To the Graduate Council:

We are submitting a dissertation written by Littleton H. Mason entitled "Moral Development: An Objective Measure of Moral Judgment in College Student Personnel Administrators." We recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education, with a major in Educational Psychology.

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We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

The Graduate School

MORAL DEVELOPMENT: AN OBJECTIVE MEASURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT IN COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATORS

A Dissertation

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Ruth; children, Terence, Littleton, Cheryl and Jackie; friends, Fred and Brecia Maston; and Mother, Adlena S. Mason.

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ABSTRACT

The major purpose of this study was to ascertain if there were differences in moral reasoning among administrative levels of college student personnel administrators (CSPA). The study further examined four corollary questions related to demographics of CSPA: age, education, sex and race.

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was used to assess the moral judgment development of CSPA. Data were collected from 479 subjects through a nationwide survey in 1981-1982. A five-way analysis of variance was used in conjunction with the Scheffe Multiple Range Test as a follow-up procedure for significant one-way differences among the administrative levels.

The principle findings in this study are as follows:

1. There were statistically significant differences between the administrative levels of responsibility and moral reasoning assessment of CSPA on the DIT P and D scores. The P score results revealed that chief (1st level) and assistant (3rd level) reasoned at a higher level than associate (2nd level) CSPA. In contrast, the D score results revealed that associates and assistants rather than chief CSPA reasoned at higher levels.

2. There were no statistically significant differences between the age groups and levels of moral reasoning in CSPA on either DIT P and D scores.

3. There were statistically significant differences between the educational levels and moral reasoning of CSPA on the D score; whereas, the P score showed no difference. the CSPA who held the doctorate degree reasoned at a higher level than did the master's degreed administrators.

4. There were statistically significant differences between the sex and moral reasoning of CSPA on the D score; whereas, the P score showed no difference. The CSPA who were males rather than females reasoned at a higher level.

5. There were statistically significant differences between the race and moral reasoning of CSPA on the D score; whereas, the P score showed no difference. The CSPA who were black rather than those who were white reasoned at a higher level.

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CHAPTER I

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY, RATIONALE, AND RELATED LITERATURE

The college student personnel profession evolved and emerged as American higher education developed (Wrenn 1924; Cowley 1949, 1957; Feder, 1958; Leonard 1956; Muelber, 1961; Williamson, 1949). Fenske (1981) stated that the profession evolved and emerged by default; that is, it assumed the necessary and sometimes unpopular tasks abandoned by college trustees, administrators and faculty. Because a multitude of student-related roles and activities were assumed throughout the years, the profession finds itself in the peculiar situation of being indispensable but peripheral. The profession, however, has grown into a "ubiquitous but some what invisible empire in virtually every institution of higher education" (Fenske, 1980, p. 3). Although the profession remains estranged from the vital functions of the academic enterprise (teaching, research and service), proposals for role change are many and range from the emergent student development concept (Brown, 1972) to institutional reward (Parker, 1971) and humanistic education (Hurst & Ivey, 1971).

The college student personnel profession, in attempting to define its desired thrust in higher education, organized its Tomorrow's Higher Education (T.H.E.) project. Phase I, developed in 1968, through approval of the American College Personnel Association (ACPA), and followed by Phase II in 1975, resulted in a pronouncement of a student development model. The model emphasized that

human development is a patterned, orderly lifelong process leading to development of self-determination and self direction, which results in more effective behavior (ACPA, 1975, p. 3). To promote the student development model, ACPA urged members of the academic community to learn "to understand the stages of development and related developmental tasks through which those in post secondary institutions are passing and to develop expertise in the competencies necessary to implement the student development model, so that a developmental learning environment will be realized" (ACPA, 1975, p. 5). This major realignment further emphasized the notion of Harvey (1974, 1976), and Jones (1978) who stated that movement away from controlling student behavior opens the door for important educational and developmental contributions to students' lives.

The historic development of the profession has resulted into a large, highly diversified field of student related activities that have and will continually be an identity crisis for college student personnel administrators (CSPA) (Brodzinski, 1979; Fenske, 1981; Harvey, 1974; Jones, 1978; and Miller & Prince, 1976). College student personnel administrators, then, find themselves in very complex situations which require varying talents and specialized competencies. They are asked to work at increasingly complex effectively with the intellectual capacities and achievements, cultural and esthetic activities, physical conditions, emotional, social and interpersonal relationships, vocational attitudes and skills, economic resources and moral dimensions of student life.

Penny (1969) and Crookston (1970) emphasized that CSPA claim that students have unique needs and should be responsible for their own development. The CSPA as managers and helping professionals often perceive their role as facilitating students by encouraging them to pursue their individual goals and aspirations. The college student personnel division is an administrative service-oriented unit in higher education that provides many facilitative and developmental programs for students. By virtue of the responsibility entrusted by CSPA by institutions of higher education, they are expected to function on a high moral plane when facilitating the development of students. That is, in order to discern equitably and help resolve problems, issues, and dilemmas that confront students, the CSPA should demonstrate a high level of moral reasoning in making moral judgment. Brown and Cannon (1978, p. 427) asserted the following:

> The permissive trend whereby student personnel workers actually seek to remove the regulatory function from their job description is cresting and interest is growing in direct and intentional moral development of college students. Student personnel workers can confront students with moral-ethical consequences of their behavior if they leave the students free to decide, maintain an atmosphere in which moral-ethical positions that differ from their own can be considered, and realize that some values are better than others.

Moral development studies indicate influence from three theoretical traditions: behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and the cognitive theories of Piaget. Of these, behaviorism was the first to make a major impact by inspiring the Character Education Inquiry of Hartshore, May and their colleagues (Hartshore & May, 1928); Hartshore, May, and Maller, 1929; Hartshore, May and Shuttle worth, (1930). The chief importance of

this research was the precedent it set for studying moral character not merely through verbal response but through observation of concrete behaviors, such as cheating, sacrifice, and sharing. The major conclusion of these researchers stated that moral qualities, such as honesty and deceit, "represent not general ideals but specific habits learned in relation to specific situations which have made one or the other response successful." (Hartshore, May & Suttleworth, 1930, p. 372).

Sigmund Freud's Theory of Moral Development

The Psychoanalytic model of moral development, according to Freud (1933), viewed the moralization of the child as problematical. Freud offered that children are dominated by the id, (i.e., they are driven by sexual and aggressive impulses which seek immediate gratification). Infants are unflatteringly described as "polymorphous perverse," and incestuous. Obviously, then, the child's inborn anarchic tendencies must be transformed before he or she can take his or her place in society. Freud's creative insight (e.g., that moralization is problematical) was followed by a creative solution. Children's instinctually based incestuous desires, which are directed toward their opposite-sexed parent inevitable bring them into conflicts with their like-sexed parent. The children renounce their sexual claim on their opposite-sexed parent and "internalizes" the image of both mother and father in order to avoid jealous retaliation by a stronger adult, and to avoid displeasing the parent whom they also love. These internalized images serve thereafter as guides to conduct.

Jean Piaget's Theory of Moral Development

Jean Piaget is recognized for his studies of moral and intellectual development in children and adolescents. Piaget's work in the development of moral judgment (1932), accomplished several things:

a) Piaget defined the domain of morality, i.e., those aspects of human experience and functioning that pertain to the rules of cooperation, to the social arrangements whereby the interests and welfare of individuals are reciprocally interrelated in terms of obligations and rights. The domain of morality, therefore, does not include all matters of human interaction, such as, etiquette, sciences, art, and all human values are not moral values.

b) Piaget called attention to a number of differences in the thinking of young children in contrast to the thinking of older children. In each case Piaget provided a rationale for regarding the younger child's thinking as simplistic and the older child's thinking as possessing a more coherent and encompassing system of ideas. Therefore, Piaget gave a general model for the psychological analysis of moral thinking and gave a number of specific characteristics or concepts by which to chart developmental progress.

c) Piaget illustrated techniques for gathering information (his use of hypothetical stories, his probing questions and interview techniques) and he illustrated forms of data analyses to support his general statements.

Among Piaget's other important contributions to cognitive developmental theory are the following concepts. Development proceeds at an irregular rate, and movement from one stage to the next higher stage involves two growth phases. The first is a readiness phase in which the individual is prepared or gathers the prerequisites for a higher level of functioning. During this phase it may appear that the person is at a standstill because there may be little behavioral indication of progress. The second or attainment phase is more obvious, the individual becomes able to employ the reasoning mode characteristic of next-stage functioning.

The empirical data Piaget provided in support of his theory pointed researchers to a key empirical test of cognitive development theory--namely to look for age-related differences in types of responses. This has been the most extensively used paradigm in cognitive developmental research. Piaget's approach did not provide, however, a complete research program for the study of morality. Actually, his study of moral judgment only provides a limited characterization of the cognitive structures underlying people's verbalization and of how the structures change over time.

Piaget (1932) stated that the essence of all morality is in the respect one holds for the rules (moral realism) which is based on an ethic of authority. There are two kinds of respect and hence two moralities: unilateral and mutual. Unilateral respect develops a morality of heteronomy on constraint (i.e., the child develops a "morality of constraint" produced by his or her experience with unilateral adult authority). In accordance with the principle of "immanent

justice", punishment follows inevitably upon violation, and its severity varies directly with the enormity of the consequences of action regardless of the motive which inspired it. At this immature level moral rules are not internalized but are adhered to solely through fear of external punishment by superordinate authority. Over time the morality of constraint is replaced by a morality of cooperation in which moral rules are seen, not as external verities, but as rational conventions which promote orderly social relations.

Mutual respect develops a morality of autonomy (i.e., the child becomes independent of adult sanctions (autonomous) and begins to conceive moral conduct as an autonomous good necessary for the functioning of any social group). The morality of an act is judged in terms of the actor's intentions, and justice is seen in terms of equality and equity. Movement from a heteronomous morality of constraint to an autonomous morality of cooperation is produced by cognitive growth and peer group interaction--the sharing of perspectives with equals. Piaget (1965, p. 113) believed that "the sense of justice, though naturally capable of being reinforced by the precepts and example of the adult, is largely independent of these influences, and requires nothing more for its development than the mutual respect and solidarity which holds among children themselves." Piaget stated, too, that "the rule of justice is a sort of immanent condition of social relationships on a law governing their equilibrium, and as the solidarity among children grows we shall find this notion of justice gradually emerging in almost complete autonomy." Prediction, he added, can be

made that the egocentric, heteronomous child's notions of justice will be related to duty toward adult authority. Their focus will be on retributive justice, which is defined by due proportion between acts and punishments. As mutual respect and solidarity become more influential in the child's life, retributive justice will become less important than distributive justice, which is defined by equality (Piaget, 1965, p. 131).

Lawrence Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg's dissertation in 1958 contributed significantly to the psychology of moral development. His works (1958, 1964, 1969, 1971, 1972) were important in furthering the development of study in subjective moral values. Kohlberg's work can be seen as a continuation of Piaget's (1932, 1955) works on the developmental acquisition of morality. Kohlberg has isolated the structure of morality from its content by describing a typology of stages. He asserted that all maturing individual's pass through the states in invariant sequence, although at differential rates which are affected by interaction with the social environment. Kohlberg's cognitive scheme describes a structure of morality in which the acquisition of new modes of thought is dependent upon the organization and displacement of preceding modes through a self-constructive process.

Kohlberg's model (1971) consists of three major levels of reasoning which succeed one another: the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. Each of these levels consists of several specifically defined stages that represent an orderly expansion of an

individual's sense of self in relation to others and in the different primary considerations used in making moral decisions.

Preconventional level. At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level comprises the following two stages:

Stage 1, punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect of an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2, instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms similar to those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

Conventional level. At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is one not only of conformity to personal expectations and

social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and of identifying with the persons or group involving in it. This level comprises the following two stages:

Stage 3, interpersonal concordance or "good-boy, nice-girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases others and is approved by them. Behavior is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention: "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4, "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level. At this level there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level has two stages:

Stage 5, social-contract legalistic orientation. Generally, this stage has utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis on procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed

upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the United States government and constitution.

Stage 5, universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (Kohlberg, 1971b, pp. 86-88).

Kohlberg (1981a) notes that the progression, or set of stages, just described implies something more than age trends. First, it implies an invariant sequence. Each individual child must go step by step through each of the kinds of moral judgment outlined. The child can move at varying speeds and stop (i.e., fixate) at any level of development, but if he/she continues to move upward, he/she must move in accord with these steps. The longitudinal study of American boys and also cross-cultural data suggest that this is the case (Kohlberg, 1981a). Second, stages define "structured wholes," that is, total ways of thinking which are identified as structures. Hence his

theory is very much in line with the structuralism of Piaget to which he acknowledges a considerable debt. Third, a stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules or the child's culture but reflects something more universal in development, something that would occur in any culture. In short, his stages in moral judgment imply a cultural universal.

Simpson (1974, p. 82) stated that "Morality may be examined from a number of perspectives, some more suited to the philosopher than to the scientist and some to the contrary. All the phenomena of morality --the patterns of behavior, principles, concepts, rules employed by individuals and groups in dealing with moral issues and decision--making--may be studied through descriptive empirical inquiry in what is."

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to ascertain if there were differences in moral reasoning between the administrative levels of CSPA. The study further examined four corollary hypotheses concerning the differences in moral reasoning to demographic variables (age, education, sex, and race) of CSPA.

Hypotheses

Major hypothesis. Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning among the administrative levels of CSPA?

Corollary hypotheses.

Corollary hypothesis I: Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning among the age groups of CSPA?

Corollary hypothesis II: CSPA who have the higher educational levels, as opposed to those who have the lower educational levels, are more likely to show the higher level of moral reasoning.

Corollary hypothesis III: CSPA who are male, as opposed to those who are female, are more likely to show a higher level of moral reasoning.

Corollary hypothesis IV: Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning between black and white CSPA?

Definitions

The following definitions apply throughout this study.

Moral judgment: An individual's cognitive capability to conceptualize how people analyze social-moral issues and considerations when solving problems (Rest, 1979).

Moral judgment scores: Scores that purport to measure the basic conceptual framework by which people analyze a social-moral issue and judge the proper course of action; that is, moral judgment assessment is a measure of conceptual adequacy of moral thinking (Rest, 1979).

Administrative Levels (I, II and III) of Responsibility

First level. The chief college student personnel administrator who is directly accountable to the principal institutional administrator

for the planning, development, coordination and supervision of the student support services, student development and student life.

Second level. The associate or executive college student personnel administrator who is directly accountable to the chief college student personnel administrator.

Third level. The assistant college student personnel administrator who is accountable to the chief CSPA.

Assumptions and Limitations

The study was based on the following assumptions:

1. The subjects constituted a stratified random sample of CSPA from four year institutions of higher education in each geographical region of the United States.
2. Moral judgment development is a psychological construct and can be objectively measured with a valid and reliable instrument (Rest, 1979).

The study is limited by the researcher's inability to control the following facets of study: the percentage of returned data, the time period involved in securing the data, and the many classifications of professional titles for the population.

Related Literature

Administrative level and moral reasoning. The college student personnel administrative hierarchy presents inconsistencies in nomenclature for job classification. Studies assessing the nomenclature

dilemma span several decades. Recent studies Crookston, (1974); Paul et al., (1980) surveyed chief college student personnel administrators (CSPA) in 1962 and 1972, and in 1977 and 1978, respectively. Their findings revealed similar inconsistencies nationwide. The most frequently used nomenclature describing job classifications for chief (CSPA) was vice president, dean, and director. Other job classifications were reported as "associate" and "assistant" in combination with "vice president" and "dean." In a southeastern regional survey Harder (1981) revealed that "vice president" was the predominant job classification used in the large four year public institutions (as was generally the case nationally). Other type institutions, however, frequently employed the classification of "dean of students" rather than "vice president." In the present study the aforementioned Levels I, II and III are used to designate the various job classifications of (CSPA).

Lilley (1974) stated that chief (CSPA) in four year institutions indicated they were directly responsible for the internal coordinating functions of policy formation affecting students, determining objectives, preparing budgets and recruiting staff. Under educative functions they were responsible for discipline, student government, student-faculty liaison, interpreting policy to students, and advising faculty. The chief (CSPA) can best be described as primary administrative officers who have very little contact with students. Comparatively, then, the executive officers (2nd level officers) provide the dichotomy with the 3rd level officers. That is, the executive officers

are second in command of the division and can act in full authority for chief (CSPA) when absent. The executive officer's responsibilities are generally more administrative than service oriented, that is, managerial and budget responsibilities which span all levels of student involvement outside the classroom. Unlike the chief (CSPA) (First Level) and the executive officers (Second Level), the third level administrators' job description is generally exclusively student oriented. These dichotomies in CSPA roles, then, provide the basis for investigation in the administrative levels and moral reasoning.

Close scrutiny of the literature related to CSPA and college administrators revealed only one study that dealt directly with the issue of moral judgment as related to college administrators. More specifically, a study using the Kohlbergian instrument with 100 juniors, 60 faculty and 16 administrators at Yale University revealed that college administrators ranked higher on the variable of moral reasoning than did the faculty members or students (Fontana & Noel, 1970). Since little research is available describing the moral principles of CSPA, this researcher concluded that such a study would be a fruitful area for empirical investigation.

Major hypotheses. Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning among the administrative levels of (CSPA)?

Corollary hypotheses. The present study further incorporated four corollary hypotheses. They were the demographic variables of age, educational levels, sex and race of CSPA.

Age and moral reasoning. Piaget's (1932) theory of moral development has been replicated by a number of investigators in Europe and the United States with specific emphasis on age trends and moral development. Studies from 1934-1959 and from two continents have reported age differences consistent with Piaget's postulated shift from moral realism toward reciprocity and equity. Thus, evidence in support of one or another aspect of Piaget's theory is reported in studies from England (Harrower, 1934; Morris, 1958; Peel, 1959); Switzerland (Learner, 1937a); Belgium (Caruso, 1934); Italy (Ponzo, 1956); and the United States (Lerner, 1937b; Dennis, 1943; Liu, 1950; Mackae, 1954; Havighurst & Neugarten, 1955; Medinnus, 1957, 1959; Kohlberg, 1958, 1959; Durkin, 1959a, 1959b; and Boehm & Ness, 1961, p. 10). Two of the foregoing researches were carried out with Indian children, and one with Chinese-Americans, (Dennis, Havighurst & Neugarten, and Liu, respectively). On the basis of their recent review of virtually all these studies, Bohem and Ness conclude that "age is the only consistently operative factor in development toward maturity" (p. 10). Dreman and Greenbaum (1973) found a lack of any relation between reasoning and age.

A review of the literature dealing with age and moral reasoning showed mixed support for a directional hypothesis. The data in Piaget's 1932 book consist almost exclusively of showing that the older subjects tend to display more advanced forms of reasoning. Kohlberg's (1958) dissertation and his research for the next ten years similarly emphasized cross-sectional age-trends among boys 10-16 years

in samples from several foreign countries. Historically, then, cross-sectional data (i.e., scores from subjects grouped by age) have been the first line of evidence offered in support of the developmental nature of moral judgment. Kohlberg (1976) stated that he regarded the demonstration of age trends in a moral judgment measure as sufficient validation of the measure and construct.

In summary, the literature tends to suggest that level of moral reasoning increases with age. According to Kohlberg (1971), however,age and education are highly correlated in the studies showing age differences. He stated that it is difficult to disentangle one from the other in determining the degree of variability that age accounts for moral development. Thus, the researcher is reluctant to affirm that age is positively related to moral reasoning. The relationship between age and moral reasoning will be studied as an exploratory question.

Corollary hypothesis I. Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning among the age groups of college student personnel administrators?

Education and moral reasoning. A considerable body of literature suggests that education is positively related to moral reasoning. Rest (1979, p. 113) stated that "generally speaking, development in moral judgment seems to advance dramatically as long as a person is in school, and that when a person discontinues formal education, his or her moral judgment development tends to stabilize." Rest further stated that a group of older, more educated subjects should generally

be further developed than a group of younger, less educated subjects. Supportive data for a similar conclusion were offered which consisted almost exclusively of comparisons of older subjects that tend to display mere advanced forms of reasoning.

Rest (1979) stated that one value in examining adult groups is to gain knowledge about how far moral judgment development continues in adulthood. Rest further stated that evidence suggests that adults do not show, in general, much advance beyond that accounted for by their level of education. In comparing moral judgment scores of students to adults, Rest suggested that, if adults are grouped according to their highest level of completed education, and an obtained average is compared to students currently at that level of education, not much difference occurs between the two groups.

Rest (1979) stated that adult samples give researchers a chance to disentangle age and education. In addition, Dortzbach (1975) analyzed the relationship of age and education to moral judgment in an adult sample. The subjects, aged 64-74, were randomly selected from voter registration lists in Eugene, Oregon. The study showed that moral judgment in adulthood increases with education; however, moral judgment decreases when the same subjects were grouped by age.

Kohlberg (1971) stated that, since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning: a person's logical level puts a certain ceiling on the moral level he or she can attain. A person whose logical level is only partially formal operational is limited to the conventional moral level.

While logical development is necessary for moral development and sets limits to it, most individuals are higher in logical level than they are in moral level. As an example, over 50% of late adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but only 10% of these adults (all formal operational) display principled or postconventional level of moral reasoning. Kohlberg further asserted that the adult population operate within stage four (4) level of moral reasoning; that is, not all adults reach the postconventional level. In fact, the research indicated that a minority of adults, perhaps less than 25% ever reach stage five (5).

Corollary hypothesis II. CSPA who have the higher educational levels, as opposed to the CSPA who have the lower levels, are likely to show the higher level of moral reasoning.

Sex and moral reasoning. Much attention has been drawn to the sex variable because of an earlier charge of sex bias in Kohlbergian moral judgment assessment (Holstein, 1976), reemphasized by Gilligan (1982). Holstein's (1976) research was a systematic study of sex differences using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale. She presented a detailed examination of cross-sectional and longitudinal data on moral reasoning of males and females revealed sex differences between males and females. Her cross-sectional findings of sex differences among samples of 16-year-olds and adults revealed that males' modal responses were at stage 4 while females modal responses were at stage 3. She reported, too, that sex bias possible existed in the

scoring system on the Moral Judgment Scale. Holstein (1976, p. 59) compared her longitudinal findings to (Kramer, 1969). The patterns in both the Holstein and Kramer samples of young males moving directly from Stage 2 to 4 and in Holstein's study of females moving directly from Stage 3 to 5 suggest possible sex bias in the scoring standards.

Kohlberg and Kramer (1969, p. 108) noted nongenerality and irregularities (skipping, regression) in their longitudinal data:

> While girls are moving from high school or college to motherhood, sizeable proportions of them are remaining at Stage 3, while their male age mates are dropping Stage 3 in favor of the stages, above it (Stage 4). Stage 3 personal concordance morality is a functional morality for housewives and mothers; it is not for businessmen and professionals.

Holstein's (1976) three year study of adolescents and parents indicated that moral judgments of women differ from those of men because women's judgments, to a greater extent, are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion. They are concerned with the resolution of real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas.

Gilligan (1982) has conducted extensive research on the relationship between responsibility for others and moral thinking. Using Kohlberg's moral-dilemma tests, she tested students taught at Harvard-Radcliffe at the beginning of a class, at its completion, two years later, and seven years later. Gilligan (1982) revealed that females tended to score lower than males. For example, on Kohlberg's moral dilemma test involving Heinz and his dying wife, the high-scoring females tended to emphasize Heinz's responsibility for his wife (Stage 4), whereas the high-scoring males viewed the problem in

terms of the value of human life relative to the value of material possessions (Stage 6). Gilligan (1977) reported that many theorists, including Freud, Piaget, and Kohlberg, on finding that females are less likely to apply absolute rules to moral dilemmas, jump to the conclusion that females are morally inferior. Gilligan suggested that females give greater consideration to the context of the moral choices, focusing on the human relationships involved.

Gilligan (1982, p. 17) contends that females are reluctant to judge right and wrong because they are socialized to be both nurturant and caring and unauthorization and nonjudgmental:

> Women's moral weakness, manifest in an apparent diffusion and confusion of judgments, is . . . inseparable from women's moral strength, an overriding concern with relationships and responsibilities with reluctance to judge may itself be indicative of the care and concern that infuse the psychology of women's development.

Gilligan's contrasting viewpoint offers that male's characteristic approach to general moral laws seems to be "Do not interfere with the rights of others"; the female's approach, however, seems to be "Be concerned with the needs of others."

Although Gilligan's research offers further evidence that sex bias lies inherently in moral development theory, her research is inconclusive. Broad generalization about masculine or feminine modes of thought, or about cognitive development in adulthood, cannot be based on any one line of inquiry.

Kohlberg (1958) used only male subjects in the early years of his research. It was thought that the test norms could not be generalized

to female populations without sex bias. Inherent in Kohlberg's research is a historic insensibility to the morality of women, and this has been seen in the psychoanalytical theory of Freud (1925, p. 257) when he offered:

> I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the level of what is ethnically normal is different from what is in man.

The Freudian explanation is inherent in the deviation of female and male development around the construction and resolution of the Oedipal problem. A similar viewpoint about women's morality was presented by Piaget (1932, p. 93) in his study of the rules of children's games. He observed that, in the games they played, girls were "less explicit about agreement than boys and less concerned with legal elaboration."

Kohlberg (1971, p. 164) also identifies interpersonal bias in the morality of women which categorized them as typically at the third of his six stage developmental sequence. At that stage, the good is identified with "what pleases or helps others and is approved of by them."

Rest (1979), on the basis of twenty-two studies assessing sex differences, made claims that only two studies showed significance in moral reasoning between males and females. Rest (1979) noted that only 6% of the variance was accounted for by the sex variable. In fact, Rest (1979, p. 120) stated that in "Moral reasoning research using his moral assessment instrument, sex differences are rarely significant in junior high, senior high, college and graduate students

or adults. So it is not true that at one age one sex has an advantage and at another age the other sex does." Rest stated further that, whenever sex differences do occur, the influence of other variables, such as education should be checked. The charge of sex bias in moral judgment assessment is dismissed by Rest (1979) as being based on arguments which are not cogent. Further evidence was provided by Coder (1975) who found no statistically significant differences between males (29) and females (58) when analyzing the results of 87 adult subjects, aged 24-29. Likewise, Dortzbach (1976) who sampled 185 adults (females 98 and males 89), aged 25-75 found no difference between males and females.

In summary, the literature related to the sex variable is mixed. On the one hand, Holstein (1976) and Gilligan (1982) argued that moral developmental theory from its inception Piaget (1932) to Kohlberg (1958) was bias toward women. On the other hand, Coder (1975); Dortzbach (1976); and Rest (1979) argue that sex differences are rarely significant in adults. Since the literature offered no definitive argument for a directional hypothesis, Holstein (1976) and Gilligan (1982) did provide a basis for predicting sex bias in males favor.

Corollary hypothesis III. CSPA who are male, as opposed to those who are female, are more likely to show a higher level of moral reasoning.

Race and moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1958, 1969, 1971) sought to identify age trends in moral judgment that would prove to be general

and uniform across social class, culture, sex, race and social epoch. His approach was through the structural analysis of 6-13 year olds justification and evaluations of their opinions as to the right decision to make in solving hypothetical moral dilemmas. Bronfenbrenner (1962) stated that class, sex, and culture are all more important determinants of moral development than advancing age or experience. Lickona (1969) suggests that class differences are best dealt with in terms of general intellectual development which has been found to be closely related to moral judgment, but, in any case, explanations of group differences involving intelligence or the attributed inferiority associated with socioeconomic status must be reviewed. Cole et al. (1971, p. 12-13) have written--"one cannot assume that psychological tasks, be they derived from theories of cognitive development or the structures of intelligence, evoke the same kinds of behaviors in subjects from different cultures." Bohannan (1965, p. 27), providing an African example, stated the British colonist "not understanding that the indigenous procedures they observed were the functional patterns of a legal system, felt compelled to write down for African use--and hence to codify into rigidity--the supple and responsive unwritten system of their own nation."

A notion which describes what disparate groups of men/women have in common regarding ethical theory, was offered by Brandt (1959, p. 87). He concluded that there were culturally universal meanings to moral terms--that is, that all cultures have legal or formal rules and moral or informal rules or both. All have certain modes of

making moral judgments and concepts which express these modes such as obligation, moral evaluation, punishment and reward, although the content to which these modes apply and which is judged moral varies from culture to culture. Although a culture moral system is unicellular; it is conceivable that any society amy have more than one set of overlapping mores. The moral content of a particular subgroup may not be consistent with that of others. In a pluralistic society as in America, ones reference group may be more important for the moral development of anyone individual or group than the generalized system attributed to the majority of the larger culture. Conformity in thinking may be referenced to small groups within a complex culture and still be conventional thought.

Moral principles, as principles of choice for resolving conflicts of obligation, are "active reconstructions of experience" Kohlberg (1971, p. 225). Kohlberg asserted that principled reasoning does not occur in some cultures. Kohlberg acknowledges, however, that his principles reasoning stage 6 describes a utopian ideal, rather than a reality: "There is a universal set of moral principles held by men in various cultures, Kohlberg's stage 6." These principles could logically and consistently be held by all men in all societies: they would, in fact, be universal to all mankind if the conditions for socio-moral development were optimal for all individuals in all cultures.

Cultures and individuals may be systematically described as to their stage or developmental status. Kohlberg (1969, pp. 176-177) "characterizes moral differences between groups and individuals as

being more or less adequate morally." That is, not only is morality culturally universal in its form or structure; its basic content principles are also universal or rather, should be.

For Kohlberg, cultural differences are actually fundamental differences in principles or modes of moral evaluation. As pointed out earlier by Cole et al. (1974, p. 22) "cross-cultural experimentation and description have built in problems of meaning communication-problems which plague and harry each step of the research process." He further suggested that when the findings are in, difficulties involving inference remain.

Since many investigators have attempted to delineate differences in the races via cultural modes and behaviors, it is clear that such research is warranted. This variable, then, was researched as an exploratory question.

Corollary hypothesis IV. Is there a difference in moral reasoning between black and white CSPA?

CHAPTER II

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Subjects

The subjects for this study consisted of 479 college student personnel administrators. Of this number 343 (72%) were males and 126 (28%) were females; 144 (30%) were black and 335 (70%) were white; 153 (32%) had doctoral degrees and 326 (68%) had master's degrees. One hundred and sixty-four (34%) were between the ages of 20 to 35; 162 (34%) were between 36 and 45; and 153 (31%) were between the ages of 46 and 70. the subjects were categorized as first, second and third level administrators. One hundred and forty-eight (31%) were first level, 159 (33%) were second level, and 172 (36%) were third level administrators. The subjects were employed in higher educational institutions during the academic year 1981-1982. Data were collected during the period of January to December, 1982.

The subjects were randomly selected from four year public and private colleges and universities that represented each geographical region of the United States. This selection method was employed to ensure representation of institutions from all fifty states. The subjects were requested (via the mail service) to participate voluntarily in the study.

Instrumentation

The Defining Issues Test. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) purports to measure moral reasoning. It was used in this study to

assess the independent variables of administrative levels, age, sex, education and race of college student personnel administrators (CSPA). The DIT was chosen over other instruments which measure moral reasoning for the following reasons:

1. It has the most extensive data base yet collected on any single measure on moral judgment.
2. The scoring is completely objective either by using scoring keys or by computer.
3. It is easily group administered and most subjects complete the test within a 40 minute period.
4. It has an internal consistency check for subjects who randomly check responses or who do not understand the directions.
5. It has repeatedly demonstrated high reliability and validity when compared to other instruments.
6. It has shown significant relationships with experimental and naturalistic measures of behavior (Rest, 1979).

The instrument measures the relative degree of use of seven (depicted in Table 1) Kohlbergian moral judgment stages. The stage scores reflect the amount of reasoning displayed by the subject at Stages 2, 3, 4, 4 1/2, 5A, 5B, 6 and A in Kohlberg's (1969) theory. Two other scores that can be derived from the DIT are labeled the Principles (P) reasoning score and the Davison (D) score. According to Rest (1979) the P score indicates the amount of Principled Reasoning, that is, reasoning at Stages 5A, 5B or 6. The P score is

Table 1

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Stages Included in the Defining Issues Test (adapted from Rest, 1974)*

Stage	
2	Morality of instrumental egoism and simple exchange. ("Do your own thing.")
3	Morality of personal concordance. ("Be considerate, nice and kind, and you'll get along with people.")
4	Morality of rules and duty to the social order. ("Everyone in society is obligated and protected by the law.")
4½	Antiestablishment orientation. (Condemns tradition and the existing social order for its arbitrariness or its corruption by the rich for the exploitation of the poor.)
5A	Morality of social contract. (Emphasis democratic procedures for generating and changing laws with the goal of maximizing the welfare of the society. Also emphasizes the importance of observing basic human rights.
5B	Morality of intuitive humanism. (Emphasizes moral principles which are held and justified by appeal to one's inner, private conscience.)
6	Morality of ideal social cooperation. (Emphasizes moral principles which theoretically would govern social cooperation that is completely noncoercive, and nonarbitrary principles which rational unbiased people would recognize as setting up social practices optimally beneficial to all concerned).

*Rest did not include stage 1 in the Defining Issues Test because stage 1 is virtually nonexistent in the population for which the test was intended (junior high school age and older.)

described, too, as the sum of weighted ranks given to Stage 5A, 5B or 6 items; that is, the "relative importants a subject gives to principled moral considerations in making a decision about moral dilemmas" (Rest, 1979, p. 5). The P score has been the most useful general index for DIT responses. Almost all the research up to 1977 used the P index.

Davison (1977) developed a new index which showed better sensitivity to longitudinal changes in less advanced subjects than the P index. The D score, which increased the power of the DIT, is an overall index of moral judgment development; it combines information from all the stages into a score rather than from only Stage 5A, 5B or 6 items. The advantage of the D score to the P Score in its sensitivity to Stages 2, 3, 4 as well as 5A, 5B and 6. The P score simply evaluates Stages 5A, 5B or 6.

Other stage scores are computed in similar fashion to the P score . . . i.e., based on weighted ranks. A Stage 2 score is the relative importance subjects give to Stage 2 considerations in making a moral decision and so on with Stages 3 and 4 (Rest, 1979).

The DIT format present the subjects with six moral dilemmas. For each of the six dilemmas, subjects evaluate a set of twelve issues and are asked to rate how important each issue is in deciding what ought to be done (most importance, much, some, little, no). Subjects are further requested to rank their choices of the four most important issues. Since each issue statement represents a moral judgment stage,

a subject's choices of the most important issues over a number of moral dilemmas are taken as the subjects grasp of different stages of moral reasoning.

Rest (1979) makes the following claims about the validity and reliability of the DIT:

1. It correlates in the .60's in several studies with moral comprehension and correlates significantly with a variety of measures of cognitive development (Piaget's Formal Operations, Perry's Intellectual and Ethical Development, and Cornell's Critical Thinking Test), and generally in the .20 to .40 range with measures of IQ, aptitude and achievement.

2. It correlates in the .60's and .70's in several studies with Kohlberg's test although lower in homogeneous samples.

3. It correlates in the .60's in several studies with people's stances on controversial political-moral issues.

4. Test-retest stability over several weeks averages .81 over a number of samples; interval consistency averages .78.

5. The DIT has inconsistent and low correlations with many personality and attitude measures (e.g., Rotter's 1-E scale, Allport-Vernon-Lindrey Values Test, Tennessee Self-Concept, Mach V, Hogan's S.E.A., and Rokeach's Dogmatism, Political Efficacy or Trust Test), but moderate correlations with some scales of the CPI and Omnibus Personality Inventory (Rest, 1979).

Procedures

The following procedures were used in the collection of data for this study:

1. The institutions in the study were four year colleges and universities randomly selected from the 1978-79 Educational Directory of Colleges and Universities. A stratified sampling procedure was used to ensure the selection of institutions from all fifty states in the United States. Stratification procedures included: type of institution--four year, publicly and privately controlled; population--2000 students or more; location--state, urban and rural; racial composition--minority representation no less than 5 percent; subjects--chief college student personnel administrator's, the associate and assistant. One thousand (1000) institutions were selected for the study.

2. The researcher mailed three packets of project materials to the chief student personnel administrator to distribute to project volunteers.

3. The researcher provided information in the material packet regarding the rights of subjects in the study.

4. The subjects were instructed to read and sign the questionnaire and Informed Consent form which described the study, the subject's role in the study, the subject's rights and an inquiry regarding desire to receive a summary of the project results.

5. Subjects were instructed where the project materials should be returned.

Statistical Analyses

The primary focus of this study was to ascertain if differences existed in scores between administrative levels of CSPA on the depend-

ent variable of moral judgment as assessed by the most objective moral judgment instrument available. The study also examined four corollary hypotheses concerning the relationship of moral reasoning to demographic variables: age, education, sex and race of CSPA.

The subjects were grouped according to their responses on the DIT and independent variables. The data were analyzed by using a five way ANOVA (3 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2). The five factors were: (a) administrative levels, (b) age groups, (c) sex, (d) race, and (e) education.

Subjects' responses to the DIT were scored using a program originally designed for a Cyber 74 computer at the University of Minnesota (Davison, 1976). The program was modified to run on the Hewlett Packard 3000 at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter was to present the data and statistical findings obtained from administering the DIT to first, second and third level CSPA. A secondary purpose was to present differences among demographic groups (age, education, sex, and race) that constituted the population under study; that is, the study explored the existence of main effects between the three levels of administrative responsibility and probed for significant differences among the demographic groups.

The DIT yielded data for two dependent variables termed the P and D scores. The five-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare group mean scores on the P and D variables. A Scheffe Multiple Range Test was used as a follow-up procedure for significant one-way differences among the administrative levels. An Alpha level of .05 was used as a criterion to determine significance.

The analysis of the P score indicated only one statistically significant effect between that of administrative level, the main research question of the study. The D score data, however, revealed statistically significant differences on four of five variables in the study: administrative level of responsibility, sex, education and race.

Administrative Level and Moral Reasoning

The five-way ANOVA was used to analyze whether a statistically significant difference existed between administrative levels of responsibility. The research question sought to ascertain if there were

differences in the moral reasoning among the administrative levels of responsibility of CSPA. The results of the five-way ANOVA indicated statistically significant differences between the administrative levels of responsibility on both the P and D scores of the DIT.

The P score results presented in Table 2 indicate the statistically significant difference for the administrative levels of responsibility of CSPA (F (2,452) = 6.664, $p < .001$). The one-way ANOVA shown in Table 3 support further the mean comparisons among the administrative levels. The P score results were similarly significant at the same levels as the five-way ANOVA (F (2,452) = 6.040, $p < .002$). The Scheffe Multiple Range Procedure was used to determine the means between which significant difference lie. As shown in Table 4, those CSPA classified as level II had a significantly lower mean than those administrators classified as level III and level I. That is, the analysis indicated no difference between levels I and III. The P score means for levels I, II and III were 47.22, 44.40 and 47.03, respectively. The P score means are presented in Table 5.

The D score results presented in Table 2 indicate the statistically significant difference for the administrative levels of responsibility of CSPA (F (2,452) = 11.958, $p < .001$). The one-way ANOVA shown in Table 6 indicates similar significant differences as did the five-way ANOVA. The follow-up Scheffe Procedure, however, indicated that the D score level I mean (31.68) for CSPA was slightly lower than the mean (33.09) for level II and the mean (33.63) for level III administrators. The results of the Scheffe Procedure are shown in Table 4.

Table 2

ANOVA Summary of Defining Issues Test P and D Scores on Main Effect Characteristics of Administrative Levels, Age, Education, Sex, and Race of Subjects

Main effect variables		P score				D score			
		DF	MS	F	P	DF	MS	F	P
Administrative levels	(2)	2	350.955	6.664	.001*	2	141.130	11.958	.000*
Age groups	(2)	2	21.385	.406	.666	2	23.204	1.966	.141
Education	(1)	1	1.744	.033	.856	1	37.101	3.144	.038*
Sex	(1)	1	7.913	.150	.698	1	47.216	4.001	.023*
Race	(2)	1	70.657	1.342	.247	1	50.061	4.242	.040*

*$p < 0.05$ denotes significance for variables.

(1) denotes a one-tailed test for variable.

(2) denotes a two-tailed test for variable.

Table 3

ANOVA Summary of Defining Issues Test's P Scores for Administrative Levels of Subjects

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean squares	F ratio	F prob.
Between groups	2	748.6384	374.3192	6.040	.0026
Within groups	477	29747.3936	61.9737		
Total	479	30496.0313			

Table 4

Multiple Range Test Results of the Defining Issues Test P and D Scores on Administrative Levels of Subjects

	P score			D score			
	Rank Order	N	M	SD	Rank Order	N	M	SD
Administrative levels of responsibility for entire population		479	46.2161	7.9570		479	32.8505	3.6565
Levels	II	159	44.4031	8.7745	I	148	31.6843	3.9088
	III	172	47.0308	7.7758	II	159	33.0902	2.9047
	I	148	47.2169	6.8883	III	172	33.6324	3.8207

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations of Defining Issues Test P and D Scores for Administrative Levels of Subjects

	Rank Order	P score N	P score M	P score SD	Rank Order	D score N	D score M	D score SD
Administrative levels of responsibility for entire population		479	46.2161	7.9570		479	32.8505	3.6565
Levels	II	148	44.2169	6.8883	I	148	31.6843	3.9088
	III	159	44.4031	8.7745	II	159	33.0902	2.9047
	I	172	47.0308	7.7758	III	172	33.6324	3.8207

Table 6

ANOVA Summary of Defining Issues Test D Scores for Administrative Levels of Subjects

Source	DF	Sum of squares	Mean squares	F ratio	F prob.
Between groups	2	321.0225	160.5112	12.615	.000
Within groups	477	6107.6218	12.7242		
Total	479	6428.6436			

The D score means shown in Table 5 indicate that administrative levels I, II and III were 31.68, 33.09 and 33.63, respectively.

The results of this exploratory question indicated that the CSPA at levels I and III employed Principled (P) reasoning at a higher level than did level II administrators. The D score results, however, indicated that level I administrators scored lower than both the level II and level III administrators. This measure is inclusive of the three levels of moral reasoning.

Age and Moral Reasoning

An ANOVA was used to determine if age groups (20-35, 36-45, and 46-70) of the CSPA were related to moral reasoning. The research question posed was as follows: Is there a difference in moral reasoning among the age groups of CSPA? The results of the ANOVA presented in Table 2 for age groups revealed no significant difference between group means on P scores (F (2,452) = .406, $p > .05$) and the D scores (F (2,452) = 1.966, $p > .05$). The mean P scores for age group 20-35 was 46.45; for age group 36-45, it was 45.52; and for age group 46-70, it was 46.70. The D score means for age group 20-35 was 33.46 for age group 36-45, it was 32.42 and for age group 46-70, it was 32.65. The P and D mean scores are shown in Table 7.

Education and Moral Reasoning

An ANOVA was used to determine if education level was related to moral reasoning in CSPA. The research hypothesis stated that CSPA who have a higher educational level are likely to show a higher level of moral reasoning than those with a lower educational level.

Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations of Defining Issues Test P and D Scores for Corollary Demographic Variables of Age Groups, Education, Sex, and Race of Subjects

	P score			D score		
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD
Age group						
For entire population	479	46.25	7.95	479	32.86	3.65
20-35	164	46.45	8.49	164	33.46	3.60
36-45	162	45.52	8.09	162	32.42	3.61
46-70	153	46.70	7.18	153	32.65	3.70
Education						
For entire population	479	46.24	7.95	479	32.86	3.65
Master's	326	46.10	8.07	326	32.82	3.46
Doctorate	153	46.46	7.71	153	32.92	4.10
Sex						
For entire population	479	46.25	7.95	479	32.86	3.65
Male	343	46.20	8.04	343	33.07	3.73
Female	136	46.25	7.76	136	32.28	3.39
Race						
For entire population	479	46.23	7.96	479	32.85	3.65
Black	144	46.85	8.51	144	33.50	3.38
White	335	45.94	7.70	335	32.57	3.74

The results of the ANOVA as indicated in Table 2, revealed no significant difference on the P score (F (1,452) = .033, $p > .05$); however, a statistically significant difference was obtained for the D score (F (1,452) = 3.144, $p < .05$). The P score mean for CSPA who had the higher educational level (Ed.D and Ph.D) was 46.46, while the mean for those who had the lower educational level (Master's) was 46.10. The D score mean for CSPA who had the higher educational level was 32.93, while the mean for those who had the lower educational level was 32.82. The means for the P and D scores are shown in Table 7.

The results do not support the hypothesis on both the P and D score dimensions of the DIT. The analysis of P score showed no difference in levels of moral reasoning as related to the educational level attained by the CSPA. The D score results, however, did show support for the hypothesis.

Sex and Moral Reasoning

An ANOVA was used to ascertain if the sex of the participants were related to level of moral reasoning. The research hypothesis stated that CSPA who are male as opposed to those who are female are more likely to show a higher level of moral reasoning.

The results of the ANOVA for the sex variable presented in Table 2 indicated no significant differences between groups on the P score (F (1,452) = .150, $p > .05$); however, the D score (F (1,452) = 4.001, $p < .05$) was significant. The P score mean for females was 46.25, and for males 46.20. The D score mean for females was 32.28;

however, it was 33.08 for males and significantly higher than females. The means for the P and D scores are presented in Table 7.

The results do not support the hypothesis on both the P and D score dimensions of the DIT. The P score showed no difference in levels of moral reasoning related to gender of CSPA. The D score results, however, did show support for the hypothesis. Male CSPA level of moral reasoning was higher than female administrators.

Race and Moral Reasoning

An ANOVA was used to determine if race were related to levels of moral reasoning. The research question posed for race was as follows: Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning between black and white CSPA? The results of the ANOVA presented in Table 2 indicated no significant differences on the P score (F (1,452) = 1.342, $p > .05$); however, the D score (F (1,452) = 4.242, $p < .05$) revealed a statistically significant difference between black and white CSPA level of moral reasoning. The mean P scores depicted in Table 7 showed that black CSPA mean was 46.85 and white administrators as 45.94. The D score showed that the black CSPA mean was 33.50 and the white CSPA mean was 32.57.

The results of this exploratory question indicated no difference in the Principled (P) levels of moral reasoning among black and white CSPA. The Davison (D) cumulative index indicated that black CSPA employed a higher level of moral reasoning than white administrators.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The major purpose of this study was to ascertain if there were differences in moral reasoning among administrative levels of CSPA. The study further examined four corollary questions related to demographics of CSPA: age, education, sex and race.

In order to explore questions posed by the study, answers were sought to a major hypothesis and four corollary hypotheses that related to demographic variables. The hypotheses were outlined as follows:

Major hypothesis. Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning among the administrative levels of college student personnel administrators?

Corollary hypothesis I. Is there a statistically significant difference in moral reasoning among the age groups of college student personnel administrators?

Corollary hypothesis II. College student personnel administrators who have the higher educational levels, as opposed to those who have the lower educational levels, are more likely to show the higher level of moral reasoning.

Corollary hypothesis III. College student personnel administrators who are male, as opposed to those who are female, are more likely to show a higher level of moral reasoning.

Corollary hypothesis IV. Is there a difference in moral reasoning between black and white college student personnel administrators?

The major hypothesis was supported in the analysis of administrative levels and moral reasoning on both the P and D indices of the DIT. The four corollary hypotheses received mixed support on the P and D indices of the DIT. Neither the age, education, sex nor race demographic variables differentiated CSPA level of moral reasoning on the P score index. Data derived from the P score, then, showed no statistically significant differences between the demographic variables. The D score index, however, showed statistically significant differences on three of the four corollary variables, that is, education, sex, and race differentiated moral reasoning in CSPA.

The principle findings in this study are as follows:

1. There were statistically significant differences between the administrative levels of responsibility and moral reasoning assessment of CSPA on the DIT P and D scores. The P score results revealed that chief (1st level) and assistant (3rd level) reasoned at a higher level than associate (2nd level) CSPA. In contrast, the D score results revealed that associated and assistants rather than chief CSPA reasoned at higher levels.

2. There were no statistically significant differences between the age groups and levels of moral reasoning in CSPA on either DIT P and D scores.

3. There were statistically significant differences between the educational levels and moral reasoning of CSPA on the D score;

whereas, the P score showed no difference. The CSPA who held the doctorate degree reasoned at a higher level than did the master's degreed administrators.

4. There were statistically significant differences between the sex and moral reasoning of CSPA on the D score; whereas, the P score showed no difference. The CSPA who were males rather than females reasoned at a higher level.

5. There were statistically significant differences between the race and moral reasoning of CSPA on the D score; whereas, the P score showed no difference. The CSPA who were black rather than those who were white reasoned at a higher level.

Discussion

Administrative level and moral reasoning. The data analyses on the DIT revealed that CSPA demonstrated moral reasoning at the post-conventional level (Stages 5 & 6) when resolving moral problems. There were, however, differences among the administrative levels.

In general, the research data revealed that third level CSPA, showed a consistent higher level of moral reasoning on both the P and D indices of the DIT; whereas, the first and second level CSPA showed mixed results. These results indicated that the second level CSPA ranked lowest on the P index, whereas, the first level ranked lowest on the D index.

The related literature suggested that a relationship existed between the job responsibility of CSPA and student contact. The

research results in this study provides further evidence to support the notion that job responsibility and student contact may influence moral reasoning. The research clearly showed that the CSPA (third level) whose job responsibility was student oriented exhibited the higher level of moral reasoning. These research results, then, provided evidence to distinguish levels of moral reasoning and the job responsibility of the CSPA.

In conclusion, CSPA who had primary job responsibilities with students rather than management responsibilities showed higher levels of moral reasoning.

Age and moral reasoning. The age variable indicated no statistically significant difference on both the P and D indices of the DIT. The research findings support the conclusion that "age is related to the DIT for student groups but not for adult groups" (Rest, 1979, p. 7).

The research results in this study supported Dreman and Greenbaum (1973) who found a lack of any relation between reasoning and age as was concluded in the present study. The research presented no support for age trends and moral development research reported by European and American investigators from 1934-1959. Bohem and Ness (1961, p. 10) concluded that "age is the consistently operative factor in development toward maturity."

In conclusion, age trends and moral reasoning in CSPA indicated no difference in their mode of cognitive structuring from other researched populations.

Education and moral reasoning. The education variable data revealed that CSPA with the Ph.D. and/or Ed.D. were differentiated from master's degreed administrators in their level of moral reasoning on the D index. The P index, however, indicated no statistically significant difference.

The resulting data in this study confirms Rest (1979, p. 113) findings which stated "a group of older, more educated subjects should generally be further developed than a group of younger less educated subjects." Data in this study further corroborates Rest's conclusion that adults, in general, do not show much advance in moral reasoning beyond that accounted for by their level of education. His conclusion that moral reasoning in adulthood increases with education is further supported in the present study.

Age trends and moral reasoning data in this study supported Rest's conclusion (1979) that adult samples disentangle age and education. The cumulative evidence is that moral judgment was more strongly related to education than to age in adults. That is, cognitive restructuring of one's moral thinking seemed to be more related to years in school than to years since birth in adults.

In conclusion, education is related to moral reasoning in CSPA at the postconventional level. Older CSPA reasoned on a higher moral plane when resolving problems.

Sex and moral reasoning. The sex variable differentiated levels of moral reasoning in CSPA. That is, males rather than females exhibited higher levels of moral reasoning on the DIT's D index. The

P index, however, indicated no statistically significant difference in the moral reasoning of CSPA.

The resulting data support contentions made by Holstein (1976), and Gilligan (1977, 1982) that Kohlberg's model of moral reasoning is sexually biased toward females. The major studies from which Kohlberg (1958, 1959, 1971) drew his conclusions used only a male population. In addition, Gilligan's (1982, p. 17) contrasting viewpoint offers that the male's characteristic approach to general moral laws seem to be "do not interfere with the rights of others," whereas, the females approach seems to suggest "be concerned with the needs of others." Gilligan further stated that females were reluctant to judge right and wrong because they were socialized to be both nurturant and caring and unauthorization and nonjudgmental.

The research findings in this study provides evidence to support Bronfenbrenner's (1962) claim that sex is a more important determinant of moral development than advancing age or experience.

In conclusion, male CSPA exhibited a higher level of moral reasoning than females. Since the question and declaration of theory bias by Gilligan, other researchers are encouraged to explore the sex differences found in the present and other studies.

Race and moral reasoning. The race variable differentiated levels of moral reasoning in CSPA; that is, blacks rather than whites reasoned at a higher level on the DIT D score. The P score, however, showed no difference.

In a pluralistic society, as in America, Brandt (1959) stated that one's reference group may be more important for the moral development of anyone individual or group than the generalized system attributed the majority of the larger culture. The differences in moral reasoning obtained on the D score indicated that black CSPA may be more sensitive to the human condition because of their historical and present plight as the predominant disadvantaged group in America. They, thus, may be more attuned to the sanctity of the individual than for a concern for society in general.

Kohlberg's (1958, 1969, 1971) studies sought to identify trends in moral judgment that he contended could be generalized and are uniformed across race and other demographics variables. His theoretical propositions need to be empirically scrutinized further before any conclusive remarks can be made about the issue.

Suggestions for Future Research

The results of this study suggests further questions for future research. Although published literature revealed evaluative processes for CSPA in their traditional roles as managers, little research literature exists in the area of moral reasoning. Thus, little is known about moral reasoning in CSPA as related to the following questions:

- What characteristics discriminate CSPA who possess the capacity for moral reasoning in resolving moral issues?
- Why do some CSPA fail to discern a moral sensitive situation when it confronts them?

How do CSPA, when recognizing a moral dilemma, sort through the complex considerations involved in making moral decisions?

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