

**HORIZONTAL CULTURAL INEQUALITIES,
GRIEVANCES, AND CIVIL CONFLICT:
ETHNONATIONALIST MOBILIZATION
IN REACTION TO
ASSIMILATIONIST EDUCATIONAL
LANGUAGE POLICIES**

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ABSTRACT

Studies in the literature on intrastate conflict onset have focused on opportunities and material grievances whereas non-material issues have not been given sufficient attention. The increasing importance of the ethnic dimension of intrastate conflicts since the mid-1970s suggests a growing prominence of ethnonationalist ideologies as a cause. Following constructivist and institutionalist theories on nationalism, this study argues that assimilationist policies, mainly centered around educational languages, induce the spread of minority ethnonationalism to the masses. This spread results from assimilationist policies being perceived as attacks on their dignity by the members of a discriminated minority group who, as a result, feel like second-class citizens in their ancestral home. Consequently, ethnonationalist sentiments contribute to identity construction in which the state is depicted as the enemy. Discriminatory policies and the subsequent spread of ethnonationalism facilitate mobilization by making it easier for the elites to recruit, and thus, increase the likelihood of conflict onset. Statistical analysis in the MENA region between 1946 and 2018 at the group level indicates an association between educational language policies and conflict onset. The Kurdish cases in Turkey and Iraq also lend support to this claim.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Claiming to represent the Basques, *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (the Basque National Liberation Movement, or the ETA) was founded by a student group as a movement committed to armed resistance in 1959. Positioning itself as a Marxist-Leninist group, the ETA pushed for independence for the Basques. After committing its first killings in 1968, the ETA fought the Spanish state for decades. The literature on the influence of opportunity on conflict onset does not explain this case. On the state side, Spain is an OECD country, i.e. a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, with a high-income economy. Governing a developed country, the Spanish government has had capacity throughout the borders of Spain. On the minority side, the Basques are the smallest of the four politically relevant ethnic groups with around 5 percent of the population. In other words, there is a relatively powerful state and relatively weak ethnic group in this case.

Factors that influence the opportunity of armed organizations to fight are essential in understanding conflict dynamics. As illustrated by the Basque case, however, it is not always possible to reduce the causal mechanisms down to strictly material factors that influence the capabilities of armed groups to fight. An alternative set of theories to account for conflict onset is based on grievances. Indeed, various case studies have depicted civil conflict as resulting from aggrieved groups turning violent to push for a political change (Achudume 2017; Bou Nassif 2015; Romano 2006). Yet, as the literature on conflict matured, quantitative research failed to find support for the claim that factors related to grievances lead to intrastate violence. A common argument was that rebel motivations do not play a significant role in the civil war onset because the manifestations of grievances in the forms of hate and hostility are quite common around the world, but these hostilities rarely turn into violence (Cederman,

Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 19). Instead, the argument follows, conflict is more likely to occur when rebellion is financially and militarily feasible (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). This difference between large-n studies and case studies led to a discrepancy in the literature regarding the causes of conflict onset.

The quantitative literature struggled to incorporate grievances into the study of civil conflict for around a decade. Subsequently, the notion of horizontal inequalities provided a framework that facilitates studying the independent impact of grievances (Stewart 2008). Horizontal inequalities refer to inequalities that affect individuals based on their culturally defined identity group. For example, horizontal inequalities that target an ethnic group put its members at a disadvantage and/or subject them to discrimination in comparison to the members of another group that is not targeted by such inequalities. This notion allowed us to differentiate grievances that are at the group level from those at the individual level. Whereas the former category is associated with ethnic conflict, the latter, despite its common use in ethnic conflict studies, is not. The framework of horizontal inequalities led to the creation of the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (or the EPR) at the group level which was used to explore the role of political and economic inequalities on the conflict dynamics (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). While the literature on horizontal inequalities has expanded our understanding of grievances, however, the connection of empirical studies to the central component of the logic of horizontal inequalities, identity, has been tangential. Whereas the influence of the factors that affect the opportunity of opposing sides in a conflict, such as group size, state capacity, population size, and mountainous territories, are well-established, there are still questions around whether grievances play any role on the onset of civil conflict.

Civil conflict has been the most common form of violence since World War II. Therefore, it is essential to study factors that contribute to intrastate violence. Yet until recently, the literature on civil conflict has mainly focused on the

opportunity of rebels to fight at the expense of motivational factors, and the recent attention given to the motivational factors has been insufficient. Motivational factors are understudied because of the subjective nature of their conceptualization. It is difficult to identify theoretical patterns and organize data collection efforts around them. As a result, the conceptualization of horizontal inequalities and early data collection efforts resulting from it took over a decade after the field emerged in the late 1990s. On the contrary, early empirically-oriented studies could employ opportunity-related factors in their analyses with relative ease because the data needed for studying civil conflict was either already available or its collection was, comparably, not particularly challenging. Given the difficulties surrounding studying them, however, motivational factors need to be paid more attention to carry our understanding of civil conflict forward. In addition to scientific benefits, improved knowledge on motivational factors and their influence on conflict can also inform our policies.

In this work, I attempt to incorporate identity as a facilitator for mobilization. I argue that identity plays a central role, particularly when horizontal inequalities are present because horizontal inequalities aggrieve individuals, not necessarily for being discriminated against individually, but rather, for the reality or the belief that inequalities target their coethnics, a large group of people with whom they share the same identity and feel a familial connection. Therefore, an analysis of horizontal inequalities essentially investigates the role of identity in the process of developing grievances.

The role of identity is most visible in horizontal cultural inequalities, and thus best captured by them. As a result, horizontal cultural inequalities are more prone to exploitation by ideology entrepreneurs because of the close ties such inequalities have to the culture and identity of the group. For instance, individuals who suffer from horizontal political or economic inequalities may not even notice these inequalities unless either these inequalities are politicized by ideology entrepreneurs and the ethnic members find their framing convincing, or

they lead to other forms of discriminations that are quite visible in everyday life and for which discriminated individuals are able to assign blame. The same conditions apply also to horizontal cultural inequalities. However, different from horizontal political and horizontal economic inequalities, it is nearly impossible for individuals to not notice horizontal cultural inequalities that deprive them of some of the essential aspects of their culture in their daily life. Consequently, the presence of horizontal cultural inequalities makes it easier for ideology entrepreneurs to reach and connect with the masses who are aggrieved. Put differently, because of the central role that identity plays in horizontal inequalities, how they lead to grievances and civil conflict is more explicitly observed in their cultural forms. Therefore, capturing grievances that are more directly connected to identity than to material factors would allow us to better observe the role of identity. To clarify, that claim that is made here is not that horizontal cultural inequalities are more successful than other forms of horizontal inequalities in mobilizing people. Rather than making a comparison in the effectiveness between forms, I only argue that the theoretical connection between inequalities and conflict is more directly observed in horizontal cultural inequalities, and thus, the empirical connection between the two concepts is relatively more justified.

Horizontal cultural inequalities can manifest themselves in many different forms, most of which can be categorized into two main groups: ones that target ethnolinguistic cultural features and ones that target ethnoreligious cultural features. Although various characteristics, such as language, religion, race, territory, etc., can be a basis for ethnonationalist ideologies whose aim is to transform an ethnic group into a nation, “language or religion or both together are central to most ethnic and national identifications, and they frequently serve as key emblems or symbols of such identifications” (Brubaker 2015, 5). Yet ethnolinguistic cultural features are particularly important due to the direct association between language and nationalism in forming imagined communities since the dawn of nationalism in Europe. Language is at the core of identity as

culture and traditions are preserved and transmitted from generation to generation using it as the medium. Unlike religion, issues around languages become inevitable with modernity due to the political changes that come with it.

Religion and language differ in key ways that have major implications for the political accommodation of cultural difference. Language is an inescapable medium of public as well as private life; religion is not. The state must privilege a particular language or set of languages, but it need not privilege a particular religion. The expansion of state employment, the introduction of universal schooling, and the increasingly “semantic” nature of work in an urban, mobile, and literate society have made language a crucial form of cultural capital. For all these reasons, language is chronically and pervasively politicized in the modern world, while much of religion has become privatized and depoliticized. (Brubaker 2015, 5)

When external factors, such as state policies, target the roles and the status of the language of an ethnic group, they essentially target the ethnic identity that the members of its speakers associate themselves with. As a result, attempts to modify or eradicate a language spoken by an ethnic minority by state policies aggrieves the speakers of this language.

This study focuses on educational language policies of modern states and claims that excluding a language that is widely spoken by a minority group aggrieves the members of the group for two reasons. The first reason is that educational language policies create such powerful horizontal cultural inequalities that have the power to assimilate minority populations. Receiving education in a different language that is foreign to them causes the children from a discriminated minority group to develop skills in this language throughout their education, as opposed to their native language (Hinton 2016). Consequently, the native language of the ethnic group is gradually replaced with the language of the majority as the members of the group are assimilated (May 2012, 2). Therefore,

speakers of the minority language are aggrieved by policies that target their language, and by extension, their culture, and identity. Secondly, in addition to the damage they inflict on the culture of discriminated minorities, educational language laws also create a hierarchy between ethnic groups. Public education being offered in the language of the majority group but not in the language of a minority group signals the members of the minority group that they are second-class citizens (Horowitz 1985, 219–20). Being forced to accept conditions under which they feel inferior creates resentment among the minority population against the state. As the state refuses the demands for cultural rights, ethnonationalist leaders capitalize on the resulting grievances, recruit their coethnics, and start an armed struggle against the state.

The centrality of identity to mobilization through nationalism can be observed in the Basque case. During the Franco era, the Basque population endured “harsh and unprecedented measures against all public manifestations of Basque cultural and political identity” (Woodworth 2001, 4). The Basque language, *Euskera*, was banned from public use. The ban covered most aspects of public life to the extent that parents were not allowed to use first names in *Euskera* even when christening their children. As a result, the ETA claimed that there was an ongoing cultural genocide in the Basque country (Encarnación 2008, 97). During an interview, the father of an ETA prisoner told Woodworth that they were made nationalist by Franco’s persecution (Woodworth 2001). As the nationalist ideas became sufficiently spread among the Basque, they facilitated recruitment for the ETA. The transition to a pluralistic democracy following Franco’s death in 1975 did not change much for the ETA. The Spanish government provided the Basques a local government that “promotes the indigenous culture in state and private schools and on its own television channels, exercises considerable economic power, and even controls its own police force” (Woodworth 2001, 3). However, despite gaining all these rights many minority groups around the world dream of but cannot attain, the ETA remained distrustful of the Spanish democracy

because of its refusal to allow the Basques to determine their own future by giving them the right to secede from Spain.

Despite having considerable support among the population, the ETA did not appeal to the majority of the Basques. It was not even the largest political organization representing the Basques. Instead, *Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea* (the Basque Nationalist Party, or the EAJ-PNV) has received the most votes for the Basque Parliament since the first regional election in 1980 and has defeated the political wings of the ETA in the elections. While the EAJ-PNV remained peaceful, the ETA aimed to gain public support through the use of violence. The ETA's strategy to recruit the masses for their cause can be summarized as the "spiral of action-repression-action," which operates as follows: "1) ETA carries out a provocative violent action against the political system; 2) the system responds with repression against 'the masses'; 3) the masses respond with a mixture of panic and rebellion, whereupon ETA embarks on a further action that brings the masses a step further along the road to revolution" (Woodworth 2001, 5). This strategy worked particularly well under the security-conscious authoritarian regime of Franco that responded to the ETA violence with repression. As a result, the grievances resulting from the cultural discrimination of the Basques led to the rise of a nationalist organization that used violence to achieve its political goals and brought a substantial level of public support for this organization among the Basques. In this case, the nationalist organization, the ETA, would not be satisfied with any concessions short of the right to self-determination. Once the support for the ETA was sufficiently widespread, the weakness of the organization and the strength of the state did not influence the ETA's resolve to fight. Because, after all, the government was quite powerful, but it was still not able to completely end the activities of the ETA. Moreover, the government addressing the grievances of the Basques did also not change the ETA's position on violence. Even if their opportunity to fight was low, their resolve was high. Once nationalist organizations form, they become independent actors that attempt to spread their nationalist ideas and shape public opinion. As

a result, the cultural discrimination in the Basque country led to the onset of the ETA violence and its persistence for decades.

Following this introductory chapter, I explore the theory as outlined and illustrated in the previous paragraphs in the second, third, and fourth chapters. There are various theoretical and empirical challenges raised against the theory I propose by the existing literature on different grounds. I borrow from theoretical and historical accounts from different branches of political science as I tackle these challenges, provide my counter-arguments, and construct my theory.

The connection between grievances and armed conflict is a difficult one to establish. This difficulty has been one of the main reasons for the pushback against grievance-based theories. There has been an ongoing debate on this topic ever since Gurr's (1970) foundational grievance-based theory and Snyder and Tilly's (1972) criticisms against it. Grievance-based accounts are criticized mainly on two grounds (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 19–20). First, whether grievances vary sufficiently to observe their impact on conflict is questioned given how widespread grievances are but how rarely they turn into conflict. Secondly, even if the level of grievances vary to some extent, several scholars argued that “this variation is not strongly associated with the outbreak of civil wars, because once we control for the ‘root causes’ of conflict, it becomes clear that opportunist leaders exaggerate or invent their frustrations in order to pursue other, usually selfish and materialist ends” (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 20).

These criticisms show that the literature emphasizes the difficulty of establishing a connection between an explanatory variable with conflict as a problem for grievance-based accounts. However, I view this difficulty as a general problem in the literature on intrastate violence. Let us see how explanations alternative to grievances fare in this regard. The “greed” explanation of intrastate violence, as put forth by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), does explain how self-interested leaders rise against the state to loot primary commodities. However, rationalist accounts do not offer satisfying explanations in terms of why individuals decide to join

armed movements and risk their lives. Explanations around material interests can account for certain cases in this framework where prospects for looting primary commodity attracts fighters. However, they certainly do not explain ethnic mobilization. Opportunity-based theories show how some conditions that are more favorable to rebels are more conducive to intrastate violence. Yet, even with a higher chance of sustained armed rebellion, states are still quite powerful, and thus, people still take a substantially high risk with their life when mobilizing against the state. Consequently, beyond making simple arguments, rationalist accounts have failed to offer theoretical mechanisms that justify why self-interested individuals would mobilize against states. To clarify, I do not dispute that their mechanisms have success in explaining certain types of cases. Yet, theoretically, rationalist accounts do not make compelling arguments explaining ethnic mobilization.

I argue that it is mainly ideologies rather than material interests that mobilize people around political goals. In terms of ethnic conflict, I argue that it is nationalist ideologies facilitate ethnic mobilization. In my review of theories in Chapter 2, I note that theories of nationalism adopted by rationalist studies of conflict are no longer relevant in the study of nationalism. Put differently, theories of nationalism that rely on similar assumptions for mobilization as those used in studies that emphasize the role of opportunity-related factors at the expense of grievances are largely discredited. On the contrary, the discussion on the origins of nationalism and on the constructivist and institutionalist theories of nationalism depict a more complex picture as to how nationalist ideologies have come to define the modern system of nation-states. Nationalist ideologies inspired mobilization to capture political power and to build nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nation-building projects were not only about economic development but also about producing conationals using state institutions. A modern invention, mass schooling allowed nation-states to make individuals into citizens who have an intellectual and emotional attachment to

the ethnic nation (Boser Hofmann 2016). Following the end of World War II, the nation-state emerged as the most popular form of political organization.

A major implication of the transformation from empires to nation-states for the domestic politics of states is that even “the very existence of the nation-state is the manifestation of ethnonationalism accomplished and being maintained by the majority nation” (Hennayake 1992). New arrangements within nation-states have further frustrated many of their minority groups because of the resulting discrimination they often have had to endure. The emergence of nation-states, coupled with their bureaucratic expansion, led to the colonization of the domestic periphery and imposed new restrictions on minority populations. Under the management of the majority group, the institutionalization of ethnic differences coupled with exclusionary policies make ethnicity politically salient. As a result, ethnic minorities develop their own nationalism in reaction to the nationalism and nation-building of the majority group.

In Chapter 3, I explore the theoretical connection between grievances and conflict onset. The presence of an ethnonationalist movement claiming to represent an ethnic group does not necessarily mean that the members of that group would support the movement. There need to be widespread grievances for ethnonationalist leaders to draw support from their coethnics, recruit more fighters, and pool more resources. The literature on horizontal inequalities suggests that it is these inequalities, as opposed to vertical inequalities, that generate grievances that are associated with conflict. Building on this literature, I argue that horizontal cultural inequalities have the power to create widespread grievances, more so than the other types of horizontal inequalities, for their connection to the culture and identity of the group. Once ethnic “groups are created and perceived, individuals strive for a positive sense of social identity” (Lieberman and Singh 2012). However, the demotion of a minority language to a lower status signals that the status of its speakers is also lowered. By creating cultural hierarchies, the state violates the dignity of its minority populations

(Kusý 1999). The assimilating power of educational language policies on the culture and identity of entire ethnic groups can amplify the grievances against the state. As a result, grievances resulting from horizontal cultural inequalities created by the state lead to an increasing level of support for ethnonationalist movements among minority populations and facilitate ethnic mobilization.

Even though I rely on a group-level analysis in this work, I also investigate the underlying reasons for individual motivations to mobilize around ethnonationalist goals. In this step, I turn to Taylor's (1994) work on the politics of recognition. Taylor argues that ethnonationalist movements rely on the demand for recognition by minority groups and that the recognition is a part of the identity itself because of the power its recognition has in shaping it. Consequently, he notes that nonrecognition or misrecognition is a form of oppression because it imprisons individuals into a "reduced mode of being" (Taylor 1994, 25). Taylor argues that the modern ideal of authenticity influences individuals at two levels. At the first level, it makes individuals feel the need to be true to themselves, and at the group level, it demands ethnic groups to be true to their original culture and preserve their way of being. These demands at both levels, but particularly at the second level, help explain the appeal of ethnonationalist ideas that advocates the protection of ethnic culture against threats attempting to undermine it.

After exploring the role of both majority and minority nationalism, horizontal inequalities, and individuals' support for ethnonationalist ideologies, in Chapter 4, I turn to the specific mechanism I investigate in this work: government assimilation of ethnolinguistic minorities and their reaction to it. I start by claiming that some of the consequences of modernization, such as bureaucratic expansion and industrialization, facilitated the nation-building projects of majority groups around the world by providing them new tools. In the absence of bureaucratic expansion and/or industrialization, nationalist elites often pursued them as they saw their usefulness. As noted in Chapter 2, nations are constructed

mainly by nationalist elites using institutional means. The most important component of this process is the indoctrination of the masses using public education. In Chapter 4, I illustrate the process of assimilation using the French case, which is the original case of nationalist assimilation. Using Weber's (1976) work, I note that, whereas half of the country did not speak French following the revolution, ethnolinguistic minorities were converted into French citizens who spoke French by World War I. Though there was still resistance to this conversion, the French state had certain advantages that made its eventual success easier. Lacking these advantages, nationalist elites around the world who have attempted to convert their minorities during their nation-building have not been as successful. Conditions favorable to the French state were simply not available to the states since the early twentieth century which covers the temporal range of this study. Whereas the states prefer to assimilate their minority populations, minorities resent it. Individuals who are members of a discriminated minority group turn to ethnonationalist leaders who offer them a way to resist.

In addition to the theoretical contribution on the connection I establish between horizontal cultural inequalities and conflict through ethnonationalism, I also make an empirical contribution. In Chapter 5, I offer an empirical analysis using new data on educational language policies. Collected as part of this project, the data on educational language policies offers the first large-n measurement of horizontal cultural inequalities. The large-n study using this data covers the Middle East and North Africa regions between 1946 and 2018 and offers empirical support for the theory. Even after controlling for various opportunity-related factors, such as group size, state capacity, population size, and mountainous territories, I find statistically significant evidence for the association between educational language policies and the likelihood of conflict onset. The results suggest that, all being equal, education not being offered in their language increases the likelihood that the minority group initiates an armed struggle against the state.

In addition to the primary quantitative test, this dissertation also includes supplemental qualitative case studies that use a most similar case design to process trace the influence of educational language policies on cultural grievance formation and the turn to violence. In Chapter 6, I explore the Kurdish case mainly in Turkey, but also in Iraq. I investigate the origins of Kurdish nationalism to explore the underlying factors of the conflicts between the state and organizations claiming to represent the Kurds at different stages. I, then, make comparisons with the Kurdish case in Iraq. These two cases are comparable for two reasons. First, they both involve the same ethnic group. In other words, Kurds in Turkey and Iraq largely have similar customs and traditions that may influence the decision-making of individuals. Second, both groups went through similar experiences following the collapse of the Ottomans. The movements claiming to represent both groups resisted the colonization of their respective nation-state. Kurdish ethnonationalist movements in both countries were also able to sustain a prolonged conflict during their resistance.

I show that the Kurdish nationalists, particularly those in Turkey, had an opportunity to gain independence in the early twentieth century. However, Kurdish nationalism lacked mass adoption due to a lack of state power under the control of the Kurdish elites and a lack of cultural grievances against the state. As a result, the nationalist movement failed to spread to the masses and remained an elite project. A lack of mass adoption of nationalist ideas led to divisions between the Kurdish tribes and the Kurdish nationalists eventually lost their struggle for independence despite their best attempts. The Turkish nationalists suppressed the Kurdish elites and the Kurdish nationalism entered into a period of dormancy. However, despite its fall decades earlier, Kurdish nationalism awakened in the 1960s in response to the cultural discrimination by the state. The assimilation through public education following the government's colonization of the region created resentment and injustices the Kurdish population faced in their daily lives led to the emergence of various new nationalist movements. Even then, the state refused to address the grievances of

its Kurdish citizens and insisted on preserving the policies of assimilation. Emerging as the dominant force of Kurdish nationalism since the late 1970s after a regional internal struggle, *Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or the PKK) started its armed struggle against the state in the 1980s.

The Kurdish case in Iraq also supports my theory. Having more favorable conditions to fight the state, the Kurdish groups in Iraq resisted the attempts for assimilation for decades, and violence between the state and the Kurdish groups recurred until the intervention by the United States in the 1990s. The invasion of Iraq by the United States-led coalition in 2004 ushered in a new era for the Iraqi Kurds following the regime change. The Iraqi Kurds negotiated an arrangement with the new Baghdad regime regarding their autonomy and cultural rights. Even though it was not an ideal settlement, it addressed their grievances resulting from decades of repression, and thus led to peace. In the 2010s, an external factor, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or the ISIS) invasion, provided the Kurds an opportunity for independence. Unsurprisingly, the Kurdish Regional Government (or the KRG) in Iraq pursued this opportunity and held a referendum for independence in 2017. Overwhelming support for independence led to a conflict with the Iraqi government (Sumer and Joseph 2018). This conflict occurred only because the KRG miscalculated the regime's power and resolve following its weakness against ISIS and the international reaction against their prospects for independence (Kaplan 2019). It is no surprise that the Kurds in Iraq want to expand into the bordering Kurdish provinces that are not a part of the KRG and to gain their independence. Yet, lacking grievances against the Iraqi state that did not threaten the existing rights and privileges of its Kurdish citizens and that only wanted to return to a previous status quo that was agreed upon by both sides, this minor conflict quickly ended within 5 days. This extremely short duration, which was caused by an external factor that shifted regional power dynamics, is in stark contrast with the intermittent periods of sustained conflicts over decades between the Kurds and the regime in the twentieth century. These

cases, thus, provide additional support for my claim that the profound impact of educational language policies on ethnolinguistic minorities influence mobilization of minority groups and the likelihood of conflict onset.

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

Introduction

I build on the literature that claims that grievances caused by horizontal inequalities lead to mobilization and conflict onset. I note that horizontal inequalities are connected to mobilization because of their direct ties to identity, unlike vertical inequalities that are related to material interests. In line with this reasoning, I claim that horizontal inequalities are connected to ethnic mobilization through ideologies around identity rather than material interests. This is not to say material interests are not important. My claim is rather that, even if material interests around horizontal inequalities aggrieve people, they motivate people mainly through ideologies. Let me illustrate this claim on a different form of inequalities and ideologies formed around them: class-based inequalities and communism. The exploitation of labor can cause frustrations, but these frustrations find a systematic voice only within the framework of communist ideologies that emerged following Marx's ideas. The arguments made by communist intellectuals regarding class consciousness and oppression spread among the aggrieved workers or peasants and lead to their mobilization. This example shows that even in cases of material inequalities between classes, ideologies play a central role in motivating and mobilizing individuals.

We should view inequalities between ethnic groups and resulting mobilization in a similar vein. There needs to be a framework of ideas that serve as blueprints for translating frustrations around ethnicity into ethnic grievances. Even though we take ethnic mobilization around ethnonationalist ideas as givens today, it has not always been the case. Ethnonationalist mobilization is absent during most of the history of human civilization and it emerged only with modernity because nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon as discussed in more detail in the

rest of this chapter. Therefore, when we talk about ethnic conflict in the periods of history that we cover, we essentially have this debate in a context where ethnonationalist ideas offer a blueprint for aggrieved groups. Similar to how intellectuals espousing communist ideologies have provided a framework for aggrieved workers and farmers to channel their frustrations and mobilize, nationalist intellectuals have espoused nationalist ideologies in an attempt to appeal to their coethnics and create a nation since the dawn of nationalism. For this reason, we need to incorporate ethnonationalist ideologies into our mechanisms through which certain frustrations that are associated with ethnic grievances lead to mobilization. Before moving on to horizontal inequalities, grievances, individual motivations, and the role of educational language policies in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the goal of this chapter is to achieve this task by building strong theoretical foundations around nationalism that is necessary to theorize ethnic mobilization that is used in the rest of this work.

In this chapter, I first start with a literature review of four sets of theories on nationalism. This section constitutes the main bulk of this chapter. Each set of theories is discussed to make a point regarding the existing literature on the relationship between nationalism and conflict and position this work within the broader literature. In this section, I first discuss primordialist theories of nationalism to review our earliest understanding of the subject. The discussion of these theories reveals that claims that take ethnicity as fixed were quickly outdated following the introduction of alternative theories. The main implication of this transition in the literature on nationalism is the finding that the ethnic characteristics of a group at a certain point in time do not determine its future characteristics. In other words, a measure that looks at the diversity of the population and that is commonly used in the conflict literature, the ethnic fractionalization index does not inform us regarding how ethnic groups are expected to act simply because even the groups themselves are not fixed, let alone their political leanings. Therefore, we need alternative measurements that get at how groups are expected to behave. In the second subsection, I explore

instrumentalist views on nationalism that are used in empirical conflict studies but that have been undermined by criticisms from various fronts. Instrumentalist theories fail to explain some essential questions around ethnic mobilization, such as why individuals have nationalist preferences, why these preferences are more common in modern times than in pre-modern times, and why they often act due to their nationalist preferences in a way that can be labeled as irrational. The discussion of these two sets of theories is essential because they illuminate how this work is situated in comparison to prominent opportunity-centric works on conflict and why the assumptions of these works around ethnicity and nationalism have deep flaws. In doing so, this discussion provides a theoretical depth for the assumptions made in this work on nationalism that is largely absent in the conflict literature.

In the third subsection, I turn to constructivist theories that view the nation as an imagined community and that highlights the constructed nature of national identities. This section also contributes to this work through the discussion of historical developments on the role of language and politics around language in the origins, rise, and spread of the European model of the ethnic nation. In this regard, educational language policies stand out due to their powerful influence over ethnic minorities and due to the connection between linguistic cultural features and nationalist ideologies, which is discussed in more detail in the following chapters. The discussion on historical developments also explores the European model of the nation which has been the most influential form of the ethnic nation around the world, and as a result, which is taken as the basis in this work. Finally, I consider institutionalist theories to explore the subsequent stickiness of nationalist identities following their construction. Just as constructivist theories on the fluid nature of ethnic identities challenge primordialist theories that expect fixity of ethnic identification, the resilience of nationalist identities, as put forth by the institutionalist theories, challenges the instrumentalist views that expect a fluidity based on material interests. The main implications of the institutionalist theories are that ethnic groups are

transformed by government policies and that ethnic groups act in response to government policies. These implications also suggest that ethnic tensions do not arise from inherent ethnic differences, they rather result from the influence of nationalist ideas, and in interaction with the state. By incorporating these theories along with the historical processes around nationalism, I attempt to justify my assumptions. Because failing to do so, as shown in this study, can lead to theoretical gaps I note that exist in rationalist frameworks. In line with this reasoning, second, I discuss the key concepts on nationalism that I use in this work in the following section.

Third, often referring to the discussion in Varshney (2007), I offer an evaluation on how the theories of nationalism that I cover in this work fare in explaining ethnic conflict. The goal of this section is to review the state of the literature on the connection between nationalism and ethnic conflict. I note that even those theories that are successful in accounting for the origins of nationalism and nation-building processes, i.e. constructivist and institutionalist theories, fail to account for the ethnic mobilization of minorities against the state. I argue that it is mainly because they either remain largely majority-centric, or they do not discern the intricacies that accompany the minority groups in their path to building nations of their own. Fourth, precisely for this reason, I evaluate the differences between majority and minority nationalism. This distinction is essential for this work because, just as nationalism is an anomaly, the system of nation-states is also an anomaly in our history of civilization as they are very recent developments. Earlier nationalisms that produced the majority nations often operated in a different political environment than the minorities that have pursued similar goals. Despite the relative similarity of the goals of both groups, the differences in the political settings they have had to operate under have led to different paths that they have needed to take to achieve their main political goal of building a sovereign nation. By making the distinction between majority and minority nationalism, I explore the relationship between states that represent the majority nations and ethnic minorities that pursue nationalist goals in systems

defined by the majority nations. While the distinction of minority nationalism is not new, though also not common, the connection between minority nationalism and ethnic conflict in response to state policies, to the best of my knowledge, is new. After establishing the majority-minority dichotomy in this chapter, I readdress this topic in Chapter 4 as I construct the theory and discuss the divergent paths majority and minority nationalist movements have taken during the historical progression of their interactions.

Theories of Nationalism

A relatively recent phenomenon in the political history of the world, nationalism has transformed the world since the late eighteenth century. Nationalism shook up the balance of power in Europe and pushed for the disintegration of the continental empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. After two world wars, the success of anti-colonial nationalist independence movements led to the collapse of Western colonial empires and the birth of new nation-states. Even though expansionism was curbed following World War II, which led to a decline in the number of interstate conflicts, nationalist ideas still motivated the eruption of numerous intrastate conflicts. The end of the Cold War heralded the decline of left-right politics and nationalism became the main source of conflict, most commonly, in the form of rebellions by ethnonationalist movements.

The persistence of nationalism since the early nineteenth century suggests that nationalist ideologies have a particular impact on ethnic mobilization. This connection needs to be studied when theorizing ethnic mobilization. Yet empirical works on conflict often fail to elaborate on the causal mechanisms under which nationalism contributes to war. Instead, they tend to rather make certain assumptions on the nature of nationalism without justifying them. These assumptions can be mutually exclusive. For example, one would expect completely different outcomes between nationalism working through values as opposed to rational calculations. Given how much theories on nationalism vary, making uninformed assumptions can lead to weaknesses in theories and

misguided expectations. To that end, this section offers a review of theories on nationalism to discuss them and adopt positions that are informed by their discussion. The questions below offer a guideline on what to look for when evaluating theories on nationalism:

- What is the nation? How can we define it?
- How and by whom is a national identity created?
- How does an individual become a nationalist?
- How does a nationalist ideology influence an individual who subscribes to it? In other words, how does it influence their thinking and political decision-making after a person adopts a national identity?
- How and when does this national identity become a mass identity? In other words, how do we get from a substantial portion of the members of a group having no distinct and politicized national identity to having one?

These questions inform the discussion of some of the prominent theories on nationalism in the rest of this section. I argue that none of the theories offer a satisfactory answer to all of the questions above by themselves. However, each theory offers an answer to some of the questions, and together, these answers constitute a basis for an understanding of nationalism that I adopt and refer to in the rest of the dissertation.

The academic curiosity on nationalism and investigating its origins gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s. The first systematic response to such questions came from primordialism. Early primordialist works were challenged by modernist theories which were split among several groups, such as instrumentalist, constructivist, and institutionalist theories. I discuss primordialism and these three modernist traditions in this section because of their relevance for the association between nationalism and conflict, as highlighted by Varshney (2007). Each of these four categories is discussed in their respective subsections.

Primordialism

Following World War II, many new states were founded as a result of the decolonization process. Nation-building within many of these states did not go very smoothly due to resistance from ethnic minorities that central governments were trying to assimilate into the national identity (Varshney 2007, 280). This resistance triggered a new wave of academic inquiry into nationalism.

Primordialism offered the first set of explanations for this phenomenon. Edward Shils is the first academic to use the term “primordialism” (Özkırımlı 2000, 65). Shils claims that how strongly people feel an attachment to their kin comes from blood ties. In his words: “The attachment to another member of one’s kinship group is not just a function of interaction ... because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood” (Shils 1957, 142). Shils describes this type of attachment as primordial. Primordialist approaches can be analyzed in three groups: naturalist, sociobiological, and culturalist approaches (Özkırımlı 2000, 66). In the rest of this subsection, I summarize naturalist and sociobiological approaches, I address the criticisms these approaches have received, and finally, I discuss Geertz’s account of culturalist primordialism.

The naturalist approach is, potentially, the most extreme version of primordialism. The naturalist primordialist approach claims that “one is born into a nation, in the same way, s/he is born into a family” (Özkırımlı 2000, 66). Therefore, the nation of an individual is predetermined and fixed and such division of humans into groups based on culture is part of the natural order. Naturalist primordialism is very popular among the majority of nationalists and is reflected in the works of nationalist historians and the rhetoric of nationalist elites. Nationalists who are influenced by naturalist primordialism often use themes such as the antiquity of their nation, the golden age in the past, the superiority of their national culture, the periods of recess, and the national hero who comes to awaken the nation and to end the “accidental” period of decline (Özkırımlı 2000, 66–68).

Sociobiological primordialism, on the other hand, applies the findings of sociobiology to the study of ethnic ties (Özkırımlı 2000, 70–71). Pierre van den Berghe (1978) investigates why animals are social creatures and why they cooperate. He argues that it is mutually beneficial cooperation that makes animals social. Animals reproduce with other animals that share a specific portion of genes. Genetic relation, in other words, kin selection enhances cooperative behavior between them. In his view, such behavior can be also observed in humans. Kinship is sufficient to produce powerful sentiments such as nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrism. He argues, however, that how humans determine their kin is less about physical attributes and more about cultural criteria of a group membership. Because neighboring populations tend to have similar genetic composition and their physical attributes are relatively similar to each other. Cultural differences such as religion, language, accent, body adornment, etc., however, are features that are easier to identify (Berghe 1978, 402–7).

Özkırımlı (2000) highlights several criticisms raised against basic assumptions of the naturalist and sociobiologist primordialist approaches. The criticisms that are relevant for this study are as follows. First, primordialist assertions on the nature of ethnic and national ties are challenged. The “givenness” of ethnic and national ties by nature suggests that these ties are fixed and they transmit between generations without any changes in their essential characteristics. However, Özkırımlı notes that a growing number of studies highlight the role that individuals play in ethnic identity construction by their choices, efforts, and investments. Observable changes in the content and boundaries of ethnic identities and redefinition and reconstruction of these identities in each generation suggest that ethnic identities are fluid, not fixed (Özkırımlı 2000, 74–75). Brass (1991) points out cases that show people can adopt different identities than the ones they are born into. Many people change the language they speak or their religious practices. Such changes can also be observed across ethnic groups (Brass 1991, 69–71).

Secondly, primordialist assertions about the origins of ethnic and national ties are questioned. Primordialists posit that “ethnic and national attachments are ‘underived’, hence prior to all social interaction. This automatically creates a mystical aura around them: primordial sentiments are ineffable, that is ‘incapable of being expressed in words’, thus unanalyzable” (Özkırımlı 2000, 77). Even though many modern nations have derived from a pre-modern ethnic group, however, what the ethnic identity and ethnic culture meant for the members of the group who lived before the emergence of nationalism and the members who lived after nationalism took hold are very different. Before nationalism, there is often little to no ethnic self-consciousness. Nationalism reconstructs identities in a way that selectively chooses certain aspects of the history and culture of an ethnic group and gives them new meanings. Another reason that the transformation from an ethnic group to a nation does not happen naturally is that this transformation is not a given, to begin with. For each ethnic group that developed a successful nationalist movement, there are many ethnic groups with unsuccessful nationalist movements, or with no nationalist movements whatsoever (Özkırımlı 2000, 77–79). In other words, after recognizing a distinct primordial group, it is not possible to predict its future development into a nation (Brass 1991, 72). This possibility rules out the existence of underived natural attachments that exist prior to social interaction.

Finally, primordialist assertions about emotions and affect are disputed. Primordialists highlight their importance by using words such as attachment, bond, tie, and sentiment which, they argue, makes primordial identities different than other identity types, such as class-based identities. While the importance of emotions in social life cannot be ignored, the primordialist mystification of emotions removes the social elements from them. Primordialists claim that emotional ties are not formed as a result of social interaction between ethnic members, but rather, they are already present, implicit in the ethnic relationship. Eller and Coughlan, however, find this claim to be a fallacy and argue that it is the

rituals that induce (religious or ethnic) sentiments in people (Eller and Coughlan 1993, 187–92; Özkırımlı 2000, 79–80).

After addressing the criticisms raised against the naturalist and sociobiological approaches, let us now turn our attention to cultural primordialism. The following paragraph lays out the cultural primordialist views of Geertz (1973):

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens"-or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens"-of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural-some would say spiritual-affinity than from social interaction. (Geertz 1973, 259–60)

The criticisms on the naturalist and sociobiological approaches have also been, according to Tilley (1997) unfairly, raised against Geertz. In Geertz's views, it is not that the givens of social existence are primordial, but that attachments that bind people with their kin are the assumed givens of social existence; these attachments are primordial, deep-rooted, and arguably inescapable to the

individuals who constitute the ethnic group (Kataria 2018). That is to say, Geertz does not claim that the givens of social existence are primordial, yet people who have attachments to their kin believe that they are. This assertion differentiates cultural primordialism from the other two approaches. Tilley (1997) argues that, because of this difference, Geertz's theory can also be categorized as a constructivist one given that attachments being primordial is a constructed belief in his account.

Instrumentalism

Popular in the quantitative literature on intrastate conflict, instrumentalist approaches explore the influence of the pursuit of rational interests on nationalist movements. Instrumentalism suggests that there are no primordial bonds that can be considered the givens of social existence. Brass (1991), a prominent instrumentalist, finds the primordialist definitions of ethnicity based on a common origin very flawed. He notes that there are very few groups in the world today that can make such a claim. For him, having a common descent is not what makes an ethnic group adopt a nationalist ideology, but rather, it is the belief in a common descent by the group members. Accordingly, he admits that the beliefs of ethnic group members play an important function to achieve group cohesion. He also acknowledges the emotional significance of the attachments that are developed in childhood or youth and that persist through life. He notes, however, that "it is difficult ... to travel much further than this with the primordialists" (Brass 1991, 70). In stark opposition to primordialism, instrumentalist theories view ethnic identities as instruments that are associated with interests.

Countering primordialist claims, Brass argues that identity-based attachments can change and he offers various observable examples of such changes. Many rural illiterate people do not even know the name of the language they speak, let alone developing emotional attachment to it. It is not unusual to see people adopting a different language than their own mother tongue and even educating their children in this new language. In multilingual developing societies, many

people speak multiple languages. Such changes are not restricted to language, religion is also subject to change. It is not unusual to see changes in one's religious beliefs or practices. Such changes may also influence entire religious communities and "shifts in religious practices brought about under the influence of religious reformers are common occurrences in premodern, modernizing, and even in postindustrial societies. Sometimes such shifts are clearly designed to promote internal solidarity and external differentiation from other groups" (Brass 1991, 71).

In the rest of this subsection, I explore two prominent traditions within instrumentalism. First, I discuss the individualist school and bring up some of the criticisms raised against it. Next, I discuss elite-based accounts of instrumentalism, mainly of Brass (1991), and the challenges against this school.

The individualist school is often known as rational choice and is a prominent tradition within instrumentalism. According to this school, an individual is motivated by self-interest and utility maximization (Leoussi 2001, 151). In fact, "one of the major claims of rational choice theory is that the peculiarities of racial and ethnic relations can be accounted for by the adaptation and application of general social science theories; they do not call for some special theory developed with only them in mind" (Banton 1995, 495). Employing a rational choice model, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) investigate the causes of civil war in a large-n study. Their framing pits greed-based explanations against grievance-based explanations. "They model rebellion as an industry in which looting generated profits" and they test both sets of theories using proxies for each of them (Varshney 2007, 284). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) claim that leaders of a rebel group avoid ethnic and religious divisions when recruiting fighters. They do it to increase the cohesiveness of the fighting force which is important for its success. This increased cohesiveness, however, comes at a cost, as they have to work with a more limited pool to recruit from. On the other hand, poor societies do not offer many economic opportunities, and thus, poverty works in rebel leaders' favor.

When a lower cost of recruitment is accompanied by the availability of finance in the form of a share from the loot, the likelihood of conflict onset increases. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that their findings contrast with the idea that grievances play a role in conflict onset. In other words, they propose that it is the greed for looting primary commodities, not grievances, that drives rebel leaders to initiate conflict.

Leoussi (2001) recognizes the ingenuity of various rational choice accounts, however, she asserts that they suffer from several recognized difficulties. First, she suggests that rational choice may be able to explain individual nationalist conduct given that individuals have nationalist preferences. However, it cannot explain successfully why they have nationalist preferences in the first place. By extension, it fails to explain why nationalist preferences are much more common among people in modern times than in pre-modern agrarian times. Second, she finds the reduction of identity to interests problematic. Rational choice theorists claim that adopting an ethnic identity is a choice that must be influenced by interests such as access to job opportunities, pensions, or welfare benefits. She claims that historical experience should teach us that identities are not influenced very much by incentives and that the overt responsiveness of people to incentives differs by culture (Leoussi 2001, 151–52).

Third, she finds rational choice theorists pseudo-empirical and argues that they tend to “provide rational accounts of why so-called ‘choices’ might have been rational. Yet they very rarely probe deeply to see whether other accounts of the phenomena they seek to explain might be better” (Leoussi 2001, 152). Indeed, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do set up models that test for grievances as alternative explanations measured by inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, and religious fractionalization. While the inclusion of these variables may seem to cover various types of grievances, none of them adequately address identity-related concerns that can fuel grievances. While admitting that hatred cannot be quantified, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) still use ethnic

polarization and religious fractionalization as proxies for hatred. They also include ethnic dominance to account for minority grievances. Indeed, ethnonationalist or ethnoreligious conflicts between different groups cannot occur in homogenous societies. Yet, diversity in a society, by itself, is not a cause of conflict. Simply put, their models do not test for ethnic grievances. Considering all these issues, Leoussi argues that, perhaps the most important contribution of the rational choice tradition is “to show the limits of rationality and choice when it comes to the examination of nationalism” (2001, 152).

Elite-based explanations make up another prominent school in instrumentalism. According to elite theorists, ethnic and national identities are tools used by competing elite groups to manipulate and mobilize the masses for political or economic gains (Bates 1974; Leoussi 2001, 149; Özkırımlı 2000, 109). Brass argues that when there is a disadvantaged ethnic group, the elites claiming to represent the group will compete with the elites who are in power for economic and political opportunities (Brass 1991, 46). If the elites in power do not compromise with the new elites of the disadvantaged group, then dissatisfied members of this group are expected to turn to nationalism. Various factors can facilitate the success of a nationalist movement. However, a couple of factors that may inhibit the success of a movement, according to Brass, are of note here. Brass argues that a potential nationalist movement may fade if the elites in power satisfy the immediate demands of the new elite from the disadvantaged group. According to Brass, not only the elites who claim to represent them, but the members of their ethnic group also act based on their own interests. Ethnic members consider whether their economic needs are satisfied within the existing system or not. If, for example, rural peasants from the ethnic group find that their leaders can be elected to positions of power, and as a result, agricultural policies can be influenced to their benefit, they will be satisfied with the system and ignore “the appeals of their urban intelligentsia for the protection of their language and culture” (Brass 1991, 47).

Another important part of the puzzle is how an ethnic group adopts a nationalist ideology and transforms into a nation. Brass (1991) discusses the requirements for the process of ethnic transformation in which an ethnic group gains ethnic self-consciousness and their ethnonational identity gains political significance. He claims that ethnic differences that separate groups and elite competition are necessary factors for the transformation of an ethnic group. However, he notes that neither of these factors is sufficient (Brass 1991, 63).

The sufficient conditions for successful communal mobilization are the existence of the means to communicate the selected symbols of identity to other social classes within the ethnic group, the existence of a socially mobilized population to whom the symbols may be communicated, and the absence of intense class cleavage or other difficulties in communication between elites and other social groups and classes. The means necessary to promote such interclass communication are growth in literacy rates, the development of media of mass communication, particularly newspapers, the standardization of the local language, the existence of texts and other books in the local language, and the availability of schools or classes in which the native language and culture can be taught. (Brass 1991, 63–64)

Varshney (2007) raises several criticisms against the elite-based accounts. First, he argues that elite-based accounts do not adequately explain why leaders in multiethnic often societies find ethnicity and not class or other factors as the means to power and for resource extraction from the state. Brass's discussion of ethnic transformation does mention the relevance of ethnic symbols and cultural markers, but it is unclear how they are relevant. He often cites the significance of economic interests, which may be more about the factors that relate to class than the ones that relate to ethnicity. Second, if we assume that elites, indeed, act in a self-interested manner and use ethnic symbols to mobilize ethnicity, elite-based accounts are not satisfactory in accounting for why masses should follow them. If we assume that the masses are manipulated by the leadership, then it is only the

elites who use ethnic identity instrumentally and not the masses. In this case, there needs to be more inquiry into what motivates the masses to follow the elites, and further, why the ethnonationalist appeals work on the masses (Varshney 2007, 282). Brass (1991) does briefly address the importance of emotional attachments, but he does not sufficiently elaborate.

Additional issues emerge if we assume the masses also use ethnicity instrumentally. First, if we assume that both elites and masses act based on their interests, then we expect ethnic mobilization to be curtailed by free-rider problems (Varshney 2007, 282). It may be rational to join a movement when it is not far from being successful. If, however, there is no success in sight, instrumentally rational individuals may expect that the odds of failure are not low and decide to not dedicate their resources to the movement. Therefore, it is reasonable to question, from an instrumental standpoint, whether ethnic mobilization can take place at all, given that the odds of success would often be very low at the beginning. Furthermore, if ex-ante odds of the mobilization in prompting violence against the group are high, then it is unreasonable for instrumentally rational individuals to participate in a rebellion and risk facing punitive action that may cause injury or even death. Second, Leoussi (2001) adds that both elites and masses may be motivated by interests, but they are still constrained by their ethnic identities. It is difficult for individuals to redevelop a new linguistic or cultural identity even if it is in their interests to do so. Third, the instrumentalist discounting of the role of ideas and doctrines independently of interests is not warranted. People decide what is right based on the ideas and doctrines that influence them, without which, they may not be able to identify what their interests are (Leoussi 2001, 150–51).

An entirely instrumental framing to explain ethnic preferences seems questionable; thus it may be necessary to incorporate psychological or cultural explanations (Varshney 2007, 283). This is not to say that instrumental approaches do not have their uses. In fact, instrumentalism is quite useful when

interpreting the actions of the elites. However, given the theoretical issues associated with instrumental approaches, scholars need to be careful about how to incorporate instrumental claims into their work.

Constructivism

Similar to other modernist theories on nationalism, the claim that identities are constructed came in reaction to primordialism. Benedict Anderson's constructivist theory argues that nations are neither natural nor primordial, they did not exist before modernity and were constructed only in modern times. Anderson's theory on nationalism as a social construct shook the foundations of primordialism and became "the conventional wisdom in the field of ethnicity and nationalism" (Varshney 2007, 285). Before discussing the constructed nature of identities, it is important to highlight the nature of identities before modernity.

Before modernity, "most human interactions were on a small scale. Only ecclesiastical and dynastic communities spread beyond the local and the regional. The implication was that religious or dynastic animosities could be said to be pre-modern, even primordial, but ethnic animosities had local or regional protocols. By bringing far-flung people into the frame of human consciousness, it is modernity that changed the meaning of ethnicity and also led to nationhood" (Varshney 2007, 281). Various ethnic groups, such as Turks, Han Chinese, or Scots existed before modernity, however, ethnic identities were largely restricted to their local communities. Ethnic communities that we consider today to be a part of the same group were not connected in a similar manner. The only identity types that managed to break the geographical barrier were religious and dynastic identities. As these types of identities declined in the eighteenth century, nationalism was on the rise. Modernity transformed ethnic identities by expanding them from separate local ethnic communities to larger and more consolidated ethnic groups that exhibit similar characteristics (Varshney 2007, 285). These ethnic groups constituted the new nations. Anderson (2006) offers the following definition for the nation:

(I)t is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.

It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.

The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them . . . has finite . . . boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind.

It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. . . (N)ations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.

Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. (Anderson 2006, 6–7)

Anderson clarifies what he means by “imagined” community by contrasting his views with Gellner’s. Gellner claims that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner 1964, 168). Anderson questions the usefulness of this formulation because it leads Gellner to depict nationalism as “fabrication” and “falsity” rather than “imagining” and “creation.” Anderson claims that “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” (2006, 6). According to Anderson, communities do not differ by their degree of falsity or genuineness, but by in what way they are imagined.

Anderson offers an extensive historical account of the development of national identities around the world. He claims that the origins of national consciousness are found in Europe. According to Anderson, print capitalism played a significant role in the construction of national identities. Book publishers were some of the earliest capitalist enterprises. Accompanied by a period of prosperity in Europe between 1500 and 1550, publishers set up branches across the continent and the publishing business boomed in its early years. At this point, the first market for the publishers was the literate Europe which comprised of a small stratum of Latin-readers who were spread across the continent. This elite market saturated in around a hundred and fifty years, at which point, the publishers were forced to publish cheap editions in the vernaculars to reach the masses so that they can continue profiting (Anderson 2006, 36–38).

Anderson argues that there were additional factors that further supported the revolutionary vernacularizing force of print capitalism. One of these factors was the Reformation. Within 15 days of Martin Luther nailing his theses to a chapel door in 1517, their German translations were spread across the country thanks to the printing press. The number of books published in German between 1520 and 1540 was three times the number between 1500 and 1520. Luther's works represented at least one-third of all books sold in German between 1518 and 1525, which made him the first best-selling author who reached a mass audience. As a result, following the contributions of the printing press to the Reformation, the Reformation contributed to the rise of vernaculars against Latin (Anderson 2006, 38–39). Another influential factor, according to Anderson, was the spread of vernaculars' use as administrative languages. This development predated both the printing press and the Reformation, and therefore, was independent of them. The adoption of vernaculars was "a gradual, unselfconscious, pragmatic, not to say haphazard development" (Anderson 2006, 42). The elevation of the status of vernaculars to languages-of-power to replace Latin contributed to the decline of the imagined community of Christendom (Anderson 2006, 40–42).

In Anderson's words, "what, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity" (Anderson 2006, 42–43). The diversity of spoken languages was so immense before the printing press that establishing a market for each potential oral vernacular would leave publishers with small markets with little profits. However, "these varied idiolects were capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages far fewer in number" (Anderson 2006, 43). Print capitalism played a critical role in this process. Indeed, "nothing served to 'assemble' related vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars and syntaxes, created mechanically reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through the market" (Anderson 2006, 44).

Anderson proposes that print languages laid the foundations of national consciousness in three ways. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, print languages gradually created unified languages. Before print languages, speakers of various spoken vernaculars, such as Englishes, Frenches, or Germans, would have difficulties understanding each other. Print languages made it possible for the speakers of different vernaculars to comprehend each other via printed material. The speakers of each language, gradually, became aware of millions of other fellow readers who belonged to their particular language field and who formed the embryo of the nationally imagined community. Secondly, print languages gradually stabilized in around three centuries as European languages assumed their modern forms by the seventeenth century. This new fixity made the texts from the seventeenth century accessible to the contemporary speakers of European languages in a way that the texts from the fifteenth century are not. As a result, the fixity in languages, in the long run, made it possible to build the image of antiquity that is central to the subjective idea of the nation. Third, languages of power, created by print capitalism, were different from administrative vernaculars of the past. Standardized print languages were closer

to certain dialects than others. The speakers of the dialects that were unsuccessful to insist on their own print form were disadvantaged in this process. For instance, “'Northwestern German' became Platt Deutsch, a largely spoken, thus sub-standard German, because it was assimilable to print German in a way that Bohemian spoken-Czech was not” (Anderson 2006, 45). As a result, dialects such as High German and King’s English were elevated to a higher politico-cultural status (Anderson 2006, 44–45).

Even though Anderson finds the origins of national consciousness in Europe through the creation of language-based imagined communities, he notes different mechanisms through which national consciousness developed. He first looks at the development of national consciousness in Latin America between 1760-1830 which he argues took place well before most of Europe. He finds the development of national consciousness in the new American states of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century particularly interesting due to two reasons. First, the language was not an issue in these cases. All of the American states, including the US, were creole states. These states were founded by people who shared a common language and common descent with those they fought against for independence. Second, the roles that social classes played in the nationalist movements in the Western hemisphere were different from the European cases. Following Nairn’s thesis, nationalist movements tend to be populist movements where intellectual leadership tries to channel popular class energies of the middle-class into support for new states. However, the middle classes in South and Central America were insignificant around the time that Latin American states gained their independence. Instead, the independence movements were led by substantial landowners who allied a small number of bourgeoisie and professionals in the colonies in fields such as law, military, and functionary (Anderson 2006, 47–50).

Given these two interesting developments, Anderson seeks to explain why “such colonial provinces, usually containing large, oppressed, non-Spanish-speaking

populations, produce creoles who consciously redefined these populations as fellow-nationals” (Anderson 2006, 50). He starts by pointing out that South American republics were previously administrative units under their imperial overlords. These units were originally shaped somewhat arbitrarily, but geographic, political, and economic factors influenced their eventual development into separate units. Difficulties in communication and traveling during pre-industrial times allowed these units to develop unique characters. Madrid’s ban of trading between administrative units further contributed to these units turning into separate economic zones (Anderson 2006, 52–53). He argues that “to see how administrative units could, over time, come to be conceived as fatherlands, not merely in the Americas but in other parts of the world, one has to look at the ways in which administrative organizations create meaning” (Anderson 2006, 53). Anderson argues that, in Spanish America, this process is precipitated by travels, “administrative pilgrimages,” of creole functionaries during which met their colleagues, “fellow pilgrims,” from other areas within their administrative unit. During their travels, they ask themselves: “Why are we ... here ... together?” (Özkırımlı 2000, 149).

Anderson uses Turner’s assertions on the function that religious pilgrimages serve in unifying people from diverse ethnicities who have a common religion to illustrate the function of “administrative pilgrimages” in Latin America (Anderson 2006, 53–54). During a pilgrimage in sacred places, such as Mecca, diverse groups of people stay together, such as Malays, Persians, Indians, Berbers, and Turks. The Berber who encounters the Malay at the Kaaba must ask themselves: “Why is this man doing what I am doing, uttering the same words that I am uttering, even though we can not talk to one another?”; the answer is clear: “Because we . . . are Muslims” (Anderson 2006, 54). Similarly, creoles in Spanish America found traveling-companions in their fellow bureaucrats during their travels, developed a consciousness of connectedness, and as a result, developed a distinct collective identity. The development of collective identity was further facilitated by sharing a single language of the state and the

restrictions on both vertical and horizontal movements of the creole functionaries. Vertically, it was nearly impossible for the creoles to serve in Spain. Horizontally, creoles from a certain administrative unit typically served only in the same unit (Anderson 2006, 56–57).

The arrival of print-capitalism in the Americas had a major influence on the territorial stretch of the imagined communities as nations. While the printing press did exist, “printing did not really develop in [North] America during the eighteenth century until printers discovered a new source of income - the newspaper” (Febvre and Martin 1976, 211 as cited in Anderson 2006, 61). Providing a tool for communication and informing about community intellectual life, printer-journalism was originally a North American phenomenon. The topics covered in first American newspapers were about the colonial administration and the market system, such as timetables for commercial ships’ arrival and departure, colonial political appointments, and marriages in the upper class. Although more slowly and intermittently, printer-journalism developed also in Spanish America in the second half of the eighteenth century as local presses were born. Readers of the newspapers in metropolises such as Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and Bogota were aware of the existence of other metropolises, but they did not read the newspapers from other metropolises. Even when they read about the other metropolises months later due to the distance, it would still be through their local newspapers. As a result, a newspaper published in a metropole created an imagined community among its fellow readers who cared about the content of these newspapers that was centered around their own administrative unit (Anderson 2006, 62–63).

Compared to Spanish America, English-speaking creoles in North America were better situated for creating a unified identity. The geographic size of the thirteen colonies was smaller than Venezuela and was one-third of Argentina. Their metropolises in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were quite accessible to each other. Newspapers and commerce connected different colonies. English-speaking

North America was not entirely united, however, as Canada remained under the British administration and the United States experienced a civil war nearly a century after the Declaration of Independence. Yet an imagined community of the United States was created in the original colonies, and following the independence, it expanded to the West. This expansion may not have been possible if there was a sizeable English-speaking community in the eighteenth century in the territories that were separate from the original colonies, such as in California. Nevertheless, the influence of political, economic, and geographic factors facilitated an imagined community of the United States whereas there were obstacles that prevented the imagining of a community of a unified Spanish America. Various political, economic, and geographic factors in Spanish America favored localism instead of Spanish-American nationalism (Anderson 2006, 63–64).

After discussing American nationalisms between 1760-1830, Anderson turns to European nationalisms between 1820-1920. Unlike American nationalisms, national print languages “were of central ideological and political importance” in European nationalisms (Anderson 2006, 67). In fact, “the nineteenth century was, in Europe and its immediate peripheries, a golden age of vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, and litterateurs” (Anderson 2006, 71). Linguistic studies in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to growing realizations about languages. Studies in Semitics, for example, challenged the divine status of Hebrew. As a result of scientific inquiries into languages, old sacred languages - Latin, Greek, and Hebrew – were demoted to the status of their new vernacular rivals. Sharing an equal status, languages did not belong to God, instead, they belonged to their native speakers and readers (Anderson 2006, 70–71).

Anderson argues that intellectual activities in linguistic studies were central to the nineteenth-century nationalist movements in Europe and offers several cases in support of this thesis. His discussion of the Greek case highlights the impact of

linguistic studies on the emergence of Greek nationalism. Philological and lexicographic studies on ancient Greek and on the entire extant corpus of the Greek classics by German, French, and English scholars recreated ancient Hellenic civilization. This ancient past became more accessible to a small number of young Greek-speaking intellectuals who studied outside of the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth century. “Exalted by the philhellenism at the centres of Western European civilization,” these young Greek-speaking intellectuals “undertook the 'debarbarizing' of the modern Greeks, i.e., their transformation into beings worthy of Pericles and Socrates” (Anderson 2006, 72). Anderson cites an address by Adamantios Koraes to an audience in Paris in 1803: “For the first time the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and trembles in measuring with the eye the distance separating it from its ancestors' glory. This painful discovery, however, does not precipitate the Greeks into despair: We are the descendants of Greeks, they implicitly told themselves, we must either try to become again worthy of this name, or we must not bear it” (Kedourie 1970, 43-44 as quoted in Anderson 2006, 72). Similarly, Anderson finds support for his claims about the role of linguistic studies on nationalism across various cases, such as Romanian, Russian, Czech, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Finnish, Norwegian, Afrikaner, Arabic, and Turkish cases. New grammar books and dictionaries facilitated developments of literature in vernaculars. Books written on the history of a prospective nation in newly standardizing languages laid the foundations of language-based imagined communities (Anderson 2006, 72–75).

Despite its strengths and widespread appeal, Anderson’s theory also faces several criticisms, some of which relating to this study are as follows. First, Anderson’s theory is claimed to be culturally reductionist. According to this criticism, Anderson underestimates the importance of the political dimension of nationalism and exaggerates the importance of the cultural dimension in nineteenth-century Europe. Breuilly states that Anderson’s plausible claims for eighteenth-century America falter in Europe as Anderson fails to address the

influence of political aspects. In America, Anderson's assertions are more successful because he addresses the political dimension by incorporating the role of colonial administrative units in his theory. Breuilly claims that the cultural dimension can explain why certain groups of people may be inclined to imagine themselves as a nation and act based on this assumption. He argues, however, that it does not explain why the elites or the masses should take nationalist arguments seriously. Breuilly thinks that examination of the links between the modern state and nationalism may address this issue. Second, Kellas notes that Anderson's claim of nationalism replacing religion does not seem to hold in certain cases, such as Ireland, Poland, Armenia, Israel, and Iran. In these countries, religious institutions have rather reinforced nationalism. Third, Anderson's claim that nationalist independence movements in America being the earliest examples came under attack. Other scholars identified the earliest examples of nationalism in England, France, and Germany. Even though Anderson finds these claims Eurocentric, Hastings suggests that Anderson's counterarguments are not convincing. While asserting that the origins of national consciousness go back to print capitalism in Europe in the sixteenth century, Anderson does not explain why the developments following the printing press do not constitute nationalism (Özkırımlı 2000, 152–54).

Institutionalism

Constructivism does make compelling arguments, yet, it is difficult to explain the stickiness of ethnic/national identities based entirely on the framework of imagined communities. At this point, institutionalism comes to aid. Along with constructivism, institutionalist explanations have also held a central position in theories of ethnicity and nationalism, as well as of ethnic conflict, in contemporary literature (Varshney 2007, 289). The theories on constructivism focus on the formation of ethnic identities and their constructed nature, whereas the theories institutionalism investigate the stickiness of ethnic identities as a consequence of their institutionalization. A notable institutionalist, Gellner

defines nationalism as a political principle that argues for the political and the national unit to be in harmony. He argues that this principle is a fundamental feature of the modern world. In pre-modern times, the borders of city-states, feudal states, or dynastic empires rarely matched the borders of ethnic groups. Furthermore, the ethnic identity of the rulers was often not even relevant for the subjects (Özkırımlı 2000, 129–30).

Gellner differentiates between agro-literate societies and industrial societies to explain why nationalism started to become a necessity only in the modern world. Gellner argues that agro-literate societies consist of a complex system of ascriptive and stable statuses. The status of an individual in a society is the main determinant for the rights and privileges of that individual. As a result, power and culture are separated. The ruling class of warriors, priests, clerics, administrators, and burghers uses culture to separate themselves from the agricultural workers who consist of the majority of the society. This creates a discrepancy between a high culture of the elites and a low culture of the masses. Additionally, context-free communication between literate elites separates the elites from the subjects who use contextual communication in which meanings depend on local dialectical idiosyncrasies. In these societies, the ruling class benefits from cultural diversity because it helps the elites preserve their higher status. As a result, the elites avoid imposing cultural homogeneity on their subjects. Gellner suggests that a lack of cultural homogenization in agro-literate societies means that nations cannot exist in this type of society (Özkırımlı 2000, 130).

Gellner claims that the relationship between power and culture follows a different trend in industrial societies. In industrial societies, a shared high culture encompasses a society in its entirety. Unlike in agro-literate societies, social status is not ascriptive in industrial societies. This difference has two implications for the social order. First, the ease of communication becomes more desired, and thus, industrial societies attempt to eliminate contextual communication. In

doing so, industrial societies prefer attaining context-free communication and cultural standardization. Second, social mobility becomes a necessity in industrial societies because they rely on constant economic growth which cannot be achieved in a society with ascribed social roles. Industrial labor requires a higher level of technical skills than agricultural labor which means that recruitment needs to be meritocratic, instead (Özkırmılı 2000, 131–32).

In relation to social mobility and the need for meritocracy, the education systems of agro-literate and industrial societies are also quite different. While people are raised entirely at home in agro-literate societies, industrial societies have a structured education system that starts at an early age in nursery schools. Literacy is not limited to the elites; it is open to everyone. The education of an individual has a substantial influence on their employability, dignity, and self-respect. Education serves another important function by conferring identity on individuals. As a result, a modern person's loyalty is to a culture, as opposed to pre-modern loyalties such as to a monarch, or land, or a faith. Protecting the culture and setting up an educational infrastructure that is large and expensive becomes a necessity for industrial societies. These complex and expensive tasks can only be served by the state. In other words, the needs of an industrial society link state and culture together. Gellner uses an analogy on plants to illustrate the influence of modern states on cultures. He argues that most cultures are not influenced by nationalism and they remain as “wild” cultures. They are produced and reproduced spontaneously without being designed by an authority. On the other hand, modernized cultures are “garden” cultures that are sustained by literacy and specialized personnel (Özkırmılı 2000, 132–33). Based on his analysis of different societies, Gellner claims that “nationalism is a product of industrial social organization” (Özkırmılı 2000, 132).

Özkırmılı highlights several criticisms raised against Gellner's foundational account of nationalism, some of which I now turn to. First, functionalism in Gellner's theory has been subject to various criticisms. Gellner establishes causal

relationships based on functionalist reasoning. Functionalism, however, is particularly difficult to invoke when explaining nationalism because nationalism is claimed to serve several incompatible functions by different theorists. According to Minogue, Gellner's approach is patronizing in the sense that he claims people are doing something different from what they believe they are doing. Whereas nationalists may believe that they are doing what they are doing to liberate their nation, as an outside observer, Gellner knows that what they are doing, as a result, is going to facilitate transforming their society into an industrial one. Gellner, then, asserts that his explanation is the cause of the events, even though this causation may not have played a role in the reasoning of the actors. This approach, therefore, ignores the agency of the actors that play a role in the process. Gellner's functionalist explanation of the emergence of mass education based on a standardized educational system suffers from similar issues. Gellner claims that education systems are built for the function it was expected to play. Breuilly, however, asserts that this reasoning can be used as an explanation only by showing a deliberate intention by the actors to achieve the specified outcome. The education system may indeed have functioned that way, but that does not mean it is why it was developed in the first place (Özkırımlı 2000, 137–38).

Second, a common criticism against Gellner's theory is directed at his claims over the relationship between industrialization and nationalism. Numerous cases show that nationalism is not necessarily a product of the industrial social organization, because many nationalist movements emerged in societies before their industrialization. Smith, a prominent ethno-symbolist, argues that the origins of national sentiments go back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in several European states such as France, England, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. While there may be contention over Western European cases, the nationalist movements in the Balkans under the Ottoman rule offer a more clear set of cases where nationalist ideologies took hold before industrialization. Breuilly claims that, national sentiments do not require an industrial society to

spread to the masses, and that there are other means through which a national culture can diffuse, such as commercial agriculture, mass education, and modern systems of communication. For instance, Gandhi's nationalism in India was positioned against industrialism, while the Soviet regime was hostile to nationalism despite pursuing an industrialization campaign. Although the rise and spread of nationalist ideologies may have gained momentum following the industrial revolution in many cases, historical evidence does not give us a clear answer. Whereas nationalism was already present before industrialization in many states, industrialization did not trigger nationalism in others and nationalist movements emerged long after the industrialization (Özkırımlı 2000, 139–40).

Third, Gellner's model is criticized for not being able to explain the passions that nationalism generates. On the one hand, some scholars admit the difficulty of theorizing the spell of nationalism. On the other hand, others, such as Gellner, theorized nationalism without mentioning the spell. His theory on the political motivations that generate nationalism is accused of cultural and material reductionism and fails to do justice to how powerful force identity can be. In line with the third set of criticisms, a prominent ethnosymbolist, Smith asks why people would identify so strongly with a high culture invented by elites to the extent that they are willing to sacrifice their lives for it, as millions have done for their nations. Gellner's response to this criticism is that it is the mass education system that shapes people's identity, and as a result, generates the emotions that make it possible for them to make such big sacrifices. Smith does not find this answer satisfactory given that the early nationalists who construct the nation cannot be products of the mass education system of a nation that does not exist. Instead, Smith calls for the incorporation of the elements from pre-existing ethnic cultures, such as myths, symbols, and traditions, that have been incorporated into the infant national cultures (Özkırımlı 2000, 141).

As a general criticism against modernist theories, ethno-symbolists argue that modernist theories cannot account for the importance of pre-modern ethnic attachments. Modernist theories see nationalist appeals as manipulations of the masses by using an invented past. However, ethno-symbolists argue that such claims underestimate the importance of ethnic ties and that the modernist notion of “invented traditions” should be viewed as “reconstruction” or “rediscovery” of certain aspects of the ethnic past. There may indeed be different ways to interpret the past. However, elites are still constricted to certain events from the past of a particular community in their reconstructions of this past. The masses will only accept it if it is convincingly shown to be a part of their past. It is not of a primary concern whether nationalist ideas are genuine or artificial in their creation, it is rather about whether or not they work; they successfully mobilize people and make them willingly fight and die for their nation (Özkırımlı 2000, 122–23).

As Smith notes, Gellner’s account of the importance of mass education in spreading nationalism does not account for early nationalists who construct the nation. Therefore it cannot account for the origins of national consciousness. Yet the impact of state institutions and mass education is still a major contribution that helps us make sense of the spread of nationalism to the masses. Darden’s contributions on this particular topic are essential.

Darden studies the impact of mass schooling in his quest to explain the stickiness of national identities and why individuals voluntarily make extreme sacrifices for their nation. Before he expands on his theory, Darden discusses some problems that are present in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism. Darden argues that “unless the population of a given territory is killed, exiled, or otherwise removed, its national identity and loyalties remain highly stable over time” (2013, 5). He asserts that it is challenging to find historical cases of any community residing on a territory of any size switching its national identity after it has already adopted one. Darden suggests that this observable durability is what gave rise to early primordialist claims in the literature that explains the durability of

identity in terms of inherent and natural differences between people groups. Volumes of research on nationalism, however, have shown that primordialism has no empirical basis because it cannot account for the initial fluidity and artificial nature of identity. We know that identity is not fixed as there are numerous cases where indigenous communities are induced to adopt a national identity with relative ease. However, we also know that this fluidity is not instrumental and that people do not switch their identity to maximize personal gain or improve life chances (Darden 2013, 5–9). Because, “if national identity were so malleable and individual families simply chose what was demanded of them socially or benefited them materially, assimilating subject populations would be much easier than it has proven to be” (Darden 2013, 8). However, “in the parts of Eurasia where borders have historically shifted and territories have changed hands, there are many cases where communities have faced powerful incentives to adopt a different national identity. More often than not, such communities resist, often with extraordinary violence, rather than change their national identity and the political loyalty it entails. Under a variety of very adverse conditions, national loyalties have proven quite resilient” (Darden 2013, 5–6). Darden addresses a major puzzle in the literature of how to account for the national identities both being relatively recent constructs, thus not primordial, and durable, thus not instrumental. His theory accounts for the initial fluidity and subsequent durability of national identities which, in his words, is “a theory that accounts for what appears to be a powerful first-mover advantage in the formation of national loyalties” (Darden 2013, 9).

Darden’s main claim is that the initial schooling of a community is when durable loyalties are formed for its members. The introduction of mass schooling marks a shift from an oral culture to literate mass culture. During this transition, national loyalties that are instilled by schooling “are internalized by individuals and their families through unique changes of status and culture to produce a powerful affective tie” (Darden 2013, 10). After national identities are established through the schools, “national identities are preserved and reproduced over time within

families and reinforced by local communities in a way that makes these constructed identities virtually impervious to significant change or elimination over time” (Darden 2013, 10). Schooled communities preserve their initial national identities even if the material or political incentives change or states try to assimilate them to secure their loyalty. In addition, “they will vote, conceal, kill, or die if need be, to insure that they and those like them are ruled by those they perceive to be their own kind” (Darden 2013, 10). Hence, knowing the national identity instilled during the initial schooling of a community is a strong predictor of how that community will politically align later.

Darden argues that the connection between mass schooling and the development of national loyalties has been recognized as early as 1806 in Gottlieb Fichte’s *Addresses to the German Nation*. Standing against the ongoing French occupation, Fichte argued for universal mass education being essential for creating and preserving national loyalty. Having achieved mass education, he claimed, can provide a nation the tools to resist alien occupation. He called for the deliberate cultivation of a national-mindedness to attain solidarity. He argued that individuals who lack the national culture pursue individual self-interest and collaborate with the occupier. Fichte blamed Prussia’s limited resistance to the French occupation for keeping the education available only for the few and not extending it to the public. He proposed German national education be offered to everyone to mold Germans into a corporate body. Indeed, Prussia established a state-funded compulsory school system in 1808 which became a model for many states, particularly following Prussia’s victory against France in 1870 (Darden 2013, 11–12).

The role that schooling plays in cultivating national loyalties was widely discussed in writings on education during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This discussion led to new compulsory education laws across European and American states. Educational surveys by the American and British governments in the nineteenth century highlighted the link between schooling

and loyalty which was further confirmed by the surveys done by the League of Nations. Some of the early works in Comparative Politics noted that, in all cases, schooling is the chief instrument for developing civic interest and loyalty among the public and that one of the main mechanisms for building loyalties is through developing school curricula. The content of textbooks has been viewed as a matter of high politics and has involved supervision from top government officials in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Stalin personally spent a substantial effort on the first school textbook on the history of the USSR. Contents of public instruction were also a topic of contention in the events leading to World War I. Following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary demanded Serbia to remove references to Austria-Hungary from public instruction that depict it negatively and that amounts to unhealthy propaganda (Darden 2013, 12–13).

Darden argues that the importance of mass schooling in the cultivation of nationalism is neglected by modernist literature on nationalism. Even though modernist scholars include mass schooling in their theories as one of the key factors, it is usually discussed in combination with other factors that together constitute forces of modernization. Darden believes that the influence of schooling on national loyalties has often been attributed to other components of modernization. To overcome this problem, Darden sets out to explore the role that schooling plays independently from “other modern processes such as urbanization, factory labor, newspaper reading, commercial exchange, the development of civil society, and the expansion of the state administration” (Darden 2013, 14). He argues that causal mechanisms that link modernization to nationalism are not nearly as clear as the one linking mass schooling to it. For example, urbanization and industrialization can create societal changes, however, the adoption of nationalism does not result from these changes. Similarly, a factory working environment can cause workers from diverse backgrounds to develop attachments towards one another and unionize, yet these attachments do not extend to other conationals living far away. Such concerns about other

processes of modernization lead Darden to conclude that the distinctness of national attachments cannot be explained by modernization itself. He argues, instead, that schooling plays an independent role in cultivating national loyalties, and “the mechanism through which schools seem to generate nationalism is by direct indoctrination rather through the development of linguistic commonalities and social communication” (Darden 2013, 16). In support of this claim, he proposes the cases of Alsace and Ukraine where groups share a common language and a high level of social communication, yet the national loyalties developed in these groups differ because of the differences in their initial schooling. Once the national loyalties develop, he claims, efforts to change them should either have no effect on the loyalties of the community or trigger resistance from the community against the state (Darden 2013, 13–18).

Ethnicity, Nation, and Nationalism

After a review of the literature, it is useful to offer a definition for the main concepts and establish an understanding of nationalism that is to be used in this study. Following an inclusive conception of ethnicity proposed by Horowitz, an ethnic group is defined as a group whose members are differentiated from other people “by ascriptive differences, whether the indicium of group identity is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof” (1985, 17–18). A nation, however, is not necessarily based on an ethnic group. As indicated by Smith’s criterion of distinctiveness, a nation can also be based on a territory as in the Latin American cases of nationalism (Smith 1983, 216). Regardless of whether it is ethnically or territorially based, there are two additional conditions to determine whether the group of people under question constitute a nation. First, there is a belief within a nation that the only legitimate rule over the nation can be by a member of the imagined community. Second, another belief requires that the nation has a right to sovereignty over its territory. These beliefs that entail political claims differentiate a nation from an ethnic group (Darden 2013, 4). Nationalism,

therefore, is an ideology that incorporates two aforementioned beliefs into the political agenda of the group. Varshney claims that having a territorial concentration is essential for an ethnic group to make national demands and that these demands may take the forms of federalism or sovereignty (Varshney 2007, 277). Though it seems necessary, an ethnic group having territorial concentration does not necessarily pursue national demands. Another term that is commonly used in the literature, ethnonationalism is often used synonymously with nationalism for cases in which nationalism is based on ethnicity as it is a more common type than the territorial form. It only highlights the ethnic nature of nationalism, which is of central importance in this study.

In simple terms, nationalism is an ideology, but it has been a difficult one to study. Ethnic groups may go as far back in history as we can look, yet nationalism is a very recent phenomenon. The earliest claims on the origins of nationalism take it to the middle ages, it is thought to be politically relevant following its spread after the French Revolution. Nationalism is a complex puzzle. As discussed in this chapter, no single theory on nationalism explains this complex phenomenon entirely by itself and each theory has received its fair share of criticisms. While alternative theories offer competing explanations on certain aspects, and sometimes even on very fundamental matters, one does not necessarily have to view the theories on nationalism as competing explanations in their entirety. One way to look at them is rather that they offer satisfying explanations for different parts of a complex puzzle.

The discussion in the first two subsections highlights that the formation of national identities can be explained in neither purely primordial nor purely instrumental terms. As Varshney notes, theories in these categories were knocked over, and “no one seriously argues any more that ethnic identity is primordial, nor that it is devoid of any intrinsic value and used only as a strategic tool” (2007, 291). It is not primordial because there are no primordial “givens” of social existence that exist prior to social interaction. It is also not based only on rational

calculations as values, emotions, and motivations do influence people's decisions. Given the empirical record, Varshney does not expect pure primordial or pure instrumentalist theories to make a comeback. However, this is not to say that primordialist and instrumental explanations do not have any value. Even though primordialism is obsolete, cultural primordialist claims cannot be discarded entirely. Attachments do play a role in binding people together around a common identity, not because these attachments are actually primordial, but because many people around the world believe that they are. Similarly, it is clear that not all actors make decisions rationally at all times within nationalist movements. Members of an ethnic group with ethnonationalist aspirations often make choices that may not maximize their utility, or may even lower their utility. They make such choices because they consider these choices to be the right ones for moral reasons under the influence of nationalist sentiments. Even though instrumentalist approaches have serious weaknesses, instrumentalism does contribute to our understanding of the rational actions of elites of a given nationalist movement.

Following Anderson's conception, the third subsection argues that identities are constructed as imagined communities. This claim is now the mainstream view in the field. This view suggests that identities can change. People can adopt different identities than they are born into and identities themselves can change in reaction to external factors. Nevertheless, looking at the empirical record, it is difficult to ignore that national identities are quite resilient. Even if one can change their identity, one is not able to, nor prefers to, keep switching their identity to another one. Once identities crystallize and take hold, they do not disappear easily. Most people who are born into a national identity preserve it throughout their lives. Constructivist theories are criticized for not sufficiently accounting for the political dimension of nation-building. This weakness, which plays a role in the weakness of the constructivist theories to account for the resilience of national identities, can be complemented by the institutionalist explanations that account for this resilience. Darden argues that it is the initial

schooling of a community that spreads a national identity among the community members in a way that sticks. His modernist account suggests that schooling cultivates national loyalties through indoctrination. Whereas constructivism is more successful in theorizing the origins of national consciousness, Darden's institutionalist account offers a more convincing argument as to why identities stick.

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict

After evaluating four sets of theories of nationalism, in this section, I discuss how these theories fare in explaining ethnic conflict. First, primordialist theories of nationalism do not help much in making sense of ethnic conflicts. If we are to take ethnic attachments as natural, then we may expect conflict to occur between different groups on the grounds that they are different groups. In this case, we would observe a constant state of conflict, which is obviously not the case.

Alternatively, we can adopt a Huntington-style argument and expect contemporary ethnic conflicts to result from ancient hatreds caused by oppression or violent interactions between groups at some point in history. Yet claims around such "past grievances" fail to explain temporal and spatial variations in conflict. Primordialist views that are associated with deep-rooted ethnic antagonisms cannot illuminate why two ethnic groups that have supposedly always hated each other fight at certain periods while remaining largely peaceful the rest of the time. Similarly, they fail to explain why the same groups that fight each other in one place can live peacefully in another (Varshney 2007, 280).

Secondly, instrumentalist theories cannot offer coherent and generalizable theories on ethnic conflict, either. It is hard to deny the role of rational calculations by the elites. Yet, instrumentalist theories fail to explain why the masses would have nationalist preferences and why they would follow the elites for nationalist causes. In rational terms, it is quite irrational for one to willingly take part in a conflict and risk their life. Therefore, even though elites may be

rational actors, it is the masses who fight the war and instrumentalism does not help us understand why they do it.

Thirdly, constructed nature of identity does not explain conflict, it rather explains how identities form and develop. It is not easy to come up with constructivist theories that help us understand general patterns in ethnic conflicts beyond case studies. Constructivist accounts of nationalism also fail to explain why emerging national identities that are proposed by states are not adopted by everyone. Resistance to national identities, most commonly, seems to emerge along the ethnic lines. Whereas a national identity that is centered around the majority group may be appealing to the individuals who are from this group, the members of not every ethnic group within the state are open to adopting the national identity advocated by the state. If identities are malleable, we can expect minority populations to be open to adopting the national identity. For many minorities, however, this is clearly not the case and they do not imagine themselves to be a part of the nation. Nevertheless, constructivism can guide us in investigating why minorities resist imagining themselves to be a part of the nation. Constructivism can also help us identify certain types of identity construction processes that contribute to mobilization, and as a result, that facilitate conflict.

Finally, institutional theories on the formation of national identities are not sufficient in making sense of ethnic conflict, either. Institutionalism helps with understanding the spread of nationalism to the masses in new nations through indoctrination by government institutions. However, this mechanism mainly explains the government indoctrination of the majority group whose members are likely to find the nationalist content of government propaganda rather appealing. If institutions are effective in turning nationalist ideas of intellectuals into mass identities using state power, minorities who are being modernized by the state should not be able to resist the power of their original schooling. Indeed, government indoctrination does work on many minority groups that are assimilated into the majority culture. However, there are many cases where the

members of minority groups are not very receptive to government indoctrination and this low receptiveness suggests that government indoctrination has its limitations. Given the high level of influence institutions have on the everyday life of the citizens of nation-states, however, institutional explanations still have promise in studying conflict and we can identify arrangements under which conflict is more likely to emerge. For instance, through studying the designs of political institutions, we can evaluate “consociational or majoritarian polities, proportional representation or first-past-the-post electoral systems, federal or unitary governments - explain why some multiethnic societies have violence, and others, peace” (Varshney 2007, 289).

Apart from indoctrination, institutional design can also influence the identity choice of individuals in multiethnic societies in other ways, for example, by increasing the salience of one type of identity over another. To give an example, Varshney cites Posner’s (2005) study on identity in Zambia. Posner highlights that Zambians have two types of identity: linguistic and tribal. Following its independence, Zambia also has had two types of political systems: multiparty rule and one-party rule. Under the multiparty system where people elected the president, the political arena was national, and as a result, Zambians identified themselves with a larger category based on their language. Under the one-party system, however, they did not elect the president and they only elected their constituency representative. In this system, the smaller category, tribe, became more relevant. The colonial rule had institutionalized only two types of identity: linguistic and tribal. Administrative policies, recruitment, and census practices of the British regime had made these types of identities more salient in Zambian politics. Posner highlights that other types of identities could have also been adopted by Zambians under alternative institutional arrangements (Varshney 2007, 290–91). Given that certain types of identities may be more prone to conflict in specific contexts, institutions can increase the likelihood of conflict by changing the salience of identities.

Ethnic Nationalism of Minorities

Most nation-states have diverse populations with multiple ethnic groups or nations. By extension, there are several ethnic groups and nations without a state of their own. Ethnic groups within a state form majority-minority relationships with each other depending on their access to political power and relative demographic size. Before starting the discussion on minority nationalism, I would like to note that not all cases of nationalism fit into a majority-minority dichotomy, such as the multiethnic nationalism in Switzerland. Alternatively, instead of a majority, an ethnic plurality describes the ethnic distribution in some cases, such as in many African states. Though in cases of a plurality, it is often possible to talk about one ethnic group that is substantially larger than others in size. It may also be the case that it may be an ethnic minority that possesses political power and constitutes the political majority. In such cases, the regime may still make arrangements to accommodate the majority, as in Syria, or the regime may discriminate against the majority by excessive measures, as in South Africa under the apartheid regime. In these cases, ethnic groups that possess political power function as pseudo-majorities. Even though these cases do not fit the majority-minority dichotomy, this dichotomy is still a useful one. Because more often than not, the distribution of ethnic groups over a territory influences ethnic dynamics, political power distribution, and government policies in the state that covers the territory. For these reasons, I use the majority-minority dichotomy in this work to illustrate my theory better.

As argued in the previous sections, primordialism and instrumentalism do not explain ethnic mobilization. Constructivism does not claim to explain ethnic mobilization, as constructivist theories avoid offering generalizable claims beyond the constructed nature of national identities and the role that intellectuals play in constructing them. These conditions in constructivism apply to all ethnic groups, and therefore, do not allow us to differentiate between the ethnic groups that mobilize and those that do not. This leaves us with

institutionalism. Institutional theories that are covered in this work rather focus on nation-building around an identity that is in power, that put differently, the nation-building of majorities. Thus, they do not account for the mobilization of ethnic minorities. That is not to say institutionalism is incapable of explaining ethnic mobilization. It only suggests that we need a new framework that incorporates ethnic minorities when studying the mobilization of ethnic minorities against the state. Referring back to Posner (2005) as an example, we can treat institutions as political entities that also influence minority group identities in a way that is different from the way they influence the majority identity.

Nationalist ideologies of ethnic minorities resemble that of majority groups in some ways. To refer back to the discussion on nationalist ideologies, ascriptive group differences defining group boundaries, the demand for the rule over the nation by a group member, and the belief in the right to sovereignty for the nation are the central tenets of nationalism. In simple terms, a nationalist ideology influences the members of a group to resist foreign rule, regardless of whether the group is a demographic majority or a minority group. Similar to majority groups, the nationalism of minority groups are constructed by their intellectual elites. As discussed in the subsection on instrumentalism, Brass analyzes this process from an instrumentalist perspective and argues that elites of ethnic minorities use ethnicity to challenge the existing elites of the state and to access political power. In other words, they invoke ethnicity as an instrument for their political goals. If the elites' attempts of invoking ethnicity to mobilize their coethnics prove successful, the members of an ethnic group gain ethnic self-consciousness (Yun 1990). Though the presence of elites invoking ethnicity to access political power does not explain ethnic mobilization, it is a necessary condition and thus can be used as a starting point.

Smith's framework nationalism is a useful one to move from majority nationalism to minority nationalism (1983, 215–27). Smith defines two criteria in

his framework of nationalism. The first one is the “distinctiveness” criterion which evaluates the extent to which a group is differentiated by the other groups by its sociological features. If the cultural distinctiveness of the members of a group is high, Smith categorizes it as “ethnic nationalism.” On the other hand, if it is low, he categorizes the type of nationalism as “territorial nationalism.” In between the two, there is “mixed nationalism.” Smith’s second criterion is “independence.” For this criterion, he argues that an ethnic group can be at one of the four stages of politicization: ethnic group, nation, autonomy, and state. In the first stage, an ethnic group manifests a low level of politicization. Therefore, the political activities of such a group can be labeled as “ethnic politics” so long as they do not include political demands that involve systemic changes. He argues that ethnic politics show similarities to the political activities of interest groups. Their main goal is to protect the interests of the members of an ethnic group instead of, for example, business associations or trade unions. A group with low levels of politicization does not demand autonomy or independence (Yun 1990).

An ethnic group becomes a nation once its members gain self-consciousness under the influence of ethnic nationalism. Once an ethnic group transforms into a nation, the degree of politicization also increases. Regardless of whether the group achieves self-rule, the ethnic group is considered a nation once it demands self-rule. At lower levels of politicization, autonomy may be sufficient to appease the nationalist sentiments of the ethnic minority. As a result of further politicization, however, the demand for self-rule turns into a struggle for independence. If this struggle succeeds, the ethnic minority obtains sovereignty and asserts itself as a nation on the global stage. While independence is the final stage, it is not the endpoint for ethnic nationalism. Smith suggests that it only marks the end of the pre-independence period. In the post-independence period, ethnic nationalism persists and uses newly acquired state tools to infuse a new spirit and moral purpose to the society and preserve the group’s collective will and integrity (Yun 1990). In other words, independence allows a minority

nationalism to become a majority nationalism and control its own state apparatus.

Conclusion

Ethnicity is the most common source of armed mobilization. Therefore, the “ethnic” dimension of ethnic mobilization needs to be explained. In this chapter, I argue that what makes ethnicity different than other forms is the ideologies that are built around it. Ethnonational identities may not be primordial, but they are often treated as such and they still ignite intense emotions. Class is also associated with ideologies, yet ethnicity is different because one may not be aware of their class, but one most certainly is aware of the language they speak, the religion they practice, and the culture and identity they consider themselves to be a part of. The essential role that identity plays in the lives of people since their childhood makes them susceptible to mobilizing around their ethnicity.

Despite this susceptibility, however, ethnic mobilization is neither natural nor given. A transition from a point in time at which none of the ethnic members subscribes to ethnonationalism to a point where a considerable portion of them subscribes to it is induced by external factors, if it happens at all. This transition requires the ethnonationalist ideology to be constructed by intellectuals, and later, adopted by the masses. The adoption of this constructed identity is neither primordial nor instrumental. The constructed nature of identity and its malleability go against the primordialist claims. It is also not instrumental because the debate on instrumentalism shows that rationality is very limited in examining nationalism. Darden claims that the adoption of national identities takes place through institutional means and that government indoctrination creates national loyalties in a way that sticks. However, it is noted in this chapter that some minorities resist the institutional means. At this point, I argue that institutional attempts to transform the culture of the population and cultivate national loyalties can create an opposite reaction and may make aggrieved members of minority groups turn to ethnonationalist movements that claim to

represent them. The connection between nationalism and mobilization requires making certain assumptions about how nationalism operates as is done in this chapter. In Chapter 3, I explore another component of this connection, which is, how horizontal inequalities create grievances which then help ethnonationalist leaders develop ethnic self-consciousness and mobilize their coethnics.

Additionally, this chapter notes that language is an essential feature of culture and identity. It points out the importance of language, not only for ethnonationalist ideologies but also for the very origins of nationalist ideas.

Anderson's theory shows how linguistic standardization led to expanded imagined communities that are larger than small localities. Linguistic standardization in Europe created the basis on which European nations emerged. Ethnolinguistic identities gained prominence in different parts of the world as the European model of the nation spread. I explore issues around language as I discuss educational language policies and assimilation in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER THREE

HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES, GRIEVANCES, AND MOBILIZATION

Introduction

After investigating the connection between nationalism and ethnic mobilization in Chapter 2, I explore another essential component of the conflict mechanism in this chapter: grievances. First, I offer a glimpse into the literature on the connection between grievances and conflict. This section helps to situate the role of grievances as theorized in this work in the broader literature on the subject. Secondly, in response to the criticisms of grievance-based accounts put forth in the previous section, I follow the claim that inequalities between ethnic groups, rather than individuals, generate grievances that are associated with ethnic conflict. Building on the literature on horizontal inequalities, the discussion in this section establishes the group-level focus adopted in this work. For grievances to turn to violence, there are multiple conditions to be satisfied: group identification, intergroup comparisons, evaluation of injustice, and framing and blaming. In this work, I build on this framework, put forth by Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013), and argue that horizontal cultural inequalities are better situated to theorize their connection to conflict than other forms and this is mainly due to cognitive reasons. Because when a government discriminates against a minority group based on its cultural features, such as its language, the resulting inequalities are easier to identify by people whose culture is discriminated against. In the case of linguistic discrimination, identifying inequalities is particularly easy because language is an inescapable medium of public and private life as noted throughout this work.

Finally, I explore individual motivations for mobilization around identity. This is an important topic to address because, even though group-level features and the

interactions between the state and its ethnic minorities are at the core of intrastate conflicts, it is still individuals who mobilize and participate. Thus, it is essential to understand why individuals who have agency over their decisions willingly risk their lives for their group. Relying on Taylor's (1994) work on the politics of recognition, the arguments made in section helps to justify the group-level focus adopted in this work by connecting individual motivations for pursuing political goals around their group. Building on the pursuit of group-level political goals, this section also highlights the value rational foundations of ethnonationalist mobilization, as opposed to instrumentally rational actions.

Literature on Grievances and Conflict

Grievances manifest in emotional responses, such as anger or resentment, to events, conditions, or treatments that are perceived to be unfair or morally wrong. These emotions are aimed against an individual or an entity, such as a political leader, an institution, or a government, who is thought to have caused the perceived unfairness. To understand the connection between grievances and conflict onset, I now explore the literature on grievances. This section covers the literature on the role of grievances in political violence since the 1970s and pulls from the literature review in Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013, 11–20).

Diverging from earlier sociological theories that see collective violence resulting from social ills and being committed by mobs, Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) argue that collective violence is caused by dissatisfaction with economic well-being. Gurr's foundational relative deprivation theory claims that when individuals have less than they believe they are entitled to, they feel discontent with their own situation in life. Such discontent triggers revolution when it is sufficiently widespread in society. Following Gurr's work, a series of studies theorized that collective violence results from factors such as economic inequality, wealth inequality, and inequality in land ownership (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 12). Gurr's grievance-based theory also received some criticisms, most notably by Snyder and Tilly (1972). Snyder and Tilly argue

that grievances are present in all societies and that grievances are not sufficient to cause uprisings. Instead, it is the factors that provide an opportunity for a rebellion that lead to conflicts and revolutions.

As opposed to grievances caused by one's economic situation relative to their expectations, Horowitz (1985) claims that grievances form in reaction to inequalities between ethnic groups. Horowitz contends that power struggles between ethnic groups are not motivated by material causes. Instead, they are driven by the elites' pursuit to increase their political influence, whether it is by attaining inclusion for their excluded group or by maintaining the exclusion of other groups. Certain areas of political inclusion or exclusion, such as in language, religion, and culture, carry a substantial level of importance for group members. Horowitz's claims do not cite nationalism as a driving factor, yet they are in line with the demands emanating from nationalist ideologies, as claimed in this work. Horowitz uses case studies to identify conflict patterns, but he does not systematically test his theories. The first of the data collection efforts were undertaken by Gurr which resulted in the Minorities at Risk (or the MAR) dataset (2009). Using the MAR data, Gurr (1993b, 1993a) found that frustrations of group members about the status of their group generate grievances over time and these grievances play an important role in conflict onset. Another factor that contributes to the onset, he argued, is the pursuit of interests that follow the framing put forth by the elites.

Since the late 1990s, grievance-based accounts of conflict have faced strong criticisms from three fronts. First, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) challenge grievance-based accounts as causes of conflict. Instead, they claim that greed for the control of primary commodities motivates rebellion. Theoretical claims of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) are briefly addressed in Chapter 2 under instrumentalist approaches to nationalism. The second front originates from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) influential work titled *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War*. They contend that civil wars break out when factors that impact the

opportunity of rebels to fight are more favorable for a rebellion. Insurgency is more likely with low state capacity, mountainous terrain, and a higher population, as well as with factors that facilitate group coordination (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Weidmann 2009).

The third front does not only question the viability of grievance-based accounts, but also the aggregation of conflict studies at the country level. Studies that focus on micro-level factors are skeptical of the influence of macro-level factors, such as identities, master cleavages, decisions of rebel organizations, or ideologies on the decisions of individuals. They claim that taking part in a rebellion is motivated by individual-level factors, such as personal grudges or material incentives (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007). These explanations that are at the individual level discredit group-level factors, such as identity or nationalist ideology, therefore, suggest that ethnicity does not play a distinct role in conflicts.

Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug highlight two patterns of thought in grievance-skepticism that are prevalent in the literature, including these three fronts (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 15–17). They call the first type the “ubiquity-of-grievances” claim. Scholars who follow this line of thought assume that grievances do not explain conflict onset simply because they are too widespread around the world. Given that it is possible to find grievances for all ethnic groups in all societies, but conflict is a rare event and most ethnic groups live in peace, it is argued that grievances cannot independently account for onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Laitin 2007, 25). The second pattern is named “irrelevance-of-grievances.” The ubiquity claim implies that grievances do not display sufficient variation to be considered viable covariates. The irrelevance claim, however, suggests that even if there is variation in the degree of grievances, they do not explain the onset after controlling for the underlying factors that cause conflict. One of the strengths of these claims is their systematic empirical testing in large-n studies, as opposed to supposedly biased case studies influenced by the narrative put forth by combatants (Laitin 2007, 23–25).

An important issue in the three fronts that criticize grievance-based accounts is their choice of the level of analysis. The studies on the first two fronts operate at the country level. These studies claim to test for grievances and find no support for them. However, grievances at the group level need to be tested at the group level to account for group-level dynamics of conflict, and doing so is essential for studying intrastate conflict. Even if they are tested at the country level, such testing needs to be carefully justified. This is not the case, however, in these studies, and contrary to their claims, group-level grievance-based accounts remain untested in these works. For the last front, the assumption that the grievances based on ethnicity and identity are not consequential makes it possible to conduct studies at the individual level. Yet, as discussed, this assumption is simply not sound. This is not to say that individual factors do not have any influence on conflicts. As claimed in this work, however, ethnicity has become the main factor facilitating political mobilization and thus group-level dynamics offer the basis for ethnic mobilization that leads to conflict.

Horizontal Inequalities and Grievances

In response to theoretical issues around the conceptualization of grievances, Stewart (2008) introduced the notion of horizontal inequalities between culturally defined identity groups as opposed to vertical inequalities between individuals. He starts by stating that the vast majority of multiethnic societies do not experience violent conflict. He cites Fearon and Laitin's (1996) estimations that only 0.01 percent of all potential ethnic conflicts turned into conflict in Africa between 1960 and 1979. This leads him to question why conflict erupts in some societies while others remain peaceful. He argues that the answer lies in horizontal inequalities which he defines as "inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups" (Stewart 2008, 4). This definition suggests that even though the majority of conflicts are between ethnic groups and they rely on "group mobilization of people with particular shared identities or goals to attack others in the name of

the group,” cultural differences alone do not explain conflict occurrence (Stewart 2008, 11). The horizontal inequalities argument proposes that inequalities do not affect all individuals or individuals at random, they rather affect individuals based on their group identity (Stewart 2008, 13). Horizontal inequalities that mainly affect members of an ethnic group produce grievances, and in doing so, they enable ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize their coethnics. Investigating grievances that result from the horizontal inequalities and that form at the group level, as opposed to the ones that form at the individual level, therefore, is more compatible with the studies on ethnic civil wars.

Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) argue that there are four requirements for horizontal inequalities to be politicized and developed into grievances. First, there needs to be group identification around well-defined groups. Grievances around horizontal inequalities cannot develop if the population affected by the inequalities does not have ethnic self-consciousness even if they constitute an ethnic group. Therefore, group identification is necessary for the group members to be aware of the horizontal inequalities that target them. They also note that the group identification process may not be easy to overcome if sharp boundary markers are not present. Whereas ethnic groups have often clear boundaries, it has proven to be difficult to construct cohesive group identities around socioeconomic classes. Marxists refer to the failure to form groups around class interests as “false consciousness” (Brass 1991, 259; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 38). Secondly, members of groups need to be able to compare their own group with other groups in terms of status, wealth, or other differences. Without being able to make such comparisons, they cannot take notice of horizontal inequalities. Thirdly, people who are negatively affected by horizontal inequalities should be able to evaluate the injustice. In other words, horizontal inequalities do not cause grievances if those who are worse off do not believe that their conditions are unjust. Finally, the evaluation of injustice may not be sufficient if it is not clear who is responsible for it. For grievances against the state to form, the members of discriminated groups must see the state to be the

source of the injustice. The likelihood of satisfying these conditions and achieving collective action is heavily influenced by the framing of the injustice by the leadership. To reach a wider audience, political entrepreneurs should frame the inequalities in a way that is relatable to people, that is persuasive, that has internal consistency, and that appeals to people's emotions (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 37–44).

Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) introduced the EPR dataset that made it possible to test whether horizontal inequalities are associated with conflict onset. They state that they “conceive of ethnic wars as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power” (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 87). Using this new dataset, they find that ethnic groups that are excluded from executive power and that experienced reversal of their political status, in other words, ethnic groups that face horizontal political inequalities are more likely to rise against the government. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) claim that income inequality not between individuals, but between ethnic groups increases the likelihood of conflict onset. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) confirm the findings of these two articles and assert that horizontal political and economic inequalities create grievances. Widespread grievances between the members of an ethnic group promote mobilization, and as a result, increase the likelihood of the eruption of conflict.

I build on the works cited in this section claiming that horizontal inequalities generate grievances that are associated with conflict onset. As an additional claim, I posit that grievances resulting from horizontal cultural inequalities are more suitable to study grievances that are connected to ethnic conflict because these types of inequalities are related to identity more directly than horizontal political or economic inequalities. Grievances associated with identity are more likely to emerge because the requirements for horizontal inequalities to turn into grievances have a better chance to materialize with cultural inequalities. Let me illustrate this claim with an example. In a society with two ethnic groups, group

A, the majority group, controls the state whereas group B, a minority group, is excluded from central executive power. The members of group B also have a lower level of income on average. A lack of access to executive power or a lower level of income, by themselves, may not be very substantial. First, being excluded from executive power can be harmful to the members of the group only if it is accompanied by other forms of discrimination. This is not to say the grievances resulting from a lack of access to power cannot lead to demands for autonomy or independence. If the group identification and intergroup comparison steps are overcome by other means, and consequently, if an ethnic group had gained ethnic self-consciousness, then the demands for autonomy or independence can be politicized by the elites and their framing may find support among the group members. Yet, if being excluded from the executive power is the only form of horizontal inequalities that are present, it may not constitute a problem for the minority group. Because the members of the minority group may find this arrangement natural, and consequently, they may not find it to be unjust, and thus, would not blame the state. They may ignore the appeals of the leaders of ethnonationalist movements who are trying to create a group identity and mobilize them.

Second, different levels of income can often be explained by factors that are not related to intergroup dynamics. In this case, even if group identification and intergroup comparison steps are completed, there may not be injustice or blaming resulting from the inequalities. On the other hand, similar to the previous case, there may be other inequalities in place that lead to the group identification, intergroup comparisons, and evaluation of injustice, and only after these steps are achieved, horizontal economic inequalities would contribute to the feeling of injustice around the horizontal economic inequalities. Economic inequalities are often cited as a source of grievances regardless of whether it is a problem in a society or not. In fact, Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann (2015) show that grievances are associated with conflict not only with the poorer groups but also with the groups that are richer than the state average. Therefore, after

the members of the ethnic group are already upset, political entrepreneurs can politicize disparities that are not necessarily supported by objective measurements and they can blame the majority group or the state for these politicized injustices.

Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug note that the empirical connection in this mechanism is between horizontal inequalities and conflict (2013, 35–36). There is a theoretical assumption behind this empirical connection, which is that horizontal inequalities create grievances that would then lead to conflict. However, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug assert that their theory is probabilistic and not deterministic. Therefore, even if there are horizontal inequalities, they may not necessarily lead to conflict if the four requirements are not satisfied. Moreover, even if they are satisfied, it may not be sufficient for mobilization. Alternatively, grievances may emerge despite horizontal inequalities being identified and framed inaccurately and the state may be blamed unfairly. Being aware of these possibilities, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug still expect that “grievances will be experienced roughly in proportion to the degree of violation” (2013, 41). While I agree with this claim, I am skeptical that income disparities between the groups can be observed by the members of ethnic group B prior to group identification and that this observation alone would lead to the crystallization of the group identity, and after that, would facilitate the other steps.

I argue that the connection to identity is at the core of the connection between horizontal inequalities and grievances and group identities are more likely to be crystallized when the members of the minority ethnic group are discriminated against based on their culture and identity. For instance, let us consider aspects relating to the language or religion of an ethnic group. These aspects are essential parts of culture and identity which individuals regularly observe and practice in their daily lives. When the members of a group are discriminated against based on their language or religion, they will be able to make comparisons about the

different rights and privileges between groups, observe the discriminations they face, and know that the state is responsible for the unjust laws and their enforcement. Because these forms of discrimination are cognitively easy to identify and form an opinion on even without them being politicized. Therefore, because of their connection to culture and identity, horizontal cultural inequalities are more likely to lead to group identification and they are also more likely to be successfully politicized by political entrepreneurs.

In addition to the cognitive processes, ideological factors also contribute to the success of horizontal cultural inequalities in mobilization. As discussed in Chapter 2, nationalist ideologies have come to define modern political systems. Ethnic groups that had gained ethnic self-consciousness and that had adopted nationalist ideologies make political demands to prevent alien rule and to preserve their culture and identity. The members of a group whose culture is threatened and undermined by the state are more likely to turn to ethnonationalist leaders who are successful in framing the discrimination in a way that appeals to the ethnic members. Ideological factors work well also in the presence of political inequalities, yet, as discussed, such inequalities are not facilitated by cognitive processes to the same extent. In other words, the theoretical connection between horizontal cultural inequalities and grievances is justified with more success than between other forms of horizontal inequalities and grievances due to both cognitive and ideological reasons that facilitate this connection. This is not to say horizontal cultural inequalities are more successful than other types of horizontal inequalities in mobilizing people. Though they may well be, the claim is rather that, particularly for cognitive reasons, claims around horizontal cultural inequalities regarding their association with conflict are more theoretically sound due to their connection to culture and identity. As a result, despite the case being made for the importance of horizontal cultural inequalities in reference to other types, this work does not attempt to compare different types of horizontal inequalities.

Recognition of Identity and Mobilization

I argue that the inequalities at the group level, i.e. horizontal inequalities, create grievances for the members of ethnic groups and group-level factors are more appropriate for capturing group-level dynamics of ethnic conflict. Regardless of the level at which factors operate, however, it is individuals who decide to join or support a rebellion. This begs the question: How are horizontal inequalities able to create grievances and promote the spread of ethnonationalist sentiments among minority populations in a way that these sentiments facilitate mobilization for armed struggle? Answering this question requires examining whether and how these group-level factors can be connected to the individual level to explain the mobilization of individuals. In Chapter 2, I adopt the position that rationalist frameworks cannot explain ethnic mobilization. In this section, which forms the main bulk of this chapter, I refer to Taylor's (1994) brilliant work on the politics of recognition to explain why grievances around identity have the power to mobilize individuals from discriminated minorities around group-level goals. Taylor's complex account is laid out in this section step by step.

The demand for recognition has become an important topic in politics. This demand, Taylor argues, is a driving force behind ethnonationalist movements representing minority groups. The identity of an individual is about how they define themselves. The recognition of the identity by the state is linked to the identity itself because its recognition plays a significant role in shaping it. People can suffer from the absence of recognition or misrecognition of their identity, because "it is a vital human need" (Taylor 1994, 26). Therefore, "nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Taylor 1994, 25).

Taylor argues that the consequences of two historical transformations made recognition particularly important for identity. The first transformation was the collapse of social hierarchies. The premodern concept of honor was a feature of aristocratic social hierarchies. What made honor valuable was that it was only

given to certain people, and not to everyone. The notion of honor collapsed with modernity and was replaced by dignity. The main difference between dignity and honor is that dignity is seen as an inherent part of humanity. It is possessed by all human beings whereas honor could only be possessed by some people who were from the upper classes. As a result, “this concept of dignity is the only one compatible with a democratic society, and that it was inevitable that the old concept of honor was superseded” (Taylor 1994, 27). Taylor highlights that, in democracies such as the United States, all people are called by titles such as “Mr.,” “Mrs.,” or “Miss.” (or “Ms.” after the collapse of the previous two titles for women into one). This is in contrast with only some people being called “Lord” or “Lady” and the rest being called by their names.

The second transformation Taylor notes is that “the importance of recognition has been modified and intensified by the new understanding of individual ideality that emerges at the end of the eighteenth century” (Taylor 1994, 28). An individualized identity that is particular to each individual did not exist before the late eighteenth century. Taylor argues that the notion of an individualized identity came about along with the “ideal of authenticity” which is about an individual being true to themselves and their particular way of being. This ideal suggests that “human beings are endowed with a moral sense, an intuitive feeling for what is right and wrong” (Taylor 1994, 28). This claim came in reaction to an earlier understanding which suggested that “knowing right and wrong was a matter of calculating consequences, in particular, those concerned with divine reward and punishment” (Taylor 1994, 28). The ideal of authenticity, however, suggests that understanding what is right and what is wrong is not based on dry calculations, instead, it comes from within, from our feelings, and not from external sources, such as God. We need to follow the guidance of our moral feelings to act rightly. As a result of this transformation, “being in touch with our feelings takes on independent and crucial moral significance. It comes to be something we have to attain if we are to be true and full human beings” (Taylor 1994, 28).

Taylor cites three philosophers who contributed to our understanding of the process that led to these transformations: Rousseau, Herder, and Hegel. First, Rousseau identified the change that was already taking place in the culture before anyone else. He proposed that morality is “a voice of nature within us” and he noted that “this voice is often drowned out by the passions that are induced by our dependence on others, the main one being *amour propre*, or pride. Our moral salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves” (Taylor 1994, 29). Rousseau defines this contact as *le sentiment de l'existence* or feeling of existence.

Following Rousseau, Herder's contributions to the ideal of authenticity are particularly important. Herder proposed that every human being has their own way of being human that is particular to them. According to this claim, “there is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's life” (Taylor 1994, 30). Following their own way is the only way in which one can be true to themselves and fulfill the purpose of their life. This powerful moral ideal attributes a particular moral significance to be true to their inner nature that is unique to them. This uniqueness is defined as the principle of originality. Failing to do it puts one in danger of giving in to the pressures of conformity from external sources, and consequently, of being lost. The fear of the danger of being lost makes us listen to our unique inner voice. Rousseau's feeling of existence and Herder's principle of originality help us understand the modern ideal of authenticity.

Herder makes another contribution by applying his originality concept at two levels. The first level is the individual level that is between individuals. The second level looks at culture-bearing people among other peoples. This second level gets us closer to understanding why cultural identity is quite important for an individual. Originality at the second level suggests that “just like individuals, a Volk should be true to itself, that is, its own culture” (Taylor 1994, 31). Every people group should be true to their culture and find their own path. This is “the

seminal idea of modern nationalism, in both benign and malignant forms” (Taylor 1994, 31).

Herder notes, similar to dignity, the ideal of authenticity is also a product of the collapse of premodern social hierarchies. Before modernity, one’s identity was tied to their social class. The identity that was based on one’s social class, however, was undermined by the ideal of authenticity. The reason for this, Herder argues, is that the ideal of authenticity requires one to discover their own way of being that is original to them. It can only derive from within, it cannot be determined by an external source, such as social roles (Taylor 1994, 31–32).

The ideal of authenticity is about one being true to oneself, listening to their inner voice, and deriving their way of being from within. Their way of being, however, cannot be generated from within in a monological manner. “We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression,” thus human life is inherently dialogical (Taylor 1994, 32). Taylor notes that, here, language refers to all modes of expressions through which we define ourselves, not just the language we speak. “We learn these modes of expression through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us,” or in George Herbert Mead’s words, our *significant others* (Taylor 1994, 32). Even though we form our own opinions by ourselves, for the most part, we do not make decisions independently of others on important issues, such as our identity. Consequently, “we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us” (Taylor 1994, 33). Even if our significant others are no longer a part of our lives, our dialogue, consequently their influence on our identity, persists until our death. Taylor argues that we can never be completely free from the influence of our significant others who shaped us in the earlier stages of our lives. Rather, we discover our identity in negotiation with other

people, regardless of whether this negotiation takes place internally or overtly (Taylor 1994, 34).

Taylor notes that our dependence on other people in terms of our identity formation is not a new development. It existed before the emergence of the ideal of authenticity, as well. The difference, however, is that, before modernity, recognition of identity was not an issue. Under the hierarchical social structures, “general recognition was built into the socially derived identity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social categories that everyone took for granted. Yet inwardly derived, personal, original identity doesn’t enjoy this recognition *a priori*” (Taylor 1994, 34). The recognition has to be earned, yet attempts for recognition may not succeed. In other words, the need for recognition did not develop with the ideal of authenticity, it was already there. The main difference that came about with the ideal of authenticity is the possibility that the attempts for recognition can fail (Taylor 1994, 35).

Finally, Taylor turns to the third philosopher, Hegel, who argues that recognition takes place on two planes: the intimate plane and the social plane. On an intimate plane, as discussed, our interactions with our significant others influence our identity, and “we can see how much an original identity needs and is vulnerable to the recognition given or withheld by significant others” (Taylor 1994, 36). The identity that is generated within us relies on self-discovery and self-affirmation that comes from our relationships with our significant others. On the social plane, the fact that identities form in dialogue “has made the politics of equal recognition more central and stressful. It has, in fact, considerably raised the stakes. Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it” and “the projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized” (Taylor 1994, 36).

Taylor notes that the politics of equal recognition has taken two forms. In the first form, the transition from honor to dignity brought the universalist idea that all

citizens deserve equal dignity and equal rights, and therefore, they cannot be treated as “second-class” citizens. In the second form, the unique identities of all individuals or groups are expected to be recognized. Failing to do so leads to assimilation to “a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity” (Taylor 1994, 38). Taylor calls these forms the politics of dignity and the politics of difference, respectively.

The politics of difference defends the ability to form a unique identity for individuals as well as culture-bearing groups. The politics of difference is critical of the politics of dignity for attempting to homogenize people by assimilating their identity. Because, in a society, there is no neutral identity to mold everyone into. Instead, the politics of dignity represents the hegemony of a certain culture and attempts to assimilate other cultures under the pretense of neutrality. As a result, “only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form” (Taylor 1994, 43).

Taylor’s discussion of the Canadian case illustrates the importance of culture and identity for cultural collectivities. The Canadian Charter of Rights that passed in 1982 provided a basis for judicial review on equal treatment of citizens to protect them from discrimination and on the protection of individual rights that are defined in the charter. French Canadians, as well as aboriginal peoples, put forth claims that are not compatible with these egalitarian norms on the basis of their distinctness as groups. They argued that their survival as peoples was at stake and that they needed autonomy to have the ability to take precautions that are necessary for the survival of their culture. Quebec has passed laws to achieve this goal. For example, Quebec restricted the eligibility to go to schools that provide education in English, not only for the francophones but also for immigrants. Other examples of such laws include one that requires businesses that have more than fifty employees to be run in French and one that bans the use of commercial signs that are not in French (Taylor 1994, 52–53).

Such laws that were adopted to protect collective goals, however, are against the basic provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights. Because “the collective goals may require restrictions on the behavior of individuals that may violate their rights” and “even if overriding individual rights were not possible, espousing collective goals on behalf of a national group can be thought to be inherently discriminatory” (Taylor 1994, 55). Yet, this is also a question about the legitimacy of cultural survival as a political goal. Demands for the protection of cultural rights are central to ethnic movements even at lower levels of politicization of their identity. Determining which type of goal has precedence over the other is a philosophical issue, one without a clear answer. Because either choice works against the other one and both choices are important. Yet, the particular importance of culture and identity following their politicization and the needs of individuals for the recognition of their culture and identity make the pursuit of collective goals more preferable for ethnic groups (Taylor 1994, 63–64).

Demands for equal recognition have been central for ethnonationalist movements. Consequently, “multinational societies can break up, in large part because of a lack of (perceived) recognition of the equal worth of one group by another” (Taylor 1994, 64). Oftentimes, nationalist actors deny that they are motivated by a lack of recognition. Indeed, Taylor claims that very few admit, among Quebec independentists, that the main reason that their political struggle gained momentum is a lack of recognition by English Canada. Instead, they cite other factors that motivate them, such as income inequality, exploitation, and injustice. Subscribing to the view that Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) call the ubiquity of grievances, Laitin is critical of “listening too earnestly to the accounts of combatants”; he follows:

When ethnic war breaks out, journalists congregate like ravens. They inevitably ask combatants to tell narratives explaining the killing. The combatants are trying to answer the same question for themselves! ... Linking an insurgency to a nationalist cause helps to sustain that insurgency. This is not the same as causing

the insurgency, as the historical grievances that are appealed to by insurgents are ubiquitous, and not any greater in cases of insurgency than in cases of peace. The images of brethren tortured and killed are, of course, powerful, but again they are the result of—used as proof of the need for autonomy—but not the cause of the insurgency. (Laitin 2007, 23–24)

Various forms of injustice being invoked by the combatants as the source of conflict, sometimes unconvincingly, makes Laitin conclude that the perceived injustice cannot be the source of conflict. Even if we assume that he is right, which he may well be, this claim does not offer sufficient grounds to dismiss the role of grievances on conflict onset. Taylor notes that the idea that our identity is partly formed by recognition has made the demand for recognition explicit. This idea has meant, not only that recognition is essential, but also that misrecognition is a source of harm (Taylor 1994, 64). Regardless of what factors ethnonationalist groups cite as the causes of their struggle, nonrecognition or misrecognition can cause identity-related grievances to accumulate among the members of discriminated minorities. Following the politicization of ethnic identities, it is these grievances that help ethnonationalist movements mobilize.

There is one final issue to address regarding mobilization. If it is the politics of recognition that explains ethnic mobilization, and not rationalist frameworks, that means individuals who mobilize are open to irrational acts. It does seem complicated for the purposes of theory building. But nevertheless, how can it be incorporated into my theory? I turn to Varshney (2003) to find an answer.

Varshney points out the duality in rationality, as conceptualized by Max Weber, to account for this puzzle. Varshney argues that, in an ethnic conflict, there is a combination of “instrumental rationality” and “value rationality” that motivates the decisions of individuals. Instrumental rationality, as covered in Chapter 2, indicates a strict cost-benefit analysis to determine goals. Necessary adjustments in the goals need to be made as the costs and benefits change. If the cost of achieving a goal is too high, then the goal would be abandoned. According to

instrumental rationality, risking sacrificing their life for the group is irrational due to the high potential cost without prospects for material gains that would justify such a major sacrifice. Even if I refer back to Leoussi's third criticism to instrumentalism, as covered in Chapter 2, which highlights the subjective nature of interests whose determination is influenced by ideas and doctrines, I can still clearly evaluate self-sacrifice for the political goals for the collective group to be instrumentally irrational. Yet many still have done it and continue to do it. The second concept, value rationality, helps us make sense of why. Value rationality arises from various types of beliefs, such as ethical, religious, or aesthetic ones. Unlike instrumental rationality, one holds value rationality independently from the likelihood of success. Consequently, "some spheres or goals of life are considered so valuable that they would not normally be up for sale or compromise, however costly the pursuit of their realization might be" and "behavior, when driven by such values, can consciously embrace great personal sacrifices" (Varshney 2003, 86).

Varshney contends that "most of the time and in most places, ethnic or national mobilization cannot begin without value-rational microfoundations" (Varshney 2003, 86). Yet value-rational basis is not sufficient for ethnic mobilization on its own. Ethnonationalist elites may need to devise strategies and form coalitions. It is also the case that some ethnic members may join once the movement gains some momentum and its chances of success increase, potentially, for instrumental-rational reasons. Therefore, opportunity-related factors and instrumental rationality may gain prominence for the movement as it evolves. Yet, the importance of instrumental rationality does not detract from the important role that value rationality plays in the early stages of mobilization and in recruiting the aggrieved ethnic members during all stages.

Conclusion

The connection between grievances and conflict has been long debated. Whereas early empirical studies in the literature on intrastate conflict discredited

grievances as viable explanations, the notion of horizontal inequalities allowed us to reconsider how grievances influence conflict dynamics. This notion suggests that grievances that form at the group level are associated with conflict. Using this notion, studies have found that horizontal political inequalities and horizontal economic inequalities increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset.

I claim that the connection between horizontal inequalities and conflict onset is mainly due to the tie of horizontal inequalities to identity. I argue that, as a result of this tie, horizontal cultural inequalities have a more direct connection to grievances, and thus to conflict onset. This tie is due to cognitive and ideological reasons. The cognitive portion suggests that horizontal cultural inequalities are easier to observe in the absence of other forms of inequalities. The ideological portion suggests that, as a result of cognitive processes that make it easier to identify horizontal cultural inequalities, ethnonationalist movements influenced by modern nationalist ideologies facilitate the process of gaining ethnic self-consciousness and capitalize on the horizontal inequalities to mobilize their coethnics.

I also note that the modern ideal of authenticity and resulting politics of recognition help make sense of individual motivations for supporting ethnonationalist movements in the absence of recognition or due to the misrecognition of their identity. People depend on their significant others for the formation of their social group identity which takes place dialogically. Once their social identity forms as they become full human agents capable of defining their identity as members of a culture-bearing group, they demand preserving their originality for their culture at the group level and they want their cultural group to be true to itself. In chapter 4, I focus on forms of horizontal cultural inequalities that have been particularly relevant since the emergence of modern nation-states: educational language policies preventing minority groups to receive education in their native language. The influence of exclusionary educational language policies is very significant because these policies not only

take away ethnic groups' chances to be true to their own culture, but also they have the capacity to assimilate ethnic minorities and wipe out their language.

CHAPTER FOUR

MODERNIZATION, ASSIMILATION, AND CONFLICT

Introduction

Nationalist ideologies have come to define the political landscape of the modern world. As a result, it is impossible to theorize the political interactions of ethnic groups without exploring the role nationalist ideas may play. The discussion in Chapter 2 notes that nationalism is very much related to ethnic mobilization for political demands. In fact, nationalist ideas are influential for mobilization because they affect both majority groups and minority groups. On one hand, majority groups use state tools in their pursuit of nation-building and they employ nationalist policies including policies of assimilation. On the other hand, ethnonationalist movements claiming to represent minority groups try to preserve their culture and achieve self-rule in the forms of autonomy or independence. To that end, they resist the domestic colonization of the state and the forces of assimilation. These political strategies of both majority and minority groups result from nationalist ideologies and developments related to modernization.

Explaining the connection between horizontal inequalities and grievances, Chapter 3 shows that ethnic mobilization against the state requires certain conditions to materialize. For horizontal inequalities to turn to grievances, there needs to be group identification, intragroup comparison regarding inequalities between them, evaluation of injustice in these inequalities, and holding the state responsible for the injustice. I argue that these conditions are satisfied more easily in the presence of horizontal cultural inequalities than other types of horizontal inequalities mainly for cognitive, but also for ideological reasons. Cognitively, horizontal cultural inequalities are more likely to be identified by people in their daily life due to their direct connection to identity. After they are

observed, ideologically, injustices targeting culture and identity are easier to be politicized by ethnonationalist leaders.

After laying the foundations in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I discuss historical processes that are related to the mechanism I explore in this dissertation and offer my theory on the association between educational language policies and conflict onset in this chapter. I do this in three sections. In the first section, I discuss the historical progression of this mechanism. I first discuss the influence of linguistic standardization and bureaucratic expansion on the gradual transition from a premodern state to a modern state. Exploring this transition helps with understanding why and how are modern states different from their predecessors. Second, I illustrate this transition using the French case. More specifically, I explore the state of the society in rural France before the mass public education and the changes that came to their governance following the French Revolution. Third, I discuss the process of the development of the public school system for the conversion of the rural non-French population into French citizens and for inculcating nationalism in all French citizens. Fourth, I note that pursuing assimilation is not a strategy that is guaranteed to succeed, and in fact, assimilationist policies are conducive to creating a feeling of resentment. Despite its unique advantages to face minimum backlash, even in the French case, the assimilation process did not go very smoothly. Various cases that are discussed throughout this work denote that such resentments are not uncommon and minority populations can develop their imagined communities in reaction to their state despite the attempts of the state to undermine it. The process examined in this section illustrates the claims and the theory offered in the rest of the chapter well. This section is mainly centered around France because the French case is illustrative of the process of modernization that led to the assimilation of its ethnolinguistic minorities who consisted of a considerable portion of the population and because it was the earliest case of nation-building and assimilation driven by nationalist ideas which, in return, made it a model for nationalists in other states.

In the following section, I expand on the majority-minority dichotomy regarding nationalism as introduced in Chapter 2. I note two differences that influence the likelihood of success for both types. An ethnic group that is the largest group in a given region has a better opportunity for success for possessing a higher capacity. In addition, the global norm of juridical statehood provides an additional advantage for majority groups by protecting their territorial integrity while curbing the opportunity of minority groups to succeed. These are the structural conditions that ethnonationalist groups formed around a minority ethnic group operate under and that encompass the cases explored in this work. In the second subsection, I discuss the process that precedes the formation of minority nationalism. Here, my focus is on the politics of language in nation-states. I highlight that language is central to ethnic groups and that the transition from premodern to modern states led to attacks on minority languages. In doing so, I also explain why governments pursue assimilationist policies against their minorities at the risk of aggrieving them. Whereas the previous section explores the historical progression of the topic, this section focuses on the structural conditions that cover the cases studied in this work and that have influenced the strategies of majority and minority groups regarding their political goals. Finally, I summarize and bring together the arguments I make in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and the preceding sections of Chapter 4 as I offer my theory on the association between educational language policies and conflict onset.

Modernization, Colonization, Assimilation, and Resistance

Modernization

The transition from a premodern state to a modern state was precipitated by two notable processes: the standardization of the state language and the expansion of bureaucracy. For the first process, four factors played a vital role. First, print capitalism facilitated the creation of standardized print languages in Europe based on vernaculars as discussed in Chapter 2 with Anderson's constructivist theory of nationalism. Whereas books were mainly published for the Latin

market previously, this market was quickly saturated following the printing press because Latin was used only by a small number of elites across the continent. Thus, publishers had to expand to other markets in search of profit. Publishing in vernaculars made it possible for the public literate in their vernaculars to access and read books. The process of this expansion led to the standardization of print languages by assimilating vernaculars that are similar to each other into one form. In doing so, printing in vernaculars considerably expanded the markets for books to wider geographies.

Secondly, state involvement contributed to the rise of the vernaculars into prominence. Vernaculars were already gaining political power before the printing press and reformation as their use as administrative languages gradually increased. Vernaculars gradually replaced Latin to attain the status of languages of power. This transition was for pragmatic reasons, though. Vernaculars were adopted as administrative languages for the convenience of state officials rather than as a part of a nationalist policy agenda (Anderson 2006, 41–42). Thirdly, as Anderson notes, the *philological-lexicographic revolution* was one of the most influential factors on the standardization of languages and the emergence of linguistic imagined communities (Anderson 2006, 83). In fact, “the nineteenth century was, in Europe and its immediate peripheries, a golden age of vernacularizing lexicographers, grammarians, philologists, and litterateurs” (Anderson 2006, 71). Professional intellectuals created monolingual dictionaries, bilingual dictionaries, grammar books, and books on the history of languages and the literary history of these languages. Literary works were published in minority languages in the European empires by intellectuals to show that the ability to produce complex works was not reserved for the majority languages and that their languages were also capable of serving such functions (Anderson 2006, 71–75).

Finally, the industrial revolution contributed to the standardization of print languages by gradually expanding literacy and spreading print material from a

small number of elites to society at large. While the products of the print market reached the reading classes, these classes consisted of only around half of the population in Britain and France around 1840. Reading classes were, “in addition to the old ruling classes of nobilities and landed gentries, courtiers and ecclesiastics, rising middle strata of plebeian lower officials, professionals, and commercial and industrial bourgeoisies” (Anderson 2006, 76). This rising middle stratum was born out of the economic development following the industrial revolution. In a rural country like Russia, only around 2 percent of the population was literate. The expansion of reading classes following the industrial revolution contributed to the adoption of the standardized form by society.

The second notable development around the mid-nineteenth century was the bureaucratic expansion seen across Europe. This development was also a consequence of the industrial revolution, though a comparable increase in Russia shows that Russia emulated its rivals in Western Europe. State bureaucracies grew at a considerable rate even though there were not any major wars fought around this time. Table 4.1 shows the per capita increase in state expenditures between 1830 and 1850 (Hobsbawm 1996, 192).

A part of the increase in spending was due to the expansion in services that were already offered. This type of increase resulted mainly from the growing needs for governance following the growth of the cities, such as the need for a larger judicial system and for a larger system of municipal administration. Another reason for the increase in state spending was the adoption of new functions by states, such as modern national police forces, a public education system, a public railway service, a large postal service, etc. Each service, both old and new, was provided usually by career officials who served under a single national institution that was tied to the central government. Even the most basic functions of a modern state, “such as the efficient assessment and collection of taxes by a body of salaried officials or the maintenance of a regular nationally organized rural

Table 4.1 - Per capita increase in state expenditures between 1830 and 1850

State	Growth (%)
Austria	70
Belgium	50
France	40
Netherlands	90
Russia	44
Spain	25
USA	75

constabulary, would have seemed beyond the wildest dreams of most pre-revolutionary absolutisms” (Hobsbawm 1996, 193).

With the expansion of bureaucracy came the colonization of the peripheral rural regions of the state. To clarify, what is discussed here is not the expansion into the overseas colonies, it is rather the expansion into the relatively close territories that are mostly, though not always, contiguous to the capital. During the process of domestic colonization, the periphery was incorporated into the national center both physically and culturally. This expansion is illustrated very well in the elaborate work of Weber (1976), *Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*, which investigates the expansion of Paris into rural France to transform France into a modern nation-state and to create national unity. Although this work covers a single case, this illustrative case illuminates the modernization process that many states have gone through under which diverse premodern societies are transformed into modern nation-states. The process of modernization in France, which was probably the earliest case of nation-building, was emulated by other modernizing states that closely followed the French recipe for success in order to accomplish their political, social, cultural, and economic goals. The following two sections discuss the French colonization of the periphery and the assimilation of ethnic minorities into the Parisian language and culture respectively.

The French Colony of France

France had a quite diverse population and was far from united before initiating its top-down modernization process following the French Revolution. There was a clear urban-rural divide in the country and many intellectuals labeled the rural population in different parts of the country as “savages” and despised their backwardness (Weber 1976, 3). At the time, the prevailing belief was “that areas and groups of some importance were uncivilized, that is, unintegrated into, unassimilated to French civilization: poor, backward, ignorant, savage, barbarous, wild, living like beasts with their beasts” (Weber 1976, 5). Many

pointed out the need to civilize these people; “they had to be taught manners, morals, literacy, a knowledge of French, and of France, a sense of the legal and institutional structure beyond their immediate community” (Weber 1976, 5).

This perception stems from the divide that existed between the urban and rural populations resulting from different levels of access to the forces of modernization. Departments and parishes in France lived under a system of autarky. People in many rural towns lived in isolation, not just from the center, but also from neighboring towns. Due to low accessibility from outside, therefore, they developed largely, though not completely, self-sufficient local economies. As a result, “peasants grew what they needed or learned to need only what they could grow, kept what they could store, and sold what they could as best they could” (Weber 1976, 42). The isolation was so strong that rural people who grew their own grain were not even aware of the grain shortages in the hard winter of 1847 in France. Yet the self-sufficiency was more psychological than material. Even someone from only ten or fifteen miles away was still considered a foreigner as late as the 1930s. The rural people were still involved with the urban markets near them, but they managed to preserve their cultural isolation (Weber 1976, 41–42, 49).

There was solidarity between locals which was quickly replaced by suspicion when they encountered outsiders who are unfamiliar to them. Peasants were unwilling to give information to anyone unfamiliar, especially to government officials, and when they did, they often provided misleading information. The main reason for peasants’ suspicion of government officials was “the devastating intrusions of the alien law and its representatives” into their world (Weber 1976, 50). Whether it was the official tax collectors, the gendarmes, or the bailiff, the experiences of the often-illiterate countryman with this alien law were mostly negative. Any official affair, such as settling an inheritance, taking loans, land sales, or court costs, was overwhelming to handle for peasants due to the

complexity of official paperwork. In addition, it often cost them enormous amounts relative to how little they had (Weber 1976, 44–45, 50).

The urban-rural divide was a major obstacle to the modernization of France, though it was not the only one. Unlike the late twentieth century, a considerable portion of the French people did not speak French according to official figures from 1863. 8,381 out of 37,510 communes in France did not speak any French at the time. According to the figures of the Ministry of Public Instruction, 448,328 school children who were between the ages of seven to thirteen out of a total number of 4,018,427 did not speak any French. An additional 1,490,269 students “spoke or understood it but could not write it, suggesting an indifferent grasp of the tongue” (Weber 1976, 67). When figures for individual departments are investigated, outside evidence shows that the number of non-French speakers in several departments is more than what is claimed by these official figures. Overall, “the Third Republic found a France in which French was a foreign language for half the citizens” (Weber 1976, 67–70).

Perhaps the main reason for the persistence of this diversity was simply that the Kingdom saw no substantial benefit in assimilating its population, and therefore, assimilating ethnic groups who spoke different languages had no significance for the French Crown. The Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts in 1539 established the use of French in matters that are relevant for the King’s court, such as legal and judicial processes. It also required that every public act of life, such as each person’s baptism, marriage, and death, be recorded in French in every parish within the King’s dominions. Consequently, the linguistic unity of the subjects does not seem to have been a goal for the French Crown whose main focus was centralizing the administration. In fact, in the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, Louis XIV ensured his new subjects that they have the right to speak any language they want (Weber 1976, 71).

Nevertheless, the use of the French language was spreading in the urban centers that are rather accessible for Paris, such as in Champagne, Burgundy, Normandy,

and the Loire valley. It spread not only among men of law, nobility, and clergy who were required to know French for their role in the public administration following the centralization policies, also among the middle and upper classes. Because French had high prestige and “there was the increasing vogue and availability of theaters and opera houses: an influence comparable to that of twentieth-century cinema, with everyone eager to adopt the admired accents and turns of phrase used on the stage” (Weber 1976, 71). The use of French was widespread in literary and philosophical works as well as in newspapers and journals. Fashion from Paris was followed closely by urban middle and upper classes. Despite its spread in urban centers, the French language did not make inroads into rural France where different languages are spoken, not only because the state made little to no effort about assimilating non-French ethnolinguistic groups, also because the process of Francization of the urban centers did not make much of an influence on the rural population due to their isolation. The difficulty of accessing isolated rural populations allowed them to preserve their culture and way of life against the forces of assimilation by the center (Weber 1976, 41, 71).

Linguistic diversity started to be perceived as a problem following the French revolution. The new regime sought ideological unity of the citizens and linguistic diversity was viewed as a threat to it. Citizens needed to understand the developments in the Republic and were expected to participate in the political process. But it was difficult to integrate the population into the political process through propaganda if they did not speak French. In 1792, Jacobins argued in the National Convention that the unity of the republic called for the unity of speech and viewed various other tongues as “remnants of the barbarism of past ages” (Weber 1976, 72).

Two prominent and interrelated factors helped transform the population into “proper” citizens who speak French and who internalize the ideals of the Republic. The first one is an exogenous factor, the industrial revolution. The

industrial revolution sped up the process in various ways, but most notably by increasing social mobility. Job prospects in new factories attracted rural populations into urban centers. The working force consisted of various ethnic groups speaking different languages. Learning French, as a common language, was necessary for workers to be able to communicate with each other (Weber 1976, 78). Also related to the industrial revolution, roads were built to connect the isolated rural communities to the rest of the country. There were already roads in place, but these earlier roads were built to serve the needs of the government and of the cities, such as to move troops or to collect tax revenues, so the layout of the road system did not correspond to the needs of the wider public. Under the Third Republic, an extensive road network was built that covered the entire country (Weber 1976, 195–97).

The second factor is government policies that were enacted to assimilate the population and achieve national unity. This factor is also related to the first one in the sense that the industrial revolution expedited bureaucratic expansion by contributing to the increase in state capacity. Additionally, developments in technology furthered the government's efforts. The government employed numerous policies, some of which are particularly of note. In 1792, the National Convention acted to replace dialects with French by abolishing them. It decreed that “children must learn ‘to speak, read and write in the French language’” and that French should be the only language of instruction across the French Republic (Weber 1976, 72). The policies of replacing inferior dialects with French were seen as an important part of the mission to civilize their speakers and to bring them into the modern world. To that end, the government used its power to support French against other languages. The official affairs were not done exclusively in French before 1870. But the Third Republic made having an official certificate a requirement for every civil service position, even if it is a minor role. In other words, becoming a public servant required one to have learned French (Weber 1976, 85). The government was not hesitant to use its powers to eliminate the use of languages in social life, either. For instance, a ministerial decree in

1890 banned religious instructions in Flemish, though the ban was hard to implement. There was a similar ban in Brittany on the use of Breton and many priests in Brittany refused to comply with the government's ban. In response, the government suspended the salaries of 51 priests in Finistère. Such bans were largely ineffective, but the impact of the forces of assimilation from multiple fronts started to be visible in the early twentieth century, shortly before the First World War (Weber 1976, 82, 88).

Creating Nation Through Public Education

A nation is not just a group of people who speak the same language. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is a group of people who feel familial bonds with each other in some capacity. In other words, assimilation is not only about converting one's language, it is also, or perhaps mainly about converting one's feeling of belonging. To create a nation, all members of the society, not just the minorities, need to be converted to imagine a belonging outside of their locality. The French government wanted to convert everyone within the borders of the Republic into French citizens who consider themselves a part of the French nation.

The most effective tool for such a conversion, probably by far, was public education. Because "adults were too deeply rooted in their backwardness" whereas children are malleable (Weber 1976, 334). Any future planning, therefore, starts with shaping the minds of future citizens. Be that as it may, establishing a public education system that is capable of achieving this task was not easy. Existing schools were in terrible conditions. Teachers were not trained for the job, in fact, a teacher "could well have been a retired soldier, a rural constable, the local barber, innkeeper, or grocer, or simply a half-educated peasant's son" in the first half of the nineteenth century (Weber 1976, 305). In addition to the bad conditions of schools and the inadequacy of teachers, the education did not make any sense to students who did not speak or understand French, so they mostly learned by rote (Weber 1976, 304–7).

A law was passed in 1833 to remedy some of these issues and to improve the quality of public education. This law introduced a requirement of an official certificate to be able to operate a school. Each department was to set up schools and teachers were to be trained by a normal school under government supervision. From 1833 to 1847, the number of schools doubled, the total number of students increased nearly threefold, and the number of normal schools increased from 38 to 47. Another law in 1881 made public education free for all by removing fees and tuition charges. More reforms were introduced shortly after. Public education was made compulsory in 1882, every village that housed more than 20 children at school age was required to maintain an elementary school in 1883, the government allotted subsidies to build and maintain schools and to pay the salaries of teachers in 1885, and an elementary teaching program and elaborate provisions for the management of this program was set up in 1886. The public education budget increased by around 150 percent between 1878 and 1885 to fund the reforms, from 53,640,714 francs to 133,671,671 (Weber 1976, 307–9).

Before public education was made compulsory, the state struggled to attract children to schools, particularly in rural areas. An education law was introduced in 1867 to increase the number of students who receive free education. Though it helped, it was not sufficient. The labor of children was crucial for the family budget. In addition, education did not seem to teach children valuable skills that have practical applications in daily life, as far as parents could observe. Because of this, families were reluctant to pay for educating their children. Even when the education was free, there were other obstacles. It still costed money to buy necessary books and school supplies and many families could not afford these additional expenses (Weber 1976, 321–26).

Many obstacles notwithstanding, the public perception started to change as people started to see benefits in schooling. Military law of 1872 threatened illiterate conscripts to serve for an extra year in the military. Disadvantages for

not having received public education did play a role in higher attendance numbers, but the main factor behind the growth was the access that the school certificate provided to public and private employment prospects. Public education offered children of poor farmers opportunities for prestigious jobs within the state bureaucracy which had been continuously expanding under the Third Republic. Seeing the value of the diploma, families were more willing to send their children to schools (Weber 1976, 326–28).

After public education became compulsory and the rural population understood that education can lead to a better life, education became a more effective tool for the government to convert peasants into Frenchmen. Peasants “spoke ungrammatically, used characteristic locutions, mishandled the small vocabulary at their command” and “the only escape from this was education, which taught order, cleanliness, efficiency, success, and *civilization*” (Weber 1976, 329). Education would soften one’s “savagery” and improve their behavior and morality. Schooling helped students adopt the habits of cleanliness and taught them manners. Schools enforced some rules to keep students’ hair, nails, and ears clean. To teach the importance of schools and education, stories were incorporated into classes where the characters would be embarrassed by their ignorance as people laugh at their mistakes. The reason for the use of such elements in education was to counter the education children had already received in their social life. Students had to abandon their local culture and adopt the superior national culture. The goal was to shape “individuals to fit into societies and cultures broader than their own, and persuading them that these broader realms are their own, as much as the *pays* they really know and more so” (Weber 1976, 331). National unity would be cultivated as students from diverse backgrounds receive a similar education and are taught similar values by teachers who were trained together by the central government (Weber 1976, 329–31).

As a great socializing agent, one of the most important functions of modern schooling is teaching patriotism. The school must “teach children national and

patriotic sentiments, explain what the state did for them and why it exacted taxes and military service, and show them their true interest in the fatherland” (Weber 1976, 332). Students are taught that loving the fatherland is their first duty; the fatherland is not one’s village, it is France in its entirety. It is a family that each student is a part of and it is their duty to defend it as soldiers, and if needed, even die for it. Children are taught songs that would stir up their emotions and implant the love of their fatherland, such as *La Marseillaise*. History and geography classes are taught as “instruments of indoctrination and patriotic conditioning” (Weber 1976, 333). Nearly all schools were supplied maps to inculcate the image of the nation’s borders in the minds of children. Tales of past French glories were other powerful symbols used during the indoctrination (Weber 1976, 332–34).

As a result of nationalist policies in schooling, “a Catholic God ... was replaced by a secular God: the fatherland and its living symbols, the army, and the flag. The catechism was replaced by civics lessons. Biblical history, proscribed in secular schools, was replaced by the sainted history of France. French became more than a possession of the educated: it became a patrimony in which all could share, with significant results for national cohesion, as the 1914 war would show” (Weber 1976, 336). After the French revolution, revolutionaries complained that the rural population does not possess patriotism. They noted that it was an urban notion and that only enlightened people could understand the concept. The path and the vision of the revolutionaries, however, changed this reality nearly a century later: The French state successfully colonized the land and the minds and created a sense of collective unity among the French people. After capturing the political power, the nationalist elites created the French nation by assimilating minorities into the French culture and language and by indoctrinating the masses using public education (Weber 1976, 98).

Nationalist Resistance to Linguistic Unification Policies

The introduction of mass schooling during the late eighteenth century in Europe and its gradual spread to the world in the twentieth century (Ramirez and Boli 1987) had a substantial impact on the dynamics of cultural transmission. The expansion of bureaucracy in modern nation-states enabled governments to influence more aspects of the daily life of an average individual (Fairclough 2001, 176). An inevitable consequence of this expansion was the clashes between different languages, as highlighted in the French case. Before modern nation-states, ethnic minorities enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy (Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999). Consequently, the language used by the state administration had little relevance for them. Nation-states' internal colonization efforts through the gradual expansion of bureaucracy, mass education, and other government services to every corner of states, however, made policies around language planning directly relevant for their minority populations. The process of Franche-Comte's integration into modern France follows a common pattern in nation-states.

The strain must have been intense when the forces of order—army, gendarmes, judges (except justices of the peace), and police—came from outside, and when the normal friction between police and natives was rendered more acute by linguistic differences. Order imposed by men of different code and speech, somebody else's order, is not easily distinguished from foreign conquest. In the southwest, wrote M. F. Pariset in 1867, union with France “was suffered, not accepted. The fusion was accomplished slowly and against the will.” Forty years later, when Ernest Ferroul, the Socialist mayor of Narbonne, charged that the barons of the north were invading the Midi as in the olden days of the Albigeois, *Le Figaro* warned its readers: “Make no mistake, this is a country to be reconquered, as in the days of Simon de Montfort.” (Weber 1976, 487)

Violent reactions to the internal colonization efforts on large scales were largely missing in France in the nineteenth century. Even though it took longer in some places than in others, however, the policies of assimilation successfully integrated non-French minorities into the French nation for the most part. It is possible to claim that France was uniquely positioned with certain advantages for successfully assimilating its minorities with minimum backlash. Owing to its political power, the majority group within a state usually claims that their language and culture are superior to that of the minorities. In the French case, though, this claim of “cultural superiority” was also supported externally. The French culture and language were dominant, not only in France but also in the entire continent as “the courts of Berlin, Hanover, Dresden, Kassel, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Munich and Vienna, the centres of political and intellectual life in the German-speaking world, had all begun to adopt aspects of French culture and to use French among themselves” in the seventeenth century (Wright 2016, 134–35). French had become the *lingua franca* long before the revolution. Its formidable economic and military power added to the prestige of the state and the culture. French scientists and thinkers were influential throughout Europe (Wright 2016, 137). As a result, French remained the most learned foreign language in Europe for three centuries. Domestically, as discussed, the French culture had already been converting the urban counterparts of the minority populations. Prospective intellectual elites of minority ethnic groups, who would be expected to lay the foundations of the imagined communities of their minority nations, had already been switching to the French side. Weber’s work reveals that what was left of the minorities, in other words, their rural population, was not able to withstand the forces of assimilation by themselves.

Even though France had certain advantages that facilitated the assimilation of its minorities, it is important to keep in mind that policies of assimilation are not unlikely to produce unintended consequences. After a difficult and rough path, these policies may work as planned, as they did in the French case. But the success of France should not mislead us to think that it was bound to succeed

without a conflict. Perhaps in the context of the nineteenth century “risings capable of seriously threatening the state were a thing of the past” (Weber 1976, 491). But still, frustrations were not uncommon. People took up arms and rebelled against the French administrators and police for crushing the locals in the Pyrenees. Living separately from the mainland, Corsicans were not enthusiastic about losing their autonomy. For French officials, serving in Savoy, where the relationship between the government and the natives was tense, was almost like serving in the colonies. Camille Le Mercier d’Erm depicted Bretons, a Celtic ethnic group that is native to Brittany, as a nation that was oppressed in a similar way to others in Ireland, Bohemia, Finland, and Poland (Weber 1976, 487–91).

These frustrations went a step further in the Breton case. Nationalist Breton elites founded the Breton Nationalist Party in 1931. The main goal of the party was to secede from France. Breton nationalists were aware that the high state capacity of France made their success unlikely. Thus, they believed that only an invasion of France by another state would make their independence possible. To that end, they allied Nazi Germany, which proved to be a big miscalculation. Not only that it turned out during World War II that the Nazis were not sympathetic to the secessionist goals of the Breton nationalists, wartime actions of the party made it easier for the French government to crucify the movement without facing any backlash from the Bretons (Leach 2010).

Policies of linguistic unification were not restricted to France; “the general growth in literacy, commerce, industry, communications and state machineries that marked the nineteenth century created powerful new impulses for vernacular linguistic unification within each dynastic realm” (Anderson 2006, 77–78). Austria-Hungary kept Latin, a rather neutral language, as the state language until the early 1840s, though it had become clear by then that Latin was in decline and its ability to remain a language to conduct business, science, or literature was in question. In various states in Europe, the gap from Latin’s

decline was quickly filled by the vernaculars that enjoyed political power and that corresponded to the language widely spoken by the (political) majority ethnic group. Attaining this convergence before the spread of nationalist ideas was the main factor that prevented dramatic political effects as English expanded in Ireland at the expense of Gaelic, French to replace Breton in Brittany, and Castilian against Catalan in Catalonia.

Yet attempts for linguistic unification worked differently in the dynastic empires of Europe than in Western Europe. Dynasties “settled on certain print-vernaculars as languages-of-state - with the 'choice' of language essentially a matter of unselfconscious inheritance or convenience” (Anderson 2006, 84). The Habsburgs chose to elevate German to the status of the language of the state in Austria-Hungary. This move was not tied to any German nationalist agenda, nor it was against the Hungarian language. It was simply because Latin was not sufficient to serve the state functions that related to the masses. There was an emerging need to identify a unifying language that could be used across the empire. German was the obvious choice due to the presence of a considerable German-speaking population that was spread across the empire and whose language possessing a vast culture and literature under its belt. Yet, choosing German, or any language for that matter, would provide advantages to its speakers and show that the state was siding with its speakers at the expense of the speakers of other languages. After ethnonationalist elites undertake a philological-lexicographic revolution in their ethnic language, however, they can reasonably be expected to react to such a decision that, in the long run, will hurt their language. This is precisely what happened in the case at hand, Hungary. Though there was no bourgeoisie class in Hungary, there was another class ready to take on the fight. The defenders of print-Hungarian against the German language were Hungarian aristocrats who consisted of one eighth of the Hungarian society, which was a considerable portion. Unlike the French minorities, rural Hungarians were not alone in their struggle against their state and this gave them a better chance to withstand (Anderson 2006, 78–79, 84).

“By the second decade of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, a 'model' of 'the' independent national state was available for pirating” and “the marginalized vernacular-based coalitions of the educated” were up for the task of creating and leading nationalist movements (Anderson 2006, 81). A similar reaction to the Hungarian case can be observed across Central and Eastern Europe where popular nationalist movements were born out of linguistic imagined communities (Anderson 2006, 79). The spread of nationalist ideas posed challenges for European dynasties as they had ruled over multiple ethnic groups and many of them could claim nationhood. In response to popular nationalisms, the dynasties devised what is called “official nationalisms” (Seton-Watson 1977, 148). It was developed as an attempt to preserve their political power. Dynasts had hoped that if they provided their ethnic minorities with an alternative identity, these minorities would not pursue ethnonationalist ideas. Though this attempt was in response to popular nationalisms, official nationalisms were adapted from popular nationalisms at the same time (Anderson 2006, 86, 110).

Official nationalisms took the form of “Russification” in the Romanov Empire and “Anglicization” in the British Empire (Anderson 2006, 86, 90). In doing so, they revealed “a world-wide contradiction: Slovaks were to be Magyarized, Indians Anglicized, and Koreans Japanified, but they would not be permitted to join pilgrimages which would allow them to administer Magyars, Englishmen, or Japanese” (Anderson 2006, 110). This restriction was not caused simply by racism. Despite the attempts of the dynasts to create a common identity, new nations were emerging also at their core that imagined their own community, as the Magyars, the Englishmen, and the Japanese, that did not include the foreign minorities. Indeed, dynastic empires fell one by one, failing to counter against popular nationalisms, not only from their minorities or their colonies but also from within their core. Consequently, popular nationalist movements led to the emergence of new imagined communities, and the process of political consolidation around the world through colonization was disrupted as empires gave way to nation-states (Anderson 2006, 111).

Minority Nationalism and Politics of Language

Minority Nationalism and Self-Rule

Despite their similarities, as noted in Chapter 2, cases of majority nationalism and minority nationalism manifest a significant level of difference in their ability to expel/oust their foreign ruler or enemy. In cases of majority nationalism, the path to self-rule has proven to be relatively straightforward. Once nationalism takes hold among the members of a group to mobilize sufficient forces, it is relatively easy for them to defeat the enemy that attempts to keep them subjugated, whether it is a monarch, a colonial administration, or agents of a foreign invasion.

On the contrary, the path to self-rule has not been very simple for minority groups for two main reasons. First, a majority group has an easier time claiming sovereignty for having a better opportunity for success. A more populous group in a given territory can simply muster a larger army. Second, the norm of juridical statehood has disproportionately benefitted majority groups against the minorities within the borders of a state (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Following World War II, the juridical statehood norm brought stability to the borders of states around the world. The sovereignty of nation-states and their territorial integrity were recognized by their peers who considered them equals in status. The strength of the norm of juridical statehood minimized foreign challenges, and as a result, allowed majority groups to remain majorities within their respective states. In other words, this relatively new post-World War II development disproportionately benefitted majority groups at the expense of minorities.

If a minority group was not able to sufficiently mobilize to seek independence at the time of a transition during which new borders are drawn and nation-states are established, it is severely disadvantaged to try it at a later point in time. Kurds in Turkey and Iraq are good examples of this, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Kurdish nationalism failed when new borders were being drawn

after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It failed mainly because Kurdish nationalism did not gain momentum among Kurdish peasants and thus remained restricted to the intellectual elites, but also because of the weakness of those who mobilized after the collapse of the Ottomans relative to Turkish nationalists. Kurds constitute a large ethnic group in both countries and Kurdish independence movements with nationalist elements have been present for decades. However, they have to defeat their nation-states with powerful armies if they are to achieve the level of self-rule that they desire. Given this disadvantage, a minority group may need foreign support to succeed, as in the case of Kosovo (Paquin 2010, 115–21), or may benefit from other factors and succeed without foreign support, as in the case of Eritrea (Thomas and Falola 2020, 129). In any scenario, the two factors that are discussed have made it quite difficult, if not impossible, for nationalist minority movements to succeed in their quest for self-rule.

Assimilation and Politics of Language

Anderson makes a convincing case for the connection between language and nationalism. To reiterate, this is not to say that a nation originates exclusively from an ethnolinguistic group. A nation can also be formed around a religion, a territory, a race, or another ethnic marker. But, Anderson's work highlights that the particular role language has played has been instrumental in the rise and spread of nationalism. As arguably the most common form, linguistic imagined communities came to replace premodern local loyalties and led to the rise of nation-states around the world.

Dynastic empires may have been too large and overstretched to keep multiple ethnic groups under their control in the age of nationalism. However, nation-states have not had as much difficulty achieving this task. Most nation-states have controlled territories that are much smaller than empires. Additionally, most nation-states have relied on their majority ethnic group that usually consists of a large portion of their population whereas empires usually governed

several large ethnic groups. The members of the majority ethnic group in a nation-state were not just subjects anymore, instead, they became the collective owners of the state. In the age of nationalism, even the new autocrats had to rely on their core ethnic groups to preserve their power. These factors, along with others that are discussed, such as bureaucratic expansion and the norm of juridical statehood, made it easier for states to retain their monopoly of violence over their territories.

The bureaucratic expansion following the industrial revolution brought about another change in the nation-states. Taking advantage of their increased capacity, states imposed considerable restrictions on minority populations that were previously governed largely autonomously. In this sense, the expansion of central governments into minority territories, with their administrators, police forces, schools, courts, etc., was colonial. An inevitable clash occurs when the colonized ethnic group speaks a different language from the majority group. Cleavages around linguistic issues are likely to emerge in modern nation-states simply because the language “is an inescapable medium of public discourse, government, administration, law, courts, education, media and public signage” (Brubaker 2015, 89). The pervasiveness of language in politics and everyday life makes it nearly impossible for states to be neutral between languages (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2015).

Language holds a central position for ethnic identity. Culture and traditions are preserved and transmitted from generation to generation through language. Cleavages around linguistic issues are particularly important also because language is a symbol of dignity for ethnic groups. The status of a language indicates the status that the group and its members have in society (Horowitz 1985, 219–20). Demands for official language status, for example, result from a desire to elevate the status of the group and increase the worth of its members in society. Similarly, not having official recognition of the language denotes a lower

status, and therefore, is perceived as an attack on the dignity of the members of a group.

Educational language policies start affecting individuals very early in life in public schools. If the government does not permit the use of a language spoken by a minority group in public education, children who are members of that minority group would have no other choice but to receive their education in a language that is foreign to them. As children complete their education, their adopted language takes up more space in their lives. In the meantime, they do not develop their linguistic skills in their native language to a similar extent (Hinton 2016). To give an example from the French case, “arithmetic, for example, was taught in French. Thus, even those who normally spoke in some other tongue could reckon sums only in French, the language in which they had learned the skill” (Weber 1976, 84).

Schooling an ethnic group exclusively in a language that is foreign to them can cause large-scale changes in the linguistic skills of members of an ethnic minority which, in return, can create a drastic impact on their language and culture. In other words, if government education is given exclusively in the majority language, the status of a minority language as a medium of communication among its community of speakers becomes endangered. In this case, it is an uphill battle for the prospective minority intellectuals to counter the influence of public education on the linguistic skills of minority children. To refer back to the French case, as Ernest Renan noted in 1889, it was not possible to produce works on science, philosophy, or political economy in patois. Even when peasants spoke patois in their daily lives, they would switch to French if they discussed politics or had any official business (Weber 1976, 85). Minority languages need their own process of modernization to stay relevant in the modern world. But, this process cannot take place if their speakers are modernized by majority groups. Because if they are, their entire educated populations would become fluent only in the majority language on topics for which they received an education. Even if some

intellectuals do undertake the mission to modernize the minority language, it is simply impossible to counter the political and material power of the state and retrain the ethnic populations in their native language after they have already received education from the government. Consequently, unless there are policies in place to preserve them, minority languages are effectively replaced by the majority language as the medium of communication by its native speakers only in two or three generations (May 2012, 2).

If a majority group is dictating its language to the minorities, two potential reasons come to mind. The first reason is that even if the majority may be sympathetic to the damage it does to the minorities, it may simply not be worth the cost and effort. Bureaucracies tend to be incredibly complex structures, thus it is quite expensive for the bureaucracy to accommodate multiple languages. It is also impractical for the government to add a language barrier to government affairs (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2015). Additionally, it is difficult to decide which languages to accommodate. Should a government recognize a language spoken only by a few thousand people who live in a rural area that is losing its young speakers to the urban areas within the domains of the majority language? Even if one may normatively claim that it should, who decides it is worth the high cost it entails? Can this minority language survive in the modern world even if the state attempts to save it? If a few thousand speakers are not sufficient, where do we draw the line? We can pose several questions that do not have clear answers. But we do know that governments are often not very benign on such issues that require accommodating minorities if there are no powerful incentives. This is an inherently political problem and there has to be a demand that is powerful enough to signal that the cost of not accommodating would be high. Even with the signal, unless the state perceives that the cost of assimilation is higher than the cost of accommodation, it may not act on the demand.

The second reason a government is imposing its language on its minorities is that the outcome that I have discussed in this subsection is precisely the goal. In the

age of modern nation-states, governments prefer a homogenous population. In non-homogenous societies, governments, if they are able to, try to create a sense of unity and harmony between citizens in the long-term by assimilating minority groups into the culture and language of the majority group (Grotenhuis 2016, 90). National unity is desired also because it makes governance easier in the long run. Recognizing and accommodating minority languages, however, go against the nature of nation-building projects. Governments are conscious of the power of language in creating imagined communities. Because governments are aware that they themselves are the manifestations of the imagined community that they represent. In other words, assimilationist policies are attempts to prevent the creation of other imagined communities within their domains that may trigger autonomist, or yet worse, secessionist demands in the future. As small as it may be, when there is an ethnic group that speaks a language that is different from the majority language, it is a potential future nation. Remember the Breton case. Should the French not have assimilated its Breton population and incorporated them into the French nation, it is quite likely that we would have seen the Breton nation that has been pushing for independence for Brittany or may have even gained it already. France was nearing the final phase of its assimilation project when the elites of several new nation-states were just getting started with their nation-building campaigns, and many contemporary nation-states did not even exist yet. Following the French success, its model is pirated and emulated by other nation-states who followed the French formula very closely, if not exactly.

In the ideal scenario for governments, public schools assimilate minority groups into the majority language and the minority groups are indoctrinated to support the nationalist project. This may prove successful as happened in the French case, as well as in many others. It is very difficult to predict which ethnic groups would assimilate and which ones would resist because every case has its own idiosyncrasies. It may be possible to find generalizable patterns, but such an attempt requires an in-depth historical analysis and extensive data collection efforts that go back at least to the early nineteenth century. Needless to say, such

data is not available, though it is not within the scope of this work to get a satisfying answer to this question, either.

The particular type of state system that dominated global politics since the Second World War, the system of nation-states, poses an unavoidable challenge for the governments: the need to either accommodate ethnolinguistic minorities or assimilate them. There is no neutral option. The centralization of political power within states ensuing their modernization was certainly not the norm before modernity. For instance, the Crimean Khanate, the Principality of Wallachia, and the Principality of Moldavia had high degrees of autonomy in their internal affairs, despite still being part of the Ottoman Empire (Panaite 2013, 12–25). Religious minorities also enjoyed a substantial level of non-territorial autonomy that covered their communal affairs (Barkey and Gavrilis 2016). In the contemporary world, however, even states that try to preserve some premodern elements in their political systems have increasingly adopted the bureaucratic structures of modern nation-states. 165 states out of 193 members of the United Nations have unitary and highly centralized state structures, though some unitary states still allow for ethnic autonomy (Fisch 2018). Among the small number of federal countries that remain, some federal arrangements are rather territorial and not ethnically-based, as in the cases of Germany and the United States. Though to be clear, it is not to say minorities within federal states that have ethnically-based territorial autonomy are immune from the forces of assimilation. Ethnically-based territorial autonomy does offer some of the highest levels of autonomy ethnic groups can achieve within the confines of nation-states. As the discussion of the French-speaking Quebecois minority in the Canadian case in Chapter 3 indicates, however, it may not be sufficient to alleviate the concerns of minorities in regards to assimilation.

Modernization, Assimilation, and Conflict

Nation-States and Colonization

In this section, I refer back to several concepts and topics that are covered up to this point as I develop a theory on the connection between horizontal cultural inequalities, nationalism, and intrastate conflict. Before proposing the theory, I would like to first reiterate that certain sociological changes that are associated with the transition to modernity made this connection possible. After their emergence, nationalist ideologies spread around the world and their success in mobilizing people around political goals transformed the political landscape of the world.

Nations are conceived by intellectual elites as imagined communities in which members share a familial bond and develop solidarity with one another. The elites then frame their conception of the nation in an ideology and set out to spread it to the masses. Whether it is through revolution or secession, their main goal is capturing political power because of their interests as well as to control the state institutions. Because state institutions are the most effective tools for converting the members of an ethnic group into the nation that they envision building. Before achieving political power, the number of ethnic members a nationalist ideology is able to convert is usually nowhere near to even a simple majority. Yet nationalist elites tend to be quite resourceful and are usually able to convert a sufficient number to start an armed struggle. When the speed of conversion is not enough, nationalists may temporarily use other prominent pre-modern cultural markers that are important for their coethnics for mobilization, such as religion as in the cases of both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism after World War I, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Once they succeed, nationalists use the power of the state institutions to rapidly increase the conversion rate and build the nation through propaganda and indoctrination.

Two common beliefs separate nation from ethnicity as articulated in Chapter 2: the only legitimate rule over a nation is by one of its members and a nation has a

right to sovereignty. Following these beliefs, nations refuse alien rule. Rebellions born out of this refusal are different from premodern rebellions by an ethnic group against their sovereign overlords. In premodern rebellions, a local leader who seeks more power uses his resources and alliances to mobilize his troops against the state, such as Bedir Khan Beg's rebellion against the Ottomans as discussed in Chapter 6. This type of rebellion is more about the leader and is relatively easy to suppress. It is, however, not as easy for states to handle nationalist rebellions. Although nationalist rebellions also rely on their leaders and losing their leaders can be a blow for nationalist movements, they are, in no way, reliant on their leaders for the survival of the movement. Leaders can continue to inspire people as symbols even after their deaths. Nationalist movements rather rely on their burgeoning nation. The community that its members imagine remains in their minds even in the absence of an active movement or under heavy repression. Once the seeds of nationalism are sown, it can outlast its leaders and continue to grow. Because of this, a nationalist rebellion is hard to eradicate for a state.

The theory of intrastate conflict proposed in the next subsection is about what happens after nationalists representing an ethnic group succeed in a given territory for the first time, usually on behalf of the majority group, and establish a modern nation-state. The establishment of a modern nation-state brings changes to all people who live within its borders, regardless of their ethnicity. Nation-states invest in their bureaucracy and start colonizing areas that were previously neglected by the state. As laid out in the case of post-revolutionary France, roads are built and government institutions expand to its provinces. Colonial representatives of the government, such as its police forces, courts, schools, etc., signal a type of intrusion that has never been experienced by the locals. Nation-building introduces ideas about nationhood based on nationalist principles envisioned by the elites of the majority. When the government tries to force the members of a minority ethnic group to learn and adopt the majority language and imagine themselves as a part of the community of the majority, which is a very

frequent consequence of nation-building, it may backfire. Led by a group of elites, the minority group may resist such demands, pirate the ideas they were exposed to, and instead, start imagining their own community that has been distinct from the majority group. To clarify, this is not to say that only the ethnic groups that end up in a nation-state can develop their own nationalism in response to the intrusion of majority nationalism. In fact, a minority nationalism can develop much earlier than the majority group in the state. To give an example, nationalist movements of the ethnic groups in the Balkans developed before Turkish nationalism in the nineteenth century because of their proximity to other nationalist movements in Europe, and thus their earlier exposure to the nationalist ideas than their eastern counterparts. Instead, the point that I am rather making is that the establishment of a modern nation-state forces ethnic minorities to take a position regarding their future because of a sharp transformation of their local domain enforced by the state.

Regarding the culture and identity of the minorities, the outcomes from the foundation of a nation-state and the subsequent interactions between the state and its ethnolinguistic minorities can be categorized into three groups. First, an ethnic minority may not resist government assimilation. As in the French case, an ethnic minority may lack a class of intellectual elites who would mobilize their coethnics and counter the colonization of the government. As a result, minorities would gradually lose their distinct culture and identity, and their future generations would adopt the majority identity. Second, the group may largely assimilate, but may still retain its identity. For instance, Circassian groups in Turkey are largely linguistically assimilated. As shown in a study published in 2017, Circassians who are older than 40 are bilinguals and they preserve their ethnic language in some capacity (Demir and Bolat 2017). However, virtually all young members of Circassian groups below the age of 30 are monolingual Turkish speakers and their knowledge of their heritage language is very limited. Even though Circassians do not view themselves as a nation, their civil society groups make efforts to preserve their distinct culture and identity. Considering

Smith's stages of politicization, however, the political activities of the Circassians can be categorized as a low level of politicization and labeled as "ethnic politics" that do not include protesting foreign rule or demands for sovereignty.

It is also important to keep in mind that the second category may also be a transitioning state to the first category if the members of the group do not embrace their ethnic identity, and instead, associate with the majority identity in future generations. Yet, this may not be the case for all ethnic groups in this category. Assimilation may eliminate ascriptive differences between the members of a minority group and the members of the majority group within a state. In this case, they would be considered a part of the majority group. However, not all ascriptive features of an ethnic group can disappear by cultural changes, and consequently, the ethnic group may not disappear even though its members fully assimilate linguistically. For instance, the members of a racialized ethnic group may not be allowed into the majority group or they may voluntarily prefer preserving their distinct identity. In this case, cultural assimilation does not necessarily achieve national unity, though linguistic unity can still contribute to the creation and preservation of an imagined community that is one based on a common language, territory, and a set of symbols. The third and final outcome is an ethnic group becoming a nation. Regardless of whether its members are assimilated or not, the members of the group not only would know they are a distinct ethnic group but also would most likely make political demands, including demanding autonomy or independence. The Kurdish cases in Turkey and Iraq are examples of this type of outcome. It is worth reminding that there is no option in which ethnic minorities that self-governed under pre-modern political structures are allowed to preserve their status following the foundation of a nation-state that covers the group's territories. Even if the majority group would be sympathetic to accepting their political demands, it would still force the minority group to operate within the modern state structures which are, more often than not, unfriendly towards minorities.

Educational Language Policies and Conflict

The previous subsection, in general terms, explains the role that nationalism has played in the emergence of modern states and its consequences as it relates to the culture and identity of its minorities. This subsection is about how nation-building processes resulting in assimilation can increase the likelihood of conflict onset.

A government can be considered assimilationist if it enacts policies that would assimilate minorities and makes no accommodation about preserving the cultural heritage of minority populations. As discussed in the previous section, one of the goals governments try to achieve by employing assimilationist policies is attaining unity and harmony among the population who shares the same language, culture, and identity, as in the French case. Yet, this is not always the goal. The state may not want the minority group to join the majority group, but it may still choose to assimilate its minority to spread the “superior” culture of the majority and to make it easier to govern the minority group. Thus, even if it is not for national unity, assimilation still has its benefits for the state. As a result, pursuing policies of assimilation is the norm for nation-states.

Groups are aggrieved as a result of horizontal cultural inequalities in the form of unequal access to education in their language for two reasons. First, as illustrated by the French case, educational language policies have a strong impact on the assimilation of minorities, in fact, it is probably the single most effective tool for their linguistic assimilation. Educational language policies that favor the majority language give an unfair advantage to the majority language at the expense of minority languages. It can cause the language of minority populations to be restricted from public life and such restrictions deprive the language of the opportunities for modernization along with the society to become a language of science and literature or preserve its status as one if it already is. Consequently, a language that cannot serve the evolving needs of a modern society faces a slow death. In a couple of generations, its status even as a language of thought and

expression may be endangered. Given the importance of language for the culture and traditions of an ethnic group, such attacks to their language by the state may aggrieve its speakers and get them to support ethnonationalist minority elites who promise to fight this injustice.

Second, grievances form in reaction to a lack of access to education in their own language for minorities because of the signaling impact of such policies regarding the status of the group. To begin with, policies of assimilation facilitate the creation of group identification where it does not exist. Once the group identities are crystallized and politicized, the status of their language relative to the language of the majority group reflects the status of its speakers relative to the majority group and thus allows for the evaluation of injustice. As Taylor notes, the need for recognition at the group level means that culture-bearing groups expect equal political recognition and want their difference to be recognized by the state. Because recognition is a vital human need and exclusionary policies deny people of this vital need and create resentment. By politicizing ethnic categories and by treating ethnic groups differently, the state creates a hierarchy between the groups. The state signals its citizens that those from a certain ethnic group are first-class citizens whereas those who are being assimilated and whose rights are being denied are inferior to the privileged group. If exclusionary linguistic policies result in a minority group being perceived as inferior or of lower status, then grievances form in reaction to horizontal inequalities along the linguistic lines.

Assimilation attempts without accommodations can create three different types of outcomes, as laid out at the end of the previous subsection. The members of one of its ethnolinguistic minority groups can completely assimilate as envisioned by a state, which would be the best-case scenario for the state. Alternatively, groups may assimilate but still preserve their identity, but not make nationalist political demands, which is still preferable for the state. However, groups may also mobilize around ethnonationalist movements and resist the policies of

assimilation, as proposed in the third type of outcome. In this case, even if the members of the group start to assimilate into the majority language simply because it is not likely to counter the overwhelming influence of schooling on the members of the minority group, it does not mean that they will start considering themselves to be a part of the majority group as they are assimilated. They will still know who they are as a collectivity. For instance, the Irish preserved their identity despite losing their language. The introduction of English-only national schools, which were depicted by a dejected clergyman as the graves of Gaelic, contributed to the sharp decline in the number of Gaelic speakers in Ireland in the nineteenth century (Cahill 119). Yet the Irish who were aggrieved by exclusionary policies and various forms of discrimination developed Irish nationalism in reaction to the British colonial rule, fought their colonizers, and gained their independence despite speaking the language of their colonizers.

Horizontal cultural inequalities facilitate ethnonationalist elites to capitalize on the grievances of their coethnics and mobilize them. As their ethnic identity becomes politically salient, individuals are more likely to mobilize if they believe that biased government policies target their group's culture and/or perceive that their group's status faces a threat. In other words, "the state's use of categories may facilitate the expression of grievances, recruitment, and mobilization. Those recruited fighters may be more likely to make corporeal sacrifices due to a perceived threat to the dignity and to demonstrate moral standing among co-ethnics" (Lieberman and Singh 2012). Therefore, assimilation attempts can produce conflict because resulting horizontal cultural inequalities help minority elites recruit aggrieved fighters for their ethnonationalist causes.

On the other hand, governments can also provide accommodations for their ethnic minorities that are meant to recognize their differences and help them preserve their culture and language. This is not to say minority groups that receive sufficient accommodations are appeased and will not fight the government for autonomy or independence. They certainly may, if different

factors help ethnonationalist elites recruit their coethnics. When controlled by other factors, however, we should observe assimilationist educational language policies to increase the likelihood of conflict onset given their enormous influence on minority populations and political accommodations that recognize minorities' right to receive education in their language to decrease it. Accordingly, public education not being offered in a minority language should increase the likelihood of conflict onset. Additionally, given the importance of language as highlighted in this chapter, I expect it to also increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war, i.e. conflict with higher intensity. These claims are hypothesized as follows:

Hypothesis 1: When public education is not offered in the language spoken by the members of an ethnic group prior to their modernization, the likelihood of conflict onset between a rebel group representing the ethnic group and the government increases.

Hypothesis 2: When public education is not offered in the language spoken by the members of an ethnic group prior to their modernization, the likelihood of civil war onset between a rebel group representing the ethnic group and the government increases.

Several factors may mediate the relationship between educational language policies and conflict onset. Some of these factors influence the opportunity dynamic between the state and the rebels. First, organizational capacity is essential for the success of mobilization. Following resource mobilization theory, groups that are larger in size relative to the incumbent groups are more likely to mobilize (Posner 2004) and rise against the government because they have a larger pool to recruit their fighters from and because it provides them “a larger potential resource pool to sustain an organizational infrastructure” (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 96). An increase in group size also indicates a higher level of social learning and cultural transmission (Henrich 2004) which, in return, may increase the likelihood of the spread of minority ethnonationalism. Furthermore, larger groups may be more likely to get educational language rights

as an appeasement strategy, because they are more likely to mobilize. Second, conventional wisdom suggests that states with a higher capacity have a lower chance of facing conflict for two reasons. States with a higher capacity are better able to address their citizen' demands and thus lower the chance of rebels overcoming the collective action problem. Additionally, a higher capacity increases states' ability to deter conflict more successfully "through the threat, or actual use, of physical coercion, which essentially lowers the probability of rebel success" (Sobek 2010, 267). However, the logic of nationalism used in this study may entail a different type of impact. States pursuing policies of nation-building under the influence of the majority group may use their increasing capacity to favor their own culture and language and discriminate against that of ethnic minorities. Resulting grievances may increase the likelihood of conflict onset.

Third, a large country population can make it more difficult for the state to identify potential fighters (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Fourth, rough terrain, such as mountainous territories, can facilitate a rebellion by offering conditions favorable for the rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Fifth, the presence of past conflicts between a group and the state may make it more likely for them to engage in a repeated conflict (Blomberg and Hess 2002). The recurrence of conflict often signals that the underlying issues have not been resolved. In addition, "such situations are likely to foster an increasingly deep sense of resentment among the conflict parties, especially among those who have lost family members, close friends, or property in previous conflict episodes" (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013, 64). Alternatively, past conflicts may also result in adjustments in educational language policies as part of a settlement. Sixth, the presence of an ongoing conflict can increase the likelihood of onset by providing a better opportunity for challengers because potential rebels know that the government fighting on multiple fronts would have to divide its resources (Uzonyi and Demir 2020). Similarly, an increase in the number of groups can increase the risk that governments may have to fight on multiple fronts after a conflict onset and thus may provide a better opportunity for potential rebels.

Other factors can influence conflict dynamics by aggrieving the members of ethnic groups, supporting their recruitment as fighters, and increasing the motivation of the fighters drawn from the group. First, groups that have a closer relationship with the state, which are labeled as in-groups, are less likely to be aggrieved to the level to fight the state than groups that are excluded from power, out-groups. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug argue that “this type of political inequality constitutes a direct violation of the principle of nationalism and self-determination” because it exposes the population to an alien rule (2013, 59).

Whereas I do not think it is necessarily the case that all excluded groups pursue a nationalist agenda and demand access to executive power, out-groups are still more likely to face various forms of discrimination by the state or to be disadvantaged by government policies in comparison to in-groups. For example, in-groups may be more likely to have the right to receive education in their language than out-groups. Second, territorial autonomy provides a degree of self-governance to ethnic minorities, and in doing so, it may address the grievances of group members and appease their ethnonationalist ambitions. Territorial autonomy may facilitate ethnic minorities to use their language in education within their autonomous territory. Alternatively, territorial autonomy can also be beneficial for ethnonationalist movements because it provides them a space with less government supervision which may allow them to mobilize for future conflicts (Snyder 2000).

Third, autocratic regimes that restrict freedoms are more likely to aggrieve their citizens and the grievances may be more pronounced for the minority groups. To clarify, a state being a full democracy does not necessarily indicate that its ethnic minorities enjoy equal rights as the majority group, nor does a state being an autocracy mean that its ethnic minorities are discriminated against. For that reason, identity politics and policies around ethnic groups should be analyzed separately from the level of democracy within states. On the other hand, a state that attempts to discriminate against its ethnic minorities would be more repressive under authoritarian regimes and thus may limit the opportunity of

potential rebels to mobilize and fight against the state. For these reasons, a measure of the level of democracy should be included in the study. Fourth, other minority languages being offered in education may increase the severity of the horizontal inequality for a group whose language is not offered, and consequently, may fuel their grievances further and increase the likelihood of conflict. Keeping these alternative explanations and confounders in mind, the hypotheses on the association between the educational language policies and conflict onset are tested in Chapter 5.

Conclusion

Domestic politics was transformed by the forces of modernization, most prominently, by the spread of nationalism and the growth of government bureaucracy. These two forces were crucial components of nation-building projects. Nationalist ideologies provided the ideological bases whereas the expansion of state bureaucracies provided the tools to build societies envisioned by nationalists. Additionally, developments in technology facilitated the majority encroaching upon minority spaces. Thus, nation-building was a new phenomenon that was not only about transforming the existing system of governance, it was also about its expansion. From the perspectives of ethnolinguistic minorities, however, it was not simply about the expansion of the state as a neutral entity. Because, after all, the state represented an ethnic group that was foreign to them regardless of whether they shared the same state borders or not. As a result, the expansion of the state came at the expense of the culture, identity, and perhaps most visibly, language of its minorities. Consequently, nation-building projects essentially meant the colonization of the periphery by the center. In this work, I refer to the French case extensively to illustrate the process of colonization driven by nationalism and the resulting assimilation of the ethnolinguistic minorities of France.

Yet, I argue that, though the French methods of assimilation have been popular with the nationalists who pursued nation-building within their state, the success

of the French has proven to be not as easy to emulate in modern times as minorities are also able to adopt nationalist ideas. Being ethnic groups themselves, just as the majority groups, many minority groups are aggrieved by this kind of modernization process that creates horizontal cultural inequalities, and as a result, that is hostile to their culture and identity. The exclusion of a minority language from public education is perhaps the most important form of horizontal cultural inequalities between the minority and the majority groups. Because the exclusion of their language from education leads to a gradual decline of their language and its eventual replacement by the majority language. Additionally, this exclusion aggrieves the disadvantaged groups also because it signals that the speakers of the excluded languages are of lower status and their culture is inferior to the majority. Due to the need for recognition at the individual and group levels, as Taylor notes, exclusionary and assimilatory policies create resentment. The resulting grievances increase support for ethnonationalist movements and facilitate mobilization around ethnonationalist goals. Accordingly, I argue that educational language policies that exclude minority languages from education increase the likelihood of conflict onset. In the next two chapters, I test this claim empirically and using supplemental qualitative case studies.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Introduction

After establishing the theory step by step in the preceding chapters and considering potential confounders, this chapter is dedicated to the primary quantitative tests for the hypotheses produced from the theory. The theory is tested at the group level instead of the individual or country level. Although grievances are felt by individuals, ethnic grievances can be studied at the group level due to the importance of preserving originality against foreign intrusions for individuals, as reflected in the modern ideal of authenticity discussed in Chapter 3. In the empirical analysis, several group-level variables that consider both grievances and opportunities are included along with country-level variables that are often used when studying civil conflict. Next, descriptive statistics on the relationship between the dependent variable and the key independent variable are analyzed. This relationship is explored using four datasets that are produced based on two conditions. First, based on the level of conflict intensity, the dependent variable is coded based on a lower threshold and a higher threshold in terms of battle-related deaths. Second, two different sets of cases of conflict are used based on the extent that ethnicity facilitated armed mobilization. Whereas the first set includes all cases that are connected to ethnicity in some way, the second set drops certain cases where this connection is relatively weak. Following the descriptive analysis, the regression models that are run using each dataset offer support for the claim that educational language policies are associated with conflict onset. In other words, this finding holds when using a higher threshold for onset and when using a looser definition of ethnic conflict.

Variables

The unit of analysis in the large-n statistical analysis is the ethnic group-year for countries in the Middle East and North Africa (or the MENA) from 1946 to 2018. The temporal restriction is imposed by the availability of the data. In terms of the regional focus, the Middle East and North Africa region is appropriate to test my theory because the beginning of the nation-building in the countries in this region is relatively recent. Therefore, the period of nation-building in this region exhibits a high level of overlap with the empirical data for the control variables which is available mainly for the post-World War II period. The EPR Core Dataset 2021 (Vogt et al. 2015) offers a list of politically relevant ethnic groups and makes it possible to study ethnic conflict at the group level. EPR 2021 defines an ethnic group as “a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture” and this definition is compatible with the definition adopted in this study. EPR considers an ethnic group politically relevant if either a significant political organization claims to represent the group or group members are systematically discriminated against. The dependent variable under investigation is the *Onset* between a government and a non-state actor that claims to represent an ethnic group in a given year. A dyad-year version of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (or the UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset v21.1 (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Pettersson et al. 2021) is used to determine the onset. Two criteria are used for the onset based on the intensity of violence. Conflict onset occurs in a year in which at least 25 battle-related deaths occurred whereas civil war onset requires at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year. ACD2EPR 2021 dataset makes it possible to connect non-state organizations in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v21.1 with ethnic groups in the EPR 2021 dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).

Education in Language is the key independent variable that is used to test hypotheses 1 and 2. This variable is a result of a data collection effort as a part of this study. I assign the value 1 to the variable if a government provides education

to an ethnic group in the language spoken by the members of the ethnic group prior to their modernization as a medium of instruction; 0 otherwise. This variable on institutional policy is coded at the group level to capture variation in government policy on different ethnic groups. Additionally, *Education in Language (Subject)* variable is used to test whether the inclusion of ethnic groups whose language is taught as a subject in schools instead of a medium of instruction has any influence on the onset. For the coding of this variable, I determined the list of ethnic groups using the EPR dataset. In the collection of information on what language is spoken by the members of ethnic groups prior to nation-building and whether or not education is offered in the language of ethnic groups, I mainly relied on Leclerc's online information source on language planning around the world (Leclerc 2020). For the pieces of information that are missing, I did additional research on individual countries.

Of the variables that are mainly related to the opportunity of rebels to mobilize and fight, first, the *Relative Group Size* variable is included to capture group capacity. It is calculated based on the group size and the access to executive political power data from the EPR 2021 dataset following the formula in Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013, 69–70). The size of the incumbent i is calculated by summing the group sizes of included groups. The group G with a group size s can be an included group (I) or an excluded group (E) and the relative group size $r \in [0,1)$ is calculated as follows:

$$r_G = \begin{cases} \frac{s}{i} & , \quad G \in I \\ \frac{s}{s+i} & , \quad G \in E \end{cases}$$

I expect group size to increase the likelihood that a group would demand education in language. In addition, a higher group capacity provides a better opportunity for the group to fight, and thus, I expect it to be positively correlated with the likelihood of onset. Second, a logged value of *GDP per Capita* is used as a proxy for state capacity which, along with the *Population* data, is drawn from

the Maddison Project Database 2020 (Bolt and van Zanden 2020). Conventional wisdom suggests that state capacity is associated with a lower likelihood of onset given that powerful states are better situated to suppress a rebellion. On the other hand, based on the theory in this work, I expect a state with a higher capacity to have more resources it can use to discriminate against its minorities by enforcing its centralized governance model and disregarding local demands on culture and identity, thus increase the likelihood of mobilization and onset. A higher population provides more opportunity for the rebels and thus is expected to be positively correlated with the onset. A higher population also means a higher group size for the minorities in absolute terms and thus may increase the likelihood that the group demands education. But this is not necessarily the case, as it also leads to a bigger population for the majority that would be able to ignore the demands.

Third, the logged value of the percentage of *Mountainous Territory* in states is taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and used as a proxy for rough terrain. I expect the mountainous territory to provide rebels a better opportunity to fight, thus increase the likelihood of onset. Fourth, a count of past conflicts between an ethnic group, more specifically any organization claiming to represent the ethnic group, and the state the group resides in is included in the analysis. I expect past conflict to increase the likelihood of onset because the experience gained from a past mobilization makes it easier to remobilize. Additionally, it would also result in grievances, not only from the pre-conflict period but also because of the losses of life during conflicts. Fifth, a binary variable on whether there is an ongoing conflict between the state and another actor is taken into account. I expect an ongoing conflict to provide a better opportunity for the rebels, thus increase the likelihood of onset. Sixth, the number of politically relevant ethnic groups is calculated based on the EPR 2021 dataset. Similarly, I expect that an increasing number of politically relevant groups provides a better opportunity for organizations claiming to represent ethnic groups to challenge the state.

There are four additional variables to control for factors that influence the level of grievances harbored by the members of ethnic groups. First, a binary variable *In-Group* is used to control for groups' access to power. In EPR 2021 dataset, groups with a "Senior Partner" or a "Junior Partner" status are considered in-groups whereas groups with a "Discriminated," "Powerless," "Self-Exclusion," or "Irrelevant" status are considered out-groups. However, while calculating the relative group size, I included the "Irrelevant" status into the incumbent in cases, such as Tunisia and Oman, where groups with this status constitute an overwhelming majority and there are no other groups that can be considered to be a part of the incumbent. Even though the ethnic characteristics of groups may not be relevant for the politics of the state for the purposes of the EPR dataset, the majority group's language, culture, and identity are still the dominant ones in these states. Though they are used as a part of the incumbent size, and therefore in the calculation of the relative group size, ethnic groups that have "monopoly" or "dominant" status are dropped from the analysis, as groups in power cannot fight against themselves. In addition, ongoing conflict years between a government and a non-state armed group representing an ethnic group are dropped since the analysis is on the onset. I expect in-groups to be less likely to initiate conflict against the state.

Second, a binary *Territorial Autonomy* variable is used which takes the value of 1 if the central government permits ethnically based territorial autonomy for the ethnic group. The data on the territorial autonomy of an ethnic group is collected as a part of this project. Whereas an ethnically-based territorial autonomy may provide a better opportunity for the group to plan its future secession, it may also address the grievances of the group members and thus state may avoid conflict by appeasing its ethnic minorities. In terms of the key independent variable, I expect territorial autonomy to increase the chances of having education in the language spoken by the ethnic group. Third, the *Polity* variable, a measure of democracy drawn from the Polity V dataset, is used to account for the level of political openness and the competitiveness of political participation (Marshall 2020). I

expect a higher level of democracy to appease minorities by providing them political channels to voice their concerns, and thus lower the likelihood of conflict. Fourth, the *Other Languages in Education* variable is created using the data collected for this study. In addition to the majority group, if any other minority group has the right to receive education in its language, I expect a higher likelihood of onset because the group would be further aggrieved. In addition to these explanatory variables, a count of the *Years Since Last Conflict* between the government and the group, as well as its squared and cubed values, are included to control for time dependence in the data (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).

Descriptive Statistics

After dropping the years of ongoing conflict, I produced four separate datasets depending on the two factors: the definition of conflict and the conditions to establish a tie between an ethnic group and a non-state organization. For the first factor, the onset variable is set up for two levels of conflict intensity, the lower being a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths and the higher being a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths, as discussed already. For the second factor on the connection between ethnic groups and non-state armed organizations, two sets of non-state organization and ethnic group dyads are included in the analysis. In the first set, all non-state organizations that have ties to an ethnic group for the ACD2EPR 2021 dataset are included. In the second set, some of these organizations were removed based on the coding for two variables in the ACD2EPR 2021 dataset. Armed organizations that are explicitly coded as not claiming to represent the ethnic group or not recruiting from the ethnic group that it is connected to are removed from the analysis. In doing so, my purpose is to follow a stricter definition of ethnic conflict by removing conflicts that may be relying on different means for mobilization rather than ethnicity, even though they are connected to ethnic groups. Based on these conditions, the datasets are created as follows. For the first factor, Dataset A and Dataset B are created

Table 5.1 Descriptive Comparisons

Dataset	Observation Category	Education in Language (Only as Medium)		Education in Language (As Medium or Subject)		Total Observations and Onset Percentage
		Yes	No	Yes	No	
Dataset A	Group Years	1835	1452	1953	1334	3287
	Onset	19	42	19	42	61
	Onset %	1.04%	2.89%	0.97%	3.15%	1.86%
	<i>p</i>	0.003		0.001		
Dataset B	Group Years	1857	1447	1975	1329	3304
	Onset	11	45	11	45	56
	Onset %	0.59%	3.11%	0.56%	3.39%	1.69%
	<i>p</i>	0.000		0.000		
Dataset C	Group Years	1930	1570	2049	1451	3500
	Onset	8	24	8	24	32
	Onset %	0.41%	1.53%	0.39%	1.65%	0.91%
	<i>p</i>	0.003		0.001		
Dataset D	Group Years	1935	1562	2054	1443	3497
	Onset	7	26	7	26	33
	Onset %	0.36%	1.66%	0.34%	1.80%	0.94%
	<i>p</i>	0.001		0.000		

following the definition of low intensity, whereas Dataset C and Dataset D are created following the definition of high intensity. For the second factor, Dataset A and Dataset C include a wider set of cases that constitute an ethnic conflict, whereas Dataset B and Dataset D include a narrower set of cases after dropping organizations that are coded as not claiming to represent or recruit from the ethnic group they are tied to.

Table 5.1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable *Onset* based on the variation in the key independent variables which looks at whether or not groups have their language in education as the medium of instruction only or the medium of instruction or a subject. Four simple conclusions can be drawn from the descriptive results presented in the table. First, onset is a rare event both for conflicts and civil wars that accounts for as high as 1.88% of ethnic group-years for the Dataset A and as low as 0.97% for the Dataset B and, though slightly higher in the decimals, for the Dataset D. Secondly, the ethnic groups whose language is excluded from education have a higher instance and a higher percentage of onset than those whose language is included. Thirdly, extending the condition for the inclusion of language in education to subject classes decreases the ratio of onset for the group with their language in education. Since there is no change in the number of instances with onset between both versions of the independent variable, the groups with only subject education for their language seem to be appeased by it as none of the group years in this group is associated with conflict or civil war onset. Yet, given that the number of group years only change by 118 or 119 between both types of the key independent variable, the ethnic groups with only subject education for their language is not a large category. Finally, the relationship between the dependent *Onset* variable and the independent variables shown in the columns is statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level for all eight models. The ρ rows for each dataset show the significance level for this relationship in a logit model with only the dependent variable, the independent variable that is shown in the column above, and the time polynomials.

Research Design

In the empirical testing, I use three methods to conduct the analysis to make sure it is robust to different estimation methods. Because my dependent variable is binary, I use logit regression with robust standard errors clustered by ethnic groups and country fixed-effects, linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered by ethnic groups and country fixed-effects, and logistic regression with country fixed-effects using penalized likelihood which is more suitable to analyze rare events.¹ Of the four datasets with two key independent variables, each one is tested using three methods which resulted in twenty-four models. In these models, all explanatory variables are lagged by one year except for the time polynomials and the logged percentage of mountainous territory coverage which is a fixed geographic variable.

Before interpreting the models, I would like to first note that each logit regression result shows fewer observations than what is contained in the dataset. This is because logistic regression tends to drop some observations when used with fixed-effects on a binary outcome. For this reason, I test the model using linear probability estimation because it does not drop observations when used with fixed-effects, as well as using logistic regression with penalized likelihood because it is more compatible for a rare event analysis such as conflict onset.

Results

After describing the variables and the datasets and explaining the research design, I now turn to the regression results. I first focus on the models using a lower threshold for the onset. As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, all twelve models lend strong support to hypothesis 1 that not having their language in education significantly increases the likelihood of conflict onset between a state and a non-state organization claiming to represent an ethnic group. Only model A2, which is

¹ I use the `firthlogit` package in Stata for the logistic regression using penalized likelihood.

Table 5.2 – Educational Language and Conflict Onset Using Dataset A

Variables	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5	Model A6
Education in Language	-1.927*** (0.449)	-0.016** (0.007)	-1.801*** (0.553)			
Education in Language (Subject)				-2.458*** (0.515)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-2.293*** (0.584)
Relative Group Size	4.990*** (1.127)	0.042** (0.016)	4.679*** (1.283)	5.386*** (1.255)	0.046*** (0.017)	5.050*** (1.292)
In-Group	-1.029* (0.612)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.959* (0.524)	-1.130* (0.600)	-0.014* (0.008)	-1.051* (0.546)
Territorial Autonomy	0.282 (0.676)	-0.011 (0.043)	0.398 (0.739)	0.202 (0.807)	-0.013 (0.044)	0.324 (0.761)
Number of Past Conflicts	0.044 (0.162)	0.018 (0.012)	0.047 (0.121)	0.002 (0.170)	0.017 (0.012)	0.007 (0.122)
Other Languages in Education	-0.292 (0.542)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.283 (0.599)	-0.833 (0.617)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.783 (0.639)
Polity	-0.013 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.038)	-0.004 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.038)
GDP per Capita, Logged	1.403*** (0.540)	0.016* (0.009)	1.347*** (0.451)	1.500*** (0.575)	0.017* (0.010)	1.440*** (0.460)
Population, Logged	0.449 (0.610)	0.016 (0.016)	0.435 (0.487)	0.580 (0.646)	0.017 (0.016)	0.550 (0.498)
Mountainous Territory, Logged	3.773*** (1.220)	-0.003 (0.017)	0.578 (1.009)	4.043*** (1.259)	-0.002 (0.017)	0.946 (1.026)
Number of Groups, Logged	0.693 (0.880)	0.005 (0.023)	0.543 (1.125)	0.856 (0.880)	0.007 (0.024)	0.703 (1.122)
Ongoing Conflict (For State)	0.524 (0.387)	0.011 (0.009)	0.504 (0.336)	0.603 (0.393)	0.012 (0.009)	0.577* (0.343)
Years Since Last Conflict	-0.256*** (0.082)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.240*** (0.064)	-0.256*** (0.085)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.240*** (0.065)
Years Since Last Conflict, Squared	0.010*** (0.004)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.010** (0.004)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.003)
Years Since Last Conflict, Cubed	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
constant	-31.575*** (6.040)	-0.259** (0.114)	-23.284*** (5.050)	-34.194*** (6.181)	-0.270** (0.115)	-25.343*** (5.250)
Observations	2745	3348	3348	2745	3348	3348
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Error Term Clustering by Group	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5.3 – Educational Language and Conflict Onset Using Dataset B

Variables	Model B1	Model B2	Model B3	Model B4	Model B5	Model B6
Education in Language	-2.077*** (0.478)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-1.917*** (0.559)			
Education in Language (Subject)				-2.703*** (0.506)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-2.478*** (0.636)
Relative Group Size	3.296*** (1.184)	0.031*** (0.011)	3.059** (1.195)	3.746*** (1.320)	0.035*** (0.011)	3.465*** (1.245)
In-Group	-1.762** (0.847)	-0.017** (0.007)	-1.603** (0.653)	-1.586** (0.719)	-0.017** (0.007)	-1.440** (0.639)
Territorial Autonomy	0.464 (0.679)	0.007 (0.041)	0.531 (0.721)	0.315 (0.795)	0.005 (0.042)	0.400 (0.745)
Number of Past Conflicts	0.064 (0.111)	0.016 (0.014)	0.073 (0.131)	0.028 (0.121)	0.015 (0.014)	0.040 (0.133)
Other Languages in Education	0.497 (0.413)	0.008 (0.012)	0.401 (0.743)	-0.128 (0.536)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.178 (0.786)
Polity	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.023 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.017 (0.042)
GDP per Capita, Logged	1.486** (0.726)	0.015 (0.010)	1.424*** (0.474)	1.568** (0.770)	0.015 (0.010)	1.501*** (0.479)
Population, Logged	0.270 (0.655)	0.022 (0.014)	0.254 (0.511)	0.400 (0.720)	0.024* (0.014)	0.366 (0.523)
Mountainous Territory, Logged	1.049 (0.860)	-0.013 (0.018)	0.233 (1.008)	0.958 (0.852)	-0.011 (0.017)	0.561 (1.031)
Number of Groups, Logged	0.924 (0.867)	0.005 (0.024)	0.773 (1.073)	1.027 (0.848)	0.008 (0.025)	0.878 (1.063)
Ongoing Conflict (For State)	0.792* (0.413)	0.013 (0.009)	0.758** (0.358)	0.869** (0.410)	0.014* (0.009)	0.832** (0.366)
Years Since Last Conflict	-0.161** (0.078)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.147** (0.068)	-0.157* (0.081)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.144** (0.069)
Years Since Last Conflict, Squared	0.005 (0.004)	0.000** (0.000)	0.005 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.000** (0.000)	0.005 (0.003)
Years Since Last Conflict, Cubed	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
constant	- 20.808*** (4.207)	- -0.271** (0.103)	- -20.787*** (5.217)	- 22.086*** (4.144)	- -0.286*** (0.104)	- -22.541*** (5.389)
Observations	2485	3360	3360	2485	3360	3360
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Error Term Clustering by Group	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

the linear probability model for the medium-only independent variable, is significant at the 0.05 level whereas all the remaining models are significant at the 0.01 level. In other words, the theory is supported by robust results which hold under different methods of estimation, different versions of the key independent variable, and different definitions of ethnic conflict which is reflected in the datasets.

Of the remaining independent variables, the most influential one on the onset is the group size relative to the incumbent, which is a proxy for group capacity. As the group capacity increases, the likelihood of onset also increases. This variable is significant at the 0.01 level in all models except for A2 and B3 models. Next, findings are mixed as to whether or not groups that are considered in-groups are less likely to engage in conflict against their state. While models A1 to A6 do not lend strong support for this claim, models B1 to B6 that follow a stricter definition of ethnic conflict are significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, in conflicts where ethnicity is more salient, horizontal political inequalities and/or various forms of state discrimination that entails aggrieve groups and make them seek change through violence. These results confirm Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug's (2013) findings.

Fourth, higher state capacity, proxied by GDP per capita, is associated with a higher likelihood of conflict onset in all models other than linear probability models. The level of significance is at the 0.05 level for the logit regression models B1 and B4 which may or may not be due to the observations dropped by the fixed-effects. The models A1, A4, and all four rare event models show significance at the 0.01 level. The results go against conventional wisdom and lend additional support for the theory of this work. Because higher state capacity, though lowers the opportunity for rebels to succeed, still increases governments' abilities to aggrieve their ethnic minorities by their nation-building projects.

Fifth, ongoing conflicts (lower threshold) increase the likelihood of onset in some of the models run on dataset B which is compiled following a stricter definition of

ethnic conflict. The logit models of B4 and the rare events model of B3 and B6 are significant at the 0.05 level. The results lend some support for the claim that a state being already engaged in a conflict provides an opportunity for another group to start an armed struggle against the state, but this opportunity may not be very strong given that conflicts do not require governments to dedicate too much resource. Finally, higher values of the log-transformed percentage of mountainous territories are associated with a higher likelihood of conflict onset only on models A1 and A4 at the 0.01 level. Whereas this support is significant, the remaining ten models do not lend support to this finding. Given that A1 and A4 are logit models, this finding may also result from some observations that were dropped during the estimation.

These results show that neither grievances nor opportunities alone influence conflict dynamics. Factors associated with both types of causes facilitate conflict onset by motivating individuals to support and mobilize around armed groups and by providing them the opportunity to fight against the state. All of these findings are consistent with the claims made throughout the theory chapters. It is also striking to see that some of the findings challenge existing claims on a lower state capacity providing more opportunity for rebels. Rather than opportunities, this factor seems to be more related to the government's ability to fuel grievances. The coefficient for the polity variable is negative, indicating a negative association between polity score and onset which suggests that democracy appeases ethnic minorities and provides them political channels to express their frustrations. However, surprisingly, the results for none of the twelve models are significant for this association. Additionally, the twelve models show that ethnically-based territorial autonomy, the number of past conflicts between the state and the ethnic group, the log-transformed value of the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in the state, and a language other than the majority language and the ethnic language being offered in education as the medium or as a subject are not associated with conflict onset.

After discussing hypothesis 1, I now turn to the results for the models that use dataset C and dataset D and that test hypothesis 2. Six of the twelve models show statistically significant support for the hypothesis that not having their language in education significantly increases the likelihood of civil war onset between a state and a non-state organization claiming to represent an ethnic group at the 0.01 level, whereas four of the remaining six models support this claim at the 0.05 level. Another interesting finding is that the level of significance improves for two of three models when using the dataset D, which follows a stricter definition of ethnic conflict, for testing the medium-only variable. Even though the level of significance for the key independent variable is lower in these twelve models than that of the models using datasets A or B, this is still a crucial finding given that the threshold for battle-related deaths is substantially higher for civil war than conflict and the findings hold even if we investigate civil wars. Additionally, rare event models which are more reliable specifically for this analysis that investigates a rare event, the level of significance for the models C3, C6, D3, and D6 are quite high where the first one is at the 0.05 level of significance whereas the remaining three are at the 0.01 level. As a result, the findings of these models offer support for hypothesis 2.

The significance level drops also for the variables for the group capacity and the state capacity. Having significance at the 0.01 level for ten of the twelve models for the datasets A and B, the relative group size does not reach this level of significance for any of the models using dataset C or D. The only models that are significant at the 0.05 level are those of three of the four rare event models, namely C3, C6, and D6. As a result, the association between the group capacity and civil war onset is not strong. Unsurprisingly, civil wars are harder to initiate than conflicts, and thus, a higher group size may not provide as much of an opportunity to fight a civil war as it does for conflict. GDP per capita does not even reach the 0.05 level of significance in any of the models. On the other hand, the binary variable of ongoing civil war (higher threshold) between the state and another actor is significant at the 0.01 level for all models except for the models

Table 5.4 – Educational Language and Civil War Onset Using Dataset C

Variables	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model C4	Model C5	Model C6
Education in Language	-1.883*	-0.014**	-1.638**			
	(1.073)	(0.006)	(0.674)			
Education in Language (Subject)				-2.399**	-0.017***	-2.094***
				(0.936)	(0.006)	(0.720)
Relative Group Size	3.555	0.024*	3.141**	4.173*	0.026*	3.712**
	(2.374)	(0.013)	(1.495)	(2.216)	(0.013)	(1.561)
In-Group	-1.664*	-0.011**	-1.388*	-1.642*	-0.011**	-1.388*
	(0.918)	(0.005)	(0.790)	(0.904)	(0.005)	(0.809)
Territorial Autonomy	0.835	-0.009	1.119	0.855	-0.008	1.125
	(1.220)	(0.050)	(1.145)	(1.240)	(0.049)	(1.161)
Number of Past Conflicts	-0.175	0.003	-0.144	-0.239	0.002	-0.197
	(0.224)	(0.005)	(0.244)	(0.223)	(0.005)	(0.251)
Other Languages in Education	-0.664	-0.005	-0.495	-1.033	-0.008**	-0.834
	(0.799)	(0.004)	(1.091)	(0.790)	(0.004)	(1.119)
Polity	-0.012	-0.000	-0.008	-0.010	-0.000	-0.006
	(0.038)	(0.001)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.001)	(0.046)
GDP per Capita, Logged	0.952	0.011	0.881	1.095*	0.011	1.011*
	(0.597)	(0.008)	(0.560)	(0.619)	(0.008)	(0.568)
Population, Logged	-0.479	-0.005	-0.398	-0.511	-0.005	-0.448
	(0.805)	(0.009)	(0.712)	(0.829)	(0.009)	(0.722)
Mountainous Territory, Logged	0.125	0.019	1.079	0.525	0.021	1.362
	(0.940)	(0.016)	(1.046)	(0.977)	(0.016)	(1.062)
Number of Groups, Logged	0.490	-0.009	0.250	1.231	-0.006	0.944
	(1.536)	(0.017)	(1.763)	(1.618)	(0.017)	(1.846)
Ongoing Conflict (For State)	1.769***	0.025**	1.696***	1.833***	0.025**	1.752***
	(0.495)	(0.010)	(0.476)	(0.517)	(0.010)	(0.485)
Years Since Last Conflict	-0.108	-0.001	-0.104	-0.113	-0.001	-0.110
	(0.074)	(0.001)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.001)	(0.077)
Years Since Last Conflict, Squared	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Years Since Last Conflict, Cubed	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
constant	-8.800*	-0.083	-11.769*	-10.781**	-0.086	-13.111**
	(4.794)	(0.057)	(6.053)	(4.794)	(0.057)	(6.267)
Observations	2637	3532	3532	2637	3532	3532
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Error Term Clustering by Group	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5.5 – Educational Language and Civil War Onset Using Dataset D

Variables	Model D1	Model D2	Model D3	Model D4	Model D5	Model D6
Education in Language	-2.363*	-0.017***	-2.062***			
	(1.292)	(0.006)	(0.725)			
Education in Language (Subject)				-2.814**	-0.020***	-2.447***
				(1.146)	(0.006)	(0.760)
Relative Group Size	3.454	0.022*	3.028*	3.989	0.024*	3.494**
	(2.667)	(0.012)	(1.558)	(2.467)	(0.012)	(1.595)
In-Group	-2.529*	-0.012**	-2.011**	-2.396*	-0.012**	-1.933*
	(1.490)	(0.005)	(0.984)	(1.432)	(0.005)	(0.990)
Territorial Autonomy	1.133	-0.004	1.391	1.108	-0.003	1.352
	(1.310)	(0.048)	(1.181)	(1.368)	(0.048)	(1.201)
Number of Past Conflicts	-0.349	0.001	-0.308	-0.395*	0.000	-0.347
	(0.234)	(0.005)	(0.240)	(0.224)	(0.005)	(0.242)
Other Languages in Education	-0.152	-0.005	-0.149	-0.586	-0.009**	-0.539
	(0.543)	(0.004)	(1.209)	(0.548)	(0.004)	(1.242)
Polity	-0.017	-0.000	-0.012	-0.015	-0.000	-0.011
	(0.038)	(0.001)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.001)	(0.047)
GDP per Capita, Logged	0.742	0.008	0.682	0.879	0.009	0.801
	(0.693)	(0.009)	(0.556)	(0.741)	(0.009)	(0.567)
Population, Logged	-0.010	0.002	0.023	-0.044	0.002	-0.023
	(0.854)	(0.012)	(0.660)	(0.900)	(0.012)	(0.673)
Mountainous Territory, Logged	-0.470	0.013	0.611	-0.034	0.015	0.902
	(1.125)	(0.018)	(1.022)	(1.178)	(0.018)	(1.033)
Number of Groups, Logged	-0.072	-0.014	-0.273	0.673	-0.010	0.439
	(1.445)	(0.017)	(1.683)	(1.535)	(0.017)	(1.797)
Ongoing Conflict (For State)	1.963***	0.028***	1.868***	2.028***	0.028***	1.922***
	(0.448)	(0.009)	(0.478)	(0.462)	(0.009)	(0.487)
Years Since Last Conflict	-0.160**	-0.002**	-0.152**	-0.162**	-0.003**	-0.155**
	(0.074)	(0.001)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.001)	(0.075)
Years Since Last Conflict, Squared	0.004	0.000**	0.004	0.005	0.000**	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Years Since Last Conflict, Cubed	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
constant	-8.508*	-0.094*	-11.651**	-10.490**	-0.098*	-12.895**
	(4.609)	(0.049)	(5.940)	(4.602)	(0.049)	(6.213)
Observations	2635	3530	3530	2635	3530	3530
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Error Term Clustering by Group	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

C2 and C5 which use the dataset C that follows a wider definition of ethnic war. Given that an ongoing civil war is likely to force the government to use its resources more extensively than it would in a conflict, the presence of a civil war invites challengers against the state by offering other groups a better opportunity to fight a civil war.

The change in the in-group variable from the first twelve models to the second twelve models is ambiguous. Five of the twelve models lend support for the association between this variable and civil war onset at the 0.05 level, as opposed to six in the previous models at the same level. Even though there is potentially some decline in the level of significance, it is understandable given that civil wars are more difficult to initiate even though the members of an ethnic minority may be aggrieved. The findings for this variable are consistent with the previous discussion on the conflict onset given that the grievances associated with educational language policies are more strongly associated with the civil war onset than those that result from a lack of access to the executive power. The remaining variables, namely ethnically-based territorial autonomy, number of past conflicts, the number of past conflicts between the state and the ethnic group, level of democracy, population, the log-transformed value of the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in the state, and a language other than the majority language and the ethnic language being offered in education as the medium or as a subject, and the log-transformed percentage of mountainous territories are not strongly linked with civil war onset.

These results show that civil wars follow a different pattern than conflicts. Both grievances and opportunities influence the likelihood of civil war onset, though at a lower level. It is important to note that despite the decline of the influence of various factors related to grievances or opportunities, having education in their language remains important for ethnic groups. Horizontal cultural inequalities can help armed groups overcome collective action problems by providing the members of discriminated minorities powerful motivational incentives to fight

for their culture and identity, not just for themselves, but for their entire group with its present and future members, including their children and grandchildren. Interpreting the results from the previous paragraph also offers interesting insights. In civil wars, governments are often the strong side whereas non-state organizations are substantially weaker compared to them. The results show that what matters most to organizations planning to start their large-scale armed rebellion is the distraction of the government with the presence of an ongoing civil war. Because governments are the stronger party in these dyadic relations, any division in their resources and troops offers significant advantages to non-state armed organizations that are substantially weaker against the state.

Table 5.6 shows the minimum and maximum values for all variables to calculate the first differences. Based on the logit models using the Dataset A, B, C, and D, Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 shows the changes in the probability based on the changes in the independent variables. Variables are moved from their minimum to their maximum while keeping the other variables at their means. These results show that not having education in their language causes a substantial level of shift in the probability of conflict onset. The results also reflect that educational language policy variables perform better than most of the variables that are included in the models and that are also some of the most common explanations for conflict. The variables that perform better than the “Education in Language” variables in any model are denoted in bold. Two variables that perform better than the key variable of interest are investigated further to look at changes at lowered maximums. Because, unlike the binary variables, the data range in these variables is considerably large and it can provide additional insight into the influence of these variables relative to the key independent variable.

First, the group size relative to the incumbent is the proxy for group capacity. Given that the values greater than 0.5 effectively mean the group is not a minority by population, I recalculate the result using 0.5 as the maximum value. A minimum of nearly 0 and a maximum of 0.5 in the variable of size relative to the

Table 5.6 – Lower and Higher Values Used for the Calculation of First Differences in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8

Row	Variables	From	From (Raw Values)	To	To (Raw Values)
1	Education in Language	0	-	1	-
2	Relative Group Size I	0.0001	-	1	-
3	Relative Group Size II	0.0001	-	0.5	-
4	In-Group	0	-	1	-
5	Territorial Autonomy	0	-	1	-
6	Number of Past Conflicts	0	-	8	-
7	Other Languages in Education	0	-	1	-
8	Polity	-10	-	10	-
9	GDP per Capita, Logged I	6.4953	\$662	10.85	\$51,681
10	GDP per Capita, Logged II	6.4953	\$662	9.44	\$12,535
11	Population, Logged	6.3302	561,000	11.51	94,745,000
12	Mountainous Territory, Logged	0	1	4.27	71.30%
13	Number of Groups, Logged	0	1	2.77	16
14	Ongoing Conflict (For State)	0	-	1	-

Table 5.7 – First Differences of Variables in the Logit Models Using Dataset A and B

Row	Variables	Conflict Models			
		Model A1	Model A4	Model B1	Model B4
1	<i>Education in Language</i>	-0.011	-0.016	-0.009	-0.014
2	Relative Group Size I	0.131	0.162	0.067	0.088
3	Relative Group Size II	0.015	0.015	0.009	0.009
4	In-Group	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
5	Territorial Autonomy	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.005
6	Number of Past Conflicts	0.017	0.010	0.010	0.006
7	Other Languages in Education	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002
8	Polity	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.002
9	GDP per Capita, Logged I	0.049	0.073	0.032	0.053
10	GDP per Capita, Logged II	0.012	0.013	0.008	0.009
11	Population, Logged	0.007	0.008	0.015	0.015
12	Mountainous Territory, Logged	0.001	0.003	-0.008	-0.004
13	Number of Groups, Logged	0.019	0.016	0.008	0.006
14	Ongoing Conflict (For State)	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005

Table 5.8 – First Differences of Variables in the Logit Models Using Dataset C and D

Row	Variables	Civil War Models			
		Model C1	Model C4	Model D1	Model D4
1	<i>Education in Language</i>	-0.009	-0.012	-0.009	-0.012
2	Relative Group Size I	0.076	0.088	0.054	0.065
3	Relative Group Size II	0.008	0.008	0.006	0.007
4	In-Group	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
5	Territorial Autonomy	0.019	0.018	0.017	0.015
6	Number of Past Conflicts	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.000
7	Other Languages in Education	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
8	Polity	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002
9	GDP per Capita, Logged I	0.025	0.027	0.024	0.025
10	GDP per Capita, Logged II	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
11	Population, Logged Mountainous Territory,	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.001
12	Logged	0.000	0.000	-0.002	-0.002
13	Number of Groups, Logged	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.002
14	Ongoing Conflict (For State)	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.014

incumbent covers around 83 percent of all observations in each of four datasets. The resulting probability with the maximum value of 1 is substantially higher than the one with the maximum value of 0.5, more specifically as low as 7.4 times and as high as 11 times high. In other words, the higher values for the relative group size may be distorting the probability change, thus looking at a lowered maximum for the minority groups may help observe the change that covers most cases. Second, GDP per capita accounts for the capacity of the state to discriminate against minority culture and identity. Moving from \$662 to \$51,681 is effectively moving from very low levels of development to very high levels of development. Similarly, I recalculate the results at the maximum of \$12,535, which is the upper limit for the middle-income countries according to the World Bank. These low and middle-income cases account for around 80 percent of all observations in each of four datasets. Although high levels of GDP per capita seem to be distorting the results, the probability change in the full range is between 4 and 5.9 times as high as the range using a lower maximum, which are lower than the changes in the ratios for the relative group size variable.

Conclusion

This chapter offers empirical testing for the hypotheses created based on the theory developed in the previous chapters. First, I offer variables that proxy the alternative explanations and confounding factors discussed in Chapter 4 following the hypotheses. Second, I present a descriptive analysis of the association between the independent variable of interest and the dependent variable. This analysis provides preliminary support for the hypotheses. Table 5.1 shows that exclusionary language policies are associated with higher numbers of instances of both civil conflict and civil war onset. Next, I lay out the remaining elements of the research design not already offered in the section on the variables. Fourth, I explain the results and discuss their relevance to the hypotheses. I note that the results lend strong support to hypotheses 1 and 2. Fifth, I discuss the substantive influence of the variables using the first

differences. Having found empirical support for my claims, I now turn to the case study portion of this work to investigate the cultural rights and ethnonationalism around the Kurdish population in Turkey and Iraq and their influence on the conflict dynamics between armed groups claiming to represent the Kurdish population and their respective states.

CHAPTER SIX

KURDISH NATIONALISM IN TURKEY AND IRAQ

Introduction

This chapter discusses supplemental qualitative case studies that use a most similar case design to process trace the influence of educational language policies on cultural grievance formation and the turn to civil conflict. Although the emphasis is on the grievances of the Kurdish population in Turkey, the Iraqi case is also discussed to make comparisons between the two cases. The discussion of these cases is essential for this work because the quantitative studies suffer from temporal restrictions on publicly available data which usually only cover the post-World War II period, at best. As shown in this chapter, however, the post-World War II period is insufficient to study the relationship between minority nationalism and civil conflict. The origins of the most recent large-scale uprisings both in Turkey and in Iraq go back to the early twentieth century. Despite the seeming detachment between the mobilization against the government in the Turkish case during the Sheik Said uprising and the armed struggle of the PKK, they are connected to each other through the actions of the government. The government's nation-building policies caused a large-scale rebellion, then the government took an even harsher stance in response to the Sheik Said rebellion. The persistence of the policies of assimilation and repression fueled grievances, culminated in the birth of a new generation of Kurdish nationalists, and eventually led to the conflict onset with the PKK. We are often forced to limit our empirical analyses to the post-World War II period. But this limitation may undermine our conclusions because, for many states, modernization efforts and nation-building strategies started well before 1945. To overcome this problem, I extend the temporal scope of my analysis of the Kurdish cases to the earlier stages of their minority nationalism to observe their connection to the

government policies towards their minorities during their early nation-building efforts.

In this work, I first discuss the origins of Kurdish nationalism in the nineteenth century. Second, I explore the political developments following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 that marked the beginning of the developments that led to armed struggles. The descendants of the exiled Kurdish leaders started to create an intellectual basis for their nationalist movement and organize around nationalist goals. Next, I investigate the attempts of the Kurdish nationalists to secede following World War I. Fourth, I cover the developments following the Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty marked the international recognition of the victory of the Turkish nationalists in their war of independence, and as a result, significantly decreased the opportunity of the Kurdish nationalists to secede. I claim that one of the major impeding factors during this period was that nationalist ideas were not widespread among the Kurdish public. Because the tribal social structure prevented the nationalists to reach the Kurds, a lack of the ability to indoctrinate the Kurdish people prevented the Kurdish nationalists to undermine the influence of the tribal leaders and recruit the Kurds, and a low level of grievances against the state that was just getting started with its modernization did not facilitate the connection between the Kurdish nationalists and people. For these reasons, I argue that mobilization around Kurdish nationalism in the 1920s failed to create a substantial challenge against the emerging Turkish state. Fifth, I show that Kurdish nationalism resurged in the 1960s, this time in response to the cultural discrimination and repression by the state. These conditions not only created a new and independent group of intellectuals but also facilitated the connection between these new intellectuals and the Kurdish public. Sixth, I show that whereas the aggrieved Kurds fought the Iraqi state for decades, the regime change and the new constitutional structure that recognized their cultural and political rights brought peace. Finally, I evaluate these cases based on my theory and discuss the influence of cultural rights on peace.

The Origins of Kurdish Nationalism

Kurds are a large and diverse group of people who speak Kurdish languages that are categorized under the Iranian branch of the Indo-European languages. A large majority of the Kurdish population had lived under Ottoman rule for centuries within semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities. The succession of Bedir Khan Beg as a prince in the principality of Botan coincided with a period of reforms in the Ottomans. Sultan Mahmud II's (1808-1839) reforms involved the centralization of political power, and thus, the suppression of this autonomy in the first half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, a power vacuum in the Kurdish territories in the southeastern part of Turkey and the northeastern part of Iraq facilitated his rise and Bedir Khan Beg emerged as a powerful leader after consolidating his power. In the meantime, he also established good relations with the Ottoman government (Jwaideh 1960, 176–80).

The origins of Kurdish nationalism go back to the events surrounding his consolidation of power. Bedir Khan was not considered to be a nationalist leader, but his alliances with Kurdish chieftains made him a leader of a Kurdish confederation. Bedir Khan sought increased autonomy. He built a powerful army that was well-trained and well-equipped. The estimations put the size of his army between 70,000 and 100,000. Bedir Khan used this power against Nestorian Christians, invading their territories and massacring them in 1843 and 1846. These massacres led to strong protests by England and France, who demanded the end of the massacres and the removal of Bedir Khan, and if needed, they offered assistance to fight against him. The Porte had already been considering this option as it wanted to centralize the power following Sultan Mahmud II's reforms. Upon the support and blessing of the Great Powers, the Porte finally decided to act. Bedir Khan defeated the first army that the Ottomans sent, and consequently, declared independence from the Ottomans. The Ottomans, then, sent a large army and put Bedir Khan's unrest to an end. He was forced to sue for peace and he was exiled to Crete (Jwaideh 1960, 204–9).

The removal of Bedir Khan in the late 1840s was significant because it defined the future of regional power dynamics in the Kurdish territories for nearly eighty years. The Porte was unable to fill the power vacuum that was created by the removal of the emirs as it had already been dealing with widespread problems across the empire. Thus, their removal created unintended consequences in the region, including an increased level of lawlessness. Consequently, Kurdish tribes sought stability, thus they welcomed the sheiks who filled the power vacuum. In other words, the division of the Kurdish emirates into smaller tribes between 1847 and 1880 contributed to the rise of sheiks. In addition, grievances against the secularizing direction that the Ottoman government had taken was another factor that facilitated the development of a type of nationalism that was led by sheiks. Except for the reign of Abdulhamid II, this secular orientation was present during most of the nineteenth century, and after the collapse of the Ottomans, was pursued also by Turkey in the twentieth century (Olson 1991).

Following the period of the power vacuum, Sheik Ubeydullah's "rise to prominence marks the first stage of a greater consciousness of Kurdish nationalism" (Olson 1991, 391). Ubeydullah's rule was different from Bedir Khan Beg in two critical ways. Whereas Bedir Khan was an *emir* (prince) "or paramount chieftain of a confederation of tribes," Ubeydullah of Nehri was a sheik, which is a title given to the head of a religious order (Olson 1991, 391–92). He was a powerful sheik as the head of the Naqshbandi order. His religious title gave him influence over territories that are outside of his direct control. His title also allowed him "to infuse religious phraseology with millenarian" and "messianic symbols into his nationalist objectives in a way that Bedir Khan Beg as a non-religious leader was unable to do" (Olson 1991, 391). In addition, Ubeydullah had explicitly nationalist goals, unlike Bedir Khan. Ubeydullah was the first of the religious-secular Kurdish leaders (Jwaideh 1960, 215). His letter to British Vice-Consul in Başkale contains the following:

The Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is different (to that of others), and their laws and customs are distinct. They are known among all nations as mischievous and corrupt ... The chiefs and rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan (the Christians) one and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on this way with the two governments, and necessarily something must be done so that the European governments having understood the matter shall enquire into our state ... We want our affairs to be in our hands... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continued evil deeds, and the oppression which they suffer at the hands of the two governments of impure intentions. (as cited in Olson 1991, 392)

As a servant of God, Ubeydullah's religious title provided him a high level of prestige in society. Sheiks at the time were respected for their piety and morality. Ubeydullah was seen as a holy person and a savior by many of his illiterate followers. In addition to their religious roles, sheiks served other functions. They had the abilities of a modern politician. They handled arbitration and conciliation in disputes while avoiding making any aggrieved parties feel shortchanged. Sheiks were thought to be able to perform miracles, even after their death. Sheiks also provided medicinal services. Sheik Ubeydullah "gained great power because many tribal chiefs either through marriage, as followers (murids) or for services rendered, owed him allegiance" (Olson 1991, 393).

Sheik Ubeydullah's rise in the 1870s coincided with a period of social and economic struggles. The hardship was made worse following the devastation caused by the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 which led to social and economic dislocation, violence and insecurity, and famine and pestilence (Jwaideh 1960, 215-16). These difficulties reinforced people's search for a savior who would bring justice and improve their lives (Olson 1991). In this context, Ubeydullah set out to unify Kurds, and to that end, created the first Kurdish alliance which was

called the Kurdish League. The Ottomans were initially supportive of Ubeydullah and the Kurdish League because Ubeydullah's troops had significant contributions in the war against the Russian Empire. But this support was replaced with suspicion as Ubeydullah sought to increase his power further. In 1880, Ubeydullah invaded the Qajar dynasty to expand his control into the Kurdish territories in Iran, however, he faced a decisive defeat. Upon his return, the Ottomans took action and captured him to appease the Europeans who were outraged by Ubeydullah's actions against Christian Nestorians, but also, because of the threat that he had become to the Porte as his nationalist goals could easily get out of control (Olson 1989, 6–7).

Olson notes that the creation of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments marks the beginning of the second stage of Kurdish Nationalism. The creation of the Kurdish regiments was in line with Abdulhamid II's pan-Islamist ideas as a solution to stop the decline of the empire. It was essential to have a powerful defensive force in the east against the increasingly assertive Russian Empire and the Armenians after 1878. A Kurdish defensive force would help counter the independence attempts of Armenians who were backed by the British. The Russian Empire came to be amenable to this policy after 1883 due to their opposition to an independent Armenia. By establishing Hamidiye Regiments, Abdulhamid II also wanted to establish closer ties between the central authority and the Kurdish tribes following the fall of Ubeydullah.

The Porte took precautions to prevent the Hamidiye Regiments to turn into a threat. The regiments were not allowed to join together. They could unify only during wars and only at the order of the commanding general. The officers who served in these regiments were trained in special military schools in Istanbul. A trained Kurd could become a colonel, but a regular Ottoman soldier still had to be his assistant. Taking part in Hamidiye Regiments was a tribe's proof of loyalty to the state. Therefore, tribes that created a regiment or provided a company of men to serve there enjoyed certain benefits, such as increased prestige among the

Kurdish tribes and weapon provision by the state. On the contrary, tribes could be excluded from the regiments if they lost favor with the government. Not only did being excluded put tribes at a disadvantage, but the members of these tribes were also subject to conscription and were required to serve in the regular army.

Although one of the goals of these regiments was to bring the Kurds closer to the state, their creation influenced Kurdish nationalism in the opposite direction. The regiments represented the highest level of concentration of Kurdish power since 1847. It is estimated that the number of Kurdish troops who served in the regiments was around 50,000. These men contributed to the war efforts of the empire between 1895 and 1914 in the Balkans. Consequently, the Kurdish officers and soldiers were exposed to not only the burgeoning Turkish nationalism but also the nationalist ideas of the new Balkan states. Along with nationalism, these experiences exposed tens of thousands of Kurds also to global politics concerning the Balkan wars. This exposure made the Hamidiye Regiments an important step in the development and spread of Kurdish nationalism and paved the way for its next stage.

After covering the important developments for Kurdish nationalism during this period, I would like to briefly explain how it relates to my theory regarding the relationship between the state and the Kurdish population and the influence of nationalist ideas on political developments. The policies of centralization by the Ottomans were frustrating for local Kurdish leaders, not for nationalist reasons, but simply because they did not want an increasing level of intrusion into their affairs. The policies of centralization were nowhere near the level of centralization experienced under nation-states. In other words, they would not contribute to the spread of nationalist ideas to the masses. Unsurprisingly, Kurdish nationalism was not present among the Kurdish population as they were isolated from nationalist ideas prevalent in Europe. The Hamidiye Regiments made it possible for the Kurds who served in the Balkans to observe the politics outside of their region. Yet, their exposure to nationalist ideas had not

contributed significantly to the spread of Kurdish nationalism among the masses during this period, either. Among the elites, we know that Ubeydullah was a nationalist and he pursued nationalist goals. But it does not necessarily mean that nationalism was widespread among the Kurdish elites. In fact, we know from the discussion in the next sections that Kurdish tribal chiefs, who had a significant influence over the mobilization of troops, were not often nationalists, even decades later. Therefore, without their involvement, it is difficult to talk about nationalist mobilization during this early period.

Kurdish Nationalism Following the Young Turk Revolution

Inspired by Montesquieu and Rousseau, the French philosophers whose ideas laid the basis of French nationalism, a new group of intellectuals who called themselves the “New Ottomans” demanded constitutionalism and parliamentary government. Despite their success in 1876, Abdulhamid II closed the parliament in 1878 and introduced his autocratic rule that lasted for three decades. What brought it to an end was the revolution in 1908 by a group of nationalist young intellectuals and military officers called the “Young Turks” who dominated Ottoman politics for the next ten years until 1918 (Ahmad 2019, 3–4). The Young Turk revolution marked the end of Abdulhamid II’s autocratic rule and revived the Ottoman Constitution which paved the way for a new era in politics that involved elections, parties, and campaigns. The revolution allowed the new elites to pursue their nationalist ideas using their newfound political power, but consequently, it also caused the minority elites to abandon their Ottomanist and pan-Islamist sentiments which were replaced by nationalist or regional loyalties (Klein 2007).

The regime change made it possible for Kurdish intellectuals to establish political clubs in Istanbul, the capital of the empire, and provincial centers. The most prominent of these was *Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (the Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress, or KTTC) which included members of prominent Kurdish families, including sons of former emirs and other important figures,

such as Emin Ali Bedir Khan, son of Bedir Khan Beg, and Sayyid Abdulkadir of Nehri, son of Sheik Ubeydullah of Nehri. Many of them were living in exile in the capital. This society founded a cultural affiliate called *Kürt Neşr-i Maarif Cemiyeti* (Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education) that established a school for the Kurdish children in Istanbul (Olson 1991).

The KTTC also published a newspaper that covered several topics that related to the Kurds, the empire, and the position of the Kurds in the empire. As reflected in the journal, the KTTC's goals included "defending the Constitution; raising the levels of education in Kurdish society and fulfilling other 'modern needs' of the Kurds; preserving the territorial integrity of the state; and promoting friendship among all Ottoman groups, particularly among Kurds and Armenians" (Klein 2007, 139). Articles that they wrote also discussed the development of the Kurdish language as a medium of instruction. They also noted the importance of the education, modernization, unity of Kurds, and the protection of their freedoms in the Ottoman context, rather than in a separate state (Klein 2007).

After the foundation of the KTTC in Istanbul, several provincial branches were opened in the eastern provinces with a Kurdish population. Although these branches were affiliated with their parent club in Istanbul, their members did not necessarily espouse similar nationalist views as those in the capital. The opening ceremony of the Diyarbakır branch included some religious elements, and during this ceremony, the Kurdish tribal chiefs expressed their dissatisfaction with the new constitutional regime, and "at the end of the ceremony, a document protesting against the Constitution and favouring the application of Islamic law was reported to have been signed by some 3,000 of those in attendance" (Klein 2007, 140). The British consul reported his impression that the interest in the KTTC club in Diyarbakır was much higher than the interest for *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (the Committee of Union and Progress, or the ITC) branch in the town that represented the Young Turks who led the new regime (Klein 2007).

The KTTC elites “were quite divorced from their people in eastern Anatolia who were still traditional and religious and whose idea of nationalism was still tied up with the Caliphate, especially as that office had been exercised by Abdulhamid II” (Olson 1991, 398). Yet, the opposition of the Kurdish tribal chiefs to the new regime was not only for religious or ideological reasons, it was also for material reasons. They enjoyed growth in their power and influence under the reign of Abdulhamid II, whose regime had created patronage networks that rewarded loyalty to the sultan. The Kurdish tribes that took part in the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments were beneficiaries of Abdulhamid II’s Hamidian rule. On the other hand, Armenian peasants, Kurdish peasants, and the Kurdish tribes that were outside of this arrangement were resentful of the Kurdish tribes that were benefitting from it. This resentment was well justified, given that the chiefs of Hamidiye tribes used their power for criminal activities, such as “murder, raids and land-grabbing” and some of their actions were “regarded as exemplifying the worst kinds of abuses committed by the Hamidian regime” (Klein 2007, 141). Even though the government did not order such activities, it was still responsible for turning a blind eye to their crimes (Klein 2007).

The change of regime, however, meant that they could lose their power. Indeed, the Young Turks regime quickly took action against this arrangement following the revolution. The government dismissed the commander of the Hamidiye Regiments, started to investigate the activities of the Hamidian chiefs, arrested many powerful chiefs, and discussed plans to completely disband the Hamidian Regiments. Additionally, the government decided to confiscate the weapons of Hamidian tribes and asked them to return the lands they usurped from Armenian peasants. These changes were some of the main reasons for the spread of the KKTC’s branches in Kurdish cities. Disgruntled tribal chiefs expressed their resentment in these social clubs. Despite their protests, however, they were also declaring their allegiance to the new regime and denying their guilt for the crimes they were accused of in hopes of avoiding prosecution (Klein 2007).

The Young Turks shut down the society in 1909, around a year after it was founded, potentially for having negative attitudes towards the ITC and/or for being a Kurdish organization (van Bruinessen 1978, 370). Nevertheless, the provincial branches continued to operate in secret even after the ban, and a Kurdish movement in the east continued to grow. Indeed, the nationalist Kurdish elites in Istanbul who advocated education and modernization were not a threat to the empire, as their views were marginal for the Kurdish population in the east. The ITC regime was rather worried about the provincial Kurds. The regime came to agree with its predecessor, the Hamidian regime, that the Kurdish population in the east was too important to ignore for both domestic and foreign threats. The regime first attempted to gain their support by sending prominent Kurdish individuals as emissaries, such as Sayyid Abdulkadir and Said-i Kurdî, and this strategy earned some success. The regime also eased its pressure on the tribal chiefs for their crimes and decided not to force them to leave the lands they usurped to their original owners, Armenian and Kurdish peasants. In response to the attempts of appeasement, “Kurdish chiefs remained ambivalent about” the ITC “during the years preceding World War I” (Klein 2007, 146).

During the period following the overthrow of Abdulhamid II, nationalist elites found freedom to express their ideas and to organize. The Kurdish elites were split in this regard. The KTTC members in Istanbul, including the children and grandchildren of exiled Kurdish leaders, espoused nationalist views. Seeking the modernization of the Kurdish people within the Ottoman Empire, they were autonomists. Yet, they were still nationalists in the European sense. Some of their first acts involved opening a school for the Kurdish children in Istanbul and advocating the development of the Kurdish language to serve as a medium of instruction. However, the Ottoman Empire quickly turned into a Turkish state following the revolution and lost its unifying appeal. The Young Turks viewed the Kurdish nationalists as a rival and shut down the KTTC after a year of its opening. In the Kurdish provinces, nationalism still appears to be weak during this period. The influence of tribal chiefs over people within their tribes was still

too powerful and neither group espoused nationalist views. The frustrations of the tribal chiefs against the regime stemmed from material grievances caused by the actions of the Young Turks who viewed them as a threat, and unlike the elites in Istanbul, the tribal chiefs did not ponder about the development of the Kurdish language and the modernization of the Kurdish territories. They rather represented the feudal status quo who benefitted from the existing arrangement. Nationalist ideas were not popular among the masses, either. Because there were neither elites trying to spread nationalism among them nor grievances caused by government discrimination against their group.

Kurdish Nationalism Following World War I

A growing number of Kurdish people started to support a form of Kurdish nationalism in response to the events during the war, but nationalism was still far from popular among the masses. In the meantime, the Kurdish nationalists in the capital and those in the provinces increased their cooperation. As the empire was crumbling by the end of World War I, its disintegration seemed imminent. Following the Armistice of Mudros on October 31, 1918, Kurdish elites started to explore their options (Olson 1991). They established *Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti* (the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan, or the KTC). The leader of this new Kurdish society was Sayyid Abdulkadir who also was the president of the KTTC a decade earlier. Sayyid Abdulkadir supported autonomy, for which he faced a backlash from pro-independence Kurdish elites. Led by Emin Bedir Khan, those who wanted to secede from the Ottomans established a rival organization called *Kürt Teşkilat-i İctimaiye Cemiyeti* (the Society for Kurdish Social Organization). The KTC appointed General Mehmed Şerif Paşa to participate in the negotiations at Versailles as the head of the Kurdish side (Bajalan 2019).

Mehmet Şerif Paşa negotiated with the Armenian delegation over the future Armenian-Kurdish border. The results of the negotiations for the borders were not favorable for the Kurdish side. Major Kurdish settlements in the north were assigned to the Armenian side. The Euphrates River marked the western border

while the southern districts within the Ottoman *vilayet* of Mosul were left to the Great Powers. Nevertheless, it was a path that achieved international recognition and the Treaty of Sèvres included two articles that outlined the path for independence for the Kurds. The treaty could not be implemented, however, due to the efforts of the Turkish nationalists who mobilized to challenge the Armistice of Mudros and the occupation and partitioning of Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish nationalists, was successful in gaining the support of the Kurdish tribal leaders who feared the prospects of ending up in the borders of Armenia. These fears were confirmed after Şerif Paşa's negotiations were published by the Ottoman press which revealed that the Kurdish delegate would cede a part of the Kurdish territories for the recognition of its independence (Bajalan 2019).

The military accomplishments of the Turkish nationalists made the Treaty of Sèvres a dead treaty and the Government of the Grand National Assembly was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Turkish side. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in April 1923 which superseded the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish nationalists largely achieved their goals. This also meant that the Kurdish nationalist movements failed to achieve neither autonomy nor independence. Some attribute this to the weakness of the Kurdish movement because of the divisions among the Kurdish elites (Olson 1991). Indeed, it is possible to claim that the elites failed to mobilize the Kurds following World War I. Yet, another look at the events reveals that the power balances in the region were not favorable for Kurdish independence, and even if Kurdish elites were united, the prospects for independence were not high. Britain was not interested in the Kurdish regions north of the *vilayet* of Mosul and "Britain possessed neither the diplomatic nor, more importantly, the military power to intervene into Kurdish Anatolia in order to enforce the terms of Sèvres" (Bajalan 2019, 21). Whereas the Tsarist regime noticed that an alliance with Kurdish nationalism could be useful for undermining the Ottoman power in the east, the prospects for this alliance collapsed along with the Tsarist regime during World War I. It was a

disappointing development for the Kurdish nationalists not only because they lost an ally, but also that the Bolshevik regime decided to support their rival, the Turkish nationalist movement. A lack of meaningful international support for the Kurdish cause, despite the lobbying efforts by the Kurdish elites, coupled with the swift rise of the Turkish nationalist movement made an independent Kurdish state very unlikely (Bajalan 2019).

Despite a lack of international support, the Kurdish nationalists did try to start a rebellion during the Turkish war of independence, and “the main reason for the rebellion seems to have been that the Kurds wanted to use the stipulations of articles 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sèvres to increase their autonomy within Anatolia” (Olson 1989, 33). In spring 1921, the ongoing battles in the west between the Turkish nationalists and the Greeks limited Mustafa Kemal’s ability to move troops to the east, and therefore, offered a great opportunity for the Kurds to start an uprising. Yet the Koçgiri rebellion that only saw around 10,000 mobilized troops in each side was suppressed by the Kemalists with relative ease, even though they launched an offensive against the Greeks in the west at the same time. In addition to the lack of international support, other factors contributed to the failure of the rebellion. First, the Kurdish population lacked a middle class. The leading elites mainly consisted of Kurdish nationalists who had come from Istanbul. Lacking a middle class, the leadership from Istanbul had to rely on tribal chiefs to undertake a nationalist rebellion. Yet, many of them were co-opted by the Turkish side by jobs, appointments, land, etc. There were also Kurdish *ağas* who knew Mustafa Kemal in person from his service at the army in Diyarbakır when his leadership played a role in the Russian retreat in 1916. Mustafa Kemal gained support from some Kurdish leaders during the Erzurum Congress and Sivas congress in 1919 upon promising equal rights to Kurds as Turks. It is further claimed that “the relations of the Kemalist forces—and Mustafa Kemal in particular—with the Kurdish chiefs and large landowners were better than those of the Kurdish nationalist organizations” (Olson 1989, 37).

Secondly, Kurds were fragmented by religious and sectarian differences and it created mistrust between different groups. Lacking strong nationalist sentiments that would overcome such fragmentations, the mistrust between Kurds from different religious groups was resilient. It is claimed that many Sunni Kurds saw the Koçgiri rebellion as an Alevi rebellion and thus were not inclined to support it. In the meantime, the Turkish nationalists were highlighting Mustafa Kemal's resistance to defend the homeland against foreign and infidel invaders and were successfully appealing to Muslim solidarity between Turks and Kurds. Finally, logistical disadvantages undermined the Koçgiri rebellion. The rebellion took place in an area that was closer to Ankara than to other Kurdish regions, and therefore, was more accessible for the Turkish nationalists, even though it was still a difficult terrain. Consequently, the rebellion was also away from most of the tribes that consisted of the Hamidiye Regiments who lived further east and south. Although it is not clear "whether any of the participating tribes had also been part of the Hamidiye Regiments or the tribal regiments created during World War I," this distance "deprived the Koçgiri rebellion of much military experience" (Olson 1989, 34). Additionally, a particularly severe winter season in 1920 prevented help from outside even if it was available (Olson 1989, 33–37).

The period following World War I was also not bright for the Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul. They finally had an opportunity to act following the fall of the empire, yet this opportunity was undercut by several factors. First, international actors were not supportive of their goals. They only promised to recognize a Kurdish state if the Kurds were to succeed. Second, the nationalist ideas of the Kurdish elites from Istanbul were still marginal for the provincial Kurds. It was impossible to talk about a nationalist mobilization of the Kurds as they were divided along tribal and sectarian lines and some of these groups rather supported the Turkish nationalists who were fighting to defend their homeland against Christian invaders. Finally, the Turkish nationalists quickly filled the power vacuum. Therefore, the time window was not very wide to overcome the issues that curtailed the mobilization of the Kurds.

Kurdish Nationalism Following the Treaty of Lausanne

The Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) marked the victory of the Turkish side. It was, however, bad news for the Kurdish nationalists. Unlike the Treaty of Sèvres, the Treaty of Lausanne did not include any provisions for the independence or autonomy of the Kurds. Internationally, the Kurdish problem was reduced down to a border issue between Turkey and Iraq (Olson 1989, 82). Apart from this border dispute, the Kurdish issue became a domestic matter for Turkey from this point forward after the international recognition of the Turkish borders.

Nevertheless, the Kurdish nationalists had already started preparing for the next stage even before the Treaty of Lausanne. The onset of the process that led to the rebellion was probably the creation of a secretive nationalist organization called *Ciwata Kweseriya Kurd* (the Society for Kurdish Independence), also known as the Azadi. According to the reports from the British intelligence, it was founded in 1921 by a former commander of the garrison at Erzurum, Colonel Halil Beg Cibran. Twenty-three branches were opened across Kurdish provinces as well as in Istanbul. The organization supplied the tribes with weapons.

Based on British intelligence reports, The Kurdish officers provided eleven reasons for their increased activities in preparation for a rebellion. Several of these reasons are related to cultural grievances and the desire to protect the Kurdish people, culture, and identity, some of which are as follows. First, the Kurds feared demographic changes resulting from colonization by the state. They argued that the Turkish government planned to dislocate the Kurdish population to Western Anatolia and gradually establish a Turkish majority in the region. Second, the Kurds were upset about the abolition of the Caliphate (March 3, 1924) and argued that this move broke “one of the few remaining bonds between the Turks and Kurds” (Olson 1989, 44). The Kurds were also frustrated with the National Law Court Organization Regulation (April 8, 1924) that abolished the Sharia courts. The regulation retired the judges of Sharia courts and transferred their jurisdiction to the new secular courts (Olson 1989, 91). Third, the Kurds

objected to the new laws on the use of languages that allowed only Turkish to be used in the courts and schools and prohibited the use of Kurdish being taught in schools. It was a very significant change because excluding the language they speak would effectively prevent the Kurdish population from participating in public life. Furthermore, religious institutions were closed down following new measures. This was a problem particularly affecting the Kurds because religious institutions functioned as the only remaining educational facilities available for them. Fourth, the state was replacing the original names of places with Turkish ones which was an act of colonization and a direct attack on the Kurdish culture. Even the word “Kurdistan” was excluded from educational materials. Fifth, all senior government officials in the region were Turkish without any exception. Although Kurds were appointed to lower levels, these Kurds were carefully selected to make sure they were not suspected of being a Kurdish nationalist. Additionally, other sources of grievances for Kurds included corruption, undemocratic electoral processes, divide and conquer tactics of the government, military raids on Kurdish villages, ill-treatment of Kurds in the army, and the exploitation of Kurdish mineral wealth (Olson 1989, 42–45).

One of the reasons for the oppression was that the government was “very much aware of the Azadi and its activities,” was “doing everything in their power to suppress it,” and was “severely punishing any Kurds who were thought to be members of Azadi” (Olson 1989, 45). In November 1924, the Azadi officers expressed three main goals. These were to save the Kurds from oppression, to allow the Kurds to develop their country, and to secure assistance from Britain because the members of the Azadi were aware that the Kurds were unlikely to achieve these goals by themselves. In addition to the Azadi threat, Turkey was also concerned about the Mosul question. The Turkish government tried to convince the Kurds in a congress in Diyarbakır (August 1, 1924) by offering to consider and to rectify some of the Kurdish demands, such as, a special form of administration for majority-Kurdish areas, a loan, a general amnesty for imprisoned Kurds, suspending conscription for 5 years for Kurds, restoring

Sharia courts, returning confiscated weapons, and removing unliked Turkish military officers. In return, the Turkish government asked the Kurds to support the Turkish arguments and tactics on the Mosul question (Olson 1989, 45–48). It appears though that the relations between the Turkish government and the Kurds were plagued by commitment problems. The Kurds did not know whether the government would follow up on its promises given that the government had given promises before as a stalling tactic during the war of independence and had not taken any steps to follow through later. The government also was suspicious of the Azadi activities and was preparing to counter a potential Kurdish rebellion.

In the weeks following the congress in Diyarbakır, another rebellion erupted among the Koçgiri tribes and the government gave the army full authority to suppress it. Even if there were any hopes of compromise, it probably ended with the rebellion and the government's response to it, though it is also possible that the commitment problems had merit. A month after the Diyarbakır congress, 500 Kurdish officers and soldiers at the military organized a strategic rebellion at Beytüşşebap, a small border town near Iraq (September 3-4, 1924). Yet, the mutiny was carried out too early and thus the Azadi leadership was not able to coordinate with the tribes. As soon as the Turkish commanding officer of the garrison at the town had found out about it, he started to arrest everyone suspected of being involved. Consequently, five hundred officers and soldiers deserted the Turkish army, fled to Iraq, and took thirteen automatic rifles with them. The Azadi had come to decide that they have to make their move quickly before the government attempts to suppress the organization because the government now not only knew more about the extent of the nationalist movement but also suspected that there may be more to come. Given that garrison sizes were small in September and October, and thus having expected a stronger reaction at a later date, the Azadi decided to start the rebellion before the government would receive reinforcements (Olson 1989, 48–50).

The Kurdish nationalist had learned some important lessons from the failure in the Koçgiri rebellion in 1921. One lesson that had come to define the next stage for the movement was that the leadership from Istanbul had found that the sheiks were more reliable than the tribal chiefs as leaders of an uprising. The supratribal connections of the sheiks were essential in creating a Kurdish movement. Sheiks were not co-opted by the government as easily as tribal chiefs. Although the spread of nationalist ideas may have challenged the role of religion in many societies, and as a result, they were met with suspicion by the clergy, the sheiks were more nationalistic in comparison to the tribal chiefs in the Kurdish case (Olson 1989, 35). The Azadi took notice of this and decided to appeal to the sheiks. Turkey becoming a republic and the subsequent abolition of the caliphate and the Sharia courts helped the Azadi to recruit the sheiks, and along with them, the tribal chiefs. In their first congress, the Azadi decided that the rebellion would have a religious appearance, not only to attract the sheiks, and therefore bring wider support from the Kurdish population, but also to play into the religious opposition to Mustafa Kemal and his reforms in the entire country. The arrest of many individuals in the Azadi leadership after the Beytüşşebap mutiny meant that the sheiks would become even more important for the rebellion. Upon the arrest of Halil Beg Cibran and Yusuf Ziya, Sheik Said started to plan the rebellion. Whereas religious leadership had its benefits, there were also some disadvantages for unifying the Kurds. Sheik Said reached out to the Hormek and Lolan Alevi tribes to get them to participate in the rebellion against Ankara for the government's anti-religion stance. Yet, the tribes stated that they not only would not join the Kurdish side, they would also fight against them with the government forces. These Alevi tribes that fought against the government themselves in the Koçgiri rebellion did not like the prospects of a Sunni-led Kurdish state. This rejection restricted the area that a rebellion could cover and deprived the rebellion of the experience the Alevi tribes gained fighting the Kemalist forces (Olson 1989, 91–99).

In early January 1925, Sheik Said started a tour to visit different Kurdish tribes to get them to join the rebellion, to mobilize the Kurds, and to choose local leaders of the rebellion. Whether it is religious or tribal, any support from local leaders was essential because the Kurds who followed a chief or a sheik would join the rebellion if their leader asked. To get more tribes involved, Sheik Said issued *fetvas* (fatwa, a nonbinding legal opinion on a point of Islamic law) against the secular government in Ankara and promised to restore religion. Even though Sheik Said was able to bring several Kurdish tribes together, many others fought on the government's side. Almost all of the tribes who participated in the rebellion were Zaza-speaking Kurds. Whereas, of the other two major Kurdish tribal confederations in Anatolia, the Babakurdi tribes did not participate and the participation from the Kurmanci tribes was limited. The tribes between Van and Şırnak preferred peace and stability and thus did not participate which severely hurt the prospects of a sustained rebellion. The non-tribal Kurds from Diyarbakır, such as peasants who were controlled by landowners or other lower-class Kurds, did not participate, either. It is argued that Sheik Said did not even invite them because he believed they would not make good fighters. The Azadi found that "inculcating nationalism in uneducated, poverty-stricken peasants or the lower classes" is a time-consuming task (Olson 1989, 99). But they did not have time for such a massive task. As for the notables of Diyarbakır, a town with a Kurdish population by a large majority, none of them supported the rebellion (Olson 1989, 95–99).

Sheik Said became the commander of the rebellion because he was the most trusted and respected of the nationalists. He had extended his influence through arranging marriages for his daughters, as well as his brothers' daughters, with sheiks and tribal chiefs who could contribute to his power. He had become a wealthy man as a sheik who owned large herds of sheep, large enough that he employed around 120 shepherds to take care of them. He had personally met everyone who had any power and status in the area and he knew the terrain very well. Unlike others in his Naqshbandi order who did not like the Kurdish

nationalists, Sheik Said's nationalist views helped the nationalists from Istanbul to extend their influence into the provincial Kurds. In the first Azadi congress, he stood out as an outspoken nationalist, unlike many others who were more cautious. He was influential in convincing others about the need to rebel against the government. Following this first congress, he became a dominant figure in the movement in the other congresses and the arrest of the Azadi leaders made him the natural leader of the rebellion (Olson 1989, 100–102).

The rebellion started a little prematurely on February 8, 1925. After a local incident, the events escalated into a rebellion. Sheik Said issued a *fetva* stating that he is the leader, *emir al-mujahidin*, of the rebellion. He declared that “he was the representative of the caliph and of Islam. He stated that he wanted everyone to join the holy crusade and become a holy fighter (*mujahidin*)” (Olson 1989, 108). The rebels quickly defeated the small number of forces that the government had stationed in the region and captured their military equipment. Taking advantage of their superiority in size early on, Sheik Said's forces attacked many towns and coerced several tribes into joining the rebellion. His forces attacked and sieged the walls of Diyarbakır but were forced to leave the siege as the government reinforcements approached the town. The rebels planned to capture Bitlis and free Halil Beg Cibran and Yusuf Ziya Beg who were in prison. Freeing these key names in the Azadi leadership, they thought, would get more tribes to join the rebellion. Yet, they lost against small government forces and local militia in the region, and the two men were subsequently hanged in Bitlis. The rebels fought several major battles before April, but their goal of extending the rebellion to Erzurum was not successful. The government forces were closing in and their escape options were narrowing. On April 15, Sheik Said was captured by an ambush. By this time, most major battles were fought and the rebellion was in decline, even though the forces of the government had not yet completely mobilized. The estimates put the rebel forces to around 15,000 men against the government forces of around 25,000 men. After the capture of Sheik Said, the government moved to disarm all Kurds by extreme measures, such as burning

some houses and villages and deporting some tribes to western Anatolia, which caused the resistance to extend through early 1926 (Olson 1989, 107–20).

It was a significant uprising and “Sheikh Said had led the largest armed and most sustained Kurdish nationalist rebellion of the twentieth century” (Olson 1989, 127). It influenced the government to devise additional strategies to prevent a future rebellion at such a large scale, a few of which are as follows. First, Mustafa Kemal adopted İnönü’s hardliner approach to handling the rebellion. This hardliner approach was used also to justify suppressing the opposition to the government’s policies. İnönü labeled the rebellion as a counterrevolutionary movement that tried to topple the government. The parliament passed a law that granted dictatorial powers to the government to convict, imprison, and execute the rebels. Before their temporary two-year activity period ended, the independence tribunals arrested 7,440 people and executed 660 of them, including Sheikh Said. Second, the government noticed the usefulness of air forces and used them more extensively in the future. Turkey used its small air forces, consisting only of 6 serviceable planes out of a total of 11, to suppress the rebellion. Upon witnessing the effectiveness of the British Royal Air Force in Iraq, the government decided to expand its air forces. Turkey had 80 serviceable planes in its air forces out of 106 planes by the end of 1926. Finally, the British reports claimed that the rebels hid 90 percent of their weapons and there would be new rebellions if the government was to remove its large military presence. To prevent this scenario and to increase its control in the region, the government invested in its gendarmerie forces in the east in the following years (Olson 1989, 120–25).

In the final episode of this early stage Kurdish nationalism, the elites in Istanbul proved themselves to be quite resourceful. They were aware that their influence over the tribal leaders was not very strong and they did not have enough time to instill nationalism into the Kurdish population. In fact, overall, the Kurds in the region still did not have much reason to be very upset with the government. The

power struggle between the state and the rebels was not unusual. In addition, the government intrusion into the region had just started, and thus not enough time had passed to create large-scale grievances. As a result, the conditions were still not ripe for nationalist ideas to spread. Learning from the past experiences, they decided to cooperate with the sheiks to overcome the issues preventing mobilization. Indeed, ever since the fall of the emirs in 1847, the sheiks were the only people who were able to overcome the divisions among Kurds, even if temporarily, and increase participation in an armed struggle. Sheik Said was the perfect fit for such a task, yet his efforts were not enough. Many factors undermined mobilization, such as tribal and non-tribal divisions, feuds between tribes, Sunni and Alevi divisions, class divisions, etc. The troops he was able to mobilize, which was not insignificant, were simply no match to the Turkish army.

The Resurgence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Conflict Onset during the Cold War

Following the repression of the rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s, Kurdish nationalism was not visible in public life for a few decades. But it resurfaced during the Cold War in the 1960s, this time not by sheiks or tribal chiefs, but rather by a younger generation of Kurds who were more educated. The Kurdish youth participated in several left-leaning organizations at the time, such as *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (the Workers' Party of Turkey). They founded an umbrella organization in 1969 called *Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları* (the Revolutionary Cultural Eastern Hearths, or DDKO). Most Kurdish nationalist organizations that emerged later were inspired by the DDKO.

Mustafa Barzani's rebellion that led to the first Kurdish-Iraqi war between 1961 and 1970 had set an example for the Kurds in Turkey. Additionally, Che Guevara and Debray's (1967) foco theory that laid out the effectiveness of guerilla warfare influenced the Turkish left who believed in the necessity of the use of violence to achieve political goals. Although the government defeated the militarized leftist organizations by 1972, their strategy of rural mobilization was emulated by the

PKK a decade later. In the 1970s, Marxist perspectives on nationalism were influential on the Kurdish intellectuals who believed that a nationalist revolution would save Kurdistan from foreign colonizers. They viewed the Soviet Union and the Turkish left as allies, though it later appeared that the Turkish left was not very supportive of the independence of Kurds.

The Kurdish left employed several strategies, such as participating in elections, publishing magazines, forming associations, and participating in street demonstrations, to name a few. The Kurdish left was divided into various groups due to ideological disagreements, such as differing views on the Sino-Soviet split, class alliances, the goals of the struggle, and the means to achieve these goals. Despite their activism, the Kurdish left was largely restricted to the urban areas. None of the Kurdish leftist groups started armed struggle or was able to reach and recruit the peasants who consisted of a considerable majority of the Kurdish society, except for two organizations: *Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları* (the National Liberators of Kurdistan, or the KUK) and the PKK. The KUK and the PKK recruited mainly from the same pool: peasants and students. The KUK started an armed rebellion and sought support from the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish tribes. The KUK did not seek to undermine landlords and tribal leaders. The PKK, on the other hand, actively challenged them. The KUK and the PKK were rivals that engaged in violent clashes before 1980. Whereas the leader of the PKK, Öcalan left Turkey, went to Syria before the coup of 1980 in Turkey, and established a base in Lebanon, the KUK did not survive the repression following the coup.

Given that the Kurdish left reached ideological and strategic maturity and produced several viable political movements in the 1970s, Tezcür (2015) seeks to explain why the path for the Kurdish nationalism was carved by violence and why it was the PKK and not any of the other organizations that became the main representative of the Kurdish nationalism. Although there were several movements, each had different views about “the desirability, timing, and type of

armed struggle” and the PKK’s rivals blamed it for “taking unnecessary risks when the conditions were not ripe for revolution” (Tezcür 2015, 253). Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, however, did not wait for the conditions to be ripe, he actively worked to create the conditions. Nevertheless, he claimed that the nature of the Turkish state necessitated armed resistance to liberate Kurdistan and emancipate Kurdish individuals from their enslaved souls.

Tezcür argues that Öcalan turned out to be right and it is precisely its strategic use of violence that made the PKK more successful than other movements that were viable candidates to represent the Kurdish nationalism. Shortly after its emergence, the PKK started to target powerful landlords in Urfa in an unprecedented manner and built a reputation as a formidable power. This reputation helped them stand out, gain popularity, and start to organize in other provinces as the other groups “remained passive and found excuses not to act” (Tezcür 2015, 256). Most Kurdish organizations were against the land inequality that was prevalent in the Kurdish society, but only PKK dared to challenge the landlords who were quite powerful. Öcalan “had no qualms with the use of violence to crush internal opposition, and eliminate defectors” (Tezcür 2015, 259). Yet, the PKK gained sympathizers also by taking action strategically on issues that were visible to the public and that showed that they looked out for the interests of the Kurds. The PKK connected with the Kurdish people and made them feel that the PKK valued them and got their back. The PKK intervened on issues and sided with the people against their oppressors. They educated their sympathizers and instilled national consciousness in them.

Tezcür notes that “all Kurdish nationalist organizations perceived the Turkish state as a ‘colonizer’ and Kurdistan as a ‘colony.’ The PKK violence was a strategic decision on the part of its leadership to compete effectively against other Kurdish organizations” (Tezcür 2015, 256). As a latecomer among many organizations, the PKK’s deliberate use of violence early on, rather than publishing ideological publications, was aimed at developing a niche. This strategy proved successful as

the PKK became the leading Kurdish nationalist organization in less than two years and their members consisted of around 75 percent of all people accused of Kurdish secessionism who were put on trial by the military regime following the 1980 coup. After establishing itself as the most prominent Kurdish nationalist organization, the PKK started an armed struggle against the state by attacking the army in two different towns simultaneously (August 15, 1984). The PKK's main strategy of guerilla warfare "represented a third generation of leftist militant activism influenced by the Chinese and Vietnamese examples and took lessons from the failures of both foco theory and urban guerilla strategy in the aftermath of the 1959 Cuban Revolution" (Tezcür 2015, 258).

There were several macro and mid-level factors that facilitated the onset of a conflict between the state and the PKK, an organization that claims to represent the Kurdish population of Turkey. First and foremost, the state's colonization of the region has long created resentment. Although the state was able to get it under control through security measures and by co-opting tribal leaders, the impact of the colonization is visible in the daily life of Kurdish individuals. Their culture and language that was dominant up until the republic has gradually been reduced to a second-class status. Public education was offered only in Turkish, and so, children received education in the language of their colonizers which significantly contributed to the decline of their own language. The colonization the Kurdish population has endured led to the creation of various organizations, both violent and non-violent, in protest. The resentment of the Kurds had manifested itself in various ways and it was not certain that an armed conflict would take place, or if it did, would last. Regardless of the shape or form that the resistance against the colonization could have taken in several alternative scenarios, it is important to take note that the colonization and its consequences are among the main causes of resentment for the Kurds.

Secondly, state repression created further grievances. Due to the uprisings in the past, the state had been cautious against the risk of a large-scale rebellion, so it

repressed the region to prevent a secessionist mobilization. But the repression added to the grievances that were already accumulating and the resulting anger contributed to the PKK's recruitment efforts as the PKK offered the prospective militants a way to channel their anger to respond to unjust policies. Third, the mountainous terrain made the PKK's guerilla warfare possible and helped them avoid Turkey's powerful army. Particularly, the weakness of the state authority in the mountainous region next to the border with Iraq helped the PKK militants avoid the state. Fourth, logistical and financial support and the provision of arms by external sources helped the PKK's armed struggle, without which, the PKK may not have survived against the state forces as long or may have posed lower levels of threat to the state (Tezcür 2015).

The discussion in this section shows that the conditions in the Kurdish territories during this second stage of Kurdish nationalism were markedly different from those of the first phase. The early nationalists were eliminated by the state and their influence had been erased. In terms of the regional elites, the regime successfully co-opted the tribal leaders. In other words, the elites during the first stage were ineffective by this point. Yet, the Kurdish public was getting aggrieved by horizontal inequalities that had been discriminating against their culture, identity, and way of life. It was these grievances that led to the birth of several leftist and nationalist organizations in the 1960s. A new young class of intellectuals who were exposed to leftist and nationalist ideas in western Turkey successfully highlighted the injustice the Kurds had endured and pointed the blame at the state. Unlike previous nationalists, they were not descendants of feudal leaders, they were just ordinary Kurds. They defended Marxist and nationalist ideas as solutions to the ongoing injustice. This time, because of the horizontal inequalities created by the state over decades, the Kurdish society was much more receptive to the appeals of these new groups of elites and this interest only grew over time. Among several groups, the reason the PKK emerged as the dominant force of Kurdish nationalism was its strategic actions against other groups, tribal leaders, and the state. The PKK successfully played into the

grievances of the Kurds and created the image that the PKK was ready to challenge everyone who threatened the rights and interests of the Kurds. Even though the state and the tribal chiefs were still powerful, the PKK was very much aware of the opportunity game. This awareness had a significant contribution for the PKK to strategically challenge other groups and tribal leaders, start an armed struggle, but more importantly, outlast the state repression and remain a threat. For the first time in Kurdish history in Turkey, nationalism started to take roots among ordinary people. The use of ideological elements facilitated the recruitment of young fighters, ensured the resilience of the movement, and made it much more difficult for the state to repress it.

The Kurdish Revolution in Iraq

After World War I, the Kurdish population ended up living in four different states. Although the Kurdish groups that were active in different states supported each other at times, Kurdish nationalism developed on four separate fronts, each entering into separate struggles against their respective colonizer. After World War I, Iraq fell under British influence and the Kurds in Iraq tried to convince the British to grant them independence. Sheik Mahmoud was recognized as the governor of Sulaymaniyah by the British (December 1, 1918), but after failing to convince the British, Mahmoud went a step further and proclaimed himself to be the King of Kurdistan (May 23, 1919). This proclamation led to his exile following a defeat at the hands of the British troops in late June 1919. A few years later, after its victory against the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia, Turkey tried to incorporate the *vilayet* of Mosul into Turkey. The British prevented this attempt and worked to ensure that Mosul would remain a part of British-mandated Iraq due to the oil fields in the region. The case was taken to the League of Nations. The decision of a League of Nations commission in December 1925 on this border dispute favored the British claims, and neither Turkey could take the region, nor the Kurds could achieve independence. The *vilayet* of Mosul was given to Iraq, a prospective state with an Arab-majority population (Stansfield 2006).

A League of Nations report “had made the inclusion of Mosul into Iraq conditional on the appointment of Kurdish officials in the vilayet and on the introduction of Kurdish in the regional administration, courtrooms, and schools; but neither the British authorities nor the Baghdad government did much to meet these conditions” (Leezenberg 2020, 63). Britain was reluctant to go through with its earlier promise of autonomy and language reforms were also delayed for several years despite repeated promises. The government had been stalling the Kurds because the Iraqi elites were Arab nationalists who tried to emulate assimilationist nationalism found in Turkey, though they were not as successful in implementing similar policies. Following Kurdish protests, the Local Languages Law was finally ratified in 1931 “in anticipation of Iraq’s admission into the League of Nations, and in reaction to continuing Kurdish agitation” (Leezenberg 2020, 63). However, the law failed to address the Kurdish demands. The education in Kurdish was available only in a dozen of primary schools. Although the Kurds protested this and asked education in Kurdish to be expanded to more schools and to secondary and higher education, Britain refused these demands. The underlying reason was the goal to integrate the Kurdish population into the Arab state (Hassanpour, Skutnabb-Kangas, and Chyet 1996).

As the Iraqi government sought to join the League of Nations and pursued independence, the Kurds were somewhat concerned about how the Iraqi government would treat them after the British leave. These concerns led to demonstrations and the Iraqi state responded with repression. At the time, the Kurdish urban elites had been motivated by leftist and nationalist ideologies and sought self-determination. Similar to the situation in Turkey, the tribal leaders, however, were mainly concerned about the interests of their tribes, though Kurdish nationalism still appealed to them. Also similar to Turkey, the urban elites found the tribal social order to be an obstacle for their political goals, but the two groups still could find a mutual ground against their common enemy, the Iraqi government. As the unrest turned into sporadic rebellions, a charismatic tribal leader, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, became a nationalist symbol of resistance.

The tribal and urban Kurds together founded the Kurdish Democratic Party (later renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party - *Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê*, or the PDK) on August 16, 1946, and Barzani became its leader (Stansfield 2006).

The Kurds were frustrated with the government's oppression and the PDK grew in response to increasing grievances among the Kurds. The PDK established contacts with a new prospective leader, Abd al-Karim Qasim, against the monarchy that ruled over Iraq. After Qasim deposed the monarchy on July 14, 1958, he rewarded the Kurds for their support by declaring them as partners with the Arabs in a provisional constitution and allowed Mulla Mustafa Barzani to return from his exile the same year. The PDK had transformed into an increasingly leftist party in the absence of Barzani, yet he was still influential over the tribes after his return, which helped him quickly rebuild his authority. He consolidated his power by attacking the tribes that opposed him. It appeared that Qasim and the Kurds were off to a fresh start, but the good relationship did not last very long. Barzani reiterated the Kurdish demands for improved rights, and upon the refusal of his demands, his forces mobilized against the state as he initiated a rebellion which he called the Kurdish Revolution (September 11, 1961). This revolution, despite some periods of relative peace, lasted until the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003. In the meantime, the Kurds were far from united as the urban leftists led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani did not support Barzani's undisputed right to lead the Kurds. This fracture turned into conflicts at regular intervals between 1966 and 1996, allowing the Iraqi government to weaken the Kurdish nationalists. Despite this fracture, however, the conflict between the Kurds and the central government persisted for decades (Stansfield 2006).

In 1966, the Iraqi government supported the Ahmed-Talabani faction to fight Barzani who received support from Iran and Israel. After the Ba'ath revolution in Iraq in 1968, the ruling elite changed, but Barzani was still the leader of the Kurdish revolution. The new regime continued to fight him with the help of the

Ahmed-Talabani faction. Yet, Barzani's success made it necessary for the state to negotiate with him. With the deal called the March Agreement, the regime promised autonomy to the Kurds and the borders of the autonomous region were to be determined by a commission. The commitment problem was present in this case, as well, as the government did not honor their end of the bargain and Barzani sought more concessions. Barzani believed that he was still in a superior position and pushed for the inclusion of Kirkuk in the autonomous zone. The regime was firmly against this demand and the Iraqi counteroffer was reflected in the Autonomy Law of March 11, 1974, which was rejected by Barzani. When it became clear that both parties could not find a mutual agreement, Mulla Mustafa Barzani renewed his push for rebellion. He was ultimately defeated, however, and was forced to go into exile in Iran. This was as much of a diplomatic success as it was a military one for the Iraqi government. The regime had reached an agreement with Iran to stop supporting the PDK, and the end of support led to the demise of Mustafa Barzani's leadership. Barzani's defeat facilitated the rise of another Kurdish party, *Yekîtiya Nîştîmanî ya Kurdistanê* (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or the YNK), which was led by Jalal Talabani. The PDK, on the other hand, reassembled its cadres under the leadership of Idris and Massoud Barzani, sons of Mulla Mustafa (Stansfield 2006).

The Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988 further complicated the situation for the Kurds. Iran invaded Iraq in September 1980 and planned to weaken Saddam's regime by supporting the Kurds. The Kurds agreed to cooperate with Iran to gain an advantage against the regime. The Iraqi forces were forced to fight a defensive war after being expelled from Iran in 1982. Despite its efforts to preserve its control in the north by buying off the tribal leaders, the Iraqi regime eventually lost control by 1987 as the Kurds formed a coalition called the Kurdish Front which declared its alliance with Iran. This alliance was unacceptable for the regime as "an Iranian victory in the war presented an existential threat. It therefore saw the Kurds' growing insurgency as capital treason and Kurdistan as the Achilles' heel of its military defences" (Hiltermann 2008, 3). The growing US

support for Iraq led Saddam to believe that the international environment was now favoring them against Iran. To solve the security problem in the north, Saddam appointed his cousin, Al-Majid, and gave him broad powers. Only in three weeks, Al-Majid used poison gas to smoke out the Kurdish guerillas. Al-Majid later razed the villages to make them inhospitable to the rebels. On February 23, 1988, the Iraqi army started the Anfal campaign. During the campaign, the regime used chemical weapons against civilians. In one instance, the Iraqi air forces killed around 5,000 people, mostly civilians, using nerve gas. This attack devastated Kurdish morale and resolve. In addition to the chemical attacks, the regime separated boys and men between 15 and 60 years of age from their families in Topzawa and killed them in the mass execution sites. The number of killings is thought to be between 50,000 to 100,000 based on the estimations of Human Rights Watch. The pattern of killings in the region was “consistent with the regime's objective of Arabising Kirkuk” (Hiltermann 2008, 7).

After the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991, the Kurds saw it as an opportunity and started another uprising. But they quickly failed. Fearing another massacre, the Kurdish refugees fled to the mountains in mass. This time, the United States stepped in and established a safe haven and no-fly zone which allowed the Kurds to form a de facto state outside of the regimes’ reach in the north. A resolution in the United Nations Security Council condemned the Iraqi government for its repression of the Kurds. The intervention of the United States allowed the Kurds to be safe from the state’s repression from this point forward. Yet, the friction between the PDK and YNK was still present and it led to a civil war between 1994 and 1998. After a peace deal was brokered by the United States, peace, relative prosperity, and democracy finally began to grow in the de facto state of Kurdistan in northern Iraq (Gunter 2008, 14).

Education in Kurdish was one of the central issues for the Kurds, even before the independence of Iraq. Arabs in the South viewed education in Kurdish and the

autonomy in the Kurdish majority regions to be a threat. Whereas the Kurds wanted self-government, Arab nationalists pursued assimilationist policies towards them. It was not possible for the Iraqi government to repress Kurdish nationalists, because, despite their division, they were relatively stronger against Iraq than the PKK was against Turkey. As a result, there was a continuity in the ideas and goals of their movements since World War I despite changes in leadership. As a result, the Kurdish elites had been preparing for their self-government and for creating the Kurdish nation. By the 1990s, the progress for education in Kurdish was very limited as the Kurdish population was subject to a policy of Arabization. But by this time, “all secondary school textbooks had been translated into Kurdish” (Hassanpour, Skutnabb-Kangas, and Chyet 1996, 372). Thus, the Kurdish elites had been getting prepared to offer education in Kurdish. When they finally had gotten the opportunity, the regional administration was able to offer education in Kurdish for their future generations.

Evaluating the Influence of Cultural Rights on Conflict Onset

Civil conflict is, more often than not, about nationalism and the civil conflicts involving the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq are not exceptions. Sheik Ubeydullah was the first leader to have nationalist motivations in the Kurdish provinces. The battles that Hamidiye Regiments participated in in the Balkans exposed Kurdish men to nationalist notions. Yet as the Ottoman Empire crumbled, Kurdish nationalism was still not sufficiently widespread among the Kurds. This is hardly surprising. Around that time, nationalism was not widespread among the Turks, either. Nationalist ideologies remained restricted to the elites who were planning to establish their future nation-states and were competing against existing elites as well as nationalist elites of other ethnic groups.

The Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul did not have the ability to effectively mobilize the Kurdish people. The fact that the tribal chiefs would determine whether tribe members would mobilize or not introduced advantages and

disadvantages. The main potential advantage for the nationalists was that if they convinced a tribal leader to join the nationalist movement, they would have been able to mobilize the entire tribe, not because the members of the tribe would also be nationalists, but rather because they would follow the orders of their tribal leader. Yet this was precisely also the main disadvantage. A tribal leader who was not convinced by the nationalist cause would be able to block out the mobilization of pretty much the entire tribe. In fact, tribal leaders were the status quo feudal leaders who did not have an understanding of or ideological leanings towards nationalism. Even if they did understand it, it would not have been in their interests to advocate nationalism.

Indeed, in the Turkish case, tribal divisions were obstacles against nationalist mobilization as many tribal leaders, for the reasons discussed, chose not to support Kurdish nationalists. Some even went further and supported the Kemalists. The Kurdish nationalists' use of charismatic sheiks as the leaders of a rebellion was a brilliant move to bring in more tribes together and to potentially override tribal leaders, but it turned out to be insufficient. The Turkish nationalists, on the other hand, did not face this kind of problem as they were recruiting fighters for the war of independence. Turks did not have a tribal social structure, thus people would have to be mobilized more directly. Even though an average Turkish peasant was not a nationalist, the war was fought against the Great Powers and their proxies on multiple fronts. Fighting for the homeland against the invading infidels was a powerful motivator, even though the devastation of the recent wars had brought difficulties.

For the secessionist Kurdish nationalists, and even for the autonomists, cultural rights were an essential part of their political goals in the early nineteenth century. Following the Young Turk revolution, the KTTC envisioned a multiethnic political system in which the Kurdish people would modernize as a separate ethnic group with its own autonomous political entity in which Kurds would be educated using the Kurdish language as a medium of instruction. They

made preparations to make it happen, including the development of the Kurdish language to function as a medium of instruction and the opening of a Kurdish school in Istanbul. Similarly, more than a decade later, the Azadi leadership emphasized the importance of cultural rights by citing cultural grievances as some of the primary reasons for their resistance against the new Turkish state. Having a religious population, the Kurdish society was aggrieved by the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sharia courts. They viewed the secularization of the state that was forced upon them to be a colonial undertaking. The Azadi was also critical of the language laws that promoted the Turkish language in public life. The state went further and made Turkish the only option available in courts and bureaucracy, but more importantly, in schools. The state monopolized the education of children and deprived the Kurdish children of receiving education in their mother tongue.

The government successfully suppressed the Sheikh Said rebellion and eliminated the Kurdish nationalists from Istanbul who led the nationalist movements in a way that would intimidate the remaining nationalists, those who may have survived the independence tribunals. Though there were several rebellions after Sheikh Said's uprising, none of them posed a similar level of threat to the state. Later, many tribal leaders co-opted with the government. As the Turkish state was creating the Turkish nation after the war of independence, lacking the prominent nationalist elites, Kurdish nationalism was in a period of dormancy. Yet the lack of elites did not mean that Kurdish nationalism was condemned to death. Because nationalist ideologies were alive and well, offering a blueprint for aspiring future Kurdish nationalists. What made them rediscover these ideas was the nationalism of the Turkish state which was a constant reminder of their second-class status. Every day before starting classes, children who are citizens, both in public and in private schools, were required to take the student pledge between 1933 and 2013 which is translated as follows: "I'm a Turk, upright and hardworking. My principle is to protect my younger, respect my older, and love my homeland and nation more than myself. My goal is to rise and go forward. O

Great Atatürk! I swear pledge to marching ceaselessly on the road you paved, and towards the target you laid out. May my being be a gift to the [collective] Turkish being. Lucky to be a Turk!” (Polat 2011, 76).

The last sentence is a motto introduced by Mustafa Kemal, who was granted Atatürk (meaning the father of the Turks) as his last name, and this motto was included in the pledge in 1972. The wording of the last sentence is “*ne mutlu Türküm diyene*” which more literally translates to “how happy is the one who says I’m a Turk” (Polat 2011, 76). It did not matter that many Kurds did not feel a part of the Turkish identity because it was tied to an ethnic group that was not theirs. They had to take the pledge in their ethnic homeland in a language that was foreign to them. Even further, Turkey had even denied the existence of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. The government advocated Sun Theory which claimed that “all languages derived from one original primeval Turkic language in central Asia. Isolated in the mountain fastnesses of eastern Anatolia, the Kurds had simply forgotten their mother tongue” (Gunter 2008, 5). In line with these claims, the Kurds were also called “Mountain Turks” who forgot their Turkish origins. This strategy was from the playbook of the nationalist assimilationist policies of France. By the early twentieth century, “if the jealous cult” of the French language “had not stamped out all competitors, it had at least persuaded many that such competitors had never really existed,” because they branched out of the same language (Weber 1976, 71). Indeed, “as early as 1907 a laureate of the Academy had declared that popular speech and literary language developed from the same source: Old French” (Weber 1976, 71). The current constitution in Turkey, which was ratified by a referendum in 1982 during the military junta regime, included provisions that specifically targeted the Kurdish identity. The preamble of the constitution declared: “The determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity” (Gunter 2008, 5). Though they did not specifically name it, two articles in the constitution banned

the use of Kurdish in any capacity in public spaces including even Kurdish music (Karakoç and Özen 2020).

Sheik Ubeydullah and the Azadi were against incoming colonization through policies of centralization. A lack of public education in Kurdish was not the only source of grievances of the Azadi, but it was certainly among the most important ones for its importance in the development of future Kurds. The absence of this natural right was not difficult to notice and it had a strong likelihood to produce grievances over the course of decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, the impact of these policies was strong enough to transform the Kurdish provinces and the Kurdish population, but not strong enough to completely assimilate them to the levels that the French had achieved. In fact, modernization and access to tertiary education exposed many young Kurds, children of poor peasants, to a wider political world and various ideologies, ironically, in the Turkish language. The process of spread of leftist ideologies, as discussed in a preceding section, eventually led to the rise of PKK, a group that used guerilla warfare to achieve its political goals. The PKK relied mainly on the voluntary recruitment of Kurds who joined the organization in reaction to the Turkish state. Its voluntary recruitment was not seriously curtailed by the tribal social order due to mounting grievances. The PKK branded itself as a savior from the oppression of tribal leaders and landlords even before it started its armed struggle against the state. The PKK became the main representative of Kurdish nationalism, which emerged, this time, within a Marxist framework. Two years after the ratification of the constitution in 1982, the PKK initiated its armed struggle against the state.

Since the spread of leftist Kurdish organizations in the 1960s, Kurds demanded the cultural, linguistic, and political rights that they have been deprived of. “Until recently, however, the government ruthlessly suppressed these demands for fear they would lead to the breakup of the state itself. This official refusal to brook any moderate Kurdish opposition helped encourage extremism and the creation of” the PKK (Gunter 2008, 6). This military solution had not brought any meaningful

progress, as the conflict resulted in “the death of about 40 000 people, the burning and forced evacuation of over 5000 Kurdish villages, severe environmental devastation, and the internal displacement of over a million people” (Savran 2020, 778). Facing the reality that it is not an easy goal to secede from Turkey, the PKK changed its position from pursuing secession to pursuing autonomy within a democratic Turkey (Gunter 2008, 7). The government’s hardline approach, however, did not adapt in a similar manner, even though the military solution has repeatedly failed. The government’s policies were influenced by the position of the Turkish military. This hardliner position did not face a strong challenge from civilian governments due to the weakness of unstable political coalitions and the persistence of the pressure from the military on this issue.

The government’s approach, however, eased following the replacement of the political elites under Erdoğan’s single-party majority governments and subsequent reforms that expanded the civilian control over the military (Savran 2020). Erdoğan was the first leader to recognize Turkey’s “Kurdish problem” which was a big step given that even the word Kurdish was used by the mainstream politicians sparingly, if ever (Gunter 2008, 9). Other reforms that would have been deemed too extreme by the government, such as the expansion of basic freedoms and minority rights, public broadcasting in Kurdish, and increased freedoms for non-violent Kurdish activism signaled the government’s willingness to solve the Kurdish problem and led to the peace process between 2013 and 2015 to negotiate the more substantial reforms, such as autonomy, constitutional recognition, and education in the mother tongue, that the Kurds have demanded.

The conditions seemed ripe for reforms, though it turned out that they were not. During the peace process, the government expected disarmament but it was not willing to offer the expected reforms. Although the government elites were now different and they wanted to solve the Kurdish problem, they had the same

concerns that the previous elites had had. The government was not sure whether agreeing with the PKK's demands would bring a permanent solution and the PKK would not pursue secession in the future. Seeing the government's hesitance and the slowness of the process, the PKK was not willing to disarm (Savran 2020). In fact, it turned out that the PKK was taking advantage of the eased security operations during the peace process. The PKK was already making preparations to bring the conflict to the urban areas in a way that it had not been able to by erecting sandbags and trenches to deter the government intervention if the negotiations would fail (Onat and Çubukçu 2019). Furthermore, the regional power dynamics had changed in the PKK's favor due to the Syrian civil war. Following the successful resistance of Kobanî against ISIS in Syria by the PKK-affiliated *Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat* (the Democratic Union Party, or PYD) and its armed-wing *Yekîneyên Parastina Gel* (the People's Defense Units, or YPG), the PKK and its affiliates finally were able to control a territory after decades. Even though the PKK has been widely recognized as a terrorist organization, its affiliates operating in Syria, the PYD and the YPG became legitimate actors and were even allied by the United States during the campaign against ISIS. The empowerment of the PKK in a significant and rapid manner made the Turkish government even more uncomfortable "because of fears and uncertainty regarding its implications to the existing order" (Savran 2020, 788). Consequently, the government was hesitant to take further steps to enact reforms that would appease its Kurdish citizens.

Although elites of an organization may have their own political agenda, the grievances of their pool of recruits and how easily they would radicalize and mobilize against the government have a substantial level of influence over the actions of the organization. During the conflict between the PKK and the government, "the Kurdish ethnic identity has grown increasingly important to many Kurds as a result of the politicization of their identity during the three-decades-long civil war" (Karakoç and Özen 2020, 22). To be clear, the PKK's views do not represent the position of all Kurds because a substantial portion of

the Kurdish population has voted for Erdoğan's party since 2002. Yet, given their political salience, the denial of cultural rights seems to be pushing the Kurdish population in the direction of the PKK. Whereas only 30 percent of the Kurds agreed with the statement that "PKK represents Kurds" in 2011, this ratio almost doubled in four years, increasing to 55 percent in 2015. During the same period, there had been an increase in support for linguistic and cultural rights: support for education in the mother tongue increased from 65 percent to 83 percent, turning the names of villages and towns back to their original Kurdish versions from 74 percent to 87 percent, providing services in the Kurdish language in institutions from 82 percent to 90 percent, and giving Friday sermons in the Kurdish language from 70 percent to 87 percent. There had been increased support also in political issues: support for independence increased from 24 percent to 38 percent, for Kurdish as a second official language increased from 56 percent to 74 percent, for autonomy increased from 56 percent to 66 percent, for a regional parliament from 49 percent to 65 percent, and for a regional flag from 40 percent to 58 percent between 2011 and 2015. The level of support for political rights is considerably high, but it appears low in comparison to cultural rights. The overwhelming support for cultural rights also indicates that the Kurdish citizens of Turkey support cultural rights regardless of their party affiliation or their position on political rights and a majority of them seem to see their future in Turkey. The position of a median Kurdish individual in Turkey, therefore, converges with the demands of the PKK even if the individual may not support the PKK (Karakoç and Özen 2020). The peace process collapsed, and after 1984, the conflict started for the second time in July 2015. The government's persistence in the denial of the cultural and political rights of the Kurds played a major role in the recurrence of the conflict. Regardless of the future consequences that the government has been worried about, if the government agreed with enacting the expected reforms, the conflict, may not have recurred. Whereas there are also considerable differences, the conflict between Iraq and its Kurdish population has some parallels with the case in Turkey and thus may offer

some insights. The Kurds in Iraq were also worried about their autonomy and cultural rights, and the state was concerned that allowing the Kurds to preserve their distinct identity could lead to secessionist demands. The tribal social order has undermined the nationalist goals of Iraqi Kurds to this day. A successful alliance between the tribes and the nationalist ideas allowed the Kurdish resistance to persist for decades, but at the same time, nationalist ideas have not become powerful enough to eliminate the tribal divisions. Whereas the PKK, as a new actor, largely overcame obstacles created by the tribal divisions, it was not possible in the Iraqi case as the tribes have remained involved in the resistance against the state in the entire process.

Though there was a chance for peace in the 1970s, Iraq's insistence on the borders of the Kurdish autonomous region and Barzani's miscalculations caused the conflict to persist. To that end, the Saddam regime tried to Arabize the Kurdish provinces to make sure the provinces would stay in Iraq, even if the Kurds were to secede in the future. The Kurds in Iraq faced extreme forms of repression during the Iran-Iraq war, including mass killings committed by the Saddam regime. The intervention of the United States in 1991 brought their suffering to an end. After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds pushed for an autonomous federal state, or if it fails, for independence. The Shiites, the majority group, needed the Kurdish votes to ratify the new constitution. Thus, they had to agree with some of the concessions that the Kurds had demanded, including an autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in which the Kurds enjoy their cultural and social rights. Fearing the demonstration effect on its own Kurdish population, however, Turkey was against an ethnically-based Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and the government heavily criticized the Kurdish attempts to annex Kirkuk into their prospective state. Nevertheless, Turkey was not able to do much to influence the outcome and had to accept the system of federal governance in Iraq as indicated in the Iraqi Constitution adopted in October 2005 (Gunter 2008, 15–18).

The swift rise of ISIS brought uncertainties for Iraq, as it did for Turkey. In 2014, several Iraqi provinces were invaded by ISIS and the Baghdad regime was unable to take these provinces back. After three years of struggle, ISIS was eventually defeated, but in the meantime, the KRG filled the gap in the adjacent provinces to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (or the KRI) and expanded its borders. Despite major economic risks posed by potential reactions from neighboring states in a landlocked territory, the KRG decided to take advantage of the weakness of the central government and pursued their nationalist aspirations for independence. The referendum in September 2017 passed with an overwhelming majority as 93 percent of the votes supported the independence. Turkey, Iran, and Baghdad, however, blockaded the region to prevent economic activities and force the KRG to cancel the referendum. Upon the KRG's refusal to cancel the referendum and hand over the disputed areas, the Iraqi government started a military campaign to restore the pre-2014 borders. The Iraqi army quickly recaptured the area, including Kirkuk (Kaplan 2019). Even though the PDK was prepared to fight, a faction in the YNK struck a deal with Qasem Suleimani of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and ordered their troops to abandon their posts without notifying the other forces. This withdrawal caught the PDK off-guard and facilitated the Iraqi troops to advance quickly and recapture Kirkuk (Hama and Abdulla 2019).

The PDK and YNK acted in harmony against ISIS because their goals were easy to rally around. They were fighting to defend their homeland and to protect the Kurds and their way of life against an invader. In the Battle of Kirkuk, however, the two sides did not have reliable cooperation. Indeed, these two sides are not the best partners and they fought multiple civil conflicts against each other in the past. But when the conditions demanded that they put their differences aside and the Kurdish interests to the fore, such as in the 1980s, they managed to make it work. The events around the 2017 referendum can be interpreted to be crucial for the Iraqi Kurds as they were set out to determine their future. The overwhelming support for independence in the referendum signaled the desire of the Kurds to

determine their own fate. Yet, I argue that the reason the Kurdish alliance fell through so quickly was that they were not very motivated to fight to begin with. Nationalism facilitates the mobilization of an aggrieved population to achieve nationalist political goals. In this instance, the YNK did not want to fight an unnecessary uphill battle. The Iraqi government did not threaten its Kurdish population, its culture, or its way of life. It rather wanted to return to the pre-ISIS status quo which resulted from an agreement between the government and the Kurdish elites. Thus, the grievances of the Kurds were insufficient to keep their resolve. In the Kurdish case in Iraq, a lack of educational language rights did not entirely drive rebellion as the existing tribal elites had already politicized this issue along with others and mobilized the Kurds against the Iraqi state. Yet, the collapse of the independence referendum is a sign that grievances caused by horizontal cultural inequalities had fueled mobilization for decades, as its absence in 2017 led to the collapse of the resistance against the state in only five days.

If the PKK was in a similar situation with low opportunity as it has had in the past, I speculate that it would not have affected the resolve of its elites and fighters as much, because it has been fighting for the political goals around which serious grievances have formed and have been present. Indeed, the PKK experiences periods of decline, such as in the late 1990s. Yet, it did not lead them to give up their main demands. In other words, high grievances could potentially overcome the inhibiting power of the low opportunity to fight, and as a result, mobilization could still occur. Yet, in the case of Iraqi Kurds, their low opportunity was coupled with low grievances. Their political situation was, indeed, not ideal and they would have preferred to declare their independence over the provinces they possessed after the fall of ISIS. However, the Kurds still had a home in which their cultural, social, and political rights were protected and their political goals were not in response to existential threats over their culture, identity, and their homeland.

To conclude, the Iraqi case contains some potential lessons for the Turkish government. The government's concerns for not making a peace deal with the PKK were shown to be somewhat valid with the KRG's independence referendum. An agreement does not ensure that it will last as both sides are unlikely to come to an agreement that the PKK will be perfectly happy with. Given an opportunity, the PKK may renege on its commitments and pursue secession. Yet, Turkey still has some important advantages compared to Iraq. The Turkish military is considerably stronger than the Iraqi military and the support of the Kurds for independence in Turkey is much lower than in Iraq. In a peace agreement, the government would potentially end up in an advantageous position in terms of its security arrangements. Nevertheless, none of these factors rule out the possibility that the PKK may push for secession in the future simply because it is impossible to rule out this possibility. Kurdish nationalism is already sufficiently widespread among the Kurdish masses. Even if the government were to defeat the PKK, given a sufficient level of opportunity in the future, former PKK sympathizers could still remobilize and start an uprising under new leadership. There is only one solution that would give the government what it wants: assimilating the Kurdish population in a way that they not only speak Turkish but also accept being Turks. While the government may have been somewhat successful with this, it seems very unlikely to achieve the conversion of a large majority of the Kurdish population given how widespread Kurdish nationalism is today. Therefore, the policies of cultural accommodation have a better chance to facilitate peace than employing only security-oriented policies.

Conclusion

This chapter is dedicated to exploring the relationship between the horizontal cultural inequalities, nationalism, and conflict onset in the Kurdish cases in Turkey and Iraq. Although the horizontal cultural inequalities are not the only factors that would facilitate mobilization in these cases, or in any case for that matter given that mobilization also requires conditions favorable for taking arms,

I attempted to cover the progression of horizontal cultural inequalities in these cases while emphasizing the role of nationalism and grievances in mobilization. Following the brief introductory section, the second section discusses the role of Bedir Khan Beg, Sheik Ubaydallah, and Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments on the origins of Kurdish nationalism. The third section investigates the developments following the Young Turk Revolution which turned the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish state. Whereas the relative freedoms enjoyed after the fall of Abdulhamid II's autocratic regime offered the Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul prospects to lay the foundations of a Kurdish nation within the empire, the Young Turks later decided that it is not in their interests to allow the Kurdish nationalists to organize. Consequently, they had to operate in the Kurdish provinces in the east moving forward. During their short window of operation in the capital, the Kurdish elites started planning the development of the Kurdish language and the modernization of the Kurdish people. In the fourth section, the events following the end of the First World War are examined. The Treaty of Sèvres made it possible for the Kurds to achieve independence, though at a large cost, as the borders of their future state would be much smaller than the Kurdish elites envisioned. The success of the Turkish nationalists to stop the partitioning of Anatolia, however, made this treaty invalid and eliminated the possibility of even a small Kurdish state.

The fifth section discusses the Kurdish issue following the Treaty of Lausanne which superseded the Treaty of Sèvres. After the borders of Turkey were recognized by the great powers, the Kurdish issue became a domestic matter for Turkey and the prospects for an independent Kurdish state within the borders of modern-day Turkey shrank significantly. The Kurdish nationalists decided sheiks would play a leading role in the rebellion that they had planned for the next step. Because sheiks were able to influence Kurds who were outside their tribes and this ability was important given that the tribal social structure hindered the mobilization efforts due to uncooperative tribal leaders who did not care about nationalist notions. Nevertheless, the uprising led by Sheik Said was crushed by

the government and the ensuing government repression put Kurdish nationalism in a period of dormancy. The sixth section is dedicated to discussing the rise of the PKK, a Marxist-Leninist organization that has a nationalist orientation, and its onset of armed struggle against the government. After decades of discrimination, the grievances of the Kurdish population, who were rather indifferent to the nationalist appeals of the Kurdish elites from Istanbul in the 1910s and 1920s, made them receptive to nationalist notions. Young intellectuals from ordinary Kurdish families set up leftist nationalist organizations. The PKK targeted other Kurdish groups that opposed them and emerged as the dominant force of Kurdish nationalism. After establishing regional leadership, the PKK started its armed struggle against the state. After these five sections that cover the history of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, the seventh section offers a summary of the progression of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq to use a part of the developments here for the discussion in the following section. Relatively stronger position the Iraqi Kurds had allowed them to resist and the infusion of tribal and nationalist goals shaped the nature of the Kurdish resistance in Iraq. The Kurds fought for autonomy and cultural rights across their land, but they failed to achieve it until the US intervention. The resulting agreement with the new democratic Iraqi regime addressed the grievances of its Kurdish population. Consequently, the conflict following the independence referendum in 2017 did not last long.

In these six sections, the history of Kurdish cultural grievances and the progression of these grievances in each step are laid out. The eighth section evaluates the significance of cultural grievances and education in the heritage language for mobilization and conflict onset in the Kurdish cases. The right to education in Kurdish as a medium of instruction has been one of the central demands of the Kurds since the early twentieth century. While the demand for autonomy has been very important to the Kurdish political elites, polls show that it is mainly various forms of identity-based discrimination and denial of rights that are the main drivers of the grievances of the Kurdish public in Turkey. Even though multiple factors have facilitated the recruitment of the Kurds,

assimilationist policies and the resulting grievances are among the most important ones. The demand for education in the heritage language remains one of the most desired policy changes for the Kurdish people. Furthermore, the Kurdish citizens of Turkey view it as potentially the most important step the government can take to end the ongoing conflict (KONDA 2010). In the Iraqi case, even though the Kurds are not perfectly happy with the current federal arrangement, they are content with their cultural rights. The recognition of their cultural rights and having public education in their mother tongue undermined their mobilization for independence and the unity between the Kurdish elites who, as a result, reverted to pursuing their self-interests rather than working together against threats to their nation in this instance.

CHAPTER SEVEN


CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I first summarize this work, discuss the implications of this study, and offer suggestions for future research. Intrastate conflicts are the most common form of political violence since World War II. Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of the conflict types based on the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v21.1 and ACD2EPR 2021 data (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Intrastate conflicts and internationalized intrastate conflicts constitute nearly the entire set of conflicts since the mid-1970s. Around this time, the number of total conflicts also experienced a sharp increase and this increase is driven by ethnic conflicts. Though religious fundamentalism has led to an increase in non-ethnic conflicts in the 2010s, ethnic conflicts remain high despite seeing some decline after their peak in the 1980s.

Influenced by the conception of horizontal inequalities, the EPR dataset was created to offer more fine-grained data at a sub-national level. In addition, this dataset also looks at inequalities between ethnic groups that are thought to fuel violence. Whereas earlier studies relied on proxies that are not directly connected to grievances that are associated with ethnic conflicts, such as income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and democracy level, the EPR dataset offers a more direct proxy for grievances created by horizontal political inequalities and classifies groups based on their access to executive political power. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) argue that horizontal political inequalities create grievances that are associated with conflict because modern nationalist principles refuse alien rule. These inequalities turn to grievances in four steps: group identification, intergroup comparison, evaluation of injustice, and framing and attribution of blame.

Building on Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Cederman, Gleditsch, and

Figure 7.1 Total Number of Conflicts in the World by Type Over Years



Buhaug (2013), in this work, I attempt to expand this literature to explore how grievances facilitate ethnic conflict. I argue that, although the investigation of horizontal political inequalities helps us explore disparities in terms of access to power, their theoretical connection to ethnonationalism is not very strong. This connection is notable because political claims based on ethnic groups have been made through nationalism. Instead, horizontal political inequalities can be used as a proxy for institutional arrangements that can account for discrimination and injustice that some ethnic groups face. Yet, if we are interested in specific forms of discrimination that trigger ethnonationalist demands on political power, I argue that educational language policies offer a more direct proxy for horizontal cultural inequalities that are associated with ethnic mobilization around modern nationalist demands. More specifically, I argue that educational language policies aggrieve discriminated ethnic minorities who then turn to their ethnonationalist elites who promise to challenge the government to correct their unjust conditions. Consequently, the spread of a constructed ethnonational identity among coethnics, in response to the discrimination by the government, facilitates mobilization around political goals even in the absence of institutional means to support that mobilization. In doing so, educational language policies that discriminate against minorities increase the likelihood of onset.

To start with, I rely on a strong theoretical foundation to support this claim. In Chapter 2, I explore various theories on nationalism, including primordialist, instrumentalist, constructivist, and institutionalist views, to explain the origins of nationalism, its constructed nature, and its connection with institutions. However, I note that the theories of nationalism cannot be generalized and can only be applied directly to the majority groups. I contend that the theories are more suitable to explain the nation-building phase, which is still essential for this work, yet I argue that the unique challenges of minority nationalism need to be addressed. I note that these theories fail to explain ethnonationalist mobilization of minorities particularly given that ethnonationalist elites do not have the institutional means to indoctrinate their coethnics and to encourage them to

mobilize. Despite this disadvantage, minority nationalism still often manages to spread to the masses. To overcome the discrepancy between majority and minority groups on nationalism, I conceptualize minority nationalism as a distinct form, not in terms of the nature of nationalist ideas, but about the unique conditions minorities have had to operate in modern nation-states. As a result, the daily lives of the members of ethnic minorities have been heavily influenced by the actions and policies of the state in a new way that had not existed before modernity. The imposition of national borders and expanded bureaucracy have forced minorities to live under the rule of states that represent the majority groups. Given the drastic nature of this change, it is essential to explore the relationship between the states and their minority groups in modern political settings specifically in terms of why and how grievances build against the state and whether these grievances are connected to political violence.

In Chapter 3, I argue that nationalism works through horizontal inequalities to facilitate the four steps stated above. Ethnonationalist elites from discriminated groups reach out to their coethnics to develop group consciousness in them, help them compare their disadvantaged conditions with the members of other groups, and show them those who are responsible for the injustice that targets them. For those reasons, horizontal inequalities are more likely than vertical inequalities to facilitate conflict. I also discuss in this chapter why individuals are moved by discrimination that targets their ethnic group. I argue that, at the social level, the modern principle of authenticity manifests itself as the need to preserve the originality of their culture from external threats and triggers a reaction against discrimination by states.

In Chapter 4, I show that horizontal cultural inequalities are most likely to achieve the four steps for ethnonationalist leaders. Among these types of inequalities, policies around language stand out because language is an essential part of our social interaction, and inequalities targeting language are impossible to escape from. The importance of language provides a cognitive advantage for

the group identification and group comparison steps. It is also easier to evaluate such inequalities targeting their language, culture, and identity as unjust and blame the state for them. Ethnic minorities are likely to view educational language policies that discriminate against their language unjust for two reasons. First, these policies attack their dignity by showing and institutionalizing that they are of second-class status. Secondly, referring back to the principle of authenticity, these policies eventually lead to the decline of their language in social life and threatens the survival of their language and unique culture, and as a result, triggers a reaction from ethnonationalist groups to reverse this trend. To be clear, ethnic groups would not necessarily be aggrieved by these developments. What I claim is that, on average, they are more likely to be aggrieved by this type of inequality than others that are not associated with their identity.

After establishing the theoretical framework, I offer quantitative and qualitative support for my claims. In Chapter 5, I find empirical support in a large-n study. I first show that conflict onset is more common among groups that do not receive education in their language. Next, I offer a series of models that support my claims and I discuss the results of the models. In Chapter 6, I offer case studies using a most similar case design to process trace the conflict mechanisms and show how discriminating educational language policies make the public more receptive to nationalist claims over time, and when these claims are satisfied, makes them less aggrieved against the state. These claims can be observed in the early failures of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey after the fall of the Ottoman Empire as many Kurdish tribes supported the Turkish nationalists. Additionally, they can be observed in the mobilization of the PKK in the 1970s building on grievances against local tribal leaders and against the government who played a role in the discrimination of the Kurds, and finally, in the quick failure of the independence attempts of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq when these grievances were largely absent in 2017.

As discussed in Chapter 4, states are not very inclined to offer their minorities the right to receive education in their language. In fact, they do not even prefer offering classes teaching the children from minorities their native languages as a subject. Minority groups that do receive education in their language are mainly those that are ethnoreligious minorities or those that had largely been assimilated to the language of the majority before the modernization of the state. Even though this is an issue that can potentially fuel grievances for ethnic minorities to the extent that they may rise against their state, governments are not inclined to offer their minorities education in their language as a part of a conscious plan to assimilate them under their nation-building project.

This work establishes a connection between horizontal cultural inequalities in the form of educational language policies and ethnonationalist mobilization. In doing so, it highlights that ethnic conflict cannot be theorized by solely relying on instrumental rationalist explanations, because value rationalism plays an essential role in ethnic mobilization. Scholars of conflict can employ these ideas in their studies to further explore the correlates of conflict in its different stages. Given its role in mobilization, value rationalism would also be visible during the duration of conflicts, leading to an extended conflict. Because after the onset, the ethnonationalist representatives emerge as new actors. If they have a substantial level of support among their coethnics, they become resilient and are hard to defeat permanently. They turn into a separate interest group that seeks legitimacy and wants to survive. Yet, governments are reluctant to share power with their past enemies due to commitment problems. Unless the outcome is a settlement that is agreed upon by the organization, the conflict may be more likely to recur until the grievances of the ethnic members are addressed.

In addition to scholarly benefits, an improved understanding of the role of different forms of grievances in conflict dynamics can also inform our policies. If policies that affect minorities are not employed with a potential impact on grievances in mind, such policies run the risk of fueling grievances and threaten

long-term stability. As a result, the cost of employing discriminatory policies can be high at the global level. Given that most nation-states include several minorities, they are prone to issues arising from identity-related causes. On the other hand, inclusive policies can minimize such problems. Regardless of the nature of the concerns, whether it is humanitarian around protecting minorities or avoiding costly civil wars, understanding sources of grievances and employing policies addressing them may be crucial to achieving long-term peace within states.

There is evidence from case studies suggesting that addressing grievances does support peace (Albertus and Kaplan 2013). This study offers additional evidence using large-n analysis that inclusive policies on language in education are associated with lower levels of conflict onset. Although inclusive policies lower the chance of onset, the governments still may prefer assimilating their minorities as a part of their nation-building projects. But if the grievances lead to conflict, as argued in this work, then governments may not be able to get away with improving only the cultural rights of their minorities after the onset to achieve peace. The rivalry between the armed organization and the government may be difficult to overcome if the organization has an agenda that is incompatible with the accommodations the state would be willing to make, such as the pursuit of secession. Thus, governments would have a better chance of avoiding conflict by accommodating their minorities before an ethnonationalist mobilization. In other words, governments would be more likely to achieve long-term peace by acknowledging the cultural rights of their minorities before an onset. But even after the onset, governments would have a better chance to achieve long-term peace by acknowledging the cultural rights of their minorities than by defeating the armed organizations claiming to represent the groups or by reaching a settlement that does not address the sources of grievances of the discriminated minorities. Referring back to the Basque case, the decision of the Spanish government to provide cultural rights following the transition to democracy appears to have been successful. The grievances against the state have

decreased, and along with this decrease, the support for violent activities of the ETA has faded over time (Dowsett 2010). This lowered support likely negatively impacted the recruitment of the ETA. Eventually, the low support for the organization and successful police operations led to the demise of the ETA (Binnie 2018). Handling the conflict has not been simple for Spain, but the policies aimed at lowering the grievances of its Basque population seem to have paid off.

Although this study addresses an important gap, there are several avenues for future research. First, whereas the claims of this work hold in the MENA region, it is uncertain whether it would be as successful in an analysis extended to the world. The theory is developed to account for cases around the world, but there may be regional factors that are influential on the results. For example, policies around language are quite different in post-colonial Africa than in the rest of the world. Having experienced assimilation by colonial states, a majority of African states are reliant on the language of their colonizers despite not having a population of native speakers of these colonial languages originating from their colonial home state. Not only this reliance has grown over time, but it is also the case that a change is unlikely because the colonial languages serve as a unifying force between various ethnic groups. If a majority group was to replace the colonial language with its own, other ethnic groups would challenge it. Therefore, more data collection is needed to address this question and it was not possible within the scope of this study due to limitations in time.

Secondly, more research should be done on group mobilization. Although this study is not the first to claim that nationalism plays a role in the conflict mechanisms, it dedicates a considerable portion to theorize why and how nationalism influences conflict dynamics, which is not common. More work should be done on why some groups mobilize around ethnonationalist goals whereas others do not. The discussion on France in the eighteenth century and other European states in the nineteenth century suggests that the presence of a

class of elites, mainly bourgeois or aristocratic classes, who internalize nationalist principles and dedicate their resources to create the intellectual and ideational basis for the modernization of their coethnics is essential, and its absence leaves the lower classes vulnerable to the forces of assimilation by the majority group that controls the state. However, it is not the only factor, as can be seen in the Kurdish case provided in this work. The discussion of the Kurds in Turkey shows that, similar to the European cases, a class of Kurdish elites in the capital attempted to achieve this task, but ultimately failed against the majority elites. Yet, the cultural discrimination experienced over decades led to the rise of new potential nationalist movements, and one of them, the PKK, prevailed against others. In other words, instead of being already present, a class of intellectual elites who create the nation can themselves be created by some other factors. More data need to be collected not only groups that already mobilized, but also on groups that have not mobilized to explore this topic further.

Third, as another important form of horizontal cultural inequalities, religious discrimination should also be investigated. Although I claim in this work that language is a more relevant cultural feature when studying conflict due to the way modern nation-states function simply because it is public and inescapable unlike religion, it does not mean that religious inequalities are unimportant. In fact, for this reason, religious assimilation attempts using state power are difficult to find during modern times. What often happens is that states discriminate against minority religions by providing lower amounts of state funds than the prioritized religion, by not officially recognizing the minority religions, or by banning religious symbols or customs of these religions. Such policies aggrieve the people who subscribe to the discriminated religions. Religious minorities may rise against state, not necessarily because the members of the majority group subscribe to a different religion than the one they believe in, but in response to discrimination by the state. Therefore, policies around religion deserve attention to improve our understanding of the association between religion and conflict onset.

Finally, a theoretical connection between language policies and nationalism is established in this study. Yet, the temporal and spatial aspects of this connection need to be explored further. Temporally, it is not clear whether this connection is stronger or weaker in different time periods. Since their inception, nationalist ideas have evolved over time. It can be useful to study how nationalism has evolved and whether the evolution of nationalism over time is relevant for the study of conflict. For instance, it is unclear whether and how nationalism may have been affected by the recent information technologies. Spatially, every region has gone through a unique process of political development. Thus, the evolution of nationalism is not only time-bound, it is also dependent on space. For example, whereas many earlier European cases of nationalism drove policies of homogenization and nation-building, newly decolonized African states found themselves in multicultural settings where majority groups were not able to establish a majority rule within the artificial borders they ended up in based on the colonial borders of the past. Additionally, their dependence on the language of their past colonizers that initiated their modernization made it difficult for African majorities to overcome this dependence and build nations in the European sense. My preliminary research shows that the only region in Africa where majorities somewhat overcome these limitations and replaced the language of their colonizers with their own languages are the Arabic-speaking nations of North Africa. Given such regional differences, it is also important to study regional characteristics of nationalist ideas and how they may be associated with language policies and conflict onset.

This work is still relevant in contemporary politics because the sovereignty of nation-states is the organizing principle of world politics. Nation-states are different from other forms of states that preceded them. Nation-states are colonial and intrusive. They expand the power of the state into minority spaces and force a pre-determined form of their majority culture upon their minorities. Minority cultures are endangered today as a result of the encroachment of the majority culture. In fact, there is an ongoing linguistic genocide as languages

have been dying at an alarming rate in the past century (May 2012, 2). In 2000, Crystal noted that 4% of the world's population speaks 96% of its languages (Crystal 2000, 14). Languages that do not have political support are vulnerable to the forces that continuously weaken them against majority languages until their eventual death. This is a woeful development for the speakers of the endangered languages and the cultural heritage of the world. I argue that, in addition, it is also relevant for achieving peace. Perhaps a majority of the languages with a low number of speakers do not have enough speakers to sustain an armed rebellion. But many groups that do have a considerable number of speakers and whose language would have flourished without the intrusion of the state are aggrieved by it and are willing to mobilize to protect their culture and language, many of which are mentioned throughout this work.

Africa offers interesting cases where groups are not particularly adamant about protecting their own language and culture, but rather, they prefer their colonial language rather than another language being imposed on them by the majority. In Mauritania, the Arabic-speaking majority has been pursuing policies of Arabization across the country, gradually replacing French in public life. The Black African minorities from the southern part of the country have been frustrated by these developments. They view French as the language of unity and Arabic as a language of assimilation. Even though they have their own ethnic languages with the status of national languages, the speakers of Pulaar, Soninke, and Wolof prefer preserving French as the language they use in their public life instead of having to learn Arabic, a language they have no historical ties with (France24 2010; Leclerc 2018).

Cameroon is another country where political cleavages emerge along the linguistic divide. The Anglophone regions left Nigeria and joined Cameroon following a referendum in 1961. They joined with an arrangement that recognized their autonomy under a federal system. However, the federal system was abolished by the Francophones in 1972. As a result, the Anglophones felt

betrayed. Because whereas they had a federal administration of their own as an equal to the French portion of the state, they only constitute around 20% of the population in the unitary system, residing as the majority in only 2 out of 10 regions. The Anglophone Cameroonians who live in the Northwest and Southwest provinces have been frustrated with the end of their autonomy which was previously protected by the constitution. They are also aggrieved by policies that discriminate against them. Under the unitary system, the Anglophone Cameroonians argue that they are not enjoying the same rights as the Francophones. These issues led to a conflict in 2017 that is still ongoing, where armed groups from the Anglophone push for the secession of Ambazonia. Although this case has more to do with status reversal, the political divide around language is still interesting. To clarify, both the Anglophone and the Francophone Cameroonians consist of multiple ethnic groups. There was nothing noteworthy bringing these groups on each side together before their colonization. What brings various Anglophone Cameroonian ethnic groups is simply having English as their colonial language and they oppose being governed by the French state (Washington Post 2019).

The rise of the Scots language along with the Scottish National Party (or, the SNP) is also an interesting case. Scots did not have political recognition as a distinct language from English until recently. In fact, it is not clear whether it constitutes a language even for many Scottish people. Despite not receiving much attention previously, the Scots language has been increasingly popular since the increase in the number of people who identify with the Scottish nationality and the emergence of the SNP as a political force in Scotland. Despite the failure in the referendum for independence, “the SNP has been enthusiastic in both funding for Scots and for developing language policy” (Lawson 2014, 149). Lawson notes that a common theme during her interviews with the Scottish people on the attitude towards the Scots language was that they are angered by “having been made to feel inferior for speaking Scots, and anger at having been educated in a system that attaches little value to the Scots language” (Lawson

2014, 152). One of the interviewed individuals described the linguistic discrimination she faced as follows: “Ah’ve been telt ma whole life tae speak properly. Ah’ dae. A’ speak like me. Whit’s ‘unproper’ aboot that? It wis nothin’ but offensive tae be a post doc at ma uni and telt by an auld Prof fae England that ah’ didnae speak properly” (Lawson 2014, 152).² The growing importance of the Scots language for the Scottish people shows that even when the linguistic differences look inconsequential to an outsider, experiences of discrimination and nationalist ideas change the meaning derived by its speakers from such differences.

Linguistic issues can also raise tensions between states, as recently observed between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. After overcoming the Greek veto for its membership in the European Union by agreeing to change its name from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia following a referendum, North Macedonia now faces another veto from Bulgaria. The incumbent government of Bulgaria demands North Macedonia to acknowledge that the people of Macedonia do not speak Macedonian, they rather speak a South Slavic language that was derived from Bulgarian (Brezar 2021). The official Bulgarian history claims that the North Macedonian people are, in fact, Bulgarian people who were brainwashed by the communist regime in Yugoslavia which created an artificial Macedonian identity and language. This nationalistic view is used for domestic political gains in Bulgaria (Deutsche Welle 2020). One may consider this a very unnecessary and irrational move, given that there is no potential benefit for Bulgaria, in fact, the abuse of the veto power in this instance rather hurts the reputation of the country in the European Union. It is doubtful whether or not it is rational even for the political party that advocates for it. Yet, actions of symbolic or ideational importance are important because

² Lawson provides a translation of the comments to English as follows: “I have been told my whole life to speak properly. I do. I speak like me. What’s ‘unproper’ about that? It was nothing but offensive to be a post doc at my university and told by an old Professor from England that I didn’t speak properly.”

they are used to rally people around political organizations and goals, as can be seen in this case. From China to Canada and to South Africa, linguistic issues have been at the core of ethnic problems in many cases. Yet, the literature on conflict has not paid much attention to government policies that have an ideational basis. I hope that these cases inspire more work on this topic and the suggestions made in this study help guide future work on ethnic conflict.

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