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THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN CIVIL DISORDERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1780-1811

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Lucas Gordon Boyd

March 1977

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DEDICATED

TO

Sara, Kimberly, and David
whose support, encouragement, and
sacrifice contributed immeasurably
to the completion of this work

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on England and Wales during the time period beginning immediately after the Gordon Riots of June 1780 and ending with the outbreak of Luddism in March 1811. The civil disorders of this span of time are examined with the main concentration being on the means by which the authorities maintained or restored order and, most particularly, on their employment of military units to achieve this end.

A survey of the statutes, of contemporary legal treatises, and of later commentaries and law histories reveals that the government possessed adequate theoretical, legal, and customary bases for dealing with civil disorders. An examination of military history also shows that by the late eighteenth century the use of military units to maintain or restore domestic order was an accepted practice.

Various sources, including Home Office correspondence, contemporary accounts, and later secondary works, were explored to find as many of the disorders of the period as possible as well as to compare different accounts of the same disturbance. Basic data on individual riots, on the various types of disorders, and on the riots as a whole was drawn from these accounts and appears in five appendices. Each disturbance is also evaluated as to its degree of seriousness and the effectiveness of the force used to restore order. The appendices and the accounts of the various disorders constitute the basic material for the writing of the bulk of the study.

Even though the responsibility of maintaining order became more

centralized with the creation of the Home Office in 1782, the evidence indicates that the centuries-old custom of placing the primary liability on the shoulders of local officials was not abrogated. The records also reveal that these local officials were aware of and accepted the responsibility and that a large majority of them acted in a decisive manner in employing military force when faced with a riotous situation.

It was found that the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars had an effect on the causes of disorders, on the manner in which they were dealt with, and on the means the government could employ against them. Perhaps the most important influence was upon the locations of barracks as England began in the 1790's to construct permanent quarters for the military. This basic change in military housing has been seen primarily as an attempt to establish police installations throughout the country or as a means of dealing with the unrest in the rising industrial working classes. However, the evidence in this study supports the conclusion that it was basically a military reform and that the locations of the barracks were influenced, for the most part, by French pressures.

In analyzing the relationship between the disorders and the military force used to quell them, it was found that there was a direct correlation between the seriousness of a riot and the use of military force. Military units were employed more often in rural disorders with the yeomanry being used three times more often here than in urban areas. Regular army units were used more frequently in all localities than all the other military units combined. The militia proved to be the most consistently employed and effective force although its relative

importance decreased during the time period. Military force proved to be an effective means of restoring order, especially when more than one type unit was used. However, the increased reliance on the military to maintain domestic order was only a temporary expedient as England moved inexorably toward the establishment of a national system of police.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
INTRODUCTION		1
I.	THE KING'S PEACE	11
	Offenses Against the King's Peace	11
	Laws and Statutes Regarding the King's Peace	19
II.	MAINTAINING THE KING'S PEACE	29
	The Civilian Instruments	29
	The Military Instruments	45
III.	THE USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	55
IV.	THE USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES	78
V.	THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, AND DISSIDENT ELEMENTS: SOME POINTS OF CONFLICT	111
VI.	THE BARRACK ISSUE	132
VII.	THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEONIC WARS	160
VIII.	THE DISORDERS: AN ANALYSIS	178
IX.	THE FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1780-1811: A SUMMARY	205
EPILOGUE		216
BIBLIOGRAPHY		225
APPENDICES		236
APPENDIX A.	THE DISORDERS: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY	237
APPENDIX B.	CIVIL DISORDERS: JUNE 10, 1780, TO MARCH 1, 1811	279
APPENDIX C.	TYPES OF CIVIL DISORDERS: JUNE 10, 1780, TO MARCH 1, 1811	280

CHAPTER PAGE

APPENDICES (Continued)

APPENDIX D. LOCATIONS IN THE COUNTIES OF ENGLAND AND WALES WHERE DISORDERS OCCURRED BETWEEN JUNE 10, 1780, AND MARCH 1, 1811 282

APPENDIX E. THE NUMBER OF DISTURBANCES IN EACH COUNTY OF ENGLAND AND WALES BETWEEN JUNE 10, 1780, AND MARCH 1, 1811 288

VITA 289

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
1.	The Over-all Seriousness of Economic Disorders During Selected Time Periods	190
2.	The Over-all Seriousness of Non-economic Disorders	194
3.	The Seriousness of All Disorders	195
4.	A Comparison of the Degree of the Over-all Seriousness of Rural and Urban Disorders	196
5.	The Effectiveness of the Different Groups of Forces in Restoring Order	198
6.	A Comparison of the Use of Non-military and Military Forces in the Different Types of Disorders	201
7.	The Frequency of Use of the Military Units in the Different Types of Disorders	201
8.	A Comparison of the Use of Non-military and Military Forces Relative to the Degree of Seriousness of the Disorders	201
9.	The Frequency of Use of the Different Military Units Relative to the Degree of Seriousness of the Disorders	202
A-1.	A Chronological Summary of Disorders, June 10, 1780-March 1, 1811	242

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE
1.	Barracks--July 1, 1805	147
2.	Disturbances--June 1780 through June 1792	148
3.	Disturbances--July 1792 through June 1805	149
4.	Distribution of Barracks by Counties, July 1, 1805	155
5.	Distribution of Barracks by District, July 1, 1805	156
6.	Barracks Proposed to be Kept, April 12, 1802	158
A-1.	Civil Disorders from June 10, 1780, to March 1, 1811	279
A-2.	Types of Civil Disorders from June 10, 1780, to March 1, 1811	281
A-3.	Disturbances by County, June 10, 1780-March 1, 1811	288

INTRODUCTION

It was the opening week of June 1780, and London found itself in the grip of a rampant mob--the infamous Gordon Riots had begun. The tumult that erupted on June 2 appeared at first to be no more serious than any other uproar of the period. However, after dark the depredations increased in severity and by the next day the city was caught up in the most violent riot in its history. Non-Anglican chapels, churches, and homes were sacked and burned and some non-Anglicans were themselves attacked; the Bank of England was stormed but withstood the assault; Newgate and other prisons were broken open and their inmates swelled the ranks of the riotous elements; distilleries in Holborn and other districts were exploded, causing the streets to run so thick with spirits that the water supply of Lincoln's Inn became alcoholic; the streams of alcohol caught fire and a number of inebriated rioters were burned to death as they lay in the gutters or in ruined buildings. On June 7 the military began firing on the crowds and within two days the mob was beaten, but it was June 12 before normal conditions returned to the city.[1]

One hundred houses were damaged or "pulled down."[2] Private

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[1]J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III, 1760-1815 (Oxford, 1960), 236-39; R. W. Harris, A Short History of Eighteenth Century England (New York, 1963), 200; Robert K. Webb, Modern England, From The Eighteenth Century to the Present (New York, 1970), 93-94.

[2]When a house was "pulled down," it was not necessarily razed. Usually the windows and window frames were broken, the doors were torn off, and the furnishings thrown into the street and burned.

citizens were eventually paid damages in excess of £70,000 and damage to public buildings exceeded £30,000. The soldiers killed 285 rioters and wounded another 173. Of the 450 who were arrested, 160 subsequently came to trial. The death sentence was handed down in sixty-two cases but only twenty-five were actually hanged; twelve received sentences ranging from one month to five years; one was privately whipped; eighty-five were found not guilty and among these was Lord George Gordon who contributed the leadership and his name to one of the darkest episodes in London's history.[3]

In 1779 a Protestant Association had been formed to protest the increasing Catholic influence in general and, more specifically, the passage of a Roman Catholic Relief Act the year before. Lord George Gordon, M. P., the third son of a leading Scottish nobleman and a person of questionable mental stability, became the leader of the movement. The gathering of a crowd of 60,000 on June 2 to present a monster petition to Parliament against the Relief Act and the resulting confusion struck the spark that touched off the conflagration. The riot soon lost most of its religious and political purpose as the mobs turned on authorities who threatened the thwart them and, to some extent, on the rich and powerful. There were other causal factors in addition to the religious and political. There was considerable social unrest in London in 1780. Failures in the American War had

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[3]George Rudé, "The Gordon Riots: A Study of the Rioters and their Victims," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., VI (1956), 99-100; George Rudé, The Crowd in History; A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (New York, 1964), 59; George Rudé, "The Study of Popular Disturbances in the 'Pre-industrial' Age," Historical Studies, X (May 1963), 462.

caused widespread disillusionment, as had heavy taxation and a trade recession. The city also lacked a police force adequate to deal with an uproar of such magnitude. All of these ingredients being mixed together in the proper proportion produced the recipe for the June violence.[4]

The fact that a disorder occurred was not startling; it was only the severity of the Gordon Riots which came as a surprise. Critchley states flatly that "for centuries the British were themselves amongst the most turbulent of peoples" and that it has only been since the First World War "that they have settled down to be one of the most tranquil."[5] This view is, of course, open to argument, but there are a number of historians who share this opinion. In discussing eighteenth-century England, R. K. Webb states that "rioting was a characteristic of the age . . . ."[6] Plumb submits that "no nation rioted more easily or more savagely--from 1714 to 1830 angry mobs, burning and looting, were prevalent as disease . . . . Mobs and destruction--they were a part of life . . . ."[7] Rudé notes that "popular rioting was endemic throughout the eighteenth century,"[8] and E. P. Thompson deduces that "the British people were noted throughout Europe for their turbulence . . . .

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[4]Watson, Reign of George III, 235-37; Webb, Modern England, 93-94; Harris, Eighteenth Century England, 200.

[5]Thomas Alan Critchley, The Conquest of Violence: Order and Liberty in Britain (London, 1970), 1-2.

[6]Webb, Modern England, 29.

[7]J. H. Plumb, The First Four Georges (London, 1956), 14-15.

[8]George Rudé, Wilkes and Liberty, A Social Study of 1763-1774 (London, 1962), 13.

The 18th and early 19th century are punctuated by riot" brought on by a great variety of grievances.[9]

In his noteworthy work on the English and their history, Halévy delves into the question of why eighteenth-century England was the home of insurrection, rebellion, riot, and disturbances of all types. He concludes that this can be explained, in part, by the fact that this was the only European country whose reigning dynasty had been established as a result of a rebellion. He sees the English as possessors of the "right to riot" or as the lawyers termed it, "the right of resistance." This was not an abstract or theoretical right but one that was put to practical use--one that was so much an integral part of the national traditions that even the anxiety resulting from the events in France did not cause the English to do away with this creed.[10]

Conclusions by other scholars and examinations of the records of the period bear out the fact that the period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was indeed a tumultuous era. This study focuses on the span of time beginning immediately after the Gordon Riots and ending with the outburst of Luddism in March 1811, a period only three months less than thirty-one years. The geographical area is limited to England and Wales. The disorders themselves must receive some inspection, but the main concentration is on the means by which the authorities maintained or restored order and, most particularly,

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[9]E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York, 1963), 62.

[10]Elie Halévy, England in 1815, trans. by E. I. Watkins and D. A. Barker (London, 1949), 148-49.

on their employment of military units to achieve this end. The absence of a national system of police in the modern sense forced the authorities to turn to whatever tools were available. Soldiers were one of the tools at their disposal.[11]

But what is the justification for scrutinizing the period 1780-1811? Scholars have long recognized the fact that the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England was punctuated with numerous disturbances. However, because of the lack of basic research on the subject, their assessments have often been couched in broad generalizations. It has been within only the last twenty-five years that investigations into the more specific aspects of the disorders and the groups involved in them have been undertaken.

The Gordon Riots attracted early attention and a short work on them by A. J. F. Mills was published in 1883.[12] A detailed day by day account by J. Paul de Castro came out in 1926, and George Rudé presented a study of the rioters and their victims as well as one on the financial and military aspects of the riots in 1956.[13] Christopher Hibbert's King Mob contributes to the understanding of the particular riot, and

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[11] See below, Chapter II, passim.

[12] A. J. F. Mills, History of the Gordon Riots in London in 1780 (London, 1883).

[13] J. Paul de Castro, The Gordon Riots (Oxford, 1926); Rudé, "Gordon Riots," 93-114; George Rudé, "Some Financial and Military Aspects of the Gordon Riots," The Guildhall Miscellany, No. 6 (Feb. 1956), 31-42.

an outstanding fictional account is contained in Dickens's Barnaby Rudge.[14]

Harold Priestley has contributed a general study of civil disorders.[15] Rudé has been the single most prolific investigator of eighteenth century aspects of this subject. However, in his study of popular disturbances in England between 1730 and 1848, he deals with both city and country riots in only a summary fashion after 1780, and his chapter on labor disputes does not deal with this type of disorder after 1780 at all.[16] Rudé has examined popular unrest of the period from several other standpoints and has investigated specifically the "London Mob" and the Wilkite movement of the 1760's and 1770's.[17]

Max Beloff touches on the early portion of the century.[18] R. B. Rose has scrutinized the price riots of the 1700's in two articles while E. P. Thompson has posited a psychological basis for the crowd's behavior.[19]

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[14]Christopher Hibbert, King Mob; The Story of Lord George Gordon and the London Riots of 1780 (Cleveland, 1958); Charles Dickens, Barnaby Rudge (1841).

[15]Harold Priestley, Voice of Protest; A History of Civil Unrest in Great Britain (London, 1968).

[16]Rudé, Crowd in History, see specifically Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

[17]Rudé, "Popular Disturbances," 457-69; George Rudé, Paris and London in the Eighteenth Century; Studies in Popular Protest (New York, 1971), first pub., 1952; George Rudé, "The London 'Mob' of the Eighteenth Century," The Historical Journal, II, 1 (1959), 1-18; Rudé, Wilkes and Liberty.

[18]Max Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, 1660-1714 (London, 1963), first pub., 1938.

[19]R. B. Rose, "Eighteenth-Century Price-Riots, The Jacobin Maximum and the French Revolution," International Review of Social History, IV (1959), 432-45; R. B. Rose, "Eighteenth-Century Price Riots and Public Policy in England," in ibid. , VI (1961), 277-92; E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present, No. 50 (Feb. 1971), 76-136.

There are two unpublished Ph.D. dissertations containing research on disorders before 1780. One by D. G. D. Isaac (1953) is in the University of Edinburgh library and covers the period 1714-1754; the other by Henry Clay Randall (1965) examines a briefer span of time, 1765-1775.[20]

Specific disturbances after the Gordon Riots and before the Luddite ferment have received scant attention. The Priestley Riots of 1791 in Birmingham have been examined in three articles with the one by R. B. Rose being the best account.[21] As we have noted, the period 1780-1811 has been studied as a part of much broader investigations, but no examination has focused specifically on it or on the relationship between the military and efforts to maintain domestic order during this time.

The Luddite disturbances of the period 1811-1818 have long held a fascination for historians and there are numerous accounts of them, some of which were published over a century ago.[22] There was even a five-act play written about this movement which contains Lord Byron's

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[20]D. G. D. Isaac, "A Study of Popular Disturbances in Britain, 1714-1754" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1953); Henry Clay Randall, "Public Disorder in England and Wales, 1765-1775" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1965).

[21]R. B. Rose, "The Priestley Riots of 1791," Past and Present, No. 18 (Nov. 1960), 68-88; B. M. Allen, "Priestley and the Birmingham Riots," Transactions of the Unitarian Historical Society, V; R. A. M. Dixon, "Was Dr. Priestley Responsible for the Dinner Which Started the 1791 Riots?" in ibid.

[22]A. Lodge, Bad Times, A Tale of the Luddites (Huddersfield, 1870); D. F. E. Sykes and G. H. Walker, Ben O'Bills The Luddite; A Yorkshire Tale (Huddersfield, n.d.); Frank Peel, The Risings of the Luddites, Chartists, and Plug-Drawers (Heckmondwicke, 1888); J. Russell, "The Luddites," Transactions of The Thorston Society, X (1906), 53-62.

speech in the House of Lords, delivered on February 27, 1812, upon the second reading of the Frame-Work Bill.[23] Luddism has also attracted twentieth century scholars. Frank O. Darvall and Malcolm I. Thomis have published works on the subject and A. J. Peacock has investigated the East Anglican portion of these riots which occurred in 1816.[24]

Certain disorders, such as the Bristol Riots, Rebecca Riots, and Plug Riots, which occurred after the Luddite discords have also been investigated.[25] In Captain Swing, Hobsbawm and Rudé have studied the movements of social protest between 1790 and 1850.[26]

Thus, it is evident that there has been a considerable amount of recent research in the area of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century riots. It is also evident that the Gordon Riots have been surveyed by several historians and that the Luddite Riots and those which followed them have received even more extensive examination. But the years 1780-1811 have not been the subject of close scrutiny, especially relative to the disorders and the military. Therefore, the exploration of this topic during this particular time period has validity.[27]

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[23]Ernst Toller, The Machine Wreckers, trans. by Ashley Dukes (New York, 1923).

[24]Frank O. Darvall, Popular Disturbances and Public Order in Regency England (London, 1934); Malcolm I. Thomis, The Luddites, Machine Breaking in Regency England (Hamden, Conn., 1970); A. J. Peacock, Bread or Blood (London, 1965).

[25]A "Citizen" [John Eagles], The Bristol Riots (Bristol, 1832); D. Williams, The Rebecca Riots: A Study in Agrarian Discontent (Cardiff, 1953); A. G. Rose, "The Plug Riots of 1842 in Lancashire and Cheshire," Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, LXVII (1957).

[26]Eric J. Hobsbawn and George Rudé, Captain Swing (New York, 1968).

[27]Philip B. Crow of the University of New Mexico registered a

After establishing a working definition of a "civil disorder," various types of disorders are examined in their eighteenth-century contexts in order to determine the specific ones with which the authorities were more concerned. A survey of the laws and statutes dealing with the various disorders shows the theoretical authority possessed by the government to quell these offenses against the King's Peace.

From these theoretical and legal bases, the investigation turns to the civilian and military instruments by which this theory was put into execution. An examination of the civilian instruments of order indicates that they were attuned to an earlier era and social order and thus were no longer viable in the emerging industrial milieu. England's failure to discard or modify significantly the old machinery or to develop a modern police system put her at a distinct disadvantage in coming to terms with the growing stresses of the period. These two failures pushed the military to the forefront as either preservers or restorers of domestic order. A delineation of the various bodies which made up "the military" follows.

The development of the policies and practices of the central government with regard to its employment of the military instruments is next examined. The evolution of the government's role beginning with the early years of the eighteenth century is noted and, especially, its position after the establishment of the Home Department in 1782. The policies and practices of the local authorities are scrutinized

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Ph.D. dissertation in 1970 entitled "The British Military as an Internal Security Force--Post-Peninsular." Although the subject is very similar, the time period is later than that of this study.

in a like manner, and the relationships between these governmental levels receive careful consideration.

Although there was a high degree of cooperation between the central government and local officials, there were certain points of friction when it came to dealing with the dissident elements. These areas of disagreement are probed as well as the ways in which the authorities at both levels came to terms with them. Special attention is given to the actions and reactions of local officials as they found themselves pressed, at times, from above by the departments in Westminster and from below by local tumultuous elements.

One of the paramount issues of the period was the quartering of regular military units. The 1790's saw a radical alteration in the country's military housing policy--a change so radical that it has been called a "revolution." This "revolution" has traditionally been viewed as an answer to rising domestic pressures. An examination of the "barrack question" shows the degree to which this change was actually influenced by domestic and foreign pressures and draws some conclusions as to the relative importance of each. Because of their world-wide importance, the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars are given special attention with regard to their effects upon domestic unrest as well as upon England's methods and means of dealing with this unrest.

The data relating to the disorders and the forces used to deal with them are summarized in the Appendices. The last major chapter of the study analyses these and, wherever possible, draws generalizations with regard to them.

After a summary chapter, the "Epilogue" ties in the period of the study with the years immediately following.

CHAPTER I

THE KING'S PEACE

Just how does one go about determining when the internal peace of a political unit is broken? In other words, what constitutes the "King's Peace"? It has been defined as "the legal name of the normal state of society,"[1] and the definition assumes that the "normal state" of society is a relatively pacific state--one in which the members' lives, limbs, and properties are secure from the dangers of general disorder. Thus, any action or actions which result in an alteration of this "normal state" can be considered an offense against the King's Peace. But this general legal definition is sterile unless the actual offenses which produced an abnormal state of society during the period under investigation are examined in some detail.

1. Offenses Against the King's Peace

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the most persistent affronts to the maintenance of public order were riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies. These closely allied offenses were by no means new actors on the English stage; during the sixteenth century they were developing distinctive characteristics which remained

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[1]Sir James Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (3 vols.; London, 1883), I, 185, quoted in Sir Charles Edward Troup, The Home Office (London, 1925), 41n.

with them into more modern times.[2] Lambard, writing during the last quarter of this century, noted that there was disagreement as to the exact nature of these offenses, but he saw the definitions produced by the decisions of the Star Chamber as the best guide a Justice of the Peace could follow in dealing with them.[3] This assessment proved to be very astute. Since the Star Chamber was a prerogative court and was able to deal with these types of wrongs more effectively than either the legislature or the common law courts, it is Holdsworth's opinion that the definitions of these offenses originated with their treatment by this body.[4]

The attempt by the jurist Sir Robert Brooke in the middle of the sixteenth century to differentiate among these threats to internal order is not only one of the earliest but also the most lucid. He classified an assembly as unlawful when at least three persons gathered for an illegal purpose against the peace, even though nothing was done to carry that purpose into effect. This unlawful assembly became a rout if it proceeded on its way to execute its illegal purpose; and once the actual execution began, the rout then became a riot.[5]

Lambard, writing in the late sixteenth century; Hudson and Coke,

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[2]Sir William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law (16 vols.; London, 1922-66), VIII, 324.

[3]William Lambard, Eirenarcha (1592), 179. First published in 1581.

[4]Holdsworth, History of English Law, V, 198; VIII, 324.

[5]Sir Robert Brooke, La Graunde Abridgement (London, 1573), "Riots," pl. 4. This work was not published until several years after Brooke's death in 1558.

writing in the early seventeenth century; and Hawkins, writing in the early eighteenth century, incorporated Brooke's concepts into their definitions of riot, rout, and unlawful assembly.[6] Although these legal authorities couched their ideas in different terms, there are three distinct principles which appear in all of their expositions of these offenses. First, it took at least three persons to commit them; second, there were definite legal lines of demarcation separating the offenses; third, intent was all important. The illegality of any of the three states was based upon the assemblage's intent to commit an unlawful act.

In the period under consideration, all of these principles were undergoing both formal and informal reinterpretations. Attempts were being made to incorporate aspects of Star Chamber and common law precedents into statute law, but the two did not necessarily coincide. For instance, the Riot Act of 1714[7] was the most important capital statute relating to offenses against public order. By this Act, it was made a capital offense for twelve persons or more to assemble in a riotous manner. But Hawkins, writing a few years after the Riot Act's passage, noted that in a legal sense an act involving three persons constituted a riot.[8] Of course, they could not be charged under the provisions of the Riot Act. Thus, in the eighteenth century, there was not yet a standard definition of what constituted an offense against

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[6]Lambard, Eirenarcha, 179-81; William Hudson, Treatise on the Court of Star-Chamber (1792), 82, cited in Holdsworth, History of English Law, V, 198; Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England; Third Institute (London, 1797) c. 79, first published, 1628-44; William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 6th edition, ed. by Thomas Leach (2 vols.; Dublin, 1788) II, c. 47, s. 8.

[7]1 George I, st. 2, c. 5.

[8]Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, II, c. 47, s. 8.

the King's Peace. The jurists who were interpreting the common law and the legislators who were writing the statutes had not reached a common conclusion.

Also, the boundaries separating these offenses were not as clear in actual practice as they appeared to be in the law treatises. Lambard could state with certainty that "an unlawful assembly is the first degree, or beginning; a Route, the next step, or proceeding; and a Riot the ful effect and consummation, of such a disordered and forbidden action."[9] But to those who were involved with the policing of the disorders of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these distinctions were much less discernible--especially insofar as rout was concerned. There is much discussion in the accounts of the period of riots and riotous assemblies and numerous arrests and trials for riot but it is impossible to find anyone who was arrested and tried for rout. In fact, in English history, prosecutions for it are unknown. Persons who could technically have been charged with rout were, as a general rule, charged with unlawful assembly.[10] Although the term remained in common usage, the offense itself was, in practice, not perceived as a prosecutable felony. This fact was recognized formally in 1840 by the Commission of Criminal Law which pointed out that while there was "an obvious [legal] distinction between these three degrees of criminality," a triangular division among them was "unnecessary and inconvenient." It was proposed that the unlawful assembly be considered

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[9]Lambard, Eirenarcha, 181.

[10]Earl Jowitt, gen. ed., The Dictionary of English Law (2 vols.; London, 1959), II, 1570.

"the groundwork of the offence and the part execution of the joint design or the motion towards it be regarded as aggravations."[11]

The third principle of intent was coming under close scrutiny as well, especially insofar as unlawful assembly was concerned.

> It was coming to be thought that account must be taken, not only of the purpose of the meeting, but of its character; and that, if it was of a character which would inspire the average citizen with reasonable fear, it might be held to be an unlawful assembly.

This view was put forward as early as 1503, came into favor during the seventeenth century, and was clearly stated early in the eighteenth century.[12] But it was the proliferation of meetings held to advocate public objects in the late eighteenth century which not only acted as a catalyst in the development of the law relating to unlawful assemblies but also caused the law regulating the powers of the authorities in dealing with these assemblies to be reconsidered. The provisions of the Riot Act were not immediately applicable to most of these gatherings since they did not convene with the expressed purpose of committing a riot and did not exhibit, as a general rule, a threatening demeanor. Yet it soon became obvious that a riot could easily result from an ostensibly peaceful assemblage.[13]

In the eighteenth century the right of public meeting was not seen as a constitutional right possessed by British subjects. Blackstone's Commentaries (1765-69) has nothing to say regarding this "right."

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[11]"Fifth Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law" (1840), [242], Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1840), XX, 92.

[12]Holdsworth, History of English Law, VIII, 326.

[13]Ibid., 329.

But in the latter part of the century, as these gatherings became more common, the English legal structure had to come to terms with them. "It was in the cases to which these practices gave rise that the right of public meeting began to be envisaged as a constitutional right, and its limits began to be defined."[14]

In addition to riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies, there were other conflicts that could become a menace to public order. They were affrays, insurrections, and malicious injury to property.

An affray was defined as early as 1503 as a "very private disorder."[15] Lambard noted that if a group of people were gathered together without any intention of causing any type of disturbance and they were suddenly to fall out among themselves, this would be an affray. "But if . . . they shall betake themselves to sundry partes, it may become a Riot . . . ."[16] An incident that occurred in June 1793 in London is a good example of how an affray could expand into a riot. A large party of Irish and English gathered at a house upon the occasion of the death of a child. An affray began which the Irish, being in the majority, won. The dispute then spilled over into the neighborhood. Watchmen were beaten and one Captain of Patrol was killed before a party of Foot Guards arrived and restored order.[17]

In outward appearance, the only practical difference between

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[14]Ibid., X, 701-02.

[15]Ibid., VIII, 326.

[16]Lambard, Eirenarcha, 184.

[17]Gentleman's Magazine, LXIII (1793), 573.

an affray and a riot was the extensiveness of influence. Both were regarded as disorders of a private nature; but once the disturbance affected the tranquility of the general public, the less serious offense of affray became the more serious one of riot.

A still more serious crime against order was that of insurrection. In contrast to affray and riot, insurrection was "an enterprise not of a private nature, but of 'a general and public nature,' savouring of high treason and involving, technically, an intention 'to levy war against the sovereign.'"[18] However, the number of offenses chargeable as treasonable or seditious crimes had been on the decrease for quite some time prior to the late eighteenth century. This is not to say that the frequency of specific incidents was necessarily decreasing. There was a persistent tendency to remove certain disorderly acts from the treasonable category and to make them chargeable as offenses of a private nature. Mid-sixteenth century statutes dealing with riots or conspiracies to raise riots which were not aimed at the sovereign offer good examples of this process at work.[19] These and other attenuations of treasonable offenses had the result of making crimes such as insurrection much rarer occurrences on the court dockets.

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[18]H.M.S.O., Manual of Military Law (1884), quoted in Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 72; my italics.

[19]Holdsworth, History of English Law, IV, 497. By 3 and 4 Edward VI, c. 5 (1549) an assembly of twelve or more persons would be guilty of treason if they conspired to make a riot for the purpose of killing or imprisoning a privy councillor or of unlawfully altering the laws established by Parliament. In 1553 this Act was repealed by 1 Mary, Sess. 1, c. 1 but its provisions reappeared later that year in 1 Mary, Sess. 2, c. 12 and in 1558 in 1 Elizabeth, c. 16. But these latter two statutes reduced the offenses from treason to felony.

Malicious injury to property was usually part and parcel of most of the disorders regardless of whether they were of a political, economic, military, religious, or racial nature. In certain instances the destruction of a specific property or of types of property was the sole aim of a riotous mob. Such was the case in May 1792 in Birmingham where, for four days, rioters systematically attacked the "houses of ill fame."[20] But more often the attacks on property were by-products of the primary goals of the rioters. This is apparent in many of the food riots of the 1790's. In order to get food prices lowered, which was their primary goal in many cases, the rioters would attack and damage or destroy shops or stalls of bakers and butchers, grain wagons, or other property associated with a particular commodity. There were several statutes dealing with malicious injury to property which are noted in the following section, but, as a general rule, property damage growing out of a riot was inextricably bound up within the more serious offense. Although those arrested were liable for property damage, the charge lodged against them was riot.

From the legal standpoint there were a number of offenses under which offenders could be charged as violators of the peace of the realm. But in the day-to-day maintenance of a "normal state of society" some of these acquired a greater prominence than did others. Rout, for all practical purposes, was absorbed by unlawful assembly; affray was not considered to be a violation of the general tranquility until its very private nature was lost, and then it was classified as a riot; malicious

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[20]Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 471.

destruction of property, when it occurred as an adjunct to general disturbances, was bound up within the limits of these disturbances; insurrection was an extinct species of disorder during the period under investigation even if the fear of its occurrence was not.

This leaves unlawful assembly and riot as the two most salient threats to England's internal security. As the number of assemblies and meetings grew, the fear that many were of an unlawful or seditious nature increased proportionally. This is attested to in contemporary accounts and in the passage of legislation on the subject. And the abundant riots of the period, many of whose origins were traceable to the assemblies, also evoked similar responses from the general public as well as from those charged with the keeping of the King's Peace. Since these two posed the greatest menace, they received the most attention, and it was against them that the power of the military was most often arrayed.

2. Laws and Statutes Regarding the King's Peace

Even more numerous than the offenses against the King's Peace were the various laws which dealt with these offenses. Both the common and statute law were used concomitantly. Even though at times a greater emphasis might be placed upon either one or the other, the two were not in conflict insofar as the authority to deal with the offenses was concerned, although, as has been noted, there was disagreement on some points of definition of the offenses.[21] Holdsworth states that, as far

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[21]See above, pp. 13-15.

as riot was concerned, adequate power to suppress it was given to the Crown by common law as well as by statute law. The statutes did not abrogate the Crown's common law powers regarding riot and unlawful assembly; they simply made them more explicit.[22]

The Statute of Winchester (1285)[23] was the first important act which aimed at keeping order within the country. It provided that each man had to possess, and present for inspection twice each year, arms for keeping the peace. It was a fusion of Saxon and Norman ideas and pivoted, in a large part, around the part-time constable who was "a local man with a touch of regal authority about him." In this individual was enshrined "the ancient Saxon principle of personal service to the community." Under the common law he exercised the powers of arrest.[24]

Less than half a century later the Statute of Northampton (1328)[25] made it an offense for persons to bring force "in affray of the peace." Neither were they "to go nor ride armed by Night nor Day in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of Justices or other Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere . . . ." The Statute of Winchester was to be observed and Justices were to have the power to punish breakers of the peace.

In that same century there was placed on the statute books a

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[22]Holdsworth, History of English Law, VIII, 324-31; X, 705.

[23]13 Edward I, st. 2.

[24]Thomas Alan Critchley, A History of the Police in England and Wales, 900-1966 (London, 1967), 7.

[25]2 Edward III.

very significant and far-reaching act for the preservation of order within the realm--the Justices of the Peace Act (1361).[26] It provided "that in every County of England shall be assigned for the keeping of the Peace, one Lord, and with him three or four of the most worthy in the County, with some learned in the Law . . . ." After setting out what sort of persons the Justices were to be, the Act spelled out the extent of their authority:

> . . . they shall have Power to restrain the Offenders, Rioters, and all other Barators, and to pursue, arrest, take, and chastise them . . . and to cause them to be imprisoned and duly punished . . . and to take all of them that be not of good Fame . . . And also to hear and determine at the King's Suit all Manner of Felonies and Trespasses done in the same County . . . .

The principles of the Statute of Winchester were not disturbed by this Act, but it changed the manner in which they were applied. Whereas enforcement was localized under the earlier Act, it was now more centralized.[27]

Beginning in the late fourteenth century, statutes dealing with riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies had been enacted with greater frequency.[28] The first one of significance directed sheriffs and other ministers of the King to use the "Strength of the County and Country" in dealing with riots and riotous assemblies.[29] This directive was reiterated a few years later and officials were made liable to a fine

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[26]34 Edward III, c. 1.

[27]Critchley, History of the Police, 7-8.

[28]The first one of record, 2 Richard II, st. 1, c. 6, was passed in 1378 but it was repealed the next year by 2 Richard II, st. 2, c. 2.

[29]17 Richard II, c. 8 (1393).

of £100 if they did not act.[30] Laws pertaining to these types of disorders continued to be enacted[31] but none, before the middle of the next century, contained new provisions. An act of 1549[32] contained most of the provisos that were later re-enacted in the Riot Act of 1714.[33] This statute was repealed in 1553 but was re-enacted before the decade had passed[34] and remained in force until 1603.

Since most cases of riot and unlawful assembly could be prosecuted under these acts, the common law was used sparingly. Then, too, other cases were usually dealt with by the Star Chamber. After the last statute of this type expired with the death of Elizabeth, Parliament sought to withhold as much power as possible from the sovereign and refused to enact any with similar provisions. In fact, between 1603 and 1714 the only statute dealing with riots was an act in 1661 against tumultuous petitioning which declared that more than ten persons coming to present a petition to the sovereign constituted a riot.[35] However, for over half a century the Star Chamber proved to be fully competent to fill the gap. But with the Restoration the situation was altered significantly. The Star Chamber had been abolished and the courts were forced to fall back upon their common law powers. It was during this period, when these powers were found to be inadequate, that a doctrine

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[30] 13 Henry IV, c. 7 (1411).

[31] 2 Henry V, st. 1, c. 8 (1414); 11 Henry VII, c. 7 (1494); 19 Henry VII, c. 13 (1503); 21 Henry VIII, c. 20 (1530).

[32] 3 and 4 Edward VI, c. 5.

[33] See below, p. 23.

[34] By 1 Mary, Sess. 2, c. 12 (1553) and 1 Elizabeth, c. 16 (1558).

[35] 13 Charles II, st. 1, c. 5.

of constructive treason was developed. The instigation of a riot within this sphere insured more severe punishments as well as greater powers of suppression. But the harshness of the penalties, many being out of proportion to the offense, shocked the general public and led to passage of the Riot Act of 1714.[36]

"An Act for preventing Tumults and riotous Assemblies, and for the more speedy and effectual punishing the Rioters" (1 George I, st. 2, c. 5), commonly known as the Riot Act, provided that if twelve or more persons assembled in an unlawful and riotous manner "to the Disturbance of the Publick Peace" and remained so assembled for one hour after an authorized official[37] had commanded them to disperse, they were to be judged felons without benefit of clergy and were to suffer the penalty of death. Upon being notified of such an assembly, the above officials were not only authorized and empowered but required to go to the place and either make or have made a proclamation:

> Our Sovereign Lord the King chargeth and commandeth all Persons, being assembled, immediately to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their Habitations, or to their lawful Business, upon the Pains contained in the Act made in the first Year of King George, for preventing Tumults and riotous Assemblies.
>
> "God save the King."

The Act further provided that persons opposing or hindering the making of the proclamation were to be adjudged felons without benefit of clergy and were to suffer death. Persons assembled when the proclamation was hindered were considered to be under the jurisdiction of the

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[36]Holdsworth, History of English Law, VIII, 327-28.

[37]Those officials were: justice of the peace of the county, sheriff, under-sheriff, mayor, bailiff or other head officer, justice of the peace of any corporate town.

Act and were felons after one hour even though no proclamation was made. If the assembly did not disperse within an hour, the peace officers were authorized to seize the offenders and could call upon citizens to assist them in doing so. Persons carrying out these duties were not to be held responsible for injuries or deaths resulting from their actions.

The "demolishing, or pulling down, or beginning to demolish, or pull down," any church, chapel, or building for religious worship "or any Dwelling-house, Barn, Stable, or other Outhouse" was a felony punishable by death. Damages for such actions were to be made good by the local units of government. The only other act dealing with riots passed before 1815, which was not simply an extension of the Riot Act, dealt with this latter aspect of disturbances.[38]

Later in the century doubts arose as to whether riotous acts against mills were included in the Riot Act. To erase this uncertainty a statute was passed in 1769[39] which not only brought them under the provisos of the Act but also made the burning of mills a capital offense.

Since property damage was usually part and parcel of most riots, the statutes on riots, as a general rule, contained sections dealing with it. In addition, there were numerous acts directed especially at malicious injuries to property. Arson was the most serious offense in this class. It was, with one exception, punished by death without benefit of clergy.[40]

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[38]33 George III, c. 39 (1793).

[39]9 George III, c. 29.

[40]This exception was contained in 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 7

The statute with the widest scope dealing with the destruction of property was passed in 1722, and was entitled "An Act for the more effectual punishing wicked and evil disposed Persons going armed in Disguise, and doing Injuries and Violence to the Persons and Properties of his Majesty's Subjects, and for the more speedy bringing the Offenders to Justice."[41] It was more commonly known as the Waltham Black Act since it "was enacted to stop the depredations being committed near Waltham, in Hampshire, by persons in disguise or with their faces blacked."[42] It remained in force for a century[43] and dealt mainly with the destruction of habitable property by fire. It was a capital offense to "set Fire to any House, Barn or Out-house, or to any Hovel, cock, mow, or Stack of Corn, Straw, Hay or Wood."

Determining with accuracy the number of capital offenses included in this Act is impossible, since it was so sweeping. Radzinowicz estimates that the number falls somewhere between two hundred plus and three hundred and fifty plus. The Waltham Black Act included practically all criminal acts and "constituted in itself a complete and extremely severe

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(1670). Certain acts of burning at night were made felonies (s. 2) but it was further provided that the felon could avoid death by agreeing to be transported (s. 4). Capital punishment had been imposed as early as 1531 by 23 Henry VIII, c. 1, s. 3 "for wilful burning of any Dwelling Houses, or Barns wherein any Grain of Corn shall happen to be" as well as for those "guilty of any Abetment, Procurement, Helping, Maintaining, or Counseling" of such an act.

[41] 9 George I, c. 22.

[42] Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and Its Administration from 1750 (4 vols.; New York, 1948-68), I, 50.

[43] It was first enacted for three years, prolonged several times, and made permanent in 1758 by 31 George II, c. 42. Peel's bill, 4 George III, c. 54 (1823), repealed all but two of its provisions.

criminal code which indiscriminately punished with death a great many different offenses."[44] Radzinowicz further sees this statute

> . . . as a kind of "ideological index" to the large body of laws based on the death penalty which were in force in England at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The main features peculiar to this Act reappear, sometimes in a modified form, in many other capital statutes of the period.[46]

There were other acts either in force or passed during the period under investigation dealing with various aspects of injury to property. Some were of a general nature[46] while others dealt mainly with specific types of property such as cloth goods,[47] mines,[48] and stocking frames.[49]

The offense of unlawful assembly was usually included in the statutes on riots, but in 1795 an act was passed dealing specifically with this wrong.[50] Meetings of persons advocating an alteration of a matter of church or state were declared to be seditious and therefore unlawful assemblies. Much of the wording of this statute is very similar to that of the Riot Act of 1714. In fact the proclamations in the two cases are identical.[51]

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[44]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, I, 76-77.

[45]Ibid., 51.

[46]43 George III, c. 58 (1803); 52 George III, c. 130 (1812).

[47]4 George III, c. 37, s. 16 (1763); 22 George III, c. 40 (1782).

[48]9 George III, c. 29, s. 3 (1769).

[49]28 George III, c. 55 (1788); 52 George III, c. 16 (1812); 54 George III, c. 42 (1813).

[50]36 George III, c. 8. This Act was revived and extended by 41 George III, c. 30 (1801).

[51]See above, p. 23.

It is quite apparent that the English magistrates had numerous statutory tools at their disposal which they could use in dealing with disorders. Of these two occupied positions of particular importance: the Justices of the Peace Act (1361), which granted the "power to bind over potential rioters to keep the peace," and the Riot Act (1714).[52]

By the late eighteenth century the common law, the statutes, and court decisions had all combined to produce the essential principles of the law against public violence. First, all peace officers were required to do all in their power to suppress riots. Second, if necessary, a peace officer could call upon citizens for assistance and anyone failing to render assistance was subject to penalties. Third, in suppressing a riot no more force than necessary could be used. Fourth, if a community failed to prevent disorder, it was liable to a collective fine.[53]

These principles can be seen very clearly in a portion of the debate on the King's address concerning the Gordon Riots of 1780. Speaking to the House of Lords, Lord Mansfield posited that the calling out of troops by the King to quell the rioting had not been, as was commonly supposed, the use of the royal prerogative. Rather, it had been a valid application of the law and the constitution. The military had been called in "not as soldiers, but as citizens . . . in aid of the laws, not to subvert them, or overturn the constitution, but to preserve both."[54]

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[52]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 72-73.

[53]Ibid., 72.

[54]Parliamentary History, XXI, 694-98.

Thus, it can be seen that the government in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries possessed ample theoretical and legal bases for quelling disturbances and maintaining order within the realm. But there can often exist a wide chasm between theory and practice. The best of theory can be virtually useless without viable means of application. It is to these instruments by which public order was maintained that we must now turn.

CHAPTER II

MAINTAINING THE KING'S PEACE

1. The Civilian Instruments

In preserving internal order and security, the State relied mainly upon the constables and the justices of the peace. As had been noted in the preceding chapter, statutes dating back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries[1] imposed upon these officials the duty and responsibility of apprehending felons, dispersing unlawful assemblies, and quelling riots. The Statute of Winchester also sanctioned the establishment of a night watch with the power of arrest which at least provided the possibility of extending the power of the constables. Although watchmen were utilized in various parts of the country, London seems to have been the only area in which a serious effort was made to extend the powers of the constables in this way.[2]

A survey of the statutes dealing with disorders reveals that most of them contain a lengthy list of officials who were given the authority to deal with these disturbances. For example, the Riot Act made it lawful "for every Justice of the Peace, Sheriff, or Under-Sheriff . . . High or Petty-constable, and other Peace-officer . . . Mayor . . . Baliff, and other Head-officer" to arrest those not dispersing

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[1] 13 Edward I, st. 2 (1285); 34 Edward III, c. 1 (1361).

[2] Charles Reith, The Police Idea (London, 1938), 17.

within one hour of the reading of the proclamation.[3] With the force of tradition and the authority of numerous statutes behind them, it would appear that these officials provided adequate means by which the State could maintain order. However, such was not the case.

The fundamental reason for this inadequacy was the fact that the ancient methods were still being applied after the medieval society for which they were devised had altered considerably. The old principles had originally been established to operate in a stable community in which there was little urbanization and limited personal mobility. But the conditions which led up to the Industrial Revolution and the beginnings of the Revolution itself were changing England at an ever increasing rate in the eighteenth century and making the old principles no longer applicable. As the old order of society broke down, so did order within the society.[4] The same forces which caused the increase in population and wealth, the expansion of towns, and a more mobile society also multiplied the opportunities for crime and disorders, and undermined the stability of society. One result of this was the destruction of the principle that individuals had a universal obligation to serve as constable. This was the principle "on which the only available means of maintaining law and order still relied."[5]

As these changes were progressing, there were conspicuous alterations in the character of the personnel who were responsible for maintaining order. These alterations were evident by the sixteenth

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[3] 1 George I, st. 2, c. 5, s. 3.

[4] Critchley, History of the Police, 25.

[5] Ibid., 18.

century, and the effectiveness of the parish constable and justice of the peace declined rapidly, especially in urban areas after the last decade of the seventeenth century when holders of both offices were increasingly looked upon with contempt.[6]

Except for certain fees and expense allowances, the office of constable was an unpaid one. It was also compulsory and fell on everyone except those of certain exempt classes. The office became more and more unpopular as its duties increased. The middle classes regarded it as a waste of time and began to pay deputies to do their work when they were selected for the office. This was a common practice by Tudor times. The buying of the cheapest substitute that could be found caused the office to decline greatly in efficiency, and the deputy who held it was usually "a simple, illiterate, poor man who wanted to supplement his income, but who was incapable of coping with the responsible and complicated duties of a constable."[7] Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, Saunders Welch, who was high constable of the Holborn Division of London for nine years, accounted for the inefficiency of the ordinary constable by the fact that "poverty and gross ignorance are too often united in the person of the constable." This condition came about mainly because "the opulent tradesman screens himself by interest from this most necessary and important duty to his country, and meanly throws it upon the indigent and ignorant."[8] Welch further states that the

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[6]Ibid., 13, 18.

[7]J. M. Hart, The British Police (London, 1951), 24.

[8]Saunders Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable (2nd ed.; 1758), "Introduction," xvii, quoted in Holdsworth, History of English Law, XII, 336n.

peace officers had become "so low and so contemptible" that it was necessary to use the king's guards "to convey a poor journey-man taylor to gaol for quitting his master's service, and leaving his work unfinished."[9]

In contrast to the office of constable, the position of justice was not avoided; in many cases it was actively sought. In rural areas it was still a prestigious position to which members of the leading families aspired. In the growing urban centers, the extensive powers of the office[10] provided numerous opportunities for self-aggrandizement and corruption. In the latter localities, it was often not sought by persons of superior birth and education. The divergencies that occurred within this office show one result of the changing pattern of English society. During Tudor and early Stuart times the office was filled, in the main, by relatively honest individuals, but by the eighteenth century many urban justices came to be stamped with the label of "trading justice" or "justice of mean degree."[11] These adventurers used the fees, fines, and power of the office to promote their own self interest. They often worked hand-in-hand with professional criminals, their official title being the only means of distinguishing between the two. They thus promoted the conditions of lawlessness and disorder that their office was supposed to alleviate.[12] In his evaluation of

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[9]Welch, Observations, "Introduction," vii, quoted in ibid.

[10]See above, p. 21.

[11]Critchley, History of the Police, 18.

[12]Keith, Police Idea, 10-11, 17.

the Metropolitan magistracy, Radzinowicz notes that "the venality, gross dereliction of duty and indolence of the justices were a public secret and a public scandal."[13]

It should be noted that Radzinowicz's condemnation of the justices of the peace is aimed at the urban rather than the rural office holders. Corruption was the exception among rural justices. The corrupt were the "trading justices" in London and some northern districts and the magistrates who controlled some of the "close corporations."[14] The Webbs point out that beginning with the reign of George III there was "a continuous rise in the standards of honor, legal attainments and social status of these Rulers of the County."[15] As we have seen, the crux of the problem was the out-dated system. Even good officials were ineffective when they had to deal with present problems using instruments of the past.

Watchmen, in the areas where they were used, were not positive adjuncts to the system. About the only assistance they gave the constables in London was to help them in dividing up the spoils in the existing system of corruption. By the eighteenth century the watchmen as an aid to law and order were virtually useless. The post carried no dignity and self-respect and was shunned by the able-bodied. As a result it attracted the old and feeble who were useless for the work needed. They were often the objects of jokesters, and

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[13]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, III, 32.

[14]Ibid., IV, 219.

[15]Sidney and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government (11 vols.; Hamden, Conn., 1963), I, 377. First published, London, 1906-29.

the harassing of "Charlies" was popular evening sport of the period. Their lanterns and rattles were used largely as a means of helping them avoid the very people they were supposed to apprehend.[16] The ludicrousness of the situation is pointed out by Lecky in his account of the Gordon Riots. He reported that "near the spot where the fiercest conflagration was raging, a watchman with a lantern in his hand passed by, calling the hour as in a time of profound tranquillity."[17]

As the traditional means of preserving order faltered at both the central and local levels, supplemental means were utilized at a growing rate. One method by which the government sought to curb the growing disorder was by increasing the severity of the Criminal Code. During the reigns of George II and George III, crimes for which the sole legal punishment was the death penalty grew at an alarming rate. By the end of the eighteenth century, capital crimes had reached the staggering total of 223. The reasoning seemed to be that the death penalty was the surest means of providing protection for property. This course of action failed to produce the desired results.[18]

Another response to crises, especially in the counties, was the swearing in of extra constables. These "special" constables were most commonly utilized during elections and civil disturbances.[19] Occasionally this method was successful in preventing or quelling a disturbance. Such was the case in April 1810 in Bristol when a disorder began as a protest against the Recorder of the Commission of Oyer and

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[16]Reith, Police Idea, 17.

[17]William E. H. Lecky, A History of England in the Eighteenth Century (8 vols.; New York, 1878), III, 563.

[18]Reith, Police Idea, 9-10.

[19]Hart, British Police, 30.

Terminer for Bristol.[20] But usually "special" constables were no more effective than their regular counterparts.

Yet another answer was private volunteer bodies of citizens. A significant number of private citizens saw these as the best means of preserving themselves and their property in times of trouble. These units showed a steady growth, and by 1834 there were at least five hundred scattered around the country. These were generally condoned by the government, and, at times, they were quite effective in their home districts, but their spheres of operation were understandably rather limited. Then, too, they presented the government with numerous problems when they asked, as many did, for a quasi-military status with the right to have arms, to drill regularly, and to intervene in disorders without direction from the civil power.[21]

One more attempt at a solution to the growing unrest involved offering rewards for information leading to arrest and conviction of rioters. This practice was not new; it had been tried by the governments of both the Tudors and Stuarts. By the late eighteenth century this method was freely used by the Home Office. As a general rule, when there was an outbreak of violence, rewards were offered for information leading to a conviction of an offender. The offer was good for as long as the disturbance lasted and was of a general nature. That is to say, it did not cover specific acts but included any act of violence committed in the disturbed area. Yet the government still

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[20] Gentleman's Magazine, LXXX (1810), pt. 1, 374.

[21] Reith, Police Idea, 18; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 211-14.

expected local units to bear a significant portion of the financial burden. After offering a reward, the Home Office was very reluctant to defray the cost of prosecution with any further sums, seeing this as the responsibility of local authorities.[22]

By the 1790's the Home Office had formulated a definite principle as to what conditions had to be met before a governmental reward could be advertised. A public disorder, a threat to a State official, or a crime committed in or directed at a public building almost always brought reward offers. But only in rare instances were rewards offered to aid in apprehending killers of watchmen or assailants of constables. The official position was that the municipal or parochial units should be responsible for the protection of their peace-keeping personnel, since they derived the benefit from their services.[23] This position is just one indication that the central government did not see the problem of maintaining order as being national in scope.

Coupled with this reward system was outright payment of informers and spies, many of whom infiltrated the numerous organizations of the period. It is suspected that the result of this large expenditure of funds was the opposite of what was intended. Much of it went to unscrupulous individuals, financed the "planting" of crimes on innocent people, and provided capital for a new criminal "industry."[24]

The eighteenth century witnessed the almost total collapse in effectiveness of the traditional means by which the English maintained domestic order. Although they were not police in the modern sense,

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[22] Ibid., 88-89. [23] Ibid., 93-95, 98.

[24] Reith, Police Idea, 18-19.

that is the role that justices, constables, and watchmen played in pre-industrial England. And as pre-industrial England moved toward gradual extinction, so did its civil structure for maintaining internal order. Yet the sentimental attachment for the old "Saxon" principle of keeping the peace with personal unpaid service did not wither at a comparable rate. Lip-service continued to be paid to the old methods and even as late as 1842 there was a statutory effort to breathe new life into the decrepit constabulary system.[25]

It was very obvious, especially to foreign visitors, that England lacked even the rudiments of an effective police force. In his survey of the writings of foreign observers in England from 1694 to 1814, Radzinowicz reports that the "totally inadequate system of crime prevention" was one of the major disadvantages noted in English criminal justice. "The existing police force was considered utterly inadequate to the task and unable to ensure public security."[26] The Frenchman who said, "as far as I can see the glory of having no police appears to be easier to acquire than the glory of finding a good one,"[27] probably expressed the feelings of many foreigners toward English efforts at keeping peace.

From about 1750 on, England had an accelerating need for a modern police system--one with a highly organized and disciplined body of policemen, who were paid to quell disorders and to prevent or detect

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[25]By 5 and 6 Victoria, c. 109; Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 71; F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge, 1913), 486.

[26]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, I, 724.

[27]M. Ribichon, De l'Angleteere (London, 1811), 350, quoted in ibid., III, pp. vii, 374.

other crimes. However, it was after 1825 before this need became a reality. The idea, the institution, and even the word "police" found a difficult acceptance in England. The story is told about a Frenchman in London about 1720 who tried to find a policeman and could find no one who even understood the term. It was the middle of the century before the word came into common usage.[28]

As a rule, the people of England did not want anything resembling a national police system. To them the word "police" both denoted and connoted the institution that held France in its grip and was diametrically opposed to liberty. A police force, once admitted into the country, would act as the thin edge of the wedge that would eventually split Englishmen away from their long-cherished liberties.[29] "Having come to terms after agonising struggles with a standing army, the country had no disposition to tinker with experiments to introduce a standing police force."[30]

However, the entire country was not blind to the need for some degree of reform in the old system of maintaining order. By the middle of the eighteenth century there was a growing awareness "that the traditional arrangments for keeping the peace had become inadequate . . . ." But it was 1829 before there was any radical break in the established system and even then the break only occurred in London. It took another twenty-five years before the reforms were extended throughout England.[31]

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[28]Ibid., 1-2.

[29]Ibid., 1; Critchley, History of the Police, 35.

[30]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 71.

[31]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, III, p. vii.

An important contributing factor to this slowness was the unevenness with which the economic and social changes were being felt throughout the country. When one section was in need of and pressing for certain reforms, other areas were unaffected and, as a result, indifferent. Using this as a basis for consideration, the country may be divided into three major areas: London and its vicinity, the boroughs, and the counties.

Because of the problems that accompanied its increase in population and land area, London was the first area of the country to feel a pressing need for reform in its police system. Much of the early impetus in this direction was provided by the Fielding brothers. Henry Fielding became Chief Magistrate of Bow Street in 1748 and, after his death in 1754, was succeeded by his blind half-brother, John, who retired in 1779. Although these two accomplished little in the way of concrete reforms, Radzinowicz sees them "as educators of public opinion" who endeavored to point out just how serious the dangers were and how necessary it was to evolve a comprehensive plan rather than rely upon fragmentary remedies.[32] In 1770, after John Wilkes and his followers had caused an extremely serious breakdown in law and order, the first in a long series of Parliamentary committees met to consider the policing of London. John Fielding was the principal witness. The only tangible thing this committee produced was an ineffective act designed to regulate the nightly watch in Westminster.[33]

Even the Gordon Riots did not shake London out of this apathy

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[32] Ibid., 14.

[33] 14 George III, c. 90; Critchley, History of the Police, 34.

towards any major police reform. This was evidenced by the fate of "The London and Westminster Police Bill" which was introduced in Parliament in June 1785. The Bill proposed to establish nine "public offices," or police-courts, "staffed by paid magistrates, and a paid body of police commissioners, who were to employ a paid body of police." It was withdrawn for a technical reason and before it could be re-introduced, such a violent opposition developed against it that it was abandoned.[34]

However, within a few years the proponents of reform managed to secure passage of the Middlesex Justices Act (1792),[35] which authorized the establishment of seven "public offices" in parts of Middlesex and Surrey lying near the Metropolis. The Act established a somewhat improved Magistracy, but it had little effect on the prevention and detection of crimes. Its promoters and the general public expected great things of it, but they were disappointed.[36]

This is not to say that there were not some improvements in the London police system. Its standards in 1800 were much higher than those of 1750, and a good deal of progress was made between 1800 and 1828. But these were only superficial improvements; the fundamental

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[34] Parliamentary History, XXV, 888-913; Holdsworth, History of English Law, XIII, 235.

[35] 32 George III, c. 53. This Act was extended by 36 George III, c. 75 (1796) and both of these Acts were later repealed by 42 George III, c. 76 (1802), which re-enacted most of their provisions with minor changes. There is a full discussion of the Act of 1792 in Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, III, 123-37.

[36] Ibid., 134-35. A good discussion of the reasons for its limited success is found in Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard (New York, n.d.), 46.

weaknesses in the peace-keeping structure of the London area as a whole had not been dealt with by the beginning of the nineteenth century.[37] However, constant and extensive thefts on the waterfront led to the establishment of a force, the River Police, to reduce these losses.[38] In June 1798 the Marine Police Establishment, financed, for the most part, by West India merchants for the purpose of self-protection, came into being.[39] The whole force acted according to written instructions, which "appear to have been the first ever issued to a civil force intended to act as a preventive police."[40] Its immediate success was instrumental in its being transformed two years later into "the first preventive police unit in the country."[41] This was done in July 1800 by the Thames River Police Act (39 and 40 George III, c. 87).[42] In 1829 the act which had continued the Thames Office expired and Peel's Metropolitan Police was established, but the Thames Office was not affected. The River Police had such a good reputation that it was continued for ten years before eventually being absorbed into the Metropolitan Police.[43]

The need for comprehensive, fundamental reform was evident in London earlier than in any other section of the island. Its failure

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[37]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 178-79.

[38]Ibid. Chapter 12 deals with the establishment of the River Police as a privately financed force; chapter 13 discusses its conversion to a public force.

[39]Ibid., 363. [40]Ibid., 365.

[41]Ibid., 378. [42]Ibid., 389.

[43]Ibid., 403-04.

of implementation here meant that it had a much less chance of success in other areas. Both the reformers and the government must accept some of the blame for this because they concerned themselves almost exclusively with London and its vicinity. For the most part, they were largely indifferent to the problem of the emerging industrial areas and to local affairs outside the capital.[44]

In the boroughs were to be found many of the same defects as in London: too many law enforcement bodies; overlapping districts and authorities; and unprofessional, poorly paid, part-time peace officers.[45] By the middle of the eighteenth century, the towns had begun to make some efforts at self-help through the sponsorship of local legislation in Parliament. A survey of the statutes shows an increasing number of local acts during the last half of the century. They were usually designated as a "Street Act," "Paving Act," or "Police Act" and gave the towns power to collect a local rate for the purpose of lighting, paving, cleaning, and policing the streets. Some two hundred towns in addition to one hundred parishes and municipalities in the Metropolis were affected by these. Critchely sees this legislation as

> . . . the first major change of principle in the police system outside London since the Statute of Winchester [1285] was enacted, in that reliance on the principle of obligatory personal service was largely abandoned in favour of the employment of paid police. The two principles, in fact, continued to operate side by side.[46]

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[44]Critchley, History of the Police, 23.

[45]Hart, British Police, 29.

[46]Critchley, History of the Police, 25-26.

As the towns began to make some changes in their systems of maintaining order, those of rural England remained virtually unchanged. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, crime presented no serious problem to the rural areas. But after that time, as new roads and canals gave the more mobile population readier access to these areas, they were faced with problems of order similar to those with which their urban counterparts were trying to deal.[47] The police organization in the counties was much simpler than that of the towns. The parish was its basis, and the only police were the parish constables. Each parish was required to have at least one of these officials. There is evidence that this system operated with a degree of efficiency in some parishes during the eighteenth century, but by 1800 it was definitely outdated.[48]

As we have noted, there were individuals in London from 1750 on who saw the need and pushed for reform and change in the peace-keeping machinery. The easiest common denominator to find among all their efforts is a lack of coordination. This is exemplified by some of the responses elicited by the Gordon Riots. Speaking in the House of Lords while the riots were in progress, the Earl of Shelburne, who was to become Secretary of State for the Home Department two years later, praised the French police system and urged that a similar system be adopted in England.[49] He was, in effect, looking fifty

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[47] Ibid., 27-28.

[48] Hart, British Police, 29-30.

[49] Parliamentary History, XXI, 680.

years into the future. At the same time William Jones's answer was to look backward to the posse comitatus, the body of men that a peace officer was empowered to call to assist him in preserving the peace. He thought that the power to assemble this body could be evoked without assistance from either the military or the Riot Act.[50] Jones's treatise on this subject "was constantly used by all radicals as an argument both against the use of the army for the maintenance of order and against the establishment of a professional police force."[51] There were, of course, many other solutions presented, but most of them fell somewhere between these two.

What we see happening in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is England's failure to translate a basic reverence for law and order into practice. Englishmen not only possessed ample laws, statutes, and legal precedents, but they also, as a whole, possessed a deep-rooted faith in "The Law." Yet what they possessed was not as important as the thing they had lost--the means. The crux of the problem of keeping order was how to put "The Law" into effect. With the theory of a modern police force as yet undeveloped, the old instrumentalities had to suffice. The inability of those in authority to deal with disorder in an effective manner can be traced, in the main, to the lack of civil power--of force behind the law.[52] With this enervation of the civil power, the government turned for a solution

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[50]Sir William Jones, An Inquiry into the Legal Mode of Suppressing Riots, with a Constitutional Plan for Future Defence, in The Works of Sir William Jones (6 vols.; London, 1799), VI, 685-712.

[51]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, III, 94.

[52]Reith, Police Idea, 8, 53.

to the military, the only institution that seemed to be forceful enough to keep "The Law" from being inundated by disorder.

2. The Military Instruments

The predilection for calling on military units to put down internal disorders was not a new solution in the late eighteenth century. The sporadic agricultural riots of that century had, at times, evoked the use of considerable force. The force to which the justices increasingly turned was the military: the county militia or the regular army.[53] This usage on a more or less regular basis helped to sanction the practice, and by the end of the century it was firmly established as a routine solution.[54] However, one factor that distinguished this period and the opening years of the nineteenth century from the earlier years of the eighteenth century was the multiplicity of military forces at the government's disposal. Their existence was mainly the result of England's conflict with revolutionary France; at times, they had an important bearing upon efforts to preserve internal order.

Occupying the position of prime importance were the regular armed forces. They were forced into pre-eminence because of the decline of the militia. The militia "had provided the key to the maintenance of order in pre-industrial Britain . . . but . . . from 1740 onwards, their role was very largely taken over by the regular

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[53]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 66.

[54]George Howard, Guardians of the Queen's Peace; The Development and Work of Britain's Police (London, 1953), 64; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, p. v.

army . . . . Early industrial Britain was policed by soldiers . . . ."[55] Fortescue sees them as "the only police of the slightest efficiency either at home or beyond the sea."[56] However, their efficiency in putting down disorders was closely related to the location of the disturbances. There were a number of permanent garrisons scattered throughout England, and troubles could be quelled without too great a time lapse if they occurred in or near the garrison towns. But several days might pass before the troops could get to other areas. In such instances, it was difficult, if not impossible, for those charged with maintaining order to use the most important weapon in their peace-keeping arsenal in a preventive manner.[57] The need to rectify this situation is one reason that is commonly given for Pitt's initiating a program of constructing a number of barracks in new locations throughout the country in 1792.[58]

Although these regular forces were the government's most powerful weapon, they proved to be, in the long run, a double-edged sword. Both officers and men came increasingly to regard their use in riots with disgust. The number of people in the civil community who possessed a similar attitude was also growing larger. There are numerous examples of regular troops refusing to act or acting only half-heartedly when

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[55]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 67-68.

[56]J. W. Fortescue, County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-1814 (London, 1909), 1.

[57]Howard, Guardians of the Queen's Peace, 64-65.

[58]J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (13 vols.; London, [1910]-1930), IV, pt. 2, 903-04. Also see below, Chapter 6.

facing unarmed rioters. The records also show that the appearance of troops could provoke a much more violent disturbance than was already in progress. Thus, the government's confidence in its strongest weapon "was shaken, and the danger of using regular troops became little less than the danger which called for their employment."[59]

Although its relative importance was declining in the late eighteenth century, the militia at times played an important role in maintaining internal order. The people of England had always viewed the militia and the regular forces in a somewhat different light. Halévy says that the militia was "neither a professional nor a standing army, nor was it separate from the rest of the nation."[60]

Although this body had come into being in the sixteenth century, its basic organization was set out in the early Restoration period by two statutes.[61] In 1662 the King was vested with supreme control of the militia; however, his appointees, the lord lieutenants of the counties, had actual command and control of the units. The expense of providing weapons, horses, and equipment fell on the propertied classes of the respective counties. The men were not to be "marched out" of the kingdom and a man was allowed to avoid service by providing a suitable substitute. The original policy was for the militia to be composed of volunteers, but the Militia Act of 1757 established recruitment by local ballot and established a quota for each county.[62]

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[59]Reith, Police Idea, 19-20.

[60]Halévy, England in 1815, 68.

[61]13 Charles II, c. 6 (1661); 13 and 14 Charles II, c. 3 (1662).

[62]30 George II, c. 25 (1757).

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there were three different bodies of militia in existence. In addition to the regular militia, an act of 1796[63] created a supplementary militia of approximately sixty thousand men. Fifteen months later a second act[64] enabled the King to call out a portion of the supplementary militia and to augment the regular militia with them.

In addition 1808 saw the establishment of a local militia[65] with a more restricted operating range. Although these units could be embodied and marched to any part of Great Britain in case of invasion, they could march no further than the adjoining county for training or to suppress riots and tumults. Later acts allowed men to serve outside their home counties on a voluntary basis but not for any extended period of time.[66] Thus, the domestic military units responsible for internal security and order became much more locally oriented than they had been in the previous century. At the same time the regular militia became, for all practical purposes, a recruiting depot for the regiments abroad.[67]

By the close of the eighteenth century, most of the enlisted personnel of the militia were drawn from the lower ranks of society. The practice of allowing substitutes contributed significantly to its vulgarization. This produced a close social affinity between the

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[63]37 George III, c. 3 (1796).

[64]38 George III, c. 18 (1798).

[65]By 48 George III, c. 111 (1808).

[66]54 George III, c. 19 (1813) allowed 42 days per year; 55 George III, c. 76 (1815) reduced this to 28.

[67]Fortescue, History of the British Army, VI, 181-82.

militia and those they were required to control. Thus, their reliability in suppressing disorders was suspect at times.[68] But even this lack of trust coupled with the instances when serious riots were actually caused by the militia[69] did not prevent its use by those in authority throughout the Napoleonic Wars. Of course, its effectiveness and frequency of usage varied, and by 1815 it was rapidly being superseded by the yeomanry.[70]

The yeomanry was the most important unit to emerge from another of the government's order-maintaining bodies, the volunteers. This organization had a tenuous beginning in the perilous times of 1782 when Shelburne proposed forming a levée en masse. That same year an act was passed dealing with "Corps or Companies of Men as shall voluntarily enroll themselves for Defense of the Kingdom, during the present War."[71] But since the "present war" was of short duration, Shelburne's plan was not implemented.[72] However, after the opening of the struggle with revolutionary France a decade later, a new Volunteer Act was passed.[73] The force created was not only for use in case of invasion but also designated for use by the civil power in the suppression of riots and tumults. Volunteers were not liable for service in the militia

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[68]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 110-11.

[69]For examples of these see John R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, 1660-1802 (London, 1965), 290-302, and Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 231-33, 246-49.

[70]Fortescue, History of the British Army, XI, 43.

[71]22 George III, c. 79 (1782).

[72]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 1, 218.

[73]34 George III, c. 31 (1794).

and this accounted, in large part, for the phenomenal proliferation of new units.[74]

The force contained companies of infantry, artillery, and cavalry as well as mixed artillery-infantry companies in some costal towns.[75] Of all of these the cavalry units had the most profound influence upon England's search for internal tranquility. The creation of the local militia in 1808 led to the demise of the volunteer infantry and artillery, but the mounted units maintained their existence. They were known by various names: volunteer cavalry, yeomanry cavalry, or just simply as yeomanry. As the last two titles imply, they "were made up of small farmers with local gentry as officers . . . . Their natural interests lay with the propertied classes and in the maintenance of law and order."[76] In one sense they were a new creation but in another they harkened back to feudalism, especially in rural areas, as great landowners formed military units of their tenants and small farmers. This composition insured that both loyalty and discipline were inherent.[77] However, "the tone of the entire force was parochial, or at best provincial, never national" and the central government had a difficult time imposing any type of centralized discipline or control.[78] "In effect the government had legalized the formation of

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[74]For a discussion of this rapid increase see Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 1, 218, and pt. 2, 892-93.

[75]Ibid., pt. 2, 893.

[76]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 112.

[77]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 99.

[78]Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 141; Fortescue, History of the British Army, V, 219, 228.

armed associations of the wealthier classes to put down by force the unrest of the poor."[79] They played a significant role during the food riots of the 1790's and again in 1811 when the Luddite movement erupted.

> They provided the authorities with their one efficient and trustworthy police force. During the industrial disturbances they were the principal auxilaries to the regular army. It was their function to repress the less serious outbreaks, and to keep order in other cases until regular troops could be summoned.[80]

These three forces--the regular army, the militia, and the yeomanry--were the government's principal military instruments for domestic peacekeeping. But the trying times of the 1790's caused a brief flirtation with two other units that deserve at least a passing mention. These were the fencibles and the provisional cavalry.

The fencibles were regular troops who were enlisted only for home service and only for the duration of the war. Their main function was "to liberate the Regular Army from the United Kingdom for service abroad."[81] The fencible system was applied on only a small scale during the Seven Years' War and Revolutionary War but it was expanded greatly early in 1793, especially in Scotland, which as yet had no militia.[82] Within a short time an act[83] extended the regulations applying to the fencibles of Scotland to corps that might be raised in other parts of Great Britain. The mid-1790's witnessed a rapid growth

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[79]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 100.

[80]J. L. and Barbara Hammond, The Town Labourer, 1760-1832 (London, 1918), 88.

[81]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, 889.

[82]Ibid., pt. 1, 83.

[83]33 George III, c. 36 (1793).

in both fencible cavalry and infantry units. This increase coupled with a similar growth in both local militia and yeomanry units made it much more difficult to secure recruits for the regular forces, and the shortage became acute by 1795, especially in the navy. With the Peace of Amiens in 1802 the fencibles passed out of existence.[84]

Conceived in 1796, the provisional cavalry was probably the least successful of all the military forces created during this period. In theory it "was supposed to include all mounted men not already gathered into the fencible and yeomanry cavalry."[85] Owners of horses were to provide one trooper and one horse for every ten horses they owned.[86] Units from several counties were embodied between 1797 and 1800 but, on the whole, the number of troops formed was small. The act creating it was amended to provide that if three-fourths of the required number were raised, the Lord Lieutenant could dispense with the provisional cavalry and raise yeomanry.[87] In all probability the recruits which had been projected for the provisional cavalry were siphoned off by yeomanry units.

Although there were several other statutes dealing with the provisional cavalry,[88] the force as a whole remained rather obscure.

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[84]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 1, 217, 407; V, 169.

[85]Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 5.

[86]37 George III, c. 6, ss. 1, 2 (1796).

[87]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, 891-92.

[88]37 George III, c. 23 (1796); 37 George III, c. 139 (1797); 38 George III, cc. 51, 94 (1798).

Fortescue states that he could find nothing about it beyond two caustic sentences in one of Windham's speeches.[89] The provisional cavalry was characterized as having "passed over the country like a blight"[90] before it passed out of existence in the opening years of the nineteenth century.

England was in the throes of change. The forces producing it were sweeping inexorably over the country and placing their indelible marks both upon the land and its inhabitants. In many instances the old agencies, practices, and ideas no longer obtained. The idea that the ancient principle which made all members of a community responsible for civil order within the community could be applied by certain local officials was becoming increasingly more fallacious. For centuries the application of this principle had been England's first line of defense against civil disorders, but now it was rapidly disintegrating. As a result, England was forced to turn to the only other means at her disposal that had any possibility of maintaining internal peace--the military. It was unfortunate that there was no intermediate force such as a reserve of police to stand between the inefficient constables and the soldiers. This was pointed out very early during the Luddite riots by the generals who commanded the troops in the disturbed areas. Their reports repeatedly informed Westminster that order could have been much more easily attained with a police force than with their troops. Unfortunately Westminster was not impressed with their assessments.[91]

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[89]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, 891.

[90]Quoted in ibid. [91]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 106.

By the late eighteenth century the government found itself in an untenable position with regard to the maintenance of internal order. Beset by mounting pressures from abroad, it was of prime importance that the domestic front be kept calm. As a general rule, when the military had to be summoned, circumstances forced them to be restorers of order rather than maintainers of it. Thus, that which was so important to keep had already been lost. The outcome of this and other weaknesses in the system was often the inadvertent clash of two bellicose forces: the "violence of rioters" opposed by the "violence of soldiers."[92]

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[92]Ibid., 71.

CHAPTER III

THE USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

As has been noted, the eighteenth century was a critical period with regard to the position the government assumed towards disorders and the practices it would employ in the restoration of tranquility within the realm. The decisions made and policies established during this century led to the formulation of principles some of which have lasted into the twentieth century.[1]

The people of England had long viewed as incompatible their constitutional freedoms and the institution of a standing army. Even so, by the opening of the eighteenth century local authorities, pressed to find some dependable force to assist them in maintaining order, were beginning to adopt on a regular basis the tactic of calling upon military forces for assistance. Regular army units stationed in the vicinity were used occasionally but it was more usual to summon local militia units.[2]

It was not until the first quarter of the century was drawing to a close that local authorities sought aid from the government in London. Historians disagree as to whether it was in 1717[3] or in

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[1]See below, Chapter IV, pp. 78-79.

[2]Beloff, Public Order, 83-86, 144-51.

[3]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 74.

1722[4] that the Mayor and Justices of Taunton in Somersetshire turned to London for military assistance to help them suppress a local disorder. After consultation the Privy Council directed the Secretary at War to comply with the request. The use of troops from outside the locality was exceptional, but a precedent had been set, and similar requests began to flow to London at an increasing rate as the century wore on. As a result, procedures to deal with these requests had to be developed concomitantly.

It had already been established that a local magistrate could use any means at his disposal to quell disturbances. If there were soldiers within his jurisdiction, he could use them as he saw fit and they were bound to obey him as were any other citizens. However, if they did not happen to be in his jurisdiction and had to be moved there from another place, or if they were within his jurisdiction and had to be called out not as individuals but as armed military units, they then came under control of the Crown and could only be moved as a military force with the Crown's permission. Thus, it developed that each request was considered and acted upon on an individual basis. If the request was deemed proper, the Secretary at War issued an order directing certain units to proceed to the magistrate's assistance.[5]

That the central government intended to keep the country's military units under close scrutiny and tight control is apparent until

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[4]Howard, Guardians of the Queen's Peace, 107; Troup, Home Office, 46-47.

[5]Ibid.; Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 74.

well past the midpoint of the century. A good reflection of this attitude is the Militia Act of 1757.[6] It did not make provision for paying the militia during its training and exercise. The omission was intentional and made it necessary for an annual act for pay and clothing to be introduced, giving the House of Commons a means of controlling the militia similar to that which it exercised over the regular army.[7]

Yet the government was never able to exercise as much control over the militia as it did over regular army units. In the sixteenth century the control of the militia had been placed in the hands of the lord lieutenants. These officials, the deputy lieutenants, and other principal landowners of the counties formed its officer corps.[8] Thus, the militia's membership and leadership had a definite local cast.

Added to this was the fact that the central authorities were very reluctant to take any initiative in appointing militia officers. This could have been done by direct appointments or through the lord lieutenants who were the government's nominees. Similarly, they were just as reluctant to initiate the displacing of officers about whom objections were raised although the power to do so was in their hands during most of the eighteenth century except for the period 1786-1795 when it was allowed to lapse. A good example of this reluctance occurred in 1778 when a controversy arose over the removal of the field officers of the North Devon Regiment of Militia. "The government, in

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[6]30 George II, c. 25.

[7]Maitland, Constitutional History, 457.

[8]Holdsworth, History of English Law, X, 377-78.

the person of [Sir Charles] Gould [the Judge-Advocate General], took the line that in such matters the judgment of the lord lieutenant had to be relied on . . . ."[9]

However, the central authorities endeavored to maintain some controls on the militia and to promote its effectiveness by the strategic stationing of embodied units.[10] When a militia unit was embodied, it came under the control of the Crown and was usually stationed outside its home county. This was common practice by the last quarter of the eighteenth century. It was done to insure that the men would not be called upon to fight their friends and relations, which would lessen the possibility of their taking the wrong side in a civil disturbance.[11]

As a general rule, the central government was reluctant to encroach upon the areas which were considered the domain of the lord lieutenants. The futility of such action was demonstrated in January 1798 when Parliament passed an act which provided for the enlistment of recruits from the militia into regiments of the regular army. The lord lieutenants did not support the measure and its execution was a failure.[12]

In May of the following year, the Cabinet discussed changes in terms of service of the militia and army, reducing the size of the

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[9]Western, English Militia, 333-34.

[10]When a militia unit was embodied, its members were called from their civilian occupations to active duty. Conversely, when a unit had completed its term of service, it was disembodied--that is, its members were sent home.

[11]Western, English Militia, 261, 433.

[12]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, p. 884.

militia, and dropping the ballot for the militia. Taking a practical stance, Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, said that any measure involving the militia depended upon the lord lieutenants and the militia colonels. Whatever scheme found favor with them ought to be adopted. "A measure which they refused to support would be futile, even if it could be carried in Parliament."[13]

The Home Office's deference to these locally powerful officials is revealed in the Home Secretary's reply to a letter from the Lord Lieutenant of the County of Oxford on September 29, 1800. There had been a riot at Witney and some detachments of troops had been sent to aid the civil authorities. The disturbance had been put down, but the Lord Lieutenant was fearful of additional disorders and requested that the units be allowed to remain in the county. Although the Duke of Portland did not share these apprehensions, he assured the Lord Lieutenant that none of the soldiers would be withdrawn "until you are entirely satisfied that no part either of the county or city of Oxford is any longer exposed to the risk of suffering from the effect of popular tumult."[14]

However, some restrictions were placed upon the powers of the lord lieutenants by the Billeting Act of 1803[15] which dealt with yeomanry and volunteer units. A portion of the Act subjected them to military law and transferred them from control of the lord lieutenants to that of the general commanding their districts if they were called

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[13]Western, English Militia, 228.

[14]Annual Register (1800), "Chron.," 141.

[15]43 George III (1803).

out to repel an invasion.[16] This Act was accepted by the lord lieutenants since it did not involve a general encroachment upon their powers and only went into effect under certain specified conditions.

Before the third quarter of the eighteenth century had passed, the policy of making soldiers available to local authorities had changed significantly. Requests for military assistance became more numerous; slow communications and slow transport made the magistrates' having to apply for aid in each individual case a cumbersome process. Often there were delays and if the soldiers got to the scene at all, they were very likely to arrive too late to be effective. Clearly a more efficient procedure was needed. During the extensive bread riots in the west of England in 1766, a new approach was tried. The Secretary at War sent a circular letter to the commanding officers of twenty regiments stationed in or near the disturbed areas, instructing them to give immediate aid to local magistrates if they requested it, without waiting for directions from London. That the War Office was not quite sure of the sagacity of this course of action can be seen in the instructions regarding the secrecy of the order. The commanders were told to keep the order secret unless they were applied to for soldiers and if that event never happened, the order was never to be known. But several of the commanders received requests, the new procedure worked well, and the necessity for secrecy gradually disappeared. This soon became the general practice and general orders were issued to that effect.[17]

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[16]Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 34; Fortescue, History of the British Army, V, 207-08.

[17]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 142; Critchley, Conquest

Although the placing of more responsibility and control in the hands of local authorities was a step in the right direction, it was not the ultimate solution. Neither did it receive full support from some Ministers and Members of Parliament. In 1769 after a riot in St. George's Fields near London, Edmund Burke moved in the House of Commons to require the magistrates to answer for their conduct. His statements in the debate on the motion show just how much the Secretaries were open to criticism in such instances.[18] Just a month before the Gordon Riots of June 1780, Sir William Meredith moved in the House of Commons to condemn the calling out of the military at a meeting of the electors of Westminster.[19] The motion failed to carry (by a vote of 91-133), but these motions are an indication that there was a significant minority in Parliament that did not support the draining away of centralized control of the military into local hands and raised questions about the propriety of local direction.

The shifting of control from one governmental level to another was not accomplished completely, quickly, or smoothly. There were times of uncertainty over jurisdiction. Although the Gordon Riots were a traumatic experience for London's inhabitants, they helped to clear up at least one question. For reasons that will be dealt with in the next chapter, neither local magistrates nor military commanders were willing to take decisive action. It fell to the King, acting in

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of Violence, 74-75; Troup, Home Office, 47.

[18]Bertram Osborne, Justices of the Peace, 1361-1848 (Shaftesbury, Dorset, 1960), 108.

[19]Parliamentary History, XXI, 591-92.

his capacity as Chief Magistrate, to take matters into his own hands and order military units into action to restore order.[20] Before taking such a drastic step, he had sought advice from the Attorney General "who gave it as his opinion, that, as soldiers were also citizens, they could constitutionally be used to prevent felony, even without the Riot Act being read." This opinion supported the legality of employing the military to put down riots, which was at that time a serious legal issue.[21]

But a disorder of even this magnitude did not silence the very vocal minority in Parliament whose existence has already been noted. Less that two weeks after the riots had ended, the Duke of Richmond introduced a motion in the House of Lords condemning the actions of Lord Amherst, the commanding general during the riots, in ordering the confiscation of arms in the hands of persons other than militiamen or soldiers. In the ensuing debate ancient statutes were quoted which gave English Protestants the right to keep arms for their protection. Those who spoke in support of the motion took the position that the constitutional rights of Englishmen should not be encroached upon in any circumstances, and that the retention of these liberties was more important than giving in to temporary expedients to retain order. The question was negated without a division.[22]

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[20]Fortescue, History of the British Army, III, 302.

[21]W. L. Melville Lee, A History of the Police in England (Reprint edition; Montclair, N. J., 1971), 168. First published, London, 1901.

[22]Parliamentary History, XXI, 726-46.

Early the next year, in March 1781, Richard B. Sheridan presented a motion in the Commons on the state of the Westminster police and magistracy. In addition to pointing out the defects in the local system of keeping order, Sheridan argued that the military could not be used by the Crown as it had been in the Gordon Riots, and that if it were used by the monarch in this fashion "then we might bid farewell to freedom."[23] His position was the same as the Duke of Richmond's: that freedoms were much more important than even temporary abrogations of them to maintain order. Two parts of his motion were withdrawn and the third failed, 94-171.[24]

From the central government's standpoint, the jurisdictional issue was settled in 1782 with the creation of a separate Home Department. The Home Secretary became responsible for maintaining the King's Peace. He was also responsible for movements of the army within the realm and for the enrollment of volunteers for its defense. These last two functions were retained until the outbreak of the war with France in 1793. When a Secretary of State for War was appointed in 1794, they were transferred to that office, but the Home Office still retained its powers to use soldiers to maintain internal law and order.[25]

Even though 1782 marked the point at which the maintenance of internal order was made the responsibility of one governmental department, the carrying out of this responsibility never operated in such a compartmentalized fashion. The dependence upon local initiative,

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[23]Ibid., 1305-12. [24]Ibid., 325.

[25]Howard, Guardians of the Queen's Peace, 118-19.

begun in 1766, continued; the Home Office had to work with and through the Commander in Chief, the War Office (after 1794), the lord lieutenants and other local officials, and the commanders of the various military forces. This produced both a vertical and a horizontal communications maze through which the Home Secretary had to exercise his peace-keeping responsibility.

The examination of Home Office correspondence indicates that the various Home Secretaries early realized their primary position as well as the reality of the functions of other agencies and individuals.

Lord Sydney, the second Home Secretary, did not operate in a heavy-handed fashion. On March 13, 1783, he wrote to General Conway, the Commander in Chief, and enclosed a letter which he had just written to the Secretary at War concerning the riots and disturbances at Newcastle under Line. Sydney informed Conway, "I have the King's commands to desire you will give such directions thereupon as may come within your department."[26] Two weeks later Sydney wrote to Conway sending a letter which he had just received from the Mayor of Liverpool and asked if it would not be advisable "to order a Detachment of Troops that can be depended upon" to go immediately to Liverpool not only to protect the magazines but also to prevent any riots and disturbances that might occur.[27]

Lord North, who followed Sydney at the Home Office, was a bit more forceful. In writing to General Conway on April 18, 1783, concerning an expected riot of seamen in London, he directed him to have a detachment

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[26]H. O. 50/1. [27]Ibid.

of troops in readiness to support the civil magistrates in case military assistance was required.[28]

By the close of the century the Home Office had had to deal with periods of extensive and intensive riotous activity. In July 1791 the Priestley Riots had kept Birmingham and vicinity in turmoil for six days, and in 1795 there were disturbances in almost one hundred localities. In 1800 the country found itself in the grips of a series of disturbances that rivaled those of 1795 in number. The Home Secretary in 1800 was the Duke of Portland, and he left little room for doubt that his office assumed the primary responsibility for maintaining internal order. In September a detachment of cavalry had been moved into Oxford without the local officials' being informed in advance. They had written to the Secretary at War to complain about this action and the letter was passed on to the Home Office. (It is interesting to note that almost two decades after this facet of the country's business had been placed in the hands of one agency, correspondence and pertinent information often reached this agency by a circuitous route.) To this letter the Duke of Portland wrote a strong reply which stated in substance that the Home Secretary knew the situation throughout the country much better than local officials. What they considered only as minor local unrest could be seen by the Home Secretary in its wider sense. Therefore, because of his better perspective, the Home Secreatry was determined to take action wherever and whenever he deemed it appropriate.[29]

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[28]Ibid.

[29]Thompson, "Moral Economy of the English Crowd," 129-30.

Some types of disturbances tended to evoke quicker action than did others. Attacks on jails produced an almost instantaneous response from the Home Office. This was the reaction when the jail at Chester was attacked on December 28, 1803. The local magistrates quickly received an offer of assistance and the posting of a reward by the Home Office.[30] A quick reaction was also usual when a force called on to quell a disturbance was itself attacked by the rioters. During the Burdett Riots of April 1810 in London, the civil force that had been called out by the magistrates was attacked by the mob. This not only prompted the King to issue a proclamation but also produced the offer of a reward of £500.[31]

As has already been noted, there was a reluctance on the government's part to interfere with certain internal aspects of the militia.[32] However, the Home Office felt free to issue directives with regard to the embodiment, disembodiment, stationing, and enforcement of certain rules and regulations as it endeavored to fulfill its role as the country's chief peace-keeping agency.

Early in March 1783 there was a five-day food riot at Newcastle under Line in Staffordshire.[33] When the Home Office received the information about this, Lord Sydney wrote immediately to Earl Gower, the Lord Lieutenant of the county, stating that he had the King's command that the Staffordshire Militia were not to be disembodied without

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[30]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 93.

[31]Ibid., 91-92.

[32]See above, pp. 57-59.

[33]Gentleman's Magazine, LIII (1783), 262.

a further directive from the Home Office. He also informed Gower that additional military units had been ordered to the area to assist the civil magistrates.[34] Sydney did not order the disembodiment of the Staffordshire Militia until the last of the month.[35] It should be noted that, even though the Home Secretary acted with dispatch in this case, by the time the word had reached his office on March 13, the riots had been over for three days, several ringleaders had been arrested, and one was already on trial. This incident is but one illustration of how difficult it was for the Home Office to bring its power to bear when an unanticipated disturbance erupted.

However, there were times when the Home Office directed local officials in the implementation of preventive procedures. Late in 1792 a circular letter was sent out to the lord lieutenants reminding them of the ninety-first clause of the Militia Act requiring the security of militia arms. This clause stipulated that if a militia unit were called out to assist the civil authorities, two-thirds of the men would answer the call and one-third would remain behind to guard the arms. During the month of December, the Home Office received a number of replies stating that this clause was being complied with. The Marquis of Salisbury even reported additional precautions: the cocks had been taken from the locks and the bayonets had been stored in a place separate from the muskets.[36]

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[34]March 13, 1783, in H. O. 42/2.

[35]Lord Sydney to General Conway, March 29, 1783, in H. O. 50/1.

[36]H. O. 50/18.

As we have seen, the government was especially careful when it came to the stationing of embodied militia units.[37] Militia units eagerly sought the privilege of being stationed at or near home but it was a privilege seldom granted. Even units stationed away from home at times abetted or even initiated disorders. Such an incident occurred in April 1795 when the Oxfordshire Militia left their barracks at Blatchford in Sussex, marched under arms to nearby Seaford and Newhaven, seized provisions, and sold them at their own prices. It was three days before regular army units could get matters under control.[38]

On April 21, three days after the disturbance had been quelled, the Duke of Richmond, who was in command in that district,[39] wrote to the Duke of York, the Commander in Chief, expressing grave concern about whether this particular regiment could be trusted to perform its duty. He was of the opinion that the ringleaders should be punished severely and that the whole regiment should have some type of punishment. He proposed that the unit be sent to serve in the Indies or on board the fleet; however, if they were to remain in service at home, he requested that the companies be scattered into various counties where they did not have close ties.[40] Richmond's desire for severe

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[37]See above, p. 58.

[38]The Times (London), April 21, 1795, p. 3; The Scots Magazine, LVII (1795), 270.

[39]Richmond had also held the Cabinet post of Master General of the ordnance until February 1795.

[40]H. O. 50/4.

punishment was apparently shared by those who conducted the trials; several lesser offenders were flogged, and two leaders were executed by their comrades in full view of the whole regiment.[41] However, his proposals on the stationing of the regiment were ignored. The Duke of York informed him that the King had directed that, upon completion of the trials, the Oxfordshire Regiment was to be moved to the North East district and that the Surrey and Herefordshire Regiments were also to be sent to other districts.[42]

Although the Home Office was kept informed of the above sequence of events, the main correspondence and decisions centered around the Commander in Chief. Earlier that same year, in January 1795, the previous Commander in Chief, Lord Amherst, had reacted in a similar manner when he received information that a riotous assembly was expected at Lamberhurst in Kent. He immediately sent orders to the Duke of Richmond to have some of the Warwickshire Regiment of Militia, who were quartered in the area, hold themselves in readiness to assist the civil magistrates if such became necessary. A letter was then dispatched to the Home Secretary informing him of the action.[43]

Similarly, when the Home Office was the first to receive such reports, quick and decisive action generally followed. For instance, the Priestley Riots were a very serious series of riots in Birmingham and vicinity lasting from July 14 through July 19, 1791.[44] Home

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[41] Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 519-20.

[42] Duke of York to Duke of Richmond, April 23, 1795, in H. O. 50/4.

[43] H. O. 50/4.

[44] For a full discussion of these riots, see below, Chapter VII, pp. 167-68.

Secretary Henry Dundas got word of the events on July 15 and dispatched a messenger to Nottingham the next day ordering troops stationed there to the troubled area. The messenger arrived at Nottingham early on the morning of July 17, and by late that evening a detachment of dragoons had marched to Birmingham. By July 22 the Home Office had ordered about four thousand soldiers from various points to the vicinity.[45]

Decisive action was again evident when a disturbance erupted around Merthyr Tydfil in Glamorganshire, Wales, in September 1800. A Bailiff of the County wrote to the Home Secretary, the Duke of Portland, reporting the disorder and the fact that aid had been requested from Birstol but that the town was fearful that Bristol might not be able to spare any troops since rioting had been reported in that part of the country as well. Portland immediately sent an order to the commander at Bristol directing him to send assistance which was done.[46]

Apparently there was a great deal of communication and cooperation among the Home Office, the Commander in Chief, and the War Office by the 1790's insofar as the handling of internal disturbances was concerned.[47] Any of these might receive the initial report of a

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[45]J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War (London, 1911), 18-19; The Times (London), July 20, 1791, p. 2; John Alfred Langford, A Century of Birmingham Life: or A Chronicle of Local Events, from 1741 to 1841 (2 vols.; Birmingham, 1868), I, 485.

[46]H. O. 42/51.

[47]Fortescue has noted a considerable amount of friction between the Home Office and the War Office beginning in the late 1790's. However, this friction was generated over jurisdictional issues--which Office controlled the various forces. For example, the War Office actually took charge of the Volunteer Cavalry in 1802 but control was returned to the Home Office the next year. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see: Fortescue, History of the British Army,

disturbance and, depending upon its urgency, would either take action and inform the other parties of that action or would request action from one of the other departments. It was evidently standard procedure for the War Office to issue official orders on the movement of regular army units even though the movements might already have been ordered by the Home Office and the march completed by the units themselves. Such was the case in 1791 when the Home Office was sending units to Birmingham during the Priestley Riots. Lieutenant Colonel Churchill, the Commanding Officer of the 15th Light Dragoons, was ordered to muster all the forces he could and send them to Birmingham. He was told that official orders to that effect would be sent from the War Office the next day.[48]

Home Office Numbers 50/4 and 50/10 contain numerous letters indicating the various ways in which the central agencies reacted when reports of disturbances were received. In some instances the Home Office passed the information along to the War Office and allowed the latter to decide which units to employ. At other times the Home Office ordered units to other localities and informed the War Office of that fact. On occasion the War Office responded to troop requests and then informed the Home Office of this fact. In some situations the Home Office requested that the War Office send certain units to various places to aid the civil power.

IV, pt. 2, p. 884; V, 200, 209; Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 67, 78, 141.

[48]July 17, 1791, in H. O. 42/19.

With the various offices in London receiving news about and responding to the different situations, there is little wonder that confusion sometimes existed and could appear among those who should have been familiar with the proper procedure. Two weeks after he had been placed in command of the military forces in the Birmingham area because of the Priestley Riots, Colonel DeLancey wrote to Home Secretary Dundas asking to whom he should look for his orders. He understood that all his correspondence to the War Office had been sent to Dundas.[49] It was apparent from the London end that the Home Office was in charge; it was just as apparent that this fact had not been communicated to DeLancey.

Even though it had become an accepted procedure after 1766 for local officials to request assistance from locally quartered units without first getting clearance from London, the central government continued to receive requests for aid throughout the period under investigation. This was especially the case during times when disturbances were widespread, as they were during 1795 and 1800. Also, when there were no military in the immediate area or when local officials were uncertain of the extent of their authority, a request was very likely to be sent to either the Home Office, the War Office, or the Commander in Chief. A good example of the latter situation occurred in September 1795 when the magistrates of Ely in Cambridgeshire expected a disturbance and requested that the Duke of York, the Commander in Chief, order a unit stationed at Milden Hall in Suffolk to their assistance. In a letter of September 19 informing the Home Secretary

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[49]August 1, 1791, in ibid.

of this, the Duke of York stated that the request would be complied with. He also pointed out that a general order had been issued to the units in Great Britain to offer every possible assistance to the civil authorities in case of riot and that he did not think there would be any hesitation upon the part of these troops if they were stationed in another county, as was the case here.[50]

When a disturbance occurred in London or its vicinity, it was not uncommon for several departments of the central government and various officials of both the local and central governments to become involved. Even the King himself was not above dealing with these matters. Acting as the Chief Magistrate of the country, he ordered military units into action to restore order during the Gordon Riots of June 1780.[51] He again asserted his authority in February 1792 when a disturbance seemed imminent. The journeyman shoemakers had conspired not to report for work unless their wages were raised. One hundred and seventy warrants were issued for the arrest of the principal leaders, and twenty-one of them were arrested. Word of this quickly spread, and soon over a thousand shoemakers assembled in a riotous manner. This fact was reported to George III who ordered enough troops sent to prevent any disturbance. One troop of Life Guards and a party of Foot Guards were dispatched. When they approached the gathering, the mob dispersed.[52]

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[50]H. O. 50/4.

[51]See above, pp. 61-62.

[52]The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1792, p. 3.

Late in June 1795 a disturbance was expected in or near London. On June 28 the Commander in Chief informed the Home Office in a letter that the necessary orders had been given to the Foot and Horse Guards to be ready on the next day to assist the civil magistrates. Several cavalry units in the vicinity with a total strength of between 350 and 400 had also been alerted.[53] Judging from the number of troops on call, considerable trouble was expected although none occurred.

The Privy Council met in a hastily called session in November 1800 to consider measures to suppress a large meeting of mechanics which was believed to be scheduled on Kennington Common. When the reported time came, the Common was covered with police and soldiers, but no assembly was to be found.[54]

By about 1800 a general "rule of thumb" in regard to disturbances in the London vicinity had emerged. If the unrest was confined to a relatively narrow locality, the magistrates in that district would call out on their own initiative a number of the "respectable inhabitants" to assist them. However, if there was danger to public order over a wide area, the initiative passed to the Home Office.[55] This "rule of thumb" was very general and the line between local and central responsibility was often extremely vague. Under these conditions it would seem that the central government could override local authorities and take charge in almost any situation if it chose to do so. However,

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[53]H. O. 50/4.

[54]H. D. Traill, ed., Social England (6 vols.; London, 1895-1905), V, 493.

[55]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 218.

such was not the case; local authorities maintained control in most instances. An incident during the Burdett Riots which lasted from April 6 through 9, 1810, indicates this.

These riots were particularly violent at times with several persons being killed and a number injured. Fearing that control would be completely lost, the Cabinet Ministers issued a call for all military units within a hundred-mile radius of London and assembled a force of 50,000.[56] These were stationed around the city. A Special Court of Aldermen was called by the Lord Mayor "relative to the admission of regular troops into the City." A majority of the Aldermen wanted to admit them, but the Lord Mayor did not feel that they were needed at that time (April 9). He went on to state, however, that since they were available, he would accept them if conditions warranted.[57] Some regular units which had been in the city when the disorders erupted were already being used by the city officials, but the brunt of the responsibility of restoring order was borne by local Foot and Guard, militia, and volunteer units. Although these disturbances covered a large sector of London, the local authorities did not lose control of the situation, and the Mayor was unwilling to admit such a large number of regular soldiers, en masse, into his area of jurisdiction.

This incident also points up the adherence to a policy emphasized by the central government on a number of occasions: soldiers,

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[56]Samuel Romilly, Memoirs of The Life of Sir Samuel Romilly (3 vols.; London, 1840), II, 312; M. W. Patterson, Sir Francis Burdett and His Times (1770-1844) (2 vols.; London, 1931), I, 263.

[57]The Times (London), April 10, 1810, p. 3.

and especially regular troops, should not be employed except as a last resort. For example, just as the Priestley Riots were ending in Birmingham (on July 19, 1791) the Home Office, fearing that similar disturbances might erupt in other places, sent a letter to the High Sheriffs of Worcestershire, Staffordshire, Oxfordshire, Shropshire, and Northamptonshire warning them to be watchful in case of disturbances. If outbreaks did occur, they were directed to call upon the different magistrates and gentlemen of the county. The letter informed them that there was a considerable body of soldiers stationed near Birmingham upon which they could call and that they should direct their requests to Colonel DeLancey. However, the Home Office stressed the fact that the military was only to be used as a last resort--only if there were no other way to restore order.[58]

Less than two months later the same idea was expressed to the Earl of Oxford, who had written to the Home Office proposing that a local association be formed and armed and that he be given the authority to draw on the military in any emergency. Home Secretary Henry Dundas did not question the Earl's motives. Nevertheless he informed him that "it must not be forgot that dangerous precedents generally originate in commendable motives, and ought therefore to be examined not with a view only of the present but to further occurrences." Dundas went on to say that it was desired that the civil power be able to support itself without having to call on the military, that the military stationed in the area already had orders to obey the civil authority

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[58]H. O. 42/19.

at all times, and that added discretional powers did not seem to be called for.[59]

Even though the government in London considered the various military units to be the "last line of defense" in the restoration of domestic order, officials at all levels found themselves employing this "last line" with increasing frequency during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1783, after peace had been made with the American colonies, the Commander in Chief requested an increase in the bounty in order to fill the home regiments so that there would be a sufficient force to maintain order in the country.[60] This request was approved and later that year he opposed the reduction of forces in England because of the "frequent calls for assistance by the Civil Magistrates . . . ."[61]

The period under investigation also saw the creation of the Home Office as a separate Department holding the primary responsibility at that level for seeing that the King's Peace was maintained. Ironically, at the same time that the government's responsibility in this area was being centralized, local officials were being given added authority, especially in the control and employment of the various military forces. It is to the local level that we must now turn.

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[59]September 1791, in ibid.

[60]General Conway to Lord North, April 11, 1783, in H. O. 50/1.

[61]General Conway to Lord North, November 13, 1783, in ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE USE OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENTS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Going as far back into English legal history as the fusion of Saxon and Norman ideas in the common law, one can note the development of the principle that the maintenance of internal order was primarily in the hands of local authorities.[1] The common law, statute law, and court decisions all worked together to mold principles which were applicable in instances of public violence. By the late eighteenth century these principles had taken on very definite forms: all peace officers were obligated to do everything in their power to suppress disorders; a peace officer could call upon all available citizens to assist him and if they failed to render aid, they were liable to penalties; in the suppression of a riot, no more force was to be used than was necessary; if a community failed to prevent or suppress disorders, the entire community was liable to a collective fine.[2]

These principles of law as well as the Riot Act had become well established long before it became general practice for local magistrates to turn to soldiers for aid in suppressing disorders. As this practice became more prevalent during the eighteenth century, some way had to be found to apply these principles to the military. This was done by making the ancient fundamental principles of the common

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[1]See above, Chapters I and II, passim.

[2]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 72.

law applicable to soldiers in the same way that they were applicable to civilians. Soldiers were required to come to the aid of the civil power when requested to do so, they were still under the law, and, like any civilian, they were allowed to use no more force than was necessary to restore order. Thus, in a legal sense, soldiers were only specially armed, specially uniformed civilians.[3] These principles concerning the obligations and legal positions of members of the military during periods of civil disorder have survived unimpaired into the twentieth century.[4]

These principles lacked a certain degree of specificity, especially when it came to the amount of force that could be used. It was during the eighteenth century that the magistrates as well as the soldiers they called on at times to assist them came to realize what a thin legal line they were treading in some cases. In one instance Barkley Kennett, Lord Mayor of London, was charged with not acting forceably enough in the face of riots. He was convicted and fined £1,000 for criminal negligence.[5]

However, during most of this century, it was more usual for magistrates and soldiers to be castigated for acting too forcefully in quelling disturbances. In 1737 during a riot in Edinburgh, Captain John Porteus ordered his soldiers to fire on the crowd, resulting in

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[3]Ibid., 73-74.

[4]War Office, Manual of Military Law, 8th ed. (1951), part II, sec. V, pars. 2, 3, reprinted in Ian Brownlie, The Law Relating to Public Order (London, 1968), Appendix.

[5]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 81-87.

seventeen persons being killed or wounded. The captain was tried for using undue force and convicted. His case was appealed but before the appeal could be heard, he was lynched. This brought home to the military the very sobering realization that dealing with rioters could indeed by very hazardous duty.[6]

Later in the century, in 1768 during the Wilkite Riots in London, Samuel Gillam, a magistrate, called in troops which resulted in the so-called "massacre" of St. George's Fields. He was tried for murder but acquitted. One of the privates killed a non-rioter by mistake. He was held guilty of murder by the coroner's inquest and another private and a captain were charged with abetting the crime. They were, however, acquitted by the court.[7]

These and other similar incidents were fostered by the erroneous belief that had sprung up during the century that the old principles of the common law had been modified by the Riot Act. It was widely believed that firearms could only be employed after a magistrate had come to the scene and read the proclamation set out in the Act. This idea, coupled with the fact that, on more than one occasion, indictments had been returned against both soldiers and magistrates, carried the possibility that a time could come when no one would act. As Dr. Samuel Johnson observed in 1776, "The magistrates dare not call the guards for fear of being hanged. The guards will not come for fear of being given up to the blind rage of popular juries."[8]

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[6] Ibid., 76-77.

[7] Ibid., 77-80; Watson, Reign of George III, 133.

[8] Quoted in Holdsworth, History of English Law, X, 706.

By the last quarter of the century the question of the use of soldiers to restore order had become a serious legal issue. The possibility of no one acting became a reality during the first week of June 1780 when the Gordon Riots erupted in London. The magistrates hesitated, unsure whether it was wise to call for troops or of the constitutionality of doing so. They would not act without orders from a superior and none came. In the same vein, the soldiers in the city were fearful of taking action that was not sanctioned by a magistrate. As a result, a disturbance that, in all probability, could have been neutralized in its early stages raged on for a week until the King took decisive action in his capacity as the chief magistrate of the country.[9]

As was noted in the preceding chapter,[10] there was a very vocal minority in Parliament that condemned this action as an unwarranted assumption of authority by the monarch. Basically, their position was that the King had usurped the authority of the civil magistrates. One part of Sheridan's motion on the state of the Westminster police and magistracy conceded that the King had been entrusted by Parliament with a military force but that that force could not be applied with justification to the quelling of civil disorders unless directed to do so by the civil magistrates. The only exception to this could be

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[9]See above, Chapter III, pp. 61-62; Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782 (Reprint ed.; New York, 1968), 109; E. Neville Williams, The Eighteenth Century Constitution, 1688-1815 (London, 1960), 417-20; Fortescue, History of the British Army, III, 302.

[10]See above, Chapter III, pp. 62-63.

a situation in which the outrages had gotten so far out of hand and become so violent and treasonable that all civil authority was subverted and the very existence of government itself was threatened.[11] Sheridan and his supporters did not believe that this stage had been reached during the Gordon Riots.

There were other groups in other sections of the country who held similar views about the use of the military. On December 30, 1779, there was a great meeting at York for the purpose of presenting a petition to the House of Commons in favor of reform. Committees were formed to push the petition and to organize an association supporting its aims. On August 2, 1780, two months after the Gordon Riots, the Yorkshire Committee of the Association "passed resolutions against the undue interference of the military in riots."[12]

Even though the use of military units was a controversial topic, it was commonly accepted that the local authorities were supposed to be in control of these situations. This fact was patently evident in a statement made by the Secretary at War, Jenkinson, during a debate in the House of Commons a month before the Gordon Riots. A motion had been introduced on May 8, 1780, condemning the calling out of the military a month earlier at a meeting of the electors of Westminster. Mr. Jenkinson stated that no order for the use of the military had passed through his office but that this was not unusual. It was his opinion that the civil magistrates had reasons to expect

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[11] Parliamentary History, XXI, 1313.

[12] William Page, ed., The Victoria History of the County of York (3 vols.; London, 1907-1913), III, 432.

a riot and had made a requisition to the military to be ready to assist them in case one broke out. This was common practice and in such cases the soldiers were solely under the direction of the civil authorities.[13]

After 1780 and the Gordon Riots, the pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction insofar as the country's attitude toward the use of soldiers in civil disturbances was concerned. The Attorney General's opinion on the legality of employing troops was important.[14] But more significant was the fact that the country in general began to realize that the available means of dealing with a determined mob were grossly inadequate. Even then the populace was not much interested in the establishment of a police system as the answer to the problem.[15]

It was at this time that volunteer bodies of citizens for the purpose of maintaining local order began a rapid growth.[16] Throughout the eighteenth century, local governments encouraged the formation of such bodies and by the end of 1779 there were approximately 150 companies, each having a membership of at least fifty men, scattered over the country.[17] Radzinowicz refers to these bodies as "incidental police" and the Gordon Riots stimulated their growth phenomenally. In fact, more of these associations were formed during June 1780 than during any comparable period, either before or after that date. Their numbers tended to decrease when times were quiet and to increase

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[13] Parliamentary History, XXI, 592.

[14] See above, Chapter III, p. 62.

[15] Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 70.

[16] See above, Chapter II, p. 35.

[17] Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 68; Fortescue, History of

during periods of stress, although never on such a scale as they did during 1780.[18]

These local associations were one of the tools that local authorities had at their disposal. They were also expected to enroll special constables from the local citizenry and to call upon the local militia units if conditions warranted. By 1812 it had become general policy that regular military units would not be made available unless a local community had done all in its power to organize its civil forces. That is to say, regular army units were considered to be the local officials' last resort--to be used only if order could be restored in no other way.[19]

There is ample evidence that numerous local officials took this responsibility quite seriously. In April 1793 the Clee Hill colliers caused a riot at Ludlow in Shropshire. The magistrates had to call upon the 89th Regiment which was quartered there to assist them in restoring order. Shortly after this incident, one William Waring corresponded with the Home Office on behalf of a number of gentlemen of the town. They proposed the forming of an association of a hundred men for their protection and that the government allocate to them enough arms and equipment for this number. Major Ellis, the Commanding Officer of the 89th, supported this proposal and offered

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the British Army, III, 296-97.

[18]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 210-11; Rose, Pitt and the Great War, 124.

[19]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 104; Darvall, Popular Disturbances and Public Order, 257.

to supply the needed equipment from his surplus arms and supplies.[20] The gentlemen and tradesmen of the town were very eager to see to their own protection if they were but granted the means. Major Ellis was just as eager to see this done and to wash his hands of this duty. However, the government was very cautious when it came to arming local associations of this type and the request was not acted upon.

In June 1783 the Lord Mayor of Liverpool wrote a very apologetic letter to the Home Office lamenting the fact that the presence of military units was necessary to insure order. He stated that he believed in the law and relied on it but that at times it was not effective.[21] The temper of the letter is that local authorities should be able to handle their own problems and feel a sense of mortification when they cannot do so.

The Mayor of Bristol, John Harris, had reason to fear that a riot was imminent late in July 1791. He wrote to the Home Secretary requesting that a body of troops be stationed near that city as a precautionary measure. After this request was granted, the Mayor reported that they would rely upon the civil power and use the soldiers only as a last resort. Six weeks later he wrote that, although several more threatening letters had been received during the month of August, the magistrates and constables had been hard at work to keep the peace and felt that they were capable of handling the situation. Therefore, the troops could be withdrawn.[22]

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[20]William Waring to H. O., April 16, 1783, in H. O. 42/2; Maj. Ellis to H. O. in ibid.

[21]Lord Mayor of Liverpool to H. O., June 3, 1783, in ibid.

[22]John Harris to Henry Dundas, July 21, 22, 23, 25 and

After receiving some erroneous information about impending disorders at Falmouth and writing a letter to the town's mayor concerning the proper action to take, the Home Office received a very pointed reply. The Mayor, John Crane, reported that no such condition existed but that if anything of this nature occurred, he would do all in his power to quell it and would call in the military if necessary.[23]

It is evident that there was general agreement between the central and local governments throughout the period under investigation that the military was to be employed to restore order only if all other methods proved futile. However, it is also evident that local officials felt much more secure if this "final solution" were close at hand and readily available in the event it had to be employed. Consequently, the official governmental correspondence as well as newspaper and other accounts dealing with disorders or expected disorders contain numerous requests for military assistance.[24] The number of these petitions was directly proportional to the degree of unrest within the country. In tranquil years when there were few or no disturbances of consequence, requests were minimal; however, during times of extensive disturbances such as occurred during 1795 and 1800, or in response to a particularly

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September 10, 1791, in H. O. 42/19; Henry Dundas to John Harris, July 22, 23, 1791, in ibid.

[23]John Crane to Home Secretary, January 10, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

[24]Requests for military assistance can be found in H. O. 42/2, 19, 34, 35, 50, 51, 52 and H. O. 50/1, 4, 10, 18, 23, 24, 48. Those found in other sources are too numerous to list.

violent disorder such as the Priestley Riots of July 1791, applications for troops were very large.

In practically every instance when military assistance was requested, the soldiers were to be used to "aid the civil power" or "to assist the civil magistrates"--or words or implications to that effect. This evidence of local control is seen in the requests from local officials, in correspondence of the Home Office and War Office, in orders sent to particular military units, and in contemporary accounts.

It would be impossible to determine how many disorders might have been prevented by the presence or timely arrival of a military force. Of the numerous requests for military assistance in the face of expected disturbances, many units were sent to places in which no riots occurred at that particular time. For example, in April 1795 troops were sent to Denbigh, Wales, after a magistrate had reported considerable unrest in the area.[25] No disorder occurred; but, it would only be conjecture to attribute its absence solely to the presence of the military since there are numerous records of riots in places where military units were available. On the other hand, the Colonel of the Hambledon (Hampshire) Volunteers reported that the area had been in a constant state of unrest for about a week and that he had kept his regiment on constant watch. It was his opinion that this action had prevented a riot. The magistrates took the position that it was better to prevent a riot than to try to stop one already in progress.

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[25]Duke of York to Duke of Portland, April 5, 1795, in H. O. 50/4.

These preventive measures were approved by both the Home Office and War Office.[26]

Thus, it can be seen that one common practice of local authorities was to use the intimidating presence of a military force to prevent the outbreak of violence. In order to assess the degree of effectiveness of this practice, each disturbance or expected disturbance would have to be examined in the light of its numerous other pacific and bellicose ingredients. And, even then, it would be impossible to determine with any degree of certainty whether a riot would have occurred had the soldiers not been present. Undoubtedly, some disorders were prevented by using a show of military force, but any generalization here would fall in the realm of speculation. What can be seen much more clearly is the manner in which local authorities used the military and other means at their disposal in the face of actual or expected disturbances.

One thing that they could do was to take preventive measures. There are at least thirty-seven instances during the period in which there is clear evidence that local officials took some type of preventive action. This number may seem small but it should be remembered that it represents only those occasions when such action failed and disorders followed. Nevertheless, these instances represent all sections of the country and include years from the beginning to the end of the period. Thus, there is enough evidence from which to draw

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[26]Colonel of Hambledon Volunteers to War Office, September 10, 1800, in H. O. 50/48; War Office to Colonel of Hambledon Volunteers, September 12, 1800, in ibid.

some generalizations about the actions taken by local authorities as they attempted to act preventively.

One course of action taken by local officials was to remove the cause of the grievances of an unruly group of citizens by giving in either totally or partially to their demands. This was especially true when it was felt that the grievances were justified or when the local authorities did not have means available to suppress the mob. On some occasions this was the only action necessary. For example, in Cambridge on July 17, 1795, a mob assembled and seized a barge loaded with flour which was bound for Ely and Littleport. They unloaded the flour and took it to the Shirehall. Local officials distributed a handbill stating that they had purchased enough flour for the local populace. This satisfied them and they dispersed. However, on the next day they assembled in the market and visited the butcher shops. The magistrates ordered meat to be sold to them at four pence per pound and they again dispersed.[27] Apparently this action on the part of the local officials pacified them, as they did not reassemble.

The manner in which the officials of Cambridge handled this situation was unusual in that they pacified the crowd without making provision for any other force to support them in case control was lost. As a general rule, officials made some arrangements for such a force, even though this fact was not always communicated to the crowd. This was the case on July 1, 1795, in Towcester, Northamptonshire. A large quantity of wheat had been bought up and stored in the town preparatory to shipping it to Birmingham. The local populace did not want it to

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[27]The Times (London), July 22, 1795, p. 3.

be sent away, and a large mob gathered and paraded the town the whole night. There was no violence, but since the nearest magistrate was seven miles away, the Towcester Troop of Gentlemen Yeomanry was put on alert. The next day the local officials prevailed upon the buyer to sell the wheat to local people who could sell it to the poor. This halted the disturbance, but before the mob dispersed, it went off to neighboring villages and to the high road to make sure that no other corn was being sent away.[28]

A very similar course was taken several years later by a magistrate of Sheerness in Kent. He was called to the market at 6:00 a.m. where a large crowd was trying to force the butter sellers, who were asking seventeen pence a pound, to sell butter at a shilling a pound. He talked with the crowd, and by 9:00 a.m. all was under control. The butter sellers were assured of protection and agreed voluntarily to sell it at fourteen pence. The magistrate had during this time both the horse and foot volunteers in readiness but did not inform the crowd of this fact.[29]

At other times local officials were willing to appease the disturbed elements but while they were doing so, they made an open display of the coercive forces at their disposal. This was the approach taken by the mayor and other peace officers of Bath in Somersetshire on August 3, 1795. A flour barge, bound for Bristol, had been stopped and it was rumored that its contents were for export.

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[28]Ibid., July 8, 1795, p. 4.

[29]The Magistrates of Sheerness to H. O., September 20, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

The Riot Act was read, and the Essex Cavalry rode among the crowd with drawn swords and loaded guns. The crowd, mostly women, said that they were not rioting but were keeping flour from being exported. Since they steadfastly refused to release the barge, the mayor allowed the cargo to be taken off.[30] A similar approach was taken at Blythe in Northumberland. A mob of riotous colliers were pacified, but the Delaval Volunteers and Lancashire Militia were kept on duty for a week until the colliers agreed to return to work.[31]

Perhaps the best example of the use of appeasement coupled with force occurred in March 1795 in Penzance, Cornwall. A group of about two hundred tin miners had come to the town when they heard that a large quantity of corn was to be shipped out which would make prices higher to them. After the Penzance Volunteer Infantry was assembled on the parade ground, the commanding officer went with the chief magistrates and principal inhabitants of the town to talk to the miners. A search was made and only a few bushels of grain were found on board a small ship. The Captain readily agreed to release it for sale, and when this was accomplished, most of the miners were satisfied and departed. About an hour later word was received that another group of approximately six hundred tinners were approaching from a different direction. The volunteer infantry was drawn up and the magistrates tried to get them to disperse since their grievances had been taken care of. They refused, became more unruly, and had to be dispersed

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[30]The Times (London), Aug. 5, 1795, p. 3; J. L. and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer, 1760-1832 (Reprint ed.; New York, 1967), 21. First published, London, 1913.

[31]The Times (London), May 13, 1800, p. 3.

at bayonet point. They left threatening to return later with a much larger force, and the officials were fearful that they might try to carry out these threats two days later on market day. In the meantime a detachment of the Volunteer Artillery Company came from Mousehole, the Board of Ordnance opened their stores and more weapons were distributed, and two guns from a ship were put at the town entrance. The volunteers were assembled early on market day, and at 10:00 a.m. the disquieting word came that about two hundred tinners had assembled north of town. The volunteers took up position and the magistrates went out to meet the miners who caused no trouble when they saw the situation. All was still quiet two days later but the volunteers were being kept in a state of readiness as a precautionary measure.[32]

Another way in which local officials sought to prevent the outbreak of threatened disorders was to utilize the forces that they had at hand. These forces could be civil; volunteer, militia, or other local units; locally stationed regular units; or any combination of these.

At times local authorities were able to use a civil force in the form of special constables quite effectively. This was the case on October 15, 1795, in Holywell, Flintshire, Wales. A mob of women stopped a cartload of wheat, brought it into town, and stored it in one of the buildings. That night they attacked the house of a local mealman, broke his windows, took his corn, and put it with the wheat. The next

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[32]Ibid., Mar. 24, 1795, p. 3; Commanding Officer of the Penzance Volunteer Infantry to Duke of Portland, March 11, 13, 14, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

day was market day and a large tumult was expected; however, three magistrates swore in several special constables and maintained the peace.[33]

During the next major wave of food riots in 1800, similar action was taken by the officials at Portsea in Hampshire. On August 26 a mob of about one hundred assembled in protest of the high price of bread and flour. The mayor persuaded them to disperse but that night handbills were posted calling for a meeting the following evening. There was an assembly the next night but the chief magistrate brought 120 peace officers and dispersed them, arresting six men and one woman.[34]

Special constables were also used to prevent disturbances other than those caused by food shortages. For example, on August 3, 1802, there was a wage dispute involving the shipyard workers at Deptford in Wiltshire. A riot was suspected but the presence of three magistrates and two hundred constables prevented it. However, three weeks later the constables almost lost control and had to call upon a party of soldiers to support them.[35]

In 1810 some of the spirit that had fostered the Burdett riots in London spilled over into other areas of the country. On April 16 there was some damage done in Bristol but the local officials, with

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[33]The Times (London), Oct. 20, 1795, p. 3.

[34]Ibid., Aug. 30, 1800, p. 3.

[35]Ibid., Aug. 5, 1802, p. 3; Aug. 24, 1802, p. 2.

the aid of special constables, took seventeen into custody and dispersed the crowd.[36]

On occasion special constables could be used in a very forceful manner. This was the case on June 13, 1783, in Wakefield, Yorkshire. A Mr. Zouch, who was the Deputy Lieutenant of the County and a magistrate, expected a food riot. He organized a small band of civilian volunteers and upon his own authority armed them with the weapons of a local militia unit which were stored in the town. This hastily organized group met the rioters and seized and disarmed the leaders; the remainder dispersed. In reporting the incident to the Home Office, Zouch recognized that he had acted beyond his authority but asked that the government acquit him of this misconduct because of the extreme emergency nature of the situation.[37] Apparently the government did so.

In some other instances local authorities turned to local military forces to prevent a disorder or to insure that one did not get out of hand. A unit of the local yeomanry was used on July 21, 1795, at Warminster in Wiltshire to disperse a mob of about two thousand who had been marching about the area extorting promises of low prices.[38] Similarly, in November of the next year the magistrates of Boston in Lincolnshire used a detachment of yeomanry to insure that the new Militia Law was carried out without serious incident.[39] The same

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[36]Gentleman's Magazine, CXXX (1810), pt. 1, 374.

[37]Mr. Zouch to H. O., June 21, 1783, in H. O. 42/2.

[38]The Times (London), July 24, 1795, p. 3.

[39]Gentleman's Magazine, CXVI (1796), 1048.

result was obtained by the civil authorities of Norwich in Norfolk on September 20, 1800, when they used the volunteer cavalry to prevent a threatened food riot.[40]

Order was not maintained so easily in some cases, however. On April 28, 1800, a mob composed chiefly of colliers and nailors seized a boatload of corn at Dudley in Staffordshire. The Dudley Cavalry was on hand but the crowd would not disperse until the cavalry fired on them, killing one rioter and wounding several severely. A number of the soldiers also received injuries from stones thrown by the mob.[41]

Just how effective these local military units could be in preventing disorders can be seen in the events that occurred in May and June 1808 in Lancashire in the vicinity of Manchester. There was a great deal of unrest over wages, and the weavers refused to work unless wages were increased. They began to assemble in large numbers throughout the area with the size of one such gathering being estimated at five thousand. In some towns and villages they carried off weaving equipment, damaged property, stoned peace officers, and extorted money. They even burned down the prison at Rochdale. However, there were no disorders in Manchester because the volunteers were on duty during the day, and a mounted guard patrolled all night.[42]

Regular army units stationed in the locality were at times

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[40]Mayor of Norwich to Duke of Portland, September 22, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

[41]The Times (London), May 1, 1800, p. 3.

[42]Gentleman's Magazine, LXXVIII (1808), 548.

used effectively by local authorities to prevent a disturbance from getting out of hand. The Mayor of Truro in Cornwall took such action in August 1793 when there was considerable unrest on the part of nearby copper miners over wages. At one point the miners assembled and marched on the town to influence the owners there. The Mayor called out the 63rd Regiment of Foot which was stationed in Truro. The soldiers met the mob near the town, the Riot Act was read, five leaders were arrested, and the remainder was driven away without bloodshed. Although the crowd stoned and abused the troops, the soldiers did not find it necessary to fire on them.[43]

In March 1795 two troops of dragoons were required to persuade the 118th Irish Regiment to continue its march from Birmingham. The Irish had become involved in a dispute over pay and a major riot seemed ready to erupt, but it failed to materialize because of the quick action of a magistrate.[44] Later in the same year, on November 2, a group of Clee Hill colliers marched on Ludlow in Shropshire with the purpose of destroying the mill there and imposing their own laws on the market. They were met by the military, and several of them were wounded before the rest dispersed.[45]

Often local officials had to resort to a combination of locally available forces as they attempted to prevent disorders. As a general rule, they sought to maintain order with local magistrates and/or

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[43]The Times (London), Aug. 22, 1793, p. 2.

[44]Ibid., Mar. 11, 1795, p. 3.

[45]Robert F. Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1945), 48.

special constables. If it became apparent that a civil contingent would be ineffective, any locally stationed military unit available was pressed into service. Usually only one type of force was used since most communities had only one type readily available to them on short notice and most disorders terminated before units from any distance could arrive. The forces used were either militia, yeomanry, fencibles, or regular units. At times more than one type of force was resorted to if several were in the vicinity. Such was the case on September 2, 1800, when a magistrate prevented a food riot from getting out of hand in Sheffield by timely use of both the yeoman cavalry and a body of the Oxford Blues.[46]

On occasions when a disturbance was anticipated well in advance, a variety of forces were more likely to be brought to bear. This was illustrated in 1796 when a new militia act was to be put into effect. In 1757 when a similar act had been implemented, a wave of protest and violence had swept the country. Anticipating a similar outbreak in 1796, authorities at both the national and local levels took precautionary measures. Special constables, yeomanry, regular troops, and fencibles were all used at different places, and the violence which had marked 1757 was not repeated.[47]

It was rare to find all of the different types of forces employed in one place at the same time to prevent disorders. However,

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[46]A Magistrate of Sheffield to H. O., September 2, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

[47]Western, English Militia, 297; Webb, English Local Government, I, 426; William Page, ed., The Victoria History of the County of Derby (2 vols. pub.; London, 1905-), II, 151.

this did occur in 1808 in Manchester and vicinity. There a wage dispute, involving the cotton weavers, resulted in unrest, disorders, and threatened disorders lasting from May 23 through June 22. As the unrest continued, local officials requested assistance from all quarters, and before order was finally restored, every type of unit was on duty in the area at one time or another.[48]

When it appeared that the civil power or locally available military units might prove insufficient, local officials usually requested that troops be made available to them from other places. Such requests went either to London or to local officials where units were stationed. The records indicate that a very large majority of these petitions were directed to the Home Office or War Office, probably because there was more certainty of a request of this type being acted upon in London than elsewhere. Very seldom did the central government fail to honor a legitimate appeal. Often local officials would refuse to send aid for fear of weakening their own capacity to prevent an outbreak of violence. For example, as soon as the Priestley Riots erupted in Birmingham in July 1791, an express was sent to Coventry for military assistance. But the mayor there refused to dispatch forces since he feared for the safety of his own city.[49] In September 1800 it was reported to the Home Office that a mob of two to three hundred men were committing acts of violence at Merthyr

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[48]The Times (London), May 27, p. 3; May 28, p. 4; May 31, p. 3; June 2, p. 3; June 3, p. 3; June 4, p. 3; June 7, p. 3; June 10, p. 3; June 24, p. 4; June 25, p. 3; Annual Register (1808), "Chron.," 48, 58, 63.

[49]The Times (London), July 15, 1791, p. 2.

Tydfil in Glamorganshire, Wales. An express had been sent to Bristol for aid, but it was feared that none would be forthcoming since rioting had been reported in that area as well. The Home Office immediately sent orders to the commander at Bristol to dispatch a sufficient force to Glamorganshire to maintain the peace.[50]

Requests to adjoining towns were not always met with rebuffs. When symptoms of riot appeared in Banbury, Oxfordshire, on September 15, 1800, an express was sent to Oxford for a troop of light dragoons. They were sent immediately and this timely action was credited with preventing an outbreak of violence.[51] However, in most cases assistance could be secured more quickly from the Home Office or War Office.

On some occasions no matter what type or how decisive the preventive measures, disorders erupted. When this happened, the local officials had to respond in some fashion. Their responses fall basically into three categories: they met the situation with vigorous and decisive action; they acted very indecisively; or, in some cases, they refused to take any action at all.

To the credit of the local officials, the times in which they acted vigorously in the face of a disorder outnumber those in each of the latter two categories by a ratio of three to one. One can find examples of many different courses of vigorous action, but, at times, even such action proved to be ineffectual. For example, the Priestley

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[50]The Bailiff of Glamorganshire to Duke of Portland, September 23, 1800, in H. O. 42/51; Duke of Portland to the Bailiff of Glamorganshire, September 25, 1800, in ibid.

[51]The Times (London), Sept. 17, 1800, p. 3.

Riots broke out in Birmingham on the night of July 14, 1791. The magistrates sent for military assistance, but by the next afternoon they saw that they would have to take some action before the soldiers arrived. They swore in several hundred additional constables who armed themselves with mop-staves and attempted to disperse the mob. At first the mob gave way before the constables, but before long this attack only served to inflame them further. Since the magistrates had no other force to use, the violence continued for two more days until military assistance arrived.[52] The next month a mob in Falmouth, Cornwall, responded in much the same fashion although the riot here was not as severe. On August 27 a group of five to six hundred tinners came into town and demanded a certain quantity of corn. When they were refused it, they became riotous and the magistrates immediately sent for troops. When one company arrived, the mob became incensed and attacked them. Several houses were set on fire in the ensuing battle. Three more companies arrived from Penryn and succeeded in dispersing the mob. One magistrate was injured severely, and there were a number of other injuries, but no deaths.[53]

In some cases local officials were able to restore order by using civil forces if they acted quickly and forcefully enough. The magistrates of Plymouth did so on April 2, 1795, when a riot broke out in the market place. The magistrates were having a meeting in

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[52]Gentleman's Magazine, LXI (1791), 675-76.

[53]The Times (London), Sept. 3, 1791, p. 4.

the guildhall at the time and they rushed out, swore in a number of special constables, and restored order in a short time.[54] Similarly, quick action by the magistrates and constables produced the same result in Cambridge on September 13, 1800, when a riot erupted in the local market-place.[55]

If local officials managed to catch a disorder in its early stages and if the crowd was not too large, peace could be restored by the civil forces alone. However, this was not usually the case. That is not to say that the civil forces were dispensed with in most cases; they were not, but the magistrates had to take measures to employ military units if they felt the situation dictated their doing so. The type and number of military units used depended upon what was readily available or what could be garnered from nearby towns.

In some instances only one type of unit was available and proved to be sufficient. This was the case on September 30, 1791, during an election of town officers in Ipswich, Suffolk. Serpents were thrown into the town hall while business was in progress, and the two rival parties came into such violent conflict that several persons were injured quite severely. The magistrates called out the dragoons which were quartered in the town and restored order quickly.[56] Very similar action was taken by the magistrates of Padstow in Cornwall when a grain riot broke out there in January 1794. They called in a detachment of

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[54]A Magistrate of Plymouth to Duke of Portland, April 6, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

[55]The Times (London), Sept. 22, 1800, p. 3.

[56]Ibid., Oct. 6, 1791, p. 3.

the Glamorganshire Militia but this disturbance lasted for two days, January 20 and 21, because this unit had to come by forced march from Truro.[57] A unit of the Southampton Volunteer Cavalry proved to be sufficient to restore order when a food riot occurred in that town on September 18, 1800. A party of women supported by a large mob seized the butter in the market and made off with it before anyone could stop them. However, they went from there to a baker's house intending to destroy it and were intercepted by the magistrates and volunteers and dispersed.[58]

Different types of military units were used together in practically any combination depending upon their availability and the seriousness of the situation. It took four days before the officials of Leicester could put a halt to a disturbance over the price of meat. The disorder lasted from May 19 through May 22, 1792. The mayor and magistrates used a great number of special constables, the local militia, and finally had to send for a troop of the Oxford Blues.[59] Officials at Bristol had to call out units of the North Lincoln Militia and the Inniskilling Dragoons to stop a bread riot on September 18, 1800.[60] Later that month, on the 30th, a magistrate of Bilston in Staffordshire had to call on the 17th Light Dragoons and the Bilston Yeomen Cavalry

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[57]Ibid., Jan. 30, 1794, p. 3.

[58]Town Clerk of Southampton to Duke of Portland, September 23, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

[59]Annual Register (1792), "Chron.," 19-20; The Times (London), May 24, 1792, p. 3.

[60]Ibid., Sept. 22, 1800, p. 3; letter to Duke of Portland, September 19, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

to quell a food riot.[61] Less than a month later, on October 20, the Mayor of Bath had to call in a party of the 6th Regiment of Dragoons and the local volunteer corps of infantry and cavalry to put down a food riot by a large group of colliers.[62]

On some occasions mobs were so intent upon accomplishing their aims that it mattered little how decisively local officials acted or what forces they used. In these instances the crowd continued their deprecations until they were satiated without being deterred by whatever forces they had to face. Two of the best examples of riots of this nature occurred in successive years, 1792 and 1793, in Birmingham and Bristol.

In Birmingham a private of the Oxford Blues had been killed in "a house of ill fame." When his killer was brought to trial, the circumstances of the case became known to the general public who decided to take vengeance on all houses of this type in the town. The riot began on May 18 and lasted for four days. A mob would form and attack a house or houses only to be driven off by constables or the military. The rioters would then reform and attack houses in another quarter, and the process would be repeated. Seven troops of regular army cavalry were eventually called in. At times the mob attacked the troops with stones and brick-bats. The reports are conflicting on some points, but at least ten to twelve houses were either destroyed or damaged.[63]

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[61]A Magistrate of Bilston to Duke of Portland, October 1, 1800, in H. O. 42/52.

[62]Mayor of Bath to Duke of Portland, October 21, 1800, in ibid.

[63]Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 471-72; Annual Register

In Bristol there had been considerable resentment over the high tax rate for some time, but the riot actually erupted when the city aldermen attempted to extend the tolls on a bridge for an additional year. A large mob estimated at one point at twelve thousand attacked the tollgate, toll booth, and various units of militia and regular forces sent to disperse them. The troops were forced to fire on the crowd on more than one occasion, killing at least seventeen and wounding fifty. Even in the face of such forceful repressive measures, the riot continued for five days, from September 27 through October 1, 1793, and only subsided when a group of private citizens agreed to subscribe the money necessary to remove the toll from the bridge.[64]

Even though vigorous action by local officials did not always serve to put a stop to the disturbance in a short time, it did so in a majority of the cases. On the other hand, in some instances in which magistrates acted indecisively, the majority of these disorders lasted from four to six days and proved to be very difficult to quell. No examples of this type of action occurred south of London; but local officials in the Midlands and North did pursue this course. Indecisiveness on the part of magistrates was not confined to any particular size or type of locality. The magistrates in London, at times, acted

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(1792), "Chron.," 18-19; The Scots Magazine, LIV (1792), 255.

[64]The Times (London), Oct. 1, p. 3; Oct. 2, p. 3; Oct. 3, p. 3; Oct. 4, p. 3; Oct. 5, p. 2; Oct. 11, p. 4; Annual Register (1793), "Chron.," 45-46; Lucyle Werkmeister, A Newspaper History of England, 1792-1793 (Lincoln, Neb., 1967), 405; Rudé, Crowd in History, 255; Gentleman's Magazine, LXIII (1793), 951.

with just as much timidity as those in the village of Blakeney in Gloucestershire. However, there is one factor common to each disorder in which this type of action was taken--each was a food riot. And in some of them there is evidence that the officials sympathized with the plight and grievances of the rioters.[65]

What usually happened was that either no or very weak action was taken initially and the disorders got so far out of hand that a considerable force became necessary to restore order. This was the pattern at Newcastle, Staffordshire, in 1783. On March 6 two boats loaded with provisions were stopped on the canal about a mile from Newcastle. On the 7th and 8th the mob began to sell the products at two-thirds the market price. On the 8th three or four justices tried to disperse them but failed. In the meantime five companies of militia arrived, and on the 10th the justices again tried without success to disperse the mob. They then sent for the militia, drew them up before the crowd, and ordered them to fire on command. The mob responded by placing their women and children in front and said that if they were fired upon, they would pull down the commanding officer's house and burn Newcastle. Thereupon the justices read the Riot Act and

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[65]During the 1780's England, with a rising population, ceased to be a corn-exporting country and became a net importer of wheat. The state of the harvest was a very important factor in determining the mood of society. Poor harvests led to increased importation, higher prices, and a temper of unrest. Even though there had been marked improvements in the country's system of transport, there remained powerful local feelings against the long-distance movement of grain. For a more complete discussion of these restive factors see Asa Briggs, The Making of Modern England, 1783-1867: The Age of Improvement (New York, 1959), Chapter I, passim. Also, see below, Chapter VII, p. 173.

withdrew. By the 12th all was quiet and the next day several ringleaders were arrested. One was put on trial, convicted, and hanged four days later.[66] It is interesting to note that this spirited prosecution was not undertaken until the disorder had subsided.

A reluctance to act produced similar results in Coventry in 1795. On April 17 a great number of disorderly persons came to the market place and forced the reduction of prices. This went on most of the day but the local officials did not consider it serious enough to act on. After nightfall large numbers began to commit acts of violence. The mayor tried to get them to stop, but they refused. The military was then sent for but by this time so much momentum had been generated that it took four more days before order was restored.[67] Indecisiveness helped to produce a four-day riot at Stockport, Cheshire, in January and February 1800;[68] a five-day riot at Nottingham in August and September 1800;[69] and a six-day riot in London in September 1800.[70]

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[66]Gentleman's Magazine, LIII (1783), 262; Lord Sydney to Earl Gower, March 13, 1783, in H. O. 42/2.

[67]Mayor of Coventry to H. O., April 22, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

[68]The Times (London), Feb. 10, 1800, p. 2.

[69]Ibid., Sept. 4, p. 3; Sept. 5, p. 3; Sept. 6, p. 2; Sept. 8, p. 2; Commander of the Bunny Troop to Duke of Portland in H. O. 42/51; Oskar Teichman, "The Yeomanry as an Aid to Civil Power, 1795-1867," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XIX (1940), 77.

[70]Traill, Social England, V, 493; Gentleman's Magazine, LXX (1800), 895; The Scots Magazine, LXII (1800), 644; Lord Mayor of London to Duke of Portland, September 15, 1800, in H. O. 42/51; The Times (London), Sept. 16, p. 2; Sept. 17, p. 3; Sept. 18, p. 2; Sept. 19, p. 2; Sept. 20, p. 2; Sept. 22, p. 3.

There were instances in which disorders were stopped on the same day that they began even though decisive action was not taken when they broke out. Even when this was the case, there was usually a disproportionate amount of property damage and violence for a one-day disorder. For example, on June 25, 1795, a group of colliers destroyed one mill, damaged another, and broke windows out of private dwellings at Blakeney and Mitcheldeane in Gloucestershire before being dispersed by the militia and yeomanry.[71] Similar examples were also evident at Carlisle in Cumberland in August 1795[72] and at Sheffield in April 1800.[73]

On some occasions the magistrates chose to allow the disturbance to run its course without intervening. One might expect a riot to last for several days if no attempts were made to quell it. However, this was not the case. In only two instances did disorders last for two days; in the rest they were only of a day or less in duration. Of course, the magistrates were taking a calculated risk in not acting. There is no way of telling what their reaction would have been had the disorders become extremely violent or lasted for an extended period. One would suspect that they would have been forced to take some action under these circumstances but it is impossible to say. It could well be that these times of no action were, in reality, times in which indecisiveness paid off. That is to say, while the magistrates

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[71] Ibid., July 2, 1795, p. 3.

[72] Hammond, Village Labourer, 121.

[73] The Times (London), May 3, 1800, p. 3.

were trying to come to a decision, the disorder ran its course.

It could be expected that some disturbances would be short-lived since they had very limited objectives and came to an end when these aims were realized. There are a number of such examples throughout the period. One occurred on April 30, 1784, at White Hart Yard, Drury Lane in London. A young girl of about thirteen who had been seduced into the "oldest profession" was discovered by her uncle. He promptly got a mob together and demolished the house in which she was living. The mistress of the house managed to escape by a rear door and was not injured.[74] The next year on June 21 a mob assembled at Black-Friar's Bridge and protested the toll by stopping its collection for the night.[75] January 7, 1797, was the day appointed for the enrolling of the supplementary militia. A mob of about a thousand assembled at Carlisle in Cumberland, seized the balloting books and lists from the town clerk, and burned them, thus preventing the enrollment there.[76] In Manchester in March 1798 there was a wage dispute between some cotton spinners and their masters which resulted in the hiring of new spinners. The old spinners assembled in a riotous manner and broke the windows of the manufactory.[77]

On some occasions local officials failed to act because they did not have a sufficient military force at hand or did not have time to assemble one. The latter excuse was given by a magistrate of

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[74]Gentleman's Magazine, LIV (1784), 380.

[75]The Times (London), June 22, 1785, p. 3.

[76]Ibid., Jan. 12, 1797, p. 3.

[77]Ibid., Mar. 27, 1798, p. 3.

Abergele in Denbighshire, Wales, when a disorder occurred on April 10, 1795.[78] That same month a magistrate of Wells in Somersetshire was left without a force to call in when the 122nd Regiment stationed there began a food riot. His solution was to turn the matter over to the Home Office.[79] In September 1800 a mob trying to release three prisoners from the Oxford jail was very disorderly for two hours without the magistrates giving the jailer any assistance. The fact that there was not a sufficient military force available was cited as the reason for the lack of action. The Home Office reacted quickly. Several military units were sent to the vicinity, the Lord Lieutenant was directed to make a thorough investigation, and the magistrates were asked not to allow such things to occur with impunity.[80]

Food riots, which were especially prevalent during some years, did not at times evoke a response from local magistrates. For example, in Hull in 1796 there was an increase in the price of flour which touched off a two-day disorder on April 25 and 26. The first day the mob attacked a miller and then attacked his mill and destroyed the property in the mill as well as his dwelling house. On the following day they assembled and attacked the butter dealers demanding goods at a fixed price. The other shopkeepers closed their shops and the local farmers were forced by fear to acquiesce to the mob's demands.

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[78]John Lloyd to H. O., April 11, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

[79]John Turner to H. O., April 28, 1795, in ibid.

[80]H. O. to a Magistrate of Oxford, September 18, 1800, in H. O. 42/51; a Magistrate of Oxford to H. O., September 21, 1800, in ibid.; H. O. to Duke of Marlborough, September 22, 1800, in ibid.

There is no indication of local officials taking any action or why they failed to do so.[81]

We have seen that the maintaining of internal peace had been one of the primary functions of local officials for several centuries. However, during the eighteenth century, the extent of their authority was called into question and attacked by the courts. Appropriately, the century that produced the question also provided an answer. After the Gordon Riots the pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction, and local authorities as well as the military found themselves on safer ground. This development, coupled with the lack of any type of police force in most cities and a marked increase in disorders during some years, caused local officials to turn to military force as a prime aid to the maintenance of order.

It is to their credit that a large majority of these local "keepers of the peace" used the forces at their disposal either in a preventive manner or in a decisive fashion if a disturbance occurred. Those who were indecisive in their actions or who refused to act at all were definitely in the minority. It is evident that local officials not only understood that the responsibility for the maintenance of order was on their shoulders but also that they were generally willing to translate this responsibility into action when the occasion demanded.

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[81] Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 48.

CHAPTER V

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, AND DISSIDENT ELEMENTS: SOME POINTS OF CONFLICT

It can be observed from Chapters III and IV that a high degree of cooperation between the central government and local authorities had to exist if order was to be kept in the country. Local officials were responsible for seeing that the areas under their jurisdiction remained tranquil. The general absence of a police force and the proclivity of local officials to use military units to enforce their authority made cooperation a necessity if they were to carry out this responsibility. Since forces were being used that were not normally under local control, communications and procedural understandings had to be maintained between the two levels. There is ample evidence that these did exist. For example, on January 23, 1795, the Home Office received a letter stating that more than forty persons had assembled at Harrietsham, Kent, the afternoon before. They had threatened, if the price of flour was not reduced by the following Monday, to return with four or five thousand persons and pull down the mill owned by Mr. Webb and Mr. Towle. The Home Office wrote an immediate reply directing the owners of the mill to inform the civil magistrates and directing the magistrates to order the military to be ready. The Home Office also noted that there were troops quartered in adjacent villages which could be used if needed.[1]

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[1]H. O. 42/34.

The central government received on a regular basis reports of impending unrest, accounts of disorders in progress, requests for military assistance, and questions concerning the legality of specific actions. In the last category, the same or very similar questions often had to be answered and reanswered. One query that reappeared on several occasions was the question of just when military force could be employed. As late as 1800 the Home Office was asked to clarify this point. A large mob had gathered at Longton in Staffordshire and had begun to commit acts of violence. A unit of yeoman cavalry had been called to duty. Whenever a magistrate approached the mob to read the Riot Act, they would disperse but form again upon his departure. The commander wrote to the Home Office wanting to know if he could act without a magistrate if his unit were attacked enroute to a disturbance or if he found a mob destroying property. He also wanted to know if he could act with a constable in a military capacity.[2]

Even though the general spirit between the central and local governments was one of cooperation, there were some points of conflict which rose to the surface at times. One of the more significant ones was a jurisdictional dispute over the control of certain militia units. In 1798 the generals who were in command of the regular army forces in the various districts in England[3] requested that the flank-companies under the lord lieutenants' command be formed into battalions and placed under the command of officers of the regular army. Some militia

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[2]Commander of a Volunteer Unit to Duke of Portland, September 25, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

[3]See below, Chapter VI, Figure 5, p. 156.

colonels denounced this move as unconstitutional and threatened to take the matter before the courts of law. In their opinion the militia was not the army and not subject to the War Office and therefore could not legally be taken away from the command of its own officers. The decision ultimately went against them. However, Fortescue sees this as an important move from the standpoint of the regular army since it "was the first step towards the uniting of all the land-forces of the Crown under a single department."[4]

On occasion local officials questioned the central government's decisions to remove military units from their particular town. The questioning of the wisdom of such decisions was usually motivated by a fear of a disturbance from a certain element of the population. One incident was prompted by the presence of a large number of canal workers in the vicinity of Wisbech, Cambridgeshire, where two canals were under construction. These laborers were viewed as a lawless element by the local populace and since some disturbances had already occurred, a contingent of troops was requested. It was pointed out in the request that the county had been safe while a unit of dragoons had been quartered there but that it had been sent elsewhere leaving the area without protection.[5] The next month the Mayor of Gloucester corresponded with the Home Office in a similar vein. The dragoons which had been quartered there had been ordered out and the last group was scheduled to leave the next day. The mayor was fearful

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[4]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, pp. 885-86.

[5]Magistrates of Wisbech to H. O., July 25, 1795, in H. O. 42/35.

that if there were no troops in the town, the colliers from the Forest of Dean would come to Gloucester in search of provisions. They had threatened to do so and had in fact been threatening several towns in the neighborhood. The mayor wanted a party of horse left in the town for the purpose of security.[6]

Just as there were requests for military units to be maintained at certain places, there were also requests that troops be removed. E. P. Thompson has noted a general reluctance, during most of the eighteenth century, of local officials to use troops. If the magistrates used the military excessively, they might have to suffer the consequences as they had to go on living in the area after the soldiers left. Troops billeted in a town soon became unpopular with everyone, even those who had sent for them. Both Home Office and War Office records show that requests for troops were usually followed within five or six weeks by petitions for their removal.[7] This was especially the case when the conditions which had prompted the request had changed.

This change of temper can be seen in a letter to the Home Office from Nottingham. There had been several days of disorders two weeks earlier, and the central government had sent several military units to assist in restoring order. The letter expressed the appreciation of the city leaders for the attention given to them by the government but asked that no more regular troops be sent. They feared that more soldiers would produce a stronger reaction from the populace.[8] The

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[6]Mayor of Gloucester to H. O., August 4, 1795, in ibid.

[7]Thompson, "Moral Economy of the English Crowd," 121.

[8]Town Clerk of Nottingham to Duke of Portland, September 16, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

same attitude had been expressed a few years earlier by the officials of Bristol. They feared a riot and had requested military assistance which had been provided. The disorder did not materialize, and four days later the mayor wrote to express appreciation for the troops which had been made available but stated that he would rely on the civil power and use the soldiers only in case of emergency. Six weeks later he wrote asking that they be removed.[9]

The most pronounced disagreements between the central government and local officials with regard to the stationing of troops usually occurred when units were sent unannounced to a town. This was the case when a hundred soldiers of the Surrey Militia marched into Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, with orders to be quartered there until further notice. The next day a petition for their removal was sent to the Home Office. The officials of Aylesbury stated that the town had ample troops (two troops of the St. Watkins Fencibles, a party of Irish, and several volunteers from the navy), and that the soldiers already there were a great burden upon the publicans who needed no more such burdens. The petition went on to say that the Surrey Corps had the reputation of being an unruly group, and it was feared that they would join a riot rather than quelling it. These Surrey men had already stated that they would make provisions cheaper, but, in the opinion of the town officials, their presence would increase scarcity and cause more discontent.[10]

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[9]Mayor of Bristol to Henry Dundas, July 25 and September 10, 1791, in H. O. 42/19.

[10]Mr. Lloyd to Duke of Portland, April 29, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

A very similar argument was made a few years later by Mayor John Massey of New Castle-Under-Lyme, Staffordshire. A minor disturbance had occurred at The Potteries a week earlier, and some person unknown to the mayor had petitioned the Home Office for troops. A detachment of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons had been marched from Birmingham. The mayor made it plain that this unit was neither wanted nor needed because there was already a shortage of provisions, especially of hay and straw with the latter being needed for the potteries. These soldiers were also a great hardship upon the publicans upon whom they were quartered. The mayor went on to state that the town had had no disturbance of consequence, and it seemed that it was being punished with soldiers for maintaining order. Furthermore, it was general knowledge that there had been recent riots in the Birmingham neighborhood, and it would appear that the dragoons would be more needed there. The mayor was of the opinion that the Newcastle, Pottery, and Stone Troops of Volunteer Cavalry combined with the numerous corps of infantry in Newcastle and the general vicinity would be capable of handling any foreseen disturbance. In addition, these local units were "much hurt" because of the regulars being sent on such a trivial matter and felt accused of being incompetent.[11]

One of the hottest exchanges between local officials and the central government in regard to the sending of troops without a prior announcement occurred in September 1800 at Oxford. The controversy began when a private citizen wrote to the Home Office on September 1

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[11]Mayor John Massey to H. O., May 6, 1800, in H. O. 42/50.

reporting a minor disturbance close to Oxford at Abingdon in Berkshire. Although the disorder was not serious, the writer noted a general unrest in the area over the price of provisions and expressed the fear that a large tumult might break out on the next market day at Oxford. He suspected that the city volunteers would not exert themselves against a mob under such circumstances. Since Saturday was the next market day, it was suggested that twenty or thirty dragoons appearing on Friday night "as if by accident" would keep things quiet.[12]

On market day, September 6, the anticipated disturbance occurred. A large number of people assembled and went about forcing the dealers in various provisions to lower their prices. While this was going on, a party of dragoons arrived on the scene, and this action ceased. One observer was of the opinion that all danger had passed by the end of the day but thought that the timely arrival of the troops had prevented a serious disorder. However, the mayor and a number of other officials were incensed at soldiers being sent to Oxford with no forewarning. They immediately wrote to the War Office expressing surprise at such action, stating that, although there was a great deal of pressure in the county, they were taking effective action, and requesting that the unit be removed immediately. Some of the members of the city volunteers even threatened to lay down their arms if the troops remained. This petition was forwarded to the Home Office, which sent a strong reply. The Home Secretary stated that his office had a broader view of the total situation than any one locality and that

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[12]H. O. 42/51.

he had to use this view to decide where and when to send troops. He also pointed out that in such cases the soldiers were being sent to assist the magistrates and local associations. The letter takes the city to task for its failure to prevent the disturbance and makes no mention of honoring the request for the removal of the dragoons.[13]

In some cases towns desired the security the soldiers provided but balked at the general inconvenience they caused. Along these lines a letter from the magistrates of Gloucester in 1800 had a decidedly different tone than the one written by the mayor five years earlier.[14] The magistrates complained that the 7th Regiment of Dragoon Guards had been quartered in Gloucester for some time and had been a constant source of irritation to the whole area. Members of the unit had participated in robberies, assaults, and other lawless acts and for this reason the officials wished to lodge a complaint. The magistrates stated that it was generally supposed that the local citizenry might corrupt soldiers but in this instance the opposite was true. It was felt that in case of a riot these soldiers would side with the rioters. The remedy could be the removal of the unit, but the magistrates felt this to be too extreme. In their opinion Gloucester should never be without troops for three reasons: the temper of the people; the nearness of the town to the clothing country; the closeness to Wales. They, therefore, proposed what to them seemed a practical solution to the dilemma--barracks. It was suggested that barracks be constructed

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[13]David Hughes to Duke of Portland, September 6 and 9, 1800, in ibid.; Thompson, "Moral Economy of the English Crowd," 129-30.

[14]See above, pp. 113-14.

and that the town never be without both horse and foot units.[15]

On some occasions local authorities felt free to use whatever persuasive powers they possessed to alter directives from London on the movement and stationing of military units. If time allowed, letters were usually sent to the Home Office or War Office requesting the desired changes. However, when time and distance precluded an exchange of messages, local officials and the commanders of the units involved had to arrive at a decision based upon their first-hand knowledge of the situation. Such was the case at Manchester in July 1791. The Priestley Riots had broken out in Birmingham on July 14 and a number of units from various places had been ordered there. Colonel Goldsworthy, Commander of the Royal Regiment of Dragoons, whose unit was stationed at Manchester, had received orders to go with part of his regiment to Birmingham. However, because of the insistence of the magistrates of Manchester, he had delayed complying with the orders. When he reported this, the Home Office ruled that he had been correct in his actions since there appeared to be a danger at Manchester, and by the time he had received the orders, the disturbances in Birmingham had subsided, making the presence of his unit there superfluous.[16]

There were times when authorities at the local level found themselves caught between the central government and the local populace. On the one hand, London demanded that the magistrates on the scene maintain order; on the other hand, riotous groups were just as

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[15]Magistrates of Gloucester to H. O., December 5, 1800, in H. O. 50/10.

[16]H. O. to Secretary at War, July 20, 1791, in H. O. 42/19.

determined that their grievances be manifested by disorderly means. As a result, local officials sometimes found themselves in untenable positions. They were open to reproof from above when they did not act with the desired effectiveness. The Mayor of Banbury, Oxfordshire, was castigated by the Duke of Portland for not taking more productive action during a riot.[17] Similarly, the Mayor of Stafford was taken to task for not quelling a disturbance with greater dispatch. In a very harsh and blunt letter, the Home Office outlined the proper action, recited portions of the Riot Act, and directed the mayor to adopt more prompt and effective action in the future.[18]

While they were trying to satisfy the Ministers in London, local officials had to react to a variety of situations at home. The attitude and temper of the disorderly elements determined, in many cases, what actions could reasonably be taken as well as how effective these procedures would be. As they tried to extricate themselves from these predicaments, authorities at the local level were faced with several common problems.

There were instances when riotous groups would let neither civil nor military force deter them from the expression of a grievance or from correcting a real or imagined injustice. At such times all the magistrates could do was to disperse the crowd whenever it assembled in hopes that the disposition to riot would eventually be eliminated. However, the rectification of their grievances was the only means of

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[17]Duke of Portland to Mayor of Banbury, September 13, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

[18]H. O. to Mayor of Stafford, September 22, 1800, in ibid.

relieving the pressure. This was evident in London in June 1792 when about forty persons who had gathered to celebrate the "King's birth-night" were arrested. Believing these arrests to be unjustified, a mob gathered and demanded their release. The disorders continued for two days during which time the mob was dispersed three times by the military. Most of those arrested were set free, but the crowd did not cease to assemble until they found one of the constables who had been most active in the arrests, ran him down, tarred him, and smeared him with dung and filth.[19] Apparently these actions satisfied their sense of justice.

Later in the same decade the citizens of London exhibited the same temperament with regard to questionable recruiting practices. It was difficult to get recruits, and the price paid for recruits had gone to thirty pounds a head by August 1794 with many unscrupulous means being employed to secure them. One deranged individual, who had been enlisted and locked up with his hands tied in a recruiting house, threw himself out of a third story window and was killed. This touched off eight days of disorders which did not subside until most of the recruiting stations in the city were attacked and until enough troops were called out to guard the stations throughout London. The soldiers had to disperse mobs of citizens on numerous occasions.[20]

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[19]Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 570.

[20]Ibid., LXIV (1794), 721-23; The Scots Magazine, LVI (1794), 571-72; Rudé, The Crowd in History, 51; Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 1, p. 214; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 212; The Times (London), Aug. 18, p. 4; Aug. 21, p. 2; Aug. 23, p. 2.

Less than a year later in July 1795, rumors of similar practices set off three days of disturbances of a like nature.[21]

London was not the only city in which officials had to face citizens who were determined to have grievances redressed in spite of all efforts to thwart them. A long-standing grievance about the high tax rate in Bristol, which erupted into a five-day disorder in September 1793, has already been described.[22]

Another common problem local officials had to face was a mob's lack of respect for the military units and a disregard for the authority which they represented. Of course, there had to be some lack of respect in the instances that have just been discussed--when a crowd of people were so intent upon realizing its aims that it more or less ignored the coercions of a military force. However, there were times when mobs reacted in a more overt fashion. In addition to verbal abuse, they would pelt the soldiers with whatever objects came to hand. The most common missiles mentioned were sticks, stones, and brickbats. Even after such acts, there were occasions when a compromise could be reached. This happened in Banbury, Oxfordshire, in September 1800 when a food riot broke out. The mob refused to disperse and in addition insulted and stoned the soldiers who were trying to restore order. After the mayor wrote for additional troops, the mob agreed to disperse if the soldiers would withdraw as well. This was done, and order was restored.[23]

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[21]Rose, Pitt and the Great War, 288; Gentleman's Magazine, LV (1795), 697-98; Annual Register (1795), "Chron.," 29; H. O. 42/35.

[22]See above, Chapter IV, p. 104.

[23]High Sheriff of the County of Oxford and Mayor of Banbury

After such abuse, compromise was the exception rather than the rule. What usually happened was that the soldiers would advance on the mob with fixed bayonets if they were foot troops or would ride among them with drawn swords if they were cavalry units. While this was in progress, it was not uncommon for the soldiers to be assailed with all manner of thrown objects. Relentless pressures by the soldiers accompanied by arrests of the leaders or the more active members of the assembly generally succeeded in dispersing the mob and restoring order. This was the chain of events in London in June 1793;[24] in Truro, Cornwall, in August 1793 and April 1796;[25] and in Birmingham in May 1810.[26]

The accounts of the period are filled with plaudits to military units who were able to restore order under such provocations without doing serious injury to the people they were dispersing. However, there were occasions when these aggravations resulted in stronger retaliation. For example, in New Alresford, Hampshire, in September 1800, a riotous mob had insulted a unit of dragoons for an hour after the reading of the Riot Act. As a last resort, the magistrates ordered the soldiers to charge the mob. They did so using the flat of their swords and beat several of the rioters severely.[27] An even more tragic

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to Duke of Portland, September 12, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

[24] Gentleman's Magazine, LXIII (1793), 573.

[25] The Times (London), Aug. 22, 1793, p. 2; April 12, 1796, p. 3.

[26] Langford, A Century of Birmingham Life, II, 240.

[27] The Times (London), Sept. 30, 1800, p. 3.

ending occurred near Leicester in August 1795. A party of cavalry had been sent to escort a quantity of corn from a nearby village, but the people refused to let it go. The officer in command talked with the leaders, and it was agreed that part of the corn would be left in the village. However, when the party set out with the remainder of the shipment, the mob pelted them with bricks and stones, and one man fired a shot at them. The soldiers turned and fired on the rioters, killing four and wounding eight.[28]

On some occasions riotous groups did much more than provoke the soldiers or throw stones and bricks at them--they attacked them with such ferocity that the troops had little choice but to defend themselves. The outcome was usually a very violent and bloody confrontation. Such was the case during the toll riots in Bristol in 1793. A mob that was estimated at times to have been as large as twelve thousand persons openly attacked the soldiers on more than one occasion during the five-day disorder. As a result, there were between twenty and twenty-five deaths and more than a hundred total casualties. A London mob exhibited the same disposition during the Burdett Riots, which lasted from April 6 through April 9, 1810. They attacked private homes, carriages, people on the street, and the soldiers who were trying to put a halt to their actions. To their credit the troops killed only two rioters, but there were a large number of injuries.[29]

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[28]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 47-48.

[29]Traill, Social England, V, 619-20; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, III, 351; Gentleman's Magazine, LXXX (1810), pt. I, 376-77; Patterson, Francis Burdett, I, 259, 261-63, 268, 272-74; The Times (London), April 7, p. 3; April 9, pp. 2-3; April 10, p. 3.

Although there were numerous instances when mobs insulted, abused, or attacked soldiers, the period is not devoid of cases in which they came to their defense. A crowd might take such action when it was felt that soldiers were receiving unjust or unfair treatment. The recruiting riots in London[30] were basically touched off by this attitude. The same position was taken by a group of people in Manchester in July 1780. A mutinous soldier was about to be punished[31] when a number of women and children attacked the officer in charge, pelting him with dirt. The officer did not retalitate, but the crowd became more violent as it grew larger. It was feared that the soldiers might retaliate if the abuses continued. A magistrate came to the scene with a party of light horse and read the Riot Act after which the crowd dispersed. The soldier's punishment was then meted out.[32]

In London in 1804 a party of Foot Guards arrested a deserter and took him to a public house until he could be taken away safely. A mob gathered with the intention of releasing him. They became so unruly that two additional companies of Guards had to be sent for before the man could be moved.[33] The next year a mob in Durham succeeded

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[30]See above, pp. 121-22.

[31]The account does not say, but the punishment was probably a certain number of lashes as this type of punishment was common to the period. Neither does the account relate the specific act committed by the soldier. However, we can conclude from the actions taken by the crowd that it considered the punishment to be harsher than was merited by the offense.

[32]Gentleman's Magazine, L (1780), 390.

[33]The Times (London), Sept. 10, 1804, p. 3. In the same vein that a crowd would come to the aid of one being coerced into military service, assistance might also be extended to an individual who was being coerced into remaining in military service, especially if the

in releasing two soldiers of the Derby Militia who had been jailed for riotous conduct.[34]

A third problem with which local officials had to cope was untrustworthiness among the military units upon which they had to rely for the maintenance of order. This is not to say that a majority or even a significant percentage of the units were unreliable, but there were enough cases to cause concern. This was especially true with regard to the militia. One of the principal arguments against the stationing of embodied militia units in their home areas was the probability that they would be hesitant to fire on a riotous mob containing their friends and relatives. It was this belief that prompted a group of citizens of Manchester in 1781 to request the removal of the Lanchasire Militia from that town. There was considerable unemployment among weavers, and it was feared that a riot might erupt. The sympathy the Lancashires had for these people was well known, making it probable that they would take their side in a disorder.[35]

Concern about the unreliability of troops serving near their homes was especially strong in regard to the manufacturing districts as these areas were considered more susceptible to disorders. In 1795 two citizens of Hull used the reverse of this attitude to argue for the stationing of a local volunteer unit at Hull. The town was in the process of raising such a unit, and it was desired that they

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person had been the victim of questionable recruiting practices or of a press-gang.

[34]Ibid., July 30, 1805, p. 2.

[35]Western, English Militia, 402.

serve in the area because Hull was not disloyal or riotous. In addition, the objections about local troops serving in their own towns did not apply to Hull since it was not a manufacturing town.[36]

The fear that militia or other military units would not act forcibly was not confined exclusively to the manufacturing districts although there seems to have been more concern about these areas than other localities. Actually, in any disorder the reliability of a unit was suspect if it were asked to operate against a mob composed of familiar people or people in the same occupation. It made little difference if the elements involved were weavers, tinners, coal miners, or shipyard workers. This fact was noted by General Rooke, the commander at Bristol, when he was asked to send more units to restore order in Merthyr Tydfil, Glamorganshire, Wales. It was his opinion that the units at Swansea would do little good since they were composed of too many of the same type of persons who were participating in the disorder.[37]

A unit might simply refuse to obey the civil authorities. This was the case in Truro, Cornwall, in June 1789. A food riot broke out on Wednesday the 17th, and a party of the 39th Regiment was ordered out. The Justices talked with the rioters for a time and then ordered the officers to have their men fire on the crowd. The officers refused to do so and the mob dispersed. However, they rose again on Friday,

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[36]William Osbourne and John K. Picard to Duke of York, March 1795, in H. O. 50/4.

[37]General Rooke to H. O., September 22, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

and a unit from the same regiment had to be called out on Sunday to assist the magistrates in restoring order.[38]

Not only did local authorities have to be concerned, under certain conditions, with the reliability of military units, but they also had to worry about the soldiers themselves being the instigators of disorders. Some of these began as personal conflicts but grew into disturbances of a public nature. For example, on December 15, 1795, at Chatham, Kent, some young, drunk marine officers were denied admittance to a room at a local inn in which a party was in progress. They abused the proprietor and his wife and were in turn attacked by a group of men at the inn. One of their superior officers had to come and restore order.[39]

In the same vein a party of the 6th Regiment of Dragoon Guards at Long Melford in Suffolk got into a quarrel with some local persons at a public house on Christmas Day, 1795. The soldiers left the establishment and attacked several persons on the street after which they were themselves attacked by a body of local people armed with pitchforks and scythes. A severe conflict ensued with one soldier having his hand cut off.[40] Similarly, in Braintree, Essex, after some soldiers who were quartered at a public house had had an argument with the landlord, they went out and beat several persons severely, which caused one woman to die from shock.[41]

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[38]A. K. Hamilton Jenkins, The Cornish Miner (2nd ed.; London, 1948), 156.

[39]The Times (London), Dec. 22, 1795, p. 4.

[40]Ibid., Jan. 2, 1796, p. 4. [41]Ibid., July 24, 1805, p. 3.

In addition to allowing their personal differences to get out of hand and causing a public disturbance, there were a number of instances during 1795 when soldiers were the instigators of and the main participants in food riots. Two of the most serious occurred in April, within one week of each other, in Hampshire and Sussex respectively. At about 7:00 a.m. a number of groups of from four to five hundred persons each gathered in several parts of Portsmouth. They forced the selling of meat and bread at much reduced prices. Officials were fearful of calling on the soldiers in the local garrison because they had come out earlier that morning and demanded and got provisions at reduced prices. That afternoon the soldiers marched to Portsea, a suburb of Portsmouth, where they were assisted by local inhabitants and dock-yard workers in seizing meat at reduced prices.[42]

A week later the Oxfordshire Militia left their barracks at Blatchford and marched under arms to Seaford and seized all the provisions they could find. They then moved on to New Haven and did the same thing. Several military units had to be called from surrounding towns to restore order. The punishments for these acts were rather severe, and the entire regiment was drawn up to witness them. Several lesser offenders were flogged, and two of the principal leaders were executed. The executions were carried out by some of their comrades who had been participants with them in the disorder.[43]

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[42]Ibid., April 14, 1795, p. 3; Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 343; John Carter to Duke of Portland, April 12, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

[43]Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 343, 519-20; The Scots Magazine, LVII (1795), 270; The Times (London), April 21, 1795, p. 3.

During the same month soldiers visited the markets at Guilford in Surrey[44] and at Wells in Somersetshire[45] and forced the reduction of the price of foodstuffs; the same action was taken in September at Canterbury.[46]

Although the general spirit in the relationship between the central government and local authorities was one of cooperation, some points of friction did exist. In the main these irritations were caused by questions over the control of the militia, by the removal of troops that local officials wanted to remain, by the maintenance of troops that local officials wanted removed, by the assignment of soldiers to a town without first informing the town officials, and by the inconvenience caused by the quartering of soldiers in a town. These frictions, even though they were very real, were manifested "on paper" in the correspondence between the two governmental levels. The place where this correspondence from above and the discontent from below met was at the local level, and this is where the real lubricant had to be applied.

There were occasions when local officials found themselves caught in a vise. They had to answer to the Home Office for the maintenance of the King's Peace, and they had to answer to their fellow citizens for the manner in which they maintained it. They often had to face dissident elements who would not be deterred until their

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[44]Ibid., April 1795, p. 2.

[45]John Turner to H. O., April 28, 1795, in H. O. 42/34.

[46]B. G. Baker, "Old Cavalry Stations: Canterbury," The Cavalry Journal, XX (1930), 189.

grievances were satisfied, who exhibited little respect for civil or military authority, and who openly insulted, provoked, or attacked soldiers under their control. In addition, the strongest force local magistrates had at their disposal sometimes proved unreliable even to the point of aiding, abetting, or even starting disturbances.

Local officials recognized that the prime responsibility for the maintenance of order lay in their hands. For the most part, they accepted this responsibility even when pressured from above and harassed from below and even when their efforts met with limited success.

CHAPTER VI

THE BARRACK ISSUE

Since it was rather common practice in the eighteenth century to employ military units to restore civil order, the local and regional accessibility of the military came to be of the utmost importance. This was especially true with regard to the regular army units, which played an increasingly prominent role in law-enforcement as the century wore on. It is obvious that their location would be a critical factor, as indeed it was. But another factor, the manner in which they would be located, came to be the cardinal point around which controversy swirled.

At the same time that England became embroiled in the struggle with revolutionary France, the policy on the quartering of regular army units on the home island was changed significantly. In fact, this alteration was so enormous that Fortescue has interpreted it not simply as a change, but as a revolution.[1] This revolution has been used to illustrate the government's, and especially William Pitt's, repressive attitude toward the discontented and restless lower social orders. It has also been seen as an attempt to solve the problem of England's lack of an effective constabulary by making troops more readily available to civil authorities. These assertions can best be evaluated against the background of a brief survey of the policy and conditions in existence before 1792.

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[1]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, p. 903.

It is well known that by the opening of the eighteenth century, one of the most salient English phobias was the fear of a home-based standing army. In many minds a standing army was equated with an army quartered and maintained in billets separate from the general population--an army in barracks. This fear was noted in 1722 by one J. Mackay on his travels through the British Isles during which he had observed the newly constructed barracks at Berwick-on-Tweed. He remarked that "it would be a vast Ease to the Inhabitants in most great Towns if they had them everywhere," but he hastened to add that "English Liberty will never consent to what will seem a nest for a Standing Army."[2]

The accuracy of Mackay's assessment was borne out in 1741. A number of innkeepers made formal complaints to Parliament about the hardships of having troops quartered on them as provided for in the Mutiny Act (see below, p. 134). This resulted in a lengthy debate in the House of Commons.[3] William Pulteney observed that a standing army in private quarters would always be more troublesome to the people than a standing army in barracks. For this very reason it should be kept in quarters in order that the people remain sensible to it.[4] Henry Pelham also thought it a poor policy to separate the soldiery from the people and he stated that "barracks . . . are justly names of terror to a free nation . . . ."[5]

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[2]J. Mackay, A Journey through Scotland . . . Being the Third Volume Which Compleats Great-Britain (2nd ed.; 1729), 25, quoted in Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 119.

[3]Parliamentary History, XI, 1388-1480.

[4]Ibid., 1448. [5]Ibid., 1459

Later in the century Blackstone expounded the maxim that had by then become, and was to remain, the basic argument of those opposed to the creation of a standing army through barrack construction.

> In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession of arms . . . .
> . . . . . .
> To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress . . . it is requisite that the armies with which it is intrusted should consist of the people, and have the same spirit with the people; . . . . Nothing, then, according to these principles, ought to be more guarded against in a free state, than making the military power, when such a one is necessary to be kept of foot, a body too distinct from the people. Like ours, it should wholly be composed of natural subjects; it ought only to be enlisted for a short and limited time; the soldiers also should live intermixed with the people; no separate camp, no barracks, no inland fortresses, should be allowed.[6]

Blackstone's principles had begun to be applied following the Glorious Revolution with the passage of the Mutiny Act.[7] This Act of 1688, re-enacted on an annual basis until 1879,[8] made provisions for the quartering of soldiers in public houses with the innkeepers receiving remuneration for this service.

Although England adhered to a no-barrack principle until the end of the eighteenth century, adherence was never absolute. There were always a few permanent military installations scattered about the country, but their number and the number of soldiers they held were not large. Although it is difficult to determine the exact number

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[6]Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. by William D. Lewis (4 vols.; Philadelphia, 1897), I, 408, 414. First published, 1765-69.

[7]The first was 1 William and Mary, c. 5 (1688) and dealt with the defense of the realm.

[8]Holdsworth has noted that there was apparently a short break in the Mutiny Act at the end of 1689. Holdsworth, History of English Law, VI, 241n.

billeted in them at any given time, we do know that, in 1697, the barracks at the various forts, garrisons, and castles were provided with enough beds, bedsteads, and sheets for five thousand men.[9] These soldiers were billeted in permanent fortifications, many of which were the very ancient guardians of harbor entrances and other strategic points.

The first barrack in Great Britain, constructed for the purpose of providing for the separate quartering of soldiers, was built at Berwick-on-Tweed in 1722.[10] Construction of facilities of this type continued at a leisurely pace for the following seventy years. By 1792 the total of these newer billets plus the older forts and castles, came to only forty-three barracks with accommodations for 20,847 artillery and infantry personnel. These installations were distributed through England, Scotland, and the Channel Islands.[11] Thirty-one were in England; there were none in Wales.[12] Thus even though there were violations of the letter of the country's barrack policy, for all practical purposes the spirit of the policy remained. But 1792 produced a significant alteration in both the letter and the spirit of this policy.

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[9]Journal of the House of Commons, XII, 55.

[10]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 68.

[11]Charles M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown; Their Administration and Government (2 vols.; London, 1869), I, 223. Installations were located on the main Channel Islands, Alderney, Guernsey, and Jersey, all just off the coast of France.

[12]Appendix no. 1 to the "Fourth Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry," Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1806-07), [99], II, 413-19.

In the summer of 1792 Henry Dundas,[13] the Home Secretary, sent Colonel Oliver De Lancey, a deputy adjutant general, on a tour of inspection of the north of England to ascertain to what degree the soldiers stationed there could be depended upon in an emergency. De Lancey reported that it was

> a dangerous measure to keep troops in the manufacturing Towns in their present dispersed state, and unless Barracks could be established for them where they could be kept under the eyes of their officers it would be prudent to Quarter them in the towns and villages in the vicinity, from whence in case of emergency they would act with much more effect.[14]

It is quite possible that De Lancey's views were colored by the fact that less than a year before, in July 1791, he had commanded the troops in Birmingham during the Priestley Riots.[15]

In June, soon after his tour of inspection, De Lancey stated that he

> was directed to attend at the house of Mr. Dundas . . . at Wimbledon, where I found Mr. Pitt, Sir George Yonge [the Secretary at War], and several other persons; the conversation was on the subject of erecting barracks in different parts of England, which it was necessary should be executed with utmost dispatch, and I was particularly desired to undertake this Service; and being perfectly convinced from the situation of the Country (with which I had been enabled to make myself intimately acquainted) of the necessity of the measure, and that it would not admit to delay . . . .[16]

The next day De Lancey met with Yonge, and procedures were arranged to put these measures into operation. These procedures very soon

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[13]Later, 1st Viscount Melville, 1802.

[14]H. O. 42/20, quoted in Hammond, Town Labourer, 83-84.

[15]Gentleman's Magazine, LXI (1791), 676.

[16]"First Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry," Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1806), [467], XI, 96.

provided evidence of a radical change in military housing policy.

An Order in Council of 1677 had given the care of all fortifications, including the charge of barrack construction, to the Board of Ordnance.[17] However, this "old bottle" was not capable of holding the "new wine." Appropriations for the Ordnance Department had to come through Parliament, and the government realized that the amount of money necessary for the projected construction program could not be obtained from this normal channel. Thus the Board of Ordnance was set aside, and the Barrack Department was created. This was a military department, created without Parliamentary sanction and independent of Parliament. It was supposed to be under the control of the Secretary at War and received its financing from the "Extraordinaries of the Army," which were not subject to close Parliamentary scrutiny.[18] The task of supervising this program was given to De Lancey, who was appointed Barrackmaster General in June 1792.[19]

The question as to why Pitt did not attempt a direct, Parliamentary approach before he embarked on the circuitous route that was soon to provoke considerable criticism can be partially answered by examining a defeat suffered by Pitt in Parliament six years earlier. On February 27, 1786, a motion had been brought to secure the dockyards at Portsmouth and Plymouth by a system of permanent fortifications.[20]

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[17]Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 8, 240.

[18]C. R. B. Barrett, "Early Cavalry Barracks in Great Britain," The Cavalry Journal, VII (1912), 162, 164, 167.

[19]Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 240.

[20]Parliamentary History, XXV, 1096-1157.

In the extended debate that ensued, Pitt tried to counter the charges that these installations were something new and unprecedented by appealing to history. He argued that fortifications had always been a part of the English defense system and, consequently, were not new in principle, only in place.[21] The jealousy that existed in the country over anything that looked like an increase of the standing army was very evident. It was reasoned that this policy could be extended to virtually the whole country, and therefore should be halted before it gained a foothold.[22] The scheme was challenged in certain particulars but the basic attacks on it were constitutional and economic objections.[23] The debate lasted all night, and the House divided on the question at seven o'clock the next morning. With 169 standing on each side, the speaker cast the deciding vote against the measure.[24]

It should be noted that this motion did not concern a change in military housing policy; nevertheless it evoked the traditional reaction against the existence of a home-based standing army. What greater storm might be unleashed by an open proposal to revolutionize the country's military housing system? This Pitt had no intention of finding out, and one is inclined to agree that in 1792 he "resolved to compass his ends by stealth . . . ."[25]

De Lancey pushed the program vigorously, and the number of barracks mushroomed. By mid-1805 in England alone there were 168

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[21] Ibid., 1105-06. [22] Ibid., 1136-37.

[23] Ibid., 1138, 1146. [24] Ibid., 1156-57.

[25] Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, p. 906.

barracks at 135 separate locations with a capacity of 132,948 officers and men.[26] There was a slight decline during the next ten years to 157 barracks at 134 separate locations with a capacity of 130,443.[27] The period under investigation can be divided into three parts insofar as the barrack issue is concerned: 1780 to 1792, when there were few barracks and no active program to increase the number; 1792 to 1805, when there was an enormous proliferation of barracks; and 1805 to 1811, when the number of new facilities was offset by the deactivation of older ones, producing a practical equilibrium in numbers and capacity.

That England's policy after 1792 on the quartering of troops was a significant break with the status quo is borne out by the statutes relating to property acquisition. Before the 1790's the Crown did not have, nor did it need, any general powers for the compulsory taking of land for the use of military or other public purposes. The first act conferring such powers was passed in 1798 under the apprehension of a French invasion.[28] It expired in March 1802 with the Peace of Amiens but was renewed[29] when hostilities broke out again fourteen months later and continued in force until 1814. This act provided that any general officer so appointed could survey and mark out a piece

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[26]Appendix no. 41(A) to the "Second Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry," Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1806), [317], VI, 282 ff.

[27]John Adolphus, The Political State of the British Empire (4 vols.; London, 1818), II, 293-97.

[28]38 George III, c. 27.

[29]By 43 George III, c. 55 (1803).

of ground wanted for public service and "treat and agree" with the owner for its "possession or use, during such time as the exigence of the service shall require." If no agreement could be reached, a jury was to be called to set fair compensation. But in no event could ground be taken without the consent of the owner unless such action was certified by the lord lieutenant or two deputy lieutenants or unless the enemy had actually invaded the kingdom.

Clode points out[30] that there was nothing in this act which made provisions for conveying these lands to the Crown, or to any one in trust for the Crown. It provided for the temporary occupation or use of needed land, but this was the only statutory sanction that the Barrackmaster General had for site-acquisitions, and several posts were acquired in this manner.[31] These properties appear to have been conveyed to the Barrackmaster General "and his successors," although such an arrangement had no legal basis under the statute. Parliament had to clear this up after the fact with a statute making the Barrackmaster General a quasi-corporation and allowing him to hold these properties in trust for the Crown.[32]

Opinion within the country was divided on the barrack issue. The populace of York, for example, raised no objections to the construction of a permanent garrison there in 1795. This can possibly be traced to the fact that York had been the home of cavalry for

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[30]Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 257.

[31]"Fourth Report," Parliamentary Papers (1806-07), II, 124.

[32]Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, I, 257.

centuries, with "temporary" quarters for them having been erected in 1720.[33] Norwich, on the other hand, had gotten sick of its soldiery in the 1650's, and this attitude carried over to the end of the eighteenth century. The leading newspaper there, the Mercury, supported barrack construction; apparently a significant number of the citizens did not. This produced a long and lively debate in the paper over the issue.[34] In London, the Morning Chronicle registered protests over the new barrack program as well as the maintenance of semi-permanent military encampments.[35] A group of land owners from Everton, Lancashire, used a very modern-sounding argument in petitioning the House of Commons. They were not against barracks but they did not want them located close to where a large number of Liverpool merchants had built "dwellings of a superior class."[36] They were saying, in effect, "there goes the neighborhood."

These divided opinions were not long in finding their way into Parliamentary debate. There were two debates on the issue in the House of Commons in 1793 and 1796.[37] Pitt fell back on the same argument used in 1786: a new principle was not being introduced.[38]

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[33]B. G. Baker, "Old Cavalry Stations: York," The Cavalry Journal, XXI (1931), 224-25.

[34]B. G. Baker, "Old Cavalry Stations: Norwich," The Cavalry Journal, XX (1930), 539-41.

[35]Werkmeister, Newspaper History of England, 140, 411.

[36]Journal of the House of Commons, LXVII (1812), 304.

[37]Parliamentary History, XXX, 473-96; XXXII, 929-44.

[38]Ibid., XXX, 495; Barrett, "Early Cavalry Barracks," 175, agrees that the proposal for barrack construction was no novelty. He cites a proposal made in 1760 to erect cavalry barracks at Hythe,

Those supporting barrack construction marshalled an impressive array of propositions in favor of the measure. The first point made was that it would be a great convenience to innkeepers.[39] They went on to argue that the program would be economical in the long run, would promote improved discipline among the troops, and would provide a more efficient means of maintaining order.[40]

The opposition, while recognizing that a small standing army had been allowed to exist in the kingdom because of the relationship between the soldiers and the citizens, saw the rapidly increasing number of barracks as a significant alteration in the spirit of the law. Their arguments were primarily based on the constitutional issue. They challenged the constitutionality of a standing army being created by the Ministry, and used Blackstone (see above, p. 134) to support their position. They further charged that the creation of this standing army was being accomplished in an unconstitutional manner--by ministers spending monies without the authorization of Parliament.[41]

Thus, the two sides adopted different tactics. Those in favor presented barracks as a practical solution to practical problems, while those opposed attacked them on theoretical, philosophical, and

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Arundel, Hastings, Windsor, and Leicester.

[39] Parliamentary History, XXXII, 932. There were numerous complaints and petitions during this time from publicans who were inundated with soldiers. For petitions from Winchester see Rose, Pitt and the Great War, 169; from New Sarum see the Journal of the House of Commons, XLIX (1794), 73; and from Uxbridge see ibid., 227 and H. O. 42/19.

[40] Parliamentary History, XXXII, 933, 935; XXX, 478, 482, 486, 495.

[41] Ibid., 473, 474, 477; XXXII, 929, 930.

constitutional bases. Theory failed to garner enough support to reverse the building program. The 1793 debate was closed without a division, and in 1796 the motion failed by a four to one margin, 98 to 24. Perhaps the feeling of a majority of the M. P.'s was typified by Lord Beauchamp of Warwickshire. He said that the residents in his area were satisfied with the plan, and since there was no clamor in the country against the measure, he regarded it as proper.[42]

The constitutional theorists, however, did not give up easily. As late as April 1812, when for all practical purposes the issue had been settled by the actual existence of over 150 installations in England alone, a motion for funds for the Barrack Department could still evoke opposition on the grounds that it was unconstitutional to keep soldiers separate from the citizens.[43]

At their inception Pitt's barrack policies were attacked in a rather condemnatory fashion. In the Parliamentary debate of 1793, the Ministry was accused of perpetrating a sham alarm within the country in order to get its way on "certain issues."[44] Later in the year the Morning Chronicle questioned whether the threatened French invasion would be used as a pretext to erect barracks throughout the country.[45] General Smith voiced the same sentiment in the 1796 debate when he exclaimed, "Good God! was every town to be made a citadel, and every

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[42]Ibid., XXX, 483.

[43]Parliamentary Debates, XXII, 301-20.

[44]Ibid., 481.

[45]Werkmeister, Newspaper History of England, 411.

village to be converted into a garrison?"[46]

Pitt has fared little better at the hands of the historians. Fortescue recognizes the fact that the quartering of troops in alehouses had become very unsatisfactory by the 1790's and is of the opinion that any reasonable person could see the urgent need for barracks. He agrees fully with Pitt's program to put the army into permanent quarters, but chastises him for the manner in which it was done. He sees the rapid growth of manufacturing, the activity of revolutionary agitators among the artisans, and the lack of an efficient constabulary as the factors which drove Pitt into his barrack program.[47] Statements by Pitt and others in the debates on the issue would seem to lend validity to this assessment.[48] However, Fortescue's pro-army bias comes through when he classifies these installations as police stations rather than military barracks. They were, as a result, not as beneficial as they could have been to the army.[49] Both the Hammonds and G. D. H. Cole agree with Fortescue that Pitt's barracks were primarily police stations. But, to them, the fact that the army suffered was not nearly so important as the fact that they were part and parcel of Pitt's policy of repression directed at the lower social orders.[50]

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[46] Parliamentary History, XXXII, 930.

[47] Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, pp. 903-04.

[48] Parliamentary History, XXX, 478, 482, 486-87, 495.

[49] Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, p. 907.

[50] Hammond, Town Labourer, 83-88; G. D. H. Cole, A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement, 1789-1947 (Rev. ed.; London, 1948), 38, 45.

These four historians also indicate that barracks were distributed throughout the country. The statements to this effect are very similar: the lack of "an efficient constabulary . . . drove Pitt to cover the country with new barracks;"[51] De Lancey's report[52] "led to the policy of covering the manufacturing districts with barracks;"[53] the French wars "had made repression easy, by enabling Pitt to cover the country with barracks . . . ."[54]

Pitt's barrack-builidng program has been interpreted as his attempt to solve a basic domestic problem, the lack of an efficient constabulary, rather than as a reaction to external pressures or as a solution to a fundamental military problem. It has also been seen as exemplifying his intentions to promote an active repressive policy aimed primarily at the laboring classes. Then too, this intensive policy has been characterized as extensive as well. That is to say, barracks proliferated to such a degree that they practically covered the entire country. But to what extent are these interpretations valid? That they need to undergo some degree of modification is beyond question.

Perhaps the most frequently made statement about the barrack program is that Pitt "covered the country" with barracks. Assertions such as this lead one to surmise that they were more or less distributed

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[51]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, p. 903.

[52]See above, p. 136.

[53]Hammond, Town Labourer, 84.

[54]Cole, History of British Working-Class, 45.

throughout the country. However, if we look at the actual locations shown in Figure 1, we note that this is not the case.[55] In fact, eighty-seven percent were located in the southern and extreme southeastern coastal counties and in the London vicinity. If these installations were intended to be a part of a conscious policy of repression, their locations should reveal some relationship to the locations of past disturbances or to areas where unrest was anticipated. An inspection of the pattern of disturbances from June 1780 through June 1792 in Figure 2 gives no indication that barracks were built in response to past riotous activity. There were some concentrations of disorders around Birmingham, Nottingham, Manchester, and Newcastle, and new barracks were built at these places, the Newcastle area being the only one that already had barracks. If we exclude London, we note that the vast majority were erected in counties in which only a total of ten riots had occurred over the past twelve-year period. Thus, past riotous activity hardly seems sufficient to account for barrack placement.

The next thirteen years, from July 1792 through June 1805, witnessed a more than three-fold increase in disturbances over the previous twelve years. Figure 3 shows the pattern of these disorders.

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[55]A large part of the barrack data for the Figures dealing with Pitt and the barrack questions comes from the barrack returns of July 1, 1805. There are several reasons for this. First, these are the most complete returns available. Second, as was noted on pages 138-139, this date marks the end of the major period of barrack building with only a small change in number coming in subsequent years. Third, mid-1805 is very near the end of Pitt's career. He had been in power, except for a fourteen-month break (1801-03), since 1783 and would die within six months. By 1805 his influence had already been stamped on the program.



Figure 1. Barracks--July 1, 1805.

Source: Appendix no. 41(A) to the "Second Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry," Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1806), [317], VI, 282 ff.



Figure 2. Disturbances--June 1780 through June 1792.



Figure 3. Disturbances--July 1792 through June 1805.

However, the distribution pattern of barrack locations does not change appreciably. Had it been the government's intent to erect strategically located installations to deal with future unrest, they could hardly have used a better guide than past events. Either this was not their intent or their prognosis was extremely inaccurate.

Even though barracks were distributed in a manner that lessened their effectiveness as police stations, the intent to use them for this purpose cannot be discounted. We have noted this purpose in De Lancey's original recommendation.[56] In the 1793 debate on the barrack issue, Pitt stated that "a spirit had appeared in some of the manufacturing towns which made it necessary that troops should be kept near them."[57] Others speaking in favor of barrack construction were much more explicit on this point.[58] Some barracks were located in the manufacturing towns. Accounts of the disturbances show that soldiers quartered in them were brought to the aid of the civil power, but the over-all pattern of barrack distribution indicates that unrest in the manufacturing districts was not the prime determinant in their location before 1805. In fact, barrack construction in these districts did not begin to take precedence over other sections of the country until the 1820's.[59]

In the debates and discussions on the barrack issue during the

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[56]See above, p. 136.

[57]Parliamentary History, XXX, 495.

[58]Ibid., 478, 482, 486.

[59]"A Return from Each Barrack in the United Kingdom," Parliamentary Papers (Accounts and Papers, 1847), [169], XXXVI, 321-74.

1790's and early 1800's, the growing industrial centers were viewed as present or potential trouble spots. The same assessment has been made by those who have studied the period. The number of radical ideas and agitators of the period considered along with the unsettled economic conditions and the rapidity with which the increasingly more concentrated artisans and workers could be mobilized into a powerful destructive force make this evaluation a very plausible one. However, these emerging centers of industry had no monopoly on riotous activities. A survey of the locations of disturbances listed in Appendix "A" reveals that a large number took place in rural areas, especially in and around market towns. It is interesting to note that neither the possibility nor the probability of disturbances in the rural parts of the country was considered significant at that time or in the later evaluations of the period insofar as the barrack question was concerned.

All historians who have dealt with the issue agree that the transference of the British Army from quarters in ale-houses to quarters in barracks was a significant change when viewed from the military standpoint. As has been noted, Fortescue even terms it a revolution. But, then, he sees this signal military change as being a by-product of Pitt's attempt to solve a fundamental domestic problem. "In fact it may be said outright that it was the want of an efficient constabulary that drove Pitt to cover the country with new barracks."[60] The capacity of the installations also leads Fortescue to see them in a non-military light. "It is significant that of forty-eight constructed

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[60]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 2, p. 903.

for the cavalry, two only were calculated to contain as many as six troops. In fact, they were not military barracks, but police-stations for the maintenance of internal order."[61] This seems to be a very logical conclusion when one also considers that the government was much concerned about disorders which might result from the spread of the ideas of the French Revolution and that 1792 marked the beginning of a very turbulent decade of internal disorders resulting mainly from economic distress.

However, if this conclusion is accepted, two other important considerations must be either minimized or ignored. The first one is military. It was accepted at the time that the practice of billeting troops was unsatisfactory for both the innkeepers and the army. The government was under increasing pressure from publicans and corporations to do something to alleviate the problem.[62] The military argued that barracks would result in a saving of money in the long run, would produce a better disciplined soldier who would be virtually free from the influences of radicals and malcontents, and would make the soldiers more readily available for use by the civil power.[63] These arguments can hardly be minimized.

The second consideration, barrack distribution, is one that has been ignored by historians. If this factor is not weighed, one can argue either interpretation--barracks as police stations or as an

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[61] Ibid., 907.

[62] See above, p. 142, n. 39.

[63] See above, p. 142.

army reform. But when one considers the geographical distribution and the relationship that has already been noted between this and the pattern of disturbances for the period, Pitt's barrack program falls very solidly into the category of an important reform in the British military system. That Pitt viewed this program in a military sense is reflected in his reply to the estimates on three proposed barracks in Sussex: "I understand these to have been so strongly recommended on military grounds, that I do not think the amount of expence ought to prevent their immediate execution . . . ."[64] Pitt seized an opportune moment--a moment when there was enough anxiety and alarm from within and without the country--to implement a significant military reform that he knew could not be accomplished in more tranquil times.

It is not enough, however, simply to discount heretofore accepted interpretations. A look at a map of barrack distributions can easily produce challenges to the Hammonds' contention that Pitt "was looking across the Trent to the 'ignorant and profligate' populations that filled the mining and factory districts."[65] But this does not answer the question of why they were built where they were. There is really only one plausible response--France.

If one had been asked during the period under investigation to distribute ground forces in positions that would best protect England and London from a direct attack by France, one could hardly

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[64]William Pitt to Duke of York, February 7, 1798, Appendix no. 9(E) to the "Fourth Report," Parliamentary Papers (1806-07), II, 427-28.

[65]Hammond, Town Labourer, 88.

have done better than the barrack pattern with its concomitant troop distribution that was developed by 1805 (see Figures 1, 4, 5; pages 147, 155, 156). This pattern placed 87 percent of the installations and 92 percent of the troops in the coastal counties from Cornwall to Norfolk and in the vicinity of London.

The opposition press was very contemptuous of Pitt and his policy of erecting and maintaining permanent military installations about the country. When it was learned that the large encampment at Brighton in Sussex was not to be broken up because of the threatened French invasion, the Morning Chronicle's response was that

> Every year Mr. Pitt brings forth a new bugbear. Last year we had an insurrection in disguise; this year we are to have an invasion Incog[nito]. Whether this [new alarm] is done to procure the erection of barracks throughout England, or simply to prepare the public mind for a campaign, or for both we shall soon see . . . .[66]

The inhabitants of those counties most likely to be the unwilling hosts to a French landing, however, did not take such a cavalier view of this invasion threat. This fear was an ever-present specter for them from 1793 until it was removed by the British victory at Trafalgar in 1805. The early years of the century were especially dreadful, particularly 1803, when Napoleon assembled a large army at Boulogne just across the Strait of Dover.[67]

The government's apprehensions about a possible French invasion

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[66]Morning Chronicle, Oct. 16, 1793, quoted in Werkmeister, Newspaper History of England, 411.

[67]Sir Reginald Hardy, "The Origin of the Yeomanry," The Cavalry Journal, XII (1922), 9-11; F. H. D. C. Whitmore, "The Changes in the Yeomanry Cavalry," ibid., 15-17.



Figure 4. Distribution of barracks by counties, July 1, 1805.

Source: Appendix no. 41(A) to the "Second Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry," Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1806), [317], VI, 282 ff.



Figure 5. Distribution of barracks by district, July 1, 1805.

Source: Appendix no. 41(A) to the "Second Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry," Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1806), [317], VI, 282 ff.

are revealed in legislation passed during this time dealing with the defense of the realm.[68] Under these acts procedures were laid down for those in command in invaded areas to order the removal of such property as boats, wagons, horses, and provisions, or to order its destruction if it were deemed to be of use to the enemy.

There is yet other evidence that barrack placement was dictated, in the main, by France. Two weeks after the Peace of Amiens, the Barrackmaster General submitted a list of barracks proposed to be kept with the coming of peace.[69] This proposal was never implemented because hostilities were resumed thirteen months later, but it is, nevertheless, informative. The proposed distribution in 1802 shown in Figure 6 is almost identical with the actual distribution of 1805. The major difference is the density in the threatened counties of the south and southeast. Outside of these counties there were only two additional barracks, one each in Northumberland and Huntingdonshire, in 1805 than had been recommended in 1802. Yet the number of installations in 1805 was over twice as great and their capacity nearly three times larger than the 1802 proposals. It would appear that neither war nor peace could cause a significant alteration in the number or the location of barracks in most of England. But in those areas exposed to a French invasion, the state of peace or war was capable of producing a noteworthy change in the barrack picture.

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[68]See above, p. 139 and nn. 28, 29.

[69]Appendix no. 56(B) to the "Fourth Report," Parliamentary Papers (1806-07), II, 548-52.



Figure 6. Barracks proposed to be kept, April 12, 1802.

Source: Appendix no. 56(B) to the "Fourth Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry," Parliamentary Papers (Reports, 1806-07), [99], II, 548-52.

In the final analysis it must be concluded that this striking change in military housing, contrary to the traditional interpretations, was primarily an implementation of a much needed army reform. Had this change been simply a by-product of a police measure or of an attempt to establish bases for lower-class repression, as has been supposed, a radically different distribution pattern would necessarily have emerged. Although such a pattern has traditionally been alleged, such did not exist. Barracks were not distributed throughout the country in a manner which contributed to the usefulness of their occupants as a country-wide police force. Furthermore, their skewed pattern towards the south and southeast was, in the main, the result of external pressures rather than of internal forces. This is not to say that troops stationed in barracks were not used as police, or, at times, in a repressive manner. They were, and their employment was effective in many instances. The contention here simply is that their priorities were the reverse of what has been generally supposed.

CHAPTER VII

THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEONIC WARS

England's proximity to and involvement with France during the period being examined could not help but have some influence upon the course of events on the home island. In 1793, four years after the French Revolution erupted, England found herself at war with France; before the century ended, this conflict merged into the struggle against Napoleon. With the exception of a fourteen-month period after the Peace of Amiens in 1802, hostilities continued virtually uninterrupted and were still in progress at the outset of the Luddite disturbances in 1811. Thus, during two-thirds of the period under investigation, England was exposed to various types and varying degrees of pressure from across the Channel. Some of the situations and English reactions to them which these pressures produced have already been discussed.

There had been ten years of military retrenchment after the peace with America, and when war was declared on February 1, 1793, neither the army nor the navy was on a war footing. However, because it could take the men and resources of mercantile shipping and press them into the King's service, the navy was in a much better position to rectify its deficiencies than was the army. When the French Revolution broke out, those in control of the government saw the greatest danger to the state coming from the revolutionary clubs and radical societies within the country. But these would become a potent force

only if they enlisted mass support during times of economic distress. To insure that such did not occur, military expenditures were reduced and the savings were channeled to the maintenance of domestic prosperity. It was this policy which led Pitt to reduce the army from 17,000 to 13,000 men just nine months before the declaration of war.[1]

The opening of hostilities had a signal influence upon England's military policy; steps were taken to increase the regular forces as well as to provide for home defense. Regular troops were released for overseas duty by calling up the militia to defend the home island; however, the country did not feel secure. Beginning in 1794 there was a growing fear of a French invasion, and a French landing in and raids on Ireland in the late summer and fall of 1798 helped to strengthen the belief that England was Napoleon's prime objective.[2] After Nelson's victory at Trafalgar in October 1805, the fears began to subside, but the intervening period had witnessed a proliferation of forces for home defense. The origins and composition of these forces have already been examined.[3] Their formation gave the authorities at all levels additional tools which could be used in case of riots and disturbances. Chapter VIII analyzes the extent of their use and the degree of their effectiveness, but it should be remembered that these new military bodies owed their very existence to the French threat.

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[1]Watson, Reign of George III, 363-64.

[2]Ibid., 365; Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 1, pp. 216-17, 406-07; Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 5; Rose, Pitt and the Great War, 363.

[3]See above, Chapter II, pp. 45-53.

In one sense the menace from the continent proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it promoted the formation of forces capable of being used to suppress disorders; on the other hand, these units, plus the regular army and navy, had to rely upon the same pool of manpower for their personnel. Competition in the same market place caused the value of recruits for the regular forces to rise and led to abuses as recruiters tried to obtain them. Ironically, on a number of occasions, public indignation over these abuses was the cause of disturbances, making the medicine the source of one of the diseases it was compounded to cure. Several of these disorders have already been surveyed.[4] Additional ones broke out in London and its vicinity in mid-August 1793,[5] on March 1, 1794,[6] on August 28, 1794,[7] on January 9, 1795,[8] and on July 7, 1795.[9] Nottingham experienced a similar disturbance early in July 1796[10] and late in December 1803 mobs rose in Chester and Liverpool protesting the actions of press-gangs.[11]

During the most serious recruiting riot in the city of London some observers noted a direct influence from France. The Times reported that a number of higher class persons were in the leadership

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[4]See above, Chapter V, pp. 121-22.

[5]Werkmeister, Newspaper History of England, 368.

[6]The Times (London), Mar. 4, 1794, p. 3.

[7]Ibid., Sept. 23, 1794, p. 3.

[8]Ibid., Jan. 12, 1795, p. 3.

[9]Ibid., July 9, 1795, p. 2.

[10]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 49.

[11]The Times (London), Jan. 3, 1804, p. 3; Jan. 17, 1804, p. 3.

groups and were bent upon instigating a general riot because they were in sympathy with France and French ideals.[12] The accuracy of this assessment is doubtful, but it points up the trepidation many Englishmen felt over the pervasiveness of the ideals of the French Revolution.

Another significant effect of French pressure was the revolutionary change it produced in the quartering of regular army units in Great Britain. The process by which home-based soldiers were transferred from quarters in public houses to billets in permanent barracks has been examined at length in Chapter VI. These permanent installations were not designed primarily as a means of preventing or arresting civil disorders nor were they concentrated in the areas of the country most susceptible to such disturbances. Nevertheless, when disorders did occur within their spheres of operation, they provided readily accessible sources of support for the civil authorities.

As we have noted, after 1789 the government feared that the revolutionary spirit in France would be infused into England through the radical societies and Parliamentary reform organizations. The Priestley Riots of July 1791[13] exposed the dangers of controlling this supposed menace by popular means--a means which possessed the inherent peril of unrestraint. The government's solution was to embark upon a program of suppression and coercion. The first step in this program was the issuance of a proclamation in May 1792 encouraging magistrates to exert rigorous control over riotous meetings or seditious

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[12] Ibid., Aug. 23, 1794, p. 2.

[13] See below, pp. 167-68.

publications and thereby reduce the possibilities of popular action.[14] Thomas Paine was prosecuted under the proclamation for his publication of The Rights of Man. Soon another proclamation was issued encouraging local officials to call out the militia to repress the "dangerous spirit of tumult" which was rampant in the country. The government's evaluation was that dissident elements in England were acting in conjunction with foreign subversives with the aim of undermining order and government.[15] Henry Dundas was Home Secretary during this period (1791-94) and is considered to be the architect of these initial coercive measures. Brown is of the opinion that a visit to Scotland by Dundas in 1792, during which he reported that "the lower ranks had been poisoned with an enthusiastic rage for ideal liberty that will not be crushed without coercive measures," was responsible for the state of mind which produced the active campaign of the same year against the reformers.[16]

Two years later on May 17, 1794, Parliament temporarily suspended the Habeas Corpus Act[17] and during the winter of 1795-96 passed the Treasonable Practices Act and the Seditious Meetings Act. The former redefined the law of treason, bringing within its scope all those who plotted against the King, who conspired to aid invaders, and who attempted to coerce Parliament by any means. Seven years' transportation

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[14]Watson, Reign of George III, 324.

[15]Traill, Social England, V, 490.

[16]P. A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History (London, 1918), 94.

[17]Parliamentary History, XXXI, 475-97.

was the penalty for anyone who attacked the constitution. The Seditious Meetings Act made illegal all assemblies of more than fifty persons unless they were licensed and supervised by magistrates. It also placed all lecture rooms where political questions were discussed in the same class as disorderly houses. Additional and similar coercive legislation was passed in 1798.[18]

These proclamations and legislative acts had the effect of making any reformer, radical politician, or dissenter as well as any questionable assembly fair game for soldiers or "patriotic" civilians who might be disposed to challenge them. For example, at Mottram in Cheshire near Manchester on May 3, 1801, there was a meeting of several thousand persons. There is no evidence that the assembly was unruly or riotous, but the magistrates came with two troops of horse and read the Riot Act twice. Even though the motive for the meeting could not be determined, the magistrates waited the proper time and then had the troops ride through and disperse the assembly.[19]

Most of the disturbances of the 1790's which resulted from the government's efforts to suppress any criticism or conflicting opinion came to be known as "Church and King" riots and deserve closer scrutiny. The outbreak and the first several years of the French Revolution provided ammunition for both sides in these confrontations. Reform Societies throughout the country, many of which had been recently formed to celebrate the centenary of the expulsion of James II, remained

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[18]Watson, Reign of George III, 360; Brown, French Revolution, 152, 158.

[19]The Times (London), May 12, 1801, p. 3.

in existence to applaud the French as they sought to gain the liberties already attained by Englishmen. Events in France also caused the revival of defunct radical societies and gave an added impetus to the movement for Parliamentary reform. Dissenters naturally gravitated to a movement which would allow those of their number with talent to find careers without restrictions.[20]

After the Anglican restoration, religious dissenters migrated in large numbers from the corporate towns and settled, for the most part, in the growing industrial cities in the Midlands and North. Here they grew rich, set up Dissenting Academies, joined together in societies (e.g., the Lunar Society of Birmingham) to promote the ideas of the Enlightenment, and even engaged in the Parliamentary reform movement. The outbreak of the French Revolution tended to associate religious dissent and Parliamentary reform more closely, and Tories and Anglicans began to form groups to counter this movement. Shortly, the Revolution, which initially infused new life into the drive for reform, provided arguments for those who would maintain the status quo and set the stage for the inevitable confrontations when it fell into the excesses foreseen by Burke. As they attacked dissenters and reformers, thereby coming to the defense of the established religion and the Constitution, patriotic Englishmen raised the cry "Church and King."[21]

The antagonism between these two forces did not come to a head

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[20]Watson, Reign of George III, 324.

[21]Rudé, The Crowd in History, 139-40; Webb, Modern England, 38-39.

until 1791. As a number of the liberal and reforming societies began to call for meetings to commemorate the second anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, apprehensions of conflicts increased. In the first week of July, the Home Office began receiving letters expressing concern that certain activities on July 14 might produce disorders. They came from London, Plymouth, and Birmingham, and not all bore signatures.[22] That there was substance to these fears was most vividly demonstrated by the Priestley Riots which erupted in Birmingham on the fourteenth and continued for six days. This has been termed the first demonstration in England against the Revolution.[23]

Birmingham had a population of some 130,000 but was not a corporate town and was governed by two constables and two bailiffs. Dissent and political reform were more closely allied here than at any other place. Prominent dissenters who could see trouble on the horizon appealed in vain to the magistrates, but adequate precautions were not taken. When the disorders began, troops were sent for, but they did not arrive until three days later. The depredations were at first directed chiefly against dissenters, and the authorities made little effort to curtail them. When other property began to be attacked, hundreds of special constables were sworn in and armed with mop-staves; however, the riot had developed so much momentum that it was impossible for the civil power to quell it without military assistance.[24] This

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[22]H. O. 42/19. [23]Brown, French Revolution, 77.

[24]Ibid., 78-79; The Scots Magazine, LIII (1791), 352; Gentleman's Magazine, LXI (1791), 675; Constance Hill, ed., Frederic Hill, An Autobiography of Fifty Years in Times of Reform (London, 1893), 9, 11.

destructive disturbance proved that popular feeling could be directed against reform. However, one only had to look back to 1780 and the Gordon Riots to note that this could be a very dangerous and unstable explosive to employ.

The Priestley Riots did not end the "Church and King" agitation in Birmingham. Late in 1792 a number of Loyalists clubs were formed and remained active into the early part of 1793. After several months of quiescence, there was another flurry of activity in August 1793. Their activities usually consisted of parading the streets in the evenings, singing "God Save the King," and compelling passers-by to join them. The evening generally terminated with attacks on the homes of respectable dissenters.[25] There is no evidence in the accounts of serious attempts by the authorities to halt these disturbances.

There were disorders or threatened disorders in other cities in July 1791. At Deal in Kent a meeting had been advertised for the fourteenth, and about three hundred people of "a strange description" tried to attend. Mr. Fitzgerald, a magistrate, prevented the meeting and was commended for his firm attachment to the constitution.[26] In Leicester a handbill had been stuck up about town which read:

No Church
No Pitt
Revolution forever
Huzza!

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[25]W. B. Stephens, ed., The Victoria History of the County of Warwick (8 vols.; London, 1904-1964), VII, 283.

[26]I. Ingram to Lord Sydney, July 16, 1791, in H. O. 42/19.

The town officials feared a riot, but none occurred.[27]

Nor was London immune. A mob gathered in front of Newgate Prison and demanded that Lord George Gordon, the leader of the Gordon Riots in London in 1780, be released so that he could participate in the celebration of July 14.[28] Troops were sent for, and the mob dispersed upon their arrival. A similar disturbance occurred at King's Bench Prison which also necessitated the use of troops.[29] A few years later on June 1, 1794, a mob attacked the home of Thomas Hardy, the shoemaker who had founded the radical Corresponding Society of London.[30]

Manchester and Nottingham were the sites of other important "Church and King" riots. In Manchester where the reformers were heavily outnumbered, the "Church and King" party formed a club in 1790. A few months later the reformers organized the Manchester Constitutional Society under the leadership of Thomas Walker. The Society celebrated the fall of the Bastille in July 1791, but there were no loyalist-provoked disturbances then. This was probably because Walker was Borough Reeve that year, but the next year proved to be a different story. In June 1792 crowds formed and, using trees as battering rams, attacked two Unitarian chapels. Subsequently, Walker's name appeared

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[27]Mayor and Magistrates of Leicester to Secretary at War, July 23, 1791, in ibid.

[28]Gordon had been imprisoned in 1788 for a libel on the Queen of France. Since he could find no one willing to guarantee his future good behavior, he was obliged to remain in prison where he died of a fever in 1793.

[29]The Times (London), July 16, 1791, p. 2.

[30]Brown, French Revolution, 141.

on an address to the French National Convention, making him a natural target for the hostility of "Church and King." Hostility was translated into action in December when a crowd broke windows for two nights, burned the homes of Walker and another reformer to the ground, and attacked Walker personally. He fired on them, wounding two before they dispersed. Fearing more trouble, the magistrates called in the military, but there were no more disturbances.[31]

Even after this, the reform society continued to function and circulated a handbill calling for a meeting in 1794 to consider the reform of Parliament. When the reformers assembled on April 21 at Royton, a village near Manchester, they were attacked by a mob which outnumbered them by an estimated fifty to one. Upon noting the explosiveness of the situation, a magistrate called for troops from Manchester, which was less than five miles distant. Before the soldiers could arrive, the meeting had been dispersed, several reformers apprehended, and six put in New Bailey Prison.[32]

The "Church and King" riots at Nottingham, where the religious element played little or no part, differed from those at Birmingham and Manchester. They began after England entered the war with France, which resulted in the reforming party being branded anti-patriotic as well as Jacobin. The Nottingham Constitutional Society had collected 2,500 signatures on a petition calling for Parliamentary reform,

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[31]Rudé, Crowd in History, 141; Howard, Guardians of The Queen's Peace, 114; Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 1144-45; Werkmeister, Newspaper History of England, 146.

[32]The Times (London), April 25, 1794, p. 3.

which was discussed and rejected by the House of Commons in February 1793.[33] Street battles erupted between reformers and loyalists in June 1793, and on July 2, 1794, an anti-Jacobin mob attacked and set fire to a mill in which a group of reformers were meeting. The popular support of both groups was approximately equal, which enabled the reformers to hold their own in the confrontations. There is no record of the employment of soldiers in the violence of 1793. In 1794 troops were summoned but only after the reformers had fired on and wounded several of their attackers; however, the records do not indicate that the soldiers were used.[34] There was another brief flurry at the Nottingham Theatre on June 23, 1800, but it was not of great consequence.[35]

Although the major agitation was centered in Birmingham, Manchester and Nottingham, other cities felt the peripheral winds of "Church and King." In Cambridge on December 13 and 14, 1792, the loyalists attacked the dissenters making it necessary to declare martial law.[36] The radical John Thelwall was on a lecture tour of East Anglia and the Midlands in the spring of 1796. One of his meetings at Great Yarmouth was broken up by a party of sailors, and he was hunted from town to town by the loyal associations.[37] The next year

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[33]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 45; Rudé, Crowd in History, 140.

[34]Ibid.; The Times (London), July 5, 1794, p. 2.

[35]Ibid., June 30, 1800, p. 3.

[36]Ibid., Dec. 17, 1792, p. 3; Dec. 18, 1792, p. 4; Werkmeister, Newspaper History of England, 151.

[37]Brown, French Revolution, 153.

he was scheduled for a speech at a Baptist chapel in Derby on the night of March 13, 1797. A mob attacked the building, broke out the windows, and wounded several persons. Thelwall escaped by producing a pistol and threatening to shoot anyone who molested him. The mob remained for some time with no effort made to disperse it.[38] During the war with France, a party of the Inniskilling Dragoons stationed at Norwich decided to attack an individual who was going about making inflammatory speeches. The orator got word of their intentions and hid. In their search for him, the soldiers wrecked two pubs before their officers could get them back to their barracks.[39] Other forces exhibited similar patriotic attitudes. When a food riot occurred in Sheffield on September 2, 1800, the Volunteer Corps of the city proved unreliable. The assessment of a local magistrate was that they would operate against a Jacobin or similar plot but not against their own kin.[40]

During the 1790's and especially after England entered the war with France early in 1793, it was relatively easy to incite a popular mob to come to the defense of the country's traditional religious and political institutions. The same was true of the military. The ironic fact was that these institutions were not in need of defense. Before 1789 both reformers and working men had seen the reform of the franchise as the key to bettering the conditions of the lower classes.

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[38]The Times (London), Mar. 16, 1797, p. 3.

[39]Baker, "Old Cavalry Stations: Norwich," 542-43.

[40]Wentworth Fitzwilliam to Duke of Portland, September 8, 1800, in H. O. 42/51.

Both these groups had put their faith in Pitt, but his repressive measures in the 1790's destroyed this hope. There were some signs of discontent between 1789 and 1815 but this was the reaction of despair from a population which was still intensely loyal.[41]

An examination of the Appendices shows that the most prevalent type of riot during the period under investigation was one caused by a scarcity of provisions. In his study of disturbances in England between 1735 and 1800, Rudé has found that two-thirds were food riots. As might be expected, their intensity and extensiveness were in direct proportion to the severity of the harvest failures. However, beginning in 1793 a new factor was introduced into the equation--the French war. Wartime needs and pressure tended to magnify the responses to conditions which were already endemic to England. It is impossible to assess accurately the degree to which the war affected supply and prices. After 1793 the effects of wartime restrictions and currency inflation cannot be disentangled from the effects of periodic crop shortages.[42] However, there is little doubt that the war magnified the already-existing problems, enlarged the means of dealing with them, and altered the outlook of those who had to come to grips with them.

In the course of the French wars, there were events that either caused certain elements in England to respond with violence or elicited a response which itself produced a disturbance. The first of these

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[41]Priestley, Voice of Protest, 194.

[42]Rudé, Crowd in History, 35-37; Thomas S. Ashton and Joseph Sykes, The Coal Industry of The Eighteenth Century (Manchester, 1929), 128.

sprang from an allied victory early in the war. During the summer of 1793, the campaign in the West was going well and the cabinet actually thought the war was almost over. Late in July Valenciennes fell to the British expeditionary force under the supreme command of Prince Frederick of Saxe-Coburg, an Austrian general. The loyalist clubs of Birmingham celebrated the news on the evening of August 2 by breaking the windows of about 150 houses of Quakers and others who refused to illuminate in celebration of the allied victory.[43] There is no evidence that officials employed either civil or military forces to halt these depredations.

This jubilant spirit soon faded as the French mounted a counter-offensive which turned the tide. In Nottingham the advance of the French in Flanders caused local sympathizers to learn the manual exercise and to show great joy at French successes. On the night of July 2, 1794, they held a meeting in a mill. When an anti-Jacobin mob gathered and someone threw a stone through a window, those inside opened fire wounding several of the mob, one or two seriously. At this point a magistrate sent for a military force, but there is no record of their use. The mob was determined to destroy the mill and set fire to it and the outbuildings. It took three hours before the conflagration was extinguished at about midnight.[44]

The year 1795 was a time of crop failures, shortages, and resultant high prices of grain and bread. The populace of London and

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[43]Stephens, Warwick, VII, 283; Watson, Reign of George III, 364-66.

[44]The Times (London), July 5, 1794, p. 2. Also see above, p. 171.

Westminster considered the war responsible for these high prices. On October 29, when the King journeyed to the opening of Parliament, his coach was attacked by a mob shouting, "peace! peace!" After he returned from the Parliament meeting and left the coach, the crowd vented the full force of its rage upon the King's vehicle and its attendants. It was attacked in earnest and all its windows broken. One of the grooms leading the horses was knocked down, run over by the coach, and injured severely. One of the King's footmen attempted to stop a person who was bent on demolishing the carved work on the coach and was attacked by the crowd. He had to be rescued by a party of the Guards.[45]

In July 1809 an expedition was sent to the mouth of the Scheldt River. It had the two-fold mission of establishing a second front in the West against Napoleon and of opening the Scheldt to British commerce. The main landing was on the marshy island of Walcheren. Before the end of the month, Austria was defeated in the East and sued for peace, and the expedition found Antwerp too well fortified to attack. Most of the force was withdrawn, but a contingent was left on Walcheren until December. Before its evacuation almost half the troops were dead or too sick with fever to be effective. There was a popular outcry against the Duke of Portland's ministers for this humiliating campaign. Portland died before the year was out, and

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[45]Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 1, p. 513; The Times (London), Oct. 31, 1795, p. 3; Annual Register (1795), "Chron.," 37-39; The Scots Magazine, LVII (1795), 745; Donald G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws from 1660-1846 (Reprint ed.; New York, 1961), 72. First published, London, 1930.

Spencer Perceval had to bear the brunt of the Parliamentary inquiry into the expedition.[46]

While this inquiry was in progress, Sir Francis Burdett, a wealthy radical and M. P. expressed some frank opinions on economy as well as speaking out and writing a letter against the misuse of privilege by the House. He also questioned Parliament's right to curtail press freedom. His letter was pronounced libelous, and Perceval aggressively sought to have him committed to the Tower. In focusing on Burdett, Perceval was attempting to draw attention from the Walcheren inquiry.[47] Burdett was taken to the Tower, but the price was a heavy one: four days of serious rioting, deaths, many serious injuries, destruction of property, and the calling for thousands of troops to suppress Burdett's supporters.

It is evident that the French Revolution and the French wars had an effect on the causes of disorders in England as well as on the manner in which they were dealt with and the means which the government could employ. The external pressures from France led to the creation of a number of new military units which were available for use in the quelling of riots and an important change in the housing of soldiers, making them more readily accessible to the civil authorities. However, the resultant competition for recruits actually was the cause of disturbances in some instances.

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[46]Watson, Reign of George III, 483.

[47]Traill, Social England, V, 619; Denis Gray, Spencer Perceval, The Evangelical Prime Minister, 1762-1812 (Manchester, 1963), 290, 298.

The government's fear that the revolutionary spirit and its concomitant excesses would enter the country fostered a policy of coercion and suppression whereby legitimate efforts directed towards reform and change were stifled. The official sanctioning of such a policy led to a number of violent disorders which paraded under the guise of defending "Church and King." In these the forces defending the status quo in practically every instance received more civil and military support than did their opposition.

The wartime economy under which the country was forced to function for so many years magnified the effects of periodic harvest failures and economic distress and made the disturbances which normally accompanied such periods more extensive than they otherwise would have been. Also in connection with the war, an English victory or defeat on the continent could and did play on the emotions of those at home and the elation or disappointment thus produced at times touched off disturbances.

While it is not startling that the events on the continent played a role, and sometimes an important role, in the events surrounding domestic disturbances, it is somewhat surprising that they did not play a greater role. Even in the face of one of the most alarming foreign threats in English history, domestic unrest was caused mainly by domestic issues.[48]

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[48]See Appendices "A" and "C."

CHAPTER VIII

THE DISORDERS: AN ANALYSIS

This chapter examines the various aspects of the four hundred disturbances which have been recorded between June 10, 1780, and March 1, 1811. Where it is possible, generalizations are drawn as well as assessments made of any relations among the several features. Unless otherwise noted, the analyses are based on the information contained in the Appendices.[1]

The duration could be determined for 283 or 71 percent[2] of the four hundred. The vast majority of these, 207 or 73 percent, occurred during only one day, and an even larger majority, 252 or 89 percent, did not last longer than two days.[3] Of the 11 percent which lasted longer than two days, one-half took place in just three years (1792, 1795, 1800). These were the years in which England experienced her most severe economic distress and almost all of these were related to this distress.

In all probability most of the remaining 29 percent were of

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[1]This chapter contains numerous evaluations of the different aspects of the disorders, many of which are expressed in percentages. It should be understood that these figures do not represent hard statistical facts. Rather, they represent the best estimates, evaluations, and conclusions which can be drawn from the available data.

[2]The percentages in this chapter have been rounded off to the nearest whole percent.

[3]For an explanation of the time involved in the number of "days" in a disorder, see the introduction of Appendix "A," pp. 237-38.

short duration. Their existence is recorded by such terse statements as: "In March of that year [1783] 'a dangerous disposition' to riot developed at Newcastle-Under-Lyme, and in the following month the Clee Hill colliers were in conflict with the troops at Ludlow."[4] In Derby several gentlemen had their windows broken but "timely interference by the Magistrates" prevented further damage.[5] At Chichester "they broke open the prison and released a number of labourers jailed for forcing a farmer to bring his corn to market."[6] As a general rule, disturbances which were serious or lasted for any length of time received more extensive coverage.

The upper time limit was approximately one week. There were three which lasted six days and one which lasted eight days--all in different years. If a riot continued for four or five days, it was generally of a serious nature. There were three disorders which lasted for more than thirty days, and they were very definitely the anomalies of the period. Two of these were more in the nature of modern-day strikes; the other falls into a class by itself. In the winter of 1792, sailors struck for higher wages and closed the port of North and South Shields for seven weeks.[7] In Manchester and vicinity in early summer of 1808, the cotton weavers refused to work and idled an estimated 60,000 looms for a period of thirty-one days.[8] The next year the owners of the

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[4]Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 127.

[5]The Times (London), June 4, 1792, p. 3.

[6]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 111.

[7]See Appendix "A," 1792, source number 21.

[8]See Appendix "A," 1808, source number 2.

Covent Garden Theater in London raised the prices which touched off a series of nightly disturbances by patrons demanding the restoration of the old prices. This "Old Price" Riot continued for seventy-eight days, until the original prices were reinstated.[9]

A survey of the disorders by counties discloses that there was an average of ten riots per county in England during the period. The thirteen counties of Wales are not considered in this average because evidence could be found of only nineteen disorders in six Welsh counties. Over half of these occurred in the two counties closest to the port of Liverpool, and the others were reported in counties which had closer communications with England. News of a local disturbance in the rural interior of Wales at this time would have had a difficult time reaching the main lines of communication.

Although the "average" county had ten riots between 1780 and 1811, there was a wide differential in numbers, ranging from forty-five in London[10] to none in Huntingdonshire, Rutlandshire, and Westmorland. There are many more on record for London than any of the surrounding counties. In fact, the counties ranking closest are Lancashire and Yorkshire, both in the North, with thirty-one and thirty respectively. There is little doubt that London ranks first in this respect but it should be remembered that this city was the center of government, commerce, and communications for the country,

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[9]See Appendix "A," 1809, source number 2.

[10]For the purposes of this study, the metropolitan area of London was considered as a county.

which probably resulted in more efficiency in reporting and recording disturbances.

There is a discernible pattern in the distribution of riots by county. Counties which contained the larger metropolitan centers, especially the old port cities such as Bristol, Portsmouth, Liverpool, and Hull, had an above average number of disturbances. The same was true of those counties in which such growing industrial centers as Manchester, Nottingham, Birmingham, and Sheffield were located. Counties with large populations of miners were very susceptible to disturbances. Colliers have been declared the most active rioters of all the classes of wage earners in the eighteenth century.[11] Regions with such large numbers of mine workers were more vulnerable in times of food shortage and other economic distress. This was a chronic problem among the tinners of Cornwall and accounts for the cause of most of the county's unrest.[12]

In breaking the disorders down by type, a determination was made of the causal factors which produced them. It should be noted that a crowd seldom rioted for any single reason. Motives often varied between one action and the next in the course of the disturbance as well as between different groups participating in the same disturbance. Even though there were numerous underlying causes and currents, Rudé has pointed out that the examiner must not be so subtle as to overlook the overt or primary reason.[13] This was the approach that

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[11]Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 130.

[12]Jenkins, Cornish Miner, 149, 154.

[13]Rudé, Crowd in History, 217-18.

was taken in the compilation of Appendices "A" and "C."

Economic motives were the most prevalent factors producing disturbances. They were responsible for an overwhelming 64 percent of the total and were followed by military (13 percent), miscellaneous and undetermined causes (12 percent),[14] political (7 percent), religious (2 percent), and racial (2 percent). Each of these categories bears closer scrutiny.

Wearmouth concludes that economic distress was the major cause of working class unrest during the eighteenth century. What concerned this segment of the population more than anything else was the adequate satisfaction of their daily needs. Unrest, anger, and noisy demonstrations by these folk were directly proportional to the shortages of commodities and unstable prices.[15] In their study of the coal industry in the same century, Ashton and Sykes show a direct correlation between crop failures and resultant shortages and rising prices and riotous activity among this segment of the working classes.[16]

The present study substantiates the above assessments; however, E. P. Thompson contends that there was, in reality, a much deeper psychological cause. He agrees that soaring prices and shortages in most cases actually touched off economic disturbances but that moral

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[14]Riots for which no cause could be determined made up an inconsequential portion (2 percent) of the total. Even though few in number, these probably were caused by several factors. For this reason they are included with the miscellaneous group for the purposes of evaluation.

[15]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 51.

[16]Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 126-29.

outrage was really the basic cause. The population had a very distinct idea of what was considered to be legitimate practice in regard to the commodity market. These codes were deeply ingrained and went well back into English history. When these accepted moral codes were violated, direct action in the form of disorders resulted.[17] The acceptance of Thompson's appraisal does not alter the fact that it took the key of severe economic stress to unlock the door of moral outrage. Researchers of these centuries usually classify disturbances, and especially those of an economic nature, as eighteenth century and nineteenth century or pre-industrial and industrial with the first and second in each category being generally coincidental. They also see distress as the primary factor in eighteenth century, pre-industrial disorders and wage disputes as the main reason for nineteenth century, industrial disturbances.[18] In his study, which was done three-quarters of a century ago, Traill even goes so far as to state that popular agitation with regard to trade and wage regulations did not erupt in riots at the end of the eighteenth century.[19] In a more recent examination, Priestley concludes that wage disputes did occur in the eighteenth century but that they found little place in history since most attention was focused on the food riots.[20]

The evidence for the period under investigation here bears out

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[17]Thompson, "Moral Economy of the English Crowd," 78-79.

[18]Ibid., 79; Rudé, "Popular Disturbances," 457 and n.

[19]Traill, Social England, V, 492.

[20]Priestley, Voice of Protest, 192-93.

Priestley's evaluation. Of the riots caused by economic factors, wage disputes account for only 10 percent of the total. There were only two in the 1780's; they both occurred in 1785 and involved disputes among sailors at Shields and Sunderland. The majority (70 percent) of the wage troubles arose in three successive years, 1791, 1792, and 1793. Involved were such diverse groups as knitters, foundry workers, tailors, colliers, shoemakers, nailers, and copper miners. The remaining wage disputes were scattered--two in 1798, two in 1802, and one in 1808. It is interesting to note that there were no wage riots in the years 1795 and 1800, the two years that experienced more economic disorders than the remaining twenty-nine years combined.

A very distant second to the economic disturbances were those with a military basis. There were only three before 1793 and, with the exception of two years, the remainder were scattered rather evenly throughout the following years. The exceptions were the years 1795 and 1796 when recruting riots and disturbances surrounding the implementation of the Militia Act of 1796 accounted for one-half of all the disorders in this category.

Disturbances which had a wide variety of causes and those of undeterminate origins accounted for 12 percent of the total. Most were scattered evenly after 1790 with no heavy concentrations in any single year. A survey of the miscellaneous group gives a good indication of the wide variety of factors which could evoke riotous behavior.

Disorders motivated by political factors made up only 7 percent of the total. Over half of these occurred between 1791 and 1795 and revealed the attachment that some segments of the population had

to Parliamentary reform and French accomplishments. The suspension of habeas corpus and other coercive legislation rendered political agitation of this type much more hazardous and helped to account for its shrinkage after 1795. Most political disorders after that date centered around disputed elections.

Religious and racial disturbances made up an inconsequential portion of the total. With the exception of two disorders, all with religious motivations were connected with the political ferment of the early 1790's and formed a part of the "Church and King" riots of that period. The racial discord which erupted in violence occurred at infrequent intervals, and usually involved the Irish. The disturbances that did not were spontaneous outbrusts involving other foreigners--usually sailors in English ports.

In his studies of eighteenth century disorders, Rudé has found that the city riot had a greater variety of causes than did the rural riot. The major cause of rural riots was some form of distress. This is not to say that disorders in urban areas did not have some bases in rising prices and food shortages. They did, but in the cities whose population was composed of more variant and volatile elements, popular protest could more easily be linked to a form of social protest or a political demonstration.[21] This study substantiates Rudé's findings for the last twenty years of the eighteenth century and indicates that this pattern continued through the first ten years of the nineteenth century. It is very unusual to find one of the less

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[21]Rudé, Crowd in History, 34, 47-48, 50; Rudé, "Popular Disturbances," 458, 465.

prevalent types of disorders occurring outside an urban setting, however, military disturbances were an exception. Attempts to put the new militia laws into effect in 1796 caused a wave of unrest throughout the country, resulting in a number of uproars in rural areas over the balloting procedures. Also, members of military units stationed in rural areas sometimes came into conflict with the local populace. These two factors produced the only real anomalies in a very valid generalization.

The degree of seriousness of the disorders was determined by considering the amount of property damage, the number of injuries, and the number of deaths.[22] Because of sketchy information, some of these aspects could not be evaluated with accuracy. However, there was information available on a sufficient number so that a valid assessment could be made over-all. Since disturbances with an economic basis accounted for a majority of the discord, they will be examined first.

In the area of property damage, 62 percent of the economic disorders could be evaluated. Of these, 47 percent had no property damage, 33 percent had a minor amount, 19 percent had a moderate amount, and 1 percent had an extensive amount. None had enough destruction to property to fall into the "very extensive" category. Over-all, there was some property damage in 53 percent of these riots, but only 20 percent produced enough harm for the damage to be considered of a serious nature.

There were two years which had an unusual number of economic

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[22]For a more complete explanation of the procedures, see the introduction to Appendix "A," pp. 239-40.

disorders: 1795 and 1800. In 1795, 41 percent of the disturbances caused some property damage while 10 percent had a moderate or extensive amount. In 1800, 50 percent resulted in some damage with 21 percent having a moderate or extensive amount. We get much the same picture if we divide the period into two parts after the year 1795. This places the same number of years in each segment as well as the two years that experienced the most riots in different segments. Through 1795, 46 percent of the disturbances caused property damage and 16 percent caused a moderate or extensive amount. After 1795, 60 percent gave rise to property damage while 24 percent resulted in a moderate or extensive amount. It can be concluded, therefore, that the amount of property damage in economic disorders increased during the period, especially after 1795.

In considering personal injuries, there was enough evidence to evaluate 58 percent of the economic upheavals in this respect. In 80 percent there were no injuries reported, 7 percent recorded a few, 10 percent a moderate number, 2 percent a large number, and 1 percent a very large number. Over-all, there were some injuries in 20 percent of the disorders with 13 percent having a moderate number or more--the latter figure representing enough injuries so that the riot would be considered serious from this standpoint.

If we break the period down as we did in examining property damage, we note that in the year 1795, injuries were reported in 13 percent of the disorders and 11 percent had a moderate number or more. In 1800, 23 percent recorded some injuries while, again, 11 percent reported a moderate number or more. The years through 1795 noted some injuries in 17 percent with 14 percent having a moderate

number or more. After 1795 the figures were 25 percent and 13 percent respectively.

The conclusion can be drawn that there was an increase in injuries during the period but not an across-the-board increase as there was with property damage. The increase was at the lower end of the scale. That is to say, more riots resulted in injuries but only in small numbers.

As a general rule, deaths resulting from a riot were reported with a great deal of accuracy. Of the economic disorders, 63 percent of the accounts made some mention of this aspect, either stating the number or that none occurred. No conclusion was drawn about those in which no statement was made in this regard. However, it is probable that if no deaths were reported none occurred, since this was the most accurately reported statistic of all. Of those reporting only 9 percent recorded any deaths. Four riots noted one death, three noted two, one noted three, three noted four, and one noted five deaths. Two disorders resulted in an abnormally high number of deaths. In 1785 there was a riot by the sailors in the port of Shields in Durham.[23] There was a dispute over wages, and various groups came into conflict. Sixty rioters were reported killed. A riot over the collection of a toll on a bridge in Bristol in 1793 resulted in soldiers killing twenty-five rioters after a large mob attacked the troops.[24]

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[23]See Appendix "A," 1785, source number 1.

[24]See Appendix "A," 1793, source number 15.

There were 115 deaths reported during the period, but eighty-five of these occurred in the two riots just mentioned. Of the remaining thirty, twenty-six occurred in three years: six in 1792, fifteen in 1795, and five in 1800. These were the years with the highest number of economic riots.

It can be seen that only a very small percentage of the economic disorders led to deaths. With the exception of two riots, there were very few deaths. Unlike property damage and injuries, the number of disturbances in which deaths occurred decreased during the period. This is true whether the two with excessively large numbers of deaths are considered or not.

In considering the above aspects--property damage, injuries, and deaths--as a whole, an assessment of the over-all seriousness could be made for 70 percent of the disorders. Of these, 10 percent proved to be inconsequential, 60 percent not serious, 25 percent moderately serious, and 5 percent very serious. None of the economic disturbances could be classified as extremely serious. Over-all, only 30 percent could be classified as being serious enough to evoke concern. However, Table 1 breaks all of them down into several time segments to note any discernible trends.

Even though there were fluctuations in some of the individual aspects, the over-all seriousness of the economic disorders of the period shows an amazing consistency. There was a slight increase in the number of more serious riots after 1795 but any logical breakdown of the years involved produces a maximum deviation from the over-all percentages of only four percentage points. Thus it can be concluded

Table 1. The Over-all Seriousness of Economic Disorders During Selected Time Periods

	Inconsequential and Not Serious	Moderately Serious and Very Serious
1780-1811	70%	30%
1780-1795	72%	28%
1796-1811	67%	33%
1795	74%	26%
1800	70%	30%
1795 and 1800	72%	28%
All years other than 1795 and 1800	66%	34%

that riots caused by economic factors presented about the same degree of threat to the maintenance of peace and to the general population throughout the period. The major threat from these disturbances came not so much from the devastation they wrought as from the sheer weight of their numbers, especially in years like 1795 and 1800.

None of the other types of disorders occurred in numbers nearly so large as did the economic,[25] and there were very few of them before 1791. Consequently, they do not warrant such extensive evaluations. However, certain of their aspects require comment and a comparison with the economic disorders are revealing.

As has been noted, 53 percent of the economic disturbances resulted in some property damage, and 20 percent had enough for them to be considered serious in this respect. Corresponding percentages for the other types of disorders were: military--30 percent and 19 percent, miscellaneous and unknown causes--51 percent and 16 percent, political--62 percent and 20 percent, religious--50 percent and 25 percent, and racial--25 percent and 0 percent. Thus it can be seen that the miscellaneous and religious disturbances had relatively the same incidence of minor property damage as did the economic; the military and racial produced much less, and the political significantly more. Insofar as serious property damage was concerned, the military, miscellaneous, political, and religious all had about the same proportion as the economic, but racial riots recorded none.

When we consider these other five types together and compare their over-all seriousness with the economic, we note that their

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[25]See above, p. 182.

percentages of 47 percent and 17 percent indicate that they were less serious. Also, while the economic exhibited an increase in property damage, these five types showed a decline and a significant decline in serious property damage.

In tumults caused by economic factors, 20 percent had some injuries, and 13 percent recorded a sufficient number to be considered serious. For the other types of disorders, the corresponding percentages were: military--44 percent and 26 percent, miscellaneous and unknown causes--35 percent and 17 percent, political--52 percent and 25 percent, religious--44 percent and 33 percent, racial--88 percent and 88 percent. With the exception of the more serious category of injuries in the miscellaneous type, all of the five other kinds of disturbances showed a significantly higher incidence of injuries than did the economic. Although the racial riots were few in number, they had a very high rate of injuries and these were all in large enough numbers to be considered serious.

In considering these five types as a whole, we can note a very similar pattern between them and the economic. There was an increase in the incidence of injuries during the period but this increase was in the category of disorders which produced only a few injuries. However, disorders caused by non-economic factors were not only more than twice as likely to produce injuries but also more than twice as apt to result in a larger number of them.

Of the disturbances which had an economic foundation, 9 percent recorded deaths and there was a total of 115 deaths. It has been noted that eighty-five of these occurred in two riots and that a

large majority of the remaining thirty occurred in three years.[26] Corresponding figures for the other types of disorders were: military--7 percent and four total deaths, miscellaneous and unknown causes--8 percent and seven, political--25 percent and twenty, religious--13 percent and one, racial--25 percent and two. They accounted for only 23 percent of the total number of disturbances, but the last three types had a significantly higher incidence of deaths. A majority of the deaths (thirteen) in the political riots were the result of the Priestley Riots in 1791.

Taken as a group, these five types had 13 percent of their number causing deaths and thirty-four total deaths. Although the incidence of deaths was higher than the economic type, a much smaller total resulted. This was mainly because of the larger number of economic riots and the very large number of persons killed in two of them. If we make a comparison of the tumults which resulted in larger number of deaths, we note that 5 percent of the economic and 3 percent of the other types produced three or more deaths each. Thus, even though the non-economic had a higher incidence of deaths, an economic riot was more likely to result in a larger number of deaths.

With regard to the over-all seriousness of the disturbances, 70 percent of the economic disorders were rated as inconsequential or not serious and 30 percent as moderately serious or very serious. None was rated as extremely serious. Table 2 shows the percentages for the other types of disorders.

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[26]See above, pp. 188-89.

Table 2. The Over-all Seriousness of Non-economic Disorders



*These types had no "very serious."

Considered as a whole these five types had 83 percent in the first two degrees of seriousness and 17 percent in the last three. Compared to the economic the ones above were of a much less serious nature. However, in this group were the only three riots rated as extremely serious.

As has been noted, the economic disorders were very consistent throughout the period in the ratio between the inconsequential/not serious and the more serious ones. This was not true of the other types. Of the disturbances rated as moderately serious or above, 61 percent occurred before 1796. After that date there was no very serious riot and only one extremely serious disorder, the Burdett Riots of 1810 in London.

Table 3 combines the statistics on all the different types of disturbances during the period and presents a very revealing picture. Considering the fact that there were four hundred riots

Table 3. The Seriousness of All Disorders

Property Damage		Injuries*		Deaths		Over-all Seriousness	
None	50%	None	69%	None	89.0%	Inconsequential	9%
Minor amount	31%	A few	11%	One	4.0%	Not serious	66%
Moderate amount	15%	A moderate number	14%	Two	3.0%	Moderately serious	21%
Extensive amount	3%	A large number	4%	Three	1.0%	Very serious	3%
Very extensive amount	1%	A very large number	1%	Four	1.0%	Extremely serious	1%
				Five	.5%		
				Thirteen	.5%		
				Twenty-five	.5%		
				Sixty	.5%		

*The number of injuries could not be determined for 1%.

during a thirty-one year period, one is struck by their "non-seriousness." Of course, there were serious riots, but they were the exception rather than the rule. Surely the period was a riotous one, but it was far from a condition that bordered on anarchy.

A comparison between riots which occurred in rural areas and those which occurred in urban centers insofar as their degree of seriousness was concerned is illustrated in Table 4.

Table 4. A Comparison of the Degree of the Over-all Seriousness of Rural and Urban Disorders

	Inconsequential	Not Serious	Moderately Serious	Very Serious	Extremely Serious
Economic					
Rural	14.0%	55%	27%	4.0%	-
Urban	3.0%	71%	21%	5.0%	-
Non-economic					
Rural	24.0%	68%	8%	-	-
Urban	1.5%	79%	15%	1.5%	3%
All riots					
Rural	16.0%	58%	22%	4.0%	-
Urban	2.0%	75%	18%	3.0%	2%

Economic disorders were more prevalent in rural areas. In fact, there were 88 percent more rural economic riots than urban, but the disturbances in urban areas were more serious than in the rural. Non-economic discord tended to occur more often in urban areas with there being 94 percent more here than in rural districts. As in the economic disturbances, the ones which erupted in the urban centers were the more serious. In considering all the riots, we find that

urban disorders were, on the whole, more serious than rural ones. However, there was a greater number of rural riots--15 percent more--than urban.

In assessing the means of restoring order, 79 percent of the disorders could be evaluated in this respect. In 21 percent of these there were no attempts made to restore order. In a majority of the remaining uproars, only one type of force was brought into play. Civil forces were used in 15 percent; quasi-military bodies in 2 percent; and military units including militia, yeomanry, fencibles, and regular troops in 46 percent.[27] In 16 percent both a military force and a civil force or a quasi-military body were utilized. There was no chronological pattern insofar as any of these forces were concerned except that, as one might expect, as the number of disorders rose, the use of the various types of forces did so in direct proportion.

When the effectiveness of these various types of forces in restoring order is examined, one is struck by their high degree of effectiveness. Over-all, 9 percent were rated as ineffective, 4 percent as marginally effective, 14 percent as moderately effective, 35 percent as very effective, and 38 percent as extremely effective. The important aspect here is the last two categories, which show that the force used was either very effective or extremely effective in quelling the disturbance in 73 percent of the cases. Table 5 shows the effectiveness of the several groups of forces in the restoration of order.

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[27]The provisional cavalry indeed seems to have "passed over the country like a blight" for no record has been found of their use in quelling any disorder. See above, Chapter II, pp. 52-53.

Table 5. The Effectiveness of the Different Groups of Forces in Restoring Order

	Quasi-Military	Civil	Military	More Than One Type
Ineffective	-	19%	10%	-
Marginally effective	-	14%	6%	3%
Moderately effective	-	10%	8%	31%
Very effective	60%	29%	36%	33%
Extremely effective	40%	38%	40%	33%

This evaluation indicates that the quasi-military bodies were the most effective, but they represent only 3 percent of the total. Both civil and military show a high percentage in the very and extremely effective categories. When more than one type of force was used, there was a striking degree of effectiveness. Representing 24 percent of the total, they show 97 percent in the top three categories of effectiveness.

In looking at the incidence of the use of the several forces the following frequencies can be noted:

civil	24%	yeomanry	18%
quasi-military	8%	fencibles	2%
militia	10%	regular troops	38%

Civil forces were used throughout the period but half of their use was concentrated in 1795 and 1800, the years of the large number of food and scarcity riots. Likewise, of all the times quasi-military bodies were utilized, slightly over one-half of these occurred in 1800.

Dropping out all except the military forces and considering them as an entity, we see the following incidence of use:

militia	15%	fencibles	3%
yeomanry	26%	regular troops	56%

Thus we note that regular troops were used more than all of the other military forces combined. The period 1790-1801 saw the heaviest concentrations in usage of regular military units. A very high percentage (88 percent) of the incidence of yeomanry use was in the years of distress, 1795 and 1800, and in 1796, the year of the larger number of riots connected with the implementation of the new Militia Act. Although it had to take a position inferior to regular troops and yeomanry, the militia exhibited a consistent pattern throughout the period with its use rising in proportion to the number of riots.

In comparing the use of the various forces to the locations where they were employed, we find that some type of force was used 15 percent more often in rural than in urban disorders. We have already noted that there were 15 percent more rural than urban riots during the period. However, when the military and non-military forces are separated, significant differences become obvious. Non-military forces were employed 24 percent more often in urban disturbances; military forces were brought into play 48 percent more often in rural tumults. This striking difference can be explained in part by the fact that urban centers generally had a larger population which was willing to be employed as special law enforcement officers. Also, more of the special volunteer associations, the quasi-military bodies, were organized in these centers.

An examination of the individual types of military forces reveals that there was only a small difference in the location in which two of them were used. Regular troops were employed in rural areas 52 percent of the time and 48 percent in urban. With the militia the

converse was the case--48 percent rural and 52 percent urban. The most pronounced differences were with the fencibles and yeomanry. The fencibles showed 75 percent rural versus 25 percent urban employment; the yeomanry was not far behind with 71 percent rural and 29 percent urban. These percentages are somewhat deceptive insofar as the fencibles are concerned since there are only eight recorded instances of their use. However, the yeomanry ranked next to the regular troops in incidence of employment.

When we compare the use of the forces in the different types of disturbances,[28] we note a distinct relationship between the military and the non-military forces. Table 6 indicates that, except for the racial disorders which made up only a small percentage of the total,[29] some type of military unit was utilized to restore order in a large majority of the other types of disturbances.

In looking at the several military units separately in Table 7, the frequency of their employment in the various disorders can be seen. Regular military units were employed to a much greater degree in every kind of disturbance than all the other military types combined and were followed by the yeomanry, militia, and fencibles in that order.[30]

Table 8 shows the use of non-military and military forces in relationship to the degree of seriousness of the disorders. As the degree of seriousness rose, the use of military units rose in direct

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[28]For the incidence of the use of the several forces, see above, pp. 197-99.

[29]See above, pp. 182, 185.

[30]See above, pp. 198-99.

Table 6. A Comparison of the Use of Non-military and Military Forces in the Different Types of Disorders

Type of Disorder	Non-military	Military
Economic	31.0%	69.0%
Military	27.0%	73.0%
Miscellaneous	46.0%	54.0%
Political	30.5%	69.5%
Religious	33.0%	67.0%
Racial	83.0%	17.0%

Table 7. The Frequency of Use of the Military Units in the Different Types of Disorders

Type of Disorder	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops
Economic	15.0%	28%	4.0%	53%
Military	7.5%	33%	7.5%	52%
Miscellaneous	15.0%	25%	-	60%
Political	12.0%	-	-	88%
Religious	25.0%	-	-	75%
Racial	-	-	-	17%

Table 8. A Comparison of the Use of Non-military and Military Forces Relative to the Degree of Seriousness of the Disorders

Degree of Seriousness	Non-military	Military
Inconsequential	44%	56%
Not serious	38%	62%
Moderately serious	29%	71%
Very serious	24%	76%
Extremely serious	40%	60%

proportion. This generalization holds true until the "extremely serious" category is reached. The trend reverses here but the fact that there were only three disturbances in this category should be taken into consideration. Such an abrupt reversal is difficult to support with so small a sampling.

The frequency of utilization of the separate military units in relationship to the degree of seriousness of the disorders is shown in Table 9.

Table 9. The Frequency of Use of the Different Military Units Relative to the Degree of Seriousness of the Disorders

Degree of Seriousness	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops
Inconsequential	7%	29%	-	64%
Not serious	16%	23%	2%	59%
Moderately serious	19%	33%	4%	44%
Very serious	25%	19%	-	56%
Extremely serious	33%	-	-	67%

It is easy to see that regular troops were employed more than any of the other types and, except for one category, they were used more often than all the other forces combined.

There is no discernible pattern in the use of the yeomanry, and the fencibles make up too small a sampling from which to draw a generalization. The regular units show an unusual pattern. They were used more frequently at the extremes and their usage declined at a comparable rate from both ends toward the middle category. In fact, if this usage were graphed, the result would be almost an exact opposite of the standard bell curve. The militia is the only force

whose frequency of use compares to that of the military units as a whole, rising as the seriousness of the disorders rose.

In examining the disturbances of the period we have seen that certain counties were more susceptible to turmoil than others. The counties in which were located the older metropolitan centers (especially the port cities), the growing industrial centers, and the mining districts had an above average number of riots.

The majority of the disturbances had economic causes, mainly in the distress resulting from food shortages and high prices. There were some wage disputes, but these did not occur on a large scale before 1811. There were more riots in rural areas than in urban centers, and most of these rural disorders were brought on by distress. Urban disturbances had a greater variety of causes and, as a general rule, were more serious than those which broke out in rural regions.

As the number of riots increased, so did the forces used to quell them. These forces were, on the whole, very effective in doing so, and the greater the number of types of forces brought to bear, the higher was the degree of effectiveness. In comparing the different forces with various aspects of the disorders, it was found that non-military forces were employed more often to quell urban tumults while military forces were used more often to bring rural disorders under control. In searching for relationships between the various types of riots and their degree of seriousness and the forces used to restore order, it was found that military units were employed much more often than non-military forces and that regular army units were pressed into service much more frequently than the other military forces.

The disorders have been scrutinized from several different standpoints, and we have noted that late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England was indeed a riotous place. Even though the number of disturbances was large, they were not, on the whole, of a very serious nature. They were mostly of short duration; nine out of ten lasted no more than two days with a week or longer being very unusual. The period 1780-1811 was truly a time of tumult, but it was not so tumultuous that it approached a state of anarchy.

CHAPTER IX

THE FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1780-1811: A SUMMARY

In a legal sense, there were several actions which were capable of endangering the peace of the realm in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Among those were rout, riot, unlawful assembly, affray, insurrection, and malicious destruction of property. However, from a practical standpoint, the real threats came from riot and unlawful assembly. Statutes dealing with these peace-breaking actions and aimed at preserving order went very far back into English history. The first one of major significance was the Statute of Winchester (1285) which placed the maintenance of order primarily in the hands of local officials. This local responsibility became more centralized under the Justices of the Peace Act of 1361, but was never lost.

Both the common law and statute law were used concomitantly to preserve domestic order. The Star Chamber Court also played an important role, especially after 1603 when the statutory laws pertaining to riot expired. However, in 1660 the Star Chamber had been abolished and the courts had to fall back on the common law which proved to be inadequate to deal with the situation. This inadequacy eventually led to the passage of the Riot Act (1714), which, next to the Justices of the Peace Act, was the most important statute dealing with the maintenance of domestic order.

By the late eighteenth century, the essential principles of the law against public violence had been laid down by the common law, the

statutes, and court decisions. The government had at its disposal broad theoretical and legal bases for the preservation of order. Even though the state possessed these bases as well as an apparent large group of officials designated to carry them out, the preservation of order became more difficult as the eighteenth century progressed. The reason lay in the fact that these were ancient methods designed for a stable society, and English society was becoming more unstable. The conditions which set the stage for the Industrial Revolution and the beginnings of the Revolution itself were generating changes at an increasingly more rapid rate--making English society more unstable and destroying the order within it. Also, the character of the personnel responsible for the maintenance of order was changing; they were becoming unreliable, especially in the urban areas.

The government reacted to the situation by increasing the number of capital crimes, by using special constables to a greater degree, by allowing the formation of larger numbers of private volunteer bodies of citizens for use in peace-keeping activites, by offering rewards for information leading to the conviction of breakers of the peace, and by the increased use of spies and paid informants. However, the central government did not see the problem as being national in scope. The "old order" was passing, but the country could not bring itself to create a "new order" to take its place. The most logical solution would have been the creation of a national system of police for preventive purposes, and there was a growing number of reformers after 1750 who advocated this answer. However, a system of police, such as that which existed in France, was generally mistrusted in England, and reforms of this nature were very difficult to implement. The

first tentative steps were taken in London, and the River Police, established in 1798, was the most effective body to come out of these attempts. Meanwhile, the problem of maintaining order began to manifest itself in the smaller towns as well as in rural areas.

The country still possessed the "Law" but it was rapidly losing the "means" of putting it into effect. As the eighteenth century progressed, the "means" turned to with increasing frequency was the military. When the century opened, it was not unheard of for local military units to be utilized, and after 1725 the central government began to receive an increasing number of requests for the use of non-local units. Because of this growing volume, it was necessary to develop procedures to deal with them. From the beginning it was evident that the central government intended to maintain a tight control over the various units--even the militia. But they were not willing to challenge the authority of the lord lieutenants in this latter area.

By 1766 requests for military units had become so numerous and the practice of going through London in every case so cumbersome that a new policy was established. Local authorities were allowed to apply directly to locally stationed units in their areas, and a general order was issued directing the commanders of such units to render assistance in such cases.

During the eighteenth century, the legality of using troops to put down riots became a serious legal issue. Both local magistrates and military commanders found themselves in court charged with using excessive force to disperse riotous mobs. However, the opinion handed down by the Attorney General during the Gordon Riots supporting the employment of military force and the fact that increased riotous

activity could be handled effectively in many cases only with troops made the legal issue a moot question, and by the 1790's the use of soldiers was virtually unchallenged. Technically, the issue was settled in 1782 when the Home Department was created. This department was given the responsibility of maintaining internal order and the power to use soldiers to do so if it became necessary. The various home secretaries all recognized this responsibility, but each handled it in a different manner. Some were very forceful; others were not.

The Home Office, War Office, and the Commander in Chief all shared in the decisions at the national level. The correspondence indicates that there was a great deal of cooperation among them. However, this spirit of cooperation did not always filter down to the local commanders and the local authorities.

It was during the late eighteenth century that the central government developed a policy with regard to the use of soldiers to suppress disorders. It was held that troops should be used only as "a last resort" to quell a disturbance. Nevertheless, the records show that this "last resort" was employed with increasing frequency during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

It is ironic that, at the same time that the central government's responsibility was being more highly centralized, local officials were being granted increased authority. If one goes as far back as the fusion of Saxon and Norman ideas in the common law, one can discern the development of the principle that the maintenance of internal order should be primarily in the hands of the local authorities. By the late eighteenth century, this principle had taken definite form and was also

applied to the use of military forces. It is evident that local officials took this responsibility quite seriously. Using military units to quell disturbances was considered to be the "final solution" by both national and local officials. Even though this was the case, local magistrates felt more comfortable with this "solution" close at hand even if they did not have to resort to using it.

In the face of a disorder or a threatened disorder, there were a number of courses of action open to local officials. If there was sufficient advance warning, the magistrates often took some type of preventive action. One common method of draining off the pressure from a dissident group was to give in, either wholly or partially, to their demands. This was usually done when it was felt that the crowd's grievance had justification or when the magistrates had no other choices open to them. In some cases riotous groups were pacified without resort to any supporting force. At other times local officials made either overt or covert use of military units while the pacification was in progress. Local authorities also took preventive steps by using the forces at hand or by requesting military assistance from the Home Office, the War Office, or nearby towns.

In many instances disturbances erupted in spite of all efforts to avert them or with little or no advance warning. In the face of these situations, the authorities reacted in three principal ways: they took either vigorous action, indecisive action, or no action at all. Examination of these responses reveals that a vigorous, assertive approach was the most effective in restoring order. To their credit local officials took this course three times more often than the other two options.

The records indicate that authorities at the local level understood that they were responsible for maintaining order. The evidence also reveals that they were willing to act upon this responsibility when the situation warranted. In general there was a spirit of cooperation between the central and local governments but there were some points of controversy and conflict. There were occasions when local officials wanted military units to remain when the central government ordered them to other stations. Conversely, there were times when local authorities desired the removal of troops but found the Home or War Office reluctant to order them away. The most pronounced controversies arose over the central government's sending military units to a locality without prior notification. The magistrates took their peace-keeping responsibilities very seriously and reacted strongly when they felt that they were being encroached upon.

There were times when local officials were caught between the demands of the government in London and the pressures of the local populace. Under such conditions the temper of the crowd usually determined what actions the magistrates could reasonably take; and when such situations arose, they felt free to alter Home Office or War Office directives in conjunction with local military commanders. It is evident that these officials closest to the problems had a keen awareness of their accountability and, for the most part, discharged their responsibilities in commendable fashion.

Beginning in the 1790's there was a significant change in England's policy on the housing of regular military units on the home island. Troops which, for the most part, had been quartered in public houses

were moved into billets in permanent barrack installations. This changeover was begun in June 1792 after the destructive Priestley Riots and De Lancey's inspection tour of the north of England. In all probability the initial reason for this major change was a domestic one--the growing unrest in the Midlands and the North. But eight months later the war with France began, and the pattern of construction definitely reflects this external pressure.

Historians have traditionally interpreted the barrack question in two different lights: barracks as police stations and barracks as a basic army reform. From the evidence in this study, the latter interpretation has the greater amount of support. Although both assessments have validity, the actual pattern of barrack distribution has been ignored by investigators. This distribution shows very clearly the external influence from France.

There were other ways in which France affected the course of domestic events in England. After 1789 the government feared that the French revolutionary spirit would enter England through the radical societies. This fear resulted in a policy of suppression and coercion. After England went to war with France, this fear was expanded to include a general fear of a French invasion. The war and the anxieties it aroused caused a rapid increase in military forces and resultant competition for recruits which, at times, produced disorders. This struggle also resulted in additional needs for foodstuffs as the regular military establishment increased in size. These increased needs helped to produce more severe food shortages in England and thereby contributed to the causes of the growing number of food riots of the period.

In addition the French Revolution and the conservative reaction in England against it were largely responsible for the "Church and King" riots of the 1790's. The Revolution tended to associate religious dissent and parliamentary reform, and because of the nature of the resultant disorders the authorities were often lax in quelling them. Then, too, certain events in the French Revolution and French wars were the causal factors in a number of disturbances. Disorders were produced by the celebration in England of the second anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, by the celebration of Allied victories, by the celebration of French victories by sympathizers in England, and by the fiasco of the Walcheren expedition. Outside influences cannot be discounted and were significant in some instances, but if the causes of domestic disorders are considered as a whole, we find that domestic unrest was touched off by domestic issues rather than by foreign pressures.

The only discernible pattern of geographical distribution is that counties with large metropolitan centers, especially old port cities, counties in which were located the growing industrial centers, and counties with large populations of miners were more susceptible to disorders than were other counties. When the disturbances were examined according to locality, it was noted that there were many more disorders in rural areas than in urban centers. Even though this was the case, sheer numbers do not tell the whole story, for urban riots were more serious than the ones which broke out in rural localities.

A crowd seldom rioted for one single reason, but there was in practically all cases a primary motive. During the period under investigation, a large majority of the tumults found their basic cause

in economic motives with some form of distress being the major factor. E. P. Thompson has gone deeper than these surface reasons and suggests that the violation of certain moral economic laws, understood by the populace as a whole, lay at the root of these disturbances. There is a very valid point here, but one should remember that distress was the fuse which touched off the explosiveness of this moral outrage.

City riots had a wider variety of causes than rural riots. It is unusual to find a rural disorder caused by factors other than distress. The major exceptions to this rule were military disturbances. The implementation of the new Militia Act in 1796 and 1797 caused a number of rural riots. From time to time military units stationed in rural areas were the source of disorders also.

When considering the seriousness of the disorders, those caused by economic factors were examined as a unit since there were more of this type than any other. In these riots both property damage and injuries increased during the period. Even though more riots produced injuries, they were not produced in large numbers. Only 9 percent resulted in deaths, and the number of riots in which deaths occurred decreased. Economic disorders were relatively constant in their threats to the maintenance of peace; they caused a major concern by the sheer weight of their numbers during some years.

In comparing the economic disorders with those caused by other factors, it was found that economic disturbances caused more property damage than did the other types but that the other types had a higher incidence of both injuries and deaths. However, an economic riot was more likely to produce a larger number of deaths. When considered on

an over-all basis, non-economic disorders were much less serious than those produced by economic motives.

When one looks at the numbers of disturbances during the period, the conclusion must be that this was a very tumultuous time in England's history. However, serious riots were the exception rather than the rule. Most of the disturbances were of short duration; nine out of ten lasted two days or less and very few lasted as long as a week. No government, either national or local, was ever in danger of being overthrown.

When the peace of the realm was broken, those in authority had to take steps to restore order. On the occasions when it became necessary to take these steps, one is struck by the high degree of effectiveness of the means employed. When more than one type of force was utilized, the degree of effectiveness rose proportionately.

Of the numerous military forces available, the militia was the only one that exhibited a consistent pattern of use throughout the entire period. That is to say, its utilization rose and fell in direct proportion to the increase and decrease in the number of disturbances. The same pattern can be seen relative to the degree of seriousness of a riot: the more serious a riot, the more likely that the militia would be employed. Of course, there was a direct correlation between the use of military force and the seriousness of a riot, but the militia was the only force that exhibited such a consistent pattern of employment relative to this. Nevertheless, with the increase in the different types of units and in the number of home-based regular troops, the relative importance of the militia in maintaining internal order declined during the period under investigation. However, their actual

use remained the same, as did their effectiveness in dealing with the disturbances.

There are a number of other discernible patterns in the methods used to restore order. Some type of force was resorted to more often in rural areas but there were more disturbances in these areas. The force employed most often was a military one. One reason for this was that rural areas generally lacked sufficient civil forces and were left with little choice other than the military. Regular army units and the militia were used as often in rural disorders as they were in urban disturbances. However, the yeomanry, which was basically a rural-oriented force, was employed three times more often in rural riots than in those occurring in towns. If just the total usage of the military is considered, we find that regular troops were used more often than the rest of the military units combined.

Just as in warfare, where for centuries the advent of a new weapon or tactic has precipitated in time a counter to that weapon or tactic, the increasing unrest in the country caused the government to search for the ways and means to counter it. Methods and forces were found and, in the short run, proved quite effective. One salient aspect was the increased reliance on regular military forces. But, in the long run, these efforts were only temporary expedients. England was being forced at an increasingly more rapid rate towards that solution which she had sought to avoid for half a century--a national system of police.

EPILOGUE

By the early part of 1811, England was still beset by external as well as internal pressures. Bonaparte had not yet made his foray into Russia and was still the formidible threat to be reckoned with from the continental quarter. On the home island, civil unrest continued to be a chronic disease, and the authorities carried on the search for an elixir with which to effect its cure. Viscount Townshend's hopes, expressed shortly after the termination of the Gordon Riots, that these disorders would make such a strong impression that the result would be a plan for an effective police system for the country, a system which would eliminate the necessity of calling on the military when the civil power proved to be insufficient to cope with a riotous situation, were for the most part still just hopes thirty years later.[1] It could have been learned from the Gordon Riots that soldiers were not the forces best suited to the task of putting down disorders, especially when the tumult had gained so much momentum that severe measures were required. Even though the lesson was presented, it was not taken to heart.[2] As has been noted, the period 1780-1811 was an era that witnessed not only an increase in the size and diversity of the military establishment but also the proclivity to rely on it during times of domestic unrest. In 1811 there began

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[1] Parliamentary History, XXI (1780-81), 732.

[2] Lee, History of Police, 168.

a series of disturbances which struck an extraordinary amount of fear among those charged with the maintenance of internal peace. This ferment and fear came from Luddism.

Frame breaking was not a new phenomenon in England. It had occurred at least as early as 1710 in London, but until 1811 these outbreaks had been sporadic and isolated happenings.[3] However, beginning in March 1811 large numbers of the workers in the hosiery industry in Nottingham and vicinity had to be dismissed because the market was glutted with the products from the new, faster working frames. Taking their name from Ned Ludd or King Ludd, a mythical folk hero who avenged wrongs done to workingmen, these unemployed workers formed into groups and not only smashed frames but also attacked millers and corn dealers. They were subsequently joined by the lace makers and workers in the woolen and cotton trades.[4]

The disturbances soon spread to Leicestershire, Lancashire, Cheshire, West Yorkshire, and the lowlands of Scotland. The main period of rioting occurred between March 1811 and January 1813, but the disorders did not abate completely until 1818.[5]

Faced with disturbances of such magnitude, the authorities resorted to all the peace-keeping resources at their disposal. They swore in special constables and called out the voluntary associations,

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[3]William Felkin, History of the Machine-Wrought Hosiery and Lace Manufactures (Centenary Edition; New York, 1967), 227-31. First published, London, 1867.

[4]Traill, Social England, V, 618-19.

[5]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 100; Holdsworth, History of English Law, XIII, 180; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 122.

the yeomanry, and the militia. There were some reservations about using the militia; it was feared that they might side with the discontented elements. These fears proved to have little foundation. It was an exceptional instance when the militia did not prove to be loyal and dependable.[6]

Even with all these peace-keeping means, only a few of the local magistrates would act quickly and vigorously against the Luddites. The major responsibility for restoring order fell upon the regular military forces under the direction of the Home Office. By December 1811 a force of 1,800 men had been dispatched to Nottingham. According to Richard Ryder, the Home Secretary, this was the largest force that had ever been employed in England for quelling a purely local disturbance. Three months later this force had swelled to nearly 4,000, and by the summer of 1812 all of the disturbed areas contained 12,000 soldiers, a force larger than many armies commanded by British generals on foreign campaigns. It is little wonder that these areas gave the appearance to contemporaries of a country under military occupation.[7]

Such a large concentration of troops assembled to put down riotous civilians could easily have been employed in an extremely repressive fashion. The two military commanders, General Maitland in Lancashire and General Grey in Yorkshire, are credited with acting with patience and restraint and in so doing keeping repressive measures to

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[6]Ibid.; Fortescue, County Lieutenancies, 267; Darvall, Popular Disturbances and Public Order, 101, 118.

[7]Ibid., 1n, 101, 103; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 122-23; Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 101, 104.

a minimum. Their approach to this situation calmed the elements on both sides. They insisted that troops only be used as a last resort and employed their cavalry more as mounted police than as combat units. Their correspondence with Westminster is filled with the observations that a police force would have functioned with a greater degree of effectiveness than their soldiers. However, Westminster was not impressed with these observations.[8]

Every conceivable method to restore order was utilized. In addition to calling out the forces already mentioned, the Home Office offered rewards for information leading to the conviction of rioters, and Home Secretary Ryder even recommended renewing the ancient system of watch and ward throughout the country--hardly a progressive solution, to say the least. What really neutralized the situation was the planting of hundreds of government spies among the Luddites. The agents uncovered the identity of a number of the more important leaders, and thirty of these served as examples in public hangings. These infiltrations undermined the Luddites' morale, shook their trust in one another, and played the major role in reducing their riotous activities.[9]

In spite of the fact that these disturbances were widespread and of an unusual nature, there is no evidence that the Luddites were impelled by political motives.[10] However, the Webbs see a significant change in the nature and tone of disturbances beginning in 1812. Riots

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[8]Ibid., 105-06.

[9]Ibid., 100, 105; Gentleman's Magazine, LXXXII (1812), pt. 1, p. 269; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 90.

[10]Darvall, Popular Disturbances and Public Order, 174.

of the eighteenth century and the first few years of the nineteenth contained no intermixture of sedition. The years after 1812 still saw fervent protests against high prices and angry attacks on machinery but there could in addition be detected a new spirit which permeated many of the disorders. In the eighteenth century there was an overwhelming feeling of loyalty to both the King and the Constitution. However, after 1812 in those who destroyed machinery, burned hay ricks, demonstrated, and rioted, there developed a consciousness that they were in rebellion against "the established order of society, laid down by Parliament, upheld by the Courts and enforced by the standing Army."[11] The impulse towards reform which had largely been placed in abeyance by the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars was again in motion, and it moved with an increased impetus after peace was made in 1815.

Although local officials and the Home Office were concerned with the Luddite disturbances, Parliament gave them a minimum of attention. They were content to let the Home Secretary deal with these matters.[12]

Even when disorders came to their very doorsteps as they did during the Corn Law Riots of 1815, Parliament remained indifferent to the subject of police reform. There was general unrest throughout the country, and in March an especially serious disturbance erupted in London. The city was very close to being exposed to a repetition of the Gordon Riots of 1780 as mobs blocked the streets of Westminster and molested members of both Houses. When the civil forces proved

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[11]Webb, English Local Government, IV, 413.

[12]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 102.

ineffective, the military was called in and order restored. The best remedy offered by Parliament came from one M. P. who suggested calling out the house holders of each parish--a clear demonstration of the attachment to ancient principles and remedies when they were no longer applicable.[13]

The year 1812 marks not only a new spirit in many of the disorders but also an important increase in the powers assumed by the Home Office in dealing with them. Lord Sidmouth became Home Secretary in June 1812 in the midst of the Luddite disturbances, and practically ran the internal government of the country. He issued orders on the movement and employment of regular army units, yeomanry, and militia; gave the Postmaster-General authorization to intercept mail; acted as a clearing house for reports from local authorities; and used the secret service fund to pay a veritable army of spies and informers. Before he left office almost ten years later in January 1822, he had earned an unenviable reputation for repressive zeal.[14]

When Napoleon was sent to his last island exile in 1815, England was long last at peace with her continental neighbors. There was not, however, placidity within the narrower confines of England. The long conflict had placed severe pressures upon the economy and contributed to a portion of the unrest which had on occasion resulted in outbreaks of violence. With the coming of peace, the country was faced with the problem of changing from a wartime to a peacetime economy. This called

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[13]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 221 and n.; III, 352-53.

[14]Critchley, Conquest of Violence, 104.

for new, imaginative solutions which were not found quickly. As a result, the country was still beset by economic difficulties--difficulties which also produced unrest and disorder.

It has also been noted that reform and radical activity experienced a rebirth. Thus, England was faced with problems comparable to the ones of the mid-eighteenth century. The country was experiencing undercurrents of unrest which often exploded into open and sometimes violent demonstrations. And just as in earlier times, the country had no police force which could deal with the dissident elements. However, the intervening years had produced a significantly larger number and variety of military units. These the authorities were not reluctant to employ.

More use was found for them during the period of readjustment between 1815 and 1820 than in the decade of the 1820's. Most of these disorders were not significantly different from others of the period, but there were several which were either serious or unusual.

In December 1816 Henry Hunt, the most renown orator of the time on political reform, was scheduled to speak to a mass gathering at Spa Fields in London. The meeting was invaded by a small group of radicals, the Society of Spencean Philanthropists, and a riot resulted. A few months later in March 1817, a group of unemployed weavers set out to march from Manchester to London to bring petitions to the Regent. These Blanketeers--so called because each man carried a blanket--were broken up by the military by the time they reached Stockport. Three months later the "Pentrich Rising" resulted in its leader, Jeremiah

Brandreth, and his lieutenants being sent to the gallows.[15]

The most infamous clash between the military and the populace occurred in Manchester in August 1819. An estimated fifty thousand people gathered in St. Peter's Fields to hear Henry Hunt speak. The local magistrates decided to arrest him and sent an inexperienced contingent of yeomanry into the crowd. When they became trapped in the sea of people, regular cavalry units had to be sent to their rescue. Eleven were killed and hundreds were wounded. The incident was derisively christened the "Peterloo Massacre." Though the government easily weathered the attacks of various liberals, reformers, and humanitarians, the impact of Peterloo was felt throughout the country.

Tensions within the country began to ease after 1820 basically because of the general improvement in economic conditions. The government which had pursued a policy of retrenchment since 1815 found this policy now out of date. It appeared that Lord Liverpool who had headed the cabinet since 1812 might fall from power. But Liverpool exhibited his political adroitness by overhauling his government. He eliminated the intransigent cabinet members and replaced them with men who were either advocates of or receptive to reforms. This new tone that was set helped to pave the way for the first alterations in the English Constitution since 1688 and for the great Reform Bill of 1832.

One of the new faces in the Liverpool cabinet was Sir Robert Peel who took over the Home Office in 1822. He not only sponsored numerous pieces of legislation dealing with criminal offenses, capital

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[15]Webb, Modern England, 160.

punishment, and legal procedure but was also instrumental in the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829. Now for the first time the London area had a regularly organized system of police protection. This major breakthrough was followed in 1835 by the Municipal Corporations Act[16] to create police forces in the towns of England and in 1839 by the County Police Act[17] to create police forces for the rural areas.

Now, three quarters of a century after it was first proposed by a few far-sighted individuals, a national system of police which could be used preventively was a reality. However, England never totally abandoned the possibility that military force might be necessary. This is attested to by the fact that the legal position and obligations of members of the armed forces during civil disturbances may still be found in the military law books of the twentieth century.[18]

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[16]For a full discussion of this Act see Critchley, History of the Police, 62-68.

[17]For a full discussion of this Act see ibid., 78-80.

[18]War Office, Manual of Military Law, 8th ed. (1951), part II, sec. V, pars. 2, 3, reprinted in Brownlie, Public Order, Appendix.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE DISORDERS: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

This appendix provides summary data on the riots and civil disorders under investigation. The accounts of some of these are very sketchy and do not contain some of the desired information. When this is the case, these categories have been marked with a dash (-).

Source Number

The source numbers refer to the list of sources located at the end of the summary. This list gives the sources of the accounts of the various disturbances. When there is more than one source, they are listed in order of importance with the more complete and significant ones being cited first.

Date

At times it was difficult to determine the exact date or dates of a disorder. Most of them, however, can be dated at least to the month in which they occurred. When a more exact date could not be found, internal evidence was used to determine the order of placement. Those in which this could not be done are placed at the beginning of the month. The same procedure was also used in placing those whose dates were given only in terms of a year or season of a year.

Duration (Days)

For those disturbances that lasted only a short time, it was, in most cases, easy to establish their duration. However, when such

limits as "the greater part of last week" or "several days" were the only clues, a minimum duration was established and a plus (+) sign added to this figure. It should be noted that very few of the riots continued without let-up for the number of days listed. A duration of three days simply means that the disorders occurred on three separate days. The usual pattern in such a disturbance was for the first riots to begin in the early evening hours of the first day with order being restored sometime during the night, for an outbreak to occur the next morning and/or the next evening, and for there to be one or two outbreaks on the third day. Thus, a three-day riot's actual disturbance time might consist of only ten or twelve hours out of the seventy-two hour period. Some were almost continuous for the days noted but they were the exception rather than the rule.

Location

All of the disturbances have been located by town and county. Those that did not occur in a town or city but in the rural areas close by have been listed in this way. Contemporary accounts usually give only the town, omitting the county designation. Where this was the case and where there was more than one town with the same name, internal evidence was used to determine the county. This was not possible in all cases and those few have been omitted from this summary.

Type

These disorders have been broken down into six main classifications: economic, political, military, religious, racial, and miscellaneous. At times, even though the causal sub-currents are obscure,

one is hard put to say that any large riotous group of people had only a single motive for their behavior. However, in most cases one motivational factor stands out clearly and it was on this basis that the categorizations were made.

Seriousness

The seriousness of these disturbances were determined, for the most part, by examining three aspects: the amount of property damage, the number of injuries, and the number of deaths.

The amount of property damage is rated on a five-point scale: A--none, B--minor amount, C--moderate amount, D--extensive amount, E--very extensive amount. One very seldom finds any monetary assessment of damages. Rather, one must work with such statements as "a few windows broken" or "three houses damaged severely." These were taken and considered in relation to the amount of damage reported in the other accounts of the period and a ranking made on this basis.

The number of injuries is also rated on a five-point scale: A--none, B--a few, C--a moderate number, D--a large number, and E--a very large number. It should be understood that those injuries reported were, as a general rule, serious ones and some mention was usually made to that effect. It is hard to believe, when one reads accounts of some of the disorders, that they resulted in no injuries. But considering the temper of the times, a few cuts and bruises were not considered noteworthy enough to report. It was the usual thing to report the number injured with indefinite phrases such as "several," "a number," "many," or "a few." When figures were given they were usually five or less. A "C" rating is considered an average number

of injuries and corresponds to about five or six. From some of the accounts it is impossible to make a rating; for these a plus (+) denotes that some injuries did occur.

Deaths were reported with a great deal more accuracy than injuries. In almost all accounts they are given in exact figures. For this reason they are listed in a like manner in the summary. These figures represent the persons actually killed during the course of a disturbance or those who died within such a short time that their deaths were included in the accounts.

After considering these three aspects separately, each disorder was considered as an entity and in relation to contemporary disorders and an over-all assessment was made of the degree of seriousness. Again a five-point scale is used: A--inconsequential, B--not serious, C--moderately serious, D--very serious, E--extremely serious.

Means of Restoring Order

The remainder of the summary indicates what forces were used to restore order. In the last column in this section, an evaluation is made of their effectiveness in accomplishing this task. A five-point scale is again used: A--ineffective, B--marginally effective, C--moderately effective, D--very effective, and E--extremely effective.

Abbreviations

These abbreviations are used in Table A-1 as well as in the remainder of the Appendices.

Angl. - Anglesey
Beds. - Bedfordshire
Berks. - Berkshire
B'ham. - Birmingham
Brec. - Brecknockshire
Bucks. - Buckinghamshire
Caer. - Caernarvonshire
Cambs. - Cambridgeshire
Cards. - Cardiganshire
Carm. - Carmarthenshire
Ches. - Cheshire
Corn. - Cornwall
Cumb. - Cumberland
Denb. - Denbighshire
Derby. - Derbyshire
Devon. - Devonshire
Dorset. - Dorsetshire
Dur. - Durham
econ. - economic
Flints. - Flintshire
Glam. - Glamorganshire
Glos. - Gloucestershire
Hants. - Hampshire
Herefs. - Herefordshire
Herts. - Hertfordshire
Hunts. - Huntingdonshire
Lancs. - Lancashire
Leics. - Leicestershire
Lincs. - Lincolnshire
Mer. - Merionethshire
Middx. - Middlesex
mil. - military
misc. - miscellaneous
Mon. - Monmouthshire
Mont. - Montgomeryshire
N'ham. - Nottingham
Norf. - Norfolk
Northants. - Northamptonshire
Northumb. - Northumberland
Notts. - Nottinghamshire
Oxon. - Oxfordshire
Pem. - Pembrokeshire
pol. - political
rac. - racial
Rad. - Radnorshire
rel. - religious
Rut. - Rutlandshire
Salop. - Shropshire
Som. - Somersetshire
Staffs. - Staffordshire
Suff. - Suffolk
W. - Wales
War. - Warwickshire
Westmor. - Westmorland
Wilts. - Wiltshire
Worcs. - Worcestershire
Yorks. - Yorkshire

Table A-1. A Chronological Summary of Disorders, June 10, 1780--March 1, 1811

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
	1780															
1	6/19	1	Leeds,Yorks.	econ.	-	A	0	B				X				D
2	7/	1	Manchester,Lancs.	mil.	A	A	0	B							X	D
3	---	-	Lancaster,Lancs.	rel.	A	A	0	A				X				E
	1781															
	1782															
1	10/16-17	2	B'ham. & vicinity,War.	econ.	A	A	0	C							X	D
	1783															
1	1/	2	Wrexham,Denb.,W. & Bangor, Flints.,W.	econ.	A	A	0	C				X				D
2	3/6-10	5	Newcastle,Staffs.	econ.	A	A	0	C				X				A
3	3/	1+	Portsmouth,Hants.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
4	4/12	1	Ludlow,Salop.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	E
5	4/	1+	Plymouth,Devon.	mil.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	4/	1+	Chatham,Kent.	mil.	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	6/8	1	Halifax,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
8	6/9	1	Bradford,Yorks.	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							
9	6/10	1	Huddersfield,Yorks.	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							
10	6/	1	Rochdale,Lancs.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	6/13	1	Wakefield,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	B			X					E
12	7/1-2	2	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	C	C	0	C		X					X	C

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
	1784															
1	4/30	1	London	misc.	B	A	0	B	X							
2	5/10	1	London	pol.	A	A	1	B							X	D
	1785															
1	5/	3+	Shields,Dur.	econ.	-	-	60	D							X	A
2	6/	-	Sunderland,Dur.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	D
3	6/21	1	London	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
4	7/4	1	N'ham,Notts.	misc.	B	A	0	B	X							
5	7/5	1	London	misc.	B	B	0	B	X							
6	7/13	1	London	misc.	B	A	0	B	X							
7	10/14	1	London	rac.	A	D	0	B		X						D
8	11/5	1	Alresford,Hants.	misc.	A	A	0	A		X						A
9	11/5	1	Lewes,Sussex	misc.	A	A	0	A		X						A
	1786															
	1787															
1	---	-	Poldice Mine,Corn.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	12/7	-	Coventry,War.	econ.	B	-	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1788															
1	---	-	Leicester,Leics.	econ.	C	+	-	C							X	-

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
	1789															
1	---	-	Poldice Mine,Corn.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	3/	1+	Northumb. & Dur. (vicinity of Newcastle)	econ.	D	-	-	C	X							
3	3/	1+	From Holywell,Flints.,W. to Oswestry,Salop., including part of Denb.,W.	econ.	C	-	-	C	X							
4	6/17,19-21	4	Truro,Corn.	econ.	-	-	-	B							X	B
5	7/29-?	1+	Wrexham,Denb.	econ.	C	A	0	B	X							
	1790															
1	10/25-29	5	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	B	D	0	C							X	A
	1791															
1	---	-	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	---	1	Bradford,Wilts.	econ.	B	A	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	7/14	1	London	pol.	A	A	0	A							X	E
4	7/14-19	6	B'ham,War.	pol. & rel.	E	E	13	E		X					X	D
5	7/27	1	Sheffield,Yorks.	misc.	C	B	0	C							X	D
6	8/1	1	Wolverhampton,Staffs.	econ.	A	A	0	A	X							
7	8/27	1	Falmouth,Corn.	econ.	C	C	0	C							X	C
8	8/	3+	Liverpool,Lancs.	econ.	B	A	0	B		X					X	C
9	9/30	1	Ipswich,Suff.	pol.	A	C	0	B							X	D

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
10	10/	1	Liverpool,Lancs.	pol.	A	B	1	B	X							
	1792															
1	1/	1	London	misc.	B	A	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	1/	1	London	econ.	A	-	5	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	2/24	1	London	econ.	A	A	0	A							X	E
4	---	-	York,Yorks.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	4/	1	Manchester,Lancs.	econ.	C	A	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	4/28	1	London	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						D
7	5/	1	Woodchester,Glos.	econ.	A	A	0	A	X							
8	5/12-14	3	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	C	A	0	B							X	E
9	5/18-21	4	B'ham,War.	misc.	D	D	0	D		X					X	C
10	5/19-22	4	Leicester,Leics.	econ.	C	A	0	B		X	X				X	D
11	5/23	1	Derby,Derby.	---	B	A	0	B		X						D
12	6/5-6	2	London	misc.	B	C	0	B							X	C
13	6/	1	Manchester,Lancs.	pol. & rel.	B	A	0	B	X							
14	---	-	Manchester,Lancs.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	A
15	---	-	Sheffield,Yorks.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	A
16	---	-	Newcastle,Northumb.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	---	-	Sheffield,Yorks.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	---	-	Coventry,War.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	10/	1	Leeds,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						A
20	10/29	1	Yarmouth,Norf.	econ.	B	B	0	B							X	D

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
21	c.10/1-11/19	49	North Shields,Northumb.;South Shields,Dur.	econ.	-	-	1	B							X	-
22	11/	-	Ipswich,Suff.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23	12/5	1	B-ham,War.	pol. & rel.	A	A	0	B	X							
24	12/9-10	2	Manchester,Lancs.	pol. & rel.	B	B	0	B							X	A
25	12/13-14	2	Cambridge,Cambs.	pol. & rel.	C	A	0	B		X						D
26	---	-	Sheffield,Yorks.	misc.	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1793															
1	---	-	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	1/	-	Padstow,Corn.	econ.	A	C	0	B				X			X	-
3	2/5--	1+	Wadebridge & Looe,Corn.	econ.	A	A	0	B							X	-
4	5/	-	Manchester,Lancs.	---	C	B	0	B							X	-
5	5/7	1	Falmouth,Corn.	econ.	A	A	0	A	X							
6	6/	1	Liverpool,Lancs.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
7	6/	1	Sheffield,Yorks.	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							
8	6/	1	N'ham,Notts.	pol. & rel.	A	C	1	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	6/	-	Dudley,Staffs.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
10	6/23	1	London	rac.	A	D	1	B							X	D
11	7/15	1	Wolverhampton,Staffs.	mil. & rac.	A	C	0	B		X						D

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
12	7/24	1	N'ham,Notts.	misc.	C	C	2	C	X							
13	8/2	1	B'ham,War.	pol. & rel.	D	A	0	C	X							
14	8/	1	Truro,Corn.	econ.	A	A	0	B							X	E
15	9/27-10/1	5	Bristol,Glos.	econ.	B	E	20-25	D				X			X	B
16	10/21-22	2	B'ham,War.	econ.	B	C	0	C							X	E
17	11/	-	Gloucestershire	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	12/29	1	Grantham,Lincs.	misc.	B	A	0	B				X				D
	1794															
1	1/20-21	2	Padstow,Corn.	econ.	A	A	0	B				X				D
2	3/1	1	Greenwich	mil.	A	A	3	C							X	D
3	4/21	1	Royton,Lancs.	pol.	A	A	0	B							X	A
4	6/1	1	London	pol.	B	A	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	---	-	Woodstock,Oxon.	mil.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	7/2	1	N'ham,Notts.	pol.	B	C	0	C							X	A
7	7/	-	Newcastle,Northumb.	econ.	B	-	-	C		X	X	X				D
8	8/15-22	8	London	mil.	D	+	0	C		X	X				X	C
9	8/28	1	London	mil.	B	A	0	B		X		X				D
	1795															
1	---	1	Chichester,Sussex	econ.	B	-	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	---	1	Portsmouth,Hants.	econ.	-	-	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	---	-	Forest of Dean,Glos.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
4	---	-	Haverfordwest,Pem.,W.	econ.	-	-	-	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	1/9	1	London	mil.	B	A	0	B	X							
6	2/	1	Aberystwith,Cards.,W.	econ.	B	-	-	B	X							
7	2/	1	Narbeth,Pem.,W.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	2/28	-	Bridgend,Glam.,W.	econ.	-	-	0	C		X						A
9	3/	1	Aylesbury,Bucks.	econ.	-	-	-	B	X							
10	3/9-10	2	B'ham,War.	mil.	A	A	0	B							X	E
11	3/10,12	2	Penzance,Corn.	econ.	A	A	0	C					X			F
12	3/	1	Padstow,Corn.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
13	3/	1	Port Isaac,Corn.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
14	Late Mar. and early Apr.	-	Exeter,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	"	-	Totness,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	"	-	Dartmouth,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	"	-	Newton,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	"	-	Ashburton,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	"	-	Plymouth Dock,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
20	"	-	Launceston,Corn.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	"	-	Collington,Herefs.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
22	"	-	Biddeford,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23	4/	1+	Mold,Flints.,W.	econ.	B	-	-	C		X						C
24	4/	1	Leicester,Leics.	misc.	A	A	0	B					X			E
25	4/	-	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	-	-	-	-					X		X	-

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
26	4/	-	Hinckley,Leisc.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27	4/1	1	Denbigh,Denb.,W.	mil.	A	A	0	B	X							
28	4/1-2	2	Hitchin,Herts.	misc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	4/2	1	Plymouth,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	B		X						E
30	4/6	1	Shackerstone,Leics.	---	-	-	-	-					X			-
31	4/10	1	Abergele,Denb.,W.	---	A	B	0	B	X							
32	4/11-12	2	Portsea,Hants.	econ.	C	A	0	B		X						E
33	4/13	-	Plymouth,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
34	4/13	-	Exeter,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-					X		X	-
35	4/13	-	Chudleigh,Devon.	econ.	C	A	0	C				X				C
36	4/16-18	3	Seaford & Newhaven,Sussex	econ.	A	A	1	C			X			X	X	D
37	4/17-18, 20-21	4	Coventry,War.	econ.	B	A	0	D							X	B
38	4/	-	Nuneaton,War.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39	4/	-	Bedworth,War.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
40	4/	-	Foleshill,War.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
41	4/	-	Guildford,Surrey	econ.	A	A	0	A		X						E
42	4/25	1	Wells,Som.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
43	5/	-	Durham,Dur.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
44	5/	-	Darlington,Dur.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
45	5/	-	Vicinity of Newcastle,Northumb. & Shields,Dur.	econ.	A	A	0	A		X					X	E
46	5/	1+	Bristol,Glos.	econ.	-	-	-	-		X		X		X		C
47	6/17	1	Tewkesbury,Glos.	econ.	A	A	0	A		X						E
48	6/22	1	B'ham,War.	econ.	B	C	2	C					X		X	C

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
49	6/22	1	Dudley,Staffs.	econ.	-	-	4	C							X	-
50	6/22	1	Stourbridge,Worcs.	econ.	C	-	-	-							X	-
51	6/23	1	Bromsgrove,Worcs.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
52	6/	1	Shobdon,Herefs.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							C
53	6/24	1	Tewkesbury,Glous.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						D
54	6/25	1	Mitcheldeane & Blakeney,Glos.	econ.	C	A	0	C				X	X			D
55	7/	-	Olney,Bucks.	econ.	B	A	0	B					X			-
56	7/	-	Poldice Mine,Corn.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
57	7/1-2	2	Towcester,Northants.	econ.	A	A	0	A		X						E
58	7/6	1	London	econ.	B	A	0	B		X						D
59	7/7	1	London	mil.	C	A	0	B							X	D
60	7/	-	Ross,Herefs.	econ.	-	-	-	-					X			-
61	7/12-14	3	London	mil.	C	C	0	C			X			X	X	C
62	7/17-18	2	Cambridge,Cambs.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						E
63	7/	1	Burford,Salop.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							C
64	7/21	1	Warminster,Wilts.	econ.	A	A	0	B					X			E
65	7/26-27	2	Wisbech,Cambs.	misc.	A	A	0	B		X					X	D
66	7/27	1	Carlisle,Cumb.	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							C
67	7/30	1	London	econ.	B	A	0	B		X						D
68	7/30-31	2	Liverpool,Lancs.	econ.	B	A	0	B							X	D
69	7/31	1	Guildford,Surrey	econ.	-	-	-	-		X					X	-
70	8/1	-	Oxford,Oxon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
71	8/3	1	Bath,Som.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X			X			E
72	8/5	1	Bishop Stortford,Herts.	econ.	-	-	-	B						X		-
73	8/5	1	Halsted,Kent	econ.	-	B	0	-				X		X		-

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
74	8/5-9	5	Knottingly,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	C		X			X			C
75	8/5-9	5	Castleford,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	C		X			X			C
76	8/	1	Carlisle,Cumb.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						A
77	8/	1	Ipswich,Suff.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
78	8/6	1	Devizes,Wilts.	econ.	B	A	0	B							X	E
79	8/	1	Hull,Yorks.	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							
80	8/	-	Rochdale,Lancs.	econ.	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
81	8/	-	Sheffield,Yorks.	econ.	-	-	2	-					X			-
82	8/	1	Leicester,Leics.	econ.	A	C	4	C							X	B
83	8/18	1	Haverfordwest,Pem.,W.	econ.	A	B	0	B		X		X				D
84	8/	1	Halifax,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	A					X			E
85	9/14	1	Sudbury,Suff.	econ.	A	A	0	A	X							
86	9/	1	Canterbury,Kent	econ.	A	A	0	B							X	E
87	10/15	1	Holywell,Flints.,W.	econ.	B	A	0	B		X						D
88	10/29	1	London	pol.	B	B	0	B							X	A
89	11/2	1	Ludlow,Salop.	econ.	A	C	0	B							X	E
90	12/7	1	Manchester,Lancs.	pol.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
91	12/15	1	Chatham,Kent	mil.	A	-	0	A							X	E
92	12/25	1	Long Melford,Suff.	mil.	A	C	0	B	X							
	1796															
1	---	1	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	-	B	-	-					X		X	-
2	---	-	Swarkeston,Derby.	mil.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	---	-	Ashbourne,Derby.	mil.	-	-	-	-					X			-
4	---	-	Wirksworth,Derby.	mil.	-	-	-	-					X			-

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
5	---	2	Bakewell,Derby.	mil.	A	A	0	A					X	X		D
6	4/	-	Truro,Corn.	econ.	-	C	0	C				X	X			C
7	4/25-26	2	Hull,Yorks.	econ.	C	A	0	C	X							
8	4/26-27	2	Portsmouth,Hants.	econ.	C	A	0	C				X	X			D
9	7/	1	N'ham,Notts.	mil.	A	C	0	B	X							
10	10/12	1	Northampton,Northants.	mil.	-	D	-	-							X	-
11	11/	1	Caistor,Lincs.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
12	11/	1	Northampton,Northants.	mil.	-	-	-	-		X						D
13	11/	1	Ulverstone,Lancs.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
14	11/5	1	Horncastle,Lincs.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
15	11/9	1	Boston,Lincs.	mil.	A	A	0	A					X			E
16	11/11	1	Wellingborough,Northants.	mil.	-	-	-	-		X			X			E
17	11/11	1	Kettering,Northants.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
18	11/15	1	Norwich,Norf.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
19	11/23	1	Barmouth,Mer.,W.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
20	11/25	1	Lalingford,Norf.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
21	11/25	1	Wing,Bucks.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
22	12/3	1	Oswestry,Salop.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
23	12/22	1	Penrith,Cumb.	mil.	-	-	-	-	X							
24	12/	1	London	---	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1797															
1	1/7	1	Carlisle,Cumb.	mil.	A	A	0	B	X							
2	3/13	1	Derby,Derby.	pol.	B	C	0	B	X							

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
	1798															
1	2/	1	Dudley,Staffs.	econ.	A	A	0	B							X	-
2	3/	1	Manchester,Lancs.	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							-
3	7/	-	N'ham,Notts.	misc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	7/6-7	2	London	mil.	A	B	0	B			X					E
5	10/16	1	London	misc.	B	B	2	C		X						D
6	12/27	1	London	rac.	A	C	1	B		X						D
	1799															
1	---	-	Boston,Lincs.	mil.	-	-	-	-					X			-
2	5/ & 6/	-	Oxford,Oxon.	misc.	-	-	-	-							X	-
3	7/22-25	4	Wilbarston,Northants.	misc.	A	A	0	B					X			E
4	11/19	1	Huddersfield,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						B
	1800															
1	---	-	Oxford,Oxon.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	1/ & 2/	-	Stockport,Ches.	econ.	A	A	0	B						X		D
3	2/13	1	B'ham,War.	econ.	A	A	0	A		X						E
4	2/	1	Westerham,Kent.	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							E
5	4/	-	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	-	-	-	B					X			E
6	4/	-	Chester-le-Street,Dur.	econ.	A	C	0	C							X	D
7	4/28	1	Newcastle,Northumb.	econ.	B	A	0	B							X	D
8	4/28	1	The Potteries,Staffs.	econ.	-	-	0	B					X			E
9	4/29	1	Bilstone,Staffs.	econ.	C	-	0	C			X				X	D
10	4/	1	Sedgley,Staffs.	econ.	C	-	1	D			X				X	D

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
11	4/28-29	2	Dudley,Staffs.	econ.	A	C	1	C					X			C
12	4/29	1	Sheffield,Yorks.	econ.	A	B	0	B					X		X	D
13	4/29-30	2	Blythe,Northumb.	econ.	-	-	-	C				X	X			E
14	5/1-2	2	B'ham,War.	econ.	C	A	0	C			X		X			D
15	5/2	1	Wakefield,Yorks.	econ.	B	A	0	B					X			E
16	5/3	1	Yarmouth,Norf.	econ.	-	-	-	-		X						-
17	5/3	1	Pontefract & Nottingley,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	B					X			D
18	5/4	1	Stowe,Staffs.	misc.	A	A	0	B					X			E
19	5/7	1	Bath,Som.	econ.	A	B	0	B					X			E
20	5/	-	Leeds,Yorks.	econ.	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	6/23	1	N'ham,Notts.	pol.	A	B	0	B							X	E
22	7/	-	Haverfordwest,Pem.,W.	econ.	B	A	0	B						X		E
23	8/14-15	2	London	misc.	A	A	0	B		X	X					E
24	8/16	1	Trowbridge,Wilts.	econ.	B	A	0	B					X			B
25	8/25	1	Worcester,Worcs.	econ.	B	A	0	B							X	D
26	8/26-27	2	Portsea,Hants.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						E
27	8/31-9/4	5	N'ham & vicinity,War.	econ.	C	B	0	D			X		X		X	C
28	9/	-	Norwich,Norf.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	9/	-	Hereford,Herefs.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
30	9/	-	Derby,Derby.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
31	9/	-	Worcester,Worcs.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
32	9/	-	Mansfield,Notts.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
33	9/1	1	Romsey,Hants.	econ.	C	A	0	B					X		X	-
34	9/1	1	Abingdon,Berks.	econ.	A	A	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35	9/2	1	Sheffield,Yorks.	econ.	A	A	0	B					X		X	E

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
36	9/4	1	Poole,Dorset.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X	X					E
37	9/	-	Hinckley,Leics.	econ.	C	A	0	B							X	-
38	9/6	1	Chesterfield,Derby.	econ.	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39	9/6	1	Oxford,Oxon.	econ.	A	A	0	B							X	E
40	9/7	1	Leicester,Leics.	econ.	B	A	0	B		X						E
41	9/8	1	Nuneaton,War.	econ.	A	A	0	B	X							
42	9/9	1	Blandford,Dorset.	econ.	A	A	0	C		X			X		X	D
43	9/9	1	Coventry,War.	econ.	-	A	0	B							X	D
44	9/9-10	2	Lynn,Norf.	econ.	B	A	0	B		X						C
45	9/8-10, 12,15	5	B'ham & vicinity,War.	econ.	C	C	3	D			X		X		X	C
46	9/10	1	N'ham,Notts.	econ.	C	A	0	C					X		X	D
47	9/	2	Kidderminster,Worcs.	econ.	B	A	0	B		X					X	D
48	9/11	1	Banbury,Oxon.	econ.	B	A	0	C		X	X		X			B
49	9/	-	Leicester,Leics.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
50	9/13	1	Cambridge,Camb.	econ.	-	-	-	B		X	X					E
51	9/14-16	3	Stafford,Staffs.	econ.	C	C	0	C							X	D
52	9/15	1	Oxford,Oxon.	misc.	-	-	0	C	X							
53	9/15	1	Banbury,Oxon.	econ.	A	A	0	A			X		X		X	E
54	9/15--	-	Cockermouth,Cumb.	econ.	B	A	0	B				X				-
55	9/15-20	6	London	econ.	C	B	0	C		X	X	X	X		X	C
56	9/18	1	Mansfield,Notts.	econ.	A	A	0	A							X	E
57	9/18	1	Southampton,Hants.	econ.	B	A	0	B		X	X		X			D
58	9/18	1	Bristol,Glos.	econ.	B	B	0	B				X			X	E
59	9/18	1	Windsor,Berks.	econ.	B	A	0	B				X				E

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
60	9/19	1	Tumbridge Wells,Kent	econ.	B	A	0	B		X						A
61	9/19	1	Dereham,Norf.	econ.	A	A	0	A		X						E
62	9/20	1	London	econ.	B	A	0	B			X				X	E
63	9/20	1	Winchester,Hants.	econ.	A	A	0	A		X						E
64	9/20	1	Romsey,Hants.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
65	9/20	1	Sheerness,Kent	econ.	A	A	0	B		X						E
66	9/20,22	2	Norwich,Norf.	econ.	A	A	0	B		X			X			E
67	9/22-24	3	Merthyr Tydfil,Glam.,W.	econ.	D	-	0	D				X			X	A
68	9/22--	3+	Longton,Staffs.	econ.	B	A	0	C					X			C
69	9/22-23	2	Margate,Kent	econ.	A	A	0	B		X					X	E
70	9/23--	-	Newcastle-under-Lyne,Staffs.	econ.	-	-	-	-			X		X		X	-
71	9/24	1	Abingdon,Berks.	econ.	-	-	-	-			X		X		X	-
72	9/25	1	New Alresford,Hants.	econ.	A	C	0	B				X			X	D
73	9/26	1	Luton,Beds.	econ.	B	D	0	C		X			X			E
74	9/30	1	Bilston,Staffs.	econ.	C	-	0	C					X		X	D
75	10/2	1	Maidstone,Kent	econ.	B	A	0	B							X	D
76	10/8	1	Oxford,Oxon.	econ.	B	B	0	B	X							
77	10/	1+	Tattershall,Lincs.	---	-	-	-	-					X			-
78	10/20	1	Bath,Som.	econ.	A	A	0	B					X		X	E
79	12/27	1	Hull,Yorks.	econ.	B	A	0	B				X				E
80	---	-	Wigan,Lancs.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
81	---	-	The Potteries,Staffs.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
82	---	-	Merthyr Tydfil,Glam.,W.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
	1801															
1	2/	1	Horsham,Sussex	econ.	B	A	0	B	X							
2	3/	-	Bury,Lancs.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	3/23,25	2	B'ham,War.	misc.	C	A	0	B							X	E
4	3/27	1	Sunderland,Dur.	econ.	C	A	0	C				X				
5	3/	-	Taunton,Som.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
6	3/ - 4/	-	Gloucestershire	econ.	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	3/ - 4/	-	Oxfordshire	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
8	3/ - 4/	-	Berkshire	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
9	3/ - 4/	-	Buckinghamshire	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
10	3/ - 4/	-	Middlesex	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
11	4/1	1	Wellington,Herefs.	econ.	-	-	-	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	4/	2	Exeter & vicinity,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	C		X					X	-
13	4/	-	Falmouth,Corn.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14	4/	-	Modbury,Devon.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
15	5/3	1	Mottram,Ches.	misc.	A	A	0	A							X	E
16	6/	-	Lancashire	---	-	-	-	-							X	-
17	10/28	1	Liverpool,Lancs.	econ.	A	B	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	1802															
1	5/1	1	London	misc.	A	A	0	B		X					X	D
2	6/15	1	London	rac.	B	C	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	7/	-	Liverpool,Lancs.	pol.	C	B	2	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	7/	1	N'ham,Notts.	pol.	-	-	-	-							X	-
5	7/22	1	Hull,Yorks.	econ.	C	A	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
6	8/21	1	Deptford,Wilts.	econ.	A	A	0	A		X					X	E
7	11/20-25	6	Newcastle,Northumb.	econ.	-	-	-	-							X	-
	1803															
1	---	-	Hull,Yorks.	pol.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	10/11	1	Leatherhead,Surrey	mil.	A	B	0	B							X	B
3	11/4	1	Brighton,Sussex	misc.	A	A	0	A	X							
4	12/28-1/--/1804	-	Chester,Ches.	mil.	B	A	0	C							X	-
5	12/29	1	Liverpool,Lancs.	mil.	-	-	-	B							X	-
	1804															
1	8/8	1	Middlesex	pol.	B	-	0	B			X					D
2	8/13	1	London	misc.	A	-	0	B		X						E
3	8/26-28	3	London	misc.	A	C	0	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	9/9	1	London	mil.	A	B	0	B							X	E
	1805															
1	6/8	1	London	rac.	A	D	0	B		X						D
2	7/	1	Braintree,Essex	mil.	A	C	1	B		X						A
3	7/25-26	2	Durham,Dur.	mil.	A	A	0	B							X	C
4	8/4	1	London	rac.	B	A	0	B		X						E

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
	1806															
1	9/13	1	London	rac.	A	C	0	B	X							
	1807															
1	3/9	1	Dover,Kent	misc.	A	A	0	B		X					X	E
2	5/19-20	2	Leeds,Yorks.	pol.	A	B	0	B							X	D
3	5/22	1	London	misc.	B	A	0	B		X						A
4	6/1-4	4	Halifax,Yorks.	pol.	B	A	0	B		X					X	D
5	7/13	1	Manchester,Lancs.	rel.	A	C	0	B							X	-
6	8/	3+	Horsham,Sussex	mil.	C	A	0	B	X							
7	10/20	1	Bradford,Wilts.	econ.	A	A	0	A	X							
8	10/24	1	Kidderminster,Worcs.	mil.	C	A	0	C			X					D
	1808															
1	3/	-	Bradford,Wilts.	econ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	5/23-6/22	31	Manchester & vicinity,Lancs.	econ.	C	D	4	D		X	X	X	X		X	C
3	6/4	1	London	misc.	B	B	0	B	X							
4	8/	1	London	misc.	A	-	0	B			X					D
	1809															
1	5/28	1	London	misc.	A	D	3	B				X				D
2	9/19-12/15	78	London	econ.	B	C	0	B		X						B

Table A-1 (continued)

Source Number	Date	Duration (Days)	Location	Type	Seriousness				Means of Restoring Order							Effectiveness
					Property Damage	Injuries	Deaths	Over-all Rating	None	Civil Forces	Quasi-mil. Bodies	Militia	Yeomanry	Fencibles	Regular Troops	
	1810															
1	---	2	Devizes,Wilts.	mil.	A	A	0	C					X			E
2	4/6-9	4	London	pol.	D	D	2	E			X	X			X	C
3	4/16	1	Bristol,Glos.	pol.	B	A	0	B		X						E
4	5/14	1	Liverpool,Lancs.	misc.	B	A	0	B		X						E
5	5/16	1	Bath,Som.	mil.	-	-	0	B				X	X			D
6	5/28-29	2	B'ham,War.	econ.	B	A	0	B		X			X		X	C
7	6/6	1	Horsham,Sussex	mil.	A	C	0	B							X	E
8	6/17	1	London	misc.	A	C	0	B		X						C
9	---	1	Manchester,Lancs.	pol.	B	A	0	B		X		X			X	D
10	7/	1	Liverpool,Lancs.	misc.	B	A	0	B		X		X				E
11	8/8	1	Canterbury,Kent	mil.	A	B	0	B	X							
12	11/	-	Falmouth,Corn.	misc.	A	A	0	B		X					X	D
	1811															
1	2/10	1	Arundel,Sussex	mil.	A	-	0	B					X			E

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[3]Annual Register (1783), "Chron.," 199.

[4]H. O. 42/2; Thomas S. Ashton and Joseph Sykes, The Coal Industry of the Eighteenth Century (Manchester, 1929), 127; Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 41.

[5]The Scots Magazine, XLV (1783), 271. [6]Gentleman's Magazine, LIII (1783), 357, 440.

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[10]Ibid. [11]H. O. 42/2.

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[1]Gentleman's Magazine, LIV (1784), 380.

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[2]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 43.

[3]The Times (London), June 22, 1785, p. 3.

[4]Ibid., July 15, 1785, p. 3. [5]Ibid., July 7, 1785, p. 3. [6]Ibid., July 15, 1785, p. 3.

[7]Annual Register (1785), "Chron.," 242-43. [8]Gentleman's Magazine, LV (1785), 915-16.

[9]Ibid., 913.

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[1]A. K. Hamilton Jenkins, The Cornish Miner (2nd ed.; London, 1948), 160.

[2]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 108.

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[1]William Felkin, History of the Machine-Wrought Hosiery and Lace Manufactures (Centenary ed.; New York, 1967), 229.

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[1]Jenkins, Cornish Miner, 160.

[2]Annual Register (1789), "Chron.," 204; Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 127.

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[5]Gentleman's Magazine, LIX (1789), 854-55.

1790

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[1]William Page, ed., The Victoria History of the County of Nottingham (2 vols. pub.; London, 1906-), II, 300.

[2]Ralph B. Pugh and Elizabeth Crittall, eds., The Victoria History of Wiltshire (10 vols.; London, 1953-75), IV, 167.

[3]The Times (London), July 16, 1791, p. 2.

[4]Ibid., July 18, 1791, p. 2; July 19, 1791, p. 3; July 20, 1791, p. 2; July 21, 1791, p. 2; July 22, 1791, p. 2; Gentleman's Magazine, LXI (1791), 675-76; Scots Magazine, LIII (1791), 352-56; H. O. 42/19; Rose, "Priestley Riots," 73-78; Annual Register (1791), "Chron.," 30; John Alfred Langford, A Century of Birmingham Life: or A Chronicle of Local Events, from 1741 to 1841 (2 vols.; Birmingham, 1868), I, 484-86, 499.

[5]The Times (London), Aug. 1, 1791, p. 3; Aug. 4, 1791, p. 4; H. O. 42/19.

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[1]Ibid., Jan. 31, 1792, p. 3. [2]Ibid.

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[4]Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 128.

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[10]The Times (London), May 24, 1792, p. 3; Annual Register (1792), "Chron.," 19-20.

[11]The Times (London), June 4, 1792, p. 3.

[12]Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 570; The Times (London), June 7, 1792, p. 2.

[13]George Rudé, The Crowd in History; A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 (New York, 1964), 141.

[14]J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War (London, 1911), 62-63.

[15]Ibid. [16]Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 128. [17]Ibid. [18]Ibid.

[19]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 44, 90.

[20]Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 1049; The Times (London), Nov. 26, 1792, p. 4; Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 44.

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[22]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 45.

[23]W. B. Stephens, ed., The Victoria History of the County of Warwick (8 vols.; London, 1904-64), VII, 283.

[24]Gentleman's Magazine, LXII (1792), 1144-45; George Howard, Guardians of the Queen's Peace; The Development and Work of Britain's Police (London, 1953), 114; Lucyle Werkmeister, A Newspaper History of England (Lincoln, Neb., 1967), 146.

[25]The Times (London), Dec. 17, 1792, p. 3; Dec. 18, 1792, p. 4; Werkmeister, Newspaper History, 151.

[26]Rose, Pitt and the Great War, 166.

1793

[1]Rudé, Crowd in History, 140n.

[2]The Times (London), Jan. 22, 1793, p. 3; Jan. 23, 1793, p. 2.

[3]Gentleman's Magazine, LXIII (1793), 179-80.

[4]The Times (London), May 13, 1793, p. 3. [5]Annual Register (1793), "Chron.," 21.

[6]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 45. [7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.; Rudé, Crowd in History, 140. [9]Gentleman's Magazine, LXIII (1793), 570.

[10]Ibid., 573. [11]The Times (London), July 19, 1793, p. 4.

[12]Ibid., July 31, 1793, p. 3. [13]Stephens, Warwick, VII, 283.

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[14]The Times (London), Aug. 22, 1793, p. 2.

[15]Ibid., Oct. 1, 1793, p. 3; Oct. 2, 1793, p. 3; Oct. 3, 1793, p. 3; Oct. 4, 1793, p. 3; Oct. 5, 1793, p. 2; Oct. 11, 1793, p. 4; Gentleman's Magazine, LXIII (1793), 951; Annual Register (1793), "Chron.," 45-46; Werkmeister, Newspaper History, 405; Rudé, Crowd in History, 255.

[16]The Times (London), Oct. 24, 1793, p. 4; Oct. 25, 1793, p. 3; Langford, Birmingham Life, II, 37; Stephens, Warwick, VII, 283.

[17]The Times (London), Nov. 8, 1793, p. 3.

[18]Ibid., Jan. 24, 1794, p. 3; Gentleman's Magazine, LXIII (1793), 1209, Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 46.

1794

[1]The Times (London), Jan. 30, 1794, p. 3. [2]Ibid., Mar. 4, 1794, p. 3.

[3]Ibid., Apr. 25, 1794, p. 3.

[4]P. A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History (London, 1918), 141.

[5]H. O. 42/34. [6]The Times (London), July 5, 1794, p. 2.

[7]Ibid., July 23, 1794, p. 4; July 30, 1794, p. 4.

[8]Gentleman's Magazine, LXIV (1794), 721-23; The Times (London), Aug. 18, 1794, p. 4; Aug. 21, 1794, p. 2; Aug. 23, 1794, p. 2; Scots Magazine, LVI (1794), 571-72; Rudé, Crowd in History, 51; J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (13 vols.; London, [1910]-1930), IV, pt. 1, p. 214; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 212.

[9]The Times (London), Sept. 23, 1794, p. 3.

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[1]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, IV, 111. [2]Ibid.

[3]Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 129.

[4]E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present, No. 50 (February, 1971), 118.

[5]The Times (London), Jan. 12, 1795, p. 3. [6]Ibid., Mar. 3, 1795, p. 3.

[7]Ibid. [8]H. O. 42/34.

[9]J. L. and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer, 1760-1832 (reprint ed.; New York, 1967), 121.

[10]The Times (London), Mar. 11, 1795, p. 3; Mar. 12, 1795, p. 3.

[11]H. O. 42/34; The Times (London), Mar. 24, 1795, p. 3. [12]H. O. 42/34.

[13]Ibid. [14]Ibid. [15]Ibid. [16]Ibid. [17]Ibid. [18]Ibid. [19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid. [21]Ibid. [22]Ibid. [23]Ibid. [24]Ibid.

[25]Oskar Teichman, "The Yeomanry as an Aid to Civil Power, 1795-1867," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XIX (1940), 76.

[26]Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 343. [27]H. O. 42/34. [28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid. [30]Ibid. [31]Ibid.

[32]Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 343; H. O. 42/34; The Times (London), Apr. 14, 1795, p. 3.

[33]"The Royal Devon Yeomanry," Journal of the Royal Artillery, LXXII, No. 4 (October, 1945), 304; Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 46-47.

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[34]"Devon Yeomanry," 304.

[35]H. O. 42/34; Hammond, Village Labourer, 121; Thompson, "Moral Economy of English Crowd," 100.

[36]The Times (London), Apr. 21, 1795, p. 3; Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 343, 519-20; Fortescue, History of the British Army, IV, pt. 1, p. 513; J. L. and Barbara Hammond, The Town Labourer, 1760-1832 (London, 1918), 86; Scots Magazine, LVII (1795), 270.

[37]H. O. 42/34; Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 343.

[38]Ibid.; H. O. 42/34. [39]Ibid.; Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 343.

[40]H. O. 42/34. [41]The Times (London), Apr. 25, 1795, p. 2. [42]H. O. 42/34.

[43]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 47. [44]Ibid.

[45]Scots Magazine, LVII (1795), 339. [46]H. O. 42/34.

[47]The Times (London), July 2, 1795, p. 3.

[48]Ibid., June 25, 1795, p. 3; H. O. 42/35; Langford, Birmingham Life, II, 51-53; Rose, Pitt and the Great War, 287-88; Stephens, Warwick, VII, 284; Thompson, "Moral Economy of English Crowd," 105.

[49]The Times (London), June 25, 1795, p. 3; June 26, 1795, p. 2. [50]Ibid.

[51]Ibid. [52]H. O. 42/35. [53]Ibid. [54]The Times (London), July 2, 1795, p. 3.

[55]H. O. 42/35; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 109.

[56]John Rowe, Cornwall in the Age of the Industrial Revolution (Liverpool, 1953), 106.

[57]The Times (London), July 8, 1795, p. 4.

[58]Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 697.

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[59]The Times (London), July 9, 1795, p. 2. [60]H. O. 42/35.

[61]Gentleman's Magazine, LXV (1795), 697-98; Annual Register (1795), "Chron.," 29; Rose, Pitt and the Great War, 288.

[62]The Times (London), July 22, 1795, p. 3; H. O. 42/35. [63]Ibid.

[64]The Times (London), July 24, 1795, p. 3. [65]H. O. 42/35. [66]Ibid.

[67]Ibid. [68]The Times (London), Aug. 8, 1795, p. 3. [69]Ibid., Aug. 3, 1795, p. 2.

[70]H. O. 42/35; Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 47.

[71]The Times (London), Aug. 5, 1795, p. 3; Hammond, Village Labourer, 121.

[72]The Times (London), Aug. 8, 1795, p. 3. [73]Ibid., Aug. 11, 1795, p. 2.

[74]H. O. 42/35; Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 47.

[75]H. O. 42/35; Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 47.

[76]Hammond, Village Labourer, 121. [77]Ibid.

[78]The Times (London), Aug. 12, 1795, p. 3. [79]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 47.

[80]Ibid. [81]Ibid. [82]Ibid., 47-48. [83]H. O. 42/35.

[84]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 47.

[85]The Times (London), Sept. 24, 1795, p. 4.

[86]B. G. Baker, "Old Cavalry Stations: Canterbury," The Cavalry Journal, XX (1930), 189.

[87]The Times (London), Oct. 20, 1795, p. 3.

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[89]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 48.

[90]The Times (London), Dec. 29, 1795, p. 4. [91]Ibid.

[92]Ibid., Jan 2, 1796, p. 4.

1796

[1]Teichman, "Yeomanry as Aid to Civil Power," 76-77.

[2]William Page, ed., The Victoria History of the County of Derby (2 vols. pub.; London, 1905-), II, 151.

[3]Ibid. [4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.; Sidney and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government (11 vols., Hamden, Conn., 1963), I, 426. First pub., London, 1906-29.

[6]The Times (London), Apr. 12, 1796, p. 3.

[7]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 48.

[8]The Times (London), Apr. 30, 1796, p. 3.

[9]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 49. [10]Western, English Militia, 296.

[11]Ibid., 294. [12]Ibid., 295. [13]Ibid. [14]Ibid., 294.

[15]Gentleman's Magazine, LXVI (1796), 1048.

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[16]Western, English Militia, 295. [17]Ibid. [18]Ibid. [19]Ibid. [20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid. [22]Ibid. [23]Ibid. [24]The Times (London), Jan. 18, 1797, p. 3.

1797

[1]Ibid., Jan. 12, 1797, p. 3. [2]Ibid., Mar. 16, 1797, p. 3.

1798

[1]Ibid., Feb. 28, 1798, p. 3; Mar. 3, 1798, p. 3. [2]Ibid., Mar. 27, 1798, p. 3.

[3]Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 49; Rudé, Crowd in History, 35.

[4]The Times (London), Aug. 9, 1798, p. 3.

[5]Tom Fallon, The River Police (London, 1956), 64-66; The Times (London), Oct. 17, 1798, p. 2.

[6]Ibid., Dec. 28, 1798, p. 4; Feb. 14, 1799, p. 3; Feb. 15, 1799, p. 4.

1799

[1]William Page, ed., The Victoria History of the County of Lincoln (1 vol. pub.; London, 1906-), II, 292.

[2]The Times (London), June 7, 1799, p. 3.

[3]Ibid., July 31, 1799, p. 3; Annual Register (1799), "Chron.," 27-28; Wearmouth, Methodism and the Common People, 49.

[4]Ibid.

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[3]Langford, Birmingham Life, II, 96. [4]The Times (London), Mar. 4, 1800, p. 2.

[5]Teichman, "Yeomanry as Aid to Civil Power," 77.

[6]The Times (London), May 5, 1800. p. 2. [7]H. O. 42/50. [8]Ibid. [9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.; The Times (London), May 5, 1800, p. 2.

[11]Ibid., May 1, 1800, p. 3; May 2, 1800, p. 3. [12]Ibid., May 3, 1800, p. 3.

[13]Ibid., May 13, 1800, p. 3.

[14]Stephens, Warwick, VII, 284; Langford, Birmingham Life, II, 97-98; The Times (London), May 6, 1800, p. 2.

[15]The Times (London), May 9, 1800, p. 2. [16]Ibid., May 6, 1800, p. 2.

[17]Ibid., May 9, 1800, p. 2. [18]H. O. 42/50.

[19]Ibid.; The Times (London), May 12, 1800, p. 3. [20]Ibid., May 14, 1800, p. 2.

[21]Ibid., June 30, 1800, p. 3. [22]Ibid. , July 22, 1800, p. 3.

[23]Ibid., Aug. 16, 1800, p. 2; H. O. 42/50.

[24]The Times (London), Aug. 20, 1800, p. 3. [25]Ibid., Sept. 1, 1800, p. 3.

[26]Ibid., Aug. 30, 1800, p. 3.

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[27]Ibid., Sept. 4, 1800, p. 3; Sept. 5, 1800, p. 3; Sept. 6, 1800, p. 2; Sept. 8, 1800, p. 2; H. O. 42/50; H. O. 42/51; Teichman, "Yeomanry as Aid to Civil Power," 77.

[28]Gentleman's Magazine, LXX (1800), 892. [29]Scots Magazine, LXII (1800), 644.

[30]Ibid. [31]Ibid. [32]Ibid.

[33]The Times (London), Sept. 9, 1800, p. 2; H. O. 42/51. [34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid.; Scots Magazine, LXII (1800), 644.

[36]The Times (London), Sept. 8, 1800, p. 4; H. O. 42/51.

[37]Ibid.; Scots Magazine, LXII (1800), 644.

[38]The Times (London), Sept. 12, 1800, p. 3; H. O. 42/51. [39]Ibid. [40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid.; Rose, "Price Riots and Public Policy," 289. [42]H. O. 42/51.

[43]The Times (London), Sept. 13, 1800, p. 3. [44]Ibid., Sept. 12, 1800, p. 3.

[45]Ibid., Sept. 13, 1800, p. 3; Sept. 16, 1800, p. 3; Sept. 18, 1800, p. 3; H. O. 42/51; Langford, Birmingham Life, II, 103-04; Stephens, Warwick, VII, 285.

[46]The Times (London), Sept. 13, 1800, p. 3. [47]H. O. 42/51. [48]Ibid.

[49]The Times (London), Sept. 15, 1800, p. 3. [50]Ibid., Sept. 22, 1800, p. 3.

[51]Ibid. [52]H. O. 42/51.

[53]The Times (London), Sept. 17, 1800, p. 3; H. O. 42/51.

[54]The Times (London), Oct. 3, 1800, p. 3.

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[55]Ibid., Sept. 16, 1800, p. 2; Sept. 17, 1800, p. 3; Sept. 18, 1800, p. 2; Sept. 19, 1800, p. 2; Sept. 20, 1800, p. 2; Sept. 22, 1800, p. 3; H. D. Traill, ed., Social England (6 vols.; London, 1895-1905), V, 493; Gentleman's Magazine, LXX (1800), 895; Scots Magazine, LXII (1800), 644; H. O. 42/51.

[56]Ibid. [57]Ibid. [58]The Times (London), Sept. 22, 1800, p. 3; H. O. 42/51.

[59]The Times (London), Sept. 22, 1800, p. 3. [60]H. O. 42/51.

[61]The Times (London), Sept. 22, 1800, p. 3. [62]Ibid.

[63]Ibid., Sept. 23, 1800, p. 3. [64]Ibid. [65]H. O. 42/51. [66]Ibid. [67]Ibid.

[68]Ibid. [69]The Times (London), Sept. 26, 1800, p. 3.

[70]Ibid., Sept. 29, 1800, p. 3. [71]H. O. 42/51.

[72]The Times (London), Sept. 30, 1800, p. 3. [73]H. O. 42/51. [74]H. O. 42/52.

[75]The Times (London), Oct. 10, 1800. p. 3. [76]H. O. 42/52. [77]H. O. 50/48.

[78]H. O. 42/52. [79]The Times (London), Jan. 3, 1801, p. 3.

[80]Ashton and Sykes, Coal Industry, 129. [81]Ibid. [82]Ibid.

1801

[1]Thompson, "Moral Economy of English Crowd," 82.

[2]J. L. and Barbara Hammond, The Skilled Labourer, 1760-1832 (London, 1919), 66.

[3]The Times (London), Mar. 27, 1801, p. 3; Mar. 28, 1801, p. 3.

[4]Ibid., Apr. 8, 1801, p. 2. [5]Ibid., Apr. 6, 1801, p. 3. [6]Ibid.

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[13]Ibid., Apr. 22, 1801, p. 3. [14]Ibid., Apr. 28, 1801, p. 3.; May 4, 1801, p. 3.

[15]Ibid., May 12, 1801, p. 3. [16]Ibid., June 9, 1801, p. 3.

[17]Ibid., Nov. 2, 1801, p. 3.

1802

[1]Ibid., May 10, 1802, p. 3. [2]Ibid., June 18, 1802, p. 3.

[3]Annual Register (1802), "Chron.," 424; The Times (London), July 16, 1802, p. 3.

[4]Ibid., July 20, 1802, p. 2. [5]Annual Register (1802), "Chron.," 428.

[6]The Times (London), Aug. 24, 1802, p. 2.

[7]Ibid., Dec. 1, 1802, p. 3; Dec. 4, 1802, p. 3; Dec. 7, 1802, p. 2.

1803

[1]K. J. Allison, ed., A History of the County of York, East Riding (3 vols. pub.; London, 1969-), I, 194.

[2]Annual Register (1803), "Chron.," 440. [3]The Times (London), Nov. 9, 1803, p. 3.

[4]Ibid., Jan. 17, 1804, p. 3; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 93, 110.

[5]The Times (London), Jan 3, 1804, p. 3.

1804

[1]Gentleman's Magazine, LXXIV (1804), 779-80; Annual Register (1804), "Chron.," 407.

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[2]Annual Register (1804), "Chron.," 409. [3]The Times (London), Aug. 29, 1804, p. 3.

[4]Ibid., Sept. 10, 1804, p. 3.

1805

[1]Ibid., June 10, 1805, p. 3. [2]Ibid., July 24, 1805, p. 3.

[3]Ibid., July 30, 1805, p. 2. [4]Ibid., Aug. 6, 1805, p. 3.

1806

[1]Ibid., Sept. 16, 1806, p. 2.

1807

[1]Ibid., Mar. 11, 1807, p. 3.

[2]Ibid., May 22, 1807, p. 2; May 25, 1807, p. 3; May 28, 1807, p. 2.

[3]Annual Register (1807), "Chron.," 432. [4]The Times (London), June 4, 1807, p. 3.

[5]Ibid., July 18, 1807, p. 3. [6]Ibid., Sept. 3, 1807, p. 3.

[7]Ibid., Oct. 23, 1807, p. 3. [8]Ibid., Oct. 28, 1807, p. 3.

1808

[1]Pugh and Crittall, Wiltshire, IV, 169.

[2]The Times (London), May 27, 1808, p. 3; May 28, 1808, p. 4; May 31, 1808, p. 3; June 2, 1808, p. 3; June 3, 1808, p. 3; June 4, 1808, p. 3; June 7, 1808, p. 3; June 10, 1808, p. 3; June 24, 1808, p. 4, June 25, 1808, p. 3; Gentleman's Magazine, LXXVIII (1808), 548; Annual Register (1808), "Chron.," 48, 54, 58, 63.

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[3]The Times (London), June 6, 1808, p. 3. [4]Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 213.

1809

[1]The Times (London), May 29, 1809, p. 3.

[2]Ibid., Sept. 20, 1809, p. 3; Sept. 22, 1809, p. 3; Sept. 23, 1809, p. 3; Sept. 29, 1809, p. 2; Sept. 30, 1809, p. 2; Oct. 3, 1809, p. 3; Oct. 5, 1809, p. 3; Oct. 7, 1809, p. 2; Oct. 10, 1809, p. 3; Oct. 11, 1809, p. 3; Oct. 12, 1809, p. 3; Oct. 13, 1809, p. 2; Oct. 14, 1809, p. 3; Oct. 16, 1809, p. 3; Oct. 17, 1809, p. 3; Nov. 1, 1809, p. 2; Nov. 4, 1809, p. 2; Nov. 6, 1809, p. 2; Nov. 27, 1809, p. 2; Dec. 15, 1809, p. 2; Traill, Social England, V, 620.

1810

[1]Teichman, "Yeomanry as Aid to Civil Power," 77-78.

[2]The Times (London), Apr. 7, 1810, p. 3; Apr. 9, 1810, pp. 2-3; Apr. 10, 1810, p. 3; Apr. 16, 1810, p. 3; Gentleman's Magazine, LXXX (1810), pt. 1, pp. 376-77; M. W. Patterson, Sir Francis Burdett and His Times (1770-1844), (2 vols.; London, 1931), I, 259-74; Traill, Social England, V, 619-20; Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, II, 93, 443, III, 351; Annual Register (1810), "Chron.," 105, 350; Lord Colchester Charles, ed., The Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbott, Lord Colchester (3 vols.; London, 1861), II, 255; Samuel Romilly, Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly (3 vols.; London, 1840), II, 312.

[3]Gentleman's Magazine, LXXX (1810), pt. 1, p. 374.

[4]The Times (London), May 19, 1810, p. 4.

[5]Teichman, "Yeomanry as Aid to Civil Power," 78.

[6]Langford, Birmingham Life, II, 240; The Times (London), June 1, 1810, p. 3; Stephens, Warwick, VII, 286; Gentleman's Magazine, LXXX (1810), pt. 1, p. 658.

[7]The Times (London), June 12, 1810, p. 3.

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[8]Ibid., June 20, 1810, p. 3.

[9]Samuel Bamford, The Autobiography of Samuel Bamford (2 vols.; reprint ed.; New York, 1967), I, 295.

[10]The Times (London), July 27, 1810, p. 3.

[11]Gentleman's Magazine, LXXX (1810), pt. 2, p. 176.

[12]Annual Register (1810), "Chron.," 288.

1811

[1]The Times (London), Feb. 11, 1811, p. 3.

APPENDIX B

CIVIL DISORDERS: JUNE 10, 1780, TO MARCH 1, 1811



Figure A-1. Civil disorders from June 10, 1780 to March 1, 1811.

APPENDIX C

TYPES OF CIVIL DISORDERS: JUNE 10, 1780, TO MARCH 1, 1811

Figure 8 breaks the disturbances down into four major groups (economic, military, political, and miscellaneous) and indicates their frequency during the period under investigation. It should be noted that these categories do not include two that are found in the "Type" column in Appendix "A." Since there were only seven racial disorders occurring in six different years, these have been included in the "miscellaneous" category on this graph. Most of the riots in which religious issues were causal factors had political motivations as well. All of these have been placed in the "political" category. This left only two disturbances attributable exclusively to religious causes. These have been placed in the "miscellaneous" category. Also placed in the "miscellaneous" group are the seven riots occurring in six different years for which no cause could be determined.



Figure A-2. Types of civil disorders from June 10, 1780, to March 1, 1811.

APPENDIX D

LOCATIONS IN THE COUNTIES OF ENGLAND AND WALES WHERE DISORDERS OCCURRED BETWEEN JUNE 10, 1780, AND MARCH 1, 1811

England

		Total
Bedfordshire		1
Luton	1	
Berkshire		4
Abingdon	2	
Windsor	1	
Undetermined location	1	
Buckinghamshire		4
Aylesbury	1	
Olney	1	
Wing	1	
Undetermined location	1	
Cambridgeshire		4
Cambridge	3	
Wisbech	1	
Cheshire		4
Chester	1	
Mottram	1	
Stockport	2	
Cornwall		18
Falmouth	4	
Launceston	1	
Looe	1	
Padstow	3	
Penzance	1	
Poldice Mine	3	
Port Isaac	1	
Truro	3	
Wadebridge	1	
Cumberland		5
Carlisle	3	
Cockermouth	1	
Penrith	1	

Derbyshire		8
Ashbourne	1	
Bakewell	1	
Chesterfield	1	
Derby	3	
Swarkeston	1	
Wirksworth	1	
Devonshire		14
Ashburton	1	
Biddeford	1	
Chudleigh	1	
Dartmouth	1	
Exeter	3	
Modbury	1	
Newton	1	
Plymouth	3	
Plymouth Dock	1	
Totness	1	
Dorsetshire		2
Blandford	1	
Poole	1	
Durham		10
Chester-le-Street	1	
Darlington	1	
Durham	2	
South Shields	3	
Sunderland	2	
Undetermined location	1	
Essex		1
Braintree	1	
Gloucestershire		13
Blakeney	1	
Bristol	5	
Forest of Dean	1	
Mitcheldean	1	
Tewkesbury	2	
Woodchester	1	
Undetermined location	2	
Hampshire		11
Alresford	1	
New Alresford	1	
Portsea	2	
Portsmouth	3	
Romsey	2	
Southampton	1	
Winchester	1	

Herefordshire		5
Collington	1	
Hereford	1	
Ross	1	
Shobdon	1	
Wellington	1	
Hertfordshire		2
Bishop Stortford	1	
Hitchin	1	
Huntingtonshire		0
Kent		11
Canterbury	2	
Chatham	2	
Dover	1	
Halsted	1	
Maidstone	1	
Margate	1	
Sheerness	1	
Tumbridge Wells	1	
Westerham	1	
Lancashire		31
Bolton	1	
Bury	2	
Lancaster	1	
Liverpool	9	
Manchester	11	
Rochdale	3	
Royton	1	
Ulverstone	1	
Wigan	1	
Undetermined location	1	
Leicestershire		9
Hinckley	2	
Leicester	6	
Shackerstone	1	
Lincolnshire		6
Boston	2	
Caistor	1	
Grantham	1	
Horncastle	1	
Tattershall	1	
London		45
Middlesex		2
Undetermined location	2	

Norfolk		8
Dereham	1	
Lalingford	1	
Lynn	1	
Norwich	3	
Yarmouth	2	
Northamptonshire		6
Kettering	1	
Northampton	2	
Towcester	1	
Wellingborough	1	
Wilbarston	1	
Northumberland		8
Blythe	1	
Newcastle	6	
North Shields	1	
Nottinghamshire		20
Mansfield	3	
Nottingham	16	
Undetermined location	1	
Oxfordshire		10
Banbury	2	
Oxford	6	
Woodstock	1	
Undetermined location	1	
Rutlandshire		0
Shropshire		5
Burford	1	
Ludlow	2	
Oswestry	2	
Somersetshire		6
Bath	4	
Taunton	1	
Wells	1	
Staffordshire		19
Bilston	2	
Dudley	4	
Longton	1	
Newcastle-under-Lyme	2	
Sedgley	1	
Stafford	1	
Stowe	1	
The Potteries	2	
Wednesbury	1	
Wolverhampton	4	

Suffolk		5
Ipswich	3	
Long Melford	1	
Sudbury	1	
Surrey		3
Guildford	2	
Leatherhead	1	
Sussex		9
Arundel	1	
Brighton	1	
Chichester	1	
Horsham	3	
Lewes	1	
Newhaven	1	
Seaford	1	
Warwickshire		21
Bedworth	1	
Birmingham	13	
Coventry	4	
Foleshill	1	
Nuneaton	2	
Westmorland		0
Wiltshire		9
Bradford	3	
Deptford	1	
Devizes	2	
Trowbridge	1	
Warminster	1	
Undetermined location	1	
Worcestershire		6
Bromsgrove	1	
Kidderminster	2	
Stourbridge	1	
Worcester	2	
Yorkshire		30
Bradford	1	
Castleford	1	
Halifax	3	
Huddersfield	2	
Hull	5	
Leeds	4	
Nottingley	2	
Pontefract	1	
Sheffield	8	
Wakefield	2	
York	1	

Locations for which counties could not be determined		6
Beeton (near Cross Flats)--Nov. 20, 1797		
Leeds--Sept. 18, 1800 (Kent or Yorks.)		
Royston--n.d., late 1796 (Herts. or Yorks.)		
Southwell--Sept. 1800 (Dorset or Notts.)		
Stamford--Sept. 1800 (Lincs. or Northumb.)		
Stockton--April 25, 1795 (Norf., War., or Worcs.)		

Wales

Cardiganshire		1
Aberystwith	1	
Denbighshire		6
Abergele	1	
Denbigh	1	
Ruabon	1	
Wrexham	2	
Undetermined location	1	
Flintshire		4
Bangor	1	
Holywell	2	
Mold	1	
Glamorganshire		3
Bridgend	1	
Merthys-Tydfil	2	
Merionethshire		1
Barmouth	1	
Pembrokeshire		4
Haverfordwest	3	
Narbeth	1	

The following counties in Wales had no record of disorders during this period:

Anglesey
Brecknockshire
Caernarvonshire
Carmarthenshire
Monmouthshire
Montgomeryshire
Radnorshire

Total 400

APPENDIX E

THE NUMBER OF DISTURBANCES IN EACH COUNTY OF ENGLAND AND WALES

BETWEEN JUNE 10, 1780, AND MARCH 1, 1811



Figure A-3. Disturbances by county, June 10, 1780-March 1, 1811.

VITA

Lucas Gordon Boyd was born on December 8, 1932, near Anguilla, Mississippi. He attended several elementary schools in the area and was graduated from Batesville High School in Batesville, Mississippi, in May 1950. The following September he entered the University of Mississippi and in January 1955 received a Bachelor of Science degree in Health and Physical Education.

In September 1957 after a two-year tour of duty with the United States Army, he accepted the position of Athletic Director at The Webb School, a private boys' boarding school, in Bell Buckle, Tennessee. He became a full-time member of the history faculty in 1963.

In June 1960 he began study toward a Master's degree at Middle Tennessee State University. This degree was awarded in August 1962.

The author received a Reynolds Fellowship for the study of economics at the University of North Carolina during the summer of 1965. The following summer he was the recipient of a National Defense Education Act fellowship for the study of Far Eastern History at the University of Chattanooga.

In June 1968 he accepted a teaching assistantship at the University of Tennessee and began study toward a Doctor of Philosophy degree. This degree with a major in History was awarded in March 1977.

In August 1973 he returned to The Webb School as Principal, the position he continues to hold.

The author is a member of the National Association of Secondary

School Principals, the Tennessee Association of Secondary School Principals, the Cum Laude Society, and is a Rotarian.

He is married to the former Sara Ferrell of Batesville, Mississippi. They are the parents of a daughter, Kimberly, who is a sophomore at Maryville College, and a son, David, a senior at The Webb School.