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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by James C. Gilchrist entitled "The Role of Foreign Policy Doctrine in the Decision Making Process for U.S. Military Intervention in Latin America, 1960 - 1994." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Robert L. Peterson, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
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THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS FOR U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA, 1960 - 1994

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Jack Cecil Gilchrist, Ph.D. (1918-1968), who introduced me to higher education but did not live to see me achieve the ultimate objective; and to my wife, Stephanie, whose patience, support and attention to detail all complimented my shortcomings in those areas.

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ABSTRACT

In the post World War II era, attention has focussed on the decision-making process leading to U.S. military intervention in other states. Many factors of domestic and international politics have been examined as part of this inquiry. One area that has not been widely considered is how foreign policy doctrine, characterized as the operational definition of a country's national interest, differs in content and effect from other statements of foreign policy in the decision to intervene militarily in various parts of the world.

The dissertation looks at major doctrines of American foreign policy that relate directly to this aspect: Monroe Doctrine, Johnson Doctrine, and Reagan Doctrine. It also considers the 1989 military intervention in Panama by the Bush administration, which occurred without a fully developed doctrine in place. A case study research design is utilized to assess the role that these foreign policy doctrines had in three decisions of U.S. military intervention in Latin America since 1960. The research question considered is how does the concept and application of a foreign policy doctrine as an operational definition of national interest differ in content and effect from other official statements, particularly with respect to the use of military force as an element of American foreign policy in Latin America.

This study has important implications for current decision makers as well as for gaining a better understanding of the actions of earlier American administrations regarding foreign military intervention. The Clinton administration has put forth several statements in this area in an effort to present a foreign policy based on a clear set of principles of a coherent and workable strategy. This attempt to forge a Clinton Doctrine illustrates the timeliness and significance of this issue as a subject for inquiry.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

All U. S. government administrations formulate and implement a range of foreign policies over the course of their term of office. Some are created through a formal decision-making process while others are established gradually over a period of time as events unfold. There is one type that can arise through either method yet assumes a distinction from these other aspects of foreign policy, what is referred to as a statement of doctrine. This has been categorized as a an operationalized definition of a country's national interest (Kissinger 1994), serving as a guiding principle for political leaders. As such, it serves as a vehicle to illustrate consensus on the balance between the moral and strategic elements in a particular area of American foreign policy.

In some cases, such a statement is expressly formulated for that purpose, like the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, while at other times people outside the administration identify a particular stance by government officials as such; a case in point is the Reagan Doctrine. In his February 6, 1985 State of the Union Address, the President advocated support for the Contras opposing the Sandanista government in Nicaragua, calling this a form of self-defense for the United States. *Time* columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote an April 1, 1985 essay identifying this statement as the Reagan Doctrine which proclaims overt and unashamed American support for anti-Communist revolution. The label subsequently was utilized both by the administration and others to describe this view.

In either case, the encapsulation of a foreign policy position into a doctrinal statement formalizes it as an official stance of the government. It serves to translate a nation's abstract values and beliefs into concrete statements of objectives in foreign relations. It also invests actions taken in accordance with that doctrine a sense of legitimacy they otherwise might not have. Thus a doctrine may be seen as a tenet of national faith

(Osgood 1953) as well as a set of operational instruments in a particular area of foreign policy. Crabb (1986) identifies important elements that may be included in this concept. One is that a doctrine may refer to a set of normative or prescriptive principles that specify U. S. objectives in its foreign affairs; however, it also may act only as a description of broad goals the U. S. has pursued over its history. Another is this mechanism can serve to identify the end result of diverse interest group competition within American society as recognized and accepted by U. S. policy-makers. Last, a doctrine can be used to legitimize whatever policy ultimately is adopted by foreign policy decision makers. It some instances this can reflect a broad consensus as in the case of the containment policy of the Truman Doctrine, while at other times, as with the Reagan Doctrine, the statement engenders significant disagreement regarding American foreign policy.

This dissertation looks at how certain doctrines of American foreign policy have been adopted, articulated and implemented.[1] It looks specifically at how the existence of these doctrines, and the degree of support each enjoyed, influenced or was used to justify the decision of the U. S. to intervene militarily in Latin America since 1960. Three cases of such action will be assessed: Dominican Republic, 1965; Grenada, 1983; and Panama, 1989. While the examples utilized here will be limited to those applied to this region and time frame, the overall approach has implications in other areas of U. S. foreign policy as well.

There are four major commonalities among these doctrines that warrant analysis of the relationship between such a policy statement and subsequent military intervention which represent a progression of legal logic justifying American interventionist practices in the Third World (Joyner 1992). One is that having issued them unilaterally, only U. S.

[1] These are the following doctrines: Monroe, Truman, Nixon and Reagan. Under President Bush, a set of guidelines on the use of military force was issued that was referred to as the Weinberger Doctrine; the Clinton administration still is wrestling with this issue.

decision makers have had the ability to interpret them within the larger American foreign policy sphere. Accordingly, another is that the applicability of a particular doctrine in terms of U. S. national interest within the region also has been the exclusive province of this country's leaders. A third is that while the United States may choose to act in conjunction with other countries in this area, it has always reserved the right to exercise a free hand in determining when and what actions will be taken under a certain doctrine. The last factor linking these doctrines is that they have created a strong underlying premise of U. S. foreign policy, particularly in the post World War II period, that influence or control over other states in the region by radical (especially communist) forces represents a significant threat to America's national security which the government must be willing to protect even to the extent of overt military intervention. However, the most important commonality is that these doctrines have been statements based on ". . . international realpolitik rather than in consensual international law," (Joyner 1992, 239) and yet have been accepted by the U.S. public as special quasi-legal edicts that provide a supportable rationale for American intervention in the region.

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation utilizes a comparative case study approach using four main steps. First is to consider the manner in which each of the designated foreign policy doctrines was formulated. That includes identifying the key people involved in this process and what role each played in establishing the doctrinal statement, as well as the historical context in which the doctrine originally was developed. Next the study considers the manner in which a particular doctrine was applied in each of the three cases studies. This segment considers the situation leading to U. S. military intervention and the way decision makers relied on doctrine in part as a rationale or justification for this action. Next, an assessment is made of how this doctrine was presented publicly to explain U. S. military intervention, both to other national leaders and the citizens at large. Finally, the study looks at how the Clinton administration has tried to deal with the creation of its own doctrine on the use of military force as part of U. S. foreign policy.

A major part of this work will center on the cognitive process by which these doctrines were utilized in the decision to intervene militarily in the three incidents identified above. The use of heuristics, analogy and schemata as a way of imposing structure on conditions of uncertainty is an important element in understanding the manner in which decision makers approached the case study situations. It allows the participant to simplify the search for alternatives by disregarding some of the data at hand or to reduce the extent and complexity of the information processing. Mechanisms such as satisficing, equal weighting and lexicographic choice may be seen operating here (Hogarth 1990). The manner in which doctrinal statements operate in this context is of interest in this study.

There are two main views on this process that will be explored in this dissertation. One is the decision maker as a consistency seeker where the mind continually processes information in an attempt to keep one's beliefs, feelings and cognitions mutually consistent (Hybel 1990). This allows the person actively but unconsciously to manipulate information to give structure to an ambiguous reality (Steinbruner 1974). This revolves around efforts to address what George refers to as value-complexity or the presence of multiple, competing values and interests that are embedded in a single issue.

Another approach is analogical thinking in which persons confronted with new situations attempt to draw parallels with prior experiences utilizing a three-step process. First similarities between present and past situations are identified, the previous solution is uncovered and lastly that mechanism is made to fit the current case (Levi 1948). This also is related closely to schema theory in which people use stored knowledge or cognitive schema to make sense of the world around them (Larson 1985). A schema is defined as a generic concept stored in one's memory as a collection of knowledge related to a general concept, rather than in the form of a dictionary definition. Schemas have four important functions with respect to decision making. First they provides guidelines and selection criteria to process information quickly and efficiently. It is an economical way to store memories of objects and events. Third, schemas also enable persons to make inferences about a specific event with limited information at hand. Last, this mechanism lets a decision maker to envision and carry out a sequence of actions to achieve a particular goal.

There are significant resources available for this study. Several excellent histories of the Monroe Doctrine exist (Hart 1916, Perkins 1963, Dozer 1965) which provide a good starting point for examining the subsequent foreign policy doctrines that are part of this inquiry. The development of the Truman, Nixon and Reagan Doctrines are covered by first-hand accounts by those involved in their formation as well as by other scholarly observers. These include memoirs of the relevant presidents and some of their top advisors. The individual cases also are well documented. Finally, there have been some recent assessments of the first Clinton term that round out this source material (Wolfowitz 1994, Maynes 1995, Morales 1995).

The case study approach is the appropriate methodology for this inquiry based on three major criteria. The first is when the researcher is considering a "how" or "why" question regarding a set of contemporary events over which the investigator has little or no control (Yin 1984). In this situation, the dissertation looks at U. S. military intervention in three different instances in an attempt to understand the role of foreign policy doctrine in the decision making process leading to that action. Second, even though control over the environment is not possible, an advantage is that, if it can be shown that a concept or theory actually works or is applicable in several real situations, that provides corroboration or support for its acceptance (Johnson and Joslyn 1991). Finally, the case study is particularly useful where descriptive and explanatory information is lacking and the researcher needs to generate such data in order to develop tentative statements of relationships for certain phenomena. Thus a case study is an empirical inquiry that (1) investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when (2) the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and (3) multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1984, 23). As such, it is the appropriate research tool in this effort to relate the role of doctrinal statements to subsequent decisions to use military force as part of American foreign policy in Latin America.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a great amount of material on the subject of military intervention both in scholarly journals and in book form. As the ensuing summary of the literature indicates, while there has been significant attention given to the general concept as well as analysis of specific factors affecting the use of military force and decision-making processes, very little has been done on the role of formal foreign policy doctrine in this area.

General Concept. It has long been recognized that armed military force is an important element of a nation's overall foreign policy. Karl von Clausewitz made this observation in *On War* and it has been echoed many times since. One of the most prominent of these later writers is Hans Morgenthau who observed:

> Intervention is as ancient and well-established an instrument of foreign policy as are diplomatic pressure, negotiations and war. From the time of the ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own interests and against the latters' will. Other states, in view of their interests, have opposed such interventions and have intervened on behalf of theirs (Morgenthau 1967, 425).

He went on to observe that what has occurred in this area since the end of World War II is merely the continuation of the power politics tradition established in the 19th Century. However, he notes some key differences in the contemporary era such as the proliferation of decolonized sovereign states still dependent on outside support and the instability of many of these in the context of the modern superpower rivalry. Morgenthau concluded it is futile to seek an abstract principle of legitimacy for intervention, as it was practiced in the prior century, which can be applied today. Rather, he urged the major powers to exercise caution and prudence in making the decision to intervene, basing it not on rigid idealism, but instead doing so only where the national interest is clearly at stake and where military power has a reasonable chance to succeed.

The difficulty in reaching a useful definition of military intervention for the purpose of analysis has been a challenge for researchers. James Rosenau (1969) encountered a wide disparity in the early literature between the political problem caused by intervention and the action itself. He found much work on the moral and legal aspects of intervention but very little analysis to provide a scientific explanation for the recurrence of military intervention in the world. He attributed this deficiency to normative judgments about the goals being sought rather than attention to the actual use of force. This resulted in a lack of agreement on definitions of the action, behavior of the participants and the consequences of the action. Thus he saw no progress towards a substantial answer on when intervention is likely to occur and succeed or fail as an element of foreign policy due to this inability to achieve a workable definition of this phenomena. Similarly, a more recent study of foreign military intervention ranging from the U. S. role in Vietnam to India's involvement in Sri Lanka encountered this conceptual problem (Levite, Jentleson and Berman 1992).

However there is definition of military intervention that has been accepted by a number of scholars in the field which is widely cited today. A 1978 study of 215 incidents involving U. S. military forces overseas between 1946 and 1975 uses the following terminology:

> A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence (Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 12).

The authors specifically excluded certain types of military conflict such as the Korean and Vietnam wars, security of the Panama Canal, military aid and routine military maneuvers overseas, in order to narrow the range of incidents to a manageable number yet still having sufficient data for analysis. The authors did not address fully the decision making process behind use of force nor the wisdom of military intervention to achieve political goals valuable in terms of the utility of military force in certain situations. However, their definition is applicable to the purposes of this dissertation.

Factor Analysis. There have been several studies which try to establish links between specific variables and the use of military force abroad by the United States since 1945. Tillema (1973) analyzed 149 incidents from 1945 to 1975 in which the U. S. could have intervened militarily, but found it did so in only four: Korea (1950), Lebanon (1956), Dominican Republic (1965) and Vietnam (1965). He noted that most current works attempted to explain why intervention occurred, but ignored situations where it did not even where there was an opportunity to do so. Some explanations advanced a pre-existing preference for military action over diplomacy (Gallois 1965, Draper 1968), a rise in the influence of military leaders (Bosch 1968), or geographical considerations (Oglesby 1967).

Tillema posited that America is likely to intervene militarily in response to a direct threat to the United States or the possibility of a communist takeover of another state. Such U. S. action would occur unless restrained by (1) the international system, (2) the internal decision making process or (3) lack of a clear moral justification for use of force. He also suggested that these restraints were subject to redefinition over time that could lead to a greater likelihood of U. S. military intervention in the future.

A similar approach giving attention to constraints rather than to causes of military intervention concentrated specifically on Third World conflicts over a 42-year period (Hosmer 1987). This study was much broader than Tillema's in that it looked at motivations underlying the constraints on U. S. military involvement in all major post-

World War II conflicts and crises in the Third World (Hosmer 1987, 2). These include controlling the risk of war with the USSR, limiting military and civilian casualties, and seeking early negotiated solutions to such conflicts. Hosmer's findings were more explicit than the prior study but do suggest continuity with those of Tillema.

Finally, there are two landmark studies of the factors affecting the use of military force by the U. S. that stand out in this area. The first (Ostrom and Job 1986) builds on the earlier Blechman and Kaplan study by taking that main definition of intervention and applying it to 72 out of the 149 cases in the prior work which these authors considered to be either nuclear-capable or major uses of force. They adapted an existing cybernetic model of presidential decision making which they indicated ". . . provides an understanding of how human decision makers reach decisions in highly complex and volatile environments by formulating simple and manageable decision algorithms. The mechanics of choice are simple: the president monitors a limited set of essential or critical factors, and considers a restricted set of decision options. Choice is tied to the essential variables by a relatively simple decision rule" (Ostrom and Job 1986, 543-4).

Ostrom and Job identified three main categories of decision variables facing the President regarding use of military force: international environment, domestic environment and political environment. Using these variables in their cybernetic decision making model to test actual incidents for the period 1949-76, an overall correct prediction rate of 75 percent was achieved. From this result the authors concluded that while all three environments affect the decision making process, domestic and political factors are more important than international ones. While political leadership factors appear to figure prominently in the propensity to use military force, both absolute and relative levels of popular support for the President are the most important influence on the political use of military force.

A later article (James and Oneal 1991) assessed the Ostrom and Job work, citing its importance as a challenge to realism. Specifically, they indicated that if the findings hold that foreign policy is inextricably linked to domestic politics, particularly the desire to generate overall public support and attention to the election calendar, then assumptions regarding the importance of objective national interests are clearly undermined. The authors reproduced the original study and achieved a 73 percent positive result compared to the earlier 75 percent figure. However, in addition to failure of the strategic balance and national election factors to reach threshold significance levels of the earlier study, James and Oneal also found that the factor of public concern on both strategic balance and public aversion to war also failed to do so for which no explanation was determined. The authors then introduced a new variable, severity of threat situation, and reran the same series of events using different statistical methods (probit analysis and OLS regression). The result was significance in only four of the original ten variables: condition of the economy, presidential popularity, overall political success and the electoral calendar. From this reexamination, James and Oneal concluded that their variable of threat severity is more important and accurate than the international environment factors of the prior study. They indicated these results suggest a significant discrepancy between the realist view of international politics and the actual influences that encouraged U. S. presidents to use military force in the post-war period.

Decision-making process. The role of personality in the decision making process has been recognized by several writers in the field (Paige 1968, Allison 1971, George 1980). As one author stated, "The core of any decisionmaking and information processing operation is the human being, whose personality structure, attributes, and style have a decisive, sometimes dominant effect on the manner and outcomes of information processing" (Vertzberger 1990, 111). Both George and Vertzberger stress the primary role of a person's belief system on the manner in which that individual makes decisions. These beliefs allow a person to construct a coherent, organized view of the world that simplifies and structures their complex environment. This psychological construct in turn shapes the way that information is perceived and processed by filtering down a large amount of data to that which is most important. The key here is that this sifting of information is inherently biased by one's underlying beliefs about the world and the way it functions, leading one to seek explanations and solutions consistent with this world view.

Similarly, a person's values or understanding about desirable behavior, situations and goals also affects the manner in which they process information and make decisions. These feelings are more emotionally than rationally developed, acting in concert with the more structured world view of one's belief system in order to function effectively in various situations. The relative intensity of these emotions will impact the manner in which a person approaches a particular problem and its possible solutions.

Dealing with uncertainty is the second area of interest for these two authors. One coping mechanism for decision makers is simply calculated procrastination or the belief that by taking no immediate action, most of the problems or difficulties encountered either will find solutions on their own or go away entirely. While this may prove effective in the short run, it also can result in more troublesome and complex situations later on that could have been avoided by taking some positive action much earlier.

A range of strategies is available to the decision maker to support the cognitive process in dealing with conditions of uncertainty. One is that of satisficing or reaching a solution that can be considered good enough rather than being the optimal choice in a particular situation. A second approach that both authors identify, and which applies directly to this dissertation, is the use of historical analogies to guide current actions, even when the circumstances only roughly approximate each other. For Vertzberger the important point here is that the historical events are recalled and interpreted through the subjective psychological makeup of the participant involved in the contemporary decision making situation. In his study of how the events surrounding Korea, Munich and Dien Bien Phu affected the later Vietnam decisions of 1965, Yuen Foong Khong (1992) suggests that historical analogies can be viewed as knowledge structures on which decision makers rely to interpret their own world today. In the same way, he argues that the Vietnam syndrome affected President Bush's decision making process regarding the Gulf War. This approach also forms the basis of several case studies of the role of historical analogy as a decision making tool presented as a primer on the ways to use experience to make contemporary political decisions.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

As indicated earlier, one goal of this dissertation is to see if a link can be established between the cognitive processes of decision makers and the manner in which certain foreign policy doctrines served as a vehicle to translate their beliefs into concrete actions, in this case military intervention. That is, to what extent has the encapsulated statement of national interest in each of these doctrines led to or facilitated the use of military force as the preferred policy option in the selected case studies. For example, in discussing the Truman Doctrine, Clarke and Clad observe that "[u]nder this all-embracing rubric, national interest became readily understandable as whatever it took to survive in the battle with an omnipresent Soviet enemy. In pursuit of this goal, the American people showed themselves ready to rally to the banner of national interest in support of practically any foreign activity - even in exotic locations such as Angola or Grenada. The national interest thus became an objective, self-evident truth. It didn't need to be discussed or analyzed. It was just there" (Clarke and Clad 1995, 104). It is this manner of connecting doctrine and policy as a prelude to military intervention which this study seeks to explain. Finally, looking at the Clinton administration's efforts to formulate its own doctrine for military intervention, does the same decision making process make such action more or less likely to be applied in Latin America in the future?

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The preliminary structure of this dissertation is as follows. It will start with an explanation of the research question, that is how does the concept of a foreign policy doctrine as an operational definition of national interest differ in content and effect from other official statements, particularly with respect to the use of military force. The next section will discuss approaches to decision making, drawing on the operational code model of Leites (1951, 1953) and George (1969). It examines techniques such as consistency seeking to address the problem of value-complexity and the use of analogy and schemata as mechanisms for reaching these decisions. This will lead into a section regarding the process used to create the specific doctrines indicated earlier. The ensuing sections will be the case studies of what role these doctrines played in the decision by the president to apply military force in these specific situations. Each case will set the temporal context of the respective incident, identify the main participants concentrating on their operational codes, and describe the decision making process to utilize military force was conducted highlighting the role of doctrine. An interpretation of the incident and a discussion how it fits within the overall framework of the dissertation will conclude these cases. The final section will bring these elements together through an examination of the efforts by the Clinton administration to forge its own doctrine on the use of military force as a component of foreign policy today, with the Haiti intervention of 1994 as an example.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

The issue of how the decision by top-level foreign policy makers to intervene with military force in other countries is affected by foreign policy doctrine requires analysis of three main components which together serve as the mechanism for this process. It was noted earlier that doctrine is presented by Kissinger as the operational definition of national interest; therefore, the first element to be addressed is what constitutes this particular concept that is being operationalized. This dissertation argues that it involves not simply physical security of territory and population but also the sustainability of a nation-state's chosen political system. A prime example of this is found in McClintock's assessment of the Truman Doctrine: "Although interest, real or imagined, was the primary motor of overseas intervention, political realities required the presentation of policies to the American public in terms of fairly consistent principles. Intervention was rationalized and justified not on selfish grounds of national aggrandizement but as a selfless mission to aid the underdog. Truman's doctrine of containment was offered as a policy to assist small, vulnerable nations against superpower aggression and to promote self-determination - and, of course, to aid the cause of world freedom" (1992, 9).

A second question is how doctrine functions regarding what means are to be employed in its implementation and how shall they be utilized. That is, drawing on classic military doctrine, what is the set of prescriptions that must be generated specifying how the applicable resources should be structured and employed in response to recognized threats and opportunities (Posen 1984). Posen suggested that the offensive, defensive or deterrent character of military doctrine held by states within a system can impact the quality of international political life. Similarly, military doctrine can be harmful to a state if it is not integrated properly with the political objectives of the state's grand strategy by failing to provide the statesman with the necessary tools to pursue those objectives. It is argued here that the same points apply to U. S. foreign policy doctrines in the larger setting as well, a point that will be explored in the ensuing case studies.

The last theoretical element to be addressed is that of doctrine functioning as a heuristic device in the decision making process. In this study it is posited to act as a filter through which national interest is interpreted in the context of a particular foreign policy situation and then acted upon. This particular lens consists of a set of preconceived ideals, actions and limits that are applied to all situations on a relatively consistent basis as a major element of the decision maker's operational code. In turn, this is part of the larger view of information processing involving schemata theory. However, it is this incorporation of national interest into a stated foreign policy doctrine that is the critical factor that sets the stage for the application of operational code as the vehicle by which decision makers employ intuitive general principles to reduce complex judgment tasks to simpler mental operations by emphasizing some properties of the data at hand and ignoring others (Vertzberger 1990).

This "neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making" (George 1969) looked at the role of subjective perceptions and beliefs held by these leaders which affects that process in conflict or crisis situations. Expanding on the original work done by Leites (1951, 1953) on the operational code of the Kremlin leadership, George argued the set of general beliefs making up the operational code serves as a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definition and estimates of particular situations. This knowledge of the actor's instrumental and philosophical beliefs assists the researcher to identify limits or find the bounded rationality within which policy options are considered by the subject.

The objective of this dissertation is to establish a relationship of national interest operationalized in the form of a doctrinal statement which then is applied as part of a decision maker's operational code to situations resulting in the use of military force. For example, when an American political leader states that our national interest is on the line in the Dominican Republic or Grenada, or a new world order is challenged by a drug-dealing dictator in Panama, such that military intervention is warranted, it is helpful to determine to what extent this suggested chain of logic can be shown as leading to that conclusion. This approach draws upon the orientation towards multicausal explanations of foreign policy behavior outlined by Hermann and East (1978) as part of their participation in the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project. As indicated by the work of Snyder (1954), Rosenau (1966) and Allison (1969), the CREON authors argued that rather than rely on a single highly generalized determinant such as power, social class, leader personality or national interest, it is more useful to interpret recurrent influences on foreign policy utilizing more complex explanatory systems. In turn, this calls for a larger number and variety of variables and increased awareness of the limiting conditions under which they operate (East, Salmore and Hermann 1978). Integrating the operational code approach within the CREON analytical framework is anticipated to facilitate the focus on the relationship of national interest and doctrine as an important factor contributing to the decision to utilize military force in certain situations.

There are three specific aspects of the CREON project's orientation to the study of foreign policy behavior which are relevant to this endeavor. One is that decision making includes not just the act of making a particular policy choice but also both the conditions preceding that specific action as well as the subsequent implementation measures of the decision. A second is that rather than being competing elements, multiple variables can be integrated to provide a more useful explanation than may be derived from any single factor. Last is attention to the manner in which stimuli in the international environment trigger a response based on defining that situation either as an opportunity to further national goals or as a threat to achieving them (Brady 1978).

In their concluding chapter, the CREON authors presented two models of foreign policy decision making (Salmore et. al. 1978, 205-7). One illustrates their explanation of general pattern behavior which is aggregated over some substantial period of time and the other demonstrates the process leading to discrete foreign policy behavior that can explain the likelihood of a particular behavior in a specific incident. It is the latter model to which the operational code construct of this dissertation applies. The sequence of actions leading to the specific action of making a foreign policy decision involves several components. These are first the personal characteristics of the political leaders, and their prior behavior or experience dealing with others. Next is the current situation, and the decision structure and process by which policy choices are made. Lastly, the subsequent relationship between the decision process and the discrete behavior of the political leader is mediated by the general tendency or propensity of the subject government towards established behavior patterns.

The area of interest here is the initial part of the model dealing with the conditions antecedent to the particular foreign policy situation which are triggered by that external stimuli. All of these are elements that appear in the operational code construct. The prior behavior patterns between nations provides a general context in which the decision maker expects the subsequent actions of other nations to follow the established path. How both conformity with the expected behavior and perceived deviations from that norm are assessed and responded to is a key part of what the model tries to explain. The other element is that of the effects of personal characteristics of the leaders involved in the particular situation, which is the main focus of this inquiry. It is noted that while the operational code approach has been used extensively, the results have been descriptive rather than dealing with the linkage between these leader characteristics and subsequent foreign policy (Hermann 1978, 55). This gap in understanding is what this dissertation will address.

This may be accomplished by introducing a more detailed functional element to the antecedent condition part of the CREON model. It entails making clear the relationship between the national interest as a concept and its transformation into a stated policy doctrine as part of the instrumental belief component of a leader's operational code. Combining this with the broader philosophical belief component gives this approach more direct focus on its effect on subsequent policy decisions.

At this point, it is useful to explore in more depth each of the links in the chain of logic proposed for this part of the model. First, the conceptual basis of national interest needs clarification before going on to see how it can be operationalized. Next, what are the main features of doctrine that allow for this type of statement to be one capable of practical implementation. This leads to the incorporation of both concept and operational definition of national interest as a discrete component of a leader's operational code. For this it is necessary to consider the make-up of that code in terms of its philosophical and instrumental parts to that approach.

NATIONAL INTEREST

The concept of national interest as it is used today has evolved from several earlier approaches as the basis of foreign relations among states according to Beard (1934). These "pivots of diplomacy" all begin with some assertion of self-interest, followed by specific policy as a practical conception of that interest. When held over time, that policy becomes an inescapable rule for the nation with its own "stern mandate imposed by the law of gravitation." How that mandate is carried out depends in large part on the historical and political context in which it is presented as a tool of diplomacy.

During feudal times, there was no national interest in the absence of true nation-states such as exist today. Rather, there were numerous principalities which slowly became absorbed into larger units ruled over by kings and other monarchial leaders. The general population held ties of personal allegiance to these individual rulers, not to a given geographically defined territory or specific political system. In this case the will of the prince dictated how diplomacy was conducted. This evolved into the idea of dynastic interest where the goal was to secure family control over land and other privileges of power including firm limits on activities of his subjects, extending dominion outward at the expense of his neighbors and otherwise perpetuating the line of succession based on personal wealth. Trade among these realms assumed greater importance for which diplomatic ties were pivotal to ensure peaceful commerce as a way to stabilize this system.

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 established the concept of national sovereignty which recognized nation-states as distinct political entities that exercised exclusive coercive control over mutually recognized territories and populations. The main point here is that sovereignty accrued not to the individual rulers or families but to the structures and institutions through which the political system was governed. Beard suggested this gave rise to a third view of national interests in the form of reasons of state, *ragione di stato* or *raison d'etat.* Cast in the Machiavellian sense this meant all actions necessary to hold reigns of state power, eliminate domestic opposition and extend political influence beyond state boundaries. The difficulty was that in the age of parliaments, reasons of state tended to mean the ruler and his top cadre claiming to have sole authority to declare what national interest was and how to pursue it. First challenged by the popular assemblies in England and Holland, by the end of the 19th Century this basis for diplomacy virtually disappeared from the European political scene.

A final pivotal element of diplomacy identified by Beard is that of national honor, a term more nebulous than the previous ones as a basis for international relations.

Practitioners of this approach invoke such ideals as righteousness, peace and principles of civilizations when trying to justify particular foreign policies. Theodore Roosevelt did so when arguing the need for U.S. naval strength by stating "[a] really great people, proud and high-spirited, would face all the disasters of war rather than purchase that base prosperity which is bought at the price of national honor" (Bishop 1920, 1:75). Similarly, in his call for U.S. action in Cuba in 1895, Roosevelt indicated that all the great civilized nations such as France, England and America sought to promote law, order and righteousness in their expansion into world affairs. The emotional aura of this rationale as a justification for state action is most eloquently presented in President Wilson's April 2, 1917 War Message to Congress leading to American participation in that European conflict.

> The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty . . . But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts - for democracy, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other (Osgood 1953, 194).

It is clear that this heritage of national interest has lost much of its relevance to the post Cold War era in which the world has grown more complex and interdependent. The ability of national leaders to advance their own view of the country's highest objectives without considering both domestic and foreign reaction is restricted severely. Except in true emergencies, the call for support based only on national honor no longer has much application. Yet, the idea of national interest has taken on several new aspects that illustrate its durability as a central concept in foreign relations (Crabb 1986). The first is the implicit recognition that although superpower conflict is less likely, the world is still a dangerous environment where a nation must be ready and willing to protect its essential resources with a range of actions, including military force if necessary. There also is the assumption that these primary security interests can extend beyond national boundaries to include major allies. Examples cited include NATO participation, maintaining sea lane access, countering foreign power influence in the Western Hemisphere and protecting the safety and independence of Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

A third feature of national interest in this modern context is to provide decision makers with a focus for setting priorities for the commitment of limited resources among several competing foreign policy objectives. This power rationing aims to reduce the problem of overextending the nation's capability to meet truly critical needs when they arise. Making these priorities clear also assists other nations to identify those objectives to which the U.S. is deeply committed and to adjust their policies accordingly. Crabb cited Henry Kissinger's observation that clearly avowing that certain foreign policies are essential to the national interest, rather than referring to naive sentimentality as Chip Bohlen did or ambiguous platitudes referred to by Walter Lippmann, sends a forceful message on the nation's staying power for these policies to both domestic and foreign audiences while enhancing public support for these choices.

Although this historical evolution of the concept is useful to a degree, it still is necessary to understand how it fits into the foreign policy making process. That is, does the concept serve merely as a backdrop to current policy or is it an active component in decision making. Two attempts to answer this question are of significance to this dissertation. One suggests three distinctions may be made in the usage of this term in policy formation (Frankel 1970). The other is on an aspirational level, based on a vision of the good life and ideals which the state sets for itself. These interests tend to be long-term, inspired by the nation's historical and ideological roots. The goals established are drawn from and shaped by a general view of the political will of the nation as opposed to a carefully calculated assessment of practical capabilities. As such, these interests are not always fully articulated or coordinated and in fact may often contradict one another.

A second category of interests are those pursued on an operational level. They are short-term, often arising in cases of expediency or necessity than from a general sense of the public will. Mainly articulated by government leaders, these goals are advanced in terms of specific policies based on an assessment of cost, capability and probable success. Since they are meant to be implemented and achieved in a relatively short time, there is less room for contradiction in the way these interests are laid out. Finally, in order to evaluate, justify or criticize either aspirational or operational interests, political leaders discuss them on what Frankel refers to as the explanatory and polemical level. Here the purpose is to "prove" that a certain statement of national interest is asserted correctly as a basis for state action rather than simply to report on its implementation as public policy.

This broad categorization of national interests does provide some basis for understanding its role in foreign policy but not in sufficient detail to understand how individual policy makers apply it to specific situations. A more practical approach to explain the content and application of this concept in foreign policy making is provided by Nuechterlein's national interest matrix, which establishes four main areas of historic and enduring concern to the United States, then cross references each in terms of intensity level as shown in Table 2-1. This model developed as a response to those who argued that national interest is too vague, poorly articulated or outdated as a tool to analyze as a basis for state action. Instead, it is suggested that American policy makers are influenced by several geographical, cultural, political and economic factors deeply ingrained in the national experience and ideology of the American people. Far from being useless, Nuechterlein argued ". . . so long as political leaders continue to speak in terms of national interests and national priorities, scholars ought to accept some responsibility to help define those interests instead of ignoring the issue" (1991, 16).

TABLE 2-1: National Interest Matrix

Basic national interest	Intensity of interest			
	Survival (critical)	Vital (dangerous)	Major (serious)	Peripheral (bothersome)
Defense of homeland				
Economic well-being				
Favorable world order				
Promotion of values				

Source: Donald E. Nuechterlein. 1991. *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World.* Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

The first category of long-term, enduring national interests in the matrix is defense of the homeland and its constitutional system, which is the primary concern of any state. It deals with threats to the physical security of territory and population under exclusive control of the United States government as well as those against Canada, Iceland, Mexico and the Caribbean Basin. According to Nuechterlein this generally is construed to mean direct military attack or the attempt of a foreign power to establish a military presence within this American defense perimeter. However, one could argue as did Alfred Mahan that national self-assertion falls into this category as well. "The first law of states, as of men, is self-preservation - a term which cannot be narrowed to the bare tenure of a stationary round of existence. Growth is a property of healthful life, which does not, it is true, necessarily imply increase in size of nations . . . but it does involve the right to insure by just means whatsoever contributes to national progress, and correlatively to combat injurious action taken by an outside agency, if the latter overpass its own lawful sphere" (Osgood 1953, 38).

In this matrix, the second interest category of enhancement of the nation's economic well-being and promotion of American products abroad may also include some, but not all, of Mahan's broad view of self defense. In the current sense this refers to access to foreign markets for trade and investment and maintaining a strong U.S. dollar, thereby supporting a high living standard for American citizens. Issues like trade deficits, direct foreign investment in the U.S. and national debt levels are raised in this area.

Creation and support of a favorable world order that is peaceful and friendly to the United States is the third type of national interest. Establishment of international regimes for regional security (NATO), freedom of the seas and economic assistance to key allies are major components. Lastly, the promotion of American democratic values and the benefits of a free market system serve to maintain an international environment conducive to U.S. national interests. The expansion of these political and economic systems in the world encompasses nations whose objectives become more compatible with those of the U.S.

Beard concluded that for all three types of national interest, non-military diplomacy is the normal means to advance and enforce this broad objective. Significantly, he stated that diplomacy (and its practitioners) assumes the current conception of national interests without question. Thus the underlying assumptions are rarely questioned or altered, but accepted even with some internal conflicts and contradictions. The substance of the routine action of diplomacy is the network of treaties, consular conventions and other international agreements; the ongoing concern of foreign policy professionals is to control and adjust disagreements within these mechanisms.

Nuechterlein stressed that when policy makers concentrate on the appropriate national interest in a given situation, it is much more important to assess correctly the intensity of interest involved rather than one of the four broad categories identified earlier. Obviously survival is the most intense, where a critical and immediate threat of destruction is posed to the homeland; this situation is rare and easy to identify. However, more likely to occur are challenges to vital interests, which while still dangerous, do not entail imminent peril but still must be dealt with promptly. There usually is enough time for consultation, bargaining and show of force sufficient to diffuse the situation.

A third category, major intensity of interest, involves cases that are considered to be serious policy issues but ones that are not crucial to the nation's well-being. This encompasses a large part of normal diplomatic activities in which a range of outcomes may be acceptable. The least intense interest level covers peripheral situations that are bothersome, mainly to private economic and commercial activities of American citizens, but do not impinge directly in areas of important public policy.

It is the contention of this dissertation that, as stated earlier, the area of national interest most closely involved in the chain of logic is sustainability of the American political system and ideals in the international environment, and not the survival intensity level shown in this matrix. There is relatively little chance of a direct attack on U.S. soil compared to the challenges to American economic and political dominance in the Western Hemisphere. All of the case studies, Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama, support this view. In each one, no immediate threat to the physical security of the U.S. mainland was evident; the same was not perceived to be the case regarding economic, political and ideological interests. Therefore it is argued that both vital and major intensity levels for these latter categories was the factor that brought into play the specific doctrine through which these interests were operationalized and acted upon in each case. The composition and function of doctrine is the next element in the chain of logic to be considered.

FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE

The structure and purpose of individual foreign policy doctrines in American diplomatic history have been discussed by many writers. What has not been covered so well are the broader role and attributes of doctrine as a discrete subject, apart from specific incidents in which they were issued by U.S. presidents. In this area, research indicates only two works are prominent and deserve extended attention. The first is Posen's study of military doctrine as part of a nation's grand foreign policy strategy (1984). Comparing the military doctrine of France, Britain and Germany between the world wars, the author applied balance of power and organization theory to explain variation in the formation and implementation of this factor. The portion of the work applicable to this dissertation is the initial analysis of function of doctrine as a part of a nation's foreign policy apparatus, as well as the continuing need to integrate this element with other diplomatic tools.

Crabb's work on the meaning, role and future of American foreign policy doctrines is an historical review of these presidential statements from Monroe through Carter; the Reagan Doctrine was formalized three years after this book was published (1982). This includes both an in-depth analysis of the context and content of each one as well as the larger contribution they made to the practice of U.S. diplomacy. The author also discusses fully the manner in which they were formulated and the consequences of these actions. For purposes of this dissertation, Crabb's study is most useful in its identification and assessment of the common characteristics of foreign policy doctrines.

Military doctrine serves as a major element of a nation's grand foreign policy strategy in three important ways. First, it is based on identification of likely threats to state security for which the nation must be best prepared to handle when they arise. Second, establishing the military component forces policy makers to consider the political, economic and other approaches to these threats that may be used along with or in place of the military response. Thus a hierarchy is established among potential threats and responses to allow careful allocation of limited resources and capabilities. Lastly, the development of the military component illustrates the need to formulate a chain of political ends and military means in such a way that the political goals are achievable within the capability of the state's armed forces. The doctrine identifies what assets and techniques are to be employed and in what manner given certain situations. A significant corollary is to determine whether the preferred military means unnecessarily restrict the discretion of political authorities to pursue the objectives critical to the security of the state. Another important aspect of

Posen's analysis is the recognition that different approaches to the international environment have implications for the type of strategy a state prefers to adopt. This applies to the military, political and economic elements forming that overall position. An offensive stance infers the desire for outward expansion which tends to trigger a direct response from other states who feel threatened by this posture. Since military actions along these lines are more evident to observers than internal political intentions, engendering a similar effort by other states to regain balance of power, offensive doctrines often lead to an arms race and greater likelihood of eventual armed conflict.

Conversely, a defensive military view indicates a preference for the status quo, with less apprehension created among other states for their own security. This suggests that states are not engaged in large military build-ups so that counter measures by other states are not as intense. Such a position also acts to reduce uncertainty on the part of other states about the general approach to foreign relations by a nation with a defensive grand strategy. Similarly, a deterrent military strategy is premised on preventing aggressive actions by other states through credible threats of inflicting unacceptable costs upon the aggressor that dissuade consideration of this course of action. It is argued further that deterrent military doctrine is the least susceptible to misperception or wrong interpretation by other states.

Posen reached some conclusions that have relevance for this dissertation. First, military doctrine has three major roles as part of a nation's grand strategy. One is to reduce uncertainty in an anarchial world political system by establishing a standard operating procedure (SOP) for anticipated likely scenarios of actions by other states. A second purpose is to limit the need for innovation in times of crisis, when decisions must be made with a lack of time and information. The last role is to stress the desirability of integrating the various military, political and economic components of the state's grand strategy in order to deal more effectively with problems as they arise.

There also is a need for civilian authorities to monitor the military doctrine established mainly by uniformed chiefs to ensure that the means of achieving objectives in this arena are compatible with political ones. This suggests the desirability of sufficient flexibility in the military component to adjust to changes in political circumstances and technological developments. Lastly, the value of coordination among states through alliances like NATO, particularly in terms of military cooperation and communication, greatly limits the chance of aggressive action against its members by other states.

The discussion of doctrines as a recognized part of American foreign policy is what sets this mechanism aside from those of other countries in Crabb's view of this subject. He notes that, outside the U.S. experience, issuance of doctrinal statements has been reserved for extraordinary situations. By contrast American presidents since 1945, with the exception of Kennedy and Ford, have made such a proclamation at some point in their tenure. Two separate areas of commonality among these doctrines are of interest. One is their general content, while the other deals with the context in which these statements were issued. The unique position of doctrine in this context and their several important features identified by Crabb have direct bearing on this dissertation and thus require full explanation.

One important connotation of these doctrines is the incorporation of some principle of domestic or international law. Drawing on the American ideal of a system of government by law and not of men, these statements of policy attempt to provide a legal basis for the position outlined for a particular stance on foreign policy. The Monroe Doctrine was a statement based on the right of each nation of self-defense, in this case sealing off the Western Hemisphere from traditionally expansionist European powers. Similarly, the Eisenhower and Carter Doctrines advanced the idea of protecting national security by indicating American interest in vital, strategic areas of the Middle East.

A second shared feature of these doctrines is the inclusion of a moral element along with the legal basis for U.S. policy, a reflection of the sense of American exceptionalism as a Christian nation and a model for others in the conduct of foreign affairs. While this is obvious in the veneration accorded the Monroe Doctrine by subsequent generations, it also appears in less known statements as well. The Open Door policy towards China was set by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899, stating that all nations conducting business in China agree first to equality of treatment in their respective spheres of influence in Asia and, the following year, cooperation with the U.S. policy of maintaining Chinese independence rather than partitioning of the country. Restated as the Stimson Doctrine in 1930 in reaction to Japanese incursion into the area, it stated that any imposed agreement on China resulting from this aggression would receive no legal recognition from the United States. This supported the preference to utilize moral persuasion in conjunction with legal obligations to assert national security interests rather than rely on military force. Later the Truman Doctrine was seen as a struggle between good and evil to see which would dominate the world (Crabb 1982, 376).

A third factor shared by these doctrines is their roots in the ideological and political principles strongly woven into the American character and world view. Crabb identified seven specific tenets of American values and ideals to be found in these foreign policy statements (1982, 378-85). Without going into detail for each one, they are:

1. Uniqueness of the new world, America's special destiny as a nation.

2. Belief in peace and nonviolent relationships, preference for negotiation over war in the conduct of foreign affairs.

3. Faith in self-government and independence, all people deserve to choose their own form of rule.

4. Power of America as example, superiority of American institutions and ideals as model for other nations of the world.

5. America's special mission, convert other nations to ideals of democracy and moral decency.

6. Utopian quality of America, ability to provide guidance towards peace and harmony.

7. Tradition of American unilateralism, willingness to lead or go it alone if necessary.

The context of American foreign policy doctrines often has been as important as the content of the message, particularly in the last 50 years, an aspect that offers a greater relevance to this dissertation and one to be considered in depth. Crabb's set of observations is valuable because while distinct doctrines were issued in different eras, all share significant features that apply to this study. He started with the view that almost without exception, American diplomatic doctrines were promulgated in times of crisis, demonstrating W.W. Rostow's general observation that U.S. policy making consists of a series of reactions to major crises. It was argued that, except for the Nixon Doctrine, it was the unexpected situation that gave impetus to the subsequent policy statement. As shown below even this exception, according to Nixon's own memoirs, had a sense of urgency attached to it. This aspect of doctrine appears well supported by several cases.

The clearest examples of statements issued in crisis are the Truman and Johnson Doctrines which occurred in rather turbulent circumstances. In the first case, Truman relates how the British government presented a note to Secretary of State George Marshall on February 24, 1947 stating that as of March 30 they were withdrawing all support to Greece, including 40,000 troops stationed there. This sudden departure of a major ally from a key part of the world was a challenge not only to that area but also had implications for Eastern Europe. The short time frame for action complicated the problem. The U.S. ambassador in Athens stressed the need for immediate action to bolster the spirits of the Greek leaders. At the same time General Smith, the American ambassador to Russia, noted that only British troops in the region prevented the Soviets from adding Greece to their sphere of influence. The conclusion was clear. "Greece needed aid, and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron curtain across the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be extremely endangered" (Truman 1956, 2:100). Given this grave view, it is amazing that the Truman Doctrine was announced formally by the President to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, just under three weeks after the formal notification of withdrawal from Greece by the British government.

A second example of doctrine issuance under crisis is President Lyndon Johnson's announcement that troops were being sent into the Dominican Republic to restore order in the midst of a chaotic situation. In this case, there was actual armed hostilities under way and a decision on how to respond had to be made almost immediately. Both Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk later wrote of the sense of urgency under which the sending of troops and the public explanation, later called the Johnson Doctrine, were determined. At the start of the unrest on April 24, 1965 to the first insertion of 400 U.S. Marines on April 28 to protect American citizens, the situation appeared manageable and time for a series of high level discussions was available. But, with the sudden collapse of all local authority on that date, plus the warning from Ambassador Bennett in Santo Domingo that power would likely be assumed by groups clearly identified with the Communist party, that small luxury disappeared.

As Johnson noted in his memoirs, the power vacuum created by the lack of any civilian control and the move by armed Communist factions to join rebel forces meant quick action was necessary. Thus on the night of April 29, 1965 the president and his top advisors determined "there was complete agreement that we must prevent a Communist takeover and act on a scale that would guarantee the earliest possible end to the fighting, destruction, and killing" (Johnson 1971, 200). Secretary Rusk confirmed this assessment of the crisis mode in which the decision to intervene was made, stating the Dominican crisis

". . . was a confusing situation, complicated by a complete breakdown of public order and threats to the safety of hundreds of American citizens. Decisions had to be made, and made quickly. But events turned out well" (Rusk 1990, 377). While the statements of Rusk and Johnson appear at first glance merely to be after-the-fact justifications for the military operation in the Dominican Republic, it will be shown in the case study and subsequent discussion in the final chapter that they also reflect pre-existing doctrinal attitudes that led to that policy.

Although not involving the type of immediate crises noted above, both President Carter and Nixon faced sharp pressure for actions resulting in doctrinal statements as well. In the first instance, the Nixon Doctrine occurred at a key point in the Vietnam conflict. At an informal press conference at Guam on July 25, 1969 the president responded to a reporter's question by stating that the United States would keep its treaty commitments to such nations as Thailand under SEATO, but would encourage and expect issues of internal security to be handled by the Asian nations themselves. What was not said by the president is that this was part of a strategy of secrecy surrounding the early meetings between then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and North Vietnam's Xuan Thuy trying to negotiate the war's end. The acceptance of proposed talks by Thuy arrived only days before the Guam statement, later named the Nixon Doctrine.

President Carter faced two compelling challenges leading to his inclusion in the January 23, 1980 State of the Union address a policy that became known as the Carter Doctrine regarding the Persian Gulf region. First the U.S. embassy in Tehran was taken over on November 4, 1979 with over 400 American citizens held hostage. Then on December 27, 1989, the Soviets began invading Afghanistan. The combination of the two events created tremendous pressure for a U.S. response. In assessing the latter event, Carter wrote in his diary on January 3, 1980, "This is the most serious international development that has occurred since I have been President, and unless the Soviets recognize that it has been counterproductive for them, we will face additional serious problems with invasions or subversion in the future" (Carter 1982, 473). As a result, in addition to imposing an embargo on grain sales to Russia and withdrawing the U.S. team from the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics, the following statement was added to the State of the Union address: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force" (Carter 1982, 483).

A second factor tied closely to the crisis nature in which the doctrines have been issued is that time pressure forced public statements with minimal consideration of the long-range implications of these policies. This also appears to have sufficient grounds for acceptance. Crabb cited Senator Vandenberg's comment regarding the Truman Doctrine that it was ". . . unfortunate when such important decisions have to be made on a crisis basis. But we confront a condition and not a theory" (Crabb 1982, 389). For instance, Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance observed that failure to consider the effect of the State of the Union statement on the Persian Gulf and other measures directed at the Soviets caused later problems with European allies who had substantial interests in the region. "Upset at what they viewed as inadequate consultations on a common Western approach before we announced far-reaching punitive steps, some felt we had adopted a confrontational strategy without taking European interests into account; having done so, we were now unfairly criticizing them for inadequate cooperation and support" (Vance 1983, 393). Vance agreed with part of this assessment, noting it taught the lesson that it is important to give adequate forewarning of what is considered unacceptable international behavior, both as a deterrent to such action and to prepare allies and the American public for quick and severe responses.

A more recent assessment of the Truman Doctrine noted a similar impact. In her work providing a psychological explanation for this containment policy, Larson (1985) indicated that Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who initially formulated the statement, did not identify the basic principles and mechanisms for implementing this policy at the time it was pronounced. Several key administration figures also found the implications to be troubling. Truman's former Secretary of State James Byrnes stated the speech implied that the U.S. would oppose communists trying to control any country in the world and that was not our position as he understood it. His replacement George Marshall thought the anti-communist element was overstated as well. George Kennan, a senior State Department official, was more clear in his objection to the way this policy might be interpreted. "[I]t placed our aid to Greece in the framework of a universal policy rather than in that of a specific decision addressed to a specific set of circumstances. . . . It seemed to me highly uncertain that we would invariably find it in our interests or within our means to extend assistance to countries [provided only that they face] the threat of 'subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures'" (Freeland 1972, 100-1). In his assessment of the Reagan Doctrine, Henry Kissinger observed, "The results helped to speed the collapse of communism but left America face-to-face with the tormenting question it has tried to avoid through most of its history, which happens to be the statesman's central dilemma: what ends justify which means?" (Kissinger 1994, 775). Finally, Dozer (1965) described the Monroe Doctrine as a policy which started out as a statement of defense of the Americas from outside interference, yet at one point, after the Roosevelt Corollary announcement, became one that forced Latin American nations to look to Europe and then the League of Nations for some protection against U.S. interference in their affairs.

A third assertion regarding the context of presidential doctrines is that they reinforce the primary role of the chief executive in setting foreign policy, particularly in times of major difficulties. The main area of this activity has been as the protector of national security. This view is echoed by a leading Latin American writer who noted, "I conclude that the Monroe Doctrine is not a doctrine but a dogma, . . . not one dogma but two, to wit: the dogma of the infallibility of the American President and the dogma of the immaculate conception of American foreign policy" (Dozer 1965, 1). In considering this factor, it is important to distinguish between the image of the president as the foreign policy leader of the nation and the practical reality that this function is shared among various actors both inside and outside of the government.

The president's function as chief diplomat and leader of the foreign policy making apparatus of American government is one which has been recognized for some time. This was explicitly stated by Chief Justice Sutherland in the *United States v. Curtiss-Wright* (1936) decision when distinguishing between the constitutional grant of power to the president in domestic and foreign affairs. His opinion read in part:

> In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He *makes* treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved (Tower 1987, 150).

It should be noted that this is not a blanket grant of power in foreign affairs to the president, but simply placed him at the forefront of the policy making process. The main point is that the chief executive does have the exclusive authority to issue statements, including doctrines, on behalf of the nation.

This gave rise to the two presidencies thesis advanced by Wildavsky (1966), asserting that chief executives have much greater success controlling the nation's defense and foreign policies than they enjoyed in the domestic policy area. The explanation advanced for this is presidents have significantly more control over information, expertise and initiation in foreign policy than does Congress, which is seen as fractured along party and constituent lines among the 535 members of the legislature. Along with public expectations of presidential leadership in this area, the president has the vantage point as chief diplomat and commander in chief, a strong position to issue doctrines that carry with them the prestige and authority of the highest office in the land.

Assessing Reagan's presidency, his Secretary of State George Shultz concluded "[h]e would fight resolutely for an idea, believing that, if it was valid, he could persuade the American people to support it. He changed the national and international agenda on issue after issue . . . He was a fervent anti-Communist who could comprehend and believe that people everywhere would choose to throw off the Communist system if they ever had the chance. And he worked hard to give them that chance" (Shultz 1993, 1135-6). The Reagan Doctrine was the embodiment of the presidential role as communicator of this philosophy to the nation and the world. In a well-reasoned critique of this policy statement, James Scott (1996) observed this presidential rhetoric became an important element of American foreign policy stating that in foreign policy, declarations are often as significant as actions, and the Reagan Doctrine indicated the potential, if not the likelihood, of increasing costs to the Soviet Union, which Moscow recognized. This effectively supported diplomatic efforts by the U.S. to moderate Soviet policy and facilitate troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and Angola.

Other presidents have expressed similar views of this aspect of the office. Lyndon Johnson concluded in his memoirs, "Scholars have been defining and refining the role of the President for almost two centuries. At the core of all those definitions one basic tenet remains: The job of the President is to set priorities for the nation, and he must set them according to his own judgment, and his own conscience" (Johnson 1971, 566). Speaking in this case on formal recognition of Israel by the U.S. in 1949, President Truman indicated that there is an inherent conflict between career State Department staff and the executive that must be resolved in favor of the latter. "But I wanted to make it plain that the President of the United States, and not the second or third echelon in the State Department, is responsible for making foreign policy, and, furthermore, that no one in any department can sabotage the President's policy. The civil servant, the general or admiral, the foreign service officer has no authority to make policy. They act only as servants of the government, and therefore they must remain in line with the government policy that is established by those who have been chosen by the people to set that policy" (Truman 1956, 2:165).

As stated above, there is a difference between the perceived role of the president as the spokesman for the nation's foreign policy and the political realities of carrying out these initiatives. The two presidencies thesis advanced by Wildavsky 30 years ago has been challenged both in terms of methodology and the application of the concept beyond the specific era (1948-64) on which it was based. Several writers argue that the use of congressional approval rates for selected important executive policy initiatives does not fully reflect all that goes into making foreign policy. LeLoup and Shull (1991) indicated that many foreign policy decisions are not formally considered by Congress nor is there direct participation in the process by legislators. They also found that for the period 1965-75 only 55 percent of presidential proposals on defense and foreign policy issues were approved by Congress, compared to the 70 percent rate reported by Wildavsky.

Another factor is that Congress has asserted itself more into the foreign policy area since the Vietnam war period in several areas. It has passed the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act requiring the president to report all executive agreements to that body for review. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act establishes a procedure whereby the president must report all proposed covert intelligence activities to congressional oversight committees, certifying that they are necessary and important to national security. The most prominent legislative control is the War Powers Act of 1973 limiting the president's ability to commit troops to overseas combat situations, although executive compliance with this act has been spotty at best. Fiscal control on foreign aid, arms sales to foreign parties and funding restrictions on military assistance in Angola and Central America also demonstrate congressional willingness to exercise greater influence over the president's actions in setting and implementing foreign policy.

This power sharing in the area of foreign affairs has accelerated in the post-Cold War era according to Scott's analysis of the process leading to the proclamation of the Reagan Doctrine that has implication for future presidents. First, with the demise of the USSR as a superpower rival, the level of threat to U.S. national security has declined. As this has ebbed, so has the "rally around the president" consensus the allowed the executive to take bold steps to counteract the perceived danger. Second, there is greater bargaining and persuasion occurring among governmental and private actors as the interdependence of economic, political and cultural ties in the world blurs the once-clear distinction between foreign and domestic agendas. This has led to another factor, the lack of one clear mission for the U.S. internationally, as regional alliances and individual nations emerge on the world stage. Finally, changes in the foreign policy bureaucracy, including greater participation by Congress, executive agencies such as Agriculture, Treasury and Commerce and private groups has created more access points into the policy making process. Thus as we get away from the unique set of circumstances of the Cold War, a more varied and complex policy making environment will reduce the president's unilateral power to issue sweeping foreign policy doctrines in the future.

The last observation by Crabb regarding the context of foreign policy doctrines is that they have tended to lack clarity on the extent of commitment intended and the conditions under which the policy may be applied ambiguous and flexible. This reflects a peculiarly American approach to foreign policy that has been labeled "dogmatic pragmatism" where "[i]t has seemed to us that it is our role to intervene in world affairs with sporadic and violent bursts of energy and with decisive and definitive effect - to appear on the scene in the nick of time like a knight errant, rescue the lady, and ride away" (Halle 1955, xv-xvi). Crabb stated the dogmatic aspect of these doctrines has been to express general principles that could be invoked and reapplied to guide American officials in dealing with external problems; pragmatically the doctrines have been issued as a result of practical challenges requiring a specific remedy, rather than as abstract philosophical propositions. The fact that such doctrines are in place prior to their expression in particular events suggests they also have a significant role in choosing a specific policy that responds to the event in question.

The Monroe Doctrine is seen by many as an example of such an undefined policy statement, which is unilaterally applied as needed by American officials. "The United States interprets the so-called Monroe Doctrine every time an international incident occurs in America, and it is unnecessary to say that each interpretation is adjusted to the requirements of the moment, as a result of which almost all the interpretations differ from each other. In every case, throughout the long history of the Doctrine, one observes clearly this one tendency and single objective: to favor the interests of the United States to the exclusion of the interests of those of any other country, whether American or not, even when it apparently is pursuing a disinterested end" (Fabela 1965, 181). This view reflects a problem that Crabb noted regarding the Monroe Doctrine, in that there is an important difference between the national interest principles first articulated by the United States in 1823 and those expressed in the several corollaries and reinterpretations which have followed. The result has been the emergence of genuine doubt and ambiguity, even among professional diplomats, as to what it means when asserted in contemporary American foreign policy.

This same observation is made about the Reagan Doctrine both in terms of its meaning and its application. Scott reported at least four variations in interpretation of the statement within the Reagan administration. Some hard liners saw it as the mechanism to roll back communism, while others considered it as a tool of diplomacy to negotiate Soviet troop withdrawals in key areas. A third group believed it called for direct American aid only to those countries where the Soviets actually had troops stationed. A final group included CIA Director William Casey, who took it to mean the U.S. should create anti-communist insurgent groups to overthrow certain foreign leaders. This divergence was reflected in the fact that the doctrine was applied consistently only in the case of Afghanistan where aid flowed to the mujahedin fighting the invading Russian army. Cambodian rebels received non-lethal American assistance, while aid to the contras in Nicaragua followed several different paths.

Steel argued that the Truman Doctrine's vagueness in terms of where and how the containment policy applied led to a range of complicated alliances far beyond protecting Greece from communist takeover. "This led through the back door of the European Recovery Program, to NATO, under which the United States is pledged to the defense of most of Europe and even parts of the Near East - from Spitzbergen to the Berlin Wall and beyond to the Asian borders of Turkey. From there the commitments become more vague, the situations more ambiguous, the countries themselves less crucial to American security" (Steel 1970, 9-10). Similarly, the Johnson Doctrine which is seen as justifying the use of American troops to any country in the Western Hemisphere faced with a communist takeover is cast as a restatement of the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary as opposed to a totally new foreign policy for the region.

SCHEMA THEORY AND OPERATIONAL CODE

The manner in which the national interest-doctrine link functions in the decision making process deals in large part with how the actor processes information in a given situation. That is, in what context does this relationship come into play and how does it function. The argument advanced here is that operational code is a mechanism to organize and assess data within which doctrine as operationalized national interest serves as a heuristic device to facilitate decision making. In order to clarify this proposition, each of these elements needs to be examined.

Schema theory. Schema theory grew out of early studies on voting behavior as researchers tried to understand how individuals take vast quantities of information generated during political campaigns and come to the point where they can make personally acceptable ballot choices. Instead of piecemeal processing of data without any attempt to rationalize it along some logical framework, it was posited that some form of overall organizing structure must be present for a person to feel comfortable in making a vote choice (Fiske and Taylor 1984). Thus schema theory suggested that individuals have some cognitive mechanism to process, store and retrieve information in a coherent format on which they can make rational decisions. It also meant that people use heuristics or logical short-cuts in reasoning to reach these decisions. Therefore schema may be seen as a cognitive structure that contains knowledge about the attributes of a concept and the relationship among those attributes. It also has been defined by Taylor and Crocker (1981) as a cognitive structure that consists in part of a representation of some defined stimulation domain. The schema contains general knowledge about that domain, including specification of the relationships among its attributes, as well as specific examples of instances of the stimulus domain. Thus it provides hypotheses about incoming stimuli, which includes a plan for interpreting and gathering schema-related information. Augoustinos and Innes (1990) stated this takes the form of general expectations which allow for the prediction and control of the social world by guiding the individual's perceptual, memory and inference processes.

The structure of these attributional relationships is as important as the process undertaken to assess information. Schema theory asserts that information is hierarchically arranged with the more abstract categories of data at the top and more specific categories at the bottom, enabling the person to move from concrete instances or events to a more general level of inference. Data may be processed in several manners depending on how the relationships among the attributes of the schema structure are expressed. The critical factor is that schema theory explicitly recognizes that the actual content of a schema will determine the way it is processed, the recognition that content has a direct bearing on the way information is organized and structured.

Heuristics. Another approach suggested by Fiske and Taylor is what is referred to as event schema in which people's prior knowledge of the typical sequence of events on standard social occasions helps them to understand ambiguous information, to remember relevant information, and to infer consistent information where it is missing. Inference as an information processing mechanism leads to the second part of this discussion, that of an heuristic as a decision making device. An heuristic is a cognitive rule of thumb that allows a person to make decisions without a formal process of information gathering, analysis and consideration of alternative actions. This is employed when a person tries to make an decision by setting some form of parameters in which to process information involving issues of time, probability and the range of outcomes. "Awareness of this wide range of difficulties, the constant need to deal with the problems that they present in connection with the reliability and validity of available information, the high level of uncertainty faced, the resultant complexity, and on the other hand the increasing challenge of making decisions that necessitate at least a minimum of reliable information create a conscious or unconscious need to set standards and criteria, arbitrary or otherwise, of acceptability. Without such criteria decisionmakers will find themselves helpless to perform their functions " (Vertzberger 1990, 34).

Drawing on the primary work in this area (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) there are four main heuristic devices employed to reach decisions. One is representativeness in which one makes inferences about probabilities by estimating the extent to which a particular event or person is similar to a category of such items with which the person is familiar. In this instance, the individual is making a judgment of relevancy of a specific piece of information to their larger range of data on that subject. Limitations of this approach include a tendency to discount prior outcome probabilities that did not meet expectations, insufficient sample size on which to make reliable inferences, and insensitivity to the predictive values of information in relation to the category in question. However, Fiske and Taylor suggest that allowing for these limitations, representativeness is usually as good as more extensive analysis at reaching acceptable choices.

Availability is a heuristic that evaluates the likelihood of a particular outcome or event based on how easily other relevant instances or associations come to the mind of the decision maker. This depends on how many similar circumstances are within the experience of the person and how quickly the information on them can be recalled in the present situation. Once retrieved, the immediate issue is compared with these prior experiences and a judgment made on the probability that essentially the same result will occur for the one at hand. Problems of ease of data retrieval, bias in selecting relevant examples and the strength of association between prior events and the current one apply to this mechanism of decision making.

Constructing hypothetical situations to identify possible outcomes based on current data is referred to as a simulation heuristic. One takes the information that is known about the event at hand and, drawing on past experience of knowledge of such activities, makes an assessment of likely outcomes. This may be considered as making an educated guess on potential results using what information can be obtained in a short period of time. A variation on this concept is the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, where a person tries to reduce ambiguity in a situation by establishing a reference point or anchor with the information immediately at hand, and then making changes to the estimated result as more data becomes available.

Even with the inherent shortcomings of these cognitive devices, they still prove useful for several reasons (Sherman and Corty 1984) according to Vertzberger's summary. One is that they often do produce acceptable if not optimal results that meet the need for a timely decision by overcoming difficulties of external pressure of events and information overload. Heuristics also bolster the decision maker's confidence in their choice of options by stressing positive aspects of the result while downplaying objections to the decision. Similarly, biases or errors in judgment are not necessarily obvious to the actor, while a combination of heuristic methods may result in these flaws canceling out each other. Acceptance of satisficing resolution to a situation may leave the actor ignorant of a better one, further supporting this method of decision making. Lastly, either a perception that dissonant information is unimportant or not relevant can lead the person to give more weight to the chosen solution than is merited, yet creating a case of self-fulfilling prophesy by doing so. Thus heuristics have a significant and valuable role in the decision making process conducted by many people in a position where a critical choice must be made.

Operational code. The role of subjective perceptions and personal beliefs of political leaders have a crucial impact on the way they make decisions in conflict situations. An important, though "neglected" approach to this subject is that of operational code analysis as developed by Leites (1951, 1953), George (1969) and Holsti (1977). This concept suggests there are certain psychological elements that serve as a prism influencing the actor's perceptions and diagnoses on the flow of political events as well as his definitions and estimates of particular situations. They provide the norms, standards and guidelines that affect a decision maker's choice of strategy, tactics and range of alternative actions that are considered in those situations. George stated that while not the only factor in shaping the decision making activity, one's operational code is a highly prominent one.

This dissertation posits that the national interest-doctrine connection functioning as a heuristic device figures significantly in this process. Without going into substantial depth of analysis of the operational code of the key participants in the case studies, their philosophical and instrumental belief are identified sufficiently to indicate how they may have affected subsequent decisions to use military force.

The operational code perspective originated with Merton (1940), who defined the term as the values, world view and response repertoire which an individual shares with other members of an organization. It was fully applied first by Leites in his two volume study of Kremlin leaders of the Politburo in the 1950's. In *The Operational Code of the Kremlin* (1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953) he illustrated how the shared beliefs and world view of the closed and isolated group created a set of decision making rules that could be used to identify predictable outcomes and policies (Walker 1990, 403-4).

The second major work in this area is George's expansion of Leites effort, which he characterized as a worthwhile but neglected area of study (1969). What was needed to make operational code a useful tool of analysis was to extract and give structure to the form of beliefs and decision making guidelines identified by Leites so they could be applied to other situations. This reflected the accepted view that decision makers attempt to deal with incomplete information about a given situation, uncertainty regarding possible outcomes of one or another course of action, and difficulty in applying a single criterion by which to judge which solution is best. These cognitive limitations lead the decision maker to filter these assessments through the two main components of the operational code. The operational code construct becomes helpful by integrating into the policy-making analysis the political actor's perception and structuring of the environment in which he attempts to advance certain relevant interests. This includes both generalized assessments of the political situation as well as more specific understandings of how certain objectives can be achieved in that environment. The following description of these elements comes from the seminal George article which is widely reproduced in operational code studies of individual leaders such as Senator Vandenberg (Anderson 1973), John Foster Dulles (Holsti 1970), Dean Acheson (McLellan 1971), Henry Kissinger (Walker 1977, Starr 1984), and Senator J. William Fulbright (Tweraser 1974).

The first element is a general set of issues and questions posed by a political actor facing a particular situation that involves abstract concepts. This includes the fundamental nature of political conflict, predictability of political events, and the extent to which individual action can affect those occurrences. A second, more concrete element addresses beliefs about ends-means relationships and the context of political action. These sets of questions are listed below.

Philosophical Content of Operational Code

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and " shaping" history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

George concluded that knowledge of the belief system and perceptions of political actors provides an important factor that needs to be considered as part of any behavioral analysis of political decision making and leadership styles. The operational code approach facilitates this to the extent that it lays out the actor's perceptions and structuring of the political world to which he relates and within which the actor is attempting to operate on behalf of the interests with which he is identified. In order to make a decision, the actor gives these perceptions some meaning to fit both the objective situation at hand and his own interests and emotions (de Rivera 1968). The actor's confidence in the ends-means chain identified through the operational code thus makes it unnecessary for him to have a detailed image of the other state in order to believe that he can predict its behavior in the particular situation (Jervis 1970). The argument advanced by this dissertation is that the national interest-doctrine link is the heuristic mechanism by which this operational code operates for the decision maker in critical situations, and where military force then becomes a more likely option.

The operational code approach to analyzing foreign policy choices is based on identifying the set of "master beliefs" likely to have the greatest impact in a wide range of situations, and which act to determine or define the rules of the game by which the decision making process is conducted (Heradstveit and Narvesen 1978). It sets a framework for the centralized cognitive orientation which the political actor uses to process information and events. Two main propositions support this approach. The first is that the central or most deeply ingrained beliefs are the most stable ones, even in rapidly changing situations or crises where new information steadily flows in. The other is that these central beliefs have a strong tendency to be consistent and structurally simple organizing tools to process information. Thus the operational code serves to define the range of uncertainty or limit the range of probable choices of the policy maker is likely to consider in a given situation. Utilizing the five questions George laid out under the philosophical and instrumental contents of the operational code construct, one then is able to explain better the policy choices made. This approach will be applied in this dissertation through three case studies - Dominican Republic 1965; Grenada 1983; and Panama 1989 - to examine the following propositions:

> 1. Both physical security of the homeland and sustainability of the American political system are operationalized elements of national interest in U.S. foreign policy doctrines.
>
> 2. Sustainability of America's political system generally is of greater intensity than direct threat to the country's physical security (per Neuchterlein matrix) in these doctrines.
>
> 3. The national interest-doctrine link was utilized as a heuristic device in the decision to employ military troops in the case study situations.
>
> 4. This process is likely to be applicable in future situations of a similar nature, based on the "Clinton Doctrine" that has been developed to date regarding the use of military force.

SUMMARY

The remainder of the dissertation begins with a chapter on the historical basis of the Monroe Doctrine and its evolution up to its incorporation in the March 1954 Declaration of Caracas by the Tenth Inter-American Conference of States. The layout of the chapter introduces the format to be used in the subsequent case studies: circumstances under which the relevant situation arose; a profile of the key participants; description of the decision making process leading to military intervention; and an interpretation of the application of the particular doctrine to each case. The operational code of the participants in the cases is identified as a mechanism to assess the policy choice. This was not done for the Monroe Doctrine chapter since data on the belief systems of the participants is limited, and the main purpose of this material is to establish the context of American foreign policy toward Latin America for the three cases selected. The concluding chapter considers the viability of the propositions listed above, using these examples of direct military intervention as the measure chosen to implement specific U.S. policy. It also will consider the efforts of the Clinton administration to formulate its own doctrine for the use of military force, reflected in public statements by top policymakers. This is illustrated in the February 1995 *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* issued by the White House.

CHAPTER 3

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The first example of foreign policy doctrine relating to American policy in Latin America is drawn from the December 2, 1823 state of the union message by President James Monroe. The principles laid out therein, which later presidents applied under the rubric of the Monroe Doctrine, are important not only for how they guided American foreign policy in the region for the next 150 years, but also for the process by which they were formulated. Therefore, as the model for subsequent doctrinal statements, it is useful to assess the perilous circumstances under which the original statement was prepared, as well as the way in which it was reinterpreted and expanded by succeeding administrations in similar situations. This includes a sense of urgency, limited factual information and a small decision making group. A high probability of involvement in military hostilities, evident in 1823 and the later examples, also plays an important role in policy-making during a foreign policy crisis (Brecher, Wilkenfield and Moser 1988, 3). The formulation, issuance and justification for subsequent policy doctrines provide a solid context for considering their role in critical decision making on military intervention in the case studies of the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama.

There are several aspects of the Monroe Doctrine that merit attention as part of this analysis. First is the set of circumstances under which the concept of the doctrine was created, centered on Anglo-American relations after almost 50 years of armed hostilities. Another major element concerns the personalities of President Monroe and his cabinet members - Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and Treasury Secretary William H. Crawford - and how they impact the decision-making process of this small group. The third element considers the debate among the cabinet members as to the best mechanism to express these foreign policy principles, ranging from a private diplomatic note to an overt public statement in response to the challenge posed by the European Holy Alliance and attempts by England, primarily through the offices of British Foreign Minister George Canning, to engage America in counteracting that entity's interests in the Western hemisphere. Last is the interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin America by subsequent presidents as well as top State Department officials. This provides the format that is utilized to assess the three subsequent case studies.

CONTEXT

The decade immediately preceding the Monroe Doctrine set the stage for the series of events that prompted issuance of this major statement of American foreign policy. The War of 1812 with England left the United States more convinced than before that relations with European nations were to be approached with caution. This conflict had its origins in the continental dispute between France's Napoleon and England's King George III, into which the United States was drawn as the conflict spread to the waters off the American coastline. It began in May 1806 with England declaring a naval blockade of Europe from Brest to the Elbe River. Napoleon reciprocated by issuing the Berlin Decree on November 21, 1806 making the British Isles off-limits to all shipping. He followed this with the Milan decree of December 17, 1807 stating that any neutral ship which allowed itself to be boarded and searched by the British navy became a lawful target for French seizure. When it became evident that U. S. merchant ships were imperiled by both warring parties, and thus threatened an American economy still dependent on European trade, on December 14, 1807 Congress implemented the Non-Importation Act it had passed in April 1806. Designed to bring economic pressure against both sides by prohibiting any ships sailing from American ports to European ones, it also authorized the President to lift it from whichever belligerent removed their restriction on American shipping. Due to public pressure resulting from hardships experienced by all sectors of the domestic economy, this act was repealed by Congress on March 1, 1809. It was replaced by the much weaker Nonintercourse Act which banned commerce with England and France until American rights were respected (Bailey 1968, 129).

Two episodes followed involving negotiations with Britain and France respectively that further disillusioned American statesmen regarding establishment of firm relations with Europe. The first was England's attempt to overcome the effects of the embargo by negotiating with the new Madison administration to recognize American interests to the point that the trade ban would be lifted. The British minister in Washington, David Erskine, had been instructed by Foreign Secretary George Canning to set up the framework for this agreement. However Erskine, whose sympathies lay with the United States (in part because his wife was an American), exceeded his instructions by negotiating and signing a pact that did not fully reflect the British government's view, particularly with respect to British seizure of American ships entering French ports. As a result, on June 10, 1809 James Madison announced the agreement publicly including an end to the embargo on Britain, only to have Canning repudiate the agreement and recall Erskine. Madison then had to reinstate the embargo on August 9, suffering much personal embarrassment in the process. This also inflamed public resentment against England, making further negotiations impossible (Bailey 1968, 131-2).

Having been snubbed by England, the Madison administration tried to secure some form of agreement with Napoleon Bonaparte. Congress replaced the Nonintercourse Act of 1809 with the Macon Bill of May 1, 1810 that allowed trade with both England and France. The bill also stated that if either of the two countries repealed their decrees of shipping seizure rights, renewal of the trade embargo by America against the other country would be reinstated. A three-month grace period then was to be extended to that country to allow it to repeal its decree as well. Napoleon took quick advantage of this provision by sending President Madison a letter through Foreign Minister Duc de Cadore. This August 5, 1810 message stated that France immediately repealed its decrees, but with a caveat that England must do the same or America would be expected to institute a British embargo.

The wording of the letter was deliberately vague as to the sequence of these events but, in his anxiety to make up for the Erskine episode, Madison accepted the French statement and issued a November 2, 1810 proclamation of trade with France and embargo of England without extending the grace period to the latter. Not surprisingly, Britain did not respond favorably and therefore France did not follow through on its pledge to respect American shipping rights. In fact, Napoleon ordered the sale of previously seized U. S. vessels on the date of the Cadore letter and continued to allow capture of American ships. It soon became evident that Madison once again had erred in his diplomatic efforts and had to back down in a humiliating manner. A *New York Evening Post* cartoon of the time showed James Madison throwing his hands in the air while the British Foreign Secretary menaced him with a club as Napoleon emptied the President's pockets (Bailey 1968, 142). This sense of victimization led Madison to consider a joint declaration of war on both countries but practical considerations limited the hostilities to England.

The next phase of diplomatic relations involving the U. S. and Europe was that over the Treaty of Ghent to secure the peace between America and England after the War of 1812. With knowledge of the missteps that led to these hostilities, the American delegation sent to negotiate this agreement consisted of five individuals (John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, James Bayard and Jonathan Russell), all of whom had sufficient capacity to deal with England in this critical situation.[1] However, their British counterparts

[1] It is particularly important that Adams led this delegation, since he played such a key role in the Monroe Doctrine events nine years later. His diary comments prove very illuminating on the thoughts of the participants in both situations.

were definitely inferior, partly due to England's disdain for recently independent America, which almost lost this second military encounter within 25 years with the mother country. But the main reason for this second level British team was the concurrent Congress of Vienna which drew their top diplomats, including Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, to the task of redrawing the European map after the fall of Napoleon. The imbalance between the American and British negotiators created serious problems from the start.

As the parties met on August 8, 1814, at the instruction of the State Department the American negotiators prepared to open discussions on the issues of ending impressment of Americans on British ships, ending seaport blockades and securing other neutral rights. But they never got the chance as the British made the first move by demanding three terms of any peace agreement. These were (1) the U. S. could not keep armed ships or land fortifications on the Great Lakes, (2) transfer of land to Britain on the western shore of Lake Superior with smaller tracts in upper New York and Maine, and (3) creation of an Indian buffer zone on the southern shores of the Great Lakes. The main purpose was to protect Canada from American incursion and to protect British claims on the western half of North America (Bailey 1968, 152-4).

Adams noted in his diary of August 19 that the tone of the British demands was more peremptory and overbearing than at any previous conferences. An exchange between Adams and British Member of Parliament Henry Goulburn, recorded in his diary for September 1, 1814 shows the tenor of these earlier negotiations. Adams began by observing that the conquest of Canada was never a goal of America during the war but simply a consequence of the course taken by the two sides on the conflict. However, as the U. S. population expanded westward no simple piece of paper could prevent claims on these territories, even by interposing Indian lands as a barrier.

> "What!" said Mr. Goulburn, "is it, then, in the inevitable nature of things that the United States must conquer Canada?"
>
> "No."
>
> "But what security, then, can Great Britain have for her possession of it?"
>
> "If Great Britain does not think a liberal and amicable course of policy towards America would be the best security, as it certainly would, she must rely upon her general strength, upon the superiority of her power in other parts of her relations with America, upon the power which she has upon another element, to indemnify herself, by sudden impression upon American interests, more defenceless [sic] against her superiority, and in their amount far more valuable, than Canada ever was or ever will be" (Adams 1929, 133).

By early September, the Americans were ready to concede defeat in their negotiations and return home. Gallatin wrote home that the British demands seemed designed to prolong the war in order to cripple the United States and thus he did not expect to spend more than three weeks in pursuit of a treaty. This view was further supported when news came in early October that British troops had seized Washington and burned the White House. Just as the British negotiators toughened their stance as a result of this advance, the report arrived of the American victory in the battle of Lake Champlain, repulsing an invasion attempt by 10,000 British troops. At first, the Foreign Ministry tried to convince the Duke of Wellington to assume command of the British Army in Canada, hoping to replicate his success in defeating Napoleon's forces at Waterloo.

Wellington replied the only way he could take on such a task was if British control of the Great Lakes could be assured, which the recent reversal at Lake Champlain clearly obviated. Therefore, the Duke advised "I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, to demand any concession of territory from America . . . You have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory . . . You can get no territory; indeed, the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any; and you only afford the Americans a popular and creditable ground . . . to avoid to make peace"

(Bailey 1968, 153). With this, the British negotiators at Ghent changed focus and an agreement to end the war was quickly secured.

While not significant with respect to the actual terms of the peace, the process of negotiating the agreement had several lasting effects on the two countries, some of which directly impacted the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine. One was the acceptance by European leaders of the United States as a fully independent and sovereign nation, equal in status to those on the Continent. Its diplomatic representatives thus received greater respect and attention than in the past, which becomes critical in the communications both with England and Russia resulting in the 1823 message to the world of America's role in the Western Hemisphere.

The other was reopening of trade between America and Europe as the seaport blockades in place during the War of 1812 disappeared. This also led to demilitarization of the U. S.-Canada border, further advancing amicable Anglo-American relations. As a result, movement increased into the recently acquired Louisiana Territory mapped by Lewis and Clark in 1804-6. The establishment of the trading settlement at Astoria on the Pacific Ocean at the edge of the Oregon Territory, lost to the British when the war began, was restored to American control under the treaty of Ghent, setting up the eventual confrontation with tsarist Russia over claims along the Western coastline. This dominance by the United States in North America by 1820 created the conditions for the announcement by President James Monroe in 1823 of the responsibility this nation assumed for this region of the world.

PARTICIPANTS

There were three main actors directly responsible for the development of the Monroe Doctrine, besides the fifth U. S. president with which it is identified. These cabinet members played different roles but all had a hand in the discussions. One was

Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford, whose contribution was relatively slight but whose presence in this small group, and strong political ambitions for the top office, created an interesting dynamic, even though he was ill and absent for much of the actual doctrine debate. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun was a more active member even with lesser foreign policy credentials than Crawford. However, in spite of this limited knowledge, his assistance in this endeavor primarily involved agreeing with others rather than advancing viewpoints of his own. The dominant cabinet officer was Secretary of State John Quincy Adams who, drawing on over 30 years of direct foreign policy experience, provided the driving force behind the final state of the union message sent to Congress by the President. Before looking at the process of drafting this long-lasting doctrine, it is useful to understand the background and approach each of these men brought to the issue of American relations with the major European powers to whom it was addressed.

William Crawford began his political career as a member of the Georgia state legislature from 1803 to 1807, moving up to be a U. S. senator from that state from 1807 to 1813. Although mainly interested in regional issues affecting the South he did get involved in the embargo debate just prior to the War of 1812. Initially against the actions, he came around to support it after Madison won election as president in 1808. He noted that while it caused some economic hardship on the Southern states, it was part of their sectional duty to the nation to preserve national honor in the face of English and French challenges. In advocating a cut in navy financing in 1810 Crawford inquired ". . . whether the present situation of the world does not solemnly admonish this nation to stand aloof from the dreadful convulsions with which Europe for years past has been agitated to its centre" (May 1975, 40). Shortly after the war began, he served as U. S. Minister to France from 1813 to 1815.

After his two-year overseas duty, Crawford was appointed by President Madison to be his Secretary of War, a post in which he served for two years. He then switched over to become the Treasury secretary, holding that position under the Madison administration from 1816 to 1820; Monroe kept him on in that role from 1820 to 1825. Two aspects of Crawford's service at the cabinet level are important here. The first is that he gained valuable experience in managing government affairs, earning a solid reputation as a manager of public finances. But at the same time he also developed a political following that fueled his presidential ambitions, which he exhibited so openly that it diminished the impact of his advice and opinions. This was especially true for his rivals for that position, including John C. Calhoun, James Monroe and John Quincy Adams.

Earlier Crawford and Henry Clay had actively sought the position of Secretary of State in the Monroe administration as a stepping stone to higher office. Not wanting to create a power base for either, the president chose John Quincy Adams for the post since he did not seem to want or to be capable of achieving the ultimate office. At the time, Crawford was characterized as ". . . a hardy, bold, resolute man, with the *appearance* of great frankness and openness of character, unpolished and somewhat rude in his manner, and very far inferior to Mr. Adams in learning and attainments. He has, however, a strong, vigorous mind, and has made himself what he is by his own active efforts" (Peterson 1987, 86). Adams soon came to recognize that he shared the cabinet with a potential rival, noting that "Crawford is not a worse man than the usual herd of ambitious intriguers - perhaps not so bad as many of them. I do not think him entirely unprincipled, but his ambition swallows up his principle" (Bemis 1949, 252). This view, generally shared by others in the administration and in Congress served to limit the role of William Crawford in the critical period during which the 1823 Monroe message was discussed and formulated.

Secretary of War John C. Calhoun provided an interesting contrast with his southern compatriot Crawford. He served as a member of the South Carolina legislature from 1808 to 1810, then moving up to the U. S. House of Representatives where he led the War Hawk wing which advocated war with England over the embargo issue. Explaining his position as a delegate from an interior agricultural area in a speech on December 12, 1811, Calhoun stated, "I only know of one principle to make a nation great, to produce in this country not the form but the real spirit of union, and that is, to protect every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business. He will then feel that he is backed by the government, that its arms are his arms, and will rejoice in its increased strength and prosperity. Protection and patriotism are reciprocal" (May 1975, 47).

President Monroe held similar views which led him to pick Calhoun for his cabinet where he headed the War Department from 1817 to 1825. Unlike the president, Crawford and Adams, Calhoun had limited foreign policy experience yet his political abilities enabled him to participate effectively in this area. In his diary entry of January 6, 1818, Adams observed the Secretary ". . . thinks for himself, independently of all the rest, with sound judgment, quick discrimination, and keen observation. He supports his opinions, too, with powerful eloquence" (Adams 1929, 191). This assessment was echoed four years later when Adams wrote in his diary on October 15, 1821 that "Calhoun is a man of fair and candid mind, of honorable principles, of clear and quick understanding, of cool self-possession, of enlarged philosophical views, and of ardent patriotism. He is above all sectional and factious prejudices more than any other statesman of this Union with whom I have ever acted. He is more sensitive to the transient manifestations of momentary public opinion, more afraid of the first impressions of the public opinion, than I am" (Adams 1929, 265).

This exceptionally high praise is telling in that it comes from the strongest, most assertive member of the Monroe cabinet, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. John

Quincy was highly educated and experienced in both domestic and international politics by the time he assumed this post in 1817. He was exposed to Europe as a boy of ten when his father served as minister to France for the Continental Congress from 1778 to 1783 after America gained its independence. This was not happenstance but a calculated move by his parents to prepare the young man for a destiny as ". . . a guardian of his country's laws and liberties." As his mother wrote to him shortly after he left for Europe, "[t]hese are times in which a genius would wish to live. It is not in the still calm of life, or the repose of a pacific station, that great characters are formed . . . Great necessities call out great virtues. When a mind is raised and animated by scenes that engage the heart, then those qualities, which would otherwise lay dormant, wake into life and form the character of the hero and the statesman." With this kind of onus placed on him early in life, it is not hard to see how John Quincy Adams came to be the formidable and difficult person so deeply involved in the formulation of Monroe's 1823 state of the union address (Bemis 1949, 9-11).

After graduating from Harvard in 1787, he began his adulthood as a lawyer but soon gravitated to public service, appointed by President Washington first as U. S. Minister to the Netherlands 1794-7 than as Minister to Prussia 1797-1801. He returned to serve in the Massachusetts State Senate for one year, whereupon he moved up to the U. S. Senate from 1803 to 1808. In response to his strong support for President Jefferson's embargo policy, he was removed by the state legislature. When James Madison won the presidency later that same year, he appointed John Quincy Minister to Russia, a position he held from 1809 to 1814, including a stint as negotiator of the 1814 Treaty of Ghent. From there, he moved on to be Minister to Great Britain from 1815 to 1817. Thus by the time he was selected by newly elected President James Monroe to be his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams had dealt first-hand with the major European powers whose actions subsequently led to the creation of the Monroe Doctrine.

Certain elements of John Quincy's character figured prominently in the cabinet discussions in question. He described himself as ". . . a man of reserved, cold, austere, and forbidding manners; my political adversaries say, a gloomy misanthropist, and my personal enemies, an unsocial savage. With a knowledge of the actual defect in my character, I have not the pliability to reform it" (Bemis 1949, 253). Yet his towering intellect and sense of assurance of his own abilities often overcame his lack of warmth and tact during his career. Thus he did make efforts to reach out to those with whom he worked as described in a May 16, 1817 letter Adams wrote to his mother Abigail on his European experience just after being named Secretary of State. "I know something of the difficulty of moving smoothly along with associates, equal in trust, justly confident of their abilities, disdainful of influence, yet eager to exercise it, impatient of control, and opposing real, stubborn resistance to surmises and phantoms of encroachment, and I see that in the nature of the things an American President's Cabinet must be composed of such materials" (Bemis 1949, 251).

This sense of self assurance tended to make Adams stake out a position and hold to it forcefully, often bringing others eventually to accept this view on issues. French minister to the United States Hyde de Neuville observed in a December 11, 1817 note to Prime Minister Richelieu "I happen to know that he [JQ Adams] has dared to take a stand quite strongly, on several occasions, against indiscreet and purely fanciful ideas" (Bemis 1949, 268). Adams records in his diary of April 30, 1822 an exchange with President Monroe over an attempt to keep secret from a report to the House of Representatives a letter to the Emperor of China drafted by the State Department.

> "Your report!" said the President, in a tone of sharp anger. "'Tis my report. It is no report at all until I have accepted it." My feelings were wound up to a pitch at which it was with extreme difficulty that I preserved the control of my temper and the command of my expressions. I did so, however, and said, "Sir, it is your report, to do what you please with it, when received; but so far as I understand the Constitution of this country it is my report to make, and I am the responsible person in making it" (Adams 1929, 280).

It is this combination of talent and self confidence that also made John Quincy Adams highly sensitive to criticism, a trait he shared with his father. In his study of the Monroe Doctrine's context, Edward Tatum presents a passage from John Quincy's memoirs on the often hostile American press considered to be typical of his attitude in this regard. ". . . He [the editor] is, like all the editors of newspapers in this country who have any talent, an author to be let. There is not one of them whose friendship is worth buying, nor one whose enmity is not formidable. They are a sort of assassins who sit with loaded blunderbusses at the corner of streets and fire them off for hire or for sport at any passenger whom they select" (1936, 211). The main points illustrated here are first that Adams often saw ulterior or sinister motives directed at him rather than sincere disagreement with his policies. A second element is that he also felt that his understanding of complex issues many times was beyond the capacity of those with whom he had to deal. Finally, there is the not so hidden nationalist feelings that only non-Americans were so base as to launch such attacks on the nation's statesmen and their positions.

All of this complexity embodied in John Quincy Adams is captured in a lengthy recollection by Stratford Canning, British Ambassador to the United States and cousin of George Canning who served as British Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister. Both men had personal dealings with Adams, George Canning when John Quincy served as U. S. Minister in London and Stratford as that counterpart later in Washington, but it is the latter's contemporary relations with the Secretary of State during the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine that is most useful. The following is Stratford Canning's recollection of Adams:

> [Adams is] . . . more commanding than attractive in personal appearance, much above par in general ability, but having the air of a scholar rather than a statesman, a very uneven temper, a disposition at times well-meaning, a manner somewhat too often domineering, and an ambition causing unsteadiness in his political career. My private intercourse with him was not wanting in kindness on either side. The

> rougher road was that of discussion on matters of business. The irritation of a sensitive temper had much to excuse it in the climate. . .
>
> Under much waywardness on the surface there lay a fund of kindly and beneficent intentions which ought to go down the stream of time with the record of his life and characteristic qualities (Bemis 1949, 271).

As president and head of the group that prepared the statement that historically bears his name, James Monroe had the experience and temperament to hold his own as the cabinet wrestled with this critical issue in November 1823. Little is known of his early childhood other than he was the second of five children born in 1758 to Virginia carpenter and planter Spence Monroe, who died when James was 16 years old. Monroe then enrolled at the College of William and Mary in 1774 but dropped out in March 1776 to join the Continental army and never secured a college degree. After two years of service, where he was severely wounded during General Washington's Delaware River crossing, he returned to Virginia and later studied law under Thomas Jefferson from 1780 to 1783.

Monroe's political career began as a member of the Virginia Assembly, 1782-3, then as a state representative for three terms in the Continental Congress from 1783 to 1786, and finally as a U. S. Senator from 1790 to 1794. President Washington appointed him as Minister to France in 1794 but, due to his personal objections to the Jay Treaty and inability to express public support for it to the French government, recalled him less than two years later. Monroe was elected Virginia governor in 1799 and, after supporting Thomas Jefferson's successful run for the presidency, received appointment from the new leader in 1803 as U. S. Minister to Great Britain. His lackluster performance in this position was offset somewhat by his role as chief negotiator of the Louisiana Purchase from France.

Returning home at the end of Jefferson's term, Monroe flirted with a presidential candidacy in 1807 then won election as governor of Virginia in 1811, a position he held for only three months before being named as Secretary of State by his earlier opponent

President James Madison. He was considered for this post by the president as one whose influence within the Madison's own Republican party was valuable and because of Monroe's reputation and demonstrated patriotism. As put to him by fellow Virginian John Taylor, "[o]ne consideration of great weight . . . is that the public think you an honest man. If this opinion is true, the acceptance seems to be a duty toward relieving it from the suspicion that there are too many avaricious or ambitious intriguers of apparent influence in the government. I suppose the President and [recently resigned Treasury Secretary] Gallatin . . . to be wholly guided by what they think to be the public good; and should you happen to concur with them, it will abate much of the jealousy (though I hope it will never be smothered) with which Executive designs are viewed; and to moderate it, under the perilous situation of the country, is in my view desirable" (Cresson 1946, 245). Taylor also suggested that Monroe could exercise influence with Madison to change administration policy seemingly leading America into war and, thus it was better that Monroe assume this responsibility rather than some lesser known and less capable person. Although ultimately unsuccessful in this objective, Monroe did earn wide respect for the manner in which he conducted this course of action; in fact he served simultaneously as Secretary of State and Secretary of War from 1814 to 1815.

As a result, James Monroe was supported for the presidency in 1816 both by Thomas Jefferson and outgoing President Madison, prevailing in the nomination over William Crawford by virtue of his reputation as a diplomat and domestic political leader. George Dangerfield in his history of the "era of good feelings" suggests that John Quincy Adams' diary accurately portrays the president over the course of his two terms in office (Dangerfield 1952, 326). As chief executive, Monroe acted as a conciliator, balancing the efforts of his strong-willed cabinet, comprised of angry and brilliant men. Dangerfield indicates that, as reflected by this diary, Monroe was deeply respected by his close associates. "Rather shy, rather formal, very kindly, he was not self-effacing; and he knew very well what was due to the dignity of his position and the weight of his experience. He was simple, but not simple-minded, and his simplicity seems to have been the effect of a quality which is very hard to define, but which one is forced to define as sheer goodness" (Dangerfield 1952, 326).

A good example of this side of Monroe's character is provided in the Adams diary entry of June 23, 1820 describing how the president dealt with the removal of Albert Gallatin as U. S. Minister to France. "In the discharge of this most painful and ungracious duty the President seems to me more governed by momentary feelings, and less by steady and inflexible principle, than I think he ought. But his failing leans to virtue's side. He is universally indulgent, and scrupulously regardful of individual feelings. He is perhaps too reluctant to exercise this power at all . . . Whether this weakness, as it appears to me to be, is not better than its proximate energy, is perhaps doubtful. In the theory of a President's duties, with almost as much indulgence, and the same tenderness for the feelings of individuals, I should look for a little more vigilance to observe and a little more rigor to control the faults of executive officers" (Adams 1929, 243). One can see even in this criticism of the president the recognition that Monroe's nature was essentially mild and cooperative but it served him well in this most difficult position. At the same time, as noted earlier in the exchange between Adams and Monroe over the China letter, the president was fully capable of expressing and holding firmly to a position with regard to his role as chief executive over the cabinet.

Vice President Calhoun also recognized this quality of Monroe, commenting upon his death in 1831 that "[t]ho' not brilliant, few men were his equals in wisdom, firmness and devotion to the country. He had a wonderful intellectual patience; and could above all men, that I ever knew, when called on to decide an important point, hold the subject immovably fixed under his attention, until he had mastered it in all of its relations. It was mainly to this admirable quality that he owed his highly accurate judgment. I have known many much more rapid in reaching a conclusion, but few with a certainty so unerring" (Ammon 1971, 369). Yet Monroe balanced this firmness with a patrician gentility that was rare in that period of rabid partisan politics. Comparing the president to others of that time Justice Joseph Story observed, "There is a great deal of gayety, splendor, and as I think, extravagance in the manners and habits of the city [Washington, D. C.]. The old notions of republican simplicity are fast wearing away, and the public taste becomes more and more gratified with public amusements and parades. Mr. Monroe, however, still retains his plain and gentle manners; and is in every respect a very estimable man" (Cresson 1946, 370).

It is this mix of four widely divergent personalities, styles and political abilities that comprised the core of the cabinet that wrestled with the issue of America's role in the Western Hemisphere and thus her relations to the major powers in Europe. The interplay among these politicians is useful to consider in terms of how the issue was raised, who advanced different possible responses, and how the final resolution was achieved. Luckily, John Quincy Adams kept a daily diary in which this material was faithfully recorded. By the same token, even as the events are reported in a straightforward manner, they must be seen as his own view of the process and not that of an impartial observer. However, the diary provides a valuable first-hand account of the creation of the Monroe Doctrine that has sufficient merit for close examination.

PROCESS

The actual formulation of the state of the union report that contained the Monroe Doctrine took only three months of cabinet discussion from October to December 1823. This was precipitated by three distinct actions by European powers that were seen as a direct threat to the security of the United States, then in existence less than 50 years.

The first problem arose from the collapse of the Quadruple Alliance in Europe. Established by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria by the Treaty of Chaumont on

March 1, 1814, its purpose was to block Napoleon's attempt to create a French empire and to preserve the existing sovereign state boundaries. However, once that danger was removed, Russia's Czar Alexander advanced the concept of a Holy Alliance with his country, Austria and Prussia by which they would conduct relations based on religious principles. Thus on September 26, 1815 this agreement was signed by the three nations pledging themselves to the following: "The policy of the powers, in their mutual relations, ought to be guided by the sublime truths taught by the eternal religion of God our Saviour . . . The monarchs look upon each other as brothers . . . They shall lend aid and assistance to each other on all occasions and in all places . . . Hence the sole principle of conduct, be it between the said government or their subjects, shall be that of rendering mutual service, and testifying by unceasing good-will, the mutual affection with which they should be animated. Considering themselves all as members of one great Christian nation, the three allied princes look upon themselves as delegates of Providence called upon to govern three branches of the same family, viz.: Austria, Russia and Prussia . . . " (Hart 1916, 44). The three original members also invited all other nations willing to accept this oath to join the alliance. By 1822 all European powers except the Sultan of Turkey, the Pope and Great Britain had done so.

One major reason for England's refusal to join the Holy Alliance was its adoption on November 22, 1822 of the Treaty of Verona by which representative government and popular sovereignty were considered to be incompatible with rule by divine right. The signees further pledged themselves to use all their efforts to put an end to such political systems in whatever country they existed in Europe and to prevent establishment of such governments in those countries where it did not yet exist. Thus, in April 1823 the Holy Alliance authorized France's invasion of Spain to head off an effort to establish a constitutional government in that country which the crowned leaders saw as a threat to their rule by divine right.

The importance to the United States in this situation lay in its effect on Latin America. As a result of the turmoil in Europe, the Spanish colonies in that region declared independence beginning with Venezuela in 1811. Shortly afterwards, many of these breakaway colonies asked for diplomatic recognition by the United States. Initially, the American position was one of neutrality. However the challenge posed by the independence movement in Latin America and the likely response by the European powers was recognized as early as December 10, 1815 when then Secretary of State James Monroe, explaining this stance, wrote the following dispatch:

> The revolution which is making rapid progress in South America becomes daily more interesting to the United States. From the best information that we can obtain, there is much cause to believe, that those provinces will separate from the mother country. Several of them have already abrogated its authority, and established independent governments. They insist on the acknowledgement of their governments by the United States, and when it is considered that the alternative between governments, which in the event of their independence would be free and friendly, and the relation which, reasoning from the past, must be expected from them, as colonies, there is no cause to doubt in which scale our interest lies (Hart 1916, 33).

On March 8, 1822, President Monroe sent a special message to Congress proposing formal diplomatic recognition of Buenos Aires, Colombia, Chile and Mexico which was approved. One of the purposes of the Holy Alliance restoration of the monarchy in Spain the following year was to enable that country to reclaim its former colonies in Latin America with the assistance of the other members of that assembly. This placed the European powers and the United States in direct opposition over the status of the southern half of the New World.

In his December 3, 1822 annual message to Congress, President Monroe foreshadowed the more famous address of the following year, indicating the growing awareness of danger posed by events in Europe. The last part of that message lays out this perception:

> Should war break out in any of those countries, who can foretell the extent to which it may be carried or the desolation which it may spread? Exempt as we are from

> these causes, our internal tranquillity is secure; and distant as we are from the troubled scene, and faithful to first principles in regard to other powers, we might reasonably presume that we should not be molested by them. This, however, ought not to be calculated on as certain. Unprovoked injuries are often inflicted, and even the peculiar felicity of our situation might with some be a cause for excitement and aggression . . . It has been often charged against free governments that they have neither the foresight nor the virtue to provide at the proper season for great emergencies; that their course is improvident and expensive; that war will always find them unprepared, and, whatever may be its calamities, that its terrible warnings will be disregarded and forgotten as soon as peace returns. I have full confidence that this charge so far as relates to the United States will be shewn [sic] to be utterly destitute of truth (Richardson 1896, 2:194-5).

The situation outlined in this message, and the uncertainty of the next move by the Holy Alliance, is noted by Adams in his diary entry of March 14, 1823:

> Cabinet meeting. Calhoun and Thompson present; Crawford absent, unwell, and Wirt [Attorney General] engaged in Supreme Court. War between France and Spain. What to be done? Agent in Cuba, Hernandez; P. U. S. to see him. Calhoun's anxiety. Information to be obtained. Consistency with what we have done to be observed. Fears of what England may do. Prospects of Spain. Danger of treachery (Adams 1929, 295).

It is clear at this point that the cabinet members were aware of the precarious position of the United States but had little sense of what to do to lessen the danger.

A separate but related issue facing the cabinet at the same time was Russia's claim on the Pacific Coast of North America extending from Alaska southward to the 51st parallel, which intersected the Oregon Territory jointly controlled by England and the United States. To ward off American and British fur trappers in this area, the Czar issued an imperial ukase in September 1821 declaring the coastal waters up to 100 miles off shore above this line closed to foreign vessels. Both England and the United States submitted formal protests of this action.

On July 17, 1823 Russia's foreign minister Baron Tuyl called on Secretary Adams regarding possible negotiations between the two countries on this question, a meeting which Adams recorded in his diary:

> At the office, Baron Tuyl came, enquired if he might inform his government that instructions would be forwarded by [charge d'affaires] Mr. Hughes to Mr. Middleton [American ambassador to Russia] for negotiating on the Northwest

> Coast question. I said he might. He then manifested a desire to know as much as I was disposed to tell him as to the purport of those instructions. I told him as much as I thought prudent, as he observed that is was personally somewhat important to him to be so far confided in here as to know the general purport of what we intended to propose (Adams 1929, 298).

Adams then made a clear statement of American policy that henceforth would become the core of the Monroe Doctrine promulgated six months later:

> I told him specially that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments (1929, 298).

This terse entry reflects the same approach that had been expounded upon at length by Adams to the British ambassador Stratford Canning two years earlier as the two nations wrangled over control of the Oregon territory. In that exchange, the Secretary told Canning that Britain had no more claim to exclusivity of settlement at the mouth of the Columbia River than it did to a piece of the moon. In his January 27, 1821 diary, Adams recalled telling the ambassador, "I have not heard that you claim exclusively any part of the moon; but there is not a spot on this habitable globe that I could affirm you do not claim; and there is none which you may not claim with as much color of right as you can have to Columbia River or its mouth" (Adams 1929, 252).

Thus in the latter half of 1823 the Monroe cabinet was trying to resolve challenges by the European powers to American interests at both the northern and southern edges of the Western Hemisphere. It was at this point when the new British foreign minister George Canning approached Richard Rush, American ambassador to Great Britain, in London on August 16, 1823 with a proposal for the two countries to take joint action to forestall all such claims by the Holy Alliance. Four days later, Canning gave Rush a proposed statement to be issued by the two countries that expressed their agreement on five main points with regard to the status of Latin America:

> Is not the moment come when our Governments might understand each other as to the Spanish American Colonies? And if we can arrive at such an understanding,

would it not be expedient for ourselves, and beneficial for all the world, that the principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed?

For ourselves we have no disguise.

1. We conceive the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as Independent States, to be one of time and circumstances.

3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them . . .

4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.

5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power with indifference.

If these opinions and feelings are as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other; and to declare them in the face of the world? (Ford 1902, 682).

These two accounts were submitted by Rush to President Monroe and the cabinet in late August and received on October 9, 1823. Rush also reported Canning's suggestion that America participate in a European conference on the future status of the Latin American colonies. Before making any judgments on this issue, Monroe sent copies of the dispatches to former presidents Jefferson and Madison, requesting their opinion on the matter. Monroe's October 17 letter to Jefferson outlined his thoughts on the issue:

> Many important considerations are involved in this proposition. 1st. Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert by agreemen[t], of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? 2d. If a case can exist, in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is not the present instance, precisely that case? 3d. Has not the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U. States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd, that aware of that necessity, her government, has seig'd on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, they announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career.
>
> *My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British govt., to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us.* I am sensible however of the extent, & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it. I do not wish to trouble either of

> you with small objects, *but the present one is vital, involving the high interests, for which we have so long & so faithfully, & harmoniously contended together.* Be so kind as to enclose to him the despatches, with an intimation of the motive (MacCorkle 1964, 59).

MacCorkle argues that this letter as he italicized it, written before any cabinet discussion on the issue, shows that President Monroe had a clear understanding of what faced the United States at this critical juncture. It also indicates that he favored some form of joint action with England as the best defense against European designs on Latin America. This position was reinforced by similar responses from Jefferson and Madison. The fact that the final message ended up a unilateral statement of the American position suggests that John Quincy Adams had some influence on the president during the subsequent cabinet meetings.

Thomas Jefferson promptly replied to Monroe in his October 24 letter sent from Monticello, with Madison responding from his home in Montpelier on October 30, 1823. Thus both were received by the president just before the cabinet reconvened after its late vacation. Again, the italics are those of MacCorkle (1964, 59-61).

Monticello, October 24, 1823.

> Dear Sir: The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. *Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle wtih* [sic] *cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.* While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. . . .

Th. Jefferson.

Montpellier, Oct. 30, 1823.

> Dear Sir: - I have recd from Mr. Jefferson your letter to him, with the correspondence between Mr. Canning and Mr. Rush, sent for his and my perusal, and our opinions on the subject of it.
>
> From the disclosures of Mr. Canning it appears as was otherwise to be inferred, that the success of France against Spain would be followed by attempts of the Holy Alliance to reduce the revolutionized colonies of the latter to their former dependence. . .
>
> James Madison.

Shortly after President Monroe received these two letters, he reconvened the cabinet on November 7, 1823 to consider how to respond to the proposed joint action by Great Britain and the United States to the actions of the Holy Alliance. This lengthy meeting dealt with two key issues. First, should the U. S. join with England in blocking the Holy Alliance's possible claims on the former Spanish colonies or issue a unilateral declaration of American policy to include Great Britain in this exclusion. The other point was, should this statement just cover the immediate danger posed to Latin America by recolonization, or be a broader affirmation of the American democratic political system as being preferable to that of the European powers.

Both former presidents favored alignment with Great Britain, and Monroe leaned in that direction as did Secretary of War Calhoun; only Secretary of State Adams opposed this approach. There appeared to be merit as a practical matter in having the naval strength of Britain, which was superior to that of the United States, committed to defense of Latin America in the face of the combined military forces of the Holy Alliance. As Jefferson observed it was better to have the one nation which could do America the most harm, as shown in both the Revolutionary War and the recently concluded War of 1812, act as our friend even at the risk of being drawn into a military confrontation with the rest of Europe. Thus Calhoun and Monroe suggested that Minister Rush be authorized to enter into a joint declaration with the British Foreign Minister on this subject.

Complicating this issue was the pending call by Czar Alexander, delivered by Baron Tuyl to Adams in July, of his desire to enter into negotiations with the United States on Russia's claim to territory in North America. As noted earlier, the Secretary of State had informed the Russian minister that such claims would be disputed by the United States but nothing formal had been expressed directly to that nation's government. At the November 7 cabinet meeting Adams now called for unilateral statement to address both the British and Russian proposals. "I remarked that the communications recently received from the Russian Minister, Baron Tuyl, afforded, as I thought, a very suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy Alliance, and at the same time . . . to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war. This idea was acquiesced in on all sides, and my draft for an answer to Baron Tuyl's note announcing the Emperor's determination to refuse receiving any Minister from the South American Governments was read" (Adams 1929, 303).

However, this was not to be the end of this discussion. At the November 13 cabinet meeting, it was announced that France had completed its conquest of Spain and that the monarchy would be restored in that country. Adams reported in his diary of that day the effect this news had on the other members who had accepted the joint proposal concept the week prior.

> I took to the President's my draft of minutes and copies of the instructions to Richard Rush dispatched last summer. I read and left my draft with him. I find him yet altogether unsettled in his own mind as to the answer to be given to Mr. Canning's proposals, and alarmed, far beyond anything that I could have conceived possible, with the fear that the Holy Alliance are about to restore immediately all South America to Spain. Calhoun stimulates the panic, and the news that Cadiz has surrendered to the French has so affected the President that he appeared entirely to despair of the cause of South America. He will recover from this in a few days; but I never saw more indecision in him. We discussed the proposals of Canning, and I told him if he would decide either to accept or decline them, I would draft a dispatch conformable to either decision for his consideration. He said he would talk further about it to-morrow [sic] (1929, 303-4).

An extensive discussion over the correct response to both England and Russia ensued in the November 15 cabinet meeting. Earlier that day Monroe had shown Adams the letters from Jefferson and Madison, indicating that he considered the views of these two American statesmen of great importance. When Adams came to the cabinet meeting that afternoon he observed a sense of apprehension among the President, Secretary of War Calhoun and Attorney General Wirt which the Secretary of State tried to assuage as noted in his diary:

> The subject of Mr. Canning's proposals was resumed, and I soon found the source of the President's despondency with regard to South American affairs. Calhoun is perfectly moon-struck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says the Holy Allies, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and all South America to the Spanish dominion (1929, 304).

Adams expressed much less trepidation of such immediate military action by the European powers, stating that it was as likely that the Chimborazo would sink beneath the ocean. However, it was the very potential for some attempt by the Holy Alliance to reverse the independence movement in that region that provided the forcible motive for the United States for treading warily in involving this country in the fate of those newly formed republics. He responded to Calhoun's call for giving full discretion to Rush to agree to Canning's initiative as the only way to forestall such an event, concluding that day's diary with this entry:

> After much discussion, I said I thought we should bring the whole answer to Mr. Canning's proposals to a test of right and wrong. Considering the South Americans as independent nations, they themselves, and no other nation, had the right to dispose of their condition. We have no right to dispose of them, either alone or in conjunction with other nations. Neither have any other nations the right of disposing of them without their consent. This principle will give us a clue to answer all Mr. Canning's questions with candor and confidence. And I am to draft a dispatch accordingly (Adams 1929, 305).

Just as it seemed that Adams had brought the cabinet back to its earlier consensus on the response to Canning, Baron Tuyl presented a message later that day that laid out the view of the Czar and the other European allies on the issue. It came in the form of extracts from a circular sent to the continental powers, lauding the success of the interventions by the Holy Alliance in support of monarchial governments in Naples, Piedmont and most recently Spain; an ". . . *Io Triumphe* over the fallen cause of revolution" according to Adams. The message concluded by restating the Czar's policy that the Alliance considered its role to be ensuring peaceful relations among all the states comprising the civilized world. At Monroe's direction, after reading the message, Adams asked if that meant reestablishing Spain's control over its former colonies, to which the Russian minister replied in the affirmative (Bemis 1949, 386-7).

The nature of the conversation among the cabinet members changed as a result of this latest communication. The situation facing the United States had escalated from a relatively distant threat to one laying at the doorstep of its own continent. Thus, according to Brecher, this raised the issue from a foreign policy crisis, one involving a situation seen from the perspective of an individual state, to an international crisis based upon objective behavioral data about conflictual interaction among states within an international system. This latter stage is characterized by two critical and necessary conditions: (1) distortion in the type and an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more adversaries, with an accompanying high probability of military hostilities and (2) a challenge to the existing structure of an international system, either global, dominant or subsystem, posed by the higher-than-normal conflictual interactions (Brecher et. al. 1988, 3). The change in the nature and tone of the cabinet meetings that followed the Czar's message reflect this heightened sense of crisis among the participants in the final few discussions.

The November 21 cabinet meeting provides a good example of this increased tension among the members. Adams laid out his proposed response to the Czar which he wanted to send as a confidential message through Baron Tuyl. "My purpose would be in a moderate and conciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit, to declare our dissent from the principles avowed in those communications [of November 17], to assert those upon which our own Government is founded, and, while disclaiming all intention of attempting to propagate them by force, and all interference with the political affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere, or to subjugate by force any part of these continents to their will" (Adams 1929, 306). Here in his diary entry of November 21 Adams presents for the first time the core of the Monroe Doctrine.

However, while President Monroe expressed agreement with this general sentiment, he then proceeded to read his draft message that, according to Adams, had an entirely different tenor. "Its introduction was in a tone of deep solemnity and of high alarm, intimating that this country is menaced by imminent and formidable dangers, such as would probably soon call for their most vigorous energies and the closest union. It then proceeded to speak of the foreign affairs, chiefly according to the sketch I had given him some days since, but with occasional variations. It then alluded to the recent events in Spain and Portugal, speaking in terms of the most pointed reprobation of the late invasion of Spain by France, and of the principles upon which it was undertaken by the open avowal of the King of France. It also contained a broad acknowledgment to the Greeks as an independent nation, and a recommendation to Congress to make an appropriation for sending a Minister to them" (1929, 306-7).

While Calhoun gave approval to this draft, Adams argued that this sudden change in approach would take the nation by surprise, alarming them as a clap of thunder. The public was not prepared for putting the country on alert for hostilities with the Holy Alliance such a message likely would engender. He ended the day's diary with the observation "[t]here had never been in the history of this nation a period of so deep calm and tranquillity as we now enjoyed. We never were, upon the whole, in a state of peace so profound and secure with all foreign nations as at this time. This message would be a summon to arms - to arms against all Europe, and for objects of policy exclusively European - Greece and Spain. It would be as new, too, in our policy as it would be surprising" (1929, 307).

Four days later, after time for reflection on the two draft messages, the cabinet met on November 25 for about four hours. Adams reiterated his argument that the final statement should indicate that America had created and was cultivating its own republican form of government. Thus, while it desired peace and friendship with the European monarchies, the United States had given formal recognition to the Latin American nations who had taken that same republicanism and would not accept any outside interference in this status in the Western Hemisphere. Calhoun advanced the notion this was too bold a statement of these principles but was overruled by the other cabinet members. Attorney General Wirt then asked a more probing question, that is by setting up this distinction in political systems between Europe and America, was the United States then prepared to defend Latin America against overt hostilities by the Holy Alliance, even if it meant declaring war. There was no immediate response forthcoming at that meeting to Wirt's inquiry.

At the November 26 cabinet meeting Adams reported he had given Wirt's comments the deepest consideration and hoped that the President had done the same. He went on to indicate that although he did not think the Holy Alliance realistically planned to attack the United States or to reestablish control by the Spanish monarchy over its former Latin American colonies. Rather such an adventure, if it came at all, would be for the purpose of dividing the lands among its own leading members. Thus Russia might take California, Peru and Chile, France claim Mexico and even Cuba might fall under the control of Great Britain. Adams noted that reports were circulating that France was interested in reclaiming the Louisiana Territory where many people still held the monarchy in esteem. Adams concluded "[t]he danger, therefore, was brought to our own doors, and I thought we could not too soon take our stand to repel it" (1929, 311).

The November 26 diary reports that Monroe had similar views on the problem but from a slightly different perspective. "There was another point of view, which the President had in part suggested, and which I thought highly important. Suppose the Holy Allies should attack South America, and Great Britain should resist them alone and without our cooperation. I thought this not an improbable contingency, and I believed in such a struggle the allies would be defeated and Great Britain would be victorious, by her command of the sea. But, as the independence of the South Americans would then be only protected by the guarantee of Great Britain, it would throw them completely into her arms, and in the result make them her colonies instead of those of Spain. My opinion was, therefore, that we must act promptly and decisively . . . " (1929, 311-2).

This was the last cabinet meeting prior to issuance of the December 2, 1823 state of the union message to Congress by President Monroe. It is apparent that the president took into account the thoughts from the letters of Jefferson and Madison on the need to distinguish between the political systems of Europe and America, as well as to prevent further colonization by the Holy Alliance in the Americas. He also adopted the position of Adams on the desirability of casting the message in a calm deliberate manner designed to advance the principles of republican government, which this country established and were now adopted by the Latin American states, and our firm intention to defend these principles throughout the Western Hemisphere expressed by Wirt. The more strident approach of Calhoun was ignored. In this way, Monroe's message tried to dispel the crisis atmosphere of the moment, and to allow formal diplomacy to ensue based on this new understanding between the United States and Europe.

Three main points were established in Monroe's message to guide the nation's ongoing foreign relations with the European powers. The first was the principle of noncolonization on the part of any outside nation in the Americas. This came from the proposal by the Russian Czar to formalize claims along the northwest coast of North America, and the potential reassertion of Spain's control over its former Latin American holdings. Monroe's answer to these expressions was very clear. "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers . . ."(Hart 1916, 67).

The second issue was the desire to distinguish between the republican form of government adopted in the Americas and the monarchies of Europe as formally pronounced in the September 26, 1815 statement by the Holy Alliance. The two political systems were vastly different both in their history and ongoing role of the people in their administration. Thus the popular sovereignty enjoyed by Americans could not be equated with the power of divine right of the kings of Europe. Thus any attempt to transplant the latter system to the Americas would be seen as a threat to the security of the people in that region.

The final principle advanced in Monroe's message was that of non-interference by powers of one continent in the internal affairs of states in the other; this is referred to as the two spheres principle. Essentially it states that since the Eastern and Western hemispheres now were dominated by two totally distinct forms of government, each of which was incompatible with the other, that the basis of ongoing relations between the two should be based on recognition of this fact. "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none" (Perkins 1963, 393). Thus the United States would assume a distant but not isolationist stance in dealing with Europe, and fully expected the same approach to be taken by those powers in the dealings with the republics in the Americas.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

Although the state message bears his name, James Monroe did not actually apply it to a specific instance or action by the European powers towards which it was directed. Shortly after the December 2 report to Congress, the president received a dispatch from Richard Rush outlining a sudden change in the interest of British Foreign Minister Canning in cooperating with the United States in securing Latin America from advances by the Holy Alliance. At the same time European newspapers told of an army of 12,000 Spanish soldiers on their way to reclaim the colonies. Monroe had second thoughts on his statements of the prior week, telling Adams that Rush should be instructed to press for joint Anglo-American action. Adams considered this situation to be overblown and successfully convinced the president to wait a bit before responding to the purported news.

On December 8, 1823, Secretary of State Adams sent instructions to Rush indicating the worrisome news reports but limiting official American response only to securing firm information on Britain's position on the issue. For his part, George Canning downplayed the impact of the pronouncement by President Monroe at the time, although he later took credit for leading the United States to take this position. He told Parliament in 1826 that "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old" (Bemis 1949, 403). In other words, by encouraging Monroe and Adams to advance the doctrine of exclusion of Latin America for the Holy Alliance, the existing balance of power in Europe which Canning had been cultivating was preserved. The Austrian minister Von

Getz admitted that by its formal statement on Latin America, and the public support which followed, the United States had effectively blocked action by the Holy Alliance in that region. Austrian Prince Metternich concurred noting that he found it to be impossible that any European power could believe this American policy to be desirable but circumstances might compel them to accept it.

The situation between Europe and the United States stabilized for the next 22 years, until the election of President James Polk, who ran on a platform of securing Texas and the Oregon Territory for the United States under the rationale of Manifest Destiny. In his first state of the union message to Congress on December 2, 1845, he echoed the three principles embodied in Monroe's earlier report, then went further to indicate that, should the people who constitute an independent state in any portion of the North American continent wish to join the American union, this would be a question only for them and the United States to decide without any foreign interference. The argument that this would constitute a change in the balance of power that the European states saw as desirable in the Americas was of absolutely no significance to such an annexation.

The following year saw two major consequences of this statement. First was the negotiated agreement between Britain and the United States to divide the Oregon Territory at the 49th parallel, something less than what Polk had sought. However his message to Congress did have the effect of hastening this agreement which had been languishing for some time. This event was overshadowed by the outbreak of the Mexican-American War, caused in large part by the encouragement Polk's message gave to the leaders of the Republic of Texas, which had declared its independence from Mexico in 1836. The status of this entity had been the subject of lengthy discussions between the United States and Mexico over the ensuing ten years; the restatement of the Monroe Doctrine by Polk to include annexation precipitated more hostile relations between the two countries that eventually led to war.

Shortly after the conclusion of the war in 1848 and the formal treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo by which Mexico ceded its land claims north of the Rio Grande River (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California) to the United States, American attention turned inward to economic and social issues, culminating in the Civil War. The post-war Reconstruction era also concentrated most political activity on domestic issues. Then in 1895 difficulties arose between Britain and the United States over the former's actions regarding its border dispute with Venezuela. England controlled the adjacent territory of British Guiana, including that part where the Orinoco River entered the Atlantic Ocean to which Venezuela also laid claim. Rather than negotiate transfer of this disputed area, home to 40,000 British subjects, the two countries suspended diplomatic relations. The United States urged submission of this issue to international arbitration. Rumors soon spread in the American press about imminent British military action, heightened by England's seizure of the Nicaraguan port of Corinto in April 1895 over a customs payment dispute.

President Grover Cleveland, then in his second term, responded to public pressure by instructing his Secretary of State Richard Olney to send a note to the British government recommending arbitration. However Olney took it upon himself to restate the Monroe Doctrine in his note to British Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury. After giving a biased summary of the doctrine's history highly favorable to the United States, the Secretary of State then warned Britain of dire consequences of their unilateral action. He pointedly referred to the American willingness to defend the doctrine on behalf of Latin America. Not satisfied merely with arguing the costly and unnecessary result of military hostilities, Olney went on to assert American supremacy in the region as a way to get Britain's attention. "To-day [sic] the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not . . . because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers" (Bailey 1968, 441).

The British Foreign Minister's response to this inflammatory note was measured and calm, asserting that the Monroe Doctrine did not constitute international law nor did this internal boundary dispute involve the United States. He further compared this current issue to the key points of the 1823 message. "The disputed frontier of Venezuela has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt with by President Monroe. It is not a question of the colonization by a European Power of any portion of America. It is not a question of the imposition upon the communities of South America of any system of government devised in Europe. It is simply the determination of the frontier of a British possession which belonged to the Throne of England long before the Republic of Venezuela came into existence" (Bailey 1968, 442). As such, the United States had no basis for dictating how the two parties involved should resolve their differences.

This outright rejection of any role for the United States in this matter created a problem for President Cleveland. There was growing public sentiment for some sort of American response to the potential for British military action in the border area, as well as the personal affront the president felt to the brusque message from Lord Salisbury. On December 17, 1895, Cleveland answered with a congressional message that boldly asserted the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to all such disputes in Latin America involving European nations. In the absence of international arbitration, he called for the United States to fund its own commission to consider the merits of Britain's claim to the disputed land. Anticipating the findings, the president warned Britain of the likely next step:

> When such report is made and accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. . . . In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. . . . I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a

> grevious thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization and strenuous and worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness (Perkins 1963, 179-80).

However, the political and public response to this message was much louder and more extensive that even President Cleveland could have expected.

Both the House and Senate erupted into cheers upon hearing the president's statement and immediately approved $100,000 for the boundary commission. Twenty-six state governors announced support for this action, while volunteers to fight came from Civil War veterans and the Irish National Alliance. Theodore Roosevelt expressed the hope that war would result in which he could take part as the *New York Sun* headlined "War If Necessary." At the same time, the editor of the *New York World* Joseph Pulitzer took the moderate view that a simple boundary line far from America's borders constituted a petty cause for war which, if pursued, would be a colossal crime. The British government, faced with outbreak of the Boer War in South Africa and European sentiment running against them, gracefully gave in. Assisted by the newly created American commission, England and Venezuela negotiated a boundary treaty in February 1897.

The successful resolution of this situation in this manner conferred legitimacy on American interests in the region, at least as far as U. S. leaders were concerned. This became evident when, in 1905 in response to a debt crisis in the Dominican Republic, President Theodore Roosevelt forestalled any attempt by European governments to use military force to collect those debts. Two issues were involved here; intervention by outside forces and the fear that once there, the possession of these lands might become permanent. This threatened the recently approved Panama Canal project and stability in the Caribbean region generally.

President Roosevelt took the initiative to head off this possibility by announcing in his December 1904 message to Congress what has become known as the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine:

> If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power (Hart 1916, 226).

This advanced a totally new conception of America's role quite different from that envisioned under the original 1823 statement developed by President Monroe and Secretary Adams. Instead of defensive measure to prevent outside interference in the Americas, the United States now assumed an offensive posture of its own right to intervene in the affairs of the nations comprising Latin America. This was clarified by the President in 1907 to mean no seizure of territory by foreign powers to resolve debts was allowed, nor even temporary occupation of custom houses to enforce payment of a nation's debts. However, if such delinquency threatened regional stability, the United States had an obligation to step in and restore order to that region.

Almost as soon as this interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was advanced, it was refuted both by critics and supporters of American interests in Latin America. Carlos Pereyra, Mexican diplomat and history professor at the National University of Mexico, challenged the imperialism of the United States practiced under this new corollary (Dozer 1965, 49). In a 1914 work entitled *El Mito de Monroe* he argued there were at least three Monroe Doctrines, all of which were unacceptable. The first is the one in Monroe's 1823 message which, it was claimed, was immediately buried in oblivion at least in its original meaning. The second version is the one of widespread dogma in glorification of the United States as promulgated by President Polk and Secretary of State Olney. The most recent version is that which presents the aggressive foreign policy of McKinley and Roosevelt, dollar diplomacy of Taft and missionary view of Wilson all as idealized offsprings of the original message. Yet, however it is interpreted, it is simply imperialism in other guises. "I believe that, on the contrary [to being an anachronistic relic], the Monroe Doctrine is a vivid reality, a myth which serves as a wrapper concealing the actual fact, namely, the ambitions of a strong people who claim to exercise hegemony over a group of weak peoples, giving to their domination over them the hypocritical appearances of disinterest and benevolence" (Dozer 1965, 49). Pereyra considered the Monroe Doctrine to have all the appearances and reality of a taboo, rather than as a statement of international law.

American statesmen also indicated their awareness that the Roosevelt Corollary may be perceived as a license for U. S. intervention anywhere in Latin America that manifests instability or lack of public order that may appear threatening to American interests. A May 14, 1965 *Time* article made reference to Elihu Root, Roosevelt's Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909, who wrote a 1914 article in the *American Journal of International Law* in which he attempted to define "The Real Monroe Doctrine." First he indicated that, while the doctrine itself is not international law, it rests on the right of self-protection which is recognized as such. Further the doctrine and its subsequent interpretations does not assert or imply the right of the United States to impair or control the independent sovereignty of any American state as a fundamental principle of international law. In fact, rather than infringe on this sovereignty, the doctrine asserts that right of all states in all American countries.

Yet by their very nature as independent sovereign states, the nations of the Americas have duties and obligations under treaties and international law to other states, including payment of debts incurred. They exist regardless of the existence of the Monroe Doctrine and are matters of equality, not rights of superiority. Root argued that actions of the United States to ensure payment of such debts by smaller nations in the region are not based on superiority of force but upon reason and law. In contrast, the scope of the real Monroe Doctrine is limited to the occupation of territory in the New World and to the exclusion of non-American governments being established there.

A decade later, another former Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, who served under presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge from 1921 to 1925, presented his view of the Monroe Doctrine in a 1923 address to the American Bar Association. Entitled "The Monroe Doctrine Officially Defined," the speech laid out six main points that represented its core. He began by noting the doctrine "[i]s not a part of international law, maintained by the consent of the civilized powers and alterable only at their will. It is a policy declared by the Executive of the United States and repeated in one form or another by Presidents and Secretaries of State in the conduct of our foreign relations. Its significance lies in the fact that in its essentials, as set forth by President Monroe and as forcibly and repeatedly asserted by our responsible statesmen, it has been for 100 years, and continues to be, an integral part of our national thought and purpose, expressing a profound conviction which even the upheaval caused by the Great War and our participation in that struggle upon European soil has not uprooted or fundamentally changed" (Dozer 1965, 88).

The following points then were outlined that defined the Monroe Doctrine. First, it is not a policy of aggression but one of self-defense. While originally issued against the menace posed by the Holy Alliance to the New World, it remains an assertion of the principle of national security. Second, it is exclusively a policy of the United States which alone controls the definition, interpretation and application of that policy. As such, it does not depend on the recognition or acceptance of other nations for its legitimacy. Third, the Monroe Doctrine does not infringe on the independence and sovereignty of the American states, nor does it attempt to establish an American protectorate over them. Yet it allows the

United States to take action against those states in the region whose activities pose a threat to this nations safety.

The fourth point is that the original doctrine must be interpreted in light of modern conditions in the hemisphere that may differ from those that existed in 1823. The building of the Panama Canal and expansion of commerce within the region create new situations to which the principles embodied in that policy statement now are to be applied. Fifth, the Monroe Doctrine does not impede Pan-American cooperation but instead provides a foundation for such joint action, that is the independence and security of the American states. The republican political system of the region thus promotes interests that are distinctly American. The final observation is that while the Monroe Doctrine established the concept of the two spheres, it does not necessarily preclude wider international cooperation between the American states and other nations of the world. Thus Secretary Hughes posited that the nature of the doctrine is one of independence not isolation.

This case study concludes with the Declaration of Caracas in March 1954 which was adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Venezuela. This statement committed the nations of the Americas to the principles of sovereignty and self-protection which the Monroe Doctrine first laid out 131 years earlier. Just as the danger posed by the Holy Alliance gave impetus to the original policy, the spread of communism in the Cold War era served as the common peril faced by the Western Hemisphere nations gathered at this conference.

The critical part of the declaration by the conference representatives condemned the activities of the international communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs. They also expressed their determination to take the necessary measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of international communism. Finally, the representatives reiterated the faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative democracy as the best means to promote their social and political progress.

At the request of the Colombian delegate the assembly of American States declared that "the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for *a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of measures* in accordance with existing treaties" (Declaration of Caracas 1954, 420).

The significance of this unified American declaration becomes apparent as the next two case studies, Dominican Republic (1965) and Grenada (1983), are presented. It is the contrast of the American foreign policy doctrine unilaterally advanced for each of these U. S. military interventions to this pledge of solidarity and mutual cooperation that provides a valuable context in which to consider how such statements reflect the decision-making process leading to these actions.

CHAPTER 4

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - 1965

In April 1965, events on the island of Hispaniola, shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic, shook the latter and led to the first U.S. military intervention in Latin America since American troops ended their occupation of Nicaragua in 1934. The unrest began when Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator since 1930, was assassinated on May 30, 1961; his place was taken first by a series of provisional state councils. In February 1963 Juan Bosch was elected to lead the nation back to stability after this disruptive two-year period. Within six months he was overthrown by a military junta which ruled from September 25, 1963 to April 24, 1965, when a countercoup was staged by junior army officers. Chaos followed this collapse of organized government and the capital of Santo Domingo became a war zone placing the residents, including American citizens, in danger. On April 28, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson ordered deployment of 500 Marines to extricate the Americans; within ten days over 23,000 American troops had landed and taken the eastern half of the island. The military occupation lasted until September 3, 1965 when the provisional government of Hector Garcia Godoy was installed, followed on June 1, 1966 with the election of Joaquin Balanguer as President of the Dominican Republic.

The decisions by President Johnson and his top advisors to intervene, first with a limited deployment followed by a substantial military involvement, best can be understood within the larger framework of American foreign policy towards Latin America reflected in the signing of the Declaration of Caracas in March 1954. This set the stage for the conduct of U.S. relations with the nations of the Western hemisphere based on a commitment to sovereignty and self-protection. It arose as part of this Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International

Communist Intervention. Of particular relevance during the 11-year period between the signing of this document and the April 1965 Dominican situation is American involvement in Guatemala and Cuba, both of which had direct bearing on President Johnson's policy choice to intervene. Following the format of Chapter 3, this case study looks at the context of the Dominican intervention within contemporary American policy in the region, the participants in the decision and their operational code, the process utilized to reach that policy choice, and finally the interpretation and application of the doctrinal basis for the actions taken by the United States in this situation.

CONTEXT

The American policy approach to Latin America has been characterized as that of a whirlpool, where the United States periodically is drawn into the region by a crisis situation that is perceived to threaten the nation's interests (Pastor 1992, 20-1). Once the immediate cause is addressed, either by political or military means, American attention and resources withdraw to the periphery only to be sucked into another crisis. This neglect-panic cycle reflects American desire not to impose political or economic systems directly on Latin America but rather to avoid emergence of those which are hostile to U.S. interests. At the same time the Latin American nations desire to exercise their independence while recognizing American dominance in the region.

This was recognized by President Eisenhower early in his first term as he faced a touchy situation in Guatemala.

> Nevertheless, from time to time, in fact to an extent all the time, our sister republics to the south feel that the United States pays too little attention to them and their problems. Perhaps, in part, this feeling is justified. Certainly after World War II, United States diplomacy was constantly preoccupied with European and Asian crises, any one of which could have resulted in serious conflict, whereas under normal circumstances it would not be expected that global war would break out as the result of problems in Latin America. Further, our shared ideals of freedom have sometimes led our diplomats to expect our sister republics to stand by us

automatically on critical world issues, thus giving them a feeling of being taken for granted. (Eisenhower 1963, 420).

President Eisenhower also noted that even with outside help, addressing the region's fundamental problems stemming from lack of capital, overdependence on primary resources and widespread poverty require long term solutions. In the meantime, the U.S. had to deal with immediate problems in individual Latin American nations as they arose with the tools at hand.

The other main element of this perspective is the tendency to stereotype other actors and their motives, rather than to assess them on their own merits. As noted by former U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, "If we pursue our relationships with them [Latin America], they accuse us of intervention; if we ignore them, they accuse us of caring less about our neighbors than about Bangladesh" (Pastor 1992, 21). This lack of common ground and purpose is at the center of U. S. foreign policy in the region. It is made more difficult by American failure to understand and address underlying structural issues regarding economic and social issues of Latin America, and inability of Latin Americans to view the United States as constrained by circumstances beyond its own borders.

This relationship is further complicated by the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine which incorporates elements of historical policy application and the broader role as myth surrounding the American outlook on Latin America. In this latter case myth is defined as a story that constructs meaning by mobilizing associations already extant in the culture and redeploying them toward new objects (public policies, for example) that then acquire the authority of the older meanings (Kenworthy 1995, 14). Kenworthy argues that by this process, the original concepts are both renewed and gutted so that their hold on current policy makers grows as their content fades. Thus President Reagan may call upon this doctrine to bolster a specific policy that may not accord exactly with the original purpose of its originators as he did in his January 27, 1987 state of the union address: "Our commitment to a Western Hemisphere safe from aggression did not occur by spontaneous generation on the day that we took office. It began with the Monroe Doctrine" (Kenworthy 1995, 15).

Kenworthy also advances the idea that the Monroe Doctrine implicitly has become a foundation of U.S. foreign policy as much as the U.S. Constitution. To illustrate this premise he cites Raymond Moley, a member of President Roosevelt's "brain trust" in the 1930's and later a contributing editor of *Newsweek*, who addressed the claim that the Monroe Doctrine was outmoded and unnecessary. "The men selected by the President to interpret foreign policy are the heirs of a principle established and maintained by illustrious American statesmen. The Monroe Doctrine is an "entailed" inheritance. It cannot be sold for the promise of good will nor given away, nor dissipated by reinterpretation. Those who speak for the nation now are not creators, they are trustees" (Moley 1964, 118). Yet at the same time the role of the Monroe Doctrine as a central working basis of unilateral action in Latin America has been replaced, first by the Good Neighbor policy of the late 1930's and formalized in the 1954 Caracas Declaration. The result is that two Monroe Doctrines exist simultaneously: the historical one that has faded in actual value for policy making today and the mythical one that appears in political discourse where it is used as a talisman.

It is in this latter role that the Monroe Doctrine serves as the center of what Kenworthy refers to as a founding myth of American foreign policy towards Latin America. He defines a founding myth as any portion of the public discourse that transforms a portion of the nation's history into a model for subsequent generations to follow. As such it becomes a narrative that has acquired the additional authority of a paradigm in the eyes of its beholders. They often are the result of a nation's recurring or traumatic experiences and become the general approach to solving such problems as they arise in subsequent times (1995, 16).

Kenworthy presents four general statements which form a cognitive map of the Monroe Doctrine as a founding myth which describes its application to U. S.-Latin American relations. He notes that these statements are both supportive of and at times contradictory to each other depending on the situation. They are:

> 1. The Western Hemisphere is the geographical *tabula rasa* on which God (Providence, History) demonstrates civilization's advance through agents understood to be the descendants of Europeans.
>
> 2. The content of this advance is freedom and progress: forms of association favoring the self-determination of peoples and the liberty of individuals, which are linked to advances in material well-being.
>
> 3. The United States of America is where this project first began and where it still excels. The United States is the vanguard of a hemisphere that, following its leadership, is the vanguard region of the world.
>
> 4. Such an advance in civilization provokes enmity from an old world that clings to ways that are the antithesis of the new ways described in (2). The new world may be endangered by the old (1995, 18).

Although one or more of these may dominate foreign relations between the United States and specific Latin American countries, over time they all have endured as the basis for the mythical aspect of the Monroe Doctrine.

The difficulty arises when the historical and mythical versions come into conflict over American intervention in Latin America. An attempt to reconcile this dichotomy was advanced in May 1950 by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller in a State Department bulletin entitled *Nonintervention and Collective Responsibility in the Americas* which, according to Walter LaFeber, formed part of the rationale for direct American involvement in Guatemala under President Eisenhower as well as Johnson's actions in the Dominican Republic (LaFeber 1993, 95-6). Miller agreed that Article 15 of the charter of the Organization of American States, established at the 1948 Bogota, Colombia conference, declares "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State." Yet the Charter also states that measures may be adopted ". . . for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties." While earlier unilateral interventions by the United States in Latin America were regrettable, they nonetheless were justified under the Monroe Doctrine. Now, with the signing of the Rio Pact by the American states, collective intervention had been substituted for actions by a single state. Faced by the common threat of international communism, the Rio Pact became the Monroe Doctrine of the inter-American community.

LaFeber paraphrased Miller's argument as follows. "Monroe's announcement of 1823 still lives but is challenged by communism. The United States does not want to respond to such challenges by intervening unilaterally (which is bad) to defend hemispheric interests as it sees them, so intervention is henceforth to be done collectively (which is good). The Rio Pact and OAS Charter provide the mechanism for upholding the Monroe Doctrine while Washington officials might be preoccupied in Europe and Asia. Since the United States can assume that it controls a majority in the OAS (including four to five Central American votes), all should go well. If things do not go well, the United States reserves the right to intervene unilaterally just the same (1993, 96-7).

This so-called Miller Doctrine added a military component to the Economic Agreement forged at the 1948 meeting. That treaty pledged the states to an open door policy of equal access to markets. products and productive facilities. To get this access, the United States agreed to provisions allowing governments to smooth out dislocations of trade in raw materials, establishment of regional preferential trading blocs and a statement calling for paid annual vacations and permanent tenure for workers who could not be fired without just cause. This latter clause was aimed at the United Fruit Company (UFCO) and other U.S. employers doing business in Latin America. This expression of desire for worker rights and fair treatment by American firms of indigenous workers soon became a focal point of U.S. intervention in the Central American nation of Guatemala, which the

Eisenhower administration directed as a covert operation under the Miller interpretation of the OAS Charter and Bogata Economic Agreement.

In 1944 the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico was overthrown by a coalition of middle-class elements including university students and junior military officers. This was followed by the free election of Juan Jose Arevalo, an author and ex-patriate educator recently returned from Argentina. He had no political experience nor a firm platform of changes to be made in the government, calling himself a "spiritual socialist" who rejected Marxism as too destructive through class struggle yet preferred collective action over individual capitalism. Yet, because of the sudden change from dictatorship to democracy, the party system and public understanding of electoral politics was lacking. This forced Arevalo to work with left wing groups and trade unions, leading to a series of economic reforms (LaFeber 1993, 114).

Passage of the Law of Forced Rental required major land owners to lease uncultivated land to peasants at low rates. Legislation was enacted to create a social security system, a labor code allowing union organizing and strike action, and establishment of a central bank. In 1950, the single six-year term of Arevalo ended with the election of minister of war Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, whom the U.S. embassy in Guatemala City described as a realist compared to his idealist predecessor. As such, Arbenz was expected to pursue a more centrist political policy. However, shortly after his election, the new president legalized the Guatemalan Labor Party (communist) and in 1952 secured passage of the Agrarian Reform Law to solidify his support among peasants and Indians. This law extended labor protection to rural workers along the same lines as that for urban worker groups. A major force behind this law was the National Peasant Confederation of Guatemala (CNGG), bringing together 25 small unions into one consolidated organization.

The following year, President Arbenz announced that under provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law, the government was expropriating 234,000 acres of uncultivated land owned by UFCO for which the firm would be compensated at the favorably low tax rate it enjoyed on the property totalling about $1 million. The company demanded $16 million based on the agricultural production potential of the land and, when the Arbenz government refused to negotiate, turned to the Eisenhower administration for assistance. They found the American officials very receptive to their position that the expropriation threatened not only United Fruit but economic and political stability of the country.

In fact, the Arbenz government had been of concern to the Truman administration early in 1952 which had initiated plans to overthrow the president through a CIA operation called Operation Fortune. This was to be conducted with the support of Nicaragua,where a group of Guatemalan exiles was being equipped and trained by the agency, using United Fruit Company ships to ferry the war material to that military force. Before it could be put into effect, Undersecretary of State David Bruce found out about the plan and convinced Secretary of State Dean Acheson it was an illegal venture. Acheson agreed with this assessment and in turn convinced Truman to abandon the operation. When approached by United Fruit two years later, the State Department was headed by John Foster Dulles who, before coming to the government worked for the law firm representing United Fruit, and his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, had served on the UFCO board. With the clear support of President Eisenhower, the plan was revived, renamed Operation Success and put into motion (Ranelagh 1987, 265).

The land expropriation was the first overt action of the Guatemalan government to come to the attention of the new Eisenhower administration. The recently appointed U.S. ambassador to that country, John E. Peurifoy, transferred there from Greece where he had been active in assisting that nation to resist communism under President Truman. Peurifoy immediately held a lengthy meeting with President Arbenz to assess the direction the

Guatemalan government planned to take in terms of economic reforms, who passed along his observations to officials in Washington.

> In a six hour conversation he [Arbenz] listened while I counted off the leading Communists in his regime, but he gave no ground; many notorious Reds he denied to be Communists; if they were, they were not dangerous; if dangerous, he could control them; if not controllable, he would round them up. He said, in any case, all our difficulties were due to the malpractices of American business. The trips of Communists to Russia were not to get training and instructions, he said, but merely to study Marxism, just in the same way as other Guatemalans may come to the United States to study economics. Meanwhile, they would continue to enjoy the full advantages accorded all Guatemalans, as they were valuable allies to him in the fight for social reform . . . It seemed to me that the man thought like a Communist and talked like a Communist, and if not actually one, would do until one came along. I so reported to Secretary Dulles, who informed the President; and I expressed to them the view that unless the Communist influences in Guatemala were counteracted, Guatemala would within six months fall completely under Communist control (Eisenhower 1963, 422).

Eisenhower agreed that something had to be done quickly, beginning with an effort to win over Latin American public support against this perceived creeping communist threat in Guatemala. This was the basis for introduction and adoption of the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against International Communist Intervention at the March 1954 OAS conference in Caracas.

On May 17, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles stated to the press that the United States had learned that the Guatemalan government had purchased over 2,000 tons of small arms, light artillery pieces and ammunition from the Skoda arms factory in Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia. This equipment, which greatly exceeded the amount needed for self defense of that small nation, was in route to Guatemala on a Swedish ship that was taking a very circuitous path in an attempt to hide its destination. The Eisenhower administration, after consultation with the leaders of Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico, announced intentions to prevent further Communist arms buildup in Central America by stopping suspicious foreign-flag vessels on the high seas off Guatemala to inspect cargo as authorized by the United Nations Charter and Caracas Declaration. A session of the OAS also would be held to consider additional actions.

As Eisenhower later recounted in his memoirs, before these steps could be arranged, President Arbenz declared a state of emergency in Guatemala. On June 18, Carlos Castillo Armas, an exiled army colonel, led about 200 men across the border from Nicaragua towards Guatemala City. This small force was supported by three old bombers which attacked a munitions depot outside the capital city; after the raid two of the planes crashed. The next day, President Eisenhower met with Secretary of State Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to assess what the United States might do to assist the Armas effort to remove the Arbenz government. Holland called for a hands-off policy, arguing other Latin American nations would see direct aid to Armas as interference in the internal affairs of Guatemala. However, without air support, the CIA Director indicated there was no chance of success for Armas.

The choice was clear for Eisenhower, either do nothing and deal with an intractable leftist Guatemalan government receiving direct Soviet support or aid the Armas force as

> the only hope of restoring freedom to Guatemala . . . I realized full well that United States intervention in Central American and Caribbean affairs earlier in the century had greatly injured our standing in all of Latin America. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to refuse to cooperate in providing indirect support to a strictly anti-Communist faction in this struggle would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Caracas resolution. I had faith in the strength of the inter-American resolve therein set forth. On the actual value of a shipment of planes, I knew from experience the important psychological impact of even a small amount of air support. In any event, our proper course of action - indeed my duty - was clear to me. We would replace the airplanes (Eisenhower 1963, 425-6).

Five days after receiving the planes, and faced with loss of support from the regular Guatemalan army, President Arbenz capitulated and fled via Mexico to exile in Czechoslovakia. He was initially replaced by a military junta, after which Armas was elected President of Guatemala.

The ease with which this covert involvement achieved its purpose in Guatemala bolstered plans for a similar operation to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba six years later, but with much different results at the Bay of Pigs. Planning for an invasion of the island by a force of exiled Cubans began in mid-1959 after Castro announced the socialist course his government planned to follow. On March 17, 1960 Eisenhower issued instructions for a two-prong effort to overthrow Castro, just as his administration had done in Guatemala in 1954. The CIA was directed to assemble a unified political opposition against the Castro regime among Cuban exiles in the United States. At the same time, the agency was authorized to recruit and train a military force of these exiles for guerrilla action on the island. President-elect Kennedy was briefed on the operation by CIA Director Dulles on November 29, 1960 whom he instructed to carry the work forward; by the time the new president assumed office in January 1961, both of these activities were well under way.

Very little time elapsed between this change of administrations and the launching of the invasion on April 17, 1961. In the meetings held on the operation, Kennedy relied heavily on the advice of the military planners and CIA staff directly overseeing the Cuban exile force. Arthur Schlesinger noted these two points as the key to the final decision to proceed, even though some others, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Vice President Johnson (who called it a hare-brained scheme that could not succeed), had reservations about the chances of the operation.

According to Arthur Schlesinger, the decision resulted from the fact that Kennedy had been in office only 77 days. He attributed this to a number of factors, including JFK's unfamiliarity with the levers of government power. The president also did not know which of his advisors were competent and which were not. Finally, the weight of authority in foreign policy and defense favored the senior officials in these areas, who unanimously supported the invasion plans. The only objections came from Senator Fulbright (D-Ark) and Schlesinger, which mattered little ". . . against the united voice of institutional authority. Had one senior adviser opposed the adventure, I believe that Kennedy would have canceled it. Not one spoke against it" (1965, 259). Secretary Rusk in his memoirs confirms his lack of confidence in the plan and his failure to voice those views during the planning sessions.

Rusk states that, in retrospect, if he had pulled together some of the people who shared this reservation he might have been able to block the plan. While he indicates Kennedy knew of his doubts, he also wrote he wishes he had pushed aside his reticence and at least insisted that the Joint Chiefs ". . . come clean with an honest, professional, military judgment regarding its probability of success," a view he does not feel was forthcoming from the military planners (Rusk 1990, 211). Yet he won Kennedy's respect by the fact that, even though he did not agree with the plan, once it failed and the president publicly accepted responsibility for the whole thing, Rusk backed the administration in his own public statements.

This kind of solidarity in the face of public criticism was an important lesson that came out of this situation, a point that was made by Kennedy to his top aides. When Vice President Johnson made a general comment attacking the CIA, the president told him "Lyndon, you've got to remember we're all in this and that, when I accepted responsibility for this operation, I took the entire responsibility on myself, and I think we should have no sort of passing of the buck or backbiting, however justified." The following day the two continued their discussion on the CIA during which Kennedy told Johnson he could not understand how such intelligent and experienced men like Dulles and [CIA Plans Director] Bissell could be so wrong. At least now he knew the weak spots in his administration, especially in the CIA and Joint Chiefs. "We can't win them all . . . And I have been close enough to disaster to realize that these things which seem world-shaking at one moment you can barely remember the next. We got a big kick in the leg - and we deserved it. But maybe we'll learn something from it." One key lesson from this is that the president never would be overawed by professional military advice again (Schlesinger 1965, 289-90).

Dean Rusk also commented on mistakes in the Bay of Pigs operation that were identified in an evaluation of the process which President Kennedy ordered General Maxwell Taylor and Attorney General Robert Kennedy to conduct. The first was that a complex plan was undertaken too soon in the new administration before the president had assembled a support team which he knew and could rely upon for reasoned advice. The second issue was the belief on the part of CIA officials that Kennedy would authorize American military air cover for the operation if it ran into problems, even though the president had publicly stated that no U.S. military support would be given to any anti-Castro group; he also told Schlesinger and Adolf Berle, head of his Latin America task force, to convey this message directly to the provisional leader of the Cuban exiles in America, Miro Cardona. Another significant error was having those proposing the operation also providing critical information on which the final "go, no-go" decision was made. The lack of impartial data hampered the process throughout the operation. After the fact Kennedy told Arthur Krock of *Newsweek* that McNamara informed him that the Defense Secretary had tried to get the Joint Chiefs to reconsider the plans but they assured him and the president they would work "as great as in Guatemala," after which the president lost faith in his military advisors (Krock 1968, 371). The last point of the Kennedy-Taylor report was that considerations of international law with respect to the Cuban invasion effort simply were ignored; neither the State Department legal advisor nor the Justice Department were consulted on this issue. Rusk indicated this caused considerably difficulty for United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson when that organization aired international criticism of the U.S. over its role in the invasion planning and support.

The lessons learned by this painful experience were put to the test less than two years later in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Many of the same officials participated in this foreign policy episode, but under different conditions and in a significantly altered planning process. It is the contrast between the manner in which the two actions regarding Cuba were determined that is the focus of this section of the case study. This is important not only to illustrate this change in decision making style, but for the effect both the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis had on the way some of these same participants, notably President Johnson, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk, reacted to the Dominican Republic intervention three years later.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (as generally named) began with a report from the CIA to President Kennedy in August 1992 that, based on reports from recent Cuban exiles of expanded Soviet activity on the island, a series of U-2 reconnaissance flights had revealed construction of surface-to-air missile sites. Subsequent overflight photographs on October 14 indicated these were to protect a ballistic missile site being built at San Cristobal, coinciding with CIA information on a sudden increase of Soviet military specialists arriving in Cuba. Ray Cline, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence briefed President Kennedy on this development the following day. The president directed National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to schedule a meeting of top officials for later of October 15; this group became known as the Executive Committee (Excom).[1]

According to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Undersecretary of State and Excom participant, the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis breaks down into four major periods: intelligence gathering prior to October 15 when U-2 photos revealed the missile sites under construction; Excom response planning from October 15 to the October 22 speech by

[1] The Executive Committee members were President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Army General Maxwell Taylor, CIA Director John McCone, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Presidential Counsel Theodore Sorenson, Undersecretary of State George Ball, Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and Soviet affairs specialist Llewellyn Thompson; part-time participants were Vice President Lyndon Johnson, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Presidential Assistant Kenneth O'Donnell and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

President Kennedy's announcing a U. S. Navy quarantine around Cuba; action from October 22 to 28 when the naval interdiction of Soviet shipping to Cuba occurred; and resolution after the USSR statement of October 28 that the missiles would be withdrawn (Johnson 1984, 380). The period of greatest relevance here is the planning phase which covered the first seven days of the crisis. At the direction of the President in the first Excom meeting on October 16, working groups were formed to consider how to respond to the discovery of the missiles. These options were bomb the sites, invade Cuba, diplomatic initiatives and naval quarantine. Interestingly, all the participants indicate that the one alternative not examined was to do nothing; the presence of the missiles 90 miles from the United States simply was unacceptable (Rusk 1990, 230-1). After setting up these groups, President Kennedy stepped back from the next few Excom meetings to allow uninhibited discussion within and among these groups to ensue.

Three significant factors operated during this 13-day period. One was that, in addition to the Excom meetings, much private consultation between individual participants took place. Secretary of State Dean Rusk reported he spoke at length directly with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, sovietologist Llewelyn Thompson, Undersecretary of State George Ball, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy during this first week. Rusk indicated in his memoir that these one-on-one consultations probably had more to do with the successful outcome of the crisis than did formal action taken by the working groups and the Excom as a whole. He repeated this point in a 1989 interview with James Blight and David Welch as part of their reassessment of this incident (Blight and Welch 1989, 176).

Thus at the October 20 Excom meeting the key cabinet heads had reached agreement on the first step in meeting the crisis. As the senior member, it was Secretary Rusk whom President Kennedy asked to begin presenting recommendations, in this case imposition of a naval quarantine. Defense Secretary McNamara also supported this option, after which

Kennedy turned to Vice President Johnson for his comments. "You have the recommendation of your secretary of state and your secretary of defense. I would take it" (Rusk 1990, 234). The president did so and instructed his speechwriters to prepare his October 22 address to the nation along those lines.

The second important factor was that the president felt it useful to consult and employ select individuals outside the government to assist in the planning and implementation of the steps to end the crisis. Kennedy had learned from the Bay of Pigs episode the need for advisors who would give him a variety of opinions and not just agree with him simply because he was the president (Cohn 1992, 229). Thus he included former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett and John J. McCloy, a retired intelligence specialist and influential business leader, in the Excom to balance administration members. This did not mean he preferred the views of the outsiders - Acheson argued strenuously for direct military action over a blockade - but that having such people involved made sure he would hear all sides of the major issues under consideration. McCloy was instrumental in assisting UN ambassador Adlai Stevenson round up support for the American actions to force removal of the missiles and later negotiated the actual dismantling process in Cuba whereby U.S. Navy ships conducted inspections of Soviet ships carrying them back to Russia (Bird 1992, 523-35).

The value of drawing on a range of views was echoed by former Defense Secretary McNamara in an October 1987 conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held at Harvard University. In discussing lessons derived from the situation almost 25 years earlier, one of the keys is to be concerned about the experience of the people who are going to deal with such crises when they occur.

> The responsible officials must think in advance of how to deal with crises, especially when they involve even a remote possibility of a nuclear response. Georgi [Shaknazarov, personal aide to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev] asked me a few minutes ago if our Administration had been adequately briefed by the prior Administration on superpower relations and crisis management -

> and the answer is absolutely no! We have no institutional memory. Each new Administration starts all over again. I've said this before, and I know some of you laugh at it, but we've got to do better than to have the president of Ford Motor Company step directly into the job of Secretary of Defense! This is very dangerous! Look at what happened in the Bay of Pigs. The Administration had no experience - we didn't know what we were doing. Some of us learned very quickly, but it's very dangerous to bring into positions of authority individuals who are totally illiterate with respect to handling superpower relations and managing international crises. It's a big problem (Blight and Welch 1989, 281-2).

Cohn notes Kennedy felt comfortable relying on outside advisors and ignoring Excom suggestions when they did not reflect his own views.

Lastly, President Kennedy exercised caution and discretion regarding recommendations coming from the professional military. After the Bay of Pigs incident he no longer had full faith in their ability to prepare objective assessments of application of force in such situations. This was reinforced when Air Force staff advocated an all-out air strike at the October 18 Excom meeting but was unable to assure the president that all the missiles could be destroyed even with the overwhelming firepower available. Kennedy was quoted afterwards as stating, "The advice I'm going to give my successor is to watch the generals and to avoid feeling that just because they were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn" (Cohn 1992, 230). He also was disturbed that one of the first people to warn about the limitations of air strike capabilities was not the military chiefs but former Defense Secretary Lovett, who also indicated a blockade was more concise and effective than uncontrollable combat (Isaacson and Thomas 1986, 624-5).

The impact of direct U.S. armed force against Cuba beyond an initial air strike was another area in which the professional military advisors seemed unable to provide concrete answers. Both McNamara and CIA staffer Raymond Garthoff argued that air strikes inevitably would require a follow-up ground invasion which would be very costly; Garthoff estimated American casualties from such an operation could reach 20,000. In addition, the Soviets would be expected to respond somewhere else, most likely in Berlin. This has been called "McNamara's Law," which the former Defense Secretary outlined at the March 1987 Hawks Cay (Fla.) and October 1987 Harvard University conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis: ". . . it is impossible to predict with a high degree of confidence what the effects of the use of military force will be because of the risks of accident, miscalculation, misperception, and inadvertence" (Blight and Welch 1989, 100). The uncertainty of how to conduct a Cuban invasion (with the recent Bay of Pigs experience) and the type of Soviet response this would engender were two points that civilian rather than military leaders brought up that led to selection of the quarantine policy option. As Kennedy remarked after the crisis ended, "An invasion would have been a mistake - a wrong use of our power. But the military are mad. They wanted to do this. It's lucky for us that we have McNamara over there [Defense Department]" (Allison 1971, 198).

This worry was communicated to Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, by Robert Kennedy on October 27 as the quarantine was being tested by the Russians. In his memoirs, Dobrynin relates the gist of that conversation. "The U.S. administration was resolved to get rid of the bases and was prepared to bomb them as a serious threat to American security if it came to the worst. But Robert Kennedy also recognized that bombing the bases might also lead to Soviet casualties, which would undoubtedly induce the Soviet government to retaliate in Europe. Then a real war would break out, and millions of Americans and Russians would perish. The American side wanted to avoid this by all means, and he was sure the Soviet government did, too. Yet delay in finding a way out entailed great risks that the situation could spin out of control. To underline this, he remarked almost in passing that a lot of unreasonable people among American generals - and not only generals - were 'spoiling for a fight'" (Dobrynin 1995, 87). He concluded that the realization by both sides of this disastrous possibility made possible the subsequent political settlement of the crisis. This fear of uncontrollable escalation, what Blight refers to as "the shattered crystal ball," is referenced by other participants as well.

Dobrynin identified the need to communicate clearly and quickly between national leaders, as shown by creation of the 1963 "hot line" linking Washington and Moscow. He also stated that, even though a strong anti-communist, as president Lyndon Johnson concluded more agreements in various fields with the Soviet Union than had occurred over the 30 preceding years since establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and USSR, a fact Johnson noted proudly in his own memoirs. This he attributed directly to the Cuban crisis experience.

Some Excom participants in later works indicated significant lessons coming out of the Cuban Missile Crisis that have guided successive administrations since 1962. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Undersecretary of State, drew three major conclusions from the 13 days in October 1962 as an Excom member about the way the U.S. government can best organize itself to handle this kind of vastly complex foreign policy crisis (Johnson 1984, 387-9). The first is that neat "war plans" composed by colonels in splendid and artificial isolation from political reality have become obsolete; this was demonstrated clearly by the Excom discussion of air strikes versus quarantine. While this was absorbed by the contemporary Joints Chiefs, subsequent military leaders often have to experience this discrepancy directly before accepting its importance. This observation leads to the second lesson, which is that with the potential for nuclear war as a result of a mistake, the president must exercise ultimate control over both military and civilian elements of the government. Thus, recognizing the political delicacy of the Cuban situation, President Kennedy directed movements of the blockade destroyers from the White House rather than passing messages through lengthy and cumbersome channels of communication at the Pentagon.

In the conclusion of his memoirs, Johnson elaborated on the problems the current military command structure poses for the commander in chief, citing the then newly created (1984) Rapid Deployment Force in the Middle East as an example of military planning by rival branches of the armed forces. He noted the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how diplomatic and military capabilities can be orchestrated by an effective president to avoid military conflict, a point which the current Joint Chiefs have forgotten. In calling for a major overhaul of that institution, he observed that bureaucratic battles among the individual services prevents the nation's political leaders from receiving the pertinent and objective information they need which the Joint Chiefs in their collegial advisory role are expected to provide (Johnson 1984, 630-1).

Last is the absolute necessity of demonstrating the capability and political will to back up words with deeds. Johnson strongly argued that Khrushchev's knowledge that American forces could attack Cuba at a moment's notice, and his belief in Kennedy's willingness to employ them to force the missiles out of the island, were critical to the successful resolution of the crisis. As classic deterrence theory indicates, the clear communication through words, actions and potential for significantly greater military operations convinced the Soviet leader that the United States meant absolutely what it said, that Soviet missiles of any kind in Cuba capable of reaching the United States constituted offensive weapons which would not be tolerated in the Western Hemisphere. By using a non-military first step of the quarantine, rather than a direct attack on the missile sites in Cuba, Kennedy created the political opportunity for the Soviets to withdraw these weapons. Graham Allison cited Robert Kennedy's assessment of the situation that the president assumed from the start of the crisis that Khrushchev was a rational, intelligent man who, in the face of American determination to force the missiles out of Cuba would, if given sufficient time, alter his position and pursue that desired course of action, which ultimately he did (Allison 1971, 215).

Robert McNamara, at the 1987 Harvard conference, discussed some lessons that he believed the Cuban Missile Crisis presented (Blight and Welch 1989, 282-3). The first is to take time to plan, rather than to respond in some fashion immediately to the perceived threat. This allows those involved to take advantage of his second point - provide the president with knowledgeable associates who can draw on their range of experience to advise him. McNamara cited the Iran-Contra affair and Vietnam as examples where, unlike the Cuban situation, American leaders operated without full information on policy choices and consequences. A third lesson is to maintain communication which facilitates the crucial need to look at the problem from the adversary's point of view. He indicated that Ambassador Dobrynin played a very important role in this regard, not only during the Cuban situation, but during the whole time he served for the Soviet government in Washington. These factors combine to address the last element, that is to create the opportunity for the adversary to get out of the situation gracefully. Backing him into a corner only increases the chances of one's opponent taking some kind of desperate action to resolve the crisis.

Finally, Arthur Schlesinger in his capacity as Special Assistant to the President in the Kennedy administration, was able to observe and record his assessment of the impact of the Cuban Missile Crisis both short and long term. The immediate effect of the resolution to the situation was for many to claim an American victory over the Soviets, a position which Kennedy refused to take. He recognized that a unique set of circumstances of geography and American political will combined to force Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, and that to overstate the case could cause resentment and retaliation later on. "Every setback has the seeds of its own reprisal, if the country is powerful enough . . . We tried to make their setback in Cuba not the kind that would bring about an increase in hostility but perhaps provide for an easing of relations" (Schlesinger 1965, 841). The more lasting impact of the crisis was the demonstration of responsible management of American power, based on a cool and calculated application proportionate to the level of threat involved. Kennedy later told German Chancellor Adenauer that, as the first time the United States and the Soviet Union directly challenged each other with nuclear weapons and resolved the crisis successfully, it represented a turning point in East-West relations that could have long lasting effects beyond his own administration.

In between the two Cuban episodes, the Kennedy administration launched a major program to enhance relations throughout the Americas, the Alliance for Progress. Announced by the president on March 13, 1961, it was intended to overcome policy shortcomings of the past which Kennedy indicated lacked understanding of the economic and social problems of Latin America. At the same time, governments in the region also were chided for ignoring ". . . the urgency of the need to lift people from poverty and ignorance and despair." Thus the president said now it was time for a new approach to inter-American relations.

> I have called on all people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress - *Alianza para Progreso* - a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools - *techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela* . . . Let us once again transform the American continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts - a tribute to the power of the creative energies of free men and women - an example to all the world that liberty and progress walk hand in hand" (Schlesinger 1965, 204-5).

The Alliance was formally established at the August 1961 Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay. At the conference representatives from twenty American republics created the Alliance charter laying out several very ambitious goals. Among these was to improve and strengthen democratic institutions through self-determination, to accelerate economic and social development, to stimulate private enterprise and to accelerate the integration of Latin America. The United States agreed to provide the majority of the $20 billion required to implement this program in Latin America over the next ten years.

An early testing ground for the Alianza was the Dominican Republic. It showed both the promise and the problem of this approach to Latin American development by tying economic growth to political evolution towards democratic leadership in these countries. The island nation had been ruled by the dictator Rafael Trujillo since 1930. Shortly after the program began, in March 1961, Trujillo was assassinated by a group of disaffected army officers; filling this vacated leadership spot was the titular Dominican president Juaquin Balaguer. The opportunity to demonstrate the ability of a nation to change from dictatorship to democracy, with assistance from the Alliance, become very important to the American administration. As Kennedy stated, "There are three possibilities . . . in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third . . . Balaguer is our only tool . . . The anti-communist liberals aren't strong enough. We must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy " (Schlesinger 1965, 769-70).

It soon was apparent that Balaguer was not strong enough to pull together elements of the left and right opposition groups to form an effective government. This became more obvious when the former dictator's son Ramfis Trujillo, who still commanded the armed forces, was joined in mid-November with his two uncles, setting the stage for a possible military coup to restore rule over the island by the Trujillo family. Schlesinger recounted the Kennedy cabinet discussion over this development between Arturo Morales-Carrion, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and President Kennedy:

> Morales-Carrion: The democratic opposition . . . are the people who represent the only possibility of democratic government in the Dominican Republic. They are the counterparts of the people who made democracy effective in Puerto Rico and Venezuela. Naturally they are not too well disciplined at the moment. They have lived under tyranny for thirty years. Now the lid is off, political life has revived and it is not always under control. But we must understand them and their position and their hopes. Otherwise we will lose all chance of bringing democracy to the Dominican Republic.
>
> Kennedy: Yes, yes, but the whole key in all those countries is the emergence of a leader - a liberal figure who can command popular support as against the military and who will carry out social and economic reform - a Nehru or a Munoz [governor of Puerto Rico]. No such figure has emerged. We don't know who he will be.

> The great danger in the next six months is a take-over by the army, which could lead straight to Castro. That is the situation we have to deal with now - that is why we must get a modus vivendi among all the forces prepared to commit themselves to democracy, instead of letting them tear themselves apart and let in the far right or the far left. The eventual problem is to find someone who will symbolize the future for the island (Schlesinger 1965, 770-1).

To demonstrate American support for the Dominican president if the military coup were attempted, President Kennedy ordered eight U.S. Navy ships loaded with 1,800 Marines to sail just outside the three mile limit of Santo Domingo harbor. When the city's residents filled the streets to cheer the presence of the ships, Dominican Air Force General Pedro Echavarria led a revolt against Ramfis Trujillo, who fled the island with the rest of his family. A Council of State was formed in March 1962 by Balaguer and Echavarria in an uneasy relationship; shortly afterward the general made an abortive coup attempt of his own. Despite this setback, the Council with the assistance of the OAS was able to hold things together until the December 1962 election of Juan Bosch, the first democratically selected leader of the Dominican Republic in over thirty years. Yet this new regime lasted only nine months when a military coup assumed power, setting up the situation that led to the April 1965 U.S. military intervention.

The failure of the Alliance for Progress to make substantial and lasting economic and political changes in Latin America has been ascribed in part to two major contradictions between its purpose and its methods. One, according to John Bartlow Martin, American ambassador to the Dominican Republic in April 1965, is that it assumes that a significant portion of growth in Latin America under the program will come from outside private investors (Martin 1966, 728). Yet, in order to sustain such growth, the Alliance promotes social changes such as tax restructuring, agrarian reform and income redistribution that create instability, the very condition that such investors are most likely to avoid. In addition, due to the lack of a trained labor force which can support modern industrial activity, simply pumping money into these countries will not produce the kind of economic turnaround which the Marshall plan produced in Europe.

The second anomaly is a political one, namely that democracy must be developed from the ground up as a popular creation, not imposed as a superstructure from the outside. Instead the approach taken through the Alliance for Progress was based on the stated principle that attaining democracy with U.S. guidance was necessary to achieve stability and prosperity in Latin America. At the same time, however, American policy supported right-wing military governments to resist opposition forces, not to secure democratic regimes, but to maintain the status quo of those in power who were friendly to the U.S. in its fight against communism. Thus the very elements of civil society which advance democratic government were suppressed in the name of national security and American credibility in resisting revolutionary movements in the region. LaFeber concluded that unable to reconcile the contradiction between the professed ideals and the social pressure it creates for major political change, the United States from Eisenhower to Bush has resorted to force (1993, 367-8).

Under the Johnson administration, the thrust of the Alliance was shifted from promoting social reform and democratic institutions to promoting private investment by ensuring government stability through enhanced military assistance. Thomas Mann, appointed Undersecretary of State for Latin American Affairs on December 14, 1963, replaced the Kennedy approach of linking improvements in democratic practices with development assistance to the goal of political stability in order to protect the hemisphere from subversion. The importance of securing democracy in the region was not eliminated from the program, but rather it became part of a larger pattern of relations the United States sought with the Latin American nations (Tulchin 1994, 230-1). In a March 18, 1964 private session with America's Latin American ambassadors, Mann outlined the four purposes for which U.S. policy would henceforth be directed. As reported by Tad Szulac in the *New York Times* the next day, these were (1) fostering economic growth in the area, (2) protection of the $9 billion in American investments there, (3) non-intervention in internal affairs of the hemisphere's republics, and (4) opposition to communism. Important for its absence at this meeting was any reference by Assistant Secretary of State Mann to the Kennedy administration's original Alliance for Progress.

In a September 1965 briefing given to Senator Robert Kennedy by State Department officials before his trip to Latin America outlining this new policy, he summarized it as follows: "You're saying that what the Alliance for Progress has come down to is that if you have a military takeover, outlaw political parties, close down the congress, put your political opponents in jail, and take away the basic freedoms of the people, you can get all the American aid you want. But, if you mess around with an American oil company, we'll cut you off without a penny. Is that right? Is that what the Alliance for Progress comes down to?" The briefing officials averred that essentially was correct (Schlesinger 1978, 2:726).

PARTICIPANTS

During the Dominican Republic episode in April 1965, four individuals were intimately involved in the management of the crisis. Three were hold-overs from the Kennedy administration: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. The last and most important was Lyndon Johnson, then in his first full year as the elected President of the United States, after his elevation to that position upon the death of President Kennedy in November 1963. Together this small group directed movement of American troops into Santo Domingo, as well as coordinated efforts among members of the Organization of American States. Along with Undersecretary Mann, they also handled public and press relations to explain the purpose behind this military intervention.

From the start, it is important to understand the Johnson administration operated to a significant degree within the legacy and public aura of the tragically shortened Kennedy era, a point recognized by the experienced politician LBJ and the people who served him in the top foreign policy positions during his almost six years as president. This dynamic of carrying on the goals of the prior administration while trying to shape his own policies and programs greatly affected Johnson's actions relative to Latin America, and elsewhere in the world. Explaining why he kept these key cabinet members he stated, "Rightly or wrongly, I felt from the very first day in office that I had to carry on for President Kennedy. I considered myself the caretaker of both his people and his policies. He knew when he selected me as his running mate that I would be the man required to carry on if anything happened to him. I did what I believed he would have wanted me to do. I never wavered from that sense of responsibility, even after I was elected in my own right, up to my last day in office." Johnson added that although he eventually developed his own programs and policies, he never lost sight of his role as trustee and custodian of the Kennedy administration (Johnson 1971, 19).

This worked the other way as well, that is, could these important cabinet members, who had intense personal loyalty to JFK, serve as diligently for President Johnson. LBJ recognized this immediately observing that he had inherited the talent of these men but not their loyalty or enthusiasm; those qualities he would have to earn. McGeorge Bundy noted this problem in terms of the much different background and temperament of Lyndon Johnson, which he said naturally limited the capacity of the cabinet members to work for the new president (Henggeler 1991, 92). Thus at his first cabinet meeting, Johnson made a special point of his caretaker role which required continuity at the top level of government to fulfill. He told them he needed them to stay on for this very purpose.

At the same time there was another more practical reason behind retaining the cabinet intact as much as possible which the political savvy of Lyndon Johnson indicated was critical to his success. In his memoirs, Johnson stated he needed to prove himself as president not only with the Kennedy appointees, but also with much of the federal bureaucracy, Congress and the nation. As he related to Doris Kearns Goodwin while working on his memoirs, ". . . I needed that White House staff. Without them I would have lost my link to John Kennedy, and without that I would have had absolutely no chance of gaining the support of the media or the Easterners or the intellectuals. And without that support I would have had absolutely no chance of governing the country" (Goodwin 1991, 177-8). However, the willingness and level of support these staff provided to the new president was highly divided. Arthur Schlesinger reported that two groups emerged almost immediately within the cabinet after Johnson assumed office, which he termed loyalists and realists. "The loyalists were those who were there because of their association with Kennedy and who had other things to do, as I did. The realists were those who loved Kennedy but loved power, the opportunity to do things, more" (Henggeler 1991, 94). Among the latter were the three most closely involved in foreign policy: McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk who, together with Johnson appointee Mann, formed the core advisors in this area during the Dominican Republic incident.

McGeorge Bundy grew up in a solidly Republican family; his father Harvey H. Bundy served as aide to Secretary of State Henry Stimson under President Hoover. He attended the Groton School and Yale (class of 1940), where his entrance exam scores were some of the highest ever recorded. Bundy was a second lieutenant during the Normandy invasion, then participated in the post-war planning efforts on the Marshall Plan. In 1948, he became a speechwriter for Thomas Dewey and, when the Truman upset occurred, Bundy returned to academia, this time as a Junior Fellow in the Harvard Government Department even though he never received his Ph.D. This was a special endowed program to allow particularly talented individuals to participate at the university while avoiding the snares of the scholar (Halberstam 1992, 53). His course on American foreign policy, particularly on the futility of the Munich appeasement effort and other shortcomings of the European inter-war generation, gained widespread student popularity. At the young age of 34, McGeorge Bundy assumed the office of dean of Harvard College.

Even though he was a Republican, his Boston background and academic reputation brought Bundy to the attention of John Kennedy. Originally, JFK considered Bundy for his Secretary of State but decided that, because of his own young age, having someone of the same generation in that critical cabinet post would challenge the credibility of the new administration. When that post went to Dean Rusk, Kennedy appointed Bundy to be his National Security Advisor. His mandate was to revitalize the National Security Council as an integral part of the overall foreign policy planning element of the White House, rather than as the military style staff resource it served under President Eisenhower. This gave Bundy and the NSC significant control over the information flow to President Kennedy, but this was at JFK's explicit direction (Gardner 1993, 208).

Halberstam indicates that Bundy represented the Brahmin, intellectual type of individual that Kennedy hoped to attract to government service under his classic call "ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." His own confidence in the possibilities of the new administration to deal with the world's problems were fully shared by his National Security Advisor. "He was the brightest light in that glittering constellation around the President, for if those years had any central theme, if there was anything that bound the men, their followers and their subordinates together, it was the belief that sheer intelligence and rationality could answer and solve anything. If this was the quality of the young President, then no one else exemplified it more than Bundy, who seemed on the surface to be the sharpest intellect of a generation, a repository of national intelligence. Even Kennedy talked of Bundy with a certain awe: what a pleasure it was to work with him all day, he could sense what you wanted before you ever knew it yourself. 'You can't beat brains,' Kennedy said of Bundy" (Halberstam 1992, 44). His ability to apply this intelligence in a way that did not put off lesser White house staff was an important element of his success during the Kennedy years .

This was not quite so under the Johnson administration. Several observers report LBJ's feelings both of awe and distrust of intellectuals, while as a group they did not respect, admire or like Lyndon Johnson (Goldman 1969, 162). He stressed to people that Jack Valenti, his personal aide, had more Harvard degrees than Bundy did, as a way to put off unfavorable comparisons with his own limited educational background. Yet Johnson often referred to Bundy as "my intellectual" and "indispensable," particularly in the area of foreign affairs. In turn, Bundy expressed his support for Johnson as president, writing a 1964 article called "The Presidency and the Peace" in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in which he said "Loyalty to President Kennedy and loyalty to President Johnson are not merely naturally compatible, but logically necessary as part of a larger loyalty to their common purpose" (Henggeler 1991, 107). Although he finally resigned in Spring 1966 to head the Ford Foundation, Johnson indicated in his memoirs that Bundy made himself available to the President when needed.

In his capacity as National Security Advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, one of McGeorge Bundy's most significant contribution was as a strong advocate of the use of military force as a legitimate and useful component of American foreign policy. This was part of his war experience as a D-Day planner and later helping former Secretary of War Henry Stimson write his memoirs titled *On Active Service in Peace and War*, in which the importance of national preparedness and military force played a great part. This view was reflected by Bundy in his Harvard course on "The U. S. in World Affairs." It was referred to at the time as the ultrarealism school in which force must be accepted as a basic element of Cold War diplomacy. The Soviets applied this approach to establish and maintain control over eastern Europe, which gave legitimacy to the Truman Doctrine containment policy of forceful resistance to the spread of communism to the rest of the world.

Bundy's advocacy of force in response to challenge by communism, whether in Latin America or Vietnam, ultimately foundered in the latter situation. "McGeorge Bundy was a rationalist in an era which saw the limits of rationalism and which rekindled the need for political humanism; the man of operations and processes in an Administration which seemed to undermine the limits of the processes without moral guidelines. But above all he was a man of the Establishment, the right people deciding on the right policies in the right way, he believed in the capacity and the right of an elite to govern on its terms" (Halberstam 1992, 657). Bundy's views on the use of force appeared to have moderated somewhat since he left the Johnson administration in 1966. In his 1988 book *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, he noted that the real lessons of the crises over Berlin and Cuba is that both the United States and the Soviet Union, who usually have been extremely cautious about the use of military force against each other, must take care to avoid all such steps that might bring the two powers into open conflict. Thus, while there is room for contests in which the superpowers support other warring states, even those where one side engages directly in combat with forces supported by the other (Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan), such conflict must be limited to avoid direct confrontation between the U.S. and USSR (Bundy 1988, 593).

The other inner circle cabinet member who shared similar intellectual characteristics as those of Bundy, although not the same upper class background, was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (Halberstam 1992, 225). The son of a sales manager for a San Franciso wholesale shoe firm, he grew up in Oakland, attending well-ranked Piedmont High School. McNamara attended the University of California at Berkeley, where he demonstrated a proficiency in mathematics. Moving on to Harvard Business School, McNamara found his element in the areas of accounting and business practices; he was so impressive that he was recruited soon after graduating to become an accounting instructor at that institution. During World War II, he was part of a select faculty that trained military officers in statistical control and logistics that this huge military effort demanded. Later he was the leader of a work group that created from scratch the design and production of the B-29.

McNamara intended to return to Harvard after the war, finding the academic climate to his liking. But his military planning boss Charles Thornton was reluctant to see his talented staff dispersed after proving their capability at complex organizational management. Seeing that reconversion of American industry from military to civilian production would be a major undertaking, he approached Ford Motor Company with a proposal to bring in his staff to assist that company to accomplish this task. McNamara was part of the eight-man group called the Whiz Kids which was hired by Henry Ford II in 1946. At the time Ford was well behind General Motors in the transition to the post-war consumer auto market, both from a design and managerial standpoint; it was in the latter area that McNamara made his reputation.

Applying his aptitude for statistical analysis and organization, he was able to make Ford competitive with GM in a relatively short time. The ability to command facts and figures, and using them to advance his arguments in a concise and rational manner, made him a powerful member of the company's management team. This also made him extremely valuable to Henry Ford II, who on November 9, 1960 elevated McNamara to the position of president of Ford Motor Company. News reports at the time indicated that the new president embodied the rational modern management that had made American business successful. "McNamara had become a walking symbol of the nation's confidence in science, technology, management, business, and progress. He had cultivated the image of the anonymous, rational executive described by Whiz Kid William Kaufman [as follows] . . . McNamara has all the best qualities of a professional manager. He has the ability to range over broad areas of interest. He is interested in ideas, has an analytical mind, and a capacity for action. He doesn't worry over details or the possibility of making mistakes" (Shapley 1993, 227). These were the very qualities that brought him to the attention of the incoming Kennedy administration.

Seven weeks after becoming president of Ford, McNamara was contacted by Robert Kennedy about joining the new government. Sargent Shriver flew to Detroit that same day and indicated that president-elect Kennedy wished to offer him the post of Treasury Secretary. When he protested he was unqualified for that post, Shriver said he could have the position of Defense Secretary instead to which McNamara reiterated the same objection. However, before taking this answer, Shriver countered that at least he should do the courtesy of meeting with JFK in person before turning down the position. The following day the two men met and, as McNamara relates it, the president indicated there were no schools for secretaries of defense just as there were none for presidents, and asked him to take a day to think it over. At his next meeting with both John and Robert Kennedy, he presented a letter citing two conditions for taking the job. One was authority to fill the top department positions based on ability, not party affiliation, to offset his own inexperience. The other was an understanding that he would not participate in the Washington social circuit. JFK took a quick look at the letter then asked his brother to do so and asked for his opinion. "I think it's great," Robert Kennedy said and the announcement of the appointment was made on the spot (McNamara 1995, 16).

The relationship between McNamara and President Kennedy was quick in forming. Schlesinger reports that the Defense Secretary's directness, intelligence and decisiveness immediately gained the president's complete and lasting confidence. Robert Kennedy indicated his brother thought more highly of McNamara than of any other cabinet member, a view reinforced by his performance during the Cuban Missile Crisis ". . . when you can see what can happen to a country and how much depends on a particular individual"

(Shapley 1993, 270). This professional assessment also became a personal one based on shared interests. "Kennedy and McNamara met at crucial points of personality, however: in their zest for challenge, their respect for performance, their sense of dignity, their demand for rational action. McNamara quickly crossed the Kennedy line between official and personal relationships" (Trewhitt 1971, 250).

When Johnson assumed the presidency, a number of Kennedy appointees felt unable to work for the new administration; McNamara was not among these. Two reasons for remaining as Defense Secretary featured prominently in this decision. One was that the fiscal and management controls introduced at the Pentagon just were starting to have measurable effect and McNamara wanted to see them through. The other was that Johnson recognized the tenacity and intellectual capacity of the secretary as vitally important and was willing to give him broad discretion in the way the Defense Department was run, much more so than President Kennedy did. Johnson's trust in McNamara grew accordingly as his administration established its own identity. At a December 1965 ceremony to present the Congressional Medal of Honor to Captain Roger H. C. Donlon for service in Vietnam, Johnson remarked, "This man [McNamara] represents to me in our civilian life what Captain Donlon represents in the military life, the very best in America" (Trewhitt 1971, 262). These feelings still were evident when, upon his leaving in February 1968 to become head of the World Bank, Robert McNamara received from President Johnson the Distinguished Service Medal. In part the award citation noted the secretary had built the nation's military forces to a pinnacle of new strength and efficiency, while being a wise counselor of restraint in its use.

McNamara had solid understanding of the value and limitations of American military power. His 1968 book, *The Essence of Security*, stressed that since nuclear strategy relied on deterrence in the use of such weapons, the corollary was the need to improve U. S. conventional forces to cope with limited aggression wherever it occurs (McNamara 1968, 78). This included organization, training, weapons systems development and above all balance among all elements of the American military. The requirement or operational goal for the non-nuclear forces is less the defense of the American territory as it is to support the commitments the U. S. has made to other nations. A major component of this approach was strategic movement of armed force units to hot spots through the enhancement of airlift and sealift capacity.

McNamara concluded that the most likely source of regional conflict is in the developing nations. Rather than to be the world's policeman, America's most effective role is to help these nations attain a level of security such that economic and political advances can be pursued. Thus, in addition to military assistance for defensive purposes, he advocated military civic action as a separate but equally important type of aid. This entails using indigenous military forces to build and maintain nontraditional facilities like public works, sanitation, public health and education. He described this approach as follows: "Assistance in the purely military sense, though, is far from enough; economic assistance is essential. President Johnson has been determined that U.S. aid be hardheaded and realistic, that it must deal directly with the roots of underdevelopment and not merely attempt to alleviate the symptoms. The principle of the entire aid program is that U.S. economic help, no matter what its magnitude, is futile unless the country in question is resolute in making the primary effort itself. That is the criterion and ought to be the crucial condition for all our future assistance" (McNamara 1968, 152). McNamara indicated that the improved balance of military forces which the United States achieved during his tenure reflected the mandate he received from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

The third person whom President Johnson retained from the Kennedy administration, and the one with which he had the closest personal relationship, was Secretary of State Dean Rusk. They both came from poor, rural Southern backgrounds, Johnson in West Texas and Rusk in Georgia, which set them apart from most of their contemporaries during the Kennedy years. Unlike Johnson, Rusk managed to follow a relatively prestigious college education path, first at Davidson in North Carolina, then from 1931 to 1934 as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. Upon his return to the United States, he was recruited as a faculty member of government and international relations at Mills College in California. In 1940, based upon his ROTC experience in college, Rusk was called up as an infantry captain, serving on General Stilwell's staff in the Far East Theater. After the war, he worked briefly as a staff officer in the General Staff Operations Division where he came to the attention of General George Marshall. In 1947, when Marshall became Truman's Secretary of State, Rusk was offered the position of Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA) formerly held by Alger Hiss. On March 5, 1947, Dean Rusk formally began his career with the U. S. State Department.

During his first two years as head of SPA, Rusk dealt primarily in a liaison capacity to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. In 1949, when Dean Acheson succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State, he selected Rusk as Deputy Undersecretary. Less than two years later, in Spring 1950, Rusk took a voluntary demotion to serve as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; the main issue was the newly created Peoples Republic of China under its communist leader Mao Tse-tung. During the next three years, he was the point man for the Truman administration in relations with Congress, testifying numerous times about American policy towards the PRC and subsequent U. S. involvement in the Korean War. Upon the election of Dwight Eisenhower as president in 1952, Rusk left the State Department to head the Rockefeller Foundation where he had been a trustee for the preceding two years while still in government service.

During his tenure in what Truman called "the best job in America," Rusk retained a high profile in foreign affairs. Since about one-third of the foundation awards went to overseas recipients in areas of agriculture, higher education, and pure research, as president he was in contact with key public and private sector leaders throughout the world. In addition, Rusk actively participated in the Council of Foreign Relations and was called upon for advice by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles about a dozen times during the latter's tenure in that office. Eight years later, this experience in dealing with foreign dignitaries while running a large organization prompted John F. Kennedy to offer Rusk the position of Secretary of State, the only offer he and the foundation trustees agreed he could not refuse. So, on January 21, 1961, Dean Rusk was sworn into this position in the new administration.

One of things that appealed to Kennedy was Rusk's understanding of the relationship of the Secretary of State to the President as one who serves a strong chief executive as his advisor and not an independent policy-maker. JFK had read a Spring 1960 article he had written in *Foreign Affairs* on this point and that, along with his belief that American power should be harnessed to the rather simple and decent purposes of the American people rather than to establish its own empire, appeared to clinch his selection; Kennedy never formally told Rusk why he was chosen. This helped in a way to keep their relationship on a formal instead of a personal level as were those of many of the other cabinet and White House staff. As Rusk noted, ". . . I shared George Marshall's view that those carrying official responsibility should have an arm's length relationship with each other. Personal relationships should not enter into the consideration of public policy. Certainly Kennedy and I had some differences in style and temperament, and we came from wholly different backgrounds, but in foreign policy we were on the same wavelength on most issues" (1990, 293). Thus in the hundreds of conversations with the president, Rusk concentrated on the matter at hand and did not engage in small talk or other informalities.

This attitude of mutual respect allowed Rusk to have instant, unlimited access to Kennedy, as he did later with Lyndon Johnson, although he was careful not to abuse the privilege. It also gave him freedom to select his own top staff including Harlan Cleveland, Chester Bowles and George Ball. He also successfully recommended Adlai Stevenson to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In his memoirs, Rusk indicates that in most cases both Kennedy and Johnson allowed him to choose staff based on their ability and not party affiliation. Only Robert Kennedy raised strong objections, arguing that only dedicated "Kennedy people" should get these top slots. However, the professional approach Rusk brought to the relationships with these chief executives, and his own close counsel, overcame this partisan view.

This same sense of formality is reflected in the assessments both he and others made regarding his performance as Secretary of State. Rusk admitted that even some of his own staff felt he was too close-mouthed about his policy views and discussions on them with the president, for which he cites two main considerations. One is that he wanted to hear the unfiltered opinions of his colleagues, so he preferred to listen to others rather than to get his own views echoed in their replies. More importantly, Rusk purposely did not relate presidential conversations to his staff but simply informed them of the foreign policy decisions to be implemented by the State Department. His rationale was that he did not want his staff to rate how hard he fought for particular department positions since "[m]y job was not to fight for State's views on policy; my job was to help find and implement the best foreign policy for the United States" (Rusk 1990, 516).

Arthur Schlesinger recounted that at White House meetings while Defense Secretary McNamara and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon forcefully presented their respective department's interests in foreign policy decisions facing the president, Rusk sat quietly, ". . . with his Buddha-like face and half-smile, often leaving it to Bundy or to the President himself to assert the diplomatic interest." While Rusk preferred this formality, Kennedy at times was not satisfied saying the Secretary ". . . never gives me anything to chew on. . . . You never know what he is thinking." Yet the president appreciated Rusk's integrity and loyalty to the office, resisting attempts by others to have him moved to the United Nations or an ambassadorship in favor of a more forthcoming Secretary of State (Schlesinger 1965, 435-6).

Lyndon Johnson also had a great deal of respect for Rusk, aware in part of the difficulty he faced from the secretary's opponents within the Kennedy administration. At the time of the transition after the assassination, he was aware of rumors that JFK planned to replace Rusk after the 1964 election which he attributed to Kennedy loyalists who were jealous and critical of his relationship with President Kennedy. His own assessment of Rusk was very positive. "I knew Rusk was a loyal, honorable, hard-working imaginative man of conviction, and I decided to ask him to remain as my Secretary of State. When he returned from the Pacific the day after the assassination, I assured him in the strongest terms that I wanted him to remain. I believe I made a wise decision for the country and for myself. He served me with distinction and great ability. He stood by me and shared the President's load of responsibility and abuse. He never complained. But he was no 'yes man.' He could be determined, and he was always the most determined when he was telling me I shouldn't do something that I felt needed to be done" (Johnson 1971, 20). Johnson felt the same way towards Rusk at the end of his presidency when, as his last official act on January 20, 1969, he awarded his Secretary of State the Medal of Freedom.

Rusk's view of the post-war era was shaped by his military and State Department experiences. He saw first hand the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe and the emergence of communist China. "Against this background, the meaning of the Cold War becomes clearer. We did not declare it; we alone cannot end it. The Cold War results from the Soviet bloc's announced determination to extend its 'historically inevitable' world revolution by every available means. The Soviets disguise their intentions and actions as 'scientific principles.' They speak of the irresistible spread of ideas. But they fail to show a single instance where people have voluntarily embraced communism through free elections" (Rusk 1990, 364). While he admits some may view him as a dinosaur of the

Cold War, Rusk adamantly states that only American military force can resist such Soviet initiatives. At the same time, both sides always must recognize the massive common interest they share in preventing nuclear war. One key to this is that, even when the two sides are face to face in times of crisis (Berlin, Cuba and Czechoslovakia) there are frequently solid contacts at lower levels that facilitate peaceful resolution of these confrontations.

It can be argued that these three advisors to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson shared the same perception of the threat posed by communism to the rest of the world, and the critical role of American military power to counteract and deter Soviet attempts to expand their sphere of control. They all were keenly aware of the consequences of the appearance of weakness in the face of Soviet advances, and the value of political resolve in such circumstances as demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In this sense they were pragmatic in the use and limitations of American military strength as a tool of international diplomacy. Thus they functioned under the same operational code in terms of their philosophical beliefs regarding the fundamental nature of politics and instrumental beliefs about the ends and means to deal with situations that arise from the state of Cold War world.

With respect to the former - the essence of international politics in that era - these men believed that communism was a major danger to American national security but one which, if faced head-on, could be managed by the U.S. and its western allies. McNamara subscribed to the call of President Kennedy in his inaugural address that every nation should know the U.S. ". . . shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty" (McNamara 1995, 30). He still held this position in his 1995 review of the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, concluding that as the archives of the former Soviet Union, China and Vietnam are opened to scholars the real threat of Cold War communism will become known. Even without this detailed information McNamara argued that, although at times the West misperceived and thus exaggerated the capability of the Soviet bloc to expand its control, the West would have been foolhardy and irresponsible not to have defended itself against the peril they believed that it represented. Dean Rusk had a similar view of the basis of U.S.-Soviet relations as being one of strength and determination. He recalled how American demobilization after World War II tempted Stalin to assert control over Eastern Europe in the vacuum left by the Western allies. The need for a clear, firm commitment to resist communist expansion, then, was at the heart of arms control and other areas of negotiation with the Soviets under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. McGeorge Bundy advanced the idea that, since the U.S-Soviet relationship was based on the avoidance of war, this necessarily implied coexistence. While the core of this view of international politics is that direct military confrontation between the two superpowers is excluded as a policy option, there will continue to be areas of conflict. This may include competition for economic and political influence throughout the world, even at times regional military clashes between client states. Therefore, both sides must become adept at containing this competition so that it does not escalate to open battle with each other (Bundy 1988, 594-5).

The instrumental beliefs regarding the best approach to achieve the goal of containing and resisting the influence of communism also were similar among these three presidential advisors. The adoption of the strategy of mutually assured destruction as the cornerstone of American strategic policy, worked out by Defense Secretary McNamara, is cited by Bundy as one tactic that served to deter the likelihood of nuclear exchange between the superpowers. This area of consensus also facilitated the negotiation of limited arms control agreements which, although they could not be expected to remove all nuclear danger, helped reduce the potential for their expansion as part of the total military arsenal of the superpowers. This along with the modernization and deployment of conventional

NATO forces in Europe ultimately led to the December 1987 agreement by Soviet leader Gorbachev not to station SS-20 missiles capable of reaching Europe in exchange for no introduction of midrange missiles by the Western allies in that region.

Robert McNamara, writing in 1968 at the end of his term as Defense Secretary, reflected on the value of seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies while at the same time implementing the principle of collective defense through a series of mutual aid treaties. This combination of finding areas of common ground with the Soviet bloc while simultaneously maintaining a strong defense capability to resist communist advances proved to be prudent. "Looking back over the history of the last twenty years, I believe it is fair to say that this system of alliances has substantially achieved its purpose. Though the record is less than perfect, the outward thrust of Soviet and Red Chinese pressure has been generally contained and the independence of even the smallest member of the alliances has been preserved. Beyond the immediate objective of these alliances, our adherence to a policy of collective defense has helped us to pursue our ultimate goal; the creation of a world order in which all states, small and large, aligned and unaligned, can preserve their independence and live in peace" (McNamara 1968, 5-6). McNamara called the search for mutual interest, trust and effort between East and West as well as within both camps continues to be a vitally important element of day to day foreign policy on both sides.

As Secretary of State under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Dean Rusk had primary responsibility to implement the policies which these chief executives determined to be in the nation's best interests, based in large part on the advice given them by these three top staff members. He reflected on the rhythm of negotiating with the Soviets, noting they are tough, extremely stubborn, persistent and unyielding (Rusk 1990, 355-6). In contrast, Americans tend to be agreement oriented and too quick to strike bargains, which usually favors the Soviets in such talks. Thus in stage one, they initially are demanding, hard as nails and highly ideological; U.S. negotiators are impatient and willing to make concessions to conclude an agreement. Small hints and suggested areas of congruence appear in stage two and, with patience, persistence and sensitivity to what the Soviets actually are trying to convey, the final stage of serious bargaining can be reached. Success depends on putting aside anger and suspicion on both sides, something often hard to do. However, Rusk expressed his optimism that, on the whole, U.S.-Soviet relations would lead to greater cooperation because, despite many serious and dangerous crises between the two superpowers since 1945, no direct military confrontation, particularly nuclear, had occurred.

One other aspect of American foreign relations that Rusk took care to discuss was the role of the United Nations, which he noted received more serious attention during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations than from any other in the last four decades. Thus the U.S. readily brought to the UN issues such as the Congo crisis, Cuban Missile situation and Six-Day war. Part of this was due to Rusk's own experience in the founding and early years of the UN; later both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson came to appreciate the contribution of that organization in the conduct of foreign affairs. He observed that, although the UN has fallen short of the far-reaching aspirations of its founding, such as ending wars, the organization has had success in keeping smaller conflicts from expanding into much larger ones. The UN also has played a crucial role in moderating superpower confrontations as well. "During the Cuban missile crisis, with the United States and Soviet Union at each other's jugular veins, it was terribly important that the Security Council was in place to hear the world community discuss and debate this crisis and give the superpowers more time to cool off. In that crisis alone the United Nations earned its pay for a long time to come. Despite obvious failings and frustrations, our investment in the United Nations has paid off" (Rusk 1990, 412). Thus, while not the answer to all problems of international relations, the UN and international institutions like the World

Bank and International Monetary Fund serve as a framework for conducting the world's business on the basis of voluntary cooperation among sovereign states.

The former Secretary of State, who from 1970 to 1984 was a law professor at the University of Georgia, concluded his memoirs with a chapter titled "Dean Rusk's Message to the Young," based on a commencement address at that institution. He stated that the next generation has three important assets on which to build. One is a 45-year period (1945-89) without a nuclear weapon fired in anger. Second is a constitutional system of government designed to limit the exercise of raw power in order to foster human freedom. Last is a free enterprise economy that generates enormous resources to deal with national and global problems. "These huge problems, global in scale, threaten to outstrip man's capacity to deal with them. But surely we have learned that the only way to deal with a dangerous crisis is to advance upon it and try to resolve it . . . If that sounds wildly optimistic these days, I would suggest that we have no choice but to try" (Rusk 1990, 633).

This convergence in perceptions or operational code in foreign affairs among Bundy, McNamara and Rusk is very important when one assesses its impact on the unique personal qualities and capabilities of President Johnson; this becomes clear in the Dominican Republic incident. "Thus Johnson had inherited not only an office but a world view: criteria of American responsibility, principles of action, necessities of leadership, established standards for determining threats to American freedom and to our greatness as a nation. Beside him were advisers who shared that view, and who represented that difficult-to-determine group of men - the so-called foreign policy establishment - who, from Acheson to Dulles to Rusk and Bundy, had developed, applied, and believed in the entire mode of reasoning that had dominated and given continuity to American foreign policy" (Goodwin 1991, 255-6). Goodwin argued that Johnson's own perceived lack of knowledge in this area, compared to domestic politics, heightened his reliance on these more experienced foreign policy veterans. Moreover, Johnson's political strength lay in his ability to recognize and exploit the practical realities of major domestic issues. Lacking such a reference point in foreign affairs, President Johnson relied more on broad principles and goals rather than on specific, detailed understanding of the means by which they might be achieved.

Lyndon Baines Johnson by all accounts was a highly intelligent politician yet had difficulties applying that characteristic to real life problems as President of the United States. McNamara called him one of the most complex and hardworking individuals he had ever known, possessing a ". . . kaleidoscopic personality: by turns open and devious, loving and mean, compassionate and tough, gentle and cruel" (McNamara 1995, 98). Rusk found him easily the most powerful personality with whom he dealt during his long career. One reason that he considered Johnson such a driven man was the president's awareness that he had not been the electorate's first choice for the position, leading him to overcompensate by demanding much of his colleagues and himself. This was most evident in the conduct of foreign affairs, an area in which he and his advisors took pains to show how the Johnson administration was following the path laid out by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, particularly with respect to Vietnam, which beginning in 1965 quickly overshadowed events in other parts of the world (Henggeler 1991, 174-5).

Johnson was born and raised in the rural area of West Texas. He attended San Marcos Teachers College, after which he taught elementary school in Cotulla and high school in Houston. In 1928, two years after graduating from college, he was appointed to the Washington staff of Representative Richard Kleberg where he served for the next seven years. The knowledge of the inner workings of Congress he learned from the Texas delegation, headed by Speaker Sam Rayburn, proved invaluable to his own political career. In 1935, Johnson secured an appointment as Director of the Texas National Youth Administration created as part of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. This exposed him to the practical side of policy implementation to go along with his legislative experience. The success he enjoyed in this new position helped him to win a seat in the U. S. House of Representatives in 1936.

Johnson served six terms in the House before running for the Senate in 1948. He won this election by just 87 votes out of 900,000 total cast; he earned the snide nickname of "Landslide Lyndon" suggesting that his legitimacy in that position was suspect (Goodwin 1991, 101). Yet he went on to become the Senate Minority Leader in 1953 and two years later the Majority Leader of the upper house. His detailed knowledge of the mechanics and politics of that establishment allowed him to transform that position into one of unrivaled power and authority over the next five years. Johnson's expansive knowledge of legislative procedures and demonstrated ability to unite various elements of the party in the Senate made him attractive to John Kennedy as a running mate who could advance his own plans for a New Frontier, as well as help the ticket in the South.

During the 1960 campaign, Johnson made some important presentations that helped the Democratic ticket in the South. At a unity meeting of southern governors in Nashville he expressed support of the civil rights plank of the party platform and took pains to diffuse concern over Kennedy's Catholic background saying he "wears no man's collar - but he wears the collar of all the people." In a speech on the same issue at the Alamo in San Antonio his presentation was tailored to his down home audience, a trait he used successfully throughout his career. Relating Kennedy's military experience in the World War II Pacific theatre he noted, "And then that little ole Massachusetts boy took his little ole torpedo boat and rammed into the side of a Japanese cruiser, and there wasn't nobody around askin' what religion he was" (Henggeler 1991, 51). On election day, the Democratic ticket carried Texas by 46,233 votes along with Louisiana and both North and South Carolina.

Despite the critical role Johnson played in capturing the Southern vote that put him and Kennedy into the White House, many saw LBJ as an outsider. Kennedy admitted that while he tried to expand the role of the Vice President he didn't know what to do with Johnson; his biggest job became simply keeping Johnson happy while the rest of the White House staff worked around him. Kennedy observed "Lyndon's an activist if ever one was born, and he's simply a miserable son-of-a-bitch in that office." Johnson similarly expressed to his Senate friend Robert Baker, "You don't really have any idea how unhappy I am now" (Henggeler 1991, 59-60). *Time* even ran a 1963 story titled "What Happened to LBJ?" noting his loss of stature within the Kennedy administration. The memory of this experience of helplessness and inactivity remained with Johnson as President, affecting the way he conducted himself after reaching the top position; foreign policy issues in Latin America offered the first chance to assert his newly acquired presidential power.

At the same time, Johnson was aware of the need to maintain continuity with the policies of the previous administration, at least until he could organize his staff and begin to formulate his own approach to the nation's foreign relations. He noted in his memoirs that Kennedy had kept him well informed in this area so no surprises awaited him once in the White House. "The most important foreign policy problem I faced was that of signaling to the world what kind of man I was and what sort of policies I intended to carry out. It was important that there be no hesitancy on my part - nothing to indicate that the U.S. government had faltered. It was equally important for the world to understand that I intended to continue the government's established foreign policies and maintain the alliances of Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy - policies of firmness on the one hand and an effort to thaw the Cold War on the other" (Johnson 1971, 22). For the most part, Johnson kept to this pledge; Latin America soon became the exception.

This first manifested itself by his appointment of Thomas Mann as both Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and White House Special Assistant, followed by the president's handling of an early Latin American crisis involving Panama. During the Kennedy administration, Panamanian President Roberto Chiari had pressed for renegotiation of the treaty by which the United States operated the Panama Canal. As a symbol of American recognition of that country's legitimate interest in this issue, the two executives agreed in January 1963 that while these negotiations were under consideration, the flags of both nations would fly side by side in all areas where American civilian authorities maintained control. Then, on January 2, 1964 American teenage students at Balboa High School in the Canal Zone ran up the U. S. flag alone, setting off rioting by Panamanian citizens in various parts of the country in which three American citizens died. President Chiari used the situation as leverage to press for treaty concessions from the Johnson administration based on his earlier understanding with President Kennedy. When Mann came to see him in Panama, Chiari staged demonstrations outside the capitol building, claiming that some form of treaty revision was a prerequisite to restore friendly relations between the two countries. Johnson refused to budge saying, "They were killing people and some thought we should write a new treaty right off, or at least agree to do it. But you can't say 'I'll give you a blank check' when there is a pistol pointed at your head" (Geyelin 1966, 100). Over the next three weeks, Mann and OAS staff tried unsuccessfully to broker a compromise solution to this tense situation.

Finally, at a March 16 address to praise the Alliance for Progress and express continued American support for its efforts, President Johnson departed from his prepared text to talk about the impasse with Panama. He indicated a willingness to discuss any matter but without asking Panama for any precommitments and that the U.S. intended to make none of its own. He added, "Press reports indicate that the Government of Panama feels that the language which has been under consideration for many days commits the

United States to a rewriting and a revision of the 1903 Treaty. We have made no such commitment and we would not think of doing so before diplomatic relations are resumed and unless a fair and satisfactory adjustment is agreed upon" (Geyelin 1966, 109-10). The audience, largely composed of Latin American diplomats and OAS representatives was shocked at this presidential intervention in delicate negotiations between the two countries.

But, according to several Johnson observers, this should have been no surprise given his personal nature and political background. He came from the part of Texas with a large Hispanic population and his first teaching job was a grade school comprised mostly of Mexican-American children. Thus his early history shaped LBJ's view of the this ethnic group. Shortly after becoming president he told reporters, "I know these Latin Americans. I grew up with Mexicans. They'll come right into your yard and take it over if you let them. And the next day they'll be right up on your porch, barefoot, and weighing one hundred and thirty pounds, and they'll take that too. But if you say to 'em right at the start, 'hold on, just wait a minute,' they'll know they're dealing with somebody who'll stand up. And after that you can get along fine" (Wicker 1969, 196). This was illustrative of his personal approach to politics in general, the belief that if he could talk directly to the opposite leader involved, he could reach an agreement. "I always believed that as long as I could take someone into a room with me, I could make him my friend, and that included anybody, even Nikita Khrushchev." Thus his first instinct in the Panama situation was to say, "Hey, get me the President of Panama - what's his name, anyway? - I want to talk to him", to which his aides explained that was not proper protocol. Johnson overrode this objection and called President Chiari, but was not able to reach a conclusion of the episode (Goodwin 1991, 194-5).

One observer concluded that Johnson's approach to foreign policy was reasonable given his background and aptitude for politics. "Motivated by a combination of political sagacity and idealism, Lyndon Johnson took very seriously his responsibilities in foreign affairs, although naturally with mixed results both at home and abroad. This politician had done the best he could to be a world statesman - given his own abilities, his built-in limitations as a dedicated partisan, the kind of advice available to him, Soviet and Chinese hostility, the albatross of Vietnam in image and reality, and the sheer magnitude of intractable world problems" (Bornet 1983, 192). In a chapter in his memoirs titled "Thawing the Cold War," Johnson related his thoughts on the accomplishments his administration had made in foreign affairs. "As my final months in the nation's highest office dwindled down to a few weeks, then a few days, I spent much time rethinking and reliving the trials and tests of the recent years. I knew I had done my best in those years to move our world toward a more stable and more peaceful order. I recalled the achievements - the problems solved, the agreements reached, the wars avoided. And I recalled some of the setbacks - the failure to find peace in Vietnam and the Middle East, the disappointment of not stopping and reversing the nuclear race" (Johnson 1971, 491). Panama and the Dominican Republic were counted among his successes in that while they contained the seed for explosive results, through a combination of patience and hard work, imagination and good will, they had been resolved without tragedy that could have affected millions of lives.

Yet it is the manner in which they were resolved - threat and actual use of force - that illustrate the true limitations of this world view. Goodwin argued that Johnson tended to see any conflict in which one side aligned itself with communist ideology as reflecting the larger conflict between freedom and the lack of it as well as between the national interests of the superpowers each reflects. It simplified international conflict for LBJ so that, even war among people within a single nation, could be perceived as an enemy agent of an outside force invading the home of an ally. Johnson, drawing on his generation's view of appeasement and appearance of weakness in the face of aggression opined, ". . . If you let a bully come into your front yard one day, the next day he'll be up on your porch and the day after that he'll rape your wife in your own bed." Thus any apparent softness towards communism will be seen as a sign of weakness of American will to resist these advances, which has two significant results. One is to encourage further attempts by the Soviets and their allies to expand their sphere of influence; the other is to hand one's domestic political opponents an issue by which to defeat you at home (Goodwin 1991, 257-8).

PROCESS

The events in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 gave the Johnson administration an early opportunity to demonstrate how America would respond to conflict in its own hemisphere. According to Secretary of State Dean Rusk's recounting of the situation, there were two distinct phases to American military involvement in the country. First was a limited operation on April 28 using two Marine units of 500 and 1,600 troops solely to protect and evacuate U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals. The second and more extensive intervention, ultimately using over 20,000 American troops, began the following day and lasted until September, when an OAS multi-national force took over to supervise elections of a new president. Each of these decisions needs to be considered separately; however, the cumulative impact of this episode on U.S. foreign policy can be viewed as a whole.

Following the May 1961 assassination of Dominican dictator Trujillo, Juan Bosch was elected president of the island nation on December 19, 1962. In turn, the Bosch government was overthrown on September 25, 1963 by a military coup, which installed a three-member civilian junta led by Foreign Minister Donald Reid Cabral. The Kennedy administration cut off aid to the Dominican government, refusing to extend official recognition to the new unelected leaders. According to Rusk, President Kennedy had planned to pursue active diplomatic pressure to force new elections, but his assassination cut short that effort. When Johnson assumed the presidency, he reinstated formal relations with the Cabral government and appointed W. Tapley Bennett as U. S. ambassador.

On April 24, 1965 a group of military officers initiated a countercoup designed to restore Juan Bosch to the presidency from which he was ousted 18 months earlier. They were joined by other military units and some civilians who were less interested in the role of Bosch in a new government as they were in the failures of the junta to improve economic conditions. This shift from a strictly military effort to a more populist uprising was driven by two events. One was the seizure of Radio Santo Domingo by the rebels who issued a call for the people to demonstrate their support by taking to the streets of the capital. The other was the arming of thousands of civilians by the coup leaders in order to broaden the anti-government movement and forestall immediate response by the rest of the military who might be reluctant to fire on their own countrymen (Slater 1970, 21-2).

A counterattack by military forces loyal to the junta, led by General Elias Wessin y Wessin, was organized some 24 hours later. They took up positions at key intersections leading into the capital but did not enter the city. It was at this point, over 36 hours after the countercoup began, that American diplomatic personnel at the U.S. embassy in Santo Domingo first reacted to these events. On the morning of the 25th, Reid Cabral contacted the embassy regarding assistance that could be provided to help him repel the coup attempt. At that time charge d'affaires William B. Connett, who had been in the Dominican Republic just five and one-half months, was the highest ranking diplomat on the scene; Ambassador William Bennett and International Development Agency mission chief Carter Ide were in the United States and the top military attaches were at a conference in Panama. When Cabral met with Connett mid-morning at the presidential palace, he inquired what kind of aid he could expect: U.S. pressure on the "loyal" Dominican generals to defend the governing junta, similar pressure on the rebels to accept a compromise, or the possibility of direct American military intervention (Gleijeses 1978, 179).

At that point, according to Senator J. William Fulbright who conducted hearings on the event in June 1965, the U. S. had three options: support the Cabral government, support the revolutionary forces, or do nothing (Fulbright 1966, 86). The embassy chose the latter course. After his meeting with Cabral, Connett sent a cable to Washington indicating he had told the junta leader that the U. S. was not able to do much to help at that time. President Johnson indicated that the first messages from the embassy were confused but that, based on a contingency plan already drawn up by the Kennedy administration, he ordered U.S. Navy ships to stand offshore from the capital. This was too late for Reid Cabral, who resigned his position at noon on April 25. His place was taken by Jose Rafael Molina, a Bosch supporter. That afternoon the rebels informed Colonel Pedro Benoit, head of the military junta, that they wanted Juan Bosch restored to the presidency, the same position from which the military ousted him. While this meeting was in progress, planes from the air force base at San Isidro held by government troops attacked the presidential palace. The civil war phase had begun.

After the raid, four representatives from the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) of Juan Bosch went to the U.S. embassy to convince the staff that the rebellion had successfully removed the junta and replaced Cabral with Molina. Based on Connett's earlier stance that the U.S. had no formal position on this change-over, they now wanted the embassy to persuade the military forces remaining loyal to Cabral to cease operations in the capital. Unable to meet Connett, they heard from embassy second secretary Arthur Breisky that it had no contact with the loyalist forces and that it appeared that, whatever the initial goals of the rebellion, a communist influence was at work. This view is reflected in Connett's cable to Washington that afternoon, sent before Breisky's meeting with the PRD:

> The Air [F]orce has decided to fight to block return of Bosch and Wessin y Wessin has agreed to support the Air Force.
>
> Situation extremely confused and no identifiable authority is exercising any effective control over the government.

ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM FEEL BOSCH'S RETURN AND RESUMPTION OF CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT IS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN VIEW OF EXTREMISTS IN THE COUP AND COMMUNIST ADVOCACY OF BOSCH RETURN [Emphasis Connett's].

I have reluctantly agreed to the De Los Santos-Wessin plan [to resist the PRD] even though it could mean more bloodshed. But it is the only way to forestall a leftist takeover. No one is governing in the Palace. Merely talking talking, according to Rivera Caminero [Admiral and Navy chief of staff].

The country team is against a show of force by the U.S. at this time. Our attaches have stressed to the three military leaders, Rivera, De Los Santos and Wessin, our strong feelings everything possible should be done to prevent a communist takeover (Gleijeses 1978, 218).

Although the communist element was reported to Washington by the U.S. embassy on April 25, no mention of this aspect is given by either President Johnson or Secretary of State Rusk in the account of this episode in their respective memoirs. From Camp David, Johnson monitored the early stages of the rebellion by telephone with Rusk and Defense Secretary McNamara; National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy did the same for the president from the White House situation room. Johnson returned to Washington on that afternoon, having instructed the Santo Domingo embassy to request a cease-fire from both sides to allow evacuation of American citizens and other foreign nationals.

The next day, Ambassador Bennett met with the president before returning to take charge of the American embassy in Santo Domingo. Johnson instructed him to work towards achieving an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of a junta as a prelude to a permanent solution. Both Geyelin (1966) and Lowenthal (1972) report that LBJ strongly impressed upon Bennett the unacceptability of another Cuba in the hemisphere. The former noted that by doing so, the president limited the feedback he got when Bennett returned, but argued that opposition to the PRD coup already had formed among embassy and State Department staff. In addition Bennett already was fully determined to prevent a rebel takeover of the government. Lowenthal characterized the president's instructions as reinforcing the approach toward the Dominican Republic already built in at all levels of the U.S. government (Lowenthal 1972, 86).

This view is supported by Johnson's own characterization of the situation in that part of the Caribbean just prior to this incident. In the brief history he provides for the description of the Dominican Republic intervention in his memoirs, LBJ indicated that chronic instability in the island nation made it ripe for communist influence. "Just beyond the horizon lay Cuba and Castro. The Communist leader in Havana was always alert to any exploitable weakness among his neighbors. He was promoting subversion in many countries in the Western Hemisphere, and we knew he had his eye on the Dominican Republic. He had already backed one attempted guerrilla invasion of that country during the Trujillo years, and he was likely to try again if he thought he could succeed. Some Dominicans were undergoing guerrilla and sabotage training in Cuba" (Johnson 1971, 188). Thus, even though the first phase of American military intervention in the Dominican Republic was limited to evacuating civilians, the threat of a communist takeover of that country was overtly considered by the president and his top staff.

The evacuation order came on April 28 in response to a cable from recently returned Ambassador Bennett, who reported about 1,000 Americans were at the Embajador Hotel awaiting airlift out of the country. Earlier that day, the ambassador had relayed a request by Wessin's forces for walkie-talkies to assist them in coordinating their efforts to subdue the rebels. This was in response to Santo Domingo police chief Despradel's report that his staff no longer were able to guarantee the lives of U.S. citizens in the capital. Initially Undersecretary Mann in Washington refused, fearing heightened visibility would suggest direct American involvement in the civil war. In a 3:00 P.M. cable Bennett conveyed concurrence by Colonel Benoit in this view who also asked for a contingent of 1,200 U. S. Marines to help restore order in the city. The ambassador indicated at that time, "The issue here now is a fight between Castro-type elements and those who oppose. I do not wish to be over-dramatic but we should be clear as to the situation. If we deny communication equipment and the anti-rebel forces lose for lack of heart we may well be asking in the near future for landings of marines to protect U. S. citizens and possibly for other purposes. Which would Washington prefer?" McGeorge Bundy then intervened and approved the request (Gleijeses 1978, 253).

Two hours later, Ambassador Bennett reported a much different environment in Santo Domingo. This message, which was flagged "Critic" indicating immediate action was needed, read as follows:

> CRITIC, CRITIC, CRITIC [Emphasis Bennett's].
>
> Regret report situation deteriorating rapidly. San Isidro pilits [sic] tired and discouraged. [Police Chief] Despradel says cannot control situation. MAAG chief [Military Assistance Advisory Group] went to San Isidro, found [former Police Chief] Belisario Peguero there in an hysterical mood, urging "retreat", number of officers weeping. Benoit requests U.S. troops formally [request put in writing]. The country team is unanimous that the time has come to land the marines. American lives are in danger. Proposes marine beachhead at Embajador Hotel. *If Washington wishes* [italics Bennett's], they can be landed for the purpose of protecting evacuation of American citizens. I recommend immediate landing (Gleijeses 1978, 254).

This cable is interesting for two reasons. One is that, even though the issue of communist involvement had been raised by Bennett just two hours before, no mention of the subject occurs here. The other is that the message suggests a dual purpose for the direct American intervention; one is protecting the immediate evacuation, the other to restore civil order in the capital. It is this latter role which ultimately becomes the rationale for the sustained U. S. military presence that develops in the Dominican Republic.

President Johnson made a televised statement to the public the evening of April 28 to explain the initial phase of American intervention. He stated the military authorities in the Dominican Republic had informed U.S. officials that American lives there were in danger and that local forces were unable to guarantee their safety. Therefore, the president said he had ordered U. S. troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to the U.S. The president also reported the United States government had appealed repeatedly for a cease-fire between the contending forces in the interests of all Dominicans and foreigners alike and that the Council of the OAS had been advised of the situation. However, no mention was made of the expected duration of the American troop intervention, nor of the suspected Communist involvement in the rebellion against the ruling junta.

Originally, this statement included a reference to an additional objective of the intervention being the need to protect "democratic institutions," suggesting a potential communist take-over of the island if the rebel forces went unchecked. This was done at the urging of Secretary of State Rusk, but UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson argued that insufficient evidence existed of this at that time; presidential aides Bill Moyers and Richard Goodwin agreed. As a result, even though this clearly was on the minds of all involved in the decision to intervene, it was not presented to the public by the president on April 28. Lowenthal reported that during the secret White House briefing that evening, congressional leaders were told by the newly appointed CIA Director William Raborn that two of the rebel leaders were known Communists and that the U.S. was responding to a ". . . Moscow-financed, Havana-directed plot to take over the Dominican Republic." Senators Russell Long (D-La) and George Smathers (D-Fla) later stated they were told ". . . this was simply a matter of whether this country was going to stand aside and risk another Cuban-type Communist take-over . . . [and the] overwhelming consensus was that we wanted to be certain that the island of the Dominican Republic was not lost to Communists" (Lowenthal 1972, 104-5).

Later that evening President Johnson received a cable from Ambassador Bennett in Santo Domingo that the situation was getting worse and that all semblance of civil authority was dissolving. As reported in Johnson's memoirs the message suggested serious consideration be given to U.S. military intervention going beyond simply protecting

Americans that would also seek to establish order in the strife-ridden country. Bennett went on to say, "All indications point to the fact that if present efforts of forces loyal to the government fail, power will be assumed by groups clearly identified with the Communist party. If the situation described above comes to pass, my own recommendation and that of the Country Team is that we should intervene to prevent another Cuba from arising out of the ashes of this uncontrollable situation" (Johnson 1971, 197). Johnson's reaction was that the last thing he and the American people wanted was another Cuba on their doorstep. Yet before he could act on this recommendation he needed to assess Latin American opinion on the subject from the OAS and determine if the Dominican forces could stop the rebels. He concluded that it was necessary to be sure no other alternative to American military intervention existed to prevent another Cuba before going further than the initial landing of the Marines (Johnson 1971, 197-8).

The importance of these statements is that they form the core of what became known as the Mann-Johnson doctrine which drove the second phase of the Dominican intervention by the United States. The president indicated that his decision on April 29 to expand the military involvement was based on several key points (Johnson 1971, 201). First, the danger of a Communist take-over was a real and present danger and as such constituted a threat to the peace and safety of the hemisphere and that of the United States. In addition, American lives and those of other foreign civilians was in peril due to the breakdown of government authority in Santo Domingo. Therefore the United States would commit sufficient military forces to the island to create an international security zone recommended by the OAS and to separate the rebels from the regular Dominican army in the capital. Lastly, the U.S. would push for a cease-fire, some form of interim government and the scheduling of free elections so all Dominican citizens could decide their political fate without threat of violence. This approach was announced publicly by President Johnson on April 30, 1965.

He began by noting that the initial phase of American involvement was limited to the evacuation of 2,400 American and other foreign nationals only after notified by Dominican police and military officials that they could no longer guarantee the safety of these citizens nor preserve law and order in the capital. But now all that had changed.

> Meanwhile there are signs that people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control. Thus the legitimate aspirations of the Dominican people and most of their leaders for progress, democracy, and social justice are threatened and so are the principles of the inter-American system . . .
>
> It is very important that representatives of the OAS be sent to the Dominican Republic, just as soon as they can be sent there, in order to strengthen the cease-fire and in order to help clear a road to the return of constitutional processes and free elections. Loss of time may mean that it is too late to preserve freedom, which alone can lead to the establishment of true democracy. This, I am sure, is what the people of the Dominican Republic want. Late action, or delay, in such a case could mean a failure to accomplish the agreed objectives of the American states . . .
>
> The United States will give its full support to the work of the OAS and will never depart from its commitment to the preservation of the right of all of the free people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey to international conspiracy from any quarter (Johnson 1965, 742-3).

The United States thus was asserting its right and obligation, as part of collective self-defense in the Western hemisphere, to intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors to prevent the establishment of a regime inspired by an ideology or regime considered hostile to its own national interests (Franck and Weisband 1970, 1011-2).

The decisions regarding both phases of the Dominican military intervention were made by President Johnson with a very limited number of his principal advisors. On the afternoon of April 28, the president was meeting with Secretary of State Rusk, Defense Secretary McNamara and National Security Advisor Bundy, along with Undersecretary of State George Ball and White House Assistant Bill Moyers, to discuss Vietnam policy. Upon receipt of the second "Critic" cable from Ambassador Bennett in Santo Domingo, Johnson decided to act. "I told my advisers that I was not going to sit by and see American lives lost in this situation. If local authorities could not provide protection, we had no choice but to provide the necessary protection ourselves. They all agreed that we had to act" (Johnson 1971, 195). Rusk recalled the occasion similarly, noting that the decision to augment the first deployment of 500 Marines with a second 1,600 from the off-shore fleet to conduct an effective civilian evacuation was one with which he strongly agreed.

The following evening, Johnson again called together his principal advisors to review the latest events on the island. He reported that just before the meeting, Ambassador Bennett related in a conference call with Rusk, McNamara, Ball and General Wheeler that in his opinion a rebel victory would result in pro-Communist government in Santo Domingo. When asked his recommendation for immediate action, Bennett called for sufficient troops to impose a cease-fire, after which the OAS could be asked to negotiate a political settlement between the factions. "This was the background against which we met that night, Thursday, April 29, from 7:30 to 9:10 P.M. in the Cabinet Room. There was complete agreement that we must prevent a Communist takeover and act on a scale that would guarantee the earliest possible end to the fighting, destruction, and killing" (Johnson 1971, 200). As noted above, this was the message President Johnson delivered to the nation the next day.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

That such a rationale could be advanced for this intervention, despite the fact that U.S. officials had publicly forsaken unilateral military intervention in Latin America since the 1954 Declaration of Caracas, suggests to Lowenthal that the operational code of decision-makers in this situation provided a consistent link between these seemingly contradictory elements (Lowenthal 1972, 152). Within this framework of American foreign policy in the region, he identifies two major factors allowing the emergence of a doctrinal statement that reconciled these apparent contradictions. The first was the deeply ingrained sense among U.S. officials that all efforts must be made to stem the international communist conspiracy; more specifically to avoid a second Cuba from arising in the region.

In his May 2 public broadcast, President Johnson explained that what began as a legitimate revolutionary movement in the Dominican "took a tragic turn" when Communist leaders gained increasing control of the rebel forces. As a result ". . . what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved . . . into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators" (Johnson 1965, 745). It was this change from an internal political dispute among Dominicans to one directed by outside enemy agents that prompted the expanded U. S. response.

Johnson went on to state that the American nations could not and would not permit the creation of a second Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. He invoked the sentiment expressed by President Kennedy shortly before his death in 1963 that "[w]e in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere." Johnson then cited a unanimous January 1962 statement by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics: "The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-American system." Therefore, in the face of a direct threat to these common principles, America would demonstrate its commitment to defend this nation against all who sought to destroy not only the United States but all free nations in the hemisphere. He concluded this broadcast by stating "[w]e do not want to bury anyone, as I have said so many times before. But we do not intend to be buried" (Johnson 1965, 746-8).

One of the harshest critics of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Senator J. William Fulbright, noted the effect of this underlying belief on the way U.S. officials viewed the rebellion against the military junta in Santo Domingo. "The involvement of an undetermined number of communists in the Dominican Revolution was judged to discredit the entire reformist movement, like poison in a well, and rather than use our considerable resources to compete with the communists for influence with the democratic forces who actively solicited our support, we intervened militarily on the side of a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy" (Fulbright 1966, 85). He argued that the American decision to send the second phase of troops to the island resulted from failure to distinguish between communist participation as opposed to control of the rebellion, due in large part to a general lack of understanding of contemporary Latin American politics. Thus, any revolution which targets existing governments, if it has any tinge of communist involvement, could trigger U.S. intervention, as it did in this case.

This leads to Lowenthal's other critical factor of the operational code of U.S. foreign policy officials that acts to minimize the inconsistency between the principles of American state sovereignty and intervention. As suggested by Senator Fulbright, there was a tendency among these officials to minimize direct involvement in the internal political activities of Latin American countries in preference simply to dealing with those in power. Thus, internal factions and dissent among the Dominican military were not apparent when U.S. embassy staff reported the early stages of the revolution. This lack of information, coupled with similar assumptions about the desire of politically active Dominicans for free elections over other methods of dealing with domestic Bosch supporters, predisposed U.S. officials in Santo Domingo and Washington to disregard legitimate complaints of the rebel forces about the ruling junta. As a result, the U.S. missed several chances to mediate this dispute before it deteriorated into the uncontrollable situation that finally left little choice for the White House but to intervene militarily. Secretary of State Dean Rusk recognized this latter point. Rusk argued the United States did the right thing by preventing total disorder, foreclosing a communist take-over and arranging free elections. At the same time, he admitted that the Dominican crisis was confusing, in large part because the participants were unknown to him. The result was heavy reliance on Ambassador Bennett's assessment which, it is now clear, was not totally accurate, either to the make-up intent or the intentions of the rebel leadership.

Finally, in a major address to the Inter-American Press Association in San Diego on October 12, 1965 titled "The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions," Undersecretary Mann clarified several areas regarding criticisms of American policy in this crisis situation (Mann 1965). First, while some had suggested that nonintervention was an obsolete doctrine, the secretary stated he knew of no Washington officials who thought that way. Intervention in terms of interference in the internal political affairs was a keystone of the inter-American system, which was why the U.S. did not support either side in the Dominican dispute but simply tried to halt the chaos in an attempt to allow a political settlement to be reached with assistance from the OAS. However, he argued if others try to take advantage of the disruption, there is a legitimate role for American states to become involved. "When, in other words, a Communist state has intervened in the internal affairs of an American state by training, directing, financing, and organizing indigenous Communist elements to take control . . . of an American state by force and violence, should other American states be powerless to lend assistance?" (Mann 1965, 731). In this case the answer clearly was "No," based on prior experience from the Cuban Missile Crisis, which demonstrated that political control of an American state by Communists was just a prelude to using that country as a base for further aggression.

A second alleged area of misconception dealt with the seriousness of Communist subversion in the hemisphere and to what extent this influence was a real threat in the Dominican situation. In respect to the former point, Mann related the stated doctrine of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung that as the principal obstacle to the Communist movement worldwide, the United States had to be defeated piece by piece in peoples' wars in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is in the weaker and more fragile societies like the Dominican Republic that such efforts are focussed and where the U. S. and its allies must be most vigilant. Thus, even though only a small number of avowed Communists were identified as participants in the rebel movement, there was no moderate force on either side with the political will or capacity to resist this influence effectively. Thus, according to Mann, "The strength of the Communist component of the rebel side must be measured not only by its men and arms and its superior discipline but by the weakness, the divisions, and the lack of leadership within the rebel movement . . . All those in our Government who had full access to official information were convinced that the landing of additional troops was necessary in view of the clear and present danger of the forcible seizure of power by the Communists" (Mann 1965, 736).

The last subject of major public misunderstanding according to Undersecretary Mann was that the reason for U.S. military action was based on a preconception that Communists were involved and, therefore, the initial landing for evacuation of civilians simply was a pretense for the real goal of using military force to prevent advancement of legitimate grievances against the junta. In reviewing the sequence of decisions, he argued that the initial Marine landings of April 27 and 28 were limited in size and scope to only that necessary to remove Americans and other civilians, ultimately 5,000 in number, from the Hotel Embajador area. "Thus it was not until the evening of the 29th that a decision had to be made on whether the Communist elements in the rebel camp presented a clear and imminent peril to the freedom of the Dominican nation" (Mann 1965, 735). It was from this third decision to land additional troops to secure the evacuation effort that subsequent actions arose in Santo Domingo. These include expanding the perimeter around the hotel, establishing lines of communication between the evacuation site and the American Embassy, and finally imposing a troop corridor throughout the entire capital that effectively separated the warring factions, thereby providing time for the OAS to assemble and bring in its own cease-fire negotiators.

With the statements of the principals involved in these decisions, first to land Marines for the purpose of evacuating American citizens, then a full-scale military force to take control of the country, one can identify a pattern of continuity from the Monroe

Doctrine to the Caracas Declaration and the Kennedy administration actions in Cuba (Bay of Pigs and Missile Crisis) which leads logically to the actions of President Johnson in the Dominican Republic. *Time* cited Secretary of State Elihu Root's 1914 observation on the Monroe Doctrine: "It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it . . . [It is] the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to defend itself" (The Nation 1965, 25).

This theme was echoed by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs incident, wherein the underlying approach of American foreign policy in the region was expressed very clearly:

> Any unilateral American intervention, in the absence of an external attack upon ourselves or an ally, would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations. But let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-intervention merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action - if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration - then I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of our nation. Should that time ever come, we do not intend to be lectured on 'intervention' by those whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest (Mallin 1965, 55).

Lyndon Johnson, through his participation in both Cuban incidents as Vice President, was well aware of this sentiment and referenced it in his own memoirs.

The restatement of this principle with respect to the Dominican Republic action, what became known as the Johnson Doctrine, came in the president's May 2 address. First was the summary of the immediate issue regarding troop deployment to the island. "Revolution in any country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for hemispheric action only - repeat, only - when the subject is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship. We support no single man or any single group of men in the Dominican Republic. Our goal in keeping the principles of the American system is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere, and we would like to do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting" (The Nation 1965, 23). Johnson then put this particular issue in the larger context established by his predecessors. He stated the goal of this doctrine is to block "establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere" (The Nation 1965, 25). "I want you to know, and I want the world to know, that as long as I am President of this country, we are going to defend ourselves. We will defend our soldiers against attackers. We will honor our treaties. We will keep our commitments. We will defend our nation against all those who seek to destroy not only the United States but every free country of this hemisphere" (Johnson 1965, 747-8).

Thus the broad policy and specific application in the Dominican Republic were laid out by President Johnson. Yet it is the Cold war assumptions interwoven in these statements and the analogies to prior American confrontations with the Soviet-backed Cuban regime that acted to limit the range of policy options other than military intervention given serious consideration. "Policy is made by piecemeal consideration of specific issues and choices, one at a time and in a limited context, by men who are not paid to question the premises of policy but only to act upon them. By accepting the established conceptual framework, even when it is inadequate, officials may make a series of individual decisions, each seemingly rational, which comprise a syndrome of miscalculation and produce undesired results. So it was in Santo Domingo in 1965" (Lowenthal 1972, 162). However, while this episode may be considered unproductive by some, one may also conclude that the actions taken by the Johnson administration within that particular context did further the stated goals of preventing the spread of Communism in the hemisphere and creating the conditions for free elections for the Dominican people. To that extent, even if one argues that the Johnson Doctrine locked in an inevitable military solution, the approach was congruent with the ultimate result. It also may be seen as the arrogance of power, which Fulbright argued leads decision makers away from the vision of America as the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all but the champion and vindicator only of her own. The larger question, beyond the scope of this study, that still remains unresolved is which of these is the more effective means to achieve the same outcome.

CHAPTER 5

THE GRENADA INTERVENTION - 1983

A period of 18 years separates the Dominican Republic intervention under President Lyndon Johnson and the Reagan administration's action in Grenada. Yet there is clear continuity between the two both in the immediate context of the military actions and the broader world view of the main participants in the decision making process leading to these incidents. In particular, the influence of the Soviet Union and its regional satellite Cuba were felt strongly in this case as they were in 1965. The personality and operational code of the president had a significant effect on the policy choice to pursue a military option in both cases; however, Ronald Reagan was important as much for his passive, almost remote, involvement in the actual Grenada operation as Lyndon Johnson was for his hands-on management in the Dominican Republic incident. Yet, although there were contrasting styles by the chief executives, the resulting decision was the same: military intervention over diplomacy. Another important distinction is that, unlike the sequence of events in the Dominican Republic, the principles of the Reagan Doctrine were articulated clearly prior to their application in Grenada.

There also are similarities between the Dominican Republic and Grenada episodes that are valuable to note (Brands 1987, 607-24). One is that they occurred in a region of protracted or chronic instability, coupled with the presence and suspected influence of an outside force. Another is that the actual decision to intervene was made when events led to a crisis situation in which protection of American citizens played a major role. The availability of some legitimizing organization to support the action also became important: for the Dominican situation it was the Organization of American States, for Grenada the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Finally, as Brands explains it, "the shadow of past failures and present problems elsewhere" predisposed both Lyndon Johnson and

Ronald Reagan towards military intervention as a symbolic action over and above its tactical value (1987, 624).

CONTEXT

In the 18-year span after the Dominican intervention there were significant changes in the Caribbean region. During most of this time, American attention was directed elsewhere, mainly in Southeast Asia as the Vietnam War reached its conclusion and in the Middle East highlighted by the Six Day War between Israel and the surrounding Arab nations. With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, the focus of U. S. foreign policy shifted substantially with human rights assuming a prominent role. One result of this new priority was greater interest in Latin America and the authoritarian regimes which had arisen in this part of the world. The interaction between the United States and its hemispheric neighbors immediately preceding the election of Ronald Reagan set the stage for the events that led to the Grenada intervention in October 1983.

The foreign policy approach of the Carter administration was to widen the view of global relations, setting a different framework from that of the preceding Nixon-Kissinger *realpolitik* perspective defined by an ongoing geopolitical struggle between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. Cyrus Vance, President Carter's choice as Secretary of State, indicated an awareness that the polarized world of the 1950's and 1960's had grown into an independent, multipolar one in the mid-1970's (Vance 1983, 26-8). He identified four principles on which the Carter administration planned to build a more realistic foreign policy. First was to ensure this policy was understood and supported both by the American people and the Congress. Second was to strengthen the processes for managing East-West relations with emphasis on direct interaction between U. S. and Soviet leaders. This was based on mutual interest in avoiding nuclear war while seeking modest gains in cooperation. Third, greater attention needed to be given to problems in Third World countries where American assistance could make a real difference rather than applying a regional approach. Finally, Vance called for ". . . harnessing of the basic values of the Founding Fathers to our foreign policy" in which the promotion of human rights would take center stage (1983, 29).

From this viewpoint came some important foreign policy initiatives that had long-reaching effects in Latin America during the Carter administration. The first was the decision to pursue negotiations begun by President Johnson to return control of the Panama Canal to the host country of that facility. The second was the implementation of the human rights pledge made by Jimmy Carter in his inaugural address: "Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, our laws fair, our national beauty preserved; the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be enhanced" (Carter 1982, 20). The final element arising from this new set of foreign policy principles was a softer tone in relations with authoritarian regimes such as those in Nicaragua and Cuba. The outcome of these initiatives, covered in the rest of this section, had a significant effect in the 1980 presidential election, bolstering the hard-line approach of the Reagan administration that ultimately was demonstrated in Grenada. As seen in the discussion of the participants in that operation, one of the objectives was to show that the perceived weakness of the United States embodied in these Carter policies was being reversed under the new president.

The Panama Canal represented both a symbol of American imperialism of the past to most Latin American countries and an opportunity for the Carter administration to demonstrate its commitment to pursue relations with the region based on shared interests. The negotiations on the canal's status had been dragging on since the Johnson administration prepared a draft treaty in 1967. When General Omar Torijos assumed power through a coup in 1968, he refused to proceed on the draft and subsequent deliberations occurred under presidents Nixon and Ford. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reached a tentative agreement with Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan

Tack on three principles that would form the basis for a new treaty: a fixed term of U. S. operation of the canal before reversion to Panamanian control, U. S. right to operate and defend the canal during this operating period, and transfer of the Canal Zone to Panama within the treaty timeframe. The objective was to meet Panama's claim for sovereignty within its borders while securing effective, stable operation of the Panama Canal. A key provision of the proposed treaty was acceptance by both sides of permanent neutrality of the canal when the transition period for handover expired.

Negotiation had reached a critical stage when, in 1976, Ronald Reagan challenged President Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination in the upcoming election. Although he narrowly lost that fight, his outspoken opposition to the proposed canal transfer put off action by the Ford administration on this issue. This created resentment among the Panamanians who had expected to conclude what had been intense and difficult discussions over the preceding two years. As Secretary of State Vance put it upon taking office, "The Carter administration thus found itself facing serious and mounting dangers to the security of the canal, and an open sore in our relations with Latin America" (Vance 1983, 143). His experience as a negotiator for the Johnson draft in 1967 gave him important insight into the main issue to be decided: how to resolve the American desire for its right to maintain the canal's neutrality through military means if necessary, and Panama's claim of sovereignty over all of its territory, including the Canal Zone. The result was a companion pair of treaties, one for transfer of the canal to Panama on December 31, 1999 and one establishing permanent neutrality in the operation of the canal.

As these final negotiations were conducted, President Carter and Secretary Vance took the unusual step of having the American representatives, former OAS ambassador Sol Linowitz and Elsworth Bunker, give weekly updates to key U. S. senators on the status of the talks. This became critical once the treaty reached the Senate floor. In addition, once the treaty was completed on August 29, 1977, Sol Linowitz and Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman General George Brown briefed former president Gerald Ford and former secretaries of state Dean Rusk and Henry Kissinger on the terms of the agreement. They in turn expressed public support for ratification, showing the bipartisan nature of the issue. This helped to get the approval process started as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 14 to 1 to send both the transfer and neutrality treaties to the full floor.

Due to the close working relationship established between the Carter administration and several senators, most notably Frank Church (D-Idaho) and Paul Sarbanes, along with Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) and Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tn), the treaties were approved on April 18, 1978 by the same 68-32 vote. Critical to the passage was the addition of a reservation on U. S. intervention to ensure the canal's neutrality. It stated any action taken by the United States of America would be only to assure that the Panama Canal remained open, neutral, secure and accessible, and not for the purpose of intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Panama.

In his memoirs Secretary Vance provides a valuable, cogent statement of the importance of this event occurring so early in the Carter administration:

> The Panama Canal Treaties were an indispensable part of the Carter administration's strategy to forge a new and more constructive relationship with the nations of the Western hemisphere and the Third World. Failure to resolve the decades-long dispute with Panama in a just and equitable manner would have made a positive American policy toward Latin America difficult, if not impossible, given the depth of hemispheric feeling about the Panama Canal as a symbol of American hegemony and intervention in the region. It is difficult to imagine how the United States could hope to deal in any affirmative way with the turbulence in Central America and the Caribbean today if, in addition to problems in Nicaragua and El Salvador, we also confronted Panamanian nationalism directed against the canal and the Canal Zone (Vance 1983, 156).

He also noted that delay could have resulted in replacement of the Torrijos government with a more intransigent one, and that President Carter knew the treaty would promote stability throughout the region while protecting American national interests in Latin America. Carter stated that approval of the treaty proved U. S. commitment to freedom and human rights by demonstrating that in difficult circumstances a great democracy practices what it preaches.

This greatly strengthened American influence in the region as revolutionary forces pressured other Central American nations (Carter 1982, 184).

A major opponent of the canal treaties was then California Governor Ronald Reagan, who was competing with President Ford for the 1976 GOP nomination. Carter noted in his memoirs that Reagan gave special prominence to the issue, often using the line "When it comes to the Canal, we built it, we paid for it, it's ours and we should tell Torrijos and Company that we are going to keep it!" (1982,154). He concluded that it was a great crowd pleaser, but only because Reagan used it as a simplistic test of American power and greatness, without any understanding of the treaty's significance in the larger context of American foreign policy in the region.

The second major area in which the Carter administration tried to change the course of American relations with the rest of the world was that of human rights, which was placed at the forefront of U. S. foreign policy. As Carter stated in his May 22, 1977 address on foreign affairs at the University of Notre Dame, "It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy - a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision" (Carter 1982, 141). In making this a focal point of U. S. foreign policy, he was consciously rejecting the argument that morality and exertion of power - idealism and realism - were incompatible. Instead, drawing on the example of the civil rights struggle in the American south as a model of how moral principles could be applied to reshape social and political institutions, the president pledged to do the same in the international arena. "To me, the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and influence" (Carter 1982, 143). The difficulty lay in the implementation of this new policy direction.

First, the Carter administration found that in applying humans rights as a standard for relations with other nations, it had to be applied equally to the Soviet bloc and totalitarian states, newly emerging nations trying to establish stable political systems, and long-time Western allies. In one of his first reports to the president, Secretary Vance wrote that since human rights had been given such prominence, the United States would face constant questions as to why the performance of some nations received public notice and others did not. Carter's response was with over 150 nations to deal with, it was not possible to have one particular aspect dominate relations with all of them. "However, even without adequately specific and consistent definitions and policies, we made it clear to everyone that a significant element in our relationships with other governments would be their performance in providing basic freedoms to their people." As he noted in his memoirs, President Carter found that in one-on-one discussions with several foreign leaders after announcing this policy, they often raised the issue first. Thus, even if they were not totally sincere in the way their human rights performance was portrayed, the American position had the effect of forcing them to confront a critical question that in the past usually went unaddressed (Carter 1982, 145).

Secretary Vance realized the value and limitations of giving human rights the special recognition as a key element of American foreign policy. Since America had served as a "beacon on the hill" for other nations in the progress of human affairs, it could not rely simply on power politics to retain its position in the world, but had to act on its principles. At the same time, he indicated that quiet diplomacy offered the more effective route, with public remonstrances saved for unusual situations calling for public pressure. In one of his first press conferences he explained it this way:

> We will speak frankly about injustice both at home and abroad. We do not intend, however, to be strident or polemical, but we do believe that an abiding respect for human rights is a human value of fundamental importance and that it must be nourished. We will not comment on each and every issue, but we will from time to time comment when we see a threat to human rights, when we believe it constructive to do so (Vance 1983, 46).

Thus Vance expressed the administration's position, which he personally supported fully, that the defense of human rights should be integrated into the full range of American foreign policy. The main point was human rights would be universal in its application, but flexible enough to adapt to specific situations. One must also recognize the limits of such an approach, avoiding either a rigid attempt to apply American values and standards on others or a doctrinaire plan of action. Positive mechanisms of encouragement and inducement should be used whenever possible, but accompanied by a willingness to use public pressure, including the withholding of economic assistance, when needed. The administration's goal was, through informed and careful judgment, to move governments in the direction of respect for human rights in words and deeds, which in the long run creates more stable allies (Vance 1983, 436).

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, was directly involved in the practical application of human rights in the conduct of American foreign affairs. In his memoirs he identified several concrete steps that were taken to implement this policy (Brzezinski 1983, 126). A major element was issuance on February 17, 1978 of Presidential Directive 30 laying out these four essential points:

1. Setting priorities among human rights objectives - reducing worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person, enhancing civil and political liberties, and promoting basic economic and social rights.

2. Greater reliance on positive incentives, such as aid allocations, to acknowledge improvement in human rights performance.

3. No U. S. support for policing functions to governments with serious human rights violations.

4. U. S. participation in international financial institutions maintained "so as not to undermine the essential U.S. interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments."

Other items were the creation of the InterAgency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance chaired by Warren Christopher, which during its first two years voted to oppose over 60 loans to fifteen countries based on human rights violations. Under Brzezinski, the National Security Council approved an initiative to limit arms sales to nations with serious human rights problems; these included Argentina, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

Brzezinski expressed particular concern about the effect of this policy on U. S. relations with Latin America, mainly with Brazil and Argentina which together had significant influence in the region. On March 14, 1977 he wrote in his journal that ". . . in talking to the President about Latin American reactions to our human-rights concerns, which have prompted a kind of coalition of Latin American countries against us, I pointed out to him that Brazil is of great importance to us as a potentially new regional stabilizer. Pointing to the globe in his office, I argued that the Carter Administration ought to have as its design the creation of closer relationships with a large number of these emerging regional powers." A similar journal entry of August 7, 1977 recounted a statement to the president that the U. S. was ". . . running the risk of having bad relations simultaneously with Brazil, Chile, and Argentina . . ." based on a seemingly one-sided human rights approach (Brzezinski 1983, 128).

Despite these concerns, Brzezinski considered the general policy a success, citing several improvements in human rights performance in Latin America: Peru released 300 political prisoners in April 1977, "disappearances" of citizens in Argentina dropped from thousands to 500 in 1978 and only 44 in 1979, while in both Chile and Brazil such practices ended altogether. At the same time, democratic institutions were strengthened in Peru and Ecuador. "Overall, the policy can be counted a success in that it established a climate of global concern that encouraged improvements in human-rights conditions and inhibited as well as exhibited the gross violations. It is interesting to note that our main supporters were the people of the various countries, and especially the victims of political suppression; our main critics, their governments" (Brzezinski 1983, 128-9). In fact, some of the harshest attacks on the Carter human rights effort came from within the United States.

Walter LaFeber observed that in trying to couple human rights with other tools of diplomacy, President Carter chose a very complicated mechanism to achieve the ends of protecting the individual from the arbitrary power of the state (LaFeber 1993, 210). Congress has attached reporting requirements to several aid measures, calling for certification by the executive on human rights performance as a condition of receiving foreign aid. This often placed the president at odds with both the offending nation and members of Congress, rather than giving the executive a unilateral process for encouraging improvements in such performance through direct diplomacy. The result was internal bureaucratic conflict within and between the White House and State Department as well as resentment among the targeted nations. In some cases, such as Argentina, Brazil and Guatemala, countries found other sources of military equipment in Israel and Western Europe, allowing them to avoid dealing with the United States at all.

The result was that the carrot and stick approach became ineffective as a way to change internal political actions in many Latin American countries. In this sense, Carter's human rights policy and Kennedy's earlier Alliance for Progress shared some common flaws, according to LaFeber.

> Both men talked about revolution when they meant painfully slow evolution. Both desired more democratic societies in Central America as rapidly as possible, but without the radical changes those desires entailed. Both wanted the military-oligarch elites, long nourished by and dependent upon the United States, to share power and distribute their wealth more equitably, but neither wanted to lose U.S. power and influence that had always worked through those elites. Both men wanted change in Central America, but they dreaded revolution. In the end when they realized that one was not possible without the other, both presidents backed away from the consequences (LaFeber 1993, 212).

The Carter administration also attempted to change the manner in which it dealt with Latin American nations, particularly those authoritarian states which posed challenges to the human rights standards outlined above. In his October 1976 foreign policy briefing paper to then presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance recommended specific goals and priorities to follow if the Democrats won in November. Regarding the Western hemisphere he stated:

> In determining what overall approach can best secure the positive cooperation of the Latin American and Caribbean states in dealing with major global issues and what relative priorities a new Administration should give to our interests at stake in the hemisphere, I favor a course of action which would treat Latin American nations in the same fashion as we treat nations in other areas of the world. More specifically, where we have matters of bilateral interest they should be treated bilaterally, and global issues should be dealt with in multilateral forums.
>
> I am persuaded that we must move away from the concepts of a "special relationship" or an "inter-American community," which have been rejected by Latin American leaders and evoke memories of past paternalism. Each country in Latin America has always been unique. These countries have become more differentiated as economic development has advanced at different rates. Henceforth, the US should give serious diplomatic attention, on the basis of negotiations conducted between equal sovereign powers, to the countries which lie to our south. Problems of a bilateral character can especially be predicted in our dealings with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile (Vance 1983, 451-2).

Vance also called for moving away from the historical policy of isolation towards Cuba, noting that the boycott had not succeeded in weakening the Castro regime despite 16 years of operation. In fact, most Latin American nations had reestablished diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba, leaving the U. S. alone in its position towards that socialist nation. He suggested that a useful but modest start would be a partial lifting of the embargo on food and medicine in exchange for Cuba releasing a small number of imprisoned American participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

National Security Advisor Brzezinski agreed with Secretary Vance on the need to conduct full, mature relations with countries in Latin America, even those whose domestic political systems were less democratic than we thought desirable. He argued against a hemispheric policy with some kind of identifying slogan in favor of dealing with individual states with a range of diverse relationships with the United States, conducted within the larger context of regional issues. In March 1977 he told the newly formed Policy Review

Committee, chaired by Warren Christopher, ". . . the notion of a special policy is ahistorical. In the past, it has done nothing more than lock us into a cycle of creating unrealistic expectations and then having to live with the subsequent disappointments." It was also important to realize that while for Americans the Monroe Doctrine represented a statement of U. S. commitment to regional security, Latin Americans considered it to be a symbol of presumptuous American paternalism (Brzezinski 1983, 135).

The combination of human rights prominence and establishing a series of bilateral relationships in place of a regional approach proved difficult in practice for the Carter administration. While a few important accomplishments such as the Panama Canal treaty resulted from this fresh perspective, the larger goal of bringing about social and political change through diplomacy failed to materialize. Yet by promoting these initiatives in the region, the seeds of this disappointment were sown, according to LaFeber. "Carter, moreover, wanted it both ways: decrease governmental coercion and publicly attack (and hence de-legitimate) the military regimes, while at the same time urging those regimes to fight the revolutions. U.S. officials acted as if they were dealing with governments, like their own, that had other kinds of legitimacy (such as the respect of their people or fair election mandates). In reality they dealt with Central American rulers who maintained order through fear and repression. Once the fear and oppression were reduced, so were the rulers' chances for survival" (LaFeber 1993, 269). This criticism of Carter's Latin American policy was echoed in the Reagan campaign of 1980 which, when successful, was interpreted as a mandate to return to power politics as the guiding principle for American relations within the region.

This view first was articulated in a November 1979 *Commentary* essay by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, later appointed by President Reagan as U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Entitled "Dictators and Double Standards," the main argument was that the Carter policy of linking human rights to the tenor of diplomatic relations with certain states, such as Nicaragua and Iran, served not to advance the goal of greater individual freedom in those countries, but contributed to internal instability that brought down those governments. Instead, Kirkpatrick advocated a policy which distinguished between tradition authoritarian regimes which tolerate but do not create social inequities, brutality and poverty, and revolutionary autocracies which create them. Therefore, for the purposes of U. S. foreign and military aid, the former merit assistance since ". . . they worship traditional gods and observe traditional taboos. They do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations." In contrast, revolutionary Communist regimes create millions of refugees by totally assuming control over all aspects of society (Kirkpatrick 1982, 49-50).

Since, she argued, traditional autocracies allow some individual freedom in economic and political activity, therefore it is reasonable to believe that maintaining friendly relations with these countries while pursuing quiet diplomacy will encourage greater liberalization over time. This is much preferable to the Carter policy which gives voice to radical factions open to Communist influence whose activities tend to destabilize authoritarian regimes.

> For these reasons and more, a posture of continuous self-abasement and apology vis-a-vis the Third World is neither morally necessary nor politically appropriate. Nor is it necessary or appropriate to support vocal enemies of the United States because they invoke the rhetoric of popular liberation. It is not even necessary or appropriate for our leaders to forswear unilaterally the use of military force to counter military force. Liberal idealism need not be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the defense of freedom and the national interest (Kirkpatrick 1982, 52).

According to Allan Gerson, who wrote an account of Kirkpatrick's tenure at the UN, this rationale appealed to Ronald Reagan as supportive of his campaign challenge that the Carter policies had weakened the power of the United States in its battle with the Soviet Union over influence in the Third World (Gerson 1991, xv).

PARTICIPANTS

The number of people involved in the planning of the Grenada action was relatively small to begin with, just the National Security Planning Group chaired by Vice President Bush.[1] Of these, the key actors were Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz; the final decision to proceed came from President Ronald Reagan. The foreign policy outlook of these three individuals is critical to understanding the subsequent choice to use military force to resolve the situation in Grenada. All shared similar views on the role of the United States as a superpower, the danger posed by Soviet-inspired communism, and the importance of a strong military posture to deter adventurism by the USSR and its followers throughout the world. Shaped by common experience of the "Munich syndrome" of appeasement, World War II and the Cold War, the shared elements of their respective operational codes became apparent in the planning and implementation of the military intervention in the Caribbean.

Caspar Weinberger first worked with Ronald Reagan as the Director of Finance when he became Governor of California in January 1967. Two years later he went to Washington, serving in the Nixon and Ford administrations as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare until 1975. With Carter's win in 1976, he returned to California as general counsel board member of the Bechtel Group, one of the largest international construction companies in the world. However, when then President-elect Reagan called upon him to serve as Secretary of Defense in 1981, Weinberger did not hesitate to return to public service. As he recalled the conversation in his memoirs, the reasons Reagan gave for wanting him to assume this new role resonated strongly with Weinberger, including the

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1 The composition of this group was Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Jack Vessey, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and Assistant Secretary of State Tony Motley.

decline in U. S. military preparedness combined with expansion of Soviet capability in this area. "The President also emphasized matters that I had previously discussed with him, namely the great alarm that our policies and our lack of strength had occasioned among our allies; the growing belief, among both our allies and other nations with whom we should be friendly, that the United States was a very unreliable ally, not a good partner and certainly not a country that was militarily strong, at least compared to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they felt that the United States lacked the will to regain the military strength necessary to have any hope of its policies succeeding. I had experienced that reaction myself many times on my trips abroad for Bechtel and other companies between 1975 and 1980, in the Middle East, in Europe and in England" (Weinberger 1990, 14-5). These sentiments were not ones recently formed, but grew from Weinberger's World War II military experience.

As a Harvard freshman in 1934, Weinberger closely followed Winston Churchill's speeches alerting the western democracies to the peril of Nazism and their unreadiness to deal with this threat militarily. He also objected personally to Roosevelt's neutrality policy, believing instead that since there was a clearly visible right and wrong between Hitler's Germany and the rest of Europe, only vigorous steps to block him would prevent outbreak of military hostilities. Once war came, Weinberger enlisted in the infantry in September 1941, serving in the South Pacific theater. From this he gleaned an important lesson. "I am sure that such early wartime experiences, coupled with my awareness of the problems Britain had had, caused by its unpreparedness, since the war began for it in 1939, impressed upon me the simple truth I have believed ever since: It is an extremely risky and dangerous business for any country to allow itself to become unarmed and unready for war" (Weinberger 1990, 8). He found similar faults with American involvement in Korea, not in terms of getting in but limiting the objectives both geographically and politically, a mistake repeated in Vietnam. Thus, he said, when Reagan approached him to serve as Secretary of Defense, Weinberger noted he was not an uninterested person regarding American military policy.

The maintenance and use of military force in defense of the national interest remained a guiding principle throughout Weinberger's tenure in the Reagan administration. The willingness to commit U. S. troops to hot spots was amply demonstrated in Lebanon and Libya, in addition to Grenada. His view of the issue is reflected in the title of his memoirs *Fighting for Peace.* In the book's conclusion, he laid out the approach followed by the administration in this area.

> The fight for peace is never over, unlike some of the wars in which we have engaged. Certainly we will have to fight another of those wars in the future, unless we keep ourselves strong, and unless we really are willing to fight for peace in peacetime.
>
> But maintaining that readiness and that resolve is difficult, and is widely viewed as an unpopular and a largely unrewarding task. It involves persuading people in freedom-loving democracies that they should follow a course instinctively repugnant to them. It also requires large and continuous investments to keep our military strong, modern and ready, so that no country, or combination of countries, can ever feel they can make a successful attack upon us (Weinberger 1990, 429).

He went on to argue it is not necessary to change the character or values of a peaceful nation in order to use military force, but instead calls for a recognition that in order to enjoy that peace, the nation and its people must be willing and able to fight for it.

In George Shultz, Ronald Reagan found a Secretary of State who shared this view. Also a fellow Californian, Shultz's early career paralleled that of Weinberger. A Marine veteran of World War II, he completed a doctorate in economics at MIT in 1949, then remained as a faculty member until 1955. After serving one year on President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisors, Shultz returned to MIT for six years, then held a deanship at the University of Chicago from 1962 to 1968. With Nixon's election, he joined Weinberger in the new cabinet, first as Secretary of Labor and, after two years as the first OMB director, as Treasury Secretary. Upon leaving the Nixon administration, he also went to work for the Bechtel Corporation, where he stayed until Ronald Reagan called upon him in 1982 to replace his first Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

Like Caspar Weinberger, George Shultz assumed a cabinet post in a program area for which he had little direct experience, although both had been at that level of the federal government in the Nixon administration. From his earlier tenure at the Labor and Treasury Departments, he learned the importance of selecting the right people to assist him. These included his OMB and University of Chicago colleague Ken Dam as deputy secretary and recently retired University of Rochester chancellor Allen Wallis as undersecretary for economic affairs. A key decision was to retain Haig's undersecretary for political affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to maximize the institutional memory of the State Department; other veterans at similar levels also were retained.

Following Alexander Haig as Secretary of State entailed some important policy shifts by George Shultz, both in management of the department and in the relationship of this major cabinet officer to the President. In the first area, Haig was reasonably able to bring in a cadre of reliable assistants, but never got a good sense of how the department operated, particularly with respect to the career foreign service officers. However, his greatest difficulty was the lack of direct and immediate access to President Reagan; both he and National Security Advisor Richard Allen had to go through Chief of Staff Edwin Meese or other White House aides to get the president's attention. For Haig, this was particularly galling after starting off the position by telling Reagan, "You must have a single manager who can integrate the views of all your Cabinet officers and prepare for you a range of policy choices. I believe it requires that the Secretary of State be your vicar for the community of departments having an interest in the several dimensions of foreign policy" (Haig 1984, 58). When, after 18 months of frustration, Haig got the president's ear to tell him of the difficulties encountered in putting this agreement into practice, the result was Reagan handing him a one line letter of resignation for him to sign.

George Shultz was quite aware of this situation before taking the job of Secretary of State; in fact, Reagan asked him to call Al Haig with the news that he was being replaced. This indicated to Shultz early on that while Reagan could be a tough executive, he had difficulty dealing with conflict within his own administration. When he met with Reagan at Camp David in June 1982 to finalize the nomination Shultz told him, "I consider myself to be part of the White House and of your team. I'm working for you, Mr. President" (1993, 9). After the rancor of the first 18 months of the new administration this seemed to be a welcome change of view. In any event, Reagan was much more at ease with his choice of Shultz for this sensitive position. For his part, Shultz indicated one reason for this improved relationship was that both he and the president shared political principles and agreed on the direction American foreign policy should take.

An important part of this congruence of beliefs was in the need for a strong military to back up diplomatic efforts around the world. Shultz saw the effect of increased military spending of the first two years in both improved defensive capabilities and rising morale among the armed forces. "From the standpoint of diplomacy, that renewed capability was important. Power and diplomacy work *together* [emphasis Shultz]" (Shultz 1993, 10). To promote this concept, Shultz emphasized to both President Reagan, and later Vice President Bush, that he intended to work closely with the White House and the president in a supportive and collaborative manner.

This is reflected in Shultz's comments on the rapid planning and response to the Grenada situation [italics Shultz]:

> Often one hears the argument "Force should be used only as the last resort." This makes people feel good, and it sounds statesmanlike. In fact, I feel strongly that it is poor public policy and an unsound application of the law. The use of force, and the credible threat of the use of force, are legitimate instruments of national policy and should be viewed as such. Waiting to use force as a last resort would have meant possibly enduring hostage taking and having to use force then. The use of force obviously should not be taken lightly, but better to use force when you *should* rather than when you *must*; *last* means no *other*, and by that time the level of force and the risk involved may have multiplied many times over (Shultz 1993, 345).

In this, all the participants in the Grenada invasion agreed. Not only did it meet the demands of that particular situation, but it conformed to the broader views of Ronald Reagan on the role of the United States as a superpower.

The development of this world view is tied closely to Reagan's background, first as union leader in Hollywood, and later as governor of California. Both Caspar Weinberger and George Shultz were attracted to their respective cabinet posts specifically by the stated foreign policy goals of Ronald Reagan as well as by the character of the man. These in turn set the overall tone for the conduct of international affairs in the new administration, leading to the application of what became known (although not by the people in charge of its implementation) as the Reagan Doctrine.[2] This view of the national interest as the overt and unashamed American support for anti-communist revolutions on the grounds of justice, necessity and democratic tradition reflects the background and operational code of the president whose name it bears. Therefore, in order to understand how this theme came to be dominant in U. S. foreign policy, it is useful to examine the career of Ronald Reagan which brought him to the White House in 1981.

He was born and raised in rural Illinois where his father was a salesman and part owner of a shoe shop. When the Great Depression hit, Jack Reagan soon was out of work but, with the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, as one of the few Democrats in Republican Dixon, Illinois, he was appointed to administer federal relief programs in the area. During this period, Ronald Reagan completed high school and, since jobs were scarce, ended up in 1932 as a radio announcer for a small station owned by a family friend. Shortly afterwards, he moved to a larger station in Davenport, Iowa where part of his duties was to broadcast Chicago Cubs baseball games. Each spring he would accompany

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2 This label was first publicly appended by Charles Krauthammer in his essay of April 1, 1985 in *Time* magazine (pp. 54-5). While it was picked up and commonly used in the press, the administration never acknowledged the term or used it in official statements or documents.

the team to its training facility on Catalina Island in California. In 1937, while with the team, he made a successful screen test for Warner Brothers and his acting career began.

These early experiences contributed to Reagan's penchant for images and roles, a characteristic that stayed with him throughout his political life. As the child of an alcoholic father, he coped by spending long periods of time alone at home with his nature and butterfly collections. Later, radio broadcasting allowed him to speak to an unseen audience, which was true of his acting as well. Reagan noted the way this reflected some of his early years:

> Still, I think there's something about the entertainment world that attracts people who may have had youthful feelings of shyness or insecurity. After I went to Hollywood, some of the most successful people I met - a lot of actors and great comedians like Jack Benny, for example - would just sit quietly, even shyly, at a party while some of the funniest people were writers who took center stage and became the real show-offs. It made me wonder if some entertainers hadn't gravitated to their calling because they'd been a little insecure and the job gave them a chance to be someone they're not, at least for a while (Reagan 1990, 42-3).

Weinberger indicated Reagan had an evident but attractive shyness about him, particularly when meeting other important people. George Shultz noted that, as the case of Al Haig's firing showed, Reagan was reluctant to engage in conflict with those around him (Shultz 1993, 14-5).

In 1947, after ten years in the movie industry, Reagan became involved in a situation which established strong anti-communist feeling he carried with him during his political career - the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) investigation of Hollywood. Two of the industry groups to which he belonged, the American Veterans Committee (AVC) and the Hollywood Industry Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions (HICCASP), were suspected of being fronts for attempts by the Communist Party to gain control of the movie business. When he gave a 1946 speech to the AVC labeling communism a threat as serious as fascism had been during World War II, he reported it was received in total silence. Shortly afterward, he received a letter from a woman who had been in the audience saying she suspected the group was infiltrated by communists and the reaction to the speech clinched it for her; Reagan resigned from the AVC the next day.

The HICCASP was a larger entertainment member association, formed originally to support President Franklin Roosevelt. Reagan called it "a respected and prestigious liberal organization that had attracted some of the best-known names in Hollywood." Assuming a position on the 60-Member board of directors, he came to feel that the focus of the group was beginning to change in an unwelcome direction. In concert with 11 other board members including Olivia de Havilland and MGM studio head Dore Shary, Reagan introduced a resolution reaffirming the association's executive board's pre-war principles, among them its "belief in free enterprise and the Democratic system and repudiates Communism as desirable for the United States." When the executive board vetoed the resolution, all twelve of its sponsors resigned. He later testified before the HUAC regarding communist influence in the movie industry (1990, 112-3).

These events helped Ronald Reagan to make a momentous decision to become actively involved in politics, beginning with his election to head the Screen Actors Guild. He recalled the impact it had on his move in this direction. "The strike [by another front organization] and the efforts to gain control over HICCASP and other organizations had a profound effect on me. More than anything else, it was the Communists' attempted takeover of Hollywood and its worldwide weekly audience of more than five hundred million people that led me to accept a nomination to serve as president of the Screen Actors Guild and, indirectly at least, set me on the road that would lead me into politics" (Reagan 1990, 114). However, this encounter left an indelible impression regarding the threat posed by such activities. "Now I knew from firsthand experience how Communists used lies, deceit, violence, or any other tactic that suited them to advance the cause of Soviet expansionism. I knew from the experience of hand-to-hand combat that America faced no more insidious or evil threat than that of Communism" (Reagan 1990, 115). Thus in his March 8, 1982 address to the National Association of Evangelicals President Reagan was entirely consistent in warning the nation to be aware of "the aggressive impulses of an evil empire" as he referred to the Soviet Union (1990, 570). The use of imagery rather than description of specific policies or actions also fits into his movie background.

Reagan headed the Screen Actors Guild for six terms from 1948 to 1960, during which he also traveled the country as a spokesman for General Electric Company. In 1962 this relationship ended and he became more active in Republican party activities, culminating in his role as cochairman of Barry Goldwater's California presidential campaign. His high profile during that period attracted the attention of GOP state leaders seeking a candidate to run against Democratic Governor Pat Brown in his bid for reelection to a third term. Waging a race built on the theme of ending wasteful government programs, constantly increasing taxes and entrenched bureaucrats isolated from and uncaring about the plight of the average American worker, Reagan defeated Brown in November 1966 by a 58 percent-42 percent margin.

Over his two terms as California's governor from 1966 to 1974, Ronald Reagan developed a management style that he continued to utilize as president. This is significant because the nature of this approach to handling public affairs allowed top staff to control much of the day to day activities of government, yet at the same time imposed constraints drawn from his general political philosophy. As shown by his tenure as chief executive at both the state and national level, this placed a burden on his cabinet officials to interpret these views in practical terms in order to formulate and carry out specific policy. In his memoirs, Reagan described his management style in the following manner:

> First, I had to select the best people I could find for my administration - people whom I could rely on and trust; this we accomplished by going out and recruiting top people from the business world and elsewhere.

> Then, I had to set policies and goals I wanted these people to accomplish and to do whatever I could to help them achieve these goals. It seemed like simple, basic, sound management policy to me. It worked for me in Sacramento and it worked for me later in Washington.

He also addressed the criticism that his "hands-off" style was ineffective, particularly as president:

> I don't believe a chief executive should supervise every detail of what goes on in his organization. The chief executive should set broad policy and general ground rules, tell people what he or she wants them to do, then let them do it; he should make himself (or *herself*) [emphasis Reagan] available, so that the members of his team can come to him if there is a problem . . .
>
> Of course, for chief executives to make intelligent decisions and good choices, they have to be well informed about what's going on in their organization and the world around it (Reagan 1990, 161-2).

It is on this latter point that it is most useful to focus, especially as it pertains to the decision making process in the Grenada example.

As noted earlier, Ronald Reagan's understanding of the state of U. S. foreign relations under the Carter administration, and what he saw as necessary to reassert America's proper role as the leading superpower, was what led to his winning the 1980 presidential election and convincing Casper Weinberger and George Shultz to become his two senior cabinet members. The components of his operational code in this area now become highly relevant. This can be gleaned from Reagan's own memoirs and speeches during his first term as president, along with observations by others in his administration. Finally, from this data one can assemble the main elements of the Reagan Doctrine, most of which were established prior to the October 1983 invasion of Grenada.

Ronald Reagan decided to run in 1980 after becoming more and more concerned about the direction of the Carter administration. One area of disagreement was what the Democrats called "national economic planning" but to Reagan these were code words for confiscation of working people's wages to redistribute to those who didn't produce anything for society. However a significant portion of his difference with Carter was over foreign affairs.

> I also thought the administration was a disaster in the arena of national security. While it was cutting back on our military power, we were losing ground to Communism in much of the globe; the morale of our volunteer army was plummeting; our strategic forces were growing obsolete; and nothing was being done to reduce the threat of a nuclear Armageddon that could destroy much of the world in less than a half hour's time (Reagan 1990, 205).

This was compounded by Carter's message that America had passed its prime as a singular world power and that the nation had to accept its lessened status with respect to global politics. Among other things, this meant losing our fear of communism and learning to co-exist with that system.

Reagan's foreign policy was intended to reverse the decline of U. S. military capability and to re-establish a position for America in its dealing with other nations in the world. In their first meeting after assuming office Weinberger brought the reduced state of military readiness to the president's attention, stating that at these low levels it was difficult to impress the Soviets sufficiently to dissuade their adventurism, starting at that time with a crackdown in Poland. Reagan stated reversing this trend was his top priority so that the Soviets would respect U. S. warnings about such actions. "If you get called [on such a threat] and cannot respond, your chances of being believed a second time are exceedingly low." Since it was important to send as strong message of deterrence backed up by strength ". . . we must never again be in a position where no one will believe us if we send signals like that" (Weinberger 1990, 34-5). Subsequently, the defense secretary told Russian Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin it was important that the Soviets and the world know that the U. S. had changed and that it had, and would continue to acquire, much greater strength as well as greater firmness and resolve during the Reagan administration.

Donald T. Regan, who was the president's Chief of Staff from 1985 to 1987 after serving as his Treasury Secretary, indicated Reagan came into office like most of his predecessors with little direct experience or knowledge in foreign policy. However, he did have a broad vision of reaching an historic agreement with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms, one that only could be achieved by negotiating from a position of strength. "Reagan's every action in foreign policy - the dramatic and very costly buildup in U.S. military power; the steadfast support of America's allies in large matters and small; the overt and covert resistance to Soviet adventurism in the small but murderous 'wars of liberation' that Moscow sponsored around the world; the public rhetoric of confrontation and the private signals of conciliation directed toward the Soviets; the dogged Geneva arms talks, and, above all, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for deploying a futuristic missile shield in outer space - had been carried out with the idea of one day sitting down at the negotiating table with the leader of the USSR and banning weapons of mass destruction from the planet" (Regan 1988, 294). Regan notes that while the president did not always have this goal at the front of his consciousness in the day-to-day administration of U. S. foreign relations, this big picture constantly was in his mind.

Development of the Reagan Doctrine. In the first three years of the Reagan administration, the president and his top aides began to draw on this world view to lay out their plan how to reverse the decline in America's world standing experienced during the Carter years. In a September 13, 1981 speech by Secretary of State Haig to the Berlin Press Association, the policy of "excessive introspection and pessimism" of the prior administration was dismissed as a sign of weakness that had encouraged the Soviet Union, despite its professions of peace and good will, to expand its own military capabilities and to arm its proxies in an attempt to promote violent change in many parts of the world. Thus it was incumbent upon the United States to defend democracy and the rule of law where it was so threatened. "The willingness to defend our values remains their essential guarantee. Surely these are things worth fighting for. The idea of a man as a creative and free individual is worth a fight." He went on to state that the democracies of the West have a unique privilege and compelling obligation to promulgate their own revolutionary doctrine just as the Soviets were doing (Haig 1981, 66-8).

In his 1982 State of the Union address, President Reagan described the steps his administration had taken to re-establish international respect for America. "Our foreign policy is a policy of strength, fairness and balance. By restoring America's military credibility, by pursuing peace at the negotiating table wherever both sides are willing to sit down in good faith, and by regaining the respect of America's allies and adversaries alike, we have strengthened our country's position as a force for peace and progress in the world." He warned those, especially Cuba and Libya, who would export terrorism and subversion in the Caribbean and elsewhere the U. S. will act with firmness when and where action is called for (Reagan 1982a, 261).

A month later, Reagan announced his Caribbean Basin Initiative to provide free-trade arrangements with nations in the region, technical assistance to help the private sector reap benefits from such trade and $350 million to aid the hardest hit economies in the area. At the same time he pointed out such programs could not succeed if these nations were forced to divert precious domestic resources to combat imported terrorism and armed attack on the public. He carefully outlined the problem the United States planned to address as part of this initiative:

> A new kind of colonialism stalks the world today and threatens our independence. It is brutal and totalitarian; it is not of our hemisphere, but it threatens our hemisphere, and has established footholds on American soil for the expansion of its colonialist ambitions.
>
> The events of the last several years dramatize two different futures which are possible for the Caribbean area: either the establishment or restoration of moderate constitutional governments with economic growth and improved living standards, or further expansion of political violence from the extreme left and the extreme right resulting in the imposition of dictatorships and inevitably more economic decline and human suffering.
>
> A positive opportunity is illustrated by the two-thirds of the nations in the area which have democratic governments. A dark future is foreshadowed by the poverty and repression of Castro's Cuba, the tightening grip of the totalitarian left

in Grenada and Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet-backed Cuban-managed support for violent revolution in Central America. The record is clear: nowhere in its whole sordid history have the promises of Communism been redeemed (Reagan 1982b, 324).

The danger posed by Communism in Central America having been clearly identified, President Reagan went on to argue that if the United States did not act promptly and decisively to defend the democratic nations of the region, new Cubas would arise from the ruins of the current insurgent conflicts in those countries. He noted that the 1947 Rio Treaty created reciprocal defense arrangements between the U.S and these nations based on common democratic ideals and that America's meeting these obligations took on greater meaning since an outside power [Soviet Union] supported this terrorism in order to destroy any possibility of freedom and democracy taking hold. Reagan warned, "Let our friends and our adversaries understand that we will do whatever is prudent and necessary to insure the peace and security of the Caribbean area. In the face of outside threats, security for the countries of the Caribbean and Central America area is not an end in itself, but a means to an end" (Reagan 1982b, 325). The implication of a military response is clear in this statement.

The use of America's newly reinvigorated military capability to back up diplomatic initiatives as a key component of the new administration's foreign policy was explained by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in his April 27, 1982 address at the United States Chamber of Congress annual meeting in Washington, D.C. Entitled *American Power, American Purpose*, it identified three trends that raised critical questions about how Western security and international peace could be maintained in the face of these challenges (Haig 1982, 517-20). The first was a relative decline of the Western alliance's military strength as the Soviets expanded their capability in this area. Second, the growing interdependence of the West and developing nations made social and political upheaval in the latter of major importance. Finally, the Soviet Union was emerging as a true global military power which had become increasingly bold in its use of these resources to promote violence, particularly in the developing nations of greatest strategic significance to the West. The question facing the United States and its allies was how to respond to this threat.

The need for a balanced American foreign policy matching strength and negotiation offered the best hope in this regard. Haig set forth some ways the administration planned to pursue this new strategy. "During this sensitive and dangerous period of changing superpower relationships, the United States must make clear to the Soviet Union that there are penalties for aggression and incentives for restraints." Thus business as usual could not proceed when Soviet adventurism occurred in Afghanistan or Latin America. "We must also create new realities in the military balance and in regions of crisis to encourage the Soviet Union to accept the need for moderation in its own interest" (Haig 1982, 520). This was part of the rationale behind the Caribbean initiative of economic aid backed by greater U. S. vigilance in defense of the region.

Haig concluded by noting that just as the Soviet Union was giving active support to Marxist-Leninist groups in the west and south, the Unites States was committed to providing vigorous support to democratic forces wherever they were located, even in countries now under communist rule. Promoting democratic values such as free press, free trade unions and free political parties was a major goal of the Reagan administration. He went on to state that the U. S. wanted ". . . the competition of democracy and communism to be conducted in peaceful and political terms but we will provide other means if the Soviet Union insists upon violent methods of struggle. There must be a single standard" (Haig 1982, 520). Haig ended his address by recalling Churchill's warning that only the swift gathering of forces to confront military and moral aggression can preserve the peace; that is the purpose to which American power now must be directed.

On September 30, 1982 Secretary of State Schultz addressed the United Nations General Assembly on U. S. foreign policy. Subtitled *Realism and Progress* he indicated the principal instrument of this policy was the concept of freedom, directed toward the nation's adversaries of oppressors, totalitarians and the tacticians of fear and pressure. He observed that managers like himself, involved in the daily affairs of state often become enmeshed in details, may easily lose sight of the underlying fundamentals of American policy, President Reagan did not. Thus Shultz wanted to bring forward the president's ideals so that the whole world could understand the basis on which the United States planned to conduct foreign affairs (Shultz 1982, 98-104).

First was the need to face the reality of international affairs, much of which is unpleasant. Part of that was aggression, subversion and repression by the Soviets and their surrogates that the U. S. clearly identified as a threat to freedom and peace. While not seeking confrontation, nevertheless America was ready to resist this tendency where it challenged our interests. This led to the second fundamental - the development of military strength to insure that no other nation could threaten the U. S., its interests or its allies. Shultz stressed that "[a]long with military readiness and capability must come the willingness to employ it in the cause of peace, justice, and security" and that America would continue to do so with prudence, firmness and balance (Shultz 1982, 99).

With this realistic assessment of the international climate and the capacity to operate boldly and decisively in it when required, the United States avowed its readiness to solve problems as the third basis for its foreign policy. This meant that we recognized that along with strength came responsibility for decision and action to meet these challenges. Citing its role in the Middle East, Caribbean region and global arms control negotiations, Shultz stated the U. S. would stay engaged in the struggle towards world peace. Finally, based on the conviction that the future of free people is unlimited as American history demonstrated, the U. S. would work to bring that vision of progress to the rest of the world.

This theme was reinforced by President Reagan in his March 23, 1983 address to the nation on peace and national security explaining his defense build-up, and his subsequent speech on April 27, 1983 to a joint session of Congress on the problems in Central America as they related to national security in the Western hemisphere. Both were offered to outline the way his administration perceived the threat of communism in the region and how to combat it effectively. In the first statement on a new defense posture, Reagan indicated the need to counter a more aggressive Soviet Union was critical to U. S. national security. "As the Soviets have increased their military power, they have been emboldened to extend that power. They are spreading their military influence in ways that can directly challenge our vital interests and those of our allies" (Reagan 1983a, 387). To demonstrate this expansion, the president showed previously secret aerial photos of a major Soviet electronic intercept station at Lourdes, Cuba and a large airbase on the island capable of supporting Russian fighter and bomber aircraft. He also presented pictures of a 10,000 foot runway and support facilities under construction by Soviet-supported Cuban forces on the small Caribbean island of Grenada. Since that small nation had no air force or tourist industry, for whom was that facility intended if not the Russians, asked the president. "The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region, and it is in this important economic and strategic area that we are trying to help the governments of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and others in their struggles for democracy against guerrillas supported through Cuba and Nicaragua" (Reagan 1983a, 388). Reagan concluded that the United States could not afford to believe the Soviets would exercise restraint in the utilization of these military resources on America's doorstep

The final expression of the elements of the Reagan Doctrine came in the president's May 15, 1983 address to a joint session of Congress, just six months prior to its application in the Grenada intervention in October (Reagan 1983b, 450-4). In his speech entitled "The Problems in Central America: The National Security of All the Americas," the president laid out his case for the direct impact of Soviet-Cuban activities in the region on the security and well-being of the United States and its hemispheric neighbors. He stated that the importance of the Caribbean Basin acted as magnet for adventurism by these two adversaries and asked "If the Nazis during World War II and the Soviets today could recognize the Caribbean and Central America as vital to our interests, shouldn't we also?" (Reagan 1983b, 450). The goal of this activity, conducted mainly through professional guerrilla movements in the area, was as sinister as it was simple according to President Reagan - to destabilize the entire region from the Panama Canal to Mexico. He argued that democracies should not be required to remain passive while threats to their security and prosperity arose on their borders but are fully justified to take action to meet these challenges head on. In addition to the immediate danger, a more significant issue was involved as well, the credibility of the United States around the world both for its allies and adversaries. "If Central America were to fall, what would the consequences be for our position in Asia, Europe and for alliances such as NATO? If the United States cannot respond to a threat near our own borders, why should Europeans or Asians believe that we are seriously concerned about threats to them? If the Soviets can assume that nothing short of an actual attack on the United States will provoke an American response, which ally, which friend will trust us then?" (Reagan 1983b, 453). Thus the United States had a vital interest, a moral duty and a solemn responsibility to stand up to these challenges here to prevent a greater danger later on to peace in the world.

Several analysts of the Reagan Doctrine found that, although it had similar origins in the Truman containment policy as did the subsequent Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon and Carter Doctrines, one factor made that statement significantly different from its predecessors. While the earlier policies essentially were defensive in nature, that is attempted to limit the existing dispersion of Soviet influence, the Reagan administration had taken an offensive stance by trying to regain democratic governments in communist-controlled states such as Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Angola (Rosenfeld 1987, Smith 1994, Johnston 1997). By portraying the actions of the Soviet Union and its surrogates (mainly Cuba) in Latin America as imminent and direct threats both to the nations in that region and the United States, the need to defend itself and its neighbors by any means necessary became a crucial element of American foreign policy. It only required an opportunity to be applied; that arose in Grenada in October 1983.

PROCESS

The events leading to the American military intervention in Grenada began with the overthrow of the island nation's elected Prime Minister Sir Eric Gairy on March 13, 1979 by the leader of the leftist New Jewel Movement Maurice Bishop. Initially welcomed by the Grenadan people who disliked Gairy's autocratic style, the Bishop government soon found they had exchanged one hard-line ideologue for another. In November 1979, it was announced that Cuba would help to build a new airport on the island, followed by a visit to the Soviet Union by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard where he received assurance of trade credits from the Russians and other Eastern bloc countries. In response, the Carter administration suspended all U. S. assistance to Grenada and refused to accept the credentials of the Bishop government's ambassador to the United States. The U. S. also used its influence to block aid programs to Grenada by the International Monetary Fund, the Caribbean Development Bank and other Western sources. This position was continued by the Reagan administration when it took office in January 1981.

Over the next two years, the Grenadan government developed two main factions: the original Bishop group which staged the 1989 coup, and a more radical Marxist element led by Coard. On October 13, 1983, the latter seized power, placing Prime Minister

Bishop and his four top aides under house arrest. Five days later, a large crowd freed Bishop and marched with him to Fort Rupert where other Bishop supporters were being held by the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (PRA), the military faction under General Hudson Austin which backed the Coard junta. At first, the PRA troops at the fort allowed the crowd onto the grounds without incident. Shortly thereafter PRA reinforcements arrived and opened fire on the citizens killing over 50 civilians. Then Bishop and his four aides were executed on the spot. Radio Free Grenada announced the action and the creation of a new Revolutionary Military Council headed by General Austin to rule the island; a 24-hour shoot on sight curfew also was implemented.

The rapid sequence of events placed American officials at a major disadvantage. Lacking a diplomatic presence on the island, there was no direct line of communication between Grenada and Washington. The closest person was U. S. Ambassador Milan Bish in Barbados who had to rely on second hand sources to find out what the junta was doing, particularly regarding the 1,000 or so U. S. citizens on the island, 600 of whom were students at St. George School of Medicine. He relayed his concerns to the State Department that the situation represented "imminent danger" to these Americans (Hooker 1991, 61-72). This report triggered a two-level decision making process in Washington.

The earliest work began at the National Security Council staff level, with a one page outline of a plan to protect U. S. citizens and restore democratic government, drafted on October 13, 1983 by newly appointed Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Constantine C. Menges (Menges 1988, 61). It proposed these efforts to be carried out by a regional collective security force under existing treaty arrangements of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). That same day, National Security Advisor William Clark announced his resignation; two days later Deputy NSC Advisor Robert "Bud" McFarlane was elevated to the top spot. On October 14 Menges gave his outline to fellow NSC staff Oliver North and senior intelligence director Kenneth deGreffenreid for their private comments. The plan was presented openly for the first time at the NSC meeting on October 17, 1983 where it was received without significant comment. Later that day Menges discussed his political-military option with U. S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) William J. Middendorf who indicated that group would likely support such an action.

Following the October 19 murder of Bishop and enforcement of the 24-hour curfew by the new military council on Grenada, staff from the NSC and State Department held their first joint meeting on October 20. At this Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) session chaired by NSC head McFarlane, Tony Motley, former U. S. Ambassador to Brazil and now head of the Latin America desk under Secretary of State Shultz, reported that State Department staff had been working in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff since October 10 on evacuation plans for American citizens in Grenada to conducted by U. S. military forces (Shultz 1993, 326-7). Menges advanced his proposal for a multi-nation operation that not only could rescue civilians but also eliminate the communist threat of the military council. It was suggested that as a precaution for either plan, the marine seaborne replacement force just underway for Lebanon could be moved closer to Grenada, but Admiral Art Moreau refused, stating the Joint Chiefs of Staff only would do so under a written order form the president. Later that day McFarlane secured the order from President Reagan; this was the first time he was made aware of the state of planning for action in Grenada (Menges 1988, 69-70).

At 6:00 P.M. that same day a critical top-level meeting of the National Security Council was held at the White House to consider options for action in Grenada. Chaired by Vice President George Bush, the participants were Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and his aide Fred Ikle, Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Jack Vessey, Acting CIA Director John McMahon, Undersecretary of

State Lawrence Eagleberger, State Department Latin Affairs Bureau head Tony Motley, OAS Ambassador William Middendorf, and NSC staff members Oliver North and Constantine Menges; Secretary of State George Shultz arrived later in the evening. Menges reported that the meeting first covered a factual update on conditions in Grenada, then moved to a discussion of military forces available and time frame for readiness to intervene. It is important to note that no discussion of diplomatic alternatives occurred at this meeting, Menges indicated, but only consideration of a rescue plan that would guarantee quick success with a minimum of casualties on either side. Shultz told the group that Caribbean democratic leaders had clearly expressed to department staff that they feared the Grenadan military council's motives and wanted action to limit this threat. He reported the OECS planned to meet the following day to consider making a formal request for such collective military action under the regional security treaty. Although no decision was reached at this NSC meeting, Menges felt a clear majority was tilting toward military action and that same evening McFarlane secured President Reagan's written order to direct the Lebanon-bound marines and naval support ships toward Grenada (Menges 1988, 72).

The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States held their meeting on October 21, 1983 to consider how to respond to the deteriorating situation in Grenada. From various accounts, the leaders of these states initially were not unanimous in their desire for American military intervention to address the crisis (Payne, Sutton and Thorndike 1984, 151). A motion to pursue an all-Caribbean Commonwealth approach received serious attention, involving a multi-nation fact finding team to visit Grenada, arrange for safety of foreign nationals and to encourage creation of a broadly based civilian government of national reconstruction. However, during the day Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga, Dominica's Prime Minister Eugenia Charles and U. S. Ambassador to Barbados Milan Bish spoke to several OECS representatives informing them of the U. S. determination to resolve the issue quickly through military means. When the group reconvened that evening, a formal invitation of American participation was submitted by the OECS to the State Department in Washington (Schoenhals and Melanson 1985, 141).

With this request in hand, the National Security Council met at 9:00 A.M. on October 22, 1983 at the White House. It was chaired again by Vice President Bush and attended by the same participants from the previous day; Secretary of State George Shultz, NSC head McFarlane and President Reagan took part by speaker phone. The group received an update on the situation in Grenada and the state of readiness of the U. S. military forces that would conduct the operation. The State Department relayed the OESC request for U. S. participation, along with the willingness of Jamaica and Barbados (non-OESC members) to provide military forces in a joint operation with the United States. After discussion covering the estimated number of Soviet-bloc forces on the island, and applicability of the War Powers Resolution to this situation, the president gave his approval to the plan. He signed the formal National Security Decision Directive that afternoon (Menges 1988, 77-8).

It is useful at this point to look at the recollections of some key participants in this meeting to see how each viewed the process and final decision to launch the military intervention in Grenada. Presidential assistant Edwin Meese noted that political issues clouded the military aspect of the operation: "It may seem hard to remember now - after successful actions in Panama and the Persian Gulf - but the negatives arrayed against decisive action in Grenada were almost too numerous to count. Not only did the operation proceed in the very wake of the disaster in Beirut [bombing of the Marine barracks], it flew in the teeth of fashionable opinion about the uses of American military power. From the standpoint of 1970s ideology, Reagan was planning to throw America's weight around, using our military to stand up for our interests and our allies. This was heresy, and plenty of people were prepared to say so" (Meese 1992, 217). Complicating the issue was opposition from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, one of Reagan's strongest supporters. JCS Chairman Vessey also indicated that with the heavy loss of life among the Marines in Beirut, public opinion might turn against another military operation involving American casualties so soon after this tragedy. According to Meese, the president asked only if there was any military reason not to proceed with the mission; General Vessey indicated there were none, Reagan approved the mission (Meese 1992, 218).

Secretary of State Shultz first reported the OECS request for American participation to Reagan just prior to the October 22 NSC meeting. As Shultz saw it, the U. S. had a formal request for assistance from the nations in the region to restore democratic institutions and bring order to the island. "We were confronted with life-threatening danger to some 1,000 American students. We were also presented with an urgent and forthright request and with a stated willingness on the part of those states to make their request publicly" (Shultz 1993, 329). Based on those factors, the secretary saw a clear course of action for the United States to intervene in Grenada; the president shared this view. "President Reagan's reaction was decisive. What kind of country would we be, he asked, if we refused to help small but steadfast democratic countries in our neighborhood to defend themselves against the threat of this kind of tyranny and lawlessness? Furthermore, Americans were in serious danger of being killed or taken hostage" (Shultz 1993, 329). Interestingly, Shultz stated that the entire Grenadan operation was driven by the State Department, not the Pentagon, National Security Council or White House staff. He saw this as sending a signal that President Reagan was capable of action beyond rhetoric. In particular, Latin American nations got the message that if a country went nose to nose with the U. S., Fidel Castro could not or would not come to their rescue. He made it a point to state that the president was closely involved in the whole planning process and that all key decisions were made by him; his was a pivotal role throughout the entire episode (Shultz 1993, 344).

In his own memoirs, Ronald Reagan described the decision to intervene in Grenada as a relatively straightforward one. Two points received particular attention in his recount of the steps leading to the approval of the military operation. First was the fact that at the urging of U.S. officials the OECS had gone out on a limb to make a public request for U. S. assistance to block the threat they perceived to stability in their region, but for which they had little capability to resist on their own. "We couldn't say no to those six small countries who had asked us for help. We'd have no credibility or standing in the Americas if we did. If it ever became known, which I knew it would, that we had turned them down, few of our friends around the world would trust us completely as an ally again" (Reagan 1990, 451). This echoed the theme of American passivity that Reagan had charged arose during the Carter years.

A much more significant issue for Reagan was the loss of America's prominence as a world power in part because of lack of respect for its willingness to use its military capability to back up diplomacy, a point he also raised in his 1980 campaign for the White House. This had major implications, not only for the Grenadan situation but for the larger question of how the United States should conduct its international affairs.

> Frankly, there was another reason I wanted secrecy [about the Grenada decision]. It was what I call the "post-Vietnam syndrome," the resistance of many in Congress to the use of military force abroad for any reason, because of our nation's experience in Vietnam. No rational person ever wants to unleash military force, but I believe there are situations when it is necessary for the United States to do so - especially when the defense of freedom and democracy is involved or the lives and liberty of our citizens are at stake. I understood what Vietnam had meant for the country, but I believed the United States couldn't remain spooked forever by this experience to the point where it refused to stand up and defend its legitimate national security interests. I suspected that, if we told the leaders of Congress about the operation, even under terms of strictest confidentiality, there would be some who would leak it to the press together with the prediction that Grenada was going to become "another Vietnam." We were already running into this phenomenon in our efforts to halt the spread of Communism in Central America, and some congressmen were raising the issue of "another Vietnam" in Lebanon while fighting to restrict the president's constitutional powers as commander in chief (Reagan 1990, 451).

Reagan indicated that although it wasn't true the limited Grenadan operation represented the kind of expansive military venture as Vietnam came to be, he didn't want to give any opportunity to make such a comparison. Therefore he said we didn't ask anybody, we just did it. The president concluded his discussion of this event that although the cost of the operation was high, with 19 Americans troops killed and over 100 wounded, the cost would have been much higher if the Soviet Union had been allowed to establish its presence in the hemisphere - it would have only spread from Grenada to the American border.

This is a very concise statement of the Reagan Doctrine in his own words, although neither he nor members of his administration ever formally called it by that designation. It fits well with his operational code with respect to foreign affairs. Part of this view, that only military force will discourage adventurism by the Soviets and its surrogates in the Western hemisphere, was consciously applied for the first time in the American invasion of Grenada. These comments, particularly Reagan's sense of a need to overcome the Vietnam syndrome noted above, suggest strongly that the essential core of the doctrine served as an impetus to act, as well as providing an after-the-fact explanation for public consumption later on. It is useful to note that success here in this limited application of military force led to the more expansive assistance to the Contras during Reagan's second term as president.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

The Reagan Doctrine was directly expressed as part of the administration's foreign policy in the president's 1985 State of the Union address, even though he did not single it out under that phrase. As indicated earlier, the policy was given this title by Charles Krauthammer in his April 1, 1985 *Time* essay in which he quoted the relevant section of the speech: "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth . . . Support for freedom fighters is self-defense." In this doctrine the United States proclaimed overt and unashamed support for anti-Communist revolution on the grounds of justice, necessity and democratic tradition (Krauthammer 1985, 54-5).

Each of these grounds was drawn directly from statements of administration officials according to Krauthammer. He cited Reagan's February 16, 1985 radio address in which justice was served because these freedom fighters were striving for an end to tyranny. Secretary of State Shultz argued the necessity of this policy in a February 22 speech to the California Commonwealth Club in San Francisco stating if these fighters were defeated because of lack of American support, their countries would be irretrievably lost behind the Soviet's Iron Curtain of domination. Finally, going back to the 1985 State of the Union, President Reagan indicated support for the freedom fighters in Central America was in this nation's democratic tradition of such aid to those seeking freedom from the French Revolution to Simon Bolivar to modern Polish patriots resisting Soviet control. The key theme running through these examples is that ". . . to be constrained from supporting freedom by an excessive concern for sovereignty (and a unilateral concern, at that) is neither especially moral nor prudent. The West, of late, has taken to hiding behind parchment barriers as an excuse for inaction when oppressed democrats beg for help. The Reagan Doctrine, while still hiding a bit, announces an end to inaction" (Krauthammer 1985, 55). The Reagan Doctrine was a first step to restoration of what he called democratic militance. To see how this relates to Ronald Reagan's operation code, and that of his top aides Caspar Weinberger and George Shultz, it is useful first to review some critiques of the Reagan Doctrine.

First, it was noted that the Reagan administration came into office with a goal to rebuild and reassert American prominence as a world power; this was one of the major themes of the 1980 presidential campaign. Thus the actual events that triggered the

Grenadan action were ". . . interpreted by an ideologically committed administration determined to avoid the imprimatur of weakness which had crippled its predecessor" (Hooker 1991, 61). The control of the planning by a small group of similar-minded staff led by Secretary Shultz created a situation not unlike that in which the CIA dominated the Bay of Pigs operation. Here ". . . the State Department in a sense both created and sold its recommended response to the Grenada crisis by controlling and interpreting the information that reached the President, without meaningful, independent assessments by other members of the foreign policy and national security community" (Hooker 1991, 69). Thus, according to Hooker, the key ingredients of the presidential decision to use force in Grenada were the presidential personality, State Department control of information and analysis combined with a reduced role of the NSC, and the ideological coloration of the Reagan administration.

Caspar Weinberger responded to critics of the Grenadan intervention in his memoirs by arguing that the public did not fully understand that allowing the Soviets to install a fully operational military facility on the island was just one step in larger strategy to impose its views on the region. He stated that the administration emphatically believed that one Cuba was enough. The defense secretary also reported that American forces captured what he called the "Grenada Documents" which outlined the Soviet plans for just this goal. He indicated they provided a rare view into the workings of a Third World Marxist-Leninist state, providing a clear signal to the U. S. and its allies of the situation then developing in Nicaragua and Central America, and showing what happens in countries vulnerable to Soviet and Cuban influence (Weinberger 1990, 131).

The belief of President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz that the Soviet Union and its surrogates were the cause of the problems in Central America, rather than indigenous forces, was another major source of the policy that came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine. Walter LaFeber suggested that their background and ideology led them sincerely to accept this premise operating not only in Central America but in other parts of the world. "Their approach, moreover, promised sweet political rewards. By fixing on the areas [in Central America] as the first arena for confrontation with the Soviets, the administration could win in its own 'backyard.' The world could see then that Carterism had given way to tough Republicanism. Reagan thus escalated a regional conflict into a global confrontation between the superpowers" (LaFeber 1984, 4). This assessment is supported by the memoirs of both Secretary Shultz and President Reagan.

Secretary of State George Shultz cited the Soviet threat to peace in Central America as a crucial one that the United States had to address directly. "To me, the task was to encourage democracy, deny the Communists their goals, and gain greater American public understanding and support for the economic and security assistance that was needed. We faced two related challenges: first, to help alleviate long-standing political, economic, and social problems; second, to help counter a Communist strategy that sought to aggravate and exploit those problems and then seize power by force of arms" (Shultz 1993, 291). To complete this task, Shultz identified three basic components of American foreign policy in the region. The first and most important was to apply some form of military pressure, direct or threatened, on the Soviets to get their attention to the seriousness of U. S. interests. This approach then would utilize a vigorous negotiating track, combined with support for the U. S. position from other nations in the region not directly involved in the situation, notably Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, to reinforce the drive for peace. However, the key to success was to reduce or eliminate outside Soviet influence on the nations most at risk.

President Reagan was equally clear in his memoirs of the danger that Soviet involvement in the Western hemisphere posed for the United States and its neighbors (Reagan 1990, 238-9). He wrote first that, shortly after taking office in 1981, he received intelligence reports confirming that the Marxist Nicaraguan government was transferring massive amounts of arms supplied by the Soviet Union through Cuba to the guerrillas in El Salvador. He noted that although that small nation was the immediate target of this activity, both the Soviets and Castro intended to do the same throughout all of Central America, right up to our closest neighbor Mexico. He cited a plan he believed had been long held in the archives of Communism first stated by Lenin: "First, we will take Eastern Europe, then we will organize the hordes of Asia . . . then we will move on to Latin America; once we have Latin America, we won't have to take the United States, the last bastion of capitalism, because it will fall into our outstretched hands like overripe fruit" (Reagan 1990, 239). Reagan vowed that although we had already lost Cuba to Communism, he was determined that the U. S. would not lose Central America or any more of the Caribbean to the same forces. He concluded that if the Soviet Union and its allies were allowed to continue subverting democracy with terrorism and fomenting so-called "wars of national liberation," that Lenin's vision of this process leading to America's doorstep was conceivable. Therefore, the United States had both a responsibility and moral duty to prevent this from occurring by whatever means necessary. This included authorizing covert CIA activities to help anti-Communist forces in Honduras to halt the flow of Soviet arms through Nicaragua to the use of military force to remove the Marxist government in Grenada.

Operational Code. These statements provide a good illustration of the operational code of Ronald Reagan and his top advisors on U. S. foreign policy in Latin America. The philosophical component portrayed the world as one of conflict between the forces of good and the "evil empire" embodied in the Soviet Union. The fundamental character of America's opponent was that of aggressive pursuit of opportunities to expand Marxist-Leninist governments through military, economic and political means which were the antithesis of the free and democratic political systems of the West. The prospects for preventing this adventurism were good, provided the United States and its allies fully appreciated the goals of the Soviets and were prepared to stand firm in their opposition to them. If this united front could be created, the forces of democracy could be given the time necessary to become established in the developing countries in Latin America and around the world.

In his assessment of Ronald Reagan's presidency, Secretary of State Shultz indicated that just this approach was the reason the United States achieved significant success in its endeavor to protect and promote democracy in Latin America.

> But beneath this pragmatic attitude lay a bedrock of principle and purpose with which I was proud to be associated. He believed in being strong enough to defend one's interests, but he viewed that strength as a means, not an end in itself. He was ready to negotiate with his adversaries. In that readiness, he was sharply different from most of his conservative supporters, who advocated strength for America but who did not want to use that strength as a basis for the inevitable give-and-take of the negotiating process. All too often, they lacked confidence in the ability of democratic leaders, including Reagan, to negotiate effectively with our adversaries. Ronald Reagan had confidence in himself and in his ideas and was ready to negotiate from the strength so evident by the mid-1980s.
>
> He was a fervent anti-Communist who could comprehend and believe that people everywhere would choose to throw off the Communist system if they ever had the chance. And he worked hard to give them that chance. He favored open trade because he had confidence in the ability of Americans to compete, and he had confidence that an integrated world economy would benefit America. He stuck to his agenda (Shultz 1993, 1136).

Thus Reagan was leaving the United States in a far better condition than when he assumed power in 1981. He had reversed the negativism and passivity of the Carter administration through a combination of clear goals and commitment to achieving them.

These goals and the manner in which they were accomplished form the heart of the instrumental component of the operational code of President Reagan and his cabinet officials. The best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action was to draw the attention of the American people to their stake in Latin America. The president went on national television with photos of Soviet military installations in Cuba and Grenada to make this case. "Why did I believe Americans should be concerned by this? Putting aside the Monroe Doctrine and the fact that Americans have always accepted a special responsibility to help others achieve and preserve the democratic freedoms we enjoy, there were reasons of national self-interest that made the events in Central America worth worrying about" (Reagan 1990, 473). These included the Panama Canal, illegal immigration into the U. S., and the ever-present meddling of Castro that exacerbated these issues. As noted earlier, the most effective way to pursue these goals was from a position of military strength backed by the political will to use it when necessary - the Reagan Doctrine.

The risks of utilizing this power had to be weighed against the costs of not doing so, which according to Reagan had been demonstrated to be ineffective and outright dangerous under the Carter administration. Reagan felt the seriousness of the problems in Central America was so obvious that the U. S. had no choice: simply recognizing the difference between right and wrong indicated that America had to help the nations of the region combat the Soviet-inspired terrorists bent on denying them the democratic freedoms they deserved. The president admitted that while this was starkly evident to him, his greatest difficulty was convincing the American public and members of Congress of how serious this threat was and the need for a strong response to counteract it. While the post-Vietnam syndrome and growing isolationist tendencies in part were responsible for this, Reagan also attributed this lack of public response to a well-orchestrated public relations campaign by the very groups he was challenging.

The last instrumental component, the timing of the actions and selection of means to achieve them, was to combine military capability with tough negotiations in order to promote peace and stability in the region. Reagan said that while he wasn't successful in raising the consciousness of the public to the particular threat of Communism in Central America, he did succeed in securing support to modernize America's military force through a major spending program to reinforce the nation's security. This was stressed in his March 23, 1983 address to the nation in which, in addition to providing photographic proof of Soviet military expansion in the Western hemisphere, he introduced the idea of the

Strategic Defense Initiative, "Star Wars," a plan to build an anti-missile shield in space capable of destroying warheads in flight towards the United States. This combination of practical modernization of conventional military weapons systems with futuristic models of new defenses for America showed Reagan's resolve to protect the United States from existing and potential threats to the nation's security. The use of force in Grenada was just one demonstration of how such resources would be used in the nation's defense.

CHAPTER 6

THE PANAMA INTERVENTION - 1989

The U. S. intervention in the Republic of Panama in December 1989 was a departure from the model of doctrine-based use of military power in Latin America illustrated in the first two cases. One analyst argued that because no unnecessary ideological baggage such as containing communism or establishing a new world order was associated with President George Bush's action on Panama, just the goal of removing Manuel Noriega from power, the operation was far better conceived, organized and executed than the Grenada episode six years earlier (Musicant 1990, 398). It represented instead a highly personalized policy decision that arose from a unique set of political circumstances faced by Bush; at the same time this incident laid some of the groundwork for the Clinton administration's search for its own military force doctrine as an integral part of its foreign policy mix. Bush's approach also drew impetus from his own experience as a pilot in World War II, which instilled in him a great appreciation for the value of military strength, and the willingness to use it, as a part of the nation's foreign policy. He made this clear during his 1988 presidential campaign stating, "We will integrate every available and suitable policy instrument into a multifaceted approach. That means using negotiations, intelligence, economic strength and aid, public diplomacy and, yes, military power."[1] Panama became the first major opportunity for the Bush administration to put that resolve to the test.

[1] This quote appeared in a March 15, 1991 *Los Angeles Times* article by Jack Nelson in which he likened Bush's willingness to use force to that of Teddy Roosevelt, indicating both presidents saw military ventures as a standard foreign policy option.

CONTEXT

The roots of the Panama intervention can be found in the latter part of President Reagan's second term, where then Vice President Bush broke with the rest of the foreign policy advisors in his call for direct armed force to remove General Manuel Noriega from power in Panama. The rise to leadership in that small Central American nation by this military strongman involved a number of increasingly bold steps, from canceling the 1984 election when it seemed his political opponent won the presidency to his alleged (but never proven) participation in the 1985 murder of his most outspoken critic Dr. Hugo Spadafora. By the end of 1985, Noriega had secured his hold on Panama through his command of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and the disappearance of organized political opposition to his position as head of state. Part of the reason for his grip on power was that, due to his support for the Reagan administration's Contra policy (including training and staging areas for this rebel force in Panama), both the CIA and Defense Department lobbied within the White House to go easy on pressuring Noriega to curb his abuses of power.

This position changed abruptly in mid-1986 when, after a series of congressional hearings in March conducted by Senator Jesse Helms on corruption and drug trafficking by the PDF, a June 12 *New York Times* article by Seymour Hersh laid out Noriega's involvement in these criminal activities; this was followed by other national news stories exposing his links with the CIA. The effects of this publicity, among them a formal request by Congress for a report on its role from the CIA, had just died down when, in early 1987 Diaz Herrera, Noriega's second in command of the PDF, called local journalists to his house where he detailed both his and his leader's role in the annulled 1984 election and the subsequent murders of political opponents; this led to several large public demonstrations. General Noriega reacted by declaring a state of emergency that suspended the Panamanian constitution's guarantees of civil liberties, allowing the PDF to arrest and detain citizens without charges or trial. The U. S. Senate responded with a resolution calling for reinstatement of these constitutional rights.

All of this culminated in a huge public demonstration by the Civic Crusade, uniting several anti-Noriega groups, on July 10, 1987, the day before the wedding of Noriega's daughter. The PDF attacked the demonstrators, shooting a large number and arresting thousands of the march participants; this came to be known as "Black Friday" among the civilian population (Donnelly, Roth and Baker 1991, 13). At the same time, the PDF began harassing American service personnel stationed in Panama, arresting and interrogating them without cause before releasing them, starting a pattern of conduct that ultimately led to the incident that precipitated the invasion of the nation by U. S. forces in December 1989. in the meantime, this put heavy pressure on the Reagan administration to remove Manuel Noriega from power.

Debate on Means. By late 1987, the split within the Reagan administration on how to deal with the leadership situation in Panama became evident, both at the military command level and within the White House. On June 6, 1987, U. S. Army General Frederick Woerner became the head of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), based at the Quarry Heights facility in the Panama Canal Zone. Created in 1916 to provide security for the Panama Canal, SOUTHCOM had assumed responsibility for running military liaison and training functions for 16 Latin American countries, including the host nation. A close relationship had been built up between Panama and the United States military representatives under the regime of Panamanian strongman Omar Torrijos from 1968 to 1981 when he died in a plane crash. However, as his successor General Noriega consolidated his control on the country through the PDF, the once close relationship deteriorated significantly.

General Woerner was familiar with Noriega from previous duties within SOUTHCOM. Now as its head he decided to set the proper tone in his change-of-command speech by outlining the U. S. view of the military's proper role as subordinate to civilian authority in a modern democracy. Citing the development of the American professional armed forces as a noble example of this relationship he stated, "Never, in our history have we had a man on horseback [in charge of the country], but have always been subordinate to civilian authority as elected by the populace. This ingredient of legitimacy is a fundamental underpinning of a professional military" (Donnelly et. al. 1991, 12). Noriega took this to be a personal attack on his government and stormed off right after the speech.

At the urging of Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Elliott Abrams, General Woerner reviewed contingency plans for defense of the Panama Canal and found that nothing covered a situation in which the PDF was considered a potential adversary of American forces in the Canal Zone. He then instructed his SOUTHCOM director of operations Brigadier General Marc Cisneros and United States Army South (USARSO) commander Major General Bernard Loeffke to draw up such a plan, even though his superior, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral William Crowe indicated that direct hostilities between the PDF and American forces stationed in Panama was not contemplated as realistic at the Pentagon. Yet Woerner felt he had to be prepared for that possibility. "Every bone in my body said, 'You know, Woerner, you'd better be prepared. As a military commander, you'll look kind of silly if you get an order to do something and you don't have any plans'" (Donnelly et. al. 1991, 17). The final combat element of the plan called Blue Spoon envisioned a two-phase operation beginning with a substantial troop buildup done very much out in the open. This was at the direction of Admiral Crowe who ruled out any kind of sneak attack. General Woerner described it this way: "We make no secret of it. We start flowing it in. That would give us one final chance at having Panama solve the problem themselves. In other words the PDF says, 'Hey wait a minute. We're not going to die for this guy.' And I would have let it be known to the PDF, to the rank and file, that you have one way to stop this invasion: take Noriega out. So I felt that the initiation of the force, prior to the stage of intervening, could have forced the Panama Defense Forces to act. And then, you know, we never would have had to say publicly whether we had intended to invade or not. Plausible denial: 'It's another training exercise'" (Donnelly et. al., 1991, 18). The plans were completed at SOUTHCOM at the end of 1987 and in January 1988 USARSO head Loeffke began coordination with the main stateside force to be involved, the XVIII Airborne Corps stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Other units that might participate started to be notified for training, such as the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York and armored divisions at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Before much further work could be done on the plans at the military command level, events in the United States suddenly shifted the focus to the White House.

On February 4, 1988, with little or no prior notification either to the State Department or top presidential advisors, the Department of Justice indicted General Manuel Noriega in Miami federal court for drug trafficking and racketeering. This set off a frenzy of activity both in Panama and Washington that lasted over the next four months. The first reaction came from Panama, where Noriega's hand-picked president Eric Arturo Delvalle fired him as head of the PDF. The following day Noriega called a session of the National Assembly where he engineered Devalle's dismissal, replacing him with the education minister Manuel Solis Palma. The United States maintained its recognition of Devalle as the duly elected president of Panama and, heeding his request, froze all payments to the government from operation of the Panama Canal. This led in turn to Noriega closing all banks in the country to prevent a run on the diminishing cash reserves in the country. An abortive coup attempt by a small group of PDF officers failed on March 16 and two days later the government declared a "state of urgency" suspending the constitution once again.

Secretary of State Shultz and his Latin America chief Elliott Abrams pushed for strong action against the Panamanian leader now that he was in a vulnerable position, both economically and politically. His approach involved two tracks, one diplomatic and one military, designed to force Noriega to leave Panama. The first which President Reagan approved was to initiate negotiations aimed at putting heavy pressure on Noriega to seek asylum in a neutral country (Spain offered to accept him) with the understanding the U. S. would not try to extradite him to stand trial in Miami on the pending drug charges. This was to be coupled with a limited buildup of U. S. troops stationed in Panama as the Blue Spoon plan called for as a first step to intervention. However, JCS Chair Admiral Crowe strongly objected to this involvement of the military in the diplomatic area and was successful in finding supporters in this position among several White House advisors. The final step in this early phase was taken by the president on April 8, 1988 when he used his executive authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 to freeze all assets of the Panamanian government in the United States and prohibiting any payments by individual American citizens or private organizations to Panama (Shultz 1993, 1053-4).

Under the direction of Secretary Shultz, Mike Kozak of the State Department and his deputy, U. S. Army Lt. Colonel Gerry Clark, went to Panama on April 23, 1988 to present Noriega with a 10-point proposal by which he would give up power and leave the country in exchange for a range of concessions by the United States. Among the key points of the proposal were lifting economic sanctions, withdrawing the arrest warrants (but not the indictment) for Noriega and agreement the U. S. would not try to extradite or kidnap him from a third country to stand trial in Miami. Once Noriega left Panama (no later than August 12, 1988) President Devalle would reassume control and hold free elections early in 1989. After the elections, U. S. economic assistance would be given to the new government.

Noriega's initial reaction was cool but at least he did not reject the offer out of hand according to Kozak. But the main sticking point in the whole deal was the fact that, even if the United States agreed not to pursue Noriega actively once he left Panama, the indictment still was hanging over his head. The only way he would step down and leave the country voluntarily was if the indictment was quashed. Shultz and National Security Advisor Colin Powell saw it as a distasteful but necessary step to get rid of Noriega once and for all; President Reagan reluctantly agreed. When Powell relayed the proposal to Vice President Bush in the first week of May 1988 he expressed his acquiescence for this negotiating position. Mike Kozak then returned to Panama and on May 10, 1988 reported that a deal with Noriega along these lines had been secured and that documents were being prepared by Noriega aides. The arrangement called for them to be held for safekeeping by the papal nuncio in Panama City. Another demand that seemed to have been met was for transfer of a $67 million loan from Japan that supposedly had been concluded but held up by the U. S. financial embargo on the country. Noriega was to give a speech announcing his departure by August 12 which would trigger an exchange of letters committing the United States to withdraw the indictment. Everything seemed to be in place for a peaceful resolution of a difficult situation (Shultz 1993, 1055-9).

That changed suddenly over the next week. First, Vice President Bush returned from a weekend trip to Los Angeles laying the groundwork for his 1988 presidential campaign with a totally different view after talking with that city's police chief Daryl Gates. The chief told Bush that allowing a drug dealer like Noriega to escape American justice sent the wrong message regarding the risk police officers took every day combatting such criminals; this was seen by many as a law and order issue and not one of foreign policy (Powell 1995, 387). In a speech that weekend Bush told a receptive audience "Drug dealers are domestic terrorists, killing kids and cops, and they should be treated as such . . . I won't bargain with terrorists, and I won't bargain with drug dealers either, whether they're on U.S. or foreign soil" (Parmet 1997, 332). Upon his return to Washington, Bush did something that Powell reported none of the White House staff ever had seen him do - argue directly with President Reagan in front of that staff. At a May 16 meeting in the Oval Office, he told Reagan this was a very bad deal and he should not go through with it. Both Edwin Meese and Reagan's Chief of Staff Howard Baker agreed with Bush. But the president was unmovable, responding only, "Ummm, George, that's interesting, but I think it's a deal worth taking" (Powell 1995, 387).

However, by now others in Washington also began to question the value of this deal. Newspapers reported the split within the administration with headlines like "Bush Splits with Reagan on Handling of Noriega" in the *Washington Post* and "Joint Chiefs' Head [Admiral Crowe] Skeptical on Noriega Policy" by the *New York Times.* Later that week the Senate approved a resolution by an 83 to 10 vote not to drop the indictment. On May 20 Bush's presidential opponent Michael Dukakis told a Sacramento audience, "You tell me how I and people like me can go to those children and their parents today and tell them to say 'no' to drugs when we've got an Administration in Washington that can't say no to Noriega" (Shultz 1993, 1070-1). The following day the *New York Times* ran a major story headlined "Deal for Noriega to Leave Panama Reportedly Gaining; Bush Opposes the Talks; Vice President's Split with Reagan Widens." All of this pressure led to a critical White House meeting on May 21 to settle the issue.

The participants in the meeting covered both the diplomatic and military areas which had been addressed in the efforts to remove General Manuel Noriega from power in Panama.[2] After Kozak reviewed the negotiations to date, Howard Baker called it the worst political situation he could think of, arguing that the trade embargo and IMF withdrawal likely would be ineffective, leaving the U. S. to flounder and cause it grief. Shultz agreed

2 Per Secretary of State George Shultz, besides himself those present were President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Treasury Secretary James Baker, Attorney General Edwin Meese, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, Chief of Staff Howard Baker and his deputy Kenneth Duberstein, NSC adviser Colin Powell and his deputy John Negroponte, CIA director William Webster, and State Department representatives Mike Armacost, Elliott Abrams and Mike Kozak.

that the chances for a peaceful settlement were worse now than when the options first were proposed. Reagan answered, ". . . none of you seem to agree with me for a minute [that the pressure would drive out Noriega]. You're just leaving the son-of-a-bitch there to do what he's doing" (Shultz 1993, 1072).

The discussion then turned to congressional opposition, to which Reagan responded that there was no alternative to the deal to drop the indictment except the use of troops which he already had rejected. Meese indicated that all the law enforcement people to whom he had spoken favored pursuing the indictment as leverage; dropping the legal angle would be like giving in to the demands of a criminal holding hostages, except here Noriega was using the Panamanian people as his shield. Unfortunately, according to Shultz, the United States initially had given those people the idea that the American government backed them, but as time dragged on they had become disillusioned to the point they no longer threatened Noriega's hold on power.

President Reagan was not convinced at this point that holding on to the indictment gave any negotiating advantage, but that quashing it was still a small price to get rid of Noriega. "None of you has shaken me a bit as to the rightness and wrongness of this. But should we go back and put it on hold? Tell him we're not ready with all that's going on here. That puts you [Kozak] in a tough spot. Tell him we're a bunch of jerks who can't make up our minds." He went on to explore how to explain to the American public why this was the best course of action. "What if you had this opportunity with Hitler, to get him out before he did all that he did? I hate the way I feel here, being so damn stubborn. But I'll work my ass off to explain this to the public. We thought from the beginning [of this negotiation] that the indictment was trading material. I just can't walk away from this" (Shultz 1993, 1074). The meeting ended and Kozak was sent back to Panama to conclude the deal with Noriega along the same lines noted earlier.

However, the effects of the delay and publicized internal dissent within the Reagan administration proved to be too much to overcome at this stage. At 8:00 P.M. on May 24, 1988 Kozak reported he had struck a deal with Noriega and that he would make his public announcement the following day. But by 9:30 the next morning Kozak called to say that the Panamanian staff with whom he had been dealing had disappeared and that Noriega was in conference with the PDF commanders. Over the ensuing six hours everything was in limbo, until at 3:30 P.M. Noriega returned to Kozak, telling him the military feared he was selling them out and that he could not sway them. He also said he needed at least another two weeks to prepare the Panamanian people for such a radical change in government. At that point Shultz admitted defeat and, after informing Reagan [on Air Force One bound for Helsinki to meet with the Soviets] of the deal's breakdown, recalled Kozak to Washington.

The publicity over the failure to negotiate Noriega departure mostly was negative. Senator Alfonse D'Amato called the proposed deal nothing more than surrender by the United States. House Democratic Majority Leader Tom Foley stated "All in all, ironically, he [Noriega] saved the administration from some very bitter criticism," although not from GOP Senator Bob Dole who noted "Noriega must go if we are to achieve our goals in Panama. But sending him to retirement with a legal golden parachute would have been the wrong step at the wrong time" (Shultz 1993, 1078). These comments were mild compared to those in the press: *Newsweek* headlined its June 6, 1988 story on the situation "Anatomy of a Fiasco." The magazine suggested that an extraordinary degree of vacillation by the administration was a significant factor as it ". . . alternated between moral suasion and Great Power ultimatums, between bargaining and the threat of force - and it has publicly committed itself to Noriega's downfall with no clear notion of how to achieve that goal" (Morganthau 1988, 36). The effect of this failure left U. S. credibility in shreds in Latin America, a devastated local economy and worst of all, a disillusioned political opposition in Panama that now was ineffective as a force against Noriega. *Newsweek* concluded "[a]nd though it may well be, as Secretary of State George Shultz noted last week, that the United States has acted with admirable restraint, the real result is that Uncle Sam looks like a chump" (Morganthau 1988, 36). Interestingly, the article stated that while Elliott Abrams refused to rule out use of military force against Noriega, even as he opened talks with Cuba and Nicaragua, most observers found that option to be unrealistic. Yet eighteen months later, the Bush administration launched its largest military operation in Latin America since the Dominican intervention.

PARTICIPANTS

The implementation of "Operation Just Cause" in Panama on December 20, 1989 came relatively early in the newly elected administration of George Bush. The final decision, once it was made, came swiftly on December 17 after a short meeting of the three major officials directly involved: Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Adviser Colin Powell and President Bush. According to a *Los Angeles Times* story of March 15, 1991 following the Persian Gulf War, the willingness to use military force as a standard instrument of national policy distinguished the Bush presidency from that of its predecessor. It quoted a senior aide (who declined to be identified) stating, "President Bush has always been willing to use force as long as it is well planned and he considers it necessary to protect American interests. The invasion of Panama is a good example. He ended up being the chief executive who carried it out, but he had been willing to do it during the Reagan Administration. He is not a first-resort man, but he's not a last-resort man, either" (Nelson 1991, A8). The article observed that Bush considered military force a legitimate option whenever vital American interests were at stake and peaceful means were too weak or too slow to protect them. This view is consistent with Bush's background as a World War II veteran and his long national government service, including that as Nixon's

United Nations ambassador and CIA director in the Ford administration. Both Colin Powell and James Baker shared much the same philosophy regarding the role of military power as one part of the nation's foreign policy, although they came to it by different career paths.

Colin Powell. Powell was born and raised in New York City, one of two children of Jamaican immigrant parents. Graduating from an accelerated high school program just two months short of his seventeenth birthday, he enrolled at City College of New York (CCNY) in the fall of 1954; the following year he joined the ROTC program more or less by chance. In his memoirs, Powell indicated he is not sure what first attracted him to the military - growing up during World War II, coming of age during the Korean conflict or the common refrain of that era that since you were going to be drafted anyway you might as well go in as an officer. In any event he joined what then was the largest voluntary ROTC campus unit in America with over 1,500 cadets at the height of the Korean War (Powell 1995, 26).

Graduating from CCNY in 1958, newly minted Lt. Colin Powell completed eight weeks of infantry training at Fort Benning, Georgia and two months at the Army's Ranger school before his first active duty assignment in Germany. Returning to the U. S. in 1960, he spent two years at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, then on January 17, 1962 arrived for his first of two tours of duty in Vietnam. Here Powell began to develop his full appreciation for the value, and the limitations, of the role of the military in the implementation of national foreign policy. After six months in the field where he was wounded on patrol by stepping on a punji stick trap, he spent the rest of his time as a liaison officer at the 1st ARVN headquarters providing technical assistance to the intelligence unit that tried to predict when mortar attacks would be made against front line troops. This exposed Powell to the difference in perspectives between those directly involved in combat and the rear echelon command. "In spite of my misgivings, I was leaving the country [December 1963] still a true believer. I had experienced disappointment, not disillusionment. I remained convinced that it was right to help South Vietnam remain independent, and right to draw the line against communism anywhere in the world. The ends were justified, even if the means were flawed" (Powell 1995, 103). He got a chance to reassess this conclusion when, after five years stateside, then Major Colin Powell returned to Vietnam on July 21, 1968.

Assigned to serve as executive officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Division (Americal), he was stationed at Chu Lai in the northern coastal plain of South Vietnam. His duties involved ensuring that the field units had full logistical support including ammunition, fuel and mail. This second stint in Vietnam exposed Powell to a different type of military operation, one much greater in terms of troop numbers and intensity of action. While the U. S. had a limited presence primarily advising Vietnam army regulars in the early 1960's, by the time he returned five years later the U. S. military was fully engaged in the war effort, with South Vietnamese troops in a supporting role. When he left Vietnam in June 1969, his outlook varied sharply from that at the end of his first tour. For one, he condemned the way U. S. political leaders supplied manpower for the war, exposing class distinctions that had not been clear earlier. He expressed anger that young men from poorer, less educated and less privileged backgrounds were sent to Vietnam as "economic cannon fodder" while those sons of powerful, well-placed members of American society (and many professional athletes) found safe slots in Reserve and National Guard units stateside.

His assessment of the war's conduct and its objectives reflected this ill feeling based on his direct field and command experience after two assignments in Vietnam:

> In time, just as I came to reexamine my feelings about the war, the Army, as an institution, would do the same thing. We accepted that we had been sent to pursue a policy that had become bankrupt. Our political leaders had led us into a war for the one-size-fits-all rationale of anticommunism, which was only a partial fit in Vietnam, where the war had its own historical roots in nationalism, anticolonialism,

> and civil strife beyond the East-West conflict. Our senior officers knew the war was going badly. Yet they bowed to groupthink pressure and kept up pretenses, the phony measure of body counts, the comforting illusion of secure hamlets, the inflated progress reports. As a corporate entity, the military failed to talk straight to its political superiors or to itself. The top leadership never went to the Secretary of Defense or the President and said "This war is unwinnable the way we are fighting it." Many of my generation, the career captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war, vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support. If we could make good on that promise to ourselves, to the civilian leadership, and to the country, then the sacrifices of Vietnam would not have been in vain (Powell 1995, 149).

This powerful lesson followed Powell throughout the rest of his career, coming into sharp focus in the Panama situation in his role as National Security Advisor to President Bush.

Over the next ten years Powell rose steadily through the ranks, making brigadier general in December 1978. During this period he was a White House Fellow in the Nixon administration from 1971 to 1973, served as executive officer of the 2nd Division in Korea to which, after attending the National War College, he returned to command, and finally returned to Washington as staff officer for national security for President Carter's Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. During this latter assignment, Powell saw first-hand that the lesson of Vietnam had not sunk in at the top level when the mission to rescue the Iran hostages failed in the desert of southern Iran. This ill-fated attempt had been hastily planned, utilizing units from different service branches and in-country agents. The resulting failure was a combination of mechanical breakdown, weak chain of command, communications lapses and poor security. "I would remember Beckwith's [Delta Force commander] words in the future when it became my responsibility to plan combat operations at the highest levels. You have to plan thoroughly, train as a team, match the military punch to the political objective, go in with everything you need - and then some - and not count on wishful thinking." This episode, coupled with his earlier Vietnam experiences, played an important role in the way Powell approached the Panama operation (Powell 1995, 249).

After a short stint at Fort Leavenworth as deputy commanding general of the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Powell returned to Washington in June 1983 as senior military assistant to President Reagan's defense secretary Caspar Weinberger; he also got promoted to major general. Four months later a terrorist blew up the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 241 American servicemen. Once again, the interplay of military force and diplomacy had ended in an unfortunate incident, illustrating the problem Powell had encountered before in his career. He noted this time the Marines had been stationed there for what he called the fuzzy idea of providing a "presence," a policy to which Weinberger had objected but was overruled by Secretary of State George Shultz and NSC head Robert McFarlane.

> I was developing a strong distaste for the antiseptic phrases coined by State Department officials for foreign interventions which usually had bloody consequences for the military, words like "presence," "symbol," "signal," "option on the table," "establishment of credibility." Their use was fine if beneath them lay a solid mission. But too often these words were used to give the appearance of clarity to mud...There are times when American lives must be risked and lost. Foreign policy cannot be paralyzed by the prospect of casualties. But lives must not be risked until we can face a parent or a spouse or a child with a clear answer to the question of why a member of that family had to die. To provide a "symbol" or a "presence" is not good enough (Powell 1995, 291-2).

Powell served as Weinberger's military deputy for almost three years before getting back to his first love, direct military command. On July 2, 1986 he took over the V Army Corps based in Frankfurt Germany, and was promoted to lieutenant general. But his career took another unexpected turn just five months later when the Iran-Contra hearings before Congress resulted in the resignation of National Security Advisor Admiral John Poindexter and Reagan's dismissal of Marine Colonel Oliver North from the NSC. Frank Carlucci assumed the post vacated by Poindexter and his first call was to Powell, saying he needed help from a trusted military man to clean up the mess, that it was so serious that the presidency was at stake. Powell said he didn't want the job now that he was back in the real Army and that the only way he would accept was if the request came directly from his commander in chief in the White House. Two days later, on December 12, 1986, President Reagan called with the offer, telling Powell that it was critical for the country for him to come home; his appointment as deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs was announced publicly on December 18, 1986.

Colin Powell made an important observation on the Reagan administration from his perspective in the White House, both for what it indicated about the civilian-military relationship in that time period and how it later affected his role as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman during the Panama incident under President George Bush. This occurred after the first national security briefing for Reagan by NSC head Carlucci and Powell. They covered several important issues to which the president just nodded without saying yes, no or maybe. "We eventually assumed that the President knew we had balanced competing views and had given him our best judgment. He evidently felt it unnecessary to do more than acknowledge what we would be doing in his name. That, at least, was our optimistic interpretation. The President's passive management style placed a tremendous burden on us. Until we got used to it, we felt uneasy implementing recommendations without a clear decision" (Powell 1995, 334). This issue carried over to the Bush administration where to prevent its reoccurrence, Powell tried to make sure that he had overt presidential approval for matters affecting national security. This became important in the planning and final decision to invade Panama.

The three years between Powell's appointment to the NSC staff and his direction of the Panama operation as JCS Chairman were eventful ones. In fall of 1987 Frank Carlucci moved over to become Secretary of Defense replacing Caspar Weinberger, and on November 5, 1987 Lt. General Colin Powell was nominated to become National Security Advisor. Coming so soon on the heels of Admiral Poindexter's tenure, there was some trepidation about putting another active duty military officer in that sensitive slot. In fact, the joint congressional committee investigating the Iran-Contra affair had just issued a preliminary report stating, that to establish clearly the lines of authority between civilian and military authority, the NSC head should not go to an armed forces member. But Powell's experience and reputation was such that, with the support of Senate Armed Services Committee chair Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and ranking minority member John Warner (R-Va), his unanimous confirmation came swiftly.

As Reagan's NSC head, Powell received generally high marks for his management of this critical post, particularly in the wake of the Iran-Contra episode. Elliott Abrams observed that Powell was very scrupulous and even-handed in this position, avoiding much of the enormous fight that had characterized the relationship between Secretary of State Shultz and Carlucci. He attributed this to Powell's faithful observance of the roles each was charged to perform on behalf of the president. Reagan's chief of staff Howard Baker recalled, "I had put my organization in place. Frank [Carlucci] had done the same with his, and the Tower Commission had reported [on Iran-Contra], so the institutional work was done. But Colin brought a special dimension to the job. In addition to being thoroughly familiar with the changes that had been put in place, he also brought a smoothness of operation that's awfully rare" (Means 1992, 244). After sharing the flight to the late November 1987 meeting in Geneva to arrange the last U. S.-USSR summit meeting of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Shultz said of Powell "[h]is upbeat personality was refreshing, and his confident optimism was much like that of Ronald Reagan himself" (Shultz 1993, 1004-5). This picture of a man at the peak of his career (he received his fourth star in May 1989) was shared by most of the people who worked with him.

In his book *The Commanders*, Bob Woodward stated this confidence and optimism carried over when Colin Powell became chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff under President George Bush in August 1989, succeeding Admiral Crowe (Woodward 1991, 108). Although he was junior of the 15 four-star generals on active duty, Bush's defense secretary Richard Cheney recommended Powell for the post because he knew his way around the Pentagon and had the required military command experience; he also understood arms control issues which Bush considered high priority. Lastly, Cheney believed that, based on his acquaintance with Powell as a member of Congress, the two men could get along well. That became crucial when, just 24 hours after assuming the post, another coup attempt against Manuel Noriega put Panama on the front burner for the Bush administration.

James Baker. Secretary of State under George Bush during the Panama invasion, Baker also had a long history of public service. He was a fellow Texan and had worked with the new president in several capacities both in private life in the oil industry, then in politics. After attending Princeton and a tour of duty in the Marines, Baker returned to Texas where, during the early 1960's, he helped to raise funds for Bush's first but unsuccessful run for the U. S. Senate in 1964 and his subsequent election in 1966 to the U. S. House of Representatives from the Houston area. Over the next nine years he stayed on the political sidelines while building up his law practice.

That all changed in 1975 when, with Bush's assistance, Baker was appointed as Undersecretary of Commerce in the Ford administration. He then served as Ford's campaign chairman in the 1976 presidential race against Jimmy Carter. Following the election he returned to Texas where he lost his own close race for Attorney General in 1978. Two years later he became Bush's campaign manager in his run for the GOP nomination for president against Ronald Reagan. Although the try was abandoned early in the primaries, eventually both Bush and Baker ended up on the winning team as Vice President and White House Chief of Staff respectively. They gained valuable experience about the executive branch during Reagan's first term.

Baker had some pointed observations about that period, particularly regarding the manner in which foreign policy was handled:

> By contrast [to the relationship between Baker and his mentor, defense secretary Cheney], I do not think President Reagan's foreign policy apparatus served him the way it should have. It was often a witches' brew of intrigue, elbows, egos, and separate agendas. From day one, the level of suspicion and mutual distrust was utterly out of control among many of the major players. I can't remember any extended period of time when someone in the National Security cluster wasn't at someone else's throat. In eight years, President Reagan had seven National Security Advisers. The National Security Council frequently ran amok, as the Iran-contra scandal documented in embarrassing detail. And sometimes when the President decided a major policy issue, his subordinates would ignore his wishes and pursue their own policy schemes (Baker 1995, 26-7).

Baker was determined to make sure the same thing did not happen during Reagan's second term nor under President Bush.

At the start of 1985, after four years as the president's chief of staff, Baker and then Treasury Secretary Don Regan approached Ronald Reagan with the proposition that the two cabinet officials trade jobs for the second term. Each was growing tired of their current duties and the president agreed to the plan, believing the enthusiasm both men had shown for service in the administration would be rekindled in the new positions. This proved very important for James Baker, giving him insight into his subsequent cabinet post as Secretary of State under President George Bush.

Secretary of State George Shultz recalled that Baker initially was reluctant to take the new job, seeing it as having less prestige than that of Attorney General and Secretary of Defense or State. However, upon reflection, some benefits to being Treasury Secretary became evident. What interested him most about Regan's proposal to switch jobs was that it gave him a chance to get his foot in the door on foreign policy. Baker confirmed this, noting that he felt qualified to be Bush's Secretary of State based on his intimate knowledge of the issues and players of international economic policy, which he saw as an important part of that position's portfolio.

Moving onto this post in January 1993, Baker made a crucial decision to change the way the State Department had operated under Secretary Shultz whom he considered a role model of public service. He observed that Shultz had taken an institutional approach to running the State Department, allowing the professional Foreign Service staff to handle most of the day-to-day management of the department and to guide implementation of foreign policy. This worked at the time following Alexander Haig's tumultuous but short-lived tenure as Reagan's first Secretary of State when the department needed continuity. Shultz also dealt with a period of incremental, progressive change in foreign affairs for which his administrative style fit well.

However, upon assuming the office, Baker felt that there were three critical reasons that this approach to management of the State Department no longer was appropriate (Baker 1995, 30-1). First was that with the fall of communism and expanding sweep of democracy, the United States was entering a time of revolutionary changes that required new mind sets and different assumptions and, above all else, little ego investment in current American foreign policy. This meant that several new people also should be brought in to fill key slots. Secondly, the Bush administration needed to establish its own identity separate from that of the Reagan era. Even though the people who had served during that period deserved credit for achieving the goals of peace through strength over the past eight years, realizing the benefits of the "peace dividend" in the new world order required a different strategy carried out by new people. Finally, the Bush administration faced a Congress controlled by the Democrats; the bitterness of the 1992 campaign against Michael Dukakis made reaching out to create a bipartisan foreign policy imperative which also called for a State Department more attentive to domestic politics. Thus Baker chose to centralize policy authority at the top, using a small team of talented and loyal aides from which to build outward. This reflected his assessment that the most successful White House chiefs of staff in the last two decades have been those secure enough to surround themselves with senior aides who could take over their jobs (Baker 1995, 31-2).

He began his tenure as Secretary of State by telling *Time* magazine that the president is the official who makes foreign policy, not the State Department head or the professional Foreign Service officers. He sent a purposeful message saying he intended to be the White House's man at the State Department, not the State Department's man at the White House. Both he and Bush agreed on the first tasks at hand. One was to rebuild foreign policy bipartisanship by strengthening relationships with Congress. Baker had forged an excellent working relationship with the legislative branch and Bush, as a former member of Congress,understood well the importance of keeping that body fully informed on the major issues facing the country. Another area of immediate interest was to deal with the swiftly changing conditions after the fall of communism, particularly in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The biggest challenge the Bush administration faced on both counts was dealing with the remaining issues on the latter region. "In essence, we were reaping the success of the Reagan Doctrine, which called for the rollback of Communist regimes in the Third World - by force, if necessary. With most of these regimes already under siege, we were now able to turn to elections as the mechanism for making a peaceful transition to democracy" (Baker 1995, 46). Baker's view of the interplay between force and diplomacy provides a good insight into how this was to be achieved by the Bush administration.

As the March 15, 1991 *Los Angeles Times* article by Jack Nelson indicated, more than any other American leader in this century, President Bush was prepared to use military force as a standard instrument of national policy. It is useful to compare that assessment to that of Secretary of State Baker on the proper role of this foreign policy tool in this new administration:

> Beyond what governments say privately and publicly, of course, there is the level of what governments do. The most obvious involve the use of military force. This is where foreign policy and defense policy intersect. War is the ultimate and last solution to any international conflict. It is also, of course, the least used. That's why it's often said in Washington that while the State Department manages policy (that is, words), the Defense Department develops programs (that is, weapons systems and military forces). Long before states go to war - or even contemplate it - their governments will usually have exchanged literally thousands of words, privately and publicly, directly and indirectly. During the Cold War, the danger of a catastrophic war between the superpowers was so great that diplomats used words as surrogates for force, sending sharply worded demarches rather that well-

> armed Marines to make their points. Paradoxically, in an age of intercontinental missiles and hot lines, words became even more important. And this was just as true for the Cold War's end as for any crisis during its decades-long tenure (Baker 1995, 154-5).

Yet in the end, the Bush administration was the one which applied the military force component of American foreign policy to resolve the situation in Panama.

George Bush. A brief review of the background of George Bush shows how he and Secretary of State Baker found common ground on this decision. The future president was born in 1922 into a relatively well-to-do family and was raised in Greenwich, Connecticut among similarly comfortable but not rich neighbors. He attended private grammar school and then, in 1937, enrolled at Phillips Andover Academy, one of three prestigious preparatory schools in the area. This early training in a climate of conservative, traditional - and Republican - values stayed with Bush throughout his political career.

He graduated from Andover in spring of 1942, just six months after Pearl Harbor, but the normal path to college was not for him, even though the commencement speaker that year - Secretary of War Henry Stimson - advised the young men to complete their higher education before considering military service. Bush told David Frost in a 1987 interview that he decided to enlist immediately upon turning 18 because the war ". . . was against imperialism and against fascism, and I wanted to be on the cutting edge" of that patriotic effort, just as his father had done in the last few months of the first world war (Parmet 1997, 46). Two major effects came of his wartime service. The first was exposure to people and ideas different from the sheltered environment in which he was raised. In flight school and on carrier duty in the Pacific he worked closely with men from all walks of life and developed an ability to get along easily with them. The other was his direct combat experience, including being shot down by the Japanese on September 2, 1944 during the invasion of Saipan, for which he won the Distinguished

Flying Cross. He gained an appreciation of the value of a strong military; it also gave him credibility with the military leaders in his later role as commander in chief.

Returning to civilian life in September 1946, the Bush family (he married Barbara in January) moved to New Haven, Connecticut where he, like thousands of other veterans, attended college under the G.I. Bill, following his uncle, father and brother to Yale. Upon graduation in 1948, he took a job with a Yale alumnus with an oil equipment company in Odessa, Texas. Over the next 12 years he rose steadily in the company and by the time he began taking an active interest in politics, becoming Harris County (Houston, Texas) GOP committee chairman in 1963, the family was financially secure. He served in this capacity for the next 18 months, building up his credentials among the Republican mainstream who at that time were battling to resist takeover of the state party by right-wing elements representing the John Birch Society. The party leaders convinced Bush to run for the U. S. Senate in 1964 against Democrat Ralph Yarborough, a political maverick even within his own party. The campaign was characterized by Bush running on a platform of conservative political issues against a man who, backed by big oil money and the Democratic machinery aided by Lyndon Johnson in the White House, attacked his opponent for being an out of state elitist. Ultimately more damaging was Yarborough's charge that the oil firm Bush worked for, Zapata Petroleum Company, was linked through interlocking stock with Pennzoil, which actively imported oil that drove down domestic prices and evaded U. S. taxes. In Texas this was seen as undermining the independent oil producers and free spirit which had built up the state. Not surprisingly, Bush lost by almost 300,000 votes although his 1.1 million vote count was the highest for any Republican in that state to date.

Two years later, running on a conservative platform but one which promoted racial tolerance (he publicly sponsored and funded a black girls' softball team in the Houston city league), George Bush was elected to the U. S. House of Representatives from the city's seventh district with 57.6 percent of the vote. He served three terms before losing a second try for the Senate, this time to Democrat Lloyd Bentsen. While in the House, Bush was one the few Republicans to remain supportive of President Lyndon Johnson's management of the Vietnam war effort; he just could not criticize the commander-in-chief while American troops were engaged in combat. In fact, he went so far as to visit the war zone, at his own expense, to see first-hand what those troops were facing. Upon his return he stated that war required patience on the part of the American people and renewed his defense of the president, saying that he carried a terrible burden and was undeserving of the public scorn that Johnson was receiving. He made a special point of attacking the press coverage of the war as biased and grossly unfair to those servicemen in combat (Parmet 1997, 128-9).

After his 1970 loss to Bentsen, Bush's loyalty to the sitting president in time of crisis came to the attention of President Richard Nixon. He was fully engaged in his own conduct of the war and needed someone who could do the same for him. Coincidentally, the position of U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations had become open and Bush convinced Nixon that he had the necessary qualifications. He told the president that the U. S. needed strong advocacy of the American side of the military and political objectives in this high profile international forum which Bush could provide. In addition, he had the proper social background to press this case in the right diplomatic circles at the UN. Nixon later wrote that he selected Bush for his important post because he ". . . not only had the diplomatic skills to be an effective ambassador, but also because it would be helpful to him in the future to have this significant foreign policy experience" (Parmet 1997, 148). This certainly proved to be the case.

After serving as chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1972-3, then as President Ford's ambassador to China for two years, George Bush returned to the United States to become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) in January 1976. At the time, many observers thought this was Ford's way of getting a potential rival for the GOP presidential nomination out of the way. But what really seemed to drive this appointment was the need to refurbish the CIA's image in the wake of the Church Committee report on illegal agency activities such as spying on domestic groups and participating in assassinations of foreign officials. Bush seemed to have the right credentials for this task, including a good military background coupled with diplomatic experience at the UN and in China. His nomination as CIA Director was confirmed by the Senate on a 64 to 27 vote.

Although he held this post only from January 30, 1976 to January 20, 1977 he received very good reviews of his tenure as DCI. Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter said Bush had done a better job instituting needed reforms at the CIA than Clarence Kelly had done at the FBI. A senior analyst at the agency stated Bush ". . . was pretty popular with the pros in the CIA . . . He worked hard in the job and learned a great deal about how intelligence is collected and analyzed. He was a good listener. He seemed to be an intelligent person. I guess they contrasted him with the people who came before and after him whom they disliked rather strongly. Neither James Schlesinger [Nixon appointee, February to July 1973] nor Stan Turner [Carter appointee, March 1977 to January 1981] was very popular with the pros because both of them set out with antagonism to the CIA. Bush didn't" (Ranelagh 1987, 632).

Described as a quasi-aristocrat on the one hand and a self-made Texas businessman on the other, Bush impressed several skeptics with his even-handed administration of the CIA during this critical period. He used it as a learning opportunity which paid off for him as president. Cord Meyer, a CIA veteran from the 1950's and 1960's provided the following assessment of Bush:

> He was initially viewed with suspicion as an ambitious politician who might try to use the agency for partisan purposes. However, he quickly proved by his performance that he was prepared to put politics aside and devote all his considerable ability and enthusiasm to restoring the morale of an institution that had been battered enough by successive investigations. Instead of reaching outside for

> defeated Republican candidates to fill key jobs, he chose from within the organization among men who had demonstrated their competence through long careers in intelligence work. He leaned over backward to protect the objectivity and independence of the agency's estimates and to avoid slanting the results to fit some preconceived notion of what the President wanted to hear (Ranelagh 1987, 628).

Bush also gained valuable information as DCI that came in very handy later on, the history of the agency's relationship with Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. Just after assuming that position, he was informed that since the early 1970's the National Security Agency (NSA) had been sharing part of its electronic intercepts of Panamanian communications with the U. S. Canal Zone military commanders. In April 1976 it was learned that Noriega had gained access to these messages from American soldiers involved in the intercepts. After a short investigation, the military quietly gave these men a dishonorable discharge rather than conduct a public trial that would disclose the NSA activities. Bush was aware of this arrangement and continued to receive data on the Noriega regime through these intercepts (Dinges 1990, 81-5).

In October 1976, as negotiations on the Panama Canal treaty became an issue in the U. S. presidential campaign, several bombs exploded in cars belonging to American personnel in the Canal Zone. This led to a face-to-face meeting on December 8, 1976 at the Panamanian embassy in Washington between George Bush and Noriega, then head of the Panamanian military, where the latter denied any involvement in these attacks. Noriega was less concerned with the accusations then with the source of the information on which it was based, fearing that the CIA had compromised members of his own staff. The meeting then turned to the question of whether the country's dictator General Omar Torrijos was a Communist. Noriega assured Bush that no one in the government supported communism nor did the Panamanian people. Dinges stated that Bush has never commented publicly on this meeting nor on any aspect of the relationship between the CIA and Noriega. However, as the agency's director, he had full access to intelligence on these arrangements. Thus when Bush had to deal with Noriega after becoming president, he had a good understanding of the kind of person he faced in December 1989 (Dinges 1990, 314-5).

With Ford's loss to Jimmy Carter in November 1976, George Bush left his CIA post and returned to Texas. Four years later he reentered politics in the 1980 GOP presidential primaries, where he soon faded. At the GOP convention in Detroit in July 1980, Reagan first entertained Gerald Ford as his running mate but the difficulty of having a former president, even an unelected one, in the second slot proved insurmountable and he turned to George Bush to round out the ticket. Reagan recalled that Bush was the obvious choice in that situation, since he got along well with the Texan and because he respected his abilities and range of experience; he also had developed a lot of support among party regulars over the years of faithful service.

At the same time, Reagan thought that Bush was something of a wimp. This view first arose during the well-publicized February 23, 1980 New Hampshire primary debate in which the two were supposed to go head to head. When Bush arrived, all the other candidates were on the podium; as he charged up to the stage to complain about being "sandbagged" the rest of the challengers followed him up the aisle to the cheers of the crowd. As the moderator tried to shut off Reagan's microphone, the front-runner grabbed it away saying, "I'm paying for this microphone, Mr. Green" (Parmet 1997, 229). The image of a defiant Reagan and an obviously dejected Bush gave the latter the wimp image which the press picked up, effectively ending his run for the nomination. At the GOP convention that July, according to Reagan aide Lyn Nofziger, the vice president choice came down to Howard Baker and Bush. "Reagan didn't like either one of them. He thought Bush was a wimp and he was mad at Baker because of the Panama Canal," but felt Bush a better fit for the ticket (Parmet 1997, 245).

This label followed Bush throughout his eight years as Vice President, leading some analysts to suggest that one purpose of the Panama invasion was to dispel the image of a weak leader at the helm of the most powerful nation in the world. George Will wrote after a 1986 lunch with Nancy Reagan where she complained that the "whiny" vice president was weak and spineless, "The unpleasant sound Bush is emitting as he traipses from one conservative gathering to another is a thin, tinny, 'arf' - the sound of a lapdog. He is panting along Mondale's path to the presidency" (Parmet 1997, 309). After his testy live interview with Dan Rather on January 25, 1988 at the start of his own presidential campaign, William Safire characterized the exchange, "And if George [Bush] is a wimp or a lapdog, beware of wily wimps and ferocious lapdogs - tip your hand that you intend to run 'em the wrong way, and they'll be ready to go for your throat" (Parmet 1997, 326-7). This image came back to haunt Bush in October 1989 when the U. S. took no action in support of a coup attempt against Noriega by a group of PDF officers; two months later 20,000 troops landed in Panama.

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The final decision by the Bush administration to invade Panama in December 1989 can be traced to three main preceding events. Each of these had a cumulative effect on the situation in that country which ultimately gave sufficient cause for direct military action by the United States. George Bush had close involvement in all of them; his first-hand knowledge of these prior events made the determination to use military force seem inevitable.

The choice not to intervene in the last days of the Reagan administration, even with much the same provocation faced by the U. S. less that two years later, was difficult for then Vice President Bush to accept. His clear split with the president that has been described earlier demonstrated his preference for more forceful action by the administration against Manuel Noriega. The argument regarding U. S. military involvement in Central America during the Contra effort to dislodge the Sandanista government in Nicaragua had been substantially resolved in Reagan's mind by the time Panama became an issue. "We had already lost Cuba to Communism. I was determined the Free World was not going to lose Central America or more of the Caribbean to the Communists, but we had to tread softly. In the minds of many people in Latin America, the United States was the "Great Colossus of the North" that in the past had been too willing to send in the marines and interfere with their governments. The prospect of American troops being dispatched across their borders to fight Communism was abhorrent to these people. And after Vietnam, I knew that Americans would be just as reluctant to send their sons to fight in Central America, and I had no intention of asking them to do that" (Reagan 1990, 239). Thus, the Reagan administration was content to apply significant economic and political pressure on Noriega, but not to remove him from power directly, as long as there was no direct threat either to the operation of the Panama Canal or to U. S. citizens. Coming right during the early 1988 primaries, this preference for a non-military approach to the Panamanian situation caused Bush difficulties in his race for the presidency. He was faced with his own desire for more vigorous action against Noriega, yet had to remain loyal to his boss who had endorsed him as his successor.

The second incident was the nullification by Noriega of elections held in Panama in May 1989, shortly after George Bush moved into the White House. Noriega placed a puppet candidate of his Torrijista party on the presidential ballot, running against an opposition Christian Democratic ticket headed by Guillermo Endara and his vice presidential candidate Ricardo Arias Calderon. On election day, May 7, 1989, it soon became apparent that the Endara slate was beating the Torrijista's by a 3 to 1 margin. At that point, Noriega ordered the military and his personal guard called the Dignity Battalions, to seize the ballot boxes and stop the balloting, nullifying the election on the basis of "foreign interference" in the internal political process of Panama (Musicant 1990, 393). Not content just with blocking the election, Noriega turned his forces loose on the civilian population to beat up and intimidate candidates and voters alike. The televised image of a bloodied Endara seeking refuge in Vatican's papal nuncio embassy brought public outcries throughout Latin America and in the United States for some action to stop Noriega's blatant exercise of power over the Panamanians.

On May 10, 1989 the Bush administration leadership met at the White House to consider what kind of response the U. S. should make to this latest provocation by Manuel Noriega. Admiral Crowe, JCS chairman, came to the meeting prepared to discuss contingency plans for Panama, such as placing American forces along the Panama Canal route to keep it operating and conducting a "non-permissive NEO (noncombatant evacuation operation)" to evacuate all U. S. civilians by taking control of airfields in and around Panama City. However, while some kind of strong American response was required, President Bush expressed wariness of making Noriega an overnight martyr by using force to install Endara as president trying to snatch the strongman from the country. Instead, on May 11 Bush approved a public announcement of an additional 1,800 troop deployment to Panama, plus a secret detachment of a Delta team of Army counterterrorist specialists and a Navy SEALS unit. Two days later on a flight to a commencement address in Mississippi, President Bush told reporters that the Panamanian people and the PDF regular military should do everything they could do get rid of Noriega. This highly unusual public call for a coup against the dictator indicated Bush's growing frustration at this point in time (Woodward 1991, 90-2).

The last incident before sending troops into Panama was the attempted coup against Noriega on October 3, 1989, led by Moises Giroldi, a member of the leader's inner circle. Two days earlier his wife told SOUTHCOM officers that the coup was coming and requested U. S. assistance in the form of American military roadblocks at two key intersections leading to the capital, and sanctuary for her and her children. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney approved the request. Giroldi initially was successful in capturing Noriega at his headquarters but before they could turn him over to U. S. officials, the Panamanian leader got word to his Dignity Battalion 2,000 which came to his rescue. Other than setting up the two roadblocks, U. S. forces did nothing else to aid the coup attempt. leading to a firestorm of criticism of the Bush administration.

Senator Jesse Helms called the administration a bunch of Keystone Kops, and said that U. S. failure to act more forcefully when it had the chance meant that no PDF member would try again since the U. S. showed it couldn't be trusted to help. House Armed Services Committee chair Les Aspin (later secretary of defense) stated the administration should always be ". . . ready at any opportunity to use the confusion and the uncertainty of a coup attempt . . . to do something about Mr. Noriega," and syndicated military analyst Harry G. Summers wrote "Our national security decision-making process . . .was revealed to be in chaos." House Democrat Dave McCurdy even made the following comparison: "Yesterday makes Jimmy Carter look like a man of resolve. There's a resurgence of the wimp factor" (Gilboa 1995-96, 555). In its October 16, 1989 story on the incident titled "The Gang that Wouldn't Shoot," *U. S. News & World Report* quoted a knowledgeable senior U. S. official as saying, "In principle, it was a Bay of Pigs. We have been encouraging the Panamanians to actively do something, and then we withdrew our support at the critical time" (Duffy 1989, 26).

Initially, Bush officials denied knowing about the coup in advance. Yet, according to an October 16, 1989 *Newsweek* article, the same day the coup occurred White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told reporters the administration staff in Washington never were told directly about the plan adding, "If we were, the president doesn't know about it, the secretary of State doesn't know about it and the secretary of Defense doesn't know about it" (Manegold 1989, 27). Of course, according to *Newsweek*, all three men learned about the impending action at least 29 hours before it began and gave approval for U. S. troops to participate. Finally, during his October 13 news conference President Bush tried to clarify the U. S. position during the coup attempt. "I have not seen any fact in all the reports that have come out that would make me have done something different in terms of use of force . . . And I've seen allegations that we had - if when I said I wanted Noriega to get out of there, that implied use of force. I hope I would never be reckless enough as a Commander in Chief to make a blanket commitment to use of force without knowing the facts regarding some coup attempt." In response to a later question if he would be inclined to use U.S force more rapidly if the opportunity to do so arose, Bush answered, "I wouldn't mind using force if it could be done in a prudent manner. So, in other words, I'm not ruling out the use of force for all time. I am reiterating the fact that it was not proper to use force under the existing circumstances. And I feel more confident in that than I ever have - more confident, not less confident, from anything I've seen." He also expressed his confidence in his top staff involved in making that decision (Bush 1989, 1335-7).

Some important changes in the Bush crisis response mechanism came out of this incident. Secretary of State Baker stated that the administration's reaction was wholly defensive and thus a golden opportunity to get rid of Noriega was lost. He indicated that the entire crisis management processes were revamped. A key part of this was to strengthen the Deputies' Committee, the most senior interagency group that dealt with national security issues below the Cabinet secretary level. The purpose was to assure that policy making during such crises was well coordinated and promptly vetted among all appropriate agencies. This action was cleared with President Bush so that he knew what to expect in the future:

> The October coup was a watershed for American policy toward Panama and Noriega. All of us vowed never to let another such opportunity pass us by. If an opening ever presented itself again, the United States wouldn't be caught unprepared. The President ordered intensive contingency planning to make sure the next chance to topple Noriega wasn't wasted. Within two weeks, seven different scenarios had been vetted. Most of them envisioned another coup attempt by the PDF. None provided for the possibility of a preemptive unilateral U.S. military

> invasion - although General Thurman [Woerner's replacement at SOUTHCOM] stepped up Southcom's contingency planning for a possible military intervention in the event of a coup (Baker 1995, 187).

Thus when events unfolded rapidly in December, the Bush administration was ready to act swiftly and decisively.

Decision to invade Panama. The impetus for the December 1989 invasion of Panama came not from the White House, but from the top echelon of the military according to Bob Woodward. One reason was the article by Harry Summers critiquing the U. S. role in the abortive October coup against Noriega. A retired army colonel who once taught at the U. S. War College, Summers had a great deal of credibility among the Pentagon brass. He wrote in part, "Last week, whether we realized or not, we had a glimpse into the abyss. Our national security decision-making process, the very heart and soul of our national defenses, was revealed to be in chaos. It was a frightening revelation . . . If our national leaders bungled so badly on a minor crisis like Panama, what would they do in the face of a major threat? Would they still be shuffling papers and staffing options while enemy missiles were inbound?" (Woodward 1991, 130). The article also attacked the committee approach to command decision-making by Secretary of State Baker, Defense Secretary Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Powell (whom he called the best and brightest veterans of crisis management, yet who failed) as arteriosclerosis at the very top which resulted in a fatal clogging of the nation's military command and control mechanism. Instead, Summers called for the President as Commander in Chief to deal directly with the military in these situations much like Franklin Roosevelt did in World War II.

This severe criticism jolted both the military leadership, most particularly Colin Powell, SOUTHCOM chief General Max Thurman, and Defense Secretary Cheney to reevaluate the existing crisis command system. Woodward reported that Cheney and Powell considered how the coup might have been handled differently and concluded they had not been ready to do anything other than what they did in October. As a result, Cheney ordered contingency plans to be updated to cover a wider range of options, one of which was to take out the entire PDF if the United States ever were forced to act in Panama. Part of that was a low profile buildup of military equipment and personnel at U. S. installations in the country.

General Thurman took a more active role in readying American forces for a major military operation in Panama if the need arose. This involved identifying stateside units to be deployed to Panama on short notice and stepped up training exercises for troops already in the Canal Zone. PDF facilities in Panama City and surrounding areas were targeted and units assigned to attack each one. A significant use of special forces was included to neutralize PDF communications centers, free political prisoners (including an American CIA agent) and to capture Manuel Noriega.

On October 15, 1989 Thurman and his staff met with JCS chair Colin Powell at the National Military Command Center where these operational plans were approved. At a November 3 presentation to the full Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, the full-scale military attack plans for Panama, code name Operation Blue Spoon, received final approval (Donnelly et. al. 1991, 88-9). Details still were being worked out in concert between stateside and Panamanian-based commanders when events in Panama suddenly changed everything from a planning effort to operational status.

On December 15, 1989, Manuel Noriega convened the Panamanian National Assembly of Representatives, where he first secured approval for the removal of the caretaker president Francisco Rodriguez, who had been installed in that position after the failed October coup. Then the Assembly took the bold step for which they had been called into session by passing a resolution stating, "The Republic of Panama is declared to be in a state of war while the aggression [by the United States] lasts . . . To confront this aggression, the job of chief of government of Panama is hereby created, and Manuel Antonio Noriega is designated to carry out these responsibilities as Maximum Leader for national liberation" (Dinges 1990, 306). Just 24 hours later, two incidents occurred that precipitated the all-out military response by the United States.

First, on the evening of December 16 a Navy officer and his pregnant wife were arrested and interrogated by the PDF over several hours, during which the woman was subject to sexual advances and groping by the Panamanians. Later on their way back to the naval base the couple observed the second incident at a PDF checkpoint just outside a U. S. military facility. Four unarmed servicemen returning to their base from Panama City found themselves surrounded by a crowd at the checkpoint. When PDF guards waving AK-47 rifles demanded the Americans get out of the car to show identification, the driver panicked and took off with the guards firing at the car. One of the bullets went through the trunk and hit Marine Lt. Robert Paz in the spine; another passenger was grazed by the bullets. Paz was driven to the Gorgas Army Community Hospital where he died shortly afterward. News of these events was flashed to the SOUTHCOM headquarters which then passed the reports on to Colin Powell and Secretary Cheney.

Powell first talked to General Thurman in Panama at 8:30 A.M. on December 17 who told the JCS chair in-country American forces already were on Delta Alert, the highest state of readiness short of combat action. Thurman quickly reviewed three options with Powell: do nothing except file a diplomatic protest, stage a limited military response targeted directly at Manuel Noriega, or launch the full-scale Operation Blue Spoon. The SOUTHCOM commander said the first option was too weak and would make Noriega look invincible, while the second was risky done by itself because the PDF would be left untouched and able to retaliate against American servicemen and civilians. The time had come to take the step for which the U. S. forces were trained and positioned for, a complete military assault designed to eliminate the PDF, arrest and remove Noriega and secure the Panama Canal to ensure continued operation. Powell listened then told Thurman he had to review the options with Secretary Cheney before any action could be taken (Woodward 1991, 159-60).

At 10:00 A.M. Cheney and Powell met at the Pentagon with Assistant Defense Secretary Henry Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for inter-American Affairs Richard Brown, Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, Cheney's military assistant Rear Admiral William Owens and his civilian assistant Dave Addington. Army General Thomas Kelly and Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer of the JCS also attended the meeting. The civilian staff asked most of the questions, trying to ascertain how solid the reports were of the two incidents of PDF assaults on the service personnel and dependents, and whether, even if true, they constituted sufficient cause for a major military response.

Powell then convened a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 11:30 A.M. to ascertain their sense of the seriousness of the situation in Panama and what kind of response the United States military forces was prepared to deliver at that point. The JCS chair recapped the earlier meeting but indicated that, while he and Cheney were leaning toward implementing Operation Blue Spoon, they wanted both the professional and political views of the service heads before going to the president. Army chief Carl Vuono said the mission was viable and, if undertaken at all, had to be done with all force necessary to achieve the objectives of destroying the PDF and removing Noriega from power. Marine General Al Gray stated the current situation was unacceptable and that the military was ready to act; he also suggested the Panamanian people would be dancing in the streets if the U. S. got rid of Noriega. Navy Admiral Carl Trost indicated that while this would be primarily a joint Army-Marine operation, naval units were in place to support the land battle along with SEAL units already in Panama (Woodward 1991, 162-6).

Air Force General Larry Welch provided the most thorough arguments for and against the operation. On the plus side, the operation had been well-planned and thus would not appear to be either hasty or primarily a political action. Next, the specific incidents were not random acts of a few errant PDF soldiers but reflective of the chaotic environment that existed in the country under the direct leadership of Manuel Noriega, who had lost all claim to legitimacy. Therefore, rather than retreat to a military enclave like Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, the United States had a broad responsibility to protect the Panama Canal for all nations, not just ourselves. These points gave the U. S. no choice but to implement the full-scale military intervention in Panama.

At the same time, the JCS and the president needed to be aware of the downsides of this military action. Latin American nations, even if they wanted Noriega out, probably would criticize the United States publicly, given the past history of American interventions in the region. Second, the PDF's ability to resist should not be underestimated, since they would be fighting on their home territory against an invading foreign power. The possibility of protracted resistance must be communicated to the president as opposed to an overly optimistic assessment of how the operation likely would go. There also would be critics who would say that the Defense Department was using Panama as an opportunity to justify a higher military budget. The operation also might be portrayed by the media as a David and Goliath situation, creating some public sympathy for Noriega at the mercy of the American bully. Finally, the JCS had to be sure that the provocation was genuine and represented a sufficiently serious problem that only the use of overwhelming military force could remedy; a Gulf of Tonkin situation where a military response was made under ambiguous circumstances had to be avoided. General Kelly concluded that as long as the JCS clearly understood the potential drawbacks of the operation, and were ready to address each of them if they arose, he was ready to offer his full support of the intervention. The service chiefs agreed with this assessment, whereupon Powell then told them he and General Kelly were going to the president with the recommendation to proceed with Operation Blue Spoon immediately (Woodward 1991, 167).

The meeting with President Bush took place in the second floor residence of the

White House that afternoon; at Bush's direction only a small group of principals attended.[3] Baker recalled the meeting as anticlimactic, with little serious debate about doing other than the full scale military intervention as described by Secretary Cheney and JCS Chairman Powell. Instead most of the discussion centered on the details of how the operation would be conducted, as well as the necessary diplomatic and other consultations with heads of state and members of Congress. The only citation Baker made is that Powell told the president there likely would be a few dozen casualties during the invasion, but that if the U. S. didn't intervene people still would be hurt and Noriega still would be in power. With that said, the president ordered the invasion to proceed (Baker 1995, 189).

Powell described a more expansive discussion on the issue than did Baker. First Secretary Cheney reviewed the series of events in Panama since the October coup, then Powell gave a detailed description of the operation including which units had which targets. He did so because, besides Cheney, all the other participants were hearing this information for the first time. Scowcroft led the questioning on casualties while Bush listened silently. Secretary Baker then stated the U. S. had an obligation to intervene, noting the State Department had expressed this position for some time. Scowcroft again raised the point about casualties and also what would happen if Noriega evaded capture. According to Powell, the meeting finally centered on whether there was sufficient provocation for this substantial military response. Citing Noriega's contempt for democracy, his drug trafficking and subsequent indictment for that crime, the death of Lt. Paz, and lastly the threat to U. S. treaty rights to the Panama Canal from an unstable Noriega regime, Powell argued there was no question but the U. S. had more than enough cause to intervene. He also noted that, although unspoken at that meeting, all the participants were aware of

[3] Those present were the President and his spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and his deputy Robert Gates, JCS Chief Colin Powell and General Thomas Kelly.

Bush's personal animosity to a third-rate dictator thumbing his nose at the United States. At that point, the president spoke up saying, "Okay, let's do it. The hell with it." With those few words the largest military operation by U. S. forces in Latin America since 1965 was put into motion (Powell 1995, 425).

Operation Blue Spoon, renamed by General Kelly's staff Operation Just Cause, right before it was announced publicly, was launched at 12:45 A.M. on December 20, 1989, with most of the fighting over in 72 hours. Twenty-three American troops and three U. S. civilians died, with 324 wounded. Slightly over 300 Panamanian soldiers were killed, and at least 200 to 300 local noncombatants also died. Within 30 days, Manuel Noriega surrendered from hiding at the Vatican embassy and was flown to Miami for trial; he was convicted of drug charges and sent to federal prison.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

In his December 20, 1989 press conference, President Bush stated the reasons for the U. S. intervention in Panama were (1) to safeguard American citizens, (2) to defend democracy in Panama, (3) to combat drug trafficking by the Noriega regime, and (4) to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal. He indicated this action was taken after all diplomatic options were exhausted and when Noriega declared his military dictatorship was in a state of war with the United States, his PDF forces killed one unarmed serviceman and roughed up two other American citizens; Bush said that was enough. Since as President he had no higher obligation than to safeguard the lives of American citizens [35,000 in Panama], he then directed the armed forces to intervene for this purpose, and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States. Thus the invasion of Panama was not strictly speaking a result of a decision based on a fully articulated foreign policy doctrine, as in the case of the Dominican Republic or Grenada. However, by reviewing the operational code of the main participants in that policy choice, the outlines of a functional definition of national interest may be discerned.

Operational code. The three men most directly involved in the planning and implementation of the December 1989 invasion of Panama - JCS chair Colin Powell, Secretary of State James Baker and President George Bush - shared very congruent views on the role of military force as an integral component of American foreign policy. This holds true for both their instrumental beliefs regarding ends-means relationships in the context of political action, as well as the common philosophical assumptions and premises about the fundamental nature of international political conflict. This derived in part from the fact that all had served in the military (Powell and Bush in combat) and come of age during the latter stages of the Cold War.

Powell, reflecting on the end of his military career, noted how the use of force had changed over that time: "The lessons I absorbed from Panama confirmed all my convictions over the preceding twenty years, since the days of doubt over Vietnam. Have a clear political objective and stick to it. Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes. Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives. Whatever threats we faced in the future, I intended to make these rules the bedrock of my military counsel" (Powell 1995, 434). This view was apparent later on when the decision was made to stop fighting Iraq after their forces were driven from Kuwait, since the military objective of liberating that nation was achieved. An incisive comment by Powell is his acceptance of the judgement of John Keegan, whom he called the world's foremost contemporary military historian, on the Persian Gulf war as a triumph of incisive planning and almost faultless execution. Thus it represented the highest purpose of military action: ". . . the use of force in the cause of order" (Powell 1995, 528).

Powell later was asked about the guidelines for the use of military force Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger outlined in his November 28, 1984 speech to the National

Press Club.[4] At his September 20, 1989 JCS confirmation hearing, he responded to questioning by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) that they were useful but worried that stating them publicly would lead potential enemies to look for loopholes to exploit at America's expense. He stated, "My experience over the last several years . . . is that the Joints Chiefs have been quite ready to recommend to the President the use of military force . . .," citing the 1983 Grenada invasion and the April 1986 bombing raid on Libya as examples. He continued, "So there is no hesitancy . . . to use the armed forces as a political instrument when the mission is clear and when it is something that has been carefully thought out and considered and all the ramifications of using military forces have been considered. I do not sense that they [potential adversaries] go down the Weinberger checklist and say, 'Ah-ha, condition number three has not been met.' . . . Secretary Weinberger's very famous speech and his guidelines are useful guidelines, but I have never seen them to be a series of steps each one of which must be met before the Joint Chiefs of Staff will recommend the use of military force" (Woodward 1991, 117-8). It is interesting to note that, even though the Weinberger guidelines were not specifically referenced by Powell, Baker or Bush in their discussions of Panama, they generally applied to the steps taken leading up to that December 1989 intervention.

In terms of the philosophical element of Powell's operational code relating to the nature of political conflict in the world, his beliefs have been clearly articulated. One of his early military assignments was to Germany in 1958, where he recalled "In that Cold War era, when the globe seemed divided between white and red, I was excited to be going to the front line, with our godless communist adversary deployed just across the Iron Curtain"

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[4] These are (1) commit U.S. forces only when the national interest or that of our allies directly is at stake, (2) do so only when there is a clear intention to win, (3) go in with clearly defined political and military objectives, (4) be ready to reassess and adjust objectives as the immediate situation changes, (5) objectives must have the support of the American people and their congressional representatives before sending troops into combat, and (6) commit U.S. military forces only as a last resort.

(Powell 1995, 44). This was the typical view of the world at that time. Yet Powell showed an ability to change his views as the Soviet Union slowly collapsed and the bipolar rivalry that had defined most of his military career disappeared, a trait that not all of his colleagues shared. On May 16, 1989 when he assumed leadership of the U. S. Forces Command Europe, he gave a speech entitled "The Future Just Ain't What It Used to Be." He declared that the Soviet system was bankrupt due to its domestic and foreign impotence and failure, noting "As a public and military matter, our [Soviet] bear is now wearing a Smokey hat and carries a shovel to put out fires. Our bear is now benign." This meant that while the Soviet military machine still was dangerous, the purpose of the U. S. military was shifting from the threat of invasion by Russia in Europe to dealing with smaller conflicts around the world (Powell 1995, 402-3). Just eight months later Panama proved to be the kind of conflict he was talking about.

Colin Powell concluded his memoirs with an assessment of how the world had changed over the course of his career. He found that during most of it had been defined by the struggle between the Soviet communist system and the democratic West that had rules that structures the political, economic and military relations on both sides. The collapse of the Soviet Union and disappearance of communism as a potent ideological challenge to democracy now has left the world without a recognizable structure or set of accepted rules of conduct.

> I believe it is unlikely that a single new strategy to define our role in the world, one with the same coherence as the old strategy of containment, will emerge. Yet, this unformed, unnamed new era holds out the promise of a bright new beginning. As I write [1995], our nation is not at war anywhere. Nor do we have the requirement imposed on us by containment to support unpalatable regimes that do not adhere to accepted democratic principles. And let us not forget the towering achievement of this past half century, our victory in the Cold War. Nuclear annihilation, the horrific possibility that hung over the world as long as East and West were locked in distrust, no longer threatens. A despotic expansionist empire, whose military might once matched our own, is gone, pulled down by its own malignancy. Free enterprise has outrun state-dominated economic systems. Individual liberty has shown its supremacy over police-state conformity. This is the victory of freedom

> that our generation leaves the world. I feel privileged beyond measure to have taken part in so historic an era (Powell 1995, 606).

The reference to unsupportable regimes and emergence of individual freedom over police states may be taken, in part, to refer to the Panama episode as an example of how the U. S. role in the world has changed.

James Baker as Bush's Secretary of State shared much the same view on the use of force as did Colin Powell. He reflected that view of war as the ultimate and last solution to international conflict when all diplomatic efforts have been exhausted in his assessment of the reaction to the invasion of Panama. Normally, such a bold use of military force would evoke loud and vociferous international protest both in Latin American and around the world. Yet, because the need to remove Noriega not just as a threat to the Panama Canal but as a clear source of political instability in the region, criticism of the U. S. action was relatively light. The OAS passed a resolution of regret over the incident but did not condemn the American policy.

Baker also indicated the American response to this situation had ramifications outside of the immediate restoration of the legitimate democratic government which the Panamanian people had chosen in the election nullified by Noriega. He stated it gave the Colombian government, backed by the United States, the courage to resist the Medellin drug cartel which had been conducting a campaign of political assassinations of presidential candidates. It also demonstrated to the Sandanista regime in Nicaragua there were significant consequences to stealing a legally conducted democratic election. The American response to assault on democratic institutions in Panama gave the OAS the willingness to pass the June 1991 Santiago resolution, committing that body's members to collective action anywhere democracy was threatened in Latin America. Baker indicated this led directly to economic and political sanctions by the OAS against Haiti and its opposition to coups in Peru and Guatemala. This is a prime reason that the United States maintains, and is willing to use, military force as part of its foreign policy apparatus.

Baker's philosophical view of the nature of world political conflict as a part of his operational code parallels that of Powell as well. Like this career military officer, his role as Treasury Secretary and Secretary of State were shaped in large part by the Cold War legacy of the last 50 years. He recognized, however, that as the end of the Soviet communist system became apparent, the approach to American foreign policy that had been predicated on East-West conflict had to change as well. Under Baker's direction, the Bush administration applied a three-prong approach to handling foreign relations in the emerging post Cold War era. One was to initiate direct discussions with the Gorbachev government, rather than to respond to limited proposals form the Soviets as a rearguard action while their system slowly crumbled. This had several purposes - institutionalize stability and predictability in Soviet reforms, open up the Soviet system to Western influence and foster democratization - all of which had the broad objective of creating a strategy of discrete, measurable reciprocity that could support efforts to build a bipartisan consensus in the United States for these goals. Another approach was to take an openly aggressive push for democratization in the former Soviet-dominated republics in Eastern Europe. By fostering political and economic reforms in this buffer zone along the border with the thriving Western European states, greater pressure could be applied on Gorbachev to stay the course on his own program of peristroika. Finally, since the new Soviet government had established its own legitimacy through adoption of democratic elections, this could be used to promote the same in former Soviet client states like Angola, Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

All of this reflects a general philosophy of managing the collapse of communism and the rise of democracy throughout the world that fit with the goal of the United States for a stable environment in which Western economic and political institutions could be established and developed over time. "While the President and I realized our central mission was to end the Cold War, we also began preparing for the post-Cold War world. To a great degree, this involved either adapting or creating institutions, but it also meant that we would have to begin developing longer-term strategies for dealing with an emerging class of transnational problems that didn't fit into traditional categories: terrorism, narcotics, the environment, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Baker 1995, 46). The willingness to use military force to rid Panama of a non-democratic regime involved in drug trafficking is a good example of this strategy in action.

In his statements from the 1988 presidential campaign and press conferences regarding Panama cited earlier, George Bush demonstrated his instrumental belief that military force is a legitimate means to the political end of promoting and defending democracy as an integral part of the national interest. This was confirmed by a long-time aide to the president who stated Bush's ". . . feeling on the use of force goes back to his own military days. He's not very reflective and hasn't talked very much about using force, but he has great respect for the military. And remember, his experience was in World War II, not Vietnam, and in conversations he keeps coming back to the threats of Hitler. He compared Iraq going into Kuwait to the Germans going into Poland" (Nelson 1991, A9). The news article containing this quote cited several examples of the president's authorization of military force other than Panama: signing a September 1989 National Security Decision Directive allowing military advisors to train anti-drug forces throughout Colombia, sending U. S. commandos to rescue American military advisors from a rebel-held hotel in El Salvador on November 23, 1989, and using American jet fighters as air cover to help loyalist troops defeat a December 1, 1989 coup attempt against Philippine President Corazon Acquino.

George Bush's philosophical component of his operational code was revealed in his attempts to articulate his vision of a new world order in which the United States remained the sole global superpower:

> We liberated the entire world from old fears, fears of tense endless confrontation, fears of nuclear holocaust. And now our children grow up freed from the looming specter of nuclear war. And having won the Cold War, we did more, we led nations away from ancient hatreds and toward a table of peace, and we did still more than that. We forged a new world order, an order shaped by the sweat and sacrifice of our families, the sweat and sacrifice of generation upon generation of American men and women. And think of it - two years ago the Berlin Wall came tumbling down, and last year the Soviet Union collapsed. Imperial communist became a four-letter word: d-e-a-d. Dead. And today, because we stood firm, because we did the right things, America stands alone, the undisputed leader of the world (Duffy and Goodgame 1992, 261-2).

For Bush, America's Cold War victory over the Soviet Union and communism vindicated this nation's economic and military strength, and the application of those assets to promote democracy throughout the world. The strategy to pursue the new world order was to cooperate with former adversaries like the Soviet Union both bilaterally and through organizations like the UN and OAS to resolve regional conflicts and to confront the great challenges of the future where the enemy was uncertainty and instability (Duffy and Goodgame 1992, 174). As he stated in several public addresses, Bush saw international cooperation and collective security, led by the United States, as the most effective way to promote the rule of law to govern the conduct of nations (Rodman 1994, 543-4).

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Military intervention has been a highly visible component of United States foreign policy toward Latin America over the past 40 years. Looking at the decision making process through which such actions were chosen by American presidents and their top advisors during this period, this study identified a link between the operational code of these leaders and their articulation of national interest through statements of foreign policy doctrine. Further, it is suggested that this link has more often led to the use of military force over other diplomatic and political measures. To illustrate this relationship, three examples of armed intervention by the United States in Latin America since 1960 have been examined: Dominican Republic, 1965; Grenada, 1983; and Panama, 1989. The case study format presented the situational context, a psychological profile of the leaders, the process by which the choice to use military force was selected, and provided an assessment of the impact of that decision. From this information, some statements now are advanced about the relationship of doctrine to the use of force, which are reinforced by the Clinton administration's development of guidelines for the military component of U.S. foreign policy.

RESTATEMENT OF THEORETICAL PREMISE

Foreign policy doctrine has been described as the operational definition of national interest, indicating what means are to be employed to achieve the policy objective as well as how they are to be utilized. Since individual leaders determine that a situation poses a challenge to the national interest and then act upon it, it is difficult to separate the subjective perceptions of those leaders as influenced and shaped by their operational code from the objective reality of the particular event. That is, prior to the specific occurrence, the decision makers have an established set of philosophical and instrumental beliefs about the political environment through which they interpret the events in a given circumstance. Holsti (1962) asserted that such a belief system has two related purposes: one is to orient the individual within his environment by defining it and identifying its salient characteristics, while the other is to establish goals and order preferences within this environment. In terms of decision making about events in this milieu, the mental orientation which one develops over time establishes an understanding of what ought to be so that realistic objectives and methods to achieve them can be put forth.

This operational code model is comprised of two complimentary sets of beliefs which together provide the decision maker with a frame of reference in which to assess the political world around him (George 1969). The philosophical component deals with the person's understanding of the essential nature of political life (harmony or conflict), their sense of how predictable is the political future, and to what extent one can influence or control events and outcomes in the direction one desires. The means by which one attempts to direct the course of these political events is the province of the instrumental component. This includes issues such as the best approach to selecting goals and objectives, the most effective manner of pursuing those ends and the timing of actions to achieve the goals. As a cohesive blend of beliefs and premises, one's operational code greatly affects the way a person perceives, interprets and acts upon particular events and situations.

The relationship of operational codes to foreign policy doctrines has much to do with the functions of these statements as a key element of America's approach to international relations as described by Crabb (1982). First, doctrines have articulated and communicated an ongoing commitment to the democratic ideal, holding out the American experience as a model for others to emulate. Second, doctrines have provided the source to legitimize the application of American power overseas as a way to further its most critical national interests. Lastly, the use of doctrines to shape foreign policy has provided continuity with the long-range goals of the United States to promote international peace by encouraging democratic governments in the face of challenges from other political systems. In this sense, foreign policy doctrine as the operationalized definition of national interest becomes the conceptual structure that both reflects and supports the operational code beliefs of foreign policy decision makers.

Heuristic approach. Both Holsti and George indicated that the belief system established through one's operational code serves as a prism that influences the decision makers's perception of and response to particular situations. In this process, doctrine then becomes a heuristic device which is used to filter the complexity of issues surrounding the event at hand, simplifying the range of policy alternatives to be considered that will advance the national interest. In this capacity, it functions as part of the larger schema or mental knowledge structure that is used to select and process incoming information from the social environment, taking the form of general expectations that allow for prediction and control of events by guiding one's perceptual, memory and inferences processes (Augoustinos and Innes 1990). A common application of this method of situation analysis involves reasoning by analogy (Jervis 1976, Khong 1992, Houghton 1996).

Reasoning by analogy as a heuristic process generally takes four main forms (Vertzberger 1990). One is availability where a person draws upon an easily recalled or imagined example from past personal experience to predict the probable outcome of a current situation. Another mechanism is representativeness, or the tendency to predict the outcome of the event at hand by identifying and concentrating on those contemporary aspects that most resemble those from past occurrences with which one is most familiar. A third analogic tool is that of simulation, where one utilizes results from past experience to run through possible scenarios for the current situation. Lastly, one may use the anchoring and adjustment technique whereby a baseline of expectations is set, based a great deal on past experience, and then changes are made to the expected outcome as additional information becomes available.

Common to all of these methods is the use of prior experience and results to simplify the cognitive process of assessing current situations and determining policy choices. Jervis (1976) argued that when decision makers utilize the analogic reasoning approach, they rarely seek alternative explanations or causes for new situations other than those their own predispositions provide, which often are quick and oversimplified. Further, the degree to which prior events affect one's perception and understanding of current events depends heavily on whether or not the person experienced the prior situation directly, how early in one's career it occurred, and how significant were the event's consequences for the participant personally or to the nation at large. Another critical factor is how familiar that person is with international events that might generate alternative perceptions of the situation at hand.

Khong's 1992 study of the 1965 Vietnam decisions by the Johnson administration supports the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Gentner (1989) that historical analogies, particularly those involving the representativeness heuristic, are a common decision making device for people faced with crisis situations. This is because under these conditions, there is a great deal of uncertainty for which prior experience can prove helpful. Khong cited Lyndon Johnson's memoirs in which LBJ stated that he, as did many other American presidents, liked to consult the past when making foreign policy decisions.

The notion that historical analogies are used by policy makers to analyze current events thus has been fairly well established. Houghton (1996) made the point that not only do leaders apply this mechanism in situations that clearly resemble past events (where most research has focussed) but that it also occurs for those novel cases that do not appear to have readily apparent precedents. Rather than attempt to reason creatively in these situations, he asserted that policy makers do make use of history to guide them. This may involve finding partial analogies taken from different events at different times in the past, which then are mixed and matched like a jigsaw puzzle. One also may seek to enhance the degree of overlap between key aspects of a current situation and a favored analogy.

Doctrine application. It is argued further that the application of doctrine usually is triggered in periods of crisis, when time constraints add to the pressure for a relatively quick resolution of the situation. The need for making important decisions in a limited time frame is facilitated by the use of doctrine as a policy making tool when faced with situations involving uncertainty and lack of control over events. In turn, these highly unstable conditions often generate a sense of fear of unknown consequences, in which there has been a tendency to exaggerate the threat posed by the situation as it is perceived by American leaders. The challenge is seen not just as a danger to the nation's physical security, but also to the pattern of order and stability on which this security is based (Johnson 1994).

This was particularly applicable to American policy towards lesser developed nations such as those in Latin America. "U.S. fears that Third World societies could slip under Soviet control were accentuated by U.S. perceptions of the weaknesses of those societies. They were often viewed initially as very nearly defenseless in the face of the might and wile of the Soviet Union. Because Third World leaders were frequently assumed to be badly informed about the true nature of Communism, almost any relationship between them and the Soviet Union could, in the U.S. view, entangle their countries in ways that would compromise their national independence" (Johnson 1994, 28). This clearly was the case with the Dominican Republic and Grenada episodes.

Johnson indicated that in the post Cold war era, the enhanced level of perceived threat by American leaders has not diminished with the end of the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the emergence of the U.S. as the single remaining superpower in a highly complex and interdependent world has increased, not lessened, the range of challenges faced by this nation's policy makers. The main issue during the Cold War was to limit expansion of influence by the USSR and to reduce the risk of nuclear exchange that could arise from regional conflicts involving the two nations and their surrogate partners. These objectives actually provided some structure to American foreign policy by identifying the most likely source of trouble, the Soviets, and establishing lines of communication between the leadership of the two countries. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989 as its main competitor, the United States now faces greater uncertainty as the Cold War systems of order and control break down, replaced by multiple sources of tension and disintegration. The result is reduced ability by America to exert control over events, which in turn increases the likelihood of anxiety and threat exaggeration; the 1989 Panama invasion was a response by the Bush administration to just this kind of situation.

CASE STUDIES

The case studies provide the opportunity to address three important points about the relationship of foreign policy doctrine to the use of military force in recent U.S. diplomatic history in Latin America. The first is the level of consistency between the operational code of presidential policy makers and the articulation of specific doctrine that reflects their particular view of national interest. That is, given their own understanding of the international political environment of the time, how closely did this operationalized definition of national interest respond to the perceptions of the challenges facing the United States as a world power? This second issue concerns the sequence of events in each case, specifically, did the statement of doctrine clearly precede the incident in which it was applied. The significant issue here is to determine whether the doctrine was an influence on a particular policy or simply a justification for action after the fact. Finally, if doctrine did indeed affect the decision to intervene militarily, to what extent did this play a role in that decision making process?

Consistency. The operational code serves ". . . as a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations" (George 1969, 191). The philosophical and instrumental beliefs which together comprise that code also provide norms and guidelines that influence the actor's consideration of alternatives and selection of strategy and tactics for specific situations. George cautioned that, although a significant factor in decision making, operational code is not the only variable in that process. However, it does provide a strong measure of how an actor's world view affects the policy choices that are made.

Lyndon Johnson's world view was shaped during the formative days of his political career during the Cold War era. For him the essential nature of political life was a fundamental conflict between democracy and communism, yet where individual situations could be mastered through one-on-one communication between the top leaders on each side. At the same time, one must always be wary of one's opponent who, if given signs of weakness or appeasement, would take full advantage of such an opportunity to expand their sphere of influence. Thus relations with the Soviet Union became a balancing act of personal diplomatic skill backed by national strength to control events. Goodwin indicated this approach, which served Johnson so well in domestic politics, proved to be a serious drawback in his conduct of international affairs (1991, 256-7). Much of this arose from LBJ's limited knowledge of who could do what in the top leadership of foreign governments. That is, while he had detailed understanding and long experience of how the U.S. Senate would behave and react, the same was not true when dealing with other nations.

In terms of instrumental beliefs, Johnson felt that rather than try for a single, comprehensive agreement for lessening of tensions between the two superpowers, it was more effective to remove small irritants one by one, gradually creating a basis for a stable peace on which to address more serious issues (Johnson 1971, 463). This limited goal was pursued most effectively by curtailing some of the more inflammatory rhetoric and then using high level contacts to invigorate discussions on specific issues such as cutting back on production of U235 weapons material and establishing a civil air agreement for flights between New York and Moscow (1971, 464-7). Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin commented that, although Johnson was staunchly anti-communist, the president also was pragmatic in his approach to relations with the Soviet Union. In particular, he praised LBJ for trying to separate issues crucial to peace between the two superpowers from those routine items not directly linked to the fundamental East-West conflict (Dobrynin 1995, 188-9). His timing of action and selection of means to advance national interests in both areas was significant; Johnson was well-known for assessing the utility of several foreign policy alternatives based on his own political calculations drawn from a lifetime in politics (Geyelin 1966, 150).

The Johnson-Mann doctrine reflected this perception in two important ways. First it recognized that the United States had to take the lead in Latin America in resisting communist subversion, either directly by the Soviet Union or through surrogates like Cuba. This is based on the original 1954 Caracas declaration of hemispheric solidarity against such influence, as well as Johnson's own experience during the Bay of Pigs and 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Secondly, resistance to communist influence in the region also was cast as a form of self defense of the United States and other democracies in Latin America. In this sense, any attempt to promote a communist-style government anywhere in the hemisphere posed a serious challenge to stability in the region on which the U.S. placed great reliance as part of its overall defense posture. When Johnson said in his May 2, 1965 address to the nation, "We will defend our Nation against all those who seek to destroy not only the United States but every free country of this hemisphere . . ." he expressed both of these concerns (Wilson 1966, 338).

The concept of preventive intervention as a defensive measure against establishment of a communist regime in Latin America was not new in 1965, having been applied along these lines in Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1962) by American leaders (Wilson 1966; Dore 1987). Haley (1975) drew a similar comparison between President Wilson's 1914 Mexico incursion against Huerta's overthrow and the murder of President Madero and Johnson's actions in the Dominican Republic. Both chief executives had the same objectives: stop revolutionary violence, establish an interim coalition government, hold free elections, and return the country to constitutional democratic rule (1975, 54). Crabb (1989) argued the latter attempt to achieve these goals essentially was a restatement of the Monroe Doctrine principle that the United States would oppose any move by a foreign power to establish itself in the Western Hemisphere. In the Dominican Republic case, the Johnson administration believed that a communist-instigated effort to overthrow that nation's government had to be prevented by a stepped up military intervention beyond that limited effort needed to protect American citizens on the island (Crabb 1989, 163-4).

While the Johnson-Mann Doctrine laid out a defensive approach to national interest, where the U.S. response was triggered by the potential for communist takeover of a Latin American government, the Reagan Doctrine took an offensive stance to such provocation. It not only considered establishment of a new communist regime unacceptable, but also targeted existing Soviet client states in an effort to roll back the gains that nation had made in expanding its sphere of influence during the 1970's in the developing world, especially in Latin America (Scott 1996, 27-8). Its origin lay in the president's view of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" with which the United States was engaged in a global battle of will and values. Reagan advisor Norman Podhoretz called the president perhaps the most sharply defined leading political figure of the age in this regard. "He stood without ambiguity for the view that the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was the central issue of our time; that it could be defined as a struggle between good and evil; that in this struggle the United States had been falling behind while an expansionist Soviet Union was forging ahead; and that unless we made every effort to restore and assert our power, the future would belong to the forces of totalitarian Communism" (Podhoretz 1983, 25). Thus the Reagan Doctrine may be seen as a logical expression of this stark world view embodied in president's underlying operational code.

Several observers (Loch K. Johnson 1991, Cannon 1991, Rodman 1994, Schmertz, Datlof and Ugrinsky 1997) commented that Ronald Reagan had a rather simplistic outlook that showed in the development of the administration's foreign policy, particularly towards Latin America. This view incorporated three main themes that were reflected in both the philosophical and instrumental elements of Reagan's world view. One was democracy's inherent virtue as the best expression of America's moral basis, while communism represented the greatest threat to those values (Rodman 1994, 262-3). This concept bolstered the second theme, that from America's unrivaled history of achievement Reagan drew an overriding self-confidence in the nation's ability to lead in the world, a belief that he consistently tried to instill in the public (Cannon 1991, 337-8). The last point was the need to translate these attributes into a relationship with the Soviet Union based on a clear understanding of the nature of the communist threat and a major buildup of U.S. military and political strength to meet it. The key to implementing all three components was to communicate them effectively to the American public and their elected representatives in order to overcome the Vietnam syndrome which had held back the nation in recent times (Reagan 1990, 479; Schmertz, Datlof and Ugrinsky 1997, 22-3). Shimko's (1992) operational code analysis of Reagan's understanding of the Soviet Union and the nature of international political conflict reached a similar conclusion. His contradictory beliefs of the malevolent Soviets who nonetheless could be dealt with in a peaceful manner led Shimko to categorize Reagan as an "uncommitted thinker" rather than a rigid ideologue (1992, 375).

The 1983 Grenada invasion was the first overt application of this understanding about the ongoing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The leftist Bishop government already had been isolated by President Carter in 1979, a position which the Reagan administration maintained upon taking office in 1981. The violent overthrow of the existing Grenadan leadership by the openly Marxist Revolutionary Military Council, and subsequent murder of Maurice Bishop and his top staff, created just the kind of situation for which the Reagan Doctrine was intended to rectify. Two main goals were accomplished by the American intervention under this policy. One was to show U.S. resolve to resist expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence, especially within our own hemisphere. The other was to demonstrate that communist adventurism was reversible, if only one had the courage to challenge it directly (Rosenfeld 1987, 205-6). This unusual boldness after 17 years of relative passivity towards Latin America by the United States had the additional affect of intimidating others in the region, primarily the Sandanista regime in Nicaragua, through the idea that similar force might be directed against them (Mandelbaum 1987, 132-3; Scott 1996, 191).

The fall of communism in 1989 deprived the newly elected Bush administration of a prime target of opportunity in Latin America. As noted earlier, there was no formalized doctrine in place when the situation in Panama came to a head in December 1989. Yet the outlines of the president's concept of a new world order based on peace, democracy and rule of law was discernable, one that came into play in the decision to intervene militarily in that nation. These foundations of the president's operational code were consistent with that choice to remove Manuel Noriega given the slightest provocation that appeared to violate those ideals for the post-Cold War world.

The invasion provided some important lessons about the way the Bush administration looked at the use of military force (Donnelly, Roth and Baker 1991, 393-7). The first was that it was an effective way to demonstrate America's support for democracy and human rights, in this case by restoring a duly elected civilian government to power. It showed that not only did the U.S. profess these goals rhetorically, but it was willing to back them up in a very practical sense. Second, the action reinforced the end of the Vietnam syndrome, the reluctance to use America's military capability, which had been shown during the Reagan administration in Grenada (1983) and in the 1986 air raid on Libya. Another aspect of the invasion was that it showed the United States resolve to protect American citizens threatened by actions of foreign governments. But perhaps the most significant lesson of the Panama intervention was it signaled a change in the mission of the U.S. military from containment of the Soviet Union and the defense of Western Europe to less well-defined purposes in the new post-Cold war environment (Donnelly et. al. 1991, 393). Among these were maintaining stability in the region, curtailing the flow of drugs from South America into the U.S., and ensuring the security of the Panama Canal as a vital link in the global trade routes.

Sequence. One crucial element of the cases presented is to show that the general concept and expression of the three doctrines preceded their application in the specific incidents. It also is important to demonstrate that the underlying bases of these policies explain in part why the decision was made to use military force, and are not just advanced after the fact to justify the action taken in each instance. A brief discussion of the three cases is presented below to address this critical issue.

The Johnson-Mann Doctrine applied in the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965 had three main antecedents. The first drew upon the historical evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, first declaring the Western Hemisphere off-limits to establishment of European power politics of the 19th Century and most recently in the 1954 Caracas declaration that domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international communist movement constituted a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of all states. It was stated further that such a condition posed a danger to the peace of the entire hemisphere.

The second item leading to the Johnson-Mann Doctrine grew out of the U.S. experience with Castro's Cuba in the early 1960's. As noted earlier, President Kennedy issued a statement after the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion that while unilateral intervention by the United States in Latin America normally would occur only in response to a direct attack on the U.S. or an ally, there was one other possible trigger for such action. That was if it became apparent that, through inaction by other member states they allowed communist penetration to occur in the hemisphere contrary to the Caracas declaration, America was prepared to step in to prevent it as part of its own national security (Mallin 1965, 55). This resolve was demonstrated less than two years later in the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Johnson indicated in his memoirs this incident occurred in part because Khrushchev misjudged JFK; he wanted to make sure the Soviet leader did not do the same of him or the will of the American people to resist communist expansion in the region (Johnson 1971, 468). He stated further an important lesson both sides of the Iron Curtain got from this is that a strong and determined nation could not be moved by nuclear blackmail (1971, 477); by extension that held true for conventional confrontation. Thus Johnson had formed his own view of preventing communist style regimes to gain a foothold in Latin America.

The final stage of development of this doctrine was the reordering of priorities for U.S. aid to the area under the Alliance for Progress. Thomas Mann took over that program as part of his overall responsibility for all U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America upon his appointment as Undersecretary of State for Latin American Affairs in December 1983. Three months later he announced that the thrust of the program was changed from promoting social reforms and democratic institutions to creating a climate of political stability in order to protect the hemisphere from subversion by communist forces. (Tulchin 1994, 230-1). This put the administration on the track of looking first at any social or political disruption in a Latin American nation as caused by communist influence rather than by indigenous factors of poverty or other ills.

The Reagan Doctrine gained its name and full expression in the president's 1985 State of the Union address. However it too had its origins much earlier in the first term of Ronald Reagan; in fact, some of the concepts embodied in that policy arose prior to his assuming office in January 1981. A conservative group called the Committee of Santa Fe had worked at the July 1980 GOP convention to include a plank in the party platform that called for a pledge to support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent government (Gutman 1988, 21); that policy statement was subsequently adopted by the full convention.[1] The committee's report was later published under the title A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties, in which they singled out Central America as the most likely base for Soviet adventurism that would threaten U.S. interests, even to the point of an direct attack on the United States. Therefore, the report concluded, America had to take the initiative to prevent this from happening or lose all since ". . . World War III is almost over" (Scott 1996, 19).

This view gained formal status with the Reagan administration as National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, signed by the president on January 17, 1983. It called for the United States to ". . . contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas, particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States" (Scott 1996, 21); Latin America was one of these regions. This would

[1] Members of the committee were John Carbaugh, L. Francis Bouchey, Roger Fontaine, David Jordan and Lewis Tambs; all except Bouchey assumed high level positions in the Reagan administration.

be accomplished by applying significant pressure so that the costs to the Soviets of maintaining an effective presence in these areas would be very high. NSDD 75 also expressed as a crucial element of this policy to ". . . weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between [Soviet Third World allies] and the Soviet Union. US policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries" (Scott 1996, 21). This policy was strongly supported by CIA Director William Casey, who led several National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meetings to hammer out this approach.

At the same time, Ronald Reagan had noticed two articles written by Jeanne Kirkpatrick that echoed this belief that the United States must stand up to the expanding Soviet influence in the world, especially in our own back yard. The first of these appeared in the November 1979 issue of *Commentary* entitled "Dictators and Double Standards." She argued that a distinction should be made in U.S. foreign relations between authoritarian governments, which preserved much of traditional societies and maintained open capitalist economies, and totalitarian states that tried to remake and control all aspects of society. The former could be influenced by diplomatic means to move closer to democratic ideals, and thus become more friendly to U.S. policy goals (anticommunism being one); in contrast no such accommodation was possible with the latter (LaFeber 1993, 276). In January 1981, just before she was named U.S. ambassador to the United Nations by President Reagan, her second article, "U.S. Security and Latin America," was published. It criticized the Carter administration for policies that allowed Marxist-Leninist governments to take power in Grenada and Nicaragua and called for the United States to revise its approach to Latin America to prevent other such regimes from taking hold. Once in the Reagan administration, Kirkpatrick became a strong supporter of the policy advanced by Casey through his leadership of the NSPG meetings. Falcoff (1997, 400) observed Kirkpatrick's main contribution to the administration's Latin America policy was to show how to identify and explain why it was necessary to resist revolutionary forces backed by the Cubans and Soviets through mechanisms like the Reagan Doctrine.

George Bush was very familiar with the situation in Panama long before he moved into the Oval office in January 1989. The case study related his contact with Noriega while serving as CIA director under President Ford, and his involvement with the dictator later on during the second term of the Reagan administration. During this latter period, Bush's strong feeling that the drug indictment against Noriega should be pursued vigorously caused a public breach between him and President Reagan. After becoming president in 1989, he continued to express publicly his desire to see Noriega brought to justice in the United States. On August 24, 1989 Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs that ". . . the grave abuses of Gen. Noriega's dictatorship threaten the peace of our hemisphere and violate the charter of this organization" (Eagleburger 1989, 67). At an October 28, 1989 news conference, after the abortive coup against the Panamanian leader, Bush stated plainly the ". . . outlaw Noriega regime simply must be replaced" (Parmet 1997, 415).

The Bush administration saw Panama under Noriega as a threat to its role as a world leader in promoting global peace and security as expressed in the regional defense strategy plans outlined by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney (Johnson 1994, 231). This reflects what Bush called in his 1991 State of the Union address a new world order drawing diverse nations together in the common cause of peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.

Doctrine's role in decision making process. It would be helpful if the case studies showed that the respective presidents cited simply said "here is my doctrine, let's go implement it in this instance." However, that is not what happened. Therefore, in the absence of such a statement, it is necessary to infer the role of doctrine in the decision making process from the general descriptions of the participants on how that policy was chosen. The strength of this relationship becomes subject to interpretation based upon the clarity and awareness of those who took part in that process.

In the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention, the main actors were President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. However it is clear from several sources (Lowenthal 1972, Gleijeses 1978, Musicant 1990) that the president made the critical decisions first to use a limited force to evacuate civilians from the island, and later to engage in a major intervention to stabilize a chaotic situation to prevent a communist-inspired group from using that upheaval to install an unwanted regime in this small country. As Geyelin described it, "[t]he 'Cuban syndrome,' in short, was exerting a profound and perhaps decisive influence on U.S. policy and strategy from the very start, from the bureaucratic organization up, as well as from the President down" (Geyelin 1966, 246).

Johnson was well aware of the danger of a second Cuba, based on his experience in both the Bay of Pigs and 1962 missile crisis in the Kennedy administration. JFK's warning after the former incident that the U.S. would act unilaterally against communist subversion if the affected states did not was firmly planted in Johnson's mind at the time of the Dominican incident (Johnson 1971, 201-2). His May 2 press statement noted the principles of communism were incompatible with those of the inter-American system. He went on to say "[t]his is what our beloved President John F. Kennedy meant when, less than a week before his death, he told us: We in the hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere. . . ." (Johnson 1965, 746).

In more colorful language Johnson expressed his understanding of what was at stake: "What is important is that we know, and that they know, and that everybody knows, that we don't propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the

Communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere" (Geyelin 1966, 238). Thus when Ambassador Bennett sent his second message to the president on April 28 stating that communist elements were poised to take advantage of the power vacuum in Santo Domingo and recommended full-scale intervention ". . . to prevent another Cuba from arising out of the ashes of this uncontrollable situation," there was no hesitation on the president's part to order the second phase of the operation (Johnson 1971, 197).

Another factor driving the application of the Johnson-Mann doctrine was the desire to maintain an exclusive "sphere of influence" over Latin America, which also had its origins in the 1823 pronouncement by President James Monroe. The 1954 Caracas declaration included a U.S.-sponsored amendment to this effect. In the face of dangers originating outside the hemisphere, its purpose was designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable rights of each Latin American state freely to choose its own form of government, economic system, and social and cultural life. This differed from blocking a second Cuba in that it preserved the pre-eminent American role in the hemisphere, which gave the U.S. significant leverage to influence the type of acceptable regimes in the region. Therefore, the Dominican intervention also was undertaken to provide time for the Dominican people to choose directly their new government rather than have a small group impose one on them.

Walter Lippmann, a critic of global military intervention by the United States at the time (particularly in Vietnam), approved of the administration's action in Santo Domingo based on the "old-fashioned and classical diplomatic ground that the Dominican Republic lies squarely within the sphere of influence of the United States" (Steel 1980, 566). He argued that these spheres were fundamental to the very nature of international society. But just as the Soviets should not interfere in Latin America, the United States should not do so in Vietnam. Lippmann concluded, "The acceptance of spheres of influence has been the diplomatic foundation of the detente in Europe between the Soviet Union and the West . . .

Eventually, it will provide the formula of coexistence between Red China and the United States" (Steel 1980, 567).

President Johnson noted this distinction in the context of American foreign aid to developing countries. "In Latin America, from the days of President Monroe the greatest source of business, trade, investment, and tourism - as well as bitterness, jealousy, and even fighting - had been the United States" (Johnson 1971, 352-3). His Secretary of State Dean Rusk saw this in the importance of creating a climate of stability in which the recipient nations could develop. "In the final analysis the United States sends foreign aid because it serves vital national interests. Indeed, one of the basic lessons of this century is that our national security is inextricably bound up with the freedom and economic and social progress of other nations" (Rusk 1990, 406-7). The shift of focus of the Alliance for Progress under Thomas Mann in March 1964 from social reform to political stability recognized this goal, thereby setting the stage for the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965. In his October 12, 1965 address to the Inter-American Press Association, Mann stated the U.S. supported the revised Alliance goals not because there are communists in the world to be bested but because the goals themselves were consistent with American national and hemispheric traditions and ideals. He also stated that, in addition to protecting the lives of U.S. citizens in Santo Domingo, the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic also was undertaken to prevent a widening of the civil war, stabilize the countryside, and to open the way for a political settlement under the auspices of the OAS (Mann 1965, 735).

In October 1983 President Reagan made the final decision to invade Grenada, but that essentially was the only viable option presented to him by his National Security Council (NSC) and State Department staff. These advisors in turn were strongly influenced by the president's clearly expressed objective to reassert America's power in order to roll back the range of the Soviet Union, particularly in the Third World, which formed the core of what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. So while a great deal of preliminary assessment and planning occurred before the first information regarding Grenada reached the president, the range of alternatives considered was limited by what the staff knew Reagan was likely to accept.

This reflected the decision making style of Ronald Reagan, with which senior NSC and State Department staff were quite familiar after almost three years in office. Constantine Menges, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1983 to 1986, who participated closely in planning the Grenada operation, agreed with a Reagan biographer that the president was "passively decisive." That is, he did not actively direct policy formation but set general parameters within which alternatives were generated for his review. "But it is not in his nature to assert himself in pursuit of his own policy. He waits until an issue has been presented to him; *then* he decides" (Menges 1988, 385-6). While Menges asserted that, in his judgment, when Reagan was presented with clear options he normally chose the correct policy, he conceded this process also was affected by the way these alternatives were presented. "If he can listen to a full discussion, he will usually make the right choice; if only one course is shown to him, that is the one he may well take" (1988, 386). The latter was the case for the Grenada invasion.

A December 1982 *Time* article by George J. Church entitled "How Reagan Decides" supported this assessment. It stated Reagan assumed the presidency believing he had a mandate to implement the principles on which he defeated Jimmy Carter. Among the most critical of these was the idea that Soviet adventurism, encouraged by American weakness, was the main threat to the United States; it could be checked only by a rapid buildup of American military forces. A second element was Reagan's personal optimism and certainty that this policy would succeed since its underlying tenets of the virtue of democracy and peace through strength were obviously (to him) correct ones. Lastly, and most important as Menges observed, staff tended to shape their policy recommendations to conform to this world view of President Reagan as they understood it. "Whether or not the decision was wise, the way in which it was reached illustrated a danger in Reagan's decision-making system: the President often gets a slightly skewed view of the world from his advisers, who present to him not the arguments they really believe but those that can be fitted into the Reagan cosmology" (Church 1982, 15).

By the end of 1981, according to Robert Osgood, the dominant theme of Reagan's foreign policy, to which all other major policies were subordinated, was firmly established: revitalizing the containment of Soviet expansion (Osgood 1985, 472). This required a bold effort to overcome the reluctance to use American military power due to the effects of what Reagan called the post-Vietnam syndrome. "In proclaiming this central theme, there was no pretention of an all-embracing grand design or even intimations of a Reagan Doctrine. The important point was to establish a central purpose and priority and to develop coherent policies consistent with each other" (1985, 473). By the time the Grenada incident arose in October 1983 that purpose, rolling back Soviet gains in the Third World, was very clear and ingrained in the foreign policy apparatus.

The effect of that well-developed mind set within the Reagan administration shows clearly in the descriptions of the planning phase of the Grenada invasion provided by those most directly involved in that effort. NSC member Menges, newly transferred there from the CIA, related his first thought upon hearing of the internal power struggle on that island was that it might provide an excellent chance to restore democracy there while protecting American citizens at the same time. It is important to note that allowing the situation to resolve itself or to engage in constructive diplomacy were two alternatives not given serious consideration from the beginning, only how American military power could be used to take advantage of this emergency situation. This approach was the primary issue placed before the senior NSC staff by Menges at its first meeting on Grenada held on October 13, 1983. The following week, at the October 18 NSC staff meeting presided over by Robert

McFarlane, the newly appointed National Security Advisor, this option was presented and accepted without serious debate (Menges 1988, 60-4).

On Thursday October 20, the NSC convened a Crisis Pre-Planning Group meeting on Grenada, bringing together State and Defense Department staffs. The Menges proposal was discussed and approved. That evening the first cabinet-level meeting on Grenada was held, whose participants included Vice President George Bush, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and Secretary of State George Shultz. In his own memoirs Weinberger related that by the time this meeting was called, his department already had been working out operational plans in anticipation of military action following the overthrow of the Bishop government the week before (Weinberger 1990, 106-7). Similarly, Shultz informed the group that his staff had been working along the same lines since October 10. Thus, by the time the president was informed of the plans regarding Grenada on October 22, the consensus for military action already had been formed and that was the only option presented to the chief executive. The final go-ahead came from Reagan on October 24, 1983, the same day he learned of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beruit, Lebanon.

In his October 27, 1983 address to the nation on the events in Lebanon and Grenada, President Reagan described how he viewed the two incidents. "The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists" (Cannon 1991, 449). The fact that both Cuban and Soviet military personnel were encountered by the invading American forces in Grenada was no coincidence, and served to reinforce the strategy of direct engagement that later became known as the Reagan Doctrine. In his assessment of the situation in his 1990 memoirs, Reagan wrote "I probably never felt better during my presidency than I did that day [his visit to Grenada]. I think our decision to stand up to Castro and the brownshirts on Grenada not only stopped the Communists in their tracks in that part of the world but perhaps helped all Americans stand a little taller" (Reagan 1990, 457-8). The influence of Reagan's personal convictions, illustrated by these comments, showed in the overall foreign policy approach of his administration. James Schlesinger observed much of that was driven by the president's instincts, rhetoric and ideological convictions which were reflected by his staff's actions on Grenada (Schlesinger 1985, 957).

The December 1989 American military intervention in Panama under President George Bush represented less the application of a formalized foreign policy doctrine and more of a personalized decision by the chief executive in response to a discrete set of provocations by a foreign leader. In this sense, it is quite different from the previous examples in the Johnson and Reagan administrations. Yet there are some important parallels in the way President Bush looked at the use of military force as a part of U.S. foreign policy and the approach taken by his predecessors.

First, military intervention was not simply an ad hoc impulse by the Bush administration but a reasonably calculated method of implementing core principles of its foreign policy. It demonstrated his acceptance of armed force as a legitimate mechanism to advance national interests. Bush stated in 1991, "Our world without the Cold War confrontation is a safer world, but it is no Garden of Eden. This [is] not the end of history. Men and nations still have their propensities for violence and for greed and for deceit" (Callahan 1994, 100). This realist view of the international political environment may not be explicitly identified as such but it forms the core thinking of most American foreign policy makers according to a former State Department official (Fukuyama 1992, 246). President Bush related his understanding of the practical role of military force in this regard in his address to the cadets at West Point on January 5, 1993. "Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice" (Haass 1994, 203). The Panama intervention clearly met these criteria.

A second factor that shaped the Bush perspective on the use of military force was its function to support America's burden of leadership as the sole remaining superpower after the end of the Cold War. Secretary of State James Baker and President George Bush both grew up in the period when the United States assumed this role, first as the director of the allied effort in World War II, and then as the foremost of the Western democracies in their standoff with the Soviet bloc. This had a strong impact on their understanding of the importance for America to carry out this responsibility. "Like George Bush, I was of a generation that embraced wholeheartedly the concept of Pax Americana, an America engaged as a force for creative and constructive change around the world. I still believe that in global affairs over the last fifty years, many things of enduring value have occurred in large part as a consequence of the dynamic involvement of American leadership. In my mind, this has always simply been a given" (Baker 1995, 276). He concluded his memoirs as Secretary of State by noting that the while the world is much safer and freer than at any time in its history, American leadership still is imperative to meet the dangers which are sure to arise given the intractability of regional conflicts around the globe (1995, 672).

President Bush presented the same vision in his January 31, 1990 State of the Union address. He observed that the United States faced a post-Cold War world of new challenges and opportunities which needed the leadership that only America can provide. "For more than 40 years, America and its allies held communism in check and ensured that democracy would continue to exist. And today, with communism crumbling, our aim must be to ensure democracy's advance, to take the lead in forging peace and freedom's best hope: a great and growing commonwealth of free nations" (Bush 1989, 133). As did Secretary Baker, President Bush warned that regional conflicts posed a threat to this commonwealth which called for the United States to remain strong enough and sure enough of its responsibility to defend its interests and ideals around the globe.

Joseph Nye (1990) argued the changing nature of American power still meant the United States was bound to lead in the world but in a different sense than during the Cold War era. Rather than matching the Soviet bloc in a bipolar relationship, a new strategy will require managing the geopolitical balance of power as a result of the independence of former Soviet-controlled nations in Eastern Europe and Asia. At the same time the emerging complex interdependence among both developed and Third World countries means that American direction and influence must be exercised through a range of multilateral regimes and institutions established for collective action in several different areas. While the United States has sufficient resources and economic capability to participate fully in these arenas, "[t]he critical question is whether it will have the political leadership and strategic vision to convert these power resources into real influence in a transitional period of world politics" (Nye 1990, 260). Bush showed his awareness of this need in his West Point address stating that, as the only superpower in the post-Cold War world, ". . . it is the role of the United States to marshal [sic] its moral and material resources to promote a democratic peace. It is our responsibility, it is our opportunity to lead. There is no one else" (Haass 1994, 201). This perception of how America fit into the global environment of the 1990's led to Bush's expression of a third factor affecting the use of military power in what he called a new world order.

This phrase appeared in the president's September 1990 speech to Congress shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. "A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak" (Callahan 1994, 122). What is important to see here is that this idea was expressed earlier as one of the reasons the United States intervened in Panama, which was to restore a constitutionally elected democratic government to the people who chose that form of rule, and to bring to justice a dictator indicted for drug trafficking under American laws. Secretary of State Baker pointed out that Defense Secretary Cheney aptly renamed the invasion Operation Just Cause. "At its core, Just Cause was an exercise in supporting democracy and the rule of law in the hemisphere" (Baker 1995, 193). In this regard, the effects of this aspect of the invasion went beyond restoring the legal Panamanian government by sending a message to other Latin American regimes, particularly those in Colombia and Nicaragua, that America was serious in its belief in these two values, and stood ready to back them up with force if necessary. Baker also stated the invasion led directly to the OAS adoption of the June 1991 Santiago declaration sponsored by the U.S., by which the member states committed the organization to collective action anywhere democracy was threatened in Latin America.

DISCUSSION

The premise of this study is that doctrine as the operationalized definition of American national interest has tended to favor military intervention over diplomatic and other measures in U.S. relations with Latin America. This relationship is illustrated in Table 7-1. The link between the operational code of presidents Johnson, Reagan and Bush and their respective doctrines appears to be consistent and follows a logical sequence leading up to the incident in each case study. However, the extent to which doctrine affected the decision making process in the three cases varies to some degree. The legal, metaphysical and ideological connotations Crabb suggested major American foreign policy doctrines possess were perceived differently by the participants in each situation, yet brought about the same choice to use military force as a mechanism to achieve the desired

TABLE 7-1: Operational Code - Foreign Policy Doctrine Link.

Operational Code	**Doctrine**	**Application**
Lyndon B. Johnson		
Philosophy of East-West conflict based on freedom and lack of it; also reflect disparate national interests of U.S. to promote democratic capitalism, and USSR support for international communist revolution. Instrumental view that agreement to limit conflict possible based on direct talks between leaders of both countries.	Johnson Doctrine identifies U.S. national interest in Latin America based on promoting economic growth, protecting U. S. investment, non-interference, and opposition to communism; Western Hemisphere stability incompatible with communism; U.S. intervention warranted to prevent establishment of second Cuba in Latin America.	Expansion of U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic beyond initial stage to evacuate American citizens due to potential of communist takeover of rebel forces in face of power vacuum. U.S. national security allows blocking communist-supported faction from gaining control of Dominican Republic.
Ronald Reagan		
Philosophy of stark contrast between American-style democracy and "evil empire" of Soviet communism; aggressive impulses of USSR expansion pose direct threat to U.S. national security. Instrumental view that in restoring American credibility by rebuilding military capability, U.S. can achieve peace through strength.	Reagan Doctrine calls for offensive steps to block Soviet expansion and to roll back existing sphere of influence; methods include direct support to "freedom fighters" resisting Soviet creation of new client states and seeking to overthrow existing communist client states.	Direct military intervention to remove Marxist government in Grenada receiving Soviet and Cuban technical and military support; provide training and weapons to Contras in Latin America, El Salvador government, and *mujahedin* in Afghanistan.
George Bush		
Philosophy of America as leader of new world order based on democracy, rule of law and international cooperation. Instrumental view of peace built on U.S. economic and political strength; military force as a legitimate means to promote and defend democracy as integral part of American national interest.	Open and realistic approach to military force patterned after Weinberger Doctrine (1984): situation vital to American national interests; clearly defined political and military objectives, milestones and exit strategy; sufficient force to achieve objectives; reasonable assurance of public and congressional support; and force used only as a last resort.	Restoration of duly elected constitutional Panamanian government, protection of U.S. citizens and bringing indicted drug dealer to justice before American court all met criteria for military invasion of Panama; conducted with sufficient force to achieve objectives.

solution (Crabb 1982, 374-7). This strongly implies that the principles embodied in these doctrines which were applied to the specific situations by these decision makers that led them to the military option.

The Dominican Republic intervention, as it expanded beyond evacuating civilians from Santo Domingo, became an effort to prevent any faction which might have communist supporters from gaining control of the government. The action clearly was a conscious decision by the president and his top advisors that the threat this possibility created to stability in the region was significant to American national security in the hemisphere. Therefore it warranted a full-scale military operation aimed at halting the conflict until the Organization of American States could stabilize the situation and eventually oversee free elections. In his October 12, 1965 remarks to correct public misperceptions of the Dominican episode, Undersecretary Mann specifically addressed the view that the rescue stage simply was a pretext for the more extensive intervention that followed. "All those in our Government who had full access to official information were convinced that the landing of additional troops was necessary in view of the clear and present danger of the forcible seizure of power by the Communists" (Mann 1965, 736). This explanation is supported by the recollections of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and President Lyndon Johnson. The Johnson-Mann Doctrine expressed by the president on May 2, 1965 explicitly stated this principle: "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere" (Crabb 1982, 235). Therefore it is reasonable to believe this perspective had a substantial impact on the choice to use military force to bring about this result.

This scenario was repeated in the 1983 invasion of Grenada, where the October 12 takeover of the island government by an overtly Marxist faction posed a threat to both that nation and others in the immediate region; it also was seen as a direct challenge to American national security in Latin America. In this case, the Reagan Doctrine called for not only resisting the creation of communist regimes but also the rollback of the existing Soviet sphere of influence through client states in the Third World. The overthrow of the leftist Bishop government by this avowed communist element quickly was recognized by administration officials as an opportunity to apply this principle. The National Security Council was so informed by Constantine Menges on October 20, and this soon became the basis for pursuing the military option over diplomatic negotiations (Menges 1988, 69-70). The recollections by Menges, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz indicated they all saw that only American military action would be able to remove the Grenadan revolutionary council. This was the only recommendation given to President Reagan, who approved it on October 22, 1983. The elimination of a communist regime in the region by swift and decisive armed force was the overriding consideration of the participants almost from the start of the decision making process to the exclusion of other courses of action.

The situation faced by the Bush administration in dealing with the Noriega regime in Panama during 1989 differed from the first two incidents in two major ways. First, with the end of the Cold War, the stark East-West conflict between democracy and communism disappeared in much of Latin America and other parts of the world. Thus it was more difficult to pinpoint the challenge to American national security posed by a distasteful regime that did not threaten directly its neighbors or U.S. interests in the region. The other distinguishing factor was the lack of a clearly articulated foreign policy doctrine by the newly elected president George Bush. However, he did express the need for American leadership in the post-Cold War era towards a new world order based on the rule of law, freedom to choose one's own form of government and international cooperation to maintain peace and stability. All of these principles were violated by Manuel Noriega as he secured his hold on the nation of Panama. In challenging the American sphere of influence in Latin America by declaring a state of war between the two countries, thereby creating the atmosphere where an attack on U.S. service personnel was condoned, Noriega gave President Bush the opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to the new world order principles through military means in December 1989. Just as Reagan felt compelled to make a strong example of his aggressive anti-communist doctrine in removing the Marxist regime in Grenada, Bush was predisposed to so for the U.S. leadership role in search of peace and security by replacing Noriega with the duly elected constitutional government he had abrogated.

Clinton administration policy. The Clinton doctrine on the use of military force is derived from the guidelines formalized by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell as modified based on the recent U.S. experiences in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia (Stevenson 1996, 514). This doctrine represents a broad consensus among military and civilian policy makers on how and when armed force is to be used as a part of American foreign policy. According to Stevenson, it is comprised of the following principles. First, when vital interests are at stake, the nation should use whatever force may be necessary to achieve a quick, decisive victory with low U.S. casualties; if less vital but still important issues are involved, limited military force is acceptable for specific, targeted objectives. Second, the civilian political leaders must give military commanders clear political objectives with defined attainable objectives. Third, mission progress indicators and a clear exit strategy must be in place before troops are committed to action. Finally, there should be reasonable assurance of public and congressional support for the proposed use of force prior to its initiation (Stevenson 1996, 512).

The importance of doctrine in the new global environment is shown in *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* issued annually by the Clinton administration under Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. It identifies the threats and opportunities facing the United States and the foreign policy approach to meet them. The February 1995 document begins:

> Protecting our nation's security - our people, our territory and our way of life - is my Administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty. The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America's security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half century - the threat of communist expansion - is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions (The White House 1995, i).

The report states American leadership in the world never has been as essential as it is today, and identifies three central goals for U.S. national security strategy to meet this range of threats: to sustain American security with military forces that are ready to fight, to bolster America's economic revitalization, and to promote democracy abroad.

The document also states that military force remains an indispensable element of the nation's power, and constitutes the core of its defenses in the post-Cold War era. Thus while America will use diplomacy as it always has where it can when national security interests are threatened, it remains fully ready to use force if it must. The United States will act with others when it can, but will act alone if necessary. At the same time, it is recognized that military force must be used selectively to provide the opportunity for diplomacy to work. The report cites the on-going protection of Kuwait from Iraqi under the no-fly zone, the Haiti intervention and Bosnia as examples of diplomacy backed by military power. It also says that while Iraq and Bosnia involved cooperative efforts with other nations, the United States stands prepared to act unilaterally if necessary to protect its interests in these regions.

CONCLUSION

The reliance on statements of doctrine has been part of the historical development of American foreign policy, providing a sense of coherence within which decision makers operated. The Monroe Doctrine defined and separated the two worlds of European power politics and the American democracies from 1823 to 1945. After World War II, the expansion of communism to the Third World by the Soviet Union led directly to promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, pledging the United States to contain this new political ideology behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe. President Lyndon Johnson essentially combined these two doctrines in his 1965 declaration that the United States had the right and obligation to prevent the establishment of a second communist government (besides Cuba) in the Western Hemisphere, including the use of military force in the Dominican Republic to resist such a threat to the national security of the American states. By intervening in Grenada in 1983 to remove an existing Marxist government, Ronald Reagan asserted an offensive foreign policy doctrine committing the U.S. to direct assistance for anti-communist "freedom fighters" around the world. Finally, the 1989 invasion of Panama, designed to restore a democratically elected government and secure free operation of the Panama Canal, was part of the Bush administration's concept of American leadership of a new world order based on the rule of law and international cooperation. This view of the United States as the preeminent power whose national interest requires active support of these objectives had been reinforced by President Clinton, demonstrated by the 1994 Haiti intervention.

This common vehicle of doctrinal statements to advance the national interests runs uninterrupted from 1823 to the present. Henry Kissinger cited Clinton's September 27, 1993 address to the United Nation General Assembly in which he identified the expansion of the circle of nations living under the free institutions of democracy and market-based economies as the basis of this latest new world order doctrine (Kissinger 1994, 805). The subsequent U.S. intervention in Haiti also demonstrated a paradox he associated with the role of military force as a mechanism to achieve these goals. That is, while the world community appears to accept peacekeeping to preserve existing arrangements which support these objectives, it has been reluctant to engage in peacemaking through active suppression of challenges to the existing world order. In line with this approach, the Clinton administration's February 1995 national security strategy statement indicated a preference for diplomacy, but retained military force an integral part of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus.

W. Y. Smith argued this reflects one part of an emerging pattern of this new era: the United States will be less willing and less able to take unilateral military action than it has been in the past (Smith 1992, 273). Other elements of this post-Cold War arrangement include a greater congressional role in decisions regarding use of military force, and changing perceptions of shared national interests of the United States and its traditional partners in Western Europe and Japan that may restrict the way America utilizes such force to advance its own goals. This means that the manner in which the United States has issued and relied upon foreign policy doctrines to conduct world affairs likely will change in the future. What Joyner (1992) referred to as their basis in international *realpolitik* or unilateral interpretation of self-defense rather than consensual international law may be forced to give way to greater cooperation among America's political and economic allies to pursue the new world order of free-market democracy.

Kissinger observed that the United States consistently has promoted its own Wilsonian perception of democratic values as the basis for world peace and stability, first in the Fourteen Points proposal in 1919 and again in the containment policy of the 1947 Truman Doctrine (Kissinger 1994, 805). However, both attempts ultimately failed in part because they were unable to adjust to changing power relationships among states and the destabilizing effects of ethnic nationalism. In fact, now more than ever, the need to recognize and accommodate a range of views on peace, stability and progress among the nations of the world while retaining its leadership role is the greatest challenge America faces within this new world order. As the controversy over almost all U.S. military actions in the post-Cold War period shows, achieving an international consensus on how such force should be used to promote these objectives is a critical part of carrying out this role (Kissinger 1994, 813). The ability of the United States to advance its own national interest through mechanisms like the doctrines issued by Presidents Johnson, Reagan, Bush and Clinton therefore represents a significant challenge in the conduct of foreign policy in this new and uncertain international environment.

Yet the attraction of doctrine to policymakers remains strong, even as its focus has changed. It began with Truman's vision of global containment of communism, leading almost 30 years later to Reagan's aggressive approach of rolling back Soviet gains in the Third World. With the end of communism, George Bush articulated his concept of a new world order based on democracy and the rule of law, where military force legitimately could be applied to restore stability under these objectives as in Panama and the Persian Gulf. The Clinton administration has advanced its own version of doctrine for the use of military force in the 1995 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, which it demonstrated in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.

Thus military force continues to be an integral element of American foreign policy. In addition, the role of doctrine to identify the appropriate application of this power still is of critical value to and influence upon decision makers at the highest levels. The need for a coherent, structured set of guidelines in the face of a highly uncertain international environment has become more important than ever. The likelihood that military intervention will occur appears reasonable, given recent experience since the end of the Cold War in 1989. The U.S. has a strong armed forces presence in the Panama Canal Zone, with active participation in anti-drug efforts throughout Latin America. With these means, and the motivation to promote stability and democracy in place, all that remains is the opportunity to arise to utilize them in the region once again.

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VITA

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James Gilchrist began his academic work in earnest after serving four years in the U.S. Army Security Agency from 1965 to 1969. Under the G. I. Bill, he completed a bachelor degree in political science at California State University, Fullerton in 1971, then in 1973 earned a Masters in Public Administration at UCLA. A twenty year career in local government followed, during the latter stages of which Mr. Gilchrist began teaching political science as an adjunct instructor at Pasadena City College and Glendale Community College. Encouraged by his department chair at Glendale, in 1993 Mr. Gilchrist embarked on the doctoral program at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

During this latest educational phase, he also has been active in local civic affairs. From 1994 to 1997 Mr. Gilchrist served on the 4th & Gill Historic Neighborhood Organization board, and is that community's representative to the Council of Involved Neighborhoods. Currently he is Vice President of the Center for Neighborhood Development.

Mr. Gilchrist plans to continue teaching and will begin work on articles covering American diplomatic history as well as comparative politics of the Middle East. A book on American foreign policy also is planned for the future. All of these endeavors reflect his great fascination with the life-long learning process.