




To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Nick Kistenmacher entitled "The Obsession for Appropriation: How the Bureaucratic Need for Publicity Has Resulted in Tragedy." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.



Dr. Anthony Nownes, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:



Accepted for the Council



Associate Vice Chancellor and
Dean of the Graduate School

The Obsession for Appropriation

How the Bureaucratic Need for Publicity Has Resulted in Tragedy

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Arts Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Nick Kistenmacher
August 1999

Dedication

I dedicate this work to the memory of the eighty-eight innocent lives described in the following pages.

Acknowledgements

There are many people to whom I am grateful for making my two years at the University of Tennessee so rewarding. First, I must thank Dr. Anthony Nownes, Dr. Patricia Freeland and Dr. Tom Ungs. Despite their busy schedules, they have always been available to offer their assistance and advice. All of their classes were interesting, informative and enjoyable at the same time - a rare combination. Most importantly, they have always tolerated my obnoxious tirades in class.

There are many others who I must recognize for the support they have given to me over the years. From Knoxville, they include Scott and April Bennett, Robert and Amy Hervey, fellow men in blue Sean Powell, Mark Kohn, and Pearce Didier, Angie Jones, LeeAnn Lynch, the Hodges staff at AV and circulation, and all at UTPD especially Dennis Danilchuk, Tracy Case, Sgt. Carl Kelly, and Sgt. Becky Richmond.

From George Washington University, I must express gratitude to the great faculty, including Dr. Phyllis Langton, Dr. Bernie Pitzvada, Dr. Marius Deeb, Dr. Charles Elliott, Jim Levy, and John Albertson. Also, I have to thank Ron Russo, Omarr Aleem, Jay Michney, Jon Cordani, and John Wynn for all the good times.

From Baltimore, I am grateful for lifelong friends like David, Ed, Sallie, and Eric Papenfuse. I am also grateful to Fr. Hartley, Saunders Allen, Keith Hannon, and Kirk Kazazian for helping me survive high school.

Finally, I must express my appreciation to my parents, Thomas and Rosemarie Kistenmacher, and my brother, Matthew, for their unconditional encouragement, love and support.

Abstract

This thesis examines what has happened as a result of bureaucracies placing more importance on their budget appropriations than on doing what the agency was created for to the best of its abilities. Two case studies were observed, the 1986 Challenger disaster and the 1993 BATF raid on the Branch Davidians outside of Waco, Texas. In addition, different contemporary views of bureaucracy, checks on the bureaucracy, and the role of the media were examined in order to help understand how these events transpired. The conclusion reached is that it is extremely rare that bureaucrats make mistakes that result in disaster. However, in the two case studies, the bureaucratic need for mass media coverage and increasing appropriations superseded better and more rational decision making. The Challenger and Waco tragedies could have been easily avoided. Unfortunately, many lives were lost unnecessarily.

Table of Contents

Chapter	Page
I Introduction.....	1
II Different Views of the Bureaucracy.....	2
III Checks on the Bureaucracy.....	6
IV The Media.....	11
V The Challenger Disaster.....	14
VI Armageddon in Waco.....	21
VII Conclusion.....	34
References.....	36
Vita.....	41

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the United States, there are entities known as bureaucratic agencies. They exercise much of the power in the American governmental system. There is a system set up to oversee these bureaucratic agencies. Unfortunately, the actors in oversight have not always fulfilled their individual duties. Because of this, bureaucrats seldom face accountability for their actions. Thus, many federal agencies like the FBI, IRS, DEA, CIA, NASA and the BATF sometimes pursue their duties without the fear of scrutiny.

Most of the time, bureaucratic agencies do not need publicity. However, when there is doubt in Congress about the necessity of these bureaucratic agencies, bureaucrats realize they need public support to maintain or increase their budget appropriations. It is at these moments that agencies believe they must create "media events" to garner public support. Unfortunately, these events, though rare, can sometimes lead to disasters. Two examples are the 1986 Challenger explosion and the 1993 BATF raid on the Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas.

By analyzing different views of the bureaucracy, checks on the bureaucracy and the role of the media, as well as the specific circumstances of the two case studies, this thesis examines how these tragedies came to be.

Chapter 2: Different Views of the Bureaucracy

Within the American government there are policymakers who few people know by name. They are bureaucrats. The term "bureaucrat" has come to have a negative connotation. There is a reason for this. Bureaucrats are seen as self-interested individuals intent on maximizing their own benefits such as salary, perquisites, reputation, patronage, power and ease of management (Niskanen, 1973). Most of the time, the top priority is maximizing their own budgets, either because this is the prerequisite for other personal goals (Niskanen, 1973), or because that is the easiest thing for researchers to examine (Schneider, 1989). Others have recognized that bureaucrats' goals might include satisfying their clients, but also count this as a form of selfish behavior on the basis that they must derive personal gratification from it (Parks and Ostrom, 1981).

There are many who disagree with the negative perception of bureaucrats. These defenders of bureaucrats point to a time in U.S. history when centralized government and bureaucracy were considered to be positive forces. It is true that earlier in this century citizens looked to government to repair such problems as air, water, and toxic pollution, automobile safety, energy underproduction, deficient education, and poverty. This resulted in the creation in large government bureaucracies, most notably in the Roosevelt and Johnson administrations. Furthermore, during the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century there was the belief that bureaucracies improved the operation of the U.S. system in areas as diverse as interstate commerce, banking, foods, and monopolistic practice (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

Many conservatives advance the notion that bureaucrats are primarily concerned with devoting themselves to the advancement of their own political objectives. It is also argued that bureaucrats constantly calculate the political costs and benefits to themselves of policies being developed or changed in the larger governmental arena, that they design strategies to increase the benefits accruing to them, that they lobby the Congress and the president in pursuit of these strategies, that they seek to develop constituency support wherever possible and use other available political resources, such as the media, to argue and advance their case (Yates, 1982).

Bureaucratic defenders attack the conservative view of bureaucracies as slow, lumbering giants that accomplish little and are generally unresponsive to public preferences. They point to evidence that suggests that bureaucracy is both responsive and efficient. For example, research shows that on average about 60 percent of all Americans have personal encounters with bureaucracy each year. In these encounters a large majority say they came away satisfied that their needs had been met expeditiously and fairly (Hill, 1992).

Defenders of bureaucrats concede that not every bureaucratic decision is correct or every program well run, but insist that citizens and public officials nevertheless have strong protection against bureaucratic misjudgments and other suspect behaviors because bureaucrats are faithful to the administrative process values of accessibility, accountability, responsiveness, participation, and responsibility. They point out that in a world of conflicting interests, where there is often no simple right decision or perfect solution, a commitment to these process values is the best insurance the country can have that bureaucrats are performing both democratically and efficiently (Yates, 1982).

The basis of the popular negative view of bureaucracy is a complex phenomenon originating from many sources. These sources include hostile campaign rhetoric, media hyperbole, American political culture, and tension resulting from the exchanges between citizens and bureaucrats. Consequently, many politicians have eagerly taken up the cause of attacking the allegedly bloated, unresponsive, inefficient, unproductive, slow and out of touch federal bureaucracy. In recent years candidates of both political parties have adopted anti-Washington, anti-bureaucratic rhetoric as standard components of their campaign speeches. Of these politicians, President Reagan is perhaps best remembered for attacking the bureaucracy. But it must be noted that such ideologically diverse presidential candidates as Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and even Ted Kennedy found it useful to blame the bureaucracy (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

The media have also contributed to popular perceptions of the bureaucracy as an unresponsive and inefficient institution. Charles Goodsell argued that one source the critics of bureaucracy always draw upon is that item found in almost every edition of every daily newspaper, what he called the bureaucratic horror story. He described these stories as a graphic and sympathetic account of how some citizen has been mistreated by incompetent bureaucrats or how in some other way a great bureaucratic error has been committed (Goodsell, 1983).

Finally, in addition to bureaucratic horror stories, editorial writers and widely read columnists like Cal Thomas, George Will, and Ann Coulter have usually expressed negative opinions about the bureaucracy. Also, popular talk show hosts like Rush Limbaugh and Armstrong Williams have expressed similar feelings. All things

considered, there is no reason to believe that bureaucracy will be presented in a more positive light by the media any time soon (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

Chapter 3: Checks on the Bureaucracy

There is a system that is intended to oversee the bureaucratic agencies in the federal government in order to ensure that tragedies like Challenger and Waco never happen again. Even though there are many different actors involved in this system, each one of them has incentives not to fulfill their obligations.

There exist many checks on the bureaucracy. It is subordinate to the Constitution, Congress, the president, and the courts. Internal checks and the media can also act as safeguards. The Constitution provides certain rights to citizens in their dealings with the bureaucracy, such as due process and equal protection of the laws. Congress and the president are jointly responsible for establishing policymaking directions and boundaries on the bureaucracy. The courts adjudicate cases and controversies involving the bureaucracy as a litigant. Nevertheless, the check on bureaucracy imposed by Congress, the president, and the courts is effective only to the extent that these major institutional actors actually use that check. These institutions were not designed to control the bureaucracy since there is no evidence that the founders anticipated its modern development (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

The fact that Congress has the ability to influence the flow of financial resources is a very important instrument of control over the bureaucracy. The reason for this is that no bureaucracies can exist without money. Financial control is exercised through the GAO [General Accounting Office] and through legislative committees, especially the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives. Legislative committees are important to the control process because they are likely to limit or curtail funds for

organizations and programs they do not support. That is a powerful inducement for bureaucrats to recognize the desires of legislators. Congress can also influence the bureaucracy by their methods of controlling personnel policies. These methods include Senate confirmations of nominations and the congressional power of impeachment. Also, Congress is empowered to investigate any part of government at will. Also, with or without executive consent, legislators have the power to create or abolish departments and agencies, to specify their internal structures, and to demand or refuse administrative changes (Lutrin and Settle, 1992).

Congress as a whole is not an effective check on the bureaucracy. Research has shown that the primary motivation for senators and representatives is a desire for re-election (Fiorina, 1981). Since oversight of the bureaucracy has a low payoff in terms of political visibility and votes, oversight hearings may occur too infrequently for effective supervision. The result is that Congress tends to respond to problems only after they happen (Wood and Waterman, 1994). It is also true that Congress's power of impeachment and the Senate's ability to deny confirmation of executive branch nominations are extremely rarely executed.

The president has a number of very important checks on the bureaucracy. The president has extensive powers with regard to budgets, personnel, organization, and legislation (Koenig, 1981). The president can appoint and subject to Senate confirmation more than twenty-five hundred officials (Lutrin and Settle, 1992). Furthermore, several attempts have been made to reform the bureaucracy that emanated from the executive branch. The Ash Council under President Nixon, reorganization plans under President Carter, the Grace Commission under President Reagan, and Vice President Gore's

“reinventing government” proposals were four of the many high-profile efforts to identify or reduce waste in the federal bureaucracy (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

The president can also be a weak check on the bureaucracy. Like Congress, the president lacks the motivation for effective supervision. There are few benefits to be derived from directing the bureaucracy. Certainly, the president cannot personally supervise the bureaucracy because of its enormous size and diversity. The White House staff is also small relative to the entire federal bureaucracy, which implies that the president has difficulty in obtaining the information necessary to monitor and control the bureaucracy. There are also a substantial number of agencies that exist outside the federal branch and that are therefore farther removed from executive control (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

The courts can be an effective check on the bureaucracy. To begin with, bureaucrats are called into court thousands of times a year to explain their actions, and why their proceedings were sensible and within the confines of the law (Riley, 1987). More significantly, Supreme Court decisions can have an enormous impact on bureaucrats at all levels. The Supreme Court decision in 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education*, which outlawed segregation in the nation’s public schools, set in motion massive changes in public policy. Bureaucrats continue to deal with issues that stemmed from that case, including busing to magnet schools and school funding. The Supreme Court rulings in the 1978 *University of California v. Bakke* case and subsequent affirmative action cases have also had a profound effect on bureaucrats (Lutrin and Settle, 1992).

Overall, the courts are a weak check on the bureaucracy. First of all, the federal judiciary is a non-democratic institution consisting of appointed, tenured-for-life personnel. There is little reason to expect that it would have much concern for popular preferences. Also, for the courts to act, there must be a case or controversy involving an individual or entity with standing to sue the bureaucracy. Lawsuits are expensive and take a long time, which suggests that bureaucratic accountability is biased towards elites and may be slow in coming. Moreover, the courts have for the most part deferred to the bureaucracy on matters of policy or adjudication, except where procedural errors or denials of constitutional rights exist (Wood and Waterman, 1994).

The media has had the capacity to be a powerful influence in checking the abuses of bureaucracy and making it more responsive to public needs. For example, aggressive reporting by the *New York Times*' Seymour Hersh has been responsible for revealing some of the most astonishing abuses in recent years including the 1968 massacre of 109 civilians at My Lai, as well as its cover-up during the Johnson administration (Lutrin and Settle, 1992). Another example is the *Washington Times*' Bill Gertz's reporting on the Clinton administration's selling out national security for illegal campaign contributions. The threat of reporters uncovering abuses certainly affects bureaucratic decision-making.

Most of the time, however, the media pays only limited attention to bureaucratic operations. Most bureaucratic decision making unfolds over a long period of time, is presented in a technical or highly detailed form, and is not particularly dramatic. This means that the bureaucracy typically does not provide interest for reporters. What is needed is a crisis or a scandal or a dramatic failure in policy to make an interesting story (Yates, 1982).

Internal checks can act as safeguards against abuse. Lutrin and Settle write that many noted theorists have held that professional ethics alone serves as an internal check on bureaucracy, encouraging honesty among public servants. However, with the seemingly continuous allegations of bureaucratic wrongdoing, relying solely on this internal check may be naïve (Lutrin and Settle, 1992). Other internal checks include the internal audit, which provides an independent analysis of the soundness of managerial practices. At the national level the Budget and Accounting Act, enacted in 1950 and amended in 1982, makes it clear that each agency must have internal systems of control (Rosen, 1989).

Another useful device for bringing about greater bureaucratic responsiveness is whistle blowing. Whistle-blowing means exposing to the public any irregularities or wrongdoing that occur at one's place of work (Lutrin and Settle, 1992). Unfortunately, there are few courageous whistleblowers like former FBI agent Gary Aldrich. The fact is that most whistle-blowers pay a heavy price for their actions. Research shows that 59 percent lost their jobs, 15 percent suffered loss of responsibilities and/or salary loss, and 19 percent suffered harassment or transfer. Whistleblowers faced protracted legal actions, most often paid out of their own pockets. Harassment, loss of job, and legal entanglements took a personal toll as well. Thirty-one percent sought psychiatric counseling, and 26 percent consulted medical personnel (Joss, Thompkins, and Hays, 1989).

Chapter 4: The Media

Throughout American history, the media have played a significant role in people's lives. One important responsibility of the media is to inform the American people of the duties of their government. Another is to examine how well the government follows through with its responsibilities. People depend upon the mass media to entertain them, guide them, and give them the sense of the larger world than what they experience everyday. A large portion of our daily lives is mediated by mass communication (Nimmo and Combs, 1990). As society has grown more complex, mass media have become the main sources of information about society at large. People have grown increasingly dependent on mass communication. This shows one possibility that peoples' opinions can be changed as a result of media. The more mass-mediated information meets people's needs, the more dependent they are on it and, hence, the more influential are the media (Nimmo and Combs, 1990).

The form of media with the most impact is television. Bureaucrats consider this when they make executive decisions. Opinion polls indicate that since 1963, a higher proportion of Americans have named television as their primary news source rather than newspapers, radio, magazines, or other people. Four in 10 say TV is their sole source of news. More than 80 percent of respondents rated ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN "highly believable or believable" (Nimmo and Combs, 1990). Television news is the most believed source of public affairs information. If exposed to conflicting reports from different media sources, 55 percent of the public indicated that they would believe television, while only 21 percent would give greater credence to newspapers. Americans

increasingly consider television news to be less biased and more accurate than news from print or radio sources (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993). Television news enjoys significant advantages over the print media as a source of information because it has a bigger audience, more power to cover events live, and the ability to provide the images that grip an audience's attention. Between 1980 and 1990, the percentage of Americans reporting that they rely solely on television increased from 39 percent to 58 percent (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993).

Nimmo and Combs write that through fantasies portrayed in melodramatic ways, TV news is a key influence on what enters into the viewers' mind and what does not. Thus, even though it may not inform people, "TV news offers simplified visions priming certain aspects of national life while ignoring others and thereby setting the terms by which political judgments are rendered and political choices made" (Nimmo and Combs, 1990). It is also true that only a modest degree of news coverage into network newscasts can induce significant shifts in viewers' beliefs about the importance of issues (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993). To summarize, television news provides much of the information upon which voters base their political judgments and choices.

The media have become dependent upon official government sources to write their news stories. This has shaped the news and how it is presented. The way television presents national problems may either shield or expose politicians to the public's attributions of responsibility. Issues that are framed primarily in episodic terms tend to produce attributions of responsibility that do not focus on politicians. The public is likely to adopt the views that are dominant in the news, and those views tend to be the views of the Washington elite policy-setting bureaucrats (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993).

Knowing this, bureaucrats aim to use the press to advance their policy positions. Leon Sigal notes that it has come to be that news in Washington can be seen as the product of the interaction of two bureaucracies, one composed of the media and the other as public officials. These officials disclose information in an effort to assemble and maintain support for a particular course of action. The reporter and the official use each other to advance in their own organizations. The reporter exploits his or her contacts in the government to obtain exclusives while the official exploits the need for news to deliver messages to key audiences (Sigal, 1973).

The need for publicity has altered the behavior of bureaucrats. Media management, image building, credit taking, blame avoidance, and public relations have become more important to bureaucratic success than policy expertise and problem solving skills. Appearance and imagery have become the most important considerations (Nimmo and Combs, 1990).

Chapter 5: The Challenger Disaster

One of the most blatant examples of an agency going through with a publicity-driven event despite the strong possibility of a catastrophe was the Challenger disaster. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had invited hundreds of news agencies to cover the event. Millions of people were watching on television at home, at work, and even at barbershops. Thousands of schoolchildren anticipated the launch as a prelude to the televised lessons Christa McAuliffe was going to give from space. NASA's goal of gaining worldwide media attention was accomplished. It looked to be a publicity coup. If the launch was successful, acclaim and more importantly, increased budget appropriations would follow. With all this at stake, NASA was extremely reluctant to postpone the shuttle launch despite the fact that engineers warned that a horrific tragedy might occur.

NASA had touted the Challenger mission as one of its greatest accomplishments. The explosion turned what should have been a shining moment into a debacle of epic proportions. On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded into a fireball 73 seconds into its flight. All seven astronauts aboard, Francis R. Scobee, Michael J. Smith, Judith A. Resnik, Ellison S. Onizuka, Ronald E. McNair, Gregory B. Jarvis, and the high school teacher from New Hampshire Christa McAuliffe, were incinerated.

The country was shocked and President Reagan ordered a presidential commission to look into the matter. On June 9, 1986, the Rogers Commission announced that it had concluded that the explosion occurred due to seal failure in one of Challenger's solid rocket booster joints. Top management at NASA and Morton Thiokol (NASA's

shuttle program contractor) had been aware of problems with O-ring seals, but agreed to launch against the recommendation of engineers. Engineers had alerted Morton Thiokol and NASA to problems with the O-rings as early as January 1985. Yet several shuttle launches prior to the Challenger had been approved without correcting the hazards (Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellican, 1989).

Publicity had not always been a top priority for NASA. NASA had enjoyed almost complete political and budgetary support from the time it was established in the midst of the Cold War until the late 1960s. Soon after the spectacular lunar landing, however, NASA faced a leveling off of both its political and financial support. A number of factors contributed to this, including NASA's apparent victory in the "space race," and America's attention turned increasingly toward Vietnam and economic issues. The space program no longer took priority.

With the public's attention turned away from NASA, it realized that single events, such as the lunar landing and a possible mission to Mars, only bring temporary publicity. For NASA to thrive, it needed to find a task that it could perform for several years, if not decades. Therefore, a new emphasis was placed on concentrating on capabilities, rather than particular destinations. A permanent, orbiting space station, which became known as the space shuttle, was the answer. NASA knew there could be endless interesting experiments to do on board such a station (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987). Wilson states that "some critics believe that NASA turned to the space shuttle program as a way of keeping itself in the public eye even though the shuttle itself was an inefficient and dangerous way to put payloads into orbit" (Wilson, 1989).

During the period when funding was no longer automatic, NASA was forced to take part in the lobbying aspect of the political process. This was made even more necessary by rising opposition to the shuttle program from the executive branch's Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB had developed a negative assessment of the program because of a report written by a presidential scientific advisory committee and the RAND Corporation. To improve their standing with both the executive and legislative branches, NASA had to do two things. First, it had to gain presidential endorsement for the space shuttle program. Second, it had to enter into political coalitions with groups that it had previously ignored or fought in the policy-making arena, as well as with its traditional supporters in government and among its contractors (Romzeck and Dubnick, 1987).

The space shuttle program was designed to attract the support of those who might take advantage of its capacity to launch satellites and conduct scientific and technological experiments in space. Aided by the military, the scientific community, and parts of the business community, NASA was able to get President Nixon's backing for the shuttle program in 1972 despite OMB's opposition (Romzeck and Dubnick, 1987). Political accountability was no longer secondary at NASA. It had become critical in guaranteeing NASA's existence as a viable agency. More recently, the need for public and political support was apparent in NASA's widely publicized efforts to include members of Congress like John Glenn and civilians like Christa McAuliffe on shuttle flights.

Despite successful missions such as the lunar landing in 1969 and the first shuttle launch, Columbia, in 1981, NASA's budget was cut in half between 1970 and 1986. Overall, NASA's staff was cut 40 percent and the administration's safety and quality

control staff were cut by 71 percent (Romzeck and Dubnick, 1987). NASA had to economize to protect the shuttle program. Accepting lower cost technologies and making extravagant claims for the shuttle's economic potential became necessary. The external pressures were easily translated into internal decisions that set an overly ambitious launch schedule. NASA was forced to do this to appease various actors, including the White House, Congress, the media, and the agency's military and private sector customers who were important actors in NASA's supportive political coalition (Romzeck and Dubnick, 1987).

This need to appease political actors caused NASA to make a decision based on budgetary considerations instead of scientific evidence that supported a postponement of the launch. On January 27, 1986, the day before the disaster, Arnie Thompson, Supervisor of Rocket Motor Cases, received a phone call from Boyd Brinton, Thiokol's Manager of Project Engineering. Brinton relayed the concerns of NASA's Larry Wear about the 18-degree temperature forecast for the next day. This phone call precipitated a series of phone calls within Morton Thiokol, at the Marshall Space Flight Center, and at the Kennedy Space Center that culminated in a three-way telecon involving three teams of engineers and managers that began 8:15 PM (Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellican, 1989).

Joe Kilminster, Vice President of Morton Thiokol, began the telecon by turning the presentation of the engineering charts over to Roger Boisjoly, Senior Scientist at Morton Thiokol and rocket seal expert, and Arnie Thompson. They presented 13 charts that resulted in a recommendation against the launch of the Challenger. Boisjoly voiced his concerns about the O-rings. He pointed out that the tremendous pressure and release of power from the shuttle's rocket boosters created rotation in the field joint such that the

middle moves away from the O-rings so that they cannot maintain contact with metal surfaces. If, at the same time, erosion occurred in the primary O-ring for any reason, then there would be a reduced probability of maintaining a secondary seal. It was highly probable that as the temperature dropped, the primary O-ring would erode, and a catastrophe might occur when the secondary O-ring failed to seal (Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellican, 1989).

Bob Lund presented the final chart that included the Morton Thiokol recommendation that the temperature be greater than 53 degrees to proceed with the launch. Since the overnight low was predicted to be 18 degrees, Bob Lund recommended against launch until the seal temperature exceeded 53 degrees. That might not happen for days, if not weeks. NASA's Larry Mulloy bypassed Bob Lund and directly asked Joe Kilminster for his reaction. Kilminster stated that he supported the position of his engineers and he would not recommend launch below 53 degrees. George Hardy, Deputy Director of Science and Engineering at MSFC, said he was, "appalled at that recommendation" (Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellican, 1989). Nevertheless, Hardy would not recommend launching if Morton Thiokol was against it.

Larry Mulloy objected to Morton Thiokol's recommendation because temperature had not been a factor in previous cold weather launches. He suggested that Thiokol was trying to establish a new 53-degree launch criteria, and that this was not acceptable the night before a launch. Although other NASA officials also objected to the association of temperature with O-ring erosion and a gas leak, Roger Boisjoly demonstrated that there was indeed a relationship: The lower the temperature the higher the probability of erosion

and leak, and the greater the likelihood of an accident. Finally, Joe Kilminster asked for a five-minute caucus "off net" (Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellican, 1989).

According to Boisjoly's testimony before the Rogers Commission, Jerry Mason, Senior Vice President of Wasatch Operations, began the caucus by saying that, "a management decision is necessary." Sensing that an attempt would be made to overturn the "no launch" decision, Boisjoly and Thompson attempted to re-review the material previously presented for the executives in the room. According to Boisjoly, after he and Thompson made their last attempts to stop the launch, Jerry Mason asked rhetorically, "Am I the only one who wants to fly?" (Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellican, 1989) Mason turned to Bob Lund and asked him to "take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat" (Boisjoly, Curtis, and Mellican, 1989). The four managers held a brief discussion and voted unanimously to recommend Challenger's launch.

James Q. Wilson notes in his *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, that the engineers in NASA and the firms contracted by NASA were a gifted and dedicated group that had accomplished extraordinary feats. However, their approach to their work may have created blind spots. Engineers value quantitative data and distrust personal opinions. Therefore, the anxieties that some may have felt about the readiness of the shuttle to be launched were not as forcefully expressed as they might have been or attended to as seriously as they should have been because they were perceived as hunches, not facts or numbers (Wilson, 1989).

Wilson also points out that engineers were not the only ones to blame. There were many contributing factors such as the pressure to move quickly with the launch schedule, budget cuts that resulted in a shortage of spare parts, unwise reductions in

quality-assurance inspectors, and management decisions to accept higher risks because nothing had gone wrong in previous launches. Warnings that should have been heeded were not. Organizational checks and balances designed to enforce safety rules were ineffective. But these contributing factors may have been tolerated in part because of the confidence a highly mission-oriented organization had that it could meet any challenge and overcome any difficulty (Wilson, 1989).

Unfortunately, NASA is not the only bureaucratic agency to have a tragedy occur in the name of funding despite evidence that supported a different course of action.

Seven years later, history would repeat itself in rural Texas.

Chapter 6: Armageddon in Waco

One of the best examples of a bureaucratic agency that used the media to improve its public and financial status is the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' (BATF) raid on the Branch Davidians in February, 1993. The BATF attempted to raise its standing in the eyes of the American public, and more importantly, members of Congress. The BATF was facing a March 10, 1993, hearing in front of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government. BATF leadership believed that it needed some good publicity to demonstrate its effectiveness, justify its existence, and increase its budget for future paramilitary operations. Arresting dozens of "religious fanatics" and displaying a big weapons cache would surely generate excellent publicity. Future revelations that the weapons were found to be legal and that the charges had been dropped would receive little or no mention in the media. The BATF believed that such positive publicity could be used to justify more gun control laws, which would necessitate an even bigger budget. Also, there would be funds to cover the costs of promotions, perks, and pensions for BATF officials and agents.

On Sunday February 28, 1993, BATF agents, dressed in combat gear, assaulted a large wooden residence in Mount Carmel, Texas, near Waco. The official Treasury Department report states, "The raid by ATF agents on the Branch Davidian compound resulted from its enforcement of contemporary federal firearms laws. In a larger sense, however, the raid fit within a historic, well-established, and well-defended government interest in prohibiting and breaking up all organized groups that sought to arm or fortify

themselves" (*Report of the Department ...*, 1993). This finding is accurate, yet the true motive of the raid was to increase BATF's budget.

Around the time of this operation, the agency was a beleaguered and maligned bureaucracy. Some politicians were calling for its abolition. In January, *60 Minutes* had just done an expose about female BATF agents who alleged routine sexual harassment and even attempted rape. Black BATF agents were suing for job discrimination. Facing the budget hearing in two weeks, the bureau believed that a televised film of a well-executed raid against a "heavily armed cult" would offset all of the bad publicity. Such an extraordinary raid would show what the agency was "really made of."

The BATF's routine work, such as enforcing the Contraband Cigarette Act, rarely received media attention. The Bureau needed an event that would attract television cameras. In fact, after the rerun of the *60 Minutes* January episode on May 23, 1993, Mike Wallace declared, "Almost all the agents we talked to said that they believe the initial attack on the cult in Waco was a publicity stunt - the main goal of which was to improve the ATF's tarnished image" (Moore, 1995).

The BATF wanted to ensure that the media, especially television networks, were present to witness its moment of glory. If the raid on Mount Carmel went as planned, officials hoped that it would make the BATF as well known, and nearly as well funded, as the FBI. To accomplish this, the bureau set two goals for itself. One was to have the agents videotape the preparation and the raid itself. The second was to make the national nightly news. For this second goal to be fulfilled, certain agents informed the media of what was going to occur.

Special Agents Sharon Wheeler and Franceska Perot's jobs were to make footage of the raid and its preparation available to news crews. Their responsibility, as Wheeler later told a congressional committee, was to put a spin on the news. "You want to promote your agency in a good light, and ATF hired public information officers over the last two years, to do that, to show the agency in a good light" (Reavis, 1995). Wheeler filmed the operation's commanders as they dressed for war and climbed into three helicopters from which they would film the action. The ground troops also carried cameras which were stuffed in their pockets and hanging off their uniforms, along with flash-bang grenades, handcuffs, and ammunition. Preparations to film the assault had been so intensive they inspired a code name for the event, "Showtime."

A few days earlier, Wheeler had telephoned several television stations to find out who would be available on February 28. Two reporters said that Wheeler told them, "we have something big going down on Sunday" (Moore, 1995). KWTX-TV cameraman Dan Mulloney testified that KWTX-TV's initial information came from agents as well as from a private ambulance driver working with the BATF. There were approximately a dozen members of the media present to witness the raid and ensuing gun battle. Agents made no attempt to stop the news people from following them. In fact, one television crew trailed agents right up to the Mount Carmel driveway (Moore, 1995).

It is unfortunate that the BATF chose the raid on Mount Carmel to be its shining moment. A great deal of evidence existed to show that the Branch Davidians wanted to work with both local and national law enforcement. The violence that occurred on February 28 was totally unnecessary and could have been easily avoided. In the past, the Davidians had always been extremely cooperative. Davidian Clive Doyle described how

Davidian leader David Koresh's relations with local sheriffs were very positive. "David always welcomed people in. He had given the invitation to sheriff's deputies to call or come out if they had any questions about anything. A Texas Ranger had come out there. He was welcomed. Deputies came out on a social basis, to fish, trade gun or car parts, talk about cars or guns. They would drive by and wave, very friendly" (Pate, 1994).

In reality, it was the BATF that was the uncooperative party. Agent Davy Aguilera refused to talk with Koresh by telephone on July 30, 1992 when gun dealer Henry McMahon had him on the phone in Aguilera's presence. Koresh told McMahon to tell the BATF agents to "come on out," and he would answer any questions (Tabor and Gallagher, 1995). Davidian David Thibodeau asserts Koresh also tried to reassure BATF undercover agent Robert Rodriguez about the Davidians' willingness to cooperate, telling him, "If there are any problems, I've invited the sheriff's department in here a number of times. If they have any questions they can knock on the door and work with me" (Thibodeau interview, 1993). After the raid ended, in a telephone conversation Koresh told BATF agent Jim Cavanaugh, "It would have been better if you just called me up and talked to me. Then you could have come in and done your work" ("Koresh to agents ..." ,1993). Despite the Branch Davidians' history of cooperation with local authorities and with the agency, the BATF, driven by the bureaucratic imperative to expand its operations and budget, decided to go forward with a dangerous paramilitary raid.

In its zeal to improve its image, not only did the BATF dismiss the cooperation of the Davidians, they even overlooked the laws. The BATF was not in any way legally justified in executing its paramilitary operation. On February 25, 1993, United States magistrate judge Dennis Green signed a search warrant. The warrant was based on

BATF agent Davy Aguilera's "Probable Cause Affidavit." The affidavit provides a chronological account of his investigation and reports of possible firearms violations at Mount Carmel in the late spring of 1992. Most of the affidavit is a technical discussion of the parts and procedures necessary for turning regular rifles into automatic weapons, the schedule of deliveries of parts and weapons to the group, and the circumstantial evidence that Davidians were converting semiautomatic weapons to fully automatic weapons without having paid the proper fees as following the legal procedures for registration.

It must be noted that the entire legal issue between the BATF and Koresh had to do with paperwork, fees, and registration, not possession of the alleged weapons and materials themselves. No matter how objectionable some Americans might find the stockpiling of weapons, what the law forbids is clear: "the manufacture, possession, transfer, transport, or ship in interstate commerce of machine guns, machinegun conversion parts, or explosives which are classified, by Federal law, as machineguns, and/or destructive devices, including any combination of parts, designed and intended for use in converting any firearm into a machinegun, or into a destructive device as defined by Federal law, and from which a device may be readily assembled, without them being lawfully registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record" (Tabor and Gallagher, 1995). In fact, the Davidians' entire weapons stockpile equaled less than three guns per resident, compared to the Texas average of four per resident (Wattenburg, 1993).

Davy Aguilera's investigation of shipments from various arms vendors and of gun dealer Henry McMahon's records indicated that during 1992 the Branch Davidians

acquired the following firearms and related explosive paraphernalia: 104 AR-15/M-16, upper-receiver groups with barrels; 8,100 rounds of nine-millimeter and .223 caliber ammunition for AR-15 /M-16; 20 one-hundred round capacity drum magazines for AK-47 rifles; 260 M-16/AR-15, magazines; 30 M-14 magazines; two M-16 EZ kits; two M-16 car kits; one M-76 grenade launcher; 300 M-31 practice rifle grenades; four M-16 parts set kits "A"; two flare launchers; two cases of approximately 50 inert practice hand grenades; forty to fifty pounds of black gun powder; thirty pounds of potassium nitrate; five pounds of magnesium metal powder; one pound of igniter cord (a class C explosive); 91 AR-15 lower-receiver units; twenty-six various calibers and brands of hand guns and long guns; ninety pounds of aluminum metal powder; thirty to forty cardboard tubes (Moore, 1995).

All these guns, gun parts, powders, inert grenades, and other equipment were lawfully purchased and could be legally owned at that time. Probable cause was not established that Koresh had violated or was about to violate federal laws. The large amounts are not illegal according to the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 and the Supreme Court decision *United States vs. Anders*, nor are they unusual for someone dealing in weapons or holding them as an investment (Moore, 1995). It was also legal at the time to own all the destructive device-related items Aguilera listed, such as the grenade launcher, M-31 practice rifle grenades, inert practice hand grenades, black gun powder, potassium nitrate, magnesium metal powder, aluminum powder, and igniter cord. What would not be legal is to manufacture these materials into grenades, pipe bombs, or other destructive devices without proper registration (Moore, 1995).

The reason the Davidians owned so many weapons is that they ran a very profitable and very legal gun business. Davidian Paul Fatta's attorney Mike DeGuerin told the jury: "Koresh and Fatta saw that a tremendous investment could be made by buying these guns. They thought the (semiautomatic) guns may be outlawed in Washington and that they would triple or quadruple in price" (Moore, 1995). In fact, between 1992 and 1994 the value of AK-47s had doubled from \$150 to \$300 and AR-15s from \$500 to up to \$1,400 (Smith, 1994).

A final point to make about Aguilera's affidavit is that it not only covered legally owned weapons, it also included several topics clearly not under the jurisdiction of the BATF. For example, Aguilera described stories of drug manufacturing, child abuse and unconventional sexual practices among the Davidians. The BATF later justified its requisitioning of U.S. military material for the initial raid by falsely claiming that the Branch Davidian property housed a laboratory for manufacturing illegal drugs (*Report of the Department .*, 1993). Aguilera's primary purpose within the affidavit was to discredit the Davidians so thoroughly to make the raid seem justified.

Even before the warrant had been signed, thorough preparations had already been made for "Showtime." Advance people, officially known as "Support Coordinators," had been in Waco since early January. They had set up a command post at an airstrip northeast of Waco. More than fifty agents and helicopter crewmen had moved into town the night before. For the evening of the raid, the BATF had reserved one hundred fifty rooms for its agents in three Waco hotels. The BATF had also contracted an ambulance service, told hospitals to be ready, and enlisted sheriff's deputies service and Texas Highway Patrolmen for back-up duties (Reavis, 1995).

On the morning of the attack, the Support Coordinators had ordered coffee and doughnuts, and even portable toilets, for the agents who, at about 9 a.m., would rally at the Bellmead Civic Center, some ten miles from Mount Carmel. Fresh from training and a sunup briefing at the Army's Fort Hood, some sixty miles southwest, the agents were moving north on Interstate 35, in an eighty-vehicle convoy more than a mile long. A half-dozen snipers had already taken up positions, both in front of and behind Mount Carmel, and the leadership of the assault was converging on the command center, to suit up in combat gear. Most of this movement was being filmed because documentation of the event was more important to the BATF than the action itself (Reavis, 1995).

Some still believed that a paramilitary raid was not necessary and that a siege was more appropriate. Unfortunately for the Davidians, a siege would not make the nightly news. Resident-Agent-in-Charge of Little Rock BATF, Bill Buford testified that he originally argued for a siege because it was "the safest way to do it." Buford claimed that he changed his mind and came to support a paramilitary raid "to protect the women and children." However, during cross-examination Buford admitted that he had no idea how many women and children lived at Mount Carmel. Moreover, defense attorneys discovered that Buford's rough notes about the planning process contained no mention of concern for women and children (Moore, 1995).

Just before the raid, Davidians learned that they were facing a shootout. Only hours before the raid, KWTX-TV cameraman James Peeler asked directions of Davidian David Jones, who was driving his postal truck. David Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin stated to reporters that Peeler told Jones, "Well, you better get out of here because there's a National Guard helicopter over at TSTC [Texas State Technical College] and they're

going to have a big shootout with the religious nuts" (Hancock, 1993). According to the Treasury report, Jones told DeGuerin that "Peeler warned him not to go near the Compound as there were going to be 'sixty to seventy TABC [Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission] guys in helicopters and a shootout would occur.'" Peeler himself confessed to the Treasury review team that he had told Jones there would be "some type of law enforcement action" and that "the action was likely to be a raid of some type and that there might be shooting" (*Report of the Department ...*, 1993).

After David Jones discovered that a raid was imminent, he rushed back to Mount Carmel and told Koresh. Undercover agent Robert Rodriguez, posing as a Davidian, alleged that after Koresh learned of the impending assault, Koresh told him, "they're coming" and mentioned the BATF and the National Guard. Rodriguez hurried across the street, called raid co-commander Chuck Sarabyn, and told him what Koresh had said. After consulting with co-commander Phillip Chojnacki, Sarabyn decided to go forward with the raid anyway. He ran out to the staging area shouting, "Get ready to go, they know we're coming!" and "Koresh knows the ATF and National Guard are coming!" (Moore, 1995) According to the Treasury report, "Over sixty agents who heard Sarabyn on the day have since recounted" that they heard him give these warnings (*Report of the Department ...*, 1993).

After the raid ended, five innocent Davidians had been killed by the BATF. Sixteen agents were injured and four were killed by Davidians defending themselves and their families. Agent Conway LeBleu had four entry wounds, including one to the head and one in the face. Agent Todd McKeehan had one fatal bullet wound to the chest. Agent Steven Willis was killed after being struck by several bullets. Agent Robert

Williams died from a gunshot wound to the head. Then Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell, who was imprisoned in Fall, 1995, for fraud, writes in his autobiography that "[Deputy Director of the FBI] Floyd [Clark]'s team was convinced that the media's being tipped off had resulted in the deaths of several ATF agents" (Hubbell, 1997). Hubbell also states that President Clinton was "furious at ATF for allowing the media to alert Koresh about the raid." (Hubbell, 1997)

Many questioned the methods the BATF used in serving the warrant. At a congressional hearing, Representative Robert Barr asked Sarabyn how the agents could have been surprised at being ambushed when they knew Koresh had been tipped off they were coming. "I'm just missing something. Knowing everything that had gone on before, knowing how much firepower you believed was in there, knowing the predisposition that you believed would make this man violent, why did you expect anything less?" Sarabyn responded by saying, "I believe we were all stunned, because we expected that we still had the opportunity to execute that warrant safely." Barr replied, "OK, maybe you did, but that raises some serious questions about your judgment" (Dart, 1995).

Once the raid had failed, the BATF knew that if the truth came out, it would be another black eye on the agency. High officials would lose their jobs and funding would be even more of a problem. The BATF now had no choice but to brand the agency as the victims and the Davidians as the aggressors. At this point, the bureau knew there would be a media circus. A thousand reporters and cameramen descended on Waco as fast as they could get there, proving the BATF correct. To the assembled press, the BATF spokespeople labeled Koresh and the Davidians as child molesters, a cult, and gun

fanatics. In order to make sure these labels stick, the bureau had to make sure the only sources available to the media were from the government. Certain agents cordoned off the zone of conflict, and cut the telephone lines that connected Mount Carmel to the rest of the world. The press was denied access to the story beyond the barricades. It reported the rest of the action by telephoto lens, more than two miles away (Reavis, 1995).

During the seven-week siege that followed the February 28 raid, the reporters were unable to objectively analyze the conflict. A number of essential sources were not available. Federal officials, except for the designated spokespeople, were not permitted to talk to the media. Even as residents of the besieged building surrendered, reporters couldn't reach them. The data that the press had to work with was almost wholly derived from facts and fabrications that carried the government's spin. Under the circumstances, the press became a voice for bureaucratic "spinmeisters."

The spin was apparent in the terminology of the press reports. The Davidians at Mount Carmel were called a "cult" and David Koresh became "a charismatic leader" who ruled his followers with "mind control." The community's wooden house became a "heavily fortified compound," its concrete structures became "bunkers," its children "hostages." America watched to see if these children would be "rescued" from their parents (Reavis, 1995).

It is the theory of Jones and Baker that the deaths at Waco were caused in part by the creation of a "media event" through the media's use of inflammatory language and images. The probability of violence was increased by pandering to stereotypical assumptions about non-traditional religious behavior. Television framed the conflict in terms of good versus evil. Labeled a "cult," the Branch Davidians were from the outset

classified as "weird" and a challenge to conventional morality. Set in opposition to "cultists," the FBI and BATF were portrayed as protectors of national values and morality. Once the dualism was established, the federal authorities, the "exemplars of absolute good," were entitled to violate conventional human rights with impunity (Jones and Baker, 1994). Richardson proposes that the Davidians never made it into the category of "worthy victims." Those living at Mount Carmel, including the children, were never fully humanized in the eyes of the general public (Richardson, 1995).

The BATF was successful in labeling themselves as the victims and the Davidians as the villains. Among the mainstream press, there was an absence of public criticism of the federal agents' behavior. From the start, the media substantially reported the story without much scrutiny of the details of the raid and siege as these were presented to them in government press briefings in Waco. Shupe and Hadden write the media contributed significantly to legitimating the government's role and portraying the federal agents as properly assuming responsibility for abused and endangered children. Agents were applauded for bringing to justice a band of criminals who had assembled an enormous cache of illegal weapons and ammunition. Finally, the agents were portrayed as guardians of a community at risk of an armed assault by followers of the fanatical and dangerous cult leader and his brainwashed followers (Shupe and Hadden, 1995).

What started out as the serving of a search warrant eventually ended in a FBI Gas and Tank attack and subsequent slaughter. The BATF had requested the assistance of the FBI on February 28, a few hours after the shoot out. On April 19, 1993, following a fifty one-day standoff, Mount Carmel burned to the ground, incinerating 76 men, women, and

children. An autopsy revealed that David Koresh died from a gunshot wound to the midforehead.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The Challenger disaster and the raid at Waco are just two examples of the unfortunate results that occur when bureaucrats feel the need to perform a publicity stunt to help their agencies sustain or increase their budgets. In the future, bureaucrats will surely use the media to achieve their goals in the future, whether or not these goals are admirable or not. Despite the fact that most bureaucrats have good intentions, there is also the likelihood of disaster in the future.

Despite the Challenger tragedy, NASA's goal of substantially increasing their budget was reached. During the mid 1980s, NASA had experienced small incremental gains in their budget. For the years 1984, 1985, and 1986, its budgets were \$7.2 billion, \$7.5 billion, and \$7.7 billion, respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1987). Amazingly, in 1987, the year following the tragedy, its budget soared to \$10.6 billion. One uneventful year later, its appropriation actually dropped to \$9 billion (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990).

The BATF was not quite as fortunate. For the years 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993, its budgets were \$264 million, \$308 million, \$345 million, and \$372.2 million, a substantial increase each year. However, in 1994, their budget remained relatively stagnant, increasing only to \$374.5 million (Office of Management and Budget, 1996).

The lack of time, resources, expertise, the absence of incentives, and the tendency to be reactive rather than proactive to major problems has lead to an ineffective oversight system. Because of this, a small number of bureaucrats believe that they can make very important decisions with little or no fear of reprisal. Wood and Waterman correctly note that the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances are violated when a

bureaucratic agency makes policy, enacts it, and, when the desired outcomes are not realized, think they can avoid responsibility. Such a condition is clearly inconsistent with the principles of limited government and curbs on tyranny inherent in the Constitution (Wood and Waterman, 1994). Much evidence suggests that both Challenger and Waco may have met this condition and both events definitely should not have proceeded. In both cases, the need for televised coverage superseded common sense. It is unfortunate that eighty-eight innocent people and four BATF agents had to die because a few individuals felt that publicity was so important.

References

References

- Aldrich, Gary, *Unlimited Access: An FBI Agent Inside the Clinton White House* (Washington, DC, Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1996).
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, Roy Behr, and Shanto Iyengar, *The Media Game: American Politics in the Television Age* (United States of America, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993).
- Boisjoly, Russell P., Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," *Journal of Business Ethics* (April 1989).
- Dart, Bob, "Barr plays tough guy for GOP Former prosecutor grills federal officials," *The Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta Constitution*, July 28, 1995.
- Fiorina, Morris, "Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy: A Mismatch of Incentives and Capabilities," from *Congress Reconsidered*, Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds. (Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981).
- Goodsell, Charles T., *The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic* (Chatham, New Jersey, Chatham House, 1983).
- Hancock, Lee, "Television Photographer Says He Tipped Waco Cult," *Washington Post*, August 28, 1993.
- Hill, Larry B., "Taking Bureaucracy Seriously," from *The State of Public Bureaucracy*, Larry B. Hill, ed. (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1992).
- Hubbell, Webb, *Friends in High Places: Our Journey from Little Rock to Washington, D.C.* (New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1997).
- Jones, Constance A., and George Baker, "Television and Metaphysics at Waco," from *From the Ashes: Making Sense of Waco*, James R. Lewis, ed. (United States of America, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994).
- Joss, Philip H., Mark E. Thomkins, and Steven W. Hays, "In Praise of Difficult People: A Portrait of the Committed Whistle Blower," *Public Administration Review* (v 49, November/December 1989).
- Koenig, Louis, *The Chief Executive*, 4th ed. (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981).
- "Koresh to agents: Should have called me," *Washington Times*, May 26, 1993.

- Lutrin, Carl E., and Allen K. Settle, *American Public Administration: Concepts and Cases*, 4th ed. (United States of America, West Publishing Company, 1992).
- Moore, Carol, *The Davidian Massacre: Disturbing Questions About Waco Which Must Be Answered* (United States of America, Legacy Communications and Gun Owners Foundation, 1995).
- Nimmo, Dan and James E. Combs, *Mediated Political Realities* (New York, Longman, 1990).
- Niskanen, William A., *Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? Lessons from America* (Great Britain: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973).
- Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1996* (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).
- Parks, R. and Ostrom E., "Complex Models of Urban Service Systems," from *Urban Policy Analysis: Directions for Future Research*, T.N. Clark, ed. (London, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, 1981).
- Pate, James L., "We have the truth on our side: Jailhouse Interviews with Branch Davidians," *Soldier of Fortune* (July 1994).
- Reavis, Dick J., *The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995).
- Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident* (Washington: June 6, 1986).
- Richardson, James T., "Manufacturing Consent about Koresh: A Structural Analysis of the Role of the Media in the Waco Tragedy," from *Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives of the Branch Davidian Conflict*, Stuart A. Wright, ed. (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
- Riley, Dennis D., *Controlling the Federal Bureaucracy* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1987).
- Romzek, Barbara S., and Melvin J. Dubnick, "Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy," *Public Administration Review* (May/June 1987).
- Rosen, Bernard, *Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable*, 2nd ed. (New York, Praeger, 1989).

- Schneider, M., *The Competitive City: The Political Economy of Suburbia* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989).
- Shupe, Anson, and Jeffrey K. Hadden, "Cops, News Copy, and Public Opinion: Legitimacy and the Social Construction of Evil in Waco," from *Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives of the Branch Davidian Conflict*, Stuart A. Wright, ed. (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
- Sigal, Leon V., *Reporters and Officials* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1973).
- Smith, Mark, "Firearms dealer says cultists paid with briefcase full of cash," *Houston Chronicle*, February 1, 1994.
- Stipak, Brian, "Local Government's Use of Citizen Surveys," *Public Administration Review* (v 40, September/October 1980).
- Stone, Deborah A., "Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas," *Political Science Quarterly* (v 104, 1989).
- Tabor, James D., and Eugene V. Gallagher, *Why Waco?: Cults and the Battle for Religious Freedom in America* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995).
- Thibodeau, David, interview on CBS "This Morning" June 10, 1993.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1987* (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987).
- U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990* (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
- U.S. Department of Treasury, *Report of the Department of Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell, Also Known as David Koresh* (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
- Wattenberg, Daniel, "Gunning for Koresh," *American Spectator* (August, 1993).
- Wilson, James Q., *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (United States of America, Basic Books, 1989).
- Wood, B. Dan and Richard W. Waterman, *Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1994).

Yates, Douglas, *Bureaucratic Democracy: The Search for Democracy and Efficiency in American Government* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1982).

Vita

Nick Kistenmacher was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on July 4, 1975. He entered George Washington University in August, 1993 where in May, 1997 he received the Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with an emphasis in Public Policy. He then entered the Master's program in Political Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville in August, 1997.