




To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Laurie L. Couch entitled "Cognitive Certainty: Trust and Betrayal in Interpersonal Relationships." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.


Warren H. Jones, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:





Accepted for the Council:


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Dean of the Graduate School

COGNITIVE CERTAINTY: TRUST AND BETRAYAL
IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Laurie L. Couch

December 1996

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DEDICATION

The work that this dissertation represents is dedicated to my academic father, Warren H. Jones. The road to this document was not always an easy one, but his years of guidance and support allowed us to work toward its completion against all odds. Working with Warren has given me some of the best years of my life, and although my developmental process is far from complete, I feel I will always owe my professional life to him.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are so many people to thank for their role in the completion of my degree. First and foremost, I would like to thank Warren Jones who has been a powerful force in my academic life from day one. I would also like to extend special appreciation to Kris Kelly for being with me at every step of the way for both moral and statistical support. Additionally, the support of Greg Carlisle and my family have always been especially important to me as I have worked toward my dreams and goals.

I would also like to thank the other members of my Dissertation Committee including John Lounsbury, Mike Johnson, and Sky Huck. Each of these individuals made unique contributions to the project in its various stages that greatly improved its quality.

Finally, I would like to offer my thanks to some other special friends that have been an important part of my graduate experience. Celeste Gaia, Patricia Adams, Jeff Adams, Connie Dyke, Brian Bufkin, and Melinda Bridges, as well as Kris, Greg, Warren, and my family have been the best part of my life.

ABSTRACT

Past research has demonstrated the undeniable link between trust and betrayal. The present research assessed the ways in which cognitive certainty is associated with perceptions of negative relational information, especially betrayal. First, results from studies 1 and 2 supported the hypothesis that betrayal is a construct that is perceived with graded structure, meaning that events belong to the betrayal category to a greater or lesser extent. In other words, there is some degree of certainty associated with the categorization of examples, and it tends to be related to perceptions of seriousness/threat to the relationship.

Dispositional trust was also related to categorization, but not in ways which would be consistent with the Appraisal Process Model of trust proposed by Holmes and Rempel (1989; Holmes, 1991). This model also assumes certainty is related to perceptions of relational information. In particular, based on the model it was hypothesized that individuals of varying levels of dispositional trust would perceive relational information differently. Evidence from studies 2 and 3 does not support the patterns expected based on the model, but differences were observed in the future beliefs of individuals with varying levels of trust that suggest cognitive certainty at some level is being experienced. However, this certainty seems to be related to expectations

for the future of a given relationship rather than appearing in the appraisal process. Further research is suggested to more fully assess the role of cognitive certainty in trust and betrayal, the utility of the Appraisal Process Model of trust, and theoretical improvements and applications for the patterns of responding which were observed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	4
TRUST	4
Trust of a Generalized Other	6
The development of trust	7
Individual differences in trust	14
Summary	16
Trust of a Specific Partner	17
Developmental Conceptualizations of	
Relational Trust	18
The component model	19
Trust in parent-child	
relationships	23
Trust in friendships	26
Trust in romantic relationships	28
Individual Difference Conceptualizations	
of Relational Trust	31
The Appraisal Process Model	32
BETRAYAL	38
Conceptualizing Betrayal	39
Research on Betrayal	43
The narrative account methodology	43
Differences in gender	44
Differences in perspective	45
Individual differences approach	47
Demographic correlates of betrayal	48
Psychological correlates of betrayal	49
Social network analysis	50
Summary	52
The Clarity of Betrayal	53

A prototype of betrayal	55
Research on prototyping and categorization	56
Factors influencing prototypicality	57
APPLICATION OF PROTOTYPING BETRAYAL TO THE APPRAISAL	
PROCESS MODEL OF TRUST	61
3. STUDY ONE: OBTAINING EXAMPLES OF BETRAYAL	64
METHOD	64
RESULTS	64
4. STUDY TWO: PROTOTYPING BETRAYAL	69
METHOD	69
Construction of Betrayal Items	69
Participants	70
Procedure and Materials	71
RESULTS	73
Victim's Perspective Analyses	75
Comparing evaluations of Prototypical, Nonprototypical, and Ambiguous Items from the Victim's Perspective	88
Prototypical examples of betrayal	104
Correlational analyses	104
Analysis of trust level	105
Nonprototypical examples of betrayal	106
Correlational analyses	107
Analysis of trust level	108
Ambiguous examples of betrayal	109
Correlational analyses	109
Analysis of trust level	110
Perpetrator's Perspective Analysis	111
Comparing evaluations of Prototypical, Nonprototypical,	

and Ambiguous Examples from the Perpetrator's Perspective . . .	112
Prototypical examples of betrayal . . .	124
Correlational analyses	139
Analysis of trust level	140
Nonprototypical examples of betrayal . .	141
Correlational analyses	141
Analysis of trust level	143
Ambiguous examples of betrayal	143
Correlational analyses	144
Analysis of trust level	144
DISCUSSION	145
5. STUDY THREE: TESTING THE APPRAISAL PROCESS MODEL .	157
METHOD	157
Materials	157
Construction of Vignettes	159
RESULTS	164
Representativeness of Betrayal	165
Seriousness of Betrayal	166
Certainty	167
Emotional Responses to Betrayal	169
Plausibility	172
Interpersonal Betrayal Scale	173
DISCUSSION	177
6. GENERAL DISCUSSION	185
REFERENCES	193
VITA	212

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1. Frequencies with which examples of betrayal were obtained in free response	66
2. Mean ratings for various evaluations of betrayal examples from the victim's and the perpetrator's perspectives	74
3. Betrayal examples by category and percentages of participant endorsement as betrayal from the victim's perspective	78
4. Mean ratings for various evaluations of betrayal examples by classification for the victim's perspective	87
5. Correlations between representativeness evaluations of each example of betrayal and other evaluations by classification from the victim's perspective . .	89
6. Betrayal examples by category and percentages of participant endorsement as betrayal from the perpetrator's perspective	113
7. Mean ratings for various evaluations of betrayal examples by classification for the perpetrator's perspective	122
8. Correlations between representativeness evaluations of each betrayal example and other evaluations by classification from the perpetrator's perspective	125
9. Vignettes chosen for use in Study Three with respective percentages of endorsement and mean ratings of experience with the described situation	161
10. Correlations between the subscales of the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale and evaluations of	

	the betrayal vignettes	175
11.	Average correlations between the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale and evaluations of emotional response to each betrayal vignette	176

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Trust is critical for most every kind of relationship. It is necessary for intimacy and is clearly associated with satisfying and successful relationships (e.g., Canary & Spitzberg, 1989; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Holmes, 1991). However, trusting others also means risking disappointment and betrayal. Because trust and betrayal are so closely linked, an understanding of how individuals varying in trust react to potential threats of betrayal is important to an overall understanding of relationships and the dynamics of relationship formation and change.

This paper begins with a review of theory and research on the construct of trust as it has been defined in psychology. Specifically, varying conceptualizations of trust from developmental and individual difference perspectives are presented concerning both trust in generalized others and trust in specific relational partners. This includes consideration of how individuals come to vary in their trust experiences, as well as the components of a trusting relationship. Special attention is paid to a conceptual model of trust in specific relational partners that incorporates the social cognitive nature of the process and also considers responses to potential threats to the relationship. The model

has been proposed to explain how trust may be conceptualized as a cognitive individual difference variable and is discussed in detail.

The Appraisal Process Model of trust suggests that individuals who are high or low in trust, as compared to persons moderate in trust, process relational information differently. In particular, individuals high and low in trust are motivated to maintain their trusting orientation (or lack thereof) by filtering the information in order to screen out discordant material. Individuals with moderate levels of trust are motivated to carefully consider all relevant information in order to make a decision about whether or not to trust their relational partner.

The nature of betrayal and the empirical literature concerning betrayal is also considered. However, because research on betrayal is scattered across various categories of empirical literature (e.g., divorce, abuse, infidelity, dishonesty, etc.) and because a unified construct of betrayal has not been thoroughly investigated empirically, a method commonly used in studies of psychological concepts known as prototyping is used to understand and define the construct. First, to better define betrayal, examples will be collected and assessed by a second group of participants. The goal of this process is to gain an understanding of factors leading to an example's classification as betrayal. Factors which will be assessed were chosen based on past research on

categorization and include how representative the example is of betrayal, how serious the betrayal is, how much experience the participant has had with the situation, how much he/she would trust the individual who betrayed, and the dispositional trust of the participant. The utility of the Appraisal Process Model of trust will then be assessed utilizing prototypical and less prototypical examples of betrayal as determined by these procedures. Specifically, individuals will be asked to respond to examples of betrayals and responses will be assessed on the basis of the participant's level of trust.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

TRUST

Research concerning interpersonal trust has demonstrated its importance in everyday social functioning and well-being. For example, trust has been found to be strongly associated with general adjustment (Doherty & Ryder, 1979; Grace & Schill, 1986; Schill, Toves, & Ramanaiah, 1980), and coping with stress and anxiety (Heretick, 1981). Individuals who score higher on measures of trust tend to out-perform their more suspicious counterparts on several social and problem-solving tasks (Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975), tend to feel a greater sense of control over their lives (Doherty & Ryder, 1979; Heretick, 1984), and are less lonely (Couch, 1994; Couch & Jones, 1995) and angry (Banks, Altendorf, Greene, & Cody, 1987). Individuals high in trust, as compared to low, also report less physical distress (Schill, Toves, & Ramanaiah, 1980), and score higher on measures of happiness (Rotter, 1980).

Trust is crucial in close relational experiences, as well. Research suggests that it is meaningfully related to interpersonal adjustment, satisfying relationships, communication, and cooperation. Attributions of honesty (Berry & McArthur, 1986; Keating, 1985; Lazelere & Huston,

1980) and a willingness to disclose information (Jourard, 1971) are found to be related to higher trust in one's relational partner and to predict positive behavioral outcomes such as constructive behavior in marital communication (Doherty & Ryder, 1979). Trust has also been found (Lewis & Weigart, 1985) to be strongly related to the development and maintenance of intimate relationships. Hatfield (1984) has argued that trust is essential to every kind of close personal relationship, and that mutual and enduring relationships cannot exist without trust. Independent areas of research also reinforce this line of argument. For example, love in romantic relationships has been positively linked to higher levels of trust in one's romantic partner (Canary & Cupach, 1988, Couch, 1994; Lazelere & Huston, 1980; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Individuals high in trust also tend to be more willing to disclose information (Jourard, 1971) and use more constructive techniques in marital communication (Doherty & Ryder, 1979) than individuals who are low in trust. Because trust plays such an important role in our daily functioning, it is considered to be an essential aspect of personality.

There is, however, some disagreement as to the best way to conceptualize the construct of trust as it relates to interpersonal relationships. Some have proposed that trust is a general disposition of the individual to perceive and relate to a partner or relationship in certain accepting and positive ways (Couch, 1994), whereas others believe that trust

develops as a function of the unique experiences of two people in the relationship. From the latter perspective, trust is conceptualized as a dynamic emergent process which arises from the nature of the interaction in the dyad and the contribution each person makes to the relationship (Holmes, 1991; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985).

Trust of a Generalized Other

Trust is usually defined as a generalized expectancy that an individual, or group can be relied upon (Rotter, 1967) or a belief that human nature is basically good (Wrightsman, 1964; 1974). In this view trust typically does not refer to any one person or situation, but rather to people or situations in general. Trust has also been discussed as an individual's belief in, or confident expectations about the fairness, honesty, and positive feelings of a specific relational partner (Chandler & Hala, 1991; Lazelere & Huston, 1980; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). This emotional bond between relationship partners allows an individual to go beyond the uncertainty of the future in a relationship (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Lewis & Weigart, 1985; Simmel, 1964; Sorrentino, Holmes, Hanna, & Sharp, 1995) and enables participation in the relationship as if certain possible negative futures will not occur. For example, one comes to believe that his/her partner will not fail to fulfill obligations in the relationship (Haas & Deseran, 1981) or that

the partner will not criticize, embarrass, or hurt him/her emotionally (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982).

Believing others to be trustworthy is considered to be essential to social behavior and functioning (Rotter, 1967; 1971; 1980; Wrightsman, 1974; Canary & Cupach, 1988) and has been presumed to be a critical aspect of human life (Grace & Schill, 1986; Rotenberg, 1991). Ostensibly, the widespread assumption of mutual trust in a society allows for increasingly complex social systems and interactions (Knapp & Comadena, 1979). For example, various factors clearly contribute to ones' acceptance by peers -- the ability to "get along" with others has been a key feature in allowing the evolution of human beings as a species (Jones, Couch, & Scott, in press). In particular, trust facilitates banding together, forming and living in groups, and developing cultural solutions to common problems. Thus, it is reasonable to speculate that trust was selected for as promoting individual and societal survival through the mechanisms of group acceptance and popularity. In fact, it has been argued that trust is so essential to social systems that there would be no need or occasion to trust apart from our interactions with others (Lewis & Weigart, 1985).

The Development of Trust

Several scholars have attempted to describe how an individual comes to have trust in the first place. Erikson (1950) and Rotter (1967) both suggested that trust develops

through one's experiences with others. Erikson argued that the relationship with the primary caregiver is responsible for basic trust to occur, and Rotter contended that relationships with others contribute to the development of trust through the social learning process. In addition, these theorists suggest that the fact that individuals have differing experiences with key relationships results in individual differences in trust. Because individual differences in levels of trust exist, personal functioning may also then be shaped. For example, individuals high in trust are seen to have more satisfying relationships than individuals low in trust, and individuals low in trust may experience lower levels of self-esteem (Butler, 1986; Dion & Dion, 1973) and use less constructive problem solving techniques than individuals high in trust (Canary & Cupach, 1988).

Erikson (1950; 1964) was one of the first to discuss trust at length. Erikson argued that trust is a basic human attitude that includes a deep faith in the self, in other people, and in one's culture and society. He believed that as a personal identity develops, one must pass through developmental stages or crises. The first of these stages is labelled basic trust versus basic mistrust. Basic trust is defined as a general sense of the correspondence between one's needs and one's world, whereas basic mistrust is defined as an expectation of danger or an anticipation of discomfort (Erikson, 1950).

Trust is hypothesized to develop from the attachment bond formed between an infant and his/her primary caregiver(s) which results from interactions during the first year of life. In this conceptualization two basic manifestations of trust are emphasized: (a) trust of specific other persons (e.g., the caregiver); and (b) trust of life itself. These two consequences correspond roughly to the two environmental sources Erikson believed to be responsible for a child's development of trust: (a) a trustworthy maternal environment in which the infant develops a sense of mutuality; and (b) a trustworthy social environment from which a sense of the meaning of life emerges. In order for basic trust to evolve, the infant must come to rely on the dependability of its caregivers. Furthermore, if this first crisis in life is resolved, the infant will develop a "favorable ratio" of basic trust over basic mistrust. According to Erikson, this ratio endures throughout life although it is subject to the effects of subsequent experiences to some extent. Essential for the survival of the infant (Erikson, 1950), initial trust is the basis for the trusting feelings that may develop later in life. Accordingly, if trust is established with the caregiver, the infant will "translate" that experience into other relationships, whereas disruptions or the failure of the development of trust (i.e., a ratio favoring mistrust), are hypothesized to result in subsequent mistrust and suspicion of people-in-general.

Bowlby (1973; 1982) has been credited with the formulation of attachment theory, which contains a similar theoretical approach to trust formation. In his work Bowlby refers to a relationship with a discriminated person or persons (caregiver) that is believed to serve a biological function -- as suggested earlier, trust serves to protect the attached individual from physical and psychological harm. He believed that the biological drive to become attached is one of the infant's strongest motivations. At birth, human infants show evidence of behaviors that bring them into closer proximity and interaction with a caregiver. Through subsequent interactions with the caregiver, these behaviors come to be preferentially directed toward the caregiver and become integrated into a coherent attachment system. Bowlby originally argued that the system stemmed from perceived danger and was deactivated by perceived safety due to the responsiveness and interactions with the caregiver. Mild alarm regarding the immediate environment draws the infant closer to the attachment figure. The information gained about the caregiver during these interactions (e.g., whether the caregiver can be trusted to be responsive) is translated into the child's view of relational interactions and the responsiveness of other potential relational partners.

Anticipated unavailability and nonresponsiveness on the part of the attachment figure will have a similar, but more permanent effect on the development of the mental

representation of the world and significant persons within it for the child. For example, if interactions suggest the caregiver will be unavailable and nonresponsive in a time of crisis, the child will be highly motivated to closely monitor the caregiver's whereabouts than if responsiveness is more certain. However, these representations that develop as a result of the attachment between the child and caregiver must be continually updated with the new information from interactions over time. Because the new information is assimilated into the existing model, representations tend to be resistant to dramatic changes. Therefore, the child's worldview or other-view tends to remain moderately stable across time. In this way, trust develops into a stable personal characteristic.

The subsequent work of Bowlby (1980) and Ainsworth (1979) also treated the attachment process as the crucible for critical relational characteristics such as trust. Ainsworth (1979) proposed that an individual may be classified on the basis of their "style" of attachment as follows: securely attached, anxiously/ambivalently attached, or avoidantly attached. Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall (1978) developed the Strange Situation paradigm in which infants and their caregivers were placed in an unfamiliar playroom where they were given the opportunity to explore toys and interact with an unfamiliar adult in the presence or absence of the mother. Ainsworth found that securely attached infants approached the

mother and sought physical contact with her if they had been overtly distressed. The avoidant infants snubbed and avoided the mother on her return and the anxiously/ambivalently attached infants showed angry resistant behavior interspersed with attachment behavior. The attachment theorists argue that, as suggested here, trust develops to the degree that an individual's experiences with others are positive and nurturing (Erikson, 1964; Bowlby, 1973). Whereas individuals bring their relationship histories to each new encounter as the attachment theories might suggest, others argue that these past experiences may not determine one's trusting orientation completely.

From the somewhat different perspective, Rotter (1967) agreed that trust evolves through interactions with others, but argued instead that any social agent may influence an individual's level of trust. Rotter's social learning account holds that behaviors or judgements depend, in part, on an individual's expectancy that a given behavior will lead to a particular outcome or reinforcement in that situation. Accordingly, trust is seen to develop through observation during experiences of positive and negative outcomes with social agents, such as parents, peers, teachers, and other sources of interpersonal interaction. These experiences presumably generalize from one social agent or situation to another so that a "generalized expectancy" emerges in which the individual assumes that the words or promises of others

can be relied upon, or not, to varying degrees. Interestingly, Rotter also claimed that one may learn differential trust expectancies without direct personal experience because important others can model trusting behaviors or attitudes.

Wrightsman (1974) argued that Rotter's trust reflects the credibility of specific people, groups, or institutions regarding specific actions that have an influence upon the individual. In contrast, Wrightsman's model of "trustworthiness" treated beliefs about the basic nature of human beings and about actions that may or may not directly affect the individual. According to Wrightsman, one's beliefs about human nature are at the heart of all social cognition and thus various thoughts and beliefs are greatly influenced by what one believes to be the character of humankind.

Several general conclusions summarize the convergent ideas of these theorists (*i.e.*, Bowlby, Erikson, Rotter, and Wrightsman). First, trust is seen as precursor of adequate functioning in a social world. Second, these disparate conceptualizations portray trust as (at least partially) acquired through experiences with significant other people. Third, once acquired, trust is described by each theory as evolving into global or generalized dimensions of personality. Fourth, each of these approaches considers trust from a developmental perspective in which experience with other people at one point in life contributes to the capacity to

trust at a subsequent point of development. These latter conclusions also suggest that individuals vary in their levels of trust due to the different experiences that they may have with their relational partners earlier in development. Bowlby and Erikson would argue that differences in trust result from disparate experience with attachment; whereas Rotter and Wrightsman, would argue that individuals develop different expectancies due to different experiences with reinforcements in all social situations.

The idea of individual differences in trust has long been important in the theoretical literature (e.g., Rotter, 1967; 1971; Wrightsman, 1974), as well as in studies of the stages of development (e.g., Erikson, 1950). Whereas the theoretical treatments of trust discussed thus far have emphasized the emergence of trust through interactions with significant others, viewing the resulting trust as an individual difference variable also emphasizes the influence of experience on the expression of such a trait. However, this perspective proceeds to argue that individuals high in trust remain relatively trusting throughout life, barring extreme situational influences. In other words, trust is seen as a stable aspect of personality.

Individual Differences in Trust

Recent research has begun to examine the link between relevant personality traits and trust. For example, trust has been found to be positively related to internal locus of

control (Doherty & Ryder, 1979; Heretick, 1984; Sabatelli, Buck, & Dreyer, 1983), and need for approval (Rotter, 1967), and inversely associated with competitiveness (Heretick, 1984), loneliness, jealousy, shyness, and suspicion (Couch, 1994). Trust has also been directly correlated with various styles of loving (e.g., erotic, agapic, etc.; Couch, 1994; Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986). Additionally, research concerned with trust as a characteristic of individuals has served to distinguish trust from other constructs: specifically, gullibility, social dependence, and naivety (Rotter, 1967; 1971).

Trust has been found to be statistically related to positive characteristics of the individual as perceived by others, such as attractiveness and common sense (Hochreich, 1977 as cited in Rotter, 1980), as well as trustworthiness (Deutsch, 1958; Rotter, 1967). Persons high in trust are more likely to be sought by others as friends (Rotter, 1980) as compared to those low in trust. Similarly, individuals scoring high as compared to low in trust tend to exhibit trust behaviorally [e.g., closing one's eyes and falling backward into another's arms with the expectation of being caught Cash, Stack, & Luna, 1975), or depending on the promises of others in laboratory games (Hochreich, 1973; Schlenker, Helm, & Tedeschi, 1973)]. Individuals higher in trust have been found to lie (Rotter, 1980; Heretick, 1984), cheat and steal (Rotter, 1980), betray others (Couch, 1994), or conceal their

attitudes from others (Mellinger, 1956) less than individuals lower in trust. These findings are consistent with data indicating that persons low in trust experience more feelings of being distrusted (Wright & Kirmani, 1977) than those who score high on such measures.

Individuals' levels of trust have been found to vary in relation to demographic variables, as well. For example, age, gender, and ethnicity have all been shown to influence one's trusting orientation. Non-traditional (*i.e.*, older) college students have been found to score higher on measures of global trust than traditionally aged students (Couch, 1994). Women and girls have been found to be more trusting in general than men and boys (Wrightsman, 1974; Heretick, 1984; Couch, 1994). Indeed, one study (Kurdek, 1988) found that long-term lesbian couples reported more trust than did couples consisting of gay men. Caucasians score consistently higher on trust and lower on measures of suspicion than do other ethnic groups (*i.e.*, Blacks and Asians; Couch, 1994; Grier & Cobbs, 1968; Miller, 1988; Steele, 1991; Terrell & Barrett, 1979).

Summary

To summarize, the theoretical generalizations regarding trust have been largely confirmed by empirical research. More specifically, the following conclusions have been supported: (1) indexes of trust have been linked to early indicators of the attachment experience in both retrospective and longitudinal research designs (*e.g.*, Ainsworth, Blehar,

Waters, & Wall, 1978); (2) trust is a stable characteristic of personality across the lifespan once established (Bowlby, 1973; 1980); (3) trust is related in predictable ways to relevant personality, demographic, and behavioral variables (e.g., cheating and stealing, jealousy, locus of control, suspicion, etc.; Couch, 1994; Doherty & Ryder, 1979; Rotter, 1967; Rotter, 1980; Sabatelli, Buck, & Dreyer, 1983); and (4) it is related also to important outcome variables such as health, adjustment and the social judgments of others (Heretick, 1981; Mellinger, 1956; Schill, Toves, & Ramanaiah, 1980).

Trust of a Specific Partner

Most researchers assume that generalized tendencies toward trust contribute to the development of trust in close relationships (Holmes, 1991). Although considerable progress toward the understanding of trust has been made from this theoretical perspective, it is also important to note that research results generally suggest that conceptualizing and measuring trust as a global trait or developmental pathway may leave unaddressed important questions regarding trust as it unfolds in and influences the outcome of close personal relationships (Chun & Campbell, 1975; Couch, 1994; Couch, Adams, & Jones, 1996; Couch & Jones, 1995; Holmes, 1991; Kaplan, 1973; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Tardy, 1988). For example, neither of the two most widely used measures of

generalized trust (Rotter, 1967; Wrightsman, 1974) has as of yet proven to be a predictor of relevant relational behaviors, love, or intimacy in close relationship contexts (Lazelere & Huston, 1980). As a consequence, increasing research attention has been focused on gaining a greater understanding of the operation of trust in these relationships.

Developmental Conceptualizations of Relational Trust

Several theoretical models have been proposed to explain how trust operates in interpersonal contexts. Much research attention has been focused on the idea of trust as a developmental process that emerges and reemerges at each subsequent stage in the cycle of a relationship (Chandler & Hala, 1991; Holmes & Rempel, 1989). The experience of trust viewed in this way is illustrated by an individual who no longer requires further evidence to have confidence in the partner or the relationship (Lewis & Weigart, 1985). Thus, trust from this perspective seems to require time and experience with the relationship, and may be renegotiated and changed on the basis of the individual's unfolding experiences with the relationship. As relational partners become increasingly intimate, expectations develop for one partner from the behavior of the other partner (i.e., dependability and predictability) and the former partner's preconception of the nature of relationships. These expectations are based largely on the individual's past behavior, expressions of honesty (Sparrow, 1991), reciprocation of feelings and

disclosure, and the beliefs and values of the partner (McCornack & Levine, 1990; Hatfield, 1984). As the belief that these expectations will be met develops, trust becomes a reciprocally reinforced outcome (Butler, 1986; Lazelere & Huston, 1980). For example, in romantic relationships, trust has been found to be reciprocated more than feelings of love (Lazelere & Huston, 1980). This serves to strengthen the bond between the two individuals or, put another way, to make the relationship stronger.

The Component model

This orientation suggests that trust is negotiated because experience with the partner affects one's trust of him/her. One theoretical model which specifically addresses this conceptualization of trust is the component model (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). The component model makes four assumptions. First, trust is seen as developing initially and subsequently as a consequence of relationship maturity and evolves from prior interactions. Second, reliability, dependability or other summary behavioral characterizations presumed to derive from dispositional attributes of trustworthiness are attributed to the partner based on one's experience with the him/her. Third, trust involves taking interpersonal risks. This is accomplished by relying on a partner's word, through intimate disclosure, and by sacrificing present rewards for future gains. Fourth, trust finally evolves to become confidence in the responses of

the partner and the stability of the relationship (Rempel, et al., 1985). These theorists believe that these four assumptions describe a process leading to a three component model of trust; specifically, predictability, dependability, and faith.

Predictability, dependability, and faith are presumed to arise out of differing levels of cognitive and emotional abstraction. The first component, predictability, is regarded as the most concrete and specific. Predictability simply refers to an expectation of the occurrence of specific behavioral patterns of the partner. If the partner conforms to this expectancy, the individual is able to move from concerns about the stability of his/her partner to more pressing matters of trust. Predictability is influenced by many factors, including the amount of past experience in the relationship, consistency of recurrent behavior, and stability of the social environment (Rempel, et al., 1985). This stage is the most basic and probably accounts for most instances of trust early in a relationship.

As relationships grow and change there is a natural shift in focus from specific actions to broader evaluative categories. At this stage, one begins to trust a person rather than his or her specific behaviors or actions (Rempel, et al, 1985). This is known as dependability, the second component of relational trust. Dependability is very closely related to predictability. This is because a partner's

predictability is a meaningful basis of information from which to attribute the personal quality of dependability. For example, if a partner behaves in a stable manner and in doing so is always responsive to the individual's needs, one may attribute dependability to that partner. These dispositional attributions can be transformed into what an individual views as his or her partner's trustworthiness (which is conceptually distinguishable from an individual's level of trust regarding that partner).

This second component also marks the necessary emergence of risk as a factor in an individual's decision to trust another. As noted earlier, relying on another's dependability inexorably brings vulnerability. Ironically according to Rempel, et al. (1985), focusing on vulnerability helps to explain the origins of feelings of security and trust. If one can resolve the question of dependability, he/she may progress to "higher" concerns. However, if one does not risk reliance on the partner's dependability, he/she cannot move past this apprehension and ever fully trust the partner. In failing to do so, the individual cannot be satisfied with that relationship and the relationship cannot develop further.

The first two components of trust, predictability and dependability, require attention to past experiences. But, the true "test" of trust comes when new situations arise, or knowledge of future events is unavailable. So, the relational partner must contemplate the impact of the future on trust.

To do so requires considerable confidence on the part of an individual that the partner will remain faithful and responsive despite future uncertainties (Rempel, et al., 1985). This element is faith, the third component of trust from this perspective. Faith is considered the most important and essential component. It may be an internal trait that allows an individual to accept an unknowable future and deal with it gracefully.

Whereas faith goes beyond an emphasis on dispositional attributions for the partner's past behavior, it is likely related to both predictability and dependability in that the past is an important basis for generalizing to future situations. Predictability and dependability are seen as suggesting the partner's underlying motives of caring which enhances emotional security in the face of the inherently uncertain future (Rempel, et al., 1985). Faith can be seen as a quality of the individual who does the trusting which may be linked to and indexed by personality dynamics, such as self-esteem and a sense of personal security. The theory, then, argues that in the absence of past experience with a relational partner, one cannot make the necessary "leap of faith" to feel trust, especially in the face of uncertainty. By contrast, experience with a partner's dependability and predictability makes possible this "leap of faith" necessary to trust the partner in future situations for which evidence is not necessarily available.

This supposition that trust is established with reference to past experience within a relationship, or other relationships like it, is frequently cited in the literature (e.g., Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Examining trust as a developmental process is especially common in studies which are focused on specific types of relationships, such as parent-child relationships, friendships, and romantic relationships. Trust characterizes the positive aspects of each of these kinds of relationships, and is used by some researchers as an index of relationship quality. The value of friendship is often directly related to the level of trust an individual experiences within the relationship (Rotenberg, 1991). Similarly, what is known as the companionate love experience is thought to be best defined by its trusting nature (Brehm, 1992). Parent-child relationships are also found to be satisfying to the degree that each participant trusts the other (Doster & Strickland, 1969; Komarovsky, 1974). In addition, trust has been viewed as a prerequisite for romantic/marital stability (Adams & Marsil, 1995), happiness, and the realization of romantic/marital potential (O'Neill & O'Neill, 1972). Thus in most types of relationships, trust appears to be an essential psychological feature, and relationships are generally considered to be functional to the degree that partners trust one another (Lazelere & Huston, 1980; Rempel, et al., 1985).

Trust in parent-child relationships. As indicated

earlier, many scholars believe that the parent-child relationship serves as the prototypical experience for trust. The child's experiences with the responsiveness of the caregiver, or the modeling of trusting behaviors by the caregiver establishes a child's trust at an early age. In addition, the interactions that children have with their parents continue to reflect the trust that is established in infancy (Ainsworth, 1979). Many believe that with each interaction the trust may continue to develop, or not, depending on the characteristics of that interaction. The study of interpersonal trust of children has been guided by the idea that the interpersonal trust of adults has its origins in the trust formed during childhood (Rotenberg, 1991).

Studies have also continued to focus on the trust relationships that exist between parent and child throughout the lifespan. Adolescence, in particular, has received attention. Parents who are perceived as non-threatening by their adolescent children, and who are also nurturing and supportive, are more frequently told "private" information by their children (Petronio, 1994) than parents who are perceived as threatening presumably in conjunction with their trust in the parent. Ironically, threats to the child's sense of independence or privacy typically result in negative consequences for the trust relationship. For example, when parents invade their adolescent child's privacy, he/she

usually responds by confronting the parent(s), and such confrontation has been found to be negatively related to trust (Petronio, 1994), especially when interference in romantic relationships is involved, as evidenced by the Romeo and Juliet effect (Driscoll, Davis, & Lipetz, 1972).

Additional research on the parent-child relationship has focused on the apparent consequences of divorce for trust. Divorce can often lead to separation between the parent and child, or conflict surrounding the issue. Findings suggest that if the parent remains an important figure in the child's life and responds with sensitivity to the child's needs, the development and maintenance of interpersonal trust will not necessarily suffer. Not only do most researchers believe that the parent-child relationship may be damaged due to a parental divorce, but the situation may also have a dramatic impact on the child's subsequent trust in others (Southworth & Schwarz, 1987). For example, the trust of daughters of divorced parents toward male partners in heterosexual relationships has been linked to their recent post-divorce contact with the father; specifically, the greater the divorced father's past acceptance and consistency of expressions of love, the higher the daughter's level of trust for men following parental divorce (Southworth & Schwarz, 1987).

To summarize, as with other relationships, the parent-child relationship is subject to issues of reliability and dependability. Trust may derive from the experiences one

individual has with the other. These continued interactions allow one to continue to accumulate more information about the other which is the basis for trust. In this way, trust may be renegotiated between the members of the relationship. Children will trust their parents as long as they can depend upon them to be supportive and nurturing. However, conflict or evidence which suggests that the parent is not reliable or responsive, such as in the cases of a "messy" divorce or parental interference, may cause the trust between parent and child to suffer. In addition, the parent-child relationship does seem to provide the child with a prototype of trust, even later in life.

Trust in friendships. Trust is viewed by some scholars in this area (e.g., Buzzelli, 1988; Sullivan, 1953) as a product of the relationship, rather than a necessary criterion for the establishment of the relationship. In this regard trust has been found to develop through the relationship with a significant peer as children reach adolescence and has also been found to be related to both friendship preferences and actual friendships (Rotenberg, 1980; Rotenberg & Pilipenko, 1984). Trust may actually serve as a means of distinguishing between types of friends, where "best" friends experience the most trust (Rawlins & Holl, 1987). Children with a best friend score significantly higher on measures of trust than children with no best friend (Buzzelli, 1988).

It is clear that children as young as the first and

second grades can make determinations about their trust of peers, even though trust may not function in the same way as it does during adolescence or adulthood. Buzzelli (1988) reports that younger children base their trust on a peer's overt behaviors, whereas older children place emphasis on the reliability of other's promises, and the degree of understanding/empathy that they provide in the friendship. He also found that children in the fourth through sixth grades report trust to be important in friendships, and adolescents use trust to decide among their friends at different levels of intimacy and amount of shared activity. By adolescence, good friends are considered to be primarily accepting and noncritical listeners that preserve confidences, and offer advice about others' perceptions of them. Each of these behaviors are believed to impact on one's satisfaction with the friendship, and all require trust that the friend will meet these expectations (Rawlins & Holl. 1987).

Additional findings from the study of friendship indicate that a child's trustworthiness (as viewed by others) is correlated with his/her standing in the peer group and may have much to do with the process of trust development in his/her early social encounters. Children who are perceived as less trustworthy by teachers and other children are less likely to be selected by their same-sex classmates as play partners or work partners (Wilson & Carroll, 1991). Conversely, children who are perceived as more trustworthy are

more popular (Buzzelli, 1988) than the less trustworthy children (Rotenberg, 1984). This means that if these children are not selected they may also lack experiences which allow them to develop trust as well. It has been suggested by Rotenberg (1984) that this trust preference, especially when it involved same-sex peers, may be responsible for the pattern of same-sex friendships that typically develops in childhood because it may limit the exchange of trust related behaviors, such as self-disclosure, that are needed to develop future trust across genders. Further, some studies show that children determine which of their peers to trust considering the reciprocation of exchanges (Buzzelli, 1988), a process that requires past experience with the individual. Children are less willing to share information with a child whom they do not trust (Wilson & Carroll, 1991). So, being perceived by others as trustworthy is related to social standing and/or functioning in social groups, and may also be negotiated through continued interaction.

To summarize, although most studies of trust in friendship have focused on children and adolescents, trust processes that develop in the context of friendships appear to result from repeated interactions with generally trustworthy peers, and once developed, trust and trustworthiness become major sources of social reputation and evaluation.

Trust in romantic relationships. Studies of romantic relationships also demonstrate the developmental nature of

trust (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Holmes, 1991). For example, trust has been found to vary with the length of the romantic relationship, as well as with level of commitment (Lazelere & Huston, 1980). Several researchers suggest that during the early stages of a romantic relationship, trust is necessarily taken for granted (Dion & Dion, 1973; Holmes & Rempel, 1989). This is so presumably because one must assume that the other will be responsive or a relationship cannot be established. But once the relationship is underway and mutual expectations for reliability (predictability and dependability) develop, trust becomes much more important. With time and increasing intimacy in the relationship, people are motivated to protect their emotional investment. If the partner is responsive and reciprocates feelings of love and other positive actions, trust is reinforced and may increase with each encounter (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Holmes & Rempel, 1989).

Satisfaction and commitment--two major variables by which romantic relationships, especially marital relationships, are studied--are affected by this increase in trust, and once an individual becomes assured about the partner's intentions, the relationship can proceed to the development of greater commitment and mutual satisfaction over time (McDonald, 1981; Lazelere & Huston, 1980). However, if one's partner does not reduce the uncertainty that the individual might have concerning the relationship, trust in that partner or relationship may suffer or fail to develop. Lazelere & Huston

(1980) have reported empirical support for this model of trust development. Specifically, they found that as the level of commitment to, and/or intimacy in a relationship increased, so did feelings of trust for the partner. Self-disclosure also increased (Lazelere & Huston, 1980; Wheelless & Grotz, 1977) and individuals' trust for one another was higher and more strongly reciprocated in married couples than in dating couples, or divorced couples.

Evaluation of one's partner and relationship quality is especially likely to occur during periods of change and adjustment. Often at this stage conflict occurs, but the partner's empathic or sensitive reactions to the conflict have been found to increase trust (Dion & Dion, 1976; Lazelere & Huston, 1980). Communication satisfaction, partner competence, and the exclusion of distributive tactics (*i.e.*, competition and primacy of personal over relational goals) from the conflict resolution process have been found to be associated with increased trust (Canary & Cupach, 1988) during this evaluative stage.

Finally, Hill, Rubin, & Peplau (1976) reported that when a romantic relationship is terminated, not surprisingly, trust decreases. Obviously, at this point in the relationship, commitment to the partner is no longer an issue. Less obviously, however, research also suggests that low trust during breakups is associated with feelings of anger toward the ex-partner, whereas high trust is associated with feelings

of freedom (Banks, et al., 1987).

A similar approach, social exchange theory, assumes that each partner must somehow persuade the other of his/her trustworthiness (Haas & Deseran, 1981). Behaviors rich in symbolism (e.g., gestures of sharing, etc.) become documents or evidences of the partner's trustworthiness, and contribute to trust building. Because people believe that one does not invest in relationships that they do not care about, interpersonal exchange is seen as evidence that the partner does care about maintaining such a bond. In this view trust builds incrementally and developmentally through a series of gradually increasing investments (expensive symbols of good faith) in the relationship. If one's partner yields the expected symbolized relational behaviors trust continues to develop in this way throughout the relationship and the individual learns to believe that his/her expectations will be met (Haas & Deseran, 1981). On the other hand, should the partner fail to reciprocate or "exchange" such items or investments, it may be taken as an indication that the partner is not to be trusted.

Individual Difference Conceptualizations of Relational Trust

Whereas each of the studies reviewed above suggests that trust evolves as a sort of interpersonal negotiation with a specific partner, alternative approaches (e.g. Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Sorrentino, Holmes, Hanna, & Sharp, 1995) suggest that trust develops as an individual's dispositional

means of coping with the uncertainty of the future and is brought to the new relationship by its participants. One proposed model relevant to this conceptualization of trust, and the focus of the current research, is the Appraisal Process Model of trust (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Holmes, 1991).

The Appraisal Process Model

The Appraisal Process model suggests a linkage between trust and cognitive style. Sabatelli, Dreyer, & Buck (1983) define cognitive style as the way in which people orient toward or think about their social environment. More specifically, cognitive style is the way in which information from one's social environment is perceived and processed. Research on close relationships has suggested that individuals conceive of their partners, and significant experiences with their partners, in a manner which is consistent with their cognitive style. For example, Murray & Holmes (1993) reported that when participants were induced to believe their partners had engaged in a practice indicative of a lower level of intimacy they developed story-like representations of their romantic partners that appeared to serve the purpose of quelling feelings of doubt engendered by the partner's faults. The Appraisal Process Model suggests that although trust develops through interactions between individuals, the resulting level of trust may be viewed as an individual difference in cognitive style. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to conclude that such differences influence the way

one thinks about a relationship. This conclusion is the assumption upon which the model is based.

The view that trust is something that individuals bring to the relational experience seems logical as well as consistent with extant data. Each individual has had different relational experiences which have shaped his/her thinking about relationships and others in his/her life. Holmes and Rempel (1989) argue that what really develops is a "readiness" to trust that interacts with the situation. As with any trait or individual difference variable, the situation and the information it provides for an individual may then temper one's trust, or way of looking at the relationship. These scholars argue that individuals low in trust adjust less effectively to changes or variations of particular relationships than do individuals high in trust. Persons high in trust expect positive outcomes in their relationships and interpret events in ways that maintain their optimistic expectations (Holmes & Rempel, 1989); they have a readiness to attribute good intentions to their partner.

Holmes and Rempel (1989) suggest that trust is strongly related to one's certainty/uncertainty orientation. Individuals are motivated to reduce uncertainty, and they may cope with potentially negative information about their relationships by interpreting it in ways that affirm their beliefs (Murray & Holmes, 1993; Holmes, 1991; Sorrentino, Holmes, Hanna, & Sharp, 1995). For example, faith allows a

trusting person to go beyond immediately available evidence interpreting a situation as non-threatening, leading to the assurance that his/her partner will be caring and responsive.

Trust appears to include expectations about whether one's partner may be counted on to be caring and emotionally responsive. An important feature of trust according to Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna (1985) is that these expectations apply both to the present and to the future. The Appraisal Process Model argues that, based on their relational experiences, individuals develop styles or attitudes which allow them to reflect upon the actions of the relational partner with an orientation of either certainty or uncertainty. This style, which includes one's level of trust, in turn influences an individual's judgements and actions with respect to interpersonal issues. For example, the model suggests individuals high in trust are motivated to interpret a partner's actions in ways that are consistent with his/her positive expectations. In this way trusting individuals are oriented toward cognitive certainty because information leading to vacillation is avoided and/or rejected. Individuals low in trust are also certainty oriented and tend to interpret information in such a way that is consistent with the negative expectations they hold about the partner and their relational future. Because these individuals (*i.e.*, high and low in trust) are oriented toward certainty, each specific interaction is less important than it might be

otherwise. An individual who is high in trust will tend to discount negative behavior by a relational partner because it is inconsistent with his/her positive attitudes whereas each positive behavior will confirm his/her trusting orientation. Trusting individuals do not treat their partner's motives as an issue worth considering; the partner is simply given the benefit of the doubt. Similarly, individuals low in trust tend to discount positive behaviors by the partner (e.g. as unimportant or less meaningful). Instead, the negative expectations which the individual holds override the positive information and the sense of certainty is maintained.

The model also addresses those individuals who have had both positive and negative relational experiences and developed an intermediate level of trust. Intermediate trust is associated with an uncertainty orientation according to which the person must use each relevant circumstance or event to make a judgement about the meaning of their partner's actions for the future of the relationship. In this case, each interaction an individual has with a relational partner gains importance, and is considered in whether or not to trust the him/her.

Whereas this approach has intuitive appeal and is consistent with previous conceptualizations, only a small number of empirical studies are available with which to judge the merits of the Appraisal Process Model. One study (Sorrentino, Holmes, Hanna, & Sharp, 1995) found that

individuals who are not threatened by a sense of uncertainty (uncertainty-oriented individuals) are less motivated to achieve cognitive clarity and confidence through intrapersonal means, and were found to be moderately trusting individuals. On the other hand, individuals who were bothered by the idea of uncertainty in their close relationships (certainty-oriented individuals) were found to avoid information that was inconsistent with their trusting orientation. They tended to work toward maintenance of their trusting orientation in that high trusting individuals ignored negative information about their partners, and low trusting individuals ignored positive information about their partners.

Other research also supports the utility of the Appraisal Process model. Holmes (1991) found that when participants were exposed to a recall manipulation, levels of trust predicted processing of an interaction with their partner. Some participants were asked to remember a time when they were in conflict with their partner and the partner did not respond positively to their needs; others were asked to remember a time when their partner responded to their needs. The participant then interacted with his/her partner in a videotaped session. Finally, participants rated the videotaped interactions.

In the negative recall condition low trust participants reported being mistrustful of their partners even when the videotaped interaction was rated positively by judges who were

unaware of the manipulation. As the model would predict persons in this group tended to avoid focusing on positive interactions in the present, and instead concentrated on a more generally negative picture based on many past events as the model would predict. Participants scoring at intermediate levels of trust as compared to participants scoring either high or low responded to the same task ambivalently and with greater variability (Holmes, 1991). Their feelings about their partner mirrored either the positive or negative recall manipulation. This is consistent with the idea that the uncertainty associated with moderate levels of trust leads to a constant appraisal process with a readiness to observe both positive and negative actions of the partner. High trust couples showed that they anticipate positive outcomes from their interactions, and interpret events in ways that support these expectations. In the negative recall condition, these couples did, as the theory suggests, fail to attach importance to specific negative behaviors, and showed less evidence of manipulation effects than any other group. High trust then, like low trust, may result in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Although it is interesting that the Appraisal Process Model predicts recall of relevant information, perhaps a better test of the model's utility would involve the individual's response to information concerning a violation or more direct threat to the relationship in question.

One index of the degree to which the Appraisal Process

Model is a useful representation of the cognitive processes that occur in social interactions would be whether it accounts for applications beyond recall. For example, a negative act that a partner engages in may be viewed as more or less detrimental to the relationship depending on the partner's level of trust. Individuals low in trust would be more likely to view acts in a negative context, whereas trusting individuals would be more likely to resist any negative information. Individuals lower in trust may then be more likely to report experiencing betrayal within their relationships, or view lesser negative situations as betrayals, than persons higher in trust. On the other hand, individuals high in trust may be less likely to view a situation as betrayal and would likely report fewer betrayals in their experiences with others. According to the model, individuals with moderate levels of trust should weigh both positive and negative information equally, but when the information is negative they should view an event as a betrayal of their relationship.

BETRAYAL

It has been argued by many scholars that a central feature of trust is the vulnerability associated with trusting another person, and that trust does not exist unless the possibility for a violation of that trust also exists (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; Hatfield, 1984; Lewis & Weigart, 1985; Rempel,

et al., 1985; Canary & Cupach, 1988). In a sense the potential of betrayal by a partner might be considered the risk one takes for seeking the benefits of intimacy. One can be betrayed only by a partner he/she trusts and with whom he/she is close, and thus paradoxically the ultimate protection against betrayal is to have no relationship, or only superficial ones (Jones, Cohn, & Miller, 1991). Because betrayal is directly relevant to the continuation of the relationship and one's trust in his/her partner, using information about such violations to test the Appraisal Process Model of trust may provide valuable evidence as to its utility generally and its robustness specifically.

Conceptualizing Betrayal

Jones & Burdette (1994) have suggested that the two major psychological risks associated with becoming intimately involved with another person are rejection and betrayal. Rejections threaten one's sense of self and are typically very unpleasant, but tend to occur early in the development of a relationship, often before the relationship becomes well established. Betrayals, on the other hand, may occur at any time within the course of a relationship. This is especially significant because as a relationship develops, so does the amount of emotional pain that would likely accompany a betrayal. Consequently, individuals may become reluctant to fully trust another because they fear exposure, abandonment,

abusive anger, loss of control, losing one's individuality, or being psychologically overwhelmed (Hatfield, 1984). Unfortunately, whereas trust is difficult to create and often evolves slowly within a developing relationship, it may be quickly damaged or destroyed (Rempel, et al., 1985).

In the literature, betrayal has been defined as a serious violation of the norms and expectations of a specific relationship (Jones, et al., 1991). When betrayal occurs, it is a threat to faith, as well as the predictability and dependability assumptions relied upon to make the leap of faith. This conceptualization of betrayal as a failure to live up to one's expectations in the relationship is consistent with the component model of trust (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985) in that faith is established only after information concerning the partner's dependability and predictability has been evaluated and considered to be satisfactory.

A wide variety of acts can be interpreted as betrayals, depending on the perspective of the individuals involved, and the current state of the relationship. The degree of involvement in the relationship (Berscheid, 1983), personal importance attributed to events (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Srull & Wyer, 1986), and the uncertainty produced by the act all may contribute to the likelihood of the act being labeled as a betrayal (Bower & Cohen, 1982; McCornack & Levine, 1990; Metts, 1994).

Some questions remain, however. For example, some scholars (Metts, 1994) believe rules or expectations (whether communicated or not) are established within a relationship (e.g., not criticizing one's friend publicly, sharing certain responsibilities, etc.) that allow the individuals involved to make a determination as to whether an act constitutes a betrayal. If the partner violates the "rule" or expectation, it may be viewed as a betrayal. For example, one expects to receive attention from relational partners and to be treated fairly. Expectations may include information relevant to a partner's feelings, such as attentiveness, supportiveness, and responsiveness. If these expectations are not met, an individual may feel let down by his/her partner and may begin to wonder (1) if the partner is behaving purposefully and (2) what motivated the partner in the failure to meet these expectations.

Lessening the degree of commitment to a relationship, and/or failing to live up to the trust that has been established may be considered serious betrayals because relational expectations have not been met, and when this occurs the relationship is in jeopardy. In addition, if it is determined that a betrayal has occurred, the perception of the severity of the transgression may be influenced by many things. This is judged by the offended partner using the established rules, attributions about motive, and the level of relationship as well. The motivations attributed for the

behavior most likely are assessed in terms of the individual's relational satisfaction, level of trust, knowledge of partner, knowledge of the present situation, and knowledge of past situations (Fincham & Bradbury, 1989; Holmes & Rempel, 1989). Each of these factors also help to define the scope of conditions under which certain rules are more strongly enforced or more strongly sanctioned. For example, violations that are "public" or known to the members of one's social network are considered more severe than those that involve only the dyad (Metts, 1994).

The causes of betrayal are likely varied and multifaceted. It is possible that in many instances, the instigator of a betrayal does not intend to betray the partner. Alternatively, it is possible that a person, unhappy in the relationship, uses betrayal as a means of ending the relationship. In such a case, termination of the relationship may be obtained by violating a relational rule that is important to the partner (Metts, 1994). It has been suggested that betrayal threatens one's feeling of identity and well-being (Jones & Burdette, 1994). Assuming the dignity and self-concept of the betrayed partner are threatened by the betrayal, the partner has no other choice but to continue the relationship with feelings of dissatisfaction, rejection, resentment, etc., or to end the relationship.

Perhaps an alternative possibility for betrayal is to test the relationship in question (Baxter & Wilmot, 1984).

For example, people expect love and affection to be reciprocated, and expect their feelings to be positively received. Another betrayal of a partner involves the dissonant goals of the individuals in the relationship. When a person attempts to strive toward the goals that compromise the relationship, it is often seen as a betrayal. For example, if a person pursues his/her career intensely and in so doing fails to meet the emotional expectations of his/her family, the family members may feel that this is a betrayal, although he/she may not see it as such. The results of a transgression such as this may be a realization that the members of the relationship are operating on different fundamental assumptions about how the relationship should be conducted (Metts, 1994).

Research on Betrayal

The Narrative Account Methodology

Relevant research employing narrative accounts typically asks respondents to describe briefly the most significant experience in which they had been betrayed by another and their most significant betrayal of another person. The accounts are often accompanied by descriptions of circumstances which surround the betrayal, such as motive, effects on the relationship, an estimate of time since the betrayal occurred, and the type of relationship in which the betrayal occurred. The account methodology, then, allows

researchers to study the single most significant instances of betrayal.

The majority of the individuals studied report betrayals involving violations of trust, commitment, or other expectations within the relationship (e.g., extramarital affairs, lying, betraying a confidence, and lack of support). Results suggest that betrayal can occur in any type of relationship, but it is more frequent in family or personal relationships (Jones, 1991). Specifically, betrayals tended to be mostly in relationships with spouses, same-sex friends, parents, siblings, and children, or in work relationships (Jones & Burdette, 1994).

Differences in gender

Participants (both men and women) agreed that men are more likely to be the perpetrators in the most significant incidents of betrayal (Jones, 1988). The types of betrayal most often described by participants also varied by gender. Men frequently reported that they had betrayed a partner by being sexually or romantically unfaithful, whereas women more frequently indicated betrayals by virtue of telling secrets or betraying a confidence (Jones, 1988; Jones & Burdette, 1994; Metts, 1994). Women were also more likely than men to report emotional attachment to a former partner, violations of a significant promise, and acting unfairly as significant betrayals (Metts, 1994). The participant's relationship to the victim/perpetrator of the betrayal also varied by gender.

Interestingly, women were more likely to report betraying and having been betrayed by same-sex friends (often citing their "best friend") than men, and men were more likely than women to cite betrayals involving work relationships (Jones & Burdette, 1994). Finally, one study also suggests that gender differences exist in the use of apology and relational outcomes after a betrayal (Moore, 1996). For men, apology makes little difference in forgiveness. Male respondents tended to forgive with or without an apology. Apparently, apology is much more important to women. Almost 83% of women in one sample forgave after an apology as opposed to just under 40% without (Moore, 1995; Couch, Moore, & Jones, 1996).

Differences in perspective

Betrayal also varies considerably by perspective (*i.e.*, whether the individual is the victim of a betrayal, or the perpetrator), especially with respect to motives for the betrayal and the effect of the betrayal on the relationship. For the most part, studies of betrayal tend to show that individuals have a strong self-enhancing tendency in their reporting of betrayals; that is, they tend to be much more forgiving of their own transgression than those of a partner. When reporting as the victim of a betrayal, the motives of the other are most often described as internal, stable, and intentional (Newell, Johnson, & Jones, 1992), and vary only in extreme circumstances, such as if the betrayal can in any way be construed as an accident (Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen,

1992). When the respondent describes his or her own betrayals of others, motives are represented as intentional, but with unstable causes, and the respondent usually admits that the betrayal was due to some temporary emotion, such as anger (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Jones, Sanchez, & Merrell, 1989; Newell, et al., 1992). In other words, when one engages in a betrayal he/she is likely to conclude that the behavior in question resulted from temporary emotions, whereas others who betray him/her are likely seen as having betrayed because of some negative and enduring aspect of their character. This pattern has been observed even when the betrayal that one experiences as a victim is the same type of betrayal that he/she engages in as the perpetrator (which occurs between 10-20% of the time).

Similarly, the betrayal's effect on the relationship is apparently influenced by perspective and self-serving tendencies. Many relationships end due to the effects of betrayal. Not surprisingly, voluntary (non-familial) relationships account for a disproportionate number of relational terminations after betrayals (Jones, 1988), regardless of perspective. But a sizeable number (e.g., 60% in one sample) remain intact. Of those intact relationships, victims of betrayal are more likely to report that the betrayal has negative effects on the relationship (i.e., relationship is reported as worse, or less satisfying), whereas perpetrators are more likely to report the

relationship as being about the same, or having improved (Jones, 1988; Hansson, Jones, & Fletcher, 1990). And when rated by independent judges, the accounts of the victims are judged to be more serious than those recounted from the perpetrator's perspective (Baumeister, et al., 1990; Couch, 1996; Jones & Burdette, 1994).

Finally, a consistent relationship has been found between the perspective of the respondent and the time since the betrayal occurred. Specifically, perpetrators tended to refer to relatively recent incidents, whereas victim reports varied in time from recent occurrences to events that took place many years ago (Hansson, et al., 1990; Jones & Burdette, 1994). In one account study, the incident was portrayed by victims in a long-term context that carried lasting implications, especially of continuing harm, loss, and grievance, whereas the perpetrator accounts tended to cast the incident as a recent and isolated incident (Baumeister, et al., 1990). This also suggests that judgements of betrayal are embedded in the perspective and expectation of the observer (Jones & Burdette, 1994), and is remembered in such a way as to protect the self-image of that individual.

Individual Differences Approach

Betrayal also has been conceptualized as a tendency that individuals possess to a greater or lesser extent. The Interpersonal Betrayal Scale (IBS; Jones & Burdette, 1994) was created to assess these individual differences in the tendency

to betray. Items for the scale were based on accounts of betrayals, and includes both items asking respondents to estimate the frequency of engaging in certain acts of betrayal, as well as items assessing the frequency with which an individual reports having been the victim of betrayal.

Demographic correlates of betrayal

IBS scores have been inversely related to age and years of education and were higher among divorced persons as opposed to married respondents, and higher also for individuals with occupations that bring them into greater contact with other people, as compared with individuals in more isolated occupations (Jones, 1988). Measured in this way, men and women report comparable frequencies of experience with betrayal (Jones, 1988). Ethnicity and religious affiliation have also been consistently related to betrayal. Caucasian respondents score highest on the IBS across samples when compared to other ethnic groups, and individuals with no religious affiliation tend to score higher than persons who subscribe to standard religious identities as well (Jones, 1988). Other cultural differences may also exist; for example, scores for U.S. college students were higher than those for foreign students studying in the United States (Jones & Burdette, 1994). Because trust scores have been found to be inversely related to IBS scores (Couch, 1994), one would expect a pattern of demographic correlates of trust to be the opposite of the pattern of IBS scores. In fact, this

expectation can be verified in the trust literature. Whereas IBS scores are high for younger individuals trust scores tend to be lower, and whereas IBS scores tend to be low for older, educated, and married individuals, each of these groups tend to score high on measures of trust.

Psychological correlates of betrayal

High scores on the IBS tend to be associated with characteristics that are identified as problematic for interpersonal relationships (Jones & Burdette, 1994). Specifically, IBS scores were significantly correlated with self-descriptions such as sullen, vengeful, jealous, and suspicious, and are inversely related to terms like trusting (Jones, 1988). Similarly, IBS scores were also directly correlated with measures of shame, guilt, resentment, suspiciousness, and resistance to authority (Jones & Burdette, 1994), as well as histrionic, passive-aggressive, schizotypal, and dependent personality disorders (Montgomery & Brown, 1988). Also, having a propensity to experience betrayal has been found to be inversely related to responsibility, well-being, self-control, empathy, tolerance, achievement, and relational satisfaction (Montgomery & Brown, 1988). Individuals who yield higher as compared to lower scores for betraying and having been betrayed also report more frequent experiences with behaviors such as lying, extramarital affairs, dissatisfying sexual relationships, negative emotions, and being impatient with their marital partners

(Jones & Burdette, 1994). Individuals with a greater propensity to betray than average included children of divorced parents, psychiatric patients, victims and perpetrators of sexual abuse, alcoholics, adult children of alcoholics, adjudicated delinquents, and adolescents permanently removed from the public schools (Cohn, 1990; Jones, 1988; Jones, et al., 1991; Jones & Burdette, 1994). In addition, betrayal tendencies may combine with other characteristics to produce negative self-evaluations. For example, in betrayals instigated in laboratory settings, depressed women who experienced interpersonal betrayal were more critical of their performance, and behaved more aggressively on a subsequent task than did nondepressed subjects or depressed subjects that had experienced a cooperative interaction (Haley & Strickland, 1986).

In summary, work on betrayal from the individual difference perspective suggests that persons scoring higher on betrayal tend to possess negative characteristics and report less satisfying relational experiences. Individuals who report infrequent involvement with betrayal, on the other hand, tend to fare much better.

Social Network Analysis

Research using the social support network analysis asks respondents to identify persons who are important to them, who provide them with social support, and with whom they have relatively frequent contact. Subjects also indicate the

individuals' ages, genders, types of relationship, length of acquaintance, etc. In addition, this methodology allows each respondent to rate the members of his/her network on certain characteristics, such as whether he/she could confide in them, trust them, how much each person had betrayed him/her, or he/she had betrayed each person, etc. (cf. Jones & Moore, 1987; Jones & Burdette, 1994). Information is obtained concerning the specific effects, severity, and victim/perpetrator of the betrayal, and at the same time the analyses reveal differences between individuals in their experiences with betrayal.

Every kind of relationship is vulnerable, but analyses using the social network method reveal that betrayal is most likely to occur in one's family or personal relationships (Jones, 1991; Jones & Burdette, 1994). For example, in non-college adults almost half of the respondents indicated that they had betrayed at least one member of their current social network, and a somewhat larger percentage indicated that they had been betrayed by at least one network member (Jones & Burdette, 1994). On average, 19% of the network had betrayed the respondent, and he/she had betrayed 20% of them (Jones, 1988). Some individuals, though few, even reported that they had betrayed and/or been betrayed by every member of their social network. These findings offer support for the claim that betrayal is a common and persistent phenomenon (Jones, Cohn, & Miller, 1991).

The social network analyses are consistent with many of the narrative and individual difference method findings. Social network analyses indicate that certain members of the network are both perpetrators, as well as victims of betrayal (Jones, 1988; Jones & Burdette, 1994). Gender differences with regard to the reported relationship between victim and perpetrator are also confirmed. For example, betrayals of involuntary ties (e.g., family members) were reported more often by women than men (Jones, 1988). And finally, no significant differences in the proportion of relationships involving betrayals can be found between men and women (Jones & Burdette, 1994). The social network analyses are valuable in that they allow the researcher to investigate the members of the individual's group instead of simply getting information about one betrayal incident.

Summary

Consistently, robust findings emerge regarding the effects of gender and perspective on the betrayal, as well as individual differences associated with experiencing betrayal. These findings include that: (1) whereas men and women experience betrayal at about the same rate, men are more likely to be the perpetrators of respondents' most significant betrayal experiences than women, and men tend to betray by being sexually or romantically unfaithful whereas women tend to commit betrayals of information; (2) women tend to forgive betrayals only after an apology is given them whereas men are

likely to forgive with or without an apology from the perpetrator; (3) a self-serving bias typifies the reporting of betrayals such that individuals see the causes of their betrayals of others as less stable and revealing about themselves than when they are the victim of the betrayal; and (4) the betrayal is seen as more negative and damaging to the relationship when the respondent is the victim of the betrayal than when he/she is the perpetrator; and (5) the propensity to experience betrayal has been found to be related to demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, age, and frequency of contact with others. Betrayal has also been found to be correlated with adjustment and interpersonal difficulties, such as guilt, suspiciousness, shame, the histrionic and passive-aggressive personality disorders, negative emotions, and negative behaviors like lying.

The Clarity of Betrayal

Since relational partners generally serve in many roles, such as friend, confidant, and support network, the betrayal of trust can be a devastating blow. When he/she betrays, the break in trust may have heightened implications because of those many roles the partner plays. Although a great deal has been learned about betrayal as a violation of trust, it remains unclear how (in the context of a given relationship) an individual determines whether a specific act is a betrayal

and whether individuals differ in their perceptions of these acts.

Even given such information as has been discussed thus far, the concept of betrayal is not well defined (or is ill-defined). The research described above has generated a great deal of information but has relied on participant generated definitions of betrayal. Unfortunately, the current literature does little to advance our understanding of the factors which lead to a behavior's identification as betrayal or outline how individuals determine a particular act's inclusion in, or exclusion from, the betrayal category. Betrayal may include violations such as betraying a confidence, disloyalty, deceit, unfaithfulness, and harm-doing, but this list is by no means exhaustive, and even comparably minor offenses may disrupt a relationship depending on the characteristics and expectations of the aggrieved partner.

Because there is diversity in the meaning of the term "betrayal," it seems logical to apply some method that would describe the "average" meaning of the term but also characterize the variability in the usage of the term. Similar difficulties have emerged with regard to other important constructs, such as anger, love, emotion, and loneliness (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, & Parad, 1981; Fehr & Russell, 1984; Fehr & Russell, 1991; Russell & Fehr, 1994) and have been approached

through prototyping the constructs.

A Prototype of Betrayal

Advances in cognitive psychology have suggested that individual examples or characteristics of a construct may be assessed cognitively in such a way that they are tested against a prototype. A prototype is a theoretical notion based on an integration of specific categorical experiences (Homa, 1984) consisting of the most common features or properties of members of a category. All of these properties characterize as least some members, but in actual practice, no one property is either necessary or sufficient for membership in that category. A commonly used example is the category "bird" (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Members of the category "bird" share many properties with each other (e.g., wings, beaks, feathers, small, colorful, sings songs, etc.). These features which tend to be shared by the members of the bird category make up the theoretical notion of "bird," and define the prototype. No actual member of the category will possess every feature that the prototype suggests, but most birds share most features. By using the theoretical notion, or prototype, one can then decide how representative a given example is of the prototype. For example, a sparrow is generally a good example of a bird because it possesses most of the ideal characteristics. A penguin, on the other hand, possesses fewer of the ideal characteristics and is considered a poorer, or less

prototypical example of a bird. Indeed, research has indicated that examples which are described by many prototypic features are likely to be seen as highly representative of the ideal, whereas examples which are characterized by fewer prototypic features are seen as less representative of the ideal (Horowitz, Wright, Lowenstein, & Parad, 1981). Examples of betrayal may be tested in much the same way.

Research on Prototyping and Categorization

Lakoff (1987) has suggested that prototype effects arise from a variety of sources. Most believe that we grade the structure of a concept such that exemplars "fit" into a category to a greater or lesser degree. For example, individuals are rich to some degree, and not all individuals are clearly rich or not rich (Lakoff, 1987; Zadeh, 1965). Instead of being equal, the members of a category differ in how well they describe (or how typical they are of) the "rich" category (Rosch, 1973).

Graded structure refers to the continuum of category representativeness, beginning with the most representative member of the category and continuing toward the least representative category member (Barsalou, 1987). It has been suggested that every category observed so far has been found to have graded structure and that it is a universal property of categories (Barsalou, 1987). Graded structure is considered to be directly related to prototype effects (Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983). Prototype theory

argues that these effects are a consequence of conceptual structure (Lakoff, 1987) and arise directly when one utilizes a scale for membership classification, such as the scale to determine membership in the "rich" or "bird" categories. The theory seems to be supported by the fact that graded structure has been found to be associated with performance on a wide range of categorization tasks, such as generating, identifying, and acquiring category members. For example, McCloskey & Glucksberg (1979) found that typical exemplars (more prototypical examples) were identified faster than atypical exemplars. Graded structure was also found to predict the frequency with which category members were generated, with typical exemplars being generated more often than atypical exemplars (Barsalou & Sewell, 1985). Rosch, Simpson, & Miller (1976) also argued that typical exemplars were easier to acquire than atypical exemplars. In short, graded structure has been found to reliably affect the ways in which individuals make decisions about categorization and how they process and manipulate members of categories. It is presumed that when individuals are faced with decisions about whether an act constitutes betrayal a similar process of graded structure could be applied in order to make the determination.

Factors influencing prototypicality

It is also possible that examples which are encountered more frequently, or are typical in raters' experiences, may be

judged to be more prototypical. As an example, individuals that had experience with being lied to might be more likely to interpret lying as a prototypical example of betrayal. Whereas Malt & Smith (1982) found that increased familiarity with a given situation may not be related to a subject's high ratings of the prototypicality of an instance, others argue that familiarity with the situation is related to ratings of high prototypicality (Ashcraft, 1978; Barsalou, 1985; Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Murphy & Medin, 1985).

One factor that has been suggested as relating to an individual's judgement about category membership is central tendency, or family resemblance (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 1981; Tversky, 1977). Central tendency/family resemblance refers to the exemplar's similarity to the average properties of the category. Another factor which has been discussed as relating to typicality judgements is how similar the exemplar is to the ideals associated with the category (*i.e.*, how well the exemplar meets the goal of the category; Barsalou, 1985). Individuals apparently use a number of differences between the "ideal" and the exemplar when judging typicality (Barsalou, 1987). The frequency with which the category is instantiated (activated) by the exemplar has also been discussed (see Barsalou, 1985). For betrayal, individuals may see an act as a betrayal most clearly when the act meets all of the objective criteria for the category (*e.g.*, malicious intent, painful consequences for the victim,

etc.), or it could be that this information is combined with other information, such as how often the act has occurred in the relationship. Barsalou (1987) argues that no single factor determines graded structure and judgements of category membership, but instead a number of factors likely work together.

Given that graded structure is important in one's understanding of prototyping effects, it is also significant to note that the graded structure of categories has been found to be fairly unstable. Barsalou (1983) found that subjects' graded structures tend to correlate at only about .50 for many kinds of categories. In addition, people's ability to construct graded structures from the points of view of their friends is also relatively poor (Sewell, 1985 as reported in Barsalou, 1987). Graded structures have also been found to vary widely within subjects. For example, McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) found that individuals often changed their minds about categorization. In addition, there is evidence that graded structure is not stable across situations or contexts. For example, Roth and Shoben (1983) found that a category's graded structure can shift as a function of linguistic context, and graded structure has also been shown to shift as a function of cultural point of view (Barsalou & Sewell, 1984 as reported in Barsalou, 1987). Given the instability of graded structure that has been found for many categories then, there may be a number of factors (such as

familiarity, central tendency, or frequency of instantiation) influencing individuals' attempts to determine whether a specific act qualifies as betrayal.

Most likely betrayal can be conceptualized as a "fuzzy" concept. A fuzzy concept (or fuzzy set) refers to conceptual boundaries which circumscribe the essence of a construct that may not be very clearly defined (Lakoff, 1973; Zadeh, 1965). Barsalou (1987) argues that the knowledge in long-term memory from which concepts are constructed for a particular category may not have clear boundaries, but it is similar in structure to other categories. Most likely membership in the category of betrayal is not clearly defined by a formal boundary that all accept. Instead membership is likely a matter of degree. By using the idea of a fuzzy set and prototyping methods one can describe a theoretically ideal betrayal (or prototype) against which other events may be evaluated. The disagreement about whether a given example is prototypical of betrayal can then also be clarified through the concept of prototype. Factors such as familiarity with the behavior or how typical the behavior may be in a given situation or the number of prototypic features a given example possesses, may lead a rater to judge an example as a prototypical betrayal. In addition, if familiarity with certain betrayals is related to prototypicality it may also suggest that possible gender differences in what is believed to constitute betrayal may exist since males and females report different experiences as

their most significant betrayal. Finally, behaviors may be judged to be more representative of betrayal if they are considered to be more serious violations. Using prototyping methods, these and other issues surrounding the categorization of betrayal may be addressed.

APPLICATION OF PROTOTYPING BETRAYAL TO THE APPRAISAL PROCESS MODEL OF TRUST

With respect to earlier speculations concerning the Appraisal Process Model of trust and betrayal, it seems likely that evidence as to the prototypicality of a given behavior may be relevant. A behavior which is judged to be highly representative of the category of betrayal (or is highly prototypical) is likely to elicit a similar response from both high, moderate, and low trusting individuals. If the behavior is so obviously a betrayal, even the high trusting individuals will be likely to agree. If, however, a behavior is judged to be low in prototypicality the differences predicted by the Appraisal Process Model are likely to emerge. According to the model, low trusting individuals will perceive the betrayal information in accordance with their certainty orientation -- they will likely perceive the behavior as negative and respond as they would if the betrayal were prototypical. High trusting individuals, on the other hand, should receive the information in accordance with their certainty orientation, and discount the negativity of the situation in order to

maintain their level of trust. Individuals with moderate levels of trust presumably react negatively to negative information (and positively to positive information) and therefore become mistrustful. It seems that moderate trusting individuals may perceive less prototypical betrayal events as would low trusting individuals due to the valence of the incoming information (i.e. whether it is a serious betrayal or not, it is still a negative circumstance).

In summary, little is known about which behaviors might be classified as a betrayal and what factors lead to such a classification. It is hypothesized that betrayal is a "fuzzy" concept, and that factors such as the seriousness of the violation, experience with certain behaviors, one's perspective on the event, and one's level of trust may influence the categorization of the situation as a betrayal. One goal of the present research was to identify which events are considered by most to represent the construct of betrayal. Another is to identify whether these factors do contribute to that decision.

Prototypicality may also be relevant to the nature of one's reaction to incoming information about a negative event. The Appraisal Process Model of Trust suggests that individuals high and low in trust are motivated to seek information that confirms their trusting orientations and discount information that is contrary to their level of trust. Moderately trusting individuals assess each situation to determine their level of

trust. This process is hypothesized to occur when the information suggests that the situation is not highly representative, or prototypical, of betrayal. When a situation is easily recognizable as a betrayal, individuals of all levels of trust should respond negatively to the negative information. The present research seeks to test the theoretical utility of the Appraisal Process Model of trust and the hypothesis that the prototypicality of hypothetical betrayal incidents also effects reactions to the information.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY ONE: OBTAINING EXAMPLES OF BETRAYAL

METHOD

Participants in Study One included 108 college student volunteers (37 males and 71 females) recruited from psychology classes in exchange for nominal course credit. The mean age for the sample was 21.96 years, and most participants were caucasian (93.1%). Data collection consisted of obtaining respondent generated examples of betrayal. The resultant examples of betrayal were rewritten as succinct items to be presented to respondents in Study Two. Specifically, participants were asked to provide demographic information and list as many examples of betrayal as possible in a 15 minute time period. In order to encourage the broadest range of meaning of the term as possible no specific definition of "betrayal" was provided. Instructions also indicated that the instances of betrayal could involve any type of relationship (e.g. romantic relationships, parent-child relationships, friendships, etc.) and could either refer to personal experience or not.

RESULTS

The average number of examples generated by participants was 6.88. The number of responses produced by participants

was not significantly related to age ($r = -0.01$, ns), nor gender [$F(1,105) = 0.05$, ns].

The participant responses also were categorized according to the frequency with which each type of betrayal appeared as an example. The frequency data are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, the most common examples of betrayal elicited by this procedure included cheating in a romantic relationship, lying to a significant other, betraying a confidence, and spreading gossip or rumors about another.

Table 1

Frequencies with which examples of betrayal were obtained in free response.

Kind of Betrayal	Number of Times Listed
Cheating on a romantic partner	108
Lying	92
Breaking a confidence	70
Abandonment	69
Talking bad about someone/gossip	52
Misrepresenting yourself for personal gain	33
Hiding important information	28
Breaking a promise	28
A friend going out with your partner	26
Hypocrisy	24
Not respecting the wishes of others	22
Stealing	20
Not standing up for someone	17
Breaking plans with someone	16

(Table 1 continues)

Table 1 continued.

Kind of Betrayal	Number of Times Listed
Taking advantage of someone	16
Physical or mental abuse	15
Being abandoned by a friend or partner	12
Trying to sabotage or destroy someone's goals	12
Parents getting divorced	10
Leaving a partner for another	7
Not returning borrowed money	6
Going against one's own belief	5
Withholding affection	5
Invading someone's privacy	5
Cheating on a test	5
Turning friends into the authorities	4
A parent putting new spouse ahead of his/her child	4
Failing to recognize achievements	4
Going against parents' wishes or trust	3
Vandalism	2
Sinning against God	2

(Table 1 continues)

Table 1 continued.

Kind of Betrayal	Number of Times Listed
Neglect	2
Praying and getting no response in return	1
Rape	1
Blackmail	1
Racism	1
Someone dies	1
Sexual desires not being met	1
Sending a child to daycare	1
Killing another	1
Abortion	1
Putting one's faults off on another	1

CHAPTER 4

STUDY TWO: PROTOTYPING BETRAYAL

METHOD

The purpose of Study Two was to assess judgements of each of the previously obtained examples' membership in the betrayal category and to explore factors which contribute to the identification of each example as a betrayal.

Construction of Betrayal Items

The examples of betrayal obtained during Study One were used to create a questionnaire to assess the prototypicality of each example. Because the primary interest of the study was to gain a general understanding of betrayal (*i.e.*, independent of the type of relationship in which it occurs) the examples were rewritten in a homogenized form, which whenever possible did not refer to any particular type of relationship. For example, one item which originally read "lying to a friend" was rewritten as "lying to someone," or one which formerly appeared as "not telling your parents something you think they should know" was changed to "not telling someone something important." In addition, past research has indicated that perspective on the incident is important in assessing betrayal. To assess the impact of the reader's perspective on the betrayal, each item was presented

twice: once from the perspective of the victim of a betrayal (i.e., the respondent was instructed to assume that he/she is the person who is being betrayed), and once from the perspective of the perpetrator of the betrayal (i.e., the respondent was instructed to assume that he/she was the person betraying another who is important to him/her). Each illustration of betrayal was rewritten as an item for use in Study Two if it appeared to be a coherent example from each perspective and only if it appeared more-or-less equally applicable to both men and women. The original list of examples resulted in 154 items, however, four items (e.g., "you get pregnant and your boyfriend abandons you") were eliminated because of this restriction resulting in the list of 150 items used in Study Two.

Participants

Participants in Study Two were 128 college students (33 males and 95 females) recruited from psychology classes in exchange for nominal course credit. The mean age for the sample was 21.6 years, and the majority of the sample reported being caucasian (91.4%). Sixty-four percent of the sample reported involvement in a romantic relationship at the time of the study (mean length of relationship = 25.1 months), of which 79.5% were in dating relationships. A majority (80.5%) reported having experienced a painful breakup of a romantic relationship in the past.

Procedure and Materials

Participants completed a questionnaire including demographic questions (e.g., age, relational status, etc.), the Trust Inventory (Couch, Adams, & Jones, 1995; Couch & Jones, 1996), and items generated from example listings of betrayal in Study One. The questionnaires were completed in monitored out-of-class sessions.

The Trust Inventory is a 50-item instrument yielding three scales, each designed to measure a different type of trust. The Partner Trust Scale (20 items) measures feelings of confidence in one's romantic partner or the romantic relationship specifically. The Network Trust Scale (10 items) measures the tendency to trust one's close friends and family members, and the Generalized Trust Scale (20 items) measures the tendency to trust people in general. Each of the scales has demonstrated substantial internal consistency ($\alpha > .87$) and test-retest reliability ($r_s > .74$), and the validity of scale interpretations has been supported by considerable evidence (i.e., appropriate correlations with relational and trait/emotion measures). The scales predict a variety of self-reported and behavioral indices of relational trust (Couch, 1994). Because a variety of relationship types were assessed in Study Two a composite score for trust was computed as the sum of the scores on each of the three scales. All analyses of participant trust were conducted using this total score.

To determine the degree to which ratings of prototypicality varied by perspective, each betrayal example was presented twice, once from the perspective of the victim of the betrayal and once from the perspective of the perpetrator of the betrayal. The order of presentation was counterbalanced so that some participants received the items from the perspective of the victim first and some participants received the items from the perspective of the perpetrator first. Participants were instructed that the term "someone" in the examples referred to a person with whom he/she had an ongoing relationship. They were also instructed that the individual to which this term referred did not have to remain constant for all examples.

Participants were asked to rate how well each of the obtained examples represented the concept of betrayal. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate whether each example represented a betrayal (i.e., yes/no) and to rate the item on a Likert-type rating scale ranging from 1 to 7 verbally anchored at the endpoints by the following descriptions: "1" indicated a very poor example of betrayal; "7" indicated a very good example of a betrayal. In addition to these evaluations, respondents were also asked to rate each item (from 1 to 7) along the following dimensions: (a) the extent to which he/she had encountered this kind of betrayal in his/her life; (b) how serious the example was; and (c) how much they would trust an individual that engaged in the

described behavior.

RESULTS

First, participant responses to the Trust Inventory were assessed in order to create three experimental trust groups for use in later comparisons. Individuals in the upper third of the distribution (i.e., those scoring above 158) served as the high trust group, those in the lower third of the distribution (i.e., those scoring below 145) served as the low trust group, and those in the middle third were labeled the moderate trust group.

Next, responses to each of the items were assessed. Overall, it was found that 40.7% of all responses (including both perspectives) indicated items were betrayals. Average ratings were calculated for participant responses to the rating categories (e.g., representativeness, experience with the situation, etc.) for the betrayal examples. These mean evaluations for both perspectives are presented in Table 2. As can be seen, the betrayal examples presented from the victim's perspective yield average responses which clustered around the middle of the possible range of scores. A series of repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to assess differences between the victim's perspective and the perpetrator's perspective for mean respondent ratings. A significant effect was observed on

Table 2

Mean ratings for various evaluations of betrayal examples from the victim's and the perpetrator's perspectives.

Evaluation	Mean Rating	Mean Rating
	Victim	Perpetrator
Representativeness	3.90	4.12
Seriousness	4.51	4.65
Experience	3.08	2.44
Trust of Other	3.19	3.16

Note: Representativeness = participant rating of how much the example represents what he/she thinks is betrayal (7-point Likert format); Seriousness = the seriousness evaluation of the betrayal example (7-point Likert format); Experience = level of previous experience with a similar situation (7-point Likert format); Trust of Other = rating of how much the participant would trust an individual engaging in the betrayal described by the example (7-point Likert format).

representativeness of betrayal examples [$F(1, 101) = 20.94$, $p < .001$] indicating that examples from the perpetrator's perspective were judged to be more representative of betrayal ($M = 4.12$) than those evaluated from the victim's perspective ($M = 3.90$). A similar difference was observed for seriousness evaluations of the examples as well, $F(1, 96) = 11.68$, $p < .001$. Participants judged examples from the perpetrator's perspective to be more serious betrayals ($M = 4.65$) than examples from the victim's perspective ($M = 4.51$). A significant difference was also observed for the amount of experience participants reported with the examples of betrayal, $F(1, 98) = 75.60$, $p < .001$, such that participants reported less experience with situations described from the perpetrator's perspective ($M = 2.44$) than from the victim's perspective ($M = 3.08$). The difference associated with trust for the other was not significant. Additional analyses of mean evaluations within each of the perspectives are presented below.

Victim's Perspective Analyses

To determine the effect dispositional trust has on perceptions of betrayal, a series of oneway analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed using the various mean evaluations of the examples from the victim's perspective as dependent variables. Trust was operationalized as defined above and significant main effects were further explored with

Tukey's post hoc analyses. In addition, while not the primary goal of Study Two, assumptions of the Appraisal Process Model were also tested. Specifically, it was hypothesized that differences in the variability of evaluations of representativeness and seriousness would be observed between individuals with a moderate level of trust and other individuals. This hypothesis was assessed using a test for homogeneity of variance, the Bartlett-Box F test for significance.

First, a significant effect was observed for trust level on representativeness, $F(2, 110) = 6.68, p < .01$. Those in the high trust group reported that the examples were more representative of betrayal on average ($M = 4.31$) than those in either the moderate trust group ($M = 3.75$) or the low trust group ($M = 3.64$).

The mean rating of experience with the situation described in the example, the mean evaluation of example seriousness, and the mean rating of how much the participant would trust the perpetrator of the betrayals described were also analyzed, but no significant effects for trust were observed from the victim's perspective. No significant differences in variability of responding were observed based on trust level.

Next, the items were analyzed with respect to their endorsement as prototypical vs. nonprototypical betrayals. Percentages of participants including and excluding each item

from the betrayal category were calculated. These percentages were used to divide the items into categories: 1) prototypical betrayal examples, 2) nonprototypical betrayal examples, and 3) ambiguous examples of betrayal. Examples which were endorsed as prototypical by a third (67%) or more of the sample were labeled as prototypical. Items which were endorsed as nonprototypical by 67% or more (i.e., less than 33% reported that the example was a betrayal) of the sample were labeled nonprototypical betrayal examples, and items which were endorsed by less than 67% of the sample as either prototypical or nonprototypical were considered ambiguous. The items from the victim's perspective and their corresponding endorsement percentages are presented by category in Table 3.

Once classification was accomplished, a number of other kinds of analyses were performed for each of the classifications of examples. First, mean evaluations of the examples' representativeness of the betrayal category, the seriousness of the examples, the experience the participant had with the situations described in the examples, and the amount of trust the participant would place in an individual engaging in the incidents described in the examples were calculated. These means are presented in Table 4. Second, factors leading to an example being labeled as betrayal (yes/no) were assessed. Evaluations of each example's membership in the betrayal category were first correlated with

Table 3

Betrayal examples by category and percentages of participant endorsement as betrayal from the victim's perspective

Example	Percent Endorsement
<u>Prototypical Examples</u>	
1. A romantic partner says he/she "loves you" and then goes out with someone else	93.4
2. Someone doesn't keep a secret	88.5
3. Someone appears to be a friend, but talks about you "behind your back"	92.6
6. Someone deceives you for his/her own personal gain	96.7
7. Someone lies to you	88.5
8. Someone "steals" your romantic partner	89.3
9. Someone kills another	77.9
13. Someone breaks the trust that you have in them	96.7
14. Someone has sexual intercourse with the person in whom you are interested	76.2
17. Your parents lie to you about what they are doing	77.9
23. Your romantic partner has an affair	96.7
24. Someone you trust turns against you	96.7
25. You risk your life for someone and he/she lets you down	71.3
26. Your family turns their back on you	94.3
29. Your romantic partner kisses another person	82.8

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
37. Someone spreads lies or rumors about you	92.6
39. Someone intentionally hurts your feelings	88.5
40. Someone mentally abuses you	88.5
41. Someone sexually abuses you	91.0
42. Someone favors one child over another	72.1
43. Someone abandons his/her own child	96.7
51. Someone uses friendship for personal gain	90.2
52. Someone lies about what went on in your relationship with him/her to another	90.2
53. Someone you trust tells a secret that you have told him/her	99.2
54. Someone has sex with your romantic partner	93.4
55. Someone "uses" another for sex	85.2
59. Someone lets his/her friends ridicule you	73.8
61. Someone goes through your personal belongings	87.7
63. Your boss promises you a raise but does not give it to you	73.8
65. Someone intentionally misleads you	93.4
67. Someone lies to you about his/her feelings	78.7
68. Someone you care about intentionally hurts you	96.7

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
71. Someone forces his/her business partner out of the business	85.2
72. Someone makes you look guilty for something he/she really did	94.3
75. Someone goes against his/her word	81.1
77. Someone manipulates you	90.2
78. Someone gossips about you	81.1
83. Someone sabotages your work	91.8
84. Someone is dishonest	80.3
86. Someone takes advantage of your generosity	84.4
89. Someone does not care about his/her child	89.3
91. Someone is not truthful about his/her past	67.2
93. Someone breaks his/her promise to do something	75.4
97. Someone uses his/her family members or friends against on another	86.1
100. Someone steals your credit card	74.6
103. Someone sells defective merchandise	77.9
110. Someone "uses" you for money	93.4
116. Someone pretends to care about you but really doesn't	91.0
120. Someone takes your virginity and then no longer wants to see you	84.4
122. Someone abandons you	93.4
123. Someone threatens you or your family/friends	72.1
124. Someone breaks into your house	74.6

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
126. Someone vandalizes your belongings	76.4
127. Someone hides information from you	68.9
129. Someone spies for another country	77.9
133. Someone doesn't keep a campaign promise	75.4
134. A teacher promises extra credit but does not let you have it	82.8
138. Your romantic partner has an affair with someone to whom you are close	98.4
144. Someone to whom you are close advises your romantic partner to end your relationship	77.9

Nonprototypical Examples

4. Someone makes plans with you and cancels at the last minute	23.0
10. Someone cheats on a diet	18.0
16. Someone "turns you in" to the authorities for committing a crime	31.1
20. Someone changes political parties	5.7
21. Someone participates in under-age drinking	18.0
28. Someone does not believe in him/herself	30.3
31. Someone does not respond to you when you ask him/her something	9.0
33. Someone dates the same person you have previously dated	23.0

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
34. Someone goes home from college and no one wants to visit with him/her	30.3
35. Someone doesn't take your side in an argument	13.9
36. Someone studies for an exam, but fails it	5.7
45. Someone places his/her child up for adoption	23.8
46. Someone favors one friend over another	25.4
48. Someone keeps his/her feelings a secret	25.4
60. Someone remains friends with your ex-partner	8.2
81. Someone is angry	5.7
99. Someone fails to get you a birthday or Christmas present	9.0
102. Someone is self-centered	19.7
107. Someone treats you differently than normal	29.5
111. Someone says that he/she could not recommend you for a job	27.0
112. Someone is snobbish to you	24.6
117. Someone confides in another person rather than you	13.9
118. Someone cannot leave others alone	19.7
121. Someone wants to be a part of your life after he/she has not seen you for a long time	16.4
128. Your parents will not let you get your driver's license at age 16	18.0

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
131. Someone doesn't return your letter	17.2
132. Someone promises to take out the garbage but doesn't	24.6
136. Someone you care about dies	7.4
140. Someone embarrasses you	30.3
141. Someone becomes jealous of you and the things you have	18.0
142. Your romantic partner becomes jealous	24.6
145. Someone plays a trick on you	27.9
146. Someone disagrees with you	7.4
147. Someone to whom you are close has a personality change	17.2
<u>Ambiguous Examples</u>	
5. Someone doesn't believe that you are truthful	43.4
11. Someone betrays his/her belief in God by having a sex change	45.9
12. Someone cheats in school	59.0
15. Your romantic partner holds someone else's hand	50.8
18. Someone of the opposite sex plays with your emotions	63.9
19. Someone "selling out"	59.0
22. You pay for someone else's education and he/she fails out	41.0
27. Someone gives you the answers to an exam	36.9
30. Someone fails to give you proper credit on an exam	42.3

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
32. Someone says that he/she will call, but never do	39.3
38. Someone hits you	54.9
44. Someone does not respect you	49.2
47. Someone keeps a secret from one that is close to him/her	36.9
49. Someone is insecure	35.2
50. Someone is hypocritical	45.1
56. Someone borrows money and never pays it back	64.8
57. Your romantic partner has feelings for someone other than you	64.8
58. Someone flirts with every person that you like	54.1
62. Someone calls you at work in order to make sure that you are there	36.1
64. Someone punishes you for rules that were never made known to you	65.6
66. Someone breaks your confidence in mankind	47.5
69. Someone is present while your romantic partner is cheating on you but fails to stop it	59.0
70. Someone that is addicted to drugs has a child	64.8
73. Someone promises not to drink, but does anyway	64.8
74. Someone interferes with your relationships	63.1
76. Someone makes excuses in an attempt to avoid helping you	54.1

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
79. Someone doubts what you are saying	35.2
80. Someone denies his/her true feelings	47.5
82. Someone commits suicide	53.3
85. Someone is not supportive of something that is important to you	34.4
87. A romantic partner breaks up with you in order to see someone else	57.4
88. Someone fails to tell you an important piece of information in order to protect you	62.3
90. Someone tells his/her friend intimate details about his/her romantic partner	45.1
92. Someone does not discuss important decisions with his/her romantic partner	64.8
94. Someone chooses a romantic partner over friends and family members	50.8
95. Someone lets you down	55.7
96. Someone is not attentive to your feelings	37.7
98. Someone denies the duties of his/her role	58.2
101. Someone testifies against his/her friend or family member in court	36.1
104. Someone doesn't accommodate a physical disability	41.0
105. Someone does not respect the veterans of the Vietnam War	50.8
106. Someone changes his/her opinions in order to fit in	59.8
108. Someone abuses drugs or alcohol	45.1

Table 3 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
109. Someone does not stand up for you in a fight	45.1
113. Someone places work ahead of his/her loved ones	63.9
114. Someone does not stand up for his/her beliefs	65.6
115. Someone charges for something he/she may not be able to deliver	60.7
119. Someone takes your virginity and then no longer wants to see you	38.5
125. Your spouse divorces you	59.8
130. Someone goes against the teachings of his/her religion	58.2
135. Your car is broken down and no one will come to your aid	36.1
137. Someone ended your relationship	43.4
139. Someone does not respect your feelings about a situation	40.8
143. Someone fails to meet his/her responsibilities	60.7
148. Someone withholds affection from you	39.3
149. Someone cheats on a test	59.0
150. Someone borrows your things without asking	54.1

Table 4

Mean ratings for various evaluations of betrayal examples by classification for the victim's perspective

Evaluation	Mean Rating	Mean Rating	Mean Rating
	Prototypical	Nonprototyp.	Ambiguous
Represent	5.23	2.26	3.55
Seriousness	5.54	3.10	4.40
Experience	2.81	3.43	3.04
Trust of Other	2.20	4.56	3.39

Note: Represent = participant rating of how much the example represents what he/she thinks is betrayal (7-point Likert format); Seriousness = the seriousness evaluation of the betrayal example (7-point Likert format); Experience = level of previous experience with a similar situation (7-point Likert format); Trust of Other = rating of how much the participant would trust an individual engaging in the betrayal described by the example (7-point Likert format).

ratings of example representativeness. This procedure was done as a kind of manipulation check to justify the use of representativeness ratings in analyses of factors contributing to the categorization of betrayal. Representativeness ratings were then correlated with ratings of each example's seriousness, the participant's experience with similar situations, and ratings of how much the perpetrator would be trusted for each example. These correlations are presented as Table 5. Finally, for each classification of examples (e.g., prototypical, nonprototypical, and ambiguous examples), mean participant evaluations were assessed through a series of oneway analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to determine the effects of level of trust. The results of these procedures are discussed below for the prototypical, nonprototypical, and ambiguous categories.

Comparing Evaluations for Prototypical, Nonprototypical, and Ambiguous Items from the Victim's Perspective

A series of repeated measures analyses of variance were performed to compare evaluations for each of the three classifications of examples (i.e., means for prototypical, nonprototypical, and ambiguous betrayals as presented in Table 4) from the victim's perspective. Mean representativeness, seriousness, experience, and trust ratings were compared across the three classifications. Significance was evaluated through the use of post hoc pairwise comparisons.

Table 5

Correlations between representativeness evaluations of each example of betrayal and other evaluations by classification from the victim's perspective

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
<u>Prototypical Examples</u>				
1	-.32**	.08	.43**	-.25**
2	-.44**	.04	.65**	-.40**
3	-.45**	-.03	.60**	-.48**
6	-.27**	-.03	.49**	-.33**
7	-.56**	.21*	.64**	-.21*
8	-.55**	.01	.72**	-.22*
9	-.78**	-.04	.27**	-.09
13	-.16	.17	.56**	-.20*
14	-.57**	-.00	.65**	-.48**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
17	-.50**	-.04	.74**	-.47**
23	-.21*	.02	.62**	-.25**
24	-.42**	.07	.52**	-.31**
25	-.67**	.03	.61**	-.48**
26	-.46**	-.14	.47**	-.22*
29	-.51**	-.12	.68**	-.46**
37	-.45**	.05	.56**	-.33**
39	-.47**	.22*	.59**	-.33**
40	-.69**	.21*	.37**	-.03
41	-.64**	.02	.33**	.00
42	-.61**	.09	.50**	-.30**
43	-.58**	-.05	.22*	-.30**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
51	-.52**	-.15	.42**	-.26**
52	-.64**	.05	.64**	-.40**
53	-.33**	.27**	.57**	-.28**
54	-.57**	-.03	.46**	-.25**
55	-.78**	-.07	.60**	.15
59	-.70**	.14	.70**	-.30**
61	-.52**	.28**	.60**	-.18*
63	-.70**	-.02	.63**	-.28**
65	-.45**	.17*	.69**	-.29**
67	-.69**	.13	.58**	-.41**
68	-.41**	.10	.54**	-.41**
71	-.66**	-.03	.66**	-.48**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
72	-.51**	.13	.47**	-.24**
75	-.62**	.26**	.62**	-.38**
77	-.68**	.15	.65**	-.23**
78	-.62**	.09	.78**	-.32**
83	-.63**	-.14	.53**	-.36**
84	-.70**	.19*	.55**	-.24**
86	-.61**	.12	.67**	-.20*
89	-.58**	.04	.36**	-.33**
91	-.28**	.07	.67**	-.41**
93	-.63**	.29**	.67**	-.40**
97	-.61**	.10	.58**	-.39**
100	-.62**	.11	.37**	-.22*

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
103	-.64**	.05	.89**	-.32**
110	-.37**	.08	.65**	-.38**
116	-.53**	.08	.70**	-.46**
120	-.72**	-.01	.63**	-.42**
122	-.52**	-.08	.48**	-.41**
123	-.79**	.11	.27**	-.19*
124	-.79**	.16	.25**	-.08
126	-.68**	.01	.37**	-.17
127	-.69**	.10	.63**	-.46**
129	-.60**	-.06	.58**	-.49**
133	-.60**	-.12	.61**	-.30**
134	-.52**	-.10	.61**	-.31**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
138	-.03	-.21*	.68**	-.33**
144	-.56**	-.07	.76**	-.53**
<u>Nonprototypical Examples</u>				
4	-.54**	.05	.65**	-.58**
10	-.46**	-.11	.67**	-.47**
16	-.66**	-.11	.42**	-.35**
20	-.25**	.18*	.39**	-.51**
21	-.55**	-.11	.53**	-.44**
28	-.68**	.12	.24**	-.18*
31	-.62**	-.20*	.51**	-.28**
33	-.65**	-.09	.63**	-.33**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
34	-.65**	.13	.60**	-.38**
35	-.63**	-.23**	.60**	-.36**
36	-.41**	-.09	.35**	-.19*
45	-.63**	.15	.45**	-.40**
46	-.67**	.07	.58**	-.33**
48	-.63**	.01	.45**	-.04
60	-.64**	.07	.57**	-.37**
81	-.29**	-.14	.36**	-.40**
99	-.45**	-.09	.49**	-.40**
102	-.63**	.04	.50**	-.28**
107	-.70**	.01	.49**	-.14
111	-.71**	.10	.57**	-.41**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
112	-.70**	.01	.57**	-.21*
117	-.56**	.03	.60**	-.20*
118	-.66**	.09	.57**	-.34**
121	-.65**	.10	.40**	-.31**
128	-.60**	.09	.55**	-.44**
131	-.64**	.09	.57**	-.33**
132	-.62**	-.04	.63**	-.41**
136	-.55**	.13	-.04	-.31**
140	-.63**	-.03	.55**	-.30**
141	-.54**	.28**	.45**	-.14
142	-.69**	.04	.47**	-.32**
145	-.74**	-.21*	.68**	-.50**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
146	-.42**	-.22*	.47**	-.39**
147	-.59**	.08	.37**	-.27**
<u>Ambiguous Examples</u>				
5	-.74**	.17	.55**	-.35**
11	-.77**	-.00	.69**	-.52**
12	-.67**	.07	.52**	-.39**
15	-.62**	-.14	.74**	-.53**
18	-.73**	.17	.68**	-.42**
19	-.71**	.22*	.70**	-.41**
22	-.71**	.12	.53**	-.12
27	-.61**	-.12	.38**	-.28**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
30	-.73**	.18	.36**	-.31**
32	-.70**	.11	.71**	-.32**
38	-.74**	.12	.46**	-.15
44	-.76**	.09	.60**	-.35**
47	-.75**	-.07	.62**	-.45**
49	-.60**	.18*	.54**	-.32**
50	-.79**	.14	.65**	-.40**
56	-.73**	.21*	.64**	-.25**
57	-.68**	.07	.79**	-.54**
58	-.70**	.25**	.70**	-.21*
62	-.73**	.12	.73**	-.49**
64	-.79**	.27**	.63**	-.35**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
66	-.77**	.22*	.56**	-.40**
69	-.64**	.13	.65**	-.42**
70	-.74**	.11	.25**	-.30**
73	-.74**	.08	.67**	-.28**
74	-.74**	.27**	.63***	-.39**
76	-.71**	.14	.73**	-.38**
79	-.74**	.17	.57**	-.42**
80	-.71**	.14	.56**	-.25**
82	-.73**	.01	.31**	-.45**
85	-.64**	.11	.50**	-.23**
87	-.69**	.04	.69**	-.50**
88	-.67**	.12	.68**	-.63**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
90	-.57**	-.17	.74**	-.51**
92	-.76**	.05	.58**	-.41**
94	-.75**	-.02	.62**	-.40**
95	-.72**	.13	.70**	-.33**
96	-.78**	.00	.46**	-.27**
98	-.71**	.19*	.69**	-.41**
101	-.69**	.03	.47**	-.41**
104	-.76**	.27**	.47**	-.34**
105	-.72**	.30**	.59**	-.31**
106	-.69**	.35**	.58**	-.36**
108	-.73**	-.05	.31**	-.30**
109	-.69**	.15	.78**	-.47**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
113	-.70**	.11	.55**	-.19*
114	-.70**	.15	.55**	-.36**
115	-.61**	.07	.55**	-.32**
119	-.71**	.05	.51**	-.25**
125	-.76**	.19*	.45**	-.37**
130	-.76**	-.05	.70**	-.46**
135	-.64**	.06	.37**	-.32**
137	-.70**	-.13	.53**	-.35**
139	-.68**	.04	.55**	-.32**
143	-.62**	.13	.42**	-.23**
148	-.77**	.09	.65**	-.43**
149	-.64**	-.17	.56**	-.44**

(Table 5 continues)

Table 5 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
150	-.64**	.20*	.54**	-.35**

Notes: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; Betrayal classification = yes/no response as to whether example was a betrayal (point-biserial correlations); Experience = evaluation of the extent to which the described situation has been experienced by the participant; Seriousness = evaluation of the seriousness of the betrayal example; Trust of Perp. = the amount of trust the participant would place in an individual engaging in the described betrayal.

Significant differences were observed for mean evaluation of representativeness, $F(2, 220) = 632.05, p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that prototypical examples were judged to be more representative of betrayal than either nonprototypical or ambiguous examples of betrayal. Ambiguous examples were also judged to be more representative of betrayal than nonprototypical examples.

Significant differences were also observed for mean evaluation of seriousness, $F(2, 210) = 678.14, p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that prototypical examples of betrayal examples were judged to be more serious than either nonprototypical or ambiguous examples of betrayal. Ambiguous betrayals were also judged to be more serious than nonprototypical examples.

Significant differences were observed for mean experience with betrayals, $F(2, 212) = 66.53, p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that prototypical examples of betrayal examples were experienced less often than either nonprototypical or ambiguous examples of betrayal. Ambiguous examples of betrayals were also experienced less often than nonprototypical examples.

Finally, significant differences were observed for mean trust in the perpetrator, $F(2, 200) = 434.66, p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that participants would trust those engaging in the described activities less than those engaging in behaviors described by nonprototypical or ambiguous

betrayal examples. Participants also indicated that perpetrators of ambiguous betrayals would be trusted less than perpetrators described in nonprototypical examples.

Prototypical Examples of Betrayal

Fifty-nine (39%) of the examples derived from Study One were classified as prototypical examples of betrayals. Examples from the victim's perspective which were identified as prototypical examples of betrayal were first assessed to determine which factors contributed to prototypicality.

Correlational analyses

Correlations between each example's representativeness of the betrayal category ratings and other evaluations (including the prototypicality judgement) for the prototypical examples were examined (see Table 5). Point-biserial correlations revealed that all of the prototypical examples of betrayal except two were negatively related to judgement of inclusion in the betrayal category. The two items which were not related were "Your partner has an affair with someone with whom you are close," and "Someone breaks the trust that you have in them." As was expected, these correlations indicate that items which are judged to be prototypical were also rated as more representative of the betrayal category. This finding, then, supports the use of representativeness ratings in assessing other factors which may be related to the categorization of betrayal.

Representativeness evaluations for all of the items in

the prototypical classification were also found to be significantly positively related to ratings of seriousness. In addition, representativeness ratings for most of the prototypical examples were unrelated to previous experience with the situation described in the example. Ten of these examples, however, did reach significance (9 positive relationships and one negative relationships were observed). These items had in common a theme of intent. The items either dealt with dishonesty, breaking a promise, or being intentionally cruel to the victim (e.g., "someone lies to you," "someone you trust tells a secret that you have told him/her in confidence," or "someone mentally abuses you").

Finally, representativeness evaluations for all but six of the prototypical examples of betrayal were significantly negatively related to the amount of trust the participant would place in an individual engaging in the behavior described by the example. Interestingly among the six where no relationship was observed, the examples referred to fairly dramatic illegal activities (e.g., "someone breaking into your house" and "someone killing another").

Analysis of trust level

In order to determine what effect the participant's trust level has on perceptions of betrayal, mean ratings for the various evaluation categories were then subjected to oneway analyses of variance (ANOVA) by level of trust (low, moderate, high). Hypotheses based on the Appraisal Process Model of

trust suggest that individuals with moderate levels of trust should be the most variable group in terms of responding. A test of variability of responses for each of the three trust groups on the representativeness evaluation revealed significant differences, Bartlett-Box $F = 3.461$, $p < .05$. In contrast to predictions, moderate trust individuals showed significantly less variability in representativeness responses than individuals high or low in trust. Because the analysis of variance procedure is robust, however, this difference is not great enough to disrupt the analysis of variance procedure (Box, 1954 as cited in Howell, 1992).

An effect for trust level was observed for the average representativeness evaluation, $F(2, 120) = 4.03$, $p < .05$. Individuals high in trust reported that on average prototypical betrayals were significantly more representative ($M = 5.55$) than individuals low in trust ($M = 5.00$). Individuals with a moderate level of trust did not differ significantly ($M = 5.12$) from the other two groups. No other differences in the other ratings of each example were observed to reach significance.

Nonprototypical Examples of Betrayal

Thirty-five (23.3%) examples were selected as nonprototypical examples of betrayal. These examples were then assessed to determine which factors were associated with categorization.

Correlational analyses

Correlations between representativeness ratings and other evaluations were assessed for each the nonprototypical examples of betrayal as a kind of manipulation check for the later use of representativeness ratings. Point-biserial correlations between mean ratings of representativeness and the assessment of each example's inclusion in the betrayal category revealed consistent negative relationships for all of the nonprototypical examples. This finding indicates that those items which were judged as not belonging to the betrayal category were also judged to be less representative of the betrayal construct.

Correlations for the nonprototypical betrayals also revealed that betrayal representativeness ratings for most of the items were unrelated to previous experience with the situations described in the examples. However, correlations for six of the items did reach significance. Of these items, representativeness for 2 was positively related to experience. These items were "someone changes political parties" and "someone becoming jealous of you." Representativeness was negatively related to experience for 4 examples ("someone playing a trick on you," "someone disagreeing with you," "someone not responding to you when you ask the a question," and "someone failing to take your side in an argument").

Evaluations of seriousness for the nonprototypical examples of betrayal were also found to be significantly

related to evaluations of representativeness. This was the case in all but one example ("someone you care about dies").

Finally, evaluations of representativeness for the nonprototypical examples were significantly negatively associated with the amount of trust the individual would place in the perpetrator of the betrayals described. Participants reported that they would trust perpetrators of nonprototypical betrayal examples less when the example better represented betrayal. This negative relationship was observed for all but three examples. These three included "someone keeping his/her feelings a secret," "someone treating you differently than normal," and "someone becoming jealous of you."

Analysis of trust level

The various mean evaluation ratings for the nonprototypical examples were then subjected to oneway analyses of variance (ANOVAs) by trust. A significant effect was observed for trust level on the average seriousness evaluations of nonprototypical examples, $F(2, 121) = 3.91$, $p < .05$. Those with a high level of trust indicated that the nonprototypical betrayals were more serious ($M = 3.39$) than those with a low level of trust ($M = 2.90$). The moderate trust group ($M = 3.00$) was not significantly different from either of the other two groups on the seriousness evaluations. A significant effect was also observed for the mean representativeness of betrayal evaluation, $F(2, 121) = 8.05$, $p < .001$. Those with high trust reported that the

nonprototypical examples of betrayal were significantly more representative of betrayal ($M = 2.73$) than those with either moderate ($M = 2.08$) or low levels of trust ($M = 1.97$). No significance for level of trust was observed for experience with the betrayal situations nor how much participants would trust the perpetrators in the nonprototypical examples. No significant differences between trust levels were observed for variability of evaluations on any of the nonprototypical examples.

Ambiguous Examples of Betrayal

The ambiguous examples of betrayal from the victim's perspective were then assessed. Fifty-six (37.3%) items were considered ambiguous examples. Mean values for each of the evaluation categories for ambiguous betrayals from the victim's perspective (see Table 4) were similar to those generated for the entire list of examples. These ratings were close to the midpoint using the 7-point evaluation format.

Correlational analyses

Correlations between the evaluations of representativeness of the betrayal category and other evaluations of each example were assessed for the ambiguous examples. Again, to verify the utility of the later usage of representativeness ratings in assessing betrayal categorization, point-biserial correlations were performed between the ratings and betrayal classifications. Point-biserial correlations for all of these examples revealed that

ambiguous betrayals were also judged to be more representative of the betrayal construct.

Representativeness evaluations were found to be positively related to evaluations of example seriousness in all of the ambiguous examples of betrayal. Among the ambiguous examples, mean representativeness evaluations for 13 were also found to be positively related to experience with the situations described in the betrayal examples. These examples have in common themes of failing to be responsible, failing to hold to values espoused by society, and dealing with others unfairly (e.g., "someone borrows money and never pays it back," "someone changes his/her opinions in order to fit in," or "someone punishes you for rules that were never made known to you").

Finally, evaluations of representativeness for each of the ambiguous examples were negatively related to evaluations of the amount of trust one would place in the perpetrator. Correlations for only two examples failed to display this relationship ("you pay for someone's college education and he/she fails out" and "someone hits you").

Analysis of trust level

Mean ratings for the various evaluation categories for ambiguous examples of betrayal were then subjected to oneway analyses of variance (ANOVAs) by trust to determine what effects level of trust has on perceptions of ambiguous betrayal events. A main effect was observed for trust level

on the representativeness of the betrayal examples, $F(2, 112) = 5.89, p < .01$. Those with a high level of trust indicated that the ambiguous examples of betrayal were more representative of betrayal ($M = 4.01$) than those with a moderate ($M = 3.36$) or low level of trust ($M = 3.25$). No other comparisons of trust level for the ambiguous examples reached significance. No significant differences were observed between levels of trust for variability on any evaluations.

Perpetrator's Perspective Analysis

To assess the effects of participant level of trust (e.g., low, moderate, high) on perceptions of betrayal, a series of oneway analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed using the various overall mean evaluations from the perpetrator's perspective as dependent variables. Significant differences were evaluated using Tukey's post hoc analysis.

The mean evaluation of experience with each betrayal from the perpetrator's perspective was subjected to the ANOVA procedure. A significant effect was observed for trust, $F(2, 108) = 4.04, p < .05$. Those in the high trust group reported more experience with the betrayal examples ($M = 2.80$) than those with low trust ($M = 2.26$). Those with moderate trust did not differ significantly from the other groups.

The mean evaluations of seriousness, representativeness, and trust of the perpetrator of the betrayals described were

also analyzed using a oneway analysis of variance of procedure. No significant effects for level of trust were observed from the perpetrator's perspective, and no significant differences between groups were observed for variability in responding.

Next, the betrayal examples from the perpetrator's perspective were assessed to determine classification (*i.e.*, prototypical, nonprototypical, and ambiguous items). The criteria described above were used in order to classify items. The items from the perpetrator's perspective, as well as percentages of endorsement and classification for each example are presented in Table 6.

Comparing Evaluations of Prototypical, Nonprototypical, and Ambiguous Examples from the Perpetrator's Perspective

Once this goal was accomplished, a number of other kinds of analyses were performed. First, the calculation of mean evaluations of the examples' representativeness of the betrayal category, the seriousness of the examples, the amount of experience the participant had with the situations described in the examples, and the amount of trust the participant would place in an individual engaging in the incidents described in the examples were calculated. These means are presented in Table 7.

A series of repeated measures analyses of variance were performed to compare evaluations for each of the three classifications of examples (*i.e.*, means for prototypical,

Table 6

Betrayal examples by category and percentages of participant endorsement as betrayal from the perpetrator's perspective

Example	Percent Endorsement
<u>Prototypical Examples</u>	
1. You tell your romantic partner that you love him/her and then go out with someone else	94.3
2. You don't keep someone's secret	86.9
3. You appear to be someone's friend, but talk about him/her "behind his/her back"	90.2
6. You deceive someone for your own personal gain	91.8
7. You lie to someone	86.1
8. You "steal" someone's romantic partner	86.1
9. You kill someone	79.5
13. You break the trust that someone has in you	96.7
14. You have sexual intercourse with the person in whom someone you are close to is interested	88.5
17. You lie to your parents about what you are doing	76.2
18. You play with the emotions of someone of the opposite sex	72.1
23. You have an affair on your romantic partner	95.1
24. You turn against someone who trusts you	90.2 73.8
25. Someone risks his/her life for you and you let him/her down	

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
26. You turn your back on your family	91.0
29. You kiss another while dating someone	78.7
30. You do not give proper credit when grading someone's exam	68.9
37. You spread lies or rumors about someone	87.7
39. You intentionally hurt someone's feelings	87.7
40. You mentally abuse someone	90.2
41. You sexually abuse someone	93.4
42. You favor one child over another	73.0
43. You abandon your own children	93.4
51. You use a friendship for personal gain	92.6
52. You lie about what went on in your relationship with another to someone	83.6
53. You tell a secret of someone who trusts you	91.8
54. You have sex with someone's romantic partner	95.9
55. You "use" another for sex	
56. You borrow money and never pay it back	85.2
58. You flirt with every person that someone to whom you are close likes	71.3
59. You let your friends ridicule someone	68.0
61. You go through someone's personal belongings	67.2
63. You promise to give someone a raise but do not give it to him/her	84.4
64. You punish someone for rules that were never made known to him/her	79.5
	74.6

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
65. You intentionally mislead someone	89.3
68. You intentionally hurt someone you care about	95.1
70. You are addicted to drugs and have a child	73.8
71. You force your business partner out of the business	84.4
72. You make someone look guilty for something you really did	88.5
75. You go against your word	83.6
77. You manipulate someone	83.6
78. You gossip about someone	77.9
83. You sabotage someone's work	91.0
84. You are dishonest	81.1
86. You take advantage of someone's generosity	82.0
89. You do not care about your child	94.3
91. You are not truthful about your past	67.2
93. You break your promise to do something	71.3
97. You use your family members or friends against each other	87.7
100. You steal someone's credit card	81.1
103. You sell defective merchandise	79.5
110. You "use" someone for money	87.7
114. You do not stand up for your beliefs	72.1
116. You pretend to care about someone, but really don't	88.5
120. You take someone's virginity and then no longer want to see him/her	84.4
122. You abandon someone	91.0

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
123. You threaten someone or his/her friends/family	75.4
124. You break into someone's house	81.1
126. You vandalize someone's belongings	85.2
129. You spy for another country	82.0
133. You don't keep a campaign promise	75.4
134. As a teacher you promise extra credit but do not let your students have it	80.3
138. You have an affair with someone to whom your romantic partner is close	96.7

Nonprototypical Examples

5. You don't believe someone is truthful	26.2
10. You cheat on a diet	20.5
16. You "turn someone in" to the authorities for committing a crime	22.1
20. You change political parties	7.4
21. You participate in under-age drinking	24.6
31. You do not respond to someone when he/she asks you something	11.5
34. Someone comes home from college and you do not want to visit with him/her	22.1
35. You don't take someone's side in an argument	9.0
36. You study for an exam, but fail it	15.6
46. You favor one friend over another	26.2
48. You keep your feelings a secret	25.4
60. You remain friends with someone's ex-partner	7.4

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
79. You doubt what someone is saying	26.2
81. You are angry	4.9
99. You fail to get someone a birthday or Christmas present	14.8
102. You are self-centered	30.3
111. You say that you could not recommend someone for a job	21.3
117. You confide in another person rather than someone to whom you are close	23.8
118. You cannot leave others alone	24.6
121. You want to be part of someone's life after you have not seen him/her for a long time	17.2
128. You will not let your child get his/her driver's license at age 16	18.9
131. You don't return someone's letter	17.2
132. You promise to take out the garbage but don't	20.5
136. You die and leave someone you care about	9.0
137. You end your relationship with someone	22.1
141. You become jealous of someone and what he/she has	23.8
142. You become jealous in your romantic relationship	29.5
145. You play a trick on someone	29.5
146. You disagree with someone	4.1
147. You have a personality change	18.9

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
<u>Ambiguous Examples</u>	
4. You make plans with someone and then cancel at the last minute	37.7
11. You betray your belief in God by having a sex change	56.6
12. You cheat in school	57.4
15. You hold hands with someone while dating another	54.9
19. You "sell out"	65.6
22. Someone pays for your college education and you fail out	56.6
27. You give someone the answers to an exam	48.4
28. You don't believe in yourself	44.3
32. You say that you will call someone but never do	34.4
33. You date the same person that someone to whom you are close has previously dated	33.6
38. You hit someone	55.7
44. You do not respect someone	47.5
45. You place your child for adoption	38.5
47. You keep a secret from one that is close to you	36.9
49. You are insecure	40.2
50. You are hypocritical	47.5
57. You have feelings for someone other than your romantic partner	63.1
62. You call someone at work in order to make sure that he/she is there	33.6

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
66. You break someone's confidence in mankind	50.8
67. You lie to someone about your feelings	66.4
69. You are present while someone's romantic partner is cheating on him/her but fail to stop it	65.6
73. You promise not to drink, but do anyway	58.2
74. You interfere with someone's relationships	62.3
76. You make excuses in an attempt to avoid helping someone	56.6
80. You deny your true feelings	46.7
82. You commit suicide	56.6
85. You are not supportive of something that is important to someone	41.8
87. You break up with your romantic partner in order to see someone else	51.6
88. You fail to tell an important piece of information in order to protect someone	59.8
90. You tell your friend intimate details about your romantic partner	55.7
92. You do not discuss important decisions with your romantic partner	63.9
94. You choose a romantic partner over friends and family members	56.6
95. You let someone down	59.0
96. You are not attentive to someone's feelings	46.7

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
98. You deny the duties of your role	62.3
101. You testify against your friend or family member in court	41.8
104. You don't accommodate a physical disability	50.8
105. You do not respect the veterans of the Vietnam War	54.1
106. You change your opinions to fit in	59.8
107. You treat someone differently than normal	34.4
108. You abuse drugs or alcohol	45.9
109. You do not stand up for someone in a fight	50.8
112. You are snobbish to someone	37.7
113. You place work ahead of your loved ones	63.9
115. You charge for something you may not be able to deliver	66.4
119. You tell someone that you do not care about him/her	39.3
125. You divorce your spouse	57.4
127. You hide information from someone	64.8
130. You go against the teachings of your religion	66.4
135. Someone's car is broken down and you fail to come to his/her aid	43.4
139. You do not respect someone's feelings about a situation	58.2
140. You embarrass someone	38.5
143. You fail to meet your responsibilities	59.8

Table 6 (continued).

Example	Percent Endorsement
144. You advise the partner of someone to whom you are close to end his/her relationship	59.8
148. You withhold affection from someone	35.2
149. You cheat on a test	64.8
150. You borrow someone's things without asking	62.3

Table 7

Mean ratings for various evaluations of betrayal examples by classification for the perpetrator's perspective

Evaluation	Mean Rating	Mean Rating	Mean Rating
	Prototypical	Nonprototyp.	Ambiguous
Represent	5.19	2.32	3.73
Seriousness	5.50	3.11	4.39
Experience	2.14	3.11	2.51
Trust of Other	2.25	4.63	3.43

Note: Represent = participant rating of how much the example represents what he/she thinks is betrayal (7-point Likert format); Seriousness = the seriousness evaluation of the betrayal example (7-point Likert format); Experience = level of previous experience with a similar situation (7-point Likert format); Trust of Other = rating of how much the participant would trust an individual engaging in the betrayal described by the example (7-point Likert format).

nonprototypical, and ambiguous examples of betrayal) from the perpetrator's perspective. Mean representativeness, seriousness, experience, and trust evaluations were compared across the three classifications. Subsequent analyses of significance were evaluated by post hoc pairwise comparisons.

Significant differences were observed for mean evaluations of betrayal representativeness, $F(2, 216) = 432.46$, $p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that prototypical examples of betrayal examples were judged to be more representative of betrayal than either nonprototypical examples or ambiguous examples of betrayal. Ambiguous examples of betrayals were also judged to be more representative of betrayal than nonprototypical examples.

Significant differences were observed for the mean evaluations of seriousness of the examples of betrayal, $F(2, 216) = 511.94$, $p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that prototypical examples of betrayal examples were judged to be more serious than either nonprototypical examples or ambiguous examples of betrayal. Ambiguous examples of betrayals were also judged to be more serious than nonprototypical examples.

Furthermore, differences were observed for experience with the betrayal, $F(2, 216) = 122.76$, $p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that prototypical examples of betrayal had been experienced less often than either nonprototypical examples or ambiguous examples of betrayal. Ambiguous examples of betrayals were also experienced less often than

nonprototypical examples.

Finally, significant differences were observed for the amount of trust participants would place in individuals engaging in activities described in the betrayal examples, $F(2,210) = 330.49, p < .001$. Post hoc analyses revealed that participants would trust those engaging in activities described in the prototypical examples of betrayal less than those engaging in behaviors described by nonprototypical examples or ambiguous examples of betrayal. Participants indicated that perpetrators of betrayal described by ambiguous examples would be trusted less than perpetrators described by nonprototypical examples, as well.

Next, other analyses were conducted for each of the classifications of examples. These included: 1) correlations between the representativeness evaluation and other evaluations for each example were calculated (these values are presented in Table 8); and 2) for each classification of examples, mean participant evaluations were assessed through a series of oneway analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to determine the effects of participant level of trust. Results for each classification are presented below.

Prototypical Examples of Betrayal

From the perpetrator's perspective, sixty-three items (42%) were classified as prototypical examples of betrayal. Examples from this classification were first assessed to determine which factors contribute to prototypicality

Table 8

Correlations between representativeness evaluations of each betrayal example and other evaluations by classification from the perpetrator's perspective

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
<u>Prototypical Betrayals</u>				
1	-.48**	-.21*	.65**	-.38**
2	-.50**	-.15	.56**	-.19*
3	-.41**	-.18*	.60**	-.19*
6	-.51**	-.27**	.51**	-.47**
7	-.67**	-.09	.61**	-.35**
8	-.65**	-.14	.64**	-.26**
9	-.74**	-.40**	.36**	-.39**
13	-.35**	-.13	.66**	-.40**
14	-.53**	-.26**	.72**	-.36**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
17	-.63**	-.06	.64**	-.43**
18	-.60**	-.01	.68**	-.45**
23	-.54**	-.08	.71**	-.39**
24	-.55**	-.03	.75**	-.39**
25	-.60**	-.01	.67**	-.39**
26	-.63**	-.27**	.54**	-.32*
29	-.63**	-.26**	.77**	-.59**
30	-.71**	-.09	.53**	-.42**
37	-.62**	-.41**	.66**	-.46**
39	-.53**	-.15	.55**	-.51**
40	-.59**	-.22*	.46**	-.19*
41	-.57**	-.27**	.51**	-.25**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
42	-.63**	-.22*	.59**	-.34**
43	-.51**	-.32**	.59**	-.41**
51	-.32**	-.15	.59**	-.38**
52	-.49**	.01	.68**	-.46**
53	-.49**	-.10	.65**	-.35**
54	-.51**	-.27**	.61**	-.27**
55	-.58**	-.29**	.62**	-.43 **
56	-.72**	-.09	.65**	-.37**
58	-.73**	-.12	.74**	-.48**
59	-.70**	.01	.62**	-.35**
61	-.64**	-.13	.70**	-.27**
63	-.62**	-.02	.62**	-.38**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
64	-.74**	-.07	.58**	-.44**
65	-.61**	-.20*	.73**	-.50**
68	-.46**	-.16	.49**	-.24**
70	-.71**	-.05	.34**	-.45**
71	-.69**	-.16	.65**	-.58**
72	-.58**	-.13	.56**	-.36**
75	-.58**	.01	.60**	-.43**
77	-.65**	-.21*	.57**	-.35**
78	-.51**	-.16	.60**	-.41**
83	-.59**	-.06	.52**	-.37**
84	-.61**	-.04	.56**	-.27**
86	-.60**	.00	.57**	-.22*

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
89	-.53**	-.22*	.47**	-.44**
91	-.65**	-.02	.49**	-.46**
93	-.50**	.11	.59**	-.34**
97	-.57**	-.07	.52**	-.43**
100	-.63**	-.13	.46**	-.23**
103	-.34**	-.08	.56**	-.27**
110	-.45**	-.12	.46**	-.31**
114	-.67**	-.09	.50**	-.43**
116	-.45**	-.19*	.44**	-.25**
120	-.68**	-.21*	.69**	-.57**
122	-.56**	-.31**	.59**	-.42**
123	-.72**	-.07	.56**	-.18*

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
124	-.69**	-.07	.26**	-.10
126	-.61**	-.12	.40**	-.31**
129	-.65**	-.14	.66**	-.62**
133	-.66**	-.05	.67**	-.46**
134	-.55**	-.02	.67**	-.27**
138	-.45**	-.41**	.66**	-.40**
<u>Nonprototypical Examples</u>				
5	-.56**	-.06	.37**	-.21*
10	-.47**	-.14	.59**	-.43**
16	-.56**	.16	.34**	-.56**
20	-.35**	.21*	.57**	-.40**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
21	-.76**	-.12	.50**	-.44**
31	-.51**	-.11	.55**	-.31**
34	-.61**	.06	.65**	-.40**
35	-.56**	-.29**	.53**	-.43**
36	-.58**	.10	.31**	-.18*
46	-.67**	-.05	.46**	-.36**
48	-.61**	-.10	.52**	-.49**
60	-.40**	-.06	.57**	-.42**
79	-.68**	-.02	.50**	-.43**
81	-.32**	-.05	.30**	-.23**
99	-.55**	-.10	.35**	-.40**
102	-.67**	.07	.50**	-.35**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
111	-.54**	.15	.49**	-.36**
117	-.58**	-.04	.62**	-.35**
118	-.50**	.26**	.53**	-.27**
121	-.67**	-.01	.27**	-.35**
128	-.48**	.19*	.56**	-.47**
131	-.51**	.06	.69**	-.45**
132	-.63**	-.09	.68**	-.37**
136	-.45**	.30**	.10	-.37**
137	-.71**	-.17	.41**	-.33**
141	-.63**	.09	.53**	-.28**
142	-.64**	.24**	.57**	-.26**
145	-.72**	-.24**	.72**	-.56**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
146	-.41**	-.30**	.48**	-.23*
147	-.60**	-.07	.51**	-.38**
<u>Ambiguous Examples</u>				
4	-.74**	-.05	.60**	-.45**
11	-.79**	-.01	.82**	-.62**
12	-.61**	-.19*	.59**	-.43**
15	-.67**	-.20*	.80**	-.53**
19	-.62**	.13	.75**	-.43**
22	-.63**	-.14	.46**	-.59**
27	-.61**	-.08	.56**	-.48**
28	-.69**	.01	.45**	-.42**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
32	-.68**	.02	.70**	-.33**
33	-.67**	-.09	.60**	-.57**
38	-.72**	-.12	.41**	-.36**
44	-.75**	-.10	.62**	-.43**
45	-.59**	.01	.41**	-.58**
47	-.76**	-.13	.63**	-.54**
49	-.64**	-.03	.53**	-.42**
50	-.77**	-.10	.65**	-.41**
57	-.60**	-.14	.71**	-.54**
62	-.63**	.03	.61**	-.36**
66	-.80**	-.03	.63**	-.50**
67	-.63**	-.02	.60**	-.46**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
69	-.69**	-.00	.66**	-.43**
73	-.76**	-.19*	.60**	-.32**
74	-.74**	.01	.64***	-.34**
76	-.73**	.11	.67**	-.46**
80	-.61**	-.09	.54**	-.43**
82	-.79**	-.04	.36**	-.52**
85	-.71**	.01	.55**	-.49**
87	-.74**	-.21*	.62**	-.39**
88	-.67**	-.06	.53**	-.55**
90	-.71**	-.27**	.63**	-.53**
92	-.71**	-.07	.58**	-.30**
94	-.72**	-.19*	.58**	-.44**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
95	-.68**	-.04	.67**	-.43**
96	-.68**	-.07	.54**	-.40**
98	-.60**	.09	.56**	-.44**
101	-.68**	.06	.47**	-.46**
104	-.65**	.05	.46**	-.44**
105	-.73**	.12	.53**	-.26**
106	-.70**	.08	.55**	-.47**
107	-.66**	-.01	.52**	-.36**
108	-.67**	.02	.40**	-.44**
109	-.61**	-.07	.61**	-.43**
112	-.62**	.03	.57**	-.40**
113	-.65**	-.04	.52**	-.26**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
115	-.58**	.02	.54**	-.28**
119	-.70**	-.06	.48**	-.40**
125	-.63**	-.05	.54**	-.35**
127	-.69**	.11	.51**	-.28**
130	-.68**	-.33**	.67**	-.49**
135	-.62**	-.08	.62**	-.29**
139	-.71**	-.34**	.66**	-.55**
140	-.65**	-.12	.64**	-.42**
143	-.67**	-.05	.46**	-.30**
144	-.69**	-.33**	.63**	-.58**
148	-.64**	-.31**	.47**	-.47**
149	-.74**	-.30**	.62**	-.49**

(Table 8 continues)

Table 8 (continued).

Example #	Betrayal Classification	Experience	Seriousness	Trust of Perp.
150	-.68**	-.21*	.61**	-.35**

Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; Betrayal classification = yes/no response as to whether example was a betrayal (point-biserial correlations); Experience = evaluation of the extent to which the described situation has been experienced by the participant; Seriousness = evaluation of the seriousness of the betrayal example; Trust of Perp. = the amount of trust the participant would place in an individual engaging in the described betrayal.

decisions.

Correlational analyses

Correlations between ratings of each example's representativeness of the betrayal category and other evaluations (including the prototypicality judgement) for the prototypical examples were examined (see Table 8). As a kind of manipulation check to ensure representativeness ratings closely resemble categorization of an example as betrayal, point-biserial correlations between representativeness and classification were performed. Point-biserial correlations revealed that all of the prototypical examples of betrayal were significantly and negatively related to judgements of inclusion in the betrayal category. As was expected, these correlations indicate that items which are judged to be prototypical were also rated as more representative of the betrayal category. Ratings of representativeness were then used to assess the contribution of other factors.

Representativeness evaluations for all of the items in the prototypical classification were found to be significantly related to ratings of seriousness. In addition, representativeness evaluations for most of the prototypical examples were unrelated to previous experience with the situation described in the example. However, 21 of these correlations did reach significance and in every such instance the relationship was negative. One theme these examples had in common was intent, and another was the selfish disregard

for the feelings of others to whom one is close (e.g., "you have sexual intercourse with the person someone with whom you are close is interested" or "you deceive someone for your own personal gain"). Another theme which was observed was that a subset of these examples were situations that are presumably infrequent occurrences for most people (e.g., "you kill someone" or "you do not care about your child").

Finally, representativeness evaluations of the prototypical examples of betrayal were negatively related to the amount of trust the participant would place in an individual engaging in the behavior described by the example. This was true for all of the prototypical betrayals from the perpetrator's perspective except one ("you break into someone's house").

Analysis of trust level

Mean evaluations for the prototypical examples of betrayal were then subjected to a series of analyses of variance by trust (e.g., low, moderate, high). As would be expected based on the Appraisal Process Model of trust, a test of variability of responses for each of the three trust groups on the representativeness evaluation revealed significant differences, Bartlett-Box $F = 4.87$, $p < .01$, however the differences were not in the expected pattern. Moderate trust individuals showed significantly less variability in representativeness responses than individuals high or low in trust. Box (1954 as cited in Howell, 1992) suggests that this

result is not, however, great enough to disregard the effects observed using the analysis of variance procedure.

Using this procedure to assess the differences due to level of trust a significant effect was observed for experience with the described situations, $F(2, 117) = 5.14$, $p < .01$. Those with a high level of trust indicated that they had significantly more experience with these betrayals ($M = 2.52$) than those with moderate ($M = 2.03$) or low trust ($M = 1.87$). A significant effect was also observed for the amount of trust that the participant would place in an individual engaging in the betrayal, $F(2, 115) = 3.88$, $p < .05$. Those with a moderate level of trust reported that they would place more trust in the individual ($M = 2.47$) than did those with low levels of trust ($M = 1.98$). Individuals with a high level of trust ($M = 2.31$) did not differ significantly from the other groups. Comparisons for evaluations of seriousness and representativeness failed to reach significance.

Nonprototypical Examples of Betrayal

Thirty items (20%) were classified as nonprototypical examples of betrayal from the perpetrator's perspective. Nonprototypical examples were then assessed to determine which factors were related to categorization.

Correlational analyses

Correlations between representativeness evaluations and other evaluations were assessed for the nonprototypical examples of betrayal. Point-biserial correlations between

ratings of representativeness and the assessment of each example's inclusion in the betrayal category revealed consistent negative relationships for the nonprototypical examples. This finding indicates that those items which were judged as not belonging to the betrayal category were also judged to be less representative of the betrayal construct. This further justifies the use of representativeness ratings to determine relationships with other factors.

Correlations for the nonprototypical examples of betrayal from the perpetrator's perspective revealed that representativeness evaluations for most of the items were unrelated to previous experience with the situations described in the examples. However, correlations for eight of the items were significant. Three of these items exhibited negative relationships, including "you don't take someone's side in an argument," "you play a trick on someone," and "you disagree with someone." The other five showed positive relationships with representativeness, and included "you change political parties," "you cannot leave others alone," "you will not let your child get his/her driver's license at age 16," "you die and leave someone you care about," and "you become jealous in your romantic relationship."

Evaluations of seriousness for the nonprototypical betrayals were also found to be significantly (positively) related to evaluations of representativeness. This was the case in all but one example (*i.e.*, "you die and leave someone

you care about").

Finally, evaluations of representativeness for the nonprototypical examples were significantly and negatively associated with the amount of trust the individual would place in the perpetrator of the betrayals described. Participants reported that they would trust perpetrator's of nonprototypical betrayals less when the example was a better representative of the betrayal category. These relationships were observed for all nonprototypical betrayals.

Analysis of trust level

Differences in mean evaluations for the nonprototypical items were compared in a series of oneway ANOVAs by trust level (e.g., low, moderate, high). A significant effect for level of trust was observed for the representativeness evaluations, $F(2, 122) = 8.21, p < .001$. Those with high trust rated the nonprototypical examples as more representative ($M = 2.84$) than did individuals with moderate ($M = 2.17$) or low trust ($M = 1.99$). No other significant results for level of trust were observed and no significant differences in variability of responses were observed.

Ambiguous Examples of Betrayal

Fifty-eight (38.7%) of the items were classified as ambiguous examples of betrayals. Ambiguous examples were then assessed to determine which factors were related to categorization.

Correlational analyses

Representativeness evaluations and other evaluations were compared for the ambiguous items. Point-biserial correlations revealed that items judged to be betrayals were also judged to be more representative of the betrayal construct. Representativeness ratings were then used to assess the contribution of other factors.

Representativeness evaluations were found to be positively related to evaluations of example seriousness for all of the ambiguous betrayals. Among the ambiguous examples, representativeness evaluations for only 12 were found to be negatively related to experience with the situations described in the betrayal examples. These examples have in common failing to live up to the established values of society (e.g., "you go against the teachings of your religion" or "you cheat on a test"). This result is in contrast to the findings concerning experience with ambiguous examples of betrayal from the victim's perspective where those relationships which were observed were positive.

Finally, evaluations of representativeness were negatively related to evaluations of the amount of trust one would place in the perpetrator described in the examples. These relationships were observed for all of the ambiguous examples of betrayal from the perpetrator's perspective.

Analysis of trust level

Mean evaluations of the ambiguous items were then

subjected to a series of oneway analyses by three levels of trust. Significant effects were observed for the representativeness [$F(2, 111) = 4.44, p < .01$] and experience with situations described by the ambiguous examples [$F(2, 111) = 3.48, p < .05$]. Those with high trust reported the ambiguous items to be more representative ($M = 4.16$) than did those in the moderate ($M = 3.48$) or low ($M = 3.56$) trust groups. Those with high trust also reported more experience with the situations ($M = 2.83$) than those with low trust ($M = 2.26$). Moderate trust individuals did not differ significantly from the other groups on past experience with these situations. No effects for level of trust were observed for example seriousness or trust in one who would engage in the described activities, and no significant differences were observed in variability of responding.

DISCUSSION

Results from Study Two provided information concerning the nature of conceptualization of betrayal. Perhaps most importantly there was variability in responses concerning the categorization of betrayal. Not all events which met the definitional criteria of betrayal (*i.e.*, violation of expectation, trust, or commitment) were judged equally to be betrayals by participants. Similarly, judgements of the examples of betrayal on a number of dimensions reflected different impressions of the various situations by

participants.

Categorization of the various betrayal examples was accomplished based on endorsements of each example as belonging to the betrayal category. Those reported to belong to the category by the majority of the sample were classified as prototypical betrayals and those which were reported by the majority of the sample as not belonging to the betrayal category were classified as nonprototypical betrayals. Finally, examples which failed to meet these criteria were labeled as ambiguous examples of betrayal.

Zadeh (1965) argued that fuzzy concepts consisted of members which belonged to the category to a greater or lesser degree. All of the examples which were assessed in Study Two were generated when the construct was originally invoked - in other words, for someone the examples were representative of the construct. However, the fact that there was not complete agreement among participants regarding the prototypicality of various examples and there were ambiguous examples is offered as support for the hypothesis that betrayal is a fuzzy concept and has graded structure, or one in which category membership is roughly based on a continuum.

Next, from the perspectives of both the victim and perpetrator, ratings of example representativeness were evaluated to determine what factors were associated with categorization decisions. In both cases the evaluations of each example's representativeness of the betrayal category

were strongly related to participant decisions about whether the example belonged to the category. These evaluations also provided information concerning the ambiguity of the boundaries for the concept. Less than complete agreement was observed in representativeness evaluations. This is important to note in that analyses based on ratings of construct representativeness provide more detailed and valuable information about the complexities concerning the ways in which betrayal is perceived. In essence, ratings of representativeness can be used as a more precise indication of one's endorsement of the example as a member of the betrayal category. In fact, for both perspectives comparisons suggested that prototypical examples were the most representative of betrayal and nonprototypical examples were the least representative. The observed variability in representativeness ratings also provides further support for the idea that, as Barsalou (1987) suggested is the case for many concepts, betrayal operates as a graded structure.

Also of note, a significant difference was observed between ratings of example representativeness from the victim's perspective and from the perpetrator's perspective. The betrayal literature supports the idea that conceptions of betrayal are more dramatic when viewed from the victim's perspective and a self-serving bias in describing and responding to betrayals has often been observed. When the threat of betrayal is hypothesized, the self-serving tendency

should be to view the example of betrayal from the victim's perspective as representing the construct and the example from the perpetrator's perspective as less representative. This, however, was not observed. Examples from the perpetrator's perspective were judged to be more representative of the construct of betrayal. It is possible that participants were responding to social desirability. It is morally responsible for one to realize the potential harm he/she could do by engaging in the described behaviors and feel badly about it. Of course, that does not mean that one wouldn't regard examples that threaten his/her life as a victim of betrayal as significant as well, but perhaps the greater self-serving tendency in this case is to be morally desirable so that others will think well of him/her.

Several factors which had been suggested by previous research (Ashcraft, 1978; Barsalou; 1985; Medin & Smith, 1981) were assessed to determine if each contributed to the judgements of betrayal representativeness. The factors included how serious or threatening the incident would be to a relationship, how much experience the participant had with the situations described by the examples, and how much he/she would trust someone engaging in the behavior which was described. In addition, the participant's level of trust was also considered as a factor which was potentially related to decisions about the meaning of betrayal.

Across both the victim's and perpetrator's perspectives,

it is clear that judgements of seriousness were strongly related to judgements of category representativeness. Those that were judged to be serious betrayals were also judged to be highly representative of the betrayal construct. Prototypical examples were judged to be most serious and nonprototypical examples were judged to be least serious from both perspectives. In fact, the observed relationships were sufficiently strong that one could question whether seriousness and representativeness judgements are analogous.

Also, similar to the discussion of representativeness above, an interesting finding emerged regarding perspective differences for judgements of seriousness. Examples from the perpetrator's perspective were viewed as more serious than examples from the victim's perspective. This is in contrast to what has previously been suggested (e.g., Couch 1996; Jones & Burdette, 1994). The seriousness of actual events (betrayal narratives) described by others has been judged in past research to be greater when told from the perspective of the victim than when from the perspective of a perpetrator. It is unclear whether the use of hypothetical stimuli is somehow different from the other kinds of data (based on self-reported betrayal experiences) which have been evaluated in the past. The latter descriptions are often quite detailed when told from the victim's perspective as opposed to the perpetrator's, however. Perhaps the lack of detail in the present stimuli has provided a means of balancing the impact of such

additional information.

The findings of the study are less clear with regard to participant experience with the various situations described by the examples. In the literature the findings have been mixed as well but, for purposes of this research it was hypothesized that experience or familiarity with a situation would lead to higher ratings of category representativeness. For both perspectives, participants reported the least experience with prototypical examples of betrayal and the most experience with nonprototypical examples of betrayal. This is not surprising considering that the prototypical examples of betrayal are fairly dramatic and serious occurrences, however this clearly does not support the hypothesis. Other differences were observed between judgements made from the victim's perspective and the perpetrator's perspective when evaluating individual examples. In most cases, results supported the earlier finding by Malt and Smith (1982) that experience was unrelated to evaluations of example representativeness. However, in some cases ratings of how representative the examples were of betrayal were related to the extent to which the participant had experienced the situation. More of these relationships were observed when participants evaluated examples from the perpetrator's perspective, especially for the prototypical betrayals. From the victim's perspective, more significant relationships were observed with experience for nonprototypical examples than for

prototypical or ambiguous examples. Other overall perspective differences were also observed. Consistent with the self-serving tendency discussed in the betrayal literature, individuals reported less experience with situations in which they imagined themselves as the perpetrator than with situations from the victim's perspective.

Representativeness was also found to be associated with the amount of trust one would place in an individual engaging in the situations described by the betrayal examples. For both perspectives, participants reported that they would trust perpetrators of the described events less when the betrayal was evaluated as representative of betrayal. These results are not surprising and are consistent with earlier research on trust and betrayal. Interestingly, this was even true when the evaluation was made regarding a behavior in which the participants imagined themselves engaging (from the perpetrator's perspective). In other words, the participants reported that they would trust themselves (the perpetrator) less when they engaged in prototypical betrayals than if they engaged in other kinds of betrayals.

Finally, participant level of trust was found to be related to the various evaluations of the betrayal examples. Whereas the purpose of these analyses was to offer some assessment of trust's impact on decision making regarding relationally threatening information, the results also provide an opportunity to investigate the predictions of the Appraisal

Process Model. First, results indicate that there were individual differences in the way betrayal is perceived related to participant level of trust. For all items from the victim's perspective participant trust level was related to representativeness evaluations. Those with high trust were most likely to view examples as betrayals. In addition, high trusting individuals were more likely to view nonprototypical betrayals as more serious than individuals with low trust.

These findings are not consistent with the predictions of the Appraisal Process Model which suggests the individuals with high trust should be attempting to view events with impressions that allow them to maintain their positive outlook on relational events. However, if one accepts the developmental explanations for trust he/she might assume that low trust individuals may have had many bad experiences in their relational histories, thereby leading to the development of their lower level of trust. It seems plausible that individuals low in trust might view examples as being less representative of the betrayal construct because they have endured many such serious events. This view is consistent with an adaptation level approach which would suggest that an increased level of experience with a phenomenon desensitizes an individual to its effects. However, no differences in experience with betrayal situations based on level of trust were observed to support this idea.

From the perpetrator's perspective, trust level was not

found to be related to representativeness ratings when all examples were considered, but was associated with the level of prior experience with situations described in the betrayal examples. Those with high trust reported greater experience as the perpetrators of the described betrayals than did low trust individuals, failing again to offer support for the adaptation level explanation of the phenomena. And, in addition to failing to support this approach, these findings run contrary to previous work on betrayal that suggests high trust individuals are less likely to report betraying others (Couch, 1994; Couch & Jones, 1996).

When considering only nonprototypical or ambiguous examples of betrayal those with high trust found the examples to be more representative of betrayal than did other participants. The valence of these responses is, again, not supportive of the Appraisal Process Model.

Finally, variability in representativeness and seriousness evaluations was observed. The Appraisal Process Model of trust suggests that as a group high trust individuals should be fairly certain about how to respond to negative information that is coming in to the individuals - they should see the information as less threatening. Similarly, the low trust individuals should also respond in fairly similar way - they should see the information as threatening. Individuals with moderate levels of trust, however, should respond with the greatest variability because as a group they should be the

least certain of their feelings concerning relational information. Some differences were observed in variability of responses, but they do not follow the patterns suggested by the model. Instead, when responding to prototypical betrayals from both perspectives the group of individuals with moderate levels of trust were observed to evaluate the representativeness of the betrayal examples with less variability than either the high trust or low trust groups. Although differences were expected based on the hypothesized addition to the Appraisal Process Model of trust, no significant differences in variability were observed when considering nonprototypical or ambiguous examples of betrayal or when assessing seriousness evaluations. The predictions of the Appraisal Process Model would appear not to be supported in this case as well, however, the fundamental assumption of the model deals with the certainty orientation of individuals in the various levels of trust. These assumptions were not directly tested in Study Two, so further research is required to fully assess the model's utility.

Taken together the results from Study Two suggest several conclusions. First, as Barsalou (1987) suggests betrayal operates as a graded structure. Second, it is also likely a fuzzy concept. Some agreement among participants about the classification of examples as betrayal suggested that some examples were prototypical betrayals, whereas others were nonprototypical examples. Other examples were not easily

classified. Third, evaluations of representativeness of examples provided an indication of how individuals made decisions concerning the membership of various situations to the betrayal category, regardless of whether examples were judged from the perspective of the victim or perpetrator of betrayal. These evaluations varied depending on whether prototypical, nonprototypical, or ambiguous betrayals were assessed, and were strongly related to evaluations of the situations' seriousness, the amount of trust one would place in perpetrators of the betrayals. Representativeness evaluations were not usually related to the extent to which the rater had experienced the described situations.

Evaluations of seriousness, experience with described situations, and amount of trust that would be placed in perpetrators of the described betrayals also varied depending on whether prototypical, nonprototypical, or ambiguous examples were being judged. As Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem (1976) have suggested with regard to other constructs, these factors (*i.e.*, seriousness and trust of the perpetrator) seemed to be common features of betrayal, but none were necessary and sufficient to cause a situation to be labeled as betrayal for every individual. It is likely the case, as suggested by Barsalou (1987), that no one factor is responsible for the prototyping effects observed here. It is unclear whether other factors which were not assessed here also contributed to decision making about betrayal, and

further study is required.

Finally, participant level of trust was related to evaluations of betrayal examples, as well. The differences that were observed between high, moderate, and low trust groups depended on whether prototypical, nonprototypical, or ambiguous examples were judged, and failed to support the general predictions of the Appraisal Process model. The fundamental assumption of the model concerning the certainty orientation of each group was not, however, tested in Study Two. A test of this assumption, as well as further confirmation of the findings in Study Two are needed to determine the utility of the model.

CHAPTER 5

STUDY THREE: TESTING THE APPRAISAL PROCESS MODEL

METHOD

The purpose of Study Three is to test the Appraisal Process Model of trust. Participants in Study Three completed two questionnaires separated by a six week interval. Five hundred sixty-one college students (195 males and 366 females) recruited from undergraduate psychology courses completed the first questionnaire in out-of-class sessions in exchange for nominal course credit. The mean age for the sample was 22.7 years, and the majority of the sample were white (91.1%). Nearly 69 percent of the sample reported involvement in a romantic relationship at the time of first participation in Study Three (mean length of relationship = 30.8 months), of which 86.1% were in dating relationships. Four hundred and seventy of these participants completed the second questionnaire.

Materials

The first questionnaire included demographic questions (e.g., age, relational status, etc.), the Trust Inventory (described earlier), and the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale (IBS; Jones & Burdette, 1994). The IBS is a 30-item measure of the tendency to betray one's friends and family members (15

items) and the corresponding perception of having been betrayed by one's relational partners (15 items). Research has supported the internal reliability of the scales (alphas > .75), and the validity of scale interpretations was suggested by inverse correlations with measures of morality and direct correlations with alternative measures of relationship betrayal and conflict, self-labeling (e.g., contemptuous, envious, cynical, exploitive, jealous, etc.), and measures of harm-doing within the family (Carver & Jones, 1993) and within the social network (Jones & Burdette, 1994). Also some evidence of discriminant validity has been reported (e.g., betrayal scores are only moderately related to scores on measures of antisocial personality).

The second questionnaire was completed six weeks later and consisted of hypothetical betrayal vignettes generated from the items in Study Two, each followed by several questions concerning the participants' reactions to the story. These questions included a goodness of example rating (prototypicality) of the vignette using a 5-point Likert-type format with verbal anchoring at the endpoints by the following descriptions: "1" indicates a very poor example of betrayal; "5" indicates a very good example of a betrayal. This rating is referred to as a rating of vignette representativeness.

In addition, participants were presented with questions concerning the severity of the betrayal (i.e., a rating of how threatening the event would be to their relationship with the

individual identified in the vignette; 3 items) and the certainty with which the participant responded to each of the items following the vignette (3 items). These items were also rated using a 5-point Likert-type format with verbal anchors at the endpoints ("1" indicated not at all, and "5" indicated very much).

Participants were also asked to complete the Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard, 1972) after reading each betrayal vignette indicating the emotions they experienced as they imagined being the victim of the described incident. The DES is a widely used 30-item measure of state emotion. The DES asks the individual to rate on a single five-point intensity scale the extent to which each word describes the way he/she felt at the time they imagined the event in the vignette (e.g., 1 = not at all; 5 = very much). The DES yields ten scores, each corresponding to an emotion: 1) interest, 2) enjoyment, 3) surprise, 4) distress, 5) anger, 6) disgust, 7) contempt, 8) fear, 9) shame/shyness, and 10) guilt. The DES is based on a circumplex model of emotion and is described as reflecting the full range of emotional experience.

Construction of Vignettes

Six of the examples of betrayal from the previous study were selected for further use in testing the Appraisal Process Model of trust. Because the Appraisal Process Model of trust predicts only one's reactions to information he/she might

receive as a possible victim of betrayal, the other perspective (*i.e.*, the perspective of the perpetrator of the betrayal) was not considered in this study. Three highly prototypical betrayal vignettes and three less prototypical vignettes (all from the victim's perspective) were written. Three criteria were used to select highly prototypical examples from Study Two for use in this study: 1) a high percentage of agreement as to the example's representativeness (*i.e.*, more than 90% of participants agreed that the example was a betrayal); 2) the frequency with which individuals experienced such an event (*i.e.*, a high mean rating of familiarity/experience with the example); 3) the ease with which the item appeared to represent a coherent example of betrayal in various relationships (*i.e.*, friendships, family relationships, and romantic relationships). The highly prototypical examples which were selected included the themes of revealing a confidence, abandonment, and gossiping/spreading rumors. Table 9 presents all of the items, expanded into vignettes, which were selected from examples meeting these criteria.

Three items were also selected to represent less prototypical examples of betrayal. Similar criteria were utilized in selecting these items, however because items classified as nonprototypical received little agreement as to the examples' membership into the betrayal category, examples of less prototypical betrayals were chosen from among the

Table 9

Vignettes chosen for use in Study Three with respective percentages of endorsement and mean ratings of experience with the described situation

Highly Prototypical Vignettes

1. You have confided in your romantic partner (friend/family member) with a very personal piece of information that you expected him/her not to tell anyone. Unfortunately, he/she tells at least one other person that you know of, and may have told more, despite the fact that he/she promised never to do so. It is however, unclear what his/her motives were in telling the information.

endorsement as betrayal in Study Two = 99.2%
mean rating of experience = 3.81

2. You learn that a romantic partner (friend/family member) has been telling people that you both know well something about you that is not true in order to avoid making him/herself look bad.

endorsement as betrayal in Study Two = 94.3%
mean rating of experience = 2.40

3. You have developed what seems to you to be a strong relationship with your romantic partner (friend/family member). Then you learn that he/she has left you and did not give you any way to contact him/her, or any indication that he/she wanted to talk to you or see you.

endorsement as betrayal in Study Two = 93.4%
mean rating of experience = 2.25

(Table 9 continues)

Table 9 (continued).

Less Prototypical Vignettes

4. You agreed to leave a note for your romantic partner (friend/family member) containing information about where he/she should meet you and a group of people later that evening. The note was left but was misplaced before your romantic partner (friend/family member) found it. You have been trying to convince him/her that you did leave the note. Even though you claim otherwise, he/she does not believe that you are indeed being truthful.

endorsement as betrayal in Study Two = 43.4%
mean rating of experience = 2.85

5. You need some help with a class assignment. When you contact your romantic partner (friend/family member) for help, he/she tells you that he/she is too busy because he/she has his/her own work to do. You later learn that he/she has not done the work.

endorsement as betrayal in Study Two = 54.1%
mean rating of experience = 3.48

6. While you are out one evening with a group of people you and your romantic partner (friend/family member) know reasonably well, you get into an argument with a member of the group. Your romantic partner (friend/family member) fails to stand up for you in the argument, and instead remains silent.

endorsement as betrayal in Study Two = 45.1%
mean rating of experience = 2.76

(Table 9 continues)

Table 9 (continued).

Note: Percentage of endorsement values refer to the percentage of participants in Study Two who agreed that the situation was a betrayal.

Note: Ratings of experience with the described situation were from Study Two and were made using a 7-point Likert-type format verbally anchored at the endpoints by the following: "1" referred to no experience, and "7" referred to very much experience.

ambiguous betrayal items. These items were not completely ruled out by most participants as betrayals, but were not selected as the best examples either. The three less prototypical items which were selected from the ambiguous examples of betrayal (*i.e.*, items that at between 37% to 67% of participants agreed were betrayals), also met the other criteria listed above. The three less prototypical items (see Table 9) were about a partner not believing truthful statements, failing to help, and failing to stand up for the individual in a social situation.

RESULTS

Data obtained from the first questionnaire in Study Three was used to classify subjects into high, moderate, and low trusting categories for the purpose of creating experimental groups. Although the Trust Inventory yields three scores, each specific to a type of relationship, participants were classified into a trust category based on a composite score from the entire Inventory. This score was used because a variety of relationships were assessed. The composite score was calculated by summing the partner trust, network trust, and generalized trust scale scores. The mean score on the Trust Inventory composite for this sample was 184.84 ($sd = 28.96$). High trust individuals were those scoring in the upper third of the sample distribution, low trust individuals were those scoring in the lower third of the sample

distribution, and moderate trusting individuals were those scoring in the middle third. Classification revealed that 186 of the subjects were high trust, 186 were low trust, and 189 were classified as having a moderate level of trust.

Based on this classification into trust categories, the second questionnaires were assembled such that individuals within each level of trust would receive various combinations of vignettes. Members of each of the three trust groups (i.e., high moderate, and low) were presented with the six vignettes (three highly prototypical and three less prototypical) in counterbalanced order with relationship to the perpetrator varied within each questionnaire. In other words, within the high trust group some participants received the vignette concerning abandonment by a friend whereas others received the same story about a romantic partner or a family member. The same was true for the low and moderate trust groups. This procedure allowed for the global assessment of betrayal, independent of one's relationship to the perpetrator. The result was a 3 x 2 (trust x prototypicality) mixed factorial design constructed to test the Appraisal Process Model of trust. All post hoc analyses were performed using the Wilks criteria.

Representativeness of Betrayal

First, a manipulation check was performed by analyzing the representatives ratings of the vignettes. Ratings of

representativeness for the three highly prototypical vignettes were averaged, and the three ratings for the less prototypical vignettes were averaged. These means were compared and a main effect was found for prototypicality, $F(1, 412) = 307.78, p < .001$. When responding to vignettes that were previously judged to be prototypical individual's ratings for representativeness of the betrayal were significantly higher ($M = 4.16$) than when responding to less prototypical vignettes ($M = 3.12$). Trust level was not observed to be related to ratings of vignette representativeness.

Seriousness of Betrayal

Next, three items designed to measure the subject's seriousness of the betrayal (e.g., "How serious do you think that this event is?" "How threatening do you think this event would be to your relationship with you friend/family member/romantic partner?" and "How difficult would this event make continuing the relationship with your friend/family member/romantic partner?") were summed. The resulting seriousness scale proved to be reliable across all vignettes ($\alpha = .9132$).

Then the seriousness ratings of the three highly prototypical vignettes were averaged, and the three ratings of the less prototypical vignettes were averaged. The means were then compared. A significant main effect was observed for prototypicality [$F(1, 412) = 336.15, p < .001$]. When

individuals responded to a highly prototypical vignette, they reported that the betrayal was more serious ($M = 11.23$) than when responding to less prototypical vignettes ($M = 7.89$). No other effects were observed to reach significance.

Certainty

In order to test whether participants with varying levels of trust differed in the certainty of their judgements, ratings of three items were combined (*i.e.*, "How sure are you about the feelings you described concerning this relational event?," "How certain are you about whether you would want to maintain the relationship with this person after this event occurred?," and "How comfortable are you with the ratings you have given concerning this situation?"). The resulting scale initially yielded a coefficient alpha of only .5213 across all the vignettes. Based on inter-item correlations for each of the items, the item regarding maintenance of the relationship after the betrayal was eliminated. The resulting certainty evaluation scale proved reliable ($\alpha = .8051$).

Ratings of certainty in responding for the three highly prototypical vignettes were averaged, and the process was repeated for the three less prototypical vignette ratings. These means were then used as the dependent variable in a 2 x 3 mixed design (trust x prototypicality). A significant effect was observed for prototypicality [$F(1, 408) = 6.31, p < .05$]. When responding to highly prototypical vignettes

individuals reported that they were more certain of their responses ($\bar{M} = 8.45$) than when responding to less prototypical vignettes ($\bar{M} = 8.33$).

Because the Appraisal Process model is based on certainty differences surrounding levels of trust, it was hypothesized that the various trust groups would respond with differential variability to the items concerning certainty. This difference was tested using homogeneity of variance tests through the analysis of variance procedure. For each of the groups of vignettes (highly prototypical versus less prototypical), responses were variable among the three trust groups, but none of the Bartlett-Box F s were large enough to cause the results of the analysis of variance procedure to be questioned (Box, 1954; Wilcox, 1996). For example, the Bartlett-Box F for the highly prototypical vignettes was 5.87, $p < .01$, and the variability within the less prototypical vignettes was also significant [$F = 3.60$, $p < .05$]. Interestingly, these tests show that variability of certainty ratings is greater within highly prototypical vignettes than in less prototypical vignettes. Overall, a significant difference was observed for variability of responding among the three levels of trust, Bartlett-Box $F = 2.45$, $p < .05$. The average variability for the low trust group was the largest ($sd = 1.214$), and variability in responding was the least among the moderate trust group ($sd = 0.957$). The high trust group was more variable in certainty responses than the

moderate trust group, but less so than the high trust group ($sd = 0.985$).

Emotional Responses to Betrayal

A 2 x 3 analysis of variance procedure (prototypicality x trust level) was performed for each of the scales of the Differential Emotion Scales. These scales included the emotions of interest, enjoyment, surprise, distress, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, guilt, and shame/shyness. No significant interactions between the independent variables were observed for level of trust but comparisons for prototypicality, and in some cases level of trust level, resulted in significant effects.

A main effect for prototypicality was found on the interest emotion [$F(1, 392) = 33.96, p < .001$] such that prototypical vignettes yielded greater feelings of interest ($M = 8.81$) than less prototypical vignettes ($M = 8.12$). No other main effects or interactions were observed for the interest emotion. A main effect for prototypicality was also observed on enjoyment, $F(1, 394) = 25.59, p < .001$. Prototypical vignettes yielded less enjoyment ($M = 3.43$) than less prototypical vignettes ($M = 3.74$). A main effect was observed for prototypicality on the surprise emotion [$F(1, 393) = 160.17, p < .001$] where participants responding to highly prototypical vignettes reported more surprise ($M = 11.29$) than when responding to less prototypical vignettes ($M = 9.34$).

Interestingly, an effect was also observed for level of trust for the surprise emotion, $F(2, 393) = 3.43, p < .05$. Individuals high in trust reported greater surprise ($M = 10.65$) than those with moderate ($M = 10.29$) or low levels of trust ($M = 9.93$). No other effects were observed for surprise.

A main effect was observed on the distress emotion for prototypicality, $F(1, 392) = 236.50, p < .001$. Participants responding to a highly prototypical vignettes reported significantly greater distress ($M = 11.52$) than when responding to less prototypical vignettes ($M = 9.15$). All other comparisons failed to reach significance. A significant main effect was also observed for prototypicality on anger [$F(1, 392) = 241.68, p < .001$]. Specifically, anger was greater in response to prototypical vignettes ($M = 11.44$) as compared to less prototypical vignettes ($M = 8.72$).

A main effect was found on disgust for prototypicality [$F(1, 393) = 219.39, p < .001$] such that highly prototypical vignettes resulted in greater disgust ($M = 9.64$) than less prototypical vignettes ($M = 7.28$). A main effect on contempt was also observed for prototypicality [$F(1, 390) = 196.68, p < .001$] such that highly prototypical vignettes were associated with greater contempt ($M = 8.60$) than less prototypical vignettes ($M = 6.59$). A main effect was observed for prototypicality on fear [$F(1, 394) = 187.76, p < .001$] where responding to highly prototypical vignettes produced

greater fear ($\bar{M} = 6.65$) than responding to less prototypical vignettes ($\bar{M} = 4.97$). No other significant main effects or interactions reached significance.

A significant effect was observed for prototypicality on the shame/shyness emotion, $F(1, 392) = 30.81, p < .001$, where individuals reported greater shame/shyness when responding to highly prototypical betrayal situations ($\bar{M} = 4.63$) than when responding to less prototypical events ($\bar{M} = 4.21$). Shame/shyness was also found to be related to participant level of trust, $F(2, 392) = 3.28, p < .05$. Individuals with high levels of trust reported lesser feelings of shame/shyness ($\bar{M} = 4.16$) than did individuals with moderate ($\bar{M} = 4.58$) or low levels of trust ($\bar{M} = 4.59$). The interaction between trust and prototypicality failed to reach significance for shame/shyness.

Finally, a significant effect was also observed for prototypicality on guilt [$F(1, 391) = 9.40, p < .01$] where participants responding to highly prototypical vignettes reported more guilt ($\bar{M} = 4.92$) than when responding to less prototypical vignettes ($\bar{M} = 4.67$). Interestingly, an effect was also observed for participant level of trust on guilt. Individuals with high levels of trust reported less feelings of guilt ($\bar{M} = 4.49$) than individuals with either low ($\bar{M} = 4.98$) or moderate levels of trust ($\bar{M} = 4.93$). No other comparisons reached significance.

Plausibility

Each participant was asked to decide whether the vignette he/she had read and to which he/she had responded seemed like an event that would likely be experienced in his/her own life; that is plausibility. For each of the vignettes, an independent groups t-test analysis was performed comparing scores on the Trust Inventory for plausibility versus nonplausibility ratings.

Significant differences were found on plausibility for all of the high prototypical vignettes. For breaking a confidence, a significant effect was observed, $t(433) = -4.40$, $p < .001$, with participants for whom this betrayal seemed like a plausible occurrence yielding lower scores on trust ($M = 178.57$) than those who did not believe their relational partner would break a confidence ($M = 190.90$). For gossiping, a significant effect was also observed, $t(436) = -4.31$, $p < .001$. Participants for whom this betrayal seemed like a plausible occurrence scored lower on trust ($M = 174.64$) than those who did not believe their relational partner would gossip about them ($M = 189.09$). And, for abandonment, a significant effect was observed, $t(430) = -3.78$, $p < .001$, with participants for whom this betrayal seemed a plausible occurrence yielding lower scores on trust ($M = 176.67$) than those who did not believe their relational partner would abandon them ($M = 188.90$).

Significant differences on plausibility were also found

for all of the less prototypical vignettes. For the vignette about a partner not believing what was said, a significant effect was observed, $t(420) = -3.57$, $p < .001$, with participants for whom this betrayal seemed a plausible occurrence scoring lower on trust ($M = 180.30$) than those who did not believe their relational partner would fail to believe them ($M = 190.44$). For a partner failing to help, a significant effect was also observed, $t(423) = -2.19$, $p < .05$. Participants for whom this betrayal seemed like a plausible occurrence scored significantly lower on trust ($M = 182.89$) than those who did not believe their relational partner would fail to help them ($M = 190.44$). And, for the vignette concerning a partner failing to stand up for the participant in an argument with others, a significant effect was observed, $t(424) = -4.99$, $p < .001$, with participants for whom this betrayal seemed a plausible occurrence scoring significantly lower on trust ($M = 179.82$) than those who did not believe their relational partner would fail to stand up for them ($M = 193.66$).

Interpersonal Betrayal Scale

Finally, the subscales of the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale were correlated with responses to each of the vignettes. Specifically, the subscale measuring the frequency with which the participant was the victim of common betrayals (betrayal of self subscale) and the subscale measuring the frequency

with which the participant was the perpetrator of common betrayals (betrayal of others subscale) were each correlated with evaluations of vignette representativeness of betrayal, seriousness, and certainty of responding. Correlations are presented as Table 10. As can be seen, no significant relationships were observed between the betrayal of self subscale and evaluations of the vignettes. Only four significant relationships were observed between the betrayal of others subscale and evaluations of the vignettes. These findings showed that greater frequency with betraying important others was significantly related to certainty of responding for the stories about a relational partner gossiping about the participant, failing to believe the participant, failing to help the participant, and failing to stand up for the participant.

Evaluations of emotional reactions to each of the betrayal vignettes were also correlated with the subscales of the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale. For ease of comparison, average correlations were calculated for prototypical vs. less prototypical vignettes, as well as for the entire set of vignettes. Average correlations were obtained by first converting each Pearson r to Fisher's z , calculating the mean and re-converting to r . These average correlations are presented in Table 11. As can be seen, when responding to prototypical betrayal vignettes those with greater experience being the victim of betrayal reported more disgust, fear and

Table 10

Correlations between the subscales of the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale and evaluations of the betrayal vignettes

Evaluation	Vignette	IBS-SELF	IBS-OTHER
Representativeness	1	.03	.02
	2	.02	.05
	3	.03	.03
	4	.05	-.01
	5	.07	.06
	6	.01	.02
Seriousness	1	.01	-.00
	2	.05	.08
	3	.07	.04
	4	.06	.04
	5	.05	.05
	6	-.00	.01
Certainty	1	-.04	-.09
	2	-.00	-.10*
	3	-.04	-.06
	4	-.02	-.25**
	5	.00	-.15**
	6	-.06	-.12*

Note : * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; IBS-SELF = betrayal of self subscale of the IBS; IBS-OTHER = betrayal of other subscale of the IBS; Vignette 1 = breaking a confidence; Vignette 2 = gossiping about the participant; Vignette 3 = abandonment of participant; Vignette 4 = failing to believe in participant; Vignette 5 = failing to help the participant; Vignette 6 = failing to stand up for the participant in an argument.

Table 11

Average Correlations between the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale and evaluations of emotional response to each betrayal vignette

Emotion	IBS-SELF		Average		IBS-OTHER		Average
	PROT	LESS PROT	Corr.	PROT	LESS PROT	Corr.	
Interest	.06	.09	.08	.00	.03		.02
Enjoyment	.00	-.00	.00	.01	-.00		.00
Surprise	.03	.02	.03	.06	.05		.05
Distress	.07	.08	.08	.10*	.09		.10*
Anger	.05	.06	.05	.10*	.09		.10*
Disgust	.10*	.08	.09	.13**	.12**		.13**
Contempt	.09	.10*	.09	.14**	.16**		.15**
Fear	.11*	.08	.10*	.09	.06		.08
Shame	.13**	.08	.11*	.08	.08		.08
Guilt	.08	.10*	.09	.08	.08		.08

Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; IBS-SELF and IBS-OTHER = subscales of the Interpersonal Betrayal Scale; PROT = ratings from prototypical vignettes; LESS PROT = ratings from less prototypical vignettes; Emotions listed are from the Differential Emotions Scales.

shame. When responding to less prototypical vignettes, those with greater experience as the victim of common betrayals reported more contempt and guilt. Overall, those with more past experience with having been betrayed reported greater fear and shame when responding to the betrayal vignettes. When responding to prototypical vignettes those with greater experience as the perpetrator of common betrayals reported more distress, anger, disgust, and contempt. More disgust and contempt were reported when responding to less prototypical vignettes by those with greater experience betraying others. Overall, those who reported having betrayed important others often also reported greater distress, anger, disgust, and contempt in response to the hypothetical vignettes.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of Study Three was to provide a more extensive test of the Appraisal Process Model of trust. It was hypothesized that, as the model suggests, (1) participants with varying levels of trust would perceive hypothetical betrayal information differently. Specifically, those with high levels of trust were hypothesized to view the betrayal information in ways that were consistent with a certainty orientation which favors positive perceptions of the partner and relationship. Those with low levels of trust were hypothesized to view the negative information consistent with their pessimistic view of human nature and relational

interactions. Individuals with moderate levels of trust were hypothesized to be uncertain individuals who respond to the valence of incoming information - in this case negative information - and interpret the information as representative of a more negative view of the partner and relationship. Additionally, (2) it was suggested that the prototypicality of betrayal information would also affect responses to vignettes with the variations in responding described above being most prevalent when less prototypical betrayals were described.

Assessments of the Appraisal Process Model relied on evaluations of each vignette's representativeness of the betrayal construct, the seriousness of the vignette, and the certainty with which the participant made these decisions. Interestingly, no differences were observed between trust groups for ratings of representativeness, seriousness, or most importantly, the certainty with which the participant responded. This argues against the original predictions of the Appraisal Process Model of trust. Additionally, no interactions were observed between trust level and prototypicality, also failing to support the newer addition to the model concerning the prototypicality of the information being assessed.

Because certainty orientation is such an integral part of the Appraisal Process Model of trust, expectations about how certain individuals report feeling about relational information is an important test of its utility, and one that

was not supported by the present research. Specifically, one would expect that the moderate trust group should be the most variable in their responding to items concerning certainty because they are hypothesized to be least motivated toward cognitive certainty. And, because they are motivated toward certainty, high and low trust individuals should respond with the least variability. These patterns were not observed. In fact, the opposite pattern of variability emerged. When the groups were compared those who were low in trust were the most variable as a group, followed by the high trust group. This evidence suggests that low trust individuals are not certainty oriented, but instead perhaps adaptability oriented.

Obviously, the assumptions of the Appraisal Process Model have not been met in the present study, but it unclear why the differences in variability were observed. One possible explanation deals with the nature of individuals who report low trust. Past research has suggested that individuals who are low in trust are less emotionally stable (Couch, Adams, & Jones, 1996) and have had tumultuous past relational experiences (Bowlby, 1973; Erikson, 1950; Rotter, 1967; Wrightsman, 1974). These experiences, presumably, have left the low trust individuals with a view of human nature, and specific relational partners, that suggests people are unpredictable. Perhaps those low in trust responded with such variability when asked how certain they were about their responses because they feel they never know how others will

behave in relational situations. One who holds this belief likely experiences the need to remain adaptive to any number of possible relational outcomes in order to have relationships at all -- a feeling that is not consistent with being certain about how one should respond to relational information.

The high trust group in this case also showed a good deal of variability in their responding to questions about certainty. This may be also explained based on the arguments of Bowlby (1973), Erikson (1950), and others. Their work suggests that high trust individuals have had many positive relational experiences. When asked to imagine a betrayal, confusion may result because the situation is novel. Perhaps lack of experience with handling such negative relational information produces uncertainty.

Fairly consistent effects were observed for the prototypicality of the vignettes. Prototypical vignettes were judged to be more serious and representative of the construct of betrayal, and participants were more certain of their responses when judging highly prototypical vignettes than less prototypical ones. This was not surprising given the results from Study Two, and provided further support for the classification of betrayals discussed earlier. It seems clear that there was substantial agreement concerning whether a situation was betrayal or not, so it follows that individuals would be more certain about their responses to a serious and representative member of the betrayal category.

The model also suggests that individuals of varying levels of trust should have different emotional reactions to betrayal. Those with high trust were hypothesized to report fewer negative emotions as reactions to the less prototypical vignettes than to the prototypical vignettes. Those with moderate and low trust were expected to respond with negative emotions to all of the vignettes. Interactions between trust and prototypicality were not observed, and in most cases, no effect for level of trust was observed for emotions assessed by the Differential Emotions Scales. The exceptions were relationships between trust and surprise, shame/shyness, and guilt. High trust individuals reported more surprise when imagining hypothetical betrayals, and low trust individuals reported the greatest feelings of shame/shyness and guilt. This was not surprising given past research on the construct of trust which suggests quite clearly that trust is inversely related to the traits of guilt, shyness, etc. (Couch, 1994; Couch & Jones, 1996). One would expect based on these findings that trust level would also be related to these state emotion experiences.

Further, evidence was also provided for the idea that prototypical vignettes evoke greater reactions from people. For all of the emotions, prototypicality of the vignette was an influencing factor in emotional reactions. More negative emotions were reported for prototypical vignettes and positive emotions were reported least in response to reading

prototypical vignettes. Further, the differences in reported emotional states due to the prototypicality manipulation were consistent. Whereas this result is not surprising it does provide support for the idea that, because perceptions and reactions can be manipulated through these hypothetical stimuli, the use of vignettes in the study of betrayal is a viable methodology. This is important to note because some laboratory manipulations have been criticized in the past as being artificial, and staging real-life manipulations of betrayal in participants' lives faces serious ethical concerns.

Having experienced common betrayals was also found to be related to evaluations of betrayal vignettes. Having been a victim of these betrayals was not related to evaluations, but having betrayed important others in the past was related to the level of certainty with which participants responded. Perhaps having been the perpetrator of common betrayals allows the individual to "put him/herself in to the other's position" when judging reactions to another betraying him/her. This would allow the participant to think back to the feelings he/she had when betraying others and whether he/she had positive regard for the victim's feelings, etc. Not surprisingly negative emotions like distress, anger, disgust, fear, shame, and contempt were also related to past experience with betrayal from both perspectives.

All of this evidence suggests that there is little

utility in the Appraisal Process Model of trust. In general individuals with varying levels of trust did not respond to negative relational information as the model would predict. In addition, patterns of variability in responding among the three trust groups were not at all similar to what would be predicted.

One piece of evidence from Study Three does, however, suggest that perhaps further examination of the issue would be prudent. Individuals who were low in trust reported that they believed their relational partners would be more likely to engage in the behaviors described in the betrayal vignettes than did those with high levels of trust. This is somewhat consistent with the predictions of the model. There is not support, however, for the idea that prototypicality influences this belief. Low trust individuals agreed that the vignette seemed plausible in their relationships regardless of the prototypicality of the situation. Whereas this piece of evidence does not suggest rejecting the model, it does lead one to suspect that certainty is not the most important part of trust, but instead beliefs about the future likely are central.

Taken together, the results from Study Three, at least partially, argue against the Appraisal Process Model of trust. In particular claims that high trust individuals idealize their partners, creating "story-like" representations of them (Murray & Holmes, 1993) appears not to tell the whole story

about the process. Perhaps high trust individuals are positive and certainty oriented in their outlook on the future, but the positivity is not in their interpretation of information as the model would predict. It appears that high trust individuals view the events in the same ways as others, but they believe instead that a negative situation is less likely to happen to them. In other words, the high trusting individuals have faith in their partners. These findings do provide some insights into the process through which individuals of different trust orientations may operate when dealing with interpersonal information.

One should be cautious when disregarding the predictions of the Appraisal Process Model of trust. Whereas results from the present research are persuasive, the magnitude of the observed differences may be limited in their practical application. In addition, limitations to the study, such as mortality between the two administrations of questionnaires and limited sampling, should also be carefully considered. Finally, it is also premature to suggest that strong conclusions can be drawn without further study.

CHAPTER 6

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Trust and betrayal are inexorably bound. By their very nature, to endeavor to understand one requires attention be paid to the other. The goal of this series of studies was to not only assess the Appraisal Process Model of trust (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Holmes, 1991) by utilizing hypothetical and negative relational information, but also to gain a better understanding of what is meant by the term "betrayal". In so doing, several issues concerning cognitive certainty have been addressed. First, it is clear that examples were found to belong to the betrayal category to a greater or lesser extent, indicating that betrayal has a graded structure. This supports the idea that individuals approach relational information, especially negative relational information, with relatively stable impressions. In other words, there is a level of cognitive certainty associated with decision-making about information with regard to categorization. Second, whereas further information is needed, these studies indicated that the patterns of certainty in appraisal of relational information that are hypothesized based on the Appraisal Process Model of trust are likely not an adequate representation of trust's functioning. Trusting individuals do exhibit certainty, but it is apparently not in the way they

process information.

To summarize further, other results indicated that individuals determined whether an act was betrayal using a number of criteria including how well it seemed to represent what most would say is betrayal, how threatening the act was to the relationship in question, and how much they would trust a person who engaged in the act. Personal experience with negative relational occurrences did not seem to enter into the decision making process in most cases, but dispositional trust did. In fact, high trust individuals consistently viewed examples as more representative and more serious, and reported more past betrayal experience than moderate or low trust individuals.

Quite clearly results indicated that regardless of other factors that were also related to decisions of category inclusion for betrayal, cases that were viewed as serious were judged to be betrayals. In fact, the strongest relationships among factors were observed between seriousness and ratings of representativeness. This is valuable information even though it is not surprising. It does, however, leave another question. How do individuals decide whether an event is serious or threatening? If the ideas are analogous one would assume past experience would be unrelated, but it is unclear what would influence the decision. Future research should be focused toward this question before the prototyping effects that were observed in these studies can be more fully

explained.

Even so, on the basis of these and other kinds of information individuals were able to decide how well a given example fit into the betrayal category and then determine the hypothetical consequences for the relationship and emotional reactions that followed. Reactions to, as well as perceptions of the events were predictable based on classification of betrayals. Knowing this should prove useful to those interested in studying betrayal because it may have important implications for conclusions that may be drawn.

The Appraisal Process Model of trust suggested that individuals with a high level of trust are motivated to interpret relational events with certainty and are thus able to maintain their positive view. Those with low levels of trust should be motivated to interpret relational events with certainty as well, and in so doing maintain a more negative relational view. Those with moderate levels of trust are uncertainty oriented, meaning they are unsure about how to perceive their partner or relational events, and should therefore be swayed by the valence of incoming relational information. Little evidence was collected that would support these predictions. In fact, most every piece of evidence from this series of studies seemed to indicate that there was little use for the model as a predictor for individual interpretations of relational situations. Trust level was related to the way information was interpreted, but not in the

ways the model would predict. For example, individuals with high levels of trust actually reported betrayal examples as more serious, more representative of the construct, and reported that they had greater experience with betrayals than those with low or moderate levels of trust. Additionally, few differences were observed in emotional reactions to betrayal information between high, moderate, and low trust individuals. Of course, the magnitude of the results should be considered when considering practical application.

There was however, some evidence to suggest that the model may be useful in another way. Those with high levels of trust, while viewing betrayals in similar or actually more dramatic ways than other individuals, believed that their partner was not likely to engage in such a behavior in the future. In essence, the faith of component of trust (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985) - a belief in the future of the relationship as positive and nonthreatening - was demonstrated. Individuals with high levels of trust may not interpret events in ways that are consistent with their trusting orientation, but it is clear that they believe different things about what is likely to occur in the future of their relationship than those with lower levels of trust - that is, they appraise the likelihood of future events differently. This is how their cognitive certainty is displayed; trusting individuals are certain, or are at least comfortable with their beliefs, about the future of their

relationships with their partner, whether his/she is a friend, family member, or romantic partner. Perhaps a revision to the Appraisal Process Model incorporating this idea could be used to make better predictions about trust.

In particular, the pattern of results which was obtained here seems to suggest that individuals high in trust, while appraising betrayal information in ways which indicate they understand its valence, buffer themselves against the negative consequences which might otherwise follow. In a sense, the vulnerability that is experienced because an individual is subject to betrayals is lessened by the trust they have. So, trust may be a stable characteristic of the individual that acts as a mechanism for coping with negative experiences. This might explain the fact that even though these individuals report greater experience with betrayal they seem to hold strong feelings that their relational partners will care for them, keep their best interests at heart, and support them in the future. In this way they are able to cope with negative information or events and seem to suffer less both emotionally, and in terms of later relational functioning, since being betrayed has not been found to impede the future development of new relationships (Couch, 1994; Couch, 1996; Couch & Jones, 1996; Couch, Jones, & Scott, in press).

Finally, this series of studies may have implications for theoretical approaches to the development of trust. For example, most accept the idea that trust is a characteristic

within a given relationship that develops due to experiences with the partner (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Holmes, 1991). Experiences over a range of relationships may be somehow added or averaged together to represent an individual's level of trust. If this approach is correct, however, then it would also follow that individuals with higher levels of trust would report less experience with examples of betrayal than individuals with low levels of trust because many past negative experiences would not allow one to maintain a positive orientation. Past research (Couch, 1994; Couch & Jones, 1996) has indicated that this is the case from both perspectives, at least when looking at common betrayals which are less serious. However, this was not the finding in the present research. High trust individuals, on average, reported more experience with all kinds of betrayals than low or moderate trust individuals.

This finding should be replicated. If a reliable pattern is observed then it may be taken as further support for the alternative theoretical approach that trust is a stable personality characteristic (i.e., trait) which allows the individual to believe positive things about the future of his/her relationships even in the face of contradictory evidence and cope with the threat. This approach does not suggest that experience cannot alter one's view of the future but it would imply that, relatively speaking, high trust individuals would remain largely unaffected.

The findings from these studies are interesting, and in some cases unexpected, however, one must carefully consider constraints when drawing conclusions. For example, a large number of participants were represented in the mortality statistics across the two administrations in study three. It seems unlikely, but this loss may have contributed to the results. Consideration must also be made of the fact that the selection of different betrayal examples to be written as vignettes, or the details which were added to them during construction, may also have influenced the outcome. These concerns should be addressed by future research.

In addition, several other interesting points which have been introduced within the literatures on trust and/or betrayal should be explored within the context of research on cognitive certainty as it is broadly defined here. For example, in the betrayal literature much is made of the influence of gender on one's experience of betrayal. This variable should be studied further to determine whether it plays a role in prototyping effects or in the appraisal of relationally relevant information. Another consideration deals with the fact that the Appraisal Process Model of trust also may be useful in predicting responses to positive information. This was not tested in these studies, but should be in the future before a complete assessment of the model's utility can be offered. Finally, the alternative suggestions concerning trust as a coping mechanism should be tested

because it has implications not only for the current state of theory concerning trust, but also for possible clinical application.

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