

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Carolyn Reagh Spellings entitled “Why Females Fight: Predicting Political Activism among Palestinian Female Youth.” I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science, with a major in Child and Family Studies.

Brian K. Barber

Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:

Greer Litton Fox

John G. Orme

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Why Females Fight: Predicting Political Activism among Palestinian Female Youth

A Thesis Presented for
the Master of Science
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Carolyn R. Spellings
August 2009

Copyright © 2009 by Carolyn R. Spellings
All rights reserved.

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my committee members all of whom have supported and challenged me throughout this process – to Dr. Brian K. Barber who pushed me to become a more critical thinker and better academic writer and graciously offered his wisdom and guidance, which have been invaluable, to Dr. Greer Litton Fox who first taught me about the research process as an undergraduate student and has always seen potential in me, to Dr. John Orme who makes statistics understandable and truly cares about his students.

Second, many thanks to my fellow graduate students. I could not have asked for more supportive and encouraging group of peers. In many ways, I have learned more about graduate school from them than from anyone else. Specifically, I would like to thank Amy Richardson, for reminding me that there is more to life than graduate school and especially for her friendship.

I would also like to thank my family – my dad who has always believed in me and has lovingly pushed me to reach destinations that were beyond my original goals, my mom who has also always believed in me and reminds me of my accomplishments when I doubt myself, my husband who listened to me discuss statistical and methodological issues and so lovingly tried to understand, and my friends who are truly interested in my studies, encourage me in all my endeavors, and treat me like family.

Finally, I would like to send sincere appreciation to all those affected by political conflict for their willingness to share their experiences and resolve to be hopeful despite horrible circumstances should be an encouragement to us all.

Abstract

A distinct focus on female youth experiences in political contests has been lacking in the literature on youth and political violence despite many female youth's involvement with armed groups. The first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993) saw the participation of many female youth alongside both teenage boys and men. This is notable especially given the patriarchal culture of Palestinian society in that women and young girls are traditionally confined to the private sphere. Additionally, public interactions with men and young boys could be viewed as improper and threats to one's honor and purity may ensue. In light of these facts, the purpose of this study is to investigate the experience of Palestinian female adolescents in zones of political conflict - specifically in the Gaza Strip during the First Intifada. More specifically, this study explores the relationship between socioeconomic status, religious, political and individual characteristics on differences in levels of female participation and activist behaviors. Data were collected via self-report survey in the Gaza Strip in 1998 from a sample of 960 youth, 375 of which were female. Models predicting political involvement are assessed through hierarchical linear regression analyses. Results indicated that socioeconomic status, age, efficacy, religiosity, and political affiliation predicted Palestinian female youth activism in the first Intifada. No interaction was found between religiosity, political affiliation, and activism. These findings are discussed in relation to the broader literature on civic and political engagement of youth as well as gender issues in orthodox Islamic societies.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW	7
Introduction.....	7
Palestinian Resistance	10
The First Intifada.....	13
The Gaza Strip	14
Youth Resistance	14
History of Palestinian Women’s Political Participation	16
Explanations for Youth Involvement in Political Violence	19
General Theoretical Approaches.....	21
Socioeconomic Status	22
Religion and Politics.....	27
Religiosity	28
Political Affiliation	30
Religio-Political Affiliation	31
Efficacy	35
Age.....	37
Summary of Hypotheses	39
CHAPTER 3: METHODS.....	41
Participants.....	41
Measures	42
Dependent Variable: Political Activism	42
Independent Variables	44
Socioeconomic Status	46
Religiosity	46
Political Affiliation	49
Affiliation vs. Non-Affiliation.....	50
Religio-Political Affiliation	50
Efficacy	51
Age.....	51
Analysis.....	52
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS.....	53
Missing Data	53
Measurement Model	54
Socioeconomic Status (SES).....	54
Religiosity	55
Efficacy	56
Activism.....	57
Correlations.....	58
Regression.....	61
Age.....	66
Socioeconomic Status	66
Religiosity	67

Political Affiliation	68
Religio-Political Affiliation	68
Affiliation with Fatah.....	68
Affiliation with fundamentalist, Islamic groups	69
The Moderating Model: Religiosity and Religio-Political Affiliation	70
Efficacy	70
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION.....	71
Age.....	73
Efficacy	75
Socioeconomic Status	76
Religiosity and Religio-Political Affiliation	79
Religiosity	79
Political Affiliation and Religio-Political Affiliation	82
Summary	85
Strengths and Limitations	86
Implications.....	88
References	91
Appendix.....	101
Vitae.....	103

List of Tables

TABLE 1 <i>SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS</i>	43
TABLE 2 <i>PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES WHO EVER (ONE OR MORE TIMES) PARTICIPATED DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS OF THE INTIFADA</i>	45
TABLE 3 <i>MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR ACTIVISM ITEMS REPORTED DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS OF THE INTIFADA</i>	45
TABLE 4 <i>LEVEL OF PATERNAL EDUCATION</i>	47
TABLE 5 <i>LEVEL OF MATERNAL EDUCATION</i>	47
TABLE 6 <i>PERCEPTION OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION</i>	48
TABLE 7 <i>POLITICAL AFFILIATION RESPONSES</i>	50
TABLE 8 <i>EFFICACY ITEMS</i>	52
TABLE 9 <i>BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS WITH INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES</i>	60
TABLE 10 <i>SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR VARIABLES PREDICTING SUPPORTIVE ACTIVISM (MAIN EFFECTS MODEL) (N = 338)</i>	62
TABLE 11 <i>SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR VARIABLES PREDICTING DIRECT ACTIVISM (MAIN EFFECTS MODEL) (N = 338)</i>	63
TABLE 12 <i>SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR VARIABLES PREDICTING SUPPORTIVE ACTIVISM (MODERATING MODEL) (N = 336)</i>	64
TABLE 13 <i>SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR VARIABLES PREDICTING DIRECT ACTIVISM (MODERATING MODEL) (N = 336)</i>	65

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of war is not unique to the modern age. Rather, history reminds repeatedly of the use of wars to advance a cause or ideology. Today, there are wars in Africa, Asia, the Middle-East, and Indonesia. A relatively neglected aspect of war is understanding the role of youth in conflict. This is an important area of investigation because studies have shown that in current or recently ended conflicts both male and female youth are actively involved with armed groups in between 36 to 55 countries throughout the world (Boothby & Knudsen, 2000; McKay, 2005).

Despite the prevalence of political conflict, there is limited research on youth and political violence; a fact that is true even more so for female youth. Thus, little is known about the gendered nature of political violence, whether that be the degree of participation or the effects of that participation on females. This lack of research is particularly unfortunate because there are clear historical cases where female youth have been very actively involved in conflict. Perhaps the most notable case has been the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli Occupation, during which it has been documented that majority proportions of female youth participated in various types of political activism during the first Intifada (1987-1993) (Barber, 2001; Barber & Olsen, 2009). Little is known about Palestinian female youth political activism in the first Intifada despite the high rates of participation and the orthodox Muslim culture of Palestine in which women are typically restricted to the private sphere (e.g., the home) (Rubenberg, 2001).

Of the studies that do focus on female experience with political conflict, little direct attention is given to female youth and often these studies are concerned with the effects of exposure to political conflict (i.e., PTSD, depression, and anxiety) and do not explore predictors

of political activism. However, despite a lack of scholarly knowledge on female political activism in political conflicts, studies in peaceful nations do explore gendered experience of political participation. Overall, this body of literature shows that girls tend to be more apathetic towards political participation than boys (Bynner & Ashford, 1994; Hart, Atkins, Markey, & Youniss, 2004). However some studies document higher levels of societal commitment in girls than boys (Watts & Guessous, 2006). Additionally, girls tend to be more affected than boys by the opinions of their parents regarding their political beliefs and behaviors. Specifically, girls were found to be more likely than boys to cease activist behaviors if they perceived low parental acceptance of these behavior. However, their political ideologies were not affected by perceived parental acceptance (Gordon, 2008).

From a theoretical viewpoint, theories from multiple disciplines suggest explanations for female youth political activism, as well as specifically Palestinian female youth activism, whether considered as a group or as individuals. For example, from sociology, Relative Deprivation Theory credits political violence to the economic health of a nation or particular sub-group (i.e., Palestinians). According to this theory, socioeconomic status of the group, and arguably of the individual, is then a driving force for political action against the elite leaders or outside rulers (Gurr, 1970; Wilkinson, 2004). Furthermore, ethnic identity theorists suggest that it is perceived deprivation along with feelings of threat to one's own ethnic group that motivate people to collective action (Petersen, 2002). The history of Palestinian resistance towards Israel and the severe economic conditions leading up to the first Intifada arguably created an environment of perceived economic inequality and ethnic threat for the Palestinian peoples (see Roy, 1995).

From political science, Political Stabilization Theory suggests that the degree of religiosity as well as political affiliation is associated with activism. According to this theory, political views and behaviors of youth are influenced by significant socializing agents such as parents, teachers, religious leaders, and political leaders. These socializing agents pass down their political ideologies and behaviors to youth, and thus there is continuity of political views between the generations (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). Specifically in the Palestinian case, the degree to which Palestinian girls identify themselves as religious, as well as report affiliation with a specific political party provides insights into the motivating factors for political activism. By examining the tenets of Islam, the dominant religion in Palestine, in addition to the gendered political and religious ideologies of Palestinian political groups, assumptions can be made about political views and behaviors that are promoted by the Palestinian culture and political groups, and, thus, transmitted to young female youth.

In addition to Relative Deprivation Theory and Political Stabilization Theory, Collective Identity theorists (a psychological theory) suggest that efficacy is a significant predictor of political activism. Collective Identity states that an individual appraisal of one's own ability as well as the group's ability to achieve pre-determined goals is significantly associated with collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This theory suggests that female youth who believe in their own ability to create positive change for the Palestinian people through political action as well as those who identify the first Intifada as a successful campaign are more likely to engage in activism than those who are more pessimistic in their views.

Finally, classic identity theory (i.e., Erikson, 1968) suggests that older female youth would be more likely to engage in political action than younger females, due to the task of youth in forming their own identity through the exploration of many identities, such as activist.

However, more recent scholars question the relevance of the use of western notions of identity development and social constructions of adolescence in non-western societies (i.e., Hammack, 2008).

For the purposes of this thesis, then, specific predictors of political activism among Palestinian female youth in the Gaza Strip during the first Intifada were identified through both theory and scholarly literature on political involvement in countries of conflict as well as political activism in peaceful societies. The variables that were identified and tested in this thesis are: socioeconomic status, religiosity, affiliation, religio-political affiliation, efficacy, and age. The effects each variable may have on youth's political activism was explored by reviewing theory and scholarly literature, as well as examining the cultural, political, and historical context of the first Intifada. In general, this evaluation of theory and literature lead to hypotheses that socioeconomic status would be negatively associated with political activism; that affiliation with secular or fundamental political groups as well as degree of religiosity would have different effects on political activism; that degree of religiosity will moderate the relationship between political affiliation and activism; and that efficacy would be positively associated with political activism.

The survey data used in these analyses come from a larger project on Palestinian adolescents living in the Gaza Strip, the Adolescents and Political Violence Project (APVP), in which the intent was to retrospectively assess adolescents' experience in the first Palestinian Intifada (Barber, 2008). APVP participants responded to a questionnaire that assessed demographics, victimization, activism, and a variety of measures of psychosocial functioning.

The survey built on a previous survey study (Barber, 1999a, 2001) and interview work (Barber, 1999b, 2009) on Palestinian adolescents in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West

Bank. Questionnaires were given to a representative sample of 917 Palestinian youth (including 383 females) five years after the first Intifada (1998). All participants were between the ages of 20-27 years old to ensure that each young man and woman had lived through at least three years of the first Intifada during their teen years. The questionnaires were developed after considerable immersion in Gazan culture and through extensive focus group analysis to ensure that questions regarding types of political activism were relevant to the conflict under study (Barber, 2009). Due to the specific purposes of this thesis, only the data from the female respondents will be used in analyses.

Analysis will begin by addressing issues of measurement. Dimensions of political activism and religiosity have been identified in previous analyses of these data but using the combined sample of both males and females (see Barber & Olson, 2009). The thesis will re-examine these for the female sample using exploratory factor analysis. The socioeconomic status and efficacy variables will also be factor analyzed using exploratory factor analysis to assess the reliability of the indicators used to measure these constructs. Finally, the variables of political affiliation and religio-political affiliation will be created by contrast coding.

The associations between the constructs of interest will be tested first via bivariate correlations, and then through hierarchical multiple regression. Based on the complexity of religious and political culture in Palestine, two models will be used in this analysis: the main effects model and a moderating model. In the main effects model, religiosity and religio-political affiliation will be used as direct predictors of activism (along with political affiliation, SES, efficacy, and age). In the moderating model, religiosity will be tested as a moderator of the effect of religio-political affiliation on activism. Finally, in order to test for the relationship between

the independent variables and the different dimensions of activism, both models will be tested separately using different forms of activism (e.g., direct, supportive, etc.)

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Despite the prevalence of political violence throughout the world, a relatively neglected aspect of war is understanding the role of youth in conflict. This is regrettable because youth, including young women, have historically been involved in war (see DePauw, 1998). In addition, studies have shown that in current or recently ended conflicts both male and female youth are actively involved with armed groups in between 36 to 55 countries throughout the world (Boothby & Knudsen, 2000; McKay, 2005). These statistics do not include countries or conflicts in which youth experience war (i.e., as passive victims) but do not actively engage in political conflict or voluntarily participate in conflict. Taken together, it is clear that political violence affects the lives of a great number of youth around the world.

Research on youth and political violence generally has been primarily concerned with the effects of exposure to political violence, particularly effects on psychopathology (e.g., PTSD, depression, and anxiety). Basically, studies use quantitative data to test the predictive links between the amounts of political violence witnessed or experienced and negative psychosocial outcomes. While most quantitative studies do not distinguish between male and female youth, some have tested for gendered effects of exposure, typically as a matter of secondary interest (e.g., Brajsa-Zganec, 2005; Kimhi & Shamai, 2006). Of those studies that do report gender differences, research indicates that in general females report more fear, depression, PTSD, and general or multiple psychological symptoms when compared to boys. Additionally, female youth report lower levels of coping than male youth (i.e., Ajdukovic, 1998; Durakovic-Belko,

Kulenovic, & Dapic, 2003; Klingman, 2001) (see Barber & Schulterman, 2009, for review of youth and political violence literature)

In addition to this quantitative literature, some few studies have focused primarily or exclusively on female youth experiences. Most of these are studies of child soldiers which have not placed primary importance on assessing negative outcomes, but rather have attempted to give a more descriptive, holistic view of the experiences of girls amidst political conflict. For example, the literature on girl soldiers describes the ways in which girls become involved in armed groups, their experiences while a part of armed groups, and the effects of involvement, often with the intent of illustrating gendered experiences of female child soldiers. Among others, these gendered experiences include sexual and domestic abuses while part of armed groups and the resulting stigmatization from civilian communities especially if these girls return to their communities with children. In addition, girls may acquire a skill while with an armed group, such as nursing or public speaking, but are unable to use the skill once reintegrated back into civilian communities due to the status of women in their society (see Spellings, 2008 for a review of this literature).

Apart from these limited attempts to appreciate female experience in war and conflict, the largest void of attention and information has to do with understanding predictors of involvement in conflict (i.e., as opposed to understanding its effects as is most commonly done). Specifically, very little is known about which females participate in political conflict and why (apart from the brief work on female child soldiers). This is relevant because it is clear that in some conflicts female youth do actively participate. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the case of the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli Occupation in which female adolescents were actively engaged in political conflict during the first Intifada (1987-1993). Specifically, majorities of

females reported various types of activism, such as throwing stones (50%), demonstrating (63%), and delivering supplies to Palestinian fighters (80%) (Barber, 2008; Barber & Olsen, 2009).

While substantially lower than their male counterparts in that particular conflict, these majority proportions of female youth activism are dramatically higher than 25% average youth participation rate (male or female) in political movements historically (Cairns, 1996). Moreover, this level of female youth's activism is particularly noteworthy given the orthodox Muslim culture of Palestine – particularly in the Gaza Strip - in which women are typically restricted to the private sphere (e.g., the home) (Rubenberg, 2001). Despite these cultural and religious sanctions, much of the female activism was public in nature. This contradiction in gendered expectations and gendered behavior makes the study of female activism all the more interesting and important.

“Who” were the Palestinian females who were actively involved? How did they differ from their counterparts who were less active? Does socioeconomic status explain political activism, and, if so, in which direction? Can female youth activism be explained by their political orientation or religiosity? What role do personal characteristics, such as age and self-efficacy, play in understanding female political participation?

Understanding the characteristics of those who participate is important since research suggests that Palestinian females who reported high degrees of participation in the first Intifada experienced both positive and negative effects of their participation. In previous analyses of the data to be used in this thesis Barber and Olsen (2009) found that Palestinian female youths' retrospectively reported activism was positively related 5 years later to civic involvement, social competence, and religious commitment. In an earlier study, Barber (1999a, 2001) also found a positive relationship between activism and depression for Palestinian female youth. Thus, for

these young women, engagement in political activism brought negative psychological effects, but bolstered their civic, social, and religious lives. If individual characteristics can predict involvement in political conflicts, then social service agencies will have a better idea of which girls are more likely to become involved and may be better able to provide services to these young women that can protect them from the physical dangers and negative effects of political activism, while also simulating an environment that fosters the development of positive characteristics such as civic engagement and social competence.

Before proceeding with the theoretical development of hypotheses, a discussion of the historical, political, and cultural context of the lived experiences of the Palestinian girls under study in this thesis is presented in order to ground the reader in a more complete understanding of the complex nature of Palestinian female youth political activism in the first Intifada.

Palestinian Resistance

Conflict and inequalities between the Palestinian Arab and Jewish populations is thought to have begun with the modern-day Zionist movement and the 1897 Basle Congress of the Zionist Organization in which leaders set forth a goal of working toward the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (W. Khalidi, 1987; Tessler, 1994). Zionists' efforts were encouraged and facilitated in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration, a letter from Lord Balfour, the British foreign secretary, that expressed sympathy for the Jewish desires by declaring support for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (C. D. Smith, 2001; Tessler, 1994).

Not surprisingly, the Arab community living in Palestine at this time viewed the Balfour Declaration as a denial of their rights to their own homeland (C. D. Smith, 2001). Palestinian Arab frustrations arose towards the British Empire (who assumed a Mandate over Palestine at the

end of World War I) and Jewish settlers and lead to increasing tensions and conflict among indigenous Arabs and in-migrating Jews. For example, tensions particularly culminated in the Arab Revolt (1936-1939) (W. Khalidi, 1987; Tessler, 1994). Similarly, the Arab-Israeli War (1947-1948) erupted after the Palestinian region was partitioned by the United Nations to create an official Jewish nation, Israel (C. D. Smith, 2001; Tessler, 1994). This resulted in several hundred thousand Palestinians becoming refugees, primarily in the West Bank (then governed by Jordan) and the Gaza Strip (then governed by Egypt) (Tessler, 1994). Furthermore, major conflict erupted again in the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and Palestinians and other Arab countries which resulted in Israel conquering various regions populated with Palestinians, including: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem (also then held by Jordan), the Golan Heights (in Syria), and the Sinai (in Egypt). (C. D. Smith, 2001; Tessler, 1994).

A litany of other conflicts continued throughout the years between Israel and its Arab neighbors as well as with the Palestinian people. Through these conflicts, Palestinians gained international attention and recognition of their right to existence and to inhabit lands which were linked to their ancestors and historical presence in the Middle East. Due to international pressure, in 1979 the Sinai was returned to Egypt via the Camp David Accords, but the rest of the territories Israel acquired in the 1967 war remained under their control, with the Gaza Strip and the West Bank officially considered the Occupied Palestinian Territories (C. D. Smith, 2001; Tessler, 1994).

There are at least two camps of thought concerning the benevolence of Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. On the one hand, supporters of the Occupation claim Israel aided these territories in making significant economic and standard of living improvements. For example, Israel helped expand the number of Gazan homes with electricity to

89% in 1981 as compared to 18% in 1967. Additionally, between 1968-1978 Gaza's gross national product (GNP) increased 12.1%, whereas Israel's GNP only increased 5.5% during that same time period (Tessler, 1994).

On the other hand, Palestinians viewed Israeli occupation as less favorable. While a high number of Palestinians were employed in Israel, there was little infrastructure development in the occupied territories. A limited number of new schools were constructed and existing schools lacked adequate facilities. Additionally, little if any effort was made by the Israeli government to develop port facilities, railroads, modern highways, or airports. The high dependence on Israel for employment, electricity, and water was viewed by many Palestinians as de-development instead of growth (a view held by many Israelis) (Roy, 1995; Tessler, 1994). Economic scholars suggest that despite the increase in the Palestinian economy in the early years of the Israeli occupation, in the three years leading up to the first Intifada (1987-1993) the Palestinian people, specifically those in the Gaza Strip, experienced a substantial economic downfall. For example, Gaza's gross national product declined 30% due to Israeli-led reduction of trade with Gaza and West Bank, a 25% income loss among Palestinians in Israel, 20-30% decline in the value of Gaza's economic output, and a doubling of Palestinian child labor (Roy, 2007).

Moreover, Palestinians pointed to the Israel's "Iron Fist" policy which allowed deportations, press censorship, collective punishments such as school closings and curfews, demolition of homes, and permitted the use of Israeli gunfire to disperse Palestinian protesters as signs of oppression, inequality, and a threat to the Palestinian people (Hunter, 1993; Tessler, 1994). The violence experienced by the Palestinians has been particularly humiliating due to the relative personal nature of the violence. For example, many Palestinian youth witnessed either

their fathers or a neighbor's father beaten by Israeli soldiers, forced to sit in the mud, or clean up garbage, all of which are culturally defined as severe forms of humiliation (Barber, 2008).

The First Intifada

From the Palestinians' perspective, it is this view of historical oppression, humiliation, and inequalities as well as the failed diplomatic efforts of Palestinian and Israeli leaders to reach a sustainable peace agreement that gives explanation to the Palestinian uprising, otherwise known as the first Intifada (1987-1993). Smith (2001), a historical researcher of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, characterized the first Intifada as a "spontaneous eruption of hatred and frustration... Much anger resulted from personal factors not directly related to politics or economics but the daily harassments, arrests, and beatings that the ordinary Palestinian had faced for many years" (p. 414). Historical as well as contemporaneous frustrations and inequalities culminated on December 8th, 1987, when an Israeli tank transporter crashed into cars in Gaza killing 4 Palestinians and ignited spontaneous and violent demonstrations from Palestinians, in which adolescents participated widely: an event that signaled the beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada (Hunter, 1993; Roy, 2007; Tessler, 1994). (Intifada is an Arabic word meaning "uprising" or "shaking off")

The beginning years (1987-1988) of the first Intifada were arguably the most violent years of the near six year conflict and are characterized as a period of intensifying violence. Israel's military reaction to the Palestinian uprising was to use force. Firing live ammunition towards protestors, beating stone throwers, often breaking their bones, raiding homes, detaining suspected opposition leaders, imposing curfews, and closing schools were a few of the tactics used by the Israeli military (Tessler, 1994). For their part, Palestinians both retaliated and

provoked the occupying Israeli Defense Force (IDF) by, as examples, erecting barricades and burning tires to impede the traffic of IDF vehicles, demonstrating, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails (a crude incendiary device) at the IDF, and boycotting Israeli goods (Hunter, 1993; Roy, 1995, 2007; C. D. Smith, 2001).

The Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip experienced the heaviest amounts of violence between the Palestinians and Israeli army. Barber and Olsen (2009) suggest that the most intense forms of the conflict occurred in the Gaza Strip because of Gaza's geographic location, economic circumstances, and its role as the center of both Palestinian political efforts and militant movements. For example, in 1988 there were approximately 750,000 Palestinians living in the 125 square miles Gaza Strip, an area one-fifth the size of the West Bank (C. D. Smith, 2001; United Nations, 1989). Of these, 54% lived in eight refugee camps (United Nations, 1989), with the remainder in villages and towns. These economic circumstances, population density, and history of oppression arguably cultivated an atmosphere of uprising or revolt against the ruling Israeli government by the Palestinian people, somewhat more so in Gaza than in the West Bank. Moreover, militant Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad organized and recruited supporters in Gaza, which, in turn, caught the attention of the Israeli military (Hunter, 1993; Tessler, 1994).

Youth Resistance

A distinguishable characteristic of the first Intifada was the proportion of Palestinian youth who actively and voluntarily engaged in the fight. Approximately 80% of Palestinian youth participated in political activities, such as throwing stones, bringing supplies to adult fighters,

and demonstrating. The majority, if not all, of these youth were well-versed in the history of Israel's occupation in Gaza and the West Bank and the past responses by Palestinians to the Israeli occupation (Barber, 1999b, 2006, 2009). In fact, the Intifada is called by many the "children's crusade." Yasser Arafat, the former leader of the Palestinian political group Fatah, often used the phrase "children of the stone" in reference to the Palestinian youth who fueled the uprising (Ibrahim, 1994). Youth committees, which employed both males and females, emerged and worked alongside other community resistance groups, usually run by a political group, uniting the effort of Palestinian adults and youth against the Israeli army (Hunter, 1993). It is suggested that Palestinian youth during the first Intifada did not only harbor ill feelings towards Israeli soldiers, but were also upset at older Palestinian generations, many of whom appeared to youth as passive in their approach towards the Israeli government, having failed to better the lives of the Palestinian people. Through involvement in the Intifada these youth attempted to change the state of the Palestinian people in a way that older generations had failed to do (Hunter, 1993; R. Khalidi, 1997).

The first Intifada officially came to an end in the fall of 1993 with the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in Oslo, Norway. The outcomes of the Principles were threefold. First, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat officially recognized the state of Israel and its right to exist in peace and security. Second, Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin recognized Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the official representative of the Palestinian people. Third, Israel agreed to withdraw soldiers from all Palestinian territories except for Gaza, though Rabin agreed to allow Palestinians self-rule in Gaza (C. D. Smith, 2001). Despite this agreement, the Declaration of Principles did not bring lasting peace to these two people groups as evidenced by

the second Palestinian Intifada (2000-2005) and the recent Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip (December 2008-January 2009).

History of Palestinian Women's Political Participation

While the number of Palestinian women and young girls who have historically participated in public forms of political activism is overall smaller than Palestinian men, Palestinian women do have a history of political participation dating back to the early 1900s. For example, in 1917 Palestinian women marched alongside men in demonstrations in response to the British government's attempts to create an Israeli nation-state (Sharoni, 1995). Palestinian refugee women living in Lebanon have been reported to have been instrumental in all facets of the Palestinian Resistance Movement against the Lebanese government in the mid 1900s, including diplomacy and leadership (Peteet, 1991). Additionally, in the 1960s Palestinian women and female youth began to participate in sit-ins, demonstrations, and sabotage missions against the Israeli army. In the 1970s and 1980s Palestinian political groups founded Women's Committees which provided a structure through which Palestinian women and young girls could officially demonstrate political activism (Sharoni, 1995). Other forms of political participation that were traditionally dominated by men, such as demonstrating and erecting a Palestinian flag, became acceptable for women when their participation was defined by a desire to promote a Palestinian identity and for the right to raise children in peace and economic stability (Peteet, 1991).

Beyond these more gendered forms of participation, a small minority of women engaged in more extreme forms activism, such as planting bombs. Instead of seeing these activists as "women bombers," it was customary in the Palestinian society to refer to these activists as

gender neutral. Scholars suggest that by avoiding gender labels with more extreme forms of activism, the society at large was able to understand and accept these behaviors that are arguable a huge departure from the gender norms in the Palestinian society. Thus, broader issues of the place, roles, and norms of women in Palestinian society, for the most part, went unchallenged (Hiltermann, 1998; Peteet, 1991; Sharoni, 1995).

Even though many parts of the world refer to Palestinians living in Gaza, the West Bank, and neighboring Arab countries as refugees, some Palestinian women instead refer to themselves rather as militants and revolutionaries. These women believe the term refugee connotes a meek and helpless image. In her ethnographic study (participant observations, life histories, and in-depth interviews) of the history of Palestinian female activism in Lebanon, Peteet (1996) found evidence that dating back to the 1970s Palestinian women have strongly rejected this helpless image. Instead they promoted an image of the Palestinian people that suggests these women are willing to fight against the injustices they, as a people, face (Peteet, 1996). Female youth who participated in the first Intifada would have seen their mothers and heard stories of their grandmothers' engagement in the political sphere, and thus, perhaps, these young girls were in part imitating and extending the older generations' political behavior.

While historically some Palestinian women have participated in all facets of political activism, most of Palestinian women's political participation appears to have been gendered in nature. In her book describing the history of Palestinian women's political participation in Lebanon, Peteet (1991), for example, claims that in poverty and crisis situations Palestinian women retreat to domestic tasks since those tasks are fundamental to daily living. Palestinian women conceptualize political activism in terms of traditional gender ideologies and believe their goal is to keep Palestinian families alive and intact. Indeed, Women's Committees, groups

or organizations founded between 1978 –1987 by each Palestinian political party that were responsible for grassroots level campaigning and organizing relief and emergency services, helped establish schools and food distribution centers. When schools closed, the Women's Committees were responsible for providing alternative education to Palestinian children. In conjunction with the gendered work of the Women's Committees, other forms of political activism in which Palestinian women and young girls have engaged in are visiting families, attending funerals, treating the wounded, and providing food and housing for Palestinian male fighters (Hiltermann, 1998; Nassar, 1989; Peteet, 1991; Rubenberg, 2001; Sharoni, 1995).

Despite the services of the Women's Committees listed above, not all of the work of the Women's Committees was gendered in nature. The elite and middle class Palestinian women who were highly involved in administrative positions in these Committees utilized the Women's Committees to define stances on social and gender issues. The leaders of the Women's Committees sought to liberate women through promoting education and awareness of women's issues. Hence, the Women's Committees served dual purposes of providing relief and emergency services that are gendered in nature and promoting social change for Palestinian women by highlighting issues such as domestic violence and women's health (Hiltermann, 1998; Sharoni, 1995).

Consistent with historical forms of Palestinian female activism, studies show the supportive nature of Palestinian female activism in the first Intifada. For example, Barber and Olsen (2009) found evidence of the gendered nature of youth's political participation in that a higher percentage of Palestinian females reported engaging in supportive forms of activism (e.g., visiting the family of a martyr, caring for the wounded, and delivering supplies) than direct activism (e.g. demonstrating, throwing stones, and erecting a Palestinian flag). Thirty-nine to

77% of female youth reported engaging in some form of following instructions from political leaders or supportive forms of activism. With the exception of three items (demonstrating, throwing stones, and erecting a Palestinian flag), less than 20% of female youth reported engaging in direct, or non-supportive, forms of activism (Barber & Olson, 2009). Similarly, Huntington, Fronk, and Chadwick's (2001) study of Palestinian female youth in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank found that less than 50% of females reported participating in demonstrations, distributing leaflets, or throwing stones at Israeli soldiers (Huntington et al., 2001) (see also Barber, 1999a; Barber, 2001).

Despite this evidence of gendered political participation by Palestine females (i.e., more supportive, less direct), still high percentages of female youth did report in engaging in more direct forms of political activism in the first Intifada. For example, anywhere between 40-65% of female youths in Gaza reported demonstrating, protecting someone from Israeli soldiers, throwing stones, erecting a Palestinian flag, or trying to distract soldiers away from participants (Barber & Olsen, 2009). These high percentages are surprising due to the cultural constraints and the gendered nature of most Palestinian female activism. These more direct forms of activism required that Palestinian girls break cultural scripts and historical norms. Thus, the high rates of overall activism, and particularly direct activism, beg the question: just who exactly are these girls who participated so actively?

Explanations for Youth Involvement in Political Violence

Despite a lack of scholarly knowledge of female political activism in political conflict, studies in peaceful nations (i.e. United Kingdom and United States) do explore gender differences in youth's political activism and political views. In general, results indicate that

overall girls are more apathetic towards political behaviors and have less civic knowledge than their male counterparts (Bynner & Ashford, 1994; Hart et al., 2004). However, girls who are politically informed tend to be more pro-social in their political views and behavior than boys. This gender difference begins to emerge in adolescence indicating that young adulthood is critical for the development of gendered political identities (Baskir, 2006). Additionally, Watts and Guessous (2006) found that American girls were more likely to express higher levels of societal commitment (i.e., beliefs regarding community service, civic engagement, and advocacy) than boys. While societal commitment is not, in and of itself, a signal of political behavior or knowledge, it can be an indicator of political activism.

Studies of female youth activism in peaceful nations provide a general understanding of female experience, however these studies do not speak to the unique circumstances of female youth political activism in conflict or, even more so, the complex intersection of cultural scripts and female participation. Therefore, in pursuing understanding of Palestinian female activism, the hypotheses of this thesis are informed by theories from a variety of disciplines that appear relevant to the task. To the extent that it is available, hypotheses will be informed also by previous research that has included attention to female experience.

First, this section will give an overview of theoretical approaches that appear relevant generally to the study of female youth political activism. Examination of these theories suggests three main categories of potential explanation of political activism on the part of Palestinian female youth during the first Intifada: socioeconomic status, religiosity/ religio-political orientation, and efficacy. The balance of this section, therefore, is organized according to those domains of prediction, in each of which theory and empirical findings are discussed and hypotheses formed.

General Theoretical Approaches

In their book on collective violence, Barkan and Snowden (2001) state that in order to fully understand collective violence, one must review theories that explore macro as well as micro factors that are associated with collective action. For example, theories from psychology provide a rationale for the individual characteristics that motivate one to engage in political activism, whereas sociological theories highlight motivators for political activism at the group level. Since there has been no explicit theorizing about the population under study, this thesis will draw on a variety of theories from psychology, sociology, and political science to propose a model of predictors of political activism among Palestinian female youth. By examining both micro and macro scopes of inquiry one can gain a more holistic understanding of the motivators and factors that influence female youth political activism.

Theories from sociology, such as Relative Deprivation Theory, identify and explain the causes of mass uprising and community unrest by examining macro level influences, such as the economic health of a nation or a particular sub-group (Gurr, 1970; Wilkinson, 2004). Second, from political science, Political Stabilization Theory suggests that youth shape their religio-political ideologies by adopting the views of their parents or other significant adult role models and explains how religious and political beliefs are passed down from generation to generation (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). Third, psychology offers explanations of political activism through an understanding of identity development. While there are many aspects to one's identity, two domains of identity are relevant to this thesis: ethnic identity and collective identity.

Phinney (2006) describes ethnic identity, or identity with one's group, as being the central defining characteristic of minority groups, and ethnic violence is thought to occur when two or more groups compete for the same resources (housing, jobs, water, etc.) and the disadvantaged

group feels threat to their own ethnic identity (Barkan & Snowden, 2001; Petersen, 2002; Phinney, 2006). Similarly, collective identity is cognitions shared by members of a single group (Klandermans & de Weerd, 2000). It can be concluded that collective identity is formed by individuals sharing similar thoughts of deprivation and injustice, interacting together, and engaging in social or political movement that advance the group's cause. While identity is not measured directly in this thesis, ethnic identity and collective identity theory support and inform the formulation of hypotheses outlining the proposed relationship between specific predictors and political activism.

Examination of these and other theoretical approaches have lead to the identification of five potential domains of antecedents of female activism among Palestinian youth: socioeconomic status, religiosity, religio-political affiliation, efficacy, and age. Accordingly, the chapter will now be organized according to those domains; in each elaboration on the relevant theory and empirical findings will be made.

Socioeconomic Status

Although there has been no specific analysis of female youth activism, both theory and empirical findings suggest that the socioeconomic level of this population would be a logical predictor of activism. As for theory, Relative Deprivation Theory attributes political violence to the economic health of a nation or group of people. Violence erupts when a nation or group identifies itself as having relatively less monetary resources or material goods than another group, with which comparisons are felt to be appropriate in such a way that the powerless group must identify themselves as being worthy of the same lifestyle as the privileged group. Feelings of disadvantage and oppression act as a catalyst for a group's willingness to engage in political

violence as a means of changing the group's status within the society (Gurr, 1970; Webber, 2007; Wilkinson, 2004).

Similarly, Ethnic Identity Theory from psychology suggests that violence between two groups emerges when the disadvantaged group feels a threat to its own ethnic identity and existence. Peterson (2002) identifies four types of feelings that are associated with ethnic violence: fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. Fear of lack of resources or safety first urges the individual or group to desire to satisfy safety concerns. Once an individual or group identifies the feeling of fear and safety concern, then hatred towards the other group prepares the individual or group to act on historical grievances. Thirdly, resentment, which comes out of fear and hatred, illuminates the discrepancies between one's group and the other group. Finally, in some instances, rage appears and drives an individual or group to engage in self-destructive behaviors. If the first goal of safety and economic security, which is associated with fear, is not met, then Peterson suggests that it is likely that ethnic violence will ensue.

Even though Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory speak to political violence at a group level, research also illustrates the relevance of deprivation to political activism at the individual level. For example, a study of female girl soldiers throughout the world (i.e. Angola, Colombia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka) revealed that poverty is a risk factor for involvement with an armed group (Kearins, 2002). While Kearins' (2002) study indicates that poverty exacerbates the vulnerability of some young girls to be either abducted into armed groups or join as a means of securing basic necessities, it also shows that deprivation is a motivating factor for young girls to engage in political activism, which is often displayed in the form of political violence.

In non-violent communities in the United States, Hart, Atkins, Markey, and Youniss (2004) found that neighborhood poverty level was negatively associated with levels of religious and racial tolerance towards other groups in youth between the ages of 16 and 25. While this study did not assess the relationship between political activism or political violence and socioeconomic status, lower levels of tolerance towards the other group may increase the probability of discrimination or acts of violence towards the other group.

Not all studies, however, indicate that poverty is positively associated with political activism. Research on youths' voting habits, involvement in anti-smoking clubs, volunteer attitudes and behaviors, and civic identity has shown that socioeconomic status is positively associated with these civic activists' behaviors (Atkins & Hart, 2003; Bynner & Ashford, 1994; Edwards et al., 1992; Hart et al., 2004; Roker, Player, & Coleman, 1999). In a summary of variables that influence civic competence and civic participation in urban youth, Hart and Atkins' (2002) suggest that youth who live in affluent neighborhoods engage in civic participation at a rate 33% higher than youth who live in poor neighborhoods, which is often in urban communities.

The discrepancy in the literature on the effects of socioeconomic status and political activism can be understood by examining the context of the societies in which the research was conducted and the type of activism displayed. The studies referenced in the above paragraph were conducted in developed, peaceful countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, whereas the findings linking poverty to political activism have been made with samples from less developed countries or countries in conflict. Additionally, the types of activism, such as voting and volunteering, are generally viewed to be altruistic means of civic participation that promote the betterment of a society. While youth of higher socioeconomic status in Western, peaceful countries may disagree with political policies, they have the luxury (i.e., security and resources)

to engage in activist behaviors that are less focused on major political upheaval, but rather a continuation of peaceful transitions of power and societal improvements. While political activism in war-torn societies is often also focused on issues of social justice, the emotional toll of deprivation and oppression may motivate youth to join more radical political movements. Specifically, the tenet of Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory (i.e. poverty is a driving factor for political activism) has been documented in impoverished, unstable nations, such as Colombia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.

Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory are particularly useful in explaining the conflict under study in this thesis, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Conflicts – both before and after the establishment of Israel over land – were fought over issues of national identity and economic equality (see earlier section on History of Palestinian-Israeli Conflict). Inequalities and disadvantages, such as harsh economic conditions and feelings of threat toward their existence as a people as well as an aspiration or the belief that their people group deserved national equality, prompted Palestinians to regularly fight against the Israeli army (see Hunter, 1993; R. Khalidi, 1997; Roy, 1995, 2007; Tessler, 1994). For example, between 1988 and 1990 (the first three years of the first Intifada) Gazans lost an income of at least \$300 million and saw a 30% decline in their gross national product due to job losses in Israel, the country which employed the majority of working age Gazans (Roy, 2007). Specifically, Gazan camp dwellers experienced the highest levels of unemployment (Barber, 1999b, 2001; Barber & Olson, 2009). Moreover, Palestinians believed in their right to exist as an independent country and national group with greater economic health (R. Khalidi, 1997).

Additionally, in studies of testing the applicability of Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory on collective action in the West Bank, Khawaja (1995) found that Israeli

repression, in the form of land confiscation, significantly increased both collective and individual Palestinian action against Israeli forces. Collective and individual action included riots, demonstrations, rallies, flag raising, marches, and rock throwing. While this study examined Palestinian adults in the West Bank and not specifically female youth in Gaza, the findings suggest that perceived economic inequalities (i.e. ownership of land) do account for both Palestinian collective and individual political activism.

Upon further examination of the Palestinian case, socioeconomic status may not only predict activism in general, but it might well predict specific types of activism as well. As mentioned above when discussing the role of Women's Committees and the history of Palestine female participation in political activism, socioeconomic status was associated with the specific types of activities in which Palestinian women were engaging. For example, the elite and middle class Palestinian women were heavily involved in the administrative and advocate sectors of the Women's Committees. Conversely, the poorer Palestinian women, many of whom lived in the refugee camps, organized and distributed the relief work of the Committees, activities that characterize supportive forms of activism as well as following instructions from activist leaders (Hiltermann, 1998; Sharoni, 1995).

In sum, Relative Deprivation Theory and Ethnic Identity Theory suggest violence between two groups of people can be explained through the lack of resources of the disadvantaged group when compared to the other or advantaged group. Studies have shown how perception of relative deprivation applies to both the group and individual level. While there are conflicting findings as to the effects of socioeconomic status on activism, a closer examination of the economic health of the societies in which these studies are conducted reveals that in developing nations socioeconomic status is negatively associated with political violence on an individual level. In

terms of the Palestinian struggle, it would be logical to expect that lower socioeconomic status would not only predict activism in general, but particular supportive forms of activism.

Therefore, the following hypotheses are advanced:

Hypothesis 1a: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated with the political activism of Palestinian female youth.

Hypothesis 1b: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated more strongly with supportive forms of activism than with direct forms of activism.

Religion and Politics

In addition to the predictive link between socioeconomic status and political activism, theory and academic literature also suggest that political affiliation and religiosity would be related to political activism. This is particularly the case in Palestinian society given the strong and intertwined relevance of religion and politics. In order to explain the impact of religious and political affiliation on female youth's political activism in the first Intifada, one must examine theory as well as religious and political doctrine. In regards to theory, Political Stabilization theory suggests that youth adopt the political views and behaviors of their parents or other socializing agents, such as religious and political leaders, older siblings, or teachers (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). This theory argues that political beliefs and behaviors of youth are influenced by parents or other significant adults in that the youth imitate the political practices and beliefs that are displayed by significant adults or prominent leaders. Political Stabilization Theory provides explanation for the consistency of political beliefs and behaviors that are passed down from generation to generation (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006).

This theory is especially appropriate in explaining Palestinian political participation because Political Stabilization Theory accounts for the influence of religious beliefs and doctrine on political behavior. In Palestine, there is significant overlap between political and religious doctrines in that the vast majority of Palestinians (98% of Gazans) are Muslims and that the major political groups, such as Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, are all influenced by Islamic doctrine. In fact, Islam explicitly draws no boundaries between the religious, social, and political (Ahmed, 1992). These different political groups do, however, differ on the degree to which each group's political agenda appears to be explicitly influenced by Islamic doctrine. Before discussing the confluence of religion and political affiliation, attention will be given first to these dimensions independently.

Religiosity

As noted above, Political Stabilization Theory accounts for the role of religious doctrine in predicting political activism, in that religious leaders can also be socializing agents and impart political ideologies and beliefs to their followers (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). In addition, researchers have found a distinction between different dimensions of religiosity. In general, scholars agree there are two dimensions of religiosity: public (i.e., attending religious services) and private (i.e., praying alone) (see Chadwick & Top, 1993; Cornwall & Thomas, 1990). This point is particularly salient in the Palestinian context.

The literature on youth activism and civic engagement in peaceful nations documents the role religion plays in the socialization of political beliefs and behaviors. Empirical literature studying the connection between religion and activist behaviors reveals that identification with a religious group, in and of itself, is not sufficient for explaining activist or non-activist behaviors.

Rather, the type of activism and religious doctrine must be examined. For example, American youth are more likely to engage in civic participation in the form of volunteering and community service if they belong to a religious institution that promotes these behaviors (Crystal & DeBell, 2002; McLellan & Youniss, 2003; E. S. Smith, 1999). Additionally, Sherkat and Ellison (2007; see also Sherkat & Blocker, 1994, 1997) found that youth and young adults were less likely to engage in environmental and anti-war protests if their affiliated religious traditions and religious leaders spoke against these types of demonstrations. Youth not only hear about the virtues of engaging in civic participation (or the admonition of activism) through sermons, but also see other adults with the same religious affiliation engaging (or not) in activist behaviors. Thus, for these youth, activism is the result of a belief in the virtue of the activity, as taught to them through religious doctrine, and imitating the behavior of others in the same religious tradition.

In order to understand the role religion plays in predicting Palestinian female youth political activism, an explanation of Islamic doctrine in regards to gender roles is necessary. The dominant religion in Palestine is Islam, and according to the Islamic religion, a woman's role in the community and her autonomy outside the home are limited. Islam advocates for the seclusion of women from public activities in order to protect women's purity. It is viewed as sexually impure for a woman to socialize with men other than her husband, father, or other male family members. To avoid any hints of impurity, Islamic women and young girls are rarely to engage in public activities unless it is with men with whom they are related (see Ahmed, 1992 for a full treatment of the role of women in Islam; Huntington et al., 2001). Since Islam makes specific statements regarding Islamic women's role in the society and in accordance with previous literature on the relationship between religion and political activism, women and young girls who are more orthodox in their interpretation of Islam are expected to follow Islamic teachings on

gender roles and, thus, less likely to go against these teachings and participate in political activism, especially direct forms of activism. According to Political Stabilization Theory, the actions of Palestinian girls who describe themselves as orthodox Islamists are determined by the socialization of gender roles, either through the teachings of Islam or seeing other orthodox Islamic females abstaining from political activism in the public sphere. Therefore the following hypothesis is advanced.

Hypothesis 2a: Religiosity will be negatively associated with the political activism of Palestinian female youth.

Hypothesis 2b: Religiosity will be negatively associated more strongly with direct forms of activism than with supportive forms of activism.

Political Affiliation

In addition to degree of religiosity, affiliation with a political group may also provide explanation as to political activism for female Palestinian youth. According to Political Stabilization Theory, political leaders are socializing agents who transmit their political ideologies and behaviors to their followers, especially youth (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006). Therefore insights can be gleaned into the political identity of females who reported belonging to any political group such as Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or PLFP (see section on Religio-Political Affiliation below for discussion of these groups). For these girls the act of signifying association with any political group shows not only commitment to the group but also awareness and internalization of the historical struggle for national identity.

Differentiating between youth who are affiliated with a political group and those who are not is an important distinction to identify and test since almost half (47%) of Palestinian female

youth to be studied in this thesis reported that they did not belong to a specific political party during the Intifada (Barber & Olsen, 2009). In contrast, 27% percent identified themselves as Fatah, 19% self-identified as Hamas or Islamic Jihad, and 7% as PLFP or another political party. Political Stabilization Theory along with the history of the Palestinian resistance towards Israeli policy and practice suggests that female youth who report affiliation with a political group implies awareness and embracing of the political agenda (i.e., resistance) and would thus be more likely than girls who report no affiliation to engage in political activism during the first Intifada. Therefore the following hypothesis is advanced.

Hypothesis 3: Female youth who reported an affiliation with any political group will have higher levels of overall activism than female youth who reported no affiliation.

Religio-Political Affiliation

Despite the logic of the arguments for independent, direct effects of religiosity and political affiliation presented above, the overlap in Palestinian society of religion and politics recommends consideration of the two forces together as well when hypothesizing about political activism in female youth. In order to more fully understand the joint impact of religion and political affiliation, a closer examination of the major political groups operative in the Gaza Strip during the first Intifada is necessary. They were: Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

While all Palestinian political groups are influenced by Islamic religion and all groups desire to achieve an independent Palestinian state, they differ in their beliefs as to the role of Islam in achieving a political replacement of the Israeli occupation. For example, Fatah, a secular political group formed in the 1959, is driven by a nationalistic political agenda which does not ascribe to

the fundamental tenets of Islam regarding gender scripts (i.e. women not allowed in the public sphere) nor to the exclusion of a right for the existence of an Israeli state. Instead, Fatah has been and currently is willing to engage in diplomatic talks with Israel and other nations in hopes of achieving a sustainable, two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Essentially, the Fatah leadership does not dictate the role of women in Palestinian society beyond what is culturally defined (Hunter, 1993; Lybarger, 2007; Peteet, 1991; Roy, 2007).

In contrast, Hamas (formed in 1987) and Islamic Jihad (formed in the 1980s) are characterized as militant, orthodox fundamentalist groups in which the political agenda is driven explicitly by their interpretations of Islamic doctrine. For example, Hamas and Islamic Jihad desire to create an Islamic state in Palestine that is reflective of traditional gender roles in which women have little autonomy to move freely in public spaces. During the first Intifada, both groups, but especially Hamas, urged the people to return to their religious roots, including the return of women to the domestic sphere (Hunter, 1993; Lybarger, 2007; Peteet, 1991). Scholars, such as Moghadam (2003) and Rubenberg (2001), claim that Hamas politicized gender during the first Intifada by equating Palestinian victory in the first Intifada with a return to traditional gender scripts for all females regardless of their religious preference.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), established in 1967, is a communist political party that utilizes militant tactics to fight Israeli oppression. Unlike Hamas and Islamic Jihad, PLFP (lead by the Ahmad Sa'adat, a Christian Palestinian in exile) does not seek to create an Islamic Palestinian state, but rather advocates for a secular, democratic nation. Due to its non-orthodox leanings, PLFP does not dictate strict gender roles, but has been noted as engaging in behaviors that run contrary to Islamic teachings, such as failing to fast during Ramadan and allowing women to dress in non-traditional Western clothing (Lybarger, 2007;

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," 2009). However, despite its political significance, relatively few female youth in Gaza reported affiliation with PLFP (Barber & Olson, 2009).

Due to the differing religious and political stances of the political groups outlined above, assessing Palestinian female youth's religio-political affiliation is an initial attempt to reflect and test for the reality of the intersection between religion and politics. To illustrate, it would be sensible to expect that young women who belonged to Fatah would have likely been engaged in political activism, specifically direct, front line, forms of political activism, since Fatah is less orthodox in gender role ideology and its leaders would not mandate specific behaviors for Palestinian females. In contrast, Palestinian girls who reported identification with fundamentalist Islamic groups (i.e., Hamas and Islamic Jihad) would be expected to have engaged in less political activism due to the fundamental Islamic underpinnings and strict gender rules which are characteristic of these two groups. Moreover, for the Palestinian females who identified themselves as belonging to fundamentalist Islamic groups, but nevertheless reported engaging in political activism, it is logical to expect that these female youth would have engaged in the less direct, more gendered forms of activism, such as following instructions from political leaders or the various forms of supportive forms of activism (i.e. caring for the wounded, delivering supplies, visiting a family of a martyr, etc.). More specifically, the hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 4a: Female youth who reported affiliation with the political group Fatah will have higher levels of both supportive and direct activism than their counterparts who reported affiliation with fundamentalist Islamic groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad combined).

Hypothesis 4b: Identification with Fatah will predict higher levels of direct activism than supportive activism.

Hypothesis 4c: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will have higher levels of supportive activism than direct forms of activism.

Hypothesis 4d: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will have lower levels of supportive activism than females who reported an affiliation with Fatah.

A second, more refined test of the intersection of religion and politics is to test for the interaction of the two in predicting political activism. Simply identifying oneself as a member of a specific political party speaks to both the political agenda of the group and the religious underpinnings. By assessing only the relationship between religio-political affiliation and activism, one does not know if participants are identifying with a political group because of its religious influences or policies regarding Palestinian nationality and Israeli occupation. Therefore testing the degree to which religiosity moderates the impact of religio-political affiliation better captures the intersection between religion and politics and thereby would add more precision to understanding the relative impact of politics and religion on female activism.

Due to the strict gendered cultural scripts of Islam and fundamental Islamic political groups, it is expected, then, that Palestinian females who reported affiliation with Islamic fundamental groups and reported high degrees of religiosity will have engaged in political activism to differing degrees than girls who were affiliated with Islamic fundamental groups but reported low degrees of religiosity. Additionally, the relationship between affiliation with Fatah and degree of religiosity will follow the same pattern as for affiliation with Islamic fundamental groups, however not to the same extent. This is so because it can be expected that a Fatah girl's interpretation of Islam would be less restrictive than the interpretation of a girl who belongs to an Islamic fundamental group. More specifically hypotheses are advanced as follows:

Hypothesis 4e: Religiosity will moderate the impact of religio-political affiliation, such that females who reported affiliation with the Islamic groups and reported high degrees of religiosity will have lower levels of overall activism compared to females who reported affiliation with the Islamic groups but reported low degrees of religiosity.

Hypothesis 4f: Identification with Fatah and reported high degrees of religiosity will be associated with lower levels of political activism than identification with Fatah and low degrees of religiosity.

Hypothesis 4g: The moderating effect of religiosity will be more pronounced for affiliation with Islamic fundamental groups than with Fatah, such that the highest level of overall activism will be had by less religious, Fatah females, followed by, in descending order: highly religious Fatah females, less religious Islamic females, and highly religious Islamic females.

Efficacy

In addition to socioeconomic and religio-political forces that drive activist behavior, it is also likely that activism at the individual level is influenced by individual characteristics. One such factor would be the degree to which the individual feels that activism is effective in addressing the grievances or otherwise meeting the goals of the broader society. Accordingly, perceived efficacy is considered in this thesis as an additional predictor of Palestinian female youth's political participation.

Collective Identity theorists suggest that identification with a disadvantaged group with little or no opportunity to become part of the advantaged group and the perceived efficacy of the self's and group's ability to obtain goals work in conjunction as key predictors of collective action (Klandermans, 1984; van Zomeren et al., 2008). In their meta-analysis of predictors of collective

action, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) found that perceived injustice, identification with the disadvantaged group, and self- and group efficacy all predicted collective action in the form of protest behaviors. In all studies in the meta-analysis, group efficacy was measured by appraisals of the effectiveness of the groups' actions to achieve its desired goals; self-efficacy was measured and defined as appraisal of one's own ability to effectively aide in achieving the group's goals.

In addition to the study by Zomeren et al. (2008), other work has found evidence of the impact of group and self-efficacy on future political action. For example, Brunsting and Postmes (2002) identified group efficacy as well as self-efficacy as key predictors of future online collective action for environmental activists in the Netherlands. Additionally, Hornsey et al. (2006) found that perceived effectiveness of an environmental rally on influencing policy and government actions predicted future political activism intentions in Australian economic and globalization activists. These studies suggest that individuals who believe in the group's and their own ability to achieve the group goals are more likely to participate in political action than those individuals who doubt their group's ability and their own ability to achieve the goals.

From a gendered perspective, Taylor (1999) and Brown and Ferguson (1995) theorize that girls and women are more likely to engage in political action when they have positive beliefs about their ability to affect a desired outcome. These authors argue that a woman's cognitive view of her personal capabilities and knowledge in part determines if the woman will become an activist. A woman's cognitive schema may allow her to break traditional cultural norms and engage in public forms of political activism (Brown & Ferguson, 1995; Taylor, 1999). This viewpoint is quite salient for the population under study in this thesis. Participation in the first Intifada, even gendered participation (i.e. supportive activism), required female youth to break

tradition and enter into a public sphere alongside non-relative men. Assessing perceived efficacy of youth may provide explanations as to why certain girls engaged in activist behaviors compared to other girls who did not.

In accordance with theory and previous research, efficacy in this thesis is measured by examining female youth's self-appraisal of their actions (perceived individual efficacy) as well as their overall beliefs about the success or failure of the first Intifada (perception of group efficacy). Despite no precedence to consider separate effects of group and self-efficacy, the literature suggests that an examination of each type of efficacy (self and group) will each be uniquely associated with activism. Therefore both self and group efficacy will be aggregated and tested independently. Specifically,

Hypothesis 5a: Perceived group efficacy will be associated positively with political activism among Palestinian female youth.

Hypothesis 5b: Perceived self efficacy will be associated positively with political activism among Palestinian female youth.

Age

Finally, although preference is given to the socioeconomic, religious, political, and personal antecedents of activism described above, age of youth will also be included in the predictive model. This is guided by classic developmental theory and some empirical findings.

Theoretically, the most salient task for youth is identity formation which is influenced by cultural and historical factors and is signified by a struggle for self-and group-identification in socio-historical-political realms that are viewed as important to the achievement of identity (e.g., Erikson, 1968). With respect to political activism, Braungart (1984) suggests that youth become

involved in political activism because they are between prescribed roles of child and adulthood and view activism as an opportunity to define a new role or identity.

In addition to theory, some research has documented a positive association between age and political activism. For example, Pearce and Larson (2006) found age to be a significant predictor of involvement for 15-19-year-old American youth in a civic activism program. Similarly, civic knowledge, or knowledge of one's country's history and political structure, has also been shown to be positively associated with age among U.S. youth (6th – 12th graders) (Hart, Atkins, Markey, and Youniss, 2004).

These notions and findings notwithstanding, it is not clear if and to what degree chronological age will be relevant to explaining activism in the Intifada. Recently, many scholars have criticized the relevance of classic developmental theory given its foundation of Western thought. Western scholarly work on identity has focused primarily on an individual adolescent's journey of self-discovery, with little attention to key cultural, historical, political, or religious influences on the development of adolescents' identity in normative circumstances (B. B. Brown & Larson, 2002; Hammack, 2008), and on conflict youth in particular (Barber, 2008; 2009). Therefore, chronological age will be included as a control variable in the thesis' analyses in order to partial out any variance that it might explain net of its correlation with other predictors, but given that theoretically it is of much less anticipated value in explaining activism than the economic, political, religious, and personal factors elaborated above, no specific hypothesis is advanced.

Summary of Hypotheses

In sum, Palestinian women have a long history of political participation despite the cultural and religious scripts that limit female activism in the public sphere. Therefore the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the experience of female adolescents in zones of political conflict - specifically in the Gaza Strip during the first Intifada, and test if differences in levels of female participation in activist behaviors can be explained by their socioeconomic, religious, political, and individual characteristics. Based on a variety of theories, cultural and historical contexts, and previous research, specific hypothesis advanced in this thesis are as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated with the political activism of Palestinian female youth.

Hypothesis 1b: Socioeconomic status will be negatively associated more strongly with supportive forms of activism than with direct forms of activism.

Hypothesis 2a: Religiosity will be negatively associated with the political activism of Palestinian female youth.

Hypothesis 2b: Religiosity will be negatively associated more strongly with direct forms of activism than with supportive forms of activism.

Hypothesis 3: Female youth who reported an affiliation with any political group will have higher levels of overall activism than female youth who reported no affiliation.

Hypothesis 4a: Female youth who reported affiliation with the political group Fatah will have higher levels of both supportive and direct activism than their counterparts who reported affiliation with fundamentalist Islamic groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad combined).

Hypothesis 4b: Identification with Fatah will predict higher levels of direct activism than supportive activism.

Hypothesis 4c: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will have higher levels of supportive activism than direct forms of activism.

Hypothesis 4d: Female youth who reported an affiliation with the Islamic groups will have lower levels of supportive activism than females who reported an affiliation with Fatah.

Hypothesis 4e: Religiosity will moderate the impact of religio-political affiliation, such that females who reported affiliation with the Islamic groups and reported high degrees of religiosity will have lower levels of overall activism compared to females who reported affiliation with the Islamic groups but reported low degrees of religiosity.

Hypothesis 4f: Identification with Fatah and reported high degrees of religiosity will be associated with lower levels of political activism than identification with Fatah and low degrees of religiosity.

Hypothesis 4g: The moderating effect of religiosity will be more pronounced for affiliation with Islamic fundamental groups than with Fatah, such that the highest level of overall activism will be had by less religious, Fatah females, followed by, in descending order: highly religious Fatah females, less religious Islamic females, and highly religious Islamic females.

Hypothesis 5a: Perceived group efficacy will be associated positively with political activism among Palestinian female youth.

Hypothesis 5b: Perceived self efficacy will be associated positively with political activism among Palestinian female youth.

See Figures 1 Appendix A for a graphic representation of the moderating model hypotheses.

CHAPTER 3: METHODS

Participants

Data came from a representative sample of 383 Palestinian female youth from the Gaza Strip, who participated in the Adolescents and Political Violence Project (APVP), the intent of which was to assess the long-term impact of involvement in political violence on adolescents. (Barber, 2008). APVP participants responded to a questionnaire that assessed demographics, victimization, activism, and a variety of measures of psychosocial functioning.

The survey built on a previous survey study (Barber, 1999a, 2001) and interview work (Barber, 1999b, 2009) on Palestinian adolescents in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank. The survey was written in English, back-translated into Arabic, and pilot tested with youth in the Gaza Strip several times before administration. The final version was administered in 1998 to 917 Palestinian youth (N=383 females), between the ages of 20-27-years-old, living in the Gaza Strip. This age range was chosen to ensure that the youth had lived through at least three years of the conflict during their teen years.

Just over one-half of the female respondents (N = 193) were participants in the 8 United Nations Development Program centers in the Gaza Strip. All youth who were enrolled in the programs participated in the survey. The other half of the female respondents (N=188) were students in selected classes at the two major universities in the Gaza strip (Al Azhar University and Islamic University). All students present in those classes on the day of the survey administration completed the survey. No census data set was available in Gaza at the time of the survey that would have facilitated a truly representative sample. However, every effort was made to include adequate representation of the diversity that exists in the Gaza Strip, including sex,

education, employment, region of residence, type of residence (e.g., camp, village, town), political affiliation, etc. Relevant sample characteristics for female youth are reported in Table 1.

Measures

The independent variables in this study were socioeconomic status, religiosity, political affiliation, religio-political affiliation, efficacy, and age. The dependent variable was political activism. The items used to measure each of the variables are described below.

Dependent Variable: Political Activism

The survey included 17 specific activism items that were identified from past literature on the Intifada and through extensive interviews with Palestinian youth (Barber, 1999b). Participants were asked “How often did you do the following things in conflict with Israeli soldiers?” Responses ranged *1 never to 5 regularly*. Additionally, participants were asked to tailor responses to the four time periods [“Before the Intifada,” “1st two years of the Intifada (1988-1989),” “Last three years of the Intifada (1990-1993),” and “After the Intifada]. In order to better assess the relationship between political activism and the independent variables and to fix the amount of time in which respondents were asked to report on activism experiences so as to control for opportunity to engage in activism [i.e., older youth had more opportunity (years) to engage than younger youth], responses from the third time period (“Last three years of the Intifada”) were used for analyses in this thesis. By using responses from the “Last three years of the Intifada,” greater variance in the distribution of the variables can be captured due to the increased length of time in which the respondents were retrospectively reporting (i.e., 2 years vs. 3 years). Although the full, continuous response scales were employed in all analyses for this thesis, for insight into the degree of participation, percentages females who “ever participated”

Table 1 *Sample Characteristics*

Characteristics	Range	Average
Age (years)	20-27	21.78
Family size		
Brothers		3.92
Sisters		3.53
Marital Status		
Single		80.6%
Religious Affiliation		
Muslim		99.2%
Geographic distribution		
Gaza Strip north		20.6%
Gaza Strip central		41.8%
Gaza Strip south		35.8%
Residence		
Camp		46.8%
Village		8.9%
City/Town		44.2%
Standard of living		
“Poorer than most”		13.2%
“Richer than most”		14.5%
Father employed in 1997		47.1%
Educational attainment		
Finished secondary school		91%
Completed university		20.1%
Currently enrolled in university		64.4%
Employment		
Employed “never” in 1997		64.7%
Employed “very often” in 1997		14.2%
Political affiliation		
No affiliation		45.2%
Fatah		25.6%
Hamas or Islamic Jihad		18.8%
PLFP		5.0%
Other		5.4%

during the third time period are also presented in Table 2. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.

In previous analysis (Barber & Olsen, 2009) of the larger data set (both males and females), the seventeen items measuring political participation loaded on three primary factors. One set, labeled *Direct Activism*, included the items a, b, e, g, h, i, j, k, and l. All these items pertain to more direct forms of activism such as throwing stones, demonstrating, and erecting a Palestinian flag. Another set, *Supportive Activism*, consisted of items d, m, n, o, p, and q, and describe activities that are were not direct protest behavior, but rather, served other supportive functions such as caring for the wounded and visiting the family of a martyr. Finally, items c and f loaded on the third factor, *Follow*. These items refer to following instructions from the movement's leadership that was written on walls or in leaflets that were distributed to the population, typically by youth. The scales were created by calculating averages for the third time period. Cronbach's alpha for each of the scales were as follows: Direct Activism: 0.88; Supportive Activism: 0.85; Follow: 0.80.

Given that those analyses aggregated male and female youth scores on these activism items, new exploratory analyses will be run to assess the factor structure for females only. For regression analysis, composite scores for each factor were created by taking the mean of the relevant items.

Independent Variables

The independent variables for this study were socioeconomic status, degree of religiosity, two forms of political affiliation (i.e., affiliated or not; and specific religio-political party affiliation), efficacy, and age.

Table 2 *Percentage of Females Who Ever (One or More Times) Participated during the Last Three Years of the Intifada*

	Percentage
a. Demonstrate	57
b. Distribute leaflets	12
c. Obey leaflets	65
d. Protect someone from IDF	50
e. Write slogans	4
f. Follow instructions from slogans	76
g. Burn tires	7
h. Erect barricades	17
i. Throw stones	47
j. Erect a Palestinian flag	40
k. Throw Molotov cocktails	5
l. Wear a mask	5
m. Deliver supplies to participants	57
n. Care for the wounded	39
o. Try to distract soldiers	49
p. Bring onions to help with the tear gas	69
q. Visit the family of a martyr	49

Table 3 *Means and Standard Deviations for Activism Items Reported During the Last Three Years of the Intifada*

	Mean	N	SD
a. Demonstrate	2.33	362	1.362
b. Distribute leaflets	1.27	354	0.821
c. Obey leaflets	2.89	344	1.614
d. Protect someone from IDF	2.33	358	1.498
e. Write slogans	1.07	358	0.397
f. Follow instructions from slogans	3.23	359	1.519
g. Burn tires	1.14	358	0.579
h. Erect barricades	1.37	357	0.914
i. Throw stones	2.08	357	1.341
j. Erect a Palestinian flag	1.94	355	1.333
k. Throw Molotov cocktails	1.10	356	0.513
l. Wear a mask	1.10	350	0.504
m. Deliver supplies to participants	2.34	358	1.398
n. Care for the wounded	1.88	359	1.272
o. Try to distract soldiers	2.17	360	1.386
p. Bring onions to help with the tear gas	2.79	364	1.460
q. Visit the family of a martyr	2.12	364	1.358

Socioeconomic Status

Several measures of socioeconomic status are available in the data set. First, participants were asked to indicate if during the Intifada they primarily lived in a camp, village, or city/town. Generally, camp dwellers are considered to be the poorest, with village residents, somewhat better off and those living in cities or towns yet better off (Barber & Olson, 2009). Second, participants were also asked to indicate the highest level of education completed by their fathers and their mothers (Tables 4 and 5). For both questions, response scales ranged from *1 no formal education* to *11 Ph.D. degree*. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their perceived well-being relative to other families they know, according to a 5-point response scale ranging from *1 a lot poorer than most* to *5 a little richer than most*. (see Table 6). Exploratory factor, correlation, and reliability analyses were run to determine if these items can be used jointly in measuring socioeconomic status, or if one or more of them is better used independently. Regardless, higher scores indicated higher socioeconomic status.

Religiosity

Degree of religiosity was measured by five items which youth responded on a 5-point response scale ranging from *1 not at all* to *5 every day* relative to how often they engaged in that activity “during the past year..” Participants were asked to respond to four time periods (“Before the Intifada,” “1st two years of the Intifada (1988-1989),” “Last three years of the Intifada (1990-1993),” and “After the Intifada”). In order to be consistent with the time period used to assess political activism, for these analyses, responses from the third period (“Last three years of the Intifada) were used.

Table 4 *Level of Paternal Education*

What is the highest level of education your father completed? (please circle one number)

-
1. No formal education
 2. Elementary school
 3. Preparatory school
 4. Did not finish secondary school
 5. Finished secondary school
 6. Vocational training
 7. Some university
 8. BA degree
 9. Some graduate school
 10. MA degree
 11. Ph.D. degree
 12. I don't know
-

Table 5 *Level of Maternal Education*

What is the highest level of education your mother completed? (please circle one number)

-
1. No formal education
 2. Elementary school
 3. Preparatory school
 4. Did not finish secondary school
 5. Finished secondary school
 6. Vocational training
 7. Some university
 8. BA degree
 9. Some graduate school
 10. MA degree
 11. Ph.D. degree
 12. I don't know
-

Table 6 *Perception of Relative Deprivation*

During the Intifada, how would you describe your family? (please circle one number)

1. We were a lot poorer than most
2. We were a little poorer than most
3. We had about the same amount of money as most
4. We were a little richer than most
5. We were a lot richer than most

Researchers have identified multiple dimensions of religiosity (see Chadwick & Top, 1993; Cornwall & Thomas, 1990), and in previous analyses of these same data (but aggregated across male and female youth) these five items loaded on two factors, *Public Religiosity* and *Private Religiosity* (Barber & Olsen, 2009). *Private Religiosity* consisted of four items: “Pray alone,” “Read in the Koran,” “Think seriously about religion,” “Talk about religion with friends.” The fifth religiosity item, “Go to a Mosque to pray,” loaded on the *Public Religiosity* factor. Other items not used in this study (such as helped teach the Koran or Bible to others) comprised the measure of Public Religiosity in Barber and Olsen’s study. These additional items will not be used in these analyses since participants were not asked to report on their involvement in these forms of religiosity during the Intifada but rather after the Intifada. Cronbach’s alpha for the *Private Religiosity* scale was .67. This set of items was analyzed again using only the female youth data via exploratory factor analysis. Since the purpose of this thesis is not to advance specific hypothesis regarding different dimensions of religiosity, but, rather, to assess the impact of religiosity (both private and public forms), in general, on activism, composite scores were formed from the mean of each item.

Political Affiliation

Political affiliation was measured by one item: “Which of the following political groups do you belong?” Responses included belonging to no political group and a series of political parties operative in Gaza during the first Intifada. See Table 7. Participants were asked to indicate membership with a political group or no political group, for four time periods. In order to be consistent, responses from the third time period (“Last three years of the Intifada”) were used for analyses in this thesis. Additionally, not until the later three years of the Intifada did Hamas begin to emerge as a prominent Palestinian political group.

To facilitate the creation of the two affiliation variables below, some recoding of this item will be conducted. Specifically, the political affiliation variable will be recoded, via orthogonal contrast coding, into a new variable (“Political Affiliation”) that includes the responses that received the most endorsement and to reflect the distinction between the secular and fundamentalist Islamic political groups: unaffiliated, Fatah, and Islamic (i.e., Hamas and Islamic Jihad aggregated). The non-designated groups will automatically be set to missing.

Orthogonal contrast coding is utilized since it allows for direct comparisons between specified groups or combinations of groups. Specifically, items coded negatively will be compared to those coded positively, whereas, items coded zero will be ignored in the comparison. Since the sum of the codes across the groups must equal zero, the recoding of variables in this analysis reflect a zero sum (see codes below) (Cohen et al., 2003).

Table 7 *Political Affiliation Responses*

Which of the following political groups did you belong?

-
1. I belonged to no political group
 2. Fatah
 3. Hamas
 4. Islamic Jihad
 5. PLFP
 6. DFLP
 7. Arab Liberation Front
 8. Palestine Liberation Front
 9. Palestine Communist Party
 10. Other
-

Affiliation vs. Non-Affiliation

To test the hypotheses relative to affiliation (N = 170) versus non-affiliation (N = 173) (regardless of political party), the recoded “Political Affiliation” variable was dichotomized to reflect those females that reported no affiliation and those that reported affiliation with secular (Fatah) or fundamentalist, Islamic political groups (Hamas, and Islamic Jihad). Unaffiliated will be set to -2, whereas secular and fundamentalist groups were each set to +1.

Religio-Political Affiliation

To test the hypotheses relative to differences between the secular (N = 98) and fundamentalist Islamic groups (N = 72), the “Political Affiliation” variable was recoded to reflect the contrast, with unaffiliated being set to zero (i.e., not used in the comparison), Fatah set to +1, and fundamental Islamic groups set to -1.

Efficacy

Efficacy was measured by ten items assessing participants' appraisal of their ability and the Palestinian people's ability to succeed in the first Intifada. See Table 8 for a full list of items. Participants responded to the stem: "How much would you agree with the following thoughts?" A 5-point response scale was used that ranged from *1 strongly disagree*, to *5 strongly agree* for two time periods: "1st two years of the Intifada (1988-1989)" and "Last three years of the Intifada (1990-1993)." Again to achieve consistency among the time periods used to measure each variable, the second time period ("Last three years of the Intifada") will be used for analyses. Exploratory factor analysis will be used to establish the most parsimonious set of items to be used. Items a, b, and c were expected to measure group efficacy, while items d, e, f, g, h, i, and j are expected to measure self-efficacy, not to be analyzed as separate items, but as a measure of overall efficacy. Exploratory factor analysis was used to determine if these items represent the same latent construct. A composite score for both group efficacy and self efficacy was computed by taking the mean of the set of items.

Age

Age was assessed with the question "How old are you?" Respondents indicated their age according to a scale that ranged from 15-30-years.

Table 8 Efficacy Items

How much would you agree with the following thoughts?

- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Strongly disagree | 4. Agree |
| 2. Disagree | 5. Strongly Agree |
| 3. Neither agree or disagree | |

-
- a. The struggle was hopeless
 - b. The Intifada was successful
 - c. The Intifada was worth the effort
 - d. I felt I could accomplish anything as a person
 - e. I felt like giving up
 - f. I felt I could carry the struggle on forever
 - g. I was confident about the future
 - h. I was worried about the future
 - i. I felt like I could make a real difference
 - j. I felt like I was helping to make history
-

Analysis

Analyses to assess the measurement properties of all of the study's variables are described above. The associations between the constructs of interest were tested first via bivariate correlations. Next, hierarchical regression analyses were used to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, separately for supportive and direct activism. In the main effects model, age was entered first, followed by socioeconomic status, group efficacy, self efficacy, political affiliation, religio-political affiliation, and religiosity. Each variable was entered separately in sequential linear regression. The same steps were used to enter the variables in the moderating model as in the main effects model, except that in a third step a variable representing the interaction of religio-political affiliation and religiosity was added. This interaction variable was the product of the two variables, after religiosity is centered.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

Four types of analyses were conducted for this thesis. First, missing data analyses were conducted to examine patterns of missing data. Next, exploratory factor analysis was used to determine the composition of scales. Finally, correlation and regression analyses were utilized to address this study's hypotheses. The remainder of this section will present the results from each analysis.

Missing Data

Before creating scale scores for the study variables the data were inspected for patterns of missing values. Overall, there were moderate levels of missing data. Specifically, for 26 of the 38 items used in the various models, more than 5% of the data were missing. For most of the items, missing data ranged from 5.5% to 7%. The highest percentages of missing data were for two items: "Go to the Mosque to pray" (9.1% missing) and "Obey leaflets" (10.2% missing). Otherwise, for 10 cases there were missing data on two items. For 5 of these cases, the missing data were for the items: "Write slogans" and "I felt I could accomplish anything as a person." For the additional 5 cases, there were missing data for the items: "The Intifada was successful" and "Obey leaflets." All other patterns of missing data applied to less than five cases. Due to this moderate level of missing data Expectation Maximization (EM) imputation methods were used at the item level, except for categorical items (i.e., political affiliation, place of residence, and religio-political affiliation) since EM does not accurately impute categorical items.

After imputation on the item level and creating scale scores for socioeconomic status, religiosity, self and group efficacy, and supportive and direct activism (see below for a description of scales), missing data analyses were conducted again, but this time on the variable

level to examine any patterns of missing data, with specific attention to categorical variables. Overall, there were very low levels of missing data for the scale scores. All but three of the variables or scale scores had 0% missing data. The three variables that had missing data were “Political affiliation” (affiliation vs. non-affiliation), “Religio-political affiliation” (affiliation with a specific political party), and “Place of residence”. Due to the nature of contrast coding, responses other than “No affiliation,” “Affiliation with Fatah,” “Affiliation with Hamas,” or “Affiliation with Islamic Jihad” were set to missing. In total there were 38 missing data for these two variables making the percentage of missing data 10%. Due to the intentional nature of the missing data for these two variables (i.e., this author recoded responses to reflect missing data) and the extremely low level of missing data for “Place of residence” (.8%), imputation methods were not used for scale level variables. Instead Listwise Deletion methods were implemented. Thus the final number of participants was 336.

Measurement Model

Exploratory factor analysis was used to assess the fit of the proposed measurement models for the independent variables and dependent variable. Principal axis factoring extraction with oblique rotation was used in all exploratory factor analyses. Results of the measurement models are discussed below.

Socioeconomic Status (SES)

The four items used to measure socioeconomic status were tested via exploratory factor analysis (EFA). EFA resulted in one factor. Cronbach’s alpha for these four items was .56, too low to justify aggregating the four items into one scale. Since mother’s level of education and father’s level of education were correlated at .61, these two items were transformed into one

composite variable by taking the mean of each item. The remaining two items (place of residence and perception of deprivation compared to peers) were used as independent measures of socioeconomic status with place of residence dummy coded so that living in a refugee camp was the reference group and living in a village and living in a city/town were the comparison groups. These three separate measures of SES (the composite variable, place of residence, and perception of deprivation) were entered simultaneously in the second block of the subsequent hierarchical regression analyses.

Religiosity

First, EFA was used to analyze all five items. These analyses revealed a two factor solution. The first factor was comprised of the single item “Go to the Mosque to pray” and was labeled *Public Religiosity*. The second factor was comprised of the items “Read the Koran,” “Thought about religion,” and “Talked about religion” and was labeled *Private Religiosity*. The item “Pray alone” did not clearly belong to either of the two factors as seen by the relatively equal split loading across the two factors, and therefore was dropped as a measure of religiosity.

EFA was run a second time with four items (without “Pray alone”) and indicated a one factor solution. While the item “Go to the Mosque to Pray” loaded with the three other items on one factor, its value was too low (.354) to justify including in along with the other items in one measure of religiosity. Additionally, based on previous analyses (Barber & Olson, 2009) “Go to the Mosque to Pray” was identified as an indicator of *Public Religiosity* while the other items were measures of *Private Religiosity*. Therefore, the final measure of religiosity includes three items “Read the Koran,” “Thought about religion,” and “Talked about religion.” Cronbach’s alpha for these items was .79.

Efficacy

EFA of the combined set of self and group efficacy items resulted in a three factor solution. The first factor was composed of the items “I could accomplish anything,” “I could carry on the struggle forever,” “I am confident about the future,” “I could make a difference,” “I was helping to make history” and was labeled *Self Efficacy*. The second factor was comprised of the items “The Intifada was successful” and “The Intifada was worth the effort” and was labeled *Group Efficacy*. The third factor was comprised of the items “Felt like giving up,” “Struggle was hopeless,” and “Worried about the future” and was labeled *Negative Appraisal*.

Based on the purposes of examining the relationship between the concepts of self efficacy and group efficacy and activism, EFA was run a second time without the negative appraisal items. The results of the second factor analysis indicated that the item “I could accomplish anything” had a loading that was less than .300, whereas the other items measuring *Self Efficacy* had loadings of .600 or higher. Therefore, based on statistical guidance, the final measure of *Self Efficacy* includes four items: “I could carry on the struggle forever,” “I am confident about the future,” “I could make a difference,” “I was helping to make history.” *Group Efficacy* consists of the items “The Intifada was successful” and “The Intifada was worth the effort.” Cronbach’s alpha for *Self Efficacy* was .75 and the correlation between the two items used to measure *Group Efficacy* was .62

Activism

In previous EFA analyses of the same set of activism items (Barber & Olsen, 2009) three factors were identified in both the male and female data. The three factors were labeled *Support*, *Direct*, and *Follow*. EFA analyses from this thesis used only the female responses and generally replicated those factors identified in Barber and Olsen's study.

For these analyses, EFA of the combined set of activism items resulted in a four-factor solution. The first factor was comprised of the items "Demonstrate," "Distribute leaflets," "Burn tires," "Erect barricades," "Throw stones," "Erect flag," and "Throw Molotov cocktail," and was labeled *Direct Activism*. The second factor was comprised of the items "Protect someone from Israeli soldier," "Deliver supplies to Palestinian fighters," "Care for the wounded," "Distract soldiers," "Bring onions," and "Visit the family of a martyr," and was labeled *Supportive Activism*. The third factor included the items "Obey leaflets" and "Follow instructions" and was labeled *Follow*. Finally, the fourth factor included the items "Write slogans" and "Wear a mask" and was labeled *Extreme Direct Activism* since these two forms of behavior were particularly risky. Writing slogans was a primary means of communicating directives from political leadership and the IDF was particularly harsh on those who did so. Wearing a mask indicated that the IDF had already apprehended the individual who wore the mask to conceal this familiarity. Both forms of behavior were typically committed by male, and not female, youth (Barber, forthcoming).

An inspection of the frequencies of these variables confirmed that, in fact, few females in this sample did engage in *Extreme Direct Activism*. Results showed that 96% of the females reported that they never wrote slogans and 95.4% reported that they never wore a mask. Due to

the low prevalence of these types of activism in this sample, the two items were dropped from further analyses. In addition, the two items “Burn tires” and “Throw Molotov cocktails” were also dropped from analyses also due to low prevalence (93% and 95% respectively reported never engaging in these forms of activism).

The final measurement, then, of *Supportive Activism* consisted of the eight items: “Obeying leaflets,” “Protecting someone from an Israeli soldier,” “Following instructions,” “Delivering supplies to Palestinian fighters,” “Caring for the wounded,” “Distracting soldiers,” “Bring onions to Palestinian fighters,” and “Visiting the family of a martyr.” (Note: The two items “Obeying leaflets” and “Following instructions” loaded on the *Follow* factor. However for the purposes of these analyses, these two items were used to create a composite measure of *Supportive Activism*.) Cronbach’s alpha for *Supportive Activism* was .86. The measurement of *Direct Activism* consisted of the five items: “Demonstrating,” “Distributing leaflets,” “Erecting barricades,” “Throwing stones,” and “Erecting a Palestinian flag.” Cronbach’s alpha for *Direct Activism* was .91.

Correlations

Bivariate correlations were calculated among all of the study variables. The coefficients are reported in Table 9. Correlations amongst the predictor variables provide insights into the lives of Palestinian young women in the first Intifada. For example, efficacy (group and self) was significantly and positively correlated with religiosity suggesting that Palestinian young women who were highly religious were also highly efficacious. Palestinian young women who were self efficacious were also more likely to be affiliated with a political party, than those with low levels of self efficacy. However, being highly religious was significantly correlated with belonging to

fundamental Islamic political groups (i.e., Hamas and Islamic Jihad). Additionally, young women who lived in a refugee camp were older and reported less relative economic well-being than those young women living in a city or town. Furthermore, as expected, the two forms of activism were significantly, positively correlated.

In terms of what was expected, lower levels of parental education and living in a refugee camp (SES) were negatively correlated with both forms of activism (direct and support) supporting expectations that Palestinian female activists came from a lower socioeconomic status than non-activists. Additionally, these young women who participated in both kinds of activism had higher levels of group and self efficacy, were more religious, and were more likely to be affiliated with a political party than those young women who reported little to no activism. Correlations between higher degrees of efficacy and activism and political affiliation and efficacy were in the expected direction, while the correlations between religiosity and activism were in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Moreover, age was positively related specifically to supportive activism, whereas, as expected, religio-political affiliation was related specifically to direct activism. Thus those young women who engaged in supportive activism were older, whereas those who engaged in direct activism were more likely to be affiliated with Fatah than their counterparts.

Table 9 *Bivariate Correlations with Independent and Dependent Variables*

	Supportive Activism	Direct Activism	Group Efficacy	Self Efficacy	Religiosity	Political Affiliation	Religio- Political Affiliation	Parental Education	City	Village	Camp	Relative Depriv.
Direct Activism	.602**											
Group Efficacy	.279**	.155**										
Self Efficacy	.284**	.279**	.361**									
Religiosity	.327**	.155**	.283**	.210**								
Political Affiliation	.228**	.253**	.048	.142**	-.033							
Religio- Political Affiliation	.008	.151**	-.068	.000	.155*	.106						
Parental Education	-.206**	-.114*	-.109*	-.032	-.091	-.141*	.043					
City	-.156**	-.114*	.042	.008	.023	-.138	-.071	.216**				
Village	-.062	-.001	-.004	.069	-.002	.085	-.004	-.029	-.276**			
Camp	.191**	.114*	-.039	-.118*	-.011	.088	.073	-.199**	-.839**	-.293**		
Relative Depriv.	-.049	-.034	-.082	-.045	-.077	.052	.087	.199**	.153**	-.019	-.141*	
Age	.357**	.066	.052	.007	.093	.071	-.003	-.313**	-.173**	-.001	.178**	-.072

** Correlations Significant at the .01 Level (2 tailed)

*Correlations Significant at the .05 Level (2 tailed)

Regression

Hierarchical regression analysis with main effects was used to examine the association between age, socioeconomic status, efficacy, political affiliation (affiliation with any party), religio-political affiliation (affiliation with a specific political party), religiosity and supportive and direct activism. Additionally, the effect of the interaction between religio-political affiliation and religiosity on activism was examined. For the analyses of main effects, variables were entered in the following sequence: Block 1: age; Block 2: SES variables (parental education, place of residence, and relative deprivation); Block 3: self efficacy; Block 4: group efficacy; Block 5: affiliation with any political party; Block 6: affiliation with a specific political party (religio-political affiliation); and Block 7: religiosity. For analyses of moderating models, variables were entered in the following sequence: Block 1: age, SES, self efficacy, group efficacy, and political affiliation; Block 2: religio-political affiliation and religiosity; Block 3: interaction term of religiosity and religio-political affiliation. Each regression model was run twice, once with supportive activism and a second time with direct activism as the dependent variable. See tables 10 and 11 for the results of the regression analyses for the main effects models of supportive activism and direct activism respectively. See table 12 for the results of the moderating model for supportive activism, and 13 for the results of the moderating model for direct activism.

Overall, the results showed that the variables used to predict activism were effective in explaining both supportive and direct activism. For example, self efficacy, political affiliation, and religiosity were all significantly related to both forms of activism at the multivariate level, as well as the bivariate level (see Correlations section). Age and socioeconomic status were significantly predictive only of supportive activism whereas religio-political affiliation was

Table 10 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Supportive Activism (Main Effects Model) (N = 338)

Variable	B	SE B	β	ΔR^2	F
Block 1					
Age	.084	.015	.265**	.131**	50.522**
Block 2				.028**	2.744**
Parental Education	-.027	.023	-.059		
Relative Deprivation	.066	.102	.030		
Village ^a	-.413	.160	-.122*		
City/Town ^b	-.254	.099	-.127*		
Block 3					
Self Efficacy	.181	.054	.164**	.080**	35.304**
Block 4					
Group Efficacy	.150	.054	.136**	.026**	11.832**
Block 5					
Affiliation ^c	.113	.031	.170**	.024**	11.080**
Block 6					
Religio-Political Affiliation ^d	.050	.065	.035	.000	.000
Block 7					
Religiosity	.317	.058	.258**	.060**	29.966**
				R2	F
				.349**	15.260**

^aVillage: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

^bCity/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

^cAffiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group

^dReligio-Political Affiliation: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups, 0 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with Fatah

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 11 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Direct Activism (Main Effects Model) (N = 338)

Variable	B	SE B	β	ΔR^2	F
Block 1					
Age	-.005	.015	-.016	.003	1.134
Block 2				.022	1.807
Parental Education	-.018	.023	-.042		
Relative Deprivation	.033	.104	.316		
Village ^a	-.208	.164	-.067		
City/Town ^b	-.224	.101	-.123*		
Block 3					
Self Efficacy	.243	.055	.243**	.091**	34.104**
Block 4					
Group Efficacy	.023	.055	.023	.001	.329
Block 5					
Affiliation ^c	.114	.031	.189**	.035**	13.697**
Block 6					
Religio-Political Affiliation ^d	.187	.067	.144*	.016*	6.220*
Block 7					
Religiosity	.132	.059	.118*	.012*	4.964*
				R²	F
				.180**	6.120**

aVillage: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

bCity/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

^cAffiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group

^dReligio-Political Affiliation: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups, 0 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with Fatah

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 12 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Supportive Activism (Moderating Model) (N = 336)

Variable	B	SE B	β	ΔR^2	F
Block 1				.290**	16.776**
Age	.084	.015	.264**		
Parental Education	-.029	.023	-.062		
Relative Deprivation	.072	.102	.032		
Village ^a	-.417	.160	-.123*		
City/Town ^b	-.253	.099	-.126*		
Self Efficacy	.179	.054	.163**		
Group Efficacy	.146	.054	.133**		
Affiliation ^c	.109	.031	.165**		
Block 2				.060**	15.024**
Religio-Political Affiliation ^d	.285	.290	.220		
Religiosity	.328	.059	.267**		
Block 3					
Religio-Political Affiliation x Religiosity	-.064	.077	-.168	.001	.692
				R²	F
				.351**	13.947**

Note: Religiosity was centered at its mean

^aVillage: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

^bCity/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

^cAffiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group

^dPolitical Party: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups, 0 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with Fatah

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 13 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Direct Activism (Moderating Model) (N = 336)

Variable	B	SE B	β	ΔR^2	F
Block 1				.152**	7.366**
Age	-.005	.015	-.019		
Parental Education	-.020	.023	-.047		
Relative Deprivation	.042	.104	.021		
Village ^a	-.213	.164	-.069		
City/Town ^b	-.222	.101	-.122*		
Self Efficacy	.240	.054	.240**		
Group Efficacy	.017	.055	.017**		
Affiliation ^c	.109	.032	.180**		
Block 2				.028**	5.630**
Religio-Political Affiliation ^d	.551	.296	.426		
Religiosity	.149	.061	.133*		
Block 3					
Religio-Political Affiliation x Religiosity	-.100	.079	-.286	.004	1.596
				R²	F
				.184**	5.741**

Note: Religiosity was centered at its mean

^aVillage: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

^bCity/Town: Dummy variable created with living in the camp as the reference group

^cAffiliation: -2 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with a political group

^dPolitical Party: -1 = affiliation with Islamic political groups, 0 = no political affiliation, 1 = affiliation with Fatah

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

predictive only of direct activism. Socioeconomic status was, however, significantly related to direct activism at the bivariate level (see Correlation section). The main difference between the two forms of activism was the percentage of variance in activism explained by the independent variables in each model. While the main effects model explained 35% of the variance for supportive activism and 18% of the variance for direct activism, the difference between these two percentages can almost entirely be accounted for by age. The remainder of this section will discuss the results of each independent variable and whether the stated hypotheses were supported or contradicted.

Age

Although no specific hypothesis was advanced for the relationship between age and activism due to criticism of the use of Western notions of chronological age in non-Western societies, age was included in the models for this study. The results showed that when controlling for socioeconomic status, efficacy, religiosity, political affiliation and religio-political affiliation (i.e., all other independent variable), age was significantly, positively associated with supportive activism ($\beta = .265$, $t = 5.557$, $p < .01$), such that older Palestinian females were more likely to engage in supportive activism than younger females. However, age was not significantly associated with direct activism.

Socioeconomic Status

In support of Hypothesis 1a which suggested that socioeconomic status would be negatively associated with activism, the results indicated that socioeconomic status was significantly and negatively related to both forms of activism. Specifically, while controlling for all other independent variables, Palestinian young women who lived in refugee camps (where

economic well-being is typically lower than in the other settings) were more likely to engage in supportive activism than those young women who lived in a city ($\beta = -.127, t = -2.573, p < .05$) or village ($\beta = -.122, t = -2.580, p < .05$). Additionally Palestinian female youth who lived in a refugee camp were more likely to engage in direct activism than those living in a city or town ($\beta = -.123, t = -2.101, p < .05$).

In support of Hypothesis 1b which suggested that socioeconomic status would be more negatively associated with supportive activism than direct activism, the block of SES variables explained significant variance in supportive activism ($R^2 = .159, \Delta F = 2.744, p < .01$). However, only one specific component of the block (place of residence) had a statistically significant main effect on direct activism. Although the specific index of SES, (i.e., living in a city or town) was significantly predictive, when controlling for other independent variables, ($\beta = -.123, t = -2.101, p < .05$), the block of SES variables did not explain significant variance ($R^2 = .025, \Delta F = 1.807, p = \text{n.s.}$). Therefore the results confirm Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b.

Religiosity

Contrary to Hypotheses 2a which stated that religiosity would be negatively associated with activism and Hypotheses 2b which stated that religiosity would be associated more strongly (but still have a negative relationship) with direct activism than supportive activism, when controlling for age, socioeconomic status, efficacy, political affiliation and religio-political affiliation, religiosity was positively associated with both supportive ($\beta = .258, t = 5.481, p < .01$) and direct activism ($\beta = .118, t = 2.228, p < .05$). Specifically, Palestinian female youth who reported being more religious were more likely to participate in both supportive and direct forms of activism than those young women who were less religious.

Political Affiliation

Consistent with Hypothesis 3 which stated that Palestinian female youth who reported affiliation with a political party would have higher levels of overall activism than those who reported no affiliation, affiliation with a political party was significantly and positively related to both supportive activism ($\beta = .170, t = 3.672, p < .01$) and direct ($\beta = .189, t = 3.632, p < .01$) activism when controlling for all other independent variables. Specifically, Palestinian female youth who belonged to a political party, regardless of the political party, were more likely than their peers who reported no political affiliation to engage in both forms of activism.

Religio-Political Affiliation

In addition to political affiliation, affiliation with a specific political party, or religio-political affiliation, was predictive of activism. Hypotheses were advanced which distinguished different activism levels depending on affiliation with secular (Fatah) or fundamentalist Islamic groups (Hamas or Islamic Jihad). First the hypotheses which propose a relationship between being affiliated with Fatah and activism will be compared to the results, followed by the results of the relationship between being affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups and activism.

Affiliation with Fatah

Hypothesis 4a stated that female youth who reported affiliation with Fatah would have higher levels of both supportive activism and direct activism than those who were affiliated with Islamic groups. When controlling for all other independent variables, results indicated partial support for this hypothesis in that affiliation with Fatah (as compared to the fundamentalist Islamic parties of Hamas and Islamic Jihad) was predictive of direct forms of activism ($\beta = .144, t = 2.808, p < .05$) but not predictive of supportive activism ($\beta = .035, t = .761, p = \text{n.s.}$).

Hypothesis 4b which stated that identification with Fatah would predict higher levels of direct activism than supportive activism, however, was fully supported. Therefore both young women who were affiliated with Fatah as well as those who were affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups engaged in supportive activism, whereas it was distinctly Fatah girls who engaged in direct activism.

Affiliation with fundamentalist, Islamic groups

In addition to hypotheses (Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b) of the relationship between affiliation with Fatah and activism, hypotheses of the relationship between affiliation with fundamentalist Islamic groups and activism were advanced. Specifically, Hypothesis 4c proposed that Palestinian female youth who reported affiliation with Islamic groups ($N=72$) would have higher levels of supportive activism than direct forms of activism. An examination of the mean levels of activism for young women who reported belonging to Islamic groups show that girls who belonged to Islamic political groups did in fact report more involvement in supportive activism ($M = 2.741$, $SD = .959$) than direct activism ($M = 1.866$, $SD = .827$), thus supporting Hypothesis 4c.

Additionally, Hypotheses 4d stated that those who were affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups would report lower levels of supportive activism than those affiliated with Fatah was not supported since affiliation with a specific political party was not predictive of supportive activism ($\beta = .035$, $t = .761$, $p = \text{n.s.}$). Therefore, even though Palestinian young women who were affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups and Fatah both engaged in supportive activism, these youth who belonged to Islamic groups engaged in supportive forms of activism more so than direct activism.

The Moderating Model: Religiosity and Religio-Political Affiliation

The hypotheses that religiosity would moderate the relationship between activism and religio-political affiliation (Hypotheses 4e, 4f, and 4g) were not supported. When controlling for age, socioeconomic status, efficacy, religiosity, political affiliation, and religio-political affiliation, the interaction effects were non significant for both supportive ($\beta = -.168, t = -.832, p = \text{n.s.}$) and direct activism ($\beta = -.286, t = -1.263, p = \text{n.s.}$) as shown in Tables 12 and 13. Thus, regardless of level of religiosity Palestinian young women who were affiliated with Fatah were more likely to engage in direct activism than those affiliated with fundamentalist Islamic groups, whereas both those affiliated with Fatah and Islamic groups engaged in supportive activism.

Efficacy

In support of Hypotheses 5a and 5b which stated that both self (Hypothesis 5a) and group (Hypothesis 5b) would be predictive of political activism, group and self efficacy were positively related to activism. When controlling for all other independent variables, both self efficacy ($\beta = .164, t = 3.351, p < .01$) and group efficacy ($\beta = .136, t = 2.798, p < .01$) were significantly associated with supportive forms of activism. However only self efficacy was associated with direct activism ($\beta = .243, t = 4.410, p < .01$).

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

In more than 30 countries around the world war or political violence is a daily experience for many youth. Despite the numbers of young people who are affected by political violence, relatively little is known about their experiences; a fact that is even more so true for female youth. Of the studies that do exist, the focus is either on risk factors for involvement in armed groups (i.e., child soldiering) or the effects of exposure to political violence (i.e., PTSD, depression, and anxiety) and not on motivations for participating in political activism during a war or other politically-related conflict. This lacuna in the literature is particularly unfortunate given that in some conflicts high numbers of female youth have engaged in political activism, such as the first Palestinian Intifada against Israel (1987-1993; see Barber, 2001; Barber & Olsen, 2009), as well as across the history of the Palestinians generally (Peteet, 2001, 2006). Specifically, little is known about these young women who defied cultural and gender norms by engaging in activism in public arenas, spaces often reserved for men since women are restricted to the private or home sphere.

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis was to investigate predictors of political activism among Palestinian female youth in the first Intifada. Relevant theory from sociology (i.e., Relative Deprivation Theory), political science (i.e., Political Stabilization Theory) and psychology (i.e., Collective Identity, and classic identity theory), as well as the literature on civic engagement in peaceful nations, was examined to identify hypothesized predictors of activism. In particular, it was expected that: 1) socioeconomic status would be negatively related to activism, specifically supportive activism; 2) religiosity would also be negatively related to activism, specifically direct activism; 3) affiliation with a political group would be positively

related to activism; 4) affiliation with the secular political group Fatah would be associated with increased engagement in activism more so than affiliation with fundamentalists Islamic political groups, specifically for direct activism; 5) affiliation with fundamentalists Islamic groups would be associated with higher levels of supportive activism than direct activism; 6) religiosity would moderate the relationship between religio-political affiliation and activism; and 7) efficacy, both self efficacy and group efficacy, would be positively associated with activism. Even though no specific hypothesis was advanced for age (see discussion of age in chapter 2 for an explanation of the lack of hypothesis), theory and previous literature suggested the inclusion of this variable in the overall model.

As to the findings, the bivariate level analyses confirmed a number of hypotheses in that Palestinian female youth who engaged in supportive forms of activism (e.g., bringing supplies to Palestinian male fighters, visiting the family of a martyr, etc.) were older, poorer, more self efficacious, believed the Intifada could bring about positive changes for Palestinians (group efficacy), and were affiliated with both secular (Fatah) and fundamentalist Islamic (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) political parties. Similarly bivariate correlations showed that those who engaged in direct activism (e.g., throwing stones, erecting barricades, etc.) were also poorer, more self and group efficacious, and belonged to a political party. However, for direct activism these girls were not affiliated with just any political party; but rather belonged to the secular Fatah party. Contrary to what was hypothesized, those who engaged in both supportive and direct activism were more, rather than less, religious than their less-active counterparts.

The multivariate level analyses confirmed many of the relationships evident at the bivariate level and thereby underscored the importance of those predictor variables by indicating that they retained unique predictive power even when combined with the full set of other

predictor variables. For example, for supportive activism the hierarchical regression analyses mirrored the bivariate findings and thereby revealed that age, SES, self and group efficacy, political affiliation, and religiosity all explained unique portions of the variance. Similarly, for direct activism, except for group efficacy which was no longer significant at the multivariate level, the regressions revealed that SES, self efficacy, political affiliation, religio-political affiliation, and religiosity explained unique variance. In sum, the multivariate regressions confirmed that with the exception of age and group efficacy (both of which predicted only supportive activism), both forms of political activism were significantly predicted by the hypothesized set of economic, individual, political, and religious variables studied in these analyses.

The remainder of this section will be devoted to discussing the findings specifically for each variable in more detail in the following order: age, efficacy, socioeconomic status, religiosity, political affiliation, and, religio-political affiliation. This order was elected in order to progressively focus on the predictors that offered the most insight into explaining activism.

Age

First, in regards to age, no hypothesis was advanced for the relationship between age and activism. This was so because it is not clear how relevant age-related issues of development are to the population under study. Specifically, there has been much recent criticism that Western scholars have unduly emphasized the intra-psychic components of identity thought to be operative during the adolescent years (e.g., crisis and commitment; e.g., Marcia, 1993), and have correspondingly paid inadequate attention to the broader historical, cultural, and social forces that shape identity among youth in much of the world that may or may not operate

predominantly during the teen years. Thus, it was unclear if chronological age would have any particular power in explaining the activist behavior of the young female Palestinians. The results proved otherwise, however, at least for explaining supportive activism. Specifically, the older the females were, the more likely they were to have engaged in supportive forms of activism.

A possible interpretation of this finding may lie in the gendered significance of supportive activism. In some ways supportive activism can be viewed as consistent with cultural norms and, specifically, as gendered in nature. For example, caring for the wounded, bringing supplies to fighters, and protecting someone from Israeli soldiers are gendered tasks (Naaman, 2007). As these young Palestinian girls aged and became young women, it is plausible to assume that it was expected for them to act in accordance with the gendered roles that are common within the Palestinian society. If it is culturally appropriate for Palestinian women to be the caregivers of the family and greater society, then it would be understandable for older Palestinian females to engage in more caretaking tasks (i.e., supportive activism). Additionally, these supportive acts may signal not just the compliance with gender norms, but also the development of an identity that encompasses service to the common good or social agenda; an identity that is culturally appropriate within the Palestinian society. It is important to note, however, that identity was not measured specifically in this thesis, and therefore references to identity formation of Palestinian female youth are purely speculative. Nonetheless, aging, in the chronological sense, may be a time for these young women to begin to take on roles and behaviors that are consistent with cultural gendered scripts as well as develop a culturally appropriate civic identity.

Efficacy

Contrary to age, specific hypotheses were advanced for the relationship between self and group efficacy and activism as a means of measuring individual characteristic that might account for differing degrees of activism. These hypotheses were influenced by Collective Identity Theory, which suggests that identification with a disadvantaged group with little or no opportunity to become part of the advantaged group, as well as the perceived efficacy of the self's and group's ability to obtain stated goals, are predictive of collective action (Klandermans, 1984). Previous literature (i.e., Zomeren et al., 2008; Taylor, 1999; Brown & Ferguson, 1995) has documented the pre-requisite of self efficacy and group efficacy on future political action.

The significant prediction of political activism by both self and group efficacy in this study not only adds general support for Collective Identity Theory but it does so by illustrating its relevance in a context not previously studied. Specifically, much of the work that has informed the theory has been conducted in countries at peace, such as the Netherlands and Australia.(e.g., Zomeren et al., 2008; Taylor, 1999; Brown & Ferguson, 1995). The results of this thesis provide evidence that the same principles of efficacy are operative also among females in the highly dynamic and volatile context of political violence.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, these findings suggest that despite age, poverty and religious and political influences (i.e., other variables included in these analyses), Palestinian female youth didn't necessarily engaged blindly in activism simply as a response to societal demands to "join the cause." Rather, it appears that they might also have evaluated whether their participation would produce anticipated outcomes as well as whether they might find personal meaning in the conflict. This cognitive deliberation about whether or not and why one participates in risky, political activism suggests a more active and agentic role of young

Palestinian females (and possibly Palestinian male youth as well) than is typically accorded adolescents. Thus, rather than performing behaviors simply reactively due to the pressure of religious or political influences or environmental circumstances (e.g., poverty) the more politically active young Palestinian women appeared to have appraised the utility or efficacy of involvement for themselves and for their society. This finding is consistent with Taylor (1999) and Brown and Ferguson (1995) who noted that efficacy is necessary for women to break traditional and cultural norms.

Socioeconomic Status

In addition to efficacy and age, the findings in regarding socioeconomic status and activism also provided insights into the phenomenon of political activism among Palestinian female youth during the first Intifada. Since previous literature has documented the link between socioeconomic status and political involvement by identifying poverty as a risk factor for involvement in armed groups among girl soldiers (Kearins, 2002), and, theory, such as Relative Deprivation Theory, suggests the importance of socioeconomic status or economic disadvantage as a driving force for activism (Gurr, 1970; Wilkinson, 2004), it was, therefore, expected that socioeconomic status would be negatively related to political activism among Palestinian female youth. Additionally, due to the history of poorer Palestinian women (as opposed to middle or upper class Palestinian women) engaging specifically in supportive forms of activism (Hiltermann, 1998), it was expected that socioeconomic status would be negatively associated more strongly with supportive activism than direct activism.

Consistent with previous literature and theory, some of the indicators of socioeconomic status (SES) included in this study were significantly related to female activism, somewhat more

specifically related to supportive activism, and, thus, supported the proposed hypotheses. Since three separate indicators (level of parental education, relative deprivation, and place of residence) were included in the analyses, this section will follow with a discussion of only the statistically significant relationships between specific SES indicators and activism (see Chapter 4 for the results of the relationships between all indicators and activism).

First, at the bivariate level, the SES indicators of parental education and living in a city (compared to a town or camp) were negatively related to both supportive and direct activism. Additionally, there were significant positive correlations between living in a camp (i.e., lower SES) and both forms of activism. At the multivariate level, however, only place of residence retained its significance as a predictor of supportive activism (but note that for direct activism, place of residence had a significant direct effect but the block of SES predictors it was in did not contribute unique variance). This appears to indicate that there are aspects of living in a refugee camp above and beyond what camp status shares with other forms of SES and with other predictors of activism that predict higher rates of supportive activism among female youth. It is likely, therefore, that the particularly dense and impoverished conditions of refugee camp life in Palestine provide an extra dose of frustration and desire for change which, according to Relative Deprivation Theory, would motivate Palestinian female camp dwellers to action.

In addition to the nature and direction of the relationship between socioeconomic status and activism, the results show a distinction between types of activism. As discussed above, the group of SES indicators accounted for significant variance in supportive activism and not in direct activism. Consistent with historical accounts of Palestinian female activism, those young women with less monetary resources appear also to have engaged in gendered forms of activism. The fact that at the bivariate level low SES also predicted direct forms of activism diverges from

past writings (i.e., that direct forms would be committed by middle or upper class women only), but the additional finding that in the multivariate analyses it did not account for unique variance does indicate that, compared to supportive activism, direct forms of activism are driven more strongly by other forces (e.g., religion and politics).

Overall, these findings support theory by providing evidence that the tenets of Relative Deprivation Theory not only apply at the group level (e.g., see Khawaja for a relevant study of Palestinians during the first Intifada), but also help explain young female political activism at the individual level. This extension of the validity of Relative Deprivation Theory can help scholars and practitioners to credit socioeconomic status, as well as frustrations that accompany deprived status, as a driving force for an individual's political activism.

Furthermore, these results illustrate that the relationship between socioeconomic status and activism is dependent on the context in which the activism occurs. For example, studies in peaceful nations (i.e., Atkins & Hart, 2003) show a positive relationship between civic involvement and socioeconomic status – thus, higher involvement by the more advantaged. In contrast, this study, together with the literature on girl soldiers (Kearins, 2002), finds the opposite – that is, higher involvement among the less advantaged. The context in which the activism occurs – that is, in peaceful versus conflicted conditions - appears to be critical in determining the direction of the relationship between socioeconomic status and activism. This finding is important because, once replicated, it would assist in refining theory about activism, specifically highlighting the uniqueness of political activism

In sum, while these findings differed somewhat from historical accounts of poorer Palestinian women engaging in supportive forms of activism (i.e., those living in the camp engaged in supportive and direct activism), they provided support for the application of Relative

Deprivation Theory beyond the group or community level to the individual level, as well as refine thinking on the relationship between socioeconomic status and activism by highlighting the contextual influences that affect the direction of this relationship.

Religiosity and Religio-Political Affiliation

In addition to those variables discussed above, religiosity, political affiliation, and religio-political affiliation were also examined for their relationship to activism among Palestinian female youth. These variables were included due to the strong influences in Palestinian society of religion, specifically Islam, the political nature of the first Intifada, and the overlap in Palestinian society between religion and politics. Additionally, theory, such as Political Stabilization Theory (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006), which suggests that youth adopt the views and behaviors of significant socializing agents, such as religious and political leaders, support the inclusion of these variables. Because of the complex relationship between religiosity and political affiliation, the hypotheses and the discussion of findings relative to them here proceed systematically from main effects of religiosity and political affiliation to combinations of the two.

Religiosity

As noted above, Political Stabilization Theory accounts for the role of religious doctrine in predicting political activism, in that religious leaders can be socializing agents and impart political ideologies and beliefs to their followers. The dominant religion in Palestine is Islam, and scholars suggest that according to the Islamic religion, women and female youth are restricted to the home or private sphere. Correspondingly, their autonomy in public places is

limited (see Ahmed, 1992). Therefore, based on theory and the tenets of Islam, it was expected that religiosity would be negatively associated with activism, specifically so for direct activism.

Contrary to what was expected, however, higher degrees of religiosity were associated with higher - rather than lower - levels of engagement in both supportive and direct activism. Despite documented evidence that Islam supports the restriction of women to the home and private sphere (i.e., Ahmed, 1992), the Palestinian young women in this sample who were more religious did not appear to adhere to the proposed religious mandate suggested by Ahmed; indeed, the more religious females left the private sphere to engage in activism more so than did the less religious females.

Before offering interpretations of this unexpected finding, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the items used to measure religiosity and the impact these limitations may have on the findings. For example, only three items were used to measure religiosity: read the Koran, thought about religion, talked about religion. While these three items measure the personal nature of religion, they do not assess a subjective appraisal of one's own level of religiosity. For example, despite praying and reading the Koran often, one may view herself as not being very religious. Therefore, a subjective appraisal of religiosity may have provided a more accurate indicator of religiosity. Similarly, other items such as asking how often one gives to the poor and if one fasts during Ramadan (two of the five pillars of Islam) might have more accurately tapped religious commitment in this sample such that the expected effect might have been discerned. However, to the degree that the measure employed here did adequately reflect at least part of the relevant religious orientation of young women, it is important to try to interpret the unexpected findings.

One explanation for this divergent finding would be that in addition to Islam bringing scripts about gender norms, it might also transmit scripts about nationalism and the promotion of the Palestinian people. Peteet (1991, 1996), for example, suggests that involvement of Palestinian women in the different Palestinian conflicts has been accepted in the wider society when their involvement is framed as an act to protect Palestine's sons and daughters. To the degree that this sanctioned behavior in behalf of a political purpose is also viewed as consistent with living one's religion, then it is sensible that more religious young women were also more active politically. In other words, fighting for equality for the Palestinian people in their struggle against the Israeli Occupation was likely viewed as sanctioned by Allah and therefore making it permissible for young women to go against gendered scripts and engage in activism.

Additionally, Treacher (2003) suggests that Islam differs in different contexts and countries. Therefore behaviors displayed by female youth that would not be permitted in one country, may be acceptable in the neighboring region of Palestine. In general, however, all forms of Islam place high importance on behaviors that display obligation, honor, and responsibility to one's family and community (Treacher, 2003). While in some Islamic countries gendered norms may prevail in discouraging women from engaging in the public sphere, Palestinian women and female youth may have felt encouraged to engage in activism against Israel since this was seen as a sign of the responsibility of promoting the well-being of the Palestinian society and the protection of future Palestinian generations.

It is important to note that scholars believe that the wider societal acceptance for activism is only permissible if women are fighting for Palestine, and not their own rights (see Treacher, 2003). Therefore any expectation that religion would promote activism in other forms and for

other causes, such as for women's rights, may be unwarranted (see Treacher, 2003; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2003).

Political Affiliation and Religio-Political Affiliation

In addition to the role of religiosity, ideas concerning the role of political affiliation and affiliation with a specific political party (religio-political affiliation) were also tested in this thesis. This was important to examine because while virtually all Gaza females were Muslim, the varying political parties to which they were or were not affiliated have different interpretations of what Islam expects of its adherents regarding political goals (i.e., not the commonly endorsed struggle against Israel, but more so in how the conflict can or should be resolved). As expected, results indicated that affiliation with a political party, regardless of which party, was associated with increased involvement in supportive forms of activism. However, with direct activism, in addition to the positive effect of affiliation, a specific affiliation with the secular political party, Fatah, was uniquely predictive of increased levels of engagement. Thus, while females from both political affiliations engaged in supportive forms of activism more so than unaffiliated females, it was distinctly Fatah females (compared to females affiliated with Hamas or Islamic Jihad) who participated more in direct, front line forms of activism.

While this finding implies a political (i.e., party affiliation) motive for direct activism, it would still be possible that the effect of religion was operative, in that, regardless of affiliation it was still the more religious females who were actively engaged. This line of thinking lead to the final set of hypotheses and tests relative to the interaction between religion and political affiliation. Specifically, it was thought that levels of political activism among females who belonged to Fatah would differ depending on their level of religiosity. Similarly, levels of

activism for females who belonged to fundamentalist Islamic political parties would also differ depending on their level of religiosity. Contrary to what was expected, however, there was no joint effect of religiosity and religio-political affiliation. Instead, as for supportive activism, it was found that both Fatah and fundamentalist Islamic females at all reported levels of religiosity participated equally as much in supportive activism. Similarly, for direct activism, Fatah females, who participated more so than fundamentalist females, also reported varying levels of religiosity. In sum, it was found that despite the fact that, overall, being more religious was predictive of higher rates of activism, it was not the degree of religiosity that explained why females of specific political groups engaged in different patterns of activism.

Despite these complexities the findings relative to the role of religion and political party do support the use of theory, specifically Political Stabilization Theory (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2006), in understanding Palestinian female youth activism in the first Intifada. For example, females who expressed affiliation with the fundamentalist Islamic groups (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) reported lower levels of activism, specifically direct activism. First, affiliation with a political party predicted both forms of activism, suggesting the presence of a political identity among these young females. Second, the lower rates of direct activism among fundamentalist Islamic females could also reflect political/religious values to the extent that Hamas and Islamic Jihad more strongly endorse traditional gender roles and behaviors than the secular Fatah party. Thus, it may have been that the political views and behaviors supported by the leadership in these fundamental, Islamic groups had been passed down or adopted by young female adherents.

Therefore, one explanation of these findings is that the gender scripts about appropriate female behavior originally thought to be displayed in religiosity alone were, in fact, present in the teachings of the Palestinian political parties. Supportive forms of activism are more

consistent with appropriate, traditional gender roles than direct forms of activism. Thus the fact that Hamas and Islamic Jihad girls engaged in supportive forms of activism, but less so in direct activism, may suggest that in these fundamental, Islamic groups political activism is framed as appropriate only when the activism is consistent with gender norms. Participation then would still be seen as an appropriate (i.e., sanctioned by Allah) way to promote nationalism for the Palestinian peoples in their fight against Israel, but participation would only be appropriate when it is consistent with the religious teachings of these groups.

An alternate explanation, however, may be found not in the gender scripts of the political parties but, rather, in their political ideology and thus the political identity of the groups' members. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that adherents to all political groups were Muslim, the varying groups had distinct elements of their political ideology. Although it is unclear how differentiated the political values and goals of the various parties were during the early years of the first Intifada, during the latter years of the movement (the years investigated in this study) contrasting political agendas were apparent (Tessler, 1974). For example, compared to Fatah, Hamas' and Islamic Jihad's leadership was politically unwilling to compromise with Israel and rejected the idea of a two-state solution (Hunter, 1993; Lybarger, 2007). Thus, the lower rates of direct activism for young women who belonged to fundamentalist Islamic political groups may reflect the political ideology of these groups in that they were less willing to fight for the resolution (i.e., sustainable peace with Israel) that Fatah was moving toward (Smith, 2001). Correspondingly, the higher rates of direct activism among Fatah young women might be explained by their endorsement of the political agenda of their party (i.e., fighting for equality, recognition, and self-determination alongside Israel).

Finally, if it was political ideology more than gender ideology that drove direct forms of activism for fundamentalist female youth, then one would expect the same pattern for Palestinian young men, with those belonging to fundamental Islamic political groups engaging less than their Fatah peers. Those data are available and will be examined in an effort to clarify whether fundamental, Islamic Palestinian political groups imparted gendered ideology or political ideology to their followers.

Summary

In summary, this thesis has sought to identify predictors of political activism (both supportive and direct forms) during the first Palestinian Intifada as a means of advancing the literature on youth and political violence by focusing exclusively on female experience and examining predictors of activism and not effects of exposure to violence. In general it was suggested that while the Western interpretations of classic identity theory should perhaps not be applied to Palestinian female youth activism, the concepts of identity theory may still provide explanation for why older females engaged in activism. Additionally, for female youth to become involved in political conflict, the thesis demonstrated the importance of internal motivations, or appraisals of efficacy, above and beyond external, contextual factors. Those factors included living in a refugee camp (and presumably its associated frustrations) and political affiliation.

Most surprisingly, however, it was learned that the more religious these young women were the more likely they were to engage in activism. Perhaps, then, rather than Islam solely carrying scripts about gender norms and behaviors, scripts about nationalism might be just as apparent in Palestinian religiosity. Finally, while there some ambiguity as to how affiliation with

Palestinian political groups, specifically fundamentalists Islamic groups, impacted political activism, it was shown that while both Fatah and fundamentalist Islamic girls engaged in activists behaviors that are gendered in nature, distinctly Fatah young women were the ones who engaged in front-line, direct forms of activism.

Strengths and Limitations

In light of these findings and the significance these discoveries, it is important to outline the strengths and limitations of this study so as to better understand the scope of interpretations of the findings. Before discussing the strengths of this study, however, an acknowledgement of the limitations of this thesis will follow. Primarily, this study employed secondary data analytic methods which limited the selection of variables to be included in the tested models. Had the study been designed explicitly to test the hypotheses of the thesis a more complete set of variables would have been included (i.e., degree of activism of participants' mothers, identity measures, etc). Similarly, the constructs that the thesis attempted to test could have been measured differently and perhaps more validly (i.e., a more comprehensive or culturally appropriate measure of religiosity may have impacted the direction of the relationship between religiosity and activism, and additional or different measures of socioeconomic status could have helped reconcile the findings with theory, etc.).

Secondly, the geographic location of the sample (i.e., the Gaza Strip) limits the generalizability of these findings. While the selection of sampling in the Gaza Strip has its own strengths (i.e., the intensity of fighting compared to other areas of Palestine), the exclusion of participants from the West Bank and East Jerusalem limits the claims that one can make about motivators for political action generally among Palestinian female youth. Despite some

similarities between Gaza and the West Bank, specifically the establishment of refugee camps and the conditions within the camps, caution is warranted in applying the results from this thesis to all Palestinian females. However, future studies could examine the role of camp life in all Palestinian territories, as well as the other variables used in this thesis, in predicting activism among female youth in order to provide more clarity as to the generalizability of these results.

Similarly, the findings should be understood in light of the political situation at the time of data collection. Since the first Intifada, the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has continued as seen in a second (al-Aqsa) Intifada and the recent bombing of Gaza by Israel in response to Hamas-launched rockets into proximal parts of Israel. Further, Palestine is currently essentially divided into two distinct political entities, with Fatah governing in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It is unclear whether the same relationships would be found if the survey were completed in more recent history. The role of historical and political events may alter the level of political engagement and motivations for engagement in Palestinian females. Thus while this study provides a much needed insight into a relatively understudied population, caution should proceed applying these findings to Palestinian female youth today.

Despite these limitations, the thesis has several strengths. First, and arguably the most significant, is the purpose of this study (i.e., identifying predictors of political activism among Palestinian female youth). As stated earlier, few studies in this field focus exclusively on female experience, while no studies focus solely on non-soldier female experience. Additionally, researchers most often take the perspective of analyzing the effects of exposure to violence on psychological and behavioral functioning, instead of questioning what would motivate youth, specifically female youth in a patriarchal society, to engage publically in political activism.

Second, the thesis utilized a strong measure of activism. Although the measure of activism was not developed in this study (see Barber and Olsen, 2009, for a description of the development of the measurement for this construct) and thus this author does not take any credit for the strength of the measurement of this construct, the use of an arguably comprehensive measure of activism, one that originated from interviews with Palestinian youth themselves, allows this study to capture a variety of political behaviors, both supportive and front-line, and to further test the differing effects of variables such as socioeconomic status, efficacy, and religiosity on each different types of activism.

Third, the use of multiple theoretical traditions and bodies of literature is a strength of the thesis. Due to the exploratory nature of this study and the relatively limited body of literature on youth and political violence, an examination of multiple theoretical traditions and studies of inquiry have allowed a more holistic understanding of potential motivating factors for activism and ground both the reader and author more broadly in an understanding not only of females in countries of political conflict, but also in issues of civic engagement and religion and Islam.

Implications

As a final point of discussion for this thesis, it is important briefly to identify the implications of a study such as this in informing diverse bodies of literature as well as practice. First, this study has implications for informing the literature on the development of civic engagement. For example, Sherrod and Lauckhardt (2008) suggest that the development of civic engagement is necessary for a democracy to function properly since democracies require input and participation from its citizens. While it can be argued that the construct of political activism as measured in this thesis is not synonymous to Sherrod and Lauckhardt's construct of civic

engagement, it is clear that at least the motivation for Palestinian activism was to promote the well-being of the Palestinian people, a motivation that is also common among youth who are involved civically in peaceful nations. Therefore, the findings inform and refine the thinking in the literature on civic engagement by examining predictors of civic involvement through a specific type of engagement, activism, and within a specific context, political violence.

Additionally, the thesis informs the practice of the development of civic engagement in Palestinian society. Knowing which factors are associated with activism is important for parents, teachers, and government officials. Again, if societies which elect their political leaders are dependent on the involvement of their people in the election process, then knowing how to aid in the development of civic engagement in youth, specifically female youth, would be quite valuable for practitioners and those who work directly with Palestinian youth. Furthermore, studies show that political activism begets civic engagement (see Barber & Olsen, 2009 for evidence from the same sample).

Thirdly, knowing the characteristics of who is most likely to engage in activism can provide insights into understanding the link between activism and negative psychosocial outcomes (i.e., depression) as seen in Barber's (1999a, 2001) studies. By identifying potential factors that are salient to the development of activism, one can then begin to tease out the longitudinal relationship between predictors of activism, activism, and the effects of activism in such a way that one may be able to identify precursors to higher levels of depression as moderated through political engagement in Palestinian female youth. While this study did not undertake this challenge, it does provide a framework for future researchers to model this relationship.

Finally, these results have implications for those wanting to discourage political activism in politically violent countries and conflicts. For example, governments wanting to bring about peace and to discourage young women from engaging in an ongoing conflict would be wise to invest resources in improving the standard of living, infrastructure, or socioeconomic status of these young women. Additionally, understanding the role of religiosity within a specific context could provide insights into why young women would engage in behaviors that seem to be contrary to cultural norms. Thus understanding the reasoning behind involvement in political violence would go far in helping governments identify those who are likely to be active as well as allow these same governments to proactively address situations (i.e., economic disparities) that have been shown to be associated with political activism among female youth in hopes of discouraging involvement in political conflicts.

References

- Ahmed, L. (1992). *Women and gender in Islam: Historical roots of a modern debate*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ajdukovic, M. (1998). Displaced adolescents in Croatia: Sources of stress and posttraumatic stress reaction. *Adolescence*, 33(129), 209-217.
- Atkins, R., & Hart, D. (2003). Neighborhoods, adults, and the development of civic identity in urban youth. *Applied Developmental Science*, 7(3), 156-164.
- Barber, B. K. (1999a). Political violence, family relations, and Palestinian child functioning. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 14, 206-230.
- Barber, B. K. (1999b). Youth experience in the Palestinian *Intifada*: A case study in intensity, complexity, paradox, and competence. . In M. Yates & J. Youniss (Eds.), *Roots of civic identity: International perspectives on community service and activism in youth* (pp. 178-204).
- Barber, B. K. (2001). Political violence, social integration, and youth functioning: Palestinian youth from the Intifada. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 29(259-280).
- Barber, B. K. (2006). Palestinian *Intifada*. In L. R. Sherrod, C. A. Flanagan, R. Kassimir & A. K. Syvertsen (Eds.), *Youth Activism: An international encyclopedia* (pp. 449-454).
- Barber, B. K. (2008). Contrasting portraits of war: Youths' varied experiences with political violence in Bosnia and Palestine. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*.
- Barber, B. K. (2009). Making sense and no sense of war: Issues of identity and meaning in adolescents' experience with political conflict. In B. K. Barber (Ed.), *Adolescents and War: How Youth Deal with Political Violence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barber, B. K. (forthcoming). *One heart so many stones: The saga of Palestinian adolescents*. New York: Palgrave/McMillian.

- Barber, B. K., & Olson, J. A. (2009). Positive and negative psychosocial functioning after political conflict: Examining adolescents of the first Palestinian Intifada. In B. K. Barber (Ed.), *Adolescences and War: How youth deal with political violence* (pp. 207-237). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barber, B. K., & Schulterman, J. M. (2009). An overview of the empirical literature on adolescents and political violence. In B. K. Barber (Ed.), *Adolescents and war: How youth deal with political violence* (pp. 35-61). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barkan, S. E., & Snowden, L. L. (2001). *Collective Violence*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Baskir, L. (2006). Gender differences in the political attitudes of youth. In L. R. Sherrod, C. A. Flanagan, R. Kassimir & A. K. Syvertsen (Eds.), *Youth Activism: An international encyclopedia* (pp. 270-272).
- Boothby, N. G., & Knudsen, C. M. (2000). Children of the gun. *Scientific American*, 6(282), 60-65.
- Brajsa-Zganec, A. (2005). The long-term effects of war experiences on children's depression in the Republic of Croatia. *Child Abuse and Neglect*, 29(1), 31-43.
- Braungart, R. G. (1984). Historical generations and youth movements: A theoretical perspective *Research in social movements, conflict, and change*, 6, 95-142.
- Brown, P., & Ferguson, F. (1995). "Making a big stink:" Women's work, women's relationships, and toxic waste activism. *Gender and Society*, 9(2), 145-172.
- Brunsting, S., & Postmes, T. (2002). Social movements' participation in the digital age: Predicting offline and online collective action. *Small Group Research*, 33, 525-554.

- Bynner, J., & Ashford, S. (1994). Politics and participation: Some antecedents of young people's attitudes to the political system and political activity. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 24, 223-236.
- Chadwick, B. A., & Top, B. L. (1993). Religiosity and delinquency among LDS adolescents. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 32(1), 51-67.
- Cohen, P., Cohen, J., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). *Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences*, 3rd edition. Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.
- Cornwall, M., & Thomas, D. L. (1990). Family, religion, and personal communities: Examples from Mormonism. *Marriage & Family Review*, 15(1-2), 229-252.
- Crystal, D. S., & DeBell, M. (2002). Sources of civic orientation among American youth: Trust religious valuation, and attributions of responsibility. *Political Psychology*, 23(1), 113-132.
- DePauw, L. (1998). *Battle cries and lullabies: Women in war from prehistory to the present*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Durakovic-Belko, E., Kulenovic, A., & Dapic, R. (2003). Determinants of posttraumatic adjustment in adolescents from Sarajevo who experienced war. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 59(1), 27-40.
- Edwards, C. C., Elder, J. P., de Moor, C., Wildey, M. B., Mayer, J. A., & Senn, K. L. (1992). Predictors of participation in a school-based anti-tobacco activism program. *Journal of Community Health*, 17(5), 283-289.
- Erikson, E. E. (1968). *Identity, youth and crisis*. New York: W. W. Norton.

- Flanagan, C. A., & Syvertsen, A. K. (2006). Youth as social construct and social actor. In L. R. Sherrod, C. A. Flanagan, R. Kassimir & A. K. Syvertsen (Eds.), *Youth Activism: An international encyclopedia* (pp. 11-19).
- Gordon, R. H. (2008). Gendered paths to teenage political participation. *Gender and Society*, 22(1), 31-55.
- Gurr, T. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hammack, P. L. (2008). Narrative and the cultural psychology of identity. *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, 12(3), 222-247.
- Hart, D., & Atkins, R. (2002). Civic Competence in Urban Youth. *Applied Developmental Science*, 6(4), 227-236.
- Hart, D., Atkins, R., Markey, P., & Youniss, J. (2004). Youth bulges in communities: The effects of age structure on adolescence civic knowledge and civic participation *Psychological Science*, 15(9), 591-597.
- Hiltermann, J. R. (1998). The women's movement during the Uprising. In S. Sabbagh (Ed.), *Palestinian women of Gaza and the West Bank* (pp. 41-52). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hornsey, M. J., Blackwood, L., Louis, W., Fielding, K., Morton, T., O'Brien, A., et al. (2006). Why do people engage in collective action? Revisiting the role of perceived effectiveness. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 36(7), 1701-1722.
- Hunter, F. R. (1993). *The Palestinian uprising. A war by other means*. Berkeley: California Press.
- Huntington, R., Fronk, C., & Chadwick, B. A. (2001). Family roles of contemporary Palestine women. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 32, 1-19.

- Ibrahim, Y. M. (1994). Arafat in Gaza: News analysis; Arafat enters Gaza to stake his claim. *The New York Times*,
- Kearins, Y. E. (2002). *The voices of girl soldiers: Summary*. New York: Quaker United Nations Office.
- Khalidi, R. (1997). *Palestinian identity: The construction of modern national consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Khalidi, W. (1987). *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestinian Problem until 1948*. Washington: The Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Khawaja, M. (1995). The dynamics of local collective action in the West Bank: A test of rival explanations. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 44(1), 146-179.
- Kimhi, S., & Shamai, M. (2006). Are women at higher risk than men? Gender differences among teenagers and adults in their response to threat of war and terror. *Women and Health*, 43(3), 1-19.
- Klandermans, B. (1984). Mobilization and participation: Social -psychological explanations of resource mobilization theory. *American Sociological Review*, 49, 583-600.
- Klandermans, B., & de Weerd, M. (2000). Group Identification and Political Protest. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens & R. W. White (Eds.), *Self, Identity, and Social Movements* (pp. 68-90). Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press.
- Klingman, A. (2001). Stress response and adaptation of Israeli school-aged children evacuated from homes during massive missile attacks. *Anxiety Stress and Coping*, 14, 149-172.
- Lybarger, L. D. (2007). *Identity and Religion in Palestine: The struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

- Marcia, J. E., Waterman, A. S., Matteson, D. M., Archer, S. L., & Orlosfky, J. (Eds.) (1993). *Ego identity: A handbook for psychosocial research*. New York: Springer Verlag.
- McKay, S. (2005). Girls as "weapons of terror" in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone rebel fighting forces. . *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28(5), 385-397.
- McLellan, J. A., & Youniss, J. (2003). Two systems of youth service: Determinants of voluntary and required youth community service. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 32(1), 47-58.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2003). *Modernizing women: Gender and social change in the Middle East* (Second ed.). Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers.
- Naaman, D. (2007). Brides of Palestine/Angels of death: Media, gender, and performance in the case of the Palestinian female suicide bombers. *Signs*, 32(4), 933-955.
- Nassar, J. R. (1989). The nature of the Palestinian intifada. *Journal of Arab Affairs*, 8(1), 10-27.
- Pearce, N. J., & Larson, R. W. (2006). How teens become engaged in youth development programs: The process of motivational change in a civic activism organization. *Applied Developmental Science*, 10(3), 121-131.
- Peteet, J. M. (1991). *Gender in crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Peteet, J. M. (1996). Identity and community in exile. *Critique*, 38(1), 1-15.
- Petersen, R. D. (2002). *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Phinney, J. S. (2006). Ethnic identity. In L. R. Sherrod, C. A. Flanagan, R. Kassimir & A. K. Syvertsen (Eds.), *Youth Activism: An international encyclopedia* (pp. 237-240).
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. (2009). *Encyclopedia Britannica* Retrieved January 29, 2009. From *Encyclopedia Britannica* Online, from

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/470229/Popular-Front-for-the-Liberation-of-Palestine>

- Roker, D., Player, K., & Coleman, J. (1999). Exploring adolescence altruism: British young people's involvement in voluntary work and campaigning. In M. Yates & J. Youniss (Eds.), *Roots of civic identity: International perspectives on community service and activism in youth* (pp. 56-72). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Roy, S. (1995). *The Gaza Strip: The political economy of de-development*. . Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Roy, S. (2007). *Failing peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict*. London: Pluto Press.
- Rubenberg, C. A. (2001). *Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and resistance in the West Bank*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2003). Liberating voices: The political implications of Palestinian mothers narrating their loss. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 26(5), 391-407.
- Sharoni, S. (1995). *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The politics of women's resistance*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Sherkat, D. E., & Ellison, C. G. (2007). Structuring the religion-environment connection: Identifying religious influences on environmental concern and activism. *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion*, 46(1), 71-85.
- Sherrod, L. & Lauckhardt, J. W. (2008). Cultivating civic engagement. In S. J. Lopez (Ed.) *Positive psychology: Exploring the best in people: Pursuing human flourishing*, Vol. 4 (167-185).
- Smith, C. D. (2001). *Palestinian and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A history with documents*. Boston: Bedford.

- Smith, E. S. (1999). The effects of investments in the social capital of youth on political and civic behavior in young adulthood: A longitudinal analysis. *Political Psychology*, 20(3), 553-580.
- Spellings, C. R. (2008). Scratching the Surface: A Comparison of Girl Soldiers from Three Geographic Regions of the World. *International Education: A Biannual Journal*, 38(1), 21-39.
- Taylor, V. (1999). Gender and social movements: Gender processes in women's self-help movements. *Gender and Society*, 13(1), 8-33.
- Tessler, M. (1994). *A history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Treacher, A. (2003). Reading the other: Women, feminism, and Islam. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, 4(1), 59-71.
- United Nations. (1989). *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations: 1 July 1988 - 30 June 1989*. New York: United Nations.
- van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of a collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological Bulletin*, 134(4), 504-535.
- Watts, R. J., & Guessous, O. (2006). Sociopolitical development: The missing link in research and policy on adolescences. In S. Ginwright, P. Noguera & J. Cammarota (Eds.), *Beyond Resistance!: Youth activism and community change: New democratic possibilities for practice and policy for America's youth* (pp. 59-80). New York: Routledge.
- Webber, C. (2007). Revaluating relative deprivation theory. *Theoretical Criminology*, 11(1), 97-120.

Wilkinson, R. (2004). Why is violence more common where gender is greater? In J. Devine, J. Gilligan, K. A. Miczek, R. Shaikh & D. Pfaff (Eds.), *Youth violence: Scientific approaches to prevention* (pp. 1-12). New York: New York Academy of Sciences.

Appendix




Figure 1: *Moderating Model*

Vitae

Carolyn Reagh Spellings graduated in 2001 from Christ Presbyterian Academy in Nashville, Tennessee. She received her Bachelors of Science from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville in 2006 with a major in Child and Family Studies. She intends on pursuing a PhD with continued focus on female experience in political conflict.