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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Bennett M. Judkins entitled "The Black Lung Association: A Case Study of a Modern Social Movement." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Sociology.

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THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION: A CASE STUDY OF A MODERN SOCIAL MOVEMENT

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee

Bennett M. Judkins

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ABSTRACT

Recent studies in the sociology of social movements have reflected a change in emphasis from the traditional psychological approach to more of a concern for sociological variables. This trend has been accompanied by a shift in the basic theoretical perspective from collective behavior to social organization. A new concept, the "social movement organization," has evolved out of this process. Several theorists have suggested that this social movement organization is similar to the complex, institutionalized, bureaucratic organization and can be studied within the same theoretical and conceptual framework. Others, however, observe that the modern social movement organization is not at all like a complex, institutionalized, bureaucratic structure but has a form which is decentralized, multiheaded, very segmented, and is influenced by external as well as internal forces.

The issue of the "social movement organization" has evoked considerable discussion but very little empirical data has been collected. This research is an attempt to provide intensive information about one social movement and its organization, the Black Lung Association, through a case study analysis.

This research project actually began in the fall of 1972 with the collection of initial data about the history and operation of the Black Lung Association. The process intensified in the summer of 1973 when the author moved to West Virginia to spend approximately 11 months

working as a part-time participant observer with the Black Lung Association. The collection of data, however, included, in addition to direct contact, information from newspapers, government documents, old Black Lung Association files, and any other available information relevant to the existence of the movement and its organization. The collection process continued to the time of this writing.

The analysis of the data led to the following general conclusions:

1. That the bureaucratic model of organizations is not necessarily applicable to all social movement organizations. Some movement organizations are reflective of a more decentralized, multiple leadership, and segmented structure.
2. That the internal structure of movement organizations is very much influenced by external factors, and that the interaction between these elements determines the outcome of the movement.
3. That the study of social movements and their organizations is best conceptualized in a framework that identifies both dynamic and static aspects of the phenomenon.

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CHAPTER I

THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION

I. INTRODUCTION

"Black Lung" is a disease. The accepted medical term for it is "coal workers' pneumoconiosis." It is a chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of employment in the underground coal mine. It is caused by the inhalation of coal dust and is characterized by a chronic fibrous tissue reaction in the lungs which may cause disability or death (Achievements, Administrative Problems and Costs of Paying Black Lung Benefits to Coal Miners and Their Widows, p. 3). In 1969, Congress passed a law which attempted to address the problem of coal workers' pneumoconiosis. This law, the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, was one of a relatively few bills passed in our national legislature in the last 50 years designed to protect the health and safety of the nation's coal miners. Although the law addressed several health and safety issues, a major part of this piece of legislation pertained to the issue of black lung—an occupationally induced disease which Congressional leaders felt had long been ignored, poorly understood, and only minimally addressed. Although the legislation directed its efforts to many aspects of prevention and control of the disease (establishing minimal dust levels, options to transfer out of dusty areas, etc.), a somewhat unique part of this law established a Black

Lung Benefits Program which would compensate those miners who had already contracted the disease. Since that program began operation in the summer of 1970, over one half of a million miners, widows, and children have received benefits from this program. This part of the legislation is unique in that it represents the first time in American history that the federal government has compensated workers for an occupationally induced disease from general tax funds.

Although this law was passed in 1969, and it represents the first time "pneumoconosis" has been recognized by the federal legislature, "black lung" is not a new disease. Several doctors have traced the original recognition of the disease to 1813 in Great Britain when physicians were reporting the occurrence of black lungs in autopsied miners (Kerr, 1969, p. 4; Rosen, 1943, p. 250). In 1880, a novel by Emile Zola, Germinal, describes black lung vividly and what it does to the miner, to his family, and to the community (Agronsky, p. 323). In the 11th Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, published over 65 years ago, reference is also made to it:

> "The fibroid changes in the lung occur in connection with occupations which necessitate the habitual inhalation of dust . . . In the case of coal miners, the sputum is black from containing carboneaceous matter . . . Ultimately (there is) increasing emaciation and death . . ." (Agronsky, p. 323)

In 1937, the British Medical Research Council began comprehensive studies of chronic pulmonary diseases among coal miners. Their first report, issued in 1942, identified and defined the long known clinical condition called "Miners' Asthma." They renamed it "coal workers' pneumoconiosis"

(CWP). A year later, it became a compensable disease in Britain (Kerr, 1968, p. 579).

Perhaps a legitimate question which might be raised at this point is why it took the United States government over an additional quarter of a century to do what the British government did around 1943 (Agronsky, 1970, p. 324). In a broad sense, this is the general question which the following study will attempt to answer. The passage of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was a major stepping-stone in this country's attempts to deal with the problem of the safety and health of the American worker in an industrial setting. The events which preceded the passage of the law, and the several years which have passed in which its programs have been implemented, reveal a complex network of factions, organizations, institutions, and public opinion which were instrumental to the kinds of social processes which operated around this one issue. We propose to look at the issue of "black lung" by analyzing the interrelationship between this complex network of elements and the changes which evolved from the process.

II. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

The issue of "black lung" in American society could be approached in several ways. Because it is a disease, it could certainly be viewed from a purely medical standpoint. Because it is an occupational disease, we could base our study on the history of occupational diseases and how they have emerged somewhat apart from the mainstream of traditional medical practice. And, because it is a miner's disease, it would also

be feasible to look at this issue as another in the long list of problems which the mining community has faced in their struggle with coal companies. These and other "points of departure" would certainly yield interesting data and provide informative ways of looking at this issue.

However, we choose to organize our analysis of the black lung issue from the vantage point of those elements within the society who were seeking changes with regard to the disease. More specifically, our study will focus in on what has been called the Black Lung Movement and its organization, the Black Lung Association. In the late 1960's, there emerged in West Virginia a social collectivity of miners, politicians, doctors, and social reformers who desired to do something about the disease called black lung. This social movement had its peak during the passage of legislation in the state of West Virginia which awarded workman's compensation benefits to miners who contracted the disease. It began to die out after the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in December, 1969, which established a federal program to be operated by the Social Security Administration which provided federal benefits for coal miners who contracted the disease. In the month of January, 1969, an organization called the Black Lung Association was formed for the purpose of establishing a corporation to which money could be sent for funding a bill that would make "black lung" a compensable disease in West Virginia. The Black Lung Association developed somewhat apart from the mainstream of the Black Lung Movement. Although the goals were essentially the same, the Black Lung Association would not be considered the formal organization of the Black Lung

Movement, at least in its inception. The Black Lung Association did not evolve into a truly functioning organization until after the implementation of the Black Lung Benefits program of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, and somewhat after the Black Lung Movement had begun to die down. At this time, the goals of the Black Lung Association became broader and its membership and strength began to grow. We make a distinction, then, between the Black Lung Movement, a broader collectivity of diverse groups and individuals that emerged in the late 1960's and died down in the early 1970's, and the Black Lung Association, an organization with definite leadership and membership which developed in 1969 and still exist today. We will maintain this distinction throughout the study.

We feel that studying the issue of "black lung" from the standpoint of a social movement and a social movement organization which emerged around it is important and useful for several reasons. First, by focusing on the social movement and the social movement organization directly related, and named after, the issue of black lung, we key in on those elements in the broader social environment which are seeking changes within that environment. This automatically gives our analysis an approach which tends to look at the dynamic rather than the static factors of society. Secondly, it is our belief that the issue of black lung is directly related to a number of different medical, economical, social, and cultural issues which cannot be adequately approached from any one institutional perspective. A study of the issue from a social movement perspective allows us to include many related areas. Thirdly,

the Black Lung Movement and the Black Lung Association provide very good examples for much needed case studies in the broader area of collective behavior, and more specifically the subarea of social movements and social movement organizations. With this last rationale in mind, a brief historical introduction to the Black Lung Association will now be given to provide further support for this study. This historical document was written and provided by members of the Black Lung Association which expressed, according to them, a clear picture of their early struggles. It will be followed by an in-depth analysis.

History of the BLA

> The Black Lung Association was formed in December, 1968, by a group of coal miners in Fayette and Kanawha counties who banded together to urge the West Virginia Legislature to make Black Lung--coal worker's occupational pneumoconiosis--compensable under the state's workmen's compensation law.
>
> Coal miners daily face two critical occupational hazards. Every moment they work underground they are in danger of violent death. A small spark from a massive machine can set off an explosion such as the one that killed 38 men in Hyden, Ky.; a roof can fall dropping tons of rock that can crush a man instantly.
>
> Many of those fortunate enough to survive in the mines, where the accident rate is double that of any other occupation, die slowly from Black Lung, an occupational disease that slowly incapacitates and finally kills.
>
> The men who mine coal were the founders of the Black Lung Association. They had lived the hard life of coal mining and faced its dangers, they had become frustrated with federal and state bureaucrats who failed to enforce even watered down safety laws, their union leadership, whose partnership with industry and lack of contact with the rank and file had led to corruption and apathy, and elected officials whose sympathy for and subservience to the dominant industry of the state is taken for granted.
>
> Shaken out of their inaction by the mine explosion which killed 78 men in Mannington, W. Va., they moved to act on the Black Lung issue. Working with the aid of three public spirited physicians, The Black Lung Association mounted a vigorous lobbying effort, enlisting the support of miners from around the state. Although as many as 3,000 men

descended on the capitol in a single day, powerful coal industry influence held the legislators in check. The UMWA gave no more than token support to the miner's efforts.

The tide turned when a spontaneous wildcat strike broke out in Raleigh County. Quickly spreading to other areas, within the week the strike had halted virtually all coal production in the state; over 40,000 miners came out. Rallying behind the slogan "no law, no coal," the miners marched on the legislature again. This time they got results; a fairly good law was passed, and Black Lung became a compensable disease in West Virginia some 30 years after being accorded this status in most European countries.

The Black Lung Association continued in existence after the legislature adjourned. The groups success in getting Workmen's Compensation legislation, and the informal ties that developed during this effort led to the raising of further questions about the miner's situation. They now knew they could act successfully; they saw conclusively that their union and their government would sit by and refuse to aid them. This new spirit was translated into action again in lobbying efforts in support of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.

Spurred by the UMWA leadership's inaction in the Black Lung fight, members of the organization urged Jock Yablonski to run for the union's presidency in 1969, and made up most of his campaign organization in Southern West Virginia. They carried District 17, one of the UMWA's largest, and did better than Yablonski's overall percentage in other areas they covered.

Yablonski's defeat, and especially his subsequent assassination, disheartened the BLA, and for a time it became relatively inactive. With pressure from the miners weakened, the coal operators were able to put through the 1970 legislative session a number of amendments weakening the 1969 Black Lung law.

Several BLA members had filed as legislative candidates in the primary elections. Sadly, the falling off of organized support kept any from winning nomination, although two came within 30 votes of victory.

The months of apathy were broken by the outbreak of the Disabled Miners Strike in the summer of 1970. As the Black Lung strike of the previous year had been unique in that the legislature, not the owners, was the object, so this strike's uniqueness lay in the fact that it was aimed against the UMWA and its Welfare and Retirement Fund, which had denied medical and pension benefits to thousands of disabled and retired miners and their widows. The strike erupted spontaneously in Wyoming County, but spread

erratically, pulling out some 18,000 men before Federal injunctions and the jailing of strike leaders broke its back.

The Disabled Miners strike failed of achieving its immediate objective, but it served a dual purpose: revitalizing the miner's movement and pointing out the need for an organized and coordinated effort. After much discussion, the BLA decided to embark on a broad program of education, service and political action aimed at serving active, disabled and retired miners and their families [see following statement of purposes]. The decision was to work for reform and revitalization of the union, while at the same time attempting to provide services to the men which the union was failing to deliver. The organization began to publish a monthly newsletter, The Black Lung Bulletin, to inform the miners of its work. The Bulletin, about to complete its first year of publication, now reaches 5,000 miners monthly.

The opportunity to serve came almost immediately; in September the first denial letters were sent by the Social Security Administration to applicants for benefits under the Federal Black Lung Program. (BLA efforts had been instrumental in getting Congress to initiate this Administration-opposed program). The BLA began to develop an educational program aimed at teaching applicants their rights of appeal. This was carried on through press releases, brochures, and a series of meetings throughout the coal fields. As the number of denials mounted (over 100,000 to date), resentment of the Social Security Administration's restrictive interpretation of the laws spurred the formation of new local chapters. Over a six month period, new groups were formed in seven West Virginia counties, three in Virginia and four in Kentucky.

Black Lung Association pressure (pickets, marches, protest meetings) on local social security offices has humanized administration of the program, and the organization is currently pressing for liberalization of the nation's regulations to meet the intent of Congress when the bill was passed.

This winter the BLA worked with the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund to put on a training program for lay advocates to help persons whose applications for Federal Black Lung benefits were denied. Twelve BLA members took this training and are currently serving in the field. Another training program is planned for the near future.

During the 1971 legislative session the organization joined with other dissident West Virginia union members to form the Worker's Alliance for Fair Compensation Laws, which proposed sweeping changes in the West Virginia law and succeeded in pushing through some significant improvements, notably a cost of living escalator on awards.

> BLA members are also playing a major role in the effort to abolish strip mining, realizing that stripping means fewer jobs for miners as well as environmental destruction. Half the voters for abolition in the State Senate came from counties with BLA chapters. (BLA History, BLA Files, 1971)

This brief history of the Black Lung Association, written by the members themselves, is, of course, a very incomplete version of what actually transpired during the period of 1968 up to 1971. However, it does tell us several things about the BLA which make it a fruitful movement organization upon which to build a case study. The mere fact that this account was written by the BLA indicates an awareness on their part of the history of the organization as an important determining influence of its future. In addition, the substantive content of the narrative illustrates a concern for factors very important to the movement's survival—structural strain, precipitating events, promovement supporters, organization, tactics and strategy, and external forces.

Although this history was written in 1971, the Black Lung Association is still an active organization. Several changes have occurred, however, which have altered the thrust of the organization somewhat. Although these will be discussed in detail later. a brief mention of them will serve to put the BLA's recent history into perspective. One of the activities of the BLA in 1971 mentioned in the document was the application of pressure for the "liberalization of the nation's regulations to meet the intent of Congress when the bill was passed." This "pressure" resulted in the passage of the 1972 Amendment to the law which permitted several hundred thousand additional miners to acquire black lung benefits.

Although the activities of the BLA were originally concentrated on the problem of "pneumoconiosis," or "black lung" disease, attempts at obtaining compensation for it had some interesting reverbrations. The "strained" relationship which existed from 1968 to 1972 between the BLA and the UMWA is evident in the history. Because the leadership of the UMWA had failed to support the Black Lung Fight, the BLA strongly supported the candidacy of Jock Yablonski to defeat Tony Boyle. However, when he was defeated and subsequently assassinated, the BLA almost folded. The revitalized organization, in 1971, again entered into the political arena in support of Arnold Miller, original president of the BLA, for president of the UMWA, after the 1970 election was declared invalid. There was much overlap in membership between the Miner's for Democracy, Miller's campaign organization, and the Black Lung Association. This multiplicity of "goal" which the BLA set for itself in 1971 is evidenced by a "Statement of Purposes" provided to me by a BLA representative:

STATEMENT OF PURPOSES

The Black Lung Association is a voluntary, nonprofit association of working, as well as nonworking miners and widows. The association has members in four coal producing states and many countywide chapters.

The Association has three primary aims:

1. To make the coal mining a safe and healthy occupation.
   —To insure enforcement of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
2. To improve the administration of all benefit programs for coal miners and to work for their improvement
   —State Workmen's Compensation Programs
   —Federal Social Security Disability Programs
   —The UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund
3. To return democracy to our union
   —To return the Constitutional rights of the rank and file to elect their District Officials

—To end corruption and featherbedding of relatives by our nation's leaders (BLA History, BLA files, 1971)

The Black Lung Association is still in existence today, with county chapters in four states, West Virginia, Tennessee, Virginia, and Kentucky. Although the responsibility for the Black Lung Program is now in the hands of the Labor Department, the BLA has merely shifted its tactics to deal with the bureaucracy of another very similar governmental agency. There are also several bills in Congress presently, which are supported by the BLA, to provide more benefits for the most miners possible. In addition, it has its organization as a base for action on an even broader range of problems, although most are directly or indirectly medically oriented.

The Black Lung Association, then, provides a suitable movement organization for study for several reasons. First, the longevity of the organization is evidenced by the fact that it has remained active for at least eight years. Secondly, it seems to have been able to overcome the problem of limited goals, i.e., when its original goal was attained, the acquisition of compensation funds for "Black Lung," the organization did not fold but reorganized on the basis of new goals and needs.

Thirdly, and perhaps most important for the orientation of this study, a study of the BLA will provide us information about the interaction between movement "organizations" themselves and their environment. From its inception, the BLA has been in contact with several organized elements within the environment--the early UNWA, the state legislature of West Virginia, the Congress, the Social Security Administration, the Department of Labor, on both a local and

national level, as well as a number of supportive elements--the Physician's Association, Miner's for Democracy, the later UMWA, the communications media, etc. The BLA provides a special case in which the movement organization experienced several major changes in "target groups," that is, groups which the movement organization is trying to effect some change upon.

Fourthly, the Black Lung Association has apparently resisted the pressures toward institutionalization, both from the standpoint of being co-opted into the UMWA and from the standpoint of maintaining its "grass-roots" character. Initial findings indicate that the BLA has maintained essentially the same organizational structure for its entire existence. Although there have been pressures for change, both internally and externally, its structure has maintained a certain stability. At the same time, however, it has entered into "battle" with some of the largest, most institutionalized, bureaucratized, and centralized power structure organizations in America today—the Social Security Administration, the Department of Labor, the Congress, and the UMWA—and has several times come out the winner. The organization's tactics and strategies have been effective in bringing about tremendous changes in both governmental and union organizations.

Finally, in its relationship with the Social Security Administration, the Black Lung Association provides us with a unique case of organized citizen feedback to an ongoing government program. Many government programs are aimed at populations who do not have an organizational base by which to give positive or negative feedback as to the effectiveness of the program. As a result, with the exception of evaluative programs,

usually conducted by the government themselves most governmental programs go for years without any real idea as to their impact upon the "client" population. Right from the inception of the Black Lung Program, the BLA organized education programs to make miners aware of the program and their rights, set up training sessions to prepare them to make sure these rights were not abused when they went to apply for black lung benefits, and then mobilized miners to provide to the SSA feedback as to how well the program was working, not just in general, but with recommendations for specific changes, many of which were implemented. To what extent the successes and survival of the Black Lung Association is attributable to the "grass roots" nature of the organization, or to the relationship which exist(ed) between the movement organization and target group(s), or perhaps to the cultural background of the miners themselves, or all three, is still unanswered. A generalizing case study of the BLA, however, in which the researcher seeks for patterns of interaction, between both individuals and organizations, without preconceived organizational (or social movement) models might not only add to our knowledge of the "contemporary" movement organization, and to its increasingly complex struggle with bureaucratic and highly centralized organizations and institutions, but it might also give us an insight into a new organizational form, one born in negative reaction to, rather than positive support for, a "social trend."

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A recent trend in the study of social movements has been to direct the focus of study away from the individual and more towards the structure of the movement's organization. Of particular importance to the theoretical developments in this area has been the creation of a new concept and unit of analysis—the social movement organization (SMO). Although the identification of an organization within a social movement is not new, its recognition as a major unit of analysis has occurred only recently. Traditionally, the study of social movements has been located within the broader field of collective behavior, and the major theoretical framework has been social psychology. In general, this has meant that the unit of analysis has been the individual, and the social structure, if studied at all, was of secondary importance. Until recently, the field of collective behavior has had little connection with the field of social organization. Many have even considered the two areas of study as opposite polar extremes within the discipline of sociology. Recent attempts at the convergence of collective behavior and social organization have received broad academic support, although little research has been done to date. While there seems to be agreement for a more "social" approach to the field, there is wide disagreement regarding the development of an appropriate conceptual scheme to guide

this new level of analysis, particularly with regard to the conception of a social movement organization.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR THEORY

Theories which have evolved from the fields of collective behavior and organization have traditionally been thought to have had very little in common. The history of organizational theory is generally built upon the basic bureaucratic model with a concern for structures with "fairly clear-cut boundaries, definite membership, formal roles, established lines of authority, and specific tasks" (Dynes and Quarantelli, p. 416). Collective behavior theory, on the other hand, is less concerned with structured social settings and more with those social situations which seem to lack structure, clear-cut boundaries, formal roles, etc. The social phenomenon to be examined was viewed as "coming into being, relatively amorphous, and in general at the opposite pole of bureaucratic or highly institutionalized behavior" (Dynes and Quarantelli, p. 416).

Collective behavior theories in the late 19th and early 20th century came out of a fairly basic psychological perspective. The work of Gustav LeBon (1879) established a precedent for concern with the individual and how he was transformed by a process of contagion "whereby unanimous, intense feelings and behavior, at variance with usual predispositions, are induced among the members of a collectivity" (Turner and Killian, p. 12). Behavior of individuals was many times given such characteristics as emotional, irrational, and uninstitutional and was explained by a process of suggestion which LeBon called "the law

of the mental unity of crowds." In a crowd, the individual "will be less disposed to check himself from the consideration that, a crowd being anonymous, and in consequence irresponsible, the sentiment of responsibility which always controls individuals disappears entirely" (Le Bon, 1960, p. 30).

The study of crowds formed the basic model for the study of all collective behavior for many years. Social movement thought received very little support in mainstream sociology in its early development, and much of the present day theoretical work is based on the conceptual formulations established in studies of crowds. As a result, the study of social movements has traditionally been included in that subfield of sociology known as collective behavior (Wilson, 1974, p. 7). Although it has been recognized for many years that social movements are generally on the other end of the "institutional-uninstitutional continuum" from crowds, the distinction is by no means a clear one, and many authors still classify social movements as "uninstitutionalized" (Wilson, 1974, p. 9), particularly with regard to the strategies and tactics used to bring about change. Other authors (Zald and Ash, 1964; Weller and Quarantelli, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1973) have begun to view social movements as having many things in common with their "organization" counterparts. Rather than basing their theoretical formulations upon social psychological or collective behavior models, many researchers are pulling their ideas and conceptual schemes from traditional organizational theory. The convergence of these two fields, however, is also being assisted by changes occuring in traditional organizational thought in the past decade.

As was stated previously, organizational theory was originally based on the bureaucratic model of Max Weber. One of the major criticisms of this model in recent years is that it has assumed a closed-system perspective (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Emery and Trist, 1960). According to Emery and Trist, closed system theorists of organizations

> regard the enterprise as sufficiently independent to allow most of its problems to be analyzed with reference to its internal structure and without reference to its external environment . . . In practice the systems theorists in social science . . . did tend to focus on the statics of social structure and to neglect the study of structural change. (p. 84)

As "open-systems theory" has gained acceptance in recent years in the study of organizations, there has been a shift from a concern for the internal structure of the organization to its external structure and a concern for the environment in which it operates. This environment, or external structure, is composed of other organizations which interact with one another. The focus of analysis has been on the dynamics of this interactional process rather than on the static relations which compose the internal structure of any one organization. In addition, the unit of analysis has become the organization itself, rather than the individual or the internal relations of any particular structure. The interactions between organizations are viewed in terms of inputs and outputs which maintain the process.

This perspective toward organizations has been especially appealing to many social movement theorists because of its concern for social change rather than social statics. The tendency to view the organization as a whole also found acceptance with movement theorists who had tended

to see the social movement as a unified collective body. Thirdly, the concern for the interactional process had a great deal in common with what has been used to identify many social movements as uninstitutional in the past--their strategies and tactics. By looking at organizations in interaction with other organizations, social movement theorists and organizational theorists have begun to observe a lot of similarities between their respective units of analysis. The concept of a "social movement organization" (SMO) has emerged and perspectives in social movements have increasingly attempted to clarify this term and to evaluate its benefits for further explorations and explanations in the field.

II. TOWARD A MORE SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The lack of theoretical support from the discipline of sociology for the study of social movements is at the crux of a more basic problem that the field of sociology has faced since its inception—an inability to deal adequately with the dynamic aspects of social life (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973, p. 665). General sociological theory has failed in any attempts to handle dynamic and ephemeral patterns of social action. Weller and Quarantelli (1973) suggest that the separation between collective behavior and sociology has been maintained because collective behavior theorists have failed to draw from the core of sociological theory to construct their theories and also because general sociological thought has failed to profit from collective behavior studies of social

dynamics (p. 666). The characterization of most collective behavior as "uninstitutionalized" has been greatly responsible for this since most sociological thought is based on an institutional model of behavior.

Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) suggest that this gap has existed because "the typical sociologist is seldom forced to look at a situation where institutionalized and noninstitutionalized behavior are both highly prevalent and equally crucial in the immediate situation" (p. 417). Although this has perhaps been true in the past, some recent writers have recognized the trend toward antibureaucratic movements (Roberts and Kloss, 1974) and the potential for interaction and confrontation between social movements and more institutionalized formal structures. This pattern has been obscured somewhat, however, by the persistence of a closed system perspective in both social movement and organizational modes of thought. Organizational theorists have focused their efforts on the internal structures of social institutions and their bureaucracies while social movement theorists have limited their analysis to either individual leaders or internal processes of contagion and convergence.

The theoretical and methodological process of moving towards a more "social" conception of collective behavior, and particularly the study of social movements, has not been easy. Those who have attempted to draw from traditional organizational thought have found that currently there is no generally accepted theory of organizations to guide them. Weller and Quarantelli suggest that the tradition of collective behavior theorists is limited primarily by the neglect of

a central problem: "what are the social properties of the collectives that engage in collective behavior, and how do they conceptually compare and contrast with the complexities of social action engaged in institutional behavior" (p. 669). The emergence of the concept of a "social movement organization" has been a step in this direction, although there is presently no consensus regarding its properties.

The purpose of the following review of literature is to contribute to a better conceptualization of the properties of social collectivities by a reinterpretation of recent theoretical and empirical studies. This reinterpretation will be guided by a framework which is taken from a theoretical model proposed by McCarthy and Zald (1973b) for the analysis of social movement organizations and their environment. The basic assumption which ties this model together is that social movement organizations, like all complex organizations

> . . . can be analyzed as dynamic goal oriented systems . . . They are dependent upon their environment for resources and constrained by actors and forces in their environment from achieving their goals. Both organizational survival, growth, and goal achievement are dependent, in part, upon organizational structure, strategy and tactics that become more or less institutionalized in organizational structure and processes. (McCarthy and Zald, 1973b, p. 29)

These relationships are formulated into the following model for exploring interaction of social movement organizations and the environment:



McCarthy and Zald also suggest a number of variables which might be useful in applying this way of thinking about organizations to SMO's. Under the topic of environment, they suggest that we need to look at the size and wealth of the beneficiary base, i.e., which is the population which will benefit from the SMO's efforts. They also suggest that the size and wealth of the conscience constituency, those who provide the resources for the SMO, is also important to study. Another is the existence of organizations which are competing for the same beneficiary base. Finally, they suggest that both the economic cycle and the issue cycle may be important factors in determining the operations of an SMO. Being totally dependent upon specific sources of funds or one specific issue may, if either changes, result in the demise of the SMO.

Under the area of structure, McCarthy and Zald suggest that we need to focus specifically on the SMO and look at such things as the size of the organization, its link to the beneficiary base, whether its members are professionals or volunteers, and to what extent a centralized organizational structure exists.

Thirdly, the variables included under process are an identification of the goals, to what extent they are broad or narrow, and whether they are directed at one or several beneficiary bases. Also important to identify is the ideology of the SMO and the various tactics which it might use to both change the environment and to assure the survival of the organization.

Finally, with regard to the outcome of the SMO, McCarthy and Zald suggest that four possible changes need to be studied: (1) the

establishment of a permanent organization from the SMO, (2) the growth in size of the SMO, (3) the development of counter organizations, and (4) goal changes of the SMO.

McCarthy and Zald state that this list of variables is not meant to be exhaustive nor is the placement of a variable under a particular rubric necessarily unambiguous (pp. 31-32). With these qualifications in mind, we would suggest a modification of the internal structure of the four major components. Although we do not necessarily disagree with the placement of those variables suggested by McCarthy and Zald, we feel that certain other dimensions must be taken into consideration. First, there exists a problem of determining when the social structure of the social movement organization ends and when the environment begins. If we follow an open-systems perspective, the boundaries become difficult to define because of the continuous inputs and outputs from both the SMO and the environment. However, for the purpose of the following analysis, we feel that a distinction must be made. Therefore, when we speak of the broader environment, we will be referring to the historical and cultural elements in which the social movement organization evolved and which it continues to operate in. When we use the term organizational environment, we will be referring to the immediate structural environment in which the SMO operates, which includes both the target group that the SMO is trying to affect as well as any coalition organizations or intervening elements in the environment which link the SMO and the target group together. When we refer to the internal structure of the social movement organization, we will assume that certain boundaries do exist, for

heuristic purposes, in which the SMO operates to maintain its membership, establish strategies, discuss issues, and other necessary activities which can be carried out only within these boundaries. Our distinction between broader environment, organizational environment, and internal structure still has some conceptual disadvantages, the most important of which is the placement of the immediate organizational environment under "environment" or "structure." Because this is the middle area which links the structure and the environment together, we have chosen to include it in our discussion of both, based upon our belief that not only does the environment have a structure but that the internal structure of the SMO is very much influenced by and a part of the environment in which it operates. The distinction is further complicated by the fact that both the elements in the environment and in the structure are dynamic, not static, or at least we choose to view them so.

Our conceptualization of the environment, then, is inclusive of all elements outside of the internal structure of the SMO. Our conception of structure, however, includes not only the internal structure of the SMO but also the immediate organizational environment in which the SMO operates. We choose, therefore, to view our boundaries as flexible and changing rather than rigid.

Our conceptualization of "process" does not differ that much from that proposed by McCarthy and Zald, although we tend to emphasize the ideology, strategies and tactics more than the goals of the SMO. And to the "outcome" of a social movement organization we wish merely to add one additional variable: the success of the SMO. When we speak of the

"process" of a social movement organization we will be referring to both actions taken by the SMO as well as elements in the environment reacting to those actions. In our discussion of the outcome of the movement, we will include changes in the internal structure of the SMO, its relationship with the external environment, what changes did result from the actions of the SMO, and finally, did the SMO succeed in its goals?

This modified interpretation of the McCarthy and Zald model will be used to organize and reinterpret the existing literature on social movement organizations. The review will be divided into four parts, each section signifying an element related to the movement organization that we consider relevant to its existence, operation, and survival. Part I will focus on material relevant to the movement organization and its structure. Part II will attempt to tie into this the literature which has focused primarily on the environment in which the movement organization operates. Part III will analyze some recent works that have looked at the social movement organization in process, i.e., the dynamics of its strategies and tactics and the interchange with elements in the environment. Finally, Part IV will focus in on the outcome of the social movement's efforts, to include literature on movement transformation, goal attainment, and changes in the social environment.

We have chosen to follow this conceptual framework in our review of literature for several reasons. First, as previously mentioned, we hope that it will provide a useful way of organizing and reinterpreting some previously unrelated studies in the field. Secondly, we feel that this model or framework has worth as a conceptual tool for organizing the

data from a case study of a social movement organization. In fact, in our study of the Black Lung Association, we will present our data based upon these divisions. Finally, we tend to support the proposed model of McCarthy and Zald as a beginning step in the construction of a theoretical framework for analyzing social movements and social movement organizations. It is our hope that the following case study of the Black Lung Association will contribute some new insights in this direction.

III. PART I: SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION

Traditional Approaches

Making a clear distinction between a social movement and a movement's organization is the first problem one faces in trying to identify what a social movement organization is. The separation is difficult because it is not easy to distinguish a social movement from its social structure. In a classic work, Rudolph Heberle (1951) states that social movements are not organized groups (p. 269), but are best classified as social collectives. He makes the distinction between social movements and political parties, saying that the latter has a formal organization (p. 10). Following the thinking of Tonnies, Heberle defines social collectives as

> large groups consisting of enough individuals to be able to endure a change in membership without undergoing a change in quality; united and held together by a sense of belonging together and a consciousness of sharing the same opinions, values, and goals, not necessarily with a formal organization. (p. 269)

This definition was a departure from many previous to it because it looked at movements as groups rather than as social processes. Although

the definition does recognize the existence of some type of collectivity, it still maintains a unified conception of the social movement held together by similar values and beliefs. For Heberle, this is crucial to the existence of the social movement:

> A sense of group identity and solidarity is required, for only when the acting individuals have become aware of the fact that they have sentiments and goals in common—when they think of themselves as being united with each other in action through these sentiments and for these goals—do we acknowledge the existence of a social movement. (p. 7)

Heberle also recognized the need for structure in social movements and briefly introduces, but fails to expand theoretically, the forms of social structure relevant to the study of social movements:

> By structure in reference to social movements we mean in the first place the differentiation of roles and the distribution of power, influence, and authority within the movement; in the second place we mean the relation of the movement to political parties, the structure and organization of the latter, and the interrelation between parties and other organized groups within the movement. (pp. 15-16)

Many of the ideas put forth by Heberle were later to become crucial in the convergence of social movement and organizational literature. Although he focused primarily upon the relationship between social movement structures and those of political parties, primarily internal to the movement, Heberle moved the field in the direction of seeing the movement as a collectivity and as a whole.

In 1957, Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, and in 1964, Ralph Turner moved the field of collective behavior a step farther in the direction of institutional behavior analysis. Rejecting the contagion and convergence theories of most collective behavior theorists, Turner postulated an emergent norm approach which suggested that collective

behavior should be analyzed within the same model of individual and interactive behavior as institutional behavior. Questioning the necessity of similarity in values and beliefs as postulated by Heberle, the emergent norm approach reflects the empirical observation that the crowd is characterized not by unanimity but by differential expression, with different individuals feeling differently, participating because of diverse motives, and even acting differently. The appearance of unanimity exist because the behavior of parts of the collectivity are perceived by observers and crowd members as reflective of the whole crowd. According to Turner and Killian (1972):

> The concept of the development of a norm, a common understanding as to what sort of behavior is expected in the situation, seems to provide an explanation of a pattern of differential expression. Such a shared understanding encourages behavior consistent with the norm, inhibits behavior contrary to it, and justifies restraining action against individuals who dissent. Since the norm is to some degree specific to the situation, differing in degree or in kind from the norms governing noncrowd situations, it is an emergent norm. (p. 22)

Weller and Quarantelli (1973) observe that the real strength of the emergent norm perspective is that it rules out looking at atypical characteristics of individuals and their reactions to each other to explain collective behavior. However, Turner obliterates the distinction between institutional and noninstitutional behavior and does not provide alternative criteria for conceptualizing the differences between them. Weller and Quarantelli agree with Turner that there are no fundamental psychological differences between people in both institutional and noninstitutional setting, but they argue that there are obvious differences, and if they are not social psychological, then they

must be found in the social properties of the collectives that enact them.

In 1963, Neil Smelser followed the same line of thought developed by Turner by stating that collective behavior "can be classified and analyzed under the same conceptual framework as all social behavior" (p. 21). Although Smelser gives us the first truly "sociological" approach to the study of collective behavior, he fails to add very much that will help us to understand the structure of a social movement better. The social action scheme provides an interesting framework within which to analyze collective behavior; however, it does little in the way of explanation. The determinants of social action are important in that they attempt to observe certain characteristics of collectivities that are deterministic of certain types of collective behavior. However, the major determinant—the creation of a generalized belief—still reflects the necessity of studying individual attitudes and beliefs as causal factors in collective behavior. Finally, and perhaps most important to the study of social movements, Smelser assumes that crowds and riots can be analyzed under the same framework as social movements. At a time when some social movement theorists were attempting to move out of the traditional crowd theory basis, Smelser draws them together theoretically.

The works of both Turner and Smelser added very little to the problem of identifying the structure of a social movement. However, they did contribute to the general move away from traditional psychological explanations and to a more "social" conception of the field of

collective behavior. One of the first theoretical pieces to directly approach the concept of a social movement organization as a unit of analysis was developed by Zald and Ash (1966). Rejecting the traditional organizational approaches of Max Weber and Robert Michels, Zald and Ash follow the general sociological approach to organizations most explicitly stated by Philip Selznick called "institutional analysis." Selznick distinguishes between the "rationa, means-oriented, efficiency guided process of administration and the value laden adaptive, responsive process of institutionalization . . . . the process of organic growth wherein the organization adapts to the strivings of internal groups and the values of the external society" (Perrow, p. 190). Zald and Ash characterizes the approach as follows:

> The approach can be applied to any kind of association or organization, not just those with bureaucratic structures. Briefly, large scale organizations are seen as a collective of groups harnessed together by incentives of various kinds to pursue relatively explicit goals. Both the ends and means of subgroups may conflict with those established by the authoritarian elements in the organization; there may be a conflict over the distribution of power and rewards within the organization. Organizations exist in a changing environment to which they must adapt. Adaptation to the environment may itself require changes in goals and to the internal arrangement of the organization. This view of organizations treats goals as problematic, and as changing in response to both internal and external pressures. It is especially useful for the study of MO's (movement organizations) precisely because it focuses on conflict, environmental forces, and the ebb and flow of organizational viability. (p. 329)

Within this framework, Zald and Ash define a social movement as "a purposive and collective attempt of a number of people to change individuals or societal institutions and structures" (p. 329). Although the organizations within the social movement can have bureaucratic

features, they differ in two ways. First, social movement organizations have goals aimed at changing society and its members, not to provide them with a regular service. Secondly, MO's are characterized by an incentive structure in which purposive incentives are dominant. Rather than being based on material (money and goods) or solidary (prestige, respect, and friendship) incentives, the social movement organization must depend on purposive incentives. According to Zald and Ash:

> Organizations which rely on purposive incentives often have the problem of maintaining membership commitment and participation, for the values represented by the MO's goals must be deeply held in order for the organization to command time and loyalty in the face of competition of work and the demands of family and friends. (p. 329)

With the institutional perspective, Zald and Ash now plant the study of social movements firmly in theory grounded from an organizational framework. In addition, a basis has been laid for looking at the social movement organization as a reality with characteristics somewhat different from those of the traditional bureaucratic model. The second defining characteristic—purposive incentive structure—however, still reflects the necessity of a psychological support base. This is particularly crucial to the "inclusive" organization, as opposed to the "exclusive" organization, two ideal type concepts elaborated by Zald and Ash. The inclusive organization requires minimal levels of initial commitment while the exclusive organization draws from those who have a heavy initial commitment. A determining factor for any MO, according to Zald and Ash, is the readiness for mobilization of potential supporters. This readiness is dependent upon the ebb and flow of sentiments toward the organization. Zald and Ash argue that the ebb

and flow of sentiments in a society more markedly affect the inclusive organization than the exclusive organization.

Although there is recognition of the environment surrounding the movement organization in the initial works of Zald and Ash, their analysis is quite obviously upon the internal structure of the organization and the social psychological processes which operate within it. This classical mode of organizational thought was further developed by the works of Curtis and Zurcher (1974), who expanded Zald and Ash's inclusive-exlcusive types with a dichotomy advanced by Gordon and Babchuk (1959) on voluntary associations, instrumental-expressive types, and formed a paradigm of social movement organizations. A review of the literature revealed to Curtis and Zurcher two key variables among the characteristics of social movement organizations: the kinds of organizational goals and the conditions of membership. The conditions of membership have already been identified under Zald and Ash's inclusive-exclusive types. According to Babchuk and Gordon, goals can reflect one of two organizational types. The expressive organization manifests a goal orientation towards satisfying the social and psychological needs of its members through acts of participation. The instrumental organization manifests a goal orientation of accomplishing some specific task external to the organization. Combining these together, Curtis and Zurcher formulate a paradigm which conceptually incorporates what they consider to be the central structural components of social movement organizations: "the nature of the goals, the nature of membership requirements, the kinds of

membership incentives; the degree to which the organization is detached from its community of concern; the types of leadership, and the kinds of membership" (p. 367). It is obvious from these components that Curtis and Zurcher are following rather closely the works of traditional organizational theorists with a closed system perspective. They even go so far to state that "whatever else a social movement may be, it is a complex organization" (p. 356).

Some New Theoretical Frameworks

While many theorists were attempting to pull well tested organizational theories into the study of social movement organizations, others were beginning to take new and fresh approaches to the study of movements. Two anthropologists, Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine, were beginning to look at movement organizations which grew up within the Black Power Movement, the Pentacostal Movement, and the Ecology Movement. Rather than entering their research with preconceived theories and conceptual frameworks, Gerlach and Hine took a more traditional anthropological approach by attempting to formulate new perspectives from what they observed. Gerlach suggested that "the best strategy for the study of social movements is to examine various local movement groups as interrelated segments within a system of groups." In this context, we shift focus to group interaction, interdependence, and function" (1970, p. 123). The importance of stressing the organization(s) of social movements becomes increasingly clear in Gerlach and Hines work People, Power, and Change (1970). In contrasting "radical" change with "progress" they give us perhaps the most realistic rationale for

sociology's recent interest in the organization rather than the social psychology of social movements:

> In a discussion of social, political, or religious movements, change may be defined as radical if those who occupy positions of power in the existing social structures resist that change. Those who desire the change, therefore, must mobilize for collective power to oppose the power vested in existing structures. By this same criterion, developmental change may be viewed as change which the people regard as "progress." (p. xiii)

Gerlach and Hine observe that, in the minds of many people, organizations are either bureaucratically run or they have a charismatic leadership structure (p. 33). When applying these preconceived stereotypical structures to social movements, many researchers have found either a "spontaneous explosion of mindless, often fanatic crowds, led by charismatic prophets . . . who suddenly and inexplicably appear out of nowhere . . . and generate an ever-increasing force by some strange process of attraction" or establishment-challenging movements (which are) too well organized and therefore must be secret conspiracies under the control of an alien mastermind (p. 124). In their research on three social movements—Black Power, Charismatic Renewal, and Environmental Action—Gerlach and Hine found neither unstructured and mysterious "spontaneous explosions" of hysteric crowds, nor products of a master planner and his devoted disciples. In contrast, they regard these as system changing movements developing sociocultural systems internally which have the following structural and functional characteristics:

(1) An identifiable social, political, and economic organization
(2) A means of recruiting new members

(3) A process by which members are enculturated and committed to the movement
(4) A developing ideology
(5) A boundary establishing and unity-generating process by which participants identify and stand together against real or perceived opposition. (Gerlach and Hine, p. xvii)

Movement organization itself is divided into three basic characteristics by Gerlach and Hine: segmentary, composed of many proliferating groups or cells; polycephalous and decentralized, led by many heads and not directed by a central command structure; and reticulate, having a networklike structure within which the various cells intersect and overlap (1970, pp. 124-125).

Following the lead established by Herberle (1951) and Zald and Ash (1966) that social movement organizations are not bureaucratic formal organizations, Gerlach and Hine first characterize a social movement organization as segmentary, by which is meant that it is composed of a great variety of cells or groups which are essentially independent, but which can combine to form larger configurations or divide to form smaller units:

> All systems are composed of parts or cells, but in a bureaucratically centralized society the segments are always subordinated to a center and operate according to a prescribed chain of command. Furthermore, new segments are formed in accordance with the rules and at the decision of or at least with the approval of the central administration. In contrast, in a segmentary system fission and proliferation of cells take place independently, unrelated to any central decision making. (Gerlach and Hine, pp. 41-42)

Gerlach's observation of the segmentary nature of movement organization suggests four basic ways in which cells split, merge, or proliferate: First, movements characteristically include in the ideology a concept of personal power; i.e., each individual is encouraged to "take

initiative in acting to promote movement goals he considers important" (p. 819). This results in organizational splits over ideological or procedural approaches and acts to stimulate new recruits to each new venture. Secondly, preexisting socioeconomic differences are carried over into the movement and increase this splitting of the organization. Thirdly, movement leaders, particularly in the case of black power leaders, compete for a broad range of economic, political, social and psychological rewards. Finally, segmentation of movement organization can occur over basic ideological differences.

The second major characteristic of movement organizations studied by Gerlach and Hine is that the leadership is decentralized. Not only is it decentralized, but it is what they call "polycephalous" or many-headed. Power and authority tend to be distributed among several of the most able and dedicated members of a group, "of which one is recognized as primus inter pares, the 'first among equals'" (Gerlach, 1971, p. 820). Gerlach also follows the findings of Sahlins (1961), that leadership in such systems is often situation specific and hence ephemeral. Leaders, then, can be either charismatic or bureaucratic, depending on the need of the situation, although Gerlach and Hine found that the leadership in the movements that they studied was, in Weberian terms, more charismatic than bureaucratic. Gerlach and Hine give five reasons for the maintenance of this polycephalous structure and the lack of "leaders," as such:

1. Leaders quite clearly disagree upon such crucial matters as the goals of the movement and the means by which these goals should be reached.

2. None of the leaders they studied had a roster or even knows about all the groups which consider themselves participants in the movement.

3. None of the leaders can make binding decisions on all of the participants in the movement, and none can speak for the movement as a whole.

4. None of the leaders has regulatory powers over the movement, which is most frustrating for representatives of the established order.

5. There is no such thing as a card carrying member of the movement. (Gerlach and Hine, pp. 36-37)

All of these factors limit the movement organization and its leaders from actually directing the movement in a traditional organizational sense. Like the inclusive organization described by Zald and Ash, Gerlach and Hine observed no objective requirements to qualify a person as a movement member.

How this decentralized, segmentary, nonbureaucratic structure operates comes as a surprise to representatives of the established order who are accustomed to a more hierarchical arrangement. It maintains its cohesion, however, though the linkages among the autonomous cells which form a network that essentially is boundless and limitless. This network is weblike, with crossing and intercrossing lines. In this type of organization, the cells, or nodes, are tied together, not through any central point, but rather through intersecting sets of personal relationships and other intergroup linkages. According to Gerlach and Hine, they identify five types of linkages:

1. Personal ties between members (kinship, friendship, close relationships)
2. Personal ties between leaders (kinship, social, etc.)
3. Traveling evangelists (living links in the network)
4. Ritual activities (unifying events or rituals)

5. Ideological linkages (basic beliefs shared by all members of movement) (pp. 60-62)

These linkages serve a very similar function to, and are supportive of, the unity, commitment, and cohesion that has been emphasized by previous students of social movements (Heberle, 1951, and Zald and Ash, 1966). According to Gerlach and Hine, in a decentralized, segmented organization

> the importance of the linkages which tie the whole into a network cannot be overemphasized. It is even more important to recognize the role of personal kinship, friendship, and other associational ties. In an organization where no single individual even begins to know all of the groups involved in the movement, and where there are no central headquarters through which information and authority can be channeled, and effective and very flexible unity can be maintained through personal ties between committed individuals. (p. 63)

A common and very dominant theme running through the works of Gerlach and Hine, and one which is contrary to traditional and much contemporary thought on organizations, is an appreciation for the adaptive functions which conflict can perform for the movement organization:

> When the success of movements is reported as having occurred 'because of' rather than 'in spite of' organizational fission and lack of cohesion, we have come to understand the nature of movement dynamics more clearly. Organizational unity is functional in a steady state social institution designed to maintain social stability and the status quo. Segmentation and internecine dogfighting are functional in a social institution designed for rapid growth and the implementation of social change. (Gerlach and Hine, p. 64)

They react negatively to the American cultural postulate that it is simply inefficient to have many different organizations, with similar goals, working in similar ways, but that all efforts should be coordinated under some central direction. They have found, on the contrary, that these very characteristics are highly adaptive in that

they "promote the growth of the movement, prevent effective suppression of it, and facilitate the desired personal and social change" (p. 65).

The functions of conflict are not necessarily new to sociological analysis (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956), but within the area of organizations, the study of conflict, at least as a functional and beneficial phenomenon, has received little attention. Two recent changes in organizational thought, however, have paved the way for new perspectives on the functions of conflict and have also contributed to the further convergence of social movement and organizational perspectives. The first of these changes was the previously mentioned move toward a more open systems perspective rather than the traditional closed systems analysis. By overlooking the boundaries of the organization and beginning to observe the interactions with the environment, inputs and outputs, social scientists were able to recognize the existence of many forms of conflict between external and internal forces, and in some cases to see that they were functional to the survival of the system. The importance this had for the social movement theorists was an organizational perspective that is capable of handling the more dynamic aspects of life.

The Levels of Analysis Issue

Perhaps an equally important change was also occurring in the basic conceptualization of just what an "organization" was anyway and how it was best conceived for sociological analysis. The issue of "level of analysis" has undergone some interesting changes in the last few years in the field of organizations. There seems to be some agreement that

generally three levels of analysis exist within the field. Peter Blau (1965) distinguishes the levels according to the focus of analysis the researcher takes: (1) the individual in his specific role as a member of an organization, (2) the structure of social relations among individuals in the various groups within the organization, and (3) the system of interrelated elements that characterize the organization as a whole. Lazarsfeld and Menzel (1969) make a similar distinction, but by a typology of the properties of the collectivities: (1) Analytical properties of collectives which are obtained by performing some mathematical operation upon some property of each single member; (2) structural properties of collectives which are obtained by performing some operation on data about the relation of each member to some or all of the others, and (3) global properties which are not based on information about the properties of individual members. Although there are some differences in these classifications, the similarities are perhaps more important. It is evident that the three levels of analysis lead to quite different, through by no means unrelated, problems (Blau, p. 326). On the first level, the role attributes and performances of individual members of organizations are investigated, and the other two are considered given conditions. In the second level, the structures of social relations in groups are analyzed, and the first and third remain constant, but limiting factors. The third level is aimed at discovering the principles that govern the functioning system by studying the combinations of attributes that characterize organizations as such and the development of these systems of organizing the efforts of various

groups in joint endeavors (Blau, p. 326). It is here that the analysis focuses on the attributes of organizations themselves and the system of interrelated elements that characterize the organization as a whole, not its component parts. In conjunction with the open-systems perspective, the unit of analysis now becomes the organization itself, not the internal parts. Blau has suggested that we now move towards a theory of organizations rather than organization theory, the difference being the latter focuses on the internal structure of the organization while the former explains the organization itself and focuses on its relationship with the environment as possible causal variables (p. 338).

An open systems perspective and a concern for the organization itself as a unit of analysis have been important stepping-stones to the comparative analysis of organizations. The trend has also affected the development of conceptions of social movement organizations in a much more "sociological" light. The result has been a somewhat different conception of just what a social movement organization is and how it should be analyzed. Of importance here has been the work of McCarthy and Zald. Critical of the classical model of social movement analysis as applicable to modern social movements, McCarthy and Zald utilize a resource mobilization perspective to introduce what they call a "professional model" of movement organizations. According to McCarthy and Zald, in the classical model the membership base provides money, voluntary manpower, and leadership (1973a, pp. 17-18). Because of certain changes in modern society, the authors feel that the functions historically served by a social movement membership base have been

"increasingly taken over by paid functionaries, by the 'bureaucratization of social discontent,' by mass promotion campaigns, by full-time employees whose professional careers are defined in terms of social movement, by philanthropic foundations, and by government itself" (p. 3). The main theme underlying this argument is that the survival of social movement organizations is dependent upon their ability to mobilize resources in support of that organization. Although many social movements have as beneficiaries the lower level economically in our society, their financial support must come from other areas. McCarthy and Zald make the argument that the beneficiary base can actually be completely separate from the support base, and that the support base, although relatively small, can make up most of the membership of the movement. Three things seem to have contributed to this change in movement organization structure. First, there has been a separation of funding and leaders from the population beneficiary base. Secondly, mass media has made it possible to build membership commitment, garner support for movement goals, and to influence decision makers. According to McCarthy and Zald:

> In the classical model the size and the amount of activity of a movement and its corresponding movement organization are presumably a tip-off to a political elite that some action on its part is necessary, be it repressive or ameliorative . . . But the public's perception of a movement's intensity of action may reflect media coverage rather than the actual membership strength or the scope and the intensity of grievances. A movement may appear to command a large membership in the classical sense, while in fact the membership may be nonexistent or exist only on paper. (1973a, pp. 18-19)

Thirdly, in conjunction with Zald and Ash (1966), McCarthy and Zald see a growing trend toward inclusive organizations, by which they mean

"partial commitment and relatively little in the way of membership requirements" (pp. 19-20). The result is that movement organizations may have a highly heterogeneous population and funding from several sources rather than just the beneficiary base.

The rise of professional social movements, then, has resulted from changing funding patterns and resulting changed career patterns of social movement leaders. Movement leaders in this matrix become social movement entrepreneurs. Their movement's impact results from their skill at manipulating images of relevance and support through the communications media (p. 20). Professional social movements are characterized by:

> 1. A leadership that devotes full time to the movement, with a large proportion of the resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent.
> 2. A very small or nonexistent membership base or a paper membership base.
> 3. Attempts to impart the image of "speaking for a potential constituency."
> 4. Attempts to influence policy toward the same constituency. (McCarthy and Zald, 1973a, p. 20)

Within the realm of the resource mobilization perspective, and the professional model as a guide, McCarthy and Zald assume that social movement organizations (SMO's), like all complex organizations, can be analyzed as dynamic, goal oriented social systems. They are dependent upon their environment for resources and constrained and restrained by actors and forces in their environment from achieving their goals. Organizational survival, growth and goal attainment are dependent upon organizational structure and upon strategy and tactics that become more or less institutionalized in organizational structure and process (p. 29).

Their definition of a social movement organization is that it is a "complex or formal organization that identifies its goals with that of the broader movement and attempts to implement the goals of the movement" (1973b). Although McCarthy and Zald are in agreement with Curtis and Zurcher (1974), and others, who see the movement organization as a complex organization, one crucial distinction remains: the resource mobilization perspective is more concerned with the external structure of the organization and its relationship with the environment than Curtis and Zurcher's emphasis on the movement organizations internal structure.

The concern for different levels of analysis seem to be a crucial issue in terms of identifying just what a social movement organization is and more importantly, what part of it is most fruitful for analysis and theoretical conceptualization. The recent works of Gusfield (1955 and 1963), Zald and Ash (1966), and Curtis and Zurcher (1974) seem to emphasize the bureaucratic elements of movement organizations. Stallings (1974) suggests that this is less a result of mistaken judgment, as has been suggested by Schultz (1972) than it is a reflection of the inadequacy of existent organizational models and methods in tapping conceptually important phenomenon. According to Stallings, "despite recognition of the presence of many nonbureaucratic dimensions, research on social movements has been guided (implicitly or explicitly) by the most fully elaborated model of organizations available at the time, the bureaucratic model as developed in American sociology" (p. 3). His major criticism of the bureaucratic model is that it pays too much

attention to the internal dimensions of single organizations rather than to the patterns of interrelationships among several groups of varying degrees of bureaucratization. Following along the same lines as McCarthy and Zald's concept of social movement industry, Stallings suggested that an interorganizational perspective calls attention to a new level of analysis focusing on sets of related groups and organizations (p.3).

In a study of a proposed construction of a fossil fueled electric generating plant in a metropolitan area, Stallings found two major coalitions with several clearly identifiable organizations. The first coalition centered upon an emergent citizen group while the second (not in direct contact with the first) had two focal organizations; the former was against the plant while the latter was in favor of it. But the picture which Stallings draws of the interaction is not one of a movement organization in conflict with a target organization:

> Rather, the movement consists of several organizations (of varying degrees of structural elaboration) in conflict with a second coalition of groups and organizations (p. 4) . . . . the conceptualization of social movements suggested here is an extension of the segmentary structure described by Gerlach and Hine (1970:41-42). Rather than concentrating on properties of a single movement organization, the inter-organizational perspective draws attention to characteristics of movements which follow from the fact that linkages among several groups of varying properties are continually being worked out. This perspective treats the multiorganizational field (or coalition) itself as the unit of analysis with various movement groups as its components and explores linkages among them as well as the interaction between coalitions as wholes. (Stallings, p. 5)

From this brief review of changes in theoretical conceptions in social movement literature, it appears as if there has been a shift from

an extremely psychological conception of social movements to an extremely sociological conception. From a starting point of focusing on individual psychological differences of movement participants (LeBon), the movement was then conceived of as a collectivity (Heberle), then as having internal processes simlilar to institutional organizational behavior (Turner and Killian), next as being analyzed with the same conceptual frameworks as organizations (Zald and Ash), as formal and complex organizations (Curtis and Zurcher), as formal organizations working within an environment (McCarthy and Zald), and finally from a standpoint of interorganizational analysis (Stallings). This trend from a concern for individual psychological differences to interorganizational analysis has seemed to have followed the same pattern that organizational theory followed some years back. However, to understand the current conceptualization of a "social movement organization," we must be able to offer more to a theoretical framework than to say merely that its development parallels that of contemporary organizational theory. To appreciate the application of interorganizational analysis and open systems theory to a modern conception of social movement organizations requires not only a new look at the SMO, but also the SMO's environment and the dynamic processes that it becomes involved in.

IV. PART II: SOCIAL MOVEMENT ENVIRONMENT

Introduction

One of the major problems with an open-system perspective is that focusing on input and output from one system to another blurs boundaries

and makes identification of units of analysis difficult. Just what "system" one is speaking of is difficult to conceptualize and to distinguish from its parts, which may be systems themselves. Going in the other direction, the search for causal variables in the environment can be an endless search, and perhaps methodologically impractical. Heyderbrand (1973) has argued that if comparative analysis is to contribute to a theory of organizations, then it must do so within a framework of a general—and perhaps critical—theory of society. This would require that organizations be studied "in their larger context, in relation to each other, in relation to the limits imposed on them by the characteristics of modern nation states, and in relation to the international order, or world society (p. 8). Although many studies of social movements have considered these variables in the past, one must ask how far would an analysis of the environment of a social movement organization have to proceed to have sufficiently explained the majority of causal influences. Although I do not envision cross-cultural factors to be crucial factors in internal national movements, there is some evidence to suggest that the form and structure of the colonial movement in South Africa was very much influenced by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States (Williams, 1975). Since most studies in the near future will most likely be exploratory (i.e., exploring interrelationships among variables while further specifying their contents operationally), this problem is perhaps not as crucial as a lack of sufficient theory from which testable hypotheses can be deduced. Progress toward theory seems to presently be in the classification stage.

Early Conceptions of the Environment: The Works of Blumer

In a recent review of the field of social movements Lewis M. Killian notes that attempts to define social movements have two things in common—action to promote or resist change in the social order or environment and behavior which is collective (Killian, 1973). It is obvious from a quick review of the studies in the field that the former has received much less attention than the latter. Perhaps a major reason for this is that it has been much easier to conceptualize theoretically and to study empirically the movement collectivity itself as a social phenomenon than to struggle with understanding the broader and more complex environment in which it develops and which it hopes to change. Another reason, and perhaps just as important, stems from the conception of social movements, as with most collective behavior, as a negative phenomenon to the social order and therefore a more fruitful place to search for causes than the social order itself. Whatever the reason, the result has been a deficiency in the development of theoretical perspectives which attempt to conceptualize and to organize analytically the elements within the social order and the environment which may directly influence the development of a social movement.

One of the first elements within the environment to be identified was what Blumer has referred to as the "public" (1951, p. 168). Blumer, however, introduced the public as one of the four basic collective groups: the acting crowd, the expressive crowd, the mass, and the public. The relations and distinctions between these groupings remained somewhat unclear in Blumer's work (Smelser, 1963, p. 7). Most of the

original work in this area has merely attempted to distinguish between publics and collective behavior or to show how the former evolves into the latter, not how the public may be influential in the development of collective behavior. Turner and Killian (1972, p. 179) advance a somewhat more active conception of the public and its potential role for affecting a group's development. According to Turner and Killian:

> A public is a dispersed group of people interested in and divided about an issue, engaged in a discussion of the issue, with a view registering a collective opinion which is expected to affect the course of action of some group or individual. (p. 179)

The importance of the public is stressed because every action by a movement provokes a community reaction. Every movement in society is viewed as generally consistent with, or fundamentally antagonistic to, the established value scheme. According to Turner and Killian (1972), how it is viewed will determine the type of tactics and opposition with which it is confronted, the circumstances under which it recruits members, and the degree to which it can operate openly through legitimate means:

> Every movement, through defining and promoting consideration of an issue, creates or fosters a public concerned with both the issue and the movement itself. Part of the function of the public is to define the movement's relation to society's value scheme. The effective definition that emerges from the public will determine the access that the movement has to legitimate means for promoting its program in society. Whether a dispassionate or retrospective evaluation would determine that the movement's objectives were or were not in fact consistent with the basic value structure of society is not the important question. Movements are identified as respectible or revolutionary on the basis of the prevailing public opinion. (p. 258)

Although public opinion is an important external factor to the development of a social movement, how this opinion is manifested and

how the public itself is "organized" has only recently been studied. Prior conceptions of the public have tended to assume the public remained in a passive role, with very little concern for the potential action that a public could take positively or negatively toward the social movement. Blumer was instrumental here in distinguishing between the general public and special publics, the latter being those segments of the public with views about particular issues, problems, or other questions of public concern. He remarks that

> public opinion may be different from any of the groups in the public. It can be thought of, perhaps, as a composite opinion formed out of the several opinions that are held in the public; or better, as the central tendency set by the striving of these separate opinions, and consequently, as being shaped by the relative strength and play of opposition among them. (Blumer, 1951, p. 189)

The distinction is important in that while the general public may have the capacity to legitimize a social movement, the special publics, or interest groups, have the potential to participate in direct social action in support of or against any particular social movement.

Toward a More Social Conception of the Environment: Smelser

Although Blumer's conceptualization of "the public" was an important step in identifying a significant element in the environment of social movements, his discussion still reflected the bias of former writers who focused on the individual motivations of collectives of people to participate in collective behavior. One of the first attempts at approaching collective behavior and social movements from a more sociological perspective which moved away from individualistic explanations was Neil Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior (1963).

Smelser's theory is built on two main theoretical anchorages: social action systems theory and the value added process. A basic assumption which guides Smelser's approach is that collective behavior is analyzable by the same categories as conventional behavior (p. 23). Following the works of Parsons, Shils, and Bales (1953) on social action schemes, Smelser postulates four components of social action which must be known in order to describe any social action:

> . . . (1) the generalized ends, or values, which provide the broadest guides to purposive social behavior, (2) the regulatory rules governing the pursuit of the goals, rules which are to be found in norms, (3) the mobilization of individual energy to achieve the defined ends within the normative framework . . . (4) the available situational facilities which the actor utilizes as means . . . (p. 24)

Smelser also suggested that there are identifiable determinants of collective behavior that operate in any incidence of collective behavior. Structural conduciveness is the most general determinant which establishes the scope within which the second determinant, structural strain, can develop. Other determinants are: the growth and spread of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization of the participants for action, and the operation of social control. The determinants are listed in what Smelser calls a value added sequence, which means that while all the determinants must be present for collective behavior to develop, one does not grow out of another and they need not appear in any set sequence. One may be added after another develops, but it may exist beforehand and simply be activated by the addition of other determinants.

Of particular importance to the environment is Smelser's identification of structural conduciveness and structural strain.

Smelser suggested that certain structural characteristics, more than others, permit or encourage episodes of collective behavior. More specifically, some structures are more conducive of certain types of social movements than others. He states that social movements are either norm oriented or value oriented. A norm oriented movement "is an attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief" (p. 270). A value oriented movement, on the other hand, "is a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalized belief" (p. 313). According to Smelser, social movements come about because of a structural strain in either the norms or values of society, the two more general components of the social action scheme. In other words, Smelser assumes that people join social movements because something is wrong in their social environment; they suffer from the injustices of existing social arrangements. Because the problem in the environment is perceived to require either a change in the normative or valuative structure of the society, a social movement, rather than some other form of collective behavior, emerges to deal with it.

A basic question which Smelser then asks is what are those elements in the environment which are conducive to the emergence of a norm oriented movement and those which are conducive to the emergence of value oriented movements. Building on a distinction made by Almond between interest articulation, which refers to the structures through which interests, grievances, and desires are made explicit, and interest aggregation, which refers to the structures in which the articulated

interests are combined, weighed, and forged into policy, Smelser suggested that we must identify both the source of demands for change in the population, and the kind of reception that these demands receive at the political level. If the expression of dissatisfaction is to be channeled into norm oriented movements, both interest articulation and interest aggregation must be structurally differentiated to a high degree. If political, economic, or ethnic cleavages coincide, any grievance is likely to become a conflict over values. If the movement is to be of a normative nature, it is necessary that the discontented have some degree of access to some method of affecting the normative order (p. 282). When all avenues of agitating are closed, dissatisfaction tends to find an outlet in a value oriented movement or in expressions of hostility (p. 284).

Smelser suggested that democratic systems possess varying ways of passing information, sentiments and desires to governmental and other agencies—"Petitions, elections, initiatives, referenda, letters to Congressmen, letters to the press, demonstrations, public opinion polls, request for court injunctions, etc" (p. 282). In addition, for each of these channels for influencing the normative order, it is possible to rely on one or more of many types of social organization—"independent associations, political parties, pressure groups, clubs, political bosses or informal gatherings" (p. 282). As a result of the potential availability of many different channels for affecting normative arrangements, and many different kinds of potential organizations by which to do so, any given social movement has a vast array of alternative strategies and tactics to use to affect change (p. 282).

To the extent that this type of structurally conducive environment exists, it is most likely that it will take on a normative rather than a valuative orientation. However, the type of social movement is also influenced by the second major determinant—structural strain. Smelser defines strain as "an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action (p. 47). Strain appears as a malfunction of one of the components of social action, but, according to Smelser, it always expresses a relation between an event or situation and certain cultural and individual standards (p. 51). Of importance to Smelser's theory is the generalized belief that develops in an attempt to reduce the ambiguity created by the conditions of this structural strain. In other words, a major element of Smelser's theory of collective behavior is the identification of a generalized belief, which establishes a perspective on the environment and the strain that determines what type of collective behavior will occur.

Another part of Smelser's theory which adds to our understanding of the environment is his use of the concept "social control." Although this is the sixth determinant of collective behavior, it arches over all the others. The study of social control, says Smelser, is "the study of those counter determinants which prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation" of the other five determinants (p. 17). He divides social controls into two broad types:

> (a) Those social controls which minimize conduciveness and strain. In a broad sense, these controls prevent the occurrence of an episode of collective behavior, because they attack very nonspecific determinants. (b) Those social controls which are mobilized only after a collective episode has begun to materialize. (p. 17)

With regard to the first type, there seems to be some consensus that the emergence of social movements may be an indication that there is a weakening in the system of social control (Turner and Killian, 1972, p. 176, and Smelser, 1969, pp. 93-94). According to Smelser, when the agencies of control suddenly lose their effectiveness, a movement suddenly turns into a revolutionary direction (value-oriented). It is not so much the nature of the ideology of the movement as the behavior of the authorities that determines this change of direction (p. 94). Several writers on the student movements of the 1960's have suggested that the revolutionary nature of the protest and the goals were a function of the total interactional process between movement participants and the elements of social control (Horowitz, 1970).

Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior, while a definite improvement over more psychological approaches to social movements, is still held back by a number of limitations. First, the definition of collective behavior is dependent upon the generalized belief that defines or redefines the structural strain in the environment. The theory is, then, still focusing on the individual definition of the situation as the causal level of analysis. Secondly, the theory is not a causal explanations of collective behavior or social movements, but merely a conceptual framework within which the study of collective behavior and social movements can be analyzed. Finally, with regard to our understanding of the environment, Smelser gives new insight in to forces which may be operating within the environment, but his theory offers little in the way of showing the interrelationships between the

elements in the environment. Although Smelser's discussion of the elements of social control does lend some insight into such agencies as police, governmental authorities, and the military, they are only a small number of the groups within the environment who affect a social movement organization and its progress.

It is perhaps important to emphasize here that within the realm of what is being called the environment of a social movement are a number of different groups and social groupings whose reactions to a social movement should not be considered as uniform. The problem in the present development of social movement theory seems to be one of the first identifying the various elements within the environment which actually come into play during the life of a social movement organization and then what social processes are operating to link them together. The recognition of these elements and their interactive patterns is obviously not a simple task. It is complicated by the existence of not only potentially conflicting groups, such as those of social control, but also groups in the society whose own goals may have varying degrees of similarity to those of the social movement organization in question.

The Organizational Structure of the Environment

Zald and Ash divide the environment of movement organization's into two major segments. One segment is the broader social movement, which consist of potential supporters—members and financial backers and other movement organizations. The other major segment is the society in which the social movement exist. According to Zald and Ash, there are at

least three interrelated aspects of the environment of MO's which critically affect both their growth and transformation:

1. Changing conditions in the society increases or decreases the potential support base of an MO—there is an ebb and flow of supporting sentiments.
2. The society may change in the direction of organizational goals, and the possibilities for success or failure of the movement will influence member and potential member sentiments and attachments.
3. MO's exist in an environment with other organizations aimed at rather similar goals, which can have advantages and disadvantages. (Zald and Ash, p. 30)

Just how the movement organization is linked up with other organizations that may have similar goals or be able to assist the movement organization in the attainment of its goal is unclear. One attempt at identifying how relatively powerless groups interact with other groups in the environment is provided by Michael Lipsky (1972). Following the works of James Q. Wilson (1960), Lipsky formulates a model of the process of "protest" which includes the identification of certain crucial factors in the MO's environment that may determine the success or failure of the movement organization's efforts. These include the role of the communications media, reference publics and target groups. According to Lipsky:

> Relatively powerless groups cannot use protest with a high probability of success. They lack organizational resources, by definition. But even to create bargaining resources through third parties, some resources are necessary to sustain organization. (p. 47)

Because communications media are extremely powerful, especially in local politics, they become an important factor in determining the type of strategies and tactics that a movement organization will use. This is so because the communications media to some extent determines what is

newsworthy, and if a tactic does not attract their attention, the movement organization will not succeed. In a sense, the communications media set the limits of protest action (p. 50).

The communications media can also be used to activate other groups in the environment or what Lipsky calls "third parties" or reference groups. These can be reference publics of "target groups" or interest groups whose regular interaction with protest targets tends to develop into patterns of influence. Although it may be unlikely that movement leaders will be able to influence community or national leaders directly, through the utilization of the communications media and successful appeals or threats to wider publics, they can influence the decision making process.

The third important group in the environment, according to Lipsky, is the target group itself. He suggests the probability of the success of a social movement organization may be approached by examining the maintenance needs of organizations likely to be designated as target groups. This is particularly true of government agencies which have a distinguishing feature that specifically constrains protest organizations. This is the agency director's need to protect the jurisdiction and income of his organization by manipulation of the external environment. In so doing he may satisfy his reference groups without responding to the demands of the protest group or the movement organization (p. 53).

The previously mentioned resource mobilization perspective advanced by McCarthy and Zald (1973a, 1973b, and 1974) offers a somewhat novel approach to classification of the environment. Under the heading of what

they call the "social movement industry," which is composed of all social movement organizations that identify their goals with a broad social movement, McCarthy and Zald distinguish between the "beneficiary base," the group that is supposed to receive the direct benefits of the change resulting from the success of the movement in achieving its goals, and the constituency, which is composed of those individuals, groups or organizations which provide manpower, funds, or activity, for a particular social movement organization (1973b, p. 16). What ties the environment together is the need for resources to carry out the goals of the organizations involved. McCarthy and Zald distinguish between those in the environment who have limited resources, or mass publics, and those who have large amounts of resources, the elite publics. It is the task of the leaders of the social movement organization to transform both mass and elite publics into constituents so that they may either provide direct resources or exert influence on behalf of the SMO in the larger society.

The picture of the environment one gets from the resource mobilization perspective of McCarthy and Zald is very different from traditional approaches. Rather than focusing on the societal response to "the life situation of the oppressed," or the values and attitudes that motivate individual social movement participation, or the ideological conflicts between elements in the environment, or the impact of traditional social control agencies, McCarthy and Zald suggest that what is important is really the ability of the social movement organization to garner enough resources to survive. They agree with

Tullock (1966) that the survival of a social movement organization depends more upon obtaining resources than it does upon actually doing good for its stated beneficiaries (McCarthy and Zald, 1973b, p. 13). Although the resource mobilization perspective moves analysis away from the "issues" which create social movements, it does offer several profitable ways of conceptualizing the social movement organization environment. First, by rejecting the "classical social movement organization," this perspective moves away from a primary concern for the internal structure of the SMO to a much broader concern for the exchange of funds, manpower and other resources with other elements within the environment. Secondly, it highlights the dynamics rather than the static nature of the environment, and provides a framework for analyzing change. Thirdly, the conceptual framework identifies the possibility of a separation of the source of resources from the beneficiary base. Finally, because it recognizes that most movements are made up of a number of different organizations, and that the environment comprises multiple elements, the resource mobilization perspective highlights the possibilities of both conflict and cooperation between movement organizations and between movement organizations and elements in the environment (McCarthy and Zald, 1974, p. 5).

Stallings follows a very similar reasoning in suggesting that to truly understand these processes, we must make the movement organization's environment, or the multiorganizational field, the unit of analysis. Rather than concentrating on properties of a single movement organization, Stallings (1974), suggested that an interorganizational perspective would

draw attention to characteristics of movements which follow from the fact that linkages among several groups of varying properties are continually being worked out (p. 5).

Summary

We have attempted to show in this section some of the various ways in which the environment of the social movement organization has been conceptualized. We began with the works of Herbert Blumer who stressed the importance of and clarified our conception of "the public." Smelser built his theory of collective behavior on some of the basic principles established by Blumer and added to our understanding of the environment the elements of structural conduciveness and structural strain, as well as the operations of social control. And, more importantly, Smelser moved the analysis toward a more social conception of the processes and elements in the environment rather than the traditional concern for individual motivations. The first real classification of the environment was advanced by Zald and Ash (1966) who suggested that it was composed of two major segments: the broader social movement, to include social movement organizations and financial backers, and the society in which the social movement exist. A further identification of the various elements in the society was contributed by Lipsky who looked at the role played by the communications media, reference publics, target groups, and a number of processes such as the interplay of symbolic rewards and the reciprocal relationships between actors in a "protest" process. Lipsky's work was important because it demonstrated the dynamics of the environment and the need for focusing on certain

processes which develop rather than the static analysis of various parts. The work of McCarthy and Zald followed this same reasoning by emphasizing the process of resource mobilization and focusing on the interchange between the social movement organization and those who had control over the resources in the environment. Finally, Stallings (1974) suggests that to really understand these processes, we must make the environment the unit of analysis.

It is apparent from the literature we reviewed that the conceptualization of the elements of the environment has become more precise and more specific. However, the more we begin to identify the environment as a unit of study, the more there is a need for a new level of analysis. Stalling's work highlights some of the analytical problems that traditional organizational theory has faced with the trend toward a more comparative analysis. Although we have made the distinction here between the structure of the social movement organization and the environment, we are not totally convinced that this is a useful or valid distinction. Sanders (1966) has suggested that the various components of a social system are linked to gether by similar ideologies, overlapping personnel, similar programs, and funds (pp. 181-188). The boundaries between various components may not be as important as those things which tie them together. The fact that we even attempt to identify definitive social movement organizations or elements within the environment is somewhat a function of an inability of sociological analysis to deal with the dynamic and ephemeral parts of life. In the next two sections, we will attempt to review the works of those who have tried to deal

conceptually with the more dynamic parts of the life of a social movement by focusing in on the process of interaction between the SMO and the environment and the outcome of these actions, both for the environment and the SMO.

V. PART III: SOCIAL MOVEMENT PROCESS

Introduction

McCarthy and Zald (1973b, p. 31) suggest that the study of the social movement organization process should include three variables: goals, ideology, and tactics. Although we are inclined to agree with McCarthy and Zald that these are probably the three most important variables influencing the character of the interactional process between the SMO and the environment, it is our decision to focus primarily on strategies and tactics and to include material on goals and ideology as it affects the utilization of strategies and tactics. We do this for three reasons. First, it is our contention that the strategies and tactics of a social movement organization are limited by the goals of that organization and by the ideology of its membership and leaders. What are the goals of a social movement organization and what is its ideology are generally not only reflected in its strategies and tactics but are, in many cases, the only source of this information. Secondly, and somewhat related to the first, is the feeling that the visibility of strategies and tactics may make them more important to both the environment and the SMO. According to Heberle:

> The consideration of the tactics of a social movement or a political party is of practical importance, because it is

> in the sphere of tactical action that conflicts with the existing regime are most likely to arise. Furthermore, it is not too difficult to repress and prosecute actions which violate the normative order of a society; it is very difficult, however, to combat successfully the mere holding and expression of ideas opposed to the existing social order or to a particular political regime. It is therefore in the field of tactic rather than in the sphere of ideas that social movements are vulnerable. (1951, p. 362)

Thirdly, we are in agreement with Turner (1970, p. 146) who suggests that the theory of social movements has characteristically been concerned with predicting support for a movement as a criteria for its success, this support based upon a consensus with the broader goals of society and a similar ideological base. However, the question of how a movement acts upon the larger society to promote the changes with which it is identified has received very little attention. Therefore, our analysis of process will tend to focus on those factors which influence the operation of strategies and tactics used by the social movement organization. Although a distinction is not of great importance to our discussion, we will refer to strategies as the more general methods of affecting change in society and to tactics as the specific techniques within these strategies.

The Work of Ralph Turner: Traditional Movement Strategies

One of the more generally accepted classifications of strategies and tactics was developed by Ralph Turner (1970), who draws from a broader theory of power and defines the problem as a choice of power strategies. At a given time or situation, a movement may employ any one or a combination of the following three strategies: persuasion, bargaining and coercion. According to Turner, each strategy is an effort

to provoke some change in the behavior of some group of people, the target group, whose action can serve the movement's aims.

Bargaining takes place when the movement has control over some exchangeable value that the target group wants and offers some of that value in return for compliance with its demands. In a democratic society, this value may be "votes" or support for another movement in exchange for their support. Coercion is the manipulation of the target groups situation in such a fashion that the pursuit of any course of action other than that sought by the movement will be met by considerable cost or punishment. Depending on the power which the movement has, this could range from complete destruction of the target group to a weakening or inconveniencing of the target group. Persuasion is the use of strictly symbolic communication, where rewards and punishments are not under the control of the movement. In this case, the movement identifies its goals with those of the target group in an attempt to persuade them of the benefits of acting in their behalf (p. 126).

What determines the strategy of a movement organization is the result of many interactions and confrontations between internal and external factors affecting movement tactics. Externally is the target group and what Turner calls "publics," those groups in society who may, for one reason or another, be concerned with the movement to the extent of supporting or undercutting movement efforts (p. 150). Internal to the movement is the movement constituency and the movement itself. According to Turner, "a movement must be concerned not only with acting upon a target group, but with winning and holding the support of those

more loosely identified elements" (p. 151). This group of potential supporters for whom the movement must be able to claim to speak is called the "constituency." These four components of the situation—the movement, movement constituency, the target groups, and the publics—provide important factors which must be taken into consideration for any movement strategy.

The strategy and/or strategies are influenced by the relationship between the movement organization and both the publics and the target group. A third factor, the values held by the movement constituency, also is important. Indirectly, says Turner, "values affect selection of strategy . . . through awareness of the image of the movement formed by a larger public reacting to the strategies the movement employees" (p. 151). This is very similar to the role which ideology is generally conceived to play. According to Gary Marx, ideology is "a relatively authoritarian, closed, and explicit belief system which commands obedience from adherents, covers a wide range of situations, and is organized around one or a few preeminent values such as salvation or equality" (p. 173). He suggests that the importance of an ideology is not in its objectivity or its fairness, but that it can have a strong effect on people's behavior. The justifications of a particular ideology "may define the relationship of the means and ends for the activist and ease any doubts he or she may have about acting in the name of a broader social group when he or she lacks a formal mandate from that group to act on its behalf" (p. 173).

Ideology comes into existence, then, when a potential social movement group begins to identify its position as perhaps suppressed or

subordinated and starts making assumptions about the nature of the social world based on this unequal arrangement. Referring to the civil rights movement in the United States, however, Marx suggests that even in the presence of an ideology, its importance in influencing conflict actions can vary considerably among individuals and situations. As the conflict evolves, particularly if events are too fast moving for rigid ideologies, new justifications and interpretations of events will emerge. He goes on to suggest that there has been until recently no well developed ideology in the civil rights movement and that this has permitted flexibility in strategy and tactics (p. 175). Horowitz (1970) reached a similar conclusion in his study of the antiwar movement, The Struggle is the Message. He found that as the goals of the struggle become fluid, indefinite, and even suspect, the forms of the struggle become sharper and consuming (p. 23).

In their text on collective behavior, Turner and Killian (1972) suggest that a continuous struggle goes on between value orientations and power orientations within any movement. They proposed that the interplay between ideology and strategy can occur in three major ways. First, a strong belief in the unlimited worth of a movement's objectives provokes the attitude that any means are justified by the ends gained. This can have several implications for the future of the movement. The slow process of winning a favorable public or getting constituted authorities to accept the program loses to the mere acquisition of power to obtain goals. Pressure is put on leaders to act quickly and forcefully in terms of power rather than the movement's values. Turner

and Killian identify these as control movements, i.e., "movements in which value orientations are so subordinated to the quest for power that they set no limitations on the strategies employed and in which the ideologies and goals are devised and changed chiefly to serve strategic requirements . . ." (p. 304). A second situation which may subvert the value objectives to more power oriented objectives is when a movement is taken over or subverted to power orientations by outsiders who see its potential usefulness to themselves. A movement with any considerable strength immediately has to contend with many efforts to capture it for power purposes. Thirdly, certain kinds of opposition so narrow the range of tactics available to a movement that many times it has no alternative other than to adopt effective means irrespective of the consequence with its values (p. 305).

The Strategy of Protest

The tactics of persuasion, bargaining, and coercion have been considered by many the main activities that social movements participated in to effect change in their surroundings. Recently, however, James Q. Wilson has provided an analysis of another contemporary form of strategy utilized frequently by the civil rights movement and increasingly by other developing movements—the tactic of protest. Protest, according to Wilson, is distinguished from bargaining by the exclusive use of negative inducements or threats which require mass action or response. He identifies four forms of protest:

> Verbal protest would include issuing denunciatory statements, mounting a campaign of adverse publicity, submitting petitions and memorials, holding mass meetings, and sending deputations

> to confront the other party. Physical protest would include picketing, sit-down strikes, marches . . . and violence. Economic protest characteristically involves a boycott or threat of a boycott . . . or a strike. Political protest requires voting reprisals, taken by either the excluded group or others who are sympathetic to its cause. (p. 230)

There are at least two basic prerequisites to the successful accomplishment of any of these strategies. First, there has to be an agreed upon goal on behalf of which mass action can be mobilized. These goals may be specific or general, defensive or assertive. The second prerequisite which Wilson suggests is a target group or an identifiable group or agency which is capable of granting the end sought. Whereas Turner saw the target group as a limiting factor on the form of the strategy, Wilson infers that it is a necessary element for tactics and strategy to be implemented.

Michael Lipsky, in response to Wilson's discussion, agrees that protest, as a tactic, is correctly conceived as a strategy utilized by relatively powerless groups in order to increase their bargaining power. However, he is critical of Wilson because he "defines protest in terms of mass action" and focuses on the utilization of "exclusively negative inducements in the bargaining process" (p. 46). Lipsky defines protest activity as "a mode of political action oriented toward objection to one or more policies or conditions, characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional nature, and undertaken to obtain rewards from political or economic systems while working within the system" (p. 46). The "problem of the powerless" is, then, not just to provide negative inducements but also positive inducements to "activate third parties to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways

favorable to the protestors" (p. 46). The picture one receives from Lipsky is not a simple interaction between movement organization and a target group but takes into consideration the possible entrance into the action of many reference publics which might effect change in some way:

> It is intuitively unconvincing to suggest that fifteen people sitting uninvited in the Mayor's office have the power to move City Hall. A better formulation would suggest that the people sitting in may be able to appeal to a wider public to which the city administration is sensitive. Thus, in successful protest activity the reference publics of protest targets may be conceived as explicitly or implicitly reacting to protest in such a way that target groups or individuals respond in ways favorable to the protestors. (p. 46)

The factors which influence the strategy of protest are not always reflective of a positive relationship between the SMO and the target group. Several writers have suggested that the strategies and tactics which a social movement may utilize are perhaps more a function of the reactions of the authorities or social control agents than of any process necessarily supportive of the movement itself. In the Politics of Protest, the report by Jerome H. Skolnick to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, the author states that:

> The most meaningful grouping of protesters separates those for whom tactics are chiefly a moral question from those who see tactics chiefly as the means to political ends. Most of the latter, though not ethically committed to nonviolence, have repeatedly turned away from possible bloody encounters. Having no single ideology or clearly formulated goals beyond an end to the war, the movement is dependent on government policy for its survival, growth, and tactical evolution. (Skolnick, 1969, p. xx)

The point which Skolnick is trying to make is very similar to the conclusions reached by Marx (1970) and Horowitz (1970). Marx, in discussing the civil rights movement, observes that the relative absence of well-developed ideologies in the context of American racial conflict

has permitted flexibility in strategies and tactics. "Though given the presence of an ideology, its importance in motivating, sustaining, and directing conflict actions varies considerably among individuals and situations" (p. 174). And once the conflict has begun, Marx adds that events are often too diverse and fast moving for rigid preprogramed ideologies. As the conflict evolves, new justifications and interpretations emerge to rationalize the necessary tactics and strategies. Horowitz goes even farther in reaching the conclusion that "most of the violence is externally generated by pressures upon the law enforcement agencies to keep greater law and order and very little is initiated from within the antiwar movement as such" (p. 115).

The implication from the works of Skolnick, Marx, and Horowitz is that there is a need to focus on factors external to the movement itself to explain the strategies and tactics of a movement; however, they offer no guiding framework or theoretical scheme by which to begin the analysis. Oberschall (1973) moves a step in this direction by advancing a perspective which deals with the process of interaction in the utilization of strategies and tactics rather than the actual methods themselves. Building on the polarization model of Karl Marx, Oberschall formulates a process which he entitles "confrontation" as a framework within which to analyze tactics and strategies. Despite the shortcomings of the polarization model as applied to capitalist societies, Oberschall credits Marx for analyzing the process of polarization in terms of the structural characteristics of the society and the characteristics of the conflict process itself (p. 287). According to Oberschall, "it is precisely because people in unplanned direct action rely on a shared

culture for guidelines and clues that their behavior is far more predictable and follows more established patterns than is commonly thought" (p. 324). In this respect, the author follows Marx in looking for those elements in the society and the conflict process which are deterministic of the way in which the confrontation will develop. Oberschall defines polarization as "the breaking up of a community, group, or society into two or more internally mobilized and mutually hostile camps" (p. 287). This process occurs in any community which is experiencing controversy, and the result is the formation of new partisan organizations and the emergence of new extremists leaders while the existing community leaders and organizations are crosspressured into inaction (p. 287). The specific issues many times grow into more general issues and the initial controversy grows into bitter antagonism. According to Gamson, "the conflict is likely to shift from conventional to rancorous, a situation during which opponents do not simply regard each other as mistaken or as pursuing different but legitimate goals but engage in tactics considered dirty and vicious and which are in violation of norms generally accepted for waging conflict (Oberschall, p. 287). Coleman (1957, p. 14) labels this overall process "Greshams's Law of Conflict: the harmful and dangerous elements drive out those which would keep the conflict in bounds."

As the process of polarization continues, communication between the conflicting parties becomes unreliable and impoverished, and the competitors become more sensitive to differences and threats than to similarities and gestures of good faith (p. 289). As pressures for

self-consistency and social conformity to one's own group arise, so do perceptual distortions of fact. The growth of group identity and solidarity occurs at the expense of hostility and aggression against the competing out-group.

Once the polarization is established and the controversy has begun, all groups involved, whether they are threatened and therefore have to organize defensively or whether they initiate a process of confrontation, "are faced with the twin problem of mobilizing their member's commitments and resources for the achievement of collective goals against outside resistance and of recruiting new members or otherwise gaining sympathy, support, and outside help from third parties, the uncommitted, and the frequently apathetic public" (p. 290). If it can gain new members without having to alter its basic values or goals, the conflict will probably be resolved more quickly, according to Oberschall. However, "when an opposition movement has to rely on mobilizing outside support to pursue its struggle, when its component subunits are diverse, each with somewhat different material goals and needs, when it has few material benefits to distribute to its supporters during the confrontation, in short, when an opposition movement is weak, it will have to make appeals for outside support and increased member commitment based on symbols, ideologies, principles, and values. That . . . will tend to make the conflict more difficult to resolve" (p. 291).

An Organizational Perspective to Strategies

The polarization perspective seems to give some insight as to why certain tactics and strategies which are contradictory to the established

norm might be used, i.e., the polarization and the subsequent confrontation result in the establishment of new norms, but it stops short in its ability to understand the process of mobilizing outside support. This seems crucial today in America where most movements are organized to benefit those people who would need outside support to keep their organization strong and effective. The resource mobilization perspective of McCarthy and Zald has already been discussed in the literature on movement organizations. The organization perspective is especially crucial in the consideration of tactics, according to another work by McCarthy and Zald, because leaders of social movements who develop tactics and strategies rarely work exclusively with unorganized adherents; strategies are impossible to carry out without some kind of continuing organization (McCarthy and Zald, 1974, pp. 3-4). In addition, a focus upon how SMO's mobilize resources (manpower, money and support) is crucial to an understanding of strategic choice. McCarthy and Zald reject the trichotomy of bargaining, persuasion, and coercion as oversimplifying strategic decisions of social movement organizations, but do build their analysis on previous works which have attempted to identify those factors which limit strategic choice. They summarize the concensus on these factors as follows:

1. First, the values of the constituency are important, in that tactics which large numbers of the aggrieved group do not approve hinder a movement's attempts to mobilize their support.
2. Second, the values and reactions of bystander publics play an important role and must be considered in strategic choice.
3. Third, the relationship between the aggrieved group and the authorities to which appeals for change are directed affect strategic choice.

4. Fourth, the activities of authorities, particularly their attempts at social control, affect tactical choice. Actual repression or anticipated repression influences subsequent tactical choice.
5. Fifth, tactics are chosen with an eye to achieving goals. Previous effectiveness of tactics is one important criterion used in choosing the most suitable tactics to accomplish change. (McCarthy and Zald, 1974, pp. 2-3)

Any one or all of these factors may come into play at any time and can overrule one another depending on the desires of the movement leaders. These are what McCarthy and Zald call tactical dilemmas. They make three basic arguments which are the basis of the resource perspective and which distinguishes them from former works: First, they argue that there are limiting factors related to resource mobilization which have been neglected in past technical analysis. Secondly, under certain resource mobilization circumstances, some of the previously suggested limiting factors are reduced in importance, and hence, thirdly, an additional set of tactical dilemmas must be explored (McCarthy and Zald, 1974, p. 3).

In light of these arguments, McCarthy and Zald identify three additional limiting factors which affect strategic choice: conscience constituents, mobilizing and maintaining adherents, and the movement organizational field.

One of the basic arguments already advanced by the mobilization perspective in the discussion of movement organization was that the supporting base for the movement may be completely separate from the beneficiary base. This former group is what McCarthy and Zald call a conscience constituency. They even make the argument that a social movement can operate completely without the involvement of a beneficiary

constituency, essentially under the manpower, funds, and support of the conscience constituency. When this occurs, both the values of the beneficiary constituents and their relationship become less important to strategic choice. Although few SMO's operate totally without beneficiary constituent involvement, many do depend heavily upon financial resources provided by conscience constituents (both individual and organizational). According to McCarthy and Zald:

> Such a dependency means that tactical choice is limited by the actions or anticipated actions of these contributing conscience constituents. We suggest that the actions of these constituents are a result of their values and their vulnerability to pressures to desist from movement support. (1974, p. 6)

Secondly, in order to maintain manpower and support for the movement organization, leaders are normally concerned with converting some bystander publics into adherents or supporters. McCarthy and Zald see this mobilization process depending primarily upon two actions: grievance portrayal and legitimacy bargaining.

> Grievance portrayal through the mass media serves to arouse sympathy with the aggrieved group among bystander publics. Legitimacy bargaining is the process whereby the organization attempts to convince bystanders that the actions of the authorities toward movement beneficiaries or adherents are not acceptable. (p. 6)

According to McCarthy and Zald, an organization concerned with converting bystander publics into adherents sometimes face complicated tactical choices in balancing the needs of this task with more traditional tactical needs. They give as a case in point the development of NORML (The National Organization for Marijuana Legalization). By choosing to limit itself to educational and lobbying tactics, NORML had chosen

tactics designed to make adherents out of bystander publics rather than constituents out of potential movement beneficiaries.

Thirdly, the resource mobilization perspective takes into consideration the existence a multiorganizational field, similar to that described by Stallings (1974). Separate organizations with similar goals may aid one another or normally state public support for one another, but, according to McCarthy and Zald, they may many times find themselves in direct conflict or competition over the same scarce resources.

Conflict as Process: Changes in Goals and Tactics

The resource mobilization perspective of McCarthy and Zald suggests that conflict may be very important to the operations of a social movement and its organization. However, we know very little about how it affects either the goals of the SMO or the tactics and strategies which it uses. We have suggested earlier, following the works of Gerlach and Hine (1970), that conflict may be functional to the survival and success of a social movement organization in a very dynamic and changing environment. This is somewhat in contrast to traditional approaches which tend to emphasize the negative aspects of conflict within an organization. Traditional approaches have attempted to account for changes in goals and tactics by the internal bureaucratization of movement organizations. Changes in goals and tactics have generally been seen in a conservative direction. Zald and Ash (1966), however, suggest that goal and tactic transformation can result from inter-organizational competition for resources and support, and the shift, while it may be towards the conservative center, may also be towards

the more radical extremes. They give the civil rights movement as a case in point:

> Consider the situation before the Supreme Court's school desegregation ruling in 1954. The goals and tactics of the Urban League and the NAACP were in agreement with most active supporters of the movement. However, the number of actives was relatively small, and there were large segments of the potential supporters who were not active at all—college and high school students, working class Negroes, in both the north and the south, and the clergy. After 1954 and especially after the Montgomery bus strike in 1958, the sentiment base of the movement changed—there was an increased readiness for mobilization of potential adherents, adherents expected more rapid change in a wider range of areas, and tactics acceptable to adherents became more militant. Furthermore, new and previously marginal organizations, such as CORE and SNCC, began to compete for the support of the enlarged potential support base. As a response both to the new opportunities for change presented by the society and the competition from other organizations, the stance of such organizations as the NAACP and the Urban League became more radical. Failure to respond to these pressures would have led to wither a smaller relative support base and/or a less prominent role in the leadership of the Civil Rights Movement. (p. 332)

William A. Anderson and Russell R. Dynes (1973) found a similar phenomenon in a case study of the organizational and political transformation of the 30 of May movement in Curacao. This movement began as an economic protest by the labor movement in Curacao but was soon transformed into a political movement. The influence of competition from other groups and a change in sentiments can be seen in the following excerpt:

> The labor movement in Curacao was jolted from its position of accommodation with long established political realities in the society and transformed into an instrument for social change in part because of the presence of competing groups. Had it not been for the presence of the more radical labor leaders, the moderate labor leaders might have been able to guide the labor movement through the crisis without

> significant change occurring within the movement itself, as well as the larger society . . . the May movement was the first time that the PWFC (Petroleum Workers Confederation of Curacao) had engaged in militant strike activity with other unions in Curacao. This marked a clear shift in tactics for the organization. Finally, the presence of the radical leaders in the labor movement was directly related to the eventual political orientation that the May movement took. Had it not been for these leaders, labor's innovative role might never have materialized. (p. 340)

Anderson and Dyne conclude that "the internal conflict within the labor movement, then, was in part responsible for its large scale mobilization for action during the May Movement and transformation into an important political instrument" (p. 340).

Summary

We have attempted to show that traditional conceptions of the strategies and tactics of social movement organizations, particularly the classification by Turner of persuasion, bargaining, and coercion, have certain limitations for our understanding of the modern social movement organization. We have suggested that the strategy of protest may be used in both a positive and negative framework to effect change upon the environment. More specifically, we have attempted to fit these strategies into two theoretical schemes, the polarization model suggested by Oberschall and the resource mobilization perspective of McCarthy and Zald. Finally, we looked at the influence of conflict on the transformation of goals and tactics.

Although there is little data yet to support our contentions, it appears that the "process" of the social movement organization is a rather complex interchanging network that includes much more than merely

the movement organization and the target group. Both internal and external process are influential in determining ideologies, goals, and strategies. External processes which are important include the relationship between the MO and the target group, between the MO and various "publics," and the availability of resources. Internal processes include the interplay between components of the movement based upon value differences as well as strategic principles. Internal conflict can be very functional in this process.

VI. PART IV: SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOME

Introduction

The outcome of a social movement is perhaps as difficult to observe empirically, if not more so, than the interplay of tactics and strategies which link the movement organization with its environment. Although the field of sociology has had some success in measuring changes in social structure over time, it has had tremendous difficulties in attributing these changes to any one particular variable, especially in real life studies involving the causal effects of a social movement and its organization. Those sociologists who have studied the outcomes of social movements have generally focused their efforts on two basic social changes or areas in which social change might occur: (1) the transformation of the social movement, and (2) changes within the social environment in which the movement organization is operating. The first has been the concern of those traditional movement theorists who have focused primarily on the social movement itself and its internal workings

as the major explanatory variable, while the second has received less attention, except by historians, until recently when the development of necessary theoretical and conceptual tools have permitted further exploration. Although the two outcomes will be separated here for purposes of organizing a review, it is important to keep in mind that the two changes are in many cases directly related.

The Transformation of a Social Movement: Internal Change

Rush and Denisoff (1971) have stated that the demise of a social movement is inevitable, for a movement ends either because its goals are not attained, or paradoxically, because they are. According to Rush and Denisoff, if the goals of a social movement are so nonlegitimate that they cannot be realized,

> then the forces of social opposition will ultimately bring about either the dissolution of the movement or its transformation into a less socially threatening form. On the other hand, the success of a movement means that its goals then become a part of the status quo—in the dynamics of social evolution, this synthesis then becomes a new thesis, and the viability of the movement as an antithesis has come to an end. (p. 367)

Rush and Denisoff refer to this dissolution of a movement or its transformation as a process of "truncation" (p. 367). This process can come about as a result of either external or internal pressures or changes. These internal processes, especially within the movement organization, and their effect upon the transformation of the social movement will be the subject of this section.

Zald and Ash identify the dominant line of approach to the sociological study of the transformation of social movement organizations

as the institutionalization and goal displacement model of organizational transformation. This model stems from the writings of Max Weber and Robert Michels and follows this line of reasoning:

> As an MO (movement organization) attains an economic and social base in the society, as the original charismatic leadership is replaced, a bureaucratic structure emerges and a general accomodation to the society occurs. The participants in this structure have a stake in preserving the organization, regardless of its ability to attain goals. (Zald and Ash, p. 327)

The three stages which an organization goes through are (a) goal transformation, (b) a shift to organizational maintenance, and (c) oligarchization. Goal transformation can take many forms—goal diffusion, replacement—but according to the Weber-Michels model, "it is always in the direction of greater conservatism" (p. 327). When the primary activity of the organization turns to maintenance of memberships funds and other requirements of organizational existence, the second change has occurred. This stage is also accompanied by conservatism, "for the original goals must be accommodated to societal norms in order to avoid conflicts that could threaten the organization's viability" (p. 327). Finally, when the concentration of power falls into the hands of a minority of the organization's members, oligarchization takes place.

A similar conclusion is reached by Sheldon Messinger (1955) in observing that when movements lose impetus through a shift in the constellation of forces, their organized arms (movement organizations) are deprived of conditions necessary to sustain them in their original form. The increasing lack of public concern, the dropping membership, the end of effective recruitment, and financial difficulties cause

> the organized arms of declining social movements [to] tend to adapt to these changed conditions in characteristic ways. We can broadly describe this adaptation by asserting that the dominating orientation of leaders and members shifts from the implementation of the values the organization is taken to represent (by leaders, members, and public alike), to maintaining the organizational structure as such, even at the loss of the organization's central mission. (p. 413)

Zald and Ash (1966) feel that, while the Michels-Weber model has provided the field with very imaginative concepts, as a statement on the transformation of social movements it is incomplete. Their main criticism is that many other transformations may take place besides those specified in the Weber-Michels model, and that there are many factors which influence the direction of change of movement organizations (p. 328). Following the already discussed "institutional perspective" of Selznick, they suggest several additional and sometimes opposite outcomes in movement organization transformation. Rather than becoming more bureaucratic and centralized, Zald and Ash see the possibility of what they call "schismogenesis" and factionalization. Splits in the movement and the development of factions can come about as a result of two reasons: heterogeniety (resulting from the increasing inclusiveness of MO's) and a concern for doctrinal purity. The heterogeniety in most modern movement organizations has already been testified to (McCarthy and Zald, 1973b) as has the concern for doctrinal purity (the polarization model as discussed by Oberschall, 1973). Zald and Ash, however, observe a crucial distinction between inclusive and exclusive organizations in this regard: the inclusive organization retains its factions while the exclusive organization spews them forth (p. 337). While the inclusive organization will retain its support base, Zald and Ash assume that its

capacity for concerted action is crippled. Gerlach and Hine (1970), on the other hand, see this type of transformation as very functional to the movement's continued existence and success:

> Such an organization is adaptive because these characteristics features make the movement difficult to suppress, allow it maximum penetration of different socioeconomic and cultural groups, and encourage the quest for social innovation.

Whether these splits and factions are functional or not is still to be seen, but the history of the civil rights movement and the student movement do provide good examples of the process occurring with a corresponding minimization of oligarchization and bureaucratization. One of the most common sources of dissension which results in factions, particularly in revolutionary movements, comes from the unintended consequences of tactical actions (Rush and Denisoff, p. 419). How the public and the authorities respond to certain strategies and tactics can result in splits within the movement based on individual ideologies for the most effective change actions.

A second change which Zald and Ash see as an alternative to the transformation suggested by the Weber-Michels model is that as the MO becomes oligarchical, it may become more, rather than less, radical in its goals:

> Under some conditions . . . a decline in member interest may actually allow a movement to grow more radical. As members permit other concerns to tempt them away from the MO, they insist less on their right to participate in decision making. The decision making apparatus of the organization thus falls into the hands of the persons with the greatest commitment to the movement goals. In some cases, these persons may actually form a cadre of professional organizers. As the MO becomes oligarchical, contrary to Michels, it may become <u>more</u> rather than less radical in its goals. (p. 339)

The third alternative to the Weber-Michels model concerns changes in the leadership style. A simple interpretation of the Weber-Michels model states that expressive leadership (which has a mobilizing function, according to Gusfield) is generally replaced by instrumental leadership (which has an articulation function). According to Zald and Ash, there is an almost inherent dualism and conflict between these roles, "for mobilization requires a heightening of the ideological uniqueness of the MO and the absolute quality of its goals, while articulation often requires the uniqueness of the organization to be toned down and an adoption of the tactics of compromise (p. 339). In a study of the WCTU (Womens Christian Temperance Union), Joseph Gusfield has revealed that no simple progression from one to the other actually occurs; in fact mobilizing leadership and articulation leadership may be needed many times in the course of a social movement (Gusfield, as reported in Zald and Ash, p. 339).

External Changes: The Environment and the Movement's Relation to It

Equally important to the survival of a social movement and its organization is the relationship which it establishes with the environment. Rush and Denisoff (1971) suggest that both the truncation or transformation of social movements through external presures can be conceptualized in terms of four types of social processes: cooptation, institutionalization, repression, and discreditation (p. 370).

Cooptation, according to Selznick (quoted in Rush and Denisoff, p. 13), is a process of absorbing new elements into the policy determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its

stability or existence. Rush and Denisoff suggest that movements which seek reform rather than radical social change are most amenable to cooptation. Revolutionary movements in particular adapt a radically critical stance toward existing political, economic, and other social institutions:

> The revolutionary "sense of reality" does not accept the validity of the status quo. Moreover, the prevailing conscience collective of the society, which reinforces existing power relationships, defines the revolutionary movement as nonlegitimate. These factors contribute to the movement's ideological and physical isolation. As a consequence, conflict between the movement and the society tends to become an all-or-nothing "zero-sum" game. Under the circumstances, accommodation is not possible between the movement and the dominant social order. (p. 372)

A second alternative to change is that the social movement and its organization become a part of the status quo and become an in-group in the structure of political power. This is the process of institutionalization and usually marks the termination of the movement as it loses its nonlegitimate character. The attainment of the goals of a reform movement means that the desired changes have been incorporated into the established order. Although the reason for the future existence of the movement is terminated, voluntary dissolution is rare and the movement usually remains, for several reasons, a shift in goals, organization and leadership maintenance, or for symbolic reasons.

A somewhat more negative result is total repression of a movement. The extent to which a social movement is subject to repression depends upon the advent of historical events which render the movement a threat to the status quo (Rush and Denisoff, p. 400). Outright repression,

however, is most common in elitists systems more so than pluralists societies. In a pluralist society, such as the United States, a certain amount of dissenting opinion is encouraged as healthy. What changes the opinion of the public to identifying the movement as a threat to the status quo is the employment of more aggressive tactics and the formulation of more apparent proposals that contradict the basic values of that social order. Even when this occurs, however, a much more common mode of truncation in a pluralist society is through discreditation (p. 400).

Discreditation can occur, according to Rush and Denisoff, by two basic actions taken by the holders of power in a pluralist society: (1) they can publicly degrade and ridicule a movement or its leadership, and (2) they can deny the existence of the problem or solve the problem themselves. The first has been the most effective device in recent decades because of the controlled mass media. The second is best exemplified in the decline of the Townsend Movement as observed by Sheldon Messinger. In this movement, the original goal became irrelevant because the problem was solved by another means than suggested by the movement.

Although this classification of transformation types tells us something about what happens to the social movement within the environment, it tells us very little about what is the broader outcome of a social movement, irrespective of whether it accomplishes its goals or not. Perhaps another way to look at the outcome of a social movement is to ask what function it serves for the society? Rather than merely

asking whether a social movement organization accomplishes its stated goals or not, or whether the movement survives or not, it might be beneficial to broaden our scope and inquire what are the latent as well as manifest functions of any particular social movement and its organization for the social order. Turner and Killian (1972) suggest that collective behavior in general may be functional for both stability and change. In the first place, conditions of widespread discontent and the availability of new cultural perspectives from collective behavior and social movements help publics to develop and to define issues that are important for the society to solve if it is to survive. Secondly, new directions of culture and social organizations are worked out during this process. This involves the processes of defining issues and values in the society and the struggles and alignments surrounding the acquisition of power to implement changes, respectively. Turner and Killian summarize the relation of collective behavior to change in the following manner:

1. A certain amount of isolated and sporadic collective behavior characterizes the most stable society and has no important implications for change. It is simply a response to events that fall outside the limits with which the established order and culture are prepared to cope.
2. Widespread collective behavior over a period of time is probably not sufficient condition to bring about change, social and cultural, though it probably always make the social order more susceptible to change when the necessary ideas and values can be supplied.
3. Widespread collective behavior becomes the major vehicle of change when contact between diverse cultures or developments within the culture supply novel values about which collective behavior can become focused.
4. Collective behavior then becomes the medium through which tentative directions of change are tested until one major direction prevails.

5. Thus collective behavior is an integral part of the process of social and cultural change. Turner and Killian, 1972, p. 419)

The Concept of "Success"

Most of the research to date which has attempted to look empirically at the outcome of a social movement has focused either on the transformation of the internal structure of the social movement organization or has observed the changing relationship with the external environment. Whether the movement actually succeeds in attaining its goals has received scant attention. Gamson suggests several reasons why:

> Success is an elusive idea. What of the group whose leaders are honored or rewarded while their supposed beneficiaries linger in the same cheerless state as before. Is such a group more or less successful than another challenger whose leaders are vilified and imprisoned even as their program is eagerly implemented by their oppressor? Is a group a failure if it collapses with no legacy save inspiration to a generation that will soon take up the same cause with more tangible results? And what do we conclude about a group that accomplishes exactly what it set out to achieve and then finds its victory empty of real meaning for its presumed beneficiaries? Finally, we must add to these questions the further complications of groups with multiple antagonists and multiple areas of concern. They may achieve results with some targets and little or nothing with others. (1975, p. 28)

What Gamson is struggling with here is not the survival of the social movement organization as a measure of success but with actual changes which occur in the environment which are outcomes of the movement's efforts. Our attempt to review literature related to this conceptualization of success has indicated that it has not been of main concern to either social movement theorists or researchers. Perhaps for many of the reasons Gamson suggests above, we have tended to shy away from measuring what changes in the social movement environment could be

construed as "successes." Another problem is the actual measurement of change itself. Not only has this been difficult empirically but it has generally required longitudinal studies over time, a privilege studies of social movements have generally not been able to afford. Others have felt that the establishment of cause and effect is so complicated as to not make any longitudinal study of change somewhat useless empirically. Although we tend to acknowledge a certain validity behind these statements, we also feel that the study of social movements could move a great deal farther in its understanding of the changes which are brought about in the environment as a result of its efforts and to what extent these can be construed as "successful changes."

Zald and Ash (1966) have made a start in this direction by suggesting that, at the very least, the study of success must distinguish between the actual attainment of goals and the assumption of power assumed to be a prerequisite to attaining goals. They assume that when a social movement accedes to power, at that point analytical concepts applicable to either party structure or governmental bureaucracy become more relevant. Although what Zald and Ash suggest may be true, they fail to tell us exactly when it is that a social movement has acceeded to power, and whether or not this should be considered a "successful" outcome of the social movement. Is it not possible that the acquisition of position may be merely a means by which the broader society or some segment of the society passifies the efforts or goals of the social movement? And, if the social movement actually obtains its goals, is the degree of success determined by the actual attainment or what the accomplishment of the stated goals actually does for the beneficiary?

What we are suggesting is that a true measure of a social movement's success may require more than an assessment of the accomplishment of the stated goals of the SMO or of the survival of the SMO itself. Gamson suggests that "it is useful to think of success as a set of outcomes, recognizing that a given challenging group may receive different scores on equally valid, different measures of outcome. These outcomes fall into two basic clusters: one concerned with the fate of the challenging group as an organization and one with the distribution of new advantages to the group's beneficiary (p. 28).

The central issue of the first cluster focuses on the acceptance of the challenging group by its antagonists as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests (p. 28). The basic question which is asked here is did the relationship between the challenging group and its antagonist change from the beginning to the end of the challenge (p. 31)? Acceptance would involve a change in a more positive direction. Gamson suggests four indicators of this more positive relationship:

1. Consultation. This must involve some degree of initiative by the antagonist. For example, if a legislative body has opened hearings on a matter of importance to the challenging group, the antagonist might invite representatives of the group to testify . . .
2. Negotiations. If the antagonist is willing to enter into negotiations with the group on a continuing basis, not simply at the height of a particular crisis, this also implies the acceptance of the group as a spokesman for the constituency . . . The outcome of the negotiations is not relevant here; the two parties may fail to reach an acceptable statement. But the mere fact of a continuing negotiating relationship implies acceptance.
3. Formal recognition. This form of acceptance is characterized by the antagonist making explicit, typically in writing, that it recognizes the challenging group as a legitimate spokesman for a designated constituency.

> 4. Inclusion. This form of acceptance is characterized by the inclusion of challenging group leaders or members in positions of status or authority in the antagonist's organizational structure. (Gamson, 1975, p. 32)

The basic question which Gamson asks with regard to the second indicator of success is "did the potential beneficiaries of the challenging group receive what the group sought for them?" (p. 34). The answer to this question, however, is somewhat of a subjective opinion dependent upon the perspective of the respondent. Gamson suggests that at least four different perceptions of goal achievement must be sought in order to determine whether the group's beneficiaries gained any new advantages during the challenge or its aftermath: (1) by historians, (2) by the challenging group, (3) by its antagonist, and (4) the challenging group's level of satisfaction with its achievement at the end of the challenge (p. 36). Although this measure of "new advantages" does have empirical usefulness, it is not without certain limitations. First, no assumption is made that the challenging group necessarily caused the benefits. Although the empirical and theoretical difficulties of doing so are great, we are not convinced that the establishment of cause and effect is an impossibility in social movement analysis. Secondly, the method only measures the outcome of desired goals, or stated goals; we suggest that the successful outcome of a social movement's efforts may include more than the stated goals. Finally, because we believe there is some validity in McCarthy and Zald's (1973) suggestion that many movements have both a constituency and a beneficiary base, which may be separate, we would propose a fifth addition to the list of perceptions, that being the opinion of the beneficiary base, or those to whom the benefits are actually supposed to go.

By proposing the operationalization of success by the measurement of both acceptance and new advantages, Gamson has moved the study of movement outcomes into a direction which is not only highly quantifiable but which may have more utility as a valid indicator of the outcome of a social movement than either the survival of the social movement organization or its access to power.

Summary

Our review indicates that traditional conceptions of the outcome of social movements have focused on either internal transformation of the movement organization's structure or on the relationship between the movement organization and the environment. Although we consider these important factors in the survival of the SMO, we find little evidence to indicate that they necessarily are positively associated with the movement's success in accomplishing its goals. Gamson's efforts at conceptualizing "success" are a step in this direction.

VII. PART V: SOME CONCLUSIONS

The preceding review of literature focused on four basic areas of the study of social movements: structure, environment, process, and outcome. These particular areas reflect what several students of social movements have focused on somewhat separately for the past three decades. We have attempted to look at the four collectively because there is an interdependency about all four which makes it difficult to study one without having some knowledge of the other three.

It is apparent to us from the review that all four components have undergone conceptual and analytical changes, the most drastic of which have been our ways of looking at both structure and environment and the relationship between the two. Because these are somewhat deterministic of the other two, they have also undergone corresponding changes. The greatest overall change has been an increased interest in the organization and structure of social movements that contradicts previous conceptualizations of social movements as somewhat disorganized, leaderless, irrational aggregates. There are at least two possible reasons for this change which are worth exploring. First, as our conceptualization of a social movement has changed, we have also begun to look at new explanatory variables external to the social movement itself. Of particular importance has been the social movement's environment. Several students of social movements have begun to adapt an open-systems perspective which looks at the interchange beteween the movement organization and elements within the environment for potential causal variables to explain movement structure, process, and outcome. The unit of analysis has moved from the psychology of the individual to the movement organization and the environment in which it operates. In addition, there has been an increasing concern for the dynamics of these interactions by attempting to focus in on process as well as structure. The basic theoretical frameworks have tended to come from organizational theory, a convergence which Zald and Ash see as lacking in the field:

> In academic courses, the study of social movements for a long time has been the province of collective behavior courses. The sociological approach to organizations . . . helps to

> bridge the gap between organizational analysis and collective behavior. . . . Although many textbooks on collective behavior deal with the organization of social movements, none that we know of use organizational analysis to systematically account for the transformation of movement organizations. (p. 328)

We see this convergence of collective behavior and social organizational models of behavior as being an asset to both areas of analysis. Organizational theory acquires a better understanding of the dynamics of social processes while collective behavior theorists acquire tools to better conceptualize the more structural components, particularly in the analysis of social movements. Of additional importance to students of collective behavior was a more "social" conception of social movements necessary to link it to basic sociological thought, and organizational theory seemed to be the most viable, somewhat established, theoretical base.

Although we are basically in agreement with the conceptual and theoretical changes which the four subject areas have undergone in the last few years, and are supportive of a more social conception of social movements, we question to what extent these changes evolved solely from a desire for alternative models to study the same phenomenon. It is our contention that changing conceptualizations of social movements are at least partially a function of the changing character of social movements and social movement organizations themselves in American society. For several reasons we feel that social movements have either been allowed to or, in some cases, forced to alter both their organizational structure and their relationship with the broader environment. First, people who choose to join social movements to change society are finding that

the interplay of power in our society is a rather complex network of highly organized components. The problem social movements are increasingly facing today is the creation of an organization from a relatively unorganized mass that can effectively combat the complex, centralized, and powerful bureaucracy that represent the status quo. Social movements today face a much stronger and more organized opposition today than in the past. Secondly, something which has tended to balance out these disadvantages has been an increasing acceptance of social movements and social movement organizations as legitimate and normal mechanisms for bringing about change. As scholarly conceptions of social movements have moved away from stereotypes of fanaticism (Hoffer, 1951) to more social conceptions so has the popular conceptions of social movements become more favorably inclined. Societal acceptance has allowed more movements to flourish and more people to participate in them. Thirdly, changing technology has allowed the development of social movements that can become more than a leaderless aggregate or a mindless mass. Improved communication and transportation mechanisms have allowed the formation of broad social movements with very traditional structures.

What we are suggesting, then, is that social movements and social movement organizations are very different today than they were forty or fifty years ago. We are in agreement with McCarthy and Zald that the conception of the classical social movement has limited utility today. However, we do not necessarily agree that the "professional social movement" is the only applicable model, or that the changes which they suggest are completely valid. The works of Gerlach and Hine (1970) seem to offer at least one other possible format for looking at social

movements as does the study of social movement organizations from an interorganizational perspective.

It is not likely that any one model or theoretical perspective will dominate the field of social movements in the near future. Most theoretical works are still in the development stage and what is needed presently from research studies is what Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956, p. 471) refer to as generalizing analyses. This refers to the development of empirical generalizations or theory through the analysis of a single case, using it not to discover anything about it as a system necessarily, but as an empirical basis either for generalization or theory construction. In essence, this is the purpose of the following case study of the Black Lung Association.

Although it might be desirable to enter into a case study with no prior conceptions about what will be found, this is in reality an impossibility. We carry into any study certain biases and prejudices about various factors related to that subject, even if these are only our theoretical perspectives. In addition, the collection and analysis of information with no prior framework is a difficult if not impossible task. Therefore, we have chosen to organize our study of the Black Lung Association generally around the same four concepts that guided our interpretation of the literature: structure, environment, process, and outcome. Because it reflects a more easily manageable temporal sequence, we will reverse the order of the first two concepts in our analysis.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODS

The specific techniques which will be used to obtain information about the Black Lung Association will be guided by three general methodological perspectives: the case study method, the logic of triangulation and analytic induction.

I. THE CASE STUDY

It was argued in the previous section that what was needed in the study of social movements at the present time was a generalizing analysis which resulted in the formulation of hypotheses concerning certain factors relating to social movements and their environment. Ideally, it would be most appropriate to involve ourselves in comparative studies of many social movement organizations so that we can generate an understanding of several social situations and their similarities and differences. However, at this point in our knowledge and understanding, we know very little about the phenomenon we are studying. While case studies of a "particularizing" nature need necessarily to focus on the internal processes in the organization, because they are attempting to test out explicit hypotheses, a "generalizing" case study which attempts to generate hypotheses does not operate under the same limitations.

In addition, social movement organizations do not enjoy the numerical strength of the contemporary complex organization. In addition to the limited number of MO's available to study, there is also a problem of access, both to information and to the MO itself. The case study, then, serves the purpose of collecting the type of information we are seeking considering the limitations of the field of study itself.

II. THE LOGIC OF TRIANGULATION

The logic of triangulation of methodologies works on a basic assumption related to the establishment of validity through the elimination of rival causal factors. Denzin has stated that no single method will ever permit an investigator to develop causal propositions free of rival interpretations. Each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, and therefore multiple methods must be employed (Denzin, 1970, p. 26).

Attempting to maintain consistency with the purpose of a generalizing analysis, it seems appropriate to employ the triangulated methodology of participant observation. According to McCall and Simmons (1969), "participant observation is not a single method but rather a characteristic style of research which makes use of a number of methods and techniques--observations, informant interviewing, document analysis, respondent interviewing, and participation with self-analysis" (preface). This is particularly important for a case study approach that attempts to generate hypotheses; if certain realities are reflected by certain methodologies, then only a

triangulated methodology which incorporates all would generate all relevant hypotheses.

III. ANALYTICAL INDUCTION

Although the basis of the participant observation method is to provide an analytic description of the population studied, it too must deal at some point with causal propositions. The demonstration of a causal relationship between variables has generally to provide evidence for time order, covariance, and the elimination of rival factors. The experimental method controls these factors, and the survey design infers them through multivariate analysis. In participant observation, the experimental model is approximated through the use of analytic induction, which is a strategy of analysis that directs the investigator to formulate generalizations that apply to all instances of the problem with which he is concerned. This is further expounded on by Denzin:

> Strategically, analytic induction represents an approximation of the experimental model to the extent that explicit comparisons are made with groups not exposed to the causal factors under analysis. Conceptually this represents the classic before-after experimental design, and when employed in participation, it calls for the investigator to search for empirical instances that negate his causal hypotheses. (p. 194).

Although there are no explicit hypotheses to be tested in this particular case study design, several models of MO's will be validated by the method of analytic induction. And to the extent that the "generalizing" analysis allows for the formulation of hypotheses during the course of the study they can be tested out at that time utilizing the method.

IV. DATA TO BE USED: INTERNAL SOURCES

In order to collect the most valid information possible, the author spent approximately eleven (11) months working with the Black Lung Association from June 1973 to May 1974. Contact with the BLA, however, was not on a day to day basis but generally centered around a number of local and state meetings of the BLA over that period of time. The number of meetings, both formal and informal, totaled around thirty-five (35), with approximately thirty (30) hours of these meetings being recorded on tape. The nature of these meetings varied from local chapter meetings to regional and national meetings with the Social Security Administration.

Initial contact was made with a representative of the BLA in June 1974. After a period of weeks of establishing rapport with the personnel and gaining their confidence, I was provided with several valuable pieces of information that the BLA itself had collected about its history. These included:

(1) All Black Lung Bulletins published up to that date.

(2) All press releases of the past two years.

(3) A collection of newspaper articles about the Black Lung movement and organization from 1970 to 1972.

(4) A collection of newspaper articles about the Reform movement in the union which coincided with the BLA movement.

(5) All of the transactions of the BLA since its inception, which included letters, notes, histories, statements on the organization, etc.

(6) Fairly extensive informations taken by the BLA to bring about change.

(7) Other miscellaneous information.

In addition to attending the meetings of the BLA, the author engaged in some of the activities of the BLA, i.e., participated in training sessions, worked with some miners in helping them get their benefits, and gave information back to the BLA of an evaluative sort with regard to my initial findings. My role was certainly more than that of an observer, but the degree of my participation was limited by the role which I did play. My role was definitely that of a movement constituent, but hardly that of a movement beneficiary.

In addition to participation, a "diary" was kept of all my activities with personal reactions as well as information which I acquired through on-the-spot interviews. No systematic interviews were conducted, mainly because the object of study was not the movement organization particpants or even necessarily their perception of the organization, but of the MO itself. These responses, however, were used to identify certain characteristics of both the organization's structure and to identify certain tactics and strategies.

The personal record which was kept included all additional secondary information received that had timely relevance, i.e., if a piece of information was received which related to the contemporary activities of the BLA then it was included in the personal records so that a clarification could be given and a reaction to it put down.

V. DATA TO BE USED: EXTERNAL SOURCES

In addition to the data which was collected directly or indirectly from the BLA itself, a search was carried on during the eleven month period for external sources of data relevant to its operation. One major source of information was government documents, in particular congressional "black lung hearings." This source is unique in that congressional hearings many times have a large amount of information which is included in the papers but is not necessarily read at the hearing itself.

Another major source of information was the Social Security Administration. During my work with the BLA, the major "target group" was the Black Lung Program of the Social Security Administration. Extensive data were collected from the SSA as to changes in both the policy of the SSA as well as objective data dealing with varying rates of acceptance of applications for Black Lung payments.

In addition to government documents and SSA material, an extensive search was initiated to locate all material dealing with the Black Lung Association in regional journals. Appalachia has several of its own journals which provided extensive historical (and sometimes analytical) information. In actuality, all information which could be found that dealt with the BLA was collected and analyzed. The only systematic sampling of records was a fairly extensive review of the five major newspapers in the region that would cover the activities of the BLA. This was conducted by a fellow colleague for his dissertation but the information is applicable to this study.

All the information collected is now being chronologically organized to reflect a historic analysis. Although the thrust of this study is not a historic analysis, it seems as if the best way to organize the data. The process of analytic induction seems to be best served by a chronological listing of data.

In summary, then, the data base upon which this study is built is eleven (11) months of participant observation, approximately thirty (30) hours of taped meetings, on-the-spot interviews of important personnel, historic data from newspapers and government documents, and extensive data provided by the MO itself.

VI. VERIFICATION

A problem that faces any research is a constant quest for validity in the information which is collected. This is of particular concern in a case study because of the variety of information one seeks in an attempt at focusing on the whole rather than its parts. The logic of triangulation functions not only to broaden the range of information available to the researcher, as has already been discussed, but also serves to minimize the threats to both internal and external validity. According to Norman Denzin:

> It must also be remembered that each method has unique strengths and weaknesses. All methods that involve direct observation and interviewing have the problems of reactivity which arise from the investigator's presence. On the other hand, such methods permit the direct study of behavior and allow the investigator to combine subject perceptions with his interpretations. In designing triangulated methodologies, the methods that are combined should reduce as much as possible all threats to internal and external invalidity. (Denzin, 1970, p. 309)

The incorporation of participant observation, unstructured interviews, document analysis, and tape recorded sessions will hopefully minimize the possibilities for reporting of valid information. For example, documents which make statements with regard to goals and strategies will be verified by interviews with key personnel and by content analysis of movement organization meetings and actions.

Although the triangulation of methodologies serves to incorporate different techniques and results in variability of data, each particular method of collection of information needs some internal verification steps. This is especially important for document analysis. Although interviews and observations were made in the year 1973-74, newspapers, BLA Bulletins, BLA records, and other written information date back as far as 1968. In essence, a large part of this study was dependent upon "historical" data, and verification requires a historical approach. Barzun and Graff (1970) suggest that, in order to verify information, the "historian must try to reach a decision and make it rationally convincing, not only to himself, but to others" (p. 102). The steps by which one performs this task, or verification, can be conducted on many planes, and the technique is not fixed. It relies on "attention to detail, on common sense reasoning, on a developed feel for history and chronology, on familiarity with human behavior, and on ever enlarging stores of information" (p. 102). Although Barzun and Graff give us encouraging guidelines, they fail to establish any specific rules to follow. Another historian, Louis Gottschalk, suggests that to admit any piece of evidence, the historian demands that it pass the following four tests:

1. Was the ultimate source of detail (the primary witness) able to tell the truth?
2. Was the primary witness willing to tell the truth?
3. Is the primary witness accurately reported with regard to the detail under examination?
4. Is there any external corrolaboration of the detail under examination? (p. 38)

Denzin suggests that a completely accurate rendering of the vent under analysis will seldom be achieved, but that we strive for approximation and valid inference (p. 249). By following the four above-mentioned tests we can at least answer some questions which can indicate something about the validity of the available data. Of particular importance to the following study of the Black Lung Association will be test four, the external corroboration through other document information collected as well as data collected from other techniques.

Finally, perhaps a word should be said about the problems of validity relating to the researcher's role as a participant observer. The problems involved in "playing a role" in the research setting have been adequately advanced (McCall and Simmons, 1969, Denzin, 1970), and will not be repeated here. Verifying the information one collects through such a procedure is part of the role playing process itself. Sometimes referred to as having a "built-in validity test," the technique of participant observation allows the researcher to test out initial hypotheses and verify information he has "observed" through the actions he takes based on this information. If he operates on false or somewhat incorrect assumptions, feedback from the interaction process will make him aware of the invalidity.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT ENVIRONMENT

Of the four areas which we have designated for the study of a social movement organization—environment, structure, process, and outcome—the environment is probably the most difficult to conceptualize because of the limitless nature of the number of variables which could be included as "environmental" factors. Although McCarthy and Zald suggest only seven areas within the environment for study, for the purposes of analyzing the Black Lung Association, we will alter the classification somewhat to include those factors which we feel are important in this case. Under the heading of what McCarthy and Zald suggest as the issue cycle, our organizational framework for the environment begins with three related subareas: (1) a general conception of illness in American society, (2) the history of occupational illnesses in the United States in general, and (3) "black lung" as an occupational disease and how it came to be identified as such. Under the heading of what McCarthy and Zald identify as the "beneficiary base," we will look at coal miners in the United States with respect to their historical development, their contemporary status (size, wealth, power) and how they are viewed in American society as an occupational group. At this point we will broaden the original classification of McCarthy and Zald to include a discussion of those specific organizations in the environment which have affected, either

positively or negatively, the development of the Black Lung Association and the issue of "black lung" as an occupational disease. Of particular importance here will be the role of the coal industry, the United Mine Workers of America, the state and federal governments and the medical profession.

I. ILLNESS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Illness in American society has generally been considered by medical science as a strictly organic phenomenon, that is, as some disturbance in the normal functions of the body processes, marked by certain symptoms, and ascertainable only by medical observations and inferences (Mechanic, 1959, p. 37). However, for a sociological concept of illness, this medical model has certain limitations. For some time it has been recognized that the sick person occupies a special position in society that affects normal participation in the social structure (Butler, p. 241). The most systematic statement of the sociology of illness was advanced by Talcott Parsons in 1951 with the publication of The Social System. According to Parsons, health maintenance is an important need at both the level of the individual and the collectivity, and society consequently has a functional interest in the control of disease and illness. Because it incapacitates the victim to a certain extent and prevents his usual participation in the structure of roles that go to make up the social system, Parsons classifies illness as deviant behavior (Parsons, 1951, p. 440). In a later article, Parsons explicitly defines ill health as the incapacity of task performance

(1957, p. 167). "Health," then, is seen as the state of optimum capacity of an individual for the effective performance of the plurality of roles to which he has been socialized (Butler, p. 242).

This emphasis upon the incapacity of task performance has been further explored by Hinkle and Wolff (1957) and Mechanic (1959). Preferring the term "disability," rather than illness, Mechanic suggests that social and cultural factors may play important roles in the broader societal definition of just what disability is, and that illness and disability will be defined differently in different situations and for different purposes (p. 38). This is so, in part, because of the larger system of which the "disability" is a part:

> It will be helpful if the sick person and the medical facilities are viewed in the context of the larger system of which they are parts. Parsons has pointed out that adequate health on the part of most group members, most of the time, is a functional requirement of any social system. A definition of disability which is too lenient would interfere with the smooth functioning of the system; it is necessary, therefore, to control socially the definition of disability to insure that not too large a proportion of the population is released from its usual social responsibilities. (Mechanic, 1959, p. 38).

The sociological conception of illness, then, is one which identifies two potentially conflicting forces—the individual, who is sick and unable to perform his social and economic roles, and the society, which, by its operation as a social system, discourages illness and works to define it in such ways as to minimize the disfunctioning of the system. According to Butler, regardless of the motivation of the actor, illness and disability are potential modes for the evasion of social

responsibilities (p. 242). In the same vein, Mechanic suggests that while on most occasions the medical definitions of illness and disability are more or less congruent with those made by other people, exceptions do occur with sufficient frequency to warrant a more systematic analysis than has been attempted (p. 38). On certain occasions and under certain conditions, the requirements of the social system itself, or its parts, can take precedence over purely medical and humanitarian considerations and thereby provide a different basis for defining illness and disability (p. 39).

The identification of and the extent to which other parts of the social system will influence the definition of "black lung" in particular will be discussed later in this chapter. However, one other part of Parson's analysis will give us some beginning insight as to the cross-cultural differences which might help to explain why the United States is thirty years behind Britain in recognizing "black lung." Parsons addressed the problem of cultural relativity in health and illness, asking the question of the importance that different cultures attach to the sick role, and what variations exist in the normative definitions of them? According to Butler, Parsons characterizes American society by

> commitment to a mastery over environment, to the establishment of a good (great?) society in which ideals such as liberty, justice and equality of opportunity prevail, and to the notion of gradual social change in the 'right' direction. For the individual, universal esteem centers on achievement, and the emphasis among the problems of illness goes to those which affect the capacity for individual achievement. The obligation to accept the need for help is stressed, but this also becomes the primary threat of illness, for dependency is alien to the patterns of mastery and the ideals of the good society. (p. 244)

In Britain, however, "the emphasis is seen to be on integration . . . . and on the threat which illness poses to the individual's status as an acceptable member of society. This is exemplified by the political ideal that people have a right to care when ill, by the wide coverage of the National Health Service, and by the sentiment that illness, far from jeopardizing an individual's status, in fact gives him special claims on the collectivity" (Butler, p. 244). In sum then, Britain has more of a tolerance to illness than the United States.

To begin an understanding of the issue of "black lung" in American society requires that we first recognize it as a disease, illness, or disability which places the victim in a sick role. This role is considered as a form of deviant behavior in that illness violates certain norms and threatens the integrity of the system. Therefore, the deviants must be defined and recognized in a certain way, and mechanisms for control must be invoked to limit the spread of the behavior and to correct the offenders (Butler, p. 253). In America this has become an industry which is now the third largest in the nation with annual expenditures exceeding $60 billion and employing more than three and a half million individuals (Kerr, 1970, p. 1023).

II. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

Our purpose here will not be to give a complete history of occupational health but to highlight those developments which have had an important impact upon our contemporary conception of occupational illnesses. Illnesses which are classified as "occupational" add several

new dimensions to the general conception of ill health that exist in our society at any point in time. First, the disease generally affects a certain group of people that work in a particular occupational setting. Secondly, the cause of the disease, although generally accepted as something within the occupational environment, raises the question of the responsibility for that condition—the worker or the industry? Thirdly, the diagnosis of the disease, its prevention, and its treatment are confounded by a definition of the disability which is influenced by economic and political considerations within that industry rather than solely by medical and humanitarian reasons.

To further an understanding of occupational health let us put it in a relational perspective to general medical practice and what might be called "public health." Medicine, from its inception, has generally been concerned with the individual patient who presented himself to a doctor who took a history, made an examination, stated the diagnosis, and instituted treatment (Kerr, 1969, p. 1). Public health, in contrast, has been concerned with those matters which affected the lives of large numbers of people. In the past the control and prevention of communicable diseases have been crucial. In modern industrialized nations, the major public health problems now confronting us are chronic diseases, mental health and accidents. Occupational health, a recognized subspecialty of public health, has been concerned primarily with the hazards of work. Although there is evidence of a concern for the hazards of the work place which go back 5000 years, it is generally accepted that occupational health had its birth around 1700 when

Ramazzini described many job related illnesses and injuries (Kerr, 1969, p. 2). After World War I there was an initial concern for certain occupational diseases but it wasn't until after World War II that an intensive effort began to adjust the work place to fit the medical and health needs of the worker (p. 2). In general, however, occupational health has taken a back seat to occupational safety which has received primary attention (Guenther, 1970, p. 257). But the statistics on injuries alone are somewhat revealing. According to Dr. Kerr, over 2 million workers are injured annually on the job and of these 14,000 are killed immediately or die later. A more recent report, however, indicates that a more accurate accounting will probably reveal 20 to 25 million job related injuries and over 25,000 deaths (Kerr, 1971). In addition,

> Two million more workers are either permanently or totally disabled, and 7 million lose a day or more of work because of injuries on the job. The rate of injuries per million man-hours worked has been steadily rising during the past decade. This toll is attributed by workers to the lack of adequate safeguards and the generalized speedup occurring throughout all industries. In addition, a decline in real earnings, occasioned by the inflationary spiral, has made overtime and moonlighting essential. The resultant fatigue slows reflexes and workers are the victims. (1970, p. 1024)

Although these statistics are somewhat incomplete, they are certainly more accurate than current information on the extent and severity of occupational illnesses. The lack of knowledge about the incidence of occupational diseases in the United States is a curious phenomenon itself. In a recent conference on occupational health, Mittelman placed blame on the U.S. Public Health Service, state health administrators, industry officials, the medical profession, and even the

workers themselves (1970, p. 53). Although a certain degree of responsibility does lie with these groupings, Kerr sees a more basic problem in the role of occupational health itself:

> Both by definition and actual practice occupational health programs are limited to the prevention, detection, and control of industrial illness and injury; the provision of services to select and place the worker in a manner acceptable to management; and fostering physical, mental, and social ideas to increase productivity. The treatment of disease or injury is restricted to those emergency measures necessary for the worker to complete, if possible, the work day. Any expansion of these services has been impossible primarily because of the economic conflict between the industrial doctor and the personal physician. While management has, in most instances, agreed with this restricted point of view, there are some spokesmen who realize the value of comprehensive health maintenance for the worker and his family but, thus far, they have been unable to overcome medical resistance. (Kerr, 1971, p. 976).

Ideally, of course, an occupational health program should operate free of these constraints. According to the council on Occupational Health of the American Medical Association, the objectives of an occupational health program are (1) to protect employees against health hazards in their work environment, (2) to facilitate the placement and insure the suitability of individuals according to their physical capabilities, mental abilities, and emotional makeup in work which they can perform with an acceptable degree of efficiency and without endangering their own health or safety or that of their fellow employees, (3) to assure adequate medical care and rehabilitation of the occupationally ill and injured, and (4) to encourage personal health maintenance (Council on Occupational Health, pp. 533-534). But even the Council on Occupational Health expresses its own biases and perhaps

indirectly influences others by the statement that "health maintenance is primarily the responsibility of the individual" (p. 533).

Finally, occupational health research has been and still is a poorly funded endeavor. According to Dr. Kerr, The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health needs at least one dollar per annum per employed worker for the detection, control and prevention of occupational diseases. In 1972, the appropriation of $29.1 million amounted to only $0.36 annually for each worker and only about one third of this is devoted to the respiratory diseases. In addition, neither labor or management can fund medical studies because the rsults would be open to suspicion by the other side (Kerr, 1972, pp. 12-13).

III. BLACK LUNG AS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

Because "black lung" is both a disease and occupationally induced, we have looked at both the general conception of illness in American society and the development of occupational health as possible environmental issues which have affected the identification of "black lung" as an occupational disease. We will now look specifically at pneumoconosis as a problem of occupational health and how it came to be identified as such.

It has already been demonstrated that the recognition of black lung as a disabling phenomenon has been traced back as far as 1813 in Great Britain. However, rather than attempting to record the international history of the disease, this section will look primarily

at that period of time following its identification and compensability in Great Britain in the early 1940's. Perhaps a good point at which to enter a discussion is to attempt an explanation of why pneumoconiosis was not well known or widely recognized by the medical profession in America. Kerr suggests that there are at least four reasons. First, until recently little has appeared in American medical journals on this disease and most of the early articles were reports on British research and surveys. Secondly, many believed that conditions reported in Britain could not exist in the United States. Thirdly, it is also due to the conviction that only silica and dust containing silica are injurious. Finally, Kerr suggests that the attitude and influence of employer-oriented physicians who avoid facing known facts about the ravages of coal dust in human lungs because to do otherwise would cost money (Kerr, 1969, p. 3). Kammer (1957) is supportive of Kerr's third reason in terms of how this medical finding came about. Kammer says that America has a strange peculiarity of placing exaggerated reliance on animal experimentation in defining an occupational hazard. In addition, we place too great a credence on the opinions of one great man. According to Kammer, the experiments of Gardner which showed coal dust to have no fibrogenic capacity lead to an erroneous classification of coal dust as inert and also to the definition of silicosis which came into usage in 1933 and has since been adopted by most states providing workman's compensation for silicosis. It wasn't until 1942 that Great Britain recognized pneumoconiosis as distinct from silicosis, but state compensation boards in the U.S., with the exception of Alabama in 1952,

Pennsylvania in 1956, and Virginia in 1968, have only recognized silicosis (pp. 466-467).

Another major reason for some of the lack of concern in America for pneumoconosis was that before about 1952, many investigators assumed that bituminous coal (soft coal found mostly in southern Appalachia) did not produce a disabling pneumoconiosis although pneumoconosis among anthracite miners had been studied by American investigators (Doyle, 1969, p. 15). The first major study of chest diseases in the United States was conducted among the anthracite miners of eastern Pennsylvania by the Division of Industrial Hygiene of the National Public Health Service between 1928 and 1931. Pneumoconiosis was identified at this time as anthracosilicosis, and resulted from the breathing of air containing the dust generated in the various processes involved in the mining and preparation of anthracite coal. In 1942, Jones attempted to demonstrate that silicosis was not a rare disease in soft coal miners and that "miners' asthma" and anthracosilicosis were one and the same disease. In a study of 86 West Virginia bituminous miners with evidence of silicosis, Jones concluded that disability was not necessarily in proportion to the total number of years employed in the mining industry, but depended more on the occupation (Jones, 1942, pp. 611-615). These studies were replicated to some extent by Levine and Hunter in 1957, by Lieben, et al. in 1961, and in 1963 by Baier and Diakun. To say that parts of the medical community in America were unaware and failed to recognize the existence of pneumoconiosis would be an untruth. As these studies show, there was concern and recognition of the disease; however,

there was not broad acceptance of the exact nature of the disease and what caused it. To some extent this confusion still exists today and has had an important impact on the development of the issue of black lung and what was to be done about it. According to Dr. Richard L. Naeye, who in a three year study of the disease between 1967 and 1970 talked to pathologists, radiologists, and chest physicians in Pennsylvania and West Virginia:

> One of the really striking things about this is the tremendous confusion by physicians in the field about the reality of the disease, its character, and the various components that contribute to the disability. As a result of these honest uncertainties, in the coal communities themselves, physicians are often not only confused and puzzled, but polarized. There are those in favor of the disease and those against, and they are often, in fact usually on public record, because they have either testified one way or another, or refused to participate in disability hearings. (Naeye, 1970, p. 63)

More specifically, some doctors feel that while there is wide acceptance of the belief that continued inhalation of coal dust leads to progressive stages of pneumoconiosis, there is still skepticism in some medical circles as to the relationship of the coal dust itself to the disease (Dole, 1970, p. 11). In a similar vein, Tabershaw (1970) emphasizes the fact that disease is very rarely a result of one causal element but is produced by a constellation of things:

> Whether or not coal dust per se produces a specific type of small vessel damage or initiates a fibrogenic reaction, or is relatively inert becomes of secondary importance from the standpoint of prevention in the consideration of the life style of the miner. Working conditions are not only a matter of dust concentration. Fatigue, heat and humidity, noise, isolation, and other physical and psychological stresses enter into the patterns of health and disease. It is not possible to incriminate a single causative element, although its presence may be necessary. (p. 8)

Our purpose here is not to argue or present the medical debate surrounding the issue of black lung; that is certainly more capably done by members of the medical profession. However, it is important to recognize that there was and still is a great deal of disagreement concerning the existence, cause and prevention of the disease. Dr. Kerr suggests that the confusion and lack of awareness can have at least two results. In the area of compensation, physicians' attitudes and knowledge affect their reports on death certificates. "Many times cor pulmonale is often given as the cause of death with no mention of the coal workers' pneumoconiosis which produced the cor pulmonale . . . . death certificates are very important in determining the existence of a dangerous dust requiring governmental action for control and eradication. Too often no records mean no action" (Kerr, 1969, p. 4). A second point brought out by Dr. Kerr is that the denial or avoidance of known facts can also determine the publication of information. According to Dr. Kerr, in 1956, the concern of some physicians about management attitudes effectively blocked the publication of a paper of his on coal workers' pneucomoniosis in a major medical journal. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, physicians' attitudes can also influence other groups, such as lawyers, state officials, and legislators who are remarkably resistant to the elimination or control of coal dust because of the expense involved (Kerr, 1969, p. 4). In addition to these two results of the confusion among medical professionals regarding black lung, we would like to offer at least one more. Not only does a lack of medical knowledge or medical concensus influence governmental officials but it allows for, and almost forces, interpretations of this

issue and this disease which are interest group oriented. Not only does the broader social system, in this case the economic system, become influential in the definition of the disease, as suggested by Parsons (1951) and Butler (1974), but the way is now open for a varying number of interpretations which, as we shall demonstrate later, results in decisions being made on other grounds than purely medical ones.

IV. THE COAL MINER

It is almost impossible to talk about the issue of black lung as a medical, economic, political, or social issue without taking into consideration the uniqueness and historical development of its victim—the coal miner. And to really put the coal miner into perspective we must understand how he has developed as an individual within the framework of three structural settings: the Appalachian region, the coal industry, and the miners' union. This section will attempt to give a description of the beneficiary base of the Black Lung Movement by focusing on those environmental economic, cultural, and political institutions which have influenced his life history and subsequently his contemporary activities and attitudes.

According to M. H. Ross, in a paper presented at the National Conference on Medicine and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, the coal miner was molded in a particular socioeconomic-political setting:

> Much of Appalachia, from just before World War I to the mid 1930's became the arena for class warfare. Older miners now working or pensioned were raised in conditions of continual civil conflict, bloodshed, starvation, terrorism, family degradation, upper class fear and hatred—paralleled only in

> England more than a century earlier and unseen elsewhere in our own times. (Ross, 1970, p. 245)

Although coal is mined throughout the United States, the major coal producing states are located within a geographical region called Appalachia. This fact cannot be minimized for the history of coal mining in this region is greatly influenced by the struggles which the Appalachian people have faced since their beginnings in the United States. Probably the most outstanding characteristic of Appalachia is its isolation from the rest of the country: economic isolation, geographical isolation, political isolation, and social isolation. The entrance of the coal industry into Appalachia in the late 19th century removed many of these insulating barriers, but it completely changed the socio-political-economic structure from one of relatively minimal differentiation among the inhabitants to one of great differentiation and inequalities. Lewis and Knipe (1970) suggest that the history of Appalachia might be compared to what has been called internal colonialism, a term coined by Robert Blauner to characterize a variation of the colonization complex. Blauner suggests four components of the colonization complex:

> First, colonization begins with a forced, involuntary entry. Those in the dominant position are not invited guests. Second, the impact on culture and social organization is greater than we would expect through cultural contact and acculturation. There follows, soon after the entry of the colonizer, rather rapid modifications in values, orientation, and way of life of the colonized. Third, colonization involves a relationship by which members of the colonized group tend to be administered by members of the dominant group. And fourth, there exists a condition of racism, a principle of social domination by which a group, seen as inferior or different in terms of alleged biological

> differences, is exploited, controlled, and oppressed socially and psychically by a superordinate group. (Lewis and Knipe, p. 11)

Lewis and Knipe attempt to document historically this model to Appalachia. First, not only were the interests of coal an unwelcome intrusion to Appalachia (because it took away their land, forced them to work for an employer, and made them move to "company towns") but mining brought about a major change in social organization of the Appalachian area. Up until that time, there was very little stratification or inequality among the Appalachian people. With the entry of mining, three separate communities were created—the mining community, the middle class town community, and the traditional Appalachian people. Competition for reward replaced a prior absence of competitive spirit (Knipe and Lewis, 1969, p. 11). But more important was the fact that the coal industry began to take control over and administer the lives of the coal miners directly, and all people indirectly, through the establishment of coal camps, company stores, control over the economic system and political system (Knipe and Lewis, 1969, p. 8). It was probably for several reasons that the coal industry was able to gain such undisputed control over the political-economic processes, but an important factor is that coal mining replaced traditional economic forms and did not create new industries in the same geographical area. As a result, the interest of coal became almost the total interest of the economic sector of the region. According to Knipe and Lewis,

> The introduction of mining into the area was responsible for changes far beyond that of creating the coal camps with their

> peasant like characteristics. Mining affected other nonminers in the region. Those who attempted to maintain traditional rural patterns of agriculture were in many cases forced off their land and the sons of rural people having only a limited education were lured into mining. (1969, p. 11)

Finally, with regard to "racism," they demonstrate how the economic sector maintains a specific image of the native inhabitants as lazy, untrustworthy, and unreliable. And in many cases, this is done not only by the colonizers but also by the colonized, particularly the smaller independent coal operators who are under the thumb of the major coal companies (Lewis and Knipe, 1969, pp. 19-20).

An important difference between the miner in Great Britain and in the United States is that the American miner is not a single national group. One estimate in the early days of minings shows 27 different nationalities working in one mine in West Virginia (Ross, 1970, p. 247). This, in part, most likely contributed to the difficulties which the Appalachian people had in getting organized to oppose their colonialized status. Leadership among the people of Appalachia did not emerge until the beginning of unionization of the mines. The coal companies had apparently been able to prevent the emergence of leaders by maintaining low standards of education, resisting contributions to local school taxes, and developing within the mining community a sense of paternalism that placed the coal operator in a "family" position with regard to the coal miners. M. H. Ross pictures the following relationship which existed between the coal operator and the miner until almost 1930:

> The company created the mining camp or company town which became a byword in America. The coal operator usually offered all community services including water, sanitation,

> police, postal, voting "rights," medical, hospital, educational, religious, entertainment, and burial. As captive customers of the company store with its pattern of enforced indebtedness, the miners were under a private and larcenous monetary system known as script. Company housing, with the right to evict without notice, and control tenants, guests, and visitors, erased the concept that a man's house was his castle. "Law and Order" was no slogan if it meant imported criminals wearing badges, company deputies strutting like storm troopers, wantonly murdering, beating, breaking and entering with impunity; the pattern of corruption inlcuded judges, sheriffs and the highest officials; the electoral process and the legislative process were polluted, there was no pretense of judicial impartiality. (Ross, 1971, p. 4)

It was in this social, political and economic environment that the United Mine Workers of America began its long struggle for miners' rights under the direction of John L. Lewis. No attempt will be made here to recount the history of the UMWA, but it is important to acknowledge its impact upon today's working miners. Miners now working were children or youth during the bloody battles of the labor war in Appalachia (Ross, 1970, p. 246). According to Ross, many of these working miners still remember what happened to them and their parents:

> Some bear the physical—and many more, the emotional—scars of these years. For when the miners lost their struggle, they and their families were imprisoned. The coal camps were put behind fences topped with barbed wire, armed guards stood at the gate to shoot on sight anyone entering or leaving without a written company pass. Powerful searchlights assured no nighttime escape. Yellow dog contracts, legally signed and upheld by the courts, gave the concentration camps their distinctively American touch. (1970, p. 246)

The union was finally successful in the mid-1930's in organizing in the southern Appalachian coal fields under the guiding hand of John L. Lewis who remained in control of the UMWA until about 1960. Under Lewis's administration, however, several changes occurred in the mining industry

and its relationship to the coal miner which have played important parts in the development of the "black lung" issue.

V. THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

Although the United Mine Workers of America came into existence in 1890, it is the 40 year period following the start of the presidency of John L. Lewis in 1920 that will concern us initially here. Tom Bethel (1969) describes the coal business at this time as "a saga of hostility between labor and management, with almost a dozen years of uninterrupted warfare in the period immediately before 1950" (p. 18). During this period, it was very important that a miner took sides, either with the union or with management and prepare himself defensively. According to Bethel, "you could choose either side and run about an equal change of being killed. You'll either be a union man or a thug for . . . a coal operator" (p. 19). The operators, on the other side, fought the organizing efforts of the union with all of the weapons they had in their arsenal. In Harlan county, Kentucky, where the labor battles were the bloodiest, and where U.S. Steel, International Harvester, and other industrial giants had staked out enormous claims, the coal operator's association budgeted most of its funds for warfare (p. 6).

The years following World War II were particularly eventful. Three times during the war national strikes by the union resulted in government seizure of the mines. It was during this period that actions on the part of government, industry, and the union were to have longlasting effects on the relationship between the three. After the government

seized the mines a fourth time in 1946, John L. Lewis was forming a very negative image of government interference in the coal industry. After a mine explosion in 1947 (while the government still controlled the mines) occurred in Centralia, Illinois which killed 111 men, Lewis declared a week of mourning, and mines shut down all over the country. At almost the same time, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley act, which would in 1948 give the Justice Department the right to get a restraining order against the union from striking. Between 1947 and 1950, the union was frequently out on strike, and the union, the coal operators, and the government were unable to alter the impasse between them basically because of a refusal on anyone's part to negotiate an acceptable contract. In 1950, however, a board of inquiry revealed that the country was down to a two week supply of coal. Public opinion, which had for forty years been extremely favorable to John L. Lewis, suddenly reversed itself (p. 20). When Truman asked Congress for authority to seize the mines, Congress was glad to accommodate him. However, this action by Truman pushed both the union and the operators into a common defensive position. According to Bethel,

> Neither the operators nor the union wanted the industry saddled with a law that would have made the Taft-Hartley Act look libertarian by comparison; if there was one thing they could agree on, it was their determination not to let the federal government dictate to the industry. Both union and management suddenly found it possible to sit down on a Sunday afternoon and negotiate a contract with each other. On Monday morning, March 6, 1950, the last great coal strike ever engineered by John L. Lewis came to an end. (p. 20)

Called the Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, it was significant for two reasons: (1) it marked the end of large scale warfare between labor and

management, and (2) it was the first industry-wide contract in the history of coal mining. It was not until 1968, however, some 18 years later, that the true nature of this agreement was realized. In 1968, a grand jury rendered a verdict that the agreement created a monopoly of the soft coal industry, in direct violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Although the trial and the verdict received very little press attention, perhaps because of the complexity of the issue, the 18 years under which the agreement was in operation were years of extremely close association between the union leadership and the coal industry. No attempt will be made here to explain why John L. Lewis did a complete reversal of his former actions, although his age, fear of government, and a fear of communism have all been suggested as possible reasons. But the impact was tremendous. He had removed the one weapon that the miners had in their favor—the threat of a paralyzing national strike—by stating publicly that there would be no further crisis in the coal industry. According to Brit Hume, although the union received a great deal from the agreement (the fund, financed by a royalty of 40 cents on each ton of coal, made UMW workers among the first workers in American industry to receive job pensions and free medical care), the fund also gave the union a vested interest in coal production. This has led some to wonder if the fund, coupled with the union's desire to see the industry healthy again, has not caused the UMW's assistance to the major coal companies to go beyond cooperation into collusion (Hume, p. 23). In any case, the next ten years brought about a dramatic change, with contracts being negotiated and signed

without publicity. Lewis continued to do the negotiation on behalf of the union, "but even his own men generally didn't know the terms of the contracts until they were read aloud at the union conventions" (Bethel, p. 64).

In addition to the secrecy which pervaded the contract negotiations between Lewis and the coal operators, it was during this period that a drastic change in the technology of mining was to come about. The simplest and earliest technology used in coal mining was what has been called "hand loading." Using this technique, each individual miner was responsible, to some extent, for the amount of coal which he could load, by hand, and, in general, he worked independently of the other workers. This method was somewhat consistent with and maintained the traditional individualism of the Appalachian person. In 1923, the first information on a newly introduced loading machine became available, and although the coal still had to be cut and dynamited by hand, the machine could load a car much faster than a man (Knipe and Lewis, p. 13). The most recent technology, and the one largely in use today that has had such a great influence on mining, was introduced soon after World War II. Called the continuous mining method, this technique does not rely on cutting or shooting of coal; instead, a machine digs into the coal and loads it directly onto a waiting buggy or onto a continuous belt.

In the early 1950's, John L. Lewis made the decision that the UMW should permit, and even help finance, the mechanization of the nation's mines (Hume, 1971, p. 22). His decision has had both positive and negative benefits. According to Joseph Brennan, Director of the Department of Research and Marketing for UMWA:

> America's active and retired coal miners have reaped tremendous economic benefits from the mechanization process. Today because of the strong competitive position of the industry job security is present in coal mining as never before in history. The mine worker's wage levels are among the highest in the industrial world. The United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund has paid well over $2,000,000,000 to fund beneficiaries in the form of pensions, medical care, and widow and survivors benefits. A coal miner can today retire on a pension at age 55, an age well below that generally adhered to in industry. All of these things, higher wages, medical care benefits, job security, pensions, etc., are possible only because the coal industry was able to survive and only because the United Mine Workers of America was able to secure for its membership a share of the productivity which they made possible. (Brennan, 1970, pp. 202-203).

In addition, there have been benefits for the coal industry as well. The American miner produces, on the average, 20 tons per man day. In contrast, a West German miner produces three tons per man day, a British miner three tons, and a miner in the U.S.S.R. two tons (Brennan, p. 201). According to Garvey, the mechanization of mines has also had positive benefits for the safety of coal mining. Bureau of Mine statistics for the period of 1930 to 1967 show that both fatal and nonfatal accidents have been reduced by over 50 percent, based on man-hours of exposure. And on the basis of tonnage produced, the reduction of fatalities has been almost 90 percent (Garvey, 1970, p. 208).

While there was increased productivity as a result of the changing technology, there is another side to the mechanization story. In 1923, there were 704,793 men employed in the mining industry. By 1950 there were 415,000 men employed in the bituminous coal mining industry, and by 1969, there were only 130,000 men employed (Brennan, p. 203). Although the coal industry survived and the miners who continued working

were paid well, the impact upon the surrounding communities was devastating: unemployment, poverty, loss of revenue, and an almost complete dislocation from the mainstream of American growth. More importantly, however, was a change in the way in which the miner was viewed in his work setting. The machine, rather than the miner, became the focus of attention and what resulted was a case of alienation not unlike that pictured by Marx over 100 years ago:

> . . . in the mechanization process the coal miner is often reduced to the status of an appendage of a machine. The pace at which he works, the contribution that he makes, the ability which he brings to bear are determined by machines and not by man. The coal industry for the most part looks to the machine and not to the man. They marvel at the productivity of the machine and talk in terms of systems and engineering and output and somehow forget that the key ingredient remains the man—for only the man can operate the machine effectively and efficiently. (Brennan, p. 204)

Henry N. Doyle, professor of occupational health at the National Institute of Health in Stockholm, Sweden, suggests that this man-machine relationship is a very complex one which tends ultimately to establish an equilibrium state, based on economic advantages balanced against human and economic risks. In American society, labor, management, government and the general public agree on the human risks involved in the machine made tasks and accept these risks as a price of the product. When there is an equilibrium attained, there is a great reluctance to alter any component of the system for fear of upsetting the equilibrium state. In addition, the risk to human health is frequently difficult to evaluate because health is not an immediate response to an altered man-machine system (1970, p. 195).

With regard to pneumoconiosis, Dr. Doyle states that, while there were several system alterations in other areas, the risk to pneumoconiosis was either ignored or an incomplete analysis of the system was made, even though predictive techniques were available (p. 195). The increase and the actual speedup in motion of the machines increased the amount of coal dust circulating in the mines. The evidence seems to indicate that the high incidence of pneumoconiosis among bituminous coal miners appears to be directly attributable to increased mechanization (Doyle, 1970, p. 197). Although classical silicosis was not uncommon among bituminous coal workers prior to the introduction of modern machines the incidence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis appears to have increased dramatically about 1950. Statistical studies by the U.S. Public Health Service based on 1950 mortality and census records indicate a death rate for bituminous coal miners about twice that of the general working male population (Enterline, 1964, p. 758), with the death rate for respiratory disease about five times that of the general working male population. When compared with similar British studies, it was evident that the death rate for the American coal miner was approximately twice that of the British miner for all age groups (Doyle, p. 197).

The mechanization of the mines, then, played a major part in the development of "black lung" as an occupational disease in our nation's mines. The Black Lung Movement, however, and the struggle over the issue of pneumoconiosis was enhanced by two other problems which confronted the miners and their union around this same period of time: a change in the leadership of the UMWA and a recurring problem of mine safety.

The reason that contracts, mechanization, and loss of jobs for many miners was allowed to continue without much uproar from the miners was, according to Paul Jacobs, "Lewis's autocratic domination of the union" (Bethel, p. 64). Because of the benefits of the miner who did work, particularly the success of the Welfare and Retirement Fund, retaliation was minimal. Lewis even began to express the same kinds of sentiments that coal operators had expressed. Both seemed to be in agreement that "bigger was better" and they conspired to almost eliminate the smaller mines and put the coal industry under the control of a labor management conspiracy (Bethel, pp. 20-21).

From 1958 to 1963, no new contract was signed by the union. In 1960, Tom Kennedy replaced the retiring John L. Lewis and in that same year the union was once again in news headlines. Although labor management relations were amazingly stable, the union came to the forefront of national news when the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, aimed at assuring the democratic operation of labor organizations, required unions to file annual public statements of income, expenditures, and assets. According to Brit Hume:

> When the UMW's first was filed in 1960, its contents made front page news. It showed that the union had a staggering $110 million in assets, including a controlling interest in the National Bank of Washington and a sizeable interest in the West Kentucky Coal Company and in American Coal Shipping, Inc. The 1960 report and the two which followed it also revealed that the union had shelled out nearly $7 million between 1959 and 1961 to pay off defaulted loans, which the UMW had guaranteed, made to coal companies by the National Bank of Washington. These facts were slow to penetrate the southern Appalachian coal fields, but the news spread like wildfire among union men to the north and added to their growing restiveness. (Hume, 1971, p. 36)

In 1963, W. A. "Tony" Boyle became president of the UMWA, succeeding Kennedy after his death. Boyle, at the time, had the recommendation of John L. Lewis which was a crucial factor in his acceptance to the position and his ability to carry on the same policies initiated by Lewis. At the beginning of his presidency, it was expected that Boyle would seek a new contract. However, this was not the case. By August of 1963, Boyle still had not reopened the contract with the industry and discontent was brewing, particularly in the northern bituminous region, where a group of local union leaders were trying to organize a strike to force the union to reopen the contract. Other rebel movements were developing in Kentucky and Pennsylvania. When Boyle did finally reopen the negotiations, the resulting contract was claimed by Boyle to be the best ever to be negotiated by the United Mine Workers. However, after the miners began reading it, they evidently saw that it was not what they wanted. What resulted was a protest strike that marked the beginning of a dissident movement in the UMWA and the end of a rather long peace in the coal fields (Hume, 1971, pp. 39-40).

Although the dissidents were at the 1964 convention to bring their complaints to the union, a carefully planned counterattack thwarted their efforts. Not only was the convention scheduled out of the mining regions, which broke a long-standing practice, but a number of locals, manned by retired miners supportive of Boyle, were encouraged to attend by the promise of jobs to help pay their way (p. 44). The result was that large locals were only represented by a few people and a few votes while small locals, mostly retired miners, had just as many votes. The

1964 convention ended with an overall sweep of support for Boyle and his administration. The election ended pretty much the same way. According to Hume, "if the convention had been a hopeless avenue of reform for the dissident elements of the United Mine Workers, the international election proved to be just as futile . . . it would take more than a tobacco chewing rank and filer with no administrative experience [a man called 'Cadillac Kochis ran against Boyle] to convince most miners to turn out an incumbent, even an unpopular one" (p. 52).

One of the issues which was of concern to these dissidents was the safety of the coal miner. This was primarily because Boyle had sought no new legislation regarding mine safety and the union leadership had failed to apply pressure on the Bureau of Mines to enforce existing regulations. In addition, accidental deaths, for which mining is notorious, were increasing. In 1968, 307 men were killed in soft coal mines, 94 more than in 1967. Another 9,000 were injured (Hume, 1969, p. 22). It is a fairly well known fact that mining is the most dangerous occupation in the United States. It has the highest fatality and accident rate as compared with any other occupation or industry (Knipe and Lewis, 1969, p. 14). Today, although no more than approximately 130,000 men are employed in the bituminous coal industry, nearly 300 are killed in mining accidents each year. Mine cave-ins and explosions have become a part of the history of coal mining in America. However, under the administration of Tony Boyle, the mine disaster was considered a part of the business which could not be changed, whereas John L. Lewis had fought hard for better mine safety and working conditions (Rasmussen,

pp. 1-2). This change in attitude on the part of the union leadership was not received well by the membership, but the patterns of administration developed by Lewis and enforced by Boyle were not conducive to change from the lower ranks.

To understand why the union leadership was able to maintain such a tight control over the membership and conduct its business in relative secrecy, hidden from the public, the government, and the miners, it is important to understand the organizational structure of the union at that time. The UMWA was composed of twenty-seven districts, all but two in the United States, and in only six of these were the members allowed to elect their regional officers. The other twenty-one districts had most of their officers appointed from the administration leaders in Washington. It was a practice that went back many years and was legal until the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act which required the election of officers in all regional union divisions. Although the law became effective in 1960, through the following decade the UMW administration had made no effort to change its practice of appointing most of the district officers (Hume, 1971, pp. 40-41). In addition, the UMWA maintained a very centralized organization with little input from the bottom up. But, to some extent, this was the way the UMW had always been, even under Lewis. According to Hume:

> Lewis had operated the UMW as a virtual monarch since 1920, and the man he had trained to take his place had no intention of breaking that tradition, regardless of what the government and dissident members wanted . . . Besides, things looked different from Tony Boyle's perspective. More than forty years of one man rule in the UMW had created an atmosphere inside the grey, six-story headquarters overlooking McPherson Square in Washington in which criticism of the man at the top

> was considered treason. Lewis had suppressed dissent in the membership and had refused to tolerate it from his associates. (pp. 41-42)

Boyle continued to carry on the same authoritarian philosophy as John L. Lewis, but Boyle lacked the charismatic appeal that followed Lewis, and, as a result, had to depend more on the apparatus of his administration to maintain power and to protect himself from the dissident membership. This apparatus was quite effective, but its strength was built on the processes of both bureaucratization and institutionalization. Brittain brings this out in an indictment of the broader open system that the union was a part of:

> The case against Boyle includes bribery, misuse of union funds, and conspiring with the coal operators. These accusations have appeared unchallenged in the best American newspapers. Nadar has written about them to the chairman of the Senate Labor Committee, Yablonski's lawyer has told Mr. Shults, Secretary of Labor, of affidavits from miners whom Boyle attempted to bribe by offering them white collar jobs on the union payroll. But letters to Senators get swallowed up in the labyrinth of Senate subcommittees, while the Department of Labor has declined to look into the affair until after the decision. Other union leaders acknowledge privately that Boyle is a disgrace, but none of them will do anything publicly to rock the boat. The best thing Boyle has going for him is the inertia of American institutions—congress, government, and unions. (p. 1)

VI. SUMMARY

It may seem somewhat unusual that we would end a discussion of the environmental factors affecting the development of the Black Lung Movement with a treatise on the organizational structure of the United Mine Workers of America. However, as we shall show, the Black Lung Movement, although primarily concerned with the occupational disease

"pneumoconiosis," was at least secondarily concerned with another problem—corruption in the union. We also believe that the development of the black lung issue was as much a function of the struggles within the union as it was an occupational health problem resulting from a negligent industry. This two-fold aspect of the movement's existence will hopefully become clearer in the following chapters which discuss the structure and process of the movement and organizations. It is important to remember that the environment which we have pictured is dynamic, not static, and that it will change in terms of the addition of new elements, the deletion of others, and alterations in already existing factors. As we shall see later, the most important element in the environment to the Black Lung Association and its development will not come into existence for several months after the beginning of the movement.

The picture of the environment which we have presented thus far is the social, cultural, and economic framework within which the issue of black lung developed. Further delineation of more specific parts of this environment will require information about the initial organizing efforts of the Black Lung Movement and the development of the Black Lung Association. Before we look at the structure of the movement, however, let us summarize our conception of this broader environment.

First, illness in American society has a peculiar social role attached to it. That social role is considered deviant behavior to the broader society because illness interferes with the efficient functioning of the total system. Occupational diseases are particularly susceptible

to this interpretation because illness means a part of the economic system is malfunctioning and must be cured. The "system" in this case is well organized with specific goals that do not allow for evasion of responsibility. In American society in particular we find less of a tolerance for disability than in Great Britain. In addition, the field of occupational health seems to be limited by industrial rather than worker or medical definitions of illness.

Secondly, "black lung" or pneumoconiosis is an occupational disease which, although it has been recognized for many years, has received very little response from medical, governmental, or industrial personnel. The state of knowledge during the 1960's was minimal among medical professionals and among those who had done research there was conflicting opinion. This lack of concern and/or lack of knowledge allowed for other segments of the society to give their own interpretations to the disease, which, for many years, meant that nothing was done about it.

Thirdly, the coal miner, the victim of the disease and the beneficiary base of the Black Lung Movement, had a unique history in American society of internal colonialism, paternalism by the coal industry, and autocracy by union leadership which resulted in alienation from his work, his union, and from the mainstream of American society. As the union leadership became more dictatorial, with the possibility of collusion with the coal industry, and the health and safety in the mines began to take a back seat to new technology, increased production and reduced employment, the miner population began building up resentments against the industry for its lack of concern for the worker,

to the union for its corruption and misuse of funds, and the government for allowing all of this to happen. It was in this environment that the Black Lung Movement developed.

CHAPTER V

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION

By "structure," we refer here not to the organizational structure of the Black Lung Association solely, but to the broader social structure of the social movement organization and its immediate environment. This includes what McCarthy and Zald (1973) refer to as the social movement industry, constituencies, target groups, countermovements, as well as coalition movements and organizations, interconnecting agencies such as news media, and social control agencies such as governmental bodies. To develop a functional descriptive picture of this broader social system, however, we choose to begin by focusing on the initial stages of the organization of the Black Lung Movement and the BLA. From there we will attempt to show how the internal structure of the Black Lung Association is linked directly and indirectly to many elements within the environment.

I. THE AWAKENING MINERS

In Chapter IV, we gave a description of the broader structural environment in which the issue of "black lung" was to develop. Of particular importance was the division of opinion in the medical profession. Denman (1974) concludes that this was the key factor which prevented miners in West Virginia from receiving benefits under Workmen's Compensation laws for penumoconiosis. With the medical profession

divided on the issue of black lung, it was left for others to push for needed changes. However, the UMWA, the only established support base for the miners, had apparently done very little to aid these disabled miners (Denman, p. 25). Although Dr. Kerr (whom we have referenced frequently), assistant to the medical director of the UMWA's Welfare and Retirement Fund, was considered a leading authority on the disease, the UMW did nothing more than give lip service to the problem (p. 26).

The Federal government first entered the picture in 1963 when it gave the Public Health Service funds to undertake a prevalence study of the disease. In 1966 HEW established the Appalachian Laboratory for Occupational Respiratory Diseases (ALFORD) in Morgantown, West Virginia. Early in 1968, the U.S. Senate Select Subcommittee on Labor held hearings on a proposed Occupational Health and Safety Bill that had been submitted by the Johnson administration. Although the bill did not refer to problems in the coal industry, testimony by two doctors, Dr. Donald L. Rasmussen, a pulmonary specialist from the Appalachian Regional Hospital in Beckley, West Virginia, and Dr. Hawey Wells, Jr., of the Pulmonary Research Laboratory at Conemaugh Valley Memorial Hospital in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, urged that provisions protecting miners be included in the proposed legislation. The pleas of the two doctors, however, went unheeded (Denman, p. 27).

In February, 1968, Ralph Nader, a well known consumer critic and auto safety crusader, wrote an article in The New Republic which was particularly critical of government inaction on pneumoconiosis (particularly the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Mines)

and called for Congressional action to solve the problem. In addition he also sent a letter to Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior, charging that the Bureau of Mines was a captive of the mining industry and urged an investigation, which was undertaken.

In bringing an increased awareness of the disease to the mining population, perhaps the most important figure was a Charleston cardiologist, Dr. Isodore E. Buff. According to Trupp:

> Dr. Buff's involvement with Black Lung began in the 1950's, after coal companies introduced new cutting machinery which made more dust than ever. Almost overnight, the number of heart and lung patients increased. Company doctors sent miners who collapsed on the job to Dr. Buff, a heart specialist, with the diagnosis of heart failure, a noncompensable disease. It soon became apparent to Dr. Buff that most of these miners had not suffered coronary failures but were victims of Black Lung. (1969, p. 102)

In 1959, Dr. Buff proposed a study of the relationship between environment and lung disorders, first to the Public Health Service, and then five years later to the Federal Bureau of Mines, but with no response. It was at this point that Dr. Buff turned to the mining communities for support. However, it wasn't until 1968 that Buff was invited to speak to his first group of miners. Until that time, he was only able to make speeches to small business groups and women's clubs (Trupp, p. 103). In May, 1968, 25 men were trapped in a mine at Hominy Falls, West Virginia. Rescue attempts were partially successful, but four men died. Although black lung was not involved, Dr. Buff was invited to a meeting at Clifftop, West Virginia where about one hundred miners listened to him discuss black lung and attack the coal companies, the government, the welfare departments, and demand compensation and demand safer working conditions (Trupp, p. 104).

From May until November, 1968, Buff intensified his efforts at fighting for black lung. Because he was appointed to the West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commission in 1967, he had considerable access to the press. In an article after Buff's death in 1974, James Casto, a reporter for the Huntington, West Virginia Herald Dispatch recalls the crusaders tactics:

> Early on in the game, Buff learned what every good politician knows, that Sunday often is a slow news day and that newspapers are often short of copy for their Monday morning editions. A story that some other day might get short drift often ends up treated at length in a Monday morning newspaper. (Casto, p. B3)

After a summer of newspaper attacks and numerous meetings with small groups of miners, Buff finally hit home with the state legislature when state senator Neal Kinsolving urged action on black lung compensation during the governor's upcoming special session. But the governor and Workman's Compensation Commissioner reiterated that black lung was covered under existing law. The battle between Buff and the state went on until October when Buff turned his attention to the United Mine Workers of America, who had just signed a three year contract with the Bituminous Coal Operator's Association without any attempt on the part of the UMW Administration to force the operators to not resist attempts at obtaining compensation for black lung victims (Denman, p. 36).

At the same time that Dr. Buff was attacking the UMWA and struggling with the state legislature, Dr. Pasmussen, previously mentioned, and a miner by the name of Earl Stafford made several trips to Washington going before committees to try and get a federal black lung law. They were told that if they could get a law passed in West Virginia then they

could get a federal law (Interview with Earl Stafford). So, according to Earl Stafford, he went back and organized a picket of his own mine, which resulted in a work stoppage there and spread throughout the coal fields ("Earl Stafford: Mountaineer of the Month," p. 4).

It appears that the efforts of Dr. Buff, and Dr. Rasmussen and Earl Stafford were independent of one another initially. Just as independent were the activities of Joe Malay, one of the original organizers of the Black Lung Association. In a tape recorded interview with Malay, it seems as if the Black Lung Association might have developed somewhat separate from the mainstream of the Black Lung Movement:

> We had a cut off down here, in 1966. And we had some men, a lot of them around 50 years old . . . . when the new mine was opened . . . they didn't even call them to work. Well, some of them went and signed up on their social security—because they couldn't pass the examination for no place else no ways . . . So there was half of the men cut out of a job just because they was over 50 years old. They did put a couple of men back to work—Mike Ritter was one of them. But in the meantime he goes to Charleston and files for his silicosis. They give him 30 percent. Well, we tried to get Mike not to settle for it, we told him that the company would cut him off. He said, "I don't believe that they would do that—they been awfully good to me." They awarded him 5,200 dollars, and they give him a check for about 3,000 dollars, and of course Mike was an awfully poor man, and 3,000 dollars looked great big to him anyway, so he just took the check and cashed it. And he wouldn't listen to us so they give him a cut off slip. And he was 53 years old, now he wasn't old enough for his miner's pension, the union allowed the company to cut him off . . .
>
> So I come home and I called one of the union officials about it, and he said "Joe, I'm just so sorry, but there's nothing we can do about Mike—we had an agreement with the company, that if he has got over 11 percent disability and he files for his compensation, the company has a right to cut him off. Now that man can never get any more, no matter how bad off he gets, he can never collect another dime off of silicosis under the state compensation law . . . Now here that man was cut off with just 5200 dollars; that's not even

> a good one year's work for him. And he's 53 years old, he can't get his miner's pension, and it would have took him six years if he could have ever got his social security, but here is the thing about it—the Social Security sent him a letter saying that they couldn't find nothing the matter with him. After all, he had done been awarded 5200 dollars for silicosis, and then the Social Security said that they could find nothing the matter with him, he's still able to work, and the company's cut him off . . . and the union says that they had an agreement that they can cut him off. And that was what made us mad . . . and that was what got us into this black lung thing; we said that if the company is not going to pay this man, or is not going to let a man work, the company is liable for that man's being sick, and it is no more than right for that company to pay him. (Interview with Joe Malay)

According to Mr. Malay, some of the men went to one of their union officials in hopes of getting something done about silicosis, but were turned down because of the coal company lawyers in Charleston (West Virginia), and because this particular official did not want to stick his neck out for them. But the union official did mention the name of Dr. Buff saying that "that Dr. Buff who was raising so much sand; if that so and so would stick to doctoring and quit being a layman, we would get more done." This was, according to Mr. Malay, the first that he had ever heard of Dr. Buff. After reading an article in the paper by Dr. Buff the following week about the limited number of claims for occupational disease that had been approved, Mr. Malay called a meeting at Clifftop:

> We called a meeting down here at Clifftop ourselves, and we got about seven or eight men out to the meeting. So I brought it up in the meeting down there, I said, you know ole Dr. Buff, out there in Charleston, he seems to be an outspoken doctor . . . I wonder if we couldn't get him up here. I said, I'll write a letter, and ask him if he will come . . . Dr. Buff said "I'll be glad to come, just set up a meeting and let me know what time I can come" . . . Well, I wrote letters, I guess that I wrote 100 different letters around to different

> locals. Well, I guess we got around 30 men to that meeting. We had it in this here community building down here. (Interview with Joe Malay)

At the meeting, Mr. Malay related that one miner, Woody Mullins, was about to retire and wanted to know how to get his silicosis. After Mr. Malay told him about the problems with the lawyers and doctors in Charleston, and the fact that he would probably not get his compensation the way the law now stood, the group decided to call another meeting and to invite Dr. Buff to it. Around 200 miners showed up:

> And from there that thing started steamrolling. Dr. Buff went down to Logan, and we went up to Morgantown, and we really got things going then. We decided that we wouldn't hold any more meetings for a while. We would let the thing die down, and we thought we would try the legislature . . . them fellas are coal company lawyers and the coal company owns them. So we decided that we would try to get them fellas out . . . and try and elect fellas that were more favorable to us. That way maybe we could get something done through the legislature . . . So, since Governor Moore has turned his thumbs down on us, we decided we would start some more rallies, try and get the union morale raised up again, and maybe call another strike . . . (Interview with Joe Malay)

The available evidence seems to indicate that the Black Lung Movement had its origins with several people or groups of people working somewhat independently of one another. And the formation of the Black Lung Association, which will be discussed later, was started by another group separate from those already mentioned. The thrust of the movement and the impetus which resulted in the conversion of a majority of the miners to this cause, and to a broader awareness of the American public to the miner's plight, was to be influenced by an event in November, 1968, which many people feel was the true catalyst to the Black Lung Movement.

II. THE FARMINGTON DISASTER: A PRECIPITATING EVENT

The history of mining disasters in the United States is characterized by tragedy followed by some action on the part of state and federal governments. The first detailed record of an American coal mine explosion is of a blast in the Black Heath Mine near Richmond, Virginia, in 1839. Since that time there have been a number of them:

> The United States Bureau of Mines was established in 1910 after explosions during the preceding three years had killed a total of 1,013 men. The year after the explosion killed 92 in Bartly, West Virginia. In January, 1940, Congress finally passed legislation that allowed Federal Bureau of Mines inspectors to actually enter and inspect mines. The Orient Mine, No. 2, at West Frankfort, Illinois, exploded on December 23, 1951, killing 119 coal miners. The following year Congress passed and the President reluctantly signed the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952. (Denman, pp. 51-52)

On November 20, 1968, a coal mine explosion which killed 78 men at Consul Number Nine Mine in Farmington, West Virginia, brought the nation's attention once again to the problem of mine safety. Although there had been many mine disasters in the previous decade, this disaster, for several reasons, is considered by many to have been the precipitating event to the development of the Black Lung Movement, to the strike in West Virginia, and to the passage of the 1969 Coal Miners' Health and Safety Act (Ross, p. 244; Guenther, 1970, p. 257; Denman, 1974, p. 52). To understand why a disaster which focuses the nation's attention on the problems of safety within the mines would be a catalyst for a movement and legislation on a health issue it is important to observe how this disaster was to some extent different from previous ones. According to Denman, one of these was exposure:

> The disaster at Farmington was not unlike other coal mine tragedies. The initial explosion, the long vigil by the miners' families, the final abandon of hope, had all occurred before and would occur again. Yet many things were different at Farmington. The tragedy went on for ten days. It was reported throughout that time by a variety of news media, most particularly television. (Denman, p. 58)

The degree of television coverage was intensified by the fact that the disaster and the reporting occurred during the Thanksgiving holidays when many people were at home watching television. In addition, the tragedy occurred after legislation had been introduced into Congress, and a number of people were ready to push for strong legislation.

The Farmington disaster provided the necessary impetus for many people and groups to become involved in the struggle. Dr. Buff continued to speak at public gatherings after the explosion but the meetings took on a more militant protest format, being action oriented rather than information seeking. In December, 1968, at a conference of the U.S. Department of the Interior on mine safety, a group called the "Physicians for Miners' Health and Safety" was formed and later became known simply as the Physicians Committee. It was made up of the three already active doctors fighting for recognition of black lung: Dr. I. E. Buff, Dr. Hawey Wells, and Dr. Donald Rasmussen. Whenever possible, the three doctors appeared together at protest meetings all over West Virginia. Each had his own style and contributed in various ways to the development of the movement. Dr. Buff would attack the coal industry, the inaction corruption of the UMW and its leadership, and talk about the horrors of the black lung disease itself. The speeches given by Dr. Rasmussen were less oratorical and perhaps more

factual presentations of the exact nature of the disease itself. He legitimized the group and the activities of the group by his expertise. Dr. Wells usually concluded the meetings with a call for political action. Wells used a particularly flamboyant device to stir the miners to action. A noted pathologist, Wells would take dried sections from diseased black lungs and crumble them in front of the miners telling them that it was a slice of their brother's lung (Denman, pp. 67-71).

The mobilization of miners in support of the black lung movement came to a peak in early January, 1969, with the formation of the social movement organization—the Black Lung Association. According to Joe Malay, the Black Lung Association (BLA) was formed initially for financial reasons:

> The reason that we formed the Black Lung Association is that we knew that we was going to have to write a bill of our own. We went down to talk to Paul Kaufman, because Dr. Buff recommended him to us . . . . then the union comes along with a bill, and of course, they ask us not to support the one that we was getting up, to forget about it, and not to give Paul Kaufman no money. So in order to get money you had to have some kind of organization, see, to pay the money into, so that's why we formed the Black Lung Association, so that we would have some kind of organization to put our money in, so that we could pay Paul Kaufman to write the bill. (Interview with Joe Malay)

The formation of the organization, however, as I found out later, was not an easy decision, mainly because of the threat of dual unionism. According to Brit Hume, this is one of the most serious charges against a coal miner (1971, p. 111). Apparently, the initial meeting to do something broke up because of disagreement as to whether their action would lead to trouble with the UMW hierarchy. Several of the miners argued that since the union had promised to introduce a bill it would

be unwise to take any action that might be interpreted as an effort to undercut the official policy of the organization (p. 111). "The UMW constitution provided that a member could be expelled for joining any organization deemed "dual" to the UMW. Loss of union membership meant loss of job and of pension and hospital benefits. It was a punishment few members were willing to risk (Hume, 1971, p. 111). Because of this, the initial meeting with Kaufman broke up, according to Hume, "an apparent failure." Hume describes the action following the meeting:

> On the street outside the city hall, after most of the miners at the meeting had departed, a few lingered still trying to figure out a way to organize a fund raising drive to press for the kind of legislation they wanted. One of them, Earnest Riddle . . . suggested the group form an "association." Such a loose organization, he said, could not be considered a dual union since it could be established for a single stated purpose, enactment of a black lung compensation bill . . . The plan was quickly agreed upon by the handful who remained. They decided to call themselves the West Virginia Black Lung Association. Charles Brooks, a mild mannered black man who was president of the local at the Carbon Fuel Company mine at Winifrede . . . was elected president, Earnest Riddle became treasurer. Later that night, Brooks called Kaufman and asked him to go ahead on the strength of the association's promise of a fund drive. The same night, Lynn Calhoun, another of the association's charter members, called a friend of his, Arnold Miller, and asked him to help the group raise money. He could not have asked a better man . . . within days, Miller had raised $1,000 at a special meeting of his own local and had convinced the members of two other locals to put up a total of $550. (Hume, 1971, p. 112).

In the same month that the organization came into existence, it formed a close alliance with the Physicians Committee and together they continued the mobilization of miners for the black lung cause. The number of meetings increased and the attendance began improving as Logan, Boone, McDowell, and Mingo Counties, the counties with the most

mining as well as the most poverty and misery, began to realize the possibility of getting compensated for their lung disease (Hume, p. 113).

III. A NOTE ON SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORIGINS

The researcher who inquires into the origins of the development of a social movement is faced with a number of problems which need qualification at this point. In response to inquiries of this nature, the researcher is quite often confronted with the question "why do you want to know how this movement began?" The question is a relevant one from the standpoint of both the student of social movements and the subject who is being interrogated. However, the reasons for academic curiosity differ from those of the social movement participant or supporter. Having the question posed to me several times in my investigation, I was forced to ponder its significance, for both parties involved.

To put this issue in a proper perspective, we need first to legitimize the academic concern. Social sciences, like all sciences, are constantly struggling with the problem of establishing cause and effect. In fact, most sciences hope to eventually attain a level of knowledge that will one day allow not only the explanation of past events as to their causes, but allow also prediction of the occurrence of similar events in the future. Within the study of collective behavior and social movements, our concern has been to explain "events" by identification of certain elements within the social environment which have influenced the occurrence of that event. Although our

sophistication in this area is rather limited at present, we have formulated two dominant theoretical schemes which assist us in our search for causes. One approach focuses attention on what might be called the "subjective" element of social reality (Wallace, p. 13), i.e., the individual motivations of the movement participants them themselves, by asking such questions as "What motivates men and women to create, join, and maintain social movements?" (Roberts and Kloss, p. 20). The second approach focuses attention on the more "objective" elements of the society, those characteristics of the social structures themselves that, because of their inequities or inconsistencies, might produce a social movement for change. The first approach tends to seek for "causes" within the realm of the individual whereas the second focuses on the environment. Although both perspectives add to our knowledge of social movements, they are not without certain "political" implications. By focusing on structural or environmental elements that may lead to a social movement, one, to some extent, identifies the possibility that there is something wrong with the social, economic, or political system that has led to discrimination, alienation, or deprivation on the part of a group of people, and therefore, a desire for change. By focusing on the characteristics of movement leaders and participants, we move away from an analysis of the ultimate objective causes of the movement in the environment to the more immediate subjective causes of the movement in terms of "who started it," "how did they mobilize the participants," and "what was their motivation for doing so?"

Participants in social movements, particularly those which attack the existing social order, are very wary of people who ask questions of this latter type. This is primarily because of a constant awareness of the efforts of the social movement opposition (established order or countermovement) to discredit the movement by revealing something about the movement leaders or how the movement began. The opposition, in other words, may attempt to discredit the legitimacy of a social movement by reflecting negatively on the movement participants and taking attention away from the more political, economic, social or structural issues that they are fighting. These attacks were very much a part of the history of the Black Lung Movement. Several newspaper accounts and articles stressed the role of people other than the miners for the "success" of the movement (Trupp, 1969, p. 101; Lee, 1972, p. 201; Loftus, p. 24) and several attacks by the opposition attempted to place the "blame" on the physicians committee. The medical societies of both Cabell County and Kanawha County, West Virginia, castigated the doctors for unduly alarming and inciting miners as well as for what they called bad medical practice (Charleston Gazette, 16 January 1969, p. 21); Charleston Daily Mail, 24 January 1969, p. 1). The union accused them of helping to form a dual union to overthrow the leadership. The actual role played by the Physicians Committee is somewhat difficult to separate from the role of the Black Lung Association, but the distinction may be important to understand, not only for how a movement develops, but also the factors which prohibit its development. It does appear as if the early efforts at making the miners aware of their

condition was the responsibility of Dr. Buff and the Physicians Committee. However, although Dr. Buff, Dr. Rasmussen, and Dr. Wells were the featured speakers at the rallies, the actual organizing work that got the meetings together was solely the work of coal miners, and we believe, had to be. According to Dr. Rasmussen in an interview in 1972:

> The people who really did the work were the rank and file coal miners. Woody Mullins, Ronny Sturgill, and the Halls . . . the rank and file miners, got the whole thing going, it was their own idea; nobody talked them into starting the Black Lung Association. Those guys pulled off quite a feat, they collected the 10,000 bucks. It was really a beautiful thing to see, the way they did that. (Interview with Dr. Rasmussen, 1972)

Because most accounts of social movements are recorded in newspapers, researchers and laymen alike tend to receive a somewhat biased perspective on the origins of movements from these documents solely. Newspapers have a tendency to report the most newsworthy items and exaggerate stories for their publicity ability. After most of the black lung rallies, the speeches of Dr. Buff received the most newspaper coverage. However, very little was ever reported of the behind the scenes work which goes on in order to assure the speaker of a large group to speak to. So the early efforts of miners before the actual establishment of the Black Lung Association were unreported, and to a great extent unknown, even to the miners themselves.

The only time that organizing activities became newsworthy was when they were attributed to someone outside the mining community. This was particularly the case when Craig Robinson, a VISTA volunteer, was given credit as being the catalyst of the Black Lung Movement (Lee, 1969,

p. 201). The state of West Virginia House Judiciary Chairman charged that the black lung strike was largely instigated by VISTA workers (Lee, 1969, p. 25). The role played by Craig Robinson and other VISTA workers, however, while important and worthwhile, must be put in a perspective which is more consistent with their capabilities. In an interview with Craig Robinson, he stated that he had nothing to do at all with the development of the Black Lung Association but that his activities were limited solely to disseminating information about the disease to the miners and its implications. While Craig was a well liked person, most of the VISTAS were received rather coldly by the general mining community. After the accusation by Chairman Watson, the response by the miners was fairly definite:

> He is a liar . . . VISTA people have nothing to do with it . . . miners have enough sense to lead their own fight . . . never heard of VISTAS around—it's not what VISTA want but what we want. (Lee, 1969, p. 25)

Just who is responsible for a social movement's development is perhaps a useless track to pursue from a sociological perspective. However, because the origins of the study of social movements are grounded in collective behavior theory, particularly the works of LeBon (1879), Mackay (1932) and Martin (1920) and Strecker (1940), there is still a tendency to identify movement leaders as irrational and abnormal, and social movements as social aberations—"as extensions of parallels of individual mental disease" (Toch, 1965, p. 4). This negative view of both the leaders and the movement are still generally maintained by the opposition, usually the established social order. It is a functional position for them, and it is important that the

researcher recognize the processes leading to these formulations, that he maintain a somewhat more objective perspective of the movement itself. Wilson (1974) suggests that a more fruitful approach would be to make generalizations about the social conditions which typically give rise to social movements and understand the processes whereby people become involved in them (p. 6). The passages from the interview with Joe Malay brings to light a very neglected area within the development of a social movement—the prior social organization of potential movement participants and the importance this plays in the ability of movement leaders to mobilize support for the constituency. This brings our discussion back to the problem of distinguishing between the role of the Black Lung Association and the miners and the role of the Physicians Committee. The role played by the Physicians Committee, as well as by VISTA Volunteers, could only be that of dissemination of information. The doctors could not have organized the miners movement because they did not have the contacts or the ability to mobilize the miners into the rallies, the strike, or the marches. Although the rhetoric which they did contribute was important, and perhaps more newsworthy, this was probably less crucial to the success of the movement than the activities which the miners participated in to establish an audience for their speeches. An important Appalachian cultural trait is operating here, that is, that the mass media is not a major form of communication in the mountains. According to O. Norman Simpkins, an authority on Appalachian culture, "The primary means of passing news among Appalachians is by word of mouth. While they may read about an incident

in the paper, they don't really believe it until they get it firsthand from someone else" (Simpkins, p. 11). Although Dr. Buff had written several articles in papers and had been quoted in papers, most of the miners disregarded what he said, even his calls for miner action. The mobilization of miners required that there be face-to-face contact with miners, something only the rallies could provide, and only the miners could set up the rallies.

IV. THE WEST VIRGINIA BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION

Although the Black Lung Association had its roots in the Black Lung Movement to obtain compensation for the disease, it is important to make a distinction between the Black Lung Association prior to the passage of the state and federal laws (state compensation in West Virginia in March, 1969 and the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act passed in December) and the organization which reemerged after the federal program was put into effect. Prior to the passage of the federal bill, there was only one organization, the West Virginia Black Lung Association. Its organizational structure during this early period was rather loose and not well formed. Hume gives the following description of a Charleston, West Virginia rally during this time:

> The Charleston rally was a big success, well attended, well publicized and filled with the melodrama that seemed to give the movement its impetus. And this was a movement in every sense of the word. The Black Lung Association had no members, actually, except its officers. Instead it had adherents and contributors who went about their chores on an ad hoc basis. The meetings never had an agenda. (Hume, 1971, p. 21)

The BLA maintained this loose structure until they acquired legislation for workman's compensation in West Virginia and until the passage of the

legislation in Washington, D.C. However, during the period between the state and the federal legislation, the Black Lung Association redirected its efforts from the "black lung" issue to the political arena. Because the association had experienced organized resistance from not only the coal operators and the legislature, but also the United Mine Workers of America, the BLA initiated efforts against the administration of the Union. Utilizing the same tactics and strategies of rallies and grass-roots meetings, the personnel of the BLA made up most of the campaign organization of Jock Yablonski, their candidate to defeat Boyle in the 1969 UMWA election for the president. But Yablonski was defeated and two weeks later assassinated. This, coupled with the ever present problem of being accused of dual unionism had a destructive impact upon the survival of the Black Lung Association.

Although the recorded history of the BLA (presented earlier) refers to the organization as being relatively inactive at this time, an interview with Eula Hall, one of the original organizers of the movement, revealed that the BLA was supported and maintained by four miners and one miner's widow who preserved, as far as the public and the coal operators were concerned, the image of an active organization. This "image" was also important to retaining the support of the mining population. Without an ongoing link with the general mining population, the BLA would never have been able to revive itself. Two factors contributed heavily to this. First, the BLA never really had an identifiable structure. Its few officers were the only recognizable membership in the organization. Secondly, without an identifiable structure, the strength of the BLA was difficult to determine. The

miner's strike in support of the fight for workman's compensation, which involved almost 40,000 miners, was the only visable evidence of the potential strength of the organization. Whether it could be done again was an unanswered question to most legislators, coal operators, and the UMWA. Therefore, the BLA was in an advantaged position to remain relatively inactive for a long period of time without a major loss in its image, its potential power, or its potential membership.

The revival of the Black Lung Association came about as a result of two major factors. First, in the summer of 1970, the Disabled Miners and Widows, another dissident miner's group, pulled out 18,000 men out of the mines before federal injunctions and the jailing of the strike leaders broke its back. The Disabled Miner's Strike was aimed at the UMWA, particularly at the Welfare and Retirement Fund, which had denied medical and pension benefits to thousands of disabled miners and their widows. This strike brought some renewed enthusiasm to the larger miner's movement and to the Black Lung Association. Secondly, the real "precipitating event" which gave the BLA a specific direction in which to work and would set the stage for the establishment of its major target group, was the issuance of the first denial letters by the Social Security Administration, the federal agency given the responsibility for administering the Black Lung Program under the guidelines of the 1969 Coal Miners Health and Safety Act.

V. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

The 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act designated the Social Security Administration as the official federal agency to administer the

Black Lung Benefits Program. This would be the agency that would not only handle the claims for black lung benefits but would also decide the eligibility of the claimants for the benefits. Although the Social Security Administration (SSA), a branch of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), was a likely choice for the program, there is much evidence to indicate that the SSA was poorly prepared to handle the program. According to Arthur Hess, Deputy Commissioner of the SSA:

> . . . even with the experience we have had and the responsiveness that has been built into the organization, the new responsibilities we were assigned with the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 represent a major challenge to our capacity and resources. We have never received a major job to do on such short notice or with so little additional personnel to do the job . . . Until the very closing days of the last session of Congress, we had absolutely no idea that we would be involved in carrying out some of the provisions of this landmark piece of coal mine legislation. (Hess, 1970, p. 41)

Although the SSA had carried out more massive programs, such as the social security disability insurance program in the fifties and the Medicare program in the 60's, Hess comments that they had some advantages in getting those programs underway which they did not have under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (FCMHSA): considerable advance notice, close participation in planning and drafting of legislation, ability to initiate planning for administration of the program, and given time after enactment to develop a basic body of policies, procedures, and other administrative mechanisms, as well as an opportunity to organize and secure necessary staff. However, Hess did identify one big advantage for the implementation of the Black Lung Benefits Program: having a going organizational structure carrying out

similar functions (pp. 41-42). Two years after the enactment of the program, in a report by the Comptroller General of the United States to the Congress, there is further evidence of the SSA's preparation problems:

> Prior to the enactment of the 1969 act, SSA received only a few weeks notice that it might be given responsibility for administering the new benefits program . . . Under the act claimants became eligible for benefits in the months their applications are filed. Because the law was effective upon enactment and included no provision for retroactive payments, SSA found itself in a position in which it had to quickly
>
> —inform potentially eligible miners and widows about the new program and advise them to file applications immediately to avoid possible loss of benefits,
>
> —establish criteria for determining when miners would be considered totally disabled due to CWP (Coal Worker's Pneumoconiosis) and when miner's deaths would be considered to be caused by CWP, and
>
> —develop policies and procedures for administering the program. (Achievements, Administrative Problems, and Costs in Paying Black Lung Benefits to Coal Miners and Their Widows, September 5, 1972, p. 15)

It appears that the SSA did not have to do much in the way of informing the miners about the program. Within one week of enactment of the legislation, 18,000 claims for black lung benefits had been filed, and this increased to nearly 100,000 claims by the end of the first month. By the end of December, 1970, one year after the program came into operation, the number of claims was approximately 247,000 and by the end of 1971, the number had arisen to 348,000 claims (Achievements, Administrative Problems . . ., p. 16).

Although over 100,000 claims were received by the end of the first month, it was several months before the claims were processed and the

benefits paid. The SSA's administration of this program was a crucial factor in the revival of the Black Lung Association as an active social movement organization. Although the Congress passed the legislation, it gave considerable leeway to the SSA as to the administration and handling of the program and to the regulations upon which claims would be based. The inconsistency between what many miners saw as the intent of Congress for the program and the way it was administered by the SSA led to major concerted effort by the miners to protect themselves.

Perhaps the initial reason for frustration on the part of the miners was the actual length of time before the first claims were processed. By the end of September 1970, SSA had processed about one-half of the approximately 100,000 claims filed in the first month of the program. According to SSA officials, delays were caused primarily by the sheer volume of claims and a lack of medical criteria for determining when miners were totally disabled due to CWP or when their death could be attributed to the disease. In addition, the limited medical resources available, particularly in the Appalachian area, had caused more than normal time to be spent in completing medical examinations of claimants (Achievements, Administrative Problems . . ., p. 16).

Not only were the original claims not processed for several months, but the SSA's predictions for claims to be filed were very far off. Initial predictions of 200,000 by June 1971 had been surpassed in September 1970. This large number of claims resulted in an unplanned for strain on the machinery of the SSA and an increasing number of

miners expecting their benefits. In addition, the initial claims processed showed high approval rates. By September, 1970, of the over 200,000 claims which had been filed, 43,000 had been processed and 40,000 of these were approved. Although there was a delay in processing, these figures indicated a high approval rate, over 90 percent. This established in the minds of many miners a high expectation for approval when their claim was processed ("Red Tape Ties Up Black Lung Benefits," p. 1).

The response of the mining population to the initial processing of claims by SSA is seen in an early issue of the Black Lung Bulletin, the newspaper of the Black Lung Assocation:

> Coal miners are worried: the Social Security Administration regulations are a mass of confusion, and some men are finding themselves tied up in just the kind of bureaucratic red tape that Congress tried to avoid when the law was passed . . . The Social Security Administration is not supposed to be tied up in party politics but reports from Washington are that many claims are being sat on until after the November election, and that they will be turned down after that. The government says that this isn't so but an official in social security recently wrote a confidential letter to a friend in West Virginia warning that many men would be turned down soon after the elections. ("Red Tape Ties Up Black Lung Benefits," p. 1)

The most glaring inconsistency in the Black Lung Program, however, and perhaps the one most responsible for the revival of the Black Lung Association in some states and not others, was the differential processing and approval rate for the major coal mining states. According to an article in The Washington Post, from figures attributed to the Bureau of Disability Insurance, as of November 6, 1970, only 22 percent of the claims from eastern Kentucky had been processed, only 24 percent from West Virginia, while the national average of processing

was almost double—43 percent. The Bureau's statistics also indicate differences in denial rates, particularly in Eastern Kentucky and West Virginia. While only 20 percent of the claims in the rest of the nation had been denied, West Virginia miners were being denied at the rate of 32 percent and in Kentucky at the rate of 57 percent (Hawpe, p. LI). The Comptroller General's report (previously documented) also notes the discrepancy between states, giving figures for approval rates as of December 31, 1971. The approval rate for Kentucky was 32.2 percent, for West Virginia 45.0 percent, and for Pennsylvania 67.4 percent. However, the report also postulated four reasons for the differences:

> —Miners of anthracite coal are more likely to become afflicted with CWP than are miners of bituminous . . . Of the miners employed in Pennsylvania during the 50-year period 1920-1969, approximately one-half were employed in anthracite coal mines and one half in bituminous coal mines. Virtually all coal miners in the other states mined bituminous coal during this period; relatively few mined anthracite coal.
>
> —Data compiled by SSA indicated that the average age of Pennsylvania miners, as a group, who filed for claims for benefits was higher than the average age of their counterparts in the rest of the nation. Certain criteria used by SSA for determining whether miners are eligible for benefits allowed nearer normal lung ventilatory function as miners advanced in age.
>
> —Data compiled by the SSA indicated that, as a group, Pennsylvania miners who filed claims for benefits had more coal mining experience than did their counterparts in the rest of the nation and therefore presumably had more exposure to dust.
>
> —Pennsylvania has had a compensation program since 1965 for coal miners disabled by CWP. Because medical and other evidence needed to support a claim for compensation under the Pennsylvania program is much the same as required by

> the SSA, thousands of Pennsylvania claimants, especially widows of miners, have had the advantage of having evidence to support their claims for federal benefits. Claimants from other states have not yet had as great an advantage because no other state had a compensation program for CWP which produced nearly as much evidence as did the Pennsylvania program. (Achievements, Administrative Problems . . ., pp. 19-20)

Although the above postulated reasons were rational, this information was not available to the general mining population. What was available was information disseminated by the West Virginia Black Lung Association though the Black Lung Bulletin and through press releases in the paper and by an organization in Kentucky called the Clay County Poor People's Association. But even without the statistics made available by miner's groups, the general attitude of miners toward the SSA has always been somewhat negative. The sentiment of many miners was expressed by Ray Hubbard at a meeting in Clay County, Kentucky, when he said, "I thought that the Congress had passed a good black lung law. After the Social Security got aholt of it, I figger they're the one's messed it up" (Hawpe, p. LI).

The Social Security Administration as a target group must be understood from at least two different standpoints: (1) the SSA as an organization with certain rules, regulations, roles, etc., and (2) the conception of this target group from the perspective of the social movement organization participants (or leaders) who are seeking to change or influence it. On the broader organizational level, the Social Security Administration is a part of the larger Department of Health Education and Welfare. States are divided into districts and each district has at least one Social Security Office. Under the FCMHSA of

1969, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was assigned the responsibility for overseeing the administration of the Black Lung Benefits Program. Within this department, the duty was delegated to the Social Security Administration because of its experience and capability in administering a nationwide benefits program (Kramer, Inc., p. 13), and also because the SSA had regional and district offices that would facilitate the application of claims.

Although the local Social Security office is the place where the miner files his claim for black lung benefits, the local office merely collects the data from available sources and forwards this information to the Bureau of Disability Insurance in Baltimore, Maryland, where it is reviewed and a decision is reached whether to approve or deny the claim. The local office, however, became as much a target group for attacks by the BLA as did the national office, mainly because it was the only point of contact which the miner had with the system. According to the First Annual Report on Part B of Title IV of the FCMHSA:

> The primary point of public contact and service in the administration of the black lung benefits program is the local social security district office. These offices provide information and assistance to claimants in the filing and processing of their claims. Trained staff in the offices answer inquiries about the program, explain the eligibility requirements and give guidance and assistance to claimants on furnishing available medical and other evidence needed to document claims . . . District offices advise each claimant on his or her rights and obligations under the law as a beneficiary. They furnished denied claimants with detailed explanation of the reason for the denial decision and the evidence on which it was based. On request also, the evidence on his claim is made available in the district office for inspection by the claimant or his representative. The claimant is informed of his rights of appeal and, if dissatisfied with the decision on his claim, is assisted

> in providing any further evidence available that may be pertinent to the further review of his claim . . . (First Annual Report 62-999-0, pp. 13-14

The Social Security Administration came under attack from the Black Lung Association on two levels. On the national level, where decisions were made for the purposes of maintaining consistent criteria for ajudication of claims to minimze regional differences, the SSA was attacked for failing to do this. On the local level, what existed in print (above) was not what came out in reality, at least according to the miners. The actual processes of confrontation between the SSA and the BLA will be covered in the next chapter; however, it is important to understand the conception of the SSA which the leaders of the BLA formulated in terms of planning their attack. In the beginning, the leaders either spoke against the system in general or categorized the struggle with the SSA as another of the many facets of political life that are controlled by the coal industry. In an early issue of the Black Lung Bulletin, the influence of the coal industry in the state of West Virginia is suggested as a conscious determining factor for state claim differences:

> Pennsylvania continues to have a much higher percentage of benefit awards than the other states. Also, Pennsylvania has the highest percentage of reconsiderations in favor of the applicant—twice as high as Kentucky, half as high as in West Virginia. This indicates that the social security officials in these states are under the heel of the coal company, just like the doctors. ("Black Lung Facts," p. 2)

This is a rather common accusation in both West Virginia and Kentucky because of the tremendous economic and political power which rest in the hands of the coal companies. The coal mining community has lived with

this arrangement for many years with very little success at change. However, the ability of the leaders of the BLA to move from these broad general accusations of blame on specific people and companies to a more detailed critical account of the flaws in the functioning of the system was a major step in the acquisition of a clearer picture of the target group they were confronted with. The following excerpts from an article entitled "Bureaucrats vs. People," which appeared in a later issue of the Black Lung Bulletin, demonstrate a change in perspective:

> In 1969, Congress gave Social Security the responsibility to administer the Federal Black Lung Program. We would like to presume that the intentions of the SSA bureaucrats were to administer fairly a federal law; however, its actions have led to other results . . . Study of the administration of the Black Lung Program reveals a failure on the part of the SSA. The regulations passed by the SSA on their administration on the poor have frustrated Congress's intentions and rendered benefits unnecessarily difficult for deserving people to attain . . .
>
> Why has this happened? In part, this is because the SSA is the largest Federal "antipoverty" organization in the country. In order to get their work done the bureaucrats running the program divide up work into small parts—for efficiency. Decisions are made on bureaucratic convenience rather than on serving human needs. For efficiency's sake workers in the SSA operate almost like machines. A decision is made, a button is pushed, and the workers do what they are told—losing the ability to understand the people with whom they are dealing. ("Bureaucrats vs. People," p. 6)

This changing conception of the target group by members of the social movement organization is important for several reasons. First, instead of general attacks on individuals, the legislation, coal company influence or more traditional areas of focus in the miner's struggle, the "enemy" is a bureaucratic organizational structure. Secondly, within this conception, various levels of attack can be identified which will require tactics and strategies which will most likely succeed

against this type of organizational structure. Thirdly, the structure of the Black Lung Association itself is very much determined by the environment in which it exists, particularly the target group in which it hopes to effect change. The Black Lung Bulletin suggests that the struggle is one of bureaucrats versus people. The target group is seen as a bureaucracy. However, how and in what way are the "people" organized? Our research suggests that the internal structure of the Black Lung Association is neither highly organized in a bureaucratic fashion nor completely unstructured and amorphous. Its organizational structure reflects what we feel is a somewhat new form of social movement organization, in part determined by the confrontation with various elements within the environment, and in part determined by the antibureaucratic sentiment of its membership.

VI. THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION

The original Black Lung Association was located in West Virginia and had only one chapter. As was previously mentioned, its structure was rather loose with a few leaders and an undetermined number of followers. Its purpose was primarily to provide an organization to which money could be sent to for the writing up of a state compensation bill. It wasn't until the summer of 1970, when the first denials by the Social Security Administration were sent out, that the Black Lung Association as a national organization began to develop. In the next six months period, 14 chapters were established in West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia and later in Tennessee. Most of these chapters were

originally established by a representative from the West Virginia Chapter coming in and helping the miners in a certain community to organize others who had been turned down for benefits. In the beginning there were no guidelines for these chapters and each of them formed structures and ways of operating which were determined by the needs of the members. Although the operating differences were minimal, some later became important factors in the inability of the chapters to eventually unite into one strong centralized organizational structure. (For example, some chapters charged dues while others operated on donations.) The rapid growth of the Black Lung Association during these six months created problems of coordination. Communication between the chapters was rather limited, and as a result chapters set up their organizations and carried out their activities in somewhat different ways. What held them together was a group referred to as "The Charleston Office Crew."

VII. THE CHARLESTON OFFICE CREW

In the latter half of the 1960's and early 1970's, government support of social movement organizations was crucial to their survival (McCarthy and Zald, 1973b, p. 13). The support came in many forms, both direct and indirect, but the two most common were Community Action Programs and VISTA. The support of VISTA volunteers in the beginnings of the Black Lung Movement has already been discussed. The Black Lung Association as a social movement organization was also supported by the government through a program called Designs for Rural Action (DRA). DRA

was a community action agency which was responsible for supporting community related projects to assist people in Appalachia. Although direct money or salaries could not be put into a social movement organization, the government workers devised a plan to cut their own salaries in half and use this money to support the activities of Arnold Miller, Dr. Rasmussen, and other community action leaders. The group was headed by Tom Rhoddenbaugh with Arnold Miller, state president of the Black Lung Association, on the board of directors. With regard to their work with the Black Lung Association, the office became known as "the Charleston Office Crew." They attempted to tie together all of the activities of the miners in the state (and in all of Appalachia) by assisting in coordination and communication between all BLA chapters. They sent out newsletters, published the Black Lung Bulletin, released press statements, and a number of other activities (Interview with Tom Rhoddenbaugh, April, 1973). In the following memo, located in old records of the BLA, and apparently sent to all chapters, the purpose of the "Charleston Office Crew" is spelled out.

> The purpose of the Charleston Office is to help with communications among the chapters of the BLA, and to provide support services to the chapters whenever possible. The Charleston Office exists to help the chapters accomplish what they want to see done. It is not the headquarters of the BLA or the place where the organization's decisions are made. As we see it, that right and responsibility belongs to the chapters, meeting together as a body. (The Charleston Office Crew, n.d., document in BLA Files)

While this was the ideal function of the Charleston Office, the social structure of the BLA was such that the role it played was more important than just coordination. And the role it established in 1970 was

maintained until 1972 when Arnold Miller, former president of the BLA, was elected to the presidency of the UMWA, and was replaced in 1973 by a UMWA affiliate called the Field Service Office. Both the Charleston Office Crew and the Field Service Office performed similar functions within the BLA which many felt led to too much centralization of power. Tom Rhoddenbaugh, manager of the office, and other workers, mostly nonminers, were aware in the beginning that a problem might exist with too much power concentrated in the office. They even attempted to disseminate some of the power by asking for more input from the local chapters:

> . . . it seems that it is done better when we work under the direction of the BLA chapter offices . . . That way, our work can be guided better by BLA policies. While this may make more work for you all, it will help insure that what is done in the name of the BLA is actually always in accordance with policies set by the members. (Memo: What we're here for, document in BLA Files, pp. 1-2)

However, it appears that the local chapters were somewhat unwilling to provide that much input into the Charleston Office, and as a result there existed some misunderstanding between the chapters and with the Charleston Office. According to a future memo:

> The Charleston Office functions as a service for the overall BLA—but in many ways there is no overall structure of the organization to set guidelines for our activities, to decide on policies we can then help implement. This confusion, which arises frequently, gives rise to misunderstandings, sometimes jealousies, and in general leads to a lot of wheel spinning and time wasting. We hope that you will discuss this problem the next time you all get together and try to come up with some ideas as to how we can have better guidance for our work. (BLA files)

It was at this point that I began to question just what was the structure of the Black Lung Association and ask how the chapters related

to one another and what role did the Charleston Office actually play. Newspaper reports and initial contact with the BLA indicated that the membership was very much in consensus with regard to the activties of the BLA and its policies and structure. More intensive investigation revealed that conflict rather than consensus characterized the BLA and that this dissensus was functional for the organization.

VIII. CONFLICT IN THE BLA

Luther P. Gerlach has argued that traditional conceptions of movement structure are based one of two ideal types: a centralized conspiracy or an amorphous collectivity. According to Gerlach, many modern social movements are neither characterized by a bureaucratic structure or a lack of organization but have a definite social organization based upon a segmentary, polycephalous, and reticulate structure. One of the resulting effects of this type of movement organization is the existence of conflict and disagreement among the many parts of the structure. However, rather than tearing the MO apart and rendering it ineffective, Gerlach suggests that this structure is "highly effective in innovating and producing social change and of surviving in the face of established order opposition" (1971, p. 816). As we shall see in the "Outcome" chapter of this study, the Black Lung Association has been highly effective in producing social change and seems to have survived in the face of strong opposition from the established social, political, and economic order, particularly the UMWA. Whether its successes and its survival were a function of a

structure similar to that suggested by Gerlach is perhaps an empirically unsolvable question completely. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the BLA is a polycephalous, segmentary, and reticulate organization and that conflict, rather than consensus, characterized its internal operations.

The way in which the 14 chapters developed and operated, somewhat independently, gives some evidence of the segmentation of the BLA. The difficulties in coordinating these chapters by the Charleston Office Crew adds additional support to the segmentation thesis. The following document, located in the files of the BLA, entitled "Some Ideas on the Organizational Structure of the Miners' Movement," suggest that the movement had been too segmented and needed a more central structure:

> To date, the reform movement has been long on enthusiasm and righteousness and short on organization. As a result, the fantastic peaks of energy that have built up during the Black Lung Strike, the Yablonski campaign, and the health and safety strikes have always fizzled away; there has been no stable, ongoing organization to consolidate the gains of each crisis period and make sure that the next battle will be fought from a position of greater strength. If the goals of a decent union and a safe industry are to be achieved, it is imperative that such an organizational structure be built before the next crisis arises. (Some Ideas on the Organization Structure of the Miner's Movement; n.d., document in BLA files)

The communique suggests several steps which would centralize the reform movement and supposedly make it more powerful:

> Set up a functioning policymaking body for the reform movement . . . establish a central headquarters for the movement . . . have some centrally directed follow-up of decision arrived at by the policymaking body . . . set up a district steering committee . . .

This was the first attempt at promoting a more centralized organizational structure in the movement. Several would follow in the next four years.

One of the more serious of these occurred in the fall and spring of 1973-74, a period in which the author was a participant observer with the Black Lung Association. Because the author was in attendance during this period, this attempt at centralization will be discussed to demonstrate why it and all previous attempts failed to alter the segmented structure of the organization.

On the weekend of November 18-19, 1973, a national meeting of the Black Lung Association took place at Pikeville, Kentucky. The Field Service Office (previously mentioned) had been in service approximately nine months, and its director, Linda Fritts, was very concerned about the role her office was playing in relation to the Black Lung Association. The meeting was called by the Field Service Office staff for the purpose of informing the membership of the BLA just how much control the Field Service Office had in BLA affairs and consequently for the membership to decide whether this was really desirable and would continue, or whether the BLA chapters were going to do some of this work themselves and regain control. At the meeting, it was obvious that the planners and the leaders were generally nonminers. George Tucker, a miner, was leading the meeting, but most of the time he kept deferring to either Gail Falk, UMWA attorney, or Bedford Byrd, assistant director of the UMWA Department of Occupational Health. The majority of the two days was spent in workshops, and the topics of discussion were the reorganization of the BLA and the problem of communication. The fact that only two of the leaders of the workshops (later changed to resource persons) were nonminers was brought up by Bill Worthington, president of the Kentucky

BLA. All through the weekend there seemed to be a constant conflict between the BLA miner membership and the nonminers, and the struggle for reorganizing the BLA was rather heated. The two day meeting did not present the image of consensus. However, at the conclusion, several resolutions were passed, four of which addressed themselves to the centralization of the organization:

1. The Black Lung Association members present at the Pikeville meeting endorse the idea of working to form an international Black Lung Association, which would include members from all coal field states, and from Canada. The purpose of this organization would be to strengthen local Black Lung Associations by joining members together to work on common problems.
2. . . . the states that now have Black Lung Chapters should get better organized on the state level, internal conflicts within the states should be resolved, and all chapters and state organizations should have an opportunity to decide whether they want to be part of the international Black Lung Association.
3. One or more organizers should be hired to work on communications among chapters, to help states organize state associations, and to help clarify whether local groups want a regional or international organization.
4. A screening committee will be established by February 1, 1974. The screening committee will be made up of two people from each state. The job of the screening committee is to attempt to get funding for the Black Lung Association . . . and to select an organizer.

The resolutions recognized and tried to minimize the conflict between the various elements within the Black Lung Association. However, the resolutions were never carried out. Approximately three months later, in Charleston, at a metting of the West Virginia Black Lung Association, new state officers were elected and there was an attempt by the new vice president, a miner's widow, to centralize the organization's structure by strengthening the state organization. The meeting ended in a failure

to come to any agreement on how the state level would be funded. Many local chapters did not charge dues, but merely accepted donations, and were therefore wary of a process of regular dues. As a result, the Black Lung Association remained a segmented organization with its basic strengths and operations in the local chapters.

Not only were there many chapters of the BLA but also a fair number of leaders. It was the conflict between these leaders which the resolutions at the Pikeville meeting attempted to address. Both the Mingo County BLA and the Beckley County BLA declared themselves the official chartered West Virginia Black Lung Association. A similar situation existed in Virginia where one chapter headed by Ethyl Darnell was supposedly representative of the Virginia BLA and another headed by Bill Mullins was representative. Although both organizations were doing essentially the same thing, they were in competition with one another, and this competition resulted in personal and political conflicts. Very rarely in a national meeting would conflicting groups show up at the same time.

In addition to the competition between chapters, there was quite clearly disagreement over such crucial matters as the goals of the organization and the means by which these goals would be achieved. Leaders from different chapters, depending on their own past social relationships, were either for or against an alliance with the UMWA after Arnold Miller, an original leader of the Black Lung Movement, was elected president of the union. Other splits occurred about how the state and national organization should be set up and utilized, primarily

because it would impinge upon local autonomy. Secondly, no one of the leaders (whom I was associated with, although there could have been more) had a complete roster of the BLA membership. Even in national meetings, the organizers were always apologizing for failing to include many names on the list. Thirdly, the decisions which were made at national meetings were many times never put into action for lack of support from the local chapters. Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that this organizational structure (multiheaded) was frustrating to members of the established order. One example of this occurred during a meeting with high administrative officials of the Social Security Administration. A list of demands were made and written up by the BLA representatives to be passed up the SSA chain of command to Bernard Popick, head of the Black Lung Program. The reply to the demands was to be sent to a three person steering committee, which was selected from the group of BLA members in attendance. However, when Popick responded, he sent his reply to Arnold Miller, who, although president of the West Virginia BLA at that time, was not even in attendance at the original meeting at which the demands were made. Not only did this infuriate the miners, because it indicated that Popick was not honoring their request, but it also demonstrates the problems of the established order in trying to deal with a polycephalous structure which has many leaders, none of which is all powerful.

The miners were tied together, however, by what Gerlach refers to as a reticulate structure. The membership of the BLA is generally inclusive rather than exclusive. Although there is stated in the Bylaws

that membership is limited to "any coal miner who may be interested in being a member," evidence has already been presented to indicate that many lawyers, doctors, students, VISTA's, miners' widows, and other nonminers were actively involved in the organization. As a participant observer, I was not only able to participate in the meetings which I attended but I also acquired a membership card. This membership card, however, was more of a receipt for a donation, rather than a requirement for entrance to the organization. According to Gerlach, this inclusive structure results in

> no objective requirements to qualify a person as a movement member . . . Participants in the movement share a common history and experience and recognize each other through bonds of objectively perceived commitment. This means that there is no leader who can determine objectively who is or is not a member of the movement, let alone direct, regulate, or speak for the movement as a whole. (Gerlach and Hine, p. 37)

The meetings with the administration of the SSA are perhaps the best example of this. Of the eight major meetings between the Social Security Administration and the Black Lung Association between 1971 and 1974, the leader or leaders who represented the BLA were different in each case. The miners were tied together, however, by a reticulate structure that was established by the fact that they were all miners (common history and experience) and resided in the mining region. Although it was many times difficult to recognize formal cooperation and coordination between the various chapters, there were times and events which reflected the full strength that the BLA possessed. This was particularly the case when there was external conflict which created internal cohesion among the membership, such as in confrontations with SSA. The unifying

appearance, as will be shown in the next chapter, was very deceptive to the SSA, but it did serve to give an impression of consensus, a factor which the BLA needed at the time.

IX. THE LOCAL BLA CHAPTER

The discussion up to this point has dealt with the Black Lung Association at the state and national level. Although the organization at these levels was rather loose, it was at the state and national level that most of the political work of the BLA was conducted from. All of the marches, meetings with SSA, and mass media communications generally came from either the state organizations or the national leadership. Although the BLA was unsuccessful at coordinating the activities of the local chapters from a more centralized power structure at these levels, its operations were quite successful in changing the legislative and bureaucratic environment. It is important, however, to make a distinction between the operations of the BLA at the state and national level and at the local chapter level. The former were basically concerned about political activity in relation to the SSA, the legislature, and the UMWA. The latter was concerned more about assisting miners and widows in getting their claims processed. The local chapter did not require a centralization of power, specialization of function, or actually much of any organizational structure at all. The work was primarily one-to-one, i.e., one experienced miner working with another to help him get his claim processed. The chapter meetings, although complementary to the activities of the state and national

levels, had a very different function. To obtain a better perspective on these meetings, the author attended over twenty meetings of the local chapters (in Kentucky and West Virginia) and recorded over thirty hours of tape from these meetings. The following analysis of the local BLA chapter is a composite of information from attendance at these meetings, reviewing of tapes, and personal notes.

Guidelines were formulated by the Black Lung Association in 1970 to regulate the organizing of new BLA chapters. They were as follows:

ORGANIZATION OF A BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION CHAPTER

1. Officers

   President
   Secretary
   Treasurer

2. Rules of Meetings

   a. All expenses must be approved at meetings before payment and expenses limited to postage, telephone, and office material.
   b. All members limited to five minutes on floor at meeting.
   c. Officer should be elected annually on or about April 15.
   d. Each chapter should elect officers as soon as possible after organized.
   e. All finances should be recorded and be open at each meeting and approved at each meeting.
   f. All chapters should have at least two meetings or more each month.
   g. Rules can be changed by two-thirds majority. (Files of the BLA)

Even with only seven basic rules for each chapter, many of the rules were not followed by all the chapters, particularly a, b, d, and f. It did not appear that there was any intention to thwart the guidelines established for local chapters, it was that local chapters usually

formulated their own way of doing things and were somewhat ambivalent to any centralization of decision making on the part of the state level.

The meetings themselves rarely had a definite agenda. They usually began with the local BLA leaders telling of the progress they had made in fighting SSA, or of the attempts which had been made to confront social security and to change their policies. Attendance at the meetings ranged from a low of 32 to a high of over 100, although the average was approximately between 50 and 60. I estimated that between 50 and 75 percent of the miners in attendance at any one meeting had not received their benefits and were there for some assistance. This group, miners who had applied but had not received their benefits, dominated the discussion at almost all of the meetings. Even though local chapter leaders would desire to discuss broader issues many times, they were frequently interrupted by a miner or a miner's widow who wanted to discuss his or her particular case. It has already been mentioned that the Social Security's handling of initial cases for claims for black lung benefits resulted in several glaring inconsistencies between states with regard to processing time and approval rates. In addition, the high approval rates initially led to high expectations on the part of most miners. However, there is also some evidence to indicate that there were perhaps as many inconsistencies within states as between states. In a report to the Congress entitled "Achievements, Administrative Problems, and Costs in Paying Black Lung Benefits to Coal Miners and Their Widows," presented by the Comptroller General's Office, the following study was reported:

> In a review of a randomly selected sample of 197 black lung claims which had been adjudicated by April 3, 1971, we noted certain problems in the claims adjudication process which we believe require corrective action. The problems relate to evidence used to support SSA's decisions to award or deny black lung benefits . . . (and to) assurance that claims are adjudicated in accordance with applicable law and HEW regulations.
>
> Claims are awarded or denied black lung benefits on the basis of claims adjudicators decisions that they are not eligible. Until October, 1971, SSA had no systematic review of the propriety of the a judicators decisions to (1) insure that the decisions were equitable and in accordance with applicable law and HEW regulations and (2) determining types of common adjudication errors and methods of preventing them
>
> We felt that the SSA's decisions on 48 of the 197 claims reviewed (90 approved, 107 denied) were questionable because:
> —the claim filed lacked sufficient evidence to support decisions that the claimants were or were not eligible
> —the decisions were inconsistent with the evidence in the files. ("Achievements, Administrative Problems . . .," p. 49)

This report not only demonstrates that some miners had received benefits who were, according to them, not necessarily eligible, but that some miners who had not received benefits could have been eligible. Although the report gave many reasons for the inconsistency, one major problem which stood out concerned the use of x-rays:

> Our review indicated that, in the adjudication of initial black lung claims, claims adjudicators accepted virtually every report of x-ray findings which they used as a basis for awarding or denying benefits; they made no attempt to determine the qualifications of the reporting physicians or the accuracy of the reports.
>
> For 75 of 157 claim files reviewed by us which were supported by x-ray evidence, SSA used only one physician's interpretation of an x-ray report to award or deny benefits. We believe that this practice—which was in effect for initial claims from inception of the program through January 16, 1972, was questionable in view of the fact that many incorrect diagnoses of the presence or absence of CWP were made due to poor quality x-rays and to errors and variations on the part of physicians who classify the x-ray. (p. 45)

This evidence has been presented at this point in the discussion to help explain why perhaps the local Black Lung Association operates as it does.

Although it is doubtful that the members of the Black Lung Association or the general mining population were aware of the above report (it was not published until September 5, 1972), they were aware that many people in the local community were getting black lung benefits who had little or no underground mining experience or who were perceived to be in better health than they were. In almost every chapter meeting and in every meeting with the SSA I attended, this accusation was vocalized. However, when the SSA officials asked for names, none was presented because the miners did not want to take away someone else's benefits, even if they did not deserve them. In any case, the complaints of the miners and widows who had not received their benefits were not directed against other "ineligible" miners but toward a system which they felt was discriminating against them. The majority of the work of the local chapter of the Black Lung Association was to help them fight this system and to get their benefits.

In order for the miner or widow to file a claim for black lung benefits, it is necessary for them to complete several written forms of information at the local SSA office. Although the program was administered by the Department of Labor after July 30, 1973, claimants still filed their claims at the local SSA office. In general, to file a claim, the miner or widow must go to the local Social Security

Office and, in addition to filling out the above mentioned forms, answer a number of questions about previous employment in coal mines. If the claimant is a miner, he must have a medical examination, and if it is a dependent or widow, evidence must be brought in to verify that the cause of death of the miner was actually black lung. After all the information has been collected, the claim file is sent to the Department of Labor, if the claim was filed after July 31, 1973, and to the Bureau of Disability Insurance of the SSA, if filed before. In either case, another person, called a claims examiner, will look over the file. Before July 31, 1973, this claims examiner made a decision at that point as to whether the claimant would receive benefits or not. Under the Department of Labor, the claims examiner only writes a recommendation. A copy of this tentative determination is sent to the coal operator (who is to pay for the benefits for all claims filed after 1973). If either the claimant or the coal operator objects to the determination of the examiner, in most cases a conference will be set up. This conference will involve the claimant, a representative of the coal company, and a Labor Department official to mediate and attempt to get the two parties to reach an agreement. If the conference is unsuccessful or if either party feels as if there needs to be further action, a formal hearing can be called. Unlike the conference in which no decision is made by a third party, in the formal hearing the case will be heard by an administrative law judge, who will make a decision based on the evidence presented. If the administrative law judge fails to rule in the claimant's favor, he or she can take the case to the Benefits Review

Board, and if no satisfaction is gained there, to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Under the SSA program before 1974, no coal operators were involved and the claimant basically made the case against the state. If the decision by the claims examiner was unfavorable to the claimant, he or she brought the case to a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge. If the decision by the judge was unfavorable, the claimant had sixty days to file with the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration. If the claimant was unsuccessful here, then the Benefits Review Board and finally the U.S. Court of Appeals (Information provided by U.S. Department of Labor, The Legal Side of Black Lung Claims, undated).

The miner or widow who filed a claim, however, faced an organization which was not as responsive as many had hoped. E. H. Robertson, a miner had filed a claim and appealed, wrote in the Charleston Gazette:

> Just why someone with authority doesn't clean up this black lung mess is beyond me. I saw Mr. Paul Jefferson on TV and he advised everyone to come talk with him who had been turned down for black lung benefits.
>
> I went to the Social Security Office and asked the young lady at the desk if I could talk to Mr. Jefferson. "Oh," she said, "He doesn't talk to anyone but one of his staff will see you."
>
> She gave me a letter stating how interested everyone there was to help us. Then, 2 hours and 20 minutes later, a young girl came out, wearing a very short mini-dress and called my name.
>
> Back at her desk, I told her I wanted to know why I didn't hear from the appeal I made for black lung benefits. She said no one heard from an appeal after they were turned down . . . Then I asked if one could draw benefits and still work. "Oh, yes," she said, "limiting benefits." So I asked her how could they work if they were totally disabled? She said she didn't know . . . I wanted to ask Mr. Jefferson if some of

> his staff were being paid by the coal interests to prevent miners from drawing benefits—but he doesn't talk to anyone. ("Black Lung Appeal is Discouraging," Readers Forum)

At each successive stage of the appeal process, the proceedings become more complex and more formal, and the miner generally needs some expert representation. In many cases, perhaps too many, the miner or miner's widow would secure the services of a lawyer. The lawyer would represent the client in the appeal process and, if the client won, the lawyer would generally get a large percentage of the settlement. This is a related issue to the black lung controversy which will not be covered here, although its implications are very irrelevant. The work of the local chapter of the Black Lung Association was to provide essentially the same services which the lawyer provided, but without a fee. In essence, the leaders of the local chapter would represent the claimant in appeals and advise the claimant as to what information was needed and how to get it.

As a result of the inconsistencies in paying benefits by the SSA and the complexity of the bureaucratic structure, as well as the number of levels of appeals, the leaders of the Black Lung Association had a basic philosophy to get claims paid: keep appealing. The miners knew that the medical profession was still in disagreement over both the actual existence of the disease and the detection of the disease. What was important to getting a claim paid was not whether one had the disease or not but keeping the pressure on the system to legitimize the claim.

As a result of this feeling on the part of miners who had filed but not received their benefits (either because they were turned down

or because their claim had not been completely processed), approximately 90 percent of the time at each chapter meeting was spent by individuals telling about their own case and wanting the BLA leadership to do something to help them. Initially this seemed rather disfunctional, i.e., to spend so much of the meeting time on individual cases, which perhaps needed to be handled in another manner at another time. However, after this pattern seemed to persist at all meetings, and generally at all chapters, I began to reevaluate my initial impressions to consider what functions this might serve for the organization as a whole as well as for the individual miners. The unstructured nature of the meetings very much lended themselves to direction by the attending membership according to their needs, but the sharing of similar problem experiences was very important to "organizational survival" of the BLA because it (1) gave the miners an opportunity to express their grievances and vent their frustrations, (2) gave the leaders of the BLA an opportunity to work with the miners on an individual basis to help solve their problems, (3) gave the miners an opportunity to see that other miners were experiencing very similar problems, and (4) demonstrated to the miners the inconsistency of parts of the SSA program through the number present who had been denied and approved. The result seemed to be a better understanding of why claims were approved and denied, what was needed to "Beat this system," and general support for the efforts of the BLA in doing it.

But not all members of the Black Lung Association were committed to the organization. On the contrary, most of the membership remained

in the organization only a short period of time. I first became aware of this when I noticed that successive meetings of any one chapter retained few of the people who had previously been in attendance. From one meeting to the next, there seemed to be (approximate guess) a "turnover rate" of about 40 to 60 percent. Whereas state and national meetings seemed to have the same people in attendance, the local chapters, with the exception of the elected officials, were relatively different each time. I was later to learn (from discussions with BLA chapter officers) that this was a function of the reason that most people came to the meetings anyway—to get their claims approved. Once the approval came through, in the majority of cases, there was no longer an incentive to attend. What maintained the continuity of the organization were the officers and those whose claims had not been acted on or had continually been denied.

Small attendance at any one chapter meeting and a relatively high turnover rate from one meeting to the next initially indicated a lack of strength. However, attendance at chapter meetings is probably a poor index of support for the organization or its potential strength. Although no records of membership were available, these figures also would be misleading because many people who worked in the organization and who were helped by the organization never had membership cards or appeared on any membership roster. Early in the movement, over 40,000 miners were brought out of the mines in support of the black lung issue. Although this is one measure of the potential power of the BLA (and was a threat which was periodically expressed in future confrontations) it

was questionable whether it could be done again. Late in 1971, in an effort to put together a petition in support of the 1972 amendments to the Black Lung Law, over 1200 names were acquired in the state of West Virginia. The purpose is not to demonstrate here the actual power or strength of the Black Lung Association but to reflect on the difficulty of assessing the strength of an organization which has such a reticulate structure of links to all members of the mining community.

Just as difficult to evaluate was the financial base of the BLA. Although the state and national level was indirectly funded by DRA initially and by the UMWA through the Field Service Office after 1972 (previously discussed), these funds merely provided money for assisting communications between the chapters. When the local chapters were organized, they operated almost totally on funds provided by their membership, and in most cases these funds were completely voluntary. However, even with the inconsistency of voluntary donations, local chapters were capable of amassing fairly large amounts of money. In a meeting concerning the possible funding of a state organization in West Virginia, Earl Stafford, president of the Mingo County BLA, stated the following:

> Let me explain how we run our chapter in Mingo County. We got rules and regulations that we run our chapter by. Everything is strictly on a volunteer basis. We demand nobody to pay anything . . . I know how we first started. We didn't have a dime in our treasury. It was strictly voluntary. We give them a membership card . . . we started working and helping them. They started donating. There was people that gave us a dollar that I know really needed it. When they got their black lung [checks], they started coming in and donating . . . and we got a lot of members that still, if they is anything that comes up on the floor, that we have to go somewhere, that they will walk up there

> and throw down five, ten, fifteen or twenty dollars. This is strictly voluntary stuff. And I guess that we got as good a treasury as there is in the state . . . We had people, when they get their black lung, come in and donate us 200 dollars. (Black Lung Meeting, Charleston, W. Va., March 15, 1974)

The financial status of the organization, then, to some extent was dependent upon the successes of the leaders in getting miners' claims approved. Making the donation voluntary, however, resulting in an attitude toward the organization that served to maintain its membership. According to Kate Currie, representative of the Beckley BLA, the main strength of their organization was not monetary but active membership:

> We had a long discussion over this money thing and our membership felt very strongly about the important thing being getting active members. We do not take up a donation, and we meet once a week, and I would bet that everybody there gives a dollar every time, at least a dollar. But I have also heard a lot of people say that if people started fussing over bookkeeping and demanding two dollars now and another two dollars next week, that they would drop out, that they don't want to be bothered with that. What we need is active members knowing what is happening. If we have a person who spends all their time just running around collecting dues, that person is not out in the countryside helping to spread the word. (BLA State Meeting, Charleston, W. Va., March 15, 1974)

X. SUMMARY OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION

This chapter has attempted to characterize the BLA as to its internal organizational structure and relate this to its immediate environment, particularly its major "target group" the Social Security Administration. However, if one can accept a somewhat broad definition of target group as a structure in the environment which the social movement organization desires to affect in some way for its own ends, then the Black Lung Association actually had at least twenty "target

groups." Six of these were governmental agencies (SSA, State Department of Mines, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Department of HEW, the Labor Department, and the Appalachian Regional Commission), three were directly or indirectly related to coal companies (coal operators, state coal associations, and coal company doctors), three with the union (the UMWA, the Welfare and Retirement Fund, and Tony Boyle), at least six elected government bodies (the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Labor and Education, the Justice Department, the West Virginia State Legislature, President Richard M. Nixon, and West Virginia Governor Archie Moore), one major newspaper (the Charleston Gazette), and one target group that is perhaps best identified as an organizational type—bureaucracy. This list was obtained from a review of all Black Lung Bulletins published between 1970 and 1974 to determine all "groups" attacked by the Black Lung Association to effect some kind of change, either on that group or on another group whom that group had influence over.

While most of these groups played some role at all times in the development and activities of the BLA, not all of them were of crucial importance at a single time. From 1968 until the passage of the Workman's Compensation Law in West Virginia, the major thrust of the BLA was against the West Virginia State Legislature and Gov. Archie Moore, with some efforts expressed in the direction of the UMWA and Tony Boyle. After the state law was passed, the direction shifted to the U.S. Congress and the passage of the 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. At that time also, the BLA was becoming politically active (along with the MFD in support of Yablonski to replace the UMWA

leadership) and the UMWA administration and Tony Boyle became major target groups. The implementation of the Federal Black Lung Program brought into the battle two new target groups—HEW and the SSA. From 1970 until 1974, the major thrust of the Black Lung Association was directed against the Social Security Administration. However, the attack involved almost all of the remaining "target groups" indirectly. In 1974, the Black Lung Program came under the direction and administration of the Department of Labor. In addition to the twenty or so "target groups" that the BLA dealt with, the organization also formed coalitions with several organizations which supported its goals and activities. In addition to the Physicians Committee, the Black Lung Association was closely linked up with the Clay County Poor People's Association, The Disabled Miners and Widows Association, and the Miners for Democracy. The next chapter will focus specifically on the three major target groups which the BLA confronted—the West Virginia State Legislature, the Social Security Administration, and the United Mine Workers of America. The analysis will demonstrate, however, that the line of communication and interaction between the social movement organization and the target group is not simple or direct. On the contrary, the process of confrontation involves a rather complex network of immediate agencies which at one time may be target groups and at another coalition agencies.

CHAPTER VI

THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION IN CONFRONTATION

Chapter IV presented an analysis of those environmental factors important to the development of the Black Lung Movement. Chapter V focused on the structure of the Black Lung Association and its immediate environment, with an emphasis on the static elements important to the development of the social movement organization. In this chapter an attempt will be made to look at those elements in interaction with one another, in process, with an emphasis on the dynamics of social movement organizations within an environment. Following the suggestions of McCarthy and Zald (1973b, p. 31), we will first look at the goals and the ideology of the Black Lung Association. Secondly, we will take a broad look at the general tactics and strategies used by the Black Lung Association to affect change. Thirdly, we will focus in on three specific target groups for change and analyze more thoroughly the confrontation between the BLA and these structures.

I. THE GOALS OF THE BLA

Although the goals of the Black Lung Association did not change drastically over time, the specificity of these goals increased as particular elements within the environment would begin to interfere with the successful attainment of the more general goals. In the beginning of the Black Lung Association, the purposes of the organization were stated rather simply:

1. To make coal mining a safer, healthier job.
2. To make sure retired and disabled miners get what they have coming to them. (Goals of the BLA, p. 4)

Within this general framework, the BLA worked for Black Lung Benefits (state and federal), Disability Insurance Benefits, workman's compensation, mine health and safety, hospital and pension benefits, and utilized political action to secure better representatives for labor and make better laws. Miners in general were identified as the beneficiaries, but disabled, retired, miners were the main beneficiary base, along with widows and orphans of former miners. At a later date, however (1971), the stated goals of the Black Lung Association became more specific with the identification of definite target groups:

1. To make coal mining a safe and healthy occupation.
2. To improve the administration of all benefit programs for coal miners and to work for their improvement.
3. To return democracy to our union. (Statement of Purposes, Black Lung Association document, n.d., approx. 1971)

The first "purpose" remained the same, the second was revised, and a third was newly added. It is important that the second goal not only identifies where retired and disabled miners are going to get "what they have coming to them," but that it also identifies a specific problem: the administration of all benefit programs. In general there were three programs that the BLA addressed itself to—State Workman's Compensation Programs, Federal Social Security Disability Programs, and the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund. The Black Lung Association was very supportive of the need for these programs but felt that there was a major need to alter the way in which they were administered. Leaders of the Black Lung Association identified each

target group as a "bureaucratic structure" but went about changing each in a different way. The third program, the Welfare and Retirement Fund, was directly linked to the third, and newly stated, goal to return democracy to the union. The identification of the UMWA as a target group did not come at the beginning of the Black Lung Movement. After the union administration fought against the BLA in its initial efforts for reform of the state workman's compensation in West Virginia, the BLA became suspicious of the union leadership. Attempts at working for the improvement of the Welfare and Retirement Fund revealed further inconsistencies which resulted in not only efforts at Welfare and Retirement Fund reform but also reform and later radical change in the union administration.

Although these were the stated goals of the Black Lung Association, their attainment required the identification of many narrower goals which, combined, would result in the accomplishment of the broader goals. These will be identified more specifically as we later look at the confrontation process between the social movement organization and its target groups. The beneficiary base for these stated goals was potentially the total mining population. However, certain goals, such as the improvement of benefit programs, were only beneficial to those miners who would be or were participating in them. As a result, the Black Lung Association attracted a large proportion of its membership from retired, disabled, and older working miners who were more concerned about benefits and pensions from these programs. Although the goals were "potentially" beneficial to all miners, the younger miner was probably

not as concerned about the benefit programs as the older and retired miner. However, the successes of the BLA were many times dependent upon the younger working miners for support. Disabled and retired miners did not have the "strike" potential as an effective weapon, since they were not working. As shall be shown later, it was therefore important that the BLA maintain some type of relationship with the working miner in order to at least maintain the image of being able to effectively call a strike or work stoppage.

II. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BLA

Wilson defines ideology as:

> . . . the generic name given to those beliefs which mobilize people into action in social movements. An ideology is a set of beliefs about the social world and how it operates, containing statements about the rightness of certain social arrangements and what action would be undertake in light of those statements. An ideology is both a cognitive map of sets of expectations and a scale of values in which standards and imperatives are proclaimed. Ideology thus serves both as a clue to understanding and as a guide to action, developing in the mind of its adherents an image of the process by which desired changes can best be achieved. (Wilson, 1973, p. 91-92)

The concept of "ideology" in social movements has been an extremely useful point of departure for the identification of belief systems that motivate individual people to participate in social movements and their organizations. However, it is not without its limitations. As with many concepts which we presently use in the study of social movements, the concept "ideology" tends to focus out attention on the homogeniety of a social movement (or its organization) by concentrating on a particular, supposedly identifiable ideological base upon which the values, beliefs,

and actions of a group are based. It is implied, therefore, that all members of a social movement view the world in a particular way and how certain changes, supported unanimously by the participants, are to be effected. Although we accept Wilson's definition of ideology, as given above, we would like to add several qualifications which will more clearly identify how the term will be used here. First, we do not believe that all or necessarily a majority of the membership of a social movement organization (or participants in a social movement) are either aware of or necessarily agree with the ideology of the movement, to the extent that one exist. Secondly, many times the ideology is established by the movement leaders who are leading the struggle with any particular target group. Thirdly, ideology is not a static but a dynamic element of a social movement, and it may flucuate many times during the life of a social movement. Fourth, the ideology of a social movement organization is as much a function of influence from external forces as it is from the individual participants beliefs. Finally, the strategy of a movement organization can be a function of the confrontation process as well as the ideology of the MO. With these qualifications, then, we will now identify those "beliefs" which we feel have been influential in establishing within the membership of the BLA certain sets of ideas or patterns of thought that guided their actions.

To understand the beliefs that motivated miners to participate in the Black Lung Movement and the beliefs that guided their joining the Black Lung Association, it is first necessary to look at the broader Appalachian culture within which the movement developed and more

specifically at the general beliefs of miners about their environment. It is within these economic and geographical structures that an understanding of the ideology of the black lung movement must be understood. Within the culture of Appalachia, a characteristic trait which guides their outlook on life is a distrust of power. Appalachian people are not generally status seekers. They fear, distrust, and are antagonistic to authority in formal situations (Simpkins, p. 5). A second major characteristic of Appalachian people is that they generally do not participate in voluntary associations, which means that they usually avoid any civic responsibility or social responsibility to affect change. These two character traits were altered somewhat by the introduction of mining into Appalachian communities, but in general the basic values still persist. In a study conducted in 1958, three-fourths of the respondents in Appalachia said that God is more pleased when people are satisfied with what they have than when they try to get ahead (Ford, 1962, p. 21). The impact of these beliefs upon how the Appalachian miner looked at his work was stated by Verhoeff:

> Accustomed to do his work in his own way he is quick to resent dictation or interference and with little sense of the value of time or the moral obligations of a contract, he will forsake his task because of a fancied slight, regardless of consequences to employer and industry. (Verhoff, p. 318)

Because of the lack of desire to join voluntary associations, the labor unions in the area, and particularly the miner's union, had a difficult time organizing initially. According to Helen Lewis:

> There is evidence that the mountain man who entered the often times benevolent and paternalistic coal camp reacted personally

> to owners, operators, and foremen. He was difficult to organize into labor unions. However, the structure of mining with absentee ownership, paternalistic labor control, and wide social class distinctions soon developed impersonality in relationships which replaced the personal orientation. The miner reacted with cynicism, hostility and bitterness which produced some of the most violent and bitter struggles in labor history. Coupled with his peer group orientation in the work situation, the miner became intensely loyal to the union. The conflict with owners and operators served to increase the solidarity and cohesion of the work group. (Lewis, October 6, 1967, p. 12)

Once the labor union was organized it replaced the family and the coal company foreman as the paternal provider for the coal miner. The miner gave to the union leadership, which for over forty years was controlled by John L. Lewis, almost complete compliance and loyalty. Although the cohesion between miners in the work setting was maintained, miners still saw their job as the hardest and most dangerous of all jobs. According to a study conducted in 1973 by Leo Kramer, Inc., miners experience a number of frustrations, dissatisfactions, and discontentments with their occupational environment:

> Miners of all categories, with few exceptions, are firmly convinced that they work harder than workers in other occupations. Three-fourths of the sample also believed the dictum that once a miner, always a miner. About one-fifth thought that conditions in the industry had not improved in the last few years. About . . . 94 percent are convinced that the mines are more dangerous than the general public thinks. (Kramer, 1973, p. 47)

The results of the study also indicated that 71 percent of the miners felt they had the worst job in the United States (p. 106) and that 62.5 percent of the miners said that they would leave mining. If they had the chance (p. 31). However, if the miner does decide to quit mining and take up another occupation, he will most likely have to move

out of the Appalachian region because of scarcity of jobs available in the coal mining regions other than coal mining. Between 1950 and 1970 there was a drastic decrease in the number of miners employed (from over 400,000 to 140,000). Those who remained were very well paid but by the late sixties there was a shortage, rather than an abundance, of miners. With job security and high wages, the miners began looking more closely at the health and safety problems of their occupation, particularly black lung. The Kramer (1973) study findings indicated that there is a high degree of consensus among the miners on many subjects bearing on their relationships to other industries and to the public (p. 47). With regard to one of the causes of black lung (coal dust), only 34 percent of the miners agreed that most coal companies were concerned with keeping dust levels low in the mines. The agencies which are responsible for regulating the dust levels (governmental) are also not seen as concerned. Only 11 percent of the miners agreed that people in Washington were really concerned with the miner and 96 percent said that government should do more for the miner (p. 106).

Although we can present no evidence to indicate a trend or change, we would suspect that this large majority opinion that the government should do something more for the miner is rather recent. Until the sixties, the miner depended mainly upon his own union for support and protection, with the ideology of miners being somewhat consistent with that of the union. The government, with the exception of a few pieces of legislation, has remained out of the struggle. However, as miners became more aware of the issue of black lung, and of the failure of their

own union to respond to their needs in this matter, the miners saw, out of necessity, the need for intervention by the federal government. As legislation was passed (state and federal) the miner's "map of the world and how to deal with it" grew to include not only the operators and the union but also the state government, the federal government, and a number of agencies, both public and private, who could hurt them or help them in their struggle over the black lung issue. Initially, the miners maintained a long established traditional ideological picture of elements within their environment: those who were for the miners and those who were for the coal operators. Newly added elements to the picture (medical profession, governmental agencies, etc.) were simply put on one side or the other of this dialectic relationship.

As time passed, however, and the Black Lung Movement developed an established social movement organization, the simplicity of the initial ideological conceptions began to break down. While the coal operators never really changed in their relationship to the miner, the government and its agencies fluctuated from good to bad, and vice versa, depending on how it served the miners and when. From intensive case studies of miners, the Kramer study reported that:

> The miners interviewed are skeptical of the agencies that they come in contact with when applying for black lung benefits, workman's compensation benefits, and Social Security disability. The attitude of most miners is that if they ever hope to get their benefits, they must be prepared to fight for them. They maintain a defensive stance against Social Security and other government agencies. As illustrated in the miner's confusion over medical examinations, they are unaware of the underlying mechanics of the various agencies with which they come in contact. There appears to be a need, not only for better understanding of the miners by the agencies, but also better understanding of the agencies by the miners. (p. 66)

It was this better understanding of governmental agencies, particularly the Social Security Administration, that the Black Lung Association gave to the mining community. In addition it offered a set of beliefs about how the union, the legislature (state and federal) and a number of other "elements" within the environment operated, about whether these were right or not, and what action was necessary in order to change them. Although there is no stated ideology of the Black Lung Association (as the goals were stated) it is possible to surmise from the available evidence bits and pieces of the organizations ideological orientations about the social world and how these influenced the actions of the miners. We emphasize the fact that this characterization of the BLA "ideology" is very dynamic and constantly changing; therefore, different orientations may come into play or existence at different times.

First, the basic picture of the "life chances" of miners was and still is seen as a struggle between the miner and the coal industry. The number of references to the linkages between the coal operators and other agencies, groups, and individuals seems to support this. Although the government, the medical profession, the legal profession, and others may intervene periodically, the miners realize that in a capitalistic system, the struggle will always be between those who own the means of production and those who work for them. Secondly, with regard to the disease "black lung," although there are several statements to the effect that the coal companies ought to pay compensation for the disease (in the Black Lung Bulletin), the miners pushed for a federal black lung law which established a benefit program funded by the

taxpayer. The miners had already experienced great difficulties in obtaining workman's compensation, and even though they acquired it in West Virginia (for black lung), the federal program would eliminate the coal operator from the struggle, at least temporarily. Thirdly, the Black Lung Program was seen as basically a good program, as intended by the Congress, but the way in which it was administered came under attack. Inititally there were charges of collusion with the coal companies, then party politics, and then attacks on the higher administration of both SSA and HEW. After this initital frustration with dealing with the problems of black lung benefits, the leadership of the Black Lung Association began to view the problem not so much as a problem of individual people but of a system—a bureaucratic structure that was set up for efficiency purposes rather than to administer a fair program to its client. Along with a realization of the problem as one of "bureaucracy" came also a recognition of the necessity for concentrated efforts at the top of this bureaucratic system to affect any change whatsoever. The Black Lung Association, then, directed most of its efforts at change at the top levels of its target groups or other agencies (legislature) who could influence or have power to change.

With regard to the United Mine Workers of America, the Black Lung Association had a very definite and simple ideological orientation: the union leadership was corrupt. It was corrupt not only because it had misused funds but because it did not allow local autonomy in the districts. The BLA therefore formulated a strategy which attempted to gain election of union leadership at the district level, rather than being appointed

by the national leaders. However, because this strategy involved the court system, and had proven futile for several years, the BLA leaders decided that the only route to autonomy was complete turnover of administration at the top.

The Black Lung Association was involved in many struggles between 1968 and the present. To attempt a further understanding of the changing nature of the ideology of the Black Lung Association (and support the above contentions), the processes through which these changes took place, and how these were influential with regard to the patterns of interaction between the social movement organization and the target group, we will now look specifically at three situations of what Oberschall (1973) calls "confrontation" between the Black Lung Association and its target groups: the West Virginia Legislature, the Social Security Administration, and the United Workers of America. We chose these three, not because they are the only target groups which the BLA focused upon, but because they represent the diversity of target groups which the BLA confronted as well as the various tactics and strategies which were needed in order to bring about change in each. The struggle between the BLA and the West Virginia Legislature was the first victory for the movement and represents a time when the movement and the BLA were loosely organized. The struggle against the SSA began in 1970 with the first denials of the Black Lung Benefits Program and continued until July, 1974, when the Labor Department "officially" began running the benefits program. The confrontation with the UMWA began in the late sixties but reached a peak prior to the special

election in 1972, in which Arnold Miller, president of the Regional BLA, defeated Tony Boyle for the UMWA presidency. Each will be discussed separately in hopes that this procedure will provide a better understanding of the processes of interaction which occur between a social movement organization and its target group.

III. THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION VS. THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE LEGISLATURE

A great deal of the struggle between the miners and the West Virginia legislature has already been discussed in the previous chapter: the mobilization of the miners to form the BLA, the rallies conducted by the BLA and the Physicians Committee, the writing up of a bill to obtain workman's compensation for "pneumoconiosis," and the Farmington disaster in November, 1968, which brought the nation's attention to the miner's plight. The Black Lung Association was officially introduced at a rally in Beckley, West Virginia on January 19, 1969. Even before this, miners were in Charleston lobbying for the passage of legislation on black lung (the hearings had begun in the middle of January). On January 29, a little more than a week after the official announcement of the BLA, the Black Lung Movement held its first statewide rally in Charleston, West Virginia. The rally was attended by a crowd estimated between 3,000 and 5,000. The ninety minute rally opened with a song written by James Wyatt of Mammoth, W. Va. entitled "Black Lung":

> A young miner's lungs may be hearty and pale
> When he enters to coal mines, with his dinner pail

> But coal dust and grime
> In a few years of time
> Fills up his lungs and they begin to fail
> Black Lungs, full of coal dust
> Coal miners must breath it or bust
> Black lungs, gasping for breath
> With black lungs we are choking to death.
> (Burchard, 1969, pp. C1-C3)

The audience was made up of mostly miners, their wives and miners widows, wearing hard hats with "78-4" imprinted on them in memory of the miners who died at Farmington (78) and at Hominy Falls (4). Others wore armbands, buttons, and cardboard discs. Besides the three doctors who made up the Physicians Committee, two other important people made speeches at this rally: Paul Kaufman, a former state senator from Charleston who had run for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1968 and Congressman Ken Hechler from Huntington, who had been an early and strong Congressional advocate of mine safety legislation. The presence of both Kaufman and Hechler helped to attract media attention to the rally (Denman, p. 73). In addition to their presence both speakers played important roles in formulating the beliefs of the miners about the issue of black lung. Kaufman was especially effective in communicating strategies that must be taken in light of the confusion of the medical profession:

> Doctors can't agree on what "black lung" looks like under a microscope so we have to get away from medical nitpicking. We have to have a bill that says if a miner has worked in the mines two years or more and contracts a lung disease he is entitled to compensation. (Lilly, 1969, p. 1, 2)

This same position was supported by a letter from Ralph Nader which was read by Ken Heckler. According to Nadar, the ability of the medical

profession, particularly those employed by coal companies, should not be the ones to determine how bad black lung is:

> Your gathering here makes it clear to the coal mine operators and those groups and individuals that do their bidding that no longer are you going to tolerate a situation that makes coal miners cheaper than coal. . . . You are not going to tolerate puppet-like physicians, employed by the coal operators, disgracing their profession by saying black lung is not all that bad and miners can learn to live with it. From now on, the coal miners—whose bodies are being abused and whose lungs are being destroyed—are going to be the ones who say how bad black lung is. (Statement of Ralph Nader, reported in Lilly, 1969, p. 5)

In addition to the letter from Ralph Nader, Ken Heckler also attacked the medical profession, particularly the West Virginia Medical Association, which had previously attacked the Physicians' Committee for questionable practice. Hechler displayed a sign to the miners which he said was a secret message from the policy-making council of the West Virginia Medical Association. The sign said: "Black Lung is good for you." In his usual display of surprising tactics, Hechler pulled out a twelve pound slab of bologna and said to the miners, "That is baloney," and the miners cheered (Peeks, 1969, p. 1).

In addition, the three doctors of the Physicians Committee spoke, each with their own emphasis. Rasmussen attacked the medical profession. Buff attacked the coal industry, and Wells rallied the group to action by calling for "strength to win the battles in the halls of the legislature and in the halls of the United States Congress" (Martin, 1969, p. 3). Denman characterizes the Charleston rally as a significant event for three reasons. First, it was the largest meeting of the Black Lung Association to date, and because it was

statewide, it served to unite the coal miners in the region for a common cause. Secondly, the rally attracted the attention of the media, partly because of the size of the meeting, and partly because of the well known featured speakers, particularly Ken Hechler. His appearance, along with the statement by Ralph Nader, indicated growing national support for the movement. Finally, the rally served to alert the West Virginia legislature of the growing strength of the Black Lung Movement and of the Black Lung Association (Denman, p. 76).

To understand how the Black Lung Association and the Physicians Committee were able to influence the state legislature, it is necessary to understand something about the structure of the West Virginia movement. The West Virginia Legislature, similar to most state legislatures, is composed of part time congressmen and senators. In 1969, the salary was only $1,500. According to Denman (1974, p. 92), there is a great deal of turnover in legislators and as a result West Virginia never had strong, ongoing committee staffs that function on a year round basis. In addition it was not until 1965 that full time research, reference, bill drafting and statuatory revision staff were made available and standing committees had to rehire every year what personnel staff are needed (p. 93).

When the black lung bills were finally introduced in February, the session of the legislature was half over. In total, nine bills were introduced. Although there were miners in attendance at the hearing, the testimony was given primarily by members of the medical profession, including the three doctors of the Physicians Committee. During the

six hour session, twenty three witnesses testified: 13 in favor of the legislation, 6 opposed, and 4 on neither side (Miller, 1969, p. 1). According to Don Marsh of the Charleston Gazette, the miners were relatively quiet during the testimony probably because they and the legislators did not understand much of the testimony they heard. On some occasions, reported Marsh, "it was hard to tell that different doctors were talking about the same disease" (1969, p. 1). The complexity of the testimony was also reported by Ryan (1969, p. 6-7) and Denman (p. 99).

Although the hearing was considered a victory for the Black Lung Association (Hume, 1971, p. 133), a week afterwards there was still no bill. According to Hume there was angry talk at the mines:

> These men were both suspicious of the legislature and, at the time, naive enough about it to expect promises to the public to be kept with punctuality. On Wednesday, the miner's uneasiness was abruptly translated into mass action. A dispute between a group of miners and their superintendent at the East Gulf Mine not far from Beckley had led to a wildcat strike on Tuesday [February 18]. When the leaders of the four hundred to five hundred men who had left their jobs were asked the reason for their action, they said it was because of the legislature's delay in passing a black lung compensation bill. (Hume, 1971, p. 134)

The strike had always been an "ace-in-the-hole" tactic for miners in their struggles, but this time it seemed to be unplanned and completely spontaneous. The strike even caught the leaders of the Black Lung Movement by surprise. Ken Hechler reacted negatively to the walkout by saying that he didn't "believe that endless, bitter and disorganized strikes and walkouts will solve the problem or result in good legislation" ("Mounting Walkouts Report," p. 1). Former state

senator Paul J. Kaufman, the attorney for the BLA, said "he thought the work stoppage was a mistake and that he advised miners who talked to him to go back to work" (Marsh, February 22, 1969, p. 1). Kaufman also said that his own impression of the strike was that it was aimed at the coal companies because their influence in the legislature was dominant. The leaders of the Black Lung Association were also somewhat perplexed, although not unsupportive, at the strike. When invited to the office of Speaker Ivor Bolarsky to discuss the strike, the leaders responded that they had nothing to do with it. Raymond Wright, secretary of the Black Lung Association said:

> We have no control over them. . . . There's a bunch of men running up and down the road stopping work. We can't control them. If the district and the international can't control them, we certainly can't. (Marsh, February 22, 1969, p. 1)

BLA president Charles Brooks declined to comment to reporters on whether the strike was an effective pressure technique or not. Although there is no evidence to indicate that the BLA did initiate the strike, it is obvious that the strike was helpful in the protest and lobbying activities of the association, if only because it freed men from work to participate in these activities. By the weekend, 12,000 miners were off the job and the strike was still growing (Hume, 1971, p. 134). On February 22, it was reported that over 30,000 miners were off their jobs.

Initially, the strike received mixed reaction from the legislature with some Congressmen supportive and others not, accusing VISTAS of organizing the strike. Many however saw it as an effective technique

to move the legislature to action. According to Charles Ryan, in a Beckley Post Herald article:

> There can not be criticism, only admiration, for miners who consider this legislation so important that they refuse to work until it is acted upon. Those who intrude and urge the miner to return to work because he is being taken care of are wrong. The coal miner may be taken care of—beautifully—if he sits and waits for legislature to move along willy nilly. He may be taken care of just as he was in the past. Not since the early union days when the coal miner's vote . . . struck fear into the heart of the politician has this grimy little man with white eyes and lots of guts been so important to the lawmakers. . . . The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, NBC, ABC, and CBS have been camped out in Charleston simply because he has made such a fuss. And unfortunately, fuss is what moves the legislature for the little guy. (Ryan, February 25, 1969, p. 8)

Although the strike was an extremely effective weapon, the leaders of the Black Lung Association felt it necessary to add pressure in another way as well. Wednesday afternoon of February 26, a second giant rally was planned for the Charleston Civic Center. The rally itself was very similar to the first, in that speeches were given by Hechler and the Physicians Committee as well as by members of the Black Lung Association. What made this rally different, however, was that it ended with a massive march of some 2,000 miners on the statehouse. In addition to the news coverage which the march produced, it also had an impact upon the legislators at the time. According to Denman:

> The gathering was closed with a prayer from Dr. Wells, and then the 2,000 assembled miners poured from the Civic Center to start their march to the Capitol, a mile and a half away. Kanawha Boulevard, a wide four lane divided avenue, runs along the Kanawha River almost the length of the city of Charleston which lies in the narrow river valley. The marching miners carried placards which read "No law, no work," "No law, no coal," and the numbers "78/4." The miners sang, waved, and cheered as they moved down the Boulevard. Windows along the route were filled with the curious. Newsmen, particularly network cameramen, shot film from their shoulder harness cameras. (pp. 159-160)

Charles Ryan in the West Virginia Hillbilly, describes the impact of this strategy:

> The panorama was something to behold as the group neared the capitol. The gold dome shone brightly as . . . a thousand hardhats turned toward the majestic edifice. . . . They spread at least fifty abreast as they stormed the statehouse steps in a slow motion pace. A human wall of flesh flattened out against the wall of the capitol at the top of the long flight of stairs that faced Kanawha Boulevard. (Ryan, March 8, 1969, p. 6)

In an interview with Robert Nelson, a state delegate in the capitol at the time, Denman got this description of the march from a legislator's standpoint:

> We were in a committee meeting. Our room was on the third floor facing Kanawha Boulevard. You could look out and watch them come—watch them march up on the steps and into the building. . . . Well, none of us had ever seen anything like that. (Denman, p. 160)

In addition to the strike and the march, a third tactic was also introduced by the Black Lung Association which was also important: lobbying. However, the type of lobbying done by the miners was considered somewhat foreign to that traditionally used. For example, an early technique was the displaying of a coffin at the Capitol following a mock funeral procession. The coffin represented "the only solution the state has offered so far for the problem of black lung disease" ("Black Lung Lobbyists," p. 15). Following the march to the Capitol on Wednesday, February 26th, the miners lobbied in mass inside the halls of the legislature:

> There were wall to wall people at the statehouse Wednesday. Miners pushing for the enactment of black lung legislation had come to Charleston for an afternoon meeting at the municipal auditorium and were stopping off at the capitol

> to see how their legislators were getting along with the bill. . . . Pieces of cardboard on which were scrawled the name and number of the mine in which they worked were stuck in their hats or hung around their necks on pieces of string. The miners flowed up the steps through the entrance on both sides of the legislature hall and milled around the rotunda well, spreading out into the House and Senate lobbies. (Dent, February 27, 1969, p. 5)

The difference between the coal miners lobbying and the professional lobbyists of the coal industry was obvious. The miners crowded into the halls and galleries, were mostly dressed in work clothes. In contrast, the lobbying activities for the West Virginia Coal Association were carried out largely by the Charleston law firm of Jackson, Kelly, Holt and O'Farrell, considered one of the most politically influential in the state. But the miners were effective. According to Joe Malay, lobbyist for the Black Lung Association:

> We'd get the House and the Senate members that we knew, we'd talk to them, and some that we didn't know too well, we'd talk to them, . . . we'd show them the literature . . . where our men had been beat on compensation cases . . . show 'em those kinds of cases were a man had actually been beat [on his compensation claim]. (Interview with Joe Malay)

When the House Judiciary Committee was working on the black lung bill, one legislator tells of the attempts by the committee members to avoid, somewhat unsuccessfully, the lobbying efforts of the miners:

> We'd have closed meetings—we set up on the third floor and nobody would tell the miners where we were; they'd just have to find us. The Judiciary Committee room had several doors, all locked on the inside . . . the miners would gather outside and send in a message for certain delegates. Somebody would tell them that they weren't there. Well a couple of us got mad at that and we go out . . . and tell the miners that delegate so-and-so was there. Then he'd have to go out and face them. Sparacino [Judiciary Vice Chairman] would come back in, his bald head red. He didn't want to talk to the miners. (Denman, p. 109)

The type of lobbying carried out by the miners was generally characterized in the press as different from traditional methods. A well publicized cartoon in the Charleston Gazette "Lobbying with Club Harmful to Both Sides," attempted a comical comparison between special interests lobbyists of the traditional mold and those of the coal miners. The caption read: "It's terrible the way you (the miner) are trying to influence the legislature—why don't you have cocktail parties and dinners and make campaign contributions the way we do" ("Lobbying with Club Harmful to Both Sides," p. 4). The lobbying, however, did come under serious question by many legislators as to its impact upon the legislature. During the hearings James F. Dent, a staff writer for the Charleston Gazette, reported the following conversations concerning the miners' tactics:

> There has been some grumbling among the "permanent" lobbyists about the usurpation of "their" space by the black lung throng. And more than one lobbyist—and some legislators—have expressed doubts about how the mass turnouts and demonstrations would effect legislation. "I don't know that you can push the legislature that way," said one. "Well, who's doing the pushing"?, a lobbyist sympathetic to the black lung group asked. "These are people. And these legislators were elected to come here and serve the people."

Howard Carson, former president of the State Senate is reported to have said:

> It's participatory democracy . . . and I don't think its a bad thing. At least these people are up here, actively showing where they stand on legislation. That's better, I think, than staying at home and then grumbling later that the legislature didn't do what you thought it ought to do.

And another observer reported:

> You know and I know . . . that if this hadn't happened—the demonstrations, the strike—there wouldn't have been any black lung legislation this session. More than likely the legislature would have appointed a committee to do an interim study and that would have been it. (Dent, February 27, 1969, p. 5)

These lobbying activities of the miners continued in the legislature from the beginning of the session in January until the end in March. The first part of the session, however, was in definite contrast to the last part, especially the last few days. According to Denman "the first half, and more, of the legislative session saw agonizing delays both in introducing legislation and then in getting bills out of committees. The last few days of the session were ones of haste and confusion, with action occuring in rapid fire succession in all areas of the legislature" (p. 163). In addition to the presence of lobbying coal miners, the legislature was also besieged by policemen and firemen lobbying to get a bill permitting them to form unions and by striking State Road Commission workers striking for a bill to permit them to join unions (Dent, March 6, 1969, p. 7). According to one observer, the atmosphere was such that anything could happen:

> It's going to be a wild, wild week. . . . It's hard to say what they'll pass. It always happens this way in the last days of a session. Bills you thought were dead come roaring back to life. Sometimes a lot of the legislators themselves don't know what they have passed until after they have passed it. (Dent, March 5, 1969, p. 5)

IV. THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION VS. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

The tactics which the Black Lung Association used against the West Virginia State Legislature were basically three: a strike, marches, and mass lobbying. The confrontation between the Black Lung Association and the Social Security Administration, which lasted from the summer of 1970 until the summer of 1974, demonstrated a somewhat different pattern of strategies and tactics and a very different interactional process between the social movement organization and its target group. This is in part because of the nature of the target groups themselves. Whereas the West Virginia State Legislature was, in some respects, a relatively new organizational structure every two years, the Social Security Administration had developed a very large complex bureaucratic structure that maintained the stability of its operations. Whereas the legislature was being pressured to pass legislation, the SSA was being pressured to administer legislation that had already been passed. Thirdly, avenues of influence to the target group were different. Being a state elected body, the legislature responded to state economic and political pressures whereas the SSA, being a federal agency, did not. However, it did have to respond to national pressure from Congress, the President, and the Department of HEW. The two target groups were similar in some respects, also. Both operated under time and personnel limitations, although in somewhat different ways. The legislature was under personnel limitations to handle research and investigations properly and under temporal pressure to finish within

the time allotted for the session. The SSA was under personnel limitations to handle the Black Lung Program effectively and efficiently and under a time limitation to get the program in operation immediately after the law was passed.

The Black Lung Program, although effective immediately after the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in December, 1969, did not arouse the intense interest of the BLA until the first denials and approvals were released in the summer of 1970. The administration of the program maintained one other common element to the confrontation between the BLA and the legislature in that the ambiguity and inconsistencies of medical opinion still persisted. The 1969 law assumed that pneumoconiosis does exist and that it is caused by coal dust; however, the detection of the disease was still an unsettled dispute. Unfortunately for the miner, the division of medical opinion worked against him this time. The Congress left it up to the SSA to establish the criteria for determining the existence of "black lung," and the administration of SSA, perhaps because of a lack of sound medical guidance at this time, established what the BLA felt were too rigid criteria for the approval of claims and inconsistent application of the criteria that were used. Of particular importance was the use of the x-ray as a sole criteria for turning a miner down for benefits. The BLA had already fought with the West Virginia State Legislature to allow the use of other tests besides the x-ray because of its inconclusiveness.

Not only did the inconsistency in the determination of criteria for detection lead to disorganization in the program, but the SSA officials established administrative rules and regulations based upon its experience with already well established programs. However, the applicants for black lung benefits were different in at least four ways from applicants to regular Social Security programs. In the first place, a large number of applicants came at one time. Secondly, the people who were making these applications were from a similar occupational and geographical background, which means that they were in contact with one another on and off the job. Thirdly, the Social Security Administration was unprepared to handle this program from both a planning standpoint and from a personnel standpoint. Finally, in the Appalachian region, where the BLA became most prevalent, there was not enough medical personnel to sufficiently and effectively supply the needed medical evidence to support the miners claims.

The miners were also well aware of the division of opinion among members of the medical profession. In a study conducted of a random sample of miners by Leo Kramer, Inc., in 1971, there is evidence to indicate that while the miner may not be completely knowledgeable concerning the black lung disease, he is aware of the issue and of the existence of diverse medical opinion concerning the detection of the disease. The study reported that while almost 80 percent of the miners said that the applicants for black lung benefits should get an x-ray, only 31.9 percent of the respondents said that x-rays were the best test for black lung. Thirty-six percent of the miners responded

that the blood gas test was better, 32.2 percent responded that the breathing test was better, 17.8 percent said that they should take the miner's word for it, and the remaining 13.5 percent said that the doctor's word was better (Kramer, 1973, p. 35). Regarding these results the report concluded:

> Of course, the miners themselves could not be expected to have expert judgement on such strictly medical matters. The series of questions was asked in order to find out the extent to which the miners were aware of the medical controversy over which tests are valid determinants of black lung . . . it is clear that at least some of the miners were aware of this controversy. . . . They knew that a positive x-ray was proof, but they thought that other tests must be used, if the x-ray was negative. (p. 35)

The lack of a legitimate means for detection of pneumoconiosis meant that any program which attempted to distinguish between those miners who did have pneumoconiosis and those who did not was built on very susceptable ground. A major part of the ideological orientations of the miners of the Black Lung Association was built on the fact that no conclusive method for detection existed, and therefore there would always be some doubt as to whether anyone who was turned down actually had the disease or not. This was one of the reasons that the BLA fought in the state and federal legislature for a good "presumption clause." The presumption clause in legislation would establish the existence of pneumoconiosis if the miner had a lung disorder and had worked in the mines for a specified number of years.

The long range goal of a good presumption clause was immediately replaced by short range goals which attempted to alter the administration of the SSA's Black Lung Program. It has already been noted that, early

in the struggle, the leaders of the Black Lung Association realized that a large part of the problem was the bureaucratic structure of the SSA. Efforts to alter this complex bureaucracy were focused on two levels: at the local district office of the SSA and secondly at the national office in Baltimore. Failure at both of these levels, however, resulted in the leaders of the BLA taking their fight back to the United States Congress.

V. LOCAL LEVEL EFFORTS

On January 11, 1971, the Mingo County Black Lung Association and the Logan County Black Lung Association collectively presented a list of nine demands to the director of the Logan Social Security Office. Approximately 50 miners participated in a march on the office to present the demands ("Black Lung Demands to be Forwarded," p. 1). The director of the office, William Chandler, said that he would forward the nine demands handed to him up to the office in Baltimore. On January 23, Baltimore and Washington officials of the Social Security Administration came to West Virginia to meet with coal miners about the complaints which the BLA had. This established a pattern of protest operations by the Black Lung Association which was to persist for the next three years. In general they would march or picket a local SSA office, submit a list of demands, which would be forwarded to Baltimore, and then there would be a confrontation between the BLA and the higher SSA officials, whom they figured were the only ones who could take action to correct the deficiencies of the program. There seemed to

be some concensus by both the BLA and the local SSA personnel that the problem is on the national level. According to Dwight Billings, director of the Beckley, West Virginia SSA office:

> It must be remembered that all decisions come from the Baltimore office and that the local offices only get the claims filed and request the necessary medical information and then send it to Baltimore—that is where the hangup is. ("Black Lung Claimants Getting Fair Treatment," p. 1)

And a representative of the BLA responded similarly:

> . . . in fairness to the local offices they have been very good. Our problem is the people in Washington. The government does not want to pay benefits so they try to see that as few as possible claims are approved. The local office has been very good to us. . . . ("Black Lung Claimants Getting Fair Treatment," p. 1)

However, this positive attitude toward district offices did not keep the Black Lung Association from continuing its protest activities focused at them, particularly when the Baltimore and Washington offices took no action. In April, 1971, Don Bryant, president of the Logan Chapter of the Black Lung Association, expressed the discontent of the miners and began plans to establish the first march on Washington:

> We have waited two months for social security to move on their promises but we see no evidence of changes. . . . Thousands of disabled miners and widows are being treated like dirt. . . . We have tried to work things out but all we get is unkept promises and no action. . . . We want what is right and we will get it even if it takes a trip to Washington. (Found in list of newspaper clippings from BLA files, n.d.)

In the month of April, two major protest marches were to occur, one again in Logan County and another in Mercer County under the direction of a newly formed chapter of the Black Lung Association. On April 13, 1971, 200 members of the Black Lung Association marched for a second time on the Logan office of the Social Security Administration.

The meeting ended in a bitter tirade against Social Security with a list of demands. In the list of demands, the miners called on Social Security to:

1. Explain why individual miners are turned down for black lung benefits and to specify the amount of black lung a miner has in the denial letter.
2. Allow miners to see and to copy their complete files on request.
3. Permit miners to be examined for black lung by doctors of their choice, such as Dr. I. E. Buff and Dr. Donald Rasmussen.
4. Pay for all additional medical evidence needed to prove that a miner has black lung and to collect all of the miner's evidence, not half of it.
5. Admit that a disabled miner who can't work in the mines is totally disabled and can't work.
6. Treat miners on a first come first serve basis and pay benefits promptly. ("Black Lung Group Makes Demand List," p. 1)

On April 29, a smaller group of miners met with SSA officials in Bluefield, West Virginia (Mercer County). The demands were essentially the same except for one addition, which was used several times afterwards in protest to the SSA and to Congress: "We demand that Social Security treat us like people, not like dogs" (Calfee, pp. 1, 2). According to the demands made by the BLA:

> When we go to Social Security for help we are ignored, insulted, and get the run around. The Social Security people won't tell us why we are turned down. They won't let us see our files. They won't help us get new evidence. All they do is try to discourage us and get us out of their office. This had better stop. We want to be treated with respect and we want our money now. We only want that which is ours and that which is ours under the law." (Calfee, p. 1)

On the same day in Charleston, West Virginia, the Black Lung Association met with representatives of SSA and presented complaints. According to Arnold Miller, then state president of the BLA, the

problem was basically caused by the regulations established by Robert Finch, former secretary of HEW, particularly the regulation with regard to the use of the x-ray. According to Miller:

> It does not require an act of Congress to revise black lung regulations. . . . It requires only a change in regulations by the head of HEW. . . . We are prepared to prove at this point that the Social Security Administration has done an inadequate job with the black lung program . . . the x-ray tests required by the Social Security Administration for black lung as well as the breathing tests are unreliable. The Social Security Administration has had the black lung program for one and a half years, and according to their own statistics, over 40 percent of the x-ray tests they have received are unreadible. In some cases, they have even paid claims for bronchitis. (quoted in Campbell, p. 1)

The confrontations with the district offices of the Social Security Administration served several functions. First, like most protest activities of relatively powerless groups, they focus on the point of contact between the aggrieved group and that part of the environment which needs to be changed. Secondly, starting at the district level first served to legitimize the activities of the Black Lung Association both to the larger governmental structure and to the local populace. By presenting demands on the local level and waiting for responses and action, the BLA originated action at an appropriate level of the bureaucracy. When the demands were not met, then the BLA was in a better position to take further actions to meet its demands. It also kept the issue of "black lung" alive in the local news and served to help build a larger constituency. Marches on the local SSA were an effective tactic on the part of the miners. Unlike the coal companies, and to some extent the legislature, the Social Security offices were

not accustomed to picketing and marches and were therefore embarrassed by them. It was only two weeks after the first march that national SSA officials met with the miners of the BLA and discussed the demands. Unfortunately for both the SSA and the BLA, the promises made by the officials were not kept. This served to legitimize the future actions taken by the Black Lung Association in June of 1971, a national march on Washington, D.C. to influence HEW and the legislators to pressure changes in the SSA.

VI. THE FIRST MARCH ON WASHINGTON

As was stated earlier, the marches on the local district offices were basically to demonstrate against the higher administration officials of Social Security. Repeated attempts to arrange meetings with Bernard Popick, head of the Black Lung Benefits Program, Commissioner Ball, the head of the Social Security Administration, and Elliot Richardson, the head of HEW, were unsuccessful. It was after Popick had failed to keep a promise to attend a meeting with the miners in April that the Black Lung Association marched on the Logan County SSA office. The delay and subsequent no show of Popick resulted in a change in strategies:

> On April 29, leaders from 10 BLA chapters were supposed to meet with Popick, the head of the Bureau of Disability Insurance, which handles the Black Lung Program. This meeting was originally set for March 15, but the Social Security pencil pushers kept stalling. April 29 came—but Popick did not show up. Instead he sent his assistant Bill Rivers and some other flunkies. Some men thought we should walk out, but we decided to give the messenger boys the word to take back to their boss. ("March on Washington," p. 1)

The members of the BLA presented their demands to the representatives from SSA and told them they had two weeks to meet them, or they would take other action. According to an article in the Black Lung Bulletin, the SSA, as expected, made no satisfactory response, so they were therefore going to Washington ("March on Washington," p. 1).

The miners had been to Washington before, during the hearings for the passage of the 1969 legislation. But the circumstances were somewhat different now. In 1969, the Congress would probably have passed the 1969 FCMHSA without the direct participation of the miners in the legislative process. The Farmington mine disaster had such a strong impact upon the legislators and the people that a law was imminent. According to Dr. Rasmussen, it was the walkout of 40,000 miners in West Virginia that really demonstrated to Congress the concerns of the miners and the need for strong legislation on black lung (interview with Dr. Rasmussen). On this second trip to Washington, the miners were not primarily interested in the legislature, because they were not at that time seeking to amend the 1969 law, but to influence a change in the rules and regulations of the SSA's handling of the Black Lung Program.

This march was also somewhat different than the march on the state capitol in early 1969. In the first place, the miners were not on strike, so the pressure to respond immediately was minimized. However, the threat of a strike was always present, and posters carried by the miners to Washington reflected this. Secondly, because of the successful efforts of the miners in West Virginia, the Congress was certainly aware of the potential power they represented. But more importantly,

the Congress was probably more sympathetic to the miner's cause than the West Virginia State Legislature had been. Finally, this march was more organized and better planned. Somewhat surprisingly, there existed quite an extensive division of labor among the BLA members who visited Washington in terms of the functions they were to perform and the activities they were to participate in. The information concerning the organizing of this march was made available to me from the files of the BLA. What follows will be an analysis and interpretation of this information in order to better understand those intraorganizational processes which lead up to a march of this type.

VII. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MARCH

In contrast to the somewhat spontaneous activities of the West Virginia March and Strike in 1969, the march on Washington in 1971 took almost two months of prior planning. After a decision was made in April to go to Washington, following the failure of SSA to respond satisfactorily, a meeting was held in Bluewell, West Virginia with about 50 representatives of the BLA from 9 counties in 4 states (news release to BLA chapters). According to a news release from the meeting, the purpose of going to Washington was clear:

> We decided that the only way to get results is to go to the people who make the laws and regulations and that is in Washington. We're going to talk to Elliot Richardson who is the head of the HEW—he has the power to change the regulations that Social Security uses to keep widows and miners from getting compensation. We are also going to visit our Congressmen from coal-mining states, and Congressman Ken Hechler called the Black Lung Office Thursday and said that he would be glad to help in anyway he can—he's going to get

meeting rooms for us on Capitol Hill, and help us set up appointments. (BLA files)

By May 13, free housing and free food had been arranged for the trip. On that same day, the leaders of the local chapters of the BLA were given the following instructions for preparation for the trip:

1. Get definite names and commitments from people going and report to the Black Lung Association Office, 1222 Washington St. E., Charleston, 304-342-3411.
2. Arrange for transportation. Cars are cheaper—but if you want to get a bus we can help you make arrangements for it. It will be about $15 per person.
3. Raise money to pay expenses. We have free housing in Washington and may get free food—but money is needed for transportation; some people will be able to afford the trip more than others—we must help pay the way for those who can't afford the trip. Ask those who are registering for a down payment ($1-$2-$5-$10)—hold gospel sings, ask for donations from people in your communities (anybody—coal operators if you want) but we need money.
4. Let people know in your area that we're going to Washington—call TV and radio stations, newspapers, put up signs—go out and talk to people.
5. Call the Black Lung Office every week until June and let us know what you are doing and how many people you have going. (BLA files)

From the registration forms that the miners who planned to go filled out, the leaders of the BLA were able to determine who the miners were interested in meeting and talking to. From their suggestions, eight teams were developed that would have specific duties in Washington and specific people to see. Time schedules were developed and almost every minute was accounted for in the plan. Of particular importance to the plan was that many Congressmen and Senators would be tied up exactly the same time by the BLA members. Even time in between appointments was accounted for: certain groups would picket the Bank of Washington, others the UMWA office, and others the Department of

Health, Education and Welfare. In addition, letters were sent to all Congressmen, Senators, government officials, and others who they planned to visit. Although the letters were basically the same, informing the recipient of their problems with the SSA and of their trip to Washington, they served the purpose of alerting certain powerful figures who helped them while they were there.

The trip to Washington, then, was a very well organized protest tactic. It required the planning of a well organized association. However, the type of organization is worth noting. From a review of the above "instructions" to the chapters of the BLA, one notes several indications that while this is a well organized effort, it does not possess the same flow of power, decision making, and structural characteristics of what would traditionally be called a "complex" or "formal" organization. While there is an attempt to maintain a centralized source of communication and storage of information (Instructions 1 and 5), Instructions 2, 3, and 4 allow for and almost force most of the actual organizing of the march to occur at local levels. Miners at the local level were responsible for recruiting for the march, of arranging for transportation, of raising money for expenses, and of informing the local news media and others about the march.

The exact number of people in Washington varied according to news reports from about 100 (Franklin, June 8, 1971, p. C1) to several hundred (Burchard, p. C6). Although the Black Lung Association had hoped for 1,000 or more, their records show that approximately 150

miners and widows were on the trip. The mass lobbying tactics used by the BLA in Washington resembled those used in the West Virginia effort, but they were much better received in Washington than in Charleston, at least by the news media, as evidenced by the following account:

> Several hundred disabled Appalachian coal miners swarmed over Capitol Hill yesterday, demanding liberalization of the black lung benefits program. For the most part, the disabled miners were well received by Congressmen and Senators and given indications of support for legislation to improve the program. (Sinclair, p. 1)

The Washington Post also reported a fairly positive response:

> Several hundred coal miners and miners' widows from four states roamed the corridors of Congress and executive offices yesterday demanding "justice for those who mine America's coal." They got tired, they got hungry, they got lost from time to time in the labyrinths of government. They got some stalling and some fancy words, but they also got respectful hearings from powerful men who promised action. The amateur and apparently effective mass lobbying sweep of Washington was organized, loosely, by the Black Lung Association, which is centered in West Virginia, but also drew delegations from Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania. (Burchard, p. C1)

Ben A. Franklin, a staff reporter for the New York Times, who had followed the activities of the BLA back in West Virginia two years before, however, saw the lobbying from a little different standpoint, at least in terms of the potential power of the group:

> About 100 disabled Appalachian coal miners and miners' widows came here today to warn that much of the East's supply of fuel for the production of power may be interrupted by strikes this summer unless action is taken on their complaints. (Franklin, June 8, 1971, p. C1)

But the threat of a strike did not seem as important as the massive lobbying efforts and meetings with key people in Washington. In all, the group met with over 17 Senators or Congressmen and three

high administrative officials, including Commissioner Ball, head of the Social Security Administration. The three day visit did not result in the passage of legislation, but merely the promises of legislators that something would be done. In addition, Appalachian Regional Commission officials promised they would set up additional diagnostic clinics in the coal fields. According to the Black Lung Bulletin:

> It is our sincere belief that the trip to Washington, D.C., by the Black Lung Association of Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia was very effective. Our presentation of the issues should have left no question in the minds of government leaders that the Social Security Administration and the Bureau of Mines have not carried out the intent of Congress when they passed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. . . . We will return to Washington if we do not get some definite answers in a few months. ("Proceedings: Washington Trip," p. 6)

After the BLA members returned to the coal fields, they continued their protest meetings against Social Security. Although the intention of the march on Washington was not legislation, the trip resulted in several legislators initiating efforts to amend the 1969 law. Of particular importance was an optimistic prediction by Rep. Carl Perkins, a democrat from Kentucky, and Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, that the Congress would probably pass legislation to liberalize black lung benefits. His labor subcommittee was already working on a set of amendments that would be out of committee soon.

As the next few months went by, the Black Lung Association took a wait and see attitude about the possibility of new amendments being passed, but they continued their fight on the local and state level to condemn the SSA for the inability of miners to qualify for black lung benefits. One of the largest protest meetings occurred on Sunday,

July 25, 1971, when an estimated 400 members of the West Virginia State Black Lung Association gathered at Lowell Phillips Park on West Virginia Highway 22 to hear Rep. Ken Hechler and dozens of miners and widows air their grievances about being turned down for their black lung benefits. Called one of the biggest meetings ever of the Black Lung Association, the miners were told that Pennsylvania has twice as many black lung applications approved as other states because Pennsylvania has more clinics, more doctors, and better records of the miners ("Black Lung Qualification Requirements Rapped," p. 1). During the next few months, the Black Lung Association worked in a somewhat different direction than previously. Rather than attacking the SSA or government officials or the legislators in order to liberalize the Black Lung Program, the BLA set up a Black Lung Education Fund, whose major purpose was to work to get a clinic program funded in the coal fields of central Appalachia. If the discrepancies in the Black Lung Program were a function of poor medical facilities and records, then the clinics would do a great deal in getting more claims approved in the coal fields where doctors and medical services were scarce. According to the Black Lung Bulletin, "the clinics program is one of the most important ways that health care and welfare of the people can be taken from control of the coal industry and its doctors, lawyers, politicians and bureaucrats" ("Fight for Clinics," p. 1). In the spring of 1972, the Black Lung Education Fund (BLEF) got word that approximately $1.3 million was available from the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) for Black Lung clinics in the Appalachian coal fields. According to the Black Lung Bulletin:

> BLEF immediately went to work on a proposal for clinics in Southern West Virginia and in Eastern Kentucky which would be run by the miners. Unlike most clinics or hospitals, the ones planned by BLEF would have a board of directors through which the consumers of the health services (the people being treated) would have a majority voice in running the program instead of leaving it up to the suppliers of health care [the doctors]. ("What Happened to Clinics," p. 4)

Unfortunately, after several months of proposal writing and rewriting, meetings with the ARC, arranging for doctors to run the program, the black lung clinic idea fell by the wayside because Gov. Moore of West Virginia would not approve any program sponsored by the BLEF. Even after a new sponsor had been found, and a health program in Kentucky was willing to donate 80,000 dollars of its own money to the Black Lung Clinics, if they could be run by miners, no money was forthcoming. What did come was an announcement by Gov. Moore that $750,000 of ARC money would go to a mobile testing unit in West Virginia. This proposal, however, was soundly condemned by the BLA and Dr. Rasmussen because it was considered useless without the laboratory and clinic facilities to back it up ("What Happened to Clinics," p. 5).

Although the clinics fell through, the Black Lung Association was more successful with the federal legislature. In November, 1971, the House of Representatives passed the Black Lung Amendments introduced by Carl Perkins through the Education and Labor Committee. The amendments included:

1. The Federal Black Lung Program to be extended two more years.
2. X-rays cannot be used as the sole evidence for black lung claims.
3. Black lung benefits to be extended to orphans who have lost both of their parents.

4. Eliminate dollar for dollar offset with Social Security disability payments.
5. Make all these amendments retroactive to December 1, 1969. Any new amendments apply to any claimants who have applied since 1969.
6. Wives and children can receive benefits directly—in case of separation or incompetency.
7. Black lung benefits are to be extended to above-ground miners. ("Victory," p. 1)

The amendments then went to the Senate. They received so much support in the House (312-78) that the BLA expected the Senate to take a favorable position. However, Senator Randolph, from West Virginia, was to submit a bill which had the first five provisions in it listed above, plus two important additions:

1. Striking out "pneumoconiosis" wherever it appears in the 1969 Act and stating instead—"pneumoconiosis, or any other respiratory or pulmonary impairments" . . . arising out of employment in underground coal mines.
2. Redefining total disability to mean a miner is totally disabled if he cannot work in the mines or at another place of work using the same skills he used in the mines. ("Victory," p. 1)

The BLA urged that their members start letter writing campaigns to their senators urging them to support Randolph's bill. On December 1 and 2, the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings on the Black Lung Amendments. Testimony was given by representatives of the Black Lung Association and by another miner's group, Disabled Miners and Widows of Southern West Virginia. In addition, Dr. Donald Rasmussen testified along with several doctors who had participated in a study conducted by the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund to examine coal miners whose applications for black lung benefits had been rejected. On January 6, 1972, the Senate Subcommittee took its hearings into the

coal fields for a hearing in Beckley, West Virginia. The purpose of the hearing was to further discuss the Randolph amendments to the Federal Black Lung Bill. Miners, wives and widows from all over West Virginia turned out for the hearing (Black Lung Hearings, p. 3). Before the miners testimony, Rep. Kee, Rep. Heckler, and Senator Byrd each made a speech endorsing the amendments. This hearing gave the BLA an additional opportunity to lobby for the amendments without the expense of a trip to Washington. The miners went away with the feeling that in 1972 they might finally see some of the fruits of their lobbying ("1971 in Review," p. 3). In addition, however, the BLA leaders printed up petitions on two important changes that they felt were needed to the Randolph amendments: (1) A widow should be allowed to present as evidence affidavits from people who knew her husband and were aware he had Black Lung, and (2) a second amendment written up by Dr. Rasmussen and BLA members that would prevent Social Security from turning down any black lung claimant before he had a complete pulmonary function exam. The amendment would also force SSA to pay for the exam ("Sign Petitions for BL Law Changes," pp. 3-4). The petitions were sent to Senator Byrd on January 28, 1972. Over 300 people signed the petitions. On April 17, 1972, despite strong opposition by the Nixon Administration and intensive lobbying efforts by the coal operators ("73-0," p. 1), the U.S. Senate passed 73-0 a bill to qualify thousands of additional coal miners for black lung benefits. Senate bill 2675, the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, included provisions for:

1. The Black Lung benefits program becomes permanent and all miners qualifying will receive lifetime benefits.
2. An elimination of the offset provision. The Social Security Administration would be prohibited from reducing the total benefits in cases where miners are receiving both black lung benefits and Social Security disability benefits. A disabled miner could receive up to 100 percent of the average of his yearly earnings while employed in the mines.
3. A provision which prohibits a denial for benefits based solely on x-ray evidence alone. Administration would require the use of additional medical tests, and lay evidence where such evidence is relevant to establish eligibility for benefits.
4. The presumption that miners with 15 years of experience in the mines who are disabled by a respiratory or pulmonary impairment are disabled by Black Lung. The language of the bill extends the word "pneumoconiosis" to "pneumoconiosis and other lung disease arising out of employment in a coal mine."
5. Relaxes evidence requirements for widows approving the use of affidavits of her husband's disability to establish the validity of his claim.
6. Orphans or deceased miners would be made eligible for benefits along with dependent parents, brothers and sisters.
7. A miner would be considered totally disabled if black lung "prevents him from engaging in gainful employment in a mine or mines."
8. The Black Lung Laws are extended to strip miners as well as underground miners.
9. The Social Security Administration would be required to notify all persons who have been denied black lung benefits, as well as miners whose claims are pending.
10. Clinic treatment facilities would be authorized for miners with lung impairments. ("73-0," pp. 1, 2)

The Black Lung Association was much more pleased with the Senate bill than the House bill passed earlier. Generous concessions were made to coal operators in the House bill, according to the BLA, and as soon as the bill was passed in the Senate, the representatives from the BLA left for Washington to make sure that in the Joint Conference Committee (where differences between the two bills were to be worked out), those

important provisions in the Senate bill which are not present in the House bill would not be left out.

On May 20, 1972, President Nixon signed the Black Lung bill into law. The following account was given in the Black Lung Bulletin:

> Fifteen months of hard work and struggle ended in success on May 20, 1972, when President Nixon signed the Black Lung Bill into law. Hundreds of BLA members marched on Social Security Offices, wrote letters to congressmen and newspapers, and traveled to Washington to lobby. The result was a law that strengthened the Black Lung Program greatly, and will make it possible for many more miners and widows to get their benefits. However, Nixon was still intending to veto the bill; a veto message had already been drafted. He was stopped in his tracks by the threat of a national coal strike. ("Nixon Gives In," p. 1)

Of particular importance in this threat was the work of the Mingo County Chapter of the Black Lung Association. According to the editors of the Black Lung Bulletin, in the last two months before the bill was passed, the Mingo BLA did an outstanding job of promoting the goals of the Black Lung Association. They organized a lot of pressure to help get the Black Lung bill across, sending many letters and telegrams. They also sent a delegation to Washington to lobby the members of the House Senate Conference Committee. When it looked as if Nixon might veto the bill, they reacted strongly by issuing press releases which made the front page of most West Virginia newspapers. But what was most important was that they backed up their words with actions. They set up information stations and explained to the working miners how important the Black Lung amendments were. Although there was no picketing, within one day Mingo County mines were shut down tight. According to the Bulletin, this strong action gave more meaning to the strike threats

being put out by other chapters, and was a vital factor in forcing Nixon to sign the bill ("Nixon Gives In," p. 2). What was crucial was that for the first time since the passage of the 1969 law, the working miners had joined the retired and disabled miners of the Black Lung Association in a collective effort to once again pressure the actions of elected leaders.

Although the passage of the 1972 amendments to the FCMHSA were a major victory in the struggle over the issue of black lung, the Black Lung Association was soon to face a more critical confrontation with the Social Security Administration over the establishment of new procedures based on the new amendments. According to the next issue of the Bulletin:

> Our battle with Congress and President Nixon is over—we won the new Black Lung amendments. But the government, true to form, has another set of red tape procedures that they may use against us and destroy all that we have worked for in the new law. That is the new HEW-SSA regulations that will govern the new Black Lung Amendments. ("Listen to Us, SSA," p. 1)

On June 15, 1972, less than a month after Nixon signed the bill into law, representatives of the Black Lung Association from West Virginia, Kentucky, and Virginia met with SSA officials in Charleston, West Virginia. Fifty miners and widows filled the West Virginia Black Lung Office, an office which usually denies 55 percent of the claims process there. The group presented a list of demands (17) that they wanted met in the writing of the new regulations. The first and most important demand presented at the meeting was that a committee selected by the BLA (including miners, doctors, and lawyers) must participate on

a regular basis in the creation of the regulations under the new amendments. Social Security Administration would pay the expenses of the committee. The BLA said that if this demand was not met, all the others would be useless. With this demand, the BLA would win a new right—the right not only to participate in making laws, but also to participate in deciding how the laws are to be interpreted ("Black Lung Benefits: Miners Make Demands," p. 29).

Although the Black Lung Association had asked for Bernard Popick, head of the Bureau of Disability, to meet with them, the Social Security Administration sent William Rivers from the staff of the Bureau of Disability Insurance to meet with the miners and widows. During the meeting, Rivers refused to make any commitments to the BLA. The miners learned very little about Social Security's plan but a lot about its unwillingness to cooperate. The representatives of the BLA demanded that Social Security meet their demands within fourteen days, by June 29, and threatened further action if necessary. The BLA told Rivers to send his reply to a three person steering committee, which they selected from the group. Although Popick responded, he sent his letter to Arnold Miller, who was not even at the meeting on June 15. The letter did not commit Popick or SSA to any of the 17 demands. The meeting, however, was not a total failure. According to BLA representatives meeting at Pursglove, West Virginia, on June 19 after the meeting on the fifteenth, even though the officials made no firm commitment to meet the demands, the session, in itself, widened the power base of the BLA from one which was formerly operated out of

Charleston to a network of strong branches throughout Appalachia ("Black Lung Benefits: Miners Make Demands," p. 33).

On July 9, the three state representatives in an expended committee of nine people met again in Charleston. They were angry that the SSA had failed to deal with their demands for participation in writing the new regulations. The group decided to make another trip to Washington where they planned to meet with Bernard Popick, head of the Bureau of Disability Insurance, and Robert Ball, head of the Social Security Administration.

In Washington on July 17, they did meet with Popick. However, a five hour meeting brought only a minor concession—Social Security would release the regulations to the BLA before they were printed in the Federal Register, where regulations are officially published. On the phone on July 25, Popick denied that he ever promised to release the regulations before they were published. The Black Lung Association responded to this reversal by picketing in the coal fields and the district SSA offices. Between July 31 and August 4, the BLA picketed SSA offices in Bluefield, West Virginia, Charleston, West Virginia, Pikeville, Kentucky, Hazard, Kentucky, Corbin, Kentucky, Harlan, Kentucky, Beckley, West Virginia, Montgomery, West Virginia, and Morgantown, West Virginia ("Black Lung Association Wins A Major Battle," p. 22). The pickets accused Popick of lying to the people and backing down on promises. On August 1, a small delegation of BLA members met with Popick while picketing was going on. But after nearly an hour of "fruitless hassle," the BLA representatives walked out. On August 7,

the BLA met again with SSA, however, this time HEW invited the delegation and paid their expenses. Social Security agreed to include BLA in writing the new regulations and to consult with them at Social Security's expense regularly. According to a report in Mountain, Life and Work:

> It was at this final meeting that the officials conceded to the demands of the BLA and agreed to let disabled miners and widows help write the regulations. The government said that it would pay expense costs for the group and two doctors and lawyers of the BLA's choosing to go to Washington and formulate the new rules. ("Black Lung Association Wins A Major Battle," p. 23)

According to Bill Worthington, vice president of the Regional Board of the Black Lung Association, "this was a real victory for the people over the government. . . . Now those who the program is supposed to be run for will finally have a say in how it's run" (quoted in "Black Lung Association Wins A Major Battle," P. 23). Frank Church, however, Board Chairman was less optimistic: "[It] all depends, though, on whether we're going to have any real say in the regulations. . . . We'll have to wait and see about that" (quoted in "Black Lung Association Wins A Major Battle," p. 23).

VIII. THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION VS. THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

It is perhaps fair to say that in its inception, the original goals of the Black Lung Association did not include conflict with, confrontation with, or reform of the United Mine Workers of America ("Purposes," p. 4). On the contrary, the members of the Black Lung

Association and the leaders of the Black Lung Movement requested early on in the struggle that the president of the UMWA, Tony Boyle, come to West Virginia to lead their fight for a change in the state compensation laws to include "pneumoconiosis" ("Miners to Invite UMW Chief to Aid in Black Lung Battle," p. 17). However, the UMWA's failure to respond to the miners resulted in a chain of events which eventually led to the overthrow of the administration of the union. The events which occurred between the time when the first efforts were made to acquire the UMWA's aid, and the overthrow of the leadership of that union, are many and complex. Some of these, although important to the outcome, had very little relationship directly to the Black Lung Association. It will not be our purpose here to analyze all of the events which occurred and the factors which came into play that resulted in the overthrow of the UMWA administration. We will only report on the efforts of one group: the Black Lung Association, and our concern will primarily be the confrontation between the BLA and the leadership of the UMWA, although it certainly was not an isolated effort on the BLA's part.

The interest of the UMWA in the disease "pneumoconiosis" would probably be classified as marginal, at least until after the passage of the 1969 state and federal legislation. Although the assistant director of occupational health for the UMWA's Welfare and Retirement Fund, Dr. Lorin Kerr, was an early advocate of prevention of dust diseases for coal miners and a strong supporter for the recognition of "black lung," his efforts were not recognized and acted upon by the union administration. At the 1968 UMWA convention in September in Denver, Colorado,

there was an atmosphere among the delegates that reflected a major concern for health issues. Over 600 resolutions calling for union action to deal with mine health and safety were submitted to the assembled delegates (Denman, p. 39). And Dr. Kerr presented to the delegates specific information about the disease "pneumoconiosis," how it differed from silicosis, what was needed in the mines to prevent it, and why it would be considered a compensable disease. When Kerr was finished, a resolution was passed at the convention calling for a massive lobbying effort in every coal state to have black lung included under workman's compensation (Hume, 1971, p. 69). Even the UMW Journal reported that the resolution started an all-out drive to bring about a solution to the dust problems in the mines. And the strike of coal miners in October, 1968, during the negotiations between the UMWA and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BOAC) was primarily to push for the contract to provide some protection against the disease ("The Black Lung Controversy," p. 20). However, Denman reports that, for all of the bombast of the UMW's announcement to fight against black lung, the new industry contract made no specific mention of coal dust related disease, but merely called for each operator to provide protection and coverage under existing compensation laws (p. 40).

From our discussion of the development of the Black Lung Movement, it is obvious that even though the UMWA leadership was not concerned with the issue of black lung, many rank and file coal miners, working, retired, and disabled, were concerned. However, their attempts to involve the union failed. And when this loosely organized group of

miners began to do something about black lung themselves, the union opposed their efforts. Although the miners were somewhat perplexed at why the union leaders would not support their efforts, their battle initially was not with the UMWA but with the West Virginia Legislature.

The Farmington disaster has already been discussed as a precipitating event to the Black Lung Movement in its struggle for compensation specifically and for better health and safety in the mines generally. However, it was also a crucial event for adding fuel to the growing disillusionment of the rank and file miner with the union leadership. After the explosion, the response of the UMWA administration was something less than desirable, at least from the miners' standpoint. Tony Boyle, president of the UMWA, responded by saying that as long as coal is mined, there is always this inherent danger of explosion and that the company (Consolidated Coal) "happens to be one of the better companies, as far as cooperation with our union and safety is concerned" (quoted in Franklin, November 22, 1968, p. 50). And the cooperation between the UMWA and Consolidated Coal was very good, perhaps to a greater extent than most rank and file miners were aware. Ironically, only three weeks prior to the explosion, a federal jury in Lexington, Kentucky, had rendered a verdict against Consolidated Coal Company and the United Mine Workers of America for conspiracy since 1950 to create a monopoly in the soft coal industry, in direct violation of the Sherman-Antitrust Act (Bethell, 1969, p. 17). After Boyle went on television and praised Consolidated Coal as a safety minded company, the miners became further suspicious of just how representative of the miners needs and problems the union leadership was (Brittain, p. 1).

As the Black Lung Movement began to grow and rallies began to spread all over the state of West Virginia, more and more anti-Boyle sentiment began to be expressed. The most scathing criticism many times came from nonminers originally, particularly Ralph Nader, an early advocate of the black lung fight. Initial criticisms, however, were addressed against the union's failure to respond to health and safety problems only. Nadar criticized Boyle for: (1) failure to secure adequate compensation in the UMW contract for death, injuries, and coal dust disablement, and (2) failure to secure state and federal laws to attack safety deficiencies, particularly inspection and enforcement provisions (Lilly, p. 1). As the campaign for compensation continued, the conflict between the leadership of the United Mine Workers and the rank and file membership grew. The tactics used by the UMWA leadership to counter the agitative efforts of their own members in the beginning of the conflict were basically twofold: (1) stating that the problem was not as severe as it seemed and that the laws on the books were adequate (evasion of the issue), and (2) postponement of the issue by asserting that the union was, after all, going to work for new laws (Denman, pp. 124-25).

But the conflict intensified as others attacked the union leadership for not only failures in the past but also contemporary action which, if successful, would thwart the efforts of the black lung movement. Ken Hechler, also an early supporter of the movement, came out strong against the UMWA after the Farmington disaster. He felt that the UMWA administration was trying to separate the health and safety

legislation because they did not believe that the health legislation which the miners were advocating would pass by itself (Martin, Ray, p.3).

The statewide rally in Charleston on January 26, with the presence of Ken Hechler and the letter of Ralph Nadar, the challenge to Boyle to come to West Virginia, and the determination and solidarity that this action seemed to demonstrate among the miners, seemed to infuriate the UMWA hierarchy more than any previous event (Humes, 1971, pp. 121-122). The officers of the UMWA responded with the charge which the originators of the BLA feared the most: dual unionism. On January 29, three days after the Charleston rally, a letter went out to all local unions in District 17. The first part of the letter urged the membership to get behind the UMWA sponsored legislation for a black lung compensation law. It was followed by the following paragraph:

> No doubt you are aware of the self-appointed group which is now sending letters to all local unions, not only in West Virginia but in Kentucky and Virginia, soliciting funds to pay an attorney $10,000 they have alleged to have hired to prepare a compensation bill. As working members of District 17, you are now paying an attorney to handle your legal affairs, under the compensation law, and some of the best legal minds in West Virginia had a part in preparing the UMW bill, as stated above. Therefore, your local union has no authority to donate money from the treasury, to some unknown group which, in my opinion, is dual to the UMWA, to be used for any purpose they see fit. (Reprinted in Hume, 1971, p. 122)

Although the charge of dual unionism is a serious threat, Hume says that R. R. Humphrey, the president of District 17, who wrote the letter, had waited too long to raise the charge, for the black lung activists had gone too far to be turned back. Too many miners had enlisted in the cause and as many of them put it "They can't kick us all out." The

result was only a reaffirmation on the part of the miners that their union leaders were against them (Hume, 1971, p. 124).

On Tuesday afternoon, February 18, an event occured which reflected, perhaps more than any other, the degree of dissension between the leadership and the rank and file of the union: a wildcat strike. Although the strike originally broke out in support of the efforts for black lung compensation ("East Gulf Miners Strike in Black Lung Protest," p. 1), it was not approved, supported, or sanctioned by the UMWA hierarchy. The first response of the union officials was to discipline those miners publicly involved in the protest. Most of the pressure to stop the strike, however, came from the coal industry pressuring the UMW and the U.S. District Court to do something. The U.S. District Court Judge concluded that he lacked the authority to grant an injunction against the strike under the circumstances, and the UMW took the position that since the walkout was a protest of working conditions, the union lacked authority to order its men back to work ("Injunction in Coal Strike Denied; Authority Lacking," p. 12b).

Although the initiators of the strike in West Virginia were primarily interested in the passage of black lung legislation, as the strike grew, more and more anti-Boyle sentiment emerged. According to Dr. Donald Rasmussen, one of the doctors of the Physicians Committee, the degree of anti-Boyle sentiment surprised the leaders of the movement and the Black Lung Association. Particularly in northern West Virginia, the reason for the miners coming out on strike was not primarily because of the black lung issue, because they did not have as much of a problem

with it as southern West Virginia miners. They supported the strike because they wanted to get rid of Tony Boyle (interview with Rasmussen).

In the interview, Rasmussen reflected on how stupid the UMWA leadership had been in terms of their reaction to the Black Lung Association and its efforts. If the union had showed any sign of support for their efforts, the BLA would have most likely dissolved as an organization and the union could have taken over the struggle for compensation. But for a reason which the miners were not completely aware (the ties between the UMWA and the coal industry), the union not only failed to support the activities of the Black Lung Association, but acted against the BLA, charging dual unionism, a threat that carried a lot of weight in the coal fields. The issue of black lung was, in the beginning, almost as much rejected by the union leadership as it was by the coal industry and the state legislature and the medical profession (Brittain, p. 1, and interview with Rasmussen).

It was not, however, until after the state legislature passed the compensation bill that the idea to oppose Tony Boyle, then president of the UMWA, really surfaced. Up until this time most of the efforts were primarily defensive, either to protect the dissident miners from the union's reprisals or merely to express discontent, as in the case of the northern West Virginia Miners (interview with Rasmussen). But the struggle to organize was difficult, not only because the union men would break up rallies but also because of a long standing tradition against democracy within the union, one that Robert Sherrill argues may be well founded:

> Miners are for the most part deeply loyal to the traditions of the UMW, which is a singularly monolithic union. It has never fostered democracy, and for a reason which miners are proud. When John L. Lewis and the other creators of the modern UMW began organizing, the company towns were, literally, concentration camps. To keep organizers out, the towns were often surrounded by barbed wire, with deputy sherriffs and yellow dogs at the gates. A worker needed a pass to go in and out. . . . The operators brought in Negroes, Italians, Poles to break strikes—men of different nationalities were taught to hate one another. It was a brutal nightmare situation, and to survive it, the union organizers and leaders had to dispense with the luxury of majority rule. Democracy might allow a company fink to slip in, get elected, and destroy the shaky beginning. It happened again and again. The fears and suspicions that guided the union in those days are still present, and most UMW members, if only instinctively, still respect them. (Sherrill, 1969, p. 531)

In Chapter IV, we discussed the organizational structure of the UMWA which has also helped to maintain the current administrative structure and policies. In addition we made note of the many accusations which had been leveled against the union and its leadership: bribery, misuse of funds, and conspiring with the coal operators. After the passage of the legislation in West Virginia, many dissident miners hastily put together an organization called Miners for Democracy (MFD) which ran Joseph Yablonski against Boyle in the upcoming UMWA presidential election. Although Yablonski was a relative unknown to newsmen, his candidacy was backed by Congressman Ken Hechler and Ralph Nadar, both early active supporters and advocators of the Black Lung Movement. In West Virginia, the officers of the Black Lung Association made up the campaign staff for the Yablonski campaign. However, the campaign did not succeed. More importantly, however, three weeks after Yablonski lost the election, he, his wife, and

daughter were murdered. The assassination of Yablonski had both a positive and a negative impact upon the movement to overthrow the UMW leadership and the continued existence of the Black Lung Association. The negative impact was that the BLA was forced into a very passive role by the murders. For a period of over six months, the Black Lung Association was held together by a group of five people, four miners and a miner's widow, who through press releases, made it appear as if the organization was still actively working and strong. The positive impact was that the assassinations spurred a federal investigation into both the election and to the UMWA internal affairs. According to Rasmussen, had it not been for the assassinations, there probably would not have been either a federal investigation or a turnover in the election.

Immediately following Yablonski's funeral, on the same day, more than 70 miners gathered in a ground floor classroom of the public school next door to the church. The purpose of the meeting was to form an alliance to continue fighting corruption in the United Mine Workers Union. Of particular importance was to continue a lawsuit which Yablonski had filed on December 4, 1969, to ask the return to the union treasury large sums of money allegedly withdrawn by Boyle and his associates for wrongful purposes.

On June 1, 1970, the Black Lung Association published the first edition of the Black Lung Bulletin. Because it would be another three months before the SSA would publish its first denials for black lung benefits, the BLA was not focusing on the SSA as a target group for

change, at least not yet. The lead article in the Bulletin was entitled, "The Autonomy Struggle," and it and other articles primarily focused on the fact that since the Landrum-Griffins Act was passed in 1959, which gave every union member equal rights to nominate candidates and to vote in elections, nothing had been done within the UMWA to assure this, either by the Labor Department, by Federal Court Judges, or by the union leadership. The problem was, like black lung, particularly acute in West Virginia because in the whole state, which takes in over 40,000 coal miners, there was not one single elected UMWA district official. Although the 1959 law guaranteed this right, for five years after it was passed, nothing was done. In 1964, the Labor Department brought suit against the UMWA for violation of the act, and charges that the "trusteeships" (names given by leadership to district positions) were illegal and must be replaced by the election of district officers. By 1970, the suit had still not been brought to court, and that year a federal district judge, reportedly an old friend of a UMW attorney, granted an indefinite extension to the UMW ("The Autonomy Struggle," p. 1).

On June 7, Elmer Brown, the vice presidential candidate and running mate of Yablonski, held a meeting of about 80 persons aligned with the dissident factions of the United Mine Workers. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss means of overturning the last December's union election and of enforcing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. In addition to the Miners for Democracy speakers, Dr. I. E. Buff, Dr. Donald Rasmussen, and Charles Brooks, West Virginia Black Lung Association president, also spoke.

In the second week of June, the first of a series of incidents occurred which received a lot of coverage in the Black Lung Bulletin and intensified the conflict between the union and the miners. According to a District 29 miner from Eccles, West Virginia, the following happened:

> An official from District 29 came to our local hall and told the members that the company could not force the best men to do electrical work because it was a violation of the safety law as well as the contract. Then, three days later when our belt men did refuse to do electrical work the company threatened to fire them. The District then turned around and supported the company decision. ("Eccles Local Strikes Against District 29," p. 1)

When the men came out of the mines that afternoon and learned what happened, they decided to strike against the District for double talking—for telling one thing to them and another to the coal operators and leaving a safety committee out on a limb. In a similar case in another district, a miner had filed grievances when he failed to receive his vacation pay. According to the UMW contract, he was entitled to vacation pay. However, when the grievance hearing was held, a District 17 official assigned to represent him supported an agreement between the district and the Kanawha Coal Operator's Association that resulted in his not getting his vacation pay. According to the miner, "It wasn't the idea I lost the case, what we're after is district autonomy because of the poor representation we're getting from the district" ("District Upholds Illegal Agreement," pp. 1, 4).

After the strike in District 29, the Eccles local decided to call a meeting and invite many miners from many locals in the area to discuss the districts actions. According to one member:

> It was a very interesting meeting. Miners came from 12 or 15 locals, some even came from Ohio. Many miners jumped up and spoke out against the district working with the operators against the miners. The miners from Ohio said that District 6 was run the same way. We talked about the problems of disabled miners and the new safety law. We all decided we must meet regularly to talk about the problems with the District that all locals share. We sure have a lot to talk about. ("Eccles Local Strikes Against District 29," p. 4)

In July, as the miners began talking about problems of the districts, another miner's group began putting pressure on the UMW administration: the Disabled Miners of Southern West Virginia. In a meeting at Gilbert, West Virginia, On Sunday, July 5, the Disabled Miners organization gave president Boyle until Wednesday, July 8, to move toward liberalization of the Retirement and Welfare Fund, or they would attempt to spark a national coal strike on midnight Sunday, July 12. When Boyle did not respond, Robert Payne, president of the Disabled Miners of West Virginia, and a handful of miners attempted to close down the five state Appalachian coal producing area to dramatize the dispute with the UMW over free hospital cards. The initial efforts, however, were thwarted by the coal companies who obtained temporary restraining orders by federal courts against the picketing and striking. According to Robert Payne:

> Our numbers are small and we are running into legal troubles, and if we don't get help from other groups pretty soon, we'll have nowhere to go. . . . We don't have no records, no charter, no financial support, and no advice from other groups. . . . This is against my own organization (UMW), and we have nothing against the mine operators. (quoted in "Strike Threat Nears Collapse in Appalachia," pp. 1, 2)

Slowly the dissident group picked up pledges of support. On the nineteenth day of the strike, more than 135 mines and over 16,000 miners were idle ("Strike Endures Despite Return to Few Mines," p. 1). At its

peak, the strike swelled to some 18,000 miners off work. However, by the first of August, a back to work trend began developing which eventually resulted in most mines being open by the second week of August. Elmer Brown stated that many of the mines were reopening because disabled miners who have led the walkout were unable to man picket lines because of federal court orders reported in "Mine Assumption Trend Developing," p. 1).

As the Black Lung Strike of the previous year had been unique in that the legislature, not the mine owners, was the object of attack, so this strike's uniqueness lay in the fact that it was aimed against the UMWA and its Welfare and Retirement Fund, which had denied medical and pension benefits to thousands of disabled and retired miners and their widows. The Disabled Miners strike failed in achieving its immediate objective, but according to members of the Black Lung Association, it served a dual purpose: revitalizing the miner's movement and pointing out the need for an organized and coordinated effort (BLA History, BLA files document). On September 1, 1970, the Black Lung Bulletin published an editorial that not only attacked the UMWA leadership directly but also urged the need for unity and leadership in the reform movement:

> The issues facing miners today are clearer than they ever have been: the Federal Mine Health and Safety Bill is not being enforced. Election abuses and the murder of Jock Yablonski are clear evidence that we do not have democracy within our union: grievances are sold out by union officials; and many retired or disabled miners are without compensation or medical and retirement benefits.

> The official UMW structure offers no leadership to combat these problems. Boyle doesn't lead the UMW—he sits on it. We know it, the government knows it, and the coal operators know it.
>
> So who does lead the miners? For the past few months, no one has. Groups within the reform movement have called for national strikes and action. Each has had the sympathy of the reform movement and partial rank and file support. But not one of them has had the full support of the union membership, and they have not been able to speak for us.
>
> The fact is that since Jock Yablonski was murdered the reform movement within the UMW has been without unified leadership. We have leaders, good leaders, but they have not been able to give the effective leadership we need to bring our movement together and make it stronger. ("The Need: Unity and Leadership," p. 1)

While the reform movement was organizing its forces, the administration of the UMWA was not standing idly by. On September 29, UMWA president, Tony Boyle, met with his executive board and announced that he was creating a "special" commission to investigate whether any UMWA member was formenting a "dual union." The board passed a resolution asking that an exhaustive investigation be made and directed the commission to make whatever recommendations as to what action may be necessary and desirable ("UMW Starts Investigation of Dissidents," p. 1). According to the response of the Black Lung Bulletin to the commission, "Union leaders are getting ready for a full scale witch-hunt" ("Time to Stand Up and Speak Out," p. 5).

It became obvious to the leaders of the reform movement that not only was there a need for organization within the movement and within the union, but because of the strength which the UMWA had been able to develop over the years, the miners would have to make alliances elsewhere. According to Robert Cassidy:

> What the reformers have learned since Farmington is that the union had oftened work against and . . . in collusion with coal operators, oil companies, and banking interests against the miners. They have learned that they must make political alliances outside the union. (Cassidy, p. 14)

One of the first of these alliances was an association with fifteen lawyers who called themselves the Coal Miner's Legal Defense Fund. The group's president, Richard Bank of Charleston, West Virginia, pledged support to working miners trying to make mining a safe and healthy job and to retired or disabled miners on their rightful claims to union, industry, and government benefits ("Lawyers Organize to Aid Miners," p. 2). In addition, the Miners for Democracy held a rally on November 13 in New York City to raise money to fund the reform campaign. The dissidents appealed to the city's consumers of "coal by wire"—electric power—to back reforms in the mines ("Insurgent UMW Drive Opens Slowly," p. 1). The West Virginia backers of the fund raising rally also planned a series of cocktail parties and receptions staged by well-to-do sympathizers that night. Both strategies were dismal failures. The backers had hoped to make their effort as widely known a rank and file protest movement as the California grape picker's movement, which drew national support for a boycott of nonunion table grapes and eventually forced a settlement favorable to the West Coast field workers ("Insurgent UMW Drive Opens Slowly," p. 1).

In addition to acquiring funds for the general reform movement, some of the money was to be used specifically in an upcoming election which would be the first major test of the strength of the reform movement. On December 8, 1970, there would be an election in District 5

for president, the only district in the whole UMWA which allowed the district to elect its own officers. It was also the district which was formerly headed by the late Joseph Yablonski. At the rally in New York City on November 13, Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski, the murdered official's son, charged that the UMW was pouring hundreds of thousands of dollars into the Pittsburgh area campaign of Michael Budzanoski to win reelection ("Insurgent UMW Drive Opens Slowly," p. 1). Budzanoski was a 54 year old incumbent president of District 5 and a tough and voluable loyalist of W. A. Tony Boyle. The district represented some 14,000 members of the 100,000 or so in the international UMWA. According to Ben A Franklin of the New York Times, the election was the first opportunity since the death of Yablonski for the dissidents to express through the ballot box their sentiments on the Boyle regime ("Smear"?, p. 1). For the first time in the union's 90 year history, however, rank and file voters in a district election were allowed to case absentee ballots. And this was important because these absentee ballots were to be the decisive votes in the hotly contested election. The Miners for Democracy had asked the court to block the use of absentee ballots but the court refused. When the regular votes were in, Louis Antal, the candidate of the reformist groups, held a 514 vote lead. Still untabulated, however, were 1200 absentee ballots cast by retired miners drawing the union's 150 dollar a month pension. On December 10, 1970, the Wall Street Journal reported that the dissident UMWA group seemed to have won an important election victory in a key district. The results were expected to have far reaching implications for the miner's union and for the coal industry,

which had to bargain over a new contract the next year. The coal industry responded that this would give the dissidents a power base, and a place to speak their demands as well as encourage other anti-Boyle miners elsewhere ("Dissident UMW Group Seems to Have Won Important Election Victory in Key District," p. F12). However, because of charges of election balloting by the dissident miners, who had stationed over 100 college students at the polls, the Labor Department seized the absentee ballots to make a complete laboratory investigation of them. On February 20, 1971, the Labor Department confirmed that there had been irregularities in the voting but said that at most 165 of the 1,224 ballots were possibly questionable. In March the ballots were returned to the election tellers for them to make the decision. However, because of the alleged voting irregularities, two of the three tellers, both admittedly Budzanoski supporters, purged the votes of some 1,400 miners in three key locals. Together with the disqualification of the 1,200 absentee ballots, the two tellers declared Budzanski the winner. The third teller, an opposition candidate himself, quit the board after the other two agreed to the purge. When word of the purge got out, miners by the hundreds stormed district headquarters in downtown Pittsburgh, demanding their votes be reinstated (Graham, p. 1).

The delay by the Labor Department's investigation, however, only contributed to the growing sentiment of the dissident miners and to the strength of their numbers. On February 23, more than 450 miners from three states went to Washington to lobby for help in the fight to reform the United Mine Workers of America. According to the Black Lung

Bulletin, Miners for Democracy led the lobbying effort, hoping it would force the government to begin pressing the autonomy suit against the UMW leadership that was first filed by the Justice Department more than six years before ("Special Report: Miners in Washington," p. 1). After the miners finished their lobbying operation, which was organized practically overnight, the miners expressed the opinion that perhaps the only action which would result in success would be another strike. At an afternoon press conference, the miners made it clear that they "were not about to yield to an obstinate union leadership or a government dedicated to standing pat ("Special Report: Miners in Washington," p. 2).

As usual, the lobbying tactics of the miners were not traditional. According to Joe Mulloy of the Southern Patriot:

> Wandering through the halls of the Rayburn Building for a day with these men, one is impressed not only with their physical strength and their self-confidence, but with the humorous candor with which they go about their fruitless task of buttonholing Congressmen. Unscrewing lightbulbs, plucking imported cigars from a Congressman's private stock, and tangling with the Capitol police over noontime cafeteria privileges [and winning]—are but a few illustrations of the fact that these men belong to no one but themselves and each other. (Mulloy, p. 6)

Although the miners were stood up by several legislators, and it appeared as if the effort was unsuccessful, the miners were not discouraged. They had gone too far to turn back now. The next move was left to the government. In April, it came, but not from the legislature. On Tuesday, April 2, 1971, the federal government brough 13 indictments against UMWA president, Tony Boyle, charging him with embezzling UMW

funds and funneling $49,250 illegally to 11 political campaign committees. Also indicted for activities carried out between 1966 and 1969 were two other top UMW officials, secretary-treasurer John Owens and John Kentz, director of the Labor's Nonpartisan League, the union political arm. Officials of the union responded by charging government harrassment and blaming the charges on the dissident miner factions "who were trying to destroy the union" ("UMW Critics Say 'We Told You So,'" p. 1). The main dissident faction in the union, the MFD, praised the government's action and asked that more steps be taken.

In another action, the federal government again added support to the actions of the reform movement. Earlier in March, the Miners for Democracy had filed a federal court suit seeking to force the United Mine Workers to recognize MFD as a legitimate body within the union and to drop charges against its members for "dual unionism" ("Miners for Democracy Sue for Role in Parent UMWA," pp. 1, 6). On April 18, 1971, a federal judge ordered UMWA District 5 to call off "trials" of nine dissident union members charged with questionable and dishonest election practices. U.S. District Judge, Gerald J. Weber, held that the union regulation permitting such charges and hearings could have no other effect but to suppress the free exercise of criticism and electioneering. The defendants in the illegal trials were members of the Miners for Democracy.

The reform movement was not as successful, however, with the Labor Department when it requested Labor Secretary, James D. Hodgson, to impose a monitorship over union affairs until new leadership could

be elected ("Anti-Boyle Factions Bids for Monitor," pp. 1, 8). However, the Labor Department rejected the request on the grounds that the department had no legal authority to appoint a monitor in the period during which the election was being investigated, because the Landrum-Griffin Act says explicitly that existing officers remain in charge of the union until the question is resolved ("U.S. Rejects Requests for UMW Monitor," p. 1). In addition, the Labor Department postponed the trial date of the government's suit seeking to nullify the 1969 election from early June, as originally scheduled, until September 12 ("Boyle Suit Postponed," p. 1).

The month of September, however, brought, in addition to the trial, the most crucial test of the ability of the UMW hierarchy to hold onto its power and control the union membership: the contract negotiations with the coal industry. The coal industry feared that Boyle had lost control over the membership and that he would make a set of fruitless and unrealistic demands, more to prove his strength within the union than to beat down the coal operators ("Coal Operators Fear Automatic Walkouts," p. 1). The reform movement was gaining more strength and the three groups: the Black Lung Association, the Miners for Democracy, and the Disabled Miners and Widows of West Virginia, had been meeting across the coal fields to discuss their needs and what they wanted in their contract. They presented a list of demands to Boyle, most important of which was rank and file ratification of the contract ("Miners Make Demands," p. 1). On September 30, 1971, the UMWA contract negotiated in 1968 expired. Because there was little or no progress in the negotiations

between Boyle and the coal operators, a walkout was staged. By the middle of October, the walkout had idled more than 100,000 workers, nearly 40,000 in West Virginia, which included almost all of the mines. However, Boyle would not officially declare the walkout a strike and therefore, the miners could not collect strike benefits from the UMW treasury. The Black Lung Association and the Miners for Democracy threatened to stage a strike benefits protest in Washington if Boyle did not declare the walkout a strike. Later, he did declare it officially a strike and promised strike benefits. However, the dissident miners were not convinced that Boyle would bring back an acceptable contract. On October 24 and 25, the three dissident miners groups, the BLA, the MFD, and the Disabled Miners and Widows, sponsored a collective planning meeting to discuss possible action if Tony Boyle brought back an unacceptable contract. The atmosphere at the meeting was such that if the three groups did not plan together they would hang separately (BLA Files, Handout, October 18, 1971). At the meeting, more than 40 key persons from 11 eastern Districts, two-thirds of whom were active miners, were in attendance. The delegates to the policy meeting decided unanimously that if their demands were not met, they would see that no coal was mined in the United States, even if the union policy committee accepted the contract. The following statement appeared as testimony to the new alliance against the Boyle regime:

> The United Mine Workers of America has for too long ignored the plight of its forgotten people—the disabled miner, the retired miner, and the widow and the dependent child.
>
> The United Mine Workers of America has for too long been insensitive to the demands of the working miner for better

> safety conditions, better health conditions, better overall working conditions.
>
> The United Mine Workers of America is guilty of neglect of the people who helped make it strong and who make us its strength today.
>
> The United Mine Workers of America is our union—and we are being victimized by it. That is why our three groups—Miners for Democracy, Disabled Miners and Widows of Southern West Virginia, and the Black Lung Association—are now joining in an effort to fight for the rights of the working miner and the forgotten people of the UMWA.
>
> It is time for the union leadership to hear our demands. It is time that control of the union be returned to the people it belongs to. It is time to reform in our union. (BLA files, Black Lung Newsletter, November 1, 1971, p. 2)

The strength of these groups combined was effective. In early November, the UMW leadership came out of the negotiations with a new contract but the miners refused to work under it and continued their strike. The union tried to force the men back to the mines by withholding the promised strike benefits. Faced with this threat and court injunctions against the continuation of the strike, the miners reluctantly returned to work. But the experience left a strong negative sentiment among many miners who knew that the union leadership had sold them out ("1971 in Review," p. 4). It became clear to many miners, in addition to the original reform groups, that a change in the leadership of the union was inevitable.

The first half of 1972 was relatively uneventful for the Black Lung Association and the reform groups as far as their struggle with the union was concerned. Most of the BLA efforts were focused on the Social Security Administration and the passage of the 1972 amendments to the FCMHSA of 1969. In the spring, however, many of the dissident miners decided that the best way to effect changes was to seek a new

avenue for power and influence, the state legislature. Of particular importance was the campaign of Arnold Miller, former president of the Black Lung Association, who ran for the House of Delegates in Kanawha County, West Virginia. Although Miller was defeated, it helped to publicize his name in the state. And more importantly, during the same month, the Black Lung Association was informed that the months and months of struggles with the union, the legislature, the courts, and the Department of Labor had paid off. In May, 1972, Federal Court Judge William B. Bryant overthrew the UMW election of Tony Boyle and ordered a new election for December 1-8, to be carried out under strict Labor Department supervision (Vecsey, p. 10).

CHAPTER VII

OUTCOME

Rush and Denisoff (1971) suggest that a social movement ends either because its goals are not attained or, paradoxically, because they are. If the goals are attained, the social movement organization becomes a part of the established normative and valuative order. If the social movement is unsuccessful, then its goals are so far removed from those of the society that it probably will cease to exist for lack of support (p. 367). The outcome of a social movement and the transformation of the social movement organization are very much dependent upon either the success or failure of the MO to do this. In this chapter, the outcome of the confrontations between the Black Lung Association and its three main target groups—the West Virginia Legislature, the Social Security Administration, and the United Mine Workers of America—will be presented. In addition, we will look at the transformation of the Black Lung Association as a social movement organization as each of these confrontations comes to an end, and the role which the BLA plays in the society some seven years after it came into existence. Thirdly, we will look at some of the other changes which this movement and the movement organization brought about, many in addition to those which it originally planned for.

I. THE PASSAGE OF A COMPENSATION BILL IN WEST VIRGINIA

As was related in the previous chapter, the atmosphere of the last week of the 59th session of the West Virginia State Legislature was, as with most last weeks before, fast paced, frustrating, and sometimes confusing. A number of organized groups had come to the legislative session this year to lobby in mass for various pieces of legislation. Only one of these was the Black Lung Association, though it was by far the largest of those groups in attendance and received most of the newspaper and television coverage. The first definitive action taken by the legislature occurred on Wednesday, February 26, 1969, when the House Judiciary Committee reported to the Floor of the House of Delegates a bill that, according to the Charleston Gazette, "comes closer to meeting the demands of the coal miners than it does to meeting the objections of coal companies" ("Black Lung Close to Demands," p. 1). The reaction by the coal industry was predictable. Stephen Young, vice president of the West Virginia Coal Association, said that bill was not workman's compensation but "social legislation": "What started out to be a bill to compensate miners for black lung has, in fact, become a signed blank check for the miners to be compensated by the industry on or before retirement, not just for pneumoconiosis, but for every other conceivable respiratory ailment" ("Black Lung Bill Close to Demands," p. 1). The reaction of members of the Black Lung Association, however, was just as negative. According to a statement issued by Paul Kaufman, lawyer for the miner's group, "By mistake,

mischief, or malice, the House of Delegates Judiciary Committee has recommended a workman's compensation bill which does justice only to the West Virginia Coal Association" (p. 2). The real problem, according to the BLA, is the fact that the bill does not stress the use of other tests than the x-ray for diagnosing the disease. The coal companies and the majority of medical testimony had taken the opinion that while x-rays are inexact they are the best tool available in diagnosing lung ailments and must be used (p. 2). Two days later, however, the West Virginia House passed, 95-0, a bill which was extensively revised from the one brought out of committee, mostly in favor of the miner. The Black Lung Association saw it as a considerable improvement (Black Lung Passes House," p. 1, 8). The press, however, was not so favorable, particularly with regard to the manner in which the bill was passed:

> . . . It would take a lot of argument to persuade any dispassionate observer that the House of Delegates acted responsibly, even rationally, in the manner in which it amended and passed the black lung bill last Friday. Quite obviously the House members bowed to pressure—highly organized pressure—and many voted not what they felt was right or reasonable but what they felt compelled to vote. ("Lobbying with Club Harmful to Both Sides," p. 4)

The editorial suggests that the House operated in a state of panic, with thousands of miners on a wildcat strike throughout the state and hundreds milling about the Capitol and legislative halls, the implicit threat of violence ever present (p. 4). In addition, Chairman Watson said that he and his committee had been "taunted and badgered on all sides" and that the actions of the miners had "gone far beyond the conduct which [could]

be tolerated" (Marsh, February 28, 1969, p. 1). Watson also charged that Congressman Hechler and Dr. I. E. Buff had made statements during television interviews designed "to create pressure on this legislature" (p. 1).

Others, however, felt that the fact that the House had passed a bill at all was somewhat a novelty. According to Don Marsh, a reporter for the Charleston Gazette:

> In many ways the House action Friday was incredible. A year ago, when the black lung movement started picking up strength, the odds would have been that the most the legislature would do would be call for a year's study of the problem. (Marsh, March 1, 1969, p. 1)

Amidst charges of galloping socialism, a pressured legislature, and disbelief among others, the House version of the bill went to the Senate. When the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out the black lung bill on Monday, March 3, it carried the House title but was a senate version developed the previous week. On March 5, the bill was defeated by a vote of 28-5, but in what Denman refers to as a tension charged atmosphere with about 400 miners packed in the Senate Galleries (pp. 170-171), the final voting resulted in a 34-0 decision on a rewritten bill. According to the Charleston Gazette, the changes from the House version—inclusion of x-ray as diagnostic evidence and a rewritten presumption clause—were viewed as a major defeat for the Black Lung Association.

Because the House would not accept the Senate's version, a conference committee of five representatives from the House and the Senate began to work on March 6, the fifty-eighth day of the sixty day

session. On the fifty-ninth day, there was not much progress, and the tension among the miners began to mount. According to Hume (1971), the last day of the session was hectic for the conference committee. Early in the day it seemed that an agreement had been reached, but the Senate conferees had attempted to slip in a definition of pneumoconiosis that appeared to satisfy the House members, who only later found that it didn't. Because the Senators had been caught in an attempted deception, the House was given a psychological edge. However, very little progress was made until Saturday evening when Delegate Cleo Jones, a two term Republican from Kanawha County, threatened the Senate conferees with an additional special session. According to Hume:

> At this point, no one could be certain what the consequences would be if the legislature failed to act. Every mine in the state was closed and there had been no sign that the forty-three thousand miners were weakening in their resolve. The coal association was claiming that the strike had already put a number of smaller companies out of business. It seemed possible that, if there was no bill, the strike might continue indefinitely. (p. 150)

According to Denman (1974, p. 172) the tactic worked. The Senate conferees agreed to a compromise, and the conference committee reported its conclusions to both Houses. The legislature approved the black lung bill late Saturday night, only nine minutes before a mandatory end of the annual session (Jackson, p. 1).

The attitude of the coal miners and the Black Lung Association was that, although they did not get everything they were after and were not entirely satisfied, they would accept it and come back in the summer to fight for changes in the upcoming special session (Jackson,

p. 1). However, they did remain on strike until the following Tuesday, in order to make sure that Governor Moore signed the bill. It was felt by one of the members of the Physicians Committee, Dr. I. E. Buff, that there would be a special session in the next three months which would correct the deficiencies of the bill. Congressman Hechler, however, said that the big battle for the Black Lung Association was farther ahead with the need for a tough coal mine health and safety law to be passed by the national Congress. Because the UMWA had fought the coal miners during their battle in West Virginia, Hechler also suggested that it was time that the United Mine Workers Union be made truly representative of the needs of the individual coal miner ("Black Lung Okay Seen First Step," p. 26). The Black Lung Association, then, did not dissolve after it achieved its initial goals. On the contrary, the accomplishment of these goals revealed other problems that the BLA members identified as compatible with their organization, and they set out to solve them.

II. THE PASSAGE OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE 1969 FCMHSA

The Black Lung Association directed its efforts in the first part of 1969 to both the UMWA and the Federal Congress. However, in December, 1969, two events occurred which resulted in the Black Lung Association coming close to truncation: the assassination of Joseph Yablonski, the dissident miners candidate for the new president of the UMWA, and the passage of the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. In the case of Yablonski's defeat and subsequent assassination,

the movement had failed to accomplish its goals and the established order responded with a violent attack. The result was that the movement was forced to withdraw further actions. In the case of passage of the 1969 FCMHSA, the movement had accomplished one of its goals, and, at least for the time being, the movement organization was not needed. For the next six months the Black Lung Association was relatively inactive. In the summer of 1970, the Disabled Miners and Widows strike against the UMWA revitalized the BLA and early in the fall, the first denials from the Social Security Administration resulted in the Black Lung Association beginning the struggle for the passage of amendments to the 1969 law. As reported in Chapter VI, the Black Lung Association was successful in not only obtaining passage of the amendments in 1972 but also forced the Social Security Administration to allow participation by members of the BLA in the writing up of regulations from the amendments. This was considered to be a major victory for the Black Lung Association by the Black Lung Bulletin ("BLA vs. SSA," p. 1) and by Mountain, Life and Work ("Black Lung Association Wins Major Battle," p. 21). However, although it appeared as if the Black Lung Association had accomplished all it could with regard to the Black Lung Program, the new regulations were regarded as "only a small improvement over the former set of rules" ("The New B.L. Regs," p. 1). Twelve BLA members and 2 lawyers and a doctor had flown to Washington, D.C. on August 19 and 18 at SSA's expense to present their changes in the regulations to Bernard Popick of the SSA's Bureau of Disability Insurance. The meeting lasted for seven hours. On Tuesday, August 22,

the BLA delegation met for another "stormy" eight hours in Charleston, with BLA chapters from West Virginia and Kentucky picketing outside. The BLA delegation said that whether the regulations were going to be positive or not would depend on whether Popick kept his promises ("BLA vs. SSA," p. 4). Unfortunately, after three months of struggle and work by the Black Lung Association, the new regulations, according to the Black Lung Bulletin, ignored the wishes of Congress in order to run the Black Lung program its own way ("The New B. L. Regs," p. 6).

This established a pattern for the Black Lung Association to become a permanent organization. Up until this point the members and leaders of the BLA had assumed that there would be a definite terminating point for the organization and its activities. It had been thought that a good black lung program could be established that would not require constant pressure in order to be administered. However, the inability of even Congressional action to alter the basic problems in the program indicated that the battle between the Black Lung Association and the Social Security Administration was to be an ongoing struggle with no definitive ending point, except perhaps July 1, 1973. On this date, the Department of Labor would take over the handling of Federal Black Lung Claims. According to the Black Lung Bulletin, in a special edition published in February, 1974, this would mark a big setback for the coal miner, and for all that the Black Lung Association had won so far:

> For one reason, a miner will have to go through an adversary proceeding which means his representative will have to argue with a coal company lawyer before a judge. Under Social

> Security, a miner and his representative presented his case before a judge. There was no coal company lawyer there. Under the Labor Department, coal companies have the right to send the miner to their doctors. Coal companies do not have this right under Social Security. All this boils down to making it harder for miners and widows to get Black Lung benefits. ("Black Lung Benefits Attacked," p. 1)

The Labor Department would only be a temporary agency for the handling of Black Lung Benefits. The law only provided that it handle claims until 1981. State Workman's Compensation departments were supposed to take over the program before 1981. For the Black Lung Association, however, it didn't really make any difference who was running the program, the organization would still be needed to protect the miner's interest:

> Whether it's the Labor Department, Social Security, or the State of West Virginia, without a continuing fight against abuses and a continuing fight for immediate compensation, miners who are now working won't have black lung benefits when they quit or are forced to quit work. ("Black Lung Benefits Attacked," p. 1)

When this researcher was last with the Black Lung Association in 1974, the organization was still thriving and in confrontation with the Labor Department. The responsibility for the Black Lung program was passed to the Department of Labor during my stay with the BLA. The Black Lung Association did not try and stop the change over from the Social Security Administration to the Labor Department, but fought for a say in the new regulations ("Black Lung Benefits: Miners Make Demands," p. 28). A major difference in the battle in 1973 and 1974 and today, however, is that the Black Lung Association lost a major enemy and at the same time gained a new ally—the United Mine Workers of America.

III. THE OVERTHROW OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UMWA

On the week the election of Tony Boyle was overturned, the Miners for Democracy held a steering committee meeting and established plans for a coalfield wide convention to be held in Wheeling, West Virginia on May 27 to select nominees for the election. Even within this convention, the dissident miners opened it to all UMW members and the candidates were selected by a weighted delegate vote system. According to Mike Trobovich, "We feel that the process of selecting our candidates is as important as the ultimate outcome. . . . If Miners for Democracy isn't democratic, then we would be as bad as what we are trying to replace. Our candidates are going to be selected in an open convention—not in smoke filled rooms" (reported in Stillman, 1972, p. 26).

According to Don Stillman, editor of Miner's Voice, a dissident miner's publication, the media and some liberals felt that the reform movement did not have any real leaders:

> They appear to be searching for the same type of flashy, well dressed labor bureaucrat with a rose in his lapel that the rank and file is so dissatisfied with. Arnold Miller, Mike Trobovich, Karl Kafton, Harry Patrick, Lou Antal, Ed Monborne, Tom Pysell and a host of others are names familiar in the coalfields—they are coal miners who travelled and campaigned with Yablonski. The rank and file in the UMW wants leaders who understand what working in the pit means. Because it is a legitimate reform movement composed of working miners, the money and the time to travel have hurt MFD some. But there is no lack of leadership at the top of the movement. (Stillman, 1972, pp. 28-29)

The convention in Wheeling, however, not only picked three strong candidates, but wrote a platform which, among other things, called for

the UMWA international headquarters to be moved from Washington, D.C. back to the coalfields. The candidate for president was Arnold Miller, one of the first president's of the Black Lung Association. For vice president, Mike Trobovich, the president of Miners for Democracy, was nominated. And for secretary-treasurer, Harry Patrick, a strong supporter of the Yablonski campaign, was chosen. The nomination, however, did not assure the MFD trio that they would get the necessary support to run against Boyle. They had to obtain nominations in at least 50 districts in order to be placed on the ballot. The strategy of campaigning was rather low-keyed. The trio traveled to bath houses and area meetings emphasizing the need for adequate sick pay, changes in the pension rules, and the return of hospital cards ("UMW Election Kickoff," p. 4). As of August 20, the reform group had picked up 317 local union nominations, a show of strength that even surprised the candidates ("Miller Ticket Rolling," p. 4).

The campaign of Tony Boyle was limited by the fact that he still had to handle his duties with the union and by the number of court appearances he was required to make to answer the indictments against him. His attack, however, was quite direct and reflected the same sentiments of other years since the original Black Lung battle in 1969. His campaign was aimed at what Boyle called "outsiders": "hippies, scabs, rich foundations, and slick suave lawyers" (McFeatters, November 20, 1972, p. 1). The real object of attack by the MFD, according to Boyle was not Boyle himself but the union:

> The Outsiders are trying to take over your union, Boyle told his members, noting that Hitler started out by destroying the leaders of labor organizations. ("Boyle's Campaign Aimed at Outsiders,: p. 1)

The other members of the Boyle slate used similar tactics, pegging the "outsiders" as crpto-communists and quasi-fascicts, bloodsucking leeches, copperheads and rattlesnakes" (McFeatters, November 25, 1972, p. 1). But the reform candidates built their campaign on disclosures about the Boyle hierarchy which was dissimenated by an abundance of literature, much of which consisted of reprints from court and congressional investigations into the UMW's leadership. Although the reform group appeared to be doing extremely well all through the campaign, the climax of the effort came when Josephine Roche, longtime confidant of the union's late president and patron saint, John L. Lewis, endorsed MFD candidated Arnold Miller and contributed $1,000 to his campaign. On December 22, 1972, William B. Bryant, a federal judge, declared that Arnold Miller, who only the day before was a retired miner collecting a pension of $150 a month, was the new president of the UMWA, which is accompanied by a salary of $50,000 a year. He won by a vote of 70,373 to 56,334 (McFeatters, December 16, 1972, p. 1). Miller's first move was to fire the two top officials of the old regime and to sack the old executive board by ousting 20 of its 24 members and replacing them with thirteen interim appointees. In his acceptance speech, he reiterated his three campaign promises: (1) to run the union from the coal fields, (2) to make the coal operators face up to the problems of the industry, and (3) to return democracy to the union (McFeatters, December 23, 1972, p. 1).

IV. A COMPARISON OF THE THREE CONFRONTATIONS

The confrontations between the Black Lung Association and the West Virginia State Legislature, the SSA, and the UMWA all resulted in some measure of success for the Black Lung Association. There were several notable similarities and differences in each confrontation. In the first place, all three target groups were well established organizations. They had developed organizational structures, institutional norms, and established procedures for dealing with problems which occurred. In the second place, the Black Lung Association presented to each of these organizations a problem situation which was relatively new and could not be handled in the traditional manner. In the West Virginia State Legislature, the lobbying activities and the strike of the West Virginia miners presented a new form of pressure to which the legislature bowed to, or at least responded to. The Social Security Administration was not used to its clients being so well organized, nor had it experienced such organized citizen feedback to its programs. The picketing of local SSA district offices, and the miners ability to pressure both the HEW and Congress into action was also a relatively unusual phenomenon. To some extent, the same was true with the struggle in the union. The UMW hierarchy had maintained such a dictatorial control over the mining population that the Black Lung Association and the Miners for Democracy had to resort to making alliances outside the union in order to gather up enough power and support to overthrow the regime. Of particular importance here, in

addition to Congressman Hechler and Ralph Nadar, was Joseph L. Raul, a liberal northern attorney, who is said to have masterminded the ousting of Tony Boyle (McFeatters, December 22, 1972, p. 1).

In addition to the organization of the target groups, and the tactics and strategies of the Black Lung Association, another similarity in each confrontation would perhaps best be identified as the unusual structure of the Black Lung Association itself. Chapter V has already shown evidence to indicate that the grass roots character of the BLA tended to be frustrating to the opposition groups, which help to contribute to the success of the BLA.

Although there were several important similarities, there were also some important differences. First, although the target groups had established patterns of operation and somewhat institutionalized structures, they were not all the same. The West Virginia State Legislature was an organization with a high turnover in membership, which operated under the limitations of temporal and political pressure. Its purpose was to create something new—legislation—rather than to maintain a status quo. The Social Security Administration, however, was a definite bureaucracy, with decisions made many times according to effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, it had a very definite set of procedures by which to do its work. The problem with the SSA was not identified as a problem of people, necessarily, but a problem created and maintained by a bureaucratic structure. The United Mine Workers, on the other hand, although a very complex organization, would not be characterized as a strict bureaucracy, but more of an aristocracy

or dictatorship. Decisions were not made on the basis of efficiency or effectiveness, but on the basis of what was best to maintain the present system of relationships, because they were favorable to the status quo. The tactics which were required to influence these target groups were a function of these differences.

Secondly, what the Black Lung Association was attempting to do in relation to each target group was different. In the case of the West Virginia State Legislature, the Black Lung Association was attempting to influence the legislature to pass a bill favorable to the miners. In the case of the SSA, the Black Lung Association was attempting to force the Social Security Administration to administer a law which had already been passed, but which had given SSA a great deal of leeway in the interpretation of how the law would be implemented. And, the Black Lung Association was attempting to reform the UMWA, although this involved a turnover in the administration.

Thirdly, the relation of the social movement organization to its target group was also different. By being in a position of voters and by the power of a strike, the miners were in a potentially powerful position, if organized, in relation to the West Virginia State Legislature. Legally, the Black Lung Association had no power over the SSA, which is an appointed governmental body. However, the public protest was quite effective in influencing the SSA to action, and the lobbying in Congress was even more effective. The relation between the BLA and the UMWA was more unique, in that the social movement organization was internal to the target group, and was, to some extent, in conflict with it from the beginning.

Although it is obvious from the available data that the Black Lung Association did accomplish, at least to some degree, its three main goals, several complications exist in making a statement of this type. First, the goals themselves are stated rather vaguely, and whether they were attained or not is perhaps a valuative question. Secondly, is a measure of goal accomplishment dependent upon the statements of the movement organization leaders themselves or should more objective criteria be used, i.e., actual changes in the social environment, and how should these be measured? Finally, to what extent are the actual changes in the environment a function of the activities of the movement organization solely (independent of other groups) and to what degree are changes in the environment brought about in addition to those established as "goals" of the social movement organization?

The first goal of the Black Lung Association—to make coal mining a safe and healthy occupation—perhaps had the lowest priority of the three major goals, at least according to definitive actions taken. Although the Black Lung Association released many statements critical of the Bureau of Mines and the coal operators for mine safety violations, the Association did not get involved in a definite confrontation with either the Bureau of Mines or the coal companies to the degree that it did with the SSA and the UMWA. Congressman Ken Hechler, an early advocate and supporter of the Black Lung Association, however, did become involved in the fight for safety in the mines. And with the support of the Black Lung Association, there were at least two evident results: (1) after constant attacks on the Bureau of Mines, it finally

awarded a $5.9 million contract to develop coal mining systems that could reduce major underground safety hazards. In addition, another measure of "success" came in 1973, when the UMWA reported that, after several years of increasing fatalities, the death rate in mines was down more than 30 percent compared to the year before (Stillman, 1975, p. 4).

The second goal—to improve the administration of all benefits programs for coal miners and to work for their improvement—was perhaps the major goal of the revitalized Black Lung Association after the implementation of the 1969 FCMHSA. The BLA's success, however, against the Social Security Administration, must be measured in several ways. Although the leaders of the Black Lung Association reported that the 1972 amendments and the regulations were only a small improvement over the original program, there is some evidence to suggest that the results, in terms of benefits to miners, were quite drastic. Initial estimates of the cost of the Black Lung Program ranged from 32 million dollars to 380 million dollars a year ("Black Lung Boondoggle," p. 58). And in 1969, the Congress expected that the Black Lung Program would aid approximately 50,000 miners and widows. As of June, 1974, however, the Black Lung Program was administering benefits to over 480,000 miners, widows, and children, with a combined total on monthly benefits of over 66 million dollars ("Black Lung Benefits to Miners," p. 66). A great deal of this increase was due to the passage of the 1972 amendments. Figure 1 shows that in the month of December, 1972, when the new regulations went into effect, that the total number of beneficiaries



Figure 1. National black lung payments/month, May 1971-June 1974

Source: Figures compiled from several issues of Social Security Bulletin.

increased by almost 30,000, more benefits awarded than had been awarded the whole previous six months.

The Social Security Administration publishes monthly the number of benefit awards in all of its programs. By comparing the increase or decrease in benefits in those states in which the Black Lung Association is active, we can get some evidence to indicate what impact the activities of the Black Lung Association had on the administration of the program. Table I shows the number of beneficiaries per state per year for three major coal producing states: Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky. These states were chosen because they represent the two states in which the Black Lung Association was most active, West Virginia and Kentucky, and the state which was accused of receiving the highest benefits, Pennsylvania, and where the Black Lung Association did not have a chapter. Although this table represents only one way to look at the differences between the states, the data does indicate that the states in which the percentage of beneficiaries increased the most. Between December, 1970, and September, 1973, the peak of the activities of the Black Lung Association against the Social Security Administration, the percentage increase of beneficiaries for Pennsylvania was only 230 percent. In West Virginia, the percentage increase was 384 percent and in Kentucky the increase was 575 percent.

Table II also gives some evidence to suggest that the Black Lung Association was effective in those states in which it was most operative. The data reveal that as of 1971, Kentucky and West Virginia, the states with the most BLA members, led in the percentage of those

TABLE I

BLACK LUNG BENEFICIARIES IN THREE MAJOR COAL PRODUCING STATES
DECEMBER 1970-SEPTEMBER 1973

State	Dec. 1970	Dec. 1971	June 1972	Dec. 1972	March 1973	Sept. 1973	Percent Increase from Dec. 1970 to Sept. 1973
Pennsylvania	57,076	93,786	94,431	106,321	118,004	131,648	230%
West Virginia	20,082	45,117	48,397	57,728	69,867	77,167	384%
Kentucky	7,597	19,502	21,712	27,745	38,049	43,712	575%

Source: Compiled from figures provided by several issues of the Social Security Bulletin.

TABLE II

BLACK LUNG FACTS

	Nat'l	Ala.	Ky.	Ohio	Pa.	Tenn.	Va.	W.Va.
Number of Applicants	329,553	17,943	35,918	15,420	104,147	11,051	18,696	62,597
Number of Cases Processed	307,521	16,918	33,337	13,961	98,201	10,229	17,767	58,428
Number of Claims Allowed on Initial Application	151,092	6,426	10,671	6,000	67,341	4,204	6,707	26,329
Percentage of Claims Allowed on Initial Application	49%	38%	32%	36%	70%	41%	38%	45%
Number of Reconsiderations Requested	83,816	5,383	16,669	2,630	16,845	4,445	4,341	22,165
Number of Reconsiderations Processed	35,631	2,830	6,097	1,178	8,469	1,539	1,898	7,838
Number of Reversals Upon Reconsideration (Cases Won)	6,742	450	811	183	2,205	257	375	1,316
Amount Being Paid to Claimants Monthly (By $1,000)	26,705	1,200	1,974	884	11,273	802	1,295	5,012

Statistics as of October 15, 1971, show that nationally about half of applicants for Black Lung benefits are winning—49 percent on initial application and so far, 2 percent more on reconsideration. Only one in five reconsiderations has turned out in favor of the applicant.

Of the tiny handful of hearings that have been held, only one in twenty has ended in a positive ruling! A great backlog of hearings is building up—some claims may take years to process.

TABLE II (continued)

If the Perkins amendments are passed by the Senate, many men who were turned down because of a negative X-ray may be able to reopen their cases. Also, if Congress indicates strong support for the program, perhaps Social Security will start judging claims more fairly.

Pennsylvania continues to have a much higher percentage of benefit awards than the other states. Also, Pennsylvania has the highest percentage of reconsiderations in favor of the applicant—twice as high as West Virginia. This indicate that Social Security officials in these states are under the heel of the coal company, just like the doctors.

A positive note: Kentucky and West Virginia, the states with the most BLA members, lead in percentage of those denied who demand the right of reconsideration, with about 70 percent. This compares with about 55 percent in Pennsylvania and less than half in other states.

Source: Black Lung Bulletin, June, 1971, p. 3.

denied who demanded the right of reconsideration, with about 70 percent each. This compares with about 55 percent in Pennsylvania and less than half in other states.

Another way of looking at changes in the administration of the program by the Social Security Administration which might have been affected by the efforts of the Black Lung Association is to note changes in the approval rates of the three states. It has already been stated in Chapter V that one of the major reasons for the revival of the Black Lung Association was the fact that Pennsylvania had a much higher approval rate than did the states of West Virginia and Kentucky. The approval rate for Pennsylvania was 67.4 percent of those claims processed while the West Virginia approval rate was 45 percent and for Kentucky, 32.2 percent (Achievements, Problems, and Costs in Paying Black Lung Benefits to Coal Miners and Their Widows, September 5, 1972, p. 18). These data were given as of December 1, 1971. In January, 1973, Bureau of Disability Insurance Figures show the following distribution for the states of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Kentucky (Table III):

TABLE III

COMPARISON OF BLACK LUNG CLAIMS IN NATION'S THREE LARGEST COAL PRODUCING STATES, JANUARY, 1973

	Claims Filed	Claims Paid	Approval Rate
Kentucky	46,400	18,900	41.3%
West Virginia	82,300	39,400	47.4%
Pennsylvania	133,000	85,400	64.2%
National	367,752	193,836	52.8%

Source: Bureau of Disability, quoted in Ashley, 1973, p. 14.

The data reveal that there was an increase in the overall percentage of claims approved in Kentucky from 32.2 percent to 41.3 percent, in West Virginia from 45 percent to 47 percent, and a drop in the percentage of those approved in Pennsylvania from 67.7 percent to 64.2 percent, with the national average increasing slightly over 49.5 percent to 52.8 percent. Social Security officials administering the program attribute Kentucky's growing approval rate to the passage on the new Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (Ashley, p. 14). Whether the end result is solely the effect of the 1972 amendments or to the activities of the BLA in Kentucky and West Virginia is debatable, although both came about as a function of the BLA.

Although the above statistics are perhaps the most obvious indication of the success of the BLA, there is also some evidence to suggest that the BLA was also effective in altering the administrative apparatus of the SSA. In an interview with Popick, head of the Black Lung Program, and one of his lawyers, they revealed that the meetings with the BLA had resulted in over 50 changes in the administration of the program, in addition to the 1972 amendments (Interview with Popick, July 20, 1973).

The final stated goal of the Black Lung Association—to return democracy to the union—required the eventual overthrow of the union leadership. In addition, the action required the Black Lung Association to link up with two other miner's organizations—the Miners for Democracy and the Disabled Miners and Widows Association. The original objective was only to return the rights of the rank and file

to elect their district officers, but when the dissident miners failed to pressure the UMW administration and the Labor Department to this end, the dissident miners, working through the Miners for Democracy, ran Arnold Miller, former president of the Black Lung Association, against Tony Boyle in a special election, after a Federal judge had overthrown the previous election. When Arnold Miller and his slate was elected, he began immediately to initiate the following reforms: removing all people in the old administration who had worked against the rank and file miner, cutting his own salary and those of his staff several thousands of dollars, and beginning the process of moving the union's headquarters from Washington to the coal fields. However, although the reform movement was now in charge of the UMWA, this did not necessarily mean that the goal of union democracy had been achieved or that all of the other internal problems of the union were solved. After one year in the office as president of the United Mine Workers of America, Arnold Miller spoke of the difficulties which he and his reform minded group encountered:

> . . . I think it should be pointed out that we underestimated the extent to which the central administrative machinery of the UMWA had just stopped functioning. It had the appearance of functioning, but when we blew the dust off and turned the switch, the whole apparatus fell apart at our feet. (Miller, Arnold, p. 6)

Arnold Miller and his staff found out that nothing would happen quick and easy. They had hoped for a rapid series of accomplishments, but a large part of the first year was spent, out of necessity, in rebuilding the administrative machinery of the union. They discovered that many

people working for the union were satisfied with the way things were and did not share their enthusiasm for reform. In addition, they still encountered a great deal of sentiment expressed for the Boyle administration and were thwarted in their efforts at reform measures.

The pledge for autonomy, however, seems to have been achieved. In the first year of the new administration, elections were held in Districts 2, 4, 5, 14, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, and 31. For the first time in over half of a century, the constitutional control of the union was being turned back to the rank and file miner (Miller, Arnold, p. 6).

Just as the Black Lung Association was unable to make many inroads in the problem of mine safety, the newly reformed UMWA and the new leadership also experienced difficulties in this area. The reform candidates pledge that "coal would be mined safely or not at all" was based on a deep belief that coal operators would begin, at least, to respond to the idea that the safest mines were also the most productive. The new leadership of the UMWA offered its full cooperation to those companies which demonstrated a genuine interest in making their mines safe. However, according to Miller, the coal companies were unreceptive:

> . . . the industry as a whole was not listening. The brutal fact is that the average energy-industry president sits in a fancy office in New York or Pittsburgh or Cleveland or Philadelphia or Boston or Houston, hundreds of miles away from his mines, and it makes no difference to him whether his coal is covered with blood, so long as someone is mining it in whatever quantities he needs. We are still dealing with an industry rooted firmly in the 19th century. (Miller, Arnold, p. 7)

The successes of the Black Lung Movement and the Black Lung Association, then, are colored with environmental elements which continue to perpetuate the same problems the miners have faced since the beginning of the coal industry. The acquisition of the recognition of "pneumoconiosis" was a major victor, and the establishment of a federal program to provide benefits for those afflicted with the disease was a first in the area of occupational health and compensation. In addition, the BLA's struggle with the Social Security Administration was an excellent example of citizen feedback to a federally funded program. Although it required tactics which have traditionally been considered unacceptable, similar strategies by other groups in recent years have proven to not only be successful but highly necessary and now are a normal way of approaching certain target groups (Judkins, p. 10-14). Although the Black Lung Association did not permanently change the administrative structure of the SSA—it is probably still a very complex and established bureaucracy—it did demonstrate that highly impersonal formal organizations will respond to pressure, both from the client population, if it is organized, and from the outside, although even Congressional legislation failed to solve many of the problems which the miners faced with the SSA. The established norms and patterns of operation seemed to persist. The organizational imperatives were perhaps stronger than either the miners or Congress were aware.

Finally, even though the reform movement eliminated a target group by taking over that organization, the new source of power if controlled was not as capable of environmental changes as the reformers had

thought. Being co-opted into the system, the Black Lung Association now found that its role in the environment was changed somewhat.

V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BLACK LUNG ASSOCIATION

The Black Lung Association began in 1968 as a loosely organized social movement organization whose initial purpose for existence was to establish a legal corporation in which to put money to finance a new compensation bill in West Virginia. In the beginning, it had no members, only officers, and it maintained this structure through the passage of a compensation bill in West Virginia in the early months of 1969. Later in that year, it linked up with the Miners for Democracy and the officers and supporters of the Black Lung Association served on the campaign of Joseph Yablonski for UMWA president. But the BLA did not increase its membership or the number of its chapters during this period; it still remained as the West Virginia Black Lung Association.

As was previously reported, the defeat and assassination of Yablonski resulted in the Black Lung Association becoming relatively inactive until the summer of 1970, after the Disabled Miners and Widows Strike and the implementation of the SSA's Black Lung Program. Within the next six months, the Black Lung Association gained 14 new chapters and is reported to have attained a membership of over 4,000 persons (BLA files document, n.d.). Although the membership of the Black Lung Association, at any one time, would be difficult to determine—

because it maintained rather loose membership roles, and because all the people who were once members or who were helped by the BLA were "inactive"—the power of the association to gather up manpower support was demonstrated several times during the protest and lobbying activities of the BLA over the past seven years. The Black Lung Association is still in existence today, and it is still fighting the same battles that it began several years ago, and still has many of the same goals. On February 13, 1975, I received a communique from the "Regional Black Lung Association," a centralized body to coordinate the activities of the various state and chapter organizations, which informed me of the hearings in Congress later that month to further amend the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. According to the letter:

> Through the support of many Black Lung Association friends, the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was passed, and the 1972 amendments were passed. We are continuing to struggle to get an even better law in 1975. We want the law to be a permanent law. We want the 15 year rule guarantee of 15 years work employment for living miners, or widows of miners, included [this pertains to a presumption clause]. We want to stop the compensation offset dollar for dollar. We want widows lay evidence honored when there is no medical evidence available, and many other benefits honored that is rightly due to miners. (Memorandum, February 13, 1975, p. 1)

The Black Lung Association had started a major fund drive to get disabled miners, widows and others to Washington to lobby and testify. Their goal was to acquire sufficient funds to send 10,000 people to Washington.

Although the basic grass roots structure of the Black Lung Association did not change, even with the formation of the Regional Black Lung Association, it did experience one major alteration in its "external" structure. When Arnold Miller was elected to the presidency

of the United Mine Workers of America, many miners and nonminers felt that a Black Lung Association was no longer needed. The work could now be taken over by the more powerful UMWA's new leadership, many of whom were former Black Lung Association leaders and members. Because the new administration had taken many steps to insure district autonomy and eliminated those parts of the old administration which were dictatorial, including people, there would not be a need for either the MFD or the BLA, at least as far as the UMWA was concerned. Others, however, felt that the MFD should be maintained as a permanent loyal opposition. According to one author:

> They might better take a page from their own troubled history. Solidarity is a great convenience. Often it takes only 10 minutes to move from the call to order to the motion to adjourn. Dissent and the right to it are a great inconvenience. But unless the formula for union organization allows some room for a difference of opinion, democracy succumbs to autocracy every time. No one should know better than the Miners for Democracy. (Author unknown, taken from information provided by Bill Lucht, staff reporter for the Huntington Herald Dispatch)

The United Mine Workers of America, unlike some other unions, was not and still is not a two party political system, at least in its constitutional make up. In the district elections the first year under the new administration, the MFD candidate did not always win; in some cases he was beaten by an opposition candidate, which according to Miller indicated that the days of dictatorial control of the UMWA were gone (Miller, Arnold, 1973, p. 6). Bill Lucht, staff reporter for the Huntington Herald Dispatch, suggests, however, that it might be wise to consider the creation of a permanent loyal opposition party in an effort to guarantee the precious democracy they had fought so hard to obtain (interview with Bill Lucht on telephone, Spring, 1974).

Although the leadership of the UMWA perhaps did not intend to do it, in effect, it did create a potential opposition party. However, it was not the Miners for Democracy, it was the Black Lung Association. In the month of April, 1973, the UMWA opened a Field Service Office in Charleston, West Virginia which was to "provide assistance to miners and their families until the international officers [could] fulfill their pledge to move the international headquarters to the coal fields" ("UMW Field Service Office Opens," p. 10). In addition to providing assistance to individual miners in their Social Security and Black Lung claims, the Field Service Office and its staff essentially replaced the expired Designs for Rural Action (DRA) as a central organizing and financing base for the Black Lung Association. In essence, the Black Lung Association was maintained as a permanent part of the UMWA (indirectly) to carry out the actions of the union in relation to the problems of getting benefits. Much of the funding for the Black Lung Association, either directly in money or more often in terms of supplies and manpower, came from the UMWA office.

For the last two years, the actions of the Black Lung Association have not only received the support of the UMWA, but in many cases the two organizations were working together, particularly against Social Security, the Labor Department, and the Congress. In contrast to its first three years of existence, the Black Lung Association now did not only not have to fight the UMWA hierarchy, but had, to some degree, been co-opt by it and brought into its ranks. But after a year in office, the new leadership of the UMWA faced a number of problems,

mostly stemming from being unable to keep many of the promises with regard to miners pensions and benefits. In addition, many of the miners were becoming upset with Miller's affection for education and degrees. Many of the staff of the UMWA administration were nonminers who were young, well educated, and from the north. According to one dissident group who met on October 21, 1973 in Mann, West Virginia, "we are in trouble because of a lack of leadership . . . we are being run from without rather than within" (Baisden, p. 13).

During 1974, this expression of dissension began to appear in the meetings of the Black Lung Association. At both local and state meetings, there was always a faction present who wanted to speak against the present UMW leadership and that they had not done what they had promised. The general sentiment was expressed by one miner at a state meeting in Charleston, West Virginia, on March 15, 1974, who said, "Well, we put Arnold Miller in office, I suppose we can take him out again." The Black Lung Association for 1974 was very well aware that it was primarily responsible for Arnold Miller being elected to the presidency of the UMWA. Although the Black Lung Association is not now involved in a political struggle with the leadership of the UMWA—they are still working together on the new black lung bill—the organizational mechanism is in existence if the conflict between the rank and file miners and the new administration should ever increase.

Two questions, then, remain to be answered. First, why did the Black Lung Association as a social movement organization survive for so many years, and secondly, why did it maintain essentially the same

grass roots structure that it had from the beginning? To answer the first question, it is necessary to look at the reaction of the union administrators at that time. Dr. Rasmussen, a member of the Physician's Committee and strong supporter of the Black Lung Association, even today, in an interview reflected on how stupid the leadership of the UMWA had acted in terms of their reaction to the BLA and its efforts. If the union had shown any sign of support for their efforts, the BLA would probably have dissolved as an organization and the union could have taken over the fight. But, according to Dr. Rasmussen, the United Mine Workers administration actually overestimated the strength and power of the Black Lung Association. Because of the strike, which pulled over 40,000 miners out of the mines, the UMWA thought that the Black Lung Association must be a strong organization. In reality, however, it was relatively small, with only a few officers and the support of only one chapter, the Montgomery chapter, making up whatever membership it had. When the charge of "dual unionism" was made, however, the Black Lung Association had gained strength and support, and the reformers had gone too far to turn back. What maintained the organization for such a long period in time, however, was a reformulation of its major goals. The ultimate goals of the organization never really changed, but actions taken by the SSA, the Congress, the UMWA, the state legislature, and others prevented the BLA from fully attaining its stated goals to the degree that the miners determined acceptable. After the passage of the 1972 amendments and the implementation of the new regulations, it became clear to the leaders of the BLA that their organization would have to

be ongoing and become, more or less, permanent. In addition, the negative reaction by the UMWA leadership gave the BLA a new goal—the reform of the union.

It must also be acknowledged that the ability of the Black Lung Association to sustain itself during the past five years has been at least partially a function of the support of both DRA and the UMWA Field Service Office, as stated earlier, from an organizational and a financial standpoint. However, the amount of funds which these organizations were able to provide to the BLA and its activities was relatively minimal, just enough to sustain it but not enough to transform it into what might have been a more "professional" social movement organization. According to Gibbs Kinderman, a later supporter of the Black Lung Association and director of the Mountaineer Family Health Plan, Inc., a health program which supported the miners efforts, the reason that the Black Lung Association never became a large national organization was than an organization can only go so far on dues that are collected at meetings and operates on a budget which is ripped off from the Appalachian Regional Commission. If the BLA could get the money, it could become a national organization (interview with Gibbs Kinderman, March 15, 1974). The Black Lung Association, then, retained its small-scale loosely organized structure partially because it never acquired enough finances to move beyond that level. Whether it was a part of the system (after Miller became president) or against the system (under the Boyle regime) did not seem to make a great deal of difference. The organization still maintains a relatively small

membership base, collects dues at meetings, organizes lobbies and protest over night, and is only operative in four states, West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, and Tennessee, the original four states in which it established its first chapters. Many people feel, however, that because the BLA was capable of amassing such great support and power in the past, that, if the need was there, the Black Lung Association could do it again. Because its organization and its potential strength did not depend on traditional methods of structuring people collectively, but upon the somewhat invisible networks of association and interaction outside of the visible organization itself, we also believe that it could.

CHAPTER VIII

REFLECTIONS ON MODERN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

One of the major purposes of this exploratory case study of the Black Lung Association has been to provide insights and possibly to evoke hypotheses that may prove to have broader applicability to our understanding of social movement organizations. This final chapter will attempt to integrate our findings with current theoretical perspectives in the hope that the added knowledge of an intensive case study of one social movement organization in process will contribute conceptually and analytically to the possibility of future comparative studies. The conclusions we present here, however, must be considered as initially applicable only to the Black Lung Association, and any generalization to other social movement organizations must take into consideration variations in social movement environment and the structure of the social movement organization.

The discussion of our conclusions will follow the same analytical framework established in the Review of Literature (Chapter II) and utilized throughout the study, i.e., the identification of social movement organization, environment, process, and outcome, as four major areas of analysis pertinent to the origin, operation, and success of the SMO. Following our conclusions within each of these delimited areas, we will then evaluate the utility of such a framework for further analysis of social movements and social movement organizations in both case studies and comparative analysis.

I. SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION: TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION

Because of the level of advancement of social movement organization theory construction is rather limited, and there presently exist no "theories" of social movement organization to be tested, our study did not attempt to prove or disprove any of the currently recognized theoretical perspectives. Our purpose was to collect information which might give insight into the feasibility of the direction in which a number of different students of the field are moving in their theoretical and empirical endeavors. In general, the information we have gained from the study of the Black Lung Association tends to support the overall work of Gerlach and Hine (1970), Gerlach (1971), Robert Stallings (1974), and others who have suggested that the study of social movement organizations should move away from traditional bureaucratic conceptions of formal and complex organizations. At the same time, although we find partial support for the works of McCarthy and Zald, their conception of a "professional social movement organization" does not seem applicable to the SMO we studied.

As the field of social movements has begun to draw from the field of organizations, the more traditional conceptions of organizational structure have persisted. The Weber-Michels model of organizations has been followed, in whole or in part, by several in the field of social movements (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973; Gordon and Babchuk, 1959; Messinger, 1955; Zald and Ash, 1966; Gusfield, 1957; Curtis and Zurcher, 1974). The model has generally viewed the social movement

organization as having a bureaucratic structure with: (1) a pyramidal arrangement of its hierarchy, (2) a formal division of work, based on task specialization, (3) clearly defined authority, with a chain of command and communication, (4) decision making power centered at the top, and (5) prescribed rules and regulations for governing the affairs of the organization (Jun and Storm, 1973, p. 20). In addition, work in this area has tended to assume the classical "closed system perspective" with very little concern for the external environment and the interplay between it and the SMO. Finally, it has been assumed that the above characterized structure is necessary not only for the survival of the organization internally, but also for the successful accomplishment of its goals in the external environment.

Our research on the Black Lung Association, however, did not find a great deal of evidence to support this conception of modern social movement organizations. The Black Lung Association did not conform to the traditional bureaucratic organizational structure, although there was evidence to indicate that some forces were in operation to move it in that direction. The lack of a pyramidal hierarchical arrangement was evidenced not only by the autonomy of the local chapters of the BLA, their independent operations from the regional office, and the difficulties encountered in trying to establish such a structure, but also by the inability of the opposing forces to pin down definitive organizational leadership. The lack of a formal division of work was evidenced by the multiple tasks carried on by many members of the organization, the participation of the leaders of the organization in national level

organizing and lobbying efforts, local level protest efforts, and personal level involvement in assistance with the handling of individual claims. Although the organization did maintain four "common" organizational positions (President, Vice President, Secretary, and Treasurer), the meetings, protests, and lobbying activities reflected no clearly defined authority with a chain of command that was enforced or communication channels that followed a rigid chain of command. Decision making power was widely dispersed about the organization. Very rarely were decisions made by officers of the organization and then implemented automatically by the MO membership. It was more common for decisions to be made in the lengthy and sometimes frustrating planning sessions which resulted from hours and sometimes days of discussions as to the appropriate tactics and strategies to effect certain types of changes. A final decision was usually reflective of input from a broad range of people in the organization. Although there were a small number of rules (6 to be exact) which supposedly governed the local chapters operations, even these were generally dispensed with once the meeting began.

The organizational structure which we did find was very similar to that found by Gerlach and Hine in the Pentacostal Movement, the Black Power Movement, and more recently in the Environmental Movement. Their classification of movement organizations as segmentary, polycephalous, and reticulate is well supported by the available evidence on the Black Lung Association.

Segmentary, according to Gerlach and Hine, means "composed of a great variety of localized groups or cells which are essentially independent, but which can combine to form larger configurations or divide to form smaller units" (1970, p. 41). The local chapter of the Black Lung Association conformed to this typology of a localized group. At times, the local chapter divided into smaller units in order to give personal attention to the cases of the individual miners in their claims for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits program. At other times, each of the local chapters combined to form either a state wide or regional body to effect change on a broader level. In the segmentary system, according to Gerlach and Hine, each unit has different ideas about how to achieve the more general objectives of the movement, and each interprets the movement ideology in its own way (p. 42). Although we did not find great differences between chapters regarding the general movement ideology, we did find sufficient differences to suggest that the local chapters operated somewhat independently of both other local chapters and any attempts at centralized control. Differences from the BLA files of attempts to pull the various chapters together indicated that the 14 or so local groups maintained a great deal of independence. This was due to several factors, although the two most important were probably geographical distance between chapters as well as competition between movement leaders for personal power and authority positions, both of which are basic ways which Gerlach and Hine suggests by which segmentation in movement organization occurs.

This personal quest for power led to further segmentation between the chapters as evidenced by the fact that two chapters in West Virginia and two chapters in Virginia each declared themselves the "official chartered" chapter of their respective states. Evidence has already been presented to indicate that this is frustrating to members of the established order in at least two ways: difficulty in determining the real strength and membership of the social movement organization and difficulty in locating its leadership. Gerlach and Hine also suggest that this may be disconcernting to members of the movement if they somehow decide that their movement organization should have the kind of stable, centralized structure characteristic of established organizations (p. 42). In fact, in at least three periods in the life of the Black Lung Association, there were attempts to do just that, although all of them failed to succeed. This was due, to a great extent, to the decentralized or "polycephalous" structure of the Black Lung Association.

According to Gerlach and Hine, the polycephalous structure has many leaders, rather than one, and the power of any one leader does not extend over the entire movement organization. We found evidence of all four reasons given by Gerlach and Hine for the existence of this type of structure. First, the leaders, although they were in general agreement over the basic goals of the movement and the changes desired, the short range goals of how to raise money, how to most effectively build the organization, what was the best way to attack the UMWA, etc., resulted in much disagreement and dissension. Secondly, none of the leaders of the Black Lung Association had a roster of the membership

of the MO, which resulted in much difficulty when trying to bring together the various factions and their members. In fact, very few people that I talked to actually had a BLA membership card, although they were at one time printed up. Thirdly, the leaders never made decisions themselves which were binding on the whole. Even when the regional association met and decided to try and centralize and stabilize the organization's structure, the various local chapters continued to operate the way in which they previously did. Finally, and according to Gerlach and Hine, this is the most frustrating to representatives of the established order, none of the leaders of the Black Lung Association had regulatory powers over the movement. When the strike broke out in the confrontation with the West Virginia State Legislature, the leaders of the Black Lung Association could not control it, even when they tried.

The leadership of the Black Lung Association, however, conformed neither to the bureaucratic conception of the classical movement organization or the charismatic conception of Gerlach and Hine's polycephalous organization. Leadership in the organization seemed to be based mostly on functional abilities. Although one of the original organizers of the Black Lung Movement, Dr. I. E. Buff, would have to be characterized as a charismatic leader, the leaders of the Black Lung Association were not seen by the membership as having as much charisma as the ability to help the miner with his claim. None of them had oratorical voices or glowing personalities, but they did have a great deal of knowledge about the disease and the issue of "black lung," and

therefore were able to work constructively in assisting individual miners and in confrontations with the SSA and the legislature. One's "authority" was attached not to a position within the organization but to his ability to make changes.

It is a common criticism by those who support the classical bureaucratic model of organizations that if an organization does not have a central hierarchical structure with decision making by a few at the top, then the organization is doomed to failure because of the resulting internal dissension and disorganization. Gerlach and Hine suggest that this is false reasoning because it fails to recognize alternative ways in which the various cells within an organization can be held together. They found in studies of the Black Power Movement and the Pentacostal Movement that the cells, or nodes, were tied together, not through any central point, but rather through intersecting sets of personal relationships and other intergroup linkages which they characterize as "reticulate":

> It may be that some peoples, such as American Blacks . . . do lack experience in forming large scale corporate organizations: this is subject to research. But even if correct, it is also true that black Americans have over the years developed extensive interpersonal and intergroup networks of communication, aid, migration, and survival. These kinds of networks are not as visible as centralized corporate organization, but they can be very effective in maintaining survival under oppression and in gaining advantage in time of change. We would suggest that detailed analysis of such premovement or extramovement networks among black Americans would display a powerful organization for adaptation and coping—and give a picture much different from that presented by those who focus on disunity and broken or matrifocal families. (Gerlach, 1971, p. 832)

Our research indicated a very similar type of interconnecting network between the members of the Black Lung Association. In the first place, they were tied together by at least two extra-movement linkages: geographical and occupational. Most of the members of the BLA were both from Appalachia and coal miners, which means that they had contact with each other on the job and lived in a widely recognized geographical area, both of which have helped to establish similar life and cultural styles. Secondly, these miners were tied together by what Gerlach and Hine call "personal ties," between both leaders and members. Kinship, close relationships, and common daily activities reinforced the interaction between members. Thirdly, in the early development of the Black Lung Movement and the Black Lung Association, the Physicians Committee, especially Dr. I. E. Buff, served in the role of a traveling spokesman to pull the movement together. Finally, once the Black Lung Association was firmly established, state and regional associations did form which maintained some continuity between the various factions. In addition, the role played by both the Charleston Office Crew and the UMWA Field Service Office must be seen as contributing to the reticulate structure, although neither of these maintained a position of central authority over the total organization.

All of these interconnecting factors contributed to an organization which outwardly appeared rather loose and lacking in unity or cohesion but which internally had a great capacity for decision making, mobilizing resources, and for generating power when necessary. This was due, at least in part, to the general inclusiveness of the organization.

According to Gerlach (1971, p. 820) an inclusive organization with minimal requirements for membership results in:

> No objective requirements to qualify a person as a movement member. . . . Participants in the movement share a common history and experience and recognize each other through bonds of objectively perceived commitment. This means that there is no leader who can determine objectively who is or is not a member of the movement, let alone direct, regulate, or speak for the movement as a whole.

The meetings which the Black Lung Association had with the Social Security Administration are one example of the polycephalous nature of the organization's leadership. Of the eight major meetings between the Social Security Administration's national office and the Black Lung Association, the leader or leaders who represented the Black Lung Association were different in each encounter.

As we have previously mentioned, the membership of the BLA was impossible to determine. The social movement organization core consisted of anywhere from 150 to 300 people, mostly miners and widows, but the BLA had the capacity to mobilize hundreds of miners for marches to Washington, D.C., thousands for petitions, and, at one time, over forty thousand to go on strike. The BLA's ability to do this was a function of the reticulate structure that tied its core members at any one time to a larger membership established by occupational commonality (coal miners) and more specifically by the phenomenon of being afflicted by a disease, black lung, and by being turned down by SSA for benefits. All of these things contributed to a network which tied a certain group of people together in what might be called the Black Lung Movement. At various points in time, the leaders of the Black Lung Association

called upon segments of the broader movement for support. That they were able to gain both monetary and manpower resources was a function of the social organizational network in existence. A further understanding of this type of "organization" is reflected in the findings of Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) in studies of group behavior in disaster situations. They suggest that a fruitful distinction can be made between those groups which develop with an old or existing structure and those with a new or crisis developed structure. The former kind of group is one in which the members stand in definite kinds of prior social relationships to one another, especially in their work activities. Such groups may be highly bureaucratic in nature or considerably less formal. However, according to Dynes and Quarantelli, this is not the important distinction. More crucial is the existence of the group as an entity prior to the collective behavior event. Although the Black Lung Association did not exist prior to January, 1969, the individuals who were to make up both the Black Lung Movement and the Black Lung Association stood in definite kinds of social relationships to one another—occupationally, geographically, medically, socially, and in other ways which contributed not only to the quickness with which the movement developed, but also to the maintenance of a social movement organization which did not necessarily require either a bureaucratic structure to maintain commitment, or the elimination of dissensus or conflict within the organization for it to be successful.

Gerlach suggests that the existence of conflict and disagreement within a social movement organization need not render it ineffective,

but that, on the contrary, in certain situations and under certain conditions, this type of internal structure may be highly effective and adaptive in innovating and producing social change and, at the same time, surviving attempts of the established order to oppose its existence (p. 816). It should be acknowledged here, however, that Gerlach supports a minority viewpoint in the field at the present time, and opposes a theoretical perspective which has received at least some empirical support. In a recent comparative study of 53 social movement organizations in America between 1800 and 1945, William Gamson (1975) found that bureaucratically organized SMO's are slightly more successful than their loosely organized counterparts. Success was determined by two major variables—the ability to gain acceptance and the ability to gain new advantages. The difference was stronger for acceptance (71 percent vs. 28 percent) than for new advantages (62 percent vs. 38 percent). However, Gamson did find that nine of the 24 bureaucratic groups gained no new advantages, and there were two groups lacking both bureaucratization and centralization that were successful. In the study, a distinction was made between bureaucratization (which was determined by a written constitution or charter, a formal list of members, and three or more levels of internal divisions) and centralization (determined by the existence of a single center of power within the organization). Both were associated with success, but centralization of power had a stronger association with gaining new advantages while the bureaucratic organization had a stronger association with gaining acceptance. However, Gamson found no relationship between

bureaucratization and centralization of power, at least in the way it was measured in his study.

Gamson suggests that a bureaucratic structure helps a social movement organization with the problem of pattern maintenance:

> By creating a structure of roles with defined expectations in the place of diffuse commitments, a challenging group can better assure that certain necessary tasks will be routinely performed. It gives the challenging group a higher readiness for action. (p. 91)

Centralization of power, on the other hand, is the way in which challenging groups deal with the problem of internal conflict and through which they are able to achieve unity of command (p. 93). According to Gamson, factional splits "are the primary manifestation of the failure of the group to solve the problem of internal conflict" (p. 101). Gamson found in his study that less than one-fourth of the groups that experience it are successful, and over 70 percent of those who do not experience factionalism are successful (p. 101).

The question which must be asked now is "how do we explain the fact that the Black Lung Association, characterized from our research as a nonbureaucratic, decentralized, and sometimes faction-riddled organization with internal conflict, was so successful"? Several "explanations" could be offered. Our data collection process could lack validity and the Black Lung Association could either have not conformed to the organizational structure which we suggest or, in fact, it could be considered an "unsuccessful" SMO. On the other hand, the study by Gamson could lack validity, and the same problem would exist. It is

also possible that the Black Lung Association is just an atypical social movement organization and did not conform to established patterns of either structure or process. We reject, however, all three of these explanations in favor of a fourth which suggests that the Gamson study failed to take into consideration other influential factors that might have played a part in the various successes and failures of each of his cases. Gerlach and Hine (1970, p. 64) suggest that organizational unity is functional in a steady state social institution designed to maintain social stability and the status quo, while segmentation is functional in a social institution designed for rapid growth and the implementation of social change. Although we do not question that the organizations which Gamson studied were probably social movement organizations, we do question the extent to which they all were designed for rapid growth and were actively implementing social change. According to Gamson's characterization of the distribution of his sample, only 19 percent of the groups were socialist groups and only 32 percent were classified as reformist. The other 49 percent of the groups were either right wing or occupational groups. This brings into question the extent to which some of the organizations were actually successful in gaining advantages which were reflective of the status quo as well as an ability to gain acceptance in an already sympathetic societal environment.

Whether a reanalysis of Gamson's data would reflect different results is, of course, an unresolved issue. Perhaps a better alternative would be further studies of a comparative nature like Gamson's which had

both a larger data base (sample) and took into consideration a greater variety of explanatory variables.

The guiding conceptual framework was inspired by the recent works of McCarthy and Zald (1973a, 1973b, and 1974). We were very much influenced in our presentation of data by what McCarthy and Zald call a "resource mobilization perspective." McCarthy and Zald assume that social movement organizations, like all complex organizations, can be analyzed as dynamic, goal oriented social systems. They are dependent upon their environment for resources and constrained by actors and forces in their environment from achieving their goals. In addition, organizational survival, growth, and goal attainment are dependent upon organizational structure that becomes more or less institutionalized. McCarthy and Zald differ from traditional approaches to social movement in at least two major ways. First they are critical of the "classical" social movement organization conception and, secondly, the resource mobilization perspective is more concerned with the external structure of the organization and its relationship with the environment than traditional approaches.

McCarthy and Zald suggest that the classical social movement organization, characterized by a membership base which is primarily responsible for providing money, manpower and leadership, has been replaced by professional social movement organization whose beneficiary base may be completely separate from its support base. The social movement organization is today made up of paid functionaries, full time employees whose professional careers are defined in terms of social

movement participation. Although the Black Lung Association did not completely conform to the professional social movement organization model, it did reflect enough of the same characteristics to suggest that the concept of a professional social movement organization may have some validity.

In the first place, there was a core leadership of the BLA which devoted full time to the movement organization's activities. These were mostly retired and disabled miners who had the time to do so, but there were also a number of nonminers who devoted most or all of their time to supporting the activities of the Black Lung Association. At different periods of time, these included individuals such as Thomas Rhoddenbaugh, director of Designs for Rural Action, Craig Robinson, VISTA volunteer, as well as other volunteers, Linda Fritts, director of the Field Service of the UMWA, and people like Bill Weiss, who characterized himself as a trouble shooter from Williamson, West Virginia, and who, in 1969, quit a very successful position with IBM to come to work as a volunteer with the Black Lung Association.

Secondly, McCarthy and Zald suggest that the professional social movement organization has a very small or nonexistent membership base or a paper membership base. To some extent, as has already been discussed, the BLA did not have an identifiable membership base, although the beneficiary base was easy to identify.

Thirdly, those leaders of the Black Lung Association did speak for a potential constituency, even though the constitutency was not always organized. McCarthy and Zald also suggest that mass media has made it

possible for social movement organizations to appear to command a large membership in the classical sense, while in fact the membership may be far less. This was certainly true in the early development of the BLA (as mentioned earlier) and it had a crucial impact upon the UMWA's reaction to the Black Lung Association's efforts. And later on, after the assassination of Yablonski, the "image" of the Black Lung Association was maintained by press releases, when, in fact, the membership was only a handful of people.

The one major characteristic of what McCarthy and Zald call a "professional social movement organization" that does not seem to apply to the Black Lung Association pertains to the source of the financial resources for the SMO. According to McCarthy and Zald, in the professional SMO there is a separation of funding and leaders from the population beneficiary base. Although the money and manpower which came from government funded community action programs, such as DRA and VISTA, and from UMWA financed Field Service Office, was important to the success of the Black Lung Association, the majority of both manpower and monetary support for the operations of the BLA did come from its own membership. However, it must be acknowledged that at various times, members of the Black Lung Association sought funds from a number of outside sources—the Appalachian Regional Commission (government), private individuals of wealth (MFD rally in New York), and the UMWA. Although most of these efforts illicited very little money, what money was collected was not used to pay salaries of the movement leaders, per se, but to fund the activities of the organization, such as lobbying, marches, newsletters, etc.

Although the resource mobilization perspective, according to McCarthy and Zald, is built upon the dependency of the SMO on the environment for resources, very little distinction is made between the degree of importance of different types of resources. McCarthy and Zald seem to emphasize monetary resources and deemphasizes the resources provided by active membership. Our research on the BLA suggests that monetary resources may not be as crucial as a committed active membership (Chapter VI). Both Zald and Ash (1966) and McCarthy and Zald (1973a) suggest that if there is a routinization of resource flow, particularly financial, then the organization will tend to develop oligarchic and bureaucratic features. It is perhaps because the Black Lung Association failed to acquire a continuous flow of monetary support that it failed to develop a bureaucratic or oligarchic structure. The source of support, however, does not seem as important as the continuity in flow. Most social organizations, whether they are social movement or otherwise, must solve at least two major problems: (1) attainment of a goal or objective, and (2) maintenance of a satisfied membership. Although the first is recognized by the resource mobilization perspective (and the conception of a professional SMO), the latter comes under serious question, in that the satisfied membership may be a conscience constituency rather than a beneficiary constitutency. According to McCarthy and Zald (1973a, p. 18), "the growth and maintenance of organizations whose formal goals are aimed at helping one population but who depend on a different population for funding is ultimately more dependent upon the latter than the former." Although

we tend to agree with their reasoning here, we found no evidence that anyone but the beneficiary base was influential in determining the organizational structure, goals, ideology, or strategy and tactics of the Black Lung Association. This is not to say, however, that had an external source of continuous funding been available, that the Black Lung Association would not have conformed more to the professional social movement organization in this respect, and perhaps been more bureaucratic in structure.

In conclusion, then, our research on the Black Lung Association lends support to those theoretical perspectives which see social movement organizations as performing the same functions as traditional bureaucratic established organizations, but which operate within a somewhat different structure. We find much support for the conception of SMO's as polycephalous, segmentary, and reticulate. We have also found evidence to indicate that this type of structure can both maintain a certain degree of conflict and dissention and still be successful in accomplishing its goals. In fact, the lack of a well defined structure was found to be instrumental in both dealing with the opposing forces in the environment and maintaining an image of strength and power. Without a clearly identifiable organizational structure, the true strength of a movement organization is difficult to determine. As a result, such an SMO is in an advantaged position to remain relatively inactive for long periods of time without a major loss in its public image, its potential power, or its potential membership.

II. ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR A NEW LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

One of the conceptual difficulties we have faced throughout this study has been a clear demarcation between the social movement organization and the environment. Traditionally, the closed system perspective has primarily concerned itself with the internal structure of the social movement organization, and the environment has received little or no attention. With the apparently increasing acceptance of a more open systemed approach, we are faced with the problem of where does the structure of the organization end and the environment begin? McCarthy and Zald utilize a modified version of the open system approach, but their distinction between environment and structure only acknowledges the influence of the environment on the structure without a corresponding influence of the structure on the environment. The inputs and outputs tend to blur the identification of boundaries. In our study of the Black Lung Association we have tried to make a distinction between the internal structure of the movement organization, the external structure of the movement organization, or what we call its organizational environment, and then the broader environment, which includes the historical development of issues relating to the existence of the SMO and current trends which indirectly affect the survival of the SMO in the societal environment.

Current theory on the environment of social movement organizations is in what might be called the classification stage, i.e., most researchers and theorists are attempting to just develop a useful

conceptualization of the parts of the environment and how they come into play with the development of a social movement and its organization. In our study of the Black Lung Association we identified elements within the broader environment which established what Smelser refers to as "structural conduciveness" for the development of a social movement. These included such things as the general conception of illness in American society, the current status of the field of occupational health, "black lung" as an occupational disease, the history of coal mining in America and the life style of the coal miner and his occupational association. According to Smelser, it is important to identify those elements within the structural environment which are conducive to the development of social movement, and how these influence whether that movement will be value oriented or norm oriented. By Smelser's classification, the Black Lung Association would most likely be identified as a norm-oriented movement because the membership of the BLA was, in all three confrontations, not confronting the basic values of the society or its institutions but merely trying to affect changes in the rules by which the society or its parts were operating. According to Smelser, however, in specifying the social environment which meets conditions of conduciveness we must distinguish between: (1) the source of demands for normative change in the population, and (2) the kind of reception that these demands receive at the political level (p. 278). In other words, what are the types of structures through which the social movement can express its grievances and what are the structures that forge these expressed grievances into policy.

Crucial to the survival of the Black Lung Association and to its successes was a high degree of access to alternative structures in the environment which were instrumental in affecting the changes sought by the BLA membership. The relationship we found between the SMO, the Black Lung Association, and its various target groups, the West Virginia State Legislature, the SSA and the UMWA, however, was neither simple nor direct. The route between the BLA and the West Virginia State Legislature included a number of additional organizations and agencies that affected the confrontation between them—the news media, regional medical societies, the UMWA, influential private individuals, coal companies, state political parties, etc. This organizational environment, however, was further limited by the impact of a broader issue environment that established certain expectations of the general public with regard to illness, occupational health and safety, and the image of coal mining and coal miners in the larger society. In the confrontation between the BLA and the SSA, the avenues of grievance expression and influence manipulation were even more complex. Although the BLA did at times "confront" the SSA directly, the most successful efforts involved the utilization of the federal legislature, the Department of HEW, the news media, and various governmental officials. Finally, the confrontation with the UMWA was successful only because the BLA was able to obtain outside support and influence in the battle. Had the confrontation been solely between the dissident miners and the UMWA hierachy, it is probable that the latter would have won. However, the BLA (and the MFD) were able to mobilize support from the federal

legislature, the federal courts, various government agencies, and the news media to even out the balance of power.

In addition, the broader environment, including the union corruption, the Yablonski killings, the misuse of funds, etc., was also instrumental in the eventual outcome. How each of these organizations and elements within both the organizational environment and the broader issue environment are causally related was only minimally researched in our study. However, our findings do support some of the beginning works of Robert Stallings who suggests that we need to move away from concentrating our efforts on one social movement organization in confrontation with one target group. Stallings (1974) finds that there is in any confrontation a multi-organizational field on both sides, and that a simple direct line between a social movement organization and a target group is misleading.

In addition to a multi-organizational environment, our study of the Black Lung Association also revealed a number of organizations at various times involved in the same struggle: the Disabled Miners and Widows of West Virginia, the Clay County Poor People's Association, and the Miners for Democracy. Traditionally, these have been conceptualized as "coalition" organizations, although McCarthy and Zald (1973b, p. 16) have recently suggested a new term—social movement industry—which is composed of all social movement organizations that identify their goals with a broader social movement. This new term is quite useful in that it helps to clear up some of the gray areas between the SMO and its environment. Because coalition organizations did not

fall under the limitations of having to be a social movement organization, organizations in society could at one time be target groups and at a latter time, after they had been "won over," become a coalition group in support of the goals of the SMO. This was particularly the case with the UMWA. Once the leadership of the UMWA was replaced, the organization now became a powerful, but institutionalized, element in the environment in support of the general goals of the BLA. It is important to distinguish in the environment those elements which have established organizational structures and have become somewhat institutionalized in the society and those which are still in the emerging process as social movement organizations. This is not to say that social movement organizations will never become established institutionalized organizations, for this has occurred in many cases. What is important is that the relationship between the SMO and the established organization is somewhat different than its relationship with an evolving organization.

One of the things which our study of the Black Lung Association has confirmed, at least to our satisfaction, is that a case study of a social movement organization can do little more than attempt a classification of the social movement environment with some input into associations between environmental variables and the structure and process of the social movement organization. Our research, and that of Stallings (1974) suggest that a comparative study of several social movement organizations is necessary to reveal causal relationships. If we are to seriously attempt to understand the environmental principles

that govern the functioning and developing of social movement organizations, rather than the principles which govern the structure of small groups or the behavior of individuals, then it is imperative that we move in the direction of a theory of social movement organizations, which makes the organization the unit of analysis. Social movement organizational analysis only contributes to our knowledge of human interaction and group processes in the context of an SMO. If the field of social movements is going to draw from the field of organizations for its theoretical frameworks, Peter Blau (1965) and Stanley Udy (1965) advise moving our level of analysis to the system of interrelated elements that characterize the organization as a whole (its "global properties"), which are not based on the properties of individual members.

The previously mentioned study by Gamson is a step in this direction, but dilemmas plague the methodological procedures. Gamson's study involves the collection of information from primarily historical data. To a great extent, most comparative studies of a large sample of social movement organizations necessitate the utilization of primarily historical data. Unfortunately, most historical data does not provide a great deal of in depth information about the social movement and its environment. More particularly, the type of information which we have collected on the Black Lung Association has required the presence of a participant observer, especially in the case of the confrontation with the SSA. Although Phillip Selznick (1949) suggests that case studies can be useful to the comparative analysis of

organizations, there is, according to Blau and Scott, a more serious problem:

> A fundamental dilemma is posed for the study of organizations by the double requirement of examining the interdependence between elements in a social structure, on the one hand, and of observing many independent cases to substantiate generalizations, on the other . . . even when comparable empirical data on many organizations are available, conceptualizing the organizations as independent cases would involve ignoring their interdependence in the larger society, whereas focusing on their interdependence would leave the investigator once more, with only one case. (Blau and Scott, pp. 11-12)

What, then, can a case study like ours of the Black Lung Association offer to a "theory of social movement organizations"? According to Udy (p. 679), it is readily possible, on any given level, "to distinguish a case study, which describes something in detail by analyzing the configuration of its parts, and a comparative analysis properly so called, which seeks generalizations about something by studying several instances of it" (p. 679). He therefore omits case studies from comparative analysis because, although they "superficially appear to compare different organizations," on closer examination, they prove merely to utilize data gathered from several organizations "in the course of analyzing something else" (p. 679). Blau concurs with Udy, in particular with the study of the organizational environment:

> . . . a case study of an organization cannot make the organization the unit of systematic analysis but only the structures of subgroups or the roles of individuals. By the same token, the study of the influence of the environment on organizations would have to employ a research design that includes organizations in a variety of different environments, and since hardly any studies do so, the complaint often heard that we know virtually nothing about the impact of the social setting on organizations is quite justified. (p. 337)

Blau's solution to the dilemma, however, is to restrict the collection of data to that information which can be collected from records of organizations and interview of key informants, without intensive observation or interviewing of most members, which would make it possible to collect data on one hundred or more organizations of a given type in one study. The research design sacrifices depth of information to achieve sufficient breadth to permit a minimum of quantitative comparison. This is essentially what Gamson did, and, unfortunately, information about the interaction between the SMO and the environment was limited. In this respect, social movement organizations are at a disadvantage in comparison with more established organizations. Not only is there a more limited number of SMO's from which to collect data, but much of the information pertaining to the dynamics of interaction between the social movement organization and its environment is available only through intensive analysis of the case.

In contrast to Blau and Udy, our research on the Black Lung Association suggests that case studies are necessary in order to acquire important data related to an understanding of the social movement environment. And because of the unique character of the availability of data from historical records, we suggest that multiple case studies will be required, at least currently, until more intensive information is available from historical material.

III. PROCESS: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND THE STRATEGY OF PROTEST

The information which we have presented on the process of interaction between the Black Lung Association and its environment has implications for theory building in a number of different substantive areas. Our findings on the confrontation between the BLA and three of its major target groups, however, are more restricted in scope, and they offer insight into at least three areas of theoretical concern: (1) the relationship between goals, ideology and tactics, (2) the internal and external influences on the utilization of various strategies and tactics, and (3) the recent studies on the strategy of protest.

Ralph Turner has suggested that neither the leadership and membership nor the goals, ideology, and tactics of a movement are constant over time (1964, pp. 124-125). The initial ideology and values of any social movement are seldom specific enough to prevent alteration of the character of the movement according to the public response. The character of a movement is not intrinsic and is never fixed, "but is always a product of the visible actions of the movement, the public response to those actions, and movement adaptations to this response" (1964, pp. 125-126). We found a great deal of support for this dynamic conception of the goals, ideology, and strategies of the Black Lung Association. The original goals of the BLA went through several revisions, most important of which was the addition of a major issue and target group, only indirectly related to the original issue of "black lung" as a disease. Although the general goal surrounding

the issue of black lung as an occupational disease has remained throughout the history of the BLA, the specific goals of desired ends varied over time. In addition, new goals unrelated to the issue of black lung arose, for example, the overthrow of the administration of the UMWA. Gamson suggests that we should consider a social movement as having multiple goals only if it gives programmatic attention to distinct subgoals in different institutional spheres (p. 44). Although we are in general agreement with this concept, it is possible that different goals can have overlapping institutional spheres or that similar goals can be fought on many levels in different institutional spheres. In relation to this, Gamson suggests that only a group which has managed to survive for a little while can be expected to begin the process of differentiating action programs in different areas (p. 45). Although it does seem logical that the idea of multiple issues implies a certain degree of strength and stability, our research on the Black Lung Association suggests at least another alternative reason. It has been suggested earlier that a social movement ends either because it does not achieve its goals or, ironically, because it does (Rush and Denisoff, p. 367). The pressure to undergo a change in the goals of the SMO, in either case, is influenced both by societal pressures to conform to certain norms and values, and by internal organizational pressure to maintain the existence of the SMO as an entity in and of itself, particularly if it has been successful. The initial success of the Black Lung Association, however, came relatively early in the career of the social movement, and to some extent prior to the establishment

of the SMO as a workable identifiable entity. Successes for the Black Lung Association, even the initial battle with the West Virginia Legislature, were only partial successes. The long lasting continuity of the Black Lung Association, then, is more a function of the inability of the BLA to accomplish all of its goals related to "black lung," for example, a good presumption clause. On September 15 and 16 of 1975, the BLA, in conjunction with the new administration of the UMWA, was again in Washington to pressure the Congress to again reform the Black Lung Benefits Act. We suggest that the multiple issue orientation of the BLA is also related to this long lasting continuity. Rather than being a direct result of successes or failures of the organization, the BLA was able to become involved in related issues partially because of the infinite character of the black lung issue. Stated more generally, social movement organizations whose goals require the SMO to be in existence for long periods of time, are more likely to broaden their issue concerns and develop additional goals in related, and sometimes unrelated, institutional spheres.

We also found that the ideological conceptions of the membership of the Black Lung Association fluctuated during the development of the SMO. Although the general ideology of the mining population remained relatively stable (referring to the traditional conflict between coal miners and coal companies), the ideology of the Black Lung Association became more focused. As the leaders and the membership failed to put all of their environment into the classical conception of being for the coal operators or for the coal miners, the dichotomy

began to break down. Mostly responsible for this was the confrontation with the Social Security Administration. Whereas it was easy to fit the UMWA, the West Virginia State Legislature, the state Medical Society, local news media, and regional groups in a specific relationship to the coal miner, the SSA was a large complex bureaucratic structure whose operations were many times a function of additional forces. Our findings here indicate support for the conception of social movements advanced by Roberts and Kloss (1974). Roberts and Kloss propose to look at social movements as arising out of a dialectic confrontation with certain trends in society. Building on a distinction by Rudolph Heberle, they suggest that various trends in a society actually produce social movements which move against the trend. One of these trends is bureaucratization. According to the authors, nearly all institutional leaders in church, corporation, or government are given to the idea that their institution fulfills tremendously important human needs and that it fulfills these needs in a way excelled by no other. The difficulty with these problem solving institutions, however, is that often the elites who control the resources and structure of the institution tend to confuse their own interests with those of the larger society (p. 10). The result, though, is not so much a problem of individual elites as much as a system produced unresponsiveness:

> Seemingly, it is a struggle involving man against machine, but in reality it is a struggle of the unorganized to become organized and to confront the unresponsive institutions called bureaucracies . . . bureaucracies will continue to exert dominance over the lives of individuals and . . . the internal needs of bureaucracies, such as growth and expanded use of resources, often conflict with the people they are to serve.

> We can feel safe in saying, as did Max Weber a half a century ago, that the future will be a dialectic of increasing bureaucratic control and increasing movements to resist that control. (Roberts and Kloss, 1974, p. 72)

The changing ideology of the Black Lung Association was very much a function of this type of process. Although initially the leaders of the BLA accused the administration of the SSA in West Virginia and Kentucky of also being "under the thumb" of the coal operators, they later realized that the problem was more complex and that a force other than the established political forces was operating against the goals of the Black Lung Asssociation—a force that the leadership of the BLA later specifically identified as "bureaucratization." This realization altered the "image" of the environment which the membership of the BLA held and therefore a change in the ideological orientaitons. This, in turn, caused a corresponding change in the strategy and tactics to effect change on that environment.

Marx (1971, p. 175) suggests that the absence of a well developed ideology or one which undergoes continuous change permits flexibility in strategy and tactics. Justifications for actions taken will emerge during or after a confrontation, particularly if events are too fast moving for rigid ideologies. External forces in the environment of the BLA were very influential in determining the type of actions which the BLA would plan. For example, failure of the West Virginia Legislature to respond to the lobbying efforts of the miners prompted both the strike and the massive march on the capitol. Failure of the SSA to respond to the demands of the BLA first at the local level and then at the national

level prompted the BLA to take its battle to the Congress. Failure of the administration of the UMWA to respond to the demands of the BLA for autonomy and an end to corruption prompted the BLA to both seek outside influence and to now begin thinking of replacing the union leadership. What these three situations suggest is that the goals and strategies of a social movement organization are very undeveloped at the beginning but take shape in terms of the environment's response. And, as the confrontation between the BLA and the SSA and the UMWA suggest, the societal response may lead to more extreme goals and strategies.

Although the leaders of the Black Lung Association did at times take the general public into consideration in choosing strategies and tactics, we found that most of their decisions were much more influenced by what has been called "bystander publics," certain segments of society whom the SMO feels has resources which can be brought to bear on the situation. As a matter of fact, as we shall discuss later with regard to protest, a number of bystander publics may come into play in one attempt at affecting a major target group. This is particularly true of groups that are relatively powerless that must depend upon the resources and power which can be generated by other, usually more established, groups.

So a number of internal forces influenced the choice of strategies and tactics. Turner suggests that the two major principles which operate to determine the movement strategy are "strategic" and "expressive" orientations. The first is the rational principle of

selecting strategies according to their anticipated effectiveness. The second is the principle of projecting an image through the movement—often an image of power that the movement adherents can assimilate into their own self-conceptions. The distinction which Turner makes is very useful in that the first focuses on a particular target group and the latter is merely aimed at the general public, or perhaps inwardly. However, Turner goes on to suggest that expressive considerations involve the gratifications that come from the exercise and display at power. What is happening here is merely individual members seeking recognition and personal reward for these efforts. While Turner may be right in that these personal needs for satisfaction may be operating, the two principles appear more complex than he suggests. First of all, a display of force or power is a useful tool both for influencing the external environment and maintaining an image for the movement consituency. This is true of established organizations and social movement organizations. Secondly, a display of power or the projection of an image may be the minimum power needed to attain the goal at hand and may reflect the available resources at the time. Both of these are considered by Turner as basic strategic principles (p. 156).

The limitations of Turner's thinking here are very much influenced by what Zald and Ash have called an "organizational bias." Turner suggests that expressive tendencies will appear more in a social movement organization with a less sophisticated leadership and membership than in one which has not effectively disciplined its membership (p. 155). He says that the more a movement can bring its membership under

organizational discipline, the greater the chance of subordinating the expressive tendencies to strategic planning. He also considers an undisciplined grass roots movement as being characterized largely by expressive tendencies. Our research on the Black Lung Association, which we characterize as a "grass roots movement," suggests that Turner's analysis, in this respect, is limited. As we have discussed above, organizations can have a certain influence over their membership without a bureaucratic or authoritarian discipline or a centralization of power in the hands of a few leaders. Although the leadership of the BLA was not sophisticated, at least in Turner's sense of "experience," it was capable of mobilizing resources, both monetary and manpower, to carry out strategic plans successfully. Perhaps a related issue which has influenced Turner's thoughts in this area is his classification which limits strategies to bargaining, persuasion, and coercion. This classification does not give appropriate consideration to relatively powerless groups which must depend upon a fourth strategy, social protest.

The majority of the strategic and tactical activities of the Black Lung Association would have to be put in a category of social protest. With the exception of the strike in 1969, which incidentally was not called or planned by the leaders of either the Black Lung Movement or the BLA, the Black Lung Association did not have the power to bargain, persuade, or coerce to any great extent. Its ability to affect change was dependent upon the mobilization of support from other groups that did have that power. The mobilization process was basically

one of social protest. McCarthy and Zald suggest that this process depends upon two actions: grievance portrayal and legitimacy bargaining (1974, p. 8). According to McCarthy and Zald, grievance portrayal is utilizing the mass media to arouse sympathy with the aggrieved groups among bystander publics. Legitimacy bargaining attempts to convince bystanders that the actions of the authorities toward movement beneficiaries or adherents are not acceptable.

For the Black Lung Association, the most effective use of the mass media came through press releases. Between January 11, 1970, and November 27, 1971, the BLA files reveal that the organization sent out 27 press releases. Twenty-four (88 percent) of these press releases were attempts to arouse some sort of sympathy with the Black Lung Association's efforts and more particularly with the coal miner population. Of these 24, eleven were directed at specific bystander publics and the remainder at the general public. These bystander publics played an extremely important role in the confrontation process between the BLA and the target group.

The ultimate goal of the Black Lung Association's efforts against the West Virginia State Legislature was a revision in the state workman's compensation law. Had the state compensation board been paying benefits for black lung claims, the issue would probably not have surfaced. The way to the compensation board, however, was through the state legislature. The way to the state legislature, as the miners soon found out, was through the coal industry, since the government in West Virginia was heavily influenced by the coal

companies; therefore, the tactic of the strike. It was not directed against the coal companies directly, but was a protest tactic to pressure the legislature to respond. The confrontation between the BLA and the SSA would probably have had an early termination date, too, if the administration of the SSA had done things differently, either in initial handling of claims or in terms of dealing with the BLA. But the power differences between the SSA and the BLA resulted in the necessity of the BLA leadership pulling into the battle a number of bystander publics, the Congress in particular, and convincing them of the unacceptable actions of the authorities, the SSA. The necessity of bystander publics was even more crucial in the confrontation between the BLA and the UMWA, because of the possibility of total annihilation of the SMO by the target group. In this case, not only the Congress, but the federal and state courts, outside legal personnel, students, and the support of the press assisted in the battle.

In contrast to the work of James Q. Wilson, we did not find that all protest strategies and tactics utilized exclusively negative inducements. Although at different times, and in different confrontations, the BLA did utilize all four of the forms of protest classified by Wilson—verbal (press releases and mass meetings and rallies), physical (pickets and lobbies and marches), economic (strike or threat of a strike) and political (voting within the union and the state)—there is a great deal of evidence to indicate that the tactics used were to motivate groups for positive as well as negative reasons. Third parties or reference groups were usually activated not because

they were forced into the confrontation by a threat of the BLA but because of their sense of a need to do something to correct an injustice. There were some identifiable differences; however. The West Virginia State Legislature and most of the state agencies and organizations responded only to negative inducements. The U.S. Congress, however, came into the picture out of no fear for its own survival or image, at least at first, but out of an expressed concern to help the coal miner. According to Dr. Rasmussen, what impressed the Congress the most was not the strike, the march, or mass lobbying as negative inducements but that the miners were so committed to their cause that they would lose several weeks pay to act politically on their behalf when the union had failed to.

Our findings suggest that positive inducements are most effective when there is an absence of organized opposition which the reference group or the target group must take into consideration. The use of negative inducements in this type of situation only serves to intensify what Oberschall calls the "polarization" process. He suggests that in a situation which results in two groups in conflict, people tend to rely on the shared culture of their own group for guidelines and clues as to their behavior. The original group breaks up into two or more internally mobilized and mutually hostile groups. As the process of polarization continues, communication between the conflicting groups becomes unreliable and differences rather than similarities between the groups become emphasized. The confrontation between the Black Lung Association and the United Mine Workers of America followed this model

rather well. Inititally, the goals of the BLA and the UMWA were similar, that being the compensation of black lung as an occupationally induced disease. The inaction of the latter and what might be called the "radical" action of the former led to the beginnings of hostilities between the two groups. In the early stages of the development of the Black Lung Association we find evidence to show that communication was occurring between the two organizations, both in West Virginia and in Kentucky. However, as time passed, the UMWA did less to solve the problems of the miners, and the size of the BLA grew and the polarization increased. Oberschall suggests that the polarization will continue to the point at which the conflict will move away from the generally accepted norms of waging conflict. The formation of what the UMWA leadership called a "dual union" would have to be considered abnormal as well as the use of a wildcat strike. The UMWA leadership, on the other hand, as is now known, resorted to violence, particularly in the killing of Joseph Yablonski and his family. This particular tactic, according to Rasmussen, served to not only intensify the conflict but to broaden the support for complete overthrow of the union administration as a strategy of obtaining local autonomy and an end to corruption. It was at this point that communication between the two groups completely broke down and the two opposing groups were in direct conflict, not just over the issue of black lung or autonomy, but over the legitimate existence of both groups. Because the balance of power was in the favor of the UMWA hierarchy, the BLA was forced to go outside the union to mobilize support, another strategy which was

constitutionally considered illegal. Oberschall suggests that this will tend to make the conflict more difficult to resolve. The mobilization of sentiment and resources will be based on symbols, ideologies, principles, and values which are more difficult to settle as compared to material interests (Oberschall, p. 50). The confrontation between the BLA and the UMWA eventually evolved into what might be called a "zero-sum game," in that the interests of the opposing parties were diametrically opposed—if one were to win, the other would lose.

Although the use of negative inducements by the BLA against the UMWA did result in a prolongation of the conflict, as Oberschall suggests, it also intensified the conflict and caused a change from rather minor goals of reform of the union to a major goal of the overthrow of the leadership. The social protest of the BLA to the wider public (to include specific reference publics such as the Federal Courts, the Congress, and the Labor Department) was of a more positive nature in terms of seeking support based upon certain acceptable values and ideals which were being abused by the UMWA leadership. Had the leadership of the reform movement attempted to force the involvement of these reference groups by negative inducements (as it had in the battle with the SSA or the state legislature), it is doubtful that the mobilization of resources would have been as successful.

IV. THE OUTCOME OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT: TOWARD A BETTER EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This research on the Black Lung Association has focused on two aspects of the outcome of a social movement—the transformation of the social movement organization and the changes in the environment which the SMO effected during its existence, whether intentional or not. The findings suggest that: (1) the Weber-Michels model, as has been postulated by many recently, is not applicable to all SMO's, that (2) the internal structure of an SMO is as much a function of external as well as internal forces, and that (3) changes in the SMO environment can be more systematically studied and measured quantitatively rather than qualitatively as in the past.

As expected, no support for the increasing bureaucratization or oligarchization of the social movement organization appeared. No goal transformation in a conservative direction appeared, thus contradicting the Weber-Michels thesis. Rather the goal transformation which did occur was in a more radical direction in the case of both the UMWA and the issue of "black lung." The confrontation between the BLA and the UMWA, as just discussed, increasingly altered the BLA's position to more radical goals. And, at this writing, the Black Lung Association continues to pressure for even more liberal compensation legislation than originally passed and amended.

The shift to organizational maintenance, the second stage of the Weber-Michels thesis, was a major concern for the Black Lung Association. Once the BLA had been successful in West Virginia and in

the U.S. Congress, certain segments of the Black Lung Association began a series of attempts at transforming the loosely tied together organizational structure into a more traditional, centrally controlled association. However, all attempts have failed to the present—no real oligarchization has occurred. Two questions are raised by this situation which we feel have not been adequately answered in previous literature. First, what are the sources of attempts at oligarchization? Second, why doesn't oligarchy appear? The Weber-Michels thesis suggests that the process occurs because of the need for the SMO to legitimize its goals and structure to the broader society. Supposedly, the participants in this structure have a stake in preserving the organization, regardless of its ability to attain goals (Zald and Ash, p. 327). Our research on the Black Lung Association suggests the reasons for the concern for organizational maintenance and the need for oligarchization are very different in origin from this thesis. Although the Black Lung Association, as a whole, successfully resisted all attempts at bureaucratization, the segments of the organization which attempted the transformation were less concerned about dominant societal consensus with the organization than with what they considered to be the most effective way to change that environment. Although bureaucratic structure is an effective way to maintain control of the internal affairs of an organization, other organizational theory indicates that it can also deal effectively with the organizational environment. Although we question the validity of the assumptions backing this argument, the bureaucratic model is probably the most

well known model of organizational structure. When involved in a loosely organized setting, most people, particularly those who have been raised in bureaucratic settings all their life, tend to seek changes in the direction of increasing oligarchization. This research on the transformation of the Black Lung Association indicated that those individuals who were most concerned about organizational maintenance and transforming the grass roots structure were nonminers who had a more positive orientation to coordination of activities and hierarchical arrangements. The two major attempts at this type of change were led by the Charleston Office Crew and the UMWA Field Service Office, both of which were staffed generally by middle class, well educated young people who, we suggest, had more association with and positive affiliation with bureaucratic structures. The coal miner membership, on the other hand, because of the historical development of Appalachia, had little familiarity with bureaucratic structures in terms of their own participation and general negative orientations to those bureaucratic structures which they had to deal with. As a result, their reactions to attempts at bureaucratization were either negative or apathetic.

Why, then, did the shift to organizational maintenance not become a major concern nor the oligarization of the SMO? Basically because the coal miner membership, which was the majority, failed to respond. The centralization of power requires either the consensus of the membership or the power to enforce it. Those who were seeking these changes had neither. Probably the coal miners did not desire a centralization of power but wanted things to remain as they were, decentralized, multi-headed and loosely organized.

Our research, then, does not support the Weber-Michels model nor do we find the same kind of transformation as found by Messinger (1955). We do find support for the works of Zald and Ash (1966) and Gerlach and Hine (1970) who suggest that other transformations may occur—the development of factions, and what we call a "functional leadership," rather than bureaucratic or charismatic, as well as a shift to more radical goals.

Finally, this research indicates that not only can outcomes of a social movement be more systematically studied, but that a determination of the "success" of a movement organization is an empirical possibility. We tend to agree with Gamson that it is useful to think of success as a set of outcomes, and his delineation of acceptance and new advantages as measurable outcomes. As discussed in Chapter II, Gamson (1975) suggested four ways to measure acceptance of the organization: (1) consultation, (2) negotiations, (3) formal recognition, and (4) inclusion. Our research indicated that not only did the Black Lung Association attain "success" in each of these ways but the information was easy to acquire and could be quantified in a comparative study. The BLA was called to testify in hearings in the West Virginia State Legislature, the Kentucky State Legislature, and the Virginia State Legislature. In addition, the U.S. Congress sought the opinion of several of the leaders of the BLA before the passage of the 1969 FCMHSA and the amendments of 1972. Secondly, the BLA won the right to negotiate with the SSA on the regulations established by the 1972 amendments and met with them on a continuing basis, the expense being

paid for by the SSA. Thirdly, the formal recognition given the Black Lung Association extended beyond the state and federal government and the UMWA to include inclusion in recent proposals by private agencies for funding as well as private research evaluation studies of black lung benefits programs. During the middle of the confrontations, the news media recognized the BLA as the officially representative body of a new breed of miners. Finally, the BLA, after the overthrow of the UMWA leadership, was officially included in the antagonist's structure, and funds and personnel were provided to assist the continued efforts of the organization. Although we did not do so here, we would suggest that future research consider the possibility of further quantifying this measure by providing information on the degree of acceptance, i.e., the number of times consultation was solicited, the number of negotiations entered into, the number of times formally recognized by different legitimate groups, and the degree of inclusion into the affairs of the authority structure. This might be particularly useful in comparative studies of similar social movements with similar goals.

Gamson's concept of gaining new advantages, however, still leaves us with the problem of cause and effect. Gamson makes no assumption that the challenging group necessarily caused the benefits, only whether desired results did occur during or immediately after the period of challenge. This has been the traditional way of measuring both a movement's success and changes in the environment. We feel that this approach leaves much to be desired. In the first place, the verification of causality requires the establishment of covariation and the

elimination of rival causal factors, as well as the establishment of time order. Secondly, the desired changes may not be the most important changes as far as the environment is concerned. The latent functions of an SMO in the environment may be even more crucial than the manifest functions.

In our research on the Black Lung Association we have attempted to measure changes in the environment which take into consideration covariation and some rival causal factors. By controlling on those states in which the Black Lung Association was most active, we were able to measure success by looking at changes in three specific areas: (1) percent who demanded reconsideration, (2) approval rate of claims, and (3) the increase in the actual number of claims paid. By comparing these figures with states in which the BLA was not active (in this case the state of Pennsylvania), we were able to more assuredly state that the effect was due to the efforts of the Black Lung Association. Our efforts in this case study, however, are rather minimal as to what could be done in a comparative study in which different environments could be studied and more factors could be controlled for.

Finally, our research attempted to look at alternatives on the SMO environment which were not necessarily sought for by the organization but which came about indirectly or directly as a result of the social movement organization's efforts. An important contribution of the BLA's efforts was the expansion of a national concern for occupational safety and health. Since the inception of the Black Lung Movement, new movements have appeared. In the cotton working areas a Brown Lung

Association operates out of Columbia, South Carolina. A concern for red lung in the steel mills, and an awareness of white lung in asbestos plants is evident. In addition, the BLA set a precedent for the federal government to compensate workers for occupationally induced illnesses, which traditionally has been a state level compensation. Finally, the efforts of the Black Lung Association resulted in millions and millions of dollars coming into the poverty stricken Appalachian area. Perhaps for the first time, the money came directly to the people, not to a government agency. These types of changes in the environment are missed by a concern for only the desired goals of an organization, and whether or not they were achieved.

Our research has led us to conclude that attempting to conceptualize movement success is similar to the problem we have faced for years with the concept of value. Our humanistic side tells us to deal with values as right or wrong, while our objective side says that values should only be treated as data, with no evaluation of its rightness or wrongness. So it seems to be with success. Gamson suggests that a good compromise is to measure success by the perceptions of four sources: (1) historians, (2) by the challenging group, (3) by the antagonist, and (4) by the challenging group's level of satisfaction with its achievement at the end of the challenge (pp. 35-36). Although this is an admirable selection of important informants, what do we do with conflicting opinions, and which is to be considered the most important? While the evaluations of all of these sources are obviously important, we would like to follow up on a previous assumption which we expressed—that

people who participate in social movement confrontations are not always the best source of valid information—and suggest that an additional measure of success would be the evaluation of the social observer, the sociologist, or social researcher who has a feel for the broader issues which are involved in the development of social movements and social change in society. Did the social movement organization create any changes in the valuative or normative structure of the society? Did, for example, the payment of compensation to the coal miners passify them into another period of apathetic reclusion? Or more specifically, did the miners really get all of the money which was due them, and how much was ripped off by lawyers who had to represent them in appeals? What did all of this money really mean to the life style of coal miners and to constructive changes in the Appalachian way of life, if they are needed at all? Did the new leadership of the UMWA administer the affairs of the union any more effectively than the old leadership, other than the absence of corruption? When we say that the Black Lung Association was successful, we speak in rather limited circles, for the real impact of this social movement may not be felt for years, and what does change may not be recognized as a result of the BLA.

V. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

Throughout this study our presentation and discussion of information has been guided, and in some ways limited, by a conceptual framework. In this final section, however, we would like to step apart from this framework and draw some rather general conclusions regarding what we have learned about social movements and social movement organizations.

First, the framework which we have used, built upon a model suggested by McCarthy and Zald (1973b), has demonstrated certain advantages and disadvantages. Its major advantage is the delineation of four parts in the development of a social movement which allow for the intensive analysis of that social movement. It seems to take into consideration both the static and dynamic elements of the phenomenon, and provides both a possible temporal and causal sequence for ordering information. The major disadvantage is the identification of each of the parts independently and as distinct from the others, particularly in the case of the structure and the environment. The parts are not only interdependent somewhat but also overlapping. Perhaps further research will result in more explicit conceptualizations of structure, environment, process, and outcome.

The framework, however, does allow us a great deal of flexibility in the way in which we view the structure of the social movement organization. Although it is our contention that the study of social movements must move in the direction of organizational analysis, we are not convinced that the acceptance of established organizational models necessarily reflects the true state of the subject of the study. Unconditional application of bureaucratic models and principles will possibly result in a misinterpretation of both the internal and external structure of the social movement organization. Further analysis of the internal structure should leave open the possibility of not only finding segmented, decentralized, nonbureaucratic structures but also observing that, in certain situations, these structures may be

quite successful. Further analysis of the external environment of the social movement organization must build on the hypothesis generating data of the case study but also on the hypothesis testing data of the comparative study. The unit of analysis may have to become the environment itself and the level of analysis may require interorganizational approaches.

Although we have utilized the case study method in our analysis of one social movement and its organization, we would contend that further research must begin the comparative study of many cases. In saying this, however, we are not necessarily advocating a change in the variables to be studied, as Blau and Udy have suggested in the comparative analysis of established organizations, but a reanalysis of the case studies which have already been done based upon a common framework for comparison. Whatever this framework is, perhaps a revision of the one we have used, we feel that it is possible to build into it a number of either systematic or quantitative comparisons between the various social movement variables analyzed. Our work on one case and that of Gamson on several is a beginning step in this direction.

Finally, our research on the Black Lung Association has indicated to us that the development of any theoretical perspective on social movements must be built within the framework of a broader theory of society. The creation of any social movement is dependent upon an issue—an issue which more than likely will be of concern to a fairly large number of people. Because it is made up of many parts which are interdependent and interrelated, society's reaction to any issue could

have broad implications, either with regard to the "issue" itself, the social movement which is affecting change, or the tactics used by either the movement organization or its target group within the confrontation process. For too long a time, students of social movements have focused on either the individual leader or follower within a social movement or at best the internal structure of the social movement organization. To truely approach the study of social movements from a sociological perspective, it is imperative that we move away from these socio-psychological explanations and begin the analysis of the broader groups and social groupings within which the social movement develops. Although our analysis of the Black Lung Association has demonstrated the relationship between the development of a social movement and the organizational environment as well as the broader issue environment, we could have extended our analysis to the political and economic environment of both the United States and the world. Social issues very rarely develop independently of the dominant institutions within a society or any social system. Although we discussed in our analysis both political and economic influences on the development process, our questions were not of national and international scope.

The maintenance of continuity in the development of theory in sociology challenges us to fit our studies of social movements into broader theories of society. Although we have here utilized and suggested that social movement theory gain insight from organizational analysis, we are also suggesting that our "open-sytem" approach be

really open and include the influence of broader societal variables. Ultimately, this will not only lead to the identification of more causal associations for the strengthening of social movement theory but in turn contribute to the eventual development and better understanding of a theory of society. It is to these goals that our study of the Black Lung Association was directed.

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After returning from active military service, he completed a M.S. is Sociology at the University of Tennessee in 1972. In 1973 he accepted an instructorship at Marshall University in Huntington, West Virginia, which provided financial support while collecting data for the doctoral dissertation. In the fall of 1974, he accepted a position as an Assistant Professor at the University of North Carolina, A and T Campus, in Greensboro, North Carolina. He is now in his second year at that institution.