




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
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Hae Kyoung Cho entitled "South Korea's Relations With Japan 1951 to 1987 From Hostility to Accommodation." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.


Vernon R. Iredell, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:


Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

SOUTH KOREA'S RELATIONS WITH JAPAN
1951 TO 1987
FROM HOSTILITY TO ACCOMMODATION

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

HAE KYOUNG CHO

December 1988

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ABSTRACT

In the period immediately following World War II, relations between South Korea and Japan changed drastically, from open hostility and bitterness to accommodation and cooperation. The purpose of this study is to analyze the relations between South Korea and Japan from 1951, the year diplomatic negotiations reopened, to 1987 to determine the factors that contributed to changing the relations from hostility to accommodation. The factors which effected relations between two countries include changing international political and economic relations as well as developments in the domestic political system of each country.

The study is divided into three historical periods. These are: (1) the rise of Korean hostility toward Japan (1910-1951), (2) negotiation and normalization (1951-1971), and (3) the worsening and subsequent improvement of relations (1971-1987). The conclusions sum up the reasons why the two countries sought to overcome their differences and reach the present state of accommodation.

The study concludes that three major factors contributed to accommodation between South Korea and Japan during the years 1951-1987. These factors are (1) generational shifts,

(2) strategic interests, and (3) economic concerns. The study predicts that in the future South Korea and Japan will develop in accordance with developments in the security and economic interests of the two countries.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the period immediately following World War II, relations between South Korea and Japan changed drastically, from open hostility and bitterness to accommodation and cooperation. In this dissertation, I will focus on the period between 1951, the year diplomatic negotiations between South Korea and Japan reopened, and 1987. I will discuss in detail the events which explain this revolution in South Korean-Japanese relations giving particular attention to changes that took place in South Korea.

Chapter Subjects

This introductory chapter will be followed by a chapter devoted to a discussion of the historical background of Japanese-Korean relations, and the events and circumstances surrounding the development of animosity between the two countries. This animosity resulted from the emotional legacy of the colonial era, when South Korea was a dependency of a typically harsh Japanese imperial rule. Thus, Chapter II will analyze the nature of colonial relations, between 1905-1945, and the impact of colonialism on subsequent relations between the two countries.

Although there are various monographs dealing with specific aspects of Japanese colonialism, the degree to which colonial relations determined the feeling of resentment and

mistrust that have prevailed since that time, and the major factors contributing to the lessening of this resentment and mistrust, are matters that have not produced much general literature. Thus, my task will be to piece together the details of this story.

In Chapter III, I will begin a discussion of the factors and forces which moved both sides in the direction of negotiation and accommodation, in the years between 1951-1971. The discussion of the complex process of accommodation will extend through Chapters IV and V. The recognition by both countries of common interests, which began after World War II, can be separated analytically along three separate lines: military considerations, economics interests, and generational shifts. These are treated separately in Chapters III, IV, and V respectively.

Thus the third chapter will focus specifically on strategic concerns, stemming from international forces surrounding the Korean War and superpower alignment, that provided both countries with mutual security interests.

Chapter IV will discuss the effects of post-war Korea's concentration on industrial development and the resulting economic ties with Japan. Major Japanese assistance began in 1965, after the fall of the stubbornly anti-Japanese Rhee regime.

Chapter V will analyze the impact of generational changes on the lessening of hostility. The discussion will

focus on how the military regime, which came to power in 1961, replaced the Rhee leadership, which still strongly resented of Japanese colonialism, with men who had been trained in a Japanese military academy and therefore had a greater appreciation for Japanese culture and society.

Chapter VI will outline the negotiation process which began in 1951 and eventually culminated in the 1965 Normalization Treaty. This will involve an examination of the process by which the Rhee regime was replaced by Park's military regime. This will be followed by a survey of the major policy changes of the transitional period.

Chapter VII examines the domestic and international forces which led to the worsening of relations, which began in 1972. The major factors explaining these developments were domestic changes in South Korea, and the complex process surrounding the end of American involvement in Vietnam, Sino-Japanese rapprochement, Sino-American detente, and the improvement of North Korea-Japanese relations.

Chapter VIII focuses on the readjustment and improvement in relations between 1975 and 1987. The end of the Viet Nam War, in 1975, resulted in a changing pattern of bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea. Mutual strategic concerns were created a few years later as the Carter Administration threatened to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea.

Chapter IX will serve as a summary and provide a forum

for me to put forth my conclusions as to the reasons why the two countries sought to overcome their differences and reach the present state of accommodation, and to present my ideas and suggestions for future relations.

Importance of the Study

I was drawn to the study of hostility and accommodation in Japanese-South Korean relations, first of all, because I am a South Korean with a strong desire to understand my country's emergence as a modern nation and the role played by Japan in this process. Also, my initial research efforts found that this subject had not been well studied, particularly from the perspective of historical analysis combined with political analysis. This is thus a unique treatment of a subject with important implications for the future of development studies of the Pacific region.

In recent years, the leaders of South Korea and Japan have increasingly come to appreciate the positive domestic impact of improved relations between the two countries. South Korea has emerged as one of the most successful and rapidly developing countries in East Asia, while Japan has become one of the most economically powerful countries in the entire world. The economic success of both countries has reinforced the bond between them. It is clear to the political leadership on both sides that improved relations are mutually advantageous.

So to study the processes that brought about this revolution in international relations, is to contribute to the future success of both countries. And since this study also focuses on the sources of past hostility between two countries that were once related as colony and colonizer, it has much to say to many other emerging Asian nations. Recommendations made here may be useful to future researchers and policy makers in planning projects to improve international relations with neighbors and adversaries.

However, since continued rapport is of fundamental importance to both South Korea and Japan, on the basis of mutual strategic and economic concerns that are crucial to the stability of the Pacific region, and hence to world stability, the most important contribution this dissertation can make is to advise future policies that may sustain this reconciliation.

Review of the Literature

As indicated above, the literature associated with South Korean-Japanese relations has not sufficiently addressed the subject of rapprochement after years of bitter animosity. Only a relatively small number of studies may be found which have focused on South Korean-Japanese relations, and these tend to describe only bilateral events of a particular period. Where possible, I have consulted scholarly texts and journals, but I have also relied on news paper accounts for

materials to strengthen the major themes of this dissertation.

One important study, used in Chapter II, is by C.I. Eugene Kim, a U.S. scholar of Korean origin, and entitled Korea's Response to Japan (Center for Korean Studies, a Western Michigan University, 1977). This is a careful, highly critical study of the impact of Japanese rule on Korea.

A good introduction to the rise of antipathy and the legacy of bitterness is by another U.S. scholar of Korean origin, Andrew C. Nam, entitled Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule (Center for Korean Studies Institute of International and Area Studies, Western Michigan University, 1973). This especially valuable book is based on a largely quantitative analysis of Korea under colonial rule.

Some of the literature associated with chapters III, IV, and V, which discuss the complex process of accommodation, include Chong Shik Lee, The Politics of Nationalism (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1963); Parvez Hagen, Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapid Growing Economy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979); Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1960); and Chin O. Chung, Pyeongyang Between Peking and Moscow; North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (University of Alabama Press, 1978).

Of the various studies of Korean and Japanese international relations, one that has been especially valuable, for the discussion in chapter VI, is Kang Bong Kim's The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971). This book is a detailed examination of the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Normalization Treaty of 1965.

Korean authors, Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, have written an important foreign policy study, entitled The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). This book is an in-depth analysis of South Korean's foreign policy from 1961-79, with particular emphasis on the fourth Republic, and was an important source for the analysis of the down-turn in relations that occurred after 1972 (chapters VII and VIII).

Another useful work, supporting the analysis in chapters VII and VIII, concentrating on foreign policy issues, is Byoung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Koh's emphasis is on general patterns of foreign policy, including Seoul's policies toward Tokyo.

The massive work by Chang Soo Lee and George De Vas, Korea in Japan (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1981), augments the latter two volumes, and was extremely useful in completing the final chapters of this work.

Among the various articles on South Korean-Japanese relations generally, the following seem to stand out: Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Korea's Policy and the Korean Unification," Asian-Survey, Vol. VII (October, 1967), pp. 703-725; and two articles by Hong N. Kim, "Japanese-South Korean Relations in the Post Vietnam Era," Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, no. 10 (October 1976), pp. 981-995, and "South Korean-Japanese Relations in the Post-Park Chung Hee Era," Asia Affairs, Vol. IX, (November/December 1981), pp. 85-103.

In addition to the scholarly works discussed above, I have relied heavily upon the following South Korean Newspapers: Dong A Il Bo (Oriental Daily News), Chosun Il Bo, and Seoul Shinmun.

Summary

My purpose in this dissertation is to examine the fluctuations in South Korean-Japanese relations, that brought once embittered and antagonistic colonial adversaries into a mutually acceptable process of political accommodation that has dramatically transformed both countries.

To this effort, I bring a synthesis of historical and political analyses, examining the impact of colonialism, the lingering resentment and mistrust following Korean independence, and the process of negotiation that produced accommodation.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF KOREAN HOSTILITY TOWARD JAPAN

To better understand relations between South Korea and Japan, it will be necessary to briefly review the historical, geographical, and cultural similarities between the two countries. Both countries are small, mountainous, and poor in natural resources(Figure 1). They share a linguistic tradition and ethnicity. Both cultures originated in China and have been strongly influenced by Confucianism.

Beginning with the Silla Dynasty, which first unified the Korean peninsula in the seventh century, Korean rulers were under Chinese protection.¹ Since that time, the Japanese have thought of Korea primarily as a channel for the transmission of Chinese culture.² The entry of Japan into the Western international system, in the nineteenth century, caused revolutionary changes in Korean-Japanese relations.³ The rise of Meiji Japan, stimulated by Western contact, presented an immediate challenge to the position of supremacy that China had held over East Asia since ancient times.

Unlike Japan, Korea avoided Western contact and maintained its traditional culture well into the twentieth

¹Carl Berger, Korea Knot: Military-Political History (London: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 16.

²John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), pp. 334-335.

³Frederick Foo Chien, The Opening of Korea (New York: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 3-17.




FIGURE 1

THE MAP OF KOREA AND JAPAN

century. Tae Won Gun,⁴ the most influential ruler of the nineteenth century, pursued a policy of preserving Korean isolation. During his ten year rule (1864-1873), Korean foreign policy was based on the principle that Korea should protect itself from Western influences. He felt that Chinese cooperation with the West, and Japan's open door policy, were the result of Western manipulation and not the eagerness of these countries to Westernize. Tae Won Gun's anti-Western stance resulted in the twentieth century modernization gap between Korea and Japan.

In 1868, Japan began to make notable economic progress. After her strategic military and economic potential was established, she became a potential target for Western countries with imperialistic designs. The new Meiji government sought the formal establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations, partly as a means of avoiding foreign invasion. The result was the rapid acceleration of Japanese modernization.

In addition to the Meiji reforms, Japan learned much from Western Imperialistic methods and began to set her sights on the Korean peninsula. At the end of the nineteenth century, Japan entered into diplomatic relations with Korea.

⁴Tae Won Gun was the father of King Kojong (26th of Yi Dynasty of Korea). He ruled Korea for ten years. His policy was a protective policy from Western countries; see C. I. Eugene Kim and Han Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism: 1870-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 14-15.

Japan recognized the prime strategic importance of the Korean peninsula for the security of Northern China and Manchuria, particularly after the Russian seizure of the land east of the Ussuri River in 1860.

The Japanese objective was annexation, but there were considerable complications to be resolved before achieving this goal. First there was the problem of China. When Japan opened the door to Korea, with the 1876 Treaty of Kwangwha,⁵ she was immediately thrust into conflict with China. Korean domestic difficulties surrounding the Tonghak Revolution of 1889,⁶ brought the two Asian powers into conflict for the first time, resulting in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.

The Japanese victory in this war put an end to Chinese influence over Korea. But Japanese hegemony on the Korean peninsula was still not unchallenged. In the years immediately following the Sino-Japanese War, the Russians attempted to take control of Korea. Japan first tried to counter the Russian threat through diplomacy. In 1903, Japan offered to recognize Russian influence over Manchuria, in return for Russian recognition of Japanese influence over

⁵John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, p. 511.

⁶Tonghak (Eastern Learning) was the salvation of farmers from their destitute lives. Although Tonghak had some religious influences (from Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism), its major concerns were national stability and security; Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea (1868-1910): A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), pp. 328-329.

Korea.⁷ The Russian rejection of the Japanese proposal led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

Victories over China and Russia enhanced Japan's prestige internationally and established her unchallenged hegemony over the Korean peninsula. In the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, Japan gained the authority to draw up treaties and conduct conventions with foreign countries for Korea. This effectively deprived Korea of her independence.⁸

The Protectorate Treaty angered the Korean people. Despite Japanese control of military and police forces, anti-Japanese sentiments grew into open rebellion. The Korean press further aggravated public opinion, which turned increasingly hostile toward the Japanese occupation.

Domestic hostility in Korea emerged in several stages, each characterized by increasingly repressive Japanese administrative policies, which in turn fueled the rise of

⁷ The Japanese proposal was:

(1) recognition of Russian Supremacy in Manchuria in return for Russian recognition of Japan's superior position in Korea; (2) a neutral zone along the Korean-Manchurian border; (3) railway connection between Korean and Manchurian lines; (4) freedom of navigation in the Korean straits; (5) a mutual engagement to respect the independence of China and Korea and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.

See Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), pp. 328-329.

⁸ Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), p. 321.

Korean independence movements. The first stage began in 1907, with the Hague incident. After hearing that the Second World Peace Conference was going to be held that year at the Hague, in the Netherlands, Emperor Kojong, dispatched three Korean diplomats (Lee Sang Sul, Lee Wi Jong, and Lee Jun) on a secret mission to the Hague to plead for Korean independence.⁹ With letters and credentials signed by the Emperor, the secret envoy approached the conference leadership, only to be denied entrance. Conference officials declared that Korea had no rights to diplomatic representation. Although this mission achieved no practical results, the plight of Korea received world attention. Infuriated, the Japanese forced the abdication of Emperor Kojong. He was replaced by the Crown Prince Sunjong, who became the last monarch to reign in Korea.

After the Hague incident, the Japanese government stepped up its repressive measures. It began a policy of indiscriminately suppressing rebellious elements. The main instrument of repression was the Japanese secret police. The independence movement was organized and led by several eminent scholars and former high-ranking government officials. Major movement leaders, including Choi Ik Hyun, Min Chung Shin, and Sim Ui Suk, were captured and executed.

⁹The petition of Kojong argued that Japan was depriving Korea of all political powers without consent of the Korean Emperor, and Japan was destroying all existing Korean laws. See Woon Sang Chooi, The Fall of the Hermit Kingdom (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967), pp. 60-64.

While this was an effective strategy, in that it destroyed the leadership of the movement, it also created martyrs for the independence movement and further embittered the Korean public.¹⁰

On October 18, 1895, the Empress Min was assassinated by a Japanese military group, further exacerbating an already volatile situation.¹¹ The resulting outbreak of revolutionary activity was ruthlessly crushed by Japanese armed forces. At least 300 Koreans were killed in Seoul alone, and many important nationalists were arrested.

In spite of increasing domestic opposition, the Japanese empire moved forward with plans for annexation. In June of 1910, the Japanese cabinet adopted an outline for the future rule of Korea. They called for a change in the name of the occupying governor, from "Residency General" to "Government General." On August 29, Japan formally declared the annexation of Korea into the Japanese empire. The declaration called for the cession of all rights of sovereignty in Korea to Japan, in order to ensure the Korean people's future happiness and to maintain the security and public order of Korea. The provisions of the Treaty Annexation were as follows.

¹⁰Ki Baik Lee, A New History of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 311.

¹¹Pow-key Sohn, Chol-Chun Kim, Yi-Sup Hong, The History of Korea (Seoul, Korea: Korean National Commission for Unesco, 1982), pp. 217-218.

Article I: His Majesty, the Emperor of Korea, makes complete and permanent cession to His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea.

Article II: His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.

Article III: His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, will accord to their Majesties the Emperor and Ex-Emperor and his Imperial Highness the Crown Prince of Korea and their consorts and heirs such titles, dignity, and honor as are appropriate to their respective ranks, and sufficient annual grants will be made for the maintenance of such titles, dignity, and honors.¹²

After the imposition of the Annexation Treaty, Korean hostility entered a second stage associated with Japanese colonial rule. Colonialism alienated increasing numbers of economically and politically significant Koreans. A much wider spectrum of the Korean public was being drawn into the independence movement.¹³ In response, Japanese brutality also increased. Between 1907 and 1909, 700 Koreans were burned to death, and 1280 were killed by other means.

Korean-Japanese relations during the colonial period (1910-45) were characterized by a strong correlation between increased independence activities and decreased Japanese repressive activities. Over time, domestic pressure forced the colonial administration to alter their policies from

¹²Woon Sang Choi, The Fall of Hermit Kingdom, p. 137.

¹³Pow-Key Sohn, Chul-Chun Kim, Yi-Sup Hong, The History of Korea, pp. 234-237.

suppression to cooperation.¹⁴ The first significant change occurred in 1919 when the military governor was replaced with a civilian government. The new government favored a policy of non-discrimination, giving Koreans more equal treatment.¹⁵ De-militarization created an atmosphere of greater freedom, which encouraged even more anti-Japanese activism.

Major cities and counties witnessed an increasing number of riots, demonstrations, and organized civil disobedience. On March 1, 1919, a major outbreak of revolutionary activity, referred to as the March First Independence Movement, spread throughout the entire Korean peninsula.

The independence movement continued to gain momentum after 1919, attracting ever larger numbers of demonstrators, especially in the provincial towns. The Japanese government general approved a decree imposing martial law throughout Korea on March 1, 1919. The decree provoked major clashes with Japanese authorities in several cities.¹⁶ According to Japanese reports, 46,948 demonstrators were arrested, 7,509 killed, 15,916 injured, and 715 homes were destroyed or burned. One of the most heinous of the Japanese atrocities

¹⁴ Takashi Hatado, A History of Korea (Santa Barbara: California Press, 1969), p. 116.

¹⁵ "Japan: Oppressor or Modernizer? A Comparison of the Effect of Colonial Control in Korea and Japan," Andrew C. Nam, Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule (The center for Korean Studies, Institute of International and Area Studies: Western Michigan University, pp. 251-258.

¹⁶ Pow-Key Sohn, Chol-Chun Kim, Yi-Sup Hong, The History of Korea, pp. 259-266.

occurred on April 15, 1919, in Suwon, Kyonggi Province, when 29 Koreans were herded into a church and the building was set ablaze.¹⁷

After the March First Movement, the military police were replaced by regular police. Within certain limits, Koreans were allowed freedom of expression. The two major newspapers, Dong-A Il Bo (Oriental Daily News) and Cho Sun Il Bo (Korean Daily News), were allowed to resume publication in 1920.¹⁸ The most important positions continued to be held by Japanese. A few Koreans were also allowed to participate in local and national policy making. As time passed however their number increased but they came to make up a smaller percentage of the bureaucracy. Table 1 presents the number of Korean officials in the colonial bureaucracy.

The third stage of hostility came between 1926 and 1945, when opposition to Japan was taken over by students and the independence movement spread to Manchuria.¹⁹ The acceptance by the students of the views of An Chang Ho, brought the nationalist movement to its highest point of revolutionary development. An was one of the most important radical acti-

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 265

¹⁸ These two major newspapers advocated Korean political, economic and educational reforms and also helped the nationalists to be more active in the stronger Korean movements. See "Nationalist Movements and Students," (ed.) C. I. Eugene Kim, Korea's Response to Japan (The Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1977), p. 279.

¹⁹ Ki-Bak Lee, A New History of Korea, pp. 364-367.

TABLE 1
 INDICES OF THE RECRUITMENT OF KOREAN OFFICIALS
 IN THE COLONIAL BUREAUCRACY
 1915-1942

Year	Number of Korean Officials			Percentage to the Total		
	(1)High Officials	(2)Junior Officials	(3) Employees	(1)	(2)	(3)
1915	354	4,891	15,543	29.9	37.8	54.5
1920	352	9,737	3,409	31.4	40.3	42.4
1925	341	9,569	4,836	28.3	34.2	39.4
1930	360	10,018	6,669	24.0	33.2	39.0
1935	361	11,018	8,756	23.5	35.8	40.8
1940	416	14,224	21,362	19.3	35.4	52.7
1942	442	15,479	29,998	18.0	32.2	57.0

Sources: (ed.) Andrew C. Nam, Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule. (The Center for Korea Studies, Institutional and Area Studies: Western Michigan University, 1973), p. 164.

vists, and his acceptance by student radicals united the students with the radical nationalist movement.

The first riots of the student-led independence movement, known as the June Tenth Independence Movement, began on June 10, 1926. These riots were triggered by several days of clashes between Japanese police units and students at the emotionally charged funeral of Emperor Sun Jong, the last ruler of the Yi Dynasty. The deep sorrow of the Korean people combined with their hostility toward Japan burst forth into street violence. More than 200 students were arrested and several Japan police stations were destroyed.²⁰

Some years later a second wave of student-led riots swept the country. They resulted from the activities of the Kwang Ju Students Movement, named for the province where the first of those riots broke out on November 3, 1929. The riots were in reaction to alleged insults directed at several Korean high school girls by Japanese students. This revolt gradually spread to other schools across Korea, peaking around November 24. In the end, 194 schools and 54,000 students were involved. 582 students were expelled and 2,330 were placed under indefinite suspension.²¹

The other major development of the third phase of hostility was the linking of the Korean independence movement to other independence and nationalist movements abroad.

²⁰ Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea, p. 363.

²¹ Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea, p. 364.

After the rise of the March First Movement, the radical ideology of nationalism began to include the concept of the necessity for armed guerrilla warfare as the only means of destroying the Japanese military regime.

The most important outcome of these developments was the establishment of a provisional government of the Republic of Korea (Dae Han Min Guk Im Si Jung Bu) in Shanghai in April of 1919.²²

During colonial rule, the Japanese Government General controlled all aspects of the Korean economy. While Korea did benefit from Japanese management of economic growth,²³ the benefit of this management have been overstated. The Japanese objective for Korean modernization was to promote Japan's own economic interests and strategic needs.²⁴

After the March First Movement, Japan emphasized cultural policies over economic ones. Japan had to review and modify its past policies in Korea. The objective during the colonial period was to assimilate Korea.²⁵ However,

²²Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea, p. 344.

²³Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemir, Growth and Structural Transformation(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 7.

²⁴Ho Chin Choi, "The Process of Industrial Modernization in Korea," Journal of Social Science and Humanities, XXVI, June 1967, pp. 1-33.

²⁵The colonial reformists advocated autonomous rule for Korea after 1919 largely because they believed that the major cause for the outbreak of the March First Movement was the Social Mobilization in Korea," (ed.) Andrew C. Nam, Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule, p. 153.

Japanese political and economic policies were far more successful than the policy of cultural assimilation.²⁶ To achieve her cultural aims, Japan imposed her educational system on Korean elementary school, high schools, and colleges.

Despite the Japanese emphasis on the expansion of Korean education, they failed to provide Koreans with any real opportunity for education. The Japanese designed education in Korea was basically aimed at denationalization. In the end, it was a source of a profound and insidious racism. Japan, in effect, turned Korean students into second class Japanese citizens by devaluing items of Korean cultural and exaggerating the importance of items of Japanese culture.

However, in the long run, Japanese assimilation policies, with its inherent racism, only strengthened Korean nationalism. Racial discrimination, combined with the lack of Korean participation in government and industry, rendered the colonial administration unacceptable to Koreans.

Although pro-Japanese feelings were evident among some government officials, landowners, and businessmen, these feelings seemed to result from their self-interested desire to secure their own futures under Japanese colonial rule. Most Koreans opposed colonialism. The independence movement, centered in Shanghai, continued under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, until the end of World War II.

²⁶ Takashi Hatado, pp. 221-222.

In November of 1943, in the Cairo Declaration, leaders of the major Allied Powers (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Ching Kei Shek) declared that Korea should be given her independence after the war. The Postdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 formally declared the liberation of Korea.

As the likelihood of Japan's defeat became more obvious in 1944, many Korean nationalist groups began to contact United States leaders to negotiate for Korean independence. Many anti-Japanese movement leaders formed pro-U.S.A. factions in the last months of the war. However, after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Korean leaders were still not prepared to institute an independent government in Korea.²⁷

As the war ended, events progressed rapidly in Korea. Liberation came, but so did Soviet troops, who quickly occupied the Northern part of the peninsula. The division of Korea continued the subjugation of the Korean people, and was one of the factors leading to the superpower stand-off known as the Cold War.

²⁷When liberation came, Korea's own institutions had no guidance to give. Instead, direction faltered, and the forces of chaos arose. See Gregory Henderson, Korea and the Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 113-147.

Conclusions

From the time of its emergence as a unified state, until the end of World War II, Korea had been under foreign domination, first by China and then by Japan. The protest against Japanese domination coincided with the rise of independence movements in many parts of the third world. From the very beginning of Japanese occupation, in 1905, Koreans agitated for independence. Over time, the struggle for independence became more widespread and, partly as a result of the increasingly repressive Japanese rule, became more determined and violent. By the time Korea gained her independence, after the Japanese defeat in World War II, Korean resentment against Japan had reached monumental proportions. And yet, within only three decades, remarkably good relations had been established between the two countries.

Three sorts of factors brought about the emergence of these good relations between these former adversaries: strategic factors, economic factors, and generational factors. The next chapter will focus on the strategic factors.

CHAPTER III

FORCES FOR ACCOMMODATION: STRATEGIC FACTORS

In the early 1960's, relations between South Korea and Japan steadily improved, culminating in the 1965 treaty of normalization. The most important factors responsible for this development were strategics in character. In order to understand how they arose it is necessary to begin by discussing developments that took place in the 1950's.

The Transitional Period: 1951-60

After Korean independence, and the establishment of the of Rhee regime, relations with Japan deteriorated sharply.¹ Rhee openly acknowledged his personal animosity toward Japan.

This animosity and the bitter legacy of colonialism on which it was based sustained the bad relations that had emerged between the two countries until the fall of Syngmun Rhee in 1960. Yet significant developments took place during this period which played an important role in the eventual improvement of relations between them. The most important of these developments began in June.

In June of 1950, when North Korea invaded the south with 60,000 troops and captured Seoul. The United Nations

¹See Chong Shik Lee, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (Winter 1962-1963), pp. 315-326.

Security Council demanded the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean troops to the 38th parallel (see Figure 2), and appealed to the United States for help in carrying out this demand. U.S. and allied forces recaptured Seoul in October, before a counter-attack by 200,000 Chinese troops. The Soviets provided the People's Army of North Korea, as well as the Chinese volunteers, with military advisers and an uninterrupted supply of weapons.

American and Soviet involvement was a function of superpower alignment. The North Korean invasion was a form of communist encroachment; Cold War skirmishing. Rhee hated the Japanese as much as the communist.² But Japan was now an important ally of the U.S. Mutual strategic concerns and mutual dependence on support and assistance from the U.S. now began to draw Korea to Japan. The involvement of China reinforced this trend in a major way.

After the cease-fire and armistice of July 26, 1953, North Korea continued strong ties with the Soviet Union and Communist China. With massive Soviet assistance, the North Korean government launched a modernization campaign, which involved upgrading their meager armed forces along Soviet lines.

This was also a period of cooperation between the

² Edmund Clubb, "Rhee's War on Japan," The Nation, November 1955, p. 376.




FIGURE 2

DIVIDED KOREA IN ITS ASIAN SETTING

Soviets and the Chinese communists. The Soviets continued to provide China with a great deal of economic and technological assistance. The result was a powerful communist alliance in Northeast Asia, which was formalized with the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in April of 1958.

The resulting shift in the balance of international relations forced South Korea and Japan into a reluctant accommodation. The two old enemies were brought together under the influence of U.S. foreign policy, which was dependent on the cooperation of these two strategically situated countries. The communist threat that arose from Soviet domination of North Korea, and the emergence of Communist China as a world power, forced the U.S. to build an anti-communist foothold in Japan and South Korea. But the personal animosities of Syngman Rhee and the legacy of colonialism, remained major obstacles to full rapprochement.³

The Emergence of Factors Leading to Accommodation: 1960-65

The emergence of accommodation and the establishment of formal relations between Japan and South Korea was influenced by the interaction of three important factors. The first was the ouster, in 1960, of Syngman Rhee followed by the military

³Mark J. Mobius, "The Korean Press and Public Opinion," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn 1965), p. 35.

coup the next year. These events removed a major political obstacle to accommodation and brought to the South Korean government a much greater appreciation of strategic concerns. The new military government, under Park Chung Hee, placed great stress on security⁴ and significantly increased South Korea's military expenditures (see Table 2).

TABLE 2
SOUTH KOREA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES: 1960-1965
(in Million South Korean Won)

Year	Military Expenditures
1960	14,707
1961	16,599
1962	20,474
1963	20,479
1964	24,926
1965	29,874

Source: Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North Korea and South Korea, p. 60, citing Republic of Korea, Secretariat, Office of the President, Han'guk Kyongje ui ojewa onul(Seoul, 1975), p. 347.

The second factor was the emergence of a power struggle between the Soviet Union and Communist China, which had the immediate effect of diluting communist unity in Northeast Asia. This eventually forced North Korea to sign separate security pacts with the Soviets and the Chinese. The new

⁴ Kang Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System, pp. 80-85.

cracks in the communist wall in Northeast Asia also diminished the need for U.S. involvement in the region.

The third factor was the development, in both South Korea and Japan, of increasingly autonomous self-defense policies. This development was a function of America's a lessening strategic concerns in the region. The United States gradually became less willing to shoulder the burden of South Korean and Japanese defense. Increased involvement in Vietnam was creating incentives for American disengagement in Korea. As both South Korea and Japan began to feel more independent, it became increasingly clear, to each country, that lessening American involvement was making mutual defense measures necessary.⁵

Critically weakened by her ill-fated involvement in World War II, Japan had temporarily ceased to conduct an active foreign policy. However, by the 1960's, Japan's unprecedented economic recovery had returned the country to the status of a world power. Japanese economic strength reached such enormous proportions that Japan began to challenge regional communist power. Japan, became increasingly able to conduct her own foreign policy, and as a result began to rely less and less on American.

The situation on the Korean peninsula was perceived as a direct threat to Japanese economic expansion and stability. While the new government of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato

⁵ Kyonghyng Shinmun, March 9, 1964.

maintained strong ties with the United States, the emergence of China, and American involvement in Vietnam, convinced Japan of the need to establish a strong relationship with South Korea.

After the revision of the United States-Japan Security Treaty, in 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda traveled to Washington for a summit meeting with President Kennedy, where both leaders agreed that close relations between Japan and South Korea were a crucial component in countering the communist threat in Northeast Asia.⁶

As a gesture of Japanese political support for the South Korean government, Prime Minister Ikeda sent the Japanese foreign minister, Kosaka Zentaro, to Seoul in September of 1960. This was first high level official visit to South Korea since World War II, and marked the beginning of a new era in South Korean-Japanese relations.⁷

In July of 1961, after the conclusion of the mutual defense pact between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk continued to stress the need for American support of South Korea to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula. However, at the same time, Rusk strongly urged Japan to give higher priority to economic assistance to South Korea.⁸

⁶ Japan Times, June 22, 1961.

⁷ Japan Times, September 7, 1960.

⁸ Mainichi Shimbun, July 28, 1961.

While taking on South Korea as a major trading partner, Japan also began to approach North Korea to promote trade relations there. The Ikeda government did not seek official diplomatic relations with North Korea. In her relations with the north, Japan pursued a foreign policy referred to as "seikei bunri," (the separation of economics from politics). Thus the Japanese strategy in North Korea was not seen as a threat to South Korean security. It was, in fact, a strategy intended to strengthen South Korean security by asserting Japanese economic power and influence in the north.

The movement toward accommodation was also shaped by the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. As relations between the two major communist powers changed from friendship and cooperation to animosity and hostility, foreign relations in Northeast Asia underwent a significant transformation. Foreign policy considerations in North Korea became significantly more complicated. North Korean leaders had to discover ways of maintaining economic and military ties with both of their major allies.⁹ While continuing to receive assistance from both Moscow and Peking, they had to avoid direct involvement in Sino-Soviet disputes.¹⁰ In July of 1961, North Korea concluded mutual defense pacts with both

⁹Jae Kyu Park, "North Korea's Political and Economic Relations with China and Soviet Union: From 1954-1980," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1984, p. 289.

¹⁰Chin-Wee Chung, "North Korea in Sino-Soviet Dispute," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, (Summer 1983), p. 68.

China and the Soviet Union. So, in spite of the problems between the Soviet Union and China, North Korea remained a significant threat to the status-quo on the Korean peninsula.

The North Korean Reaction To

South Korean-Japanese Normalization: 1965-71

In spite of South Korea's unprecedented increase in military expenditures during the early 1960's, the strategic situation in Northeast Asia continued to change as the United States became increasingly less willing to shoulder the burden of South Korean defense. Increased involvement in Vietnam was creating incentives for American disengagement in Korea. So the new military regime in South Korea took an historic initiative by abandoning the Seoul-Tokyo cold war of the 1950's and turned to Japan for support against the North Korean threat. In both South Korea and Japan, there was an increased consciousness of the strategic problems in Korea. These mutual strategic concerns led directly to the signing of the treaty of normalization in 1965.

South Korean-Japanese rapprochement increased tensions on the Korean peninsula. North Korean leaders perceived this as a measure which strengthened the south, and therefore a measure which upset the balance of power on the peninsula.¹¹ In addition, North Korea's anxiety worsened bilateral relations with Japan. The normalization of

¹¹Kim Il Sung, Selected Works (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1971), vol. IV, p. 338.

relations between Japan and South Korea had a direct impact on North Korean military planning and policies. The result was a substantial increase in North Korean military expenditures during the 1960's (see Table 3).

Although North Korea was unable to adopt a consistent foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and communist China, the politics surrounding the Sino-Soviet confrontations of this period eventually pushed North Korea further into the Soviet camp. North Korean officials, seeking greater military strength, sought assistance from the Soviets.¹² In February of 1965, Soviet Premier Kosygin visited Pyongyang and agreed to supply northern forces with improved air defense missiles and other military hardware.¹³

Despite North Korea's move toward the Soviet Union also continued to supply North Korea with military equipment and training. As her military strength increased, her leadership grew bolder. By the end of the decade, the North Korean government had become convinced that normalization and other factors would soon create a situation where her power would gradually begin to decrease, and that her last chance to reunite the peninsula with military force would soon pass.

¹²Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between peking and moscow; North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, 1958-1975 (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978), p. 119.

¹³Chin-Wee Chung, "North Korea in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2 (Summer 1983), p. 81.

TABLE 3
NORTH KOREA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES
(in 10,000 North Korean Won)

Year	Total Government Expenditures (A)	Military Expenditures (B)	B as % of A (C)
1960	196,787	6,100	3.1
1961	233,800	5,917	2.5
1962	272,876	6,163	2.2
1963	302,821	6,359	2.1
1964	341,824	25,637	7.5
1965	347,613	35,109	10.1
1966	357,140	44,643	12.5
1967	394,823	120,026	30.4
1968	481,289	155,938	32.4
1969	504,857	156,506	31.0
1970	508,200	149,412	29.4
1971	630,168	195,982	31.1

Source: Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 59, citing, Tong'a yon' gam, 1975 (Seoul: Tong'a Ilbo-sa, 1975), p. 508.

The result was an increased militancy that led to the most serious military confrontation between North and South Korea since the Korean war. The belligerent nature of North Korean militancy was derived from her paranoid reaction to Japanese-South Korean normalization and the perceived military threat it posed on her southern border, coupled with her insecurity at being caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The North Korean perception of the military threat in the south was further intensified by the renewal of the South Korean-United States alliance in April of 1968. This renewed emerged after South Korea's decision to send troops to Vietnam, which had prompted the Johnson administration to pursue the continuation of South Korean military assistance.¹⁴

In January of 1968, confrontation between North and South Korea had erupted suddenly in two separate incidents, which occurred within days of each other. A third incident occurred one year later. These events brought about a rapid deterioration in relations that threatened to destroy the fragile balance on the Korean peninsula. The first which occurred on January 21, was the North Korean guerrilla attack on the Presidential residence in Seoul. The second occurred two days later, on the 23rd, and involved the seizure, by North Korean forces, of the U.S.S. Pueblo, an American

¹⁴ New York Times, April 18, 1968

intelligence vessel, with 83 crewmen, who were tortured and imprisoned for almost a year.

The presidential residence attack had been initiated by North Korean president, Kim II Sung, who sent 31 specially trained guerrillas, into South Korea surreptitiously, with the intention of overthrowing the government at Seoul. Although the attack was a failure, the incident highlighted major weaknesses in South Korean security. The shock of the attack caused South Korean leaders to reevaluate their military preparedness and to strengthen South Korea's ties with the United States and Japan.

The Pueblo incident created a serious international crisis and a major superpower confrontation. Since the North Koreans imprisoned the captured American servicemen and subjected them to brutality and torture, holding American military authority up to ridicule in a propaganda campaign that lasted for 11 months, the incident had a great impact on world opinion.

One year after the capture of the Pueblo, the third incident involving North Korean military aggression occurred. On April 15, 1969, North Korean military forces shot down an American reconnaissance plane (EC-121) with 31 crewmen on board.

These last two incidents, both involving successful assaults on American military units, clearly diminished American prestige and enhanced the Soviet position. However,

the U.S.S.R. showed a great deal of restraint during these crises, avoiding direct involvement or support that might have led to a confrontation with the United States or provoked U.S. military intervention in Korea.

With uninterrupted Soviet support, the North Korean military build-up continued throughout the 1960's. Military expenditures in North Korea doubled during this decade (see Table 4). With this rapid increase in military power, northern leaders began to reconsider the unification of the Korean peninsula by force. Consequently, by the end of the 1960's, there had been a large number of violations along the Demilitarized Zone, and several large scale guerrilla incursions from the north into South Korea.¹⁵

During these crises and confrontations, the Japanese government used every possible means to avoid being drawn into a situation requiring military intervention in Korea. The normalization treaty made no provision for Japanese military cooperation with South Korea. However, the strengthening of Japanese security forces was a primary policy objective of the Sato government. Even though Japan had formally recognized the government of South Korea as the legitimate government of the peninsula, she could not ignore

¹⁵William J. Barnds, ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 23.

the fact that there was a competing communist government in the north.¹⁶

After the attack on the presidential residence, the new left-wing leaders in the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) began to apply pressure on the Sato government to pursue and develop better relations with North Korea. In August of 1968, a delegation from the JCP, headed by Miyamoto Kenji, went to Pyongyang and met with Kim II Sung to discuss possible strategies to nullify the Japanese-South Korean normalization treaty.¹⁷ The JCP visit to North Korea put new pressure on the Sato government to avoid moving to close to South Korea.¹⁸

The Nixon administration came to power in 1969, inheriting the chaos of Northeast Asian foreign policy. Nixon revived the old policy of giving major responsibility for self-defense to the Asian nations. This policy, now known as the Nixon doctrine, forced South Korea and Japan to assume the major responsibility for their own defense. With the

¹⁶By the time of the Pueblo Incident, the North Korean armed forces were completely re-equipped with Soviet aid. The Japanese learned that the North Korea-Japan confrontation brought about a direct confrontation between Japan and the U.S.S.R. See Chin-Wee Chung, 'North Korea in the Sinbo-Soviet Dispute,' pp 80-82.

¹⁷Nodong Shinmu, August 26, 1968.

¹⁸Tae-Hwan Kwak, Chonghan Kim, and Hong Nack Kim, (eds.), Korean Reunification (Seoul: Kyungnam University, 1984), pp. 256-257.

U.S. ceasing to defend its national interests in Asia, Japan was faced with the need for greater self-reliance in defense.¹⁹

By the summer of 1969, Japan had a significantly different attitude toward South Korea. She had become increasingly aware of the concrete threat to her future security on the Korean peninsula. Both the Japanese leadership and public had come to the realization that the time had come for Japan to take more responsibility in Korea.²⁰ The Sato government came to realize that its failure to take stronger measures, and the policy of avoiding confrontation during the various Korean crises, had been a foreign policy failure. By the summer of 1969, Sato was publicly emphasizing the need for positive Japanese involvement to maintain the stability of the Korean peninsula as a critical factor in Japan's own security.²¹

Despite the increasing need of Japanese involvement, however, a few months later crisis emerged in the peninsula, Japan took no action. The Japanese government also showed a greater unwillingness to get involved when the crisis reemerged in the peninsula in the early 1970's.

¹⁹ See "Joint Statement by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato" R.P. Stebbins and E.P. Adam, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1968-1969 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1972), pp. 336-341.

²⁰ Asahi Shimbun, September 29, 1965.

²¹ Japan Times, September 26, 1969.

Actually Japan's reaction was complex, because every time there was trouble between North and South Korea, Japan was torn between supporting South Korea and thus strengthening her own security and withdrawing support to avoid dangerous military involvement.

Other Factors Contributing to Accommodation After 1971

After 1971, the emergence of a policy of peaceful coexistence between the communists powers and the United States and her Asian allies, once again transformed the basis of Northeast Asian Foreign policy. The Japanese and South Korean perception of the communist treat gradually diminished as the U.S. policy of detente with the Soviet Union and communist China moved forward.

The improvement in East-West relations resulted in North Korea's disenchantment with the Soviet Union. Even though her military capacities continued to expand, North-Korean militarism became increasingly moderate. Her policy of military unification of the peninsula slowly changed to a policy of peaceful unification.

After the United States resumed diplomatic relations with China in 1972, cold war relations between Washington, and Peking, and Peking and Tokyo, were abandoned in favor of increasing friendship.²² As the bipolar nature of superpower

²² "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence," (ed.) Gene T. Hsiao, Sino American Detente and its Policy Implications (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974),

relations began to break down, the dependence of Northeastern Asian countries on the United States and the Soviet Union lessened.

Under these circumstances, South Korean-Japanese relations also underwent significant changes. The most important change was in the perception of the military threat from North Korea. North and South Korea were actually coming to terms with one another, in a cooperative effort to find a peaceful solution to the division of Korea. In January of 1974, a delegation headed by North Korean Vice-President Park Sung Chul, met with South Korean leaders in Seoul to discuss the establishment of peaceful relations with South Korea and Japan. The result of this meeting was an agreement between South Korea and Japan to develop a joint policy of Korean unification without the assistance of the United States or the Soviet Union.²³

Shifts in Soviet foreign policy also had an important effect on relations between South Korea and Japan at this point. The normalization of relations between the U.S. and China forced Kremlin strategists to reexamine Soviet policy in East Asia and elsewhere in the world. Soviet leaders saw U.S.-Chinese normalization as a great advantage for China, and sought ways to counter the increased Chinese threat, with

pp. 160-181.

²³ "The Two Koreas-Dialogue or Conflict?," The Two Koreas In East Asian Affairs, (ed.) William J. Barnds (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 64.

an active campaign to encircle China. The Soviets immediately reinforced their forces on the Chinese border and stepped up efforts at diplomatic negotiation with Japan. At the same time, Soviet leaders approached Washington with arms control proposals and pursued a new policy of detente.

As North Korea began to exercise more independence from the Soviets and South Korea became less dependent upon the United States, foreign relations in Northeast Asia began to take on a less polarized character. After the meetings between delegations from the two Koreas, the Japanese government announced its recognition of North Korea as one of two legitimate governments on the Korean peninsula.

While these changes moved the area toward ultimate peace and normalization in the short run they also created problems for Japanese-South Korean relations. Japanese relations with North Korea improved significantly. Seemingly, Japan no longer recognized South Korea as the sole legitimate Korean government.²⁴ And this left the government at Seoul feeling less secure and more anxious in regard to their place in the politics of Northeast Asia. South Korea's uneasy status as an independent nation, within a rapidly changing international system produced security problems. Superpower detente and the reduction of militancy in North Korea had reduced the pressures unifying Japan and South Korea, and the two countries again began to drift apart.

²⁴ Japan Times, August 20, 1974.

In the 1970's, America's Asian policies also became an important ingredient in Japanese-South Korean relations. From the beginning, the United States had played a unifying role. Both South Korea and Japan were allies of the U.S., and it had been in the interest of the United States to encourage good relations between the two countries. However, the fact that both countries relied so heavily on such a strong ally made unity seem less important to them than it would otherwise have seemed. As American problems accumulated in Vietnam, it became more and more obvious that her Asian allies would have to rely more completely on themselves and each other. This policy of encouraging Asian independence came to be embodied in the Nixon Doctrine. Later, the Carter administration's threat to reduce American military commitment in Korea was even more important. The end result was again to force South Korea and Japan into a policy of accommodation.

To summarize, South Korean-Japanese strategic relations did not develop smoothly. Security disputes between the two countries were quite complex and also involved relations with North Korea, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. Difficulties between the two principal countries seemed to come more from the Japanese side than from the south Koreans. Japan was willing to use its relations with South Korea to further its own strategic interests, without getting too deeply involved in the crises on the Korean peninsula. Japan

was willing to help indirectly with economic support, but would not commit herself militarily.

However, the South Korean government did benefit considerably from relations with Japan. Japanese economic aid enabled South Korea to recover from the Korean War, consolidate her military strength, and effectively meet the threat from North Korea and maintain her national security.

Fluctuations in the security picture clearly played a significant role in producing fluctuations in the movement toward increased accommodation between South Korea and Japan. Though the intensity of the threat from North Korea and her allies varied from time to time it was to a greater or lesser degree present though the entire period we are dealing with and was a major force moving the countries toward accommodation.

CHAPTER IV

FORCES FOR ACCOMMODATION: ECONOMIC FACTORS

The accommodation that took place between South Korea and Japan after World War II was both political and economic in character. That is both closer political and closer economic ties were forged. The relationship between those two sorts of ties as they developed was a complex one. In the main increases in political cooperation made possible increase in economic cooperation. At the same time the drive toward political cooperation often resulted not simply from strategic considerations but also from a desire for economic gain.

Every economic exchange was inevitably measured in terms of its potential political consequences. Japanese economic power was increasingly used to secure political benefits. In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship of economics to the politics of accommodation.

The Establishment of Economic Cooperation: 1951-1964

The beginning of economic cooperation between South Korea and Japan, after 1951, was influenced by the interaction of three dynamic forces: domestic political developments, economic conditions, and the involvement of the United States. Japan's domestic situation was in complete turmoil as a result of her defeat in World War II. In South

Korean political circles there was still a great fear and hatred of Japanese militarism, which was a result of Japan's role in the war and the lingering hostility from the colonial period. Although Japan and South Korea were at different levels of development and pursued differing economic policies, the war had also left the economies of both countries in ruin. Both were therefore to become economic dependencies of the United States.

In June of 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War further complicated the situation. Immediately after the North Korean attack, Japan supported the U.S. sponsored resolution in the United Nations Security Council calling for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean troops to the 38th parallel. In spite of tremendous difficulties associated with post-war restoration. Japan supported the war effort of South Korea by selling her arms.

The war presented a major threat to America's strategic interest in Asia. North Korean forces immediately captured Seoul, the South Korean capital, and, with the help of the Chinese, almost captured the city of Bu San, the second largest city in the country. Under these alarming circumstances, the United States began to apply pressure on Japanese officials to come to the aid of South Korea. Under U.S. influence, Japan and South Korea signed a mutual security treaty. Supplying military aid to South Korea, was an important impetus to Japanese industrial recovery and

development.

In the years immediately following the Korean War, U.S. assistance was a critical importance to South Korean recovery.¹ U.S. assistance during these difficult years was not limited to economic aid, but also included a comprehensive collaboration in the fields of culture, science, and military support. A great many qualified experts, from UNKRA (United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency), participated in the development of a plan for South Korean recovery. U.S. aid to South Korea increased dramatically after 1954 and reached a peak in 1957 of \$383 million.² Due to American assistance, South Korean economic growth increased by about 5% per year during this period.³

In spite of continuing U.S. influence, and the influx of American and Japanese aid, economic relations between South Korea and Japan did not improve significantly. The victory of Hatoyama Ichiro in Japan's national elections of 1954, brought to power a left-wing government determined to create a foreign policy independent of superpower influence.⁴ The Hatoyama government began to pursue economic relations with

¹Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han, The U.S.-South Korean Alliance(Lexington: Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983), pp. 187-191.

²Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han, The U.S.-South Korean Alliance, p. 187.

³Ibid, p. 187.

⁴Mainichi Shimbun, December 16, 1954.

North Korea.

Surprised and alarmed by the actions of the Hatoyama government, the U.S. reacted quickly. In August of 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a strong communique to Japan insisting that Japan should avoid establishing relations with communist countries.⁵ Dulles' demands made the Hatoyama government more firmly resolved in their pursuit of North Korean relations. However, United States' interest prevailed with the establishment of the new pro-American government of Kishi Nobusuke in February of 1956. Japan once again renewed efforts to improve relations with South Korea and follow an anti-communist foreign policy line.⁶

And yet, during this period (1956-60), Japanese economic relations with North Korea continued. Two important trade agreements were concluded between the two countries. The first agreements were concluded between the two countries. The first agreement was reached on September 27, 1957 and called for the establishment of concrete regulations on the classification and rating of export items.⁷ The second was reached on April 23, 1958, and called upon both countries to seek the realization of the free exchange of trade missions

⁵ Ibid, August 30, 1956.

⁶ Chae-jin Lee, Japna Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 34.

⁷ Nodong Shinmun, October 22, 1955.

for the purpose of economic development.⁸

Meanwhile, South Korean-Japanese economic relations had not improved much during the 1950s. The problem centered around some complex political issues between the two countries, involving fishery disputes, the repatriation of Korean residents, and Syngman Rhee's personal animosities.⁹ However, economic relations had begun to emerge as a result of the strong military and economic dependencies of both countries upon the United States. The most important factor leading to South Korean-Japanese economic accommodation was thus their mutual ties to the United States.

Between 1960-64, relations between Japan and South Korea improved significantly. Relations became especially close after the establishment of the new military regime in South Korea in 1961. The era of hostility and the legacy of colonial hatred were laid to rest with the demise of the Rhee regime. The establishment, in May of that year, of the government of Park Chung Hee, began a period of political accommodation, which had important implications for economic relations.

In Japan, important political changes had begun in the summer of 1960, which led to new directions in domestic and

⁸ Kang In-dok, "Pukhan ui Daeil Chongchaek Baljon Kwachong e Kwanhan Yonku" (Study on the development of North Korea's policy toward Japan), The Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol XIII, No. 1, March 1970, p. 68.

⁹ Dong A Il Bo, June 15, 1959.

foreign policy, with implications that were to lead to significant improvements in relations with South Korea. In July, Ikeda Hayato became Prime Minister of Japan, appointing Kosaka Zentaro the new foreign minister. In his effort to maintain close ties with the U.S., Ikeda decided to work for better relations with South Korea. To this end, he sent his foreign minister to South Korea, in September, to attend the inauguration ceremonies for the Second Republic. This gesture of friendship was greatly appreciated in South Korea.¹⁰

On economic issues, Japanese and South Korean policies were often divergent. The Ikeda Administration had a more international approach than South Korea. This included the development of economic ties with North Korea, under the "seikei bunri" policy (separating economics from politics).

During the 1950s, with security concerns taken over by the United States, Japan was able to concentrate completely on economic development. As the 1960's arrived, American withdrawal from Northeast Asia placed an increasing security burden on Japan. These new security concerns forced Japan into closer ties with South Korea. To achieve greater economic and military stability, and to pursue her policy of expanding trade and investments so as to compete in the world market, Japan was increasingly inclined toward a policy of accommodation with South Korea.

¹⁰ Japan Times, September 6, 1960.

South Korea had a different set of concerns. The new military regime favored a policy of rapid economic expansion.¹¹ While it continued to experience difficulties in the area of technological acquisition and the diminution of U.S. aid caused problems, the military leadership called for an expansion of all major elements of foreign trade, with great emphasis placed on general exports and the extension of South Korea's willingness to accept credits.¹² South Korea's economic goals, and the difficulties encountered meeting them, logically pointed to the need for accommodation with Japan.¹³

Both countries took a number of measures to underscore their mutual economic interest in improved relations. During Prime Minister Ikeda's summit meeting with President Kennedy, in June of 1961, Japan was encouraged to provide South Korea with economic assistance.¹⁴ As a result, relations between South Korea and Japan improved noticeably.

In August of 1961, Kim Yu-Taek, Minister of Economic Planning in South Korea, went to Japan to discuss a variety of economic issues with Japanese leaders. During the visit he was quoted as saying that political normalization was a

¹¹Korean Stenographic Association, ed., The National Assembly Record of the Third Republic, Vol. V (Seoul: Yonhap Insaee-Sa, 1964), p. 113.

¹²Cho Sun Il Bo, May 19, 1965.

¹³Seoul Shinmun, March 7, 1964.

¹⁴Japan Times, June 22, 1961.

necessary prerequisite to the economic development of both countries. After his visit, a number of meetings took place attempting to establish a process of negotiation that would lead to mutual economic cooperation.¹⁵

In November of 1961, the growing contacts between the two countries reached a high point with the Japanese visit of President Park Chung Hee. The visit went well. There were long productive talks with Prime Minister Ikeda. At the conclusion of the visit, a joint statement was issued. In it both leaders agreed to develop areas of cooperation rather than conflict and to avoid critical statements that had marred relations in the past.¹⁶

Japanese desires for accommodation with South Korea were also influenced by continued U.S. pressures. In December of 1962, Averell Harriman, Undersecretary of State, was quoted, in an interview with MAINICHI SHIMBUN, as saying that the United States was willing to help with Japanese-South Korean normalization negotiations, and that the U.S. and Japan should assist South Korean economic development.¹⁷ These improvements were furthered by the manifest desire of both the Ikeda and Park administrations to work for accommodation by preparing for a South Korean goodwill visit to Japan and

¹⁵ Japan Times, January 20, 1962.

¹⁶ Daehan Minguk Joungbu (the Government of South Korea), Han Il Hoedam Baksou (The White Paper on Korean-Japanese Negotiation) (Seoul: South Korean Government, 1965), p. 156.

¹⁷ Mainichi Shimbun, December 20, 1962.

by the decision of the Japanese government to endorse bilateral economic assistance to South Korea.

Toward Progress in Economic Relations: 1965-1972

After 1965, economic issues were central to the evolving relations between South Korea and Japan. The two countries had differing economic and political motivations. From the Japanese perspective, South Korea was a major market for Japanese exports and a shield against the communist threat from the north.¹⁸ For South Korea, Japanese economic assistance was essential for her own economic growth and stability as well as her strategic survival. The conclusion of the Diplomatic Normalization Treaty of 1965 ensured a firm political foundation for further economic relations.

South Korean-Japanese economic cooperation came to be coordinated through the Commission on Economic Cooperation, which consisted of representatives from leading business groups, and the Ministerial Conference, which consisted of high ranking government officials.¹⁹ The first meeting was held in Tokyo, in August of 1967, while subsequent annual meetings alternated between Seoul and Tokyo. The head of the South Korean delegation was Chang Ki Yong, president of HAN KUK IL BO (Korean Daily News). He was a skilled economic

¹⁸ Sanup Kyongje Shinmun, October 4, 1969.

¹⁹ Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea (New York: Columbia University aPress, 1985), p. 182.

manager with long and close ties with Japan.

The scope and variety of the annual Ministerial Conferences agendas increased as the 1970's approached. Close coordination of economics--including trade, aid, and investment--was encouraged within the context of political relations. Conference goals included maintaining a strong credit rating for South Korean export markets.

The improvement in Japanese-South Korean economic relations was expressed in two policy areas: economic aid and trade. Japanese aid was perhaps the single most important factor leading to South Korea's swift rapprochement with Japan. Through the Ministerial Conference channels, this aid served a major role in South Korea's First and Second Five Year Plans (1962-66, 1966-71). During the first, Japanese assistance totaled nearly \$630 million and, in the second, nearly \$2,858 million.²⁰

Between 1966-68, the Japanese government also appropriated \$442 million in financial loans for capital formation and technical assistance for South Korean economic development.²¹ Under the technical assistance program, a

²⁰In the First Five Year Plan (1962-1966), Japanese capital constituted 29 percent of the total foreign capital. In the Second Plan (1967-1971), it constituted 19.3 percent of the total. See Hong N. Kim, "Japan's Policy Toward the Two Koreas and Korean Reunification," Korea and World Affairs (Seoul) (Summer 1977), p. 1163.

²¹Young C. Kim and Abraham Halpern (ed.), The Future of the Korean Peninsula, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 25.

number of Japanese specialists were sent to South Korea. Prime Minister Sato was particularly interested in this kind of assistance. He did much to facilitate cooperative working relationships between the technicians in both countries.

Sato's concern for technical assistance is best illustrated by the Pohang Steel Mill construction project. In the late 1960s, the Park regime had initiated a major review of the project with economic assistance from the United States and West Germany. From the beginning, the South Koreans had been dissatisfied with their backers lack of enthusiasm for the project. At the Third Ministerial Conference, held in Tokyo in 1969, the Japanese expressed an interest in cooperating with the project and agreed to invest \$143.7 million in Japanese capital.²²

Technical assistance was an important component of Japanese economic aid. Technical support and training was a vital ingredient in South Korean economic development. Virtually all technical personnel, from director and chief engineer to shop and section chiefs, as well as other workers participating directly in plant construction, were specially trained by the Japanese for specific industrial objectives. This training encompassed construction operations, equipment

²²At the third ministerial conference (Tokyo, August 26-28, 1969), the Japanese side expressed its interest in cooperating with the construction of the Pohang Steel Mill and agreed to invest the \$143.7 million of Japanese capital. Japanese companies, such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and C. Itoh, Japanese Competition in International Markets (Berkeley, 1975), p. 194.

installations, preparation of individual productions within specific enterprises, and the initiation of operations. Of the total number of technological items imported world-wide, 65.6% came from Japan from 1962 to June 1977.²³

In the field of trade, the asymmetry of the relations between the two countries has been particularly marked. Since the mid-1960s, Japan has been the main source of South Korean imports and exports.²⁴ In 1966, 67, 68, and 72, Japan provided 41%, 44.5%, 42.7%, and 40.9%, respectively, of South Korean imports, while receiving 26.5%, 26.5%, 22.2%, and 25.1%, respectively, of South Korean exports.²⁵ During this period (1966-72), Japan's imports from South Korea increased absolutely (see Table 4). In spite of the political fallout from the Kim Dae Jung affair, South Korea continued to be the main buyer of Japanese goods. And, while the United States remained the largest purchaser of South Korean goods until 1972, in 1973 Korean exports to Japan surpassed those of the

²³ Korea International Economic Institute, Kisul doip ui hyonhwang kwa Kwaje: Iibon Kisul Doip Yerul Jungsimuro (Seoul, 1977), p.31.

²⁴ The major reasons for Korea's attraction of Japanese businessmen were geographical proximity, guarantees of repayment to foreign lenders by the commercial banks, inexpensive labor, and the Confucian behavior deeply rooted in both societies. See David Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). pp. 181-182.

²⁵ Before normalization, between 1961 and 1964, the annual average Japanese export to South Korea had been \$133 million. After normalization, between 1966 and 1970, the annual average was \$586 million. See Table VI.

TABLE 4
TRADE AMONG JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA,
AND THE UNITED STATES: 1961-1977
(in million dollars)

Year +	Japanese Imports from S. Korea	Japanese Exports to South Korea	U.S. Imports from S. Korea	U.S. Exports to S. Korea
1961	19	69	7	143
1962	24	109	12	220
1963	25	159	24	184
1964	38	110	36	202
1965	44	167	62	182
1966	66	294	96	254
1967	85	443	137	305
1968	100	624	236	452
1969	133	754	321	530
1970	234	809	395	585
1971	262	954	532	678
1972	408	1,031	759	647
1973	1,242	1,727	1,021	1,202
1974	1,380	2,621	1,492	1,701
1975	1,293	2,434	1,536	1,881
1976	1,802	3,099	2,493	1,963
1977	2,148	3,927	3,119	2,447

Source: Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea, p. 160, citing U.S. Department of Commerce; South Korea Agency of Customs Administration; and Korea Herald.

United States. South Korean exports to Japan consisted primarily of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods, while the major Japanese exports were heavy machinery, machine tools, and scientific and industrial equipment.

Given South Korea's dramatic shifts in economic policy, following the 1965 normalization of relations with Japan, it is tempting to characterize the late 1960's as a period of Japanese economic dominance of South Korea. During this period, South Korea came to occupy what might be described as satellite status, as Japan gained increased influence over South Korean domestic economic policies.²⁶

After normalization, South Korea maintained a consistently unfavorable balance of trade. As the figures in Table 5 indicate, the trade deficit in the years 1968-70 was well over \$500 million, and by 1971 it had reached \$692 million. One of the many unfortunate results of this growing foreign trade deficit, and the injection of Japanese loans into the South Korean economy, was that South Korea was forced to rely increasingly on its foreign debt. The size of the debt made debt servicing increasingly difficult and placed South Korea's credit standing in international circles in jeopardy.

²⁶ Paul W. Kuznets, Economic growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea (New Haven: Yale University, 1977), p.86.

TABLE 5

SOUTH KOREA'S TRADE BALANCE WITH JAPAN, 1961-1977

(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Trade Deficit	Total
	with Japan	Trade Deficit
1961	50	275
1962	86	367
1963	134	473
1964	62	285
1965	123	288
1966	228	466
1967	358	676
1968	524	1,008
1969	621	1,021
1970	575	1,149
1971	692	1,326
1972	623	898
1973	485	1,015
1974	1,241	2,391
1975	1,141	2,193
1976	1,267	590
1977	1,778	764

Source: The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, annual.

All of these trends were particularly alarming for South Korea. Vice Prime Minister Chang Ki Yong pointed out many times that the unfavorable trade balance was a serious threat to the maintenance of South Korean-Japanese accommodation.²⁷

Emergence of Political Complications After 1971

Japanese-South Korean economic relations, after 1971, may be divided into two main periods, which correspond to several major political incidents. The first period (1971-74), covers the time from the Japanese trade agreement with North Korea, in January, 1972, until the Kim Dae Jung incident of August, 1973. The second period (1975-87), covers the time from the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, until 1987.

In the early 1970s, there was reason for optimism, as both countries expressed their desire for cooperation. However, beginning early in 1972, political events began to threaten economic achievements. Although it was a private agreement between the Japanese Dietment League and North Korea, the January trade agreement marks the formal beginning of Japanese economic assistance to the North Koreans.²⁸ This agreement was aimed at the establishment of a total volume of

²⁷ (ed.) Choe Song Yol, "Chang Ki Yong, Problems Between South Korean and Japan and the South Korean Position", (Seoul, 1969), pp. 421-442.

²⁸ Dong A Il Bo, January 24, 1972.

trade, between 1972 and 1976, of almost 200 million pounds.²⁹ Aware of the effect this would have in South Korea, the Tanaka administration tried to avoid announcing its intention to provide substantial industrial equipment and technology for North Korean industrial development.

The South Korean government registered strong objections to the trade agreements. It consistently argued that the agreements would tend to increase North Korean belligerence, upset the balance of power on the Korean peninsula, and endanger South Korean security.³⁰ While sincere in accepting the objections from South Korea, Japanese spokesmen insisted that its economic relations with North Korea did not in any way upset the balance of power or threaten South Korea. These strongly held contrary opinions had a decidedly negative impact on Japanese-South Korean relations.³¹

A year and a half later, in August of 1973, the kidnapping of South Korean presidential candidate, Kim Dae Jung, in a Tokyo hotel, by a South Korean agent, added more strain to South Korean-Japanese relations. The reaction of the Japanese government created further tensions. Japanese officials protested, in the strongest possible terms, and

²⁹ Ibid., January 24, 1972.

³⁰ Dong A Il Bo, January 24, 1972.

³¹ The Tanaka government's policy of expanding economic, cultural, and personal exchanges with North Korea (1972-74) put a strain on relations between South Korea and Japan. See Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, p. 158.

demanded that the South Korean government return Kim to Japan immediately. For, although Kim was a South Korean citizen, the abduction took place on Japanese soil. This action by South Korean agents was clearly a violation of Japanese sovereignty. South Korean President Park refused to yield to these pressures, arguing that the incident involved South Korean domestic politics.

The disagreements over Japan's handling of the Kim Dae Jung affair created a serious breach between the two countries, which adversely effected economic relations. The Tanaka government decided to reduce economic aid to South Korea.³² A loan already promised for South Korea's Third Five Year Plan was substantially reduced (from \$170 million to \$45 million).³³ The Tanaka administration decided to review the entire South Korean development program. Reservations were expressed as to Japan's position on aid to the Pohang Steel Mill project, and the annual ministerial conference of 1973 was postponed.

The actions of the Tanaka administration, following the Kim Dae Jung incident, were highly controversial and widely criticized. President Park registered a strong protest and demanded that Japan explain her actions. But the Tanaka administration could not be swayed, and the result was a marked departure from prevailing economic policies

³² Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, pp. 157-158.

³³ Ibid., p. 158.

established between Japan and South Korea.³⁴

This situation did not improve until the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1975. This created incentives for renewed economic and political relations between Japan and South Korea. In Japanese eyes, the victory of North Vietnam could have implications for security on the Korean peninsula.³⁵ It might motivate the North Koreans to once again attempt to unify the peninsula by force.

In 1975, the Miki administration initiated a major review of Japanese foreign policy in Northeast Asia. Concerned with East Asian security, Miki expressed his desire to improve relations with South Korea.³⁶ While his insistence on maintaining economic ties with the North evoked strong criticism in the South, both parties recognized the importance of reestablishing relations.

In 1976, when the Fukuda administration came to power, it was widely assumed in both South Korea and Japan that relations would continue to improve. Fukuda was known to be a supporter of South Korea and relations did improve during his administration. Both countries took measures to underscore their mutual economic interest in improved

³⁴Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 186-187.

³⁵Tae Hwan Kwak, Chonghan Kim, and Hong nack Kim (eds.), Korean Reunification (Seoul: Kyungnam University, 1984), p. 204.

³⁶Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han (eds.), p. 188.

relations. In September of 1975, the eighth ministerial conference was held, in an atmosphere markedly different from that of the previous talks held in December of 1973.

Although the Japanese declined to committ themselves to a specific amount of aid, they reversed their 1973 position and promised to provide public loans for various projects associated with South Koreas plans for economic development. Also, in June of 1977, the Japanese administration ratified the continental shelf agreement and agreed to provide scientific-technical cooperation for South Korea's seaboard development, and promised to continue economic aid to South Korea.

To summarize, in the period after 1951 political relations between Japan and South Korea did much to define the scope of economic relations. Economic relations between the two countries were mutually dependent parts of a pattern of relations consisting of Japanese economic assistance to South Korea and South Korea's security shield for Japan. Although specific political conflicts (like the Kim Dae Jung incident) created strained relations, South Korea's economic problems and Japan's security needs created an atmosphere conducive to economic and political accommodation.

CHAPTER V

FORCES FOR ACCOMMODATION: GENERATIONAL FACTORS

This chapter examines the relationship between leadership changes in South Korea and rapprochement with Japan. South Korea's Confucian heritage, with its strong emphasis on centralized authority, has left her perhaps the most centralized and uniformly administered nation in Northeast Asia.¹ Because of this, the power to plan and make policy is concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of the head of state.² Therefore, one of the most significant factors effecting the evolution of relations with Japan has been the changing leadership styles of the three chief executives who have governed South Korea since World War II: Syngman Rhee (1948-60), John M. Chang (1960-61), and Park Chung Hee (1961-79). Each regime related to Japan in specific ways that determined the course of accommodation. The Rhee regime was hostile and stubbornly anti-Japanese. Chang was not hostile toward Japan, but his short tenure in office and his ineffectiveness politically, left him relatively powerless to pursue accommodation, and therefore represents only a transitional phase. The Park regime was enthusiastically pro-Japanese and politically effective, and

¹Harold C. Hinton, Korea Under New Leadership (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 24.

²Ibid., p. 38.

therefore completed the process of normalization of relations with Japan.

The purposes of this chapter will be to analyze the political character of these three key personalities and their roles in the reshaping of South Korean-Japanese relations.

Syngman Rhee (1948-60)

After thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule of Korea (1910-45), the two countries undertook to follow independent courses after World War II. Japan was preoccupied with the problems of rebuilding the nation, while the Korea peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel by Soviet and American occupying forces. This division set in motion political forces that led to the Korean War. In May of 1948, with the support of the Soviet Union, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the north with its capital at Pyongyang, and in the south, with American backing, the Republic of Korea was established with its capital at Seoul.

Dr. Syngman Rhee was chosen as president of South Korea in July of that year and remained in power for 4 terms until, at the age of 85, he was ousted in 1960 amid charges of corruption and fraud. His rule was characterized as autocratic and extremely hostile toward Japan. Although Japan sought to establish relations with South Korea

throughout the Rhee years, the personal animosities of President Rhee made any form of accommodation virtually impossible.

Syngman Rhee was born to a poor family in Whanghai province in northern Korea on March 26, 1875. He was in his mid-seventies when he came to the presidency and had lived much of his life abroad. He had been influenced by two quite different cultural traditions: the Chinese Confucianism of his Korean childhood and Western European Christianity.³ His childhood was spent in a Korean community that was governed strictly by the Confucian code of behavior, which emphasized ritual courtesy and rigid conformance to prescribed etiquette and protocol devised for all manner of relationships and for all probable situations. Until the age of 19, Rhee was taught in the home by a relative, who tutored him according to the Confucian educational tradition.

In the fall of 1894, with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Rhee turned nineteen and was encouraged by a friend to attend the Pai Jai Middle School, recently established by Methodist missionaries. Young Rhee had a great interest in the west. So, in spite of his father's strong objections, he entered the Pai Jai school at Seoul, as a regular student.⁴ During his years at Pai Jai (1894-1897),

³ Kyung Cho Chung, New Korea (New York: The Macmillan Company., 1962), p. 15.

⁴ Ibid, p. 15.

he became increasingly interested in American democracy and became convinced that Korean society must be westernized and democratized.

During his years at Pai Jai, the Sino-Japanese War continued. Within a few months of Japan's military initiative, the unorganized and dispirited Chinese were completely defeated. The Chinese advisors in Korea were expelled and replaced by Japanese, who, for the moment, pledged to guarantee Korea's complete independence. However, at the same time, Japan began informally to take control of all Korean internal political affairs.

Early in 1896, the Independence Club was founded for the purpose of encouraging the Japanese to withdraw from Korea. From its inception, Syngman Rhee was very active in the Independence Club and quickly rose to a position of leadership in the movement. Rhee and his associates demanded from Japan a policy of non-intervention in Korea's internal affairs. In 1897, at the age of 22, Rhee was imprisoned for his nationalistic activities by the Japanese authorities.⁵

During his seven years in prison (1897-1904), affairs in Korea continued on their dismal course. The Independence Club was completely destroyed. Rhee decided to use his prison time constructively, by writing a book setting forth the principles of the independence movement. He argued that

⁵Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1960), p. 32.

the reason that all previous independence movements had failed was because they had neglected to educate the public. He gathered his ideas into a massive political treatise, entitled Dong Nip Jung Shin (The Spirit of Independence).⁶ It described various American political principles and institutions, and argued the value of education for the Korean reform movement. He completed 34 chapters before his release from prison in 1904. The Spirit of Independence was finally published on February 19, 1904. It became the political bible of the Korean people.

After his release from prison, Rhee went abroad, attending George Washington University and studying American history, economics, and sociology. After graduating from George Washington, in 1905, he entered Harvard, where he received an MA in international relations, in 1908. He then continued his studies at Princeton, where he received his Ph.D. in international law, in 1910.⁷

Rhee's two years at Princeton were probably the most influential years of his academic career. The president of Princeton at that time was Woodrow Wilson, who later became president of the United States. Wilson's ideas on self-determination encouraged Rhee, during his student years, to continue his ties with the Korean independence movement and

⁶ Ibid, pp. 35-36.

⁷ Kyung Cho Chung, New Korea (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 16.

played a major role in his political career, after he returned to Korea.⁸

After he completed his studies at Princeton, Rhee accepted a position with the Y.M.C.A., in Seoul. He returned to Korea in 1911, and found a country under complete Japanese domination. Christian churches in Korea had had their charters revoked and had been placed under Japanese administration. His involvement with a christian organization had, once again, brought him directly under Japanese authority. He was determined to leave Korea for the safety of the west where he could work with the independence movement. With his nomination as a Korean delegate to a Methodist convention in Minnaeapolis providing him passage, Rhee left Korea in the the spring of 1912.

While in exile, he continued his nationalist activism and was a major leader of the independence movement until the end of World War II. He worked at the various headquarters of the indepenence movement around the world, in the U.S., Hawaii, and Shanghi, China.⁹ In April of 1919, a group on Korean nationalists met in Shanghi, to form a provisional government, and elected Syngman Rhee as president. His role in the new provisional government provided him with a quasi-

⁸ Kij-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea, p. 340.

⁹ Robert T. Oliver, The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1955) , pp. 156-207.

official status, that allowed him to carry on diplomatic relations on behalf of Korea for the next three decades.¹⁰

When Dr. Rhee returned to Korea in 1945, there was a tremendous amount of popular resentment against Japanese rule. His ascent to power was the natural outcome of his participation in the independence movement and his leadership of the provisional government. This experience, as well as his academic background in international law, gave him the expertise and motivation to exercise absolute control over foreign policy. Accordingly, Rhee's personal prejudices against the Japanese came to be embodied in his administration's foreign policy.

Rhee did not trust the Japanese. From the perspective of national security, he was not in agreement with the U.S. security policy in Japan. He felt that it would be better for world peace and South Korean national security if the United States and South Korea cooperated in a policy that would isolate Japan from the Free World. He felt that U.S. diplomatic support and economic aid were not only dangerous, but misguided. In spite of U.S. pressures, South Korea refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951, by which Japan regained her independence.¹¹ Indeed, Rhee's attitude toward Japan was so determinedly hostile that the Japanese were not invited to Asian League meetings and conferences

¹⁰ Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 50.

¹¹ Dong A Il Bo, July 18, 1951.

attended by South Korea.¹² It soon became clear that one of the major functions of the league, in Rhee's view, was to alert fellow Asians to the danger of Japanese resurgence.

As a result of his long involvement in the independence movement, Dr. Rhee was particularly interested in the emerging nations of Asia. Early in 1954, he realized a long-cherished ambition, with the establishment of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League, a loose group of delegations from various Free World nations, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. The first meeting was held at Rhee's vacation resort, Chinhae, in southern Kyoung Sang province, in South Korea. Here, one of Rhee's first proposals was to bar Japan from membership in the league. Rhee's motives were interpreted as a further attempt to establish a system of alliances that would isolate Japan.¹³

In contrast to Rhee's position, the leaders of other Asian nations, that had suffered Japanese domination and oppression, like Taiwan and the Philippines, did not let past antipathies prevent them from building up a flourishing trade with Japan. Alone in Asia, Rhee pursued a policy of isolation, attempting to block Japan's entry into the Free World.

¹²Edmund Clubb, "Rhee's War on Japan, The Nation, November, 1955, p. 376.

¹³Richard C. Allen Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 188.

From Rhee's perspective, "neutralist" Japan was extremely dangerous, especially in her ability to delude the United States as to her true motives, which were Machiavellian and deceptive.¹⁴ Rhee charged that Japan was planning a new invasion of Korea and, even during the Korean War, labored strenuously to exclude Japan as a source for war materials and support.¹⁵

Another important factor that obstructed accommodation under Rhee was the political outlook of his closest advisors, who had also been recruited from the independence movement. Like Rhee, these men had very hostile attitudes toward Japan. Since most of Rhee's advisors had devoted their lives to the independence movement, it was almost impossible for them to even consider normalization of relations with Japan. Also, by utilizing old friends from the independence movement, Rhee had surrounded himself with yes-men who accepted the Rhee line without question.¹⁶ Those who suggested a more pragmatic approach, as an alternative to Rhee's emotionalism, were removed from office.

One of his most influential advisors, Pun Young Tae, was South Korea's chief representative to the United Nations. He

¹⁴Office of Public Informatin, South Korea, Korea Fleming High: Excerpts from Statement by President Syngman Rhee in 1954-1955, Vol. II (Seoul, 1956), p. 16.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 51

¹⁶Chong Shin Kim, Seven Years with Korea's Park Chung Hee (Seoul: Hollym Corporation: Publishers, 1967), p. 184.

later became foreign minister and Prime Minister under Rhee. He also served as a member of parliament and represented the government at many international conferences. Pun was an outspoken critic of Japanese colonial policy. He feared what he felt was Japan's inherent militarism and therefore could never agree to policies encouraging negotiations with Japan.¹⁷ Like Pun, most of Rhee's influential advisors were undoubtedly more preoccupied with settling old scores from the first half of the twentieth century, than with establishing a workable foreign policy for the second half.

In the face of such hostility, Japanese leaders reacted strongly. At the third round of talks between the two countries, in October of 1953, Japan announced a new set of conditions for normalizations of relations with South Korea, including the right to demand compensation from South Korea, for benefits received from Japan over the 36 year colonial period.¹⁸ The chief delegate from Japan, Kubota Kanichiro, was quoted in the Korean press, as saying that, from his view of Asian diplomatic history, if Japan had not taken control of Korea, she would have been occupied by some other country, and would have experience a more miserable situation than she did under Japanese rule.¹⁹ This remark incited violent anti-

¹⁷ Young Tae Pun, Korea, My Country (Seoul, 1954), p. 68.

¹⁸ Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea, . p. 169.

¹⁹ You Chan Yang, "The Aspiration of Korea," The Annals, Vol. 294 (July, 1954), p.44

Japanese reactions among the Korean people. Korea withdrew its delegation and demanded a formal apology from Japan. As a result, normalization negotiations were suspended for nearly four years.

Rhee's proclamation of the Peace Line (later known as the Rhee Line), which delineated disputed territorial waters, gave South Korea a larger area than had originally been proposed by General MacArthur. This further aggravated tensions between the two countries. Japanese Prime Minister Kishi retaliated by proposing a repatriation scheme for Korean residents living in Japan to return to North Korea.

Despite shrill protests from Rhee, the Kishi government proceeded with its plans for repatriation throughout 1959. Once again, Seoul broke off normalization negotiations and Rhee hinted that he would attempt to intercept any repatriation ship bound for North Korea. But, in December, in spite of Rhee's threats, the exodus began.²⁰ This cycle of mutual recrimination and hostility deepened the already well-established antagonistic attitudes.

In addition, public opinion in South Korea, further reinforced Rhee's emotionalism. Deep-seated anti-Japanese sentiments permeated popular attitudes, aggravating the tensions between the two countries. Each country developed prejudiced and myopic stereotypical images of the other. The

²⁰ Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 190.

Japanese considered Koreans coarse and backward; Koreans considered Japanese deceitful and manipulative.²¹

In short, Syngman Rhee, and the generation exposed to Japanese colonial rule, harbored extremely negative views toward Japan, which made rapproachment virtually impossible. The attitude of the Rhee regime toward Japan was mainly one of resentment, hostility, fear, and envy. Above all, there existed a deep distrust and suspicion, firmly rooted in recent Korean history. Evidence suggests that the unresolved diplomatic issues and conflicts were not necessarily the root causes for the bitter relations between the two countries. They can be more adequately explained as the symptoms of a deep-seated prejudice, born out of the bitter historical experiences shared by the two countries.

John M. Chang (1960-1961)

With Rhee's resignation, the prospects for improved relations with Japan brightened significantly. In August of 1960, the Second Republic was established under the leadership of John M. Chang. Although an honest and intelligent man, Chang was cautious and short on political experience. He was therefore a weak leader, who was unable to meet the challenges of the extremely demanding domestic

²¹Minority Status and Radicalism in Japan," Studies in Race and Nation, III, 4, 1972-73, p. 5.

and international situation he inherited from Rhee.²² Chang held power for only nine months before being ousted in the military coup that brought Park Chung Hee to power in 1961.

During the brief tenure of John M. Chang, the leadership's personal animosities were no longer an obstacle to Japanese-South Korean relations. Chang was eager to strengthen ties with Japan. A brief look into his background and personality will help explain his role in the transition toward better relations with Japan.

John M. Chang was born on August 28, 1899, in Seoul. His family was Catholic, which put him in touch with European culture from an early age.²³ He was sent abroad to study, attending Manhattan College, in New York City, and then Rochester University, where he received a Ph.D. in education. After returning to Korea, he served as principal of Dong Sung High School, in Seoul, one of the major Catholic foundation schools, for fifteen years (1934-48). Chang was not active in the independence movement. He felt that the best way to achieve independence was through education, as opposed to political activism.

This uninspiring high school principle was to become the major opposition party leader under Rhee. In South Korea, the president and vice-president are elected on separate

²²Harold C. Hinton, Korea Under New Leadership, p. 31.

²³Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual (Seoul: Republic of Korea, 1966), p. 433.

tickets. In 1956, the major opposition party, the Democrats, chose Chang as their vice-presidential candidate. While the presidential race went smoothly, re-electing Rhee with an easy victory, the vice-presidential race did not.

As the votes were counted, it became increasingly clear that Chang was winning a large majority in the cities. Even in the rural areas, where Rhee's Liberal party had repeatedly capitalized on the political apathy of the country people, Rhee's hand-picked running mate, Lee Ki-bung, was barely holding his own. Chang won only about 46% of the vote. But the pro-administration vote was split among three maveric Liberals, and Chang won an unexpected upset.

To the long suffering Korean people, Chang became a hero and a symbol of hope.²⁴ However, Rhee himself had no contact with his vice-president and, in effect, isolated him from the everyday functioning of the government.

In the 1960 election, although Rhee was now 85 years old, he sought re-election for fourth term. With Rhee's age as a factor, the vice-presidential race became much more important. The real race that year was between Chang and Rhee's runningmate, Lee Ki-Bung, Speaker of the National Assembly. While Chang had soundly defeated Lee in 1956, this time Lee received nearly four times the number of votes cast for Chang. Chang immediately protested, charging the Rhee regime with election fraud. In the middle of March, Chang

²⁴Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, pp. 218-219.

formally declaring that the Korean people had been completely deprived of their sovereign rights and that the election had been illegal. The despotism of 12 years finally fell before the wrath of students in the April Student Revolution.²⁵

After the April Student Revolution and the fall of Rhee, Chang's Democratic Party won an easy victory in the new election held in July, and, in August, Chang's government was formed. Conscious of his indebtedness to the students who had played such a key role in bringing down the Rhee regime, Dr. Chang adopted a lenient attitude toward their political activities. The students, however, showed little restraint. They hit the streets almost daily with demands both trivial and exorbitant, creating a great deal of chaos.²⁶

After the establishment of the Chang government, the movement toward rapprochement with Japan was one of the new government's many policy concerns. Chang encouraged the movement toward normalization by urging Koreans to put aside their emotionalism and look at Japanese issues with objectivity and calm.²⁷ His cabinet was pro-Japanese, and

²⁵ Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual (Seoul: Republic of Korea, 1966), p. 282.

²⁶ Ibid., 283.

²⁷ Chang Myon, *Hanal ui mil i chukchi ankionun: Chan Myon Paksa Hoegorok* (Unless a Grain of Wheat is Dying: Dr. Chang Myon's Memoir), ed. by Han Chang Wun (Seoul: Catholic Press, 1967), p. 187.

with its support, Chang began to speak publicly of the need for economic cooperation with Japan.²⁸

Two of Chang's cabinet members --Foreign Minister, Chong Il Hyong and Cho Jae Chun, the Minister of Justice --were instrumental in the creation of the new pro-Japanese attitudes. Cho was a graduate of Chou University, in Japan, and had passed the Japanese civil service examination.²⁹ Although he had never held a position in the Japanese government, Cho's background left him with a positive attitude toward Japan. Chong studied in the United States and was a graduate of Drew University, in Madison, New Jersey, with a Ph.D in philosophy.³⁰ He had been involved in the independence movement, but his attitude toward Japan was far more moderate than which prevailed under Rhee.

After sending Dr. Rhee into exile in Honolulu, Chang immediately began the process that was to lead to rapprochement with Japan. When foreign Minister Koska Zentaro visited Seoul, in September of 1960, as the first official Japanese goodwill envoy in the post-war period, Chang promised to release some forty Japanese fishermen detainees. In addition, forty Korean students were sent to

²⁸Ministry of Public Information, ROK, Han Il Hoedam Ui Oje Wa Onul (South Korean-Japanese Negotiation Yesterday and Today) (Seoul : Ministry of Information, ROK, 1965), p.20.

²⁹Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual(Seoul: Republic of Korea, 1966), p. 434.

³⁰Ibid., p.440.

Japan on a cultural mission, and the first regular passenger boat service was reinstituted between South Korea and Japan.³¹ Moreover, the two countries agreed to exchange private economic missions for the purpose of promoting trade.³² And when the fifth round of talks opened in October, the atmosphere contrasted sharply with that of previous talks under Rhee. The Korean side seemed unusually conciliatory and flexible, reflecting Chang's desire for prompt restoration of relations with Japan.³³

By the end of 1960, Chang's policy of rapprochement at all costs, had evoked strong emotional reactions in South Korea. Anti-Japanese demonstrations caused the last minute postponement of a planned visit of a Japanese economic mission. Unfortunately, popular disapproval of the pace and manner of the normalization talks, left the Chang government unable to capitalize on the gains made in relation with Japan.³⁴ The domestic chaos of the student revolts created the conditions which led to the military coup of May 16, 1961, which brought Major General Park Chung Hee to power.

³¹ Japan Times, November 3, December 2, 1960.

³² Ibid., October 9, 1960.

³³ Ibid., December 3, 1960

³⁴ Ibid., January 23, 1961.

Park Chung Hee (1961-79)

Immediately following the May 16th revolution, the Park government centered its efforts on the promotion of international understanding, strengthening diplomatic ties with free nations, and cooperation with international organizations. The activities of the Korean missions overseas were increased and invitations were extended to the chief executives or foreign ministers of friendly nations to visit South Korea. Good-will missions were sent to all parts of the world to enlist international understanding and support for the new Korean government.

Of particular importance was the fact that the general framework of South Korean-Japanese relations changed drastically after the military junta came to power. The new military government recognized that the Rhee regime's hostility toward Japan had been destructive. Among Park's top priorities was the establishment of normalized relations with Japan.³⁵

The new attitudes of the Park regime were part of a generational shift in the national consciousness that was reflected in the thinking of its central policy makers. In contrast with the generation of Syngman Rhee, the new military elite felt that rapprochement with Japan would be of great advantage to both countries. However, the old pattern

³⁵Park Chung Hee, To Build A Nation (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 129.

of domination would not be tolerated. Instead, South Korea and Japan should look for ways to interact with mutual advantage politically, economically, and culturally.³⁶

The attitude of General Park and the junta toward the Japanese was clearly significantly different than that of Rhee and his associates. Thus, while relations with Japan were a consistent frustration during the 12 years of Rhee's rule, it was only four years after the military take-over that relations were formally normalized between the two countries. This difference can perhaps best be explained by examining the backgrounds of Park and his associates.

General Park was born in Ku Mi, in northern Kyoung Sang province, on September 30, 1917, the youngest son of a poor peasant family. He was exposed to Japanese culture at a relatively early age. He studied under the Japanese educational system at the Tae Ku Teacher's School, in northern Kyoung Sang province. After working as an elementary school teacher, he was sent to Japan, to study at the Japanese Imperial Military Academy.³⁷ During his prolonged stay in Japan, he was profoundly influenced by Japanese culture.

The other military leaders had similar backgrounds. However, like Park, most of the junta officers did not have backgrounds in politics. They had been trained militarily.

³⁶ Park Chung Hee, To Build A Nation, pp., 129-130.

³⁷ Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1966, p. 466.

In contrast to the policy-makers under Syngman Rhee, most of whom were over the age of sixty and had devoted their lives to the independence movement during the Japanese occupation, Park's close circle of advisors and associates were mostly under forty years of age and had been educated in Japanese schools. Because of this, Park and his associates found it easier to approach Japan for the purpose of normalizing relations.

In addition, Park's policy makers were more realistic and pragmatic than those of Syngman Rhee.³⁸ One of Park's foreign ministers, Lee Dong Won, who was appointed at the age of 38 with no previous governmental experience, held a Ph.D. in international relations from Oxford. He became chief negotiator in the South Korean-Japanese normalization talks.³⁹ His long years abroad had instilled in him a more objective view of Japan that he carried into these talks.

Park's leadership style also had a significant effect on foreign policy decisions concerning Japan.⁴⁰ While Rhee had delegated very little authority and surrounded himself with flatterers, Park sought out well-trained experts, on whose objective judgements he could depend.⁴¹ During his first

³⁸ Dong A Il Bo, May 11, 1964.

³⁹ Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1966, p. 483

⁴⁰ Harold C. Hinton, Korea Under New Leadership, pp. 32-33.

⁴¹ Chong Shin Kim, Seven Years With Korea's Park Chung Hee (Seoul : Hollym Corporation Publishers, 1967), p. 184.

years in office, he attempted to clean up the bureaucracy, openly opposing nepotism and patronage.⁴² His government, therefore, was run in a more Western style, basing policy decisions on well-thought-out, objective, and pragmatic concerns. In the context of Japanese relations, Park's foreign policy style was dramatically different from the emotionalism of the Rhee regime.

While Rhee had been preoccupied with settling the scores of the past, Park was much more willing to forgive and forget.⁴³ Rhee felt that, because the Japanese population was simply too numerous to be contained on their own islands, expansion into Korea was inevitable. However, Park felt that the Koreans were no longer slaves to Japan and must look to the future by ridding themselves of the colonial mentality. If there was to be peace in Asia, then a free South Korea must find a way to live in peace with Japan. If there was sufficient understanding and goodwill on both sides, South Korean-Japanese relations could be mutually beneficial.

From a diplomatic perspective, Rhee had proved intractable, obstinate, and stubborn in his encounters with Japan. His demands for a monetary settlement in excess of 49 billion yen was unrealistic and perhaps unreasonable.⁴⁴ His

⁴² Park Chung Hee, The Country, The Revolution and I (Seoul: Hollym Corporation Publishers, 1970), p. 64.

⁴³ Park Chung Hee, To Build A Nation, pp. 130-131.

⁴⁴ See Korean Survey, Vol. III, No. 3 (March, 1954), p. 3.

refusal to allow Japanese technicians to land in Korea to assist the United Nations efforts during the Korean War, and his continual detention of Japanese fishermen who had strayed into disputed waters claimed by South Korea, were foolish, self-defeating, and unproductive.⁴⁵

In contrast, Park's demands were coupled with a sense of compromise and flexibility. He not only welcomed Japanese technical assistance, but also neglected, to his later embarrassment, to supervise the infiltration of Japanese businessmen into Seoul prior to the signing of the treaty of basic relations.

However, with the experience of the Rhee and Chang regimes' difficulties with student protesters fresh in his mind, Park was not willing to tolerate student riots and demonstrations.⁴⁶ Korean students had played a key role in the ouster of the Rhee regime and had become politically active again. Unlike Dr. Chang, who had accepted the students' right to protest and treated them with the gentle hand of a former school teacher, Park treated the students as the serious threat he knew they could be, and publicly expressed his willingness to use military force to deal with student unrest.⁴⁷ He knew that his pro-Japanese policies

⁴⁵ Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p.350.

⁴⁶ Seoul Shinmun, May 3, 1965.

⁴⁷ Dong A Il Bo, June 3, 1964.

were likely to draw significant opposition. He attempted to convince the public that the changed international situation made normalization of relations with Japan a high priority, and that those who opposed the government would be dealt with firmly, even if it meant a proclamation of martial law.⁴⁸

In Japan, the contrast between those responsible for negotiations prior to and after 1961, was not nearly as sharp as in Korea. The Kubota statement (referred to above) and the well known personal antagonisms between Premier Yosida and Rhee were aberrations. In general Japan appears to have been represented by men of patience and self-restraint. Japanese officials had been willing to treat their volatile East Asian neighbor with some measure of dignity and respect.

Especially after 1961, Japanese negotiators, particularly foreign minister Shiina Etsusaburo, were careful to preface discussions with expressions of deep regret for Japanese actions of the past,⁴⁹ and to refer to outstanding issues by their Korean names.⁵⁰ In this same spirit, Shiina Etsusaburo's chief negotiator, Takasugi Shinichi, was reported to have said that he would respect Korea's national prestige by negotiating with her as an equal, a statement intended to repudiate charges by the Korean press of Japanese

⁴⁸ Park Chung Hee, To Build A Nation, p. 130

⁴⁹ "Documentary Material," Contemporary Japan, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, June 1965, p. 471.

⁵⁰ Chou Sun Il Bo, June 20, 1965.

insincerity. Takasugi also acknowledged, as few of his predecessors had, that the defense of the 38th parallel was of direct benefit to Japan.⁵¹ His respect for South Korean concerns, and his ardent anti-communist stance, were to act as a kind of lubricant to overcome the friction existing between the two countries.⁵²

In retrospect, the years 1961-65 were marked by negotiations between mature and balanced delegations. Both sides were keenly aware of the domestic pressures with which each country had to contend. Yet, both countries remained optimistic about achieving a final settlement in the near future. Both regarded cooperation as mutually beneficial, for security as well as economic reasons. And both countries realized that they faced some seemingly impossible obstacles, like the Dokto issue, but were willing to ignore these or side step them in ways designed to save face for both parties. These were, in short innovative men who recognized that the urgency of the moment demanded the abandonment of traditional posturing, in order to deal with a crucial foreign policy issue.

On the domestic front, Park faced the more difficult problem of overcoming the hostility the Korean people felt toward Japan. Distrust of Japan was in no way confined to policy makers. It was a national sentiment, especially among

⁵¹ Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 18, 1965.

⁵² Ibid.

the generation who had experienced Japanese colonial rule.⁵³ The Christians, who had spearheaded the Korean independence movement and were persecuted most by the Japanese, had declared the anti-Japanese struggle to be not simply a patriotic act, but also a sacred duty.⁵⁴ Anti-Japanese sentiment was amply represented by hundreds of protest demonstrations and rallies, during the determined campaign of 1964-65 to block rapprochement.⁵⁵

In addition, most South Koreans feared that their nation was not economically or politically strong enough to resist the possible economic aggression of Japan.⁵⁶ They feared, for example, that the government could not protect Korean fishermen from Japanese competition. They felt that Japan would deplete Korean fishery resources within a few years, as compensation for unsettled property claims and past economic aid to Korea. Some also pointed out that, even before the normalization of relations, a number of giant Japanese business firms had already made deep inroads into the Korean market. Faced with their overwhelming assault, and the attraction of Japanese capital, some argued that the weaker

⁵³ Park Chung Hee, To Build A Nation, pp., 129-130.

⁵⁴ "Songmyonsoh Kidokkyo moksa kyoyokja" (Declaration of Christian Ministers and Preachers), Sasangge, Vol. XIII, No. 8, pp. 156-157.

⁵⁵ Kang Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 103.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

and more corrupt Korean businessmen would become the pawns of Japanese capitalists.⁵⁷

This conflict between the military leaders, and the feelings of hostility among the Korean people demanded resolution as quickly as possible. However, the leadership had to carefully assess the public mood and not antagonize the people or do anything in the negotiation process that could result in a new Japanese colonialism.⁵⁸

A survey conducted by Seoul's Dong A Il Bo (Oriental Daily News) in December of 1964, summed up the public's views on normalization. In answer to the question. "Do you approve or disapprove of the normalization of relations with Japan?" The survey revealed that the majority of the people polled had no objections to normalization in principle (see Table 6). The survey also showed that younger people were more aware of the necessity for normalization than were older people (see Table 7). And yet, in another study conducted by Sukmyong Women's University, between March and May of 1964, it was found that a majority of the students in their survey opposed normalization (see Table 8). Among those opposed, the major reasons were (1) "apprehension of economic aggression," and (2) "the humility of South Korean diplomacy" (see Table 9).

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 104

⁵⁸ Dong A Il Bo, March 28, 1964.

TABLE 6
NATION-WIDE SURVEY ON THE NORMALIZATION ISSUE

	Nation-Wide	Urban	Rural
Approve	45%	46.1%	45%
Disapprove	28	30	26
Do not know	27	24	29

Source: 'no.5 Dae Il Kyosup ul otokebona" (How do they view the South Korean-Japanese negotiation), Dong A Il Bo, January 19, 1965.

TABLE 7
OPINIONS ON THE ISSUE: AGE DIFFERENCES

	Approve	Disapprove	Don't Know
20s	47%	26%	17%
30s	46%	29%	25%
40s	42%	36%	22%
Over 50	35%	25%	40%

Source. "How do they view the South Korean-Japanese Negotiation", Dong A Il Bo, January 19, 1965.

TABLE 8
STUDENT VIEWS ON SOUTH KOREAN-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION

Do you approve of the Korean-Japanese negotiations now being pursued by the Government?	Number	Percentage
Very much approve	37	2.5%
Tend to approve	307	21.1%
Neither approve nor disapprove	260	17.9%
Tend to disapprove	634	43.7%
Very much disapprove	214	14.7%
Total	1,452	99.9%

Source: Suk Myong Women's University, "Kyoyuk Kwa chongchi, Sae Kyo Yuk, Vol. XVI, No. 10 (October, 1964), p. 41.

TABLE 9
STUDENT VIEWS: REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL

If you disapprove or tend to disapprove, then why?	Number	Percentage
Apprehension of economic aggression	382	41.4%
Humility of South Korea Diplomacy	240	26.0%
Danger of Japanese aggression of the Peace Line	112	12.1%
Distrust of Japan	90	9.8%
Arrogance of Japan	34	3.9%
Small amount of property claims	25	2.7%
Urge for opposition	15	1.6%
Others	25	2.7%
Total	923	100.2%

Source: Suk Myong Women's University, "Kyoyuk Kwa Chongchi," Sae Kyo Yuk, Vol. XVI, No. 10 (October, 1964), p. 42.

Summary

In the early years, after the establishment of the new South Korean government under Syngman Rhee, the personal antipathies of Rhee and his advisors from the independence movement were the main obstacle to rapprochement with Japan. Rhee's rigidly held anti-Japanese sentiments translated into a policy stance that could in no way accept reconciliation with Japan, unless and until Japan fully and openly acknowledged its guilt, and apologized for its past brutality and aggression. The emotionalism of this generation of leadership, created a foreign policy stalemate, which firmly entrenched South Korea in a policy of Japanese isolation. After the ouster of the Rhee regime, the transitional government of John M. Chang, while weak and short-lived, secured a bridgehead for the normalization process. The more determined and effective efforts of the military government under Park Chung Hee successfully completed the diplomatic process that led to the 1965 treaty of normalization.

CHAPTER VI

NEGOTIATION AND NORMALIZATION: 1951-71

Normalization negotiations first began in October of 1951. It was not until June 22, 1965 that Japan and South Korea finally established normal and friendly relations by signing the Treaty on Basic Relations and Other Agreements. During the fourteen years of negotiations, there were seven formal conferences. Because of the bitterness and hostility of the early years the negotiation process produced many disappointments. The multifaceted nature of the disagreements between the two countries made the negotiation process long, difficult, and complicated. During the negotiations, both countries identified and agreed upon five distinct problem areas that had to be resolved before normalization of relations could be accomplished. These areas were as follows: (1) property claims, (2) fishery disputes, (3) the legal status of Koreans living in Japan, (4) treaty provisions on basic relations, and (5) the return of Korean cultural assets. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the history of the negotiating process and to analyze some of the problems dealt with in the final agreement.

The Process of Negotiation

Post-war relations between south Korea and Japan had to overcome the legacy of hostility of the colonial era. The

war had ended Japanese rule and the mutual alliance with the U.S., to ward off the communist threat during the Korean War years, had created a favorable climate for diplomacy.

Japan's rapid economic recovery did not go unnoticed in South Korea, where political leaders began to increasingly look to Japan as a source of aid.¹

In October of 1951, at Korea's request, a preliminary conference was held in Tokyo. The conference set the following conditions for diplomatic normalization: (1) the granting of legal status to Korean nationalists living in Japan, (2) the drafting of provisions for property rights and claims, (3) the settlement of ship ownership disputes, (4) the negotiation of fishing agreements, and (5) the improvement of basic relations.²

Both parties agreed that the issue of the legal status and treatment of Koreans residing in Japan, though not ultimately not the most important one, was the most pressing one was of the highest demanding immediate settlement. The Korean position was that Koreans living in Japan were the victims, or descendants of victims, of Japanese colonialism

¹Chong Shik Lee, Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 193-194; see also Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 235-289.

²Kang Bong Kim, The Korea- Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 43.

and militarism, and should therefore, be treated differently from other aliens under Japanese immigration control.

In discussing the fisheries issue, a Korean proposal,³ that the MacArthur Line be recognized as the international dividing line limiting fishing rights, was rejected by the Japanese. This line was established in September of 1945 by General Douglas MacArthur to limit Japanese fishing activities.⁴ It would later be abolished, only to be re-established by the Rhee regime. Rhee referred to the line as the "Peace Line," while it became known in Japan as the "Rhee Line." The 1951 conference ended without any major agreements, but both sides agreed to meet again in 1952 to resume negotiations.

The second round of talks began on February 15, 1952. In an attempt to resolve the various problems facing the two countries, five committees were formed: (1) the Committee on Property claims, (2) the Committee on Fisheries, (3) the Committee on the Legal Status and treatment of Korean Residents in Japan, (4) the Committee on basic Relations, and (5) the Committee on Vessels.

The main issue for Korea remained the question of property claims. From the beginning, South Korea expected that Japan should pay what she regarded as legitimate and

³Dong-A Il Bo, February 18, 1952.

⁴Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. IV (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 1184-1186.

reasonable claims. Korean sources indicate that these claims were based on a balance sheet prepared by a joint South Korean-American committee, which claimed that the outstanding debt owed by Japan was nearly 50 billion yen, figured in the 1945 values of the currency.⁵

The heated controversy over property claims was soon rendered more acrimonious by new developments. For the Japanese, the Rhee Line was the central concern. Early in 1952, President Rhee issued a proclamation extending the territorial jurisdiction of South Korea sixty miles out from the Korean coast. Rhee contended that a fishing line between the two countries was necessary for conservation and development of ocean resources.⁶ Furthermore, he claimed that the line was established to maintain peace and friendship between South Korea and Japan.⁷ However, Japan countered that relations between the two countries should be based on the principles of international law, which, at that time, supported only claims of a three mile limit on territorial waters. The Japanese reaction to the Rhee Line was an immediate proposal for fishery negotiations. While the negotiations were not productive, they were a beginning. Throughout the negotiations, the Japanese held that the Rhee

⁵Mitari and Tatsuo, "Korea-Japan Diplomacy," Oriental Economist (April 1958), p. 188.

⁶Mura, Tsuneo, "The Rhee Line," Japan Quarterly, VI (1959), p. 30.

⁷Dong A Il Bo, November 17, 1955.

Line was a clear violation of international law, and that the seizure of Japanese vessels and crews was illegal and violated the principle of freedom of the high seas. Japan reserved the right to file claims for damages suffered from any seizures.⁸

The third round of talks opened in Tokyo on October 3, 1953. The conference was similar to the first two meetings, except that disagreements disrupted the meeting much sooner. Not only had the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels continued, but, from the beginning, the negotiators became entangled in the same old legalistic arguments. The hostility came to a head at the October 15th meeting of the property claims committee. The Japanese chief delegate, Kanichiro Kubota, stated that Japan had the right to demand compensation for the benefits accrued to Korea during the 36 years of Japanese occupation.⁹ The Korean delegation was so outraged by Kubota's statement that they walked out of the conference and refused to meet again until Japan officially withdrew the statement. Although both sides indicated a desire to resume negotiations, the Japanese persistently refused to withdraw the statement. Talks did not resume again for four years.

⁸ "Japan-Korea Relations Doomed," Oriental Economist (March 1955), p. 114.

⁹ Youngnok koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea, p. 169.

The fourth round of talks opened on April 15, 1958. Relations had deteriorated sharply in the four years since the last talks were held. The Japanese government had warned the Koreans that there could be no significant improvement in relations until the level of unlawfull activities, such as the seizing Japanese fishing boats and the detention of Japanese crewmen, had been reduced sharply. Japan also dispatched patrol boats to over-see fishing practices in the Sea of Japan. In 1953, South Korean police fired on these Japanese patrol boats.¹⁰

After this incident, Japan urged South Korea to accept arbitration of these territorial disputes by the International Court of Justice. By late 1954, the South Korean government had intensified its support for the Peace Line. This resulted in a sharp deterioration in relations. The Japanese government responded with threats of unilateral and unconditional rejection of the Rhee Line. The South Korean navy sent armed patrol boats into the area to enforce its claims. Several million dollars worth of damage was inflicted upon Japanese ships and equipment and hundreds of Japanese crewmen were imprisoned (see Table 10).¹¹

However, by 1957, both sides had begun to soften their positions. Japanese foreign minister, Nobutsuke Kishi, insisted that formal talks could resume if South Korea

¹⁰ Nippon Times, July 14, 1953.

¹¹ Korea Times, October 10, 1956.

TABLE 10
NUMBER OF JAPANESE FISHING BOATS AND CREWMEN SEIZED

Year	No. of Boats Captured	No. of Crewman Detained	No. of Boats Sunk	No. of Boats Returned	No. of Crewmen Returned
1952	10	132	--	5	131
1953	47	585	--	2	584
1954	34	454	--	6	453
1955	30	498	--	1	469
1956	19	235	--	3	235
1957	10	98	--	--	98
1958	9	93	--	1	93
1959	9	91	--	1	91
1960	6	52	1	--	52
1961	9	70	--	5	57
(to Sept.)					
Total	183	2,308	1	23	2,290

Source: Changsoo Lee and George De Vos, Korea in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1981), p.94, citing Asian Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Ministry, Chosen Benran (Tokyo, 1961), p. 42.

expressed only a willingness to modify its Peace Line policy. In a speech before the National Assembly in January, Rhee made it clear that resuming relations with Japan was major issue for his government.¹² In April, Japanese Prime Minister Kishi indicated a willingness to meet with President Rhee to discuss the resumption of normalization talks.¹³ In December, Japan formally retracted the Kubota statement and both sides agreed to meet for a new round of talks.

In April of 1958, the fourth conference was held in Seoul. Before these talks were interrupted by student riots, a new controversy emerged. This time, the irritant was the decision by the Japanese government to repatriate Korean living in Japan, by sending them to North Korea. The South Korean government made every attempt to obstruct Japan's actions by mobilizing pro-South Korean organizations in Japan. For nearly two years, documents were exchanged between the two governments, in which South Korea accused the Japanese of dealing unilaterally with an issue involving the rights and treatment of Koreans.¹⁴ Japanese officials justified their actions by arguing that the Korean immigrants chose voluntarily to return to North Korea,¹⁵ and that the

¹² Dong A Il Bo, January 5, 1957.

¹³ Hankook Il Bo, April 3, 1957.

¹⁴ Chosun Il Bo, February 14, 1959.

¹⁵ Chosun Il bo, June 14, 1959.

Japanese decision had no bearing on the question of the legal status of Koreans living in Japan. No progress had been made by the time the talks were interrupted by the Student Revolution of April 19, 1960.

After the Student Revolution and the establishment of the Second Republic under John M. Chang, South Korean attitudes toward Japan shifted dramatically.¹⁶ The fifth round of talks began in October of 1960 and lasted until May of 1961. Discussion of property claims accelerated and progress was made on the fisheries dispute. But the talks were again disrupted, this time by the military coup of General Park Chung Hee on May 16, 1961.

The establishment of the military government marked another turning point in Japanese-South Korean relations. During 1961, Park's overtures to Japan began to show signs of success. That summer a committee was established to prepare the ground work for the next round of talks. In July, General Choi Duk Shin, one of the leading members of the military regime, was sent to Tokyo to deliver a personal letter from General Park urging Japan to resume normalization talks.

In November, five months after Park came to power, the U.S. gave its first show of support for the new regime by sending an American delegation to Seoul, led by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In his discussions with Park, Secretary

¹⁶ Dong A Il Bo, August 21, 1961.

Rusk called for diplomatic negotiations with Japan for the establishment of military and economic cooperation. Rusk arranged for Park to visit the United States, for talks with American leaders, including President Kennedy.¹⁷

The sixth round of talks began in Tokyo on October 20, 1961, exactly ten years after the first conference. Negotiators decided to hold working level talks, through the committee system set up at the previous round of talks. During this conference the first negotiations between heads of state were held. On his way to the U.S., President Park stopped in Tokyo, for a brief visit with Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, and the two leaders agreed to strive for normalization of relations as soon as possible.¹⁸ The Park-Ikeda conference was held on November 12. The two leaders exchanged views on a broad variety of problems, ranging from the world situation to Asian problems, including South Korean-Japanese relations.¹⁹

In February and November of 1962, Kim Jong Phil, the Director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, visited with Japanese foreign minister, Ohira Masayashi, to

¹⁷ Hankook Il Bo, November 4, 1961.

¹⁸ Daehan Minguk Joungbu (the Government of South Korea), Han Il Hoedam Baksou (The White Paper on Korean-Japanese Negotiation) (Seoul: South Korean Government, 1965), p. 156.

¹⁹ C.C. Hellman, "Basic Problems of Japanese-South Korean Relations," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 3 (May 1962), pp. 19-24.

discuss the issue of property claims.²⁰ These negotiations resulted in the Kim-Ohira memorandum, which was officially recognized on December 13, 1962. In the memorandum, Japan agreed to the Korean demands for \$300 million in Japanese goods over a period of 10 years, \$200 million in credits through the Economic Cooperation Fund, and \$100 million in commercial loans.²¹

This was a major breakthrough and had a significant effect on resolving many other outstanding issues which had eluded settlement and prolonged the negotiations for over a decade. The memorandum was a catalyst, which encouraged the Park regime to condense the complexities of the normalization issues into manageable form. The Kim-Ohira accord was symbolic of the fresh spirit of mutual accommodation, which made it reasonable to view the ongoing process of South Korean-Japanese diplomacy with cautious optimism.

The Kim-Ohira agreement did not resolve all South Korean property claims, and actually created as much controversy as it resolved. As a result of the agreement, anti-negotiation feelings quickly spread among South Korean students, the opposition party, and intellectuals.²² The property claims issue provoked massive popular repudiation and formal

²⁰ Dong A Il Bo, January 29, 1963.

²¹ Jin Hyun Kim, "Hanil Kyoungje Gyangye uwi Guzojuk Galdung," Shin Dong A (June 1976), p. 75.

²² Dong A Il Bo, December 28, 1962.

institutional opposition.²³ Widespread protest demonstrations throughout the nation brought crisis and instability to the Park regime.²⁴ The government's position was challenged by students groups, religious organizations, and several well-known civic and professional leaders.²⁵

As the negotiations progressed, domestic opposition mounted in South Korea. Groups opposing accommodation argued that the agreements being negotiated were humiliating and disadvantageous to Korean interests, and therefore invited Japanese economic and political exploitation.²⁶ There was a growing public apprehension that the entire negotiation process, as carried out by the military leaders, was irregular and illegitimate. Feeling the intensified pressure from opposition groups, the military government recalled Kim Jong Phil, who had been overseeing the negotiations in Tokyo, Kim resigned from the chairmanship of the South Korean delegation, amidst a flurry of public criticism.²⁷

However, despite domestic opposition on both sides, the negotiations continued until, on June 22, 1965, the Treaty and Agreements were concluded. They were ratified by the South Korean National Assembly on August 14, 1965.

²³ Hankook Il Bo, January 19, 1964

²⁴ Dong A Il Bo, January 11-14, 1964.

²⁵ Dong A Il Bo, July 17, 1965.

²⁶ Hankook Il bo, July 10, 1965.

²⁷ Chosun Il Bo, June 22, 1965.

The Problems

As indicated at the opening of this chapter throughout the seven rounds of talks, between 1951-65, the following problem areas served as the focus of the negotiations: (1) property claims, (2) fisheries, (3) the legal status of Koreans living in Japan, (4) basic relations, and (5) the return of Korean cultural assets. To fully appreciate the complexities of the negotiation process, each of these problem areas must now be analyzed in some detail.

Property Claims

The property claims issue was perhaps the most difficult and complicated problem facing negotiators. Before it could be settled, there would arise a number of serious problems that would have to be solved through negotiation. One possible approach was proposed by the Rhee regime during the first round of talks. The major items in dispute were identified as (1) the amount of money and gold removed from Korea to Japan, (2) the actual transfer of funds to Japanese treasury accounts, and (3) Military funds transferred from the Korean budget to the Japanese army.²⁸ The Rhee government announced that they were willing to accept the creation of a compensation fund.²⁹

²⁸ Dong A Il Bo, October 24, 1961.

²⁹ Dong A Il Bo, October 24, 1961.

Another possible approach was suggested in the second round of talks. South Korea based its new proposal on the example of the Philippines, which had received \$800 million in damages from Japan for four years of occupation.³⁰ Accordingly, the Korean government insisted that Japan should pay \$8 billion for the forty years of Korean occupation. Japan rejected this plan on the grounds that, even on an extended installment plan, this sum was far beyond the capacity of the Japanese economy.

After the second round of talks, both countries took a series of positive steps to resolve the property issue, primarily due to the involvement of the United States. The U.S. pressed South Korea and Japan to reconsider the property claims and resolve the dispute. In 1957, the U.S. attempted to formalize the interpretation of the property dispute and called for a memorandum to solve the central issues of the dispute.³¹

According to the memorandum, all Japanese property in South Korea would be confiscated and transferred to the South Korean government. It was assumed that Korea would take this into consideration as part of the property settlement. This interpretation was also given to the Japanese ambassador to the United States, who in turn transmitted it to Washington.

³⁰Mitari and Tatsuo, "Korea-Japan Diplomacy," Oriental Economist (April 1958), p. 188.

³¹Japan Times, March 9, 1961.

This information was then transmitted to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, in December 1957, but the memorandum was not made public until March of 1961.³² Relations were severely damaged by this delay and the long withholding of Japanese agreement to treat South Korean claims constructively. The delays added more fuel to the flames of rampant Korean nationalism.

The next proposal came in the early sixties. With the failure of the proposals of the Rhee regime as his guide, Park quickly realized that Japanese economic support would be indispensable for the foreseeable future.³³ South Korea would have to adjust its policy demands to insure Japan's continued support.³⁴ The issue was almost settled with the Kim-Ohira memorandum in 1962. In March of 1965, the final settlement was finally reached by altering the amounts of the commercial loans proposed in the Kim-Ohira memorandum.

The agreement stipulated that Japan would pay, with Japanese products, the equivalent of 300 million U.S. dollars, within ten years. Article 1 of the agreement also stipulated that the South Korean government could request Japanese loans equivalent to 200 million U.S. dollars, within ten years. The total amount to be received from Japan would be \$800 million: \$300 million in grants, \$200 million in

³² Ibid.

³³ Dong A Il Bo, April 12, 1964

³⁴ Hankook Il Bo, April 5, 1964.

government loans, and \$300 million in commercial loans.³⁵

The settlement provided as follows:

Article I. 1. Japan shall supply the Republic of Korea with:

(a) The products of Japan and the services of the Japanese people, the total value of which will be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to three hundred million United States of America dollars (\$300,000,000) at present computed as one hundred and eight billion yen (108,000,000,000) on a non-payable basis within the period of ten years from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement. The supply of the products and services in each year shall be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to thirty million United States of America dollars (\$30,000,000), at present computed at ten billion eight hundred million yen (10,800,000,000); in case the supply of any one year shall fall short of this amount, the remainder shall be added to the supply of the following year. However, the amount of supply for any one year can be increased by agreement between the Governments of the Contracting Parties.

(b) Long-term and low interest loans up to the amount of so much in yen as shall be equivalent to two hundred million United States of American dollars (\$200,000,000) at present computed at seventy-two billion yen (72,000,000,000) which the government of the Republic of Korea may request and which will be used when the Republic of Korea procures the products of Japan and the services of the Japanese people needed for the implementation of the projects which will be decided upon in accordance with arrangements to be concluded on the basis of paragraph 3, within the period of ten years from the date of coming into force of the present Agreement. Those loans shall be furnished by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan, and the Government of Japan shall take necessary funds to execute the loans evenly each year.

The above-mentioned supply and the loans should serve the economic development of the Republic of Korea.³⁶

³⁵Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of Republic of Korea, pp. 1173-174.

³⁶Woonsang Choi, p. 146.

The Fisheries Dispute

On the question of fisheries, the Rhee regime and the Chang government consistently asserted the importance of the defense of the Peace Line, which provided 90 miles of exclusive jurisdiction, for security against the possibility of a Japanese invasion and the promotion of independent economic development.³⁷ However, Japan saw the issue in terms of a particular territory, and contended that the Korean demands infringed upon Japanese territory.³⁸

During the sixth round of talks, in March of 1963, Korean officials suggested a forty mile limit to exclusive jurisdiction, but an agreement could not be reached at that time. In August of that year, Park sent his foreign minister, Kim Yong Shik, to Japan for further negotiations. During these meetings, an agreement was reached which provided that South Korea would exercise an exclusive jurisdiction of only twelve miles.

Because of domestic pressures, it was uncertain if Korea would accede to Japan's demand for a twelve-mile limit. South Korean fishermen, fearing Japan's technological superiority, lobbied hard to prevent concessions on the fishery issue.³⁹ The issue also provoked a deeply emotional

³⁷ Dong A Il Bo, August 5, 1965.

³⁸ Dong A Il Bo, August 9, 1965.

³⁹ Hankook Il Bo, March 4, 1965.

response from large segments of the South Korean public, who felt that their national honor was at stake.⁴⁰

Despite these pressures, the military leaders were resolved to make concessions on the Peace Line issue for the sake of normalization. The final agreement provided as follows:

Article I. 1. The Contracting Parties mutually recognized that each Contracting Party has the right to establish a sea zone extending to 12 nautical miles from its respective coast base-line; over which it will exercise exclusive jurisdiction concerning matters pertaining to fisheries. In case either Contracting Party uses the straight base-line for the establishment of its fishery zone, it shall decide the straight base-line on the basis of consultations with the other Contracting Party.

2. The Contracting Parties shall not object to the exclusion by one Contracting Party of the fishing vessels of the other Contracting Party from engaging in fishing operations in its fishery zone.

3. An area where the fishery zones of the Contracting Parties overlap shall be divided into two by straight lines joining the midpoint of the straight line drawn across the area at their widest points with the two end points of the overlapping area.⁴¹

Another fishery issue was the ownership of Dokto, a small useless island located eighty-six miles from Japan and fifty miles from South Korea. The Japanese called this island Takashima. In spite of its lack of economic value, Dokto/Takashima was of important political and psychological value, and therefore remained a significant issue between the two countries.

⁴⁰ Dong A Il Bo, March 22, 1964.

⁴¹ Woonsang Choi, pp. 154-155.

In 1952, South Korea declared that Dokto was again Korean territory. The island had been recognized as Korean territory until the end of the nineteenth century, when, in 1905, Japan had taken possession. South Korea claimed to have historical records and documents verifying their claim to the island. They further claimed that when the Japanese took possession of the island, they had taken advantage of Korea's military weakness, in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War.⁴² Korea was therefore in no position to protest the loss of the island. Japan insisted that the island had already been recognized as Japanese territory prior to the annexation of Korea in 1910 and that there were maps and other documentation to prove this.⁴³ Thus, Japanese possession of the island dated from a time when Korea was free of Japanese influence, Korea had not been manipulated during a time of weakness. Therefore, Japan had satisfied all of the requirements for the establishment of authority and effective administration over the island.

In June of 1953, Japan sent two naval ships to the island, expelled the Korean fishermen working there, and planted a signpost declaring it Japanese territory. In retaliation, South Korea immediately took physical control by

⁴²Byhong Do Lee, Guksa Daegwan (A Study of Korean History) (Seoul, 1948), pp. 453-457.

⁴³Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 1965.

stationing a small security force there.⁴⁴ Japan then proposed that the dispute be submitted to the International Court of Justice. But South Korea rejected this proposal on the grounds that there could be no dispute over territory that belonged to South Korea without question. Japanese officials assured their people that normalization could not proceed until and unless this dispute was settled.

However, the dispute was still not settled when relations were normalized in 1965. The two countries had agreed, however, to seek settlement of any disputes through peaceful means, through diplomatic channels agreeable to both parties, as stated in the Exchanged Notes concerning Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

Koreans Living in Japan

Another obstacle to normalization was the question of the legal status of Korean nationals living in Japan. By the end of World War II, the number of Koreans who had emigrated to Japan had reached about 2 million.⁴⁵ Most had been conscripted into military service or mobilized from the labor

⁴⁴Dong A Il Bo, November 17, 1955.

⁴⁵Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Korea's Policy and the Korean Unification," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 10(October 1967), p. 708.

forces during the second Sino-Japanese War (1937) and World War II.⁴⁶

Most Koreans returned to their homeland after World War II. However, some who had achieved economic success stayed in Japan. In 1945, Japan passed a law placing severe limitations on the amount of property emigrants could take back to Korea with them.⁴⁷ In addition to the slow-down created by this law, the Korean War exacerbated the decrease in the flow of emigrants.⁴⁸ Those who remained in Japan developed a strong sense of community, and yet were increasingly confronted with racial discrimination and prejudice. As indicated on Figure 3, as late as 1974, there were over 600,000 Korean living in Japan.

The failure of the government to settle the various disputes with Japan, created further problems for Koreans living in Japan. Some Koreans who had lived in Japan for many years without incident were deported without having violated any laws. The South Korean government registered strong objections to these actions. Japan's aim was apparently to use the minority problem as a tool for resolving other issues. In retaliation, the South Korean government refused to accept the deportee. However, Japan

⁴⁶ Richard H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p.102.

⁴⁷ Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan 1904-1950 (New York: Institute of Poupou Relations, 1951), p. 54.

⁴⁸ Mitchell, op. cit., p. 102.




FIGURE 3

PLACE OF BIRTH OF KOREANS IN JAPAN IN 1974

Source: Changsoo Lee and George De Vos, p. 135, citing Ministry of Justice Zairyaikokujin Tokei, 1974.

insisted that the status of Koreans living in Japan was strictly a domestic issue that did not concern South Korea. Table 11 summarizes the deportation of Koreans from Japan between 1950 and 1960.

During the course of negotiations, the minority problem was divided into several major issues, including the status and nationality of children born to Korean parents living in Japan, deportation, and the amount of property returning Koreans could take with them. Each issue was a potential stumbling block.⁴⁹

The final settlement was reached in March of 1965, and stated that Koreans who were born in Japan after 1945 were entitled to Japanese citizenship.⁵⁰ It also stipulated that Koreans who participated in the anti-Japanese movement and those who had been sentenced to more than seven years in prison could be legally deported.⁵¹ The issue of how much property Koreans could remove from Japan was settled through a compromise which allowed emigrants to return with property valued at no more than 10,000 U.S. dollars.⁵²

⁴⁹ Han Il Hoedam Baksou, p. 30

⁵⁰ Daehan Minguk Joungbu (the Government of South Korea), Daehan Minguk Gwa Ilbonguk gane Joejak mit Hyopjung (Treaty and Agreements between South Korea and Japan) (Seoul: South Korean Government, 1965), p. 6.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.5.

⁵² Daehan Minguk Joungbu (the Government of South Korea), Hanil Hoedam Ueje Yoa Ounul (Yesterday and Today Between South Korea and Japan's Treaty Negotiation) (Seoul, 1965), p. 56.

TABLE 11
KOREANS DEPORTED FROM JAPAN

Year	Males	Females	Total
1950	796	159	955
1951	1,534	639	2,173
1952	1,500	798	2,298
1953	1,733	855	2,588
1954	567	268	835
1955	445	262	707
1956	--	--	--
1957	--	--	--
1958	713	290	1,003
1959	--	--	--
1960	986	445	1,431

Source: Changsoo Lee and George De Vos, Korean in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). p. 96; citing "Oppression Against Koreans in Japan and Immigration Control Law Designed for Deportation" (Tokyo, 1969), p. 13.

Basic Relations

Perhaps the most controversial problem for South Korea was how to deal with the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 and the Annexation Treaty of 1910. At issue were the historical rights of the two countries in relation to one another.⁵³ South Korea insisted that normalization be preceded by an apology from Japan for past misdeeds, formalized in a treaty in which Japan explicitly took responsibility for the problems between the two countries, by acknowledging that these had resulted from the illegal and immoral Japanese occupation of Korea. South Korea also insisted that Japan specifically repudiate all previous treaties and agreements that had subjugated the old empire of Korea and converted it into part of the Japanese colonial empire.⁵⁴

The Japanese position was that relations should be normalized by a joint South Korean-Japanese declaration, instead of a formal treaty, and that the status of old treaties or agreements should not be discussed, since they were no longer valid or effectively in force, following the separation of Korea from Japan in 1945. The important thing was to draw a historical lesson from past failures and to work for the mutual prosperity of the two nations.

⁵³ Dong A Il Bo, June 22, 1965.

⁵⁴ Dong A Il Bo, August 9, 1965.

However, the Korean insistence on an official apology from Japan was finally satisfied in February of 1965, when foreign minister Shiina Etsusaburo came to Seoul to initial a tentative draft of the Treaty on Basic Relations and expressed his personal apology for an unfortunate period in the long relationship between the two nations.⁵⁵

Another issue to be resolved was the wording of treaty provisions with respect to Japanese imperial control. South Korea contended that the treaty should take the form of a peace treaty, which would render the Protectorate and the Annexation treaties illegal. The Japanese, however, favored the use of the terms "null and void," instead of "illegal."⁵⁶ This semantical argument remained unresolved throughout the entire period of negotiations (1951-65). The issue was finally settled with the agreement that the treaties concluded between the two countries prior to 1910 were already null and void. Article 2 of the treaty stated that "all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Korea and the Empire of Japan on or before August 22, 1910, are already null and void."⁵⁷

Article 3 of the Normalization Treaty, carefully disregarded the fact of a divided Korea, stating that "the

⁵⁵ Hankook Il Bo, February 23, 1964.

⁵⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On the Agreements Between Japan and ROK (in Japanese), November 1964, p.3.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On the Agreements Between the ROK and Japan (in Korean) (Seoul 1965), p.1.

Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly."⁵⁸ South Korea held that, by accepting Article III, Japan fully recognized South Korea's assertion of jurisdictional control over the entire Korean peninsula. South Korea also maintained that this implied that Japan accepted the illegality of North Korea.⁵⁹

South Korea hoped Japan would reduce her trade with North Korea. However, in spite of South Korea's interpretation of Article III of UN Resolution 195, Japan does not interpret her signing of the treaty as recognition of South Korea's jurisdiction over all of Korea. It is clear that Japan has to live with both North and South Korea, and, for practical reasons, has chosen to maintain cultural and economic relations with both countries.⁶⁰

Cultural Assets

The least controversial issue was the return of Korean cultural assets. The South Korea government, as well as various private citizens and groups, were despoiled of various treasures without compensation during the Japanese

⁵⁸ Daehan Minguk Gwa Ilbonguk gane Joejak mit Hyopjung, p. 2.

⁵⁹ Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 1965.

⁶⁰ Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Korea's Policy and the Korean Unification, "Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 10 (October 1967), pp. 703-725.

occupation. Those that could be found were returned. What problems arose, centered on things that proved difficult to locate. Some claimants insisted that the government take a hard line and insist that all cultural assets be returned.⁶¹ However, among the numerous items removed since the inception of the Japanese Protectorate in 1905, 103 items were identified as the most valuable. Eighty-one (81) of these were classified by the Japanese government as national cultural assets.⁶² In the end, Japan returned a total of 1430 items to South Korea. While some were personal and others public, the final agreement provided that all transferred assets be considered public.⁶³

Summary

The period from 1951-65 was a period of adjustment in South Korean-Japanese relations. The establishment of diplomatic normalization in 1965 was essential for the creation of a situation in which South Korea might expect to receive compensation for her losses during the 36 years of Japanese colonialism. The 1965 Treaty of Normalization was the first major foreign policy issue to attract massive public attention in South Korea. Debate over the treaty was

⁶¹ Daehan Minguk Joungbu, Han Il Hoedam Baksou, p. 5.

⁶² Ibid., p. 66.

⁶³ Daehan Minguk Gwa Ilbonguk gane Joeyak mit Hyopjung, 81-94.

not, therefore, confined to policy makers, but extended widely to various elements outside of government, including students, intellectuals, and political parties.

During the entire process of negotiating, concluding, and ratifying the treaty, there were serious problems between the two countries. Part of the legacy of colonialism was the fact that the victim nation, while desperate for modernization, had first to settle the score with her former master. This situation was complicated by the Korean War, which destroyed much of the industrial base left by the Japanese and left the country divided.

Generally speaking, the most discussed issues during the seven rounds of negotiations were those of Korean property claims, the status of Korean national living in Japan, fisheries and the Rhee Line, and the disposition of Dokto. Resolving these issues was a long and arduous process, where nationalist sentiments collided with international realities and the economic and political interest of the two nations.

CHAPTER VII

RELATIONS WORSEN: 1971-75

In the 1970s, bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea took a turn for the worse. In this Chapter I will discuss the complex foreign and domestic events that led to this worsening of relations.

On July 15, 1971 President Nixon announced that he would visit China which he did in the February of the following year. On October 25, 1971, the United Nations adopted a resolution seating Mao Tse-tung's communist government and ousting Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists. These developments, which lead to a rapid improvement in relations between China and the United States and brought China into the world community, had profound repercussions for developments in north east Asia.¹ At first they seemed to open the door for stabilization of the situation on the Korean peninsula. Stabilization, however, largely depended on two additional developments, one of which was largely completed by the time of Nixon's visit. This development was an increase in the influence of China on North Korea. Friendly relations between the two countries had been restored after the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communists, in April of 1969, which marked the end of the most intense phase of the Cultural

¹ "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence." (ed.) Gene T. Hsiao, Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 160-181.

Revolution. As part of China's decision to relax its self-imposed isolation, measures were taken to reestablish normalized relations with North Korea.

North Korea's decision to accept Chinese advances was apparently motivated by decreased Soviet economic aid and the desire to build an economic and military base independent of Moscow.² The turning point came with Premier Chou En Lei's visit to North Korea in April of 1970. This was the first high-level Chinese visit since 1963.

Just as Sino-North Korean relations were warming up, the U.S. announced plans for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. This caused serious apprehension in North Korea.³ A special Chinese delegation was sent to Pyongyang to explain China's actions. In the summer of 1971, a series of meeting was held, which led to an agreement providing for mutual aid and economic cooperation, in which Peking apparently promised economic and military assistance.⁴ After assurance of aid, North Korean officials publicly announced their support of the Nixon visit, which President Kim Il Sung claimed would temporarily ease international tensions, and declared that Sino-American rapproachment had no direct bearing on North Korea.⁵

²Dong A Il Bo, May 8, 1970.

³Dong A Il Bo, July 12, 1971.

⁴Dong A Il Bo, October 11, 1971.

⁵Dong A Il Bo, October 11, 1971.

The second development necessary before the improvement in Chinese-American relations could lead to stabilization of the situation on the Korean peninsula was agreement between China and the United States on the issue of stabilization itself. This was achieved through a complex arrangement negotiated between the two powers. One might argue that this stabilization should have relieved Japanese worries about becoming enmeshed in a Korean conflict and should thus have lead to better relations between South Korea and Japan or one might argue that it should have developed the need for complication thus slowing the process of accommodation.

In the end the whole process led to increased tension between South Korea and Japan. This resulted from the fact the Japan followed the American lead and improved her relations with China as well. In the process she moved toward improving relations with North Korea. South Korea followed the same course but in the end without notable success. The result was a divergence of the policies of Japan and South Korea. The former was now increasingly friendly to North Korea while the latter was not. As a result South Korea ended up more isolated than before and resentful of Japan's support of her enemy. We must now recount these developments in more detail.

While Japan had had a long standing relationship with communist China prior to 1972, this relationship had been more economic than political. Japan's anti-communist

sentiments had led her to maintain diplomatic ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Nixon's announcement that he would visit China created turmoil in Tokyo. However, following Nixon's lead, Japan quickly moved to establish full diplomatic relations with China in 1972.⁶

But Japan had much more at stake than America. Her decision to abandon Taiwan was made out of fear of Peking.⁷ Her concern was that the rise of Communist China was a significant threat to Japanese influence in East Asia. Above all, Japan was concerned with the possibility of the extension of Chinese influence in the Korean peninsula. North Korea had maintained close ties with Communist China, in a power block clearly threatening to South Korean, and, in turn, Japanese interests. For security reasons, Japan had been drawn into alignment with South Korea.

Sino-Japanese rapproachment completely transformed Japan's policies toward North Korea. In November of 1971, a group of Liberal Democratic party Dietmen established the supra-partisan Dietmen League for the Promotion of Friendship between Japan and North Korea.⁸ This action was an important

⁶ "U.S.- China Normalization: The Japanese Perspective," (ed.) John Bryan Starr, The Future of U.S.-china Relations (New York: New York University Press, 1981), p. 138.

⁷ The normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China produced a fundamental shift in Asia's multipolar regional order. See Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 62-64.

⁸ Japan Times, November 17, 1971.

step toward the establishment of better relations with North Korea.⁹ The League promoted cultural, arts, sports, and technological exchanges. They also advocated free travel between Japan and North Korea and sought the peaceful unification of the Korea Peninsula.¹⁰

The Dietment League soon started making contacts with North Korean leaders. In January of 1972, the organization sent a goodwill mission to North Korea headed by Kuno Chuji.¹¹ The Kuno mission held a series of talks with the North Korean government. Both sides agreed that, to improve relations between their countries, it was necessary to promote personnel, economic, and cultural exchanges. Each agreed to abandon unfriendly policies toward the other. And it was agreed that Japan should refrain from any attempt to obstruct the peaceful unification of Korea, or to intervene in any way in Korean internal affairs.¹²

Friendly relations between Japan and North Korea were accelerated by the activities of the Dietment's League. While Japan scrupulously avoided any official contacts with North Korea, it nonetheless implemented its long standing policy of "seikei bunri" (separating politics from econo-

⁹Nodong Shinmun, November 18, 1971.

¹⁰Japan Times, October 30, 1972.

¹¹Japan Times, January 14, 1972.

¹²Japan Times, January 26, 1972.

mics).¹³ The establishment of the Dietmen's League was a major factor contributing to the improvement of trade relations between Japan and North Korea. During this period, trade with North Korea increased significantly (see Table 12).

South Korea and Sino-North Korean Relations

The normalization of relations between the United States and China and subsequently between Japan and China and Japan and North Korea had a critical impact on relations between North and South Korea. In the first place, the decision to open direct bilateral negotiations for the first time was generally interpreted as a response to the changing super-power balance.¹⁴ Between 1971 and 1974, the Park regime met several times with North Korean officials to discuss plans for the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.¹⁵ This dialogue between the north and south produced some progress.

¹³ Japan times, February 2, 1972.

¹⁴ "The Two Koreas-Dialogue or Conflict?" The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs, (ed.) William J. Barnds (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 64.

¹⁵ President Park's statement on June 23, 1973 and his new year press conference on January 18, 1974, East Asia Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Spring 1974), pp. 103-113.

TABLE 12
JAPANESE TRADE WITH THE TWO KOREAS, 1971-1975
(in millions of dollars)

Year	South Korea		North Korea	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
	from	to	from	to
1971	262.0	953.8	30.0	28.9
1972	407.1	1,031.1	38.3	93.4
1973	1,241.5	1,726.9	72.2	100.1
1974	1,380.2	2,620.6	108.8	251.9
1975	1,235.4	2,433.5	64.8	180.6

Source: (ed.) Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea, p. 180, citing, the Office of customs, ROK; Japan-North Korea Trade Association, Annual Report, 1975.

The following three principles, taken from President Park's "Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification" (June 23, 1973), formed the basis of South Korea's proposal for peaceful unification.

1. The peaceful unification of the fatherland is the supreme task of the Korean people. We will continue to exert efforts to accomplish this task.
2. Peace must be maintained on the Korean peninsula by all means. The South and North should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other.
3. We will continue to make efforts with sincerity and patience to secure concrete results from the South-North dialogue based on the spirit of the South-North Joint Communique, dated 4th July, 1972.¹⁶

Advocates of North-South Korea rapprochement were greatly encouraged by the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between North Korea and China.¹⁷ In the end, however, no real progress was made and South Korea, unable to move toward accommodation with the north became increasingly apprehensive and unhappy with Japan's ever improving relations with the north.

¹⁶ National Unification Board of Republic of Korea, A White Paper on the South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul, 1982), pp. 323-325.

¹⁷ "The Impact of the Sino-American Detente on Korea," (ed.) Gene T. Hsiao, Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications, pp. 189-205.

Changes in South Korean Leadership

The detente between Japan and North Korea persuaded President Park to make sweeping changes in South Korea's political system. In December of 1971, Park declared a state of emergency, stating that his action had been made necessary by the rapidly changing international situation.¹⁸ Park's new reform movement, called "Yushin" (meaning revitalization), was actually motivated by Park's desire for absolute power. He had just been reelected to his third presidential term, after legislating the necessary constitutional amendment. However, he was unsatisfied with the margin of victory of only 47.4% which his ruling party (DRP) had won in the National Assembly.¹⁹ The Yushin reforms revised the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly.

To justify his personal consolidation of power, Park appealed to the dangers of the international situation. He cited the Sino-American rapprochement, Sino-Japanese diplomatic reorganization, the severing of official ties with Taiwan, the deteriorating situation in Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine's policy of withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea,

¹⁸Kim Yong C. (ed.), Major Power and Korea(Silver Spring, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1974), pp. 139-164.

¹⁹C.I. Eugene Kim, "The Meaning of 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern of Political Development," Asian Survey, XII (March 1972), pp. 213-224.

and the renewed North-South Korea dialogue.²⁰ These international changes demanded a stronger government. Park's Yushin constitution dismantled the democratic government of South Korea and replaced it with an authoritarian regime. While the Yushin system created domestic problems and dissention in relations with Japan, it remained in effect until Park's death in October of 1979.²¹

Yushin Korea, under Park, thus imposed an autocratic system on the South Korean populace to counter perceived threats from the changing international environment. Under Yushin, South Korea abandoned its hopeful, modernizing, and fairly democratic government of the 1960s, for an increasingly arbitrary, repressive, and authoritarian one.

However, the base of political support for Yushin grew increasingly narrow as the 1970s progressed. The growing alienation of the progressive forces--intellectuals, religious leaders, students, and the press--forced Park into an even more determined arrogation of authority.

On several occasions, Park ruthlessly exercised the emergency powers authorized under the Yushin Constitution. The emergency decree prohibited all oppositional activities and banned all demonstrations and political organizations. The vindictive nature of Park's repression was obvious from

²⁰B.C. Koh, "Convergence and Conflict in the Two Koreas," Current History (November 1973), pp. 205-208.

²¹For Details, see "South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition," Asian survey, January 1980.

the fact that the decree also forbade citizens from praising, encouraging, or sympathizing with any opposition organization or activity.

The Park administration justified these measures by citing the need to increase national unity in the fact of the North Korean threat. As criticism mounted against the harsh measures, confrontations between the government and oppositional forces escalated. These developments also soured relations with the Japanese government, who watched the South Korean domestic situation with great concern.

The Japanese Reaction to Park's Authoritarianism

The era of detente with Communist China and North Korea set in motion some disquieting developments that threatened to undermine the basic framework laid down by the Sato government. The repercussions ultimately led to Park's Yushin reforms, which so strained diplomatic relations with Japan that they nearly reached the breaking point.

After the promulgation of the Yushin constitution of 1972, South Korean students began to demonstrate against the Park regime. The military government responded with strong measures designed to suppress all anti-government actions. The foreign press followed the events closely.²² After media exposure of the Park regime's brutal treatment of dissenters,

²²(ed.) Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of Republic of Korea, p. 186.

Japanese public opinion began to turn against the South Korean government.

South Korea began to censor domestic and foreign press reports. Several foreign correspondents and priests were forced to leave the country. Reporters were arrested. One hundred and eighty newsmen were dismissed. Advertisers were pressured to avoid certain newspapers. For example, Dong A Il Bo, one of the most influential anti-government newspapers, met with heavy losses in advertising revenues.²³ In 1974, two Japanese newspapers, Ashai Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun, were banned in South Korea, as relations with Japan steadily worsened.

The Kimura Statement

Relations between Japan and South Korea worsened significantly after Tanaka Kakuei succeeded Sato in July of 1972. Tanaka took the initiative in the normalization of relations with mainland China and made it clear that he intended to improve relations with North Korea. However, the North Korean initiative was complicated diplomatically by Japan's obligations to South Korea under the Treaty of Basic Relations with South Korea, of 1965.

²³ The government pressured the Dong A Il Bo, one of the most prominent and influential anti-government newspapers, not to place Korean advertisements for the purpose of the company's financial troubles. Chosun Il Bo, one of the most prominent and long established newspapers, was also involved in the anti-government movement. This was called the Dong A and Chosun Incident.

By 1972, North Korea's Kim Il Sung was pressing Japan's Tanaka government to pursue a policy of normalization. Tanaka decided to try to improve relations with North Korea in carefully planned stages, beginning with exchanges in non-political areas.²⁴ Kim argued that it was possible for Japan to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea without abrogating the 1965 treaty with South Korea. He pointed out that North Korea had opened up diplomatic relations with a number of nations who also maintained relations with South Korea.²⁵

The Tanaka government's decision to call North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, encouraged Kim.²⁶ He interpreted it as a clear step forward in Japan's policy toward North Korea. In July of 1974, Japan's foreign minister, Kimura Toshio, revealed his government's intention to revise its Korean policy. Kimura stated that the peace and security of the entire peninsular, rather than just South Korea, was essential to Japan. He went on to say that there was no threat to South Korea from the north. These statements were interpreted as a sign that

²⁴ Japan Times, November 2, 1972.

²⁵ Nodong Shinmun, August 7, 1971.

²⁶ Japan Times, July 29, 1972.

the Tanaka government was intention altering its relations with the two Koreas.²⁷

Kimura's statements also had implications for U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. If North Korea posed no threat to South Korea, then the need for U.S. bases in Japan and American forces in South Korea were called into question. To add fuel to the fire, on September 5, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, claiming to speak for Kimura, stated that the South Korean government was not the only legal government in Korea.²⁸ The statement was made in response to a query from a Diet member.

This statement provoked sharp criticism from Seoul. Massive demonstrations were held throughout South Korea.²⁹ Demonstrators broke into the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. But Japan held firmly to the idea that two sovereign nations occupied the peninsula and that this fact must be acknowledged and incorporated into a realistic foreign policy. The logic was similar to that which justified the recognition of the government of mainland China. While acknowledging the political features that Japan found objectionable in North Korea

²⁷ Foreign minister Kimura Toshio's statement indicated a two Koreas policy. Moreover, Japan was ready to consider recognizing North Korea, because Japan's national security was related to the entire Korean peninsula (North and South Korea). See Japan Times, August 20, 1974.

²⁸ Dong A Il Bo, May 17, 1975.,

²⁹ Tae-hwan Kwak, Chonghan Kim, Hong Nack Kim, p. 201. For Kimura's statement, see Asahi Shimbun, August 29 and 30, September 6, 1974.

and Communist China, it was not strategically appropriate to deny the existence of such powerful adversaries.³⁰

The Kim Dae Jung Incident

As tensions mounted, two major incidents brought relations between the two countries close to the breaking point. One was the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung and the other was the assassination of Mrs. Park.

Kim Dae Jung was the opposition party's presidential candidate in 1971. Kim traveled to Japan after he lost the election, and was there when Park declared martial law and the Yushin constitution. Kim publicly criticized Park's actions and began to advocate the restoration of the old constitution. Fearing Kim's influence on Japanese and world opinion, the South Korean government sought to discredit him by exposing him as a communist supporter of North Korea.

On August 8, 1973, Kim was kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel room, taken to a waiting boat, and returned to Seoul.³¹ According to Kim's later account, the kidnappers had planned to dump him into the Sea of Japan, but scuttled the plan when they received new instructions from an unidentified source. He was released unharmed near his home in Seoul five days after his capture. After a brief investigation, the

³⁰ See (ed.) William J. Barnds, pp. 28-30.

³¹ "For details of the Kim Dae Jung incident, see Asahi nenkan, 1974, pp.227-228. See also Mainichi Nenkan, 1974, pp. 602-604.

Japanese government announced that it had found fingerprints in Kim's hotel room identifying Kim Dong Wun, an officer of the South Korean Embassy in Japan, as the kidnapper.³²

Embarrassed and outraged by the incident, as a clear violation of her sovereignty, Japan demanded the immediate return of Kim. The Park regime, instead sent Premier Kim Jong Pil to Tokyo to express regrets to the Japanese government. The director of Korean Central Intelligence was removed and the South Korean ambassador was replaced.

After word of the incident spread, anti-South Korean feelings grew stronger in Japan. One direct result of the incident was a meeting in Tokyo of opposition parties and Japanese leftists, who formed the National Council for the Normalization of Relations between Japan and North Korea. The new organization was designed to coordinate the campaign in Japan to normalize relations with North Korea.³³

In spite of this, the Park regime instituted a series of political concessions designed to insure the continuation of Japanese economic assistance, which was to figure very prominently in South Korea's third Five Year Economic Development Plan. The Tanaka government, however, first postponed indefinitely the South Korean-Japanese Ministerial

³² The Japanese government contended that K.C.I.A. was involved in the "kidnapping incident" of Kim Dae Jung because Kim Dong Wun was an officer of K.C.I.A.

³³ Japan Times, September 8, 1973.

Conference scheduled for September of 1973.³⁴ And even after Japan attained certain political concessions from the Park administration she refused at the Seventh Ministerial Conference held in December to fully abandon economic sanctions against South Korea.³⁵

A final settlement was reached in November, whereby the South Korean government assured Kim Dae Jung's freedom, including his right to depart from Korea, and promised that he would not be tried for any action he had undertaken while in Japan. In return, the Japanese government agreed to drop the issue.

The Kim Dae Jung incident gravely damaged the image of South Korea in Japan and destroyed the favorable image the Park regime had built on the basis of phenomenal economic growth. The affair reinforced the strong anti-Korean prejudices of the Japanese and strengthened the convictions of those who argued against maintaining close ties with South Korea. The incident added considerable momentum to the anti-Park forces in Japan. Kim came to personify the opposition forces in South Korea repressed by Park's Yushin policies.

There were several important repercussions of the Kim Dae Jung incident. First, it exposed to world opinion the

³⁴ (ed.) Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, The Foreign Policy of Republic of Korea, p. 186.

³⁵ Dong A Il Bo, December 27, 1973.

repressive nature of the Park regime.³⁶ Second, it stimulated the rise of the Anti-Park movement.³⁷ Third, it gave leftists, including Korean residents in Japan, a chance to criticize the South Korean government and to improve relations with North Korea.³⁸

The Assassination of Mrs. Park

The other major incident was even more disturbing: the murder of President Park's wife, during an attempt to assassinate Park. This occurred on August 15, 1974, while Park was delivering a speech for the Thirtieth Anniversary of Liberation from Japan. Mrs. Park was sitting behind the general and, along with several other prominent officials, was sprayed by machine-gun fire. Although the assassin, Mun Se Kwang was Korean, he was carrying Japanese identity papers and used a weapon purchased in Japan. South Korea, therefore, held Japan responsible for the incident.³⁹

The Korean government held the Japanese government responsible for Mun's actions, because he was a permanent

³⁶Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy System of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 85.

³⁷(ed.) Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, p. 186.

³⁸Ibid. p. 186.

³⁹Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy System of North and South Korea, p. 216. See Also B.C. Koh, "South Korea, North Korea, and Japan, "Pacific Community 6, 2(January 1975), pp.205 & 210.

resident of Japan and had traveled to Korea under a forged Japanese passport. He had planned the assassination while in Japan and had killed Mrs. Park with a pistol stolen from a police substation in Osaka, Japan. When Japanese authorities disclaimed moral and legal responsibility for Mun's actions, Korean officials were infuriated. The Japanese reasoned that the assassination had taken place in South Korea, at a national theater where strong security measures were in place, and the assassin had been issued a visa by the Korean consulate.⁴⁰

Seoul's anger was further heightened when Japanese editorials blamed the Park government for inflicting the outrage on itself by suppressing freedom. Foreign Minister Kimura's North Korean statements came just at this time, aggravating the situation even further.⁴¹ There were massive anti-Japanese demonstrations and the Japanese Embassy in Seoul was ransacked. The Japanese felt that the raid on their embassy as instigated and tacitly approved by the Korean Government.

The Park government demanded an apology for the incident and a pledge by Japan to regulate the Federation of Korean Residents in Japan, regarded by Seoul as the headquarters of anti-South Korean operations in Japan. The Japanese govern-

⁴⁰Tae Hwan Kwak, Chonghan Kim, and Hong Nack Kim, p. 201. Also see (ed.) Young nok Koo and Sung-joo Han, p. 187.

⁴¹Byung Chul Koh, p. 217.

ment was willing to express regret over the incident, and Premier Tanaka personally attended Mrs. Park's funeral, but saw no reason to offer an apology. As to the Korean Residents Federation, Japan agreed to interfere only when Japanese laws were violated.

An impasse was reached and the possibility of diplomatic rupture was frequently mentioned. But after intense negotiations and the mediation efforts of the United States, a compromise was finally reached. Under an elaborate formula worked out by both sides, Japan dispatched Shiina Etsusaburo, vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party, to Seoul to deliver Prime Minister Tanaka's personal letter to General Park.⁴² The letter expressed Tanaka's condolences and deep regret over the death of Mrs. Park, promised full cooperation with Seoul's investigation of the incident, assured that Japan would do its best to punish illegal acts aimed at overthrowing the South Korean government, and pledged appropriate measures to prevent similar occurrences in the future. In a supplemental verbal explanation, Shiina specifically mentioned Chongnyon (a pro-North Korean group in Japan) as a possible object of governmental regulation. He stated that Japan understood the hostile posture of this group toward Seoul, and objected to its use by North Korean

⁴²Dong A Il Bo, September 4, 1974.

agents for anti-Seoul activities.⁴³ Japan promised to take stern measures if its member violated her laws. In short, the compromise was a symbolic victory for South Korea, for which Japan paid a relatively low price. What made this the solution possible was the perception on both sides that they needed the friendship and good will of one another for the future.

Summary

In summary, South Korean-Japanese relations during the first half of the 1970's, were influenced negatively by a complex set of international and domestic issues and events. American and Japanese detente with Communist China and the abandonment of Taiwan, the improvement of Japanese relations with North Korea, served to isolate and alienate South Korea. This created great anxiety in the Park regime and led the authoritarian measures associated with the Yushin constitution. This, in turn, created domestic tensions that were further exacerbated by the Kim Dae Jung incident and the assassination of Mrs. Park.

⁴³ Byung Chul Koh, "South Korea, North Korea, and Japan," Pacific Community 6, 2 (January 1975), pp. 213-216.

CHAPTER VIII

RELATIONS IMPROVE AGAIN (1975-87)

The end of the war in Vietnam was a major watershed in South Korean-Japanese relations. Both countries were afraid that the collapse of Vietnam would send a message to North Korea that would intensify her desire to reunify Korea by force. The congruence of the perspectives and policies of South Korea and Japan toward North Korea provided a solid base for the development of improved relations.

Japan moved quickly to soften its anti-Seoul posture. A broad spectrum of political groups, including some influential members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, urged the government to end its policy of antagonizing the South Korean government. For its part, South Korea adopted a more flexible attitude toward Japan. Her major concern was the Carter Administration's plan to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea. This gave Seoul the motivation to seek reconciliation with Tokyo.

Accommodative gestures on both sides led to slowly improving relations during the period from 1975-87. This has been one of the longest periods of improvement in relations in the history of the two countries. There were occasional temporary setbacks but the overall trend has been toward accommodation.

This chapter, will focus on the problems that lead to these setbacks and the ways in which they were overcome. That is it will focus on the aftermath of the Kim Dae Jung affair, U.S. Asian policies, Japan's Korean policies, the Kim Dae Jung trial, the \$6 billion loan affair, and the Japanese revisionist history texts.

Resolving Old Issues

In the crisis surrounding changing events in Indochina, the two old enemies were brought into an uncertain partnership. The issues were primarily strategic: the threat of North Korean reunification. However, the domestic political climate in both countries, after the Kim Dae Jung incident, made the development of a close military relationship very difficult. In April of 1975, Japanese foreign minister Miyazawa visited the United States to discuss the, so called, "South Korean Clause" agreed to at the 1969 Nixon-Sato summit. During talks with President Ford, the clause was interpreted to mean that the security of South Korea was essential to the security of Japan.¹ The following month, South Korean prime minister Kim Jong Pil visited Japan to reaffirm the Miki-Ford interpretation of the South Korean Clause.²

¹Dong A Il Bo, May 13, 1975.

²Dong A Il Bo, May 21, 1975.

Washington was worried about the situation on the Korean peninsula. In May of 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advised that the situation required a stronger response and succeeded in gaining increased aid to the South Korean military.³ In June, Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, strongly reaffirmed the American commitment to defend South Korea in the event of a North Korean attack.⁴

The Japanese response was, however, complicated by the fact that the government was deeply involved in an investigation of the Kim Dae Jung incident.⁵ To avoid problems that could lead to an impasse, the Japanese government decided to drop charges against kidnapper Kim Don Wun.⁶ They did, however, insist that he was indeed an agent of the South Korean government, acting surreptitiously in Japan.

The United States took an active role in resolving the differences between the two countries in the aftermath of the Kim Dae Jung affair. In August, Prime Minister Miki visited Washington for a summit meeting. After the summit, President

³ Dong A Il Bo, May 29, 1975.

⁴ Schlesinger contended that the U.S. might use tactical nuclear weapons in case of a North Korean attack. See Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, p. 103.

⁵ The more difficult hurdle to restoration of relations was that the Japanese government was already deeply involved in the investigation of the Kim Dae Jung incident and with South Korea's domestic political problems. Furthermore, the government violated international law. See also Tae-Whan Kwak, Chonghan Kim, and Hong Nack Kim, p. 202.

⁶ Hong N. Kim, "Japanese-South Korean Relations in the Post-Vietnam Era," Asian Survey (October 1976), pp. 989-990.

Ford sent James Schlesinger to Tokyo and Seoul to support the positions to which Miki and Ford had agreed. The Miki government issued a statement saying that close security ties between the United States and Japan were essential for the defense of the Korean peninsula.⁷ He also reaffirmed Japan's commitment to maintain U.S. military bases on Japanese territory.⁸

Schlesinger advocated a defense triangle in Northeast Asia, to be established between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.⁹ Japan agreed on the importance of Schlesinger's defense triangle, but made it clear that she did not want to get directly involved on the Korean peninsula. South Korea also endorsed Schlesinger's plan, agreeing that Japan and the U.S. should develop a close and cooperative relationship for the benefit of East Asian defense.

President Park clearly supported the triangle. He felt that Japan and South Korea should have a special security relationship, in as much as the two countries were linked by respective security treaties with the United States.¹⁰ As part of this triangular arrangement, Park asked for economic aid from Japan. The atmosphere of the eighth Ministerial Conference, held in September of 1975, contrasted sharply

⁷ (ed.) Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, p. 188.

⁸ Dong A Il Bo, June 2, 1975.

⁹ Dong A Il Bo, September 16, 1975.

¹⁰ Dong A Il Bo, September 15, 1975.

with that of the previous talks of 1973.¹¹ Although Japan declined to commit herself to a specific amount of aid, she reversed her 1973 position and promised to provide public loans for various projects contained in South Korea's third and fourth five-year economic development plans.¹²

The Impact of U.S. Withdrawal Policy

After 1977, the major concern of both Japan and South Korea was the Carter Administration's plan to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea.¹³ Carter's plan raised some important security issues for Northeast Asia. Although South Korea's armed forces had improved, it was the presence of U.S. forces that stabilized the military balance, not only on the Korean peninsula, but in Northeast Asia generally. Most leading political figures in South Korea expressed concern over the plan for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. In an interview with Newsweek, on January 14, 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda stated that the U.S. withdrawal program should be suspended for security reasons.¹⁴ He emphasized that there was danger of a misunderstanding with North Korea in the event of a complete withdrawal. Then, in a meeting

¹¹(ed.) Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, p. 188.

¹²Ibid., p. 188.

¹³(ed.) Franklin B. Weinstein, U.S.-Japanese Relations and Security of East Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p. 209.

¹⁴Dong A Il Bo, January 14, 1977.

with President Carter, in March of 1977, he appealed to the U.S. to reconsider the implications of the withdrawal policy.¹⁵

It was now clear that both South Korea and Japan were considering increases in their defense expenditures.¹⁶ However, on the question of what Japan was prepared to contribute to South Korea's security major differences existed between the two countries. The official Japanese government view was that, in case of the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula, Japan should seek to minimize the impact on herself by refraining from any military involvement beyond cooperation in the use of U.S. military bases on Japanese territory.¹⁷ In other words, Japan was prepared to honor commitments under the military security treaty with the United States, but she was not prepared to accept new obligations for the defense of South Korea. Japan insisted that the U.S. should maintain the defense of South Korea.¹⁸ It was felt that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea would reduce U.S. options and, therefore, make American involvement in Seoul's defense more likely.

¹⁵ Dong A Il Bo, March 23, 1977.

¹⁶ Dong A Il Bo, June 3, 1977.

¹⁷ (ed.) Franklin B. Weinstein, U.S.- Japanese Relations and Security of Southeast Asia, p. 206.

¹⁸ (eds) Franklin B. Weinstein and Fujio Kamiya, The Security of Korea: U.S. and Japanese Perspective on the 1980s.

The U.S., of course, disagreed with the Japanese position. In July of 1977, U.S. defense minister Harold Brown argued that the Japanese government should continue to support the security of South Korea in non-military areas.¹⁹ After the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Japan should give greater economic support to South Korea so that she might increase her military expenditures.

Those in Washington who defended the withdrawal plan were also depending on relations among external powers to help in improving relations between North and South Korea. Although North Korean imports from the Soviet Union and China dropped from 83% in 1970 to 48% in 1974, she was still critically dependent on the communist superpowers for military aid.²⁰ However, the Carter administration felt that Peking and Moscow could be persuaded to use their leverage to prevent North Korean aggression on the Korean peninsula. The Carter administration used various diplomatic channels to explain its Korean policy to Moscow, Peking, and Pyongyang. During his August 1977 visit to Peking, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance asked the Chinese leadership to do what they could to moderate the expansionist desires of their North Korean allies. President Carter made it clear to both Moscow

¹⁹ Nihon Keizai Shinbun, August 5, 1977.

²⁰ See Chin Wee Chung, "North Korea in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Summer 1983), pp. 67-85.

and Peking that his withdrawal policy in no way indicated a weakening of U.S. commitment to South Korean security.²¹

However, Carter's withdrawal plan was short-lived. Conservative senators resisted the plan. The 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act allowed only for the gradual and phased reduction of U.S. ground forces in South Korea in stages consistent with the security interests of South Korea and other U.S. interests in Asia.²² The following year, the Joint Chief of Staff recommended that the U.S. suspend all further troop withdrawals. Then, on July 20, 1979, presidential security advisor Zbigniew Brezinski announced the president's decision to suspend troop withdrawals until 1981.²³ Carter's subsequent failure to gain reelection effectively killed the withdrawal plan.

It can be argued that Carter's troop withdrawal plan brought Japan and South Korea substantially closer together. In April of 1979, the two governments took an epochal step toward improved relations.²⁴ For the first time since World War II, General Nagano Shigeto, chief of staff of the Japanese Land Self-Defense Force, visited South Korea in his

²¹Department of State Bulletin, December 12, 1977, pp. 852-854.

²²Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A changing Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1982), p. 116.

²³Ibid., pp. 122-124.

²⁴Dong A Il Bo, April 30, 1979.

official capacity. The same month also saw the emergence of the South Korean-Japanese Parliamentary Council on Security Affairs. In July, Yamashita Ganri, director-general of the Japanese Defense Agency, paid an official visit to South Korea. These were all clear signs that the two countries were moving toward closer cooperation on security matters.²⁵

The Kim Dae Jung Affair

While foreign relations improved, the domestic situation in South Korea deteriorated. The eighteen year reign of General Park ended on October 26, 1979, with his assassination. The assassin was Park's trusted lieutenant and the incumbent director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Jae Keu. Park had alienated a large segment of the populace with his oppressive Yushin measures. Then an economic down turn in 1978 brought political grievances into sharper focus and increased support for oppositional forces.

Following a period of political turmoil, a new military regime came to power in August of 1980, headed by Major General Chun Doo Hwan. Chun had carried out a coup against the chief of staff of the army on December 12, 1979. He had effectively placed all armed forces under his control. Chun promoted himself to four-star general, then retired from the army, and had himself elected president by a rubber-stamp electoral college on June 27.

²⁵ Dong A Il Bo, May 2, 1979.

Chun's first official action was to proclaim an expanded emergency martial law on May 17, 1980. Chun justified his actions by invoking the need to bring order to the turmoil created by widespread student protest demonstrations. The May 17 proclamation not only extended emergency martial law to the entire country, but also banned all political activities and tightened up press censorship. Under the martial law command, 26 leading politicians and former government officers were arrested on charges of aiding and abetting the student demonstrations.²⁶

The emergence of the Chun government, and its oppressive domestic measures, stirred Japanese public opinion.²⁷ It also aroused concerns in the Japanese government, which had hoped for an orderly political transition under the caretaker government headed by Choi Kyu Ha. Amid these various volatile events, the trail of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung was particularly disturbing to Tokyo.

The former presidential candidate and kidnap victim was indicted, tried, and convicted by a military court on charges of plotting rebellion and violating the National Security Law. He was sentenced to death on September 17, 1980. These events put the newly formed Japanese government, headed by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko, in a political dilemma. The

²⁶ Andrew Nagorski, "East Asia in 1980," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No 3. p. 672.

²⁷ Ashahi Shimbun, August 13, 1980.

Japanese public was outraged by the charges against Kim Dae Jung, whose name had become a household word since his 1973 kidnapping.²⁸ Although Prime Minister Suzuki had publicly declared that he would not interfere in Korea's domestic problems, the fate of Kim was obviously a matter of grave concern for the Japanese government. He officially notified the Korean ambassador in Tokyo that the court's decision would have a gravely adverse impact on Japanese policies toward South Korea.²⁹

When Kim's appeal was denied by the appellate martial law court, Prime Minister Suzuki confronted the Korean ambassador to express his concern, stating that Kim's execution might prevent the Japanese government from providing further assistance to South Korea, and strengthen Japanese domestic sentiment favoring the improvement of ties with North Korea.³⁰ Former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo visited Seoul and attempted to persuade President Chun to show leniency toward Kim.³¹ However, Chun was not receptive to this advice, saying that the Japanese should not try to interfere with judicial processes in South Korea.

Against this backdrop of rapidly deteriorating relations, anti-South Korean groups in Japan stepped up their

²⁸ Yomiuri Shimbun, September 18, 1980.

²⁹ Asahi Shimbun, September 18, 1980.

³⁰ Asahi Shimbun, September 22, 1980.

³¹ Asahi Shimbun, September 26, 1980.

campaign to pressure the Japanese government to apply stringent measures to prevent the execution of Kim Dae Jung. Union leaders announced a plan to boycott South Korean goods and refuse to handle cargoes between Japan and South Korea if Kim was executed. On December 7, hundreds of demonstrators rallied in front of the South Korean embassy in Tokyo to protest the sentence.

On January 23, 1981, under Japanese pressures, Chun decided to commute Kim's sentence to life imprisonment. The Suzuki government praised Chun's actions of leniency and added that there were no more outstanding problems between the two countries.³²

In the aftermath of the Kim Dae Jung affair, there were signs of improvement in South Korean-Japanese relations. The Suzuki government not only unfroze \$94 million in credits to South Korea, but also indicated its willingness to hold a bilateral ministerial conference at the end of 1981.

The \$6 Billion Loan Affair

Another incident that adversely effected South Korean-japanese relations was the \$6 billion loan affair. By the summer of 1981, relations had fully recovered from the trauma to the Kim Dae Jung affair. Seoul and Tokyo had agreed to hold a bilateral foreign minister's conference on August 20-21 to discuss a number of important issues. On the eve of

³² Japan Times, January 24, 1981.

the conference, it had become increasingly clear that the most important item to be discussed would be South Korea's request for a massive economic aid package. In order to meet the mounting burden of its defense expenditures, South Korea was seeking an unprecedented total of \$6 billion in Japanese loans.³³ According to Japanese sources, Seoul felt such a request was appropriate on the grounds that South Korea was playing the role of bulwark against the communist countries of East Asia.³⁴ No progress on the issue was made at the August conference.

The \$6 billion loan issue was taken up again at the 11th South Korean-Japanese ministerial conference held in Seoul on September 10-11. South Korean officials insisted that the money was necessary to help finance Seoul's fifth five-year plan. They again contended that Japan should extend the aid in return for security benefits. However, Japanese foreign minister Sonoda replied that it was incompatible with Japanese foreign aid policy to provide economic assistance with military implications to any country.³⁵ Japan also felt that the amount requested was unacceptably high.³⁶

While it was clear that the loan was becoming a major issue between the two countries, the amount as well as the

³³ Japan Times, August 18, 1981.

³⁴ Japan Times, August 22, 1981.

³⁵ Japan Times, September 3, 1981.

³⁶ Japan Times, September 3, 1981.

terms of the loan were difficult for the Suzuki government to accommodate. The amount was simply too large for Japan to allocate to a single country. The total amount of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) pledged to all Asian countries was only \$10.5 billion. South Korea argued that this was the price of Japanese security. South Korea also argued that the magnitude of the deficits in its balance of trade with Japan, and Japan's substantial economic stakes in South Korea, justified its request for low interest government loans and commodity credits. In April of 1982, Japan offered a loan package totaling \$4 billion, of which only \$1.5 billion would be a ODA loan. The remainder would be Japanese Export-Import Bank credits. South Korea flatly rejected the offer and negotiations were suspended.

In order to find a solution, Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio proposed to hold working-level consultations in December.³⁷ Through two rounds of such talks, substantial progress was made. The final settlement was reached between foreign ministers Lee Bum Suk and Sakurauchi Yoshio. They agreed to a \$4 billion loan package, with an average interest rate of 6% per year, to be provided over seven years, divided into \$1.85 billion from the ODA fund, \$350 million in bank loans, and \$1.8 billion from the Export-Import Bank.³⁸

³⁷ Japan Times, July 6, 1982.

³⁸ Japan Times, July 3, 1982.

The Textbooks Issue

Another development that had serious implication for relations between Seoul and Tokyo was an incident surrounding the revision of Japanese history books. It was revealed in late 1982 that government censors at the Japanese Education Ministry had ordered a substantial revision of history textbooks, so as to gloss over the aggressive acts and atrocities committed by Japan against Korea, prior to and during World War II. The details of the textbook revision were reported extensively in the Korean press in July.³⁹ Predictably, the South Koreans reacted with anger, demanding the immediate correction of the distorted texts.⁴⁰ Rallies and demonstrations were held in many South Korean cities.

Prime Minister Suzuki responded by instructing officials of the Foreign and Educational Ministries to promptly work out a plan to settle the textbook issue. The plan was announced on August 26, 1982. In a prepared statement, Suzuki declared that he was acutely aware of the serious damage inflicted on Korea before and during the war and recognized that this should be reflected in Japanese history curricula.⁴¹

³⁹ Korea Herald, July 24, 1982.

⁴⁰ Japan Times, August 16, 1982.

⁴¹ Yomiuri Shimbun, August 24, 1982.

The Evolution of South Korean-Japanese Relations

Two major factors explain the improvement in South Korean-Japanese relations. The first, and most obvious, was mutual security concerns. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought these concerns once more sharply into focus. To the Chun regime, North Korea's heavy military build-up and their adamant refusal to accept accommodation with the south, coupled with the Soviet's heightened military preparedness in the Far East, left little doubt as to the nature and origin of the security threat.⁴²

Chun contended that such security threats should be deterred by the countries most directly effected: South Korea, Japan, and the United States.⁴³ Chun asserted that the Japanese defensive responsibilities originated not only in the need to protect her territory, but also to safeguard the peace of the region and to keep the sea lanes open.⁴⁴ Chun's persuasive demands for Japanese security cooperation were the main factor in the settlement of the \$4 billion aid package of 1983, and an important source of improved relations generally.

⁴² Selected Speeches of President Chun Doo Hwan, The 1980's: Meeting a New Challenge (Seoul: Korea Textbook Co. Ltd., 1981), p. 269.

⁴³ Selected Speeches of President Chun Doo Hwan, The 1980's: Meeting a New Challenge (Seoul: Korea Textbook Co., Ltd., 1981), p. 265.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 284

The other factor explaining the improvement in relations was the Nakasone government's accommodative policy. When Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro came to power in Japan in November of 1982, a new era of relations with South Korea began. Nakasone showed great interest in attempting to settle the South Korean problem. On his fourth day in office, at his first cabinet meeting, he indicated to his foreign minister that he intended to go to Seoul to visit President Chun. At this meeting he also initiated secret negotiations. In a telephone conversation with President Chun, he pledged every possible effort to develop bilateral relations on a truly national basis. Nakasone also appeared before a meeting of the Japanese-South Korean Parliamentary Federation held at the end of the year in Tokyo. There he expressed his desire to do his best to build friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and South Korea.⁴⁵

During his visit to Seoul on January 11, 1983, Nakasone expressed the need for a penitent attitude regarding the unfortunate past between the two countries and allocated a considerable portion of his speech to praising Korean culture as the foundation of the early Japanese state.⁴⁶ Through every gesture and remark exchanged during Nakasone's one day visit to Seoul, the two leaders strove to break down the heavy barrier that had developed over the years. By paying

⁴⁵ Yomiuri Shimbun, January 9, 1983

⁴⁶ Dong A Il Bo, January 13, 1983.

an unprecedented state visit to South Korea, choosing to visit Seoul before his scheduled visit to Washington, and offering generous aid to South Korea, Nakasone clearly demonstrated his goodwill toward South Korea. It was an epochal event in Japanese-South Korean relations. Since the visit, both sides have striven to maintain an atmosphere of cordiality and have de-emphasized outstanding issues that might arouse intense emotions.

Summary

The period from 1975-87 was a period of readjustment in relations between Japan and South Korea. The results of the Vietnam war, and the emergence of Communist China, made it clear that the establishment of diplomatic relations was necessary for the security of both nations. Both were opposed to American plans to withdraw forces from South Korea. Japanese leaders conceived South Korea to be a buffer against the communist threat. The security interests of Japan, therefore, were firmly connected to American strategic interests in Asia.

The overall movement toward improvement in relations was somewhat uneven, however, due to the emergence of several problems. In the wake of the assassination of President Park, Japan's relations with South Korea became much more difficult to manage. Under Chun's leadership, relations worsened. The Kim Dae Jung affair provided a powerful

propaganda weapon for the anti-Seoul forces in Japan. The controversy over the \$6 billion loan negotiations brought to light the lack of a common strategic perspective in Tokyo and Seoul. And the Japanese textbook affair pointed to some serious problems with respect to Japanese attitudes toward South Korea.

Despite these problems the Nakasone government's conscious efforts to pursue improved relations proved a successful impetus for accommodation. South Korea's enhanced international status, and the issues of mutual security, have produced a strong bond between the two countries. Therefore, in spite of various temporary setbacks, during the period from 1975-87, relations between Japan and South Korea clearly improved.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: FROM ANTAGONISM TO COOPERATION

Since the end of World War II, relations between Japan and South Korea have undergone ups and downs that have ultimately led to accommodation. This dissertation has attempted to outline and explain this accommodation process. Three explanations have been put forth: generational shifts, strategic interests, and economic concerns. These will be summarized below. In the end, accommodation was a product of all three.

The Generational Factor

Especially in the decade immediately following the first negotiations in 1951, relations between Japan and South Korea had strong emotional content, due primarily to the lingering hostility in the Korean populace of the memory of Japanese colonialism. This hostility diminished only with time. Hostility lingered much longer among the Korean people than among government leaders, who were in a position to understand more clearly the need for accommodation. Therefore, generational change was perhaps the most significant factor in the timing of the unfolding accommodation process.

The hostile attitudes each country had toward the other had been born of the gross differences in power, the conqueror-conquered relations of the past, and the associated bitterness, frustration, and fear. The Japanese at first

attributed the estrangement of relations to Syngman Rhee, believing that rapprochement would follow Rhee's fall from power. Committed as he was to an anti-Japanese policy as a matter of principle, Rhee could conceive of no reconciliation with the Japanese without their open admission of regret and guilt, and a public apology for the brutalities of the past.

Most Koreans suspected and feared the Japanese as much as Rhee did. Rhee's hostility and resentment was shared in one way or another by many or most Koreans of Rhee's generation who could not forget what they referred to as the yoke of Japanese imperialism. This Korean bitterness, combined with the prejudice of the Japanese people toward their former subjects, accounts for the long diplomatic stalemate that continued even after the fall of Rhee.

After Rhee, relations did not change drastically until late 1962, when the South Korean military junta moved to normalize relations with Japan. With popular emotionalism as the primary impediment to rapprochement, the existence of a military dictatorship, which was in a position to disregard popular demands, was perhaps essential in getting the normalization process off the ground. The Chang government had been a weak democratic government, buffeted about by overly emotional and nationalistic students, and therefore could do little to move the process forward. So time, and changes in South Korean leadership, helped overcome the hostilities of the Rhee generation.

Strategic Factors

Generational changes, however, only removed blockages. It was not the fundamental force producing accommodation. The main force behind such changes was probably mutual strategic needs and concerns. It was therefore cold war pressures that forced these hostile adversaries into an uncertain military partnership. In a less stressful period, accommodation might have developed more slowly.

The involvement of the United States was also of crucial significance. Of particular importance was America's reassessment of Japan's strategic role as that of equal partner in the cold war, especially in foreign military assistance to underdeveloped countries in Asia. By 1963, it was clear that American military aid to South Korea was being sharply reduced. Thus, pressure from Washington, aimed at shifting the burden of South Korean aid to Japan, was pushing South Korea toward accommodation.

As long as the international system remained sharply divided into two major blocks, the Ikeda government in Japan was unable to avoid the accommodative policies of South Korea. In addition, with the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, the importance of Japanese-South Korean accommodation became increasingly obvious to all parties. The 1961 mutual defense pacts North Korea concluded with both China and the Soviet Union seemed to underscore the need for

a strong cooperative military alignment between South Korea and Japan.

In the early 1960's, as the cold war escalated between North and South Korea, the Japanese government came to regard North Korea as a potential menace to the peace and security of Northeast Asia. As a result, Japan imposed severe restrictions on bilateral relations with North Korea. North Korea condemned the Sato government as a mere tool of America's Asian policy, and as the most reactionary government since World War II. Japanese security was indeed an important component in the framework of the western alliance system, and one of the primary concerns of the United States. South Korean security, on the other hand, was in the main of value to the United States only because of its profound effect on Japanese security. Because American and western Asian policy depended on Japan, and Japan upon South Korea, South Korea was strategically important to America.

Economic Factors

Economic incentives, particularly on the South Korean side, were important motivations for cooperation. Of course, there is little doubt that South Korea has proven to be a lucrative market for Japanese industries. Both countries benefited from economic exchanges. South Korea very likely had a comparative advantage, with respect to labor and thus did well in the textile, electronic, and chemical industries.

Japanese firms exported high level technological products and services related to the sale of technology, while South Korea focused on opening Japanese markets to its new manufactured exports. The South Korean military regime saw Japanese capital investment as a useful means of insuring a sense of confidence and independence. And, by 1960, economic thought in the United States was beginning to see foreign aid as an impediment to self-sufficiency for underdeveloped countries. Correlations once established between the infusion of capital and economic development, and between economic development and democracy, were now being challenged by historical experience. In this situation, the Park regime came to view Japanese capital as an alternative source to replace lost American aid.

As economic relations rapidly grew in importance, political problems developed. The relationship between political accommodation and economic cooperation was extremely complicated. Economic integration is often said to lead to political integration. However, in this case the demand for economic cooperation lead to political integration, which in turn, made possible and stimulated economic cooperation.

Then as the Park regime became increasingly authoritarian, Japan frequently violated her traditional policy of separating economic and politics called *seikei bunri*. Japan's use of economic measures to obtain political conces-

sions, as when aid was cut in conjunction with the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping, had adverse effects on accommodation.

What About the Future?

It is difficult to predict the future course of Japanese-South Korean relations. In the a long run, however, it seems likely that concern for the military and economic security of both countries will play the major role indeter- mining the direction developments take. It seems probable that bilateral relations will continue to move toward increasing cooperation. This conclusion flows from two assumptious. One is that the international situation surrounding the two countries will stimulate improved relations. Future policies of the superpowers and the unfolding relations between North and South Korea cannot be accurately predicted, but it is reasonable to assume that, in one way or another, these forces will continue to influence accommodation positively. The possibility of North-South rapprochement seems greater now than at any previous time. Though this in a sense reduces pressure for accommodation it also reduces Japans reluctance to accept accommedation.

The second condition reinforcing cooperation is increasing economic interdependence, which will provide mutual benefits that will insure cordial and harmonious relations in the future. South Korea now has crucial economic ties with Japan. Japan is an important supplier of

advanced industrial plants and equipment. Japan also provides more than half of South Korea's total foreign investment. And Japan is a leading source of foreign aid. South Korea, in turn, is an important market for Japan's manufactured products. South Korea imports more goods from Japan than does any other Asia nation.

It seems likely, that economics will increasingly become the stimulus for cooperation. The volume of trade between the two countries has continued to rise, in spite of all the political problems. In the economic area, problems may increase because of the rising competition between the two countries. As South Korea has advanced technologically and its economy has expanded, the two countries have come to compete for the same markets. The more South Korean industries have successfully challenged the Japanese, the more intense the Japanese concerns have become. However, at the same time, Japan and South Korea have become increasingly interdependent competitors which must work out mutual problems if they are to prosper.

It is also worth noting that prestige was a major factor in the accommodation process. For a considerable time, South Korea insisted that Japan must accept blame for past misdeeds, and Japan refused to do so. Japan was unwilling to satisfy the Korean demand for an apology for the suffering inflicted under colonial rule. This was partly due to the South Korean tendency to continually exaggerate the evils of

Japanese colonialism and their occasional reckless treatment of Japanese fishermen. There was also resentment in South Korea of Japanese arrogance in the treatment of Korean residents in Japan.

As time passes, this traditional enmity is slowly diminishing. It has become clear in government circles that accommodation is mutually advantageous, and as the governments have accumulated sufficient power to act against considerable popular opposition, issues of prestige and prejudice have been overcome without much difficulty. It was not the complexity of the issues that governed the process in the end but the will and opportunity to move toward accommodation that ultimately created successful negotiations capable of overcoming deeply rooted disagreements and antagonisms. The adverse impressions each country has of the other have been slowly changing, thanks, in part, to the progressive intellectuals who have been chipping away at the stereotypes created by the colonial experience. The important thing for future relations between the countries is to modify the national ethos of each country. Japan is particularly interested in bridging the cultural gap between Asia and the west. Finally, the unfolding relationship will no doubt be influenced by unpredictable incidents like the Kim Dae Jung affair and the assassination of Mrs. Park. Such incidents are, however, unlikely to have dramatic and lasting effects.

Summary

On the whole, the most critical factors effecting the improvement in bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan after 1951 were generational, strategic, and economic concerns. Generational factors may have been the most important negative factor, yielding only with time. Strategic concerns were the main factor initially stimulating cooperative interests. Especially after the emergence of communist China and the subsequent changes in American involvement in Northeast Asia, South Korea and Japan came to increasingly recognize the strategic importance of each other. Also, as American aid to South Korea diminished, the two countries, for strategic reasons, came to rely more heavily on one another economically. In the long run, it is probably this economic cooperation that will insure continued interdependence and cooperation.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN(1965-77)

1965

- Feb. 20 Treaty on basic relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan is provisionally signed.
- March 3 Agricultural ministers' meeting is held.
- March 11 Trade talks are held between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
- June 22 Treaty agreements between the Republic of Korea and Japan are signed in Tokyo.
- Aug. 11 Korean parliament's special committee passes the ratification of the treaty and agreements.
- Aug. 14 Korean parliament passes the ratification of the treaty and agreements.
- Sept. 21 An agricultural ministers' meeting is held.
- Nov. 6 Japanese Lower House of Diet' special committee passes the ratification of the treaty.
- Nov. 12 Japanese Lower House of Diet passes the ratification of the treaty.
- Dec. 6 Fishery talks begin.
- Dec. 11 Japanese Lower House of Diet passes the ratification of the agreements.
- Dec. 13 A foreign ministers' meeting is held.
- Dec. 17 Civic fishery agreement is signed.
- Dec. 17 President Park Chung Hee signed the ratification of the treaty and agreements.
- Dec. 18 Agreement relating to the arbitration rule on the loan agreement between the government of the Republic of Korea and the Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund is signed.
- Dec. 18 The ratifications of treaty and agreements are exchanged and put into effect.
- Dec. 18 Korean government proclaims it exclusive waters.

Dec. 18 An agricultural ministers' meeting is held.

1966

Jan. 7 Korea and Japan exchange agreements.

Jan. 14 Kim Dong-Jo, Korean ambassador to Japan, presents his credentials.

Jan. 17 The agreement on the legal status of Korean residents in Japan signed.

Feb. 3 Working level negotiations for property and claims are held.

Feb. 8 Korean government demands that Japanese government reconsider North Korean technician's entry to Japan.

Feb. 18 Korean and Japanese businessmen have a meeting in Tokyo.

March 14 Korea captures Japanese fishing boat "Kaijoumaru" in the exclusive fishing zone off Cheju Island.

March 24 Trade agreement between the Republic of Korea and Japan is signed.

March 29 Korea released the captured Japanese fishing boat "Kaijoumaru."

April 1 Korean Ministry of Commerce and Industry decides to put a partial tax on the imported Japanese auto Corona.

April 2 Japanese Prime Minister Sato says before the House of Representatives that Japanese contact with North Korea case by case is not contrary to the Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan.

April 4 Joint committee for property and claims is held in Tokyo.

April 19 Agreement relative to the detailed procedures for implementing Article 7 of the first protocol and the exchange notes on details for implementation of the first protocol of the agreement on the settlement of the

problems concerning property and claims and on economic cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan is signed.

- April 23 The joint committee for the property and claims concludes its first year's plans.
- May 10 The joint committee for fisheries is convened (to May 19).
- May 10 Japanese government hints that it will allow North Korean technicians to enter Japan.
- May 11 Etsusaburou Shiina says before Diet that plant exports to North Korea are not in accordance with the separation of politics and economy.
- May 13 Chung Il-Kwon, prime minister of Korea, presents a memorandum to Sato, protesting Japanese allowance of North Korean technicians' entrance to Japan.
- May 16 Chang Ki-yong, Vice Premier of Korea, has a meeting with Sato.
- May 20 First meeting of fisheries is held in Tokyo.
- May 28 Japanese government returns Korean cultural assets.
- June 22 Korean government permits the Koreans in Japan to take the nationality "Chosen."
- July 8 Joint committee for fisheries is convened.
- July 13 Japanese government allows North Korean to enter Japan.
- July 15 Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks countermeasures against Japan, but ministries of economic field reject proposal.
- July 19 Japanese minister delivers his personal letter to Korean Premier Chung Il-Kwon.
- July 20 Korean government stops issuing visas to Japanese.
- July 23 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee says that he will recall ambassador from Japan in the worst case.

- July 25 Japanese government decides to allow North Korean sportsmen to enter Japan.
- July 27 Korea and Japan sign the working plan for the first year concerning the claims for Japan.
- July 28 Japanese Prime Minister Sato delivers personal letter to Korea.
- July 28 Shiina delivers letter to Korea.
- July 29 Japan informs Korea that visas will be issued to North Korean technicians.
- Aug. 3 Japanese ambassador Kimura returns home.
- Aug. 5 Japanese government announces that it has decided to put off issuing visas to North Korean technicians.
- Aug. 5 Korean parliament's standing committees of Foreign Affairs Laws and Finance & Economy have a joint meeting (to Aug. 11).
- Aug. 11 A resolution on the present Korean-Japanese problem is adopted in parliament of Korea.
- Aug. 16 Japanese government rejects landing of Korean fishing boat.
- Sept. 8
Conference Korean-Japanese Economic Ministerial opens.
- Sept. 28 Japanese government sends four North Korean fishermen to the Republic of Korea.
- Oct. 3 Japanese economic delegation visits Korea.
- Oct. 21 Joint meeting for the problem of the legal status of Koreans in Japan is held.
- Dec. 9 Vice Premier Chang Ki-yong negotiates economic cooperation with Japanese officials.

1967

- Jan. 9 Ministerial conference is held on economic problems with Japan.

Feb. 13 Korean economic cabinet meeting concludes to buy Japanese-made ship with claims money.

Feb. 24 Agreement on the second year use plan for the claims money signed.

March 10 Korean Premier Chung meets with Japanese Prime Minister Sato.

March 24 Korean economic delegation agrees with Japanese Overseas Economic Fund on the loans of \$9.34 million.

April 14 Korean Ministry of Commerce and Industry allows Japanese firm in Korea to register the offer.

May 15 Agreement between the government of the Republic of Korea and the government of Japan for air services is signed.

June 30 President Park meets with Japanese Prime Minister Sato.

July 14 Japanese government publicizes the law on regulating foreign fisheries.

July 20 Working-level negotiations for implementing the agreement for legal status are held (to July 21).

Aug. 9 The first annual ministerial meeting between the Republic of Korea and Japan is held.

Aug. 27 Japanese Minister of Law Tanaka visits Korea (to Aug. 31).

Sept. 11 Educational council for private school of Tokyo is held.

Nov. 8 Korean government presents a memorandum protesting the Japanese trial on sending Koreans in Japan.

Nov. 11 Korean Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chin meets Kimura, Japanese ambassador to Korea, and protests Japanese trials on sending Koreans in Japan to North Korea.

Dec. 6 Educational council for private schools of Tokyo is held.

1968

- Feb. 13 Korean and Japanese businessmen have meetings (to. Feb. 15).
- April 17 Minobe, Mayor of Tokyo, acknowledges the university of North Koreans in Japan.
- April 18 Korea and Japan sign the implementing plan for claims money of \$71 million.
- May 7 Trade negotiations are held between Korea and Japan.
- June 24 New Japanese ambassador to Korea Kaneyama presents credentials.
- Aug. 27 Second annual ministerial meeting is held in Seoul.
- Sept. 3 The first meeting of Korean and Japanese Ministers of Science and Technology is held in Seoul (to Sept. 5).
- Sept. 6 Korean Premier Chung Il-Kwon delivers personal letters to Japanese Prime Minister Sato demanding a stop to exports to North Korea.
- Sept. 6 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu-ha sends a memorandum protesting Japanese measures.
- Sept. 27 Japanese Cabinet meeting decides to reopen negotiations for sending Koreans in Japan to North Korea.
- Sept. 30 Committee for Foreign Affairs of Korean Congress is held.
- Nov. 5 Working-level negotiations for implementing the agreement of legal status of Koreans in Japan is held in Tokyo.
- Nov. 13 Working-level negotiations for navigation between Korea and Japan are held in Seoul (to Nov. 14).
- Nov. 19 Meeting of vice ministers of Law between Korea and Japan are held (to Nov. 23).

- Dec. 3 Agreement concerning mutual protection of rights on trademarks is exchanged.
- Dec. 12 Meeting of vice ministers of Commerce between Korea and Japan is held.
- Dec. 17 Japanese Minister of Law announces that his government has decided to allow Chongryon.
- Dec. 18 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu-ha meets with Japanese prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs.

1969

- Jan. 19 Korean government presents a memorandum denouncing Japanese allowance of Chongryon's visit to North Korea.
- Jan. 20 Chang Ki-yong, special envoy of Korea, visits Japan.
- Jan. 27 Former chairman of ruling Democratic Republic Party visits Japan (to April 24).
- April 9 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu-ha presents a memorandum to Japan through Ambassador Kaneyama.
- May 26 President Park Chung Hee gives guidelines for negotiations with Japan concerning the resident rights of Koreans in Japan.
- June 9 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu-ha visits Japan to participate in the fourth director's meeting of ASPAC.
- June 11 A Foreign Affairs ministerial meeting is held between Korea and Japan.
- July 4 Korean government delivers the Sakhalin residents' list to Japan and International Red Cross Society.
- July 21 Japanese Prime Minister Sato has a press conference commenting on Tok-do.
- Aug. 5 Korean government presents a memorandum protesting Japanese Red Cross' contact with North Korean Red Cross.

- Aug. 19 A meeting of ministers of Law between Korea and Japan is held (to Aug. 20).
- Aug. 26 Third annual ministerial meeting is held (to Aug. 28).
- Sept. 26 Korean Ministry of Economic Planning Board announces schedule for construction of Pohang Complex.
- Oct. 28 Japanese government presents a note verbale to Korean government.
- Nov. 21 Nixon-Sato Joint Communique is issued.
- Nov. 25 Korean government presents a memorandum answering Japanese note verbale.
- Dec. 8 Japanese government examines Korean repayment of loan.
- Dec. 24 Korean Vice Premier Kim Hak-ryol says that he will remove limit on joint-ventures between Korea and Japan.

1970

- Jan. 27 Korean government appoints Lee Hu-rak ambassador to Japan.
- Feb. 3 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Kyu-ha issues a statement on North Korea placing order for bacteria from Japan.
- Feb. 10 Korean government presents a note verbale to Japan concerning Chongryon's visits to North Korea.
- Feb. 19 Japanese government presents a memorandum explaining the bacteria order incident.
- Feb. 24 Korean government urges Japanese government to halt trade with North Korea.
- Feb. 28 JSP Chairman Narita demands that government reexamine the "repatriation problem."
- March 3 Convention on tax avoidance and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to tax income is

signed at Tokyo.

- March 7 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Aichi says government will allow exchange with nations Japan has not yet recognized.
- March 9 Japanese government decides to examine "repatriation" to North Korea.
- March 11 Korean Ambassador to Japan Lee protests to Japan about visit to North Korea.
- March 31 Nine members of Japanese ultra-leftist student group hijack JAL Boeing 727, Yodo and emergency land at Kimpo Airport.
- April 1 Japanese minister of transportation visits Korea on the JAL incident.
- April 1 Korean government decides to cooperate with Japan on the JAL incident.
- April 3 Japanese JAL Yodo leaves South Korea for North Korea.
- April 4 Japanese Prime Minister Sato gives a telegram to President Park on the JAL incident.
- April 20 Korea-Japan Committee for Economic Cooperation meets in Seoul (to April 22).
- April 22 Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai announces his four-point principle of diplomacy.
- May 12 JSP dietman presents a draft on resuming "repatriation."
- May 14 Korean government urges Japanese government to take measures to convince the Japanese business corporation not to accept Chou's principle.
- May 15 Second Korea-Japan civil joint committee for economic cooperation is held (to May 16).
- May 21 Korean Premier Chung meets with Japanese Prime Minister Sato.
- July 17 Nihon Steel, et al. sign the agreement for construction of Pohang steel complex.
- July 21 Fourth annual ministerial meeting is held (to July 23).

July 27 Japanese government allows the commercial visa to North Korea.

Sept. 29 Ratifications of convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal avoidance on income is exchanged.

Oct. 27 Vice ministerial meeting of law is held (to Oct. 28).

Oct. 29 "Convention for avoidance of double taxation" is entered into force.

Nov. 11 Directors' meeting of the Korea-Japan Committee for Economic Cooperation is held (to Nov. 13).

Dec. 24 Korean parliament passes bill on report of civil claims to Japan.

1971

Jan. 7 Korean Vice Premier Kim Hak-ryol and ADB president Watanabe sign a loan agreement for \$25 million.

Jan. 10 Japanese Trade Promotion Association decides to apply Chou's principle to Korean businessmen.

Feb. 8 A Japanese research delegation on the investment in Korea visits Korea.

March 5 Korean government urges Japan to regulate firms accepting Chou's principle.

April 9 Japanese civil banks decide to loan \$49.5 million to Korea Exchange Bank.

April 16 Working-level negotiations on the problems following the close of permanent residence rights application are held.

April 22 Japanese Toyota Auto Company announces that it has accepted Chou's principle.

June 8 Japanese government makes a promise to sell rice 0.2 million t. to Korea.

June 18 Korean government issues a statement on Okinawa's return to Japan from U.S.

July 15 Korea and Japan conclude that Japan will establish public information center in Seoul.

July 29 Japan-Korea Committee for Economic Cooperation holds its congress in Tokyo (to July 31).

July 30 Japan Public Information Center opens in Seoul.

Aug. 10 The fifth annual ministerial meeting is held in Tokyo.

Sept. 28 Working-level negotiations for demarcating the continental shelf are held (to Sept. 29).

Sept. 28 Standing meeting of the Korea-Japan Committee for Economic Cooperation is held in Seoul.

Oct. 11 Japanese Minister of Self Defense Force says that Japan can dispatch its forces abroad for nonmilitary purpose.

Nov. 4 Japanese Prime Minister Sato says the U.N. resolution declaring North Korea and Communist China as aggressors is de facto defunct.

Nov. 16 Korea-Japan Committee for Trade holds its conference in Tokyo.

Nov. 17 Nihon Iwai Sha leaves the Korea-Japan Committee for Economic Cooperation.

Dec. 13 Korea grants that Huji Bank and Taiichi Kangkyo Bank can establish branches in Seoul.

Dec. 30 Agreement on Japanese loan for national railway electrification and Seoul subway construction project is signed in Seoul.

1972

Jan. 18 Japanese government appoints Ushiroku new ambassador to Seoul.

May 17 Korean government decides to secure more financial loans from U.S. and Japan.

June 5 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Fukuda says that sports and culture exchanges with North Korea are under consideration.

July 1 Korean and Japanese governments sign loan agreement.

July 4 Ninth Korea-Japan trade talks are held.

July 28 Standing meeting for Korea-Japan Committee for Economic Cooperation is held.

Aug. 25 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Yong-shik holds meeting.

Sept. 4 President Park holds a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira.

Sept. 5 Sixth annual ministerial meeting is held.

Sept. 9 Korean government orders the closing of the Seoul branch of Yomiuri.

Oct. 5 Working-level negotiations on Korea-Japan continental shelf are held.

Oct. 11 Japanese special envoy Kimura calls on President Park Chung Hee.

Nov. 18 Korean government allows the Yomiuri to resume press activity.

Nov. 28 Working-level negotiations for Korea-Japan continental shelf are held.

Dec. 1 Korean government allows the correspondent of Yomiuri permanent residence in Korea.

1973

Jan. 10 Korean premier Kim Jong-pil holds a meeting with Japanese prime minister Kakuei Tanaka.

Jan. 24 Loan agreement for telecommunication facilities expansion project is effected.

Jan. 25 Agreement concerning mutual protection of rights on patents and utility models is effected.

March 5 Working-level negotiations on Korea-Japan continental shelf are held.

April 16 Korea-Japan foreign ministers meeting is held.

April 23 Working-level subcommittee meeting on the Korea-Japan continental shelf is held.

June 12 Korea-Japan Parliaments' meeting is held in Tokyo.

June 14 Korean Premier Kim Jong-pil holds a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka.

July 4 Agreement on joint development of continental shelf is concluded.

Aug. 8 Japanese Minister of Law holds an emergency meeting.

Aug. 9 Japan organizes a special investigation team.

Aug. 9 Korean government calls Japanese ambassador Ushiroku regarding the protection of Kim Dae Jung.

Aug. 9 Korean Ambassador to Japan Lee Ho visits Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Aug. 13 Kim Dae Jung appears at his house and holds a press meeting.

Aug. 14 Korean prosecutor-general holds press meeting.

Aug. 18 Korean Premier Kim Jong-pil delivers personal letter to Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira.

Aug. 22 Korean investigation team reports on the Kim incident.

Aug. 24 Japanese Cabinet meeting decides to postpone scheduled ministerial meeting.

Aug. 25 Korean government protests the attitude of Japanese government, parliament and press.

Aug. 27 Japanese police announce notification of Korea of investigation.

Aug. 28 Japanese ambassador to Korea Ushiroku meets Kim Dae Jung.

Aug. 29 Director of KCIA Lee Hu-rak holds a press conference.

- Sept. 5 Japanese special investigation team requests the presence of Kim Dong Wun, the first secretary at the Korean Embassy in Tokyo.
- Sept. 15 Korean Premier Kim Jong-pil meets with Japanese Ambassador Ushiroku.
- Sept. 17 Korean government forwards the results of investigation to Japan.
- Sept. 18 Korean investigation team announces investigation results.
- Sept. 27 Kishi, chairman of Japan-Korea committee for cooperation, visits Korea.
- Sept. 28 The tenth standing meeting of the Korea-Japan committee for economic cooperation is held.
- Oct. 13 Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka says that he will soon resolve the annual ministerial meeting.
- Oct. 26 Korean minister of foreign affairs notifies that Kim Dae Jung has been restored to status quo.
- Nov. 2 Korean Premier Kim Jong-pil meets with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and presents president's letter.
- Dec. 21 Japanese Cabinet meeting decides to change the economic cooperation policy toward Korea from government orientation to civil one.
- Dec. 21 The seventh annual ministerial meeting is held.

1974

- Jan. 24 Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka praises the imperial Japanese role in Korean colonial period.
- Jan. 29 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Dong-jo protests the prime minister's remarks.
- Jan. 30 Japan and Korea sign agreement on continental shelf.

- Feb. 4 Korean government cancels the allowance of import of Ashahi Shimbun.
- Feb. 6 Japanese ambassador Ushiroku delivers government message of regret on Korea-Japan history.
- May 13 Commercial loan agreement is signed between Korea and Japan.
- June 4 Japanese ambassador Ushiroku visits Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim and raises the matter of the recall of Kim Dae Jung.
- June 7 Agreement on technical cooperation for the implementation of Korea-Japan joint research programs on agriculture is signed.
- July 18 Standing meeting of Korea-Japan committee for economic cooperation is held (to July 19).
- Aug. 15 Korean first lady is shot dead by Mun Se Kwang, a Korean resident of Japan.
- Aug. 19 Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka attends the funeral of the late first lady.
- Aug. 21 Demonstrations staged against Japan.
- Aug. 24 Korean Premier Kim Jong-pil delivers personal letter to Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka.
- Aug. 29 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Kimura says there's no North Korean threat to South Korea.
- Aug. 30 President Park Chung Hee urges Japan to take "understandable measures."
- Sept. 2 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Dong-jo presents a memorandum to Japan.
- Sept. 6 A group of anti-Japanese demonstrators enters the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.
- Sept. 6 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Kimura says that Republic of Korea is not the only lawful government in Korea.
- Sept. 6 Korea government regrets the embassy incident.
- Sept. 6 Japan government demands the compensation.

- Sept. 14 Korean Premier Kim Jong-pil and Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo and Japanese Ambassador Ushiroku hold meetings (to Sept. 15).
- Sept. 19 Japanese special envoy Etsusaburou Shiina calls on President Park and delivers prime minister's personal letter.
- Sept. 23 Korean government re-allows circulation of Ashahi Shimbun.
- Oct. 21 The eleventh annual Korea-Japan trade talks are held.
- Oct. 25 Loan agreement for the implementation of rural development project and of Daechung Dam construction project is effected.

1975

- Jan. 10 Korean government allows the establishment of branch of Yomiuri.
- Jan. 22 Korea-Japan Parliamentarian's meeting is held.
- July 10 Korea-Japan Parliamentarian's union is established in Seoul.
- July 23 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Miyazawa visits Korea and holds a meeting with his Korean counterpart.
- Aug. 29 Loan agreement for the development of Pukpyong port and the promotion of agricultural production is effected.
- Sept. 4 The first working-level negotiations for economic cooperation with Japan are held.
- Sept. 12 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Miyazawa says Japan will not recognize North Korea.
- Sept. 15 The eighth annual ministerial meeting is held.
- Oct. 20 The second working-level negotiations for economic cooperation with Japan are held (to Oct. 25).
- Dec. 1 Korea-Japan trade talks are held (to Dec. 2).

1976

- Jan. 13 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin meets with Japanese Ambassador Nishiyama concerning the Japanese Parliamentarians' trial on access to North Korea.
- Jan. 21 Working-level negotiations for Korea-Japan economic cooperation are held (to Jan. 23).
- Feb. 8 First working-level negotiations for textiles are held.
- March 2 Korean government establishes three-stage policy against Japanese silk import policy.
- March 4 Working-level negotiations on silk between Korea and Japan are held.
- March 6 Agreement concerning technical cooperation for Daejeon vocational training institute is signed.
- March 8 Korean government forbids the import of textile machine from Japan.
- June 10 Foreign ministers meeting is held between Korea and Japan.
- July 24 Japan decides to establish the Japan-Korea Economy Association and KIDC.
- Sept. 28 Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin meets with Japanese counterpart Kosaka at U.N.
- Oct. 1 Members of Japan-Korea Parliamentarian's Union ask government to investigate the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.
- Nov. 1 Working-level negotiations on economic cooperation are held.
- Nov. 13 Korea and Japan sign an agreement under which Japan will loan 10,900 million yen in Japanese currency for the construction of the 126.9 Km Chung-buk railway and for the expansion of communications facilities.

- Nov. 14 Working-level negotiations on legal status of Koreans in Japan are held.
- Nov. 26 Japanese Prime Minister Miki disagrees with withdrawal of U.S. ground forces in Korea.
- Dec. 8 Japanese economic delegation visits Korea.
- Dec. 9 Korea-Japan Committee for Economic Cooperation meets in Seoul.
- Dec. 23 Fukuda, president of Liberal Democracy Party, says in a press conference that it is necessary to have close relations with Korea.
- Dec. 25 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matoyama says that there should be no sudden change of balance of power on the Korean peninsula.

1977

- Feb. 10 Speaker Chung Il-Kwon and Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda exchange views.
- Feb. 10 Japan agrees to extend a loan of 12,600 million Japanese yen to Korea to facilitate agricultural projects.
- Feb. 17 Park Tong-jin, minister of foreign affairs, and his Japanese counterpart, Ichirou Hatoyama, discuss bilateral problems and America's planned withdrawal of ground troops from Korea.
- March 22 U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda agree in a joint communique that peace in Korea is important to security of Japan and East Asia.
- March 29 Japanese minister of agriculture and foreign affairs say they will ask the Korean government to remove guard forces from Tokdo.
- April 14 Working-level negotiations on economic cooperations are held (to April 15).
- May 4 Korean Ministry of Culture and Information closes branch of Yomiuri.
- July 26 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs allows

339 Korean inhabitants of Sakalin to immigrate into Japan.

- July 31 Park Tong-jin, Korean minister of foreign affairs, and Sunobem Ryoze, Japanese Ambassador, sign a loan agreement for \$77,920,000 to assist Korean agricultural development.
- Aug 31 Loan agreement for agricultural development project, high voltage power transmission line facilities and Chungju Dam construction is effected.
- Sept. 5 The ninth annual ministerial meeting between Korea and Japan opens.
- Nov. 3 Korea-Japan and Japan-Korea Friendship Associations adopt a resolution opposing the planned withdrawal of American ground forces from Korea.

¹"Chronology of Relations Between Korea and Japan: 1965-1984," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 8 (Fall 1984), pp. 685-715.

APPENDIX B

**TREATY OF ANNEXATION BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN,
PROCLAMATION, AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS
AUGUST 22, 1910**

THE PROCLAMATION

Notwithstanding the earnest and laborious work of reforms in the administration of Korea in which the Governments of Japan and Korea have been engaged for more than four years since the conclusion of the Agreement of 1905, the existing system of government in that country has not proved entirely equal to the duty of preserving public order and tranquility; and in addition, the spirit of suspicion and misgiving dominates the whole peninsula.

In order to maintain peace and stability in Korea, to promote the prosperity and welfare of Koreans, and at the same time to ensure the safety and repose of foreign residents, it has been made abundantly clear that fundamental changes in the actual regime of government are absolutely essential. The government of Japan and Korea, being convinced of the urgent necessity of introducing reforms responsive to the requirements of the situation and of furnishing sufficient guarantee for the future, have, with the approval of his Majesty the Emperor of Japan and his Majesty the Emperor of Korea, concluded, through their respective plenipotentiaries, a treaty providing for complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan. By virtue of that important act, which shall take effect on its promulgation on August 29, 1910, the Imperial Government of Japan undertake the entire government and administration of Korea, and they hereby declare that the matters relating to foreigners and foreign trade in Korea shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules:

1. Treaties hitherto concluded by Korea with foreign Powers ceasing to be operative, Japan's existing treaties will, so far as practicable, be applied to Korea. Foreigners resident in Korea will, so far as conditions permit, enjoy the same rights and immunities as in Japan proper, and the protection of their legally acquired rights subject in all cases to the jurisdiction of Japan. The Imperial Government of Japan are ready to consent that the jurisdiction in respect of the cases actually pending in any foreign Consular Court in Korea at the time of the Treaty of Annexation takes effect shall remain in such Court until final decision.

2. Independently of any conventional engagements formerly existing on the subject, the Imperial Government of Japan will for a period of ten years levy upon goods imported into Korea from foreign countries or exported from Korea to foreign countries and upon foreign vessels entering any of the open ports of Korea the same import or export duties and tonnage dues as those to be levied upon the aforesaid goods

and vessels will also for a period of ten years be applied in respect of goods imported into Korea from Japan or exported from Korea to Japan and Japanese vessels entering any of the open ports of Korea.

3. The Imperial Government of Japan will also permit for a period of ten years vessels under flags of the Powers having treaties with Japan to engage in the coasting trade between the open ports of Korea and between those ports and any open ports of Japan.

4. The existing open ports of Korea, with the exemption of Masampo, will be continued as open ports, and in addition Shinwiju will be newly opened so that vessels, foreign as well as Japanese, will there be admitted and goods may be imported into and exported from these ports.

THE TREATY

The Majesty the Emperor of Japan and his Majesty the Emperor of Korea, having in view the special and close relations between their respective countries, desiring to promote the common weal of the two nations and to assure the permanent peace in the Extreme East, and being convinced that these objectives can be best attained by the annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan, have resolved to conclude a treaty of such annexation and have, for that purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say, his Majesty the Emperor of Japan Viscount Masakata Terauchi, his Resident-General, and his Majesty the Emperor of Korea Ye Wan Yong, his Minister President of State, who upon mutual conference and deliberation have agreed to the following articles:

Article I. His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to his Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea.

Article II. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.

Article III. His Majesties the Emperor of Japan will accord to their Majesties the Emperor and ex-Emperor and his Imperial Highness the Crown Prince of Korea and their consorts and heirs such titles, dignity, and honour as are appropriate to their respective ranks, and sufficient annual grants will be made for the maintenance of such titles, dignity and honour.

Article IV. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will also accord appropriate honour and treatment to the members of the Imperial House of Korea and their heirs other than those mentioned in the preceding article, and the funds necessary for the maintenance of such honour and treatment will be granted.

Article V. His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will confer peerage and monetary grants upon those Koreans who, on account of meritorious services, are regarded as deserving such special recognition.

Article VI. In consequence of the aforesaid annexation the Government of Japan assume the entire government and administration of Korea, and undertake to afford full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obeying the laws there in force to promote the welfare of all such Koreans.

Article VII. The Government of Japan will, so far as circumstances permit, employ in the public service of Japan in Korea those Koreans who accept the new regime loyally and in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service.

Article VIII. This treaty, having been approved by his Majesty the Emperor of Japan and his Majesty the Emperor of Korea, shall take effect from the date of its promulgation.²

²Woon Sang Choi, The Fall of the Hermit Kingdom (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967), pp. 135-138.

APPENDIX C

**TREATY OF DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION BETWEEN
KOREA AND JAPAN
JUNE 22, 1965**

TREATY OF BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN

The Republic of Korea and Japan,

Considering the historical background of relationship between their peoples and their mutual desire for good neighborliness and for the normalization of their relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty;

Recognizing the importance of their close cooperation in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the promotion of their mutual welfare and common interests and to the maintenance of international peace and security; and

Recalling the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 and the Resolution 195 (III) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1948;

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty on Basic Relations and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

The Republic of Korea:

Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

Dong Jo Kim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Korea

Japan:

Etsusuaburo Shiina, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Shinichi Takasugi

Who having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I

Diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between the High Contracting Parties. The High Contracting Parties shall exchange diplomatic envoys with the Ambassadorial rank without delay.

The High Contracting Parties will also establish

consulates at locations to be agreed upon by the two countries.

ARTICLE II

It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Korea and the Empire of Japan on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.

ARTICLE III

It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195(III) of the United Nations General Assembly.

ARTICLE IV

(a) The High Contracting Parties will be guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the mutual relations.

(b) The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in promoting their mutual welfare and common interests.

ARTICLE V

The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest practicable date for the conclusion of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

ARTICLE VI

The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest practicable date for the conclusion of an agreement relating to civil air transport.

ARTICLE VII

The present Treaty shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN
CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS OF
PROPERTY AND CLAIMS AND CONCERNING ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Signed at Tokyo on June 22, 1965
Entered into force on December 18, 1965

The Republic of Korea and Japan,

Desiring for the settlement of the problems in regard to the property of both nations and their peoples and to the claims rights between the two nations, between their peoples and between the two nations and their peoples; and

Desiring for the promotion of economic cooperation between the two nations;

Having agreed as follows:

Article 1. 1. Japan shall supply the Republic of Korea with:

(a) The products of Japan and the services of the Japanese people, the total value of which will be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to three hundred million United States of America dollars (\$300,000,000) at present computed at one hundred and eight billion yen (108,000,000,000) on a non-repayable basis within the period of ten years from the date of coming into force of the present Agreement. The supply of the products and services in each year shall be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to thirty million United States of America dollars (\$30,000,000) at present computed at ten billion eight hundred million yen (10,800,000,000); in case the supply of any one years falls short of this amount, the remainder shall be added to the supply for any one year can be increased by agreement between the Governments of the Contracting Parties.

(b) Long-term and low interest loans up to the amount of so much in yen as shall be equivalent to two hundred million United States of America dollars (\$200,000,000) at present computed at seventy two billion yen (72,000,000,000) which the Government of Republic of Korea may request and which will be used when the Republic of Korea procures the product of Japan and serices of Japanese people needed for the implementation of the projects which will be decided upon the accordance with arrangements to be concluded on the basis of paragraph 3, within the period of ten years from the date of coming into force of the present Agreement.

Those loans shall be furnished by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan, and the Government of Japan shall take necessary means in order that the said Fund secure the necessary funds to execute the loans evenly each year.

The above mentioned supply and the loans should serve the economic development of the Republic of Korea.

2. The Government of the Contracting Parties shall establish a joint committee to consist of the representatives of both Governments as a consultative organ between the two Governments, which shall be empowered to make recommendations on matters related to the implementation of the provisions of this Article.

3. The Government of the Contracting Parties shall conclude necessary arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this Article.

Article 2. 1. The Contracting Parties confirm that the problems concerning the property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their peoples (including juridical persons) and the claims rights of either Contracting Party and its people against the other Contracting Party and its people, including those provided for in Article 4(a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1952, have been settled completely and finally.

2. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the following (excluding those which became the objects of special measures which each of the Contracting Parties took prior to the date of the present Agreement):

(a) The property, rights and interests of those nationals of any one of the Contracting Parties who have ever resided in the territory of the other Contracting Party any time in the period from August 15, 1947 to the date of the signing of the present Agreement; and

(b) The property, rights and interests of either Contracting Party and its people, which were acquired or brought under control of the other Contracting Party in the process of ordinary contracts on and after August 15, 1945.

3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, no claim may be made regarding the measures to be taken in regard to such property, rights and interests of either Contracting Party and its people as are under the jurisdiction of the other Contracting Party on the date of the signing of the present Agreement and regarding such claims rights of either

Contracting Party and its people as have arisen due to causes dating prior to that date.

Article 3. 1. Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation and implementation of the present Agreement shall be settled primarily through diplomatic channels.

2. Any dispute which cannot be settled under the provisions of paragraph 1 shall be composed of three members, one each to be appointed by the Government of the respective Contracting Party within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt by the Government of either Contracting Party of an official note of the Government of the other Contracting Party requiring mediation of the dispute, and the third to be agreed upon by the two committee members within a further period of thirty days. However, the third committee member must not be a national of either of the Contracting Parties.

3. In case of the Government of either Contracting Party fails to appoint a mediation committee member within the prescribed period, or in case agreement cannot be reached within the prescribed period on the third committee member or the third power, the mediation committee shall be composed of two members who shall be nominated one each by the Governments of the two nations which the Governments of the Contracting Parties shall respectively select within a period of thirty days, and of a third member who shall be nominated by the Government of a third power which the two Governments, thus selected, shall decide upon through consultations.

4. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall accept decisions rendered by the mediation committee in accordance with the provisions of the present Article.

Article 4. The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall enter into forces as from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

For the Republic of Korea:
Tong Won Lee
Dong Jo Kim

For Japan:
Etsusaburo Shiina
Shinichi Takasugi

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN
CONCERNING FISHERIES

Singed at Tokyo on June 22, 1965
Entered into force on December 18, 1965

The Republic of Korea and Japan,

Desiring that the maximum sustained productivity of the fishery resources in waters of mutual interest be maintained;

Firmly believing that the conservation of such resources and their nationale xploitation and development will serve the interests of both countries;

Confirming that the principle of the freedom of the high seas will be respected unless otherwise especially provided for in present Agreement;

Recognizing the desirability of eliminating the causes of disputes which may arise from their geographical proximity and the intermingling of their respective fisheries; and

Desiring mutual cooperation for the development of their respective fisheries;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. 1. The Contracting Parties mutually recognize that each Contracting Party has the right to establish a sea zone (hereinafter referred to as "fishery zone") extending to 12 nautical miles from its respective coastal base-line, over which it will exercise exclusive jurisdiction concerning matters pertaining to fisheries. In case either Contracting Party uses the straight base-line for the establishment of its fishery zone, it shall decide the straight base-line on the basis of consultations with the other Contracting Party.

2. The Contracting Parties shall not object to the exclusion by one Contracting Party of the fishing vessels of the other Contracting Party from engaging in fishing operations in the fishery zone.

3. An area where the fishery zones of the Contracting Parties overlap shall be divided into two by straight lines joining the midpoint of the straight line drawn across the area at their wides points with the two end points of the overlapping area.

Article 2. The Contracting Parties shall establish a Joint Control Zone encircled by the line described below (excluding territorial waters and the fishery zone of the Republic of Korea).

- (a) A line on the 124th E meridian north of 37°30'N.
- (b) Thence, a line joining the following coordinates in order:

- (I) 37° 30' N, 124° E
- (II) 36° 45' N, 124° 30' E
- (III) 33° 30' N, 124° 30' E
- (IV) 32° 30' N, 126° E
- (V) 32° 30' N, 127° E
- (VI) 34° 34' 30" N, 129° 2' 50" E
- (VII) 34° 44' 10" N, 129° 8' E
- (VIII) 34° 50' N, 129° 14' E
- (IX) 35° 30' N, 130° E
- (X) 37° 30' N, 131° 10' E
- (XI) Highest peak of Uamryung

Article 3. The Contracting Parties shall enforce in the Joint Control Zone the provisional fishery control measures provided for in the Annex, which forms an integral of the present Agreement, with respect to dragnet fishing, purse-seine fishing and mackerel fishing by vessels of 60 or more tons, until conservation measures necessary for maintaining the maximum sustained productivity of the fishery resources are put into effect on the basis of sufficient scientific surveys. (By ton, gross ton is meant. The tonnage is denoted with the tonnage permitted for improving living quarters on the vessel deducted.)

Article 4. 1. Policing (including halting and inspecting a vessel) shall be done and the right of court jurisdiction shall be exercised only by the Contracting Party to which the fishing vessel belongs.

2. Each Contracting Party shall exercise appropriate guidance and supervision in order to secure the faithful observance of the provisional fishery control measures by its own nationals and fishing vessels and shall enforce domestic measures including appropriate penalties against violations.

Article 5. Joint Resources Survey Zone shall be established outside of the Joint Control Zone. The scope of the said Zone and the surveys to be conducted therein shall be determined through consultations between the two Contracting Parties on the basis of recommendations to be made by the Joint Fisheries Commission provided for in Article 6.

Article 6. 1. The Contracting Parties shall establish and maintain the Republic of Korea-Japan Joint Fisheries Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") in order to realize the objectives of the present Agreement.

2. The Commission shall be composed of two national sections, each consisting of three members appointed by the Governments of the respective Contracting Parties.

3. All resolutions, recommendations, and other decisions of the Commission shall be made only with the concurrence of the two national sections.

4. The Commission shall be decided upon rules for the conduct of its meetings and may, as occasion may require, amend such rules.

5. The Commission shall meet at least once each year and, in addition, it may meet at the request of one of the national sections. The date and place of the first meeting shall be decided upon by agreement between the Contracting Parties.

6. At its first meeting, the Commission shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from different national sections. The selection of the chairman and vice chairman from the national sections shall be made in such a manner as will provide each Contracting Party in turn representation each year in those offices.

7. A permanent secretary shall be established under the Commission to carry out the businesss of the Commission.

8. The official languages of the Commission shall be Korean and Japanese. Proposals and dara may be presented in either official language, or, if necessary, they may be presented in English.

9. In case the Commisssion concludes that joint expenses are necessary, the Commission shall pay such expenses out of contributions made by the Contracting Parties in the form and proportion recommended by the Commission and approved by the Contracting Parties.

10. The Commission may delegate the disbursement of funds to cover joint expenses.

Article 7. 1. The Commission shall perform the following functions:

(a) The Commission shall make recommendations to the Contracting Parties concerning scientific surveys to be

conducted for the purpose of studying the fishery resources in waters of mutual interest and concerning control measures within the Joint Control Zone which should be taken on the basis of the results of such survey and study;

(b) The Commission shall make recommendations to the Contracting Parties concerning the scope of the Joint REsources Survey Zone;

(c) When it is deemed necessary, the Commission shall review matters concerning the provisional fishery control measures and make recommendations to the Contracting Parties concerning measures to be taken as a result of such review (including the revisions of such control measures);

(d) The Commission shall compile and study data, statistics, and record which Contracting Parties shall submit at the request of the Commission;

(f) The Commission shall deliberate on the enactment of schedules of equivalent penalties for violations of the present Agreement and make recommendations thereon to the Contracting Parties;

(g) The Commission shall submit annually its business report to the Contracting Parties; and

(h) In addition to the abovementioned functions, the Commission shall study the various technical questions arising in connection with the implementation of the present Agreement, and shall, when deemed necessary, make recommendations to the Contracting Parties on the measures to be taken.

(2) The Commission, in order to perform its functions, may establish subordinate organs when necessary.

(3) The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall respect to the extent possible the recommendations made by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.

Article 8. 1. The Contracting Parties shall take measures which they deem appropriate in order to secure the observance of international practices concerning navigation by their own nationals and fishing vessels, to maintain the safety and order of fishing operations between the fishing vessels of the Contracting Parties, and to secure smooth and speedy settlements of accidents arising at sea between the fishing vessels of the Contracting Parties.

2. In order to achieve the objectives enumerated in paragraph 1, the authorities concerned of the two Contracting Parties shall communicate and cooperate with each other as closely as possible.

Article 9. 1. Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation and implementation of the present Agreement shall be settled primarily through diplomatic channels.

2. Any dispute which can be settled under the provisions of paragraph 1 shall be entrusted for decision to a mediation committee, which shall be composed of three members, one each to be appointed by the Government of the respective Contracting Party of an official note of the Government of the other Contracting Party requesting mediation of the dispute, and the third to be agreed upon by the two committee members thus selected or to be nominated by the Government of a third power as agreed upon by the two committee members within a further period of thirty days. However, the third committee member must not be a national of either of the Contracting Parties.

3. In case of the Government of either Contracting Party fails to appoint a mediation committee member within the prescribed period, or in case agreement cannot be reached within the prescribed period on the third committee member or the third power, the mediation committee shall be composed of two members who shall be nominated one each by the Governments of the two nations which the Governments of the Contracting Parties shall respectively select within a period of thirty days, and of a third member who shall be nominated by the Government of a third power which the two Governments, thus selected, shall decide upon through consultations.

4. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall accept decisions rendered by the mediation committee in accordance with the provisions of the present Article.

Article 10. 1. The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The Present Agreement shall enter into force as from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

2. The present agreement shall continue in force for a period of five years and thereafter until one year from the day on which either of the Contracting Parties notifies the other Contracting Party of its intention to terminate the Agreement.

For the Republic of Korea:

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN
CONCERNING THE LEGAL STATUS AND TREATMENT OF THE NATIONALS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA RESIDING IN JAPAN

Signed at Tokyo on June 22, 1965
Entered into force on December 18, 1965

The Republic of Korea and Japan,

Considering the fact that the nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan for many years have come to possess a special relationship with the society of Japan; and

Recognizing that, enabling these nationals of the Republic of Korea to lead a stable life under the social order of Japan, will contribute to the promotion of friendly relations between the two nations and their peoples;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. 1. The Government of Japan shall permit those nationals of the Republic of Korea falling under either of the following categories to reside permanently in Japan in case they apply for permission for permanent residence within five years of the effective date of the present Agreement in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Government of Japan for the enforcement of the present Agreement:

(a) Those who, on or before August 15, 1945, was residing in Japan and who continuously so reside until the time of their application;

(b) Those who were or will be born in Japan on or after August 16, 1945 and within five years of the effective date of the present Agreement, as lineal descendants to the persons falling under the category of (a) above, and who reside continuously in Japan thereafter until the time of application.

2. The Government of Japan shall permit those nationals of the Republic of Korea who will be born more than five years after the effective date of the present Agreement as children of the persons permitted to reside permanently in Japan in case they apply for permission for permanent residence within sixty days of their birth in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Government of Japan for the enforcement of the present Agreement.

3. The terms within which application for permission for permanent residence is to be made by the persons who, falling under the category of 1(b), above, are born after a lapse of four years and ten months from the effective date of the present Agreement, shall be sixty days beginning on the respective date of their birth notwithstanding the provisions of 1, above.

4. No fee shall be levied for the abovementioned applications and permissions.

Article 2. 1. The Government of Japan shall agree to hold consultations, if requested by the Government of the Republic of Korea, within twenty-five years of the effective date of the present Agreement, concerning the residence in Japan of the nationals of the Republic of Korea born in Japan as lineal descendants to the persons who have been permitted to reside permanently in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 1.

2. In the consultations under 1, above, the spirit and purposes which form the basis of the present Agreement shall be respected.

Article 3. The nationals of the Republic of Korea, who have been permitted to reside permanently in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 1, shall not be forcibly deported from Japan except falling under any of the following categories as a result of acts committed after the effective date of the present Agreement:

(a) Those who have been sentenced to penalties heavier than imprisonment for offenses in Japan against the internal safety of the state or crimes in Japan relating to external war (excluding those who have been granted a suspension of execution of penalties and those who have been sentenced to penalties heavier than imprisonment for criminal acts against the chief of state, diplomatic envoy or embassy of a foreign country, and, thereby, have injured the important diplomatic interests of Japan.

(c) Those who have been sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for life or more than three years (excluding those who have been granted a suspension of execution of penalties) for criminal acts committed with an aim at pecuniary gain in violation of the laws and ordinances of Japan concerning the control of narcotics, or those who have been sentenced to penalties on more than three (but two for those who have been sentenced to penalties on more than three different occasions for their acts committed before the effective date of the present Agreement) different occasions for criminal acts committed in violation of the laws and ordinances of Japan concerning the control of narcotics.

(d) Those who have been sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for life or for more than seven years for criminal acts committed in violation of the laws and ordinances of Japan.

Article 4. The Government of Japan shall give proper consideration to the following matters:

(a) Matters concerning the education, livelihood insurance and national health insurance in Japan for the nationals of the Republic of Korea who have been permitted to reside permanently in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 1.

(b) Matters concerning carrying property with them and remitting funds to the Republic of Korea in case the nationals of the Republic of Korea who have been permitted to reside permanently in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 (including those who are qualified to apply for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of the same Article) have forsaken the intention of residing permanently in Japan and return to the Republic of Korea.

Article 5. It is confirmed that the nationals of the Republic of Korea who have been permitted to reside permanently in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 shall be subject to the application of the laws and ordinances of Japan applicable equally to all aliens, concerning all matters including emigration and immigration and residence, except for the cases especially provided for in the present Agreement.

Article 6. The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall enter into force thirty days after the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

For the Republic of Korea:
Tong Won Lee

For Japan:
Etsusaburo Shiina
Shinichi Takasugi

AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND JAPAN
CONCERNING ART OBJECTS AND CULTURAL COOPERATION

Signed at Tokyo on June 22, 1965
Entered into force on December 18, 1965

The Republic of Korea and Japan,

Considering the historical relations of the cultures of the two nations; and

Desiring to contribute to the development and studies of their science and cultures;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan will cooperate with each other to the extent possible in order to promote the cultural relations between the two peoples.

Article 2. The Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the procedures agreed upon between the Governments of the two nations, turn over to the Government of the Republic of Korea the art objects listed in the Annex within six months after the entry into force of the present Agreement.

Article 3. The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan will afford as much convenience as possible to the people of each other's nation so as to give them opportunities for studies regarding the art objects kept by art museums, museums, libraries and facilities of science and culture of their own nations.

Article 4. The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall enter into force as from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

For the Republic of Korea:
Tong Won Lee

For Japan:
Etsusaburo Shiina
Shinichi Takasugi³

³Ibid., pp. 143-165.

VITA

Hae Kyoung Cho was born in Wyu Sung, South Korea, on September 9, 1949. He attended elementary and secondary schools in Seoul, South Korea. He entered the Sung Kyun Kwan University and received his Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in public administration in February 1975.

After a year and a half of service in the Korean military(1975-1976), he was employed as a newsman by the Dong A Il Bo(Oriental Daily News) in 1977. He was subsequently employed by the Planning Department of the HYUNDAI General Trading Corporation(1977-1978).

In the fall of 1978 he entered the Graduate School of Saint Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas, from which he received the Master of Arts degree in political science in December 1979. In the fall of 1980 he was admitted to the Graduate School of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville and began a study towards the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in political science. This degree was awarded in December 1988. He is married to Su Hyang Cho and has two children, Young Hun and Young Min.