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INCORPORATION AND RESISTANCE:
THE NATIVE SOUTHEAST AND THE WORLD-ECONOMY,
1670s-1830s

A Dissertation

Presented For The

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

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Jeffrey Phillip Stotik

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for my parents

Karl and Esther Stotik

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ABSTRACT

Between the late 1670s and the 1830s the Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw were incorporated into the world-system. Their incorporation took place in two phases. Phase one was characterized by intense imperial competition and conflict. The mechanism of incorporation during this period was the deerskin trade. The second phase of incorporation was characterized by settler expansion, more complete economic and political restructuring for the southeastern societies, and their ultimate removal. During this phase, the southeastern nations experienced the development of private property and the emergence of class divisions.

Both phases of incorporation were resisted by the southeastern societies. The first phase was notable for open rebellion and political resistance. The second phase was marked by a wider variety of forms of resistance, including rebellion and diplomatic and legal resistance.

Ultimately this project argues for an expansion of the concept of incorporation. Many theorists adhere to an orthodox view, which defines incorporation as the integration of an area's production processes into the world-wide division of labor. However, there are cases where a region becomes hooked into the world-economy, but not to this degree. Analyses of incorporation must recognize this, as well as the existence of resistance.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

> The conquerors of America glorified the devastation they wrought in visions of righteousness, and their descendants have been reluctant to peer through the aura. Decent [people] with pigmentless skins no longer overtly espouse delusions of peculiar grandeur, but the myths created by the cant of conquest endure in many forms to mask the terrible tragedy that was Europe's glory (Jennings 1975:6).

This study is an examination of economic incorporation, geo-politics, cultural and physical genocide, and rebellion. Specifically it is an examination of indigenous responses to incorporation into the modern world-system. While many scholars have examined the history of the interaction between European colonists and Native Americans, too often the perspective has been developmentalist. In other words, this period of North American history is often viewed as a clash between cultures, with the superior culture inevitably being triumphant. This project is a challenge to the idea that the vast destruction involved in North American colonization, while tragic, was the unavoidable byproduct of progress, or the march of western civilization.

There are a number of myths inherent in the progress

view of history. For example, because the history of Native Americans has been written largely from a European point of view, it is usually tainted "by the uncritical acceptance of cultural evolution as the definitive experience of our species" (Deloria and Lytle 1983:1). Most people will undoubtedly say that they no longer hold on to such myths. In response, Richter (1993) makes a strong argument. Despite the emergence of a "new Native American history" in recent years (i.e. the idea that Europeans and Native Americans were co-creators) it has not had a large influence on broader areas of inquiry, and certainly not in secondary and higher educational textbooks, or the American popular consciousness. This is not to say that conventional history does not at times recognize that history has involved vast destruction. But when it does recognize the destruction of North America, it has left us with the idea that history is finished, that the indigenous peoples are no more, that they have disappeared or are disappearing (McGuire 1992) and that they were overwhelmed so rapidly that they do not have a story to tell (Wright 1992). With the exception of the story of the "Trail of Tears," this case is particularly applicable to Native Americans of the southeast.

I take as my starting point the assumption that the conquest of the indigenous peoples on the North American continent is best characterized as incorporation into the capitalist world-economy. Incorporation is not only best

viewed as a continuum, it is also a multi-directional process. In other words, the world-economy it is not an irresistible force totally unaffected by those being incorporated.

Studying Native American-white contact as a process of incorporation, in keeping with some of the recent scholarship on Native American history (e.g. Salisbury 1982;1987, McNeill 1985, Martin 1987, Jaenen 1987, Jennings 1988, Hall 1989, White 1991) entails reconstructing historical myths. From a western point of view the discovery-progress myth is truth. History from a Native American viewpoint is also mythic (Wright 1992). The difference is that while the western myth is victorious, the Native American myth must explain and struggle with cataclysm. As Wright says, "If the vanquished culture is to survive at all, its myths must provide it with rugged terrain in which to resist the invader and do battle with his myths" (1992:5).

It is a legacy of imperialism and cultural and human genocide that contemporary scholars still discuss and struggle with ways to include the Native American voice in American history. Fundamentally there seems to be two broad issues that scholars have historically dealt with, the remnants of which survive today. First, Native American history has often been treated as a smaller part of the real story of North America (Martin 1987). An indication of the

survival of this view can be seen in terms like "prehistory," which refers to the time before Europeans set foot on the continent. Why is there not just history? The second issue, clearly related to the first, is the idea that Native Americans and Europeans constituted two different types of humanity. It is widely recognized that Europeans tried to justify their acts of colonization through a mythological dichotomy of savage/civilized (Salisbury 1987). According to Jaenen, history "has not been liberated yet from the savagery/civility dichotomy" (1987:57).

Traces of this dichotomy can be seen in the presumption that Europeans actually made history, and Native Americans are only relevant in their interaction with whites (Salisbury 1987). Ultimately both these ideas stem from imperial histories, which have focused on core regions and viewed the story of the colonized as mere continuations of core history (McNeill 1985). At the same time one could say that much current history has a particular ideology embedded within it; an ideology that puts a divide between their (non-European) history and our history. Our ideology (myth) holds that this thing called the West is separate from (not dependent on) the non-European. Unavoidably this myth not only describes how imperialists interpret their actions (Rogin 1971) but also denies non-European peoples their history (Rubertone 1989). To create a more authentic story, we must start by recognizing that the western myth was

"created to morally and politically justify European colonialism" (Rubertone 1989:34). While people are beginning to recognize the need to include European and Native American in the same history, there is still a long road to walk (Meinig 1989).

Ultimately, then, this project continues the critique of our dominant organizing myths, but from a world-systems perspective. According to Taylor (1986) the world-systems project is that of providing an alternative to the progressive organizing myth. One way social scientists have contributed to the progressive myth is through the separation of social science and history. This separation has allowed the progress myth of history to become statements of universal generalizations, or truth. In the world-systems perspective there is not social science and history, only historical social science (Taylor 1986).

It is fruitful to attack the progress myth because, even though truth changes through time, it has become absolute. As Taylor says, "Traditional societies and their myths have been vanquished by our truth. It is this arrogant 'modernization' which has produced a rationality upon which economic efficiency can be developed" (1986:273). According to Richter, if the fundamental problem is shaped by myth and its functions, we cannot simplify the problem "to whether or not myth should play any role in our understandings of the past." Rather, the problem is

determining the roles myth has in historical inquiry and how such roles can be used for "constructive, socially inclusive purposes" (1993:387). World-systems analysis is a critique of the developmentalism myth that has dominated social science (Wallerstein 1990), or the idea that all societies progress through similar stages until they reach the same end (Wallerstein 1977). A common component of developmentalism is the idea that since some societies are more advanced than others, some acts of brutality are justified as necessary for the promotion of progress and civilization. It is time to replace "the old master narrative of European progress and Indian retreat" (Richter 1993:390). One way to do this is to examine macro processes experienced (differently) by Native Americans and Europeans. Certainly the overarching process/structure to consider is incorporation into the modern world-system. This process not only united people "in a single transatlantic world," but its "diverse forms of exploitation" point to the way of "revisioning early American history" (Richter 1993:391).

Plan of Study

This project is best characterized as historical political economy, and as such will not follow the format and procedures of most contemporary, mainstream sociological studies. The area of interest for this study is the southeastern United States from the 1670s-1830s.

Specifically I want to look at the experience of the Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw. These peoples were considered the major political groups in the area, and colonial efforts centered around them. Singly, and in combination, they often held the balance of power in the southeast, and their incorporation, and resistance to it, was central to the incorporation of the entire region. The study consists of seven main sections: the current chapter outlines my theoretical foundation and research questions. In chapter II I examine precolonial social formations and the initial penetration of the world-economy. Chapter III examines what I call the first phase of incorporation. This primarily consisted of imperial competition and the deerskin trade. The deerskin trade was the key mechanism of incorporation. Chapter IV looks at the consequences of and nonrebellion responses to incorporation. The fundamental point here is that Native Americans actively responded to the invasion of the world-economy. Chapter V examines the second phase of incorporation, which involved the attempt to economically convert Native societies, capitalist class formation and removal. In chapter VI I examine disease and imperial hegemony, both of which are crucial elements, or obstacles, to consider when examining Native American resistance. In chapter VII I examine resistance to the first phase of incorporation. Resistance was ongoing, and involved geopolitics and armed rebellion. Chapter VIII is

an analysis of resistance to the second phase of incorporation. Broadly speaking, the project is best conceptualized as a merging of three literatures; world-systems analysis, some of the literature on rebellion, and the literature on Native Americans in the southeast.

Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical beginning for this study is the notion of incorporation drawn from world-systems analysis. According to world-systems analysis the current world-system takes the form of a capitalist world-economy, the "driving force" of which is the endless accumulation of capital (Wallerstein 1990:288). The present world-system is a world-economy because of the existence of a number of integrated production processes joined in an ongoing social division of labor (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987). The main elements of the capitalist world-economy include a single social division of labor, production for profit on the world market, the creation of three zones of economic activity (core, semiperiphery, periphery) which have unequal exchange and trade imbalances between them, and two main world class formations, the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Within the relationship of capital and labor the surplus created by producers is appropriated at the point of production, or immediate market place. The particular structure of the world-economy also allows the unequal exchange of goods and

services; i.e., much of the surplus value extracted from peripheral zones is transferred to the core (Wallerstein 1985). According to Wallerstein the "boundaries of the capitalist world-economy" correspond "to that of an interstate system comprised of sovereign states." Although the modern world-system emerged in Europe, it has covered the globe through the process of incorporation (1990:289).

From a world-systems perspective, the history of the capitalist world-economy has been expansion into, and the incorporation and peripheralization of new geographic areas (Timberlake 1985). According to Wallerstein (1984) the continual stagnations in the world-economy have led to periodic restructurings. These restructurings have included the expansion of the boundaries of the world-economy. This process of expansion is more or less complete. There are no longer areas external to the modern world-system.

In simple terms incorporation entails three successive moments for a region. A region is initially an external arena of the world-economy, it becomes incorporated, and is subsequently peripheralized (Wallerstein 1989). A simple definition of incorporation is the integration of an external area's "production processes into the interdependent network of production processes that constitutes the world market" (Sokolovsky 1985:42). Essentially, incorporation establishes new low-cost labor zones for world production, thereby ensuring that a high

proportion of world economic surplus continues to flow to the "high accumulators," located in the core of the system (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987:771).

While incorporation is a singular process of economic and political restructuring (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987), it operates in specific zones within particular time frames and takes on unique historical forms (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981). Nevertheless, incorporation is always characterized by the reshaping of all varieties of social interaction through the capitalist division of labor (Sokolovsky 1985). The restructuring of production processes can entail the introduction of new processes, or the articulation of new and old production processes, or simply the redirection of surplus already produced. Whatever form the restructuring of production processes takes, it always involves the transformation of workers into labor for capital. This transformation is coercive, and the incorporated experience a decline in their material well-being (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981).

There are a number of additional changes that must be created in a zone undergoing incorporation. Restructuring production processes also involves changing land ownership, relocating labor, changing the balance of social power (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987), changing production relationships, property laws, and household organization (Sokolovsky 1985).

Even though all regions in the world have been incorporated into the modern world-system, there is still room for the deepening of capitalism in various peripheral areas (Timberlake 1985). Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987) say that the deepening of capitalism takes three interconnected forms: mechanization, commodification, and contractualization. Mechanization refers to the fact that production processes gradually take a larger proportion of their input from machines. Commodification occurs after the elimination of non-capitalist ways of obtaining an income. It refers to the transformation of products, land, and labor into commodities. Contractualization refers to the process of social relations becoming free to be controlled by direct agreement between the agents as opposed to being governed by pre-existing rules or custom.

In the present context there are two theoretical critiques that can be made of the concept of incorporation. First, as Hall (1986) points out, while there have been quite a few analyses of the incorporation of state societies, there has not been much work on the effect of incorporation on nonstate societies. Second, I would argue that although the work on incorporation presumes resistance (Wallerstein 1984; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987; Phillips 1987), it lacks explicit analysis of resistance to incorporation, as the process is occurring, on the part of indigenous peoples.

Hall's analysis of the incorporation of the southwest suggests that the concept of incorporation should be defined as a matter of degree, or as a continuum. According to Hall (1986;1989) incorporation from a world-systems perspective, the integration of a zone's production processes into the network of production processes that make up the world market, is real or effective incorporation. Real incorporation can be distinguished from nominal or formal incorporation. Nominal incorporation is defined as a situation where a zone is politically dominated by an outside power, and it has economic connections with the world-economy. However, the dominant processes of production remain those that characterize external arenas.

Hall says that the problem with only accepting the effective definition of incorporation is that it does not include an entire range of social change that occurs with less extreme forms of incorporation. He therefore broadens the concept of incorporation to include contact. As a result, peripherality is redefined as a continuum based on degree of incorporation. Hall suggests that incorporation can be placed along a three point continuum. At the weak end he places zones that are unconnected, or slightly connected, to the world-economy. At the middle point are zones where the direction of influence is mainly from the core to the periphery. The strong end of the continuum refers to a situation where essential goods are exchanged

between the core and periphery, but net capital flow is to the core. Based on degree of incorporation, or market articulation, Hall distinguishes between types of peripheries: external arenas and contact peripheries, marginal peripheries, and fully dependent peripheries.

Besides Hall's theoretical ideas being useful, the broader implications that can be derived from his work are relevant to this project and very much coincide with the overall world-systems project. An obvious implication is that the consequences of incorporation are extremely variable. Incorporation is an interactive process. Change occurs as a result of intrusion by the world-economy, but it is also influenced by indigenous social organization. The process is not one-dimensional, and the vital roles played by the incorporated should not be ignored. For Hall (1986;1989), therefore, the consequences of incorporation are the result of contextual factors and local/regional dynamics. In order to understand local/regional factors, resistance to incorporation must be taken into account.

Larson makes the point that dependency and world-systems theorists have "anatomized the behemoth called the capitalist world-system" (1983:8). This has important implications for the study of resistance in colonized societies. For example, it becomes easy to portray native peoples as "active consumers, copiers, and passive recipients" (Rubertone 1989:36). When instead, as Larson

points out in reference to Latin America, "social conflict and contradiction" played more of a role than "the 'rational' calculations of colonizers intent upon maximizing their returns" in creating "the diverse contours of Latin America's social, political, economic, and cultural geography," as well as the "historical 'breakpoints' in the evolution of these societies" (1983:11). The conscious actions of oppressed people had an impact on, and often changed the direction of colonization. The scope and "systems" aspect of world-systems analysis make it easy to overlook this fact. And indeed, those who generally point to European colonialism as a matter of superior technology (or system) fall into an evolutionary argument, and ignore economic conflict and various historical processes. Not only do evolutionary/progress arguments justify "slavery, colonialism, expansionistic imperialism, and neocolonialism" (Richards 1979:246), but the ultimate result of such views is the failure to see that not only have indigenous people participated in their history, but they have also resisted historical processes (Rubertone 1989).

As a result of these realizations, a number of scholars have taken an "inside looking out" approach to colonization, i.e., shifting more of a focus to the innovative resistance of indigenous peoples, rather than the overwhelming force of the world-economy (Larson 1983). By using an inside-out approach we can begin to understand

that colonialism has depended on coercion and collaboration, and the implications such a system has for rebellion and other forms of resistance (Larson 1983). As peasants and slaves interrupted the colonization process in Latin America (Larson 1983), the resistance in the southeast altered the trajectory of incorporation and set the stage for resistance as long as the system is in place.

Having said all this however, it is not enough to simply take an inside-out perspective on resistance. One can be very aware that indigenous people have resisted incorporation and yet fall into the trap of characterizing all resistance as merely a defensive reaction to external forces (Stern 1987). Stern argues that we need to reevaluate certain assumptions when examining resistance by "subsistence-oriented agricultural producers" (1987:4). First, the role of subordinate groups as "continuous initiators" must be examined. Second, appropriate time frames must be utilized. Third, it is a serious error not to recognize the "diversity of 'peasant' consciousness and political horizons." Fourth, ethnic factors must be taken into account when analyzing resistance and rebellion (1987: 8,9).

A goal of this study, therefore, is to contribute to an understanding of the incorporation process. I begin with two key ideas. First, the incorporation of the southeast was violent, relatively chaotic, and fraught with imperial

competition. Second, to truly understand the incorporation process, one must examine the responses of those who are being incorporated. If this is not done, world-systems theorists run the risk of doing what they are fundamentally oppose: viewing history/incorporation as an inevitable social development through which all societies must pass. In an effort to add to the literature on incorporation I will draw from and incorporate ideas from work that has been done on rebellion.

There are numerous examples of Native American resistance to the phases of incorporation in the southeast. However, this resistance must be placed within a theoretical analysis. This is so for two main reasons. First, there were many types of resistance. To understand them as a totality a theoretical analysis is necessary. Second, if a theoretical grounding is not used it becomes too easy to dismiss indigenous resistance as unimportant and unconnected to the modern world-system. A key component in my analysis of resistance is the work done by Scott (1985; 1989; 1990), Colburn (1989), and Nissman (1992). Not only do these authors recognize a wide variety of forms of resistance on the part of oppressed groups and the connection between open/mobilized resistance and everyday/hidden resistance, but their analyses also presume that oppressed groups, in Stern's (1987) words, are continuous initiators. My ultimate hope is that my examination of resistance will be a

step toward placing real human experience and action into analyses of incorporation. The process can easily be dressed up with sophisticated concepts and ideas, but ultimately incorporation in the southeast meant the displacement, enslavement and death of human beings, as well as their acculturation. However, if we do not also recognize that all these profound disruptions were resisted, we perpetuate the denial of humanity that is inherent to imperialism.

Research Questions

My research questions are as follows:

1. What was the nature of the incorporation process in the southeastern part of what is now the U.S.?
2. What were the most important specific disruptions in the social and economic processes of the indigenous peoples of the southeast?
3. How did the indigenous people respond?
4. Since the process of incorporation is variable, was there a moment in time when change in the southeast was reversible?
5. How important was disease in the incorporation process? Should it be somehow intertwined in the political economic view of incorporation?

Analytical Mechanisms

This project is a study in historical sociology. Here I want to lay out my analytical framework. It should be mentioned at the outset that there are no set, "proper," methods in historical sociology (Skocpol 1984b). The basic goal of historical sociology is the discovery of structures (often hidden) which help explain societal change (Smith 1991). Doing this requires more than reference to sources that describe the change under investigation. Social change (destruction) and the mechanisms responsible for it must often be inferred. In other words, the events one is interested in need to be interpreted within a theoretical perspective which specifies the mechanisms that bring about change (Karsten and Modell 1992). I am interested in the southeast beginning in the mid-1600s, and my interpretive framework is the world-systems perspective.

One of the overarching goals of world-systems theory is to replace the notion that historical change is made up of a number of stages through which all societies must ultimately pass (Skocpol 1984a). World-systems theory also has an explicit political (third) world-view, and therefore the perspective is a combination of applying a framework to history, and the creation of a political interpretation of history (Skocpol 1984b).

According to Ragin and Chirot (1984), Wallerstein's world-systems perspective uses a number of explanatory

mechanisms. The most basic explanatory concept is the make-up of the world-economy itself; a single economy containing many political entities. This concept allows the negation of the distinction between nomothetic and ideographic approaches to research. There are several other explanatory mechanisms. First, the geo-political reality of the world-economy is that countries dominate other countries in order to survive. Second, lack of demand creates periodic crises of overproduction. Increased demand can be created by expanding the system through the incorporation of new zones, and the deepening of capitalism in already incorporated zones. Third, the search for cheap labor and raw materials are additional catalysts for incorporation.

The purpose of the world-systems project, and this one, is to use a particular perspective to interpret social history, and not to verify it in relation to alternative theories (Ragin and Chirot 1984). My hope is that this will be a contribution to the need for a more philosophic history that can explain societal transition with the purpose of examining the character of power and its effect on people's life chances (Smith 1991).

CHAPTER II

PRECOLONIAL SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND EARLY CONTACT

Ancient Civilizations

Even though it is quite common to divide Native American history into prehistory and history, the story of Native Americans did not begin with European contact (Williams 1979). Not much is known about the ancient ancestors of the interior tribes of the southeast; largely because these ancient civilizations experienced massive depopulation, and ultimately disappeared. Although these civilizations are not directly relevant to this project, they illustrate the far-reaching and early destructive nature of the incorporation process.

The civilizations of interest here are the Moundbuilders of the Ohio River Valley, which began to decline around 500 A.D. (Nash 1982), and the Mississippians, who started to emerge in the Mississippi River Valley after 700 A.D. According to Williams, Mississippian culture began a drastic decline, largely due to European diseases, in the 1500s and 1600s. Alternatively, O'Brien (1992) suggests that the core of a Middle Mississippian "world-system" declined between 1100-1350 A.D., through internal disintegration.

According to Nash (1982) the Moundbuilders were the

ancestors of the Creeks, Choctaw, and the Natchez. Corkran (1967) characterizes the Creek as late Mississippian, and says their ancestors were likely part of a great migration of northern groups that came into the southeast about 800-1000 A.D. According to White, one of the groups among the Mississippians were the Muskogeans, the "lineal ancestors" of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek (1983:2). As far as the Cherokee are concerned, precontact Delaware legend has references to a southern migration of Tallegwis (Cherokee). The Delawares had militarily defeated the Cherokee, and driven them past the Ohio River. Cherokee history also has references to such a migration (Woodward 1983). It would seem, then, that many of the later interior southeastern tribes were descendants of the Mississippians.

The center of Mississippian culture was present-day St Louis, and it spread across most of the Mississippi watershed, covering the territory between Wisconsin and Louisiana, and Oklahoma and Tennessee (Nash 1982). Mississippian culture was based on intensive agriculture (Williams 1979; Nash 1982), and was organized into city states instead of tribes. Mississippian culture, through the production of crops like corn, beans, and squash, was able to produce a surplus, and therefore had a relatively complex class structure. For example, there existed an upper class of religious leaders, as well as an artisan and craftsman class (Williams 1979). O'Brien (1992:405) locates

what is now west Kentucky/Tennessee within the semiperiphery of a Mississippian trading "world-system." The local polities that later became identified as the Five Civilized Nations (Cherokee, Natchez, Chickasaw, Creek, and Choctaw) were on the periphery of this world-system. With the decline of the core, the Cohokia site, from approximately 1300 A.D., the "power center" of the Middle Mississippian world shifted to these nations (O'Brien 1992:412).

Smith (1987), in analyzing the decline of the early societies in the southeast, provides some insights into the social organization of the peoples of the southeast right before and during initial European contact. He calls this period the early historic period. The beginning of this period are the explorations of Hernando De Soto in 1540, the first European to enter the southeast.

According to Smith (1987) the groups in the southeast at this time are best characterized as highly ranked, complex chiefdoms. These chiefdoms, which can be conceptualized as a polity or province, were marked by large towns, a sophisticated military and religion, and a high population. And indeed, the southeast, in the early 1500s, was one of the most densely populated areas on the Atlantic coast (Nash 1982).

The chiefdoms had several levels of political power. Not only were there differences in political authority between towns, but political coalitions often existed among

several towns within a chiefdom. A smaller town would be under the political authority of a larger town, which in turn was under the authority of a principal town or chiefdom (Smith 1987). After the early Spanish explorers in the 1540s, Europeans had no direct contact with the people of the southeast until 1673 (Woodward 1963), and yet the societies described by the Spanish explorers of the sixteenth century were completely different than those described by Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The complex chiefdoms had given way to tribes and loosely formed confederacies (Smith 1987). The main reason for this change was massive depopulation due to European diseases. Somewhere between 1000-1500 the entire Mississippi Valley was depopulated, largely due to diseases such as smallpox, chickenpox, mumps, measles, tuberculosis, and the cold (Marriott and Rachlin 1969). As mentioned, it is interesting to note that this decline occurred without direct European contact (Williams 1979; Smith 1987). Although the precise history of the complex chiefdoms and disease is not fully known, it is clear that epidemic disease had reached the interior before De Soto (Smith 1987). Epidemics that had broken out among coastal tribes did not take long to reach the interior (Williams 1979). These diseases not only resulted in massive depopulation, but also led to large-scale changes in social and political organization, even before there was extensive European-

Native American contact.

In socio-political terms, epidemic disease had two major effects; large population movements, and the political disintegration of the chiefdoms (Smith 1987). Although population movements are difficult to document, Smith (1987) says there is evidence of correspondence between certain settlement movements and outbreaks of disease among the chiefdoms of the southeast. The political disintegration resulting from massive depopulation is much easier to determine. By looking at factors such as the decline of public works, the decline of status systems as reflected in grave goods, and the decline of craft specialization, Smith concludes that it is clear that the complex chiefdoms disintegrated into smaller groups due to an outside influence. By the beginning of the eighteenth century these groups had joined together in what was later known as the Creek confederacy. Where once people had been governed by powerful, hereditary chiefs, they were now governed by headmen (mikos), and tribal councils.

Smith (1987) therefore concludes that the Creek confederacy, and by implication other southeastern groups, emerged in response to outside pressures. It should be mentioned, that in addition to disease, the southeastern confederacies were also formed as an indirect result of the fur trade wars in the northeast. Europeans fought these wars using Native American groups. Refugees from these wars

moved south, and set in motion a settlement displacement chain reaction. Involved in this displacement were groups from the destroyed chiefdoms. Therefore, refugee groups from the north sped up the confederation process that had begun with massive depopulation. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the confederation process was further accelerated by the activities of slave traders (Smith 1987). Even though these pressures on the people of the southeast were not the result of direct contact with imperialists, they were set in motion by European imperialism. They are a good illustration of the many forces involved in, and the ultimately complex nature of, the incorporation process. The experience of the Mississippians also shows how disease served as a key component, or silent ally, in the incorporation process.

Tribal/Confederacy Formations

Even though the southeastern societies had changed significantly, due to the indirect effects of imperialism, it was not until the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that extensive European intrusion began (Smith 1987). Therefore, in order to judge the effects and nature of incorporation, it is useful to examine the social formations of the tribes and confederacies that emerged from the remnants of the complex chiefdoms.

The precolonial Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and

Choctaw all had similar political, economic, and social organization. All four societies had democratic political systems, a low level of political differentiation, and subsistence and nonacquisitive economies (Champagne 1992).

The Creek/Muskogee

The name Creek is a European invention (Corkran 1967). The Creeks are in actuality a branch of the Choctaw-Muskogee tribes (Halbert and Ball 1969). The people known as Creeks occupied territory that stretched from the Atlantic coast to the Tombigbee River in Alabama, and south from the Savannah into Florida (Braund 1993). As what later became known as the Creek confederacy became consolidated and incorporated different groups, the Muskogees remained the dominant group (Hawkins 1938). The Creek confederacy in the 1800s is best characterized as a loosely organized political unit, centered around the Muskogee towns of Coweta, Cussita, Tuckabatchee, and Coosa (Corkran 1967). During the tumultuous seventeenth century the confederacy "welcomed many harassed peoples into their territory" (Braund 1993:4). Various native groups entered the confederacy through request and invitation. For example, during the British-Cherokee war, some Lower Towns received an invitation to join the confederacy, which they refused. Often however, groups wanted to join, and made formal requests to do so. More often than not the Creek responded favorably to such

requests. For example, in 1772 a group of Chickasaw made a formal request to live within the Creek Upper Towns (Braund 1993). By 1848 the confederacy was made up of several tribes speaking five languages, Muskogee, Hitchittee, Uchee, Natchez, and Alabama or Coosada (Hawkins 1938). At the beginning of European contact the confederacy had incorporated the Alabama, Koasati, and Hitchiti. Ultimately segments of the Apalachee, Shawnee, Yuchi, Yamasee, Natchez, and Chickasaw were incorporated (Corkran 1967). Clearly, as the incorporation process, and subsequent destruction, proceeded, various groups found it necessary (useful) to join together in facing the outside threat.

By the early nineteenth century the Creek numbered 20,000 (Champagne 1992). In the mid-1800s the confederacy consisted of 37 towns located on the Chattohochee, Coosa, and Tallapoosa rivers (Hawkins 1938). According to Corkran (1967) there were eventually 60 towns in the confederacy. The 40 Upper Towns were on the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers, and the 20 Lower Towns were located on the Ocmulgee, Flint, and Chattahoochee Rivers. Although it is common to refer to the two geographical divisions in the confederacy as the Upper and Lower towns, these are European designations. Nevertheless, there were two divisions which had political independence. For example, in matters of war and diplomacy the Upper and Lower towns were not under obligation to act together and indeed could and did act independently

(Champagne 1992).

The confederacy was a political entity. It enabled different groups to take joint action when facing outside threats (Gatschet 1969). The confederacy, as an overarching political structure, had no direct input into individual tribal social organization. The various towns were even able to maintain autonomy when decisions concerning warfare were made (Gatschet 1969).

Corkran (1967) gives a good description of the confederacy's political structure. Each Creek town had three or four headmen, or mikos. The mikos were not the same as the popular image of Native American chiefs. The miko can be seen as the first among equals. In modern terminology they were the council president, and they had no power apart from their council. The next level of political power was each town's head warrior, or Tastanage. In addition, there were two levels of councillors within the miko's political circle, the Micnggee, or secondary councillors, and the Enchau Ulgea, those second in command and directors of public works. As well as these two levels of councillor, there were a third and fourth level, the Istechque. These councillors were primarily former Micnggee and warriors. Political decisions, then, were made by a conference of the various important men in each town. A national council, when it was needed, consisted of representatives from the various towns (Champagne 1992).

The Cherokee

Cherokee tradition holds that they have always occupied the mountains of the southern Alleghenies, or present day southwest Virginia, western North and South Carolina, east Tennessee, northern Georgia, and northeast Alabama (Woodward 1963). In 1721 the Cherokee had 60 towns and a population of 10,379 (Crane 1959). By the early 1800s the Cherokee had a population of 25,000 (Champagne 1992). According to Wright (1992) the Cherokee were a loosely knit federation which ultimately contained sixty-four towns. The only factors binding these towns were language, culture, and kinship. Rights (1957) describes the Cherokee as a separated offshoot of the Iroquois, and comparable latecomers to the region.

Clan membership for the Cherokee was key in determining a person's identity. Fundamentally clans were divided into war and peace clans. Clans not only decided political affiliation, but also determined social roles (Perdue 1979a). Like the other groups in the pre-capitalist southeast, the Cherokee did not have a centralized system of government. As such the bond between individuals and groups was primarily cultural, rather than political coercion (Perdue 1979a; Wright 1992). Prior to the late eighteenth century, Cherokee leaders operated through consensus, and did not have the kind of political power we associate with modern political leaders (Perdue 1979a).

Champagne (1992) gives a detailed account of

precolonial Cherokee political organization. The basic political unit for the Cherokee was the town, or village. Each individual town was autonomous, and had the authority to make political decisions, including decisions of war and peace. However, even with this autonomy, town coalitions were often formed, especially in times of war. Nevertheless, besides the coalitions there was not much national political coordination, and certainly "no regular national political mechanism" (Champagne 1992:25). Similar to the Creek, the Cherokee nation consisted of regional divisions. The Cherokee divisions consisted of five town coalitions: overhill towns, valley towns, lower towns, middletowns, and the out towns.

While emphasizing the autonomy of the towns, Champagne also points out that the Cherokee nation was "more than a loose confederation of towns" (1992:25). This is evident when one examines the Cherokee decision making bodies. The nation was "governed by seven mother towns." Each mother town had a chief who served as the "regional leader of affiliated daughter towns" (1992:25). While the mother towns did have substantial political influence, they did not have coercive power. The nation also had regional and a national council. Both types of council consisted of the village chiefs and their assistants, head warriors and their assistants, as well as beloved men and priests. The national council did not meet on a regular basis, and for a

decision to be binding, it had to be unanimous.

The pre-capitalist Cherokee economy is best described as subsistence-based, or as Perdue (1979a) puts it, the Cherokee way of life consisted of communal labor and a redistributive economy. Therefore individual wealth or the generation of economic surplus was unnecessary. This situation changed rapidly with the intrusion of the world-economy. The incorporation of the Cherokee, and indeed the entire southeast, proceeded extremely fast and involved tremendous destruction. Beginning in about 1785 the Cherokee economy started to be transformed into an industrial and agricultural one. An indication of this transformation was the construction of mills and trading posts (Carter 1976).

The Chickasaw and Choctaw

The traditional territory of the Chickasaw included what is now northern Mississippi, northwest Alabama, west Tennessee, and southwest Kentucky (Guice 1985). The Chickasaw population was seldom over 5,000 (Champagne 1992). The tribal organization of the Chickasaw was very similar to the other groups in the region. The Chickasaw were organized by clans and towns. Each clan and town were self governing, but all the towns and clans formed somewhat of a confederation which could act as a single political unit. Private land ownership did not exist for the Chickasaw; all

tribal land was held in common (Gibson 1971).

By 1708 the Chickasaw nation contained seven major towns and a mother town. Each town had a chief, who were more or less politically under the chief of the mother town (Champagne 1992). However, as is the case with all these societies, the Chickasaw political organization occupied the gray area between structure and autonomy. The chief of the mother town had moderate power, and each town usually handled their own political matters (Champagne 1992).

It is difficult to discuss the Chickasaw without reference to the Choctaw. Of all the groups in the southeast, the Chickasaw were most similar to the Choctaw (Gibson 1971). The reason for this can be clearly seen when one looks at some of the origin stories of the Choctaw (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Brescia 1985).

The Choctaw have two main types of stories regarding where they came from: migration stories and creation stories. Several migration stories refer to the Choctaw moving into the southeast from somewhere in the northwest (Brescia 1985). They also refer to two brothers, Chactas and Chicsa, who were leaders of different clans, and ultimately separated to form the Chickasaw and Choctaw (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Brescia 1985).

The Choctaw were one of the most populous tribes of the southeast, only the Cherokee had a larger population (Sheddan 1931; Guice 1985; Searcy 1985), and traditionally

resided in what is now southern and central Mississippi and western Alabama (Sheddan 1931).[1] The Choctaw settlements made up three broad divisions: the A-he-pot-Okla, or potato eating people, the Ok-la-fa-la-ya, or long people, and the Okla-Hamali, or six towns. Each of these divisions had a miko (Sheddan 1931; McKee and Schlenker 1980). In addition, each village had a miko, and each miko relied on a group of officials (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Galloway 1985). For example, each town had a tichou mingo (master of ceremonies), taskananfouchi (miko's speaker), soulouche oumastabe (war chief), and hopaii mingo (prophet chief) (Galloway 1985).

The system of Choctaw government can best be described as democratic. Governance took place in both district and national councils (McKee and Schlenker 1980). As with other groups in the region, the Choctaw mikos were not elected or inherited positions. Choctaw leaders gained their position "by the way he conducted his life" (Noley 1985a:56). The national council only met in times of crisis, but individuals were not forced to go along with national resolutions (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Noley 1985a).

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[1] There is not total agreement as to the size of the groups in the southeast. Crane (1959:136) says that the Choctaw in the eighteenth century, with a population of 15,000, were the largest "compact nation" in the south, second only to the Creek federation. Champagne (1992) says that it is likely that the precolonial Choctaw had one of the largest populations in North America. In the 1800s they numbered 30,000.

The Choctaw social and economic structure, although similar to other groups in the region, differed in one important regard; they seemed to be the only group in the region which consistently produced a surplus (Noley 1985b). The Choctaw were mainly agricultural people, who engaged in communal agriculture. And indeed the Choctaw are often described as the most adept farmers in the region, and more dependent on crops than other groups (Brescia 1985). Although they consistently produced a surplus, it was always traded to other groups in the region, and therefore no single individual made a profit (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Noley 1985b). As has been mentioned, at the top of the Choctaw class structure were three tiers of miko; district, town, and war. The class structure also consisted of three other classes. There was the hattak holitopa, or "beloved men," the tushka, or fighting and hunting class, and the hattak imatahali, or the young and inexperienced men (Noley 1985b:96).

Generally speaking, all four southeastern societies operated through negotiation and consensus. Principal and regional leaders had nominal power, and the minority were not forced to abide by the majority decision in various political matters. All four groups also had horticultural/hunting subsistence economies. Production was geared towards local needs, and not much surplus was created for trade. The lack of surplus stemmed from more than

material situation and circumstance. According to Champagne all of these societies "were openly disdainful of personal wealth and accumulation" (1992:34).

Early Contact

The first European to come into contact with the southeastern societies was Hernando De Soto in 1540. De Soto and other Spaniards explored the region from 1540-1567 (Corkran 1967; Fairbanks 1974). During these explorations the Spanish made contact with all four of the groups under consideration (Shedden 1931; Woodward 1963; Gibson 1971; Searcy 1985). The intrusions of the Spanish explorers into the interior southeast should not be taken lightly in either social or human terms. According to Smith (1989) the explorers, especially De Soto, murdered and forced Native Americans into labor, and introduced a number of new diseases. Other side effects of the De Soto expedition included warfare and famine.[2]

Historical convention holds that the southeastern societies had no contact with Europeans for the next 150 years. However, during the interim the Cherokee made periodic raids on Spanish settlements in Florida (Woodward 1963), and although the Chickasaw had no direct contact with Europeans, they were aware of the Spanish by way of

[2] Two other major Spanish expeditions into the interior southeast were those by Tristan de Luna in 1559/60, and Juan Pardo in 1566 and 1568 (Fairbanks 1974; Smith 1987).

intertribal trade and warfare (Gibson 1971). The Spanish had set up a military post at St. Augustine in 1565 (Doster 1974). The colonists of main interest here are the French on the Gulf coast and the British on the Carolina coast. Both these settlements emerged in the late 1600s.

In 1663 the British Crown gave the charter to the territory known as Carolina to eight proprietors. In 1670 the settlement of Charleston was founded (Bolton and Marshall 1922). The original settlement consisted of 150 people (Crane 1959) from England, Ireland, Barbados, and Bermuda (Randolph 1973). Around the same time that Charleston was being established, the Carolina proprietors had acquired the Bahamas, with the intent of setting up a trade between the island and North American colonies (Bolton 1922). The first French settlement in the region was established on the Gulf Coast in 1699. By this time the Carolina colony was deeply entrenched (Shedden 1931). The French colony, under the leadership of Governor Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, was largely constructed to combat the growing political and economic influence of the British in the Lower Mississippi Valley (Gibson 1971).

The British were the first Europeans to resume prolonged contact with the southeastern societies. By the end of the 1600s English traders from Charleston had reached the Mississippi River in their quest for deerskins and slaves (Usner 1992). In 1673 two English traders made

contact with the Cherokee (Bolton and Marshall 1922), and by 1685 Charleston traders were among the Creek (Cotterill (1954), specifically the Lower Town of Coweta (Corkran 1967). The traders left Coweta with 150 Native American "cargo carriers" hauling loads of deerskins (Corkran 1967). In 1698 two English traders, with a supply train, made their way into the Choctaw nation. They exchanged cloth, guns, shot, powder, knives, and hatchets for pelts and slaves (McKee and Schlenker 1980). The first Europeans to reestablish contact with the Chickasaw were the French, from Canada and the northwest, in 1682. By 1698 Charleston traders made contact with the Chickasaw. Once again cloth, guns, beads, and knives were traded for deerskins and slaves (Gibson 1971).

Two conclusions can be made about the early contact between the southeastern societies and the British and the French. One, contact was the equivalent of economic exchange. There was no "lag time" between contact and the transfer of commodities to the market. This suggests that economic incorporation in this region should be conceptualized along the lines Hall (1989) suggests. Hall distinguishes between nominal and effective incorporation. Certainly at this point the southeast was not effectively incorporated into the world-economy, i.e., production processes typical of the southeast did not cease to exist. Nevertheless, the political relations in the region were

beginning to change, and economic relations with the world-economy were emerging. The restructuring of production processes does at times simply mean the redirection of commodities already being produced, rather than just the introduction of new production processes (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981). Second, the political importance of alliances between Europeans and Native Americans, not to mention the intrigue and manipulation, that was characteristic of the incorporation process later on also began almost immediately with contact. The Creek and the British provide a good example.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century the Creek were emerging as a powerful confederation. Corkran says that they were becoming the "most formidable and aggressive warriors of the southeast" (1967:48). Nevertheless, the Creek were in a difficult political situation. The Westo, armed with British guns, were attacking them from the east, the Choctaw were attacking the Upper Towns from the west, the Mobilians were attacking the Upper Towns from the south, and the Spanish in Florida were keeping a vigilant eye on the Creek (Corkran 1967). In light of this situation the Creek saw the establishment of Charleston as a political opportunity, rather than a threat. Representatives from the Lower Towns went to Charleston in an attempt to form a Creek-British alliance against the Westo. The British declined a military

alliance, but wanted to maintain friendly relations (Corkran 1967).

The French also did not waste any time in attempting to engineer political alliances that they hoped would lead to long-term economic advantage. The first French settlement on the Gulf coast was established in 1699, and by 1702 d'Iberville had invited various tribes to a conference at Mobile. d'Iberville particularly urged the Chickasaw to cut off relations with the British, and to cease their war with the Choctaw (Gibson 1971). The examination of early political relations in the southeast also clearly shows that the incorporation process is not a uni-directional process (Hall 1989). The southeastern societies were not passive recipients of the political and economic actions of the European colonizers. As the example of the Creek indicates, the indigenous peoples were both subjects and initiators.

CHAPTER III

INCORPORATION: PHASE I

Incorporation: Which One?

In this chapter I want to examine the nature of the incorporation process for the four societies under consideration. So far I have operated under the assumption that the concept of incorporation is appropriate to use in an analysis of this period in the southeast. Therefore, the ultimate aim of this chapter is to determine how accurate the assumption is. Based on an examination of the initial contact between Native Americans and Europeans, I am certain that a historically specific notion of incorporation is the best way to conceptualize and understand the southeast from the 1670s-1830s. Specifically, the task of the chapter is to see which is more applicable in this case, effective incorporation or incorporation as a continuum.

For the purposes of this project, therefore, I see two basic views of incorporation, I call them the "orthodox" world-systems view of incorporation and incorporation as a continuum (Hall 1989). In order to proceed, more refined definitions of incorporation must be offered to use as guides, or as forms of ideal types.

As we have seen, for world-system theorists (eg. Timberlake 1985; Sokolovsky 1985; Hopkins and Wallerstein

1987; Wallerstein 1989) incorporation means the integration of an area's production processes into the complex of production processes that make up the world market, or what Hall (1989) calls effective incorporation. Wallerstein (1989) gives the clearest definition of incorporation from this point of view. Wallerstein says that incorporation means that, at the very least, some of a zones important production processes become components of the commodity chains "that constitute the ongoing divisioning of labor of the capitalist world-economy" (1989:130). To figure out whether a production process is integrated into the network of production processes that make up the world-economy, one must determine whether it responds, or is influenced by, the market of the world-economy (Wallerstein 1989). For a production process to be influenced by the market of the world-economy it must have an available, expendable workforce (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987). If one can explain, or analyze, a production process without reference to the overarching process of the world-economy, the accumulation of capital, a zone is unincorporated "despite the existence of trade links" (1989:130). The trade of luxury goods does not entail incorporation.

To specifically determine whether a zone is incorporated into the world-economy one must look at the structures where economic decisions are made, the ways labor is made "differentially available," the extent to which

political structures relate to the political superstructure of the world-economy, and a zone's changing infrastructure (Wallerstein 1989).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Hall suggests viewing incorporation as a continuum. By failing to use nominal incorporation (the political domination of a zone, which nonetheless retains its patterns of production) in the analysis of the expanding world-economy, world-systems theorists do not examine a vast "range of social changes" (1989:15). As a result, Hall proposes a continuum of incorporation which has weak, moderate, and strong degrees of incorporation.

These two conceptions of incorporation are not in conflict. Hall (1989) simply expands the concept beyond the strict definition put forward by many world-systems theorists. For this project I hypothesize that incorporation is best viewed as a continuum. However, the essential process and effects described by Wallerstein (1989), and others, remain essential for understanding the story of the southeast beginning in the late 1600s. In other words elements of both perspectives are applicable. My main concern is that incorporation be viewed as a continuum, and not an either/or proposition.

The Incorporation of the Native Southeast, 1670s-late 1700s

Two people have done analyses of the Native Southeast

using the idea of incorporation as a framework. Champagne (1992) examines the Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw and the world-economy beginning with initial contact. He specifically examines political changes and responses as a result of incorporation. Dunaway examines the incorporation of Southern Appalachia, beginning in 1690, with particular focus on the Cherokee and the fur trade. One of her broad goals is to "reconceptualize incorporation ... from the vantage point of the affected peoples" (1994). Both these studies are very useful in providing conceptual elements, as well as concrete components of the incorporation process.

While Champagne (1992) and Dunaway (1994) do have somewhat different agendas, they both point to some common themes, which will be explored in detail in this chapter. First, both point to the fact that the incorporation process involved intense imperial competition and conflict. Second, both identify the deerskin trade as the mechanism through which the southeastern societies were incorporated into the world-economy. Third, both examine the changes in political and economic structures as a result of incorporation. On this third point, however, there are some significant differences. Dunaway is more explicit in connecting events in the southeast to the structure of the world-economy. For example, Dunaway shows how the Cherokee system of government was restructured and therefore resulted in the "articulation of the region with the interstate network that comprised the

capitalist world-system (1994). She also examines how the Cherokee economy was restructured into an export economy, providing the world-market with raw materials for the European leather industry.

The incorporation of southeastern societies is best viewed as a continuum. The region was ultimately effectively incorporated, and Native Americans were a point in the continuum towards effective incorporation. I conceptualize the incorporation of the Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw as containing two broad phases. First, there was a chaotic period, during which the southeast was hooked into the world-economy, and when a form of dependency was created via the trade in deerskins and slaves. Second, a more rational period emerged, which saw the development of settler colonialism and agricultural surplus. The first stage saw the destruction of culture and depopulation. The second stage saw the attempt to economically convert native societies, and their ultimate physical removal. These stages should not be seen as exclusive but rather overlap and serve as analytical guideposts. Native American resistance to incorporation is found in both of these phases.

Somewhat of a parallel can be drawn between these stages and the periods Cornell identifies in the "incorporative process" experienced by the North American continent as a whole (1988:12). Although Cornell is vague

on his theoretical definition of incorporation, two of his periods are of relevance here. First is the market period which revolved around the fur trade. Here Native Americans were incorporated as producers of peltry. Second is the conflict period. This period involved the theft of Native American land, and the "incorporation of Indian resources into the developing economy of the United States" (Cornell 1988:12). Or as Petras says, in describing colonialism as a process, during the early colonial period power centered on the imperial state, "which recruited labor, transferred capitalists, and distributed means of production" (1978:67). Eventually colonial settlers achieved a measure of independence as a result "of the growth and expansion of production located in the agro-mineral enterprises" (Petras 1978:67).

Cornell (1988) also identifies stages of resistance, or responses, to the incorporative process. In stage one there is Native American participation and diplomacy in an effort to retain independence. In stage two there is diplomacy, but also an increasing level of armed resistance. I disagree somewhat with Cornell, at least as far as the southeast is concerned. I will try to demonstrate that during both phases of the incorporation process there was diplomacy and armed resistance, with a gradual tapering off of armed resistance. The rest of this chapter will discuss the first phase of incorporation, which includes imperial

competition and the deerskin trade.

Imperial/ Mercantile Competition

The conceptual work on incorporation can easily leave one with the image of a process with only two main sets of actors. The incorporation of the Native Southeast is notable precisely because of the number of groups involved, and the intense imperial and mercantile competition. It will be worthwhile to try and understand what the terms imperial and mercantile mean, because they are often mentioned, without definition, by historians of the southeast.

It is difficult to come up with definitions of imperialism and mercantilism which everyone can agree with. However, there are common elements in the various definitions. Mercantilism and imperialism are usually viewed as different stages in the creation of capitalism, and I think these are appropriate terms to use in connection with the incorporation of the Native Southeast.[1] And indeed, the time frame 1600-1750 is often referred to as the "age of mercantilism." While it is a difficult term to define, mercantilism usually has meant state policies of economic nationalism, and has centered around "a concern

[1] A notable, and significant, exception to the view that imperialism is a stage of capitalism is Wallerstein. He says that imperialism refers to "activities of stronger states towards weaker states that derive from one of the fundamental antinomies of capitalism: the existence of an economic division of labor that has boundaries far larger than any particular state structure" (1980b:21).

with the circulation of commodities" (Wallerstein 1980a:37). Betts (1968) describes mercantilism as a combination of a favorable balance of trade, bullionism, colonialism, and naval power.

How ever one defines imperialism, it usually includes elements such as the taking of raw materials and land, the domination of indigenous peoples, and racism (O'Conner 1970). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries imperialism emerged "in the doctrine of mercantilism" (Osterweis 1949:172). Imperialism is a political and social process which ultimately leads to changes in the distribution of societal power. It is also a "conscious state activity" geared towards long-term political/economic control (Betts 1968:5). Very simply, economic imperialism is economic and social domination. Often, particularly among neo-Marxists, monopoly capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism are treated as the same thing (O'Conner 1970).

While O'Conner says there are differences between early mercantilism and nineteenth century imperialism, there are also similarities. Specifically, both have depended on "active state participation in the direction, organization, and character of trade" (1970:105). Colonial conquests in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries centered on reducing the dangers involved in trade and maintaining monopolistic control. Nineteenth century imperialism was the formal, and informal control, over local economies, to their

disadvantage, but to the advantage of the core (O'Conner 1970). In other words, during the early colonial period, power centered on the imperial state, "which recruited labor, transferred capitalists, and distributed means of production" (Petras 1978:67). Eventually colonial settlers achieved a measure of independence as a result "of the growth and expansion of production located in the agro-mineral enterprises" (Petras 1978:67).

The essential point to keep in mind, at this point, is that the southeast was the center of a conflict between three European powers trying to achieve imperial control and economic monopoly. As a result, the incorporation process was chaotic and messy. It was not a clean, neat interaction between two opposing sides along a frontier. As Cornell (1988) points out, the incorporators acted more often in conflict than together. To complicate conceptual matters, hegemony among the incorporating powers was either unclear or changing. After 1763 the British were the dominant power in the southeast, and ultimately Anglo-Americans achieved dominance. These changes were occurring at the same time as the processes Petras (1978) describes: initial power being centered on the imperial state, with a movement towards settler independence and the growth of agricultural production. As mentioned, for native groups the two stages were involvement in the fur trade and ultimate removal to open up land for agricultural production.

Prior to the birth of the U.S., four European countries engaged in a power struggle for control of North America. Spain occupied the Gulf Coast and Florida from the 1550s-1763, France occupied the territory stretching from the midwest to Louisiana from 1604-1763, Great Britain possessed territory stretching from New England to Georgia from 1607-1776, and Holland controlled the New York-New Jersey from 1614-1664. By the mid 1700s Great Britain was the most powerful nation on the continent (Segal and Stineback 1977).

Bolton and Marshall say that the Carolinas, Florida, and southeast Louisiana made up a "great triangle" where Spain, France, and England came into close contact without ever really defining concrete boundaries (1922:315). As a result the southeast served "as a microcosm of global conflict" between the three imperial powers (Dunaway 1994). It must not be forgotten, however, that the imperial struggle for the southeast revolved around interaction with and against Native Americans (Nash 1982). Native Societies largely determined how the process of incorporation occurred.

Meinig presents the best image of the region during the 1600s and 1700s. He makes the point that the use of the concept "frontier" as a line of contact between Europeans and Native American stands in the way of integrating European and Native American history. Rather the southeast, at about 1750, is best conceptualized as a "shared zone of

joint occupancy, interlocking interests, and interlocking influences" (1989:196). The imperial process in 1750, is best viewed as a set of gradations. First is a conquered coastal zone. Second is an inland zone of articulation and interdependence. Third is the interior zone, which is isolated from prolonged contact, but nevertheless effected by the imperial presence.

Within this expanding imperial system both Europeans and Native Americans were key, interdependent components. However, interdependent is not the equivalent of equal. As the world-economy expanded and changed through the southeast, Europeans could leave, or take advantage of the changing economy. For Native Americans, life could never be as it was, and they could not escape European destruction. They were hooked into the capitalist world-economy (Meinig 1989). At this point it will be useful to look at the main elements in the imperial struggle for the southeast. The details of the competition between European powers is best examined in the context of the trade in deerskins and slaves.

The Deerskin Trade

The deerskin trade was the key mechanism through which the southeastern societies were incorporated into the world-economy (Champagne 1992; Dunaway 1994). However, the trade was much more than an economic mechanism. It had vast

social and political consequences as well. Originally the trade gave native societies a measure of political power, and provided commodities they desired. Ultimately, however, it created dependence, stripped them of their political power, and made them susceptible to removal. For Europeans, the trade provided profits and investment capital. It eventually became a political weapon and method of removal. It should also be mentioned that although histories of the southeast often leave the impression that the imperialist's main initial concern was the fur trade, and they somehow stumbled across the value of Native American land, my feeling is that long term production based on land was always the ultimate goal.

The Politics of the Deerskin Trade. The trade in deerskins was much more than an economic phenomenon. The trade was both the "foundation and rationale," or object and means, for European expansion (Cornell 1988:14). Traders were not only the frontline of imperialist contact, but their actions fed the extermination of Native Americans and led to intertribal war (Perdue 1979a). The fur trade was also the object and "central pivot" of European competition, and a major factor in interstate/tribal politics (Cornell 1988:16). Therefore, besides providing raw materials for the European leather industry (Phillips 1961; Cornell 1988; Dunaway 1994), the fur trade was a mechanism of imperial

competition, or tool of foreign policy (Cornell 1988; Eccles 1992). The use of the trade as a political weapon is particularly evident in the French/British competition for the Lower Mississippi Valley. The Choctaw and Chickasaw in particular provide a good example.

If there is a starting point to the extreme imperial competition in the southeast it would be 1699 with the establishment of Louisiana (Champagne 1992). The French believed that the British planned to build a settlement at the mouth of the Mississippi (Eccles 1992). To counter the British, the French developed a plan to build a series of forts along the river, and therefore hem in their rivals on the east coast (Champagne 1992). The key instruments in this policy were to be missionaries and traders. Ultimately the French hoped to mold native societies into a vast commercial coalition, with the express purpose of cutting off Native American contact with the British. According to Eccles (1992) this was a case of trade being subordinated to political goals. The fur trade for the French at this time served mainly to pay for the their presence in the interior, and to slow down the British. A major obstacle to France's grand imperial plans were trade goods, or lack of them. The British were always able to provide higher quality goods at lower prices (i.e. offer higher prices for deerskins) (White 1983; Dunaway 1994). This was the case because British leather manufacturers paid more for deerskins than their

French counterparts, and Britain's economy could produce goods at a lower cost (White 1983).

To combat France's scheme the British sent traders to the interior nations, and presented abundant, cheaper, and higher quality goods (Champagne 1992). The French inability to provide enough goods of high quality was a consistent obstacle to their control of the trade, and ultimately to their broader imperial ambitions. To compete with the British they had to use precarious strategies, such as encouraging warfare between the Chickasaw and Choctaw (Usner 1992). And indeed the entire French/British rivalry can be characterized as a series of wars and shifting alliances between the two imperial powers and the Choctaw and Chickasaw (Sheddan 1931).

A short time after the creation of Louisiana, various Choctaw towns were allied with the French and the British. In 1702 French officials, in an effort at wider commercial control, tried to end a ten year war between the Choctaw and Chickasaw that had been instigated by British slavers (Fairbanks 1974; Champagne 1992). The war had started in 1690, and by 1702 800 Chickasaw and 1800 Choctaw had died (Cotterill 1954; Crane 1959). By 1721, however, the French, in light of the Chickasaw/British trade alliance, were encouraging the Choctaw/Chickasaw war. In addition, the Chickasaw had begun to attack French supply boats on the Mississippi, cutting off the supply line between New Orleans

and the Illinois region (Cotterill 1954; Gibson 1971). These attacks resulted in extreme shortages of trade goods for northern Louisiana settlements (Peyser 1992). The French began to use, and grew dependent on, the Choctaw as mercenaries against the Chickasaw and British trade expansion (Usner 1992). The French openly fostered the war by giving the Choctaw guns and ammunition for slaves and scalps (Cotterill 1954). According to Crane (1959), no other single factor was as important an obstacle to French imperial plans as the Chickasaw/British alliance. During the 1730s, therefore, French foreign policy was almost solely directed at exterminating the Chickasaw (Corkran 1967).

The logic of the French was that besides countering the Chickasaw/British threat to their control of the Lower Mississippi Valley, the Choctaw/Chickasaw war prevented the two nations from uniting against the French. The war also made up for the lack of French trade goods. They could not form a commercial alliance with the Chickasaw, and therefore the war countered British economic hegemony. At the same time, however, the French did not want the Chickasaw destroyed. Without the Chickasaw, the Choctaw would become too powerful (Usner 1992). Broadly speaking, the French "feared peace." Or stated another way, constant war between the Choctaw and Chickasaw not only weakened the powerful tribes and prevented British commercial penetration, but

also prevented the Chickasaw from realizing French "poverty and impotence" (White 1983:51).

The Choctaw went along with French imperial policy for a number of reasons. Through gift giving, and political maneuvering, the French were able to secure key Choctaw allies. In addition, between 1730-1760 the main way the Choctaw obtained French trade goods was to sell "their services as mercenaries in the French wars against English allies" (Champagne 1992:60). Just as important, by choosing a French alliance, the Choctaw could acquire arms to defend against British instigated slave raids by the Chickasaw and Creek (Galloway 1985). It should be mentioned, however, that the Choctaw villages engaged in a series of shifting alliances with the French and British. These alliances were often dependent on the availability of trade goods. It is no surprise, then, that between 1699-1760 there were a number of political splits, and periodic civil war within the Choctaw nation (Champagne 1992). The consequences of imperial politics were not any better for the Chickasaw.

According to Champagne (1992) The Chickasaw were one of the most powerful societies in the southeast. As such both the French and British desired trade and political alliances. The Chickasaw were trading with the British by the 1690s. As previously noted, the superiority of British goods were a key factor in securing an alliance. However, the Chickasaw, like the Choctaw, were used in the frontline

of the conflict between competing imperial interests. Beginning in the 1730s, as the French were arming the Choctaw, the British were arming the Chickasaw (Champagne 1992). For the next few decades the story of the Chickasaw and Choctaw was a succession of war and absence of war (Noley 1985a). The situation began to take its toll on the Chickasaw. In the mid-1750s there were even plans to disband the nation. The defeat of France in the Seven Years War in 1763 solved the situation for the Chickasaw (Champagne 1992).

The essential point is that both imperialists, and native societies, were not of equal strength and therefore utilized different strategies. The French relied on political/military strategies, while Britain's real strength was superior trade goods. However, this is not to say that Britain did not utilize intertribal warfare. The Chickasaw were important to the British as economic and political allies. The British saw in the Chickasaw the possibility of forcibly taking French occupied territory (Gibson 1971). As such, the Chickasaw were an important element in the British offensive against the French and Choctaw. The British wanted the Choctaw, and therefore the French, destroyed (Noley 1985a). Chickasaw towns also served as warehouses from which British goods could be introduced to societies within French occupied territory (Gibson 1971).

The deerskin trade also served political ends among the

Cherokee. According to Dunaway, "The cornerstone ... of British political leverage with the Cherokees was trade" (1994). As with the Chickasaw, the British were able to prevent a Cherokee/French alliance through their cheaper, higher quality trade goods. However, Dunaway also points to the fact that political manipulation revolving around trade worked both ways. The British took pains not to "disgust" the Cherokee and thereby allow room for a Cherokee/French alliance. And indeed, if the British tried to stop the flow of trade goods, Cherokee leaders would turn to the French or Spanish (Hatley 1993; Dunaway 1994). A good example of the political nature of the trade among the Cherokee is the Creek/Yamasee rebellion of 1715.

According to Nash (1982) the Yamasee war on South Carolina in 1715 was largely organized by the Creek. The principal cause of the Yamasee rebellion was the abuses of Carolina traders. When the Yamasee, and allies, began attacking European settlements and traders the colony of South Carolina feared for its very existence.[2] Of particular concern was the possibility of the Cherokee joining the rebellion. The Cherokee held the situation in the palm of their hand. Both the Creek and British courted the powerful interior society. The Cherokee chose to remain

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[2] Other groups involved in the rebellion included elements of the Choctaw, and the Yuchi, Apalache, Shawnee (Crane 1959), some Cherokees, Catawbas, Saraws, Waccamaws, Santees, and Cape Fears (Jennings 1993).

neutral, and the rebellion was put down. A key to the Cherokee position was British trade. It was "only reluctantly" that a native society attacked those who supplied them with trade goods (Nash 1982:137). Therefore, a highly outnumbered British colony was able to annihilate many coastal societies, "and drive a wedge between the Creek and Cherokee." A Creek/Cherokee alliance would have been able to rid the southeast of the British (Nash 1982:137).

The Creek were somewhat of an anomaly when it came to imperial politics. Generally speaking they remained economic and lukewarm political partners with the British until the British/Anglo-American war (Gatschet 1969). However, while other native societies experienced population decline and a decrease in political independence, the Creek confederacy increased in population and power during the colonial period (Williams 1930; Debo 1941; Wood 1989). As such the British were wary of the confederacy. James Adair, a British trader during the 1770s, said that there was no doubt that the Creek were the most powerful nation in contact with the British, and had doubled their population during the previous generation (Debo 1941). In addition, after the Yamasee rebellion, the Creek developed a policy of neutrality, or limited cooperation, in European imperialist struggles (Nash 1982). They had "learned the lesson of overcommitment to the English" (Corkran 1967:61). Of all the southeastern societies, the Creek developed the most

explicit and effective policy toward the Europeans. Generally, the policy consisted of playing the European powers off against each other, and thereby getting what they wanted from each, while preserving their political independence (Corkran 1967). In this way the Creek attempted to reestablish their position as keepers "of the balance of power" (Nash 1982:231). According to Crane after 1718, the Creeks had "extraordinary influence as custodians of the ... balance of power in the South " (1959:260).

Specifically, after the Yamasee rebellion, the Creek began to establish relations with their former enemies, the Spanish. They even sent delegates to St Augustine and Mexico city. Eventually they created a situation where some of their towns were allied with the Spanish, and some with the British. At the same time they continued to help the Yamasee, Britain's enemies, and attacked the Cherokee, Britain's allies (Nash 1982). In other words, they maintained "good relations with all and [allied] themselves with none" (Jones 1982:39). As a result the Creek were able to retain a measure of political independence. For example, in 1738 they refused to join Britain's war on Spain, as well as the British war on the French and Spanish in the 1740s. In 1747 South Carolina attempted to "mobilize the Creek and Cherokee" in an offensive against the French. The Creek informed the British that they could trade in their territory, but could not build forts (Cotterill 1954),

and would not receive any military support (Nash 1982).

A number of conclusions can be draw from the examination of imperial competition and the politics of the trade. First, the intense imperial competition suggests that the incorporation process was not a smooth linear process. Second, the incorporation process was extremely violent, which not only suggests European conflict, but resistance on the part of Native Americans. As such incorporation must be seen as an interactive process. European conflict did not occur in a Native American vacuum (Cornell 1988). Third, the conceptual work on incorporation must allow for the idea of multiple incorporators that do not necessarily act in concert. Part of the reason for the intense imperial competition in the southeast may be due to the fact, as Wallerstein (1984) suggests, that there was no clear hegemonic power in the world-system during the period under consideration. Nevertheless, the imperial process is ultimately the interaction of states of unequal strength (Wallerstein 1980b). In the southeast Britain and Anglo-Americans, after much struggle, gained the upper hand.

The Organization of the Deerskin Trade. The political and economic center of the trade in the southeast was Charleston, South Carolina (Bolton and Marshall 1922; Meinig 1986; Braund 1993). Although South Carolina competed with other colonies, by 1750 it was the center of the trade

(Hagan 1993). The trade, and how it was organized and regulated was seen, by the imperialists, as crucial in the "management of Indian relations" (Braund 1993:xiii). Initially the trade occurred on plantations, and was controlled by the colony's proprietors. By 1710 the Charleston merchant class had control of the trade. Three years earlier, largely to prevent trader abuses, the General Assembly had created a board of commissioners to regulate the trade (McDowell 1955). The trade, was placed under governmental control, or made a public monopoly, after the Yamasee rebellion in 1717 (McDowell 1955; Braund 1993). The public monopoly involved building factories (forts) where people would come to trade. All furs obtained by the factories had to be sent to Charleston (Phillips 1961). However, due to pressure from merchants from South Carolina and London (Crane 1959; Phillips 1961), the trade went back to private control by 1721. Ultimately only a few mercantile concerns controlled the trade, particularly Panton, Leslie and Company (Usner 1992; Braund 1993). It is interesting to note that many of the coastal plantation owners opposed the trade because some of the taxes they paid were used to support the enterprise (Phillips 1961).

Even though the trade was controlled by mercantile interests both Georgia and South Carolina, through commissioners of trade, regulated the trade by licensing traders. This supposedly restricted trader's business to

specific towns (Crane 1959; Braund 1993). The hierarchy of the trade consisted of wholesale merchants, retailers, resident traders, boatmen, and wage and slave labor. The merchants were in the trade for themselves, but also often acted on behalf of British firms (Braund 1993). Merchants in European centers, such as Charleston, New Orleans, or Pensacola, imported commodities on credit, and in turn commissioned traders, or supplied them on credit, to take the goods to interior towns. The traders engaged in "semiannual exchanges," which usually involved extending credit to Native American producers in the fall, and the collection of debts after the spring hunting season (Usner 1992:52).

As one might expect, there was quite a gap between how trade was supposed to be conducted, and how it really operated. Edmond Atkin, a merchant and member of the South Carolina Governor's council, describes aspects of trade practices in a report to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations (Jacobs 1954). His essential point is that British traders were out of control. Although traders were supposed to only trade in towns for which they were licensed, they would often force unlicensed servants to carry out the trade in their place. In addition, traders would send in false accounts, discuss governmental affairs with Native Americans, and became involved in native society's decisions concerning peace and war. Besides

cheating and abusing native American trading partners, the practice of most concern to Atkin was the creation of debt and use of rum.

According to Atkin the creation of vast debt "gives traders undue influence over Indians and discourages Indians from hunting for Deer Skins and other furs" (Jacobs 1954:23). It is interesting to note that Atkin's main concern over the creation of debt was not the abuse against Native Americans, but that it caused a "general state of alarm and uneasiness" (Jacobs 1954:27). As will be discussed in the section on resistance, Atkin had reason to be concerned. The use of rum in the trade was also common. Traders would meet hunters on their way back to their towns, offer them rum, which facilitated their efforts to cheat Native American producers. Atkin was particularly disturbed by this practice because it "results in poor quality [badly dressed] leather" (Jacobs 1954:35).

The Meaning of the Deerskin Trade. A key question that must be addressed in the rest of this chapter is whether, or not, the deerskin trade became part of the network of production processes that made up the world-economy. In other words, was deerskin production in the southeast determined by the market of the world-economy, or was it simply a lucrative trade? The examination of this question is important in determining the nature of the

overall incorporation process for the Native southeast. As Hopkins and Wallerstein point out, "Trade in itself is not evidence of interdependence, only trade in 'essentials'" (1987:773). It must always be remembered that incorporation is fundamentally a search for cheap labor, and not simply a search for things to buy and sell (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987).

From a world-systems perspective, therefore, the distinction between a trade in luxuries and a trade in necessities is of paramount theoretical importance. A trade in necessities indicates a trade within a system, while a trade in luxuries indicates trade between different systems (Wallerstein 1991). Was the trade between the Native Southeast and the world-economy a trade within a system, or was it between systems? Or put another way, was the trade in deerskins a mechanism of incorporation?

The answer to this question is difficult to determine. However, when all is said and done, the exact theoretical nature, and definition, of the incorporation process may be of secondary importance. What is important, and certain, is that the native southeastern societies did become linked to the world-economy through the deerskin trade, and that this link shaped native social formations. In other words, what is of ultimate importance is what the link to the world economy changed, created, and destroyed. This will be the subject of the next chapter. In this, and following,

sections I want to look at the importance of the trade for the European core, as well as local capitalists. In addition, the volume of the trade will be examined.

That the southeastern deerskin trade had connections to the core of the world-system there is no doubt. The trade in furs was one of the main "extractive enterprises" in North America. In the middle 1700s the trade had already been occurring for over a century, and was a "sophisticated business, with efficient markets, and a highly articulated division of labor" (Eccles 1992:212). The demand for furs in Europe began to rise in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and therefore the trade was both a source of raw materials for European manufacturers, and provided a market for European manufactured goods (Cornell 1988; Dunaway 1994). In addition the trade was the source of local capital which made possible later economic expansion. As Cornell says "the development of agriculture in the southern colonies was dependent on trade profits" (1988:18). Therefore the trade constituted the first phase of incorporation and was the basis of the second phase. For example, a number of colonists from South Carolina became very wealthy from the trade (Williams 1930; Phillips 1961; Cornell 1988). These people represented the colony's first phase of capital accumulation, which was used to build up rice and indigo plantations, and the African slave trade (Cornell 1988). It should be noted that often European

colonists engaged in the trade and land and cattle speculation simultaneously (Braund 1993).

A number of people have pointed out that leather and furs were important commodities in Europe, and that the demand rose quite sharply in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Phillips 1961; Axtell 1988; Cornell 1988; Braund 1993). According to Phillips (1961) fur bearing animals were already becoming scarce in fourteenth century Europe. It was to the point where European animals could no longer meet the demand for both luxury and everyday furs and leather. The encroachment of Europeans into North America and its fur resources therefore resulted in "classic mercantilist activity" (Cornell 1988:16).

While many of the North American furs going to Europe were luxury items, Europe's lower and middle classes also required leather which European cattle could not provide. Leather was used for worker's clothing, saddles, saddlebags, harnesses, bookbindings, covered seats, and luggage (Axtell 1988). Leather was also used for gloves and shoes. As such, "leatherworking" was among the main industries in Great Britain. By the end of the 1700s London was the center of the leather industry, and leather goods produced there were sent to markets in Europe and North America (Braund 1993:87).

The volume of southeastern leather and furs going to Europe was enormous. For the first thirty years of its

existence South Carolina produced no agricultural staple. Its most important commodities were those from the trade, which it extracted from "a huge hinterland by means of Indian intermediaries" (Meinig 1986:175). By the early to mid 1700s leather and fur, mainly deerskins produced by interior tribes, were its main export. With each passing year the volume of deerskin exports increased (Braund 1993). However, Native Americans were not silent and overwhelmed by the forces of the world-economy. The volume of the trade rose and fell with Native American resistance. For example, during the Yamasee rebellion in 1717-16, and war with the Creeks and Cherokee in 1728-30, exports declined (Crane 1959; Phillips 1961). The years 1720-24 and 1730-48 were periods of relative peace, during which exports increased (Phillips 1961).

In the early 1700s over 70,000 deerskins were brought into Charleston annually (Phelps 1957). Braund (1993) gives a good idea of the number of deerskins leaving Charleston over a number of time periods.[3] Between 1699-1705 over 45,000 deerskins per year were shipped to London. By 1715

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[3] The impression should not be given that Charleston was the only export location in the southeast. For example, after Georgia was created in 1733 it cornered a significant portion of the deerskin trade, and eventually established direct links to Britain (Martin 1991). After the Seven Years War in 1763 the Lower Mississippi Valley was divided into British West Florida and Spanish Louisiana. Merchants in West Florida began to export increasing numbers of deerskins from Pensacola and Mobile to London (Usner 1992).

the number of deerskins had gone up to 53,000.[4] During the Yamasee rebellion the number dipped to 25,000 annually, but by 1721 was back up to 60,000. In 1743-44 130,884 pounds of leather were shipped to Europe, and by 1744-45 the amount had risen to 305,717 pounds. According to Phillips (1961), between 1730-1748 160,000 deerskins were being exported annually. The monetary value of exports in 1748 was 36,000 British pounds. In 1750, 100,000 deerskins were exported from Carolina (Meinig 1986). Between 1739 and 1759 1,250,000 deerskins were exported from Charleston (Hagan 1993). By the late eighteenth century the total production of deerskins in the southeast was 1.5 million pounds per year. About half of this output was produced by the Creeks. In terms of individual production, by 1764 the typical hunter produced about 57 pounds of deerskins (30-60 deer) a year (Braund 1993).

While it is useful to examine the number of exports in raw numbers, it is more instructive to try and get a clearer picture of the trade in terms of a form of unequal exchange. In this way one can determine the true nature of the enterprise. Trade within the modern world-system is intrinsically unequal. The concept of unequal exchange

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[4] According to Crane (1959), between 1699-1715 Carolina exported an average of 54,000 deerskins per year to Great Britain; or about a million deerskins for the period (Wright 1992). The highest number of skins obtained in one year was 121,355 in 1706-07 (Crane 1959). According to Usner (1992), during the 1730s and 1740s, Carolina exported a yearly average of 100,000 deerskins; or 200,000 pounds.

refers to the transfer of surplus from direct producers to expropriators (Wallerstein 1978). Within the world-system this means that there is a transfer of surplus from one geographic zone to another (Wallerstein 1983). Or more specifically, value is "distributed unevenly in the direction of core states" (Baker 1993:16). However, "trade within states between rural and urban areas is also a trade of unequal exchange" (Wallerstein 1978:221). The southeastern deerskin trade is no exception. According to Logan, the "system of exchange" in the native southeast "was exceedingly advantageous to the English." For the manufactured goods they offered Native Americans, they received skins "which, in Charleston, would command many times their original cost" (1859:169). Through time unequal exchange means "the peripheralization of groups incorporated into the world-economy" (Baker 1993:16).

The profits Europeans made from the trade were extremely high. For example, a major trader, William Panton, sold his goods at 500% of what they cost him. Each year South Carolina imported 10,000 British pounds worth of manufactured goods to use in the deerskin trade (Phillips 1961). Braund (1993) gives an idea of the kind of profits that could be made. Traders in Charleston bought blankets at the equivalent of 5 pounds of deerskins, and sold them for 15 pounds of deerskins; a rate of profit of 300%. The typical trading company made a profit of 500-600% (Dunaway

1994). Philip Pittman, a British soldier and surveyor, claimed that French traders along the Mississippi, using European goods valued at 8000 British pounds, were guaranteed a 200% rate of profit (Pittman [1770] 1973). In all likelihood this rate of profit was higher before the extreme competition with Great Britain (White 1983).

As we have seen, this surplus was not only flowing from the Native American hinterland to European metropoles on the Atlantic coast, but also to the core of the system. As Jones says, deerskins went from the interior to various river and seaports, and then on "to the great European trade fairs in a chain of trade that linked Leipzig with Chota" (1982:111).

The Slave Trade

Although deerskins were the "staple" of the southeastern trade (Braund 1993), they in no way constituted the only link between the Native southeast and the world-economy. According to Dunaway (1994), due to the demand for labor in the West Indies and northern colonies, Native American slaves were the first profitable commodities in the region. As early as 1681 Cherokee slaves were being sold. The slave trade was not only a significant economic process, but also a consequence of imperial competition. For example, in the late 1600s Carolina experienced a labor shortage, and therefore supplied arms and offered rewards to

the Cherokee, Creek, and Chickasaw for Choctaw slaves. In response the French, in an effort to win allies, supplied the Choctaw with weapons (Galloway 1985; Champagne 1992).

The slave trade, like the deerskin trade, was a key mechanism of imperial expansion and a source of local capital (Crane 1959; Perdue 1979a). Although slaves had always been a consequence of war in the southeast, it was not until Europeans began offering manufactured goods for human captives that slaves became the reason for intertribal warfare. And indeed, European traders often promoted wars in order to maintain the supply of human cargo (Gibson 1971; Perdue 1979a; Dunaway 1994). However, the Carolina colonial administration also actively promoted Native American slavery. It was particularly interested in exporting slaves to the West Indies in exchange for African slaves (Cornell 1988). It is also interesting to note that a consequence of the deerskin trade was to feed the slave trade. The deerskin trade caused intertribal competition for hunting range as hunters went beyond traditional hunting territory. This resulted in increased warfare and human captives (Gibson 1971).

Each of the southeastern societies served as the supply and the suppliers of slaves. For the Creek, the Choctaw and tribes of the Gulf Coast were important sources of slaves, and as early as 1708 they were travelling to the "point of Florida" in search of human commodities (Braund 1993:33).

According to Jennings (1993) the British led many of the Cherokee and Creek slave raids into Spanish Florida, attacking groups such as the Apalachee and Timucuan. By 1708 between 10,000-12,000 slaves had been acquired and exported to the West Indies as a result of these raids. As the British also supplied the Chickasaw with arms they became the "scourge" of a number of western tribes, and were also selling the English Choctaw captives as early as 1706 (Crane 1959). On the other side, the French gave the Choctaw arms in return for Chickasaw scalps and slaves (Cotterill 1954). There occurred a mutual destruction and enslavement instigated by imperial greed and fed by European trade goods. It must always be remembered that Europeans did not only instigate intertribal wars for economic or imperial reasons. Ultimately the wars served the imperialists by depopulating Native American societies. Over time this opened up land for livestock and crops (Nash 1982). Slaves were a lucrative by-product of war. The imperial pattern in the southeast was trade, death, and land. Land, unlike deerskins and slaves, was the commodity that could consistently produce a surplus through time.

Most Native American slaves from the southeast were exported to New England or the West Indies (Crane 1959; Noley 1985b). There are several reasons for this. One, the planters in Carolina perceived Native Americans as poor workers (Crane 1959). Second, it was crucial that

Europeans, especially early on, maintain reasonably good relations with Native American societies. Third, Native Americans were very susceptible to a variety of European diseases, which diminished their usefulness as unfree labor. Fourth, it was difficult to enslave people in close proximity to their homes (Cornell 1988) because of the increased possibilities of escape and revolt (Perdue 1979a). Finally, Cornell (1988) gives the puzzling reason that Europeans saw Native Americans as adversaries rather than chattel. But clearly they had no difficulty in viewing them as chattel for export. He does, however, make an important point in stating that Native American labor was most crucial in the fur trade. Europeans could not enslave Native Americans in order to exploit their labor in the deerskin trade.

Theoretical Summary: Incorporation or Incorporation?

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the previous discussion. From my point of view it is appropriate to characterize the experience of the Native southeast, beginning in the late 1600s, as incorporation into the capitalist world-economy. My feeling is that not many "orthodox" world-systems theorists would agree since it is not clear whether an exchange of necessities occurred. Dunaway (1994), however, emphatically states that the Cherokee were effectively incorporated into the world-

economy. She presents a logical argument, particularly in reference to commodity chains linking the southeast with the core of the system.

The idea of commodity chains is critical when discussing incorporation. As Baker says, "Incorporation refers to the linking of new labor forces and resources into the production processes of the world-economy through commodity chains that respond to market forces and economic cycles" (1993:18). In other words, commodity chains are the link between production processes in different zones of the world-economy. If there are commodity chains there exists "an extended social division of labor," which through time has become "more functionally and geographically extensive" (Wallerstein 1983:30).

According to Dunaway "the Southern Indians provided to the world-market the raw commodities to fuel the European leather manufacturing industry" (1994). The trade in southern deerskins was necessary to the European core in a number of ways: it helped cement political alliances, it provided raw materials for the growing leather industry, it served as an outlet for European manufactured goods, it provided colonial governments with a revenue source, and "helped the European powers to maintain their balances of trade with other world-market participants through an elaborate chain of commodity exchanges that circled the globe" (Dunaway 1994). In reference to the Cherokee, she

says Southern Appalachia became articulated with commodity chains of the world-economy; deerskins and slaves were exported to Europe and the West Indies, and in return sugar, tobacco, and manufactured goods came into the southeast. And certainly, as Jennings says, the term fur trade is a "misnomer." In actuality there occurred a trade involving "many varied commodities" (1993:177). In addition to slaves and deerskins, Charleston exported beef, pork, butter, tallow, hides, rice, pease, lumber, staves, pitch, and tar to the West Indies, and rice, silk, and naval stores to Britain (Bolton and Marshall 1922; Dunaway 1994).

I do not necessarily disagree with Dunaway (1994), but I have doubts as to whether it can be demonstrated conclusively that necessities were being exchanged between the southeast and Europe. To do this would require determining exactly to what degree the British leather industry hinged on southeastern deerskins. Part of the problem is the artificial separation between the southeast and the rest of North America. Certainly if the entire continent was taken into consideration, North American furs were necessities. The same cannot be said for the southeast alone. This raises a number of important points. One, there were links between the southeast and the world-economy. If these links did not constitute the theoretical definition of incorporation, what were they? Second, from a Native American point of view, it does not matter if the

goods exchanged were necessities or not. What does matter is that they were a part of links to the world-economy, and these links changed their societies. Does the theoretical definition matter when the effects of the world-economy were real? It is somewhat of a paradox that the trade between the native southeast and Europe does not fit a strict definition of incorporation, but the effects of this trade coincide with what an "orthodox" world-systems theorist would predict as a consequence of incorporation. These consequences (or meanings of, and responses to, incorporation) will be examined in the next chapter.

Ultimately the experience of the southeast calls for an expansion of the concept of incorporation, as Hall (1986; 1989) argues in connection with the southwest. Expansion of the system has involved vast destruction of native social formations even when it is not based on capital accumulation. As such the effective-nominal distinction as an analytical tool for incorporated areas should be reexamined (Hall 1986). Ultimately, then, it can be argued that the "orthodox" world-systems perspective has overstated the importance of the distinction between so-called luxury and necessary goods (Champion 1989). As we will see in chapter IV, in terms of changes to indigenous social formations it did not matter whether deerskins were luxuries or necessities. A narrow view of incorporation "denies" the impact luxury goods can have in "structuring social

relations" (Champion 1989:8). Also, by utilizing a restrictive definition of incorporation, world-systems theorists run the risk, as Marxist scholars have pointed out, of denying "peripheral formations their own histories of development and resistances to exploitation" (Rowlands 1987:3). A theoretical expansion is necessary if we are at all concerned with theoretical accuracy, or reality. A valid question at this point would be why not, therefore, reject the world-systems perspective in this case? I do not reject it because it is not necessary or desirable. Incorporation as a broad process is extremely useful as an analytical tool, and allows room for modification and expansion. As Rowlands points out, the intent of the world-systems perspective is that of a "dynamic model of modern world history" (1987:9).

Finally, the above discussion raises a question. Is it possible, in some way, to distinguish the incorporation of people and the incorporation of resources, in this case land? Cornell (1988), as mentioned above, discusses an incorporative process for North America. During the first stage Native Americans were incorporated as producers via the fur trade. In the second stage resources were incorporated into the expanding economy, while Native Americans were removed. Over time, Native Americans lost their usefulness as producers of furs. Their land, however, remained the ultimate prize, and was, over time, used to

produce necessities for the core of the system. The imperialists understood that land had to be the basis of their economic expansion.

CHAPTER IV

THE MEANING OF INCORPORATION

Consequences and Responses

The usefulness of the world-systems perspective becomes particularly apparent when one examines the consequences of the expansion of the world-economy. The world-systems perspective provides a framework that allows for variation in the analysis of incorporated groups. While the southeastern groups were each effected in some similar, basic ways, they also had different experiences with the world-economy and, therefore, responded differently.

While it is appropriate to discuss what incorporation means for those incorporated, (or consequences of incorporation) as described by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987) for example, it is just as important (necessary) to discuss responses to incorporation. Often consequences and responses cannot be analytically separated. However, I think they are two different ideas. The indigenous people of the southeast were not shaped passively by the world-economy. It is true that the forces of the world-economy ultimately "hooked" the southeastern societies, and created dependence, but it was a coercive rather than a passive process. In other words, these societies had initiatory responses and not just reactions. Probably the most

striking response to the incorporative process was armed rebellion. However, in this chapter I will examine nonrebellion consequences and responses to the first phase of incorporation. The mechanisms and responses/consequences to the second phase will be examined in the next chapter. Resistance to the two phases of incorporation will be examined in chapters VII and VIII. Chapter VI sets the backdrop for resistance in terms of geo-politics and genocide.

After taking into account this and the previous chapter, I think it will become clear, as some have argued explicitly and implicitly, (e.g. Meinig 1989; White 1991; Jennings 1993), that the concept of frontier has questionable usefulness for understanding Native American societies and the penetration of the world-economy. The impact of the notion of "frontier" in shaping visions of Native American history cannot be underestimated. The term frontier has inherent evolutionary connotations, i.e., the European colonization of North America had a beginning point in space and time, and developed, or progressed, from there. An analysis rooted in the world-economy supports the idea that it is useful to view imperialism as a system, and therefore the southeast as "a spectrum of gradations in power, intensity of interaction, and social character" (Meinig 1989:195). Reexamining the concept of frontier, or utilizing a "less linear narrative" (White 1991:ix), is

essential in reorienting history toward a Native American history.

Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987) give perhaps the clearest idea of the changes that occur in an incorporated zone. The fundamental transformation is the creation of a type of economic activity that responds to the market of the world-economy, i.e., export-oriented activity. This has already been discussed in relation to the deerskin trade. To create this responsive economic activity requires an available and dispensable workforce, since the ultimate benefit of incorporation is cheap labor. As such, to keep wages low the dispensable workforce must be "located" in semi-proletarian households. It must always be remembered that the world-system is capitalist, and therefore everywhere workers are changed into "labor-in-relation-to-capital." This change is forceful and coincides with material deprivation (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981:243). Incorporated areas also require state-structures that are "parallel in form and mode of operation" to the interstate system of the world-economy (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987:777).

Fundamentally the consequences of incorporation can be divided into two broad categories: the economic and the political meaning of incorporation. As mentioned, I think the usefulness of a neo-Marxist/world-systems approach to Native Americans and the world-economy will become clear in

this section. It is not enough to simply discuss ideas like assimilation and resistance. Rather, Native Americans experienced massive, coercive economic and political restructuring. Many Native Americans became coerced labor, and were forced to secularize and centralize their political structures (Champagne 1992; Dunaway forthcoming) in order to deal with the world-economy's interstate system. At the same time there was rebellion and collaboration in both the political and economic sphere. In the economic sphere this translated into the formation of distinct classes based on the production and appropriation of surplus. Before examining the specifics of the meaning and responses to the first phase of incorporation, I will try to provide a general picture of the political and economic transformations in the southeast.

Economic and Political Restructuring

The deerskin trade in the southeast was not simply an economic exchange. The articulation of indigenous economic activity with the capitalist world-economy resulted in drastic socioeconomic restructuring. As Dunaway (1994) says, "Incorporation necessitated a reorientation of pre-existing subsistence patterns and the creation of new economic activities geared toward commodity production, market exchanges and the creation of surplus." The trade essentially constituted an industry which swallowed up self-

sufficient families (Jennings 1993).

And indeed the fundamental meaning of incorporation for native societies was dependence (White 1983; Champagne 1992; Dunaway 1994). The southeastern societies lost the ability to be self-sufficient, eventually becoming workers in the fur industry (Champagne 1992), and becoming "locked into" a situation of unequal exchange (Dunaway 1994). Ultimately this meant that the surplus created by Native American labor was siphoned away, and utilized in local and European capital accumulation (Champagne 1992). Other economic consequences were a changed division of labor and spatial restructuring.

Economic dependence was created in a number of ways. First, native implements and crafts gradually were replaced with European manufactured goods (Axtell 1981; Cornell 1988; Champagne 1992; Braund 1993; Dunaway 1994). Eventually this meant that native manufacturing techniques fell into disuse, which in turn meant an increase in fur production as a singular economic activity. The loss of traditional manufacturing techniques also destroyed generational relations and "respect for traditional authority" (Braund 1993:131). All this adds up to increasingly less self-sufficient societies (Champagne 1992). Second, economic dependence was created by Europeans through the extension of credit. This practice resulted in a situation of "debtor dependency" (Jennings 1993), or "debt peonage" (Dunaway

1994). Debt was also a key mechanism used to incorporate Native American land (see chapter V). A third factor creating dependence was the inherent nature of capitalist production. The very mechanics of the deerskin trade meant that Native Americans would become dependent upon the world-economy. Like any other capitalistic activity, a characteristic of the deerskin trade was the push for increased production. Ultimately this resulted in the decline of deer (Jones 1982; Usner 1992; Jennings 1993). To meet the demand for deerskins, Native American producers had to hunt "with such a destructive intensity" that the destruction of the deerskin economy was inevitable (Jennings 1975:87). By 1744 commercial game were gone from the British colonies east of the Appalachians (Cornell 1988). With the decline of deer and indigenous manufacturing techniques, economic options for native societies were limited. They were therefore compelled, over time, to participate in agricultural-export economic activity. According to Nash (1982), as long as there was a viable fur trade, Native Americans were vital to European imperialists, and therefore had more or less an equivalent level of power in determining their destiny. As the importance of the fur trade declined in the mid-1700s, and the importance of tobacco, rice, and indigo increased, Native Americans experienced a decline in power.

Another broad consequence of the first phase of

incorporation was a restructured division of labor, and the emergent beginnings of capitalist class formations. It is not difficult for the casual reader to come away with the impression that the fur trade was a benign, almost part-time, activity. However, not only the hunters, but people remaining in the towns, typically women, became "specialized laborers" in the deerskin industry (Champagne 1992:53). Not only did women have to work harder because of their involvement in preparing deerskins, but also because they had to do the jobs usually done by absent male hunters (Hatley 1989; Jennings 1993). Men were the main "purchasers and sellers" in the deerskin trade. Women, however, "paid a disproportionate price" through their labor in producing the final product (Hatley 1989:237).

The deerskins as commodities were the result of much labor power. As Hatley points out in reference to Cherokee villages, all the work that went into preparing deerskins amounted to "cottage industries" that represented "an accumulation of village labor" (1989:235). The deer had to be killed, or extracted as a raw material. The useful (commercial) part of the skin had to be extracted and transported to the town. At the towns the skin was dressed. As mentioned, the preparation work was usually done by women, and according to Jennings (1975) was very difficult work and is best described as an industrial process. One laborer could only prepare 8-10 deerskins a day. The

process involved "soaking and scraping the skins, heating them together with the animal's dried brains in a kettle, scouring them, twisting and untwisting, and forcing the water out with a dull hatchet" (Jennings 1975:92). The final stage in the process was transportation to market.

Clearly, the southeastern Native American's labor power was integrated into world-economy. As labor they not only spent large amounts of time in commodity production, but also devoted much skill and capital (tools) to the process (Cornell 1988). It should also be mentioned that in addition to the creation of specialized labor, the trade, through the creation of new sources of wealth, restructured the foundation of authority and prestige (Cornell 1988). This is most clearly seen during the second phase of incorporation, with the development of property, and therefore class relations.

Clearly, Native American societies did not become dependent on, and restructured by, the world-economy because they did not know how to participate in it, or were overwhelmed by it. Rather, indigenous societies became underdeveloped because of their structural role in the world-economy. What follows are some specific consequences of incorporation that occurred in addition to the universal ones already described. Initiatory responses to incorporation are often best seen in the various political adaptations each society made.

Consequences of Incorporation and the Creek

Although the Creek probably resisted the destruction of the world-economy more effectively than the other groups, they too had to deal with dwindling game and the destruction of indigenous ways of subsistence.[1] Traders from Carolina had come into Creek territory shortly after 1699 (Phillips 1961). It was not long, in historical time, before their economy was destroyed. For example, during a journey through Creek lands in 1789, Benjamin Hawkins noted fenced in fields and the effect of long term grazing. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, some of the Creek had even become slaveowners. Slaves were used to help raise livestock and crops (Silver 1990).

The Creek had a long history of trade and land cessions with the British. Often, with all the southeastern societies, trade and politics went hand in hand with the appropriation of native land. Land cessions were not only a consequence of the first phase of incorporation, but set up the second phase. The first Creek/British treaty occurred in 1733. In addition to promising a political and commercial alliance with the British, the Creek ceded their land between the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers, and some islands off the coast. As a result of treaties in 1790 and

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[1] According to Adair, the Creek grew in power, while other nations were disintegrating, because they had "few enemies," and because the traders taught them how to contain smallpox through the use of quarantines (Williams 1930:276).

1796, the Creek agreed to allow the establishment of trading posts in their territory, and ceded more land in 1802 and 1805 (Gatschet [1884] 1969). The ceding of land was not entirely voluntary, but was inherently connected to the dependence created by the trade. The Creek land cession of 1773 was made possible because of Creek debt owed to traders. The British Superintendent of Indians in the Southern District demanded land in payment, and eventually two million acres were ceded (Debo 1941).

Politically, the impact of incorporation was mixed for the Creek. In contrast to the other southeastern societies, the Creek confederacy grew in size and power, largely because of its willingness to absorb a variety of groups (Champagne 1992). The increase in Creek power was not simply a by-product of incorporation. The confederacy adopted a conscious policy of neutrality in an effort "to bolster [their] strategic strength" (Champagne 1992:55). The Creek also differed from the other societies in the region in another important aspect. For the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw the most pronounced change in their political and social institutions was increased secularization. The Creek, however, held on tightly to "their nonsecular social and political institutions" (Champagne 1992:69). While the other nations tended to drop strict religious prescriptions as they became more tightly integrated into the world-economy, the Creek "adhered

strongly" to the ways of their religion and culture (Champagne 1992:72). Resisting cultural destruction did not, however, make the Creek immune from political disintegration.

The Anglo/American conflict, beginning in 1775, had significant political consequences for the Creek, and the other southeastern societies. At the beginning of the war a number of lower towns wanted to maintain the political strategy of balancing the Europeans off against each other, i.e., accept aid from both, but ally themselves with none (Champagne 1992). O'Donnell (1975), however, claims there was a distinct "pro-American" group within the Lower Creek. Although the Creek were enemies of the British and Cherokee in the early 1700s (Phillips 1961), many of the upper towns tended to be under the British sphere of influence by the late 1700s. This split between the lower and upper towns almost led to a Creek civil war. Ultimately, due to economic pressures and other reasons, the neutral towns also allied themselves with the British (Phillips 1961; Champagne 1992). Nevertheless, a new sort of division was beginning to emerge after the war. There appeared a new, small, class of "mixed-blood" planters. This class did not have a high degree of political power, but nonetheless willingly participated in the market of the world-economy through the exploitation of slave labor (Champagne 1992).

Consequences of Incorporation and the Cherokee

The Cherokee were not major components of the fur trade until around the mid eighteenth century. And indeed, the interior tribes generally did not become essential to the trade until the coastal tribes were obliterated (Perdue 1979a). Carolina traders were a permanent fixture among the Cherokee by 1711, and before the mid-1700s the Cherokee were necessary to the trade.

In addition to the consequences already discussed, the Cherokee experienced political instability and warfare, and therefore disrupted settlement patterns as a result of the first phase of incorporation (King 1979). At the start of the 1700s Cherokee towns were homogenous and dense. Due to the impact of the world-economy Cherokee towns became more spread out, and are best characterized as a "community of farmsteads" (King 1979:xiii). While the Cherokee were being spread out spatially, incorporation pulled them together politically. One indication of this is the development of the notion of nationality, as shown in the election of a primary chief in 1721 (Starkey 1946). And indeed political centralization was a universal consequence of incorporation. It was both a consequence of geopolitics and a survival response.

Ultimately, as with the other southeastern societies, the Cherokee could not survive through the trade, and made a gradual turn towards an agricultural economy. At the time

of the Anglo/American war the Cherokee were raising some livestock, making butter and cheese, beekeeping, and growing potatoes, grain, flax, and cotton. While the Cherokee had always engaged in communal agriculture, the new agriculture was capitalist, and therefore social divisions began to emerge. For example, the upper Georgia region was suitable for large-scale cotton cultivation, and by the end of the eighteenth century plantations utilizing slave labor emerged. As the Cherokee plantations grew, so to did the use of slavery. By 1825 there were 1,227 black slaves within the Cherokee nation (Starkey 1946).

In terms of political reactions to incorporation, the Cherokee made "the most dramatic response" (Champagne 1992:55). The essential response was increased centralization and secularization of political structures. However, the Cherokee also experienced a tribal split during the first phase of incorporation. The split centered around the imperial competition between the British and American settlers starting in 1775. Most of the Cherokee nation wanted to remain neutral, while a faction, eventually known as the Chickamaugas, wanted to side with the British. They ultimately seceded from the nation (Champagne 1992).

Consequences of Incorporation and the Chickasaw/Choctaw

According to Gibson the period 1710-20 was a time of "commercial surge" for the Chickasaw (1971:39). During this

period the Chickasaw went through the transformation from subsistence to commercial hunters. The destructuring was so complete that trading complexes eventually supplanted council houses and sacred grounds. Like the Cherokee, the Chickasaw also experienced a spatial restructuring. Chickasaw settlements gradually became more scattered due to their economic links to the world-economy and geopolitics. Specifically, the constant attack from French allies, and the pressure for increased deerskin production forced the Chickasaw to extend their settlement patterns.

Similar to the other groups in the region, the Chickasaw were forced to give up their land because of debt and economic dependency. For example, by 1805 the Chickasaw nation was $12,000 in debt. The U.S. government offered them $20,000 for a tract of land, over half of which had to be used to pay national debts (Gibson 1971).

If White (1983) is accurate, the Choctaw, at least initially, had a quite different experience with the world-economy than the other southeastern societies. The Choctaw did not need many "durable" commodities (blankets, tools, cloth), and even fewer luxury items. White claims that the Choctaw were "quite indifferent" to quite a few European commodities, i.e., refused to accept commodities that they did not find useful or were of inferior quality (1983:57). This is not surprising considering that the Choctaw were among the "most prosperous, well-organized" societies in the

region (Searcy 1985).

The Choctaw lack of demand was problematic for European imperialists. They wanted to increase the Choctaw's level of consumption in order to increase the level of trade. In order to overcome the "Choctaw refusal to develop a proper appetite for European goods" the British did what capitalism always does, create demand where there is none. Demand was created through the use of rum, a strategy not restricted to the Choctaw. From the British point of view rum had two advantages; it was a commodity that was constantly in demand, and inherently produced debt (White 1983).

According to White, the British also tried to convince the Choctaw that the deerskin trade would make them "prosperous." Instead it created "chaos" (1983:71). By the mid to late 1700s the Choctaw were in a state of economic dependency, and by the beginning of the 1800s were at least $48,000 in debt. The significance of debt was much more than economic. Much of the Choctaw debt was owed to the British enterprise, Panton, Leslie and Company (Guice 1985), the major trading firm in the region (Champagne 1992). As with other southeastern nations, the U.S. government struck a bargain with Panton, Leslie and Co. in order to seize Choctaw land. The government allowed the Choctaw to pay their private debt through land cessions, and in turn paid the company (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Guice 1985).

Similar to the other southeastern societies, the trade also shattered Choctaw subsistence systems, led to overhunting, and therefore to spatial expansion and a search for economic alternatives. Another factor that contributed to dependency and destitution was increased warfare as a result of the trade. This further prevented a once prosperous nation from planting and harvesting (Noley 1985b), to the point where the Choctaw were even dependent on the British for food (White 1983). Silver (1990) says that many Native Americans in the southeast experienced a scarcity of food. A society that had once produced a surplus had become restructured into a coerced market for European goods and a pool of exploited labor (Noley 1985b).

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter is to give an idea of what incorporation means to the incorporated. I do not want to leave the impression that the consequences of the initial phase of incorporation are somehow analytically separate, or different than those of the second phase. I discuss the two phases separately because of the length of the process, and because there were historical breakpoints in the process that changed the nature, or deepened, the process of incorporation. Nevertheless, the consequences and responses discussed in this chapter are the foundation for the mechanisms of what I call the second phase of incorporation.

And indeed, some of the consequences discussed here analytically belong in the discussion of the second phase of incorporation. To gain a clearer theoretical understanding of the incorporation process it is useful to divide it up, but real history is not as clean or clear cut.

As we have seen, the initial mechanism of incorporation, the deerskin trade, created dependence by restructuring villages into export centers that responded to outside demand. Inherently connected to this was the transformation of people into labor, which became hierarchically divided along gender lines. And clearly during the first phase of incorporation Native American political structures began to become transformed in such a way as to coincide in "form" and "operation" with those of the world-economy (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987:777).

As the deerskin trade was eliminated as a viable economic activity, these processes nevertheless continued and deepened. As Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987) point out, two of the forms the deepening of capitalism takes are commodification and contractualization. These processes can be clearly seen during the second phase of incorporation. In addition to labor, land became a commodity, almost "necessarily" so after the elimination of deer. And certainly imperialist regulations began to govern relations between Europeans and Native Americans. Ultimately, however, Native American societies became irrelevant to

capital accumulation, and were thereby removed.

CHAPTER V

INCORPORATION: PHASE II

The Deepening of Capitalism, Late 1700s-1830s

As we have seen, the initial mechanism of incorporation was the deerskin trade. A breakpoint in the process of incorporation was the increasing scarcity of deer. This left Native American societies in a precarious situation. Their social structures had been destructured in order to accommodate the export of deerskins, and now the commodity was disappearing.

The second phase of incorporation was marked by this dilemma, as well as, on the surface at least, a contradiction. The U.S. state made conscious efforts to convert the Native American societies into producers of agricultural surplus but, at the same time, engaged in a number of strategies to take the land that was the basis of this surplus. The final stage of incorporation, therefore, was characterized by a slow, agonizing, convoluted effort to take Native American land in order to open it up for the unending flow of European settlers. Also, although examined in detail in the following chapter, intertwined with these processes was the elimination of imperial competition; the French were effectively removed from the region after the Seven Years War in 1763, and the British were eliminated by

Anglo-American settlers in 1783.

The following chapter contains three main sections. First, although I have divided the incorporation process into two phases (deerskins and land) I do not want to give the impression that imperialists somehow stumbled upon the production of agricultural surplus after the deer population was depleted. Agricultural production began early, and the taking of land and elimination of Native American societies was a long time in the making. A second characteristic of the final phase of incorporation was relentless European settler pressure. Again, settler pressure did not emerge out of nowhere. The vast amounts of Native American land had been coveted for many years. The final section is an attempt to describe the specific mechanisms of the second phase of incorporation; further Native American political and economic restructuring, theft of land, and removal.

The Depletion of Deer and Early Agricultural Production

The fundamental fact of the first phase of incorporation was that the deerskin trade destroyed the usefulness of Native Americans to the economy into which they had become hooked (Jennings 1975). To meet the demand for leather deer were virtually exterminated. In other words, as long as deerskins were central to the southeastern economy, Native Americans were "indispensable" (Nash 1982:276), but ultimately Native American producers became

"superfluous" to the economy "on [which] they [had come] to depend" (Jennings 1975:87). The commodity of importance now was land. According to Trimble, it was inevitable that land would become the basis of conflict. However, he makes the important point that it was two centuries before Europeans could "achieve the critical mass that could challenge Native Americans" (1987:215).

By the time the U.S. republic was created in the 1780s, the centrality of the fur trade as an economic activity was over (Nash 1982; Cornell 1988; Braund 1993). This, combined with increased settler expansion and decreased Native American independence meant a "new pattern of incorporation" based on the theft of native land (Cornell 1988:25). However the impression should certainly not be given that the imperialists only discovered the possibility land had for capital accumulation in the late 1700s. As Karras points out, the colonies themselves were "designed" for core capital accumulation, and one resource that existed in abundance was land. And therefore, by 1650 Europeans were pursuing profit through the production of highly marketable crops such as sugar and tobacco (1992:8). And certainly by the 1700s the production of surplus based on agriculture was well under way. By the middle of the eighteenth century the mainstays of the southern economy were tobacco, rice, and indigo (Nash 1982). A couple of examples should suffice in giving an idea of how important agriculture was in different

areas of the southeast.

Philip Pittman, an army officer ordered to tour the Gulf coast after the Seven Years War, reported the existence of plantations along the Mississippi River that made up the "greatest part of the commerce of Louisiana" ([1770] 1973). These plantations mainly produced indigo, cotton, rice, maize, beans, myrtle-wax candles, and lumber. According to Pittman, the maize, beans, rice, and candles were in great demand in St. Domingo, and quite a bit of lumber was exported to the West Indies. After 1762 the wealthier plantation owners had begun producing sugar cane, and had constructed mills to extract the sugar from the cane. The story is more or less the same for other areas in the region. According to Braund (1993) by the late 1700s the trade was no longer the central productive aspect of Georgia's economy. By this time crop and lumber production were significant, and pork, beef, and corn were being exported to the West Indies.

Settler Expansion

Inseparable from, and intertwined with, the commodification of land, the elimination of deer, and the creation of the U.S., was ever increasing settler pressure on Native American land. The pressure was felt by all the interior southeastern nations. By 1773 there existed a "great restlessness" within all the societies due to

European settler expansion (Corkran 1967:281). The immediate results of this pressure were increased intertribal diplomacy (Corkran 1967) and conflict and upheaval (Nash 1982; Jones 1982). As Woodward says, during the late 1700s, Cherokee towns became "cauldrons of violence" because of settler intrusion (1963:106). Settler expansion was extremely intense in the southeast not only due to the desire for surplus production, but also to the tremendous influx of immigrants from Europe beginning in the mid-1700s (Bailyn 1986).

According to Nash (1982), toward the end of the eighteenth century land was scarce in coastal areas at the same time that the European population was growing exceedingly fast. In 1700 the British colonies had a population of a 1/4 million; fifty years later it had grown to 1.2 million. Between 1750-65 the population of the British colonies grew at a rate equivalent to that of the first fifty years of the eighteenth century. After 1760 the British colonies went through a remarkable explosion of growth; both territorially and demographically (Bailyn 1986; Hatley 1993). Bailyn (1986) provides the most in depth analysis of the dimensions and mechanisms of settler expansion during this period. As such, it is worthwhile examining his argument in some detail.

In the mid to late 1700s there was an immense flow of British immigration to North America. This immigration was

connected to the rapid expansion of colonial settlement to the "backcountry of the coastal colonies" and across the Appalachians (Bailyn 1986:3). By the 1750s, thousands of white settlers were moving west toward the Appalachians (Nash 1982; Martin 1991). The expansion west from South Carolina was fueled both from northern settlers coming south along the Appalachians, and immigrants from Britain and Western Europe. The expansion into Georgia was more rational, i.e., occurred through a series of huge land purchases. Bailyn claims that European settlements abruptly emerged not only along the "frontier line," but hundreds and even thousands of miles from neighboring settlements. Bailyn characterizes these settlement patterns as "extraordinary considering how poorly explored" the region was, particularly west of the Appalachians (1986:21).

An important point to be made in connection to this rapid, intense, settler expansion is that it was not an evolutionary, natural, development, but was in good part consciously organized by capitalist land speculators looking for massive profit. To take advantage of both vast amounts of land and the exploding white population, land companies were created utilizing capital "from London investors, Virginia tobacco planters, and northern merchants" (Nash 1982:248). As Bailyn puts it, land speculation reached a fever pitch in the late 1700s. In other words, white settlers did not expand without help; "before them, behind

them, wherever they went" there too were land speculators (1986:21). Hence, the "surge" in private land purchases in the latter part of the 1700s (Jones 1982:116). Blumenthal characterizes the land companies as "commonwealth builders" (1955:46). Their land deals contained much "confusion and corruption" and many were of "dubious legality" (Blumenthal 1955:48,51). The British Crown presumed it had sovereignty, but from the mid 1700s on, colonial power brokers often acquired land without mediation from local politicians or the British Crown (Blumenthal 1955).

According to Bailyn, capitalists in Europe and North America jumped at the chance to make a profit "from what promised to be the biggest land boom in history" (1986:358). Those seeking profit included more or less all those serving in an official capacity in the colonies, colonial planters and merchants, and British politicians and merchants (Bailyn 1986). The white settlement of the southeast, therefore, was not a democratic, inevitable process. Bailyn does make the point that this kind of land speculation was not new, but reached a new level of complexity and dimension in the mid/late 1700s. Bailyn claims that the land deals that occurred just before the creation of the U.S. were "complex," "intricately interrelated," and usually the result of "shadowy intrigues." As a result, even today, they can barely be "sorted out and clearly depicted" (1986:358). In addition, the tracts of land the land

companies dealt with were enormous. For example, the Ohio Company claimed 200,000 acres of land between the Appalachian mountains and the Ohio River, while the Loyal and Greenbriar Company was dealing with grants from a total of a million acres in the same area (Bailyn 1986).

Another mechanism of increased settler expansion was political. Colonies like South Carolina and Georgia offered incentives to European immigrants. For example, South Carolina had a policy of assisted immigration as early as 1731, and Georgia had a similar program in 1766 (Bailyn 1986). However, the ultimate force behind the explosion of white settler expansion was economic. People arrived from Europe looking for land, and more often than not came in response to "recruitment agents" that worked for "land speculators in every region of British North America." Another important factor was the increased demand for labor after the mid 1700s (Bailyn 1986:355).

The situation for the Native American societies, therefore, was ever decreasing economic and political options. Deer were becoming scarce and therefore Native Americans "had a diminishing product to trade" (Williams 1979:13), the British (and ultimately Anglo-Americans) were consolidating their power, and settlers were chewing up Native American land, coercing debt and land cessions along the way (Martin 1991). It must be emphasized that the taking of native land was not a smooth, neat process. The

southeastern societies were facing tremendous pressure from many sides; land speculators, settlers, and ultimately the U.S. government (Cotterill 1954). An early method of land acquisition was through treaties. A key method for acquiring land, however, was debt as a byproduct of the trade (Cornell 1988). After the emergence of the U.S. state, theft of native land became state policy, and a western civilizational project and the creation of Native American debt were the methods chosen (Cotterill 1954; McKee and Schlenker 1980; Braund 1993).

In response to their ever decreasing independence the southeastern societies did what had to be done within the confines of the expanding European economy; they based their survival on agricultural production (Starkey 1946). The end result of settler and state pressure for native land was forced removal. This process took several decades, within which Native American societies went through fundamental restructuring once again.

Mechanisms of the Second Phase of Incorporation

Economic and Political Restructuring

The transformation of the southeastern societies from deerskin to agricultural producers was both a conscious response to changed economic conditions, and ultimately official imperialist policy. However, the transformation

was not uniform within the societies. The production of agricultural surplus meant the emergence of private property, and therefore class distinctions. It should be mentioned that while certainly these class distinctions were based on property, other important determining factors were race and ideological commitment to tradition. Stavenhagen (1975) points out that social scientists have not paid much attention to the formation of classes in nonstate, nonindustrialized, societies. He provides a good framework for understanding how the expansion of capitalism creates class in so-called agrarian societies.

According to Stavenhagen a number of processes (two of which are relevant here) occur to create class distinctions as capitalism is "superimposed on existing structures" (1975:53). First is the introduction of a cash economy. Such an economy adds to the dismantling of indigenous economies by encouraging market exchange and making labor available. Second is the transformation of land into private property, and thus market agriculture. This process is one of the most fundamental aspects of the expansion of capitalism, and "profoundly" changes native social structures, particularly by giving rise to new social classes based on property (Stavenhagen 1975). Both of these processes occurred during the second phase of incorporation.

Although each of the four societies under consideration struggled with the declining deerskin trade beginning in the

late 1700s, there were differences in their responses and experiences. According to Champagne, the Creek engaged in the strongest resistance to becoming agricultural producers. The Cherokee made the most rapid transition, while the transition for the Chickasaw and Choctaw was "more gradual" (1992:89).

The Creek. Martin (1991) and Braund (1993) provide the most in depth analysis of the Creek transformation. Private property among the Creek had its basis in the fur trade. Over time certain individuals accumulated more wealth than others. Typically, those who actively tried to accumulate property through the trade were offspring of white traders and Native American women, or to use a commonly used term, mixed-bloods (Braund 1993). By the end of the 1700s, the Creek mixed-bloods were beginning to form a distinct class which began to be the strongest force in Creek politics (Martin 1991). With the deepening of capitalism the outlines of this class became sharper, and the divisions within the nation became wider.

With the decline of the trade, the southeastern societies had few economic options beyond agriculture. Nevertheless, the U.S. state actively sought to restructure native societies. Specifically, the U.S. actively promoted agricultural production, which ultimately, it was hoped, "would free large hunting territories for American

expansion" (Champagne 1992:89). To carry out this western civilization project, the U.S. sent agents to the Native American societies "to teach agriculture and the domestic arts" (Champagne 1992:88). For Anglo-Americans civilization meant work and private property; both of these were to be found in agriculture (Rogin 1971). Benjamin Hawkins was appointed to civilize the Creek in 1796 (Martin 1991), and faced a difficult task since the Creek were very resistant to the U.S. civilizational project (Champagne 1992).

As mentioned, the U.S. state cared less about the Creek becoming "civilized" than they did about Creek land. Turning the southeastern Native Americans into "European peasants" (Wright 1992:206) would unavoidably concentrate their land, therefore making it available for white surplus production. In the meantime, Hawkins's task was to "reconstruct the Creek economy" (Champagne 1992:114), and turn the Creek into agricultural laborers that produced "marketable goods." As part of this, Hawkins was supposed to teach the Creek to "think" in the same way as "the ideal European settler" (Martin 1991:97,93). Specifically Hawkins introduced mechanization by bringing in plows, spinning wheels, and looms (Champagne 1992), and urged the creation of individual, private, farming and the dismantling of communal living (Debo 1941; Braund 1993). During his tenure "slaves [also] became numerous" (Debo 1941:69).

As mentioned the emergence of a distinct class based on

property ownership began within Creek society as a result of the fur trade. The second phase of incorporation exacerbated these divisions. As Martin says, the civilizational project "reinforced economic divisions already present" (1991:102). The mixed-blood class had already begun to acquire private property (which included slaves), to raise stock, and sell crops on the market. And indeed, as early as 1798 the use of slave labor to produce cotton and other crops had begun within the Creek nation (Silver 1990; Braund 1993). Other commodities sold on the market included corn, honey, horses, beef, cattle hides (Braund 1993), and nut oil (Debo 1941).

The mixed-blood group within Creek society made up a distinct class in every sense of the word. They were devoted to accumulation, the acquisition of private property, and consumption. They also demonstrated a consciousness through their "devotion to self-improvement," and their "refusal to honor the ethic of reciprocity" (Martin 1991:108). The mixed-blood capitalist class, although a numerical minority, became the strongest force in Creek politics. Their refusal to honor tradition represented a "fundamental contradiction" to Creek cosmology, and eventually resulted in a "profound religious crisis" and civil war (Martin 1991).

According to Champagne, in contrast to the other societies, the Creek exhibited a much higher degree of

"cultural and institutional orthodoxy" (1992:72). Nevertheless, not only does incorporation mean the transformation of people into labor, but the transformation of political organizations in such a way that facilitates the production of surplus for the market. As such, in the late 1790s "the Creek national council acquiesced to Hawkins's plan for centralizing and regulating the Creek government" (Champagne 1992:114). Political centralization chiefly took the form of legal prohibitions against treaty violations and crimes against white settlers, as well as the creation of law enforcement officials (Champagne 1992). While certainly this degree of contractualization is significant considering the traditional Creek political structure, it was tepid compared to the transformation of the Cherokee.

The Cherokee. According to Champagne, "The Cherokee, though not without resistance ... , were the quickest to turn away from hunting to subsistence husbandry and farming" (1992:89). Undoubtedly related to the rapid turn to agricultural production, the Cherokee are also notable for their complex political restructuring and centralization.

Beginning in the late 1700s, the Cherokee began the transformation to agricultural and industrial production. This included the construction of mills and trading posts (Carter 1976). As with the Creek, the U.S. state

nonetheless sent an agent to the Cherokee in 1797. The agent's civilizational task included instruction in the raising of stock and market crops, particularly corn, wheat, cotton, and flax (Woodward 1963; Perdue 1979b). The Cherokee were also taught the finer arts of western civilization by carpenters, wheelwrights, blacksmiths, and weavers (Woodward 1963). The Cherokee also began to produce honey, butter, and cheese (Starkey 1946). As with the Creek, production for the market hinged on private property, and therefore communal ownership began to be discarded; thus the emergence of class distinctions (Starkey 1946).

Certainly a common thread through all four societies, as one might expect, was the emergence of a market/profit oriented class. These individuals functioned as traders, planters, or merchants. In each case the new class was a numerical minority (Champagne 1992). Nevertheless, in the modern world-system property is power. The Cherokee provide a good example.

As we will see shortly, the Cherokee eventually constructed a political structure best characterized as a republic. The power within this political structure lay with the slaveholders. They controlled and created the structure, the fundamental characteristic of which was centralized power, in order to protect their property (Perdue 1979b). It is also interesting to note that, as with the Creek, the majority of property owners were what

many refer to as mixed-bloods or intermarried whites (Perdue 1979b; Shadburn 1989). By 1835 "78% of the members of families owning slaves" had some European heritage. Slaveowners also owned 75% of the nation's mills, utilized more land, produced more corn, and owned the majority of the "nascent industries" (Perdue 1979b:117,118).

As Champagne (1992) mentions, the transformation of the Cherokee into agricultural labor was rapid and deep. By the early 1800s Cherokee life more or less "paralleled that of southern whites" (King 1979:xvi). The best way to get an idea of the dimensions of this transformation is to look at the actual amount of productive property within the nation.

By 1810 the Cherokee owned 19,500 cattle, 6,100 horses, 19,600 hogs, 1,037 sheep, 467 looms, 1,600 spinning wheels, 30 wagons, 500 ploughs, 3 saw mills, and 13 grist mills (Perdue 1979b). By the late 1820s and early 1830s the nation owned 22,000 cattle, 7,600 horses, 46,000 hogs, 2,500 sheep, 762 looms, 2,488 spinning wheels, 172 wagons, 2,943, 10 saw mills, 31 grist mills, 62 blacksmith shops, 8 cotton machines, and had 18 schools (Blumenthal 1955; Perdue 1979b). In 1809 the nation owned 583 African slaves (Thornton 1990), by 1825 they owned 1,227 slaves (Blumenthal 1955; Thornton 1990) and by 1835 they owned 1,592 slaves (Thornton 1990). Considering that the Cherokee population was about 15,000 at this time (Blumenthal 1955), this is a high level of property ownership. And indeed, in 1820s and

1830s Georgia, Native Americans were some of the state's largest slaveowners (Genovese 1979).

Historians have long been enamored with the Cherokee political restructuring during this period. And certainly, Cherokee political transformation was rapid and fundamental. Incorporation involves the restructuring of political systems in such a way that they coincide with the operation of the interstate system. No southeastern society illustrates this notion better than the Cherokee. As a number of people have pointed out (Gearing 1956; Champagne 1992; Dunaway 1994) Cherokee political centralization and secularization began early.

As early as 1730 a discernable tribal political structure emerged (Gearing 1956; Dunaway 1994). According to Dunaway (1994) this structure was constructed as a result "of articulation of Cherokee towns with the European trade and war complex." Gearing (1956) characterizes this structure as a tribal half-government. Its central purpose was the negotiation of trade relations with the European powers. By 1758 the outlines of a "tribal state became explicit." This political structure was made up of a "tribal structure for offensive war," as well as a "tribal structure for general councils" (Gearing 1956:95). Persico (1979) claims that the national council created in the mid-1700s was made up of delegates from each town. As a structure supposed to represent the nation as a unity it was

more or less ineffective (Gearing 1956).

According to Champagne, with the exception of the Creek, the political structures of all the societies started to become increasingly secularized during the time of British hegemony. As mentioned, the Cherokee "experimented with a kind of centralized political structure in the mid-1700s, and created a principal chief. Nevertheless, primary political allegiance remained with the towns (1992:86). Champagne somewhat agrees with Perdue that continued Cherokee political restructuring largely stemmed from the emerging market-oriented class in an effort to protect private property. However, settler "threats to land and political sovereignty ... operated in conjunction" with the new class (1992:93). The Cherokee hoped that a centralized political structure would prevent loss of land and promote independence. Therefore, by the early 1800s the nation "centralized control over blood revenge, formed commitments of national political unity, and created ad hoc committees and more rationalized administration of government" (Champagne 1992:93).

Political restructuring continued to proceed rapidly as the imperialists continued to treat the nation as one political entity, i.e., the behavior of a single town or individual "brought reprisals against all" (Persico 1979:95). By 1817 the Cherokee national council adopted six articles which created a thirteen person national committee.

Fundamentally the new committee was an executive body within the broader national council (Persico 1979; Champagne 1992). The effect was increased centralization and efficiency (Persico 1979).

From the early 1800s until the late 1820s the political trend for the Cherokee was toward increasing centralization, or the flow of power from the towns to a central government (Persico 1979). Thus, by 1820 the nation was separated into eight representative/judicial districts (Woodward 1963; Persico 1979). Each district contained a judge, marshall, and local council. A circuit judge was given jurisdiction over every two districts (Woodward 1963). Champagne claims that these political changes were largely in response to continued, intense, white pressure for Cherokee land. In the national council, the nation debated whether to fully adopt political westernization, or stay with tradition. Under the influence of the "planter" class the nation decided to westernize (Champagne 1992:134).

According to Champagne, for the next several years the national council, under the influence "of the small group of planters, chiefs, and mission-educated Cherokee," pursued westernization even further (1992:136). For example, in 1822 a Supreme Court was established, and in 1826 the national council voted to form a constitutional convention to begin in 1827 (Persico 1979; Champagne 1992). It is significant in terms of the analysis of political power that

of the 24 convention delegates, approximately 20 were from the planter class (Champagne 1992).

Essentially the constitution established a "separation of powers" between the judiciary, executive, and legislature (Champagne 1992:139). Specifically, the legislature became bicameral (Woodward 1963; Champagne 1992); previously the national committee was appointed, and now was made up of one elected representative from each district. The national council was made up of three elected representatives from each district. A bill of rights, which barred blacks from Cherokee political life, was also drafted.

Perdue (1979b) argues, and McLoughlin (1990) implies, that this political structure was essentially created by slaveholders to protect their property and facilitate their accumulation of surplus. Champagne claims that while the new political structure certainly facilitated the accumulation of surplus by the minority planter class, "It is unlikely ... that the planters were ever in direct or total control of the Cherokee government" (1992:141). He argues that while a good portion of the laws contained in the new constitution protected private property and regulated markets, a class argument too easily dismisses the influence of the conservative (traditionalist) majority. The slaveholders were able to pursue political westernization in the face of the conservatives because they offered "a strategy for preserving their homeland and

political sovereignty" (1992:142). Nevertheless, whatever the various motives, or stated purposes, were, the planters were able to wield their power, and the effect of the new political structure was to institutionalize surplus accumulation. From producers of deerskins in an external arena, the Cherokee had become strongly integrated into the world-economy.

The Chickasaw. According to Gibson (1971) the Chickasaw, at least before 1763, were not under the same degree of settler pressure as the other three nations. Nonetheless, their towns were being scattered due to warfare and the search for skins and slaves. Once again, Champagne (1992) and (1993) presents the most in depth analysis of Chickasaw economic and political restructuring.

If the rapidity and extent of economic and political restructuring were placed on a continuum, the Creek and Cherokee would occupy the ends, and the Chickasaw and Choctaw would fall in the middle. They did not resist as strongly as the Creek, but made a slower turn to agricultural production and stock raising than the Cherokee. The Chickasaw began a slow turn to agriculture as late as the early 1800s, and almost two decades later most of the Chickasaw still did not engage in commercial production (Champagne 1992).

Despite this slow turn to commercial agriculture the

Chickasaw, as did all the other nations, experienced the emergence of a class based on property and production of surplus. A minority of Chickasaw families began plantation production, ultimately with slave labor, exporting cotton, corn and cattle. Hence the emergence of "distinct classes" (Champagne 1993:238). According to Champagne (1992) the Chickasaw class structure, by 1818, consisted of a minority group of slaveowners and a majority of hunters/subsistence farmers. A good number of the property owners accumulated a substantial amount of wealth through plantations, farms and slave labor. As with the other societies, this class carried much political weight.

In terms of political restructuring, Champagne sees the influence of the Chickasaw planter class as similar to that of the Cherokee. However, at the same time both the Creek and Chickasaw "willfully and collectively" refused to take the same road as the Cherokee (Champagne 1993:245). The Chickasaw national council, in the early 1800s , refused to implement political centralization pushed by the planter class. Still, the planters, although they did not control the political structure, were able to utilize the political structure to enhance their economic interests. As with the Cherokee, the conservative majority were willing to allow this "as a way of getting [the planters] to help manage Chickasaw relations with the U.S. government" (Champagne 1992:112). Specifically, the conservatives hoped the

planters would help prevent the U.S. from taking Chickasaw land (Champagne 1993).

After 1818 the Chickasaw class system went through fairly rapid change. Largely due to the continued decline in the trade, the majority of Chickasaw turned to agricultural production. Champagne (1992) claims that in the 1820s the market class grew and increasingly turned to cotton production based on slave labor. A key factor in the class structure becoming more entrenched were the mixed-bloods. Not only were they increasingly devoted to accumulation, but also accepted western education and mechanization. Just prior to the nation's removal, the Chickasaw mixed-bloods were not only producing cotton, grain, and cattle for the market, but also establishing lucrative mercantilist operations (Guice 1985). According to Champagne (1992), however, most Chickasaw still produced a small surplus.

The Choctaw. The broad outlines of the preceding story apply to the Choctaw. By the beginning of the 1800s the Choctaw started to experience class distinctions based largely on the increase in the mixed-blood population. The nation began to produce cotton and raise livestock, both for export (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Searcy 1985). Thus, the Choctaw too saw the rise of a planter-merchant class. The planter class was made up of two strata; the intermarried

whites and mixed-bloods who produced cotton with slave labor, and a larger group of full and mixed-bloods who produced smaller surpluses of crops like corn (White 1983). Once again, Champagne (1992) says this class was small. While the petty capitalistic class was small, there was conflict between them and the traditional hunters (White 1983).

According to White, the force behind private property and raising stock for surplus production were the mixed-bloods and intermarried whites. The majority of the hunters were full-bloods. Even though Choctaw tradition did not condone the accumulation of property, livestock production meant private property, and therefore the increase in livestock was only beneficial to the owning class. As such, White describes the mixed-bloods as "modernizers," and the "destroyers of traditional ways" (1983:116).

By the 1820s private property and accumulation were causing serious divisions within the nation (White 1983) as class distinctions became sharper between the minority market directed agricultural producers and merchants, and the traditionalists (Champagne 1992). The mixed-bloods were creating a culturally and economically westernized society, a key component of which was protection of private property. While this class wanted to jettison tradition, they were nationalists in the sense that their political power centered on their strong resistance to removal (White 1983;

Champagne 1992). The slaveholding and propertied class displayed a change-oriented, rather than conservative, nationalism. They reasoned that westernization was the key to protecting land and preventing removal (Champagne 1992).

During the early 1800s the Choctaw did not make significant moves toward political centralization, i.e., their three political districts retained a high degree of independence. In 1826, however, under the influence of the mixed-blood, propertied class, the nation adopted a constitution. This class also managed to pass laws that dismantled tradition and promoted surplus production (White 1983).

Theft of Land

As the southeastern societies' political-economic systems were being restructured, imperialists did not take their eyes off native land. Land was integral to the economic expansion of the new U.S. state. In other words, U.S. growth hinged on Native American removal (Cornell 1988). Native Americans were a disposable satellite for the emerging core. In the south, cotton production was the force behind economic expansion. Cotton production could increase only as rapidly as Native American land was taken. As Cornell (1988) points out, from 1815-1830 the pattern of cotton production coincided with the pattern of native land cessions. During the second phase of incorporation, the

U.S. state acquired native land by using an intertwined scheme of debt creation and treaties (Williams 1979).

Treaties had always been a mechanism of imperialism in Native America (Jones 1982). As such, each of the four societies had extensive treaty histories with the Europeans. What follows is a glimpse at imperialism through treaties in the southeast.

Between 1763-1768 the British constructed an extensive treaty system. While the treaties signed by imperialists and Native Americans covered a wide variety of concerns, they all dealt with land boundaries and jurisdiction. In the late 1700s the U.S. state picked up where Britain left off (Meyer 1971). As Jones says, by the 1790s the southeastern people "were caught in a treaty system ... that systematically relieved them of their land" (1982:5). According to Blumenthal there were 720 land cessions between 1784-1894 in native America. Among all these cessions it is almost impossible to find one "made by [Native Americans] entirely of their own volition" (1955:43). Land cessions through treaties usually occurred at the end of wars, or under extreme imperialist state pressure (e.g. the U.S. push for removal in the 1830s), or under relentless settler pressure (Blumenthal 1955).

The first treaty the Creek made with the British was signed in 1733. The treaty involved ceding land between the Savannah and Altamaha Rivers and some islands off the coast,

and an agreement of alliance and commerce. The treaty also contained pledges to sign another commercial agreement in the future. The Creeks further agreed to "live in peace" with white settlers, and to return runaway slaves (Gatschet [1884] 1969). The Creek signed treaties with the U.S. state in 1790 and 1796. Once again, an article in these treaties specified that the Creek return runaway slaves, as well as captured whites and property. In addition, the Creek agreed to let trading posts, and a U.S. agent, be set up within their borders. Additional land cessions were made to the U.S. in 1802 and 1805 (Gatschet [1884] 1969).

The Cherokee signed a treaty of alliance with South Carolina as early as 1684. Only eight Cherokee leaders were involved (Rights 1957). Between 1721-1798 the Cherokee signed thirteen treaties which included sixteen land cessions amounting to 82,277 square miles (Thornton 1990). In 1775 the Cherokee made a land cession of 17,312,000 acres to the Transylvania Land Company (Blumenthal 1955). For this, the largest land cession in "frontier history" the Cherokee received 2000 British pounds and 10,000 British pounds worth of trading goods (Woodward 1963:88). In the late 1700s the Cherokee, with the Chickasaw and Choctaw, signed treaties with the U.S. state that regulated trade and initiated the western civilization programs (Carter 1976; Wright 1992). From the late 1700s until removal, the U.S. pressured the Cherokee for land cessions more or less on a

yearly basis (Champagne 1992).

The first treaty of commerce and alliance the Choctaw signed with the British was in 1738 (Jacobs 1954). In 1759 they signed another treaty with the British, promising to ban French and Spanish traders and provide safe passage for British traders (Sheddan 1931). In 1785 both the Choctaw and Chickasaw signed a treaty in Hopewell, South Carolina. The treaty dealt with trade, land boundaries, and essentially placed the nations under U.S. authority (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Guice 1985). Between the late 1700s and 1817 the Chickasaw signed several land cession treaties with the U.S. (Champagne 1992).

A valid question at this juncture is why didn't the U.S. simply take native land by force. According to Williams (1979), the U.S. was too weak at this point to subjugate the native societies. Nevertheless, acquisition of native land became state policy (Cotterill 1954). In order to achieve their goal, the U.S. state set up a series of trading posts which generously extended credit. The aim was to create debt that was unpayable, and then demand land in payment (Cotterill 1954; Williams 1979). In 1796 congress allocated $150,000 "as revolving capital for the Indian trade," and permitted the President to set up government stores wherever there was a need (Cotterill 1954:115). The U.S. then embarked on its policy of encouraging the nations to acquire large debts at government

stores. The state stores traded goods at cost, and in this way the U.S. was able to limit foreign competition, and prevent the nations from going into debt with private traders (Champagne 1992), which would be counterproductive to the acquisition of land.

However, even when the native societies did have sizeable private debts, the U.S. and private trading companies found ways to cooperate. For example, by the early 1800s the Choctaw had amassed large debts to the monopolizing firm Panton, Leslie and Company (Guice 1985). In 1796 the nation owed the firm $16,091, and by the 1800s owed $48,000 (White 1983). In 1805 the President, Thomas Jefferson, mediated on behalf of the company by "allowing" the nation to pay its debt through a cession of land to the U.S., which in turn paid the company (Guice 1985:168). In the same year the Chickasaw received $20,000 for a tract of land ceded to the U.S., $12,000 of which went to a partner in Panton and Leslie (Cotterill 1954; Gibson 1971).

Although this mechanism of land acquisition was slow and tedious, it worked, as further examples illustrate. In 1797 the Creek had a total debt of $282,445. The nation's largest single creditor was Panton, Leslie and Company. Their U.S. agent encouraged them to cede land to pay off the debt. Eventually the Creek, in 1805, ceded 2 million acres (Braund 1993). In 1801 the Choctaw ceded 2.6 million acres in a treaty with the U.S. In 1803, one of the nation's

districts ceded 853,000 acres to pay of individual debts, and in 1805 the nation ceded 4.1 million acres for $50,000 (Martin 1991; Champagne 1992). The Chickasaw national council, to raise funds, ceded land to the U.S. in 1805. Chickasaw merchants used approximately half of the money to pay off their individual debts. Between 1801-1818 the Chickasaw, in a series of treaties, ceded 20 million acres to the U.S. (Champagne 1992).

Although the U.S. was successfully swindling native societies out of their land, it was not going fast enough for white settlers. For example, in the late 1700s white settlers overlooked treaty stipulations, and started moving in on Cherokee land. By 1809 the Chickasaw, in the face of their massive land cessions, were "besieged by American squatters" (Champagne 1992:110), and by 1812 the Choctaw were experiencing a white settler "invasion" (Guice 1985:169). The settlers had support from the federal government. After becoming president in 1829, Andrew Jackson "publicly refused to honor federal treaty obligations," and therefore refused to "protect" the southeastern nations from vigilante and settler "harassment" (Nabokov 1992b:148).

And thus, by the early 1800s both settlers and the individual states were putting constant pressure on the federal government for native land. An important driving force behind this pressure was the rise of cotton (Cornell

1988; Champagne 1992). The interior south was prime land for the establishment of cotton plantations, and therefore southern politicians, planters, and land speculators pressed the government for Native American removal; these human beings were merely a "major impediment to the development of a southern export economy" (Champagne 1992:125). According to Meyer (1971) Jefferson had proposed removing the southeastern peoples west of the Mississippi as early as 1802.

Removal

Between 1830 and 1845 the majority of southeastern people were forced to give up their land and/or be removed west of the Mississippi. The forces behind this U.S. policy were cotton export interests. The mechanisms of removal were the individual southern states (Champagne 1992). The U.S. state removed most of the Choctaw in 1830, the Creek between 1832-1837, and began the removal of the Cherokee and Chickasaw in 1838 (Woodward 1963; Gibson 1971; McKee and Schlenker 1980; Champagne 1992).

The immediate pressure for removal came from the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee (Champagne 1992). As with the other components of the incorporation process, removal was slow and convoluted. It more or less began with the states legally claiming native land, and placing Native Americans under their jurisdiction. In the late 1820s and

1830s Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama claimed legal jurisdiction over the native societies, and essentially proclaimed native governments to be invalid (Blumenthal 1955; Cornell 1988). For example, in 1828 Georgia claimed all Cherokee land within its borders (Blumenthal 1955; Thornton 1990), and in 1829 Alabama and Mississippi claimed all Creek and Choctaw and Chickasaw land (Blumenthal 1955). While the states were engaging in this legal imperialism, they kept the pressure on the federal government to completely remove the native societies (Davis 1979). In addition, tribal leaders were bribed and "coopted with gifts" in order that they too would push for removal (Wolf 1982:285). In 1830 Congress passed the Removal Bill (Woodward 1963; Thornton 1990; Hagan 1993).

The removal of the southeastern societies from their land was brutal. As Hagan says in reference to the Creek,

> When a caravan of 2,000 Indians got under way ..., Alabamians hovered around the column like Cossacks, submitting fraudulent claims and seizing horses and other property from those unable to defend themselves. The governments policy of contracting with private companies to remove the Indians did not improve the situation ... About half the Creek nation did not survive the migration and difficult early years in the West. (1993:890).

The process was no better for the other nations. In 1838 the U.S. army impounded 16,000 Cherokee in concentration camps before their forced removal (Woodward 1963; Wright 1992). On the journey west 4,000 people died (Thornton

1990; Wright 1992). According to Meyer (1971), in all approximately 50,000 people were removed, of which about half died.

The incorporation of the southeast is historically unique partly because of the centrality of land to the process. A key process within incorporation is the transformation of people into labor in relation to capital. And certainly this occurred to a degree in the southeast. However, ultimately Native Americans were themselves dispensable commodities in the face of the expanding world-economy. Or more accurately, Native Americans were a temporary nexus between the commodification of deer and land. This is the way incorporation worked in the southeast.

CHAPTER VI

DISEASE, GENOCIDE, AND IMPERIAL HEGEMONY

The Capitalist World-System as Noninevitable

The ultimate purpose of this project is to critique the image of colonialism/capitalism as an overpowering force. World-systems theory has as a stated purpose a similar critique. However, it falls short, particularly in the analysis of incorporation. World-systems theory clearly states that incorporation takes historically particular forms, and that there is not a single model, or series of stages through which all societies must pass on their road to the promised land. Nevertheless, the world-systems notion of incorporation still leaves me with the image of a spreading cancer that sweeps aside indigenous peoples and cultures as if they were not there. While the image of the capitalist world-economy as a cancer may be a good one, to be true to history, we must recognize that people have resisted incorporation rigorously and in a number of ways as the process has been occurring.

The following two chapters are a glimpse at the resistance in the native southeast. This resistance was strong, innovative, and ultimately unsuccessful in terms of its ultimate goal; the removal of Europeans and their new economy. However, before examining southeastern resistance,

it is important to understand why this resistance was seemingly so unsuccessful. In this way we can avoid pointing to racist factors that have been used, implicitly and explicitly, in the past and present, for example, inferior cultures, the inability to understand the meaning of the vast economic changes that were occurring, and the inability to see beyond ethnic differences.

As Trimble points out, for centuries, the colonization of Native Americans has been justified through racism. Such justification has left a legacy that has been difficult to destroy. Euro-American racism has been deep and wide. Not only has Native American colonization and genocide rested on the view that Native Americans were "deficient" in their knowledge of how to use the land and in the way they organized their life, but also in military matters (1987:209). Wright makes the point that when Europe's children try to answer the questions, "Why were Amerindians so vulnerable?, Why was America so overwhelmed by Europe that it has never been decolonized?" the common answers are "self-serving" and based "in assumptions of superiority." For example, Native Americans "lost" because they were few in number, and their societies were primitive and weak (1992:13). The denial of Native American humanity, which includes the fact of their resistance, can be seen in such racist views which ultimately see a "nuisance" on the land, rather than a human being (Trimble 1987:215).

One of the most important factors, or the short answer (Wright 1992), in explaining the obstacles to effective resistance in the fifthteenth and sixteenth centuries was the silent ally of incorporation; European disease. It is also important to further examine the competition between the incorporators. This not only sets the backdrop to Native American resistance, but also helps one understand some of the other obstacles Native Americans faced in resisting the European economy.

Disease and Genocide

In disease we are dealing with massive death that was a crucial factor in successful European colonization, as well as a debate on population with wide political ramifications.

According to Stiffarm and Lane, the debate over how many people there were on the continent at the time of European contact has always had broad political implications. Specifically, it is connected to "post hoc justifications" for European colonialism (1992:23). The "mythology" that the pre-European Americas were populated by people in small, wide ranging bands is deeply embedded in the current national consciousness. This mythology also contains the corollary that since there were not many people, the level of socio-economic development was low. Therefore, if there were not many people, and they were primitive, the land was more or less empty, and imperialists

were "obligated to put it to productive use" (Stiffarm and Lane 1992:28).

The simple fact is that available evidence indicates that the land was highly populated by people existing within complex societies before European influence (Snipp 1989), but was often conveniently cleared out through the spread of European disease. And it is largely because of the massive death caused by European disease that there has been a wide range of estimates of the pre-European population of the Americas (Kupperman 1980).

According to Daniels (1992) three schools have developed in the attempt to estimate the population of North America prior to the invasion. Between them, estimates have ranged from 500,000 to 18,000,000. Denevan (1992) says that the hemisphere's population was between 40-100 million at the time of contact. The population of North America was about 3.8 million. Thornton (1987) claims that there were more than 5 million people in what is now the U.S.

Where there is total agreement is in the fact that a "demographic collapse" occurred (Denevan 1992:370). The most crucial factor was disease (Muntz 1927; Ramenofsky 1987). By 1650 the indigenous population in the hemisphere had been cut down by about 90% (Denevan 1992; Butzer 1992). In North America, between 1492 and 1800, the population was reduced by approximately 74% (Denevan 1992; Butzer 1992;

Stiffarm and Lane 1992).[1] Thornton (1987) says that there were 600,000 native inhabitants in the U.S. in 1800; reduced from over 5 million. By the end of the 1800s there were 250,000. According to Snipp (1989) a conservative estimate is that the population of North America, between 1500-1890, declined by between 1.75-4.75 million. Ultimately disease killed between 1/2 and 3/4 of the population of the Americas (Middleton 1992). In real numbers, as Butzer says, we all must grapple with the "appalling implications" of approximately 40-60 million human beings dying from disease and famine brought on by European colonialism (1992:351).

Prior to the intrusion of Europeans, it is widely recognized that Native Americans were "remarkably free of serious diseases" (Thornton 1987:39). With European contact came truly deadly diseases; smallpox, cholera, measles, diphtheria, influenza, typhoid fever, bubonic plague (Thornton 1987), yellow fever, dysentery (Axtell 1981), and scarlet fever (Snipp 1989). The most deadly of the new diseases was smallpox (Crosby 1992). Smallpox crossed the ocean in 1518-19, and during the next four centuries "played as an essential role in European imperialism as gunpowder (Crosby 1992:23).

Besides lack of initial immunity, disease caused such massive death because of initial sporadic exposure, which

[1] According to Ramenofsky, a reasonable hypothesis is that "minimum population loss" was 90% (1987:171).

prevented development of immunity (Wood 1989), and exposure to several epidemics simultaneously (Middleton 1992). In other words, microorganisms hit in "clusters," which in turn arrived in interrupted succession. The "insidious periodicity and plurality" of disease is why Native Americans could not acquire immunity (Martin 1978:50). As a result, a single epidemic could kill between 50-90% of a tribe's members (Axtell 1981).

It is no wonder that in attempts to understand what disease meant in the Americas this demographic collapse has been described as the planets "greatest demographic disaster," and the first colonies characterized as "charnel houses" (Crosby 1992:29). Loewen says that the epidemics brought by Europeans "constituted the most important single geopolitical event of the first third of the 1600s, anywhere on the planet" (1992:16).

The First Line of Imperialism

An important factor that must be understood with regard to the Americas, disease, and colonialism was the advance spread of the epidemics. Microorganism extended "far ahead" of the Europeans that were their source. As such the societies at the time of European contact were often fragments of what they once were (Calloway 1987). Disease "decimated" native societies "far beyond the geographical limits of face-to-face contact" (Dobyns 1983:24). In fact

the records of first European intrusion indicate massive depopulation in "protohistorical times" (Martin 1978:47). For example, the records of Hernando De Soto's first European expedition into the southeast indicate people had suffered from disease prior to his arrival. Loewen (1992) gives a better example, in New England, of the early start to disease and its relationship to colonization. Native Americans in New England started to die of disease in 1617, before the Pilgrims arrived. In three years between 90-96% of southern New England's indigenous population were dead. The first Europeans in the region did walk into an empty land, and saw it as the work of God (Hagan 1993). As the first Governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony said, "For the natives, they are neere all dead of small Poxe, so as the Lord hathe cleared our title to what we possess" (Crosby 1992:28).

The fact that disease, and the beginnings of demographic collapse, began long before sustained European occupation (Ramenofsky 1987) has significant implications for the analysis of colonization and resistance. Imperialism unleashed disease and subsequent destructuring and migration that "extended far beyond [the European's] own presence" (Dobyns 1983:25). Therefore, the people of the Lower Mississippi Valley initially "described" by Europeans were "survivors" of massive "demographic and systemic change" (1987:173,176). The first imperialists often encountered

not "pristine" societies, but societies that had reorganized themselves in response to depopulation (Snipp 1989:22).

Epidemics in the Southeast

As discussed in chapter II, the forerunners of the southeastern societies, the Mississippians, underwent a large population decline, due to warfare and disease, in the 1500s and 1600s (Williams 1979). In the southeast the 1500s were the disease century (Ramenofsky 1987). Therefore, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the southeast had already experienced a massive depopulation through disease. The groups that survived the epidemics of the sixteenth century had quite a bit of time to "recover" before the British created Charleston in 1670. As mentioned in the previous section, this means that the British did not come into contact with "aboriginal groups." The societies in the region had survived demographic collapse, and had "recreated themselves" (Martin 1991:47). Disease in the region, then, went through a number of stages. Disease was there before De Soto, increased after his expedition, and after a time of recovery, came again with European settlement (White 1983). As such, the rate of population decline continued to increase until about 1800 (Thornton, Warren, Miller 1992).

Silver claims that imperialists of the 1690s, in the South Atlantic region, recorded five large smallpox epidemics, each of which lasted for several years; 1696-99,

1729-33, 1738-39, 1755-60, 1779-83. In 1559 the southern interior was hit by an influenza epidemic, and in 1761, influenza "struck on the heels of a measles epidemic" (1990:76). According to Silver (1990), in 1685 the indigenous population of North and South Carolina was about 10,000 respectively, and was cut down by a quarter within the next fifteen years. The same was true for other areas of the southeast. At the beginning of European colonization a large number of societies lived along the coast and rivers of Alabama and Mississippi. By 1798 only the four societies under consideration more or less occupied the region (Guice 1985).

The first Cherokee smallpox epidemic, as far as is known, hit in 1697. Other epidemics arrived in 1738-39, 1759-61, and 1783 (Wood 1989). The epidemic of 1738, within twelve months, killed half the Cherokee nation (Williams 1930; Mooney 1975; Nash 1982; Wright 1992; Hatley 1993). Between 1685-1730 the Cherokee population declined from 32,000 to 10,500 (Wood 1989). During the 1760s increased warfare and disease reduced the Cherokee population to about 7000 (Silver 1990).

The story is more or less the same for the other societies. In 1685 the Creek numbered 15,000, and by 1730 they had a population of 11,000. Together the Chickasaw and Choctaw had a population of 35,000 in 1685, and by 1730 it was down to 14,300 (Silver 1990). Wood (1989) says the

Choctaw alone had a population of 28,000 in 1685, which was reduced to 11,200 by 1730. It should be mentioned that in the second part of the eighteenth century all four societies's populations began to increase. This was a result of geographical distance, the incorporation of other groups, and coping mechanisms (e.g. the Creek use of quarantines in the eighteenth century) (Silver 1990).

The Imperialistic Consequence of Disease

Ultimately what we are discussing here is one of the dimensions of genocide. Churchill says genocide,

> express[es] the reality of policies which lead not simply to the physical liquidation of groups of individuals targeted as belonging to an identified 'ethnic, racial, religious, or national' entity, but to bring about the destruction of the entity itself, as such, through any means (1992:229)

The single most catastrophic element of the invasion of the Americas was monumental death through disease. When disease is analyzed together with the interrelated facts of increased warfare, famine, settlement dislocation (Martin 1978), and the loss of traditional skills and subsistence systems (Calloway 1987), one sees genocide. In my view genocide is often an inherent aspect of imperialism and, as Churchill (1992) says, a conscious policy of annihilation. Both these aspects of genocide were present in Native

America.[2] Disease as an element of this genocide is crucial in understanding not only incorporation, but resistance to it.

Loewen (1992) and Green (1993) both make a strong connection between disease, colonization, and resistance. According to Loewen, if there had not been disease, Europeans would have been able to technologically dominate Native Americans, but would not have been able to settle the Americas; "for that the plague was required" (1992:16).[3] This is in contrast to many other peripheral regions which Europeans also dominated, but could never settle because there were too many people. A fundamental reason Europeans successfully colonized and settled North America was because demographic collapse "paved the way" (Crosby 1992:19). Disease did not even allow large, powerful, state societies, such as the Aztecs and Incas, to carry out substantial

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[2] The genocidal aspects of imperialism are obvious from the discussion so far. Genocide as a conscious policy is not as well documented, or at least characterized as such. Examples include the extermination of almost all Native Americans in Texas, Wounded Knee in South Dakota where 700 people were murdered, Sand Creek where 150 people were murdered, the cultural and physical destruction inherent in the U.S. policy of removal (Thornton 1987), and the bounties offered by states like Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, New Jersey, and New York for Native American scalps (Muntz 1927).

[3] As far as European technology is concerned, McNeill makes an interesting point. He claims that "diverse historical and epidemiological circumstances combined to make it impossible for other peoples of the earth to come close to matching European military organization and power by the time the industrial revolution began to transform weapons technology" (1989:17).

resistance to imperialism (McNeill 1989).

Green looks at the broader link between disease and the rise of European hegemony in the world-system. Like Loewen, Green claims that even without disease Europe would have eventually dominated the Americas. However, if the population of the Americas had been healthy, the process of incorporation would have taken much longer and been much more difficult (Salisbury 1982; Green 1993). As Green says, "Europe's 'windfall' in America would have been much more painfully earned, much more costly in manpower and money, and much slower to materialize" (1993:183). The ultimate point is that without disease "The timing and the contours of western capitalism would have been different" (Green 1993:183).

Nondeath Consequences of Disease

Disease not only facilitated incorporation through death, but also through the social and cultural consequences of death. According to Calloway, disease "tore holes" in the Native American "social fabric" (1987:28). For instance, as indigenous populations were obliterated, traditional structures of authority disappeared (Green 1993), food production was interrupted, settlement patterns were disrupted, and voids were left in "corporate memories" (Axtell 1981:83). Just as significant, however, were the cosmological and psychological effects of epidemic death.

According to Dobyns, disease ultimately resulted in a "loss of core confidence" that left native societies more "vulnerable" to European cultural domination than they otherwise might have been. This psychological effect of disease also played a role in reducing the "energy" put into maintaining indigenous economies (1983:10). Disease also fractured religious belief systems and "cosmological assumptions" (Axtell 1981:251). Over and over again, people saw their fellow citizens die "agonizing deaths," while the Europeans remained untouched (Green 1993:182). This, along with the ineffectiveness of native healers (Kupperman 1980), meant "spiritual and psychological upheaval" (Calloway 1987:28). It was as if the gods had decided to join with the intruders (Kupperman 1980). For example, during the Cherokee epidemic of 1738, Hagan (1993) claims that Cherokee healers attributed the epidemic to the sexual regressions of their youth, while others blamed the movement away from tradition. In any event, Cherokee theological remedies did not work and, as a result, sacred artifacts were discarded, and many people even committed suicide (Williams 1930).

The Meaning of Disease

Disease "prepared the way" for European imperialism through the physical and social death of native societies, a key part of which was the destruction of "morale" and the dissolving of "spiritual" structures (Martin 1978:53). In

terms of resistance to incorporation, the huge, rapid reduction of the Native American population often made armed rebellion "unfeasible" (Jennings 1993:170).

Finally, it is important to return to the issue raised at the beginning of the discussion on disease and genocide. As Snipp argues, the social and cultural responses to the depopulation caused by disease (economic despecialization and less complex social organization) left images of Native Americans that continue to have an impact on the national consciousness. One of these images is that of a continent loosely settled by "Stone Age primitives" (1989:19). Unavoidably connected to this image is the idea that Native Americans were overwhelmed by imperialism because they were few in number and inferior in their culture and social organization. Certainly one cannot ignore European technology and military power. But we cannot ignore the true significance of disease either. The initial "success" of European imperialism was largely due to the death and resettlement caused by their diseases. Disease "arrested the military power" of native societies, and "opened the land for European settlement" (Snipp 1989:21).

Shifting Imperial Hegemony

Another important factor to consider in examining Native American resistance in the southeast was the shifting hegemony of the European powers. From the late 1600s until

1763 Britain, France, and Spain engaged in intense competition for control of the southeast (Nash 1982). During this time Native American societies were hooked into the world-economy. Politically this situation was not entirely disadvantageous to native societies, as they were able to play one European power off against the other. This changed with Britain's victory in the Seven Years War.

The Seven Years War, 1754-1763

Jennings (1988) says that the Seven Years War is often called, by some, the First World War. Britain and France fought in Europe, Asia, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and North America. At this time, one of the regions that was of extreme importance to both powers was the "mountainous region between French Louisiana and English Georgia and South Carolina" (Jennings 1988:8). According to Usner (1992) the agreements that ended the war had more of an impact on the people in the region than the actual conflict.

In 1763, at the end of the war, France and Spain ceased "active competition" with Britain for domination of the eastern portion of the continent (Jones 1982:3). Not only did Britain acquire all land east of the Mississippi River (Fairbanks 1974; Silver 1990), but France's influence was "curtailed and broken" across North America (Jones 1982:36; Cornell 1988). In addition, Spain ceded Florida to Britain

(Williams 1979; Silver 1990). In 1762 France had given Louisiana to Spain in order to convince Spain to go along with the Treaty of Paris that ended the war (Gibson 1971; Usner 1992).

The Tightening of Imperial Control

With the British victory, the Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw "lost their bargaining position which had been an effective means of gaining political and economic concessions" during the European struggle for hegemony (Champagne 1992:68). The ultimate result of Britain's rise to domination in the southeast was a severe lessening of native "political autonomy" through the codification of colonial administration, regulation, and the push for settler expansion (Champagne 1992:68).

According to Gibson, after the war, the southeastern nations were "subjected to a noticeable administrative tightening" (1971:58). A series of meetings were held with the native societies, and the British created a "second level of government," which ultimately was a factor in tearing apart the first (tribal) level of government (Gibson 1971:59). The fundamental component of this new system of governance was the creation of two administrative regions north and south of the Ohio River. Each region had a superintendent with the power to regulate trade, and administer judicial functions (Gibson 1971). The essential

point is that with the lack of imperial competition, the "source" of Native American power within the incorporative process was gone. There was no longer a shifting balance of power. In addition to a political monopoly, Britain also gained a more or less complete monopoly of the trade (Cornell 1988). As such, British imperialists were able to demand that Native American producers "pay their own way in the fur trade," and the southeastern nations were collectively held accountable for property and harm done to British traders (Champagne 1992:69).

The Creation of the U.S. and the Spanish Obstacle

The other major, overt battle for hegemony in the region was between Britain and Britain's colonists. With the outbreak of this conflict the region was once again characterized by "competitive geopolitical conditions." Britain and the U.S. signed a treaty in 1783. However, the new American state still had to deal with "strategic" opposition from Spain (Champagne 1992:74).

Spain had been a presence in the region since the 1500s. In 1565 the Spanish established a military installation at Ft. Augustine in an effort to protect traffic between Spain and its colonies in South and Central America, and the Antilles. During the seventeenth century a series of missions, going as far as southern Georgia were set up (Doster 1974). After the Seven Years War Spain lost

Florida, and gained Louisiana. During the Anglo/American conflict Spain was able to turn back attacks against Louisiana, retake West Florida in 1779-81 (Usner 1992), and after the war regained all of Florida (Debo 1941; Wright 1971; Champagne 1992).[4]

The American state, in the 1780s, had few resources and little strength, and Spain set in motion a policy to reduce the new republic's economic activity and settler expansion (Holmes 1975; Champagne 1992). A key component of Spain's policy was to be a broad alliance with the southeastern nations. In an effort to achieve this alliance, or barrier to American expansion, Spain provided the southeastern societies with weapons and trade goods (Champagne 1992). In order to keep the southeastern societies supplied with goods, Spain utilized foreign companies, particularly Panton, Leslie, and Company. By the close of the 1700s the firm had an almost complete monopoly over the Native American trade (Holmes 1975). Spain envisioned a defensive type of confederation and pledged to assist the southeastern nations in stopping American intrusion on native land. And

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[4] It is worth mentioning that at the time the Lower Mississippi Valley was divided into British West Florida and Spanish Louisiana, the deerskin trade "expanded in volume" and its "commercialization accelerated," as West Florida merchants exported a growing number of deerskins from Pensacola and mobile to Britain. After Britain left West Florida, the four societies negotiated trade tariffs with Spain. Nevertheless, the British firm Panton, Leslie and Company, under authority from Spain, ultimately dominated the trade (Usner 1992: 268).

indeed, Spain managed to enter into alliances with all the societies under consideration, except the Cherokee (Holmes 1975).

By the late 1780s, the increased centralization of power in the U.S. federal government allowed the republic "to carry out more unified strategic, trade, and military policies with the Indian nations," as well as to compete more strongly with Spain (Champagne 1992:74). Nevertheless, although the southeastern nations were in a state of continual conflict and war between 1783-95 (Champagne 1992), they were still able to "keep enough pressure" on the new state to maintain a relatively "favorable bargaining position" up to the 1790s (Jones 1982:4). By 1795 both Spain and Britain began to cut back their supplies to the southeastern nations (Champagne 1992) largely because of renewed warfare in Europe (Jones 1982).

Without assistance from Europe, the southeastern societies were much "more vulnerable" to the relentless American push for settler expansion (Jones 1982:4). According to Champagne, the southeastern societies required European allies "to carry on active" resistance to the new republic (1992:75). As we have seen in the examination of the second phase of incorporation, the U.S. was ultimately able to take native land through the creation of debt, and eventually by forcibly removing the obstacles to their prize (Williams 1979).

CHAPTER VII

REBELLION WITHIN GENOCIDE

Resistance and Rebellion

Although the southeastern Native Americans used a variety of resistance strategies, the most visible strategy, looking back in time, was rebellion. The purpose of this, and following sections, is to examine southeastern rebellion, as well as other strategies. Ultimately I will attempt to place southeastern Native American resistance within a theoretical analysis. Such an analysis is necessary in order to avoid explanations that have no connection to real social and economic processes.

Rebellion is but one form of resistance. Resistance is the effort to curb the consequences of so-called "legitimate power." Resistance is not a spontaneous reaction. It is a "conscious decision" to reject claims of authority (Bell 1973:2,4). Rebellion is "an attack" against legitimate power by those oppressed by it (Boggs and Boggs 1974:16) and is the best way to characterize the open attack against organized power by non-state societies. According to Boggs and Boggs the goal of people involved in a rebellion is not state power. Rather, rebellion is an important step on the road to revolution, or the organized effort to take power. Rebellion is an "assertion of humanity" by oppressed people

and an attack on the relations that constitute an oppressive system. Rebellion calls "into question the legitimacy and supposed permanence of existing institutions" (Boggs and Boggs 1974:16). More broadly, for our purposes, rebellions may arise in opposition to enforced construction of new institutions.

Rebellion, and other forms of open resistance, do not emerge out of nowhere or exist in a vacuum. Although these types of resistance tend to get more attention from historians and social scientists, most daily resistance, as Larson (1983) and Scott (1985; 1990) point out, is hidden or covert, and is therefore easily overlooked or misinterpreted. Also, as Nissman points out, one takes a risk when examining mobilized, or open, resistance without also considering everyday forms of resistance. This is a risk because it blinds one to the fact that there is often resistance within non-mobilization, because it causes researchers to see "too sharp [a] disjuncture between mobilization and non-mobilization," and because it leads to an overemphasis on external factors when studying open resistance (1992:3). Ultimately, then, a sole focus on mobilized resistance and the exclusion of everyday forms of existence leads to inaccuracies in the analysis of non-mobilized people, and therefore in the explanations given for resistance. By equating mobilization with resistance, mobilization scholars are too easily led to view people as

acquiescent victims (Nissman 1992).

Nissman (1992) therefore advocates merging what she calls mobilization and non-mobilization approaches to resistance. For Nissman, resistance is inherently part of being a human. As such, even the most seemingly subordinated people more than likely resist in some way. Any negation of oppression is resistance "no matter how subtle or ineffective" (1992:20). Beyond the fact that mobilization scholars too easily overlook this fact, it is important to combine open and everyday approaches to resistance because it is very probable that scholars have attributed mobilization efforts to exogenous variables, when instead the mobilization may have been largely sparked by everyday forms of resistance (Nissman 1992).

In this, and the following chapter, I want to examine both types of resistance within the context of the Native southeast's incorporation into the modern world-system. As part of this I want to examine the connection between open and hidden resistance. In this regard it is important to keep in mind that the emergence of open resistance from everyday types of resistance does not proceed in a linear fashion (Nissman 1992). It is perhaps best to examine the dialectics of covert and open resistance.

Although it is extremely difficult to discover concrete examples of everyday resistance in the southeast for this time period, traces can be seen. This is particularly true

when examining cases of open resistance and rebellion. Before turning to examples of inherent resistance to incorporation, it will be worthwhile to understand what exactly is meant by everyday forms of resistance.

If my task is to understand incorporation and resistance, it is not enough to only examine violent, collective action (Larson 1983). Besides the difficulty in detection, one reason why not a lot of attention has been paid to everyday forms of resistance is because they are seen as trivial (Colburn 1989). However, these "informal, undeclared, disguised" types of resistance make up a huge arena of political activity (Scott 1989:4). Often the only main difference between hidden and open resistance is tactical. There are many situations of domination-subordination in which it is simply smart for the oppressed to resist undetected. The risk of reprisal or annihilation is greatly reduced (Scott 1989). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the connection between hidden and open forms of resistance (Nissman 1992). When open, violent resistance erupts, much of what Scott (1990) calls the hidden transcript of the oppressed, which includes sentiments and practices, is revealed. Examples of forms of resistance which have this potential include things like "foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder" (Scott 1989:5).

Nissman does the best job of showing the parallels and connections between open and hidden resistance. She identifies six parallels; liberation paradigms, safehavens, internal enforcement, production of distinct cultural practices, alternative value structures, and communication. Her main point is that there is a certain amount of "carry-over" from the forms of everyday resistance to open resistance. If the two approaches can be integrated, or in my view, if the artificial boundary between them can be removed, it is highly likely that we will discover that much rebellion has its origin in the culture and resistance of seemingly passive people, rather than just outside factors (Nissman 1992).

For this project I examine, separately, resistance to the two phases of incorporation. It must be noted that during the first phase of incorporation by far the most dominant type of resistance was open rebellion. The second phase of incorporation is characterized by a wider variety of types of resistance. Whether these types can be characterized as hidden or covert is less important than the fact that resistance in the southeast took a variety of forms. Resistance to the second phase of incorporation will be examined in the next chapter.

The backdrop to my analysis of resistance is incorporation and its two phases. Within both phases there was open rebellion. However, there are differences between

the two phases due to changed political and economic relations. Although I think the distinction between so-called everyday forms of resistance and open resistance is somewhat overdrawn in an analytical sense, I find it useful. As such I will to examine both types of resistance in the two phases of incorporation.

An important component of resistance in the region during this time period was religion. In a number of cases religious beliefs served as the grounding and spark for resistance. Of particular analytical usefulness in this regard is Martin's (1991) work on the 1913-14 Creek rebellion, and Adas's (1979) analysis of millenarian protest movements.

An additional factor to keep in mind is the shifting hegemony of European imperialists. Two instances are of particular significance; the Seven Years War and the Anglo-American conflict beginning in 1775. After the Seven Years War Great Britain was the hegemonic power in the southeast. No longer could indigenous societies play one European power against the other. After the British were defeated in the Anglo-American conflict, native societies had to negotiate their existence within an emerging nationalistic society; a society with an unquenchable desire for native land, and therefore intent on obliterating or removing native peoples.

By the 1790s the colonists of the newly created American state no longer needed to try and win Native

American allies in their struggle against other imperial powers. Land was now the major objective (Nabokov 1992b). And indeed, a major explanatory factor for Native American resistance is white intrusion on tribal land (Nabokov 1992a). The leaders of the new state saw four choices with regard to the indigenous nations; kill them all, place them in protected enclaves, force assimilation, or remove them. As we have seen, removal more or less was the ultimate option chosen (Nabokov 1992b).

Other work that I have found useful is some of the work on slave rebellions in colonial North America, for example Wood (1974) and Genovese (1979). Both authors point out that the Europeans in South Carolina lived in fear of slave-Native American collaborative resistance. Genovese also examines the importance of religion, and the role of the "privileged strata of the oppressed" in slave rebellions (1979:28). Both these factors are critical in the examination of indigenous resistance to incorporation.

Resistance and Rebellion: Phase I, 1670-1790s

The Yamasee Rebellion

It was not long after the intrusion of the western civilizational project into the southeast, embodied in the modern world-system, that anti-western rebellion to occurred. The most notable early revolt against

incorporation was the Yamasee rebellion in 1715-16. While certainly not the first instance of southeast Native American resistance to the world-economy, it almost destroyed the core of the world-economy in the southeast, Charleston.

Covington (1975) identifies a common view in regard to Native American resistance in general. Using the Creek as an example, he points out that most Native American societies were not characterized by a central authority. As a result there was not much unified resistance against European imperialists. He views this as a central weakness. There is much truth to the assertion. However, the Yamasee rebellion is notable not only because of its impact, but also precisely because of the number of different societies involved. Historians accept as a given that European powers would be in conflict. They are people governed by rational, goal-directed systems. But the fact that different Native American societies were in conflict, and had different goals and interests, is condemned as a weakness. Clearly, different standards of humanity are being applied.

According to Axtell (1981), by the time of the Yamasee rebellion in 1715, the Yamasee had been enthusiastic commercial and military partners with Charleston for almost three decades. Not only did the Yamasee participate in the incorporative deerskin trade, but they made profitable slave raids into what are now Florida, Georgia, and Alabama.

However, at the same time that they were being hooked into the world-economy, the new economy was destroying the conditions for their participation, and ultimately their existence as a society. As has been discussed, this was the general pattern in the southeast; the extraction of surplus through the deerskin trade, and then the incorporation of land through the extermination, or removal, of native inhabitants. While the Yamasee were supplying the imperialists with skins and slaves, the imperial population was expanding, intruding on native land, and beginning to raise stock and cultivate rice. This cut into the deer population (Axtell 1981; Nash 1982; Braund 1993), and therefore reduced Yamasee relevance to the world-economy.

The fundamental causes of the Yamasee rebellion were the more specific mechanics of incorporation, particularly the creation of debt, and the abusive behavior of European traders (Crane 1959; Nash 1982; Braund 1993). By 1711 the Yamasee owed European traders over 100,000 deerskins (Phillips 1961; Axtell 1981; Nash 1982). To force payment of these debts, Carolina traders took barbaric measures. For example, they began abducting women and children, to sell as slaves, in lieu of deerskins (Nash 1982). In addition to the abduction of human beings, white traders committed extortion, beatings, and murder (McDowell 1955). These everyday actions by the agents of incorporation were the spark for the Yamasee rebellion.

Although there is not total agreement as to some of the specifics of the rebellion, Certain elements are clear. First, the rebellion did not occur in a vacuum. It was not simply a spontaneous reaction to barbarism. Second, it was a coordinated rebellion, including approximately fifteen Native American societies (Nash 1982). Third, although it did not rid the region of the world-economy, it came very close, and altered the trajectory of incorporation.

The Yamasee rebellion of 1715-16 is one example, during the first phase of incorporation, of indigenous societies resisting "becoming colonized people" (Nash 1982:115). And indeed, in the eighteenth century southeast, the Yamasee uprising was the broadest "most successful anti-European resistance movement" (Nash 1982:134). The rebellion was broad and successful partly because it was a coalition made up of remnants of coastal societies, as well as elements of the strong interior societies (Nash 1982). The different groups involved included the Choctaw, Cherokee, Yuchis, Apalachees, Shawnees, Catawbas, Saraws, Waccamaws, Santees, and Cape Fears (Nash 1982; Jennings 1993).

According to Bolton and Marshall (1922) the Yamasee created an alliance with the Creek and Cherokee with the express purpose of destroying European South Carolina. The Yamasee began the rebellion by attacking traders and settlements in April 1715 (Jennings 1993). Nash (1982) agrees that the Yamasee were at the forefront of planning

the rebellion. However, others claim that the Creek approached the Yamasee with the idea of engaging in an anti-colonial uprising (Jennings 1993). Crane says the Lower Creek "directed the plot" (1959:169). In order to deal with Carolina's trading abuses, the Creek sought to eliminate Carolina and "fill the commercial vacuum" with Britain's enemies, the Spanish and French. They were the ones, therefore, that began the uprising, and wanted the Yamasee to finish it (Cotterill 1954).

Ultimately it does not matter who started the rebellion. The essential point is that it came extremely close to eliminating the British bulwark of the world-economy in the region (Nash 1982). To the imperialists in Carolina it seemed as if all the native societies in the region had unified against them. The governor of the colony even thought it was possible the Iroquois would join the rebellion (Crane 1959). The leaders of Carolina not only feared for the existence of their colony. They believed if the rebellion was successful, it would function as an inspiration for native societies throughout North America (Nash 1982). As such, appeals for armed men and supplies were sent out to North Carolina, Virginia, New England (Nash 1982), Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York (Crane 1959), and England (Bolton and Marshall 1922). After a number of military confrontations the Yamasee were forced out of the area and further inland (Bolton and Marshall 1922).

It is interesting to note that the key to the imperialist victory in this case was not some sort of European superiority, but Native American collaborators among the Cherokee. During the rebellion the Creek tried to bring in the Cherokee; precisely what Carolina feared most. The central factor in the outcome of the rebellion was the Cherokee decision to reject Creek diplomacy (Nash 1982). The Creek had also tried to bring in more of the Chickasaw. However, both the Cherokee and Chickasaw had a history of hostile relationships with the Creek (Phillips 1961). This history, along with trade goods (Nash 1982), turned the tide in favor of the British. To complicate matters further, Silver (1990) claims that Carolina was spared annihilation through an alliance between Carolina, the Cherokee, and Upper Creeks.

By most standards the Yamasee rebellion failed. However, when examining the rebellion within the context of European imperialism, and an expanding world-economy, it becomes impossible to characterize the rebellion as a failure. The Yamasee were not swept aside by an overwhelming European system. The rebellion reoriented the process of incorporation and had implications for resistance by other Native American groups in the region.

Probably the most dramatic consequences of the rebellion was the British Crown's decision to make Carolina a royal colony, thereby taking control away from the

proprietors (Crane 1959; Fairbanks 1974; Jennings 1993). A small rebellion on the Carolina coast reverberated through to the core of the modern world-system. The Governor of the colony, in response to the uprising, also decided to restructure the way trade was conducted by creating a public monopoly. Because of opposition from mercantile capitalists, the monopoly only lasted for three years (Crane 1959). Prior to the rebellion, Carolina had tried to prevent European trading abuses by creating a commission for Native American trade. Even though much of the commissioners' time was spent dealing with trading abuses (Logan 1859), the rebellion proved the commission to be a miserable failure (McDowell 1955).

The rebellion also had significant consequences in terms of the geographical expansion of the world-economy. According to Crane, the rebellion slowed down the colony's initial western expansion and "initiated" a more intense imperial struggle for hegemony in the region (1959:324). The rebellion also reminded British imperialists that further expansion would not take place in a human vacuum. After the rebellion not only did "defense" and "Indian management" become the highest items of importance in Carolina's budget (Crane 1959:192), but the colony realized that the "friendship" of the powerful interior societies, such as the Creek and Cherokee, was "essential" to their project. As we have seen, much energy was expended in

securing this "friendship" (Randolph 1973).

In sum, the rebellion was one face of the dialectical pattern of incorporation, i.e, accommodation/resistance to the extraction of surplus from human labor, eventually rendering people irrelevant, and incorporating their resources. Native American societies served as "barriers" (Bolton and Marshall 1922:310) to the incorporation of other lands and societies that were further removed geographically from the centers of the world-economy. The logic of the world-economy is never ending accumulation through expansion in space. As such these human barriers either had to be obliterated or removed. Again, this is not to say that resistance did not occur, and that when it did occur, it was futile. But there is a limit to how effectively people can resist microorganisms and bullets.

The Yamasee, and other early rebellions, not only forced the agents of incorporation to alter strategy, but also had significant implications for further Native American resistance to incorporation. Nash makes the important point that the "prolonged resistance" by coastal societies gave societies further inland time to create ways to deal with the expanding capitalist system. This, along with the absorption of coastal remnants into larger societies, were key factors in the strong resistance by groups such as the Creek (1982:139). The significance of coastal resistance is seen in the fact that for 150 years

European colonialism was confined to the "coastal plain" (Nash 1982:139).

Finally, the rebellion played a role in determining other forms of resistance to, or strategies in dealing with, incorporation. For example, as has been mentioned, after the rebellion the Creek learned what overdependence on the British meant (Corkran 1967), and therefore created a "policy of limited cooperation." They sent political representatives to the Spanish in Florida and Mexico, held conferences with the Seneca a thousand miles to the north, and continued a dialogue with the British. Eventually the Creek set in place a political structure in which some of their towns remained in the British sphere of influence, while others were with the Spanish (Nash 1982:232). My impression is that this Creek strategy was both a historic development and a conscious policy. Waselkov says that "counterpoised" "economic and political factions arose" after the Yamasee rebellion, but also states that the Creek leadership sanctioned "the coexistence of competing factions throughout the colonial era," and thus were able to circumvent the "divisiveness" that usually stems from such factionalism (1993:126,129). The ultimate effect of such strategic resistance was Creek neutrality in their relations with Europeans (Waselkov 1993) at a time when the Europeans were dependent on Native American allies.

Turning Back Genocide: The Chickasaw and the French

A common, if undertheorized, factor of incorporation in the southeast was the existence of multiple incorporators. Neither the British, French, nor Spanish could dominate societies they viewed as inferior. Such was the case even when the French pursued a conscious, rational policy of genocide against the Chickasaw. According to Fairbanks (1974) the political situation in the southeast was coming close to a crisis. Part of the reason was the French decision to wage constant war against the Chickasaw beginning in 1730. And indeed, French politics at this time was "dominated" by the effort to "exterminate" the Chickasaw (Corkran 1967:105).

The principal reason why the French decided to try and completely eliminate the Chickasaw were the Natchez/Chickasaw "guerilla" attacks on French economic activity (Usner 1992:82). Beginning in 1720 the Chickasaw, with the support of the British, regularly attacked convoys that travelled between French colonies in the Illinois region and Louisiana (Gibson 1971; Peyser 1992). French convoys were attacked on the Mississippi, Mobile, and Tombigbee Rivers (Bolton and Marshall 1922). It was to Britain's advantage that France's northern and southern colonies be economically separated. And indeed, Chickasaw attacks stopped French river traffic for about four years, and by 1723 "commerce in Louisiana was at a standstill"

(Gibson 1971:42).

French territory in the Illinois region constituted a crucial link between Canada and Louisiana. Louisiana initially came about "as an extension of Canada, rather than an implantation on the seaboard" (Meinig 1986:193). The British viewed the Chickasaw as a key to hegemony in the region. The Chickasaw resided in a central location along the Mississippi, and therefore could control all waterways between Canada and New Orleans (Gibson 1971).

Thus the incorporators dilemma. Not only did they run into indigenous resistance, but they also had to outmaneuver other imperialists. Incorporation in this historical case was not a smooth process; it consisted of cycles of military and economic advantage and disadvantage. Native Americans were initially crucial allies and sources of surplus, but then became obstacles to the further extraction of surplus.

Adding fuel to the "animosity" between the Chickasaw and French was the French effort (with the Choctaw) to annihilate the Natchez in 1729 (Peyser 1992:156). According to Bolton and Marshall (1922) the Natchez had spearheaded an ultimately unsuccessful pan-tribal plan to drive the French off their land. The surviving Natchez sought refuge with the Chickasaw. The French, through Native American allies, attacked the Chickasaw, who in turn "countered with forays" in the Illinois region. The attacks on French shipping, which had ceased in 1725, also began again (Gibson

1971:47,48).

The directive to exterminate the Chickasaw/Natchez alliance came from the core of the world-system; from the Minister of Marine Maurepas (Usner 1992). The French began "full-scale military campaigns" in 1736 and 1738 (Usner 1992:82). The campaign of 1736 resulted in "disaster" for the French (Bolton and Marshall 1922:281). The Chickasaw caused a French retreat (Peyser 1992). The Chickasaw victory was not a minor setback for the continual spread of European capitalism. France's "overwhelming defeat threatened the security of all of Louisiana" (Peyser 1992:160). As Harris says, the French intended to exterminate the Chickasaw "and make an example of them to surrounding tribes." Quite the reverse happened (1959:84).

It took three years for the French to build enough strength to begin another campaign. It was necessary to attempt another campaign of genocide, not only because the Chickasaw were interrupting economic activity, but also to restore imperial prestige. According to Harris, even the French Crown, and ministers, "saw the seriousness of the situation, and knew the Chickasaw must be conquered or destroyed, regardless of the cost" (1959:85). With reinforcements from Canada (Peyser 1992), and infantry, artillery, and supplies from France (Harris 1959), the French could not even "engage" the Chickasaw because of difficult terrain. After a failed siege of Chickasaw towns,

the two nations signed a treaty in 1740 (Peyser 1992). According to Usner (1992) seven Chickasaw headmen agreed to stop the raids on French convoys and to give up the Natchez among them. On the surface it appears as if the French were successful. However, they were not successful, but fortunate. Louisiana did not have the economic-military power to carry on a prolonged conflict with the Chickasaw. In any case, it was not long before Chickasaw attacks on French economic activity began again. A final, unsuccessful, effort to eliminate the Chickasaw was attempted in 1752 (Gibson 1971).

The Cherokee: Resistance and Schism

Some of the strongest Cherokee resistance seemed to occur during the Anglo-Anglo/American conflict for hegemony in North America during the 1770s. Indeed, during the first decades of the century the Cherokee were not perceived as especially warlike; "some even considered them cowards" (Thornton 1990:34). It is probably not a coincidence that during the Anglo-Anglo/American conflict, in 1776, a contingent of Native Americans from the north (including members of the Iroquois, Mohawk, Shawnee, Delaware, Ottawa, and Nantucas) came into the southeast and tried to organize a unified war against colonialism (Cotterill 1954). The delegation was trying to organize Native Americans stretching from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. The goal of

this movement was to "exterminate" all "colonizers" (Woodward 1963:92).

Partly in response to this mobilization effort, and white intrusion on Cherokee land (O'Donnell 1975), some of the Lower Cherokee began to attack European settlements in South Carolina (Woodward 1963) and eventually in Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia (Cotterill 1954; O'Donnell 1975). The imperial response was severe. The four emerging states, between them, obliterated many of the Lower, Middle, and Overhill Cherokee towns (O'Donnell 1975). With no real need for Native American allies to use against other colonialist powers, combined with an unquenchable thirst for land, the emerging American state was ruthless. More than fifty towns were torched, fields and crops were destroyed, livestock were killed, and property was stolen. Hundreds of Cherokee were killed or starved to death. Prisoners were taken, with some being sold as slaves (Thornton 1990).

One figure stands out in particular with regard to Cherokee resistance. Dragging Canoe not only engaged in a decades long struggle against imperialism, but served as a symbol of the larger split within the Cherokee nation. Two events seem to have made an especially strong impact on Dragging Canoe and help explain his virulent resistance to domination. First, he was "violently opposed" to the Cherokee land cession, land between what is now Kentucky and middle Tennessee, to the Transylvania Land Company in 1775

(Woodward 1963:89). Second, the mobilization effort by the northern nations inspired a dream in Dragging Canoe that could not die (Wright 1992). After the white settlers destroyed many of the Cherokee towns, Dragging Canoe and others withdrew from the Cherokee nation, causing a "tribal schism" (Gearing 1956:115). As the Chickamaugas, who have been characterized as revolutionary "nationalists" (Hatley 1993:226) they continued to resist settler encroachment throughout the 1780s and early 1790s (Woodward 1963; King 1979).

Wright (1992) gives some perspective to the seemingly unsuccessful Cherokee, and southeastern, resistance. From 1775, the Cherokee resisted the expansion of settler capitalism for two decades. When one considers that in the late 1700s the new white republic contained about three million people, and the Native American societies in the region had less than 125,000 members, such resistance cannot be dismissed. As Wright says, the Chickamauga, and others, "held off an incomparably larger, richer, and more ruthless people for a generation" (1992:206).

The Choctaw: French Mercenaries?

One of the most striking things about the Choctaw during the colonial period was their relatively solid alliance with the French. The Choctaw were consistent enemies of both the British and Chickasaw (Bolton and

Marshall 1922). Williams says that the European imperialists in North America "pioneered" the idea of using indigenous peoples to fight their wars for them (1979:12). The French certainly mastered the technique.

As mentioned, the more the French position was threatened by the Chickasaw, the more they relied on Choctaw mercenaries. To maintain their Choctaw allies, the French relied on political strategy and the distribution of gifts (Usner 1992). The French directly meddled in Choctaw politics. Their main concern was to keep the British from doing the same (White 1983). French strategy contained a number of elements. Besides putting constant pressure on the Choctaw to wage war on the Chickasaw (White 1983; Galloway 1985), the French tried to concentrate power by "identify[ing] and support[ing] a central chief" (Usner 1992:87), and using him as the annual gift distributor (White 1983).

Sheddan says it is "puzzling," especially considering French prices for deerskins and the poor quality of their goods, that the Choctaw remained their steady allies (1931:43). The Choctaw political choice is somewhat of a puzzle. However, their behavior becomes less enigmatic when one carefully examines various resistance strategies. The simple fact is that the Choctaw "refused" to be French "Subordinates" (White 1983:49). The French would not have expended so much energy in Choctaw politics if the loss of

Choctaw support was not a constant possibility (Noley 1985b). Although the Choctaw did not engage in a broad-based revolt against the French, they engaged in strong, diversified resistance within a cauldron of violence and death. What follows are some examples.

The constant for the Choctaw in the 1700s was war. This condition, plus superior British trade goods, contributed to a "Choctaw peace faction" in the 1730s (Usner 1992:87). In the late 1730s and early 1740s (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Usner 1992) the Choctaw initiated, in the face of intense imperial pressure, peace negotiations with the Chickasaw. By the mid-1740s peace was close, but the peace efforts were not successful, and ultimately the Choctaw endured a civil war, between French and British factions, in 1748 (McKee and Schlenker 1980).

This is not the only example of Choctaw resistance to unending, ruthless French pressure. According to Usner (1992) the Choctaw often strongly expressed their dissatisfaction with both the quality and amount of French trade goods, as well as the French unwillingness to fight the Chickasaw themselves. In addition, one must not forget that the French were dependent on the Choctaw to further their imperial objectives. As a result, the Choctaw were very skillful in forcing concessions from the French. For example, in the 1730s, the Choctaw forced the governor of Louisiana to place a fort on the Tombigbee River and to

increase the exchange rate for deerskins (Usner 1992). The French fear of British trading influence was a point of power skillfully used by the Choctaw.

The most intriguing form of Choctaw resistance was directly related to the initial mechanism of incorporation; the deerskin trade. According to White, the Choctaw constituted a "relatively inelastic" market for European goods. In fact, they were "quite indifferent" to a significant number of European trade goods and would refuse goods that did not have any use-value for them. As such, the Choctaw only wanted a small range of "quite specific durable goods" (1983:57). The limited Choctaw demand is reflected in the number of deer they killed in the first decades of the 1700s. During this time, for example, Creek labor was producing approximately 100,000 deerskins annually, while the Choctaw produced about 15,000. This was not because the Choctaw were poor hunters, but because they wanted a smaller amount of European trade goods (White 1983).

From the Europeans point of view, "the Choctaw did not want enough," and their "devotion to commerce was weak" (White 1983:58). Considering the seductive force and power of the fur trade, this resistance is among the most impressive discussed so far. A clue to the Choctaw ability to resist the early trade may be found in their indigenous social-economic structure.

The Choctaw form of agriculture and hunting was enough to sustain them (White 1983). As discussed in Chapter II, prior to their increased articulation with the world-economy, the Choctaw were among the wealthiest societies in the region. They were also mainly farmers who consistently produced a surplus, which was often sold (McKee and Schlenker 1980; Searcy 1985). The Choctaw were viewed as the most proficient farmers in the region and more dependent on agricultural production than other societies (Searcy 1985). As a fundamentally agricultural society, trade was traditionally a supplement, or enhancement, to their economy (McKee and Schlenker 1980). This form of Choctaw resistance, whether called hidden or open, was embedded in the structure of their society.

Other Forms

Although they undoubtedly existed, other (non-rebellion) forms of resistance are difficult to see in the first phase of incorporation. Nevertheless, I will try to provide a number of examples. One form that has already been discussed in passing is the phenomenon of confederation. As various Native American societies on the Atlantic coast were being exterminated in the early 1700s (Middleton 1992) remnants of smaller societies joined with more powerful societies, and as the process continued, the confederations themselves tightened their political

structures (Marriott and Rachlin 1969).

Another interesting form of resistance was undertaken by the Creek in response to disease. One reason why the Creek managed to prevent the kind of population decline experienced by other societies was through the use of quarantines. They learned from European traders that isolating the infected prevented epidemics (Williams 1930).

To get a better idea of not only the diversity of resistance, but also the types of everyday resistance carried out by Native Americans, it is useful to examine Rubertone's (1989) analysis in her archaeology of resistance.

Rubertone's analysis centers on the relationship between the Europeans and Narragansetts in seventeenth century New England. The Narragansetts were the dominant group in the region. One method Europeans used to gain control of the Narragansetts, and change the balance of power, was to demand tribute in the form of wampum. Wampum was indigenous manufactured beads that were used in fur trade mediations and came "to be valued as legal tender" (1989:39).

The imperialist demand for tribute served more than an economic function; it was designed to humiliate and coerce submission. The creation of wampum required intensive labor. Such tribute demands put a strain on Narragansett labor. In addition, tribute demands tore away wampum's

"quality of voluntary offering" (Rubertone 1989:40). Prior to imperial tribute demands, tribute was offered to Narragansett leaders as a way of "acknowledging agreement involving mutual obligations" (Rubertone 1989:40).

Rubertone's interest is in how the Narragansett resisted this tactic of colonialist domination. The Narragansett resisted in a variety of everyday forms. First, they showed an unshakable trust in their religion, and followed their rituals with "unrivaled intensity" (1989:41). Second, the Narragansett would put off meeting tribute payments, utilizing the law and diplomacy. Third, the most intriguing form of resistance was ritual consumption of wampum. Rubertone points out that evidence of this type of resistance was not found in the written record, but the archaeological. In her analysis of a burial site, Rubertone found that wampum was removed from circulation through placement in graves. This constituted two acts of resistance. The ritual consumption of wampum was not only a "conscious act of political resistance" by symbolically sustaining traditional Narragansett authority, but also served as resistance to imperial tribute demands by taking wampum out of economic circulation (1989:42).

The Meaning of the First Phase of Resistance

By "meaning" of resistance I refer to resistance in relation to, and its impact on, the first phase of

incorporation. The meaning of resistance in terms of human dignity should be obvious. There is no greater assertion of humanity and dignity than resisting a system that wants to erase your existence from time and space.

One (probably unanswerable) question of relevance to this project is whether or not Native American resistance contained the possibility of turning back incorporation. That this resistance altered the trajectory of incorporation, there is no doubt. The process itself was dependent on resistance, or more accurately, the absence of resistance. As Edmond Atkin (merchant, member of South Carolina's Governor's Council, and Southern Superintendent for Indian Affairs)[1] said, the "prosperity" of South Carolina "stands or falls with our interest and favour among them" (Jacobs 1954:3). The expansion of the system "required" Native American cooperation. When there was resistance, deerskin exports fell, when there was "general peace" exports rose (Phillips 1961: 418, 419). Still, the question, why was incorporation not turned back?

In disease we have already discussed a major determinant of successful European imperialism. However, sociohistorical reality is not as simple as that. It must be remembered that incorporation was brutal and bloody. By

[1] After the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, Britain tried to codify Native American relations with the creation of Southern and Northern Superintendents for Indian Affairs (Doster 1974).

1783 Native Americans had been through more than a century of wars "generated by Europeans" (Calloway 1987:32). In addition, for the next three decades the people of the southeast existed in a situation of "endemic warfare." The southeastern societies, to survive, had to exist "on a war footing," (Calloway 1987:32) or be erased from the planet. Needless to say, such an existence tore apart these societies' cultural, economic, and political moorings (Calloway 1987).

The incorporation of the southeast involved a number of intertwined processes; exploration, the taking of land, the domination of indigenous peoples, and the creation of European settlement. Through all this the most basic process was the obliteration of Native American societies, and their "replacement by Africans and Europeans" (Karras 1992:7). Becoming integrated into the world-economy, at its most basic level meant "sickness, death ... and the unknown" (Axtell 1981:82). Resistance within this genocide speaks for itself.

There are other factors that must be considered in relation to this question. First, the southeast was a nucleus of imperialist conflict. Survival for Native American societies not only hinged on resistance, but also collaboration. As we have seen, elements of all indigenous societies acted with colonial powers, especially "when they could no longer play them off against each other" (Axtell

1981:83). Just as we must recognize the humanness of Native Americans through their resistance, we must recognize that the politics of incorporation in the southeast meant that different factions would emerge within native societies "as different groups and individuals variously perceived the nature of the problem" (Axtell 1981:83).

Finally, Middleton (1992) examines factors that served as obstacles to the turning back of incorporation. Besides greater European resources, he mentions isolation and linguistic barriers. Native American societies did not encounter the Europeans at the same time. Therefore, for each society the encounter was a "recent phenomenon," the ramifications of which were hard to determine. Also, it must be remembered that there were approximately 200-300 native languages in North America. The implications this had for communication and unified action are obvious.

The southeast was brought into the world-economy largely through the trade in deerskins. However, as Edens points out with regard to trade and the relationship between cores and peripheries, trade is but one component of a "totalizing" core-periphery structure. To understand trade one must also consider and analyze "warfare, diplomacy, cultural hegemony and resistance, and the social contexts of production and consumption" (1992:134). The process in the southeast was all of these.

Certainly all regions have been incorporated into the

modern world-system. However, regions have been incorporated at different rates and under different conditions. Examining one case of incorporation does not allow generalizations to all others. While incorporation is a historical process that can be seen and analyzed, it does not contain social scientific laws. Every "historical instance" of incorporation "requires careful and serious study" (Mintz 1977:259). In the southeast incorporation was characterized by disease and genocide, but also by strong, meaningful resistance.

CHAPTER VIII

RESISTANCE: PHASE II

The various factors involved in southeastern resistance come into full relief during the second phase of incorporation. In particular, it becomes clear that open forms of resistance do not erupt out of nowhere and that collaboration, or the privileged segment of the oppressed (Genovese 1979), is a crucial factor in determining the success/nonsuccess of resistance. The second phase of incorporation was characterized by a wide variety of forms of resistance: religion, adherence to tradition, and collaboration were all key factors in determining types of resistance.

The Creek: Constant Resistance

As in the first phase of incorporation, in the second, the Creek stand out in their resistance to incorporation. Their resistance was characterized by intertwined open and covert forms, as well as continued political/diplomatic resistance based on factionalism. Creek resistance during this period also illustrates the influence of religion and collaboration in determining the nature of resistance.

The Creek Rebellion, 1813-1814

The Creek rebellion of 1813 was many things; a

revitalization movement, a anti-western civilization revolt, and a civil war. The fundamental lesson learned from this rebellion is that the Creek responded to the expansion of the world-economy "with religious vision and creativity" (Martin 1991:ix). At the core the rebellion was a revitalization movement, or, in other words, resistance against the restructuring that flowed from European imperialism (Adas 1979); an attempt to "salvage meaning" from a crumbling social existence (Robinson 1980:72).

According to Adas, revitalization (or millennial, messianic) movements that occur in peripheral regions are not "bizarre episodes," but protests against colonialism, and efforts to construct a new social order. Such revitalization movements take a number of forms, one of which is prophet-inspired (1979:xix). This is the form of the Creek rebellion. Since anti-western revitalization movements are attempts to overthrow an oppressive political-economic system, they are revolutionary (Adas 1979).

In his detailed analysis of the Creek rebellion Martin (1991) explores the political-economic factors leading to the revolt (settler encroachment, debt, stratified market system), but also points out that religion was an essential empowering force. As Adas mentions in his examination of millenarian protest movements, there is a reinforcing link between the "meaning of prophetic expression" and violent rebellion (1979:xxi). And therefore, trying to single out

ultimate causes is often arbitrary and the effort "distorts the multifaceted nature" of social existence (1979:45). The prophet of the Creek rebellion was Tecumseh of the Shawnee.

In 1811 the Creek were experiencing intense settler pressure, debt, and a western civilizational program that was tearing at the soul of their society (Fairbanks 1974; Martin 1991; Braund 1993). Within this maelstrom Tecumseh of the Shawnee visited the four southeastern societies (Halbert and Ball [1895] 1969; Gibson 1971; Carter 1976). Tecumseh's vision was a broad, anti-U.S., confederation of Native American societies, which would be linked by adherence to tradition (Halbert and Ball 1969; Carter 1976). Tecumseh told the southeastern nations that accepting the European's way of life was not only an affront to their ancestors (Starkey 1946) but was resulting in the loss of land and destitution (Halbert and Ball [1895] 1969). The answer was to destroy the ways and symbols of western civilization (Starkey 1946; Carter 1976). In order to do this a pan-tribal movement was to be constructed (Martin 1991). The nations would have to end their wars with each other and join in an alliance that would allow them to preserve their tradition, land, and nationalities (Halbert and Ball [1895] 1969).

In Tecumseh's words,

> The whites are already nearly a match for us all united, and too strong for any one tribe to resist; so that unless we support

> one another with our collective and united forces; unless every tribe unanimously combines to give check to the ambition and avarice of the whites, they will soon conquer us apart and disunited, and we will be driven away from our native country ... Soon their broad roads will pass over the grave of your fathers, and the place of their rest will be blotted out forever. The annihilation of our race is at hand unless we unite in one common cause ... Have we not for years had before our eyes a sample of their designs, and are they not sufficient harbingers of their future determinations? Will we not soon be driven from our respective countries and the graves of our ancestors? Will not the bones of our dead be plowed up, and their graves be turned into fields? (Vanderwerth 1975:54,55).

Of all the southeastern societies, only the Creek, particularly the Upper Creek, took Tecumseh's words to heart (Gatschet [1884] 1969; Starkey 1946; Carter 1976; Martin 1991), and decided to resist their "flagrant oppression" (Halbert and Ball [1895] 1969:59).

In 1813, a faction of Upper Creeks, with some members of the Yuchi and Sawokli (Gatschet 1969) attacked the U.S. post at Fort Mims near Mobile Bay, Alabama (Debo 1941; Martin 1991). In the attack approximately half of the 750 rebels died, and U.S. retaliation was assured (Martin 1991). Militia from Tennessee mobilized from the north, Georgia volunteers from the east, and federal troops from the south (Debo 1941). Through several battles the rebels, or Redsticks as they were known, were put down. During the decisive battle at the rebel town of Tohopeka, 1500 white

troops, 500 Cherokee, and 100 collaborating Creek killed 557 rebels. Within the span of a year, 1800 rebel men and hundreds of women and children had been killed. In addition, 50 villages had been razed, and the survivors were enduring famine (Martin 1991).

The Treaty of Fort Jackson was the formal end to the rebellion. The treaty essentially divested the Creek of their land, and paved the way for removal (Meyer 1971). The terms of the treaty were legal imperialism at its most brutal. The Creek were forced to cede 14 million acres, allow the construction of military and trading posts, restrict trade with other nations, and hand over the rebellion's prophetic leaders (Martin 1991). According to Guice, the cession of land was not merely punitive but "also a product of agrarian cupidity" (1985:174). And certainly, white settlers, partially spurred on by the rise in cotton prices, poured onto the ceded land. By 1820, 85,000 whites were occupying Creek land (Martin 1991).

The Meaning of the Creek Rebellion

Understanding the Creek rebellion is as simple and complex as the fact that where there is imperium, there is resistance. The Creek were becoming peripheralized by an expanding and deepening world-economy. They were growing dependent on western mechanization, were enduring settler encroachment, and were suffering debt, impoverishment

(Braund 1993), and class divisions. People experiencing such imperialism, resist. The immediate cause of the rebellion was Tecumseh and his impact on the Creek prophetic movement. In a material sense, the most significant cause was white settler encroachment on Creek territory (Fairbanks 1974). In his in depth analysis of the rebellion, Martin (1991) explores the religious force propelling the rebellion, as well as the fact that the movement was an organized, conscious resistance to further entrenchment in the expanding European system and its class divisions.

Martin characterizes the rebellion as a prophetic movement. As such, the rebellion cannot be separated from Creek cosmology. A central element in the Creek social and sacred was equilibrium and reciprocity. The consequences of incorporation meant that balance in all facets of Creek life was being torn apart. Over time, therefore, one of the consequences of incorporation for the Creek was, at the same time, a religious crisis, civil war, and anti-westernization rebellion. Martin mentions that the U.S. civilizational program among the Creek partially achieved its purpose. It promoted economic development, but as capitalist development, it created development only for some, and therefore "nurtured a form of class consciousness" among those who were being increasingly underdeveloped (1991:113). By the time Tecumseh, and the other "prophetic shamans" arrived, the Creek were "ready for a new vision and strategy

of resistance" (1991:116).

While the Creek were the only ones to actively respond to their marginalization with a prophetic rebellion, it should not be assumed that their action was simply an emotional, spontaneous, extraordinary reaction to the speeches of Tecumseh. In his study of revitalization movements connected to prophetic leaders in peripheral regions, Adas found that they were organized efforts to preserve native life and remove the ways and ideas of oppressive colonial systems. These movements were "creative" attempts to correct indigenous societies that were being torn apart by outside forces. Prophet propelled rebellions, besides violent conflict, "involved restoration and reformulation of customary ideas and institutions" (1979:xxvii). People confronted with imperialist domination "begin to doubt the viability of customary political systems and modes of organization" (1979:61). Therefore, prophets with millennial visions can play an important role in "allaying doubts and fears." In addition to the prophetic vision, other mechanisms of empowerment include prepatory omens, legitimating symbols, solidarity rituals, and the use of talismans (1979:139).

As Martin points out, the Creek rebellion contained many of these elements. Tecumseh's vision was of a "grand movement of pan-Native American cultural revival and solidarity" (1991:119,120). After Tecumseh's visit, a

number of Creek leaders went north to meet with him. Due to this visit, continued settler encroachment, and a series of earthquakes (prepatory omens), a Creek prophetic movement emerged and began to grow (Martin 1991). Increasingly the division between the conservatives (traditionalists) and the progressives (economic collaborators) reached a boiling point (Hagan 1993). By 1813, the Maker of Breath changed the movement's "shamans into prophets of rebellion," and revealed that the time had come for an anti-western rebellion. The land, the ancestors, and the cosmos itself insisted that the "Europeans and their collaborators" be driven from the Creek nation (1991:127).

Martin emphasizes that the Creek rebellion was a total rebellion. The attack against the imperialists did not erupt out of nowhere. It had its roots in other forms of resistance. To indicate that they had shed the European identity, the prophets encouraged various "acts of negation," or the rejection of ways and symbols that showed their peripheralization (1991:142). For example, the rebels destroyed livestock (Cotterill 1954; Hagan 1993), killed collaborating chiefs, threw away European ornaments, tools, and clothing, cut down the use of guns, and deserted their cornfields (Martin 1991). The rebels also left the towns and set up their own camps. In their camps the rebels engaged in an important solidarity ritual; a dance that came to the Creek with Tecumseh. The dance was "uniquely" anti-

imperialist, and could be used to "distinguish rebel from collaborator" (Martin 1991:146,148).

These elements of the Creek rebellion lead to a number of broad conclusions. First, the rebellion was "processual, dynamic, self-critical, innovative, and fluid," rather than "naive, illusory" or "reactionary" (Martin 1991:148), as such movements are often characterized by imperialists (Adas 1979). Second, as Scott (1985,1989,1990) and Nissman (1992) point out, open resistance does not occur in a vacuum, and often open mobilization has its roots in everyday, more covert, forms of resistance. Third, the rebellion shows how important indigenous collaboration is to the expansion and entrenchment of the capitalist world-system. As Genovese points out, the privileged strata of dominated groups have a clear choice in terms of resistance and are the "least likely to equivocate." They can side with the imperialists and continue to pursue their "individual advancement," or they can join the resistance to domination. In any event, a large number of "leaders and traitors" come from this group (1979:28). Most of the Lower Creek, and some of the Upper Creek, were not part of the rebellion. Martin (1991) says that as far as the Lower Creek were concerned, geography was a factor. The Lower Creek were located near Georgia, and the risk of severe retaliation was great. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter V, there were Creek that were succeeding in the new economy, and had a stake in preserving

it. The rebels had tried to make an alliance with the Choctaw (Halbert and Ball [1895] 1969). Had the rebels secured the Choctaw as allies, the dynamics of the rebellion would surely have been different. Instead, the "Choctaw contended for peace" (Halbert and Ball [1895] 1969:121). And indeed, the same can be said for the Cherokee.

The essential aspect to keep in mind about the rebellion is that it was an specific assault on the economic system that "led to economic dependency," and it brought to the forefront the way certain Creek "had collaborated with colonialism" (Martin 1991:180). The rebellion was not just a reaction to outside forces. Incorporation into the world-economy had created class divisions in Creek society, and therefore the rebellion was also a "self-purge" that "involved unprecedented class conflict" (Martin 1991:181). The rebellion was revolutionary in the sense that its goal was the total transformation of Creek society and its replacement with a system not controlled by imperialists and their collaborators (Adas 1979).

Why the Creek?

Since all the southeastern societies were experiencing the same deprivation and divisions as the Creek, it is interesting that only the Creek engaged in this type of total rebellion. One factor that certainly sheds light on the question, as Champagne emphasizes, is that the Creek,

throughout the incorporation process, clung zealously to their nonsecular, nonwestern social institutions. In other words, the Creek "exhibited a much stronger adherence to cultural and institutional orthodoxy than did the other southeastern nations" (1992:72). An important question, at this point, is why were the Creek able to maintain cultural orthodoxy and therefore engage in strong resistance?

The Creek were able to maintain cultural tradition largely due to their political structure and geographical location. The Creek owned a large amount of land that was fairly remote from European influence. As a result, they were not wiped out by disease or politically dominated like many of the other southeastern nations (Martin 1991). In addition, as discussed previously, the Creek willingness to incorporate other groups served to increase their strength (Martin 1991; Braund 1993). All of these factors meant that the Creek were not only able to survive, but also able to keep their land and cultural and political independence (Martin 1991).

According to Scott (1990), the discussion about, and the practice of, resistance requires social spaces that are out of reach of dominating groups. Such social spaces allow the growth of meaningful strategies of resistance. Through both their geographical location and the creation of their own camps, the Creek rebels had social spaces where they could critically "formulate patterns of resistance" (Scott

1990:119). The decision to create their own camps "dramatically relocated the rebels in space" and allowed a "communal rebirth" that was the essence of the rebellion (Martin 1991:144).

As Martin (1991) points out, there are also reasons why the Creek were more willing to respond to Tecumseh's specific message of rebellion. The Creek and Shawnee had sustained stable diplomatic relations for over a century. Both nations also developed similar tactics in dealing with settler encroachment. Specifically, they thought that the British could be used as allies in driving the U.S. out of native land, and both, separately, had tried to create pan-Native American movements before the Creek rebellion in 1813. In 1807 Tecumseh had tried to join the Shawnees, Ottawas, Kickapoos, Chippewas, and Potawatomis in a confederation based on collective land ownership. In 1805, 1807, and 1810 a series of Creek leaders urged the other southeastern nations to join as allies in a united, anti-U.S. movement. Their efforts were not successful.

Other Forms of Resistance

During the second phase of incorporation there were a variety of forms of resistance to the deepening of capitalism. If nothing else, the existence of these different forms indicate that resistance in the southeast was continuous, dynamic, and creative. Once again, the

Creek stand out in terms of variety in the forms of resistance.

Part of the western civilizational programs among the southeastern nations was the introduction of Christianity and western education. The Creek resisted the European missionaries in a "passive" but "effective manner" (Martin 1991:109). Rather than argue or declare ignorance about Christianity, the Creek would pretend to embrace the new religion. This "feigned receptivity" would cut down on European conversion efforts, and therefore was a common and effective resistance tactic (Martin 1991:110). In addition, the Creek would publicly harass those who accepted Christianity, and therefore "missions ... made little headway" (Champagne 1992:166). Many Creek parents also dissuaded their children from attending the European schools since they viewed western education as fruitless (Champagne 1992; Hagan 1993). According to Champagne, certain Creek towns strongly resisted the U.S. civilization program from the beginning. For example, these towns were "so strongly opposed to the new economic innovations that they threatened to kill anyone who adopted use of the plow" (1992:115).

As mentioned, the Creek appear to be unique in their resistance. Some reasons for this have already been mentioned. However, Champagne (1983) mentions factors that may shed more light on all forms of Creek resistance. Champagne (1983) explores structural factors that lead to

the emergence of state building and revitalization movements by examining the experience of the Iroquois, Delaware, Choctaw, and Cherokee. While the Iroquois and Delaware responded to social deprivation with revitalization movements, the Choctaw and Cherokee responded with "increased differentiation and specialization of sub-macro political and economic institutions" (1983:759). According to Champagne, while the Cherokee and Choctaw were structurally differentiated societies, the Iroquois and Delaware were characterized by nondifferentiated social institutions. As a result, the Cherokee and Choctaw were more apt to absorb social innovations. In other words, they had a higher degree of "institutional adaptiveness" which meant the "avoidance of the revitalization movement response" (1983:759). The Delaware and Iroquois had less adaptive social institutions, and therefore responded to deprivation with revitalization movements.

Champagne's (1983) argument can be used to explain Creek resistance. The Creek, like the Delaware and Iroquois, were characterized by structurally nondifferentiated social institutions. The Creek had "local and particularistic forms of social identity" as well as "a culturally defined political order" (Champagne 1992:87). According to Champagne's (1983) argument, then, it is not surprising that the Creek exhibited less institutional adaptiveness, and were more likely to have a revitalization

movement response to social deprivation.

Creek Diplomatic Resistance

The Creek and Cherokee both engaged in innovative legal and diplomatic resistance during the second phase of incorporation. Both types of resistance indicate perceptive analyses of the changing geo-political situation, as well as the fact that the southeastern nations constantly and creatively resisted their domination.

According to Martin (1991), after the emergence of the U.S. in the 1780s, the Creek once again utilized factionalism to resist imperial domination. One faction, represented by Alexander McGillivray, kept up ties with the British firm Panton, Leslie and Company, which now operated out of Spanish Florida. The other faction, led by Eneah Miko and Hopoithle Miko, attempted to maintain trade with Georgia. In terms of diplomatic, political resistance, Alexander McGillivray of the Creek stands out. McGillivray was a so-called mixed-blood who, over time, increasingly identified himself as Creek and rose to an influential leadership position. Immediately after the creation of the U.S., Spain still occupied Florida. In order to preserve Creek power and independence, McGillivray utilized a common Creek strategy by playing Spain off against the U.S. (Hagan 1993). He also tried to strengthen and unify the Creek confederacy (Green 1980; Champagne 1992; Hagan 1993)

According to Hagan (1993), by the 1780s McGillivray was imagining a pan-Native American confederacy of southeastern nations. If such a confederacy was allied with the Spanish, it could possibly prevent U.S. theft of native land. In 1784 McGillivray, and other Creek leaders signed a military and commercial treaty with Spain (Green 1980). At this time the U.S. was too weak to confront the Creek, and McGillivray's main concern was the aggressive state of Georgia. In 1786 and 1787 the Creek, with material aid from Spain, were able to drive U.S. settlers out of their territory and stall the white expansion of Georgia. Shortly thereafter, however, the U.S. organized its constitutional government, and it was clear to the Creek that the new republic, rather than Spain, was the future power to be dealt with (Green 1980).

According to Green, in 1789 McGillivray decided to "outflank Georgia" by negotiating with the U.S. a treaty of territorial protection and Creek independence (1980:54). The treaty was signed in 1790, and now both imperialist powers in the region had pledged to protect the Creek nation and recognize their independence.

Despite McGillivray's efforts, his vision of a much more unified Creek nation, and independence, never came to fruition. There had always been a group of Creek headmen who resisted McGillivray's efforts to bring "political discipline" to the nation, and therefore made political

decisions contradictory to his own (Green 1980:48). While initially this factionalism had prevented the Creek from becoming dependent on one European power, over the long term it became "dysfunctional" (Martin 1991:83). In addition, McGillivray's power base was in the Upper Towns. When the 1790 treaty was signed, McGillivray ceded a tract of land near the Lower Towns that the Creek there had defended vigorously against white settlement. This created much bitterness and anger among the Lower Creek. Ultimately McGillivray's dream was unfulfilled (Green 1980; Champagne 1992).

Cherokee Legal Resistance

As mentioned, the removal of the southeastern nations was primarily a conflict between individual U.S. states and the native societies. In the late 1820s and early 1830s Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Alabama declared legal jurisdiction over the Cherokee. The discovery of gold on Cherokee land at this time meant a rapid, large influx of white settlers and is commonly seen as the main impetus behind the pressure for Cherokee removal (Blumenthal 1955; Champagne 1992). According to the various states' laws, Native Americans could not bring legal action against white settlers. As a result, white settlers commonly stole Cherokee property, including plantations and farms (Champagne 1992).

To combat this legal domination, the Cherokee took two cases to the U.S. Supreme Court (Blumenthal 1955; Woodward 1963; Thornton 1990; Champagne 1992). The first case was thrown out, since the court denied the Cherokee the right "to bring a case as a foreign nation" (Champagne 1992:144). In 1832, the Supreme Court ruled in the Cherokees favor. The court ruled that the Cherokee were an independent nation occupying their own territory, and the laws of the state of Georgia did not have jurisdiction (Blumenthal 1955; Nabokov 1992b; Hagan 1993) since only the federal government could appropriate native land (Champagne 1992). However, just as Andrew Jackson refused to abide by the terms of federal treaties (Nabokov 1992b), he did not enforce the court's decision (Champagne 1992). Nevertheless, this was not the end of Cherokee resistance. Their 1835 removal treaty had been signed by only one faction of the nation. As a result, "Thousands of Cherokee ... petitioned the Senate not to ratify the removal treaty." As one might expect, the petitions were ignored (Hagan 1993:90).

Conclusions

In reference to peasant rebellions, Stern (1987) says that rebels are often seen as reactors, rather than continuous initiators. Often peasant political behavior is only taken into account during extraordinary times, i.e., open rebellion. During more typical moments, their

conscious analysis of their situation is ignored. Stern also makes the point that open rebellion is but a "short-term variant within a long-term process of resistance" (1987:11). To truly understand resistance, long spans of time must therefore be chosen as units of analysis. In addition, peasant consciousness must not be degraded through the assumption that they have narrow world-views and that their behavior is predictable. And certainly, worthwhile analyses of resistance must examine the role of ethnicity as a unifying element.

It is clear from the examination of southeastern resistance, that the Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw were both creative participants in, and resistors to, the intrusion of the world-economy into their territories. In terms of resistance, the southeastern societies creatively and actively resisted an incorporation process that was complex and genocidal. They were very well aware of the political and economic mechanisms of the world-system, as well as the long-term consequences of their incorporation. In his analysis of the Creek rebellion, Martin concludes that deprivation through colonialism was not the only key factor. The "power of new visions amplified in communal discussions" must also be examined. Understanding this power "affirms the full humanity of Native Americans," by recognizing that they are "much more than victims of history;" they are initiators within it (1991:179).

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

While the essential purpose of this project is theoretical, the theoretical debates and contentions loose a degree of significance when confronted with the human story. Ultimately the preceding pages are an exploration of physical and cultural genocide. To feed the capital accumulation logic of the world-economy countless people were murdered, viable social structures were destroyed, and tradition and culture were denigrated and tossed aside. This is the story of the incorporation of the southeast. It can be wrapped up in sophisticated concepts and theories, but at the core it is death; a journey into darkness.

World-systems theory, with its notion of incorporation, sets for itself a difficult task; theoretically explain the expansion of the world-economy, while claiming that each instance of incorporation is historically unique. A goal of this project was to explore the incorporation of the native southeast, while at the same time attempting to refine the broader, theoretical notion of incorporation. Some may ask, why bother with this interpretive effort? I bother because history does not speak for itself, and without an interpretive effort, imperialist myths are too easily perpetuated. In addition, this story without an interpretive framework too easily leaves the impression that

imperialism in the southeast was an overwhelming tidal wave. Clearly the examination of resistance shows this was not the case. Hence, somewhat of a dilemma. As an interpretive framework I have used world-systems theory. The perspective typically does not go far enough in examining incorporation from the ground up and is therefore overly deterministic. At the same time, however, it does provide the space to examine indigenous responses to incorporation. What follows are some of my observations on incorporation and the incorporation of the southeast.

Incorporation

The discussion on the nature of incorporation in this project ultimately leads to a discussion on the fundamental nature of the world-system. Most definitions of incorporation emphasize the integration of a region's production processes into the world division of labor (So 1984; Sokolovsky 1985; Palat et al. 1986; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987). Therefore, incorporation means that a region's workers are transformed, in a coercive manner, into labor for capital (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981; Phillips 1987). From this viewpoint, incorporation is driven fundamentally by a search for cheap labor, and a region is incorporated only when its production processes are articulated with the commodity chains that make up the world-economy (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987; Baker 1993;

Dunaway 1994). Commodity chains constitute the link between the production processes in different regions of the world-system (Wallerstein 1983). Fundamentally this means that the existence of trade between two regions does not necessarily mean interdependence. Only trade in essentials (versus luxuries or prestige goods) indicates trade within a system, rather than between separate systems.

It must be mentioned, as Chase-Dunn points out, that this definition of incorporation (and therefore the world-system) is not universally adhered to. While all world-systems theorists define the system in terms of systemic interaction, there are debates on "the relative importance of specific kinds of interconnectedness." One of these debates centers on "the systemic significance of prestige goods exchanges" (1992:316). As discussed in chapter III, this debate is very relevant to the notion of incorporation used in this project.

As discussed previously, based on Hall's (1986;1989) work, I characterize the above definition as the orthodox view of incorporation. Hall says that the orthodox (effective) definition of incorporation needs to be loosened up because it does not allow for the analysis of less extreme situations of incorporation. His work, as does this project, indicates that there are situations, and time-frames, where the world-economy intrudes into a region and generates restructured production processes and political

systems, yet the region is not fully integrated into the world-wide division of labor.

Based on this project, I agree that the notion of incorporation needs to be broadened in order to take account of the wide range of historically unique cases of world-system-external arena interaction. In other words, analyses of incorporation need to look at the process from the perspective of those being incorporated, i.e., their social transformation and resistance to it. During the time frame covered in this project it is doubtful whether the southeast was effectively incorporated. However, the native societies were transformed into labor; their political and economic systems were restructured. From a world-systems perspective, what should we call this?

Ultimately, I suppose, from the viewpoint of the southeastern societies it does not matter how incorporation is theoretically defined. What does matter is that the world-economy did intrude into the region. This intrusion was not bloodless. It involved imperialist coercion, but also constant, consciously adaptive indigenous resistance. Unless analyses of the workings of the modern world-system take such resistance into account, they run the risk of perpetuating the myth that the imperialist system is invincible and natural.

I certainly do not want to leave the impression that those using the world-systems perspective do not take

resistance to incorporation into account. In their analysis of incorporation, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987) mention that the restructuring of production processes results in resistance, and Phillips, in his analysis of the incorporation of the Caribbean, states that political incorporation did not proceed in a "linear fashion," i.e, "local resistance" had to be dealt with (1987:797). However, these analyses do not go far enough. As Stern (1988) argues, in addition to the world system, resistance must be taken into account as an explanatory factor. In reply, Wallerstein says that the world-system is not a "factor," but rather "the whole historical framework within which the actors and factors exist" (1988:881). In other words, local conditions are the result of incorporation. In my view both are somewhat talking past each other. The world-economy determines the general direction of local conditions; it is the framework. However, cases of incorporation are historically unique, and different strategies of resistance result in specific experiences of incorporation. What follows are some of my observations on the incorporation of the southeast.

The Incorporation of the Southeast

The most striking characteristics of the incorporation of the southeast were multiplicity and conflict. The expansion of the world-economy into the region took the form

of imperialists using different strategies and in conflict. As Hagan (1993) points out, the French mainly focused on the fur trade, while the British always had a long-term interest in the land. The conflict between imperialists reached down to every level. For example, the British Crown was often in conflict with its own colonies over land and trade policy. The individual colonies also were in conflict. Pennsylvania was "at odds" with Virginia over the Ohio Valley trade, and with New York over the Lake Erie trade. And certainly Virginia and South Carolina competed intensely for the southern trade (Hagan 1993:26). In addition, the societies being incorporated were in conflict with each other, as well as with the imperial powers. Therefore, the incorporation of the region was characterized by three levels of military and political conflict; imperialist-imperialist, native society-imperialist, and native society-native society. Incorporation was multi-sided, neither smooth nor linear. Over the long term the process moves toward integration but along the way there are systemic and anti-systemic disruptions and disorganizations, represented by imperial competition and native resistance.

The incorporation of the southeast is best conceptualized as occurring in two phases. The first phase was characterized by the transformation of native societies into labor for the deerskin trade. This period was also marked by intense military and geopolitical conflict.

Clearly, the particular form of the incorporation process was not inevitable. It was an historical process, subject to conjuncture, contingency, and agency. Underlying the economic restructuring was indigenous resistance in the form of diplomatic maneuvering and open rebellion.

The second phase of incorporation was characterized by the elimination of imperial competition, the decline of the deerskin trade, and the effort to acquire native land. This period also saw the deepening of capitalism and the development of class relations and centralized power structures within the southeastern societies. It becomes clear during this phase that just as the making of the modern world-system was an historical, not an inevitable process, so are the consequences for incorporated societies. Just as it is a grave oversight to ignore resistance to incorporation, it is humanity denying to forget the variety of Native American societies before incorporation and the range of experiences during incorporation.

The world-economy is not monolithic. If nothing else, southeastern resistance shows that the world-economy does not move like a juggernaut, with the peoples of the world blindly throwing themselves beneath its wheels as it advances. Nor are external arenas monolithic. It must be kept in mind that as a region being incorporated, the southeast was not represented by a single society, nation, or even culture. But despite the complexities of multiple

incorporators, the southeast and the Americas were eventually dominated and settled by massive economic and military force (assisted by disease). The "unprecedented economic and social revolution" that gave birth to expansionistic Europe (Salisbury 1982) did extend to the southeast. While the world-economy was not a juggernaut, in the longue duree of incorporation time was on its side.

There are three other more specific points that should be mentioned. First, as So (1984) points out, often a distinction must be made between economic and political incorporation. During the first phase of incorporation the southeastern societies were economically hooked into the world-economy, but political incorporation did not proceed at the same pace. It was not until the second phase, when the initial mechanism of economic incorporation was no longer viable, that political systems became fully restructured. Second, it is clear that the incorporation process is not only an external phenomenon. It depends on indigenous cooperation. The precise nature of collaboration is difficult to discern. Just as a distinction can be made between economic and political incorporation, a similar distinction can be made, in the southeast, between economic and political collaboration. During the first phase of incorporation all the nations, or segments of them, made political alliances with European powers. During the second phase segments of each society (typically "mixed-bloods")

embraced the new economy, and were factors in its entrenchment. However, although the mixed-bloods were economic collaborators, they politically resisted the taking of their land. Ultimately, in terms of resistance, collaboration is best viewed as a national rather than class phenomenon. For example, British dominance, and at times survival, depended on the Cherokee, and French military power often hinged on the Choctaw. And certainly, the Creek rebellion would have been much more successful if the Americans did not have the cooperation of the Cherokee, Choctaw, as well as the Lower Creek (Halbert and Ball [1895] 1969). The final point that needs to be made concerns the definition of incorporation in relation to the southeast. According to the orthodox definition of incorporation, the process is essentially a search for cheap labor. As such, the fundamental consequence of incorporation is the transformation of people into labor in relation to capital. This occurred to a degree in the southeast during the deerskin trade. But the commodity of ultimate importance was land. Land is what the incorporation process revolved around. Native societies were disposable labor to this end. Native American labor was useful, but not essential. Native American land, and their genocide, was essential to the incorporation of the southeast as an agricultural periphery within the capitalist world-economy. Land was, and is, the center of the conflict. Heinmot Tooyalaket of the Nez

Perces understood this,

> The Earth was created by the assistance of the sun, and it should be left as it was ... The country was made without lines of demarcation, and it is no man's business to divide it ... I see the whites all over the country gaining wealth, and see their desire to give us lands which are worthless ... The earth and myself are of one mind. The measure of the land and the measure of our bodies are the same ... I never said the land was mine to do with it as I chose. The one who has the right to dispose of it is the one who has created it. I claim a right to live on my land, and accord you the privilege to live on yours (Brown 1972:300).

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