To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Thomas M. Wilson entitled "Factionalism and Party Politics in Colombia." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Nelson Robinson, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Chancellor
Graduate Studies and Research

Thesis
79 b
.W567
cop 2

FACTIONALISM AND PARTY POLITICS IN COLOMBIA

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Thomas M. Wilson

June 1979

139[illegible]

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to the many people who have assisted me, and without whose help this study would have been impossible.

Professor Nelson M. Robinson directed not only the dissertation but my graduate education, and I am grateful for his faith and patience. Professors Joseph Dodd, Roland E. Duncan, and Vernon Iredell read the dissertation and made many valuable suggestions.

I wish to thank two people whose help was invaluable during my stay in Colombia. Judith Talbot Campos of the Universidad del Valle willingly gave of her experience and knowledge of Colombian politics. Joseph Nalven was an advisor and a friend.

It is impossible to thank all the people who have in some way made other contributions to this study, but I would like to mention Mr. Thomas Platt, of Levi-Strauss and Company, and Professor T. McN. Simpson III, for their support and encouragement. In addition, completion of the study would have been impossible without the support of Mr. Austin Gaines, Executive Director of the Tennessee Law Enforcement Planning Agency.

My parents, Mr. and Mrs. R. M. Wilson, and my sister, Robbie Wilson, often gave material support, and always love.

A special word of appreciation is reserved for my wife, Ann Thompson, who contributed more than anyone at every stage. My deepest gratitude is to her.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to identify and describe certain salient aspects of political party factions in Colombia. Based on this description the major goal was to formulate a series of propositions and hypotheses which could serve as a basis for future research.

The focus of the study was upon the Liberal and Conservative parties in the department of Valle del Cauca, but within the context of national party politics. The data were drawn from published sources in the United States and Colombia, and from the results of Colombian elections. Additional data were collected by means of personal interviews with Colombian party leaders. The historical period of interest was from 1958 to 1974.

Based on a review of the theoretical literature pertaining to factionalism, three major areas were selected for investigation: the structure of factions, the bases of factional conflict, and the behavior of factions in the political arena. These variables served as the organizational and descriptive framework of the study. In keeping with the purpose of the study, the major findings are stated as propositions and hypotheses for future testing.

The study hypothesizes that the structure of Colombian party factions may be described as a series of vertical and exclusive loyalties between political leaders of unequal status. Through this system of loyalties, Colombian party factions may be national, departmental or local in scope.

The study hypotheses that the sources of conflict between or among factions are not disputes over ideology or program, but are primarily competition among political leaders to obtain favorable positions on electoral lists, to win elected office, and to control patronage.

Finally, the study sets forth some hypotheses concerning the relationship between factionalism and party competition, La Violencia in Colombia, urbanization, and voter participation and abstention.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	Location, Scope, and Methods of the Study	13
II.	THE STUDY OF FACTIONS	19
	The Problem of Definition	19
	The Structure or Organization of Factions	23
	An opposing view of the structure of factions	31
	Summary	32
	Factions and Conflict	34
	Origins and sources of factional conflict	35
	Patterns of factional conflict and conflict resolution	40
	Relationships between Structure and Conflict	43
	Factions and the Political Arena	45
	The Utility of a Faction Model in the Study of Latin American Politics and Political Parties	54
III.	PARTIES, FACTIONS, AND ELECTIONS IN COLOMBIA: 1958-1974	58
	Formation of the National Front	58
	The Elections of 1958	63
	The Presidency of Alberto Lleras Camargo	67
	The Presidency of Guillermo León Valencia	81
	The results of the 1966 elections	91
	The Presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo	96
	The elections of 1970	108
	The Presidency of Misael Pastrana Borrero	116
	The results of the 1974 elections	130
IV.	THE STRUCTURE OF THE FACTIONS	136
	Party Leadership in Colombia	137
	The Structure of Relationships	146
	Parties and factions in Valle	146
	The nature of the relationships	156
	The function of the relationships	161
	The stability of the relationships	163
	The Formalization of Relationships: Party and Factional Organization	167
	Summary and Conclusions	180

CHAPTER PAGE

V. ELEMENTS OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT 185

Party Conflict in Perspective 185
The National Front System 196
The Composition of the Lists 200
Patronage and Spoils 209
Factions and patronage: the case of Invicali . . . 216
The Role of Ideology 227
Ideology and factions in Valle 229
Summary and Conclusions 237

VI. THE FACTIONS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA 243

Variations in Factionalism: 1958-1974 244
The national level 244
Variations in factionalism in Valle 250
Factionalism and Party Competition 252
La Violencia 258
Urbanization 262
Participation and Abstention 269
Summary and Conclusions 274

VII. CONCLUSIONS 277

Final Remarks 284
Propositions 285
Hypotheses 286

BIBLIOGRAPHY 289

VITA 301

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
3.1.	The Congressional Election of 1958	66
3.2.	The Presidential Election of 1958	68
3.3.	The Congressional Election of 1960	73
3.4.	The Congressional Election of 1962	80
3.5.	The Presidential Election of 1962	81
3.6.	The Congressional Election of 1964	87
3.7.	The Congressional Election of 1966	92
3.8.	The Presidential Election of 1966	95
3.9.	The Congressional Election of 1968	104
3.10.	The Presidential Election of 1970	110
3.11.	The Congressional Election of 1970	112
3.12.	Voting for Pastrana and Rojas According to Socioeconomic Class, in Percentages	113
3.13.	The Presidential Election of 1974	131
3.14.	The Congressional Election of 1974	132
4.1.	Composition of the Liberal Party Comisión Política Central, July 1973	141
4.2.	Party and Factional Division of Valle Assembly: 1962-1974	148
4.3.	Number of Congressional Lists Inscribed in Valle: 1958-1974	160
4.4.	Percentage Replacements of Representatives from Valle: 1962-1970	164
4.5.	Factional Composition of the Liberal Party Comisión Política Central, July 1973	173

TABLE		PAGE
5.1.	Number of Lists Inscribed in Congressional Elections: 1958-1974	198
5.2.	Ranking of Internal Party Conflict	234
6.1.	Party Voting in Colombia in House of Representatives Elections, in Percentages: 1958-1974	245
6.2.	Factional Division of Party Voting in Colombia, 1958-1970, in Percentages (House of Representatives)	246
6.3.	Factional Division of Party Voting in Valle, 1958-1970, in Percentages (House of Representatives)	251
6.4.	Average Conservative Vote: Elections of 1930 and 1946	254
6.5.	Correlations of Liberal Party Vote and Dissident Liberal Vote in Five House of Representatives Elections in Valle	256
6.6.	Liberal Vote in Municipios in Valle Affected and Not Affected by La Violencia	260
6.7.	Comparison of Voting for Unionista and Independiente Factions in Municipios Affected and Not Affected by La Violencia: 1966	262
6.8.	Voting for National Front Factions and Dissident Factions in Cali Compared to the Rest of the Department, in Percentages	265
6.9.	Comparison of Urban and Rural Voting for National Front Factions and Dissident Factions, in Percentages	267
6.10.	Participation in Presidential Elections: 1930-1974	270
6.11.	Correlations of Voter Turnout and Voting for Dominant Factions in Valle	272

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the more commonly observed characteristics of Latin American political parties is the frequency with which they are torn by internal conflicts or factional struggles which lead to their dissolution, the formation of new parties, electoral defeat or what sometimes appears to be endless intra-party quarrels. Explanations have varied, but the fact remains that not a great deal is known about internal party conflict in Latin America. Only recently have scholars begun to apply the skills and techniques used in the study of North American and European political parties to those in Latin America. As a result, while our perceptions may have been sharpened somewhat, much remains blurred.

Factionalism in Latin American political parties is one of these "blurred" areas. Factionalism has long been of interest to anthropologists, and their writings on this subject are rather extensive. Since the publication of V. O. Key's Southern Politics,[1] political scientists have begun to devote more attention to factions in political parties, but the majority of these studies, however, have been concerned with party politics in the United States, Europe, and to a lesser extent, Asia. This work perhaps could provide a valuable basis for the study of Latin American political parties, but such application has been

---

[1] V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

rare. When factions in Latin American parties have been the object of research, generally they have formed only a part of broader studies. Consequently, many important matters have been left untouched.

There can be little doubt, however, of the significance of factionalism in the behavior of political parties in Latin America. In a broader context, Mauricio Guzmán once wrote that factionalism was the greatest barrier to progress in Latin America.[2] In a more restricted context, another writer has listed factionalism as one of the chief characteristics of Latin American political parties.[3] Kenneth Johnson has written that the camarilla (political clique or faction) "is central to understanding the creation, maintenance, and transfer of power within Mexico's PRI."[4] Despite their apparent importance in Latin American political parties, factions have not been analyzed in any depth. How they are to be defined and described, what their origins are, what the sources of conflict are, what the relationship is between factionalism and the party, social, or political systems, and the consequences of factionalism are a few topics which have not received much attention.

One starting point might be with the question: What is a faction? For the most part the answer has only been hinted at, although it

---

[2]Mauricio Guzmán, "El Faccionalismo: Supervivencia Medieval en América Latina," Journal of Inter-American Studies, V (October, 1963), 466.

[3]Leslie F. Manigat, "Introduction," Guide to the Political Parties of South America (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 24.

[4]Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 70.

appears to be important to any analysis. More needs to be known about the structural properties of Latin American factions. In his study of Colombian politics, James L. Payne is one of the few who has offered a definition or description of a party faction. He states that "The national factions are semipermanent groups of political leaders that compete with each other and establish separate organizations with separate headquarters, party committees, and congressional groups."[5] Others have been less clear. One briefly notes that "Latin American political parties factionalize about individual personal followings."[6] The description of party factions as political leaders with personal followings is a common one, although usually rather brief. The camarillas of Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) have been described in similar terms.[7]

Interestingly, party factions in Latin America have not always been pictured in this manner. In his study of Acción Democrática in Venezuela, John D. Martz speaks of both "ideological factionalism" and "personalistic factionalism" and suggests that a party may have two kinds of factions. The first arises from ideological conflict and the second from the clash of "personal ambitions."[8] In defining factions or

---

[5]James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 186.

[6]Ronald H. McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), p. 12.

[7]See Johnson, pp. 67-84.

[8]John D. Martz, Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 168-192.

factionalism, others have made ideology the primary feature. Based on a study of Bolivian politics, Christopher Mitchell states that "Factionalism . . . means a condition of deep structural division within a single ideological movement or tendency. This division may take the form of organized sub-units within a political party or of any rival parties within a given ideological movement."[9]

Thus, what seems to emerge from the scattered writings which touch on factionalism are two rather generalized descriptions or definitions of factions. One indicates that factions are composed of political leaders with personal followings, while the other describes factions as being some sort of ideological division within political parties. Unfortunately, not much else has been said. Are these two descriptions both accurate? Is one correct and the other wrong? Can factions within the same political party be described in two different ways, as did Martz? Do factions have other elements which can be identified and described? These are only a few questions which could be asked, but so far have not.

The source or sources of factionalism is another area of interest which has received scant attention. There are perhaps two general ways in which this inquiry could be approached. The first would be the historical method, by which one could begin at an appropriate point such as the Wars of Independence, the birth of a given party or movement, or

---

[9]Christopher Mitchell, "Factionalism and Political Change in Bolivia," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 1.

some other date believed to be relevant, and then attempt to determine from events the sources of factionalism in a party or parties. The second method would be the attempt to identify the political, social, economic or psychological origins of factions.

With rare exceptions neither method has been employed with much rigor. It has been suggested that the factionalism encountered in so many Latin American political parties can be traced back to the Wars of Independence and the forces unleashed by them. The authority of Spain was shattered, but not easily replaced. Instead, local caudillos sprang up struggling among themselves to fill the void that remained. This period has been called one of "anarchic factionalism,"[10] and its effects may still be seen in the parties today. Even some of the parties themselves in the nineteenth century were not parties as we think of them today. Frank Brandenburg has written that the Liberal and Conservative parties "were really factional groupings within a small, wealthy ruling class."[11]

Whatever the historical origins of party factionalism, there is perhaps even less agreement concerning other factors which may shape the behavior of factions. Of the political variables, the type of party system has been said to be a major factor. For example, Martin

---

[10]Richard M. Morse, "Political Theory and the Caudillo," Dictatorship in Spanish America, ed. Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 1965), p. 65.

[11]Frank Brandenburg, "Political Parties and Elections," Government and Politics in Latin America, ed. Harold E. Davis (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), p. 191.

Needler believes that in those Latin American nations with two-party systems:

> the range of political opinion has proved to be too broad to be expressed by only two alternatives, and the presence of more or less permanent factors within the two major parties is the standard situation. Permanent factionalism is especially characteristic of the two-party system, in point of fact; where party identification expresses an inherited loyalty, it is unavailable as an expression of opinion—to express a novel point of view, one creates a new faction rather than a new party.[12]

The reference here is to Colombia and Uruguay, and it is true that political parties in both nations have experienced widespread factionalism. No comparative studies have been done, however, and thus it is difficult to determine if in fact two-party systems are any more subject to factionalism than multi-party systems or one-party systems. One could argue also that in some cases it is factionalism which is the controlling factor, not the type of party system, in that factional divisions may bring about a multi-party system.[13] The relationship, therefore, between factionalism and the type of party system in Latin America is not very clear.

Another disputed point is whether factionalism is a manifestation of ideological conflict or not. That it is has been the conclusion of some,[14] but other studies have concluded that factions are an outgrowth

---

[12]Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 118.

[13]McDonald makes this point, p. 12.

[14]Mitchell, op. cit. See also, Burt H. English, Liberación Nacional in Costa Rica: The Development of a Political Party in a Transitional Society (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971), p. 88.

of purely personal conflicts among ambitious politicians.[15] There are, however, variations on this theme. One interpretation is that during the nineteenth century in Latin America factions were almost wholly personal struggles for power devoid of any ideological content, while in recent times party divisions "have centered as much on conflicting ideas as on personality conflicts."[16] Another interpretation is that factionalism springs from a growing conflict between young, more ideologically aware, and revolutionary leaders "facing the tactical cunning and conservatism of their elders—the passionate expression of a renewed but permanent dispute between ancient and modern."[17]

In contrast to those explanations which have centered on expressly political factors such as the party system or ideology, perhaps the most familiar and common efforts to account for the sometimes turbulent character of Latin American political parties have been those which have sought to establish a relationship between either cultural or psychological norms and political behavior. Thus personalism has long been a concept which has been employed in an attempt to explain how political life in Latin America is in part a result of certain societal values. Students of Latin America are acquainted with this concept, and there is no need to go into it here at length except to show how it has been related to party factionalism.

---

[15]See Payne, for example, passim.

[16]Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Political Parties (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. xvi.

[17]Manigat, p. 24.

Frequently, such a relationship is suggested but not made explicit. Scattered through the writings on political parties in Latin America are phrases such as "personalistic factions" or "personalistic factionalism." The implication is that factions are a result of personalismo in the arena of political parties, the consequences of a political and social system in which "a man is not commonly elected or acclaimed to office because he represents the social, economic, and political positions of his followers, but because he embodies in his own personality those inner qualities that they feel in themselves and they would like to manifest, had they but the talent to do so, in their own actions."[18]

But if personalism is a source, or the source, of factionalism, it has also been argued that it is the wellspring of two other closely related phenomena in Latin American political history: caciquismo and caudillismo. The reason for mentioning these phenomena is that they also have been linked in various ways to factionalism. To cite only one example, in a study of a Mexican village Antonio Ugalde argues that violent factionalism erupted during the 1930's because of the breakdown of the old system of caciquismo and the emergence of a weaker "neo-caciquismo." Order was finally restored when the PRI became well established in the village. The violence of the new caciques was halted, but factionalism was, in his words, "institutionalized" within the

---

[18]John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 31.

PRI.[19] Therefore caciquismo is said to be a determining factor in party factionalism.[20]

The linking of factionalism and personalismo, caciquismo, and caudillismo is intriguing, but at the same time unsatisfactory. If these political and cultural traits are in some way related to the behavior of factions, what precisely is that relationship? Are they different facets of the same thing? Are they different things each having a bearing on factionalism, and if so, how? These questions have not been answered, and thus to what degree the behavior of party factions is influenced by the political culture in this regard is still not clear.

One exception is to be found in the work of James Payne. Payne has attempted to take a political variable (party identification) and a psycho-cultural variable (the desire of politicians for status) and show how the interaction of these two may account for the degree of factionalism within Colombian political parties. Payne's hypotheses are the following:

> 1. Factionalism will not occur where party identification is low.
> 2. Where party identification of the electorate is high and the incentive for leaders is program, factionalism will not be prevalent.

---

[19]Antonio Ugalde, "Contemporary Mexico: From Hacienda to PRI, Political Leadership in a Zapotec Village," The Caciques: Oligarchical Politics and the System of Caciquismo in the Luzo-Hispanic World, ed. Robert Kern (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), pp. 119-134.

[20]The close relationship of these terms—personalism, factionalism, caciquismo and caudillismo—will be treated more fully in Chapter II.

> 3. Where party identification of the electorate is high and the incentive for leaders is status, factionalism will be prevalent.[21]

Colombia, Payne believes, conforms most closely to the third hypothesis. Payne's work will be considered in more detail later, but it is worth noting at this point inasmuch as he is one of the few who have tried to state explicitly a relationship between a psychological or cultural variable (in this case the desire of politicians for status) and the political variable of party factionalism.

The broader relationship between factionalism and either the party system or the political system is another area of interest only touched upon in the literature. Speaking of Latin American society in general rather than political parties, Guzmán has charged that factionalism is the cause of a near plague of political ills, such as military intervention in civil life, lack of faith in presidential government, instability of democratic institutions, and even the "penetration" of Soviet communism.[22] Another student of Latin American political parties simply concludes that "While the advantage of unity or coalition is obvious in a reality of factionalism, unity for Latin American parties has been historically difficult to achieve."[23] Robert Dix has been somewhat more specific about the impact of factional politics in Colombia. He writes that:

> Factionalism has had three significant consequences for Colombian politics, aside from the obvious one of weakening

---

[21] Payne, p. 332.

[22] Guzmán, p. 469.

[23] McDonald, p. 13.

> the ability of the majority to govern and vitiating the minority's power to oppose. In the first place, factions have frequently served as the functional equivalent of an opposition party . . . . Secondly, on every occasion that power has alternated between the parties, with the single exception of the accession of the Liberals in 1861 through successful armed revolt, a change in the party in command has been directly attributable to a split in the dominant party . . . . A third trait of Colombian factionalism is that it has frequently led to the formation of third parties, or to virtually independent groupings, without permanent disruption of the two-party order of things.[24]

Although the relationship between factions and either the party system or the political system is the most interesting and important aspect of their behavior, it is also the most difficult in terms of political theory. The problem is to demonstrate in some way that an observed action is a consequence of factionalism within the party or parties and not the result of some other cause. Certainly political parties in Latin America have been some of the most fragmented to be found anywhere. Parties may suddenly appear on the political scene, and then just as suddenly disappear. Even in many of the sturdier parties, the formation of splinter groups and quarrels within the parties make it difficult to hold together from one election to the next. Yet, the complexity of Latin American society makes cautious restraint an imperative for the researcher. Factionalism is only one force in the interplay of many. The parties themselves are only one element in the political system. Many writers seem to overlook this basic fact. In studies of Latin American political parties it has been proposed that

---

[24]Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 217-218.

factions have certain consequences for the party system or the political system. Curiously, the reverse is rarely, if ever, considered. What, we might ask, is the impact of the political system upon factions? Does not the environment act upon them as they do upon it?

This study makes no claim that the relationship between party factions and the political arena can be specified with any degree of exactness. It is believed that the present state of empirical political theory is not advanced enough yet to permit such specification. Nevertheless, it is impossible to investigate factions in isolation from their environment. Therefore, it should be recognized at the outset that the section which deals with factions in the political arena represents only a first attempt at sorting out factors which appear to have a bearing upon each other and remain somewhat speculative.

The preceding brief summary has been intended to sketch the present state of political science in regard to the study of factions in political parties in Latin America. It is by no means comprehensive, but seeks only to point out current findings and suggest what seem to be a few of the principal gaps in contemporary knowledge of this one aspect of Latin American politics. Certainly other questions could be raised quite easily. Research on Latin American political parties is still for the most part in its infancy, and previous studies have largely concentrated on broader topics such as party systems, history and organization of particular parties, and the like, Many aspects of party behavior have received only cursory attention. Factionalism is one of those aspects which appears to have a significant impact upon the

parties and party systems in which it is often to be found, yet no study as yet has been devoted entirely to it. Neither has any application been made drawing upon the wealth of findings and theory developed by social scientists from studies of factionalism in other areas of the world or of manifestations of political behavior other than political parties. In brief, the following chapters seek to take a small step in that direction.

Location, Scope, and Methods of the Study

While a comparative examination of factionalism in more than one Latin American party system would be of considerable value, the pressing demands of research have made it necessary to restrict this study to only one of those systems—that of Colombia. Specifically, the research was focused in large part on political parties in the city of Cali, in the department of Valle del Cauca. Several reasons, beyond those of time and financial resources, were responsible for those decisions.

Emerging in the year 1849, the two dominant political parties of Colombia, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, have survived until the present day, unlike many other parties in Latin America which once bore those names. Yet the two parties have been described as "factionalized, personalistic, and unrestrained in their methods of competition."[25] This struggle between the parties has at times been fierce and at times has strained the Colombian political system to near

---

[25]McDonald, p. 181.

the breaking point. In the nineteenth century, conflicts between the parties sometimes resulted in bloodshed, but in the twentieth century with the murder of the Liberal leader, Jorge Gaitán, in 1948 a wave of brutality and death swept across Colombia known as la violencia. In the years that followed, thousands died as followers of one party tried to exterminate those of the other.[26] One consequence of the violence was that the military assumed a more active interventionist role in politics, and the country was controlled by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla from 1953 until he was overthrown in 1957.

To regain power and halt the violence, leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties struck a bargain known as the Sitges Agreement. Under this agreement a Frente de Transformación Nacional was formed, and made part of the Constitution by plebiscite held in December 1957. Beginning in 1958 elections would be held, but the presidency would alternate between the parties (alternación) and all legislative representation, as well as bureaucratic posts, would be divided equally between the parties (paridad). Originally the agreement was to be in effect until 1970, but it was later extended until 1974.

Within these boundaries, then, Colombians have sought to contain party competition. Although not nearly so bloody, conflict within each of the parties has nonetheless been a permanent feature. Yet the

---

[26]The standard work on the violence is German Guzmán, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna, La Violencia en Colombia, 2 vols, (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1963 and 1964). Although studies in English of the violence have been made in recent years, primarily doctoral dissertations and articles, no comprehensive treatment has been published.

factionalism that marks the internal life of the parties has received far less attention. The current study is an attempt to achieve a better understanding of this factional conflict and competition in the hope that it may contribute to a deeper understanding of the party system as a whole.

Certain limitations in the scope of this study should be noted. Only the Liberal and Conservative parties are examined in detail. Colombia does have other parties, but with the exception of the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO), none has shown much success at the polls. In fact, because of the requirements established under the Frente, other parties were forbidden to run candidates under their own banners until 1974. In order to set boundaries necessary to facilitate the research, only the two recognized parties were included. Likewise, the historical period of primary interest here is 1958-1974.

One important point which must be emphasized is that the purpose of this undertaking is not to test hypotheses. Instead, two major goals have been set. The first is to identify those elements of factions which appear to be salient in the operation of the Colombian party system. In this respect, the dissertation is an exploratory and descriptive one. On the basis of the descriptive material, the second goal is to develop a series of propositions and hypotheses concerning these party actions. These proposition and hypotheses are stated as having general application although they have not been tested. As Leslie Lipson has written:

> The study of a single country, as is evident can lead to conclusions which are valid for it alone and do not in

> themselves warrant a wider application. But such conclusions will suggest hypotheses for testing in other contexts so that, when these are checked by a comparative method, a reliable body can be pieced together.[27]

Field work for the study was conducted in Colombia from February until May, 1975. Some of the historical and statistical data were gathered in Bogotá, while other research and the interviewing of party members was done in Cali. Cali was chosen for two reasons. First, it was not possible to examine party factions in any detail on a national basis. Second, Cali was chosen because it is the capital city of one of the more important departments (from an economic and political perspective) in Colombia: Valle del Cauca, generally referred to simply as Valle. Since Cali is the capital city, it was possible to interview politicians who participate in, and have knowledge of, a broad range of party activity. It was also hoped that by focusing on one city and one department, it would be possible to gather data at different levels of the parties, and that this approach would facilitate the identification of the most salient characteristics of factional behavior. Consequently, the conclusions reached herein should be taken for what they are. They may or may not be valid for other cities or departments. To determine this would be outside the scope of this study; ideally, one might hope that they could form the basis for future research.

Evidence used in this study was acquired in several ways. The writings of scholars, both Americans and Colombians, were useful

---

[27]Leslie Lipson, "The Two-Party System in British Politics," American Political Science Review, 47 (June, 1953), 338.

traditional sources. Colombian newspapers are also very valuable sources of information about party factions, but they must be read with a critical eye because of their rather open partisanship. In the interviewing of party members two methods were used. Informal and unstructured interviews were first conducted with several party activists because of the paucity of descriptive information on internal party affairs. Data acquired from these interviews was then used to develop a standard set of questions to be asked of other party members. By the second method 18 party members holding national, departmental, and municipal offices were interviewed. Only officeholders were chosen because of their participation in internal party affiars. The sample was small, as the intent was not to establish statistical relationships, but was aimed primarily at acquiring descriptive data which is seriously lacking in regard to party politics in Colombia. The departmental party secretaries were interviewed twice and were apparently quite frank in discussing many politically sensitive issues. All those interviewed will, of course, remain anonymous.

This study falls into three parts. The first attempts to outline briefly the current state of research in regard to factionalism and party politics in Latin America. In Chapter II, a review is presented which summarizes the theoretical literature devoted to the study of political factions. The aim is to give an overview of the principal findings of other studies, the theoretical generalizations which have been proposed, and to point out some of the main problems which have arisen. This body of work is presented not in the form of hypotheses

to be tested here, but rather as an organizing framework and a suggestion as to the direction in which the research should proceed.

In the second part, party factions in Colombia are explored. Chapter III is a historical account of party and factional politics at the national level during the National Front period. Chapters IV through VI attempt to describe three general characteristics or aspects of factions: (1) the structure of factions, (2) patterns or elements of factional conflict, and (3) factions within the political arena.

As the description of each of those characteristics progresses, an effort will be made to state several propositions and to suggest their possible interrelationships. In the third part, Chapter VII, an attempt will be made to formulate a refined series of propositions which it is hoped will make some contribution to the development of political theory concerning factional behavior not only in Colombia but in other political systems as well.

CHAPTER II

THE STUDY OF FACTIONS

The past decade or so has witnessed a sudden outpouring of studies of factions and closely related topics, but this scholarly vigor has not been altogether an unmixed blessing. While on the one hand it has focused attention on conflict within groups and institutions such as villages or political parties, it has also created some confusion regarding terminology, method, and the conclusions which may be drawn. Therefore it might be useful before proceeding any further to review this body of work, and attempt to point out what have been some of the major findings as well as identifying some of the more prominent problems. Such a review is of necessity brief; to deal with the now-existing literature in any complete way would involve a full-length study in itself, and perhaps one is now needed.[1]

The Problem of Definition

The word "faction" is a common one in discussion of politics, used frequently by both journalists and scholars. Among the latter, however, the search for precision in the use of the word has created both a

---

[1]Following the completion of the research for this chapter, an edited work was published which offers a convenient survey of much of the theoretical literature pertaining to factionalism. Many of the articles cited in this chapter may also be found in the following book. See Steppen Schmidt, et al., ed., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

debate and confusion as to its meaning. The question of how a faction is to be defined is not a trivial one; to the contrary, this matter is directly related to other questions concerning factions, and many of the theoretical generalizations which have been offered by various scholars are dependent upon what they believe a faction is.

The word faction is derived from the Latin verb facere, to do, to make.[2] Originally, the noun form described the groups which organized chariot races in the Roman circus. Several hundred years ago, however, the word began to take on an expressly political meaning. In American history, the definition of James Madison has become famous.

> By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.[3]

Madison's dislike of factions is an attitude often shared by others, and the term has for the most part been used in an opprobrious sense; the "factious spirit" is one to be condemned.

Contemporary scholars, however, have sought to define factions without an inherent moral judgement of their effects upon the community. One of the earliest of these definitions is that of Harold Lasswell, who wrote that "the term faction is commonly used to designate any constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of

---

[2]See the OxFord English Dictionary for the etymology of the word "faction."

[3]The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cook (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 58.

particular persons or policies."[4] This formulation has been criticized as being too broad a definition since "from the point of view of the state" the British Labour Party could be considered a faction.[5] It is true that the term faction has been defined in many different ways. In his study of a village in India, Oscar Lewis regarded factions as "primarily kinship groupings."[6] To some factions are groups, but to others they are not groups but "quasi-groups" or "action-sets."[7] Others consider factions to be essentially legislative groups "with a measure of discipline and cohesion."[8] Still others use the term in such a way that organization is not necessary at all, and a faction may be little more than an opinion grouping within a party or a legislature.[9] Impermanence has been suggested as the major element in any definition of faction, yet Asian scholars argue that in Japan some factions have

---

[4]Harold D. Lasswell, "Faction," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1931), Vol. 6, p. 49.

[5]J. A. A. Stockwin, "A Comparison of Political Factionalism in Japan and India," Australian Journal of Politics and History, 16 (December, 1970), 364.

[6]Oscar Lewis, Village Life in Northern India (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958), p. 147.

[7]Adrian C. Mayer, "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. Michael Banton (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), pp. 97-122.

[8]Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in British Parties," Political Studies, 12 (February, 1964), p. 37.

[9]Alan J. Stern, Sidney Tarrow, and Mary Frase Williams, "Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties: Some Evidence From a Study of Italian Socialist Activists," Comparative Politics, 3 (July, 1971), 529-559.

lasted for decades.[10] Factionalism has been defined as covert conflict within a group as well as "overt conflict which leads to the increasing abandonment of cooperative activity."[11] Factions have been defined as non-ideological groups in conflict, while on the other hand they have been defined as "deep structural divisions within a single ideological movement or tendency."[12] For some scholars, the heart of the definitional problem has been how to delineate factions from party. Once the two terms were used more or less synonomously, but the rise of modern political parties makes it necessary, in the opinion of some students, to define factions in such a manner as to avoid confusing them with political parties.[13]

Differences in definition are shaped to some extent by professional training, as in political science or anthropology, for example, and Raphael Zariski has recognized cultural influences as well.

> There seems to be no agreement as to what factions <u>are</u>: each country has its own variety of factional activity, and this inevitably shapes the conceptual scheme of political scientists concerned with that country.[14]

---

[10]Stockwin, op. cit.; George O. Totten and Tamio Kawakami, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics," <u>Pacific Affairs</u>, 38 (Summer, 1965), 109-122.

[11]Bernard J. Siegel and Alan R. Beals, "Pervasive Factionalism," <u>American Anthropologist</u>, 62 (June, 1960), p. 399.

[12]Christopher Mitchell, "Factionalism and Political Change in Bolivia," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1974 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 1.

[13]Janet N. Bujra, "Dynamics of Political Action: New Look at Factionalism," <u>American Anthropologist</u>, 75 (February, 1973), 132-152.

[14]Zariski, p. 25.

These definitions represent only a sampling of the literature, but they indicate the diversity which now exists. The admirable goal of achieving greater precision has so far produced only variety, and the initial problem remains unsolved: What is a faction? The question, however, cannot be answered by scholastic debate. As indicated earlier, how factions have been defined has been influenced by other considerations. In order to fully understand the problem it is necessary to examine several related matters.

The Structure or Organization of Factions

The structure, or the manner in which students have perceived factions to be organized, is one of the major influences not only upon how they are defined, but also upon other theoretical formulations. It is not possible to review all of these descriptions, but an examination of a few of them is indispensable.

Anthropologists have had a considerable impact upon political scientists and their conceptions of factions. In a comparative study of the literature in his field, Ralph Nicholas has set forth several propositions concerning the structural characteristics of factions. First, Nicholas argues that factions are political groups in conflict. What delineates them from other political groups, however, is the "negative criterion" that factions are not corporate groups. In other words, factions are not institutionalized and they lack permanence. Another characteristic of the structure of factions is the central position of the leader. Nicholas proposes that it is the activity of

the leader that gives rise to the faction. The leader recruits his followers, or members of the faction, and "members can be connected to a faction only through the activity of a leader, since the unit has no corporate existence or clear single principle of recruitment."[15]

Approaching it from a somewhat different angle, Adrian C. Mayer has developed a similar conception of the structure of factions. Mayer likewise concludes that factions are not corporate groups but rather what he calls "quasi-groups" composed of a series of "action-sets."

> These quasi-groups differ fundamentally from the group and the association. First, they are ego-centered, in the sense of depending for their very existence on a specific person as a central organization focus; this is unlike a group in which organization may be diffuse. Second, the actions of any member are relevant only in so far as they are interactions between him and ego or ego's intermediary. The membership do not include interaction with other quasi-group members in general.[16]

Both Nicholas and Mayer, then, essentially agree that the primary structural characteristic of factions is that the leader occupies the central position and the members are individually connected to him, or to him through an intermediary. They may interact with one another, but this is not necessary. In fact, it is being "ego-centered" which distinguishes factions from other political groups.

Another anthropologist, B. D. Graham, has described factions in much the same way, but states that the structure may be more extensive.

---

[15]Ralph W. Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965), p. 28.

[16]Mayer, p. 97.

The leader he calls the "core," and the attached followers the leader's "support." Graham agrees with Mayer that the structure of a faction may include intermediaries. The structure may furthermore be "direct" or "indirect."

> A faction has a direct structure when its secondary leaders are the lieutenants of the primary leader, to whom the followers owe direct allegiance; it has an indirect structure when the secondary leaders have independent followings, and the ability to secede—when, in fact, a faction is a federation of minor factions. In practice, a faction combines direct and indirect features in its structure although the balance may vary greatly.[17]

But it is not only anthropologists who have described factions in such terms. In a study of the origins of American political parties, the historian William Nisbet Chambers reaches essentially the same conclusion. Chambers states that politics in America before the rise of political parties was "faction politics." This type of politics, he says, "depended heavily on personalities and personal ties, and was subject to abrupt, kaleidoscopic change."[18] Structurally, these early American factions differed from political parties in that they lacked and "durable or regularized relationship between leaders and followers."

---

[17]B. D. Graham, "The Succession of Factional Systems in the Uttar Pradesh Congress Party, 1937-66," Local-Level Politics, ed. Marc J. Swartz (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 324.

[18]William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 26. For a similar treatment of early American factional politics see Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). A different treatment is given to factions and the rise of American political parties in Rudolph N. Bell, Party and Faction in American Politics: The House of Representatives, 1789-1801 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973).

They were composed of political leaders who had followers personally tied to them, but these were weak and could change or be broken rapidly.[19]

While Chambers maintains that factions were dominant in American political life before the ascendancy of political parties, it would be misleading to suggest that they disappeared afterwards. Historians as well as other students have recognized that despite changes factions have persisted. They have not always been labeled factions, but the descriptions of the structure of "bossism" or "machines" are strikingly similar.[20] Without the language of social science, William L. Riordan's little book, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, is a classic description of what some would call factional politics. In it, George Washington Plunkitt relates how he rose in politics by building a personal following.

> Now, I've told you what not to do; I guess I can explain best what to do to succeed in politics by tellin' you what I did.

---

[19]Chambers, p. 45. For a similar view of the structure of factions in eighteenth century British politics, see Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (London: St. Martin's Press, 1957), and by the same author, England in the Age of the American Revolution (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1961).

[20]It is not possible to discuss in any detail the literature on American political machines and bosses; the amount of material is simply too vast. Suffice it to say, however, that these political forms have usually been described in essentially the same way as many conceive of factions; that is, as political structures which are "ego-centered," or built on personal ties to a leader. Thus machines were based on networks which existed by virtue of allegiances not to a group, an idea, or an institution, but to the boss. To cite only one example of this, Robert Caro in his massive study of Robert Moses writes that, "By the end of (Mayor) Impelliteri's term, there existed within the upper echelons of the city government an extensive network of men whose first loyalty was not to that government but to the man who ran the independent government on Randall's Island," The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 79.

> After goin' through the apprenticeship of the business while I was a boy by workin' around the district headquarters and hustlin' about the polls on election day, I set out when I cast my first vote to win fame and money in New York city politics. Did I offer my services to the district leader as a stump speaker? Not much. The woods are always full of speakers. Did I get up a book on municipal government and show it to the leader? I wasn't such a fool. What I did was to get some marketable goods before goin' to the leaders. What do I mean by marketable goods Let me tell you: I had a cousin, a young man who didn't take any particular interest in politics. I went to him and said: "Tommy, I goin' to be a politician, and I want to get a followin'; can I count on you?" He said: "Sure, George." That's how I started in business. I got a marketable commodity—one vote. Then I went to the district leader and told him I could command two votes on election day, Tommy's and my own. He smiled on me and told me to go ahead. If I had offered him a speech or a bookful of learnin', he would have said, "Oh, forget it."[21]

In recent years, political scientists have devoted more attention to identifying the structural properties of factions and describing them in a more generalized way to allow for a greater range of application and comparison. In this effort they have been greatly influenced by the work of several anthropologists who have for some time been concerned with village politics and factions. Drawing upon anthropological theory, Carl Lande proposes that factions are structured as dyads, or as a series of dyadic (two-person) exchanges.[22] Using the concept of dyad, Lande has developed an extensive set of propositions about factions.

---

[21]William L. Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: Dutton, 1963), pp. 11-12.

[22]Lande has employed the concept of dyad in several studies of factions. See his Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (Yale University: Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 6, 1965), and "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some observations on the Group Theory of Politics," American Political Science Review, 67 (March, 1973), 103-127.

As far as the structure of a faction is concerned, Lande's propositions do not vary greatly with those of anthropological theory. He sees factions as political forms which are structured as a network of dyadic exchanges between the leader and his individual followers. It is this point which is crucial; the role of the leader is central to a faction's existence. Without a leader there is no basis for the existence of a faction. What distinguishes a faction, therefore, from what Nicholas calls corporate groups, or what Lande calls trait associations, is that the only common point which binds together the members of a faction is their individual ties to the leader.


Consequently, factions come into being because of the action of the leader. His following is developed out of a desire of leader and follower to exchange favors—such as jobs for votes or political support. Because of these reasons a faction relies heavily on face-to-face relationships, is restricted in size, and often short-lived. As Lande, Andrew Nathan,[23] and others have noted, a faction normally cannot outlive its leader. Factions tend to be unstable, often depending upon whether the leader can provide sufficient particular rewards to his followers. Loyalties are, therefore, relatively weak, and there is much shifting of allegiances as the situation demands.

Another important structural characteristic of factions according to Lande is their ability to expand and consolidate, or to "pyramid." In other words, the leader in the dyad may link himself to another dyad,


---

[23]Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53 (January/March, 1973), p. 43.

thereby expanding the faction. Thus while he continues to be the leader of his faction he becomes a follower as well in a now larger faction. Exchanges, however, tend to continue to be dyadic. Nathan proposes that this may be explained by distinguishing between "simple" and "complex" factions, and may be illustrated as follows.[24]



Simple Faction



Complex Faction

In both of these cases, the significant interactions continue to be conducted in a dyadic way, and the faction still exists not because of the loaylties or exchanges among all members, but between member and leader.[25]

In the past few years a model has become popular among political scientists which is of particular interest to those concerned with the

---

[24] Ibid., p. 41.

[25] The person playing the role of both leader and follower has been called by some students either a "broker" or intermediary. That a faction may be structured in such a way has been asserted not only by anthropologists but by historians as well. See for example, Lewis Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 203, fn. 1.

structure of factions. This is the concept of clientelism.[26] It is of interest because the terms "faction," "clientele," "patron-client relationships," "dyadic relationship," to mention only a few, have begun to overlap considerably, and the result has been some confusion. This may be illustrated by comparing the following two definitions.

> A faction may therefore be defined very broadly as a segment of a clientage network organized to compete with a unit or units of similar type within one or more political arenas. It is a coalition of self-interested followers recruited personally by or on behalf of a leader, who is in conflict with another leader or leaders.[27]

> The patron-client relationship—an exchange relationship between two roles—may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. Two characteristics of the patron-client dyad require emphasis in this context: its basis in inequality and its diffuse flexibility as a system of personal exchange.[28]

Thus, Lande regards the structure of a faction as a dyad, while Nathan refers to it as clientelism. Scott states that a patron-client relationship is a dyadic one, while Sandbrook defines a faction as part

---

[26]For a summary and critique of the clientelism model in political science see Robert R. Kaufman, "The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Problems and Prospects," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (June, 1974), 284-308.

[27]Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa," Canadian Journal of Political Science 5 (March, 1972), p. 111.

[28]James C. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia, " The Journal of Asian Studies, XXVII (November, 1972), p. 8.

of a "clientage" network. Is everyone talking about the same thing? It appears that for the most part they are. Whether the choice of labels is patron-client relationship, clientelism, faction, or dyadic ties, each writer is referring to essentially the same type of political behavior. What to call it and how to describe it may differ, but the propositions about these political structures are basically the same. It would be more accurate perhaps to say that the structure of a faction is a patron-client relationship or a particular kind of dyadic one, but not all of the latter type are factions. For example, a marriage is a dyadic relationship. Consequently, since "faction" has a distinctly political connotation it will be the term used here, but the studies of clientelism are considered applicable.

An Opposing View of the Structure of Factions

The various descriptions of the structure of factions dealt with so far do not represent the view of all scholars. These descriptions have been challenged by a number of political scientists who hold an opposing concept which is relatively simple to explain. This contrary description of the structure of factions takes issues, policy or ideology as the defining variable. For example, in a study of Italian political parties three authors write:

> The problem with the clientelistic approach is that it is hard to conceive of factions that are <u>not</u> cemented together by personalistic ties, nor is it possible to conceive of any form of political grouping, at least at the activist or leadership level, in which there are not friends and neighbors, leaders and followers, and so forth. In other words, what the clientelistic interpreters of factions have taken as

a specific property of factions is also a general property of political associations.[29]

Stern, Tarrow, and Williams argue instead that factions are structured more as "opinion groups" on a left-right continum. Others have arrived at much the same point. Munger and Blackhurst in their study of party conventions in the United States interpret factions as ideological groupings of states.[30] Christopher Mitchell's description—that factions are divisions "within a single ideological movement or tendency"—has already been mentioned.[31] It is not uncommon either for those who study legislative bodies to describe factions as groups whose principal characteristic is shared policy or ideological goals. For Richard Rose, factions in British parties are marked by not only shared policies, but by organization, leadership, and a certain durability. This is in contrast to what he calls "tendencies," or common attitudes which are far more fluid and lacking the organization of factions. But in both cases Rose makes policy or ideology the major feature of his analysis.[32]

Summary

The foregoing review represents perhaps the more important propositions which have been made about the structure of factions. As Belloni and Beller have correctly observed:

---

[29]Stern, Tarrow, and Williams, p. 535.

[30]Frank Munger and James Blackhurst, "Factionalism in the National Conventions, 1940-1964: An Analysis of Ideological Consistency in State Delegation Voting," Journal of Politics, 27 (May, 1965), 375-394.

[31]Mitchell, p. 1.

[32]Rose, op. cit.

> The major issue of the structural properties of factions has been what might be termed factions' primary organizing variable. That is, students of factions have given the object of their study several different characteristics in terms of what, basically, faction consists of. Some have called them "cliques" and "followings" and some have called them "wings" of a party. The several different conceptualizations, however, are ultimately reducible to two: factions are conceived as consisting of followings of a prominent leader, or they are conceived of consisting of a collectivity of like-minded individuals. The two views are not ultimately inconsistent; nevertheless, there is a real difference in relative emphasis of the leadership quality and the quality of shared values of substantive policy or ideology.[33]

It should be much clearer now that how factions are defined—or ought to be defined—depends upon one's perception of the structure or form of a faction. Those who define factions in terms of dyads, patron-client relations, or personal followings place the emphasis upon the leader and his relationship to his followers. The other camp regards this as of secondary importance to the policy or ideological beliefs and goals the faction may have. Yet, while the structure of factions remains an earnestly debated point in regard to how they are to be defined and what propositional statements may be made, this area of disagreement is closely interwoven with another matter: the nature of factional conflict. In order to explain how the structure of a faction has been perceived to be related to factional conflict, the latter must be discussed in some detail.

---

[33]Frank P. Belloni and Dennis C. Beller, "The Study of Political Party Factions," International Review of History and Political Science, 10 (May, 1973), p. 68.

Factions and Conflict

For many anthropologists, factions cannot be examined apart from their lifeblood of conflict. Ralph Nicholas has aptly summarized this by noting that "conflict is the raison d'etre of factional membership. Conflict explains why there is no such thing as one faction in any political arena; obviously there must always be at least two factions."[34] By almost any standard Nicholas is correct; regardless of how they have been defined, to speak of factions is to speak of conflict whether it be mild or extreme. Moreover, the notion of faction has always implied plurality and division; a faction is a part of something, or exists within something, be this a political party, a religious movement, a village, a military organization, or a legislative body. In its modern usage faction suggests intra-group division and conflict. As Harold Lasswell has observed, "a faction presupposes some measure of unity in fundamentals."[35] However slight it may be, factions share some common ground. In this sense David French has pointed out that the positions of factions are not "true opposites."

> In other words, factions may be participating differently (and this can include having differing ideologies) with regard to a system which all have in common and which all understand equally well.[36]

No doubt it is because factions represent intra-group conflict and division that they generally have been written of or spoken of in an

---

[34]Nicholas, p. 27.

[35]Lasswell, p. 49.

[36]David French, "Ambiguity and Irrelevancy in Factional Conflict," in Intergroup Relations and Leadership, ed. Muzafer Sherif (New York: John Wiley, 1962), pp. 240-241.

opprobrious sense. To admit that factions exist is to admit that the group is not unified; the group contains within itself a smaller group (or groups) which is "participating differently." Consequently, from a moral point of view factions have been condemned as selfish and as a threat to the unity of the whole.

Origins and Sources of Factional Conflict

Laying aside any moral judgments, what gives rise to factions? In the tenth Federalist, James Madison wrote, "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man . . . . But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property."[37] For Madison the word "faction" meant something much broader than it does today, but contemporary social scientists have been no less interested in unearthing the seeds of factionalism whether they are buried in human nature or the unequal distribution of property.

Most scholars have avoided the prickly question of the cause of factions, and instead have focused on identifying either the origins or sources of factional conflict. It might be said that in general two methods have been employed. The first is the historical, which takes a political party, movement, society or whatever, and from the evidence available attempts to identify which specific events in the past are the ones from which factionalism sprang. Normally, the historical approach leaves the matter at that, with the conclusions applying only to the case at hand. This is legitimate, but other social scientists have

---

[37] The Federalist, pp. 58-59.

followed a different course by seeking to determine what forces give rise to factions and, if possible, state these in the form of propositions which have either partial or universal application. To simplify, the emphasis of the historical method is upon specificity while the social science method is upon generality.

Unfortunately, social scientists have neglected somewhat the historical basis of factionalism. For example, if one accepts the description that factions are defined as personal followings in the manner described in the preceding section, then the evidence would suggest that factions as a political form have existed for thousands of years. A. H. M. Jones notes that in Athens class conflicts occurred between the rich and the poor, but there were also "groups or cliques among the politicians . . . . But such alliances were probably based on personalities and seem to have been temporary."[38]

Quite likely factions can be found in almost all periods of history and societies, but the historical origins are still obscure. Thus social scientists have looked more at contemporary behavior in the search for the sources of factionalism, and the number of explanations nearly defy categorization. The following are a few categories which have been devised to permit some order and to simplify the review. They should be regarded as somewhat arbitrary, and represent only a sampling of the literature.

1. Cultural Bases. Many explanations of the origins of factions are founded upon patterns of behavior or norms believed to be

---

[38]A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), p. 110.

significant in a given culture. Thus, for example, the values associated with kinship—such as exclusiveness, affectivity, and mutual loyalty—are projected into politics and remain strong even though society has undergone change and kinship groups have lost the power they may have once exercised. Students of Asian societies frequently note the importance of kinship patterns and their relation to factional behavior,[39] and there is now a growing body of literature devoted to the connection between kinship and patron-client relations in Latin America.[40]

2. Role Confusion. Although it has been expressed in varying ways, some writers suggest that factions originate in confusion regarding appropriate roles. Two anthropoligists have attempted to explain this in terms of "stress" and "strain." Stress is external pressure brought to bear on a community which in turn produces strain, or "the presence of potential conflicts concerning appropriate forms of behavior."[41] When change occurs (for whatever reasons) an ambiquity is

---

[39]See, for example, Oscar Lewis, Village Life in Northern India; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); K. G. Machado, "From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines," Journal of Asian Studies, 33 (August, 1974), 523-547.

[40]This literature is too extensive to be listed here, but one interesting attempt to apply anthropological concepts to history is Stephanie Blank, "Patrons, Clients, and Kin in Seventeenth Century Caracas: A Methodological Essay in Colonial Spanish American Social History," Hispanic American Historical Review, 54 (May, 1974), 260-283.

[41]Siegel and Beals, p. 407.

produced within social organizations as to how individuals should properly respond. Consequently, factional struggles erupt as the community attempts to adjust.

3. Structure of Party or Government. Perhaps the best known explanations of the sources of factionalism in political science are those which associate factions with the structure of the parties or the government. In this case, party or governmental structure is believed to be either the principal root of factional conflict or a condition which exacerbates it. V. O. Key, for example, attributed the multifactionalism he found in the Democratic parties of the Deep South to the lack of party competition.[42] In contrast, it has been argued that a competitive party system tends to reduce the number of factions within a party.[43] Aspects of political systems, such as electoral systems and types of legislatures, are also held to be a major source of factionalism. Duverger maintains that proportional representation encourages the growth of factions because there is less need for unity to win a seat.[44] Likewise, it has been asserted that factionalism is pervasive in Japanese parties because the parliamentary system—

---

[42]V. O. Key, pp. 15-18.

[43]John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1966), Chapters 2 and 3.

[44]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley, 1963), pp. 248-249.

theoretically at least—puts the premiership in reach of so many individuals.[45]

4. Incentive Approaches: Self-Interest vs. Moral Incentives. Some political scientists (and a few anthropologists) have attempted to determine the sources of factional conflict by focusing on what the participants want. In other words, what are the goals of the participants? What are the incentives that lead them into conflict? What do they hope to obtain? Two sub-categories might be included under this rubric.

The first is what might be called self-interest incentives. This category includes those who have interpreted factional conflict as arising from the desire of the participants to gain personally, whatever it might be. For some it is the struggle for political power. For James Payne the goal is status in society. Lande argues that factions are "especially likely to appear when leaders and followers can provide large gains to each other at small costs to themselves."[46] Lastly, the material rewards of patronage is an interpretation which deserves to be stressed since more than a few writers have found the source of factional conflict in the skirmishing for access to the public purse.

The second category is called moral incentives to include those interpretations of factional conflict as arising from the moral goals of

---

[45]Haruhiro Fukui, "Factionalism in a Dominant Party System: The Case of Japan," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1974 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, p. 6.

[46]Lande, "Networks and Groups," p. 122.

the participants. In other words, the participants may be drawn into conflict because of their desire to achieve what they believe is "right" more than to gain materially. This may take the form of factional disputes over issues, programs, doctrine or ideology, and the goal of a faction is to have its policies or beliefs accepted by the others.

Patterns of Factional Conflict and Conflict Resolution

While the origins or sources constitute one aspect of factional conflict, the manner in which that conflict is conducted and resolved is another. Since factionalism is generally accepted as being intra-group conflict and therefore factions share some common ground, anthropologists have maintained that for the most part factional conflict is not a "zero-sum game." In other words, factions "relatively seldom kill, jail or even confiscate the property of their opponents within the system" unless they are perceived to be a threat to the system itself.[47] Regulated in this way, factions calculate and recalculate their strength and that of opponents, exchange charges and countercharges, maneuver and test their strength, but these are the "rules of the game" generally accepted by the participants.

The ways in which factional conflict is conducted may at times be deceiving. If the incentives or sources of conflict are self-interest rather than moral or programmatic, factions may nevertheless use moral or ideological rhetoric in their disputes. This may take the form of

---

[47]Nathan, p. 46.

charges regarding ideological purity or the questioning of morals and personal motives. Several purposes may thereby be served. First, it may be a strategy by which a faction seeks to attract support to itself and weaken that of others since it cannot openly admit that its goals are not significantly different than others. Second, the appeal to emotions may at times be one of the most ancient strategems of politics—that of diverting attention from personal venality. Third, inasmuch as factional conflict is often viewed as selfishly motivated, factions may couch their appeals in moral terms as a means of seeking legitimacy or approval; in short, to have their behavior considered just.

Two questions may be raised at this point. How is factional conflict conducted if factions really do spring from program or ideological disputes? If factions indulge in ideological exchanges how is it to be determined if their motives are sincere? There may be a rather curious and ironic way to gain some insight into these questions. Joseph Nyomarkay proposes that "the nature and characteristics of intragroup divisions are determined by the nature of legitimacy of the group." He argues that in totalitarian movements, legitimacy "may be either ideological or charismatic; it is either dogma or person that justifies the existence of the group."[48] Consequently, if it is dogma that binds together the group factions will avoid attacking dogma and attack persons. If on the other hand it is loyalty to a leader that

---

[48]Joseph Nyomarkay, "Factionalism in the Socialist German Workers' Party 1925-1926: The Myth and Reality of the Northern Faction," Political Science Quarterly, 80 (March, 1965), p. 44.

binds together the group, factions will dispute points of dogma and avoid attacking the leader.[49] Although these propositions are drawn from an investigation of a totalitarian movement it would seem they merit investigation in other contexts.

The third area of investigation into factional conflict has been the attempt to identify the patterns of its resolution. The general argument has been that factional disputes are resolved, or at least suppressed for a time, through alliance or through the elimination of the principal source of conflict. Factions may bargain and make deals, one faction might politically destroy or absorb another faction, a leader might die or abandon the conflict, and so on. It has also been asserted that factional conflict may be resolved through the process of institutionalization; in a village setting a faction may begin to entrench itself to the extent that it begins to lose the characteristics of a faction and becomes more of a "group invested with local authority."[50] Likewise, one or more factions may cease to be factions and become institutionalized as a political party or parties.[51]

In any event, these propositions have been put forward by those who on the whole interpret factional conflict as not arising from ideological disputes. As a result, factional conflict is said to be

---

[49] Ibid., p. 45.

[50] Bujra, p. 145.

[51] This is, of course, a standard argument in regard to the origins of political parties in the United States. Jeremy Boissevain has recorded an incident where factional conflict resulted in the permanent formation of a new party in a village on Malta. See his "Factions, Parties and Politics in a Maltese Village," American Anthropologist, 66 (December, 1964), 1275-1287.

most often resolved through peaceful means, such as negotiation, or through the process of institutionalization. Yet if the conflict is of a highly ideological nature, or if factions believe themselves to be motivated by important moral issues, how is it resolved? When the incentives are moral, it would appear that the room for negotiation is much more restricted. In a totalitarian party factional conflict might be resolved by the losers being arrested or taken out and shot. In less extreme circumstances the conflict might be resolved by the withdrawal of a faction from the arena, or perhaps by its being driven out with no further punitive action being taken. Whatever the patterns of conflict resolution might be in such cases, they have not been explored in any depth by students of factionalism.[52]

Relationships between Structure and Conflict

One of the more intriguing questions which seems to emerge from a review of the literature on factionalism concerns the relationship between the structure of factions and the patterns of factional conflict. It was noted earlier that how a faction should be defined depends upon one's view of the structure of a faction, but this in turn seems to be interrelated with the nature of conflict. One interesting point is that those who argue that the structure of a faction is a dyadic or patron-client relationship also see factional conflict as motivated by

---

[52]The Democratic party in 1968 could possibly be a valuable case study of factional conflict arising from highly charged moral issues, and how that conflict was dealt with.

self-interest, conducted by tactical maneuvering, and resolved by negotiation. Conversely, those who maintain that the structure of factions is some sort of collectivity of like-minded individuals tend to view conflict as policy or issue-oriented, although in general little has been said about the resolution of conflict. Thus it has been hinted, but not made explicit, that the structure of a faction is interdependent with conflict, and this is especially true in regard to the structure of a faction and the sources of or incentives to conflict.[53] The patterns of factional conflict and conflict resolution are also related in some way to the previous two variables.

Thus four variables seem to stand out: the structure of a faction, the sources of or incentives to conflict, the style or ways in which conflict is conducted, and patterns of conflict resolution. The relationships among the propositions concerning these variables are not specified in the literature, nor is a suggestion as to what these relationships might be offered at this point. This question will be considered in the concluding chapter of the study. In the meantime, these four variables will be among those which will be used to explore party factionalism in Colombia. It will also be noted that "faction" has not yet been defined. Because of the issues raised above, this delay has been deliberate. It does not seem fruitful to debate the

---

[53]For a valuable essay in this vein which deals with American political parties, see Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts," The Journal of Politics, 34 (May, 1972), 365-398.

meaning of "faction" apart from other questions. As John Rawls has argued, in the development of theory:

> Definitions and analyses of meaning do not have a special place: definition is but one device in setting up the general structure of theory. Once the whole framework used in setting up the general structure of theory is worked out, definitions have no distinct states and stand or fall with the theory itself.[54]

There remains, however, a third area to be considered and that is the relation between factions and their environment, or the political arena in which factions are to be found.

Factions and the Political Arena

The most difficult task for social scientists has been to determine the relationship between factions and their environment whether it is a village, a political party, or a nation. Nevertheless, this aspect of factional conflict cannot be ignored. As Janet Bujra has pointed out, factions are "dynamic phenomena" which are "in a dialectical relationship with other social and political processes."[55] They cannot be understood apart from their environment, but this has proved to be an especially thorny problem for those wishing to understand what that relationship is.

This question has been approached in several different ways. One of these has been the attempt to relate the concept of faction to other

---

[54]John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 51.

[55]Bujra, p. 133.

concepts, such as stability, integration, modernization, and then by evaluating factions according to whether they have positive or negative consequences in their impact upon the former. In this way it has been debated back and forth that factions promote stability or exacerbate instability, that they facilitate national integration or hinder it, and so on.

Those who see factions as having positive effects probably speak for the minority. Ralph Nicholas states that while factions are associated with social and political change, "in the absence of conventional political division, (factions) perform necessary functions in organizing conflict."[56] Based on a study of a Guatemalan community, Norman Schwartz has developed a similar argument.

> In the absence of durable national political parties and corporate political groups at the local level, the factions organize and channel political conflict in the town. In the attempt to gain power, which involves an attempt to defeat and sometimes do personal damage to each other, faction rivals also perform necessary tasks.[57]

The sort of tasks factions may perform are directing rivals toward certain goals, stimulating political interest among the citizenry, articulating demands, and if factions are able to rotate in office individuals may acquire some experience in government.

Schwartz rejects the position that factionalism is automatically undesirable for a community.

---

[56]Nicholas, op. cit., p. 29.

[57]Norman B. Schwartz, "Goal Attainment Through Factionalism: Guatemalan Case," American Anthropologist, 71 (December, 1969), p. 1100.

> For some communities this may involve erroneous assumptions about the way in which political energies are mobilized. In some places factions may organize personnel and mobilize support for competing views on the direction the community should take in the future. In a more "harmonious" community, decisions based on majority demands may leave minority demands unsatisfied and deeper resentment within the community. Consensus politics can be a name for the effective suppression of dissent.[58]

To students of American political parties it is a well-known argument that "machine" politics performed integrative and socialization functions, particularly in those cities which received large numbers of immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[59] Some believe that party factions in changing societies may play a similar role.

Alex Weingrod, for instance, takes the position that there is a "positive" relationship between patronage of party factions and the role of the state. According to Weingrod, "Party patronage . . . is associated with the expanding scope and general proliferation of state activities, and also with the growing integration of village, city, and state.[60] The spread of patronage then indicates that the role of the state is becoming greater politically, socially, and economically, but

---

[58]Ibid., p. 1106.

[59]The classic statement of this thesis is to be found in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 71-81.

[60]Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10 (July, 1968), p. 381.

"these changes are symptomatic of an even more profound transition: namely, the movement from 'traditional' to 'mass' society."[61]

Most students, however, are less sanguine about the impact of factionalism on a political system. In his study of an Indian village, Oscar Lewis noted that one characteristic of factions was they sometimes cut across caste lines and included individuals who might socially have little in common.[62] Carl Lande found a similar pattern in the Philippines with the effect that factions vertically split social and economic classes. The importance of this observation is that when members of factions are recruited from different classes and bound together by reliance upon dyadic ties, the development of class identification tends to be inhibited. Individuals may show little concern about government measures which adversely affect their class since they can expect to be exempted, or avoid such measures, through the system of personal connections.[63]

As a result, factional politics hinders the development of what Luigi Graziano calls categorical groups. This situation he refers to as disorganic integration and exclusivism.

> That is when clientelism integrates people in the social and political system, it does so in a (dyadic) way which prevents the restructuring of society along associational lines. Clientelism is the product of a disorganic society and tends to preserve social fragmentation and disorganization.

---

[61] Ibid., p. 384.

[62] Lewis, p. 114.

[63] Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties, p. 43.

> Secondly, clientelism integrates, but very selectively, the other side of particularism being exclusivism.[64]

In sum, when factional politics is prevalent within a system it tends to inhibit broad participation in the decision-making process since the system responds to those who have the necessary personal connections while excluding others. Groups based on associational traits may find it difficult to participate, and indeed in a society which emphasizes personal followings, associational groups may be held in low esteem.[65] Moreover, the concept of the impartial rule of law is undermined, and bribery and corruption are encouraged as a means of gaining access when previous personal connections do not exist.[66] Some social scientists have observed the effects on bureaucracies as well, and argue that when personal ties are lacking, bureaucracies are

---

[64]Luigi Graziano, "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy," European Journal of Political Research 1 (April, 1973), p. 5.

[65]See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965); Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958). In a study of barrio politics in Mexico City, only 14 percent of those surveyed thought that they could improve their own condition, and only 1 percent thought that private aid could be used. Wayne Cornelius, "Urbanization and Political Demand Making Among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities," American Political Science Review, 68 (September, 1974), 1131. Similarly, there may even be a clash between those who hold associational values and those who cling to the values of personal relationships. Richard Hofstadter feels that there was such a conflict between the Yankee reformers and Southern European immigrants in the United States around the turn of the century. See his The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), pp. 174-186.

[66]Anthony H. Galt, "Rethinking Patron-Client Relationships: The Real System and the Official System in Southern Italy," Anthropological Quarterly, 47 (April, 1974), 182-202.

characterized by complex rules, lengthy delays, approval of numerous authorities, and no assurance that a valid request will be granted. Yet when personal ties do exist, bureaucracies may respond rapidly and efficiently.[67]

In a recent article, two political scientists have disputed the argument that clientelism, or factional networks, may promote national integration. Not only do they feel that such networks inhibit the growth of modern structures, but they respond to Weingrod's thesis by asking, "Who are the patrons who direct patronage? What are the types of transactions involved in party patronage? Can the volume of demands channelled through patronage be sustained by the system without endangering its viability?"[68] They suggest that the evidence indicates party patronage may not be able to handle the volume of demands because rewards given to supporters by leaders are particularistic in nature. The success of clientelism also depends upon "control of the means of production."[69] When control is centralized integration may be promoted. If, however, the means of production are controlled by local bosses, they will be unlikely to make any changes which would undermine their power.

Lamarchand and Legg see two additional negative consequences of clientelistic politics. First, a clientelistic network may be too

---

[67]Michael Kenny, "Patterns of Patronage in Spain," Anthropological Quarterly, 33 (January, 1960), pp. 14-23.

[68]Rene Lamarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development," Comparative Politics, 4 (January, 1972), p. 175.

[69]Ibid., p. 176.

extensive to effect changes. In other words, the political system is "hamstrung" by a complex web of personal allegiances and obligations. Second, in rural areas pressure for change may build until violence is the only means whereby peasants may escape domination by local patrons.[70]

The claim that the distribution of patronage by factions is conducive to integration or stability has been challenged by others on several points. James Scott, for example, has suggested that factional politics may be inflationary in some cases because of the need of faction leaders to dip into the public coffers in order to reward their supporters.[71] A recent study of Philippine politics lends some credence to this thesis, but the authors have developed some additional hypotheses which relate the strength of factions to economic conditions. They maintain that as the Philippine economy has become more industralized and as capital has become more concentrated, "patronage resources have become increasingly scarce in relationship to the obligations incurred," and this in turn has led to more deficit financing.[72] Moreover, economic differentiation has further increased pressure upon local machines by permitting the rise of numerous leaders who find it more difficult to obtain sufficient rewards to satisfy their

---

[70] Ibid., p. 177.

[71] James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, 65 (March, 1972), pp. 111-113.

[72] Thomas C. Nowak and Kay A. Snyder, "Clientelist Politics in the Philippines: Integration or Instability?" American Political Science Review, 68 (September, 1974), p. 1149.

followers. This intensifies factionalism because of the "greater ease with which clients can attach themselves to and break attachments with patrons." They write that:

> Increasing reliance on monetary forms of exchange by political machines facing a growing shortage of patronage resources decreases the reliability of support for any one faction. Since both the economic and psychic sanctions which patrons can apply to urban lower classes are more limited than those available to a landlord with his tenants, clients have more incentive to maximize their resources by hedging on commitments—e.g., collecting money from or being courted by more than one faction.[73]

In sum, in an urbanized and economically expanding environment factions tend to become more unstable and are weakened as resource-providing and control mechanisms.

Nowak and Snyder take no firm stand on whether the weakening of local factions leads to increasing political instability. They conclude that this largely depends upon whether alternative means of integrating the masses into the life of a nation are developed such as through "class- or mass-based parties." But if this is not done, they assert, "the increasing weakness of machines intensifies the potential for more violent forms of mass activity."[74]

These positive and negative consequences have been a few of the ways in which many social scientists have attempted to conceptualize the role of factions in the political system. There are, however, other ways in which this has been done. At least one political scientist places factions within a historical-developmental framework.

---

[73]Ibid., pp. 1152-1153.

[74]Ibid., p. 1170.

Much like Chambers, Huntington sees factions as political forms which precede institutionalized political parties, and calls factional politics "preparty" politics. In the development of institutionalized parties factions may originate either as legislative groups or revolutionary groups. In either case, however, Huntington views factions as "inherently conservative."

> In and of itself the competition of factions—legislative or revolutionary—tends to be a closed system, an endless round of interminable maneuvering in which the actors continually shift partners and antagonists without ever enlarging the number of participants.[75]

For a system to make the transition from factional politics to party politics it is necessary to have a polarized situation arising from issues which cut deep into the system; otherwise, there is no reason for factions to change or "attempt to expand political participation." If, however, the issues are severe enough leaders will be forced to appeal for greater support and competing factions will form much broader allegiances. Thus the stage is set for the shift from a system of factions to one of parties.[76]

---

[75]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 415.

[76]Ibid., pp. 415-419. In a recent study of Australian political parties, P. M. Weller places factions in a similar historical-developmental framework. For Weller factions are also a type of political form preceding institutionalized parties. But unlike Huntington he finds that the key change is the shift from the authority vested in a particular leader to moral authority deriving from the position or office. P. M. Weller, "From Faction to Party: The Role and Authority of the Leader," Political Science (New Zealand), 26 (December, 1974), 41-47.

The Utility of a Faction Model in the Study of Latin American Politics and Political Parties

It is now possible to return to some of the questions raised in Chapter I and suggest how a model of factions might be of some value in the study of Latin American politics and political parties. To an extent, such a model might be of special utility. Often Latin America is regarded as having its own unique ways of going about its politics, different from all other societies with the possible exception of the mother countries, Spain and Portugal. Although there is much truth in this assessment, the task in comparative politics is to account for whatever uniqueness may exist as well as to explain the possibilities of finding constants and similarities in political behavior which might permit a level of general application of theory.

The immediate problem is political party factionalism, but it is worth noting that a faction model might be useful as a tool not only in the study of parties but also as a link to certain political phenomena often considered distinctively Latin American. This was alluded to earlier in the observation that factionalism is sometimes said to have some vague relationship to such Latin American traits as personalismo, caciquismo, and caudillismo. Yet what, precisely, is this relationship?

In his study of Tzintzuntzan George Foster attempted to construct a model which would account for an important form of social behavior of individuals outside of family life and describe "the underlying principle which gives the social system coherence." Foster maintained that at this level of human interaction, individuals organized their

relations with other individuals by means of a "special form of contractual relationship" that he called a dyadic contract. Foster argued that in Mexico such contracts have a profound impact because they "cut across formal institutional boundaries and permeate all aspects of society." These contracts were implicit ones validated by the reciprocal exchange of goods and services, and composed of two types: the "colleague" contract, which bound persons of roughly equal status, and the patron-client contract, which bound people of unequal status.[77]

Foster believed that an awareness of the importance of these contracts would help greatly in understanding behavior not only in Mexico but the rest of Latin America. In essence, they are defense mechanisms, the way people cope with a world perceived to be hostile and threatening. As such, the patron-client contract exists not only in the temporal world but the spiritual as well. God, Christ, the Virgin, and the saints are all patrons, or potential patrons, to whom one makes promises or offerings in hopes of obtaining some favor in return.[78]

These contracts are pervasive in society, and explain why corporate groups are difficult to form and why formal rules or laws are so often ignored. They underly what is referred to as personalism, and Foster maintained that personalismo is nothing more than a contractual tie between two people (a dyad) who feel that they can help each other

---

[77]George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Relationship," American Anthropologist, 65 (December, 1963), p. 1281.

[78]Ibid., p. 1282.

by ignoring in large measure the institutional context in which they meet."[79]

If Foster's judgment is correct, it is not surprising that these dyadic contracts, especially the patron-client type, have been seen as having a significant impact upon the political system as well. According to Eric Wolf and Edward Hansen, one of the main characteristics of caudillismo in the nineteenth century was the "repeated emergence of armed patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms."[80]

Clearly Latin America has undergone political change since the days of Juan Manual Rosas or Porfirio Díaz, and the classical caudillo has faded into history. Nevertheless, the personal ties which were the basis of the caudillo's strength still occupy a special place in politics. As Wayne Cornelius has shown, the cacique, the local political boss, has adapted to the changing times and lives on.[81] Yet even more important than the cacique in Mexican politics is what Kenneth Johnson calls the "mosaic of linkages" or the personal ties that

---

[79]George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Village," American Anthropologist, 63 (December, 1961), p. 1191.

[80]Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (January, 1967), p. 169.

[81]Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Contemporary Mexico: A Structural Analysis of Urban Caciquismo," in Robert Kern, ed., The Caciques (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), pp. 135-150.

combined to make up the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. This informal network cuts across all boundaries and makes it difficult to enforce formal rules. Johnson writes that:

> Whether we refer to them in English as cliques or brotherhoods is unimportant if it is understood that we refer to tightly knit nuclei of loyalty and influence, usually founded about the power of a given individual whose ability to control behavior and allocate rewards makes him the catalyst which gives the group a singularity of purpose, and an informal web that can perhaps be called a latent structure.[82]

This latent structure may expand outward from the central "boss" in what Johnson calls "circles of intimacy" not only within the formal structure of the party but well beyond it.

These are only a few examples of a "personalistic" style of politics which is sometimes implicitly suggested as being peculiarly Latin American. At first blush, however, it is striking how closely they conform to many of the propositions which have been made regarding the structure and behavior of what many have called factions. These propositions may or may not be valid when applied to factions in Latin American political parties, but they do offer a starting point toward the development of a more sophisticated set of theoretical generalizations than has previously existed.

---

[82]Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 71.

CHAPTER III

PARTIES, FACTIONS, AND ELECTIONS IN COLOMBIA: 1958-1974

The purpose of this chapter is to sketch briefly a narrative history of party politics in Colombia during the period of the National Front. The emphasis is upon the parties and their factions at the national level, and the results of the congressional and presidential elections held between 1958 and 1974. Since no single work has appeared yet in either Spanish or English describing Colombian politics during this time period, this chapter may be useful as a general description of what happened specifically with reference to the major national factions, when they came into being, and how they fared in the elections. It is also hoped that this chapter will make subsequent chapters clearer by providing the reader with an overview of the parties and factions at the outset. The first part is a brief description of the formation of the National Front. The following sections have been divided according to the four presidential terms provided for in the original agreement between the parties.

Formation of the National Front

Emerging in the year 1849, two "traditional" parties of Colombia, the Liberals and the Conservatives, have a long history by any standard, and especially so when compared to other Latin American political parties. Yet, if the history of the Liberals and Conservatives is long,

it is also bloody. During the nineteenth century, the two parties fought each other in numerous civil wars, and the death toll was often high for a sparsely populated nation. In one of the bloodiest, the civil war known as the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902), it has been estimated that 100 thousand persons were killed.[1]

Although not as frequent as in the previous century, conflict between the parties in the twentieth century has been more severe. On April 9, 1948, the charismatic Liberal leader, Jorge Gaitán, was shot to death on the streets of Bogotá for reasons not entirely clear. His assailant, an apparently demented man with a personal grudge, was immediately beaten to death by an enraged mob of witnesses. Gaitán's assassination inflamed the Liberal masses of Bogotá. Within an hour of Gaitán's death, riots broke out in the city, public order collapsed, and mobs began burning and looting buildings. During the next thirty-six hours, the central part of the city was nearly destroyed in what has been called the bogotazo. The number of deaths reached several thousand before order was finally restored.

The outburst in Bogotá fanned the flames of violence which had broken out in some rural areas following the election of Mariano Ospina Pérez as president in 1946. As John Martz has pointed out, "Contrary to what has been written elsewhere, violent clashes did not begin following the Bogotá riots of 1948. Rather they were mounting in

---

[1]Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, History of Colombia, Trans. by J. Fred Rippy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1938), p. 519. The population of Colombia in 1900 was about 4 million.

intensity some months before."[2] Mariano Ospina was the first Conservative president in sixteen years, and in certain rural areas of Colombia fierce party loyalties had once again erupted in violent conflict. The Conservative controlled national police began to persecute Liberals which in turn led to bloody reprisals against Conservatives. The bogotazo worsened a situation already serious, and during the next decade thousands of Liberal and Conservative campesinos died in what is simply called la violencia. The exact number of deaths is not known, but estimates have ranged from 100 thousand to more than 200 thousand.[3]

As the violence in the countryside spread beyond control the Conservatives increased their suppression of Liberals holding public office or positions in the bureaucracy. In protest, the Liberals refused to participate in the presidential election of 1950. The absention of the Liberals and a state of siege declared by Ospina resulted in the election of Laureano Gómez, a Conservative and admirer of Spanish falangism. Gómez did little to halt the growing violence and his heavy-handed attempt to establish a falangist regime in Colombia alienated leaders of his own party. After three years of violence in the countryside and the tactics of the Gómez government, the military

---

[2]John D. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 50.

[3]There is no satisfactory study of la violencia. A good starting point, however, is the annotated bibliography compiled by Russell W. Ramsey which includes 250 items in Spanish and English. See, Russell W. Ramsey, "Critical Bibliography on La Violencia in Colombia," Latin American Research Review, 8 (Spring 1973), 3-44.

took power in a coup supported by both parties. Gómez went into exile and General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla became the new chief of state.[4]

The enthusiasm which originally greeted the military coup slowly turned into hostility. Although Rojas made some effort to suppress the violence, he grew more and more ambitious to perpetuate his own rule. To the leaders of the traditional parties this was intolerable, however much they fought among themselves. As Rojas set about organizing his own independent political base, the Liberal and Conservative chiefs began exploring ways of unifying their opposition. In July 1956, Alberto Lleras Camargo, the major Liberal leader, met with Laureano Gómez in Spain. The result of this meeting was the Pact of Benidorm, by which they agreed to form a common Civil Front against Rojas and run a joint candidate in the elections of 1958. Rojas fought back with repression and began laying the groundwork for his own election. In 1957, Liberal and Conservative leaders announced that they would run Guillermo León Valencia as a joint candidate for president. Rojas responded by placing Valencia under house arrest. Politically, this was a mistake, for it touched off a series of protests which led to the overthrow of Rojas. Student demonstrators fought with soldiers and police. The Church denounced Rojas and a general strike was called. In

---

[4]The two principal works which describe the Gómez era are Martz, pp. 98-169, and Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), pp. 118-142.

the face of such opposition, the military forced Rojas to resign on May 10, 1957.[5]

To restore Colombia to civilian rule and to find some way of bringing party conflict under control, Alberto Lleras Camargo and Laureano Gómez met again in Spain. The result of these negotiations was an agreement known as the Pact of Sitges. Briefly, the agreement provided for the establishment of a coalition government called the Frente Nacional or National Front. At the heart of the agreement were three provisions. The first was alternación, or alternation. By this provision the presidency was to be alternated between the two parties for twelve years, but later (1959) the period was extended to sixteen years. Only one candidate would stand for election and both parties had to approve the person chosen. The second provision was paridad, or parity. This provision required that all legislative bodies be divided equally between the parties, and only Liberals and Conservatives would be eligible for election. Likewise, all posts in the bureaucracy and cabinet positions were to be divided equally between the parties. The third, major provision required that all legislation be passed by a two-thirds majority. This was intended to guarantee bipartisan support on all legislative acts.[6]

---

[5]While Martz and others emphasize the detention of Valencia as a crucial event leading to the downfall of Rojas, Daniel Premo discounts this and argues that the student protests were more important. See, Daniel Lawrence Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular: Populism and the Politics of Social Class in Colombia, 1961-1970," Unpub. Ph.D Diss., University of Texas, 1972, p. 15.

[6]See, Por qué y Cómo se Forjó el Frente Nacional (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1959).

To gain popular support for the National Front coalition, a plebiscite was held on December 1, 1957, and leaders of both parties urged that the agreement be ratified by the people. The result was overwhelming approval of the proposals; 4,169,294 votes were case in favor, 206,864 votes against, while 20,738 blank or null ballots were cast. Voter participation was the highest in the twentieth century, with 72.3 percent of the eligible electorate casting ballots.[7]

The Elections of 1958

The plebiscite, however, was only the first step in implementing the National Front. The next step was the election of legislative bodies and the president, with the latter to be chosen on a separate date. Legislative elections were scheduled for March 1958, and the presidential election two months later in May.

One reason the presidential election was to be held later was that old rivalries in the Conservative party had begun to reappear and threatened to wreck the coalition even before it could be instituted. The major division was between former presidents Laureano Gómez and Mariano Ospina Pérez, who had been battling one another for control of the Conservative party for many years. The heart of the dispute was who would control the presidency. Alberto Lleras and Laureano Gómez had agreed that the first candidate would be a Conservative. Yet while Gómez had been in exile the Liberals had worked out an understanding

---

[7]Registraduriá Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, Abril 21, 1974, p. 374.

with Mariano Ospina that the first candidate would be Guillermo León Valencia. Thus, Valencia was identified with the Ospinista wing of the party and was therefore totally unacceptable to Gómez, who was still considered to be the principal leader of the Conservatives, and without whose cooperation the coalition would not work.[8]

The rivalry between Gómez and Ospina was not the only split within the Conservative party. The National Front agreement itself came under attack from two other Conservative leaders, Jorge Leyva and Gilberto Alzate Avendaño, both of whom were ambitious to be president. Leyva had held various elected offices and had been minister of public works under Laureano Gómez. Alzate had been a political activist in his youth and had once been expelled from the party by Gómez. Readmitted to party ranks, Alzate continued to maneuver for the presidency. He made a bid to succeed Mariano Ospina as president but was blocked in the party convention of 1951. Undaunted, Alzate had continued his efforts to capture the party nomination.[9]

The National Front may have helped bring party conflict under control, but it did not bring about internal party unity. The disputes within the Conservative party over control of the presidency were reflected in the Congressional elections of 1958. The Conservatives ran three different slates, or lists, of candidates. The Laureanistas, led by Gómez, voiced their support of the National Front, while the Ospinistas directed their attacks mainly at the Gómez faction in an

---

[8]Martz, pp. 259-263.

[9]Ibid., pp. 123-124.

effort to increase their share of Conservative votes. The Ospinistas did not reject the National Front, but the Alzatistas fiercely attacked the whole idea of sharing power with the Liberals. In a rare display of unity, Liberal candidates generally supported the National Front.[10]

When the votes were finally counted, the Laureanistas had soundly defeated their Conservative rivals, winning 28 seats in the Senate and 49 seats in the House of Representatives (see Table 3.1). The Ospinistas won 10 seats in the Senate and 19 in the House, and the Alzatistas captured only two Senate seats and six House seats.

The Laureanista victory created a dilemma. The Liberals had indicated their support of Valencia as the presidential candidate, but the Ospinistas had been defeated. Gómez had demonstrated that he was still the strongest Conservative leader, and had established his right to approve or disapprove the nominee. With the presidential election only a few weeks away, the coalition was left without a candidate. Gómez flatly rejected Valencia, and his intransigence touched off an acrimonious debate within the Conservative party. Gómez suggested numerous other Conservatives, but the Liberals refused to accept anyone but Valencia. To break the impasse, Gómez finally decided to strike a bargain with the Liberals. He suggested that the first coalition candidate be a Liberal on condition that the second president be a Conservative and that the National Front be extended to 1974.[11]

---

[10] Ibid., p. 267.

[11] Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 135-136.

TABLE 3.1

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1958

Party/Faction	Votes	Percent	Seats
	Senate		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	2,105,171	57.6	40
Conservatives	1,545,262	42.3	
Laureanistas	NA	NA	28
Ospinistas	NA	NA	10
Alzatistas	NA	NA	2
Null and Blank	5,040	0.1	-
Total	3,655,474	100.0	80
	House of Representatives		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	2,132,741	57.7	74
Conservatives			
Laureanistas	925,856	25.1	49
Ospinistas	446,894	12.1	19
Alzatistas	150,155	4.1	6
Others	33,368	0.9	-
Null and Blank	4,925	0.1	-
Total	3,693,939	100.0	148

Sources: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 3,000,000 Colombianos Cedulados, pp. 51-2; Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, p. 154.

This bargain was acceptable to the Liberals, but the problem was finding a candidate. The only Liberal with sufficient standing and prestige was Alberto Lleras Camargo. At first, Lleras refused the offer on the grounds that since he was one of the architects of the National Front, his candidacy might be a barrier to party and national unity. The situation became more and more tense as the election drew nearer. Finally, after much discussion Lleras Camargo decided to accept the nomination.[12]

Although Lleras Camargo was the official coalition candidate, he did not run unopposed as had been the intent of the alternation provision. Jorge Leyva continued to denounce the National Front and entered the contest as a Conservative candidate even though he received no support from the party hierarchy. Alberto Lleras, however, won easily. Of the 3,108,567 ballots cast, Lleras received 2,482,948 votes while Leyva received 614,861 votes (see Table 3.2). The National Front had at last been put into effect, but the number of votes received by Leyva suggested that popular support for the bipartisan experiment had already begun to decline.

The Presidency of Alberto Lleras Camargo

Alberto Lleras Camargo assumed office at a crucial time in Colombian politics. The recent experience of military government, the continuing violence in the countryside, and the experiment of the

---

[12]Martz, p. 270.

TABLE 3.2

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1958

Candidate	Votes	Percent
Alberto Lleras Camargo	2,482,948	79.87
Jorge Leyva	614,861	19.78
Others	290	-
Null and Blank	10,468	0.33
Total	3,108,567	99.98

Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, p. 155.

National Front made his task a difficult one. Lleras Camargo, however, was a skillful politician, both nationally and internationally. He had served as president of Colombia from 1945 to 1946, following the resignation of Alfonso López Pumarejo, as secretary-general of the Organization of American States and as chief of the Colombian delegation to the San Francisco meeting which drafted the charter of the United Nations. His background and ability to compromise had made him the logical choice to head the first National Front government.

Although the economy was functioning reasonably well when Lleras Camargo took office, several problems demanded immediate attention. The violence in the rural areas remained severe, and Lleras Camargo attempted to halt the violence by issuing an amnesty decree in 1958, as Rojas Pinilla had done in 1954. A rehabilitation program was established but failed because of Conservative opposition. Yet it did

lay the basis for the Acción Comunal program established in 1959.[13] In another attempt to cope with the social and economic problems of the rural areas, Lleras Camargo proposed an agrarian reform soon after taking office, but no bill was passed by Congress until 1961.[14] Lleras also attempted to create goodwill by lifting the state of siege which had been in effect since the elections of 1949. The president took an active role in planning and development and encouraged export diversification. Cotton, tobacco, and sugar exports did rise, but the increase of the latter two was in part the result of the blockade of Cuba by the United States.[15]

In addition to persistent economic and social problems, every president during the National Front has had to face one constant political problem: factionalism within the parties. During the first few months of his government Lleras Camargo was generally spared this headache, but by early 1959 divisions within the parties had begun to widen. Initially, Lleras tried to maintain good relations with each of the two major factions of the Conservative party, but squabbling between the Laureanistas and the Ospinistas made this nearly impossible. The Laureanistas had defeated the Ospinistas in the election of 1958 and had

---

[13]Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 65-66.

[14]Ernest A. Duff, Agrarian Reform in Colombia (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 20-61.

[15]Carlos F. Díaz-Alejandro, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1976), p. 25.

been included in the government as the representatives of the Conservative party. The Ospinistas, who had been excluded, demanded participation and claimed that they represented the party in spite of their electoral defeat.[16]

Behind the rhetoric the major point of difference was the composition of the cabinet. Laureano Gómez wanted to be the only spokesman of the party and flatly refused to allow Ospinistas to hold cabinet positions. Yet in an effort to mollify the Ospinistas, Lleras Camargo shook up the cabinet in March 1959 and appointed two Ospinista ministers. This attempt at compromise satisfied neither side. Mariano Ospina then ordered his two ministers to resign, but they broke with him and remained in the government.[17]

When Congress opened again in July 1959, the Ospinistas became more critical of the National Front, and tried to block the bill legitimizing the extension of the alternation provision to 1974. The Ospinistas attacked Gómez for working with the Liberals, but Gómez defended the National Front as beneficial to both parties. As a result of the sniping between the two factions, the Laureanistas held their own convention in September. The following month the Ospinistas formed an alliance with the Alzatistas with the intent of wresting control of the party from Gómez. By the end of the year, party unity seemed more elusive than ever.[18]

---

[16]Dix, p. 137; Martz, p. 293.

[17]Martz, p. 294.

[18]Dix, p. 137.

As the Conservatives fought among themselves for control of the party and the distribution of cabinet posts, divisions began to appear in the Liberal party as well. In mid-1959 Alfonso López Michelsen formed a group called first the Movimiento de Recuperación Liberal, and later the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (MRL). In the beginning, Alfonso López took the stance of leftist dissident. He was careful not to disavow the Liberal party, but did call for radical reform. López attacked the alternación provision on the grounds that the Liberals were the majority party and therefore should not be required to turn over the presidency to the Conservatives in 1962. López also attacked the "oligarchical domination" of the Liberal party, expressed a sympathy for Fidel Castro and put forth a program of reform called "Salud, Educación, y Techo" (Health, Education and Housing), or the "Plan de SET."[19]

As 1959 drew to a close, the divisions within the parties caused some concern over the elections scheduled for the following March. The National Front had attempted to bring the extreme party conflict under control, but now the growing factionalism within the parties threatened to wreck the Front itself. The National Front, in fact, was made the issue of the campaign, and a simple pattern may be observed: Those factions which controlled the coalition government defended the National Front, and those excluded from government attacked it. Thus, the "official" Liberals and the Laureanista Conservatives appealed to the

---

[19]Alfonso López Michelsen, Colombia en la Hora Cero, Tomo I (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1963), pp. 270-277.

voters for support of the coalition. On the other hand, the Alza-Ospinistas, the MRL, and the smallest of the Conservative factions, the Leyvistas, all attacked the coalition agreement.

The results of the elections of March 1960 were a stunning surprise, and upset the balance of power in the Lleras Camargo government. Running separate lists of candidates, the Alza-Ospinistas defeated the Laureanistas and won a majority of the Conservative votes. In the House of Representatives, the Alza-Ospinistas won 38 seats, while the Laureanistas captured 37 seats. The Laureanistas still held the majority of Conservative seats in the Senate, but dominance of the Conservative party had clearly shifted from Gómez to Ospina. The Leyvistas remained a minor faction, winning only one seat in the House (see Table 3.3).

The MRL also did surprisingly well. The MRL won approximately 14 percent of the total vote and 18 seats in the House of Representatives. The "official" Liberals lost their monopoly of the party, but still held 58 seats in the House.

The election of 1960 indicated that significant numbers of voters in each party were not pleased with the coalition government. The MRL and the Alza-Ospinistas had both criticized the National Front and had apparently touched a responsive chord. The election also forced a repositioning of political forces. Lleras Camargo tried to balance the situation by including all four factions in the government. Alfonso López refused to participate and all Laureanista cabinet ministers resigned. This meant that the coalition would now be based on the

TABLE 3.3

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1960

Party/Faction	Votes	Percent	Seats
	House of Representatives		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	1,106,678	43.5	58
MRL	354,560	13.9	18
Others	17,165	0.7	-
Conservatives			
Ospinistas	567,087	22.3	38
Laureanistas	446,393	17.6	37
Leyvistas	37,020	1.5	1
Others	8,870	0.3	-
Null and Blank	4,878	0.2	-
Total	2,542,651	100.0	152

Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, p. 154.

"official" Liberals and the Alza-Ospinistas. Stung by his defeat, Laureano Gómez shut down his national headquarters, even though his followers still held a significant number of seats in Congress.

The new factional arrangements made it difficult for Alberto Lleras to govern effectively. In his own party he was faced with an opposition faction which had made an impressive showing in its first election campaign and which had publicly rejected cooperation with the government. In the Conservative party, the Alza-Ospinistas and the Laureanistas simply exchanged positions; the former became defenders of the government, and the latter became opponents. In Congress the MRL and the Laureanistas used their position to harass the official Liberals and the Alza-Ospinistas. For example, the agrarian reform was Lleras Camargo's most important piece of legislation, yet the MRL and the Laureanistas tried every possible tactic to delay or defeat the bill. The bill was finally passed on November 22, 1961, but its slow progress through Congress illustrates the effect of party factions on policy-making. It had taken Congress two years to act.[20]

In the final two years of the Lleras Camargo administration, internal party divisions widened as the time drew nearer to select a new president. The National Front agreement required that the next president be a Conservative, and although it was clear that the "official" candidate would be someone agreeable to the two dominant factions, "unofficial" candidates began to emerge nonetheless.

---

[20]See Duff, pp. 20-61.

One was the former dictator, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. In 1958 Rojas had returned from a brief exile which followed his overthrow. In 1959 he was stripped of his civil rights by the Colombian Senate on the grounds of corruption and abuse of power while he was president. In 1960 Rojas founded the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) which was originally made up of his family and friends and dissidents in the two traditional parties, primarily the Conservatives. In spite of the fact that his candidacy was illegal, Rojas announced his intention to run for president in 1962.[21]

Rojas was not the only unofficial candidate challenging the coalition. In 1961 the MRL began agitating to have Alfonso López Michelsen nominated for president. The Lleras Camargo government responded by ordering that López Michelsen's name not be inscribed as a candidate since as a Liberal he was not constitutionally eligible to serve as president during the next period. López argued against this position, but the government refused to back down.

In the meantime, the two ruling factions bided their time in making known who the coalition candidate would be. The two men who would have the greatest influence in choosing the next candidate were Mariano Ospina Pérez and Carlos Lleras Restrepo. The death of Gilberto Alzate Avendaño in 1960 had made Ospina the undisputed chief of the Conservative's largest faction. Similarly, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a cousin of Alberto Lleras Camargo, had emerged after the 1960 elections

---

[21]Premo, Chapters I and II.

as the leader of the "official" Liberals. As senator, he had guided the agrarian reform law through Congress, and in 1961 he had been named jefe único of the Liberal party.[22]

Amid much speculation the choice of the official candidate was dragged out through several months of haggling and negotiation. The Ospinistas refused to allow the Laureanistas a voice in the selection of a candidate, but the Ospinistas were not able to agree among themselves. Finally, in late February 1962, the Ospinistas decided to let the Liberals make the decision and submitted five names to the Liberal convention. Guillermo León Valencia, who had been denied the presidency in 1958 by Laureano Gómez, had received the most votes in the Ospinista convention and he was overwhelmingly the choice of the Liberals.[23]

As the campaign of 1962 got into full swing, the principal issue was once again the National Front. Making a second bid for the presidency, Jorge Leyva ran as a dissident Conservative. In vitriolic speeches Leyva denounced the National Front and appealed for violent demonstrations against the government. Although he was receiving some backing from the Laureanistas, his popular appeal was not great.[24]

The ANAPO campaign was poorly organized and had to cope with the restrictions placed on rallies and appearances by the government in a

---

[22]Carlos Lleras Restrepo, Hacía la Restauración Democrática y el Cambio Social, Tomo I (Bogotá: n.p., 1963), p. 367.

[23]Dix, pp. 139-141.

[24]Kenneth F. Johnson, "Political Radicalism in Colombia: Electoral Dynamics of 1962 and 1964," Journal of Inter-American Studies, 7 (January, 1965), p. 21.

somewhat confused attempt to prevent Rojas from having much appeal. Premo writes that:

> The bases for the movement's first doctrinal platform were patently demogogical and expressed in the simple language of the lower class masses to whom it was directed. That ANAPO had failed to create an institutional identity of its own can be seen in the fact that Rojas and his partisans identified more with the accomplishments claimed for the military government than any articulated program for the future.[25]

In contrast to the approaches of Leyva and Rojas, the MRL attacked the National Front from the position of the radical left. Alfonso López attacked the Alliance for Progress and claimed that Colombia had been made dependent upon the United States. He called for major economic and social reform and greater public ownership of resources. In foreign policy, López expressed sympathy for the Cuban Revolution and criticized John Kennedy for the American blockade. In short, the MRL tried to present itself as a group in favor of radical reform.[26]

As the candidate of the National Front, Guillermo León Valencia no doubt drove his supporters to the point of despair. The son of a romantic poet and Conservative politician, Valencia sometimes became mired in his own rhetoric. Pat Holt writes that:

> In Manizales, which is the coffee capital of Colombia, Valencia was so moved by the orators who had preceeded him that he threw away a carefully prepared speech on coffee and extemporized for half an hour about the virtues of honesty in public life. He explained to his audience that his prepared speech, of which he read only a few paragraphs, had already been released to the press and that they could read it the next

---

[25] Premo, p. 59.

[26] See Alfonso López Michelsen, Colombia en la Hora Cero, Tomo II, "Campaña de 1962."

> morning. It was, he said in effect, dull—"without an epithet, without a literary figure . . . ." This had roughly the same effect that would be produced by a United States candidate telling an audience in Kansas that it would bore him to read a speech on wheat.[27]

But Valencia's rambling, mystical oratory was not the National Front coalition's greatest problem. In the last two years of Lleras Camargo's term, social and economic problems had begun to mount. The rural violencia had not been eliminated, but had, in fact, gotten worse. Maullin states that "Political violence in 1961-1962, as measured by the number of incidents, increased by a third over its 1960 level, reaching an intensity nearly two-thirds that of 1958."[28] Moreover, the rural violence had begun to take on an ideological character, with the formation of Castro-oriented guerrilla bands.[29] In addition to the violence, the fear of Cuba, and the vague threats of Rojas to take over the government, tension was building as a result of the economy. Inflation had grown more severe, and pressure was building to do something about the overvalued peso.[30]

Amid these difficulties the legislative elections were held in March 1962, and the presidential election in May. The National Front coalition maintained its control of the government, but the elections divided the parties more than had been the case in 1960. In the Liberal party, the Oficialistas won a majority of seats in both houses of

---

[27]Pat M. Holt, Colombia Today—And Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 68-69.

[28]Maullin, p. 28.

[29]Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[30]Díaz-Alejandro, pp. 184-195.

Congress, capturing 37 seats in the Senate and 59 seats in the House of Representatives. Yet the MRL cut into the strength of the dominant faction, winning 12 seats in the Senate and 18 in the House. Furthermore, the MRL had increased substantially its share of the Liberal vote in the House elections from 21.5 percent in 1960 to 36 percent in 1962 (see Table 3.4).

In the Conservative party the Laureanistas were again soundly defeated. The Laureanistas received 35 percent of the Conservative vote, and lost ground in the Congress. In the Senate the Laureanistas won only 16 seats while the Ospinistas won 31 seats. In the House of Representatives, the Ospinistas increased their number of seats to 50, while the Laureanistas held on to 36. The Leyvistas won no seats in either house, but ANAPO won 6 seats in the House and 2 in the Senate.

In the presidential election held two months later, the National Front survived its first challenge, but the increase in popular support for the opposition was substantial. Valencia received slightly more than 60 percent of the votes, but the combined strength of the opposition candidates was almost 40 percent (see Table 3.5). The votes of López and Rojas were counted but annulled on the grounds they were ineligible candidates. Rojas had made a tactical error perhaps in campaigning so early after his return and with little or no organization, and won only a small percentage of the votes. Instead, the popular dissatisfaction Rojas had hoped to turn to this advantage had been expressed in the heavy vote for López Michelsen, although one surprising result was that the MRL had captured a great many votes in the rural

TABLE 3.4

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1962

Party/Faction	Votes	Percent	Seats
	Senate		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	1,076,151	34.9	37
MRL	601,063	19.5	12
Others	2,376	0.1	-
Conservatives			
Unionistas	797,341	25.9	31
Laureanistas	491,731	16.0	16
Others	4,450	0.1	-
ANAPO	104,829	3.4	2
Null and Blank	2,114	0.1	1
Total	3,080,055	100.0	98
	House of Representatives		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	1,081,103	35.0	59
MRL	601,926	19.5	33
Others	2,502	0.1	-
Conservatives			
Unionistas	794,688	25.7	50
Laureanistas	487,733	15.8	36
Others	4,778	0.1	-
ANAPO	115,587	3.7	6
Null and Blank	1,886	0.1	-
Total	3,090,203	100.0	184

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Organización y Estadísticas Electorales: Marzo y Mayo de 1962, pp. 42, 89, 165.

TABLE 3.5

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1962

Candidate	Votes	Percent
Guillermo León Valencia	1,633,873	62.1
Jorge Leyva	308,814	11.7
Alfonso López Michelsen*	624,863	23.7
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla*	54,557	2.1
Others	494	-
Null and Blank	9,012	0.4
Total	2,631,613	100.1

*Votes Annulled.

Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, p. 155.

areas.[31] In sum, the National Front had been victorious in its first real test, but the increase in support for opposition factions and ANAPO portended greater difficulties in the years ahead.

The Presidency of Guillermo León Valencia

Guillermo León Valencia has been regarded as a weak president, and a man "who in style and manner seemed almost a throwback to the

[31] It is not clear why the MRL did well in the rural areas. Payne believes it was a Liberal backlash against a Conservative government in areas where the violence had been severe. See, James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 234-237. See also, Lars Shoultz, "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1946-1970," Political Science Quarterly, 87 (March, 1972), pp. 38-39. Payne's hypothesis seems to be supported by calculations made by Maullin, who finds that the MRL received a higher percentage of votes in areas with violence than without violence. In contrast, there was little difference for the "establishment" Liberal factions. See Maullin, pp. 50-51.

nineteenth century." Yet under Valencia the government was able to reduce the level of rural violence, which was perhaps the greatest accomplishment of his administration.[32] In other areas Valencia had less success. Soon after Valencia took office Colombia was forced to devalue the peso, and inflation rose at a rate three times that recorded under Lleras Camargo.[33]

In addition to the problems of devaluation and inflation, Valencia also had to cope with the problem of growing factionalism within Colombia's political parties. Although the Oficialista Liberals and the Ospinista Conservatives controlled the government and held the largest blocs of seats in Congress, the MRL had increased its strength, and the splintering of the parties made it more difficult to get legislation passed.

One practice which Alberto Lleras had followed in an attempt to lessen the opposition of the factions in Congress had been to offer them participation in the government roughly proportional to their voting strength. As has already been pointed out, in the case of the Ospinistas and the Laureanistas this did not work. Valencia refined the procedure and the practice became known as milimetría.[34] Thus, of the six cabinet posts to be distributed among the Conservatives, two

---

[32]Maullin, p. 9.

[33]For a brief discussion of the 1962 devaluation see, Díaz-Alejandro, pp. 188-195.

[34]Francisco Leal Buitrago, Análisis Histórico del Desarrollo Político Nacional, 1930-1970 (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1973), p. 137.

were given to loyalists of Mariano Ospina, two to followers of the late Gilberto Alzate (although the Alzatistas were now aligned with the Ospinistas), and two to the Laureanistas, who this time accepted. Of the six Liberals appointed to cabinet positions, five were Oficialistas and one was a member of the MRL. ANAPO, however, was not offered any positions.

Participation by the MRL in the government was brief. Six weeks after his appointment, MRL Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Juan José Turbay, resigned. The reason for the MRL's abrupt change of attitude was a dispute over the governorships. The MRL wanted a greater share, but Valencia had refused to break the milimetría formula.[35] In the case of the MRL, at any rate, the compromise had not worked.

At the same time that Valencia was trying to unify the parties, the MRL was being broken up by factionalism in its own ranks. In late 1962 dissidents within the MRL began to complain that López Michelsen was not radical enough in his opposition to the National Front. Much of the criticism being directed at López came from MRL members in the department of Valle del Cauca. One of the leaders of the dissident group was Cecilia Muñoz, nicknamed la pelusa, or "the fuzz," because of her short haircut. Under a barrage of criticism for not taking a more radical stance, López followed the time-honored tactic of Colombian politicians and resigned as chief of the faction. The tactic worked, at least temporarily. At the MRL convention held in Ibagué during

---

[35]Hispanic American Report, October 1962, pp. 932-933.

November 1962, the dissidents were repudiated and López was reinstated as chief.[36]

Nevertheless, López was not able to hold the faction together. During 1963 the MRL began to split into three groups: one group favoring closer relations with the National Front factions, one group demanding more militant opposition, and the third, led by Alfonso López, taking a course of moderate opposition. After several months of feuding and maneuvering, the MRL finally split into two separate factions. Felipe Salazar, who had led the pro-Front group, deserted the MRL and accepted a position in the Valencia government. This left the MRL divided into a línea dura, or "hard line," and a línea blanda, or "soft line." The línea blanda was led by Lopez, and the línea dura by Alvaro Uribe Rueda. The ostensible reasons for the split were that López had moderated his attacks on the National Front, while the línea dura had taken a more radical path.[37]

While the MRL was being broken up by factionalism, efforts were being made to unite the Conservative party. After his election Valencia had been urging the Conservative chiefs to put aside their differences and pull the party together. In March 1963, the leaders of the major factions agreed to form a unified party directorate. In keeping with the practice of milimetría, four members were Ospinistas, four were Alzatistas, and four were Laureanistas. Mariano Ospina was chosen as

---

[36]Hispanic American Report, November 1962, p. 1030.

[37]Dix, p. 265.

chairman, and Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, the son of Laureano Gómez who had become the leader of the faction because of his father's poor health and age, was chosen as vice-chairman.[38]

As the legislative elections of 1964 drew closer, rumors circulated that the fragile Conservative unity would shatter. In spite of the speculation, the Conservatives were able to hold themselves together through the campaign and the election. The campaign was intense. The Oficialista Liberals and the Conservatives attempted to hold themselves together and defend the Valencia government, while the Communists urged the voters to cast their ballots for the MRL Línea Dura.

The most effective opposition, however, came from ANAPO. In spite of the government's attempts to suppress his activities, Rojas campaigned around the country scoring telling points on the inability of the Valencia government to control inflation. One campaign technique was the dialéctica de la yuca, whereby Rojas would hold up various foodstuffs and point out the difference in prices during his regime and during the Valencia government. But as the campaign progressed, Rojas began to talk more in terms of a dialéctica de las pistolas, and a "popular revolution" which would restore him to power. Rojas also fiercely attacked Carlos Lleras Restrepo, who was most likely to be the next presidential candidate of the National Front.[39]

In the elections of 1964 the National Front factions retained their majority in Congress, but ANAPO made striking gains. The Oficialista

---

[38]Holt, p. 187.

[39]Johnson, p. 24; Premo, pp. 77-79.

Liberals held on to their position as the largest faction by winning 59 seats in the House of Representatives, the same number as in 1962. For the first time since the National Front was created, the major Conservative factions ran unified lists, and won 65 seats in the lower house. The two MRL groups ran separate lists, and the Línea Blanda of Alfonso López captured 23 seats in the House; the Línea Dura won only 8 seats. Even combined the MRL had lost strength since 1962, but if the number of seats won by the López group is compared to the number won in 1962, the loss was even greater. In either case, the MRL was losing its appeal to the voters. In contrast, ANAPO candidates won 13 percent of the vote and captured 27 seats in the House of Representatives, which was a dramatic increase over 1962 (see Table 3.6).

The elections of 1964 raised some doubts about the stability of the National Front. The low turnout of voters (36.85 percent) suggested to some that the public was dissatisfied with the performance of the coalition. Whether this is a correct interpretation is another matter, but the large gains made by ANAPO did indicate that many voters felt their interests would be better served by a party or group which had as one of its goals the abolition of the National Front. Rojas himself seemed confident that the elections presaged his return to power. In an interview with the New York Times, Rojas said "his followers would probably compel him to take over the Government before the elections scheduled for 1966." Although Rojas hinted at a coup, he also said that a candidate selected by him could win the next presidential election.[40]

---

[40] New York Times, March 22, 1964, p. 7.

TABLE 3.6

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1964

Party/Faction	Votes	Percent	Seats
	House of Representatives		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	738,437	32.7	59
MRL Linea Blanda	284,952	12.6	23
MRL Linea Dura	96,895	4.3	8
Others	21,219	0.9	1
Conservatives			
Unionistas, Laureanistas*	794,000	35.1	65
Others	8,282	0.4	1
ANAPO	309,678	13.7	27
Null and Blank	7,727	0.3	0
Total	2,261,190	100.0	184

*Unified Lists.

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Organición y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964, p. 54.

The 1964 elections also touched off another round of feuding among the major factions of the Liberal and Conservative parties. Soon after the elections the unity of the Conservatives was strained when the Laureanistas attempted to take control of the party from the Ospinistas by forming an alliance with the Alzatistas. The breaking point was finally reached when Alvaro Gómez attacked Mariano Ospina as the person responsible for the disunity in the Conservative ranks. Ospina reacted by resigning as head of the directorate and leaving on a vacation in Mexico. Claiming now to be the dominant faction of the Conservative party, the Lauro-Alzatistas began pressuring Valencia for a greater share of positions in the government, but Valencia refused to change the formula of awarding two ministries to each of the three groups.[41]

Ospina's resignation left the Lauro-Alzatistas formally in control of the Conservative party directorate, but it did them little good. The Lauro-Alzatistas held a convention in November 1964 with the intent of gaining from control of the party, but the Ospinistas simply refused to attend. Once again the factions created separate organizations. The bickering over control of the party and the distribution of cabinet posts occupied the Conservatives throughout much of 1965. But as far as the cabinet was concerned, Valencia doggedly refused to change the composition of the government. The Ospinistas, who had once been supporters of the milimetría formula, then attacked it, demanding a

---

[41]Payne, pp. 227-228.

greater share. Valencia held firm and the Ospinistas took what was offered them, but began to criticize the government in Congress.[42]

Another source of Conservative division was the presidential candidacy of Carlos Lleras Restrepo. In 1966 the presidency would be turned over to the Liberals, and from about 1961 it was fairly clear that Carlos Lleras Restrepo would be the choice. He was the most powerful Liberal and he had the support of Mariano Ospina, and thus the largest bloc of Conservatives. In August 1963, Lleras announced that he was putting himself forward as a "pre-candidate" for the 1966 nomination. In 1964 the Oficialista Liberals endorsed his candidacy. Although Ospina supported Lleras, Alvaro Gómez opposed him, partly because of Gómez' own ambitions and partly because of bad feelings going back to the days when Lleras had been a vociferous critic of Laureano Gómez.[43]

The parties thus entered the legislative and presidential campaigns of 1966 as divided as ever. Carlos Lleras was supported by the two largest factions of the parties, the Oficialista Liberals and the Ospinista Conservatives, and a bipartisan commission was set up to back his candidacy, headed by former president Alberto Lleras Camargo. In an attempt to give a more progressive image to the coalition, the National Front was now referred to as the Frente de Transformación Nacional, or Front of National Transformation.[44]

The opposition groups seemed unsure of what tactics to adopt in the approaching campaigns, although the primary goal was to form a

---

[42] Ibid., pp. 228-229.

[43] Martz, Chapter IX.

[44] Dix, p. 145.

coalition against Carlos Lleras. In 1964 the MRL Línea Dura of Alvaro Uribe had attempted to form an alliance with ANAPO. Uribe denounced Carlos Lleras and Alfonso López and claimed that a union of the MRL Línea Dura and ANAPO was quite logical since both were revolutionary and dedicated to overthrowing the oligarchy that exploited the Colombian masses. Rojas apparently never made any commitments to the MRL Línea Dura, and shortly before the Congressional elections of March 1966, Uribe denounced the "intellectual bankruptcy" of all the opposition and asked his followers not to participate in the elections.[45]

Although the MRL Línea Dura and the Lauro-Alzatistas (now coming to be called the Alvaristas) put up opposition candidates, the most effective opposition came from ANAPO. This time the government did not try to suppress ANAPO's activities, and Rojas and his daughter, María Eugenia, campaigned widely across Colombia. ANAPO made economic issues the heart of its campaign, blasting the government for the high cost of living and calling for nationalization of certain enterprises, such as imports and the Bank of the Republic. In the cities Anapistas distributed food and clothing to the poor, while in rural areas ANAPO concentrated on agrarian reform. Daniel Premo writes that:

> As the Congressional elections drew near, the strategy adopted by the bipartisan commission which supported Carlos Lleras contributed to bring into sharper focus the image of ANAPO as the major party of opposition. Frente leaders, convinced that the people would respond to the threat of a return to dictatorship, projected the campaign as "a political struggle between the Front of National Transformation and Rojas." Reduced to

---

[45]Premo, p. 105.

its simplest level, the alternative which the Frente placed before the nation was "Peace with Lleras or violence with Rojas."[46]

The Results of the 1966 Elections

In the 1966 legislative elections, the National Front groups maintained their majority in Congress, but ANAPO made an impressive gain. The Oficialista Liberals kept their position as the largest single group in the Congress. In the Senate elections the Oficialistas received 38.39 percent of the total vote and won 46 seats, while in the House elections the Oficialistas received 38.13 percent of the vote and won 69 seats. In both the House and Senate the Oficialistas increased their number of seats, while the MRL continued to lose strength. In the Senate contests, the MRL received 12.59 percent of the total vote and elected 7 members, while in the House elections the MRL received 12.58 percent of the total vote and won 21 seats (see Table 3.7).

In the Conservative party the relationship among the factions was much the same as in 1962, with the Unionistas outpolling the Lauro-Alzatistas. The unionistas won 21 seats in the Senate while the Lauro-Alzatistas won 14, and in the House the Unionistas won 36 seats while the Lauro-Alzatistas won 24. The Leyvistas entered the elections but received very few votes and won only one seat in the House. Thus, the Unionistas continued to be the major Conservative faction.

The great increase in strength recorded by ANAPO in 1966 was at the expense of the Unionistas, the Lauro-Alzatistas and the MRL. All three

---

[46]Ibid., pp. 106-107.

TABLE 3.7

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1966

Party/Faction	Votes	Percent	Seats
	Senate		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	1,120,394	38.4	46
MRL	367,457	12.6	7
Others	347	-	-
Conservatives			
Unionistas	472,876	16.2	20
Lauro-Alzatistas	339,809	11.7	14
Independientes	112,595	3.9	1
Leyvistas	6,894	0.2	-
Others	3,960	0.1	-
ANAPO	484,772	16.6	18
Null and Blank	8,669	0.3	-
Total	2,917,863	100.0	106
	House of Representatives		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	1,120,824	38.1	69
MRL	369,956	12.6	21
Others	38,966	1.3	1
Conservatives			
Unionistas	474,397	16.2	36
Lauro-Alzatistas	346,664	11.8	24
Leyvistas	7,485	0.3	1
Others	47,877	1.6	1
ANAPO	523,102	17.8	37
Null and Blank	9,951	0.3	-
Total	2,939,222	100.0	190

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 20 y Mayo 1 de 1966, Tables I-VIII, n.p.

of these factions suffered losses when compared to previous elections. For example, the number of seats held by the Unionistas in the Senate fell from 31 in 1962 to 21 in 1966, and in the House from 50 in 1962 to 36 in 1966. In the Senate elections ANAPO received 16.6 percent of the total vote and won 18 seats, and in the House elections 17.8 percent of the total vote and 37 seats. In terms of the popular vote as well as the number of seats in Congress, ANAPO had suddenly emerged as one of the strongest political groups in Colombia, although certainly it could not match the strength of the Oficialista Liberals. Although its success was greatest in the urban areas, ANAPO had increased its vote in both urban and rural areas. Furthermore, it may be noted that ANAPO was apparently beginning to take more votes away from the Conservative factions than the Liberal factions, but part of this may be due simply to the fact that ANAPO was running more Conservative than Liberal lists.[47]

The surprising gains made by ANAPO in the Congressional elections had an effect on the presidential campaign. The factions which had been trying to agree on a candidate to oppose Carlos Lleras found it impossible to come to any understanding in the wake of the Congressional elections, no doubt because ANAPO's success at the polls would place them in an inferior position. Discussions between ANAPO and the MRL

---

[47] Ibid., p. 109. The list system will be explained in Chapter IV. Briefly, Colombia uses a proportional representation system. Voting is for lists of candidates rather than individuals. Since ANAPO could not legally run as a third party, it registered its lists either as Conservative or Liberal.

Línea Blanda were broken off because the Línea Blanda would accept no candidate other than Alfonso López. The position of the Lauro-Alzatistas was essentially the same, and after the legislative elections Alvaro Gómez urged his followers to abstain from voting in the presidential election. Alvaro Uribe of the MRL Línea Dura also urged his supporters to withdraw from the campaign.

This left ANAPO as the only group willing to oppose Lleras and the National Front, but the problem was to find an eligible Liberal in order to fulfill the alternation requirement of the National Front. Rojas offered the candidacy to a number of Liberal politicians but all refused. Finally, on April 1, only one month before the presidential election, Rojas announced that the ANAPO candidate would be José Jaramillo Giraldo. Jaramillo was a Liberal who had served under Rojas during the military regime and had the virtue of proven loyalty to Rojas, whatever his defects as a candidate might be.[48]

Neither candidate made appearances during the first half of April, and the campaign in effect lasted less than two weeks. Jaramillo spoke only a few times at rallies and reiterated the promises made by Rojas during the Congressional campaign. As in the past, the central issue of the campaign was the National Front, with the two candidates taking opposing sides.

Carlos Lleras easily won the election of 1966, receiving slightly more than 70 percent of the popular vote. But in spite of the victory

---

[48] Ibid., p. 116.

of Lleras, the results were still somewhat ambiguous (see Table 3.8). First, only 40 percent of the electorate turned out to vote, leaving the impression of widespread apathy among the public. Second, Carlos Lleras did not do as well among urban voters as rural voters. Lleras received only 66 percent of the urban vote as opposed to the 33 percent received by Jaramillo.[49] Thus ANAPO seemed to have greater appeal among urban voters than rural voters, although the cities have traditionally been Liberal strongholds. Consequently, the National Front seemed to be losing support more rapidly in the cities than in the countryside, but the reasons are not clear.

TABLE 3.8

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1966

Candidate	Votes	Percent
Carlos Lleras Restrepo	1,881,502	71.3
José Jaramillo Giraldo	741,203	28.1
Others	589	-
Null and Blank	15,117	0.6
Total	2,638,411	100.0

Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, p. 155.

Other aspects of the elections of 1966 seem clearer. For one thing, the National Front factions lost their two-thirds majority in Congress, but one of the themes in Lleras' campaign was the need to

[49] Ibid., p. 120.

abolish this requirement of the National Front in favor of a simple majority. Another result of the elections was that the MRL and the Lauro-Alzatistas had lost their position as the major opposition factions. How successful ANAPO would be in replacing them was another matter, but the voters seemed less inclined to express their dissatisfaction with the National Front by voting for opposition factions within the framework of the Liberal and Conservative parties.

The Presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo

On August 7, 1966, Carlos Lleras Restrepo was sworn in as the third president of the National Front government. Lleras was a veteran politician, having won his first office in 1931 and serving in numerous positions over the next 35 years. Robert Dix writes that Lleras "was the 'modern' Colombian president par excellence," a man who was almost the prototype of a "developmentalist" who was dedicated to building an industrial economy in Colombia.[50] His cabinet was composed mainly of técnicos from the business and professional world, although several were wealthy men.

Carlos Lleras was considered to be knowledgeable in economics and an advocate of reform. In fact, when a major reform measure appeared it was often Lleras who was its chief sponsor or supporter. To mention only a few, Lleras was the main force behind the import and exchange-control system of 1959, the agrarian reform law of 1961, the new Liberal

---

[50]Robert H. Dix, "The Colombian Presidency: Continuities and Changes," in Thomas V. DiBacco, ed., Presidential Power in Latin American Politics (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 90.

party statutes of 1961, the educational reform of 1968, and the constitutional reforms of 1968.

Carlos Lleras was also a consummate politician. In foreign policy, he attempted to keep close relationships with the United States, yet expand Colombia's relations with the Soviet bloc. By this latter step, Lleras was attempting not only to increase Colombia's foreign trade but also to mollify leftist critics at home. By establishing relations with the Societ Union which had been severed after the Cuban Revolution, Lleras was also hoping to persuade Moscow to reduce its support of Communist guerrillas in Colombia.[51]

During the first two years of his government one of the major obstacles to Lleras' reform programs was the lack of a two-thirds majority in Congress. The Lauro-Alzatistas and ANAPO could simply block legislation by refusing to support it. The government did gain some support during Lleras' first year in office by the eventual absorption of the MRL Línea Blanda into the official or regular Liberal ranks. The elections of 1966 clearly indicated that the MRL was losing support and therefore influence and power. With López Michelsen's approval, MRL leaders Juan José Turbay, Ramiro Andrade and Luis Villar Borda began negotiations with the Oficialista Liberals to unite the two groups. According to Alfonso López Michelsen and Jaime Vidal Perdomo, the eventual union of the groups was the ability to arrive at agreement

---

[51]Maullin, p. 33.

concerning the proposed constitutional reforms Carlos Lleras had introduced in 1966 and 1967.[52]

By August 1967 the Oficialista Liberals and the MRL had agreed to unify the party. In a letter to the MRL congressmen, López said that the union was "irreversible" and should be instituted in "good faith, leaving behind lesser feeling of personalistic inspiration." López said that the ideals of the MRL were not being abandoned, nor had they accepted the National Front. López said that in the last Liberal period of alternation the MRL would rather be united with the Liberal party than be a minority in a coalition dominated by Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. López felt that the union had been possible by agreeing on the constitutional reforms, but he also seemed at pains to deny that in exchange for their support of the government leaders of the MRL had received "bureaucratic perquisites" (gajes burocráticos). López said when he first entered politics he had been offered an ambassadorship but had turned it down in order "to struggle for my own convictions," and that in later years he had turned down similar offers.[53]

In October 1967 the Liberals held their biennial national convention in the chamber of the House of Representatives, the Salón Elíptico, and one of the major orders of business was to make the

---

[52]Alfonso López Michelsen, Posdata a la Alternación: Intervenciones Políticas de 1964-1970 (Bogotá: Populibro, 1970), pp. 297-306; Jaime Vidal Perdomo, Historia de la Reforma Constitucional de 1968 y sus Alcances Jurídicos (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1970), p. 19. See also the brief discussion of these proposals on p. 31 of the dissertation.

[53]Lopez Michelsen, Posdata a la Alternación, pp. 300-302.

unification of the party official by choosing a new party directorate. President Carlos Lleras was invited to address the convention, and during the course of his speech he revealed that a few days earlier he had met with Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, the president of the Liberal party national directorate, and Alfonso López to discuss the party union and the composition of the new directorate. Lleras said they had agreed on four party leaders: Alfonso López Michelsen, Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, Hernando Agudelo Villa, and Julio César Turbay Ayala.

When Lleras finished his speech and the platform was speedily adopted, Senator Enrique Pardo Parra took the floor to nominate the members of the national directorate. He nominated the same men as mentioned by Carlos Lleras: López Michelsen, Espinosa Valderrama, Agudelo Villa and Turbay Ayala. The convention waited patiently while a few women delegates proposed that a woman be appointed to the directorate, but the matter had already been decided. The four proposed members were approved unanimously.[54]

Whether MRL leaders received any "bureaucratic perquisites," it is true that following the union of the Oficialistas and the MRL, López was brought into the government. In December 1967, two months after the Liberal convention, López was appointed governor of César.

While the Liberals were attempting to unite their party, the Conservatives were as divided as ever as the elections of 1968 drew nearer. In 1967 both major Conservative factions, the Unionistas

---

[54]Mario Latorre, Elecciones y Partidos Políticos en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial El Greco, 1974), pp. 1-7.

(Ospinistas) and the Independientes, as the group led by Alvaro Gómez was now known, once again held separate national conventions. Other than reaffirm the leadership of Mariano Ospina and Alvaro Gómez, the conventions accomplished little. Both groups were looking toward the elections of 1968, and party unity was still elusive. Some contacts were made between the two groups and the advantages of party unity were discussed, but in October 1967 the subject was dropped.[55]

Following the conventions late in 1967, campaigning began to grow more intense. As an off-year election only seats in the House of Representatives, the departmental assemblies, and the municipal councils were being contested. Primarily, the campaign of 1967-1968 centered on the policies of the Lleras Restrepo government: its development policies, national planning, and the proposed constitutional reforms. Quite naturally, the Liberals and the Unionistas defended the programs of the government, while the major opposition and criticism came from the Independiente Conservatives and ANAPO.

The constitutional reforms were one of Lleras' major proposals, and since they greatly affected the structure of the National Front government they became one of the central issues of the campaign. The proposed reforms had been submitted to Congress in three groups, two in 1966 and one in 1967. Although lengthy and complex, the main proposals would abolish the two-thirds rule, reduce the number of members of Congress, change the basis of representation in Congress, increase the

---

[55]Ibid., pp. 71-72.

term of members of Congress to four years, expand the role of the executive in planning, and add to the state of siege the right of the president to declare a "state of social and economic emergency."[56]

In Congress the followers of Gómez had opposed the revisions of the Constitution from the beginning, and during the campaign Gómez claimed the proposals were intended to dismantle the National Front. Although the proposals were primarily the work of the Liberals, Gómez charged that Mariano Ospina had made a pact with the Liberals and was in favor of desmonte (dismantlement) of the National Front. According to Gómez, the National Front was created as a system of "guarantees" to prevent one party from dominating the other, and suggested that any tampering with the arrangements would be a threat to peace.[57]

The Independiente Conservatives also attacked the developmentalist policy-making of Carlos Lleras and his técnicos. A man fond of similes and metaphors, Alvaro Gómez accused Lleras of trying to institute socialism in Colombia, and denounced what he called el desbordamiento del estado, or "the overflowing of the state" which treatened to destroy individual liberty. Gómez said that "It is not good that the State do everything; it is not good that it be farmer, importer, miner, manufacturer, banker."[58]

Led by Carlos Lleras and Mariano Ospina, the Liberals and the Unionistas defended the policies of the government, including the

---

[56]The "state of social and economic emergency" was proposed by López Michelsen. Vidal Perdomo, pp. 269-270.

[57]Latorre, p. 50.

[58]Ibid., p. 59.

constitutional revisions. For their part, the Unionistas said that the revisions were not aimed at desmonte but were a "transition" which would actually institutionalize the National Front. In response to the charge of socialism, the Unionistas argued that the policies of the government were intended to make Colombian society "more just" and were compatible with, and founded on, the doctrine of the Church. Mariano Ospina said that there was a difference between socialism and "democratic interventionism" and that it was the latter course of action that the government was following.[59]

The Unionistas also attacked the Independientes for forming an alliance with ANAPO in several departments. The alliance had been proposed by Gómez in 1967 and finalized in January 1968. The purpose was merely tactical to take advantage of the proportional representation system by combining their electoral lists and thereby increase the representation of both groups in Congress. But the Unionistas accused the Independientes of being hypocrites, asking how could Gómez claim that the Unionistas were in favor of desmonte when Gómez himself had formed an alliance with a group pledged to destroy the National Front.[60]

For its part, ANAPO emphasized organization as much as propaganda in the campaign. After Lleras had been inaugurated in 1966, Rojas had taken steps to expand ANAPO's structure and to give it more the appearance of a party distinct from the Liberal and Conservative labels under which it was obliged to campaign because of the National Front

---

[59] Ibid., p. 60.

[60] Ibid., pp. 72-73.

agreement. An institute was set up to indoctrinate ANAPO's barrio leaders, and Rojas made a concerted effort to expand the Liberal wing of the movement and give it broader appeal.[61] The tactical alliance with Alvaro Gómez also points up the fact that ANAPO was very much concerned with increasing its representation in Congress.

The elections were held on March 17, 1968. At stake were 204 seats in the House of Representatives, 438 seats in the departmental assemblies and all municipal and intendancy councils. The National Front coalition won a solid victory. The Oficialista Liberals won almost 40 percent of the total vote and captured 77 seats in the House of Representatives. Local dissidents kept the Oficialista total from being even higher by winning 7.87 percent of the vote and 17 seats in the House. On the other side of the coalition, the Unionistas increased their strength by winning 23.18 percent of the vote and 49 seats in the House (see Table 3.9).

The opposition groups did not do as well as in 1966. The Conservatives of Alvaro Gómez won only 8 percent of the vote and 19 seats in the House, a loss of 5 seats from 1966. The alliance with ANAPO, however, did appear to pay off, and the combined lists won 5 seats.

When Alfonso López made peace with the Oficialistas, some of the MRL members tried to keep the group alive by calling themselves the MRL del Pueblo. Without López, however, the MRL suffered a crushing defeat

---

[61] Premo, pp. 136-140.

TABLE 3.9

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1968

Party/Faction	Votes	Percent	Seats
	House of Representatives		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	988,540	39.6	77
Desidentes	196,457	7.9	17
MRL	55,984	2.2	2
Others	5,351	0.2	-
Conservatives			
Unionistas	578,485	23.2	49
Independientes	199,330	8.0	19
ANAPO-Lauro-Alzatistas	48,087	1.9	5
Others	14,937	0.6	1
ANAPO	401,903	16.1	34
Null and Blank	7,381	0.3	-
Total	2,496,455	100.0	204

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 17 de 1968, pp. 167, 170.

and polled only 2.24 percent of the total. The MRL del Pueblo won only two seats in the House, which was not enough to give the group any political influence.

Compared to 1966, ANAPO did not fare well either in the elections of 1968. Although ANAPO won 16.10 percent of the vote, this was less than the 17.8 percent it won in 1966. Similarly, ANAPO's representation in the House declined from 37 to 34 seats. No single factor seems to account for the decline in ANAPO's strength. One factor may be the decline in voter participation which always accompanies an off-year election in Colombia. Second, Premo writes that ANAPO's strategy to increase its Liberal representation did not work, and its gains under the Liberal label were modest.[62] Thus, another factor may be that identification with the traditional parties may have restrained voters from casting their ballots for ANAPO, especially when ANAPO was trying to run under the labels of both parties. Finally, ANAPO's biggest decline was in Cundinamarca, which suggests that ANAPO's appeal was greatest to the urban masses and also that the turnout of these voters tends to decline during off-year elections.

The elections of 1968 gave Carlos Lleras and the ruling coalition the necessary majority to pass the constitutional revisions which had been blocked by the opposition in Congress for almost two years. In November 1968, however, the revisions were almost defeated when the Ospinistas balked at the government's proposals modifying the basis of

---

[62] Ibid., p. 153.

representation in Congress. The support of the Ospinistas was necessary to pass the revisions, but the Conservative faction was afraid that the formula devised by the government would further increase the Liberal majority. The Ospinistas demanded that the formula be written in such a way as to insure that the Conservatives would be represented. Finally, a compromise was reached at a meeting between Carlos Lleras and Mariano Ospina, and the amendments to the constitution were approved by Congress a few days later and signed by Lleras on December 12, 1968.[63] For his cooperation with the government in the elections and in supporting the constitutional revisions, Alfonso López was brought into the cabinet that same month as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The last two years of the Lleras administration were marked by political and social unrest, political scandal involving the land reform agency, and anticipation of the 1970 elections. School teachers and cab drivers went on strike. In December 1968, Colombia was rocked by a letter signed by 50 priests known as the Grupo de Golconda which denounced inequities within Colombian society. Religious controversy was further heightened by a conflict between the Lleras government and the Church over contraception which the government was supporting through family clinics.[64]

In addition to social unrest, the last two years of the Lleras government were marked by intense political competition in anticipation

---

[63]Vidal Perdomo, p. 152. See pp. 133-152 for the position of the Ospinistas and the compromise finally reached.

[64]Steven Brzezinski, "Church versus State: Family Planning in Colombia, 1966-1972," Journal of Church and State 18 (Autumn, 1976), 491-502.

of the 1970 elections and by factionalism in the parties which nearly destroyed the National Front. The battle began in December 1968 when Bertha Hernández de Ospina (Doña Bertha), a senator and the wife of Mariano Ospina, let it be known that Conservative leaders Misael Pastrana Borrero and Hernan Jaramillo Ocampo were being considered for the presidential nomination. The following month, Belisario Betancur, a Conservative who had achieved some recognition as Minister of Labor in 1965, announced his interest in the presidential nomination. Shortly thereafter, Evaristo Sourdis, who was an Ospinista leader from Atlántico, said that only two candidates was a sign of "weakness" in the party.[65] Sourdis was then made president of the Conservative national directorate and his name was added to the list of possible candidates.

Divisions within the Conservative party began to widen rapidly as regional leaders started to choose sides. Although Pastrana was the choice of Ospina, many of the regional jefes made it clear they they would not support him. The growing factionalism and rebellion of the regional bosses forced Ospina to seek a reconciliation with Alvaro Gómez, and by June the two factions had agreed to hold a single party convention.

Although the National Front leaders had always been able to control the nomination process in the past, this time the regional leaders would not passively accept the wishes of the national chiefs. When the Conservative convention opened in November 1969, it was well-known that

---

[65]Premo, p. 199.

Carlos Lleras and Mariano Ospina had agreed on Misael Pastrana as the next president. The followers of Betancur would not accept Pastrana and held their own convention. The regional bosses who could not accept Pastrana nominated Sourdis, and for several days the convention was deadlocked. Ospina was determined to nominate Pastrana, but the Sourdistas refused to back down. Alvaro Gómez declined to take sides and released his followers to support whom they chose.

Finally, Ospina recessed the convention and submitted two names to the Liberals to break the deadlock. Since it was obvious whom the Liberals would choose, Betancur and Sourdis announced they would be candidates regardless of the outcome of the Liberal convention. After three weeks of discussions and negotiations between Oficialista and Ospinista leaders the Liberal convention met and nominated Misael Pastrana. Thus, the National Front had split three ways, and this disruptive factionalism very nearly brought the ruling coalition down in defeat.

The Elections of 1970

The elections of 1970 were the most fiercely contested of any held during the National Front period. ANAPO had spent two years expanding its organization throughout the country, but its major strength was no doubt the candidacy of Rojas Pinilla himself. Neither Betancur or Sourdis was able to develop widespread support, and as the elections approached the major battle was between Rojas and Pastrana.

The supporters of Pastrana portrayed the elections as a choice between democracy and dictatorship. Pastrana ran as a candidate of

continuismo, or continuing the policies of Carlos Lleras, although Malcolm Deas has noted that this was somewhat unusual since none of his predecessors had adopted such a strategy.[66] Pastrana's defense of the system and his pledge to continue the policies of the Lleras government were summed up in his campaign motto: "I am not a man. I am a program." Yet the Lleras government was not altogether popular, and Pastrana's image as a candidate who would continue the policies and methods of the National Front may have weakened his appeal.

In contrast, Rojas campaigned widely in Colombia, fiercely attacking the National Front system and making allusions to a violent overthrow of the government if he did not win the election. In the cities Rojas drew large and enthusiastic crowds, a fact which alarmed the National Front leaders and was an embarrassment to Pastrana. But despite the shrill propaganda issuing from both sides, the theme of the Rojas campaign was that of populism and a generalized struggle of rich against poor rather than revolution or class warfare.[67]

In accordance with the constitutional revisions of 1968, both the presidential election and the legislative elections were held on the same day, April 19, 1970. In all, more than 9,000 offices were to be filled. The atmosphere was tense, and the ballots were counted during a state of siege imposed by Carlos Lleras after some disorders by

---

[66]Malcolm Deas, "Coalition in Colombia," Current History, 60 (February, 1971), p. 92.

[67]Daniel Premo notes, however, that class struggle was "implicitly advanced" by Rojas although he did not talk in these terms. Premo, p. 225.

Anapistas who claimed they had won the election but were being denied their victory by the government. The results stunned the ruling coalition, which barely escaped defeat. In the presidential election, Misael Pastrana defeated Gustavo Rojas by less than 2 percent of the total votes cast. The two dissident Conservatives, Belisario Betancur and Evaristo Sourdis received a combined total of 20 percent of the votes, no doubt contributing to Pastrana's small margin of victory (see Table 3.10).

TABLE 3.10

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1970

Candidate	Votes	Percent
Misael Pastrana Borrero	1,625,025	40.3
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla	1,561,468	38.7
Belisario Betancur	471,350	11.7
Evaristo Sourdis	336,286	8.3
Others	11	-
Null and Blank	42,318	1.0
Total	4,036,458	100.0

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, 19 de Abril de 1970, p. 59.

In Congress, ANAPO won the largest single bloc of seats in both houses, although not a majority if the totals of the coalition factions are combined. ANAPO won 38 seats in the Senate and 71 seats in the House of Representatives. Compared to 1968, ANAPO increased its vote in the House elections at the expense of both coalition factions. The

Oficialista vote declined from 39.6 percent to 26.4 percent, while the Unionista vote declined from 23.2 percent to 14.8 percent.

The elections of 1970 have been analyzed more frequently and in greater detail than any other aspect of modern Colombian politics. Two principal questions stand out: first, who voted for ANAPO, and second, what it the significance of the elections. Although the numerous subtleties of the 1970 voting cannot be examined in detail here, the major points may be summarized.

Almost all of the studies of the 1970 election tend to agree that the voting was divided along class lines to a degree unprecedented in Colombia, and that the great majority of the ANAPO ballots were cast by the lower income class. This is the finding of Campos and McCamant, who write that "A number of indicators reflect socioeconomic stratification, and they all show the same thing: Colombia in 1970 was polarized between those who had very little and those who had more."[68] The survey data collected by Campos and McCamant indicate that voting was indeed along class lines. Rojas received virtually no support from the upper class, while conversely ANAPO drew its greatest strength from the lower income groups (see Table 3.11).

Other studies have also found that class played a significant role in the 1970 elections. A post-electoral survey of voters in Bogotá shows fairly clearly that Rojas received his greatest support among the

---

[68]Judith Talbot Campos and John F. McCamant, Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Elections (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 59.

TABLE 3.11

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1970

Party/Faction	Votes	Percent	Seats
	Senate		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	1,074,059	27.1	37
Belisaristas	131,430	3.3	3
Sourdistas	152,506	3.8	5
Others	108,653	2.7	2
Conservatives			
Pastranistas	586,131	14.8	18
Belisaristas	294,185	7.4	9
Sourdistas	185,206	4.7	6
ANAPO	1,419,427	35.8	38
Null and Blank	15,409	0.4	-
Total	3,967,006	100.0	118
	House of Representatives		
Liberals			
Oficialistas	1,051,666	26.4	57
Belisaristas	137,069	3.4	6
Sourdistas	156,877	3.9	9
Others	125,316	3.2	5
Conservatives			
Pastranistas	589,234	14.8	30
Belisaristas	300,223	7.6	19
Sourdistas	185,686	4.7	13
Others	7,881	0.2	-
ANAPO	1,412,752	35.5	71
Null and Blank	13,497	0.3	-
Total	3,980,201	100.0	210

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, 19 de Abril de 1970, pp. 121, 135, 205, 223.

lower income levels of the population and very little among the middle class or the upper class.[69] Surveys conducted by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) in Bogotá and Medellín obtained essentially the same results (see Table 3.12). The middle and upper classes cast the great majority of their votes for Pastrana, while the lower class voted primarily for Rojas.[70]

TABLE 3.12

VOTING FOR PASTRANA AND ROJAS ACCORDING TO SOCIOECONOMIC CLASS, IN PERCENTAGES

	Upper	Upper Middle	Middle	Lower Middle	Lower	Slum	N
Pastrana	96%	100%	87%	57%	48%	12%	229
Rojas	4	0	13	43	52	88	135
N	23	26	76	79	143	17	364

Source: Adapted from Rodrigo Losada and Miles W. Williams, "Análisis de la Votación Presidencial en Bogotá," in Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, p. 19.

Although class was an important element, this was not the only factor influencing the vote. The survey by Losada and Williams also found that party identification was the factor most strongly associated

---

[69]Rodrigo Losada and Miles W. Williams, "Análisis de la Votación Presidencial en Bogotá, 1970," in Departamento Administrativo Nacion de Estadística, Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, pp. 18-20.

[70]Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970, p. 297.

with the vote. Those with a strong sense of party identification voted for Pastrana. The ANAPO voters on the whole were weak party identifiers. In addition, ANAPO voters tended to be younger and were those who previously had participated very little in elections.[71] In short, ANAPO voters tended to be young, low-income persons who had little identification with the traditional parties and who formerly had low rates of voter participation. They were in general persons dissatisfied with the National Front whom Rojas was able to mobilize and bring to the polls.

Another dimension of the 1970 election was that voting for ANAPO tended to be disproportionately from the more urbanized and modern departments, although it did receive substantial support in rural areas. The meaning of this trend, however, is not altogether clear. Some have interpreted it as an indication that support for the traditional parties is breaking down, and that the urban areas especially are more susceptible to the appeals of radical candidates. However, this sort of interpretation has been challenged by a number of writers. As far as urbanization itself is concerned, both Peeler and Schoultz have argued that this is not an adequate explanation of the ANAPO vote.[72] Although it is true that ANAPO received greater support in the urban areas, Peeler and Schoultz find no trend toward increased radicalism in the cities.

---

[71] Losada and Williams, p. 40.

[72] John A. Peeler, Urbanization and Politics (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 33; Schoultz, pp. 37-45.

Similarly, in a comparison of three "modern" departments and three "traditional" departments, Heggan finds that the key variables seem to be participation and partisanship rather than modernization. In the "modern" departments ANAPO's strength came from its ability to mobilize voters who were weakly identified with the two traditional parties and who had lower rates of participation. In contract, high party identification and participation seem to be the key variables in the "traditional" areas. Pastrana received support from Liberal strongholds, while ANAPO drew its strength from traditionally Conservative areas.[73] This may not seem as odd as it might at first blush when one considers that ANAPO had its origins in the Conservative party and that in his rural campaign Rojas stressed such traditional themes as religion and the elimination of birth control programs. Since Pastrana ran on a program of continuismo, one may speculate that in the rural areas the campaign had the appearance of the standard battle between Liberals and Conservatives.

Robert Dix questions whether the elections were a sign of radical class conflict. He stresses the populism of ANAPO, pointing out that its program, although vague, was not radical but very traditional in many ways. Consequently, while ANAPO did appeal mainly to the lower class, its voters were those who wanted a "better deal" but at the

---

[73]Jon Heggan, "Continuity and Change in a Modernizing Country: The 1970 Colombian Presidential Election," Administrative Change 1 (December, 1973), pp. 56-61.

same time still held many of the traditional values in society.[74]

In sum, the vote cast for ANAPO in 1970 may be regarded as a protest vote from the disadvantaged of Colombian society, but it does not necessarily signal the end of the two-party system nor a movement toward lower-class radicalism.

The Presidency of Misael Pastrana Borrero

On August 7, 1970, Misael Pastrana Borrero was inaugurated as the fourth, and final, president to hold office according to the alternation provision of the National Front agreement. Pastrana had close ties to business and industry, and although he was not the "reform-mongerer" Carlos Lleras was, he did pursue in general the developmentalist policies initiated by his predecessor. Pastrana reflected the growing importance of business and industry in Colombia, and he perhaps represented a major shift in the Conservative party which traditionally has found its strength in the rural areas.

The rapid growth of Colombia's cities and the stunning defeat of the National Front in the urban areas forced the Pastrana government to recognize at least the potential dangers there. A development plan was formulated which recognized the seriousness of the problem and was the first of its kind in Latin America.[75] Known as the "Four Strategies,"

---

[74]Robert H. Dix, "The Politics of Income Distribution in Colombia," Rice University Studies, 61 (Fall, 1975), pp. 31-47.

[75]Alan Gilbert, "Urban and Regional Development Programs in Colombia Since 1951," in Wayne A. Cornelius and Felicity M. Trueblood, ed., Latin American Urban Research, Vol. 5 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 243.

it was conceived by Laughlin Currie, an economist and friend of Pastrana. The plan was not actually new, but had been devised by Currie some ten years earlier. Briefly, the Four Strategies were intended to (1) increase investment in urban housing, (2) increase exports, (3) increase agricultural production and redistribute land, and (4) reduce income inequities through taxation. The unique part of the plan was the first strategy which "turned a neutral attitude toward urbanization into an overt pro-urbanization strategy.[76]

Essentially, Currie's argument was that in Colombia demand was too low. The plan was to increase demand for locally produced consumer goods indirectly through housing construction. Construction would provide jobs and an expanded market for building materials. Loans would be made at low interest rates to families to purchase housing. Through multiplier effects demand for consumer goods would be increased. Furthermore, by focusing on urban development the pressure on agricultural lands would be relieved as families moved into expanding urban markets. Progressive taxation would be used to bring about a greater measure of social justice. The difficulties of the plan, however, were to balance the urban and rural strategies and to hold down inflation.

The plan was not popular. The Banco de la República, the Banco Central Hipotecária, and the Junta Monetária opposed it, as did Liberal leaders Carlos Lleras and Alfonso López, and even members of Pastrana's

---

[76]Ibid., p. 243.

cabinet. The plan also ran into opposition in the Congress, and Pastrana had to implement his policies by executive decree.

In other areas, Pastrana slowed the pace of reforms adopted in previous administrations. Groves writes that under Pastrana there was some "slippage" in efforts to bring about some administrative coordination of the more than 100 decentralized, or semi-autonomous agencies in the Colombian bureaucracy.[77] Agrarian reform, which had been making slow progress anyway, fell behind even further.[78]

Among other things, his lack of popularity among many Conservatives and his narrow margin of victory in the 1970 election made Pastrana somewhat politically weak, and problems began to press in on him. The economy expanded rapidly during his administration, but inflation also rose sharply from around 7 percent in 1970 to 25 percent in 1974. The most serious inflation was in consumer food prices, which increased at a rate greater than other prices.[79]

In addition to inflation, peasant and student unrest added to the president's headaches. In January and February 1971, several thousand campesinos who were frustrated at the slow pace of agrarian reform

---

[77]Roderick T. Groves, "The Colombian National Front and Administrative Reform," Administration and Society, 6 (November, 1974), p. 324.

[78]Roger W. Findley, "Problems Faced by Colombia's Agrarian Reform Institute in Acquiring and Distributing Land," in Robert E. Scott, ed., Latin American Modernization Problems (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 144-145.

[79]United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1974, pp. 92-93.

invaded lands in Córdoba, Tolima, Sucre, Bolívar and Huila. The invasions were apparently coordinated by the Asociación Nacional de Campesionos, an organization which had been created by Carlos Lleras. When Carlos Villamil Chaux, the head of INCORA, the land reform agency, defended the invasions, large landowners were outraged. Villamil Chaux was fired by Pastrana, and by July 1972 all land redistribution was stopped.[80]

At the same time the dispute was taking place over the land invasions, Colombian university students began a series of strikes and protests which spread throughout the country. The protests began at the Universidad del Valle in February 1971 when students demanded the elimination of representatives of private business from the governing board. When the army opened fire on a group of protestors, killing eight, strikes and demonstrations spread to other universities. President Pastrana invoked a state of siege, but clashes between students and police continued well into the following year. Public universities were ordered closed in February 1971 and remained closed into 1972.

The election of 1970 and the persistent social and economic problems are two factors which contributed to Pastrana's political weakness, but there is another important factor. In the first two years

---

[80]Findley, p. 145. A useful source on the land invasions is Hugo Escobar Sierra, Las Invasiones en Colombia (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1972). Escobar Sierra is a Conservative politician, but he gives much information on where the invasions occurred, the properties taken over, the owner's name, and the number of peasants involved.

of his administration party factionalism became so extreme that it virtually paralyzed the Colombian government. Both parties were looking toward the end of the National Front and the return to fully competitive elections, and the strategy adopted by most of the factions was unrelenting opposition to every policy put forth by the government. During this time the Congress passed almost no bills at all, let alone any significant ones, and had to be called into special session to approve the government's application for loans from the World Bank.[81]

Pastrana received little support even from his own party. He had not been popular to begin with, and once in office he was bombarded with criticism from powerful Conservatives over his initial efforts to carry on the policies of Carlos Lleras. The Conservatives were as divided as the Liberals. Mariano Ospina led one group and Alvaro Gómez another, while Belisario Betancur had not patched up his break with the party and was calling for all opposition groups, including ANAPO, to unify against the government. One object of the Conservative attacks was J. Emilio Valderrama, the Minister of Agriculture who had built himself a power base as the manager of the Ospinista organization in Antioquia. Valderrama came under fierce attack over the agrarian reform issue and at the end of May 1971 he resigned, saying that he was joining the "progressive" wing of the party.[82]

---

[81]Daniel Pecaut, "Colombie 1971-1974," Notes et Etudes Documentaires, 4139/4141, Problemes d'Amerique Latine (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1974), pp. 11-12.

[82]Ibid., p. 10.

Pastrana could not bring the situation under control. His ministers fought among themselves, and in June 1971 the entire cabinet resigned. What little support Pastrana did receive was from the Liberal faction led by Julio César Turbay Ayala. Turbay was a party bureaucrat who over the years had risen in power because of his expert management of the party machinery. Turbay was never considered an intellectual like the Lleras cousins or Alfonso López, but rather a conservative (with a little "c") and a vote producer.

Both Carlos Lleras and Alfonso López were already maneuvering for the party's presidential nomination in 1974, and Turbay's cooperation with Pastrana provided them with the perfect target. To enhance their image as independents and progressives neither Lleras nor López would associate themselves with Pastrana or Turbay. The Liberal convention scheduled for April 2, 1971, had to be postponed when Lleras and López said that they would not attend. Lleras was abroad, but said he would not come even if he were in the country, and López said the Liberals could not support Pastrana if he continued to work with a man who did not represent the party. The Liberal convention was finally held on May 21, 1971, but the so-called progresistas of Lleras and López walked out when the majority of Turbayistas adopted a resolution supporting President Pastrana.[83]

During the months following the Liberal convention the various factions of the parties engaged in a truly astonishing combination of

---

[83]Ibid.

alignments, realignments, and political maneuvers. The following are a few examples: an attempt by Alfonso López to join forces with María Eugenia Rojas to elect J. E. Valderrama president of the Senate and embarrass President Pastrana; a coalition between the Turbayistas and ANAPO to elect an Anapista as president of the House of Representatives; a flirtation between Carlos Lleras and the socialists and Communists; an attempt by Alvaro Gómez to smear Lleras' reputation by exposing alleged corruption when Lleras was president; a call by Carlos Lleras for a more leftist democracy; support for Carlos Lleras from Mariano Ospina; an exchange between Gómez and Ospina over Lleras' alleged leftist policies; an alliance among J. E. Valderrama, Lleras and López to oppose Pastrana. One French commentator writes that the reservations the factions had about the administration's policies tended:

> toward criticism pure and simple. Every day the Lleristas and the Lopistas, in spite of their statements of neutrality, denounce the government. Financial administration is presented as lax and inflationary; the revision of agrarian reform as a submission to the traditional agrarian sectors. To the Alvarista Conservatives education reform seems like demogogic populism; the creation of new semi-public institutions of savings and investments, a step toward socialism. For some it is necessary to go faster; for others to proclaim a pause. Fired at from left and right, the government seems condemned to act from day to day.[84]

ANAPO contributed to the paralyzation of the government by joining whichever Liberal or Conservative faction was harassing the government at the moment, even if this meant voting against ANAPO's own policies. For example, in late 1971 ANAPO joined with a Liberal faction led by

---

[84]Ibid., p. 12.

William Jaramillo to oppose ratification of the Andean Pact even though ANAPO had formerly supported ratification. When asked to explain this contradiction, ANAPO spokesmen said, "Now that the government has suffered a reverse in this affair, we are sure our colleagues in the senate will vote against the measure, thus preserving the integrity of anapista doctrine."[85] Apparently, harassing the government somehow was more important in preserving the "integrity" of ANAPO than voting for its own policies.

Other than simply opposing the Pastrana government, the parties followed different strategies in the local elections of 1972. The major Conservative factions united behind Alvaro Gómez, who was anxious to be the party's presidential nominee in 1974. Gómez adopted the traditional Conservative line and made a strong appeal to the landowning class in Colombia. Although the Liberals had been one of the pillars of the National Front up to 1970, some of the Liberal factions seemed to be trying to appear as independent as possible. As late as January 1972 Carlos Lleras and Alfonso López were saying they would not even take part in the elections, thus leaving the field to Julio César Turbay Ayala.[86]

In March former president Alberto Lleras Camargo gave a series of speeches defending the National Front which were well received, and then Lleras and López decided they would participate in the elections after

---

[85]Quoted in Latin America, 19 November 1971, p. 373.

[86]Latin America, 28 January 1972, p. 31.

all. Lleras Camargo also had an impact on the Liberal strategy by urging that the party run a great many women as candidates. The fear was that ANAPO was gaining ground in traditional Liberal strongholds, and the strategy was to appeal to women in the belief that their loyalties to the party were stronger than men's, thus blocking a potential gain in strength for ANAPO.[87]

ANAPO itself was running this time as a distinct, third party rather than using the labels of the Liberals and Conservatives. On June 11, 1971, ANAPO had held a meeting in Villa de Leiva, Boyacá and declared itself a third party and adopted a new program. According to the Program of Villa de Leiva, ANAPO would institute a "Colombian socialism" which included such elements as the nationalization of the subsoil, especially petroleum, the socialization of credit, improvements in health, education and housing, and a greater emphasis on planning. Its program for agrarian reform was not very radical, calling only for the expropriation of "archaic" latifundios and the colonization of fallow land.[88]

For the first time several minor parties entered the electoral arena. The Communists put up candidates, as did the Christian Democrats. The pro-Chinese Movimiento Obrero Independiente Revolucionario (MOIR)

---

[87]Shirley Harkess and Patricia Pinzón de Lewin, "Women, the Vote, and the Party in the Politics of the Colombian National Front," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 17 (November, 1975), 439-464.

[88]Pecaut, p. 11.

abandoned its abstention strategy and entered candidates, as did another small party of the left, Unidad Popular.

In the elections of April 1972, the traditional parties maintained their dominance of Colombian politics. In the elections for departmental assemblies the Liberals received 46.26 percent of the total votes while the Conservatives received 30.76 percent. ANAPO's decline from 1970 was dramatic, and its candidates received only 18.80 percent of the ballots. Of the total of 406 seats in 22 assemblies, the Liberals won 196 seats and the Conservatives won 134 seats. ANAPO won 65 seats but lost every assembly it had controlled in 1970, and did not win a majority in any department. In the municipal council elections the results were essentially the same. Of the total 8,407 seats being contested, the Liberals won 3,821; the Convervatives 2,941; and ANAPO 1,411.

The elections of 1972 were hardly over before the competition began in earnest for the elections of 1974. The elections of 1972 had left the Liberals divided four ways, with factions led by Alberto Lleras Camargo, Julio César Turbay Ayala, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, and Alfonso López Michelsen. Lleras Camargo and Turbay were loosely allied as the "conservative" wing of the party while Lleras Restrepo and López were loosely allied as the "progressive" wing. The Liberal national directorate was divided four ways, and the divisions extended on down through the party to the local level.[89] In June a "preconvention" was

---

[89] Latin America, 7 July 1972, p. 214.

held in Medellín to decide what to do about the structure of the party. At the initiative of Carlos Lleras the convention decided to poll the party as to whether the directorate should be plural or have a jefe único, which in the latter case would give the edge to one faction. Alberto Lleras and Turbay Ayala both opposed the idea, no doubt recognizing that Carlos Lleras would most likely be the man who would win.

The "progressives" did, in fact, have the upper hand. The Turbayistas refused to participate in the poll, and when the results became known in August, more than 95 percent of those polled opted for a jefe único. On August 22, as was expected, Carlos Lleras was selected as the Liberal party's sole chief. In October Lleras consolidated his position when the Liberal convention ratified him as party chief. Turbay Ayala in effect admitted defeat when he publicly called for approval of Carlos Lleras.

Although Lleras had defeated his principal "conservative" rival, he still had competition from his fellow progressive, Alfonso López. Lleras appointed only Turbayistas to party posts and for a while it seemed that he had succeeded in pushing López to the side. In April 1973, however, Lleras made a calculated gamble which turned out to be a mistake. In a letter from Brussels sent while on a trip to Eastern Europe, Lleras suggested that the parties agree on a single candidate for president in 1974 and extend the National Front eight more years. Implicit in the letter was the suggestion that Lleras himself be the candidate, but the idea of extending the National Front gave López the

ammunition he needed. Many Liberals felt confident they could defeat the Conservatives without any coalition, and Lleras came under fire from his own party.[90]

The dispute finally boiled over at the Liberal convention in May. Carlos Lleras officially put forth his idea of coalition with the Conservatives, and this touched off an uproar in the convention. Turbay Ayala refused to take sides and for three days the Lleristas and Lopistas battled over the Lleras proposal. Finally, Lleras resigned as party chief and walked out of the convention, leaving control in the hands of the Lopistas. The followers of López then tried to nominate him, but López suggested the convention recess until the party could be unified.

On June 30 the convention met again. By now López had the support of Turbay Ayala, and the support of the delegations from the Atlantic coast departments, Valle and Tolima. By a vote of 162 to 88, Alfonso López Michelsen was nominated as the Liberal party candidate for president, and Julio César Turbay Ayala was elected chief of the party.[91]

While the Liberals were fighting among themselves over the direction the party should take and who would lead it, the Conservatives were struggling with essentially the same problems. In the elections of 1972 Alvaro Gómez had assumed the position of a party leader, and had made clear his presidential ambitions. In October 1972 the Conservative

---

[90] Latin America, 11 May 1973, p. 151.

[91] Pecaut, p. 32.

national directorate announced that the party should run its own candidate, and that that person be Alvaro Gómez. Yet, as of March Mariano Ospina had said that he favored a coalition with the Liberals. For a few months it was not clear which way the Conservatives would go. When Lleras made his proposal, however, some Conservative factions took the cue and proposed a coalition between the progressive elements of the parties.

The Liberal convention forced the issue in the Conservative party. Once the Liberals had rejected the idea of coalition and nominated López, the Conservatives had no choice. The factions were pulled together, and on September 14, 1973, the Conservative convention met in a spirit of unity and proclaimed Alvaro Gómez Hurtado their candidate for president.[92]

The elections of 1974 were the first fully competitive one since 1946. In addition to the Liberal and Conservative candidates, three other candidates entered the presidential race. The first was the ANAPO candidate, María Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, the daughter of Gustavo Rojas, and the first woman to run for president in Latin America. The second was Hernando Echeverri Mejía, a former Liberal turned Anapista turned Marxist. Echeverri was the candidate of the Unión Nacional de Oposición (UNO), an assortment of dissident Liberals and Anapistas, socialists, and Marxists. The third candidate running against the traditional parties was Hermes Duarte, representing Colombia's tiny and electorally insignificant Christian Democratic party.

---

[92] Ibid.

As the campaign progressed fear began to recede that ANAPO would repeat its success in 1970. Rojas himself was old and ill, and his daughter faced the difficulties of being a female candidate in a traditional society. Furthermore, ANAPO was torn by factionalism in its own ranks, and Anapistas began to desert the party. Even the ailing general's son, Gustavo Rojas Correa, publicly announced that he was joining with the Conservatives. The Colombian socialism preached by Maria Eugenia did not seem to have the appeal of the populism of 1970, and on several points ANAPO differed little from the program of UNO.

With ANAPO in decline, and the lack of support for UNO and the Christian Democrats, the campaign soon became a contest between the two parties which have always dominated Colombian politics. According to Visión, López campaigned:

> for 285 days, during which he visited 328 cities, gave 503 speeches, appeared 12 times on television, met in private with all sectors of national life, gave dozens of interviews to the press and radio, and in an unprecedented act met with 30 thousand women in a sports arena in Bogotá which stood out as a new style of feminine political participation.[93]

Everywhere he went López asked for a mandato claro; a clear mandate for the Liberal party. He promised to turn Colombia into the "Japan of South America," to balance taxes and salaries, to reduce inflation, to increase agricultural productivity, and to reduce the number of peasants without land. López also spoke in favor of university autonomy and lowering the voting age to 18. The Liberal

---

[93]"Etapa Historica," Visión, 27 de Julio de 1974, pp. 24-28, 25.

candidate also proposed legislation permitting civil marriages and divorce in the case of civil marriages. To do all this, López said, the Liberals needed two and a half million votes from the Colombian people.

In contrast, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado put forth his ideas of desarrollismo, or "developmentalism," which emphasized higher productivity and the importance of self-help and personal initiative. The Conservatives launched a public relations campaign around the motto, "Alvaro hablo claro" (Alvaro talks straight), but Gómez also articulated the Conservative view of society and the need to maintain "tradition" and to fight against "materialism."

The Results of the 1974 Elections

As can be seen in Tables 3.13 and 3.14, the Liberals won a solid victory in 1974, defeating their closest rivals, the Conservatives, by approximately 25 percent of the total vote. ANAPO, which had very nearly wrecked the National Front in 1970, won less than 10 percent of the vote. The Liberals swept the legislative elections, and won a majority of the seats in both houses of Congress.

Although it is not the purpose to analyze the elections in detail here, a few observations are in order. First, it may be noted that the results of the election have been widely interpreted as evidence that Colombia has returned to a two-party system following the success of ANAPO in 1970. While the Liberals and Conservatives did win almost 90 percent of the vote some qualifications may be necessary.

Yet, what explains the success of the traditional parties and the rapid decline of ANAPO? Several explanations have been offered, such as

TABLE 3.13

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1974

Candidate	Party	Votes	Percent
Alfonso López M.	Liberal	2,929,719	56.2
Alvaro Gómez H.	Conservative	1,634,879	31.4
M. Eugenia Rojas	ANAPO	492,166	9.4
Hernando Echeverri	UNO	137,054	2.6
Hermes Duarte	SDC	5,718	0.1
Others		6	-
Null and Blank		12,591	0.3
Total		5,212,133	100.0

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, Abril 21, 1974, p. 61.

TABLE 3.14

THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF 1974

Party	Votes	Percent	Seats
	Senate		
Liberal	2,840,315	55.6	66
Conservative	1,631,115	32.0	37
ANAPO	458,745	9.0	7
UNO	155,158	3.1	2
SDC	7,909	0.1	-
Others	1,310	-	-
Null and Blank	12,223	0.2	-
Total	5,106,774	100.0	112
	House of Representatives		
Liberal	2,834,245	55.6	113
Conservative	1,631,926	32.0	66
ANAPO	458,424	9.0	15
UNO	155,855	3.1	5
SDC	5,674	0.1	-
Others	1,764	-	-
Null and Blank	11,211	0.2	-
Total	5,100,099	100.0	199

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, Abril 21, 1974, pp. 119, 126, 182, 191.

factionalism within the ANAPO ranks and María Eugenia's sex. These may be contributing factors, but the preliminary results of a survey of voters in Bogotá and a recently published study of urban voting behavior in Colombia present hypotheses which may be closer to the truth.

In the survey of voters in Bogotá, approximately 75 percent of the respondents identified with either the Liberal or Conservative party. Thus party identification is an important factor, indicating that many of the voters cast their ballots according to their traditional partisan preferences. The majority of those identifying themselves as Liberals voted for López and the majority of Conservatives voted for Gómez. Only 3.5 percent of the Conservatives and 2.8 percent of the Liberals said they had switched parties.[94]

In addition, those who stated they had voted for Rojas in 1970 either did not vote in 1974 or voted for López. But the majority of these did not vote at all, indicating that an important reason for ANAPO's quick decline was that it could not bring to the polls the voters it had in 1970. Furthermore, the ANAPO sympathizers are mainly among the lower income groups, and generally have lower rates of participation. The ANAPO respondents explained that they did not vote because ANAPO had lost in 1970 and voting for ANAPO again would not accomplish anything.

---

[94]Miles W. Williams, "Urbanization and the Crisis of Colombia's Traditional Parties," SECOLAS Annals, 7 (March, 1976), p. 86.

[95]Gabriel Murillo and Miles Williams, "Análisis de las Elecciones Presidenciales en 1974—Bogotá, in Fernando Cepeda Ulloa and Claudia Gonzalez de Lecaros, Comportamiento del Voto Urbano en Colombia: Una Approximación (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1976), p. 57.

The programs of the candidates and the socioeconomic level of the voters also had a bearing on the election results. From their point of view, the voters cast their ballots according to their policy preferences, naming the quality of life and the candidate's positions on education as the most important points. But divisions may be noted according to income. Voting for López and the Liberals tended to be distributed fairly evenly across class lines, while the Conservatives received most of their support in the upper income levels.[96] It is important to note, however, that this is a change from the sharp class divisions of 1970, and it also suggests rather strongly that the votes cast for ANAPO in 1970 were protest votes.

This brings up the question of the future of the Colombian party system. Does the election of 1974 represent a return to the traditional two-party system? Although ANAPO and the minor parties received only small percentages of the vote, there are signs that the two traditional parties do not have the grasp on the electorate they had in the past, and this finding is especially true in the cities. The Bogotá survey reveals that the number of respondents claiming no party identification increased from 5.79 percent in 1970 to 16.35 percent in 1974. It is the Conservatives, however, who are losing the most supporters. While the number of Liberal partisans dropped 5 percent between 1970 and 1974, the Conservatives lost 12.83 percent. In 1974 only 14.24 percent of those interviewed claimed to be Conservatives, while 61.17 percent identified

---

[96] Ibid., pp. 56-57.

themselves as Liberals.[97] The Liberals clearly dominate in Bogotá, but both parties are losing their faithful partisans.

In general, this pattern seems to be repeated throughout Colombia. The growth of the major cities has increased their proportion of the total vote, but the Conservatives have not been able to keep pace. Part of the reason may be the impact of urbanization, but another part may well be age; the weakest party identification is among those less than 30 years old. Yet is the Conservatives are losing their position as a competitive party, the Liberals cannot be complacent. The success of ANAPO in 1970 demonstrates that a very large number of dissatisfied Colombians can be mobilized, at least occasionally, against the traditional parties. Perhaps even more important, the history of violent conflict between the parties points up the fact that neither party will passively accept submission to the other for long. The crucial test may be whether the Conservatives can accept such a role if they begin to lose their strength in competitive elections.

---

[97] Williams, p. 88.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FACTIONS

Describing the factions of the Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia, Mario Latorre writes that:

> However the groups have formed and divided the parties . . . they have formed around a political leader to whom is offered adhesion and loyalty; and the groups are structured and held together by mutual relationships and favors and last as long as that leader does, politically or in reality.[1]

While this description is essentially accurate, James L. Payne adds further details in his description of the factions of the parties. He notes that:

> The national factions are semipermanent groups of political leaders that compete with each other and establish separate organizations with separate headquarters, party committees, and congressional groups. At the local level, national faction lines tend to be reflected in separate groups of local leaders in most departments. But even within these local branches of national factions there are divisions expressed in competing lists for Senate, House, and city council positions—factions of factions.[2]

As Latorre and Payne suggest, Colombian party factions are composed of political leaders who in turn organize around a central or primary leader. These leaders are linked together by a structure of relationships which may extend across different levels (national, departmental, and local) of the parties. The factions may also take on some aspects

---

[1]Mario Latorre, Elecciones y Partidos Políticos en Colombia (Bogotá: El Greco, 1974), p. 253.

[2]James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 186.

of a more formalized organization by opening headquarters, establishing committees and so forth. In an effort to describe the structure of the factions the following sections will focus on three characteristics which are salient. The first is the composition of the faction, with emphasis upon factional leadership. The second is the structure of relationships among the leaders who make up the factions. Finally, an attempt will be made to show how these relationships have been formalized to some degree as organization. Before turning to the matter of factional leadership and the structure of relationships, it may be useful to point out who provides the leadership of the parties in general.

Party Leadership in Colombia

In Colombian political parties leadership comes essentially from their elected officeholders, who are the members of Congress, the departmental assemblies, or the local municipal councils. Although legislators do not constitute the universe of political leaders, they are the major leaders within the parties and the most active. This is especially true of the congressmen, who dominate the leadership positions within the parties, and also make up much of the important units of party organization. Because of their ubiquity in leadership positions, and their influence in party affaris, Mario Latorre refers to the Liberals and Conservatives as <u>partidos parlamentarios</u>, and notes the "presence of senators and representatives in departmental directorates, conventions, national directorates, advisory and consultative boards, in

all the apparatus and machinery of the parties."[3] The same characteristic has also been observed by Alan Angell, who points out that nearly all of the party directors are congressmen, and that they dominate party meetings.[4]

Congressmen are accorded a privileged role within the parties. It is perhaps symbolic that national party conventions are often held in the chamber of the House of Representatives, the Salón Elíptico. The importance of the congressmen within the parties is reflected in the statutes of the parties which specifically entitle the congressmen to act as delegates to the national conventions without having to be elected.[5] Furthermore, they generally dominate the proceedings, act as presiding officers, give the speeches, and make the nominations.[6] Although the party statutes do not specifically designate the congressmen as delegates to the departmental conventions, they are generally in attendance and again seem to play an influential role. For example, of the thirteen delegates to the Liberal national convention in

---

[3]Latorre, p. 259.

[4]Alan Angell, "Co-operation and Conflict in Colombian Party Politics," Political Studies, 24 (1966), p. 65.

[5]As of 1974, the Conservative party statutes were those adopted in 1948. They may be found in Guillermo Salamanca, Los Partidos en Colombia (Bogotá: El Voto Nacional, 1961), pp. 321-325. The Liberal statutes were adopted in 1961. They may be found in Carlos Lleras Restrepo. Hacía La Restauración Democrática y El Cambio Social, Vol. II (Bogotá: Editorial Agra, 1963), pp. 805-830.

[6]For a good descriptive account of the way in which Colombian party conventions are conducted, see Latorre, pp. 1-27.

1973 from the department of Tolima, six were members of Congress.[7] Thus almost half of the delegation were congressmen. This is one means by which the congressmen provide much of the leadership of the parties both at the national level and the departmental level.

The prominence of congressmen and other legislators in party leadership roles also seems to be true in regard to the other major element of party organization, the directorates. This may be illustrated by examining the composition of the national directorates in 1968. Of the four members of the Liberal (Oficialista) national directorate, three were senators and one was a representative. All five members of the Independent Conservative directorate were senators. The Ospinista Conservatives appear to place somewhat less emphasis on active legislators holding party positions, but the influence of congressmen is still apparent. Of the seven members of the Ospinista directorate in 1968, one was a senator and two were representatives. Yet two of the four who were not congressmen had run for the senate in 1966 and lost by narrow margins. A third ran for the Senate in 1970 and won.

One may find many other examples of the domination of the party organization by the congressmen at the departmental and local levels. If all of the members are not congressmen, at least the officers frequently are. In May 1973, the president of the Bogotá Liberal directorate, Alvaro Uribe Rueda, was a senator from Cundinamarca. Likewise, the vice president, Alegría Fonseca de Ramírez, was a

---

[7] El Tiempo, June 2, 1973, p. 7-A.

represenative from Cundinamarca. The Conservative directorate of Cauca had a three-member mesa directiva, of which two members were congressmen. Mario Vivas was a senator, while Rodrigo Velasco Arboleda was a representative. Ignacio Valencia López did not hold a seat in Congress, but he did have the advantage of being the son of former president Guillermo León Valencia.[8]

The congressmen are also prominent in other units of the party organization. For example, in addition to the national directorate the Liberals also choose a Comisión Política Central which is to act as a national policy-making committee for the party, in regard to party affairs as well as legislative proposals in Congress. This party organ is also usually made up of congressmen. Nine of the ten members elected by the national convention in July 1973 to the Comisión Política Central were congressmen: even the one member of the commission who did not hold a seat in Congress at the time, Fabio Echeverri, was subsequently elected to the House of Representatives from Antioquia in 1974 (see Table 4.1).

It should be pointed out that Colombian political leaders have devised a system which allows legislators, especially the congressmen, to hold a wide variety of leadership positions simultaneously, which perhaps helps them to consolidate indirectly the leadership of the parties. First of all, the Colombian constitution permits a rather extensive holding of concurrent positions by the congressmen. Although

---

[8] El Tiempo, May 10, 1973, p. 9-A.

TABLE 4.1

COMPOSITION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY COMISIÓN POLÍTICA CENTRAL, JULY 1973

Name	Position	Department
Gustavo Balcázar Monzón	Senate, principal	Valle
Fabio Echeverri	- -	Antioquia
Edmundo López	Senate, principal	Córdoba
Alberto Santofimio Botero	House, principal	Tolima
Carlos Holmes Trujillo	Senate, principal	Valle
Juan José Turbay	House, principal	Santander
Diego Uribe Vargas	Senate, principal	Cundinamarca
Jorge Valencia Jaramillo	Senate, suplente	Antioquia
Rafael Vergara Tamara	Senate, principal	Bolívar
Campo Anibal Toledo	Senate, suplente	Santander

Source: El Tiempo, 6 July 1973, p. 6-A.

one may not hold two seats in the same legislative body, it is permissible to hold concurrent seats in different legislative bodies; for example, Congress and a departmental assembly. There is no limit to the number of different legislative bodies to which one may be elected.

In addition, the boundary between legislative and executive roles is not as sharply drawn as in the United States, and Colombian congressmen may also hold leadership positions within the executive branch of government. They may serve as cabinet ministers, heads of administrative agencies, mayor of Bogotá, governors, and diplomatic agents.[9] The fact that legislative and executive roles overlap to such an extent tends to concentrate leadership within a smaller group than

[9] Constitution of the Republic of Colombia: 1886 (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1960), Articles 108 and 109.

might be expected where the boundaries of such roles are more clearly defined.

The system of suplentes, or alternates, makes it possible for one person to hold many different positions. For each person elected to office an alternate is also elected. Thus party leaders can run for seats they have no intention of ever taking, and they can place their supporters in positions they do not want to serve in personally. The effects this practice may sometimes have can be seen in one four-year period in the career of Alfonso López Michelsen. In this brief period he was: a senator from Cundinamarca (1966-70); a deputy in the departmental assemblies of Boyacá, Quindío, and Valle (1966-68); the Minister of Foreign Relations (1968-70); and the governor of César (1967). In addition to the governmental positions he held, he was also appointed to the Liberal party national directorate (1968-70).

Not all Colombian congressmen, of course, hold such a variety of prestigious leadership positions at the same time or in such a brief period. Alfonso López was a major national leader who was elected president in 1974. Yet, it is not uncommon for less prominent congressmen to hold a seat in Congress, as well as other positions within their own departments, such as a seat in a municipal council, positions within the local or departmental bureaucracy, or perhaps a diplomatic post. While this system does not place leadership exclusively in the hands of the congressmen, it does give them a certain edge over other competitors.

Although less is known about them, it seems that the other elected officeholders, the assembly deputies and municipal councilmen, provide

much of the party leadership at the local level. For example, in 1974 the delegates to the Liberal departmental convention in Cundinamarca were chosen by the Liberal members of the various municipal councils in the department. Similarly, in 1974 in Caldas the delegates to the departmental convention were selected by juntas made up of all Liberals who had been councilmen or were currently serving in that capacity.[10] Assembly deputies and municipal councilmen are among the delegates to party conventions, and occasionally they may be the only delegates. For example, Stephen Rozman writes that in 1967 the Liberals in Valle held a special convention to choose a new party directorate in the department. The delegates to the convention were the current Liberal councilmen in the municipios of Valle.[11]

A similar involvement of the legislators in the leadership of the party organization also seems to be the case at the departmental level. Rozman surveyed all the members of the departmental directorates in Valle and the municipal directorates of Cali and the "most striking characteristic" he found was the prominence of current and former legislators in the party organization. Of those surveyed, "42 present were currently members of legislatures and 39 percent had previously served in legislative bodies. On the other hand, only 36 percent had never performed the role of legislator." However, one-third of those

---

[10] El Tiempo, March 17, 1974, p. 11-A.

[11] Stephen Lyle Rozman, "A Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Party Leadership in Cali, Colombia," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Florida, 1968, p. 260.

who had never held a legislative office were members of the Ospinista municipal directorate in Cali. Rozman believes that this indicates a "more open recruitment" pattern among Ospinistas.[12] That may be true but other explanations are possible. For one thing, the municipal directorates are among the least active and influential components of party organization, which may have made the municipal directorates unappealing to Conservative leaders.

Rozman does, however, note the "dual role" of legislator and party leader; that is, rather than elective office or party office being a step toward the other, the two seem to go together. Yet of the two it seems that position within the party hierarchy (e.g., the directorates) is more the result of winning elective office than the other way around. Furthermore, the legislators seem to dominate the directorates. Rozman writes that most of the presidents of the departmental directorates in Valle were senators. Another practice which concentrates leadership of the parties in the hands of elective officeholders is that apparently some of the members of the directorates who are not legislators have been appointed from time to time merely for prestige reasons and are not expected to take an active role in party affairs.[13]

In addition to the prominence of legislators within the party organization one sometimes finds a rather extensive overlap between different levels of the party organization itself. For example, in 1967 one Liberal faction in Valle had both a departmental directorate and a

---

[12] Ibid., p. 108.

[13] Ibid., pp. 96-97.

municipal directorate in Cali. Indeed, six of the eleven members of the two bodies served on both directorates. This overlap is also found between the national and departmental levels. In 1968, for example, J. Emilio Valderrama was president of the Ospinista Conservative national directorate as well as president of the Ospinista departmental directorate in Antioquia.

All of this has an important effect on the parties. Most importantly, as Hoskin and Swanson note, "party structures are not well differentiated, the parties are not highly structured organizations running from the barrio to the national level." Hoskin and Swanson go on to point out that the Colombian Congress is the "locus of organizational activity."[14] Congressmen not only provide much of the party leadership, but because of their prominence within the party organization they are the organization to some extent. In addition to the congressmen, other legislators, the assembly deputies and municipal councilmen, also act as party leaders. Consequently, elected officeholders are to a significant extent the leaders of the parties at all levels of the parties except the very bottom.

The elected officeholders are not the universe of party leaders. But it can be argued that they are the major leaders or the dominant leaders in most cases. This is important to an understanding of the structure of the factions for two reasons. First, it helps to identify

---

[14]Gary Hoskin and Gerald Swanson, "Political Party Leadership in Colombia: A Spatial Analysis," Comparative Politics, 6 (April, 1974), p. 398.

who the party leaders are, and as will be seen later, who the members of the factions are. Within this context, it is also possible to define the scope of the factions, or the composition of the factions. While legislators are not the totality of the factional membership they are the active members. Second, by focusing on the relationship among legislators it will be possible to describe the structure of the faction.

The Structure of Relationships

At the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that party factions in Colombia may best be described as a structure of relationships among political leaders. These political leaders have been identified as primarily the elected officeholders: the congressmen, assembly deputies and municipal councilmen. What then is the structure of relationships among these leaders that makes a faction what it is? The purpose of this section is to describe this structure of relationships, and in an effort to do this we shall focus on one department in Colombia—Valle del Cauca.

Parties and Factions in Valle

In his description of party factions in Colombia, James L. Payne notes that national factions are composed of political leaders who run competing lists of candidates for most elected offices; that is, for the Congress, the departmental assemblies, and the municipal councils. (The president is the only elected executive. Governors are appointed by the president and mayors are appointed by the governor.) Payne also notes that in a department groups of political leaders may break off

from national groups and run for a few offices in their own department, thus creating local or perhaps regional factions. Payne defines factionalism as the "presence of candidates bearing the same party label but competing with each other in general elections."[15]

Payne's description of the factions is useful. He is right to point out that national faction lines tend to be repeated at the departmental or local level. This can be seen in the composition of the departmental assembly of Valle during the years of 1962-1974. It is true that the national factions have generally run candidates for most legislative offices in Colombia. As can be seen in Table 4.2, party and factional divisions within departmental assemblies have roughly paralled those found in the Congress. To use some simple examples, the division between the Oficialista Liberals and the MRL found in the Congress may also be found in a departmental assembly. The same is true of the Conservative split between the Unionistas and Independientes.

One important question does arise, however. Payne makes competing lists of candidates within the same party the distinguishing feature of factionalism. Therefore, if the Liberals run two lists of candidates for Congress in a given department one may say that in this case, at least, the party was factionalized. This is a convenient and useful description. Yet beginning in the 1972 elections for city councils and departmental assemblies, the Liberals and the Conservatives began running unified lists of candidates. Likewise, in 1974 both parties ran

---

[15]James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 186.

TABLE 4.2

PARTY AND FACTIONAL DIVISION OF VALLE ASSEMBLY: 1962-1974

Party/Faction	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974
Liberals						11	14
Unified Lists							
Oficialistas	7	8	10	13	6		
MRL	7	6	4	1			
Others					1		
Conservatives							
Unified Lists							
Unionistas	7		3	5	3		
Independientes	4		3	2			
Belisaristas					2		
Sourdistas					1		
Others			1				
ANAPO	3	6	7	7	11	7	3
Other Parties					1	1	1
Total	28	28	28	28	25	25	25

Sources: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Resultados Electorales Frente Nacional 1958-1972: Asambleas Departamentales, pp. 63-66; Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, Abril 21, 1974, p. 273.

unified lists throughout most of Colombia. In Valle, at any rate, both parties ran unified lists of candidates for Congress and the departmental assembly for the first time since the National Front was created in 1958. The question is, Does this mean that the parties were not factionalized or divided in 1974? By Payne's definition one would conclude that they were not.

If the leaders and the relationships among them are taken into consideration then a somewhat different pattern emerges. Although the parties ran unified lists in 1974, leadership within them was nonetheless divided and rather well defined. In the Liberal party leadership at the departmental level was divided among three men: Senators Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, and Ramiro Andrade. The domination of the Liberal party in Valle by these three men had earned them the collective nickname of los tres reyes magos, or "The Magi."[16] The Conservatives identified their leaders as Senators Alvaro H. Caicedo, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, and Humberto González Narváez. A fourth Conservative leader was Carlos Holguín Sardi, who did not hold elective office at the time but had served previously in Congress and had been Minister of Communications under President Misael Pastrana.

But some very interesting questions arise. Why were these men considered the major, or primary, leaders in Valle? A certain ranking of ordering of leaders if implied by the designation "departmental leader." There is a recognition that some leaders stand at the top. In

---

[16] El Pueblo, April 3, 1975, p. 5.

Colombian terms, some are dirigentes. Yet simply holding an elective office is not sufficient to confer upon someone the status of dirigente. It may be noted that the three Conservative senators considered dirigentes were the only three senators the party elected in 1974. But Carlos Holguin Sardi held no office at all and yet he was considered a leader. Furthermore, the Liberals elected six senators in 1974, yet only three were considered departmental leaders. Why were not the other three? In addition, none of the members of the House of Representatives in either party was a departmental leader. Thus there is a ranking of leaders which does not coincide altogether with the offices held. How might this pattern be explained?

One way of approaching this problem is by examining the composition of the lists. Colombia uses a list system of proportional representation. Candidates run at large within departments. Furthermore, this system is known as a "closed list," that is, voting is for fixed lists of candidates: the voter may choose among lists, but cannot choose among the individual candidates on a list. The parties make up their own lists and distribute them on election day.

Nominally the lists are chosen by the party convention, but the actual process of candidate selection has been quite different. As difficult as it is to determine precisely how the lists are chosen, they are important to an understanding of the structure of the factions. As Gary Hoskin writes, the formation of the lists:

> represents perhaps the principle raison de'etre of congressional and party activity in the political system. Colombian parties are, for all practical purposes congressional

parties that thrive upon electoral politics, obviously including the nomination and election of a president.[17]

When one party leader in Valle was asked how the lists are decided, he replied that "First the chief places himself at the head of the list, then his followers." He went on to explain that for the first few positions there is not much competition; it is more or less understood who will occupy this position. For the remainder, however, the competition is somewhat greater, and here the chiefs resolve the matter by aplicando el bolígrafo, which translates literally as "applying the ballpoint pen." This colorful phrase means that the major party leaders decide the positions by themselves.

There does seem to be some truth in this, at least as far as who heads the lists. The departmental leaders head the lists, generally the Senate lists. In 1974 in Valle, for example, the chiefs headed the Senate lists in their respective parties. On the Liberal Senate list Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, and Ramiro Andrade were placed first, second, and third, respectively. On the Conservative list, Alvaro H. Caicedo, Rodrigo Lloreda, and Humberto González Narváez were likewise placed first, second, and third, respectively.

One may find other evidence that suggests that the dirigentes have a major role in making up the lists. In September 1973, the delegates from Valle to the Conservative national convention selected Alvaro H.

---

[17]Gary Hoskin, "The Colombian Congress: Paradise of Politics, Shadow of the Formal Model," in Legislative Behavior in Colombia, Vol. II (Buffalo, N.Y.: Council on International Studies, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1976), p. 168.

Caicedo, Rodrigo Lloreda, and Humberto González Narváez to make up the party's lists for their department. On March 15, 1974, a week before the departmental convention was to be held to choose the candidates, the three dirigentes announced that they had achieved a "harmonious and integral agreement on the configuration of unified lists for the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Assembly, and the Departmental Directorate."[18] Their decision, however, would be subject to approval of the departmental convention.

The convention met the night of March 21 and according to El País unanimously approved the lists as they had been devised. El País, which is owned by the Caicedo family, reported no dissension over the composition of the lists, but El Tiempo reported that there was a good deal of disagreement and that those who did not approve of the lists were not allowed to speak.[19]

Similarly, the Liberal leaders began the process of selecting the candidates well before the departmental convention met. In January 1974 it was reported that Gustavo Balcázar Monzón and Carlos Holmes Trujillo had been making "contacts" to unify the lists, and that Julio César Turbay Ayala, the national director of the Liberals, would attend the departmental convention when the lists would be pronounced. The Liberal departmental convention finally met on April 7, 1974, and authorized the directive committe of the departmental directorate, made up of

---

[18] El País, March 16, 1974, pp. 1, 26.

[19] El Tiempo, March 22, 1974, p. 1-A.

Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, Carlos Holmes Trujillo and Ramiro Andrade, to make up the lists. Then the convention adjourned.[20]

These cases indicate that the influence of the principal leaders in the composition of the lists is considerable, but how do they acquire that power? How do they obtain their positions at the head of the lists? How are the other positions decided? Based on what party leaders in Valle say, there are several factors involved. One high-ranking member of the Conservative party explained that:

> What is most important to head a list in my party has to be necessarily the personal qualities of the leaders on the one hand, and the representation that one has within the party, and that which is most important is the number of votes, or followers, or adherents.

He went on to explain that it was a "sum of conditions," personal and otherwise, but that "fundamentally" the greater the number of adherents or followers one has the more likely he is to head the list. Other party leaders likewise seem to emphasize basically two "conditions" or categories of "qualities" which are important to head a list: (1) the personal attributes of the leader, and (2) his political strength.

In referring to personal qualities, party leaders stress such characteristics as intelligence, charisma, intellectual ability, hard work, ideas, prestige, loyalty to one's comrades, and so forth. Personal characteristics and the social background of leaders are undoubtedly important. But what is perhaps more important, in fact vital, is for the leader to have a following, or adherents, or those who have

---

[20] El Tiempo, April 8, 1974, p. 6-A.

identified with the leader and who support him. In large part this is the "representation" a leader has, or to use the Colombian political expression, his cuota de poder or "quota of power." It is essential that a leader have followers who pledge their loyalty and support. The more followers a leader can count as "his," the greater is his cuota de poder and the higher he rises in importance.

Thus the leader who can build the largest following has the greatest chance to head the list. Since Colombian legislators run "at large" a politician who aspires to a seat in Congress must attempt to build a following throughout the department, or in as many municipios as possible. The most successful have the greatest chance to head the list, or to occupy a high position on the list, for the Senate or House of Representatives. Such a large following is not necessary for positions on lists for the departmental assembly, and those seeking a position on a city council list need only develop a following in their municipio, not the whole department.

Heading a list is important for several reasons. For one thing, it holds prestige or political status; to head a list is to be recognized as an important leader. This is especially true in regard to Senate lists; the House of Representatives lists seem to carry somewhat less prestige. Consequently, major departmental leaders may sometimes lend the prestige of their names to several lists for offices of lesser importance than the one which is their principal goal. For example, in 1974 Gustavo Balcázar Monzón headed Liberal city council lists in the municipios of Caicedonia and Florida, in addition to

heading the Liberal Senate list in Valle. Likewise, the person who held the second position on the Liberal Senate list, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, also headed city council lists in the municipios of Cartago, Dagua, Jamundi and Palmira.

Heading a list is not only important for the prestige or recognition of leadership that goes with it. It is also politically important because of the system of proportional representation; in short, heading a list increases one's chances of being elected. Likewise, a major departmental leader, or dirigente, may head a list of lesser importance, such as city council, in order to increase the electoral chances of the other candidates on the list. A dual purpose is thus served. The lesser-known candidates are elected and the dirigente increases his following and cuota de poder.

Until now the discussion has centered on heading the list and the major leaders, those who are considered the departmental level dirigentes or jefes. How then are the other positions, or renglones, on the lists decided? It seems that the criteria for choosing the remaining positions are quite similar to those used to choose who shall head the list. As one party leader in Valle said, generally there exists a "calculus" which takes into account the popularity of candidates, their work for the party, their ability at organizing meetings, and other factors. But he also noted the importance of having followers and supporters. While others also mentioned these qualities of leadership, the importance of the followers was also noted. That is, those who occupy the other positions on the lists must, like the departmental

chiefs, have their own followers or supporters, and the size of their following is taken into account in the process of allocating positions on the lists.

Whether the allocation of positions on the lists is strictly and simply decided according to the size of one's following is difficult to say. It does seem, however, that the possession of a following, and the size of that following, is of fundamental importance. Those with the largest followings have a chance at heading the list; those with small followings occupy the other positions. Yet each must have his own followers or supporters.

The Nature of the Relationships

Although the composition of the electoral lists is important in understanding the structure of the factions, the lists themselves are not synonymous with factions. What then is the distinguishing feature of factions? It is argued here that the principal feature is the relationship between leaders which may be described in terms of vertical attachments and exclusive political loyalties.

In Colombian politics a number of words and phrases are frequently used to describe this relationship, such as identificar (to identify), afiliar (to affiliate), marcar (to mark), and apoyar (to support). It is fundamental that a party leader identify or affiliate with another leader of higher standing than himself. Furthermore, this identification must be exclusive; that is, one can identify with only one leader. This was expressed in a number of different ways. One member of the city council of Cali said that any effort to identify or support more

than one leader at the same time "simply is political suicide." A Liberal explained in more lofty terms that "One has to have a single ideal . . . and be for a single person or a single group." Another said that "One can be a friend of another leader, but not politically." Still another pointed out that the only way that one could support or identify with two leaders simultaneously would be if they formed an alliance between themselves, or in his words, an amistad pactada.

Some, however, went further in explaining that it is possible to support more than one leader, but only if they are on different electoral levels (Senate, House, or assembly, for example). Thus one can identify with different leaders holding different positions in the hierarchy of offices. Yet it is important to note that this cannot be a random choice, for all of the leaders that one supports must be linked together in the same "line."

> Yes, it is possible to support two leaders at the same time when they belong to the same line. For example, in my particular case I support Dr. Rodrigo Lloreda and Dr. Mariano Ospina Pérez. But to support two leaders of different lines is improbable and I believe practically impossible.

In sum, each leader must identify with or support another leader, but he may identify with only one leader on the same electoral level, such as enate, ouse, departmental assembly or city council. Furthermore, all of the leaders thus connected must belong to the same "line" or group. For example, if a member of the assembly is identified with a member of the House of Representatives who is in turn identified with Senator Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, he cannot claim to be a supporter of Senator Ramiro Andrade. By this structure of vertical attachments and

exclusive loyalties the parties divide into "lines," "groups," matices (shades or tints), or "factions." These series of attachments may extend across different levels of the parties, linking together congressmen, assembly deputies, and municipal councilmen.

The extent of groups structured in this manner is determined by the central or primary leader. The primary leader is the leader with the highest standing at a given level, and this may be national, departmental or local. To put it another way, the primary leader does not identify with or support any other leader at the same level, though he may identify with another leader at a higher level. For example, in 1975 Senator Gustavo Balcázar Monzón was one of the primary leaders of the Liberal party in the department of Valle. He was, in fact, one of the dirigentes of the party in the department. Balcázar Monzón did not identify with any other leader in the department, but he did identify with Alfonso López, the President of Colombia and a fellow Liberal. In contrast, Armando Holguín Sarria was also a senator from Valle, and therefore had the same electoral status as Balcázar Monzón. Yet Holguín Sarria was not a primary leader wince he in turn was a follower of Senator Ramiro Andrade. Holguín Sarria was a leader, however, because he had his own followers, but all of his followers would ultimately be tied to Ramiro Andrade rather than Balcázar Monzón.

The national factions are those made up of políticos in all the departments of Colombia and who are ultimately tied to a central or primary national leader such as Carlos Lleras, Alfonso López, Mariano Ospina, or Alvaro Gómez. These national factions may subdivide at the

departmental level, with two or perhaps more leaders independent of each other yet still tied to the national leader. This has, in fact, frequently been the case in Valle. For example, leadership of the Oficialista Liberals has usually been divided. In 1966 leadership of this group was divided between Francisco Ramírez and Gustavo Balcázar Monzón even though they ran on the same Senate list, and although they both supported the same national leader.

If the primary leader at a given level does not identify with another leader at a higher level, the group, or "line," does not extend any further. It is possible, therefore, to have groups which are purely local or regional. For example, in 1964 a Conservative group emerged in Valle called the Movimiento de Restauración Conservadora. The leader was César Tulio Delgado, who did not support Mariano Ospina or Laureano Gómez, the leaders of the two national Conservative factions. The group formed by Delgado was consequently only a departmental faction. By 1966, the group had virtually disintegrated and Delgado did not win reelection.

Thus factional divisions within the parties may, on occasion, be concealed by a given list. Even though the Liberals and Conservatives ran unified lists in 1974, each candidate was identified with one of the departmental dirigentes. Payne's definition of factions is therefore somewhat misleading. What seems more important is the linkages and allegiances among leaders. It is true that at times a group may run its own list in an election. This has been, in fact, a common practice not only in Valle but throughout Colombia. As can be seen in Table 4.3

TABLE 4.3

NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL LISTS INSCRIBED IN VALLE: 1958-1974

	Senate				House			
	Lib.	Con.	Other	Total	Lib.	Con.	Other	Total
1958	2	3		5	2	3		5
1960					2	3		5
1962	6	3		9	5	3		8
1964					7	4		11
1966	5	5		10	6	6		12
1968					7	9		16
1970	7	4		11	10	6		16
1974	2	1	3	6	2	1	3	6

Source: Calculated from records published by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

the number of lists filed for congressional offices increased from 1958 to 1970, then dropped off sharply in 1974.

It is important, however, to reiterate that it is not the list that is the defining characteristic of a faction. The lists are important in the sense that they are the instruments, or means, by which politicians are candidates for office. But what is more important is the division of groups of politicians who are "identified" or linked together in series of exclusive political loyalties and who are ultimately tied to a central or primary leader. Such groups may form their own list and run for office, but this is not absolutely necessary. More than one group may be represented on a single list.

From what could be determined by interviews with party leaders and officeholders in Valle in 1975, every person who was included on the

Liberal or Conservative party list for the 1974 elections was "identified" with one of the three matices or groups in his respective party. In other words, in the Liberal party every candidate for Congress, for the departmental assembly, and the municipal council of Cali was ultimately allied with, or a supporter of Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, or Ramiro Andrade. Even the other senate candidates were tied to one of these three men. In addition, all candidates were included within a single list. Thus Payne's definition of the structure of factions as competing lists is not accurate; it is the structure of relationships between leaders and followers which is the principal characteristic of a faction in Colombian political parties. Such relationships may be reflected in competing lists in a given election, but this is not invariably the case.

The Function of the Relationships

The need to identify with or support a leader has a very practical purpose within the context of Colombian party politics. To be a leader obviously requires followers. It is in the interest of a leader who aspires to higher office to expand his following as much as he can and thereby increase his cuota de poder. But it is also in the interest of the followers to be identified with the leader. If the leader's group is expanding and growing in strength, the followers' chances to obtain higher positions are also increased. Consequently, it is not simply identifying with a leader that is important to followers, but what they expect to get out of it. This was perfectly expressed by one Conservative in Valle:

> But you understand that in order to be elected to a legislative body—the parties nominate the lists according to the groups that are represented in them—therefore one necessarily must identify himself or mark himself in order to fulfill the aspirations he has as a politician.

In other words, if one has ambitions to hold an elective office he must first be on the list to be a candidate, and to be a candidate he must be identified with or marked as a follower of a leader higher than himself and make known his support of one of the "groups," "lines," or matices. It would appear, therefore, that the ties between leader and followers are first of all a matter of practical politics to get elected. In the system that has evolved, leader and follower need each other.

The leader needs followers to establish his cuota de poder, by which he lays claim to an "effective," or electable, position on the list. The follower has essentially the same motive; by attaching himself to a leader with a large enough group he may claim the reward of a position on a list in exchange for his support, although the follower may have a lower position on the list, or be given a position on a list of lesser prestige (assembly, e.g.). Because of the exchange involved, the relationship must be exclusive; that is, a follower can only identify with, or be loyal to, one leader.

The need to declare one's loyalty or support may also be described by examining the alternatives an aspiring politician has. If he does not wish to identify with an existing group he can form his own group and launch a competing list of candidates, or perhaps merely join a competing group. Yet this entails certain political risks. A competing group, or "dissident" as such a group is generally called in Colombia,

faces obstacles similar to those confronting a candidate who challenges an incumbent in an election in the United States. An existing group may have power or resources like those of an incumbent United States senator, such as organization, money, name recognition of the principal leader, previous electoral victories, and so forth. In short, a dissident who does not wish to identify with an existing group or dirigente runs the risk of not being elected. In Valle, some aspiring politicians have adopted the dissident strategy and succeeded; others have tried and failed.

Yet certain limits to the expansion of a group seem inevitable. On the one hand, the principal leader, or leaders, and a number of the followers may benefit from the relationship. A larger group would have a greater cuota de poder and claim the higher positions on the lists. But on the other hand, the number of seats a group can win is limited. Consequently, the desires of many aspirants (receiving an "effective" position on a list) cannot be fulfilled. Thus, the structure of relationships has a practical political purpose, but at the same time an inherent instability.

The Stability of the Relationships

One of the most difficult questions to answer concerns the stability of the relationships among leaders, or the strength of the ties. Are they stable, lasting from election to election? In a system where leaders constantly stress the importance of loyalty and identification, are these stated values actually adhered to in politics?

Political groups built on these sorts of ties among leaders do not seem to be very stable. Table 4.4 shows the percentage of replacements of principals elected to the House of Representatives from Valle during the National Front. As the table demonstrates, in all but one election year more than half of the representatives elected as principals are replaced by new members. In both parties most representatives elected as principals have served only one term in that capacity. In the Liberal party, of the 34 individuals elected to the House as principals from Valle between the years 1960 and 1970 (five terms), only nine served more than one term. Only two men were elected five times. In the Conservative party, only one of the individuals elected as principals served more than two terms.

TABLE 4.4

PERCENTAGE REPLACEMENTS OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM VALLE: 1962-1970

Year	Percentage Replacements
1962	66.6
1964	60.0
1966	65.0
1968	45.0
1970	55.0

Source: Calculated from records published by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

$$PR = \frac{\text{(Number new members)-(Number new seats)}}{\text{(Number seats)-(Number new seats)}}$$

These data must, of course, be used with caution. Some alternates were later elected as principals, and vice versa, which means some persons did sit in Congress more often than is indicated. A few representatives were later elected to the Senate. Furthermore, some members probably did not return to Congress because of electoral competition among the factions, though not between the parties because of the parity provision of the National Front. Several explanations are possible for the turnover rate. Payne argues, for example, that many Colombian politicians do not seek reelection because they have status incentives and not program incentives.

Yet even when all of these factors are taken into consideration it still appears that the relationships between leaders are not very stable, and this may in part account for the turnover. The composition of the lists is an internal party affair. While parity was in effect each party was guaranteed half of the seats in Congress. Competition among the factions and the rise of ANAPO upset parity somewhat, but even the representatives elected by the different factions vary from election to election. Thus even in the strongest factions, such as the Oficialista Liberals and the Unionista Conservatives, the representatives elected by these groups vary each term.

Another indication of the weakness of ties among leaders is that a principal who wins reelection rarely has the same alternate as in the previous election. In 1968, for example, none of the principals reelected to the House of Representatives had the same <u>suplente</u> as in 1966. There are a few leaders, primarily the departmental <u>dirigentes</u>

who tend to hold their positions from election to election, but aside from them the membership of Congress is a kaleidoscope of changing names and combination of names.

It seems that party leaders constantly pursue the strategic benefits of attachments to other leaders. This begins with the departmental leaders and extends downward through all levels of the parties. For the departmental leaders the overriding question is who will be president. When a political follower of Gustavo Balcázar Monzón was asked about the political loyalties of the senator, he replied, "First he was a Llerista, then a Lopista, and now is in the process of becoming a Turbayista." This was in 1975, when Alfonso López had been in office less than a year, but the process of transferring loyalties to the next likely candidate had already begun.

Some of the most common words used to describe the expectations leader and follower have of one another are lealdad (loyalty), fidelidad (fidelity), adhesión (adhesion), seguridad (security), and confianza (confidence). Perhaps the major reason leaders emphasize matters of loyalty, fidelity, and confidence was expressed by the Liberal party secretary who said that the reason was to guarantee "stability in the political position that one fills." In other words, the emphasis upon loyalty is necessary to keep one's office. The followers and the leader need each other to be elected and to remain in office or to rise in the hierarchy. Nevertheless, these loyalties do not seem especially strong. Even the Liberal party secretary estimated that only about 10 percent of the barrio leaders could be counted on to stay loyal to their leaders.

In his words, "Nadie tiene capital político fíjo." Nobody has fixed political capital.

This seems to be true at other levels within the parties, such as the Congress and the assembly. It is very difficult to devise a quantitative measure, because of the lack of accurate data on the political loyalties of dozens of candidates and the changes in these loyalties over a period of 16 years. But judging from the turnover rate in Congress (see Table 4.4) and the rise and fall of dissident groups, it appears that nobody has fixed political capital at other levels in the party. The few officeholders who survive for more than two or three elections seem to be the exception, and even these seem to base their success on "new" followers each time.

The Formalization of Relationships: Party and Factional Organization

Although the Liberal and Conservative parties took on their labels quite early in Colombian history, the growth of formal party organization has been slow. During the nineteenth century organizational features such as regular meetings, periodic conventions, committees, or defined offices seem to have been either nonexistent or very rare. Sometimes the lack of party organization was the result of government repression, as was the case of the Liberals in the late 1880's. Helen Delpar writes that "During this period Liberals made no concerted effort to participate in elections, and party organization was nonexistent. When a small group of Liberal leaders met in Bogotá in 1887 to plan the

reconstruction of the party, the government reacted by expelling several of them from Colombia."[21]

After World War I formal organization slowly developed, and by the time of the National Front the parties had evolved, on paper at least, a hierarchical structure of conventions and directorates. Ideally, the formal organization provides for unified and regularized functioning of the parties, but the reality has been somewhat different. It is not necessary to discuss the formal organization in detail, but the major features during the National Front may be pointed out.[22]

The two principal elements of organization are the conventions and the directorates. Nominally, the ultimate authority in both parties, as in the United States, is the national convention. The national convention meets every two years to elect the party directorate and every four years to choose the presidential candidate. Similarly, conventions are also held at the departmental level to ratify congressional candidates, candidates for the departmental assemblies, and the departmental directorates. The municipal conventions are the least significant. The Conservatives do not hold them, using the departmental conventions instead while the Liberals have used them mainly for choosing delegates to departmental conventions and apparently little else.

---

[21]Helen Delpar, "Road to Revolution: The Liberal Party of Colombia, 1886-1889," The Americans, 32 (January, 1976), p. 353.

[22]The following discussion is based on the party statutes cited in Footnote 5.

Between conventions the major element of the formal party structure is the directorates. The directorates are a kind of executive committee responsible for managing party affairs on a daily basis. They are charged with such duties as calling the conventions, selecting the sites, resolving internal disputes, and so forth. The directorates exist at three levels of the parties (national, departmental and municipal), but the national and departmental directorates are the most active. Apparently, the municipal committees meet seldom, and although they are charged with maintaining the grass roots activity of the parties, attention to this responsibility would seem to be sporadic.

One additional element of party organization should be pointed out, although it is not mentioned in the Conservative statutes, and only briefly touched on in the Liberal statutes. At the base of the organizational pyramid are the comités de barrio, neighborhood committees, which are nominally the party organization in the most direct contact with the average citizen. The barrio committees are generally made up of a president and a few other officers such as a secretary and a treasurer. Little is known of the barrio committees. They do not exist in every neighborhood, and where they do exist they seem to be concentrated in lower income barrios, or rural areas.[23] Although their activities seem to vary from place to place, these committees appear to be most active during electoral campaigns.

Although the formal organization of the parties provides a framework for unity, in practice this has seldom been the case. For

---

[23]Rozman, p. 58.

even when the party organization is more or less unified it is mainly a coalition of very personalized factions who join together, and frequently only temporarily, to take advantage of the benefits to be derived from common action. Thus even in times of unity, the party organization remains divided along factional lines.

This is especially true of the directorates, which are in essence coalitions of the major factional chiefs. It is significant that the directorates do not represent any specified geographical areas or functional groups or sectors within the parties. Furthermore, there is no division of labor among the members. It is important to note that the party leaders and activists have little interest in the mechanics of party organization. In his study of the party directorates of Valle del Cauca, Rozman finds that the members felt their most important activities to be making speeches and meeting with other party leaders.[24] In a survey of more than 400 members of the directorates and barrio committees in the Bogotá metropolitan area Murillo and Ortiz find the same lack of interest in party organization. The responses were, in fact, very similar. Both Liberals and Conservatives said that meeting with other leaders was their most important activity, followed by "diffusion of national problems to the people." Very few party leaders considered other party activities of great importance, including voter registration.[25] It may not be very surprising that the higher ranking

---

[24]Ibid., pp. 117-119.

[25]Gabriel Murillo and Israel Rivera Ortiz, Actividades y Estructura de Poder en los Partidos Colombianos (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1973), pp. 27-34.

leaders do not feel that organizational work is their affair, but at no level of the parties did leaders attach great importance to organizational work.

In this context the party organization becomes very personalized. Even the number of members within the directorates is subject to adjustment to fit the realities of factional politics. The Conservatives do not have a set number and thus the directorates may expand or contract according to necessity. The Liberals do have a fixed number, but the rules are not always followed. The Liberals, for example, require that the national directorate be composed of three members without suplentes (alternates) or a jefe único (single chief). The instances of the parties having a jefe único are exceptional. Carlos Lleras was elected jefe único of the Liberals in 1961, but even here it was more a case of his being the chief of the Oficialista faction since the MRL recognized Alfonso López as its leader and had its own directorate. At the national level the Conservatives have always been too divided to ever agree on a single party head.

It is thus more common for the parties to have plural directorates, which are generally made up of the major factional chiefs or their representatives, especially at the national level. The composition of the directorates consequently involves a careful balancing of the major factions. A good example of this occurred in 1968 in the Liberal party. When the MRL Línea Blanda made peace with the Oficialista Liberals in 1967 one of the major steps in unifying the Liberal party was to include the MRL within the regular party ranks. In October 1968 the Liberal

party held its national convention to make the union of the two groups official and to elect a new national directorate. Yet in choosing the new directorate the most important element was to include the major chiefs. Although nominally the convention chooses the directorates, the decision had already been made a few days before in a meeting of President Carlos Lleras, Alfonso López Michelsen, and Augusto Espinosa Valderrama, the current president of the national directorate. They had agreed that the directorate should be made up of four men: López Michelsen, Espinosa Valderrama, Julio César Turbay Ayala and Hernando Agudelo Villa. These names were then presented to the convention and ratified unaminously.[26]

The choice of the directorates involves a careful balancing of power among the factions. The major chiefs cannot be ignored without running the risk of splitting the party. The directorates are a union of chiefs and thus the perennial questions are: How many members should compose the directorate? Who will be the members? How many positions will be given to each faction? If a factional chief is not satisfied with the composition of the directorate he may refuse to participate thus breaking the unity of the party and throwing it into a "crisis." It may be noted in the case above that three of the members of the Liberal directorate were Oficialistas, while López Michelsen was the leader of the "old" MRL. It may also be noted that the directorate had four members even though the statutes specify three when the directorate

---

[26]Latorre, pp. 1-7.

is plural. The rules are therefore ignored when it is politically necessary to do so, or they are changed.

Another example of the balancing of factions in the party organization occurred in 1973, when the new Liberal Comisión Política Central was selected. The positions held in Congress by the members has been discussed previously, but El Tiempo also reported the factional alignment of each (see Table 4.5). Of the ten members four had already identified with Alfonso López and two with Carlos Lleras. The four "neutrals" were actually identified with Julio César Turbay Ayala, but three had preferences for López while one was leaning toward Lleras in the battle between López and Lleras for the nomination for president. Turbay claimed to be neutral, but actually swung his support to López.

TABLE 4.5

FACTIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY
COMISIÓN POLÍTICA CENTRAL, JULY 1973

Name	Faction
Gustavo Balcázar Monzón	Lopista
Rafael Vergara Tamara	Neutral-Lopista
Jorge Valencia Jaramillo	Llerista
Diego Uribe Vargas	Neutral-Lopista
Juan José Turbay	Lopista
Campo Anibal Toledo	Llerista
Carlos Holmes Trujillo	Neutral-Llerista
Fabio Echeverri	Lopista
Edmundo López	Neutral-Lopista
Alberto Santofimio Botero	Lopista

Source: El Tiempo, July 2, 1973, p. 6-A.

Thus each of the members was identified with one of the three national Liberal chiefs—López, Lleras and Turbay—with some maneuvering taking place as the chiefs struggled for the presidency. It may also be noted that the party statutes call for eight members, but the convention changed the rule to include two more members. According to El Tiempo the reason for the change was to give "ample participation to the different matices of the party, as well as to the different regions of the country."[27]

The membership of the directorates and other party organs is therefore selected on the basis of factional identity, but with some consideration of regional representation. How then is the numerical division decided? Once again the phrase cuota de poder or "quota of power" of the leaders is most often mentioned as the criterion by which the standing of the leaders is measured, with the cuota de poder being the electoral strength of the leaders or the size of their following. The same practice is said to be followed at the departmental level as at the national level. Stephen Rozman writes that in October 1967 the Liberals in Valle met and decided to form a united directorate which included all factions of the party. According to Rozman, "The problem of representation was resolved by basing it on the proportion of the total Liberal vote obtained by each group in the 1966 congressional elections." Thus the faction led by Francisco "Pacho" Eladio Ramírez received four positions, the faction led by Gustavo Balcázar Monzón

---

[27] El Tiempo, July 2, 1973, p. 6-A.

received three positions, the MRL received three positions, and the faction led by Carlos Holmes Trujillo received two positions, for a total of twelve seats. Balcázar Monzón, Trujillo, and Ramiro Andrade, the leader of the MRL in Valle, were among the twelve members of the new directorate.[28]

It is important to point out that when the major leaders cannot agree among themselves about how to share the party organization, it is a common practice for a faction to break away from the party and set up its own organization of directorates and conventions. Both parties have been affected by this throughout the National Front. In the Conservative party, the Laureanistas and the Unionistas maintained separate directorates and held separate conventions from 1958 to 1964. In 1964 the party organization was unified, but broke up shortly thereafter. In 1970 the Conservatives again tried to unify the party, but then split again when the Sourdistas and the Belisaristas held their own conventions, after the clash with Mariano Ospina over the nomination of Misael Pastrana as the presidential candidate. In 1974 the Conservatives were able to unify at most levels and agree on Alvaro Gómez as the presidential candidate, as well as to run unified lists of candidates for other offices.

The Liberals have also been affected by this division of organization. The Liberals began the National Front with a unified party, but in 1959 the MRL set up its own directorate and in 1960 held

---

[28]Rozman, p. 259.

its first convention. The division lasted until 1968 when the MRL was merged with the regular party organization and Alfonso López Michelsen was elected to the national directorate. When the national factions have broken away from the regular party organization this generally has been at all levels—national, departmental, and local. There are, however, numerous instances when factions have broken away from the regular organization only at the departmental level, or perhaps the municipal level, and set up their own organization.

For example, in Valle until 1967 a group called the Movimiento de Renovación y Revitalización Liberal, led by Carlos Holmes Trujillo maintained its own departmental directorate and municipal directorates, although the membership of the departmental directorate and the municipal directorate of Cali was greatly overlapping. Trujillo claimed to be a supporter of the Oficialista Liberals nationally, though not in Valle. At the same time, the "regular" Oficialistas were themselves divided into two groups in Valle, one led by "Pacho" Eladio Ramírez and the other by Gustavo Balcázar Monzón. Each of these groups maintained its own directorate, thus for awhile giving the Oficialistas three organizations in Valle. Ramírez and Balcázar Monzón merged their directorates voluntarily in 1964, and in 1967 the departmental convention passed a resolution which required a single directorate thus bringing in Carlos Holmes Trujillo.

In spite of all attempts to unify the parties and end the practice of setting up separate directorates, the major party leaders have continued to seek ways of establishing their own personal organization.

For instance, the Liberals unified their directorates in 1974, but the party dirigentes in Valle have devised other ways of creating their own organizations. As the strongest of the three dirigentes in Valle, Gustavo Balcázar Monzón simply used the official party headquarters as his headquarters. Instead of establishing their own formalized directorates, the other dirigentes began to open their own headquarters, calling them casas. By 1975 Carlos Holmes Trujillo had his own headquarters called the Casa Liberal Popular. On April 26, 1975, Ramiro Andrade opened his casa, or sede, in Cali. For a few days before, handbills and posters were distributed urging the public to attend the grand opening. The motto was, "CAMINE CON LA IZQUIERDA, CAMINE CON RAMIRO." (March with the left, march with Ramiro.)

It is difficult to determine how much organization each departmental leader has, but in the case of Carlos Holmes Trujillo it seemed quite extensive. First there was a Comité Político Liberal, of which Trujillo was president, and made up of Holmista senators and representatives in Congress from Valle. In addition, there was a Corporación Económica Liberal, an Asociación de Professionales Liberales, an Asociación de Salud y Servicios Sociales and an Executive Secretary who presided over a Junta Asesora which directed and coordinated the activities of the barrio leaders in Cali who were followers of Trujillo. The Holmistas claimed that there were 500 of these leaders, which seems a very large and possibly exaggerated number.

These various associations seem to have the purpose of increasing the political fortunes of the Holmistas rather than the party in general.

The Association of Liberal Professionals was made up of three to four hundred professional men and women such as doctors, lawyers, and the like, and met once each month at luncheons to discuss problems of "national interest." In contrast, the Association of Health and Social Services was directed toward the lower class, with the goals of getting people innoculated, helping them with housing problems, jobs, and the like. The Holmistas claimed to have the most extensive political organization in Valle, which seemed to be true.

The Conservatives in any case did not maintain quite so elaborate organizations. The Conservative leaders did not maintain separate casas but rather all used the headquarters of the Conservative party in Valle. The Conservative party secretary explained that while his party leaders had previously opened their own headquarters in electoral campaigns, at the present time they were united in order to obtain the "best results." The same building was used by all the major leaders, although it was listed twice in the telephone book, once for the Unionistas and once for the Independientes.

This brings us to one additional point. At the base of the parties are the barrio committees. Again it is hard to determine how extensive and active barrio committees actually are. Rozman writes that in Cali they are "virtually confined to the barrios populares (lower class districts)."[29] (In Bogotá the barrio committees also do not seem to be well organized or very active politically.) Furthermore, in Cali the

---

[29] Ibid., p. 58.

barrio committees do not exist in every neighborhood, even in the lower income areas. What is important here, however, is that the barrio committees are not organized simply along party lines, but rather factional lines. Rozman notes that this is the case in Cali. As an example, the Liberal newspaper, El Crisol, reported in April 1975 the creation of a committee in barrio Panamerica in Cali. The committee, however, was being established under the "orientation" of Carlos Holmes Trujillo.[30]

Party leaders attempt to organize committees in the barrios with allegiances to themselves, not merely the party. Some evidence of this may be found in a speech by Fernando Hedmond, the executive secretary of the Holmista organization, at a meeting of the faction's barrio leaders held in May in the chamber of the Consejo Municipal. He told the leaders:

> The first instruction that we are going to give you, and which is one of those of the greatest importance concerning you, is that each one of you ought to choose from your neighborhood or area of residence the names of ten Liberal citizens, men or women, who have popular support like you, and whose names with their corresponding identity card numbers and addresses ought to be submitted to the executive secretary. These persons will make up the second part of the plan drawn up by Doctor Trujillo, Senator Nestor Urbano Tenorio and myself. We will have to keep the plan in mind for the enrollment of our fellow party members, which will be initiated shortly.[31]

Thus, leaders seek to expand the barrio or local level organization of the parties, but even more importantly, to attach it directly to

---

[30] El Crisol, April 11, 1975, p. 16.

[31] Ibid., May 4, 1975, p. 7.

themselves. The purpose is to increase their cuota de poder or "representation" at the local level. Thus a leader can build his political strength by organizing barrio committees loyal specifically to him. He can count a greater following and, of course, claim greater appeal to the "popular masses."

The fragmentation of the party organization is directly related to the goals of the leaders and the relationships among the leaders discussed earlier. That is, even when the parties are supposedly unified, the organization is still divided along the lines of the factional leaders. When this unity is broken it has been the practice of the factional leaders to hold their own conventions and set up their own directorates.

Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to identify and describe the principal structural characteristics of Colombian party factions. The focus has been on political parties in the department of Valle del Cauca, but still within the broader context of the Colombian political system. In an effort to identify the structure of relationships, which is the key to understanding factions, three components were believed to be most salient: (1) the composition of the factions, (2) the composition of the electoral lists, and (3) the formalization of relationships as organization. But the thread running throughout the discussion has been an identifiable pattern of relationships between political leaders which is the defining characteristic of a party faction in Colombia.

For the purposes of the argument, the political leaders who make up the factions have been identified as elected officeholders and candidates for elective office. Legislators play the major leadership role in the parties, and they are the major actors in factional politics, as both leaders and followers. Furthermore, because of the unique nature of Colombian politics, legislators not only provide leadership within the parties, but come close to making up its organization as well.

It could be argued that the structure of relationships described above also extends beyond formal officeholders and candidates for office. In other words, the scope of a faction (i.e., its participants) is not absolutely defined by the boundaries of elected office. This is no doubt true, as the section on factional organization suggests. Surely the members of a legislative body have some interaction and relationships with other actors or participants in politics who hold no public office, nor have the desire to do so. But because of the structure of the parties, the domination of the parties by elected officials, and the importance attached to winning office, it seems justified to limit the scope of the faction to the legislator-participant.

If legislators, and candidates for legislative office, are the prime participants in party factions, what is the defining characteristic of the structure of a faction? By examining the composition of the party lists it has been argued that the key element is the structure of relationships between leaders. This relationship is one of exclusive vertical loyalties between leaders at different levels in the parties. The levels are defined by the hierarchy of elected office, with the

presidency at the apex and the city councils at the base. Members of factions may, in fact, play a dual role; that is, they may both be leaders and followers. A departmental leader has followers within his department, yet at the same time he may be the follower of a national leader.

Nonetheless, what defines Colombian party factions is the exclusive vertical loyalties between leaders. It is these ties which constitute a faction rather than separate electoral lists, although in some cases an electoral list may include only the members of the faction. This, however, seems to be more the case with dissident lists. As has been shown, more than one faction may be included within a single list.

The ties between leaders create linkages which may permit a faction to extend from the national level to the local level of the parties. Since more than one primary leader may exist at a given level, the parties may divide into different factions, and, in fact, a national faction may itself subdivide in different factions at the departmental level, or the municipal level. The relationship between leaders is the central element in Colombian party factions. The evidence indicates that the relationship is one formed between two leaders of unequal political status. In general, political status is determined by the office one holds, or for which one is a candidate. Colombian politicians appear to use elected office as a kind of status criterion. The presidency is the highest level, followed by the Senate, the House of Representatives, departmental assembly, and municipal council, respectively. Governors and mayors are appointed rather than elected,

and they rarely seem to be considered political leaders of any particular status unless they also hold an elected office. Winning an elected office confers status upon a politician, and makes him a leader, although being a candidate may temporarily confer leadership upon an ambitious politician. This is the reason that party leadership seems to be concentrated within legislative bodies. Winning an election is absolutely crucial, and losers seem to fade rapidly into obscurity. Some of the consequences of the emphasis placed upon winning elected office will be discussed in the next chapter.

Winning an election in Colombia, however, involves something more than receiving the most votes, and it is here that the relationship between leaders takes an added importance. Voting in Colombia is not for individual candidates, but for lists of candidates. A leader cannot, so to speak, run on his own. He must be associated with other candidates or leaders, and furthermore, once in office he must continue to be associated with other legislators. This association is not a somewhat generalized association such as "party." Instead, leaders are attached to one another in a network of vertical and exclusive political loyalties. In other words, leaders are bound to each other by series of dyadic, or two-person, ties. Furthermore, these ties are vertical, rather than horizontal, and link leaders of unequal political status. In practical terms, if one has the ambition to hold an elected office he must link himself to another leader in order to be on the list and thereby be a candidate. To increase his own political status, he must also develop his own personal following in order to obtain a higher position on the list.

It would be a mistake to suggest that this pattern of relationships has evolved in response to the list system. Rather the list system has more likely evolved as uniquely adapted to the relationship between leaders. A political leader who has developed a personal following of other leaders of lesser status is the one who has demonstrated his eligibility for office. The list is only the means by which candidates are put forth in an election.

The structure of the factions also has an effect upon party organization. In the first place, the party organization is centered on elected officials; i.e., legislators. To a very great degree, in fact, legislators make up the party organization. This, combined with the structure of the factions, fragments and divides the parties from the national to the local level. The party organization, such as it is, is a somewhat loose confederation of the various factional chiefs who develop their own self-serving vehicles, but vehicles which can be disassembled to serve personal interests if the occasion demands such a response. Under the National Front, the major factional chiefs carried this to the point of holding their own nominating conventions and campaigning for office very much like a separate political party. When the National Front ended, the factions became somewhat more cautious about establishing their own organizations, but the practice has not been eliminated altogether. Given the factional nature of the parties, it is doubtful that it will.

CHAPTER V

ELEMENTS OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT

Party Conflict in Perspective

In terms of conflict, the Liberal and Conservative parties of Colombia present a strange paradox. On the one hand, the parties have fought each other with savage brutality, as during la violencia when more than 100 thousand persons were killed. Yet on the other hand the parties have formed compacts to share the power of government and divide its offices between them, as has been the case during the National Front. Neither of these developments, however, is without historical precedent. Colombia has frequently suffered the pains of civil war and violence. James Payne points out that:

> On a scale of political deaths per generation, Colombia has one of the highest levels of political conflict in the world. In nearly 150 years since independence, the country has been racked by ten national civil wars: 1830-31, 1839-41, 1851, 1854, 1860-61, 1876, 1885, 1899-1902, and the covert guerilla wars of 1949-53. In addition there have been countless local revolts and flare-ups, including the violence of the 1922 election campaign, the many local clashes in the period of 1931-34, and in 1946-48. The national civil wars between 1830 and 1876 cost an estimated 24,600 lives. The War of a Thousand Days is supposed to have cost about 100,000 lives. One approximation of the costs of the most recent major conflict (1949-53) and its aftereffects is 134,820 lives.[1]

While violence between Liberals and Conservatives has subsided considerably in recent years, it has nonetheless persisted as an element

---

[1]James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 4.

in Colombian political life. Since the early 1960's Marxist guerrilla bands with various allegiances (Moscow, Peking, or Havana) have operated in the countryside, raiding villages, holding up banks, and eluding army patrols. The guerrillas have not been able thus far to recruit widespread support, but neither has the military been able to root them out.[2] In addition to the guerrillas, other forms of violence are fairly common. Riots, kidnappings, and assassinations are reported rather often in the press. In response, the Colombian government has imposed martial law at times and called out its troops in an apparent display of its force.[3]

It is within an environment of conflict that the traditional parties have existed throughout their histories. Even by restricting the analysis to the parties alone, determining the roots of conflict has continued to be a formidable problem, and explanations abound. For the nineteenth century, one popular interpretation is the belief that the basis of conflict concerned the opposing sides the parties took on the issues of the form of government, its role in the economy, and power of the Church in the secular world. The argument runs that politically the Liberals supported a federal government while the Conservatives sought a unitary system. The Liberals were anti-clerical, favored the abolition of slavery, with the Conservatives taking the opposing side.

---

[2]The best study of recent guerrilla activity in Colombia is Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).

[3]It is not always reported in the press when the government calls out the Army.

The Liberals were influenced originally by Jeremy Bentham and by the Manchester school of economics, and later by French socialism. The economic philosophy of the Conservatives was not clear, but leaned in the direction of state intervention or control. Thus it has been asserted that these ideological or programmatic differences fueled party conflict in the previous century.[4]

The conflict between the parties, however, was not quite that simple; for example, Alan Angell notes that:

> Doctrinal differences between groups rarely prevented alliances that seemed to be ideologically contradictory; two leaders who dominated political life at different times in the nineteenth century, Tomás Cipriano Mosquera and Rafael Núñez, both ended up as champions of the party they had once opposed.[5]

Although there were some differences between the parties, these were not so sharp that landowners could not be found in the Liberal party or businessmen in the Conservative party. There was always much switching of sides and taking positions that seemed contradictory. In any event, not all Liberals wanted to strip the Church of its rights and privileges, and whether Conservatives opposed federalism sometimes depended upon who was in power.

In the twentieth century programmatic differences between the parties became more difficult to discern. By 1942 the Liberals had

---

[4]A somewhat different argument has been made by Charles Bergquist, who sees the conflict in the latter half of the nineteenth century as arising from a clash between those involved in the export-import trade and those who were not. Charles W. Bergquist, "The Political Economy of the Colombian Presidential Election of 1897," Hispanic American Historical Review, 56 (February, 1976), pp. 1-30.

[5]Alan Angell, "Co-operation and Conflict in Colombian Party Politics," Political Studies, 24 (1966), p. 55.

abandoned their commitment to a federal political system and laissez-faire economics. By this time the Liberals had begun to claim that they were the party of economic development, aided or directed by the state. Even if the parties had been once clearly divided into two opposing camps over the issues of federalism, the Church, and the role of government in the economy, the National Front made it difficult at best to do battle under the old standards. Thus John Martz could write that "With neither party having preserved doctrinal purity, and with opportunism a common trait, deviations on the grounds of expediency are frequent. The common practice is to speak on broad principles, leaving the dictates of practical politics to determine a stand on given issues."[6]

The interpretation that conflict between the parties is the result of ingrained and tenaciously-held ideological differences has had an appeal, but it has not gone unchallenged. Perhaps the strongest case against the programmatic view has been made by James L. Payne. For him the key to understanding the nature of party conflict is what he believes to be the primary incentive for participation in politics in Colombia, and that incentive is status. Payne asserts that although in the United States politicians on the whole are interested mainly in matters of policy and program, and derive their greatest satisfaction from seeing their preferences adopted, this is not the case in Colombia.

---

[6]John D. Martz, "Political Parties in Colombia and Venezuela: Contrasts in Substance and Style," Western Political Quarterly, 18 June, 1965), p. 324.

According to Payne, most Colombian politicians have little interest in these affairs; they enter and participate in politics largely because of the status one can achieve from being active in political life. This yearning for status and disinterest in policy constantly fuels the fires of conflict among politicians. Since status rather than program satisfaction constitutes the major goal of most politicians, no matter what a politician or a party does it will be attacked vehemently by those seeking to discredit opponents and thereby increase their own status.[7]

Another explanation of the roots of party conflict is that of the Colombian sociologist, Orlando Fals Borda. Fals Borda has argued that the issue of clericalism was important in the nineteenth century, but that it was interwoven with a more mundane struggle for power among elites whose strength was based largely on the peasants and gamonales (bosses) under their control. Acting much like feudal lords, they fought among themselves, and the peasants were forced to adopt the party allegiance and political views of their masters. Consequently, Colombia was divided not only along party lines, but also vertically, with each party counting among its followers members of all classes, and also regionally according to the preferences of local caudillos.[8]

Arguments such as the above have been made to explain the origins of two additional aspects of conflict: regionalism and what Colombians

---

[7]Payne, p. 301.

[8]Orlando Fals Borda, Subversion and Social Change in Colombia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 105.

call the parties' policlasista (multiclass) membership. With such awesome geographical barriers separating Colombians, the regional basis of conflict is perhaps not surprising. Even into the twentieth century to reach Bogotá from the Caribbean coast required an arduous journey of several weeks.[9] It is also commonplace to note the regional voting patterns of Colombia, with villages or areas casting every ballot for one or the other parties, or with one party overwhelmingly dominating an area.[10] This extreme areal division played a part in la violencia with armed men of one party entering a hamlet of the other party and slaughtering the inhabitants. According to Richard Maullin, the guerrillas operating in Colombia today have been constrained by this localism and remain for the most part in areas where la violencia was at its worst.[11]

Even though the parties do rightly claim adherents in all social and economic classes, they are not evenly matched in this regard. The evidence indicates that the Liberals draw more strength from the lower socioeconomic groups than do the Conservatives.[12]

---

[9]E. Taylor Parks and Alfred Tischendorf, "Cartagena to Bogotá, 1825-1826: The Diary of Richard Clough Anderson, Jr.," Hispanic American Historical Review, 42 (May, 1962), pp. 217-231.

[10]Paul Oquist, "Las Elecciones Presidenciales: 1930-1970," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 268-269 (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1973), pp. 63-334.

[11]Maullin, p. 14.

[12]This is, however, more likely the case in the urban areas than in the rural areas.

Although Liberals and Conservatives have debated at length the proper role of government in economic affairs, they have clashed repeatedly over one "economic" matter which involves something less than a philosophical disagreement—the pitched battles the parties have fought over the bureaucracy. As the late Vernon Fluharty has written:

> Politics in Colombia has long been both a way of life and an integral part of the economy for the winning party. The winner has controlled the budget, handed out jobs, and acted as a source of all economic good for the faithful partisans and the members of the ruling camarilla. The losing party has been denied access to the fount of plenty, and in many cases losing an election has resulted in outright economic hardship for whole families whose income had been based upon service with and in the government. Consequently, from the top echelons down the ferocity of the struggle . . . . From the very beginning of the nation, party aims have been to invade, conquer, and exploit government for party welfare excluding all other party members if possible.[13]

The role of spoils and partronage as a source of conflict has been noted by many others, and the common use of military metaphors gives some indication of the importance many writers have attached to this issue. Robert Dix, for example, states that "The parties have treated government as an objective to be seized and, once won, as a bastion in which to entrench themselves like armies of occupation, subsisting on the bureaucratic booty of battle."[14] The Colombian historian, Fernando Guillén Martínez, has described the two parties in their fight for the bureaucracy as "rival hordes." Indeed, Guillén Martínez believes that

---

[13]Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), p. 232.

[14]Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 180.

the struggle for control of patronage was one of the chief reasons for the formation of the parties in the first place. The main reason for the abrasive conflict over the bureaucracy, he suggests, has been the economic underdevelopment of Colombia and the fact that the government was for many years one of the few places in the country that a job could be found.[15]

In a recent study of the Colombian bureaucracy, John J. Bailey has expressed a similar view. He writes that:

> The line ministries provide jobs for middle-sector political followers, which is especially important in a slowly expanding economy in which the educational system produces more certified graduates than the job market can absorb. Short-term job opportunities are further constrained by the interactive effects of population growth and age composition, protective labor legislation, substitution of technology, and the saturation of import substitution industries. Public employment, particularly in the traditional administration, has been and remains a central factor in the partisan dynamics of Colombian politics.[16]

Although other reasons existed, the struggle for control of patronage was a prime force in the competition for the presidency in the nineteenth century, and when this fact is recognized the arguments over federalism and centralization seem more a matter of the rewards of office than a fight for principle. Because of the president's vast appointive powers after 1886, control of the national executive was also

---

[15]Fernando Guillén Martínez, Raíz y Futuro de la Revolución (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1963), p. 134.

[16]John J. Bailey, "Policymaking in Colombian Decentralized Agencies: Presidential Control Versus Agency Automony," Paper delivered at the 1975 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1975, p. 4.

a means of rewarding loyal supporters at the local level.[17] This has caused some to question the thesis that peasants followed local caudillos or gamonales solely because of coercion.

> Colombians followed party banners for many reasons. The campesino owed a certain allegiance to his patrón, and for that reason alone fought for his patron. The campesinos were not, and are not, fools. Like the leader they followed, they hoped to enjoy the prestige of victory won by battle or ballot. Victory, after all, meant a share of the spoils, and even the most unimportant campesino might entertain hopes of being named police inspector in his vereda.[18]

The importance of patronage in party conflict is also indicated by the fact that some of the provisions of the National Front agreement attempted to effect something of a truce by making paridad applicable to all bureaucratic posts not in the carrera administrativa (career service). Yet the number of bureaucrats in the career service has remained relatively small. At the beginning of Carlos Lleras' administration the number was only 2,000. Lleras increased this to 18,000 "by throwing open the doors," but the number of persons working in the career service has continued to be a minority.[19] The presidents holding office under the National Front have made efforts at administrative reform, but it has been for the most part organizational reform. Personnel reforms touch a very sensitive nerve. When Alberto Lleras introduced measures aimed at eliminating much patronage:

---

[17]Maullin, p. 6.

[18]James D. Henderson, "Origins of the Violence in Colombia," Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1972, pp. 66-67.

[19]Roderick T. Groves, "The Colombian National Front and Administrative Reform," Administration and Society, 6 (November, 1974), p. 327.

> A groundswell of opposition quickly arose within the political parties and the National Congress, charging that the intended reforms were in fact a subterfuge attempt to undercut the principle of political parity and to impose bureaucratic rule by an elite from the nation's capital. A measure was introduced in the Congress and was defeated only after an intense battle.[20]

In spite of efforts at reforming the Colombian bureaucracy, Groves observes, a "patronage mentality" still dominates public administration. Bureaucratic posts based on political considerations, the botín político, still provide the oil for the party maquinaria (machinery).[21] Violent confrontations over patronage have been reduced under the National Front, but both parties keep careful watch over the distribution of jobs, and charges by one that the other has violated paridad are commonplace. For example, during the presidential campaign of 1974, El Tiempo printed a list of those holding positions in the foreign ministry and their party affiliation as evidence that the Conservative government of Misael Pastrana had not observed the parity rule and placed more Conservatives in the foreign service than Liberals.[22]

These are only a few of the sources of conflict which have been identified by various scholars. But while such conflict at times has appeared to be unrestrained and of extreme bitterness, the opposite side of this coin is that the parties have from time to time found methods of establishing certain boundaries to their disputes, if not yet a way of guaranteeing a free, peaceful, and wholly democratic competition.

---

[20] Ibid., pp. 325-326.

[21] Ibid., p. 318.

[22] El Tiempo, March 3, 1974, p. 7-A.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and describe the elements, or sources, of factional conflict within the parties during the National Front period. Although there are a number of potential sources or elements of factional conflict that could be explored, only four will be examined here. They are: (1) the National Front system itself, (2) the role of ideology, (3) the composition of the electoral lists, and (4) patronage and the bureaucracy. Several reasons have guided the choice of these elements. First of all, they are closely related to the sources of party conflict discussed above, and it does not seem unreasonable that factional conflict may have some of the same roots as party conflict. Second, these four elements have appeared to be some of the most salient in factional conflict during the National Front period.

It should also be pointed out that the elements of factional conflict discussed in this chapter are interrelated with other aspects of factional behavior which will be examined in the next chapter. In other words, additional elements of factional conflict could be treated. The difference is primarily one of perspective and emphasis. The focus here is more narrow. The intent is to identify and describe some of the immediate and direct sources of factional conflict. To put it another way, the emphasis here is upon the behavior of elites; that is, the participants in factional conflict, such as party and factional leaders, officeholders and candidates for office. Some of the aspects of factional behavior treated in the next chapter may be viewed from one perspective as indirect sources of factional conflict, but the emphasis

will not be upon elite behavior. It is hoped that how these differences of perspective are related, and how they in turn are related to the structure of the factions, will become clearer when all have been fully discussed.

The National Front System

It has been argued by some that one source of factional conflict within Colombian political parties has been the National Front system itself. The National Front system did create an environment for factional conflict. As a result of alternation and parity party competition had in one sense been suspended for a period of sixteen years. With each party guaranteed half of the seats in all legislative bodies no matter what the outcome of elections, and with the presidency to be alternated every four years, the major question was which individuals within the parties would receive the benefit of this arrangement.

In public, however, the debate was carried on in terms somewhat different than who might be best qualified to represent their constituents in a coalition government. From the very beginning leaders and groups in both parties fiercely attacked the National Front system itself. In the Conservative party, Gilberto Alzate Avendaño and Jorge Leyva launched scathing attacks against the National Front and the Liberal and Conservative leaders who had created it. Although he was more restrained in his statements than Avendaño and Leyva, the Conservative leader, Mariano Ospina Pérez, was also critical of the

National Front in its first years. In the Liberal party, Alfonso López Michelsen and the MRL campaigned against the National Front for seven years, although López Michelsen lessened the sting of his attacks as time passed.

The National Front, therefore, did appear to be a source of factionalism within the parties. But other than the fact that groups such as the Alzatistas, the Leyvistas, and the MRL emerged during the National Front period, what evidence may be presented which indicates whether the National Front system actually was a source of factional conflict? The difference is subtle but important. In other words, would factional conflict have arisen even without the National Front?

This question is not easily answered. At a minimum some comparison seems necessary. Second, there is the problem of obtaining valid and reliable data with which to measure the degree of factionalism. In 1974 the National Front arrangement expired and the parties returned to competitive elections. Thus some comparison is possible, although the post-National Front period is brief. The problem of measurement remains, however.

One measure which might be used is the number of lists inscribed in congressional elections. As Table 5.1 indicates, the number of lists increased rather steadily in both parties after the National Front was formed. The number of lists increased until 1970 when 206 lists were filed for Senate elections and 325 lists were registered in House of Representatives elections. In 1974, however, the alternation and parity provisions of the National Front were no longer in effect and the

TABLE 5.1

NUMBER OF LISTS INSCRIBED IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: 1958-1974*

	Senate				House			
	Lib.	Cons.	Other	Total	Lib.	Cons.	Other	Total
1958	18	49		67	27	56		83
1960					64	49		113
1962	54	47		101	83	62		145
1964					111	77		188
1966	64	73		137	106	99		205
1968					112	108		220
1970	108	98		206	181	144		325
1974	67	54	55	176	110	75	68	253

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

*ANAPO lists are included with Liberal and Conservative lists from 1962 to 1970 because of the provisions of the National Front.

number of lists declined for the first time. The same pattern may be observed in Valle. (See Table 4.3, page 160.) The increase in the number of lists until 1970 and the decline in 1974 suggests that the National Front system was a source of factionalism. But these data must nonetheless be interpreted with caution. For one thing, it must be kept in mind that the number of lists is not necessarily an accurate measure of factionalism, as was pointed out in Chapter IV. More than one faction may be represented on a single list, as was the case in Valle in 1974. The expiration of the National Front did not cause factionalism to subside, it merely gave an incentive to the different factions to form unified lists.

One likely explanation for the decline in the number of lists in 1974 is that with parity no longer in effect it became politically risky

for the different factions to register separate lists. For the first time in many years it was not altogether clear what the outcome of the election would be. Given the political risks involved, it was better to run unified lists than for each group to run its own list and divide an unpredictable vote.

It seems, therefore, that the National Front did act as a catalyst to competing electoral lists, but it is questionable whether the National Front was a source of factionalism itself. It should be recalled, for example, that before the elections of 1974, the Liberals were deeply divided at the national level among the groups led by Carlos Lleras, Alfonso López Michelsen, and Julio César Turbay Ayala, even though the National Front agreement was about to end. In Valle, the situation was essentially the same. In that department, both major parties were divided into three distinct groups. In 1975, the parties had entered the post-National Front period, but the situation had not changed. In fact, there were signs that even more factions were beginning to emerge.

To reiterate, the effect of the National Front seems to have been primarily one of encouraging competing lists, but not to have served as a source of factional conflict per se. Since more than one faction can be represented on an electoral list, the National Front in one sense had little or nothing to do with conflict between or among factions. What the National Front did do was stimulate competing lists since the political risks were not as great. Each party was guaranteed half of everything no matter what happened in an election. Consequently, there

was little need for the parties to unify their lists. Factions could therefore break with the party in an effort to increase their share of what had already been allotted. When the National Front ended, the risks of competing lists were greater. Neither party could be sure what percentage of votes it would receive, nor could the factions. Unified lists were less risky, but unity in the lists does not necessarily imply unity in the parties.

The Composition of the Lists

There is one aspect of the electoral lists that is important in identifying and describing the elements of factional conflict within the parties, and that is their composition or formation. The composition of the lists is important for several reasons. Until 1974 the rule of parity applied to all legislative bodies; therefore, competition was not between the parties to capture a majority of the seats since each party was guaranteed half of the seats regardless of the results of an election. The question was who would occupy the seats, and the competition was between groups or factions within the parties.

The distribution of the seats was made in the following manner. Under a proportional representation system when more than two seats were to be allocated between or among competing lists, an electoral quotient was determined by dividing the number of votes the whole party received by the number of seats. The electoral quotient was the number of votes needed to win one seat. Then each faction received seats according to its percentage of votes. If a seat remained it was given to the faction

with the highest percentage of votes. The seats won by a faction were assigned according to the order in which the names appeared on the list. Thus if a faction won three seats they would be received by the persons whose names appeared in the first three positions on the lists, and if a faction received an extra seat then the person whose name appeared in the fourth position was elected.[23]

The use of this system makes it imperative that a politician seeking office occupy as high a position on the list as possible in order to maximize his chances of being elected. For example, if a given faction generally elects at least three representatives, then those who hold the first three positions on the list have a reasonable expectation of winning office. The person at the fourth position may be elected if his group polls a somewhat higher percentage of votes than normal, or if there are fewer competing lists. In contrast, those candidates assigned to positions further down on the list may have a very slim chance of winning office. For this reason, Colombian politicians sometimes speak of "effective" positions; that is, positions high enough on the list to win office.

If there are more aspirants to office than "effective positions on the list then a conflict situation is created. Daniel Premo writes that it is at such times that party dissension and conflict become most

---

[23]For a good discussion of Colombian election procedures see Pat M. Holt, Colombia--Today and Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 62-64.

acute.[24] A reading of the Colombian press in the weeks before an election lends weight to this judgment. Although the leading party papers constantly stress the importance of party harmony and unified lists, disputes over the composition of the lists are often acrimonious and sometimes violent. Charges fly back and forth about who truly represents the party, who has "popular support," who is undemocratic, who is disrupting party unity, and so on.

In making up the lists the biggest problem the parties face is trying to agree on a unified list and preventing the different factions from running their own lists. Unified lists, however, are the exception rather than the rule. In the months before the elections of 1974, for example, both the Liberals and the Conservatives were often divided over the composition of the legislative lists. A number of new local and department factions appeared, and many threatened to register their own lists.

In Bogotá, a dissident Conservative group was formed calling itself Acción Conservadora Popular, or "V Azul" because of its symbol, which was a blue "V." They claimed to be loyal to Alvaro Gómez, but said they rejected the "politics for dogs" practiced by other Conservative leaders. The "V Azul" group claimed to be the "true representatives" of the party and said their goal was to win back the "old sectors of the party at the popular level."[25]

---

[24]Daniel Lawrence Premo, "Alianza Nacional Popular: Populism and the Politics of Social Class in Colombia, 1961-1970," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1972, p. 59.

[25]El Tiempo, November 5, 1973, p. 2-B.

Similarly in Cundinamarca a Liberal group was formed by Gloria Gaitán de Valencia. This group called itself "The Independents," and charged that the Liberal leaders in the department were "applying the ballpoint pen" in making up the lists, when actually it was "the popular base that ought to decide whether or not to approve the proposed names."[26] In March, the Liberals also split over legislative lists in Santander, Huila, Chocó, Antioquia, César, and Atlántico.[27] In Antioquia, for instance, there were 15 different lists of Liberal candidates for Congress at one point, but this was eventually narrowed down to three.[28]

The Conservatives were also torn by bickering and infighting over the lists. In late February 1974, the Conservative National Directorate tried to impose order by "promulgating" the lists for Santander, Huila and Chocó, but this immediately touched off a heated dispute among the various factions affected. In Santander, Carlos Augusto Noriega said he never wanted to be on a list made in Bogotá and he was forming his own "movement." Representative Jaime Serrano Rueda of Santander had been given the fifth place on the House of Representatives list, and said he was forming his own group which would be called the Movimiento de Renovación Conservadora. Serrano, who had been elected to Congress in 1970 as a Belisarista, called the Senate list a "list of pensioners"

---

[26] Ibid., February 23, 1974, p. 3-A.

[27] Ibid., March 1, 1974, p. 5-B.

[28] Ibid., March 16, 1974, p. 6-A.

and said nobody had been consulted about the House list, so he was forming his own list. Luisa Emma Mantilla de Romero renounced her position because she had been made an alternate on the Senate list. Some Conservatives were not included on the lists for belonging to the "wrong" faction. In Huila, Senator Alvaro Sánchez Silva was not given a place on the list since he had been elected in 1970 as a Pastranista. In Choco, Libardo Arriega Copete was "decapitated," or not allowed to head the Senate list, since he had been elected to the Senate in 1970 as a Belisarista.[29]

The competition for places on the lists is reflected by an article in El Tiempo a few weeks before the election. According to El Tiempo, "complete anarchy" characterized the competition for places on the lists, and estimated that there were an astonishing 100 thousand candidates for only nine thousand seats to be filled.[30]

As previously noted, violence between the parties has been a recurring theme in Colombian political history, but on occasion it erupts between factions within the parties. At times competition between factions to control the composition of the lists has been the spark igniting the violence. For example, in March 1974, rivalry between two Liberal factions in La Paz, César led to a riot in which one person was killed, several were injured, and two automobiles were burned before police could restore order.[31]

---

[29] Ibid., March 1, 1974, p. 5-B.

[30] Ibid., April 9, 1974, pp. 2-A, 6-A.

[31] Ibid., March 11, 1974, p. 1-A.

More than half of the party leaders interviewed in Valle agreed that it was during the process of choosing the lists that internal conflict became most severe. The reason is that the selection of the lists is a crucial event in the life of a politician. He must be on a list to be a candidate, and he must be placed high enough on a list which is likely to win. As one party leader in Valle explained, it is during the selection of the lists that leaders begin counting the number of followers they have, and "this is where the fights start." Disputes then arise over who has how large a following, and who is to be placed where on the list.

The place, or position, on the list is a hotly contested affair. According to one Liberal councilman in Cali, this is only "logical" because:

> . . . there are those who are offered positions that are going to win, and they are happy, and those who are offered positions with the possibility of winning, and still others who refuse their positions because they are afraid of being in the line of fire.

Those in the "line of fire" are the ones who are almost certain of losing because of their positions near the bottom of the list.

Two examples may help illustrate the importance of one's position on the list, and some of the conflict which may result. In 1974, the Liberal Senate list was headed by Gustavo Balcázar Monzón. The second position was held by Carlos Holmes Trujillo, and the third by Ramiro Andrade. Thus the Liberal party <u>dirigentes</u> held positions according to their standing, or "quota of power." The fourth position on the list was held by a follower of Balcázar Monzón, the fifth position by a

follower of Trujillo, and the sixth position by a follower of Andrade. It seems, therefore, that the positions on the lists were allocated according to the cuota de poder of the three dirigentes. The sixth position was held by Armando Holguín Sarria, since his chief, Ramiro Andrade, ranked third among the dirigentes. The Liberals had expected to win only five seats in the Senate, but Holguín Sarria had a chance of winning. In fact, the Liberals did well in the election and Holguín was elected.

In the Conservative party, Betina Franky de Franky was assigned the fifth position on the House of Representatives list. She apparently was afraid that the Conservatives would not be able to elect five representatives, for when she was first assigned her position she threatened not to accept it. She said she would be on the "margin" of the campaign and would vote only for Alvaro Gómez. If this was a tactic to gain a higher position on the list it failed. She was obliged to accept the fifth position—a decision which turned out to be in her favor since the Conservatives elected five representatives.

Protests and threats to either sit out the campaign or to run separate lists are tactics factions, and individual candidates, sometimes use in an effort to obtain more or better positions on the lists. How successful this is is hard to measure. Challenging the party chiefs is obviously a gamble. Some have taken the chance and won, but many have lost. One Liberal in Valle said that an aspiring leader can either take what he is offered or run his own list. But the consequences are: "If he wins, he is respected. If he loses, he is

destroyed." Destroyed may be too harsh a word, but Colombian politicians do seem to respect a winner.

When disputes arise over the selection of the lists what role is played by the factional leaders at different levels in the hierarchy? What role is played by national leaders in departmental disputes? What role is played by departmental leaders? Both party secretaries in Valle said that when disputes arose between the departmental leaders the role of national leaders was quite restrained. The Liberal party secretary explained that times had changed and that national leaders no longer intervened in internal disputes in Valle the way they once had. The Conservative party secretary said much the same thing. He said the national leaders did help to find solutions but always with "language and in a manner eminently diplomatic." The reason was, he said, that:

> At the present time the national leaders do not have complete power over the departmental leaders because the power of the national leaders depends, to a greater or lesser extent, on the support they can obtain from the departmental leaders.

He went on to explain that when disputes arose between departmental leaders in Valle, national leaders were quite cautious and diplomatic about intervening, and they did so primarily to reach an agreement that would avoid "internal fights."

It does appear that the power of the national leaders depends on the support they receive from departmental leaders, and the ability of the national leaders to enforce their decisions has its limits. One example may illustrate this.

Chocó is a sparsely populated and economically backward department on the northern Pacific Coast. In 1974, the Liberal party was divided

into four factions, each one threating to run its own list of candidates in the election. Julio César Turbay Ayala, the Liberal party's national director, had said there would be only one unified list. The way in which Turbay tried to force a unified list was extraordinary. In March, Alfonso López Michelsen, Turbay, and other Liberal leaders were scheduled to speak at a rally in a park in Quibdó, the capitol city. Before López spoke, Turbay went to the microphone and publicly "invited" the four Liberal leaders to come forward one by one and announce whether they were still going to be candidates. Before the surprised crowd each came forward and renounced his candidacy. According to El Tiempo, it went this way in the case of one:

> Turbay proceeded: "Now I invite Doctor Ramón Lozano Garcés to state his position." Lozano also came forward and announced: "If my resignation contributes to the triumph of the Liberal party, I place it in the hands of the director."

After each had resigned Turbay said, "I believe that Liberalism has given the clearest demonstration of its disinterest and I promise that we are going to study and devise the lists of victory in this department."[32] This rather heavy-handed attempt to force a unified list failed. The "resignations" of the factional chiefs was only temporary, and the Liberal party ran four separate lists.

National leaders seem to be somewhat more diplomatic in their dealings with departmental leaders in Valle. Turbay Ayala did, in fact, visit Valle in February 1974 to seal the final agreement among Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, and Ramiro Andrade on the

---

[32] Ibid., March 28, 1974, p. 4-C.

composition of the Liberal lists. Precisely what happened was not announced, but Turbay's role seemed to be restrained. El Tiempo happily reported that the agreement in Valle was "one of the most important steps in achieving party unity in the whole country."[33]

Departmental leaders appear to have somewhat greater control over their followers than do national leaders, but their authority is not absolute, as existence of competing lists at the departmental level from time to time indicates. It is difficult to sort out all of the factors which go into the composition of a list, but the quota of power of each leader seems to weigh heavily in the decision. Some of the legislators interviewed in Valle complained about what they saw as arbritrariness on the part of the departmental dirigentes, but their alternatives are not great. They can attempt to gain a better position on the lists, accept what they are offered, withdraw from politics, or create their own lists. In 1974, most of those in Valle appeared to accept what they were offered rather than take the chance of running on a competing list as some had done in the past.

Patronage and Spoils

In the first section of this chapter it was noted that several writers have argued that patronage and spoils have long been a major source of conflict between Colombia's traditional parties. But if patronage has been a source of conflict between the parties, could it

---

[33]Ibid., February 8, 1974, p. 7-A.

also be said that it has been a source of factional conflict as well? Certainly the potential is there. The National Front agreement assured each party half of the positions in the government, but was silent on how these were to be distributed within the parties. It is, of course, difficult to compile extensive information on factional disputes arising from patronage, but references to it are quite frequent.

In April 1975, El Tiempo published a report on factionalism in the Liberal party in eight different departments. In Atlántico, "which reflects the crisis that exists in all of the Atlantic coast," the Liberals had split into six factions because of disagreement over the distribution of jobs in the bureaucracy. In Huila, the Liberals had split into two main factions: an old MRL group headed by Jaime Ucros García, and a Turbay faction headed by the mayor of Neiva, Guillermo Plazas Alcid. During the past administration of Governor Olga Duque de Ospina, the Ucros faction had been dominant while the Plazas Alcid faction had declared itself in opposition. Under the new governor, David Rojas Castro, the situation was reversed. El Tiempo reported that the cause of the split was a fight over bureaucratic positions, indicating that the Plazas Alcid faction wanted the Ucros loyalists removed from their jobs to be replaced by its own followers.[34]

Although one may find many references such as this to factional disputes over patronage, Colombian politicians are often reluctant to discuss the subject. Some are evasive while others simply claim that

---

[34]Ibid., April 7, 1975, p. 7-A.

patronage does not play any role in internal party conflict. Nevertheless, there are indications that "carving the pig," to use the Colombian expression, does figure as an element of factional conflict. It is perhaps significant that although parity in elected offices was phased out in the 1974 elections, it was retained as the guiding principal in the selection process for bureaucratic posts. As in times past, both Liberals and Conservatives have been continually vigilant in regard to the party balance in the bureaucracy.

For example, in 1975 the Cali Municipal Council appointed a bipartisan commission headed by Elvira Gracia de Várgas (Liberal) and Raúl Suárez Franco (Conservative) to study the situation. In April the commission "denounced" the inequality it had discovered in the municipal administration. According to the study, Conservatives held 54.49 percent of the public posts, while Liberals held 38.92 percent, Anapistas .29 percent, and unaffiliated persons held 4.89 percent. El Pueblo pointed out that while the Liberal party had received more than twice as many votes in Valle as the Conservative party, the latter controlled 494 more positions. Within the Cali municipal administration were employed 1,234 Liberals, 1,728 Conservatives, 41 Anapistas, 155 unaffiliated persons, and 6 foreigners. Seven positions were vacant bringing the total to 3,171 positions. The report then gave the number of employees according to party allegiance in each municipal department.[35]

---

[35] El Pueblo, April 8, 1975, p. 22.

Since the distribution of jobs in the bureaucracy is such a sensitive issue between the parties, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it is also an issue among the factions of the parties as well, in spite of disclaimers. For instance, early in 1975 a new faction was being formed in the Liberal party in Valle, and the patronage issue was clearly of major concern. On March 22 in barrio Siloé in Cali, a reported two thousand persons jammed into the Club El Dorado to attend a meeting called to announce the creation of the Movimiento Popular de Recuperación Liberal. The leader of the new faction was Marino Renjifo Salcedo, the director of the Liberal newspaper El Pueblo, and a former governor of Valle, mayor of Cali, congressman, and senator. Renjifo was also a Llerista in national politics.[36]

Marino Renjifo said that what the new group wanted was a restructuring of the Liberal party if Valle. Among the issues raised was that of patronage. According to Nueva Frontera, a political magazine published by Carlos Lleras, "The central proposition of the radical movement is in attaining a true popular unity which does not concern itself in the least with the bureaucratic quotas on which the equilibrium of the various groups is based." Nueva Frontera went on to say that the bureaucratic quotas are "accessories" of the political process, and that Marino Renjifo "indicated he would look first for an ideological cohesion, not a bureaucratic (one)."[37]

---

[36]Ibid., March 23, 1975, pp. 1, 10.

[37]Nueva Frontera, No. 25 (April 12, 1975), p. 14. It is interesting to note that Renjifo's statements about the bureaucracy are quoted in Nueva Frontera, but not in El Pueblo.

Nevertheless, Renjifo repeatedly returned to the theme of bureaucratic quotas. He said that "We concede that the union of the party revolves around a community of objectives implicit in its programs and ideological content, and we combat all conception of unity understood as the sum of bureaucratic quotas that characterizes the orientation of Liberal politics in the region." In an attack on the other Liberal leaders in Valle Renjifo accused them of being overly concerned with spoils. His movement, however, was not:

> one more group in the politics of the department that looks for antagonisms with those who operate under the orientations of distinct personalities. On the contrary, it is the consequence, or conclusion, or imperative, or whatever one wants to call it, of the attitude that the regional leaders of Liberalism have taken toward the popular masses. The latter have taken toward the popular masses. The latter have seen themselves relegated little by little to the state of simple spectators of the daily and continued event of a machine that divides bureaucratic posts, that divides milimetrically "quotas or power" and encloses itself in an impregnable and unmovable shell . . . .[38]

Thus while Renjifo hurled invective at the Liberal leaders in Valle for their obsession with every "milimeter" of power and influence in the bureaucracy, his movement regarded the bureaucracy only as the means to a more idealistic end. The Movimiento Liberal de Recuperación Popular did not shrink from "bureaucratic worries and if someday it occupies them (public posts) it will do so only as the indispensable way to impose some ideas and a style of government.[39]

These comments by Marino Renjifo suggest that there is more conflict among the factions over the distribution of bureaucratic posts

---

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

than many party loyalists will admit. Only a few days after Renjifo's speech one Liberal journalist wrote that the internal feuds dividing the party were all carried on in the name of ideological principle when in reality they were a less than edifying factional struggle for patronage and power. In almost every department in Colombia, he said, "appears a new caudillo, who proclaims himself the true redeemer of the people, and as the true interpreter of the great Liberal ideology." But where are, he asked, the Herreras, the Uribes, the Gaitáns, men with a "spirit of sacrifice"? These "present day caudillos" demonstrate that today there are "very few ideological Liberals" and they "have converted Liberal politics into 'bolsas de empleos.'"[40]

It would be a mistake to assume that internal party conflict is nothing more than a fight over the distribution of jobs in the bureaucracy. Yet on the other hand, the sensitivity of this issue cannot be ignored. Each faction does seem to be as jealous of its "bureaucratic quota" as its "quota of power"; indeed, it would seem that the former is both an element and a result of the latter. When a faction establishes a "quota of power" it is also apparently entitled to an approximate "bureaucratic quota" of jobs to distribute among its supporters. How much patronage the factions have to distribute is nearly impossible to determine. According to one high-ranking Conservative, his party "has the right to two or three hundred"

---

[40] El Crisol, April 11, 1975, p. 4. Literally translated, "bolsas de empleos" means "job bags." An equivalent English expression might be "pork barrel."

administrative posts in Valle. Assuming parity, this would mean that combined the two parties have from 400 to 600 administrative posts to allocate, if the figure is accurate.

Yet this does not take into account the more numerous non-administrative positions, such as clerical workers, truck drivers, and common laborers. According to the study cited above, in 1975 the city of Cali alone employed more than 3,000 persons. If the number of employees of all other municipalities in Valle were added to this, then the total number of public employees in the department must be rather large. The study done for the municipal council in Cali strongly indicates that the Liberals and Conservatives are very much interested in the party allegiance of every single employee, no matter how lowly a job he or she may hold.

Whatever the precise number of positions, it is clear that much maneuvering and bargaining ensues among the factions as to how they are to be distributed. These matters are not discussed much in the local press, and since party leaders are somewhat evasive on the topic, it is difficult to outline in detail this process of conflict and bargaining. One case, however, does offer some insights and seems to be quite likely a representative one.

Factions and Patronage: The Case of Invicali

On February 2, 1973, members of the junta directiva of Invicali, the Cali housing authority, met in the agency's offices.[41] Four items appeared on the agenda for discussion, the substantive ones being the election of the board of directors and the setting of a date for the election of manager (gerente). The mayor of Cali, Carlos Holguín Sardi, attended the meeting and said that some Liberal as well as Conservative leaders recently had come to his office to ask his help in order "to normalize life in the Institutes." He had been wanting these types of meetings for some time, he said, but since this proposal had been met by some "with a certain mistrust and reserve" he had decided to remain on the margin until the parties reorganized themselves. The party leaders who had come to see him, the mayor revealed, were Gustavo Balcázar Monzón, Rodrigo Lloreda "and others." What they wanted was his help in working out an understanding among the various groups as to how positions in the bureaucracy could be distributed. The mayor indicated that a prior agreement had been made, and he said that he was worried that the "formulas" decided upon were the most equitable, but that they had been made according to the parity provisions of the National Front. This was an "act of confidence," he said, by both parties (Liberals and Conservatives), and two days later Balcázar Monzón, Lloreda, and Donald Rodrigo Tafur replied they had accepted and expressed their gratitude.

---

[41] I am indebted to Joseph Nalven for providing me copies of the documents on which the following discussion is based. He obtained the documents in the course of research on an "invasion barrio," or squatter settlement, in Cali. These documents provide a rare "inside look" into the way patronage politics is conducted in Colombia.

The "formulas" were not described in detail, but they do reveal something of the process of negotiation and bargaining which goes into the dividing up of the bureaucracy. What was at stake were the various "decentralized institutes" in Cali; that is, public agencies which in theory are autonomous and independent of government, but whose directing boards are appointed by elected officials, in this case the city council. Yet the political issue was, in fact, the party and factional loyalties of the executive director (manager, or gerente) and the officers of the board of directors (junta) of each agency. The mayor indicated that according to the agreement, the Conservatives would choose the manager of Emsirva (parks and sanitation), the Oficialista Liberals would choose the manager of Emcali (water, sewage, electricity and telephone), and the faction of Carlos Holmes Trujillo would choose the manager of Invicali (housing). Moreover, the officers of the juntas would rotate each six months, and the person heading the junta would be of a "different politics" than the gerente. The mayor said that the policy of rotating the officers of the boards was the practice that had been worked out in other agencies.

As the discussion turned to what all this meant for Invicali, Hernań Isaías, a Liberal, said that according to this hypothesis the gerente of Invicali ought to be a Liberal and the president of the junta ought to be a Conservative. Carlos Holguiń Sardi, himself a Conservative, interrupted to say that "it is not a hypothesis, but an agreement." Ibarra said that since the agreement had been made, they should go ahead with the election of a new general manager, and stated

that the candidate of Carlos Holmes Trujillo was Hugo García Reyes.[42]

This proposal, however, touched off several weeks of debate and manuevering among the members of the board. Ibarra said that an agreement had been made between Trujillo and Balcazar Monzón that García Reyes would be the new general manager. Carlos Holguín Sardi said that he did not know anything about this, that it was an "internal" agreement and had not been made in his presence. For reasons not altogether clear, Holguín Sardi raised objections to García Reyes as the new general manager. He stressed the importance of abiding by political agreements, but said this was a special case. He said that García Reyes had a "total lack of understanding" of Invicali and questioned García Reyes' previous performance in developing the plans for the city's water and sewage system. The mayor said he was not bringing up "ethical problems," but rather "administrative and juridical problems." The nomination of García Reyes, however, did raise political problems.[43] Apparently, none of the board wanted to vote for him, but neither did they want to vote against him. After further discussion, they decided to postpone the question until the next meeting.

The board met again on February 16 and quickly became entangled in legalistic arguments. Blasteyo Trejos, the ANAPO member of the Board, tried to build a case for electing a Conservative. According to Trejos, the city council required that the auditor of Invicali be of a different

---

[42] Invicali, Acta No. 04—Febrero 2 de 1973, Folio 04-2.

[43] Ibid., Folio 04-3.

political affiliation than the general manager. Since a Liberal held the post of auditor, this meant that the manager must be a Conservative. This led the board into a lengthy debate on the meaning of various city council resolutions, as well as the provisions of the National Front. Hernán Isaías Lbarra said that the constitutional reforms of 1968 established a gradual dismantlement of the National Front. Competition between the parties would first be restored in legislative elections, but to avoid any "disequilibrium," the division of the bureaucracy will still be decided by the parties. In short, it was up to the parties to decide the distribution of positions in the bureaucracy and since an agreement had been made it was to be kept. No consensus could be reached among the members of the board, however, and the selection of a new general manager was postponed once again.[44]

In the next meeting, the question was still unresolved. Armando Holguín Sarria, a Liberal member of the board, tried to break the impasse by suggesting that the agenda be altered and a new president and vice president of the board be elected. Hernán Isaías Ibarra was opposed to changing the agenda, but said that when they did get around to electing a new president he wanted to propose Carlos Holguín Sardi. Armando Holguín Sarria then proposed that Luis Efrén Fernández be elected vice president. Hernán Ibarra said electing the gerente was still the "Gordian knot" and said that the agenda should not be changed until this issue was settled. After further debate about which election

---

[44]Acta No. 05—Febrero 16 de 1973, Folios 05-1—05-6.

should be held, the board decided to continue the meeting until the new general manager was elected.

When discussion was resumed concerning the election of the gerente, Hernán Ibarra challenged those who were trying to block the Holmista candidate. Ibarra said that García Reyes was not a personal choice, but rather the candidate of a group. Ibarra said that he had heard that some were not going to vote for García Reyes, and that this was breaking the pact that had been made. He said that if those who did not want the candidate of Carlos Holmes Trujillo, then they should "defeat him, but God forbid the sad consequences for relations within the Liberal party."[45] Ibarra said that those who broke the unity of the party would have to explain this act of disloyalty in public in the next campaign. Ibarra accused Hernán Dávila Zorrilla and Armando Holguín Sarria of being the Liberals trying to block the Holmista candidate, and if they did not want García Reyes they should accept their responsibilities, "demonstrate their own personal beliefs," vote that way, and not leave it to their alternates.[46]

The minutes of the Invicali meetings indicate that in large part the dispute was a factional struggle within the Liberal party, involving the competition between Carlos Lleras and Alfonso López Michelsen for control of the party and the presidential nomination. In a subsequent meeting Armando Holguín Sarria said that the pact made within the party

---

[45]Acta No. 06—Febrero 20 de 1973, Folio 06-5.

[46]Ibid.

was a "compromise" that the new gerente would be someone associated with the Carlos Lleras faction.[47] At the time, Carlos Holmes Trujillo was aligned with Lleras. In contrast, Gustavo Balcázar Monzón was beginning to align himself with López Michelsen. Similarly, Armando Holguín Sarria was aligned with López Michelsen through his ties to Ramiro Andrade, a longtime Lopista leader in Valle. Apparently, then, the Liberals were divided while the Conservatives and ANAPO members were attempting to exploit the situation by encouraging the bickering within the Liberal ranks.

Eventually, the dispute had to be settled by the chiefs themselves. According to the minutes, Armando Barona Mesa, a Holmista councilman who was not a member of the board but who was observing the meetings, called Hugo García Reyes and asked him to withdraw his candidacy. Gustavo Balcázar Monzón called Carlos Holmes Trujillo and the two dirigentes reached a compromise in the name of party unity. The new candidate for general manager would be Hernán Mejía Arango, who was a Holmista, but was more acceptable to Balcázar Monzón. Balcazar Monzón then called Armando Holguín Sarria and urged him to respect the agreement that had been made. Once the Liberals had agreed among themselves, Mejía Arango was elected unanimously.[48]

The party and factional wrangling did not end there, however, The next order of business was the election of a new president of the board,

---

[47]Acta No. 07—Febrero 27 de 1973, Folio 07-2.

[48]Acta No. 06—Febrero 20 de 1973, Folio 06-8.

and this was complicated by manuevering within the Conservative ranks. It began immediately when Oscar Delgado nominated Freddy Rodríguez for president of the junta, a proposal which was, he said, purely "spontaneous." Armando Barona Mesa then asked who was the official candidate of the Conservative party. Barona Mesa said that he was sure that Carlos Holguín Sardi was a "splendid candidate, equal to Councilman Freddy Rodríguez," but they needed to wait until they had agreed on the candidate before making any nominations. Rodríguez replied that it had been agreed that the presidency would rotate every six months, and since a Liberal had been chosen as gerente, then the president of the board was to be a Conservative. Oscar Delgado said that he had heard discussion among Conservative leaders about the selection of officers of the board, but that his chief was Rodrigo Lloreda, and that Lloreda had said nothing to him about particular individuals. Delgado went on to say that if Lloreda had said anything about who was to be president, he did not know about it. The board was therefore faced with two candidates from different factions in the Conservative party: Carlos Holguín Sardi, a major leader in Valle and an Independent (Alvaro Gómez) nationally; and Freddy Rodríguez, a follower of Rodrigo Lloreda, who was also a chief in Valle and an Ospinista. No one wanted to make a choice at this point, and the election was postponed until the next meeting.[49]

When the board met again, Harold Martínez, a Liberal, said that some questions still had not been answered. Was the Conservative party

---

[49] Ibid., Folios 06-8—06-9.

nominating both Carlos Holguín Sardi and Freddy Rodríguez? Did Oscar Delgado and Freddy Rodríguez have the authority to act as spokesman for the Conservative party? These questions required a recess until telephone calls could be made to the party chiefs for their advice. David Riaño said that he needed to call Carlos Holmes Trujillo so that the Holmistas could vote in good conscience. The Liberals did not want to choose sides in a Conservative matter.

When the meeting reconvened, Oscar Delgado tried his hand at compromise. He suggested that the presidency be divided into four periods, with Carlos Holguín Sardi selected for the first period, a Liberal for the second, Freddy Rodríguez for the third, and a Liberal for the fourth. Most of the board agreed with the idea of having four periods, but objected to the idea of having candidates named in advance. At this point another recess was necessary to reach an agreement.

That afternoon the board reconvened, and the motion was adopted that the presidency be divided into four periods, but without prior naming of individuals. The first period would go to a Conservative, the second to a Liberal, the third to a Conservative, and the fourth to a Liberal. The election was then held and Carlos Holguín Sardi was chosen president by a vote of five to three.[50]

The selection of a new vice president involved almost as much bickering as did the election of the president. The divisions within the Liberal party was the main issue. Armando Holguín Sarria nominated

---

[50]Acta No. 07—Febrero 27 de 1973, Folio 07-4.

Luis Efrén Fernández as vice president. Fernández had once been a member of the MRL in Valle, but in 1972 he had been elected to the assembly as a member of the Alianza de Izquierda, a small splinter group which had tried to continue the policies of the MRL. Consequently, he was in some ways still associated with the López Michelsen wing of the Liberal party. The Conservatives tried at first to block his election by arguing that Fernández was not a Liberal, and therefore was not eligible under the terms of the pacts that had been made.

The Holmista Liberals were not happy either, and they proposed one of their own, Sigifredo Escobar. Armando Holguín Sarria said that since the Liberals had received the gerencia and the Conservatives the presidency of the board, "it would be convenient to give the vice presidency to the opposition."[51]

Carlos Holguín Sardi said that if his memory did not fail him, the agreements did not include vice presidents, and in fact there were no vice presidents in some of the institutes. The mayor said that he did not want to make the agreements more complicated. Furthermore, he said he "lamented very much" the way the election of the president had been conducted, and that the incident was in every way very unfortunate." He said he had no interest in the presidency anyway because such positions were only "honorific."

After some additional discussion Arturo Paláez said that he would like to say to the "Liberals of the matiz of Carlos H. Trujillo" that

---

[51]Ibid., Folio 07-5.

the election of general manager had been good for them, "without doubt a triumph," and that it had been done unanimously. He asked that the Holmistas put aside their political passions and consider Fernández, who would be a good man for vice president. David Riaño said that since everyone agreed that it was important that the institute continue to make progress, and that since the pacts did not include the vice presidency, he was withdrawing the name of Sigifredo Escobar. Fernández was then duly elected without opposition.[52]

The keen political interest the parties and their factions have in the bureaucracy extends well beyond the administrative level positions, and some of the Invicali minutes offer a few insights into the division of lower-level jobs. In July 1973 the board met to decide how a number of staff positions would be allocated.[53] Essentially two proposals were made.

Armando Holguín Sarria proposed that positions, as well as salaries, be divided equally between the Liberals and the Conservatives, but that the "opposition" be given some positions, not in a "proportional sense," but that they receive "some functionaries." Harold Martínez then suggested that this proposal be modified to reflect that the Liberals would give positions to "their opposition," the Alianza de Izquierda, and the Conservatives give positions to ANAPO.

Luis Efrén Fernández, on the other hand, wanted the positions divided proportionately. According to Fernández, the constitutional

---

[52]Ibid., Folio 17-7.

[53]Acta No. 021—Julio 6 de 1973, Folios 02-1—02-5.

reforms of 1968 had eliminated parity, and positions in the bureaucracy should be distributed according to the representation of the different political groups on the Cali municipal council. This was, he said, how the members of the governing junta of Invicali had been selected, and other jobs should be decided in the same manner. Since the opposition had two of the eight members of the board, 25 percent of the positions should be given to them. The Liberals and the Conservatives, however, were in no mood to give this large a percentage to their opponents, and the motions of Armando Holguín Sarria and Harold Martínez were adopted. After a brief recess, the board moved quickly to divide the positions.

Altogether, 28 positions were allocated that afternoon. It is very difficult to determine precisely how the positions were distributed among the factions, but the general division along party lines is apparent, and the process does reflect how extensive the patronage system is.[54] Some persons were replaced, some were continued, one was promoted, and a number of vacant positions were filled. The Conservatives decided 13 positions and the Liberals decided 11 positions. The Liberals gave the Alianza de Izquierda two positions, and the Conservatives gave ANAPO two positions. The Conservatives received two more than the Liberals, but it should be noted that this was only one afternoon and did not deal with all the employees of Invicali. The

---

[54]How the políticos and the recipients of patronage become linked to one another is virtually unknown. For example, do the recipients seek out the politicians? Is there some sort of exchange relationship? Further research along these lines might illuminate some obscure aspects of the patronage system.

kinds of jobs allocated included assistant cashier, file clerk, chainman, messenger, census taker, urban inspector, process server, and archivist. Once the jobs had been decided, it was recommended that the board make the appropriate allocation in the budget to pay for the positions. At 3:20 in the afternoon, the board adjourned. The process had taken less than an hour.

The Role of Ideology

One of the more important questions to be asked concerning factional conflict is whether the frequent internal disputes arise from basic differences of policy, program, or ideology. On the surface, factional strife has indeed appeared to be the result of major policy differences among the parties' continually warring groups, if this is judged by what the factions and their leaders say in public. The rhetorical exchanges among the factions are sometimes fierce. Debates rage over such matters as the structure of the National Front, constitutional reform, economic policy, and so on. In their choice of names and labels, the factions convey the impression of being the proponents of a bewildering array of different policies and programs. Factions claim to represent "revolution," "renovation," "revitalization," "restoration," "reintegration," "movements," "independence," "progress," "socialism," "Marxism," and "popular unity," just to name a few of a seemingly endless list.

Efforts to measure programmatic differences among the factions at the national level have yielded results that are sometimes contradictory

and sometimes rather odd. For example, Gary Hoskin and Gerald Swanson studied the ideological perceptions of party leaders at various levels of the most prominent national leaders during the presidency of Carlos Lleras. In party terms, Liberal leaders were regarded as more to the left than Conservative leaders. Yet within the parties, ideological perceptions were less coherent. Among Liberal leaders Turbay Ayala and López Michelsen were "perceived as more to the left than Lleras Camargo or Lleras Restrepo." Normally, however, Turbay Ayala has been considered a leader of the right wing of the party and Lleras Restrepo a leader of the left wing of the party. Hoskin and Swanson write that the:

> Lleras Liberals are probably more to the left than the Turbay Liberals in programmatic terms, but respondents perceived Turbay as more leftist when the data were collected (perhaps a result of his sometime overt opposition to the then President Lleras Restrepo).[55]

The major Conservative factions have not been consistent in their opinions of the National Front. The Ospinistas first opposed the coalition then supported it. The faction led by Laureano Gómez, then Alvaro Gómez, first supported the coalition then opposed it. Yet Hoskin and Swanson found that both Alvaro Gómez and Guillermo León Valencia (the former Ospinista president) were regarded as pro-government (i.e., pro-National Front). According to Hoskin and Swanson:

> This suggests that upper-echelon políticos view both as highly committed to the governmental system and that their

---

[55]Gary Hoskin and Gerald Swanson, "Political Party Leadership in Colombia: A Spatial Analysis," Comparative Politics, 6 (April, 1974), p. 411.

> intermittent opposition stems mostly from tactical rather than deeply rooted attitudinal or policy differences with the governmental parties.[56]

The role that ideology plays in factional conflict may be explored in further detail by describing this element in party politics in Valle.

Ideology and Factions in Valle

Some evidence had been gathered which could be interpreted in such a way as to support the argument that factional conflict in Valle stems from the different ideological or programmatic beliefs of party activists. In a survey Stephen Rozman conducted of members of the Liberal and Conservative directorios in Cali in 1967, the author found that leaders of both parties listed ideological reasons as the major impetus for their becoming active in politics. Likewise, Rozman found that these party leaders also stated that ideological satisfaction was first among those derived from their participation in political life.[57]

Since leaders state that ideology constitutes both the main reason for entering politics as well as the major satisfaction for participation in politics, the data presented by Rozman might be interpreted to suggest that it is this apparent ideological consciousness which contributes to conflict among the factions of the parties. Rozman warily leans in this direction, even though his data do not indicate if the members of the various factions had different ideological reasons

---

[56] Ibid., p. 415.

[57] Stephen Lyle Rozman, "A Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Party Leadership in Cali, Colombia," Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Florida, 1968, pp. 67, 68, 201, 202.

for entering politics or likewise if their satisfactions are from the accomplishment of different ideological goals.

On the surface at least, the disputes among the factions of each party often appear to be the consequence of conflict over policy and program. When the parties divide into factions or matices, generally each faction attempts to couch its appeals in some sort of ideological terms, vague as these may sometimes be. Thus when Carlos Holmes Trujillo, for example, began his climb up through the hierarchy of the Liberal party he claimed that the faction he headed was seeking to breathe new life into the party's doctrine. This faction was an offshoot of the Oficialista faction, although Carlos Holmes Trujillo tried to walk the tightrope of breaking with the National Front faction yet not cutting himself off altogether. The faction became known as the Movimiento de Renovación y Revitalización Liberal, claiming to be the Gaitanista matiz in Valle. In its stance of critical supporter of the Frente the faction called for "renovation," "revitalization," and "change." Yet interestingly for a faction claiming to be motivated by ideological concerns, its supporters and members had virtually no influence on its stated policies. Rozman writes that:

> According to two other Revitalización leaders, the main source of communication as to what the group's program would be was top leader, Trujillo. One simply declared that "Carlos Holmes Trujillo spoke about what the party program would be at meetings." This would indicate a greater degree of personalism than some other leaders would admit.[58]

---

[58]Ibid., p. 162.

This is a typical pattern to be found in both parties in Valle throughout the National Front. Each time that a faction has emerged within one of the parties it has surrounded itself with some sort of ideological rhetoric. It is also common for the new faction to adopt a name which apparently is intended to summarize the faction's position. Thus the Holmistas began as a "Movement of Renovation and Revitalization." In 1964, César Tulio Delgado formed a Movimiento de Restauración Conservadora within the Conservative ranks. Obviously, the choice of words is significant, with factions claiming to represent "renovation," "revitalization," "restoration," "movements," "revolution," "independence," and "reintegration" to name only a few. By this method a faction attempts to attract attention, win support, and project the image of a group struggling for ideological purity. Superficially, the impression is one of parties divided by a bewildering array of ideological cleavages.

The way in which factions use ideology in their appeals may be described by examining the group formed in 1975 by Marino Renjifo. In his speech, Renjifo said that what the new group wanted was a restructuring of the party in Valle. He criticized the present Liberal leaders in the department claiming that since they had achieved their high positions they "had forgotten the necessities of the popular masses." The same was true, he said, of the party's national directors who held their meetings in "exclusive places, in the great social clubs." It was not possible for the party to turn its back on the people; the Movement of Popular Liberal Recuperation did not want the

electoral lists made up during "compromises in a hotel." Renjifo went on at length in this vein by claiming that the driving force was to restore control and direction of the party to the masses; the faction had been formed "not for its own benefit, but for the popular welfare." Renjifo's speech also contained the type of ideological appears commonly to be found in factional rhetoric. The goal was "to arm a popular army with ideas instead of guns to impose our sovereign liberty in the department"; the form it would take was a "socialist politics to help the government in its reforms"; and its method was for the people to gain control of the Consejo de Cali which had been converted into a "kind of social club."[59] Renjifo returned time and again to the theme of the importance of ideological line to follow, "to defend an ideology each time more combative," "to search for ideological cohesion," and to eliminate within the party "the inconsistency . . . in regard to ideology." The base of the movement's activity, he said, "is ideology."[60]

Such vague and sweeping generalizations constitute an important element in the style of factional conflict. This is especially true when a faction is being created and fighting for a toehold in the party. The faction is given a name which purports to symbolize its position; it claims to be motivated by ideology and selfless dedication to the masses, and current leaders are attacked for their treachery and bad faith.

---

[59] Nueva Frontera, No. 25 (April 12, 1975), p. 14.

[60] Ibid.

In public, therefore, factional rivalry often is expressed in ideological terms, with other types of charges mixed in. Once Marino Renjifo launched his faction, Carlos Holmes Trujillo's faction responded through its tabloid, Insurgencia Liberal, calling the meeting in the Club El Dorado an "ignorant demonstration," and making puns on Renjifo's name and newspaper saying that "Donde manda capitán, no puede mandar 'marino,'" and "AL ÚNICO PUEBLO QUE PODRÍA REPRESENTAR MARINO, SERÍA AL DIARIO LIBERAL DE LOS LONDOÑO."[61]

Inasmuch as factional leaders profess to be continually at odds with one another over matters of ideology, and this is often considered as the major source of factional conflict, those party leaders who were interviewed were asked to rate in order of importance five topics which are often discussed as areas of internal party disputes. The ranking produced results which are not clearcut (see Table 5.2).

Thus those leaders interviewed rated personal ambitions as the main source of factional conflict, followed by differences in ideology, position on the lists, regionalism, and finally competition for public posts. What is curious, and would seem to be illogical, is that ideological differences are ranked between personal ambitions and position on the lists, two closely related aspects of party politics. Seemingly a paradox is to be found here; on the one hand party leaders

---

[61] Insurgencia Liberal, No. 3 (May, 1975), p. 3. The pun in "Where the captain commands, the 'sailor' cannot." The jibe, "The only people Marino can represent would be the Liberal newspaper of the Londoño family," refers to the owners of El Pueblo.

TABLE 5.2

RANKING OF INTERNAL PARTY CONFLICT

Sources of Conflict	Rank
Personal Ambitions	1
Differences in Ideology	2
Position on the Lists	3
Regionalism	4
Competition for Public Positions	5

Source: Personal interviews; ranking based on mean score of responses.

consider personal ambitions the principal source of internal party conflict, while on the other ideology is ranked a close second.

When considered individually, the responses of those interviewed do not fall into any clear pattern; some said that ideological concerns were the major source of conflict, while others claimed that these were not at all important. This was true for both parties. The Liberal party departmental secretary explained that ideological disputes were for "electoral purposes." Similarly, a prominent Conservative commented at greater length on internal disputes, saying that he considered the fundamental cause to be:

> the personal ambitions of each one of those who aspire to be on a list, in that many times those who consider themselves leaders and have a great number of votes are not kept at an effective position on the list, then they cause internal fights or at the most little divisions, that is, they create separate lists . . . . In regard to the differences of ideology in our party, undoubtedly they cause internal disputes, because there are leaders and party members who believe that the programs ought to be renovated, ought to be accommodated to the historical situation that affects every

> country. But this is not definitive, not fundamental in making up the lists because generally those leaders of those members are integrated and related to the rest in such a way that permits a representation of all on the same list.

In other words, while there are differences of opinion in the ranks as to what the party should do, the main cause of conflict is the position on the lists a leader is given, and matters of program do not play a significant part in this decision.

The variation in responses cuts across party lines. Another Conservative insisted that factional disputes do grow out of different ideological orientations of the party's groups. Yet a Liberal member of the Consejo, who was allied to the Trujillo faction, which claims to be "leftist," said that "there are no divisions over ideology, that is, when the parties divide they divide over questions of seats (in a legislative body) or over positions (as on the lists)."

How then is this series of contradictory replies to be explained? One possible answer is that some party leaders sincerely believe that the internal conflicts of the parties do stem from different programmatic goals, while others do not. Another possibility is that respondents were saying either what they believed the interviewer expected to hear or were being evasive. But this is speculation and not easy to determine one way or the other.

As a kind of "corrective" question, therefore, those interviewed were asked when internal party disputes became most intense. The response was revealing, and casts some doubt upon the assertations of factional conflict as a battle over ideas. More than half of the party leaders interviewed noted that internal conflict is most acute during

the selection of the lists, but this number could be increased when considering the explanations offered by those who initially said before or during the convention. For example, one Conservative who said that party conflict became most intense before the convention went on to explain that "it is at this time that the convention is being prepared, that is to say, that the different directories are choosing their lists." A Liberal member of the Consejo said that in reality conflict within his party was most intense "in two phases." The first was before the convention and elections when the lists were being prepared. Conflict entered its second phase after the elections and was centered on "the quota of power that each of the matices asks or demands."

Since almost all leaders indicate in one way or another that internal disputes reach their height of intensity during the process of making up the lists, it becomes doubtful that matters of ideology are as serious a source of factional conflict as they are often said to be even by the políticos themselves. The evidence presented here is not sufficient to support the assertion that internal party conflicts are absolutely devoid of ideological or programmatic content. On the other hand, the struggles for positions on the electoral lists and the constant infighting over the bureaucracy also make it difficult to defend the argument that internal party conflict is a consequence or manifestation of basic programmatic differences. Further research into the belief systems of leaders, their actual behavior in formulating and administering public policy, and the sources of public policy would do much to clarify these issues. In the following section some propositions will

be made as a tentative description of the process and elements of factional conflict in Colombian parties.

Summary and Conclusions

Based upon the foregoing description of factional conflict, it is perhaps possible to offer a tentative analysis. To begin, an attempt has been made to identify and describe the major sources of conflict among factions with special emphasis upon an exploration of the role of ideology in factional disputes. Although factional leaders speak often of the importance of ideology and some lower ranking leaders have asserted that factional disputes grow out of ideological differences, it is not believed here that this factor constitutes an important source of party division. Instead, it would seem to be more accurate to say that factional conflict has more distinctly political roots in the sense of the struggle among party leaders to move up through the hierarchy, to gain political office, or to insure their placement at a position on the party lists which either guarantees or increases their chances at being elected.

Although some observers have claimed that factional conflict within the two major parties stems from basic program, policy, or ideological differences, that view is discounted here. If factional conflict does not arise from such clashes, what then explains the frequent use of ideologically phrased language? In general terms, Anita Weiss has described factional conflict in Colombian political parties as the result of a strategy of "tactical dissidence," whereby factions attempt

to improve their political fortunes by opposition to the party. She writes that:

> Taking into account the personalistic character of Colombian politics, we can say that the traditional parties are not united wholes, but constitute confederations of groups that follow one or another caudillo or leader. The phenomenon of "tactical dissidence" consists of the separation of a group from the nucleus of the party by means of personal ambitions or through divergent positions opposed to official party politics.[62]

Thus Weiss questions ideology or policy differences as an element of conflict within the parties but recognizes its tactical value. James L. Payne comes to essentially the same conclusion.

Weiss also recognizes that the traditional parties in Colombia are not unified organizations but are more like confederations of politicians tied to one or another major leader. This description is basically the same as that of the structure of the factions offered in the previous chapter. The conflict one observes within the parties, therefore, arises not from policy differences, but is instead the struggle between or among factions to gain a tactical advantage.

One important question, however, is what is the relationship between the structure of factions and conflict? First of all, two additional aspects of political leaders must be briefly described: their social background and their relationships to interest groups. It was not possible to consider these in this study, but other research provides some evidence. Two studies of party leaders in Colombia have

---

[62]Anita Weiss, Tendencias de la Participación Electoral en Colombia, 1935-1966 (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1967), p. 46.

found that leaders have very similar backgrounds. For the most part, they are middle class. Law is the most common vocation. They have attended the same types of schools and universities. Those in Congress have been educated primarily in the principal cities.[63]

Second, and equally important, Colombian politicians seem to have rather weak linkages with interest groups, perhaps because interest groups are themselves only weakly organized. In general, individual Colombian politicians do not appear to have any linkages with particular interest groups, such as labor, farmers, and others. Contacts between politicians and interest groups seem to be diffuse and generalized.[64]

The consequences of this is that Colombian politicians seem rather "detached" from those they in theory represent. As a result, Colombian politicians are, in a manner of speaking, "left to themselves." The political game is played before spectators who become involved only at election time. In large measure, the power base, or constituency of a Colombian politician is other politicians. This is why politicians in Colombia seem so acutely aware and interested in the activities of one another. An aspiring politician must develop a following, a personal following, of other politicians. He does not "press the flesh" among civitans, veterans organizations, garden clubs, and factory workers to

---

[63]Harvey Kline and Francisco Leal, "Background Characteristics," in Legislative Behavior in Colombia, Vol. I (Buffalo, N.Y.: Council on International Studies, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1976), pp. 47-80. See also, Rozman, p. 91.

[64]Harvey Kline, "Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 16 (August, 1974), pp. 274-300.

the extent of a North American politician. Between campaigns what a Colombian politician must do is work hard at factional politics—observing shifts in alignments, increasing his following, linking himself to a higher leader at the appropriate time.

Research indicates that Colombian legislators spend little time advocating policies of interest groups or their constituents. Much of what transpires in Congress, or in a departmental assembly, is party and factional politics as the different groups struggle for a partisan advantage.[65] Issues do, of course, force their way into Congress from time to time, but they seem to be channeled from above (the president) rather than below (interest groups).

Since a Colombian politician's linkages are primarily with other politicians they are fragile. Turnover rates in Congress are rather high. Factions can shift their political positions as the situation demands, join with one leader one time and his opponent the next. There is political risk in doing this, but also a political risk in not doing it.

Colombian politicians do need votes to hold office, but this is not inherently contradictory to what has been stated above. At election time, party and factional organizations gear up for the campsign. What organizational work is done is apparently directed at lower income areas, among the "popular masses." Campaigning is done primarily by public speaking, most often at rallies in the public squares. Candidates

---

[65]Payne, pp. 238-267.

go on giras, or whirlwind tours through the cities and towns exhorting the faithful to vote for their party. It is at this time that the politicians try to create a sense of linkage between themselves and the voters. Once the campaign is over, the link between candidate and constituent seems very weak indeed.

To appeal to the voters, however, candidates must adopt some sort of image, and it is here that "tactical dissidence" becomes important. An aspiring faction must attract attention. It must appear to be different from other groups within the party. It claims to be truly representative of the people, and claims to stand for Marxism, renovation, revitalization, restoration, popular unity, or any number of other ideas. The rhetoric of ideology is a means of winning votes and a tactic to increase the cuota de poder of the faction. What can the parties and factions give in return? One thing is patronage. A faction may not concern itself with satisfying interest groups by advocating certain public policies, but it can distribute patronage if it established a cuota de poder and gains control of a setment of the bureaucracy. A faction can reward its supporters and claim to have done something for them. Reading the minutes of the Invicali board meeting, one striking thing is how little attention was given to matters of housing. Rather the conflict was over which party and which faction would receive which job.

If these hypotheses are valid, the relationship between the structure of factions and the nature and style of internal party conflict becomes much clearer. The environment in which factions exist

is important, although it is not possible to examine all the factors which are related to factional behavior. In the following chapter, however, a few will be explored.

CHAPTER VI

THE FACTIONS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

Until now the focus of this study has been somewhat narrowly fixed on the factions themselves—their structural characteristics and elements of conflict. But factions, like other phenomena of political behavior, do not exist in isolation. The factions exist within an environment which they affect and which in turn affects them. In the broadest terms this environment is human behavior. Yet human behavior has many different aspects, and one of the tasks of social science is to delineate these different aspects of behavior, to categorize and define them, and to explain, or attempt to explain, their complex inter-relationships.

To describe how factions are related to all other aspects of behavior is obviously impossible. It is quite likely that the behavior of Colombian party factions are in some interrelated with patterns of behavior we call economic, social, psychological or cultural. Further, it is assumed that the behavior of the factions is in some way closely related to that aspect of human behavior we call politics. After all, factions exist within a political environment. How then does this environment or aspect of behavior affect the factions? How do the factions affect their environment? How might these relationships be described?

Politics itself, however, has many different aspects, and it is impossible to examine the relationship of factions to all of these.

Consequently, a modest goal has been set here: to describe factions in the political arena by examining their relationship to a few selected factors. Moreover, a temporal dimension has been added to permit an explanation of the factions within the National Front system. Therefore, this chapter has two basic objectives. The first is to describe variations in the strength of the major national factions from 1958 to 1974 nationally and in the department of Valle. The second is to examine some factors which may be associated with these variations. In the concluding section a few speculations will be offered on what meaning the factions may have for the future of the party system in Colombia.

Variations in Factionalism: 1958-1974

The National Level

Chapter III presented an overview of Colombian parties, factions and elections during the period of the National Front at the national level. Here the purpose is to describe variations in the strength of the major national factions but relative to the party vote rather than the total vote. To accomplish this we shall focus on House elections primarily because these elections were held every two years until 1970. This permits a somewhat closer look at variations in factionalism and a comparison of election results. The party vote is given in Table 6.1.

In Table 6.2 one can see the relative strength and variations of the factions from 1958 to 1970. Several observations can be made about each party. In the Liberal party it is clear that the Oficialistas have

TABLE 6.1

PARTY VOTING IN COLOMBIA IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS, IN PERCENTAGES: 1958-1974

	Liberals	Conservatives	ANAPO	Other*
1958	57.7	42.1	-	
1960	58.1	41.7	-	.2
1962	54.5	41.7	3.7	.1
1964	50.5	35.5	13.7	.3
1966	52.0	29.9	17.8	.3
1968	50.0	33.7	16.1	.2
1970	29.6	34.6	35.5	.3
1974	55.6	32.0	9.0	3.4

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

*"Other" includes null and blank votes, and minor parties in 1974.

TABLE 6.2

FACTIONAL DIVISION OF PARTY VOTING IN COLOMBIA, 1958-1970, IN PERCENTAGES (HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)

Party/Faction	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970
Liberal							
Oficialistas	100%	75%	64%	64%	73%	95%	71%
MRL		24	36	33	24	4	2
Belisaristas							9
Sourdistas							11
Others		1		3	3	1	7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Conservative							
Unionistas	29%	54%	62%	99%*	54%	69%	54%*
Independientes	59	42	38		40	28	
Alzatistas	10						
Leyvistas		3			1		
Belisaristas							28
Sourdistas							17
Others	2	1		1	5	7	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

*Combined lists of Unionistas and Independientes.

been its dominant faction throughout the National Front. In 1958 the Oficialistas won 100 percent of the votes in the House elections. The greatest threat to Oficialista dominance came from the MRL in the four elections between 1960 and 1966, especially in the elections of 1962 and 1964 when the Oficialista share of the Liberal party vote dropped to 64 percent. Beginning in 1964, however, the MRL began to decline as a force within the party, which was perhaps a factor in the decision of Alfonso López to make peace with the Oficialistas in 1967. In any case, the decision clearly had an effect. Without López the MRL won only 4 percent of the Liberal vote in 1968 and the Oficialistas increased their share of the Liberal vote to almost 95 percent. Although the Oficialistas again lost some ground in the volatile election of 1970 no other faction was able to win more than 11 percent of the Liberal vote. In sum, the Oficialistas fairly consistently dominated the Liberal party during the National Front and although various other factions did appear from time to time, only the MRL was to cut very deeply into the Liberal vote.

In comparison, the Conservatives have shown much greater variation. In 1958 the faction led by Laureano Gómez (Independientes) rather handily defeated those led by Mariano Ospina and Gilberto Alzate Avendaño. Only two years later, however, the Ospinistas, or Unionistas, won a majority of Conservative votes cast. In 1962 the Unionistas increased their share of the Conservative votes (excluding those of ANAPO) to 62 percent. In the election of 1964 the Unionistas and the Independientes ran unified lists and won almost all Conservative votes.

When the unity of the party was broken the Unionistas again emerged as the strongest Conservative faction. In 1968 the Unionistas won the highest percentage of Conservative votes of any of the party's factions during the National Front.

As pointed out in Chapter III, the nomination of Misael Pastrana as the National Front candidate for president in 1970 touched off a factional struggle within both Conservative and Liberal ranks. Two Conservative leaders, Belisario Betancur and Evaristo Sourdis, ran for president even though this was prohibited by the National Front agreement. A number of disgruntled Liberals as well as Conservatives filed electoral lists for Congress and other offices and temporarily aligned themselves with either Betancur or Sourdis.

In some ways the election of 1970 had a more profound effect upon the Conservative party than the Liberal party. Even running combined lists the Unionistas and Independientes were able to win only 54 percent of the Conservative party vote. The Belisaristas won 28 percent while the Sourdistas won 17 percent which indicates the fragmentation of the Conservatives in 1970. For the first time the hold on the party of the two major factions led by Ospina and Gómez was almost broken by other Conservatives.

In comparing the two parties a few additional observations can be made. In the first place, during the National Front both parties have been substantially affected by factionalism. Although there have been a number of different factions in both parties, two factions within each party have clearly monopolized the vote. The Liberals have shown

relatively a more consistent pattern of factional strength. The Oficialistas have always dominated the party, winning approximately two-thirds of the vote or greater. No other faction has been able to overcome this majority. The Conservatives have been less consistent, with changes in the dominant role, with unity then disunity, and then a new breakup in 1970.

No percentages are given in Table 6.2 for factional voting in 1974 for several reasons. One is that the parties were "officially" unified in 1974, and the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil did not calculate voting results for national factions. But this does not mean that the parties had no factions in 1974. To recall a point made in Chapter IV, factions did exist within the parties. In many cases, the factions combined their electoral lists, as they did in Valle. In other cases, factions did run separate lists but without the somewhat formalized titles that had been the custom in previous years.

In sum, the parties have remained factionalized as in the past, although there were fewer separate lists in 1974. The elections of 1974 were, however, a transition from the National Front coalition to a more truly competitive system. It is hard to predict what this means for the Liberals and the Conservatives. Will factionalism decline within the parties, or will the factions eventually return to the tactics pursued during the National Front? These are difficult questions to answer.

Variations in Factionalism in Valle

When Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are compared, it can be seen that the variations in the relative strength of the factions in Valle are not especially different from the pattern found at the national level. Each party has been dominated generally by two factions, although there are some differences between the parties. In the Liberal party, the Oficialistas remained the dominant faction throughout the National Front, with the strongest challenge to their control coming in the elections of 1962 and 1964. In those years, the MRL won 48 percent and 44 percent of the Liberal vote, respectively. It may be noted that the MRL had somewhat greater strength in Valle than it did in Colombia as a whole, but not enough to become the majority faction in the department. (See Table 6.3.)

In 1968 Oficialistas very nearly returned to the absolute dominance they had enjoyed ten years earlier, but this was somewhat shaken in the elections of 1970 when a number of Liberals broke with the party hierarchy and temporarily aligned themselves with either Belisario Betancur or Evaristo Sourdis. Smaller local factions which have appeared from time to time have not seriously threatened Oficialista control.

The Conservatives in Valle have followed the same rather erratic pattern as found at the national level. In the elections of 1960, the regional followers of Laureano Gómez lost control of the party in Valle to the Ospinistas. The Ospinistas maintained their status as the majority faction in the following years, although the two major

TABLE 6.3

FACTIONAL DIVISION OF PARTY VOTING IN VALLE, 1958-1970, IN PERCENTAGES (HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)

Party/Faction	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970
Liberals							
Oficialistas	100%	70%	51%	56%	72%	93%	75%
MRL		30	48	44	28	6	
Belisaristas							16
Sourdistas							1
Others			1			1	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Conservatives							
Unionistas	13%	64%	63%	86%*	48%	70%	60%*
Independientes	77	34	37		43	27	
Alzatistas	10						
Leyvistas		2					
Belisaristas							30
Sourdistas							9
Others				14	9	3	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

*Combined lists of Unionistas and Independientes.

Conservative factions did run combined lists in the elections of 1964 and 1970. The decline of the Gómez faction, or Independientes, has been rather dramatic. In 1958, this Conservative faction won 77 percent of the party vote in Valle, but in the elections of 1962 they won only 34 percent of the party vote. The faction increased its vote in the elections of 1966, but in 1968 the Independientes won only 27 percent of the Conservative vote, which was the smallest percentage received during the National Front period. The decline in Conservative support for the Independientes may have been a factor in their willingness to combine lists with the Ospinistas. The Independientes have not, in fact, run separate lists since 1968, and this might signify a permanent change in regard to Conservative factionalism.

Finally, it may be noted that although the Belisarista and Sourdista factions emerged only in the elections of 1970, their effort was greater within the Conservative party than the Liberal party. Together the two factions won 39 percent of the Conservative vote, in contrast to 17 percent of the Liberal vote. This is no doubt due to the fact that Betancur and Sourdis were Conservatives and consequently had greater appeal to voters within their own party.

But what factors may account for variations in factionalism that are not readily apparent? In the following sections a few possibilities will be explored by focusing on Valle.

Factionalism and Party Competition

In one sense, Colombia ranks among the most competitive party systems in the world. Competition between the Liberals and

Conservatives has been fierce, and often violent, for more than a century. The irony is that the parties have also occasionally formed some sort of coalition to share power and control competition between them.

Competition between the parties has also had some unusual effects other than coalition government. It has been argued that the fierce rivalry between the parties has produced a sense of partisan identity almost unmatched in other areas of the world. Another consequence, it is said, is the somewhat unusual pattern of the geographical distribution of party loyalties. It is not uncommon to find municipios in Colombia which consistently case nearly every vote for one party, while a municipio nearby may cast nearly all of its votes for the other party. Thus the parties may be competitive on a regional or national basis, but not necessarily on a local basis.

This pattern may be observed, for example, in the elections of 1930 and 1946. Taking all 879 municipios existing at the time, Paul Oquist has computed the average percentage of vote won by each party in these two elections and ranked each municipio according to direction of the vote (party) and strength of the vote (percentage).[1] The extent to which the parties divided the electorate on a geographic basis may be illustrated by examining the average percentage won by the Conservatives. The Liberal strength may be obtained by simply reversing the order of the first column in Table 6.4.

---

[1]Paul Oquist, "Las Elecciones Presidenciales: 1930-1970," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 268-269 (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1973), pp. 307-330.

TABLE 6.4

AVERAGE CONSERVATIVE VOTE: ELECTIONS OF 1930 AND 1946

Average Percentage Range	Number of Municipios	Percent of Total Municipios
90-100	82	9.33
80-89	69	7.85
70-79	63	7.17
60-69	65	7.39
50-59	107	12.12
40-49	100	11.38
30-39	113	12.85
20-29	113	12.85
10-19	90	10.24
0-9	77	8.76
Total	879	99.99

Source: "Votación Conservadora en los Municipios 1930 y 1946," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 268-269, Noviembre-Diciembre 1973, pp. 307-312.

As Table 6.4 indicates, in a fairly high number of municipios each party won by very large majorities. The Conservatives received an average between 90 and 100 percent of the votes cast in 82 municipios compared to 77 for the Liberals. In 318 municipios, either the Liberals or the Conservatives received an average of 80 percent or greater of the ballots. Oquist suggests the parties may be considered competitive in the range between 40 and 59 percent. By this standard, the parties were competitive in only 207 municipios, or 23.5 percent of the total. Thus, either the Liberals or the Conservatives were the dominant party in 76.5 percent of the municipios in Colombia.

The reason for noting this pattern is that one explanation for party factionalism centers on the degree of party competition. V. O. Key, for example, argued that the factionalism he found in Southern politics was in part a result of the absence of competitive parties.[2] Considering the range of party competition at the local level in Colombia, what is the relationship between this variable and factionalism? Would factions find greater support in areas of weak competition, or not? Such an examination is complicated by the alternation and parity provision of the National Front, but some tentative probes may be worthwhile.

In an effort to explore the relationship between competition and factionalism, the percentage of votes cast for the Liberal party in each of the 42 municipios in Valle was calculated for five House of

---

[2]V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Knopf, 1949), p. 11.

Representatives elections.[3] House elections were chosen because these were held biennially until 1970. Second, the percentage of the total party vote cast for dissident Liberal lists was computed. Dissident lists are defined as all lists except the Oficialista, or "official" party lists. The coefficient of correlation (Pearson's r) was then computed for the two variables: percentage party vote and percentage dissident vote. The purpose was to examine what relationship there is between party competition and factionalism (see Table 6.5).

TABLE 6.5

CORRELATIONS OF LIBERAL PARTY VOTE AND DISSIDENT LIBERAL VOTE IN FIVE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS IN VALLE

Year	Correlation Coefficient (Pearson's r)
1962	+ 0.32
1964	+ 0.68
1966	+ 0.59
1968	- 0.27
1970	+ 0.40

Source: Calculated from records of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

The results are not clearly defined. In four elections the correlations are positive, indicating that as the percentage of votes cast for the Liberal party increases, so does the percentage of votes

[3]The Conservatives were not included because of difficulties with the data. In 1964 and 1970 the Unionistas and Independientes ran combined lists. Voting for other factions was not sufficient for this type of analysis.

cast for factionalists. In other words, as party competition decreases, factionalism increases. Yet caution is necessary in any interpretation. There is little relationship between the variables in the election of 1968. Furthermore, the stronger correlations in the election of 1964 and 1966 quite likely reflect the success of the MRL in those years.

The results do indicate that factionalists are somewhat more successful in areas where their party is stronger. But whether party competition is the underlying factor is hard to determine. It may reflect a kind of political opportunism; that is, dissident candidates do better in areas where there are more of their party's votes to share. The impression one receives from observing Colombian politics is that candidates campaign fiercely for the votes of partisans of their own party. In other words, Liberal candidates campaign among Liberal voters and do not attempt to win over Conservative voters. The same appears to be true of Conservative candidates.

For these reasons, it is difficult to tell whether competition makes any difference. If the parties were to change their campaign tactics and begin seeking votes among all partisan groupings, this could reduce factionalism by increasing competition between the parties.[4] Nevertheless, the evidence is still inadequate to posit a clear relationship between factionalism and party competition.

---

[4]There is, however, still some danger in attempting to organize among voters of the other party. While the author was in Colombia, a Conservative party leader and his associate were shot to death on their way home from an organizational trip to a rural Liberal area in Valle. The old hatreds still smolder in some parts of the country.

La Violencia

One of the more interesting arguments put forth to explain factionalism within the traditional parties in Colombia concerns *la violencia*. The thesis is that in the years before the outbreak of *la violencia*, the party bosses, or *gamonales*, exercised tight control over the Colombian electorate. This was said to be especially true in the rural areas. *La violencia*, however, had the effect of breaking many of the traditional patterns of social and political behavior, and loosened the grip the party bosses had on the electorate. Consequently, many voters were inclined to cast their ballots for candidates other than those sanctioned by the traditional party elite. Radical and dissident candidates were the ones who benefited most from this change.[5]

In general, not much evidence has been cited to support this argument. One exception may be found in the work of Richard Maullin. Maullin compiled data on four congressional elections and found that "antiestablishment political parties and groups were more successful in *municipios* that had suffered from insurgent political violence."[6]

In Valle, 24 *municipios* suffered the impact of *la violencia*.[7] This is approximately half of the 42 *municipios* in the department, and thereby

---

[5]A number of writers have commented on the supposed social change created by *la violencia*. See, for example, Camilo Torres, "Social Change and Rural Violence in Colombia," in *Revolutionary Priest*, ed. John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 188-244.

[6]Richard Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia* (lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), p. 49.

[7]German Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna, *La Violencia en Colombia*, Tomo I (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962), p. 131.

allows some comparison. In the Liberal party, la violencia did seem to have some impact on voting patterns in congressional elections.

As Table 6.6 indicates, the MRL fared much better in those areas which had been affected by la violencia. In contrast, the Oficialistas received greater support in areas not affected by the violence. In 1964, for example, the MRL won 58 percent of the Liberal vote in areas affected by violence, but only 38 percent of the vote in areas not affected by violence. This is a difference of 20 percent, and seems rather substantial. Furthermore, in 1962 and 1964 the MRL actually polled a majority of the party votes in these areas affected by violence, but not in those areas which escaped the tragic consequences of la violencia. It may also be noted that although the number of votes won by the MRL declined in each succeeding election, the percentage received by the MRL declined more slowly in the affected areas.

In the Liberal party at least, the violence did seem to have a significant effect on voting for dissident candidates, especially for those who billed themselves as "leftist." It is, however, difficult to tell whether this represents a weakening of the power of the gamonales (assuming this argument is valid), actual support for radical candidates, or a protest vote against the government and the traditional party hierarchy. It is somewhat more difficult to compare voting for Conservative factions because of the practice of combining and then splitting lists, the changing of positions regarding the National Front, and the problem of defining a dissident faction within the Conservative ranks. In 1966, however, the Unionistas and the Independientes (called

TABLE 6.6

LIBERAL VOTE IN MUNICIPIOS IN VALLE AFFECTED AND NOT AFFECTED BY LA VIOLENCIA

	Affected			Not Affected		
	Oficialistas	MRL	Total	Oficialistas	MRL	Total
			1962			
Vote	20,324	28,328	48,652	69,214	56,402	125,616
Percent	42	58	100	55	45	100
			1964			
Vote	13,904	19,082	32,986	45,807	27,489	73,296
Percent	42	58	100	62	38	100
			1966			
Vote	23,702	13,809	37,511	88,756	20,011	108,767
Percent	63	37	100	82	18	100

Source: Compiled from results of House of Representatives elections published by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

Lauro-Alzatistas that year) ran separate lists in Valle, and a comparison is possible. Whether there is any actual programmatic difference between these two factions is open to question, but their image was different. The Unionistas were considered the more progressive and moderate faction. The Independientes were, of course, the faction of Laureano Gómez and his son, Alvaro Gómez. Laureano Gómez has the reputation of being the most reactionary of the Conservative leaders, and has been suspected of encouraging the violence once it erupted in 1948.

As can be seen in Table 6.7, there is a difference in voting for the two factions between those municipios affected by the violence and those that were not. In those areas which suffered from violence the Unionistas received a much higher percentage of the votes, while the Independientes fared better in areas which had not been affected by violence. The results are similar to those found in the Liberal party; that is, factions which projected a more progressive image polled higher percentages of votes in areas affected by violence, while factions associated with the more traditional party leaders did better in areas not affected by violence.

Again it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why this is the case, but it does seem that the violence did loosen the hold that the traditional party leaders had on the electorate, and stimulated support for those factions who are challenging them for control.

TABLE 6.7

COMPARISON OF VOTING FOR UNIONISTA AND INDEPENDIENTE FACTIONS IN MUNICIPIOS AFFECTED AND NOT AFFECTED BY LA VIOLENCIA: 1966

	Affected		Not Affected	
	Votes	Percent	Votes	Percent
Unionistas	17,418	62%	13,312	44%
Independientes	10,506	38	16,667	56
Total	27,924	100	29,979	100

Source: Calculated from records of the Regístraduria Nacional del Estado Civil.

Urbanization

One variable which has been studied rather frequently in an effort to explain Colombian voting behavior is urbanization. As in many other nations of Latin America, the urban population has been increasing steadily. Normally, the Conservatives have drawn their greatest support from the rural areas, while the Liberals have been stronger in the cities. Recent research, however, indicates that neither party has increased its urban vote in proportion to the increase in urban population.[8] Voter participation in the cities tends to be below those levels found in rural areas, but most writers have failed to note that this was also apparently the case in the nineteenth century.[9]

---

[8]Fernando Cepeda Ulloa and Claudia González de Lecaros, Comportamiento del Voto Urbano en Colombia: Una Aproximación (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1976), pp. 10-15.

[9]David Bushnell, "Voter Participation in the Colombian Election of 1856," Hispanic American Historical Review, 51 (May, 1971), pp. 237-249.

The primary reason urbanization has attracted attention is that voters in the cities show a greater predilection than rural voters to cast their ballots for antitraditional or radical candidates. In the election of 1946 Jorge Gaitán won a higher percentage of votes in the cities than in the rural areas. In the election of 1970, Gustavo Rojas and his ANAPO party also received strong support in the urban areas.

Why urban residents show a stronger tendency to vote for candidates such as Gaitán and Rojas is still not clear. Some Colombian students maintain that gamonalismo, or "bossism," is not as prevalent within cities. For example, Fernando Cepeda Ulloa and Claudia González de Lecaros state that in the cities there are more votos no-cautivos; that is, votes "uncaptured" or uncontrolled by party bosses.[10] Similar statements may be found in studies conducted by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE).[11]

The meaning of the urban-rural difference in voting behavior is not clear either. On the one hand, it has been interpreted as a sign that traditional political allegiances and controls are breaking down, possibly leading to the creation of a more radical political regime. Lars Schoultz, however, warns against interpreting urbanization per se as a factor associated with anti-traditional or radical voting. His evidence indicates that although anti-traditional voting has been more

---

[10]Cepeda Ulloa and González de Lecaros, pp. 6-7.

[11]"Comportamiento Electoral en Medellín y Cali," Boletín Mensuel de Estadística, Nos. 250-251 (Mayo-Junio, 1972), p. 105

prevalent in the cities, there is no detectable trend of it increasing.[12]

In spite of the difficulties involved, it seems worthwhile to examine whether the urban-rural distinction has any relationship to factionalism in Colombia's traditional parties. One immediate problem is the definition of the term "urban." The term may have a number of different meanings. It may refer to the size of a population living within a given area, or to particular social, economic, cultural, and physical characteristics. In studies of Colombia, the term has generally been applied to the population size of cities and towns. Another problem is that some studies have simply defined "urban" as the departmental capitals, and "rural" as the remaining areas. Yet Colombia has a number of cities and towns which have populations exceeding 50,000 or 100,000 persons, but which are not capitals. In Valle, for example, the cities of Buenaventura and Palmira each have populations greater than 100,000 persons.

To explore the relationship between party factionalism and urbanism in Valle, several approaches have been used. The first compares voting for National Front factions and dissident factions in Cali to the rest of the department in five House of Representatives elections. Cali is the capital as well as the largest city in the department. The National Front factions are defined here as the Oficialista Liberals and the Ospinista and Independiente Conservatives. The dissident factions are all others. The ANAPO vote is excluded.

---

[12]Lars Schoultz, "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1964-1970," Political Science Quarterly, 87 (March, 1972), p. 38.

The results are somewhat surprising in light of the above discussion. As Table 6.8 indicates, dissident factions within the traditional parties have rather consistently found greater support in Valle outside of Cali, although the dissidents have not seriously weakened control of the parties by their dominant factions. In Cali, the largest and most urbanized city in the department, the National Front factions maintained a solid majority over competitors within their own party ranks. Challengers have had greater success in other areas of the department.

TABLE 6.8

VOTING FOR NATIONAL FRONT FACTIONS AND DISSIDENT FACTIONS IN CALI COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE DEPARTMENT, IN PERCENTAGES

	Cali		Rest of Department	
	National Front Factions	Dissident Factions	National Front Factions	Dissident Factions
1962	74%	26%	68%	32%
1964	72	28	59	41
1966	81	19	76	24
1968	89	11	83	17
1970	70	30	70	30

Source: Calculated from records of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

In Cali, dissident factions received their highest percentage of votes in the turbulent elections of 1970. This was the year the traditional parties were split by the rival candidacies of Pastrana, Betancur, and Sourdis, and ANAPO scored its greatest electoral success.

In the remainder of the department, dissidents reached their apogee in 1964. This reflects voting for the MRL Liberals, and it is interesting to note that the group sometimes labeled "radical" actually found stronger support outside of the capital city. It is also interesting to observe that after 1964 dissidents were losing strength in both areas. The election of 1970, which was a "high-stimulus" election temporarily reversed this trend, but the traditional factions maintained their hold on the parties.

When the classification "urban" is changed somewhat, the results also change. Since Valle has cities other than Cali, additional ones were included within the category "urban." The term urban was defined as municipios having a cabecera municipal of 25,000 or more persons. This is rather arbitrary but was done for several reasons. One is that a municipio in Colombia is not like a municipality in the United States, but more like a county, even though it is the smallest unit of government. A municipio may have more than one town, and may also include fairly large rural areas. The cabecera municipal is the town or city in which the local government is situated. By this definition eight municipios out of a total of 42 were classified as urban.

Although the results obtained according to this classification are different from the previous one, they still do not indicate any significantly greater support for the dissident factions in the cities. As Table 6.9 demonstrates, the dissident factions received a slightly higher percentage of votes in the urban areas in the elections of 1962 and 1964 than did the National Front factions, but probably not enough

TABLE 6.9

COMPARISON OF URBAN AND RURAL VOTING FOR NATIONAL FRONT FACTIONS AND DISSIDENT FACTIONS, IN PERCENTAGES

	National Front Factions	Dissident Factions	Total
		1962	
Urban	63%	69%	65%
Rural	37	31	35
		1964	
Urban	62	66	63
Rural	38	34	37
		1966	
Urban	72	69	71
Rural	28	31	29
		1968	
Urban	66	64	66
Rural	34	36	34
		1970	
Urban	67	78	70
Rural	33	22	30

Source: Calculated from records of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

to be significant. In the elections of 1966 and 1968, the opposite was true. Only in the election of 1970 is the difference very noticeable. In this election, the dissidents received 78 percent of their votes in the urban areas, whereas the National Front factions received 67 percent of their votes in the cities, a difference of 11 percent. It should also be recalled that the 1970 election was not a "typical" election.

In sum, these data do not indicate any clear pattern of greater support for dissident Liberal and Conservative candidates in the urban areas of Valle. It may be true that urban voters gave greater support to ANAPO than rural voters, but ANAPO has been treated as a third party, not as a Liberal or Conservative faction. As far as voting for the Liberal and Conservative factions is concerned, the distinction between urban and rural residence does not appear to be especially significant.

Finally, the argument that gamonalismo has broken down in the urban areas of Colombia begins with some debatable premises. In the first place, the existence of rural bosses who control the votes of campesinos has not been documented. The argument often overlooks the fact that Jorge Gaitán in 1946, Alfonso López Michelsen in 1962, and Gustavo Rojas in 1970 all won substantial numbers of votes in the rural areas, although it is true that they did proportionately better in the urban areas. This is not to say that gamonalismo does not exist in the countryside, but rather that further evidence needs to be collected.

Second, why is gamonalismo necessarily incompatible with urbanization? The famous political machines of the United States such as those of Tammany Hall, Richard Daly, and "Boss" Crump all existed

within urban areas. It has been argued also that machine politics does exist within Latin American cities such as Caracas and Mexico City. Based on his study of Mexico City, Wayne Cornelius writes that "it appears that urbanism per se is not incompatible with the emergence of caciquismo (bossism) as a pattern of political leadership among low-income populations."[13]

Participation and Abstention

One aspect of voting behavior in Colombia that has been commented on perhaps more frequently than any other has been the rate of participation in elections, or turnout. Some writers have taken the turnout rate as a kind of barometer of support for the traditional parties. This judgment may or may not be accurate. It does appear that in the early years of the National Front, the turnout rate began to decline with each succeeding election. As can be seen in Table 6.10 the turnout rate in presidential elections declined to a low of around 40 percent in the election of 1966, but then began to increase again. In 1974, the turnout rate was higher than that recorded in 1958.

The meaning of the rates of voter participation in Colombian elections is a much debated topic, and a number of different interpretations have been offered. In a survey conducted in Cali following the elections of 1968 a team of researchers found that the two major

---

[13]Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Contemporary Mexico: A Structural Analysis of Urban Caciquismo," in Robert Kern, ed., The Caciques (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), p. 140.

TABLE 6.10

PARTICIPATION IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: 1930-1974

Year	Eligible Voters	Voting	Percent
1930	N A	824,530	N A
1934	N A	942,309	N A
1938	1,700,171	513,520	30.20
1942	2,056,366	1,147,806	55.81
1946	2,450,596	1,366,005	55.74
1949	2,866,339	1,140,646	39.79
1958	5,386,981	3,108,567	57.70
1962	5,404,765	2,634,840	48.75
1966	6,611,352	2,649,258	40.07
1970	7,683,785	4,036,458	52.53
1974	8,964,472	5,212,133	58.14

Source: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Estadísticas Electorales, Abril 21, 1974, pp. 373-374.

reasons for electoral abstention were an indifference to politics and discontent with the way in which politics was conducted. Yet they found that even among those who could be classified as discontented, the majority still supported the National Front system. Their complaints were directed more at what was seen as defects in the system than the system itself. The authors concluded that "Abstention in itself, then, does not signify a lack of support for the democratic system or a lack of support for the system of the National Front."[14]

Two years later, however, the surprising success of ANAPO in the elections of 1970 stimulated greater interest in Colombian electoral

---

[14]Pedro Pablo Morcillo, et al., "Estudio Sobre Abstención Electoral en las Elecciones de Marzo de 1968 en Cali," Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970 (Bogotá: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 1972), p. 79.

behavior. Of the several factors believed to have contributed to ANAPO's strength, one was a sudden increase in participation by lower-class voters. In short, lower-class voters who previously had lower rates of participation cast their ballots for ANAPO as a protest against the traditional two-party system.

In his study of the 1970 elections, Jon Heggan also finds that the turnout rate was an important factor in the outcome. Using different indicators, Heggan classified three departments as "modern" and three departments as "traditional." In the "modern" departments Heggan found that turnout rates correlated positively with the Rojas vote, while in the more traditional departments turnout rates were positively correlated with the Pastrana vote. In other words, in the modernizing areas an increase in participation is more likely to lead to voting for "anti-system" or protest candidates, while in the more traditional areas an increase in participation is more likely to increase support for "pro-system" candidates.[15]

The purpose here is not to resolve all issues pertaining to turnout votes. What is of interest, however, is the relationship, if any, between the turnout rate and voting for factions within the traditional parties. Are the factions affected in any way by the rate of voter participation? Unfortunately, the lack of adequate data makes it impossible to explore this question fully. For one thing, it was not

---

[15]Jon Heggan, "Continuity and Change in a Modernizing Country: The 1970 Colombian Presidential Election," Administrative Change, 1 (December, 1973), pp. 56-59.

possible to conduct a survey of voters in Valle. Second, the examination is hampered by the fact that the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil did not begin publishing the turnout rates for each municipio in Valle until 1968. Recognizing these obstacles, however, it may be possible to examine two elections with aggregate data. The results should be taken as only a very preliminary exploration, which could suggest a topic for further research.

First, the percentage of the total vote received by the Oficialista Liberals and the Ospinista Conservatives was calculated for each municipio in Valle for the House of Representatives elections of 1968 and 1970. The dominant faction in each party was selected in order to give some consistency to the data. The percentage of total vote was then correlated with the percentage of voter participation.

The results obtained are rather intriguing. On the one hand the turnout rate is positively correlated with the Ospinista vote, while on the other hand it is negatively correlated with the Oficialista vote (see Table 6.11). The pattern seems to be that as the turnout rate

TABLE 6.11

CORRELATIONS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND VOTING FOR DOMINANT FACTIONS IN VALLE

	1968	1970
Oficialistas	-0.77	-0.22
Ospinistas	+0.61	+0.51

Source: Calculated from results of House of Representatives elections.

increases, the Oficialista Liberals lose strength while the Ospinista Conservatives gain in strength. This does not necessarily mean the Ospinistas are taking votes from the Liberals. Instead it suggests a pattern somewhat closer to that noted by Heggan. In other words, voting for the factions is related to the social composition of party loyalists, their political attitudes, and levels of participation. But these have quite different effects within each party.

It may be hypothesized that as participation increases Liberal voters tend to desert the Oficialistas, perhaps in favor of more "anti-system" candidates. On this point, it may be recalled that the MRL demonstrated considerable strength in Valle during its heyday. The MRL, in fact, generally won a higher percentage of the Liberal vote in Valle than it did nationally. Since the Liberals are the majority party in the urban areas in Valle, an increase in participation may mean that larger numbers of lower-class Liberals choose candidates other than the Oficialistas.

In contrast, an increase in participation appears to favor the Ospinistas within the Conservative party. Heggan hypothesizes that in the more traditional departments in Colombia the turnout rate was more closely related to partisanship than social class; that is, voters were guided by a stronger attachment to their party heritage, and an increase in participation by these voters favored Pastrana, in spite of social class.

It may be that in general voting for Conservative candidates in Valle is more a function of partisanship than policy preferences or

social class, and that this is somewhat stronger within Conservative ranks than within Liberal ranks. In that case, an increase in participation would bring to the polls highly partisan Conservatives who choose lists sanctioned by the traditional leaders within the party.

Summary and Conclusions

Although the preceding chapters of this study have focused primarily on elite behavior, this chapter has attempted to examine the behavior of factions within a broader political context. The intent has been to identify and describe a few selected variables which might be beneficial in developing some hypotheses regarding the relationships between the factions as groups of leaders and the political encironment in which they exist.

This is a difficult task under the best of conditions. The lack of sufficient data complicates matters even further. In order to explore the behavior of factions in the political arena, therefore, a rather modest goal was set. Drawing upon existing studies of Colombian elections, four variables were selected which have been posited as having an effect upon the outcome of Colombian elections. These were: (1) party competition, (2) la violencia, (3) urbanization, and (4) participation and abstention. The purpose was not to test existing hypotheses, but rather to see these variables as an organizing framework in an effort to identify and describe a few relationships between factions and the political environment. Given these boundaries to the investigation, the following conclusions may be offered as a few hypotheses.

The degree of party competition appears to have little definite relationship to factionalism. Dissident factions seem to receive greater electoral support as competition diminishes, but the relationship cannot be clearly isolated and defined.

Of the four variables considered, la violencia seems to have the clearest relationship to factionalism. The evidence suggests that those factions within the parties that projected a radical or progressive image, the MRL and the Ospinista Conservatives, received substantially greater electoral support in those areas which had been affected by the violence. In contrast, those factions with a more conservative image, the Oficialista Liberals and the Laureanista Conservatives, were stronger in the areas not affected by the violence. Whether this will have any permanent effect on the parties is not as clear. The MRL leadership was for the most part integrated with the Oficialistas in 1967, and no Liberal heir to the "protest" faction has yet emerged. On the other hand, the Ospinistas did establish themselves as the majority faction within the Conservative party. As time passes, however, memory of la violencia will fade, and one might expect those tragic years to have less and less effect upon current party affairs.

Dissident factions within the parties seem to have greater success in urban areas of Colombia, but there are a number of conceptual pitfalls associated with formulating hypotheses. One is defining the term "urban." Another is controlling for the variable of urbanization itself. It may be that there are other variables which have a greater effect, but which have not yet been sorted out and examined. This

problem, as well as the hypothesis that gamonalismo exerts a stronger influence in the rural areas, calls for further investigation before any meaningful relationship to factionalism can be posited.

There are also difficulties in establishing a clear relationship between factionalism and the voter turnout rate. It appears that higher turnout rates have a differential effect. Within the Liberal party a higher turnout rate appears to weaken the "establishment" faction, while within the Conservative party it strengthens the "establishment" faction. This is, however, a very tentative hypothesis which calls for further research with aggregate data, and especially survey data.

In sum, this investigation has achieved mixed results, but it is to be hoped that it does suggest some areas for future research. Yet it may also be said that one of the purposes in undertaking the study was to identify and describe a limited number of characteristics of Colombian party factions and to formulate a few hypotheses for further testing. As far as the question of the factions in the political arena is concerned, this study has not touched on a wide range of other variables that could be examined. If the study does in any way contain value for other researchers, however, its purpose will have been accomplished.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The basic purpose of this study has been to identify and describe certain salient characteristics of political party factions in Colombia, with a view to formulating a number of hypotheses which might be useful in future research. Based on a review of existing literature pertaining to factions, three areas of factional behavior were selected: (1) the structure of factions; (2) the elements, or sources, of factional conflict; and (3) the behavior of factions in the political arena. The review of the literature indicated that these three characteristics are the ones which have attracted the greatest attention from scholars and are of the greatest theoretical interest.

It should be reiterated, however, that the purpose of this study has not been to test the numerous hypotheses generated by others. Although factionalism within Latin American political parties is a commonly observed phenomenon, relatively little research has been focused specifically on party factions. A few hypotheses have been offered concerning the reasons for factional conflict, but often without much supporting empirical evidence. The structural elements of Latin American factions have received even less attention. What one is left with is often a somewhat vague suggestion that factionalism is somehow related to, or stems from, an equally vague concept of Latin American culture. This does not mean that the concepts and their relationships are false, but merely that greater rigor is needed. The purpose of this

study, therefore, has been to identify and describe basic elements of factions, to formulate more precise hypotheses, and to support possible interrelationships among these hypotheses.

Essentially, the hypotheses of the structure of factions may be grouped in two categories. The first describes the structure of factions as a series of exchanges or relationships between two people of unequal status. The goals of the actors are particularistic and the duration of the relationship is relatively brief. Additional persons may become linked to the faction, but the relationships are still a series of two-person exchanges. The terminology varies; some have referred to these types of factions as dyads, and others have preferred to call them patron-client relationships. In any case, the behavior observed is basically the same.

The second category of hypotheses posits that factions are structured in a different manner. Some scholars use ideology, or values, as the defining characteristic and see factions as groups of persons who have a broad set of values in common, but are divided over other, related values. Relationships between individuals is not especially important, except in terms of shared values and policy goals.

The first set of hypotheses appear to be a more accurate description of the structure of party factions in Colombia. The examination indicates that party factions are structured as series of two-person linkages between political leaders of unequal status. These linkages are furthermore vertical and exclusive. Since they are vertical, a party faction may expand across different levels of the

parties and this permits factions to extend from the national level to the local level of the parties. The scope of the faction, or its extent, depends upon the central, or primary, leader. The primary leader is the highest standing leader who is not linked to another leader of still higher standing at the same level. Primary leaders may, however, exist at different levels of the parties, although the national and departmental primary leaders appear to be the key ones.

The function of the relationships between the party leaders who make up the factions is distinctly political in the sense that it is through these sorts of ties that politicians create groups which have the short-range goal of winning elective offices. A Colombian politician in large part demonstrates his eligibility for office by his ability to build a personal following of other aspirants. It is the fact that the power base of a politician is built upon the personal loyalties and support of other candidates and officeholders which makes party factions in Colombia somewhat unusual. This is slightly different from having a personal following in the community. In one sense, a Colombian politician cannot "run on his own." He may, of course, attach himself to a higher leader, but to obtain a position high enough on the electoral list to win an office in the proportional representation system requires enough followers to demonstrate his "quota of power." An aspiring politician may also file a competing list, but this likewise requires that he have at least enough followers to make up a list.

Because of the nature of the relationships between leaders and their goals, linkages do not seem to be particularly strong. Each

election brings large numbers of newcomers into the Congress. Yet what accounts for the fact that the factional chiefs generally have a longer political life than others? One explanation may be that they have all the followers they need. In other words, they have demonstrated their "quota of power," and consequently others who are ambitious for office are quite willing to follow an established leader in exchange for a favorable position on his list. If they are diligent and resourceful, in time they may also establish themselves as key leaders.

This structure of relationships divides and fragments the parties into vertical hierarchies, or factions, which are only loosely held together by a common label such as "Liberal" and "Conservative." Since Colombian politicians link themselves together primarily for the purpose of winning office, the conflicts which arise between factions is not of a programmatic type. Without using the term in a necessarily perjorative sense, conflict between Colombian party factions is mainly self-serving. Factions seek to advance their own self-interest—to get elected, to defeat opponents, to control a larger share of patronage. The ideologically-charged speeches Colombian politicians like to deliver is a political tactic, a means of attracting attention and hopefully votes on election day. It is this reason the statements of Colombian politicians seem contradictory and appear to be "illogical."

It is difficult in some ways to understand why North American political scientists would be perplexed by this. The structure of urban machines in the United States was very "personalistic," and the organizations run by the big city bosses were seldom famous for a

concern with programmatic issues. In his study of the Chicago Democratic Party political scientist Milton Rakove points out that the party regulars studiously try to avoid programmatic disputes.[1]

It is not surprising that the structure of factions and the sources of conflict are related in the sense that neither are programmatically based. But what is the precise nature of the relationship? Which is the independent variable? Does structure determine conflict? Does conflict determine structure? Does neither determine the other? To an extent it seems that the structure is dependent upon the nature of conflict; that is, the goals of Colombian factions are not policy goals and their structure is an adaptation to the absence of such goals. Yet the structure of the factions also tends to exclude policy disputes because of the way in which politicians form relationships with one another. The factions are not structured so as to aggregate policy issues.

To develop a fully coherent set of hypotheses which would set forth the relationship between structure and conflict requires a careful exploration of both within the broader political, social, and economic context. What other forces are at work, and how do they influence factional behavior? Some authors suggest that the structure of the factions is a result of the Latin American value system. Implicit in the work of James Payne is that the structure of the factions is dependent upon the value system which places great emphasis upon status

---

[1]Milton L. Rakove, Don't Make No Waves—Don't Back No Losers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975).

achievement. He does explicitly argue that Colombian politicians are motivated by status concerns, which in turn produces a non-programmatic conflict. Other writers also suggest that the explanation for factional structure and conflict is rooted in the Latin American value system. This is implicit in the many discussions of caudillismo and personalismo.

The Marxists, of course, see the explanation within their economic interpretation and the class structure. Colombian politicians are fiercely attacked by the Marxist press as the representatives of a capitalist class seeking to stifle and suppress the demands of the masses. The Marxists generally view factionalism in the parties as bickering among capitalists and the result of their refusal to represent the true aspirations of the working class.

It is impossible, however, to explore fully all the points of interaction between party factions and the political arena or environment in which they exist. Which variables will be selected? Can adequate data be collected? This study sets as an admittedly very modest goal the examination of a few factors to see whether variations in factional strength is dependent upon, or related to, other underlying forces.

Party competition, which has been hypothesized by some writers as a controlling variable of factionalism, appears to have little discernible effect in Colombia. There is a slight tendency for dissident factions to gain strength as competition declines, but the data do not seem sufficient to posit a clear relationship.

On the other hand, la violencia seems to have had a fairly clear relationship to factionalism. In those areas which were affected by

la violencia, factions which projected a more "radical" or "progressive" image received significantly greater popular support in elections. In those areas which were not affected by la violencia, factions which projected a more "conservative" or "establishment" image received significantly greater popular support in elections. This indicates that la violencia had the effect of weakening popular support for the more "traditional" factions of the parties, but the long-range effects upon party factionalism will probably diminish as memory of la violencia fades.

It may also be hypothesized that dissident factions, that is, factions which break with the official party hierarchy, tend to receive greater popular support in urban areas than in rural areas. However, data at this point is not sufficient to indicate a long-range trend in this direction, nor to indicate that this represents a loss of popular support for the two traditional parties. In addition, the concepts "urban" and "urbanization" need to be clarified. They remain too broad for rigorous analysis. Finally, it cannot be hypothesized that the more "establishment" factions receive greater popular support in the rural areas because of bossism due to the absence of empirical data.

In regard to rates of voter participation in Colombian elections, it may be hypothesized that higher rates of participation have a differential effect within the parties. In the Liberal party, higher rates of participation weakens support for factions with an "establishment" image, while in the Conservative party high rates of participation tend to increase support for factions with an "establishment" image.

Final Remarks

In many respects, the study of political factions is the study of politics in miniature. Factional politics concerns the relationships between and among individuals, how they organize themselves into groups, what the goals of participants are, why and how the participants are brought into conflict, and the ways in which factional behavior is related to other aspects of social behavior. The study of factions, therefore, offers the potential for a clearer understanding of political behavior in general.

The goals of this particular study have been only to draw upon the rich body of ideas developed by social scientists in several disciplines, and to suggest a point of departure for future investigation of an aspect of Latin American political parties. Relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to political party factionalism in Latin America, and even by limiting this study to two Colombian parties, a great many areas of factional behavior have not been explored. The linkages between faction leaders and other political actors, the belief systems of faction members, and the many linkages between factions and their environment are only a few areas in which further research would do much to increase our understanding not only of Colombian parties but perhaps other Latin American parties as well. There is no shortage of topics for the interested researcher.

Neither does this study preclude research along the same lines. To the contrary, the purpose has been to formulate some hypotheses for testing. Whatever merits this study has in the development of

comparative political theory should be seen in this light. The major propositions and hypotheses are as follows.

Propositions

1. Political leaders in Colombia are of unequal status.
2. Political leaders may form linkages between themselves based on personal loyalty.
3. When linkages are formed between leaders of unequal status, the linkages are vertical.
4. When linkages are formed between leaders of unequal status, the linkages are exclusive, binding only two persons.
5. The duration (temporal dimension) of linkages or loyalties is generally brief.
6. Political leaders may play dual roles; a leader may link himself to another leader of higher status, and in this role he is a follower.
7. A party faction in Colombia has a primary leader. A primary leader is the leader who is not linked to a leader of higher status at the same level (national, departmental or local) of the parties.
8. A primary leader may play a dual role by linking himself to another leader at a higher level of the parties.
9. More than one primary leader may exist at the same level of the parties.
10. More than one primary leader at one level of the parties may be linked to the same leader at a higher level of the parties.

11. The "quota of power" of a leader is the number of followers a leader has bound to him.
12. Political leaders in Colombian parties form linkages between themselves primarily to obtain elective office.
13. Primary leaders seek to create their own personal organizations within the party organization.
14. Factional conflict in Colombian parties is not programmatic or ideological.
15. The use of ideology by factions is a political tactic to attract attention and to appeal to voters.
16. The behavior of political party factions may be affected by other variables of political and social behavior. In Colombia, four of these variables are: (1) party competition, (2) la violencia, (3) urbanization, and (4) voter participation and abstention.

Hypotheses

1. The structure of party factions in Colombia is dependent upon the types of linkages between political leaders. Factions are created when vertical and exclusive loyalties are formed between leaders of unequal political status.
2. The scope, or extent, of factions is dependent upon the loyalties of primary leaders. When a primary leader has no loyalties to another leader of higher status, the faction extends no further. Factions may therefore be national, departmental or local.

3. The size of a faction is dependent upon the number of vertical and exclusive loyalties formed between a leader and his followers, and upon the number of primary leaders linked to a leader of higher status.
4. The status of a political leader is dependent upon his "quota of power."
5. The eligibility of a leader for political office is dependent upon his "quota of power."
6. The position of a leader on an electoral list is primarily dependent upon the leader's "quota of power."
7. The number of electoral lists is independent of the number of factions.
8. The composition of a faction (its members) is dependent upon the vertical and exclusive loyalties existing at a given time.
9. The divisions of party organization is dependent upon the number of primary leaders creating their personal organizations.
10. Non-ideological conflict within Colombian parties is dependent upon the structure and goals of the factions.
11. The percentage of votes received by factions is independent of inter-party competition.
12. Factions which project a "radical" or "progressive" image receive greater popular support in areas affected by la violencia than "establishment" factions.
13. The effect of la violencia upon factionalism within the parties is diminishing.

14. Dissident factions tend to receive slightly greater popular support in urban areas than in rural areas.

15. The rate of voter participation (turnout) has a differential effect upon party factionalism. In the Conservative party, higher rates of participation increases popular support for factions with an "establishment" image.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

Adams, Richard N., et al., eds. Social Change in Latin America. New York: Vintage Books, 1960.

Alexander, Robert J. Latin American Political Parties. New York: Praeger, 1973.

Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965.

Banfield, Edward C. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958.

Banton, Michael, ed. Political Systems and the Distribution of Power. London: Tavistock Publications, 1965.

_____. The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies. London: Tavistock Publications, 1966.

Bell, Rudolf N. Party and Faction in American Politics: The House of Representatives, 1789-1801. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Bernard, Jean-Pierre, et al., eds. Guide to the Political Parties of South America. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1973.

Bonomi, Patricia. A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Campos, Judith Talbot, and John F. McCamant. Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Elections. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972.

Caro, Robert. Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.

Cepeda Ulloa, Fernando, and Claudia González de Lecaros. Comportamiento del Voto Urbano en Colombia: Una Aproximación. Bogotá: Universidad de Los Andes, 1976.

Chambers, William Nisbet. Political Parties in a New Nationa: The American Experience, 1776-1809. Oxford University Press, 1963.

Cook, Jacob E., ed. The Federalist. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961.

Cornelius, Wayne A., and Felicity M. Trueblood, eds. Latin American Urban Research, Vol. 5. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1975.

Davis, Harold E., ed. Government and Politics in Latin America. New York: Ronald Press, 1958.

Díaz-Alejandro, Carlos F. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1976.

Di Bacco, Thomas V., ed. Presidential Power in Latin American Politics. Praeger, 1977.

Dix, Robert H. Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

Duff, Ernest A. Agrarian Reform in Colombia. New York: Praeger, 1968.

English, Burt H. Liberación Nacional in Costa Rica: The Development of a Political Party in a Transitional Society. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971.

Escobar Sierra, Hugo. Las Invasiones en Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1972.

Fals Borda, Orlando. Subversion and Social Change in Colombia. New York: Colombia University Press, 1969.

Fenton, John H. People and Parties in Politics. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1966.

Fluharty, Vernon Lee. Dance of the Millions. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957.

Gerassi, John, ed. Revolutionary Priest. New York: Vintage Books, 1971.

Guillén Martínez, Fernando. Raíz y Futuro de la Revolución. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1963.

Guzmán, German, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna. La Violencia en Colombia. 2 vols. Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1964.

Hamill, Hugh M., Jr., ed. Dictatorship in Spanish America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965.

Henao, Jesús María, and Gerardo Arrubla. History of Colombia. Translated by J. Fred Rippy. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1938.

Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage Books, 1955.

Holt, Pat M. Colombia Today—and Tomorrow. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Hoskin, Gary, Francisco Leal, and Harvey Kline. Legislative Behavior in Colombia. 2 vols. Buffalo, N.Y.: Council on International Studies, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1976.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Johnson, Kenneth F. Mexican Democracy: A Critical View. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971.

Jones, A. H. M. Athenian Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957.

Kern, Robert, ed. The Caciques. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973.

Key, V. O., Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.

Lande, Carl. Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series, No. 6, 1965.

Latorre, Mario. Elecciones y Partidos Políticos en Colombia. Bogotá: Editorial El Greco, 1974.

Leal Buitrago, Francisco. Análisis Histórico del Desarrollo Político Nacional, 1930-1970. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1973.

Lewis, Oscar. Village Life in Northern India. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958.

Lleras Restrepo, Carlos. Hacía la Restauración Democrática y el Cambio Social. 2 vols. Bogotá: n.p., 1963.

López Michelsen, Alfonso. Colombia en la Hora Cero. 2 vols. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1963.

_____. Posdata a la Alternación: Intervenciones Políticas de 1964-1970. Bogotá: Populibro, 1970.

Martz, John D. Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Martz, John D. Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962.

Maullin, Richard. Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973.

McDonald, Ronald H. Party Systems and Elections in Latin America. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971.

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press, 1957.

Murillo, Gabriel, and Israel Rivera Ortiz. Actividades y Estructura de Poder en Los Partidos Colombianos. Bogotá: Universidad de Los Andes, 1973.

Namier, Lewis, England in the Age of the American Revolution. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1961.

_____. The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III. London: St. Martin's Press, 1957.

Needler, Martin. Latin American Politics in Perspective. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1967.

Payne, James L. Patterns of Conflict in Colombia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Peeler, John A. Urbanization and Politics. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977.

Por qué y Cómo se Forjó el Frente Nacional. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1959.

Rakove, Milton L. Don't Make No Waves—Don't Back No Losers. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Riordan, William L. Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. New York: Dutton, 1963.

Salamanca, Guillermo. Los Partidos en Colombia. Bogotá: El Voto Nacional, 1961.

Scalapino, Robert A., and Junnosuke Masumi. Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Schmidt, Steppen, et al., eds. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Scott, Robert E., ed. Latin American Modernization Problems. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973.

Sherif, Muzafer, ed. Inter-Group Relations and Leadership. New York: John Wiley, 1962.

Swartz, Marc J., ed. Local-Level Politics. Chicago: Aldine, 1968.

Vidal Perdomo, Jaime. Historia de la Reforma Constitucional de 1968 y sus Alcances Jurídicos. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1970.

Weiss, Anita. Tendencias de la Participación Electoral en Colombia, 1935-1966. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1967.

B. PERIODICALS

Angell, Alan. "Co-operation and Conflict in Colombian Party Politics," Political Studies, 24 (1966), 53-71.

Belloni, Frank P., and Dennis C. Beller. "The Study of Political Party Factions," International Review of History and Political Science, 10 (May, 1973), 50-74.

Bergquist, Charles W. "The Political Economy of the Colombian Presidential Election of 1897," Hispanic American Historical Review, 56 (February, 1976), 1-30.

Blank, Stephanie. "Patrons, Clients, and Kin in Seventeenth Century Caracas: A Methodological Essay in Colonial Spanish American Social History," Hispanic American Historical Review, 54 (May, 1974), 260-283.

Boissevain, Jeremy. "Factions, Parties and Politics in a Maltese Village," American Anthropologist, 66 (December, 1964), 1275-1287.

Brzezinski, Steven. "Church versus State: Family Planning in Colombia, 1966-1972," Journal of Church and State, 18 (Autumn, 1976), 491-502.

Bujra, Janet N. "Dynamics of Political Action: New Look at Factionalism," American Antropologist, 75 (February, 1973), 132-152.

Bushnell, David. "Voter Participation in the Colombian Election of 1856," Hispanic American Historical Review, 51 (May, 1971), 237-249.

"Comportamiento Electoral en Medellín y Cali," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 250-251 (Mayo-Junio, 1972), 99-130.

Cornelius, Wayne. "Urbanization and Political Demand Making Among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities," American Political Science Review, 67 (September, 1974), 1125-1146.

Deas, Malcolm. "Coalition in Colombia," Current History, 60 (February, 1971), 90-118.

Delpar, Helen. "Road to Revolution: The Liberal Party of Colombia, 1886-1889," The Americas, 32 (January, 1976), 348-371.

Dix, Robert H. "The Politics of Income Distribution in Colombia," Rice University Studies, 61 (Fall, 1975), 31-47.

"Etapa Historica," Visión, 27 de Julio de 1974, 24-25.

Foster, George M. "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Village," American Anthropologist, 63 (December, 1961), 1142-1173.

_____. "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan, II: Patron-Client Relationship," American Anthropologist, 65 (December, 1963), 1280-1294.

Galt, Anthony H. "Rethinking Patron-Client Relationships: The Real System and the Official System in Southern Italy," Anthropological Quarterly, 33 (January, 1960), 182-202.

Graziano, Luigi. "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy," European Journal of Political Research, 1 (April, 1973), 3-34.

Groves, Roderick T. "The Colombian National Front and Administrative Reform," Administration and Society, 6 (November, 1974), 313-336.

Guzmán, Mauricio. "El Faccionalismo: Supervivencia Medieval en América Latins," Journal of Inter-American Studies, 5 (October, 1963), 465-470.

Harkess, Shirley, and Patricia Pinzón de Lewin. "Women, the Vote, and the Party in the Politics of the Colombian National Front," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 17 (November, 1975), 439-464.

Heggan, Jon. "Continuity and Change in a Modernizing Country: The 1970 Colombian Presidential Election," Administrative Change, 1 (December, 1974), 41-61.

Hoskin, Gary, and Gerald Swanson. "Political Party Leadership in Colombia: A Spatial Analysis," Comparative Politics, 6 (April, 1974), 395-423.

Johnson, Kenneth F. "Political Radicalism in Colombia: Electoral Dynamics of 1962 and 1964," Journal of Inter-American Studies, 7 (January, 1965), 15-26.

Kaufman, Robert R. "The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Problems and Prospects," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16 (March, 1972), 284-308.

Kenny, Michael. "Patterns of Patronage in Spain," Anthropological Quarterly, 33 (January, 1960), 14-23.

Kline, Harvey F. "Interest Groups in the Colombian Congress," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 16 (August, 1964), 274-300.

Lamarchand, Rene, and Keith Legg. "Political Clientelism and Development," Comparative Politics, 4 (January, 1972), 149-178.

Lande, Carl. "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics," American Political Science Review, 67 (March, 1973), 103-127.

Lipson, Leslie. "The Two-Party System in British Politics," American Political Science Review, 47 (June, 1953), 337-358.

Machado, K. G. "From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines," Journal of Asian Studies, 33 (August, 1974), 523-547.

Martz, John D. "Political Parties in Colombia and Venezuela: Contrasts in Substance and Style," Western Political Quarterly, 18 (June, 1965), 318-333.

Munger, Frank, and James Blackhurst. "Factionalism in the National Conventions, 1940-1964: An Analysis of Ideological Consistency in State Delegation Voting," Journal of Politics, 27 (May, 1965), 375-394.

Nathan, Andrew J. "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53 (January/March, 1973), 34-66.

Nowak, Thomas C., and Kay A. Snyder. "Clientelist Politics in the Philippines: Integration or Instability?," American Political Science Review, 68 (September, 1974), 1147-1170.

Nyomarkay, Joseph. "Factionalism in the Socialist German Workers' Party, 1925-1926: The Myth and Reality of the Northern Faction," Political Science Quarterly, 80 (March, 1965), 22-47.

Oquist, Paul. "Las Elecciones Presidenciales: 1930-1970," Boletín Mensual de Estadística, Nos. 268-269 (Noviembre-Diciembre, 1973), 63-334.

Parks, E. Taylor, and Alfred Tischendorf. "Cartagena to Bogota, 1825-1826: The Diary of Richard Clough Anderson, Jr.," Hispanic American Historical Review, 42 (May, 1962), 217-231.

Ramsey, Russell W. "Critical Bibliography on La Violencia in Colombia," Latin American Research Review, 8 (Spring, 1973), 3-44.

Rose, Richard. "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in British Parties," Political Studies, 12 (February, 1964), 33-46.

Sandbrook, Richard. "Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5 (March, 1972), 104-119.

Schoultz, Lars. "Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns: Colombia, 1964-1970," Political Science Quarterly, 87 (March, 1972), 22-45.

Schwartz, Norman B. "Goal Attainment Through Factionalism: A Guatemalan Case," American Anthropologist, 71 (December, 1969), 1088-1108.

Scott, James C. "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies, 27 (November, 1972), 5-37.

Scott, James C. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, 66 (March, 1972), 91-113.

Siegel, Bernard J., and Alan R. Beals. "Pervasive Factionalism," American Anthropologist, 62 (June, 1960), 394-417.

Stern, Alan J., Sidney Tarrow, and Mary Frase Williams. "Factions and Opinion Groups in European Mass Parties: Some Evidence From a Study of Italian Socialist Activists," Comparative Politics, 3 (July, 1971), 529-559.

Stockwin, J. A. A. "A Comparison of Political Factionalism in Japan and India," Australian Journal of Politics and History, 16 (December, 1970), 361-374.

Totten, George O., and Tamio Kawakami. "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics," Pacific Affairs, 38 (Summer, 1965), 109-122.

Weingrod, Alex. "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10 (July, 1968), 377-400.

Weller, P. M. "From Faction to Party: The Role and Authority of the Leader," Political Science (New Zealand), 26 (December, 1974), 41-47.

Williams, Miles W. "Urbanization and the Crisis of Colombia's Traditional Parties," SECOLAS Annals, 7 (March, 1976), 79-89.

Wolf, Eric R., and Edward C. Hansen. "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 9 (January, 1967), 168-179.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts," The Journal of Politics, 34 (May, 1972), 365-398.

C. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Colombia. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Colombia Política: Estadísticas 1935-1970.

Colombia. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. Resultados Electorales Frente Nacional 1958-1972: Asambleas Departamentales.

Colombia. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. Estadísticas Electorales, Abril 21, 1974.

Colombia. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. Estadísticas Electorales, 19 de Abril de 1970.

Colombia. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 17 de 1968.

Colombia. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 20 y Mayo 1 de 1966.

Colombia. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. Organización y Estadísticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964.

Colombia. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. Organización y Estadísticas Electorales: Marzo y Mayo de 1962.

Colombia. Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 3,000,000 Colombianos Cedulados.

D. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Bailey, John J. "Policymaking in Colombian Decentralized Agencies: Presidential Control Versus Agency Automony." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1975 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Cali, Colombia. Invicali. Actas.

Fukui, Haruhiro. "Factionalism in a Dominant Party System: The Case of Japan." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1974 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Henderson, James D. "Origins of the Violence in Colombia." Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1972.

Mitchell, Christopher. "Factionalism and Political Change in Bolivia." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1974 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Premo, Daniel Lawrence. "Alianza Nacional Popular: Populism and Politics of Social Class in Colombia, 1961-1970." Ph.D dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1972.

Rozman, Stephen Lyle. "A Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Party Leadership in Cali, Colombia." Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Florida, 1968.

E. MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

Constitution of the Republic of Colombia: 1886. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1960.

Hispanic American Report.

Insurgencia Liberal, No. 3. May, 1975 (Cali, Colombia).

Lasswell, Harold D. "Faction," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. VI, 6.

Nueva Frontera, No. 25, April 12, 1975.

Pecaut, Daniel. "Colombie 1971-1974," Notes et Etudes Documentaires, 4139/4141, Problemes d' Amerique Latine. Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1974, 1-110.

United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America. Economic Survey of Latin America, 1974. New York.

F. NEWSPAPERS

El Crisol (Cali, Colombia).

El País (Cali, Colombia).

El Pueblo (Cali, Colombia).

El Tiempo (Bogotá, Colombia.

Latin America (London)

New York Times

VITA

Thomas Michael Wilson was born in Vicksburg, Mississippi, on July 30, 1944. He was graduated from Saint Aloysius High School in that city in 1962. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Mississippi State University in 1966.

He entered the Graduate School at the University of Tennessee in September 1966 and received the Master of Arts degree with a major in political science in December 1970. He received the Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in political science in June 1979.

He currently holds the position of Research and Evaluation Specialist with the Tennessee Law Enforcement Planning Agency in Nashville.