

**Politics at the Intersection of Sexuality:
Examining Political Attitudes and Behaviors of Sexual
Minorities in the United States**

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For Wilma & Darren

ABSTRACT

The existing political archetype of sexual minorities in the United States present lesbians, gays, and bisexuals as more ideologically liberal and Democratic than heterosexuals, as well as politically driven by issues specifically related to LGBT life. Ascribing political distinctiveness based solely on identification with a group, however, commits the fallacy of “difference-as-explanation” (Shields 2008:3030), equating a “shared [LGBT] history of sexual oppression and [LGBT] political sympathies” (Duong 2012:381).

Post-modern theories posit that social positions in society, i.e., socially-constructed categories of identity, exist as part of a simultaneously-experienced and mutually-reinforced “matrix of oppression” (Collins 2000:18). The personal meaning and political effects associated with a particular identity can only be understood in relation to the other social identities an individual occupies and the related structural inequalities which reinforce identity-based asymmetric power distributions.

Using sample survey methodology, I conduct a web-based survey of 1216 sexual minority adults residing in the United States. Informed by a cross-disciplinary approach, I measure cognitive and affective aspects of sexual and racial identity – not simple dummy indicators – in order to analyze the effects of intersecting socially-constructed identities on political attitudes (i.e., toward income inequality, government provision of services, private vs. public rights, and policy-specifics such as gun control and immigration) and behaviors (i.e., political participation and alienation from the political process).

My findings progress the study of LGBT politics beyond existing literature by quantitatively demonstrating that sexual minority politics are motivated by more than simple group identification. The analysis shows that sexual minorities use cognitive and affective evaluations of society as well as relational identity comparisons in their internal political calculus. The data suggest that liberal (i.e., economically redistributive, pro-civil rights, or anti-status quo) political claims, as well as participation in and alienation from the American political system, occur as sexual minorities evaluate their own sexual and racial identities in relation to heteronormative, racist, and androcentric power structures in society. Furthermore, these internal and relational comparisons extend across identity categories and exhibit separate and ignificantly different main and interactive effects.

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CHAPTER 1: SEXUAL IDENTITY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Despite the long history of sexual and gender minority¹ (often represented by the moniker Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender people – or the umbrella acronym LGBT) visibility and community in the United States, LGBT people were not recognized as active participants in popular political and social debates until the latter portion of the 20th Century (D’Emilio 1983; 1992; Chauncey 1994; Howard 1999). Over the last four decades, scholars developed a political archetype of LGBT people. Politically distinct from heterosexuals, sexual minorities are also characterized as ideologically liberal, primarily Democratic, and well-informed on LGBT-specific public policy (Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002; Shaffner and Senic 2006).

These studies, however, typify a pattern of identity politics research which only seeks to emphasize differences between sexual minorities and heterosexuals. Just as feminist studies were critiqued for a deficiency of analyses which examined the “heterogeneous ethnic character of [gender relations],” so too can LGBT studies be critiqued for failing to explore intragroup heterogeneity among LGBT people (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983:71; Rich 1983). By empirically demonstrating political distinctiveness, LGBT studies assume “adequation between

¹ It is important to delineate the difference between sexual and gender minority studies. The term sexual minority typically refers to sexual orientations other than heterosexuality, most notably, lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations – although this list is not exhaustive (e.g., pansexual, asexual, etc.) – and is often denoted by the acronym ‘LGB;’ whereas the term gender minority typically refers to gender queer, variant, non-conforming, transgender, or transsexual people. Sexual orientation and gender identity are not interchangeable characteristics (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). Because this distinction has not been widely recognized in quantitative political science research, the conflation of sexual minority and gender minority identities has been, and continues to be, a troubling trend in political science. While the study of gender minority communities should be a priority for political science, the limits of sample survey research – and funding – require this study to examine sexual minorities, only.

[the LGBT] shared history of sexual oppression and [LGBT] political sympathies” (Duong 2012:381). That is, in failing to explore intragroup differences, scholars have assumed an equivalence between LGBT identity and liberal/Democratic political attitudes. This oversight holds serious social and political consequences for sexual minorities.

Politically, as Egan (2012) suggests, LGBT people may be subject to electoral capture. That is, a situation where a particular group of voters are increasingly taken for granted by one political party while being ignored by the other (Smith 2007). Socially, LGBT identity has been established and perpetuated by society and LGBT elites as white, upper-to-middle class, non-religious, and male (Ochs, 1996; Cohen 1997; Cohen 2001; Purdie-Vaughns, and Eibach 2008). By accepting this assessment and failing to interrogate the category, social science has contributed to the misrepresentation and underrepresentation of racial, ethnic, low socioeconomic, gender variant, and other marginalized minorities within the LGBT community and society at-large (Duggan 2003; Ferguson 2005; Strolovich 2007; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Assessing and analyzing political variation among LGBT people is important both for producing representative political parties and social movement organizations as well as refining our understanding of the predictive power of social identities (Cole 2008:444; Cohen 1999).

The evolution of feminist and queer theories throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries and the multidisciplinary adoption of the Intersectional approach have led contemporary scholars to critically analyze the category referred to as ‘LGBT’ (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). While qualitative studies have eluded to heterogeneity in the socio-political experiences of sexual and gender minorities (Icard 1986; Chan 1989; Loiacano 1989; Thumma 1991; Rogers and Lott 1997; Garcia 1998; Green 1998), due to methodological and practical considerations, only

recently have scholars begun to quantitatively – primarily through survey research – examine within-group political variation (Jensen 2014; Maccio, DeRosa, Wilks, and Wright 2014; Swank and Fahs 2013a; Egan 2012; Lewis, Rogers, and Sherrill 2011; Marzullo and Herdt 2011; D’Augelli, Rendian, Sinclair, and Grossman 2006; Harding 2006; Egan and Sherrill 2005). While these studies have begun to elucidate variation in LGBT political experiences, the interaction between social, cultural, and historical effects (e.g. religion, ethnicity, class, (dis)ability) and identity (e.g. gender, race, or sexuality) are often overlooked. Furthermore, the extant attitudinal literature examines those attitudes relating specifically to aspects of LGBT life, reinforcing the notion that sexuality is only important in determining attitudes about LGBT-specific public policy.

The goal of this study is to analyze and explain political attitudinal and behavioral variation within sexual minority communities in the United States. Tangentially, with this study, I also seek to clarify, quantitatively, how we understand sexuality in political science. Critical feminist and queer theories as well as intersectionality have shown that the behavioral effect of identity must be measured as more than just a categorical indicator, e.g., dichotomous ‘1’ or ‘0’ (Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Warner 2008). Complex social-psychological and socio-historical processes such as ‘androcentrism,’ heterosexism, and racism, among others, interact and effect one’s political orientation (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). It follows, then, that LGBT people are not politically distinctive (i.e., ideologically liberal or Democratically-oriented) simply because of a sexual minority identity (Shields 2008). Instead, I hypothesize, that interactions between identity categories effect the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities. Specifically, one’s relationship to an identity category, experiences with stigmatization resultant from identification with a certain group, the composition of one’s social networks, and one’s

socio-cultural condition interact to influence how one participates in and perceives the political process as well as one's attitudinal orientation (Bedolla 2007).

In a recent interview, the well-regarded statistician and political commentator Nate Silver intimates that the collection and analysis of methodologically sound survey data is important in a representative democracy because survey data provide an equitable forum for the conveyance of ideas between a constituency and their representatives (Gross 2016). The collection and analysis of quantitative data from marginalized communities shares this *raison d'être*. For example, the extant sexual minority attitudinal literature typically only differentiates LGBT people from heterosexuals, rarely do political analyses fully interrogate intragroup heterogeneity. This gap in political science and LGBT studies literature necessitates further scientific inquiry. Also, public opinion research is a valuable tool which, when used properly, keeps interest groups, policy elites, and government officials accountable to their constituencies. Understanding the variation in attitudes and behaviors, and most especially learning how or why variation exists is critical to informing policy decisions, political campaigns, interest group and community service organization strategies, and, most importantly, assuring that marginalized groups and individuals have representation and a voice in our democracy.

A detailed examination of intragroup variation and its effect on political participation and political attitudes is not lightly undertaken. The variety of lived experiences within the LGBT community is vast. Quantitative studies are therefore complex and require large samples – a difficulty given there exist few sample frames from which to draw respondents. While model complexity is not always a vice (Davis 2008; Walby, Armstrong, and Strid 2012), funding limitations are problematic. For this reason, the scope of this study is limited to the quantitative exploration of sexual minority politics. A second issue faced by quantitative intersectional

scholars of LGBT politics is in the representativeness of sample frames which do exist. Specifically, affluent LGBT people are over-represented. This problem further reinforces existing theoretical and methodological marginalization of poor LGBT people who do not have access to the technology necessary to participate in web-based survey research.

In the following pages, I first trace the roots of modern conceptions of identity and the influences which feminist, intersectional, and queer theorists predict to be important determinants of political attitudes and behaviors. I also discuss the role of identity in politics by examining the historical and current uses of identity categories in political research. Secondly, I analyze the contribution of the many theories and disciplines which have produced a body of literature broadly defined as intersectional theory. A brief history of intersectionality, and a discussion of the many theoretical and methodological debates which permeate contemporary intersectional research follows. At the end of this section, I present the theoretical foundation of this study.

In the next chapter, I examine the theoretical model, in detail, including an elucidation of key hypotheses. I then discuss the survey methodology focusing on survey objectives, sample size, data collection, question construction, and statistical methods. An analysis of the survey and statistical results follows in the third and fourth chapters. I conclude with a discussion of the myriad intersecting and mutually reinforcing experiences with social advantage and disadvantage which affect sexual minority political attitudes and behavior in the United States.

Political Identity Research

Early identity research in American politics was based on the idea of America as an identity ‘melting pot,’ and examined how well, if at all, various ethnicities – conceptualized at the time predominantly as European immigrants – assimilated into American society (See Dahl 1961, for example). The theoretical rationale, and primary concern of this line of research was to ensure that the ‘melting pot’ was doing its job to ‘burn away’ impurities, unnecessary and non-conforming identities, and producing a cohesive, distinctly American identity. As conceptions of identity evolved and categorical-based differences multiplied, studies of identity politics emerged which specifically examined inter-group variation, i.e., whether attitudinal variation can be contributed to differences in identity. Founded on theories such as self-categorization, social identity, and identity politics (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987; Tajfel 1978), such studies produced many valuable insights, including into sexual minority politics; however, they are roundly criticized for relying on unitary conceptions of identity – a fallacy which prohibits the exploration of intra-group diversity, renders invisible group members at the margins or intersections of certain identities, fails to consider socio-contextual influences on identity and, fails to problematize the use of identity categories in social science research.

In order to understand modern conceptions of identity in political research it is important to first review and, where necessary critique, the literature on the subject. In what follows, I review the literature concerning identity as a predictor of political attitudes and behaviors. While critical, I recognize the important contributions of this literature to modern research. Afterward, I more thoroughly examine modern critiques of identity politics and explore contemporary conceptions of identity and its role in political processes. After a brief introduction to

intersectional theory, I focus the remainder of the discussion specifically on LGBT politics and how modern intersectional and queer conceptions of sexual identity are hypothesized to influence political attitudes and behaviors. The chapter ends with a brief review before introducing the theoretical model used in the current study.

From Ethnic Voting to Identity Politics

It is important to begin any discussion of identity categories by noting that social identities are, in fact, social constructs and cultural representations (Omi and Winant 1994). Social constructionism is essentially a challenge to the inevitability of a given social condition – whether that is an identity such as race and ethnicity (Omi and Winant 1994) or gender (Risman 2004), or social problems such as poverty, unemployment, and discrimination (Ingram and Schneider 2005; Edelman 1988; Collins 1989). Social construction typically occurs when a dominant group in society agree to “the values and meanings associated with events, persons, groups, regions, countries, or any other objective or subjective situation” (Schneider and Ingram 1997:106), although the process may also take the form of internal policing whereby members of minority groups determine what constitutes membership in the group (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). These values and meanings are entirely dependent on the structure of power within a given society and as such are highly contextual – changing from society to society and across time. Identities are not only socially constructed they are also culturally represented in that the structure of a society is built upon constructions of identity (Omi and Winant 1997). Homosexuality in the United States, for example, has been constructed as sexually deviant, a symptom of mental illness, a chosen lifestyle, and a natural biological development depending

upon the historical context and structure of power (Strolovich 2012; Herek 2010; Brookey 2001). Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater detail later, the term LGBT – once constructed as an ‘umbrella’ category for sexual minorities – has been challenged by critical scholarship as an unrepresentative conflation of gender and sexuality (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). As represented in modern American culture, homophobia, heteronormativity, biphobia, and transphobia are systems of power which structure conventional representations of gender and sexuality in society (e.g. in media depictions and public policy). As eluded in this example, social construction presents a number of issues for identity measurement – a discussion to which I will return – and it is also a recurring concept in this study. It also highlights the importance of examining, as well as problematizing, societal power structures in order to better understand their effect on politics. In the following sections, which discuss the use of identity measures in political science, it is important to remember that the categories and cleavages used to determine differences have been imposed on groups in our society by scientists and policy-makers alike. They are, however, constructs that rest on contextual, structural, and cognitive assumptions which, in actuality, change over time.

Identity Categories & American Political Research

The United States is neither socially nor politically homogeneous. One need only examine election returns or interest group data to understand that a multitude of political divisions exist in the United States; divisions which find expression in multiple and competing forms of political action and attitudes (Truman 1951). Early models in political science sought to explain political heterogeneity by examining social heterogeneity. These studies postulated that the country was divided along a number of cleavages, believed to be representative of the dominant social divisions among the United States population. These cleavages, in turn, were thought to be the

basis for individual “political choices” (e.g. vote choice or policy preferences) (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954:54). The primary “social experiences” which were assumed at the time to “most persistently underlay political choices” were centered around “class, ethnic, and ecological differences” (Berelson, et al. 1954:54) although by the 1960s political parties had emerged as a social identity cleavage which also appeared to be a reliable predictor of political behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).

To Berelson, et al. (1954) and others, class represented one of the most basic divisions in American society. From the era of the Great Depression forward, Americans were divided by “occupational, income, and status cleavages” (Berelson, et al 1954:54). As it was then viewed, class division in American politics could be summed up by the following statement: “Richer people vote Republican more than poorer people” Berelson, et al (1954:56). Class distinctions, though, are certainly more complex than this rudimentary observation. Political socialization and historical context are also factors which influence class-based voting; however, it was argued that activating a class-centered identity required “a depression or heated political campaign directly aimed at economic interests” (Berelson, et al 1954:59). Social class was therefore reasoned to be less salient among the general population than other cleavages such as race, ethnicity, or geography. Contrarily, socioeconomic class, especially as it intersects with race, ethnicity, and gender in the United States, is considered to represent a powerful influence in American politics (Landry 2004). Indeed, contemporary western feminist and Black feminist theorists explicitly reject conceptions of identity which devalue the role of class in psychological and political development.² As will become clear, early conceptualizations of identity in political

² The recognition of class-based cleavages also represents a broader international philosophical and political debate which greatly influenced what would come to be the western Feminist Movement – from which originated many of the ideas adopted in this study. Socialist Feminism

science both reinforced societal divisions and, because of the nature of their construction often completely overlooked marginalized communities.

Other divisions among the electorate were observed along “religious, racial, and ethnic cleavages” (Berelson, et al 1954:54). Politicians could work to unite what was perceived at the time to be cohesive blocs of voters by making “appeals” to “a common characteristic” shared by members of the group and/or members of the group and the politician (Berelson, et al 1954:63). Furthermore, because of their “internal cohesiveness,” these groups offered ready-made political organizations which could be used to turn out the “bloc vote” for certain candidates (Berelson, et al 1954:63). Such conceptions represent perhaps the most egregious error in the study of political identities. Assuming homogeneity within social groups and then attributing political distinction to that homogeneity serves only to reify artificial differences and perpetuate stereotypes as well as to silence marginalized members of the group – important criticisms which will be reviewed later (Shields 2008).

Other identity constructs appear in early political science literature. Robert Dahl, for example, (1961) proposed that ethnic minorities – in this instance white European immigrant communities of New Haven, Connecticut – relied on their shared immigrant identity as a political heuristic informing their vote choice and behavior. In the debates over economic assimilation (i.e., whether ethnic cleavages would disappear once a group attained middle class status) Dahl (1961), Gordon (1964), Wolfinger (1965), Parenti (1967), and Gabriel (1972)

(i.e., “linking systems of patriarchy and capitalism”) and Marxist approaches to “racial and ethnic inequality which identified racism as a means to maintain class boundaries” would be subsumed by the intersectional perspective in the late 20th Century (Veenstra 2013:647). For perspectives on Socialist Feminism see Jaggar and Rothenberg (1993) and for perspectives on Marxist links between capitalism and racism see Bohmer (2005), finally, for a critique of Marxist influences on Feminism see Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1983).

offered competing hypotheses for why individuals vote for candidates with which they share an ethnic identity.

Wolfinger's (1965) "mobilization theory," for example postulated that only after achieving middle-class status could ethnic minority candidates afford to compete for elected office and, in turn, inspire cohesive voting behavior among an ethnic population. While Parenti (1967) insisted that ethnic identities may never disappear, Gabriel (1972) proposed a "new theory of ethnic voting" to be tested using social psychological indicators of group belonging. Gabriel (1972) operationalized "ethnic consciousness" using a battery of interview questions such as whether respondents would object to being referred to as Italian or Irish; whether or not the respondent associated her/himself with the Italian or Irish community; whether or not respondents were happy with Italian/Irish traditions or if those traditions should be eliminated; and, how "at home" respondents felt among members of the Italian/Irish community (Gabriel 1972:411-413). The study suggested that identity cohesion among ethnicities resulted in ethnic voting (i.e., selection of ethnic candidates on a ballot) and concluded that "the more intense an individual's ethnic consciousness, the greater the chance that he will make an ethnic choice on the ballot" (Gabriel 1972:413).

Early studies such as these gave strong indications that interactions across societal divisions held important implications in the study of political behavior. Although these early works failed to fully examine the effects of other social identities such as race, gender, and religion, Dahl's (1961) work implies mutability (i.e., evolving new meaning over time) in identity categories as well as interaction between categories of difference (e.g., ethnicity and class) – key features of intersectional theory. Furthermore, concerning categorical mutability, it should be noted that the concept of ethnicity is itself an exemplar of social constructionism. That

is, “yesterday’s races are today’s ethnicities” (Parent, et al 2013:642). These early studies constructed ethnicity based on white European (Irish or Italian) descent while people of color were all construed as ethnically homogeneous. Later constructions of race and ethnicity have attempted to be more inclusive of cultural diversity (Omi and Winant 1994). Gabriel’s (1972) conclusions also implied intriguing new questions about the role of social identities in politics. For example, how socio-economic status (SES) is experienced across racial and ethnic categories; whether social structures or political institutions contribute to the experience of SES; and, how interactions between ethnicity and SES change over time.

Since the 1960s, political scientists have focused much effort and analyses on the strong correlations between partisan identity, vote choice, and political ideology (Campbell, et al 1960). Partisanship was constructed as “coalitions of sociodemographic groups” in which disparate racial, ethnic, class, and religious identities developed allied, if not entirely cohesive, partisan identities which held great promise both in terms of empirical study and applied political action (Nie, Verba, & Petrocik 1976:213; Axelrod 1972). While partisanship, along with political ideology, remain consistent predictors of political attitudes, the definition of party identification remains unclear (Fiorina 1981; Miller and Shanks 1996) and the psychological influences on partisanship ambiguous. Greene (2002), for example argues that partisan identity cannot solely be described as identification with a group. In addition, robust measures of partisanship must consider affective and cognitive components – attitudes and beliefs about political parties – in order to measure the full effect of partisan identity on political behavior (Greene 2002).

Continuing in the tradition of inter-group differentiation, political scientists have examined racial and ethnic groups (De la Garza and Weaver 1985; Binder, Polinard, Wrinkle 1997; Claassen 2004; Jones and Frances 2012), religious groups (Woodberry and Smith 1998;

Greeley and Hout 2006), gender binaries (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef ,and Lin 2004; Norrander and Wilcox 2008), and sexual minorities (Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002; Shaffner and Senic 2006) and shown distinctive political behaviors between one or more social categories of difference. These identity politics-based approaches highlight differences between identity categories in an effort to explain political phenomena. While a critique will be offered later, it is sufficient to say that identity-based explorations which rely on categorical differences as explanations have a number of theoretical flaws. That is not to say, however, that such studies are without value. In making categorical distinctions, researchers are able to highlight inequalities between groups, such as wage gaps based on gender or mortality rates based on race (Bowleg 2013) – distinctions which are important for public policy. However, assuming group homogeneity (i.e., viewing groups as solid ‘blocs’ of voters or consistently opinionated as Berelson, et al (1964)) implies cohesion that does not exist. Basing policy positions or movement strategies on these false assumptions, then, only serves to reify differences without addressing the views of those not fully represented by the most dominant members of a socially constructed category³.

After reviewing the body of literature regarding the influence of identity on political attitudes and behaviors, a number of themes emerge which have been further refined by contemporary scholars. First, the interactive nature of identities – when not explicitly tested – was implied. Berelson, et al (1954) explored the relationship between socioeconomic status

³ As an example, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, many LGBT interest groups endorsed policy positions in favor of legalized same-sex marriage. While a small, but not insignificant, portion of the LGBT community opposed such positions nearly all national interest groups as well as the Democratic Party supported legalized same-sex marriage without addressing the underlying inequalities produced by state-sanctioned marriage. For a discussion highlighting how race, class, and sexual orientation interact and influence opposition to same-sex marriage among black LGBT people see Farrow (2014).

(SES) and religion, for example, while Dahl (1961), Wolfinger (1965), and Parenti (1967) tested similar interactions in an effort to predict vote choice. These studies served as precursors to interactive and “multiplicative” models of political behavior (Veenstra 2013).

Second, as suggested by Gabriel’s (1972) operationalization of ethnic consciousness, group attachment is a key concept in measuring social identity. While adding affective and cognitive measurement components, contemporary scholars researching identities in political contexts use similar methodologies, conceptualizing identities as an amalgamation of factors not merely as dichotomous (yes or no) indicators (Bedolla 2007; Duckitt, Callaghan, & Wagner 2005; Greene 2002; Phinney 1989).

Third, as Black feminist and intersectional scholars have shown political outcomes are a function of individual experience (Beal 1970; Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1983; James and Busia 1993; Bacca Zinn & Dill 1996; McCall 2005; Hancock 2007b; Simien 2007). It was hypothesized that political cleavages among voters formed because of “differentiation” (i.e. “policy issues persisting over a period of time that affect [groups] differently” (Berelson, et al 1954:74). Whether the experiences of African-Americans with the structural effects of racism or the experiences of the working class striving for the American dream, “vote is as much conditioned by who one is as by what one believes” (Berelson, et al 1954:67).

As identity groups continued to refuse ‘assimilation’ throughout the 20th and early 21st Centuries political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists took note and used them as unique predictors of political attitudes and social behaviors. Ethnicity, race, gender, class, religion, and sexuality are all shown to correlate with distinct voting preferences, political attitudes, and political behaviors. The central questions have since centered on how best to conceptualize and measure identity and, perhaps more importantly, how best to analyze within-group variation.

Scholars of identity have traditionally fallen into one of two groups: categoricalists who adhere to rigid definitions of identity primarily out of methodological concern; and anticategoricalists (to borrow a term from McCall 2005:1773) who seek to fully “deconstruct analytical categories” altogether.

In the following sections I will: review the extant identity literature and offer a definition of identity which guides this study. While I briefly critique categorical and anticategorical approaches to identity measurement, I also highlight a modern “both/and” solution to social scientific methodology (Shields 2008). I will then apply the concepts and definitions of modern identity scholarship to an analysis of intra-group heterogeneity among sexual minorities.

Identity: Toward a Definition

Various popular and scientific uses of the term ‘identity’ are well documented (Gleason 1983; Gitlin 1995; Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). As previously expounded, identities have been used to shape and categorize politics as well as define popular culture, and explain various social scientific phenomena throughout history (Gleason 1983). Identities have been defined as “social categories in which an individual claims membership as well as the personal meaning associated with those categories” (Shields 2008:301). This definition of identity, which is relatively similar throughout the social sciences, has been subject to criticism by contemporary scholars based on two key deficiencies. First, this definition assumes that identities are unitary (stable categories). One develops an identity either through birth, socialization, or choice, and that identity remains unaltered throughout one’s life (Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting 1999). Identity – this definition implies – is a static representation of one’s

membership in a certain class. Similarly, this definition leaves open the idea of essentialism – that all the individuals in a given identity category represent the prototypical member of that category – a critique expressed by Black feminist and queer theorists. Second, like the first, this definition assumes that identities do not interact. Instead, identities represent discrete categories. That is, one can identify with multiple social or political groups; however, those various identities represent separate experiences which do not overlap with one another.

Theoretical debates about identity stability – especially among sexual minorities – hold serious methodological concerns for quantitative research. As previously discussed, identities are subject to temporal and contextual constraints. In fact, Diamond (2003a), observes alterations in sexual identity after only a five-year study of bisexual and lesbian women. Changes in identity were linked to changes in how the women “interpreted or acted on their attractions.” Furthermore, some feminist and queer theorists view identities as so mutable that they are impossible to measure quantitatively. The following discussion highlights modern theorizing and research about the stability of identity categories. It is meant to problematize reliance on identity categories for the purpose of inter-group comparisons as well as highlight the within-group variation of identity categories that most scholars view as constant.⁴

⁴ While I recognize these modern critiques of identity, for the purposes of this study, I adopt the view that identities are “coherent enough to be recognized, yet fluid enough to be interrogated” (Honeychurch 1996:345). That is, identities have both “dynamic” and “stable” properties which allow identities “to influence behavior at the level of [a] specific event” (Sellers, et al. 1998:23). This is important to this study because it implies that survey responses represent the identity of the respondent – and convey the behavioral influences of that identity – *at the time of the survey*, although that identity may change over time. Furthermore, I adopt the view that survey responses collected through valid sample survey methodology are generalizable to national populations. These are assumptions which I will reiterate in Chapter 2.

The Stability of Identity Categories

The increasing recognition and reliance on unitary social identities as predictors of attitudinal and behavioral characteristics has not occurred without criticism. Among political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists, the conceptualization of identity as fluid, non-static, and responsive to contextual and situational influences represents a growing body of theory. Political science has recognized the limitations of “identity politics,” for example, where unique categories (e.g. race, gender, class) “serve to bind people into a political group based on a uniform set of experiences” (Hancock 2007a:65). The reality of the incongruous bonding of individuals on the basis of prototypical identity traits, however, only “silences sub-group members in an effort to present a united front” politically (Hancock 2007a:65). Examples frequently cited include the underrepresentation and misrepresentation of minority women by the feminist and black male-dominated civil rights movements; of lesbian women by the feminist movement; or, of Bisexuals, Gender Queer, and Transgender people and people of color of all gender and sexual identities by the gay rights movement. Traditional political conceptualizations of identity which limit group association to a single descriptor, therefore, result in the disenfranchisement of millions of people who only partially share the dominant social identity (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Identity, then, is more than fitting into a single demographic category.

Among sociologists two observations about unitary identity categories are important. First, sociologists such as Emirbayer (1997) suggest a dynamic view of identity processes. That is, identity is not static; it is mutable. This “relational” view of sociology, “conceive[s] of the social world as consisting primarily in...processes...in dynamic, unfolding relations” (Emirbayer 1997:281). In this formulation, identity can be adjusted based on contextual or situational factors,

a multidisciplinary idea which I will return to shortly (Diamond 2003a; Bedolla 2007; Warner 2008; Valentine 2007; Diamond & Butterworth 2008).

The relational view is important particularly among social movement theorists. The reliance on a single socially or culturally constructed identity as catalyst for social movement formation is problematic. Shared group identity, or what is sometimes referred to as group consciousness (broad social constructs such as gender, race, or sexual orientation) is a central tenant of political mobilization, and requires settling a number of problematic “relational comparisons” vis-à-vis other groups (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2009:19; Cole 2008). That is, groups must decide what constitutes group membership – who is ‘in.’ Notably, Sidney Tarrow (1998:119) recognized that social movements constructed around a single rigid conceptualization of identity would produce “insular, sectarian, and divisive movements incapable of expanding membership, broadening appeals, and negotiating with prospective allies” (See also Gitlin 1995; Gamson 1995; Stein and Plummer 1994).

Secondly, as with political science, the exclusivity of identity politics is particularly troublesome for those seeking to explain social movement formation and perpetuation (Cole 2008). If the requirement for group mobilization is collective identity, and identity is restricted to a single explicitly-defined category, e.g., “Gay” can only be defined as white, male, wealthy, non-religious, homosexuals, then the movement is not only limited by its membership base, but it is also limited in its ability to appeal to broader populations for political support and resources.

Psychologists, and especially feminist and womanist scholars recognized that restrictions and narrowly-defined concepts of identity are counterintuitive. Just as collective or group identities are constantly in flux, cultures, experiences, and structural influences – which differ among groups – are important in defining identity. As Shields (2008:304) notes, “the facts of our

lives reveal that there is no single identity category that satisfactorily describes how we respond to our social environment or are responded to by others.” The reduction to “difference-as-explanation” observed by early political scientists such as Berelson, et al. (1954) is judged a “seductive oversimplification” (Shields 2008:303). Furthermore, Shields (2008:303-4) notes, that popular culture and media observe categorical differences among populations, e.g. the ‘gender gap’ or ‘race gap’ in presidential elections, which scientific studies then reify, thus elevating categorical differences to the level of scientific explanation. These scientific ‘explanations’ are then used to fuel gender, race, and/or sexuality-based stereotypes in areas such as physical and mental health care, social welfare, and public policy (Shields 2008; Richards 2002; Hare-Mustin & Marecek 1988). Understanding identity as a “mutually-shaping” composite of experience, culture, history, context, and socio-structural influences is important in not only combating stereotypes, but also in producing better health outcomes and more representative political systems (Walby, Armstrong, and Strid 2012:235; Cravens *unpublished manuscript*; Sevelius 2013; Singh 2013; Warner & Shields 2013).

Along with these contributions, Black feminist (also referred to as multiracial or multicultural feminist) scholarship has provided two theoretical insights which are important in defining identity. The first involves the somewhat disputed idea of the ‘mutually constitutive’ nature of identity; and, the second is that identities are defined by their socio-structural power relationships within a society.

While the terminology is disputed⁵ (Walby, et al. 2012), concerning the idea that identities mutually shape one another, Shields (2008:301) notes that “one category of identity,

⁵ In fact, the debate is more than just semantic and has serious implications for the measurement and analysis of identity. A radical branch of intersectional theorists posit that “mutually constituted” identity refers to the transformation that occurs when two or more identities

such as gender, takes its meaning as a category in relation to another category” with which one is identified. Similarly, in the “trans-actional” view of the social world, relational sociologists posit “the very terms or units involved in a transaction [e.g. societal interaction] derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction” (Emirbayer 1997:287). While some scholars (Zack 2007; Hancock 2007a; Baca Zinn and Dill 1996; Spelman 1988) take a more radical view concerning the mutually constitutive nature of identity, what I argue is that mutually-shaped identity refers to the idea that identity categories interact with and affect one another (Walby, et al. 2012:235). What it means to be female in the United States, for example, is directly related to one’s race, class, sexuality, and/or religion. That is, the advantages and disadvantages associated with certain identities, Caucasian, for example, are differentially distributed based on gender or class or sexuality. So, what it means to be white in the United States is related to (changes based on) whether one identifies or is identified as male or female, affluent or poor, or a sexual minority. Furthermore, the interactions between

intersect. Black (race) and woman (gender), for example, are two identity concepts which are empirically measurable and often intersect in politics, economics, health, etc. Intersectionality scholars such as Hancock (2007a) argue that where two or more identity categories intersect (e.g., a Black Woman is disadvantaged in health care by (1) a lack of health insurance from her place of employment or insufficient pay to afford health insurance and (2) by women’s health organizations which focus primarily on white women’s reproductive health needs) the prior components of an identity are no longer measurable, and a new identity category exists (in this example the term “BlackWoman” is conceptually different than ‘black’ or ‘woman’ identity categories. Methodologically, this implies that “black women cannot be understood as the mere addition of ‘women’ and ‘black,’” but rather are a “distinctive category” (Walby, et al. 2012:239). Some intersectional theorists (Hancock 2007a) have even argued that true intersectional analyses are only those which conceptualize identity in this way (Spelman 1988; Baca Zinn and Dill 1996; Brah and Phoenix 2004; Zack 2007). In terms of semantics, it is argued that the concept should be altered, and instead referred to as “mutual shaping” – which “enables the retention of naming each relevant inequality while simultaneously recognizing that it is affected by engagement with others” (Walby, et al. 2012:235). For the purposes of this study, the most important aspect of the concept is the recognition that identities interact and are affected by their ‘engagement’ with other categories of identity.

each additional identity category are just as important. The nature of those interactive relationships is, in turn, defined by the socio-structural power dynamics that accompany each identity. In this way, identities derive meaning from and “reinforce” one another through the socio-structural distributions of power within a given culture or society (Shields 2008:301; Ashmore Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). To understand one’s experience, and therefore political attitudes and behaviors, it is necessary to know more than just one’s racial or class or sexual identity.

Identity & the Structure of Power

Essential to any conceptualization of identity is the understanding that “identities are couched within status and power relations” (Warner 2008:455). In short, socially constructed identities such as race, class, gender, and sexuality are the “primary organizing principles of society which locates and positions groups within that society’s opportunity structures” (Baca Zinn and Dill 1996:322). Identities are used as “mental heuristics” which “filter information in a biased manner, thereby resulting in a tendency for individuals to confirm new information that is consistent with preexisting beliefs and reject information that is not” (Pierce, Siddiki, Jones, Schumacher, Pattison, and Peterson 2014:3). On the basis of these biased judgements, systems of power are constructed “in which one group exerts control over another” (Weber 2004:127; Landrine, Klonoff, Alcaraz, Scott, and Wilkins 1995; Bacharach and Baratz 1962; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950). At its most basic, this conceptualization of power relations among identities can be summed up by social dominance theory which posits that “dominant groups have a disproportionate share of economic resources and social and culture capital, while subordinate groups suffer stigma, prejudice, and discrimination” (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008:379).

Accordingly, even a conservative analysis of social dominance in the United States reveals a patriarchal social organization resulting in male dominance of women, while racial stratification has meant white dominance over other racial groups. Furthermore, the heteronormative orientation of U.S. society has meant heterosexual dominance over ‘deviant’ sexualities. The socio-structural manifestations of these power relationships have been referred to as “androcentrism,” “ethnocentrism,” and “heterocentrism” and are reflected throughout society by everything from the character of political institutions and public policy to media portrayals of subordinate groups (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008).

The impact of these power relationships on identity is not discrete. First, these systems of oppression operate simultaneously, and, as was previously discussed, these fundamental systems of oppression within U.S. society intersect i.e., “work with and through each other” (Baca Zinn and Dill 1996; Crenshaw 2014). This means that “people experience race, class, gender, and sexuality differently depending on their social location in the structures of race, class, gender and sexuality” (Baca Zinn and Dill 1996). Perhaps the relationship between identity and socio-structural systems of power is best described as follows:

“Class, race, gender and sexuality are components of both social structure and social interaction. Women and men are differently embedded in locations created by these cross-cutting hierarchies. As a result, women and men throughout the social order experience different forms of privilege and subordination, depending on their race, class, gender, and sexuality. Intersecting forms of domination produce both oppression and opportunity. At the same time that structures of race, class, gender, and sexuality create disadvantages for women of color, they provide unacknowledged benefits for those who are at the top of these hierarchies (Baca Zinn and Dill 1996).”

Collins (2000:18) characterizes the organization of these intersecting structures of oppression and opportunity most notably as a “matrix of domination.” The intersection of hierarchies of power hold a multiplicity of meaning depending on one’s place in the hierarchy (Crenshaw 1991). That does not mean, however, that identity is non-quantifiable. An understanding of

Collin's (2000) matrix actually provides a theoretical foundation from which to build empirical analyses (Bedolla 2007). Simply stated, any conceptualization of identity must take into account the observations that multiple social identities can be experienced at once, identities only have meaning in relation to other identities, and that identities cannot be understood outside of their socio-structural context.

For the purposes of scientific understanding, and particularly this study, simply identifying as 'gay' manifests no explanatory value on its own as categorizations are meaningless without context. Placing sexuality in the context of other identities and with them the associated socio-structural power relations, however, provides explanatory value as the intersections of privilege and disadvantage associated with each identity component begin to emerge. Political attitudes and behaviors, then, are not just influenced by sexual identity – they are also shaped by one's experience with gender, race, class, and religion, among other social identities. Our previous definition of identity ("social categories in which an individual claims membership as well as the personal meaning associated with those categories" Shields 2008:301) can now be altered. Identity, then, refers to any number of mutually-shaped and simultaneously experienced social categories in which an individual claims membership, the personal meaning associated with those categories, and the relationship between those categories and the structures of power within a society.

Intersectionality

As eluded to in the previous section, recent theorization regarding the mutually-shaped, simultaneously-experienced, intersecting nature of identity along with the study of the "material

consequences of categories of difference” has come to constitute a body of knowledge referred to as Intersectionality (Davis 2008). In political science, intersectionality is often referenced as a critique of the treatment of race and gender by contemporary researchers. At the same time, however, the intersectional approach is criticized for its complexity (Simien 2007; Hancock 2007a; McCall 2005) – though complexity is also viewed as beneficial by some (Davis 2008; Walby, et. al 2012). As used in this study, intersectionality is an attempt to “conceptualize and theorize about...the cross-cutting political effects of both marginalization and privilege *within and among groups* in U.S. society” (Bedolla 2007:232, emphasis added). To this end, the intersectional approach is used to analyze “within-group diversity” with the goal of “shed[ding] light on the way we think of groups as actors in politics.” (Hancock 2007b:251).

Early formulations of intersectionality explored the idea of multiple categories of difference within feminism (i.e., poor Black women and lesbians) and the implications for the role of women in politics and society (Stewart and McDermott 2004). Based on these approaches, additive models were developed which analyzed categories of differences as discrete indicators of oppression. That is, by analyzing and adding together each individual oppressed identity (e.g., Black + Female + Lesbian) researchers could discern the totality of one’s experience with oppression (Beale 1970). These conceptualizations resulted in many quantitative analyses of discrimination (Alquist 1975; Jeffereies and Ransford 1980; Ransford and Miller 1983; Reid 1984; McLeod and Owens 2004). While many of these concepts preserver in contemporary research, poststructuralist feminist scholars have pressed the discipline to deconstruct and “abandon categorical thinking altogether” (Davis 2008:73). This divide in feminist thought has been somewhat bridged by the development, and continual refining, of intersectionality which recognizes both the importance of inclusion and the danger of over-

categorization (Davis 2008). In what follows, I will provide a brief history of the development of the intersectional approach, discuss the debate between intersectional schools of thought and provide examples of their application in contemporary interdisciplinary research. Finally, I discuss sexual identity and the study of LGBT political attitudes and behaviors in light of intersectionality and queer theory. The section ends with the theoretical rationale for this study.

Intersectionality: A Brief History

The term “intersectionality” was first coined⁶ by the Black feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) “to describe the exclusion of black women from white feminist discourse (which equated women with white) and anti-racist discourse (which equated black with men)” (Bowleg 2013:755) in the context of critical legal studies (Grzanka 2014). This is fitting as the epistemological roots of intersectionality are intertwined with Black feminist theory, especially the writings of many lesbian women of color (The Combahee River Collective 1997; Moraga and Anzaldua 1983). As Shields (2008:303) notes, “the theoretical foundation for intersectionality grew from the study of the production and reproduction of inequalities, dominance and oppression.” The present (i.e., postmodern) formulation of intersectionality required two developments. First, Black feminist scholars challenged the lack of inclusivity in White feminist theory. As discussed previously, it was the primary contention of Black feminists in the United States that any grand theory of feminism (e.g., essentialism) which failed to consider the experience of poor women, women of color, or lesbians (and, in international

⁶ Crenshaw’s (1989) conception referred specifically to the experience of Black women, however, the term has now grown to represent an entire sub-field of multidisciplinary academic inquiry. While this is the first use of the term ‘intersectionality,’ it is important to note that many of the key themes and assumptions of what would come to be intersectionality were simultaneously developing throughout the 20th Century. Those relevant to political science were briefly discussed in the introduction to this chapter, but see Walby, et al. (2012:225) for further references to intersectional themes in multidisciplinary literature.

debates, women in developing countries, immigrants, or refugees) would be unsuccessful. To this end, scholars such as Beale (1970), Green (1995), and Gay and Tate (1998) formulated arguments for the inclusion of women of color, poor women, and lesbian women in feminist thought and social action which adopted an accumulative approach to discrimination. A second development came when scholars proposed an ‘intersectional’ approach to address the limitations of accumulative models (Shields 2008:303).

The accumulative/additive approach (Veenstra 2013:646) – or the accumulated disadvantage model (Shields 2008:303; Nakano Glenn 1999) – suggests that women of color exist in a state of “double jeopardy” (Beale 1970) because of the oppression that comes from both their gender and race. Women face sexism and people of color face racism. The additive effects of these two power structures in U.S. society work to doubly disadvantage women of color. Add to this poverty, minority sexuality, or (dis)ability and the negative effects mount (Bowleg, Huang, Brooks, Black, and Burkholder 2003). As Veenstra (2013:647) notes, “accommodating the possibility of double and triple jeopardies accruing to multiple disadvantaged identities represented an important advance over a literature that had predominately focused on sexism to the exclusion of racism and classism.” Early proponents of the “race, class, gender strand” of feminist inquiry were primarily concerned with just such questions of “intragroup differences” (Davis 2008:71). The additive model thus highlights the differences within the category ‘women’ and allows for more thorough exploration of the “struggles for empowerment” minorities *within minority categories* confront (Davis 2008:71). The utility of additive models is in their ability to “predict who experiences the most discrimination” (Veenstra 2013:647; Landrine, Klonoff, Alcaraz, Scott & Wilkins 1995). By quantitatively analyzing experiences of discrimination, those who face ‘the most’ can be targeted

by public policy or interest group resources (Quinn 1993; Williams 1999; Krieger 1999; Veenstra 2013).

The idea that identities and inequalities are mutually shaped and that systems of power intersect to “construct systems of oppression/advantage” (Veenstra 2013:647) is the key theoretical distinction between the additive approach and the intersectional approach to social science research. The intersectional approach was developed around Collin’s (2000) concept of a “matrix of domination,” and views systems of inequality as so interconnected as to be “analytically inseparable” (Veenstra 2013:647; Anderson 2008). While the inseparability of intersectional experiences is contested – especially for purposes of quantitative research (e.g., McCall’s (2005) “intercategorical complexity”), that identities and systems of advantage and disadvantage interact and shape one another is not (Walby, et. al 2012). Since these developments, intersectionality has been further critiqued and revised. Structures, rather than individual characteristics, have become the focus of analysis in critical theories (Duong 2012), while the effectiveness of the approach across all contexts has been questioned (Luft 2009).

Intersectional theory has continued to evolve and adapt as theoretical discrepancies develop, are debated, and resolved (Zack 2007; David 2008; Luft 2009; Walby et. al 2012). Across disciplines, however, scholars have used intersectionality to highlight experiences with discrimination (Landrine, et. al 1995), inform counseling (Szymanski, and Moffitt 2012), medical (Jackson and Williams 2006), educational (Gutierrez y Muhs, Niemann, Gonzalez, and Harris 2012), and political (Cohen 1999) practices, and explore intra-group variation across a wide array of subjects.

Complexity & McCall's Paradigms

Perhaps one of the most cogent discussions of complexity in intersectional theory and methodology comes from McCall (2005). In this assessment, there exist three –though this is not exclusive – approaches to intersectional inquiry, each of which is “defined in terms of how they understand and use analytical categories to explore the complexity of intersectionality in social life” (McCall 2005:1773). The “anticategorical” approach is “based on a methodology that seeks to deconstruct categories,” while the “intercategorical” approach “requires that scholars provisionally adopt existing analytical categories to document relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions” (McCall 2005:1773). Finally, the “intracategorical” approach – which lies on the spectrum between the two previously mentioned – “maintains a critical [or problematizing] stance toward categories,” while at the same time focusing “on particular social groups at neglected points of intersection.” (McCall 2005:1774). I will examine each in turn.

First, the intercategorical approach necessitates the use of categories in intersectional analysis in order to examine the differences which exist between identities. While this risks committing the fallacy of “difference-as-explanation,” the role of categories in such an analysis is to highlight and explain differences between social groups (Shields 2008:303). Similarly, the intracategorical approach assumes the existence of semi-stable categories in order to examine within-group variation.

Such analyses are characterized methodologically by the additive perspective which rests on two assumptions: dichotomy of categories and the ability to rank-order identities (Collins 1993; Davis 2008). These assumptions are problematic for intersectionality and have been criticized theoretically for their oversight of intracategorical complexity (King 1988; Collins

1993; Takagi 1996; Kwan 1997; Collins 2000; Warner 2008). One's experience with gender is informed by one's race. Likewise, the experience of sexuality is informed by one's experience with race and gender. Simply indexing subordinate identities (e.g., Gender + Race + Class + Sexuality) does not adequately represent the experience of those who lie between or at the intersection of those categories. In this view, analyses which focus on a specific category of identity (e.g., gender, race, sexual identity) "obscure the depth of understanding provided by that category's intersection with another category[ies] (e.g., race, SES, sexual identity)" (Bowleg 2013:758-9).

Similarly, some multiplicative models adopt the use of identity categories for the purpose of statistical analysis (Veenstra 2013). Whereas additive models posit a simple sum of identity categories provide the true 'total' amount of discrimination faced by an individual or group, multiplicative models posit a compounding of discriminatory effects as identities multiply. As Parent, DeBalere and Moradi (2013:640) note, "beyond independent effects, minority statuses and related experiences may interact to shape people's experiences with the typical implied nature of interaction being that one minority status or experience may exacerbate the effect of another" (See also Green 1995; Landrine, et al. 1995). The end result of multiplicative models is a greater amount of "disadvantage than that predicted by double, triple, or quadruple jeopardy" (Veenstra 2013:648). Methodologically, this approach is characterized by the use of interaction terms in statistical regression models (Frederich 1982; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006; Hancock 2007a; Cole 2009). Multiplicative models, although not as wedded to dichotomous identity categories, are nevertheless criticized for their reliance on the assumption of within-group homogeneity and the static nature of identity (Emirbayer 1997; Hancock 2007a; Bedolla 2007; Choo and Ferree 2010). Despite these critiques, multiplicative models appear to be the

most productive – and utilized – quantitative methodology in intersectional research. (For a more thorough review of the advantages and disadvantages of multiplicative models see Landrine, et al. (1995)).

The anticategorical approach challenges the use of identity categories in social scientific inquiries altogether. Since the 1980s and 1990s, postmodern and poststructuralist feminist and queer theorists sought to destabilize identity categories which were viewed as perpetuating stereotypical representations of race, gender, class, and sexuality in popular culture and political and scientific discourse (Davis 208; Cohen 2001; Stein and Plummer 1994). In this view, categorical-based analyses misrepresent the true nature of identity because categories are based on the “dominant constructions of race, gender [and sexuality]” in society (Cohen 2001:203). In short, anticategoricalists argue that categories are too exclusive, structured around white, male, heteronormative prototypes, and fuel stereotypical representations of those who do not meet societally-imposed standards. Analyses based on such categories are therefore neither valid nor generalizable.

Methodologically, the anticategorical approach is at best antagonistic toward quantitative methods. Intersectional analyses in this tradition are encouraged to adopt methods informed by qualitative designs, focusing on “individual narratives” (Robertson and Sgoutas 2012:428). Such designs are better capable of capturing the subtleties of identity interaction while at the same time avoiding the trap of dichotomous categorization which so often accompanies identity research. In the most extreme cases, the compatibility of intersectional theory and quantitative methodology is questioned altogether (Bowleg 2008:317). While qualitative methods have proven insightful in the study of identity intersections, abandoning quantitative methods is argumentum ad absurdum. As McCall (2005) and others note, approaches which bridge the gap

between the two extremes of anticategorical and additive analyses seem to offer the most promising road forward for intersectionality researchers.

McCall's (2005) intercategorical analysis seems best suited for this task. While critical of the use of categories, such an approach also recognizes their utility for delineating specific social foci. In this respect, analyses can target a particular social group in order to better understand the "relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions" which exist within the category (McCall 2005:1773).

Research using the multiplicative approach, while not perfect, has been an "indispensable tool" which is "particularly useful for revealing patterns of disparity in arenas such as employment and income, physical and mental health, and social life" (Cole 2009:177). It should also be noted, though, that many historiographical accounts and theoretical explorations of intersectionality distinguish additive and multiplicative approaches from 'true' intersectional theory (a position I refute) (Parent et al. 2013; Zack 2007; Brah and Phoenix 2004). The basis of this delineation, however, is purely driven by assumptions regarding data collection (Hancock 2007a; Shields 2008; Cole 2008). That is, the aforementioned assumptions of staticity and mutual exclusivity of identity have been applied to data collection methods especially in survey research. As McCall's (2005) intercategorical and intracategorical approaches make clear, the use of identity categories in intersectional research, while debated, is not without merit. Using dichotomous or otherwise mutually exclusive indicators for such complex and interrelated concepts as race, gender, and sexuality, however, are anathema to intersectional theory. While considered the gold standard by survey methodologists (Salant and Dillman 1994; Johnson 2014), mutually exclusive categorical measures of identity fail to represent those at the intersection of the categories and misrepresent many who do not fit the prototypical socially-constructed image (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach

2008). For these reasons, moving forward with intersectional research, especially in the area of survey research design, questions must be carefully considered to ensure proper measurement of the various aspects of identity. Indeed, as with Hancock (2007a:66), I argue “for new conceptualizations of categories and their role in politics, rather than seeking an abolition of categories themselves.” As will be explained in the methodology section, I offer to supplement categorical variables with social-psychological measures of group association and personal affect.

As with McCall (2005), Shields (2008) argues for a “both/and” approach to intersectionality in behavioral research. Such an approach “entails both comparing individual identities to each other as well as considering intersections and their emergent properties” (Shields 2008:307). Similarly, Risman (2004:443) notes,

“we cannot study gender in isolation from other inequalities, nor can we only study inequalities' intersection and ignore the historical and contextual specificity that distinguishes the mechanisms that produce inequality by different categorical divisions, whether gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, or class.”

This view is based on a systemic or structural conceptualization of identity which holds that in order to address structural oppression (e.g. sexism or heterosexism) the causal relationships within each structure must be explored and explained separately. This requires a view which discretely examines heterosexism (sexuality-based discrimination) and sexism (gender-based discrimination). While each are understood as interlocking forms of oppression, “it is important for analytic clarity, and...the scholarly contribution to social change, to identify causal mechanisms for heterosexism and gender oppression distinctly (Risman 2004:443; Calhoun 2000). Indeed, the legacy of intersectionality to this point has been its impact on our understanding and problematizing of power structures as well as in its assumption of within-group heterogeneity (Stewart and McDermott 2004).

In the preceding sections I provided a modified definition of identity, a brief history of the development of intersectionality, and discussed the theoretical and methodological distinctions between the additive, multiplicative, and intersectional research designs. Finally, I proposed adopting a synthesized approach (e.g., “both/and”; “intercategorical”) to intersectional research with a focus on multiplicative analyses and proposed restructuring survey research design to better meet the theoretical assumptions of intersectionality about the nature of identity (i.e., mutually constitutive and non-static). As Syed (2010:61) notes, intersectionality was “originally developed within legal studies and the humanities as a way of making sense of interlocking societal oppression experienced by subordinated groups” not as a way of making predictions about human behavior. As such, the study of human behavior necessarily requires modifications to the existing literature. This kind of “incompleteness” has been pointed to as a means by which intersectionality remains a highly salient research paradigm across many disciplines and fields of specialization (Davis 2008).

Intersectionality “serves as a reminder to researchers that any consideration of a single identity, such as gender, must incorporate an analysis of the ways that other identities interact with, and therefore qualitatively change, the experience of gender” (Warner and Shields 2013:804). With this in mind, I now turn to a discussion of LGBT identity and intragroup heterogeneity, as well as the complicated nature of identity interaction within a marginalized and stigmatized social group.

LGBT Identity: Development & Interaction across Multiple Axes of Dis/Advantage

“LGBT” is a misleading acronym. First, as noted in intersectional criticisms of gender, the acronym implies group cohesion across the sexual and gender identity categories Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender. While this may be important in facilitating a discussion of sexual diversity, for the purposes of scientific inquiry the assumption of cohesion across sexual minorities can lead to incorrect conclusions about group attitudes and behavior. As translated through the “difference-as-explanation” assumption, for example, LGBT group “distinctiveness” is used to explain attitudinal variation between homo- and heterosexuals. For example, LGBT people are observed to be more liberal and Democratic in policy and candidate preferences than heterosexuals (Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002; Shaffner and Senic 2006). While it may make analyses easier, the cohesion assumed by the LGBT moniker is not supported by sexual minority research⁷ (Worthen 2013; Egan 2012; Eliason 2010; Lombardi 2009; Fassinger and Arseneau 2007; Weiss 2004; Mohr and Rochlen 1999).

Similarly, the term LGBT belies cohesion across racial and ethnic identities. The dominant view of ‘LGBT’ is white, affluent, and gay male, despite the varied experiences and identities which exist within the LGBT community (Chan 1989; Thumma 1991; Garcia 1998; Green 1998; Duggan 2003; Ferguson 2005). Racial discrimination is not uncommon within the

⁷ Studies which have examined intragroup differences among LGBT people originate primarily from the field of psychology and examine discriminatory attitudes between group members (Mulick and Wright 2002), although some studies have also examined political distinctions between lesbians/gays and bisexuals (Baumgardner 2007). Other studies include: Weinberg, Williams, and Pryor (2012); Brewster and Moradi (2010); Weltzer-Lang (2008); Gordon (2006); Burleson (2005); Ault (1996); Ochs (1996); Hutchins (1996); Rust (1995).

LGBT community and racial minority LGBT people often face significantly different social and cultural pressures which demand sexual ‘normalcy’ than do white LGBT people (Icard 1986; Loicano 1989; Garcia 1998). As Rogers and Lott (1997:297) note, “oppressed groups struggle against the boundaries dividing them from privileged groups but also against boundaries constituted by mixes of privilege and disprivilege within their ranks” (quoted in Cole 2008).

The LGBT acronym actually groups together both sexual and gender identities. While the implications for transgender political participation as well as physical and psychological health have until recently been relatively understudied, what research that has emerged suggests transgender people fall into a category of “otherness” that exists within the LGBT identity (Parent et al. 2013:641; Roen 2002; Fassinger and Arseneau 2007; Koken, Bimbi, and Parsons 2009; Worthen 2013; Singh 2013). Transgender itself is a cross-cutting categorization which encompasses significant variation (D. Valentine 2007). That transgender people can identify as heterosexual, gay, lesbian, or bisexual – as well as represent racial and ethnic, and religious differences – is another layer of intricacy which is overlooked by the LGBT acronym, what Parent, et al. (2013:641) calls a “conceptually inconsistent separation in our domains of gender and LGBT identities.”

Examinations of intragroup variation, especially those which focus on points of identity, sociocultural, and structural intersections, are essential to our understanding of LGBT politics. In the section that follows, I will explore LGBT identity through the intersectional framework and examine the identity intersections which theory posits to be sources of variation in behaviors and attitudes. I will also begin to introduce the formal model of this study by examining the intersectional and social psychological literature which will be used to construct measures of identity.

Modeling Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity

As with all social constructions of identity which are not representative of dominant social characteristics, early conceptions of LGBT identity were constructed as ‘deviant’ and innately self-loathing (See Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous 1998). Freudian conceptualizations of sexuality, for example, treated homosexuality as an obstacle along an otherwise natural path of sexual development (Freeman 2007). In an attempt to elucidate and refine identity formation processes, later scholars suggested “homosexual identity” was the natural (i.e., not inherently flawed) culmination of a linear process involving periods of identity confusion, comparison, tolerance, acceptance, and pride (Cass 1979). “Identity synthesis” – the point at which gays and lesbians are able to “integrate homosexual identity with all other aspects of self” – finalized the process (Cass 1979:234,235; Herek 2010).

Similarly, de Monteflores (1978) viewed lesbian and gay identity formation as an extension of what is modernly referred to as the “coming-out” process whereby individuals reveal their sexual orientation in varying degrees to the people in their lives. According to de Monteflores (1978:65), the process begins with personal acceptance of a gay or lesbian identity and ends with the public expression of that identity or “self-disclosure” (publicly coming-out) in an effort to achieve “self-validation” or a sense of worth from society. In this process, identity is linked to public expression. That is, one cannot truly be gay or lesbian-identified without reconciling the private and public aspects of identity. Regardless of the source of sexual orientation de Monteflores (1978) postulated that gay and lesbian identity is acquired by choice through a linear process similar to Cass (1979) and dependent on a public revelation of the acquired identity.

Linear models of identity formation, however, are criticized for a number of reasons. Most notably, such models were the result of studies which examined primarily white, affluent, gay men who were socialized and ‘came out’ during the early to mid-20th Century. As such, these models cannot account for the experiences of the majority of LGBT people. Furthermore, self-fulfillment and, as social movement scholars noted, political activity were contingent upon vocal and overt self-identification with the marginalized LGBT community – a situation which many racial minority or low-income LGBT people often find untenable (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007).

Similarly, Garcia (1998:19) and others questioned both the sequential nature of the models, as well as the insufficient consideration for different cultural values which help shape identity development and influence political outcomes. As previously discussed, one’s lesbian or gay identity cannot be understood apart from one’s culture, which includes ethnicity, religious heritage, and socioeconomic factors. “No social group is homogeneous” and there exists “within-group diversity” in each “category of difference” (Simien 2007:267; Hancock 2007a:251). That is, while sexual minority identities may share similar characteristics and/or experiences (e.g. coming to terms with one’s sexuality, experiences with discrimination, familial rejection, same-sex partnering, etc.) it is inappropriate to assume that these similar experiences are shared across racial, ethnic, gender, and even temporal experiences (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). In fact, modern queer theorists posit that there is no descriptive (i.e. demographic) or structural (shared heterosexual experiences) characteristics upon which any commonalities among “sexual deviants” (e.g. sexual minorities) can be based, and therefore, they are required to create one through a process Duong (2012:379) calls “world-making.” More radical notions aside, identity formation from an intersectional perspective, especially the formation of an LGBT identity must

be understood as a “multicultural” process “whereby people can develop and maintain a solid, productive identity that is influenced by two or more cultures without having one replaced by the other” (Garcia 1998:104, See also: Ramirez, 1983). These intersecting identities form the bases for interactions which influence political attitudes and behaviors.

Consistent with the additive approach, scholars studying sexual minorities modified the concept of lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity in the 1990s and 2000s. In studying suburban gay men, for example, Brekhus (2005:94) noted the formation of an “integrator” identity where a gay identity is “just one of many affiliations which he [a self-identified gay man] combines into one complete multifaceted self.” Using a multicultural approach, Bailey (1999) recognized the intersection of identities among lesbian, gay, and bisexual people and adopted an additive view which led to the “identity multiplexing” hypothesis. Similar to the double and triple jeopardy paradigms, identity multiplexing views various social and political identities as “layer[ed] and rank[ed] by individuals” according to individual cultural and historical experiences and circumstance (Bailey 1999:31)⁸. While both Bailey (1999) and Brekhus (2005) attempted to examine intersecting identities within the LGBT community, such attempts, again, only modeled white, middle-class, gays and lesbians (Brekhus (2005) only examined gay men) and failed to fully explore cultural and historical differences while overlooking gender variance. Not until feminist, queer, and transgender scholars exposed the discrepancy between experiences of white gay men and racial and ethnic minority gays and lesbians did formulations of LGBT identity development change.

⁸ Although ranking has been controversial in intersectional thought, Bowleg (2013), noted the phenomenon among Black lesbian and bisexual women. It was postulated that such effects are “the consequence of power relationships that shape the construction and salience of social identities” (Bowleg 2013:764).

Modern social psychological literature has provided a wealth of new ideas, theories, and concepts about the development and maintenance of LGBT identities. Within the past seven years, two special issues of the journal *Sex Roles* (Vol. 68, 2013; Vol. 59, 2008) have been devoted to explorations of LGBT identity research. As concepts of ethnicity and race evolved in social scientific research, so too must conceptions of gender and sexuality. LGBT, as a social scientific category – especially in quantitative research – still marginalizes bisexual, queer, and transgender individuals (Hutchins 1996; Warner 1999). While identities and our notions about identity formation change over time (Diamond and Butterworth 2008; Fassinger and Arseneau 2007) the idea that identities influence our perception of the world and have behavioral and attitudinal effects is not disputed. What is important, however, is to develop, adequately conceptualize, and measure identity categories so as not to exclude those already at the margins of research.

At the Intersection of LGBT Identity

The intersectional approach provides a framework for analyzing LGBT political attitudes and behaviors because it emphasizes the “interaction of categories of difference” (Hancock 2007b:64). LGBT people “reside in multiple systems of stratification” which “constantly challenge” them to “simultaneously respond to numerous privileges and constraints that are bestowed on the various social roles they occupy” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:661). The intersectional approach is valuable because it helps us understand better what shapes LGBT attitudes and behaviors. Previous studies offer socialization and group interest as explanations for lesbian, gay, and bisexual political distinction. However, these studies fail to recognize the “competing hierarchies, obligations, and experiences,” such as racial, gender, religious, and class

considerations, which “inform and modify one another in ways that create many variations within a single stratum of people” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:661).

Lesbian, gay, bisexual people who, along with their sexual minority identity, identify as racial/ethnic minorities, gender non-conforming, or as religious, for example, experience cross-cutting or intersecting value systems and social pressures which further complicate identity formation and, subsequently, its influence on political attitudes and behavior. This occurs for two reasons. First, social and cultural norms that regulate behavior exist within most social groups. These norms primarily arise from culturally-constructed gender or sex roles, although, they can be the product of structural forms of discrimination, as in the case of African-American women whom the dominant white society often stereotypes as promiscuous. Such stereotypes force false images of ‘normalcy’ on marginalized communities and induce internal policing so that racial minority lesbians, for example, face moral and cultural coercion in order to avoid intra- and inter-group stigmatization. Secondly, every socially constructed identity possesses its own innate advantages and disadvantages (Weldon 2006).

Cultural Variation in Perceptions of Sexuality

Studies of racial minority LGBT people suggest that dominant cultural perceptions of sexuality and gender norms exert pressure on sexual minorities to conform or at least modify their sexuality in the face of competing community values. Schnoor (2006:47) notes such struggles among Latino and Asian-identified LGBT people. Specifically, Green (1998:43-8), notes (1) the role of the family in “protecting against the racism of the dominant culture” and the “strong family ties that encompass nuclear and extended family members in complex networks;” (2) the value placed on motherhood among African-American women; (3) the strong presence of “Western Christian religiosity;” and (4) a “legacy of sexual racism” (i.e. a negative stereotypical

view of African-Americans as promiscuous) which has led in many cases to “an exaggerated need to demonstrate ‘normalcy’” in terms of sexual behavior as sources of tension between African-American and sexual identities (See also: Chan 1989; Morales 1989; Thumma 1991; Garcia 1998; Moore 2011). Indeed, culturally-constructed and enforced conceptions of masculinity and femininity have a significant impact on sexuality even among racial minority heterosexuals (Bowleg, Teti, Massie, Patel, Malebranche, and Tschann 2011). Furthermore, Bowleg (2013:759) notes a majority of an African-American gay and bisexual male sample ranked their “black or black male identity as primary.” To explain such behavior, Bowleg (2013:759) notes, “the combination of the ascribed identity status of race in the U.S., the visibility of “race” relative to normative Whiteness, and the role of racial prejudice and discrimination against Blacks in the U.S. are social processes that may have prompted an early awareness of Blackness.” Bowleg (2013:759) also posits that the “non-visible” nature of sexual identity vis-à-vis race allows for racial identity to take preeminence, noting of one study participant, “being able to pass as heterosexual, and thus avoid LGB discrimination presumably made his Black identity more salient than his bisexual identity.”

The real effect of these competing value systems becomes apparent in studies of minority transgender populations. Koken, Bimbi, and Parsons (2009), for example, observe experiences of rejection among transwomen of color fueled by family religious traditions. This rejection often has the tangible consequence of poverty and homelessness. Furthermore, Gray (2009:37,8) and Singh (2013) also note that LGBT youth experience pressure on their identity based on geographic isolation while Kazyak (2012) observes a similar phenomenon among geographically isolated lesbians. While these LGBT people may not select a rural identity per-se, this is the effect of their geographic location and Gray (2009) notes that these LGBT people rely on the

identity and subsequent “familiarity” of their immediate family, or what is referred to as “a strategy of sameness” to offset their LGBT identity in order to better integrate into rural society. Across cultures, then, pressures to conform – whether to gender or sexual norms, established religious beliefs, or other community values – exert influences on LGBT identity. I hypothesize that these pressures in turn influence political attitudes and behaviors.

As part of an intersectional approach it is also important to explicitly consider the role of whiteness as a component of LGBT identity. As mentioned previously, it is not atypical for racial minority LGBT people to experience discrimination at the hands of white members of sexual minority communities. Hurtado and Stewart (1997:303) identify a number of ways that whiteness is used to “maintain structural privilege and to promote racism.” Among them are distancing, denial, superiority, belongingness, and solidarity, although research suggests whiteness holds less meaning for the latter two except in situations where whites feel disprivileged e.g., in the context of outsourcing or undocumented immigration (Fine, Weis, Addelston, and Marusza 1997).

Systems of Power & Influences on Sexual Minority Politics

What accounts for political attitudinal and participatory variation among sexual minorities? The answer, I hypothesize, can be found by examining intragroup heterogeneity. As previously stated, socially constructed identities are multifaceted. In order to better understand the influence on politics, as well as the interaction between identities, I measure, as Greene (2002), identity categories using social-psychological indicators of group belonging (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and Cook 1989; Mael and Tetrick 1992; Duckitt, Callaghan, and Wagner 2005). The composition of social identities is more complex and nuanced than current quantitative research recognizes (Bedolla 2007). Identities, like attitudes, consist of

cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (see Greene 2002; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). “Linked fate” (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005), experience with stigmatization (Goffman 1963; Major and O’Brien 2005), group associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992; Sellers, et al. 1998), and social networks (Knoke 1990; Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 2012), along with situational and contextual effects represent aspects of social identity which influence political attitudes and actions. Yet, contemporary survey research discounts or fails to adequately measure the interaction between these important and influential concepts (Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Cole 2008), instead assuming self-selection into an identity category occurs in social isolation and invariably results in intragroup political homogeneity

Social identity and self-categorization theories hold that individuals endeavor to “maximize differences” between the group with which they identify (“ingroup”) and members of “psychologically relevant opposition groups” (Greene 2002; Brown 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987; Tajfel 1978). While definitions of identity are imprecise, most political and social-psychological studies have conceptualized social identities in this way, i.e., as oppositional and mutually exclusive (Jackson and Smith 1999; Sellers, et al. 1998). Furthermore, the ambiguous conceptualizations and focus on distinctiveness have led many scholars (as with LGBT political studies) to “misattribute” social and political phenomena to social identity (intergroup) differentiation (Shields 2008; Richards 2002; Helms, Jernigan, and Mascher 2005). Post-modern scholarship, however, suggests that identities exist as part of a “matrix of domination” (Collins 2000), i.e., intersecting structures of opportunity and disadvantage which privilege and/or disprivilege particular identities in certain social contexts (Warner 2008). As previously stated, any conceptualization of identity must take into account the intersectional notion that multiple social identities can be experienced at once, identities only

have meaning in relation to other identities, and that identities cannot be understood outside of their socio-structural context (Brown and Williams 1984; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting 1999).

While intersectional conceptions of identity have permeated interdisciplinary research for more than three decades, one overlooked element of this line of research is what Crenshaw (1991) refers to as “political intersectionality,” or the idea that “those who occupy multiple subordinate identities may find themselves caught between the sometimes conflicting agendas of two political constituencies to which they belong, or are overlooked by these movements entirely” (Cole 2008:444). Often, political intersectionality includes “the challenge of working politically with the diversity within an identity group” (Cole 2008). Similar to identity politics, social identity and self-categorization theories assume group heterogeneity once individuals self-select into a group. In terms of political activity, shared experiences are wrongly translated into shared political attitudes and behaviors (Cross 1991; Rogers and Lott 1997). A more realistic approach, however, recognizes that “subpopulations within a constituency that have relatively more privilege” often “set political agendas” which leads to the “secondary marginalization” of multiple-minority groups whose “interests are not addressed by the organizations or movements purporting to serve them” (Cole 2008:444; Strolovich 2006; Cohen 2001; Cohen 1999).

Although some studies suggest that single social group identification is adequate to induce social movement participation (Simon, Sturmer, Loewy, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 1998), theories of stigmatization have hypothesized that individuals who identify with multiple minority groups are less likely to challenge dominant political structures through participation in protest activity (Swank and Fahs 2013a) or even hold ideologically dissident

attitudes – i.e., liberal attitudes that would challenge dominant social constructions of power relations (Cravens *unpublished manuscript*).

Figure 1.1 graphically depicts the model used in this study. The individual LGBT-identified person is the level of analysis. Strength of group association, stigma, social networks, and context represent four processes which influence individual political orientation.

Intersectional theory notes the importance of assessing how other identities with which the individual might identify influences each of the specified processes (Bedolla 2007). That is, researchers should consider how gender, racial, or religious identities influence the strength with which an individual identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. Similarly, stigmatization does not occur in isolation. Stigmatization (Goffman 1963) interacts across social identities (e.g., a gay man of color experiencing both racism and homophobia) to influence political attitudes and action.




Figure 1.1: Theoretical Model of Identity Interaction (Adapted from Bedolla 2007)

The goal of this study is to analyze and explain political attitudinal and behavioral variation within sexual minority communities in the United States. In the following chapter I describe the research design and methodology used to implement a nationally representative sample survey of sexual minority adults living in the United States. I explain how the four key processes at the center of Figure 1.1 are operationalized to measure sexual minority and racial identity, describe the operationalization of attitudinal and behavioral measures – used as dependent variables, as well as the methodology and the various hypotheses used to test the cognitive, affective, and associative effects of identity on each.

CHAPTER 2: INTERSECTIONAL METHODOLOGY & SURVEY RESEARCH DESIGN

As discussed in chapter 1, the approach undertaken in this study relies on McCall's (2005:1773) conception of intercategorical inquiry to explore the "relationships of inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and conflicting dimensions" of identity among a sample of 1216 sexual minority survey respondents in the United States. The intercategorical approach – like all forms of intersectional analysis – "considers" categories of difference such as race, gender, class, and sexual orientation "as organizing structures of society, recognizing that these key components influence political access, equality, and the potential for any form of justice" (Hancock 2007a:63).

While some approaches to intersectional research pursue evaluations of institutional and "historically particular configurations of inequalities," such as "the cultural influence of the media" – what Choo and Ferree (2010:135) refer to as "systemic intersectionality" – other intersectional approaches engage in individual-level research and often attempt to "include the excluded" (Duong 2012). These "process-centered models" (Choo and Ferree 2010:133) conceive of identity intersections as "locations like 'street corners' where race and gender meet and have multiplicative effects." In this metaphor, 'streets' refer to "social processes such as racism or sexism" and are considered to 'cross' one another without actively altering or transforming the underlying processes (Choo and Ferree 2010:133). This interpretation of the transformative nature of intersections is, however, disputed. Some scholars suggest that identity categories are fundamentally altered by the process of intersection in such a manner that disallows quantitative measurement and methodologies (Walby, et al. 2012; also see Chapter 1, footnote 5).

The debate over quantitative intersectional analysis appears to be based on traditional data collection methods – most notably the use of survey research designs which rely on standard categorical variables for the collection and interpretation of identity-related information and effects (Hancock 2007b; Simien 2007; Bedolla 2007; Emirbayer 1997). It is argued that research which relies on measures that reflect static (often conceptualized as dichotomous) identity categories – namely with additive and multiplicative models of political phenomenon – produces “competition” between “marginalized groups for fringe levels of resources rather than systemic reform” which is beneficial across society (Hancock 2007a:70). The resultant “oppression Olympics” is often a criticism of such methods of analysis (Walby, et al. 2012:237). Furthermore, identity analyses which rely on mutually-exclusive response categories in survey research “deny certain groups who fall between the intersections of multiple groups the political space for claims” to a voice in policy debates (Hancock 2007a:70; Crenshaw 1991; Cole 2008; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Finally, critics suggest that traditional additive and multiplicative models “lead to [a] misdiagnosis” of social problems and even have the potential to contribute to harmful “policy solutions” (Hancock 2007a:70).

Highlighting these criticisms scholars Patricia Hill Collins (2000) and Leah Warner (2008) suggest that identities exist as part of a “matrix of domination” (Collins 2000), i.e., intersecting structures of opportunity and disadvantage which privilege and/or disprivilege particular identities in certain social contexts (Warner 2008). Simply stated, any conceptualization of identity must take into account the intersectional notion that multiple social identities can be experienced at once, identities only have meaning in relation to other identities, and that identities cannot be understood outside of their socio-structural context.

For the purposes of survey research, it is necessary to “provisionally adopt” (McCall 2005:1773) analytical categories; however, the hazards outlined by anticategoricalists may still be avoided. This is accomplished by also adopting Collins’ (2000) and Warner’s (2008) reconceptualization of identity and using more robust measures in quantitative research. This is not a radical new approach to political science. In fact, some of the indicators used in this study were developed to measure attitudes toward the private rights of business owners to maintain racially segregated facilities Woodmansee and Cook (1967; 1976) while many of the identity measures have been tested in relation to partisan identification (Green 2002). What is unique to this study is the application of cognitive and affective measures of identity – including identity centrality, public and private regard, and stigmatization – to concepts such as sexuality and race within the same survey instrument. These robust identity measures can then be compared and interacted to determine their individual and multiplicative effects on attitudinal and behavioral measures. In short, by adopting the intercategorical approach and relying on social-psychological theory to inform my methodology, I quantitatively complicate how we understand sexuality, its relationship to socially-constructed identities such as race, and its effect on sexual minority politics.

In the following sections, I discuss the nature of intragroup heterogeneity and the theoretical model used in this study; identify key hypotheses; explain the survey research design, including survey question construction and sample survey methodology; and, finally, introduce the statistical analysis undertaken in this study.

Sexual Minority Heterogeneity

What accounts for political attitudinal and participatory variation among sexual minorities? The answer, I propose, can be found by examining intragroup heterogeneity. That is, “the cross-cutting political effects of both marginalization and privilege within...groups in U.S. society” (Bedolla 2007:232). Critical feminist and queer theories as well as intersectionality have shown that the behavioral effect of identity must be measured as more than just a categorical indicator, i.e., dichotomous ‘1’ or ‘0’ (Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Warner 2008).

While this study follows McCall’s (2005:1773) intercategorical approach to intersectional inquiry, I also borrow from the intracategorical approach in that one goal of this study is to “reveal the complexity of lived experience within social groups at neglected points of intersection.” Sexual minorities “reside in multiple systems of stratification” which “constantly challenge” them to “simultaneously respond to numerous privileges and constraints that are bestowed on the various social roles they occupy” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:661). That is, sexual minorities – like other socially-constructed groups – are neither demographically nor politically monolithic. Instead, “competing hierarchies, obligations, and experiences inform and modify one another in ways that create many variations within a single stratum of people” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:661).

Complex social-psychological and socio-historical processes such as ‘androcentrism,’ heterosexism, and racism, among others, interact and effect one’s political orientation (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). It follows, then, that LGBT people are not politically distinctive (i.e., ideologically liberal or Democratically-oriented) simply because they identify as a sexual minority (Shields 2008). Instead, I hypothesize, that interactions between identity categories

effect the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities. Specifically, one's relationship to an identity category, experiences with stigmatization resultant from identification with a certain group, the composition of one's social networks, and one's socio-cultural condition interact to influence how one participates in the political process as well as one's attitudes toward specific policies (Bedolla 2007).

Theoretical Model

Figure 1.1, on page 45, graphically depicts the model used in this study. As introduced in Chapter 1, the individual LGBT-identified person is the level of analysis. Strength of group association, stigma, social networks, and context represent four processes which influence individual political orientation. Intersectional theory notes the importance of assessing how other identities with which the individual might identify influences each of the specified processes, graphically depicted here by the boxes containing various social and political identities (Bedolla 2007). That is, researchers should consider how the relationship between societal power structures and socially-constructed gender, racial, or religious identities influence the strength with which an individual identifies as a sexual minority. Researchers should also consider the culturally significant values associated with categories of identity and how these internal value structures – as well as exogenous power structures – influence the relationship between sexuality and other socially-constructed identities. Similarly, stigmatization does not occur in isolation. Stigmatization interacts across social identities (e.g., a gay man of color experiencing both racism and homophobia) to influence political orientations. While multiple identities are

specified in Figure 1.1 that are not under investigation in this study, the possibilities for future research are illustrated by the complex web of interacting social identities⁹.

Intersectional Decisions

The goal of this study is to analyze and explain political attitudinal and behavioral variation within sexual minority communities in the United States. In the end, I will be able to make generalizations about the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities in relation to their racial & ethnic identity, specifically. It is important in quantitative intersectional research to limit the categories of difference under evaluation in order to avoid generating as Young (2004:721) warns “an infinite regress that dissolves groups into individuals” (quoted in Warner 2008:455-7). It is also “the researcher’s charge” to “make choices” about which identity groups to study and also to “explicitly” justify those “decisions processes” in light of their research questions (Warner 2008:455-7).

As I discuss later, examining the politics of only the most visible members of the LGBT community risks perpetuating the “intersectional invisibility” of racial and ethnic minorities, the economically disadvantaged, gender minorities, the differently abled, religious queers, and others who struggle for recognition and whom social science repeatedly ignores (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). It was the original intent of this study to include a detailed examination of gender identity; however, due to economic and methodological constraints, this study focuses on sexuality

⁹ It should be noted that a central criticism of the intersectional approach among political scientists has been the complex nature of intersectional models (Simien 2007; Hancock 2007; McCall 2005). The statistical power of models which intricately examine sub-populations can be limited without proper oversampling of, in this case, minority populations. This criticism has not gone unanswered – either theoretically or methodologically – and other scholars suggest that properly executed research designs and statistical modeling along with a proper understanding of the terms under investigation yield beneficial results even with complex models (Davis 2008; Walby, et al. 2012).

at the intersection of race. The research question which follows, is how does sexuality interact with race to influence the political attitudes and behaviors of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people in the United States? In the following section I discuss the theoretical model – graphically depicted in Figure 1.1 – in detail and explain the key hypotheses of this study.

Conceptualizing Identity

There are many aspects of social identification; and, the composition of social identities is more complex and nuanced than current quantitative political research recognizes (Bedolla 2007). In order to better understand the influence on politics, as well as the interaction between identities, I propose as Green (2002) to measure identity categories using social-psychological indicators of group belonging (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and Cook 1989; Mael and Tetrick 1992; Duckitt, Callaghan, and Wagner 2005). Identities, like attitudes, consist of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (see Green 2002; Deaux, et al. 1999; Brewer 1993; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). “Linked fate” (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005), experience with stigmatization and internalization (Goffman 1963; Kelman 1961; Gaventa 1980; Major and O’Brien 2005), group associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992), and social networks (Knoke 1990; Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 2012), along with situational and contextual measures represent aspects of social identity which influence political attitudes and actions. Yet, contemporary political survey research discounts or fails to adequately measure the interaction between these important and influential concepts (Hancock 2007; Shields 2008; Cole 2008), instead assuming self-selection into an identity category occurs in social isolation and invariably results in intragroup political homogeneity.

Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theories hold that individuals endeavor to “maximize differences” between the group with which they identify (“ingroup”) and members of

“psychologically relevant opposition groups” (Green 2002; Brewer 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987; Tajfel 1978). In essence, social identities reflect the point at which “I becomes we” (Brewer 1991:476, emphasis in original). Furthermore, these theories posit that self-conceptions expand and contract “across different levels of social identity” and are dependent upon “the frame of reference for differentiation and social comparison,” i.e., the other social groups to which we compare and differentiate ourselves (Brewer 1991:476; Turner, et al. 1987; Tajfel 1978). These comparisons are viewed to entail “a shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987:50; quoted in Brewer 1991:476). While critical theories have demonstrated that prototypical images of socially constructed categories often do not match the lived experiences of those who exist at the intersection of these social constructions (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008), and that existing definitions of identity are imprecise (Mael and Tetrick 1992), most political and social-psychological studies have conceptualized social identities in this way, i.e., as oppositional and in many cases mutually exclusive (Jackson and Smith 1999).

Such ambiguous conceptualizations and a focus on distinctiveness have also led many scholars (as with LGBT political studies) to “misattribute” social and political phenomena to social identity differences – what Shields (2008:304) refers to as the fallacy of “difference-as-explanation.” (See also Richards 2002). Helms, Jernigan, and Mascher (2005:32), for example, refer to how “easily” quantifiable characteristics such as race are – especially when measured in “combination” with “imprecise definition[s] of racial categories” – and suggest that such measurements often result in the researcher contributing “more meaning to racial categories than is merited” (quoted in Shields 2008:304). Sellers, et al. (1998:25) and Cross (1991) similarly contend that “ascribing” identity characteristics – such as behavioral or attitudinal outcomes –

based solely on racial categorization “do[es] not fully incorporate the individual differences in the meaning and relevance of race in the lives of persons,” and suggest that researchers may “obtain inaccurate estimates of the relationship between identity and outcome” measures. Furthermore, Brewer (1993) and Deaux, et al. (1999:97) suggest that identity “categorization” alone omits relevant “affective and behavioral” components of “social identification.” These criticisms require that measurements of identity encompass categorization, intergroup relational comparisons, and self-evaluation.

Identities are a function of ingroup and outgroup comparisons as well as social interactions; and, the strength of attachment to an identity appears to be related to how well the identity “satisfies” certain “functions” such as raising one’s self esteem, allowing for social interaction, or fostering intragroup cooperation (Deaux, et al. 1999:106). Because identity construction requires relational comparisons, group membership alone is insufficient to measure the effect of social identities. Measuring identity, then, requires the adoption of more robust indicators of group belonging (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, and Cook 1989; Mael and Tetrick 1992; Duckitt, Callaghan, and Wagner 2005). A review of the social science literature reveals that measures of “Linked fate” (Dawson 1994; Simien 2005), experience with stigmatization and internalization (Goffman 1963; Kelman 1961; Gaventa 1980; Major and O’Brien 2005), group associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992), and social networks (Knoke 1990; Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 2012), along with situational and contextual measures fit the criteria specified for robust identity measurement. I will discuss the effects of stigmatization and social networks separately, however, I turn now to a discussion of ‘linked fate’ and group association.

Group Association & 'Linked Fate'

Social and political psychologists have struggled to completely define and measure group identification. Indeed, Bedolla (2007) readily admits it may be impossible to know exactly what a person's identity is. Identification, broadly conceptualized, refers to "the tendency of individuals to perceive themselves and their groups or organizations as intertwined, sharing common qualities and faults, successes and failures, and common destinies" (Mael and Tetrick 1992:813), and is one of the most widely used indicators in social science. One measure of identification, "identification with a psychological group," is perhaps the most commonly adopted indicator for identification as it involves "the perception of shared prototypical characteristics, virtues, and flaws" (Mael and Tetrick 1992:813). As the critique offered previously suggests, however, the concept is often measured with categorical (sometimes dichotomous), mutually-exclusive indicators because researchers typically focus on "the cognitive perception of oneness with the group" (Mael and Tetrick 1992:813). In fact, identity and its behavioral and attitudinal effects are much more complex than mere self-selection into a group.

Identity, like attitude, is composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Cognitive components refer to "an individual's beliefs about" the identity; "the affective component consists of feelings, moods, and emotions experienced in relation to" the identity; while "the behavioral component reflects a person's actions toward" the identity (Greene 2002:178; Eagly and Chaiken 1995). As part of the affective component of identity, scholars, especially in the intersectional vein, have introduced the concept of linked fate – or "a feeling of closeness to others who identify with the group label and the acceptance of the belief that individual life chances are inextricably tied to the group as a whole" (Simien 2005:529; Dawson

1994; Gay and Tate 1998). Often used in studies of racial and sexual identity (Simien 2005; Cohen 1999; Simon, Sturmer, Lowey, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 1998), linked fate is an important concept in identity measurement because it allows researchers to measure “the relative degree of attachment an individual has to particular group identifications” (Bedolla 2007). The concept also “shows how meaningful certain attachments are relative to others the individual may have, helping scholars understand the interrelation among identities” (Bedolla 2007). The measurement of identity in this study, which is operationalized in detail below, is different from previous sexual minority political research because single categorical indicators are abandoned in favor of additive indices which provide more detail and nuance to the effects of identity and its interaction across categories of difference.

Identity Measurement: So What?

I have provided a theoretical justification for measuring identity as a composite of cognitive, affective, and behavioral indicators and demonstrated how these indicators offer more robust insight into identity effects. It should also be noted, however, that the effects of identity measurement do not solely exist in theory. In what follows, I also offer a practical justification of my identity measurement methodology and suggest that political research which relies on categorical measurement of identity without providing adequate justification risks serious political consequences for LGBT people and people at the intersection of multiple social minority identities.

As noted in Chapter 1, an overlooked element of this intersectional research is what Crenshaw (1991) refers to as “political intersectionality,” or the idea that “those who occupy multiple subordinate identities may find themselves caught between the sometimes conflicting

agendas of two political constituencies to which they belong, or are overlooked by these movements entirely” (Cole 2008:444). Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach (2008:381) have termed this phenomenon “intersectional invisibility” and describe it as “the general failure to fully recognize people with intersecting identities as members of their constituent groups;” and, “the distortion of the intersectional persons’ characteristics in order to fit them into frameworks defined by prototypes of constituent identity groups.” They suggest as Crenshaw (1991) that the effect of such a system of marginalization is “political invisibility,” or the “neglect by allegedly inclusive advocacy groups of the issues that predominately affect people with intersecting subordinate identities” (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008:385). Strolovitch (2007) observes such a pattern in an examination of interest group activity, finding “advocacy groups often wind up devoting proportionally less attention and resources to constituents with multiple subordinate identities than they do to their more prototypical constituents who have only a single subordinate identity” (also quoted in Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008:385).

Aside from issues of descriptive and substantive representation, failing to adequately report the effects of intersectional identity categories may also seriously effect minority political participation and empowerment. Swank and Fahs (2013a), for example suggest that among LGBT political activists, those who experience discrimination across multiple axes of oppression – in this case lesbian women of color – are “much less inclined to engage in” political activity. Similar results are observed for political attitudes as multiple minority gays and lesbians appear less likely to hold dissonant attitudes – even toward policies which have the potential to reinforce minority oppression (Cravens *unpublished manuscript*).

Stigmatization

The term stigma refers to “the culturally shared knowledge that society regards the members of a particular group or category negatively and accords them inferior status in their social interactions with the nonstigmatized” (Herek 2010:693). Stigmatization is “an undesired differentness,” according to Herek (2010), which is socially constructed and, as such, mutable as societal “mores” change. Stigmatization exists across all aspects of American society (Goffman 1963), and is often expressed in the form of negative treatment or discrimination (Major and O’Brien 2005). Stigmatization often fuels “negative evaluations and stereotypes” which are “widely shared and well known among members of a culture” (Major and O’Brien 2005:395; Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998; Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller and Scott 1984). Furthermore, stigmatization is directly related to the structures of power within a society. Herek (2010) asserts that “stigma-based differentials in power and status are legitimated and perpetuated by society’s institutions and ideological systems in the form of structural stigma which is ‘formed by sociopolitical forces and represents the policies of private and government institutions that restrict the opportunities of stigmatized groups’” (Link and Phelan 2001, quoted in Herek 2010:693). In effect, a group or groups of ‘others’ – those who do not share the dominant characteristic(s) of society – are subjugated, valued less by society, made invisible and erased from societal discourse, asymmetrically benefit from societal advancements, and necessarily experience life within a society differently than the dominant group. Such disparities in lived experience have profound effects including negative mental and physical health outcomes and negative economic effects (Williams, Yu, and Jackson 1997). For political scientists, it is expected “the more stigmatized groups accept their lower status, the less likely

they are to challenge the structural [and political] barriers they face” (Bedolla 2007). Empirical examination reveals, however, that among LGBT people, specifically, stigmatization acts as a motivating factor for political participation (Swank and Fahs 2013a). I turn now to an examination of stigmatization, focusing on two types, specifically: sexual stigma and intersectional stigma.

Sexual Stigma

Sexual stigma refers to “the stigma attached to any nonheterosexual¹⁰ behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (Herek 2010:693). Like other forms of stigma, sexual stigma is related to the structures of power within a society. In the United States, society is structured around a system of power (nominally known as heterosexism or heterocentrism) which defines “heterosexuality as the normative standard of human sexuality” while stigmatizing – through “ostracism, discrimination, harassment, and violence” (Herek 2010) – sexual minorities (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008; Herek 2007; Hegarty, Pratto, and Lemieux 2004; Harper and Schneider 2003). Sources of stigmatization for sexual minorities include “HIV/AIDS-related biases” (Worthen 2013; Wright, Mulick, and Kincaid 2007; Miller 2001) and religiously-based biases (Worthen 2013; Hinrichs and Rosenberg 2002; Selzer 1992), although sexual stigma may also originate within sexual minority communities. For example, gays and lesbians may hold negative stereotypical views of each other (Gordon 2006), while also holding negative stereotypical views of bisexuals (Ochs 1996; Rust 1996;1995).

¹⁰ Again, sexual stigma is used here to denote the stigmatization of non-heterosexuals. Transgender, transsexual and gender-nonconforming people also face strong structural barriers in the form of ‘androcentrism’ and transphobia (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Stigmatization of transgender people is often violent and gender-based stereotypes often fuel such biases (See Norton and Herek 2013 and Lombardi 2009).

Research suggests that among sexual minorities, sexual stigma – especially if internalized – effects physical and mental health outcomes and is often correlated with increased stress, drug and tobacco use, risky sexual behavior including HIV/AIDS exposure, as well as homelessness, especially among sexual minority youth, and unemployment (Herek and Garnets 2007; Meyer 2003; Diaz, Ayala, and Bein 2004; Diaz 1998). These factors are also often exacerbated by multiple minority identities – as will be discussed below.

Politically, empirical research indicates that sexual stigma alone does not negatively affect participation or activism. To the contrary and, as Swank and Fahs (2013b:1390) note, to the consternation of “homophobic bullies,” stigmatization in the form of hate crime attacks appears to “generate resilient gays and lesbians who are more resolved in their political efforts” rather than “intimidate them into submission.” This is not an uncommon finding. Among racial minorities, “feelings of power deprivation” and “the belief that inequities in the social system are responsible for a group’s disadvantaged status in society” are two key components which motivate political action (Lien 1994; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981). Furthermore, studies of resilience suggest that certain “innate” traits as well as psychological therapies can assist transgender people and gender minorities in avoiding negative psychological outcomes associated with “negative experiences and/or challenging environments,” although this research has not been extended explicitly to include effects on political participation or attitudes (Singh 2013:692; Sevelius 2013; Singh and McKleroy 2011).

This is certainly not to say, however, that all sexual minority political experiences are monolithic. The political effects of sexual stigma against bisexuals, for example, often results in a lack of association with gay and lesbian community and interest groups. As Rust (1995) suggests, bisexuality is considered “bad politics” among many gays and lesbians (quoted in

Worthen 2013; see also Burleson 2005; Ault 1996). Bisexual people are perceived as “less committed to the community,” because they can often ‘pass’ as straight (Ochs 1996:224). Biphobia, “erotophobia, and sexism” among heterosexual society stereotypes bisexuals as promiscuous and conduits for HIV/AIDS (Hutchins 1996:251; Ochs 1996), while stigma from gays and lesbians often results in bisexuals being excluded from sexual minority political associations and policy initiatives. The result is that bisexuals are less likely to politicize their sexuality, hold liberal political attitudes, or engage in political activity (Egan 2012; Lewis, Rogers, and Sherrill 2011).

Intersectional Stigma

Like identity, stigmatization does not exist in a vacuum. That is, sexual minorities may not experience stigmatization based solely on a single social identity. Stigma may be experienced based on sexuality, race, gender, ability, class, etc. Like identity it is difficult to quantify so many experiences without introducing too much complexity into both theoretical and statistical models undertaken here (Young 2004; Warner 2008). Furthermore, some research suggests that it is difficult for multiple minorities to determine the exact source of stigmatization when it is expressed across multiple axes of discrimination (Meyer 2008) while others suggest that sexual minorities experience – especially – heterosexist stigma similarly regardless of race (Moradi, Wiseman, DeBlaere, Goodman, Sarkees, Brewster, and Huang 2010¹¹). Intersectional scholars hypothesize (Bedolla 2007) and research suggests (Swank and Fahs 2013a; Parks, Hughes, and Matthews 2004), however, that sexual minorities do experience stigmatization across multiple

¹¹ This study admittedly suffers methodologically as the conclusions are based on a study of only 178 lesbians, gays, and bisexuals – only half of which were dichotomously characterized as ‘racial minorities.’

axes of identity simultaneously and this stigmatization has important effects on sexual minority politics.

Diaz, et al. (2004), for example, observed stigmatization in the form of “rude mistreatment and physical abuse” based on both ethnicity and sexuality among a probability sample of gay Latinos in the United States. The researchers determined that these forms of discrimination are linked to mental distress, risky sexual behavior, homelessness, and poverty among gay Latinos (See also, Sandofrt, Melendez, and Diaz 2007; Diaz 1998).

Similar patterns exist among Native Americans. Balsam, Huang, Fieland, Simoni, and Walters (2004:289) observed lesbian, gay, bisexual, and “two-spirit” Native Americans are more than “2.5 times” more likely than whites to experience “violent victimization,” with more than 70% of attacks “perpetuated by assailants of another race” – a statistic, they note, which is “a significantly higher rate than that reported by European Americans or African Americans.” This appears to contribute to the finding that Native American sexual minorities are more likely than their heterosexual peers to experience negative physical and mental health outcomes. The researchers recommend that future health intervention strategies take into consideration the effects of “multiple minority” status on Native American sexual minorities.

Like other racial minorities, the literature on Black experiences suggest that stigmatization can originate from within white communities, within sexual minority communities, as well as from within the black community (See: Chan 1989; Morales 1989; Thumma 1991; Garcia 1998; Moore 2011).

Often, stigmatization of Black sexual minorities within Black communities takes the form of heterosexism, or sexual stigma, and, for Black gay men, is fueled by heterosexist conceptions of masculinity (Bowleg 2013; Bowleg, et al. 2011; Wilson and Miller 2002; Levant, Majors, and

Kelley 1998). Across six focus groups consisting of Black heterosexual men, Bowleg, et al. (2011:550), for example, noted a common theme among respondents, that “Black men who have sex with men are not real men.” Wilson and Miller (2002) also note the difficulty among Black gay men of “managing” the racism experienced in gay communities and the heterosexism experienced in Black communities.

Among the gay community, Wilson, Valera, Ventuneac, Balan, Rowe, and Carballo-Diequez (2009) and Malebranche, Peterson, Fullilove, and Stackhouse (2004) observe white gay males racially and sexually stereotype black gay males, choosing partners based on racially-motivated assumptions, for example. Icard (1986) and Loiacano (1989) note racism against Black sexual minorities in employment, advertisements, admittance to bars and clubs, even in “standards of beauty set forth by the gay male community” (Loiacano 1989:21).

The Contested Effects of Stigma

That stigmatization is experienced across multiple identities simultaneously is rarely disputed in the literature. It is important to note, however, that alternative theories of the experience and effect of stigmatization exist. For example, Veenstra (2013:648) tests the “subordinate male target hypothesis” which asserts that “people with multiple subordinate-group identities regularly experience less discrimination than people with a single subordinate-group identity.” This argument is somewhat antithetical to intersectional conceptions of identity, power, and discrimination, and focuses on an androcentrist view of the concept. That is, the heart of the theory is “intra-male competition,” or the idea that

“oppression experienced by the men of subordinate groups – primarily at the hands of men of dominant groups – is greater than that experienced by women of the same subordinate groups because the men of subordinate groups tend to bear the brunt of the discrimination targeted at their groups” (Veenstra 2013:648).

It is the compounding and internalization of stigmatization, however, that contributes to behavioral and attitudinal variation among sexual minorities. While avoiding the ‘oppression Olympics’ and additive approaches to analysis (Walby, et al. 2012), this study measures stigmatization across two aspects of social identity – race & ethnicity and sexuality.

Swank and Fahs (2013a) suggest that sexual stigma, alone, motivates political participation and a desire to challenge existing societal power structures which perpetuate inequality. Similarly, racism, alone, appears to motivate political participation among racial minorities (Lien 1994; Miller, et al. 1981). Intersectional stigmatization, however, can be experienced simultaneously across multiple aspects of identity. Bedolla (2007:242), for example, asserts, that those who experience sexual stigma in combination with racism, for example, may be more likely to “accept their lower status,” and “less likely...to challenge the structural barriers they face.” In this vein, Swank and Fahs (2013a) examined political participation among a sample of sexual minority activists and found that among lesbian women racial identity is significantly associated with less political participation. Specifically, they observed that “lesbians of color were significantly less likely to join gay and lesbian protests than White lesbians” (Swank and Fahs 2013a:666). Although this finding was not consistent across all measures of political activity it offers evidence to support the intersectional perspective that multiply marginalized people are less likely to “challenge” barriers to political participation (Bedolla 2007).

Social Networks

Social identity and self-categorization theories assert that social identities represent an attempt to “maximize differences” between groups in society (Green 2002; Brewer 1991; Turner, et al. 1987; Tajfel 1978). That is, social identity entails relational comparisons between groups

by which individuals pursue “optimal distinctiveness,” or the “need for differentiation of the self from others and inclusion of the self into larger social collectives” (Brewer 1993:3, quoted in Deaux, et al. 1999:98). This “bonding” often seeks to “reinforce exclusive identity” labels and preserve group “homogene[ity]” (Putnam 2000:22). Conversely, “bridging” social networks (Putnam 2000:22) are those “networks of people” which bring together individuals with “different opinions and backgrounds” (Quintelier 2012:868). Based on these ties, social organizations such as – community groups, ethnic or fraternal groups, religious groups, etc. – are formed which, in line with political resource theory – provide “practical opportunities to acquire democratic norms, skills, and experiences which can then be translated into political action in the form of increased political participation (Knoke 1990:1041; Brady, Verba, and Scholzman 1995). Recent research suggests, however, that the structure of social networks – i.e., whether exclusionary (bonding) or inclusionary (bridging) is an important determinant of individual political attitudes and behaviors (Quintelier, et al. 2012; Mutz 2002a; 2002b).

One important aspect of identity is relationality. That is, as Deaux, et al. (1999:106) note, the strength of attachment to an identity category is, in part, the product of relational comparisons, but is also related to how an identity allows for social interaction. McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) suggest that individuals associate with those whom they perceive to be like them. This “homophily” in social networks is also observed by Knoke (1990:1043) who suggests that Americans “tend to conform to the political coloration of their intimates.” Diversity in social relationships, however, appear to have different effects on political attitudes and behaviors. Using national survey data and experimental procedures, Mutz (2002a), for example finds that “cross-cutting” social networks – or those social interactions and relationships which expose individuals to “conflicting political viewpoints,” in fact, are associated with

political tolerance, i.e., “greater awareness of rationales for oppositional viewpoints” as well as a willingness to protect the civil rights of others in society.

Studies of political participation, however, suggest somewhat conflicted results regarding the effect of bridging social networks. Mutz (2002b), in an analysis of two nationally representative surveys, finds that “cross-pressures,” or political disagreement within a social network, is related to political ambivalence and decreased political participation as group members attempt to maintain “harmony of social relationships” by avoiding controversial political behaviors including voting for president. Conversely, Quintelier, et al. (2012), in an examination of social network change over time among Belgian youth, finds that political diversity is more common than racial, ethnic, or religious diversity among young people; and, that these politically diverse social networks are related to increased political participation. This study, however, excludes voting as a form of participation, which suggests that individual methods of participation are influenced differently by social network diversity.

Socio-Historical Context

Because of the ambiguous nature of identity (Jackson and Smith 1999), researchers studying identity-related phenomena often focus on the relational and affective aspects of identity, i.e., what individuals “believe others think about them” (Bedolla 2007:239; Greene 2002). Another aspect of identity, however is “the relative social, political and economic standing that entails because of the group(s)” with which an individual identifies (Bedolla 2007:239; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). The former – what individuals believe others think about them – is encompassed by my conceptualization of identity as previously described. The latter, however, refers to what Bedolla (2007) recognizes as “socio-historical context.” Bedolla (2007:243) argues that “individuals are embedded within social and historical contexts which

affect their experiences and resulting world view.” The various “aspects of this context,” therefore, “need to be taken into consideration” by researchers when “questions of inequality and political incorporation are dealt with” (Bedolla 2007:244).

As Deaux (1993:9) notes, role theory in social-psychology has long “emphasized the importance” of the “when and where of identity.” In this view, identities are conceptualized “in terms of relationships with others and a structural setting in which those relationships were carried out” (Deaux 1993:9) This view recognizes “that each identity has domains in which its influence is most likely to be evident” (Deaux 1993:9; McCall and Simmons 1978). In terms of politics, this means that “political socialization does not occur in isolation” (Bedolla 2007:245). Political orientations are influenced by social context – whether this is social networks (Knoke 1990) or cultural and economic backgrounds. This is similar to Proshansky, Fabian, and Kaminoff’s (1993) conception of “place identity” which Deaux (1993:9) describes as “a sense of self in a particular geographical or environmental context” (Proshansky 1978). In this view, identity development and management – along with subsequent political orientations – can be influenced by past and present social contexts (Ethier and Deaux 1990; 1994).

In intersectional terms, as previously mentioned, identity is structured by power relations. Racism, for example, structures the nature of racial minority identity vis-à-vis White privilege; sexism structures the nature of gender identity vis-à-vis male privilege; and, heterosexism structures the nature of sexual identity vis-à-vis heterosexual privilege. These structures and relationships define the social contexts within which social and political identities develop and are expressed. Specific social contexts are also related to certain demographic indicators. For example, African-Americans experience higher poverty rates, unemployment rates, incarceration rates, and mortality rates than do whites in the United States (Bolweg 2013; Murray, Kulkami,

Michaud, Tomijima, Bulzacchelli, Iandiorio, and Ezzati 2006). These structural inequalities are the result of historical racism, and the experiences, identities, and necessarily the political orientations of many African-Americans are affected by their relationship to these structures of power (Sue, Capodilupo and Holder 2008).

Similarly, women and gender minorities experience employment and wage discrimination – earning less, disproportionately achieving positions of power or even being hired – which appears rooted in male conceptions of power, authority, and domestic responsibility (Glick and Fiske 2001; Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Also, as previously noted, sexual minorities experience employment and housing discrimination, cultural opposition from many religious denominations, and until 2003 faced criminal sanction for same-sex sexual behavior in the United States, all enforced by structural homophobia that shapes the experiences and political identities of LGBT people. Similar processes appear at work for the differently-abled (Ethier and Deaux 1993; Jager and Bowman 2005) and transgender people (Singh and McKleroy 2011), among other social identity groups.

These processes define lived experiences, i.e., the individual socio-historical context. In turn, the economic, educational, geographic, and political choices available to both dominate and subordinate groups in society are structured by the context within which one exists. I am by no means advocating a determinist perspective. Instead, I suggest – as do many scholars of relational psychology and intersectionality – that social identities are variable, i.e., not stable and fixed; and, that “social processes such as social interaction, context, and social-structural factors inform and create social identities” (Bowleg 2013). Income, unemployment, religion, place of birth, place of residency, whether or not one owns a home, parental acceptance, and others are examples of contextual indicators which influence identity development and politics – and often

vary when viewed longitudinally. Egan (2012), for example, finds a relationship between contextual influences such as parental birth location, i.e., being born and raised in the United States, urban residency, the number of siblings in a household, and identification as a sexual minority among a sample of lesbian, gay, and bisexual survey respondents. Furthermore, Egan (2012) speculates that these contextual characteristics influence identity development and subsequent political orientation among sexual minorities (See also Gray 2009).

Socio-historical context, then, represents a web of past and future structural advantages and limitations available to individuals based on the various social identities they occupy that influence political socialization and shape perceptions about and the ability to participate in the political process as well as cognitive and affective assessments of policy and politicians.

Survey Research Design

Having detailed the theoretical model adopted in this study I now turn to a discussion of the sample survey research design. According to Salant and Dillman (1994:4), the purpose of a sample survey “is to obtain information from a few respondents in order to describe the characteristics of hundreds, thousands, or even millions” of people in a given population. The survey results presented in later chapters are based on data collected from 1,216 sexual minority-identified adults living in the United States. The sample was acquired from the survey research firm Qualtrics, while the number of respondents was chosen in order to both maximize the amount of identity variation within the sample, as well as to minimize the confidence level of the survey at $\pm 3\%$ (Salant and Dillman 1994). The survey instrument is self-administered via a web-based platform and consists primarily of fourteen multi-item batteries. As previous studies have

shown (Koch and Emery 2001; Swank and Fahs 2013b:1386) web-based or online surveys are often “the best option when studying gay and lesbian populations.” To ensure that survey participants are eligible – i.e., over the age of 18 and identify as a sexual minority – a series of screening questions are employed. Relevant statistics for completion rates, times, and general demographics will be presented in Chapter 3. For a complete list of survey questions and response sets see Appendix A.

Moving beyond comparisons with heterosexuals, I conduct an examination of intragroup differences among sexual minorities, specifically, an examination of the effects of cross-cutting identity influences on political attitudes and behaviors. Independent variables are constructed from survey responses measuring cognitive and affective aspects of sexual and racial identity as well as gender identity, religious, and class associations, social group demographics and personal experience with discrimination (The SMART Team 2009, The GenIUSS Group 2014). Four batteries of questions measure political attitudes and two batteries of questions measure political behavior and are operationalized as dependent variables to be included in multiple regression analyses (Aiken and West 1991).

I advance the study and understanding of sexual minority communities by elucidating the processes which effect multiple-minority political attitudes and efficacy. Furthermore, I specifically advance the study of sexual minority political attitudes by expanding the scope of the issues under investigation beyond those with direct bearing on LGBT interests (e.g., same-sex marriage or anti-discrimination protections).

In the following sections I describe the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables used in the proceeding analyses as well as specific hypotheses related to each independent variable.

Dependent Variables

In accordance with my research goal – to analyze and explain political attitudinal and behavioral variation within sexual and gender minority communities in the United States – eight dependent variables are operationalized from a battery of questions measuring six distinct political attitudes and two aspects of political behavior. In the following sections I discuss each in turn.

Political Attitudes: Role of Government, Private Rights, Egalitarianism, and Policy-Specific Indicators

Attitudes, while not explicitly defined in the psychological literature, are often considered to be “sets of beliefs ‘whose referents have shared general societal relevance to many people in religious, economic, political, educational, ethnic, and other social areas’” (Kerlinger 1972:614 cited in Saucier 2000:366) and are often considered evaluative in nature. That is, attitudes are often defined as a “like or dislike” of some ‘object’ (Saucier 2000:366). Consequently, “social attitudes constitute in part the lines along which one finds individual differences in ideology within a society” (Saucier 2000:367). In this study, I will measure participants’ evaluation of the role of government (Markus 1990; Feldman 1993), private rights (Woodmansee and Cook 1967; Woodmansee and Cook 1976; Biernat and Crandall 1993), egalitarianism (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Feldman 1993), and three specific policies: gun control, immigration, and abortion (Comrey and Newmeyer 1965). Each attitude is coded to represent a liberal-conservative continuum and will be discussed in detail.

Role of Government

Attitudes toward the role of government are measured using three questions from the limited government subscale of the American National Election Studies Individualism Scales

(Markus 1990). This subscale is similar to the Comrey and Newmeyer (1965) welfare scale and measures attitudes toward “social welfare issue positions” (Feldman 1993:175). Survey participants are presented with three statements such as “The government should try to ensure that all Americans have such things as jobs, health care, and housing” and asked to rate their agreement with each using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ (See Appendix A, Q1a-c for original survey questions and response sets). Responses will be reverse coded where necessary to create liberal-conservative indicators where low scores represent liberal attitudes and high scores represent conservative attitudes. For *role of government*, the scale values will range from 3 – 15. Low scores represent the liberal attitude favoring expansive social welfare – or an expanded role for government in society – and high scores represent the conservative attitude favoring a limited role for government.

Private Rights

Private rights refer to individual rights under the law and are often viewed in the context of competition (Woodmansee and Cook 1967). The two-item measure used here is adapted from the private rights subscale of the Woodmansee and Cook (1967; 1976) Multifactor Racial Attitudes Inventory (MRAI). The scale was originally developed to measure attitudes related to the private rights of business owners to maintain racially segregated facilities. In this instance, I have adapted the scale to measure attitudes toward the private rights of business owners to refuse service or hire to LGBT people (See Appendix A, Q2a-b). Survey participants are presented with two statements (1) “There should be a strictly enforced law requiring businesses to serve persons regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity,” and (2) “Regardless of their own views, an employer should be required to hire workers without regard to sexual orientation or gender identity.” The *private rights* scale ranges from 2 – 10. Low scores represent the liberal attitude that private ownership

rights are outweighed by the rights of a minority group to equal treatment and high scores represent the conservative attitude favoring private rights.

Egalitarianism

Egalitarianism refers to individual beliefs about inequality, specifically, the “causes and consequences of income inequality” (Feldman 1993:169). The three-item measure used here is adapted from Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) egalitarianism scale and measures participants’ attitudes toward income inequality. Survey participants are presented with three statements such as “More equality of incomes would avoid conflicts between people at different income levels,” and, again, asked to rate their agreement with each on a five-point Likert scale (See Appendix A, Q3a-c). The *egalitarianism* scale ranges from 3 – 15. Low scores represent the liberal attitude that favors egalitarianism while high scores represent the conservative anti-egalitarian attitude.

Policy-Specific Indicators

Along with the social-psychological scales, three measures of policy-specific attitudes are included. Similar to the previous measures, survey participants are presented with a statement about *gun control* (i.e., Government should protect the rights of gun owners), *immigration* (i.e., Immigrants burden the country), and *abortion* (i.e., Favor no restrictions on abortion) (Comrey and Newmeyer 1965) and asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ (See Appendix A, Q4a-c). The measures were chosen because they represent issues which are facially ideologically divisive (i.e., clearly have liberal and conservative poles) and attitudes about them are traditionally viewed as motivated by a social identity. For these reasons, they provide an opportunity to observe the cross-cutting influences of identity on issues not directly related to dominant constructions of sexuality. Scores range from 1 – 5, and as with the previous measures, low scores indicate the liberal attitude (e.g., favors gun

control; believes immigrants pose no greater burden on society; opposes restrictions on abortion) while high scores indicate the conservative attitude (e.g., opposes gun control; believes immigrants burden society; and, favors restrictions on abortion).

Political Behavior: Participation & Political Alienation

Two aspects of political behavior are measured. First, actual political participation is measured using a scale adapted from the National Election Studies (ANES) model (Brady 1993). Survey participants are again presented with a series of statements indicating participation in primary/general election voting, persuading others to vote for a candidate, attending political events, donating money, or volunteering and asked to rate their involvement using a 4-point scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘often’ (See Appendix A, Q5a-f). Cronbach’s Alpha scores are computed to determine the scalability of the measures and are reported in Chapter 3. The *political participation* scale ranges from 6 – 24. Low scores indicate less participation in politics while high scores indicate more participation in traditional political activities.

Second, political alienation, defined as “powerlessness, self-estrangement, political ineffectiveness, and disorientation toward the political system” (Reef and Knoke 1993:433) is measured using a four-item scale adapted from Malik (1982). Survey respondents are presented with statements including, “Sometimes governmental and political affairs look so complex that I am unable to understand them;” “If government officials mistreat us we are unable to do anything against them;” and, “I think that other than voting there is no way whereby we can influence governmental decision-making,” and again, asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ (See Appendix A, Q6a-d). The *alienation* scale ranges from 4 – 20 with low scores indicating less alienation from the political process and

high scores indicating more alienation. Attitudinal and behavioral dependent variables are included in regression analyses with the independent variables detailed below.

Independent Variables

Independent variables are constructed from survey responses measuring social-psychological characteristics of sexual and gender identity, as well as gender identity, religious, and class associations (Mael and Tetrick 1992; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, and Chavous 1998; The SMART Team 2009, The GenIUSS Group 2014). Indicators are also constructed which measure social group demographics and personal experience with discrimination. In the following sections I will describe each in detail.

Identity Centrality, Public Regard, & Private Regard

Consistent with Green (2002) and others, identity is operationalized as a function of both cognitive and affective indicators measuring ‘public’ and ‘private’ perceptions of group membership and ‘linked fate.’ Based on the Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity (MMRI) (Sellers et al. 1998) and the Identification with a Psychological Group or Organization (IPGD) scale (Mael and Tetrick 1992), survey participants are asked a series of questions about two primary social identities, their sexual identity and their racial identity (Sellers et al. 1998). Survey participants I ask to identify their sexuality (See Appendix A, Q7) then, following Sellers et al. (1998), I present participants with a battery of questions which measure identity centrality, private regard and public regard, which I describe in turn below.

Identity centrality is defined as the “extent to which a person normatively defines himself or herself with regard” to their sexual identity (Sellers et al. 1998:25). To measure *sexual identity*

centrality (SI centrality), participants are presented with a series of eight statements¹² such as, “In general, being gay is an important part of my self-image;” “Being gay is not a major factor in my social relationships;” and “My destiny is tied to the destiny of other gays,” and asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ Responses are reverse coded where necessary. The *SI centrality* scale ranges from 8 – 40. Low scores indicate that sexuality is not central to respondents’ overall identity and that they share no ‘linked fate’ with other sexual minorities, while high scores indicate that sexuality is a central part of respondents’ overall identity and that they share ‘linked fate’ with other sexual minorities (Simien 2005) (See Appendix A, Q8a-i).

Private regard is defined as personal “feelings of positivity and negativity toward” one’s sexual identity (Sellers, et al 1998:25). To measure *sexual identity private regard (SI Private Regard)*, respondents are presented with a series of six statements such as, “I am happy about being gay,” and “I feel that the gay community has made valuable contributions to society,” and asked to rate their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ The *SI private regard* scale ranges from 6 – 30. Low scores indicate that respondents have negative affect toward their sexual identity while high scores indicate that respondents have positive feelings toward their sexual identity (See Appendix A, Q9a-f).

Similarly, public regard is defined as “the extent to which individuals feel that others view” their sexual identity as positive or negative (Sellers et al. 1998:26). To measure *sexual identity public regard (SI Public Regard)*, respondents are asked to rate their agreement on a five-point

¹² To ensure internal reliability and external validity, survey participants who identify as lesbian are presented with the same series of statements which substitute ‘lesbian’ for ‘gay.’ Similarly, participants who identify as ‘bisexual’ are presented with the same statements about bisexuality. This methodology is repeated for identity centrality, public regard, and private regard as well as in question wording regarding stigmatization.

Likert scale with a series of six statements such as, “Overall, gays are considered good by others,” and “Gays are not respected by the broader society.” The *SI public regard* scale ranges from 6 – 30. Low scores indicate that respondents believe society devalues their sexual identity while high scores indicate respondents’ belief that society values their sexual identity (See Appendix A, Q10a-f).

Participants are also asked to identify their racial identity (See Appendix A, Q13). Afterward, participants are presented with a battery of questions measuring racial identity centrality, public and private regard (See Appendix A, Q14a-i; Q15a-f; Q16a-f). Following the same procedures as the operationalization of the sexual identity independent variables, three additional identity independent variables will be operationalized from these measures: *Racial Identity Centrality (RI Centrality)*, *Racial Identity Private Regard (RI Private Regard)*, and *Racial Identity Public Regard (RI Public Regard)*. Rather than simply interacting dichotomous terms (Landrine, Klonoff, Alcaraz, Scott, and Wilkins 1995) these measures allow for comparisons of social-psychological characteristics across identity categories.

While current theory suggests multiple minority status (i.e., identifying with multiple minority social identities) is related to depressed political participation, political alienation, and moderation in political attitudes (Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 2013), I propose that identity centrality and public/private regard have differential effects on political participation, alienation, and attitudes – also, that these identity variables have distinct effects from experiences with discrimination which will be described in detail later. Most survey research relies on categorical indicators (e.g., dichotomous identity categories) to ascribe behavioral and attitudinal characteristics. However, current research suggests that attributing attitudinal and behavioral differences to such categories may, in fact, be a “misattribution” (Shields 2008; Richards 2002:

Helms, Jernigan, and Mascher 2005). To test how the different aspects of identity interact to effect political attitudes and behaviors I propose several hypotheses which follow.

H1: Sexual identity centrality and racial identity centrality are negatively associated with political alienation, positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism.

Because, identity centrality asymmetrically influences political attitudes about issues related to specific categories of minority rights. That is, variation in identity centrality will reflect liberal attitudes toward policies specifically related to those aspects of one's identity. Therefore, I hypothesize:

H1a: Sexual identity centrality is positively associated with LGBT policy liberalism.

H1b: Among racial minorities, racial identity centrality is positively associated with "role of government" policy liberalism.

Lastly, because "white respondents are hard-pressed to define whiteness and the privileges it brings to those who own it," yet whiteness becomes "much more definable when the privilege it accords its owners is lost" (Hurtado and Stewart 1997:299), I hypothesize:

H1c: Among white respondents, racial identity centrality is negatively associated with immigration policy liberalism.

While current theory suggests that multiple minority status (i.e., identifying with multiple minority social identities) is related to depressed political participation, political alienation, and moderation in political attitudes, I hypothesize the following:

H2: Sexual identity private regard and racial identity private regard are negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;

Hypothesis 2b expresses how private regard interacts across categories of identity to effect political alienation, participation, and attitudes and are indicative of interaction terms in statistical models.

I hypothesize:

H2a: Sexual identity private regard is negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;

H2b: Among racial minorities, both racial identity private regard and sexual identity private regard are negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;

Finally, as one's perception about society's value of a social identity is related to political participation (Sellers, et al 1998), I hypothesize:

H3: Sexual identity public regard and racial identity public regard are negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism.

Again, Hypothesis 3b expresses how public regard interacts across categories of identity to effect political alienation and are indicative of interaction terms in statistical models.

H3a: Sexual identity public regard is negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;

H3b: Among racial minorities, both racial and sexual identity public regard are negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism.

Social Networks

Social networks shape political attitudes and behaviors (Knoke 1990), and recent research suggests that social network diversity increases political participation (Quintelier, Stolle, and Harel 2012). I measure social networks as per Quinteller, et al. (2012), by asking respondents to identify,

on a scale from 0 – 6, where 0 means none and 6 means all, how many of their close friends share their sexual orientation, their gender, their race, their religion (or are religious if they are not), and their political party (See Appendix A, Q18a-e). After determining the scalability of the indicators (using Cronbach’s Alpha), a scale is constructed which measures social network heterogeneity. Thus, Social network scale ranges from 0 – 30, and is reverse coded so that low scores indicate social network homogeneity while high scores indicate social network heterogeneity. Because urban areas present more opportunities for diverse social interaction, I include a dummy variable called *urban* in multiple regression estimates. The variable is a dichotomous indicator operationalized from a survey question measuring urbanity of residence. Categories ranging from 1 – 4, where 1 = rural; 2 = small city (more than 50,000 people); 3 = medium city (more than 100,000 people); and 4 = large city (more than 500,000 people) (See Appendix A, Q24) are collapsed and, urban takes on a value of ‘0’ for rural/small city and a value of ‘1’ for medium city/large city. I hypothesize:

H4: Heterogeneity of social networks is negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism.

Stigmatization

Determining the effects of stigmatization has been an integral component of intersectional analyses (Landrine et al. 1995). Stigmatization is defined as a threat to personal identity, and is commonly measured using indicators of “negative treatment or direct discrimination” (Major and O’Brien 2005:396). Along with influencing physical and mental health outcomes (Williams, Yu, Jackson, and Anderson 1997) and sexual behaviors (Diaz 1998), stigmatization is constructed around “systems of power relations” which also structure the “political choices” available to marginalized groups (Cohen 1997). While some stigmatization researchers compare health

outcomes related to discrimination between single subordinate-group and multiple subordinate-group identities (i.e., between people who identify with one minority group versus people who identify with multiple minority groups) (Babbitt 2013; Veenstra 2013; Moradi, Wiesman, DeBlaere, Goodman, Sparkes, Brewster, and Huang 2010; Parks, Hughes, and Matthews 2004), in the political context, the consensus in the literature suggests that stigmatization, especially across multiples axes of discrimination, negatively effects political participation (Swank and Fahs 2013; Bedolla 2007) and possibly influences reactionary ideologies. To test this assertion, similar to Williams, Yu, Jackson, and Anderson (1997), I operationalize sexual identity stigma as a scale (range 7 - 28) derived from a battery of questions which present respondents with seven statements describing acts of discrimination, such as “I have been subject to slurs or jokes,” or “have been treated unfairly by an employer” and ask respondents to indicate “whether or not any of the following have happened to you because you are or are perceived to be gay” (See Appendix A, Q12a-g). Similar to the identity independent variables, gender identity stigma and racial identity stigma scales are constructed from batteries which present respondents with the same seven statements, but insert their racial identity (Q17a-g).

Like identity, stigmatization may be experienced across multiple categories. That is, one may experience discrimination because of one’s sexuality, gender, or race – or all three at the same time (Collins 2000). Relative to the effects of discrimination on the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities I hypothesize that H6: high values on the SI and RI stigma scales are positively related to the political alienation scale, negatively related to the political participation scale, positively related to the egalitarianism, private rights, and role of government scales, and policy-specific variables. As with the identity hypotheses, hypothesis 5a expresses how

stigmatization interacts across categories of identity to effect political alienation and are indicative of interaction terms in statistical models.

H5: Sexual and racial identity stigma is positively associated with political alienation, and negatively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;

Context

Because “political socialization does not occur in isolation,” structural and historical characteristics that reflect experiences with systems of inequality are important influences on political attitudes and participation (Bedolla 2007:245). For this reason, I include economic and demographic indicators including employment, education, and income to measure respondents’ experience with structural and historical systems of inequality (See Appendix A, Q23, Q27, Q28). Consistent with public opinion and intersectional literature (Bedolla 2007) I hypothesize that homeownership, employment, education, and income are all negatively related to the political alienation scale, positively related to the political participation scale, negatively related to the egalitarianism, private rights, and role of government scales, and policy-specific variables. Specifically,

H6: Income is negatively associated with political alienation and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;

H7: Education is negatively associated with political alienation, and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism;

H8: Employment is negatively associated with political alienation and policy liberalism, and positively associated with political participation.

Finally, I include in my analysis a contextual variables measuring religious affiliation. Religion is measured by asking respondents to indicate their religious affiliation from a list of

including Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Jewish, and Atheist (Appendix A, Q20). If respondents indicate Christian, they are asked to identify a specific denomination (Appendix A, Q21). First, religion is operationalized as a dichotomous indicator where 0 = non-religious (i.e., indicated Atheist) and 1 = religious (i.e., indicated a religious affiliation); and, evangelical Christian is operationalized as a dichotomous indicator where 0 = non-evangelical Christian (i.e., indicated affiliation with Mainline Protestant denominations) and 1 = evangelical Christian (i.e., indicated affiliation with evangelical Christian denomination). Mainline and evangelical denominations are drawn from Melton's (1991) descriptions of denominational positions toward homosexuality. I hypothesize that

H9: Religiosity is positively associated with political participation, and negatively associated with political alienation and policy liberalism; and

H9a: Christianity is positively associated with political participation, and negatively associated with political alienation and policy liberalism.

In this chapter I detailed the theoretical model used to guide this study, explained the survey and research methodology and operationalization of variables, and presented eleven hypotheses associated with each of the independent variables. In the following chapter I present the results of the survey and regression analyses.

CHAPTER 3: IDENTITY MEASURES & SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

The central focus of this study is to better understand the effect of socially constructed identities, specifically at the intersection of sexuality and race, on political attitudes and behaviors. To achieve this goal, I conducted an internet-based survey using the methodology described in chapter 2 between November 4 and November 14, 2016 using a quota sample of LGBT-identified adults living in the United States. The sample frame of 1216 respondents was obtained from Qualtrics Panels with funds from a grant by the University of Tennessee. The survey instrument is a self-administered online questionnaire which presents respondents with approximately 93 questions, as previously described. With 1153 completed surveys, the completion rate is 94.8%. On average, it took survey participants approximately 15.9 minutes to complete the survey and internal quality checks (See Appendix A, Q8f and Q14f) confirm the reliability of the survey instrument.

In the following sections, I describe the survey data including demographics and key indicators constructed to test the hypotheses from Chapter 2. Aside from standard descriptive demographic information, I present an analysis of six additive indices measuring social-psychological identity indicators – racial and sexual identity centrality; racial and sexual identity private regard; and, racial and sexual identity public regard – described in Chapter 2. Finally, I present the results of statistical analyses and discuss evidence supportive of – and contradictory to – my hypotheses from the previous chapter.

Sample Demographics

Before proceeding to a discussion of regression modeling, it is important to first examine the demographics of the sample frame. The difficulty in obtaining a representative sample of LGBT survey respondents is widely documented (Rollins and Hirsch 2003). As previous research has shown (Koch and Emery 2001; Swank and Fahs 2013b:1386), web-based or online surveys are often “the best option when studying gay and lesbian populations” because they allow for the collection of data from a stigmatized population in a fashion which limits social desirability bias. Due to funding constraints, previously discussed in Chapter 1, this study is limited to the use of a quota sample of LGBT adults living in the United States. While not as accurate as a probability sample, quota sampling offers the best alternative given existing constraints.

In this study, demographics represent more than simple categorical indicators; although, I adopt an “intercategorical” approach to describe sample demographics in the following sections (McCall 2005). One of the major contributions of this study to the body of LGBT politics research is in the more nuanced understanding of sexual identity and its interaction with racial identity that comes with altering long-standing survey methodologies (Hancock 2007b; Simien 2007; Bedolla 2007; Emirbayer 1997). In the previous chapter, I describe scale measures of sexual and racial identity. While the social-psychological measures of identity used in this study are not innovations themselves, the use of multiple scale measures of identity among the same LGBT sample provides unique insight into the intersection of sexuality, race, and politics.

As discussed in Chapter 2, identity centrality is defined by Sellers, et al. (1998:25) as the “extent to which a person normatively defines himself or herself with regard” to a specific

identity. Centrality, as a concept, denotes the extent to which individuals experience or share a particular group affiliation. Similarly, private regard for one's identity refers to "feelings of positive or negative" affect toward an identity one inhabits (Sellers, et al. 1998:25); while, public regard for one's identity refers to cognitive perceptions of societal rejection or acceptance of one's identity. A total of six identity indices are operationalized from these concepts, using specific survey questions (See Appendix A, Q8a-i; Q9a-f; Q10a-f; Q13a-i; Q14a-f; and, Q15a-f). These indices – *Sexual (SI)* and *racial identity (RI) centrality*; *SI* and *RI private regard*; and, *SI* and *RI public regard* – are used as independent variables in multiple regression models described later in this chapter. In the following sections, I discuss these measures as they relate to sample demographics. I begin the discussion of demographics from Shield's (2008) "both/and" perspective; that is, recognizing categorical descriptors for the purpose of organization (Hancock 2007a), but also using them to "reveal the complexity of lived experience within social groups at neglected points of intersection" (McCall 2005:1773).

Sexual Identity

Figure 3.1 represents a graphic depiction of the distribution of categorical identity measures for self-reported sexual identity among survey participants. As the figure shows, a plurality of the sample (44.3 percent) identify as bisexual, while slightly smaller proportions (30.3 percent and 23.6 percent) identify as gay and lesbian, respectively. Of the small percentage (1.6 percent) of the sample who identify with a sexual identity other than lesbian, gay, or bisexual, the most common identities are 'pansexual,' 'asexual,' and 'queer.' This distribution is consistent with recent online survey research (Pew Research Center 2013); however, other samples from large urban areas report more self-identified 'queer' survey participants (Rollins and Hirsch 2003).

Along with standard categorical measures of sexual identity, the survey instrument – using a battery of twenty questions – also measures the relative strength with which individuals hold their sexual identity, or centrality; positive or negative feelings about one’s sexual identity, or private regard; and, perceived societal acceptance of sexual identity, or public regard (Sellers, et al. 1998) (See Appendix A, Q8a-i; Q9a-f; and Q10a-f).




Figure 3.1: Distribution of Sexual Identity

Appendix A, Q8a-i shows the distribution of responses for items which comprise the SI centrality scale. The distribution of every item is characterized by a negative skew. That is, a majority of survey participants either agree or strongly agree with each statement. For example, a majority of survey participants (57.1 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “my destiny is tied to the destiny of other [LGB/Sexual Minority] people” (see Appendix A, Q8c). The only exception to this pattern is item five (Q8e). On this item, the distribution of responses, while

displaying a slight negative skew, more closely approximates a normal curve, with the majority of responses clustered around the center of the distribution. Three items are reverse coded and, the eight items are operationalized as the *SI centrality* scale. As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range 8 – 40 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .797$). Low scores on the scale represent low sexual identity centrality, or the feeling that one's sexual identity is unimportant to one's sense of self; while, high scores on the scale represent high sexual identity centrality, or the feeling that one's sexual identity is important to one's sense of self.

Appendix A, Q9a-f shows the distribution of responses for items which comprise the *SI private regard* scale. Again, the distributions show a consistent negative skew as the majority of survey participants either agree or strongly agree with each statement. For example, more than three-quarters of participants (82.1 percent) either agree or strongly agree with the statement, “I feel good about being [LGB/Sexual Minority]” (see Appendix A, Q9a). There is one exception to this pattern. The distribution of item four (Q9d) exhibits a strong negative skew, as a majority of participants (77.5 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, “I often regret that I am [LGB/Sexual Minority].” One item is reverse coded and, the six items are operationalized as the *SI private regard* scale. As Appendix B shows, the values on the scale range from 6 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .816$). Low scores on the scale represent low sexual identity private regard, or a negative affective evaluation of one's sexual identity; while, high scores represent high sexual identity private regard, or a positive affective evaluation of one's sexual identity.

Finally, Appendix A, Q10a-f shows the distribution of responses for items which comprise the *SI public regard* scale. In this case, the distributions show greater variation. The distributions of items one (Q10a) and four (Q10d) are negatively skewed. While a plurality of

survey participants (42.2 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “[LGB/Sexual Minority] people are considered good by others,” a majority of participants (56 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “[LGB/Sexual Minority] people are not respected by the broader society.” Conversely, the distribution of item six (Q10f) shows a slightly positive skew, as a plurality of survey participants (40.6 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree that “society views [LGB/Sexual Minority] people as an asset.” Finally, the distributions of items three (Q10c) and five (Q10e) appear mesokurtic, with the majority of responses clustered around the center of the distributions. Two items are reverse coded and the six items are operationalized as the *SI public regard* scale. As Appendix B shows, the values on the scale range from 6 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .789$). Low scores on the scale represent low sexual identity public regard, or a negative evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s sexual identity; while, high scores represent high sexual identity public regard, or a positive evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s sexual identity.

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution and median scores on the RI centrality scale by sexual identity. As the figure shows, the highest median values on the sexual identity centrality scale (denoted by the lines within the black boxes) appear among the least represented group in the study, i.e., survey participants whose sexual identity is something other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Overall, median scores on the scale appear higher among gays, lesbians, and other sexual identities than bisexuals. That is, the relative strength of association with bisexual identity appears weaker than with gay, lesbian, or other sexual identities. An independent samples t-test using a dummy variable operationalized from a survey question measuring sexual identity (See Appendix A, Q7) appears to confirm this observation. The statistically significant t-value, $t(1157) = 7.47$, $p = .000$, shows that gay, lesbian, or another sexual identity ($N = 648$) is

associated with a higher score on the SI centrality scale, $M = 24.97$ ($SD = 6.20$) than bisexual identity ($N = 511$), $M = 22.2$ ($SD = 5.87$). (See Appendix B for descriptive statistics of variables used in statistical analyses).




Figure 3.2: Sexual Identity Centrality Distribution by Sexual Identity

A similar pattern holds for SI private regard (see Figure 3.3) and SI public regard (see Figure 3.4). As Figure 3.3 shows, gay survey participants appear to report the highest median scores on the SI private regard scale; whereas, as shown in Figure 3.4, median scores on the SI public regard scale appear only slightly higher among gays and lesbians than among bisexuals. The lowest median score on the SI public regard scale appears among those who report a sexual identity other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual. This is not surprising as sexual identities such as pansexual and asexual are rarely mentioned within the LGBTQ community and even less understood by society at-large.




Figure 3.3: Sexual Identity Private Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity

Statistically significant t-values, show that gay and lesbian identities (N = 648) are associated with higher scores on both the SI private regard, $M = 25.6(SD = 3.96)$, $t(1157) = 8.16$, $p = .000$, and SI public regard, $M = 17.9(SD = 4.35)$ scales, $t(1157) = 3.70$, $p = .000$, than bisexual identity (N = 511), $M = 23.7(SD = 4.00)$ and $M = 17.0(SD = 4.21)$, respectively. In short, bisexuals in this sample are significantly less likely to “normatively define” themselves with regard to their sexual identity (Sellers, et al. 1998), less likely to regard their sexual identity with positive affect, and more likely to perceive society as devaluing a bisexual identity than are gays and lesbians. Survey participants whose sexual identity is defined as something other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual, however, appear to be the most likely to view society as unaccepting of their sexual identity.




Figure 3.4: Sexual Identity Public Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity

Centrality, Private Regard and Public Regard: Interactions

While an understanding of each scale independently is important, it is also necessary to examine the relationship between them. Given the data, it is difficult to confidently establish causation; however, the statistical models discussed in future sections will benefit from a correlational analysis. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 are scatterplots which graphically depict the relationship between the SI centrality, private regard, and public regard scales.

There appears to be a moderately positive correlation ($r = .334$) between SI centrality and SI public regard. That is, increasing values on the SI centrality scale are associated with increasing private regard – or positive affective disposition toward one’s sexual identity.




Figure 3.5: Scatterplot, Sexual Identity Private Regard by Sexual Identity Centrality

The relationship between SI centrality and SI public regard, however, is slightly negative ($r = -.077$), although, as Figure 3.6 shows, the pattern is much more difficult to distinguish. It appears that increasing values on the SI centrality scale are associated a negative perception of societal acceptance of sexual minorities. Alternate modeling confirms these relationships across all categories of sexual identity in this study.

The direction of the correlations presented are intuitive. That is, an identity central to one's definition of self is likely to be looked upon positively by the individual holding the identity. While, at the same time, strongly associating with a sexual minority identity likely results in increased affiliation with other sexual minorities allowing for the transmission of shared political and social grievances (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Hartman 2006; Evans and Harriott 2004), thus, shaping a negative perception of societal acceptance. Although neither




Figure 3.6: Scatterplot, Sexual Identity Public Regard by Sexual Identity Centrality

of these scenarios are absolute, the implications for political behavior are, as H1, H2, and H3 in chapter 2 suggest, that an identity, or self-definition, which includes sexual identity as a strong cognitive and affective component will result in more political participation and policy liberalism among sexual minorities.

Sexual Identity Stigmatization

One possible explanation for the observed pattern between SI centrality, public and private regard, especially among bisexual survey participants, is experience with stigmatization. Appendix A, Q11a-g shows the distribution of responses for each item on the sexual identity stigmatization scale. Most of the distributions exhibit a positive skew, meaning a majority of survey participants indicate experience with discrimination rarely or never occurs. For example, the distribution of item one (Q11a) shows a pronounced positive skew, as a more than three-

quarters of participants (77.7 percent) indicate that they have rarely or never been “threatened or physically attacked” because of their sexual identity. Only two items exhibit distributions with a negative skew. First, a majority of survey participants (53.7 percent) indicate that they are sometimes or often “subject to slurs or jokes” because of their sexual identity (see Appendix A, Q11b). Similarly, a majority of participants (57.2 percent) indicate they are sometimes or often “offended by a religious group or official” because of their sexual identity (see Appendix A, Q11e). These six items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *SI stigmatization* scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 7 – 28 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .872$). Low scores on the scale represent less experience with sexual stigma; while, high scores represent more experience with sexual stigma.

While there are various sources of stigmatization, sexual stigma refers to “the stigma attached to any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community” (Herek 2010:6930). Sexual stigma can either originate within or be transmitted through sexual minority communities. In the latter case, group associations – including participation in LGBT organizations – allow for the transmission of shared grievances, such as perceived discrimination or stigmatization, even without all members directly experiencing abuse (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Hartman 2006; Evans and Harriott 2004). In the former case, bisexuals are often targeted for stigmatization by gays and lesbians because of their ability to ‘pass’ as heterosexual, and thus avoid sexual stigma from heterosexuals (Rust 1995; Ochs 1996). So called “identity threat” research (Sevelius 2013; Major and O’Brien 2005) suggests this often results in bisexuals feeling disconnected from the gay and lesbian community (Rust 1995). Politically, Egan (2012) and Lewis, et al. (2011) suggest bisexuals have a less politicized identity, i.e., their sexual identity is

less salient as a source of political attitudes or behavior than gays and lesbians. The findings presented so far support this assertion.

According to scholars such as Swank and Fahs (2013b), sexual stigmatization often results in identity salience which increases political participation, especially among gays and lesbians. While the latter assertion will be tested later, if this is the case, there should be a positive relationship between the SI stigma scale – operationalized from seven questions measuring experience with discrimination based on one’s sexual identity (See Appendix A, Q11a-g) – and the SI centrality scale. Figure 3.7 is a scatterplot graphically depicting this relationship. As the figure shows, there appears to be a moderate positive correlation ($r = .379$) between the two indicators suggesting that sexual stigmatization is associated with higher levels of identity centrality.




Figure 3.7: Scatterplot, Sexual Identity Centrality by Sexual Identity Stigma

But, are there any statistically significant differences in reports of sexual stigmatization between categories of sexual identity? Figure 3.8 plots the distribution and median scores of the SI stigma scale across the four categorical indicators of sexual identity. As the figure shows, participants whose sexual identity is something other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual appear to report the highest median scores on the SI stigma scale. Interestingly, it appears that bisexuals in this sample report the lowest levels of sexual stigma. Again, an independent sample t-test confirms this observation. The statistically significant t-value, $t(1153) = 3.66$, $p = .000$, shows that gay, lesbian, and other sexual identity ($N = 645$) is associated with a higher score, $M = 15.5$ ($SD = 5.23$), on the SI stigma scale than is bisexual identity ($N = 510$), $M = 13.3$ ($SD = 5.45$).




Figure 3.8: Sexual Identity Stigma Distribution by Sexual Identity

Because the survey instrument does not explicitly ask about stigmatization from other LGBTQ people, it is difficult to determine if sexual stigma from the LGBTQ community is a factor which contributes to low identity centrality among bisexual survey respondents. Given the correlational data between SI stigma and centrality and that reports of stigmatization are lower among bisexuals in this sample, the results support the assertions of scholars such as Swank and Fahs (2013b), Egan (2012), and Lewis, et al. (2011) that bisexuals exhibit a less politicized sexual identity than gays and lesbians which contributes to political conservatism and depressed political activity. This also supports H1, H2, and H3 in chapter 2 which, again, suggest an identity, or self-definition, which includes sexual identity as a strong cognitive and affective component will result in more political participation and policy liberalism among sexual minorities.

Gender & Sexual Identity

There are also important subtleties which can be better articulated by an examination of sexuality and gender identity. As Figure 3.9 shows, the sample is almost evenly split between survey participants who identify as female (49.2 percent) and male (47.1 percent), while a small percentage of the sample (roughly 3 percent) identify as transgender. Of the respondents who do not identify as either male, female, or transgender (about 0.7 percent) the most common identities are ‘gender fluid’ and ‘non-binary.’ Again, this distribution is roughly equivalent to other recent online surveys of LGBTQ adults in the United States (Pew Research Center 2013).

As Fassinger and Areseneau (2007) observe, social scientists often conflate gender and sexual identity under the broad ‘umbrella’ acronym LGBT. They, instead, suggest that transgender people “reveal the restrictive, proscriptive nature of socially constructed gender-role

ideologies” and the fallacy that “gender transgressions are indicative of same-sex sexual preferences” (Fassinger and Areseneau 2007:28,29).




Figure 3.9: Distribution of Gender Identity

These conclusions are born out in the data from this survey, in that, cross-tabulations reveal not all survey participants who identify as gay concurrently identify as male, nor do all participants who identify as lesbian concurrently identify as female. Furthermore, survey participants who identify as transgender, whether Female-to-Male (F-t-M) or Male-to-Female (M-t-F), identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, and other sexual identities such as queer and pansexual.

Two important political consequences are highlighted by these findings. First, the fluid nature of both sexual and gender identity makes it difficult to construct a sense of community

around which common political and social grievances can be established and from which collective political action can be initiated. For example, as previously illustrated, those who identify as bisexual appear to hold weaker ties to their sexual identity than gays or lesbians. This, along with research concerning sexual stigma against bisexuals, suggests that bisexual interests are not well-represented among LGBTQ civil rights organizations and are often not considered in policy decisions (Rust 1995; Ochs 1996), further contributing to disassociations between bisexual and lesbian/gay communities.

Recent research suggests that transgender and gender queer individuals similarly find it difficult to join or influence LGBTQ community and political associations. As Fassinger and Gallor (2006) and Strolovich (2007) note, in the “socio-political arena,” the “inclusion of trans rights” is often “limited if it threatens LGB [Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual] legal or political progress” (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007:43). In this respect, “political advocacy requires essentialist definitions of sexuality” and gender, which “negate[s] the fluidity and flexibility of psychological identity development for many sexual minority people” (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007:43). Not only this, but “rights granted in response to essentialist arguments” reinforce existing socially-constructed divisions further “cleav[ing] communities trying to fight collectively for those rights” (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007:43).

While a relatively small number of survey participants identify as neither male nor female, an analysis of these essentialist gender binaries in relation to the SI centrality, private regard, and public regard indices reveal no statistically significant differences. That is, sexual identity does not appear to vary based on dichotomous categories of male/female gender. An interesting pattern emerges, however, at the intersection of trans and sexual identities. While the proportion of trans and gender queer survey participants is too small to draw generalizable

conclusions, in this sample, two different relationships emerge from an analysis using a dichotomous trans/cisgender indicator and the SI centrality and public regard indices.

Specifically, independent sample t-tests show that, in this sample, transgender and gender queer survey participants ($N = 41$) exhibit significantly higher scores, $M = 26.3$ ($SD = 6.19$), on the SI centrality scale $t(1141) = -2.68$, $p = .003$, than cisgender survey participants ($N = 1102$), $M = 23.7$ ($SD = 5.52$); while, the converse is observed for the SI public regard scale. That is, a significant t-value, $t(1141) = 2.66$, $p = .003$, shows that transgender and gender queer survey participants ($N = 41$) have significantly lower scores, $M = 15.8$ ($SD = 4.30$), on the SI public regard scale than cisgender survey participants ($N = 1102$), $M = 17.6$ ($SD = 4.20$).

The reason for this variation may, again, be due to experience with stigmatization. A significant t-value, $t(1141) = -4.20$, $p = .000$, shows that trans and gender queer survey participants ($N = 41$) report significantly higher scores on the SI stigma scale, $M = 18.4$ ($SD = 4.75$), than cisgender ($N = 1102$) participants, $M = 14.8$ ($SD = 5.34$). A similar result, $t(1133) = -2.72$, $p = .003$, also suggests that cisgender female ($N = 580$) survey participants exhibit significantly higher scores on the SI stigma scale, $M = 15.3$ ($SD = 5.36$), than cisgender males ($N = 555$), $M = 14.5$ ($SD = 5.33$). The concomitant lack of differentiation in SI centrality between male/female respondents, however, is not consistent with this theory (i.e., a link between SI stigmatization and centrality) of the effect of stigmatization on political outcomes.

The results suggest, then, that SI centrality is stronger among transgender and gender queer survey participants in this sample than cisgender participants, while SI public regard is significantly lower. Strong internalization of an identity perceived to be devalued by society may explain political differences between trans and cisgender survey participants better than SI stigmatization – although, again, I am unable to generalize beyond this sample. Future research

should apply similar methodologies in order to fully test the variation in identity among sexual and gender minorities. As I argue in chapter 1, the recognition of identity variation within sexual minority communities is important for the development of representative political and social organizations which advocate for policy changes that benefit the entire sexual minority community, not just those who represent the dominant socially-constructed characteristics.

Racial & Ethnic Identity

Figure 3.10 graphically depicts the distribution of racial identities among survey participants. Based on responses to the open-ended question regarding racial identity (See Appendix A, Q13), along with Black, Latino/a, and White, a fourth category of racial identity – Asian, comprised primarily of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese ethnicities – is constructed. Figure 3.10 shows that a majority of survey participants identify as White (76. percent), while Latino/a (9.3 percent), Black (7.7 percent), and Asian (3.3 percent), together, make up slightly more than 20 percent of the sample. Of the 2.6 percent of survey participants who identify as a race or ethnicity other than the four previously mentioned categories, Hispanic, Native American, Pacific Islander, and Mixed Race are the most common. As with sexual identity, the survey instrument also measures racial identity (RI) centrality, private regard, and public regard (Sellers, et al. 1998) (Appendix A, Q13a-i; Q14a-f; and, Q15a-f).

Appendix A, Q13a-i shows the distributions of survey responses for items which comprise the RI centrality scale. The distributions of most items are negatively skewed. For example, a majority of survey participants (59.5 percent) either agree or strongly agree that being “[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] has very little to do with how I feel about myself” (see Appendix A, Q13a). Similarly, a majority of participants (59.8 percent) either agree or strongly

agree that being “[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am” (see Appendix A, Q13d).




Figure 3.10: Distribution of Racial Identity

Conversely, the distribution of item three (Q13c) shows a slight positive skew, as a plurality of survey participants (42.6 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree that their “destiny is tied to the destiny of other [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people.” The skew in distributions observed among these items possibly reflect the skew in racial identity distribution, i.e., the large proportion of the sample that identify as White – a point which I explore in detail in the following section. Finally, responses to items five (Q13e) and seven (Q13h) are mesokurtic, with responses clustered around the center of the distribution. Three items are reverse coded and, these eight items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *RI centrality* scale (see

Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 8 – 40 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .820$). Low scores on the scale represent low racial identity centrality, or the feeling that one's racial identity is unimportant to one's sense of self; while, high scores on the scale represent high racial identity centrality, or the feeling that one's racial identity is important to one's sense of self.

Appendix A, Q14a-f shows the distributions of survey responses for items which comprise the RI private regard scale. The distributions of all but one item exhibit pronounced negative skew. For example, more than three-quarters of survey participants (79.5 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people have made major accomplishments and advancements” (see Appendix A, Q14c). Only the distribution of item four (Q14d) exhibits a positive skew, as a majority of participants (64.1 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, “I often regret that I am [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority].” One item is reverse coded and, these six items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *RI private regard* scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 6 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .861$). Low scores on the scale represent low racial identity private regard, or a negative affective evaluation of one's sexual identity; while, high scores represent high sexual identity private regard, or a positive affective evaluation of one's sexual identity.

Finally, Appendix A, Q15a-f shows the distributions of survey responses for items which comprise the RI public regard scale. The distributions of four items are characterized by a negative skew. For example, more than three-quarters of survey participants either agree or strongly agree that, “overall [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are considered good by others” (see Appendix A, Q15a). Conversely, the distributions of items three (Q15c) and four

(Q15d) exhibit a slightly positive skew, as pluralities of participants (45.8 percent and 48 percent, respectively) either disagree or strongly disagree that “most people consider [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people to be more ineffective than other social groups;” and, “[Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are not respected by the broader society.” Two items are reverse coded and these six items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *RI public regard* scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 6 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .797$). Low scores on the scale represent low racial identity public regard, or a negative evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s racial identity; while, high scores represent high racial identity public regard, or a positive evaluation of societal acceptance of one’s racial identity.

Figure 3.11 shows the distribution and median scores on the RI centrality scale by category of racial identity. The highest median scores on the RI centrality scale appear among Latino/a survey participants (as denoted by the lines within the black boxes), while the median score is noticeably lowest among Whites. An independent samples t-test using a dummy indicator constructed from a question measuring racial identity (see Appendix A, Q13) confirm this observation. That is, the significant t-value, $t(1146) = -13.7$, $p = .000$, shows that Racial Minorities ($N = 265$) have significantly higher scores, $M = 26.8$ ($SD = 5.87$), on the racial identity centrality scale than Whites ($N = 883$), $M = 21.0$ ($SD = 6.00$). Racial minorities, then, are significantly more likely to view themselves “with regard to” their racial identity, or see their racial identity as a central part of their self-identity, than Whites in this sample (Sellers, et al. 1998).




Figure 3.11: Racial Identity Centrality Distribution by Racial Identity

Figure 3.12 depicts the distribution and median scores of the RI private regard scale. As the figure shows, the pattern for racial identity private regard or, positive or negative affect toward one's racial identity, is similar to that of RI centrality. In this case, the highest median scores on the scale appear among Black survey participants; while, again, the lowest median scores on the scale appear among Whites. An independent samples t-test confirms this observation. A significant t-value, $t(1146) = -7.80$, $p = .000$, shows that Racial Minorities ($N = 265$) have significantly higher scores, $M = 25.0$ ($SD = 4.31$), on the RI private regard scale than Whites in the sample ($N = 883$), $M = 22.6$ ($SD = 4.51$). Racial minority survey participants, then, view their racial identity more positively than do White participants.




Figure 3.12: Racial Identity Private Regard Distribution by Racial Identity

Interestingly, a converse pattern appears in Figure 3.13, which depicts the distribution and median scores on the RI public regard scale. In this case, Black survey participants appear to have the lowest median score on the scale, while White survey participants appear to have the highest. This suggests that Whites in the sample are more likely to believe that society positively views their racial identity than racial minorities. Again, the observation is confirmed by an independent samples t-test. The significant t-value, $t(1146) = 13.22$, $p = .000$, suggests that White participants ($N = 883$), have higher scores, $M = 21.4$ ($SD = 4.13$), on the RI public regard scale than Racial Minorities ($N = 265$), $M = 17.5$ ($SD = 4.55$). Whites, then, are more likely to believe society positively views their racial identity than Racial Minorities in this sample.




Figure 3.13: Racial Identity Public Regard Distribution by Racial Identity

These findings comport with scholars such as Phinney (1989) and Hurtado and Stewart (1997:229) who, in their study of White racial identity, suggest that “white [survey] respondents are hard-pressed to define whiteness and the privileges it brings to those who own it;” however, they also note whiteness becomes “much more definable when the privilege it accords its owners is lost.” That is, whiteness, as a racial identity, holds little meaning until it is challenged. In this case, Whites in the sample view their racial identity as less important to their sense of self, hold less positive views of their racial identity, yet, at the same time, recognize that society positively regards their identity in comparison to unnamed ‘others.’ The relationship between these attitudes somewhat contradicts Hurtado and Stewart (1997), in that, White survey participants may be “hard-pressed to define whiteness;” however, they appear well-aware of the privileges it brings.

Centrality, Public Regard, and Private Regard: Interactions

The previous point is illustrated by Figures 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17, which show scatterplots graphically depicting the relationship between the RI centrality, private regard and public regard scales among the entire sample (Figures 3.14 and 3.15) and among White survey participants (Figures 3.16 and 3.17).

Figure 3.14 shows a similar relationship between RI centrality and private regard as that observed between SI centrality and private regard. The moderate positive correlation ($r = .480$) means that RI centrality is associated with a positive affective evaluation of one's racial identity. Like the relationship between SI centrality and public regard, the nature of the relationship between RI centrality and public regard is not as easily specified.




Figure 3.14: Scatterplot, Racial Identity Private Regard by Racial Identity Centrality




Figure 3.15: Scatterplot, Racial Identity Public Regard by Racial Identity Centrality

As Figure 3.15 shows, there appears to be a slightly negative relationship ($r = -.010$) between the two scales.

The pattern in Figure 3.16 is similar to that of Figure 3.14. That is, among White survey participants, RI private regard is positively correlated ($r = .423$) with RI centrality. However, as shown in Figure 3.17, the moderately positive correlation ($r = .468$) between RI public regard and centrality is a stark contrast to the pattern which exists overall. In this case, instead of perceived societal rejection, White identity centrality is more clearly associated with positive public regard. Again, while White survey participants may be “hard-pressed to define whiteness,” they appear well-aware of the privileges it brings (Hurtado and Stewart 1997:229), i.e., an understanding that whiteness is associated with societal acceptance.




Figure 3.16: Scatterplot, White Racial Identity Private Regard by White RI Centrality

An examination of the relationship between RI centrality and public regard among Black and other racial minority survey participants yields the opposite pattern. Among Black participants, RI public regard and centrality are negatively correlated ($r = -.074$), if only slightly. A similar correlation appears ($r = -.137$) between the RI public regard and centrality of participants who identify as neither Black, White, or Latino/a. In these two cases, RI centrality appears to be associated with negative public regard – or a negative perception of societal acceptance. Just as with SI public regard, in terms of racial minority politics, this finding is intuitive. That is, strongly identifying as a racial minority likely results in a more politicized identity – one which makes political and social grievances more salient and, which heightens the perception that society devalues one's racial identity (Miller, et al. 1981; de la Garza, Falcon,

and Garza 1996; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto 1997; Schildkraut 2005). This trend is not, however, consistent across all categories of racial identity in this study.




Figure 3.17: Scatterplot, White Racial Identity Public Regard by White RI Centrality

Specifically, among Latino/as in the sample, the relationship between RI centrality and public regard is positive ($r = .171$). Latino/a identity centrality appears to be associated with the perception that society accepts and values Latino/a identity. While facially counterintuitive, this finding comports with previous research which suggests that among Latino/as, “a sense of ethnic or national origin group solidarity,” in fact, counteracts the negative effects of discrimination and perceptions of discrimination within society, especially as it relates to political participation (Schildkraut 2005:306).

It is important to recognize that identity is a composite of cognitive, affective, and relational factors. In this case, racial identity appears to be more important cognitively and affectively to Racial Minorities than to Whites. This finding somewhat supports H3b from chapter 2, which suggests that high scores on the RI centrality and private regard scales among White respondents will be associated with policy conservatism – especially when the policy in question threatens their racial identity, e.g., immigration liberalism. But, what accounts for variation in racial identity? As I have suggested previously, the answer may be related to racial stigmatization.

Racial Identity Stigmatization

As with SI centrality, public and private regard, the patterns observed in the analysis of RI centrality, public and private regard may be related to stigmatization. It is already widely documented by social-psychologists and scholars of intersectionality that life experiences, including cultural, sociohistorical, and socioeconomic factors influence racial identity development (Green 1995; 1998; Bedolla 2007). Scholars of political behavior have also recognized that discrimination can act as either a motivating or mitigating factor for political attitudes and behavior given various contextual factors such as internalization, perceived intent, and perceived target of the abuse (Miller, et al. 1981; de la Garza, Falcon, and Garza 1996; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto 1997; Schildkraut 2005; Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 2013b). To capture these aspects of discrimination I measure public regard, as previously described, and experience with discrimination. The RI stigma scale is similar to the SI stigma scale, and measures survey participants' experience with discrimination based on their racial identity.

Appendix A, Q16a-g shows the distributions of responses for items which comprise the RI stigma scale. The distributions of all items exhibit pronounced positive skew – meaning the majority of responses indicate participants have rarely or never experience racial discrimination related to the item under consideration. For example, more than two-thirds of survey participants (69.6 percent) indicate they have rarely or never been “subject to slurs or jokes” because of their racial identity (see Appendix A, Q16a). This, again, is likely explained by the relatively small proportion of racial minority respondents in the sample. The seven items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *RI stigmatization* scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 7 – 28 and, the scale shows a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .907$). Low scores on the scale represent less experience with racial stigma; while, high scores represent more experience with racial stigma.

Figure 3.18 shows the distribution and median values of racial identity stigmatization by category of racial identity. It is apparent, and expected, that RI stigmatization is reported more by Black, Latino/a, Asian, and other racial minority survey participants than Whites. While Whites show the lowest median scores on the scale, the highest median scores appear among Latino/a survey participants. A significant t-value, $t(1144) = -8.99$, $p = .000$, confirms the observation regarding White stigmatization. That is, racial minorities ($N = 264$) report higher scores on the racial identity stigmatization scale, $M = 13.4(SD = 5.48)$, than whites, $M = 10.4(SD = 4.53)$.




Figure 3.18: Racial Identity Stigma Distribution by Racial Identity

This finding is all the more interesting given that, in this sample, Latino/as centrality is positively associated with public regard – or a view that society is accepting of Latino/a ethnicity. It appears Schildkraut’s (2005:306) findings are confirmed by this data, in that, while Latino/as report the most personal experience with racial discrimination, a strong “sense of ethnic or national origin group solidarity” (i.e., centrality) appears to mitigate the negative effects of stigmatization, at least with regard to societal perceptions (i.e., public regard).

Race, Ethnicity, & Gender Identity

Table 3.1 is a cross-tabulation of gender and racial categorical indicators showing observed frequencies from the sample. As discussed previously, the sample is relatively evenly split between male- and female-identified respondents. As Table 3.1 shows, this pattern is consistent across categories of race and ethnicity. Again, tests of association are enlightening, in

that, independent samples t-tests reveal RI centrality, private, and public regard significantly vary based on categories of gender. Specifically, a significant t-value, $t(1133) = 3.27$, $p = .000$, indicates that cisgender male survey participants ($N = 555$) exhibit higher values on the RI centrality scale, $M = 23.0$ ($SD = 6.34$), than cisgender female participants ($N = 580$), $M = 21.8$ ($SD = 6.46$). Also, significant t-values, $t(1133) = 5.28$, $p = .000$, show that cisgender male survey participants ($N = 555$) exhibit higher values on the RI private regard scale, $M = 23.8$ ($SD = 4.27$) than cisgender female participants ($N = 580$), $M = 22.4$ ($SD = 4.72$). A similar pattern is shown on the RI private regard scale, $t(1133) = 3.72$, $p = .000$, where $M = 21.1$ ($SD = 4.25$) among cisgender male participants ($N = 555$) and $M = 20.1$ ($SD = 4.67$) among cisgender female participants ($N = 580$).

Table 3.1: Cross-Tabulation, Gender Identity by Racial Identity

Gender Identity	Black	Latino/a	White	Asian	Another Racial Identity	Total
Female	34 (40.0%) ^a (6.0%) ^b	52 (48.1%) (9.2%)	450 (51.0%) (79.9%)	15 (38.4%) (2.6%)	12 (40.0%) (2.1%)	563 (49.2%) (100%)
Male	47 (55.2%) (8.7%)	51 (47.2%) (9.4%)	403 (45.7%) (74.7%)	22 (56.4%) (4.0%)	16 (53.3%) (2.9%)	539 (47.1%) (100%)
Transgender, Another Gender Identity	4 (5.4%) (9.7%)	5 (4.6%) (12.1%)	28 (3.6%) (68.2%)	2 (5.1%) (4.8%)	2 (6.6%) (4.8%)	41 (3.5%) (100%)
Total	85 (100%) (7.4%)	108 (100%) (9.4%)	881 (100%) (77.0%)	39 (100%) (3.4%)	30 (100%) (2.6%)	1143 (100%) (100%)

^a denotes column percent

^b denotes row percent

In short, in this sample, cisgender males regard their racial identity as a more central part of their self-identity, more positively view their racial identity, and believe society values their

racial identity more than cisgender females. This, perhaps, lends some support to the ‘subordinate male target hypothesis’ (Veenstra 2013); not that the theory itself is credible, but the assertion that cisgender men view themselves as the paradigm of their race may, in fact, be supported. This explanation is consistent with previous research (Sellers, et al. 1998; Phinney 1989), and appears to confirm a long-standing tenant of intersectionality, namely, that women – especially racial and ethnicity minority women – experience multiplicative disadvantage from a society which devalues both their gender and racial identities (Crenshaw 1991; Baca-Zinn and Dill 1996).

There is further evidence to support this assertion. For example, a significant t-test, $t(82) = 3.71$, $p = .000$, shows that Black cisgender women ($N = 35$) believe society devalues their racial identity, $M = 14.8$ ($SD = 5.05$) more than Black cisgender men ($N = 49$), $M = 18.4$ ($SD = 3.85$) in this sample. Similarly, racial minority cisgender women – including Hispanics, Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and Bi-Racial women – ($N = 28$) believe society devalues their racial identity, $M = 16.9$ ($SD = 4.12$) more than racial minority cisgender men, $M = 19.1$ ($SD = 4.88$), $t(66) = 2.39$, $p = .009$; again, however, this pattern does not hold among Latina cisgender women.

As with sexuality, significant variation in racial identity public and private regard is associated with transgender and gender queer identities. As compared to cisgender people in the sample ($N = 1102$), transgender and gender queer people ($N = 41$) are more likely to exhibit lower scores on both the RI private, $t(1141) = 2.45$, $p = .007$, $M = 23.2$ ($SD = 4.45$), and public regard $t(1141) = 2.41$, $p = .008$, $M = 20.6$ ($SD = 4.50$), scales than cisgender participants, $M = 21.4$ ($SD = 4.96$) and $M = 18.9$ ($SD = 4.67$), respectively. That is, transgender and gender queer

people hold less favorable affective views of their racial identity and believe society devalues their racial identity more than cisgender people in the sample.

The most within-group gender-based variation, however, appears between White men and women. Perhaps an artifact of the large number of White respondents in the sample, White identity centrality, private regard, and public regard all significantly differ based on binary categories of cisgender. Across all three racial identity scales, white men have significantly higher scores than white women. That is, white men in the sample ($N = 412$) are more likely to view their racial identity as a central characteristic of their definition of self, $M = 21.8$ ($SD = 5.05$), $t(873) = 3.49$, $p = .000$, more likely to view their racial identity as a positive part of their self-identity, $M = 23.5$ ($SD = 4.28$), $t(873) = 5.87$, $p = .000$; and, more likely to believe society values their identity $M = 21.9$ ($SD = 3.98$), $t(873) = 3.37$, $p = .000$, than white women ($N = 463$), $M = 20.4$ ($SD = 5.87$), $M = 21.8$ ($SD = 4.53$) and, $M = 21.0$ ($SD = 4.19$), respectively. Whiteness, then, may not only be a significant predictor of political attitudes and behavior when it is challenged (Hurtado and Stewart 1997). It may be that whiteness, *in combination with* a cisgender male identity provides motivation for political attitudes and behavior; and, also contributes to problems with political representation such as the lack of diversity within LGBTQ interest groups and racism within the LGBTQ community.

Socioeconomic & Socio-Cultural Demographics

I will return to an intersectional discussion of race and sexual identity later; however, at the crux of intersectionality is the idea that socially-constructed identities such as race, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender do not exist in a vacuum. That is, as Bedolla (2007:239) observes, each

identity we inhabit exists as part of a socioeconomic, socio-cultural, and “socio-historical context” which helps define and inform the social, economic, and political choices we make. Education, for example, often defines income potential, but the concentration of wealth in the United States is defined by race. Religion, too, is often dictated by culture and history through socialization, and defines norms, customs, and standards of morality for a society. Even geography acts to define our identity by limiting or expanding the opportunity to interact with those different from ourselves. An understanding of these factors, then, will better inform our models of political attitudes and behavior.

Social Networks

Social networks serve as an influence on political attitudes and behaviors in a number of ways. First, because we often “conform to the political coloration of [our] intimates” (Knoke 1990:1043), social networks are often accurate predictors of individual political attitudes. Not all social networks, however, are homogenous. Heterogeneous social networks exhibit variation in demographics, culture, and politics, but are associated with differential effects on political attitudes and behaviors. Mutz (2002a), for example, suggests heterogeneous social networks are associated with values such as political tolerance, defined as a “greater understanding of oppositional viewpoints,” but also a willingness to protect the civil rights of others.

Heterogeneous social networks, however, also appear to have a dampening effect on political participation. That is, similar to identity threat research (Major and O’Brien 2005), variation within social networks can lead individuals to avoid participation in political activities in an attempt to avoid conflict within their social networks (Mutz 2002b). On the other hand, contemporary research suggests the opposite (Quintelier, et al. 2012). Specifically, social network diversity among young Europeans is associated with greater political participation.

While these assertions will be tested in later sections, continuing the demographic analysis, several important observations arise when examining network diversity within this sample. First, social network diversity is measured using a series of questions which ask survey participants to rate how many close friends share specific characteristics, including sexual identity, gender, race and ethnicity, religion, and partisan affiliation (see Appendix A, Q17a-e). Figure 3.19 is a boxplot showing the distribution and median sexual network diversity scores by category of sexual identity (see Appendix A, Q17a). While the median scores on the scale appear relatively equal across categories of sexual identity, bisexuals in the sample report more scores in the third quartile. An independent sample t-test confirms this observation. A significant t-value, $t(1012) = -4.96$, $p = .000$, shows that bisexuals in the sample ($N = 456$) exhibit more sexual diversity, $M = 3.58$ ($SD = 1.56$), than lesbians, gays, and those reporting other sexual identities ($N = 558$), $M = 3.11$ ($SD = 1.45$). Because the survey instrument does not quantify diversity among specific categories of sexual identity, a number of social scenarios are possible. It may be, for example, that social connections among bisexuals reflect broad sexual diversity, encompassing gay, lesbian, and heterosexualities. It may also be that these networks solely reflect connections with heterosexuals. In terms of social connections with sexual minorities, this finding is consistent with previous results which suggest gays and lesbians are more likely to associate with sexual minority communities than bisexuals. This, again, reinforces the gay and lesbian narrative within LGBTQ politics likely resulting in less representation for bisexuals.




Figure 3.19: Social Network Sexual Diversity Distribution by Sexual Identity

Figure 3.20 is a boxplot showing the distribution and median racial network diversity scores (see Appendix A, Q17c). As the figure shows, Black and White survey participants report the lowest median scores suggesting that their social networks more closely mirror their racial identity than others in the sample. A significant t-value, $t(938) = -6.06$, $p = .000$, confirms this observation. That is, Racial Minorities ($N = 209$) in the sample report more racially diverse social networks, $M = 2.92$ ($SD = 1.61$), than Whites ($N = 731$), $M = 2.28$ ($SD = 1.26$).

This is a troubling confirmation of the racial divide within the LGBTQ community. Previous research shows racism across axes of sexuality, beauty, and social interaction within the LGBTQ community (Wilson, et al. 2009; Malebranche, et al. 2004; Green 1998; Loicano 1989; Icard 1986). That White LGBTQ people are less likely to associate with Black, Latino/a, Asian,

etc. LGBTQ people suggests a pattern of racial stigma and isolation that holds many consequences for LGBTQ people of color.




Figure 3.20: Social Network Racial Diversity Distribution by Racial Identity

First, racial stigmatization within the LGBTQ community is likely to continue. This poses serious risks to people of color who lack access to resources, interest groups, and political elites. Second, racial isolation threatens the legitimacy of the LGBTQ movement. As I note in chapter 1, traditional political conceptualizations of identity which limit group association to a single descriptor necessarily result in the disenfranchisement of millions of people who only partially share the dominant social identity (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008). Just as the feminist movement was criticized for ignoring women of color, so too can the LGBTQ movement be criticized for overlooking, further subordinating, and taking advantage of LGBTQ people of

color. The only remedy is a recognition of the diversity which exists within the community, as well as an understanding that not everyone in the community fits the prototypical standard of gayness or lesbianism as defined by White social science.

Finally, Figure 3.21 is a boxplot showing the distribution and median political network diversity scores (see Appendix A, Q17e) over collapsed categories of political affiliation (see Appendix A, Q29, Q30). As the figure shows, Democrats exhibit the lowest median scores on the scale, suggesting that they are less likely to associate with members of other political parties. Again, an independent sample t-test confirms this observation. A significant t-value, $t(840) = 6.83$, $p = .000$, shows that Democrats ($N = 549$) are less likely to report politically diverse social networks, $M = 2.43$ ($SD = 1.40$), than Republicans and Independents ($N = 293$) in the sample, $M = 3.15$ ($SD = 1.54$).




Figure 3.21: Social Network Political Diversity Distribution by Party Identification

Numerous studies have shown that LGBTQ people are generally more liberal, and especially more likely to identify with the Democratic Party than the general population (Edelman 1993; Sherrill 1996; Hertzog 1996; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002; Shaffner and Senic 2006). While not all LGBTQ people identify with the Democratic Party (Rogers and Lott 1997), the political dynamic between the LGBTQ community and the Democratic Party can be increasingly characterized by the term “electoral capture” (Smith 2007; Egan 2012). That is, a system in which one party (Democrats) takes for granted the support of a particular group in society (LGBTQ people) while the same group goes uncontested by the other major party (Republicans).

These results suggest, however, that this system is two-tiered. Not only do Republicans fail to electorally contest the LGBTQ community, LGBTQ Democrats fail to associate beyond their partisan affiliations, perhaps giving little reason to electorally contest the group. Politically, this can have serious consequences. As Overby and Barth (2002) and Barth, Overby and Huffman (2009) suggest, contact with LGBTQ individuals can favorably influence individual attitudes toward the group. A lack of contact with opposing partisans, then, may reinforce existing negative conceptions of the LGBTQ community, provide little incentive to support LGBTQ equality or inclusion, and further divide partisan positions leaving the LGBTQ community with no representation in Republican-dominated political institutions.

These items are reverse coded and, along with measures of gender and religious social network diversity, comprise an additive index operationalized as the *network diversity* scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 0 – 30 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .680$). Low scores on the scale represent less social network diversity; while, high scores represent more social network diversity.

Economic Indicators

More than half of the survey participants in this sample (52 percent) report an annual household income of less than \$50,000 (see Appendix A, Q27). This is consistent with previous research which suggests that stereotypes of affluence within the LGBTQ community are simply that, stereotypes perpetuated by popular media representations of LGBTQ characters as well-educated, metropolitan, elites (Sears and Badgett 2012). In actuality, more than one-quarter of gays and lesbians in this sample and almost one-third of bisexuals report an annual household income less than \$30,000. Cross-tabulations also show income disparities across categories of race. Whereas about twenty-eight percent of Whites report an annual household income less than \$30,000, nearly forty percent of Black participants report at this income level. Similarly, whereas almost one-third of Whites (30.2 percent) report a household income over \$75,000, only about one-quarter (24.3 percent) of Latino/as and about nineteen percent of Black participants report at this level.

More than one-third of the sample (36.9 percent) report receiving a 2-year or 4-year degree, while roughly eighteen percent of participants report having a high school diploma or less education. As with income, employment among the LGBTQ community is stereotyped as professionalized and high-earning. However, again consistent with previous research (Movement Advancement Project, et al. 2013), more than one-quarter (25.9 percent) of survey participants report being unemployed (see Appendix A, Q22). Cross-tabulations show that, while still higher than U.S. averages, about eighteen percent of gay participants report being unemployed; whereas, almost one-quarter of lesbians (22.3 percent) and nearly two-thirds of bisexuals (32.9 percent) report being unemployed. Similarly, more than one-quarter (28.9 percent) of Latino/as and more than one-third (34.1 percent) of Black participants report unemployment.

Again, the compounding of economic and educational disadvantage based on categories of sexual and racial identity represent serious problems within the LGBTQ community. As long as stereotypes of affluence dominate in popular and academic depictions of LGBTQ people, there is little incentive to focus on anti-poverty, employment, or social justice issues – which appear to affect more than one quarter of this sample. This is reflective of a long-standing debate within the LGBTQ community over the utility of pursuing “neoliberal” policy priorities such as legal same-sex marriage and ending the United States military’s ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy (Warner 1999).

The nodes of contention over LGBTQ movement policy priorities are often defined in terms of economics. Egan and Sherrill (2005), for example, find that among lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, college education is a significant predictor of support for same-sex marriage. Educational attainment suggests economic stability and marriage provides a mechanism to protect one’s family and property against economic hardship. Those who would potentially benefit from same-sex marriage, then, even if not a majority of the LGBTQ community, are the most likely to support the policy and be heard by the relevant political interests (Strolovich 2007). For this reason, critical scholars refer to same-sex marriage as a way for wealthy gays and lesbians to “concentrate wealth and power” at the expense of economic and social assistance for low-income and LGBTQ people of color (Stanley 2014:27; Spade and Willse 2014; Strolovich 2012; Currah 2008; Duggan 2003; Cohen 1997). That is, those gays and lesbians who have achieved economic affluence, through same-sex marriage, have a way to secure their property against punitive governmental policies; while the policy simply reinforces the existing capitalist power structure which disadvantages the poor, women, and people of color.

While an often-overlooked factor in LGBTQ political calculus (Strolovich 2007), the role of social class is a key consideration for scholars of intersectionality (Collins 1993; Dawson 1994; Landry 2004; Weber 2004; Strolovich 2006; Strolovich 2007; Meyer 2008). The construction of classes in society, and our relationship to them, inform our political decisions because they frame the available choices (Bedolla 2007). Not only this, but, as Collins (2000) suggests, and as the data here show, race, gender and sexuality intersect and interact with social class producing new experiences, (dis)advantages, and political choices. As with the general population, income, education and employment are consistently strong predictors of LGBTQ political attitudes and behavior (Lewis, et al. 2011). This study nuances our understanding of socio-economics by further examining social class at the intersection of sexual and racial identities. LGBTQ people are more likely to live in poverty than are heterosexuals. Within the LGBTQ community, women and people of color are more likely to be undereducated and unemployed (Sears and Badgett 2012; MAP, et al. 2013). The data here support these findings and suggest greater attention be paid to the role of economics in LGBTQ politics.

Cultural Indicators

As Bedolla (2007) makes clear, one key to understanding the effect of identity on political attitudes and behaviors is by examining socio-cultural influences. Post-modern and intersectional scholars make it clear that identities exist within a “matrix of domination” (Collins 2000:18). That is, systems of power – whether race-based, class-based, gender-based, or sexually-based – structure the advantages/disadvantages, privileges/disprivileges, and choices available to us based on where our identities fit within the system of power. Norms and values are the primary tools used to shape our life (and political) choices. In this way, it is apparent that

other systems, such as religion and geography, effect change in the political choices available to a particular group in society.

Religion

After an examination of the open-ended questions related to religious affiliation (see Appendix A, Q19, Q20), among this sample, almost three-quarters (72.7 percent) of participants report some religious affiliation. While more than one-quarter of participants report being agnostic or no religious affiliation (27.2 percent), a majority of participants affiliate as Christian (51.7 percent), followed by Jewish (3.6 percent), Wiccan or Pagan (3.1 percent), Buddhist (2.2 percent), or report some other religious affiliation (3.5 percent). Interestingly, cross-tabulations reveal, of the survey participants who identify as religious, almost three-quarters (72.7 percent) report attending an institution that is not affirming of their sexual identity. Of those who identify as Christian, more than half (60.1 percent) report attending a non-affirming church.

Religion and its relationship with political attitudes and behaviors is an under-analyzed topic within the LGBT studies discipline. Of the studies which have assessed religious affiliation among LGBTQ survey respondents, Egan (2012) notes that neither religious fundamentalism nor moderation in families affects LGBTQ identity in adulthood. A recent Pew Research Center study, however, suggests that LGBTQ people are less likely to self-report a religious affiliation than heterosexuals, and are significantly less likely to affiliate with Christianity (Murphy 2015; Pew Research Center 2013). Similarly, Egan, Edelman, and Sherrill (2008) find that more than one quarter of survey participants report becoming “less religious” after publicly coming out as lesbian, gay, or bisexual; while, Lewis, et al. (2011:671), in their study of the 2000 presidential election, note ‘outness’ – a psychological resource relevant to political participation – is more

prevalent among “non-Judeo-Christian religions” and the non-religious. Religious affiliation, then, appears to exert a mitigating effect on policy liberalism.

This is somewhat at odds with the results of this study which finds more than half the sample identify as religious – the largest proportion of which identify as Christian. Given that affiliation with conservative – and especially Christian – religious tradition is associated with hostile attitudes toward LGBTQ people (Norton and Herek 2013; Negy and Eismann 2005; Hinrichs and Rosenberg 2002; Selzer 1992), it is understandable that LGBTQ people would avoid affiliation with such denominations. Yet, previous research failed to determine how LGBTQ survey participants evaluate their religion’s position toward their own sexual identity.

In terms of political behavior, religious affiliation, and especially participation in religious activities, is thought to provide a political resource translatable to secular political pursuits (Brady, et al. 1995). Although untested, Swank and Fahs (2013b) suggest that participation in LGBT-affirming religious institutions increases political participation and, perhaps, policy liberalism, as it allows the transmission of shared political grievances, similar to the function of an interest group (Hartman 2006; Evans and Harriott 2004).

While statistical tests reveal no significant difference in SI centrality between dichotomous categories of religious affiliation, a significant t-value, $t(1141) = -2.88$, $p = .002$, shows that non-religious LGBTQ people in the sample ($N = 312$) hold higher scores, $M = 25.3$ ($SD = 3.80$), on the SI private regard scale than religious LGBTQ people ($N = 831$), $M = 24.6$ ($SD = 4.15$). Conversely, a significant t-value, $t(1141) = 4.02$, $p = .000$, also shows that religiously-identified LGBTQ people ($N = 831$) exhibit higher scores, $M = 17.8$ ($SD = 4.25$) on the SI public regard scale than non-religious LGBTQ people ($N = 312$), $M = 16.7$ ($SD = 4.36$).

Among this sample, religious affiliation is associated with a negative view of one's sexual identity, but also with a belief that society positively views one's sexual identity.

Although it may sound counterintuitive, this may be because more than half of religious survey participants report conflict between their religion and sexual identity. While still internalizing religious heteronormativity, the identity conflict may be associated with a view of society as a respite from oppressive religious doctrine; or, at least a view of society as permissive. Contrary to Swank and Fahs' (2013a) untested assertion, this may suggest that religious participation – even without conflict between religious and sexual identities – may not supply the cognitive resources (Harris 1994; Calhoun-Brown 1996), including shared concern with the LGBTQ community and outness, necessary to motivate political participation.

Indeed, a significant t-value, $t(733) = -2.68$, $p = .003$ – using a dummy variable constructed from a question measuring religious/sexual conflict (see Appendix A, Q21) – shows that religious LGBTQ participants who report conflict between their religious and sexual identities ($N = 535$) exhibit lower scores, $M = 23.2$ ($SD = 6.25$), on the SI centrality scale than participants who report no conflict ($N = 200$), $M = 24.6$ ($SD = 5.28$). Furthermore, conflict ($N = 535$) is significantly associated, $t(733) = -2.91$, $p = .001$, with lower scores, $M = 17.6$ ($SD = 4.29$) on the SI public regard scale than none ($N = 200$), $M = 18.6$ ($SD = 4.17$). This lends support to H9 in chapter 2 which suggests religiosity is positively associated with political participation and negatively associated with policy liberalism; while, conflict between sexual and religious identities produce the converse.

Geography

The sample frame also provides an interesting perspective on geographic diversity among LGBTQ people. As previously discussed, one problem with traditional LGBTQ social science

literature is the consistent stereotypical narrative that LGBTQ people are wealthy urbanites who only achieve social acceptance and political power in the context of large, diverse cities (Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996). Contemporary research, however, suggests that LGBTQ identity is equally entwined with rural life experiences (Gray 2009). This is reflected in the sample frame in that slightly more than forty percent of survey participants report living in a small or rural city of no more than 50,000 residents (See Appendix A, Q23).

According to Gray (2009), in these rural areas, LGBTQ people increasingly rely on familial identities rather than sexual identity as a means of integration into traditionally heteronormative communities. Interestingly, in this sample, a significant t-value, $t(1139) = -3.35$, $p = .000$, indicates that urban residents ($N = 674$) do exhibit higher scores on the SI centrality scale, $M = 24.3$ ($SD = 6.12$), than rural residents ($N = 467$), $M = 23.0$ ($SD = 6.16$), although the pattern does not hold for SI public or private regard. While internal and external evaluations of sexual identity are consistent across geographic settings, the finding shows support for Gray's (2009) assertion that rural LGBTQ people define themselves with familial connections – in an effort to integrate into an unsupportive environment – rather than as sexually distinct – which may prove an unsafe gambit (Roen 2001). Another significant rural/urban difference occurs in reports of sexual stigma. Again, a significant t-value, $t(1139) = -2.34$, $p = .009$, indicates that urban residents ($N = 674$) exhibit higher scores on the SI stigma scale, $M = 15.3$ ($SD = 5.40$) than rural residents in the sample ($N = 467$), $M = 14.5$ ($SD = 5.27$). This is consistent with previous findings in this study; namely, that SI stigmatization is positively correlated with SI centrality. In this sample, urban residents appear more likely to experience sexual stigmatization which could contribute to an elevated sense of one's sexual identity as central to one's definition of self.

In this sample, the strength of racial identity also appears to be associated with rural/urban residency. Specifically, a significant t-value, $t(1139) = -1.66$, $p = .048$, shows that urban residency ($N = 674$) is associated with higher scores, $M = 22.6$ ($SD = 6.50$), on the RI centrality scale than rural residency ($N = 467$), $M = 22.0$ ($SD = 6.31$). While there is no significant difference between rural and urban residency related to the RI private regard scale, again, a significant t-value, $t(1139) = 2.66$, $p = .003$, indicates rural residency ($N = 467$) is associated with higher scores, $M = 21.0$ ($SD = 4.41$), on the RI public regard scale than urban residency ($N = 674$), $M = 20.2$ ($SD = 4.57$). In this sample, rural residents view their racial identity with less centrality, yet also view society as more accepting of their racial identity than urban residents. While this could be contributed to reliance on familial relationships – as opposed to sexual- or race-based categories of identity – as Gray (2009) suggests, these findings could also be attributable to the small number of non-White rural respondents in the sample. Indeed, cross-tabulation shows that, by a two-to-one margin, more Blacks, Latino/as, and Asians in the sample reside in urban areas. This, too, likely accounts for the significantly higher, $t(1139) = -2.34$, $p = .009$, number of race-based discrimination reports among urban residents ($N = 674$), $M = 15.3$ ($SD = 5.40$), than among rural residents ($N = 467$), $M = 14.5$ ($SD = 5.27$).

Beyond Categorical Analyses

One important goal of this study is to better understand sexual identity at the intersection of race and ethnicity. While categorical-based analyses can provide insight into important aspects of social and political behavior (McCall 2005), I move beyond categorical analyses by adopting measures of identity which provide social-psychological context to the various

categorical indicators traditionally employed in survey research. It is understood that culture, race, and ethnicity represent sources of intersectional influence on sexual identity (Chan 1989; Loiacano 1989; Thumma 1991; Rogers and Lott 1997; Garcia 1998; Green 1995;1998). Not only this, but the various identities we occupy structure systems of advantage/disadvantage and privilege/disprivilege (Bedolla 2007; Hancock 2007a; 2007b) which, in turn, shape our social and political experiences. In order to “reveal the complexity of lived experience within social groups at neglected points of intersection” (McCall 2005:1773), the following section examines the intersection of the previously-discussed additive identity indices for sexual and racial identity.

Perceptions at the Intersection of Sexual and Racial Identities

Figures 3.22, 3.23, and 3.24 graphically depict the distribution and median scores for the SI centrality, private regard, and public regard indices by categories of sexual and racial identity. As Figure 3.22 shows, the lowest median score on the RI centrality scale appears among White survey participants who identify as pansexual, asexual, etc.; while, the highest median score appears among lesbian participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian. On the SI private regard scale, Figure 3.23 shows the highest median score appears among gay survey participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian; while, the lowest median score appears among Asian bisexual participants. Finally, as Figure 3.24 shows, the highest median score on the SI public regard scale appears among lesbian survey participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian; while, the lowest median score appears among White participants who identify with a sexual identity other than lesbian, gay, or bisexual.




Figure 3.22: Sexual Identity Centrality Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

This is an interesting and counterintuitive finding. That is, those survey participants who report the lowest median SI centrality score also report the highest SI public regard score. Even though sexuality appears to be a less central component to the identity of racial minority lesbians, this group appears to believe society greatly values their sexuality. From these graphic depictions, two important observations emerge. First, median values on each of the three sexual identity indices appear relatively consistent across categories of racial identity. Indeed, categorical tests of association reveal no significant differences based on racial identity. Second, across almost all categories of racial identity, bisexual survey participants consistently show lower median scores on each of the sexual identity indices. Among bisexuals, however, Black participants exhibit the highest median scores on all three scales. Finally, a comparison of the

distributions of the SI private and public regard scales shows that across all categories, survey participants report consistently higher SI private regard scores.




Figure 3.23: Sexual Identity Private Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

In this sample, personal regard for one's sexual identity is consistently evaluated more positively than society's regard for one's sexual identity.

Figures 3.25, 3.26, and 3.27 graphically depict the distribution and median scores for the RI centrality, private regard, and public regard indices by categories of sexual and racial identity. As Figure 3.25 shows, the highest median scores on the RI centrality scale appear among Black bisexual and Latino/a lesbian participants; while, the lowest median score appears among White participants who identify as neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual. A similar pattern appears in Figure 3.26 which shows the highest median score on the RI private regard scale appears among

Black lesbian participants; while, again, the lowest median score appears among White participants who identify as neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual.




Figure 3.24: Sexual Identity Public Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Finally, as Figure 3.27 shows, the highest median score on the RI public regard scale appear among White participants who identify as neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual; while, the lowest median scores appear among Black and Asian lesbian participants.

From these figures, two important observations can be made. First, the findings outlined in previous sections, namely that White survey participants report lower scores on the centrality and private regard scales, appears to hold across all sexual identities. The converse pattern for racial identity public regard also remains. That is, White survey participants appear to hold

higher scores on the RI public regard scale across all sexual identities, with the highest median score appearing among White participants who identify as neither lesbian, gay, nor bisexual.




Figure 3.25: Racial Identity Centrality Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Second, as with the measures of SI public and private regard, among racial minority participants, scores on the private regard scale appear consistently higher than the public regard scale, while scores appear relatively static among White participants. As with sexuality identity, among racial minorities, personal regard for one's racial identity is consistently evaluated more positively than society's regard for one's racial identity.

Stigmatization at the Intersection of Sexual and Racial Identities

Stigmatization is both an important component of identity development and important predictor of political outcomes because experience with discrimination both informs one's perception of social and political problems, but also structures the political choices available

based on one's socially-constructed identity (Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b; Hartman 2006; Evans and Harriott 2004).




Figure 3.26: Racial Identity Private Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

As discussed in chapter 2, Bedolla (2007:242) asserts, that those who intersectionally experience discrimination, i.e., a Black lesbian woman experiencing sexism, racism, and homophobia, may be more likely to “accept their lower status,” and “less likely...to challenge the structural barriers they face.” Because this theory is challenged in the literature (Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b), it is important to examine how LGBTQ people experience both heterosexism and racism in order to better understand the effects of discrimination originating from multiple social loci on political outcomes.




Figure 3.27: Racial Identity Public Regard Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Figures 3.28 and 3.29 graphically depict the distributions and median scores for the SI and RI stigma indices by categories of sexual and racial identity. Contrary to studies such as that conducted by Moradi, et al. (2010), as shown in Figure 3.28, it appears that heterosexist stigmatization is experienced differently across categories of race and ethnicity. In this sample, gay and bisexual Asian participants exhibit the lowest median scores on the SI scale; while, Latino/a, White, and those who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian appear to report the highest median scores on the scale. Consistent with previous findings, across three of the five racial and ethnic categories – Black, Latino/a, and White – Figure 3.28 shows bisexuals appear to exhibit the lowest median scores on the SI stigma scale.




Figure 3.28: Sexual Identity Stigma Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Figure 3.29 shows racial stigmatization is also experienced differently across categories of racial identity (Landrine, et al. 1995). As discussed in previous sections, White participants – across all categories of sexual identity – appear to report the lowest median scores on the RI stigma scale, while the highest median score is exhibited by Latino/a participants who identify with a sexual identity other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual. This is not an attempt to revise the “oppression Olympics” (Walby, et al. 2012); however, it is necessary to depict the nature of sexual and racial oppression in order to better understand the effects on politics.

Summary

From an examination of sample demographics alone, the assertions of scholars such as Worthen (2013), Egan (2012), Eliason (2010), Lombardi (2009), Fassinger and Arseneau (2007), Weiss (2004), and Mohr and Rochlen (1999) who suggest the existence of heterogeneity within the often-homogenized LGBT community are confirmed.




Figure 3.29: Racial Identity Stigma Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Adopting McCall’s (2005:1773) “intercategorical” approach and Shield’s (2008) ‘both/and’ approach to intersectional analysis allows for the “provisional” use of categorical indicators in order to explore the diversity within the LGBTQ community, but also highlight the experience of those at “neglected points of intersection.”

In this chapter, I reviewed the demographics and social-psychological identity measures gathered from an online survey conducted using a sample frame of LGBTQ adults living in the United States. According to the data, the sample is majority White and plurality bisexual. Consistent with previous research, bisexuals in this sample exhibit significantly lower scores on the SI centrality, private and public regard scales – meaning, bisexuals in the sample are less likely to consider their sexual identity as a central component of their sense of self, are less likely to positively view their sexual identity, and view society as less accepting of their sexual identity than gays and lesbians. One possible explanation offered here is the differential in experience with sexual stigma. Bisexuals in this sample are significantly less likely to report experience with sexual stigma than gays and lesbians. The moderate positive correlation between sexual stigma and sexual identity centrality suggests that stigmatization helps solidify one’s sexual identity, making that identity more emotionally and politically salient. This is consistent with previous research which observed increased participation and policy liberalism among gays and lesbians compared to bisexuals (Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b; Egan 2012; Lewis, et al. 2011). In the next section I will evaluate this claim using the social-psychological measures of sexual identity to predict political attitudes and participation of the survey participants.

In this sample, White survey participants exhibit significantly lower scores on the RI centrality and private regard scale – meaning, Whites in the sample are less likely to consider their racial identity as a central component of their sense of self, and are less likely to positively view their sexual identity. While this is consistent with previous research, e.g., Hurtado and Stewart (1997), who suggest White identity is only salient when challenged, the findings here somewhat contradict existing literature as Whites in the sample recognize the privilege associated with their racial identity, as they exhibit significantly higher scores on the RI public

regard scale than racial minorities. As expected, racial minorities in the sample experience significantly more racial discrimination than Whites. Again, stigmatization and experience with discrimination may be one mechanism which increases identity salience and centrality contributing to policy liberalism and political action.

The recognition of White identity privilege also highlights the issue of racism within the LGBTQ community. Racial discrimination is well-documented among LGBTQ people (Wilson, et al. 2009; Malebranche, et al. 2004; Green 1998; Loicano 1989; Icard 1986). However, the research presented here adds a new dimension to the problem, namely White LGBTQ people in this sample are significantly less likely to associate with people who do not share their racial identity. Social networks are one mechanism which informs our view of politics and the world (Quintelier, et al. 2012; Mutz 2002a; 2002b). Racial isolation within the LGBTQ community threatens to perpetuate underrepresentation in movement organizations and policy priorities as well as the disenfranchisement of racial minority LGBTQ people (Strolovich 2006; 2007).

The sample demographics also highlight the importance of intersectional research by emphasizing the gender, class, and cultural heterogeneity which exists within the LGBTQ community. As previous scholars recognize, gender and sexuality are distinct, not interchangeable, concepts in social science. The small number of transgender and gender queer survey participants help to nuance our understanding of sexuality at the intersection of gender fluidity. Not all men in the sample identify as gay, nor do all women identify as lesbian. In fact, not all survey participants identify with a binary gender construct. This variation is an important and understudied component of sexuality research and should be the focus of future research projects.

Finally, this study refutes stereotypes of LGBTQ people perpetuated in popular media and social science by demonstrating economic, cultural, and geographic variation. Almost one-quarter of survey participants live at or near the federal poverty line, while more than one-third of Blacks and bisexuals in the sample are unemployed. This is a stark contrast to popular images of affluent urban gays and lesbians who exert enormous social and political power. Not only this, but the sample demographics reveal religious diversity within the LGBTQ community which mirrors society at-large. While about one-quarter of the sample report no religious belief, nearly half report being Christian – a finding somewhat counter to contemporary research which suggests LGBTQ people are more likely to reject religious belief (Murphy 2015; Pew Research Center 2013; Lewis, et al. 2011; Egan, et al. 2008). Combined with the fact that almost three-quarters of religious survey participants report attending a religious institution which does not affirm their sexuality, future research should more fully explore religious diversity within the LGBTQ community, but also the effects of religious and sexual identity conflict on political outcomes.

Having reviewed the sample demographics and distributions of social-psychological identity measures, I now focus on the questions which are central to this study. Namely, what, if any of these variables effect the political attitudes and behaviors of LGBTQ people. In the next chapter I review the dependent variables in this study, i.e., six measures of political attitudes and two measures of political behavior. In chapter 5, I synthesize the information from chapters 3 and 4 and present evidence related to nine hypotheses from chapter 2.

CHAPTER 4: POLITICS AT THE INTERSECTION: STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

In chapter 2, I describe the methodology for conducting an online survey of LGBTQ adults living in the United States. In chapter 3, I present the demographics of the quota sample of 1216 participants including the distributions of social-psychological measures of sexual and racial identity, the key independent variables of this research project. In the proceeding sections, I review the eight dependent variables and present an analysis of each in relation to the categorical measures of identity described in the previous chapter. I then report the results of OLS regression modeling using the eight dependent variables and present evidence in support of the hypotheses outlined in chapter 2. In addition, I present the results of hierarchical OLS regression modeling to explore the intersection of the previously described identity measures and the utility of interaction terms in explaining variation in the dependent variables. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a summary of the findings.

Dependent Variables

In chapter 2, I describe the operationalization of eight political attitudinal and behavioral measures from two batteries of survey questions measuring attitudes regarding the role of government, private rights, egalitarianism, and policy-specifics including gun control, immigration, and abortion rights, as well as political participation and political alienation (see Appendix A, Q1a-c, Q2a-b, Q3a-c, Q4a-c, Q5a-f, and Q6a-d). In the following sections, I review the operationalization of these measures and present distributional data for each. Later, I present

the results of OLS regression estimation using these eight measures as dependent variables to test the hypotheses posited in chapter 2.

Political Attitudes

Attitudes are “sets of beliefs ‘whose referents have shared general societal relevance to many people in religious, economic, political, educational, ethnic, and other social areas’” (Kerlinger 1972:614 cited in Saucier 2000:366). Furthermore, attitudes are evaluative, often defined as a “like or dislike” of some ‘object’ (Saucier 2000:366). In this study, survey participants are asked to evaluate various statements which measure attitudes toward the concepts mentioned above, e.g., role of government, egalitarianism, etc. In the following sections I present descriptive and distributional data related to each.

Role of Government

Attitudes toward the role of government are measured using questions derived from the limited government subscale of the American National Election Studies Individualism Scales (Markus 1990). This subscale is similar to the Comrey and Newmeyer (1965) welfare scale and measures attitudes toward “social welfare issue positions” (Feldman 1993:175). The distribution of responses for each question is shown in Appendix A, Q1a-c. The distribution of item one (Q1a) exhibits a pronounced negative skew as more than three-quarters (83.8 percent) of survey participants either agree or strongly agree with the statement, “The government should try to ensure that all Americans have such things as jobs, health care, and housing.” The distribution of the other two items in the subscale, however, more closely approximate a normal curve, with responses clustered in the center of the distribution. As shown in Appendix A, Q1b, a plurality of participants (42.1 percent) either agree or strongly agree that “government has gotten bigger because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves;” while, attitudes

appear almost evenly split in thirds regarding the statement, “The free market can handle today’s complex problems without government being involved.”

These three items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *role of government* scale (See Appendix B for descriptive statistics for each dependent and independent variable used in statistical analyses). All attitudinal scales are coded on a liberal – conservative continuum. That is, low scores on attitudinal scales represent liberal positions while high scores represent conservative positions. To this end, one item is reverse coded. Values on the role of government scale range from 3 – 15 and, as Appendix B shows, the scale exhibits a moderately strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .534$). Low scores represent the liberal position favoring government intervention; while, high scores represent the converse conservative position. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution and median scores on the role of government scale divided by categories of sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, median scores on the role of government scale are relatively evenly distributed across identity categories. The highest median scores appear among survey participants who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian; while, the lowest median score appears among lesbian-identified Asian participants.

Private Rights

Private rights refer to individual rights under the law and are often viewed in the context of competition (Woodmansee and Cook 1967). Here, a two-item measure is adapted from the private rights subscale of the Woodmansee and Cook (1967; 1976) Multifactor Racial Attitudes Inventory (MRAI). The scale was originally developed to measure attitudes related to the private rights of business owners to maintain racially segregated facilities. In this instance, I have

adapted the scale to measure attitudes toward the private rights of business owners to refuse service or hire LGBT people.




Figure 4.1: Role of Government Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

The frequency distribution of responses for each question is shown in Appendix A, Q2a-b. The distributions of both items exhibit a pronounced negative skew, as a clear majority of survey participants agree or strongly agree with laws which prohibit discrimination against LGBTQ people in the provision of services (84 percent) and in hiring (90.5 percent).

These two items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *private rights* scale (see Appendix B). To maintain the liberal – conservative continuum, both items are reverse coded. Values on the scale range from 2 – 10 and, as Appendix B shows, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .742$). Again, low scores represent the liberal position that civil

rights claims outweigh private rights claims; while, high scores represent the converse conservative position. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution and median scores on the private rights scale divided by categorical indicators of sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, median scores on the scale are low across all categories of identity. This is expected as the rights in question directly implicate the sexual and gender identities of survey participants. Later analyses will test this assumption and assess the strength of the relationship between identity and private rights.




Figure 4.2: Private Rights Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Egalitarianism

Egalitarianism refers to individual beliefs about inequality, specifically, the “causes and consequences of income inequality” (Feldman 1993:169). The three-item measure used here is

adapted from Kluegel and Smith's (1986) egalitarianism scale and measures participants' attitudes toward income inequality. The frequency distribution of survey responses for each of the three items is shown in Appendix A, Q3a-c. The distribution of the first item (Q3a) is negatively skewed, as more than two-thirds of survey participants (67.4 percent) either agree or strongly agree that "equality of income would avoid" class-based conflict. The second item (Q3b) is platykurtic – more closely approximating a normal curve, with most responses clustered around the center of the distribution, while the distribution of the third item (Q3c) is negatively skewed. In short, as a reason to support equality of income, a plurality of participants (41.5 percent) believe "everybody's contribution to society" is "equally important;" while, a majority (59.6 percent) of participants either agree or strongly agree that "every family's needs" are the same.

These three items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *egalitarianism* scale (see Appendix B). To maintain the liberal – conservative continuum, two items are reverse coded. Values on the egalitarianism scale range from 3 – 15 and, as Appendix B shows, the scale exhibits a relatively strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .664$). Low scores represent the liberal position favoring economic equality, while high scores represent the converse conservative position. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution and median scores on the egalitarianism scale divided by categorical indicators of sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, the distribution of values on this scale shows greater variation than the two previous scales. Median scores on the scale appear consistently higher among gay-identified participants across all categories of racial identity, while Black participants exhibit consistently lower scores across categories of sexual identity. Consistent with results described in chapter 3, the distribution of scores on the egalitarianism scale appears similar between Latino/a and White survey participants.




Figure 4.3: Egalitarianism Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Policy-Specific Attitudes

Because policy-specific indicators often reveal greater variation across categories of identity (Holbrook, Sterrett, Johnson, and Krysan 2016), along with the three attitudinal indices, three policy-specific items are included as response variables: gun control, immigration, and abortion. As the data in Appendix A, Q4a indicate, attitudes toward gun control exhibit a relatively normal platykurtic distribution. Less than one-third of respondents either strongly agree (14.5 percent) or disagree (17.5 percent) with the statement, “Government should do more to protect the rights of gun owners.” As Appendix B shows, attitudes toward gun control are operationalized as the variable *gun control*. Values range from 1 – 5 and, again, low scores

represent the liberal position favoring gun control; while, high scores represent the converse conservative position.

As Appendix A, Q4b shows, the distribution of attitudes toward immigration among the sample show a pronounced positive skew. That is, a majority of survey participants (57.7 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, “Immigrants to the United States burden the country because they take our jobs.” As Appendix B shows, attitudes toward immigration are operationalized as the variable *immigration*. Values range from 1 – 5, where low scores represent the liberal position favoring immigration and high scores represent the converse conservative position.

Finally, as Appendix A, Q4c shows, the distribution of attitudes toward abortion among the sample exhibit a pronounced negative skew, as a majority of survey participants either agree or strongly agree (66.2 percent) with the statement, “There should be no restrictions on the ability of a woman to get an abortion.” As Appendix B shows, attitudes toward abortion are operationalized as the variable *abortion*. The values are reverse coded to maintain the liberal – conservative continuum. Again, values range from 1 – 5 and low scores represent the liberal position supporting fewer restrictions on abortion; while, high scores represent the converse conservative position.

Political Behavior: Participation & Alienation

Two aspects of political behavior are analyzed in this study, political participation and political alienation. Political participation is measured using a scale adapted from the National Election Studies (ANES) model (Brady 1993) which is composed of items related to traditional aspects of political action such as voting, volunteering, attending, meetings, and donating money. Appendix A, Q5a-f shows the distribution of responses for each behavior in the study. Not

surprisingly, the distribution of items one (Q5a) and two (Q5b), related to voting, as well as item three (Q5c), exhibit a pronounced negative skew. That is, a majority of survey participants report voting either sometimes or often for presidential candidates in primary (81.8 percent) and general (87.8 percent) elections, and attempting to persuade people to vote for a particular party or candidate (66.5 percent). Conversely, the distributions of items four (Q5c), five (Q5e), and six (Q5f) in Appendix A show pronounced positive skews, as a majority of survey participants report rarely or never attending a political meeting (71 percent), contributing money to a political cause (70.8 percent), or volunteering with a political interest group (74.9 percent).

These six items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *political participation* scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 6 – 24 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .794$). Low scores on the scale represent less political participation while high scores represent more political participation. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution and median scores on the political behavior scale divided by categories of sexual and racial identity. As with the attitudinal measures, median scores appear to vary across all categories; however, there appears to be no immediately discernable pattern. The lowest median score appears among gays who identify as a racial minority other than Black, Latino/a, or Asian, and the highest median score appears among Whites who identify as a sexual minority other than gay, lesbian, or bisexual.




Figure 4.4: Political Participation Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

Lastly, political alienation, is defined as “powerlessness, self-estrangement, political ineffectiveness, and disorientation toward the political system” (Reef and Knoke 1993:433). In this study, the concept is measured using a four-item scale adapted from Malik (1982). Appendix A, Q6a-d shows the distribution of responses for each item on the scale. The distribution of items two (Q6b) and three (Q6c) are negatively skewed, as a majority of survey participants (52.7 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree that “there is no way whereby we can influence governmental decision-making;” while a plurality (45.5 percent) either disagree or strongly disagree that “we are unable to do anything against” the government in the event we are “mistreat[ed].” Conversely, the distribution of items one (Q6a) and four (Q6d) are positively skewed – with a plurality of survey participants (44.7 percent) either agreeing or strongly agreeing that “governmental and political affairs look so complex that I am unable to understand

them” and, a majority of participants (53.1 percent) either agreeing or strongly agreeing that “the government does not care for people like me.”




Figure 5.5: Political Alienation Scale Distribution by Sexual Identity and Racial Identity

These four items comprise an additive index operationalized as the *political alienation* scale (see Appendix B). As Appendix B shows, values on the scale range from 5 – 20 and, the scale exhibits a strong alpha reliability level ($\alpha = .659$). Low scores on the scale represent feeling less political alienation while high scores represent more political alienation. Figure 5.5 shows the distribution and median scores on the political alienation scale divided by categories of sexual and racial identity. As the figure shows, political alienation varies all categories of sexual and racial identity. The lowest median scores appear among lesbian-identified Asian survey

participants, while the highest median scores appear among lesbian-identified Black participants. Latino/a, Asian, and White bisexuals exhibit the highest median scores within their respective racial identity categories.

Explaining Political Outcomes

The analysis of response distributions, alone, again confirms the intersectional tenant of intra-group heterogeneity. However, categorical identity indicators do not provide an accurate description of LGBTQ politics. As this study argues, the relationship between politics and identity is more nuanced. In the following sections, I review the results of eight OLS regression model estimations (Aiken and West 1991) using the dependent and independent variables described in this and the previous chapters (see Appendix B; see Appendix C for a correlation matrix of all independent variables used in regression estimations).

Attitudes: Role of Government

Table 4.1 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the role of government scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 1a is significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and, explains roughly thirty percent of the variation in the role of government scale ($r^2 = .298$). Diagnostics reveal normality in model residuals ($W = .996$; $z = 1.92$, $p = .027$) and no problem with heteroscedasticity ($LM = .798$, $p = .670$) or multicollinearity ($VIF = 1.53$).

All attitudinal scales are operationalized on a liberal – conservative continuum, i.e., negative coefficients are associated with policy liberalism while, positive coefficients are associated with policy conservatism. After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the

Table 4.1: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Role of Government

Variable	Model 1a		Model 1b	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	-.054***	.012	-.051***	.012
SI Private Regard	-.044**	.018	-.047**	.018
SI Public Regard	.070***	.016	.063***	.016
SI Stigma	.028*	.017	-.070**	.031
RI Centrality	.007	.012	.006	.012
RI Private Regard	.029	.018	.029	.018
RI Public Regard	-.008	.015	-.016	.015
RI Stigma	.032*	.017	-.157**	.053
Gender	-.330**	.136	-.308**	.136
Network Diversity	.008	.012	.012	.012
Income	.059*	.034	.053	.033
Education	.028	.050	.022	.050
Unemployment	-.093	.157	-.092	.156
Age	-.016***	.004	-.015**	.004
Religious Affiliation				
<i>Christian</i>	.560***	.158	.544***	.157
<i>Other Religion</i>	.123	.186	.166	.184
Urbanity	.107	.130	.092	.129
Party ID				
<i>Republican</i>	.661**	.229	.632**	.227
<i>Democrat</i>	-.884***	.181	-.907***	.180
Ideology	-.353***	.061	-.354***	.060
Interaction Terms				
<i>SI Stigma x RI Stigma</i>	-	-	.009***	.002
Constant	9.30***	.759	11.4***	.953
N	1106		1106	
F	23.09***		22.9***	
r²	.298		.307	
Mean VIF	1.53		4.08	

* $p \leq .1$ ** $p \leq .05$ *** $p \leq .01$

coefficient estimates of nine independent variables achieve statistical significance. Consistent with H1, H2, and H3, the coefficient estimates for SI centrality, private and public regard are statistically significant at either the ninety-five percent or ninety-nine percent confidence level. The direction of the relationship between SI centrality, private regard and the role of government scale are also consistent with H1 and H2. That is, SI centrality ($\beta = -.054$, $p = .000$) and private regard ($\beta = -.044$, $p = .016$) are positively associated with policy liberalism. Although significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level, the direction of the relationship between SI public regard and the dependent variable is the converse of that predicted in H3. In this case, SI public regard ($\beta = .070$, $p = .000$) is associated with policy conservatism.

Although no racial identity coefficient estimate achieves statistical significance, consistent with H5, at the ninety percent confidence level, the coefficient estimates of both SI and RI stigma are statistically significant. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship between both variables and the role of government scale is consistent with H5. That is, SI stigma ($\beta = .028$, $p = .090$) and RI stigma ($\beta = .032$, $p = .066$) are positively associated with policy conservatism. Studies of political behavior suggest stigmatization increases identity salience which, in turn, motivates political action to eliminate societal inequalities related to that identity (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Lien 1994; Miller, et al. 1981). The correlational findings in chapter 3 are consistent with this theory, in that stigmatization is strongly correlated with identity centrality. The effect of stigmatization on political attitudes, however, is not as clearly defined in the literature. Bedolla (2007:242) asserts that stigmatization across multiple axes of identity not only discourage political participation, but make those who experience intersectional stigmatization “less likely to challenge the structural barriers they face.”

In order to evaluate this intersectional claim, I estimate Model 1b in Table 4.1 with an interaction term – operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales (Frederich 1982; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). As Model 1b shows, the coefficient estimates of both the SI and RI stigma scales remain statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level; however, the directionality of the relationship to the role of government scale reverse from Model 1a to Model 1b. Consistent with intersectional scholarship, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level, and in the expected direction. That is, while SI and RI stigmatization exhibit independent main effects – i.e., are associated with policy liberalism, intersectional stigmatization is associated with policy conservatism ($\beta = .009$, $p = .000$). The results presented here suggest that the individual effects of identity-based stigmatization are increasing identity salience and concomitant political attitudinal and behavioral orientations which reflect a challenge to the discriminatory status quo. When identity-based stigmatization is experienced across multiple social identities simultaneously, however, the likelihood that an individual will attitudinally challenge the status quo, even regarding a relevant policy issue such as the provision of government services, is diminished.

As Model 1b in Table 4.1 shows, the coefficient estimate for gender is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and negatively related to the role of government scale ($\beta = -.308$, $p = .023$). Cisgender females in this sample, then, hold more liberal attitudes toward the role of government than cisgender males. Similarly, the coefficient estimate for age is statistically significant and in the same direction ($\beta = -.015$, $p = .002$). Age, too, is associated with policy liberalism. Finally, as Model 1b in Table 4.1 shows, consistent with H9, the coefficient estimate for Christianity is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent

confidence level and positively related to the role of government scale ($\beta = .544, p = .001$). As the model uses non-religious participants as the base category, survey participants who identify as Christian hold significantly more conservative attitudes toward the role of government than non-religious participants.

Attitudes: Private Rights

Table 4.2 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the private rights scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 2a is significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains slightly more than sixteen percent of the variation in the private rights scale ($r^2 = .168$). Diagnostics show normality in the residuals of Model 2a ($W = .856; z = 11.4, p = .000$), and no problems with multicollinearity ($VIF = 1.53$); however, there appears to be an issue with heteroscedasticity ($LM = 26.6, p = .000$). For this reason, I estimate Model 2b in Table 4.1 using robust standard errors.

After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates of only five variables achieve statistical significance in Model 2b. Consistent with H2, the coefficient estimates for SI and RI private regard are statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent and ninety-five percent confidence levels, respectively, and in the hypothesized directions ($\beta = -.093, p = .000$ and $\beta = -.012, p = .002$, respectively). While the coefficient estimate for SI public regard is statistically significant, the directionality of the relationship is, again, contrary to H3. Interestingly, SI public regard is positively related to policy conservatism ($\beta = .033, p = .003$), even when the policy in question directly implicates sexual identity by permitting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity.

Again, the coefficient estimates for the SI and RI stigmatization scales achieve statistical significance, although, in opposing directions ($\beta = -.024, p = .048$ and $\beta = .027, p = .034$,

Table 4.2: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Private Rights

Variable	Model 2a		Model 2b	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	-.006	.009	-.006	.008
SI Private Regard	-.093***	.013	-.093**	.013
SI Public Regard	.033**	.011	.033**	.011
SI Stigma	-.024**	.012	-.024**	.012
RI Centrality	.014	.009	.014	.009
RI Private Regard	-.046***	.013	-.046**	.014
RI Public Regard	-.012	.011	-.012	.012
RI Stigma	.027**	.012	.027**	.012
Gender	-.118	.098	-.118	.094
Network Diversity	-.0004	.008	.0004	.009
Income	.022	.024	.022	.024
Education	-.014	.036	-.014	.035
Unemployment	-.053	.114	-.053	.113
Age	.001	.003	.001	.003
Religious Affiliation				
<i>Christian</i>	.104	.114	.104	.113
<i>Other Religion</i>	.017	.134	.017	.119
Urbanity	.047	.094	.047	.091
Party ID				
<i>Republican</i>	.206*	.165	.305*	.183
<i>Democrat</i>	-.235*	.131	-.235*	.139
Ideology	-.119**	.044	-.119**	.048
Constant	6.43***	.549	6.43***	.572
N	1106		1106	
F	10.99***		11.81***	
r²	.168		.168	
Mean VIF	1.53		1.53	

* $p \leq .1$ ** $p \leq .05$ *** $p \leq .01$

respectively). Unlike with the role of government scale, alternate regression modeling using an interaction term yields no significant changes in the model specification.

In this case, it appears that while sexual stigma increases the likelihood that one supports civil rights of LGBTQ people over the private rights of business owners, racial stigma exhibits the converse relationship. That is not to say there is no intersectional effect, however. That is, experience with racial discrimination may not increase policy conservatism as much as make it less likely that one would expose themselves to further stigmatization by advocating for a policy which may expose their sexual identity.

Attitudes: Egalitarianism

Table 4.3 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the egalitarianism scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 3a is significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains more than twenty-one percent of the variation in the egalitarianism scale ($r^2 = .216$). Diagnostics show normality in model residuals ($W = .995$; $z = 2.88$, $p = .001$), and no problems with either heteroscedasticity ($LM = 3.07$, $p = .214$) or multicollinearity ($VIF = 1.53$).

After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for seven independent variables achieve statistical significance. Consistent with H1, H2, and H3, the coefficient estimates for SI centrality, public and private regard are all statistically significant at either the ninety-five percent or ninety-nine percent confidence level. Coefficients for both SI centrality and private regard are in the hypothesized direction; while, again, the coefficient estimate for SI public regard is positively related to the egalitarianism scale, the converse of H3. SI centrality and private regard are positively related to policy liberalism ($\beta = -.040$, $p = .009$, and $\beta = -.102$, $p = .021$, respectively), while SI public regard is positively related to policy

Table 4.3: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Egalitarianism

Variable	Model 3a	
	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	-.040**	.015
SI Private Regard	-.102***	.021
SI Public Regard	.045**	.019
SI Stigma	-.023	.020
RI Centrality	-.014	.014
RI Private Regard	.038*	.021
RI Public Regard	-.031	.018
RI Stigma	-.015	.021
Gender	-.710***	.162
Network Diversity	-.005	.014
Income	.211***	.040
Education	-.013	.059
Unemployment	-.359*	.187
Age	-.007	.005
Religious Affiliation		
Christian	-.004	.187
Other Religion	.067	.220
Urbanity	-.110	.154
Party ID		
Republican	.307	.271
Democrat	-.739***	.215
Ideology	-.339***	.072
Constant	12.5***	.900
N	1106	
F	15.0***	
r ²	.216	
Mean VIF	1.53	

* $p \leq .1$

** $p \leq .05$

*** $p \leq .01$

conservatism ($\beta = .045$, $p = .021$). Only one racial identity coefficient estimate shows significance; although only at the ninety percent confidence level and, the observed direction of the relationship is the converse of that predicted in H2. In this case, RI private regard is positively related to the egalitarianism scale ($\beta = .038$, $p = .075$).

Again, the coefficient estimate for gender shows significance at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and, in a negative direction ($\beta = -.710$, $p = .000$). In this sample, cisgender females exhibit significantly more policy liberalism regarding income equality than cisgender males. Finally, the coefficient estimates for two context variables achieve statistical significance. First, income is positively related to policy conservatism at the ninety-nine percent confidence level ($\beta = .211$, $p = .000$). This is consistent with H6, although the directionality is transposed. The finding is intuitive, however, as survey participants with more personal wealth are more reluctant to support policies which would mandate income equality. Second, consistent with H8, unemployment is positively related to policy liberalism ($\beta = -.359$, $p = .055$).

Political Attitudes: Policy Specifics

Table 4.4 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using gun control as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 4a is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains slightly more than thirty percent of the variation in attitudes toward gun control ($r^2 = .307$). Diagnostics show normality in model residuals ($W = .997$; $z = 1.73$, $p = .041$) and, no problems with multicollinearity ($VIF = 1.53$); however, there appears to be an issue with heteroscedasticity ($LM = 38.5$, $p = .000$). For this reason, I estimate Model 4b in Table 4.4 with robust standard errors.

After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for ten independent variables achieve statistical significance in Model 4b. Consistent with H1, H2 and

Table 4.4: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Gun Control

Variable	Model 4a		Model 4b ^a		Model 4c ^a	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	-.019**	.006	-.019**	.007	-.018**	.007
SI Private Regard	.004	.009	.004	.011	.003	.010
SI Public Regard	.022**	.008	.022**	.009	.019**	.009
SI Stigma	-.013	.009	-.013	.009	-.054***	.018
RI Centrality	.004	.006	.004	.010	.003	.007
RI Private Regard	.028**	.009	.028**	.010	.028**	.010
RI Public Regard	-.004	.008	-.004	.009	-.007	.009
RI Stigma	.047***	.009	.047***	.009	-.031	.032
Gender	.032	.073	.032	.073	.041	.072
Network Diversity	-.008	.006	-.008	.007	-.007	.007
Income	-.041**	.018	-.041**	.018	-.043**	.018
Education	-.051*	.027	-.051*	.026	-.054**	.026
Unemployment	-.201**	.084	-.201**	.085	-.201**	.084
Age	-.019***	.002	-.019***	.002	-.019***	.002
Religious Affiliation						
<i>Christian</i>	.295***	.084	.295***	.083	.289***	.082
<i>Other Religion</i>	.093	.099	.093	.092	.090	.092
Urbanity	-.168**	.069	-.168**	.068	-.174**	.068
Party ID						
<i>Republican</i>	.310**	.122	.310**	.125	.298**	.124
<i>Democrat</i>	-.079**	.097	-.602***	.102	-.612***	.102
Ideology	-.079**	.032	-.079**	.036	-.079**	.036
Interaction Terms						
<i>SI Stigma x RI Stigma</i>	-	-	-	-	.003**	.001
Constant	3.72***	.406	3.72***	.421	4.63***	.531
N	1106		1106		1106	
F	24.06***		34.3***		23.48***	
r²	.307		.307		.312	
Mean VIF	1.53		1.53		4.08	

^a model estimated with robust standard errors* $p \leq .1$ ** $p \leq .05$ *** $p \leq .01$

H3, the coefficient estimates for SI centrality and public regard and RI private regard are statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level. As predicted, SI centrality is positively related to policy liberalism ($\beta = -.019$, $p = .008$); however, both SI public regard ($\beta = .022$, $p = .015$) and RI private regard ($\beta = .028$, $p = .006$) are positively related to policy conservatism.

Consistent with H5, the coefficient estimate for RI stigma is statistically significant and positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .047$, $p = .000$). Given previous findings regarding stigmatization, however, Model 4c in Table 4.4 is estimated with an interaction term – again, operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales. From Model 4b to Model 4c, the coefficient estimate for RI stigma no longer achieves statistical significance; however, the direction of the relationship with the dependent variable is reversed. With the inclusion of the interaction term, the coefficient estimate for SI stigma achieves statistical significance at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and exhibits a negative relationship ($\beta = -.054$, $p = .001$) with policy conservatism.

Finally, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and exhibits a positive relationship ($\beta = .003$, $p = .004$) with policy conservatism. While inconsistent with H5, this finding comports with previous research (Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b) in that SI stigmatization, alone, is associated with a challenge to the status quo, i.e., policy liberalism. However, as previously described, when identity-based stigmatization is experienced across multiple social identities simultaneously, the likelihood that an individual will attitudinally challenge the status quo is diminished.

Table 4.5 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using immigration as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 5a is statistically significant at the ninety-nine

Table 4.5: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Immigration

Variable	Model 5a		Model 5b ^a		Model 5c ^a	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	-.006	.007	-.006	.007	-.004	.007
SI Private Regard	-.028**	.010	-.028**	.010	-.029**	.010
SI Public Regard	.020**	.009	.020**	.009	.017*	.009
SI Stigma	-.001	.009	-.001	.009	-.014**	.019
RI Centrality	.013**	.006	.013*	.007	.013*	.007
RI Private Regard	.011	.010	.011	.010	.011	.010
RI Public Regard	.033***	.008	.033***	.009	.030***	.009
RI Stigma	.051***	.009	.051***	.010	-.025	.034
Gender	-.049	.075	-.049	.075	-.040	.075
Network Diversity	-.008	.006	-.008	.007	-.006	.007
Income	-.042**	.018	-.042**	.018	-.044**	.018
Education	-.018	.028	-.018	.027	-.020	.027
Unemployment	-.061	.087	-.061	.088	-.060	.087
Age	.0007	.002	.0007	.002	.009	.002
Religious Affiliation						
<i>Christian</i>	.301***	.087	.301***	.085	.295***	.085
<i>Other Religion</i>	-.003	.103	-.003	.094	-.006	.094
Urbanity	-.083	.072	-.083	.072	-.089	.072
Party ID						
<i>Republican</i>	.561***	.127	.561***	.137	.549***	.137
<i>Democrat</i>	-.366***	.100	-.366**	.117	-.376***	.117
Ideology	-.112***	.033	-.112**	.036	-.112**	.036
Interaction Terms						
<i>SI Stigma x RI Stigma</i>	-	-	-	-	.003**	.001
Constant	1.97***	.421	1.97***	.423	2.86***	.545
N	1106		1106		1106	
F	20.15***		25.8***		25.05***	
r²	.270		.270		.275	
Mean VIF	1.53		1.53		4.08	

^a model estimated with robust standard errors* $p \leq .1$ ** $p \leq .05$ *** $p \leq .01$

percent confidence level and explains roughly twenty-seven percent of the variance in attitudes toward immigration ($r^2 = .270$). Diagnostics show normality in model residuals ($W = .983$; $z = 6.05$, $p = .000$) and no problems with multicollinearity ($VIF = 1.53$); however, there appears to be an issue with heteroscedasticity ($LM = 51.1$, $p = .000$). Because of this, I estimate Model 5b with robust standard errors.

After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for seven independent variables achieve statistical significance in Model 5b. Consistent with H2 and H3, the coefficient estimates for SI private and public regard are statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level. As predicted, SI private regard is positively related to policy liberalism ($\beta = -.028$, $p = .009$); however, again, SI public regard exhibits a positive relationship with policy conservatism ($\beta = .020$, $p = .041$). Also, consistent with H1 and H3, coefficient estimates for RI centrality and public regard are statistically significant at the ninety percent and ninety-nine percent confidence levels, respectively. In both cases, the direction of the relationship is the converse of that specified by the relevant hypotheses. Both RI centrality ($\beta = .013$, $p = .055$) and RI public regard ($\beta = .033$, $p = .000$) are positively related to policy conservatism.

Consistent with H5, Model 5b shows the coefficient estimate for RI stigma is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .051$, $p = .000$). Again, to better model the intersectional effect of stigmatization, Model 5c in Table 5.5 is estimated with an interaction term – operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales. As Model 5c shows, the coefficient estimate for RI stigma no longer achieve statistical significance; however, the direction of the relationship with the dependent variable is reversed. With the inclusion of the interaction term, the coefficient estimate for SI

stigma achieves statistical significance at the ninety-five percent confidence level and exhibits a negative relationship ($\beta = -.014$, $p = .029$) with policy conservatism. Finally, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and positively related ($\beta = .003$, $p = .020$) to policy conservatism. As with attitudes toward gun control, SI stigma and RI stigma (although not statistically significant in this case), independently, are associated with an attitudinal challenge to immigration policy status quo, i.e., policy liberalism. However, again, when identity-based stigmatization is experienced across multiple social identities simultaneously, the likelihood that an individual will attitudinally challenge the status quo is diminished.

As Model 5c in Table 4.5 shows, consistent with H9, the coefficient estimate for Christian religiosity is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and in the hypothesized direction. That is, survey participants who identify as Christian exhibit more conservative attitudes toward immigration ($\beta = .295$, $p = .001$) than participants who do not identify as religious. Finally, consistent with H6, the coefficient estimate for income is positively associated with policy liberalism ($\beta = -.044$, $p = .016$) and in the hypothesized direction.

Table 4.6 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using abortion as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 6a is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains only about eighteen percent of the variation in attitudes toward abortion ($r^2 = .189$). Diagnostics show normality in the model residuals ($W = .966$; $z = 7.83$, $p = .000$) and no problems with multicollinearity ($VIF = 1.53$); however, again, there appears to be an issue with heteroscedasticity ($LM = 69.5$, $p = .000$). For this reason, Model 6b in Table 4.6 is estimated using robust standard errors.

Table 4.6: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Abortion

Variable	Model 6a		Model 6b ^a	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	-.006	.007	-.006	.007
SI Private Regard	-.033**	.010	-.033**	.011
SI Public Regard	.006	.009	.006	.009
SI Stigma	-.006	.009	-.006	.010
RI Centrality	-.011	.007	-.011	.007
RI Private Regard	.033***	.010	.033**	.010
RI Public Regard	-.011	.009	-.011	.009
RI Stigma	-.012	.010	-.012	.010
Gender	-.125	.077	-.125	.077
Network Diversity	.007	.006	.007	.007
Income	-.045**	.019	-.045**	.018
Education	.012	.028	-.012	.027
Unemployment	.018	.089	.018	.090
Age	-.005**	.002	-.005**	.002
Religious Affiliation				
<i>Christian</i>	.524***	.090	.524***	.086
<i>Other Religion</i>	.242**	.105	.242**	.096
Urbanity	-.228**	.074	-.228**	.074
Party ID				
<i>Republican</i>	.209	.130	.209	.143
<i>Democrat</i>	-.398***	.105	-.398***	.109
Ideology	-.105**	.034	-.105**	.040
Constant	3.88***	.432	3.88***	.433
N	1106		1106	
F	12.64***		13.75***	
r²	.189		.189	
Mean VIF	1.53		1.53	

^a model estimated with robust standard errors

* p ≤ .1

** p ≤ .05

*** p ≤ .01

After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the coefficient estimates for seven independent variables achieve statistical significance in Model 6b. Consistent with H2, the coefficient estimates for SI and RI private regard are statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level. While the relationship between SI private regard and the dependent variable is in the expected, negative ($\beta = -.033$, $p = .004$), direction, as Model 6b shows, there is a positive relationship between RI private regard ($\beta = .003$, $p = .002$) and policy conservatism. Regarding attitudes toward abortion, contextual factors appear to have the most significant effects. Consistent with H6, the coefficient estimate for income is significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and positively related to policy liberalism ($\beta = -.045$, $p = .016$). Similarly, the coefficient estimate for age ($\beta = -.005$, $p = .035$) and urbanity ($\beta = -.228$, $p = .002$) are statistically significant and positively related to policy liberalism. Finally, consistent with H9, the coefficient estimates for both categorical religion indicators are statistically significant. As the model uses non-religious participants as the base category, survey participants who identify as Christian ($\beta = .524$, $p = .000$) or with another religion ($\beta = .242$, $p = .012$) hold significantly more conservative attitudes toward abortion than non-religious participants.

Political Attitudes: Summary of Findings

After reviewing the attitudinal models, a number of significant findings appear. First, consistent with H1 and H2, the relationship between SI centrality, private regard at the attitudinal dependent variables, where statistically significant, is in the expected negative direction. That is, a sexual minority identity which is a central part of a person's definition of self is related to policy liberalism. Similarly, a positive affective evaluation of one's sexual minority identity is also related to policy liberalism. An unexpected relationship emerges, however, between SI public regard and policy conservatism. It appears the more LGBTQ people perceive society as

accepting of their sexual identity, the more conservative the political attitudes they hold. This relationship is statistically significant in every attitudinal model except attitudes toward abortion. In that case, as Model 6b in Table 4.6 shows, while not statistically significant, the directionality of the relationship remains consistent. In light of intersectional scholarship, this finding is intuitive and consistent with H5b. That is, a perception of oppression is associated with a political orientation which challenges inequality in society. However, when oppression is not perceived, there appears to be no motivation to challenge the political status quo.

This finding is bolstered by evidence from the analysis of stigmatization. A cursory examination of the regression modeling yields contradictory results, in that RI stigmatization, when significant, is consistently positively related to the attitudinal dependent variables; while, SI stigmatization, when significant, exhibits both positive and negative relationships with policy conservatism. While consistent with H5, this does not appear to be an accurate representation of the relationship between identity-based stigmatization and political attitudes. Model 1b in Table 4.1, Model 4c in Table 4.4, and Model 5c in Table 4.5, which include interaction terms representing intersectional stigmatization, yield results consistent with previous research (Bedolla 2007; Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b) and appear to more accurately model this relationship.

The evidence presented here suggests that both experience with and perception of stigmatization are significant predictors of political attitudes (Sidanius, et al. 1997; Schildkraut 2005). Although observed with political behavior (Swank and Fahs 2013a; 2013b), the intersectional effects of stigmatization on political attitudes is rarely discussed in the political literature (Bedolla 2007). It appears that, like political behavior, intersectional stigmatization lessens the likelihood that an individual will – even attitudinally – challenge the political status

quo by adopting a liberal political position – even regarding policies such as the provision of government services and immigration, which likely have direct bearing on their livelihood.

Consistent with H1b, H1c, H2b, and H3b, a review of the models in the previous sections also shows a pattern of negative relationships between the racial identity indices and the attitudinal dependent variables. This is especially noticeable in Models 5a, 5b, and 5c in Table 4.5 – regarding the relationship between racial identity and attitudes toward immigration. The pattern observed in these models, specifically, is consistent with H1c which posits that RI centrality will be positively associated with policy conservatism, especially when the policy in question challenges White racial identity. Because the relationships between RI centrality, private and public regard are consistent across most of the attitudinal dependent variables, the overrepresentation of White survey participants in the sample may skew the coefficient estimates for these indicators. Indeed, in alternate regression modeling (analysis not shown) using only White RI centrality, public and private regard indicators, RI centrality and private regard are consistently positively related to policy conservatism. White RI public regard, however, exhibits a consistent negative relationship with policy conservatism (see Appendix D for alternate regression modes). As discussed in chapter 3, this suggests the relationship between political attitudes and White racial identity somewhat contradicts Hurtado and Stewart (1997), in that, White identity public regard may act as a barometer for understanding ‘White privilege.’ While White centrality is associated with policy conservatism, when White participants recognize the privilege afforded their racial identity – indicated by high scores on the RI public regard scale – it appears they are more likely to favor policy liberalism. Future research should evaluate this claim with appropriate survey data.

Finally, consistent with H6-9, all socio-economic and socio-cultural variables achieve statistical significance in relation to the attitudinal dependent variables. Income was the most consistent socio-economic predictor of political attitudes, exhibiting a statistically significant relationship with five out of six attitudinal dependent variables. While positively related to gun control, immigration, and abortion policy liberalism, regression model estimates for the role of government and egalitarianism scales exhibit the converse relationship. Similarly, Christian religiosity exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship with four of the six attitudinal dependent variables. In each case – role of government, gun control, immigration, and abortion – as compared to the base category of non-religious survey participants, Christian religiosity is related to policy conservatism.

Political Participation & Alienation

Table 4.7 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the political participation scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 7a is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains more than twenty-seven percent of the variation in the political behavior scale ($r^2 = .274$). Diagnostics show normality in model residuals ($W = .997$; $z = 1.37$, $p = .085$) and no problems with multicollinearity ($VIF = 4.08$); however, there does appear to be an issue with heteroscedasticity ($LM = 14.2$, $p = .000$). For this reason, Model 7b in Table 4.7 is estimated using robust standard errors.

The political participation scale is operationalized so that low values on the scale represent less political participation and high values represent more political participation in Model 7b. Therefore, negative coefficients equate to reduced participation while positive coefficients equate to increased participation. After controlling for partisanship and political ideology, the regression coefficients of eight independent variables achieve statistical

Table 4.7: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Political Participation

Variable	Model 7a		Model 7b ^a	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	.071***	.021	.071***	.021
SI Private Regard	.033	.031	.033	.031
SI Public Regard	.049*	.027	.049*	.028
SI Stigma	.144**	.053	.144***	.058
RI Centrality	.025	.021	.025	.020
RI Private Regard	-.060**	.030	-.060	.029
RI Public Regard	.017	.026	.017	.026
RI Stigma	.161*	.090	.161***	.101
Gender	.040	.230	.040	.236
Network Diversity	.004	.020	.004	.020
Income	.286***	.057	.286***	.058
Education	.242**	.085	.242**	.084
Unemployment	-.724**	.265	-.724**	.276
Age	.017**	.008	.017**	.008
Religious Affiliation				
<i>Christian</i>	.104	.265	.104	.264
<i>Other Religion</i>	-.008	.312	-.008	.294
Urbanity	-.115	.219	-.115	.222
Party ID				
<i>Republican</i>	1.78***	.385	1.78***	.414
<i>Democrat</i>	2.24***	.305	2.24***	.348
Ideology	-.147	.103	-.147	.107
Interaction Terms				
<i>SI Stigma x RI Stigma</i>	-.001	.004	-.001	.004
Constant	4.82***	1.61	4.82***	1.74
N	1106		1106	
F	19.54***		22.16***	
r²	.274		.274	
Mean VIF	4.08		4.08	

^a model estimated with robust standard errors

* p ≤ .1

** p ≤ .05

*** p ≤ .01

significance. Consistent with H1 and H3, the coefficient estimates for SI centrality and public regard are statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent and ninety percent confidence levels, respectively. Furthermore, both SI centrality ($\beta = .072$, $p = .001$) and public regard ($\beta = .047$, $p = .083$) are positively related to political participation.

Consistent with H5, the coefficient estimates for SI and RI stigmatization are statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent variable. To test for intersection effects, an interaction term is included – again, operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales. As Model 7b in Table 4.7 shows, there is no significant interactive stigmatization effect on political participation. That is, both SI stigma ($\beta = .144$, $p = .000$) and RI stigma ($\beta = .161$, $p = .000$) are associated with independent increases in political participation.

Finally, consistent with H6, H7, H8 and political resource theory (Brady, et al. 1995), the coefficient estimates for income, education, age and unemployment are statistically significant. As Model 7b in Table 4.7 shows, income ($\beta = .286$, $p = .000$), education ($\beta = .241$, $p = .005$), and age ($\beta = .017$, $p = .036$) are positively associated with the dependent variable; while, unemployment ($\beta = -.724$, $p = .006$) is negatively associated with political participation.

Table 4.8 shows the results of OLS regression estimation using the political alienation scale as the dependent variable. As the table shows, Model 8 is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and explains slightly more than seventeen percent of the variation in political alienation ($r^2 = .173$). Diagnostics shows normality in model residuals ($W = .998$; $z = .675$, $p = .249$) and no problems with multicollinearity ($VIF = 4.08$) or heteroscedasticity ($LM = .657$, $p = .719$).

Table 4.8: OLS Regression Estimation, DV = Political Alienation

Variable	Model 8	
	Coefficient	S.E.
SI Centrality	-.013	.019
SI Private Regard	-.033	.027
SI Public Regard	-.041*	.024
SI Stigma	-.185***	.047
RI Centrality	.005	.018
RI Private Regard	-.003	.027
RI Public Regard	-.013	.024
RI Stigma	-.194**	.081
Gender	.335	.205
Network Diversity	-.066***	.018
Income	-.189***	.051
Education	-.143**	.076
Unemployment	-.088	.237
Age	-.018**	.007
Religious Affiliation		
Christian	.582**	.237
Other Religion	.093	.279
Urbanity	-.320	.196
Party ID		
Republican	-.721**	.344
Democrat	-.872***	.273
Ideology	.102	.092
Interaction Terms		
SI Stigma x RI Stigma	.018***	.003
Constant	18.6***	1.44
N	1106	
F	10.83***	
r ²	.173	
Mean VIF	4.08	

^a model estimated with robust standard errors

* p ≤ .1

** p ≤ .05

*** p ≤ .01

The political alienation scale is operationalized so that low values on the scale represent less political alienation while high scores represent more political alienation in Model 8.

Consistent with H3, the coefficient estimate for SI public regard is negatively related to the political alienation scale ($\beta = -.041$, $p = .098$). Intuitively, it appears the perception that society values one's sexual identity is associated with less political alienation. Again, consistent with H5, the coefficient estimates for SI and RI stigma are statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent and ninety-five percent confidence levels, respectively. As Model 8 indicates, both SI stigma ($\beta = -.185$, $p = .000$) and RI stigma ($\beta = -.194$, $p = .016$) are negatively related to political alienation when an interaction term – again, operationalized by multiplying the SI and RI stigma scales, is included in the regression model.

As the model also shows, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .018$, $p = .000$). As Model 8 shows, stigmatization exhibits an intersectional effect on political alienation. While SI and RI stigma exert independent negative effects on political alienation, stigmatization experienced across multiple social identities increases feelings of political powerlessness.

Consistent with H4, the coefficient estimate for network diversity is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and negatively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = -.066$, $p = .000$). As predicted, heterogeneity in social networks appears to reduce political alienation. Similarly, the coefficient estimates for income ($\beta = -.189$, $p = .000$), education ($\beta = -.143$, $p = .059$), and age ($\beta = -.018$, $p = .013$) are statistically significant and in the expected negative direction, consistent with H6 and H7. Conversely, and contrary to H9, the coefficient estimate for Christian religious affiliation is statistically significant at the ninety-five

percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .582, p = .014$). Survey participants who identify as Christian, then, experience more political alienation than participants who do not identify as religious. This is a curious finding considering religiosity is often considered a political resource which enables political activity (Brady, et al. 1995); however, as discussed in chapter 3, more than half (60.1 percent) of survey participants who identify as Christian report attending a church which does not affirm their sexual identity. It is possible this finding is reflective of the isolation, both social and political, brought about by attending a non-affirming congregation.

Intersectional Identity Effects

After reviewing the regression results, the most significant intersectional finding is related to stigmatization. As previously discussed, the main effect of both SI and RI stigmatization is an increase in policy liberalism and political participation, and a decrease in political alienation. Where statistically significant, the interactive effects of stigmatization, however, appear to result in policy conservatism, political alienation, and depressed political participation. While the primary goal of this study is to explain identity-based attitudinal and behavioral variation in LGBTQ politics, the intersectional approach undertaken here also demands an investigation of the effect of identity intersection, focusing on how much attitudinal and behavioral variation can be contributed to the phenomenon. In the final steps of this analysis, I conduct a series of hierarchical OLS regression estimations – which input ‘blocks’ of independent variables and measure the change in residual r^2 values to determine how much explanatory value the variables in each block contribute to the overall model (Becker and Scheufele 2011). To analyze the effect of sexual and racial identity intersection, four interaction terms are included as a ‘block’ in the model estimations. The interaction terms are

operationalized by multiplying the RI and SI centrality, private regard, and public regard scales (Frederich 1982; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006).

Model 9 and Model 10 in Table 4.9 show the results of hierarchical OLS regression estimation using the role of government and private rights scales, respectively, as dependent variables. As the table shows, independent variables are entered into the model in blocks, beginning with the partisanship and ideology control variables. The incremental r^2 values show the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the inclusion of each block of variables (Becker and Scheufele 2011). As Table 4.9 shows, the largest incremental r^2 value in Model 9 appears after the inclusion of the first variable block, or the control variables (21.3 %, $p = .000$); while the largest incremental r^2 value in Model 10 appears after the inclusion of block three – the sexual identity variables (7.8%, $p = .000$). As a whole, the sexual and racial identity variables account for more variation in the private rights scale than other variable blocks in the model.

Only one interaction term achieves statistical significance in the final standardized log odds for Model 9 in Table 4.9. In this case, consistent with previous OLS models, the coefficient estimate for the intersectional stigmatization variable is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level and positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .009$, $p = .000$). Also, as Model 9 in Table 4.9 shows, while small, the incremental r^2 value for block five (.012, $p = .001$) – the interaction terms – is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level, meaning the block explains a significant portion of the variation in the role of government scale beyond the other four blocks of variables. Similarly, only one interaction term achieves statistical significance in the final standardized log odds for Model 10 in Table 4.9. In this case, the coefficient estimate for the public regard interaction term is statistically significant at the

Table 4.9: Hierarchical OLS Regression Estimations, DV = Role of Government, Private Rights

	Model 9 DV = Role of Government		Model 10 DV = Private Rights	
	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds
Block 1: Controls				
<i>Republican</i>	.887***	.633**	.305*	.309*
<i>Democrat</i>	-1.01***	-.899***	-.329**	-.236*
<i>Ideology</i>	-.517***	-.354***	-.206***	-.119**
Incremental r^2	21.3%***		6.2%***	
Block 2: Context				
<i>Gender</i>	-.426**	-.314**	-.175*	-.115
<i>Network Diversity</i>	.011	.013	.002	-.0001
<i>Income</i>	.071**	.055	.020	.022
<i>Education</i>	.036	.025	.021	-.015
<i>Unemployment</i>	-.148	-.099	-.015	-.057
<i>Age</i>	.021***	-.015**	-.004	.002
<i>Christian</i>	.729***	.541***	.184	.100
<i>Other Religion</i>	.166	.110	.015	.022
<i>Urbanity</i>	.017	.019	.007	.023
Incremental r^2	3.9%***		1.0%	
Block 3: Sexual ID				
<i>SI Centrality</i>	-.055***	-.066**	.0009	.001
<i>SI Private Regard</i>	-.045**	-.084	-.116***	-.170**
<i>SI Public Regard</i>	.080***	.176**	.035**	.123**
<i>SI Stigma</i>	.045***	-.073**	-.003	-.015
Incremental r^2	3.8%**		7.8%***	
Block 4: Racial ID				
<i>RI Centrality</i>	.007	-.009	.014	.023
<i>RI Private Regard</i>	.029	-.010	-.046***	-.129**
<i>RI Public Regard</i>	-.009	.070	-.012	.059
<i>RI Stigma</i>	.032*	-.164**	.026**	.043
Incremental r^2	.8%**		1.7%***	
Block 5: Intersection				
<i>SI x RI Centrality</i>	.0006	.0006	-.0004	-.0004
<i>SI x RI Private Regard</i>	.001	.001	.003	.003
<i>SI x RI Public Regard</i>	-.005*	-.005*	-.004**	-.004**
<i>SI x RI Stigma</i>	.009**	.009**	-.0007	-.0007
Incremental r^2	1.2%***		.5%	
- 2 log likelihood	-2352.85		-2000.16	
Final r^2	.310		.173	
N	1106		1106	

* $p \leq .1$; ** $p \leq .05$; *** $p \leq .01$

ninety-five percent confidence level and negatively related to the private rights scale ($\beta = -.004$, $p = .044$). However, the relatively small and statistically insignificant incremental r^2 value for block five (.005, $p = .192$) indicates the inclusion of interaction terms in this model does not significantly improve the model fit.

Model 11 and Model 12 in Table 4.10 show the results of hierarchical OLS regression estimation using the egalitarianism scale and gun control, respectively, as dependent variables. Again, the independent variables are entered in blocks beginning with the partisan and ideological control variables. As Table 4.10 shows, the largest incremental r^2 value appears after the inclusion of the first variable block, or control variables, in both Model 11 ($r^2 = 11.2\%$, $p = .000$) and Model 12 ($r^2 = 17\%$, $p = .000$). Similarly, the contextual variable block accounts for more variation in the egalitarianism scale ($r^2 = 5.5\%$, $p = .000$) and attitudes toward gun control ($r^2 = 8\%$, $p = .000$) than the identity or intersectional blocks.

Again, only one interaction term achieves statistical significance in both models. As Model 11 in Table 4.10 shows, consistent with previous research, stigmatization exhibits both individual main effects and interaction effects. In this case, the final standardized log odds for SI and RI stigmatization are statistically significant and positively related to the egalitarianism scale, i.e., policy conservatism ($\beta = .069$, $p = .066$ and $\beta = .162$, $p = .011$, respectively).

The stigmatization interaction term in Model 11 is also statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and negatively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = -.008$, $p = .003$). This relationship is the converse of that observed between stigmatization and the other attitudinal dependent variables. That is, the independent or main effect of SI and RI stigmatization is a reduction in policy liberalism related to economic equality; while, the intersectional effect of stigmatization is an increase policy liberalism.

Table 4.10: Hierarchical OLS Regression Estimations, DV = Egalitarianism, Gun Control

	Model 11 DV = Egalitarianism		Model 12 DV = Gun Control	
	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds
Block 1: Controls				
<i>Republican</i>	.367	.327	.353**	.274**
<i>Democrat</i>	-.947***	-.728***	-.755***	-.617***
<i>Ideology</i>	-.484***	-.339***	-.144***	-.082**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	11.1%***		17.0%***	
Block 2: Context				
<i>Gender</i>	-.763***	-.718***	-.038	.034
<i>Network Diversity</i>	.015	-.008	-.010	-.006
<i>Income</i>	.204***	.214***	-.027	-.043**
<i>Education</i>	-.020	-.011	-.057**	-.050*
<i>Unemployment</i>	-.318*	-.360*	-.206**	-.190**
<i>Age</i>	-.006	-.007	-.020***	-.019***
<i>Christian</i>	.129	.004	.394***	.285***
<i>Other Religion</i>	.016	.083	.125	.090
<i>Urbanity</i>	-.033	.002	-.066**	-.080**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	5.5%***		8.3%***	
Block 3: Sexual ID				
<i>SI Centrality</i>	-.046***	-.031	-.022***	-.003
<i>SI Private Regard</i>	-.089***	-.137	.001	.068
<i>SI Public Regard</i>	.039**	.103	.033***	.042
<i>SI Stigma</i>	-.034**	.069*	.011	-.057***
<i>Incremental r²</i>	4.6%**		1.9%***	
Block 4: Racial ID				
<i>RI Centrality</i>	-.014	-.0004	.004	.019
<i>RI Private Regard</i>	.038*	-.001	.028**	.102**
<i>RI Public Regard</i>	-.029	.018	-.004	.008
<i>RI Stigma</i>	-.015	.162**	.048***	-.034
<i>Incremental r²</i>	.3%		3.4%***	
Block 5: Intersection				
<i>SI x RI Centrality</i>	-.0005	-.0005	-.0006	-.0006
<i>SI x RI Private Regard</i>	.001	.001	-.002	-.002
<i>SI x RI Public Regard</i>	-.002	-.002	-.001	-.001
<i>SI x RI Stigma</i>	-.008**	-.008**	.004**	.004**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	.7%**		.8%**	
- 2 log likelihood	-2684.46		-1872.34	
Final r²	.223		.316	
N	1106		1106	

* p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01

The relationship between stigmatization and attitudes toward gun control shown in Model 12 in Table 4.10 is consistent with previous findings. That is, the final standardized log odds of both the SI stigma scale and the stigmatization interaction term are statistically significant; and express converse relationships with the dependent variable. While SI stigma is positively related to policy liberalism ($\beta = -.056$, $p = .001$), the stigmatization interaction term is positively related to policy conservatism ($\beta = .008$, $p = .014$). Although the final log odds of the RI stigma scale do not achieve statistical significance, the negative direction of the relationship with the dependent variable is consistent with previous findings.

Concerning the effect of the interaction terms on model fit, as Table 4.10 shows, the incremental r^2 values for block five – the interaction terms – are statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level for both Model 11 ($r^2 = .8\%$, $p = .014$) and Model 12 ($r^2 = 1\%$, $p = .005$). That is, the inclusion of the interaction terms accounts for a statistically significant portion of the variation in both the egalitarianism scale and attitudes toward gun control.

Model 13 and Model 14 in Table 4.11 show the results of hierarchical regression estimation using attitudes toward immigration and abortion, respectively, as the dependent variables. The control blocks show the highest incremental r^2 values in both models. Both dependent variables, however, measure attitudes toward identity-based policy questions, i.e., immigration is associated with ethnicity while abortion is associated with gender. Not surprisingly, then, as Table 4.11 shows, the identity and contextual variable blocks account for statistically significant portions of the final r^2 values in both models.

Table 4.11: Hierarchical OLS Regression Estimations, DV = Immigration, Abortion

	Model 13 DV = Immigration		Model 14 DV = Abortion	
	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds
Block 1: Controls				
<i>Republican</i>	.754***	.531***	.235*	.207
<i>Democrat</i>	-.363***	-.379***	-.518***	-.394***
<i>Ideology</i>	-.197***	-.114***	-.167***	-.107**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	17.7%***		10.7%***	
Block 2: Context				
<i>Gender</i>	-.153**	-.043	-.157*	-.139*
<i>Network Diversity</i>	-.016**	-.005	.015**	.005
<i>Income</i>	-.028	-.045**	-.047**	-.041**
<i>Education</i>	-.0008	-.018	-.007	.017
<i>Unemployment</i>	-.085	-.061	.034	.023
<i>Age</i>	-.002	.001	-.004*	-.006**
<i>Christian</i>	.443***	.289***	.565***	.529***
<i>Other Religion</i>	.062	-.0004	.225**	.250**
<i>Urbanity</i>	-.049	-.046	-.106***	-.097**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	3.5%***		5.8%***	
Block 3: Sexual ID				
<i>SI Centrality</i>	-.006	-.003	-.011*	.018
<i>SI Private Regard</i>	-.033***	.011	-.020**	-.037
<i>SI Public Regard</i>	.036***	.098**	-.001	-.044
<i>SI Stigma</i>	.024***	-.045**	-.016**	.034*
<i>Incremental r²</i>	2.1%***		1.5%***	
Block 4: Racial ID				
<i>RI Centrality</i>	.013**	.015	-.011	.016
<i>RI Private Regard</i>	.011	.059	.033**	.027
<i>RI Public Regard</i>	.033***	.093***	-.010	-.046
<i>RI Stigma</i>	.051***	-.031	-.011	.067**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	3.8%***		.8%**	
Block 5: Intersection				
<i>SI x RI Centrality</i>	-.00008	-.00008	-.001	-.001
<i>SI x RI Private Regard</i>	-.001	-.001	.0002	.0002
<i>SI x RI Public Regard</i>	-.003**	-.003**	.002	.002
<i>SI x RI Stigma</i>	.004**	.004**	-.003**	-.003**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	1%**		.8%**	
- 2 log likelihood	-1883.76		-1854.62	
Final r²	.281		.196	
N	1106		1106	

* p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01

Two interaction terms achieve statistical significance in the final standardized log odds of Model 13 in Table 4.11. Again, stigmatization exhibits both an individual main effect and an interaction effect on attitudes toward immigration. In this case, the coefficient estimate for SI stigmatization is statistically significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level and negatively associated with the dependent variable ($\beta = -.045$, $p = .010$). Furthermore, the coefficient estimate for the SI and RI stigma interaction term is statistically significant and positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .004$, $p = .003$). While the coefficient estimate for RI stigma does not achieve statistical significance, the direction of the relationship specified in the final standardized log odds of Model 13 is consistent with previous findings. Again, the main effect of stigmatization is an increase in policy liberalism, while the interaction effect of stigmatization is an increase in policy conservatism in attitudes toward immigration.

Model 13 in Table 4.11 also shows that public regard exhibits both main effects and an interaction effect on attitudes toward immigration. In this case, the coefficient estimate for the SI and RI public regard interaction term is statistically significant and negatively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = -.003$, $p = .013$). The coefficient estimates for SI public regard ($\beta = .009$, $p = .004$) and RI public regard ($\beta = .096$, $p = .001$) are also statistically significant, but positively related to the dependent variable. This is consistent with previous findings, in that public regard is positively related to policy conservatism; however, the relationship between the interaction term and the dependent variable specified in the final standardized log odds of Model 13 suggests, in this case, that a positive evaluation of societal acceptance of one's sexual and racial identities results in policy liberalism in attitudes toward immigration.

While Model 14 in Table 4.11 again shows both main effects and interaction effects of stigmatization on attitudes toward abortion, the direction of the relationship specified in the final

standardized log odds is the converse of that observed previously. That is, the coefficient estimates for both SI ($\beta = .035$, $p = .053$) and RI stigma ($\beta = .069$, $p = .024$) are statistically significant and positively related to the dependent variable; while, the SI and RI interaction term is negatively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = -.004$, $p = .005$). In this case, the main effect of SI and RI stigmatization is an increase in policy conservatism while the interaction effect is an increase in policy liberalism in attitudes toward abortion.

As Table 4.11 shows, the incremental r^2 value for block five – the interaction terms – achieves statistical significance in both Model 13 ($r^2 = 1\%$, $p = .005$) and Model 14 ($r^2 = .8\%$, $p = .028$). The inclusion of the interaction terms accounts for a statistically significant portion of the variation in attitudes toward both immigration and abortion and significantly improves the model fit for both models in Table 4.11.

Model 15 and Model 16 in Table 4.12 show the results of hierarchical regression estimation using the political participation and political alienation scales, respectively, as dependent variables. In neither model does the control block show the highest incremental r^2 value. Instead, the highest incremental r^2 values in Model 15 appear after the inclusion of block two ($r^2 = 9.4\%$, $p = .000$) – the context variables – and block four ($r^2 = 9.4\%$, $p = .000$) – the sexual identity variables. While, in Model 16, the highest incremental r^2 values appear after the inclusion of the context variable block ($r^2 = 7\%$, $p = .000$) and the racial identity variable block ($r^2 = 4.2\%$, $p = .000$).

As the final standardized log odds of Model 15 in Table 4.12 show, no interaction term achieves statistical significance in relation to political participation. However, as the final standardized log odds of Model 16 show, two interaction terms achieve statistical significance in

Table 4.12: Hierarchical OLS Regression Estimations, DV = Political Participation, Political Alienation

	Model 15 DV = Political Participation		Model 16 DV = Political Alienation	
	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds	Upon-Entry Standardized log odds	Final Standardized log odds
Block 1: Controls				
<i>Republican</i>	2.25***	1.76***	-.529	-.770**
<i>Democrat</i>	2.99***	2.24***	-.925***	-.882***
<i>Ideology</i>	-.160	-.148***	-.003	.096
<i>Incremental r²</i>	6.9%***		1%***	
Block 2: Context				
<i>Gender</i>	-.052	.025	.091	.326
<i>Network Diversity</i>	-.052**	.003	-.086***	-.064***
<i>Income</i>	.306***	.286**	-.153**	-.198***
<i>Education</i>	.312***	-.714**	-.086	-.159*
<i>Unemployment</i>	-.994***	.016**	-.138	-.091
<i>Age</i>	-.009	.001	-.038***	-.018**
<i>Christian</i>	.093	.110	.698**	.566**
<i>Other Religion</i>	.300	-.010	.285	.099
<i>Urbanity</i>	.076	-.021	-.148	-.180**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	9.4%***		7.3%***	
Block 3: Sexual ID				
<i>SI Centrality</i>	.078***	.074	-.024	-.002
<i>SI Private Regard</i>	-.013	.236*	-.066**	.012
<i>SI Public Regard</i>	.073**	.104	.007	.192**
<i>SI Stigma</i>	.210***	.146**	.116***	-.194***
<i>Incremental r²</i>	9.4%***		3.1%***	
Block 4: Racial ID				
<i>RI Centrality</i>	.025	.027	.007	.023
<i>RI Private Regard</i>	-.060**	.162	-.003	.053
<i>RI Public Regard</i>	.017	-.105	.001	.168**
<i>RI Stigma</i>	.132***	.166*	.182***	-.210**
<i>Incremental r²</i>	1.7%***		4.2%***	
Block 5: Intersection				
<i>SI x RI Centrality</i>	-.00006	-.00006	-.0007	-.0007
<i>SI x RI Private Regard</i>	-.008	-.008	-.001	-.001
<i>SI x RI Public Regard</i>	.007	.007	-.011**	-.011**
<i>SI x RI Stigma</i>	-.001	-.001	.019***	.019***
<i>Incremental r²</i>	.3%		2.4%***	
- 2 log likelihood	-3112.90		-2915.96	
Final r²	.277		.180	
N	1106		1106	

* p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01

relation to political alienation. First, as Model 16 shows, consistent with previous findings, stigmatization exhibits both individual main effects and an interaction effect. Specifically, the coefficient estimates for SI ($\beta = -.194, p = .000$) and RI ($\beta = -.207, p = .011$) are statistically significant and negatively related to political alienation. While the SI and RI interaction term is statistically significant at the ninety-nine percent confidence level, it is positively related to the dependent variable ($\beta = .019, p = .000$). Second, also consistent with previous findings, public regard exhibits both individual main effects and an interaction effect. That is, the coefficient estimates for SI ($\beta = .196, p = .037$) and RI ($\beta = .177, p = .018$) public regard are statistically significant and positively related to political alienation. Conversely, the SI and RI public regard interaction is statistically significant, however, the coefficient estimate shows a negative relationship with the dependent variable ($\beta = -.011, p = .009$). In this case, the main effect of stigmatization appears to be a decrease in political alienation, while the interaction of SI and RI stigma appears to result in an increase in alienation. Conversely, the main effect of public regard appears to be an increase in political alienation, while the interaction of SI and RI stigma appears to result in a decrease in alienation.

As Table 4.12 shows, the incremental r^2 value associated with the intersectional block of variables only achieves statistical significance in Model 16 ($r^2 = 2.4\%, p = .000$). In this case, the inclusion of the interaction terms significantly improves the fit of Model 16 – describing the predictors of political alienation. On the other hand, as the incremental r^2 value of the intersectional block of variables in Model 15 does not achieve statistical significance, the inclusion of interaction terms does not improve the fit of the model.

Summary

The purpose of the preceding analysis is to determine whether the inclusion of identity interaction terms more accurately describes the relationship between the identity measures and the attitudinal and behavior dependent variables by significantly improving model fit. In all but two models, the inclusion of interaction terms significantly improves model fit, as shown by the statistical significance of the incremental r^2 value associated with block five in Tables 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12.

It should be noted, however, that the inclusion of the interaction terms improved model fit, on average, by less than one percentage point. Even though the intersectional variables only account for a small percentage of attitudinal and behavioral variation, the variation is significant and, most importantly, provides nuance to the nature of the relationships predicted in chapter 2.

For example, stigmatization shows both a main effect and interaction effect with most of the dependent variables – although the evidence here is mixed. In most cases, consistent with the extant literature, the main effect of stigmatization is an increase in policy liberalism; while, in half of the hierarchical OLS regression models the interaction between SI and RI stigmatization results in policy conservatism – as predicted by H5 in chapter 2. However, in the other half of cases where the SI and RI stigmatization interaction term is statistically significant, the direction of the relationship is the opposite. That is, intersectional stigmatization is associated with policy liberalism. The relationship between policy conservatism and intersectional stigmatization, therefore, may best be described as policy-specific (see Holbrook, et al. 2016).

The intersectional effects of stigmatization also extend to political participation – specifically, to alienation from the political system. As Model 16 in Table 4.12 shows, the main

effects of both SI and RI stigma are a decrease in political alienation; while the intersectional effect is an increase. As the extant literature suggests, identity-based stigma may provide increased motivation to participate in political activity (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Lien 1994; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981); however, stigmatization experienced simultaneously, across multiple socially-constructed identities, although not significantly reducing political participation, does significantly increase the likelihood that one feels alienated from the political system.

Stigmatization is not the only concept which exhibits both main and interaction effects. In three hierarchical OLS regression models, public regard shows positive main effects and negative interaction effects. That is, while SI and RI public regard are independently associated with policy conservatism, intersectional public regard is associated with policy liberalism. Specifically, as Model 10 in Table 4.9 and Model 13 in Table 4.11 show, the main effects of both SI and RI public regard are policy conservatism related to private rights and immigration, respectively. However, a positive evaluation of societal acceptance of one's sexual and racial identity is likely to result in policy liberalism. Similarly, political alienation is reduced among participants who report positive public regard across multiple social identities.

Also, consistent with H1-9, the inclusion of SI/RI identity measures and contextual indicators significantly improve the fit statistics of every model. However, identity measures account for more variation in political attitudes when the identity is implicated in the policy outcome. That is, as Model 10 in Table 4.9 shows, sexual identity measures explain a larger proportion of the variation in the private rights scale – which contrasts the civil rights of LGBTQ people with the private rights of business owners – than any other attitudinal dependent variable. Similarly, in Model 12, contextual variables, including socio-economic indicators account for

more variation in attitudes toward economic equality; while, racial identity measures account for a significant portion of the variation in attitudes toward immigration, as shown in Model 13.

In the previous sections I describe the distributions of the dependent variables, OLS regression estimation predicting political attitudes and behaviors, and hierarchical OLS regression estimation determining the effectiveness of interaction terms in nuancing the relationship between social identity and political outcomes. In the next chapter, I synthesize the findings from chapter 3 and chapter 4 into a discussion of LGBTQ politics and quantitative intersectional research. I conclude this study with a discussion of the limitations of the current project and offer suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 5: THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL IDENTITY, LOOKING FORWARD

In the previous chapters I describe the results of statistical analyses using data obtained from a survey of 1216 LGBT-identified adults in the United States. While cognizant of the limitations of the current work, in this concluding chapter, I continue the discussion of the politics of sexual identity and offer direction for future LGBTQ political research. I begin by revisiting the hypotheses proposed in chapter 2 – offering supportive or contradictory evidence for each. Next, I discuss important study findings not directly implicated in the original hypotheses, yet which indicate the necessity of future research. Before concluding, I recognize possible critiques and some limitations of the current study.

Hypotheses Revisited

Quantitative identity research in the field of American politics is often employed to examine “political choices” (e.g., vote choice or policy preferences) (Berelson, et al. 1954:54). Since the outset of such research, it has been thought that political variation within society reflects social divisions – or cleavages – such as racial or ethnic, class, gender, religious, or sexual identities. Much of the political survey research from the past fifty years rely upon theories of identity politics which equate differences in categorical identity with homogeneous political attitudes and behavior (Shields 2008). Contrary to early research, however, “common” group “characteristics” do not inevitably result in “internal cohesiveness” (Berelson, et al. 1954:63). For a number of reasons – most relevant to this study the intersectional notions of

identity cross-pressures and socio-historical context (Bedolla 2007) – even within identity categories perceived to be politically cohesive, attitudinal and behavioral variation exists.

Sexual and Racial Identity

As H1, H2, and H3 indicate, I hypothesize three factors which contribute to attitudinal and behavioral variation in sexual minority politics are identity centrality, public and private regard. Specifically, H1 suggests that high identity centrality – or the extent to which an individual “defines” one’s self “with regard” to a particular identity (Sellers, et al. 1998:25) – is positively related to political participation and policy liberalism and negatively related to political alienation.

Identity Centrality

H1 is partially confirmed in that, when statistically significant, sexual identity centrality is positively associated with policy liberalism and political participation. Consistent with previous research, e.g., Egan (2012) and Lewis, et al. (2011), the data in chapter 3 show that gays and lesbians exhibit higher levels of sexual identity centrality than bisexuals. Along with the regression data from chapter 4, this suggests that gays and lesbians – with higher identity centrality – are more likely to translate sexual identity into political activity and policy liberalism than bisexuals.

As discussed in chapter 3, one possible motivator of sexual identity centrality is experience with discrimination. Indeed, other studies find that sexual and racial stigma result in more salient (socially and politically) sexual and racial identities (Swank and Fahs 2013b; Lien 1994; Miller, et al. 1981). That bisexuals in this sample report, on average, less experience with sexual stigma supports these assertions. The consequences for sexual minority political mobilization and representation are clear. Bisexuals – who do not fit the dominant paradigm of

sexuality among either hetero- or homosexual communities – are likely to be underrepresented and disproportionately neglected in policy formulation.

H1 also concerns racial identity centrality. Unlike sexual identity centrality, racial identity centrality only achieves statistical significance in one model (see Table 4.5); and, in this instance, the nature of the relationship is contrary to that predicted in H1. Not surprisingly, racial identity centrality is highest among racial minority survey participants. Like sexual identity, one motivator is possibly racial stigmatization. Again, the correlational data from chapter 3 are consistent with this theory. That is, experience with stigmatization likely drives identity salience (Lien 1994; Miller, et al. 1981) which, in turn, affects political outcomes.

The associational data from chapter 3, however, show that racial identity is experienced differently depending upon the socially-constructed category under consideration, whether race-, gender-, or sexuality-based (see Moradi, et al. 2010). Future research, then, should disentangle the scale measure used here and examine racial identity data independently. That is, while racial identity centrality appears to be an insignificant determinant of political attitudes and behavior, it is likely that the finding is only reflective of the majority-white sample. Indeed, alternate regression estimations using individual racial identity centrality measures, e.g., White RI centrality, Black RI centrality, and Latino/a RI centrality, reveal White identity centrality and private regard to be consistent predictors of policy conservatism. This relationship is also reflected in Table 4.5 – the one model in which RI centrality achieves statistical significance and is positively associated with conservative attitudes toward immigration. That is, in instances where White identity is said to be challenged, racial identity centrality is a significant predictor of political attitudes (Hurtado and Stewart 1997).

Identity Private Regard

H2, which suggests sexual and racial identity private regard will be positively associated with policy liberalism and political participation and negatively associated with political alienation, is also partially confirmed. While there is no relationship between sexual identity private regard and political behavior, sexual identity private regard is positively associated with policy liberalism in all but one case (i.e., attitudes toward gun control). Similarly, there appears to be no significant relationship between racial identity private regard and political participation.

As predicted, in one model, racial identity private regard is significantly associated with policy liberalism (see Table 4.2). However, in three models (see Table 4.3, Table 4.4, and Table 4.6), racial identity private regard is significantly associated with policy conservatism. These contrary findings are not surprising as previous studies have elucidated the asymmetrical effects of identity on policy-specific attitudes (Holbrook, et al. 2016). However, after controlling for the interactive effects of private regard, all but one of the significant contradictory relationships either reverse or disappear. That is, both SI and RI private regard perform as expected, significantly predicting policy liberalism (see Model 10, Table 4.9).

Whereas most research recognizes the importance of group association for group mobilization (Tarrow 1998; Cole 2008; Abdelal, et al. 2009; Lewis, et al. 2011; Egan 2012), the findings here indicate that internal cognitive and affective processes are just as important to the formation of political attitudes and behaviors. While not a significant predictor of political behavior, positive internal evaluations of one's sexual and racial identity are associated with liberal policy positions in at least one case, when the interactive effects of identity are taken into consideration. Specifically, sexual and racial identity private regard are significantly associated with the liberal policy position which favors the rights of LGBT people in public accommodation

disputes. Beyond group association (i.e., identifying with a social group), positive internal identity evaluations appear to motivate more robust identity-based claims to political rights.

Identity Public Regard

Finally, H3, which suggests sexual and racial identity public regard will be positively associated with policy liberalism and political participation and negatively associated with political alienation, is also partially confirmed. Sexual identity public regard is positively associated with political participation and negatively associated with political alienation. Contrary to H3, however, when statistically significant, the variable is positively associated with policy conservatism. Specifically, perceptions of societal acceptance of one's sexual identity are associated with conservative attitudes toward the role of government, private rights, egalitarianism, gun control, and immigration. This finding is intriguing, in that it suggests sexual minorities who believe society accepts, or at least positively evaluates, their sexual identity are more likely to participate in politics and hold politically conservative attitudes, even in instances when such a position would jeopardize sexual minority civil rights claims (see Table 4.2) – a finding to which I will return later.

The associational data from chapter 3 show that White sexual minorities exhibit higher scores on the racial identity public regard scale than any other racial identity. Contrary to Hurtado and Stewart (1997:229), it appears that White sexual minorities are well aware of their racial privilege, i.e., the understanding that whiteness is associated with societal acceptance. It might be expected, then, that the recognition of personal privilege is associated with an attitudinal orientation disfavoring societal inequality, e.g., preferring those who do not share the identity characteristic in question be treated equally. Interestingly, racial identity public regard, *alone*, does not translate to policy liberalism. Indeed, only after controlling for the interactive

effects of public regard does the relationship between public regard and political attitudes achieve statistical significance; and then, the results indicate significant, and different, main and interaction effects (see Model 13, Table 4.11 and Model 16, Table 4.12). While the main effects of RI public regard are policy conservatism and political alienation, when interacted, the converse relationship is observed. That is, when multiple social identities are perceived as privileged, i.e., accepted by society, sexual minorities are more likely to express policy liberalism and decreased political alienation.

Because this finding extends across racial and sexual identity public regard, it may be that the concept of public regard, alone, measures a sense of race- or sexuality-based competition. That is, the privileges associated with any racial or sexual identity are perhaps perceived as zero-sum – they can only be exercised by one category of identity. The main effect of the perception of race- and sexuality-based social acceptance, then, is to prefer a policy which disallows race (or ethnic) or sexual privilege to be distributed equally among society.

In this case, the data specifically denotes this relationship in attitudes toward immigration policy and private rights. Reflecting the long-standing racial, sexual, and gender divisions within the LGBT community, the data indicate that racial and sexual privilege – when considered independently – cannot be conveyed to recent immigrants or those making ‘additional’ sexual- or gender-based civil rights claims, e.g., transgender rights claims. Only when one’s identity-based privilege is recognized as compounded across various categories of identity does this competitive model of civil rights give way to a cooperative model, which is associated with the view that identity-based civil equality is not a zero-sum venture, and that those who do not share one’s privileged identity should be treated equally by society.

Identity Centrality, Public and Private Regard: A Summary of Findings

The findings presented here progress the study of sexual minority politics beyond the existing literature by quantitatively demonstrating that sexual minority politics are motivated by more than simple group identification or selection into a category (Egan 2012; Lewis, et al. 2011). The data show that sexual minorities use cognitive and affective evaluations of society as well as relational identity comparisons in their internal political calculus. In addition, the data show that these internal and relational comparisons extend to the various identity categories which each individual occupies. Finally, the data suggest that liberal (i.e., economically redistributive, pro-civil rights, or anti-status quo) political claims, as well as participation in and alienation from the American political system, occur as sexual minorities evaluate their own sexual and racial identities in relation to heteronormative, racist, and androcentric power structures in society. Furthermore, these internal and external comparisons exhibit separate and significantly different main and interactive effects.

Specifically, it appears that sexual minorities who perceive society as more accepting of non-heterosexualities participate more in politics, hold more conservative political attitudes, and experience less political alienation. While this may appear to be a benign social process, it takes on a more insidious caste in the context of political participation, representation, and democratic governance. That is, individual perceptions of sexual acceptance also drive participation in the political process. Sexual minorities who view society as less accepting – likely in conjunction with experiences of discrimination – participate less in politics and feel more politically alienated. Furthermore, the data here provides quantitative evidence of the pervasiveness of heterosexist power structures in society. Namely, heterosexim is so ubiquitous that even strongly-identified sexual minorities form notions about their own civil rights vis-à-vis dominant

heterosexist acceptance of their sexuality. That is, sexual minorities are more likely to support anti-status quo policy positions when it is clear society will accept them (i.e., their identity). It is likely the fear of heterosexist, racist, or androcentric stigmatization, i.e., a fear of personal or political reprisal, informs this relationship. Indeed, as Appendix C shows, SI public regard exhibits a moderate negative correlation with SI stigmatization.

The data also suggest these same internal and relational comparisons occur regarding racial identity. Again, beyond phenotypical or even psychological association, affective internal and external evaluations of personal and societal acceptance of one's racial identity drive political outcomes – even after controlling for how strongly one defines oneself in relation to that racial identity. This suggests the belief among participants that race and sexuality-based political progress is zero-sum, i.e., cannot be distributed equally across all sexual or racial categories. This political selfishness has been described by Fassinger and Arseneau (2007) and others among LGBT interest group and social movement organization priorities. Namely, Fassinger and Arseneau (2007) and Fassinger and Gallor (2006) show that when the inclusion of transgender civil rights claims jeopardize gay and lesbian civil rights claims, gay and lesbian interest groups are more likely to abandon trans-inclusive policy. The data here, however, present the first indication that a similar evaluation occurs at the individual-level. That is, psychological identity evaluations appear to drive policy preferences which disfavor the equal distribution of racial (or ethnic) or sexual privilege across all members of society.

This, however, appears to be only the main effect of racial and sexual identity as interactive effects appear to mitigate and, in some cases, reverse the relationship with political attitudes and behavior. When one recognizes societal acceptance (i.e., positive public regard) – or privilege – across multiple social identities, one is more likely to support liberal and

redistributive policy preferences. For example, while the main effect of both SI and RI public regard are policy conservatism toward immigration and private rights, the interactive effect is policy liberalism, favoring the conveyance of identity-based privilege to immigrants and ‘other’ sexual and gender identities, respectively.

The implications for sexual minority politics are tremendous. For example, using sexual and racial distinctiveness as the basis for civil rights claims may, in fact, sharpen the divisions both within the LGBT movement and between the LGBT movement and society at-large. That is, highlighting categorical distinctiveness may prove counterproductive, if the goal is inspiring social empathy. The perception of identity-based rights claims as zero-sum may preclude some members of society from supporting LGBT rights based solely on identity distinctiveness. Such an identity-based struggle is currently transpiring between sexual minorities and religious conservatives in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision legalizing same-sex marriage in the United states (*Obergefell v. Hodges* 2015). Both sides view the other’s identity-based claims to civil rights as an erosion of their own identity-based claims, with religious conservatives often criticizing LGBT-inclusive public accommodation laws as capitulation to ‘special rights’ (see Tadlock, Gordon, and Popp 2007). While not a panacea, the prescription offered here, i.e., making civil rights claims which highlight the privileged status of dominant (heterosexual) identity categories vis-à-vis sexual minorities, have proven effective in provoking pro-sexual minority political change from federal and state judiciaries. Most notably, in their landmark *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015) decision, the Supreme Court of the United States used language from the petitioner’s (same-sex couples’) brief recognizing the 1,138 federal benefits reserved only to heterosexual couples by same-sex marriage bans as justification for striking down those bans (see Cravens *unpublished manuscript*).

Furthermore, sociologists and some political scientists have long criticized identity politics for the reasons highlighted above. Notably, Sidney Tarrow (1998:119) recognized that social movements constructed around a single rigid conceptualization of identity would produce “insular, sectarian, and divisive movements incapable of expanding membership, broadening appeals, and negotiating with prospective allies” (See also Gitlin 1995; Gamson 1995; Stein and Plummer 1994). Indeed, the political priorities of the modern LGBT movement exemplify this characterization. As noted previously, Fassinger and Gallor (2006), for example, recognize that when transgender rights claims potentially weaken the political position of gay and lesbian rights organizations, a competitive model of civil rights advocacy ensues and trans rights claims are dismissed as unrealistic or unachievable. Furthermore, until recently, as the data here suggest, LGBT people are racially and politically isolated; and, this isolation may reinforce competitive (i.e., zero-sum) perceptions of civil rights claims. Highlighting the privileges associated with identity (not just focusing on identification with an identity), and educating the public and those within the LGBT movement about how privilege is compounded across the various categories of identity in society may prove a more unifying and politically successful message for the LGBT movement.

Most important, it appears, is the work of problematizing heterosexism and racism – the dominant structures of power in American politics – which are shown here to construct the very arena in which sexual and racial equality claims are issued. It has been nearly forty years since the Black lesbian feminist scholar Audre Lorde questioned the under- and misrepresentation of women of color and lesbians in feminist scholarship by asking a room of mostly white, heterosexual, cisgender female scholars, “What does it mean when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy?” (Lorde 1984:111-12). In response, she

noted “it means that only the most narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable” (Lorde: 1984:112). Using androcentric and heteronormative conceptions of what femininity *should* be, and then judging female expression by that standard, she warned, is only beneficial to those who “still define the master’s house as their only source of support” (Lorde 1984:112). The data here suggests that, in fact, sexual minorities engage in politics as if heterosexism and racism are their only ‘sources of support.’ That is, the dominant perception is that civil rights are only distributed as part of a zero-sum game; and, even when civil rights claims are made, they are voiced only after society is perceived to be accepting. Specifically, the data show that the perception of societal acceptance of a sexual minority identity is associated with an anti-egalitarian, status quo political orientation. The more accepted one feels by heterosexist society, the less likely one is to challenge the social hierarchy which perpetuates inequality against oneself and others who share the label ‘sexual minority.’

Instead, Lorde charges us to dismantle our conceptions of scholarly and political engagement by adopting a new understanding of what femininity – and sexuality – *should* be. Not constructed from heterosexist, androcentric, or racist conceptions which only seek to limit the potential for radical reform, keeping those at the margins of society from achieving equality; but, from a perspective that will “enable us to bring about genuine change” (Lorde 1984:112). Because, she famously declares, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde 1984:111).

Social Networks

One telling indicator which provides evidence of the social context in which we make relational comparisons involves the diversity of the social networks we inhabit. In H4, I suggest that social network heterogeneity is positively related to political participation and policy

liberalism and negatively related to political alienation. However, there is little evidence to support this assertion. The social network diversity scale only achieves statistical significance in one model (see Table 4.8). In this case, as predicted, social network heterogeneity is negatively associated with political alienation.

While I cannot replicate the findings of Muntz (2002a; 200b) or Quintelier, et al. (2012), the correlational and associational analyses in chapter 3 are revealing of a pattern of sexual, racial, and political isolation among sexual minorities in this sample. First, the data reveal that bisexuals in this sample are more likely to report sexually diverse social networks than gays and lesbians; while, White sexual minorities are less likely to report racially diverse social networks than Blacks, Latino/as, or Asians. Finally, Democrats in this sample are less likely to report politically diverse social networks than Republicans or Independents. While the additive index measured here showed little predictive value, future analysis should examine the individual components in more detail to untangle the effects of social isolationism on LGBTQ politics.

Stigmatization

H5, which suggests sexual and racial stigma is positively associated with political alienation and negatively associated with political participation and policy liberalism, is confirmed, specifically, in relation to the intersectional effects of sexual and racial stigmatization. Contrary to previous research, the associational analyses in chapter 3 show that heterosexist and racist experiences are not evenly distributed across categories of sexual and racial identity (Moradi, et al. 2010). As expected, in this sample, Black, Latino/a, and Asian respondents are more likely to experience racism than Whites. Furthermore, gays and lesbians in the sample are more likely to experience heterosexist stigma than bisexuals. These two findings are important in conjunction with the correlational data from chapter 3. Namely, sexual and

racial stigma are positively correlated with sexual and racial identity centrality, respectively. While causality is not examined in this study, it may be that, as Lien (1994), Miller, et al. (1981), Swank and Fahs (2013b), and others observe, sexual and racial stigmatization likely result in a highly salient and politicized identity. This could account for the ‘selection’ effect observed by Egan (2012). In the psychological literature, the concept of resilience is suggested to account for the motivational effects of stigma (Singh 2013; Sevelius 2013). That is, rather than negative health or social consequences, certain innate psychological characteristics lead individuals, in some cases, to overcome stigmatizing experiences. In this case, as with Swank and Fahs (2013b:1390), contrary to the intent of “homophobic bullies,” the main effect of stigmatization appears to “generate resilient gays and lesbians who are more resolved in their political efforts.”

Consistent with H5, however, experience with stigmatization across multiple axes of identity demonstrates a decidedly negative effect. Specifically, intersectional stigmatization is negatively associated with political participation and positively associated with political alienation and policy conservatism. Actual experience with heterosexist and racist power structures in society negatively affects participation and seems to preclude challenges to the policy status quo, again, even in situations which directly implicate racial and sexual minority civil rights.

Socio-Economic and Cultural Factors

Another component of the social context which is predicted to influence political outcomes relates to socioeconomic factors. Socioeconomic indicators represent resources, asymmetrically available to groups in society, which consistently predict political behavior (Brady, et al. 1995). In H6, I propose that income is negatively associated with political alienation and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism. The

evidence presented here confirms this hypothesis. In all but one case, i.e., egalitarianism (see Model 3a in Table 4.3), where statistically significant, income is positively related to policy liberalism.

Similarly, H7 and H8 predict that education and employment, respectively, will be negatively associated with political alienation and positively associated with political participation and policy liberalism. Again, the hypotheses are confirmed. Economic resources appear to act as political resources by providing tangible benefits for participation and, also inform policy positions. The demographic data presented in chapter 3, however, emphasize the asymmetrical distribution of these resources among the sample. As indicated, the results are consistent with contemporary research (Sears and Badgett 2012; Movement Advancement Project, et al. 2013) which highlights the fallacy of the wealthy, effete, White, gay male often perpetuated in popular media and among LGBTQ political elites. Sexual minorities in the sample experience disproportionately higher levels of unemployment and poverty, for example, than heterosexuals. These disparities are further compounded among racial and ethnic minorities. Combined with associational data relating to social networks, it may be that sexual minorities are increasingly divided along class lines as well. As discussed in chapter 3, there are practical political implications for these divisions and the failure to fully address the issue of poverty among sexual minorities. A focus on same-sex marriage rights and military service, for example, may come at a high social cost as poverty, unemployment, undereducation, and personal security appear to be more common experiences and concerns among sexual minorities than political elites realize (Strolovich 2012).

The construction of classes in society, and our relationship to them, inform our political decisions because they frame the available choices (Bedolla 2007). Not only this, but, as Collins

(2000) suggests, and as the data here show, race, gender and sexuality intersect and interact with social class producing new experiences, (dis)advantages, and political choices. As with the general population, income, education and employment are consistently strong predictors of sexual minority political attitudes and behavior (Lewis, et al. 2011). This study nuances our understanding of socio-economics by further examining social class at the intersection of sexual and racial identities. LGBTQ people are more likely to live in poverty than are heterosexuals. Within the LGBTQ community, women and people of color are more likely to be undereducated and unemployed (Sears and Badgett 2012; MAP, et al. 2013). The data here support these findings and suggest greater attention be paid to the role of economics in LGBTQ politics.

Finally, one understudied aspect of cultural distinction among sexual minorities concerns religion. Like economic resources, religiosity is theorized to act as a psychological and behavioral resource which can be translated into secular political action (Brady, et al. 1995). In H9, I propose that religiosity is positively associated with political participation and negatively associated with political alienation and policy liberalism. Secondarily, I hypothesize that Christian religiosity, specifically, is likely to be associated with policy conservatism more than other religious affiliations. H9 is partially confirmed. Sexual minorities who identify as Christian hold more conservative political attitudes than non-religious sexual minorities. Interestingly, sexual minorities who identify as Christian also experience more political alienation than non-religious sexual minorities. Instead of acting as a political resource which motivates participation in the political process, it appears that Christian religiosity – perhaps because of its devalued status within sexual minority communities – inspires feelings of alienation from politics.

Another possible source of attitudinal and behavioral variation among religious sexual minorities involves the discursive treatment of sexuality among religious denominations. Swank

and Fahs (2013a), for example, hypothesize – although do not test – a relationship between membership in a religious congregation which affirms one’s sexual identity and political participation. As the data here suggest, religious affiliation among sexual minorities is more common than popular media and even scientific literature portray. Indeed, more than half of the sample identify with some religious tradition. Future political research should fully interrogate tensions between religious doctrine and sexual identity.

For Further Exploration: Gender

At the outset of this study I recognize the distinction between sexual orientation and gender identity. The implications of this distinction are, obviously, more than semantic. For decades, sexuality and gender research have conflated the two terms – often to psychologically disastrous effect among gender variant, queer, and transgender people (Fassinger and Arseneau 2007). Likewise, the conflation of gender and sexuality is expressed in the lack of transgender representation among sexual minority political elites and policy positions. Again, Fassinger and Arseneau (2007), Fassinger and Gallor (2006) and others suggest that in political situations when trans-inclusive policies conflict with sexual minority policy positions, the trans-inclusive policies are often abandoned.

Due to funding limitations, this study is not able to fully interrogate gender identity in the manner prescribed for sexual and racial identity. While the categorical measure of gender in the survey instrument allows for non-binary or transgender expression, the statistical analyses rely on dichotomous indicators of cisgender. As discussed in chapter 1, this methodology is not inconsistent with intersectional theory (McCall 2005), however I do recognize the limitations it

imposes on the study findings. Still, the associational data presented in chapter 3 and the regression data in chapter 4 present compelling evidence for the effects of gender identity on sexual minority politics.

First, as discussed in chapter 3, transgender and gender queer survey participants are more likely than cisgender participants to believe society devalues their sexual identity. Similarly, trans and gender queer participants are more likely to report experiences with sexual stigma than cisgender participants. The question of stigmatization still looms over transgender studies. Sevelius (2013), for example, recognizes the resilience of transgender individuals in the face of discriminatory experiences. Does intersectional (i.e., gender and sexual) discrimination exhibit the same effects as sexual and racial intersectional stigma? If so, we would expect transgender and gender queer people to participate less in politics, feel more politically alienated, and, if the current data hold, less likely to support transgender-inclusive civil rights policies.

Second, an examination of gender at the intersection of race demonstrates the subordination of racial minority cisgender female identities. That is, in this sample, cisgender males regard their racial identity as a more central part of their definition of self, more positively view their racial identity, and believe society values their racial identity more than cisgender females. Indeed, across two of the three categories of racial minority identity examined in this study, cisgender females are more likely to believe society devalues their racial identity than cisgender males. As discussed in chapter 3, this, perhaps, lends some support to one aspect of the ‘subordinate male target hypothesis’ (Veenstra 2013); not that the theory itself is credible, but the assertion that cisgender men view themselves as the paradigm of their race may, in fact, be supported. This explanation is consistent with previous research (Sellers, et al. 1998; Phinney 1989), and confirms a long-standing tenant of intersectionality, namely, that women – especially

racial and ethnicity minority women – experience multiplicative disadvantage from a society which devalues both their gender and racial identities (Crenshaw 1991; Baca-Zinn and Dill 1996).

Finally, after controlling for the interactive effects of sexual and racial identity in multiple regression analyses, while there appears to be no relationship between participation or political alienation and cisgender, cisgender women are more likely to exhibit policy liberalism than cisgender men (see Model 9, Table 4.9, Model 11, Table 4.10, and Model 14, Table 4.11). If the current data hold, this is may be due to gender-based stigmatization which – when considered independently – works to motivate anti-status quo policy positions.

For Further Exploration: Geography

After controlling for the interactive effects of identity, urbanity – or urban residency – is positively associated with policy liberalism and negatively associated with political alienation. Specifically, urban sexual minorities hold more liberal attitudes toward gun control and abortion (see Model 12, Table 4.10 and Model 14, Table 4.11, respectively) than rural sexual minorities; while, rural sexual minorities experience more political alienation (see Model 16, Table 4.12) than urban residents. This dichotomous characterization of LGBTQ politics is a common refrain in the extant literature (Bailey 1999). The historical evolution of the LGBTQ rights movement has long been linked to post-WWII urbanization (D’Emilio 1983). The diversity inherent in large population centers allows for the recognition of a shared social identity. Gay bars, nightclubs, and other entertainment venues, for example, have long been recognized as a source of collective identity and political mobilization (Sherrill 1993). The combination of moral permissiveness,

individual anonymity, and political collectivism contributes to the perception of cities as bastions of gay identity and legal protection (Wald, et al. 1996).

LGBTQ identities do exist and thrive in rural areas, however, often through the cultivation of local resources and reliance on family – not sexuality – as the primary form of collective identity (Gray 2009). While it is expected that rural queer people will abandon their ‘backward’ homelands in favor of urban acceptance, in reality, most rural queer people have neither the resources nor the desire to sever those connections – especially after ‘coming out’ (Weston 1995). Furthermore, advances in technology and communication, not the least of which involves social media and the internet, allow for the cultivation of a queer identity without the traditional ‘face-to-face’ interaction associated with gay bars in the late 20th Century (Gray 2009). In short, the list of divisions which threaten the LGBTQ movement also includes a rural/urban divide – with rural being “the devalued term” (Halberstam 2005:36; Quoted in Gray 2009:10). This divide, though understudied, is perhaps one of the most consequential for the success of pro-LGBTQ public policy. While LGBTQ groups focus attention on urban centers, the stark reality is that rural areas consistently vote against LGBTQ issues and candidates. As the data presented suggests, rurality and urbanity affect LGBTQ politics differently. The failure to recognize the divide, as Hancock (2007a:65) suggests, will only “silence sub-group members in an effort to present a united front” politically. This subjugation will likely exacerbate the rural/urban divide among LGBTQ people and between LGBTQ people and rural American society – a powerful force in electoral politics.

Conclusion

For this study, I created and implemented a unique sample survey of 1216 LGBT-identified adults living in the United States. I measure cognitive and affective aspects of sexual and racial identity – not simple dummy indicators – in order to analyze the effects of intersecting socially-constructed identities on political attitudes (i.e., toward income inequality, government provision of services, private vs. public rights, and policy-specifics such as gun control and immigration) and behaviors (i.e., political participation and alienation from the political process).

First, the data indicate that the social category of ‘sexual minority’ – here defined primarily by lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity – is heterogeneous in its cultural, economic, racial, and sexual composition. That is, identity politics-based conceptions of LGBTQ politics reveal sexual minorities to be distinctly liberal and Democratic, but to ascribe social or political homogeneity based solely on group association – especially when the categories of associations are imposed by social scientists – falsely represents the extent of within-group variation and further subjugates those at the margins of the community who do not share the dominant sexual, racial, class, etc. characteristics. Not only this, but identities are asymmetrically experienced across socially-constructed categories of sexuality and race. Exogenous factors, including experience with stigmatization and social network diversity, as well as inhabiting multiple social identities contribute to variation in identity centrality, public and private regard.

Second, the data presented here suggest that along with cognitive and affective evaluations of group association, internal affective evaluations of sexual and racial identity as well as external evaluations of societal acceptance of sexual and racial identities motivate the political attitudes and behaviors of sexual minorities. Furthermore, the data here provides

quantitative evidence of the pervasiveness of heterosexist and racist power structures in society and their perverse effect on sexual minority identity evaluations. For example, heterosexism appears to be so ubiquitous that even strongly-identified sexual minorities form notions about their own civil rights vis-à-vis dominant heterosexist acceptance of their sexuality. That is, policy liberalism is contingent upon society's acceptance of LGBTQ civil rights claims. This appears to be a form of internal policing – where only those claims to rights are made which are consistent with societal approval.

Third, consistent with intersectionality, identity and stigmatization exhibit both main effects and interactive effects. In the case of stigmatization, when experienced across multiple social identities, the effect is sufficient to alter political outcomes. Whereas experiencing sexual or racial stigmatization, individually, motivates political participation and policy liberalism, discrimination across multiple axes of identity contributes to political alienation and policy conservatism.

Finally, the socio-economic and socio-cultural diversity of sexual minorities mirrors that of the broader society. What is apparent, however, is the asymmetrical economic disadvantage associated with sexual minority identity – compounded by racial and ethnic minority identity; and, the lack of social scientific inquiry regarding the political implications of religiosity among sexual minorities. Furthermore, the intersection of religious belief, socio-economics, and geography, i.e., the rural/urban divide, among sexual minorities remain relatively unexplored in political science research. The data here indicate that each represent significant sources of variation which merit further study.

Limitations of Identity Research

It should be noted that in adopting intersectional theory and methodology, I implicitly and explicitly accept the mutability of identity. The concept of identity mutability encompasses a temporal aspect. That is, identity can (and will) change over time (Bowleg 2008). One may identify as a lesbian, but days, months, or years later, one may instead identify as bisexual. Likewise, one may identify as ‘mixed race,’ but through the course of one’s life, one may become more strongly identified with specific aspects of one’s ethnicity (Omi and Winant 1994). So, intersectional attitudinal or behavioral research must come with a caveat that the identity presented at the time of interview or survey instrument administration may not be the same identity presented upon the next interview or survey. For this reason, longitudinal research designs may be better able to analyze how changes in identity affect political attitudes and behaviors over time (Diamond and Butterworth 2008; Diamond 2003a; Diamond 2003b). As recognized in previous footnotes, I adopt the assumption that identities are “coherent enough to be recognized, yet fluid enough to be interrogated” (Honeychurch 1996:345). That is, the survey responses collected by this study represent the identity of the respondent – and convey the behavior and attitudinal influences of that identity – *at the time of the survey*, although that identity may change over time.

It is also important to recognize that this research project uses statistical tools of analysis which assume survey data are collected from a probability sample. Because of the financial and physical limitations associated with LGBT-identity research, a probability sample is difficult to obtain. As Appendix A shows, however, the sample is representative of the LGBT population in the United States and closely mirrors – in demographic composition – other recent studies (Pew Research Center 2013).

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Codebook

S1: Political Attitudes

The following questions will present you with a series of statements about various political issues or policies. Please tell us the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

Q1a. [ROG1]: The government should try to ensure that all Americans have such things as jobs, health care, and housing.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	66	5.5	5.6	
2	Disagree	45	3.7	3.8	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	82	6.9	6.9	
4	Agree	439	36.9	37	
5	Strongly Agree	556	46.8	46.8	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	4.15	1.07

Q1b. [ROG2]: The main reason that government has gotten bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	103	8.5	8.7	
2	Disagree	242	19.9	20.4	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	343	28.2	28.9	
4	Agree	320	26.3	26.9	
5	Strongly Agree	180	14.8	15.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	3.29	2.27

Q1c. [ROG3]: The free market can handle today's complex economic problems without government being involved.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	154	12.7	13.0	
2	Disagree	318	26.2	26.8	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	357	26.4	30.1	
4	Agree	263	21.6	22.1	
5	Strongly Agree	96	7.9	8.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	2.85	1.14

Q2a. [PR1]: There should be a strictly enforced law requiring businesses to serve persons regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
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	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	40	3.3	3.4	
2	Disagree	54	4.4	4.5	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	96	7.9	8.1	
4	Agree	265	21.8	22.3	
5	Strongly Agree	733	60.3	61.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	4.34	1.03

Q2b. [PR2]: Regardless of their own views, an employer should be required to hire workers without regard to sexual orientation.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	18	1.5	1.5	
2	Disagree	24	2.0	2.0	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	71	5.8	6.0	
4	Agree	238	19.6	20.0	
5	Strongly Agree	837	68.8	70.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	4.55	.818

Q3a. [ES1]: More equality of income would avoid conflicts between people at different income levels.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	41	3.4	3.5	
2	Disagree	127	10.4	10.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	219	18.0	18.4	
4	Agree	453	37.3	38.1	
5	Strongly Agree	348	28.6	29.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	3.79	1.08

Q3b. [ES2]: Incomes should not be more equal, because everybody's contribution to society is not equally important.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	205	16.9	17.3	
2	Disagree	288	23.7	24.2	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	290	23.8	24.4	
4	Agree	284	23.4	23.9	
5	Strongly Agree	121	10.0	10.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	2.85	1.24

Q3c. [ES3]: Incomes should be more equal, because every family's needs for food, housing, and so on, are the same.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	68	5.6	5.7	
2	Disagree	187	15.4	15.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	225	18.5	18.9	
4	Agree	386	31.7	32.5	
5	Strongly Agree	322	26.5	27.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	3.59	1.20

Q4a. [PS1]: Government should do more to protect the rights of gun owners in the United States.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	208	17.1	17.5	
2	Disagree	264	21.7	22.2	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	275	22.6	23.1	
4	Agree	268	22.1	22.6	
5	Strongly Agree	172	14.1	14.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	2.94	1.30

Q4b. [PS2]: Immigrants to the United States burden the country because they take our jobs.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	373	30.7	31.4	
2	Disagree	312	25.7	26.3	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	200	16.4	16.8	
4	Agree	190	15.6	16.0	
5	Strongly Agree	113	9.3	9.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1188	28	1.00	5.00	2.45	1.32

Q4c. [PS3]: There should be no restrictions on the ability of a woman to get an abortion.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	28	2.3		
1	Strongly Disagree	94	7.7	7.9	
2	Disagree	131	10.8	11.0	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	177	14.6	14.9	
4	Agree	278	22.9	23.4	
5	Strongly Agree	508	41.8	42.8	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev

1188	28	1.00	5.00	3.82	1.30
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S2: Political Behavior

S2a. Please tell us whether you often, sometimes, rarely, or never take part in each of the following activities.

Q5a. [PB1]: Vote for a presidential candidate in a primary or election caucus.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Never	117	9.6	9.9	
2	Rarely	97	8.0	8.2	
3	Sometimes	216	17.8	18.3	
4	Often	748	61.5	63.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev
1178	38	1.00	4.00	3.35	.995

Q5b. [PB2]: Vote for a presidential candidate in a general election.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Never	75	6.2	6.4	
2	Rarely	69	5.7	5.9	
3	Sometimes	188	15.5	16.0	
4	Often	846	69.6	71.8	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev
1178	38	1.00	4.00	3.53	.865

Q5c. [PB3]: Try to show people why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Never	147	12.1	12.5	
2	Rarely	247	20.3	21.0	
3	Sometimes	476	39.1	40.4	
4	Often	308	25.3	26.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev
1178	38	1.00	4.00	2.80	.965

Q5d. [PB4]: Attend political meetings or rallies.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Never	502	41.3	42.6	
2	Rarely	335	27.5	28.4	
3	Sometimes	240	19.7	20.4	
4	Often	101	8.3	8.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev

1178	38	1.00	4.00	1.94	.985
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Q5e. [PB5]: Contribute money to a political party, candidate, or other political cause.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Never	570	46.9	48.4	
2	Rarely	264	21.7	22.4	
3	Sometimes	249	20.5	21.1	
4	Often	95	7.8	8.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev
1178	38	1.00	4.00	1.88	1.00

Q5f. [PB6]: Volunteer with a political interest group.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Never	606	49.8	51.4	
2	Rarely	277	22.8	23.5	
3	Sometimes	204	16.8	17.3	
4	Often	91	7.5	7.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev
1178	38	1.00	4.00	1.81	.981

S2b. Please tell us to what extent you agree with the following statements.

Q6a. [PA1]: Sometimes governmental and political affairs look so complex that I am unable to understand them.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Strongly Disagree	126	10.4	10.7	
2	Disagree	251	20.6	21.3	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	275	22.6	23.3	
4	Agree	413	34.0	35.1	
5	Strongly Agree	113	9.3	9.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1178	38	1.00	5.00	3.11	1.16

Q6b. [PA2]: I think that other than voting there is no way whereby we can influence governmental decision-making.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Strongly Disagree	212	17.4	18.0	
2	Disagree	409	33.6	34.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	229	18.8	19.4	
4	Agree	228	18.8	19.4	
5	Strongly Agree	100	8.2	8.5	

Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1178	38	1.00	5.00	1.48	.363

Q6c. [PA3]: If government officials mistreat us we are unable to do anything against them.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Strongly Disagree	190	15.6	16.1	
2	Disagree	346	28.5	29.4	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	179	14.7	15.2	
4	Agree	310	25.5	26.3	
5	Strongly Agree	153	12.6	13.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1178	38	1.00	5.00	1.71	.088

Q6d. [PA4]: The government does not care for people like me.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	38	3.1		
1	Strongly Disagree	45	3.7	3.8	
2	Disagree	186	15.3	15.8	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	321	26.4	27.2	
4	Agree	384	31.6	32.6	
5	Strongly Agree	242	19.9	20.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1178	38	1.00	5.00	3.50	1.09

Section 3: Sexual Identity

The following questions concern your feelings about different aspects of your sexual orientation.

Q7: [SI]: Do you consider yourself as:

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	41	3.4		
1	Gay	357	29.4	30.4	
2	Lesbian	378	22.9	23.7	
3	Bisexual	521	42.8	44.3	
4	Not Listed [write-in]	19	1.6	1.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1175	41	1.00	4.00	3.50	1.09

S3a: Sexual Identity Centrality

[For each statement, insert value from Q7]

Q8a. [SIC1]: Overall being, [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] has very little to do with how I feel about myself.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		

1	Strongly Disagree	100	8.2	8.6	
2	Disagree	235	19.3	20.8	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	162	13.3	13.9	
4	Agree	372	30.5	32.1	
5	Strongly Agree	290	23.8	25.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.44	1.29

Q8b. [SIC2]: In general, being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is an important part of my self-image.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	68	5.5	5.8	
2	Disagree	203	16.6	17.5	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	294	24.1	25.3	
4	Agree	383	31.4	33.0	
5	Strongly Agree	211	17.3	18.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.40	1.14

Q8c. [SIC3]: My destiny is tied to the destiny of other [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	225	8.2	8.6	
2	Disagree	308	19.3	20.8	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	267	13.3	13.9	
4	Agree	258	30.5	32.1	
5	Strongly Agree	101	23.8	25.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	2.74	1.24

Q8d. [SIC4]: Being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	116	9.5	10.0	
2	Disagree	228	18.7	19.6	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	192	15.7	16.5	
4	Agree	325	26.7	28.0	
5	Strongly Agree	298	24.5	25.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.39	1.32

Q8e. [SIC5]: I have a strong sense of belonging to the [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] community.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	128	10.5	11.0	
2	Disagree	216	17.7	18.6	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	355	29.1	30.6	
4	Agree	302	24.8	26.0	
5	Strongly Agree	158	12.9	13.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.12	1.91

Q8f. This is an attention filter. Please select ‘Strongly Disagree.’

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	1159	95.3	100.0	
2	Disagree		0	0	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree		0	0	
4	Agree		0	0	
5	Strongly Agree		0	0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	1.00	1	0

Q8g. [SIC6]: I have a strong attachment to other [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	67	5.5	5.7	
2	Disagree	140	11.5	12.0	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	358	29.4	30.8	
4	Agree	424	34.8	36.5	
5	Strongly Agree	170	13.9	14.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.42	1.06

Q8h. [SIC7]: Being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is an important reflection of who I am.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	84	6.9	7.2	
2	Disagree	179	14.7	15.4	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	286	23.5	24.6	
4	Agree	431	35.4	37.1	
5	Strongly Agree	179	14.7	15.4	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev

1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.38	1.13
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Q8i. [SIC8]: Being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] is not a major factor in my social relationships.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	92	7.5	7.9	
2	Disagree	207	17.0	17.8	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	208	17.1	17.9	
4	Agree	402	33.0	34.6	
5	Strongly Agree	250	20.5	21.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.44	1.22

S3b: Sexual Identity Private Regard

Q9a. [SIPr1]: I feel good about being [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	12	.98	1.0	
2	Disagree	41	3.3	3.5	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	153	12.5	13.2	
4	Agree	441	36.2	38.0	
5	Strongly Agree	512	42.1	44.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	4.20	.875

Q9b. [SIPr2]: I am happy that I am [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	12	.98	1.0	
2	Disagree	43	3.5	3.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	203	16.6	17.5	
4	Agree	414	34.0	35.7	
5	Strongly Agree	487	40.0	42.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	4.13	.904

Q9c. [SIPr3]: I feel that [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people have made major accomplishments and advancements.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	12	.98	1.0	
2	Disagree	26	2.1	2.2	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	212	17.4	18.2	
4	Agree	437	35.9	37.7	

5	Strongly Agree	472	38.8	40.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	4.14	.867

Q9d. [SIPr4]: I often regret that I am [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	559	45.9	48.2	
2	Disagree	328	26.9	28.3	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	135	11.1	11.6	
4	Agree	87	7.1	7.5	
5	Strongly Agree	50	4.1	4.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	1.91	1.13

Q9e. [SIPr5]: I am proud to be [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	12	.98	1.0	
2	Disagree	52	3.3	4.4	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	236	12.5	20.3	
4	Agree	352	36.2	30.3	
5	Strongly Agree	507	42.1	43.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	4.11	.949

Q9f. [SIPr6]: I feel that the [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] community has made valuable contributions to this society.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	20	1.6	1.7	
2	Disagree	31	2.5	2.6	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	225	18.5	19.4	
4	Agree	420	34.5	36.2	
5	Strongly Agree	463	38.0	39.9	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	4.10	.920

S3c: Sexual Identity Public Regard

Q10a. [SIPu1]: Overall [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people are considered good by others.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	54	4.4	4.6	
2	Disagree	251	20.6	21.6	

3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	353	29.0	30.4	
4	Agree	370	27.1	31.9	
5	Strongly Agree	131	10.7	11.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.23	1.05

Q10b. [SIPu2]: In general, others respect [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	77	6.3	6.6	
2	Disagree	331	27.2	28.5	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	343	28.2	29.5	
4	Agree	313	25.7	27.0	
5	Strongly Agree	95	7.8	8.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.01	1.07

Q10c. [SIPu3]: Most people, on average, consider [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people to be more ineffective than other social groups.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	110	9.0	9.4	
2	Disagree	273	22.4	23.5	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	431	35.4	37.1	
4	Agree	262	21.5	22.6	
5	Strongly Agree	83	6.8	7.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	2.94	1.12

Q10d. [SIPu4]: [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people are not respected by the broader society.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	43	3.5	3.7	
2	Disagree	168	13.8	14.4	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	298	24.5	25.7	
4	Agree	498	40.9	42.9	
5	Strongly Agree	152	12.5	13.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	3.47	1.01

Q10e. [SIPu5]: In general, other groups view [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people in a positive manner.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		

1	Strongly Disagree	61	5.0	5.2	
2	Disagree	325	26.7	28.0	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	430	35.3	37.1	
4	Agree	276	22.6	23.8	
5	Strongly Agree	67	5.5	5.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	2.96	.960

Q10f. [SIPu6]: Society views [Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Sexual Minority] people as an asset.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	57	4.6		
1	Strongly Disagree	115	9.4	9.9	
2	Disagree	356	29.2	30.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	453	37.2	39.0	
4	Agree	175	14.3	15.1	
5	Strongly Agree	60	4.9	5.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1159	57	1.00	5.00	2.74	.999

S3d: Sexual Identity Stigma

We would like to know how other people have treated you because of your sexual orientation. Please tell us how often, if at all, any of the following have happened to you because of your sexual orientation.

Q11a. [SIS1]: Been threatened or physically attacked.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Never	611	50.2	52.9	
2	Rarely	287	23.6	24.8	
3	Sometimes	207	17.0	17.9	
4	Often	50	4.1	4.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	1.74	.902

Q11b. [SIS2]: Been subject to any slurs or jokes.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Never	246	20.2	21.3	
2	Rarely	288	23.7	24.9	
3	Sometimes	446	36.7	38.6	
4	Often	175	14.4	15.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	2.48	.990

Q11c. [SIS3]: Been treated unfairly by an employer.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Never	627	51.6	54.3	
2	Rarely	224	18.4	19.4	
3	Sometimes	221	18.2	19.1	
4	Often	83	6.8	7.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	1.79	.990

Q11d. [SIS4]: Been made to feel uncomfortable in a public place such as a movie theater or restaurant.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Never	455	37.4	39.4	
2	Rarely	285	23.4	24.7	
3	Sometimes	296	24.3	25.6	
4	Often	119	9.8	10.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	2.07	1.02

Q11e. [SIS5]: Been offended by a religious group or official.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Never	309	25.4	26.8	
2	Rarely	185	15.2	16.0	
3	Sometimes	348	28.6	30.1	
4	Often	313	25.7	27.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	2.58	1.15

Q11f. [SIS6]: Been offended by a friend.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Never	425	35.0	36.8	
2	Rarely	361	29.7	31.3	
3	Sometimes	273	22.5	23.6	
4	Often	96	7.9	8.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	2.03	.968

Q11g. [SIS7]: Been offended by a family member.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Never	355	29.2	30.7	
2	Rarely	286	23.5	24.8	

3	Sometimes	321	26.4	27.8	
4	Often	193	15.9	16.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	2.30	1.07

Section 4: Racial Identity

Q12. **[RI]: Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity?**

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	61	5.0		
1	Black, Not Latino/a	89	7.3	7.7	
2	Latino/a	108	8.9	9.4	
3	White, Not Latino/a	888	73.6	76.9	
4	Not Listed Here (write-in)	70	5.8	6.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1155	61	1.00	4.00	2.81	.654

S4a: Racial Identity Centrality

[For each statement, insert value from Q13]

Q13a. **[RIC1]: Overall being, [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] has very little to do with how I feel about myself.**

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	85	6.6	7.4	
2	Disagree	194	15.9	16.9	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	185	15.2	16.1	
4	Agree	401	32.9	34.9	
5	Strongly Agree	283	23.2	24.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.52	1.23

Q13b. **[RIC2]: In general, being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is an important part of my self-image.**

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	161	13.2	14.0	
2	Disagree	213	17.5	18.5	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	300	24.6	26.1	
4	Agree	306	25.1	36.6	
5	Strongly Agree	168	13.8	14.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.09	1.26

Q13c. [RIC3]: My destiny is tied to the destiny of other [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	233	19.1	20.3	
2	Disagree	257	21.1	22.3	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	303	24.9	26.3	
4	Agree	252	20.7	21.9	
5	Strongly Agree	103	8.4	8.9	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	2.76	1.24

Q13d. [RIC4]: Being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	85	6.6	7.4	
2	Disagree	169	13.8	14.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	207	17.0	18.0	
4	Agree	369	30.3	32.1	
5	Strongly Agree	318	26.1	27.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.58	1.24

Q13e. [RIC5]: I have a strong sense of belonging to the [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] community.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	121	9.9	10.5	
2	Disagree	241	19.8	20.9	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	367	30.1	31.9	
4	Agree	275	22.6	23.9	
5	Strongly Agree	144	11.8	12.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.06	1.17

Q13f. This is an attention filter. Please select 'Strongly Agree.'

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	
2	Disagree	0	0	0	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	0	0	0	
4	Agree	0	0	0	
5	Strongly Agree	1148	94.4	100.0	

Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	5.00	5.00	5	0

Q13g. [RIC6]: I have a strong attachment to other [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	93	7.6	8.1	
2	Disagree	191	15.7	16.6	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	400	32.8	34.8	
4	Agree	328	26.9	28.5	
5	Strongly Agree	136	11.1	11.8	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.19	1.10

Q14h. [RIC7]: Being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is an important reflection of who I am.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	177	14.5	15.4	
2	Disagree	232	19.0	20.2	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	314	25.8	27.3	
4	Agree	280	23.0	24.3	
5	Strongly Agree	145	11.9	12.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	2.98	1.25

Q13i. [RIC8]: Being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] is not a major factor in my social relationships.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	64	5.2	5.5	
2	Disagree	161	13.2	14.0	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	244	20.0	21.2	
4	Agree	389	31.9	33.8	
5	Strongly Agree	290	23.8	25.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.59	1.16

S4b: Racial Identity Private Regard

Q14a. [RIPr1]: I feel good about being [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	40	3.2	3.4	
2	Disagree	70	5.7	6.1	

3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	367	30.1	31.9	
4	Agree	398	32.7	34.6	
5	Strongly Agree	273	22.4	23.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.69	1.01

Q14b. [RIPr2]: I am happy that I am [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	20	1.6	1.7	
2	Disagree	38	3.1	3.3	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	391	32.1	34.0	
4	Agree	401	32.9	34.9	
5	Strongly Agree	298	24.5	25.9	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.80	.922

Q14c. [RIPr3]: I feel that [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people have made major accomplishments and advancements.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	15	1.2	1.3	
2	Disagree	28	2.3	2.4	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	191	15.7	16.6	
4	Agree	521	42.8	45.3	
5	Strongly Agree	393	32.3	34.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	4.08	.846

Q14d. [RIPr4]: I often regret that I am [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	448	36.8	39.0	
2	Disagree	289	23.7	25.1	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	232	19.0	20.2	
4	Agree	133	10.9	11.5	
5	Strongly Agree	46	3.7	4.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	2.16	1.17

Q14e. [RIPr5]: I am proud to be [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority].

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	38	3.1	3.3	
2	Disagree	97	7.9	8.4	

3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	369	30.3	32.1	
4	Agree	314	25.8	27.3	
5	Strongly Agree	330	27.1	28.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.69	1.07

Q14f. [RIPr6]: I feel that the [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] community has made valuable contributions to this society.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	20	1.6	1.7	
2	Disagree	31	2.5	2.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	216	17.7	18.8	
4	Agree	480	39.4	41.8	
5	Strongly Agree	401	32.9	34.9	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	4.05	.894

S4c: Sexual Identity Public Regard

Q15a. [RIPu1]: Overall [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are considered good by others.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	50	4.1	1.7	
2	Disagree	171	14.0	2.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	337	27.7	18.8	
4	Agree	412	33.8	41.8	
5	Strongly Agree	178	14.6	34.9	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.43	1.05

Q15b. [RIPu2]: In general, others respect [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	42	3.4	3.6	
2	Disagree	135	11.1	11.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	313	25.7	27.2	
4	Agree	473	38.8	41.2	
5	Strongly Agree	185	15.2	16.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.54	1.01

Q15c. [RIPu3]: Most people, on average, consider [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people to be more ineffective than other social groups.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
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	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	186	15.2	16.2	
2	Disagree	340	27.9	29.6	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	362	29.7	31.5	
4	Agree	176	14.4	15.3	
5	Strongly Agree	84	6.9	7.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	2.67	1.13

Q15d. [RIPu4]: [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people are not respected by the broader society.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	209	17.1	18.2	
2	Disagree	243	19.9	29.8	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	293	24.0	25.5	
4	Agree	212	17.4	18.4	
5	Strongly Agree	91	7.4	7.9	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	2.68	1.19

Q15e. [RIPu5]: In general, other groups view [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people in a positive manner.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	53	4.3	4.6	
2	Disagree	181	14.8	15.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	360	29.6	31.3	
4	Agree	397	32.6	34.5	
5	Strongly Agree	157	12.9	13.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.36	1.04

Q15f. [RIPu6]: Society views [Black/Latino(a)/White/Racial Minority] people as an asset.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	68	5.5		
1	Strongly Disagree	41	3.3	3.5	
2	Disagree	100	8.2	8.7	
3	Neither Agree nor Disagree	346	28.4	30.1	
4	Agree	460	37.8	40.0	
5	Strongly Agree	201	16.5	17.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1148	68	1.00	5.00	3.59	.981

S4d: Racial Identity Stigma

We would like to know how other people have treated you because of your race or ethnicity. Please tell us how often, if at all, any of the following have happened to you because of your race or ethnicity.

Q16a. [RIS1]: Been threatened or physically attacked.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	70	5.7		
1	Never	742	61.0	64.7	
2	Rarely	232	19.0	20.4	
3	Sometimes	124	10.1	10.8	
4	Often	48	3.9	4.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1146	70	1.00	4.00	1.54	.846

Q16b. [RIS2]: Been subject to any slurs or jokes.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	70	5.7		
1	Never	468	38.4	40.8	
2	Rarely	330	27.1	28.8	
3	Sometimes	278	22.8	24.2	
4	Often	70	5.7	6.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1146	70	1.00	4.00	1.95	.945

Q16c. [RIS3]: Been treated unfairly by an employer.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	70	5.7		
1	Never	800	65.7	69.8	
2	Rarely	155	12.7	13.5	
3	Sometimes	137	11.2	11.9	
4	Often	54	4.4	4.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1146	70	1.00	4.00	1.51	.878

Q16d. [RIS4]: Been made to feel uncomfortable in a public place such as a movie theater or restaurant.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	70	5.7		
1	Never	726	59.7	63.3	
2	Rarely	223	18.3	19.4	
3	Sometimes	154	12.6	13.4	
4	Often	43	3.5	3.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1146	70	1.00	4.00	1.57	.859

Q16e. [RIS5]: Been offended by a religious group or official.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	70	5.7		
1	Never	782	64.3	68.2	
2	Rarely	141	11.5	12.3	
3	Sometimes	156	12.8	13.6	
4	Often	67	5.5	5.8	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1146	70	1.00	4.00	1.57	.932

Q16f. [RIS6]: Been offended by a friend.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	70	5.7		
1	Never	755	62.0	65.8	
2	Rarely	206	16.9	17.9	
3	Sometimes	138	11.3	12.0	
4	Often	47	3.8	4.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1146	70	1.00	4.00	1.54	.857

Q16g. [RIS7]: Been offended by a family member.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	70	5.7		
1	Never	882	72.5	76.9	
2	Rarely	119	9.7	10.3	
3	Sometimes	93	7.6	8.1	
4	Often	53	4.3	4.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1146	70	1.00	4.00	1.40	.821

Section 5: Social Networks

The following questions are about your close friends and how alike or different you are. On a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 means none and 6 means all, tell us how many of your close friends SHARE each of the following characteristics with you.

Q17a. [SN1]: Your sexual orientation.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	90	7.4		
0	None	112	9.2	9.9	
1		132	10.9	11.7	
2		194	16.0	17.2	
3		240	19.7	21.3	
4		206	16.9	18.3	

5		130	10.7	11.5	
6	All	112	9.2	9.9	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1126	90	0.00	7.00	4.01	1.75

Q17b. [SN2]: Your gender.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	82	6.7		
0	None	30	2.5	2.6	
1		36	3.0	3.2	
2		87	7.2	7.7	
3		290	23.8	25.6	
4		285	23.4	25.1	
5		254	20.9	22.4	
6	All	152	12.5	13.4	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1134	82	0.00	7.00	4.88	1.42

Q17c. [SN3]: Your race or ethnicity.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	82	6.6		
0	None	41	3.4	3.6	
1		50	4.1	4.4	
2		87	7.2	7.7	
3		208	17.1	18.3	
4		260	21.4	22.9	
5		294	24.2	25.9	
6	All	194	16.0	17.1	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1134	82	0.00	7.00	4.99	1.55

Q17d. [SN4]: Your religion.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	240	19.7		
0	None	118	9.7	12.1	
1		130	10.7	13.3	
2		150	12.3	15.4	
3		239	19.7	24.5	
4		127	10.4	13.0	
5		118	9.7	12.1	
6	All	94	7.7	9.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
976	240	0.00	7.00	3.88	1.80

Q17e. [SN5]: Your political party.

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	174	14.3		
0	None	67	5.5	6.4	
1		60	4.9	5.8	
2		88	7.2	8.4	
3		234	19.2	22.5	
4		179	14.7	17.2	
5		234	19.2	22.5	
6	All	180	14.8	17.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1042	174	0.00	7.00	4.75	1.72

Section 6: Context

Q18. [Gender]: Which of the following best describes you:

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	73	6.0		
1	Male	539	44.3	47.2	
2	Female	563	46.3	49.3	
3	Male-to-Female Transgender	16	1.3	1.4	
4	Female-to-Male Transgender	17	1.4	1.5	
5	Not Listed [write-in]	8	0.7	0.7	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1143	73	1.00	5.00	1.59	.666

Q19. [Rel1]: Which of the following best describes your religious affiliation:

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	73	6.0		
1	Muslim	8	0.7	0.7	
2	Hindu	5	0.4	0.4	
3	Buddhist	26	2.1	2.3	
4	Christian	555	45.6	48.6	
5	Jewish	42	3.5	3.7	
6	Atheist	273	22.5	23.9	
7	Not Listed [write-in]	234	19.2	20.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1143	73	1.00	7.00	5.08	1.33

[If Christian is selected from Q20.]

Q20. [Rel2]: Which of the following best describes your religious denomination:

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	661	54.4		
1	Catholic	258	21.2	46.5	

2	Mainline Protestant	93	7.6	16.8	
3	Evangelical Protestant	49	4.0	8.8	
4	African-American Protestant	19	1.6	3.4	
5	Mormon	7	.6	1.3	
6	Not Listed [write-in]	129	10.6	23.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
555	661	1.00	6.00	2.66	2.02

Q21. [Aff]: Do you attend a church that is affirming of your sexuality?

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Yes	206	16.9	18.1	
2	No	821	67.5	72.0	
3	I don't know	114	9.4	10.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1141	75	1.00	3.00	1.92	.524

Q22. [Employ]: Which of the following best describes your current employment situation:

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Note Employed	295	24.3	25.9	
2	Retired	127	10.4	11.1	
3	Employed Part-time	196	16.1	17.2	
4	Employed Full-time	523	43.0	45.8	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1141	75	1.00	4.00	2.83	1.25

Q23. [Urb]: Which of the following best describes where you currently live:

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Rural city	231	19.0	20.2	
2	Small city (> 50,000 people)	236	19.4	20.7	
3	Medium city (> 100,000 people)	323	26.6	28.3	
4	Large city (> 500,000 people)	351	28.9	30.8	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1144	75	1.00	4.00	2.70	1.11

Q24. [Born]: Were you born in the United States, or in another country?

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Born in the United States, Puerto Rico, or other U.S. territory	1090	89.6	95.5	
2	Born in a different country	51	4.2	4.5	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1141	75	1.00	2.00	1.04	.207

Q25. [Age]: What is your current age (in years)?

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	0			
18					
...					
...					
79					
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1216	0	18.00	79.00	54.0	366.9

Q26. [Edu]: What is the highest grade you completed in school?

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Less than high school	21	1.7	1.8	
2	High school graduate	185	15.2	16.2	
3	Some college	320	26.3	28.0	
4	2-year degree	129	10.6	11.3	
5	4-year degree	292	24.9	25.6	
6	Professional degree	164	13.5	14.4	
7	Doctorate	30	2.5	2.6	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1141	75	1.00	7.00	3.96	1.47

Q27. [Income]: Last year, that is in 2015, what was your total family income from all sources?

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Less than \$20,000	160	13.2	14.0	
2	\$20,000 to under \$30,000	176	14.5	15.4	
3	\$30,000 to under \$40,000	140	11.5	12.3	
4	\$40,000 to under \$50,000	118	9.7	10.3	
5	\$50,000 to under \$75,000	221	18.2	19.4	
6	\$75,000 to under \$100,000	157	12.9	13.8	
7	\$100,000 to under \$150,000	110	9.0	9.6	
8	\$150,000 or more	59	4.9	5.2	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1141	75	1.00	8.00	4.11	2.10

Q28. [Ideo]: In general, how would you describe your political views?

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Very conservative	36	3.0	3.2	
2	Conservative	93	7.6	8.2	
3	Moderate	328	27.0	28.7	

4	Liberal	314	25.8	27.5	
5	Very Liberal	301	24.8	26.4	
6	None of these	69	5.7	6.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1141	75	1.00	6.00	3.84	1.17

Q29. [Party]: In politics today, do you consider yourself as a:

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	75	6.2		
1	Republican	167	13.7	14.6	
2	Democrat	611	50.2	53.5	
3	Independent	317	26.1	27.8	
4	Something else [write-in]	46	3.8	4.0	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
1141	75	1.00	4.00	2.21	.735

[If Independent or Something else is selected from Q30.]

Q30. [Partyln]: As of today, do you lean more toward

Value	Label	Frequency	%	Valid %	
	Refused/Blank	853	70.1		
1	The Republican Party	38	3.1	10.5	
2	The Democratic Party	135	11.1	37.2	
3	Neither party	190	15.6	52.3	
Valid	Invalid	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
363	853	1.00	3.00	2.42	.674

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Variables used in OLS regression estimation:

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	St. Dev	Skewness	Kurtosis	α	N
Dependent Variables								
<i>Scales:</i>								
Role of Government Scale	3	7.89	15	2.45	.184	2.83	.534	1188
Private Rights Scale	2	8.90	10	1.66	1.84	6.53	.742	1188
Egalitarianism Scale	3	7.46	15	2.73	.318	2.73	.664	1188
Political Behavior Scale	6	15.3	24	4.07	-.159	2.71	.794	1178
Political Alienation Scale	5	12.1	20	3.37	.089	2.58	.659	1178
<i>Policy Specific Variables:</i>								
Gun Control	1	2.94	5	1.31	.023	1.86	-	1188
Immigration	1	2.45	5	1.32	.497	2.02	-	1188
Abortion	1	2.17	5	1.30	.823	2.46	-	1188
Independent Variables								
Sexual Identity Centrality Scale	8	23.7	40	6.20	-.011	2.70	.797	1159
Sexual Identity Private Regard Scale	9	24.7	30	4.09	-.718	3.40	.816	1159
Sexual Identity Public Regard Scale	6	17.5	30	4.31	-.102	2.75	.789	1159
Sexual Identity Stigmatization Scale	7	14.9	28	5.36	.262	2.18	.872	1155
Racial Identity Centrality Scale	8	22.4	40	6.44	.088	2.85	.820	1148
Racial Identity Private Regard Scale	6	23.1	30	4.58	-.346	2.82	.861	1148

Racial Identity Public Regard Scale	6	20.5	30	4.54	-.336	3.38	.797	1148
Racial Identity Stigmatization Scale	7	11.1	28	4.93	1.35	4.06	.907	1146
Gender ID	0	.511	1	.500	-.044	1.00	-	1135
Network Diversity Scale	0	11.0	30	6.05	.095	3.15	.680	1216
Income	1	4.11	8	2.10	.060	1.87	-	1141
Education	1	3.96	7	1.47	.089	1.94	-	1141
Unemployment	0	.258	1	.438	1.10	2.21	-	1141
Age	18	37.5	83	14.8	.736	2.60	-	1212
Religious Affiliation	1	2.06	3	.689	-.087	2.10	-	1143
Urbanity	0	.491	1	.491	-.368	1.13	-	1141
Ideology	1	3.83	6	1.17	-.233	2.59	-	1141
Party ID	1	1.96	3	.577	.0002	2.98	-	1115

Appendix C: Correlation Matrix

Variable																		
SI Centrality	1.00																	
SI Public Regard	.33	1.00																
SI Private Regard	-.06	.14	1.00															
SI Stigma	.37	.10	-.24	1.00														
RI Centrality	.20	-.04	.09	.01	1.00													
RI Public Regard	-.10	.17	.21	-.20	.47	1.00												
RI Private Regard	-.03	.11	.17	-.13	-.002	.27	1.00											
RI Stigma	.13	-.11	.02	.56	.23	-.006	-.27	1.00										
Gender	-.02	.03	-.06	.07	-.10	-.16	-.11	-.03	1.00									
Network Diversity	-.24	-.08	-.13	-.11	-.17	-.03	-.09	-.13	.04	1.00								
Income	.07	.01	.11	.02	.07	.05	.06	.11	-.13	-.10	1.00							
Education	.11	-.02	.06	.03	.09	.01	.08	.06	-.16	-.11	.44	1.00						
Unemployment	-.07	-.03	-.11	-.05	.001	-.04	-.10	-.04	.13	.12	-.29	-.33	1.00					

Age	-.03	.10	.08	-.23	.02	.15	.24	-.19	-.34	-.05	.09	.25	-.21	1.00				
Religion	-.009	.01	-.02	-.02	-.04	-.05	-.05	-.04	-.01	.007	-.01	-.03	-.01	-.10	1.00			
Urban	.09	.03	.05	.06	.04	-.001	-.08	.07	-.07	-.04	.14	.14	-.07	.02	.03	1.00		
Party ID	.02	.03	-.04	.002	-.08	-.10	-.09	-.07	.06	.08	-.07	-.05	.01	-.05	.04	-.02	1.00	
Ideology	.18	.18	-.14	.09	-.12	-.15	-.03	-.09	.04	.03	-.07	-.02	.05	-.03	.06	.002	.29	1.00

VITA

Royal Gene Cravens, III was born in Crossville, TN in 1986. He attended Cumberland County High School after which he pursued an Associate's Degree in Political Science from Roane State Community College in Harriman, TN while working full-time in his family's florist in Crossville. He graduated Magna Cum Laude with a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from The University of the South in Sewanee, TN. During his undergraduate career, he was awarded the Order of the Gownsmen and served as a Presidential Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington, D.C. He also served as a United States Congressional intern and an intern in the Office of the Governor of the State of Tennessee. In 2012, he became the first openly-LGBT delegate to the Democratic National Convention from the 4th Congressional District of the State of Tennessee.

He received a Master's Degree in Political Science from the University of Tennessee in 2015 and was awarded a Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in 2017. During his graduate career, he served as a Graduate Research Fellow at the Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy and a Graduate Teaching Associate, and was awarded the Political Science Department's John Shanks Prize for outstanding achievement in the field of American Government. He has published two articles and presented original research at more than half a dozen regional and national academic conferences.

He currently lives in Cookeville, TN with his partner, Darren, and their three girls, Fiona, Jazmina, and Lily.