
The Effect of U.S. Intervention on Political Rights and Civil Liberties

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Introduction

The United States is currently involved in at least two major military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as being involved in the ongoing crises in Libya. U.S. military intervention continues to be an ongoing occurrence in international relations and as such warrants further analysis. There has been a lot of research done on the relationship between military intervention and democratization. Some research suggests that there is a positive correlation between military intervention and democratization while others have found that there is not. Intervention by the U.S. is often justified as being for the promotion of democracy abroad. Studies on U.S. intervention are similar in their disagreement and find that U.S. intervention results in democracy only some of the time. This disparity suggests that democratization might fruitfully be examined with greater scrutiny. Therefore, it may be more worthwhile to examine factors that underlie democracy rather than looking at democratization as a whole.

This study will examine the effect of U.S. intervention on Political Rights and Civil Liberties within a targeted country. Political rights and civil liberties are fundamental to functioning democracies, and as a result should bare further scrutiny. This builds upon existing research in the field by examining a specific aspect of democratization and how it is affected by U.S. intervention. This is accomplished by using two different data sets on U.S. intervention and examining their effect on political rights and civil liberties. This will allow for a more thorough examination of democratizing forces that may be at work through military intervention.

In order to examine the issue of U.S. intervention and its effect on political rights and civil liberties I structure the thesis into three sections. First, I provide a theoretical framework that explains the conditions in which U.S. intervention may increase political rights and civil liberties. Second, I provide the research design that was used to test my hypotheses and then use

the data to analyze if there is an increase in political rights and civil liberties as a result of U.S. intervention. Last, I offer my conclusions based on the results as well as my suggestions for future research on United States military intervention.

Theoretical Explanation

There are currently two major positions within research on military intervention and its effect on democratization. There are those studies that find military intervention has a positive correlation with democratization on one side (Hermann and Kegley 1998; Gleditsch et al 2004), and the studies that find it to have no correlation with democracy on the other (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Bueno De Mesquita and Downs (2006) find that a military intervention may even detract from a countries democratic trajectory. They argue that leaders of intervening states focus more attention on pleasing their constituents at home, rather than actually promoting democracy abroad. This causes U.S. leaders to be more likely to install autocratic leaders that undermine democracy, but that will be more in line with U.S. policy goals. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argue that the democratic peace only applies to mature democracies. Although mature democracies have not yet engaged in war with each other, they find that countries that are emerging democracies are often very belligerent and engage in wars more than mature democracies and stable autocracies. This suggests that these new democracies may well in fact fight with other democracies which undermines the notion of a democratic peace.

In contrast, Gleditsch et al. (2004) find that there is a correlation in the first year after intervention with increased democratization, but the long term results are unpredictable. They find that when looking at the data as a whole, countries are more likely to become semi-democratic or autocratic as a result of intervention. Hermann and Kegley (1998) found that

military intervention has been successful in increasing democratization. Their study finds that democracies tend to justify their military interventions based on the premise that promoting democracy also promotes peace. This theory is in line with the concept of a democratic peace in which democracies are not likely to go to war with each other. They find that interventions that enlarge the community of democracies will lead to lower levels of interstate war.

These studies examine military interventions on a large scale, but as a result do not allow the affect of specific interveners to be analyzed. U.S. intervention should be examined more closely because of the position of relative power that the U.S. occupies within the international community. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the world shifted from a bi-polar power structure to a uni-polar system with the U.S. as the dominant force. No other country has the resources or level of military development at its disposal. This can be seen in the amount the U.S. spent on it military in 2011. The U.S. spent \$741 Billion in comparison to China the second highest spender which only spent \$380 Billion on military expenditures (Global). There is also no other country that possesses as much international influence as the United States. Even when there are multi-lateral interventions taking place, the U.S. is often the major contributor of people and resources. U.S. power also matters because of the rhetoric of its leaders and the national image of the United States. Leaders in the U.S. frequently use the spread of democracy as the basis for military intervention. An example of this presidential rhetoric can be seen throughout George W. Bush's speeches on Iraq. In one of these speeches he stated that the goal for U.S. intervention was to give Iraq," a free, representative government that is an ally in the war on terror, and a beacon of hope in a part of the world that is desperate for reform" (AR) These types of arguments are often associated with notions of being the leader of the free world or a beacon of freedom for the world.

Concerning studies on U.S. intervention specifically there appear to be two positions that are taken. One position finds that military intervention with liberalizing objectives may be more successful in promoting democratization (Peceny 1999; Meernik 1996). The other looks at the record of U.S. intervention and sees that it is capable of promoting democratization, but that it has not always been successful in doing so (Pei Mixin and Sara Kasper 2003; Hook 2002). Peceny (1999) found that military intervention on its own was not enough to promote democratization. However, when the intervention included the promotion of liberalizing objectives it did have an effect. Specifically, Peceny focused on the presence of U.S. sponsored elections and the effect they had on democratization. He found that such elections had a statistically significant result on the level of democratization within a target state. States that had experienced intervention as well as U.S. sanctioned elections were more likely to result in democracies than those that had not. Meernik (1996) also finds that military intervention by the U.S. does not automatically mean an increase in democratization. He finds that when the president declares democracy to be a goal of the intervention, it increases the likelihood that democratization will occur. It is interesting to note that in both of these studies the researchers found that countries that have experienced U.S. intervention are more likely to have increased democratization over time, than countries that have not been intervened in. This implies that even if there is not a direct increase in democratization during the intervention, there is still something occurring that makes democratization more likely over time.

Studies that view U.S. intervention as having inconsistent results interpret the data with a different emphasis. They point to successes in Japan, Germany, Grenada and Panama, but also point to the failures that have occurred in states like Haiti and Somalia to illustrate their point (Pei Mixin and Sara Kasper 2003). Hook (2002) found that although the U.S. devotes many

resources to spreading democracy it often has domestic concerns and foreign policy objectives that impede that goal. Examples of these domestic concerns are things like unemployment or sluggish economic conditions. Domestic pressures like these are likely to make the American public far more concerned about their own domestic well being rather than foreign policy goals such as spreading democracy. Foreign policy can conflict with the spread of democracy when U.S. policy makers have regional security concerns in mind. The U.S. has a record of propping up dictators that stay in line with U.S. policy when the alternative might be democratically elected extremists. An example of such a leader is Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Despite the fact that he had effectively seized control and even abused his power, the U.S. continued to support him (Hook 2002). This was the result of fears of Islamic extremists as well as the possibility of threatening Middle Eastern security. Although there has been a lot of research on U.S. intervention, there has been little if any research that focuses on U.S. intervention and its effect on political rights and civil liberties. This matters because these rights and liberties are the foundations upon which democracy is built. Even if the result of U.S. intervention is not a fully fledged democracy, an increase in these rights and liberties may provide a base for future democratization.

We might expect U.S. military intervention to have an effect on political rights and civil liberties for a number of reasons. Interventions by U.S. forces are almost always justified by being for the promotion of democracy in the world (Meernik 1996). If this is the common justification used then it is reasonable to expect that the U.S. has a stake in attempting to increase democratization. Political rights and civil liberties may be increased as a result of such efforts. Another reason to expect such an effect is that U.S. presidents frequently use rhetoric espousing the ideal of spreading democracy in order to justify the use of military intervention and to build

consensus on foreign policy (Peceny 1999). If the goal of spreading democracy is how consensus is gained domestically, this reinforces the fact that leaders must show democratization results. It has also been suggested that promoting democracy is in the interest of the U.S. because of both the democratic peace theory as well as economic factors that favor the U.S. in its interactions with democracies. The economic benefits to the U.S. include access to stable markets and the possibility of U.S. investment and sustainable growth (Lynn-Jones 1998). The benefits of the democratic peace theory include a more stable international community as democracies do not engage in interstate wars. Another clue that U.S. intervention is having an effect on political rights and civil liberties can be seen in some of these studies. Herman and Kegley (1998) and Meernik (1996) found that U.S. interventions generally leave a state more liberal than it was pre-intervention. This suggests that there may be a variable such as political rights or civil liberties that have not yet been accounted for. With all of these factors in mind it is possible to see why the U.S. has an interest in promoting democracy and may be increasing the political rights and civil liberties within target states.

Political rights can be defined as the rights of individuals in respect to participation in the political process. Thus political rights can include fair electoral policies and the right to political participation. Civil liberties can be defined as the rights of an individual to protection from the state. Thus civil liberties can include freedoms of expression and belief, freedoms of association, and liberties associated with personal autonomy (FH). Political Rights and Civil Liberties are foundational to successful democracy. Their importance can be seen in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. constitution as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was passed by the U.N. following the Second World War (UN).

It is important to examine these variables independently of each other to precisely measure the results of U.S. intervention. If they were to be lumped together it is possible that they would cloud the results for each specific variable. Although they are related concepts, they are distinct and should be examined accordingly, and for this reason I have two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. U.S. intervention will increase political rights within a targeted country.

Hypothesis 2. U.S. intervention will increase civil liberties within a targeted country.

A second pair of hypotheses concern unilateral intervention specifically. As discussed earlier, U.S. leaders frequently espouse rhetoric that interventions are based on spreading democracy. This idea along with the democratic peace theory provides a reasonable basis for expecting U.S. intervention to be vested in increasing democratization. It is possible that multilateral efforts could interfere with the United States goal of democratization as a result of many states having competing interests in a given intervention. This is a result of the U.S. not being able to impose its preferences on an intervening coalition. For this reason it is important to examine U.S. unilateral intervention specifically to examine if such a relationship exists. Therefore, I argue that where the U.S. intervenes unilaterally we might expect a clearer relationship between intervention and an increase in both political rights and civil liberties.

Hypothesis 1a. U.S. unilateral intervention will increase political rights within a targeted country.

Hypothesis 2a. U.S. unilateral intervention will increase civil liberties within a targeted country.

Analysis

Methodology

To test the hypotheses I use time-series cross-section data for interventions most of which was initially compiled by Vllasi (2009). This data covers the period 1972-1999 for 199 countries. This start date is determined because Freedom House started to compile data on political rights and civil liberties in 1972, and thus we lack adequate data for earlier periods. The end data is determined based on the fact that this study builds upon Vllasi (2009) and going beyond 1999 would make the results less comparable. I used two estimation procedures, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and OLS regression with Newey-West standard errors. OLS regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors has many advantages over other procedures but has been known to generate unduly small standard errors under some circumstances. Accordingly, I also display the results for OLS regressions with Newey-West standard errors as an indicator of the stability of the results. In the following section I outline the variables used in the analysis.

Dependent Variables:

Political Rights and Civil Liberties are indicators that may be used to measure the foundations of democracy within a country. For the purpose of this study I used the data compiled by Freedom House since 1972 (FH).

Political Rights: are measured on a scale of 1 to 7 based on a checklist of 10 questions that are placed into three categories: 3 Electoral Process questions, 4 Political Pluralism and Participation questions, and, 3 Functioning of Government questions.

Civil Liberties: are measured on a scale from 1 to 7 based on a checklist of 15 questions that are placed into four categories: 4 Freedom of Expression and Belief questions, 3 Associational and Organizational Rights questions, 4 Rule of Law questions, and, 4 Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights questions.

In the Freedom House measures higher scores indicated lower levels of rights and liberties. For the purpose of this study the scales have been reversed so that higher scores imply increased levels of civil rights and liberties.

Independent Variables

Data on military interventions was drawn from two sources. Data on all military interventions was taken from Ellis Vllasi's (2009) piece on third party military interventions. To examine U.S. intervention specifically I used data that had been collected by Mark Peceny and supplemented it with data from the IMI Data Collection (Peceny 1999, IMI). This supplement was necessary because Peceny's data ended in 1992. Using Peceny's data I created two variables which measured U.S. intervention and U.S. unilateral intervention. I then compared Peceny's data with Vllasi's and created two more variables that measured the same phenomenon but based on Vllasi's data instead. This allowed for a more robust examination of the effect of U.S. intervention and controls for discrepancies between the two sets of data.

U.S. (V): Is a dummy variable representing whether the U.S. was involved in an intervention according to Vllasi (2009). The value is represented by a 1 if U.S. intervention occurred for a given country and year and a 0 otherwise.

U.S. Unilateral (V): Is a dummy variable representing whether the U.S. was the lone actor in an intervention according to Vllasi (2009). The value is represented by a 1 if unilateral U.S. intervention occurred for a given country and year and a 0 otherwise.

U.S. (P): Is a dummy variable representing whether the U.S was involved in an intervention according Peceny (1999). The value is represented by a 1 if U.S intervention occurred for a given country and year and a 0 otherwise.

U.S. Unilateral (P): Is a dummy variable representing whether the U.S. was the lone actor in an intervention according to Peceny (1999). The value is represented by a 1 if unilateral U.S. intervention occurred for a given country and year and a 0 otherwise.

Control Variables:

Democracy+10: To account for countries' previous experiences with democratic institutions, I follow Vllasi and use Polity IV data to create the variable *Base Democratization +10*. This variable aggregates the democracy scores for a given country year for the the 10 year period prior to the given year. Therefore, the minimum and maximum scores for the variable are -100 (full autocracy) to +100 (full democracy).

GDP per Capita: Some scholars believe that economic development facilitates democratization (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Lipset 1959). In order to control for this possibility Gross Domestic Product per capita was used as an indicator of such development. The annual GDP per capita data was taken from the UN Statistics Division–Database (2007).

Ethnic Fragmentation: The lack of a homogenous population can exacerbate existing conflicts and complicate the reconciliation process afterwards. These factions within a society can make it

harder for democratization to take place as warring parties are less likely to reconcile. This data is taken from Regan (2002) but was originally compiled by Ellingsen (2000).

State Failure: Failed states are accompanied by lower levels of political rights and civil liberties as a consequence of states experiencing civil, political, and economic problems. (Langford 1999). According to the Political Instability Task Force (2007) there are four distinct types of state failure: revolutionary wars; ethnic wars; adverse regime changes; and genocides and politicides. The first three types of state failure are measured on three alternative scales and are represented through an average score. Vllasi combined the four types of state failure into one continuous variable ‘State Failure’ that represents the sum total of the average scores measured by each type of state failure, and takes the range of 0 to 17. A higher score means increased level of state failure within a country.

Post Cold War: Is a dummy variable denoting whether the intervention occurred during the Cold War. It takes the value of 0 for Cold War years, and a value of 1 for post-Cold War years. Following Patrick Regan (2000), the Cold War is considered to be ended by January 1, 1989.

Length of Intervention: The length of an intervention is thought to affect the level of commitment from a country as well as the intensity of conflict. It is measured based on the number of years an intervention occurred.

Results

Multiple regressions are employed to examine the effect of U.S. intervention on political rights and civil liberties. This is done because they control for other variables that may impact the stated relationship and for the possibility of incorporating general functional form relationships (Wooldridge 2006). Four estimation techniques were used but due to the findings being largely

consistent only the Driscoll-Kraay and Newey-West estimation procedures were tabulated. The results for U.S. interventions are displayed in Table 1 overleaf.

Table 1: Effects of U.S. Intervention on Political Rights and Civil Liberties								
Independent Variables	Political Rights				Civil Liberties			
	Driscoll-Kraay	Driscoll-Kraay	Newey-West	Newey-West	Driscoll-Kraay	Driscoll-Kraay	Newey-West	Newey-West
Base Democratization	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.24*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
GDP per Capita	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Ethnic Fragmentation	0.23 (0.19)	0.22 (0.19)	0.23 (0.23)	0.23 (0.23)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.18)	0.03 (0.20)	0.03 (0.20)
State Failure	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.02)
Post-Cold War	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)
Length	-0.08** (0.15)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)
U.S. (V)	0.16 (0.15)		0.16 (0.27)		0.26** (0.12)		0.26 (0.21)	
U.S. (P)	0.35*** (0.13)		0.35* (0.20)		0.46*** (0.12)		.46** (0.20)	
Constant	3.83*** (0.12)	3.92*** (0.14)	3.83*** (0.20)	3.83*** (0.20)	3.92*** (0.14)	3.92*** (0.14)	3.92*** (0.17)	3.92*** (0.17)
Number of Observations	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620
Number of Groups	139	139	139	139	139	139	139	139

NB: Standard errors in parentheses; two tailed test. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 1 includes eight data models which measure the impact of U.S. intervention on Political Rights and Civil Liberties. They are labeled according to the independent variable and estimation procedure that was used. The first four models test hypothesis number one dealing with political rights. The following four test hypothesis number two dealing with civil liberties. Positive coefficients imply an increase in political rights or civil liberties depending on the model, and negative coefficients imply a decrease in political rights or civil liberties.

In line with research that had been done by Dobbins (2003) the analysis shows that prior democratization is positively correlated with political rights and civil liberties and is statistically significant. Furthermore the analysis confirms that economic development is associated with higher levels of political rights and civil liberties and is statistically significant as was established in a study by Przeworski and Limongi (1997). State failure and the length of an intervention do not appear conducive to political rights and civil liberties since neither are statistically significant. Length having a negative correlation is surprising, but may be the result of other factors. For instance, higher levels of conflict may result in longer interventions where security concerns are given higher priority than democratization. As such length may be serving as a proxy for conflict and higher levels of conflict during an intervention may reduce the level of political rights and civil liberties. Failed states are unable to guarantee political rights and civil liberties and an authority vacuum may mean that security concerns are once again much more important than increasing democratization. Table 1 also shows that ethnic fragmentation and the post cold war period are not statistically significant.

The first four models measure whether any intervention involving the U.S. has a positive effect on political rights. Using the data compiled by Vllasi (2009) results in a positive but not

statistically significant relationship. Using the data compiled by Peceny (1999) results in a positive and statistically significant relationship for political rights.

The next four models in Table 1 measure whether U.S. intervention in general has a positive effect on civil liberties. Using the data compiled by Vllasi (2009) shows that under one estimation procedure there is a positive and significant relationship, but under the other this is not the case. This shows that there is sensitivity to the way in which U.S. interventions are measured.

In sum table 1 shows that U.S. intervention is positively correlated with increases in both political rights and civil liberties, but the significance depends on both the measure of U.S. intervention as well as the estimation procedure used. How U.S. intervention is measured is important in examining the relationship between interventions and its effect on democratization which will be discussed later.

The results for U.S. unilateral interventions are shown in Table 2 overleaf.

Table 2: Effects of Unilateral U.S. Intervention on Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Independent Variables	Political Rights				Civil Liberties			
	Driscoll-Kray	Driscoll-Kray	Newey-West	Newey-West	Driscoll-Kray	Driscoll-Kray	Newey-West	Newey-West
Base Democratization	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
GDP per Capita	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Ethnic Fragmentation	0.24 (0.19)	0.24 (0.19)	0.24 (0.23)	0.24 (0.23)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.17)	0.03 (0.20)	0.02 (0.20)
State Failure	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.02)
Post-Cold War	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.40 (0.08)
Length	-0.09*** (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.18** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)
U.S. (V)	0.07 (0.17)		0.07 (0.28)		0.16 (0.19)		0.16 (0.24)	
U.S. Unilateral (V)	0.07 (0.21)		0.07 (0.29)		0.23 (0.30)		0.23 (0.29)	
U.S. (P)		0.38*** (0.13)		0.38** (0.19)		0.47*** (0.11)		0.47** (0.19)
U.S. Unilateral (P)		-0.20 (0.24)		-0.20 (0.30)		-0.04 (0.29)		-0.04 (0.25)
Constant	3.83*** (0.11)	3.82*** (0.11)	3.83*** (0.20)	3.82*** (0.20)	3.92*** (0.14)	3.91*** (0.14)	3.92*** (0.17)	
Number of Observations	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620	3620
Number of Groups	139	139	139	139	139	139	139	139

NB: Standard errors in parentheses; two tailed test. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 2 is structured similarly to table one but includes extra variables to account for unilateral intervention by the United States. The first four models test hypothesis 1a dealing with political rights. The last four models test hypothesis 2a dealing with civil liberties. Here again previous democratic experience as well as economic growth is positive and statistically significant for an increase in political rights. Ethnic fragmentation remains positive while post cold war remains negative but neither is statistically significant. This table also supports the finding that the length of intervention and state failure are bad for political rights and civil liberties since both are negative and statistically significant. Vllasi's unilateral variable results in a positive correlation that is not statistically significant while Peceny's unilateral variable results in a negative correlation that is not statistically significant. In short, there is no evidence that unilateral U.S. intervention will have an effect on political rights and civil liberties.

The results show that there is a generally positive effect on civil liberties as a result of U.S. intervention. However, when there is a unilateral intervention there does not appear to be any relationship. This makes sense because in a unilateral intervention it may be the case that the U.S. is focused more on security concerns as well as democratization. Whichever of these two concerns is given greater emphasis will result in the other being less important. This also suggests that when there are a number of countries intervening they may be able to put their own agendas aside and focus more on promoting political rights and civil liberties within a country. The data also appears to be sensitive to measures of U.S. intervention. The measurement of U.S. intervention based on Vllasi's work was rarely significant compared to Peceny's which tended to be. This suggests that more attention should be focused on measuring U.S. intervention precisely. Interventions that are undertaken with specific policy goals such as promoting democratization will be different in nature from those that seek to restore order in a failed state.

Each U.S. intervention should be scrutinized to determine the nature of the intervention and what should be expected based on the difference between interventions for security purposes as compared to those that seek to increase democratization.

Conclusion

As the U.S. continues to engage in military intervention around the globe I have shown that there may well be a reason to expect that U.S. intervention will increase political rights and civil liberties. When the U.S. engages in multilateral intervention it is much more likely to have a positive effect on political rights and civil liberties than when it intervenes unilaterally. Such results suggests that multilateral interventions may take some of the domestic pressure away from policy decisions and also result in a more democratic process occurring as a result of the interactions between intervening states. If this premise is true, then it may be the case that the U.S. effort in Afghanistan a multilateral undertaking will be more successful than its intervention in Iraq which is a largely unilateral endeavor. This may be the case because Afghanistan has numerous governments involved in the intervention that result in a more democratic nature of the intervention itself born out of their varying interests and concerns. Iraq is an intervention that places almost all of the strain of intervention on the United States. As the intervention has dragged on, it is possible that the U.S. has shifted its focus on security concerns such as creating a stable government rather than a more democratic one.

This research has expanded upon the work of other researchers in a number of ways. Focusing on political rights and civil liberties as opposed to a broad idea of democratization allows an examination of the normative aspects of democratization. This break from traditional

measures of democracies will allow for more accurate and focused studies on the processes of democratization through the examination of specific features of democracy

Future work regarding the impact of U.S. intervention on democratization should augment the analysis in at least three ways. First, it should focus more on a careful coding for the instances of U.S. intervention. Related to this concept would be a contextual analysis of interventions and determining their relevance. For instance, when the military intervenes in a country solely to provide aid it is probably not relevant to a question on democratization and should be placed under more scrutiny. Rationales for U.S. intervention may well play an important role in determining its effect on democratization.

Second, researchers might look for other normative measures of democracy and try to come up with a more thorough study of the forces that are actually influenced by intervention. If a more thorough analysis of democratization was done it could show how democratization efforts should be undertaken if at all. This would tie into the final argument which would produce more sophisticated models capable of forecasting the results of interventions for policymakers. This would allow U.S. policy makers to tailor the strategies of military interventions to better achieve increased democratization.

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