




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I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Denise Margaret Knight entitled "The Collaborative Creation of Alternate Realities and the Use of Torture: An Analysis of Abu Ghraib." I have examined the final paper copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Sociology.




Lois Presser, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
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Accepted for the Council:



Vice Chancellor and Dean of Graduate
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Thesis

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**THE COLLABORATIVE CREATION OF ALTERNATE REALITIES AND THE
USE OF TORTURE: AN ANALYSIS OF ABU GHRAIB**

**A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Arts Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville**

**Denise Margaret Knight
August, 2005**

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my family, Dennis, Patty, and Jonathan Knight. Words could never adequately express how much I truly appreciate your support. Your encouragement has carried me. Your constant patience, love, and kindness have sustained me. I only hope that everyone could have a family like mine.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

The abuses at Abu Ghraib, an American-run prison in Iraq, raise the question, how does torture happen in a society whose members for the most part believe that doing harm to others is wrong? Ronald Crelinsten (2003) offers the explanation that people create an alternate reality in which torture is justified. Three types of people, perpetrators, victims, and bystanders, participate in the maintenance of this alternate reality. My study is an instantiation of Crelinsten's framework. It focuses on the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib. I propose that two types of perpetrators participated in the abuses: the soldiers and personnel in the U.S. government bureaucracy. Although we cannot truly know whether or not an alternate reality existed, we can examine public definitions of the nature of the enemy made by government officials that suggest current international protocols of war do not apply to the enemy. By recognizing the definitions offered that could result in the creation of an alternate reality which includes torture, we can learn how to prevent its construction.

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I. INTRODUCTION

During the “War on Terror” and the preemptive war against Iraq in 2003 and 2004, American soldiers abused detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison located near Baghdad. After several independent investigations by the U.S. government, investigators found a pattern of abuse against detainees prior to Abu Ghraib. Abuses also occurred at Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, both sites used to hold detainees from the so-called “War on Terror.” The abuses at Abu Ghraib caught the public’s attention after photographs taken of soldiers posing with the abused detainees were broadcast on the national television news program, *60 Minutes II*. Two days later, journalist Seymour Hersh (2004a) printed a story in *The New Yorker* outlining the specific abuses against these detainees and also displaying the same pictures shown on *60 Minutes II*.

The abuses at Abu Ghraib raise sociological questions of why such harmful behavior might be perpetrated and allowed to continue. Ronald Crelinsten (2003) addresses these questions on a general level. He explains that people involved in torture, the perpetrators, the victims, and the bystanders, all participate in the shared construction of realities. Although torturous behavior may not be directly condoned, it is allowed to continue by inaction. Crelinsten’s (2003) framework explains both action and inaction with the notion of alternate realities.

Organization of Thesis

In Section II of this thesis, following this introduction, I describe my methodology and data. The data are extensive due to the current nature of the Abu Ghraib abuses as well as public interest in it. Even a year after the story first broke, “Abu Ghraib” is still appearing in the media on a regular basis. The amount of information is not only large,

but the data are also being continually updated because at the time of this writing, investigations are still ongoing.

Section III lays out what happened at Abu Ghraib. I provide a history of both Abu Ghraib and related events in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. In the same section, I describe the abuses inflicted on the detainees by the U.S. military. I review military protocol and procedural guidelines for interrogations. Finally, I consider the speculations of James Schlesinger and Major General George Fay (2004) on why the abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred.

Section IV provides the theoretical framework that I applied to the events at Abu Ghraib. This section summarizes Ronald Crelinsten's (2003) model of why torture occurs in a "humane" society. Crelinsten (2003) explains that people create alternate realities that neutralize the use of torture, either by condoning the behavior or by inaction and ambivalence. In addition to Crelinsten's framework, I briefly detail other sociological theories that parallel Crelinsten's (2003) work.

Section V offers my analysis. I apply Crelinsten's framework to the events at Abu Ghraib and examine the conditions conducive to the creation of an alternate reality. Finally, Section VI follows with a discussion and a proposal for future research in the area of torture and the creation of alternate realities.

II. METHODOLOGY

Data

Because the abuses at Abu Ghraib have been covered in the media since April 2004, a vast amount of literature on the topic exists, ranging from news reports to government documents to editorial opinions. Yet, the empirical ground of the events at Abu Ghraib is still shifting. More reports are generated every day due to the ongoing investigation of the events at Abu Ghraib. Since new reports continue to appear, I have chosen to limit my data to only those reports issued from September 11, 2001 through April 14, 2005. The beginning date is significant because it marks the events of the terrorist attacks of 9-11 (to be discussed in further detail in the section entitled “Afghanistan”). These events are crucial for understanding the context leading up to the military presence at Abu Ghraib.

My investigation relies heavily on secondary analysis of government documents, including the Pentagon’s investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and select unofficial sources. I chose secondary analysis because the U.S. government already collected and compiled the data within the Pentagon’s investigations. I use the government reports on those investigations to instantiate Crelinsten’s (2003) theory.

The government documents are comprehensive sources recounting the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the protocols in place on the treatment of prisoners, as reported in interviews. Two important government sources are the report of the Independent Panel chaired by Former Defense Secretary and Advisory Counsel Member James Schlesinger, and the report of the Pentagon chaired by Major General George Fay (Strasser, 2004). I reference the Pentagon’s investigation to lay out the groundwork of what occurred

leading up to and during the abuses at Abu Ghraib. *The Torture Papers* by Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (2005) and Seymour Hersh's *The Chain of Command* (2004) are two unofficial sources that corroborate, in thoroughness and focus, on the Abu Ghraib (as opposed to other) abuses, the official documents. Greenberg and Dratel's (2005) book is a compilation of the declassified memos written by the Bush Administration leading up to and during the abuses at Abu Ghraib. I used Greenberg and Dratel's compilation of memos to place the events leading up to and at Abu Ghraib in historical context. To present the data in as efficient and organized fashion as possible, I present the memos in chronological order. When I quote military personnel, or those associated closely with them, and members of the bureaucratic administration, I use both the Pentagon's reports and media sources, such as newspaper or television interviews. I also reference MSNBC's reports on some of the statements released by the detainees at Abu Ghraib as well as pictures of the abused detainees at Abu Ghraib taken by the soldiers who participated in the abuses. I use both government and non-government reports to corroborate the abuses and their institutional contexts.

Limitations of Official Documents

Significant limitations exist when using official documents for a historical analysis. The researcher conducting a project on a current event involving the government faces methodological and epistemological problems. First, a researcher can only use what is declassified. All of the documents surrounding Abu Ghraib were not declassified by the end of my research period, April 14, 2005, and therefore could not be used for my thesis.

A second limitation in using official documents, specifically memoranda, is that there is no way to know what occurs between the times that a memo is drafted and when it is actually sent. Understanding what happens between the times that a memo is written and the time that the same memo is sent may indicate the urgency and accuracy of a memo (Wood, 2004). For example, if I drafted a memo on the progress of my thesis, but did not send it for a substantial period of time, a person might assume either (1) the progress of my thesis has likely changed since I first drafted the memo and/or (2) the memo was not extremely urgent in the first place. Acknowledging this limitation, I have chosen to present the documents according to the date given on the memo. There is also no way to know in what manner the memo was viewed. Was it posted on a bulletin board that most people ignored? Did government advisors read it around the water cooler and joke about it? Was it presented in a formal meeting? A researcher typically cannot account for the context in which an official document was presented, thus creating a gap in the interpretation of the context of that document (Wood, 2004).

A third limitation, one that is related to my point about classified documents, is more critical. Governments lie—both by telling untruths and by failing to disclose truths. For example, consider the investigation into two detainee deaths in Afghanistan during 2002 (Golden, 2005). Army investigators had autopsy reports stating that the cause of death for both detainees was “blunt force trauma.” In addition, several soldier accounts stated that these two detainees died after being hit by American military guards. Nonetheless, the Army investigators still wanted to close the case without filing any criminal charges. Although eventually further investigations charged seven soldiers, the investigation took two years to complete (Golden, 2005).

Another example of this limitation concerns St. Louis Cardinals' football player Pat Tillman. Tillman served as an Army Ranger and was killed in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. Initial press releases and statements given by Army officials stated that Tillman was killed by members of the Taliban while charging up a hill. A few weeks after his nationally televised funeral, Commanding General of U.S. Army Special Operations, Philip Kensinger, announced that an investigation determined that Tillman was actually killed by friendly fire. The results of this investigation were made available to officials shortly after Tillman's death and before his memorial service on May 3, 2004. The army waited to publicly announce that Tillman had been killed by friendly fire until May 29, 2004 (Jackson, 2005). In both of these examples, it is clear that the government lies by telling untruths and by not disclosing information. Recognizing this limitation, my solution is the corroboration of sources.

Definition of Terms

To establish clarity when using particular terminology in my thesis, the definition of specific terms is necessary. I use the term *abuses* to refer to any behavior—physical, emotional or verbal—in violation of the Geneva Conventions and military protocol. When I refer to *bureaucracy*, I am referring to the military leaders associated with the abuses at Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib, as well as the executive branch from 2001 through 2005. Finally, the term *accountability* in my thesis signifies the oversight of most or all individual action by others and particularly by supervisors.

III. HISTORY: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB

A New Kind of War

The attacks by Al Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001 prompted U.S. President George W. Bush to declare “war” on Afghanistan, where most members of the Al Qaeda network presumably lived. The military action against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was more an armed attack supported by the idea that the terrorists were hiding out there. He declared this action as a “War on Terror,” thus claiming to be fighting a faceless enemy. Given that the enemy of the “War on Terror” was purportedly unlike any enemy that the current administration, or any prior administration, had faced, the Department of Defense allegedly had to reevaluate the policies established to deal with enemies during wartime.

Interrogation techniques are often used during wartime to gain more intelligence on the enemy (Field Manual 34-52, 1992). The techniques of interrogation outlined as part of the “War on Terror” were used in both Guantanamo Bay, Cuba¹ and Afghanistan. Afghanistan was the main theater for the “War on Terror,” and Guantanamo Bay served as the holding site for prisoners from the “War on Terror.” Similar techniques were used at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, Iraq. Some of these techniques were of an elaborate and degrading physical and even sexual nature. Their publication through videotaping and photographing met with mass disapproval on a global scale. The historical background that follows provides the foundation for an analysis of how such

¹ Prisoners captured as part of the War on Terror in Afghanistan were detained at a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

torture is made possible when committed against a group labeled as an enemy (Crelinsten, 2003).

Afghanistan

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, two hijacked commercial airplanes flew into the Twin Towers at the World Trade Center in New York. One plane hit the north tower at 8:45 a.m. and the second plane hit the south tower at 9:02 a.m. Shortly after, at 9:40 a.m., another hijacked plane hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. At 9:58 a.m. the north tower of the World Trade Center collapsed followed by the south tower at 10:28 a.m. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Another plane was supposed to attack the White House but the passengers over-powered the hijackers and the attempt was thwarted. In this instance, all of the passengers were killed when the plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. The death toll of all the attacks of September 11th, 2001 is estimated to have exceeded three thousand.

Although no one took responsibility immediately after the attacks, the American government soon identified an attacker. President Bush addressed the nation on September 20, 2001, stating, "The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda" (Bush, 2001). He explained, "The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's vision for the world" (Bush, 2001).

In the weeks following the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush and his advisors drafted reports to send to Congress on retaliation against the perpetrators of the attacks and their supporters. On September 18, 2001, Congress nearly unanimously

accepted the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, an Afghani political party supportive of Al-Qaeda. U.S. intelligence indicated that Afghanistan housed both terrorist groups and that Al Qaeda and the Taliban were both considered prominent within the Afghani government (Schlesinger, 2004). On October 7, 2001, the “War on Terror” began (Cirillo and Ricchiardi, 2004). The United States initiated hostilities and captured the first detainees shortly thereafter in November 2001 (Schlesinger, 2004).

The U.S. government was allegedly engaging in a war unlike any other in its history. Hence, in a September 20, 2001 address to our nation, President Bush stated, “Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success” (2001). The novelty of this war extended to treatment of prisoners. On the advice of some of his advisors, on February 7, 2002, President Bush released a memo declaring that the Geneva Conventions were not applicable to the conflict with Al-Qaeda (Schlesinger, 2004). The memo explained that the Geneva Conventions *did* apply to Afghanistan civilians but that members of the Taliban were actually “unlawful combatants” and therefore should not receive the treatment outlined for prisoners of war according to the Geneva Conventions (Schlesinger, 2004). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, all disagreed with the President’s memo and stated that the treatment of detainees should follow those outlined by the Geneva Conventions regardless of their membership in Al Qaeda or terrorism (Schlesinger, 2004).

Guantanamo Bay

On October 11, 2002, military officials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba requested Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's authorization of stronger interrogation techniques. On December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld responded with the authorization of 16 additional stronger interrogation techniques (Schlesinger, 2004). Rumsfeld and his advisors classified these techniques into two types: Category II and Category III². Schlesinger (2004) reported:

Reacting to tenacious resistance by some detainees to existing interrogation methods, which were essentially limited to those in Army Field Manual 34-52, Guantanamo authorities in October 2002 requested approval of strengthened counter-interrogation techniques to increase intelligence yield from interrogations. This request was accompanied by a recommended tiered list of techniques, with the proviso that harsher Category III methods could be used only on "exceptionally resistant detainees" and with the approval by higher headquarters (Schlesinger, 2004:31).

Category II interrogation techniques were outlined by Jerald Phifer, advisor to Rumsfeld, as follows:

- (1) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours.
- (2) The use of falsified documents or reports.
- (3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made through the OIC [Officer In Charge], Interrogation Section, to the Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must be approved by Commanding General. For selected detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature.
- (4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth.
- (5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli.
- (6) The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during transportation and questioning. The hood shall not restrict breathing in

² Category I techniques were conceived as the mildest form of interrogation techniques. They include yelling and some minor forms of deception. Category I techniques could be used at will with detainees. Category II and Category III techniques are stronger interrogation techniques and required the approval of commanding officers (Schlesinger, 2004).

any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded.

(7) The use of 20-hour interrogations.

(8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items).

(9) Switching the detainees from hot rations to MREs.

(10) Removal of clothing.

(11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.).

(12) Using detainees' individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress (Phifer, October 11, 2002:2).

Phifer stated that the recommendation of additional techniques not identified as Category II and Category III techniques could be submitted to Rumsfeld along with the safeguards the interrogator intended to use to ensure the detainee's right guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions and the rationale for using such techniques. Phifer also commented, "Nothing in this memorandum in any way restricts your existing authority to maintain good order and discipline among detainees" (2002:1).

On January 15, 2003, Rumsfeld rescinded authorization of the use of all Category II techniques and one Category III technique on the advice of the Navy General Counsel. The one Category III technique rescinded was "The use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing" (Haynes, November 27, 2002:1). Additional Category III techniques not rescinded included threatening the detainees with death for themselves and/or their families as well as the use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the perception of suffocation for the detainee (Phifer, October 11, 2002:2). In his January 15, 2003 memo Rumsfeld also stated that the remaining Category II and III interrogation techniques that were not rescinded must only be used with his express consent (Rumsfeld, 2003). In the same memo, Rumsfeld added, "In all interrogations, you should continue the humane treatment

of detainees, regardless of the type of interrogation technique employed” (Rumsfeld, January 15, 2003:1).

Later in January 2003, Rumsfeld convened a new committee referred to as the Working Group, to examine interrogation techniques. Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker was appointed as chair. The Working Group involved members from both military and intelligence organizations as well as lawyers from the Office of Legal Counsel (Schlesinger, 2004). The Working Group evaluated 35 interrogation techniques and ultimately presented 24 to Rumsfeld as legitimate (Schlesinger, 2004). The recommendation of the 24 interrogation techniques by the Working Group apparently led directly to Rumsfeld’s memo dated April 16, 2003, in which he listed 25 interrogation techniques that were stronger than had been used before, to be used only at Guantanamo Bay. These supplemented the ones Rumsfeld had approved in January. These included sleep deprivation, isolation, the silent treatment, false flag (give the detainees the false impression that members of another country are interrogating them), environmental manipulation (altering the detainees’ environment to make them uncomfortable, like drastically changing the temperature or bringing a repulsive smell into the room), and “fear up harsh” (considerably raising the fear level of a detainee) (Rumsfeld, April 16, 2003). Rumsfeld stated, “I reiterate that U.S. Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions” (Rumsfeld, April 16, 2003:1). The policies established by Rumsfeld in April 2003, based on the Working Group’s recommendations, remained ground protocol at Guantanamo Bay (Schlesinger, 2004).

Preemptive War on Iraq

On March 19, 2003, the United States declared a preemptive war against Iraq. Iraq had been an undemocratic nation led by the dictator Saddam Hussein. Hussein had allegedly oppressed his own people as well as those of surrounding countries, such as Kuwait and Iran (U.S. Department of State, 2004). Hussein and his administration, primarily comprised of his family, were also alleged to be producing and harboring weapons of mass destruction. The supposed production and housing of weapons of mass destruction was a concern to the United States because Bush's Administration believed that Hussein's hatred for the United States could provoke him to ally with Al Qaeda and the Taliban and supply them with these weapons of mass destruction. Hussein denied the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. When asked by the United States to disclose the whereabouts of these weapons, Hussein refused. The United Nations also sent weapons inspectors to Iraq to attempt to find the alleged nuclear weapons. After multiple "negotiations" with the United Nations, during which Saddam Hussein refused to disclose the location(s) of the weapons, the United States declared war on Iraq.³ In his speech addressing the nation on the eve of war, President Bush said, "In this conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality" (Bush, 2003). Shortly following the declaration of a preemptive war, the military forces began to imprison Iraqi insurgents at Abu Ghraib.

During the reign of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, located just outside of Baghdad, gained a reputation as one of the world's most horrific prisons. The reputation was earned by the despicable living conditions, weekly executions and torture that

³ The United Nations opposed a war against Iraq (United Nations, 2003).

occurred at Abu Ghraib prison. Some sources claim that over fifty thousand prisoners, both men and women, were held at Abu Ghraib at any one time. Following the fall of Hussein's regime in April 2003, Abu Ghraib was completely looted. Anything that could be removed was. The Coalition forces, including American, British and Australian troops, remodeled the prison, adding a new medical facility, toilets, showers, and tiles for the floors. With these renovations, Abu Ghraib was turned into a U.S. military prison (Hersh, 2004).

As early as October 2003, the prisoners held at Abu Ghraib by Coalition forces numbered approximately seven thousand (Schlesinger, 2004). Coalition forces categorized them into three groups: "common criminals; security detainees suspected of 'crimes against the Coalition'; and a small number of suspected 'high-value' leaders of the insurgency against the Coalition forces" (Hersh, 2004:21).

Policies for Interrogations

In August 2003, the Joint Staff appointed Major General Geoffrey Miller to visit the detainee facilities in Iraq and meet with Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), the military command post in Iraq, to discuss the intelligence gained from the detainees being interrogated. The aim of Miller's trip to Iraq was to evaluate interrogation policies in place with the intent of revising them (Schlesinger, 2004). Miller brought the list of interrogation techniques drafted by Rumsfeld on April 16, 2003. This list was to be used as a baseline for policies at Abu Ghraib. Miller showed it to Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of CJTF-7. Recall that these techniques were to be used only at Guantanamo Bay (Schlesinger, 2004). When evaluating the facilities at Abu Ghraib, Miller reportedly suggested that stronger techniques should be used, and that policies

should be made as uniform as possible throughout Iraq. At this point, the standards for interrogation procedures were not widely known, even to the soldiers involved in the interrogation process. As a response to Miller's suggestions and a request from the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion (the battalion deployed from Afghanistan to Abu Ghraib) for written guidelines for appropriate interrogation procedures, Sanchez issued a memo including the authorization of 12 additional techniques. The additional techniques were not included in Manual 34-52 but were suggested by Sanchez and his advisors (Schlesinger, 2004).

Even though Miller established that the techniques listed in Rumsfeld's April 16th memo were approved only for use at Guantanamo Bay, Sanchez reasoned in a report that the detainees held at Abu Ghraib were also "unlawful combatants" and thus that these techniques were appropriate (Schlesinger, 2004). Sanchez assumed he held the power to authorize such aggressive procedures as well as to categorize the detainees as unlawful combatants (Schlesinger, 2004). Schlesinger (2004) reported, "The CJTF-7 Commander [Sanchez], on the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, believed he had the inherent authority of the Commander in a Theater of War to promulgate such a policy and make determinations as to the categorization of detainees under the Geneva Conventions," (pp. 8-9). Central Command, also referred to as CENTCOM, was the central command committee housed in Iraq. CENTCOM disagreed with Sanchez's view of his authority and referred to his procedures as overtly aggressive. In response, Sanchez withdrew the additional techniques of interrogation and authorized methods only mildly stronger than those listed in Manual 34-52 (Schlesinger, 2004).

Abuses

At the time of the *Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon*, 155 investigations had been completed on the approximately 300 alleged incidents of abuse against prisoners at the Joint Operations Areas, which included Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib. Sixty-six of the 155 investigations confirmed that U.S. forces had in fact abused detainees. Of the 66 confirmed investigations into the abuses, the Pentagon substantiated eight at Guantanamo Bay, three in Afghanistan and 55 in Iraq at Abu Ghraib. Approximately one third of the alleged cases of abuses at the Joint Operations Areas occurred during interrogations (Schlesinger, 2004). There were five substantiated accounts of detainee death during interrogation, while 23 detainee deaths are under investigation at the time of this writing.⁴

In December 2003, the first commanding female officer in Iraq was appointed to office at Abu Ghraib, Army Reserve Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who had no prior experience in supervising a prison. After the Pentagon received a report that addressed the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib in January 2004, Karpinski was formally reprimanded and suspended from her post only a month after her initial deployment there. At approximately the same time, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez ordered an investigation on the reports of abuse at Abu Ghraib by the 372nd Military Police Company and 320th Military Police Battalion. Lieutenant General Sanchez appointed Major General Antonio M. Taguba to head up the investigation (Hersh, 2004). In his

⁴ Twenty of the 23 detainee deaths occurred in Iraq while the other three cases occurred in Afghanistan (Schlesinger, 2004).

report, Taguba recounted some of the abusive behavior occurring at Abu Ghraib by the Military Police (MP). His list is as follows:

- a. Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet;
- b. Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
- c. Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;
- d. Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time;
- e. Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
- f. Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped;
- g. Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
- h. Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;
- i. Writing "I am a Rapist" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;
- j. Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a picture;
- k. A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
- l. Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
- m. Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees (Taguba, 2004:16).

Major General George R. Fay's investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib classified the abuses inflicted at Abu Ghraib into four groups: physical abuse which included the use of dogs; humiliating and degrading treatments which included nakedness, photographs, simulated sexual positions, and improper use of isolation; failure to safeguard detainees; and failure to report detainee abuse (Fay, 2004).

The general physical abuse against detainees included slapping and kicking detainees, twisting the hands of a detainee while in handcuffs, and throwing balls at detainees. The Fay report also recounted an incident where a soldier held a hand over the

nose and mouth of a detainee to stop breathing. All of these incidents are in violation of interrogation procedural guidelines issued for Abu Ghraib by Rumsfeld and those outlined in Field Manual 34-52 (2004).

Another type of physical abuse that the Fay report addressed was the use of dogs. The use of dogs is a common form of security for military prisons. The use of dogs, however, to threaten or intimidate detainees is a direct violation of military prison guidelines. The report mentioned an incident at Abu Ghraib where two Army dog handlers used dogs to intimidate two detainees to see which one urinated and defecated first. Another instance was when two Army dogs were let loose in a cell with two juvenile detainees. The detainees were terrified and attempted to hide behind each other (Fay, 2004).

The physical abuse also turned sexual in several instances. For example, these abuses included forced participation in group masturbation and the rape of a detainee by an American translator (Fay 2004).

A second type of abuse was humiliating and degrading treatment. The Fay report stated that any attempt to humiliate or degrade a detainee is a direct violation of Geneva Conventions IV, Field Manual 34-52, the additional techniques approved by Rumsfeld and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Three types of humiliation and degrading treatment were identified by this report: nakedness, photographs and simulated sexual positions. Removal of detainees' clothing was apparently a common, or at least not uncommon, practice at Abu Ghraib (Fay 2004). Most accounts indicated that the removal of detainees' clothing was a form of punishment for insubordination against interrogators or MPs. Additionally; female soldiers were present with naked male

detainees. Soldiers who reported this practice were informed that it was common procedure even though it was in direct violation of approved guidelines for holding detainees (Fay, 2004). Photographing detainees in humiliating positions was another, ultimately notorious, form of degrading treatment. In several instances, detainees were posed in simulated sexual positions with other detainees and photographed.

Another type of humiliating and degrading treatment used at Abu Ghraib was the unsanctioned use of isolation. Isolation is a common interrogation procedure, nominally designed to keep detainees from telling each other about interrogation techniques or sharing sensitive information with each other (Fay 2004). The Geneva Conventions IV stated that isolation should only be employed to maintain military security, but not as a form of punishment. Isolation was frequently used as a control technique or punishment at Abu Ghraib and therefore violated military protocol as established in Field Manual 34-52 and the UCMJ as well as the Geneva Conventions (Fay 2004).

A third type of abuse found at Abu Ghraib was the failure to safeguard detainees. Detainees at any military prison have the right according to the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulations to be “protected against all acts of violence and threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity” (Fay, 2004:114).

The fourth and final type of abuse at Abu Ghraib, according to Fay, was the failure to report detainee abuse. Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) states, “[when a soldier or other military official] violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by any member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct”

(UCMJ, 2005). Not only could failure to report detainee abuse result in dereliction of duty for soldiers, but for contracted interrogators as well because all are bound by the Geneva Conventions (Fay, 2004).

Fay's report also addressed other problems at Abu Ghraib that were not as easily categorized as specific abuses. The lack of cooperation and communication between the Military Police and Military Intelligence soldiers created problems in guarding the detainees. For example, the MPs were responsible for detainees' clothing; however, MI soldiers began as early as September 16, 2003, to institute nudity as an interrogation tactic. When the issue of the detainees' clothing was questioned, the answer commonly given was that there was a shortage of supply clothing. Fay (2004) reported, "Removal of clothing and nakedness were being used to humiliate detainees at the same time there was a general level of confusion as to what was allowable in terms of MP disciplinary measures and MI interrogations rules, and what clothing was available" (p. 115).

Until April 28, 2004, when CBS's *Sixty Minutes II* aired a story about abuses against detainees, the military's actions at Abu Ghraib had been able to keep the abuses a "family matter" and out of the living rooms of the public. The pictures used on this episode of *Sixty Minutes II* depicted American soldiers with Iraqi prisoners posed in humiliating sexual positions. Intelligence journalist Seymour Hersh had also obtained the pictures as well as the Taguba report, which CBS did not have as of its broadcast. Hersh also learned that CBS had held off airing the story at the request of the Pentagon. The story finally aired on April 28, 2004. Two days later, Hersh's article profiling the abuses and displaying some of the pictures was printed in *The New Yorker*. Within months, the U.S. government organized multiple investigations into the abuse at Abu Ghraib, two of

which were the Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon by Schlesinger and Fay (Hersh, 2004).

Military Protocol and Procedural Guidelines for Interrogations

A number of official protocols – national and international – guided the interrogation practices used at Abu Ghraib. In the summer of 2002, President Bush requested specific standards of interrogation techniques that would be in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Torture (Schlesinger, 2004). The UN Convention Against Torture was created on July 16, 1994 and defined torture as:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions (*Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment Or Punishment*, 1994:1).

The U.S. Office of Legal Counsel agreed with this definition of torture, but added that the allowable pain suffered must endure over time, as long as months and years (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002). Also, the United States participated in and amended the UN definition of torture but was not a signatory of the UN Convention Against Torture. Afghanistan, however, was.

Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, sent a memo to Alberto Gonzales and William Haynes, Counsel to the President on January 22, 2002. This memo stated that members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were not, by definition, prisoners of war but “unlawful combatants,” therefore the Geneva Conventions would not apply to them

(Bybee, January 22, 2002). Discussion continued on the suspension of the Geneva Conventions for the “war” with Afghanistan. William Taft, a legal advisor to the Department of State, stated in a memo that the suspension of the Geneva Conventions would only provoke more danger for U.S. soldiers in the present war as well as future wars (Taft, February 2, 2002). Taft reported that the United States was showing the rest of the world how to avoid following the Geneva Conventions.

As another source for standards of interrogation procedures, the Department of Defense used Army Field Manual 34-52. Manual 34-52 outlined 17 techniques approved for use while interrogating prisoners of war, which coincided with the treatment of prisoners of war as outlined by the Geneva Conventions. These techniques included more aggressive techniques than the 17 outlined by Manual 34-52 that seem to have been used in Afghanistan (Schlesinger, 2004). In a memo dated January 24, 2003, the Commander Joint Task Force-180 presented a list of interrogation techniques employed in Afghanistan, several of which were not listed in Manual 34-52. The Commander Joint Task Force-180 used the list as documentation that stronger techniques than those listed in Manual 34-52 were being used.

Under Siege at Abu Ghraib: Reasons Why

Schlesinger, Fay, and the other independent investigators speculated on why these abuses occurred. A commonly cited reason was lack of leadership and poorly articulated policies. Fay (2004), for example, found that “MI personnel were also found not to have fully comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. Theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies were found to be poorly defined, and changed several times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes

crossed into abusive activity...” (p. 110). Fay’s report indicated that even when the abuses were brought to the attention of leaders stationed at Abu Ghraib, nothing was done to stop or prevent them. Fifty-four (54) MI, MP, medical soldiers and civilian contractors were found responsible to some extent: 27 of them were accused of some degree of responsibility while an additional seventeen were accused of misunderstanding procedure (Fay, 2004).

Contributing to the lack of accountability at Abu Ghraib was the presence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Fay reported that the CIA often gave the soldiers at Abu Ghraib the impression that the CIA had the authority to act outside protocols and procedures for interrogations. The CIA also housed “ghost detainees” at Abu Ghraib. Ghost detainees were prisoners who were kept secretly at Abu Ghraib. The purpose of secretly holding these detainees was so that the CIA staff members would not have to follow procedures when interrogating these detainees because if no one knew where they were, no one was held accountable for what was being done to them (Fay, 2004).

Schlesinger (2004) stated in his report that appropriate training, leadership, and supervision could have prevented the abuses at Abu Ghraib. He located the problem in the individual perpetrators. Schlesinger (2004) reported, “Though acts of abuse occurred at a number of locations, those in Cell Block I have a unique nature fostered by the predilections of the noncommissioned [subordinate] officers in charge. Had these noncommissioned officers behaved more like those on the day shift, these acts, which one participant described as ‘lust for the fun of it,’ would not have taken place” (pp. 13-14). Whereas Fay and Schlesinger are independent investigators, the causes they identify

for the Abu Ghraib torture do not indict an entire system or policy. Rather, they focus on individuals and supervision of individuals.

IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Foundational Theories

Ronald Crelinsten's (2003) alternate reality theory provides the primary theoretical framework of my thesis. In this section I detail his work. But first I would like to touch on two theories that are relevant to my analysis as well. Gresham Sykes and David Matza (1957) offered "techniques of neutralization" in an attempt to explain deviance of juveniles on an individual level. Sykes and Matza (1957) state, "We would argue that techniques of neutralization are critical in lessening the effectiveness of social controls..." (p. 669). Sykes and Matza's five techniques of neutralization are: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties. Denial of responsibility has offenders stating that they are not at fault. Denial of injury is the lack of recognition by offenders that anyone was harmed physically or emotionally by their actions. Denial of victim is similar to the denial of injury because it is also the lack of recognition that there was a victim, or that the victim was blameless. This technique is seen frequently in the justification of white collar crime (Benson, 1985). The technique of condemning the condemners is a shifting of focus from the offenders' actions to the motives or actions of the people condemning them. Finally, the appeal to higher loyalties occurs when the offenders state that their actions serve a higher purpose.

The second theory I would like to briefly describe is Travis Hirschi's (1969) control theory. Although not all of Hirschi's theory is relevant to my thesis, he and Crelinsten (2003) make similar assumptions concerning a common belief system. Hirschi (1969) states, "The control theory assumes the existence of a common value

system within the society or group whose norms are being violated... The question is, 'Why does a man violate the rules in which he believes?' It is not, 'Why do men differ in their beliefs about what constitutes good and desirable conduct?'" (p. 23). This theme of a common belief system temporarily abandoned for another belief is something Crelinsten also addresses (see *The Creation of an Alternate Reality*), as do Sykes and Matza (1957). Like Sykes and Matza (1957), Hirschi (1969) applies his theory to juvenile delinquency, while Crelinsten (2003) takes a broader approach, examining the creation of alternate realities at the level of aggregates, including nations.

My Contribution

Having reviewed the historical context and the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib, I will engage in a sociological analysis on how the abuses could occur. Crelinsten's (2003) explanation of torture as a constructed alternate reality assists me in this project. Crelinsten's theoretical framework makes a contribution in pursuing an explanation of an often disregarded crime construct—torture.

By tradition, criminological theories tend to explain conventional crimes, such as assault, rape, burglary, not torture. Torture can encompass assault, rape, and even murder. Further, torture is typically commissioned by aggregates and criminologists have not tended to explain the behavior of aggregates. Whereas mid-century criminologists attended to gang behavior (Miller, 1958; Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960), criminological theories have not generally examined behaviors perpetrated by groups of high social status. Aggregates with power can maintain power by withholding information, and lack of information would certainly inhibit research. Inspired by Crelinsten (2003), however, my research considers how aggregates can establish the

conditions for an alternate reality that includes torture. In the next section I will clarify Crelinsten's theory.

The Creation of an Alternate Reality

Crelinsten takes as a given that most people believe that harming another person is generally bad. As already mentioned, this is a premise Crelinsten shares with control theorist Travis Hirschi (1969) as well as Sykes and Matza (1957). Crelinsten states, however, that there are circumstances when most people can justify the harm inflicted on another person. The most obvious example of this concept according to Crelinsten is that of just war. Some wars are deemed as just insofar as they are allegedly fought to protect the basic rights of humans. World War II is a good example of just war logic. The United States entered World War II as a response to the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Japan was considered a part of the Axis Power with Germany and Italy. France, the United States, Great Britain and Russia, formed the Allied Powers to fight against the Axis Powers. The Allied Powers, led by the United States, dropped two bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. While these bombs inflicted death and long-term damage to Japan, they were perceived by most Allied Power sympathizers as serving a part of a just cause: retribution. In the abstract, people may view violence as wrong, but once there is the perception that this harm could be serving a greater good, an alternate reality is created to include some use of harm. This phenomenon is akin to Sykes and Matza's (1957) appeal to higher loyalties.

More generally, Crelinsten argues that torture is only possible because people create alternate realities in which torture is either accepted or permitted by ambivalence and/or ignorance. Crelinsten (2003) states, "This passivity [of torture] or silent

acquiescence on the part of the larger society allows the reality construction to spread into more and more spheres of political and social life until it is sufficiently anchored in law, custom and discourse to define what is right and wrong, what is permissible and what is not” (p. 303).

Crelinsten lists the specific processes of perpetrators to maintain an alternate reality: authorization, routinization and dehumanization. I will focus on perpetrators and proceed to discuss the three main processes by which perpetrators create alternate realities.

Three Processes of Alternate Realities

Authorization

Authorization, in Crelinsten’s (2003) model, consists of the “explicit orders, implicit encouragement or tacit approval by those in authority to commit torture” (p. 300). When people perceive that they have received authorization by someone in a position of authority to commit a behavior outside of societal norms, such as torture, then they are relieved from making personal judgments or decisions. This aspect of Crelinsten’s framework resembles Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization, denial of responsibility.

Martha Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip Zimbardo (2002) refer to a similar process that of moral disengagement. In *Violence Workers* (2002), Huggins, et al. (2002) interviewed 23 Brazilian policemen who were either direct perpetrators or indirect facilitators of state-sanctioned violence, to understand and reconstruct social memory. Huggins, et al.’s (2002) concept of moral disengagement occurred when the police officers were able to separate themselves morally from the torture that they committed.

In their study of torture by Brazilian police, Huggins, et al. refer to authorization as “blind obedience.” While this is stronger language than Crelinsten used, Huggins, et al. (2002) seem to be advancing a very similar concept, as they explain, “Coercive rules and imposed roles prescribe and limit the behavioral options of the system’s operatives. At every level in social and political hierarchies, obedience to superiors is demanded of subordinates, with subordinates in turn demanding it of those beneath them” (p. 251). Although Crelinsten’s (2003) and Huggins, et al.’s (2002) works are very similar, their concepts may differ because Huggins, et al. specifically focused on state workers and Crelinsten generalized his theory to apply to all governments. Blind obedience is a fundamental aspect of military life. A soldier’s life in the military is based on imposed roles and obedience to superiors through a chain of command. I will discuss authorization and blind obedience in terms of military life further in the analysis section.

Routinization

Crelinsten (2003) describes routinization as “[involving] the professionalization of those who commit torture and the supplanting of conventional moral values with those of obedience to authority and unquestioning acceptance of the regime’s ideology” (p. 301). Huggins, et al. (2002) parallel Crelinsten’s routinization concept with their own—that of “professionalization.” They explain that professionalization includes specialized training, division of labor, chain of command in decision making, and working protocols. In other words, the use of torture is routinized by training individuals in particular methods of torture, creating specific jobs to carry out torturous behavior, responding to a set chain of responsibility for making decisions on torture, and following a protocol that details how to carry out specific methods of torture.

Huggins, et al. (2002) explain that the use of professionalization as a method of routinization is effective because “it would be misleading to view torture as outside conventional morality. One such conventional morality—professionalization—is a modern, secular moral ethos that includes a set of principles about right and wrong in which science and reason supposedly guide attitudes and conduct” (p. 208). The use of professionalization reflects an image of rationality and legitimacy, and therefore seems not so far outside of conventional morality. Although Crelinsten refers to the “routinization” of these tactics as socializing the perpetrators of torture, the “routinization” also characterizes in the transformation of society because it not only involves perpetrators, but victims and bystanders as well.

Dehumanization

Dehumanization, according to Crelinsten (2003), is the creation by the perpetrator of the perception that the victim deserves his/her fate. This process is similar to Sykes and Matza’s (1957) denial of victim. Sykes and Matza (1957) state, “Even if the [perpetrator] accepts the responsibility for his deviant actions and is willing to admit that his deviant actions involve an injury or hurt, the moral indignation of self and others may be neutralized by an insistence that the injury is not wrong in light of the circumstances. The injury, it may be claimed, is not really an injury; rather it is a form of rightful retaliation or punishment” (p. 688). Because of depicted retaliation, dehumanization occurs frequently in times of war.

Once again, I turn to Huggins, et al. (2002) for their conceptualization of dehumanization. They write: “When people are viewed...as less than human—restraints are lifted or suspended on what is permissible to do to them. We act in self-interest,

without concern for either their feelings or lives, without concern for any societal sanctions” (p. 255). Both Crelinsten (2003) and Huggins, et al. (2002) say that dehumanizing victims makes it easier to perpetrate harm against them. In contrast, if victims are seen as human, the perpetrator can relate to them and hence it is harder to harm them.

A specific aspect of dehumanizing victims is labeling (Huggins, et al., 2002; Crelinsten, 2003; Maruna and Copes, 2005). Huggins, et al. (2002) reference Hitler’s use of labeling as dehumanization during Nazi reign. Hitler’s propaganda depicted Jews and non-Nazis as subhuman. Jews were described as “vermin” and communists were described as “insanely destructive” (Huggins, et al., 2002). Hitler’s regime was not the only one using subhuman propaganda to dehumanize the enemy. During World War II, U.S. propaganda portrayed images of Japanese as rats and the Nazis as gorillas (Dower, 1986). Although these are blatant examples of dehumanization of the victim—the victim as presented as an animal—perhaps we have learned from that and have moved on to a more discreet form of dehumanization: depicting the victim as simply different from us, as we have with “enemy combatants.”

Labels create an “us versus them” mentality. Crelinsten argues that the “us versus them” mentality is mainly disseminated by the mass media. He also states that if the perceived enemy includes constructed classifications such as “radical extremists” or “violent insurgents,” then the threat of the enemy becomes more compelling. Crelinsten states that the more different the “them” is from the “us,” the more believable the threat is.

An example of this form of dehumanization was the 1994 Rwandan genocide between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. The Hutus and Tutsis were actually very similar ethnically; they both spoke the same language and followed the same traditions. When the Belgians colonized Rwanda in 1916, however, they saw distinctions between the two groups. The Belgians required the Hutus and Tutsis to carry identification cards according to their ethnic dissent. The Belgians saw the Tutsis as superior to the Hutus, and assigned privileges accordingly. Thus, the Tutsis enjoyed better jobs and better education than the Hutus. This distinction, initiated by the Belgians, remains to this day and was a primary contribution to the recent genocide of the Tutsis by the Hutus. (BBC News, 2004). A memo issued by Colonel Déogratias Nsabimana, chief of staff for the Hutu party, defined the enemy as “the Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power, who have NEVER recognized and will NEVER recognize the realities of the 1959 social revolution and who wish to reconquer power by all means necessary, including arms” [emphasis in original document] (Human Rights Watch, 1999:1). Referring to the Tutsis as “extremist and nostalgic for power,” Nsabimana built on a separation between the Hutus and the Tutsis. While the situation at Abu Ghraib was not genocide, a distinction was certainly made that the victims were different than the perpetrators. I develop this idea further in the analysis.

Alternate Realities in an Open Society

Crelinsten argues that in open societies, where the media go relatively uncensored and citizens are allowed to question the government, the alternate reality must be introduced in subtle ways, meaning gradually. He claims that people can only deny what

they perceive and understand and if the alternate reality is introduced subtly so that no one is able to perceive it, no one is able to question it.

Crelinsten explains that in open societies, there are certainly ambiguous areas between the traditional reality (torture is bad) and the alternative reality (torture is acceptable). Crelinsten's uses a metaphor to demonstrate this ambiguous area between the original reality and the alternate reality. Crelinsten states, "One can only deny what one is aware of in the first place. As such, there are gradations or grey areas between the realities that sustain torture and related atrocities and those that sustain more conventional morality" (Crelinsten, 2003:298). Crelinsten's use of the color metaphor is symbolic of ambiguous conditions created by the aggregate to create a climate more conducive to torture. Crelinsten is referring to a continuum of grey areas within alternate realities. In an open society, citizens can actively question their government, but the grey areas make questioning more difficult.

Three Roles in the Use of Torture

Crelinsten identifies three roles in the use of torture: the perpetrators, the victims, and the bystanders. I have focused on perpetrators, and their use of three processes to aid in justifying the use of torture: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. Here I briefly discuss the other two roles.

Victims at the domestic level of torture are generally minorities, disadvantaged economically or politically or both. Crelinsten notes that if these minorities are associated with violent insurgents or terrorism, the installation of a torturous regime is easier because it is easier to apply the label of "enemy" to violent insurgents or terrorists.

Crelinsten explains that the definition of the enemy by “the regime” is often broadened to include sympathizers with the victims in the enemy category.

Finally, bystanders aid in the construction of the alternate reality through apathy and tolerance. Bystanders may not necessarily condone the torturous behavior but by not openly opposing it, the alternate reality continues. Crelinsten lists three ideas with which bystanders justify the use of torture: just world, denial, and repression. The just world framework, described earlier, justifies the use of torture by constructing victims as deserving this treatment. Denial is the idea that the torture would never be perpetrated against the bystanders. Finally, repression occurs when the bystanders suppress of any emotion related to the perpetration of torture (Crelinsten, 2003).

Foreground and Background: The Conditions for Sharing an Alternate Reality

Jack Katz (1988) says that criminologists should focus on the foreground of offending behavior rather than just the background. The foreground pertains to the qualities of the crime while the background pertains to the social environment of the perpetrators. Katz’s distinction between the two is useful, and I concur that criminologists should study both. In the case of Abu Ghraib, both the foreground and the background were essential in facilitating conditions for the emergence of an alternate reality. At Abu Ghraib, the foreground was the soldiers’ participation in the abuses while the background was the military and executive branch’s bureaucratic acquiescence in the abuses.

Foreground: The Conditions for the Soldiers’ Alternate Reality

Facilitating conditions for the production of an alternate reality were the following three processes: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Crelinsten,

2003). To believe in a successful alternate reality, the soldiers had to convince themselves that the torture they were committing was within societal norms. Given the classified nature of most first-person accounts, I have limited data on the verbal neutralizations of the soldiers. I can, however, make inferences about the participation of soldiers by interpreting how pictures of the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib eventually became public. After committing the abuses, some of the soldiers transmitted pictures of themselves standing with the abused victims via cell phone to family members back in the United States.

Most of the accounts of the victims are still classified, but MSNBC, a television news network, gained access to some of the statements released by the detainees at Abu Ghraib. Some of the accounts given by the victims describe how the soldiers perpetrated the torture against them. Some specifically describe the photographs taken of the abuses. When questioned about the photographs taken of the abuses, Hiadar Sabar Abed Miktub al-Aboodi, detainee No. 13077 said, "They forced us to walk like dogs on our hands and knees. And we had to bark like a dog, and if we didn't do that they started hitting us hard on our face and chest with no mercy. After that, they took us to our cells, took the mattresses out and dropped water on the floor and they made us sleep on our stomachs on the floor with the bags on our head and they took pictures of everything" (Higham and Stephens, 2004a:1).

Background: The Conditions for the Bureaucracy's Alternate Reality

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann said, "He who has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing his definitions of reality" (1966:109). Bureaucracies can condition the people under their authority to participate in the realities that they create

(Weber, 1921/1968). Crelinsten explains that the imposition of a bureaucracy's definitions of reality can occur both gradually and suddenly, but it is more likely that a gradual implementation of the conditions of an alternate reality will go unquestioned. Bureaucracies as aggregates neutralize through the same processes that individuals do: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Crelinsten, 2003). Bureaucracies, however, bear a somewhat different relationship to these processes. Generally, bureaucracies direct these processes by setting policies. If framed in vague or ambiguous language, bureaucracies convey tolerance for harmful conduct that is not explicitly named as forbidden (Weber, 1921/1968). In the analysis, I address both the foreground and the background facilitating conditions of an alternate reality.

V. ANALYSIS

Introduction

This project is exemplary, not exhaustive. It serves as a demonstration of a part of Crelinsten's framework that is evident in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Since alternative realities are abstract, arguably no one can ascertain that they exist. We can, however, determine if facilitating conditions exist. I demonstrate some particular aspects of the Abu Ghraib abuses and relate them to Crelinsten's (2003) conditions for torture.

Specific examples of the conditions conducive to the creation of an alternate reality are organized according to two types of perpetrators: the soldiers and the bureaucracy. As discussed previously, these two perpetrator groups correspond with a "foreground" and a "background" of torture at Abu Ghraib.

Foreground: The Soldiers as Perpetrators

Authorization

Recall that the authorization of torture is the explicit order or at least official tolerance of acts of torture. Indeed, at Abu Ghraib, the soldiers were responding to the authorization from their superior officers to interrogate the "unlawful combatants" in an aggressive manner.

Harvey J. Volzer, attorney for Meghan Ambuhl, a soldier who was accused of participating in the abuses, stated, "If you're there, you're going to see what's going on. If you're Private England or these two specialists, what in the hell are you supposed to do? You know that Military Intelligence is telling the people above you what to do" (Scelfo, 2004:1). Taking Volzer as a representative or proxy for Ambuhl, Volzer's statement reflects Sykes and Matza's (1957) neutralization technique, denial of responsibility.

Sykes and Matza (1957) explained this technique as the process of transferring responsibility onto someone or something else. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the soldiers denied responsibility to the extent that stated that they were obeying orders from their commanding officers. This technique of neutralization coincides with Crelinsten's (2003) authorization process because the denial of responsibility often refers to obeying orders from a person perceived to be in authority.

Private Lynndie England, a better known female soldier accused of abusing detainees, stated, "I was instructed by persons in higher rank to stand there and hold this leash and look at the camera," in reference to the photographs taken of her standing next to a leashed detainee (CBS/AP, 2004:1). England also stated, "To all of us who have been charged, we all agree that we don't feel like we were doing things that we weren't supposed to, because we were told to do them. We think everything was justified, because we were instructed to do this and to do that" (CBS/AP, 2004:1). Similar to Volzer, England indicated that she was obedient to those in authority.

Some of the soldiers perceived silence from the administration on interrogation tactics as authorization to use some tactics that were actually never approved. For example, Specialist Sabrina D. Harman, a soldier accused of photographing and participating in the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib, said that she was never informed about the Geneva Conventions and what they stated regarding the humane treatment of detainees. Harman was quoted by *The Washington Post* as stating, "The Geneva Conventions were never posted, and none of us remember taking a class to review it. The first time reading it was two months after being charged" (Spinner, 2004: A01). Harman was effectively allowed to participate in torturous behavior because she was unaware that

the United States was bound by international law to treat detainees humanely in all circumstances—a commitment that Rumsfeld had reaffirmed symbolically in a memo to be distributed to military personnel on April 16, 2003. Her attention to only what was explicitly instructed or prohibited of her reflects the foundation of torture in “authorization.”

Private Charles Graner stated his perception that the abuses were authorized through orders he received from commanding officers. During his trial, Graner stated that his lieutenant told him, “If [military intelligence] asks you to do this, it needs to be done. They’re in charge, follow their orders...At the time my understanding is that they [the treatment of the detainees] were [lawful], or I wouldn’t have done them” (Graner, 2005:1). By telling Graner not to question the authority of commanding officers even if what they were suggesting seemed wrong to Graner, the lieutenant “authorized” him to submit to those with perceived power.

Routinization

Recall that routinization is the professionalization of the people who commit torture. Journalist Seymour Hersh reported that Sergeant Javal Davis, a soldier accused of abuse, did question the abuses but the response he received was that this was the proper manner in which to handle the detainees. Hersh quoted Davis as stating, “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section... being made to do various things that I would question morally... We were told that they had different rules... The MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Graner compliments... statements like, ‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information’” (Hersh, April 30, 2004:1). This affirmation is an example of routinization

because a system of rewards and punishments condition the perpetrators to continue the torture (Crelinsten, 2003:301). Davis perceived that Graner was receiving affirmation that his treatment of the detainees was not only authorized but encouraged.

When he was questioned as to why he did not report the abuses that he allegedly thought were “morally” wrong, Davis replied, “Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing [where the abuses occurred] belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse” (Hersh, April 30, 2004:1). In the wing where the abuses occurred, MI supposedly was in control and therefore controlled what behavior was appropriate with the detainees.

As mentioned earlier, routinization can also be seen in the division of labor as legitimatizing the use of torture. In the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, some soldiers would gather the victims, some would place them on the train, some would take them to the “showers” to be executed, would collect the shoes from the bodies, and some would take the bodies to the incinerator (Barnavi, 1992). This division of labor created a separation between the perpetrator and the system of torture. It is an example of Huggins, et al.’s (2002) concept, the professionalization of torture. While Abu Ghraib was not a concentration camp, there was a division of labor between the Military Intelligence (MI) and the Military Police (MP).

At Abu Ghraib, the MPs were in charge of guarding the detainees while the MIs were in charge of interrogating them. For example, Private Lynndie England told investigators, “MI had told us to 'rough them' up to get answers from the prisoners” (Higham and Stephens, 2004b:1). Stephanie Harman, another soldier accused of abuses

at Abu Ghraib, stated in a sworn statement, "It is [Graner] and Frederick's job to do things for MI and OGA [other government agencies] to get these people to talk" (Fuoco, et al., May 8, 2004:1). While no guidelines exist outlining the protocol for MP and MI relationships within a MP detention facility, there was a clear division of labor between the two groups (Schlesinger, 2004). The division of labor, as a part of the process of routinization, allowed the soldiers to separate themselves from the system of torture.

To military personnel, war is a legitimized event. In other words, a soldier's job description might include fighting in a war. War itself—and all that it might entail—is professionalized. An example of this process is found in Private Lynndie England's explanation as to why she participated in the abuses. She told a reporter, "I guess it just goes with stuff that happens during war time... You know, going in and interrogating, and doing what you're told." England emphasized the fact that the abusive behavior occurred within the confines of war. Since the abuses occurred during wartime, they are more easily justified than if they had occurred during peacetime.

Dehumanization

As discussed earlier, modern history reflects a shift away from dehumanizing by referring to the victim as subhuman to referring to the victim as *different* than the perpetrators. Recall, Crelinsten (2003) refers to this as an "us versus them" mentality.

Perhaps President Bush set the precedent for separating "us" from "them" in his address to the nation of the eve of declaring the "War on Terror." He stated, "The enemies you confront will come to know your skill and bravery. The people you liberate will witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality"

(2003:1). By appealing first to the “skill and bravery” and the “honorable and decent spirit” of the American military, President Bush established that the American military is collectively a morally good entity. He then refers to the enemy “who has no regard for the conventions of war or rules of morality.” In this statement Bush implies that while the American military is moral, the enemies that it is fighting are not.

For another example of the “us/them” mentality (Crelinsten, 2003), recall President Bush’s statement cited in the sub-section, *A New Kind of War*. Bush referred to starkly opposing differences between the American and the Iraqi ideologies. He stated that Hussein’s mindset was that of “tyranny and murder” while the American mindset was of “liberty and life” (Bush, May 24, 2004). By emphasizing the difference between the two ideologies, a separation was created between us and them.

When referring to the detainees who were being held at Abu Ghraib, Guy Womack, Charles Graner’s attorney, said that they were “not just some guys you find standing out front of a Dairy Queen” (Kirsch, January 12, 2005:1). By this statement, Womack, on behalf of Graner, distanced the victims from the perpetrators. If the victims had been “guys you find standing out front of a Dairy Queen” it would have been more difficult, or less defensible, to torture them because Graner could have related to them more easily. Like Bush’s statement regarding the enemy being immoral, Womack’s statement created distance between the perpetrators and the victims. The separation of the perpetrator from the victim allows for a denial of victim (Sykes and Matza, 1957) to occur.

Background: The Bureaucracy as Perpetrators

The same three key processes apply to the bureaucracy as the perpetrator: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. In this case, the bureaucracy is the American government and military command. Recall that the background consists of the social environment of the perpetrators (Katz, 1988). The bureaucracy acts as the social environment by creating an atmosphere conducive to torture.

Authorization

Tables 1-3 give the chronological order that interrogation techniques were authorized at Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. After reviewing the order of authorization, it will be easier to examine how the authorization of the interrogation tactics contributed to the conditions necessary for the creation of an alternate reality. As shown in Tables 1 through 3, the interrogation techniques authorized at Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq all initially followed Field Manual 34-52 exclusively. Field Manual 34-52 provides military guidelines for interrogation procedures last updated in 1992 (Jacques, 2005). While Field Manual 34-52 has been widely used and accepted as an appropriate set of guidelines, it does not list specific authorized techniques. Rather, it addresses in a more general manner the behaviors expected and not expected from interrogators. Field Manual 34-52 strongly discourages the use of physical force to obtain information from prisoners. The manual states, "The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S. Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of

Table 1: INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR GUANTANAMO BAY (2002)

Date Effective	January 2002	December 2, 2002
Protocol	Field Manual 34-52	Category II and III techniques
Authorized By:	Army Protocol	Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Description	While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out explicit interrogation techniques, the manual uses more general suggestions in interrogation prisoners. Field Manual 34-52 states, "The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S. Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources. The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ. Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques" (1992, Chapter 1:2)	Category II: (1) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours. (2) The use of falsified documents or reports. (3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made through the OIC [Officer In Charge], Interrogation Section, to the Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 30 days must be approved by Commanding General. For selected detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature. (4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation booth. (5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli. (6) The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during transportation and questioning. The hood shall not restrict breathing in any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when hooded. (7) The use of 20-hour interrogations. (8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items). (9) Switching the detainees from hot rations to MREs. (10) Removal of clothing. (11) Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.). (12) Using detainees' individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce stress (Phifer, October 11, 2002:2). Category III: "The use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing" (Haynes, November 27, 2002:1)

Table 1 (cont.)

Date Effective	January 15, 2003	March 6, 2003	April 16, 2003
Protocol	Category II and III techniques	35 Revised techniques submitted to Rumsfeld for approval	24 of 35 accepted techniques
Authorized By:	Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld	U.S. Air Force Commander General Counsel Mary Walker	Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Description	Category II and III techniques were rescinded on the advice of General Counsel of the Department of the Navy, Alberto J. Mora	(1) Direct (2) Incentive/Removal of Incentive (3) Emotional Love (4) Emotional hate (5) Fear Up Harsh (6) Fear Up Mild (7) Reduced Fear (8) Pride and Ego Up (9) Pride and Ego Down (10) Futility (11) We Know All (12) Establish Your Identity (13) Repetition Approach (14) File and Dossier (15) Mutt and Jeff (16) Rapid Fire (17) Silence (18) Change of Scenery Up (19) Change of Scenery Down (20) Hooding (21) Mild Physical Contact (22) Dietary Manipulation (23) Environmental Manipulation (24) Sleep Adjustment (25) False Flag (26) Threat of Transfer (27) Isolation (28) Use of Prolonged Interrogations (29) Forced Grooming (30) Prolonged Standing (31) Sleep Deprivation (32) Physical Training (33) Face Slap/Stomach Slap (34) Removal of Clothing (35) Increasing Anxiety by Use of Aversions (Walker, 2003:71-73)	(1) Direct (2) Incentive/Removal of Incentive (3) Emotional Love (4) Emotional hate (5) Fear Up Harsh (6) Fear Up Mild (7) Reduced Fear (8) Pride and Ego Up (9) Pride and Ego Down (10) Futility (11) We Know All (12) Establish Your Identity (13) Repetition Approach (14) File and Dossier (15) Mutt and Jeff (16) Rapid Fire (17) Silence (18) Change of Scenery Up (19) Change of Scenery Down (20) Dietary Manipulation (21) Environmental Manipulation (22) Sleep Adjustment (23) False Flag (24) Isolation (Rumsfeld, 2003:1-2)

**Table 2: INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR AFGHANISTAN
(2001-2003)**

Date Effective	October 2001-December 2002	January 24, 2003	February 27, 2003
Protocol	Field Manual 34-52	Category II and III techniques	Revision of five techniques not consistent with Field Manual 34-52
Authorized By:	Army Protocol	CJTF-180 Acting Staff Judge Advocate	CJTF-180 Commander, Lieutenant General Dan K. McNeil
Description	While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out explicit interrogation techniques, the manual uses more general suggestions in interrogation prisoners. Field Manual 34-52 states, "The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S. Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources. The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ. Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques" (1992, Chapter 1:2)	The CJTF-180 Acting Staff Judge Advocate drafted a memorandum that was sent to CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate outlining the interrogation techniques in practice in Afghanistan. According to the Executive Summary by the Department of Defense (2005), these techniques closely resembled those techniques listed in the December 2, 2002 memo regarding the Category II and III techniques employed at Guantanamo. Recall, these were later rescinded by Rumsfeld.	This memo addressed five techniques (the specifics are still classified) that were believed to be involved in 2 detainee deaths in December 2002. These five techniques were either modified or eliminated as a precautionary action (Jacques, 2005).

Table 2 (cont.)

Date Effective	March 2004	June 2004
Protocol	Revised interrogation techniques	Field Manual 34-52
Authorized By:	CJTF-180	CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid
Description	According to the Department of Defense's Executive Summary, these revised guidelines revised some of the techniques that had previously been rescinded on February 27, 2003. Additionally, "Some of techniques in the new guidance were based upon an unsigned draft memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to CENTCOM (prepared by the Joint Staff) that was substantively identical to the Secretary's April 16, 2003 interrogation policy for GTMO" (2005:7).	General Abizaid ordered that all interrogations techniques be standardized to one policy. The policy adopted relies nearly exclusively on the procedures laid out by Field Manual 34-52 (Jacques, 2005).

**Table 3: INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR IRAQ,
INCLUDING ABU GRHAIB (2003-Present)**

Date Effective	March 19, 2003	September 14, 2003	October 12, 2003	May 13, 2004 to Present
Protocol	Field Manual 34-52	CJTF-7 Interrogation policy for Iraq	Revision of CJTF-7 Interrogation policy for Iraq	Revision of CJTF-7 Interrogation policy for Iraq
Authorized By:	Army Protocol	CJTF-7 Commander, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez	CENTCOM's Staff Judge Advocate	CJTF-7
Description	While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out explicit interrogation techniques, the manual uses more general suggestions in interrogation prisoners. Field Manual 34-52 states, "The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S. Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources. The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally constitute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ. Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques" (1992, Chapter 1:2)			
		The CJTF-7 interrogation policy was heavily influenced by the April 16, 2003 memo which outlined interrogation techniques to be used at Guantanamo Bay. This memo was brought to Iraq by Military General Miller on a visit. This policy also included some techniques being employed in Afghanistan (Jacques, 2005).	The CENTCOM's Staff Judge Advocate reviewed the policy as drafted by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez and found it "overly aggressive" (Jacques, 2005:8). After the revisions, the policy closely resembled guidelines outlined in Field Manual 34-52. The Department of Defense's Executive Summary stated, "It should be noted that none of the techniques contained in either the September or October 2003 CJTF-7 interrogation policies would have permitted abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib" (2005:8).	According to the Executive Summary of the Department of Defense was, "The list of approved techniques remained identical to the October 2003 policy; the principal change from the previous policy was to specify that under no circumstances would requests for the use of certain techniques be approved" (2005:8).

sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear” (1992:2). The Manual discourages use of force for instrumental reasons, and not because it is wrong *per se*.

Because Field Manual 34-52 only provided general guidelines for interrogating detainees rather than specific protocols, the interrogation techniques used at all three locations— Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq—were open to the interpretation of commanding officers (Jacques, 2005). This ambiguity would present a problem in an environment as highly structured as the military. Because protocol exists for almost every behavior in the military, Field Manual 34-52, which was open to interpretation, would cause confusion and prompted creative techniques perceived as legitimate according to the Manual. Indeed, in the *Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations*, Chairman James R. Schlesinger (2004) stated, “The policy memos promulgated at the CJTF-7 level allowed for interpretation in several areas and did not adequately set forth the limits of interrogation techniques. The existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned” (p. 9).

Another example of authorization as a condition of the creation of an alternate reality was when Rumsfeld briefly authorized the use of Category II and III techniques in Afghanistan on January 24, 2003. Although these techniques of interrogation were later found to be in violation of Field Manual 34-52 and thus rescinded, the authorization of these techniques at all, even if it was only for a few weeks, led soldiers to believe that these techniques were approved.

The Tables clearly show that the interrogation techniques were revised several times, often within a very short period of time. For example, there was a significant shift in less than a month's time of interrogation techniques approved by Rumsfeld (Table 3, September 14, 2003 and October 12, 2003). The frequent revisions added to the confusion of what techniques were authorized at any particular time. Even though the Department of Defense's summary said that frequent revision to the approved interrogation techniques did not cause the abuses suffered at Abu Ghraib (Jacques, 2005), Fay's (2004) report indicted the frequency of revisions by stating, "Theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies were found to be poorly defined, and changed several times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes crossed into abusive activity..." (p. 110). Fay's explanation of why the abuses occurred coincides with Crelinsten's framework regarding authorization as a condition of the creation of an alternate reality. The Abu Ghraib example extends Crelinsten's discussion, however, in highlighting the role of inconsistent authorization. Inconsistency can be taken as authorization itself.

Routinization

Recall that Crelinsten refers to routinization as the professionalization of those who commit torture and the routine occurrence of torture so that it is normalized. For example, consider the terminology used for the detainees. President Bush and his advisors decided that members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda were "unlawful combatants" and would not be considered prisoners of war. The terminology prevented the detainees from receiving rights outlined in the Geneva Conventions for prisoners of war (Schlesinger, 2004).

Because the term “unlawful combatant” had never been officially used in any other war before, no protocol existed on how to treat the unlawful combatants. Because of the new terminology, the bureaucracy purportedly had to establish new protocol for how to treat unlawful combatants. The routine referral of the detainees as unlawful combatants created the condition of routinization as explained by Crelinsten, especially in open societies, such as the United States, where the conditions for the creation of an alternate reality must occur subtly and in complex ways.

Ambiguous or vague language by the bureaucracy also enabled “transcendence” from generally held norms (Hastings and Vernon, 1971). For example, recall that Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in regard to treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, “I reiterate that U.S. Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions” (Rumsfeld, April 16, 2003:1). When he used the expressions, “to the extent appropriate” and “military necessity,” Rumsfeld indicated that the soldiers would have to use some discretion on what that “extent” and that “necessity” were. If no one knew precisely what was meant by these terms, they were open to interpretation.

Additionally, and more generally, when a bureaucracy professionalizes the use of torture through policies, training, and regulations, the process is perceived by the perpetrators as authorized and therefore legitimated by bureaucratic norms (Huggins, et al., 2002). The policies authorized by Rumsfeld and other military officials professionalized the more aggressive techniques. While some of the interrogation techniques were rescinded, they were in effect for a short period of time during which

they were used on detainees. The routine authorization of more aggressive interrogation techniques conditioned the soldiers to perceive the techniques as authorized and acceptable, and therefore led to minimal challenging of them.

Dehumanization

Similar to the dehumanization techniques employed by the soldiers, the bureaucracy as an aggregate also works to dehumanize the enemy. An example of dehumanization in the context of Abu Ghraib was the bureaucracy's use of the term "unlawful combatant" instead of prisoner of war (Schlesinger, 2004). Since members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda were considered "unlawful combatants" instead of "prisoners of war," President Bush and his advisors determined that they were not necessarily entitled to the humane treatment outlined in the Geneva Conventions specifically for prisoners of war (Schlesinger, 2004). A semantic change paved the way for a policy change.

VI. CONCLUSION

Discussion

Inspired by Crelinsten (2003) framework, I have examined the facilitating conditions that would produce an alternate reality conducive to torture. Both the soldiers and the bureaucracy—that is, the military leaders and executive branch of the United States—participated as perpetrators at Abu Ghraib through authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. Hopefully, by recognizing the processes of the construction of an alternate reality that includes torture, we can prevent torture in the future.

The prevention of torture requires the deconstruction of the alternate reality by all those involved in its sphere of influence, the perpetrators, victims and bystanders. It occurs when people recognize that there is an alternate reality and can stop the spread of its influence.

A factor contributing to the creation of an alternate reality which includes torture can involve the enlarging of who is considered the enemy. Enlarging the enemy simply means broadening the scope of who is considered the enemy. Huggins, et al. (2002) gives an example in their book *Violence Workers*. In reference to the training process of Brazilian police, they explain that the police cadets' instructors tell them that danger is ubiquitous such that their enemy can literally be anyone. This technique caused the police officers to be skeptical of everyone.

John Jacques (2005) refers to the enlargement of the enemy in the Department of Defense's Executive Summary in its discussion of gaining intelligence through interrogations by stating, "Human intelligence, or HUMINT – of which interrogation is an indispensable component – has taken on increasing importance as we face an enemy

that blends in with the civilian population and operates in the shadows” (p. 1). This type of rhetoric implies that the enemy could be anyone, not just terrorists. Jacques’ statement that the enemy “blends in with the civilian population” clearly broadens the scope of who is considered the enemy. Recognizing that the enlargement of enemies is occurring and stopping the spread of its influence is one step in preventing torture.

Critique

Crelinsten’s (2003) framework is derivative, though not explicitly so, of other sociological schemes. Crelinsten’s sociological forbears provided tools for understanding the conditions conducive to the creation of a shared reality that includes torture. With an eye toward preventing, we would do well to turn to more specific theories focusing on the construction of bureaucracies (Weber, 1921/1968). Even though Weber does not address torture, often torture is state-sanctioned and therefore a look into how bureaucracies work would help in understanding the inclusion of torture by a bureaucracy.

An examination of the body of literature on the “Just World Hypothesis” (Lerner, 1981) would prove fruitful in evaluating how some people believe that torture is justified because the victims somehow deserve this treatment. The Just World Hypothesis helps people believe that the world makes sense, which Lerner (1981) implies is universal. Yet it remains the case that in many circumstances many people do not justify mistreatment on deserving grounds. What are those conditions? It behooves us to ask.

On a micro level, we would do well to turn to Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization. While Crelinsten’s (2003) framework focuses on a macro explanation of how torture occurs, Sykes and Matza offer a theory for how individuals neutralize deviant behavior. Sykes and Matza do not specifically address torture, but I

think that their framework would be useful for impeding the neutralization of torture (see Maruna and Copes [2005] for a recent review).

I was attracted to Crelinsten's (2003) framework because he was unique in his usage of the term torture. While most criminologists shy away from discussing torture, Crelinsten makes a contribution to criminology by addressing how torture occurs via the construction of alternate realities. Crelinsten's framework could have been made stronger by referencing the body of literature by other sociologists and criminologists who had conducted research in areas pertaining to his work (Weber, 1921/1968; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Lerner, 1981).

A Proposal for Future Research

Given the time parameters and the limited scope of this project, certainly much more research could be conducted to further the application of Crelinsten's framework to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. A large amount of data remains to be analyzed regarding the interrogation policies of the United States, at Abu Ghraib or more generally.

As more time goes by, more information will be released regarding the victims, the soldiers, and the bureaucracy at Abu Ghraib. By April 15, 2005, there was very limited disclosure of the statements of the victims at Abu Ghraib. I hope that future investigations into Abu Ghraib will also reveal the testimony of the victims. These data will enhance the application of Crelinsten's model of how and why torture occurs. After all, without laying blame with the victims, Crelinsten ascribed them a role in an alternate reality permitting torture.

Likewise, research can be conducted on the role of bystanders in the creation of alternate realities. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the United Nations was a key bystander.

The leader of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, expressed clear disagreement with President Bush and his administration in declaring a preemptive war against Iraq. Yet, once the United States initiated hostilities, Annan and the United Nations did not take any action to stop the hostilities.

Also, a cross-national or cross-historical study into interrogation policies appropriated by governments might be fruitful. Each government has different guidelines for interrogations; therefore a comparison of interrogation techniques would be insightful in understanding how different cultures perceive the objectives of interrogations. Another method in understanding the evolution of interrogation techniques would be to conduct a cross-historical study. Examining interrogation methods used throughout history, and considering the context (for example compare the methods of interrogation used during World War I and the most recent preemptive war with Iraq) perhaps would be useful in understanding why particular methods are still used, no longer used, or why new techniques are in effect.

Crelinsten's framework is broad, and there are many aspects of it that I did not explore. I focused on the conditions that make the creation of an alternate reality possible. Crelinsten explores not only the creation, but the consequences and cures for an alternate reality that includes torture. Further temporal distance from Abu Ghraib will allow future researchers to examine the consequences of Abu Ghraib as well as cures to prevent the same type of atrocity from occurring in the future.

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