To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Mohammad Hadi Semati entitled "Power, Discontent, and Resistance: The Islamic Revolution in Iran and The Resource Mobilization Paradigm." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

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We have read this dissertation
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Accepted for the Council:

Associate Vice Chancellor
and Dean of The Graduate School

POWER, DISCONTENT, AND RESISTANCE: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND THE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION PARADIGM

A Dissertation Presented In Partial

Fulfillment of The Requirements For The

Doctor of Philosophy Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Mohammad Hadi Semati

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To Maryam Whose Patience And Support

Made This Project Possible

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ABSTRACT

This research is an attempt to explain the Islamic revolution of Iran using a theoretical framework known as resource mobilization in the studies of social movements and revolutions. More specifically, I will focus on Charles Tilly's resource mobilization model and try to test its applicability in the Iranian case. The model juxtaposes "causal explanation," which traces the effects of long-term structural factors, with "purposive explanation," which analyzes underlying reasons why groups make real choices for mobilizing their resources. Collective action, joint action in pursuit of shared interests, is a function of interests, organization, and mobilization. Contending groups engage in intentional collective action within a set of structural and institutional constraints. This research employs the case-oriented comparative method to demonstrate the relative utility of the resource mobilization paradigm.

This study analyzes the trajectory of state-building and modernization in Iran as a significant explanatory variable. The structure of the state and its relationship to social classes and groups and its impacts on various groups' resources are central to understanding the dynamics of the revolutionary movement in Iran. The study shows that the rentier state capitalism in Iran was a particularly vulnerable institution that could not tolerate structural crises. When the opportunity presented itself, the intelligentsia, the clergy, the bazaar, the industrial working class, and the modern middle class formed a multi-class revolutionary coalition under the leadership of the clergy which eventually managed to assume state power. It was the preponderant control of the clergy over

institutional and normative resources and ineffective coercive control by the state that gave it enormous mobilizing potency. The eventual entry of the industrial working class and the modern middle class expanded the commitment to the alternative polity and led to the creation of multiple sovereignty and, after the disintegration of the armed forces, the collapse of the state in February 1979.

Although Tilly's resource mobilization framework is of considerable value in explaining the Iranian revolution, major modifications were made to accommodate the historical particularities of the case. These included reconceptualization of power, interests, and resources. The study finds that the impact of Shi'i political ideology on interest formation and articulation, culturally-embedded resources and meaning systems, and regime type are key variables to which Tilly's resource mobilization model is not attentive.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic revolution in Iran has generated new debates among those studying revolution. As a truly transformative revolutionary phenomenon, the Iranian case seems to have caught the attention of both revolutionaries and social scientists. The surprising collapse of the strong Iranian state in 1979 as a result of a mass-based revolutionary movement consisting of various traditional and modern classes and its replacement by a religiously-based political structure have raised fundamental theoretical and methodological questions for students of revolution. An efficient mobilization of socially embedded resources by a multi-class coalition led by the clergy brought an authoritarian regime with an omnipotent coercive apparatus to its knees in a short period of time. This intentional and ideologically-informed collective action took place at a conjuncture where long-term historical processes and structural crises did facilitate collective mobilization. It is the unique interplay of these forces in the Iranian case that has been most illuminating and challenging to the theorists of revolution, illuminating because of the nature of the social forces involved and the forms of collective action pursued and Challenging, because the inadequacy of the prevalent paradigms for answering new questions has been revealed.

The purpose of this project is to situate the Iranian revolution within its long-term historical and macro-structural context while at the same time emphasizing the importance of rational, deliberate, and ideologically-informed human action. To this

end, I will employ Charles Tilly's resource mobilization framework and test its fitness for dealing with the Iranian revolution. It is my contention that Tilly's model enables us to appreciate the mutual interaction between structure and agency in revolutionary transformation. It is a general model that utilizes a multi-causal explanation to account for collective action. At one level, the dynamics of the historical processes are taken into consideration as causal mechanisms. At the level of groups, purposive action is emphasized as an important source of explanation.

This introductory chapter presents a map of the research. Chapter II defines the general methodological framework of the project. A brief discussion of the comparative case-oriented method, the principal method used in this research, will lay the groundwork for data collection and analysis. In chapter III, I shall review theories of revolution. This task, due to the extensiveness of the literature, will be organized on the basis of two objectives. The first is providing conceptual and definitional clarification. The second is presenting a historically useful theoretical summary and synthesis of existing paradigms and the problems inherent in them. In chapter IV, state-building and modernization as the structural determinants of collective action will be discussed. This chapter will deal with the trajectory of modernization and state-building and how it influenced the composition and resources of competing groups and classes in the pursuit of common goals. The primary argument is that modernization and the particular structure of the state significantly contributed to the emergence of the revolutionary situation by altering the configuration of contending groups.

Based on Tilly's polity and mobilization models, Chapters V and VI deal with three essential challengers in the Iranian revolution. The former argues for the centrality of the intelligentsia and their role in the articulation of a revolutionary discourse grounded in an activist Shi'i political philosophy. The latter emphasizes the role of the ulama (clergy) and bazzar in the mobilization of various segments of the population. Here, I will demonstrate that the clergy with superior control over cultural and non-cultural resources could successfully dominate the revolutionary coalition. By focusing on cultural resources, I intend to bring ideology back into the analysis of revolution. In other words, a great deal of attention will be given to meaning systems and the way intersubjectively constituted resources induce collective action. In chapter VII, the emergence of multiple sovereignty and the collapse of the coercive apparatus of the state as a result of the mobilization of contending forces will be explained. In particular the role of the modern middle class and the industrial working class in expanding the commitment to an alternative polity will be analyzed. Furthermore, the chapter will deal with the circumstances under which the armed forces collapsed leading to the takeover of the state by revolutionary groups.

The conclusion, chapter VIII, is an effort to sum up theoretical studies of the Iranian revolution and offer an alternative synthetic explanation. Moreover, it will summarize the theoretical significance of this investigation. It must be noted that each chapter ends with a theoretical appraisal which deals with pertinent analytical questions concerning various parts of the resource mobilization framework.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

In general terms it can be said that the primary method of research used in this study is qualitative historical and comparative case study. Such a seemingly convoluted methodology needs further elaboration, to which I will turn shortly, before getting into the focal point of the project. Lijphart (1971) in an article examining the comparative approach in political science formulates a typology of different methods available to the comparativists in the field. They are the experimental, statistical, comparative, and case study methods. His classification, still rooted in the empiricist tradition, offers us a starting point on the basis of which we can develop the methodology utilized in our investigation. The subject matter and the kinds of data available in the inquiry greatly influence the basic methodological orientation of the project in hand. Dialectically related, method and data fundamentally define each other's character and sphere of operation. In light of such interaction between method and data, one's option among a plethora of alternatives seems limited.

By qualitative, I am referring to an approach that could be contrasted with Lijphart's experimental and statistical methods (Lijphart, 1971: 683-684). It is my view that studies about revolution, a complex and historically-grounded socio-political phenomenon, fall far outside the domain of strict quantitative methods. Stinchcomb aptly puts it:

> Now it turns out that numbers available for the analysis of historical questions do not provide very subtle data about what people where up to. This means agreeing to be voluntarily ignorant of all but the number is much more of an intellectual sacrifice for a historian than for a modern sociologist or econometrician. (1978: 5)

Stinchcombe's legitimate concerns, however, ought not to drive us to the point where historical details override the need for theoretical awareness, or make it almost impossible to envision theoretically-sensitive use of regularities in history. Oversensitive about the use of history in comparative research, he suggests that " they (theorists) become greater theorists down there among the details, for it is the details that theories in history have to grasp if they are to be any good" (Stinchcombe, 1978: 124).

The inadequacy of the statistical method, as defined by Lijphart, for capturing the essence of a unique historical reality , such as revolution, tends to direct the present search toward other methods. The lack of sufficient quantitative data, furthermore, renders statistical inference almost impossible even if I wanted to pursue the inquiry along such a standard path.

The statistical method seems to be conceived "as an approximation of the experimental method" (Lijphart, 1971: 684). This, in turn, means that one is primarily interested in "the establishment of general empirical relationships among two or more variables" (Lijphart, 1971: 683).[1] The objective here, however, is not to formulate general empirical causal relationships in a universal fashion. The dream, I imagine, of

[1] For an extensive examination of quantitative approach in the political science see Meehan (1965).

grand schemes of this nature has long been put to rest in the social sciences. The purpose is to come up with meaningful explanations using a set of plausible hypotheses about long-term historical processes in a given context. This, a less ambitious agenda and pursued with a greater degree of skepticism, comes close to what Mcridis and Brown seem to suggest. They argue that:

> Explanation simply means verification of hypothetical propositions. In the field of politics, given the lack of experimentation, it is only the test of hypothesis in as many systems as possible that will provide us with a moderate degree of assurance that we have an explanation. (Macridis and Brown, 1986: 5)

Since the overall intention is to test a general model- that is Charles Tilly's resource mobilization model- in a single case, it is imperative to clarify what I mean by the case study method. The method is the last one in the Lijphart's schema. Social scientists have always been skeptical of the case study method as an approach for establishing general empirical relationships. The very nature of this method, scholars argue, provide us with no chance for generalization across cases, for the method operates on the basis of a sample of one. The power of such a method is very limited, thus:

> The scientific status of the case study method is somehow ambiguous, however, because science is a generalizing activity. A single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization. (Lijphart, 1971: 691)

Smelser (1976), reasoning along similar lines, seems to agree concerning the general weaknesses of the case study method. Both Smelser and Lijphart, however, cannot fully dismiss the method because theoretical advances have indeed started with a case study. Tilly, himself a conscious admirer and practicionar of quantitative social history reveals his distaste for the conventional comparative historical method in many situations. He seems to express doubts about the usefulness of a large number of cases in grasping historical particularity, or constructing a basis for theoretical innovation. He indicates that:

> On the whole, comparative studies of the big structures and large processes yield more intellectual return when investigators examine relatively small numbers of instances. That is not because of the intrinsically greater value of small numbers, but because larger numbers give an illusory sense of security. (Tilly, 1984: 77)

"It is clear," Bradshaw and Wallace argue, "that single case studies are deemed most valuable by scholars concerned with historical processes, case uniqueness, social complexity, and careful interpretation" (1991: 165). Moreover, every social scientific investigation is in one way or another comparative in nature.[2] That is to say whether dealing with one or a few cases, comparison is an integral part of the process.

Lijphart has an inventory of six types of case studies . These are: (1) theoretical case studies, (2) interpretative case studies, (3) hypothesis-generating case studies, (4)

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[2] Both Gabriel Almond And Charles C. Ragin who come from different theoretical and methodological traditions agree on such similar broad conceptualization of the comparative method, and I tend to share their views on at least that point.

theory-confirming case studies, (5) theory-infirming case studies, and (6) deviant case studies (Lijphart, 1971: 691). It seems quite clear that hypothesis-generating and deviant case studies are most helpful to the conventional social scientific enterprise. They are methods of either establishing or refuting generalizations.

In the current study, I intend to employ a combination of two or possibly three of these types of case studies. In the real world, after all, no single case fits completely in one category. This dissertation is an attempt to interpret a case within an already-existing theoretical framework. Secondly, it is a theory-confirming endeavor. I am, furthermore, hypothesizing that it is plausible to demonstrate a reasonable degree of "goodness of fit" between the theory and the case of my choice. It is, thirdly, my overriding concern to raise some of the problems associated with this particular theoretical scheme. Thus, it is arguably a theory-infirming case study as well.[3]

The case study method, by its very logic, sheds light on the unknowns of a case through in depth analysis of available data and, quite often, contradictory interpretations. As Bradshaw and Wallace argue:

> Case studies are useful when (1) researchers do not have sufficient knowledge to place it in a theoretical perspective or a case does not fit any extant theory (a more occurrence than often admitted); (2) a case partially supports (or deviate from) existing theories; (3) a case represents a special (perhaps unique) set of circumstances or phenomena that warrant intensive study, even if theoretical discovery is not their primary objective. (1991: 154-155)

[3] For a review of case study design see Yin (1984).

Charles Ragin (1987) in an innovative discussion makes a distinction between the "case-oriented comparative method" and the "variable-oriented approach". To make my methodological outlook even more explicit, I am tempted to borrow his concept of case-oriented comparative method".

Ragin (1987: 51-52) considers four principal features which distinguish the case-oriented method distinctive from others. The researcher, first, aims at establishing "patterns of invariance and constant association" (Ragin, 1987; 51). He seeks extended causal relationships rather than correlation or "probabilistic relationships." The second feature is an exercise in incorporating deviant cases into the causal explanation. Bringing deviant cases somehow into the general explanatory structure signifies the limited importance of the frequency distribution of types of cases (Ragin, 1987: 52). Ragin, here, is concerned with the nature of causal relationships and their mode of operations. The third feature of the case-oriented method, for Ragin, is its totalistic approach in both gathering data and theoretical scrutiny.

> Researchers examine cases as wholes, not a collection of variables. An interest in interpreting specific cases and in pinpointing the combination of conditions, the causal complexes, that produce specific outcomes encourages investigators to view cases as wholes. Thus, the different parts and conditions that make up a case are understood in relation to each other. They are considered together as composing a single situation. (Ragin, 1987: 52)

The flexibility that is built into the method, the fourth feature, offers analysts a means of restricting themselves when moving between theory and data because they are not heavily involved in explaining variation.

It is the third feature in which I am interested. I will try to rearrange Ragin's list in a way so that the third feature assumes priority. The present research project, therefore, following Ragin's analytical distinction, uses a "case-oriented comparative method" in which the fundamental focus of inquiry is the holistic picture of the Iranian revolution as a historical process. In other words, the research will not be buried under detailed description and analysis of a large number of variables and their relationships. That is, it will not make use of what Ragin identifies as a "variable-oriented approach" (1987: 54-55). Expressed differently, Skocpol(1979: 36) discusses the same approach under the rubric of macro-historical analysis. To her, this is a method for generalizing about revolutions without sacrificing concrete history. She indicates that:

> To generalize about social revolutions, to develop explanations of their causes and outcomes, one can employ comparative historical analysis with selected slices of national historical trajectories as the units of comparison. (Skocpol, 1979: 35-36)

I will try to examine the case in its entirety and look at the long-term historical processes in the hope of arriving at some historical explanations. This, however, does not eliminate the needs for studying a number of principal variables. Indeed, part of the project involves a multi-level analysis of "long-term causal" and "short-term purposive explanations" (Coleman, 1973: 2-3; Tilly, 1978: 6). In other places, Tilly makes similar

attempts at juxtaposing multiple levels of analyses. He has constructed four possible levels of analyses in comparative research two of which are most relevant to our project (Tilly, 1984: 61). As he points out:

> At the macrohistorical level, we seek to account for particular big structures and large processes and to chart their alternate forms. At the microhistorical level, we trace the encounters of individuals and groups with those structures and processes, with the hope of explaining how people actually experienced them. (Tilly, 1984: 61)[4]

The multi-level synthetic approach, which is problematic in certain areas, concerns the interplay of a number of variables and their relative weight over a period of time. Specifically, state-making, modernization, capitalist development, and proletarianization - following Tilly's model- are of significant value for our "long-term causal explanation. "Short-term purposive explanation" involves variables built into Tilly's mobilization model such as interests, organization, mobilization, and threat/opportunity. The totality of the revolution as a historical phenomenon will be analyzed in the context of the interaction among these variables.

One can make a good case for the proposition that Immanuel Wallerstein (1989, 1990) postulates, although implicitly, a similar explanatory scheme in drawing the contours of historical change in the long journey of historical systems. The constraints,

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[4] The world-historical and world-systemic are his other levels of analyses. In the first case, one tries to look for characteristics of part of history in the context of human history. The objective, in the latter case, is to explain the features of the world system as a single unit composed of interrelated social structures.

he argues, imposed upon social movements by long-term historical and structural forces make successful collective action less likely. Here, in principle, he is articulating long-term causal processes. "Windows of opportunity," as he maintains, at certain historical conjunctures provide mobilized and organized social groups with a chance for triumphantly overcoming structural barriers. A "window of opportunity" is a historical conjuncture in which the "opportunity/threat" structure makes voluntaristic and intentional collective action in pursuit of shared interests worthwhile and attractive. Wallerstein's analysis would seem to shed light on Tilly's notion of short-term purposive explanation (Tilly, 1978: 6).

Tilly's research menu comprises a variety of collective actions the extreme case of which is revolution (Tilly, 1978: 198). His political conflict model uses a large number of variables that are observable in many cases. The multitude of variables, thus, is used to make his theoretical framework susceptible to rigorous testing in as many cases as possible (Skocpol, 1979: 34). To avoid a methodological inconsistency, my research agenda is limited to a particular kind of collective action (that is revolution) that lies at one end of the collective action spectrum. In a sense, I am trying to secure my loyalty to the "case-oriented comparative method," as defined earlier, by containing the number of variables and using reasonably narrow categories. The word comparative used here needs some qualification to which I will turn now.

How could a single case study be comparative? Some comparativists would probably argue when your "N" is one, the research is by definition not comparative. The contemporary debate about the nature of comparative method spreads over four decades

of academic reasearch.[5] Essentially this study is comparative for the following reasons. First Ragin argues, a case study is comparative to the extent that an "ideal-typic" model is our frame of reference (1987: 39). All theoretical models are basically ideal-types that never completely match social reality. In an effort to test the validity of an "ideal-typic" case, researcher engages in a comparative analysis in which a particular historical occurrence comes under empirical scrutiny in the shadow of an ideal model. The case under investigation, in other words, is always compared to an abstract picture, and the investigator attepmts to maximize the symmetry between the model and the specific case. It is, however, an elusive undertaking if one aims at a perfect fit in the comparative historical social sciences.

Second, the study traces the historical trajectory of a single case longitudinally, and the passing of time helps us to compare different segments of a historical process. As we move across time, the dynamics of variables at work presents us with various configurations of historical entities which are continuously being compared with each other in their respective time frames. Even though we are not moving across national units, the driving logic is still comparative in nature. For time has the function of providing us with slices of a given historical trajectory. And these are single cases.

One, however has to be cautious of possible pitfalls, for example the long-term causal determinants that seem to live through different historical epochs, or cumulatively manifest their impacts. Overcomparison, thus, could be the source of error in sorting out

[5] For a current compilation of the ongoing debates in the field see Cantori and Ziegler (1988) and Wiarda (1985).

the operating variables in a longitudinal study. Delineating the contribution of long-term and short-term causal determinants is a formidable task in comparative historical inquiries. It is one that is heavily dependent upon researcher's interpretive job.

> Strategic guesses have to be made about what causes are actually likely to be operative-that is, which ones could, or could not actually affect the object of study. The upshot is that there always are unexamined contextual features of the historical cases that interact with the causes being explicitly examined in ways the comparative historical analysis either does not level, or must simply assume to be irrelevant. (Skocpol, 1979: 39)

Third, from the vantage point of the sociology of knowledge, theoretical structures are firmly rooted in the socio-cultural milieu of a given society, and Tilly's resource mobilization model in no exception. He has generated a vast array of hypotheses within a generalized explanatory framework. The framework and its components are fundamentally based on his findings, which flow mostly from quantitative historical data, concerning Europe. By transcending cultural and geographical borders, the explanatory power of a theory is tested in an alien context from which the theory was not generated (Bradshaw and Wallace, 1991: 159-160).

Most social scientific generalizations, regardless of epistemological and methodological heritage, are offsprings of Eurocentric efforts embedded in Western civilization. Scholars put forward concepts and theories which, to use Heinz Kohut's fascinating phraseology, reflect nothing but "experience-distant" conceptualization (Kohut, X: Y). Formulating concepts that are not "experience-near" may produce unstable foundations in the theory-building business. Thus, the comparative approach, as defined

earlier, followed in this research is a limited attempt to shorten the distance between two often divergent worlds. A "theory-confirming" case study is comparative in so far as the reference model is subjected to examination outside its native home. What I hope to do is subject a reference model to such examination. Primary and secondary sources, both in Persian and English, are my main data pool. Without access to original archival materials, one is bound to use primary, written or oral, accounts of history as it was seen or experienced by participants. This includes not only the historiographical works but secondary interpretative explanations of contemporary Iranian history. Interviews and writings of revolutionary cadres, from a variety of sources, will also be used to the extent that they expand the diversity of our sources.

Statistical yearbooks of the U.N. will provide us with some needed quantitative data on major social and economic development indicators but they will not be a major source. They will be supplemented by statistics published in Iran by various governmental bureaucracies.

Finally, the personal experience of the writer who was a participant in and an observer of the events preceding the collapse of the regime in 1979 is a valuable source. Anthropologist Clifford Geerts (1983) elegantly defines such experience as "local knowledge". My modest involvement, both inside and outside the country, in the revolutionary process will hopefully be useful in further enlightening the theses articulated in this project. "Local knowledge" is indeed most helpful in circumstances where the availability of first hand data is limited. Certainly, in using personal knowledge no researcher is totally immune from the interference of biases in the research process.

However, I will try to be as objective as possible in such a risky endeavor.

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

Definitional Criteria

It is generally agreed that the word revolution, as we use it today in the social sciences, was first applied to the French Revolution and its profound impacts on European history (Zagorin, 1973: 24; 1976: 152). The meaning of the term has been a matter of controversy among the students of revolution ever since. What exactly is a revolution? How would we formulate a set of criteria by which we would be able to recognize a revolution if we saw one? The quarrel, I believe, is both normative and theoretical. It results from more than a semantic disagreement among competing persuasions in the social sciences. The very concept has a tendency to lend itself, directly or indirectly, to normative discourses across disciplinary boundaries. As Dunn, in an overstatement of course, puts it:

> What needs emphasis is that to entertain any theory about the meaning of revolution - and it is not even possible to identify just what events do constitute revolutions, as will be shown later, without assuming some theory about the meaning of revolution - is to assume a political posture....Revolutionary theories, whether favorable or hostile, are major premises in a large range of hugely important political syllogisms. The value-free study of revolution is a logical impossibility for those who live in the real world. (1989:1-2)

But, the value-laden nature of the word has not, and ought not to, distract the participants in this ongoing dialogue from trying to assemble meaningful, though

inevitably controversial, definitional characteristics that will be useful to researchers. Writing in the early 1970s, Dunn had not yet witnessed the flourishing literature on revolution which has attempted to reflect the cannons of value-free social sciences in its treatment of revolution, to the extent that such a task is possible. But there seems to be less of an excuse for Dunn to have espoused the same idea, with his original fervor, in the second edition of his Modern Revolutions (1989). Many scholars including Zagorin disagree with Dunn's position. Zagorin suggests that:

> It follows as a general methodological conclusion that revolution must if possible be constituted as a neutral descriptive category free of ideological prepossessions if some of its essential features or phenomenal forms are not to be arbitrarily extruded. (Zagorin, 1976: 157)

The intrusion of ideological strands, or valuational beliefs (Zagorin, 1976: 156), into the conceptualizing of revolution displays itself in many forms. The most striking of all is the attempt to impose upon a historical phenomenon a set of preconceived notions of "right" and "wrong" and "justice" and "injustice". This further complicates our efforts to understand revolutions as they are in reality. Tilly is concerned with this difficulty when he writes:

> Just as a theory of heredity which could not account for the occasional appearance of dramatically new genetic traits would be considered incomplete, a theory of revolution, or an analysis of a specific revolution, which provides no understanding of the presence of counter-revolutionary forces in the midst of society in revolt must leave us unsatisfied. If a theory purports to tell us when and why a society is ready for rebellion, it also ought to tell us which sectors of the society will resist the rebellion,

> and why. Exceptions prove the rule. Counter-revolutions test our explanations of revolution. (1964: 30)

For revolutionary praxis, this is of course nonsense. Revolutionaries have an unambiguous conceptions of their ideological projects, particularly in the post-revolutionary period. The line between revolution and counter-revolution is, for them, much less blurred than for the historian or the sociologist of revolution whose analytical convictions seem to override other concerns.[1] Although one might feel comfortable, or even obligated, to take note of ideology as part of a definitional scheme, yet passing judgment on similar occurrences does not alter their historical reality.

In addition to normative confusion surrounding the concept of revolution, most observers tend to build into their definitions of revolution a number of prerequisites without which an event cannot be considered a revolution. Looking at the vast array of studies on revolution in divergent fields, one can group all definitional components into a few broad categories. The following list is in no way exhaustive rather it touches upon central questions about how to conceptualize revolution. It is quite possible to broaden the list by adding further criteria which have been used by theorists. Our efforts will be hampered unless we recognize the limitations inherent in theorizing about such a

[1] For an interesting discussion about how normative and analytical justifications are used to distinguish between revolution and counter-revolution see Mayer (1971). The fascist experience, he concludes, is a prime example of counter-revolution merely in the realm of normative world. At a theoretical level, however, it deserves to be called revolution no less than most twentieth century revolutions.

phenomenon. This overview is only the first step in the direction of conceptual clarification.

Seizing the State Power

Revolution, many analysts argue, by definition presupposes the replacement of the old state by a new structure of power. The first and foremost operational criterion is the actual transfer of power. Pettee, for example, argues that "the state is the field of action; and this is most clearly set forth in the description of the state as an association." (1971: 1) The central entity towards which revolutionary activity is directed is the state with its intricate components. Transforming the state, for Pettee, is not merely changing an "association". What take place in a revolution, or "great revolution" as he calls it, is the reorganization of that association accompanied by an alteration in its social and institutional composition.

> A great revolution is a reconstitution of the state. This means a change in the purpose and institution of the state, and in the arrangement of its members in political classes. During a revolution there is a short time when there is no complete state association in the community. (Pettee,1971: 3)

Reconstitution of the state is the end point of a process in which the state incrementally loses its power base. Simultaneously with the corrosion of the state power, a new "oppose purpose" emerges (Pettee, 1971: 3). This reminds us of the concept of

"dual sovereignty" suggested earlier by Trotsky (1965: 224). Pettee's seems to purpose the idea that indeed the restructuring of the state is a fundamental step after which other major forms of societal reorganization take place. Thus, "owing to the peculiar position of the state in society, a great change in social conditions can not take place without a change in the composition of the state" (Pette, 1971: 3).

By introducing the concept of "partial revolution" (Pettee, 1971: 2), which refers to an adjustment in some institutions or members of the state not a complete overhaul, Pettee creates a confusion over the exact meaning of revolution. Partial and great revolutions are then two distinct possibilities contingent upon the magnitude of change in the state structure among other social changes. Nevertheless, neither "partial" nor "great revolution" takes place without some changes in the organization of the state with one (great revolution) entailing a complete transfer of power.

Huntington also assumes that revolution involves a full scale change of the state apparatus. Definitionally, revolutions have distinct features by which one can distinguish them from other forms of social upheaval. He maintains that:

> A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence. (Huntington, 1968: 264)

Clearly, a transfer of power could be accomplished without having a revolution. Therefore, for Huntington, the seizure of power is a necessary but not sufficient

condition. The French, Russian, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions represent cases where a multifaceted dramatic change reshaped the entire social formation.

Focusing on the revolutionary event (a change of government carried out by force), Calvert incorporates into his conception of revolution a definite transformation of governmental structure. According to one of his definitional requirements that revolution is "a change of government (transition) at a clearly defined point in time by the use of armed force, or the credible threat of its use, namely, an event" (Calvert, 1970: 4). Separating the event from the process, for Calvert, is justified on the grounds of analytical simplicity and empirical observability. In other words, operationalization is method-driven for the obvious reason that researchers can easily detect the event (a complete shift in power structure).

Trimberger identifies revolution as "an extralegal takeover of the central state apparatus" (1978: 12), which presumes a counter claim for legitimacy on the part of insurgents. The question of extralegality which implies extraconstitutional actions poses a number of problems. For many scholars (Johnson: 1966; Zimmermann: 1983) revolution presupposes the use of extralegal means for the acquisition of power because there is an unequal power relation between contenders.

Amann (1962: 38) on the other hand conceives of revolution as a "breakdown, momentarily or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience." Amann, thus, emphasizes the mere change of power structure rather than the nature and dynamic of change. He, furthermore, seems to argue that revolution is a process which begins with sufficiently strong drive for the

state power and ends by establishing a new hegemonic power over state apparatus. In his words, "revolution prevails when the state's monopoly over power is effectively challenged and persists until a monopoly of power is re-established" (Amann, 1962: 39).

Similarly Welch and Taintor build into their definition an element signifying a change in the political structure. Part of their definition suggests that revolution is "the creation and solidification of a new political order on a different basis of political legitimacy" (Welch and Taintor, 1972: 2). Both of these conceptualizations greatly expand the number of cases by sacrificing clarity pertaining to the means and scope of change involved in revolutionary transformation.

Zagorin's interpretation departs from others in that it brings the notion of revolutionary desire or attempt to create new political arrangements. Derived from such analysis, revolution

> Is any attempt by subordinate groups through the use of violence to bring about (1) a change of government or its policy, (2) a change of regime, or (3) a change of society, whether this attempt is justified by reference to the past conditions or to an as yet unattained future ideal. (Zagorin,1982, vol. 1: 17)

Even though the change of regime or government is the ultimate aim of revolutions, the failure in achieving these goals does not disqualify the process as a revolution. Therefore, for Zagorin, intention rather than consequence is significant for theoretical attention. The vagueness of such treatment raises questions as to what the distinctive feature(s) of a successful revolution are as opposed to a failed attempt. Also, with

respect to the causal processes, what are some of the indicators of individual or collective attempts. One thus has to look for forms of revolutionary behavior as expressed by the occurrences themselves or participants in the process.

Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950: 252) in their classification make a distinction between three types of revolution all of which end up in some shuffling of authority structure. Sigmund Neumann's article (1949: 333-34) defines revolution as "a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization," which takes place alongside other social structural changes. "Revolutions", Davies observes, "are here defined as violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis for support" (1962: 6). Davies' analytical choice is to shift attention toward replacement of elites by re-orienting loyalty and legitimacy. Once again involved in the transformation is the instituting of new patterns of authority without reference to any discrimination of various forms of power transfer.

Seizing the state power, for Arendt, is just a small, yet essential, part of revolution or, a new beginning as she describes it, since revolutions "are not mere changes" (1965: 34, 21). Some adhere to the notion of inseparability of revolution from broader questions of social change. Viewed from this perspective, Johnson argues that:

> Revolution is not a unique social phenomenon; there exists functional equivalents of revolution--namely, other forms of change-- and questions directed at discovering the causes of social change and identifying the level in the social system at which social change occurs are prevalent to the problem of the causes of revolution. (1964: 3)

He believes, nonetheless, that revolutions partially involve the transfer of power. More specifically, "revolutions transfer the locus of authority within political systems (occasionally transforming the sources of authority themselves)" (Johnson, 1964: 1).

An essential definitional criterion accepted by Zimmermann is the prevalence of a new political structure over the old regime. He suggests that:

> A revolution is the successful overthrow of the prevailing elite(s) by a new elite(s) who after having taken over power (which usually involves the use of considerable violence and the mobilization of the masses) fundamentally change the social structure and therewith also structure of authority. (Zimmermann, 1983: 298)

He apparently considers the actual transfer of power (success of revolutionary movement) to be an integral part of what is called revolution. What constitutes revolution is the overthrow of the incumbents through mobilization of a significant proportion of the population. Since the incumbents do have a monopoly of coercive resources, revolutions are by definitions "illegal" and any attempt to define them in terms of the prevalent legal norms is a contradiction in terms.

One of the most comprehensive and well-accepted landmark studies on revolution to date, Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions, deliberately defines revolution as fundamental transformation of the state structure. This State-centered approach, as many have characterized it, leads Skocpol to treat the state as the single most important explanatory variable. She does not hide the suggestion that successful change of a "society's state structure" is the principal visible sign of underlying macro-structural

causes of revolutionary transformation (Skocpol, 1979: 4-5). For both Zimmermann and Skocpol, the replacement of the state structure is definitionally crucial and theoretically indispensable. Without success being built into the conceptualization, Skocpol argues, one can not easily talk about long-term causal processes.[2]

Contrary to Skocpol and others, Tilly attempts to clarify the conceptual confusion by introducing notions of "revolutionary situation" and "revolutionary outcome" (1978: 190). Defining the phenomenon of revolution in terms of two analytically distinct but interrelated processes is a reasonably ingenious rout out of teleological deadlock. Revolutionary situations may or may not lead to revolutionary outcomes. The researcher is thus advised to reckon with two discernable causal relationships, one for the process and one for the outcome. In order to qualify a phenomenon as revolution, one has to have "some minimum combination of revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome" (Tilly, 1978: 198). As one might notice, success or the actual transfer of power is an ingredient of the outcome which can be examined independently and its absence would never downplay the significance of revolutionary situation as a vital part of the revolutionary phenomenon.[3]

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[2] For further elaboration on this point see Skocpol (1979: 5). She argues that leaving actual change of state contingent in the definition of revolution is contradictory to macro-structural analysis. Because successful revolutions take place within different long-term structural contexts than failed revolutions. To exclude success from the definition, one has to assume that there is little or no significant structural differences between successful and failed revolutions.

[3] Rod Aya (1979) and D. E. H. Russell (1974) follow Tilly by making a distinction between revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome. Russell notes that theorists normally fail to draw a line between characteristics of rebellion, its causes, and its consequences. In other words, "rebellion is defined as a form of power struggle,

The common thread that runs through all of these conceptions of revolution is the premise that without successful transfer of power an event does not deserve to be called a revolution. Defining revolution in terms of its intended future consequences simply sinks us into a standard teleological dilemma. Most theorists of revolution, at least those we have discussed so far, tend to operationalize the concept according to the outcome of the process. Resorting to Tilly's analytical distinction would not resolve the issue completely either. Because, as Tilly himself confesses, it is not easy to isolate characteristics of revolution which are themselves partly entailed in the causal configuration. Collapsing causes and characteristics of revolution produces theoretical problems which are bound to create operational imprecision. As explained by Tilly, "to what extent the development of a revolutionary situation is a symptom, rather than a cause, of a revolutionary outcome is not easy to resolve" (1978: 212).

Defining revolution in terms of successful seizure of power produces another difficulty for theorists of revolution. Defining revolution as gaining control over state power, itself a part of the explanation, renders the analysis tautological. Explaining revolution by revolution is an age old fallacy yet to be resolved by social scientists. Considering success a characteristic though, notwithstanding the methodological problems, smooths the hazardous road in which theorists of revolution have to walk before arriving at the destination which is a sound explanation. It is easier to theorize about an observable occurrence.

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independent of its causes and consequences." (1974:58)

Ideological Reconstruction

Another critical component of revolution, for most observers, is the complete overhaul of the prevailing normative order on the basis of which a new "legitimized" social structure is constructed. Abandonment of the old myths and value system by which the ancien regime justified its hold on power clears the way for the establishment of new foundations for social power. Shattered by programmatic or spontaneous action, the old mythology is no longer supportive of legitimacy claims advanced by the entrenched incumbent elites. Indeed a completely different breed of ideology is born out of a new worldview.

Someone like Arendt sees a broader vision of change in the contours of historical development. She suggests the emergence of a holistic progressive movement. As she poetically puts it:

> The modern concept of revolution, inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before is about to unfold, was unknown prior to the two great revolutions at the end of eighteenth century. (Arendt, 1965: 28)

Of course she tends to side with the argument that this reconstituted history is nowhere close to what revolutionaries engaged in praxis foreseen.[4] The progressive nature of the revolutionary process would gradually cause a "drama" to be unfolded (Arendt, 1965:

[4] Here Arendt emphasizes the proposition that the full-fledged moral and cultural restructuring begin in the post-revolutionary society. Revolutionary leadership does not have a clear idea of what this utopian society looks like in the course of the revolution.

29). As revolutions reach the maturity stage right before victory, the vision of a new society with moral, cultural, and ideological components quite distinct from those of the existing order becomes more vivid.

Social revolutions, for Skocpol, are large-scale macro-structural changes. They "have transformed state organizations, class structures, and dominant ideologies" (Skocpol, 1979: 3). Skocpol, however, takes Arendt's thesis further and purposes that ideological restructuring is an artifact of the new state after the successful transfer of power is completed. It is after consolidation of the new regime that fundamental cultural reorientation is initiated. For revolutions, according to Skocpol, are not deliberate , purposeful, and ideologically-determined programs undertaken by revolutionary vanguards (1979: 90-94).

Hagopian's definition of revolution, albeit less clearly, indicates the necessity of an ideological platform promulgated by revolutionaries. His conception of revolution entails the emergence of the idea that "a future or possible society is enormously superior to the existing one, either by a detailed blueprint or plan (a utopia) or by vague hints or suggestions about the post-revolutionary order" (Hagopian, 1974: 2). Huntington also claims that revolution necessarily involves a "change in the dominant values and myths of a society" which distinguishes it from other forms of societal transformation (1968: 264). These two conceptions depart from Skocpol's characterization rather dramatically by stressing intentionality in moral reconstruction.

Rooted in the same tradition, Walzer puts forward an analysis in which revolutions lead to the emergence of a heaven on earth by conscious actions of participants, and

revolutionary elites in particular. "Revolution", he argues, "is conscious attempts to establish a new moral and material world and to impose, or evoke, radically new patterns of day-to-day conduct. A holy commonwealth, a republic of virtue, communist society - these are the goals revolutionaries seek" (Walzer, 1979: 30). Sewell, in a brilliant critique of Skocpol's determinism, along the same line succinctly argues that revolutions are not only changes of institutional arrangements but a recreation of moral and cultural life as well. Revolutions aim at changing the totality of social life (Sewell, 1985: 76-80).

Both Zagorin (1973: 28) and Johnson (1966: 12-14), it seems, argue that one of the preoccupations of revolutionaries is to reorganize society and its dominant values. Calvert goes so far as to suggest that a "political myth" appears in the post-revolutionary society that legitimizes the new regime and its domain of authority (1970: 4). The myth is simply a new way of perceiving the world and a redefinition of notions of justice and right.

Others, particularly Tilly, seem to have some reservations given the historical records. From Tilly's point of view, acute social transformation in general, and moral reconstruction in particular, depends upon the duration of time within which one examines revolutionary change. Notwithstanding a few rare cases, history is a testimony to the lack of massive transformation of prevailing cultural patterns during or after revolutions (Tilly, 1978: 220).[5] Referring to long-term cataclysmic changes of this nature, he argues that:

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[5] Two prime instances of permanent changes in value structures are the English revolution of seventeenth century and Russian revolution of 1917.

> Relatively few changes of this sort actually occur in the course of the revolutions. Engels, Sorel, and Fanon held out the hope of a vast moral regeneration within the act of revolution itself; the historical experience is sadly lacking in examples thereof. (Tilly, 1978: 220)

Gramsci, an outstanding theoretician and revolutionary practicionar coming out of the Marxist tradition, stands virtually alone in his appreciation of the role played by cultural symbols and revolutionary consciousness in bringing about transformation of the state organization. For Gramsci, moral and cultural reconstruction in revolutions actually begin prior to the acquisition of power. For revolution involves a profound change in the consciousness of the masses (Gramsci, 1971: 492). Gramsci here is referring to subjective changes as a precondition for gaining control over state power. Revolutionary leadership, after assuming state power, embarks on the tasks of societal and institutional change.[6]

Gramsci assumes that a major part of what is called revolution takes place before the actual transfer of power, and without that revolution ceases to exist. Reconstruction of civil society, as he characterizes it, is made possible by reaching a popular consciousness through which a new cultural hegemony is firmly established by exploited classes. Socialist revolution is thus an agenda that must move beyond a single class project. It involves the formation of "ideological bloc," "political bloc," and "historical

[6] For a concise overview of Gramsci's treatment of revolution see Adamson (1980).

bloc," concepts to which Gramsci constantly refers, during the revolutionary process and which leads to a new socialist popular consciousness after the revolution (1971: 365).[7]

The demand for radical cultural transformation as an integral part of the definition of revolution underscores the need for further assessment of the revolutionary outcomes. Major theoretical attempts have so far revolved around the causes of social revolutions. However rare these particular revolutionary changes may be, their profound and lasting impacts cannot be understated. The reorganization of social life yet remains part of the outcome that could not be examined until the transfer of power is completed. And that seems to be the ever-present conceptual problem.

Structural Transformation

What sets revolutions apart from other acts of political violence is the degree of change in social structure that they deliver after the seizure of power. And this is indeed another defenitional criterion for many students of revolution. It is somehow even difficult to come up with an agreed-upon conception of structural change let alone a shared definition of revolution. What are some of the components of structural change? In addition to cultural transformation discussed earlier, one can refer to primarily two critical and intertwined elements of structural reorganization. Class structure, first of all, is the locus where the battle for social change is fought. Without a fundamental change in class relations and class sources of power one is outside the domain of revolutionary

[7] The review of Gramsci's thought in this section is primarily based on Adamson (1980), Mouffe (1979), and Boggs (1984).

phenomenon. Secondly, an alteration in resource allocation mechanisms or distributive measures, themselves an extension of property relations, occupies a major place in structural change according to a number of theorists.

Marx, the foremost architect of historical explanation, developed a theory of revolution in which the inevitable consequence was massive structural changes in both the infrastructure and superstructure. In Marx's conceptualization, structural change means not only a change in the mode of production but a change in the social relation of production as well. A bourgeoisie revolution would transform the feudal mode of production to a capitalist mode leading to the dominance of the bourgeoisie as a class. A socialist revolution would in turn bring about a change in the capitalist mode of production through the successful class struggle led by the proletariat. We will entertain Marx's theory of revolution in more detail, however, for the time being one needs to recognize the centrality of structural changes in production processes which results in changes elsewhere in the social structure as a significant component of revolution. The new proletarian class once in power ultimately succeeds in gaining hegemony and gradually abolishes the state and classes at the same time. Marx's maximalist definition approaches structural change in the most radical way known to date.[8]

Skocpol, in a broad sense of course, remains loyal to the marxian paradigm, albeit with some reformulations. Her major preoccupation is changes following the breakdown

[8] The best review of the Marx's theory of revolution is The Communist Manifesto (1961).

of the state. Transformation of the state and class structures culminate in reshaping previous class prerogatives.

> Once the old-regime states had broken apart, fundamental political and class conflicts were set in motion, not to be resolved until new administrative and military organizations were consolidated in the place of the old. Revolts from below directly attacked the property and privileges of dominant classes, thus accomplishing changes in class relations that otherwise would not have occurred.(Skocpol, 1979: 285)

Mode of production, however, is not the sole vehicle for change although it represents a significant explanatory variable when she deals with the world historical development of capitalism.

Basing his analysis on structural functionalism, Johnson argues that all revolutions are the result of systems failure, but their effects are not system wide across the board. Different revolutions, for Johnson, lead to divergent consequences. The jacobin communist revolution, millenarian rebellion, and mass military insurrection are cases where replacement of the dysfunctional social system comes through complete systemic change (Johnson, 1964: 26-57). Concerned primarily with functional social system, Johnson does not provide detailed analysis of the type of change in class or property relations. However, jacobin communist revolution and the other above-mentioned forms of change are guided by "revolutionary goal or ideology" which would indeed aim at drastic structural adjustment (Johnson, 1964: 27-28).

Huntington's approach, another versions of Johnson's functionalism, suggests that revolution by definition means fundamental change in social and political structures. Being a political scientist, he focuses on the political dimensions of revolutionary change.

> A full-scale revolution involves the rapid and violent destruction of existing political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into politics, and creation of new political institutions. (Huntington, 1968: 266)

Looking at stratification systems, Hagopian engages in an analysis of social structure which is rooted in traditional Weberian sociology. Revolutionary situation evolves from a crisis in social structure and its respective stratification systems. Revolution thus involves a transformation of hierarchical structures of class, status, and power (Hagopian, 1974: 1-3). These three sub-systems of stratification are indeed three targets of revolutionaries. Success or failure in abolishing any or all of these structures of inequality is contingent upon the "scope" and "intensity" of revolution (Hagopian, 1974: 2). Hermassi gauges the outcomes of revolutions in terms of their proclivity for social structural changes. He maintains that:

> Once we take a long-term perspective, it seems appropriate to define the success or failure of revolutions in terms of their capacity to transcend the 'confining conditions' against which they first assert themselves and to institutionalize the changes in value, and social structure. (Hermassi, 1976: 216)

Tilly sees structural change as an all-encompassing process the beginning of which is the transfer of power. All other changes seem to follow the centralization of power in the new state. Structural change "means further redistribution of resources, changes in the quality of life, urbanization, and these all depend on the time scale one adopts" (Tilly, 1987; 220). Both the degree and direction of structural transformation seems to be a function of "the organizational means available to those who emerge from the revolution" (Tilly, 1978: 221). Concentration of power in the hands of the French revolutionaries of 1789-94 led to large scale changes in property and wealth structure, legal system, and the entire feudal arrangement. In other places Tilly emphasizes the institutional changes evoked by stronger post-revolutionary states. China's remarkable state-building is a case in point. What they accomplished, least of all, was a change in the organizational structure of the village (Tilly, 1974).

Violence

Violence, of all definitional criteria, has been the most widely accepted. It seems that a wide variety of often contradictory theoretical orientations agree in characterizing revolutions as violent political acts. However, there is far less agreement on what constitutes violence. This in itself has become a standing point of contention. A broad definition used by Johnson identifies violence "as action that deliberately or unintentionally disorients the behavior of others" (1966: 8). The behavior of others within a socially integrated system is based on mutually shared expectations. By attacking the consensual basis of social organization, revolutionaries, by definition, are

committing violence. The act does not have to end up in injury or physical harm. To the extent that action is outside the sphere of "normal" order, it is inevitably disorienting and violent (Johnson, 1966: 7). So far as Johnson is concerned, therefore, any attempt counter to the prevailing patterns of interaction is "abnormal" and harmful.

Arendt does not seem to make revolution contingent on violence alone. Change which does not institute a new social order is not revolutionary whether by violent means or otherwise. Nonetheless, events which lend themselves to structural change tend to be accompanied by violence. What needs to be recognized is that:

> Violent is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violent is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution. (Arendt, 1965: 35)

Pettee (1971:98) argues that "revolution is generally an extremely violent process" but that it need not to be demonized. However nasty revolutionary violence may be, a note of caution is warranted before coloring our judgments with emotions. Huntington's definition also emphasizes the necessity of violence in overthrowing existing political institutions (1968: 264-5). "Violence," for Zagorin, "is a defining characteristic of revolution that distinguishes it from nonrevolutionary attempts at change" (1982: 18). Violence as a means of revolutionary change differs from violence as a means of

reform.[9] Logically then Zagorin has to face the question of how far violence has to go to fall in the category of revolutionary violence?

Davies (1962: 6) and Dunn (1989: 12) both agree that revolutions are massive change brought about by violence. Although no attempt has been made by them to articulate the nature and constituents of violence, nevertheless, it seems to have become an imperative for revolutionary transformation. Hagopian goes further to argue that "our definition of revolution considers recourse to violence as essential rather than accidental to it" (1974: 3). It is the depth and scope of societal change which give rise to violence thereby illuminating the rigidity of existing social stratification systems.

The political conflict model, the theoretical framework within which Tilly operates, does not identify violence as a central concept or definitional criterion. What Tilly seems to argue is that collective action logically does not have to lead to violence. There may exist some affinity between a particular form of action and violence in situations of competition over power. However, one can not state that collective action is inherently violent. His research on the history of French collective action suggests that violence is usually but not always a by-product of collective action.

> Most collective violence - in the sense of interactions that produce direct damage to persons and objects - grows out of actions that are not intrinsically violent, and which are basically similar to a much larger number of collective actions occurring without violence in the same periods and settings. (Tilly, 1978: 177)

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[9] According to Zagorin (1982:), reformative violence is "quite limited, and its purpose is to secure the cooperation and compliance of elites and to accelerate the adaptive processes of the political system."

In summary, it is fair to say that there is presently broad agreement in the literature on the proposition that the use of violence during the course of revolution and after the transfer of power is a definitional prerequisite. However, a few remarks have to be made about the implications of the use of such a fuzzy concept in defining and explaining revolutions.

It is absurd to assume that Western scholarship has simply attempted to "explain" revolutions detached from ideological constraints.[10] The same ideological parameters that underlie studies of revolution imply the legitimacy of the use of force by the status quo while delegitimizing counter-violence often utilized by revolutionaries to suppress the power-holders' threat.[11] Even those who have attempted to use the concept of violence in a non-ideological fashion have approached it with, to use Pettee's (1971: 98) phrase, "rubber gloves" thus suggesting the avoidability of violence in inducing structural change. The revolutionary use of violence as a means of bringing about social change, although in reaction to the state's repressive measures, has driven some scholars to regard revolution as a worthless undertaking.

Magnitude, intensity, duration, and forms of violence are all controversial issues to which any definition of revolution needs to pay attention. Both empirically and conceptually, it seems, analysts of revolution are faced with irreconcilable differences as to where the threshold has to be in order to qualify an abrupt violent change as

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[10] See MacIntyre (1973: 321-342) who explains forcefully the ideological presuppositions built into most social science studies of revolutions.

[11] Tilly (1978: 177) argues that most of the time violence has been initiated by the state which control the means of coercion.

revolution. Related to this is the dilemma which we encounter if massive socio-structural changes do take place without recourse to violence. Despite the fact that incidents of this nature are rare, the conceptual confusion generates problems if one, for example, wants to explain the independence movement led by Gandhi. The source of the confusion comes from the fact that violence is present in all of the categories of social transformations postulated by the authors mentioned above.

Mass Mobilization

Great revolutionaries of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries including Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, and Ho Chi Min have underlined the centrality of mass mobilization in the revolutionary process. Trotsky goes so far as to deny any societal change not involving mass participation can properly be called revolution. For him:

> The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct interference of the masses in historic events... But at those critical moments when the old order becomes no longer endurable to the masses, they break over the barriers excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside their traditional representatives, and create by their own interference the initial groundwork for a new regime.... The history of a revolution is... first of all a history of the forcible entry of the masses into the realm of rulership over their own destiny. (Trotsky, 1973: xvii)

The notion of masses, at a theoretical level, remains problematic particularly for those who depend solely on marxist orthodoxy. Marx had in mind a strictly working-class population but later marxists transformed the concept of masses to comprise primarily the revolutionary peasantry (Mao, 1971), or a coalition of different classes (Gramsci, 1970)

contingent upon particular historical circumstances. The critical point being that masses included all subordinate classes unified by a common project for which they struggle and without which they lose the battle to the ruling class.

Scholars not interested in praxis have also stressed the prominent position the dominated classes play in revolutionary transformation. Skocpol (1979: 4) reminds us that revolutions "are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below." However, she acknowledges that we might have class-based rebellions which do not end up producing socio-structural changes. It seems necessary though that revolutions involve mass mobilization both prior to and after the seizure of power. From her analytical standpoint, a much greater degree of mass mobilization takes place in post-revolutionary society.

Moore (1969:6) recognizes "the mobilization of a revolutionary mass, most probably through some sudden disruption of everyday life coupled with increase of misery" as a definitional prerequisite. Moore's class struggle approach is very much indebted to Marx in a grand theoretical sense. However, he emphasizes the peasantry and the social structure of agrarian capitalism and how in a given historical situation the revolutionary potential of the peasantry is actualized through mass mobilization.

By contrast, Dunn (1989: 16) and Green (1984: 90) seem to be skeptical of mass participation. Revolutionary projects have been undertaken by small committed elites without much involvement of the masses. Dunn argues that "there can be revolution of - a sort- without much mass participation except at the level of minimal post-revolutionary cooperation" (1989: 17). The cases from which Dunn draws his conclusions pose serious

problems of both empirical validity and intellectual neutrality. Algeria and Cuba both were rather popular revolutions with distinct multi-class coalitions taking shape during and after a colonial era.

Green also assumes that "revolution involves minorities fighting minorities" (1984: 90). As for the involvement of different classes, particularly intellectuals, it is always "a small minority of activists within each of these categories" (1984: 92). Of course it is a mystery what constitutes mass mobilization for these authors. Is emotional commitment and support extended by a population included in their conceptions? How can one measure this sort of participation? They have no unambiguous answer to such questions. For Tilly, whose theoretical structure rests on mobilization as a central variable, mass participation takes another form. One of the conditions that causes revolutionary situation is "the commitment of a significant part of the population, regardless of their motives, to exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government currently exerted by the members of the polity" (Tilly, 1978: 201). One can raise a question as to what significant means. Still crucial to the argument is the strength of the commitment expressed by the population and the formation of coalitions which further expand mass participation and exacerbate the fragmentation of the existing polity.

The striking feature of all the discussions that we have reviewed so far is the conceptual chaos surrounding the very heart of the studies on revolution. That is the lack of a consensus on a working definition. Whether to use a few or all of these definitional criteria seems to be a matter of choice often guided by ideological preferences. The quintessence of these conceptualizations is the notion of social change, irrespective of the

progressive or regressive nature of it, on which theorists try to impose their constructs. Analytically speaking, constructs are generally evaluated by their utility rather than the inherent truth built into them. Beyond that everything else seems to be arbitrary.

A Note on Typology of Revolutions

Scholars have made efforts to organize existing knowledge on revolutions so that different forms of social transformation could be grouped according to certain shared qualities. Disagreement over typological schemes partly stems from the conceptual chaos explained earlier which has engulfed the very definition of revolution itself. Typologies, however problematic because of their static nature, make the life of the researcher much easier. Nonetheless, boxes illustrating different breeds of phenomena in a classificatory scheme are much more fragile and the lines separating them are more blurred than the analyst of revolution want us to believe. Having that in mind, let us undertake a quick review of some of the well-known typologies available in the fields.

Based on four characteristics of revolution, Johnson offers one of the most elaborate typologies. Targets of revolution (government, regime, community), identity of revolutionaries (masses, elites, elite-leading-masses), revolutionary goals or ideology, and deliberate or spontaneous nature of revolution are the bases on which Johnson distinguish between revolutions (1964: 27-28). Absence or presence of these criteria provide us a yardstick by which we can categorize six types of revolution.

The jacquerie is a mass rebellion of the peasantry which involves an attack on the government and which is aimed at restoring the "old order" (Johnson, 1964: 32). So the

ideology of the movement is conservative in nature and glorifies the old "church" or "king" in most instances. The Russian peasant revolution of 1773-75 is a prime example. A jacquerie is therefore better labeled a "rebellion" than a "revolution" (Johnson, 1964: 32).

The millenarian rebellion involves a mass movement whose target is to change the "community" in the hope of establishing an utopian paradise on earth. Such a movement usually emerges under the guidance of a charismatic leader (Johnson, 1964: 35-6). Anarchistic rebellion, the third type, is very similar to the jacquerie rebellion in its goal of restoring the highly valued past (Johnson, 1964: 40). The jacobin communist revolution is carried out by masses led by a committed elite whose primary goal is massive changes of the old society in accordance with a vision of an "enlightened" future (Johnson, 1964: 47-48). The quintessential of this type is the French Revolution.

Conspiratorial coups are calculated and elite-directed attempts to reform a regime by acquiring power. Conspirators usually enjoy a strong organizational support but lack mass following. They do usually claim to undertake the coup for the purpose of eliminating corruption and remedying societal dysfunction. "Conspiratorial coups," as Johnson argues, "successful or abortive, do not cause revolutionary change unless the system suffers from multiple dysfunctional conditions" (1964: 52). Militarized mass insurrections, finally, "are calculated, mass, revolutionary wars... under the guidance of a conspiratorial, revolutionary general staff" (Johnson: 1964: 57). Ideologically, these revolutions are inspired by nationalism, sometimes blended with marxism. China and Algeria seem to fit into this category.

Hagopian uses a typology in which "true revolution" is distinguished from three other classes of "violent political phenomena" (1974: 1-39). These classes are coup d'etat, revolt, and secession all of which comprise a number of subclasses. A coup aims at the limited objective of replacing the "ruling clique" (1974: 3). A revolt, very difficult to tackle because of its diverse and complex forms, is "qualitatively" different from a revolution. The differences, for Hagopian, are "(1) the stakes of the uprising, (2) the function of ideology, and (3) the role of leadership" (1974: 10). A revolt is a sudden outburst of popular anger rejecting the status quo which falls short of "a full-scale attack on the institutionalized systems of stratification" (Hagopian, 1974: 10-11). Finally, secession is "the breaking of one part of the state and the proclamation of its independence" (Hagopian, 1974: 31). In general, Hagopian's classification is based upon very broad, yet clear, distinctions which often simplify the true character of a movement and which at the same time ignore the overlapping of these categories. This is partly due to the existence of not just a "qualitative difference", as Hagopian proclaims, but often a quantifiable difference (i.e., magnitude, intensity, and scope) as well.

Pettee suggests a classification scheme in which three types of violent political are identified. First there is the private coup or palace revolution in which the personnel of the government is changed. Second, the public coup which happens when a substantial proportion of "the ruling elite gives an aspect of mass action and publicity to a seizure of existing power...and no change in the social system is sought" (Pettee, 1971: 27). Social revolutions the third category, involves a mass attempt to reshape the social system with "a new myth" (Pettee, 1971: 27).

Revolutions, according to Huntington's typology, are different from coup d'etats, rebellions or insurrections, and wars of independence. Except for revolutions, none of these events involve changes in the "social structure and values" (Huntington, 1968: 264). For Huntington, a coup represents simply a circulation of elites and sometimes policies while rebellion goes a little further and changes political institutions. "A war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not necessarily involve changes of the social structure of either community" (Huntington, 1968: 264). Revolutions, or some may say great revolutions, entail all these changes plus a change in the social structure and value system. Thus, Huntington's categories lie along a continuum representing the degree of change with the most extensive transformation showing up in revolutions.

Harry Eckstein (1965: 133-34) uses the concept "internal war" to cover broad family of related phenomena. It "denotes any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, values, or policies." Revolution, civil war, coup d'etat, rebellion , and etc. belong to this family and they do have similar traits such as violence, erosion of legitimacy of the existing political order, and willingness and resources to instigate violence. These common characteristics might make instances of internal war more susceptible to theoretical generalizations. By the same token, however, the concept clearly encompasses a lot of variations. Revolution is one specific case.

Grounded in the same analytical framework, Rosenau (1964: 63-64) suggests three classes of internal war. They are personnel, authority, and structural wars. The first category involves an alteration of "existing roles in the existing structures of political

authority" (Rosenau, 1964; 63). In the second category, the insurgents aim not only at changing the roles but the specific arrangement of political authority as well. Finally, structural wars are attacks on the structures of political authority and other substructures of the society (such as the system of ownership, the educational system, etc.) or its major domestic and foreign policies" (Rosenau, 1964: 63). Revolutions are thus species of structural wars.

Relying on Karl Deutsch's (1964: 102-104) criteria of revolution, Tanter and Mildarsky (1967: 266-670) offer a typology in which four types of revolution are distinguishable. Depending on "mass participation, duration, domestic violence, and the intentions of the insurgents," we can have mass revolution, revolutionary coup, or palace revolution (Tanter and Mildarsky, 1967: 266). The Russian Revolution of 1917 belonged to the first category, the Turkish coup of 1919 to the second, the Venezuelan coup of 1958 to the third, and the Guatemalan revolution of 1958 to the last.

As indicated earlier, Tilly accepts a broad definition of revolution in which the presence of both a revolutionary situation and outcome is a necessity. In other words, "the phenomena we call 'coups,' 'insurrections,' 'civil wars,' and 'full-scale revolutions' overlap, but not completely. Each has its own characteristic range of outcomes and revolutionary situations (Tilly, 1978: 198). The central issue distinguishing different forms of collective action is who replaces who? Or, as Tilly puts it, "the identities of the parties to the transfer of power: in the coup, members of the polity displace each other; in a full-scale revolution, much or all of the previously dominant class loses power, and so on" (1978: 199). In his typology the nature of collectivities, which fall

along a continuum and which theoretically are class-based, is of enormous significance. Figure III-1 is a diagrammatic representation of the range of collective action.

After examining the various definitional and typological arguments, one cannot but conclude that he is inescapably trapped in a relativistic world in which no single theorist holds a "truth claim" radically superior to the claims of others. Arbitrariness in drawing demarcation lines between competing categories seems to be the rule rather than the exception. One's definitional criteria and the classifications that emerge from them are based more on functional considerations often politically-driven than on empirical regularities discovered by research. It is generally fair to say that "no concept of revolution can escape from such difficulties, because no conceptualizer can avoid making some such choices" (Tilly, 1978: 190).

Explaining Revolutions

Social theorists have attempted to understand, describe, and explain social revolutions. Explanation typically refers to questions of why, and why most often means "causes" of certain phenomena. Keeping in mind that causal relationships exist only at a theoretical level (Blalock, 1961: 6), in this section I will try to examine major theories of revolution in which causal explanations have been sought. I should point out at the outset that for the most part I will select exemplars of major paradigms and not try to review each prominent figure on an individual basis.




Figure III-1 Situations and outcomes in different types of power transfers

Source: Tilly (1978: 198)

Marx's Inevitable Revolution

Marx's theory of revolution can only be comprehended within his broader analysis of society and social change. As the forefather of systematic theories of revolution, his impact on both social scientists and revolutionaries is indisputable. Revolution is an integral part of his architectonic theory of historical development and an inevitable moment towards which history is marching. Society, for Marx, in any historical epoch is shaped by a particular mode of production in which a continuous contradiction exists between the means and relations of production. The resolution of this conflict will eventually be achieved through a revolution. For the most part the very dynamics of the mode of production generates two distinct classes. Historically, we have those who own the means of production and those whose only assets are labor power. Structurally speaking, the inescapable product of such a social formation is an intractable conflict between these two classes throughout the history of mankind.

The contradictions within each mode of production are the key to the emergence of the revolutionary situation. Exacerbation of class conflict as a result of tension between the existing means of production and relations of production gives birth to a revolutionary class consciousness.

> But at a certain stage in their evolution the forces ofproduction would develop beyond the relations of productionand these would act as a fetter. Such a stage inaugurated a period of social revolution. These productive forces had to develop to the fullest extent possible under the existing relations of production before the old social order would perish. (McLellan, 1979: 1)

Under the capitalist mode of production, which Marx theorized more than other modes of production, ongoing alienation and immiseration of the working class, the majority of the population contrary to previous eras, intensify class consciousness and thus transform the proletariat as a class in itself to a class for itself. It is at this point that the internal contradictions of capitalism manifest themselves and the exploited working class realizes the need for a total change in society's means and social relations of production.

Hence, class consciousness is a reflection of objective structural conditions. As agents of historical development, members of the proletariat have no choice but to acquire political power through a socialist revolution. The transformation of the economic base will lead to changes in the superstructure including the state and prevailing ideology.

> Communism is for us not a state of affairs to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence. (Marx, In Tucker, 1972: 126)

Marx's argument, as simple and straightforward as it might seem, provides a comprehensive, unified, and powerful theory of revolution which still influences every corner of the academic world. However, its comprehensiveness and simplistic coherence seem to make it amenable to a number of criticisms.

First, the progressive developmentalism promoted by Marx has not successfully stood the test of time. The transition from feudalism to capitalism has not been

completed in many societies, and those that have undergone such a shift have not experienced the materialization of revolutionary potentials. This is related to a second classical Marxist tenet, and that is economic determinism. The hyperdeterminism advanced by Marx as the logical core of historical materialism fails to account for a wide range of powerful explanatory variables contributing to the emergence of the revolutionary situation.

Marx, thirdly, did not foresee the amazing flexibility of late capitalism which has enabled it to adjust itself to the needs of capital as such rather than the individual capitalist. It is here that Marx's instrumentalist vision of the state becomes a drawback in so far as the predictive power of the theory is concerned. The state's capacity to mobilize coercive resources against revolutionary movements has been a major cause of the failure of many such efforts. The state now "relatively autonomous" vis-a-vis the ruling class has become more and more central to suppressing the revolutionary process. role one might add.[12]

Finally, Marx's preoccupation with the trends towards proletarianization in the capitalist societies caused him to largely neglect the peasantry. He often thought of peasants as potential "conservatives' whose propensities for revolutionary action are minimal at best.[13] In Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonapart Marx argues that:

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[12] See Fred Bloch (1977).

[13] For a review of Marxist interpretation of the role peasantry see Friedland (1982).

> Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no rational band, and no political organization among them, they do not form a class.they are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. (1968: 171)

The triumph of revolutions in the twentieth century agrarian societies like the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam undermined the validity of Marx's thesis and generated a new debate on the role of peasants both at a theoretical and practical level. Mao tackled the issue at both levels. For him, the bourgeoisie was too weak to carry out a revolution in the underdeveloped world. The advent of imperialism and colonialism and subsequent exploitation greatly expanded the revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry as a class enabling it, in alliance with other classes, to successfully seize power which would ultimately be handed over to a hegemonic proletariat. Mao's emphasis on class coalitions underscores yet another shortcoming in Marx's classical framework. The proletariat has failed in most advanced capitalist nations to lead a revolution, and where it has gained partial success it has been through cross-cutting alliances between different classes. This is a scenario prevalent in contemporary Third World revolutions.

But, as Burawoy (1978: 50) argues, "Marxism has overtaken Marx." Viewed from such a perspective and conscious of the totality of the Marxian project, one would be justified in utilizing Marx in practically every field of the social sciences. The literature on revolution in one way or another has long utilized Marx and will

undoubtedly continue to do so in the future. Conflict and classes are the two theoretical notions most relevant to the present research which were largely developed by Marx.

Durkheim and Social Equilibrium

As a classical sociologist, Durkheim's influence has been widespread among mainstream social sciences and particularly structural functionalists who later dominated a number of disciplines. A sizable proportion of studies on revolution have directly or indirectly felt the impact of Durkheim.[14] The central theoretical concern for Durkheim was the increasing social differentiation prevalent during industrialization. Durkheim argued that society is held together by social solidarity which is a manifestation of a strong moral structure at the core from which people drive their common purpose. This moral core not only regulates individual behavior but also operates as a mechanism of social integration. Social integration thus helps to maintain the social equilibrium in the face of ongoing technological changes. The society's "collective conscience," Durkheim assumes, is the primary social control mechanism and a force opposing social disintegration (1933: 37). Expanding division of labor and intensified social differentiation, the result of modernization, exert new pressure on the social system thereby necessitating a new consciousness for social reregulation. The lack of such a consciousness breeds anomie consequently threatening the social order.

[14] Among such studies are Brinton (1965), Johnson (1966), Smelser (1961), Gurr (1970), and Huntington (1968).

> Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time...The state of de-regulation or anomie is thus further heightened by passion being less disciplined, precisely when they need more disciplining. (Durkheim, 1951: 253)

Revolution is hence an anomic response to social breakdown and differentiation and the absence of social regulation. This subsequently leads to individual disorientation, social dislocation, and economic ills by which revolutionaries justify their onslaught on the structure of society. The anomic condition created by perplexities of rapid social and economic modernization soon spills over to the general population and is translated into momentous collective action. The deliverance promised by revolutionaries, argues Durkheim, is doomed to failure from the very outset because they cannot regenerate overnight the moral fabric necessary for social solidarity.[15]

Durkheim, as is the case with his successors in the contemporary social sciences, dose not take us far in the direction of explaining much. Rather he mystifies the historical trajectory of European industrialization with a set of tautological propositions. The manifestations of rapid bureaucratization, moral degeneration, and compartmentalization of life are to be found in collective discontent which one has no means, qualitatively or quantitatively, to verify or test. Collective anger emanating from accelerated social change becomes the lone explanatory parameter, or at least eclipses alternative variables. Such anger and actions justified by it, is furthermore "abnormal"

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[15] See Fenton (1984) for an excellent review of Durkheim.

and contrary to integrative forces constantly readjusting social order. The enjoyment of power by different collectivities, either classes or social organizations, and the conflict between them and the state over resources hardly enter the Durkheimian discourse. "Like orthodox Marxism they implicitly refute," Aya argues, "volcanic theories of revolution are, to say the least, profoundly anti-political" (1979: 52). At an empirical level Durkheim becomes amazingly "useless," to paraphrase Tilly's critique (1981: 106). European history clearly rejects Durkheim's dubious findings.[16] Tilly elegantly argues that:

> It develops that many of the key ideas in Durkheim are either circular or extraordinarily difficult to translate into verifiable propositions. It happens that in the last analysis the Durkheimian corpus concerning the impact of large-scale social change on collective action yields few fruitful, even interesting historical hypotheses. (1981: 108)

Crane Brinton and the Stages of Revolutionary Process

Brinton probably epitomizes a tradition to which many have referred as the "natural history" paradigm for the study of revolution (Goldstone, 1980; Kimmel, 1990). The very term natural history symbolizes the analytical corpus of this tradition, that is it deals with the life and death of a historical phenomenon which is said to be analogous

[16] Tilly et al. (1975: 83-86) convincingly demonstrate how most incidents of contentious collective action in Europe, particularly France, did not take place as a result of modernization. "Rather than inciting protest through breakdown and hardship, 'modernization' changed the prevailing forms of collective action." (Tilly et al., 1975: 83)

to a living organism. Like the Marxist tradition, Brinton advocates a theory of "successive stages" that all major revolution, with minor differences, go through.

Marginalization or alienation of the intellectuals marks the beginning of the revolutionary process (Brinton, 1965: 251). Whether in response to the lack of incorporating mechanisms, or a sheer discontent with the horrible social and economic conditions of the lower classes, the intelligentsia deprives a regime of its moral support. Facing an insurmountable crisis, the old regime reacts by instituting some reforms which prove to be too little and too late. The incapacitated incumbent elites become more and more incompetent in dealing with a severe political crisis from which the opposition takes maximum advantage. A combination of these events eventuates in the final collapse of the old regime.

> The governmental machinery is clearly inefficient, partly through neglect, through a failure to make change in the old institutions, partly because new conditions laid an intolerable strain on governmental machinery adapted to simpler, more primitive conditions. (Brinton, 1965: 251-52)

In the aftermath of the breakdown of the state, the moderate faction of the revolutionary coalition takes command of the new ship and embarks on a series of reformative policies. The demands of the newly mobilized masses outstrips the moderates' initiatives. This is where the radicals step in and purpose their egalitarian and totalistic program of change which resonates with the masses. Utopian policies initiated by radicals lead to the exclusion of a substantial part of the revolutionary coalition thereby inviting coercive measures to suppress dissent. A "Reign of Terror" thus prevails

(Brinton, 1965: 177, 255). The failure of the radicals combined with the physical and moral exhaustion of the people involved in a long and cumbersome mobilizational process fashions a "Thermidorian Reaction" stage the beginning of which is marked by the return of the moderates and the isolation of the radicals. What follows is the consolidation of an orderly society, similar to the pre-revolutionary society both in policy and vision, a marked "return to old habits in daily life" (Brinton, 1965:235).

The objective enunciated by Brinton himself turned out to be the core problem of the natural history school in general. That is the idea of "describing" a set of "striking uniformities" present in all revolutions (Brinton, 1965: 250). One need not to worried about "hows and whys," but should record the transparent and observable life cycles of revolutionary upheavals. Why does the old regime crumble, or why does the intelligentsia withdraw its support from the regime, or why does the army disintegrate, or how and why does class antagonism become a symptom, rather than a cause, of revolution?

By accentuating the role of elites, whether intellectuals in the opposition camp or members of the incumbent political and military aristocracy, the natural history school appears to produce an elitist social history. The masses play no real role in engineering the march toward earthly salvation. It is a project tailored by elites. As a truly schematic "diagnosis" of outburst of revolutionary convulsion, the natural history school sacrifices historical complexity and uniqueness. This is achieved most often, if not always, by forcing historical data into pre-designed contours which are supposed to explain uniformities.

Johnson's Functionalism

An extension or an application of Parsonian functionalism, Johnson's theory is built upon the concept of a harmonious and equilibrated social system the core of which is a value consensus. Societies are smoothly running arrangements glued together by shared expectations and contributions from each part of the system. Functionally integrated social systems respond to periodic convulsions through self-maintaining adaptive mechanisms and thus re-adjust themselves. From this vantage point, the would-be revolution is indicative of a total failure of the system which has developed "multiple dysfunctions." Multiple dysfunctions are the result of a series of imbalances created by dysfunction-inducing changes to which the system cannot react and adjust itself in a timely fashion. There are four sources of change that strain the social system: exogenous value-changing sources, endogenous value-changing sources, exogenous environmental-changing sources, and endogenous environmental-changing sources (Johnson, 1966: 64).

The presence of a disequilibrated social system in and of itself does not produce a revolution. The second "cluster of causes," as he defines it, essentially involves elite behavior, whether the elite institutes much needed reform to adjust the system or intransigently compounds the problem (Johnson, 1966: 91). Elite intransigence further desynchronizes the already dysfunctional social system (Johnson, 1966: 94). Lastly, an "accelerator" such as a charismatic leader is identified by Johnson as the sufficient condition. The accelerator intervenes in the process and guarantees a revolutionary outcome (Johnson, 1966: 91).

Johnson's model is in essence a sequential theory in which the cumulative effect of a set of successive stages eventuate in a revolutionary change. It explains both everything and nothing. By that I mean the propositions are true by definition and can not be tested. Why do we associate revolution with system disequilibrium? The reason boils down to "a we know it when we see it proposition" (Taylor, 1984; 18). The "cluster of causes" to which Johnson refers is basically a description of a set of conditions which is almost impossible to examine in concrete historical cases. In other words, these conditions are automatically explained by the model itself. Accelerators, using Johnson's terminology, operate mysteriously at the final stage. The impact of an accelerator, virtually a function of luck, fails to help us explain anything. Good fortune, or lack of it, turns out to be a weapon to which theorists cling whenever an unfavorable outcome surfaces. Finally, overwhelming emphasis on elites and their abundant capacity to respond neglect the purposive and organized mass action, which is quite often responsible for incapacitating elites.

In the same Parsonian vein, Huntington explains revolutions in terms of the insurmountable pressures placed upon the social system by rapid modernization. More specifically, revolutions are more likely in societies where the pace of social and economic development outruns political development (Huntington, 1968: 47). Political development is of course the capability of the political system to effectively institutionalize political participation generated by the increasing social mobilization. The lack of proper institution building in the developing world makes it unlikely that newly

mobilized groups will be incorporated into the political system. This induces political instability.

> Political development involves the creation of political institutions sufficiently capable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to order the participation of these new groups... The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institution to assimilate them. (Huntington, 1968: 266)

The intervening variables that connect modernization and instability are social mobilization and frustration. Frustration becomes rampant as the gap between "want formation and want satisfaction" increases (Huntington, 1968: 54). The inability of the government to fill that gap results in the distrust for the system and further disintegration of political order and eventually violence. Much of the critiques leveled against Durkheim, as explicated earlier, holds true for Huntington's theoretical framework as well. For the spirit of Durkheim seems to be alive at the core of the argument.

Tilly (1973: 432), on empirical grounds, casts doubt on the stipulated relationship between modernization and violent political conflict. Nations struck by urbanization and industrialization, on the contrary, seem less prone to instability. Even if one can observe empirical indications of such a relationship, it is less of a vindication of Huntington's propositions than an affirmation of the tautology with which he fashions his concepts and hypotheses. In other words, it is the elegance and straightforwardednes of the model that become the liability for him. Sigelman (1979: 210-24) along the same line picks up on

questions of "parsimony," "precision," and "predictive power" all of which seem to point to serious flaws as far as causality is concerned.

Davies and Gurr

Tapping cognitive psychology, Davies and Gurr searched for social dynamics that engenders cognitive alterations to which aggressive behavior could be attributed. Causal factors, for them, have to go through the cognitive make-up of individual actors and the collective psychology of groups. By synthesizing the Marxian notion of immiseration and Tocqueville's thesis that loosening of repression sets off the revolutionary process, Davies formulated the famous J-curve model. The model elaborately postulates that a steady improvement in economic and social conditions, if followed by a period of stagnation and hardship, creates a gap between previously formed expectations and actually gained satisfaction (Davies, 1962: 5). There is a point after which the discrepancy between the actual "need satisfaction" and "expected need satisfaction" becomes intolerable, and that is when revolution is most likely to happen. Ted Gurr identifies "turmoil," "conspiracy," and "internal war" as three forms of political violence (1970: 11). What distinguishes these forms of violence is the intensity of the relative deprivation as perceived by both masses and elites. The key concept, "relative deprivation" that is, refers to the "perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and value capabilities" (Gurr, 1970: 13). It is people's perception of the gap between what they are entitled to and what they actually receive that leads to civil strife. As the degree of deprivation increases, so does the level of frustration, hence the grater build up of potential collective

violence (Gurr, 1968: 1105). Perception is a screening process as a result of which people justifiably think they deserve more than what they are offered by the society. Gurr takes a step further and makes a distinction between types of relative deprivation. When value expectations remain constant but value capabilities gradually decrease we have a situation of "decremental deprivation" (Gurr, 1970: 47). By contrast "Aspirational deprivation" occurs when collective capabilities tend to be constant but value expectations deteriorate (Gurr, 1970: 51). An upswing in value expectations and value capabilities followed, at a certain point in time, by a downturn in value capabilities results in "progressive deprivation" (Gurr, 1971: 53).[17] "Accelerated deprivation," a pattern that Hagopian (1974: 174) adds to Gurr's classification, is the result of an asymmetrical growth rate in value expectations and value capabilities with the former moving faster.

One major problem with psychological approaches is that they require making inferences concerning individual behavior from aggregate social processes. In other words, to paraphrase Muller (1972), choosing macroindicators as causal references of individual cognitive map is a fragile and non-falsifiable argument. Moreover, Davies and Gurr fail to explain clearly how individual discontent is transformed into collective discontent and collective action (Aya, 1979: 58). Frustrations that emanate from deprivation seem to be automatically transmuted into collective violence. Do different

[17] This particular type of deprivation matches J-curve model suggested by Davies (1962).

classes or collectivities experience the same level of deprivation and if not, how and why are some successful in targeting the political structure and eventually changing it.

At another level, one can argue that neither Davies nor Gurr explains why "civil strife" takes place. They, in particular Gurr, tend to emphasizes the leading causes of "the extent of violence" thereby laying out an explanatory scheme of different configurations of variables which account for various levels of political violence (Cohan, 1975: 201). Thus, neither the causes nor the outcomes of collective aggressive behavior are dealt with as a central theoretical question. Finally, as Taylor (1984: 86) has pointed out, psychological variables even by Gurr's admission have less explanatory power than non-psychological ones. What is then the utility of these models? One response would be that they are another link in the chain of theoretical development. Or, as Gurr (1968: 312) seems to suggest, his model like any other is valid until the sword of refutation has proven otherwise. The insufficiency of social psychological models for explaining revolutions has paved the way for the introduction of other approaches.

Skocpol's Structuralism

Truly a landmark, Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions has interjected new life into the debate about the causes and outcomes of social revolutions. Her "nonvoluntarist, structural perspective" opened a new chapter in the development of revolutionary theory. Using a comparative historical method, she attempts to develop "causal, explanatory hypotheses" about social revolutions by pitching the analysis at the level of "macro-units" (Skocpol' 1979: 36). Macroscopic treatment of the interplay of class and state structures

and the interplay of competing states in the international arena form the analytical framework of Skocpol's project.

She ardently dismisses voluntarist, purposive, and self-conscious image of revolutionary movements. She takes issue with the perspectives which operate on the assumption that the collapse of the old regime is more or less caused by intentional, self-conscious, ideologically-informed groups. That image, for Skocpol, is historically false and theoretically fallacious since it relies on a consensual conception of societal order (Skocpol, 1979:16-17). Rejecting the voluntarist conception of revolution, Skocpol introduces three key variables which in their dynamic structural interactions set the stage for potential revolutionary action. First, analysts of revolution need to elevate the role of "international and world-historical contexts" to their proper position as independent causal factors. Specifically, transnational structures such as the uneven spread of global capitalism have significantly influenced the causes and outcomes of revolutions (Skocpol, 1979: 190). Military and economic competition within the interstate system have shaped domestic social and political structures along different lines. Their impacts have either distorted self-sustaining economic development or made national bureaucracies extract surplus to finance military competition within a global network of states.

The state , secondly, as an independent and "potentially autonomous" actor is essential in Skocpol's theoretical structure. Social revolutions, she argues, "have been direct expressions of contradictions centered in the structures of old-regime states" (Skocpol, 1979: 29). The state, neither in the instrumentalist Marxist conception nor in the class struggle version of neo-Marxism, leads us anywhere close to an understanding

of the dynamics of revolutionary transformation. She treats the state as an organization which performs certain functions independent of the dominant classes and the mode of production. Skocpol's "organizational and realist" conception of the state demands that the student of revolution be particularly attentive to the relations between classes and the state and the relations between states in a competitive interstate system (1979: 31). Indeed, the domestic class structure and the very nature of the international state system seem to provide the structural context in which states act autonomously vis-a-vis- class arrangements and rival states.

The variety of agrarian social structures is the third class of variables to which Skocpol pays a great deal of attention. Since revolutions are more likely to happen in "agrarian bureaucratic" societies, one should examine the structure of the peasantry and the elites and their relationships to the state and how they are situated within the surplus expropriation processes. The autonomy and solidarity of the peasants coupled with the erosion of the state's coercive capacity at the local level due to crisis situations stemming from international pressure create a revolutionary environment. Furthermore, the state's reliance on the landed class for both political support and revenue adds to the fragility of this particular social structure. In France in 1789 and Russia in 1917 contrary to Prussia in 1848, the peasants' autonomy and organization along with the elites' refusal to support the state's directives greatly enhanced the peasants propensity to act on their grievances (Skocpol, 1979: 112-17; Goldstone, 1980: 442). As one might notice, the collective frustration and ideological orientation of the peasantry play a very marginal role in Skocpol's framework.

Skocpol goes on to discuss the different patterns of revolutionary outcome. The underlying similarity between all social revolutions is further bureaucratization and centralization of the state in post-revolutionary society. Depending upon the structure of the old-regime and particular class relations, post-revolutionary elite and class structures are expected to have uniquely different traits. However, it can be said in general, state-building, mass mobilization, and the abolition of the privileges of the dominant classes (particularly the landed upper class) tend to be the common characteristics of the post-revolutionary order. Tilly (1984: 105-15) calls into question her comparative methodology, for she "minimizes variation" and in the search for similarities between different cases ignores complexities within units. Explicit rejection of ideological framework as a causal element further weakens her explanatory structure (Sewell, 1985: 57-85). Contemporary revolutions seem to affirm the contention of Sewell and others that Skocpol has failed to take sufficient note of the ideology. Furthermore, the urban nature of most recent revolutions such as those in Nicaragua and Iran demands that more attention be paid to the role of urban groups (proletariat, city dwellers, and the informal sector in general) as opposed to Skocpol's one-sided emphasis on the peasantry. Needless to say, however, her contribution to the field of revolution remains substantial.

Tilly and Resource Mobilization

For close to three decades, Charles Tilly has gained the respect of the students of revolution for his continuous attempt to reconcile structure and agency in the revolutionary process. Collective action, defined as "people acting together in pursuit

of common interests" (Tilly, 1978: 7), has been the broad focus of his research. Revolution is a subclass of collective or group action. The analysis of purposive group action is fundamental to the proper understanding of human attempts at changing the world. Action, however takes place within structural and institutional contexts which have no delimiting impact on the voluntarism of individual or collective actors. Theorizing about the dialectical interplay between structure and agency is no easy task. What Tilly has tried to do with his dual analysis is to juxtapose "causal explanation," which traces the effects of major long-term structural factors, with "purposive explanation," which analyzes underlying reasons why groups make real choices for mobilizing their resources (Tilly, 1978: 6). Such a synthesis allows Tilly to search for the contribution of historical "master change processes," state-making and the expansion of capitalism for example, to the mobilizational capacity of collective entities. It is these twin pillars of multicausality, though with more emphasis on the action side, that runs through Tilly's project.

His approach is made even clearer when he articulates his general theoretical orientation. In his own words the project is "doggedly anti-Durkheimian, resolutely pro-Marxian, but sometimes indulgent to Weber and sometimes reliant on Mill" (Tilly, 1978: 48). A political version of Marx's conflict model combined with the Millian notion of the rationality of collective action come to the service of Weber's treatment of state-building and bureaucratization to form the theoretical kernel of Tilly's work. The whole project also clearly reflects his conviction concerning the "uselessness of Durkheim" (Tilly, 1981: 95-108). Within such a theoretical framework, collective action is the

product of the competitive interactions of groups contesting for power. This process is depicted in an abstract framework called the "polity model." He divides any given population into a government, the polity members, and challengers or coalition of challengers asserting their claims (Tilly, 1978: 52). The government, by virtue of its monopoly of coercive and normative resources, attempts to bar challengers from entry into the polity and facilitate challengers' low-cost access to the polity. In other words, these participants are continuously mobilizing their collective resources either to enter the polity or remain in it.

How dose each individual actor mobilize its resources to influence the polity? The answer is a timeless "mobilization model" (figure III-2) by which Tilly illustrates each group's collective action at any given point in time (1978: 56). Essential components of the model are interests, organization, mobilization, collective action, and opportunity which itself comprises three elements; power, repression, and opportunity/threat (Tilly, 1978: 54-55). He defines interest as "the shared advantages and disadvantages likely to accrue to the population in question as a consequence of various possible interactions with other populations," and organization as "the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals in the population." Mobilization is "the extent of resources under the collective control of the contender, collective action is "the extent of a contender's joint action in pursuit of common ends," and opportunity is "the relationship between the population's interests and the current state of the world around it" (Tilly, 1978: 54-55). This basic model explains how contenders for power, members or challengers, engage in alternative forms of collective action one of which is revolution.




Figure III-2 The mobilization model

Source: Tilly (1978: 56)

Tilly, as indicated earlier, makes a distinction between revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome and attempts to identify two sets of causal factors for each. For him, "multiple sovereignty is then the identifying feature of the revolutionary situations." It comes into being "when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the subject of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities" (Tilly, 1978; 191). Tilly then goes on to articulate three "proximate causes" of revolutionary situations (1978:200). "The appearance of contenders or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government," paves the way for the emergence of revolutionary situations. Secondly, "commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population" is needed to make those claims credible and real while the existing polity's monopoly over resources is gradually eroded (Tilly, 1978: 200). Surely the commitment has to go beyond mere pronouncement of positions to include actualization of the stated beliefs. Add to those the failure of the state's coercive apparatus to suppress the emerging alternative polity, and we have the ideal mixture conducive to revolutionary situations.

The second causal sequence deals separately with revolutionary outcome. "A revolutionary outcome," Tilly writes, "is the displacement of one set of power holders by another" (1978: 193). Power in Tilly's conception has an extended meaning including control over the "means of production," "symbols," and "government" (1978: 193). Finally, there are three "proximate causes" of revolutionary outcomes: "(1) the presence of revolutionary situation: multiple sovereignty; (2) revolutionary coalitions between

challengers and members of the polity; (3) control of substantial force by revolutionary coalition" (Tilly, 1978: 211-12). The word proximate connotates the time scale, short or medium term, in which the dynamic operation of causal factors should be analyzed. It is the extensiveness of the revolutionary situation that more than likely leads to extensive revolutionary outcome (transfer of power). Preoccupied with the extent of power transfer, he seems to leave the impression that further structural changes are a function of the magnitude of the change in the power structure (Tilly, 1978; 220). In the chapters that follow we will find out whether, and to what extent, this particular model fits the Iranian revolution.

To sum up, this chapter was an exercise in assessing the extant paradigms for the study of revolution. This undoubtedly was not an exhaustive review. A number of powerful and influential theories have been intentionally omitted.[18] The idea was to use paradigms that are directly or indirectly pertinent to the current project. some positively contributing to it. It seemed wise to refute others which though important in the literature were judged no to be helpful.

[18] This is more so with the structuralist tradition. Studies of agrarian revolutions such as Wolf (1969) and Page (1975) have made important contribution to the field but would be of partial help in our case.

CHAPTER IV

STATE-BUILDING AND MODERNIZATION

The State in the Safavid Era

In this chapter we will discuss the underlying long-term structural causes that made the collapse of the old regime possible in February 1979. To do this I intend to analyze the course of Iran's "modernization" particularly in twentieth century. Let us begin by justifying the use of such a misused and misconceived concept as modernization. I simply use modernization to refer to the change, rapid or gradual, from one state of social organization to another. Specifically, and certainly within our theoretical framework, modernization means successive attempts at state-building, industrialization, urbanization, and corollary socio-cultural transformation. Modernization brought with it a profound but varied alteration of the configuration and resources of different groups struggling for power and legitimacy. Below we will explore the dynamic process of modernization and how it changed the structure and collective resources of major groups.

In 1501 Shah Ismail ascended the throne and began the long reign of the Safavid dynasty which historians always refer to as the beginning of a new chapter in the history of modern Persia. It is not within the scope of this study to trace the early modernization initiatives undertaken by the Safavids. However, a glimpse at the extent and forms of reform under the Safavids (1501-1722) will set the more contemporary modernization in historical context. Before

the year 1500 Iran was plagued by severe tribal conflicts within and invasion from abroad.[1] Territorial fragmentation and strong provincialism prevalent among competing tribes made it virtually impossible to put together any workable political structure to which people could extend their loyalties. Shah Ismail I, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, started the process of unification by establishing Shi'ism as the official state religion.[2] Shi'ism acted as a powerful unifying element throughout the ensuing centuries. A sense of shared identity finally brought with it the possibility of social integration and political centralization. This development was to have significant social and political implications from the Safavid period onward. The doctrinal evolution of Shi'ism during this period heavily influenced the relationship between the state and religion and its guardians the ulama (clergy).

The institution of Shi'ism as a state religion impelled two interrelated and vital development. First was the birth of ulama as powerful class whose members claimed legitimate authority as intermediaries between the Imams and the muslim community (Algar, 1969: 5; Arjomand, 1988: 11-12).[3] Secondly, the basic ingredients of a political philosophy began to form through subsequent evolution of Shi'ite jurisprudence, the essence of which was the illegitimacy of the temporal power. The state's endorsement of the official religion empowered

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[1] See Sarvar (1939: 43) who examines the configuration of tribal forces and their importance in a national context in and around 1500.

[2] There is a dispute as to the true intention of Shah Ismail. Most historical accounts seem to support the idea that he had a strong conviction to Shi'ism. But to what extent political calculations played a part in his policy of establishing a state religion is inconclusive.

[3] There are twelve Imams in Shi'i tradition who are believed to be the true descendants of Prophet Mohammad. The last Imam is gone to the great occultation and is believed to eventually appear and deliver justice to mankind.

the ulama in different arenas and it became an impetus to the intellectual and cultural development of Iran.

Of similar importance during the Safavid period, particularly under Shah Abbas I (1587-1629), was the centralization of the state to a degree never achieved before. His vigorous efforts were aimed at revitalizing his military force by suppressing autonomous tribal armies and building a cohesive force which operated under centralized royal command and was financially dependent on the court. He reduced the size of the tribal army of the Qizilbash and incorporated the remaining force into the newly formed military structure (Arjomand, 1988: 16-17). The new standing army consisted of a corp of royal squires, a corp of musketeers, and a corp of artillery which had 500 pieces of canon in its arsenal (Savory, 1967: 418; Roemer, 1986: 266).[4] In addition to that , the Shah created a small force for the purpose of guarding the royal court. The Safavid state brought contending tribal forces under effective centralized control by restructuring the coercive apparatus. These efforts subsequently made Iran a regional power with which the neighboring states, particularly the Ottoman empire, had to reckon. The primary source of revenue for the Safavid's centralization efforts came from the state's lands. Shah Abbas I drastically increased the size of royal land-holdings by seizing control of entire provinces.[5] This policy seemed necessary, for public taxation as a source of fiscal strength was insufficient at the time. As Roemer writes:

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[4] Using Savory's (1967) data, Roemer estimates the number of troops under the Shah's control at over 37,000 men. This is excluding the Qizilbash tribal army which numbered about 30,000 (Arjomand, 1988: 16).

[5] In the long-run, however, the acquisition of more land by the Safavids became a sign of decline because a major incentive had been taken away from the provincial leaders. These incentives operated as both a sign of social status and a source of income.

> The implication of this can be assessed if we remember that between 996/1588 and 1014/1606 the provinces of Qazvin, Kashan, Isfahan, Kirman (in part), Yazd, Qum, Mazandaran, Gilan, Astara and Gaskar were finally, or at any rate for some considerable period, converted into royal demense lands, so that their total revenue was reserved for the use of the shah, i.e. could neither be paid into the state treasury nor used for purposes of enforcement. (Roemer, 1986: 269)

A central part of military reorganization during the Safavid period was incessant bureaucratization and administrative centralization. Scholars have justly given most of the credit to Shah Abbas whose "administrative genius" made possible the building of highly centralized machinery comparable to that found in Europe (Sykes, 1958: 180). The trend towards centralization was detectable throughout the first half of the Safavid dynasty and culminated during the reign of Shah Abbas I. By the end of Shah Abbas's reign three achievements stood far above all others. They are directly related to our conception of state-building.

The first was the process of civilianization of the bureaucracy through which the administrative structure gradually ceased to be subordinated to military cadres (Savory, 1986: 367). This functional division of labor helped contain the potential threat of tribal armies and increasing professionalization of the Safavid military force. Secondly, incredible improvement of communication and transportation, particularly the huge number of bridges and caravanserais which Shah Abbas built, made all quarters of the empire accessible to the central authority. This in turn increased the state's ability to suppress provincial rivals and collect revenue from royal lands. Further consolidation of state power throughout the empire brought the supremacy of the temporal power over other claims of sovereignty. And this is the third, and probably the most important, development of the time.

The state gradually subordinated the religious institutions and the office of the Sadr[6], made the clerical class an institutional appendage of the temporal political institutions. Thus, a dependency relationship emerged between the ulama and the state (Arjmomand, 1988b: 80-81). As one would expect, however, the principal tenets of Shi'ite doctrine, that is the illegitimacy of the temporal power and the representation of the Hidden Imam as the ulama's prerogative did not disappear. On the contrary, it is ironic that an ideological revolution was quietly taking place while the clergy was simultaneously being curtailed and accommodated. In spite of attempts to incorporate religious institutions into the central authority, the mere presence of such institutions and their relative freedom encouraged the flourishing of a variety of intellectual currents. The vitality of ideological claims of the clergy became evident soon after the state's total monopoly over resources, coercive and symbolic, began deteriorating (Savory, 1986: 368).

Despite the gradual decline, due to a combination of internal and international pressures, of the Safavid dynasty from 1630 onward, the ceaseless centralization of the preceding century left its imprints even up through 1722, when Afghan tribesmen eventually brought the empire down. Savory, an authority on the Safavids, maintains that:

> The Safavid administrative machine, with its complex system of checks and balances, worked with surprising efficiency, except when there was lack of effective direction from the center. Life and property were secure; travel was safe; trade and commerce flourished; minorities were tolerated and protected; formidable foreign foes were kept at bey. Alone of the countries of the Middle East, Iran resisted the most efficient military machine of its time, that of the Ottoman empire...Despite the internal stresses and the external pressures to which the system was subject, it gave Iran two and a quarter centuries of stable and prosperous government. (1986: 372)

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[6] Sadr was the state's office in charge of the judicial matters and appointments.

The question that could be raised is, to what extent did the Safavids' efforts at concentrating means of coercion and setting up an administrative structure winded up creating a "national state,"? Keddie (1981: 12) holds that no true "national state" came into being because "not only were the socio-economic preconditions of modern nationalism not present, but there was no national or ethnic content to the Safavid's ideology." It is quite clear that the Safavids did not build a "nation-state," "a state whose people share strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity" (Tilly, 1990: 3). Despite the decline in the latter part of their reign, however, the Safavids' state-building activities integrated a large portion of the tribal forces, suppress their military strength, provided Iran with a well-defined territorial boundary, and above all caused the Sunni population to adopt, willingly or unwillingly, a distinctly Shi'ite identity. At its hay day the Safavid state came close to being, if not a nation-state, a national state.[7]

The increasing concentration of the means of coercion assisted the state-building process in that it not only excluded the rival Qizilbash tribes, but also enhanced the accumulation capabilities of the Safavids (Franger, 1986: 524). By undermining the competing domestic social forces, the Safavids cultivated a strong state machinery which would cause the germination of challenging groups in later centuries.

The fall of the Safavid dynasty, due to whatever combination of external and internal causes, plunged Iran into renewed tribal conflicts which eventually led to the disintegration of

[7] Tilly (1990: 2-3) makes a distinction between national state and nation-state. He argues that "the term national state, regretably, does not necessarily mean nation-state, a state whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity."

the political structure.[8] The process indeed began early in the 1630s after the death of Shah Abbas, and when the power of the central authority gradually eroded. The breakdown of organized coercion hence led to internal chaos and decay and the ascendancy of the ulama (Savory, 1980: 239). Two major consequences of this trend need to be emphasized. First, the ulama increasingly reasserted their claim as legitimate deputies of the Hidden Imam and became more autonomous vis-a-vis the temporal state power. They subsequently began gaining increasing control over symbolic and economic resources. Secondly, internal chaos and particularism eventually produced a virtual economic crisis which eventually destroyed the empire in 1722.

The State in the Qajar Era

The period between the fall of the Safavids and the coronation of Aqa Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, in 1796 is generally viewed as an era of continuous stagnation, disintegration, and internecine tribal warfare. Decentralization disrupted trade, the development of infrastructure, and the expanding and balancing power of the central government. The trend, however, was reversed between 1796 and 1834 in the early part of the Qajar period. The country was reunified and tribal chiefs were subdued either by force or occasionally through power-sharing arrangements.

Reviving a strong central state, like that which had existed during the Safavid period, was contingent upon military reform. Situated in a hostile region among ambitious foreign powers,

[8] See Foran (1992) who provides a relatively new interpretation for "the long fall of the Safavid dynasty."

military strength was deemed to be a prerequisite to the centralization of power. This became more evident after the defeat of Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834) in the wars with Russia in 1813 and 1828 (Lambton, 1987: 19-20). Serious attempts were made to reorganize the army. The first was undertaken by the French advisers under the supervision of General Gardane whose mission only lasted from 1807 to 1808 (Curzon, 1966, I: 577). The mission concentrated in training the troops in Azerbaijan and Kermanshah, two of the most important provinces. It met with a considerable degree of success.

In 1810, after the termination of French mission, Sir John Malcolm brought with him a number of officers to drill and instruct the Iranian army. For this purpose, under a provision in the treaty signed in 1809, British agreed to allocate an annual 200,000 tomans (Iranian currency) to pay part of the cost for the mission. In yet another Anglo-Iranian treaty in 1814, the British government reaffirmed its commitment to provide the Iranian army with officers for training and also with some weapons. This arrangement came to an abrupt end in 1815 due to a disagreement over the financial terms stipulated in the treaty (Curzon, 1966: 579). British assistance, however, remained the major means of military modernization up through the late 1830s. In the following decades the Qajar kings made unsuccessful attempts to refurbish the army by acquiring help from Western nations such as Italy, France, and Austria.

It is believed that it was Abbas Mirza, the crown prince, who should be credited for taking major steps towards strengthening the coercive capacity of the state through militay reform of various kinds.

> Although he spoke no European language, he fraternized with Europeans to a far greater extent than any other member of the royal family. Before his premature

> death in 1833, he was regarded by those Europeans who believed that Iran needed reform and a large degree of westernization, as the one man capable of initiating a national revival. (Hambly, 1991: 150)

Amir Kabir, Nasser al-Din Shah's prime minister, undertook a policy of military reform involving both organizational and personnel restructuring. His outstanding accomplishment was the establishment of a new school, Dar al-Funun, in 1851 where foreign military and civilian staff trained Iranian officers in European military sciences. Other prominent and able prime ministers, particularly Mirza Hussein Khan Mushir al-Dawla, undertook initiatives aimed at modernizing the army but did not make much headway. Despite the failure of these repeated efforts, Nasser al-Din Shah's request from the Russian emperor resulted in the establishment of the two Cossack Brigades in the 1880s (Sykes, 1958: 368). This Russian-organized force, notwithstanding its relatively small size, soon looked promising and later on became the nucleus of the modern Iranian army (Kazemzadeh, 1956: 351-63).[9]

A careful examination of the existing accounts of the formation of a centralized standing army suggests that any reasonable degree of success seemed chiefly dependent upon reform in the internal structure of the state and its administrative institutions. Bureaucratic reorganization began early in the Qajar period with some limited division between military and non-military administrative functions. One can observe throughout the Qajar's reign a gradual expansion of the bureaucracy and an elaboration of its organizational structure. The creation of new

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[9] The Cossack Brigade had proved itself as a reliable and efficient force by the end of 1890s. This was evident by the role it played in the smooth and orderly transition of power to Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1896 (Kazemzadeh, 1956: 363). Kazemzadeh's assertion that the force was an "instrument of Russian dominance" is, however, an overstatement, at least in regard to the entire life of the brigade.

ministeries and offices brought with it a sharper division of labor and a much clearer distinction between the bureaucracy and the royal household. A number of inconsistent and incoherent operational procedures and management styles were adopted and abandoned by the Qajars, particularly during Nasser al-Din Shah's reign (Bakhash, 1971: 149).

Increasing centralization of the bureaucracy and a growing complexity in the division of labor did not yield much increase in administrative efficiency. The reasons for the failure of bureaucratic reform are not hard to comprehend. First, contrary to bureaucratic rationalization in the Weberian sense, offices in Qajar Iran were treated as possessions and assigned to the highest bidders or transferred to one's kin. Mirza Agha Khan Nuri, Nasser al-Din Shah's Prime minister, appointed two of his sons as ministers of war and finance (Bakhash, 1971: 145). It was a routine practice for provincial governors to name their relatives as their successors. In 1824-25 this was done in Kerman and Kurdestan (Sepehr, 1959, I: 48). One can see the tragic picture in the following story:

> In 1298/1880-81, Mirza Yusef, the mustawfi al-mamalek [finance minister], anticipating his appointment as prime minister, resigned his post in favor of his infant son, and a seven-years-old boy thus became the finance minister of finance of Persia. (Bakhash, 1971: 145)

Second, the shah residing at the top of the power structure wanted to retain ultimate authority over the bureaucracy. But organizational efficiency was perceived to be a threat to his absolute control. Thus, when a reformist measure taken by a strong prime minister, Amir Kabir for instance, was gaining momentum he would undermine it by dismissing the responsible parties and adopting preventive measures. This is related to the third problem, that is bureaucratic

infighting among top officials who were constantly interested in enhancing their positions and accumulating more wealth. It was not unusual for a bureaucrat in this period to amass a considerable amount of money and land. The dismissal of Haji Mirza Aghasi resulted in the confiscation, by the shah, of 1,438 pieces of property which Aghasi had mostly accumulated during his tenure as prime minister (Sepehr, 1959, II: 212).

Corruption and bribery were rampant throughout the century partly because the financial reward structure in the form of salaries was irregular and unprofessional at best. Offices were sources of privilege and power and tended to be staffed by elites seeking to further strengthen their status and wealth. Differentiation and specialization of tasks, contrary to the anticipation of observers, wound up consolidating the firm grip of the bureaucratic class vis-a-vis the shah and rival colleagues.

Fourth, despite the sizable expansion of the bureaucracy, its functions did not go beyond tax collection, foreign relations, and military operations. As Keddie (1991: 176) rightly points out, the government bureaucracies virtually neglected areas of public interest such as schools, health, and transportation. Many such functions were under the purview of religious institutions financed by religious taxes and endowments. Despite the existence of the court of urf (customary law), much of the administration of justice were left to ulama, who were operated under the Islamic Sharia, and where highly independent of the state bureaucracy. This duality later on became a major source of contention when some leading reformers tried to bring these separate functions under auspices of the state.

The failure to centralize power through bureaucratic institutionalization and efficiency seems to have contributed to the lack of progress, notwithstanding sporadic and often vigorous attempts to modernize the military. It seems obvious to many observers that:

> A modern army is a function of a modern state. It requires a modern bureaucracy and modern man to run smoothly, and while the army created by the Qajar shahs and their foreign advisers tended to pull the Persian government in the direction of a modern organization, the basic problem of bureaucratic reorganization, among others, was one with which they were never able to deal successfully. (McDaniel, 1974: 22)

Any progress in military and bureaucratic institution-building was tied to the soundness of economic conditions and the strength of the financial resources. In both respects, Iran under the Qajars witnessed, after the initial recovery of the first three decades, a steady decline throughout the nineteenth century. A number of explanations can be offered for this. Three major wars in this century largely drained the treasury. Costly military campaigns along with wasteful treatment of the treasury by the bureaucrats brought the state to the brink of bankruptcy. In addition the court's extravagance led to expenditures far larger than those of previous dynasties. Finally, the effects of defeat in two wars with Russia were not confined to the military costs of the campaigns, nor were they limited to territorial losses.

The 1828 Russio-Iranian Treaty of Turkomanchai is a case in point. Russia was to be compensated in cash for the cost of the war. Under the terms of treaty Russians were subject to a low import and export tariff of no more than 5 percent and they were exempted from the internal duties to which the Iranian merchants were subject (Issavi, 1971: 17). Similar disastrous concessions were granted to the British. The Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1841 marked the

beginning of a long period in which major rival powers were given commercial concessions which has serious political and economic ramification. This particular treaty inaugurated the era of intense Anglo-Russian rivalry, one that would change the nature and direction of the socio-economic development of Iran.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the Qajars found it convenient to generate revenue by offering further concessions to the foreign nationals. In 1872 the British Baron Julius de Reuter was granted exclusive rights for railway construction, mineral-extraction, irrigation systems, and the establishment of the first modern bank, the Imperial Bank of Persia (Avery, 1965: 88). Due to strong opposition that arose to the granting of the monopoly, Nasser ad-Din Shah cancelled part of the agreement and eventually modified remaining part of it.[10] A monopoly over the sale and export of tobacco was given to a British subject in 1890 to the dismay of local merchants.[11] In another concession, William Knox d'Arcy gained the right in 1901 to exploit natural gas and petroleum throughout the country except for five northern provinces. This resulted in the establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909 which transformed the nature of British economic influence and the focus of collective discontent. The Qajar policy of granting concessions in the second half of the nineteenth century emerged at the vortex of the incorporation of new zones into the capitalist world-economy. In this period, Iran's economy was facing stiff competition from the colonial powers Russia and Britain which

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[10] According to the revised version which was signed in 1889 Reuter was granted a right over the establishment of the Imperial Bank of Persia for sixty years. The bank had the exclusive right to issue bank notes which led to the opposition of the local bourgeoisie. (Keddie, 1981: 62)

[11] This concession sparked a nation-wide movement, known as tobacco movement, in which a coalition of classes under the leadership of the leading clergy boycotted tobacco. The concession, due to strong popular pressure, was finally nullified.

had strengthened their positions through a variety of concessions discussed earlier. The introduction of machine-made goods, particularly textile products, almost destroyed the local manufacturing base (Issavi, 1971: 71). At the same time the silkworm disease devastated silk exports and related industries.[12] Even though the export of some agricultural products, cotton and opium for example, rose in this period, the overall balance of trade was as much as half of the total trade (Entner, 1965: 59-62).[13] Political penetration in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century by the Western powers added to Iran's economic problems.

> This series of concessions, which returned only small sums to the government, although bribes to the shah and officials to promote them were quite large, meant that Iran in this period was falling even further under British and Russian control. (Keddie, 1981: 62)

As the value of silver fell, the value of the Iranian currency depreciated, which in turn led to further disintegration of the economy. The mounting fiscal crisis of the state produced higher taxation. The creation of new tax farms was supposed to remedy, at least to some extent, the financial breakdown. The extraction of part of the surplus in the form of taxation did not resolve the problems, but it further increased the oppression of the peasants. Even if the local authorities were able to recover all taxes, the revenue would be unlikely to pass through the filters of inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies to reach the central treasury. The interplay of the

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[12] Keddie (1981: 56) argues that some European firms intentionally imported contaminated silkworm eggs thus devastating the local production just to gain access to the Iranian market.

[13] It is important to note that the major trading partner of Iran after 1880 was Russia. "By the first World War, Russia took some 70 percent of Iran's exports, supplied over 50 percent of imports and accounted for almost two-thirds of total trade." (Issavi, 1971: 72)

above-mentioned socio-political and economic factors and their combined effects tended to reinforce the structural impediments to rapid and efficient centralization.

In other words, in a mutually-reinforcing dynamics, the fiscal crisis of the state and the lack of success in reforming the coercive apparatus hampered the overall drive towards centralization of power, that is the creation of a strong bureaucratic state. This is not to suggest that the control of the central power was absent. Rather the institutional and "rational" foundations of the state machinery, which supported European state-building, were missing.

Patrimonial state power in this period was a component of Iran's pre-capitalist social formation. In this "patrimonial and Asiatic " state, the centralized bureaucratic machinery under the absolute power of the shah monopolized power and virtually subordinated all social classes (Ashraf, 1971: 312). Thus, class structure and class formation tended to be in part a function of centralization and decentralization tendencies. The state owned much of the land, referred to as khasseh or khliseh, thus preventing the rise of a strong landed nobility. Centralization attempts were usually aimed at the prosperous urban economy where petty bourgeoisie and petty-mercantile bourgeoisie engaged in extensive economic activities. In general, these various classes were somehow connected to the state from which they derived their strength and power. Hence, contrary to the European feudal social structure, landlords and merchant capitalists were at the mercy of the state and depended on it for the maintenance of their power and status.

The despotic nature of the Qajar state, which employed the services of different classes, and the absence of a landed aristocracy gave rise to a considerably less rigid class structure than that found in feudal Europe. Social mobility was therefore much easier. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, economic dislocation and quasi-colonial domination of Iran by

Russia and Britain combined with the already-crippled bureaucracy made the state a vulnerable institution. The growth of merchant capital concentrated in the urban communities, as a result of expanded trade with the west, was another impediment to the state's control over social classes (Katouzian, 1981: 54-55). The gradual shift towards the institutionalization of private land ownership which culminated in the abolition of land assignments, known as tuyul, in 1907 by the first Iranian parliament enhanced the power of landed class vis-a-vis the state. The same development, on the other hand, exerted tremendous pressure on the traditional bourgeoisie and its networks of local trade and commodity production.

Unable to deal with these complex internal and external crises, the state seemed to be losing its hold on power. The situation was exacerbated by the revival of provincialism which challenged the state's authority over the regional centers of power. The collective discontent echoed by a nationalist sentiment within a religious framework gave rise to a broad coalition of classes whose concerted collective action resulted in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. This coalition consisted of the traditional bourgeoisie (the bazaar community), the guild members, the merchants, intellectuals, and the clergy who provided the uncontestable leadership for the movement. The socio-economic and political preconditions which made the Constitutional Revolution possible thus signified the failure, or collapse of "both bureaucratic landlordism and bureaucratic capitalism" (Ashraf, 1971: 327).

This analysis leads us to the following conclusions. State-building (accumulation and concentration of capital and coercive means) up to the end of Qajar reign followed a cyclical pattern of centralization and decentralization. Each phase produced its own configuration of social forces and a distinctive form of state. The failure of the state's accumulation policies, in

regards to capital and coercion, in the early twentieth century facilitated the rise of classes whose relative autonomy and potential resources could be mobilized in revolutionary situations. The state became more and more dependent on international capital and gradually sought military protection as well. These in turn dwarfed the development of an efficient coercive apparatus. I am thus inclined to partially disagree with Abrahamian's assertion that "the Qajar neither developed the instruments of coercion nor the means of administration" (1982:41). What thye could accomplish was to concentrate, rather than accumulate, the means of coercion. It was the lack of accumulation which eventually undermined the central government and made it vulnerable to geopolitical and economic interests of the hegemonic powers of the day. If "war wove the European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of the states within it" (Tilly, 1990: 76), the Iranian state during the latter part of the Qajar period was woven by the increasing manipulation and unyielding penetration of the superpowers of the time.

The Rise of Dependent State Capitalism Under the Pahlavis

Iran's experiment with quasi-constitutional democracy did not last long. With the help of the Cossack Brigade, Mohammad Ali Shah closed the first majles in June 1908 (Keddie, 1981: 75). A number of pro-constitutional rebellion began in different parts of the country which finally forced the shah to step down, and his son Ahmad was put on the throne. The second majles was then convened in November 1909. At this time Iran was virtually a semi-colonial territory of Russia and Britain who, on the basis of the agreement of 1907, had divided

the country into three zones of influence. The northern and central parts were the Russian sphere, the southeastern part was the British sphere , and a central zone separated the two.

Under pressure from Russia and Britain , who had marched their troops into Iran by 1911, the government closed the second majles in November 1911 (Abrahamian, 1982: 109). Once again Iran was engulfed in civil war, troubled by political factionalism dividing the revolutionary forces, and humiliated by foreign powers. This state of affairs dragged on for almost a decade. The outbreak of World War I "was the last straw that broke the camel's back. The people's rooted anti-Russian and more recent anti-British sentiments automatically placed them on the side of the Central Powers" (Katouzian, 1981: 65). The declaration of neutrality in the war did not provide any protection from the direct and indirect effects of the war. The country, a battle zone for belligerent parties, was occupied by Turks in the northwest, Russian in the north, and British in the south and southwest.

The war disrupted trade and almost destroyed local agricultural production. It also plunged the country into renewed tribalism by undermining the power of the central government. Fragmentation, decentralization, and economic hardship were the order of the day. The socio-political anarchy and ever-increasing imperialist expansion revived the urgent need for strengthening the central bureaucracy. At the same time revolutionary movements emerged in many parts of the country. The most famous of these were the Jangal Movement (1917-1921) in the Caspian province of Gilan and the movement of the Democratic Party (1920) led by Shaikh Mohammad Khiabani in Azerbaijan.[14] The failure of these movements to integrate

[14] For an historical overview of these movements see, Fakhrayi (1977), and Taherzadeh (1953).

divergent forces into a unified front coupled with the intrusion of foreigners whose commercial interests were by now considerable gave rise to yet another despotism.

The modern era of centralization began by the coup of February 1921, when Colonel Reza Khan, the commander of Cossack Brigade in Qazvin, marched into Tehran and declared martial law and formed a new government headed by Sayyed Zia Tabatabai as prime minister (Wilber, 1975: 42-47).[15] After a brief period as the Army Commander, Reza Khan forced Sayyed Zia out of power and gradually became a defacto shah. Between 1921 and 1925, he put together a moderate size army of 40,000 with which he put down tribal forces of the Kurds in western Azerbaijan, the Shahsavens of northern Azerbaijan, the Kuhigiluyeh of Fars, the Sanjabi Kurds of Kermanshah, the Baluchis of the southwest, the Lurs of the southwest, the Turkmans of Mazandaran, and the Kurds of north Khorasan (Abrahamian, 1982: 120). The final campaign of 1929, against the rebellious Arab tribe led by Shaikh Khazal in southwestern province of Khuzestan brought fame, recognition, and support for him as a strong man of action who could salvage the disintegrating political structure (Banani, 1961: 43; Abrahamian, 1982: 120).

These events replaced chaos with relative internal security and order and helped the Reza Khan to consolidate his power even further. The significance of suppressing the provincial loci of power was that it marked the emergence of the incipient of the modern state in Iran. In December 1925 the majles, after months of infighting, revised the constitution and vested Reza Khan with the title of shah. Early in 1926 he was coronated as Reza Shah, the founder of the

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[15] There has always existed some controversy about the scope of British role in the coup. There is, however, little doubt about the crucial role that the General Ironside played in instigating the coup with explicit British support. Katouzian argues that "Reza Khan was hand-picked by Ironside" (Katouzian, 1981: 80).

Pahlavi dynasty. Already in 1921 Reza Shah had embarked on an extensive program of modernization from above which relied largely on the coercive apparatus of the state. Thus, Iran between 1921 and 1941 witnessed the most coherent and relentless attempts to build the coercive, extractive, and administrative capacities of the state. Reza Shah, being a military man, firmly believed that reforms of previous governments failed because of the lack of an efficient and powerful standing army. He initiated the military reform in 1921 and in a short period of time created a unified army by combining cossacks and gendarmes (Abrahamian, 1982: 120). The stage was set for the realization of Reza Shah's dream to build a modern national army (Hambly, 1991: 225).

He introduced a bill providing for compulsory military conscription, which was passed by the parliament in 1925. All male citizens 21 years old were to provide a pool of fighting men for the new army. Furthermore, he created a universal military training program (Banani, 1961: 55). This not only helped the organizational efficiency of the military but also gave him the opportunity to build political loyalty. A small-scale, but cautiously picked, contingent of Swedish and Russian advisers were used to provide modern training for the officers. In the same period, he dispatched many students to European, particularly French, military academies for officer training. A clear indication of the growing size of the army was its annual budget. In 1922, by one account, the military's budget jumped to 40 percent of the total budget (Zabih, 1988: 3).

According to Banani (1961: 57), the military appropriation rose to an average of 33.5 percent of the total budget per annum between 1921 and 1941. This sharp rise had serious repercussions for other components of the development scheme. There are contradictory figures

as to the number of troops available by 1941. Zabih (1988: 3) claims that the number was 125,000 while Banani (1961: 57) estimates that Reza Shah's optimum mobilizational capacity was close to 400,000 men. The discrepancy seems to stem from Banani's emphasis on the total number of troops that the shah could mobilize whereas Zabih refers to active forces. Whatever the exact number, Reza Shah efficiently used his coercive machinery to crush the opposition and rebellious tribes. Thus, the chief function of the army was to provide internal security. A clear sign of success in this area was the fact that by the early 1930s his regime had become a virtual military dictatorship. The parliament had been changed into a rubber stamp institution which reaffirmed Reza Shah's policies.

The foundation of the Iranian air force was laid in the late 1920s when he purchased a number of airplanes. The first Iranian navy was also established in 1932. By 1941, a relatively disciplined and well-trained standing army had been built on which Reza Shah could depend for internal security, if nothing else. Forcible sedentarization of nomadic tribes, banning unions and leftist organization, and harsh treatment of any organized dissent from any class were signs of the expanded coercive capacity of the state.

Reza Shah's centralization policies brought the need for an efficient and expanded bureaucracy to the forefront. Training classes were set up to teach civil servants new techniques of public administration. Recruitment and promotion became more standardized and uniform throughout the 1930s. Inspired by the model of Western European states, he divided the country into 11 provinces (ostans) each of which contained a number of rural and municipal districts (Hambly, 1991: 232; Abrahamian, 1982: 127). The Interior Ministery at Tehran was responsible for appointing all provincial governors and other municipal administrators. In sum,

the administrative centralization enabled the shah to exert total political control over the entire nation.

Of paramount importance was the judicial reform that took place during this period. Some reformist measures had been taken before Reza Shah assumed power. Specifically, French lawyers were hired to develop a body of codified civil law. But it was Davar, Reza Shah's Minister of Justice, who inaugurated the first phase of his judicial reform in 1927. It began by granting the rights of registration of documents to civil courts in 1932. It continued in the mid-1930s by implementing all civil codes and formulating a set of qualifications for recruitment of judges, which in effect disqualified the clergy for such positions.[16] These efforts severely deprived the clergy of their most important functions and turned them against the state for years to come.

By the late 1930s, the number of government employees totalled close to 90,000. They staffed "the ten civilian ministeries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, education, Trade, Post and Telegraph, Agriculture, Roads, and Industry" (Abrahamian, 1982: 136-37). Bureaucratic restructuring and "rationalization" of the administrative machinery did not eliminate extensive bribery and graft, reminiscent of the old Qajar practices. Nevertheless, bureaucratic centralization and expansion continued vigorously. Military and administrative reform were essential components of a large-scale modernization program which Reza Shah would pursue up to the end of his reign. By the beginning of the 1930s the stage was set for massive

[16] This set of qualifications and how it generated response from the religious establishment are discussed in detail by Banani (1961: 72-73).

state intervention in virtually all areas of economic activity. Indeed, state capitalism seemed to the Reza Shah to be the only plausible alternative for materializing his vision.

> The weakness and incapability of individual initiatives which has been proved since the World War, has forced all countries to abandon the Laisser-Faire policy and compelled all governments to take an active part in the economic life of their countries. Our country has also followed this universal trend, and the government of Iran has directly or indirectly controlled 33 per cent of the imports and 49 per cent of the exports through the state monopolies. (quoted in Ashraf, 1970: 328)

This vivid policy pronouncement signaled the underlying development ethos and the role of the state in fostering modernization. After securing his power by consolidating his coercive apparatus, Reza Shah turned to economic and infrastrucutral modernization.

Foreign trade monopolies were established to protect domestic production and regulate various sectors of the economy. Transportation and communication were the priorities of the late 1920s and early 1930s. By 1938 close to 14,000 miles of new roads had been built (Bharier, 1971: 196). The Trans-Iranian Railway was completed by 1938 at a heavy cost. The state generated most of the revenue for this project from levying taxes on tea and sugar, the two most important items in people's diet in Iran. The Indo-European Telegraph line which covered about 1,200 miles was expanded by the late 1930s (Bharier, 1971: 216). The improved means of communication not only helped the despotic state to enhance its control over the population, it also became a powerful mechanism for internal integration both geographically and politically.

Foreign trade expanded dramatically throughout the 1930s with a sharp rise in oil exports. Extensive modernization programs of Reza Shah rapidly accelerated the importing of goods and thus exacerbated the negative balance of payments. Furthermore, fluctuations in the

world economy and the depression of the late 1920s came as a shock and crippled the economy, particularly the agricultural sector (Banani, 1961: 130). To counter these unfavorable conditions and partly because of the "raw deal" that the shah was getting from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the state intervened extensively in foreign trade (Katouzian, 1981: 117). Foreign trade monopolies were established to regulate the economy and control domestic consumption and imports.

By the beginning of WW II oil had become a vital part of the Iranian economy. Oil output reached 8,627,000 long tons in 1940. The oil revenues formed almost 60 percent of total government income by the end of 1930s. However, the oil industry simply operated as an "enclave industry" making little contribution to the overall health of the economy (Bharier, 1971: 160). Industrialization was also well under way by the mid-1930s. The labor force in the industrial sector increased by 250 percent. New plants producing cement, sugar, textile, and other manufactured goods were opened. According to Ashraf (1970: 329), 200 new plants came to existence by 1940. The state owned the most important and the largest of the these plants.[17] Therefore, by the onset of the Second World War Iran had developed a considerable industrial base relative to the size of her economy.

Reza Shah's modernization scheme resulted in the consolidation of a bureaucratic state-capitalism. The power of the state was increased at the expense of the power of social forces whose relationships with each other and the state would profoundly alter the mobilization and collective resources of these groups. The expanded bureaucracy gave rise to a new middle class

[17] Sugar, cement, and tobacco were basically state-owned (Bharier, 1971: 180). The state spent something close to 20 percent of its budget on these industries throughout the 1930s. Many of course tended to be losing money.

which initially was co-opted by the state and was dependent on it. The state also undermined the power of the landlord class through its coercive measures in the rural areas and some institutional reforms that strengthened the institution of private property (Keddie, 1960). The Shah at the same time incorporated a segment of this class into the state apparatus and bought the landlords' loyalty by giving them special privileges to guarantee their supremacy over the village community (Abrahamian, 1982: 149).[18]

The state's control over the economy marginalized the traditional bourgeoisie of the bazaar, but created a prosperous merchant class in the cities some of whom originated from the bazaar. Growth of the industrial sector gave birth to a modern industrial working class and weakened the craftsmen of the urban communities. The economic transformation of this period paved the way for the germination of a modern bourgeoisie, who began operating small-scale trading and industrial firms. This particular form of bourgeoisie, however, was not an autonomous class that could bargain with the state, or flex its muscles in order to influence state policies. It was rather, contrary to the bourgeoisie in early European history, at the mercy of the state and its patronage. Finally, the power of ulama, gradually decreased. Reza Shah's educational and judicial reforms coupled with the repressive treatment of the clergy alienated and politicized this traditionally powerful and respected class. Thus, the state's aggressive modernization not only changed the class structure but also the organizational pattern and solidarity structures of the class forces.

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[18] The number of deputies in the parliament who came from the landlord class rose to 26 percent in the Twentieth Majles compared to 8 percent in the First Majles (Shaji'i, 1965: 175-78).

Reza Shah's relations with Nazi Germany cost him dearly. British and Russian forces invaded Iran in August 1941 and exiled him to Mauritius and then to Johannesburg where he died in 1944 (Ramazani, 1975: chap. 1). Allied forces were concerned about the security of the strategic Trans-Iranian Railroad which was vital to the war effort on the Soviet front. His son, Crown Prince Mohammad Reza, assumed power with the backing of the Allies. The war and the departure of the shah had profound economic and political consequences. The war adversely affected trade, industry, and agriculture. Limited supplies could not match the demands which had multiplied as a result of the presence of the allied troops. Thus, inflation and scarcity became intolerable for the mass public.[19] Some merchants took advantage of the situation and prospered through black market trading. Furthermore, as in many other war-disrupted economies, profits from urban trade and services that were somehow linked to the war increased. But the very localized urban growth that resulted was not sectorally linked to an integrated economy (Katouzian, 1981: 142).

The state during and after the war lost its absolute grip on power thus unleashing various socio-political forces which contested to gain access to power. As the state's authority, now wielded by a young and inexperienced shah, dwindled classes and groups with their respective organizational vanguards reasserted themselves. The transfer of power from the shah to the parliament resulted in a quasi-democratic constitutional monarchy which lasted until 1953. The Shah who was becoming a figurehead, was determined not to lose control over the major coercive apparatus of the state, that is the army. "Out of the wreckage," says Abrahamian,

[19] The cost of living index increased by 750 percent between 1939 and 1944, which almost entirely was caused by the war (Keddie, 1981: 116).

"however, Mohammad Reza Shah managed to salvage the remnants of the central pillar, the military" (1982: 178).

The political arena, on the other hand, was left open by the faltering despotism of preceding decades. This atmosphere enabled a number of challenging groups, each with irs particular class base, to launch "proactive collective action" to acquire state power. Political parties, associations, and societies with different ideological orientations mushroomed again. The conservative agenda was advanced by the National Will Party, headed by Sayyed Zia who had pro-British inclinations. Its major support came from conservative elements of various classes. Among these, landlords, members of the upper class, and some bazaar merchants and traditional clergy were noticeable. On the left, Marxist Tudeh (Masses) Party was the most powerful and organized force mobilizing the working class and some factions of intelligentsia.[20]

The liberal nationalist persuasion was strong among western-educated professionals generally coming from a middle class background. At the forefront of this camp was the Iran Party whose members later in 1948, with the collaboration of social democratic parties, founded the National Front. The National Front managed to pull together a coalition of forces from the modern middle class, the traditional middle class or petty bourgeoisie, and the activist faction of ulama. Finally, a small number of devoted radical Muslims, who were striving to establish an Islamic state, formed the Fedayan-e Islam.[21] Their main base of support was the bazaar community and activist clerics who were a minority within the mainstream religious hierarchy.

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[20] The Tudeh Party originally had a nationalist and social and social democratic platform. It later transformed into a Marxist-Leninist organization supporting Soviet Union. For An excellent study see Zabih (1966).

[21] See Kazemi (1984) and Ferdows (1983) for an historical exposition of this group.

The contending challengers, albeit representing diverse class and ideological positions, were fighting against a state which had lost its autonomy because of the post-war socio-economic dislocations and a realignment in class coalitions and interests. While Reaz Shah's autocratic power rested largely on coercive means, he nonetheless benefitted to some degree from the support of the middle class. This was not the case with his son Mohammad Reza. The middle class, which had grown in size due to the centralization policies of Reza Shah and the war-time urban boom, largely withdrew its support for the new shah (Cottam, 1979: 261; Keddie, 1981: 128). Thus, the class composition of the state was rather different from that which had existed between 1925 and 1941. The landholding class, the new landlord class, and the upper echelon of the bureaucracy were the main power base of the shah's regime. The state then seemed to be dependent upon these classes who were far from invincible amid growing discontent of the masses.

The discontent was a consequence of a war-ravaged economy, the transitional nature of the socio-political order, the widening chasm between classes, and foreign interference in many areas of Iran's political and economic life. The bazaar economy was heavily damaged in this period along with the economy urban petty industrial bourgeoisie. Indirect taxation and customs duties on many products of mass consumption, sugar, tea, and tobacco for example, impoverished a large segment of the population.[22] A considerable fraction of the new national bourgeoisie who had invested in some modern private enterprises also suffered as a result of unrestricted importing from abroad. Peasants and the agrarian social structure in general were

[22] One-third of the state's revenue in 1948-49 came from government monopolies over basic commodities. Another 27 percent came from customs duties on the same goods. Income tax accounted for only 8 percent of the total government income.

the least protected victims of economic change. Some lost their lands and became rural proletariat while others were pushed to the cities where they joined the army of unemployed and semi-employed city dwellers.

The accumulation of capital, to the extent that it was not directed toward land speculations and money lending operations, was carried on by a small minority of the landlord class and modern bourgeoisie with close ties to the state. Hence, a major mobilization of resources by different groups was under way as a result of the particular policies of the state. The state and the mechanism by which it was related to different players facilitated the modes of mobilization to which we shall turn in later chapters.

In the latter part of the 1940s oil became an issue around which the opposition could articulate its demands. There was a deep-seated anger with the terms of the 1933 agreement in which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was given an unjustifiable share of the profit. According to one estimate, Iran's royalties from the agreement between 1945 and 1950 were less than the income tax paid to the British government by the AIOC (Keddie, 1981: 133). The company, furthermore, was seen as an instrument of British imperialism which undermined Iran's sovereignty. Negotiated settlements, in particular the "supplemental agreement", which was presented to majles in 1949, were not passed thus leaving the Shah in a politically charged situation. The Shah's failure to meet the demands of the popular forces, now mixed with strong nationalism, further radicalized the movement. The nationalization of oil became therefore a platform which encompassed all other demands including social justice and self-reliance (Diba, 1986: 91-92). It also became an impetus for coalescing all classes in a unified front.

Despite fierce opposition to the nationalization of the oil industry by both the Shah and his prime minister General Razm Ara, who was assassinated for his stand on the issue, majles deputies passed the nationalization bill in March 1951. The new prime minister, Hossein Ala, did not last long and in light of mass demonstration and national support, Mossadegh, the architect of the bill, became prime minister in April 1951 (Ferrier, 1991: 661). One ought not to forget that these events were taking place at a time during which the Shah was stepping up his efforts to regain some of the power that he had lost immediately after his father's abdication. The prime examples were his triumphant campaign against the autonomous movements in the eastern provinces, his expanded control over the army, and his arrest of opposition leaders like Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani.[23]

Soon after the nationalization of the oil, a joint British and American boycott of Iranian oil mounted extreme pressure on the nationalist government. The economic situation thus deteriorated. The nationalist coalition which was responsible for the victory revealed signs of strain, and support for Mossadegh from some members of the coalition dissipated. American and British officials were increasingly concerned about the anti-Western and nationalist sentiments expressed in Iran. This fear coupled with the internal unrest persuaded the Americans to prepare a contingency plans. Finally, in August 1953, the-CIA sponsored coup toppled Mossadegh thereby closing an important chapter of the history of Iran.[24] The post-copu

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[23] The failed assassination attempt on shah in February 1949 gave him enough ammunition to recklessly harass the opposition. He even declared martial law throughout the country (Katouzian, 1981: 155, 158).

[24] For an interesting account of the coup see Roosevelt (1980). He was the primary CIA agent in charge of the operation.

d'tat era began with the recurrent cycle familiar in Iran's history, that is the resumption of repression and consolidation of autocratic power of the shah. General Zahedi, the new prime minister, undertook a policy of harshly suppressing the opposition (Graham, 1980: 67-68). Mossadegh was sentenced to three years of imprisonment and later placed under house arrest in his estate at Ahmad Abad. The leaders of the National Front were arrested and sentenced to jail, albeit their terms were mild compared to those given to some other opposition leaders. Mossadegh's foreign minister, Hossein Fatemi, was executed. Political parties and associations, trade unions, and other forms of organized opposition were banned (Keddie, 1981: 144).

The pro-Soviet Marxist group, the Tudeh Party, was brutally suppressed to the verge of eradication. In a few years, the repressive apparatus of the state "executed forty party officials, tortured to death another fourteen, sentenced some two hundred to life imprisonment, and arrested over three thousand rank-and-file members" (Abrahamian, 1982: 280). Mossadegh's nucleus of support in the army including eight high-ranking officers were also arrested.

By the mid-1950s all opposition was virtually eliminated. But the Shah, having learned from the oil nationalization episode, needed more assurances. The internal security apparatus of the state, known by its acronym SAVAK, was established in 1957.[25] The military, on the other hand, was being simultaneously strengthened. US military aid along with increasing budget allocation gradually transformed the coercive apparatus of the state into a modern fighting machine. Thus, the twin pillars of state coercion, the SAVAK and the military, were

[25] CIA and Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, provided the SAVAK with extensive training and abundant supply of intelligence gathering equipment.

continuously concentrating and accumulating their resources thus enabling the shah to further consolidate his power.

The international scene, one needs to realize, had dramatically changed by now. The United States, now at the peak of its hegemonic "maturity phase" (1945-1967), had replaced British imperial power in the Middle East (Hopkins, Wallerstein, et al., 1982: 118). Following the strategy of containment, the U.S. was interested in securing her economic and geopolitic interests by building a strong client state. In pursuit of this objective, between 1954 and 1961 the Unite States gave the Shah $681 million and $500 million in economic and military aid respectively. Showing further signs of alliance with the West and motivated by the U.S., Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in October 1955. The Pact, after Iraq's departure in 1958, was renamed CENTO (The Central Treaty Organization) which also included Turkey and Pakistan. The Pact created a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf.

Right after the coup, the Shah realized that the economy, which was in shamble due to the world-wide oil embargo, needed to be revitalized. Thus the government reached an agreement with American and European oil companies in 1954. An International Consortium was established consisting of Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, Gulf, and nine small independent companies. The five major companies received 35 percent of Iran's oil while independents received 5 percent. BP (formerly AIOC) received 40 percent of, the Royal Dutch was given 14 percent, and the rest was granted to a French company. Profit was divided on a 50/50 basis between Iran and the members of the Consortium.

The new oil revenue along with growing foreign aid coming from the U.S. jump started the economy. These resources once again became incentives for massive state intervention, but

this time colored with the developmentalist paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s. The strategy projected massive state investment in infrastructure. Based on this new blueprint, infrastructure investment amounted to 59 percent of the total state expenditures (Katouzian, 1981: 203).[26]

What needs to be stressed is the economy's growing reliance on oil revenue in this period. Between 1955 and 1962, oil revenue accounted for 62.5 percent of Iran's total foreign exchange capital (Katouzian, 1981: 205). State-encouraged consumption to counter the discontent led to large-scale imports which further hurt indigenous manufacturing and opened the market for foreign capital. Considerable expansion of the middle class, mostly salaried employee of the bureaucracy, drained the state revenue even more. The Shah also pursued a relentless military modernization. The size of the armed forces grew from 120,000 in 1953 to over 200,000 in 1963. In the same period, the military budget rose from $80 million to $183 million per annum (Abrahamian, 1982: 419-20).

After a temporary rise in living standards, primarily due to new oil revenues and substantial American aid , underlying structural problems manifested themselves in acute economic crisis of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Ambitious development projects and oversized bureaucratic-military apparatus sharply escalated the state expenditure which outran the financial resources. This meant that the state had to resort to deficit financing and large foreign loans. The deficit and the influx of imported goods drove inflation up. Its effect on the impoverished urban and rural masses was particularly severe. The trade deficit , as a result of continuous importing, compounded the situation thereby triggering mass protest, particularly in

[26] The total expenditure was 41.3 million rials. Although Katouzian believes that the actual expenditure was close to 48 percent, the overall picture though does not change significantly.

the cities which by now had become the opportunity magnates for an educated and semi-educated army of unemployed. The crisis led the Shah to ease repression and allow some pro-mossadegh members of the National Front to nominate themselves for election to the Twentieth Majles (parliament).

Pressure for reform from the U.S., now led by President Kennedy, in conjunction with internal discontent caused the Shah to appoint a reformist, Ali Amini, as prime minister. The new premier began a series of reforms, the most important of which was the 1962 Land Reform Act. The lingering economic difficulties, the National Front's withdrawal of support from Amini, clashes with the Shah over policy issues, the military budget in particular, and Amini's fame as an "American" made him increasingly unpopular. The Shah hence ousted Amini and replaced him with his confidant Alam. The Shah, from this point on, resumed politics as usual and reversed most reforms initiated by Amini or made them little more than paper policies. The austerity measures instituted to control the economic crisis, the fraudulent election of 1962, the Shah's bold policy reversals, and growing ties with the West opened the old wounds and culminated in the mass demonstrations of June 1963.

The protests which occurred in major cities were mounted by various classes including traditional bazaar merchants, high school and university students, secular nationalists, and the clergy. The Shah's violent crack down on this social upheaval ended up as a major massacre. The June 1963 massacre, which by some estimates resulted in thousands of deaths (Zonis, 1971: 63), left a deep scarf in the Iranian national conscience. The state's violent response to the popular discontent signaled the superiority of the regime's coercive instruments as over against the resources at the disposal of the masses. Secondly, a new era of struggle which was

qualitatively different from what came before began. And thirdly, clerical opposition, which Ayatollah Khomeini personified through his leadership in the 1963 uprising, entered its most aggressive phase.

Consolidation of the Rentier Sate Capitalism: 1963-1978

This is perhaps the most critical period of the development process in Iran for the state assumed an even more important role and molded the social formation in significant ways. The first priority was given to the land reform which the parliament had passed in 1962. The Land Reform Act, despite some progressive intentions of its original architect, had both economic and political objectives. On the political side, the state was interested in: (1) uprooting the power base of the traditional landlord class in the countryside and; (2) defusing the potential uprising of the peasants by meeting some of their demands. The lack of revolutionary peasantry should not mislead us to deduce that the state was completely successful. The initial peasant enthusiasm for the reform may confirm the partial success of the regime. The state, insofar as the first political objective was concerned, scored major points and substantially disorganized and fractured the landholding families as a powerful class (Kazemi, 1980: 35-36).

On the economic front, the land reform goals were to limit the landholding to one village, distribute the land among the peasants, and set up rural cooperatives which could provide easy credit for new small landowners. The plan also, in successive phases, included provisions for establishing joint stock corporations, and large mechanized agribusiness corporations (Lambton, 1969: 206, 294). The underlying objective was to integrate the agricultural sector into the national market, which was becoming an institution of the new capitalist mode of production.

This objective could not be achieved by automatic or voluntaristic actions on the part of the autonomous peasantry whose prosperity is best secured within the traditional agrarian social structure. The state therefore intervened to integrate the agrarian economy into the national market (Najmabadi, 1987: 169).[27] The land reform was conceived to perform this function. The land reform, however, because of both structural reasons and the nature of regime and its distorted policies, proved to be disastrous for agriculture and the entire economy.

First, amendments added to the original legislation and various loopholes eliminated over 50 percent of the total fertile land from the program. About one-third of the rural households benefitted from the reform and purchased some land. At the same time, one-third of the peasant households were simply left out of the land distribution process (Looney, 1982: 47). Second, agricultural modernization and farm corporations tended to encourage large holdings thereby driving even more peasants from their land and transforming them into wage laborers. This largely altered the tenure relations in the villages, which in turn undermined the autonomous and self-sustaining village social structure.

Third, rural-urban migration became inevitable. The landless peasants and small landowners who could barely subsist flooded the cities for better employment opportunities. Rural petty producers also suffered as a result of imported, and often cheaper, goods which were more appealing to the consumers. Estimates of rural-urban migration differ. Looney (1982: 56) maintains that 50 percent of the population growth in the urban areas between 1966 and 1976 stemmed from migration. Finally, and probably most importantly, the state had become by now

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[27] For an excellent study about the intervention of the state at three different levels of exchange, production, and monetary stimulation see Najmabadi (1987: 169-70).

a prisoner of the oil revenue. As a rentier state, the government lost serious interest in the agricultural sector as a source for capital accumulation. Furthermore, the oil enabled the state to accelerate the importing of major agricultural products and through its subsidization scheme the state made agricultural production less profitable. Thus, by the early 1970s agriculture became marginal and somehow isolated from the overall development efforts.

Although the state built large and complex bureaucracies to commercialize agriculture, or introduce capitalist farming, its attempt to integrate agriculture into the national market was a complete failure (Najmabadi, 1982: 167). Aside from a number of middle size farms, agriculture did not seem to be a promising enterprise to get involved. The state's investment in the agricultural sector mainly favored big projects, known as Agricultural Development Poles, at the expense of the majority of peasants who usually owned less than 20 hectares (Hoogland, 1982: chap.5; Najmabadi, 1987: 168).

The oil revenue, as indicated earlier, provided a "safe" source of capital for the state throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1967 oil accounted for 13.8 percent of the GDP. This figure increased to 19.5 percent in 1972 and 48.7 percent in 1977 (PBO, 175: 37). Furthermore, the oil income increased from 45.6 percent of the total government revenue in 1963 to 49.2 in 1970, 67 percent in 1973, and 73.6 percent in 1977 (UN, Statistical Yearbook). The oil industry, though its became the leading source of income, did not function as the leading sector of the economy. On the contrary, because of its capital-intensive and skill-intensive nature it made no significant contribution to the economy as a whole. The share of manual labor, for instance, in the Iranian oil industry declined from 39,638 in 1961 to 24,931 in 1972 (Fesharaki, 1976: 145). The oil was significant insofar as it enabled the state to expand its

public and infrastructural expenditures thus permeating into the institutional fabric of the society.

The substantial surge in oil revenue gave a considerable boost to the state's aggressive industrialization program. The role of the state massively increased in various sectors. Under the Third Development Plan (1963-67), the state's contribution was about 44.1 percent of the total investment. The state's share of investment grew to 55.8 percent under the Fourth Plan (1968-72) and to 58.5 percent under the Fifth Plan (1973-77). By the mid-1970s, the state was the essential investor in the industrial and mining sectors.[28] It also exerted vital control over construction and services accounting for 31.1 and 48.2 percent respectively.

Despite growing state intervention, private investment was facilitated and showed modest growth. Private enterprise investment constituted 24.1 percent of total investment between 1965 and 1975. Moreover, domestic private investment, in the same period, amounted to a strong 68.8 percent and 51.8 percent of the total investment in construction and services respectively. The boom provided an opportunity for a number of industrialists to embark on major ventures thus planting the seed of a modern bourgeoisie. The state's import control measures, low taxes, easy credit from the banks, and other lucrative incentives were part of the overall import-substitution industrialization, which heavily favored the upper layers of the modern bourgeoisie.[29]

The state allocated near $1.9 billion to social programs between 1963 and 1972. As a result, substantial improvement was made in health care services and educational opportunities.

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[28] For a detail examination of the data concerning the development plans see Abrahamian (1982: 426-35).

[29] For an in-depth analysis of the data regarding industrialization and other grandiose development programs see (Walton, 1980: 278-84).

The population per physician ratio changed from 4,000 in 1960 to 2,490 in 1975. Between 1963 and 1972, the number of hospital beds more than doubled, rising from 24,126 to 48,000 (Abrahamian, 1982: 431). The change in education was also noticeable. Table (XXX) illustrates the magnitude of change. In addition, adult literacy increased from 16 percent to 36.2 percent between 1960 and 1975.

Table VI-1 Number of enrolments in various educational institutions

Educational Level	1963	1977
kindergartens enrolment	13,296	221,896
elementary schools enrolment	1,641,201	4,078,000
secondary schools enrolment	369,0069	741,000
Technical, Vocational, and teacher training schools	14,240	227,497
college enrolment	24,885	154,215
student registered in foreign universities	18,000	80,000

Source: Constructed based on Abrahamian (1982: 431)

Rapid industrialization, decline of agriculture, and social welfare improvements, which were concentrated in the urban centers, accelerated the rate of urbanization. The expanded state role, furthermore, meant the establishment of large bureaucratic structures to carry out regulatory and coordinating functions. This further fueled the urbanization trend of the 1970s. State-related services accounted for most of the growth in the service sector between 1963 and 1978 (Katouzian, 1981: 286). The state penetrated to all levels of social organization. In many provinces over 50 percent of the employment was provided by the state. The village structure,

which had mainly been changed by land reform, now had to face agents of the state who represented various bureaucratic outfits. The state thus replaced the traditional headmen or landlords. The state, most notably the Shah himself, conceived of themselves as the masters of architectonic social change trying to plan the "Great Civilization" for these otherwise "backward" people. Central to the bureaucratic statism of the shah was the expanded military machine to which we shall turn now.

The military experienced unparalleled growth both quantitatively and qualitatively. Its size increased from over 200,000 men in 1963 to 410,000 in 1977. Table (xx) reveals the growth of different branches of the armed forces.

Table IV-2 Armed forces' growth by number of personnel

Branch	1963	1977
army	180,000	200,000
gendarmerie	25,000	60,000
air force	7,500	100,000
navy	2,000	25,000
elite commando unit	2,000	17,000
Imperial Guard	2,000	8,000
total	218,500	410,000

Source: Constructed based on Abrahamian (1982:435)

In terms of budget allocation, the share of military expenditure showed a sixfold increase between 1963 and 1973, that is from $293 million to $1.8 billion (Abrahamian, 1982: 435). The figure skyrocketed to $7.3 billion in 1977 after the oil crisis of 1973 which multiplied the state's

source of foreign exchange overnight. Internally, the secrete service SAVAK was needed more than ever because of the extensive social mobilization of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This notorious agency expanded until it employed more than 7,000 full time agents. Its total part-time informers, whq gathered information from every possible source, reached 20,000 to 30,000 prior to the revolution (Gasiorowski, 1991: 152-53).[30] By this time, SAVAK had become one of the most efficient and repressive agents of any police state silencing all opposition, particularly the urban guerilla organizations.

How did these socio-economic developments shape class forces in Iranian society.[31] As industrialization proceeded, the working class population grew in substantial numbers. This class, broadly defined as wage earners, rose to 34 percent of the total labor force by the mid-1970. This figure includes among others poor migrant laborers and underclass residents of shanty towns who would often work on seasonal construction jobs. The industrial working class numbered over two million by the late 1970s. The state followed a dual policy toward the working class. Profit-sharing schemes and the like were supposed to convince the working class that the state was making every effort to satisfy their legitimate demands. On the other hand, banning unionization and expanding the SAVAK's presence in the factories, where it frequently put down strikes, was intended to exhibit the willingness of the state to use coercion whenever

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[30] Gasiorowski had actually interviewed some former CIA agents who were had first-hand knowledge about SAVAK's operations.

[31] It has to be recognized that most studies about class structure in Iran compile their data based on occupational categories which is far from capturing the essence of the concept class. Therefore, any discussion about class structure, as a sociological concept which goes beyond occupational stratification, involves some forms of extrapolation.

it was deemed necessary. The economic crisis of the mid-1970s severely undermined the livelihood of this class to the extent that the majority was living near the subsistence level.

Thanks to the petrodollars and the statist ideology of the regime, the modern middle class increased in numbers in this period. This category included professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, and etc.), state employees, managers, a portion of the military establishment, and entrprenures of small businesses who profited abundantly from the oil boom. Concentrated in urban areas, the modern middle class contributed to rapid and uneven urbanization and was under close state scrutiny. It also depended on the state for its survival. Bazaar merchants, shopkeepers, and guild members formed the traditional middle class many of whom owned property and had a few employees. They were heavily involved in retail and wholesale trade. Interestingly, the size of this class remained almost constant although the anti-profiteering campaign of the regime in the mid-1970s damaged them as a viable economic institution. Despite the onslaught of modernization, the bazaar community retained its independence vis-a-vis the state. The solidarity structure of the traditional middle class combined with their economic power assured their class autonomy. Moreover, the state's repressive measures did not brutalize this class as harsh as it did other antagonists.

Modern bourgeoisie, not more than one percent of the population, inspite of its shared economic interests, lacked a homogeneous socio-cultural background. It was composed of the members of the royal family, old landlords who channelled their capital into modern industry, a few merchants from bazaar, and some young entrepreneurs seeking quick fortune. The oil income provided the state with liquid cash which could be handed over to the bourgeoisie in the form of easy credits and tax exemptions. In addition, protectionism that was forged by the state

created a favorable condition for bourgeoisie consolidation (Ashraf, 1971: 262). Modern bourgeoisie, to the extent that it flourished, became more dependent on the state for its operations. Political connection with the court was a prerequisite for success. The state's capital accumulation hardly needed modern bourgeoisie since it had secure oil revenues sitting in the banks. Thus, the state was the source of well-being of modern bourgeoisie, a class which was dominated by a handful of famous families.[32]

The state, defined as an organization in control of means of coercion, administration, and normative production, in Iran seemed to have evolved through an identifiable cyclical trajectory of centralization and decentralization from the early sixteenth century. This cyclical rhythm of state-building, however, unfolded within a fairly constant territorial boundary and semi-homogeneous, yet ethnically diverse, culture which usually characterizes a state. A modern state, as we know the concept today, with almost an irreversible drive towards concentration and accumulation of coercion was established in the early 1920s.[33]

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Iranian government became a strong bureaucratic structure which penetrated every aspect of the social organization. Its strength, paradoxically, turned out to be its weakness. For, it was a "rentier state"[34] (Skocpol. 1982; 269) whose plentiful source of income from oil and its omnipresent bureaucratic and police apparatus virtually delinked it from major social classes. The major medium through which state-society nexus was connected

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[32] For a discussion about these families and their background and how they succeeded in their businesses see Bashiriyeh (1984: 40-41) and Abrahamian (1982: 432).

[33] Almost irreversible has a connotation of caution. The only period that this trend saw a pause was during the Second World War when the authority of the central state was faltering.

[34] The concept of rentier state was originally coined by Mahdavi (1970) whose excellent study of Iran has become a reference case for examining other rentier state formations.

was coercive institutions. The "White Revolution" of the early 1960s defused the power of the landlord class and also destroyed the viable, yet not necessarily desirable, agrarian social structure. State capitalism funded by the oil revenue created an industrial transformation without an independent bourgeoisie. Traditional middle class of the bazaar, notwithstanding its significant contribution to handicraft and trade, was marginalized by the state's control over the economy.

Thus, by the mid 1970s the state was highly autonomous organization vis-a-vis civil society. This autonomy led to a pervasive clientelism without which independent initiatives of major classes could carry no weigh. Internationally, however, the state was no where near an autonomous institution. It was politically subservient to the Western powers and economically vulnerable to the fluctuations of the capitalist world market. Furthermore, it was internally immune from the discontent of the masses and decomposition of its limited support base, especially during crises. If a rentier state, one may ask, is so vulnerable how come social upheavals have not resulted in the breakdown of the state (Keddie, 1982: 287; Ahmad, 1982: 293-300)? The explanation then has to go beyond the particular state formation under examination. Of similar significance, if not more, is how social classes collectively mobilize their resources in a sustained struggle against the state. Under what circumstances contenders for power attempt to break the state down? These are the questions that we will try to answer in the following chapters.

CHAPTER V

INTELLIGENTSIA

In the last chapter we examined a causal mechanism which working over a long period of time set the stage for revolutionary action. The structure of the state and its relationship to the social classes and groups and its development policies were all structural determinants without which challenging of the state power would not have been possible. This causal process, however, was not sufficient to automatically generate collective action. Here, as indicated earlier, I intend to make use of an analytically separate causal process which accounted for the purposive action of mobilizing groups. Purposive group action is at the heart of the process of revolutionary transformation. The crisis of the state, consequences of rapid modernization, and accumulated grievances of the masses do not miraculously lead to uncontrolled collective mobilization. Historical evidence convincingly demonstrates that such factors have rarely produced mass participation in collective action. Thus, one must, within the long-term causal constraints, examine the mobilization of contending actors, whether individual or group (Tilly, 1978: 6).

Let us begin with a quick description of the general model. Tilly divides any given population into: (1) government which "controls the principal concentrated means of coercion;" (2) contender which includes any challenger or member group that utilizes its resources to influence the government; (3) polity which consists of the collective

action of the members and the government; and (4) coalition which is joint action of a number of contenders (1978: 52). The model seems to suggest that collective action is normal politics by other means. In other words, struggle for power among contenders is a normal and ongoing activity. Groups mobilize their resources to realize their interests by influencing the behavior of the government. The crucial point is that members of the polity have low-cost access to resources controlled by the government while challengers need to pay a considerably higher cost for entering the polity.

The model does not tell us anything about the collective action and the process of mobilization themselves. That is in the purview of the mobilization model. In this model, a group's collective action is explained as a function of its interests, organization, and mobilization. The mobilization is in turn determined by a group's interests and organization. Tilly adds another dimension to the determinants of mobilization which falls outside the group, and consists of the group's power, its subjection to repression, and the configuration of opportunities and threats that it encounters (1978: 81). I use the polity model to illustrate the configuration of different collectivities in the Iranian revolution. This elementary model simply functions as a map that tells us which groups were most important in the bid for power and how their individual or joint action situated them within the general contest for state power. As for the mobilization process, I will try to deal with the pertinent questions as I explain the individual actor's collective action in the coming chapters. Furthermore, I will try to tackle some of the theoretical problems presented by the model at the end of these primarily empirical chapters.

Using Tilly's polity model (figure V-1), five major challengers are identifiable: the intelligentsia, the working class, the modern middle class, the bazaar, and the clergy. The polity members include the court, the armed forces, and the modern bourgeoisie. One of course may add the Shah himself to the list since he, as the absolute power and the final arbiter, maintained the position of omnipotent decision-maker. Another note of caution is that these groups or classes should not be conceived of as static and impermeable entities. We can always demonstrate how some members or factions of a particular class acted on a set of interests different from that of the recognizable majority.

Intellectuals in modern times seem to have performed two functions. As the preservers of the status quo, on the one hand, they articulate justificatory paradigms for the existing power structure. On the other hand, they are the most ardent critics of the established order and try to use their intellect to call into question the legitimacy of the "powers" (Shils, 1972).[1] Intelligentsia here is defined as a social category, not necessarily homogeneous, whose "consciousness" and "enlightment" brought them together, and who shared at lest the one objective of opposing the Shah's dictatorial regime. This class was thus ideologically heterogeneous and included different individuals and organizations whose resources and divergent interests produced different kinds of mobilization and collective action.

Intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were primarily intrigued by the economic and political advancements in the West and envisaged the idea

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[1] For different theoretical frameworks about intellectuals and their social positions see Manheim (1936), Gouldner (1979), Gramsci (1971), and Lipset and Dodson (1972).




Figure V-1 The polity model

Source: Tilly (1978: 53)

of duplicating blindly Western rationalization in Iran. The failure of the Pahlavis, the impact of neocolonialism, and growing cultural and economic dependency dashed all hopes and gave rise to a new breed of intelligentsia who initiated an awakening and reexamination of Iran's cultural identity in the face of the avalanche of Western civilization. This new awakening, particularly in the post-1953 coup period, became the source of inspiration for many thinkers of religious or secular orientations, some liberal nationalist and others Marxist-Leninist. The principal preoccupation of the intelligentsia was how to raise the social consciousness of the masses in light of a massive invasion of Western consumerism and materialism.

Jalal Al-e Ahmad

Jalal Al-e Ahmad occupied a prominent position in the crusade against Westernization. A brilliant literary figure, he brought to focus the painful process of cultural alienation and its socio-political repercussions. Through his literary and often down to earth works, a cultural discourse, which has appeared in different forms in modern Iranian history, was revitalized. This was a discourse of social criticism and progressive activism rooted in Iran's cultural identity.

Al-e Ahmad was born and raised in a religious environment but gradually found himself as a Marxist and an official member of the Tudeh party in the late 1940s (Hanson, 1983: 7). Because the Stalinist experience in the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party's position in regard to Soviet expansionism in Iran, Al-e Ahmad ultimately left the party. At the same time he was undergoing a serious ideological turbulation the

resolution of which was a return to religion, that is a vibrant Shi'i Islam. The pilgrimage to Mecca is seen by many as the completion of his transformation into an intellectual with a religious outlook. To him, religion was an authentic and potent weapon with which one could combat the onslaught of Westernization. This weapon, he seemed to argue, was truly an integral part of the Iranian national and cultural identity without which salvation for the people of Iran was unattainable. It is, however, an injustice to Al-e Ahmad to regard him as a person who had an instrumentalist approach to religion. As Hanson argues:

> From the account of his pilgrimage, one may infer that Al-e Ahmad is on the verge of embracing Islam wholeheartedly- perhaps on his own terms - if the conversion has not already taken place. Al-e Ahmad seems, in the years just before his death, to have accepted Islam as an indigenous, non-Western part of Iranian identity and a possible path to salvation from the curse of gharbzadegi. (1983: 12)

Gharbzadegi (Westoxication or Weststruckness) was the paramount theme of Al-e Ahmad's literary works. A process which he conceived of as a disease infecting the fabric of the society. In his most famous work Weststruckness, he tried to diagnose the disease and explain how it had worked to destroy every cell in the society. It is analogous to a tree which has been nourished and has its roots in the West with just some of the branches and limbs stretching across the globe into the Third World. Armed with machine and technology, Al-e Ahmad argues, the West is uprooting an entire history, degenerating our collective conscience, and delivering instead men with no convictions, art with no meaning, society without any direction, and a collection of bystanders

watching the glorious civilization of the East being pushed into the history books and museums. The advent of Westernization has created a generation of intellectuals and technocrats who lack any conception of self. Who is this Weststuck individual?

> A Weststruck person who is a part of our national leadership apparatus has his feet in the air. He is a particle of dust suspended in space, just like straw floating on water. He's cut his ties with the core of society, culture, and tradition. It is not like having no relationship between the ancient and the modern nor like a transitional line between the old and the new. This is a phenomenon with no relationship to the past and no perception of the future. It is not a point along any line. It's some imaginary point on a page, or perhaps in space, just like that suspended particle of dust. (Al-e Ahmad, 1982: 115)

His critiques of the educational system reveals his complete distrust of the products of such a system whom he saw as diploma-bearers. In order to rescue ourselves from this national disaster, Al-e Ahmad advocated a return to the culture and ideology of Shi'i Islam. The true Shi'i Islam, he argues, is the only weapon capable of repelling the cultural war that has been waged against us by the West. The key is to realize that "as Islam became Islam by conquering Baghdad, Ray, Damascus, Alexandria, Bukhara, and Andalusia, now from all these places it must begin an offensive and put an end to this automated savagery" (quoted in Dorraj, 1990: 134).

Al-e Ahmad was a pioneer in popularizing the concept of Westernization. A term that came to capture a cornerstone of the struggle against the regime. What he accomplished was to give the movement, particularly the intellectual community, a linguistic code with which they could diagnose a causal chain associated with the

miserable condition of life. The concept thus became a "packaging," to use Gamson's terminology (1988), device to depict the realities of Western encroachment. His populist style of writing resonated with the laymen both in describing the disease of Westernization and attributing the blame to neocolonialists and Westoxicated intellectuals for whom the public could care less. Al-e Ahamd's novels and short stories in many ways framed the debate about the plight of Iran's cultural and economic dependency. Written in a largely polemical style and not overtly concerned with systematic historical analysis, his works engendered a humanist response to Iran's lost, at least on the brink of being lost, collective identity. The response was welcomed by the intelligentsia in general and the growing body of students in particular.

Emerging as a star of the conscious literati in the most repressive era of modern Iran demanded a great deal of subtlety in action against the state. Censorship and the brutality of the coercive apparatus made him more conscious of the power of Persian literature as the main resource for promulgating an Islamic renewal which could foster cultural emancipation. This seemed to him a prerequisite for economic and political liberation. Having no institutional platform from which to launch his crusade, Al-e Ahmad relied heavily on the ambiguous structure of Persian language and allegorical description of life under the influence of Westernization which had been promoted by the tyrannical regime of the shah. By creating a diagnostic language of gharbzadegi (Westoxication) rooted in the indigenous cultural frames, Al-e Ahmad transcended all partisan and ideological boundaries. His appeals for reconstruction of a genuine Islamic identity might have been limited to religiously-oriented population, but for the fact that

his folkloric anti-Westernism crossed all political factionalization of the day (Dorraj, 1990: 132).

Soon he became a literary figure of national stature who crystallized a movement's struggle against cultural imperialism.

> Al-e Ahmad both in his life and his fiction of this period of the sixties sought to put before Iranians the example of the person who could not be bought. It was the best that he could offer the opposition as it struggled, and it commanded respect. But he wasn't sure where things were going. Under all his customary vigor as an essayist, a writer of fiction, and a leader of an important intellectual circle his friends saw a man who was not sure that there could ever be any solution and was grieving. (Mottahedeh, 1985; 322).

His grieving generated a prolific inventory of books, essays, and novels which contained a harsh, yet sometimes simplistic, critique of modern culture of the West. He molded the revolutionary ethos of the ensuing decades in many ways. The most significant of all was the echoing of his political thought among the generation of intellectuals who came after him.

Ali Shari'ati

Arguably Ali Shari'ati was the leading intellectual of modern Iran and one whose mark on contemporary social and political thought was significant enough to buy him the title of "the teacher of the revolution." He was indeed essential to the redefinition and reinterpretation of Islam as a vibrant ideology. Consumed by an urgent need to reintroduce a religion of conscious social praxis, Shari'ati soon became another "architect

of the renewal of the Islamic thought."[2] He was by far the most influential precursor of the student mobilization of the 1960s and 1970s.

Born into a religious family in 1933 in a village called Mazinan in the northeaster Iran, Shari'ati was immensely influenced by his father. His father, a learned man in religious sciences, was the source of inspiration for him both in scholarship and commitment to social change. Upon graduation from high school, he entered the teacher's training college. As an honor student, Shari'ati was awarded a scholarship to pursue a graduate training abroad. He spent five years in France at the end of which he received his doctoral degree in sociology. While in France between 1960 and 1965, he was actively involved in the anti-Shah movement in Europe. His devotion to the Third World national liberation movements gave him an opportunity to get into the intellectual circles of Europe associated with these movements. The Algerian liberation movement, which he was closely involved with, had an enormous impact on him. Through this experience he made the acquaintance of the scholar and activist of the Algerian revolution Franz Fanon whose lasting effect on Shari'ati is unquestionable.

While at the Sorbonne, Shari'ati studied great classical and contemporary theorists of Western social thought. He particularly spent a great deal of time on an in-depth review of Marxism and existentialism. Reading Marx, Hegel, Weber, Sartre, Camus, and other giants of scholarship indeed helped him to rediscover his cultural roots. This

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[2] He admired Iqbal, the prominent Muslim reformer, so much that he gave a series of lectures examining his contribution to the Islamic reform movement. The transcribed lectures was later published under the title of Eqbal, Architect of the renewal of Islamic Thought.

conscious discovery of his self was a step toward redefining, if not revising, Islam as an ideology and a philosophy of social praxis. Western education ironically sharpened even more his critique of the West thereby making it more appealing to the young generation of the 1960s and 1970s.

After receiving his doctoral degree, he returned to Iran in 1964 and was arrested at the border. Immediately after his release, he began teaching at a high school and soon after joined Mashhad University as a professor. His lectures at Mashad University introduced Shari'ati as an outstanding intellectual whose provocative analysis of Islamic history and its contemporary relevance could not be tolerated by the regime. After being fired from the university he found himself with no choice but to turn to independent and traditional institutions of learning. Hosainieh-ye Ershad, a new mosque built in the northern part of Tehran, became a forum for Shari'ati's most blazing lectures of the 1970s. This institution attracted primarily university students and lay educated people with a middle class background. His lectures were so moving and thought provoking that soon the size of audiences reached unexpected levels. Shari'ati was invited to different cities across the country to give lectures. In a short period of time his loyal students and followers published his transcribed lectures in numerous volumes throughout the nation. His lectures at the Husainieh-ye Ershad gave him a chance to put forward a systematic ideology of Islam which combined praxis and theory. Eventually the regime closed down the institution and imprisoned Shari'ati. After spending eighteen months in solitary

confinement, he was released and shortly after was forced to move to London. On June 19, 1977 he died under mysterious circumstances (Keddie, 1981: 216)[3]

Like Al-e Ahmad, Shari'ati was preoccupied with the fate of indigenous cultures as they face Westernization. While in France, he was in close contact with Third World liberation movements and studied the impact Western imperialism. Having critically examined the consequences of colonialism and neocolonialism, he developed a strong resentment against the "barbarian" West which in the name of progress, democracy, and the concept of universal man plunders and enslaves the entire humanity. He particularly paid a great deal of attention to the problem of cultural colonialism, a mechanism or process through which the people, especially intellectuals, of the periphery are alienated from their cultures and thus become susceptible to subjugation of various kinds.

Any struggle to liberate, he argues, is contingent upon the return to one's genuine identity. Combating neocolonialism is indeed impossible without escaping estrangement from one's own ideological and cultural roots. Since an alienated individual, psychologically and otherwise, is already part of the culture of the colonial enterprise, untangling this chain requires a shift of focus to the colonized mind. That is why, for Shari'ati, the diagnosis is incomplete without a thorough reexamination of the colonized societies themselves. He was concerned with institutional and structural arrangements which through a transformative dynamics could potentially be of some service to the Western civilization's project of alienation and domination. In other words, there are

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[3] It is believed that his release was based on an agreement that he would leave the country. His death, reportedly the result of a hearth attack, was so sudden and mysterious that his supporters still believe it was perpetrated by the SAVAK.

structurally embedded core values the deformation of which paves the way for neocolonial penetration. At the forefront of such institutions, in the case of Iran, was the religion of Shi'i Islam.

Shari'ati's first aim was to reveal, through a sociological and historical analysis, why and how religious beliefs have been made devoid of their true meanings. He was interested in explaining how and why Shi'ism had lost its revolutionary spirit and awakening power to become a stagnant tradition oriented enterprise. In one of his most famous works, Shari'ati makes a distinction between "Alavi Shi'ism" (referring to Ali the first Imam) and "Safavid Shi'ism" (referring to the Safavid dynasty of the sixteenth century).[4] Alavi Shi'ism is the original and authentic Islam of the dispossessed and masses. It is a movement toward justice, equality, and moral commitment. Shi'ism is a religion of revolt against all tyrannical forms of power. Safavid Shi'ism, by contrast, is an institutionalized religion which disengages itself from the social world and neglects the implementation of the God's commands, that is the establishment of social justice on earth. Safavid Shi'ism is the religion of the state while Alavi Shi'ism is the religion of the impoverished. The former is the religion of ritualism and the latter is the religion of progress and meaningful action toward the realization of a moral and classless society. Safavid Shi'ism, Shari'ati argues, is incapable of liberation and silent regarding Islam's true class orientation. Alavi Shi'ism, on the other hand, is the true Islam which can

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[4] Alavi Shi'ism and Safavid Shi'ism, the well-known book, is based on the transcription of a series of lectures. It was a strong critique of the established and institutionalized Shi'ism and very critical of the clergy who was associated with the state and the apolitical clergy in general.

reconstruct the revolutionary essence of early Islam. And that is the ideology of responsibility and struggle against oppression and despotism.

After this diagnostic analysis of "distorted" Islam, he attempted to revitalize Islam as an ideology rather than a religion in the conventional sense. The fundamental pillar of Islam is towhid (oneness of God). Everything else follows from that very first principle. Based on towhid a Muslim is part of a single reality. This reality is a totality that constitutes a single origin and a single direction. For Shari'ati, Algar argues, a Muslim:

> Sees himself not as a stranger in nature, something apart from it, but rather as being, together with nature, a single origin and single purpose. This living unity of the entirety of reality, of man and the universe, is a reality that has certain purpose as well as unity, and a certain direction, a direction of the attainment of ever-growing perfection. (1983: 78-79)

The idea of purpose and direction underlies the influence of Sartre's concept of responsibility (Dorraj, 1990: 142). The notion of oneness of God is not simply a metaphysical belief. It rather has enormous social and political significance. In a society that is base on towhid, man is constantly moving toward attaining God-like qualities on earth. This movement is in harmony with nature and the purpose of God. The foremost attribute of God is His justness. He is the supreme authority ruling with ultimate justice. Thus, as His representatives, we have the responsibility to eradicate injustices in any form. For Shari'ati, one of the enduring manifestations of injustice is found in class exploitation.

The social significance of towhid is represented in Shari'ati's philosophy of history, which is based on a unique interpretation of Quran. The history of mankind, he argues, has been an arena of conflict between competing forces. It is a dicothomous confrontation between good and evil. He maintains that:

> The war between Cain and Abel is the war between two opposing fronts that have existed throughout history, in the form of a historical dialectic. History, therefore, like man himself, consists of a dialectical process. The contradiction begins with the killing of Abel by Cain. Now Abel, in my opinion, represents a pasture-based economy, of the primitive socialism that preceded ownership, and Cain represents the system of agriculture, and individual and monopoly ownership. Therefore a permanent war began so that the whole of history became the stage for a struggle between the party of cain the killer, and Abel, his victim, or, in other words, the ruler and the ruled. (quoted in Vakili-Zad, 1987: 124)

This forms the core of Shari'ati's novel theory of class structure and class struggle. A Muslim, who is by definition self-conscious and responsible before God and humanity, should direct his utmost efforts toward the elimination of class cleavages.[5] Fulfilling such a responsibility is not without cost. The ultimate cost, Shari'ati argues, that a Muslim has to pay for realization of the Muslim community's goals is martyrdom.

Martyrdom as a concept and a tactic in the struggle is an intentional act of supreme sacrifice in the service of the Muslim community. Shari'ati was perhaps the first to resurrect the concept of martyrdom in Shi'ism for the educated youth, and one

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[5] Although very critical of Marxism as a philosophy, his idiomatic use of Marxist terminology is extensive. I believe he was using Marxist concepts not only to appeal to the youth, but also he was convinced that some of these constructs had intrinsic utility for his ideological reconstruction.

who systematically incorporated it into his philosophy of praxis. Using Quranic verses and revolutionary interpretation of Imam Husain's martyrdom, which has mythical dimension in the Iranian collective conscience, Shari'ati revived the praxis of self-sacrifice as a fundamental component of his revolutionary ideology. The clergy conveyed the message of martyrdom to the ordinary man whereas Shari'ati reformulated the concept for the young intelligentsia in a dynamic and modern discourse.

Martyrdom, he argues, is the ultimate weapon of the oppressed and the manifestation of the fulfillment of true responsibility. It is not an act of redemption nor an exercise of self-purification. It is rather a self-conscious assertion of one's communitarian and social responsibility. This interpretation of "active martyrdom" (Swenson, 1985: 138) made sense to the educated youth who in the socio-political milieu of the time were becoming more amenable to new ideas. Among these, the legacy of the Cuban and Algerian revolutions, the legendary resistance of the Vietnamese against American aggression, and continuing torture and execution of political prisoners by the Shah were all convincing evidence of the utility of a reaffirmation of the powerful paradigm of martyrdom.

Shari'ati, in reformulating Shi'ism, was from the beginning on a collision course with the clergy. He believed that the clergy as a class was to a substantial degree responsible for deforming true Islam, thereby, providing an instrument of legitimacy for the status quo. Furthermore, clerical institution has failed to accommodate the exigencies of the time. Historically, Shari'ati argued, the Safavid's institutionalized Shi'ism produced clerics who resembled their Christian counterparts in social characteristics, that

is they became either part or an instrument of the ruling class (1972: 98). By immersing themselves merely in scholastic training, Shari'ati argues, the clergy have lost touch with realities of modern world and is incapable of communicating with the new generation in a language suitable for revolutionary action. The scholastic education of the clergy produces philosophers, jurists, and theologians not social theorists or activists equipped with revolutionary ideology (Shari'ati, 1978: 21).

Shari'ati, however, realized that without the clergy revolutionary mobilization of the masses would be difficult, if not entirely impossible. He, being a sincere and committed intellectual well-informed about Shi'i history, could not underestimate the significant contribution of some clergy to the revolutionary struggle of the last two centuries (Sachedina, 1983: 208). This contradictory tendency was evident throughout his writings and lectures. He, I tend to believe, acting as an antithesis, was essential for awakening some fractions of the clergy, particularly the younger seminary students.

The impact of Shari'ati on contemporary Iranian social thought has been immense. His contribution to the "intellectual field" in the 1960s and 1970s was not limited to the construction of a discourse of dissent. He transformed the institutionalized religion, at least as far as the intelligentsia was concerned, into a socially active and theoretically comprehensive ideology. His reformulation, despite its shortcomings and internal inconsistencies, offered the educated youth a framework within which they could meet the contingencies of modernity. His efforts, to the university students, represented a "renaissance" that was needed to revive the stagnant Shi'ism of the palace (Abrahamian, 1982: 471). This renaissance rooted in popular Islamic culture appeared authentic and

was carried out by a young devoted intellectual whom some have called the "Luther of Iran."

His efforts, in a matter of a few years, dramatically changed the atmosphere of the universities. The change was first and foremost a consciousness mobilization based on an Islamic discourse that seemed quite capable of challenging the state and was at the same time competitive with Western ideologies including Marxism. He, more than anybody else, brought to the forefront the need for a renewal of youth's collective identity, which he thought had been buried under the debris of cultural imperialism. Thus, as the leading ideologue of the Islamic revolution, he prepared an entire generation for mass political action. The student mobilization of the late 1960s and 1970s fed on his passionately constructed social thought and the intellectual resources that he assembled. I will now turn to the large number of students who embraced his ideas and ended up constituting a vital component of the revolutionary process.

Student Movement

The expansion of educational opportunities in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a substantial increase of the number of students. Educational reform, paradoxically, created new institutional means and intellectual potency by which the regime could be further challenged. Education in many parts of the developing world has become the most important vehicle for upward social mobility.[6] The modernization projects of this

[6] For particular reference to the Middle East see Lenczowski (1975) and Zartman (1980).

era demanded new technocratic and bureaucratic skills. Universities thus became the assembly plants of human resource production. In Iran, however, educational credentials did not guarantee upward mobility, let alone elite membership (Zonis, 1971: 167). Loyalty to the regime, more than anything else, was needed to move up the ladder of status and power. Within certain limits, moving up the civil service hierarchy was possible due to developmental imperatives. This is where a large number of university graduates found secure salaried jobs. In other words, a college diploma was for many an essential first step toward getting a governmental job, which in turn would facilitate their transition from lower class to lower middle-class or middle class status.

Data on the background of the Iranian university students are sketchy or not available at all. A few studies, however, seem to be useful in shedding some light on the class composition of college students. Nasafat (1975: 88-90) did a study in which he found that just about 0.9 percent of the Iranian university students' parents had college degrees during the 1970s. Over 33.9 percent of the parents did not even have high school diplomas. College students coming from salaried middle class families constituted about 30.2 percent while those coming from traditional middle class families (merchants and shopkeepers) represented 23.6 percent of the total student body. Students from the families of members of the armed services and farmers formed 7.4 and 11.7 percent of the total number of college students respectively (Nasafat, 1975: 91). Therefore, as we moved into the late 1960s and 1970s, access to higher education became less a function of lineage than it was earlier in the century. This shift in the social composition of college students was important in that it mirrored some of the changes in the society at

large. Students as a collectivity became more of a melting pot of contending forces whose entry to the political arena was blocked while class distinctions sharpened. As to their intellectual development, college students were introduced to a variety of ideas from all over the world which included indigenously defined Third Worldism. Familiarity with the Western intellectual currents ironically undermined the legitimacy of the state and its Westernizing orientation. The Iranian colleges thus turned into centers of dissent and revolution and were subjected to the state's brutal repression.

Immediately after the U.S. backed coup of 1953 and during the reign of shah's consolidated power, university students were among the leading opponents of the regime. Student organizations, whether they were part of lager political organizations like the National Front or independently organized entities,have always carried a major burden of the cost associated with collective action. A turning point, one could argue, in the student movement came on December 7, 1953 (sixteenth of Azar 1332, Iranian calendar). On that day, while Vice-President Richard Nixon was visiting Iran to lend American support to the Shah, students organized a massive demonstration expressing their opposition to U.S. policies and the tyrannical regime in Iran. The security forces stormed the campus of Tehran University and as a result three students were killed. That day has since been recognized as "Student Day" and people usually commemorate it every year. During January 1962 the University of Tehran was the scene of another riot. This time in response to the Shah's decision to dissolve the parliament and extend his autocratic power (Akhavi, 1980: 94).

The government, now determined to crush the opposition, reacted by stationing police and soldiers on the Tehran University campus. This further exacerbated the antagonism between students and regime. The chancellor of the university in a letter to the prime minister describes the event as follow:

> Soldiers and paratroopers ... attacked boys and girls indiscriminately. ... Many of the students were beaten to the point of death. I have never seen or heard so much cruelty, sadism, atrocity, and vandalism as on the part of government forces. Some of the girls were criminally attacked in the classrooms by soldiers. (quoted in Zonis, 1971: 72-73)

One should not be misled into assuming that the publication of this letter indicates some degree of political openness. The event was indeed unique to the semi-relaxed period of the 1960-62 which was followed by over two decades of repression.

After the brutal suppression of the June 1963 uprising and the beginning of the era of absolute authoritarianism, an intense debate surfaced within the student movement. The underlying concern was the failure of reformist movements of the preceding decades and the need for rethinking the theory and political strategy of the struggle against the regime. The result of this internal debate was a departure from the reformist policies of the National Front and the Liberation Movement. The students thought these two organizations to be too moderate and unable to adjust themselves to the new realities of political life under a despotic authority. The radicalization of the student movement was a logical product of this internal discord. Both Marxist and religious groups were

undergoing a doctrinal transformation, which to some extent the revolutionary struggle as a whole was experiencing.

In the period between 1963 and 1977, the regime's control over universities markedly increased. Control was asserted in many ways. First the SAVAK and other watchdog institutions interfered in the faculty recruitment process. Professors had to go through a series of admission filters so they would not have any background of political activism. Students and staff were closely monitored by the security apparatus, and any indication of harboring "subversive" political beliefs could mean imprisonment, harassment, or being blacklisted. Secondly, the physical presence of security forces on campuses was intended to create fear and pacifism.[7] Security personnel checked the entrance doors and did not allow any unauthorized individual to enter the campus (Menshari, 1992: 292). Infiltration, thirdly, was a routine means of intelligence gathering about the students and faculty. People often believed that SAVAK agents were present in every classroom or socializing event.[8]

The state's brutal repression of the university students, which further radicalized the movement, led to the strengthening of the students' resolve and much more professional underground organizational skills. Being subject to such intense police measures, new resources and means of collective action were developed. Poetry nights

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[7] As a frequent visitor to the campus of the University of Shiraz, I was somehow educated by my friends of how to walk, talk ,and dress in order not to be suspected by the security agents. The sheer fear, real or perceptual, was so strong that I would usually take the longest road no to get near any office of the security of the campus.

[8] Occasionally a few students would stop coming to class. The missing students' names will later appear on the arrest list.

was among this new inventions. Dynamic and rich symbolism of the Persian poetry was an invaluable resource with which daily experiences and events under a despotic regime could be articulated and presented to the public with latent messages. These meetings were attended by thousands of students, and often, had the function of a cover for organizational meetings of movement activists. Another innovative mechanism was the use of extra-curricular activities such as camping, hiking, and mountain climbing. These leasurly activities were essential part of the training and recruitment process. Involvement in charitable activities was an access channel to the masses and a mechanism of popular support maintenance. Students were involved in providing extensive help to victims of two major earthquakes in the 1970s. They were also part of relief operation for flood victims in various parts of the country.

Inspite of the presence of the security forces in the campuses, students periodically engaged in different forms of collective action. The intention was to reaffirm the students' opposition to the regime and send a politicization signal to the nonactive segment of the student population. Strikes, boycotting classes many times for an entire semester, and damaging property were examples of overt expression of dissent in the 1970s (Graham, 1980: 214). Visiting the campus of the University of Shiraz, I saw the burned down cafeteria a number of times. Distributing flyers and writing slogans on walls were part of the routine action. The consequences of such action were usually cruel. They included jail sentences or expulsion from the college, which would often mean the termination of one's career.

The growing number of the Iranian students abroad during the 1970s combined with the open political atmosphere of Western democracies helped produce a flourishing of the dissident student movement outside Iran, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. The two most important organizations in North America and Europe were the Confederation of the Iranian Students (CIS) and the Muslim Students' Association (MSA). The CIS early in the 1960s was mainly dominated by the National Front and the Tudeh party. Student radicalization of the late 1960s meant the abandonment of the reformist nationalism and thus the National Front. The Tudeh party (Communist Party of Iran) was also discredited and by then expelled from the Confederation. The CIS hence became an umbrella organization for major Marxist groups.

The MSA, on the other hand, was an organization with a religious outlook whose leadership came primarily from the Liberation Movement-Abroad. The MSA had close contact with Ayatollah Khomeini who was in exile in Iraq. Many leaders of the MSA assumed top positions in the revolutionary government. As members of a politically diverse movement, students were critically important in displaying the human rights violations in Iran to world public opinion. As the only channel to the outside world, the student movement in North America and Europe was remarkably successful in discrediting the shah.

By the early 1970s the student movement in Iran and abroad was experiencing a shift in ideological composition. Owing to Shari'ati's dynamic and critical presentation

of Islam as a reconstructed theology of revolution, many students were turning to Islam.[9] Not entirely satisfied with secular ideologies, students were becoming adherents of Shari'ati 's message, a message that to them was powerful enough to generate mobilization and action. Thus, religiously inspired intellectuals were gradually gaining popularity and prestige on the nation's campuses (Algar, 1983:80).

Guerilla Movement

Secrete study groups, a popular form of group action among students in this period, were central to the genesis of the guerilla movement in Iran. Students in these groups read and discussed histories of China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Algeria and the works of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Jiap, Che Guevara, and Regis Debray. These discussion groups and their offsprings, the guerilla organizations, were interested in praxis-relevant theorizing rather than pure intellectualism (Dorraj, 1990: 115). It is common knowledge that many intellectuals at this juncture reached the conclusion that armed struggle was the only viable alternative course of action. The brutal crackdown of the June 1963 uprising, they argued, disclosed the uncompromising, corrupt, and violent nature of the regime and the impossibility of any political rapprochement. Armed struggle was glorified as a means of displaying popular dissent and shattering the illusion of the regime's

[9] I believe this was more true with apolitical and pseudo-Westernized student population than the already committed leftist or secular students. A good indication of this trend was the growing popularity and appearance of the traditional Islamic dress for women in university campuses when the overall societal pressure was demanding to the contrary.

invincibility. Of numerous guerilla organizations of this period two deserve brief attention.

Fedaiyan-e Khalq, the major marxist guerilla organization, was formed by two intellectual circles known as the Jazani and Ahmadzadeh groups. The two were leading theoreticians of their respective groups whose collaboration resulted in the merging of the groups in 1970 (Abrahamian, 1982: 483-84). The central question with which these intellectuals wrestled before merging was whether mass political struggle was possible in the repressive environment of the time. Lack of resources and overwhelming repression inhibited vanguard parties' access to people thus making large-scale mass movements inconceivable. Armed struggle then was prescribed as the only means available to provoke mass consciousness and spontaneity. The main theoretical work of the Feda'i entitled Armed struggle: Both a Strategy and Tactic was written by Ahmadzadeh. This and other theoretically important pamphlets of the group, written by Jazani and Poyans, were all efforts to synthesize and apply urban and rural guerilla warfare in Iran.[10] What the Feda'i intended to do was to break the atmosphere of terror by resorting to heroic action and self-sacrifice, or to purify the proletariat of the elusive culture of bourgeoisie (Poyan, 1972: 7-8).

In order to wage armed struggle, the Feda'i dispatched a team to Gilan, a province in the northern part of Iran which had favorable terrain such as mountains and

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[10] Other two critical pamphlets, How the Armed Struggle Will Be Transformed into a Mass Struggle and The Necessity of Armed Struggle and the Rejection of the Theory of Survival were written by Jazani and Poyan respectively. They were theoretically indebted to Lenin, Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and Carlos Marighells, the Brazilian revolutionary whose work emphasized the centrality of urban guerilla warfare.

forests. The preparation had to be shortened because one of their sympathizers was arrested. To prevent the disclosure of vital information under torture, the group decided to free their comrade by staging a premature attack on the gendarmerie post in the village of Siahkal where he was kept in custody. This attack in February 1971 marked the beginning of the guerilla armed struggle in Iran.[11] The Shah's response was swift and relentless. A combination of regular army units and special forces was sent to the region and after a few weeks all thirteen members of the team were executed. (Abrahamian, 1982: 487).

After the Siahkal incident, SAVAK escalated its repression. It was determined to eliminate the Feda'i organization at the early stage of the game. In less than a year, the regime was able to arrest or kill all the top leadership of the group. The remaining members, however, reacted by recruiting new members and expanding operations in other major cities. They managed to carry out many operations including bank robberies, political assassinations, and bombings Western interests and police stations (Parsa, 1989: 181-82).[12] By the mid-1970s, despite many heroic acts of the Feda'i, armed struggle had not achieved its intended objectives. Altruistic deeds of self-sacrifice did not

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[11] It should be noted that other organizations, primarily religious, had undertaken armed action during the oil nationalization movement and after the June 1963 uprising. These groups, however, were not based on a formulated theoretical doctrine and lacked the organizational sophistication of the later movement which sprang out of the intellectual community.

[12] Among these were five banks, assassinations of two police informers and chief military prosecutor. They also bombed the embassies of Oman, Britain, and the United States along with the offices of TWA and Iran-American Society (Abrahamian, 1982; 488).

generate mass revolutionary consciousness. They rather made the regime more aggressive in hunting down guerrillas and killing a large number of them. Their major impact was on universities and radical mobilization of a segment of college students.

The other major guerrilla organization was the Mojahedin-e Khalq (people's fighters) whose founders came primarily from the Liberation Movement (LM). Moderate positions of the LM, particularly after the massacre of 1963, caused some young members to drift away and form their own secret discussion group. This discussion group was formed by three young graduates of Tehran University. They were Mohammad Hanifnejad, Said Mohsen, and Ali-Asghar Badizadegan. They were all active members of the LM and Islamic Student Association and participated in the 1963 uprising, during which the former two were arrested. As a result they spent seven months in jail.

In September 1965 the three founding members organized a disciplined secret discussion group composed of about twenty friends. This date, as indicated in the emblem of the organization, has been recognized as the birth date of the Mojahedin (Abrahamian, 1989: 88). In the next three years, the group undertook an extensive study of Shi'ism, the political and social history of Iran, Marxist literature, and contemporary revolutions. At the end, a Central Committee and an Ideological Committee were established. The central committee was in charge of drafting the organizational strategy while the Ideological committee was assigned the task of formulating a set of theoretical pamphlets describing the Mojahedin's ideology.

The result of this ideological struggle, as they called it, was a number of important works. One of the most important, Nehzat-e Hussaini (Hussain's Movement), was a systematic exposition of Imam Hussain's martyrdom in Karbala and the philosophy behind this heroic act.[13] The book is an analysis of the rise of class stratifications and repressive political authority after the death of the Prophet Mohammad and Imam Ali. Imam Hussain's martyrdom, in the face of all odds and under injust circumstances, is a testimony to Islam's intolerance of class divisions and the sacred obligation to pursue a classless society. The Karbala incident thus was used as a justification for armed struggle. A glance at the Mojahedin's works leaves no doubt that they attempted to synthesize Marxism and Islam. Marxist social thought but not its philosophy, according to the Mojahedin, was compatible with Islam. Class struggle as a central component of scientific Marxism, they argued, is an inseparable part of Islam (Abrahamian, 1989:93). Combining Marxism and Islam as a reaction to traditional Islam seemed appealing to the young intelligentsia.

Between 1968 and 1971, the Mojahedin spent their time in organizational and ideological mobilization. After the Marxist Feda'i waged their first guerrilla operation, the Mojahedin decided not to be outdone and hence planned to disrupt the extravagant celebration of 2500 years of the Persian Monarchy. The plan was to bomb the main electrical power plant in Tehran so that the festivities would be interrupted by darkness

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[13] Other equally critical monographs were Shenakht (Epistemology) and Takamol (Evolution), both philosophical in nature; Rah-e Anbia Rah-e Bashar (The Path of the Prophets and the Path of Mankind) and Cheguneh Quran Biamuzim (How to learn Quran), both an overview of the Mojahedin's interpretation of Islam.

and the Shah would be embarrassed before sixty invited heads of states. The search for explosive happened to be carried out through a police informer thus exposing some of the members to SAVAK surveillance. On August 23, 1971 the SAVAK arrested thirty five members of the organization. As a result of torturous interrogations SAVAK managed to round up another seventy members and sympathizers. Among those arrested were eleven of the sixteen members of the Central Cadre, which had by now replaced the central committee in a new organizational chart. They were tried by military tribunals receiving either sentences of death or prison terms. Eleven members of the central cadre were sentenced to death. These massive arrests, which destroyed more than half of its organizational capacity, badly wounded the Mojahedin before it could carry out any military operations.

Astonishingly, however, the survivors regrouped themselves and tried to revive the organization from the demoralizing effect of "the great blow" of 1972. Major armed operations of the Mojahedin took place between 1972 and 1975. These included the bombing of police stations, vital U.S. economic and political interests, and some offices belonging to British and Israeli interests. They attempted but failed to assassinate General Harold Price, the head of the U.S. Military Mission in Iran, and successfully gunned down Colonel Lewis Hawkins, the deputy head of the Mission. On two separate occasions, during visits by President Nixon and Secretary of state Kissinger, the Mojahedin bombed a few installations associated with U.S. business and military interests. The intensified military operations did help the organization to expand its recruitment and non-military activities which included the publication of a paper and a

newsletter. Nonetheless, the cost of urban guerrilla warfare was not cheap. Between 1972 and 1978 seventy four members of the organization were killed in addition to those who lost their lives as a result of the big blow of 1972. These casualties were the result of executions, street battles, torture, and mysterious deaths in prison (Abrahamian, 1989: 142).

On top of all these heavy losses, the organization suffered another blow in 1975, but this time from within. A pamphlet entitled Manifesto of the Ideological positions was published which declared the conversion of the organization to Marxism-Leninism. Critical of Islam as the "ideology of the petty bourgeoisie," the pamphlet had an outright anti-religious content and stated that it was Marxism-Leninism, not Islam, that could foster revolutionary action and emancipate the working class (Mojahedin, 1975: 1-6). One faction of the Mojahedin resisted the ideological change and tried to retain its original direction.[14]

From 1975 to 1978 there were two Mojahedin organizations, one Muslim and the other Marxist. Both organizations continued their military operations throughout this period. Although less intense, these actions were costly as many members, most university students, fell victim to the violence of the state. When the mass revolutionary movement of 1978-79 began, most guerrilla organizations or whatever was left of them, had been overwhelmed and they played only a marginal role in the extensive mass mobilization. It was rather the organized clergy who carried the task of leadership, not

[14] An internal strife was developed as a result of this resistance. The leading figure of this faction, who was a member of the Central Cadre, was murdered due to his opposition to coercive tactics of the Marxist faction.

the vanguard intellectual organizations. Before turning to this issue in the coming chapter, let us look at some theoretical underpinnings of the preceding discussion.

Theoretical Appraisal

In the preceding section I tried to demonstrate how the intelligentsia, one of the key challengers, was actively engaged in a process of building consciousness, solidarity, and organization. This constructive engagement in and of itself seems to further question the dubious explanation of the early social movements theory which described social movements as volcanic eruption of accumulated grievances. As conscious participants in revolutionary movements, intellectuals are involved in constructing new paradigms of dissent, reformulating the old ones, and radically castigating others. Indeed extensive resource allocation and mobilization by intellectuals in the Iranian revolution points to the inadequacy of the classical notions of collective behavior.

Intellectuals with their distinct political culture and critical predispositions are not only involved in "the creation and diffusion of culture," they also provide essential leadership capacities for social movements (Pinard and Hamilton, 1989: 85). Historical evidence presented in this chapter corroborates the centrality of the mobilization process in explaining the emergence of movements. However, beyond throwing away the "boiling water" analogy of social movements (McAdam, 1982: 10), the role of intellectuals in the Iranian case clearly poses serious problems for the resource mobilization paradigm.

Tilly, and the resource mobilization approach in general, tend to either neglect or downplay the impact of ideologies and world views on the mobilization process. At best, as Tilly (1978: 58) has, they indirectly take into account the influence of belief systems on the interests of collective actors. Tilly specifies, without articulating the origins and sources, two choices for identifying a group's interests. These are "(1) infer the interest from the population's own utterances and actions; (2) infer it from a general analysis of the connections between interest and social position" (1978: 60). The latter, which is treated as the long-term predictor of interest, is soon relegated to a semi-trivial position within the explanatory framework. That is why class position, for example, as a source of structural conflict and as a determinant of interest articulation is not equally represented. As for the former, the interests are taken to be those expressed and articulated by the actors. Why one set of interests, not others, must be taken seriously is not clear. I have no quarrel with taking actors' own expositions of interest seriously. This should not take place at the expense of disregarding contextual interaction between actors' interests and their ideological references. However, interests are not statically calculated equations that happen to be professed by the actor. They are rather part and parcel of a meaningfully shared and dialectically constructed set of goals. I emphasize the word meaningful to denote the actor's perception of value, however costly that may be, rather than the observer's economistic analysis of interest.

This lack of attention to ideological factors has been recently noted by many scholars (Snow et al., 1988; Ferree and Miller, 1985; Gamson et al., 1982). What disturbs these scholars is the decontextualization of actors by resource mobilization

theorists. In other words, social movement participants are not merely repositories of ideas that are floating out in the world. They "are actively engaged in production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" (Snow and Benford, 1992: 136). Different generations of intellectuals in the modern history of Iran have ceaselessly engaged in interest articulation and ideological reconstruction. Many reform movements to which I referred previously revitalized, otherwise stagnant, ideological frameworks from which justification for collective action could be derived. Intellectuals are thus vital to the mechanism of "focusing and punctuating" existing injustices (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137).

Ideologically driven, intellectuals and particularly Shari'ati as the leading one, were directly involved in formulating "diagnostic and prognostic attributions" (Wilson, 1973) based on their distinct interpretation of revolutionary Islam.[15] Using McCarthy And Zald's (1973) distinction between constituents, adherents, bystander publics, and opponents, I argue that the intelligentsia is crucial to a conversion process whereby adherents and bystanders are transformed into constituents of a movement. This was clearly the case wiyh the student population of Iran. A significant minority of apolitical students, within a few years, joined the student movement as active or sympathetic constituents. This happened long before the mass mobilization of 1978 when spontaneity or the dynamic of the situation could attract bystanders.

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[15] In addition to Wilson (1973), for a detailed analysis of the functions of ideology and how it dynamically situates the actor in a causally understandable world see Snow and Benford (1988: 200-202).

Another serious flaw in the resource mobilization approach, and to a lesser degree in Tilly's approach, stems from its utilitarian rational choice leaning. Using Mancur Olson's (1968) analytical tools, resource mobilization theorists have tried to bring into the picture what has been missing in traditional social movement research, that is the rationality of actors. In an attempt to vindicate the irrationality and abnormality of actors, however, proponents of the resource mobilization model fail to discard the fundamental problems inherent in the rational choice framework. The underlying argument runs like this. Individuals act in pursuit of self-interest by maximizing their returns while minimizing their costs.

However, a not so negligible problem arises. Individuals in a given social movement try to evade the cost by free-riding. That is, in anticipation of collective goods being delivered to them at the end, rational calculations should cause them not to participate. To resolve this "free-rider dilemma," Olson proposes the notion of selective incentives as a replacement for collective goods. Since collective goods are not by themselves rational foundations for action, incentives and punishments that are built into the movement organizations make cost-efficiency calculations transparent to those involved in collective action.

The dilemma is not fully resolved by this modification. Intense commitment to an ideology, as was the case with intellectuals in the Iranian revolution, could be the source of high cost participation. Selective incentives provide a less satisfactory explanation when many actors willingly pay the ultimate cost, that is their lives, in pursuit of stated goals. Whether due to strong moral commitments or psychological

gratifications, many members of the intellectual community, members of the guerrilla organizations in particular, lost their lives rendering rational utilitarianism weak as an explanation of all human action.

Tilly (1978: 62-64) attempts to overcome the dilemma by working his way through group solidarity and internal group structure. He uses the concepts of catness (referring to common identity in a group) and netness (referring to internal networks of a group) as determinants of group organization. Greater density of interpersonal networks and shared identity within a group enhances both organizational capacity and group solidarity. Tilly seems to suggest that increasing group solidarity increases the chances that individuals would put their resources in the service of group goals. The implication is that group membership and solidarity operate as a psychological mechanism rationalizing collective action. Cost tolerance may then be explained as a function of group maintenance.[16] This explanation does not satisfactorily circumvent the dilemma either. Searching for clues in the group dynamics pushes ideology and group goals once again to the sidelines. It seems that explanation is destined to be located outside the actor's frame of action. Resorting to group solidarity and internal structure as causal parameters delinks the actor from his subjective underpinnings thus leaving him chained to events and processes.

Intellectuals in the Iranian revolution seemed to be, using Tilly's (1978: 74) terminology, more prone to "preparatory" and "offensive" mobilization. These forms of

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[16] To see how the concept of group solidarity could be used as a rational psychological calculus see Oberschall (1978).

action involved high risks since participants were competing for mutually exclusive claims. As a result, they were subject to intense repression by the regime. The state thus utilized all means available to make action extremely costly for this group. Tilly (1987: 99-100) maintains that governments respond to contenders by repression, facilitation, and or toleration, which are in turn affected by contenders' power. As a collective actor, the intelligentsia was advancing goals that were basically contrary to the government's interests and therefore could not be facilitated or tolerated. The intelligentsia, regardless of how powerful it was, and Tilly probably argues that it was somewhat powerful but renders all studies tautological[17], was systematically excluded from the competition for power. The extreme cost that it had to pay for both mobilization and collective action accentuate the centrality of repression in the process of revolutionary mobilization.

Increasing the level of repression during the preparatory mobilization tends to hike the cost of resource allocation thus impeding collective action. What Tilly needs to add to his explanatory equation is a reformulation of the concept of power. Although guerrilla organizations and intellectuals in general could not make their interests prevail over the state's interests since they were under severe repression, one cannot deduce that they were powerless. The level of constituent commitment, moral support, and financial resources extended to them seems to suggest otherwise. I would even, contrary to Tilly's thesis, argue that the relationship between power and repression is reversed in the case

[17] Tilly (1978: 115), in describing the conflict between two groups over their respective interests, defines power as the extent to which one group is successful in securing its interests over another.

of Iran, and authoritarian regimes in general. The more powerful the group and the more incompatible its claims with those of the state, the harsher the repression that it would have to incur. Thus, the nature of the relationship needs further theoretical development. These theoretical assumptions and further arguments made by Tilly will be discussed in the following chapter when we deal with other important challengers and their collective action.

CHAPTER VI

THE CLERGY AND BAZAAR

In this chapter I will try to demonstrate how and why the clergy and bazaar, two powerful and persistent challengers of the state, prevailed over other challengers. In doing so, I need to explore the dynamic process of resource mobilization by these two groups. This process was greatly indebted to a natural affinity between the bazaar and clergy which was anchored in the interlocking dynamics of the socio-cultural history and economic structure of Iran. Structural and institutional advantages, I will argue, gave them a far better access to available resources than other groups had. It was the availability of these resources, which were primarily socio-culturally embedded, and existing organizational networks that allowed the clergy to become the leaders of the revolution. Furthermore, the state's peculiar relationships to these groups and its inability to deny them already existing resources seem to have enormous explanatory value. Both conditions, the state's incapacity to ultimately suppress the mobilization process and superior access to resources, particularly cultural ones, provided the clergy with the greatest numbers of constituents. Here, I use a broad definition of resources that includes everything which could be utilized irrespective of its intrinsic characteristics. The quality and the level of commitment of the constituents gave the clergy a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the state and power over other challengers within the revolutionary coalition. The clergy, as the interpreter and product of an organizing

ideology, used a variety of symbolic, mythical, and normative resources in defining the situation and articulated remedial courses of action with which the subject population could subjectively identify within the existing socio-cultural milieu. Following the last chapter's format, I will lay out the historical data concerning the two groups' collective action and then present a theoretical assessment of the resource mobilization paradigm.

The Clergy

Scholars commonly agree that the indisputable feature of the Iranian revolution was the significant contribution of the clergy to both its genesis and the success. The clerical social power, so remarkably expressed at different historical junctures, cannot adequately be explained without reference to its historical development and theological justification. It is indeed my argument that it was the unique institutional characteristics and theological framework of the Shi'ite clergy, endowed with unlimited potential for political action, which made them a force with enormous mobilizing capability. I will therefore begin with a brief overview of the Shi'i doctrinal development and the place of the clergy within its trajectory.

The principal divergence between two main branches of Islam, Shi'i and Sunni, is traceable to the question of succession after the Prophet Mohammad's death (632 A.D.)[1] When Imam Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, was burying the Prophet, companions

[1] To some scholars the contention over succession was not merely a political one. The dispute over political authority is an extension of the deeper schism between the Sunnis and Shi'ites over correct interpretation of the divine revelation. "The principal cause of the coming into being of Shi'ism, however, lies in the fact that this possibility existed within the Islamic revelation itself and so had to be realized" (Tabataba'i, 1981: 9).

chose Abu-Bakr from among themselves to succeed the Prophet in leading the early Islamic community. Abu-Bakr and three other chosen caliphs (Omar, Othman, and Ali) were considered to be the "rightly guided ones" commanding the community of believers. Adherents to this line of historical reasoning became known as the Sunnis. A group of early companions of the Prophet, however, believed that the rightful inheritor of the Prophet's authority was Ali. Ali, who according to this group should have been the first Imam rather than the fourth caliph, was unjustly denied the legitimate succession to the prophet. Those who follow this argument and believe that Imam Ali's right had been usurped constitute the Shi'i community. Two central pillars that make Shi'ism distinct from Sunni Islam are Imamat and adl.[2] The Imamat is the institution of succession of Imams who are divinely inspired, infallible, and legitimate transmitters of prophetic message (Algar, 1972: 2). In Imamat the Shi'ites found the authentic line of succession after the Prophet. Imams, the legitimate heirs of the Prophet, combined both functions of political rule over the community and interpretation of "Divine Law and its esoteric meaning" (Tabataba'i, 1981: 10). Adl (Divine justice), according to Shi'ism, is an inherent attribute of God without knowledge of which one cannot comprehend the essence of existence. The predominant theological argument in Sunni literature seems to emphasize the concept of the will of God. The justness of an action is predetermined by

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Regardless of the theological discord, this is how the Shi'ite community interprets the logic of succession.

[2] There are three other principles that are shared by both branches of Islam. These are tawhid (divine unity or oneness of God), nubuwah (prophecy), and ma'ad (belief in resurrection).

the will of God. For Shi'ism, since God will not act against His nature, human intelligence (aql) becomes important in discerning the nature of an act in the social universe. That is probably why "intelligence can judge the justness or unjustness of an act and this judgment is not completely suspended in favor of a pure voluntarism on the part of God" (Tabataba'i, 1981: 11).

Followers of the Twelver Shi'ism, the predominant religion in Iran, believe in a line of succession which consists of twelve Imams all of whom were descendants of the Prophet and were believed to have been infallible leaders of the Muslim community. Their very existence was not only a source of continuous guidance but also provided the community with the sole legitimate political authority. This infallible line of succession was terminated by the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in 874 A.D. With the disappearance of the Imam, Shi'i theory of Imamat seems to suggest, no temporal authority can enjoy legitimate power (Algar, 1969: 3-4). During this period of occultation (ghaybat), however, contradictory interpretations of the proper course of action against worldly powers have emerged. As Algar notes:

> Moreover, both activist and quietist attitudes to prevailing authority could be deduced from the Imami belief, but it is clear that the latter came gradually to dominate the mainstream of Shi'ism, leaving its trace also on the Safavid and post Safavid Shi'ism of Iran. Insofar as any attitude to the state and existing authority can be deduced from the teachings of the Imams, it is one that combines a denial of the legitimacy with a quietist patience and abstention from action. (1969: 2)

Despite occasional rebellions and resistance against unjust order, the predominant view throughout most of Shi'ite history was pacifism, often justified by the concept of "prudential dissimulation of belief" (taqiya) when the faith or life is in danger (Algar, 1969:3)[3] This seemingly tactical acquiescence is normally traced back to early Shi'ism when the Imams were facing persecution (Kohlberg, 1988: 37).

The doctrine of Entezar (anticipation), another key concept in the Shi'i political vocabulary with dual meaning, has generated a radically different and persistent belief among the Shi'ites. Waiting for the return of the Hidden Imam, who will establish complete justice on earth at the end of time, could set in motion a preparatory activism by which justice could partially be achieved (Enayat, 1983: 200-201). From this vantage point, true anticipation for the messianic reappearance of the Imam of the age necessitates not only militant rejection of the usurped authority of the Imam, it also presumes the obligation to strive for the establishment of an alternative order which will last untill he returns. In other words:

> The aspiration for the return of the Twelfth Imam from the plane of occultation to that of manifestation, a vital part of Ithna ashari spiritual and devotional life, is therefor also an aspiration for social justice and the relief of the downtrodden. While such justice and relief are, in their plentitude, to be expected only from the renewed manifestation of the Imam, they may be partially achieved by those who desire his coming and wish, as it were, to prepare the way by anticipating the characteristics of his dominion. (Algar, 1972: 232)

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[3] Although taqiyeh has reenforced a defacto acceptance of illegitimate authority, more contemporary activist ulama have simply advocated it as a tactical and prudent means of decitng authorities in their secret struggle.

This radical and engaging paradigm has become more relevant over the past century. Both the ulama and religious intellectuals of modern times have given the theory of Entezar (anticipation) a socially committed and activist character and strengthened its philosophical underpinnings. Shari'ati, for instance, in the 1960s and 1970s viewed Entezar as part of a revolutionary mission in which a "future oriented" ideology commands the social praxis of the true believer (Bayat, 1985: 25). Still others have characterized the return of the Hidden Imam as the perfect revolution, the coming of which depends upon anticipatory mobilization of the Muslim community in pursuit of a just and moral order.[4] Thus the voluntaristic and activist tradition has always, though at various times with various intensity, been part of the Shi'i collective memory and has never been eliminated from their common history (Lewis, 1987: 23-24).

Besides such eschatological aspiration for justice, a more concrete issue has been the source of an intractable dispute among the shi'i scholars over the centuries. That is, how and by what mechanism the Muslim community could be continuously guided in the period of occultation. Shi'i scholars and theologians have fought over this question throughout history and have provided an extensive, albeit contradictory, body of literature. A doctrinal framework gradually developed which suggested that the ulama (the learned) could furnish the community with the needed chair of guardianship and authority. Although a fairly well systematized Shi'i jurisprudence had emerged by the Mongol period, it was not until the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722) took over that one finds

[4] See also Mottahari (1984) for a more theoretically sophisticated exposition of the theory of anticipation.

a concerted and coherent effort to develop a theological basis for the ulama's power (Cole, 1983: 37).

The theoretical basis for the ulama's significant social power could be found in the concept of ijtihad, " the searching for a correct opinion (rayi savab), particularly in the deducing of the specific provisions of religions law (furu) from its principles (usul) and ordinances (ahkam)" (Algar, 1969: 6). Furthermore, the community of believers is supposed to be divided between those who follow the mujtahids in particular matters of the Sacred Law and those who are themselves mujtahids. Mujtahids, the highest ranking of the ulama who exercise ijtihad, in shi'i Islam function as the deputies of the Imams. As authoritative interpreters of the religious law, they hold enormous functional and spiritual power within the community. Whether the clergy's assertion that they are the true link to the Imams can be convincingly supported by original sources is not particularly relevant.[5] The assertion seems to be the received wisdom and what is being practiced is based on a dominant interpretation by the most important though not necessarily the most numerous shi'i jurisprudents.

The doctrine of ijtihad was challenged by the Akhbari school later in the eighteenth century. Akhbaris claimed that the concept of iitihad is an invention in shi'ism and the shi'i community must rely solely on the transmitted sayings and practices of the

[5] Akhavi (1980: 11) and Eliash (1979: 9-25) argue that the clergy's authority was not based on an appointment by the Imams. It was rather an innovation by the clergy. In the words of Akhavi, "the Imams did not prepare the way for the clergy to become their agents or deputies; instead, the clergy gradually assumed among their own ranks that they were, indeed, the deputies of the Imams (although they have never pretended to the Imam's barakah, his infallibility, or his ilm al-ghayb (esoteric knowledge)."

prophet and infallible Imams. They rejected the use of independent reasoning in deducing ordinances thereby undermining the power of the clergy both in practice and theory. It was not long however before the usuli school, the predominant school of shi'i jurisprudence, overcame the Akhbaris and thus strengthened the institution of ijtihad.[6] The defeat of the Akhabari school left firm theoretical ground for the clergy's power in ensuing centuries.

The emergence of the Safavid state and the subsequent establishment of the Twelver Shi'ism as the official religion brought the clergy recognition that they had never experienced before. The ascendancy of the ulama however was institutionally overshadowed by the centralization policies of the Safavids. That is, the claim of the shahs to be the representative of the Hidden Imam and their identification with an established religion gave the state power which superseded that of the clergy. Although the clergy received both institutional and vocal backing from the state, its prerogative was undermined by the state's expanded role in religious affairs. Sadr, the state's administrative authority in charge of religious affairs, appointed people to major religious positions. The clergy's judicial power, albeit semi-independent, was, nonetheless, under the state's overall control. The ulama during most of the Safavid period, co-opted by and dependent on the state, seemed to be either accommodative to the state or choose the path of abstention from politics. After many centuries of powerlessness, the clergy enjoying the state's protection, seemed to be engaged in homogenizing their doctrinal bases and

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[6] For a discussion about the doctrinal conflict between usuli and Akhbari schools of Shi'i jurisprudence see Algar (1969: 33-36) and Arjomand (1984: 144-50).

enhancing their corporate and institutional structure (Algar, 1969:28). The integration of the clergy into the sphere of state operations and the fact that the legitimacy of their political claims was not fully established prevented them from posing any threat to the newly entrenched national state. These developments, however, preclude an increase in the power of the clergy, particularly in the latter part of the Safavid era, within a communal network of relationships where they had considerable legal authority.

The rise of the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925) was accompanied by a resurgence of the ulama's power. From this point on, one may plausibly argue, an irreversible trend toward increasing conflict between the state and the ulama developed. The gradual importance of ulama in the political history of the Qajar dynasty is attributable to a number of factors. First, and perhaps most important, was the articulation and amplification of the theory of ijtihad as the ideological justification of the clergy's power (Algar, 1972: 235).[7] As a result, the clergy became more conscious of the theoretical rational for their power and felt more responsive to the cause of the masses. Second, modernization adversely affected the moral structure envisioned for an Islamic society and signalled the potential erosion of the clergy's power.[8] Third, the association of the state

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[7] Here, I believe Algar takes the argument too far in overstating the theoretical supremacy of the ulama's political power. He maintains that "the theoretical clarification of the position of mujtahid as marga-i taqlid took place on the eve of the establishment of Qajar rule... The monarch was theoretically bound, no less than his subjects, to submit to the authoritative guidance of mujtahid and in effect make the state the executive branch of ulama authority."

[8] Some scholars, Floor (1983: 75) for instance, give more attention to this particular factor. Curtailing ulama's power by the state is thus viewed as the most important variable in explaining their oppositional role in the nineteenth century Iran.

with the interests of foreign powers produced a nationalist discourse which could only be articulated by the Ulama in the language of Islam. This in turn strengthened its position vis-a-vis the state. Fourth, ineffective centralization policies and an incompetent ruling class produced a "power vacuum" which ulama could easily fill (Keddie, 1972:213).[9]

The increasing power of the ulama was in part due to its financial independence. They had the right to collect doctrinally sanctioned religious taxes known as Khums and Zakat. In addition, they had control over vagf (endowment) lands, a percentage of which they could allocate toward various activities. Both religious taxes and private donations, not a negligible amount, were essentially voluntary contributions and a function, not necessarily always, of the religiosity of the public. This, I believe, had the effect of making them more accountable to populist demands than state pressure. As Tabari puts it:

> Although the nineteenth century clergy enjoyed power and influence derived from their control over many functions that in modern Western societies are under state administration, they were not a formal part of the executive as some of them had been under Safavids... For instance, discontented social layers could turn to the Shi'i clergy for assistance, and the clergy could deploy its ability to manage social discontent as a bargaining counter against the court and bureaucracy. (1983: 49)

The tobacco movement (1890-92) was the first social discontent in the recent history of Iran under the active leadership of the clergy (Keddie, 1981: 67). Indeed, the transformation of the discontent into a mass-based movement was made possible by the

[9] For a detailed examination of these points see Keddie (1972: 213-17).

intervention of the highest ranking Shi'i clergy of the time whose fatva (religious decree) forbid the use and sale of tobacco.[10]

A decade later, leading ulama in collaboration with liberal reformers triumphantly brought the despotic Qajar to its knees and established the first constitutional structure. Once again the clergy, as the uncontested leaders of the movement, and despite ideological diversity, proved the revolutionary potential for fostering change. A combination of structural determinants such as Western capitalist penetration and accompanying economic dislocations, the despotic nature of the regime, and general weakness of the state paved the way for possible collective action. The clerical mobilization and coalition formation, however, was indispensable in completing the causal chain.[11] Without their hegemonic social power, rooted in popular religious sentiments, it is hard to conceive of mass-based transformative action. Ironically, constitutionalism, a souvenir of Western thought, inspite of its fuzzy connotations sofar as the ulama were concerned, became the central demand of a movement led by a "traditional" class.[12]

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[10] Of course, it should be noted that the religious hierarchy formed an alliance with modernists, intellectuals, bazaar, and other classes. For a comprehensive study of the Tobacco Movement see Keddie (1966).

[11] Foe informed and more detailed study of the Constitutional Revolution, particularly the ulama's role, see Algar (1969) and Bayat (1991).

[12] For a succinct analysis of constitutionalism in the context of Shi'i political discourse see Hairi (1977). Intellectual map of the Constitutional Movement is examined by Adamiyat (1976).

The post-constitutional era was marked by an internal dispute within the rank of the clergy, political decay, and re-emergence of absolutism.[13] The rise of Reza Shah at this conjuncture was not surprising to many observers. Reza Shah, who came to power with the tacit and active support of some ulama, embarked on a course of open conflict with the clergy. His policies were not much short of a complete containment of clerical power and the inauguration of an epoch of secularization, emulating to some extent the Ataturk experiment in Turkey. The centralization policies and administrative reforms of Reza Shah not only attacked the institutional and communal power of the clergy, but also intruded into the everyday religious experience and practices of ordinary citizens.[14] Judicial reform, instituting conscription for the standing army, and altering the traditional educational system characterized an aggressive campaign of Westernization which aimed at the obliteration of the clergy (Tabari, 1983: 59-60) Most repugnant, perhaps most tormenting to the public , was the treatment of women with veils and traditional dress. The police forcibly unveiled women in public, dragged them from public places and made them wear European dress (Fisher, 1980: 97-99). Despite this massive suppression of deeply-held beliefs, and with the exception of Ayatollah

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[13] The debate in the surface was between proconstitutionalist clergy and those who advocated the establishment of a government base on Shari'a (sacred law). But the discord was much more complex than that, and involved a doctrinal and practical conflict. The most articulate defense of the compatibility of constitutionalism and Shi'i principles of political authority was written by Ayatollah Na'ini (1860-1936) entitled An Admonishment to the Nation and Exposition to the People. The leading supporter of mashru'i (religious law) was the prominent mujtahid Shaykh Fadlullah Nuri.

[14] For more information on state-building and centralization policies see chapter three.

Mudarres, the clergy remained mainly apolitical and did not pursue an expressive and organized hostility toward the state until the late 1940s.

Another significant mass movement which achieved momentary victory and in which the ulama with other social forces played a vital part and achieved was the oil nationalization movement of 1951-1953. As in the case of the constitutional movement, a single issue, this time oil, galvanized popular dissent. The target was the monopolization of oil by British imperial power. Although other post-world War II economic difficulties made life intolerable for many Iranians, the question of the exploitative policies of Britain with respect to oil seemed to encapsulate all grievances for various classes. Rejecting previous agreements with Britain, Mossadeq proposed nationalization of oil as the only means to insure Iran's independence. The National Front led by Mossadeq along with the clerical faction of the opposition started a public debate in favor of nationalization as early as June 1950 (Abrahamian 1982: 263). The proposal soon found enormous public support which overwhelmed the Shah and the conservative parliament. Ayatollah Kashani, the prominent clerical leader of the movement, supported the nationalization and asked "Sincere Muslims and patriotic citizens to fight against the enemies of Islam and Iran by joining the nationalization struggle" (quoted in Abrahamian, 1982: 265-66). The struggle was waged on various fronts. In the majlis, nationalist deputies fought with royalist and centrist members. Ayatollah Kashani, supported primarily by low-ranking clergy and the students in seminaries, spearheaded a popular mobilization in the local mosques to build support for nationalization. The bazzar, merchants, and petty bourgeoisie in general, rallied behind

the movement led by the clergy. The Tudeh party organized the working class and progressive intellectual constituencies. By March 1951 this powerful alliance forced the majlis to pass the nationalization bill. A few days later Mossadeq was elected prime minister marking the first unstable beginings of quasi-democratic government in modern Iranian history. This experiment soon came to an end with the coup of August 1953 which was supported by the United States.

The leading clergyman whose name is justly linked with the nationalization movement is Ayatollah Kashani. His political career began early in Iraq, as a result of which he was sentenced to death in absentia in 1919 for fighting against the British mandate. He managed to escape to Iran where he re-emerged in the late 1940s as an advocate of the Palestinian cause and later of the nationalization movement (Algar, 1972: 241). His emergence as the sole clerical opposition happened in an era when the clerical establishment was relatively apolitical. The highest ranking marja of the time, Ayatollah Borujerdi, was particularly in favor of the idea of clerical participation in politics (Richard 1983: 120).[15] This, however, did not prevent Kashani and some other members of the clergy from actively mobilizing their constituencies in support of Mossadeq. Many pages have been written and many arguments have been advanced about the goals of Kashani.[16] There seems to be agreement on at least two principal

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[15] He convened a conference in 1950 which was attended by almost 2,000 members of the clergy. The principal resolution passed in the conference prohibited the clergy from engaging in political activities (Akhavi, 1980: 63; Richard, 1983: 120).

[16] See Yazdi (1990: 282) who distinguishes between "three types of interest that may motivate members of the clergy to become involved in politics: religious, clerical corporate, and national." He seems to place Kashani in the last category more than

stands repeatedly taken by him. First, he passionately opposed to foreign, especially British, domination exemplified by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Second, he emphatically opposed the despotic tendencies of the monarchy.[17] Anything beyond these stands seems to be subject to contention among scholars dealing with Iran. What can be said for certain is that he lacked a solid and coherent ideological project as a basis for his actions. He never consistently argued for the establishment of an Islamic state, although he often pointed to the inseparability of religion and politics.

Kashani had access to two major resources on which the National Front could not easily lay its hands. As a prominent clergyman with a backdrop of long standing political activism he could appeal to the masses at different levels. Being isolated by the high-ranking clerics, he found his major support among low and medium ranking clergy who had institutional power in various communities and mosques. These became critical loci of mass mobilization in support of Mossadeq. They, for the most part, lent their support to Mossadeq who knew that without the clergy's active involvement his chance for victory would be slim. Cottom (1979: 154) suggests that:

> The Mossadeqists needed Kashani. As he demonstrated very clearly in the Tabriz election, Kashani and his religious followers could defeat their liberal nationalist opponents by virtue of their greater appeal to the lower-middle class, lower class, and peasant elements. In the major pro-nationalist demonstrations throughout 1951-52 Kashani supporters almost always predominated.

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others.

[17] Algar (1972: 241), Akhavi (1980: 67-69), and Richard (1983: 121) concede to this dual objective of Kashani, with his anti-imperialism being given a heavier weight.

Feda'iyan-e Islam (devotees of Islam), an organization led by charismatic cleric Navab Safavi, despite its lack of broad popular support proved to be a critical player in the oil nationalization drama.[18] Strongly committed to the idea of an Islamic state and the elimination of temporal power, they embarked on a violent course by assassinating top government officials.[19] Feda'iyan, a highly political and militant force, was not welcomed by the clerical establishment. They found their natural ally in the person of Kashami. Following a short period of cooperation, particularly after Mossadq became prime minister, the warm relationship between Kashani and Feda'iyan started to fade. Criticizing Mossadeq's reformism, the Feda'iyan later broke away from the nationalist coalition and began campaigning heavily against Mossadeq. The tension rose to a point where the government arrested the supreme leader of Feda'iyn and executed him in 1953. Shortly after that, the relationship between Mossadeq and Kashani also deteriorated.[20] This strain was enough to endanger the entire coalition inviting those loyal to the monarchy and foreign elements to move against Mossadeq. The fracturing of the nationalist coalition coupled with the crumbling of the economic situation, due to the oil blockade, provided fertile ground for foreign powers to exploit (Elm, 1992: 295). The

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[18] It is clear that their prolonged struggle, often violent, accelerated the course of events in such a way to put the regime in the defensive. Cottam (1979: 151) goes as far to claim that Razmara's assassination by Feda'iyan "inaugurated the Mossadeq era of extreme nationalism."

[19] Two of their most important victims were prime minister Ali Razmara and minister of court Hazhir (Akhavi, 1980: 68).

[20] Feda'iyan's motivation to exit the coalition was mostly ideological, whereas Kashani's departure has been attributed to ideological, political-jurisdictional, and personal reasons.

combination of these elements led to the orchestration of the Anglo-American Coup in August 1953 which ended the nationalist government of Mossadeq closing a turbulent chapter in Iranian history.

With the collapse of the multi-class alliance of the nationalization movement, the clergy suffered a set-back and slipped again into a quietist mode. Between 1960 and 1963 mounting internal and external pressure for reform appeared. Despite official pronouncements of reform, the prevailed totalitarian tendencies of the 1950s were still present. Successive changes of prime minister to fine tune the consolidation of the Shah's power went nowhere, and parliamentary elections were viewed, quite justly, as propaganda and basically rigged. In the same period Iran was experiencing a deep economic downturn to which the Shah was impelled to respond (Avery; 1969: 401).[21] Some of the steps that were taken included land reform, women suffrage, and revision of local election procedures. Reaction to these reforms inaugurated the mass mobilization of 1962-63 in which Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the unchallengeable and most respected leader.

Eexactly what ignited the social upheaval of this era is still clouded by factual ambiguity and ideological predispositions. Regardless of the issue involved, it is reasonable to argue that the appearance of Ayatollah Khomeni with his activist theology could not have happened at a better time. For, all major disturbances were initiated as a response to his speeches from the pulpits of seminaries or mosques. The death of

[21] The response was to rely heavily on American financial help which was coincided with coming to power of the Democratic president J.F.K.

Ayatollah Borujerdi, the sole marja of the Shi'i world, in March 1961 cleared the way for Ayatollah Khomeinis's ascendancy to the position of marjaiat (source of imitation). Despite the existence of other prominent ulama, it was he who captured the attention of Iranians as the leading alternative to fill the vacuum created by Borujerdi's death.[22]

His opposition to local elections led to an organized nationwide protest in which, for the first time since the nationalization movement, the clergy played an important role.[23] The confrontation with the regime escalated after the Shah tried to challenge the ulama by resorting to a referendum to put a stamp of popular approval on his newly proposed reform package.[24] The ulama's opposition was not to the reform package per se. In all likelihood, the election bill was seen as a further steo toward the destruction of traditional social organization and the subordination of Iran's religious and moral structure to a Western social project. Ayatollah Khomenini, ruling the referendum unconstitutional, called for its boycott and invited other ulama and the public to express their disapproval of the bill. The National Front also boycotted the referendum not so much because it opposed the content of the reform program as because it felt that a

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[22] Among these were Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Ayatollah Milani, and Ayatollah Khunsari who were all in Iran at the time. Two other candidates, Ayatollah Khu'i and Ayatollah Hakim, were residents of Iraq (Algar, 1972: 245).

[23] This bill proposed to enfranchise women and Substitute Quran with the clause "holy book," which would mean that representatives of the parliament could swear on their own holy books.

[24] The six-point reform, which was called the "white revolution," included: (1) land reform; (2) sale of government-owned factories; (3) a new election bill aimed at preventing fraud; (4) the nationalization of forests; (5) the formation of a teacher corps for rural education; (6) workers profit-sharing in state-owned factories (Cottam, 1979: 306).

legitimate parliamentary election would have been a far more valid exercise of popular sovereignty (Cottam 1979: 307). By January 1963 the of protest was in full swing with the clergy, led by the uncompromising Ayatollah Khomeini, pushing their way into the forefront of the movement.

After numerous speeches in early 1963 in which he rigorously criticized the regime's policies, particularly in the foreign relations area, the gulf between the opposition and the regime widened and this made the latter even more authoritarian and repressive. In March 1963, the famous Faydiya Seminary in Qum was attacked by the security forces resulting in a number of deaths. The breaking of the sanctuary of a sacred place of learning was central to the further radicalization of Ayatollah Khomeini and the movement in general. Upon his release from temporary detention, Ayatollah Khomeini continued his forthright denunciation of the Shah culminating in the famous speech of 3 June 1963. In this speech he targeted the Shah and questioned outright the legitimacy of the regime. Responding to the Shah's accusations, he stated:

> If the tyrannical regime of Iran simply wished to wage war on the maraji, to oppose the ulama what business did it have tearing the Qur'an to shreds on the day it attacked Fayziya Madrasa?..We come to the conclusion that this regime also has a more basic aim: they are fundamentally opposed to Islam itself and the existence of the religious class... They [ulama] desire the welfare of the country. Don't listen to Israel; Israel can't do anything for you... You miserable wretch, forty five years of your life have passed; isn't it time for you to think and reflect a little, to ponder about where all this is leading you, to learn a lesson from the experience of your father? (Khomeini, 1981:177, 179)

His arrest the following day touched off massive demonstrations in Tehran, Qum, and other major cities. The regime's reaction was swift and savage resulting in heavy casualties.[25] Despite the pressure exerted on Khomeini to silence him after his release sometimes later, he kept on attacking the regime with intensity and from every direction possible. A a result he wound up in temporary detention and under house arrest again. Khomeini did not miss the opportunity to further excoriate the government when it granted capitulatory rights to American military advisers and personnel and requested a $200 million loan from the United States for the purchase of armaments. In an emotional speech following the approval of the bill by the parliament, Ayatollah Khomeini blasted the regime for trampling on the dignity of the Iranian army and the nation as a whole (Khomeini, 1981: 181). Referring to the bill while addressing the public, he went on to argue that:

> If some American's servant, some American's cook, assassinates your marja in the middle of the bazaar, or runs over him, the Iranian police do not have the right to apprehend him!... They passed it without any shame, and the government shamelessly defended this scandalous measure. They have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog...why? Because they wanted a loan and America demanded this in return... The government has sold our independence, reduced us to the level of a colony, and made the Muslim nation of Iran appear more backward than savages in the eyes of the world (Khomeini, 1981: 181-82).

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[25] The number of fatalities is still subject to dispute and ranges anywhere from 1,000 to about 15,000. A more agreed-upon figure among outside observers seems to be about 3,000 death nationwide.

This speech together with the subsequent pronouncements and popular unrest prompted the government to exile Ayatollah Khomeini to Turkey in November 1964. After one year, he moved to Iraq where communication channels to Iran were much better, and Shi'ite religious centers could also provide him an environment for both scholarship and political activism. The bloody crackdown of June 1963 and the exiling of Khomeini by no means ended the conflict between the state and the clergy. Paradoxically, as I will argue later, the very failure of the movement contributed to the victory of the Islamic revolution in February 1979. The revolution was a logical continuation of the previous movement as many have argued.

The entrenched authoritarianism of the regime in the 1960s and 1970s, which rested on a strong coercive apparatus and expanded bureaucracy, put down virtually all forms of dissent, but could not extinguish the revolutionary potential generated by the 1963 movement. Between 1964 and 1978, when mass mobilization surfaced under clerical leadership, many deciples of Ayatollah Khomeini took the cause seriously and started a campaign on four different fronts. First, efforts were made, Khomeini being the the chief architect, to reform the clerical institution from within making it more compatible with the revolutionary conception of Islam. The reform, though opposed by the conservative establishment, was reasonably successful in altering the theoretical, methodological, and spiritual character of some of the clerical institutions (Algar, 1988: 281-82).[26] Second, the clergy gained a better organized and stronger presence in

[26] According to Algar, these reformist measures in the religious institutions began in Khomeini's own classes and later, particularly after Borujerdi's death in 1961, became a more extended project. For a discussion of other efforts with similar agenda, carried

cultural and educational activities. This allowed them to build linkages with some segments of society where thay had previously had little influence. For example, some leading ulama took teaching positions in major universities.[27]

Third, as a result of the previous two changes, the activist ulama became more efficient in building coalitions with intellectuals and nationalists, both religious and secular. In other words, the new vitality in the clerical institution engendered by the Khomeini generation made the creation of a unified front more feasible than ever. Last but not the least, was open political opposition by the clergy. Despite intense repression, a small number of clergy, mostly Khomeini's students, openly and persistently challenged the state. The reaction was often exile, imprisonment, or execution.[28] It was the combination of these efforts that made the clergy potentially the most powerful actor standing against the regime. Thus, it was not surprising that when political "stability" ruptured early in 1978 and the new cycle of mass mobilization began, the clergy were able to mobilize a wide range of resources thereby subordinating other members of the revolutionary coalition.

This new cycle began on January 7, 1978 with the publication of an article in the state-run newspaper Ettela'at in which Khomeini's past and personality were slanderously

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on mainly by Khomeini's students, see Akhavi (1980: 118-20).

[27] The most prominent of these were Ayatollah Mottahari and Ayatollah Moffateh, both of whom became professors of philosophy and theology in Tehran University.

[28] Ayatollah Saidi and Ayatollah Ghaffari, two famous and adamant critics of the regime, were tortured to death in the 1970s. The former was arrested when a declaration written by him harshly attacked the regime for expanding American investment in Iran (Algar, 1972: 250).

attacked. This incident was serious enough to create an uproar in the city of Qum, where theology students staged a massive demonstration defiantly condemning the Shah personally for the first time in a public arena. The demonstration was put down brutally resulting in the death of close to seventy people, according to some reliable reports. A spontaneous coalition was formed in reaction to the Qum massacre. At the request of Khomeini and other ulama, and with the support of the National Front and other organizations, the nation prepared to commemorate the victims of the Qum massacre on the fortieth day following the tragedy.[29]

During February 1978, a fortieth day procession ended in a bloody confrontation with security forces in Tabriz, a city with of strong religious sentiments and a history of political activism. The resulting massacre claimed many more lives and produced heavy property damage. After the Tabriz massacre, a full-blown cycle of commemoration was in motion in different cities. Each fortieth day ceremony led to another, interconnecting the entire nation by a single course of action with parallel mechanisms for challenging the state. Thus, after Tabriz came the massacres in Yazd, Shiraz, Abadan, and Tehran. Funeral services and commemorations of the martyrs every forty day, were invaluable weapons in the arsenal of the rebellious groups, the utilization of which insured a sense of continuity in collective action. Furthermore, the chain reaction placed the burden of

[29] It is a common religious tradition to hold memorial services for the deceased in the third, seventh, and fortieth day of the death.

leadership directly on the clergy. The massacre of September 8, 1978, known as "Black Friday", terminated of the first protest cycle and acted as a prelude to the second.[30]

The second phase was characterized by its intensity and scope. In other words, vertical and horizontal expansion of the movement among social groups and the scars left by the massacre caused most of the population to join the revolutionary camp. As the second phase was beginning, Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from Iraq and after searching for a new place to live he took up residence in a suburb of Paris in October 1978. Selecting Paris in the heart of Europe gave Khomeini valuable access to the mass media by which he could communicate both with his followers in Iran and world public opinion (Keddie, 1981: 251). The chief tactic used in the second cycle was mass demonstrations with, at its peak, more than two million participants, a phenomenon unseen or unheard of in any social revolution in the history of the world. The intensification of mass demonstrations took place in Ramadan, the month of fasting in the Islamic Calendar, when religious ceremonies and festivities could arouse the public around a unifying theme in the pursuit of collective goals. At the same time, Ayatollah Khomeini's declarations and speeches, distributed in vast numbers, formulated further the uncompromising demand for the ouster of the Shah and the dismantling of the monarchy.

In this phase, the lower-ranking clergy at the community mosques became the only agents who could organize and lead collective action at the local level due to their loyalty

[30] The number of death in this massacre which happened in Jaleh square in Tehran has been contradictory. It ranges from 500 to more than 4,000. Based on different accounts, it seems reasonable to estimate the fatalities at around 600 to 800.

to Khomeini.[31] In the latter part of 1978, the popular movement was for all practical purposes under the command of grassroots organization led by the clergy, at the top of which stood Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris. The populist pressure from below and firm revolutionary positions taken by those above forced the liberal nationalists to support the Khomeini led opposition with its revolutionary platform. The formation of this coalition further strengthened the opposition, while the state's violence helped to unify the different factions within that coalition. Strikes became commonplace in this phase with the clergy and bazaar, who controlled the financial resources, helping those who were hurt by the strikes (Green, 1982: 108-110).

Martial law and conciliatory overtures toward Ayatollah Khomeini could not neutralize the mass mobilization under way in this period. The religions opposition, owing to its superior organizational structure and the resiliency of its mobilizing ideology, managed to set the collective goals and strategy of the revolutionary movement. The irreversible course of the revolutionary transformation put the clergy at the center of the collective action cycles until the collapse of the state in February 1979.[32] Thus, as previously, the clergy played a significant historical role but this time their activity was notable for its greater extent, intensity, and duration.

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[31] It must be noted that many of these local preachers were previously apolitical. But, as in the prior social movements, they got involved as soon as an eminent marja assumed the leadership of the oppositional movement.

[32] By irreversible I intent to argue that by October 1978 the question to prominent figures of the revolutionary leadership was no longer whether thy would succeed, but when they will overrun the state. This was a purposive program of action for many revolutionaries, the feasibility of which was irrelevant at the time.

The Bazaar

The history of collective action and the periodic class alliances that were formed against the centralized power of the state cannot be adequately explained without some reflection on the role of bazaaris in Iran. The bazaar in Iran, as the center of the commercial activities of urban life, is an interconnected network of merchants (retailers and wholesalers), shopkeepers, and artisans who are involved in exchange relations between themselves and with the outlying markets. Although identified as a class in this project, bazaaris are not a class in Marxist sense, for their relations to the means of production are not uniform and do not constitute a single positional arrangement (Keddie, 1981: 244). This compositional diversity makes it difficult to look for the ownership of the means of production as the primary indicator of class location. Indeed, both very rich and moderately well-off merchants, involved in petty trade, are often considered to be bazaaris. Both petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie are members of this class. Hierarchical structure of ownership does not exclude them from membership of the bazaari class.

If using economic criteria for describing the bazaar as a class inhibits our understanding of Iran's class structure, what needs to be added to the analysis. First, the bazaar is not merely a marketplace for exchange activities. It is also a communal and associational structure which maintains a sense of cultural continuity and ideational identity.[33] Sustaining a communal identity has given rise to a distinctive organizational

[33] John Gulick (1969: 122-58) makes an interesting argument that the urbanized life in Middle Eastern cities manifests a quality of cultural continuity despite accelerated urbanization. This continuity also, according to him, renders rural-urban distinctions somehow meaningless.

autonomy and collective solidarity. Second, despite variations in status, social bonds among members of the bazaar are strong and rooted in basically similar cultural references (Bonine, 1981: 234). That is why, most often, one can observe striking similarity in life styles and common membership in different voluntary organizations. What binds this class together is a unique value structure grounded in Shi'i Islam. Here lies the source of allegiance to the clergy, who are viewed by bazaaris as the historically authentic and most trustworthy guardians of Shi'i Islam. This cordial relationship organically related to a particular religious frame of reference has been, over the last century, responsible for the strong anti-Western sentiments of the bazaar-ulama alliance in Iran.

Bazaaris have generally been practicing Muslims whose adherence to strict moral codes has persisted over generations. Religious values have not only guided personal action, but have also provided a framework within which ethical business transactions could take place.[34] This religious morality has made the durable relationship between bazaaris and the clergy a particularly strong one. Paying religious taxes to the clergy, supporting charitable activities, and holding religious commemorations have been essential in re-enforcing this interlocking relationship between the two institutions. Furthermore, inter-marriages have been fairly common between bazaaris and the clergy. Thus, a historical affinity, the emergence of which goes back to the nineteenth century, has existed between these two classes. This affinity has manifested itself in unified

[34] See Fischer (1980: 150-59) for a general account of Islamic economics as formulated and advocated by Shi'i texts.

collective action against the state, particularly when the latter's policies have undermined the prerogatives of both the bazaar and clergy.

Other features of the bazaar as an institution to which one has to pay attention were its physical structure and geographical location in urban centers. Situated in a congested area, usually in downtown districts, bazaaris were in constant and intimate interaction with each other. Hence as a community with overlapping communication channels they tended to be attentive to each other's problems (Ashraf and Banuazizi, 1985:29). At the center of this associational pattern lay numerous mosques which merchants and bazaar workers used for their daily prayers and as places to meet and discuss issues as well. The mosques in the bazaar area were central to the preservation of a cohesive cultural framework organically linking the bazaaris to the clergy. Last but not the least, the physical and architectural structure of the bazaar with hundreds of back alleys made it a perfect location for demonstrations and other forms of collective action. The density of shops and neighborhoods made it almost impossible for security forces to track down people engaged in urban rebellion.[35]

The bazaar, notwithstanding its diversity of political orientation, has generally acted as a collectivity in the modern history of Iran. The bazaaris were an essential part of the broad-based Tobacco Movement (1891-92) against the state and its attempt to grant an enslaving concession to a British subject. In the constitutional movement (1905-11)

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[35] Early in 1978, I happened to be involved in a few mass demonstrations in the city of Shiraz. As soon as security forces started attacking the front rows of the demonstration, people escaped to back alleys of the bazaar area where they could not be followed. Even if security forces could manage to pursue demonstrators, the residents of the area would normally hide them.

the bazaar's contribution was central to the building of an effective coalition that ended the reign of a despotic monarchy. The nationalization movement of 1951-53 attested to the bazaar's persistent role in revolutionary movements. Through independently formed guilds, bazaaris supported Mossadeq's populist and nationalist economic policies. They actively participated in street demonstrations against the Shah and frequently, fifty times according to one estimate, closed down the entire bazaar to back Mossadeq's popular program (Parsa, 1989: 96). In critical days prior to and after the August 1953 Coup, bazaaris continued their strikes and open denunciation of the regime despite intense pressure from the government to open their shops. As a sign of their resentment of Mossadeq's overthrow and his public trial, many bazaaris went on strike again, and this resulted in the arrest of a few hundred of them (Parsa, 1989: 98). The regime went even further and physically destroyed part of the bazaar as a reprisal for the bazaaris' involvement in the oil nationalization movement. After the coup, a consolidated authoritarian monarchy resorting to coercion managed to quiet down any dissent originating from the bazaar. Between 1953 and about 1977, when a revolutionary situation emerged, the protest movement of the bazaar as a whole resurfaced only in the June 1963 uprising. However, during this period a few small political organizations were secretly established by some veteran activists in the bazaar. The most famous of these was of course Hayat-Ha-ye Mo'talefeh Islami which undertook, a not very well-thought out or articulated armed struggle.[36] The principal organizers of this group and its

[36] Their most important operation was the assassination of prime minister Hassan Ali mansur in January 1965.

financial support came from the bazaar. The major cadres were soon arrested along with their bazaari sympathizers, but a few secret cells survived as part of the broader clergy-bazaar movement.

It is obvious that one also has to look beyond the use of coercion by the state for a convincing explanation of the bazaar's continuous participation in collective action, particularly in the 1977-79 revolutionary process. The structural transformation of the economy and the ambitious developmentalism of the Pahlavis were undoubtedly perceived as a death knell, at least to the bazaaris. The crash industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s prepared a favorable environment for the development of a modern bourgeoisie whose investment in industrial projects squeezed the traditional sector (Mozaffari, 1991: 384). New industrialists, supported by the state through various incentive mechanisms such as easy credit and tax exemption, mushroomed across the country and began taking over certain areas of commerce that had traditionally been left to the bazaar. Modernization accelerated urbanization hence expanding the need for new commercial centers in Tehran and other major cities. The physical expansion of the cities created new competitors, who came partly from the new bourgeoisie, thus increasing the pressure already felt by the bazaar (Bonine 1981: 235-36).[37]

In the 1970s, the state expanded its direct control over the bazaar by taking charge of independent guilds which had historically contributed to the autonomy of the bazaar as a corporate entity. As the Shah began to diminish the bazaar's influence over the

[37] As Bonine argues, in some cases part of the bazaar was destroyed to construct new avenues and streets to help the development of new commercial districts.

commercial life of Iran, the inflationary trend of the mid-1970s undermined the economic stability that had been enjoyed by the modernizing elites. A substantial increase in the cost-of-living hurt both the middle and working classes. This was happening at a time when the oil revenue had been sharply increased, and the "oil bourgeoisie" seemed to be the principal beneficiary of the early boom (Abrahamian, 1982: 497). The Shah's response to the inflationary situation was an "anti-profiteering campaign" against the bazaar accompanied by strict price controls and heavier taxation. Guild courts were established by SAVAK to prosecute the presumed bazaari profiteers.[38] When the state stepped up its interventionist policies and tightened its control over the bazaar, the natural tendency was for the internal cohesion and solidarity of the bazaar to increase and for it to turn to the clergy for help. As the revolutionary fervor heated up, bazaaris continued their struggle against the Shah by closing their shops and providing financial help to the victims of the violent confrontation with the state and strikes in other sectors of the economy. In the latter part of 1978 and early 1979, the bazaars of major cities were shut down continuously in unified defiance of the regime.

The regime's expectation that the bazaar would be uprooted as an inevitable consequence of modernization proved to be wishful thinking. As an enclosed and fairly autonomous socio-cultural and exchange network, the bazaar managed to reassert itself as an indispensable component of the challenging coalition. Moreover, despite the

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[38] Abrahamian (1982: 498) describes how "Guild Courts set up by SAVAK gave out some 250,000 fines, banned 23,000 traders from their home towns, handed out to some 8,000 shopkeepers prison sentences ranging from two months to three years, and brought charges against another 180,000 small businessmen."

diminishing power of the bazaaris, their economic influence in general was not inconsequential.[39] In the revolutionary movement of 1977-79, they had linked up with other social classes in a systematic way. In particular, bazaaris' sons and daughters were now the intellectual soldiers of a new and more powerful form of collective action. This significantly altered, the rapidity and nature of the coalition formation process.

It would be a mistake to attribute the bazaaris' participation to the economic dislocation that they experienced during the modernization process. Although under pressure, many of them did still enjoy a decent standard of living and steady flow of income. The continuity of the bazaaris' role in collective action indicates the centrality of religio-cultural factors which organized the discourse of political action. It is similarly a mistake to search for an exclusively cultural explanation. What made the bazaar's mobilization more potent this time was the opportunity structure they had and the maximum utilization of resources at that historical juncture. There was an interplay of a mobilizing ideology and painful experiences produced by structural realignments a changing economy. How can then we explain the predominance of the clergy-bazaar alliance and their significant mobilizing capacity in the course of the revolution? This is a question that I will try to answer in the next section.

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[39] According to Graham (1979: 229), the bazaar in the 1970s, despite adverse policies of the state, still controlled close to two-thirds of the domestic wholesale trade and about 30 percent of total imports. This indicates that their financial and organizational autonomy was largely intact.

Theoretical Appraisal

Convinced of the indispensability of the clergy and bazaar to the success of the revolutionary movement, I now turn to the question of why they dominated a multi-class revolutionary coalition and managed to perform their historical function as consensus builders. Using Tilly's conceptualization, I argued earlier that collective action is determined by group's shared interests, organization, and mobilization (1978: 81). Interest has already had its share of discussion and refinement. Here I will discuss the problems pertaining to mobilization and organization. Mobilization refers to "the extent of resources under the collective control of the contender" (Tilly 1978:54). Tilly like many other resource mobilization theorists uses a market analysis in operationalizing resources. The principal criterion is the "intrinsic character" of the resources rather than their use. This argument moves him further toward an economistic explanation. That is why he suggests that:

> If we are actually comparing the current mobilization levels of several groups, or trying to gauge a group's change over time, we will ordinarily do better to fall back on the economist's factor of production: land, labor, capital, perhaps technical expertise as well. To the extent that all of the resources have well-established market values in the population at large, reliance on production factors will help us set rates of return for resources expended in the political arena. (Tilly, 1978: 67)

This analysis then impels Tilly to exclude commitment, loyalty, and obligation from the list of resources and consider them as merely "conditions affecting the likelihood that resources will be delivered when called for. Oberschall's list of resources includes

"anything from material resources to non-material resources--authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry, and so on" (1973: 28). Gamson assembles resources based on their "means of utilization" (1968: 100).[40] Ample evidence points to the the centrality, in the Iranian case, of commitment, obligation, and loyalty, the utilization of which changed the contour of collective action against the state.

Extensive use of funeral ceremonies for the commemoration of the martyrs brought the communities together and tied them to the leadership of the revolution. Religious processions, rituals used to revive the concepts of endurance and sacrifice, have long been a tradition in the Shi'i community. The Islamic calendar furthermore, is full of occasions to which Shi'ites pay a great deal of attention by holding gatherings in which the clergy play the leading role in recollecting the shared grievances of the entire community. These traditions built into the culture and collective experience of the population were indeed vital to the creation of a sense of commitment and obligation which in turn could be used to sanction collective action. The central unifying "schemata of interpretation", operating as a set of rhetorical and symbolic resources was what Fischer (1980: 13) has called "the Karbala paradigm." This is an intersubjectively communicated understanding about Imam Hussein's martyrdom in Karbala.

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[40] His categorization includes constraint resources, inducement resources, and persuasion resources. The last one includes three different subcategories: (a) communication, media, and skills; (b) reputation for wisdom; and (c) personal attraction. It is this last category that seems to be some applicability in the Iranian case. See Gamson (1968: 102).

> The Karbala paradigm is the story of Husayn, the third part of the origin legend of Muhammad, 'Ali, Hussayn. It is the part that is the most emotionally intense and concentrated, and is the reference point for almost all popular preaching. It is however, only intelligible as the climax to the story of Ali. Its focus is the emotionally potent theme of corrupt and oppressive tyranny repeatedly overcoming (in this world) the steadfast dedication to pure truth; hence its ever-present, latent, political potential to frame or cloth contemporary discontents (Fischer 1980: 13).

The Karbala paradigm, an architectonic meaning frame, integrated the entire inventory of cultural resources and symbols in a powerful way making them available for use in mass mobilization. It was a cultural drama with enormous "mobilizing potency," to borrow from Snow and Benford (1992: 140), carved from everyday religious experience and the socio-cultural history of the nation. It was a means by which one could make sense of existing grievances and search for modes of expression and mobilization, which were themselves part of the same cultural system. The actors did not have to search for empirical validity outside the meaning systems that they shared.[41] The meaning systems were both resources for and modes of articulation justifying action in pursuit of collective goals. The intersubjectively constituted belief systems provided not only a reservoir of resources that could be used but also created a collective identity

[41] I use empirical simply to note the actors' perception of the existing grievances which are corroborated by the cultural systems with which they identify. Snow and Benford (1992:) delineate three factors that affect collective action frames' resonance. They are empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and ideational centrality or narrative fidelity. For the, empirical credibility is "the apparent evidential basis for a master frame's diagnostic claims."

which could enlist other non-cultural resources and facilitate their delivery.[42] Tilly's assignment of market values to intertextual resources makes them marginal. They simply influence the utilization of other resources such as money, time, skill, weapon and etc. By contrast, I argue that cultural symbols and linguistic codes have autonomous mobilizing capability, and when appropriated at a strategic juncture, they can induce mass collective action (Tarrow, 1992: 174). The clergy, being an integral part of this cultural frame of meaning had a structural advantage over other challengers in defining the conflict and its parameters. Their social hegemony was indeed essential for extracting resources from other social classes, particularly the bazaar community whose alliance with the clergy had a culturally defined and historically persistent anchor. As the revolutionary process gathered momentum, the clergy's control over cultural resources enabled them to further frame the revolution in religious terms thus strengthening the identification of individuals and groups with the movement's ideology.

In addition to culturally constituted resources and organically related to them, there were pre-existing organizational networks within the social structure which enhanced the prevalence of the clergy over other challengers. Although scholars of social movements (Gamson, 1968, 1990; Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978) have paid attention to the pre-existing organizational structures as a key variable in movement success, the Iranian revolution has provided a new dimension to our

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[42] Following Friedman and McAdam (1992: 157), I use the concept of collective identity to refer to an individual's proclamation of status plus group affiliation, both of which go beyond the atomistic conceptions of individual "rational" action. As they argue, "collective identities function as selective incentives motivating participation."

understanding of their role. The symbolism of religious life was tightly intertwined with extensive networks of communal and grassroots organizations. The vast number of neighborhood mosques and religions associations provided a place for congregation and exchange of news and information about the ongoing activities of both the regime and the revolutionaries.[43] The dissemination of revolutionary preachings and messages wrapped in religious symbolism and metaphors further solidified the role of the clergy as the carriers of revolutionary ideology. The bazaar guilds which were traditionally connected to local mosques presented another set of overlapping communal networks. Unlike many organizations responsible for social movements in liberal democracies, these congregational associations were not implanted at some point by external activists. Instead they evolved as socially embedded institutions whose contributions to social solidarity and collective mobilization were undeniable. For this very reason, mosques and other associational networks were relatively immune from state repression. The state could not easily close mosques or theological seminaries thus they became one of the few vehicles for collective mobilization.

The clerical organization, not hierarchically structured like that of many Christian churches also improved enormously after the 1950s. The clerical establishment went through an organizational revolution of sorts which was chiefly initiated by Ayatollah Borujerdi. New bookkeeping methods, supervisional mechanisms for tighter control over

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[43] Arjomand (1988: 92) suggests that "by 1974 there were 322 Hosayniyyeh-type centers for commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hosayn and other religious events in Tehran, 305 in Khuzestan, and 731 in Azerbaijan. In addition, there over 12,300 religious associations in Tehran alone, most of which were formed after 1965."

local clergy, and more structured admission and evaluation standards were introduced (Algar, 1972: 243). This became the basis for the emergence of an efficient clerical network and local grassroots religious organizations. This extensive network was not, however, used by a majority of the ulama for political purposes since the majority of them, for most of this period, remained politically inactive. This culturally-embedded network was brought to the service of the revolutionary movement by two developments.

The first was the appearance of Ayatollah Khomeini who was armed with the first systematic political theory to emerge in many generations. In a series of lectures, later published in 1970 as a book entitled Islamic Government: Guardianship of the Jurisconsult, he articulated a theoretical argument for the inseparability of politics and religion. It rested on the notion that the artificial distinction made between the political and moral spheres was an absurd innovation introduced after the golden age of Islam. The novelty of Khomeini's political theory lays in his extensive use of logical reasoning to justifying the authority of fagih (jurist). In his view, as Fischer (1982: 117) says, "That the clergy are heirs to the Imams is openly admitted to be based more on logical deduction than on documentation: the hadith on which such a claim to leadership by the clergy might be based are weak." Although I feel that the claim might better be called controversial and debatable than weak, the general proposition seems to be plausible. Thus, the "logical intent" of Islam is used as a basis for the clergy's claim to legitimate power.

Second, he managed during his teaching career in the seminaries at Qum to train a few hundred students who later formed the corpus of a new generation of revolutionary

clergy.[44] Deeply committed to Khomeini's political philosophy, this new generation of clergy assembled resources and revitalized the organizational structure of the religions establishment thus strengthening its capacity for collective action. It was not the formation or professinalization of these organizations that contributed to the movement's success, although increasing efficiency in communication networks was of enormous help, it was rather the revitalization of an organizational infrastructure built into the fabrics of the social structure that gave rise to mass mobilization. Indigenous mechanisms, not the external entrepreneurial resources, were essential to the development of the movement's organization. Participants, in other words, did not have to rely on organizers from outside to create a new highly effective pattern of organization since they were already organized (Oberschall and Farris, 1985). It is my argument that the entrepreneurial perspective, chiefly articulated by McCarthy and Zald (1977), is inadequate for addressing the organizational attributes of the successful revolutionary movement in Iran. Tilly (1978), who pays much attention to organizations and their internal characteristics and dynamics, also fails to conceptualize organizing as a process in which linkages between movement participants and movement objectives are constantly being reproduced by the meaningful experience of challengers who are part of a pre-existing social network.

To sum up, I contend that the clergy-bazaar alliance did enjoy an overwhelming advantage over other challengers because it collectively controlled strategic resources. This control over resources and the capability to deliver them was an integral part of a

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[44] Arjomand (1988: 98) estimates that by the mid-1970s he had trained more that 500 mujtahids. Altogether about 12,000 students attended his classes before his exile in 1964.

socio-culturally constituted meaning system largely defined by the clergy. Furthermore, the intrinsic quality of these cultural resources made the state less capable of demobilizing the clergy than other challengers. When the structural conditions, as explained in previous chapters, presented the opportunity, the clergy moved in to perform its historical function of leading mass-based collective action. This time, however, it was intent on seizing the state power. By advancing exclusive claims to replace the state it signaled the emergence of multiple sovereignty, which I shall discuss in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII

MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNTY AND SEIZURE OF STATE POWER

We started with macro-structural determinants of collective action and worked our way down to the processes of mobilization with the help of challengers which, using a variety of culturally constituted resources, aggressively engaged in collective action in pursuit of their stated claims. In this chapter, I will attempt to explain how and why purposive mobilization and action in Iran led to the rise of a revolutionary situation and from there to a revolutionary outcome. Furthermore, I will evaluate the utility of Tilly's conceptual model for the Iranian case. Tilly (1978: 190) contends that "The distinguishing characteristic of a revolutionary situation as Leon Trotsky said long ago is the presence of more than one bloc effectively exercising control over a significant part of the state apparatus." What control means here is not entirely clear. Tilly's theoretical formulations lead one to inconsistencies in definitional underpinnings of his theory. Does control mean activly performing part of the state's functions, such as coercion, administration, or distribution of resources or, as in the Iranian case, can a revolutionary situation exist even though the revolutionaries have not taken over some of the state functions?. In other words, is the expanding support base of a revolutionary coalition, whose claims of legitimacy have been widely condoned by popular collective action, evidence of the presence of a revolutionary situation. The problem is the confusion between the outcome and process since taking over part of the state could be both a cause

and an outcome. The existence of claims which are mutually exclusive and which challenge the state signifies the presence of multiple sovereignty which is "the identifying feature of revolutionary situations" (Tilly 1978: 191). Tilly purposes three short-term to mid-term causes for multiple sovereignty. These are:

> (1) The appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government...; (2) commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population (especially when those commitments are not simply acknowledged in principle, but activated in the face of prohibitions or contrary directives from the government); (3) incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of government to suppress the alternative coalitions and/or the commitment to its claims.

What is interesting about the history of revolutionary movements in Iran is that the principal challengers have existed for over one hundred years and have repeatedly demonstrated how they could question the legitimacy of the state through concerted collective action. Furthermore, it is noticeable that little variation has existed in the configuration of members of contending coalitions since the late nineteenth century. The claims to which these challengers have committed themselves have primarily been communicated and advanced in the language of political Islam. Thus, the doctrinal foundation of an alternative polity has long been around in various formulations. The joint action of the clergy, bazaar, and intelligentsia is a testimony to a recurrent form of revolutionary movement with transformative objectives. The mobilization of these groups in the medium-term firmly established a set of claims which were for the most part, at least ever since 1963, quite incompatible with the existence of the regime. As a result

of these efforts, the commitment to these claims expanded across all classes, which points to the second critical cause of multiple sovereignty. It is to this expansion of loyalties that we must look for insights into the distinctive features of the 1977-79 revolutionary movement which caused it to succeed while the others had failed. Traditional members of the challenging coalition, (the clergy, bazaar, and intelligentsia) were joined by two newcomers, the modern middle class and the working class. Their addition, although late in the process, to the revolutionary movement certainly raised the level of commitment thus paving the way for a quantitative and qualitative change in movement participation. The very expansion of commitment also damaged the already eroding capacity of the state to demobilize the movement. The state's inability to suppress the revolutionary movement, the third cause of multiple sovereignty (Tilly, 1978: 209), brings to attention the significance of the armed forces' resolve, or lack therefore, in the final stages of revolutionary transformation. On the following pages, I will describe the collective actions of these late comers to the movement and explicate how they, in the face of the disintegrating coercive apparatus of the state, prepared the way for the emergence of multiple sovereignty.

Industrial Working Class

Most of the dispute over the significance and contributions of the working class to the revolutionary struggle is attributable to two sets of problems. First, definitional ambiguity has caused confusion as to what exactly constitutes the working class. Wage earning and occupational categories or a combination of both have often been used by

analysts. But due to the very complex and overlapping urban occupational structure, different studies have produced different results. Second, and partly as a result of the above problem, data sets do not present a uniform picture of the composition of the labor force. Traditional petty commodity production, rural manufacturing, and other components of industrial production have been incorporated into the statistics differently by different scholars thereby making it difficult to assess the working class as a single and static entity. In this study, however, I concentrate primarily on the industrial working class who seem to have joined the revolutionary coalition fairly late in the process. Moreover, other components of the working class (workshop employees, workers of small manufacturing units, and workers of traditional manufacturers related to the bazaar) were more inclined to link themselves to the organizational structure of the bazaar-clergy networks.

The strategy of import substitution industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s led to a rapid growth of the industrial sector which produced a variety of consumer and intermediate goods. The value of overall industrial output increased by twelve times between 1962-63 and 1977-78 (Katouzaian, 1981: 275). In 1975-6 about 35 percent of total industrial output was produced by "small-scale traditional urban and rural industries, including carpets: and the remaining 8 percent by non-oil mining" (Katouzian, 1981: 281). In spite of inconsistencies in data compilation, a rough and fairly reliable estimate of the increase in the working class population is available. The number of workers in the modern industrial sector rose to 880,000 by 1977. This included 30,000 oil workers; 20,000 electrical, gas, and power workers; 30,000 fishery and lumberyard workers;

50,000 miners; 150,000 railway men, dockers, truck drivers, and other modern transport workers; and 600,000 factory workers employed in plants with more than ten employers.[1]

The economic boom of the 1960s and early 1970s made capital-labor relations fairly stable and trouble free. This was particularly true in the skilled labor force whose wages, in some key industries, rose fourfold between 1971 and 1977. The average wage in some industries jumped by 30 percent in the 1974-1975 and 48 percent in the 1975-76 periods. Not surprisingly, "the rise in the standard of living was most noticeable among skilled factory workers" (Abrahamian, 1982: 511). The inflationary trend of the post-1973 oil boom started crunching the working class in the mid 1970s. Despite falling wages and the rising cost of living, the industrial working class did not reveal any sign of active dissent. The most noticeable confrontation, a violent one, between workers and agents of the state took place in the Jahan Cheet textile factory near Tehran in 1969. The security forces opened fired on the workers who had gone on strike killing fifteen and injuring many more.

In the period of 1977-78, the beginning of the revolutionary situation, there were only seven major industrial strikes (Abrahamian, 1982: 511). The number of small-scale strikes climbed to near twenty in 1974-1975. The worsening standard of living due to massive inflation further encouraged workers to engage in strikes as the only means of

[1] To this, one could add 392,000 wage earners employed by urban services and small manufacturing plants. That makes a total of 1,272,000 workers. The figure even goes beyond 2,400,000 if one includes the urban subproletariat. The figure reaches over 3,500,000 if one adds the rural proletariat (Abrahamian, 1982: 434-35).

expressing dissatisfaction. The frequency and duration of strikes increased as a result of the government's inability to fully respond to the workers' demands. Strikes in the industrial city of Alborz, Ferdows shoe factory in Tehran, a metal factory near Tehran, and automobile plants in and around Tehran were indications of growing discontent with the living conditions of the working class (Parsa, 1989: 143). In this period, the Shah followed a traditional carrot and stick approach. He tried to appese the industrial working class by meeting some of their demands despite unfavorable economic and fiscal conditions. At the same time he frequently used force or the threat of force to demobilize the workers. The state's inability to meet the demands of labor in the face of rising expectations led to the hardening of positions on both sides. The Shah expressed his displeasure harshly.

> This is intolerable. Those who do not work, we shall take them by the tail and throw them out like mice. He who does not do his job properly is betraying not only his own conscience but also his patriotic duty... I remember a few years ago a mason-who is now so much in demand that people have to flatter him-was prepared to work a whole day for a mere meal and he never had enough work. But today, in this period of transition, we are in need of more workers and have to run after them in supplication (quoted in Abrahamian, 1982, 511-12).

Until the summer of 1978, when the number of strikes gradually rose, strikes were generally apolitical. The demands were basically economic and did not articulate a general set of objectives of labor as a whole. By the beginning of the fall, strikes increased both in intensity and number, and for the first time political objectives were part of the demands. September 1978 marked the begining of a new and massive cycle

of labor strikes across the country. The industrial working class was drawn into the conflict by the dynamics of a revolutionary situation in which the traditional middle class and intelligentsia had already made their demands, the most important of which was the dismantling of the monarchy. In this period most major industrial firms witnessed strikes of various durations.[2]

The most critical sector of the labor movement, which has usually been ahead of the others, was oil workers. The oil industry was so critical to both the regime's economic survival and its international credibility that even minimal disruption was intolerable. Oil workers have historically been part of anti-imperialist and nationalist movements in modern Iran. Being relatively modern in character and yet one of Iran's oldest industries, the oil industry's labor force has had more experience than most in organizing collective action. They have also been more politicized than other segments of industrial working class. That is partly traceable to the activities of Marxists groups', particularly the Tudeh party, during the oil nationalization movement. It is also due to a general pride of the labor force in the oil industry because of its significant role in the nationalist struggle of Iran.

The September 1978 cycle of stikes began with the strike of workers in the Tehran oil refinery and Bandar Shahpur Petrochemical Complex. A few days later workers of NIOC (National Iran Oil Company) headquarter in Ahvaz walked out thus encouraging

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[2] For a more detailed account of strikes across the nation see Parsa (1989: 144-56), Abrahamian (1982: 512-18), and Ashraf and Banuazizi (1985: 11-13). Ashraf and Banuazizi in their study characterize the period of mass strikes as stage IV (Oct.-Nov. 1978). Of course, they include modern middle class strikes in the same category.

workers in other plants to do the same. As a result, the strikes grew in numbers causing a substantial drop in oil production by October 1978 (Keddie, 1981: 251). The workers of the world's largest oil refinery at Abadan went on strike in October and demanded the "lifting martial law; the dismissal of General Kolya'i, head of security in the refinery; prohibiting the army from entering the refinery; release of all political prisoners; expulsion of all foreign employees of Iranian oil companies; and higher wages" (Parsa, 1989: 158). By November, oil production had fallen to 28 percent of its previous level. The government's conciliatory measures had not worked. Next came the use of the military and other security forces to break up the strikes and send the workers back to work. Military occupation of the major oil installations brought only temporary relief.

The strikes resumed soon after in full force and by late December almost no oil was being produced. Further erosion of state authority was evident when the strikers met with Ayatollah Khomeini's representative in order to discuss their living conditions and the resumption of oil production for domestic consumption only. From this point on the economic destiny of the regime was in the hand of the opposition led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The industrial working class pledged their support to Khomeini as the leader of the revolution. The halt of oil production was of enormous importance because it not only froze Iran's source of revenue but also affected other parts of the economy. That is it the disrupted production in many other industries which in turn led to a nationwide series of strikes and massive unemployment. The strikes created their own dynamics of solidarity which was continuously reenforced by cross-cutting alliances. Strikers with and families received financial support from the bazaar and clergy further strengthening

linkages and support mechanisms. This was indeed the beginning of the establishment of parallel community institutions that performed welfare functions for workers who were in need of assistance. The deepening political crisis which seemed unresolvable by December 1978, although indebted to the collective action of the industrial working class, would not have come about without the equally if not more important contribution of the modern middle class. They also joined the revolutionary coalition late but played a significant role in paralyzing the state's major functions. Let us now quickly review how they did so.

Modern Middle Class

Being a by-product of the modernization process, the modern middle class experienced escalating growth in the 1960s and 1970s. This class was comprised of professionals, white-collar workers, teachers, students, intellectuals, and the like. They did not constitute a homogeneous unitary actor. However, one can safely point to a discernable pattern of collective action which the modern middle class undertook in the latter part of the revolutionary process. Like the industrial working class, their full participation began late but at a crucial time when the state was weak and a modest increase in opposition could prove disasterous. I have already explained the collective actions of some factions of the new middle class such as the students and intelligentsia who had been part of the revolutionary movement early on. It is time to present the case for the rest of the modern middle class.

The working class mobilization in late 1978 was supplemented by the activation of white collar employees in both the private and public sectors. In November and December 1978 many governmental bureaucracies ceased to function effectively due to frequent strikes. Strikes in Ministeries of Justice, Electricity, Highways, and Economy and Finance; in the customs operations; the Plan and Budget Organization; and major banks including the Central Bank brought government operations to a virtual halt. The means of communication were also disrupted by strikes in daily national newspaper facilities. Employees of the Ministry of Finance in collaboration with the employees of the Central Bank tried to expose officials and industrialists who attempted to take cash out of the country and published a list of those who had already done so (Parsa, 1989: 155). Soon other banks followed in the footsteps of the Central Bank and by the end of the year normal financial transactions had become rare throughout the country, particularly in the capital city, Tehran.

Upper levels of the modern middle class tended to be more ambivalent about the revolutionary process and their roles in the ongoing struggle. By upper level, I do not mean managers or entrepreneurs that were part of the state apparatus, although they had their own grievances and complaints. Certain segments of the new middle class; doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other technocrats for instance; have historically followed the more moderate liberal nationalist tradition. However, the strength of the revolutionary ethos of late 1978 lured them away from their historical positions thereby incorporating them into the general middle class opposition. The middle class oppositionent was led principally by the lower layers of the civil services who followed in turn the

acknowledged leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The clergy-led revolutionary cycle, which was rooted in the socio-cultural hegemony of the clergy, had already established the framework within which other groups could act. The choices were thus limited for other challengers and the time had passed for any change in the direction and major components of the revolutionary coalition. The middle class, not unwillingly submitted to the structurally situated social forces which had already molded the nature of the process, and would determine its outcome.

The process had led to an "irreversible split" (Tilly, 1978: 194) in the polity before the new middle class actively joined the last cycle of collective action. As a result of historical-structural forces explained earlier and the collective actions of other challengers the state was in crisis. What the entry of the modern middle class did was to further deepen the crisis to a point where salvaging the old political order was impossible. In other words, the entry of the new middle class took place at a time when pressure was mounting on the state and a last straw was needed to break the camel's back. The middle class did not of course bring about the final collapse. It did guarantee the irreversibility of the eventual fragmentation of the government. Thus, in and of itself, the collective action of the middle class did not determine the destiny of the regime. According to data collected by Ashraf and Banuazizi (1985: 25), out of 2, 483 demonstrations held during the final stages of the revolution, only 1 percent were organized by the white collar public workers. If one includes high school and university students in the middle class, the number of demonstrations organized by them rises to 24 percent. Out of 1,195 mass strikes in the same period, two-fifths occurred in

governmental bureaucracies and other public institutions. Therefore, it was the timing of the entrance of the middle class, the mode of its mobilization, and the fact that it followed the coalition forged by the clergy that made the difference. Why did it embark on the course of action that it did?

Abrahamian (1982: 497-98) offers a classical economic grievances explanation. He argues that structural fluctuations accompanied by the inflationary trend caused by rapid modernization and the oil boom pushed up the cost-of-living thus threatening the well-being of the new middle class. There were objective grievances troubling them which they felt a need to express, and when the opportunity arrived they expressed them. On the other side is Arijomand's (1988: 110-11) basically Durkheimian analysis in which social-psychological dislocations play the leading role in fracturing identities that are supposed to be the essential ingredients of collective order.

> For my part, I think the source of malaise lay deeper and therefore prefer the old-fashioned Durkheim, who stressed normative disorientation. Persistent sense of malaise and anomie caused by rapid social change was a much more basic cause than the sudden downturn in economic growth that triggered it. It was not so much sudden frustration as constant disorientation resulting from a decade of rapid change that finally--after a period in which the nouveaux riches had sought to allay their insecurity by conspicuous consumption of the gaudiest kind--heightened the concern of the middle class for their fundamental national and cultural identity. (Arjomand, 1988: 110)

However, both arguments in their one-sidedness run into the standard problem of tautology that has long crippled all explanations of revolutionary action. Iran had periodically experienced a combination of both conditions which did not result in

revolutionary outcomes. Even Parsa's (1989: 127) explanation, which is a synthesis of Abrahamian's economic grievances argument and purposive mobilization of resources argument advocated by social movements theorists, falls short of fully accounting for the multiplicity of factors involved. From a synthetic point of view, I prefer an explanatory structure that makes use of all three and attempts to map the dynamics of collective action within a structurally defined economic crisis with its concomitant cultural dislocations.

Mere economic hardship could not have automatically caused massive revolutionary action. If it had been the major force at work, the modern middle class, naturally and historically allied with the liberal nationalist faction, should have been subdued by the Shah's economic and political concessions. Promising political liberalization and improving living conditions, the Shah tried hard to separate this class from the more radical components of the revolutionary alliance. However, the modern middle class turned down his concessionary gestures both by action and words. As the potential leader of this class, the National Front and Liberation Movement, soon agreed to the positions enunciated by the clerical leadership. It was the mobilization of the traditional middle class (the bazaar and clergy) and the radical wing of the intelligentsia that activated the participation by the new middle class. The clergy's organizational structure provided necessary channels for the middle class to express itself. However, one must not be misled into assuming that they joined the alliance simply out of political expediency or a "free rider" mentality. This is where social-psychological variables come to play a significant role. The mobilization of cultural resources provided symbolic and normative frames within which the new middle class could willingly subscribe to the

ideology of the revolution. The reassertion of authentic cultural identity worked its way through a normative structure propagated by the clergy who were part and parcel of the general cultural system. Therefore, the organizational superiority of the traditional middle class facilitated the activation of collective action by the new middle class by reconstructing a normatively meaningful collective identity which was, at least perceived to be, undermined by the onslaught of the pseudo-modernism of the Pahlavi regime.

As the revolutionary challengers forged an uncompromising alliance and commitment of the subject population expanded dramatically over the last few months of the revolutionary process, the state had no choice but to surrender or take the coercive path and suppress the opposition. That brings us to the last condition necessary for the appearance of multiple sovereignty, that is the lack of willingness or ability to crush the challenging coalition.

Breakdown of the Coercive Apparatus

During the reign of the Shah the institution that experienced the largest growth both in man power and budget was the military. Indeed, modernization of the armed forces was thought to be the exemplar of the grandiose development scheme that the Shah was dreaming. While the Shah embarked on a massive military build-up, the regime drifted toward authoritarianism which relied on the military for its survival. As a centralized institution of coercion, the military's expansion and percurement policies left no doubt in the public's mind that it was an object of the United States' economic and geopolitical interests and desires. One of the key functions of the armed forces was

preserving internal security, although by the late 1960 and early 1970s they had become an instrument of regional security arrangements within the larger U.S. Cold War foreign policy. Throughout his reign, the Shah had total control over the armed forces and was personally involved in every major decision from general defense strategies to weapon systems to individual appointments. Thus, he created an institution of massive firepower equipped with cutting edge technology but highly dependent on him and a handfull of trusted advisers. Such an overexpanded and complex force had to face a mass-based movement with a high degree of commitment and revolutionary spirit.

The rapidly changing dynamics of the mobilization early in 1978 threatened to overwhelm the regime thus quick action necessary. On September 8, 1978, the cabinet of prime minister Sharif-Emami decided to impose martial law on Tehran and all major cities across the country. The next day a demonstration in Jaleh square in Tehran was quelled brutally leading to the death of at least 200 people.[3] This was the bloodiest confrontation between the armed forces and demonstrators. It dramatically changed the course of events insofar as the military was concerned. From this point on, the armed forces were brought into the picture to protect internal security by means of coercion and direct confrontation if necessary. It must be noted that prior to the announcement of martial law, Sharif-Emami's government of "national reconciliation" had taken some steps toward liberalization. These included releasing some political prisoners, abolition

[3] There are conflicting accounts of the exact number of casualties. The military government reported 86 death and 265 wounded. Some journalists put the number at about 300 death. A few French journalists and the opposition estimated the number of death at about 4,000. The Military Governor of Tehran, General Oveisi, became known as the butcher of Tehran after this incident.

of the Rastakhiz party, and some measures to fight corruption. These measures increased the momentum of mass mobilization which eventually led to the September 8 massacre.

The beginning phase of the violent confrontation is believed to have been marked by an internal dispute as to what the appropriate course of action ought to be in managing the crisis. There was disagreement about whether to use force, and how far the military should go in suppressing the rebellious masses. Arjomand (1988: 114) suggests that prime minister Sharif-Emami and the Military Governor of Tehran General Oveisi took conflicting positions. The latter believed in the get-tough policy while the former did not want to aggravate the situation by more bloodshed. Apparently the Shah himself tended to side with the Prime minister favoring the application of more limited force. Notwithstanding the differences, elites were not yet fragmented and showed a reasonable degree of cohesion. But it was the lack of a coherent and consistent policy, more than anything else, that at this point created confusion in the field. Thus, depending on the particular situation and individual commander, different policies were pursued in different cities. The complexity of the situation was further compounded by the simultaneous process of liberalization. By late October another group of political prisoners were freed and censorship of the press was relaxed. These things were all happening while Ayatollah Khomeini and the mobilized challengers were demanding nothing short of the removal of the Shah and the termination of the monarchy. The more activist and committed strata of the opposition stood firm and suffered casualties thus making blood the ultimate weapon of the oppressed. The more massive the response of the coercive apparatus the bolder the opposition got in pursuit of its goals.

The policy of simultaneous liberalization and repression did not seem to be effective and the crisis got out of control to the extent that a major riot occurred in Tehran on November 4, 1978. The result was extensive damage to public offices and banks. On that day, while Tehran was burning, the martial law forces did not or could not restore order (Zabih, 1988: 26). The following day the Shah installed a military cabinet with General Azhari as the prime minister. This move was supposed to convey the message that the government is going to be in charge and would do everything possible to establish order and punish agitators with severity. Some scholars (Zabih, 1988: 27) seem to imply that the military cabinet could indeed have reversed the process by taking decisive actions and using massive force. They argue that it was the indecisiveness of the Shah himself that decreased the efficiency of the armed forces. In support of their argument, the same analysts refer to the famous televised message of the Shah announcing the formation of the military cabinet in which he said:

> Nation of Iran, I heard your revolutionary voice. You have risen against corruption and oppression in the prevailing open political atmosphere. Your revolution could not be opposed by me. The wave of revolution, while at the beginning was justified, has recently changed its course to paralyze the country's economy, stop production of oil, and spread disorder and killing and rebellion in a way to endanger the country's independence... Once again I swear to prevent the repetition of past errors.... I am with you in the struggle to secure fundamental freedoms. (Quoted in Zabih, 1988,28-29)

Although he was sending contradictory signals, it is a misinterpretation of the facts to believe that in late November the use of force could have broken up a firmly established multi-class alliance of which the middle class, both old and new, was a

committed member. It is conceivable that by taking firm position after the installation of the military government and systematically using the armed forces the Shah could have forestalled the final collapse of the regime, as some leading activists themselves were predicting at the time.[4] It is at a juncture like this that the presence of an organized and intensely committed vanguard, not necessarily in the form of a party organization, can make all the difference. Such a vanguard existed in the form of a network of clergy-led communal organization which counteracted the Shah's attempts to suppress the movement. That is what many analysts fail to see when talking about how a revolutionary situation can be silenced by the actions of a well-organized and equipped military force, provided they operate on the basis of a consistent and unambiguous policy. In other words, they downplay the paramount role of the strategic decisions that the revolutionary actors make in order to diffuse or neutralize the state's initiatives.

Ayatollah Khomeini's ingenious tactical move aimed at neutralizing the armed forces in December is a case in point. The opposition realized that the army must be won over morally in a decisive psychological confrontation before the eventual takeover. Ayatollah Khomeini thus started a propaganda campaign intended to persuade the army to shift their royalty. His leaflets, carrying intense overtones of moral and religious obligation, were widely distributed among the soldiers and even within some bases (Arjomand, 1986: 386). The demonstrators began using effective slogans in their

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[4] This is based on personal observation and discussions with some of the organizers of mass demonstrations at the time. The more widespread belief, as I could further confirm it after the revolution, among the revolutionaries as late as November was a prolonged mass confrontation combined with, at a later stage, some form of armed assault on the military.

encounters with the armed forces. They furthermore put flowers on the barrels of the guns and made affectionate gestures. The combination of these tactics virtually demoralized the army to the extent that no will to open fire on the demonstrators was left. The demoralization campaign reached its peak when around December 1978 indications of the breakdown of the armed forces began to surface. Some soldiers started deserting the services while others disobeyed their commanders' orders to fire on the public.

On December 11, the Lavizan garrison in north Tehran experienced the most serious internal disarray. A few soldiers opened fire on the officers mess killing a dozen officers and non-commissioned officers. The fact that this incident happened in the elite Imperial Guards Compound underlined the extent of the deterioration of morale and discipline in the military (Zabih, 1988: 30-31). This is the period in which the desertion of soldiers sharply increased in Tehran and other cities. Parsa's data indicate "that by December 7, exactly one month after the military government had been installed a total of 5,434 army personnel, mostly low-ranking enlisted men, had defected from thirty-one garrisons" (1989: 243). The key event that rapidly accelerated the number of defections was the announcement of the Shah's departure. The figures are contradictory, but studies suggest that the rate of desertion had reached between 1,000 and 1,500 daily by January (Parsa, 1989: 243;Zabih, 1988: 38). General Huyser (1986: 105), U.S. envoy to Iran during the crisis, indicates that the number of deserting soldiers jumped to about 100 daily before the Shah's departure and 200 daily by the end of January.

Despite conflicting numbers, the fact that the army was disintegrating by January 1979 remains indisputable.[5] The Shah's departure on January 16, 1979 made things even worse. It not only eroded the confidence and power of the armed forces but also convinced the opposition that the course on which they had embarked was right and victory was near. His departure signaled a shift in the composition of the defectors. Now the desertion included both enlisted men and a number of higher ranking non-commissioned and commissioned officers. General Oveisi, the infamous Military Governor of Tehran, had fled the country a few days before the Shah departed Iran thus shattering loyalty to and respect for high-ranking officers. The erosion of discipline and obedience to the command structure deepened upon Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran on February 1, 1979. According to Arjomand (1988: 123), "at least half a dozen key generals in the Air force, the army, the navy, and the police defected", in the aftermath of Khomeini's arrival in Tehran. The military's decision-making structure was paralyzed not only by the defection of officers but also by internal discord among the top brass over the handling of the crisis. Continuous disintegration of the armed forces along with general strikes in all major institutions led to the spontaneous creation of neighborhood Revolutionary Committees. These grassroots organizations began managing traffic, distributing goods and services, maintaining order and security in the neighborhoods, and later functioned as an armed militia which helped in taking over key garrisons in the final

[5] On December 5, near 500 conscripts fled from a Mashhad garrison. On December 11, 300 soldiers escaped from the Jay garrison. On another occasion, 600 soldiers escaped from the Kazeroun garrison (Parsa, 1989: 242-43). Although numerically slight, these defections had an enormous psychological impact on the morale of the armed forces.

days. The mushrooming of the Revolutionary Committees, normally headed by local clergymen and located in neighborhood mosques, marked the beginning of functioning parallel institutions which assumed some part of the state's functions.

As the number of violent confrontations between the army and demonstrators climbed and the armed services showed more signs of disintegration, President Carter dispatched General Huyser to Iran in early January 1979. His chief mission was to work with the armed forces' top brass to secure the unity of the military and "to ensure that a mass exodus of the military leaders would not occur following the Shah's departure" (Zabih, 1988: 95). In addition, he was instructed to make sure that the military establishment would support Bakhtiyar's government. Huyser also proceeded to devise a contingency plan to, as a last resort, forcibly restore order and stop the establishment of a radical and unfriendly regime. By late January and early February the revolutionary mass mobilization had foreclosed the possibility of a massive use of force. To pursue such an option, the military would have had to inflict considerable casualties on the opposition which seemed unlikely due to the reluctance of rank and file members of the armed services at that stage of the game.

The policy planning apparatus in Washington seemed also to be in complete disarray. The U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan and top State Department Officials were in serious disagreement with the National Security Advisor Brezezinski. The Pentagon, relying on General Huyser's assessment, was advocating a more hawkish approach toward the mass insurrection until early February. Many observers (Stemple, 1981; Sullivan, 1981; Sick; 1985; Rubin, 1980) who were involved in the advisory

process concur with the argument that the incoherence and inconsistency of the U.S. policy facilitated the corrosion of elite cohesion within the Iranian government. Inconsistent and confusing signals conveyed the message, even if it was a mere perception, that the U.S. might have lost confidence in the Shah's capability of surviving the crisis. What we can be certain of is that Washington's signals exacerbated the Shah's indecisiveness in using his coercive apparatus. Despite the collapse of the Carter Administration's decision-making process, I am inclined to agree with Keddie (1981: 254) that "it seems unlikely that a different American policy in 1978-79 could have significantly changed the course of events." As I will make clear shortly, an iron fisted policy of the Shah backed by a unified voice from Washington could not have saved the regime, for the armed forces did not have the will to open fire on large numbers of demonstrators by that time.

By early February, the regime could not count on the armed forces to contain the revolutionary movement. Furthermore, a substantial number of parliamentary deputies had either fled the country or defected to the opposition. Ayatollah Khomeini launched his final offensive on February 5 by appointing Bazargan as the prime minister of a provisional government while Bakhtiar was still claiming to be the legitimate prime minister on the basis of his appointment by the Shah. Millions of people poured into the streets to pledge their loyalty to the new prime minister thereby establishing his legitimacy. The final collapse began on February 9 when the National Television rebroadcasted a film of Ayatollah Khomeini's arrival in Tehran and some of the Air Force cadets expressed their sympathy for him in a demonstration at the base. The

Imperial Guards present in the compound opened fire on the cadets and the result was an armed exchange in and around the air force barracks.

The air force mutiny, which was the first armed confrontation between the armed forces, set off the last cycle in which the populace provided armed support for the mutinous military personnel. Soon arms were being distributed among the population who were eager to defend the military insurgents. By Saturday February 10, the mass mobilization had been transformed into a partly civilian armed insurgency. Armed confrontations with units of the armed forces had grown considerably in number in the capital and other cities. Police stations, army units, and military barrack were taken over one after another in a matter of two days. Guerilla organizations largely absent in the mass mobilization phase, played a much more important role in the last few days when armed encounters with the military increased. The overwhelming power of the popular insurrection, now possessing firepower, and the disintegration of the armed forces culminated in the declaration of the armed forces' neutrality, and soon after, the resignation of Bakhtiar. The military units were pulled back to their barracks and the revolutionaries could now joyously claim victory over a regime whose invincibility had rarely been questioned.

Theoretical Appraisal

Multiple sovereignty as the hallmark of a revolutionary situation is an insightful concept that neatly captures the mobilization of challenging groups whose actions, based on a set of claims incompatible with those made by the existing polity, aim at

reconstituting it. The reality of power and domination throughout history reminds us that challengers who advance exclusive claims that are incompatible with the survival of any existing polity are always present in one form or another. The mystery is why and under what circumstances these challengers are activated (Tilly 1978: 202). Tilly's model, theoretically less capable of appreciating the role of ideology and charisma in the formation of these groups, naturally turns attention to challengers who in the process of mobilization transform claims which are compatible with the existing order into claims which are not. In the present study, as I explained earlier, the most vital challengers were those who from the beginning, regardless of whether one accepts 1953 or 1963 as the true beginning, claimed absolute legitimacy. Armed with a messianic world-view, the clergy proposed an alternative polity which undermined the structure of power.

However, structural changes created new groups and classes who did not necessarily adhere to the transformative objectives set forth by the truly radical challengers. The new middle class and industrial working class were two examples. These groups, although not overtly significant as a percentage of the total population, were central to the expansion of commitments extended to revolutionary objectives. The key was that the mobilization of clergy and bazaar with extensive resources provided an umbrella under which the new middle class and industrial working class could organize. Both of these classes were under the closer scrutiny of the state's coercive apparatus and hence lacked the independent organizational structure necessary for mobilization. Being a part and a product of a modernized economy, these challenging groups were more dependent on the state for their survival than others. At the same time, they were not

completely delinked from a vast network of culturally significant communal associations. Thus, one has to pay attention to the nature and extent of the relationships between these new challengers and socially embedded actors who provided continuity to the protest movements. It was the existence of these networks that attracted the commitment of new groups. Therefore, the stronger and more intersubjectively constituted these relationships, the more powerful the solidarity structure to which they give birth.

Although they joined the revolutionary movement late in the process, the new middle class and industrial working class provided a key ingridient for the emergence of multiple sovereignty. They extended their commitment to the movement at a stage when more pressure was needed to bring the state to its knees. Their commitment expanded the pool of resources available to the opposition. The principal resource they used in their attacks on the state was their skills, or refusal to deliver them. Commitment per se cannot sufficiently change the balance of forces in favor of challenging groups. It is the impact of commitment on resources and their utilization that makes all the difference. Activation of the commitment of these late comers was made possible by the same processes that generated mobilization of other key challengers. The difference was the extent of the revolutionary ideology's resonance with various members of the coalition. The more powerful challengers with stronger commitments, both potential and activated, tend to target groups that are less committed to transformative goals in order to alter the nature and extent of their commitments. This is mostly achieved, though not always deliberately and self-consciously, through concrete collective action that entails considerable self-sacrifice.

Another mechanism which is widely used is the war of persuasion in which groups with a more credible balance sheet in the struggle against perceived injustices overcome challengers with less outstanding track records. In accounting for the acceptance of these alternative claims by a large segment of the population, Tilly (1978: 206-208) falls back on the macro-structural changes and their adverse effects on the structure of "rights, privileges, and principles." Here, Tilly seems to be less successful in explaining why these changes lead to deliberate purposive action on the part of the threatened classes. That is why I argue for the centrality of meaning systems and socially constituted solidarity networks which facilitate the expansion and acceptance of alternative claims. This is a crucial link between structural transformation, relative deprivation, and collective action of committed participants. Tilly's problem with resource mobilization manifests itself in yet another form and that is the insufficient explanation of the conversion of contenders who originally hold claims that are compatible with the existing polity.

His analysis of the transformed challengers is vague and sketchy. It is correct that such transformation is observable because "we can witness its occurrence as old members lose their positions in the polity and as challengers are refused access to power" (Tilly, 1978: 203). The question is what mechanisms encourage these forces to act collectively and how they do so.[6] Marx offers a partial framework which is quite

[6] Tilly (1978: 203) refers to Marx's argument that industrial capitalism generates claims advanced by newly created classes. These classes are radicalized by their intrinsic relationships to the capitalist mode of production. Of course, Marx was primarily concerned with the working class immiseration. Despite overlooking certain novelties of advanced capitalism, Marx was in general right to bet on new classes for the formation

revealing as far as the new middle class and industrial working class are concerned. Objective immiseration resulting from capitalist development is necessary for the formation of radical consciousness. It is not, however, sufficient across time and space. For traditional classes such as the clergy and bazaar engaged in revolutionary collective action much earlier than newly formed classes. That is why I have tried all along to search for historically situated meaning systems that translate objective sufferings into class-conscious collective action.

Finally, some light has to be shed on the last cause of multiple sovereignty. The armed forces, as the principal concentrated means of coercion, are central to the dynamics of revolutionary situations. Many scholars (Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1978; D.E.H. Russell, 1974), in various degrees, place the armed forces at the center of their explanatory frameworks. The inability or unwillingness of the state to crush the alternative coalition is essential to the emergence of multiple sovereignty, and eventually to the success of the revolutionary movement. The collapse of the armed forces in the Iranian revolution can be attributed to five following factors. First, 75 percent of those serving in the army were conscripts. The enlisted men soon lost their will to open fire on the masses among whom many had family members. The draftees were primarily from working and middle classes families whose members were marching in the streets in large numbers. The soldiers never lost their class ties and became even more conscious of them as they were ordered to suppress demonstrations by force. Thus, a major variable in explaining the disintegration of the military is its class composition.

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of revolutionary consciousness.

Second, the deliberate efforts of an organized opposition to demoralize the armed forces played a significant role in breaking their cohesion. Students of revolution should not look for clues exclusively in the military per se. They should rather pay reasonable attention to the strategic and dynamic interaction between the armed forces and insurgents and how they learn from each other in regrouping and counteracting. Third, the sheer strength of the mass mobilization during the 1978-79 period was important. The powerful demonstration of will in the streets of Tehran simply caught the military establishment off guard and overwhelmed them. The army would have had to kill a considerable number of people in order to clamp down on the opposition, a thing that they were not willing to do for reasons I have already dealt with.

Fourth, the role of the Shah himself was important. Some analysts (Zonis, 1983: Arjomand; 1988) have brought to our attention the psychodynamics of the his personality. Contrary to the image he tried to project, he was not a strong man who could endure massive crises. His vacillation and indecisiveness resulted from a personality structure that was incapable of encountering large-scale opposition in a uniform way.[7] This personality trait and the massive opposition to him led to his departure from Iran which further exacerbated the disintegration of the armed forces. Fifth, the above four factors led to the collapse of the command structure. At the height of the crisis, units were in a complete disarray and could not respond to disturbances, even if they wanted to. Finally, the armed forces of client states seem to be particularly vulnerable in the face

[7] For a comprehensive study see Zonis (1991) who examines the Shah's decisions from a political psychology framework.

of internal mass mobilization. The special relationship between the U.S. and Iran clearly projected a negative image of the armed forces. The Iranian military was seen by many as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and this weakened support for it at home. The vulnerability of of client states render their coercive apparatus ineffective. Thus, in this case the international context, which is an external variable, within which the revolutionary situation emerged contributed to the erosion of the state's grip on power. Furthermore, exogenous factors such as Carter's human rights policy and confusing signals conveyed to the Shah influenced the balance of power between the state and its challengers. Here, I am primarily referring to control over normative resources, that is the shift in commitments.

The loss of the support base coupled with the collapse of the coercive apparatus set the stage for the revolutionaries to seize the power of he state. This marked the beginning of an extensive transfer of power. The central thrust of the explanation lead us to further away from blind structuralism. At every stage of the revolutionary process purposive collective action seemed to expand further both the composition and commitment of the challenging coalition. Intentional collective action that formed a powerful revolutionary coalition and disolved the armed forces was informed by an organizing ideology deeply seated in the socially constructed universe. This phenomenon which characterized the Iranian revolution presents us with important theoretical questions which I will try to summarize in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The Islamic revolution of Iran has challenged, in different ways and degrees , all existing social science theories of revolution. My review of the literature left me with a certain degree of doubt about the extant paradigms and their ability to offer valid explanations for that revolution. Most theoretical structures, to the extent that they are well grounded generalizations, have failed in capturing the unique context in which the Islamic revolution of Iran took place. In my quest for a better understanding of the revolutionary phenomenon, I have concentrated on the relationship between structure and agency in the emergence of the revolutionary situations. It is the proper understanding of the interactive effects of these two and how they regenerate each other that one can appreciate the dynamics of historically situated phenomena. In other words, what sorts of structural underpinnings produced the necessary conditions for social groups and classes to engage in collective action? From the very beginning I had the suspicion that a solely structural explanation could not adequately explain the mass-based revolutionary action in Iran.

After careful analysis of existing accounts and some firsthand experience, I was fairly well convinced that any promising explanation needs somehow to take into consideration purposive human action. Historical evidence presented in this study illustrates the centrality of deliberate and intentional revolutionary action on the part of

contending forces. This was a case in which actors, seizing the opportunity provided to them in a unique structural conjuncture, managed to mobilize their resources and successfully challenge the state. This fact directed me to Tilly's resource mobilization framework as a generally fruitful model for explaining the Iranian revolution. The model provides an analytical framework within which one can account for the interactive effects of the structural forces and informed and self conscious collective action. This conception of deliberate, rational, and purposive action was missing from a wide range of studies of revolution. It is particularly pertinent to revolutionary transformations of the sort examined in this project.

Brinton's (1965) version of the "natural history" paradigm in general seems to fit the sequential life cycle of the Iranian revolution. Marginalization of the intellectuals coupled with the insurmountable crisis of the state created a revolutionary situation. The regime's incompetent response to the crisis, i.e. implementation of needed reforms in an untimely fashion and the failure to use force efficiently, led to the outbreak of the revolution. The description of the natural history, however, does not tell us how and why the crisis of the state came about. It fails to tell us how the Shah's development policies created a state that became vulnerable to global turbulations. It also pays no attention to the paramount impact of the world historical processes on the national states and how subsequent alterations in domestic socio-economic structures often create, as in the case of Iran, considerable change in class arrangements.

Brinton's model cannot capture the dynamic configuration of contending groups acting in pursuit of rationally perceived interests. By neglecting the rationality and

purposiveness of groups which pursue generally defined and clear interests, the natural history school simply describes a set of observable characteristics rather than presenting the configuration of causal factors of revolution. Though the Iranian revolution went through a series of phases similar to those characterizing other revolutions, Brinton's framework seems to be of little help in explaining the emergence of the revolutionary situation in Iran.

Some theorists have attempted, implicitly or explicitly, to use the Parsonian functionalism as a general theoretical framework for explaining the Iranian revolution. These scholars, relying more on Huntington's brand of functionalism, emphasize the rapidity of modernization in Iran. The rapidity of change, these analysts argue, operated as a disequilibriating force which placed enormous pressure on the social system. As the Shah pursued his extensive socio-economic development agenda, new emerging groups needed to be incorporated into political institutions that could provide a new socio-economic organization. The Shah failed to build viable institutions which could assimilate newly mobilized groups that had come into existence as a result of the modernization process. Abrahamian is the quintessential proponent of this type of analysis. He argues that:

> The revolution came because the shah modernized on the socio-economic level and thus expanded the ranks of the modern middle class and the industrial working class, but failed to modernize on another level- the political level; and that this failure inevitably strained the links between the government and the social structure blocked the channels of communication between the political system and the general population, widened the gap between the ruling circle and the new social forces, and, most serious of all, cut down the few bridges that had in the past

> connected the political establishment with the traditional social forces, especially with the bazaars and the religious authorities. (Abrahamian, 1982: 427)

Functional analysis in general, as indicated in earlier chapters, runs into tautology and cannot adequately distinguish between system characteristics and causal mechanisms. Therefore, one can only attribute the outbreak of revolution to a sequence of events after the realization of the outcome rather than prior to its occurrence. Moreover, deliberate mass mobilization from below in the Iranian case warrants a great deal of attention to ideology and organization as autonomous variables. Functional theory is least attentive to such variables.

Abrahamian often advances propositions that are grounded in the Marxian framework and these are at times inconsistent with his functional analysis. Huntington's framework does not suggest that one should take seriously the power relations between classes and between classes and the state. In addition to problems of logical consistency, empirical evidence is does not convincingly suggest a relationship between rapid modernization and revolutionary outcomes. By the mid-1970s, when the Shah's modernization program was at its peak, no observer in either academic or policy making circles was predicting the imminence of revolutionary turmoil in Iran. The imbalance between socio-economic and political development, as a cause of revolution, is a true proposition by definition that does not tell us why the revolution occurred when it did. Thus, the application of variants of the functional explanation poses serious empirical, methodological, and theoretical problems.

Explanations anchored in the social psychological frameworks of Davies and Gurr have also been used in examining the Iranian case. The thrust of these arguments seems to revolve around variations of the J-curve model. Macro socio-economic changes of the 1960s and early 1970s produced a steady improvement in the standard of living. This relative prosperity, however, was followed by a sudden decline in the mid-1970s when the state faced a massive economic downswing. The resulting gap, the proponents of this view argue, between formed expectations and need satisfaction created cognitive structures amenable to revolutionary aggression. Bashiriyeh (1984: 85), though at times trying to be theoretically synthetic, follows Davies' line of argumentation. He maintains that:

> Looking at the situation in Iran in the light of the above-mentioned theories, it seems that the 1973-8 period preceding the revolution fits the Davies theory, with rapid economic growth being followed by a sharp decline. Thus we will show how for a short while an increase in economic resources raised the expectations of the lower classes and how in the following period of crisis, while expectations continued to raise, the regime's capability of meeting these began to decline.(Bashiriyeh, 1984: 85)

The most serious problem with this approach is the impossibility of demonstrating the relationship between individual, and by extension collective, expectations and actual discontent. Cyclical trends of rising expectations followed by unfulfilled obligations of the state have not resulted in collective rebellion in many societies. The important thing is to determine how these disturbances affect collective resources and the capability of groups to deliver them. The way these structural changes influence class conflict and the

exact nature of resource allocation and utilization varies depending on the particular socio-economic and cultural history of the case under investigation.

Following a similar social psychological line of reasoning, Moshiri (1985) taps into Gurr's relative deprivation theory. Using the clergy as a reference group, he argues that the net effect of Westernization was to reduce the collective capability of the clergy while their collective value expectations remained fairly constant (Moshiri, 1985: 102). The resulting gap was produced by the decrease of the ulama's social influence and financial resources, on the one hand, and the increase in the state efficiency and the emergence of more secular classes, on the other hand. The discrepancy between collective value capability and collective value expectations of the ulama produced collective discontent. In Moshiri's own words:

> Due to the government's financial harassment of the ulama, and the implications of government initiated social change, the collective value position of the ulama declined throughout the Pahlavi era. Since there is no basis for assuming that the collective value expectations of the ulama had also declined, a case for decremental relative deprivation can be made. (Moshiri, 1985: 105)

This approach also presents considerable methodological and theoretical difficulties. The argument is based entirely on the assumption that individuals uniformly experience the same deprivation. It is this perceived deprivation that causes revolutionary aggression. It is a cause imputed to the actors by the theorist who assumes that the relationship exists in the real world. We will never be able to say for certain that this was the ultimate cause. The leap from individual deprivation to collective

deprivation is not sufficiently addressed. Does anything intervene in the process whereby individual deprivation reconstructs itself at the level of the group? Other groups' relative deprivation cannot simply be inferred from the clergy's deprivation. Furthermore, the relative deprivation framework as used by Moshiri does not help us understand the mechanisms that translate deprivation and subsequent discontent into revolutionary action. Last but not the least, empirical evidence of the decline of the clergy's collective capabilities is not strong and can easily be challenged.

The appearance of Skocpol's "nonvoluntarist, structural perspective" has been recognized as a turning point in the study of social revolutions. By turning to macro structural units, she abandoned the conception of revolutions as the product of intentional, self-conscious, and ideologically informed actions by continuing groups. However, her proposition that revolutions are not "made" but that they simply come was seriously questioned by the outbreak of the Iranian revolution. The central causal variables which she examined in her attempt to explain the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions seem to have little explanatory value in the Iranian case. The crisis of the state was not caused by external pressure, military or otherwise. Within the interstate system, the Iranian state was not subject to any significant exogenous threat and conflict between the marginal elite and the state was minimal or absent. Due to the peculiar Iranian social formation, the peasant movement for all practical purposes was inconsequential during the period of revolutionary mobilization.

Skocpol later confessed to problems associated with the applicability of her structural model to the Iranian case and suggested that "if ever there has been a

revolution deliberately 'made' by a mass-based social movement aiming to overthrow the old order, the Iranian Revolution against the Shah surely is it" (1982: 267) The theoretical shortcomings of her model when applied to the Iranian case, however, did not cause her to completely abandon it. Indeed, she still remains loyal to her basic analytical framework and maintains that "the Iranian Revolution, too, must be understood from a macroscopic and historically grounded structural perspective, one that examines the interrelations of state, society, and organized politics in Iran, and situates Iran in changing international political and economic contexts (Skocpol, 1982: 268). Nonetheless, she cannot evade the centrality of ideas and cultural systems in the making of revolutionary action. Therefore, she shifts her attention to three unique features of the Iranian revolution: the structure of Iran's rentier absolutist state, urban communal organizations, and the organizing ideology of Shi'i Islam. To me, that seems a notable departure for which she should be commended.

Having taken issue with these theoretical structures, it is now time to turn to what I have tried to accomplish in this research. To account for the mutual interaction of structure and agency, I used Tilly's multi-causal approach, one that synthesizes causal and purposive explanations (Tilly, 1978: 6; Coleman, 1973: 5). The former is a set of factors outside the actor's decision-making parameters which either constraints or facilitates action. The latter deals with individual or collective actors and how their interests and objectives cause certain behavior. The tricky part is that future consequences, which the outside observer has to logically deduce, work as causal mechanisms producing deliberate action. Purposive explanation thus allows us to bring

to bear the impact of choice structure on the structural constraints. In other words, although empirically difficult to demonstrate, purposive social action constantly reconstitutes social structures.

The long-term causal forces which turned out to have significant explanatory value in the Iranian case were the particular state structure and the form of modernization. From a macroscopic point of view, the nature of the state, its relationship to different classes, and its position in the vortex of the capitalist world market paved the way for the transformation of the discontent against the state into collective action. Specifically, the Iranian state began an irreversible march toward concentration and accumulation of coercive means in the early 1920s. Between the 1960s and mid-1970s a rentier state-capitalism was established which penetrated all aspects of social organization. The rentier state was highly autonomous vis-a-vis major social classes and vulnerable to the changing rhythms of the capitalist world economy. Delinked from major classes, the state had to rely on its expanded bureaucratic and repressive apparatuses. Furthermore, the shah's development policy made Iran a virtual client state in the global interstate system thus identifying it with the interest of the Western powers. The combination of these features made the state extremely vulnerable to organized mass dissent. However, the developmental trajectory and the distinctive nature of the Iranian state did not produce collective action automatically. Modernization and state building facilitated the emergence of a revolutionary situation by changing the configuration, alliances, and resources of various groups and classes. In particular, the effects of modernization on

the intelligentsia, the traditional bourgeoisie, and the clergy have been valuable in explaining the contours of collective mobilization and action.

In order to explain purposive action at the right historical conjuncture, I used Tilly's polity and mobilization model. The polity model illustrated how key challengers: the intelligentsia, the clergy, the bazaar, the industrial working class, and the modern middle class mobilized their resources in pursuit of common interests. The mobilization model was a conceptual framework that explained the determinants of collective action at the moment of action. On the basis of these models, I argued that the clergy's superior control over normative and material resources made them an uncontestable challenger. The bazaar, having greater access to financial resources and historical ties with the clergy, reenforced the power of the traditional forces in their direct confrontation with the state. At the same time, because the communal network of the clergy and bazaar was culturally embedded and socially constructed, the state could not repress these forces as harshly as other contenders. Therefore, the clergy managed to lead a multi-class urban coalition by depending on their hegemonic social power.

The mobilization of contending forces led by the clergy resulted in the articulation of claims which were incompatible with those made by the existing polity. That was the beginning of the emergence of the revolutionary situation. The potency of these claims, which resonated with the targets of mobilization, greatly increased the level of commitment. The new middle class and the industrial working class joined the mass mobilization at this point thus creating a multi-class populist coalition. The immensity of mass mobilization at this juncture coupled with the composition of the armed forces

incapacitated the coercive apparatus of the state resulting in dual sovereignty. The irreversible split in the polity and the collapse of the armed forces set in motion the last phase of the revolutionary mobilization, that is seizure of the state power.

In this research I tried to demonstrate that Tilly's basic analytical framework is applicable to the Iranian revolution. I argued that large structural processes, state-building and modernization specifically, did not cause mass revolutionary action per se. The most significant causal factor was rather the self conscious mobilization of contending groups whose control over a variety of resources was indispensable to the success of the revolutionary movement. Macro structural changes, however, did have a significant impact on the distribution of resources and power of among the different social groups and classes. Although loyal to the general framework, I had to make certain revisions in order to increase the degree of theoretical fitness.

First I had to discard the utilitarian rational choice component of the model so that purposive and high cost collective action could be explained more adequately. That was done by redefining rationality to include moral commitment and other motivational patterns not simple Millian strategic decision making rules. Second I had to bring ideology back into the picture. The static conception of interest in Tilly's work presented serious problems for the analysis of the Iranian case. That is why I argued for the autonomous role of ideas and cultural systems whose linguistic codes undeniably shape actors' perceptions of interests. Related to this was the notion of charisma which in the Iranian case was crucial to the articulation of interests. Third, I tried to redefine the concept of resources and make it more inclusive. Tilly's market-oriented concept, I

argued, is very mechanical and cannot fully encompass the diversity and complexity of symbolic structures and explain how they provided the best pool of resources for the opposition movement in Iran. Finally, access to political power is extremely costly in Third World polities. Thus, the polity model, which implicitly assumes a competitive political arena, needs to take into account regime type as a key variable. That also led me to shift my attention to the social nature of power, emphasizing control over normative resources and legitimacy claims.

Social revolutions not only cause the old social order to crumble but they also shake up established paradigmatic order. They bring new insights, pose new questions, and redraw an intellectual map that has sometimes existed for generations. The more cataclysmic the revolutionary transformation the more challenging the new questions it brings to our attention. Each new social revolution, by virtue of its uniqueness, seems to cast further doubt on existing generalizations. Even observed uniformities are themselves part of larger and unique historical phenomena for which we will never be able to account by using static universal propositions. The best we can hope for is to construct interpretative schemes that are based on probability statements. The Islamic revolution of Iran has brought about the most spectacular revolutionary transformation of the twentieth century. An examination of it can provide students of revolution with some new answers to old questions. I hope that this study has been a step in that direction.

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