

**Conscientious Acceptance:
The Impact of Public Support on Conscription**

**A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my wife and my parents.

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I want to express my sincerest gratitude to my wife, parents, siblings, friends, and family, near and far. Without your unwavering support and belief in me and this project, this dissertation would not have seen the light of day. I would also like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Gary Uzonyi, for being invaluable during the last few years. Not only did he ask the right questions at the right time, but he also helped me make sense of the many thoughts and ideas that became this project. He also brought the necessary patience, trust, and understanding to the process, making it much more bearable than expected. A special Thank You to my committee members, Dr. Brandon Prins, Dr. Ian Down, and Dr. Victor Asal as well. Their constructive feedback added immense value to my experience and (hopefully) the dissertation. Even though it will never do the profound impact he had on my life any justice, a big and heartfelt ‘Dankeschön’ goes to Dr. Ryan Grauer. If it were not for him, his classes, mentorship, and support throughout the years, I would not be where I am today, personally, geographically, and academically. Moreover, I want to give thanks to Dr. Krista Wiegand and the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy. They fostered my growth and development as an academic in many ways, including by allowing me to present, shape, and refine my research at the ‘International Relations/Global Security Workshop’ before taking it to conferences. Furthermore, I want to say thank you to the Department of Political Science, which took me on as a graduate student many years ago and provided me with the tools (and stipends) that helped me grow from a young and inexperienced student into something bigger. Namely, I would like to express gratitude towards Dr. Richard Pacelle and all the administrative staff past (Laura and Sue) and

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ABSTRACT

“What makes a state maintain conscription, especially during peacetime?” – Conventional wisdom argues that forced recruitment is a practical and efficient tool to increase a country’s security, especially during episodes of high threat. However, the policy loses its appeal in times of peace when its downsides become more evident. Consequentially, it should be expected that states would rid themselves of the draft when there are no security-related reasons to keep it. Yet, empirical reality paints a different picture, with more than half of all conscription cases existing under no active threat. This dissertation proposes that it is the support of the public, in the form of the Winning Coalition that is necessary to keep a leader in power, that allows for conscription to exist in times of peace. The basic principle is: When Winning Coalition Support for conscription is high, then it will be maintained. If it is low, then the draft will be abolished. I test my theory across three different papers: Paper 1 (Chapter II) demonstrates that the size of the Winning Coalition affects the tools that leaders can use to sell conscription to the people. In particular, large Winning Coalitions cannot resort to private goods but must rely on policies like Conscientious Objection that give the draft a more human face. It finds that larger Winning Coalitions have a higher likelihood of implementing Conscientious Objection. Paper 2 (Chapter III) highlights the impact of time on the support of the Winning Coalition for forced recruitment. The analysis shows that a drop in levels of Winning Coalition Support for conscription in the Federal Republic of Germany led to debates about its future. Lastly, paper 3 (Chapter IV) investigates how the salience of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service during debates can influence the support of the Winning

Coalition. It establishes that when salience was low in Germany, it suspended the draft. Nevertheless, when it was high in the Republic of Austria, conscription was maintained.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

“Nation Ends Draft, Turns to Volunteers” – This headline on the front page of the New York Times in late January 1973 marked the end of forced recruitment in the United States (Rosenbaum 1973). While there was still a requirement for eligible men to register for the Selective Service, nobody would be compelled to serve in the country’s armed forces against their will. By ending conscription, the U.S. followed the example of Great Britain, which rid itself of the policy over a decade prior. Yet, despite these states abolishing the draft, it was maintained by many countries throughout the Cold War (Poutvaara and Wagener 2011a). This changed with the fall of the Soviet Union, which led to an increasing number of states phasing out this form of recruitment. Conscription, so the prevalent notion during these years, was on its way out (Leander 2004).

However, the policy proved to be more resilient than expected, with more than 70 countries worldwide maintaining forced recruitment in some shape or form in the year 2022, mainly in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia (CIA World Factbook 2022). On the one hand, this is not surprising since there are states with conscription that are engaged in war or under active internal or external threats, e.g., Ukraine, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. In those cases, the draft can be a viable and effective tool to increase power and security. On the other hand, conscription makes less sense in cases where there are no security threats. However, there several places in which the draft is active despite obvious security reasons, such as Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Switzerland, and Vietnam. This is puzzling since common knowledge would expect those countries to not have conscription

anymore, especially during peacetime. As a consequence, my dissertation will investigate why forced recruitment persists.

This chapter provides an overview of the academic discussions on conscription that are relevant to my project. It begins with a definition and brief history of conscription. Then, it dives into factors that lead a state to adopt the policy. Afterward, it presents reasons why conscription might not always be the ideal recruitment mechanism for a country. Following the discussion of the benefits and advantages of conscription, it will highlight the disconnect between theory and empirical reality and present the underlying puzzle of this project. It will then preview my theory for why countries keep conscription during peacetime and describe the main element behind it: Conscientious Objection. Lastly, it will illustrate my contributions to the general field of IR and present a roadmap for the dissertation.

What is Conscription?

Conscription has been around for millennia. It describes the forced recruitment of (mostly) male adults into a country's armed forces and can range from a 1) complete or universal draft, in which every eligible citizen has to serve, to 2) selective service, where only parts of the eligible population are drafted, to 3) no conscription, meaning the absence of forced recruitment. The earliest traces of it reach back to the Babylonian Empire, which established “the obligation to serve in the royal army in return for the right to hold land” (Postgate 1994, 242). While the policy existed in some form or the other over the next thousands of years, for example, during the Middle Ages when rulers employed levies to gather enough troops for war or expeditions, it took its most current form in France in 1793,

when the country proclaimed its *levée en masse* (Haltiner 1998). For the first time, a state engaged in forced recruitment of its citizens on a massive scale and made service in the armed forces one of the primary duties of the citizenry (Blanton 2009). Spurred by France's military successes, other European countries began compelling their people into service as well, which led to conscription becoming the main form of recruitment in the Western World (Haltiner 1998, Nickerson 1942, Lachmann 2013). However, conscription then was not always a permanent policy. For example, many Anglo-Saxon countries only resorted to forced recruitment in times of crisis (Levi 1996). Regardless, even in these countries, conscription skyrocketed during the First World War, which was fought by millions of draftees on every side of the front lines. Conscription's heydays continued until the end of the Second World War, which, again, saw clashes of large conscript armies. Even though some democracies phased out this form of recruitment in the years after the war, with Canada being the first (Burk 1992), many other countries, such as the Soviet Union and the member states of the Warsaw Pact, France, Germany, Sweden, Austria, South Korea, etc., maintained the policy. The biggest shift away from conscription came about with the end of the Cold War when states started to shift away from mass armies to volunteer forces (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Haltiner 1998).

Why Have Conscription?

Countries implement conscription for a variety of reasons: economic benefits, culture and ideology, foreign influence, and security:

Economic Benefits

Staffing a military is expensive, primarily when a state with limited budgets must compete against the private sector to find volunteers for their professional forces. For one, governments have limits on what they can pay in salaries, whereas other sectors of the economy do not. However, without comparable wages, militaries will have a more challenging time staffing their ranks (Hosek, Peterson, and Heilbrunn 1994). Additionally, the profession of a soldier comes with inherent dangers, e.g., forced relocations, risks to health, and loss of life, that do not exist or are limited in the civilian economy. As a consequence, potential recruits might prefer joining the private sector over the military because of higher salaries and improved working conditions, in particular, when unemployment numbers are low. Moreover, with advances in military technology, foreign deployments, and the rise in sophisticated weaponry, the armed forces' requirements for new recruits, e.g., background, skills, and education, are becoming more demanding. Unfortunately, many suitable candidates might not see service in the military as a preferable alternative to other jobs (Ben-Ari, Rosman, and Shamir 2021).¹ That leads to a situation where the state has to lower its requirements for new recruits and accept sub-par candidates who would usually not make the cut (Margulies 2021). Overcoming these issues of low-quality staff and competition with the civilian sector requires massive investments on the government's side.

These issues are less pronounced under conscription. States employing forced recruitment can tap into a nearly endless pool of recruits consisting of all men (and

¹ An example of this is the Israeli military's struggle to compete with the high-tech sector for recruits (Ben-Ari, Rosman, and Shamir 2021, 10).

sometimes women) of military age. This allows the armed forces to meet all their staffing goals. Additionally, conscription eliminates competition with other sectors of the economy. Even though some highly sought-after recruits might prefer working in the civilian workforce for better pay, they could be compelled to join the military (Margulies 2021). This allows the state to pick and choose the members of their armed forces at a fraction of the cost they would have to invest in a professional military.

In addition to the benefits for the government, conscription offers economic advantages to the individual recruits, mainly through the acquisition of tangible and non-tangible skills. During their service, draftees will learn discipline, leadership skills, and how to function as a member of a team, amongst other things (Levy 2007). Furthermore, job training provided by the military can leave recruits with valuable skills such as specific trades or licenses. These can benefit them after exiting the armed forces and joining the civilian workforce.

Culture and Ideology

Traditionally, conscription has been regarded as the glue that holds a society together. The idea dates back to Rousseau's *Social Contract*. Citizens, so his theory, accept forced recruitment because it is necessary to achieve a functioning state (Rousseau and Frankel 1947). The shared experience of military service will instill a sense of community and responsibility for the state among the population (Ben-Eliezer 1995, Røislien 2013). Levy sees this as a form of symbolic reward, e.g., citizenship, that is essential to building a state (2007), and Eichler calls military service and its effects the "main tools to bind male citizens to the nation-state and make the provisions of security public" (2014, 603). It also

serves as an integrative tool, or the “school of the nation” that can overcome divisions based on class or geographical regions (Leander 2004, 576).²

Immanuel Kant and others draw a connection between regime type and conscription by arguing that republics would prefer forced recruitment of all members of society over professional armies so that society as a whole would carry the weight of military service (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Cohen 1985, Kant [1795] 1991, Kubik 2001). However, it is not just a mere preference for conscription as a concept. Instead, Levi stipulates that the population of democratic countries will be more enthusiastic about being drafted themselves as well (1996, Burk 1995). Indeed, this seems to hold up for several democracies, such as France and Finland, which saw a positive interconnection between democracy and conscription, with France even considering forced recruitment a melting pot (Forrest 2002, Leander 2004, Phillips 1991). Moreover, union influence has a positive impact on the draft as well (Anderson, Halcoussis, and Tollison 1996).

In addition to its integrative potential and its importance for democracy, conscription can also create vital connections between a state and its military, thereby establishing civilian control (Janowitz 1960). Ioannis Choulis, Zorzeta Bakaki, and Tobias Böhmelt have found a direct and positive link between countries with forced recruitment and appreciation for their military by showing that conscription leads to higher support for the military (2019). This can lead to better integration of the armed forces in society and will prevent them from going against the civilian government (Kuemmel 2006, Wallenius et al. 2018). As a consequence, unstable democracies tend to use conscription as a way of

² Leander calls these integrative functions of conscription “myths” (2004).

civilianizing their military and keeping it from overthrowing the government (Adam 2012). The constant cycling of fresh recruits into the military will make it harder for the armed forces to develop the capabilities of engaging in a coup d'état and preventing a state within a state. An empirical example of this is France, where "conscription had been viewed as a bulwark against political intervention that could result from having a reactionary professional military that was detached from society" (Vasquez 2011, 638).³

Foreign Influence

States and their policies do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, they are subject to outside forces. While this is certainly the case in terms of economic or environmental policies, it also holds true for issues pertaining to security, such as conscription. Max Margulies showed that the relationship between a security patron and its client could have an impact on the latter's military (2021). He finds that when a patron state relies on conscription to staff its armed forces, it will try to implement the same policies with its weaker client.

Another, albeit less direct, way of affecting recruitment policies in a certain country is legal origins. Former colonies or newly independent states that took over the institutional setups from former colonizers or parent states will usually keep them intact and running. Consequently, states built around French legal heritage are more likely to have conscription (Djankov et al. 2002). This makes sense considering France's long history and preference for forced recruitment. The same holds true for former Soviet states, which primarily relied on conscription. Governments with a similar legal system have a higher likelihood of conscripting into their armed forces as well (Hadass 2004).

³ Vasquez features a substantial summary of the end of conscription in France (2021).

Security

Threats to a country are substantial drivers behind the decision to implement conscription (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Cohen 1985). In addition to the theoretical benefits of conscription on security laid out above, there are practical ones: From a defensive perspective, when states perceive the need to improve their security, they will rely on forced recruitment. It is a quick and somewhat efficient way to increase the size and strength of militaries, especially when the threats are external (Anderson, Halcoussis, and Tollison 1996, Choi and James 2008). This taps into the notion that, from a defensive standpoint, large armies built around draftees are superior to professional forces, especially when engaging in mass warfare (Cohen 1985). The preference for using conscription to increase security is shared not only by the government but also by the public, which is more likely to accept and support conscription during major conflicts (Fordham 2016). However, public support is likely to shift when conscript armies are used for antagonistic foreign policy moves. Hence, relying on conscription can signal decreased aggressiveness. This is supported by Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James, who found that belligerent governments prefer volunteer armies since they are under less public scrutiny (2008).

From a historical perspective, conscription in the form of *levée en masse* put France and Napoleon in the position to compete with other great powers (Stephens and Baker 2006, 73). Following France's example of universal conscription to increase security, other countries implemented the draft as well (Posen 1993). Another prominent example is the US Civil War which saw extensive use of conscripts (Beringer 1986). In Europe during the time of the Cold War, particularly from 1970-1994, conscription was equally widespread, with fifteen Western European countries resorting to the draft to defend against the Warsaw

Pact (Haltiner 1998, 13). Forced recruitment was so fundamental to the security of these nations that the average conscription ratio of their militaries was about 50% (Haltiner 1998, 16).⁴

Why Not Have Conscription?

Even though the reasons for why states might want to introduce or maintain conscription seem compelling, especially the ones centered around security, under most conditions outside of threat to a country, conscription's benefits are massively outclassed by its disadvantages:

Economic Drawbacks

From the perspective of society as a whole, conscription is deemed highly inefficient. Adam Smith argued forcing every citizen to serve in the military would negate the advantages of job specialization (Smith and McCulloch 1863). Instead of using professional soldiers as a dedicated group of experts on all things military, conscription cycles cohort after cohort of fresh recruits through the system. Since these always start with a clean slate and no knowledge of the armed forces, they will waste valuable time learning the basics of what it means to be a soldier. The better alternative would be to employ the comparative advantage that volunteer militaries offer and reap the benefits of their experience (Poutvaara and Wagener 2011b, Smith and McCulloch 1863). Scholars largely agree that professional armed forces allocate labor more efficiently (Ross 1994) and that conscription is difficult to maintain in advanced industrial societies (Higgs 1999). Moreover, the draft places a burden of social cost on every country, especially when

⁴ Conscription ratio means the share of draftees of the overall fighting force in a country (Haltiner 1998).

considering the price of deferments. These costs can be so high that even the United States only once hit a point in which the costs for conscription and a professional military were almost equal: World War 2 (Perri 2010). Consequently, it comes as no surprise that economists took a critical role in the process of ending conscription in the country (Henderson 2005, Perri 2010).

Forced recruitment negatively affects the individual draftees as well: Even though military service can provide recruits with certain skill sets or qualities, as mentioned above, research has established that these positive impacts⁵ appear to vanish in comparison with citizens that did not serve in the military when selection effects are taken into account (Bauer et al. 2012). Additional negative drawbacks for the individual and the larger economy stem from the delayed job market entry for draftees. This postpones their careers or education and hampers their progress (Renshaw 1960, Poutvaara and Wagener 2011a, b). These fallouts continue to negatively impact draftees for decades, with Joshua D. Angrist finding that white veterans of the Vietnam War earned 15% less annually than nonveterans (1990). Even though the effect was not statistically significant for non-whites (Angrist 1990) and lost its impact in the 1990s (Angrist, Chen, and Song 2011), it still highlights the negative economic influence of conscription on the individual. Furthermore, even if the drawbacks disappear over time, there are no substantial financial benefits that former soldiers reap over time, with research finding that veterans of WW2 made the same or fewer wages than nonveterans during the 1990s (Angrist and Krueger 1994).

⁵ Benefits include earning advantages and wage premiums (Bauer et al. 2012).

Culture and Ideology

While scholars, as mentioned further above, highlighted the positive connection between conscription and democracy, there exist some caveats. For one, there exists some doubt concerning citizens' appreciation for the draft, especially when taking into account deferments of any kind. Then "conscription is socially preferable to a volunteer military only if a large percentage of eligible individuals are demanded by the military" (Perri 2010, 22). Consequently, if a draft is not fair and does not impact every citizen the same way, i.e., selective instead of universal conscription, populations will be less inclined to support it (Haltiner 1998, 32). Others, such as Casey B. Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer argue that "conscription does not seem to be influenced by democracy" at all (2005, 85). This is supported by recent investigations into the determinants of conscription which find that democratic regimes decrease the likelihood of conscription (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015). Moreover, the often used idea of the military representing the *school of the nation* does not hold up in empirical tests (Krebs 2004). Lastly, the coup-proofing properties of conscription are also questioned with current recent findings that drafted militaries are more likely to overthrow autocratic forms of government than volunteer-based ones (Vasquez and Powell 2021). While this bodes well for pro-democratic movements, it does question the idea of conscription bringing stability to a regime.

Foreign Influence

This category builds on the idea of conscription representing a substantial violation of individual rights. Thus, a culture of liberalism focused on personal liberties will prefer voluntary over forced recruitment (Cohen 1985, 35-35). States, such as Great Britain that follow liberal ideas will also be reluctant to implement conscription and share this

hesitation with their colonies (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Cohen 1985, Cohn and Toronto 2016, Hadass 2004). These will then embed liberal values in their institutions. As a consequence, former British lands are less likely to adopt the draft than their non-British counterparts, even after they gained independence (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015). This connection remains statistically significant (Margulies 2021).

Security

Even though conscription is a quick and efficient way to respond to threats and increase security, there are some downsides connected to it, mainly the potential for aggression and issues with conscripted militaries in general.

First, even though some research suggests that volunteer militaries are the tool of choice for governments wanting to engage in aggressive action (Choi and James 2008), there is some evidence that this might not always be the case. Jeffery Pickering establishes that countries that mainly staff their armed forces with conscripts “have a significantly higher propensity to use belligerent military force than states with volunteer armies” (2011, 119). Furthermore, these states have an increased likelihood of picking fights with nonstate actors (Pickering 2011).

Second, conscripted military suffer from a variety of issues: In general, they are less effective than their volunteer or professional counterparts (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin 2004). This is due to the fact that conscripts do not stay in the armed forces long enough to build up substantial expertise. Additionally, limited service terms of draftees lead to a high turnover rate in personnel (Warner and Asch 2001). Therefore, they are less trained in the usage of sophisticated equipment and sometimes lack the skills to operate

high-tech weaponry to the fullest extent (Warner and Negrusa 2006). While this is preferable in a situation in which leaders want to prevent the military from overthrowing them, it reduces battlefield effectiveness. Another consequence of the low skills and high turnover that are characteristics of conscript militaries is an increased casualty count (Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam 2011). Since conscripts are forced to serve, sometimes against their will, their use in conflict also leads to lower war support (Horowitz and Levendusky 2011). This reduction support even exists when conscripts are employed in a defensive manner, such as a response to an attack (Kriner and Shen 2016).

Lastly, changed security environments, especially since the 1990s, with more deployments abroad and less focus on territorial defense via mass armies, make it harder to justify conscription (Bieri 2015). This is mainly due to draftees generally not being suited for extended deployment abroad (Burk 1992, Simon and Lovrich 2009).

Puzzle

The theoretical evaluation above presents a conflicting picture: The literature review of conscription showed some factors that speak in favor of forced recruitment, mainly its ability to improve security during times of threat. However, the vast majority of scholarship on the topic suggests that states would rid themselves of the policy, even going so far as to call it a “wasteful means of mobilizing manpower” (Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam 2011, 909), especially when compared to the fighting performance of professional militaries.

Yet, based on data on the status of conscription globally from 1816 to 2000 collected by Victor Asal, Justin Conrad, and Nathan Toronto, there are some surprising discoveries, illustrated in Figure 1 (2015):




Figure 1. Country/Year Observations of Conscription from 1816-2000

From 10,068 country-year observations, 6,260 (62%) featured some sort of conscription. Out of these, more than half (3,450; 55%) employed forced recruitment despite there being no indicators of dangers to a state, be it internal, external, or through a rival. These numbers are puzzling since they go against most established wisdom that would only see conscription justified under a particularly narrow set of circumstances, such as threats. Thus, even though theory would expect a decline in conscription globally, there are still quite a few countries that refuse to phase out conscription or buck the trend entirely by (re-) introducing conscription (e.g., Israel, Sweden, or the Arab Gulf states). Other cases, such as Austria, introduced and kept conscription for decades, despite a lack of threat to the state.

In short: The likelihood of having conscription is highest when threat is high. Then, as threat dissipates, the probability of conscription decreases as well. At one point threat will be so low that there should not be any more forced recruitment. Yet, despite this, conscription still exists in several countries.

This raises the question of why countries would choose to maintain a recruitment policy that is clearly deemed inefficient and outdated by scholars, particularly when there is no need to improve security. Consequently, my research asks: “What makes a state maintain conscription, especially during peacetime?”

Main Argument

By posing this question, I am focusing my attention on the subset of countries that have conscription, even though they are not engaged in any kind of conflict. This section will now highlight why states might choose to keep the draft, explore who would find it the

most difficult to maintain, and the theoretical mechanism behind it. Then, it will present a case example to showcase the theory.

Reasons for Maintaining Conscription

There are several explanations for why countries might want to keep conscription even after threat to them has ended. Some of them build on what was written further above. First is uncertainty about the future: leaders might hold on to forced recruitment because they are unsure about their country's security in the coming years or decades. On the one hand, this goes back to the sociological concept of *risk society* in which "we experience, suddenly, the unwelcome return of frightening uncertainties" (Beck 1992, O'Malley 2004, Sørensen and Christiansen 2012, 9). These risks affect not just individuals but also governments and states. In order to prepare for the uncertainties that the future might bring, countries decide to keep conscription around, even though there might not be any threats on the horizon in the short or long run. This also fits the notion of anarchy in the international system since its inherent uncertainties make security the number one priority for states, as stated further above (Axelrod 1984, Mearsheimer 1990). On the other hand, governments might want to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy in the future. In these cases, conscription appears to be the tool of choice for belligerent leaders (Pickering 2011). Consequently, it would not make much sense for these states to end conscription just to re-introduce it a few years or decades later.

Second, there could be cultural, philosophical, or civil-military relations factors that can compel leaders to hold on to forced recruitment despite a lack of threats to security. From the perspective of the latter, the institution that is conscription is a key element of

maintaining civilian control over the military (Janowitz 1960, Kümmel, Caforio, and Dandeker 2009). An example of this is Germany, which saw the “necessity for general conscription as a general device to counteract anti-democratic political ambitions of the officer corps of the armed forces” when it introduced the policy (Von Bredow 1992, 291). Other states might adhere to the notion of the military being the *school of the nation* which is necessary to create civic identities. Even though Krebs debunks this (2004), the idea is still present in several countries. The Arab Gulf states recently introduced conscription in a “departure from world trends” to increase their security and pursue a more active foreign policy (Alterman and Balboni 2017, VII). Yet, they also highlighted the fact that they aim to use forced recruitment as a way to “enhance national identities” and to create “ideal citizens”⁶ (Ardemagni 2018). Additionally, in terms of cultural reasons, some states might view conscription as an institution that promotes the perception of masculinity in a society (Moon 2005).

Third, institutional resilience to change might prevent a leader from abolishing conscription. This can be due to the existence of veto players that prefer the status quo, i.e., keeping conscription, over a change of policy (Tsebelis 1995). Additionally, established institutions can become sticky and resilient to change (Béland 2009). The institutional idiosyncrasies connected to this can severely limit the freedom that policymakers have in making decisions such as ending conscription. Lastly, the inherent costs of keeping certain policies, e.g., conscription, are lower than the costs of establishing a new one, e.g., a professional military (Margulies 2021).

⁶ This last statement stems from Doha's Minister of State for Defense, Major-General Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah, quoted directly in Ardemagni (2018).

Varying Levels of Difficulty

Regardless of the specific reason for why a government would want to maintain forced recruitment, the decision to do so must be justified to the relevant parties involved in the decision-making process, especially when traditional reasons for conscription, i.e., threat, are lacking. In countries where only a few people have a say in the matter, leaders will have a relatively easy time explaining why they want to keep conscription. However, in states with a large number of individuals or groups present, the government will need to work harder to justify its decision.

Selectorate Theory and its concept of Winning Coalitions provide a good measurement of the level of opposition that a leader might face in the process of making a decision about the future of conscription. The theory was conceived by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Marrow (2003). It argues that leaders can survive, i.e., stay in power, only when they keep their supporters satisfied. The size of the Winning Coalition is also an indicator of the amount of opposition a leader must contend with: The larger the Winning Coalition Size, the more difficult it will be to stay in power.

In practical terms, a small Winning Coalition Size describes a system in which only a few select members of the population can influence a leader's policy decisions. Among those would be family, friends, the wealthy, or the military. Large Winning Coalitions, however, feature an extensive number of people that can affect the leader, such as the voters, parties, unions, etc. As a consequence, leaders in states with large Winning Coalitions will have to work harder and sway more people in their favor to get their way.

Theoretical Mechanism

When governments choose to maintain conscription in times of peace, for any of the reasons laid out above, they need to engage the members of their Winning Coalitions to ensure enough backing for the decision to overcome opposition. Selectorate Theory suggests that leaders with small Winning Coalitions could use private goods to win over enough supporters to hold on to forced recruitment (Cao and Ward 2015, Morrow et al. 2008). Potential opponents of the draft might drop their resistance if leaders entice them to do so via monetary rewards.

However, this is not possible in countries with large Winning Coalitions since there are simply too many supporters to bribe. Instead, leaders who want to keep conscription regardless of a lack of threats must use different strategies. In order to sell the draft to their sizable Winning Coalition, they will have to sweeten conscription with other policies to make it more palatable to the supporters. For me, Conscientious Objection, meaning the right to object to forced recruitment based on conscientious or religious reasons, represents a policy that has the potential to do just that. This is due to the fact that Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service⁷, which is connected to it, are generally well-liked in the states where it is in effect, such as Germany (Beher et al. 2002, 21). Consequentially, Conscientious Objection has the ability to give a human face to conscription, thereby making it more acceptable to potential opponents. As a result, leaders in states with large Winning Coalition Sizes will introduce the policy to soften or eliminate

⁷ The concepts will be explained in more detail in the next section.

the obvious downsides connected to maintaining draft in times of peace to buy the support of their Winning Coalition.

An example of the significance of Conscientious Objection for maintaining conscription in times of peace is the Republic of Austria. The country has relied on forced recruitment ever since it regained sovereignty in 1955, even though there are no instances of either internal or external threat or international rivals. Despite the lack of threats to the country and a policy of "active neutrality," the state kept conscription active (Meyer 2007, 2). Moreover, Austria's foreign policy became more engaged after the end of the Cold War, and the country saw increased support for military missions abroad (Molnár 2021). Following traditional explanations for why countries have conscription, the combination of high security and more deployment abroad should have led the government to give up on the draft. Nevertheless, it chose to buck the trend and even decided in favor of keeping conscription when a referendum on its future was conducted in 2013. The existence of Conscientious Objection Austria, which was implemented in 1955 (Brett et al. 2021), might explain why conscription was upheld for so long.

In this dissertation, I will break down my theory on why states choose to keep conscription during peacetime into three testable parts. The first part explores the connections between conscription, Winning Coalition Size, and Conscientious Objection. It argues that states with larger Winning Coalition Sizes will be more likely to feature policies of Conscientious Objection. To evaluate the validity of these claims, it engages in statistical analysis of data that I specifically collected for this project.

The second part focuses on countries that actively use forced recruitment during peacetime and that engaged in serious deliberations on its future. It claims that these debates result from low levels of Winning Coalition Support for conscription. When support is low, then the population of a country will begin to question the usefulness and existence of forced recruitment. Consequently, discussions about whether to keep or end conscription will appear. The empirical examination in the form of computer-assisted content analysis focuses on articles published in a German newspaper before the debates about the future of the draft happened.

The third part takes a closer look at these active discussions and investigates the impact that Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service have on the actual discourse. It contends that when the salience of these policies is high during the debates, states will be more likely to maintain conscription. High salience of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service will remind the members of the Winning Coalition of the advantages that the policies offer. Thus, they will be more likely to accept a continuation of conscription. In order to test the theory, this part employs manual and computer-assisted content analysis of newspaper articles published during the debates about the draft.

Conscientious Objection

The concept of Conscientious Objection is a key element to my theory of why states choose to maintain conscription during peacetime. To get a better understanding of the concept, this section will provide a more detailed look at its history, its philosophical and theoretical background, its legal status, and different variants of the policy.

Brief History of Conscientious Objection

Conscientious Objection finds its roots in early Christianity, whose followers refused to serve in the armed forces because they saw war as incompatible with their religion (Grünewald and Knebel 2000). The opposition to the use of violence spread among religious groups such as the Mennonites and Quakers⁸ which founded the first peace organization in Britain and the United States (Grünewald 2020).⁹ Even though these clubs began to flourish until 1914, Conscientious Objection "was rejected by an overwhelming majority," with only individual groups advocating for it (Grünewald 2020, 3). The general sentiment during these times, even among pacifist religious groups, was that war could be just and, therefore, conscription justified (Brock 2006, 281-2).¹⁰ Yet, it gained some traction at the beginning of the First World War when Anglo-Saxon countries introduced conscription with an option to oppose military service (Levi 1996). Despite provisions for Conscientious Objection in England, only 16,000 men were approved to object, with just 300 of them completely freed of any obligations. A whole 6,000 were imprisoned, and another 6,000 served in the regular fighting forces but without any access to weapons (Grünewald and Knebel 2000, 7). In the United States, objectors made up less than 0.15% of the overall force (Mellors and McKean 1982, 227). Regardless of those low numbers, Conscientious Objectors in England were still the target of ridicule and propaganda campaigns¹¹, such as the White Feather Movement (Brain 2022). In other countries,

⁸ The Quakers still are one of the main supporters of War Resisters' International, a "global pacifist and antimilitarist network" (War Resisters' International 2022).

⁹ Grünewald provides a brief summary of the history of peace movements (Grünewald 2020).

¹⁰ Brock uses the example of German Mennonites that accepted service in the military (2006).

¹¹ A typical propaganda postcard read, "The Conscientious Objector at the Front – While the shot and shell are flying and the mighty cannons boom, he is tidying up the trenches with a dust-pan and a broom!" (Rippon 2017).

objectors faced imprisonment (e.g., Imperial Russia) or confinement in a mental institution in Germany (Brock 2006). After the end of the First World War and as a result of its carnage, Conscientious Objection saw a massive push and then mass codification into law after the end of WW2 (Grünewald and Knebel 2000). Objectors also experienced better treatment over the years (Levi and DeTray 1993, 433). Today, Conscientious Objection is recognized by most countries that use conscription (Bergeron 2014).¹²

Philosophical and Theoretical Background

While its roots were religious, there are philosophical justifications for Conscientious Objection as well – some of which are similar to the reasoning behind conscription.¹³ First, liberalism and its focus on the individual are supportive of the concept (Cohen 1985). The impact of liberal traditions is one of the reasons Conscientious Objection was introduced together with forced recruitment in the United States, the UK, and its colonies (Levi 1996). Other ideologies, such as France's, which saw conscription as a fundamental part of its political system, were less inclined to allow for Conscientious Objection (Kessler 2015, Livny 2017, 668). Second, Conscientious Objection can be seen as the result of “citizenship regimes” that “shape the sensibilities and preferences of activists and state actors” (Lainer-Vos 2006, 357). Consequently, the acceptance or a specific form of Conscientious Objection a state employs is highly specific (Livny 2017). Third, it could be understood as the results of a rational-choice analysis that deems Conscientious Objection appropriate when it can guarantee citizen consent for conscription (Levi and DeTray 1993, Livny

¹² A problem, or blessing(?), with writing about Conscientious Objection is a lack of attention from the discipline of Political Science (Evans 2015). Fortunately, there are some attempts to bring the topic into the discipline, such as Matthew James Evans (2015) and Adi Livny (2017).

¹³ This section closely follows Adi Livny's approach (2017).

2017). Lastly, the specific forms of Conscientious Objection could be due to “diverging security circumstances” that dictate whether a state allows for objection to military service or not (Livny 2017, 667, Noone 1993). Regardless of the theoretical foundations of Conscientious Objection, the fundamental problem always is: “For a citizen of a country at war, opposition to war is problematic” (Sciarrino and Deutsch 2003, 3)

Legal Status

As mentioned above, Conscientious Objection saw an increase in codification into law after the end of WW2. Several countries introduced the Right to Conscientious Objection into their legislative texts. Some of them, such as West Germany, even made it part of their constitution: "No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service involving the use of arms" (Von Bredow 1992, 290). In international terms, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which included the right “to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” in Article 18 (UN General Assembly 1948). Even though it did not explicitly mention Conscientious Objection to military service, it was soon expanded to include it via General Comment No. 22 (Human Rights Committee 1993). Since then, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has made it its task, amongst other things, to encourage the spread and compliance of the right to object to military service. The office provides regular reports and updates on the status of Conscientious Objection globally. It made its first waves in 2006 when it found that the Republic of Korea violated its citizens' rights to Conscientious Objection (Kessler 2013). Additionally, the policy is also part of the European Convention of Human Rights (Major 2001).

Types of Conscientious Objection

Just like conscription, Conscientious Objection can take several different forms. Livny categorizes them into 1) “recognition (de jure and de facto)”, 2) “De jure recognition without accommodation”, 3) “Informal practices of accommodation”, and 4) “Categorical rejection” (2017, 669). *Full recognition* describes a state that allows its citizens to object to conscription and to engage in alternatives to service in the military. This usually takes the form of Alternative Civilian Service, which has objectors placed in the social or health sector and emergency services (Beher et al. 2002). *De jure recognition without accommodation* means a situation in which Conscientious Objection exists in the constitution or laws of a country. However, the concept is not enacted into actual policy or designed to be complicated to achieve (Livny 2017). In states with *informal practices*, draftees might be allowed to object, but the reasons might be narrow. Additionally, alternative service opportunities might be fewer and include unarmed military service, similar to what happened to objectors in Britain during the First World War. Lastly, *categorical rejection* designates cases in which governments do not allow for Conscientious Objection and actively fight against it (Livny 2017).

Contribution to Existing Scholarship

By investigating why countries maintain conscription during peacetime, this dissertation adds to existing scholarship in two ways: First, I am highlighting how Conscientious Objection matters for International Relations. From a realist perspective, the policy presents a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is a clear danger to the security and power of each state since it chips away at the overall manpower a country could use to defend itself. When states allow for exceptions to military service, it might entice whole

swaths of the population to forgo conscription and focus on other things instead, thereby lowering a state's military capabilities. This is particularly problematic when Conscientious Objection exists during times of high threat to a state, such as during the World Wars.¹⁴ – Yet, it is not clear whether this fear is justified considering the low number of Conscientious Objectors to these wars in the United States and England (Grünwald and Knebel 2000, Mellors and McKean 1982). On the other hand, Realism in all its forms might see the strategic value behind Conscientious Objection as a tool to 'humanize' conscription. Except for a few select cases, conscription is not always the most popular form of recruitment a state can choose, especially when it exists for a longer time, wars drag on, casualty counts are high, and war support is low. In a situation like that, Realists might appreciate that Conscientious Objection could increase the attractiveness of conscription again or at least make it seem less daunting for potential draftees. Thus, even though objectors might reduce the overall manpower, governments will gladly accept this reduction if it means maintaining conscription in times of war or even increasing enthusiasm for the policy. From a more liberal point of view, scholars of International Relations could see Conscientious Objection as an example of international cooperation and human rights (Lippman 1990). With an international organization like the United Nations declaring the right to Conscientious Objection a human right and other NGOs invested in the issue as well, they create attention and collaboration for the issue in all parts of the world. Additionally, the policy can reduce the aggressiveness of states. However,

¹⁴ A potential question that might arise here is “Why would a state have Conscientious Objection during times of high external threat?” – A potential answer would be that quite a few states introduced Conscientious Objection together with conscription, especially during the First World War (e.g., Anglo-Saxon countries).

even though there are regimes in place to enforce or at least monitor Conscientious Objection, they are mostly toothless and only able to shame violating states for violations.

Second, my research contributes to the linkage between domestic politics and the international system, such as Democratic Peace Theory, Diversionary Theory, Bureaucratic Politics, Game Theory, and Fearon (1994). I take from Selectorate Theory and highlight how a leader's desire to stay in power can affect a state's security policies and, consequentially, the international system. This adds power not only to the specific leaders but also to the audiences that are supporting them. My theory also tells a story about how leaders might use Conscientious Objection to distract their citizens from the obvious downsides of conscription and sell them on the policy.

Third, I am expanding the literature on Civil-Military Relations. In general, I enhance the understanding of the relationships between the different actors, mainly the government, society, and the military, through the help of Selectorate Theory. Its notion of Winning Coalition Size increases the status and effects that society can have on the other parts. In particular, though, I add nuance to the work that exists on forced recruitment into the military. While substantial attention is paid to the determinants of conscription, a lot less is done to address why countries would choose to maintain conscription (Ben-Ari, Rosman, and Shamir 2021, 4). By introducing Conscientious Objection, in theory, and actual data, to the debates, I hope to foster a deeper understanding of how it affects states' decisions to introduce, maintain, or end the draft.

Structure of the Dissertation

This project attempts to answer the research question, “What makes a state maintain conscription, especially during peacetime?”. To do so, it breaks my theory down into three different papers which focus on their own hypotheses. These will take the form of chapters in this dissertation:

- Paper 1 – Chapter II: “Permission to Object – How Winning Coalition Size Shapes Conscientious Objection” investigates hypothesis 1: *Given conscription, states with a larger Winning Coalition are more likely to have Conscientious Objection.*
- Paper 2 – Chapter III: “Don’t Mention the Draft - How Lack of Winning Coalition Support Leads to Debates About Conscription” evaluates hypothesis 2: *If a state has decreased levels of Winning Coalition Support for the draft, it is more likely to have debates on the draft’s future.*
- Paper 3 – Chapter IV: “Let’s Just Talk About It” – How Salience of Conscientious Objection Impacts the Future of Conscription” analyses hypothesis 3: *If there is a debate about maintaining conscription, countries with Conscientious Objection are more likely to maintain the draft when Conscientious Objection is a salient topic during the debates.*

At the end of the dissertation, Chapter V will draw an overarching conclusion and expand on how my research and findings contribute to existing literature and scholarship.

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**CHAPTER II:
PERMISSION TO OBJECT -
HOW WINNING COALITION SIZE SHAPES
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION**

Abstract

Why do some countries introduce Conscientious Objections to conscription while others do not? While there exists substantial scholarship on why countries enact forced recruitment, less attention is paid to Conscientious Objection, even though a substantial number of states with conscription make use of it. This article employs elements of Selectorate Theory to explain why Conscientious Objection is implemented. In particular, it focuses on the connection between Winning Coalition Size and the likelihood of Conscientious Objection. It argues that the likelihood of a state introducing Conscientious Objection primarily depends on the size of its Winning Coalition, with larger coalitions increasing the probability of having Conscientious Objection. Using existing datasets on determinants of conscription and original quantitative data on the status of Conscientious Objection globally, it finds that Winning Coalition Size has a positive impact on a government's decision to establish Conscientious Objection. Moreover, interstate rivalries have a dampening effect, reducing the likelihood of Conscientious Objection. Additional discoveries include clustering of the policy in specific regions, mainly Europe, and that a majority of states introduce it during times of peace when conscription is already established.

Introduction

When Russia attacked Ukraine at the end of February 2022, the defending government quickly enacted martial law to respond to the aggression (Krauss 2022, 49). As part of the emergency legislation, Ukraine required its male population to join the fight against the invaders (Bolger 2022). On the other side, Russia staffed its fighting forces mostly with

conscripts. On both sides, Conscientious Objection to military service seemed to play no role at all. The same appears to be true for many other countries. Yet, 49 out of 192 countries allow (or have allowed) draftees to forgo service in the armed forces. Sometimes even in exchange for alternative service elsewhere. This is puzzling since conscription is traditionally used for security reasons (Haltiner 1998). Forced recruitment all but guarantees that militaries will have enough recruits to start or continue fighting. Hence, it would be counterintuitive to limit the effectiveness of conscription via Conscientious Objection. From a security perspective, objectors decrease the number of new recruits who are available to the military, so one would not expect to pair it with conscription. However, as mentioned above, it still happens during peace and war. This begs the question: *Why do some countries introduce Conscientious Objections to conscription while others do not?*

This project employs elements of Selectorate Theory to explain why Conscientious Objection is implemented. In particular, it focuses on the connection between Winning Coalition Size (W) and the likelihood of Conscientious Objection (CO). It argues that countries with larger Winning Coalitions have an increased chance of allowing for Conscientious Objection, i.e., introducing it: As a state's W grows, so do the opportunities for dissatisfied actors. If a government wants to stay in power, it needs to maintain the support of the members of its Winning Coalition. This is particularly important when a government wants or is forced to introduce or keep unpopular laws. Whereas it is seemingly easy to justify the implementation of conscription in times of threat, it can get harder to validate it after peace is achieved.

Conscription, meaning forced recruitment into the armed forces, is a policy that is not always universally liked, especially when its legitimacy is questioned (Burk 1989, Leander 2004, Vasquez 2011). While citizens might put up with it during times of high external threat, outright war (e.g., the current situation in Ukraine), rivalries, or times of economic crises, they are less likely to support it in times of peace and prosperity. Yet, if a government wants or needs to maintain conscription despite a lack of security or economic factors, it needs to pursue other ways of convincing the public and their Winning Coalition of the benefits of conscription. Reasons for maintaining forced recruitment could be the stickiness of it as an institution or the fact that security threats might arise in the future. Alternatively, it can try to lessen its effects on the individual. To generate support and to make conscription more ‘palatable’ to a potentially apathetic citizenry, governments can set up policies that allow potential conscripts to object to military service. This commonly takes the form of Conscientious Objection as part of a country’s constitution or law on military service. When governments provide a way out of forced recruitment that applies to all their citizens equally, the members of the Winning Coalition will be more inclined to accept conscription than without this mechanism. As a consequence, states with large Winning Coalitions and conscription as the primary form of recruitment are more likely to introduce Conscientious Objection.

This study conducts probit analysis to evaluate the connection between the size of W and Conscientious Objection. The underlying data is based on Asal et al.'s (2015) project, extended with Bueno de Mesquita’s work on Selectorate Theory (2003), mainly Winning Coalition Size, and enriched with collected information on the status of CO for

the year the policy is introduced in a country. It finds that states with a large Winning Coalition Size feature Conscientious Objection more often than countries with smaller W. In addition, it appears that interstate rivalries have a dampening effect on the likelihood of Conscientious Objection.

These findings add to the existing and growing literature on Civil-Military Relations and the connection between external security and domestic politics. It also complements past and current work on the determinants of conscription (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Beukema 1941, Cohn and Toronto 2016, Henderson 2005) by adding the Selectorate Theory and the influence of Conscientious Acceptance to existing explanations. Moreover, they highlight the influence of Winning Coalition support and public opinion on the policy-making process.

This study proceeds as follows: First, it will explain the concept of Winning Coalitions, conscription and why countries choose it, and Conscientious Objection. It will then clarify the reasoning behind my theory on the connection between Winning Coalition Size and the likelihood of Conscientious Objection. Second, it will lay out the research design, the used methods, and the variables underlying the analysis. Third, it will present a brief overview and initial analysis of my collected data. Then it will highlight the results of my statistical analysis and evaluate my models before focusing on the relationship between Winning Coalition Size and regime type. The conclusion will summarize the findings and discuss the approach's limitations.

Explaining Why Countries Choose Conscientious Objection

To understand why countries implement Conscientious Objection to military service, it is essential to first clarify the concept of Winning Coalitions and why states have conscription in the first place. Once this framework is laid out, it is possible to explain why governments choose Conscientious Objection and how it is connected to Winning Coalition Size.

Winning Coalitions

The concept of stems from Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow's *Selectorate Theory* (2003). The theory is a Domestic Politics approach to International Relations. It grows out of the idea that political leaders can only stay in power because they can keep their supporters happy. For Selectorate Theory, there are three groups in a state that can influence a leader: the residents who make up the overall population of a country, the Selectorate, which describes everyone who has a say in the political process, and the Winning Coalition. The latter is the portion of the Selectorate that is required to keep a leader in power. In a state with a small Winning Coalition, this could mean a limited group of influential actors, such as generals, members of the ruling family, or the rich (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Large Winning Coalitions, however, usually include a greater number of actors, such as all the voters for a specific party or coalition. If leaders want to ensure their political survival, they have to specifically focus on maintaining the support of their Winning Coalition. This can be achieved by distributing public or private goods (Cao and Ward 2015, Morrow et al. 2008). As a consequence, rulers do not seek to gain benefits for everyone but only for their closest supporters who help them stay in power. Selectorate Theory might have its shortcomings, e.g., in terms of measurements, but it is still "elegant and compelling, and the applications

they [the authors] present for the theory are vast" (Kennedy 2009, 712). Hence, it is no surprise that Selectorate Theory is used in a variety of (sub-) fields, e.g., climate policy (Boehmer-Christiansen 1997), electoral politics (Bassett 2011, Madonna 2011), or political economy (Kilchevsky, Cason, and Wandschneider 2007), to name a few.

Conscription

Historically, states have employed conscription, i.e., forced recruitment into the military, to ease their security concerns (Posen 1993, Cohen 1985). There are alternative arguments for why states choose this policy, such as democratic reasons (e.g., building the nation, rite of citizenship) or colonial legacy (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Margulies 2021).¹⁵ However, the importance of security was recently confirmed in a large-n study by Asal, Conrad, and Toronto, in which the authors find that heightened threat increases the odds of a country introducing conscription (2015). Alternative explanations for forced recruitment, so the authors do not hold up to their tests or have limited significance in their models. Additionally, a revisitation of the security hypothesis, such as Lindsay P. Cohn and Nathan W. Toronto's found that while the relationship between threat and conscription is more nuanced, i.e., structural economic variables play a role as well, it still plays a major role (Cohn and Toronto 2016).

Conversely, when threats pass, then governments are more likely to abolish conscription (Safrai 2018). Yet, this is not always the case. According to Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's dataset, there are 3,450 country-year observations in which conscription exists without any form of interstate war, civil war, or rivalry. This is particularly striking since

¹⁵ Max Margulies provides a succinct summary of these arguments (2021).

it represents slightly more than half of all total observations with active conscription.¹⁶ The apparent reason for this is that most governmental institutions, once set up, are resilient to change. Conscription, a bureaucratic behemoth itself, is a prime example of this stickiness: From established actors resisting innovation, societal norms favoring the old ways, to huge costs associated with reforms – changing the policy is mostly an uphill battle (Margulies 2021).

Due to this reluctance to change, policymakers need to find different ways to justify or defend conscription to appease their Winning Coalition. This is particularly important but not limited to the many instances in which conscription exists outside of external threats, civil war, or rivals. Joseph Paul Vasquez, III, provides an example of public attitudes towards conscription in times of peace: British support for the policy, engraved in the National Service Act of 1947, "was not passionate or overwhelming," among other reasons, because "there were few ways of legally avoiding conscription" (Vasquez 2011, 641). For leaders, this is a dangerous situation since it could potentially threaten the support of their Winning Coalition, especially when it is large and citizens have a say in the process.

Conscientious Objection

The idea of Conscientious Objection to military service is derived from article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (1948). The Human Rights Committee extended the interpretation to include objection to service in the armed forces (1993). Conscientious Objection can take different shapes: from *full recognition*, *de jure recognition*, and *informal recognition* to *complete rejection* (Livny

¹⁶ The code for these tests is in the author's do-file.

2017). In its most complete form (full recognition), CO usually includes opportunities for alternative service, which allows unwilling recruits to ‘serve’ their time outside the military, e.g., in the social sector. This type of substitute service, which can be regarded as the policy that grows out of CO, sometimes happens without provisions for actual Conscientious Objections, mostly in states that practice informal recognition (Livny 2017). At its lowest stage, however, a government will actively denounce or persecute objectors. Additionally, Conscientious Objection varies broadly in how it is codified into action: Countries may choose to put regulations pertaining to objection to military service into their constitutions or law. The former might add higher prestige and protections to Conscientious Objection, since constitutions are harder to change and less at the mercy of shifting majorities in power. Laws as a source are quicker to set up but also easier to change, should the political will to do so exist. A combination of both is also possible. Even though the specific policies and location of Conscientious Objection sometimes differ from state to state, ranging from full recognition to complete rejection, the concept “is acknowledged by most of the nations still conscripting military personnel” (Bergeron 2014, 49). – However, this does not explain why countries introduce Conscientious Objection in the first place.

Theory

I argue that a country’s decision to implement Conscientious Objection, regardless of which form and codification, is connected to the size of its Winning Coalition. By doing so, I follow Adi Livny, who highlights the importance of the state, i.e., the government, in the decision-making process to establish the policy (2017). Conscriptio is rarely

questioned in times of threat to a state. Nevertheless, as a state gets more secure and threats subside, citizens realize the downsides of forced recruitment. While this realization might not always lead to protests and riots in the streets, it might negatively impact the larger support of the Winning Coalition that holds up a leader. This is particularly grave in countries with large Coalitions that require the backing of many people to stay in power. Even though conscription might not be the sole reason a Winning Coalition collapses, it might add to existing pressures in the system that threaten a leader. To keep its coalition happy, the government will want to ensure that it balances the need for public support with the need to maintain conscription since giving up forced recruitment would be problematic for all the reasons laid out above. Leaders then engage in some sort of "maintenance-through-change," i.e., evolution, not revolution (Ben-Ari, Rosman, and Shamir 2021, 4). While this can take the form of letting unwilling draftees pay their way out of military service (e.g., Turkey) or excluding certain groups from the draft (e.g., Israel), it can also mean allowing recruits to object to the draft.

For governments and citizens alike, the appeal of Conscientious Objection lies in the fact that it affects every eligible citizen and serves as an equalizer before the draft. In systems where it is possible to 'pay away' conscription, economically challenged draftees are put at a disadvantage. In countries where particular sections of society are exempt from conscription, some members are favored over others and do not have to serve. Conscientious Objection, however, gives every citizen the chance to avoid service in the armed forces, at least in theory, and affirms their human rights.¹⁷ Additionally, when states

¹⁷ Honoring Conscientious Objection might also have positive effects on the global reputation and standing of a country since it is considered a Human Right by the United Nations.

combine CO with options for Alternative Service outside the military, it gives them a chance to further boost conscription by rebranding it and CO as 'National Service.'

Consequently, states will have an incentive to introduce Conscientious Objection when there are no other justifications for conscription. This is especially important in countries with larger Winning Coalitions because more people need to be satisfied to keep the leader in power. In these cases, governments will accept losing out on some recruits who might object to military service just to reap the benefit of increased public support. Using the advantages of Conscientious Objection to maintain forced recruitment taps into Anna Leander's reasoning, which sees the legitimacy of conscription as the main reason for its resilience (2004). States with smaller Coalitions, however, may be less motivated to opt for CO because there are fewer people involved in supporting the government. Moreover, it is generally easier to pay off the members of the Winning Coalition with private goods when the Coalition is smaller (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, Kennedy 2009).

This theory of why countries with conscription introduce Conscientious Objection forms my hypothesis:

H: Given conscription, states with a larger Winning Coalition are more likely to have Conscientious Objection.

In order for my hypothesis to be supported, my empirical analysis would need to find a higher number of instances of Conscientious Objection in countries with larger Winning Coalitions. Additionally, I would expect my models to yield increasingly higher odds of implementing Conscientious Objection in states with larger Ws. Lastly, alternative reasons

for why conscription exists would not have any or, even better, a negative impact on the likelihood of Conscientious Objection.

My theory and hypothesis do not make any firm claims on the timing of Conscientious Objection and conscription. While I anticipate that a majority of cases would adopt CO after conscription, there might be cases where it happens at the same time (e.g., Canada in 1917) or where Conscientious Objection was introduced before forced recruitment (e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949). What mostly matters is the size of the Winning Coalition when it happens.

Research Design

This study employs statistical analysis via STATA to evaluate my hypothesis. My unit of analysis is country-year, following Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's data (2015). The dataset covers the years from 1816 to 2000. It provides information on whether a country recruits through conscription ($fdraft=1$) and factors that can influence the decision, such as security, economic, regime type, and historical variables. Conscription in this project follows Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's definition, meaning any form of involuntary and forced service in the armed forces. The values for Winning Coalition Size (W) come from Bueno de Mesquita (2003). They range from small ($W=0$) to large ($W=1$) with 0.25 steps. The higher the value, the larger the Winning Coalition that a leader has to satisfy to stay in power. Even though the BDM data extends the set's starting point to 1763, my analysis will still start in 1816. The cutoff year is 1998 due to the limited availability of information concerning my dependent variable Conscientious Objection (CO). Unfortunately, this restriction meant that gathering information on subtypes of conscription (e.g., full draft,

selective service, etc.) was not possible since the availability of sources for this year is somewhat limited.¹⁸

I gathered data on my DV from War Resisters' International's (WRI) "World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service" (2005). The group publishes country reports about the status of forced recruitment and its objection to it. These briefings vary in length, ranging from just a few sentences to several paragraphs, and were mostly published in 1998, which explains the cutoff year for my analysis. From these reports, I collected information on Conscientious Objection. First, I examined whether a country allows for any form of Conscientious Objection. Some states permit potential draftees to forgo military service by objecting to it based on conscientious reason. If that is the case, my dichotomous variable *Conscientious Objection as a Policy* (COPol) will be 1. Other countries do not offer objection but provide alternatives to duty in the armed forces. This is captured in my dichotomous variable *Alternative Civilian Service* (ACS), which will switch to 1 in a case where services are offered (ACS=0 otherwise). My DV is a combination of both *COPol* and *ACS*, meaning that the existence of either policy or both will count as an instance of *Conscientious Objection* and switch CO=1. This follows Adi Livny, who categorized the ideal types of CO as *recognition*, *de jure recognition without accommodation*, *informal practices of accommodation*, and *categorical rejection* (2017). For me, every type of Conscientious Objection, including Alternative Civilian Service, is considered CO=1, except for cases of complete rejection.

¹⁸ My primary source for this information, the CIA World Fact Book, does not provide old iterations of their publications.

I am interested in the connection between a state's Winning Coalitions Size (W) and the likelihood of Conscientious Objection when conscription is used as a form of recruitment. I argue that CO is more likely in a state with larger W (e.g., 0.75, 1) than it is in a country with smaller W (e.g., 0 to 0.5). To investigate this connection, I employ probit-analysis, which is well suited for dichotomous dependent variables (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). In order to account for temporal dependence, I added time polynomials ($coyr$, $coyr2$, $coyr3$) based on Carter and Signorino (2010). This approach will “capture any hazard shape that is recovered by commonly estimated parametric duration models” and avoid the overfitting associated with higher order polynomials (Carter and Signorino 2010, 282). In my models, I am looking at the size of W in the year CO is implemented since my theory argues that W in the specific year matters and not the W in the year before CO is introduced. Lastly, I will not use a Hazard model since probit analysis with a time polynomial already give me the same information as a Hazard model and is more easily interpreted and flexible. For results, I expect the likelihood of CO in a country with conscription to increase in states with larger W .

In addition to information on the type and existence of Conscientious Objection, I extracted a few more variables from the reports. Most of these are not featured in the main model but will help understand the situation of Conscientious Objection around the world and, hopefully, inform future research: First, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about newly independent states.¹⁹ Many of these chose to implement some sort of Conscientious Objection policy for their armed forces. To identify

¹⁹ Newly independent states could also be coded as “New States” in future projects. This would require more data collection.

those, I added the variable *Conscientious Objection After the Cold War* (COAfterColdWar). Due to its dichotomous character, it can only exist with values of either 0 or 1. Second, the data gathering process showed that there are some cases in which CO is implemented, despite there not being any form of conscription. As a way of capturing these few cases, I use *Conscientious Objection With Conscription* (COWithCons, 0 or 1). Third, for Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service to exist, it must be written into laws or a constitution. The latter, being the hardest to change in the political process, offers the most protection and prestige for the policies. Laws, however, are easier to implement but also easier to change. Thus, CO or ACS that are written into laws may not be as protected or prestigious as if they were written into the constitution. I created the dichotomous variables (0 or 1) *Constitution* and *Law* to note where the policies are sourced. Ideally, states would use both Conscientious Objection and its policies, but that is not always the case.

Further variables included in Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's dataset and relevant for this project as controls are, as mentioned above, connected to security, economic, and regime type. For better navigating of the data, their set includes information on *Country Code* (ccode), *Country Name Abbreviations* (cabbr), and *Years*. From Bueno de Mesquita's data, I added the official *Country Comes* (country) and *Winning Coalition Size* (W). Variables relating to security consist of International Wars (inter), Intrastate Wars (intra), and Interstate Rivalry (thomrival). The main economic variable used by Asal et al. as well as this project is *Energy Per Capita* (ENERGYPRCAP) which is a "proxy for the economic development level of each country" and allows for better comparisons over time (2015,

1466). Lastly, regime type is captured through *Polity Scores* (polity2), with higher scores (5-10) depicting democracies and lower scores (-10-5) depicting non-democracies. Additionally, they employ the *Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy*. It codes *democracy* as 1 every country that satisfies its three criteria: elected executive that is responsible to the voters or a legislature, in free and fair elections, and “a majority of adult males must have the right to vote” (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, 1466, Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013).²⁰

Analysis

This part is broken down into three sections. In the beginning, I take a look at my collected raw data on Conscientious Objection and present a few key findings. Then, I conduct my empirical analysis and test my suggested models to uncover the impact of Winning Coalitions Size on the likelihood of Conscientious Objection. Lastly, I explore possible connections between my models and regime type, mainly democracies.

Section 1: Data on Conscientious Objection

Table 1 lays out descriptive statistics for the main variables contained in my dataset. It includes 19,531 total observations (years), of which my analysis uses 10,068. That number is due to the available information on *fdraft*. Overall, the dataset features 192 states.

²⁰ A more detailed explanation can be found in Asal, Conrad, and Toronto (2015).

Table 1. Summary Statistics

VarName	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
year	19531	1928.886	56.255	1763	2000
fdraft	10068	0.622	0.485	0	1
CO	18001	0.003	0.058	0	1
W	19354	0.479	0.290	0	1
inter	10068	0.058	0.233	0	1
intra	10068	0.093	0.291	0	1
thomrival	10068	0.316	0.465	0	1
ENERGYPRCAP	10068	2.757	7.857	0	127.602
polity2	14498	-1.448	6.890	-10	10
COAfterColdWar	60	0.450	0.502	0	1
COWithCons	55	0.909	0.290	0	1
COPol	64	0.813	0.393	0	1
ACS	61	0.656	0.479	0	1
Constitution	62	0.484	0.504	0	1
Law	62	0.710	0.458	0	1

Out of all observed years, there are 6,260 with conscription and 3,808 without. Over the analyzed time frame, 60 out of 192 states (30%) implemented some type of Conscientious Objection (CO=1), whereas four states had the policy but no conscription (Table 2).²¹

While seemingly strange, these countries (i.e., Argentina, Haiti, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe) have provisions in place that would allow their citizens to object to forced recruitment or to engage in alternative service if conscription were ever to be implemented. Another example that is not captured in the dataset for the specific year, the Federal Republic of Germany, included a provision on Conscientious Objection in the 1949 constitution, several years before conscription was introduced in the 1950s.²² Table 3 shows the countries with active Conscientious Objection policies in my dataset.

Conscientious Objection Over Time and Space

Time: Figure 2 plots CO Introduction Years (the year CO switches to CO=1) over time. It reveals that the policy first became law at the beginning of the 20th century: Australia introduced it in 1903. Canada and Denmark then introduced it in 1917 during WW1. Four countries adopted CO during the 1920s and 1931. While the 1930s and 1940s featured almost no new instances of Conscientious Objection, the policy picked up a bit during the mid-1950s until the end of the 1970s, with countries such as Austria, South Africa, France, and Portugal adapting it. A massive rise in Conscientious Objection legislation kicked off

²¹ Table 2 only features a total of 49 countries. The missing 11 (out of 60) are due to a lack of data.

²² This case, albeit included in the dataset, has no information on conscription for the year 1949 in the set. The statement was made based on the text of German Basic Law, Art. 4.

Table 2. CO without Conscription

CO	Conscription		Total
	0	1	
1	4	45	49

Table 3. List of Countries with Conscientious Objection

Albania	Argentina	Australia	Austria
Azerbaijan	Belarus	Belgium	Bosnia-Herzegovina
Brazil	Bulgaria	Cape Verde	Chad
Cyprus	Ecuador	Estonia	Finland
France	Georgia	Germany	Greece
Guatemala	Guyana	Haiti	Hungary
Israel	Italy	Kyrgyzstan	Laos
Latvia	Lebanon	Lithuania	Luxembourg
Macedonia	Moldova	Mozambique	Netherlands
Norway	Paraguay	Poland	Portugal
Republic of Korea	Rhodesia	Romania	Russia
Slovenia	South Africa	Spain	Sweden
Switzerland	Ukraine	Uzbekistan	




Figure 2. The Ratio of Conscientious Objection Introduction to Draft Over Time

just a few years before the end of the Cold War, with Guatemala, Israel, Brazil, and Poland starting the trend in 1985, 1986, and 1988. CO spiked in 1992 with eight countries, most of them former members of the Warsaw Pact but also Paraguay and Cyprus. More Conscientious Objection was then codified in Eastern European and South American Countries until the late 1990s. All in all, 27 countries opted for the policies after the end of the Cold War.²³

Space: In terms of geographic dispersion, Table 4 shows that the majority of states with Conscientious Objection are located in Europe. This region alone is responsible for 37 cases (61.67%) over the analyzed frame. Latin America features seven cases (11.67%) and Africa five cases (8.33%) of Conscientious Objection. The least number of instances is located in the MENA region, with only Israel and Lebanon allowing some of their citizens to object to military service.²⁴

Relationship Between Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service

For the main part of my analysis, the investigation of whether the size of a Winning Coalition increases the likelihood of Conscientious Objection, I consider Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service to be the same. The mere existence of one policy will switch my variable *CO* to 1. However, there is value in differentiating between the policies, if not for this project, then for future research.

²³ See Table 19 in the appendix.

²⁴ A model (9) with region-fixed effects is included in the appendix. It supports my theory.

Table 4. Geographic Dispersion of Conscientious Objection

Region	Frequency	Percent
North America	3	5.00
Latin America	7	11.67
Europe	37	61.67
Africa	5	8.33
MENA	2	3.33
Asia	6	10.00
Total	60	100.00

Based on the descriptive statistics presented in Table 5, there are 35 states (61%) that enacted policies for both CO and ACS. Fourteen countries (25%) just have provisions for Conscientious Objection and no Alternative Civilian Service. These range from allowing draftees to fully object to military service to having objectors serve in the armed forces without weapons (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina).²⁵ Three countries (5%) only have Alternative Civilian Service and no provision for Conscientious Objection. Amongst them is Haiti, where there are no legal provisions for Conscientious Objection, but the constitution allows for Alternative Civilian Service.²⁶ Surprisingly, there are five states without any policy even though they are coded as CO=1. These are countries where the legal situation about Conscientious Objection is either fussy (e.g., the Republic of Korea, which has a provision for freedom of conscience in the constitution but established that it did not cover objection to military service), or where mechanisms for CO exist in case of a draft (e.g., the U.S.). Moreover, two special cases that are not covered in this table are Chile and Morocco. The former does not recognize Conscientious Objection but allowed some draftees to forgo military service after a lengthy judicial process (War Resisters' International 2007). The latter has no provisions for Conscientious Objection but seems to allow some alternative to military service (War Resisters' International 1998c).

²⁵ An example of a country that only has CO and no ACS policies is Australia which only allows draftees to object to military service. Since there is no conscription in the state right now, there is no need for alternative service.

²⁶ The other two countries are Guatemala and Lebanon.

Table 5. Relationships Between Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service

	ACS		
COPol	0	1	Total
0	5	3	8
1	14	35	49
Total	19	38	57

Codification of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service

Building on the differences between the policies laid out above, this part will establish where and how they are codified. In general, provisions enshrined in constitutions will hold more prestige and enjoy a higher level of protection since they cannot easily be changed or eliminated. Policies that are written into regular law, however, can still guarantee rights and freedoms but are also more susceptible to alterations and fluctuating political interests.

Table 6 presents data on where legislation on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service is anchored. The majority of CO and ACS takes the form of laws, with a notable 29 cases out of 61 total (52%). The second most common form of codification is the combination of constitution and laws, with 17 of all states employing this option (28%). The least used form establishing Conscientious Objection is via a constitution, with only 11 countries (20%) relying on it. The three cases that apparently have some sort of Conscientious Objection but no legal basis for it in neither constitution nor law are Guatemala (where men just object to service), Lebanon, and Morocco (War Resisters' International 1998a). War Resisters' International reports state that both Lebanon and Morocco feature semblances of CO without a clear source (War Resisters' International 1998b, c). The extra case that brings the total number up to 61 is Syria. It has a law on Alternative Civilian Service, which is not enforced (War Resisters' International 1998d). This is why Syria is not included in the overall count of countries with CO.

Table 6. Codification of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service

<u>CO/ACS</u>	Law		
Constitution	0	1	Total
0	3	29	32
1	12	17	29
Total	15	46	61

Conscientious Objection and Winning Coalition Size

Based on my theory and hypothesis, the number of states with CO should increase with the size of the Winning Coalition. Thus, countries with a larger W should be more prone to allow draftees to object to military service. Tabulating all instances of CO based on Winning Coalition size and establishing the ratios of active cases of Conscientious Objection to the overall number of Conscientious Objection in my dataset supports that notion, as shown in Table 7.

In total, there are 17,882 instances with information on both W and Conscientious Objection. However, the vast majority (17,822) are not relevant to this project since they do not have active CO. Instead, the analysis will focus on the 60 instances and states that have the policy.

- The Winning Coalition size of 1.0 saw the second most overall cases of Conscientious Objection (15 total), but the highest ratio of active cases of CO to total cases: 0.016.
- The second largest Winning Coalition size of 0.75 features almost half of all instances of Conscientious Objection in the dataset and has a ratio of 0.007.
- The Winning Coalition size of 0.5 has the third most cases of CO objection with 12 (20%) of all and a ratio of 0.002.
- The second smallest Winning Coalition size of 0.25 sees a drop in instances of CO, with only seven states in this category using the policy but maintains the same ratio as the category above: 0.002.

Table 7. Conscientious Objection and Winning Coalition Size

CO	W				
	0	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
0	2556	4094	6796	3427	949
1	1	7	12	25	15
Total	2557	4101	6808	3452	964
Ratio	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.016

- The smallest Winning Coalition size of 0 shows a significant decline in the overall number of CO, with only one country (2%) featuring Conscientious Objection, resulting in a ratio of 0.000.

The table shows that there seems to be a clear connection between Winning Coalition Size and Conscientious Objection. The larger the size of the Winning Coalition, the higher the ratio of active CO to the total number. Hence, this is the first indicator that the likelihood of CO increases with Winning Coalition Size.

Conscientious Objection, Security, and Economic Factors

Before investigating the connection between the size of the Winning Coalition and the likelihood of Conscientious Objection, it is necessary to explore possible alternative cofounders of CO:

Security: The variables relating to security stem from Asal et al.'s dataset and, as mentioned above, include variables on *Interstate War*, *Civil War*, and *Rivalries*. The established theoretical notion is that security factors will have an impact on the onset of conscription. However, based on some initial investigation presented in Table 8, there does not seem to be a strong positive connection, if any, between policies on Conscientious Objection and security factors. Quite the opposite: the majority of countries establishing CO were at peace:

- Interstate War: Only two countries out of 49 introduced some form of Conscientious Objection while they were engaged in an active war which results in a ratio of 0.004.

Table 8. Conscientious Objection and Security

	Interstate War		Intrastate War		Rivalries		Draft (Peacetime)	
CO	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
0	8059	481	7705	835	5581	2959	2334	2574
1	47	2	42	7	40	9	2	33
Total	8106	483	7747	842	5621	2968	2336	2607
Ratio	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.008	0.007	0.003	0.000	0.012

- Intrastate War: Seven of all states implemented Conscientious Objection during a civil war, leading to a ratio of 0.008.
- Rivalries: Nine countries, or a ratio of 0.003, set up CO policies while a rivalry was active.
- There is only one case that had all three security factors active when it began Conscientious Objection²⁷: the United States in 1917.
- A total of 35 countries introduced CO during times of peace. All but two had conscription active.

The results of a difference of means test revealed that there is no statistically significant difference in means for interstate and intrastate conflict. Yet, there is significance at the 5% level for the difference between “no rivalries” and “rivalries”, i.e., the former is more likely to have Conscientious Objection than the latter. My analysis will shed more light on this preliminary finding. Furthermore, when combining all elements of security into a “threat”-category, significance is only found at the 10% level. This indicates that the “peacetime” group is more likely to have Conscientious Objection which is intuitive since “threat” is a combination of all factors, including the significant “rivalries.”

Economy: The variable on economic development (Energy per Capita) is also from Asal et al.’s article. It is created by using a “state’s energy consumption and total population from the correlates of war (COW) project” (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, 1466). Figure 3 plots the level of development of the countries that introduced Conscientious Objection, while Figure 4 tracks the frequency of ENERGYPRCAP in the dataset.

²⁷ See Table 20 in the appendix.




Figure 3. Conscientious Objection and Energy Per Capita




Figure 4. Frequency of Energy Per Capita in the Dataset

Judging from Figure 3, it appears that countries that implemented Conscientious Objection were not always the most economically developed. This becomes a bit more apparent when compared to the overall frequency of Energy Per Capita in the dataset. The most developed state ranged below an ENERGYPRCAP score of 14, whereas Figure 4 indicates that there even are cases above 100. Explanations could be that richer (or more developed) countries do not need Conscientious Objection to ‘sell’ conscription to their citizens. An alternative explanation could be that states might introduce CO when they are at lower levels of economic development compared to where they are now. Regardless, it is not possible to make a clear statement about the connection between Energy Per Capita and Conscientious Objection.

Section 2: Winning Coalition Size and Its Effects on Conscientious Objection

The initial descriptive analysis of the raw data on Conscientious Objection showed initial evidence of a possible connection between W and CO. Consequently, this section will now test my theory more rigidly via probit analysis and a linear probability model for M3. I expect to find that a higher Winning Coalition Size will have a positive impact on the likelihood of Conscientious Objection. In particular, the larger the W, the higher the chances of CO.

Table 9 features the results of my analysis. Model 1 is my basic model and only features Winning Coalition Size. As shown, the results appear to strongly support my hypothesis: there is a connection between W and CO. However, due to the nature of probit analysis, it is only possible to say that Winning Coalition Size has a positive impact on the

Table 9. Factors Influencing the Likelihood of Conscientious Objection

	Model 1: Base (Probit)	Model 2: Controls (Probit and Controls)	Model 3: Controls and Time (LPM FE)
Winning Coalition Size	1.3246*** (0.2522)	1.2508*** (0.2997)	0.0155** (0.0078)
Interstate War		-0.0402 (0.2779)	-0.0007 (0.0043)
Intrastate War		0.2819 (0.1895)	-0.0008 (0.0056)
Rival		-0.3316** (0.1585)	-0.0113** (0.0061)
Energy Per Capita		0.0110 (0.0077)	0.0012 (0.0008)
Years Since CO		0.1572 (0.0113)	0.0010** (0.0005)
Years Since CO ²		-0.0002 (0.0001)	- 0.0000* (0.0000)
Years Since CO ³		0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000* (0.0000)
Constant	-3.1553*** (0.1732)	-3.4538*** (0.3678)	0.1643*** (0.0167)
N	5155	5155	5155
Log-Pseudo likelihood	-238.7901	-231.9264	n/a

Standard errors clustered by country. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

likelihood of Conscientious Objection. Moreover, the effect is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Added control variables for security and economic factors in Model 2 paint a similar supporting picture: Winning Coalition Size still has a positive and highly statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of Conscientious Objection. Surprisingly enough, rivalries seem to have an effect on the policy as well, i.e., an existing rivalry with another state decreases the chances of implementing CO. This fits my theory since states with ongoing security concerns will not have to justify conscription to their citizens by ‘sweetening’ it with Conscientious Objection. As found by Asal, Conrad, and Toronto, rivalries have a positive impact on conscription (2015).

The linear probability model employed in Model 3 adds fixed effects to the controls used previously. Winning Coalition still has a significant positive impact, albeit only on the 95% level. The effect of rivalries stays the same as on Model 2 in its direction and significance.

Figure 5 below provides a more detailed look. The graph on the left indicates that the likelihood of CO is increasing substantially with every level of Winning Coalition Size. In more detail, based on the predicted values based on King, Tomz, and Wittenberg’s CLARIFY-command (2000): When holding all other variables equal in Model 1 and the Winning Coalition Size is at its smallest ($W=0$), then there is a 0.09% probability that a country will establish Conscientious Objection. For Model 2, the percentage remains the same. However, with a Winning Coalition Size of 1, there is a probability of 3.4% for CO in Model 1. This value changes to 2.8 in Model 2,




Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities of CO – Model 1 and Model 2

holding all other variables equal. – Although seemingly small, the probability for CO increases almost 40 times from the smallest to the largest Winning Coalition Size.

All in all, it seems that models 1-3 back my hypothesis of a positive influence of Winning Coalition Size on the likelihood of the implementation. There might be a minor difference in the intensity of the effect. However, the statistical significance and direction hold up. States with a larger Winning Coalition are more likely to introduce Conscientious Objection. Additionally, I uncovered a slight but significant impact of rivalry. This is a somewhat surprising, albeit not unexpected, finding.

Section 3: Alternative Explanations - Winning Coalition Size and Regime Types

The last part of my analysis will examine whether regime type would be a better measurement for my theory. Fortunately, the basis for my analysis, Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's dataset, already includes the widely used polity scores and the *Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy* (BMR) to establish whether a country is an autocracy or a democracy. Replacing Winning Coalition Size with democracy in my base model (Model 1) seems intuitive since most states with large Winning Coalitions are also democracies. In fact, judging from Model 4 in Table 10 supports the notion.

Adding polity scores to the original model leads Winning Coalition Size to lose its significance and polity scores to gain significance at the 99% level (Model 4). The direction of polity's effect is still positive, though. Yet, in Model 5, when including the Boix-Miller-Rosato score instead of polity scores as a different measure for democracy, the significance

Table 10. The Impact of Democracy on Conscientious Objection

	Model 4: Base Model and Regime Type	Model 5: Base Model and Democracy (BMR)	Model 6: Base Model With Democracy Dummy	Model 7: Base Model With Democracy (BMR) and Democracy Dummy
Winning Coalition Size	0.1964 (0.3469)	0.9700*** (0.3226)	0.7925** (0.3443)	0.8315** (0.3528)
Polity Scores	0.0594*** (0.0171)			
Democracy (BMR)		0.3053* (0.1768)		0.2244 (0.2123)
Democracy Dummy			0.4016** (0.1974)	0.1824 (0.2410)
Constant	-2.5702*** (0.1933)	-3.0621*** (0.1693)	-2.9902*** (0.1772)	-3.0146*** (0.1740)
N	5040	4893	5155	4893
Log-Pseudo likelihood	-219.5482	-228.3780	-235.6371	-227.9169

Standard errors clustered by country. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

of Winning Coalition Size is restored to the 99% level. Granted, BMR still maintains a level of significance of 90%, but they both have explanatory powers.

These results indicate that there might be a high correlation between the three measurements and that they should not be used in the same model. Table 11 confirms that.

Interacting Winning Coalition Size with the polity measurement and plotting the results into a graph shows a somewhat counterintuitive result: as polity scores increase, the probability of implementing Conscientious Objection decreases (Figure 6). There are two explanations for this.

On the one hand, Winning Coalition Size and democracy could be substituted for each other, but the evidence is not quite clear, as argued further below. On the other hand, the two concepts could be complementary or supplementary. Polity scores, or Democracy (BMR), both constitute democracy, whereas Winning Coalition Size does not. As a consequence, it might not be necessary to add all of them together in a model. Moreover, the dip in predicted probabilities of CO in Figure 6 might not be because of W but due to the fact that I am trading out other elements.

A potential avenue to address this issue would be to break apart the polity measurement and run the interaction with W for each of its elements. It would enable me to identify exactly what is causing the downward slope in probabilities. Alternatively, it would be worth turning the interaction around to see how the average marginal effects of polity change. Unfortunately, this would break the confines of this project but could be set aside for the future.

Table 11. Correlation for Alternatives to Winning Coalition Size

Obs: 9059	Winning Coalition Size	Polity Scores	Democracy (BMR)
Winning Coalition Size	1.0000		
Polity Scores	0.8094	1.0000	
Democracy (BMR)	0.7504	0.8394	1.0000




Figure 6. Interaction of W and Polity Scores and its Effects on the Probability of CO

To still get an idea of what measurement should be used, I created Model 6, which includes a dummy for *democracy* (dem) that switches to dem=1 when the policy score for the observation is equal to or larger than six. The results in table 10 above show that once democracy is dummied out in the base model, both it and W matter. Consequently, there is something beyond democracy that is captured by Winning Coalition Size.

Surprisingly enough, adding BMR's democracy measure to the model with the other democracy dummy changes the equation completely: Model 11 shows that when both these indicators for democracy are used, they all lose their significance. Only Winning Coalition Size keeps its significance at the 95% level.

In summary, it appears that there is no final answer to the question of whether regime type could be a better measurement than Winning Coalition Support. Polity scores have more explanatory power and significance than W in the base model. Nevertheless, when dummied out into a democracy (dem) variable, both it and W regain significance at the 95% level. Hence, both variables seem to matter. A possible explanation could be that polity scores are too finely grained in comparison to W because when we just capture democracy via the dummy, it becomes apparent that there is something else to democracy (not caught by polity scores) that matters since W is significant as well.²⁸ Moreover, BMR's democracy variable seems to not hold up when added to the model with the dummy.

²⁸ Adding to this explanation: Polity scores are only one way of defining democracy since it only looks at institutional trappings (e.g., constitution, legislature, etc.). There are other means of measuring democracy, such as Freedom House or Cheibub (2002).

Due to these ambiguities, I chose Winning Coalition Size as my main explanatory variable for this project.²⁹

Discussion

Based on the results presented above, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the collected data and the relationship between Winning Coalition size and the likelihood of Conscientious Objection:

CO-Dataset

The set provides some insight into the numbers behind CO. As expected, only a minority of 49 states (out of 192) employ some sort of Conscientious Objection. These, however, mostly do it together with conscription, the majority of which establish it when the draft already exists and during times of peace, even though there are four countries that feature CO without a draft. Most instances of Conscientious Objection can be found in Europe (37; 62% of all cases), with Latin and South America coming in second place (7; 12% of all cases).

Investigating the frequency of CO over time showed that while the policy existed for over a century, it gained most of its tracking after the Second World War and around the end of the Cold War. It appears like older democracies (e.g., Australia and Canada) introduced Conscientious Objection first. Additionally, the policy seemed to spike around times of uncertainty (WW1, the 1920s, Cold War) when it is more important for countries with large Ws to secure public approval. Moreover, the explosion in countries that

²⁹ Another reason why Winning Coalition Size might be the better measure for my theory: not all non-democracies or autocracies lack a large W coalition or a winning coalition at all. (E.g., Japan = -10 in polity score, but 0.25 in W).

implemented CO beginning in the mid-1980s until the end of the 1990s can be explained by massive democratization efforts in these places, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. These developments support the idea that larger Winning Coalitions (typical for democracies) are more invested in implementing Conscientious Objection.

While I, for the purpose of this project, treat Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service as one, there is some difference in which policy countries choose. The dataset showed that the vast majority employ both policies at the same time (35 states, 61%). The next most common form is just Conscientious Objection (14, 25%). Alternative Civilian Service alone just makes up three cases in total (5%). Strangely enough, there are five countries that have Conscientious Objection (CO=1) but no specific policy. This is either caused by a lack of data or them paying lip service to CO.

In terms of codification of CO, most (29 out of 61) states seem to prefer laws over constitutions as the source of Conscientious Objection. A combination of both is the second most common option (17 out of 61), followed by constitutions alone (12 out of 61). Three cases do not have either option as the foundation of CO.

Tabulating Conscientious Objection and Winning Coalition Size highlighted a possible connection between the two concepts and provided initial support for my hypothesis. States with a higher W were more likely to employ CO. Doing the same with security factors showed that only a small minority of countries use Conscientious Objection when they are engaged in a war (inter or intra) or had a rival. This fits my theory since countries would not need to justify conscription when security issues are present. Economic factors did not yield a clear picture, though. Graphing out Energy Per Capita illustrated that

most countries are in the lower half of the chart, signifying lower (or: not as high) economic development. This could be due to a variety of factors and deserves further investigation.

Models

The relationship between Winning Coalition Size and the likelihood of Conscientious Objection could be confirmed in my empirical analysis. Moreover, the direction fits my theory and the initial data analysis further above. Even when controlling for security and economic factors, as well as time, my findings hold up. Winning Coalition Size has an effect on Conscientious Objection: the larger the W, the higher the chances that CO will exist.

The analysis also appears to indicate an additional connection between interstate rivalries and Conscientious Objection: an active rivalry reduces the chances that CO is implemented. This finding, even though somewhat surprising, still fits my theory since states engaged in rivalries would not need Conscientious Objection.

An investigation of whether Winning Coalition Size should be replaced by the concept of democracy came to no clear conclusion: there is some evidence that polity scores might have more explanatory power. Yet, once democracies are dummied out, it appears that Winning Coalition Size regains its significance. Furthermore, the BMR measurement for democracy loses its significance as well when a model with a democracy dummy is employed. Hence, it seems like W is justified – for now.

Conclusion

This project sought to find an answer to the question: *Why do some countries introduce Conscientious Objections to conscription while others do not?* - After laying out my theory,

creating a new dataset based on existing work and my own collection efforts, conducting some exploratory analysis, and then testing my models, it is now possible to establish that the suggested explanation in the form of hypothesis *H: Given conscription, states with a larger Winning Coalition are more likely to have Conscientious Objection.* seems to have some support.

Based on my findings, I can state that Winning Coalition Size positively affects the likelihood of Conscientious Objection. This impact is pronounced in my base model but maintains statistical significance even when controlling alternative explanations, time, and fixed effects. Additionally, my analysis reveals that Interstate Rivalries have a dampening impact on Conscientious Objection. Fortunately, this follows my theory because governments would not need to introduce Conscientious Objection if the legitimacy of conscription is guaranteed through external threats.

Elaborating on my choice of measurements, i.e., whether democracy would be a better main independent variable than Winning Coalition Size, leaves some mixed results: While polity2 scores seem to outperform my original IV, Winning Coalition Size regains its explanatory power once democracy is dummied out. Moreover, relying on alternative measures of democracy did not subtract from Winning Coalition Size as well. Given this situation, there might be some unexplored factors at play. However, it still appears like Winning Coalition Size is a good enough measurement for my theory – so far.

My exploratory analysis of my dataset opened up new insights into Conscientious Objection and conscription. The most striking findings are related to its clustering in region

(i.e., mainly Europe), that most countries with CO establish it during times of peace and when conscription already exists, and that laws are mostly used for the codification of CO.

Despite the initial support for my hypothesis, there is still a lot that can be done to push the project even further: For one, it would be possible to analyze the connection between CO and ACS based on Winning Coalition size and dive deeper into the different levels of legal recognition of Conscientious Objection (Livny 2017). Furthermore, I could expand my data to include not just information on CO Implementation Year but all following years in which Conscientious Objection exists. Moreover, I could extend my cutoff year and extend the set to include the years from 1999 onward as well. There are a few instances of countries introducing Conscientious Objection after 1998, which might add to my theory. Furthermore, I would like to add Max Margulies' recently released dataset on *Instances of Military Design* to my data. He uses it to analyze the influence of military patrons, i.e., outside actors, on a country's decision to implement conscription (Margulies 2021). Investigating the impact of external actors on the implementation of Conscientious Objection could be a fruitful task, especially since international organizations seem to have an impact on newly independent states' constitutions. Lastly, I could explore alternative measures for Winning Coalition Size and Democracy. My analysis highlighted that there seem to be some connections between the two concepts but also some unknowns. Adding variables from Cheibub or Freedom House might shed some additional light on these issues.

As it stands now, the main limitation of this project is the limited amount of information on Conscientious Objection and its cutoff year of 1998. Since this is primarily

due to limited data availability on the status of Conscientious Objection, it still puts restraints on my work. For example, it limits my ability to collect information on the many subsets of conscription (e.g., full conscription, selective service, no conscription) simply because the main sources for this kind of data only provide information for the current years or hide their older information behind paywalls.

Despite these shortcomings, this project should still have some value for the larger field of Civil-Military Relations and the research on the connection between international security and domestic politics and the determinants of conscription because it identifies the impact of Winning Coalition and public support on the decisions of leaders.

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**CHAPTER III:
DON'T MENTION THE DRAFT -
HOW LACK OF WINNING COALITION SUPPORT LEADS
TO DEBATES ABOUT CONSCRIPTION**

Abstract

Why do countries that successfully maintain conscription during times of peace start questioning its future? This paper argues that a lack of Winning Coalition Support for conscription will lead to serious debates about the future of the draft. The key to maintaining this support is highlighting the policies of Conscientious Objection (CO) and Alternative Civilian Service (ACS) and downplaying the draft. To evaluate the validity of this claim, this project conducts a Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count analysis with LIWC-22 of roughly 1,300 unique newspaper articles published in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* from 1997-2010. It follows a *typical-case* approach based on the Federal Republic of Germany. It finds that the levels of Winning Coalition Support were low in 2010, right before the country engaged in discussions about conscription. This was reflected in an increasing number of publications on conscription over time and the negative, and cold and rigid tone employed in articles on CO and ACS. Results of other measures, such as the rise in articles CO and ACS and word frequency analysis, seem not to follow my hypothesis, but they suffered from their caveats. Overall, this study signals that public support for conscription can affect its future.

Introduction

The year 2010 proved to be a tumultuous one for Germany and its military. Whereas they both started the month of January with conscription in place, the year saw political dogmas shift and brought an end to the policy in December. Even though the country had recruited its military mainly via the draft for decades, it took the government only a few months to abandon tradition and suspend it indefinitely. The decision to end conscription and the

speed in which it was made came as somewhat of a shock not just to the political supporters of the draft but also to the general public (Blechtschmidt and Braun 2010, Connolly 2010). Just south of the German border and in the same year, Austria went through a similar phase when Vienna's mayor proposed a possible end to conscription as well. The policy, which had existed since 1955, was put to a public vote in a referendum in January 2013, which it survived (Impey 2020).

These two instances of states re-evaluating their conscription policies are somewhat striking, especially since they happened in places where the policy had been in effect for over half a century. The common scholarly understanding of forced recruitment and why countries might have it posits that states are less likely to employ it when there is no threat to them. This already puts Austria and Germany in a special category since they were some of the last countries in Europe to maintain conscription even long after external or internal threats to them subsided. What is even more puzzling about these cases is that they kept the draft along for such a long time, bucking all trends to end it, and then decided that they needed to address the future of conscription. As a consequence, this project asks: *Why do countries that successfully maintain conscription during times of peace start questioning its future?*

My theory of why states with long-established practices of using forced recruitment during times of no threat would start to doubt the policy builds on the idea of Winning Coalition Support. Conscription, which for the purpose of this project is defined as any form of compelled service in the armed forces, is an unpopular policy, especially during peacetime and when it does not affect every potential draftee equally (Haltiner 1998, Perri

2010). Hence, if a government wants to keep it after threat subsides, they need to create support for the policy. They do this by lobbying the members of their Winning Coalition, i.e., the individuals or groups that keep them in power (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, Kennedy 2009, Morrow et al. 2008). Only when leaders secure this support for themselves and conscription will it stay in place despite lacking other cofounders, such as external or internal threats. The backing of the Winning Coalition is not a one-time matter, though. Instead, it is something that needs to be maintained over time. If that does not happen, then the supporters of the leaders will start to question the decisions to which they agreed. In terms of conscription during peacetime, that means that debates about its future will arise.

Initially, leaders can bolster the support of their Winning Coalition for keeping conscription by implementing Conscientious Objection (CO) and Alternative Civilian Service (ACS).³⁰ The former describes a policy that allows potential draftees to object to military service based on conscientious or religious reasons. The right to Conscientious Objection is a codified human right (UN General Assembly 1948). Alternative Civilian Service allows objectors to serve their allotted time as a draftee in the health or social sector as a substitute for duty in the armed forces (Livny 2017). Despite CO and ACS's ability to help sell conscription to the Winning Coalition in the first place, it must be maintained as well. This is done by keeping it present in the perception and minds of the members of the Winning Coalition. For me, only when the levels of support of the Winning Coalition are high will there be no debates.

³⁰ Chapter II of this dissertation lays this concept out in more detail and empirically tests its validity.

In order to evaluate my claims on the impact of Winning Coalition Support on the appearance of debates about the future of the draft, I engaged in a *typical-case* analysis of the Federal Republic of Germany before serious public discussions about conscription appeared. In particular, I investigate the levels of Winning Coalition Support represented in the media coverage of Conscientious Objection, Alternative Civilian Service, and conscription in the German daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) in the thirteen years leading up to the beginning of the debates on the future of conscription. After evaluating the roughly 1,300 unique articles through the help of computer-assisted Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC-22)³¹ software, some support for my theory is revealed. The number and steady rise of published articles on conscription and the negative tone and cold and rigid style used in the publications that covered Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service reflect low levels of support for the draft. While the increase in articles on CO and ACS and the results of a word frequency analysis did not support this notion, they suffer from limitations themselves. As a result of the levels of Winning Coalition Support, it is no surprise that a serious debate about the future of the draft appeared in Germany.

My discoveries impact existing scholarship on several levels: First, it strengthens the link that exists between policymaker and their supporters by highlighting that leaders need the support of their Winning Coalition to not have debates about certain policies, e.g., conscription. This also has implications for public policy, advising leaders that want to maintain conscription to keep support for it high. Alternatively, countries that want to end

³¹ I would like to thank Ari Perliger for introducing me to this software during our panel at International Studies Association's 2022 Annual Convention in Nashville.

conscription should lower its popularity. Second, it affects International Relations theory, e.g., Realist, Liberal, and Domestic Politics approaches, by highlighting the impact that citizens can have on a state's security policy. It shows that public support matters in which recruitment mechanism a country might choose. Third, it enhances the significant work that is being done on the determinants of conscription by adding the variable Winning Coalition Support to the explanations of why a country might have or keep forced recruitment. Additionally, it provides a dataset on 17 years of newspaper coverage on CO, ACS, and conscription and their linguistic evaluations to the research community. Its scope and uses might be limited, but it might spur further investigation in terms of how public support for recruitment policies trends over time.

This project proceeds as follows: First, it lays out my theory of why Winning Coalition Support needs to be maintained and how it influences debates on the future of the draft. Then, the research design section describes my tools, data, method, and operationalizations. Following that, it presents the results of my analysis and a discussion of the findings. Finally, it ends with a conclusion and reflection on possible limitations.

Explaining Why Winning Coalition Support Needs to be Maintained

This section outlines my theory on why it is important to keep up the support of the Winning Coalition to not have debates about the future of conscription. To understand why this is the case, it briefly explains: 1) why support is needed in the first place, 2) why a country would choose to maintain conscription, 3) how Winning Coalition Support is

achieved, 4) the role of time in the process, and 5) what can be done to secure support over the years.³²

The Importance of Winning Coalition Support

Conscription, like any other policy, has its advantages. These range from economic benefits, e.g., making it easier for a military to compete for personnel with the private sector (Ben-Ari, Rosman, and Shamir 2021, Margulies 2021), culture and ideological reason, e.g., Rousseau's Social Contract, the armed forces as the School of the Nation, and anchoring the military in society (Kümmel, Caforio, and Dandeker 2009, Leander 2004, Rousseau and Frankel 1947), and security, e.g., allowing a state to ramp up its military power in a short time and creating a better defensive fighting force than professional armies (Anderson, Halcoussis, and Tollison 1996, Choi and James 2008, Cohen 1985). Yet, there are massive downsides to it as well: temporary economic disadvantages for veterans (Angrist 1990, Angrist, Chen, and Song 2011), potential social issues when it is perceived as unfair (Haltiner 1998), issues of battlefield effectiveness and higher casualty counts (Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam 2011, Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin 2004). While the problems of forced recruitment mostly disappear when the security of a state is in jeopardy, they are exacerbated during times of peace. Consequently, it is to be expected that conscription would fade away when there are no threats. Yet, this is not always the case, with many countries keeping conscription active after their security is restored. As argued before, the reason that allows states to maintain the draft is the support of their Winning

³² The reasoning for why Winning Coalition Support matters and why countries might choose to maintain conscription were highlighted in greater detail in the previous Chapters I and II. Hence, this paper will only feature a brief discussion.

Coalition. The concept describes the group of people, be it large or small, that is necessary to hold a leader in power and stems from Selectorate Theory (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). When governments manage to achieve the backing of their Winning Coalition, they can implement any policies they choose, such as keeping conscription active.

Reasons to Maintain Conscription

While Winning Coalition Support can enable a leader to make conscription permanent, even though there are a lot of reasons speaking against it (e.g., no threat to a state), it does not say much about why they would want to do that. Among the potential arguments for maintaining conscription is uncertainty about the future. Governments do not always know which challenges their countries could face in the coming decades, especially considering the lack of order in the international system (Waltz 1979). As a consequence, they might hold on to conscription as a means of increasing their security. Moreover, states might see the benefits of forced recruitment as a tool to anchor the military in society or to prevent it from potentially overthrowing the government (Adam 2012, Kümmel, Caforio, and Dandeker 2009, Vasquez 2011). Lastly, there could be veto-players or sticky institutions that either oppose a change in recruitment policies or make it more costly than keeping it (Tsebelis 1995, Margulies 2021).

How to Preserve the Draft During Times of Peace

Once leaders decide that they want to maintain conscription, they have to convince their supporters that this is the right choice of action. This statement is rooted in the notion that governments must be responsive to their supporters or risk losing their power or worse (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005, Lowell 1913). Additionally, the influence leaders have

on the preferences of their supporters, i.e., the government leading its people, is well established (Zaller 1992). In times of high threat, such as an impending major conflict, this does not require a lot of effort since the citizens of a country will be more inclined to accept the policy (Fordham 2016). Yet, when security improves, the population will begin to doubt the usefulness of forced recruitment, especially when not all eligible individuals get drafted into the military, which can be perceived as not fair (Haltiner 1998, Perri 2010). This will make it harder, if not impossible, to find enough support for conscription. Consequently, governments will have to find other ways of increasing the policy's appeal. For me, this can be achieved through implementing provisions for Conscientious Objection (i.e., the option to object being drafted) and Alternative Civilian Service (i.e., substitute service). In fact, based on the *Status of Conscientious Objection* dataset, out of the 60 states that had Conscientious Objection from 1816 to 1998, the vast majority (45) introduced the policy after conscription was already implemented. These can overcome the negative perceptions that citizens might have of conscription since they offer a way to escape service in the armed forces and provide additional value to the community with their engagement in the health and social sectors. Due to this, leaders that introduce Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service will be able to sway a Winning Coalition that is doubtful about the future of conscription towards accepting it during peacetime.

Why Time Matters

When the support of the Winning Coalition for conscription is high, then it will be maintained, even during peacetime.³³ However, my theory in this project argues that

³³ The previous chapter argues and evaluates this point.

securing this approval is not a one-time event. Instead, it must be maintained over time. Support for forced recruitment can fluctuate, just like for any other policy. If it drops too much, then questions about its future will arise. Then, if nothing is done to address the continued decrease in popularity, conscription could ultimately be scrapped. An example of this is the end of the draft and the establishment of the all-volunteer force in the United States, following the rapid decline of the popularity of this form of recruitment during the Vietnam War (Bailey 2009). For me, the approval of the Winning Coalition for conscription is affected by several factors: On the one hand, it might fade because of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. Their ability to make the draft ‘palatable’ for the public lies in the fact that people perceive them as something positive, e.g., the public attitudes towards ACS in Germany (Beher et al. 2002). Yet, when a country stops seeing them in a positive light, their power to justify conscription dissipates. On the other hand, conscription plays a role as well. Since Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service are meant to cover the flaws and downsides of forced recruitment, any highlighting of conscription will affect the support of the Winning Coalition negatively.

How to Maintain Support Over Time

States that want to keep conscription active despite a lack of traditional reasons that would justify it must ensure that the support of the Winning Coalition does not decline too much over time. The obvious solution for this would be to pay off the opponents of the coalition who might have an impact on its future. However, this is only viable when their numbers are small (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, Kennedy 2009). If this is not possible, then other

alternatives must be pursued, mainly bolstering the Winning Coalition's perception of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. This can be achieved by highlighting their advantages and making sure that they stay on the minds of the supporters, for example, through advertising, information campaigns, interviews, and events focused on CO and ACS. Additionally, governments could seek to limit negative portrayals of the policies. To tackle the issues that emanate from conscription, i.e., the harmful impact that its presence in the minds of the supporters alone could have, leaders would want to avoid talking about the policy altogether. This could be achieved by either censoring or restricting information about the draft, using euphemisms or code when talking about it, e.g., 'intervention' in Ukraine 2022 instead of 'war', or via diversion.

Figure 7 illustrates my theory graphically. As Winning Coalition Support (solid blue line) drops over time, it will get closer to the threshold for debates (green line). Once both lines intersect, a country will start a serious discussion about the future of conscription. Forced recruitment will be ended if Winning Coalition Support continues to decrease and reaches the minimum support necessary to maintain the draft.³⁴ If leaders manage to increase Winning Coalition at any point during or after the debates, conscription will not be abolished (dotted red line). In order for my hypothesis to be supported, I would expect to find low levels of Winning Coalition Support for conscription close or at the time that debates appeared.

³⁴ The end of conscriptions is the subject of the next chapter.




Figure 7. Theoretical Model of Winning Coalition Support Over Time

To sum up my theory, the support of the Winning Coalition for conscription must be maintained over time by the government. Otherwise, the public will question its viability. In such a case, even a country that has maintained conscription for decades will be more likely to have debates about the future of the draft. This leads me to my hypothesis:

*H: If a state has decreased levels of Winning Coalition Support for the draft,
it is more likely to have debates on the draft's future.*

Research Design

To evaluate the validity of my theoretical claim, I employ manual and computer-assisted text analysis through the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC-22) software to analyze relevant newspaper articles published in the Federal Republic of Germany over a time span of 13 years.

By relying on just one case to investigate my hypothesis, I follow the *typical-case* approach (Gerring 2007). It is particularly useful to “probe causal mechanisms that may either confirm or disconfirm a given theory”, which is what I aim to do in this project (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 297). The success of using this approach hinges on finding a “representative of a broader set of cases” (Gerring 2007, 91). My universe of cases consists of all countries that maintained conscription during peacetime and discussed its future, resulting in a clear decision to either keep or abolish the draft later on.³⁵ For me, the Federal Republic of Germany represents a prime example. It introduced conscription in the 1950s and decided to hold on to it even after the Cold War. Even when most of its European neighbors ended forced recruitment into their armed forces, Germany maintained its draft.

³⁵ The 'later on' part is not of interest to my analysis. It is just needed to identify that a debate happened.

Then, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, a debate about the future of conscription sprang up that resulted in a suspension of conscription in December 2010.

My case selection is justified because the situation of the Federal Republic of Germany is similar to what happened in other countries, such as the Republic of Austria and the Swiss Confederation. They all maintained conscription in times of peace to then discuss whether to keep it. Moreover, Germany is also a suitable representative of the region of Europe as a whole. Based on data collected by Victor Asal, Justin Conrad, and Nathan Toronto, more than 50% of all country/year observations of states that had conscription during the absence of threat are located in Europe, as presented in Table 12 (2015).

Regions means the geographical regions of the world. Frequency shows the instances of country/year observations in which there was no threat (internal, external, or rival) to a country that had conscription as their main form of recruitment. It shows that the vast majority of these countries were located in Europe. Consequentially, this supports my decision to use Germany as a representative case for this project.

The data for this project consists of primary source newspaper articles from the German daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ). The paper was founded in Munich in 1945 and had about 316,000 readers in the first quarter of 2022 (IVW 2022). During the relevant years for this study, the SZ was the most published of all super-regional newspapers, with 430,000 papers printed daily (Deutschland.de 2012). It is commonly regarded as an influential indicator of public discourse and enjoys high national and international recognition (Hachmeister 2012). Thus, based on its “status of a leading

Table 12. Geographic Dispersion of Conscription without Threat

Region	Frequency
North America	61
Latin America	397
Europe	1,820
Africa	360
Mena	380
Asia	432
Total	3450

media” and its “high circulation” especially around the time of the inquiry, the SZ is a good source for my project (von Nordheim, Boczek, and Koppers 2018, 813). Moreover, the SZ releases its articles in German, which guarantees that this project will reduce the likelihood of translation-introduced mistakes.

Ideally, I would have employed survey data to establish the levels of Winning Coalition Support for conscription in Germany over time. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to several issues: First, limited data availability: On the one hand, there exist national surveys on the public's opinion on security and defense-related issues. These are published by the Center for the Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr (ZMSBw 2018). However, the surveys are conducted only once per year, which would not allow for a fine-grained plotting of Winning Coalition Support over time. On the other hand, the availability of these reports, especially older ones, is spotty at best. While most of the publications made in the last decade are accessible online, there are only a few for the first ten years of the 2000s. Alternative sources for those reports, like the German National Library or the GESIS database, did not provide any relief. Even though I could find a few individual reports for the 1990s in the latter, it was not enough for my project. Adding to that, there were no consistently published surveys on Conscientious Objection. Second, the few surveys I retrieved did not focus much on Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service. Instead, they were mostly set up around topics of security and defense which is not surprising, given their nature. When Alternative Civilian Service came up, it did so in questions that were supposed to gauge the respondents' bias, e.g., “My son did/is doing Alternative Civilian Service” or “Respondent did/is doing Alternative Civilian

Service”, or basic comparisons, e.g., “Conscription or Alternative Civilian Service: what is more important?” “Conscription is easier than Alternative Civilian Service” (ZMSBw 1999, 3, 4, 6, 7). They did not explore Alternative Civilian Service more deeply. Lastly, even if the availability of surveys and information on CO and ACS would have been better, there still exists a potential issue of bias since the research was conducted on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Defense and the armed forces.

As a result of this lack of survey data, I had to seek alternatives to help me properly gauge the levels of Winning Coalition Support. I found them in the form of newspaper articles. This is due to the fact that for me and others, the main driver behind and arena for public debates is mass media (Walgrave, Soroka, and Nuytemans 2008, Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer 2010). As an element of mass media, newspapers are thus a cornerstone of public debates and are still regarded as "keystone media," especially when they are local (Nielsen 2015, 51). For this project, I argue that the specific newspaper coverage of Conscientious Objection, Alternative Civilian Service, and conscription reflects how the Winning Coalition perceives forced recruitment. Support for the draft will be high when there are regular, positive, and friendly and personable stories on CO and ACS that do not mention conscription a lot. Plus, a low number or an absence of articles on forced recruitment. Support is low when there are no articles on CO and ACS, or they are negative, appear cold and rigid, and talk about the draft a lot, and when there are many publications on conscription.

To evaluate the validity of my theoretical claim, I employ manual and computer-assisted text analysis through the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC-22) software

to analyze relevant newspaper articles published in the Federal Republic of Germany over a time span of 13 years. For the word-frequency analysis part, I rely on NVivo.

LIWC-22 is the self-prescribed "gold standard" for the evaluation of language and was successfully used in "over 20,000 scientific articles" (Pennebaker Conglomerates 2022b). Text analysis has a long history, with computerized attempts starting in the 1960s (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010). Even though LIWC was initially applied in the field of Psychology, it has found its way into other fields, like Political Science, where it is enjoying great popularity (Donohue, Liang, and Druckman 2014, Schoonvelde, Schumacher, and Bakker 2019). I utilize the software to understand how conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Alternative Civilian Science are portrayed in the media to gauge the levels of Winning Coalition Support

All articles used in this analysis were gathered through the *Nexis Uni* portal. It features SZ articles from the current year back to January 1st, 1997. For this project, I collected all articles from that date until the end of May 2010, when the decision to talk about the future of conscription was made.³⁶ The keywords for the search were "Zivildienst OR Kriegsdienstverweigerung" for articles on Alternative Civilian Service or Conscientious Objection and "Wehrpflicht OR Wehrdienst" for conscription. The parameters were set to "Publication Type: Newspaper" and "Süddeutsche Zeitung (inkl. Regionalsausgaben)" (SZ with all regional variants). All articles that matched my criteria were downloaded and prepared for analysis. This included eliminating all duplicates and renaming the individual filenames to reflect the date when they were published. Then I

³⁶ The date is selected as a rough reference for when the debates started. Since I am interested in the overall trend over the years, the actual day when the decision was made does not have to be fully accurate.

processed everything through LWIC-22 via the *LWIC Analysis* command and with the help of the *DE-LIWC2015* German dictionary. The word frequency analysis was conducted via NVivo.

The key concept of this project is *Levels of Winning Coalition Support*. Based on my theory laid out above, the levels are reflected by the coverage of conscription, Conscientious Objection, or Alternative Civilian Service. Table 13 illustrates the operationalization of the concept:

- *Topic* refers to the category under which an article was selected. It is either "Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service" or "conscription."
- *Indicator* is the measurement used to capture the level of Winning Coalition Support.
- *Number of Articles* means the n of articles published at a given time.
- *Tone* describes the emotional tone that is used in an article. It is created during the analysis and ranges from 0 to 100. High values mean positive tones, whereas a score of under 50 implies a negative tone (Pennebaker Conglomerates 2022a).
- *Analytical Thinking* "captures the degree to which people use words that suggest formal, logical, and hierarchical thinking patterns." High scores in a text make it appear "cold and rigid," and low scores "friendly and personable" (Pennebaker Conglomerates 2022a).³⁷
- *Frequency of Conscription* identifies how often the word conscription is used in articles about CO and ACS.

³⁷ This variable is a complex construct. By only focusing on how a text appears, I am tapping into only a fraction of its abilities.

Table 13. Elements of Level of Winning Coalition Support

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Indicator</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
Conscription	Number of Articles	Few	Many
CO/ACS	Number of Articles	Many	Few
	Tone	Positive	Negative
	Analytical Thinking	Low	High
	Frequency of “Conscription”	Low	High

I will consider the level of Winning Coalition Support for the draft to be high at any given time when the following combination of factors exists: few articles on conscription and many articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. Additionally, the tone of the CO/ACS publications should be positive, the writing style (analytical thinking) friendly and personable, and the frequency of the word conscription in those articles low.

The support of the Winning Coalition will be low at any given time when there are many articles on conscription and few articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. Moreover, the tone of publications on the latter should be negative, the writing style cold and rigid, and conscription will be mentioned a lot.

Once the levels of Winning Coalition Support are established for every point in time for which there are articles, it will be possible to plot them over the years to get a trendline of how the support for conscription has fluctuated before the decision to talk about the future of the draft was made.

Analysis

The data collected from the SZ yielded a total of 1,621 articles that fit the search criteria and timeframe. Out of those, 883 were on conscription and 738 on Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service. After removing all duplicates in several rounds, I was left with 691 unique articles on the draft and 583 for CO and ACS, for a sum of 1,274. It was also revealed that there seems to be a gap in coverage on all topics between the years 2002 and 2006. Yet, since there are articles available on other topics during that time span, it is not quite clear what caused the break in coverage.

Conscription – Articles Over Time

Plotting the 691 articles on conscription over time reveals a slight upwards trend in publications. Figure 8 shows that coverage of conscription seems to be mostly spread out evenly, with the regular appearance of at least one article and a few occasional spikes. Yet, there was an uptick in publications starting at the beginning of the year 2008. From that point to my selected end date of 05/31/2010, 279 articles were published. This represents 40% of the overall count in only the last quarter of the observed timeframe. Based on my theory, this relatively high level of publications on conscription indicates a low level of Winning Coalition Support compared to the previous years. In practical terms, this means the government was not successful in keeping conscription and its downsides off the minds of the people. Consequently, the levels of support dropped.

CO/ACS – Articles Over Time

Figure 9 shows all 583 articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. Judging from the trend line presented here, publications on the topic have been increasing steadily over the years. In a similar fashion to the articles on conscription, there was also a boost in overall numbers starting around the year 2008. From there on until the end of May 2010, 319 articles on the topics were released. This equals about 55 percent of the overall article count in less than three years. The uptick in articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service in such a short timeframe before the debates began signals high levels of Winning Coalition Support. This is backed by the fact that the first half of the observed time saw 135 articles and the second half more than three times




Figure 8. Published Articles on Conscription from 01/1997 to 05/2010




Figure 9. Published Articles on CO and ACS from 01/1997 to 05/2010

that number (448). For the empirical reality of my theory, this means that leaders were successful in keeping Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service present in the lives and minds of people, thereby reminding them of their benefits and helping them forget the disadvantages of keeping conscription during peacetime.

Tone

The emotional tone used in all articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service plotted over time shows the continuous fluctuation of feelings. Yet, a closer look reveals a slight decrease in positive attitudes over time (Figure 10). The 135 articles published during the first half of the observed timeframe had an average score of 34.54, which signals negative tones (Pennebaker Conglomerates 2022a). The second half, starting on 09/18/2003, was a little less negative, with an average of 42.27 for the 448 articles. Yet, this is still well below what would be considered positive tones. According to my definitions further above, this overall negativity represents low levels of Winning Coalition Support. My theory suggests that the negative tone employed in these articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service reflects the overall opinion on these policies, which equals low support.

Analytical Thinking

This category captures whether a text is *cold and rigid* or *friendly and personable*. Judging from Figure 11, the scores stayed mainly in the high 90s. There were occasional drops in analytical thinking scores, with a massive dive down to 6.35 on 09/19/2001. The low scores are a result of the article being a personal essay that was published that day. It only mentions Alternative Civilian Service once (Goericke 2001). The first half of the thirteen




Figure 10. Emotional Tone for Articles on CO and ACS from 01/1997 to 05/2010




Figure 11. Analytical Thinking for Articles on CO and ACS from 01/1997 to 05/2010

observed years had an average of 90.1 points, and the second half 92.08. This represents a small increase in *cold and rigid* writing styles. The last three years decreased a bit down to 91.91 points. While the differences between these values appear minuscule, the articles are fairly cold overall. Judging by the fact that the SZ is a renowned newspaper, this is not surprising. Still, the *cold and rigid* style of the publications signals low Winning Coalition Acceptance to me. If the public attitudes towards the policies were positive, the analytical thinking scores would mirror them. Since this was not the case, my hypothesis argues that there was low support of the Winning Coalition.

Frequency of Conscription

Word frequencies for all articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service were established through NVivo. The results are presented in Table 14. As expected, the top ranks of the used words in the 583 publications (*nothing, I, one, all*) are of little relevance for this project. What is striking, though, is that Alternative Civilian Service (“zivildiensts”) came in on rank eleven with a count of 1037 instances and a weighted percentage of 0.32. This breaks down to 1.78 uses of ACS per article. Conscription (‘wehrpflicht’), however, is situated far below with only 160 words in total, meaning just 0.27 occurrences of draft per publication and a weighted percentage of 0.05. Based on the high position of ACS in the list of most frequently used words and the low status of conscription, this signals high levels of Winning Coalition Support. It mirrors that Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service were on the minds of people a lot more than conscription, indicating that they either saw the advantages of the former or forgot about the obvious downsides of the latter. Either way, their support was high.

Table 14. Results of Word Frequency Analysis

Rank	Word	Translation	Length	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)
1	nichts	Nothing	6	2774	0.86
2	ich	I	4	2430	0.76
3	eins	One	4	2255	0.70
4	alles	All	5	2433	0.56
---	---	---	---	---	
11	Zivildiensts	Alternative Civilian Service*	12	1037	0.32
---	---	---	---	---	
160	Wehrpflicht	Conscription	11	160	0.05

Discussion

After the analysis, it is now possible to draw some conclusions about my results. Table 15 summarizes my findings and shows that there is conflicting support for my hypothesis, with some measurements supporting and others opposing it. According to my theory, low levels of Winning Coalition Support should be expected in Germany, especially right before the end of my observed time frame when the debates about the future of conscription began. This notion is backed by the number of articles on conscription, the tone, and analytical thinking. Over time, publications focusing on conscription became more common, especially in the two years leading up to 2010. Moreover, the tone of the articles worsened as well. Despite this being just a small decrease throughout the years, the overall values were always below the threshold for positive tone. Lastly, the writing style was always seemingly cold, despite trivial improvements. Even though this result for Analytical Thinking could be written off as typical for newspapers, the results show that more friendly and personable writing is possible.

Yet, two of my observed variables indicate the opposite: Judging from the number of publications on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilians Service, which soared in the last 2 ½ years before the debates began, the support of the Winning Coalition for the draft must have been high. The, on average, low usage of the word conscription over the 13 observed years bolsters this impression. Nevertheless, there are two caveats to these measurements: First, when comparing the actual numbers of articles published on conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Alternative Civilian Service, it becomes clear that the former outperformed by quite a margin, with a total of 108 more articles on conscription than on CO/ACS. Thus, even though articles on the latter increased over time,

Table 15. Observed Elements of Level of Winning Coalition Support

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Level of Winning Coalition Support</u>	<u>Observed in data</u>	→	<u>Level</u>
Conscription	<u>Number of Articles</u>	Many	→	Low
CO/ACS	<u>Number of Articles</u>	Many	→	High
	Tone	Negative	→	Low
	Analytical Thinking	High	→	Low
	Frequency of “Conscription”	Low	→	High

they were still substantially below the overall number of publications on conscription. This weakens the opposition that this indicator presents to my hypothesis. Second, while the word frequency analysis showed results that go against my theory, its explanatory power is limited due to the fact that it does not take into account time or trends.

Another finding was the apparent lack of articles from the years 2002 to 2006. Fortunately, while this gap in the data is bothersome and could potentially affect my findings, I do not expect the changes to be too significant. For one, article numbers for conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Alternative Civilian Service skyrocketed starting in the year 2008. If data were to appear for the missing years, that should not impact these measures too much. The same is true for Analytical Thinking, where the averages were similar throughout the years. Additionally, the frequency analysis of conscription is already averaged out, and the word in question is not used a lot anyway. Hence, if the data suddenly became available, it would have to significantly increase the number of overall articles and the usage of conscription. This is not likely, though. The only substantial impact the missing articles could have is on tone since the trend in the data is so slight that more publications could change it.

Alternative Approaches for the Future

My empirical analysis relies on newspaper articles as a gauge for the support of the Winning Coalition. Ideally, I would have employed survey data. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to the reason laid out above. Moving forward, I would like to avoid the problems that come with a lack of data and try to find alternative indicators for my theory. Thus, I put together a short best-case scenario plan for successfully pushing this project

and others into the future: To best identify the levels of Winning Coalition Support, I will rely on surveys of individual citizens of a country. This eliminates the distortion that could result from using proxies. The surveys would include questions on the respondents' perceptions of Conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Alternative Civilian Service and the benefits they provide. It would also be possible to ask hypothetical questions about ending conscription or CO/ACS and how they think about that.

Potential targets for my research would be either South Korea (short term) or Ukraine (long term). Even though South Korea is still under external threat, opposition to conscription is growing slowly (Kang 2022, Yonhap News Agency 2021). Additionally, despite there being no official provisions for Conscientious Objection, the country is “carving out more exemptions” from military service (Yoon 2021). This could signal that the South Korean government is trying to increase Winning Coalition Support for conscription. Thus, this would be an excellent opportunity to measure the process behind my theory and the creation of support for the draft from the beginning. Ukraine could be a project for the far future and is built on hypotheticals. Once the country is at peace again, it will have to tackle its current policy of mass conscripting almost every male adult, in particular, if Russia seized to be an immediate threat. Observing firsthand how the government attempts to do this, especially considering that Conscientious Objection already exists, would be beneficial for future research agenda.

Conclusion

This project asked: *Why do countries that successfully maintain conscription during times of peace start questioning its future?* – A series of empirical tests in the form of a typical-

case approach on the representative case of the Federal Republic of Germany now suggest that there seems to be some support for my proposed answer: the levels of Winning Coalition Support affect the appearance of debates about the future of the draft. In particular, I establish that low levels of support will lead the public to question the viability of forced recruitment. This was supported by the majority of results of my analysis: I found a large overall number and steady increase of articles on conscription over time. Additionally, the publications on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service suffered from negative tone and a high level of a cold and rigid writing style. Not only do these indicate that CO and ACS were perceived as negative, but also that conscription was present in the minds of the Winning Coalition, showing a low level of support for the policy.

Even though there was a rise in articles on Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service over time and a low usage of the word conscription in the publications, which would both suggest high levels of Winning Coalition Support, there are some caveats to these measurements. For one, the rise of articles on CO and ACS pales in comparison to the overall count of articles on conscription. Furthermore, the results of the word frequency analysis cannot be plotted over time, limiting their ability to establish trends.

These findings, albeit limited, add to existing research not only in Political Science but in adjacent fields as well. For one, it makes available a collection of 1,274 articles on conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Alternative Civilian Service that were published in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* from 1997 to 2010. Additionally, it includes a dataset with the results of their linguistic analysis. These all are available for future analysis now

and do not have to be collected individually anymore. Moreover, I add to scholarship on the link between policymakers and their supporters by showing that the levels of support of the Winning Coalition for a policy, e.g., conscription, can impact debates about its future. In practical terms, that means that governments that want to get rid of or maintain the draft need to reduce or increase support for it. This connection is also crucial for International Relations theory because it highlights how citizens can impact a state's security policy which can affect the global arena. Lastly, I enhance the understanding of why countries introduce, keep, or end conscription by adding a new variable Winning Coalition Support to the existing theories.

Even though I found support for my theory, this project could be enhanced on many levels since it suffers from a few issues. First, my case selection can be criticized as too limited. I chose the Federal Republic of Germany because it reflects a typical case for my theory. Other cases, such as Austria, France, the Netherlands, or the United States, would have been possible as well. Yet, based on the reasoning further above, I decided in favor of Germany. Second, my selection of data and sources might be problematic. Focusing on newspaper articles instead of survey results is not ideal. However, it presented itself as the best solution regarding the unavailability of survey data. Third, I could have relied on different newspapers other than the SZ, such as other renowned publications like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. I hope to address at least some of these issues in future projects, which, in a best-case-scenario, will include my own surveys in countries that are either actively trying to increase Winning Coalition Support (e.g., South Korea) or might lose the threats that justify conscription at the moment (e.g., Ukraine).

Yet, despite these issues, this study should still add to the understanding of why countries with a long tradition of keeping conscription during peacetime would start debating its future. By highlighting the role of Winning Coalition Support in the process, it can also act as a starting point for future research, but that remains to be seen.

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**CHAPTER IV:
LET'S JUST TALK ABOUT IT -
HOW SALIENCE OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IMPACTS
THE FUTURE OF CONSCRIPTION**

Abstract

How do countries justify conscription in times of peace? Given the multitude of factors that speak for or against the military draft, states must weigh each of them carefully when deciding whether to implement or abolish conscription. This is particularly difficult when governments are dependent on large Winning Coalitions. To appease larger Winning Coalitions, states must win public support. In democracies, the key to securing this support for conscription lies in Conscientious Objection (CO) and Alternative Civilian Service (ACS) – i.e., allowing draftees to fulfill their duties outside of the military - especially when external threats and economic factors are lacking. Utilizing computer-assisted text analysis and German primary sources, this study investigates how CO and ACS played a crucial role in ending conscription in Germany in 2010 but retaining it in Austria in 2013. It finds that when debates about the future of the draft showed high salience of CO and ACS, as in Austria, conscription was upheld. Conversely, the draft was suspended in Germany, where discussions about conscription featured low salience of the policies. This signals that it is not just the mere existence of CO and ACS that influences conscription but their salience in public debates.

Introduction

When Germany decided to suspend military conscription in December 2010, it joined the ranks of 21 other members of the European Union that had already transformed their militaries into professional armies (Deutsche Welle 2010). This followed a global trend to move away from mass armies, reliant on drafted recruits, to more professional volunteer forces (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Bieri 2015, Haltiner 2016). However, despite this international tendency, some countries still keep their conscript militaries, for example,

Austria and Switzerland, or have even reintroduced the draft, as in some Persian Gulf states, such as Morocco (Alterman and Balboni 2017). These developments are puzzling, especially when considering that “the myths enchanting conscription have been tarnished” (Leander 2004, 593). This rift becomes particularly clear when comparing the suspension of the draft in Germany with decisions to keep it in Austria. Given these variations, this study asks: *What makes a state opt for conscription during peacetime?*

This study’s theory for why countries end or maintain conscription hinges on the concept of Winning Coalition Acceptance. It encompasses all traditional reasons for keeping or introducing conscription (e.g., external threat, economic reasons, colonial heritage) and extends them with public support. States that want to establish the draft will need to secure this support, especially during peacetime or when other reasons are lacking. The main elements of achieving Winning Coalition Support in countries with large Winning Coalitions lie in the policies of Conscientious Objection (CO) and Alternative Civilian Service (ACS).

Those policies have the ability to secure public support because they are more well-regarded by the citizens than conscription. Consequently, if a state without external threat or economic need wants to (re-) establish conscription, it has to appeal to its Winning Coalition by linking the draft to policies on Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service. If leaders fail to do so, conscription will not happen.

For this project, conscription will be defined as any form of forced recruitment that a country uses to staff its military. There are different varieties of conscription, such as full draft, selective service, no draft, etc., but since they all serve a similar purpose, I consider

them the same. Conscientious Objection means the right of an individual to refuse military service based on religious beliefs or conscience. Alternative Service is the policy that grows out of Conscientious Objection and allows draftees to serve their time outside of the armed forces, for example, in the social sector.

To assess the theory of Winning Coalition Acceptance, this study analyses German-language newspaper articles published before the decision to suspend conscription in the Federal Republic of Germany and the referendum to keep it in the Republic of Austria. It establishes the importance of public support through an evaluation of the salience of Conscientious Objection during those debates. Measuring salience as sentiment shows that, in Austria, the discourse became increasingly emotional with a tight clustering of sentiment right before the referendum. This high salience resulted in the country keeping conscription. In Germany, however, debates were somewhat overloaded with emotions from the beginning but not clustered around the critical time of the decision on the future of conscription. This led to lower salience, which resulted in the suspension of the draft. Alternative measures of salience, such as article ratios and word frequency, did not support my theory, whereas article length provided mixed results. Nevertheless, article publication time backed my theory again with higher salience of CO and ACS in Austria than in Germany.

These findings have significance for the research on civil-military relations in Western Europe and the rest of the world because it highlights the impact that public opinion has on security policy. Furthermore, it will add to existing research on the topic, e.g., Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's large-n study on determinants of military conscription

(2015), Max Margulies' analysis of foreign influences on recruitment policies (2021), or Lindsay P. Cohn and Nathan W. Toronto's *Markets and Manpower* (2016), by presenting a manual and computer-assisted content analysis of two similar cases.

This analysis proceeds as follows: First, the theory of Winning Coalition Acceptance that can lead countries to decide in favor or against conscription will be laid out. Second, the research design section will explain which methods and sources are employed. Third, the results of the content analysis will be presented and evaluated. Finally, a conclusion and limitations will be discussed.

Explaining How Countries Justify Conscription

Conscription, meaning forced recruitment into the armed forces, has long been a topic in the social sciences. It has found its way into research stemming from Security Studies over Conflict Studies to Economic Studies (Poutvaara and Wagener 2007, Renshaw 1960, Goldstein 1943, Haltiner 2016, Mannitz 2013). When debated from a security perspective, conscription is usually seen as a way of increasing a military's security and strength in times of threat, i.e., putting bodies on the field. This has been the case for external threats, for example, during the Cold War, as well as internal threats during a civil war (Posen 1993). Despite its uses, conscription features a plethora of downsides. On the one hand, through the lens of security, drafted militaries tend to have higher casualty counts (Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam 2011) and tend to decrease war support stronger than volunteer armies (Horowitz and Levendusky 2011), to name a few. On the other hand, conscription has negative impacts on the economy since it keeps young men from entering the job market and delays them from progressing in their careers or education (Renshaw

1960, Poutvaara and Wagener 2011a, b). Any potential positive impacts, such as improved skillsets due to military training, appear to vanish in comparison (Bauer et al. 2012). Moreover, changed security environments after the end of the Cold War make it harder to justify conscription since, for example, draftees are generally not suited for extended deployment abroad (Burk 1992, Simon and Lovrich 2009, Warner and Negrusa 2006). Lastly, a state's former colonial relationships can influence the decision for or against conscription, as does the prevalence of liberalism in a country (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, Cohen 1985, Cohn and Toronto 2016).

Given the multitude of factors that speak for or against conscription, governments must weigh each of them carefully when they decide whether to implement or abolish conscription. A country will only opt for conscription when military value or economic factors align. However, if the relationship is out of alignment, a state is more likely to decide against conscription. This mechanism has been widely accepted by literature and is used to explain the majority of cases in which countries either opted for conscription or abolished the draft (Haltiner 1998, Henderson 2005, Bauer et al. 2012, Konstantinidis 2020, Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015). Figure 12 provides an illustration of this mechanism. Yet, despite its intuitiveness, this model does not account for why some states ended conscription despite high external threat (e.g., the United States and Great Britain during the Cold War) or why some countries opt to maintain conscription even with a lack of both external threat and economic value (e.g., Austria and Switzerland).

For me, this is because the existing mechanism, e.g., military and economic value, is part of a larger concept: Winning Coalition Acceptance. – Winning Coalition (W)




Figure 12. Traditional Explanations for Conscription

describes the set of the Selectorate (S) that allows a leader to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, Gallagher and Hanson 2015, Clark, Golder, and Golder 2018). Ensuring its support is paramount for a government's survival and can be achieved through policies that satisfy the Winning Coalition (Cao and Ward 2015, Morrow et al. 2008). Yet, should a government engage in projects that are unpopular with this subset of the Selectorate, the support will wane.

My project borrows from Selectorate Theory, albeit with a few changes: Similar to Bueno de Mesquita (2003), I am treating Winning Coalition Size as a relation (percentage) to S and not as an absolute value.³⁸ Moreover, my theory uses Winning Coalition as an indicator of actual opposition in the coalition that needs to be appeased. Basically, as W gets larger, it increases the chances for dissatisfied actors in the coalition who also have the ability to influence policy. The government is then forced to expand its efforts to appease the Winning Coalition to stay in power.³⁹ To clarify, the project does not measure actual dissent but the probability that dissent can influence policy.

This notion is of particular importance for conscription: The practice of forcefully recruiting civilians into the armed forces is not only unpopular amongst the men subject to the policy but also among the greater population of a country. While this unpopularity might not be problematic for states with a small W, who can easily pay off their supporters through private goods, it presents a significant challenge for countries with large W. In particular, recent research shows that democracy "has a suppressive effect on the use of

³⁸ Consequently, states with similar Winning Coalition Size are not necessarily alike.

³⁹ Additionally, my theory is not necessarily concerned with regime type, even though large Ws are more common among democracies.

conscription" (Asal, Conrad, and Toronto 2015, 1472). Consequentially, when a government wants to introduce conscription, it must overcome the public's negative conceptions of the draft.

According to my theory, the key component to securing Winning Coalition Acceptance of conscription lies in Conscientious Objection (CO) and institutionalized Alternative Civilian Service (ACS). The concepts describe an alternative way for unwilling draftees, who refuse to serve in the armed forces because of conscientious reasons, to still fulfill their duty requirements (Ellner, Robinson, and Whetham 2016). Conscientious Objection generally means the refusal to serve in the military and is grounded in the Anti-War Movement and Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴⁰ It lays the groundwork and is the prerequisite for Alternative Civilian Service. As its name suggests, ACS allows draftees to serve their allotted time while staying outside of the military. Most commonly, draftees are placed in the social sector. Alternatively, they are employed in emergency services or civilian protection organizations where they provide relief in case of natural or humanitarian disasters. Since these sectors are chronically understaffed and underfunded, while still highly valued by the public, CO and ACS are generally well-perceived by many members of society.

The existence of CO or ACS heavily depends on the size of a state's Winning Coalition, with most states with larger Ws and conscription using CO or ACS. In particular, there exist a variety of key policies regarding the draft, such as *no draft*, *selective service (with and without CO)*, as well as *full draft (with and without CO)*, with CO most common

⁴⁰ A more detailed explanation can be found in Chapter II.

in Western Democracies. Additionally, CO does not simply have a dichotomous character of *exists/does not exist*: Instead, there is a gradient from full recognition (usually includes CO and ACS at the same time) to complete rejection (Livny 2017). Countries using conscription without CO either have small Winning Coalitions (and thus do not need their population's approval) or have larger Winning Coalitions but face greater threats (e.g., WW2, Cold War). The value of CO comes to light when these two conditions do not hold. When a state wants to introduce or maintain conscription without having a small Winning Coalition (i.e., to pay it off with private goods), or there are not enough other factors (e.g., security) to justify the policy, they have to pursue other ways to maintain the support of the Winning Coalition for the practice.

Due to the high value that the public sees in Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service, I consider both practices the main drivers behind Winning Coalition Acceptance in times of peace. During times of war or threat to a country, Winning Coalition Acceptance is guaranteed by military value of conscription, i.e., the supporters of the government will understand that conscription is needed to bolster security. However, when security factors subside, governments have to find support to maintain conscription through other means. As a result, the models of why and when countries opt for conscription need to be extended to account for other factors outside of security and economic reasoning: public support. The decision to implement the draft now rests on Winning Coalition Acceptance. It encompasses military value, economic value, public support, and potentially other factors such as colonial history. The keys to winning over public support are Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. Figure 13




Figure 13. Pillars of Winning Coalition Acceptance

illustrates this theory. Without these two additions, a state will find it highly unlikely to manipulate the Winning Coalition into accepting conscription when military and economic factors do not suffice, e.g., in a time of peace. Consequentially, I argue that the existence of CO and ACS changes the equation of why countries opt for the draft. In states without CO and ACS, the government cannot secure enough Winning Coalition Acceptance to justify implementing (or continuing) forced recruitment when military or economic value is lacking. Yet, in countries where conscription is paired with CO and ACS, the Winning Coalition is more likely to opt for the draft (Figure 14).

Overall, this is the basis for my main proposition: *When Winning Coalition Acceptance of conscription is higher, then a country is more likely to have conscription.*

Winning Coalition Acceptance, however, is not just a one-time occurrence that only matters before a state introduces conscription. Quite the opposite: It must be continuously maintained while conscription exists. Should it drop, concerns about conscription's viability and future will increase, even in cases where forced recruitment is already an established practice. Once these doubts reach critical mass, the government will be forced to engage in debates about the future of the policy. Considering that Winning Coalition Acceptance of conscription is already low at that point, it should be expected that it would be abolished. Yet, there are states in which conscription is maintained despite debates about its future. This leads to my research question mentioned above: *What makes a state opt for conscription during peacetime?*

According to my theory, countries that increase Winning Coalition Acceptance during these debates will likely keep the policy. A government would do this because they




Figure 14. The Effect of Public Opinion on Winning Coalition Acceptance

see higher value in maintaining conscription or do not want to pay the price for undoing the policy. This is particularly problematic since conscription, once established, can be hard and costly to remove, just like any other governmental institution. Winning Coalition Acceptance could be boosted by focusing on its particular elements ('pillars'): On the one hand, a government could focus on security aspects of conscription. However, that would only work during times of high threat to a country. In that case, the public would not have questioned the purpose of forced recruitment in the first place. It could also tackle its economic value, but that might be costly as well. On the other hand, leaders can address public opinion and support through Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. This option is particularly useful in times of peace when other arguments for conscription would not sway the Winning Coalition. By highlighting the advantages of these policies not just for the draft but the individual, society, and the state as a whole, governments can generate acceptance inside the Winning Coalition. If enough of it is generated, conscription can be maintained. However, if a state fails to rally public support through Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service, forced recruitment is likely to end. This means that even in a country with active CO or ACS, the policies will not serve their purpose in maintaining conscription if they are not a prominent part of the debates, i.e., not salient. This forms my hypothesis:

H: If there is a debate about maintaining conscription, countries with Conscientious Objection are more likely to maintain the draft when Conscientious Objection is a salient topic during the debates.

For me, salience of CO takes the form of *sentiment* that is evoked when talking about the policy. This ‘general tone’ can be positive or negative and will increase when more of it is used in the debates. Consequently, high usage of sentiment, positive or negative, towards Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service leads to high salience. I choose sentiment as an indicator of salience because feelings and “opinions are central to almost all human activities and are key influencers of our behavior” (Liu 2012, xiii). Thus, they influence how we perceive a subject or topic.

The importance of salience in debates lies in the fact that it will inform a community’s perception of dominant opinions, particularly when it is generated through mass media (Mutz and Soss 1997). Not only can this inform the voting choices of the individual, but it also shapes politicians’ behavior on certain topics.⁴¹ This is because leaders will perceive the salience of a topic as the majority opinion of their Winning Coalition and will act accordingly to keep their support, especially when emotions are involved.⁴²

In short: If someone feels something about a topic, it influences their perception of salience. Society and leaders will act accordingly if salience is perceived to be high. Hence, if emotions towards Conscientious Acceptance are high, the people or the government will perceive it as salient and important. As a consequence, they will keep conscription. – If a government wants to maintain the policy, it will have to use the media to spread emotional coverage of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service.

⁴¹ Mutz and Soss provide a summary of these effects (Mutz and Soss 1997).

⁴² Katrin Döveling, Christian von Scheve, and Elly Konijn feature a collection of articles on the connection between emotions and mass media (2011).

In order for my hypothesis to be supported, I would expect to find high salience for Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service in Austria since they maintained conscription. Germany, however, should show low salience because the draft was suspended. Additionally, since salience affects both society and the leaders of a country, it does not matter how and where the decision was made (i.e., referendum or decision in parliament).

Lastly, time plays a role as well. For salience of CO and ACS to have an impact on the future of conscription, it needs to be high right before the decision is made. If it rises too early in the debates, it might lose its effect.

Research Design

I will answer my research question through manual and computer-assisted content analysis. With the help of the NVivo software package, I investigate the newspaper coverage in the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany before the decisions on the future of conscription were made.

Comparing Austria and Germany is justified as a most similar systems design. Austria and Germany share many baseline features and antecedent conditions: First, they are highly developed socially, economically, and politically. Second, the states, even though they are located in the center of Europe, are surrounded by peaceful democracies which are, for the large part, members of the European Union. Additionally, they all have a history of using military conscription to recruit personnel into their armed forces. Furthermore, they all seriously considered ending the draft around the same time between 2010 and 2013, yet they ultimately diverged in their decisions concerning keeping

conscription. While Germany decided to suspend conscription and Austria voted to uphold the policy. Selecting similar cases means that more independent variables can be controlled, making it easier to identify the diverging process that caused the differing outcome (George and Bennett 2005, Gerring 2009, 7). Additionally, the method is “particularly useful for obtaining explanations for deviant cases” and is thus a suitable tool to help reveal why Austria is a deviant case that counterintuitively retained conscription when Germany and most Western European states abolished it (George and Bennett 2005, 215). Thus, it should be the right tool to explain why Germany suspended conscription while Austria held on to it, even though the countries are relatively similar to each other.

This study relies on primary source newspaper articles collected from leading German-language daily papers two years before the decision to suspend or uphold conscription. I particularly chose newspapers because they are a key element of mass media and play an important role in the political decision-making process. This influence is well researched and established (Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011, Walgrave, Soroka, and Nuytemans 2008, Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer 2010).

For the Republic of Austria, I will rely on the nationwide daily *Der Standard* (The Standard). For Germany, I will employ the nationwide daily newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ – South German Newspaper). The chosen papers are large enough, in terms of circulation and online visits, to be considered influential indicators of public discourse. Moreover, the two sources are situated along the center of the European ideological spectrum. Since the publications mostly release articles in German, it is guaranteed that the

analysis is based on primary data for the two cases, thereby making sure that no meaning is lost or distorted in the translation process.

I collect articles from these two newspapers mainly through LexisNexis' *Nexis Uni*. It is a database that collects, among others, articles from a variety of sources. Data is gathered for the two-year period before the decision about the future of conscription was made in both countries. For the Republic of Austria, this includes all articles published between 01/20/2011 and 01/20/2013, and for the Federal Republic of Germany, this includes the time frame from 12/10/2008 to 12/10/2010. I consider and download every article that includes the (German) keywords "Wehrpflicht" or "Wehrdienst" (draft/conscription), "Kriegsdienstverweigerung" (Conscientious Objection), and "Zivildienst" (Alternative Civilian Service).

As mentioned above, this paper defines salience as sentiments. The higher the instances of sentiment, the higher the salience of a topic. The specific kind of emotion (positive or negative) is of secondary importance. While it does still matter, the sheer number of emotions reigns supreme. Sentiment Analysis is a part of the NVivo suite and an automated process. It works for sources in English as well as in other languages, such as German. Even though it is inferior to a supervised method of sentiment analysis and has issues in dealing with elaborate uses of language, e.g., double meanings, its results can still be used to gather preliminary or initial empirical insight (Ceron, Curini, and Iacus 2015).⁴³

Once downloaded, I prepared the articles for the sentiment analysis by using NVivo by auto coding them for the topics Conscription and Alternative Civilian Service. Then, I

⁴³ An alternative to NVivo is LIWC, which I employ in Chapter III.

ran the analysis through ‘identify sentiment’ on the sentence level. Unfortunately, coding for Conscientious Objection was not possible because of a lack of articles for this part of the project. Consequently, my sentiment analysis will mainly focus on Alternative Civilian Service instead of Conscientious Objection. While not ideal, it does make theoretical sense to have more articles on ACS than CO since the former is the policy that grows out of the latter.

Analysis and Discussion

This section is divided into two parts: First, it will analyze my hypothesis of salience based on sentiment. Afterward, it will explore alternative measures of the concept.

Section 1: Salience as Sentiment

Table 16 provides the results of my sentiment analysis. Articles identifies all articles that were coded under the topic (Alternative Civilian Service or Conscription). In total, there were 276 articles on Alternative Civilian Service and Conscription in the Süddeutsche Zeitung and 294 in Der Standard. In addition, information on conscription is included in this table to have a reference point.

Germany had a high average of both positive and negative sentiments for articles on conscription and ACS, with 1.425 negative and 0.513 positive for the former and 1.067 negative and 0.485 for the latter. Combined, the country had 253 sentiments (negative and positive) on ACS and 171 for conscription, for an overall sum of 424 sentiments in the analyzed time frame.

Table 16. Sentiment Analysis - Output

Source	Topic	Articles	Negative Sentiment Total	Negative Sentiment per Article (Average)	Positive Sentiment Total	Positive Sentiment per Article (Average)
SZ	ACS	163	174	1.067	79	0.485
Standard	ACS	44	37	0.841	15	0.341
SZ	Conscr iption	113	161	1.425	58	0.513
Standard	Conscr iption	250	230	0.920	65	0.260

In Austria, this came down to 0.92 positive and 0.264 negative average sentiments for conscription and 0.841 positive and 0.341 negative for ACS. The 59 counts of emotions on ACS and 295 on conscription combine for a total of 354 sentiments over two years.

Discussion I: Sentiment analysis indicates that emotions for both categories were somewhat higher in Germany than in Austria, particularly in articles about conscription. SZ's 1.425 average negative sentiments were 1.55 times higher than the ones in Der Standard. The same holds true for average positive sentiments, where the difference is almost doubled. Sentiments seem to calm down a bit on ACS, where Germany's average negative and positive sentiments were only about 1.2x higher than Austria's. This suggests that the debates were more sentimental in Germany, thus indicating high salience. Austria, on the opposite side, seems to be more neutral compared to its neighbor. Even though this finding does not quite fit my hypothesis, the countries were still somewhat close in terms of overall sentiments (Germany: 424; Austria: 354). Broken down into months, this represents 35.3 sentiments on conscription and ACS per month in Germany compared to 29.5 in Austria.

Sentiment Over Time: Nevertheless, the overall totals and monthly averages only tell half the story. As laid out in theory, salience should be high right before a decision is made. Otherwise, it might have diminished effects or none at all. Consequently, plotting the results of the sentiment analysis over time yields a better understanding of their importance for salience:

As can be seen in Figure 15, emotions regarding ACS in Austria are mostly concentrated in the last twelve months before January 2013. The first year features a total




Figure 15. Austria – Sentiment Towards ACS Plotted Over Time

of fourteen sentiments: eight moderate positive and two very positive, with two moderate and two very negative. This corresponds with 0.625 positive and 0.25 negative sentiments per article during this timeframe. The second year sees 38 sentiments: 26 moderate and one very positive, with five moderate and six very negative, resulting in 0.964 positive and 0.393 negative sentiments per article. This notion is slightly backed up by the overall rising trend of emotions, especially concerning positives.

For the German case, Figure 16 shows 116 sentiments in the first year. These break down to 64 moderate and 16 very positive, as well as 28 moderate and eight very negative instances. On average, this means 1.081 positive and 0.486 negative sentiments per article. The last twelve months record 137 overall: 73 moderate and 21 very positive, plus 32 moderate and eleven very negative sentiments, making it 1.056 positive and 0.483 negative emotions per article. The trend supports this as well.

Organizing sentiment over the years shows that emotions, both positive and negative, seem to heighten over time, notably in terms of sheer numbers. However, focusing on average sentiments per article changes the perception slightly: whereas Austria uses more emotion (0.964 positive in the second year, compared to 0.625 positive the year before), Germany's average drops a bit, mainly in terms of positive and negative sentiments. Even though the decline is fairly small, it pales in comparison to Austria's rise sentiments toward ACS.

Discussion II: Plotting sentiment over time adds a different nuance to the earlier findings through sentiment analysis and fits my theory: While Austria has lower overall numbers of sentiment concerning ACS than Germany (both in total numbers and on average), their debates seem to get more emotional over time than the ones in Germany. Moreover, in




Figure 16. Germany – Sentiment Towards ACS Plotted Over Time

Austria, there is a cluster of sentiments in the last months before the decision. In Germany, that is not the case, with only a few sentiments in the three months before the debates.

Additionally, it appears that the debates in Germany might be slightly overloaded with emotions. This would make it harder for sentiment and salience to have an effect right when the decision is made. Austria seems to have less ‘emotional noise’ going on in the time before the referendum. That might have increased the effect of sentiment on salience.

Lastly, articles published in the SZ slightly drop in positive sentiments, but Der Standard jumps from 0.625 positive and 0.25 negative sentiments to 0.964 positive and 0.393 negative sentiments in just one year. For me, this boost in emotions can be regarded as a definite increase in salience of CO, which supports my hypothesis.

Section 2: Alternative Measures of Salience

Even though sentiment analysis seems to support my theory, there are other potential measurements for salience:

- Article Ratio: The proportion of Conscription/Draft to CO/ACS articles. A higher number of articles on CO/ACS (lower proportion) would indicate high salience.
- Word Frequency: The number of times CO or ACS are mentioned in an article. The more mentions, the higher the salience.
- Length of Publication: How many words are used in the article? The more words, the more salience.

- Timing of Publication: When was the article published? Was it closer to the decision or grouped with others? Articles that were printed around the same time are an indicator of higher salience.

This part of the analysis includes a higher number of cases that were not autocoded for themes. Instead, it uses all articles that I initially collected with the help of the keywords mentioned above and is not limited to just conscription or Alternative Civilian Service. This left me with a total of 934 unique articles for Germany (out of 1,416 total) and 677 for Austria (out of 1,301 total).⁴⁴ Based on those articles, I conducted my analysis of article ratio and word frequency.

Article Ratio: Out of the 934 unique articles for Germany, conscription and draft received 378 and 284, respectively. Merged into the combined category draft+conscription, and after another round of duplicate checks, I was left with 559 articles.⁴⁵ Conscientious Objection yielded seven pieces, whereas Alternative Civilian Service resulted in 368 (see Figure 17). Based on these article numbers, Germany has an overall draft/conscription to conscientious objection/alternative civilian service ratio of 1.491. This means that the overall number of publications on CO and ACS was relatively close to the number of publications on draft and conscription. The 677 articles found in the Austrian newspaper

⁴⁴ The total number of articles is higher because it includes many duplicates and “directory”-files. These were the results of articles appearing multiple times for different keywords. E.g., One article was downloaded as part of my search for *conscription*, *draft*, and *alternative civilian service*. “Directory”-files were included in every batch of downloaded PDFs but could be discarded because they contained only a list of what was in every zipped file.

⁴⁵ The reason for creating this joined category of conscription and draft is mainly the reduction of duplicates and facilitating more accessible future analysis.




Figure 17. Germany – Collected Articles – Article Ratio

can be broken down into 528 for conscription and 50 for draft, resulting in an overall draft+conscription count of 539 (without duplicates). LexisUni featured only one publication on conscientious objection but 137 on alternative civilian service (see Figure 18). These numbers result in a draft/conscription to conscientious objection/alternative civilian service ratio of 3.934 for Austria. This means that there were almost four publications on draft and conscription for every single publication on CO and ACS.

This sends a clear message: Not only were there more articles on all topics published in Germany, but the SZ also featured almost three times the number of articles on ACS than Der Standard was publishing in the analyzed time frame, but about the same on draft+conscription. Conscientious Objection, however, did not seem to play a sizable (if any) role at all, with a total number of less than ten unique publications. Additionally, the article ratios suggest that the SZ was also more active in publishing articles on CO and ACS, with more than double the ratio of the Austrian newspaper. In terms of alternative measures of salience, this means that stories on ACS were a lot more prominent in Germany than they were in Austria, both in terms of overall articles and ratios. Moreover, CO did not matter much.

Word Frequency: After the ratio analysis, I proceeded with a word count on all unique articles for both countries. I generated a word count for all unique articles for both countries with the help of NVivo's "Explore" and "Word Frequency"-tools. The parameters for this search were set to the 150 most frequent words with a minimum length of four. Grouping was set to allow for stemmed words. This was done to make sure that more variations of the keywords conscientious objection and alternative civilian service (similar words) could




Figure 18. Austria – Collected Articles – Article Ratio

be included.⁴⁶ After the query, NVivo provided tables containing the rank, length, count, and weighted percentage - “the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted” for every keyword (QSRSupport 2017).

Based on Table 17, the word group surrounding ACS (“zivildiensts”) was found in 1289 instances in all SZ articles (categories: draft+conscription, conscientious objection, alternative civilian service) for Germany (table 1). This gives ACS a weighted percentage of 0.30 and makes it the no. 24 most used word. Even though not the focus of the analysis, the output also shows that conscription and draft (“wehrpflichtiger”) was placed seven ranks higher on the spot 17. Together with its variations, it occurred a total of 1566 times, had a weighted percentage of 0.36 and came in on rank 17. Hence, based on word frequency, ACS was less salient than draft or conscription, albeit not by much and still in the upper quarter of most-used words.

Results for Austria paint a similar, albeit more extreme picture (Table 18): ACS and its word group occurred 421 times in all examined articles from Der Standard, which translates into a weighted percentage of 0.18 and a rank of 56 (Table 18). Draft and conscription, however, received a count of 1541, a weighted percentage of 0.65, and a rank of 5. Consequently, it seems like ACS was a lot less salient in Austria than draft or conscription. Moreover, ACS was used so infrequently that it ended up over 50 ranks below its counterpart draft/conscription.

The results of Word Frequency analysis are comparable to those of article ratio. ACS and draft/conscription were highly salient in Germany, whereas that is only true for

⁴⁶ For example, these variations allow that “Zivildienst” (ACS) will also include “Zivildienstler” (Member of the ACS).

Table 17. Germany – Word Frequency

Rank	Word	Length	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)	Similar Words
1	nichts	6	4978	1.15	nicht, nichte, nichts
2	sichern	7	4294	1.00	sich, sicher, sicher', sichere, sicheren, sicherer, sicherheit, sicherheiten, sicherheits, sicherlich, sichern
3	auch	4	3504	0.81	auch
4	alles	5	2433	0.56	alle, allem, allen, aller, alles, alls
5	seines	6	2340	0.54	seine, seinem, seinen, seiner, seines
6	werden	6	2319	0.54	werde, werden, werder
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17	wehrpflichtiger	15	1566	0.36	wehrpflicht, wehrpflichtig, wehrpflichtige, wehrpflichtigen, wehrpflichtiger
---	---	---	---	---	---
24	zivildiensts	12	1289	0.30	zivildienst, zivildienstes, zivildiensts

Table 18. Austria – Word Frequency

Rank	Word	Length	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)	Similar Words
1	nichts	6	3081	1.30	nicht, nichts
2	sichern	7	2377	1.00	sich, sicher, sichere, sicheren, sicherer, sicheres, sicherheit, sicherheits, sicherlich, sichern
3	standards	9	2327	0.98	standard, standards
4	auch	4	1989	0.84	auch
5	wehrpflichtiger	15	1541	0.65	wehrpflicht, wehrpflichten, wehrpflichtig, wehrpflichtige, wehrpflichtigen, wehrpflichtiger
6	alles	5	1393	0.59	alle, allem, allen, aller, alles
---	---	---	---	---	---
55	prozent	7	422	0.18	prozent, prozente, prozenten, prozentiges
56	zivildiensts	12	421	0.18	zivildieners, zivildienst, zivildienste, zivildienstes, zivildiensts
57	volksbefragung	14	415	0.17	volksbefragung, volksbefragungen

draft/conscription in Austria. ACS, however, fell far behind in Der Standard. Again, Conscientious Objection seemed not to matter.

Length of Publication: As laid out further above, the length of an article can be an alternative sign of salience as well. The following graphs plotted the numbers of words in every article on ACS in SZ and Der Standard that was published within two years.

The 163 articles in the SZ add up to an overall number of 85,986 words (Figure 19). The first half of the analyzed timeframe saw 74 articles and 37,494 words, resulting in 506 words per article. The last twelve months before the decision and their 89 articles with 48,492 words averaged 544 words per article. This slight growth is also reflected in the trendline.

Figure 20 displays the 44 Der Standard articles, their length, and when they were published. At first glance, there is no clear pattern, except for a few lengthier articles that appeared in the papers closer to January 2013. The overall number of words on ACS published in the first year is 6,582, which breaks down to 411 words per article (16 in total) in that time frame. The second year features a total of 12,244 words and 437 words per article (28 in total) for the second year. This fits the overall trend in article length, which gets slightly longer the closer the referendum comes.

Analyzing the length of publications offers some evidence for and against my hypothesis: On one hand, the increase of words per article in Austria over time suggests that salience of CO and ACS was increasing as well. On the other hand, Germany saw an expansion in article length and, therefore, salience, too.




Figure 19. Germany – Article Length in Words Over Time




Figure 20. Austria – Article Length in Words Over Time

Publication Time: Article length over time shows mixed support for my theory but was based on all collected articles. To get a clearer picture, I auto-coded two article categories (conscription and ACS), in a similar fashion to the sentiment analysis above, for the topics of conscription and Alternative Civilian Service: The 378 articles on conscription in the SZ yielded only 113 articles that talked about the topic conscription. For Der Standard, 528 articles were reduced to 250. The same happened for ACS where Germany was left with 163 out of 368 articles and Austria with 44 out of 137.

The SZ's 163 articles on ACS paint a picture similar to the Austrian case. Even though they all seem to be spread out again, more than half of the overall number of articles was published only one year before Germany suspended the draft, as seen in Figure 21. Specifically, the timeframe from March to October 2010 shows an increased cluster of publications on ACS, with only ten within one month of December 10th. For me, this suggests low salience of Alternative Civilian Service, especially at the critical time right before the decision to suspend conscription.

The 44 articles on ACS that Der Standard circulated during the two years before the referendum seem to mostly spread out evenly over time (Figure 22). However, there are at least two clusters in which articles were published closer together: the first weeks of my analyzed timeframe and the last five months before the decision to keep conscription. The latter cluster saw half of the total number of articles (22 out of 44), with even more articles pushed out into public around a month before January 13th. This could be seen as an indicator of increased salience for Alternative Civilian Service.




Figure 21. Germany – Published Articles on ACS Over Time




Figure 22. Austria – Published Articles on ACS Over Time

Utilizing publication time as an indicator of salience of Conscientious Objection appears to yield some support for my hypothesis. The high number of articles clustered around the date of the decision in Austria and the low number of publications in the month before Germany's vote both correspond with high and low salience, respectively, and could explain the outcomes in both countries.

Discussion

Based on the findings of both Article Ratio and Word Frequency, it appears that Alternative Civilian Service had high salience in Germany but not in Austria. Additionally, it was revealed that Conscientious Objection did not play a major (if any) role at all. The latter is intuitive since ACS can be regarded as the 'CO turned policy' or the mechanism that makes CO work. This is commendable from a human rights perspective since it implies that both Austria and Germany accept Conscientious Objection as a given. Strangely enough, the high salience of ACS in the SZ and low salience in Der Standard seem to go against my hypothesis. Based on my theory, I would expect the opposite to be the case since Austria maintained conscription whereas Germany suspended it.⁴⁷

The analysis of article length and publication time yields mixed, yet somewhat supporting, evidence regarding the salience of CO. While the former sees both salience increases in both Germany and Austria, the latter shows higher salience in Austria, especially around the critical time of the referendum. Germany, however, had lower salience due to low numbers of publications before the decision to end conscription.

⁴⁷ Yet, there is a caveat: the articles I used for the analysis were selected based on keywords only. It is not guaranteed that an article assigned as "ACS" mentioned anything ACS-related.

Conclusion

This paper set out to answer the question: *What makes a state opt for conscription during peacetime?* – After testing my model against the cases of the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany, it can be stated that the suggested theory based on Winning Coalition Acceptance holds some explanatory power. Based on my findings, it can be argued that the salience of Conscientious Objection (and Alternative Civilian Service) played a role in suspending the draft in Germany and maintaining it in Austria, especially when it is defined as sentiment. While the overall levels of sentiments were higher in Germany, they did not cluster around the critical time of the decision like they did in Austria, where the debate got increasingly emotional before the referendum. Germany, on the other side, seemed somewhat overloaded with sentiment, which might have made it harder for new sentiment, of which there was not much, to have an effect.

Alternative measurements of salience provided mixed results: article ratio and word frequencies did not sustain my hypothesis since they both showed higher salience of Conscientious Objection in Germany, which suspended conscription. Article length exhibited some support for and against my theory because it indicated increased salience for both cases. A more refined approach with publication time then backed my theory with Austria publishing more articles, i.e., being more salient, shortly before the referendum than Germany, where salience dropped.

Among the other takeaways was the revelation that Conscientious Objection did not matter much in terms of article numbers and word frequency.

Even though the project still needs some refinement in terms of articles used (e.g., including articles on *conscription* for sentiment analysis), the findings are somewhat

noteworthy. Identifying the impact of public opinion (via Winning Coalition Acceptance) on a state's security policy adds to the existing debates on the connection between domestic politics and international security. Additionally, from a civil-military relations perspective, there still exists ambiguity on what motivates a country to abolish or maintain conscription, especially during peacetime. Coming closer to a definite answer on this subject will help improve and maintain civil-military relations domestically and globally, particularly in countries with poor relationships between society and the armed forces.

Due to the nature of my project based on manual and computer-assisted text analysis, there are several limitations that could shape the outcome of my research: First, the time frame used for my project (two years before the decision on the future of conscription) can be criticized for being either too short or too long. Second, the newspapers chosen for this paper can be attacked as well for being too narrow. In countries with a rich history of print (and online) media, there are plenty of alternatives that I could have referred to instead. For example, it would be possible to extend my analysis to other main newspapers, such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Germany) or *Die Presse* (Austria). Considering the importance of sentiment for my argument, it would make sense to include daily tabloid papers, such as *Kronen Zeitung* (Austria) and *Die Bild* (Germany). Even though their levels of sophistication are commonly criticized, they still constitute a sizable influence on the political discourse in the two countries and are both masters in the use of emotions in their reporting.

Nevertheless, any case study of just a handful of cases is limited. Yet, this comparison of two states helps to reveal the importance of a somewhat new variable – the

impact of Winning Coalition Acceptance - on the future of conscription. However, only future larger quantitative tests can help assess the generalizability of this variable and its scope of applicability to other cases cross-nationally.

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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

Conclusion

This dissertation set out to answer the research question, “What makes a state maintain conscription, especially during peacetime?”. It was inspired by the puzzle of why countries would hold on to forced recruitment, even though there are no apparent reasons for it, e.g., threats. In a nutshell, my overarching theory suggests that this is only possible when leaders manage to create and maintain the support of their Winning Coalition for the policy, i.e., the people who keep them in power. Over the course of three individual papers, I evaluated the main elements of this theoretical construct: 1) The influence of a country’s Winning Coalition Size on the policies it will use to create support for conscription, mainly Conscientious Objection (CO) and Alternative Civilian Service (ACS). 2) The effects of the levels of Winning Coalition Support on the decision to maintain forced recruitment over time. 3) The impact of Winning Coalition Support during debates about the future of the draft. Now that the analysis is finished and the puzzle is answered, it is possible to evaluate the discoveries and talk about the lessons learned.

Main Findings

There are several key points that my research unearthed:

Winning Coalitions Matter. If a government wants to maintain conscription, it needs to ensure that it has the backing of its supporters. Without it, there will be no policies of any kind and no functioning government. While this is the case for any size of Winning Coalition, there is no uniform way of achieving support. When the Winning Coalition is small, leaders will have an easier time winning them over because they could use private goods to gain their loyalty. This is not the case when the Winning Coalition is large and

includes sizable portions of the population of a country, such as parties or voters. Then governments must become more creative in selling conscription to the public.

Time Matters. Winning Coalition Support is a foundation element of allowing a country to have conscription. However, it is not a one-time event but must be preserved over time. When the levels of Winning Coalition Support waiver over months or years and drop below a certain threshold, the people will start to question why they still have conscription. When this point is reached, it does not make a difference whether a country had long periods of conscription before or not. All that matters is the level of Winning Coalition Support at that concrete point. Although this is applicable to all cases of forced recruitment, it is of particular importance for states that use the policy in times of peace because they have a harder time justifying conscription without existing threats.

Salience Matters. Once debates about the future of conscription have started, there are still ways of ensuring that the policy prevails. This is done by increasing the support of the Winning Coalition to a level on which the draft will be seen as acceptable enough to survive. This, again, is relatively simple for states with a small Winning Coalition Size since they can buy the needed support. Larger Winning Coalitions will struggle with this. For them, the best way of action is to increase the salience of the policies or reasoning they used to sell conscription in the first place. The mere existence of these will not be enough to maintain the draft. Instead, the members of the Winning Coalition will need to be made aware of whatever enticed them to approve of conscription in the first place.

Conscientious Objection Matters. The key elements of creating and maintaining support for forced recruitment in countries with large Winning Coalitions are the concepts

of Conscientious Objection and the policy that grows out of it: Alternative Civilian Service. These have the ability make the overcome the downsides of conscription and make it more palatable to the Winning Coalition. This allows leaders to pay off most if not all of the opposition against conscription. Small Winning Coalition Sizes can and do employ these policies as well, but they are not always necessary to ensure support of conscription in these cases. From an empirical perspective, Conscientious Objection is more common in countries with large Winning Coalition Sizes.

Leaders Matter. The main actor in my theory is the head of a state. They alone have the power to choose if they want to keep or cancel conscription. They make this decision based on a variety of factors, such as insecurity about the future, institutional concerns, and ideological or cultural reasons. This process can happen in the eyes of the public or behind open doors. Once the leaders make their choice, they will have to argue and lobby for it with the Winning Coalition, not just once but for the entire duration of the policy. They do so with a multitude of tools at their disposal, ranging from bribes to introducing Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service as a way of sweetening forced recruitment.

The Public Matters. Although the leaders of a country have such commanding positions, especially in deciding whether they want to maintain the draft, they are still heavily dependent on their supporters. While the government can propose and influence a verdict on conscription, it is still the supporters that make or break the policy. If they are not willing to put up with forced recruitment, they can bring about its end at any time. Thus, leaders need to stay vigilant and be aware of the power of their supporters.

Lessons Learned

The end of this project leaves me with insights and reflections on the conducted research, the greater literature, and future projects.

The Research Process: The process of working on a project as sizeable as this dissertation left me with many impressions, among which the research process had the most impact on me: First, I realized that even the best ideas and theories could struggle when they reach the conceptualization and measurement stages. Fortunately, substantial parts of my projects could rely on established concepts, such as Winning Coalition Size, internal and external threats, and rivals. However, *Level of Winning Coalition Support* and *Salience* proved quite tedious to properly define and measure. Even though the theory behind them appears to be somewhat intuitive, their operationalization was not. The measurements I used might not be the best, but they seemed to do their job for me. Consequently, my takeaway for conceptualization is that sometimes things do not have to be perfect but just have to work.

Second, being a somewhat qualitative researcher at heart, at least in the broadest sense, I was pleasantly surprised to discover the enormous capabilities that statistical approaches bring to the table. Finding new ways to quantify my data opened up many new and unexpected insights, some of which, e.g., quantifying and analyzing the collected newspaper articles, might lead to future projects.

Third, working with both qualitative and quantitative data taught me valuable lessons. For one, finding and identifying suitable sources is always a key concern. This became particularly obvious in my second paper, which would have profited from using survey data but had to contend with newspaper articles instead because of a lack of

available sources. A similar situation developed during the data collection process for the status of Conscientious Objection worldwide. While War Resisters' International was an excellent source, their reports were only available up to 1998 with a few exceptions. This limited the data I had available. Fortunately, a good portion of my analysis could build on already existing datasets from Victor Asal, Justin Conrad, and Nathan Toronto (2015) and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2003). Then, once data was collected, the cleaning process led to new challenges, such as setting up rules on how to identify and deal with duplicates, establishing coding guidelines, properly formatting data for statistical analysis, and dealing with articles that were just a few words long. Additionally, gaps in the data, e.g., the missing articles from 2002 to 2006, proved to be challenging as well since it was not always clear why the data was not there. Moreover, its absence and impact on my results would have to be explained and evaluated.

Fourth, I learned to identify and appreciate the different abilities that analytical software solutions have to offer. My first attempts of inquiry were centered around Microsoft Excel. While it got the job mostly done, it was cumbersome and laborious to use. Switching to NVivo made things a lot easier, especially in terms of Word Frequency analysis, but visualization still had to be done via Excel. LIWC-22 proved to be a game changer. Its speed, ability to handle large numbers of files, and the sheer amount of its capabilities. I only scratched the surface of this software, but I will employ it in future projects. Finally, STATA proved to be essential to a good portion of my projects. Although skeptical at first, I slowly developed an appreciation for the ease with which it conducts

quantitative analysis. While it will take a lot more work and understanding on my side, I will most likely continue using it.

The Greater Literature: My findings affect different fields of literature: First, I am adding to the most established perspectives on International Relations Theory. From the realist point of view, my research identifies a new way of how states can improve power and, thus, their security: Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service. At first, this sounds counterintuitive since these policies detract from the available pool of manpower by giving potential recruits a way to dodge service in the armed forces. However, my findings and theory suggest that these concepts can be employed to convince or sell the population of a country on conscription. Ultimately, this allows states to resort to this powerful method of staffing their military without risking upheaval at home. Alternatively, the introduction of Conscientious Objection could signal to other states that a government is serious about keeping conscription even during times of peace. That would make it a less ideal target for surprise outside attacks in the future since it already has access to a nearly limitless number of soldiers. The same is true for potential internal tension in a country. Future rebels in a country might think twice about their plans to strike against the government when conscription that increases its military power already exists. Through a liberal lens, Conscientious Objection can be regarded as an example of international cooperation and its effects on human rights. With an international organization such as the United Nations or the European Union declaring Conscientious Objection as a human right, the policy's symbolic status increased. Additionally, there are many NGOs that advocate for Conscientious Objection, e.g., the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection. All

these regulations and entities can have an impact on the behavior of states: as part of my data collection effort on CO, I stumbled across a few countries, like Serbia, that introduced or adjusted their policies on Conscientious Objection because of assistance and pressure from international organizations and NGOs (War Resisters' International 2005).

Second, my research connects to the subfield of Domestic Politics: My main concept, the impact of Winning Coalitions, stems directly from Selectorate Theory. I am incorporating another example of how this theory can be applied to explain the impact of domestic affairs on the international stage. In my case, it is the leader's intentions and the public's support that influence whether a country will maintain or end conscription and, consequentially, shape its security policy. As pointed out further above, my theory puts heavy emphasis on the position and authority of leaders. They alone have the ability to set the agenda for their state and to make the initial decision on the future of the draft. Although this power is checked by the members of the Winning Coalition, who could prevent policies from appearing, the leaders still have the initiative. Additionally, my theories state that the government has a variety of tools available to get its way. These range from private payoffs and engaging in informational campaigns to censoring information about particular policies. In the case of Winning Coalition Support for conscription, this means they can manipulate the public into either maintaining forced recruitment, via increasing the levels of support, or they could entice it to end the draft by highlighting its downsides.

An element that I hint at but do not fully explore is the role of personalities or individual characteristics of political leadership (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). Charismatic or seemingly friendly leaders could have an easier time influencing the Winning Coalition.

This might affect the likelihood of implementing Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service, because more personable leaders might be able to secure support for conscription through speeches or amicable interactions with the public. They might not need to implement the full spectrum of CO and ACS and only resort to one of the policies since they can make up for the cost of missing one of these elements by sheer charisma. The level of economic development of a country might matter as well. Leaders of rich states might not need to resort to Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service to sweeten conscription. Instead, they could offer material incentives, just like their colleagues with smaller Winning Coalitions. These might not necessarily come in the form of bribes but could include better pay or tax breaks for conscripts.

Yet, while I highlight the importance of the leader, I also theorize that there is immense power at the hands of the Winning Coalition. Although they are in a more passive role when compared to the government, i.e., they can only decide whether to support or oppose a leader, they are the main element that keeps the government in power. This is true for all sizes of the Winning Coalition and impacts leaders from small to large states.

Third, my findings expand existing research on Civil-Military Relations and add more details to the understanding of the connections between the government, society, and the armed forces. While, in theory, these actors are all part of one triangle, my reasoning and research discovered a heavy emphasis on just two elements. In particular, the conversations about maintaining conscription, even though they might be somewhat one-sided, happen between leaders and society. This is problematic not just because they exclude the military but also because they are deciding about one of the core pillars of the

military: its recruitment practices. Even though this could be regarded as an example of civilian control over the armed forces, it might affect the relations between the civilian and the military side in the short and long term. Additionally, it might increase the ever-present civil-military gap and could lead to a military that, in a best-case scenario, accepts its fate as the toy of the government and the people or, in a worst-case scenario, starts harboring resentment and turns into a threat to the state. In order to prevent this from happening, leaders should want to include the military and its representatives in their calculations on how to establish support for their policy ideas.

Furthermore, this project combines my interest in Civil-Military Relations with elements of Selectorate Theory. It showed that some concepts, like Winning Coalition, might be employed to explain the particular design of a state's relationship with its military. The notion of Winning Coalition Support could also shed light on instances in which governments make decisions that negatively affect their Civil-Military Relations. At that point, it might not be normative ideas about how society and the armed forces should interact but purely selfish reasons of leaders wanting to secure the support of their Winning Coalition, regardless of the cost. Moreover, for me, Selectorate Theory might be especially beneficial to use in cases in which the military is part of a government's Winning Coalition. In this case, a leader's options and tools will change because the military might react differently to attempts to buy their support than the general public, i.e., they would be less inclined to accept Conscientious Objection or Alternative Civilian Service.

Lastly, my project expands the discussions surrounding the determinants of conscription. While incredible work is done to explain why countries introduce the draft,

there exists less research on why states might maintain it (Ben-Ari, Rosman, and Shamir 2021, 4). I aim to address this issue by presenting my theory of Winning Coalition Support. Not only does it add to the influence of leader choices and the public, but it also captures a variety of established indicators for conscription and combines them under one simple mechanism. This might explain cases that feature characteristics that would speak for and against keeping conscription at the same time. On a more practical level, my findings show that policies of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service have an effect on the future of conscription. This suggests that conscription could potentially profit from pairing it with mechanisms that allow draftees to avoid service in the military. It is also possible that the existence of CO and ACS could present benefits to a state, such as cheap labor in the social and health sectors. These considerations could influence the draft as well, especially when it is seen as a vehicle to provide staffing for Alternative Civilian Service. Finally, I hope that my dataset on the Status of Conscientious Objection will help foster future inquiry, not only into forced recruitment but also into these policies as well. By presenting information on CO in an accessible format, it might entice the field to include it in its theory-crafting and hypothesis-testing. This would not only benefit Civil-Military Relations but also raise the awareness of Conscientious Objection.

Despite the contributions that my project makes to the existing literature, there is a strong caveat regarding the generalizability of the knowledge presented here. This is mostly due to my focus on internal validity. Focusing mostly on the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany allowed me to establish that my proposed theory works for the most typical case. Yet, it leaves questions regarding the external validity of my

findings, such as, how widespread the dynamics at play are and how they could be mediated or modified under certain conditions. These questions should be addressed in the future.

Future Projects: The findings in this paper and the process that took me there leave me with a multitude of avenues for additional research: First, I can continue and deepen my work on the effect of Winning Coalition Support on conscription. The most obvious step is to add more cases and different sources of data to my qualitative projects. For my work on the Levels of Winning Coalition Support, that means finding other sources or including another case. Ideally, it would be a country that is either just now opening itself up to the idea of increasing Winning Coalition Support, e.g., South Korea, or one that will have to deal with it once threats subside, e.g., Ukraine. For my research on the salience of Conscientious Objection, I could extend my sources to include other newspapers or publications made by the government. Additionally, I could refine the measurements for my key concepts in these two papers to improve the quality of my analysis and findings.

Second, I would like to put my newly developed interest in and skills for text analysis software to the test. These tools are a great way to process large amounts of text in a reasonable amount of time. Thus, they would be ideal for investigating parliamentary minutes, legal texts, or social media to get a better understanding of how countries think about Conscientious Objection, Alternative Civilian Service, or conscription. The current situation in Ukraine and its effects on security perceptions in the European Union would be an excellent target for such an inquiry. Several states that ended conscription in the past are now debating whether they should introduce or intensify conscription again. Even Germany, which suspended the draft in 2010, has discussions appear every now and then.

These might not be too serious, but they could still offer an insight into how Winning Coalition Support is articulated and influenced.

Third, I would like to dive deeper into my chosen field of Civil-Military Relations. My current project exclusively focuses on the relationship and interactions between the government and society. Even though the main element of this back-and-forth relates to the military, i.e., how it can recruit its soldiers, the armed forces do not have a voice in the process. Consequently, there would be a benefit in focusing on how the military is influencing the support of the Winning Coalition and the leaders. This could be established through analyzing media campaigns or press releases that the armed forces initiate or publish.⁴⁸ It will allow me to identify if there is any influence, which direction it goes, and what the motives behind it are. The results would not only be insightful for my research agenda but also for Civil-Military Relations in general.

Fourth, it would be worthwhile to investigate the relationship between the leaders, the public, and the media. Right now, I only use the latter as a mirror of Levels of Winning Coalition Support and as an indicator for salience. This relegates the media to a role that does not do it justice. An analysis of media outlets (print, digital, TV) with different ideological backgrounds and how they portray conscription, Conscientious Objection, and Alternative Civilian Service could offer insights on whether and how they influence the process of establishing Winning Coalition Support.

Fifth, since my project mainly focuses on countries with a large Winning Coalition Size, I could examine how states with smaller Winning Coalitions ensure their support.

⁴⁸ To add an interesting side note: Even though Germany suspended conscription, they replaced parts of it with voluntary service branded 'voluntary conscription.

The theory proposes that it should happen in the form of private goods but gaining an actual empirical idea would shed some light on this black box. An appealing case for this would be Turkey which does not tolerate Conscientious Objection but allows for unwilling draftees to pay their way out of conscription. Examining media publications that happened around the time of the decision to let recruits forgo military service this way would provide critical insights into how authoritarian governments establish Winning Coalition Support.

Lastly, as a more permanent early to mid-career project, I want to expand on my dataset and work on the status of Conscientious Objection globally. As a start, I could update the existing set with cases that happened after my cutoff year of 1998. This should not be a problem since my primary source, i.e., War Resisters' International, has some entries for select countries ranging up to the late 2010s. Furthermore, I can improve the quality of data by adding information from the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection's yearly reports or publications from the United Nations Human Rights Office. Additionally, I could gather alternative indicators for regime type, such as Freedom House's Democracy index. This would allow me to get at the *missing part* of democracy that is not fully captured by polity scores. As mentioned in a previous paper, I would like to develop my own survey and conduct it in countries with Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service to properly gauge the levels of Winning Coalition Support. This could result in new variables for my dataset, such as *Level of W*, *Attitude Towards Conscription and CO/ACS*, *Likelihood of CO Adoption*, or, following Max Margulies' recent publication on "Foreign Determinants of Military Recruitment Policies," *Outside Influence on CO* (2021, 354).

In a best-case scenario, working on this dataset would enable me to collaborate with a variety of other scholars or organizations. For one, there is a potential to combine my data with existing sets on the determinants of conscription, such as Asal, Conrad, and Toronto's (2015). Moreover, there is potential that either the United Nations, the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection, or War Resisters' International would see a benefit in working together. They already provide excellent reports. Quantifying them would make them even more appealing to researchers, policymakers, and the public.

Final Comments

This dissertation is the project of several years of academic labor, love, sweat, and tears. What started out as a hastily written paper for a class on Civil-Military Relations at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School for Public and International Affairs almost a decade ago now turned into something a bit more substantial – at least, so I hope. My focus on conscription has not changed much over the years. Yet, it has evolved. From looking at it mainly as a tool to bridge the Civil-Military Gap back then, today, I know that things are a bit more complex. Conscription has several advantages but also a multitude of downsides. Regardless of where one stands on these, the draft still represents a massive invasion of a person's life. While I hope that my work will provide some clarity on why countries choose to maintain the policy even during peacetime, I also hope to highlight the importance of Conscientious Objection and Alternative Civilian Service not just as tools to 'sell' the draft to the public, but also as a legitimate way of avoiding forced service in the military. I understand that circumstances sometimes call for conscription. Nevertheless, there should

always be a provision to object to it based on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

It is a human right – deservedly so.

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APPENDIX

This appendix includes the tables mentioned in Chapter II, as well as additional analysis of the Conscientious Objection data and a deeper investigation of the relationship between Winning Coalition Size and CO.

Table 19 presents a count of all instances of CO introduced after the end of the Cold War.

Table 20 shows that there is only one case overall that had all three security factors active at the same time when CO was introduced. It tabulates all CO with all cases of interstate war that also have an ongoing intrastate war and rivalry. Then it does the same for all cases of intrastate war with active interstate war and rivalry. Lastly, it tabulates CO with rivalry cases that are engaged in an interstate and interstate war.

Section A1: Winning Coalition Size Influence on Codification of CO

While the main text describes and analyses the impact of Winning Coalition Size on the likelihood of Conscientious Objection, the dataset also allows drawing a few more preliminary conclusions about a deeper relationship. In this appendix, I will explore its impacts on the codification of CO, i.e., how it is put into effect (constitution or law).

Table 21 breaks down the codification for every size of Winning Coalition. The lower number of overall cases is again due to missing information and incomplete data. Additionally, the values in combination (0, 0) do not present the overall count of countries with CO. It shows that these cases do not have Conscientious Objection set into law or constitution. They might still feature a form of CO, just like Morocco, but it is not included here. Despite these limitations, some analysis is possible:

Table 19. Instances of Conscientious Objection Implementation after the Cold War

VarName	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
COAfterColdWar	27	1	0	1	1

Table 20. CO and Interstate War (Ongoing Intrastate War and Rivalry)

	Interstate War		Intrastate War		Rivalry	
CO	0	1	0	1	0	1
0	280	57	219	57	30	57
1	1	1	1	1	0	1
Total	281	58	220	58	30	58

Table 21. Codification of Constitution (Const.) and ACS by Size of W

N=15	Law		<u>W=1</u>
Const.	0	1	Total
0	0	10	10
1	0	5	5
Total	0	15	15

N=25	Law		<u>W=0.75</u>
Const.	0	1	Total
0	0	12	12
1	5	7	12
Total	5	19	24

N=12(!)	Law		<u>W=0.5</u>
Const.	0	1	Total
0	0	5	5
1	4	4	8
Total	4	9	13

N=7	Law		<u>W=0.25</u>
Const.	0	1	Total
0	2	2	4
1	2	1	3
Total	4	3	7

N=1(!)	Law	<u>W=0</u>
Const.	0	Total
0	1	1
1	1	1
Total	2	2

For the largest Winning Coalition size of $W=1$, there are 15 instances in which Conscientious Objection is codified. The majority of 15 states have the policies ratified into law only, with just five countries using both law and their constitution to secure them. There is no case in which Conscientious Objection is only in the constitution. Additionally, all of the 15 states with the largest Winning Coalition Size and active CO have it codified in either constitution or law. There is no state in this category that does not have a legal framework for the policy.

The Winning Coalition of 0.75 sees 24 cases of Conscientious Objection written into law or constitution. Half of them (12) use laws as the source of CO, whereas only five (21%) just employ the constitution. Seven states (29%) employ both means. As with $W=1$, all states with of this Winning Coalition Size have actual legal texts as the basis of Conscientious Objection. The one missing case is due to a lack of data.

For the category of $W=0.5$, a slim majority of states (five out of thirteen) use laws for the codification of CO, and four use their constitution. The same number (four out of thirteen) employs a combination of both sources. The $n=12$ in this category which is smaller than the total of 13, is due to missing data. It seems like the extra case in the tabulation does not have any form of Conscientious Objection but still legislation for it.

The bracket for the Winning Coalition size of 0.25 features a more diverse picture with seven cases in total. Constitution or law as sources are both used by two states each (29% each). One country alone (14%) uses both legislative options to anchor Conscientious Objection. Moreover, there are two countries that do not have their CO codified.

Lastly, the smallest Winning Coalition of 0, only one state out of two uses a legal source for Conscientious Objection. The other one does not. Similar to $W=0.5$, there is a disconnect between n and total numbers. Incomplete data is to blame.

Overall, it appears that countries prefer to codify Conscription or Alternative Civilian Service into law over the constitution. The second most used option is a combination of constitution and regular law. The least popular option seems to be constitution only. This might be due to the reasoning mentioned earlier (e.g., harder to ratify). Furthermore, some states make Conscientious Objection part of the laws that organize their military. Hence, no need to put it in the constitution.

This all seems to provide additional support to the impact of Winning Coalition Size and Conscientious Objection. It appears that W does not only influence the likelihood but other factors, such as codification, as well. Needless to say, further investigation is needed in the future.

Section A2: Basic Model with Region Fixed Effects

Table 22 presents the coefficients for my Model 8. It follows Model 3 by employing linear probability regression with region fixed effects. It does so to account for the clustering of Conscientious Objection cases in Europe. The results support my overall findings: Winning Coalition is statistically significant on the 99% level and rivals on the 95% level.

Table 22. Basic Model with Controls and Region Fixed Effects

	Model 8: Controls, Time, Region FE (LPM FE)
Winning Coalition Size	0.230*** (0.0069)
Interstate War	-0.005 (0.0039)
Intrastate War	-0.0067 (0.0046)
Rival	-0.0063** (0.0031)
Energy Per Capita	0.0004 (0.0003)
Years Since CO	0.0003 (0.0003)
Years Since CO ²	- 0.0000 (0.0000)
Years Since CO ³	0.0000 (0.0000)
Constant	-0.035 (0.0158)
N	5155
Log-Pseudo likelihood	n/a

Standard errors clustered by country.

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

VITA

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