

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Lachelle Norris-Hall entitled "A Social Movement Analysis of an Environmental Protest Group: The Dead Pigeon River Council." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Sociology.


Sherry Cable, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:




Accepted for the Council:


Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

STATEMENT OF PERMISSION TO USE

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master's degree at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, I agree that the Library shall make it available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of the source is made.

Requests for permission for extensive quotation from or reproduction of this thesis in whole or in parts may be granted by the copyright holder.

Signature Lachell Norris-Hall
Date November 30, 1988

A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ANALYSIS OF AN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST GROUP:
THE DEAD PIGEON RIVER COUNCIL

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Arts
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Lachelle Norris-Hall
December 1988

Copyright © Lachelle Norris-Hall, 1989
All rights reserved

DEDICATION

This thesis is hereby dedicated to the members of the Dead Pigeon River Council, including members past and present. Though deeply involved in their fight, the group always made time for me, and provided encouragement which helped in completing the project. Without these special individuals, this thesis would never have been realized, and I will always be indebted to them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of thesis research, a number of scholars have assisted me generously. In particular I am indebted to Sherry Cable, who served as my director. Without her guidance, criticism, encouragement, and understanding this thesis could not have been possible. I also acknowledge with thanks my committee, John Gaventa and Donald Clelland, for their guidance and input in association with this thesis.

I also deeply thank my husband, John Hall, whose patience and encouragement saw me through this thesis project. I am forever grateful to him.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an examination of an environmental protest group from a social movement perspective. The group, the Dead Pigeon River Council, is presented as a case study to assess empirical support for a more refined resource mobilization theory. This refined perspective, while continuing to place emphasis on the movement organization, is a synthesis incorporating social psychological variables. Individual members' ideologies and perceptions derived from interaction are included to strengthen the analytical worth of resource mobilization perspectives.

The Dead Pigeon River Council represents the first successful collective action against the eighty-year pollution of a river. Questions focusing on why this group emerged when it did and what factors contributed to its success are examined with this newer theoretical framework. The case is made that without such a synthesized theory as a means for analysis the fuller understanding of group dynamics could not have been achieved.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	7
The First Phase: The Role of Rationality	11
The Second Phase: Micro versus Macro Levels of Analysis.	16
The Third Phase: Social Psychological versus Structural Variables	25
The Theoretical Purpose of This Project .	38
Summary of Chapter I.	44
III. METHODOLOGY	46
Field Research Methods.	46
Interviews.	49
Archival Research Methods	50
Discussion.	52
IV. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COCKE COUNTY REGION.	56
Newport, Tennessee.	59
Lumber.	61
Agriculture	66
Tourism and the Park Service.	70
Summary	74
V. CASE STUDY PRESENTATION OF THE DPRC	84

Incidents Leading to Mobilization	85
The Dead Pigeon River Council	94
Discussion.	128
Summary	142
VI. CONCLUSION.	144
Thesis Summary.	144
Theoretical Implications.	146
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	150
APPENDIX.	157
VITA.	160

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States has experienced many popular social movements in the last few decades as people have attempted to create or prevent changes in this society. This attempt at changing society has resulted in the Civil Rights Movement, the Women's Liberation Movement, and the Environmental Movement to cite a few examples.

Movements realized a peak in the 1960's, and attracted social scientists, who began researching and analyzing social movement organizations (SMOs) from a sociological perspective. New exploration and insight into the world of SMOs brought new perspectives and theories, in some instances, replacing the classical or traditional, more psychological explanations for social movement behavior. The resource mobilization (RM) perspectives were born of the activity of sociologists attempting to break the stronghold of more psychologically-oriented thinkers, dominating the theories of the time.

Simultaneously, the appearance of grassroots environmental organizations has become increasingly noted. According to Barry Commoner (1987), environmental SMOs, or "national organizations" as he so

terms, have achieved many of the goals originally set, although falling severely short of others. This shortfall he feels can be attributed to the national organizations' strategies of compromise, of working in the system, of hesitancy to disrupt the status quo. Thus, the grassroots environmental protest groups have become increasingly visible, being composed of people having much to gain and little to lose by implementing more radical methods/tactics. The results are seen at Love Canal, Times Beach, Three Mile Island, and Yellow Creek, Kentucky, where communities have mobilized to fight environmental threats.

The Pigeon River flows approximately thirty-five miles through Western North Carolina into Cocke County, Tennessee, before emptying into Douglas Lake. Due to the waste products of the Champion International Paper Company in Canton, North Carolina, the river has been polluted for eighty years. For many miles downstream of the mill, the river is thought by many to be useless for any purpose. Thought first to represent an aesthetic problem with its dark, coffee color and foul odor, the river is now known to harbor dioxin, a suspected carcinogen.

The Dead Pigeon River Council (DPRC), a group from Newport (Cocke County), Tennessee, formed in 1986 to fight the environmental threat that flowed through the

heart of the town. The group's main goal centered around the cleaning up of the Pigeon River. This would involve a strict permit that would assure removal of the dark brown color, reduction of the amount of organic matter in order to increase dissolved oxygen, limitation on the toxicity of discharges from the plant, and limitations of discharges of chloroform and ammonia into the water. One step in achieving this goal was seen to be the pressing for a United States Environmental Protection Agency public hearing. The DPRC felt that the hearings would provide an arena in which popular sentiment could be heard regarding the federal issuance of a waste water permit, a proposed document that would establish regulations concerning the amount of color released by the mill into the river. The DPRC believed that the proposed allowable color units were sufficient to achieve a cleanup of the river. Champion claimed such stringent requirements would force the mill to shut down. In this atmosphere, after being once rescheduled, the hearings were held in January, 1988, with much emotion and activity from both those advocating a cleaner Pigeon River and those in support of Champion International.

With the deadline for receiving public statements a week away, EPA announced that an agreement had been reached between the states of North Carolina and

Tennessee; another permit was proposed. Champion believed the new permit "reasonable," as did the state of North Carolina and Tennessee, but was required to file for a variance from Tennessee in order to pollute at the levels allowed by the new permit; the new levels exceeded Tennessee regulations. Members of the DPRC, confronted at this time with the discovery of dioxin contaminated fish in the river, a factor that could not be included into the permit, felt the issue had not been fairly settled, and that the state of Tennessee had compromised the original position by thirty-five color units more than Tennessee state law allowed. The group had successfully carried out the plan that it had set, that being the EPA hearings, and while some of the members believed the fight to be over, others did not. Subsequently, internal conflict surfaced among the individuals of the DPRC involving the next course of action. Differing individual ideologies concerning tactics, goals and group organization have resulted in factionalism within the DPRC.

Pertinent questions about this group are suggested by the social movement literature: Under what conditions did the DPRC emerge? Why was the group not formed earlier? What attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, as well as resources attributed to the mobilization of this SMO? What were the goals of the group and what beliefs

and ideologies of the members supported those goals? Why do members see the group as successful even though the group failed to resolve internal conflicts?

Resource mobilization perspectives alone are not adequate in examining these questions. In the last ten years of social movement literature, there has been an attempt to combine social psychological elements with contemporary resource mobilization perspectives in order to more thoroughly understand social movement phenomena, in particular, the grassroots SMOs. This new framework will be applied to the DPRC case study in order to more completely analyze this SMO.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine from a social movements perspective the DPRC and the conflict that has emerged regarding this environmental issue. The analysis will utilize a synthetic theoretical framework, formed by the merging of resource mobilization and social psychological perspectives. This case study supports such a theoretical framework.

The second chapter of this thesis is an analysis of the dialectical process that has taken place in the field of social movement theory within the discipline of sociology. As the result of two prior syntheses, the current thesis consisting of the RM perspectives is contested by a more social psychological approach, or the antithesis. The examination of this historical

dialectical process is essential to examine in order to predict the future direction of social movement theory.

This is followed in Chapter III by a discussion of methodology used in the case study.

The fourth chapter is presented as a historical analysis of the Cocke County region in order to explain why no relatively longstanding social movement occurred prior to 1986. The economic and political environment of the area is examined in some detail in order to more thoroughly understand this phenomena.

Chapter V presents the case study of the DPRC in chronological form. Here the three variables examined by RM theorists are analyzed as they are found within the group. These variables include: organizational structure, goals, and strategies/tactics. Social psychological variables are examined in the light of these variables also.

The final chapter offers a summary, a discussion of the theoretical implications of the findings, and some suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In this chapter, I examine the background of social movement theories including dominant current perspectives. A dialectical process has occurred consistently within the field generating the development of a variety of approaches which have proved useful in the examination of social movements. This process has resulted in today's basic frameworks and suggest the direction of future developments of social movement theory. Therefore, an examination of this dialectical process is essential in proposing a new theoretical framework for modern social movement analysis.

Dialectic is defined by Theodorson and Theodorson as "the development of contradictions and their solutions as a way of advancing thought" (1969: 111). Although the dialectical approach to analysis stemmed from the Greek philosophers, it was Georg Hegel who explored the use of a dialectic in explaining reality development. For every action, there exists a reaction; hence through the conflict of opposites, syntheses are born of the action (thesis) and the conflicting opposite reaction (antithesis). Writers in which a dialectical analysis is evident include such theorists as Bendix and

Berger (1959), Mannheim (1936), Sorokin (1937-41), Simmel (1945), Pareto (1935), and Gross (1961).

To propose that a synthesis is occurring within the current arena of social movement theory involving resource mobilization and social psychological approaches, one must first examine the history of social movement theory leading up to this point. If it is true that a dialectical process has taken place from earliest social thinkers up to the present, then a current synthesis does not appear to be so conceptually farfetched. This chapter therefore analyzes the theoretical development in the area of social movements as a dialectical process, following Robert Nisbet's line of thought:

Ideas are dialectical responses caught up in the logic of circumstances of antithesis. This is, no doubt, as true in the physical sciences, philosophy, and art as it is in the social sciences; but it is more immediately evident and dramatic in the latter. To a striking extent, every major social idea begins as an attack on, a criticism of, or a response to, some other idea.

(Nisbet, 1965: 9)

Three phases are identified in the dialectical development of social movement theory. The first synthesis was the merging of the eighteenth century

moral philosophers' conception of the rational human being (Thesis #1) with the perspectives developed by the French thinkers, in that human beings were basically irrational in the presence of a group (Antithesis #1). The issue involved in this first process concerned rationality and Synthesis #1, based on Park's work and the subsequent Chicago school tradition, resolved this contradiction. This first synthesis viewed human beings as largely rational, but still influenced by the group.

Synthesis #1 developed into the traditional collective behavior field in American sociology, firmly entrenched in symbolic interaction, and focused at a microsociological level. This approach in turn became Thesis #2, contested by the more European structural-functionalist approach (Antithesis #2). In this case, the contrast was the microlevel analysis of the symbolic interactionists framework as opposed to the more structural macrolevel theoretical framework. Drawing on both perspectives, Synthesis #2 developed as a result of Smelser's (1963) incorporation of structural-functionalism, mass society and disorganization theories, and the tenets of the collective behavior approach. Synthesis #2 yielded the breakdown theories, those models in which social psychological variables (relative deprivation, status discontent) were analyzed within a structural framework.

This approach became Thesis #3 when a perspective developed as a contrasting approach. Antithesis #3 appeared when social movement analysts presented resource mobilization perspectives to more thoroughly examine social movement activity. The basic issues these perspectives revolved around involved the question of the appropriateness of social psychological variables, with resource mobilization theorists arguing for the limited relevance of such variables in social movement analysis. Theorists stressed that analysis should occur within a social structural framework.

A synthesis appears to be emerging in the field at this time, with the basic point of contention being the relative roles that structural and social psychological variables play in social movement behavior. As suggested by the ongoing dialectical process, the most logical prediction involves an expansion of the basic resource mobilization framework which incorporates more social psychological variables. If this is indeed the future direction, the newer theoretical framework will facilitate more complete analyses of social movement organizations than either resource mobilization frameworks or more traditional models of analysis. This project presents empirical support for the utility of such a synthesis by applying both resource mobilization

and social psychological variables to analyze a social movement organization.

The First Phase: The Role of Rationality

The foundations of modern social movement theory are found in the works of the moral philosophers and eighteenth-century philosophes (the critical rationalists, such as Adam Smith and Quesnay). During this time, major investigations were focusing on the lifestyles and customs of many non-European peoples (e.g. Chinese, American Indians). In the hope of completely discrediting the divine right theory of nobility, or the religious-based views of human nature, more scientific explanations were being developed. The following Enlightenment era sought to dispel the superstitious beliefs and fanatical religiosity being used by the Church as a means of dominance and control over the people. By examining groups of people other than European, these eighteenth-century thinkers attempted to develop theories of group processes, norm formation, and the mechanics involved with all groups, nations, and societies based on human perception and motivation.

Newtonian perspectives and the common sense approach utilized by men such as Locke and his followers

provided a methodological framework to examine the data being collected by explorers, missionaries and other travelers of the day. With increasing regularity, the royal courts were visited by non-Europeans, this too providing data. Now topics such as social inequality, humanity and civil society were being analyzed in the light of constant and variable elements. The peoples of the known regions of the earth were seen as a heterogenous group, capable of rationality and common sense, enabling them to adapt to any particular environment. A basic assumption surfaced as a result of the scientists', moral philosopher's, and Enlightenment thinker's work during this era: "all peoples ha[ve] the same capacity to develop and to progress" (Oberschall, 1973: 5). Regardless of differences in environment, intellectual and moral capacities were believed to be constant.

Drawing on this Enlightenment period and the observational research conducted, the Scottish moralists began analyzing society by examining the motivational and moral foundations of its inhabitants. Observing the everyday life, feelings, emotions, and experiences of human beings led the Scottish moralists to conclude that people of all regions operated on both selfish and unselfish principles. Moral sense and empathy in human beings played a larger role in decision making and

everyday activity than did reason. Human beings were seen as social animals as a result of communal living, and they possessed the ability to be aware of his neighbor's approval or disapproval. This sympathy, when combined with rationality, led to an individual's development of an enlightened self-interest. In this way, one's actions, opinions, and habits were determined. Most importantly, "judgment and choice in human action depended on a moral sense and the ability to project oneself and adopt another's point of view" (Oberschall, 1973: 6; emphasis added). Socialization and the social influence of one's setting explained a person's pursuits rather than any innate idea, unconscious drive, or instinct.

Simultaneously, the Continental thinkers were becoming increasingly involved with the study of conflict processes and authority. The environment that produced the moral sense according to the Scots, produced a nonrational, selfish, somewhat brutal human being, according to these thinkers. For instance, emotions, sexuality, or equality, stated Rousseau, were suppressed through the institutions humans had created. European contact, the subsequent education, and therefore enlightenment, previously seen as a stepping stone to man's glory and development, were becoming viewed as detrimental under the Continental approach.

Divisions of property and labor were believed to be the root causes of greed, alienation, and the public's general unhappiness.

Thus far the earlier eighteenth-century thinkers, the moral philosophers, the Scottish moralists, and the Continental theorists have been examined. These traditions yielded much to continuation of sociological thought, however divergent. Whether the influence was positive (Scots) or negative (Continental), social influence and group processes were seen as the major determinants of the life, actions, and essence of the basically rational human being. This rationality proved to be the central premise in the first thesis.

The antithesis of this premise arose with later French thinkers, as they developed a different perspective in regard to human behavior. Based on the work of Gustave LeBon and Gabriel Tarde, human beings were believed incapable of rational collective action. Theorists writing during the time of France's social revolutions held that the mobs, crowds, or any other type of collectivity (e.g. juries, electorate) exercised inordinate power over the individual. Thus, when an individual became involved in any group situation, that person would be seen as losing all morality and rationality, bending and swaying to the desires of a leader or a small group. The ideas of the few

instigators would swiftly contaminate the minds of the followers.

Therefore, in the studies produced during this time, the main thrust of this perspective became clear: rationality and the rational individual were nonexistent in a group or collectivity. Whether describing members of parliament or LeBon's crowds storming the Bastille, individual rationality was dismissed, for human beings were believed too easily moved by their emotions. "Irrational belief forms a large bulk of the furniture of the mind and is undistinguishable by the subject from rational verifiable knowledge" (Trotter, 1919: 43).

If the perspectives originating from the early eighteenth-century moralists, Scottish moralists, et al., comprise Thesis #1 of this dialectic, the contradictory proposal, or Antithesis #1 was set forth by the French thinkers. Thesis #1 states that human beings, socialized (positively or negatively) either by the society or a smaller collectivity, are enlightened, rational beings, capable of developing sympathy, a moral sense, and social radar. In contradiction, Antithesis #1 holds that human beings become captive in the group situation, losing all rationality as a consequence of participating in a group. The ideas he/she holds are no longer the person's own, but rather those of a leader,

inciting the group to irrational behavior that will have negative consequences for society.

Park brought the two approaches together, synthesizing the perspectives into the emerging field of collective behavior and so generating Synthesis #1. Prior to this, the French perspectives had resulted in a public opinion theory, developed by the British as they contrasted the Continental theorists' mental unity, yet stopped short of the extremes postulated by LeBon and the others. Park proposed a synthesized framework for collective behavior heavily indebted to the eighteenth-century moralists, the French thinkers, and to the British who worked from the base of both these traditions.

The Second Phase: Micro versus Macro Levels of Analysis

Park and Burgess placed collective behavior in a sociological framework, defined the field of collective behavior, and in fact defined sociology as "the science of collective behavior" (Coser, 1977: 358) without the more judgmental or psychiatric connotations prevalent until this time. These two analysts discussed the crowd, sects, mass movements, and the public under the heading of collective behavior, seeing social unrest as the "most elementary form of collective behavior and the

condition out of which other forms develop" (Turner and Killian, 1957: 7).

As Oberschall (1973) reflected, Park and Burgess's perspective contained shades of LeBon ("emotional contagion"), public opinion theories, and elements of the moral philosophers. From the work of Park and Burgess emerged the Chicago tradition, a school of thought holding collective behavior to be a normal expression of social change as well as a normal, essential component of societal operation. The study of collective behavior expanded, involving such social-psychological analysts as Blumer, Turner, Killian, Edwards, and Smelser as Synthesis #1 developed into Thesis #2. It is important to examine some of the main points of this area of microsociological analysis, for it is from this tradition that social movement perspectives further developed.

In a 1958 textbook, Broom and Selznick defined collective behavior as:

the study of relatively unstructured
social situations and their products
such as crowds, riots, rumors,
public opinion, fads and social
movements

(Broom & Selznick, 1958: 255)

Social movements had come to be seen as a type of collective behavior. Killian argues that social and

cultural change are most often achieved by way of social movement activity.

Turner and Killian (1957) further described this field of collective behavior as the study of individuals interacting in collectivities, or groups through which collective behavior occurs. These collectivities were not seen as guided by the formalized cultural norms of the society, but rather by norms that were emergent or spontaneous. The group being studied was "comprised of interacting individuals, [but] the collectivity rather than the individual is the ultimate center of interest" (1957: 13). However, the study of such a collectivity still relied heavily on social psychological methods of analysis. Thesis #2, consequently, focused on the behavior and role of the individual within a group which had either spontaneously developed new norms or had reinterpreted the norms of the larger society.

Antithesis #2 developed as a response to the collective behavior micro-analysis and is apparent in the European structural-functionalist method of analysis. In contrast to the Park-Chicago school's focus on the micro-level, this European approach focused on the macro-level. The European tradition of structural-functionalism saw modern society as an organic whole made up of interrelated parts. In order for the organism to survive, each interdependent part had to

perform certain functions, thus enabling the system to operate in equilibrium, or normally. If at any time the needs of the system were not met, a pathological condition (disequilibrium) would develop, affecting all individual aspects of the system, as well as the complete system itself. This pathological state of affairs, which the system would eventually repair, had been termed social change by modern functionalists.

Parsons brought the structural-functionalist tradition into American sociological light. Parsons never wrote of collective behavior and conflict process per se (see Oberschall, 1973). Yet, he noted that group deviance may in fact lead to the legitimization of a pattern of group deviance due to the inconsistent, contradictory elements existing in any societal value system. This, he felt, was a likely source of structural change within the system itself. But Parsons held that even as a source of change, all group deviance was essentially the same in impact and was detrimental to the smoothly functioning social system, or the status quo. Strain and discontent, due to the control held by the system, were believed to originate from "symptoms of disturbance," the result being "fantasies of utopian ideal future states" or "wishful thinking" (Parsons, 1961: 75), all being mental states that were irrational.

Other structural theorists analyzed social movement activity in particular and developed the theory of mass society. Various writers including Lipset, Hofstadter, Hoffer, Mannheim, Lederer, and Arendt worked with mass society theory, but it was Kornhauser with his book Politics of Mass Society (1959), who attempted to synthesize the previous mass society theories into one coherent perspective.

The crux of Kornhauser's argument lay in his belief that "under certain conditions any or all classes may give rise to masses," (1959: 14) making even a democratic society vulnerable to rule by the masses. His argument was that participation in mass movements (movements defined as radical, or value-oriented) was due to lack of membership and participation in secondary organizations. Secondary organizations were seen as those that served as a barrier or mediator between the individual and/or family and elite powers, those being the state, nation, or government. Secondary organizations were formal organizations such as unions, or business associations and these provided an arena for participation, in which citizens were less likely to confront the state with their demands for power. Persons not belonging to such mediating, independent organizations, or living in societies where such organizations did not exist, were more likely candidates

for "mass appeals, as evidenced in the success of communism" (1959: 87). Acting as "social insulation" (1959: 43), these secondary groups prevent "a profound loosening and an enervation . . . of [the] whole society" (1959: 88) from mass movements.

According to Kornhauser, the factors that weaken these social intermediating arrangements included major disruptions of social processes (e.g. a change in political authority where popular rule is introduced) and the discontinuities within the society, possibly stemming from urbanization or industrialization, especially when these phenomena develop rapidly. These two disruptions or discontinuities were believed to destroy the intermediate relations already in place, or prevent the birth of new organizations that would keep social order. A third discontinuity resulted if the social system encounters major or sudden breakdowns; i.e. "sudden tears in the fabric of a whole society" (1959: 159) or within the system (e.g. economic depressions, military defeats).

Collective behaviorists such as Burgess, Park, and Blumer examined disorganization as a possible explanation of movement activity, yet these Chicago school traditionalists did not see mass society theory or structural-functionalism as being compatible to the collective behavior tradition. Herein lies the

importance of Smelser's often criticized work which laid the foundation for Synthesis #2.

Smelser acknowledged the influence of Parsons in Theory of Collective Behavior (1963), the book in which he presented his social-structural theory. Influences of Blumer and Kornhauser can also be seen in his work. Smelser's goal was to produce a more tightly bound theory of collective behavior from the fragments he found existing. This involved the integration of notions regarding collective behavior, mass phenomena, mass behavior, and collective dynamics into a more complete theory of collective behavior.

Smelser's theory describes the structural conditions most likely to produce collective behavior. Smelser saw structural strains as the initial causes of conflict, strains arising from social processes, e.g., poverty, threat of war, unemployment. Additionally, social arrangements vary so that social movements occur more readily under one system than another. This varying tolerance level of social systems for collective behavior and social movement behavior was referred to as structural conduciveness. Given such strain and conduciveness, mobilization depended on "a belief which redefines social action" (Smelser, 1963: 8). These are referred to as generalized beliefs which identify the

sources of discontent and/or strain, and were then dispersed throughout the population.

In Smelser's value-added approach to collective behavior, another critical factor was the occurrence of a precipitating factor. This factor, or event, served to strengthen the belief that was forming and so validate threats of action, and allow further recruitment for the cause. This mobilization of participants for action had to occur because social organization was believed to be absolutely essential for any movement to develop fully. Smelser believed that at this point leadership is very important also. Finally, the normal means used by any society to keep social control must be ineffective for movement activity to emerge. If, for instance, channels for communication were opened up by the oppressor, or if the leaders of the potential movement were co-opted into the system, the probability of the movement mobilizing was not great.

In an attempt to classify the field of collective behavior, Smelser had incorporated elements of the Chicago collective behavior tradition with a structure-functionalist view of society. He proposed examining movement activity from a macrosociological stance and correlating it to broad social structural indicators, rather than to the individuals' characteristics, as had

been the usual method of analysis within the Chicago school. He defined collective behavior as

. . . an uninstitutionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstitution of a component of action.

(1963: 71)

While emphasizing structural variables, Smelser did not lose sight of the individual's attitudes, beliefs, and commitments. He sought to examine these social psychological aspects as they were influenced by the structure of the social system. Smelser stressed that collective behavior was social, not psychological but that it was the social system that incited feelings, reactions, and responses in the individual.

Smelser's integration of the collective behaviorists' approach with the structural functionalists' perspectives had yielded a new general social movement theory, one that contributed to the emergence of breakdown theories. Kornhauser's theory was utilized in these new perspectives as well. The synthesis of the collective behaviorists' traditional school of thought with structural-functionalism gave rise to the next phase in the dialectical process: Synthesis #2 consisted of what opponents have termed the breakdown theories, i.e. perspectives which utilized both social

psychological and social structural variables in explaining social movement activity.

The Third Phase: Social Psychological versus Structural Variables

Useem discussed breakdown theories in some detail, arguing that "collective action results from social disorganization and increased levels of discontent" (1985: 677). According to Useem's account, the social system functions smoothly, in its normal state. Social organization existed when there was a unity, cooperation, and predictability within the society. Social conflict, role conflict or discontent do not exist under these conditions, for there are structures of solidarity in place (church, work, voluntary organizations) to provide members of society with a sense of belonging and purpose. These structures of solidarity were seen by breakdown theorists to prevent mobilization, for while the individual felt a commonality with other members of society, he/she strove to keep the system operating with consistency and stability. The individual's emotions, thoughts and appetites are controlled by the system due to the close integration of the member to the society.

In explaining the causes and effects of disorganization, two variations of the breakdown theory developed. First, should something occur to create disorganization in the social system (rapid urbanization, for example), people would feel uprooted. They would lose touch with their social or recreational activities and begin to feel isolated and cut off from society. They would have only weak feelings of identification with their community. They would be marginal individuals, subject to mobilization at this time when all bonds had been broken. Discontent increased, and the population would begin to develop farfetched ideas or solutions, hopeless wishes to ease their problems. Collective action might be utilized as a way to realize such fantasies.

A second facet stemmed from the work of Piven and Cloward (1977) in their analysis of poor people's movements. This economically-oriented approach operated on the assumption that people tended to believe that society should provide for its members by meeting their needs. If the members of society were faced with unemployment, for example, the rewards gained through work would be eliminated, and the people would experience discontent, disappointment, or anger. Discontent would lead to protest, for the system had lost its legitimacy as a provider in the minds of the

people. The existing power arrangements would be no longer seen as inevitable, and the people would begin to feel that they could initiate change, "that they have some capacity to alter their lot" (Piven & Cloward, 1977: 4). Action was believed to first take the form of defiance, that later developed into a collective movement.

As Piven and Cloward noted, whether seeing the eruption as arising from the breakdown of regulatory controls routinely established within the structure, the lack of secondary organization association, or the internal divisions among elites, these breakdown theories "provide a major insight . . . into the links between societal change, the breakdown of social controls . . . and the eruption of protest" (Piven & Cloward, 1977: 10).

Useem further noted that breakdown theories held that:

. . . protest occurs in periods of high rates of personal pathology and antisocial behavior, such as suicide, dissolution of families, alcoholism, vagrancy, and crime . . . as both [protest and pathology] are products either of the dissolving of social controls or of increased deprivation.

(Useem, 1985: 677-78)

These basic tenets of the breakdown model served as the third thesis. The third antithesis that developed in criticism were the resource mobilization perspectives.

Previous theorists held that secondary organizations and community solidarity prevented mobilization from occurring. Solidarity theorists now stated that such cohesiveness actually enhanced mobilization. According to this new perspective, solidarity provided a communication network. Elements such as common values and past group participation experiences could be utilized for further mobilization recruitment (e.g. bloc mobilization), drawing in already organized groups of people to the new movement. Theorists were proposing that unless solidarity existed, mobilization could not take place.

The idea of enhanced mobilization opportunity due to solidarity is but one tenet found in several loosely-bound theories making up what are known as resource mobilization perspectives. These perspectives were developed as alternative approaches to Thesis #3 that had developed from mass society, relative deprivation, and collective behavior theories.

The groundwork of the resource mobilization perspectives and Antithesis #3 was laid by the work of Olson (1968), Stinchcombe (1968), Coleman (1969), Gamson

(1969), Tilly (1969), and Oberschall (1973). Oberschall summarized the main tenants of these theorists' works in regard to an approach he referred to as resource management.

Oberschall insisted that the main focus should be on resources, this including material (jobs, incomes, etc.) as well as nonmaterial (friendship, skills, authority, etc.) items. It was in the way that such resources were dealt with, exchanged, borrowed, created, used, and lost by a group for its purposes that he termed the process resource management. The battle for resources that will aid a group in its endeavors can result in conflict, or may entail a reaching out to an uncommitted third party. Mobilization occurred as useful resources are acquired that would give one's organization power and control to either challenge or protect the status quo. Throughout this conflict it was stressed that members would make rational decisions in their pursuit of resources and would do so in a somewhat selfish albeit enlightened manner. Costs and benefits would be weighed, as would rewards and sanctions. Alternative paths might be considered.

Oberschall's theory of mobilization stressed the organization base rooted in a particular social structure, characterized by dense networks of either traditional lines (e.g. kinship) or among secondary

organizations (e.g. religious), that produced "horizontal links and sentiments of solidarity within the collectivity" (1973: 119). Participants were recruited from these pre-existing networks and were people who were active and well-integrated within the collectivity. Also important in Oberschall's theory was the premise that highly stratified and segmented societies are more conducive to mobilization, when the ruling social order possessed fewer holds on the lower orders, i.e. when social control was loosened. In both cases the social structure took precedence. Dissatisfaction and grievances were treated as given; alone, they would not result in long-term, sustained resistance.

McCarthy and Zald (1973,1977) took the resource management/ resource mobilization theory one step further. Though still emphasizing resources, they attempted to steer clear of the development of group consciousness and the formation of ideology. The resources to be analyzed were those available for use in a potential movement. Growth and vitality hinged on these resources. Therefore, rather than emphasize grievances, McCarthy and Zald designed their approach to stress structural conditions that would lend themselves to the public expression of grievances and discontentment.

Noting the decisive role grievances and deprivation played in prior social movement approaches, McCarthy and Zald argued for a resource mobilization approach capable of explaining why social movement activity increased in the 1960-70's rather than decreased, as previous theory would suggest. In times of prosperity and high per capita income social movement activity should have decreased as grievances decreased, yet instead it increased substantially. They therefore suggested that structural changes allowing the mobilization around grievances was a more likely answer. Those theorists that stressed structural strain, generalized beliefs, and deprivation also tended to ignore the problems and strategic difficulties of the social movement organization.

McCarthy and Zald offered their approach (Antithesis #3) as a way to deal with the "dynamics and tactics of social movement growth, decline and change," (1977: 1213). They emphasized social support and social constraint of social movements, in a more political sociological and economic approach. This was in direct contrast to the more social psychological emphases (values, attitudes, and grievances) put forth by Smelser and others (Thesis #3). So too, had the previous approaches emphasized the heightening of grievances, subsequently shared and resulting in the development of

an ideology just prior to the breakout of a movement. True, discontent in some cases might be due to some structural condition, argued these theorists, but this condition did not play a major role.

While calling the resource mobilization perspective a partial theory, McCarthy and Zald did set forth some basic concepts and propositions that defined the approach. They saw empirical work done thus far in the social movement area as calling into question the link between "preexisting discontent and generalized beliefs in the rise of social movement phenomena" (1977: 1214). Assuming that discontent was constant in every society, the key must lie in the structure from which a movement originates, and from the actions of actors enmeshed in the political and economic systems (1977: 1215). The emphases of the resource mobilization perspective, according to McCarthy and Zald, included the following.

- 1) The study of the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is crucial to an understanding of social movement activity.

- 2) Resource aggregation requires some minimal form of organization . . . hence, we focus more directly upon social movement organizations.

- 3) In accounting for a movement's successes and failures there is an explicit recognition of the crucial importance of involvement on the part of individuals and organizations from outside the

collectivity which a social movement represents.

4) A supply and demand model is sometimes applied to the flow of resources toward and away from specific social movements.

5) There is a sensitivity to the importance of costs and rewards in explaining individual and organizational involvement in social movement activity . . . costs and rewards . . . centrally affected by the structure of society and the activities of authorities.

(McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1216)

Jenkins (1983) provided an excellent summary of the various emphases found in the resource mobilization perspectives. He found that basic to this approach was, first, that the costs and rewards (put forth by McCarthy, Zald and others) found in various lines of action allowed adaptive responses that would result in movement action that would be rational. Secondly, the "conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations" (1983: 528) defined the goals of a social movement. Third, initial mobilization of a social movement was dependent upon the resources, group organizations, and opportunities for action, as well as changes in these. As resource mobilization theorists had addressed, grievances due to the institutionalized conflicts of interests were too ubiquitous to be analyzed as a central component. McCarthy and Zald further noted that modern social movement organizations

found support from outside the organization itself. Fourth, the social movements of today were believed to be centralized and formally structured, allowing for more efficient and effective mobilization of resources. This also allowed for protection against challenges that decentralized, informally structured social movement organizations could not endure. Finally, the success or failure of a social movement was largely determined by "strategic factors and the political processes in which they become enmeshed" (Jenkins, 1983: 528).

Thus resource mobilization perspectives constituted Antithesis #3. In contrast to Thesis #3, these perspectives focused extensively on the structural conditions that determine mobilization.

As examination and utilization of the resource mobilization perspectives ensued, criticisms arose. The basic criticism dealt with the almost complete disregard for social psychological variables in resource mobilization analysis. Presently there are demands for a more synthesized theoretical framework, one incorporating the strong elements of the resource mobilization frameworks as well as the more social psychological elements of the traditional approaches. Such criticisms have been offered by Useem (1980), Walsh (1981), Klandermans (1984), and Ferree and Miller (1985).

Useem, in exposing weaknesses within the breakdown theory, believed the solidarity model of the resource mobilization perspectives explained the mobilization of the Boston anti-busing movement (1980). However, the perspective fell short in accounting for and analyzing discontent, in this case, relative deprivation. While having no solid link that discontent did in fact lend itself to mobilization, the basic critique that held that the premise "discontent is ever-present for deprived groups" (1980: 367) that resource mobilization theorist espoused, was not grounded in empirical analysis, nor had it been supported validly. Solidarity theorists had failed, according to Useem, to provide the evidence of this constant condition, especially in such cases where discontent seemed to arise overnight. Yet, Useem incorporated both breakdown and solidarity models in his analysis, merging the two perspectives successfully. This justified his demand for the "need for an integrated theory based on insights from the different models" (1980: 368).

Walsh (1981) argued that studies within the resource mobilization framework had focused mainly on national movements prevalent in the 1960-70's to the exclusion of cases studies dealing with local mobilization. Owing to the fact that today's discontents may surface in local collectivities,

especially those areas generally believed to be less deprived, Walsh stated that in fact, grievances may at times initiate mobilization. His findings on citizen protest organizations emerging after the Three Mile Island accident supported his statement that "both grievances and the structural situations of aggrieved groups should be treated as variables in the RM perspectives," (1981: 1). Basically, his hypothesis held that a threshold level of resources must be available and that the collectivity must have the capacity to use them when it experiences a dramatic increase in perceived grievances. This sudden perception of grievances had spurred mobilization in such areas as Love Canal and over such issues as the VietNam War, yet grievances had been continuously treated as a given by resource mobilization theorists.

Klandermans (1984) stated explicitly that social psychological variables could enrich and expand the resource mobilization theories. This would allow analysis of the processes of participation on an individual level, as he saw resource mobilization as "confusing the individual and societal levels of analysis" (1984: 584). Yet, traditional social psychological analyses also fell short. His argument held that while grievances and ideology might not play as important a role in explaining the rise of a social

movement, these two variables were essential in analyzing why participants decided to take part in a social movement in the first place. By applying his theory, a proposed social psychological expansion of resource mobilization theory, to the Industrial Workers' Union (Netherlands), he found that individual perceptions and expectations and the bearing these two variables had in the psychological process of weighing costs and benefits played major roles in decisions concerning both participation in and choice of a particular social movement. However, such variables typically had not been addressed by resource mobilization theorists. Likewise, relative deprivation had been avoided within the resource mobilization perspectives. The key, claimed Klandermans, was to examine how goals of a social movement are perceived to aid in the elimination of relative deprivation or discontent.

Ferree and Miller (1985) also took up the issue of participation in a social movement. These theorists supported the resource mobilization perspectives as providing the framework to examine tangible resources used by both social movement groups and social control agents. Yet they believed that the basic assumption of this perspective concerning individual economic rationality (cost-benefit analysis) was seriously

lacking. What was needed, argue Ferree and Miller, was more attention to the "effects of social organization on individual thought . . . cognitive structure and social psychological processes" (1985: 54). They suggested resource mobilization models incorporate social psychological assumptions, especially those dealing with the role of ideology and socially structured perceptions. Such assumptions when placed within a resource mobilization framework could help to analyze relationships between social movements and the society as a whole. It could also be useful in examining the processes all movements go through as they develop, change, and grow. If this approach were utilized, other questions concerning the use of power in producing and disseminating dominating ideologies as a means of social control could be addressed. The cognitive element in the invention of new strategies and tactics could also be examined. These analysts therefore contended that resource mobilization models alone were not sufficient. A "more realistic model of human action" (1985: 55) would have to be incorporated.

The Theoretical Purpose of This Project

It appears that the third synthesis in the dialectical process has begun. If indeed a synthesis is

the merger of the most beneficial elements found in both the old thesis and in the contrasting antithesis, then the theoretical framework demanded by the critics seems logically sound. The criticisms calling for inclusion of social psychological variables have resulted, not in a desire for a revival of analysis concerning psychological types of participants pronounced by the French thinkers, but rather a need for variables which will help examine the variations and processes in strategies, participation, recruitment, and mobilization in a new light. This new approach does not disregard the strengths of the resource mobilization models, but is believed to enrich and strengthen the perspective, allowing the new combination of social psychological and resource mobilization variables to produce a framework which will be more conclusive and empirical in its application. It is also believed that this new approach will help lend needed consensus to a highly fragmented social movement discipline.

This case study of the Dead Pigeon River Council will test the utility of a third theoretical synthesis suggested by using a framework that combines resource mobilization and social psychological variables. The initial mobilization of the DPRC, the success of the group, and the means utilized to achieve that success are issues to be addressed. My theoretical framework

consists of four categories of variables emphasized by leading resource mobilization theorists; I will also utilize the social psychological variables, in particular perceptions of grievances and perceptions of the existing power structure prior to mobilization, and the role of ideology and perception in recruitment, group participation, strategies and tactics, and goals.

Four major categories of resource mobilization variables form the foundation for this analysis: structural conditions prior to mobilization; the organizational structure of the social movement organization; goals; and strategies/tactics of the organization.

The structural conditions prior to the mobilization of a social movement have already been touched upon briefly. Resource mobilization theorists examine the conditions of the social fabric before a movement emerges. The social structure is believed to have an enormous effect on the resources available for mobilization, by determining what is possible to do within the existing power structure and by determining what people are available for recruitment within already existing networks and social ties.

The second variable, the organizational structure of the social movement organization involves the internal structure of the organization itself. Two

strains of thought have developed, relating organizational structure to the success of the social movement organization. First, Gamson (1975) argues that social movement organizations with a highly centralized bureaucratic framework will be more likely to succeed. This group, by providing well-defined roles, will be able to contain internal conflict. On the other hand, Gerlach and Hine (1970) that decentralized group structures are more effective, especially in soliciting grassroots support. Group solidarity is more easily maintained when working as a small, local group networking with other small, local groups. The strength behind this form of structure is its lack of susceptibility social control agents and elites attempting cooptation.

Goals constitute the third variable examined by resource mobilization theorists. Gamson attempts to distinguish between displacement and nondisplacement goals, and which of the two goals are most likely to lead to success for the group. Displacement goals involve the removal or replacement of the object(s) targeted, whereas nondisplacement involves just the opposite. In this case changes are sought but goals do not require the removal of the targeted object(s). Gamson proposes that nondisplacement goals, being a more

reform-oriented tactic, will be more likely to meet with success.

Theorists have also debated the efficiency of long-term goals versus short-term goals. Piven and Cloward (1979) foresee the value in long-term goals as a movement seeks to promote another political consciousness through various movement activity. In this case the two analysts argue for "politics of turmoil," whereby disruptive behavior will be sustained in order to force concessions. Roach and Roach (1978), in their critique of Piven and Cloward's hypothesis, argue that achieving small victories carefully directed toward the positive can ultimately lead to the realization of more long-term goals, while simultaneously benefiting the people involved in the struggle.

Ash (1972) examines the three choices available to all social movement organizations concerning the setting of goals. First, the group must decide if it wishes to make single-issue or multiple-issue demands. The group must then decide whether to be radical in their demands, disrupting the legitimacy of present distributions of wealth and power, or to be more reform-oriented. Finally, the group must choose a goal that will either involve influencing elites toward sympathy for the cause, or will involve replacing the elites in power.

The strategies and tactics of a social movement organization comprise the fourth variable examined by resource mobilization theorists. Piven and Cloward (1979) suggest disruptive tactics, strategies that involve the disturbance of everyday patterns and routines of normal institutions. Unruly tactics (Gamson, 1975) involve a selective violence, used when public opinion appears to be in favor of the group's demands. Lobbying, as examined by McCarthy and Zald (1977) involves more full time social movement personnel. Finally, a group may devise a strategy of litigation, this being the moving of conflict into civil and criminal courtrooms. This may aid the movement in three ways: by mobilizing the law on the behalf of the social movement, by strengthening and solidifying the members of the group, or by convincing and swaying public opinion the believe that the group's cause in a just one (Barkan, 1980: 945).

Social psychological variables will also be incorporated into this theoretical model. As Useem, Walsh, Klandermans, and Ferree and Miller suggest, grievances and ideology will be examined in addition to the resource mobilization variables.

Social psychological theories used in analyzing social movement activity tend to focus on the relationships between social conditions, psychology and

behavior. Variables used in this model will involve perception and articulation of grievances held by the DPRC members, and the consequences such perceptions have for the organizational structure, the goals and the strategies and tactics of the social movement organization.

Ferree and Hess (1985) argue that not only are resources needed for action, but that an ideology, or "way of explaining reality that makes sense to . . . participants and justifies their involvement" (1985: 26) is equally relevant. Ideologies provide identification with a group, shape perceptions of opportunities for change, and provide the ability to recognize resources and effective strategies to utilize for the group.

Summary of Chapter I

The historical dialectical process leading to modern day social movement theory has been examined in this chapter. The thesis that resulted from the synthesis of the moral philosophers and the French thinkers held that humans are basically rational, though still influenced by the group. This thesis developed into the collective behavior tradition, in which micro-level analysis was believed to most adequately explain social movement activity. The thesis of the synthesis

that took place between this micro analysis and the structural, macro-level of analysis yielded the breakdown theories. Resource mobilization perspectives were the antithesis of this more social psychological approach. Currently there appears to be a third synthesis developing in the field in an attempt to produce a more theoretically strong framework with inclusion of both RM and social psychological variables in analyzing social movement organizations. The concepts and variables proposed will comprise the theoretical framework that will guide the examination of the DPRC, an environmental protest group. In the chapter to follow, I present a discussion of the methods used in this case study.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The questions raised in the previous chapter are addressed in an analysis of the Dead Pigeon River Council (DPRC). In order to examine questions concerning the initial mobilization of the group, its success, and the ways and means utilized by the DPRC to achieve that success, it was essential that the research analysis be qualitative in nature. This chapter describes the research design used in the case study, a combination of field research, interviews, and archival research.

Field Research Methods

Field research involves the observation and analysis of situations and activities as they occur in the natural setting. The researcher is the main instrument of investigation, establishing close contact with the individuals of the group in order to observe and collect data.

Use of this method gives comprehensiveness to the research project. A deeper and more thorough understanding of the social phenomena being examined is

realized by observing and experiencing primary interactions and social processes. The researcher is able to discern subtleties associated with cognitive orientations and behavior in cases where quantification is not practical.

Field researchers contend that human behavior is best understood within its natural setting. In other words, behavior cannot always be duplicated in a laboratory nor solely determined by means of a questionnaire. Therefore this method of research allows the investigator the opportunity to follow social processes and activities as they develop. This process, too, is difficult to reconstruct at a later date (Babbie, 1983: 244-245). The principle method used in field research is participatory observation. Knowledge obtained through participatory methods is vital because the insights acquired from personal experience with the group's situations, dilemmas, successes, and social structures cannot otherwise be attained. Participatory observation involves data gathering through active involvement with and observation of the individuals of the group.

The role that I developed as participatory observer in working with the DPRC has been termed "research participant" by Gans (1982: 54) and "participant doubling as observer" by Jarvie (1982: 69). It is

essential to note, as Burgess (1982) did, that the relative emphasis on, involvement in and observation of the group varies with the researcher, the situation, and those people being studied. Ideal types of observation are represented by the complete participant and the complete observer. The complete observer interacts as little as possible, if at all, with those people being observed. The complete participant interacts and participates with the group being studied as much as possible, in the natural setting. During the actual project the role of the field researcher will more than likely fall between these two ideals.

My role as researcher did in fact fall between these two ideal types. With members' consent, I joined the group in the fall of 1987 as both observer and participant. It was understood from the beginning that I was a graduate student engaged in thesis research but that I wished to aid the group's efforts when and if possible.

The nature of my research during the first few months was exploratory, but became more focused with time, experience and the group's increasing acceptance of me. My active participation in group activities has been hampered by my living approximately forty miles away from the community. Yet contact has been maintained since that fall and DPRC members have

consistently made their plans known to me. This has resulted in my inclusion not only in regular group meetings but also in special events and activities as they developed.

Interviews

Like all research methods, participatory research is strengthened by combining it with other strategies. Analyses are more conclusive when based on multiple methods. Consequently, interviews were included as part of the research design. The flexibility of field research is especially conducive to such triangulation.

The interviewing conducted during a field research project varies from the more structured interviewing associated with survey research and a standardized questionnaire format. While the interviews were of an informal, relaxed, and conversational nature, the focus continued to be on the variables I wished to analyze in regard to this social movement organization. Both general and specific questions were asked, while answers to these provoked new questions based on a deeper understanding of the salient issues of the group. Only unstructured interviews permit such on-the-spot adjustments.

The validity and reliability of the interviews were aided by the time spent as a participatory observer in the months prior to interviewing. The respondents felt at ease, they "trusted me," as one key member stated, and they relayed information to me that would have been unobtainable when I first came to the group. In this way participatory observation was crucial to my interviewing techniques.

The selection of respondents developed naturally during the months prior to the interviewing. Through interaction with the group, the eight core activists were made known to me. These members were interviewed individually and privately. The general and specific questions (see Appendix) remained relatively consistent over respondents. The interviews were recorded on audio tape, and I have sole access to these tapes.

Archival Research Methods

The case of the DPRC cannot be understood without placing the group within an historical context. A long-term, successful group did not mobilize for eighty years. The patterns and social processes of the area contending with an eighty year problem are important in analyzing mobilization processes. This source of data aids in the analysis of the resource mobilization

aids in the analysis of the resource mobilization variables, namely structural conditions prior to mobilization. Secondly, the social psychological variables can be better analyzed: perceptions of grievances and the preexisting power structure, ideologies, and goals. All these variables are rooted in the community's history and must also be analyzed. Archival research for this project has consisted of numerous newspaper articles spanning the last five years, documentaries written by local historians, magazine articles, and documents acquired by the DPRC. These sources provided the basis for a chronology of group events on which interview questions were based. This method also provides a check for bias that might surface in the various data sources. The data collected in this manner aid in historical background reconstruction.

Two limitations, or drawbacks, exist for archival research. One must be aware that documents or other sources may not be accurate or may be biased. Validity lies in replication, checking several sources for the same information if possible (Babbie, 1983: 301).

Discussion

This research began as participatory research, or self-directed education, as some have termed it. This form of research seeks to reject methods that see individuals as objects under the scrutiny of the researcher. Participatory research rather is a method of research in which the results can be used for social change, improving the life situation of the people that are involved. Participatory research ". . . is a combination of education, research, and action so intertwined that the three components can not really be separated from each other or approached serially" (Cassara, 1987: 39). In other words the research project is an empowering experience for the people involved. It aids them in discovering their own problems, and their own topics for research in the hope of furthering education and action.

The basic premise of participatory research is the democratic principle that oppressed and marginalized peoples, through education, research, and action can transform their social realities. This kind of empowerment will be based on their own value systems. . .

(Cassara, 1987: 39)

The research methods used to carry this out vary to fit the situation at hand.

One of the key methodological points concerning this type of research is that the research problem must be a decision made by all people involved; the researcher does not choose the topic to be studied, nor does she decide exclusively on the means used to study this topic. The situation that I encountered involved a group of people who had already decided upon the problem to be resolved and the courses of action necessary to resolve the problem. The initial decision making processes had already been completed before I arrived on the scene. I merely observed the group, rather than playing any part in the steps the group went through to arrive at their decisions. My topic of research did not coincide with the group's problem at hand. I fell into the traditional researcher mode of participatory observation.

While I did become deeply involved with the group, I still remained "the graduate student working on a project for my own benefit." The close relations and interactions so vital to the participatory research method were not entirely possible due to my living miles away and making my access to all activities impossible. Furthermore, the time constraints placed on a graduate student are not conducive to the long-term, intimate

interaction necessary for this type of research. I felt this shortcoming even though I was involved with the group for one year.

A second aspect of participatory research that can prove fatal to the project deals with neutrality between two or among many groups with which the researcher is working. As a particular instance in the course of this research project with the DPRC, a faction developed among certain members of the group. If alliance with any particular side were suspected, the objectivity and neutrality could be called into question by other members of the group. This led me to retreat to an even more observational stance. The division within the group became so severe that to show intense loyalty to one side or the other would jeopardize my relationship with another group. The members of the group were comfortable with this more "objective" role that I took.

My role as a participatory observer yielded valuable data and yet the role can prove to hinder the project. Research in the field can become personal in terms of measurement of variables. As a participatory observer there exists the possibility of becoming so enmeshed with the people and their activities that objectivity and personal orientations may pose a threat to reliable, valid findings.

Weaknesses, however, are inevitable in all the three methods discussed above. This provided the rationale for inclusion and integration of the three selected. By combining various methods, data can be collected from different perspectives, taking care to focus upon the same variables under investigation. Triangulation provided the integration necessary to realize the full potential of multiple research methods, and has resulted in the wealth of data presented in the next two chapters: the historical analysis of Cocke County and the analysis of the DPRC.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COCKE COUNTY REGION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical analysis of Cocke County that offers a partial explanation for the lack of protest mobilization prior to 1986 over the polluted state of the Big Pigeon River.

Social movement theorists variously argue that movements emerge from a stimulus-response to a recent event, from sudden increases in outside resources, or from rapid social changes that produce strain. Cases where there is a lack of organized protest in spite of a longstanding problem are not so readily explained by analysts. I suggest that in such cases, an historical analysis is critical. With this method, the long-term development of economic, social and political processes affecting mobilization can better be understood.

Three major factors that have affected mobilization in Cocke County developed over a period of many years. These factors are the economic impacts of the agricultural and lumber industries, the takeover of residents' land, and dependency on tourism as a means of economic survival. These factors resulted in power relationships that dominated the native people of the

region. This mobilization model includes an analysis of the power relations which have developed as a result of these factors. Gaventa (1980) uses a three-dimensional approach to power in order to analyze the historical development of dominant relationships that affect action or inaction. The power relations presented here also evolved over time. Gaventa's model was useful in analyzing the factors that led to a dominating power structure in Cocke County that inhibited grassroots mobilization.

The economy of the Cocke County area was based primarily on agriculture from the time of its settlement until the coming of the railroad. With transportation networks in place, the vast resources of the area's natural products, timber and agricultural goods, became a target of outside interest. Northern investors recognized the potential wealth of this once-secluded Appalachian region and sought to capitalize on these resources. Thus throughout its history, the county has experienced widespread absentee ownership in the form of various lumber companies that came and went. Taking advantage of the agricultural value of the county's rich river bottom land, companies such as Stokely Brothers created agricultural empires. The first factor influencing the lack of mobilization involves this economic dominance by outsider-owned agricultural and

lumber companies which contributed to a legacy of dependence among residents.

The second factor concerned the massive takeovers of land by the federal government for the establishment of parks, forests and reserves. Though there are discrepancies in the figures available, it appears that of Cocke County's total acreage (271,360), 23.6% of the land is set aside for recreational purposes (East Tennessee Development District, 1977: 110). Today, approximately 193,246 acres are under government ownership. The result was the further dependence of residents on the canning and lumber industries.

The third factor is directly related to the first two. Unemployment rose steadily from 1950 (3.4%) through 1983 (24.9%) with the decline of the dominant industries, forcing the residents to focus on the tourism industry as a possible livelihood. With the development of neighboring Sevier County and the construction of Interstate 40, the county's major city of Newport was bypassed by the millions of tourists visiting the Great Smoky Mountains and other regional recreational areas every year. Economic growth continued to decline, and many residents were forced to seek employment in outlying areas, many in the resort towns of Gatlinburg and Pigeon Forge.

These three factors inhibited mobilization by Cocke Countians on the issue of the polluted Pigeon River. The perceptions residents held concerning the river's condition was a contestable issue directly affected by the evolution of domination by economic means. Ideologies developed as a result of power relationships deriving from the economic structure of the area. These ideologies and perceptions played a major part in the lack of successful movement organization prior to 1986. The three-dimensional approach to power will be used to further clarify these assumptions.

Before I discuss in detail the historical factors inhibiting mobilization in Cocke County, I present a brief history of the establishment of Newport, Tennessee, the location of the DPRC.

Newport, Tennessee

The settlement of Cocke County, Tennessee predates the formation of the state of Tennessee itself. While Tennessee was granted statehood in 1796, the area now know as Cocke County was first settled by whites in the spring of 1783 on a tract of ground at the mouth of the Pigeon River. This river, called Wayeh ("beautiful maiden") by the Cherokee Indians, would play an integral role in the history of the County.

Cocke County was officially formed in October, 1797, having been a part of Jefferson County during those first few years. Most of Cocke County was located in the Ridge and Valley province of the Great Valley of East Tennessee. On the same day the county was established, the county seat was located in a settlement on the French Broad River and named Newport. Residents soon found this location to be an inconvenience. Because no bridges existed at this time, the French Broad, Big Pigeon and Nolichucky rivers were serious barriers in attending to county business: residents could not "with convenience, attend courts, general musters, or elections" (O'Dell, 1950: 18) in Newport.

The post-Civil War years brought a railroad boom to the country and to the East Tennessee area. After the development of the railroad, the location of the county seat became contested among area residents. In 1866, a plan to acquire a new courthouse and jail led Newport officials to seek to extend the corporate limits to include Clifton, a town located on the Pigeon River. While Newport residents wanted the county seat to remain in Newport, Clifton residents wished the county seat to be relocated in their community. The seventeen-year struggle ended in an 1879 Supreme Court ruling that the extension plans were "fraudulent." The decision to locate the county seat in Clifton was reached in 1884,

and the new courthouse was built there. Again, opposition surfaced, as Newport residents wished to name the new county seat after their town. Outnumbered Clifton residents lost this battle. The new county seat was dubbed "Newport," while the former seat became known as Old Newport, or Old Town (O'Dell, 1950). Today Newport is located on the banks of the Big Pigeon River, forty-five miles northeast of Knoxville, Tennessee and fifty-five miles northwest of Asheville, North Carolina.

Lumber

There is some historical evidence suggesting that the Scottish land investor Alexander Alan Arthur was influential in the relocation of the County seat. Arriving in Newport in the early 1880's, Arthur sought to capitalize on the potential wealth contained in the vast stands of timber in the Pigeon River watershed area. He brought with him the international Scottish Carolina Timber and Land Company, headquartered in Glasgow, Scotland. The company bought 120,000 acres of land in Haywood and Madison counties in North Carolina to supply the Newport mill and log boom. Arthur's dream was to create a "metropolis in the mountains" (Dykeman, 1955: 168) at the site of the mill. To accomplish this task he brought in an assortment of people and

stockholders from all over the world, investing capital from England and Scotland. At the time it was quite fashionable to invest in American land development and enterprises.

In 1883, Arthur began developing the town. In addition to overseeing his booming lumber industry on his "shiny black stump-tailed horse" he devised a plan for his "ideal Newport of the future" (Dykeman, 1955: 168). He planned and mapped out parks, large tracts of land to be set aside for factory and power developments, a steam tannery, "clubhouses for varying strata of society" (Dykeman, 1955: 168). He envisioned a leading residential area, to be located on the bluffs over the Pigeon River. Medieval jousting tournaments were acted out among the local merchants, farmers, and a handful of professional men. Arthur had built a house for his family of such magnitude that it was called "The Mansion" by the local residents.

Arthur's actions and attitudes reflected a division of people based on class and economic principles, such as wealth and access to resources. Just as Arthur's wife refused to associate with the local people, whom she saw as uncultured and strange, so there developed class distinctions in contrast to distinctions based on status, personality characteristics, or traits (e.g. age, sex) of the original residents.

The Newport boom lasted only two years, ending in the spring of 1886, just as the plans for the ideal metropolis were to be set in motion. The Pigeon River flooded and completely wiped out the earthen dams that had been erected to hold the millions of board feet of tulip-poplar logs in the river; these logs represented the heart of the Scottish Company and all were swept away. The loss for the company was enormous. When stockholders received word, capital from England and Scotland disappeared as had the investment represented in the logs. The investors Arthur had brought to Newport left town and the Scottish Carolina Timber and Land Company, Ltd. dissolved. Arthur left the area shortly thereafter to begin another "metropolis:" he soon arrived in a southeastern Kentucky town that would become Middlesborough (see Gaventa, 1980).

The short-lived investments by the Scottish Company had an impact on the residents of the Cocke County region, albeit not on the scale that the company had on the Kentucky city. Many of the tactics Arthur used in Kentucky that resulted in a dominated hegemony (Gaventa, 1980) had been attempted in Newport just a few years prior. As in Middlesboro, there was a division of the social classes by such means as development of a leading residential area, clubhouses and tournaments for the upper classes which served to present a new culture that

was further accented by the influx of foreign residents. This provided a startling contrast to the previous life led by Clifton's 200 residents.

The second generation of timber cutters moved into the East Tennessee, West North Carolina region around the turn of the century. The lands between the Pigeon River and the Little Tennessee River were divided up among major lumber entrepreneurs. Up until 1940, some eighteen lumber companies occupied thousands of acres of land. Lumber companies tended to move in, fell quickly, ship fast, and move out. The companies needed workers. They either brought hands in to work, where housing in ready made towns was available, hired men who still owned small tracts of land, or allowed those who had sold their land to live on and work, living on company property in arrangements similar to the coal camps of other areas. Mill villages grew quickly, and local farmers sold their goods to the loggers and sawmill men.

Communities along the Pigeon River grew rapidly. An eighty year old, lifelong resident of Hartford recalled the year 1929 and the advent of the band sawmill which created a logging boom town in this once small community. She remembered the large number of homes, businesses, and other buildings. The town boasted of a movie theater and public transportation services. The Pigeon River generated mill that produced

railroad cars of hardwood for the Canton paper mill also produced electricity for the residents of Hartford. It was a period of economic prosperity.

Hartford was one example of the logging companies' boom patterns. As in this community, when the boundary of timber was exhausted, the band mills would leave, taking the era of prosperity with them. In their quest for large profits quickly realized, these logging companies laid the mountains in ruins. Carelessness led to great waste, as companies continued to purchase even more land in great swaths, leaving paths of destruction in their wake.

The largest of all lumber companies was located in 1906 on the Pigeon River in Canton, North Carolina, a town approximately thirty miles upstream from the town of Newport, Tennessee. The site was selected by Peter Thomson of Hamilton, Ohio who recognized the abundance of "clean water . . . satisfactory timber . . . intelligent labor" (Dykeman, 1955: 271). The Champion Coated Paper Company had arrived, buying 36,400 hectares of timberland.

From the time of its initial siting on the banks of the Pigeon River in the early twentieth century, the Champion paper industry had experienced a history of growth and prosperity, merging several times to become the largest producer of paper in this country. From its

first day of operation the plant also polluted the Pigeon River, though residents along its banks note that the severe pollution was periodic.

In the late 1920's the lands of eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina had been ravaged by logging and by the fires, floods, and erosion that accompanied the exploitative logging practices. For instance, two-thirds of the Great Smoky Mountains had been either logged or burned. In addition, the lumber companies had made the people of the region dependent on lumbering money for additional food, clothing and recreation.

Agriculture

Numerous accounts can be found in the literature concerning the role of the family farm, the core of Appalachian economy prior to the advent of the logging industries. Cocke County was originally settled due to the rich bottom lands of the French Broad River. The first settler in the county cleared a portion of ground in the fork of the French Broad and the mouth of the Pigeon River, planting the land in corn. Shortly thereafter others moved to the area, becoming large land owners in the late 1770's. Henceforth the basic industry of the county would remain agriculture. Personal accounts of older residents of Cocke County

also confirm that until the logging industries came, "practically everybody" farmed.

An Appalachian farm as a rule in 1880 contained approximately 187 acres of which one fourth was actually under cultivation. Fifty-five percent remained in timber, important to the keeping of livestock, another principle commercial enterprise at the time. Hogs, the most important of these, were raised in the forest, leaving the valleys for corn. Of this cultivation, fifty percent was planted in corn, the main staple crop. From that point, each farm had a wide variety of vegetables, fruits and grains. The family farm was basically self-sufficient and self-sustaining. Farm products during this time were also the major, or more commonly, only sources of income for the people in the Appalachian areas (Eller, 1982: 16-22).

The timber industry had the most impact on the primarily agricultural economy of Cocke County. During the first attempts at lumbering, large tracts of land were purchased, cleared and abandoned. Emphasis on farming paled in comparison to the wealth of the lumber industry, introduced in Cocke County by A. A. Arthur. When his company declared bankruptcy, other smaller temporary companies followed, but met with the same fate. In their wake, the land was left completely useless for livestock, particularly the raising of hogs.

Marginal farmers were forced to raise livestock on land previously set aside for crops, if they still owned land at all. Many people had turned from farming to the lumber industry, seeing the money to be made during the boom periods. They attempted to return to farming when the first wave of lumbering died out.

In the 1880's in Jefferson County, the Stokely family plantation held control of the fertile river-bottom land of the French Broad River. The family had arrived in east Tennessee one year after the American Revolution with a land grant and had since "accumulated a half dozen of the finest farms along the Tennessee part of the river" (Dykeman, 1955: 195). The plantation was completely self-sufficient, having a general store, boat landing and school. Visits from doctors, dentists and seamstresses occurred once a year.

In 1890 John Stokely died, leaving his wife and children, five of whom were sons. Rotating management duties during their college years, the sons continued to run the farm. Returning to the farm after college, one son suggested a small cannery for tomatoes. On January 1, 1898 a partnership comprised of two sons, their mother Anna Stokely, and Colonel Swann (a cousin and a neighbor who also owned a large farm) was formed and Stokely Brothers was born. The company was managed solely by the five brothers.

No other industries existed in the area during these first years of the Stokely cannery. With the lumber industry gone, many farmers came to work in the new and expanding plants along the river and nearby streams. These workers had found a means of obtaining cash pay, supplementing the primarily produce barter system common at the time.

The venture was successful and an additional canning plant was built each year. This was accompanied by an expanded produce market, requiring a large number of farmers to relinquish traditional planting and livestock patterns of farming. Promising the farmers a doubling of the value of farm products within 10 years, the farmers agreed to year round planting, making the industry itself a year round project. Work for the Stokely company was no longer seasonal. Needing the railroad to increase distribution, the company established a central office and a warehouse in Newport in 1905. The fertile farmlands, however, remained in the Stokely family. The Stokely's also became involved in the Newport political structure. One brother, George, was mayor of Newport at the time of his death in 1916.

One Stokely son secretly worked for a month in 1908 at the most efficient cannery in the country at the time, Van Camp of Indianapolis. He learned what

improvements to make in the smaller Stokely plant in Newport, and the company again enlarged and consolidated. The Stokely brothers bought the Van Camp company in 1933, creating a million-dollar enterprise. At this time, the company was still completely managed by the Stokely family, sons of the original five brothers.

In 1921 the Stokely cannery was the largest in the South. In 1933, approximately 2,620 acres supplied Stokely with produce, 75 percent of which was grown on company-owned land. In 1934 Cocke County ranked seventh in vegetable production for the state of Tennessee. By the late 1940's Newport was home of the largest vegetable cannery in the world. Approximately 15,000 of the county's 29,000 residents were engaged in agricultural pursuits. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. was purchased by Quaker Oats Inc. in 1983-84, at which time the company employed approximately 600 people.

Tourism and the Park Service

Concern about the environmental consequences of lumbering first arose with Horace Kephart's arrival in the region of the Smoky Mountains from the north. He came in 1904 for health reasons and stayed for twenty-seven years. Once here, Kephart came to recognize the

effects, of the lumbering industry on the environment. He proposed a national park to preserve the mountains.

The Great Smoky Mountains Conservation Association was formed in 1923 by two Knoxville men. This association achieved its goals two years later, when Congress passed legislation allowing associations in Tennessee and North Carolina to buy lands and deed them to the United States government. This task proved quite large -- 6,600 separate tracts and thousands of landowners stood in the way. But eventually the lumber companies within the designated areas were bought out. One of the last and largest settlements, arrived upon after a lawsuit, involved the Champion company, who finally sold their holdings in the park region for \$3 million in March of 1931.

Dykeman notes that the individuals who owned smaller tracts of land gradually "acknowledged the fact that a park and its tourist trade might be a continuing asset" (1978: 142), accepting the idea of a park with "a combination of fatalism and cautious hope." The here today, gone tomorrow tactics of felling timber had provided pockets of temporary prosperity, and the people saw the park with its promise of tourists as a more stable economic basis. This in combination with the dependency the lumber companies had cultivated led many people of the region to sell their land to the

associations. Others were simply forced to move. Once the goal was reached, Franklin D. Roosevelt dedicated the Great Smoky Mountains National Park on September 2, 1940.

The Great Smoky Mountains National Park controls 17,170 acres of Cocke County. However, when the acreage of all parks, national forests, and game preserves in the county today are totalled, the figure is even more startling: Cherokee National Forest, 35,076 net acreage; John Sevier Game Preserve, 135,000 acres; and Pisgah Forest, 6,000 acres. The total amount of land set aside by the government in Cocke County is approximately 193,246 acres.

Unemployment rates in Cocke County rose steadily from 1950 through the 1980's. In 1950, 18.0 percent of the total population of the county was employed in manufacturing industries, as opposed to the 45.8 percent still engaged in agriculture. This trend began to reverse itself. In 1960, 30.0 percent of the population were employed in manufacturing, while 24.3 percent remained agricultural employed. By 1970, only 7.2 percent of the population remained in agriculture, while manufacturing employment rose to 50.1 percent. However, unemployment continued to increase, and in the mid-1970's the total number of Cocke County residents

employed in manufacturing began to decline as industrial development declined.

As early as the late 1940's, there can be found a desire for tourism as the answer to economic problems. However, the completion of Interstate 40, diverted the somewhat heavy traffic away from the city of Newport. Highways 25 and 70 had been the primary routes previous to this construction. Some buildup has occurred around the city's two interchanges and many plans have been formulated at trying to draw this traffic into the city, according to the Cocke County Chamber of Commerce. Sadly ironic, given the locale of Newport off the beaten path, is the following account written by O'Dell for a federal government report in the late 1940's. She commented on Newport's gradual growth and spoke of new era that the city's residents now faced:

[we face] marvelous opportunities because of our 'strategic position' to the world's most picturesque region of mountain splendor and we should all co-operate to bring this county a network of roads . . . [to] the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. We should interest ourselves in instituting in every school in the county a revival of handicrafts of our forefathers and teach our boys and girls how to work with their hands in growing better farm products, more beautiful flowers, and thereby making their homes more attractive to the millions of tourists that will pass our way

leaving a stream of wealth that we
have heretofore never dreamed would
come to our people

(O'Dell, 1950: 56)

The stream of wealth never materialized, yet the strong desire for a tourism based economy persists today.

O'Dell in her late 1940's report mentioned the three rivers and many creeks that added great beauty to the area. But it is only in a footnote that she stated that the forty mile Pigeon River flowing directly through the middle of Newport was "sometimes called Black River, because the refuse from Champion Fiber Company in North Carolina makes it appear black and destroys many fish" (1950: 62). No other note is made of the condition of the river though it is said today that at times its condition was the worst in the history of Champion pollution.

Summary

In pulling together these three factors of lumber and agriculture, government land acquisition, and tourism, a significant trend is observed.

The introduction of industrialization to an agriculture-based Cocke County economy began with the

lumber industry. While the boom of the 1880's did not leave as obvious an impact as the second timber boom around the turn of the century, the beginning of long-range effects as a result of the Scottish Company's brief reign can be commented on.

Arthur brought a new class distinction that had to that point been based primarily on personality traits or characteristics such as age. There were divisions now due to wealth, land ownership, and access to resources, i.e., class distinctions on the basis of economic standing. By such tactics as development of a leading residential area, clubhouses, and tournaments for the elites, a consciousness of class distinctions surfaced among the 200 residents of Clifton.

Similarly, the "absentee, concentrated economic control of the resources and the means of their extraction" (Gaventa, 1980: 56-57) was felt in Newport with the lumber company, much in the same way the coal company affected Middlesboro. Yet, since the Scottish Company quickly deserted the Cocke County area for greener pastures, the long term effects on the political economy of the region are difficult to estimate. Part of the legacy, however, was an industrial, humanist ideology instilled in the people of the region that the environment was at one's disposal. For when the

Scottish Company failed, the native residents tried to resurrect the boom years themselves. As Dykeman notes:

Looking at the grandiose map that lay discarded after the Scottish Company's failure, a group of the town's citizens adopted the dream and formed the Newport Development Company

(1955: 176)

Arthur had bequeathed his brand of faith, hope, and confidence which led many local residents to attempt lumbering with the same slashing, cutting, and wasting methods that had characterized the Scottish Company (Dykeman, 1955). This ideology was imposed on the people of Newport in much the same ways as it was imposed on the residents of Middlesboro. In addition, the practice of conspicuous consumption introduced by the Scottish Company stockholders who resided in Newport for a short while continued in the general populous after the company departed. However, the domination of nature was not as complete in Newport as in Middlesboro, for it had been the Pigeon River "putting on its big britches" (Dykeman, 1955) that had wiped out the boom. Still, important to this thesis are two elements: first, the new philosophy that there was a vast wealth in the area to be realized was developed. Second, this wealth could be achieved with any means necessary or available, regardless of the consequences to nature.

The impact of this ideology can be seen throughout the history of the Pigeon River watershed.

After Arthur's retreat to Middlesboro, Kentucky, the residents remaining in Cocke County unsuccessfully attempted to recreate the lumber boom. When that failed, they once again turned to agriculture. Though the Arthur years had provided an additional income, agriculture remained the dominant economic backbone, especially during the flourishing tobacco years.

This agricultural base provided the environment that proved so successful for the Stokely family. The industry's effects on the area included long-term dependency on one industry. Whereas the jobs with the logging boom were seen as part-time or temporary work, work in the cannery developed into full-time employment for many. As noted, the previous means of trade were based on a produce barter system. With the expansion of the Stokely company, monetary compensation was possible.

Though the Stokelys were a local family, evidence suggests that their control over the region was strong. The Stokelys were part of a minority of wealthier people who owned and controlled large tracts of land. Those families who were "usually the first to arrive on the land . . . acquired large land holdings (often as Revolutionary War grants) and . . . emerged as a resident ruling class" (Eller, 1982:11). The wealthier

families had great economic and political clout and very often were the political leadership, controlling local commercial enterprises. Their descendants fared equally as well, having the resources and the education to retain power. George Stokely's mayorship of Newport is an excellent example of the courtship which developed in those years between economic and political control. The success of the Stokely family venture and the one family control over the only industry in Cocke County set the stage for an industrial ruling class. Here again the people of the area were faced with class differentiations and the growing dependency of the farmers on the industry increased the domination of the elite over the people.

With the second generation of lumber entrepreneurs the domination increased. The takeover of land from residents and farmers was extensive. Dependency grew on this wave of timbering that moved into an area and moved out again, leaving a path of destruction; the land was rendered virtually unusable for any purpose. The combination of economic dominance of the agriculture and lumber industries left a legacy of residents' dependence upon new industrial development, having no other means of survival.

The third factor involves the takeovers of land by the government for the formation of parks, forests and

reserves, resulting in a reliance on tourism as a means of survival. The takeovers were met with opposition, but it was the Department of the Interior's condemning of smaller farms that significantly raised local hostility toward government agencies. The residents perceived these acts as a deliberate scheme to completely destroy Appalachian communities. The acquisition occurred during the Depression years and was perceived as contributing to the growing depression of the timber and local agricultural economy. Residents believed their last means of independent survival were being forcefully taken from them and the response was "suspicion, hostility, and despair" (Eller, 1982:120). The final blow was delivered by the Tennessee Valley Authority with the condemning of farms for the construction of reservoirs such as Douglas Lake. The damming of the river resulted in 4,244 acres of rich Cocke County river bottom land being flooded. Frustration and "a strong bitterness toward the federal agency" were "passed down to their children" (Eller, 1982:120) by those who were forced to relinquish their land.

These three factors can be seen to affect mobilization. One member of the DPRC related that she had been told upon moving to the area that she "must understand that first, people that were born and raised

here, their land has been taken away by the government, forest, parks, things like that . . . people whipped into submission." She saw this in combination with the high unemployment rate and high dependence on the government for subsidies, such as food stamps, as leading to a fear by residents of "offending the government." There was a deep apathy, born of years of domination. In the earliest months of the DPRC two members explained how everyone they talked to about the pollution of the Pigeon River expressed this apathy. "It's been tried before [the cleanup of the river] and it can't be done, you can't do it . . . you can't fight Champion." This belief helped to prevent mobilization over the pollution of the Pigeon River.

In combination with this apathy, the industrial humanist ideology, i.e., man's domination over nature, further served to prevent the river's pollution as being viewed as a problem. Economic growth at the expense of the environment was nothing new, given the history of the lumbering industry on this eastern Tennessee, western North Carolina region. Having experienced economic hardship in Cocke County, the pollution was perceived as something one lived with if a livelihood were to be made. Two native Cocke Countians help explain this belief in the following.

Brad, a native resident of Cocke County, had far reaching kinship ties, and he attributed a lack of any sustained protest activity on this kinship factor. "A lot of family, relatives, worked in Haywood County," Brad himself having a cousin who worked for Champion. Brad's family had migrated from Haywood County, North Carolina in 1908, and in fact his father's middle name was "Haywood." He felt that you stretched across state lines with family.

In addition to the family ties, Cocke County had been tied economically to Haywood County. Both before and during the Depression of the 1930's, many loggers and woodcutters in Cocke County had sold lumber to the railways for export, or had sold the lumber directly to Champion, in Haywood County. This was how families were fed, Brad stated.

Gordon's explanation was also based on similar kinship ties and economic factors. He, first however, believed the lack of organized protest in Cocke County was due to strong pride. Though he believed the explanation to be a lot more complicated than any single factor, "if I had to put one thing on it, [pride] would be it," an "unbelievable pride" that prevented outcry. In addition to this pride, he felt the people of Cocke County, having "had some hunger pangs, too" as a result of economic hardships, realized that when the plant was

built Canton residents had to either "pollute or starve." He believed that Cocke County residents had sympathy with the Haywood Countians. The people of this area, he claimed, would live with the pollution for their neighbors if it helped to feed those neighbors. "You do this to neighbors," he felt. He summed up this philosophy by explaining a traditional practice associated with fence building:

. . . in this area, if I owned a farm and I decided to build a fence along that line . . . I always came back twelve foot away from that fence. . . . If I built the fence I gave you ten-twelve foot of my land. . . . That's the way we did things. . . . Taking care of your neighbor had a real impact on the people and this filtered down until recently. . . .

As noted, agriculture, lumbering, land acquisition, and tourism were significant factors inhibiting mobilization over the polluted Pigeon River. It is also apparent that these factors resulted in a common tie between the residents of the two states. Therefore, both structural and social psychological factors inhibited mobilization.

The next chapter examines the Cocke County mobilization that did take place in 1986 over the

pollution issue. This took the form of the Dead Pigeon River Council.

CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY PRESENTATION OF THE DPRC

In the last chapter, the history of the Cocke County region was presented in order to understand the structural factors that inhibited mass mobilization around the pollution of the Pigeon River. In this chapter, the Dead Pigeon River Council is examined. This group represents the only successful mobilization over the pollution issue to experience a relatively long-term existence in Cocke County.

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First the case material of the DPRC will be presented. Special emphasis is placed on the individual core group members, the names of whom have been changed for this thesis. Second, the theoretical model presented in Chapter II will be applied to the data to assess fit and degree of understanding allowed by the model for case studies such as the DPRC.

I begin with an examination of the river-related incidents prior to the first organizational meeting. Subsequently, the DPRC will be described so that analysis will be possible, applying the theoretical model proposed. The findings will then be summarized.

Incidents Leading to Mobilization

Individual efforts. The national environmental movement of the 1960's and 1970's had not only brought about a new public awareness concerning environmental issues, but also gave rise to federal laws and regulations, such as the Clean Water Act. These new laws provided a legal basis and an avenue for environmental protest movements to work through.

Many people of Cocke County had tried numerous times to express their disapproval of the pollution of the Pigeon River. Minor uprisings and short-lived mobilization efforts had developed during the eighty year history of pollution, yet "these movements would die when they ran out of gas," remarked one member of the DPRC. He felt that the residents "couldn't quite get things going . . . [because] they didn't know how to." He cited lack of legal counsel, lack of skills in public relations and public opinion management, and absence of expertise in maintaining media involvement as contributing factors for the historical absence of a sustained citizen's movement. He contended that, as attempts to effect improvements in the condition of the river repeatedly failed, the failures had had a "psychological impact," leaving a feeling of "utter

hopelessness" among the citizens of Cocke County. Generation after generation had been forced to contend with the problem and felt helpless to do anything about it. He believed that a collective low self-esteem prevailed in Cocke County from this situation. This resignation had made mobilization an even harder objective to achieve. This, he explained, was why residents had suffered the pollution for so long.

Carol told of her father's protests against the river pollution. Though there were some organized groups throughout the eighty years, of which her father was occasionally a participant, she stated that a group could never "get organized enough" to accomplish anything. She recalled how small groups of individuals and county officials would periodically go to North Carolina and address the pollution issue. She explained the activity as follows: upon talking with North Carolina officials, the Tennessee group would be promised that steps would be taken to clean up the river. "People of this area tend to be people that believe that when a man's word is given . . . it means something.. . . so they would come back home and they would feel that they had succeeded in some way." Yet, nothing was ever done. Meanwhile this pattern of activity continued.

Gordon started individual efforts "years ago" and vowed that he would do what he could to fight the polluting of the river. Around 1983, he found out about the Pigeon River Action Group's (PRAG) activities and tried to help them, but he was forced to become inactive due to health problems. Some time later, Gordon began talking to people along the banks of the Pigeon River in order to gauge his neighbors' interest in a broad based environmental group that he planned to organize. He had gone so far as to have a few membership cards printed with "Appalachian Environmental Council" when he learned of other's plans to organize a group. Gordon decided to join this movement, the DPRC, instead of following through with his plans. He felt that the DPRC would have a "wider acceptance" than his group, and remarked that the planners had more expertise than he in starting an organization of this kind.

Jim also noted that many people had tried to address the Pigeon River problem in past years, but "nobody had been successful." He claimed to have reviewed a newspaper article dated 1912, that told of the proposed plans of Champion to cleanup the river. He had also read news articles from the 1920's, 30's, 40's, 50's, and 60's that reported similar promises from the paper mill. He believed that until the Clean Water Act was ratified there was no way for the people of

Tennessee to force North Carolina to take action on the river's condition, in other words, the people of Cocke county "just didn't have the legal club to beat them with." Even after the passage of the law it had taken years to reach a point at which it appeared that some action would finally be taken.

Wilma Dykeman, Tennessee state historian residing in Newport, spoke at the August 18, 1988, Newport variance hearings. She gave a public presentation on pollution of the Pigeon River as seen through the media. For instance, a 1923 newspaper article reported a massive fishkill that had prompted the Newport newspaper to call for an investigation. A petition was sent as a result. She recalled how her husband, James Stokely, had spent the years up until his death fighting for the cleanup of the river.

Impact of a polluted river. Residents of Cocke County, as well as others involved in the economic development of the county believe the degraded condition of the Pigeon River to be the primary reason for the lack of tourism and further economic development.

One member, Scott, worked for a white water rafting firm from Gatlinburg for a period of time prior to joining the DPRC. Rafting enthusiasts were brought to the Pigeon River where Scott led expeditions. By

signing up in Gatlinburg the customers did not have a chance to see or smell the river until actually reaching their destination, prepared to raft. Scott recalls being asked repeatedly about the condition of the river, why the color was so dark, why the water foamed and why the smell was so bad. Customers were concerned for their safety, a few to the point of refusing to raft the river. Scott stated that if they did follow through and raft, having already paid to do so, they never returned a second time.

Another member, Jim, also a white water enthusiast and avid fisherman, explains that he "always thought that river running through [Cocke County] has been a financial detriment." He first believes that recreationally, the county has been deprived. The river is really three rivers in one, he explained, ranging from advanced white water rapids, to a more moderate white water class, to finally a gentler fishing river as it empties into Douglas Lake. The possible employment lost in recreational industrial development was beyond his estimation, yet he did note that the river did not have a picnic table along its entire length. To date, only one picnic table is known, at a Hartford store.

Jim claims that loss of industry to the county has been the result of the river's condition. With the close location of Interstate 40, the river represents

ideal industrial sites. Jim recalls that one company, Busch Gardens, visited Cocke County looking for a location for a theme park. The company decided not to locate on the Pigeon River because of the lack of clean water. This is just one example of many, Jim believed, where jobs had been lost due to the polluted river.

In August of 1987, a study was released by two Walter State Community College professors who estimated that Cocke County lost approximately 7.3 million dollars annually in recreational revenue alone, due to the uselessness of the Pigeon River.

One member of the DPRC stated that the Tennessee legislature had brought the Pigeon River pollution problem to the floor periodically in seventy-eight years of sessions. He claims many politicians had promised that they would see the river cleaned up, yet each failed.

Political activity. It was not until 1980 that the state of Tennessee first brought suit against the paper company. This was an attempt to enforce Tennessee water quality regulations on the North Carolina industry. After presenting North Carolina water quality experts with a non-binding model permit in April, 1983, which was ignored, the state formally issued a complaint against the Champion industry to the Tennessee Attorney

General and Department of Public Health. Champion was found in violation of its own state's water quality standards. The industry's NPDES permit had expired in 1981. Yet the paper company filed a motion to dismiss the case concerning the Tennessee lawsuit. In January of 1985, however, the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that Tennessee could require the industry to meet Tennessee water quality regulations. Tennessee's stricter rules, in comparison to North Carolina's, could then be applied to the state's boundary waters.

In May of 1985 North Carolina officials issued Champion a permit. The EPA rejected this permit two months later, for the permit had not been submitted to the agency for a ninety day review period. The permit was not strict enough, according the EPA and the federal agency threatened intervention at this point if the two states could not settle the issue with a suitable permit. The EPA remarked that it would regulate the river, if a new permit was not submitted or public hearing conducted within ninety days.

The Pigeon River Action Group. In October of 1986, a Tennessee chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America (IWLA) received a memo announcing a meeting of the Pigeon River Action Group (PRAG), a North Carolina organization that had mobilized to protest the polluted

state of the Pigeon River. Norman, a member of the IWLA decided to attend this meeting with his daughter. He later remarked that, prior to attending the meeting, he had believed that the president of PRAG "had [the situation] in hand" and that he had expected to find a meeting run by a highly motivated and organized environmental group. Instead, he and his daughter found a small assembly of seven or eight people, speaking in subdued tones, almost as if Champion International were monitoring their conversation. He discovered that these North Carolinians feared severe sanctions if their protest activities became known.

PRAG continued to decline in membership as more and more members feared to speak out against Champion. The president and his wife received a threatening phone call on Christmas eve, 1987. Fearing for their lives, the couple moved to Florida for a short duration. They have since returned to North Carolina, but they are the only members of the PRAG as of this writing. Some residents express support but remain silent due to the threats they claim to have received from the company.

The planning of the DPRC. Norman returned to the IWLA with his information concerning PRAG. Based on his findings in North Carolina, it was decided by IWLA members that mobilization of Cocke County, Tennessee

residents was also needed. "That's where the river is," Norman stated. "We had to have the nucleus of the people and the eyes of the public . . . on the people who've been most severely impacted by the river," he recalled. The IWLA saw the need to initiate a Newport-based organization in conjunction with "some organization that [was] already in place." In essence, the new group would "piggy back" some organization firmly established in the community. In November of 1986 the IWLA contacted the outgoing president of the Newport Chamber of Commerce, feeling that they needed the "stamp of approval from the business community." The IWLA thus believed that, by emphasizing the importance of a clean river for the economy and the tourism of the region, a new group could gain necessary recognition quickly and solidly within the community.

The incoming president of the Chamber of Commerce, Brad, met with Norman and together began tentatively organizing a group of citizens, the Dead Pigeon River Council (DPRC). Norman had written the following resolution:

We are resolved that the Pigeon River should flow free from major pollution emitted by the paper mill located in Canton, North Carolina, and operated by Champion International Corporation, and to this end, we dedicate ourselves to the effort of using every legal

method to accomplish our goal at the earliest possible date. We now serve notice that the Champion Mill can no longer peacefully pollute the Pigeon depriving the citizens of this region of the recreational, aesthetic, and economic values of a clean Pigeon River. We will not rest until our river again runs clear.

Norman had named the group, designed the organization's logo, and made plans for the group's first meeting to take place on the bridge in Newport. The 1986 Tennessee Homecoming celebration had been tremendously successful in Cocke County and, as Norman noted, "we [IWLA] saw a window of opportunity." Norman and Brad, claiming themselves co-founders, planned for this first meeting to take place at midnight, December 31, 1986 to represent the last official act of the Homecoming celebration. The idea was to use the enthusiasm that had characterized the previous year's activities for community support.

The Dead Pigeon River Council

On a bridge crossing the Pigeon River in Newport, Tennessee, the Dead Pigeon River Council officially organized at midnight on December 31, 1986.

Early mobilization. This first meeting was advertised through the local media, flyers, and press releases. The Newport Chamber of Commerce reportedly picked up the tab. The New Year's eve meeting was successful in attracting local residents. Various members recall that from 100 to 200 Cocke Countians appeared for the midnight bell-ringing, at which time the church bells of the city rang, symbolizing "A bell tolls for Champion." The resolution was read and the DPRC was officially born. At this time, there were no members of the DPRC, except for the co-founders, although several people who attended would become the core members of the group. However, there was no attempt to "sign up" people for membership into the group at this first meeting.

When Brad took office as the new president of the Chamber of Commerce on December 12, 1986, he began working closely with Norman. Together, they worked on an "annual plan," to include a rally, or "memorial" day, and other symbolic activities which would aid in focusing attention to the condition of the river and spark the public's interest in the project.

During the first months of 1987, there was little formal group activity. However, there were still no membership drives. Norman explained the philosophy behind this tactic: the co-founders did not want people

willing to work toward the cleanup of the river to become "objects of Champion We wanted leadership but we wanted this thing to be the universe . . . and we wanted anyone, just by saying 'I'm interested in cleaning that river up, I want to be a member of that group' " to be able to say "I'm a member of the DPRC, I'm a member of this movement." Norman stressed that the group had symbolically counted all people who had aided in the struggle, though no formal lists were drawn up. Lists of names for contacts were used, but not for the purposes of constituting any type of formal membership roster.

Plans continued to be made by the two co-founders. Eventually other citizens became involved, mainly the result of existing social ties. Meetings were held sporadically after the first one, but became more regular as the May EPA hearings approached. Occasionally, new interested persons would attend DPRC meetings but would not return. One member relayed a typical scenario: As the group of core members became increasingly close, the desire for the recruitment of new people was not strong. The core members felt uneasy about discussing issues that were somewhat secretive or controversial in front of new people and therefore, at times, the DPRC appeared disorganized to newcomers. In addition, the group typically would not assign a task or

role to new people who approached with the desire to help. With nothing to do, these people seldom returned. Another member recalled bringing a friend of hers to a meeting. Afterward the friend refused to return, claiming that the group was a "bunch of goddamned snobs." The president of the DPRC simply recalled that people came and went but usually "lost interest."

The DPRC chose to elect officers in mid-August, 1987 (president, treasurer, secretary.) Though the group did not want a formal membership or structure, the legal council provided by the IWLA suggested that names were needed in order to start the incorporation proceedings for the DPRC. If incorporated, individual members could not be singled out by Champion and forced into litigation.

The core activists recalled how they became members of the DPRC. Co-founder Norman resided in Jefferson County where he was a professor at Carson Newman College in Jefferson City. Norman described the motivations for his involvement with the Pigeon River pollution issue. As a Christian, he believed that all humans have an inherent obligation to God to place wildlife and the environment under their "watchcare." This predisposition prompted him to become involved with the issue when an opportunity presented itself in the form of contact from PRAG. His involvement with IWLA, in

addition to the "window of opportunity" at the end of Homecoming 1986, came together at the right time to aid in the mobilization of an environmental group. He also received satisfaction from his involvement, as the work also gave him a "good personal feeling," by being a small part of history.

His academic background explains his philosophy concerning his stance on the Pigeon River controversy. Norman stated that he took an "academic position" on the Pigeon River issue. Through his connections within the IWLA, a range of experts from accountants to biochemists supplied information on the river, the economy of the region and on the Champion paper company. Contacts from the fields of science, ecology, economics and other areas were seen as important assets to the IWLA, and were eventually important to the DPRC. The IWLA "had the knowledge and the information and that's the reason we've been able to be successful against Champion." Norman believed information was power, for those in possession of such information.

The organizing of the DPRC, remarked Norman, was "almost like planting a seed." Though denying being "puppet master over this group," Norman believed the mass population of Cocke County was not "sophisticated" enough to have an organization capable of getting to the heart of matters concerning science, ecology, or

economics without having an office staffed with paid personnel. The IWLA solved this problem by providing access to national networking and massive amounts of information. Norman stated that he and the IWLA had a plan, an idea that would not have been realized without Cocke County people who translated that plan and made it work. Norman likened himself to a "quarterback that's been on a winning team," in explaining his relationship with the DPRC.

Norman, after several disagreements, saw the DPRC grow unpredictable, especially after the issuance of a "compromise" permit. His support of a variance for Champion was not shared by all members of the DPRC. He recalled a couple of occasions where he attended DPRC meetings and "tried to use the science and rationale of management," but was confronted with hostility from the group, a rage he believed to stem from fear of being "sold down the river." Thus, he resigned, as he no longer felt the group knew which direction that they were headed in. He believed the group to be motivated by emotion, and very dangerous. Therefore, he and his IWLA affiliates pulled away in order to let the group "go their own way."

Politically, Norman felt there existed good environmental laws on the books, but due to the Reagan administration's pro-business and anti-regulation

policies, these laws had been largely ignored. "Citizens have to, through our representatives and government . . . be aware and we have to demand through social action" the adherence to rules and regulations. "Good science, good politics . . . can be used to enforce the law . . . economy and free enterprise will adjust." Social action within the system had been the strategy of the IWLA and had also helped the DPRC succeed.

The second co-founder, enlisted by Norman, was a native Cocke Countian. Brad recalled the day when he first met with Norman and was asked how he felt about the formation of a group. "I was excited because I grew up with the Pigeon River, " and even as a child he remembered being agitated about the pollution. He was eager to try a mobilization attempt, though he had never been involved in an environmental movement prior.

In Brad's opinion, he felt the Pigeon River pollution had "actually held the county in a time warp." He compared the economic development to the development of neighboring counties and felt the pollution responsible for loss of industry and subsequent taxes that might have resulted in strong economic growth and a better quality school system in Cocke County. He could find no other reasons for his county's lack of development, having the Great Smoky Mountains National

Park as did Sevier County, and having the same potential for industrial development as Jefferson or Green counties. Champion's pollution of the river had prevented growth, prosperity, and tourism. "We have a beautiful mountain gorge with a sewer running through it," he concluded. He also believed that when the river finally ran clear, it would allow him and others in the county to "be able to control our destiny," in being able to carefully plan economic development and control a tourism industry.

His work with the DPRC and his taking the executive position of the Chamber of Commerce coincided. He was asked by Chamber directors in the beginning what he hoped to accomplish by such protest activity. They believed only "hard feelings" would result. He replied that he perceived his job as being one to help enhance the quality of life for residents of the county. He believed the cleanup of the Pigeon River would help do this more than anything else.

Brad had helped to organize a Homecoming 1986 celebration in a small local community prior to his taking the Chamber of Commerce position. The committee that he formed for this project was very successful with the celebration. He saw his role in this as one to aid the people in organizing and achieving a goal that they had previously considered unobtainable. This was

accomplished as well as effecting a complete turnaround in public outlook, from hopelessness to confidence, as the people began taking over the project themselves. This was Brad's goal for the DPRC project and he felt that the group had aided in changing the helplessness and hopelessness felt by the county's residents to feelings of hope. Though not so in the early days of the DPRC, community support had become very strong.

He believed the informal structure of the group to be the most effective structure possible, given the size of membership of the group. "We are family," he remarked. He felt this informal organization gave him the power to make some critical decisions on his own at times when there was not time to call a group meeting for a vote, or when one-on-one political diplomacy was critical to achieve some result. A large, formally structured organization that worked like "clockwork" would not have allowed this freedom. He claimed that at times he had made decisions without the group's input, or withheld knowledge, but that in certain instances this had been felt necessary, for it benefited the group.

He felt his position as Chamber executive placed him in a position to be listened to within the political system and this had aided the group. Therefore, he saw working within the framework of the community, with its

political entities, as the way to bring about social change in America. He felt that by convincing the local politicians to support the cause and by persuading them that he and the group were right in their efforts, one could win the battle. When the politicians are reached, he believed, then you know you have reached the people, for "constituents are telling [the politicians] that its the right thing to do." He felt he had been required to play politics to "the hilt," and though this was distasteful to him he saw it as necessary.

Carol recollected the day she took Chamber of Commerce business papers to her father, who was the treasurer of the Chamber at the time. While there she began talking to Brad about the group. Having been friends with the man for years, she also discovered that she shared his concerns over the river. She then decided to become involved.

Carol's family had been among the first settlers of Cocke County, arriving in the late 1700's. She had lived in the county all her life, employed as a local elementary school teacher while working on her master's degree in education at an area university.

She recalled having always been aware since childhood that the river needed cleaning up and wondered why no one ever did anything about it. The extent of

her environmental activity prior to the DPRC consisted of taking care of her own property, though not beyond.

Carol described herself as the most conservative member of the group. "I've been the calm, kept things on an even keel." She did not see herself as radical nor did she consider most members of the group to be radical. Supporters of the Pigeon River movement included preachers, doctors, lawyers, bankers and teacher, "basically conservative people" who would not be comfortable with a radical movement.

The resources she felt she brought to the group included: skill at organizing time, (a consequence of her teaching experience), prior bookkeeping skills, (which aided her as treasurer of the group), her tenacious nature, and her understanding of the political processes, due to her extensive work in Republican campaigns (Baker, Dunn, Alexander). She strongly believed that the political structure had to be used in order to achieve goals. Learning to "play the game," or playing politics, she remarked, was the way to get things accomplished. By conducting a professional relationship within the political structure one could discover the methods necessary to influence certain elected officials.

Though not originally planning to become involved with a long-standing group, Carol felt the Pigeon River

struggle had become a very personal thing. She believed the river to be a factor effecting the future of the children whom she taught and felt that her activity in the DPRC was just one more extension of her duties in preparing children for that future. She planned to stay involved with the group for as long as it took to realize the original goal of the DPRC: a clean river. The successful mobilization of the group she attributed to "the right people [who] came together at the right time," all who were as tenacious as she.

Another member, Gordon, who had been fighting the pollution on an individual basis for years, heard of the co-founders' efforts and pledged his support.

Gordon considered his family "rock bottom rooted in East Tennessee." His family ties and history were deeply embedded in the area, and he attributed his concern for the river being based in his interest in history, his love for the "mountaineers," and people in general. The river could not be separated from the people, he stated, due to its previously life-sustaining role for those who settled along its banks, farmed and logged with it. Various wildlife had also depended upon the river for survival, and he felt the demise of this life-sustaining capacity his main concern.

Gordon owned, managed, and lived in a small country store located just outside Newport, directly across from

the Pigeon River. He stressed the devastating economic impact he had witnessed along the river due to the pollution and he felt that oppression and hard times could be attributed directly to the river. He felt that the average Cocke countian did not truly realize the source of their poverty as being related to Champion's abuse of the river, although the river he believed "just completely killed Cocke County."

Gordon felt any group of volunteers to be a very fragile organization, yet believed that the informally structured, low membership group had worked and had been successful. He admitted that the group would have had a larger membership if organized differently but felt any restructuring would have been unnecessary; "this little group [was] headed in the right direction," by acting "responsibly," keeping credibility within the community, and by using "good common sense within the system." The group had to be able to talk to political officials, such as governors and senators. He recalled members who desired a more formalized structure for the group and replied, "if it's not broke, don't fix it," for he felt the group had been "tremendously successful."

He had been invited on two occasions to attend EPA meetings in Atlanta, and sensing this a ploy of the agency's to create a schism within the group, had always taken at least one other person with him. He saw

himself to be in a good lobbying position. Being Republican, his ties with the local government and in particular with the county executive were useful. He felt that, now more than ever, local political and community support was strong. His feelings differed concerning state and federal level politics, believing the "bureaucrats" to be against the group. Even so, he stressed that the United States' form of government was the "best form of government in the world even with all the rotten apples in it." Freedom of the press prevented society from falling apart in his perspective, and he attributed to the press ninety percent of the credit for the success realized by the DPRC. This use of press had been the only tactic used by the group, he concluded.

Ann heard about the plans for the DPRC from her husband, who was active in Chamber of Commerce business. He had informed her of the initial bridge meeting and asked if she would help with this project.

Ann moved to Newport from Knoxville when her husband took the position of president at a local bank, approximately four years ago. Even so, she recalled having been shown the polluted Pigeon River at the age of twelve. Her family was actively involved in environmental issues, especially her father, who protested the Tellico Dam. Yet, she had never been

involved in this kind of issue before, where the members constituted the group that took care of everything. She previously believed that unless a problem became your problem, you did not get involved. Now after involvement with the DPRC over the past two years, she stated that she felt it her "duty to see this through." She expanded her environmental concern to a Newport incinerator controversy, realizing that sometimes you cannot take the "back seat."

Her political ideologies changed also. She jokingly stated that prior to the DPRC, she knew who James Watt was and was skeptical of him, but that she always thought the government would fix, or did fix, everything. She had previously placed a great deal of trust in elected officials. However, as a result of various incidents and interactions with political officials, she became very disappointed, losing all trust in the federal EPA and state level political officials. She stated: "I hate to be a pessimist, but I don't feel like we [DPRC] have a friend at all," on the state and federal level. Local political support was now strong, she believed, and the Cocke County executive's close relationship with State Representative Quillen had been very important. Community support was also strong, she felt.

She remarked on the group's desire to work completely within the system, through the local county officials and strictly within the boundary of the DPRC. This did not include "outsiders," meaning other community residents or other environmental groups. The group feared being labeled too radical, and desired to keep its image "perfect" in order to keep community and local political respect. She also attributed this philosophy to the members' positions within the community. These ties and obligations to the status quo precluded the radicalism of many members. She noted her own experience with this due to her husband's position in the community, and remarked that she had been told to "tone it down" on occasion. In fact, "I don't know how far I'd be willing to go for this cause," due to this. She stated that this uncertainty had created great mental strain for her.

The DPRC "has taken over my life," she noted. At the time of this interview she was the only remaining member without a full-time job, and she felt that she had been relied upon too heavily at times. This had left no time for anything but group business, and her duties as secretary of the group. Due to the small number of members, "burnout" had affected her and other members of the group, yet the DPRC refused to allow others inside the close-knit structure of the group.

Even though she commented on feeling emotionally drained at times, she still saw the group as having become her family and she would continue to fight for the cleanup of the river as long as it took to reach this goal of the group.

Husband and wife, Jim and Brenda, heard of the organizational meeting through the local media, attended it, and joined. Jim was elected president of the group, due to his "mouth" as he recalls.

Also from the Cocke County region, he and his wife owned and worked a small land surveying business in Newport. Jim was also involved with an auction company and was active on the County Planning Commission.

Jim perceived the river problem prior to involvement with the DPRC as having "always been there, can't do anything about it." He always felt that the river was an "embarrassment" yet he has never considered himself an environmentalist. As noted earlier, he felt the economic conditions of the county could be directly correlated to the pollution of the river. Once the Pigeon River was resolved, economic development and prosperity would occur.

He considered himself a "laid back kind of president" not ruling with an "iron fist." Meetings were not conducted in a formal matter nor was the structure of the group formalized. Disagreements were

handled by allowing contested issues to be "thrash[ed] . . . out until everyone's in agreement," or until someone backed down. This he felt, worked out "pretty good, most of the time," especially for a volunteer group. He felt comfortable with this organizational format, and believed it to be successful.

Jim felt that the Tennessee state government did not really understand the positions held by the people of the area. The challenge was centered around keeping "elected representatives from selling us out while trying to do what's best for us The government has the tendency to know what's better for us than we do." He believed the group had to "drag the state of Tennessee kicking and screaming to the position of helping us" on this issue. He also felt this to be true for the EPA. Having to resort to these means of airing grievances and achieving results were wrong, as he stated: "We shouldn't have to be begging the government for help." He saw local political support however, as having been very good. "Publicity has been the only thing we have had," Jim claimed when discussing tactics. He personally discouraged any type of DPRC involvement with more radical confrontational tactics, such as picketing, for example.

Another married couple, Jane and Scott, saw a television commercial featuring the co-founders shortly

after the initial meeting and soon became involved, though they lived upstream of Newport, closer to the North Carolina state line. Though they had lived in the Hartford area for approximately eight years, this couple felt they were still considered outsiders from Pennsylvania, having no kinship ties or family history in Cocke County. Their home was the furthest away from Newport of any other member's, and somewhat remotely located in the mountains. Both worked part-time, Jane in Gatlinburg.

These two core members appear to have had the least in common with the other members. Scott had much prior experience in environmental issues and protest activity, having protested against nuclear power in Pennsylvania. The couple had been active in animal rights issues, forest clear-cutting issues, and Greenpeace. Neither Jane nor Scott had prior ties with the more economic or "civic-oriented" organizations in Newport in which other core members were involved with, e.g., Kiwanis.

Differences from the majority of DPRC members concerning ideologies and perspectives led to severe problems for these two members. While perceiving the group to be more economically concerned, the couple's focus tended to be more environmental in nature, and on a global scale, not merely regionally-oriented. Networking and a more formally structured organization

were therefore important to Jane and Scott in addressing global environmental issues. They encountered disagreements over the organization of the group as well. As their encounters with other more "radical" grassroots organizations increased (Citizen's Clearinghouse, Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens), the discontent increased. Jane and Scott felt that their ideas were not even allowed discussion within the framework of the group.

In addition, Jane and Scott found that they were being excluded from group discussions, meetings and other activities because of a fear, they believed to be held by some members of the DPRC, that they would not present the right image, or say the right things in instances where political diplomacy was deemed necessary. The couple began to see the DPRC evolving into a social group, a closed organization that equated membership with status in the community at large. They felt that the real issues and original goals were no longer of central importance to the group and this eventually resulted in the couple's leaving the DPRC.

In the months to come, these eight persons remained the core members of the DPRC who were most active in the internal business of the group. No formal recruitment drives were conducted to increase membership.

Activities. The first official activity of the DPRC, in cooperation with the Cocke County Chamber of Commerce, was to stage a "Pigeon River Memorial Day" on May 8, 1987. The event reportedly drew several thousands of Cocke Countians for the day-long activities. Parades, banners, and placards were made by local students in attempts to interest the school children in the issue. The children gathered flowers and threw them into the river; they also participated in poetry and essay contests. Residents listened to speeches by Newport and Cocke County political officials. All these activities were conducted with the DPRC's hopes of bringing attention to the condition of the river and to gauge public support.

The memorial day was also an attempt rouse public sentiment for the EPA hearings that were scheduled to be held in Newport on May 14, 1987 and in North Carolina on May 16. Yet the day before the first hearing was to be held, the EPA cancelled, due, it was stated, to the need for more time to fully evaluate masses of technical and economic data that Champion had supplied in April. The EPA later cited threats of violence from both Tennessee and North Carolina as the reason for the postponing of the hearings.

The DPRC, hoping to continue the momentum of public sentiment, sponsored other activities. A fund raising

drive was launched to provide funds to help promote the Pigeon River's cause. A direct mail campaign to solicit individual contributions was initiated. The group also began selling T-shirts and hats bearing the DPRC logo.

In mid-August of 1987, the DPRC announced a regional boycott of all milk products packaged by Champion. In calling on all consumers in the region to support the boycott, the DPRC felt it could "get to the heart of Champion" (Knoxville News-Sentinel, 8/12/87). Champion would be forced to drop its pursuit of a appeal and would begin focusing on a solution to the problems of the river.

On September 9, 1987, seven Champion International executives from Canton met in Newport with the DPRC. The two and one half hour meeting developed into a question and answer session with twelve questions gathered from Cocke Countians being submitted in writing to plant manager, Oliver Blackwell. The DPRC was described in one paper covering this story as a "collection of blue collar workers, professionals, retirees, and office workers" (Asheville Citizen, 9/9/87). Blackwell invited group members to tour the Canton plant, yet Champion still refused to accept any responsibility for the pollution of the river, according to the DPRC's lawyer.

At a November 5 meeting of the DPRC, the group discussed the latest developments concerning the incorporation proceedings, plans for a merger with an already existing Sevier County group who addressed the issue of the Pigeon River, and plans for the rescheduled EPA hearings to be held in January of 1988. The group planned to form fundraising, publicity, and newsletter committees although these committees never materialized. Members were also beginning to buy Champion International stock in order to receive financial reports and other documents.

The beginning of factionalism. The issues involved with the polluted river took a drastic turn in the fall of 1987 as the DPRC learned of dioxin and the chemical's relation to paper mills in an article obtained from Greenpeace. Jane and Scott had procured the information accidentally, as they had contacted Greenpeace (themselves members of that organization) in an attempt to get information on paper mills. The issue no longer centered around the color of the water but the possible health hazards now believed present in the coffee-colored river. This information was obtained just after the meeting with the Champion officials in Newport in September, at which the company had assured the

residents of Cocke County that there was nothing in the water that was harmful.

At a November 5 meeting of the DPRC, the group discussed a possible pre-Thanksgiving release of a press statement concerning the dioxin contamination of the Pigeon River. By a November 19 meeting, the date for the press conference had been set for November 24. It was the circumstances involved with this press conference that resulted in the first serious problems for the group.

Jane and Scott insisted that the information they had received be relayed to the public, including the most serious possible health hazards. They were concerned about the irrigation of crops using river water and the milk from cattle grazing along the river. They realized that this information could have serious implications for the Cocke County agricultural economy but felt that, due to the nature of the hazard, the county should be warned.

Other members were more hesitant. A frantic farmer called the Chamber prior to the press release to say that the local cannery in Cocke County would cancel his contract if they believed his crops were contaminated. DPRC members were dealing with a chemical whose potential effects were not known. Little scientific study had been done. Even with the evidence in hand

disputing some of the fears of the farmer, members foresaw a "scare" concerning the dioxin issue. This scare, however "unfounded," could have been detrimental to the Cocke County economy, not just in agricultural-related losses, but in land value and tourism as well. Heated discussions ensued moments before the press conference concerning just how much information should be released to the public.

Jane and Scott perceived this tactic as one on a par with Champion's typical concealment of information from the public. They simply could not reconcile their beliefs with the actions of the group. Henceforth they perceived the actions of the group to reflect self-centered economic interest rather than the original goal, that being the cleanup of the river, but they continued as DPRC members.

The press conference was held as planned on November 24, 1987. Basically, the DPRC members and Cocke County officials stressed a need for the immediate testing of the Pigeon River for dioxin.

Activity concerning the color permit. On December 11, 1987 at Stone Mountain Inn, Georgia all concerned parties met for the first time since the battle had begun. The EPA, Tennessee officials, North Carolina officials, and Champion lawyers and officials held a

meeting to discuss their positions concerning the color permit. The DPRC had originally been denied access to this meeting by the EPA. Norman requested members not to attend, but three decided to attend regardless, including Brad. Upon arriving at Stone Mountain Inn they were met by their lawyer, who informed them that they could sit in on the meeting but were warned by the presiding officials against making any comments.

On the eve of the January 14 EPA public hearing to be held in Asheville, Champion plunged into a public relations blitz. The plant sponsored rallies and provided midnight buses leaving for Asheville, to ensure their supporters the opening speaking times for Champion and prevent the "wild-eyed radical environmentalists" from taking these early chances to speak. Due to an understanding on the part of the DPRC, no opposition from Tennessee would cross the state line. This "gentlemen's agreement" was said to have been reached at the Stone Mountain Inn meeting. Therefore, only one member of the DPRC attended, but not to testify.

The Asheville EPA hearings were held January 14, 1988. The common theme throughout was Champion's threat to close the plant if a "reasonable" permit could not be agreed upon. There were no statements issued in favor of the river.

The following day, Governors Jim Martin and Ned McWherter met in Nashville for three hours to "air opposing viewpoints." McWherter at this time pledged full cooperation but made no promises that Tennessee would relax its environmental standards. Several Tennessee officials, however, were unconvinced as to the extent of Champion's efforts and stated ability to clean up the river. It was felt by many that Champion was not doing all that was technically possible in reaching a 50 color unit limit. This doubt was echoed in the minds of many DPRC members.

As the Knoxville January 21 hearings approached, the DPRC received word that as many as 8,000 Champion supporters were to be bussed to Tennessee for the hearings. Champion denied any "gentlemen's agreement" in a press conference held by Blackwell on the eve of the hearings. He defended the shipment of 10-15% of the mill workers to Knoxville.

The EPA hearings were held in Knoxville on January 21, 1988 with some 3,500 people attending. Crowds from Champion were present but not in the numbers hinted at by the paper company. The issues most testified on by the residents of Tennessee concerned environmental degradation and the threat of dioxin. DPRC members later stated that during the time of the hearings the group was the strongest it had ever been. The group had

a goal in sight (the EPA hearings) and there were massive amounts of work to be done for the hearings. Members of the group were bonded together recalls one member at this time.

In a press conference held on this same date just prior to the hearings, the EPA was criticized by the DPRC (Norman and the IWLA attorney as acting spokespersons) for not having tested the Pigeon River for dioxin during a testing round conducted the year before. Pigeon River testing had not begun until December of 1987 and January of 1988, this only after the information was released by the DPRC. The group now saw the dioxin threat as a major factor to be considered in the issuance of the permit.

Immediately following the hearings, Champion launched into a massive letter writing campaign to the EPA. DPRC followed suit. Meanwhile Tennessee officials were accusing Champion of making a "political issue out of a waste water dispute" in order to get their way in the matter.

The emotional momentum of the hearings resulted in a feeling of some members of a "let down" when the activity settled down again. The group followed Champion's actions in continuing a letter-writing campaign rather than "taking the offensive," as one member felt should have been the next step. There

appeared to be no tactical plan after the hearings were over, and the group fell into a lull. Some members saw this lack of organization, this "disarray of ideas" as a serious problem. The group was somewhat unsure as to the next plan of action.

On February 12, 1988, the EPA announced that Tennessee and North Carolina officials had reached a tentative agreement concerning the permit proposal. Seen as a compromise by some DPRC members, the proposal would allow the plant to stay open by approving the fifty percent color reduction asked for by Champion. Also included was a tougher monitoring system for possible toxic pollutants, such as dioxin, to be carried out by Champion. The result of this permit, believed to be one of the toughest in the country, would be a "substantial" cleanup of the Pigeon River. The decision to accept the permit was now up to Champion. DPRC members argued that this permit was agreed upon and issued one week before the deadline for public input.

Some DPRC members also argued that several closed-door meetings had been taking place just prior to the agreement; these meetings were believed to have taken place between individual council members and between a council member and officials from EPA, Tennessee and North Carolina. Other members of the group only heard information concerning the permit through the media.

The apparent lack of communication among members of the DPRC fanned feelings of suspicion, hostility and hurt. Some believed that as group members they should have been included in any and all meetings or discussions concerning the river. They felt that their exclusion stemmed from council members who saw them as "too radical" or unpredictable in their behavior in such matters. These perceptions bred further suspicion and hostility.

Dioxin. On February 13, the Knoxville News-Sentinel ran a front page story telling of the abnormally high cancer rates believed by residents of the community to be present in the town of Hartford, Tennessee, located in Cocke County on the banks of the Pigeon River. The residents, with the aid of a DPRC member, conducted an informal survey, finding 167 cancer-related deaths out of a population of 500 in the last thirty years. Dioxin-laced fish and water were speculated to be the reasons. The residents were now demanding that their wells be tested for contamination by the chemical. Residents called their town "Widowville."

Up until this point, little effort had been taken by the DPRC to include the Hartford residents. But now the group saw an issue that could possibly elevate their

cause to a national arena and in turn provide substance for the group to work on, since they were experiencing a lull after the EPA hearings. This activity served to strengthen the group again after the disagreement concerning the press release. Tempers were cooled as the spotlight was shifted to the small community. This was accompanied by a fresh new wave of media attention. In fact, the president remarked that the "Widowville" article in the Knoxville paper was the most effective of any news article that had appeared in the mass media.

Located several miles upstream from Newport and situated directly on the Pigeon River, this small community's residents, though concerned with the pollution of the river prior to the dioxin issue, had found it difficult to travel to Newport for meetings. Two members of the DPRC were from this area and believe that the Hartford residents saw the Community Center (located in the Chamber of Commerce and the site of DPRC meetings) as "foreign, not built for us, but built for the people in town." This feeling, coupled with the mountainous roads that would have to be traveled after dark, deterred Hartford residents from attending DPRC meetings. The DPRC declined suggestions to hold meetings in Hartford.

Grassy Fork and Hartford residents, with the aid of the two DPRC members living there, held a community fund

raiser for the DPRC which proved to be very successful. Though offering their sincere thanks for the effort, the group assigned no tasks to the community. One member believes that this stemmed from the DPRC belief that they had things under control and were hesitant to relinquish any of that control to others outside of the core activists concerning matters other than fundraising.

The state of Tennessee conducted a health survey of its own, which upon completion of the study completely discredited the Hartford survey. Meanwhile, the DPRC was calling for a congressional investigation to determine whether or not the EPA had covered up knowledge of the dioxin contamination of the Pigeon River. One member relayed conversations with EPA officials in which there were admissions of knowledge of eighty years of dioxin contamination. Other members believed the American Paper Industry and the federal government were involved in a deliberate plan to "downplay" the hazards of dioxin.

The final break. On March 9, 1988 all parties agreed (with the exception of certain members of the DPRC) to a draft waste water permit. Champion would still have to apply for a Tennessee variance, since the company would be discharging color units at 35% higher

rates than the state of Tennessee laws allowed. Yet the requirements of the permit were as Champion had requested, at least in the eyes of the DPRC members. The "compromise" again split the group, much in the same way the dioxin issue originally had. One side felt this permit to be the fastest way to a clean river, avoiding lengthy court settlements. Others saw the permit as a sell-out. The president of the DPRC, Jim, saw the agreement as a "temporary arrangement" -- the DPRC would not dissolve until the river ran clear. Even Cocke County and Newport city officials were not pleased with the permit, believing the original, more strict version should have been accepted.

This meeting at which the compromise was made known was the final breaking point for several members. The group solidarity regained with the Hartford work dissolved. Norman believed this permit to be the most expedient route to a clean river: because of his unpopular stance on the issue, he left the group, pulling out IWLA contact also. He returned to the IWLA to pursue his own route of action. The lawyer of the DPRC (brought with the IWLA) also pulled out of the DPRC at this point. Norman recalled that this decision was made in light of the "unpredictable" sentiments of the members of the group. He felt the IWLA could no longer "control" the DPRC and chose to step aside.

This also proved to be the breaking point for Scott and Jane, who found that they could no longer contend with what they viewed as a "secret society." Charging lack of organization, structure and communication, as well as purposeful exclusion or "blackballing" from group activities, these two members thought it best to leave the group. The differing philosophies became apparent. As Jane revealed, success for the DPRC meant a clean river through Newport, and she did not feel that way: "Victory will be when all the rivers run clear." In other words, she believed the DPRC should take a more global approach, not just concerning itself with one particular river. Later, the two members who left recalled that "we were always pushing, I guess . . .," but, not being originally from the area, they had nothing to lose by saying whatever they felt appropriate. Other members, due to their deep ties in the Newport area, could not afford such outspokenness, still preferring to work within the established political system.

The DPRC today. The remaining members of the DPRC attended the congressional hearings in Washington, D.C. They also rallied the Newport and Hartford communities together for the August 1988 variance hearing, held in Newport. Though the remaining members of the DPRC and

those who splintered from the group are still working toward a cleanup of the Pigeon River, the split has not been mended. No final decision has yet been announced by the governor concerning the issuance of a variance to Champion. It is believed he will wait until after the November 1988 elections. Another member of the group has resigned due to the frustration and degree of secrecy she perceived still plaguing the group. Ann joined those members that have splintered off of the DPRC, and these people have begun basing most of their work in the Hartford community, continuing their fight on an individual bases. They sense a desire on behalf of the Hartford residents to become more active. Yet, due to the close ties between prior group members, Hartford community leaders, and the remaining members of the DPRC, all involved in the Hartford area are hesitant to act, fearing their actions might be interpreted as a strike against the DPRC.

Discussion

The case of the DPRC social movement organization has been presented. The purpose of this section will be to examine the resource mobilization and social psychological variables proposed as a theoretical framework in the second chapter of this thesis.

Therefore, this discussion will focus on the existing power structure in place prior to the organization of the DPRC, the organizational structure of the DPRC, and the DPRC's goals, strategies and tactics. Social psychological variables are included; this focus will be predominately concerned with the grievances and ideologies of group members.

Existing power structure. The factors that led up to the power structure that was dominant prior to the DPRC have been examined in Chapter IV. In summary, the historical development of dependency of the residents on agricultural/lumber industries and the massive acquisition of residents' land by the government, led to a domination by the powerful in the area of those residents whose economic options were severely limited. With high unemployment rates, the promise of tourism and the desire for industrial development appealed to the economic developers of the county. Yet, the dependency had resulted in hegemony, and feelings of powerlessness were held by the people to the extent of preventing mobilization against such conditions as the pollution of the Pigeon River. Each member of the DPRC native to the county relayed a sentiment they believed to be shared by a majority of county residents for many years: the

pollution was there, had always been there, and there was nothing that could be done to change that.

In addition to this political-economic scenario, the oral histories of some members of the DPRC reveal that due to the economic disparity of Cocke county, the residents were able to sympathize with their North Carolina neighbors when Champion threatened to shut down due to environmental regulations pressure. Up until late 1987, the concern with the pollution had been aesthetic in nature. The river was dark brown and it smelled bad, and the people along its bank had no reason to suspect health threatening dangers, being told otherwise by respected state officials from North Carolina. Tennessee residents, it was stated, could live with color and smell if it helped feed a family. This compromise can also be seen as the result of dependency on economic control that both residents in North Carolina and Tennessee shared. Cocke County residents, however, did not link their poverty to exploitation by Champion. Though individual efforts to challenge the pollution surfaced throughout the eighty years, grassroots mobilization was stifled due to the historical economic dependency. As economic developers, finding high unemployment rate within the county, shifted their focus away from agriculture and lumber, and turned to tourism and industry, they found the

river's condition to be preventing both tourism and industry from developing. Action on behalf of the river however, appeared to stem from politically and economically concerned persons not from mass citizen protest. Costs and rewards, crucial variables from a resource mobilization perspective (Jenkins, 1980) played a most important role in the mobilization that did occur in Cocke County. Decisions based on such rationale also help explain the composition of DPRC membership. In addition, resources and opportunities for action, exemplified by the existing environmental laws, the Tennessee Homecoming 1986 celebration, and individual resources of each member are also explained by resource mobilization perspectives. These variables did in fact contributed much to the mobilization of the DPRC.

Despite the formation of the DPRC, this group cannot be analyzed as a grassroots organization. The group was instigated by elites, not by the masses. Neither were there any overt attempts at recruiting the residents of Cocke County once the group was organized. This point will be examined in more detail in the following sections.

Organizational structure of the DPRC. Though newcomers were sometimes noted to drift into and out of the group, membership basically consisted of eight core

people. These people, with the exception of the original organizer and a husband and wife from Pennsylvania, had preexisting social or friendship ties and became involved with the group by such avenues.

The name, logo, purpose, and resolution of the DPRC were constructed by Norman and IWLA before mobilization actually took place. The group members, upon formation, were handed a pre-planned schema, though some autonomy developed during the lifespan of the group. The structure was designed to be basically informal, with no clear-cut roles, or decision making processes decided upon. Communication within the group was conducted via. phone calls or by the spreading of information between core members. Officers were eventually elected, but only when it appeared that litigation was a possibility.

Though a president was elected, it appears that the group was led by the co-founders and the other native Cocke Countians members. This eventually presented problems for the co-founder and the other members not of Cocke county origin. This internal power struggle aided in the splintering of the group. It appears that there is support for Gamson (1975) in his assessment of the success rate of highly centralized bureaucratic organizational frameworks. In part, many of the group's internal problems stemmed from lack of such an organized framework and lack of well-defined roles for group

members. The DPRC was unable to contain internal conflict.

Goals. The main goal of the DPRC, stated as a clean Pigeon River, was also predetermined by Norman and IWLA, the instigators of the group. The cleaning up of the river, however, mostly dealt with the issuance of a water quality permit to Champion. The main contention focused upon the color limit, followed by concerns with BOD discharges, toxicity of discharges to aquatic life, and discharges of chloroform and ammonia. With the discovery of dioxin and its fear of cancer-related deaths, the goal shifted somewhat to address this issue. In both cases, however, the goals were nondisplacement in nature (Gamson, 1975), and were basically reform-oriented (Ash, 1972). The successes of the DPRC can thus be explained. As Ash (1972) also notes, the decision as to choosing a goal which would be realized by either influencing or replacing elites in power was made intuitively, as the initiators of mobilization were the elite.

Though the preset goal as devised by the IWLA and presented to the DPRC was environmental in nature, there existed another goal for the native Cocke County members, that being economic development. This can be

more thoroughly explained when grievances and ideologies are examined.

Strategies and tactics. As with the goals, the strategies and tactics were originally predetermined by Norman and the IWLA. The co-founders then developed an "annual plan," the purpose for this to focus the public's attention on the river. If this could be achieved, a support base could be formed for events needing large numbers of people in attendance, such as the EPA hearings. Fundraising could also be enhanced.

Media expertise and usage was stressed as the most important tool available to the DPRC. This would make the community, state, and nation aware of the problem. The IWLA possessed the experience and knowledge to use media effectively, and in many instances the co-founder from Jefferson County was contacted by media, rather than members living along the Pigeon River's banks. Later the DPRC took more control of this process.

The core members from Cocke county developed strategies and tactics that were completely institutional in nature, a tactic stressed by the IWLA. The most effective course of action was believed to be working within the political system, relying heavily on more traditional lobbying-style activity (McCarthy and

Zald, 1977) and personal contacts with elected officials.

Grievances and ideologies. Though much can be learned from the resource mobilization approach adhered to above, the social psychological variables add depth to this understanding.

First, the grievances of the members concerning the pollution of the river were pre-supposed by the organizers of the group, or the IWLA. Yet, every member of the DPRC originally from Cocke County except one, stated that although always aware of the problem and concerned about the problem, they, too had been resigned to the fact that nothing could be done since many had tried and failed. The grievance as presented by the IWLA brought attention to the river's condition, identified the pollution as a grievance, and presented a plan to alleviate the grievance. Tied in with this prepackaged grievance concerning river pollution was an almost covert economically-oriented grievance. It was implied that not only aesthetic values were an issue, but also recreational and economic values also. This was deliberate on IWLA's part, in an attempt to gain credibility within the community, though not the most direct focus of the grievance.

While the DPRC espoused a basically color-oriented pollution grievance, the lack of economic development in the county appeared to be just as strong a grievance if not the strongest grievance for those core members from Cocke county: the cleanup of the Pigeon River was the means by which to alleviate this grievance. The three members not originally from the county placed the environmental problem as the priority grievance, while economic development might follow if the group was successful. Therefore, perceptions of grievances is a crucial element in the examination of the DPRC.

As members collectively learned more about the company responsible for the pollution of their river, they developed grievances associated with their feelings of exploitation by Champion of the residents of Cocke county. The paper company was making profits by continuing to pollute the river, and this was framed as being morally wrong by some members of the group, if not all.

As the dioxin issue became apparent, the grievances again shifted somewhat. No longer was the pollution of the river color- and odor-oriented but possibly life threatening as well. The evolution of these grievances by the DPRC began to filter into the larger community, and may explain why it took eighteen months from the

time of the formation of the DPRC for residents to fully support the cleanup efforts.

Many encounters between members of the DPRC and state and federal officials gave rise to grievances directed toward the state and federal governmental agencies. Interesting to note, however, is that belief in the United States political system in general remained strong among members, though faith in politicians wavered and developed into grievances. This resulted in the request for a congressional hearing due to the grievances held by the DPRC toward the EPA.

As with grievances, the basic ideology of the DPRC was defined by the IWLA. Ideology did not evolve from the group itself. The ideology as seen collectively is best exemplified in the resolution written by Norman. This basically reflected and stressed environmental concerns, the author being primarily concerned with the environmental impact of the polluted river. The resolution did not completely reflect individual ideologies. As with grievances, the native Cocke Countians focused intensely on the economic detriments of a polluted river, and had no prior environmental protest background. The two members, not of Cocke county, joined because they had learned of the group through the media and had been exposed to the environmental ideology in this way. Having much prior

experience in environmental protest, they became involved with the DPRC based on the presentation of the collective ideology, and not through social ties. Upon becoming more involved, they experienced dissension between those whose economically-based when their own environmentally-based ideologies clashed. Differing ideologies concerning goals led to confrontations over differing strategies and tactics to achieve those goals.

Ferree and Miller (1985) suggest analyzing the effects of the organization on the individual's more psychological processes, namely the effects of a social movement organization on members' ideologies and socially structured perceptions. The method of analysis, as illustrated previously, aids in understanding the processes a movement organization, such as the DPRC, go through during the course of their existence.

A modified social movement organization. On the basis of these findings, this grassroots group, the DPRC, cannot truly be classified as a grassroots social movement organization. The initial mobilization, the structure, the goals, the strategies, and group ideology were not a result of any mass movement on the part of the Cocke County area. In fact, inclusion of a broad mass base was never sought and sometimes discouraged.

Though the remaining core members report that they have turned the community around from one characterized by apathy and acceptance of exploitation, to a community ready to force the mill to close, these people of Cocke County have not been mobilized. The masses were generally sought out only in instance where numbers of people were needed at some activity. Only recently, as DPRC members relay, has support for the DPRC become strong, however, these are the people not allowed entrance into the structure of the group.

The DPRC can best be characterized as a modified-professional social movement organization. To examine this in more detail, the works of McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) and Straggenborg (1988) are examined.

The first evidence of this group's being a professional social movement organization can be found with the leadership and initiation of the DPRC. McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) argue that professional movements involve career-oriented activists, who are full-time staff members and therefore paid for their services within the formal social movement organization. This was not the case with the leadership of the DPRC. Rather there is evidence to support Straggenborg's (1988) argument of the existence of two types of leadership and organizational structure.

Straggenborg states that both professional and nonprofessional leaders can "initiate movements, organizations, and tactics" (1988: 587); her research findings suggest that nonprofessionals are more likely to initiate a movement than are professionals. She also differentiates between two types of nonprofessional leaders: volunteer leaders, who are not paid, and nonprofessional staff leaders, who are compensated in some way.

The co-founders both had full-time occupations and careers in other areas, one as professor at an area college, another as president of the Chamber of Commerce. Straggenborg proposes that this form of volunteer leadership of a group takes an "entrepreneur" role. Rather than forming the DPRC to establish careers or obtain a paying job, the two founders initiated the group due to "personal experiences and ideological commitments which make them interested in the particular issue(s) of the movement.. . . They are also tied into the social networks and preexisting organizational structures that allow the movement to mobilize and are influenced by environmental developments that make movement issues salient and provide opportunities for action" (Straggenborg, 1988: 593-94). This differs from the professional who is hired to enter the already organized and formally structured SMO, regardless of

personal regard for the ideology behind the issues at hand.

Straggenborg also offers another variation from McCarthy and Zald's professional SMO in the organizational characteristics of the group. She stresses that entrepreneurs prefer informal structures and may actually resist any attempt to create a more formally structured SMO.

She defines an informal social movement organization as one having very few formalized methods for procedure, being a group whose membership requirements and division of labor within the group are minimal. Only immediate needs are addressed, tasks being assigned accordingly. If decisions must be made, the process involved is not structured or formalized, but spontaneous, and easily changed. This allows leaders considerable control and domination over the group; these leaders tend to be nonprofessional and, for the most part, volunteer.

Informal structures provide the personal control that movement entrepreneurs prefer. Being personally involved, these leaders have much at stake by initiating such a movement and therefore need such control in decision making processes, discouraging a more routinized decision making framework over which they have little control.

While this informal structure with co-founder leadership proved successful in the first months of the movement it began to cause problems for group members later. This phenomena is not new and can be found in other organizations founded by entrepreneurs who attempt to remain in control (Chavez and the UFWU; Wicker and the New York Mattachine Society). Power struggles among the organization's leaders, entrepreneurs and newer members rejecting the idea of such power being in the hands of so few is evidenced in the case of the NARAL (see Straggenborg, 1988). A similar situation occurred with the DPRC, between the two factions.

Summary

Through presentation of the data gathered in the case study of the DPRC, the resource mobilization and social psychological variables have been examined. Explanations as to why a grassroots organization failed to effectively mobilize in Cocke County prior to 1986 are apparent. The blend of economic factors and the subsequently determined social psychological factors are presented as support. Examination of the DPRC has revealed that, in effect, the group is not a grassroots organization. The resource mobilization variables dealing with organizational structure of the group, the

goals, strategies and tactics of the group aid in determining that the DPRC can be classified as a modified professional social movement organization. Social psychological variable of grievances and ideologies are similarly pertinent in this analysis; furthermore, analysis by use of these variables helps in understanding factionalism and the effects of this type of professional social mobilization organization on the individual within the group.

The next chapter offers some concluding remarks.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The last chapter of this study will not only present a brief summary of the thesis but will also address the primary research question of this thesis: Did the third synthesis proposed provide a more thorough understanding of social movement groups? On the basis of this study it did. Afterward, some criticisms and weaknesses in the proposed theoretical framework will be addressed. These focus mainly on the lack of power analysis in the framework. As is evident in this study, it is just as important to understand why a group does not mobilize as it is to explain why mobilization occurs. Power analysis provides the necessary understanding of this structural factor.

Suggestions for further research of movement organization in the field of social movements will be made in the concluding remarks of this chapter.

Thesis Summary

This thesis has presented a case study of social movement activity interpreted in the light of the proposed theoretical framework. This framework,

however, is the probable outcome of Synthesis #3, thought to be occurring currently in the field of social movements. This synthesis arises from dialectical processes that have emerged throughout the history of social movement theory. The criticisms toward resource mobilization theories have initiated this synthesis, proposing inclusion of social-psychological variables. Therefore, a framework incorporating social psychological variables, namely grievances and ideologies, and structural resource mobilization variables was proposed. The dialectical process and theoretical framework for this study were presented in Chapter II.

The variable concerning structural conditions prior to the mobilization of the DPRC was the topic of Chapter IV. These conditions that inhibited grassroots mobilization over the polluted Pigeon River prior to 1986 can be found by historical analysis of the region. The results of this analysis reveal long-term economic dependency of the residents of the county. The analysis also shows power relations that developed as a result of this dependency, resulting in dominated consciousness concerning the residents' ability to recognize and act on an environmental problem, such as the Pigeon River issues. Gaventa's three dimensional power analysis is

instrumental in revealing this mobilization inhibiting factor.

Finally, in Chapter V, the DPRC is presented. Through in depth examination of the eight core members, the organizational structure of the group, and the goals, strategies, and tactics of the group, it has been found that grassroots mobilization did not occur. The same factors inhibiting mass mobilization for eighty years did not disappear with the formation of the DPRC. The group, instead, is presented as a modified professional social movement organization, initiated by elites, and including no broad base community membership. The impression of widespread community involvement was stressed by the group and further presented to the outside by the media coverage the group controlled. Yet the actual power and decision making for the county was controlled by a small number of Cocke County natives.

Theoretical Implications

This thorough analysis of the activity surrounding the pollution of the Pigeon River could not have been successfully completed without Synthesis #3. The findings suggest that not only structural factors give rise to, direct, and influence mobilization, but that

grievances and ideologies developing within such a structural framework are equally important, especially in analyzing the processes of the group through its duration. Through examination of such social psychological variables, the inhibition of mobilization was more clearly understood. Upon actual organization of the group, grievances and ideologies explained the mechanics of the DPRC, for these variables dealt with members' reactions to group organizational structure, goals, strategies, and tactics. In the case of the DPRC, the social psychological variables also explained dissension and subsequent factionalism within the group.

The third synthesis, however, cannot stand alone. As is evident in the historical analysis, the establishment of power relations are of utmost importance. The theoretical framework proposing resource mobilization and social psychological variables is strengthened substantially by inclusion of an explicit power analysis. The three-dimensional approach (Gaventa, 1980) yields much needed insight into power relations. Though social movement analysts have previously implemented power models in their work, the inclusion of a power model must be utilized in addition to a resource mobilization and social psychological framework, in order to develop a more useful, explanatory, and operational theoretical framework.

It is important to comment on the DPRC's modified professional social movement organization status. The formation of this group has actually prevented any further grassroots mobilization from taking place in Cocke County. The DPRC, however, has been successful in their efforts, one aspect of this success being the community's raised consciousness concerning the polluted river, as well as recognition of the source of residents' exploitation by the North Carolina paper company. The members perceived growing support via enhanced consciousness. It is possible that grassroots mobilization may be taking place in small communities located along the Pigeon River. This possibility has been strengthened by the growing awareness and the sense of power this awareness has brought to a suppressed region. This mobilization may be further aided by the resources former DPRC members are bringing to the grassroots level. These achievements would have been unlikely if not for the efforts of the DPRC.

Research with other environmental protest groups such as the DPRC are needed to provide even more application for the feasibility of Synthesis #3. This theoretical framework combining resource mobilization, social psychological, and power relation variables must be applied in other case studies in order to assess the degree of understanding this model permits for social

movement analysis. It is believed by this author that such a framework will consolidate and strengthen the field of social movements.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ash, Roberta. 1972. Social Movements in America. Chicago: Markham.
- Ash-Garner, Roberta. 1977. Social Movements in America. Second edition. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Babbie, Earl. 1983. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Barkan, Steven E. 1980. "Political Trials and Resource Mobilization: Toward an Understanding of Social Litigation." Social Forces 58: 944-961.
- Barnes, Samuel H. and Max Kaase. 1979. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. London: Sage.
- Bendix, Reinhard and Bennett Berger. 1959. "Images of Society and Problems of Concept Formation in Sociology." Symposium on Sociological Theory. Row, Peterson and Company.
- Broom, Leonard and Philip Selznick. 1958. Sociology, third edition. New York: Harper and Row.
- Burgess, Robert G. 1982. "Some Role Problems in Field Research." Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual. Robert Burgess, ed. Allen and Unwin.
- Cable, Sherry, Edward J. Walsh, and Rex H. Warland. 1988. "Differential Paths to Political Activism: Comparisons of Four Mobilization Processes After the TMI Accident." Social Forces 66: 951-969.
- Cassara, Beverly B. 1987. "The How and Why of Preparing Graduate Students to Carryout Participatory Research." Educational Considerations 14: 39-42.
- Coleman, James S. 1969. "Race Relations and Social Change." Race and the Social Sciences. Katz and Gurin, eds. New York: Basic Books.
- Commoner, Barry. 1987. "A Reporter at Large: The Environment." The New Yorker, June 15, 1987; pp. 46-71.

- Coser, Lewis A. 1977. The Masters of Sociological Thought. Harcourt Brace Jorantovich, Inc.
- Davies, J. C. 1962. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review 27: 5-14.
- Dykeman, Wilma. 1955. The French Broad. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc.
- Dykeman, Wilma and James Stokely. 1978. Highland Homeland: The People of the Great Smokies. Washington, D.C.: National Park Service History Series, Division of Publications.
- Eller, Ronald D. 1982. Miners, Millhands, and Mountaineers. Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press.
- East Tennessee Development District. 1977. The District and Its Economy.
- Ferree, Myra M. and Frederick D. Miller. 1985. "Mobilization and Meaning: Toward an Intergration of Social Psychological and Resource Perspectives on Social Movements." Sociological Inquiry 55: 38-61.
- Feuer, L. S. 1969. The Conflict of Generations. New York: Basic Books.
- Gamson, William A. 1969. Power and Discontent. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press.
- Gamson, William A. 1975. The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press.
- Gamson, William A., Bruce Freeman, and Steven Rytina. 1982. Encounters With Unjust Authority. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press.
- Gans, Herbert J. 1982. "The Participant Observer as a Human Being: Observations on the Personal Aspects of Fieldwork." Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual. Robert Burgess, ed. Allen and Unwin.
- Gaventa, John. 1980. Power and Powerlessness. University of Illinois Press.
- Gerlach, Luther P. and Virginia H. Hine. 1970. People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.

- Gross, Llewellyn. 1961. "Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework for Sociology." American Journal of Sociology 67: 125-143.
- Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, Budd. "Knowledge as a Commodity and Participatory Research."
- Handler, Joel F. 1978. Social Movements and the Legal System: A Theory of Law Reform and Social Change. New York: Academic Press.
- Heberle, Rudolf. 1968. "Social Movements I: Types and Functions of Social Movements." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. D. L. Sills (ed.). New York: MacMillan.
- Hoffer, Eric. 1951. The True Believer. New York: Harper.
- Jarvie, I. C. 1982. "The Problem of Ethical Integrity in Participatory Observation." Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual. ed. Robert Burgess. Allen and Unwin.
- Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements." Annual Review of Sociology 9: 527-553.
- Klandermans, Bert. 1984. "Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory." American Sociological Review 49: 583-600.
- Kornhauser, William. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.
- Leites, Nathan and Charles Wolf, Jr. 1970. Rebellion and Authority. Markham.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Marsh, Alan. 1977. Protest and Political Consciousness. London/Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Marx, Gary T. 1967. Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community. New York: Harper & Row.

McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1973. The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization. Morristown: General Learning Press.

----- 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212-1241.

Morris, Aldon. 1981. "Black Southern Student Sit-In Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization." American Sociological Review 46: 744-767.

Nisbet, Robert. 1965. Contemporary Social Problems. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

O'Dell, Ruth Webb. 1950. Over the Misty Blue Hills: The Story of Cocke County, Tennessee.

Olson, Mancur, Jr. 1968. The Logic of Collective Action. New York: Schocken Books.

Orum, Anthony M. 1972. Black Students in Protest: A Study of the Orgins of the Black Student Movement. Arnold and Caroline Rose Monograph Series. Washington, D. C.; American Sociological Association.

Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935. The Mind and Society. Vols. I-IV, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. 1971. Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. New York: Pantheon Books.

----- 1977. Poor People's Movements. New York: Pantheon.

----- 1979. Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage Books.

Reason, Peter and John Rowan. 1981. Human Inquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research. Chichester/New York/Brisbane Toronto: John Wiley & Sons. Reason and Rowan (eds).

- Roach, Jack L. and Janet K. Roach. 1978. "Mobilizing the Poor: Road to a Dead End." Social Problems 26: 160-171.
- Roberts, Ron E. and Robert Marsh Kloss. 1974. Social Movements Between the Balcony and the Barricade. Saint Louis: C. V. Mosby.
- Rochford, E. Burke. 1985. Hare Krishna in America. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Simmel, George. 1945. Conflict. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.
- Smelser, Neil J. 1963. The Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press.
- Snow, David A., Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., and Sheldon Ekland-Olson. 1980. "Social Networks and Social Movements: Micro-structural Approach to Differential Recruitment." American Sociological Review 45: 787-801.
- Sorokin, Pitirim. 1937-41. Social and Cultural Dynamics. New York: American Book Company.
- Stinchcombe, Arthur. 1968. Constructing Social Theories. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
- Straggenborg, Suzanne. 1988. "Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization." American Sociological Review 53: 585-605.
- Tennessee Department of Economic and Commercial Development: Cocke County Profile. 1985.
- Tennessee Statistical Abstract. 1988.
- Theodorson, Achilles G. and George A. Theodorson. 1969. A Modern Dictionary of Sociology. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Tilly, Charles. 1969. "Collective Violence in European Perspective." Violence in America. Graham/Gurrs eds. New York: Signet Special.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. "From Mobilization to Revolution." Reading: Addison-Wesley.

- Trotter, Wilfred. 1919. Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. T. F. Unwin, Ltd.
- Turner, Ralph H. and Lewis M. Killian. 1972. Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Useem, Bert. 1980. "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement." American Sociological Review 45: 357-369.
- 1985. "Disorganization and the New Mexico Prison Riot of 1980." American Sociological Review 50: 677-688.
- Walsh, Edward J. 1978. "Mobilization Theory vis-a-vis a Mobilization Process: The Case of the United Farm Workers Movement." Research in Social Movements Conflicts and Change Vol 1: 155-177. JAI Press.
- 1981. "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities Around Three Mile Island." Social Problems 26: 1-21.
- 1985. "Challenging Official Risk Assessments via Protest Mobilization: The TMI Case." Penn State University.
- Walsh, Edward J. and Rex H. Warland. 1983. "Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a Nuclear Accident: Activists and Free Riders in the TMI Area." American Sociological Review 48: 764-780.
- Walsh, Edward and Sherry Cable. 1986. "Litigation and Citizen Protest After the TMI Accident." Working paper.
- Zurcher, Louis A. and David A. Snow. 1981. "Collective Behavior Social Movements." Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives. Rosenberg and Turner (eds). New York: BasicBooks.

APPENDIX

*The following are examples of questions that have been developed from 1) four categories of variables emphasized by resource mobilization theorists, and 2) social psychological variables. The questions were drawn from a chronology and were used in interviewing members of the DPRC.

I. Structural Conditions Prior to Mobilization

1. Describe the politics of Cocke County/Newport. Who has the most power in Cocke County/Newport? In Haywood County/Canton, North Carolina?
2. Have you tried to express your opinion/register a complaint previously concerning the Pigeon River or any other issue? How did you do this? Were you successful?
3. How politically active were you prior to the DPRC? How much trust did you place in local, state, federal government prior to your involvement in the group? To what degree has that trust changed, if any?
4. What/who prevented cleanup of the river prior to the DPRC? What/who restricts this now?
5. Have you belonged to any social organizations (eg. clubs, church, PTO) in the past x years? Have you been active in other environmental issues/organizations prior to the DPRC?
6. How important were environmental issues to you prior to your activity with the DPRC? Today? What were your feelings/attitudes toward the river prior to involvement with the DPRC...satisfied? dissatisfied? unconcerned?
7. What role has the river played in the communities along its banks? How has the pollution affected those communities? How important to you was the cleanup of this river prior to the DPRC? During your involvement with the DPRC? Now?
8. How do you perceive others in your community to feel about the river/importance of this river?
9. How has the degraded condition of the river affected you personally? As a community?

II. Organizational Structure of the DPRC

1. Why did the DPRC organize, when did it organize, who was responsible for organizing the group? Did mobilization of the DPRC occur

inside the community or did it occur from outside? For what reason(s)?

2. How was the leadership of the group selected/organized? What part/role did you play in this selection? What is/was your role within the group itself? How has the group handled or dealt with decision making? with conflicts, from within the group and from outside the group? Is the group cohesive? What tasks were assigned? How?
3. How have you felt about the structure of the DPRC as a group? Is it a successful setup? Have you been "comfortable" or content operating within this group? Have you been contented with the role you have played?

III. Goals

1. What was/were the original goal(s) of the DPRC upon mobilizing? Long-term or short-term? Have they changed during the life of the group? What is/are the goal(s) today?
2. How were the goals decided? Did you agree with these goals? If not, what did you do?
3. Do you believe the goals to be radical or conservative in nature? Could these goals be achieved by working within the established system, by influencing those in political/economic power, or would other steps need to be taken?

IV. Strategies

1. What strategies/tactics have the DPRC employed to achieve set goals? How were these decided upon? Did you agree? Why, or why not?
2. How effective have these strategies/tactics been?
3. How far have you gone, or would you be willing to go, to achieve these goals?
4. What do you believe the future of the DPRC to be?

VITA

Gwendolyn Lachelle Norris-Hall was born in Anderson, South Carolina on September 28, 1963. She moved with her family to Crossville, Tennessee in 1968, and she attended Homestead Elementary in that city. She graduated from Cumberland County High School in 1981. In September of 1982, she entered Tennessee Technological University located in Cookeville, Tennessee, graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in Sociology in August 1986.

In September of 1986, she accepted a teaching assistantship at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville in order to pursue a Master of Arts degree in Sociology. This degree was awarded in December 1988.

The author is a member of the American Sociological Association and the Southern Sociological Association. Ms. Norris-Hall currently plans to continue her education at The University of Tennessee, pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in Sociology.