




To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Zelma Lansford entitled "A Study of Conflict Related to the Development of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education, with a major in Educational Administration and Supervision.


Francis M. Trusty, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:





Accepted for the Council:


Vice Provost and
Dean of the Graduate School

Thesis
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A STUDY OF CONFLICT RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION REFORM ACT OF 1984

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Education
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Zelma Lansford
December 1984

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the countless educators who strive to improve the quality of life for students in Tennessee;

To my beloved daughter, Vickie, who has been my motivation and the reason for my efforts;

And to my parents, Eldon and Margaret Lansford, whose love and support have been constant.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Governor Lamar Alexander and his staff, Commissioner of Education Robert McElrath and members of his staff, to the members of the General Assembly, the Tennessee Education Association, and the many people involved in education reform in Tennessee, my deepest appreciation is expressed.

To the most challenging and supportive doctoral committee, my gratitude is unending: Dr. Fran Trusty, Chairman; Dr. Charles Thompson, Dr. Lynn Ourth, and Dr. Charles Peccolo. For his guidance throughout the comprehensive examination, special thanks goes to Dr. John Lovell, committee chairman until his retirement. For his encouragement and advice, special appreciation goes to Dr. Charles Achilles.

For his friendship and belief in me, special gratitude is extended to my mentor for the past decade, Dr. Robert Freeman of Georgia Southern College.

For her help in the technical production of this study, Mrs. Georgia Bunn receives many thanks. Special thanks must also go to the teachers and very special people at Hickory Valley School for the time which they gave me to complete this study and for their cooperation and support.

Finally, appreciation is expressed to fellow graduate student, Dr. Deborah Arfken, and to the many friends who have waited patiently for me to complete this project.

ABSTRACT

In this study, the researcher explored the development of conflict related to the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984 in the state of Tennessee. The conflict was studied through the critical incident technique which utilized printed data from Tennessee newspapers, State Department of Education materials, Tennessee Education Association publications, and other related materials during the period of January 28, 1983 through February 24, 1984. In addition, 24 persons were identified from the printed data and interviewed by the researcher. The data from those interviews identified seven additional critical incidents to be studied and eight other persons to be interviewed.

Findings included the following: the governor's leadership, commitment, and effective use of strategies were primarily responsible for passage of the act. The Tennessee Education Association's futile effort to resist education reform and maintain control of educational change was due to a lack of unified leadership and use of effective strategies. The legislature was influenced by the emergence of new leaders, new power alliances, and behavior which relied heavily on compromise. Finally, the characteristics of leaders and their organizations were a potent influence on the way in which goals were pursued. The primary conflicts of interest related to the control of Tennessee education and the distribution of scarce resources including money and status.

The use of strategy was a dominant factor in management of the conflict. It was determined that the governor's forces relied on careful planning and directed strategies while the teachers' association relied on power alliances formed in the past and on lobbying to influence the legislators.

Although the outcome of the conflict was a win/win situation for all participants, the governor demonstrated the desirability of using strategy and non-coercive power to accomplish planned change. Compromises and integrative problem solving produced benefits for all participants and established major education reform in Tennessee. These reforms included performance based evaluation, incentive pay, a career ladder for teachers and administrators and \$358 million in additional finances for education in the state of Tennessee.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

From Bristol to Memphis and from Union City to Copperhill, the yellow school bus transporting young Tennesseans has been a symbol of the State's interest in education. Since the first public schools were established by the legislature in 1873, education in Tennessee has been assessed, however, as inferior to that in most of the other states in the nation. Whether the focus of the day happened to be mainstreaming handicapped students, teaching basic skills, or collective negotiations for teachers, the assessment revealed a reputation of less than ideal public education. Whether bearing a direct relation to Tennessee's economic development or Tennesseans' priorities, the amounts of money allocated for education in Tennessee have never been perceived as quite enough to raise teacher salaries, increase instructional resources, or boost student achievement scores to a level competitive with that of some of the more prosperous states. To correct more than a century of inferiority, Tennessee obviously needed a comprehensive solution to an accumulation of complex problems.

During the late 1970's, Republican Governor Lamar Alexander recognized the implications of the state's lagging education system through his efforts in economic development. He emphasized the relationship between education and economic development and influenced the development of a Basic Skills Program.

During his re-election campaign in 1982, Governor Alexander promised Tennesseans a special effort to aid the state's development. There was some speculation that tax reform would be his special project (personal communication, Campbell, December 22, 1983), but the need for an immediate boost for Tennessee led to the governor to a different type of reform. He planned a multifaceted response to Tennessee needs. On Inauguration Day 1983, Alexander faced a state in which there were high levels of unemployment, students who were being educated in skills which might not be relevant to jobs in the 1980's, many citizens who were living below the poverty standards, and general economic and education problems which threatened Tennessee's potential.

The reactions to Alexander's first term as governor were mixed. His second-term election was a rather easy victory, but there were charges during the campaign that he had been a "do nothing" governor (Memphis Commercial Appeal, January 31, 1983). He was inaugurated for a second term as the leader of a state with major problems such as a 13.5 percent jobless rate (the highest in four years), a citizenry of which less than half had graduated from high school, an already high sales tax rate, and numerous problems of economic development. During his first term as governor, he had developed a commitment to economic development for Tennessee and a perception that educational reform had to be an integral part of that plan (personal communication, Campbell, December 22, 1983). To implement his plans, he had the support of a new legislative study, some

members of the legislature, the resources of state government, his staff and the electorate.

Alexander's ideas for education reform were selected from many different sources, including the Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study (TCES), a 1982 report which was the result of a June 1981 joint resolution of the General Assembly to create a special task force to study the public education system and to make recommendations and long range plans. The chairperson of that task force, Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien, influential sister of a former Democratic governor of Tennessee, therefore became a key legislator with regard to these proposals.

There were several other influential legislators whose support was crucial to the success of education reform. The Democratic Speaker of the House, Ned Ray McWherter, a frequently mentioned potential nominee for the 1986 gubernatorial race, held immense influence. Lieutenant Governor John Wilder's prestige could not be underestimated. Assuming leadership roles in legislative committees, Representatives Steve Bivens and Steve Cobb and Senators John Rucker and James Elkins were but a few of the legislators whose influence became crucial in the consideration of education reform.

A long history of support for Democratic administrations coupled with an endorsement of an opponent in the 1982 election might have been an early indication that the Tennessee Education Association's (TEA) position on Alexander's proposed education reform would be negative. In 1975, the Tennessee Political Action Committee

for Education was formed as the political action force of the TEA (Cheshier, 1983). This group became the impetus for fund raising, lobbying, and presenting TEA views. In March of 1978, the legislature enacted the Education Professional Negotiations Act requiring boards of education and professional employees to establish procedures governing their relationships. This act was intended as a process for establishing and maintaining an educational climate and working environment for achieving the highest possible education standards and meeting the special needs and requirements of public education (Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 49-5501). The gain in power by TEA was symbolized by the then Democratic Governor Ray Blanton's signing the bill, not at the Capitol, but at the TEA convention. The literature on collective negotiations indicates that both administrator and teacher activists view collective negotiations as a means to assume greater power over policy formulation and decision making by teacher organizations (Cresswell, 1980; Perry, 1970). With the long-term executive secretary Cavit Cheshier; president, Jim Booth; and president-elect, Marjorie Pike; the TEA leadership in 1983 professed different values and goals regarding the teaching profession from those espoused by the governor. The TEA position regarding Alexander's first-term accomplishments and TEA's traditional support of the Democratic Party were conditions which did not offer encouragement to the innovative ideas of a Republican governor.

At the end of January 1983, the Tennessee Education Association focused attention upon higher salaries for all public school personnel.

In addition to the issue of education, the attention of the legislators was focused upon such diverse issues as banking regulations, the legal drinking age, state taxes, and clean water. The governor's attention, however, was firmly focused upon a rapid development of Tennessee's economy through education, thus increasing the standard of living for the state's citizens. These differences in values, perceptions, status of leaders, and preferred allocations of resources constituted a predisposed state for disagreement. The conflict began with the governor's unveiling of the "Better Schools Program," his ten-point plan, during the January 28, 1983 speech on statewide television. Responses to that speech identified many of the major participants in the impending conflict and the issues which governed the controversy.

Statement of the Problem

The problem which this study addressed was the lack of data concerning the nature and role of conflict in the development of the Comprehensive Educational Reform Act of 1984.

Rationale for the Study

In the early 1980's, considerable national attention was drawn to the need for quality education (Adler, 1982; Gardner, 1983; Goodlad, 1983; Wood, 1983; Boyer, 1983). In 1983 alone, there were seven major studies released (Academic Preparation for College, Action for Excellence, America's Competitive Challenge, Making the

Grade, A Nation at Risk, A Place Called School, A Study of High Schools, and High Schools: A Report on Secondary Education in America), which advocated the need for education reform. In addition, the Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study of 1982 advocated the need for reform within Tennessee.

As Tennesseans, led by Governor Lamar Alexander, tried to respond to that need, it became apparent that a comprehensive solution would be required to solve such complex problems. Generating the momentum and commitment necessary to effect such monumental changes required an unprecedented effort by numerous individuals; however, no information existed on how the state's resources were marshaled to interact and facilitate such complex education reform. Therefore, this study was directed toward describing the incidents which affected that change effort and to providing a record for future education reformers.

Choosing recommendations from the TCES report, incorporating some of his own concepts and translating them into proposed legislation, Alexander unveiled his proposals on January 28, 1983. For the press and the public, the governor labeled these ideas "The Better Schools Program." The comprehensive reform package was received in the press and elsewhere with favorable interest and enthusiasm, with the exception of two proposals. The Master Teacher/Principal Program seemed to polarize the factions involved and resulted in opposition from the leadership of the TEA, the state's teachers' union (Alexander, 1983; Cheshier, 1983). With differing

values and goals, the various participants moved closer to conflict. The questions of how teachers should be evaluated, how education could be improved, and how the state's economic resources would be distributed in servicing these goals became major issues.

Full (1967) indicates that conflict and controversy accompany educational change. To understand this process, there is a need to study and analyze educational conflicts and to contribute to the literature on education reform. It was perceived that the absence of data regarding education conflicts and the potential value of a conflict analysis approach to understanding how education reform and improvement occur was sufficient justification for the study.

Purposes of the Study

This is a study of education in Tennessee, specifically of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984. One purpose of this study was to identify the major participants, their goals and strategies, the issues which divided the participants, and the critical incidents around which conflict developed and was resolved. A second purpose was to analyze the information collected using content analysis in order to better understand and describe the nature and role of conflict in education reform.

Importance of the Study

Although more than one thousand newspaper articles were generated regarding education reform in Tennessee during the period of the

study; and the governor, legislators, and TEA generated a multitude of printed materials, there existed no summary analysis of the critical incidents and the accompanying conflict. Various leaders involved gave different verbal accounts of the transactions, but no single account of the total interaction was available. Because such complex education reform involving this amount of effort had never been proposed before at this level of government in Tennessee, the procedures followed and the ensuing controversy deserved description and analysis. As a result of this study, it was possible to discern the critical incidents, how these led to other events as the conflict developed, the major participants in the conflict, the strategies they used, how their goals were achieved, how the conflict was resolved, and the nature and role of conflict in comprehensive education reform.

As Tennessee was unique in attempting comprehensive education reform, this study is unique in its record of the conflict. Other states (Idaho, Washington, New Mexico, Massachusetts) conducted major education studies during the same time period, but Tennessee was a leader among the states in which numerous complex changes were proposed or in which the governor played such a major role. At the end of 1983, twenty-three states reported some level of consideration of merit pay, differentiated salaries, or the master teacher concept (Education Week, 1983) but the scope of the Tennessee effort and the level of the governor's involvement made this effort unique.

The ultimate significance of this study is the availability of the analysis to interested individuals--particularly those in

education and political science who undertake such enormous education reform.

Assumptions of the Study

For purposes of the study, the following assumptions were made:

1. The newspaper accounts and other related printed material provided a correct record of the development of issues and processes.
2. Those persons interviewed provided additional relevant information, and their perceptions reflected the issues and strategies involved.

Limitations and Delimitations

The study was delimited to the issues, participants, and processes of conflict arising from the proposed education reform program in Tennessee. It was delimited to the period which began with the release of the Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study in December 1982 and ended with the conclusion of the special session of the General Assembly on February 23, 1984. It was limited by the collection of data from Tennessee newspaper articles published from January 27, 1983 through February 23, 1984; printed material from the State Department of Education, the Tennessee Education Association, the Governor's Office, and through personal interviews with people indicated by the newspaper data as being major participants.

The issues, participants, and process were described. The nature of the research suggested the use of content analysis rather

than correlational analysis or other statistical treatment of the data. Thus, description and analysis became the major tools for gaining insight and making inferences.

Definition of Terms

1. Better Schools Program. This title represented Governor Lamar Alexander's proposed legislation, a ten-part plan of comprehensive educational reform largely taken from the Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study (1982). Each of the ten points, along with the entire program, is discussed in depth beginning on page 75.

2. Conflict. Conflict is a process which itself is neither good nor bad, but which has elements and outcomes which may be judged favorably or unfavorably by those participating in or evaluating it (Filley, 1975, p. 7). Organizational conflict is a disagreement between two or more groups or members arising from the fact that they must share scarce resources or work activities and/or from the fact that they have different status, goals, values, or perceptions. These members or groups attempt to have their own causes or points of view prevail over others (Stoner, 1978).

3. Conflict management. Conflict management is an intervention in a conflict by a third party or through participants' use of strategies to effect change, stimulate, or reduce conflict. These strategies or interventions are directed toward moving the interactions toward an outcome or facilitating the conflict to serve some purpose.

4. Conflict resolution. The resolution of a conflict is the final outcome of the controversy. This outcome may be influenced by the types of conflict management strategies which have been utilized. Dominance or suppression may produce a win/lose outcome while compromise can produce either a win/win or a lose/lose. Integrative problem solving is most likely to lead to a win/win outcome. The participants' perceptions influence the particular outcome.

5. Content analysis. A system of conceptually linking the content of the research with its description, Berelson describes it as "a research technique for objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (1971, p. 18).

6. Critical incident. This is an event which stimulated conflict.

7. Goal. A goal is the objective, aim, intent, or purpose which the major participants attempted to achieve.

8. Influence. Influence is "a change in behavior or attitude resulting directly or indirectly from the actions or examples of another person or group" (Stoner, 1978, p. 266).

9. Major participant. A person or group whose influence was a primary factor in the conflict is designated as a major participant.

10. Power. It is the ability to exert influence or to facilitate a change and dispense rewards and punishments, especially of a monetary nature.

11. Semi-structured interview. An interview which is "built around a core of structured questions from which the interviewer branches off to explore in depth" (Isaac, 1980, p. 26).

12. Unstructured interview. An interview which does not employ a detailed interview guide but includes questions or comments from a general plan intended to lead the respondent toward giving data to meet specific objectives (Borg, 1979).

Questions to be Answered by the Study

The researcher explored the following questions and their ramifications related to Tennessee and the CERA.

1. Who were the major participants in this conflict?
2. What were the issues which divided the participants?
3. What were the incidents around which conflict developed?
4. What were the participants' goals and strategies?
5. How was the resolution of conflict achieved?

Procedures

Relevant newspaper articles were collected from twenty-nine daily and weekly newspapers published in the state of Tennessee (see Appendix A) along with relevant publications from TEA, the State Department of Education, and from Governor Alexander's office from the period January 27, 1983 through the end of the special session of the General Assembly on February 23, 1984. The printed data were arranged in chronological order, then divided into categories according to the subjects covered by the articles. Categorizing the data generated information regarding the critical incidents and the major participants in the conflict.

A list of critical incidents (see Appendix B) was developed from the printed data with additional incidents added from the personal interviews when the participants indicated that there were other incidents which were important but not necessarily mentioned in the newspapers. A list of major participants was also generated which served as the basis for personal interviews conducted by the researcher. In addition to the lists, names of other persons were added when perceived by those interviewed to be major participants. The researcher conducted the interviews, utilizing the list of critical incidents and the research questions within a combination of the unstructured and semi-structured format (Borg, 1962, pp. 221-223). This format was chosen as a means of pursuing Flanagan's critical incidents scheme (1954). The use of newspaper articles as background information was used in the development of the interview guidelines.

The researcher had been trained at the graduate level in interpersonal communications, counseling, and group dynamics. Further study addressed the use of interviews conducted for the purpose of collecting specific data. As a means of establishing safeguards against interviewer bias, the researcher demonstrated to experts in communications her skills in the technique of interviewing. This demonstration was conducted through a review by two professors at The University of Tennessee. One professor was a member of the Educational and Counseling Psychology Department and a nationally known expert in counseling. The second professor was a member of the Educational Leadership Department and a specialist in behavioral sciences.

A review of the researcher's skills was first conducted in a role-play situation using the interview guide to develop practice for conducting the interviews. Second, the researcher submitted a typed manuscript of the first two interviews to the two experts to determine if the information required by the interview guide had actually been obtained. Their reviews led them to affirm that the interviewer's skills were adequate to conduct the interviews needed for the study.

Utilizing data obtained from newspaper articles and from interviews of the major participants, the researcher then described the critical incidents around which conflict revolved, the issues which separated the major participants, the goals and strategies of the participants, and the outcomes of the strategies employed by the major participants from December 1982 through February 23, 1984.

This description was developed through the utilization of content analysis. Holstei (1969, p. 2) indicates the suitability of this method as specifically developed for investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as the basis for inference. Berelson (1971) indicates that content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.

Using the printed data from publications reviewed and the tape recordings from the interviews, the researcher performed a content analysis to determine the professed and apparent interests and goals of the participants. The content analysis had the following major categories:

1. Characteristics of leaders
2. Characteristics of organizations
3. Communications
4. Goals
5. Economics/scarce resources
6. Power/control
7. Strategies
8. Compromises
9. Other categories when frequently mentioned.

Using the data, the conflict was considered from a three-way perspective. A description of the critical incidents was first constructed from the printed data and the personal interviews. The conflict was then considered through an analysis of the issues, participants' goals, and their strategies involved in the conflict. The third consideration was the behaviors of the major participants, their organizations, and their involvement in effecting a resolution of the conflict. To conceptualize this three-way perspective, a model was developed. Thus, through the use of the model and conflict management literature, an analysis was constructed of the entire conflict.

Organization of the Study

The study or dissertation is presented in the following organizational format:

Chapter I presents the introduction, statement of the problem, rationale for the study, purpose of the study, importance of the study,

assumptions of the study, limitations and delimitations, definition of terms, questions to be answered by the study, procedures, and organization of the study.

Chapter II presents a review of the literature related to this study. The review includes a section on leadership, power, policy development, political processes, change, and conflict.

Chapter III describes the method used for collecting the printed data, the procedures employed in conducting the interviews, content analysis, and presentation of the data.

Chapter IV presents a description of the critical incidents derived from the printed data and verified in the personal interviews.

Chapter V presents an analysis of the issues, participants' goals, and their strategies involved in the conflict.

Chapter VI presents a description of the behaviors of the major participants in the conflict.

Chapter VII presents a summary, questions answered by the study, findings, conclusions, and recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

The broad base of the subject of this study required a review of literature in several areas. First, to examine the participants and their organizations, it was necessary to survey literature on leadership and power. Then, to consider the task adopted by some of the participants, it was necessary to examine literature on policy development. Finally, to analyze how participants tried to accomplish their task of gaining adoption or rejection of their goals necessitated a survey of the literature on change, conflict management, and political processes.

Leadership

James Stoner observed that "the concept of authority is so much a part of our culture that it is hard for us to imagine a workable society without it" (1978, p. 265). While authority is accepted as a necessary ingredient for an orderly society, there is little agreement among authors as to the ingredients in leadership. Although scholars from Aristotle's time onward have examined the phenomenon, the conceptual approach to leadership studies has changed only in the last 30 years. Until recently, most authors concentrated on what is called the trait approach to studying leadership. This

concept followed the idea that great leaders are born, not made. Perhaps one reason for the acceptance of that idea in earlier periods of history was the large number of leaders who inherited their positions of leadership as opposed to the modern methods of selecting leaders.

Having abandoned the trait approach, most modern authors concentrate on studying the processes and styles of leadership. Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard define leadership as "the process of influencing the activities of an individual or group in efforts toward goal achievement in a given situation" (1982, p. 84). Edwin Hollander (1978) emphasizes the importance of consideration of a two-way influence relationship involving the cooperative efforts of followers.

James Burns (1978) lamented the inability of the social sciences to provide standards and knowledge which allow a distinction to be made between leaders and tyrants. He indicated that leaders such as Hitler are actually polar opposites from true leaders since they do not lead but crush all opposition. Bavelas (1960) contends that a good leader is inseparably tied to a system of values.

Fiedler and Chemers (1977) note that leadership is a complex interpersonal relationship which can only be exercised in groups in which the participants want to accomplish a common goal. Hollander (1978) also notes that leadership is a relationship, not a single person. Johnson and Johnson (1982) indicate that leadership is also

dependent upon chance: the circumstance of being in the right place at the right time. Lassey (1973) indicates that leadership is not solely a function of the characteristics of an individual but a complex relationship among the variables of the leader, the characteristics of the followers, characteristics of the organization and the nature of tasks or goals, and the general environment of the time. Lippitt (1982) indicates the importance of followers and their competency for ensuring effective leadership.

If leadership is a reciprocal relationship between leader and followers, effective leadership is dependent upon the leader's ability to influence. Johnson and Johnson define influence as "persuading group members to cooperate in setting and achieving goals" (1978, p. 50). Stoner defines influence as "a change in behavior or attitude resulting directly or indirectly from the actions or example of another person or group" (1978, p. 266). Influence bears an intimate relationship to power in that the most powerful leaders are perceived as those who can most influence their peers, superiors, or subordinates (Stoner, 1978).

Power

The English word "power" is derived from the Old Latin root posse which means "to be able." Stoner defines power as the ability to bring about a change in the behavior or attitudes of others (1978, p. 266). Johnson and Johnson expand the definition of power as "one person's control over resources valued by another" (1982, p. 343).

Winter calls social power "the ability or capacity to produce intended effects on the behavior or emotions of another person" (1976, p. 3).

French and Raven (1959) classified power in five categories. Those were expanded by Hersey and Blanchard (1982) to include the following types of power:

Legitimate Power is based on formal authority such as an elected official.

Expert Power is based on the leader's possession of expertise, skills, or knowledge which is respected.

Reward Power is based on the leader's ability to provide rewards for others.

Referent Power is based on the leader's personal traits and is usually regarded as having charismatic qualities.

Coercive Power is based on fear and the leader's ability to instill fear of punishment.

Information Power is based on the leader's possession of information that is perceived as valuable by others.

Connection Power is based on the leader's "connections" with influential or important persons (pp. 178-179).

The authors indicate that the most effective use of power does not lie in any one type of power. Rather, the type of power exerted is related to the situation and the followers. Stoner (1978) also notes that the use of influence and power is dependent upon acceptance. Etzioni (1968) indicates that different types of power are likely to produce more or less alienation in those subjected to the power. Deutsch (1973, p. 87) suggests that more alienation can be expected from the use of coercive power and less from the use of expert and referent power. Further, Deutsch contends that ". . . if those in

high power expect to be humiliated or frustrated in major ways by a redistribution of power, they will resist it and seek to defend or extend their superior position" (p. 93).

Burns (1978) indicates that two essential elements of power are motive and resource. He states that motive is the will to do something while resources are the enablers. Both must be present at a high level for power to be exerted.

Martin and Sims (in Leavitt and Pondy, 1964, pp. 210-225) note that powerful leaders may not have traits in common, but they may employ common power tactics such as:

- taking counsel
- forming alliances
- maintaining maneuverability
- emphasizing communications
- compromising
- using negative timing
- using self-dramatization
- displaying confidence.

Stoner notes that evidence of American distrust of excessive power can be seen in the Constitution and in the history of the country. He indicates that Americans "tend to have ambivalent feelings about power. They may desire it but are reluctant to admit this openly. They may both admire and resent power in others" (1978, p. 270).

Recent political science studies focus on two different views of power within the community (Clelland, 1977). The elitist view assumes that power is invested in an individual or very small group who wield influence over the entire community. This concentration of power at the top of an organization or community can be visualized by a pyramid. In this view, an ever decreasing number of people ascend with greater power over the people below with less power.

Batkins compares the opposite view of community power, that of the pluralists, to a matrix of separate pyramids. He sees them as "forming the tops of many special interest group strongholds, which all act to shape the future of the community" (1982, p. 7).

Whether viewed as a single pyramid which reigns in all situations, or as a series of peaks that arise in response to different situations, power is usually concentrated at the top. Perhaps Hobbes' very early definition of social power (1651) as a person's "present means to obtain some future apparent good" remains a very relevant description of the community power holder.

Finally, Burns describes the intimate relationship of power and leadership with the statement, "All leaders are actual or potential power holders, but not all power holders are leaders" (1978, p. 10). The authors seem to agree that the effective use of power depends upon the control of resources to generate power, the motivation to use those resources to influence others, skill in the use of those resources, and good judgement in employing the power in an appropriate method.

Policy Development

Dye defines public policy as "whatever governments choose to do or not to do" (1976, p. 1). Freeman refers to policymaking as "the formulation, adoption, and application of legal courses of action" (1965, p. 12). Dror's definition is "a very complex, dynamic process used to decide the major guidelines for action directed toward what is in the public interest by the best possible means" (1968, p. 12). Guba expresses frustration at the lack of a uniform definition in the literature which could facilitate the process of policy analysis. In an effort to focus attention on the importance of policy definition for analysis purposes, Guba collected the following definitions:

1. Policy is an assertion of intents or goals.
2. Policy is the accumulated standing decisions of a governing body by which it regulates, controls, promotes, services, and otherwise influences matters within its sphere of authority.
3. Policy is a guide to discretionary action.
4. Policy is a strategy undertaken to solve or ameliorate a problem.
5. Policy is sanctioned behavior.
6. Policy is a norm of conduct.
7. Policy is the output of the policymaking system.
8. Policy is the effect of the policymaking and policy-implementing system (1984, pp. 64-65).

Dye (1969) indicates that state legislators perceive their roles to be involved with the passing of laws, representation of people, and development of policy. Dye contends that the governor,

courts, executive agencies, and other groups make public policy, but that the legislature is more involved with resolving conflicts over policy. Fuhrman and Rosenthal (1981) note the dramatic expansion of legislative power in education policy making.

The formulation of policy involves both planning and change. It is the development of a plan of objectives which has been derived from perceived needs (Dejon, 1980). The path from policy to legislation requires strategy and involvement. Watson and Thomas indicate that the political leader's major role with regard to policy development is "one of knowing what those proposals should be, that is, having the wit and imagination to recognize the existence of ideas and programs that will actually work" (1983, p. 419).

Anderson, Brady, and Bullock (1978) indicate that some changes are incremental in that they make small changes in existing policies. Dror (1968) indicates that incremental change is the most common type of policy change in a democracy in that it minimizes risks and settles for achievements of satisfactory quality rather than optimum results. He indicates that one reason for the common occurrence of this type of policy is that acceptance is usually gained through bargaining, and therefore, follows the path of least resistance. Lindbloom (1959) developed a realistic description of incremental change in his discussion of "muddling through."

Dye (1976) indicates that an educated population should be more receptive of innovation in public policy. He also indicates

that studies of policy innovation suggest that the wealthier states tend to be more accepting of innovative changes in policy.

Education Policy in Tennessee

Educational policy in Tennessee is derived from legislation passed by the General Assembly. That legislation originates in the form of a bill in either the House or Senate. The bill must be introduced by the tenth legislative day of the session unless an extension is granted by two-thirds of the originating body. The bill, after introduction, must be passed by the Education Committee of both the House and the Senate. Any education bill which requires funding must also be passed by the Finance, Ways and Means Committees. It is then considered by both groups' Calendar Committees and scheduled for debate. For a bill to become law, it must be considered and passed on three different legislative days in each house. On the third and final consideration, the bill must receive approval of a majority of the members to which each house is entitled (50 votes in the House and 17 votes in the Senate). When this occurs, the legislation is signed by each speaker and sent to the governor for his signature. The governor may veto such legislation, but that veto can be over-ridden by a simple majority vote in each house. Further education policy is developed by the State Board of Education (Tennessee Blue Book, 1983-84, pp. 4 and 141). At times, the courts can also establish procedures as a result of litigation.

Memphis Commercial Appeal columnist Richard Locker gave a more picturesque description of the path in the Tennessee legislature.

For education legislation, the road from bill to law is a dusty, treacherous trail with stops in two Senate committees, three House panels and the floors of both chambers--seven in all (November 27, 1983).

Political Processes

Dugger indicates that "we may scorn politicians, but politics dominates us . . ." (1982, p. 1). Yet as pollster Patrick Caddell indicated in a memorandum to Jimmy Carter the month after Carter won the 1976 presidential contest, "Governing with public approval requires a continuing political campaign" (in Watson and Thomas, 1983, p. 165).

Paige indicates that "political leadership is the behavior of persons in positions of political authority, their competitors, and these both in interaction with other members of society" (1977, p. 1). Berreth (1984) states that educators' hesitancy to participate in politics has placed the profession in a reactive mode, defensive and criticizing ill-formed policies without offering attractive alternatives.

Political Processes of Political Leaders

There is little in the literature to describe adequately the political processes in Tennessee at the time of this study. The governor was only the second Republican to be elected in more than half a century. Yet, the General Assembly was dominated by Democrats. In order to find implications for Tennessee political process at the time of the study, it seemed appropriate to examine the literature

regarding the politics of the United States Presidency. Governor Alexander had studied the history of the presidency and had enjoyed the opportunity to observe the President when he was a congressional liason staff member at the White House.

The implementation of a political leader's policies requires a close and cooperative working relationship with the legislative or congressional bodies. Watson and Thompson (1983) indicate that presidential legislative skills tend to be related to personal style. To illustrate the point, a comparison of the legislative styles of Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter indicates some of the reasons for success or failure. In the mid-1960's, President Johnson had become very involved with the development and passage of innovative legislation which he termed "The Great Society" (e.g., Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Medicare Act of 1965, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965). Johnson used his considerable knowledge of the Congress as a key strategy. For example, he waited to send bills to Congress until the moment seemed right in terms of maximizing support and minimizing opposition. He sent bills singly rather than in a package so that opposition would not develop automatically around several measures at once. Just before sending these bills to Congress, Johnson and his aides would hold a special briefing to explain his proposals. Finally, when crucial votes were approaching on Capitol Hill, he made intense personal appeals to key members whose votes served as cues for others and to members who were

identified as uncommitted or wavering (Watson and Thomas, 1983, p. 263).

In contrast, President Carter presented Congress with a lengthy agenda of comprehensive proposals, neglecting to focus attention on his concerns of high priority. Unlike Johnson, Carter tended to cast proposals in moralistic, self-righteous tones and frequently managed to alienate members of Congress (p. 279). Carter tended to pursue many goals in a short period and initiate policies without sufficient consultation and analysis. Carter is often remembered as a president who failed because he neglected to exercise appropriate leadership with Congress (Green, 1984). Yet, Carter enjoyed a Congress whose characteristics were typical of congresses in periods marked by significant policy changes (Anderson, Brady, Bullock, p. 406).

The literature suggests that there are periods when the astute political leader can avoid merely proposing incremental changes and practicing Lindbloom's "science of muddling through" (1959). It appears that Congress has been overwhelmingly accepting of a President's proposals immediately after an unusually large vote in an election. Personal popularity with the voter apparently results in cooperation from Congress (Green, 1984). This mandate, however, is not insurance, as can be noted in the early 1970's when Nixon chose to confront Congress with a sweeping doctrine of executive privilege rather than use his mandate to build a coalition with Congress.

Further implications for Tennessee political processes can be drawn from President Reagan's success with Congress. His personal charm, success with the media, ability to mobilize money and business, and his knowledge of members of Congress have contributed to Reagan's success in gaining some measure of cooperation from a Democratically controlled Congress (Watson and Thomas, 1983).

Lobbying as a Political Process

A lobbyist is one who may frequent the lobby or ante-room outside legislative quarters for the purpose of influencing the individuals within. This attempt to sway is usually a highly organized effort to disseminate influence on behalf of special interest groups. This attempt to influence is not confined to the lobby as the name might indicate, rather it extends to any place or means that is deemed to serve the needs of the lobbyist. While such coercive techniques as bribery are not allowed by law, there is little effective control of lobbying efforts except for the requirement that all lobbyists be registered (Dye, 1969). The Johnson administration set a strong precedent in the establishment of a liaison operation to lobby Congress. Watson and Thomas (1983) call this lobbying "persuasion and use of formal powers to form congressional coalitions to enact the president's program" (p. 267).

Green (1982) describes the very effective efforts by the Tennessee Education Association in the early 1960's as follows: "The floors of the legislature were still open to nonmembers, and

TEA representatives packed the hallways and flowed onto the floor of the legislative chambers themselves" (p. 313).

Political Processes in the Legislature

It is a widely accepted axiom that "politics is the art of compromise." Indeed, compromise seems to be a primary political process in the legislative body. The late Senator Everett Dirksen once said, "If there were no compromise, there might not have been a Constitution of the United States" (in MacNeil, 1970, p. 12). In fact, it seems to be the first of what Dye (1969) refers to as the "rules of the game." Although the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and various other laws establish legislative procedures, there are also unwritten rules or customs of the legislators which govern their interactions. At the top of the list are the following guidelines:

- be willing to compromise
- keep your word
- support another member's bill if it doesn't affect you or your district
- don't make personal attacks on other members
- don't conceal the real purpose of bills or amendments
- respect the seniority system
- respect committee jurisdiction
- don't talk too much or fight unnecessarily.

These are the rules which freshman legislators learn quickly if they are to survive (p. 127).

Political processes are the interactions among elected leaders and their constituencies. Bacharach and Lawler indicate that "survival in an organization is a political act" (1980, p. 1). Apparently, if the rules are assimilated and the "game" is played well, politics becomes "the art of the possible" (Dirkson in MacNeil, 1970, p. 12).

Change

Havelock (1973) indicates that change is any significant alteration in the status quo. Further, he indicates that innovation is "any change which represents something new to the people being changed" (p. 4). Human beings are apparently not amenable to change. According to Conner (1982) change is a disruptive force. While it is easy to focus upon the complexities of modern society and the change which technology has forced upon humans, the attitude toward the difficulties associated with change is not new. In The Prince in 1513, Machiavelli wrote, "There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things."

Havelock (1973) indicates that most of the time, people do not want to change. For that reason, a change agent is needed "just to overcome the inertia, to prod and pressure the system to be less complacent and to start working on serious problems" (1973, p. 8). Wiles and Lovell (1975) indicate that people have varying degrees of readiness for change.

Regardless of attitudes toward change, change occurs every moment. How the occurrence of change is accepted influences the outcomes of this change. Humans either react to change as it comes, or they anticipate its occurrence. According to Stoner (1978, p. 317), planned change is the process of dealing with present difficulties as well as anticipated difficulties that are not yet observable. This action might be considered pro-active in opposition to reactive responses to unanticipated change.

In 1947 Kurt Lewin (cited in Stoner, 1978) created the early concept of planned change which was derived from this theory of social behavior. This theory had three basic phases as follows:

- Unfreezing -- The need for and possibility of change must be recognized by the persons involved. The existing equilibrium must be made open to change.
- Moved -- Movement to a new state
- Refreezing -- The changed forces must be supported or stabilized at the new level for the change to be long-lasting (p. 384).

Out of this earlier model, an action research model was developed which utilized a problem-solving approach to change. This model called Force Field Analysis, emphasizes the restraining forces and the driving forces which exert pressure on the status quo.

Bennis (1966) believes that change occurs best when the environment is conducive to change and when those above and below the change implementation are in consensus. Bennis indicates that the ability

to reduce resistance to change is critical. He states that resistance can be increased by changes directed toward norms, because of the greater number of people involved, and when they are directed toward values held sacred. Bennis outlines the following as important means of lessening resistance to change:

1. Involve the persons related to any change in the decision making process.
2. Seek the support of the hierarchy above and below.
3. Present the changes as lessening the burdens of those involved.
4. Present the changes as offering new experiences and not threatening autonomy.
5. Obtain as much commitment and participation in order to effect a consensus regarding the change.
6. Elicit trust from participants.
7. Keep issues open for revision (p. 317).

Bennis further states that the major strategies for effecting change in organizations are rationality, educativeness, and influence. It is a process of re-educating those involved in an organization through the strategies of reason and influence.

Dalton (1973) indicates the following six conditions associated with successful change efforts:

1. There is a strongly felt need that people want a change.
2. The person assisting in change is highly esteemed by the persons involved in changing.
3. The change effort moves from general proposals to specific plans and workable sub-goals.

4. The change plan increases the self-esteem of the people who are changing.
5. The change plan results in new social ties or re-formulation of old ties around new behaviors and attitudes.
6. The people changing shift from an external motive for changing to an internal understanding and commitment.

Achilles and Norman (1974) caution that for change to be effective, careful attention must be paid to the communications process involved. They emphasize that local adoption of a wide-spread implementation of change must involve personal assistance and communications. The authors indicate that change and communication cannot be separated.

A change model which incorporates theory and research from both fields and recognizes their relationships should have a better probability of promoting professional growth among educators and improved instructional and administrative practices in the schools than one which takes a narrow and separate view of communication and change (p. 142).

The literature substantiates that major changes in education have not occurred easily or frequently. Reichart picturesquely describes attitudes toward change in education in the following:

In a professional sense, the teacher has too often replaced the God of St. Augustine with the ritualistic observance of tradition, has too often founded the actions of today only upon what was done yesterday, and thus has been detached from a futuristic attitude. Certainly the past should be a bedrock--but to stand upon to extend the grasp, not to sleep on (1969, p. 6).

For change to take place in education, this worship of the past and closed attitude to the new must be replaced. To follow the Lewin model, there must be an "unfreezing" and amenability to change.

The driving forces which pressure the status quo also result in what Wiles and Lovell call "disequilibration" (1975, p. 18). This unfreezing and disruption of equilibrium are not usually accomplished, however, without conflict. According to Deutsch (1973), this disruption actually acts to effect change. It is in this manner that conflict can be a healthy aspect of every change effort.

Conflict

Conflict as a Pathological Phenomenon

Late nineteenth and early twentieth century conflict theorists such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Max Weber, and Georg Simmel tended to view conflict in negative terms. Simmel (1908) considered conflict in terms of such dissociating factors as hate, envy, need, and desire. Marx and Engels (in Duke, 1976) strongly emphasized the exploitative and competitive nature of social relations and the resulting conflict. Most early writers viewed conflict as a result of human beings' basic aggressive and hostile nature where only the fit survive.

Conflict as an Aspect of Change

Contemporary conflict literature is primarily directed toward learning to manage conflict in such a way as to utilize its positive aspects and values. Many authors (Conner, 1982; Deutsch, 1975; Filley, 1975; Johnson and Johnson, 1982; Walton, 1969) view conflict as a means of opportunity and change. It is this view of conflict

which resulted in modern conflict management literature in which skills in analysis, management, and resolution are explored and developed. It is this area of the literature which was utilized as a background for analysis of the conflict in this study.

Definitions of Conflict

Deutsch indicates that "a conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur" (1975, p. 10). Filley expresses conflict as "a process which itself is neither good nor bad, but which has elements and outcomes which may be judged favorably or unfavorably by those participating in or evaluating it" (1975, p. 7). Likert and Likert view conflict as "the active striving for one's own preferred outcome which, if attained, precludes the attainment by others of their own preferred outcome, thereby producing hostility" (1976, p. 7).

While conflict takes many different forms, most authors distinguish between two distinct types of conflict. Likert and Likert view substantive conflicts as those that involve tasks. They call conflicts which are caused by emotional aspects of interaction as being affective. Johnson and Johnson (1982) and Walton (1969) also make those distinctions in terms of analyzing and managing conflicts.

The Value of Conflict

Deutsch (1975) indicates that conflict can prevent stagnation, stimulate interest, and become the medium through which problems may be aired and solutions found. He sees conflict as the root of social

change. Cozer (1956) indicates that conflict within a group frequently helps to revitalize existing norms and can contribute to the emergence of new norms. Walton (1969) indicates that conflict can increase motivation and energy and can increase innovativeness because of the greater diversity of viewpoints which are thrust upon the situation. Further, Walton states that interactions during conflict necessitate increased articulation of views and thus develop a greater understanding of one's own position in helping to achieve a greater awareness of one's own identity.

Filley (1975) states that conflict can stimulate the search for new facts, methods, or solutions. He sees value in conflict as a means of moving mechanically functioning social systems where there has been little likelihood of creativity or change. With regard to conflict between groups, Filley regards it as opportunity for group growth since it can stimulate group cohesion and increase performance. Likert and Likert refer to this as "the 'fruitful friction' that is necessary for seeking new levels of creativity and organizational efficiency" (1976, p. 7).

Antecedent Conditions

Antecedent conditions are the characteristics of social relationships which are the causes of conflict. While these conditions do not lead directly to conflict, their existence creates opportunities for conflict to arise in the presence of a catalytic event. Some causes for the type of conflict in this study are as follows.

Ambiguous boundaries. Filley (1975) indicates that the opportunity for conflict will be greater when the limits of participants' jurisdictions are unclear. When either organizational definitions or historical and traditional directions appear to be exceeded by one participant, the result is an increased condition for conflict. Duke (1976) indicates that the attempt to extend boundaries through the use of power will result in conflict.

Communications. Stoner (1978) indicates that ineffective communications are a common cause of conflict among groups. Filley (1975) states that time and space barriers to communication increase the chances for conflict to occur. Deutsch (1975) notes that misleading or infrequent communication creates a competitive climate rather than one of cooperation.

Association of parties. There is indication that opportunities for conflict are greater when groups are involved in decision making in the same area but are not engaged in participative decision making (Filley, 1975). While the literature confirms that a high degree of participation in decision making can lessen conflict (Likert and Likert, 1976), a simple informal association can breed conflict.

Behavior regulations. The imposition of regulations such as rules and policies which govern behavior can reduce conflict since they make relationships predictable and reduce the making of arbitrary decisions. However, the imposition of such standards of

behavior is an attempt to control. It is this attempted effort to gain control which may then cause conflict (Filley, 1975).

Conflicts of interest. The literature suggests that this group of conditions constitute the greatest area for potential conflict (Deutsch, 1975; Filley, 1975; Johnson and Johnson, 1982; and Stoner, 1978). Johnson and Johnson determined that a conflict of interests exists when the actions of one person attempting to maximize his advantages or benefits prevent or interfere with the actions of another person who is attempting to maximize his or her benefits. Such interests may be differences in needs, values, or goals or scarcities of such resources as power, influence, time, position, popularity, or money. These differences in interests may develop into a rivalry which is a forerunner of conflict. Duke (1976) indicates that major sources of conflict are differences in the distribution of resources, status, and honor. Differences in values and ownership are additional sources of conflict. Duke further indicates as follows:

Conflicts of interest, are normal, inevitable, and ubiquitous in social life, primarily because of the scarcity of valued goods and services. No human society or social group exists which does not possess conflicts of interests. Generally, the greater the scarcity, the greater the conflict (1976, p. 235).

It is necessary, for the purposes of this study, to examine closely the conflict of interest which occurs when two groups possess differing goals. According to Johnson and Johnson, a group goal is

"a future state of affairs desired by enough members of the group to motivate their working toward that achievement" (1982, p. 137). As members commit themselves to achieving a goal, internal tension is aroused and motivates the group toward achievement. The authors indicate that member commitment to goal achievement is dependent upon the following:

- desirability of the goal
- possibility of accomplishing the goal
- challenge of the goal
- ability to tell when the goal has been achieved
- satisfaction or reward which members expect when the goal is accomplished
- group interaction (p. 141).

The level of commitment to differing goals by two or more groups thus serves to increase the likelihood of conflict. The importance of goals as an area for conflict is confirmed by Duke in his definition of a conflict of interest as "the incompatibility between the preferences or goals of two or more parties" (1976, p. 237). Deutsch (1973) indicates that problems can arise when individual members see no relationship between their individual goals and the goals of the group (1973). According to Johnson and Johnson (1982) there is nothing more destructive to a team effort than having members who act competitively or individualistically.

Unresolved Prior Conflict

Prior situations which have erupted into conflict but which have been met with dominance and suppression usually result in the continuation of the situation as an antecedent condition. The use of power in forcing suppression may create situations which only serve as ground for further conflict (Filley, 1975). Stoner (1978) notes that past avoidance of conflict may also create a condition which may result in conflict at a later time.

The Conflict Process

Filley indicates that the following characteristics are usually present in conflict situations:

1. At least two parties (individuals or groups) are involved in some kind of interaction.
2. Mutually exclusive goals and/or mutually exclusive values exist, in fact or as perceived by the parties involved.
3. Interaction is characterized by behavior designed to defeat, reduce, or suppress the opponent or to gain a mutually designated victory.
4. The parties face each other with mutually opposing actions and counteractions.
5. Each party attempts to create an imbalance or relatively favored position of power vis-a-vis the other (1975, p. 4).

Deutsch (1975) has outlined a group of variables affecting the course of conflict. He indicates that regardless of whether the conflict is between two individuals or a group of nations, these

variables can be used to gain knowledge about the conflict. A synopsis of these variables is as follows:

1. Characteristics of the parties in conflict

These include values, motivations, aspirations, objectives, resources, conceptions of strategy, and what each party will consider a reward or loss.

2. Participants' prior relationships

Information includes attitudes, beliefs, and expectations about the other and the degree of polarization which has occurred in the past.

3. Nature of the issue giving rise to the conflict

Scope and rigidity of the issue, its motivational significance, and how it was formulated should be known.

4. The environment within which the conflict occurs

This includes the facilities and restraints, social norms, and past tradition of conflict resolution.

5. Strategy and tactics

Strategy information includes legitimacy/illegitimacy, incentives, openness of communication, degree of credibility, degree of commitment, and use of coercion, persuasion, and similar tactics.

6. Interested audiences and their relationships to the participants

The interests of the audiences, their characteristics, and the effect of the outcomes on the audience are a consideration.

7. Consequences of the conflict to participants

These involve gains/losses, precedents established, internal changes such as the rise of new leadership, the long-term effects on the relationship of the groups, and the reputation that each group developed during the conflict (pp. 5-7, paraphrased).

Interactions

Several authors (Johnson and Johnson, 1982; Stoner, 1978; and Walton, 1965) note the differences between substantive issue conflict and emotional or personalized conflict. Johnson and Johnson note the importance of maintaining the focus on ideas, not on people. They stress the critical importance of communication which conveys messages regarding the issues without clouding the issues with personal attacks. Filley notes that "the most important consideration in determining the outcome of the conflict is whether the situation is personalized or depersonalized" (1975, p. 14). Affective behavior sets the tone for the overt behavior that dominates the conflict interactions. Considerable importance is placed in the

literature, therefore, upon the nature of the interactions and that consequence regarding the outcome of the conflict.

Filley (1975), Johnson and Johnson (1982), and Stoner (1978) indicate some common interactions which occur in groups during the time of conflict. These are as follows:

1. There is an increase in group cohesion. Group members close ranks, put aside former disagreements, and develop an appearance of unity.
During this period of competition with an opposing group, intragroup cooperation and loyalty are high.
2. There is an appearance of leadership. Leaders are chosen during conflict who display a high degree of loyalty to the group. They are usually aggressive, verbal, and display a high degree of power.
3. There is a distortion of perception. Members of opposing groups make little effort to gain an understanding of their opponents. They tend to rationalize their own weaknesses and inflate those of their opponents. Their understanding of their own position can become distorted.
Distortion can also occur in views of the differences which separate the two groups. They may appear to be greater than in reality.

4. There is a break-down in communications. Members of opposing groups may ask questions which are intended to embarrass the opponents rather than to provide information regarding the issues. There may be little attempt to understand opponents. Leaders may communicate in such a way as to increase rather than decrease the conflict.

It is evident that these interactions are not beneficial in actually resolving conflict. It is for this reason that one, both sides, or a third party may have to intervene in an attempt to manage and resolve the conflict.

Negotiations

Interactions which are directed toward managing or resolving the conflict are called negotiations. Walton (1969) indicates that the first step in negotiating is a confrontation. He describes a confrontation as the direct expression of one's view of the conflict and one's feelings about it and an invitation for the opposition to do the same. Johnson and Johnson (1982) indicate that two main reasons for negotiating a conflict of interest are:

1. reaching an agreement
2. avoiding damage to future relationships

There are a variety of negotiation strategies which may be used in a conflict. For the purpose of this study, a distinction is made between interactions--the involvement of participants which are

primarily conflictive--and negotiations, which are actions directed toward ending the conflict. It is possible, however, for both types of behaviors to take place in the conflict simultaneously.

There are various means of negotiating or managing a conflict. Tjosvold and Johnson (1983) indicate that the method chosen is determined by the means of resolution being sought. The main object of negotiation is to achieve some type of resolution.

Conflict Resolution

Himes describes conflict resolution as a "means of terminating such a nonlegitimate conflict by techniques of social interaction and restoring relations between the contending actors to a level of legitimacy" (1980, p. 235). Stoner (1978) indicates three major types of conflict resolution: dominance or suppression, compromise, and integrative problem solving. The first is not successful in that the conflict is not really resolved, only repressed. This method also creates a win/lose situation and becomes ground for possible future conflict.

The second strategy, compromise, is not considered totally desirable by Filley (1975) or Tjosvold and Johnson (1983) since it also necessitates a loss, usually by both sides. The participants usually feel that they have given more than they gained; thus, their levels of commitment to the outcome may be low. The outcome may be perceived as a lose/lose situation since neither of the opponents achieved his or her goals. The outcome may be personalized and may

emphasize the disagreement which existed rather than the desirability of a long-term relationship of cooperation.

Integrative problem solving is indicated by the literature as the most desirable strategy (Deutsch, 1975; Filley, 1975; Stoner, 1978; and Walton and McKersie, 1965). Its outcome is defined as win/win since both sides are able to achieve all or part of their goals. The task necessitates joint cooperation and lessens the focus on disagreement. Resources are perceived as greater and realities are perceived with less distortion. The process of cooperation needed to engage in joint problem solving creates a higher level of trust, respect, and an increased sense of ownership of the solutions found. This process of cooperation also results in a change of leadership (Walton and McKersie, 1965) from the aggressive power-oriented leader chosen at the beginning of conflict to a leader possessing group skills and a rational, articulate approach.

Summary

Conflict is a product of human interaction, but it can be managed to accomplish changes and opportunities. The form of that management, its interactions and negotiations, has critical effects upon the outcome. The final conflict resolution--whether it is win/lose, lose/lose, or win/win--may determine the future relationship between the opponents as well as the possibility for the occurrence of future conflict arising from scars and remains of the situation or problem supposedly resolved.

CHAPTER III

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The Printed Data

The topic of education reform was a dominant theme in the news media from January 27, 1983 through February 24, 1984. Education reform, a subsequent tax increase, and the many personalities involved furnished constant impetus, especially for the newspapers. The results were countless articles in the daily and weekly newspapers in Tennessee. At times, the subject of Tennessee's education reform effort was carried to other newspapers and periodicals throughout the nation. This deluge of newspaper accounts, in addition to the barrage of materials disseminated from the Tennessee Education Association and countered with material from the State Department of Education and the Governor's Office, produced voluminous data. While analysis of samplings of the newspaper accounts has been conducted on this subject (Handler and Carlson, 1984), the purposes of this study seemed best served by making every effort to collect all of the newspaper data.

The Governor's Information Office files were the primary source for collecting a major portion of the printed data. The office receives copies of the twelve daily newspapers in the state and Tennessee Press Association clippings of the smaller newspapers,

person checks each paper and removes all articles related to state government, events of importance, and matters of interest to those involved. These articles are assembled, copied, and distributed as a news summary to the governor, his staff, cabinet, and other officials in the government. The decision to utilize these newspaper files was made only after a careful scrutiny revealed that all articles regarding the subjects in this study appeared to have been included in the files. It appeared that the articles had been selected on the basis of topics, without discrimination, and represented complete coverage. In fact, this collection of printed data appeared to be the best source available on the subject.

Each day's news summary was inspected for stories regarding education reform and the related topics. Electrographic copies were made of all such articles. These were arranged in chronological order to cover the entire period of the study.

To expand the newspaper coverage, copies of the Tennessee Teacher and TEA News were collected. During this period of the study, TEA distributed frequent bulletins and materials through its internal organization. These materials expressed the association's views on various parts of the program and leadership reactions to the issues. The State Department of Education also disseminated various communications to schools and teachers throughout the state. The Governor's Office and the citizen's organization, Tennesseans for Better Schools, distributed frequent releases to provide information for constituents and to promote support for the

reform. Because these materials were usually distributed to a specific audience, such materials were included in the study on a selected basis. Articles about the attempted reform in Tennessee were also included from national news magazines and from newspapers in other states.

After the collection was completed, the organization of the articles was changed from chronological to topical. For certain articles, it was necessary to note a cross reference since their content covered more than one topic. Most articles, however, could be grouped according to a particular person or event. This organization led to an insight that certain events and people had generated most of the newspaper coverage. It was from this group of events that the list of eleven critical incidents was generated.

Critical Incidents

Good (1963) notes that study through consideration of incidents may be an appropriate technique for educational research in which anecdotal data exists. The method of considering a conflict through its critical incidents utilizes the research technique originally developed by John C. Flanagan (1954). He describes the method as follows:

The critical incident technique consists of a set of procedures for collecting direct observations of human behavior in such a way as to facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical problems and developing broad psychological principles. The critical incident technique outlines procedures for collecting observed

incidents having special significance and meeting systematically defined criteria. By an incident is meant any observable human activity that is sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and predictions to be made about the person performing the act. To be critical, an incident must occur in a situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly clear to the observer and where the consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its effects (p. 327).

Fivars (1973) substantiated the critical incident technique as a well documented and accepted scientific approach to studies of human behavior. The adaptation for this study is the incorporation of newspaper data as part of the observation and the utilization of conflict management literature to reflect Flanagan's critical requirements. In a description of his technique, Flanagan emphasizes that the method does not consist of a single rigid set of rules concerning data collection; rather it is a flexible set of principles which should be modified and adapted to meet specific situations.

The critical incidents studied in the CERA conflict were determined by grouping the observations from the printed data which consisted of 100 or more articles regarding each event.

1. Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study, December 1982
2. Governor Alexander's speech, January 28, 1983
3. Governor's presentation of the Better Schools Program to the public
4. Establishment of Interim Certification Commission
5. Education Committee's decision to study proposals and establish the Select Committee, April 13, 1983
6. Select Committee's decision on November 22, 1983
7. Governor's decision to call a special session of the General Assembly

8. Legislative compromises, e.g. Weakley County Amendment
9. TEA decision to endorse legislation
10. Passage of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act, 1984
11. Passage of the taxes and funding.

It was from the many articles about these events and from the accounts of what happened that insight was gained about the entire period of the conflict. Chapter IV of this study was produced through the consideration of these events and the events added during the interviews. Consideration of the critical incidents thus became a means of describing the total conflict surrounding comprehensive education reform in Tennessee. These eleven events were also used as the basis for interviewing the major participants.

The Interview

The Interview as a Research Tool

The personal interview is a unique research tool in that it is a process of communication and interaction between two individuals (Borg and Gall, 1979, p. 309). It offers the researcher an advantage in allowing the adaptability, probing, and for obtaining more in-depth data (Isaac, 1971, p. 96). Good (1972, p. 219) indicates that the interview is a particularly valuable tool for obtaining data when the emphasis of the data collection is on desires, goals, perceptions, and attitudes.

For this study, the personal interview was used as a means of verifying the printed data. The interview was chosen since it offered

the most efficient potential for obtaining reliable data from participants with diverse perspectives and backgrounds.

The researcher arranged and conducted all of the interviews. In order to ensure that objective information was obtained for the study, consideration was given to the skills of the researcher. The necessary interpersonal skills had been developed during formal graduate study in courses in communications, counseling, group dynamics, and other areas which focused upon human interactions. Expertise in both verbal and non-verbal communications was established. Further study was focused upon questioning techniques and other skills needed for conducting interviews for this study.

Two professors reviewed the interview technique and affirmed the process as being satisfactory for producing the data. To establish safeguards against interviewer bias, the researcher conducted two practice interviews which were evaluated by two members of the doctoral committee. With a concern for systematic collection of data in the interviews, the process was carefully planned and monitored.

Selection of Major Participants

The newspapers and other printed accounts of the development of reform mentioned the names of many state and local officials, teachers, and private citizens. Some were mentioned with regard to specific incidents, while others were mentioned frequently in all incidents. Despite the large number of people and organizations mentioned in accounts during the 13 month period, a nucleus of

16 people were mentioned most frequently as being related to the conflict. Those people comprised the first list of persons to be interviewed (see Appendix A). The diversity in the printed accounts of the events reflected the diversity of the major participants. They represented the leadership of the administration, the legislature, the TEA, and the groups which studied the reform.

One of the questions included in the interview guide was directed toward the respondent's perception of other people who had been important in shaping the legislation during the critical incidents. Several other people were mentioned by those interviewed as being important. Ten people were perceived as being important in the conflict by at least three other persons and were included in the interviews (see Appendix A). All of the persons on the second list were members of the support staffs of the organizations involved.

Twenty-four interviews were conducted by the researcher during the period between April 15 and July 30, 1984. After the major participants were identified from the printed data, a letter was mailed to each one which explained the nature of the research and the importance of the individual's participation (see Appendix C). The researcher then telephoned each participant to arrange a convenient time for the interview. All of the participants identified from the printed data were interviewed. Eight of the additional ten which were identified were also interviewed. One of the respondents from the support staffs was unable to arrange an interview because of schedule conflicts and one person was unavailable. With one exception, the interviews

were conducted in the respondents' offices. Each interview was conducted at a time and place of the respondent's choice.

Many of the interviews were conducted after the end of the regular legislative session. This period was chosen as being preferable to the weeks immediately after the Special Session of the General Assembly for two reasons. First, the personal schedules of many of the participants frequently made them unavailable for interviews when the legislature was still in regular session. Second, and more important according to Sudman (1983), while the time delay may dim small details, the time space allows a more reflective response by the subject. It should be noted that the participants' involvement with educational reform did not end at the date of the passage of the legislation and funding. Their continued involvement contributed to the description of events connected with the passage of CERA.

Technique for Gathering Data

The researcher requested a period of approximately 35 minutes for the interviews and discreetly kept a small timer in her view to monitor the time-frame. With few exceptions, the respondents continued to discuss the incidents well beyond this length of time. Several noted that the discussion helped them to "sort it all out" and served as a catharsis.

The researcher used a microcassette recorder to tape record the interviews. The tapes were kept by the researcher and were not available to anyone else. At the conclusion of the research, the recordings were magnetically erased.

The use of a tape recorder is considered by Borg (1979, p. 315) to present a decided advantage to the interviewer in that it reduces interviewer bias in the tendency of the interviewer to make an unconscious selection of data as could occur in note-taking. This freedom from pen and paper also minimizes disruption and allows the interviewer to be more attentive and interactive. To reduce the possible alteration of the environment by the introduction of a tape recorder, a small black (3" x 5" x 1") microcassette recorder was used.

It was explained to the participants in the introduction of the research that the recordings were to ensure accuracy in the communication of information. The participants were assured of confidentiality and that no one would have access to the recordings. Further, each participant was told that the information and perceptions expressed would be used to aid the researcher's description of the critical incidents. They were also told that their permission would be requested for any direct quote. Borg and Gall (1979, p. 17) indicate the importance of this procedure at the beginning of the interview as being helpful in promoting effective communications.

It is important to note that this assurance of confidentiality seemed to improve the attitude of some participants. Several mentioned that their future relations with other major participants were very important. They expressed a concern for avoiding conflicts in the future. Filley (1975) indicates that the manner in which the resolution of conflict is perceived by the participants influences their attitudes toward future relations. The researcher responded to these concerns by expressing a similar genuine concern.

Borg and Gall (p. 310) indicate the necessity of the interviewer's establishing rapport and helping the respondent to feel comfortable in revealing negative aspects.

The participants were also told that the recorder would be turned off, if at any time they wished to communicate information which they thought would be helpful to the study, but which they did not wish to be recorded. Approximately half of the participants chose that option for communicating some information, usually regarding their own opinions. None of the interviews included extended periods in which the tape recorder was turned off. Information communicated without the tape recorder on was used by the researcher in gaining an overall understanding of the conflict. The substance of such information was not included in the study.

The Interview Guide

Borg (1979), Good (1972), Isaac (1971), and Sudman (1983) indicate the necessity for some type of well developed guide for managing an interview. Essential to the guide is the construction of sequence, questions, and topics to be included in the interview (Survey Research Center, 1976). The major focus of developing the interview guide for this research was that of forming questions which would answer the research questions and provide information for the objectives of the study.

Questions were directed toward providing the information needed with care being taken to avoid leading questions and asking for information beyond the respondent's knowledge. To avoid

response effect (Sudman and Bradburn, 1983), the apparent, simple answer, questions were phrased to probe for reflective replies and answers which led to in-depth discussions. Along with the primary questions, the interviewer used clarification phrases and other forms of active listening.

The interview guide was constructed by refining the questions from a pool of questions which were based upon various aspects of the critical incidents. The guide was then reviewed by two professors and evaluated as a part of the practice interviews. The semi-structured and unstructured questions were intended to provide the participants with a means of communicating their roles in the conflict and their perspectives regarding the objectives of the research (see Appendix D).

The interview guide consisted of the following three major sections:

- A. Introduction. The interviewer began by introducing herself, establishing rapport, and taking an appropriate place in the physical environment.
She then briefly introduced the research topic.
Positioning the small microcassette recorder in an appropriate place, the interviewer asked for the participant's permission to record the interview, indicating strict confidentiality and freedom to turn the recorder off. In introducing the research, the interviewer explained the period of the research, the method of determining critical

incidents from the printed data, and the way major participants were selected. At this point, she gave the subject a list of the critical incidents (see Appendix B).

- B. Interview questions. The questions focused on the objectives of the research. There were three major questions directed toward the critical incidents which the subject chose to discuss. This portion occupied the major part of the interview time.
- C. Wrap-Up. This part of the interview focused on summarizing and reflection. Verbal appreciation was expressed for participation. The subject was then requested to sign the consent form (see Appendix D). Singer (1978) emphasizes the preference for obtaining a signature on the consent form at the end of the interview. She indicates that the delay in that ritual produces a more candid response.

Response to the Interview

Immediately after the interview, a short letter of appreciation was sent to each participant. The same letterhead and format were used as in the initial letter. While each letter began with similar statements of appreciation, each contained a personal note regarding the participant such as "best regards for a successful reelection campaign" or some small point which communicated to the participant genuine gratitude rather than a form letter of acknowledgement.

Interpreting the Data

Each interview was transcribed verbatim from the tape recording by the interviewer. The transcriptions were then studied by the researcher for specific information regarding the research questions, the critical incidents, and the content analysis categories. This information was noted and subsequently transferred to charts which helped to focus upon the content analysis categories for each critical incident which the respondent discussed (Appendix D).

Content Analysis

Borg (1979, p. 361) indicates that content analysis is a frequently used means of educational research. Krippendorff (1980, pp. 20-21) defines it as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data and their context." Borg notes that in a typical content analysis study, the researcher tape records communication, makes a typed transcript from the audiotape, and then analyzes it in order to measure variables formulated by the researcher. Budd, Thorp, and Donohew (1978) indicate that content analysis studies usually involve six stages. They list them as follows:

1. Formulation of the research questions
2. Selection of a sample and definition of categories
3. Reading or listening then coding the content
4. Tabulation of scores
5. Comparisons with other variables
6. Interpretation of the findings (p. 6).

They emphasize the importance of devising a conceptual scheme which consists of "categories which are not mere labels, but compartments with explicitly defined boundaries into which material is grouped for analysis" (p. 39). Isaac (1971, p. 9) notes the importance of classification categories which are specific yet comprehensive.

Development of Content Analysis Categories

For the purpose of this study, the research questions were used as the basis for developing categories. An additional factor in developing categories was the consideration of antecedent conditions found in conflict management literature. The following categories were developed for use in analyzing each participant's discussion of each critical incident:

1. Characteristics of leaders
2. Characteristics of organizations
3. Communications
4. Goals
5. Economics/scarce resources
6. Power/control
7. Strategies
8. Compromises
9. Other categories when frequently mentioned.

The unit of recording was the individual statement about the category made by each participant. The researcher quantified the

frequency of the participants' perceptions and reported that frequency. Validity for the procedure was high because little doubt existed in determining categorization. For example, when the respondents discussed taxes, the economics/scarcce resources category was indicated; when they discussed the governor's use of the powers of his office, the power category was used. Berelson (1971, p. 169) indicates that where "there is high agreement on the definitions of the relevant categories, there is little difficulty in achieving validity. The instrument measures what it is intended to measure."

To ensure reliability, an independent researcher evaluated the material from two interviews and compared the categories indicated with those of the researcher. Consistency was easily achieved due to the specific nature of the categories. Although frequency was tabulated, the major purpose of the content analysis was to use the data to expand the printed data in drawing inferences and insights and to aid in the description of the conflict.

Presentation of the Data

Using the data, the conflict was considered from a three-way perspective. A description of the critical incidents was first constructed from the printed data and the personal interviews. A table was constructed to quantify the data and to evince the participants' involvement with individual critical incidents. The description and table comprise Chapter IV.

Using information from the printed data and from the interviews, the researcher then considered the conflict through an analysis of the issues, participants' goals, and their strategies involved in the conflict. This information formed the content of Chapter V. An analysis of the major participants, their organizations, and involvement in effecting a resolution of the conflict comprise Chapter VI. Inferences were drawn for conclusions regarding the conflict under study and recommendations were made regarding similar conflicts in the future. This information, along with a summary and recommendations for further research comprise Chapter VII.

To conceptualize consideration of the data as a means of gaining a better understanding of conflict, the researcher developed the model shown in Figure 1.

Presentation of the Interview Data

In the Interview Guide and in the Consent of Participation in the Study (see Appendix D), participants were assured of confidentiality and encouraged to be candid in their comments. The sensitive nature of much of the information obtained from the interviews necessitated careful consideration in presentation. A rationale for presenting the information accurately and in its entirety, was gained from Sam Donaldson, American Broadcasting Company's Washington news correspondent.

He, along with many of his colleagues, uses the premise that the public's right to know what has happened supersedes publication of the source (Viewpoint, July 9, 1984). This task of including all





Figure 1. A Model of Conflict Analysis in the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984.

of the pertinent information from the interviews, without compromising confidentiality, led the researcher to present some facts without attributing them directly to the source. This research problem is usually solved by the assignment of fictitious names or the use of other means of camouflage. The subjects and participants in this study, however, did not allow such convenience; i.e., it is not possible to construct anonymity for a state governor and his actions when studying events within that same state.

CHAPTER IV

A DESCRIPTION OF THE CRITICAL INCIDENTS



Introduction

Conflict is not an occurrence of a single incident. Rather, it is a phenomenon which is manifested when two or more individuals or groups of differing values and goals attempt to change the status quo (Coser, 1957). The status quo in this situation was the state of education in Tennessee. It was the difference in perceived need for change, the exact types of changes which should occur, and the time in which they should occur that pressed the status quo.

The antecedent conditions of the conflict under study were numerous and had been formed over a period of years. These conditions included differences in goals, communications, scarce

resources, and orientation of leaders and their desires for power. It was not the first critical incident, the TCES, which was the catalyst or the first confrontation in the conflict. Rather, it was the second incident, the governor's speech, which brought the conflict into full fervor. The period of the following 13 months can be seen as a continuum in the conflict in which the action peaked with each of the critical incidents. These were events of increased activity, and usually involved increased numbers of participants, which moved the action along the continuum of the conflict.

In analyzing such a conflict through the study of its critical incidents, it might be anticipated that some incidents would be of greater intensity than others and that it would be possible to chart the conflict with a line graph showing a series of peaks in the conflict. While the number of participants involved in the critical incidents in this study varied and not all participants mentioned all of the incidents described as being critical, the researcher was unable to determine any rank order of importance. Rather, the participants' perception indicated that all of the events were important and that all of those identified from the printed data represented a sequence of incidents which propelled the conflict from initial confrontation through resolution. Participants' discussions during the interviews and their identification of additional incidents seemed to be directly related to their own participation and involvement in various aspects of the situation. The emphasis of the research, therefore, was placed upon descriptions of these

incidents rather than an attempt to measure their intensity. The following is a description of the eleven critical incidents identified in the printed data and the seven additional incidents which were identified by participants during the 24 interviews.

Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study (TCES)

Origin

The General Assembly adopted on May 27, and Governor Alexander approved on June 12, 1981, Senate Joint Resolution No. 56 (Tennessee Archives). The resolution's sponsor was Senator Milton Hamilton, Democratic Majority Leader. Senator Hamilton was presumed by many to be the author of the resolution. Since his father was a former senator in the legislature and was serving as a member of the Tennessee Education Association staff at the time of the resolution, it was assumed by some that the elder Hamilton and the TEA assisted in the preparation of the resolution. In view of that connection, it may have been assumed by legislators that TEA concurred with the effect of the resolution.

As Chairman of the Finance, Ways, and Means Committee, Senator Hamilton was said to have been concerned about the status of education. With more than half of the state's budget allocated for education, it was not difficult for Senator Hamilton to obtain support for his resolution. As the Senate sponsor and the chief influence for obtaining its \$300,000 appropriation, Senator Hamilton was given credit by most observers for originating the TCES. The

actual origin of the TCES, however, may have been quite different from what it appeared to be.

Roy Nicks, Chancellor of the State University and Community College System, was involved with Lieutenant Governor Wilder on an effort to reshape educational management and give greater power to The Higher Education Commission. Through the means of a legislative study, the two hoped to obtain recommendations for educational management. Thus, the resolution was said not to have been the work of the sponsor, as assumed, but the product of Nicks and his staff. Senator Hamilton's help was then utilized in sponsoring the resolution.

Both Speaker of the House Ned Ray McWherter and Representative Steve Cobb expressed reservations about the General Assembly's appropriation of \$300,000 to study education. It was only after members of the Senate convinced them that this was not a boondoggle but a serious effort to address the needs of education that the representatives supported the creation of the task force.

TCES Task Force

The Task Force was led by Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien as the chairperson and the Commissioner of Education Robert McElrath as vice-chairperson. Twenty-five other members were appointed representing "the entire public education system" (TCES, 1982). The executive director for the study was Dr. William Payne, a former Memphis area school superintendent. To facilitate their comprehensive

task, the 27 member panel was divided into five subcommittees addressing the following areas under study:

- Coordinating Committee
- K-12 Subcommittee
- Vocational-Technical Education Subcommittee
- Higher Education Subcommittee
- Professional Schools Subcommittee

A concerted effort seemed to have been made in all appointments to include outstanding and committed people. During the period in which the study was conducted, none of those interviewed remembered serious complaints about the membership. In fact, most participants expressed confidence and respect for the task force. Afterwards, however, some respondents questioned the make-up and intent of the 27 member panel.

The purpose of the study was expressed in the enabling resolution as follows:

. . . to develop a long-range plan for public education in Tennessee and in doing so include but not be limited to an assessment of the current state of public education, kindergarten through graduate and professional schools, a statement of the goals and objectives of Tennessee's public education system, a description of the problem areas in Tennessee's public education, and recommendations to address the problem areas identified. Areas to be investigated shall include, but not be limited to, programs, staffing/personnel, facilities, finances, and organization (p. A-1).

The task required 18 months, numerous consultants, professional staff, and elicited considerable interest from the governor and members of the legislature.

TCES Report

The Task Force published a 664 page report which was released in December 1981. The report included the results of an extensive public opinion survey on education, considerable economic and demographic information, a review of education statutes in the Tennessee Code Annotated, and recommendations. The report "recommended changes or improvements in the areas of educational goals, governance, quality, and fund distribution" (TCES, 1982, p. 452). These recommendations included educational goals, improvements in curriculum, changes in governance, improvement in teacher training and certification, and numerous improvements in vocational technical, higher education, and professional schools. The recommendations and findings were numerous and detailed, but perhaps most notable were those on which Governor Alexander is said to have based his ten point Better Schools Program. Task Force members took pride in the TCES noting that it was sought as a model by other states.

TCES Outcomes

The Task Force goals of identifying issues, problems, and making recommendations for amelioration were accomplished in the study. There were some areas in which recommendations resulted in controversy. Although the 1981-82 president of TEA, Jim Booth, had been a member of the sub-committee studying the K-12 portion of the effort, there was a question regarding TEA's overall interest in the study. Data were not obtained regarding the level of TEA's awareness

of preparation of the higher education recommendations. It was those recommendations for a master teacher program and "additional salary monies provided for outstanding teachers at all levels to make the profession more competitive in the market place" (TCES, 1982, p. 397) which resulted in TEA's submission of a minority report (TEA News, January 15, 1983). In his report, Jim Booth made a plea for a reduction in class size and offered a strong castigation of the concept of merit pay.

Several people who were involved with the TCES mentioned an intense desire for greater implementation of their recommendations than had been given the 1957 study, the state's last attempt at a comprehensive study of education. It was only a month after the TCES report was released that Governor Alexander outlined his educational proposals, giving the TCES report as the basis for his plans.

Governor Alexander's Speech

On January 28, 1983, Governor Lamar Alexander spoke to the Tennessee Press Association in Nashville. The speech was carried on live television by 11 stations across the state with four other stations including the speech in delayed broadcasts. It was a widely publicized event which marked the beginning of the conflict, but it was not the beginning of Alexander's interest in education.

Development of Education Interests

When Alexander began his first term as governor in 1978, he was eager to help develop Tennessee's economy and to move the state from among the poorest in the nation. During his first three years, he focused on recruiting new industry for the state and creating new jobs. In the process of working toward greater economic development, Alexander became increasingly convinced of the critical importance of education to the well being of the state (Alexander, 1984). During the same period, Alexander was also serving on The Task Force on Education for Economic Growth coordinated by the Education Commission of the States. It was this group which produced the report, Action for Excellence: A Comprehensive Plan to Improve Our Nation's Schools which was released in May 1983. At the time of the Governor's involvement in national activities in education reform, the Commissioner of Education, Dr. Robert McElrath, espoused similar ideas and collaborated with Alexander on possibilities for Tennessee. Through the encouragement of other advisors and his awareness of the information being developed in the TCES, the governor incubated ideas for massive changes in how students were educated in Tennessee.

Adopting the premise that an improved educational system would "improve the economy and economic opportunity by raising the supply of intelligence and skill" (Griesemer and Butler, 1983, p. 4), the governor decided that the best approach to long term economic development for the state and its citizens was through education. This view

was shared by many and was best summarized by one response to Governor Alexander's proposals:

Beyond any question, it (the Better Schools Program) addresses the central problem this state faces in its quest for economic growth, wider opportunities for all Tennesseans, and a richer quality of life (Memphis Commercial Appeal, January 31, 1983).

As Alexander was developing his ideas concerning the relationship between education and increased economic opportunity, his staff, advisors, and especially the legislative task force were working on the possibilities for increased educational opportunities. Numerous speeches and remarks during 1982 confirm the governor's increasing conviction that education reform was the key to economic development.

In his inaugural address on January 15, 1983, the governor began his second four-year term with the "motto or even a battle cry: Basic Skills First, Computer Skills Next, then New Job Skills for all Tennesseans of all ages" (Tennessee Blue Book, 1983-1984, p. 99). His address was focused on the theme of economic development and jobs through improved education. After mentioning the state's low national rank in family income, citizens with too little education in an age of technology, and the state's great resource in being "a nice place to live," the governor stated:

That's why I'm campaigning across this state as hard as I ever did to get elected for: Basic Skills First, Computer Skills Next, New Job Skills for Tennesseans of all ages. It will take: a stronger curriculum, higher standards, tougher management, better teachers who can look forward to a more professional career, and all of those in school will have to work harder (p. 101).

In addition to mentioning many prominent citizens, the attractions in Tennessee, and its 3,000 communities, Alexander returned to the education theme throughout the speech.

As early as June 1982, Alexander had told the TEA Board of Directors, "The only way to kick up salaries in a significant way . . . is to see if there is some way to pay some teachers more than others" (TEA News, January 15, 1983). The following December, Commissioner of Education, Robert McElrath, had also told the same group that the governor was planning to recommend reform in the profession. During his January 27, 1983 news conference scheduled to publicize the "Second State of Education Address," Alexander told news people that his address would be "the most important speech of his tenure as governor, focusing on proposals to make teaching a much more attractive career" (Kingsport Times-News, January 28, 1983).

There had been several previous references to paying outstanding teachers more, along with considerable news media references to:

a new concept for rewarding excellence in teaching, mandatory kindergarten attendance, incentives to lure additional math and science teachers to the classroom and stricter proficiency requirements for both students and teachers (Knoxville Journal, January 28, 1983).

Despite these and other references to Alexander's plans, TEA officials professed to have no knowledge of the governor's plans until three hours before his speech. One member of the TCES Task Force even speculated that "the governor's proposals will be the kind that don't cost much money" (Johnson City Press Chronicle, January 28, 1983).

Data from interviews in this study indicated that the respondents had either forgotten the information found in the printed data prior to January 28, 1983, or had chosen not to read the governor's repeated message.

The Governor's Speech

At 6:30 p.m. CST, Lamar Alexander addressed the Tennessee Press Association assembled in Nashville and a statewide television audience. After the usual greeting, the governor plunged into the premise which had dominated his inaugural address--better education encourages economic development. He communicated his premise in such statements as the following:

We need better jobs because our family incomes are too low, 44th in the country. . . . We can't get better jobs without better skills. We can't get better skills without better schools (Alexander, January 28, 1983).

He then outlined a ten point proposal which he called "The Better Schools Program." He discussed the first nine points, saving the more complex Master Teacher proposal for last. Each of his proposals, with his explanations, is as follows:

1. Basic Skills First. The teacher-designed new elementary curriculum is in 11,366 classrooms. It establishes 1,300 skills in reading and math, 680 of which must be learned. By 1990, every child (who is not severely handicapped) should pass the Basic Skills First eighth grade competency test before entering ninth grade.
2. Computer Skills Next. Every child will know basic computer skills before ninth grade.
3. Kindergarten for Every Child. Every child must start school at the kindergarten level, even if the child does not start school until age six.

4. More High School Math and Science. Double the one credit of math and one of science we now require and pay for the extra teachers.
5. Special Residential Summer Schools for Gifted Juniors and Seniors. Reward academic excellence, not just athletic excellence.
6. Redefine High School Vocational Education Curriculum. Tie it more closely to the jobs of the 80's and provide equipment.
7. Classroom Discipline. Create alternative schools for students who disrupt classrooms. State-paid liability insurance for teachers and all other school personnel costs only \$2.50 per teacher. We should support teachers, not sue them in court.
8. Put Adult Job Skill Training Under the Board of Regents. Our 40 community colleges, technical institutes and area vocational schools should have a single overall management. Most of us over 21 will be going back to school to brush up on basic skills and learn computer skills and new job skills.
9. Centers of Excellence at Universities. Provide first-rate financing for first-rate programs and better overall support for good teaching and research. In the 1980's good universities will spin off the ideas that spin off new jobs.
- Music in the Early Grades. With budgets so tight, I cannot make this a top ten priority. But we will provide a small state base of support and I will raise money privately to keep Tennessee's musical heritage in Tennessee's schools.
10. The Master Teacher Program and Master Principal Program. This is the most important of all. Our teachers are good, but not as good as they can be. Our principals are good school leaders, but not as good as they should be. Therefore, our schools are good, but not good enough to teach us the skills we need to get better jobs.

Today, Tennessee teachers are paid about as well, on the average, as other Tennessee workers: about 82 percent of the national average salary. But the best teachers get paid no more than the worst. We expect teachers to reward excellence in the classroom, but we don't reward their

excellence in the classroom. We don't attract the best young people to teaching. Because they have so little to look forward to financially, we can't keep our best teachers teaching.

The Master Teacher Program is an incentive pay system that will make teaching a fully professional career, draw our best young people into it keep our best teachers in it, challenge our best teachers to do even better, and inspire excellence in our classrooms by rewarding excellence in our teachers (Alexander, January 28, 1983).

Much of the remainder of the speech was devoted to detailing and illustrating the incentive pay plan. Alexander also mentioned that funding for the program would necessitate a five-eighth cent sales tax increase. He quickly added that this tax was the only tax increase which he had proposed as governor. He was very emphatic that he would veto and campaign against any general tax increase that did not include the Better Schools Program. He concluded by inviting citizens to contact their legislators in support of the plan and gave a toll-free number for those who sought more information.

Origins of the Plan

During the 13 month period which followed that speech, there was recurring speculation regarding the origin of Alexander's ten-point plan. In the speech the governor mentioned the TCES report, explaining that almost every point in the set of proposals came from that study. The following list of proposals appear to have been taken from the TCES recommendations with little alteration from Alexander:

1. Basic skills first (TCES, 1982, p. 462).
3. Kindergarten for every child (p. 459).
4. More high school math and science (p. 463).
6. Redefinition of high school vocational education curriculum (p. 463).
8. Adult job skill training under the direction of the Board of Regents (p. 460).
9. Centers of excellence at universities (pp. 475, 487).

Recommendations concerning the following proposals were included in the TCES; however, the Alexander proposals differed somewhat in their exact interpretation.

2. Computer skills next (p. 465). The TCES recommendation was very emphatic with regard to the importance of computer skills and the means of training teachers and achieving computer literacy; however, it did not establish ninth grade as the goal for attaining basic computer skills.
5. Special residential summer schools for gifted juniors and seniors (p. 463). The TCES recommendation for gifted students concerned the collection of data regarding the expenditure of funds for gifted students. Another recommendation (p. 259) was the establishment of a state school for the gifted and talented to encompass all subjects. No grade levels were recommended by the TCES.

10. Master teacher and master principal programs (pp. 466, 467, 468, 478). The K-12 recommendations included consideration of a requirement for apprenticeship program for beginning teachers. Under this period the apprentice-teacher would be closely supervised and evaluated by a "master teacher." There were also recommendations regarding statewide evaluation and the investigation of "ways of rewarding outstanding teachers (as determined by fair and impartial evaluation) over and beyond their set salaries" (p. 468).

According to the TEA News, however, TCES chairperson Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien told the governor during his appearance before a joint session of the House and Senate Education Committees that "The Master Teacher Program is not a product of the legislative task force" (March 15, 1983).

The seventh proposal on classroom discipline was not a prominent part of the TCES. Neither the creation of alternative schools for disruptive students nor the state-paid liability insurance for teachers was an obvious part of the comprehensive study. The inclusion of that proposal had considerable influence on the ensuing conflict.

It was not until June 27, 1984 (Nashville Banner) that efforts were made by Tennessee newspapers to explore origins of the Better Schools Program and the Master Teacher Program beyond those mentioned during the governor's speeches. Because the origins were of much

greater concern to TEA, Gene Bryant had written a commentary which appeared in the TEA News on April 29, 1983, more than a year before the public was made aware of an additional advisor to the governor. Very critical of the governor's motives, Bryan indicated that the reform was conceived as follows:

The Master Teacher Program, from all indication, is a product of Vanderbilt University professor Dr. Chester Finn and McElrath's Department of Education. It was packaged by political consultant Doug Bailey, who had handled public relations for a similar proposal by Gov. Jim Thompson in Illinois.

Both the printed data and the interviews conducted for this study indicated that, except for TEA, there was little concern about the motives or origin of the proposals. Instead, subsequent attention was focused upon the proposals and their implications.

Responses to the Speech

Following the governor's speech, newspapers across the state were generally favorable in their coverage of the incident. The Jackson Sun responded with the following:

By attaching such high importance to the matter with a state-wide televised address, Alexander made the embarkation on the new era seem exciting (February 1, 1983).

The Memphis Press-Scimitar gave the governor a lengthy and supportive editorial praising his efforts but was somewhat reserved regarding possible sales tax increases. Extolling his commitments, the editorial included the following praise:

Many Tennesseans were stunned by Governor Lamar Alexander's sweeping proposals for public education. They frankly are not accustomed to such forthright, farsighted leadership on

behalf of the schools from that level of state government. . . . The governor deserves credit for offering Tennesseans an opportunity and a challenge with his exciting "better schools" plan (February 2, 1983).

Every Tennessee newspaper carried at least one article on Alexander each day for several days after the speech. There were accounts of the speech, details of the master teacher program, and reactions of various community leaders to the governor's speech.

Immediately following the speech, responses from teachers, and even from TEA, were rather warm. Marilyn Robertson, president of the Johnson City Education Association, called the plan, "a step in the right direction." Harvey Howell, president of the Washington County Education Association said that "he found no fault with Alexander's program for the betterment of education and called it 'a challenge'" (Johnson City Press Chronicle, January 29, 1983). Jim Booth, president of TEA, responded with, "We will support the basic thrust of your program and we're going to help you sell it" (Knoxville News-Sentinel, January 30, 1983).

The Knoxville News-Sentinel carried the news of TEA's stronger opposition to the plan on February 3, 1983. It was on that day that a letter had gone to each of the 38,000 members of TEA expressing concerns over what was perceived as certain flaws in the program. That news was followed by the expression of concerns by some members of the legislature. Representative John Bragg, a Democrat from Murfreesboro said that "Teachers would be better off with across-the-board pay raises than with Governor Lamar Alexander's proposed

incentive pay plan for top-rated instructors" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 2, 1983). Representative Paul Starnes, Democrat from Chattanooga, said that he liked the attention focused on education, but he was not complimentary of Alexander's proposals (Chattanooga News-Free Press February 3, 1983). During the following days, state newspapers carried articles concerning the Better Schools Program with such titles as "TEA Balks at Governor's Plan" (Knoxville News-Sentinel, February 3, 1983) and "Alexander, TEA Lock Horns on 'Master Teacher Program'" (Chattanooga News-Free Press, February 5, 1983). Thus, the printed data gave clear indication of the major participants' movement toward conflict.

Governor's Presentation of the Better Schools Program
to the Public

This critical incident began on the morning after the governor's speech and continued through the opening of the special session of the General Assembly on January 10, 1984. The incident covered innumerable appearances by Alexander, his family, staff, or members of the Department of Education. Those appearances were on national television and in the state's smallest communities. This campaign by the governor was the most frequently mentioned critical incident in the interviews conducted for this study.

Alexander's taking the issues in his education reform proposals to the public had several implications. It involved the people who would benefit from an improved education system and also the people

who would pay for that improvement. Alexander hoped that by raising public awareness of the need for his Better Schools Program, the legislators would be more amenable to the plan and feel safer in voting for a tax increase. Alexander said that his reason for taking the Better Schools Program, especially the Master Teacher Program to the people was ". . . because I felt that most people wanted better schools and understood that teachers ought to be rewarded for outstanding teaching. And I knew that if I would develop popular support for it, that ultimately, if I could keep the spotlight on the idea that it would eventually work" (personal communication, Alexander, July 16, 1984).

The Governor's Journey

The governor embarked on a 13-month journey that led him from the most remote mountain communities in Tennessee to Maine, California, and across the nation carrying the message of the Better Schools Program. He began his journey on the morning of January 29, 1983 by going to the headquarters of TEA at the foot of capital hill. He spent two hours with members of the TEA Board of Directors, explaining his proposals and answering questions. After the meeting, the governor flew to Johnson City, Knoxville, and Memphis. The Memphis Commercial Appeal captured the essence of the governor's commitment and the long road which followed with:

In less than 24 hours after announcing his ambitious "better schools" program, Governor Lamar Alexander had traveled nearly 1,000 miles to sell it. . . . (January 30, 1983).

Although Alexander and his team were barnstorming the state with public appearances in numbers that often exceeded election campaigns, by the end of February 1983, they realized that they were involved in a difficult battle. It was at that point that his staff and members of the State Department of Education began to intensify their strategy efforts. One member of the team summarized it as follows:

We spoke to everybody we could speak to and I don't want to talk about how many miles we traveled. We went to every PTA, every Rotary Club, every civic club that we could. Anyone who wanted a speaker got one. There would be days when I worked from Johnson City to Memphis and became exhausted. Then I would look at the Governor's schedule and realize that he had been more places than I!

This constant stream of appearances maintained the contact with the public which had been an integral part of the Alexander election campaign in 1978 when he walked 1,022 miles across the state. In addition to the public contact which he viewed as vital, the appearances also generated a constant flow of coverage by the news media. The subject was a popular governor, just re-elected as the first governor in Tennessee history to a second consecutive four-year term. He carried a message of concern for the state, its people, and especially for its children and their future. He spoke of matters which concerned the public and he spoke in easily understood language about the need for jobs, better teachers, and a better life for Tennesseans. His activities, appearances, and messages were subjects which generated innumerable news stories for the Tennessee media, for the Wall Street Journal, The Orlando Sentinel, the

Washington Post, The Cincinnati Post, and many other national publications. He appeared on the CBS Evening News, at national conferences, and with President Reagan but always with the same message. Examination of the printed data from the 13 month period indicates the consistency with which the Alexander team carried their message across Tennessee and across the country.

The Activities

In addition to his many appearances across the nation, Alexander was, at the same time, very active within the state. He encouraged the Tennessee School Boards Association to organize a bipartisan group called People Advocating Superior Schools (PASS). Dr. Merlin Cohen, immediate past president of the TSBA, served as chairman with Frank Gorell, a Democrat and former lieutenant governor as vice-chairman. Bill Farris, former chairman of the Tennessee Democratic Party was also asked to serve on the 23-member advisory board of PASS (Nashville Banner, September 16, 1983).

Alexander and his staff also organized the Tennesseans for Better Schools, a lobbying group which eventually boasted some 40,000 members and raised more than \$400,000 to finance the campaign for Better Schools. The organization was led by Frank Clement, Jr., son of the late Democratic governor and nephew of Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien who had chaired the TCES. Co-chairman was Mrs. Flo Alexander, the governor's mother. He also used the help of his wife, Honey, as a speaker on behalf of Better Schools. Tennesseans seem

to applaud the use of a governor's family in official positions (Greene, 1982, p. 304).

In addition to these groups, there was a task force of persons from the governor's staff and from the State Department of Education (SDE) involved in planning and communications. This group conducted letter campaigns, communicated with teachers, and coordinated numerous activities. One activity which generated support for the governor's proposal regarding computer literacy was a series of dinners. The idea, borrowed from Governor Winters of Arkansas, was to have seven "bean suppers" in selected counties. These were very large gatherings of people where several thousand dollars were raised for the purchase of computers for the local school classrooms. A toll-free phone number was installed to encourage Tennesseans to inquire about the Better Schools Program.

Alexander's task of raising public awareness was helped by the coincidental release of five national education studies during April and May of 1983. Action for Excellence, A Nation at Risk, America's Competitive Challenge, Making the Grade, and Academic Preparation for College were nationally sponsored studies about large numbers of the nation's schools. The attention that these reports focused on the problems of American education gave support to Alexander's cause and confirmed his foresight in being concerned for Tennessee schools.

The national news media coverage of the problems of education in the United States raised attention from many sources. On June 15,

1983, President Ronald Reagan met Governor Alexander at Knoxville's Farragut High School. The President was on his way to visit the National Parent Teacher Association in New Mexico. This event was an opportunity for both Reagan and Alexander to extol the need for better schools and for better paid teachers. Also included in the event were the former president of TEA and several legislators.

Another opportunity to focus the news media on education occurred when Terrel H. Bell, U. S. Secretary of Education, visited Kingsport in October. Selected as one of 12 U. S. cities to host a forum on excellence, the conference included teachers, legislators, and of course, the governor with his message. Bell's expressions of interest in the master teacher concept and his praise for Alexander gave the campaign another boost.

The Evolution

As the year progressed, Alexander's cries for better jobs through better schools were reduced to focus on the need for better teachers. Most of his speeches and publicity concerned his Master Teacher Program. His theme, and the quote on the Better Schools Program brochure was "No teacher in Tennessee's public school system is paid a penny more for excellence in performance" (1983). Since this had been the most controversial of his original ten proposals, and the major focus of his own attention, that was the proposal which received major attention. Since the governor had originally announced that he would not favor any tax increase for education

which did not include his Master Teacher Program and many of the other proposals required additional funding, the Master Teacher Program became the pivotal point of the entire reform push.

The Result

The results of Alexander's public campaign for Better Schools took many forms. In addition to helping him achieve his final goal, the constant public attention generated an awareness that transcended the issues of the governor's efforts. While the printed data during the period of Alexander's public campaign are filled with articles related to his activities, there are also numerous articles about the need for excellence in education, parental involvement in education, and other aspects of educational goals. Alexander made Tennesseans aware of his proposals and of his message, but he also succeeded in focusing public attention on education. Along with the national focus on education, the Better Schools campaign focused more attention on education than anything or anyone else in recent Tennessee history.

Tennessee Education Association Opposition

While the prospects of more money and attention for education were pleasant for TEA, it was very difficult for the association to accept a plan for education that they did not originate. The century old organization had grown accustomed to enjoying considerable influence and esteem in the legislature. For many years, most of the

proposed education legislation affecting kindergarten through the twelfth grade had been conceived, researched, drafted, and lobbied by TEA. It was not surprising that the ideas of this bold young governor were distressing. From the time of his first campaign, there had been few issues on which the two agreed. Having invested \$22,000 in Alexander's opponents, there was little indication that TEA would enthusiastically accept any of the governor's innovations (Knoxville News-Sentinel, March 20, 1983).

As noted earlier in this study, initial responses from TEA were guarded. Following Alexander's meeting with TEA officials on January 29, 1983, TEA President Jim Booth told Alexander:

"I pledge to you right now that the TEA is going to join hands with you and lend to you every ounce of support we have in obtaining adequate funds for education in this state." Then Booth added, "We have some problems with parts of this package" (Maryville Times, February 3, 1983).

Five days after that statement was made, a letter was sent to each TEA member which expressed strong opposition to any form of differentiated pay for teachers.

TEA endorsed parts of the Better Schools Program despite the fact that, in the same speech in which the governor announced his plan, he also made it clear that he would "oppose, campaign against and veto any general tax increase that does not include the BETTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM" (Alexander, January 28, 1983). In that speech and in subsequent messages, the governor made it clear that the incentive pay plan and the evaluation system were an inseparable part of the Better Schools Program. Since the endorsement of such expensive

programs as the development of computer skills, and more math and science in the high schools were an integral part of the governor's total plan, TEA's endorsement of some proposals did not receive much attention from the press. Instead, the major focus was on their opposition to the Master Teacher Program.

Although TEA communicated reservations about the reform effort to its members, the association did not make a strong public stand in opposition for more than two weeks after the governor's speech. It was not until mid-March that the printed data carried the news that the TEA board of directors had voted to oppose the plan and "authorized an all-out effort to defeat it" (TEA News, March 15, 1983). Public relations assistant Gene Bryant said that this was "an accurate signal of a tougher position by the organization." With regard to the governor's proposal, he said, "We'll kill it. It will be one of the biggest news stories you'll write" (Johnson City Press-Chronicle, March 17, 1983).

With the submission of a hastily drawn Education Excellence Bill to counter the governor's proposed legislation, the Knoxville Journal title of March 4, 1983 best described the situation for the following twelve months: "Alexander, TEA draw battle lines." The TEA battle received support from the National Education Association. In May, Terry Herndon, NEA's executive director said that NEA had aided TEA with analysis of the governor's plan and staff help for the year, and indicated that more would be forthcoming if needed. "We are going to win this fight in Tennessee; we are going to win it

across the nation" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 8, 1983).

Herndon's remarks indicated that NEA would aid and direct the battle to avoid the passage of a concept which NEA had traditionally opposed. "Both NEA and TEA had opposed merit pay for public school teachers and supported across-the-board pay increases. The organizations say there is no way merit pay can be distributed without political favoritism" (Chattanooga Times, May 10, 1983).

That traditional opposition to differentiated pay tied to evaluation was a part of the philosophical foundations of both the state and national teacher organizations. They viewed the threat to teachers' job security as unacceptable and contended that the Tennessee plan "is nothing more than a 'back door' attempt to eliminate the Teacher Tenure Law passed in 1951" (Nashville Banner, April 4, 1983).

The other proposal which TEA strongly opposed, however, did not receive as much public attention. It concerned the governor's stand for discipline and teacher liability. While the TEA did not seem to be disturbed by the creation of alternative schools for disruptive students, the idea of a state paid liability insurance for school personnel jolted the organization's security. While it seemed a very logical idea to the public when the governor said, "We should support teachers, not sue them in court" (January 28, 1983), the proposal had more implications for TEA than mere teacher protection. President Jim Booth told the governor, "You are addressing an issue that simply is not a problem. We are protecting teachers in this state with a

1.7-million-member (sic) policy, which far exceeds anything the state could come up with for 40,000 teachers" (TEA News, February 15, 1983). Since inclusion in that million dollar liability insurance policy had been one of the long-standing attractions for membership in TEA, Alexander appeared to be removing a motivation for that membership. The stance of TEA was that they "did not see it as a sincere effort to help teachers, but rather as a union-busting tactic" (personal communication, Z. Lansford, June 20, 1984).

The threat to both organization and individual security led TEA to become entrenched in a long and bitter battle. Although TEA's decision to oppose the governor's proposals was an incident termed as critical by only two people during the interviews conducted for this study, TEA's opposition was an integral part of the news media coverage and was accepted and discussed as an unavoidable phenomenon by all participants.

Endorsement by Speaker of the House Ned McWherter

Accounts in the printed data and information obtained during the interviews address the integral part that Speaker McWherter played in the education reform conflict. Only one participant termed his role as a critical incident, but numerous participants, especially those involved with the legislature, discussed the speaker's immense influence as being critical.

The motivation for McWherter's endorsement of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984 came from two primary sources--

the governor's efforts and McWherter's own interest in education. During the first part of February 1983, soon after Governor Alexander made his speech introducing the Better Schools Program, he invited the veteran Democrat to dinner at the home of his parents in the mountains of East Tennessee. During dinner and into the night, the two discussed the future of Tennessee, its economy, and the effect of technological changes on the state. The governor conveyed his thoughts about education and his plans for reform. He discussed his expectation that the program would create increased effectiveness in education in the state during this decade and into the 1990's.

Although Speaker McWherter did not publicly endorse the program at that time, he indicated to the governor that he agreed with the concepts. He further indicated that he did not agree with some of the details of the proposed legislation but that he intended to learn more about the issues involved and to seek recommendations from teachers. He indicated that he would support the governor's program and the revenues needed for funding in the legislature.

Although supportive of the education program, McWherter was concerned about the effects of collecting education revenues from additional sales tax. Newspaper accounts began to appear in mid-February which indicated that the speaker had reservations about the increase in taxes on a depressed state economy. The Kingsport Times News indicated,

House Speaker Ned McWherter has thrown a damper on ambitious education and correctional programs advanced by Governor Lamar Alexander just as the General Assembly prepared to

begin its regular session tonight. The Dresden Democrat said, . . . I say "no" to a general tax increase unless there's improvement in the economy (February 14, 1983).

The Memphis Press Scimitar of February 26, 1983, stated a somewhat softened position in which McWherter repeated his opposition to a sales tax increase until the economy and jobless rates improved. In that interview, however, he added the possibility of a gradual increase in the following statement:

Until recovery comes to Tennessee, ambitious programs to improve public services, such as Gov. Alexander's proposed \$210 million Better Schools Program, are going to have to be deferred or phased in.

When McWherter observed an improving economy during the spring, he pronounced the economy "on the rebound" in a Jackson Sun interview which was titled "Merit pay justifies higher tax: McWherter" (June 9, 1983). The Chattanooga News-Free Press on June 24, 1983, carried the title of an article, "McWherter Favors \$300 Million Tax Hike for Teacher Pay."

As the speaker's opposition to a tax increase lessened, his position regarding the legislation became more enthusiastic. Although he did not totally support the governor's Master Teacher Bill he did endorse a compromise bill. During the 13 month period of the conflict, the speaker publicly indicated his support of the governor's program; however, he did not actively campaign with the governor. More of his effort was conducted quietly with concern for bringing greater input and involvement from the state's teachers. McWherter's major concerns were teacher involvement and maintaining high standards for education.

McWherter's second motivation for supporting education reform, perhaps, came from his personal lack of educational opportunity. Describing himself as a college drop-out, McWherter was the child of share-croppers born during the Great Depression. A millionaire businessman, McWherter came to value the advantages offered by formal education as he amassed various business and industrial holdings and as he pursued a 14-year political career. Having served as Speaker of the House for 12 years, longer than any other Tennessean in history, McWherter was familiar with the needs of the education system. His personal value of education led to his willingness to work to upgrade the education system.

Although McWherter's colleagues described him as being intensely powerful, he apparently preferred to reserve that power for use when others were unable to work out solutions (Knoxville Journal, February 15, 1983). His political history is marked by taking positions on the issue, not according to precedent, party, or special interest, but by the way he saw the issue. Regarding education as a bipartisan issue, Speaker McWherter was able to work with the Republican governor without compromising his intense loyalty to the Democratic Party.

Well known by his colleagues as a lover of compromises, his attempts to bring the opponents together extended from his telling TEA to "back off its opposition to the merit pay concept" (Tennessee Journal, March 7, 1983) through his efforts to arrange compromises during the final days of the special legislative session in 1984. In seeking McWherter's help, Governor Alexander knew that the speaker's

support would not only be a cue for many other Democrats, it would also be a necessity in moving the legislation through the General Assembly.

Alexander's insistence upon passage of his program in early 1983 was motivated by his concern for having the remaining four years of his term to ensure implementation and a lasting impact. McWherter's involvement as a major participant in the passage of the program created a sense of ownership for the speaker. By involving McWherter, since he was the most often mentioned potential Democratic candidate for the 1986 governor's race (Knoxville News-Sentinel, September 2, 1983; Tennessee Journal, August 22, 1983), Alexander had also protected the future of his program in the event that the Republicans were unable to continue to reside in the governor's mansion.

Securing of Bi-Partisan Support

All of the participants indicated a recognition of political realities in the Tennessee General Assembly at the time of the conflict. A strong majority of Democrats in both houses necessitated a bi-partisan effort for passage of the education reform. Of course, the key Democrat was the influential Speaker of the House. Although McWherter endorsed the program, the Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the Senate John Wilder never gave more than a tacit approval to the Master Teacher Plan. Compensation for the lack of Wilder's support was achieved through the help of key senators, such as John Rucker.

Alexander began his efforts to achieve support from Democrats by inviting numerous legislators to the governor's residence for a breakfast briefing on the morning of his January 28, 1983 speech. Others were invited to his office soon afterwards to discuss his proposals and to seek their input. It was during this initial briefing, much in the style of Lyndon Johnson, that Alexander obtained support from such Democrats as Nashville Representative Steve Cobb.

As a party, the Democrats never gave support to the governor's program. Indeed, at one point out of loyalty to TEA, there was a strong move in the Democratic Caucus to oppose the program formally (Tulahoma News, April 13, 1983). When that attempt was defeated, the governor was able to establish an individual working relationship with a number of Democrats. The manner of his securing the support of key senators is detailed in the accounts of the Select Committee (see page 107) and Acquiring Sponsors (see page 123). His work with representatives continued to involve individual and small group meetings and to rely on the influence of McWherter and Cobb.

Being a confident risk-taker is a part of Governor Alexander's personal style. It was in this manner that he invited key Democrats to accompany him to national meetings such as the Education Commission of the States meeting in Denver, Colorado. He took them along to Florida, Texas, and other places where they were exposed to the national concerns for education. He invited Speaker McWherter and Senator O'Brien to accompany him to North Carolina where he received an enthusiastic reception from a group of 40 governors, business

leaders, and educators during a meeting of the National Task Force on Education for Economic Growth (Tennessean, May 5, 1983). The bipartisan effort was characterized best by a Nashville Banner article which began as follows:

Tennessee politics will celebrate a quiet milestone when Frank Clement, Jr. appears on television sets statewide promoting Governor Lamar Alexander's Better Schools Program. His comment, "There are no Republican schools or Democratic schools--only Tennessee schools for our children" bring the contention full circle that the Better Schools Program, initiated by a Republican, is nonetheless a bipartisan idea (September 16, 1983).

In summary, the Republican was able to achieve a largely bipartisan support for his reform efforts by using his own personal style in appealing to parallel concerns for education and by appealing to the legislators' sense of responsibility for the future of the state. The Chattanooga Times summarized the move in the following statement:

Four years ago Alexander was being chided by lawmakers for his partisan politics. But Democratic leaders of both the House and the Senate changed their tunes Tuesday and commended the Republican governor for his trend-setting ideas. House Speaker Ned Ray McWherter said, ". . . Now he's stepped out and made some bold proposals in education and taxes--and we have a responsibility in the Legislature not to allow this opportunity to improve schools to pass by" (March 23, 1983).

Appointment of the Interim Certification Commission

Despite much success with the public, when the governor counted potential votes in the legislature in late March of 1983, there was cause for concern. The path for passage of Alexander's Master Teacher Bill took it through the education committee of both the

House and the Senate. As controversy and doubt arose in both groups over reservations about teacher evaluation, chances for the legislation's ever reaching consideration by the full General Assembly were diminished.

A part of the Master Teacher legislation established a State Certification Commission. The duty of this body would have been to promulgate certification standards and criteria; develop, approve, or acquire tests and examinations; and to certify all teachers and administrators under the provisions of the act. The status of the legislation was in a quandry. The major controversy was the question of whether or not it was possible to evaluate teachers fairly and objectively. The proof of the solution was in the legislation and could not be established initially to some legislators' satisfaction (Knoxville Journal, March 29, 1983).

Taking a pro-active response to the situation, the Alexander forces decided to begin the process of establishing evaluation criteria. With the agreement of Speaker McWherter, Lieutenant Governor Wilder, and sponsors of the legislation, on March 31, 1983, Governor Alexander announced his appointments for an Interim Master Teacher Certification Commission. Although it was an ad hoc group, without legal basis until passage of the legislation, the commission was able to begin work on the feasibility of teacher evaluation.

Commission Membership

Following the provisions of the proposed legislation, the governor appointed in a non-partisan manner four distinguished lay persons and a representative of one of the colleges of education. The remaining 13 members of the commission were representatives of various education groups (News release, Governor's Information Office, March 31, 1983). When the legislation was actually passed by the legislature, the governor's appointments would require confirmation by both houses of the General Assembly. Alexander's most significant appointment was that of Nashville attorney Bill Willis. A Democrat and counsel to the Metro Nashville School Board, the appointment of Willis was an indication of the intent for the Interim Commission to be a non-partisan body which would deal with the task of evaluation in a non-political manner. Since fear of political influence on any evaluation process had been a TEA concern from the beginning (Johnson City Press Chronicle, January 29, 1983; Knoxville Journal, February 5, 1983), it was essential to Alexander's strategy to establish a non-political environment for the development of the evaluation criteria.

The Interim Commission began deliberations on April 4, 1983, with its task clearly defined. The Chairman, Bill Willis, was committed to completion of that task without polarization taking place within the Commission membership. He contended that such was possible; however, observers noted that subcommittees which contained TEA and State Department of Education representation required

considerably longer to complete deliberations (Jackson Sun, December 15, 1983).

On April 13, 1983 when the Senate Education Committee voted to place the proposed legislation under study until the 1984 session of the General Assembly, the newly appointed ad hoc Interim Certification Commission was left in a predicament. With no consideration of accepting defeat, Alexander quickly made provision for the Commission to continue its work. With the approval of McWherter and Wilder, the governor arranged for the continuation of the Commission's work under the auspices of the State Department of Education with \$40,000 for expenses. Although Democratic Representatives Jim McKinney and Shelby Rhinehart protested the action and challenged the expenditures (Memphis Press-Scimitar, April 15, 1984), the Commission continued to pursue the task of evaluation, ignoring the conflict in other places.

The Task

The Commission's study of the proposed Master Teacher/Administrator legislation interpreted the concept to embody the following four major parts:

1. An incentive pay plan designed to reward and retain outstanding teachers and administrators
2. A career ladder based on certification
3. Performance-based evaluation
4. Teacher/administrator educational improvement and correction of weaknesses.

To pursue its task, the work was organized around the following three questions:

1. What evaluative criteria and procedures are proposed in the current bill?
2. What does the best educational research and theory have to say about effective teacher and administrator performance?
3. After research theory and common sense have produced skills for evaluation and processes for collecting information, do Tennessee educators agree with these criteria and procedures based on their experience and study? (Report of the Select Committee on Education, 1984; pp. 144-147).

To assist the Commission members in their work, Governor Alexander and Commissioner of Education Robert McElrath appointed University of Tennessee professor of education Dr. Russell French as Executive Director of the Interim Commission. In addition, UT colleague Dr. Francis Trusty was appointed as Executive Director responsible for developing the administrator-supervisor evaluation system.

Beginning with consultant Dr. Susan Rosenholtz, a Vanderbilt professor of education, the Commission sought to provide research on effective teaching, student achievement, instructional behavior, and classroom management and planning. Later, numerous national consultants provided extensive research and advice for the Commission.

On December 14, 1983, the Commission gave tentative approval to an evaluation plan. The timetable adopted by the panel indicated field testing in the spring, further consideration and revisions during the summer, and readiness for use in September 1984.

The Result

Although it did not function in total harmony or without controversy, the Commission was able to conduct its work without considerable conflict. It served the purpose which the governor sought in that it established the fact that evaluation could be separated from political influence. It also established the feasibility of evaluating teachers and administrators using agreed upon criteria. Further, it gave the credibility needed for acceptance of the entire concept.

Most of the participants interviewed for this study gave only passing mention of the Interim Certification Commission and its task. Content of their discussions led to the indication that, while the appointment and task of this commission were critical in the conflict, the Commission's work was not a center of conflict and only a few of the major participants were involved with the Commission's work.

Decision to Study and Establish Select Committee

Governor Alexander indicated that his speech on January 28, 1983, was an offer, his best judgement of how a career ladder plan could be developed. He invited consideration from professionals and citizens for development of legislation (personal communication, Alexander, July 16, 1984). Numerous drafts and revisions were made before the bill was given to the legislature at the deadline for submitting bills for the 93rd Session. Some legislators were impatient and critical over the delay in submission (Chattanooga News-Free Press, February 20, 1983).

In the meantime, TEA supporters introduced a Teacher Excellence Program which stressed higher salaries for all teachers. Instead of the Master Teacher/Administrator State Certification Commission, the Teacher Excellence Program would have set in place a nineteen member board, fourteen of whom would have been chosen by the TEA. This proposal was intended to remove politics from the certification process (Johnson City Press Chronicle, March 15, 1983). A hastily drawn piece of legislation, the TEA bill was not a seriously considered alternative to the Alexander plan, but it did serve TEA's purpose of creating a diversion in the legislature.

As consideration of education proposals continued in the House and Senate Education Committees, Governor Alexander made a historic move on March 7, 1983 in testifying before a joint meeting of the two committees. He addressed the group of legislators and guests about his concerns regarding the proposed legislation. Alexander was eager for passage in 1983 to allow him four full years as governor to ensure solid implementation of the program.

The Vote to Study

When opponents of the Master Teacher Program observed that there was too much public interest and support in the legislature to kill the bill, they used a standard parliamentary strategy of placing the matter under study. Led by Representative Paul Starnes, the idea to delay consideration for a year while a study was conducted became a threat to early passage. After discussion as to which education

committee would vote on the Master Teacher Bill first, it was decided that the Senate action would be first.

On April 13, 1983, the Senate Education Committee scheduled a vote on the bill. It was generally known that there were three Republicans and the Democratic sponsor, Senator John Rucker, who were in favor of the plan. Of the five other Democrats, four were known to have strong ties with TEA and were expected to oppose the plan. Senator Tommy Burks, the fifth Democrat was non-committal. Even though Governor Alexander had flown to his home to have Sunday dinner with the senator, he was unable to sway Burks. When the votes were taken on the move of Senator Frank Lashlee to delay a vote on the matter until 1984, there were four, including Burks, voting in favor of the move and four voting against (Bristol Herald-Courier, April 14, 1983). It was Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien, chairperson, who cast the decisive vote in favor of placing the matter of education reform under study until January 1984. Senator O'Brien also had been supported and identified with TEA (Knoxville Journal, April 21, 1984).

In response to the vote, National Education Association Executive Director Terry Herndon told the TEA representative assembly, "You have bought yourself a short-term future by causing the governor's nonsense to be delayed a year" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 8, 1983).

With that action in the Senate, the best efforts to save the plan were in the adoption of Senate Joint Resolution No. 96. It was that resolution which directed that a special study committee

be established to examine the various proposals for teacher compensation, along with the ancillary issues of college preparation and in-service training for teachers. The study resolution was a broader package of educational reform than had been proposed by the Master Teacher bill (Report of the Select Committee on Education, 1984).

Joint Committee Membership

Both Speaker McWherter and Lieutenant Governor Wilder demonstrated statesmanship in their appointments to the Joint Committee. Seven of the nine members of the Senate Education Committee were appointed, omitting one Democrat and one Republican. Seven of 19 members of the House Education Committee were appointed, making a total of 14 for the joint committee. Membership was as follows:

Senators:	Tommy Burks	Representatives:	Steve Bivens
	Joe Crockett		Steve Cobb
	Leonard Dunavant		Dale Kelley
	Frank Lashlee		Alvin King
	James Elkins		Paul Starnes
	John Rucker		Zane Whitson
	Anna Belle O'Brien		Walter Work

The composition of the committee consisted of four Republicans and eight Democrats. Of those Democrats, John Rucker was a sponsor of the proposed legislation and a vocal supporter of the plan. Representative Steve Cobb had indicated his interest in the legislation

and his support of the concept to the governor on January 28, 1983. Senators Lashlee and Crockett had voted against the bill in the Senate Education Committee. Representative Work was a former employee of TEA, and Representative Starnes was closely identified with the TEA position.

Senator Anna Belle O'Brien had also voted against the Master/Teacher bill. A Jackson Sun article of July 13, 1983 suggested that her vote could have been motivated by a \$10,000 contribution from TEA for her 1983 campaign for the Democratic nomination for governor. Senator O'Brien explained that when she campaigned for the Senate, she promised that she would vote in response to what she heard from the people, even if she did not agree. She said that a survey of the teachers in her counties revealed a necessity for her vote to study the governor's plan (Harriman Record, July 23, 1984). Both Senator O'Brien and Governor Alexander indicated that, after the Senate Education Committee vote, the Governor summoned the senator to his office where she told the governor,

I voted to study, and I know how disappointed you are because you have done a great job in presenting your plan. As soon as we can sit down with the people in our districts and hear what they are upset about, I feel that together, we can pass the finest bill. I would like to help you pass the bill once we work out a compromise (personal communication, July 2, 1984).

Senator O'Brien's commitment to the plan made the seventh member of the joint committee to indicate support of the governor's ideas.

The eighth member of the joint committee to become involved with the incentive pay forces was Democratic Representative Steve

Bivens. A former high school guidance counselor, Bivens had also held close ties with TEA. An article by Bivens in the January 1983 edition of the TEA publication, Tennessee Teacher extolled the virtues of the association. Yet, in expressing his eagerness to be a member of the Select Committee, Bivens made a decision regarding the opportunities in the governor's plan. Although he did not endorse the governor's plan, he indicated that his experiences in attending national meetings influenced his ability to see the advantages in some of the possible changes that could be made in the education system.

Bivens's decision meant that there were four Democrats who had expressed an interest in the establishment of a career ladder concept and incentive pay. Together with the four Republicans, those four Democrats created a polarization against the remaining six Democrats--a situation which was reflected in deliberations and in the final vote of the committee.

The Chairmanship

Although the appointments had been made much earlier, the Select Committee did not hold its first meeting until July 12, 1983. Both Representative Bivens and Representative Starnes had expressed an interest in being elected chairman of the study group prior to the first meeting. Starnes made the following remarks to the press:

The committee studying Governor Lamar Alexander's master teacher plan may replace it with a "much broader" legislative proposal. . . . and the new proposal may be a Democratic solution with 10 committee members Democrats. You

can often see when there are Democratic and Republican version of the same legislation, the Democratic version will pass and the Republican version will not (Chattanooga Times, May 28, 1984).

Whether his fellow Democrats held the same fierce party loyalty or whether there was a larger loyalty to issues, a controversy arose over the chairmanship of the committee even before the first meeting was convened.

Chairperson of the Senate Education Committee, Anna Belle O'Brien, and Walter Work, Chairman of the House Education Committee, fearing an open conflict which would threaten the Select Committee's work, were concerned. The following newspaper account described the maneuvering:

Fearful of starting the panel's work in an atmosphere of conflict, Work and O'Brien said they consulted with House Speaker Ned Ray McWherter and Lt. Gov. John Wilder on a method to sidestep the controversy. It was decided Work and O'Brien would assume leadership duties themselves. The move was apparently motivated by a bruising behind-the-scenes battle between Rep. Paul Starnes and Rep. Steve Bivens to win election to the prestigious chairmanship. Both claimed Tuesday they had enough votes to win (Knoxville Journal, July 13, 1983).

Information obtained during several interviews indicated that the action described in the Journal article was primarily conducted by Representative Work. Senator O'Brien, having completed chairmanship of the two-year Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study, had not expressed an interest in leading another such study.

When Representative Work announced to the committee that, as chairpersons of their respective education committees, they were exercising their prerogative, numerous members of the committee

became noticeably angry (Jackson Sun, July 13, 1983). Soon after Representative Work's announcement, the meeting was adjourned. The matter of how the study would be conducted and who would assume leadership was left to be resolved by individual members of the committee.

The next morning, Work and O'Brien abdicated their positions at the beginning of the meeting. Work said that he "found out what he wanted to know, that Alexander was not determined to control selection of the committee chairman" (Jackson Sun, July 13, 1983). Steve Bivens, who was said to have eight of the committee votes, was then elected chairman by acclamation. Since Representative Starnes was a participant in the minority report which was submitted as part of the Report of the Select Committee on Education (1984), the consequential nature of this incident is emphasized in relation to the possibility of a totally different outcome from the Select Committee's work if the Democrat had been elected to serve as chairman.

Peter Hart Poll

While only one participant termed the poll as being a critical incident, most of the participants referred to indications of public opinion reflected by the Hart poll. The results of the poll provided the Alexander forces with more credibility and confirmed what the Governor had been saying in his Better Schools campaign.

The poll was conducted in April 1983 by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., of Washington, D. C. It was a telephone

survey of 502 randomly selected registered Tennessee voters (Tennessean, May 3, 1983). It contained approximately 35 questions or statements to which the respondents were asked to react. In addition, there were 12 areas of demographic data included. The subjects included an assessment of President Ronald Reagan, Governor Alexander, the state legislature, and local representatives. Respondents were asked about such issues as the environment, unemployment, crime, and education. They were asked to assess changes or policies needed in education. They were also asked questions regarding the Better Schools program and the taxes needed to fund the program.

Although the results of the poll were released too late to aid passage in the 1983 session of the General Assembly, they gave the Governor the clear message that the voters of Tennessee were interested in education and in his proposals for improving education. Seventy-six percent of those polled indicated that they had heard of the Better Schools Program. Seventy-three percent indicated that they were in favor of the Master Teacher philosophy. Only 13 percent of those surveyed indicated that they would favor a tax increase for across-the-board pay raises for teachers. That finding corroborated Alexander's position of a threatened veto for any tax increase which did not include incentive pay for teachers. Another encouraging statistic for Alexander was that while only 19 percent of those surveyed called themselves Republicans, 63 percent rated the governor's performance as good to excellent (Tennessean, May 5, 1983).

The poll was commissioned by the People Advocating Superior Schools, under the auspices of the Tennessee Organization of School Superintendents. PASS was a short-lived lobbying group which was later merged with Tennesseans for Better Schools. The choice of Peter Hart Research to conduct the poll was significant in that Hart was frequently identified as a Democratic pollster doing considerable work for Tennessee congressional candidates and for presidential hopeful, Walter Mondale. This choice of pollster meant that Hart's findings had credibility with the Democratic majority in the legislature.

While the Hart poll provided information regarding Tennessee attitudes toward education, national polls indicated a general concern for education. Robert Teeter, the Detroit-based Republican pollster indicated that "there is a heavy emphasis on 'academic quality, competency and accountability'" (Washington Post, May 17, 1983).

Select Committee Decision of November 23, 1983

The goals and tasks of the Select Committee on Education were outlined in Senate Joint Resolution No. 96. The purpose of the group's work was to "bring structure to various proposals for education reform debated throughout Tennessee during the past three years" (Report of the Select Committee on Education, 1984, p. vii). In addition to trying to compromise the differences between the

Governor's Master Teacher bill (SB1000/HB1081) and the TEA Teacher Excellence Program (SB1124/HB1099, Tennessee Archives, 1983) the committee was directed to study teacher compensation, teacher preparation, and in-service training for teachers. On numerous occasions, TEA forces tried to inject a requirement for the reduction in teacher/pupil ratio (Chattanooga News-Free Press, September 16, 1983; Johnson City Press-Chronicle, November 23, 1983); however, it must be noted that class size was not an area of study mentioned in the original resolution.

After a somewhat stormy opening session (Jackson Sun, July 13, 1983), with its newly elected chairman, Steve Bivens, the committee approached the complicated task of reconciling the two legislative bills and exploring additional areas of education reform. Proving to be a formidable but fair leader, Bivens divided the committee membership into the three subcommittees of:

- teacher compensation
- teacher training
- instructional development.

One of the most significant choices made by the committee leadership was that of Billy Stair as staff director. After having worked with Speaker McWherter, Stair was very familiar with the legislators and with the political processes which would inevitably ensue as a result of the committee's work. Stair also brought to the committee his skills in writing and research. Thus, it was largely his work which brought the committee together in their

acceptance of a position paper in late October 1983 which helped the members of the committee conceptualize the research, testimony, and work to which they had been exposed. It was that step which helped to move the committee toward its final decision a month later.

During the period from July through November 1983, the committee was convened fourteen times. During those meetings, they heard testimony from 32 educators whose involvement in education ranged from positions as superintendent to classroom teacher and included legislators, college professors, and those involved in national and regional education reform.

During the early months of deliberations, several private meetings were also held which included Chairman Bivens, Staff Director Stair, TEA chief lobbyist Betty Anderson, and Special Assistant to the Governor, Keel Hunt. Those meetings were arranged in an effort to confront the issues, increase communications, and enhance the opportunities for the Select Committee to devise an education reform bill which would be acceptable to all participants involved (TEA News, November 4, 1983).

The normal outcome of any issue sent into legislative study is a dilution of the original content (Memphis Commercial Appeal, April 23, 1983). In contrast to the usual study effort, the Select Committee's work was thorough and added to the content of the original plan. This difference can be attributed to membership commitment and to effective leadership. During the period of the study, the press accounts included such notes as "The legislature's Select

Committee on Education has surprised most observers with its in-depth attention to the issues of teacher education" (Knoxville Journal, November 3, 1983). The Johnson City Press Chronicle included the following comment:

The committee, chaired by Representative Steve Bivens, has conducted its study thoroughly and responsibly. It has delved in depth into what other systems elsewhere are doing. And it is incorporating many of the best ideas into its plan (November 3, 1983).

That same newspaper also carried an editorial indicating that both the governor and TEA were pleased with the compromises which had been achieved by the committee.

Coverage of the final meetings on November 22 and 23, 1983, indicated considerable displeasure from TEA, however, concerning the committee's final recommendations. According to one newspaper, "TEA Executive Secretary Cavit Cheshier lamented that the legislators had not been willing to make the improvements for education that TEA wanted" (Jackson Sun, November 23, 1983).

It was during the final session that the committee voted to recommend its draft of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984 (CERA) to the 94th Session of the General Assembly. Some of the major provisions of that bill included the following:

1. A four-step career ladder for teachers with a three-step ladder for administrators
2. Pay incentives ranging from \$1,000 to \$7,000 related to performance and length of contract
3. Establishment of state and regional certification commissions

4. Creation of a method for the removal of incompetent teachers
5. Strengthening of entrance requirements for state colleges of education
6. Provision of teacher aides--one for every three teachers in grades one through three
7. Lengthening of the school year from 175 to 180 instructional days
8. Establishment of a new loan program to help attract new math and science teachers (Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 25, 1983).

Some items which were not included in the proposed bill were the quotas on the number of participants in the program which had been included in the Master Teacher bill. This proposed bill also excluded the words "master teacher" in favor of less descriptive nomenclature.

The fact that the revised bill did include a career ladder, incentive pay related to performance, and higher standards for teacher training were areas which pleased Governor Alexander. In response to the new CERA, he said, "The committee's work will make history--not just for this state but for the country" (Manchester Standard, November 28, 1983).

In addition to the legislation, the committee also recommended a 10 percent increase in all teachers' salaries. That was more than the 7.5 percent increase recommended by the governor but considerably less than the 20 percent advocated by TEA.

An additional TEA concern was the exclusion of a reduction in the pupil/teacher ratio. TEA officials expressed the feeling

that the new CERA did not reflect a complete compromise but rather was a mere change in nomenclature. TEA Executive Director Cavit Cheshier said, "The committee's product 'appears to be' the Master Teacher Program in sheep's clothing" (Knoxville Journal, November 23, 1983). That same article described the communications which expressed those concerns contrasted with their opponents' views during the final Select Committee session:

Tuesday's session was marked by harsh rhetoric, flaring tempers and close votes as lawmakers tackled some of the most controversial elements of the education program.

Despite the controversy indicated by the news media of the Select Committee's work, the committee prepared for the General Assembly a lengthy and thorough work to guide decisions for education reform in 1984.

Critics claimed that the final eight to six vote in favor of the legislation (Knoxville Journal, November 24, 1983) was far from consensus. Closer scrutiny of the legislators, however, indicated that the vote simply reflected a commitment to various issues which the members held at the time of their appointments. Reflecting that commitment, four of the six Democrats who voted against recommending the proposed legislation attached a minority report to the Select Committee's report. The four and one-half page document primarily cautioned the legislature against changing any policy which would diminish the local control of education and the power of teachers to negotiate with local school boards. The report also expressed doubts about the validity of the evaluation of teachers.

In addition, there was a recommendation for a reduction in class size to 20 students in grades one through three and an increase in teacher salaries of 15 percent.

The submission of a minority report was inevitable from the outset of the appointments. Although the committee members did not change their original commitments, they were able to achieve the goal of Resolution No. 96 and develop a product which reflected research, compromise, and some integrative problem solving. While their deliberations did not produce a shift in personal stance, they were able to attain the goal of producing a bill which reflected legislative views and ownership.

Resignation of Susan Rosenholtz

Dr. Rosenholtz first began working for the State Department of Education as a consultant in early 1983. An Assistant Professor of Education and Sociology at Vanderbilt University, Rosenholtz was asked to provide research from the literature regarding effective teaching. With her assistant, Mark Smylie, she later testified before the Select Committee and the Interim Certification Commission. The Interim Commission sought her expertise on student achievement, classroom management, and effective instructional behavior.

The Conflict

Using the Rosenholtz research as the basis for establishing teacher competencies, the Interim Commission developed a draft of

teacher competencies in the fall of 1983. That draft was sent to the Teachers' Study Council, the liaison group which had been established by the State Department of Education, to obtain input from teachers regarding the use of those competencies in the construction of an evaluation instrument. After receiving feedback from the teachers and after the competencies had been studied by TEA and the Commission members, a decision was made to change some of the competencies to reflect the teacher feedback and also to seek additional expert advice before finalizing the draft.

Rosenholtz disagreed with the Commission on the appropriateness of including additional research with her original research (TEA News, November 4, 1983). While not diminishing the importance of the Rosenholtz work, the Interim Commission perceived a need to include additional consultants and to establish the research as having a broader base of input. Rosenholtz contended that the introduction of any new material would destroy the validity of her work. The disagreement over her inflexibility in allowing greater input for the competencies was increased by her public expressions of doubt regarding incentive pay (TEA News, August 15, 1983).

Concerns about the movement of the consultant who had been engaged for technical level research, into an area of public policy were interpreted as political pressure by Dr. Rosenholtz. There was indication that the State Department of Education and the Interim Commission interpreted Dr. Rosenholtz's tasks differently from her perspective.

The Resignation

On December 8, 1983, Dr. Rosenholtz submitted her resignation and informed the press of her decision. The Memphis Commercial Appeal quoted her resignation, which was said to be in the mail to Commissioner McElrath: "I cannot allow your political concerns about passing the bill to distort my professional judgment." She told a reporter that McElrath was supporting criteria that had nothing to do with improving education. In the same article, McElrath responded to the news of her resignation and objections to changes in the evaluation criteria by saying: "I regret that, however, any changes in the evaluation criteria were made after consulting with classroom teachers across the state" (December 9, 1983).

Amid comments that the changes resulted from an academic dispute, that the resignation destroyed credibility, and that it would damage chances for passage of the legislation, Representative Steve Bivens told reporters:

Ms. Rosenholtz' resignation would not make it more difficult to pass the legislation. . . . We had input from 5,000 teachers. As for Ms. Rosenholtz contention that the evaluation will be difficult, there are other professional teachers who say it can be done. . . . Some people think their views are the only views (Chattanooga News-Free Press, December 9, 1983).

Representative Steve Cobb was even more direct in his response to the media.

You can't just listen to the voice of one social scientist. He said a decision had been made not to renew Dr. Rosenholtz's contract due to her inflexibility (Knoxville News-Sentinel, December 9, 1983).

Cobb's responses to the resignation in the Chattanooga News-Free Press were as follows:

She has some skills that are useful and she lacks some skills that would be useful. The issue is not what she thinks, but whether teachers can be evaluated and she testified last week that they can be (December 9, 1983).

The Outcome

After the involvement of the newspaper reporters in the resignation, followed by the stinging responses of legislators, an open collision might have been expected. That it did not occur is attributable to several circumstances. The timing of the resignation, just before the Christmas holidays and immediately before the announcement of another critical incident in the conflict, served to obscure the resignation.

The fact that Dr. Rosenholtz had placed herself in a predicament because of her own rigid posture concerning the research position made her stance difficult to defend. In addition, the tenuous nature of Dr. Rosenholtz's position at Vanderbilt was said to have discouraged her from openly pursuing the conflict.

In an article describing House and Senate Education Committee hearings during the special session, Dr. Rosenholtz's departure was described as follows:

To hear another assessment of the evaluation plan, both education committees invited Susan Rosenholtz, the Vanderbilt professor who resigned as a consultant to the interim commission, to testify.

Rosenholtz declined the invitations, explaining in letters to the committees that she, as an academician, desires to avoid the political arena. She also said her doctor advised her not to attend.

BURKS [Senator Tommy Burks] SUGGESTED to the Senate committee that he has reason to believe that Rosenholtz, a

non-tenured professor, was advised by her superiors not to address the committees.

On the floor of the Senate, Burks said, "The lady from Vanderbilt was afraid to testify."

Burks said Rosenholtz, who "took suddenly ill," was denied her academic freedom.

"Someday I hope I can say in public what I know about this," he said (TEA News, March 1, 1984).

Although she later spoke to a meeting of TEA members and had some subsequent contact with that group, she was no longer a participant in the conflict and later left the state.

Acquiring Sponsors for the Comprehensive Education

Reform Act of 1984

When the Select Committee voted on November 23, 1983 to recommend the revised legislation to the General Assembly, the bill was moved closer to passage. The Select Committee had broadened and strengthened the legislation. The original Master Teacher bill had been transformed into the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984. That bill represented greater legislative ownership than the governor's bill.

The Senate

Although the Senate's leadership had given approval only to the concept, two Democratic senators had endorsed the legislation. They were John Rucker, member of the Select Committee and original sponsor of the bill, along with Senator Anna Belle O'Brien, Senate

Education Committee Chairperson and TCES Chairperson. While the legislation had the solid support of the 11 Republican Senators and the bill's two Democratic sponsors, they needed four additional Democrats to join them. Together, they would comprise the 17 votes needed to pass the legislation in the Senate.

To secure their position, Senator Rucker, with the support of the governor's staff, approached four Democrats. As before, in gaining support from other Democrats, he appealed to their concerns for education and their responsibilities to the state's future. The first Democrat approached was Doug Henry of Nashville, the influential chairman of the Finance, Ways and Means Committee. Obtaining his sponsorship meant more than just a vote for passage; it also enhanced the chances for the passage of a tax bill to fund the education package. After obtaining Henry's signature, the bill was flown to Bristol for the signature of Carl Moore. The influential Moore had been approached by several people in an effort to obtain his support. Next, the bill was flown to McMinnville for the signature of Ernest Crouch, Senate chairman of the Democratic Caucus. Both Crouch and Henry had announced that they would have voted for the Master Teacher Bill had it reached the Senate floor in April (Nashville Banner, April 9, 1983). Finally, the bill was taken to Columbia for the signature of Bill Richardson. With Richardson's signature, there were 17 senators committed to the legislation--a majority vote in the Senate. Among those 17 votes were five of the nine members of the Education Committee and five of the nine members of the Finance,

Ways and Means Committee--a majority for every Senate vote which was anticipated for the bill.

The House

While a majority of the Senate was publicly committed to the bill, the 50 vote majority needed in the House required a different strategy. The daughter of Senator Carl Moore, Representative Dana Moore, became a CERA sponsor during the first weeks of December (personal communication, August 31, 1984). Together with Representatives Steve Cobb, Steve Bivens, and the seven Republicans, that group comprised a majority vote in the 19 member House Education Committee. To enhance the bill's chances in the Calendar and Rules Committee, the most difficult stop on the road to the floor of the House, Chairman Elbert Gill was also invited to join as a House sponsor of the bill. The House sponsors also had the support of Speaker McWherter in encouraging committee votes and finding the necessary votes for passage by the entire House.

The Results

Without fanfare or press coverage, those final signatures needed to ensure passage and positive committee proceedings were obtained during the Thanksgiving holidays. The strategy of personal appeal used by Senator Rucker and the governor's staff secured the bill's vote in the Senate and by the Senate committees. The House sponsors greatly enhanced the outlook in their Education Committee and helped to prepare for the difficult hurdle in the Calendar and Finance Committee.

There was little public knowledge of the accomplishments until Senator Rucker prefiled CERA with the Senate clerk on December 16, 1983. That move, however, was a signal to the governor, the legislators who supported the bill, to the public, and especially to the opponents of the plan that much had been accomplished toward final passage of CERA (Chattanooga News-Free Press, December 18, 1983).

Governor's Decision to Call a Special Session

By the first of December 1983, Governor Alexander knew that there was an adequate number of committed votes in the Senate for passage of the education reform bill. He also knew that there were enough votes for the bill to pass both the House and Senate Education Committees. In addition, he knew that there were sufficient votes for a favorable response in the Senate Finance Committee along with some key committee members in the House. With that support, the question became one of how to best utilize the strength which had been acquired.

Even though the 94th Session of the General Assembly was scheduled to be convened at noon on January 10, 1984, there was some speculation that nothing would really be accomplished in education reform before March (Jackson Sun, November 24, 1983). Eager to avoid another delay, Alexander had been considering the possibility of calling a special session of the legislature since the Master Teacher Bill was sent to the study committee in April 1983. Bill Koch, the governor's legal counsel had researched the mechanics of

a special session as outlined in Article III, Section 9 of the State Constitution (Tennessee Archives) and had sent the governor a report on November 1, 1983 (Tennessean, December 21, 1983). The governor was also aware that Florida, Arkansas, and Mississippi had recently passed education packages in special legislative sessions (Knoxville News-Sentinel, December 25, 1983).

The governor was not the only person aware of the advantages of legislative considerations during a special session. Eight months before the governor issued the call for a special session, Memphis Commercial Appeal columnist James Brosnan wrote:

Some mechanism is needed to separate the short-range and the trivial problems from the long range and the important. As much as taxpayers might object to the cost, they might be better off if the governor and the legislature considered holding special sessions limited to major issues like taxes and educational reform (April 24, 1983).

On December 19, 1983 when Governor Alexander was telephoning key legislators, he received the boost which he needed. Senator O'Brien described that telephone call as follows:

The Governor called most of us on the Education Committee and asked us what we thought. When he called me he said, "Miss Anna Belle, I was giving some thought as to what would be the best way for us to get on with the Better Schools Program." And I don't remember whether I said it first or he did, I think he maybe said, "I remember that your brother called a special session back in 1964 or 66." And I said, "Well Governor, I really think that's the thing you ought to do" (personal communication, July 2, 1984).

In his press release on December 20, 1983, the governor mentioned that he made the decision to call the special session at the suggestion of Senator O'Brien (Nashville Banner, December 21, 1983).

Before conducting the press conference on December 20, Alexander arranged a morning meeting with Lieutenant Governor Wilder, Speaker of the House Ned Ray McWherter, Senate Majority Leader Milton Hamilton, and Senate Minority Leader Jim Henry (Tennessean, December 21, 1983). The governor had met with Speaker McWherter in Dresden and asked him to join in the call for a special session. He also asked the lieutenant governor to join. Neither of the two shared the governor's foresight in having a legislative session restricted to the subjects of education and the taxes needed for funding education. The speaker, however, expressed an obligation to the chief executive to honor the call and to organize and structure the House to accommodate the session even though he had reservations about such a session at the same time as the 94th Session was scheduled to be convened.

Governor Alexander's call for the special session to begin one hour before the regular session on January 10, 1983 was generally applauded by Republicans and criticized by Democrats. Reactions, even by supporters, were mixed. Some saw the session, during which the attention could be given only to education and the taxes needed for funding as an opportunity for the opponents to aim all of their power at the reform effort. Others viewed the special session as an opportunity to focus on education without the distraction of other important issues such as banking regulations, legalized gambling, the legal drinking age, and Senate redistricting (Chattanooga News-Free Press, December 25, 1983).

On December 28, the governor held a discussion with key legislators concerning the ideas for conducting the special session. During that week, his staff polled the General Assembly for their suggestions (Knoxville Journal, December 30, 1983). It was agreed that the session should be broad enough to consider the CERA, the TEA Teacher Excellence Bill, a bill proposed by Lieutenant Governor John Wilder to restructure the State Board of Education, various revenue approaches to fund the education reform, and a discussion of salary increases for state employees as well as for teachers. (Nashville Banner, December 29, 1983). The inclusion of consideration of bills other than CERA was a step to allay the fears expressed by TEA President Marjorie Pike that the special session might "restrict the flow of debate, the introduction of bills or the interjection of ideas on any topic concerning education" (Tennessean, December 21, 1983).

In essence, the decision to call a special session of the General Assembly was a matter of danger and opportunity (Conner, 1982; Johnson City Press Chronicle, December 28, 1983). David Lyons, columnist for the Knoxville News Sentinel expressed the move as follows:

What is clear is that by calling a special session and limiting debate to education reform, Alexander has pulled a political coup, outsmarted his enemies, and forced his own agenda on a Legislature which prides itself for independence (December 15, 1983).

The outcome of the session and the opinions expressed by the participants indicated that the governor's decision was a positive move.

The Governance Bill

Although not identified as a critical incident from the printed data, several participants mentioned the importance of the introduction and passage of the Governance Bill as being critical in the total conflict. It was also a consideration for the part which Lieutenant Governor John Wilder played in the situation.

In his role in the creation of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC) and the Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study (TCES), Wilder had made his philosophy on management clear. Fred Travis's commentary in the Johnson City Press-Chronicle (January 13, 1984) described Wilder's intentions to install what could be described as a classical management scheme for governing kindergarten through grade 12 education (Bass and Ryterband, 1979). Wilder had been eager to establish a strong management system for the State Department of Education, the Department of Corrections, and other areas of state government. Although somewhat surprised by Governor Alexander's move to call the special session of the legislature, Wilder saw that as an opportunity to press for acceptance of his ideas--a move which might not have been so easily accepted at another time.

The purpose of the Governance Bill was to create a different structure for the State Board of Education, reducing its membership, increasing its powers, and allowing the board to employ its own executive director (TEA News, March 1, 1984). Whereas the board had formerly been appointed by the governor, under Wilder's bill the new

board members, one from each of the nine congressional districts, would also require confirmation by the legislature. While the commissioner of education would continue to serve on the governor's cabinet under Wilder's proposal, his influence would be significantly reduced. The essence of the change was that of giving greater control to the State Board of Education, establishing it as the policy making body for K-12 education, and placing the commissioner in a role of implementation. It changed the function of the commissioner from one of policy-making and administration to one of administration (Knoxville News-Sentinel, January 17, 1984).

The pressure to reduce the influence of the commissioner of education probably existed before the tenure of Dr. Robert McElrath; however, McElrath's high visibility and strong leadership in the Better Schools Program possibly encouraged opposition. The State Department of Education is the largest single unit of state government, receiving the biggest share of the state's budget and representing the largest number of employees. Its size and influence made the SDE and its commissioner a target for conflict.

The lieutenant governor would have preferred to institute a procedure whereby the State Board of Education elected the commissioner--in much the same manner as executive director of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission is elected (Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 22, 1983). He was unable to get encouragement for such a move since that procedure did not exist in other departments of state government. Instead, he created the position of executive

director for the state board, separate from the State Department of Education staff. That proposal created the potential for future conflict between the commissioner of education, appointed by the governor, and the executive director, elected by the board.

The existing board of education endorsed the Governance Bill (Kingsport Times-News, January 7, 1984), and the governor also gave it his support. Despite the fact that it reduced the influence of one of Governor Alexander's most influential cabinet members, the governor endorsed Lieutenant Governor Wilder's bill. The increased mandate, the new energy, and the greater involvement of the public in school leadership made the change in governance attractive. April 1, 1984 was the effective date for the inception of the new Board.

When Lieutenant Governor Wilder made his proposals known at a press conference in late December, the press did not respond with the same enthusiasm and coverage afforded the development of the CERA. Even Wilder admitted that his proposal lacked the glamour of Governor Alexander's efforts (Johnson City Press-Chronicle, January 13, 1984). It did, however, give him participation in the reform process and became a condition for his support of the master teacher concept (Chattanooga Times, January 5, 1984). The lieutenant governor also insisted that his bill be scheduled for consideration on the Senate floor before the CERA. The leadership agreed and it was debated and passed prior to CERA. In describing the lieutenant governor's posture toward the bill, the Jackson Sun indicated, "He

believes his bill would go further toward improving schools than Alexander's" (January 19, 1984).

Legislative Compromises

All of the compromises proposed and/or agreed to during the period in which the legislature deliberated CERA are considered in this study as a single critical incident. The various compromises, some of which were in the form of amendments to the CERA, were identified from the printed data and from the interviews.

When the Select Committee voted to recommend the CERA to the legislature, the bill's supporters were well aware that numerous compromises and adjustments would be made before the bill could be enacted into law. The dissenting members of the Select Committee submitted an alternative bill which they proposed as a compromise between the governor's ideas and TEA's position. Although that bill received some support in the legislature and had some effect upon the final outcome, it was not seen by most observers as a legitimate compromise because it omitted attention to higher education and several other areas of reform (Kingsport Times News, January 15, 1984).

The path of the CERA was marked by compromises from its inception through its passage. Most of the legislative compromises were in the form of amendments. From the moment that it became possible in the legislative proceedings, there was a rapid attempt to amend the bill in a variety of ways. Perhaps one of the more significant

features of those attempts was in the agreement to accept only written amendments which could be studied before the members were asked to vote.

Opponents of the bill, especially TEA supporters, sought to amend the CERA in ways which would make it less potent. Other legislators made efforts to amend CERA to reflect their particular concerns. For example, Senator Milton Hamilton expressed a belief that the first and second year incentives on the career ladder were too low. An amendment was subsequently passed which added \$500 to the supplement for apprentice teachers. Senator John Bragg had concerns about accountability and CERA's lack of clear-cut goals. Educational goals were then added to the legislation. Senator Riley Darnell, as a TEA supporter, made every effort to amend the bill to include a restriction of pupil/teacher ratios. When that amendment was not passed in the House, he agreed to an amendment which increased the number of teacher aides in the lower grades.

The Weakley County Amendment

One of the most notable of the legislative compromises grew from Speaker McWherter's efforts to make changes in the proposed legislation which could be accepted by both the administration and the TEA. In late January 1984, the Speaker was concerned about the impasse which existed between the governor's forces and the TEA supporters. That concern led him to arrange a series of meetings for representatives of TEA and the administration in his office

(Jackson Sun, January 29, 1984). During those closed-door meetings, he conveyed his concerns about the proposed bill and the concerns which he had heard from teachers in his home district, Weakley County.

After many hours of negotiations, newspaper reporters became curious and asked the speaker about what was happening. When he replied that they were discussing concerns expressed by the teachers in his home county, the press immediately dubbed the resulting compromise as the "Weakley County Amendment" (personal communication, McWherter, August 3, 1984).

The changes effected by the Weakley County Amendment included a change in nomenclature from "professional, senior, and distinguished senior teacher" to Career Levels I, II, and III as recommended in the Select Committee's October 1983 concept paper (TEA News, November 4, 1983). Further compromises included additional means for entry onto the career ladder other than by a single proficiency test. In addition, the amendment gave the local boards of education time to help inferior teachers gain competency before removing the state salary supplement for such teachers. Speaker McWherter's concerns for implementation of the reform were incorporated by the inclusion of an oversight committee.

One of the points of agreement reached during the session in the speaker's office was TEA's acceptance of the governor's proposal of a five year recertification plan. While TEA objected to the shortened certification period, officials did agree to accept the

five year plan. Other small changes were made in the legislation's language which lessened the threat to tenure, a grave TEA concern.

The prospect for final agreement seemed imminent during those meetings as a result of a compromise on the sharing of teacher evaluations with local boards. That agreement was not implemented, however, probably because all TEA officials were not included in the meetings. Although the administration officials agreed to the terms of the compromise, TEA added greater restrictions on the sharing of the evaluation process:

"The Tennessee Education Association would stop fighting Gov. Lamar Alexander's teacher incentive pay bill if local teacher unions could decide who gets the smallest bonuses of \$1,000 a year," TEA lobbyist Betty Anderson said Wednesday (Bristol Herald Courier, January 19, 1984).

Under the amendment, local authorities would evaluate teachers with a system based on state standards. More stringent standards could be imposed with state approval (Memphis Commercial Appeal, January 20, 1984). Preferring more participation in the evaluation process, the association indicated the following position:

TEA insisted the plan would destroy the tenure system and eliminate local control of schools. It proposed instead that local schools conduct evaluation for teachers entering the first level of the career ladder, and that the evaluation procedures be subject to local collective bargaining agreements (Knoxville Journal, January 21, 1984).

Thus, despite Speaker McWherter's best efforts to appease the TEA during the three days and two nights of negotiations, the association was unwilling to accept the evaluation proposal. In the end, "the reform bill sponsors and House Speaker Ned Ray McWherter parted,

optimistic about an agreement" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, January 20, 1984). Perhaps part of that optimism came from remarks made by TEA lobbyist Betty Anderson:

Ms. Anderson said "TEA does not agree that the career bonuses are the answer to the problems of education in this state. But if backers of Alexander's bill would agree to local, union-negotiated evaluation of teachers with three or four years' experience, qualifying them for \$1,000 annual bonuses, we could accept the rest of the governor's bill. . . ." In any case, Ms. Anderson's comments mark a shift from TEA's 1983 position when it opposed any type of bonus or merit pay--and argued that teacher evaluation always was political (Bristol Herald Courier, January 19, 1984).

Despite complete acceptance by TEA, the negotiations did produce changes which allowed other legislators to endorse the bill. Among those were Shelby Rhinehart and John Bragg. Perhaps the most important convert was Representative Tommy Burnette.

The Burnette Compromise

Having once been the Democratic Majority Leader in the House during the Blanton administration, Representative Burnette had experienced personal difficulties which had reflected on his participation in the General Assembly. At the time of the special session of the legislature, he was facing an 18-month federal prison sentence for conviction of two misdemeanor income tax violations. Although he had once been considered a TEA supporter, he had refused to sponsor the TEA Excellence Bill during the previous session of the legislature. Having maintained neutrality in the conflict, Burnette was able, for a short time, to resume his leadership role in mediating the final compromise which allowed TEA to endorse the CERA (Nashville Banner, February 16, 1984).

Several of the participants interviewed for this study indicated that Burnette probably acted upon the request of Speaker McWherter in arranging meetings with House Minority Leader Jim Henry, Republican Representative Dale Kelley, the bill's chief House sponsor, Representative Steve Cobb, and TEA representatives President Marjorie Pike, Executive Secretary Cavit Cheshier, Lobbyist Betty Anderson, and TEA attorney Bryan McCarty. TEA House supporters Representative Paul Starnes and Representative Walter Work also participated in the meetings. During those meetings, TEA agreed to support the tax package and to withdraw opposition to the governor's bill with the following provisions:

- The governor's bill should be amended to satisfy teachers' major objections.
- There should be at least a ten percent across-the-board pay raise.
- There should be amendments included to protect tenure, negotiations, and certification for current teachers.
- There should be additional attention to oversized classes (TEA News, March 1, 1984).

With the inclusion of those compromises, Representative Burnette was able to inform the governor and the speaker that TEA would endorse the CERA. The TEA attorney Brian McCarty, the governor's legal counsel Bill Koch, and Representative Steve Cobb, a Nashville attorney, collaborated on drafting the new agreements into the legislation. That step probably facilitated adherence to the agreements.

All of the legislative compromises received attention in the printed media. Possibly because of the involvement of Speaker

McWherter, the Weakley County Amendment received considerably more attention than the other compromises. The teacher aide for lower grades, which was accepted as a compromise to lowered teacher/pupil ratios, also received attention. Except for an analysis by Mike Pigott in the Nashville Banner (February 16, 1984) and coverage in the TEA News (March 1, 1984), surprisingly, there was little coverage of the Burnette meetings or of his role in the legislative compromise. In contrast, numerous participants interviewed for this study discussed Representative Burnette's importance and his statesmanship effort.

Tennessee Education Association Decision to Endorse the
Comprehensive Education Reform Act, 1984

The TEA representatives had exerted a valiant effort in attempting to influence the Joint House and Senate Select Education Committee. President Marjorie Pike and Lobbyist Betty Anderson spent endless hours with members of the Select Committee, the Interim Certification Commission, the governor and his staff, and various legislators in an effort to avoid having an incentive pay plan become part of the Tennessee education system.

By the time of the governor's call for a special session of the legislature, various polls indicated that both the public and the legislators favored education reform of the type advocated by the governor and the Select Committee (Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 27, 1983). It became increasingly clear that TEA had

little choice except to face the reality that some type of differential pay plan would be passed by the 1984 session of the legislature. One alternative was to design a differential pay plan which would reflect TEA views. The Education Excellence Act of 1984 (EEA) was written by Representative Paul Starnes with the aid of TEA attorney Brian McCarty. Representatives Walter Work and Joe Crockett, both TEA supporters, agreed to become sponsors of the legislation. Although TEA pushed the bill, it was never seriously considered by the legislature (TEA News, March 1, 1984).

When the possibility for passage of the EEA was abandoned, the remaining alternative was to incorporate as many of the features of that bill into the CERA as possible and to remove as many of the unacceptable parts as possible through the introduction of amendments. President Marjorie Pike summarized the TEA strategy as follows:

With political realities being what they were, TEA had only two viable alternatives: (1) to promote alternative legislation which closely paralleled the original Master Teacher Program or (2) to modify the Select Committee's Comprehensive Reform Act (CERA). Both were utilized (TEA News, March 1, 1984).

In a TEA News editorial (March 1, 1984), by Executive Secretary Cavit Cheshier entitled "Decisions, Decisions, Decisions--and Why They Were Made," Executive Secretary Cavit Cheshier chronicled the associations' 13-month battle. He outlined the activities, tried to justify the final decision to endorse CERA, and praised TEA's accomplishments in gaining the best possible reform. He summarized the attempts as follows:

As the dust settles and we reflect on all the tough decisions which had to be made in the last 13 months, we take pride in what has been accomplished. Under the circumstances which existed, the options that were available, the possibilities of success, and the resources with which we had to work, we stand accountable for the decisions of the past and reaffirm our faith in the future through the strength and integrity of the members of this organization.

The headlines on that same issue of the TEA News carried the news: "TEA obtains risk-free plan, Pike: 'We encourage members to apply for career ladder.'" In the article which followed, President Pike called CERA "a potential model for the nation." After the 13-month period of vocal and fierce opposition, TEA officials began the task of justifying their decisions and helping their membership feel comfortable with the CERA.

Numerous participants interviewed for this study discussed the TEA endorsement as happening so late in the process that it appeared CERA would pass with or without TEA. The Knoxville News-Sentinel indicated, "Last week, when both House and Senate Education Committees passed bills by impressive margins, TEA lobbyists cut the best deal they could" (January 29, 1984).

TEA endorsement was regarded by the administration and many legislators as desirable for implementation of CERA and for passage of the taxes needed to fund the reform act. As early as March 1983, the news media had indicated the TEA's need to endorse the governor's program to maintain credibility and influence. Columnist Ken Renner advised the association as follows:

If TEA's leaders hope to maintain any public credibility and political clout, they'd better re-evaluate their position. If they don't, the chance may permanently pass them by (Knoxville Journal, March 10, 1983).

According to the Chattanooga Times, Representative Tommy Burnette said, "The merit pay plan would pass with or without TEA support--but TEA support was needed for the election-year tax increases." Further, that article intimated in the following statement that the endorsement was really motivated by political reality:

After counting enough votes in both the House and Senate to pass the merit pay proposal, the Tennessee Education Association agreed Saturday to back both the teacher legislation and the \$351 million in taxes that the plan will cost (January 30, 1984).

Passage of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act, 1984

Obviously a critical incident in the conflict, the process required for passage of the reform legislation was identified in the printed data and discussed by the major participants. None of the participants expected the special session of the legislature to be brief or the passage of the CERA to be easy. Reporter Keith Miles described the first day: "The first week of the special session of the General Assembly is over and about all that has been accomplished is the spending of some \$80,000 in taxpayers' money" (Johnson City Press-Chronicle, January 15, 1984). The Kingsport Times-News blamed the problems on lack of familiarity with the process.

It was a week filled with uncertainty, because the last special session occurred nearly 20 years ago. Legislators groped in search of proper procedures, and by adjournment yesterday, little had been accomplished (January 13, 1984).

TEA supporters, however, gained a victory in the House defeat of the governor's proposal to provide liability insurance for school

personnel. A Chattanooga News-Free Press editorial said, "It seemed clear that the majority of the Democrats in the House were more interested in favoring the TEA than in favoring the teachers in general" (January 12, 1984).

A gain for the administration occurred when Representative James McKinney's move to kill the sales tax increase needed to fund the reform was thwarted by a hasty adjournment of the House (Knoxville Journal, January 12, 1984). Not satisfied with his loss in the attempt to kill funding for the governor's proposals, Representative McKinney, chairman of the House Democratic Caucus went even further:

In a meeting of the House leadership Monday afternoon, McKinney suggested that legislators not allow Gov. Lamar Alexander to make his scheduled television address to a joint session at 6:30 p.m. today. . . . "Now you fellows better think about it a long time," McWherter said sternly. McWherter said legislators should respect the office of governor and Alexander's prerogative in calling the special session (Jackson Sun, January 10, 1984).

That instance proved to be an initial example of the incidents which occurred on the path to CERA passage. TEA supporters made brash moves only to be reminded of their responsibilities.

Governor Alexander's speech was given high marks in the press although it may not have swayed many votes in the legislature (Knoxville News-Sentinel, January 11, 1984; Jackson Sun, January 11, 1984). The televised speech, however, continued the governor's appeal to the public and his effort to make legislators aware of public opinion regarding the reform.

The Path to Passage in the Senate

When the special session was convened, there were enough votes in the Senate Education Committee and in the Finance, Ways and Means Committee to move CERA through the Senate committee process and onto the Senate floor for debate. Once there, the sponsors combined with the Republicans represented the 17 votes needed for passage. Thus, both the printed data and the participants interviewed indicated that Senate passage was assured (see page 125).

That assumption, however, did not anticipate the procedural move which Democrats pushed through the Senate by a 19-12 vote to expand the Education Committee and the Finance, Ways and Means Committees to include 17 senators rather than the usual nine. The reason given for that move was as follows:

Supporters of the expanded committees, including Lieutenant Governor John Wilder, argued it was necessary to give all senators a chance to study and propose amendments to the package. If the normal committee system was used, they said 16 senators that do not serve on either panel would be left out of the debate (Knoxville Journal, January 11, 1984).

One of the major participants revealed in the interview conducted for this study that the move was directed toward slowing the governor's achievement and drawing attention to the lieutenant governor (personal communication, Z. Lansford, June 28, 1984).

As both committees were reorganized with appointments by Lieutenant Governor Wilder, the declared balance in favor of the governor was held intact--with Wilder holding the balance of power (Jackson Sun, January 17, 1984). The Johnson City Press Chronicle

article regarding the expanded committees carried the title, "Committee appointments give Wilder 'big voice'" (January 17, 1984).

Debate in both Senate committees occurred as might have been anticipated during the following weeks. Perhaps the most dangerous moment for CERA was in the passage of Senator Riley Darnell's amendment to reduce class sizes. A goal of TEA and a logical move for public acceptance, the amendment threatened CERA in an oblique manner. Reduction in class sizes could have resulted in the necessity for extra classrooms, additional capital expenditures, and difficulty for financing such a move. Despite lack of data to prove that a reduction in class size to 20 in grades K-3 could produce increased learning, Senator Darnell was able to achieve passage of his amendment with the help of Republican Senator Ray Albright's vote. The amendment was subsequently defeated in the House and did not become a part of the CERA.

The Path Through the House

Passage through the House was more complicated. There were enough Democrats, combined with the Republicans who supported CERA, to move the bill out of the Education Committee. By an 11-3 vote, the House Education Committee approved the bill after a series of amendments. "'Sergeant at Arms, please notify the speaker that the little bill is trotting down the hall,' committee chairman Walter Work declared after the vote" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, January 25, 1984). Senator Work's vote was represented in the minority.

Realizing that there was a majority of votes in favor of the bill on the committee, Chairman Work had utilized a procedural move in putting the bill on notice with intention of sending it to a sub-committee. The quiet work of Speaker McWherter prevented that from happening.

The Finance, Ways and Means Committee proved to be an equal challenge for supporters of the bill. The next hurdle was in the House Calendar and Rules Committee. Even after the bill finally reached the floor for debate, TEA supporters continued attempts to amend it.

The entire passage of the CERA through the House was marked by the guidance of Speaker McWherter. Movement through the Calendar and Rules Committee, dominated by old-line Democrats, would have been impossible without the speaker's influence. Governor Alexander was dependent upon McWherter for much of CERA's success in the House.

Final Passage

Despite the fact that the special session had begun with a majority of votes to pass both the education bills and the tax measures in the Senate, the legislation was actually passed first in the House. It was then left to the Senate to accept the House version or to work out the differences. After determining that the Senate disagreed with only four House amendments and that those could be worked out without going to a conference committee, Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien proclaimed the sentiments of many legislators, "We have a bill!" (Tennessean, February 19, 1984).

Passage of Taxes and Funding for CERA

Without financial support for education reform, implementation could not have been accomplished and the outcome of the conflict would have been quite different. Identified in the printed data as the final critical incident, the major participants also discussed the critical nature of this incident during the interviews conducted for the study.

For several months prior to the special session of the legislature, there had been widespread speculation that passage of an education reform bill could be accomplished. The governor's participation, the results of public polls, and the apparent willingness of legislators to support reform were indicators that education reform was possible--with or without TEA agreement. The possibilities for a tax increase to fund such education reform, however, were not as great. In the 1984 session, legislators were asked to vote on increasing taxes just months prior to election campaigns for all representatives and one-third of the senators. Reluctance to vote for a tax increase just before election time, coupled with the fact that a complete tax reform was on the legislative agenda, complicated the prospects for securing additional state taxes in early 1984.

The governor had indicated that he planned to make tax reform one of his priorities but not until after passage of the CERA (Chattanooga News-Free Press, January 8, 1984). To encourage legislators to vote for a tax increase, he told them in his address to

the opening session of the General Assembly, "I will take the heat for tax increases" (Chattanooga Times, January 11, 1984). In the televised speech, Governor Alexander urged the legislators to vote for the 351 million dollar sales and business taxes which he proposed. The governor's willingness to take the responsibility for tax increases may have been motivated by his knowledge of a general change in attitude toward financing educational excellence. The improvement in fiscal conditions, in public opinion polls, in the political context, and in the publicity associated with the need for educational reform served to support his position (Odden, 1984; Piphio, 1983). Editorials in Tennessee newspapers also favored the tax proposals (Chattanooga News-Free Press, December 30, 1983; Chattanooga Times, January 11, 1984). Even with such support, it was apparent that a majority of the legislators were not convinced of the acceptability of voting for a tax increase in 1984. Representative David Copeland expressed the irony of the entire situation as follows:

In all my years in the state legislature, I've never experienced anything like this. You've got people who don't want to give something up, being asked to give it to people who don't want to take it, and they're being asked by a group that doesn't want to ask for it (Legislative Review, February 18, 1984).

TEA's continued opposition to the educational reform bill left several legislators speculating that it would be impossible to pass the tax increases without TEA endorsement. While TEA advocated additional revenues for education, they did not want the funds spent for the changes proposed by the governor.

Tax Proposals

Governor Alexander proposed to raise more than one billion dollars over a three year period to fund education reform by increasing the state sales tax by one cent, by extending the sales tax to amusements, by increasing corporate franchise taxes, and a gross premium tax on non-Tennessee casualty and property insurance companies. In addition, the governor proposed to freeze the compensation which vendors were allowed for collecting sales taxes. While the tax increase for financing education reform would logically have been implemented July 1, 1984, the beginning of the state's fiscal year, the governor proposed beginning the tax increase on April 1, 1984 in order to swell the state's "rainy day fund" with the three months revenue. That proposal was in response to the contingency fund's having been severely depleted by several unexpected expenditures. The governor maintained that even with those increases, Tennessee would still have the lowest state taxes in the South (Alexander, January 27, 1984).

Problems in Passage of the Amusement Tax

While the one cent increase in the state sales tax was expected to carry the major portion of the total tax increase, generating 281 million dollars the first year, it was the proposed extension of the tax to amusements which caused a greater problem in passage of additional taxes. There had been extensive opposition and lobbying attempts from the groups which would be affected by

such a tax. Representatives from the state's amusement parks, movie theaters, TV cable companies, tourist attractions, and other amusements descended upon both the House and Senate Finance Committees with convincing arguments regarding why they should be exempted from the tax. Legislators from the Knoxville area succeeded in defeating the first bill introduced in the Senate Finance Committee on the grounds that it was unfair to that area which already had a 10 percent levy on all amusements. To introduce an alternative bill into the committee on taxing amusements required an opinion from the state attorney general and a decision by the lieutenant governor to suspend Senate rules which prohibited the introduction of a second bill dealing with the same topic after that matter had been rejected in the same legislative session. On Tuesday, February 14, the Senate Finance Committee approved the bill extending the sales tax to amusements by a vote of 13 to 3 (Nashville Banner, February 15, 1984). The Senate's lengthy process of dealing with the amusement tax gave justification to the opponents of the sales tax measures in the House (Nashville Tennessean, February 14, 1984).

Problems with Passage of the Sales Tax

Although the House had passed a bill taxing amusements during the first week in February, the vote on the sales tax increase did not take place until the evening of February 13, 1984. After much negotiation, the bill cleared the three House committees and was sent to the full House. After more than four hours of debate and

consideration of 18 amendments, the vote was 52 to 45 in favor of the sales tax increase.

The surprise amendment, and one which may have made it more acceptable to some legislators, was first introduced on February 7, 1984 by Representative Mike Murphy, a Nashville Democrat, during House debate on the amusement tax bill. Representative Murphy's motion to amend the bill to remove the tax on food over a three-year period beginning in July 1985 was defeated by 54-40 on the argument that such a move should wait for the 1985 special legislative task force on state and local taxes report. "'It's always taxes today and tax reform tomorrow,' complained Murphy" (Nashville Tennessean, February 26, 1984).

Knowing that the February 13 vote on the sales tax increase would be another opportunity to amend the bill, Murphy went to work collecting the additional ten votes needed for a House majority. When he introduced the amendment a second time, it passed 83-9. Three days later the measure was easily passed by the Senate. Perhaps the reason for the change in attitude toward the amendment was that it made the legislators look better in voting in favor of the tax increase in an election year. With much of the debate centering on the regressive nature of the sales tax and its hardship on poor people (Legislative Report, 1984) a removal of the tax on food enhanced the public image of the sales tax increase.

Another factor was that some lawmakers considered the move--wrongly, it appears--to be a "toothless tiger," something that could simply be repealed next year

before ever taking effect (Nashville Tennessean, February 27, 1984).

The Revenue

The late endorsement of CERA by the TEA, the amendment to remove the sales tax on food beginning in 1985, and considerable counseling, lobbying, and pressuring by various factions finally resulted in passage of the following tax increases:

- One cent increase in sales tax generating \$281 million
- Amusement tax of 5.5 percent creating \$25 million
- Increase in state corporate franchise tax from 15 cents for each \$100 of net worth, raising \$40 million
- A gross premium tax on casualty and property insurance raising \$7 million
- Lowered vendor compensation for sales tax collection generating \$5 million (Nashville Banner, February 24, 1984).

The total amount anticipated from the tax increase totaled 358 million dollars, seven million more than the governor had proposed. That revenue was specified to be used for the tools to improve public education in Tennessee as follows:

\$9 million to purchase computer hardware for all 7th and 8th grade classes--one computer for every 30 students in those classes

\$3.5 million to hire more math and science teachers for high schools. In addition \$200,000 for a loan pool to encourage college freshmen to enter that teaching field

\$450,000 for three summer residential programs for gifted junior and senior high school students

\$6.5 million to hire one teacher aide for every three teachers in grades kindergarten through three. That program to be

phased in over three years with additional money to be appropriated

\$500,000 for in-service training of Grades K-3 teachers to improve classroom teaching of music and art

\$2.4 million in recurring appropriations for textbooks and instructional supplies. In addition, 3.4 million for instructional supplies as a one-time appropriation

\$1.2 million for alternative schools for disruptive students

\$10 million for centers of excellence at public universities

The remaining funds were allocated for the incentive pay plan, its implementation, and for higher education (Nashville Banner, February 24, 1984; Nashville Tennessean, February 26, 1984).

Passage of funding measures for CERA brought to an end the final critical incident and the conflict over the development of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984. At a press conference on Thursday, February 23, 1984, Governor Alexander stated:

The legislature has passed what is clearly the most important, most comprehensive, best public school improvement program in the country (Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 24, 1984).

Summary

Deutsch (1973) indicated that the interested audiences and their relationships are variables which influence the outcome of conflict. In identifying and studying the critical incidents which developed as a part of this conflict, the researcher noted the level of the participants' involvement and interest in each particular incident. The transcripts from the interviews indicated that the participants responded to the list of critical incidents in relation

to their personal interest and involvement. The participants' discussions of the critical incidents were divided into three groups: those who discussed the incident as an involved participant or with considerable detail, those who discussed the incident but did not indicate personal involvement or include detailed consideration, and those who did not mention the particular incident. Interest and involvement are shown in Table 1.

During the interviews, participants were asked if there were incidents, other than those identified from the printed data, which they viewed as being critical. The following incidents were discussed:

<u>Critical Incident</u>	<u>No. Discussing Incident</u>
Opposition by the TEA	2
Bi-Partisan Support	15
Endorsement by Speaker McWherter	3
Peter Hart Poll	1
Securing of CERA Sponsors	4
Resignation of Dr. Rosenholtz	11
Passage of the Governance Act	8

While it might have been anticipated that the critical incidents would have been viewed by the participants as being of varied importance, the interviews indicated that there was a regard for the importance of all the incidents. The participants did not perceive the incidents as having varied levels of intensity. Indeed, many participants indicated an impossibility for differentiating importance.

Table 1. Critical Incidents Identified from the Printed Data


Incident	Involved Discussion	Uninvolved Discussion	Did Not Mention
Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study	10	9*	5
Governor's Speech, January 28, 1983	14	9	1
Governor's Taking Issues to Public	19	5	0
Appointment of Interim Commission	5	12	7
Study Vote/Select Committee	8	15	1
Select Committee Decision	7	16	1
Special Session of the Legislature	15	6	3
Legislative Compromises	12	9	3
TEA Endorsement	7	13	4
Passage of CERA	8	16	0
Passage of Taxes	8	12	4

*Two participants indicated that TCES was not critical and had little influence on the development of CERA.

Rather than ranking them according to their critical importance, the participants indicated that the incidents were a series of related events which led to the final outcome of the conflict.

CHAPTER V

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES, PARTICIPANTS' GOALS, AND THEIR STRATEGIES



Introduction

An analysis of the issues, participants' goals, and their strategies was accomplished by performing a content analysis of the interviews of the major participants. Categories for the analysis were constructed through consideration of antecedent conditions indicated in the literature on conflict. Content analysis of the interview data was used to verify the printed data and thus allow the researcher to draw inferences and insights to aid in the description of the conflict.

Characteristics of Leaders

Both the leadership status of the major participants and their respective power bases were an integral factor in the development of the conflict in this study. The contrast in leadership styles among CERA opponents appeared to have had a decided effect upon their interactions and upon the interactions between the two opposing factions.

Characteristics of Governor Alexander

Lamar Alexander was characterized by his followers as a brilliant, serious, and well-organized leader. They described him as having an orderly, systematic way of approaching problems and tasks. His associates indicated that he held challenging and high expectations for himself and for others. His aides described him as being extremely well-informed and a serious student in every undertaking.

The governor was perceived as having made few changes in his personal style from the eager, talented, and energetic boy who grew up in Maryville, Tennessee. It appeared that during his youth in the East Tennessee mountains, he became a serious student, nurtured by parents who were both school teachers. A superior student at Vanderbilt University, Alexander received a law degree from New York University.

The governor was perceived as having gained essential experience as a law clerk in the Fifth Circuit of the U. S. Court of Appeals in researching problems. Further work in Washington as a legislative assistant to Senator Howard Baker and as an executive aide to Bryce

Harlow, a White House congressional liaison officer, was seen as enhancing Alexander's understanding of the importance of interaction between the executive and legislative branches of government. The management of Winfield Dunn's successful campaign for governor in 1970 was perceived as having given Lamar Alexander one of his first major challenges involving state government. In 1974, Alexander made an unsuccessful bid for the governor's office. In what his supporters termed, "the typical Alexander style," he assessed his strengths and weaknesses, along with his strategies and errors, to determine changes which were needed for a successful gubernatorial campaign. His work for newspapers and television during that period was seen as having given Alexander an opportunity to develop a unique ability to articulate his ideas to the public.

The risk-taking characteristic which led him to embark on a walk of more than 1,000 miles across the state of Tennessee in his bid for election in 1978 was the same bold confidence which led to his making innovative proposals for education in the face of a century-old association which had dominated Tennessee education. He seemed to be viewed as having the same physically fit, energetic, and competitive form in the halls of the Capitol as he used on the tennis court.

A very attractive man whose age was 43 during the time of the CERA conflict, Alexander was known by his supporters as personable, warm, and friendly. Television cameras often caught his outgoing charm and seeming vivacious nature. Personal encounters were

reminders, however, of his serious intent and unpretentious nature. The governor's use of referent power was often frustrating to his opponents. One adversary spoke of his "ability to charm the wallpaper right off the walls." Opponents reluctantly discussed his charisma and public appeal, admitting that he was kind, forgiving, and diplomatic in all interactions.

The governor's associates expressed respect for his ability to research and carefully plan a course of action for pursuing any task. They also mentioned his expectations of creativity and commitment from them. He expected the same investment of energy and perseverance from those around him as he invested in tasks.

The governor's opponents seemed to be even more impressed with his strategic ability. During the interviews, there were numerous references to his being "a brilliant strategist who was able to out-manuever our every move." Although his opponents questioned his motives and expressed doubt about his political integrity, none of his detractors seemed to underestimate his ability, personal resources, or perseverance.

Lamar Alexander's personal life was perceived as complementing his public life. While the governor lent his ability as a novice pianist to altruistic causes throughout the state, his wife, Honey, was involved in generating public support for the Better Schools Program and the Healthy Children Program. The fact that three of the Alexander children attended private schools never became an issue in the governor's campaign for public schools. The governor's flawless reputation as a family man and model citizen was an asset which

enhanced his credibility as a leader. The governor was viewed as having complex characteristics and the ability to utilize his own strengths and those of all who would follow him to accomplish the task of education reform. Lamar Alexander was seen by both followers and adversaries as a leader who was committed to a system of values and who was most effective in his ability to influence others.

Characteristics of Commissioner of Education Robert McElrath

The expert power noted in Governor Alexander's style was complemented by that of Commissioner McElrath. A highly respected educator who had been superintendent of one of the state's more prestigious school districts, the commissioner instituted a new type of leadership in the State Department of Education (SDE). His personal style was perceived as working well for the governor's team. The soft-spoken McElrath was an energetic researcher who indicated a value for planning, strategy, and problem-solving. While educators are often labeled as "ivory-towered and unfamiliar with the rest of the world," Robert McElrath was perceived as having knowledge of organizational dynamics, communications, and change strategies.

Governor Alexander credited much of the Better Schools Program to the work of Commissioner McElrath. Other participants credited the commissioner with the ideas for part of the Master Teacher Program in his efforts to "recruit, retain, and reward outstanding teachers." He was perceived as working diligently to gain teacher acceptance of the proposals. He was also perceived as having made

considerable efforts to involve classroom teachers in the process of developing the plans and in helping them to gain a sense of ownership for the program.

While McElrath was highly visible, his prestige as education commissioner was not perceived as having an effect upon his personal goals. In his acceptance of a lessened role in the SDE with the passage of the Governance Bill, the commissioner was seen as demonstrating the fact that he placed greater importance on education goals than on personal status goals.

Characteristics of Lieutenant Governor John Wilder

Lieutenant Governor Wilder was perceived as exhibiting a mixed style of leadership. While he advocated a strong legitimate type of power in leadership for other organizations, he demonstrated a very different style in the Senate. Advocating classical management for K-12 education, higher education, prisons, and other organizations in state government, he fostered participative management in the Senate. That apparent contradiction in style confused and frustrated the participants in the CERA conflict. Numerous participants expressed frustration over the lieutenant governor's agreement with the concepts of CERA but his refusal to publicly endorse and actively support the legislation. The participants did not express much perception regarding the lieutenant governor's goals or his needs with regard to involvement in the CERA conflict. They did not indicate an awareness of the needs which Wilder expressed to the media or in public.

Characteristics of Speaker of the House Ned Ray McWherter

Speaker McWherter was applauded by participants on both sides of the conflict for his statesmanship, his strong leadership, and his eagerness to involve the participants. Although having been deprived of opportunities for his own education, McWherter was viewed as having gained extensive learning from experience. His power over obstructionist Representative McKinney and his influence with the administration and the TEA were viewed as making the environment possible for agreement on numerous areas of controversy.

The speaker's personal appearance added power to his stature. His height and size gave a strong profile of leadership in the immense chamber of the House of Representatives. While exhibiting legitimate power, and reward power at times, the speaker was never perceived as exhibiting strong ego needs or enjoying his control over others. Instead, he was perceived as enjoying the respect of his colleagues, as being very fair, and as being an arbitrator.

Perhaps the most often mentioned characteristic of his political interactions was his love of compromise. Descriptions of his preference for compromise indicated that he expected flexibility from the participants.

Johnson and Johnson (1982) indicate that successful leadership is related to chance--being in the right place at the right time. Numerous participants perceived Speaker McWherter's leadership in the House as having been at the right time and place for supporting the governor and as having been instrumental in the passage of CERA.

The speaker was perceived with great admiration for his bi-partisan leadership and, what one participant called "his noble effort for education."

Characteristics of Senate Leaders: Rucker, O'Brien, Elkins

In approaching Senator John Rucker to be the prime sponsor for the Better Schools Program in the Senate, Governor Alexander selected a highly respected, experienced, and committed advocate for education. A lawyer by profession, the Middle Tennessee Democrat was perceived by those interviewed as a highly capable and articulate leader. He was also perceived as being an advocate for teachers. Unlike some of the other participants, Senator Rucker was perceived as having endured some abuse for his support of CERA. That perception, however, only served to increase the esteem which many participants expressed regarding Senator Rucker.

Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien was highly regarded by most of the participants interviewed. She was respected for her support of CERA in spite of her traditional support of the Tennessee Education Association. She was also respected for her experience in the political system and her diplomacy in dealing with her colleagues.

Senator O'Brien's leadership experience in developing the Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study gave credibility to her work with the Select Committee. Although she was a staunch Democrat, she repeatedly demonstrated that party loyalty was not a consideration in determining what was best for education. While there were indications

that the senators sometimes deferred to her as the only woman senator, she clearly enjoyed the distinction.

Senator Buzz Elkins was one of only two Republican senators on the Select Committee. That position was a challenge for those members who participated in partisan politics. Senator Elkins was perceived by those interviewed as having been an articulate and intelligent sponsor for CERA. His profession as an attorney was perceived as being valuable in working with proposed legislation. Being married to a former "teacher of the year" was perceived as having given him a unique insight in knowing how the teachers in East Tennessee accepted the proposed reform. There were numerous indications of Senator Elkins's teamwork with Senators Rucker and O'Brien and the effect that it had on the strength for support of CERA.

CERA leadership was not confined to those three senators, but they were perceived as having been the primary leaders. Opposition leadership in the Senate was perceived as being more diffused.

Characteristics of House Leaders: Cobb, Bivens, Burnette, Starnes

Representative Steve Cobb, the prime sponsor of CERA in the House, was viewed by participants as a fortunate choice to carry the administration's ideas. His credentials, a doctorate in both philosophy and jurisprudence, were impressive even to those who disagreed with his decision to support a Republican idea. The Democrat was regarded as an advantage for the CERA forces in his understanding of the statistical data, the research and preparation of the evaluation

instruments, and in his ability to negotiate with the TEA legal staff over the most minute language in the legislation. Brilliant, incredible, and fierce were adjectives used to characterize Representative Cobb.

Representative Steve Bivens, a former school counselor, assumed the leadership responsibilities in the Select Committee. CERA supporters characterized his strength and leadership as a primary reason that a compromise was reached on numerous issues involved in drafting CERA. In strong contrast to his colleague Representative Cobb, Biven's soft-spoken deliberate manner was perceived as having been an asset in negotiations with TEA.

As a former teacher, Representative Bivens had been an honored member of TEA. The January 1983 issue of TEA's Tennessee Teacher contained an article written by Bivens which extolled the association's leadership for education in Tennessee. His decision to support CERA was perceived as evidence of his courage and his emphasis on education reform opportunities rather than on organization loyalties.

Representative Tommy Burnette was in a unique position during the 13 month conflict. In the beginning, he refused to co-sponsor the TEA excellence bill. During the succeeding months, he did not take a strong stand on either side of the conflict. By the time of the special session, his position was strongly affected by the prison sentence which he faced for income tax evasion. Having lost his prestige in the Democratic Party, having been prevented from assuming

his position on the House Calendar and Rules Committee, and having been generally overlooked, the opportunity to negotiate the final CERA compromise gave Representative Burnette a second chance.

Representative Burnette was held in respect by many of his colleagues for his ability in the legislature, and numerous participants expressed regret over his personal state.

Representative Paul Starnes was characterized by his leadership efforts for the TEA position. A staunch Democrat, Starnes was perceived as finding it impossible to compromise in any way with the administration. Even after TEA endorsed the CERA, Starnes refused to vote for either the CERA or for the taxes to fund the reform. While Starnes's opponents viewed him as being close to consideration of the CERA, his supporters perceived him as an educator whose position was valid.

Characteristics of TEA Leadership: Cheshier, Booth, Pike, Anderson

Perhaps the most outstanding perception of TEA leadership was that it changed during the conflict. As the literature indicates, leaders chosen at the beginning of a conflict may exhibit a high degree of loyalty to the group. They may also be aggressive, verbal, and display a high degree of power. The primary TEA leadership during the early months of the CERA conflict was assumed by Executive Secretary Cavit Cheshier and 1982-83 President Jim Booth. Numerous participants stated that the attempt to lead the association with reward power and coercive power contributed to the conflict. By the fifth month of the conflict, a change was perceived in the TEA

leadership style. The installation of Marjorie Pike as president of the association marked a shift to the use of expert and information power. Along with Lobbyist Betty Anderson, President Pike became more involved with problem solving activities.

Although the aggressive influence of the executive secretary remained a part of the organization and the NEA influence and adherence to traditional values remained, there was a change in the public image. The personal styles of the two women, regarded as "charming," probably contributed to the articulation of the association concerns and objections with greater diplomacy and tact. Lobbyist Betty Anderson's numerous meetings with members of the Select Committee and the legislators and President Marjorie Pike's meeting with the governor and Speaker McWherter resulted in movement toward conflict resolution. While TEA's basic position did not change, a change in leadership is often made, as noted in the literature (Walton and McKersie, 1965), when there is a need to move from a position of aggressiveness to one of cooperation and problem-solving.

Summary

While the personalities, backgrounds, and personal styles of the leaders in the CERA conflict were diverse, their interactions were marked by certain of the following tactics noted by Martin and Sims (in Leavitt and Pondy, 1964):

- taking counsel--TEA leadership was frequently counseled by NEA. The governor, commissioner, and legislative leaders were frequently advised by education experts and by others.

- forming alliances--Governor Alexander formed alliances with the speaker and with numerous Democrats. Cavit Cheshier formed a bond with Representative Starnes. Betty Anderson attempted to form numerous legislative alliances.

- maintaining maneuverability--The governor and commissioner were perceived as having maintained greater maneuverability than TEA leaders.

- displaying confidence--While never appearing arrogant to most participants, the governor and legislative leaders displayed greater confidence than TEA leaders.

The behaviors of all of the leaders in the CERA conflict were marked by their interactions with their followers. Their effectiveness as leaders appears to have been characterized by their abilities to influence, to utilize resources, and to use the power which they held.

Characteristics of Organizations

There were five major organizations involved in the conflict. The characteristics of those organizations, the way in which they worked internally, and the way they interacted with other organizations and participants had a major influence on the conflict. All five organizations were discussed by the major participants during the interviews conducted for this study. Those perceptions of the organizations are as follows.

The Governor's Staff

The administration staff during the time of the conflict was a mirror image of the governor. It was perceived to have worked like the governor--relentlessly, energetically, carefully, and studiously. The administrative aides, public relations staff, legal aides, legislative coordinators, planning specialists, and other staff members turned their time, energies, and abilities toward supporting the governor. That total support for CERA was viewed with both disdain and envy by opponents. During the interviews, members of the governor's staff expressed the views that while their work was characterized by persistence, they never viewed themselves as having perfected their strategies. Conversely, other participants viewed their work as characterized by brilliance and thoroughness.

The State Department of Education

Some of the participants expressed the view that it was impossible to separate the governor's organization from the SDE. That interaction by the two groups was viewed by opponents as suspicious and improper. Participants who were a part of either group characterized their organizations as "running to keep up with the governor," trying to meet the challenges given to them by their leadership. All of the members of the SDE organization expressed a strong agreement with the issues involved and an enthusiasm for the proposals. The SDE group also reflected the energetic interaction noted in the administration. Lacking a history of leadership in education,

members of the SDE expressed excitement as being involved in the proposed reform.

Characteristics of the Legislature

The characteristics of that organization were as numerous as its participants--132. A majority of Democrats in both houses characterized much of the organization's activity as persuasion during the CERA conflict. The proposals of a Republican governor required numerous Democrats' support for the CERA to become a reality, and much of that persuasion was called compromise. Participants perceived negotiations, problem solving, and other forms of conflict management as compromise. Their ideas were expressed in "getting all you could and giving up as little as possible."

The other form of persuasion which characterized the legislature was lobbying by special interests. Legislators seemed especially perceptive to the needs of special interests. It was that tradition which had characterized the relationship between the legislature and the TEA.

Characteristics of the TEA

The Tennessee Education Association was perceived by the participants in the conflict as extremely powerful and very accustomed to being powerful. TEA was perceived by both TEA and CERA supporters as having been the chief originator of all education legislation in the past. TEA was seen as the source of research in education, a resource for determining the needs of education, the spokesman for all teachers, and the defender of tenure.

As time passed during the conflict, TEA became known in Tennessee more as a labor union than as a professional association. That reputation was generated by the administration's use of the term "union" and by the association's actions as perceived by the other participants and by the public.

TEA participants viewed the conflict as occurring for two main reasons: their lack of attention to more global education concerns and their underestimation of the political ambitions of the governor. Their position in the conflict was characterized by the influence of their friends in the legislature. Numerous members of the General Assembly were former TEA members and staff members: that relationship characterized much of the interaction between TEA and the legislature.

The Interim Certification Commission

The Commission pursued the task of researching and developing an evaluation instrument for the Master Teacher Program with members from both sides of the conflict. The Commission's work was characterized by participants as task oriented and with little admission of the conflict on all sides. One observer compared the Commission to "Switzerland in the middle of World War II."

Pressured by the needs of the CERA forces to have an instrument ready for the legislature and by the needs of TEA to delay and scrutinize the proceedings, the Commission was viewed as pushing through the research, the many consultants, and the hours of expert testimony.

Although some TEA participants viewed the Commission as having little independence from the governor's forces, its Chairman Bill Willis and other participants did not express that view.

It should be noted that the lack of controversy which generally characterized this organization may be reflected in the small number of major participants who discussed the Commission and its work. With few exceptions, the Commission was viewed as a group which was busily pursuing a task of major proportions. Most participants did not see the Commission as a part of the open conflict.

Summary

The characteristics of the five organizations were a major cause of the conflict and affected the proceedings of the critical incidents and final outcome of the conflict. The strong, strategically conscious, and dynamic organization of the SDE and the governor's staff contrasted with the aggressive, defensive, and ego-centric organization of the TEA constituted an environment for conflict. The legislature was an additional organization involved in the conflict; it attempted to formulate public policy from the governor's proposals for education reform and, at the same time, to consider the objections of TEA. The diversity in organization dynamics made an obvious condition for conflict.

Communications

Introduction

According to Johnson and Johnson (1982), communication is the basis for all human interaction. Thus, its importance in the process of conflict cannot be underestimated. All of the participants interviewed for this study indicated that their personal communications with other participants were open and usually characterized by mutual respect. Public communications, however, were quite different.

Since the accounts of education reform received almost continuous coverage in Tennessee newspapers for the 13-month period, communication became a primary strategy in the conflict. The styles of communication which the various participants used appear to have had considerable influence upon the critical incidents and upon the development of conflict.

Communication Styles of the Governor and the SDE

Governor Lamar Alexander's communications style was marked by a clearly articulated speech, a sincere tone, and a well-practiced rhythm. His personal style and his non-verbal communications contributed credibility to his communications.

His opponents complained that he was able to use communications more effectively than they. In seeking public support, the governor expressed ideas in clear, simple, and logical terms. His own assessments of his communications were that he had the better side of the argument. He carried the message "We ought to reward teachers for

teaching well." To construct an argument for not paying teachers more for teaching well was difficult; therefore, the governor claimed that it was not his ability, but his message, that made his communications effective (personal communication, July 16, 1984).

With few exceptions, the governor's communications were focused upon issues, not upon personalities. He was careful not to blame teachers for problems within the education system. He placed a high priority upon communicating his message of proposed reform. The printed data are evidence of his skillful use of redundancy. While the basic message was repeated, the setting, the participants, or the channel of communication was varied slightly. That repetition kept the message alive and added to public understanding and acceptance.

Communications of the TEA

By their own admission, TEA assumed a defensive posture during much of the 13-month conflict. Gibb (in Stoner, 1978) indicates that a defensive attitude can inhibit communication. Such defensiveness may be characterized by superiority, certainty, and control attempts. Such communications were evidenced in late March 1983 during Speaker McWherter and other legislators' attempts to negotiate a compromise between TEA and the governor's proposals. Without warning, even to their supporters in the legislature, TEA announced plans to defeat the Better Schools Program. That contradiction between public announcements and participation in compromise negotiations communicated a negative message to the public and to legislators.

The inconsistency in TEA leadership was also communicated in that same instance. On the same day that President Jim Booth said there would be an all-out effort to defeat the Master Teacher Program, Betty Anderson said, "It appears to leave the impression that we are in a noncompromising position and that's not the case," and Public Relations Assistant Gene Bryant said, "We'll kill it." The superiority and certainty attitudes were evidenced in Bryant's concession that TEA had erred in not advising key legislators of their announcement, to which he then added, "Tomorrow they will have cooled off and everything will be back to normal" (Johnson City Press Chronicle, March 17, 1983). That style of communication left TEA open to public criticism. Memphis Commercial Appeal reporter James Brosnan termed the inconsistent communication, "TEA's dumbest move yet" (March 27, 1983).

Contrast in Communication Styles

The governor's forces dominated the communications with a style which was usually simple and appealing. Conversely, TEA had difficulty constructing a simple retort. In response to the governor's messages of what should be done for teachers and for education in Tennessee, TEA usually responded with a message that it could not be done, without effectively communicating appealing alternatives. J. J. Parker, a former Tennessee school principal, responded to an article written by Executive Secretary Cavit Cheshier as follows:

This long article had no real identified issues, no summary, mathematical data, no statistics, no quotations, and no good

logic. Everything was proven by Cheshier's "own 25 years of observations" (Nashville Banner, October 19, 1983).

While that response was expressed as an opinion, a content analysis of TEA communications might bear similarity. As Parker noted, the lack of proof was a problem in TEA communications.

Participants on both sides complained during the interviews conducted for this study of being misquoted and being quoted out of context. Both sides included some "name calling" in their communications. The governor rationalized that the TEA's behavior was not characteristic of a professional organization; therefore, he frequently referred to them as "the union." In retaliation, TEA referred to the SDE officials and the governor's staff members who traveled across the state speaking in support of the governor's program as the "SWAT team" and accused them of "simply prevaricating" (TEA News, March 15, 1983).

Both the governor and the TEA utilized the television media for a series of short advertisements publicizing their positions (TEA News, September 15, 1983). Both sides utilized newspapers, television, and other forms of reaching the public with their respective communications.

From the beginning of the conflict, the governor made every effort to address his communications to the public, the teachers, to TEA, the legislators, and anyone who would listen across the nation. After experiencing difficulty in gaining a sympathetic public audience, TEA addressed its later communications toward its members and the legislators.

Summary

In general, the governor's communications were perceived to have been very effective and consistent. Probably because of its defensive posture, TEA had difficulty communicating its position. The contrast in communication styles and effectiveness is evidenced in the interactions among the various organizations. The importance of communications in the conflict is demonstrated by the use of communications in the critical incidents and in the final outcome of the conflict.

Conflicts of Interest

Conflicts of interest are a set of conditions which form the basis for potential conflict. These conditions exist when one group or person attempts to increase benefits or advantages or to interfere with the actions of another group or person who is also trying to increase benefits or advantages. The interests may be in needs, values, goals or in scarcities of such resources as power, influence, time, or money.

Goals

A major area for potential conflict exists when two groups have different values and goals. Such a condition existed in the conflict involving the CERA. The governor, SDE, and supportive legislators' goals were expressed as follows:

- To increase Tennessee's economic development through better education.

- To improve the quality of education through basic skills, computer skills, mandatory kindergarten, additional high school math and science courses, special programs for gifted students, and increased discipline.
- To redefine vocational curricula, reorganize job skills training, and establish centers of excellence in higher education.
- To establish an incentive pay program, a career ladder, and to attract outstanding teachers.

In contrast, TEA goals were focused upon the following areas:

- To increase funding for all existing programs.
- To increase all teacher salaries, retirement, insurance, and other benefits.
- To improve teacher working conditions through reduced class sizes, improved physical facilities, more textbooks, materials and supplies, preparation time, and teacher aides.
- To provide special art, music, physical education, and guidance programs for elementary schools.
- To give teachers greater influence and control over demotions, negotiations, tenure, retention, and certification.

The major difference in the two sets of goals lay in the apparent beneficiaries. The governor's goals were stated in such a manner that the state and its people were the obvious recipients of the benefits of education reform. Conversely, the TEA membership seemed to be the primary beneficiaries of their goals. Since

desirability of the goal is a major factor in establishing support, the governor immediately had a larger audience for his goals.

The governor also made the possibility of accomplishing his goals seem imminent and important. He consistently referred to the need for Tennessee to be "first, to be a leader in education."

The TEA goal of "adequate funding for all existing programs" seemed vague when compared to the governor's advocating \$7,000 more in pay for an outstanding teacher in Cocke County."

The governor's goals were focused upon education in Tennessee while the TEA goals seemed to be focused upon its membership within the education system. The governor's goals were not perceived as changing during the 13-month period. In contrast, TEA goals appeared to have changed. While the formal goals of TEA remained intact, as set by their board, their functional goals in the conflict were perceived as having moved to the following:

1. Defeat the reform plans in the Master Teacher Program.
2. Dilute the reform plans in the Select Committee to remove all objectionable elements.
3. Weaken the CERA with amendments.
4. Establish a CERA compromise which removed as many objectionable elements as possible.
5. Survive CERA implementation.

The legislature was not perceived as having its own set of educational goals. Despite having just completed its own study of education, legislators' goals were perceived as having been influenced more by their affiliations and prior positions.

Economics/Scarce Resources

In 1983, Tennessee ranked 45th in the country in income per person, 41st in teacher salaries, and 48th in per-pupil expenditures. Despite the low national ranking in providing financial resources, education expenditures represented 52 percent of the state's budget. The obvious scarcity of financial resources, together with the budget allocation, created an area for a conflict of interests.

A major element of the Better Schools Program was the incentive pay plan which would reward outstanding teaching. That type of pay increase would allow a large salary increase for particular teachers but not for all teachers. The TEA and NEA had long opposed any such plan, regarding differentiated pay as being unfair because of the difficulty in determining who should receive additional rewards. Instead, TEA advocated considerable pay increases for all teachers. While the governor proposed a 7.5 percent pay increase for all teachers, with additional increases for those on the career ladder, TEA wanted more. Specifically, TEA insisted that the Select Committee recommend a 20 percent pay increase for all teachers since the governor had blocked their receipt of any increases the previous year. A compromise was reached at a 10 percent increase for all teachers.

TEA also advocated increased funding for all existing programs. In partial contrast, the governor advocated increased funding for some new programs such as computer skills, more high school math and science courses, and summer programs for the gifted.

A proposal which appeared to be an educational goal was actually perceived by many participants interviewed for this study as a TEA economic goal. TEA advocated a reduction in class size as a means of increasing the quality of education. Opponents of the plan, however, indicated that there was little evidence that a reduction in class size to 20 actually produced increased learning. When the additional cost of such a move was calculated, many observers indicated that the recommendation was actually motivated by TEA's desire for more potential members.

A further economic conflict occurred in the legislature's decision to increase taxes to finance education reform. Despite polls indicating that voters were willing to accept a tax increase to support education reform, substantial conflict occurred over the decision to impose such a tax.

In summary, the proposal to pay for education reform or for additional funding for existing programs and all teacher salaries resulted in conflict. The proposal to increase the taxes for education, and the questions of what to tax and to what extent, resulted in an additional economic conflict

Power and Control

The participants indicated in the interviews that power was a major influence on the conflict. Both the literature and the participants regarded power as "the ability to do something, to make something happen, or to change something." They also regarded control as a result of exercising power.

Governor Alexander was perceived as utilizing all of the powers of his office. He was described as using legitimate power, expert power, referent power, and occasionally as using information and connection power. His opponents accused him of using reward power and coercive power; however, use of such power was never substantiated. Perhaps the governor's most effective use of power was in his ability to determine the appropriate time and circumstance for the appropriate type of power usage. For example, when making a television appeal for support of education reform, he displayed legitimate power and referent power. In making a speech to the Education Commission of the States, he used expert power. In attempting to influence a representative from a rural West Tennessee county, he allowed the legislator to use connection power in forming a liaison with the governor.

The power issue for TEA tended to be more frequently focused on the association's previous power status rather than on the exertion of control during the critical incidents. During its long history, TEA had become a very influential force in the legislature. During the preceding 25 years, TEA had become the major force for change in Tennessee education in grades K-12, thus supplanting the State Department of Education's leadership role.

Since TEA had become accustomed to conceiving, researching, proposing, and lobbying major changes in education, they were not prepared to consider change from another source--especially from a Republican administration. When Governor Alexander and Commissioner

McElrath began talking about new opportunities for the teaching profession, new opportunities for students, and improvements in the education system, their advocacy posed competition for the role of change-agent.

The introduction of the Better Schools Program was threatening, frustrating, and perhaps humiliating to TEA's assumed role of change agent. Deutsch (1973) contends that when there is a threat to power which might result in its redistribution, leadership makes every effort to resist change, defend the position, and attempts to exert superiority. The TEA leadership's defensiveness and resistance was noted repeatedly in the critical incidents. The TEA attempt to extend the power base could be observed in the lobbying efforts and in the strong attempt to reduce class size, thereby gaining several thousand new teachers for the state.

The printed data documented TEA's apparent fear of losing power. The Bristol Herald-Courier observed that "TEA would lose its grip on Tennessee schools under Alexander's legislation . . ." (January 14, 1984). The Knoxville News-Sentinel indicated the following:

TEA has fought as though its life were at stake, fearing that differential pay for teachers would give some teachers less incentive to join the association (January 29, 1984).

Thus, it was demonstrated that a major cause of the CERA conflict was a threat to TEA's power as the major leadership in Tennessee education, the protector of the teaching profession, and a major influence

in the legislature. Much of TEA's response to the critical incidents was influenced by the need to avoid loss of power.

The diversity in membership influenced the power of the legislature. Power was usually influenced by the situation, as described by Batkins (1982) as forming the tops of many pyramids which represented specific issues. For example, when the issue was education, the power holders in the legislature were the major participants described in the critical incidents. When the issue became taxes and financing, new power holders became prominent.

The major power holder in the House was Speaker McWherter. In the CERA conflict, the other power holders were the major participants previously mentioned. Although others attempted to gain power, such as Representative Jim McKinney, those attempts were unsuccessful. An attempt to retain some of his former power and influence was evidenced in Representative Tommy Burnette's efforts. Representative Steve Bivens demonstrated the emergence of new power. In his successful leadership efforts in the Select Committee, he emerged as a representative of greater power.

The smaller size of the Senate and longer terms of its membership contributed to a different power situation. The personal style of its leader, Lieutenant Governor Wilder also tended to disperse the power bases in the Senate. Changes in power holders in the Senate could be observed in the increased influence which the Senate CERA sponsors enjoyed in the subsequent regular session of the legislature.

The effect which Lieutenant Governor Wilder's lack of participation in the CERA leadership had upon his power base cannot be fully known until the senators elect their leadership for the 94th session of the General Assembly.

One of the major power bases in the legislature during the time of the CERA conflict was the TEA influence. Long known for its amenability to special interests groups (Nashville Banner, February 13, 1984), the legislature was especially responsive to TEA (Jackson Sun, June 12, 1983). The Bristol Herald-Courier described the situation in the following editorial comment:

Make no mistake. A great many members of the Tennessee General Assembly jump when the teachers' union says "Frog." The TEA is a powerful organization boasting 40,000 members in the Volunteer State. A lot of votes can be generated by the organization--for or against candidates for public office. Additionally, the TEA can hand out campaign contributions and provide a ready supply of campaign workers (April 15, 1983).

As noted earlier in this study, the CERA conflict posed a threat to the TEA power base. The reduction in that power can be observed in the critical incidents and in the course of the organization's actions. The change in TEA's influence on the legislature was observed by the Johnson City Press-Chronicle as follows:

The legislation underwent extensive revision to make it more acceptable to TEA, but the Senate-House committee proceeded without TEA setting the agenda, a departure from past "education reform."

Lamar Alexander's use of the powers of the office of governor and TEA's use of its long-established power in efforts to accomplish different goals and reflecting different values were major causes of

the CERA conflict and strongly influenced the critical incidents. Changes in power and different power alliances can be noted in the critical incidents and in the outcome of the conflict.

Compromises

Introduction

In contrast to the literature, the major participants seemed to regard compromise as desirable and as any outcome which was not a total loss or a total gain. The literature, however, regards compromise as a mutual loss or a mutual gain. Compromise is regarded in the literature as a less desirable outcome since it necessitates "giving up something." In contrast, conflict management literature advocates the use of integrative problem-solving as a superior means of effecting outcomes. This method of conflict resolution is regarded as win/win since both sides are able to achieve all or part of their goals.

Examples of Compromise

The solution found to the problem of local control of the evaluation process was a compromise. Instead of gaining complete local control of the process through professional negotiations, TEA agreed to the use of an evaluation instrument provided by or approved by the state, while the state accepted limited local control in the use of their instrument. The TEA had to forego complete local control while the SDE had to forego complete state control of evaluation.

The governor compromised his desire for swift passage of his program in early 1983 and accepted a more comprehensive reform in early 1984. The TEA compromised in accepting a plan which was not of their design, nor consistent with their traditional values. The compromises accepted by and effected by the legislature were described earlier in this study. The most notable compromise, however, was in the passage of a program which the governor, the TEA, and the public found acceptable.

Freelance writer Hope Aldrich wrote in an article in the Washington Monthly (June 1984) that public apathy resulted in the governor's forces compromising with the powerful TEA to the point that the basic fiber of the Better Schools Program had been lost. A subsequent article in the Memphis Commercial Appeal was titled "Education reform backers deny 'fatal' compromises" (July 20, 1984). Governor Alexander, Representative Cobb, and Speaker McWherter indicated in the latter article that Ms. Aldrich's assumptions were based upon her observations of only a small part of the total situation.

Examples of Integrative Problem Solving

Although the participants regarded most of the solutions and outcomes reached during the conflict as compromises, there were numerous instances of integrative problem solving where new solutions were found. During attempts to reach agreement on the Career Ladder, "fast-tracking," a means of immediate entry into the program was found. That was a solution which neither TEA nor the governor had proposed.

An additional example of integrative problem solving occurred when attempts were made to make the selection of textbooks relate to the curriculum. A part of the Governance Bill then included the move of the textbook commission to function with the new state board, thus creating a new solution for the problem of relating curriculum to textbooks. The result was a move of the textbook commission into a more cooperative and efficient position with the new State Board of Education.

Summary

A review of the compromises in the CERA conflict reveal that there were concessions made by the organizations and participants involved. There were also instances of integrative problem solving and gains by those involved. That accomplishment was most important in the future relationships of the participant organizations and lessened the possibilities of future conflicts. The fact that the governor, TEA, and the legislature viewed the outcome as a win/win situation was evidence of the effective management of the conflict.

Strategies

Introduction

The plans, actions, and tactics adopted by the participants in this study were examined to determine which actions were helpful in aiding the accomplishment of their goals and which actions were not helpful. James Brownan indicated that "Strategies don't change much

in politics" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, January 29, 1984). Many of the actions were familiar in the political process, however, as indicated in the following descriptions, some of the strategies were different or unexpected in such a conflict.

The Strategies of the Governor and His Team

The fact that the governor introduced the reform proposals to an unsuspecting TEA immediately resulted in the association's assuming a defensive position. There were few instances during the thirteen-month period when that position changed. As noted earlier in this study, the fact that TEA indicated surprise on January 28, 1983 was influenced by their lack of attention more than by the governor's efforts to conceal his intentions. Surprise, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of the governor's strategies. What was a definite strategy, however, was the fact that the governor had not involved TEA in the creation of his proposals. That omission might have been one reason that TEA did not anticipate his actions. The association had been accustomed to participating in everything which involved education in grades K-12. The literature is clear (Bennis, 1966; Dalton, 1973; Filley, 1975; and Johnson and Johnson, 1983) that those involved in any change should be involved in the decision making process. After making his proposals public, the governor immediately sought to involve TEA and the teachers. When asked why the governor did not seek TEA involvement in the development of the Master Teacher proposals prior to the January 28 speech, an administrative aide

indicated that a long series of general public consultations had been the historical procedure and had not always been productive. In order to accomplish a major goal--education reform during his second term--the governor assembled what he thought were his best recommendations and then sought discussion of them (personal communication, Hunt, May 22, 1984). A review of that strategy indicates that it was most helpful in accomplishing the governor's goals.

Another useful strategy employed by the governor was the involvement of key legislators in national events which focused upon the needs for education reform. In effect, the governor shared his awareness with important legislators in regard to the findings of the Commission on Education in the States, the U. S. Department of Education, and other similar groups. That action resulted in legislative leaders realizing that "it wasn't a 'home brew' we were cooking up, but that it was something that had real validity" (personal communication, Alexander, July 16, 1984).

The cultivation of Democratic legislators extended from Governor Alexander's suggestion of Senator Anna Belle Clement O'Brien as chairperson of the TCES to the involvement of Representative Steve Cobb as the major House sponsor and CERA supporter everywhere. The governor continued to form and maintain relationships with Democrats and was very forgiving when their actions were not in agreement with his goals, as when Senator O'Brien voted to delay consideration of the Master Teacher Bill. The strategy of maintaining relationships

with key Democrats continued to be very valuable to the governor as can be noted in the special session and in the final outcome of the conflict.

Much in the style of U. S. President Lyndon Johnson's successful strategy with Congress, the governor met with key legislators just prior to the introduction of his proposals in January 1983. To focus on the issues, he continued to arrange small group meetings with legislators throughout the thirteen-month period. Governor Alexander made considerable use of the executive mansion for such meetings, much in the manner of President Johnson or President Reagan's inviting key participants to the White House to focus on important issues.

A communication strategy was in the governor's use of the term "union" when referring to TEA. He could rationalize his use of that term through considerations of TEA actions as more nearly resembling that of a labor union than that of a professional association. In order to defuse apparent disregard of the organization by labeling it a union, he employed an interesting strategy. He invited Albert Shanker, President of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) to Tennessee and also addressed the AFT's national convention in Los Angeles. That action removed the sting of any anti-union messages which were heard in the governor's remarks. Thus, Alexander degraded the organization which preferred the image of a professional organization with the "union label" while still managing not to offend the 19.3 percent of the state's non-agricultural work force which was

affiliated with AFL-CIO unions. The AFT was an American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations member.

Perhaps the most notable of the Alexander strategies was the use of his own personal style, charisma, ability to articulate ideas, and personal involvement. The use of his own energies and constant presence was an effective strategy that the opposition was never able to match.

Another notable strategy was in the absence of the Alexander presence. In contrast to the first twelve months of the conflict period, after the beginning of the special session of the legislature, the governor maintained a lowered profile. Remaining in his Capitol office and available for conferences, the governor's position facilitated the legislature's gaining ownership of the program. At every opportunity, he gave credit for passage to the legislators and to other participants.

Consistent with his role of being a studious researcher and careful planner, the governor led his team in countless hours of planning and strategy sessions. It appeared that his group tried to identify and solve problems before the opposition could find them. The governor's team was marked by cohesiveness, commitment, and energy. Their actions indicated that they were well informed in regard to the literature on change and conflict management. During the period of the thirteen-month conflict, they made a few errors, but the careful planning and use of strategy made a major contribution toward the accomplishment of their goals.

The Strategies of the TEA

The task of planning TEA strategy could not have been an easy one. The fact that the association had failed to read the four articles in its own January 15, 1983 newspaper and had not anticipated the governor's actions with an alternate proposal prior to his January 28 speech, left them in a defensive position. In addition, their position was difficult to defend to the public. Performance evaluations were a fact of life for many Tennessee workers in 1983. There was an assumption that if other workers could be evaluated, teachers could also be evaluated. TEA appeared to have adopted the strategy of pointing out that evaluation could not be done fairly, rather than proving that it could not be accomplished. Thus, they failed to disprove one of the governor's proposals, leaving him with the better side of the argument.

During 1983, TEA appeared to rely on its past power and failed to develop a precise plan of strategy. TEA was never successful in maneuvering in such a way that they could dominate the Select Committee. While the communications of Betty Anderson had considerable influence on the development of the Select Committee's decisions, TEA never demonstrated a clear strategy with regard to the Select Committee. From the time of the TCES, TEA appeared to have relied on past successes and adopted a reactive and defensive mode. They simply pointed out problems and loopholes with whatever the governor, Select Committee, or Interim Commission happened to be discussing. Numerous

participants interviewed for this study indicated that where TEA could not find problems or loopholes, they used the strategy of inventing them. That misinformation, however, was probably caused by what Johnson and Johnson (1982) term distorted perception rather than an actual use of strategy.

By the time of the special session, TEA had begun to put more effort on the development of strategies. Perhaps they had no choice since the governor had been outmaneuvering them for a year. In fact, the move to schedule the special session was not only a successful strategy for the governor, it removed one of the tactics which had been most successful for TEA in the past. Reporter David Lyons described it as follows:

In limiting debate to education reform, he has taken away one of TEA's most effective weapons--delay (Knoxville News-Sentinel, December 25, 1983).

During the special session, TEA relied heavily on its lobbying efforts. At times, the association was said to have had 34 lobbyists on the hill pressing opposition to CERA. They made every effort to divide and conquer. Their most notable use of that strategy was in their attempt to pass the class size amendment. That strategy almost proved successful when one of the Republicans voted for the amendment.

The class size amendment was only one of countless amendments which their machine produced. While the governor had taken away the option of delaying CERA for consideration, TEA still used the strategy

of attempting to delay passage with numerous amendments and other tactics.

Perhaps one of the more unfortunate strategies used by TEA was their focus upon personalities rather than upon issues. Since the governor had used his own personality as a major positive strategy, it made the course very easy for TEA to fall into focusing the conflict upon opposition personalities, rather than upon issues. The conflict management literature is very clear that such a tactic is unwise if cooperative resolution is expected to be achieved.

Strategies of the Legislature

There was no consistent pattern of strategy among the legislators. Instead, their use of strategy tended to be reflected by their positions with regard to the conflict. For example, Representative McKinney attempted to use every possible delaying tactic. His most notable was an attempt to bind the Democratic Caucus to a 1983 resolution to also oppose any tax increase for 1984 consideration. Senator Bill Ortwein suggested a strategy to deal with the governor's strategy of calling a special session by a vote to adjourn sine die (indefinitely) as soon as the session was convened.

Another strategy used by some legislators was an interesting ploy to defeat the amusement tax. Opponents of the bill sought to include as many different organizations, museums, tourist attractions, television cable companies, clubs, sporting events, and other attractions as possible. The tactic in doing that was an assumption that


the inclusion would produce such a large group in opposition that the entire tax measure could be defeated. While the opposition to the amusement tax was far greater than to any of the other tax bills, the strategy was not totally effective. Many legislators did not enjoy the possibility of explaining a vote in favor of a sales tax increase but a vote to exempt amusements and other discretionary items which were viewed as being consumed by middle and upper income groups. The considerable lobbying efforts which resulted from the numerous groups included in the bill served to focus the attention on the success of special interests groups. Instead of working as an effective strategy, the ploy tended to have a reverse effect of that intended.

Summary

The use of strategy and the absence of strategy were of critical importance in the management of the CERA conflict. The governor used a great deal of strategy and planning while the TEA tended to react to Alexander's actions. The association's failure to adopt a carefully planned strategy in early 1983 left them in a defensive mode most of the time. TEA's actions were generally governed by confidence in their powerful status of the past, by their effective lobbyists, and by the uncertainty which surrounded the possibility of the passage of the tax bills. This absence of TEA strategy through much of the period resulted in TEA's being at the mercy of the governor's strategy.

CHAPTER VI

A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS



Introduction

A third view of the CERA conflict is through a consideration of the behaviors of the major participants. To further analyze the conflict, conclusions are drawn regarding how those behaviors influenced the critical incidents and the final outcome of the conflict. The analysis is not a psychological or personality study of the participants. Rather, it is an analysis of participant interactions during the critical incidents and a means of gaining insight into how various participant behaviors helped or hindered accomplishment of goals.

The Governor

Lamar Alexander's first term as governor reflected his personality. It was a time of study, of learning, and of planning. It was a time of repair for the state's image. When the governor succeeded Ray Blanton, he found it necessary to take the oath of office privately several days before the formal inauguration. That action was prompted by the fact that former Governor Blanton was under indictment on criminal charges. Although Blanton did not actually enter prison until the new governor was in his second term, Lamar Alexander seemed eager to restore dignity to the governor's office, to regain national respect for Tennessee, and to facilitate economic development.

As noted earlier in this study, the Tennessee Education Association strongly questioned the governor's motives and his genuine concern for education. The association had not forgotten that during his efforts to reduce spending, education had received budget slashes along with numerous other areas of state government. Refusing to accept his motives or intent as related to education, TEA launched an effort to discredit the governor. That attempt was not successful for several reasons. Governor Alexander's public appeal was considerable and he had previously established credibility. That local credibility was enhanced when state newspapers carried reports of the Tennessee governor's effect upon the experts. The following is but one example of the national credibility which the governor established:

After Alexander's speech at the University of Virginia's Rotunda Building, Henry Hermanowicz, dean of Pennsylvania

State University's College of Education, described the Tennessee governor as "bright, talented, and committed." "He conveys the impression that 'Tennessee is on the move and you'll hear from us.' He's a splendid representative of the state of Tennessee."

University of Nevada, Las Vegas Dean Kunkel said "That man knows the profession. He was not at all superficial" (Johnson City Press-Chronicle, July 21, 1983).

In addition to establishing credibility, Lamar Alexander also established his determination to facilitate education reform. When Howard Baker made public his decision not to seek re-election to the U. S. Senate in 1984, there was much speculation that Governor Alexander would resign his position and seek a seat in Congress. That was the reason which his opponents gave for the governor's push for passage of the Better Schools Program in 1983. That was also the reason given for his calling the special session of the legislature in 1984. That he remained in the Governor's Office despite the fact that a Democrat, Albert Gore, Jr., was elected to the U. S. Senate on November 6, 1984 only gave credibility to his determination for education reform. The fact that the governor did not resign was another of his opponents' failures to really understand the man and thus be able to predict some of his behaviors.

As mentioned earlier in this study, the governor devoted the majority of his time and attention to education reform. Various guesses were made at different times during the conflict by the governor, his staff, and his opponents as to how much of his time was actually devoted to education reform efforts. The data gathered during this research indicated that more time was spent on CERA

than any of the participants wanted to admit. While his staff did not want to infer that the governor neglected any of his other duties, and the opposition did not like to admit the volume of their foe's efforts, both missed the connection between the governor's intentions and his behaviors. Cheskin (1966) explains it as follows:

We must have problem-directed leaders, if we are to achieve our goals in building our society and serve as an example to the world.

A problem-directed man directs his full attention toward the problem (page 75).

Another factor which influenced Governor Alexander's behavior was that he regarded many problems as opportunities for change. When his original proposals were criticized, he used those criticisms as opportunities for involving other people and for making improvements. He seized on the national educational problems as the time to focus on Tennessee's education needs.

The governor seized upon every opportunity to focus attention on his proposals. He viewed his job as identifying needs, planning the means to meet those needs, and persuading a majority of electorate and the legislature that he was correct. With regard to CERA, that was a summary of his actions.

Some of the behaviors which were most helpful during the conflict included the governor's high level of participation in the efforts to gain support for education reform. In addition to his participation in public activities, he was also a participant in technical and policy making activities. The governor's studious

nature enabled him to discuss problems with the evaluation instruments or implications of specific language in the legislation. That not only allowed him to communicate with other participants, it also allowed him to be a well-informed leader.

The governor's behaviors as a communicator were a major factor in his interactions in the critical incidents. In a Jackson Sun interview, he said "I spend a lot of time making sure I say what I have to say in a way people can understand" (February 7, 1983). Although he made some unfortunate references to a "political blood bath" (Kingsport Times-News, April 9, 1983), most of his remarks were focused upon the issues and not upon opposition personalities, a behavior which increased his credibility.

In seeking fellow-supporters for education reform, in establishing bi-partisan support, and in finding sponsors for the bill, the governor displayed highly successful behaviors. While he used various strategies to accomplish those tasks, the results led closer to success. While he assumed the forefront of leadership during 1983, he stepped back and allowed the legislature to establish ownership of CERA in the special session.

It was during the special session that numerous references were made in the press concerning the governor's efforts to "cut deals." Knoxville News-Sentinel columnist David Lyons cautioned:

Better chain down the dome of the state Capitol. For the price of a yes vote on Governor Lamar Alexander's Better Schools Program and tax increase, everything is for sale (January 8, 1984).

In response to such speculation, the governor commented as follows:

I've never been very comfortable dealing with legislators on a quid pro quo basis . . . It's been very hard, in my experience, to make a deal and enforce a deal (Chattanooga News-Free Press, January 13, 1984).

While an opportunity exists for any Tennessee governor to dispense highway funds on a prioritized basis, it was not possible in this study to determine if any such ranking was made on the basis of legislator's CERA votes. Another opportunity for deals was said to be in the governor's ability to discourage Republican opposition for certain Democratic CERA supporters. It was also impossible to prove or disprove agreements in that area.

The one instance where an agreement of mutual support was made and substantiated by this study was found in the governor's acceptance of Lieutenant Governor Wilder's Governance Bill. While mutual support was accepted, Wilder had previously voiced support of the reform concept and the governor was eager to obtain the new mandate incorporated in Wilder's bill.

Governor Alexander exhibited behaviors which were almost totally helpful toward accomplishing his goals. Other than a few unfortunate comments, there were only two behaviors which were not helpful to accomplishing education reform. The first was in his references to Vanderbilt professor, Dr. Chester Finn. Although Dr. Finn maintained silence with regard to his relationship with the governor, Alexander made no attempt to hide the professor's influence.

Maintaining that advisors to public figures are not, themselves, public figures, Dr. Finn seemed contented that his ideas regarding incentive pay were receiving public attention. His research on the teaching profession, which was conducted for the Carnegie Foundation and reflected in the Boyer report on High School (1983), had given Dr. Finn an opportunity to consider various implications for the profession. Perhaps it was his earlier work, however, for U. S. Senator Daniel Moynihan which tainted the professor in TEA's views. His work on the tuition tax credit legislation which Senator Moynihan sponsored destroyed any possible credibility with TEA.

Joseph Kraft noted, "Almost all the important problems of government go beyond the range of individual knowledge" (1966, p. 67). The fact that the governor enjoyed the input of his staff and various advisors might have been assumed by many observers. TEA, however, would not admit the validity of such advice for the governor.

The fact that the governor did not deny the use of Dr. Finn as an advisor gave TEA an opportunity to castigate the governor for being associated with a tuition tax credit supporter. While in the total conflict it was a minute problem, it was typical of Alexander's generosity. In discussing the origins of his ideas in a Jackson Sun interview, the governor said, "I don't like to give myself a lot of credit" (February 2, 1983). The quick manner in which he consistently gave credit to the commissioner, the legislators, and others was evidence of his modesty.

One mistake which the governor's team made during the CERA conflict was in the underestimation of the needs of the lieutenant governor to be regarded as a power figure and as a participant. Although it appeared that the governor gave the same cordial overtures for involvement to Wilder that he gave to McWherter, apparently, the lieutenant governor needed more.

While Speaker McWherter became more supportive of the CERA, Lieutenant Governor Wilder held back. He seemed to prefer a certain decorum from the governor which would not place much pressure on the legislature. Wilder indicated a preference for an independent legislature, free from influence of the governor.

As noted earlier in this study, the lieutenant governor sent mixed messages with regard to his views on power. While he advocated strong leadership and centralized decision-making management for state institutions, he practiced decentralized power in the Senate and fostered participative management. Perhaps those mixed messages created problems for the governor and his staff. They appeared to have adopted a tactic of working around the lieutenant governor rather than attempting to deal with his confusing style.

Regardless of the tactic, Lieutenant Governor Wilder appeared to have been perturbed at the governor's announcement that he intended to call a special session of the legislature. Of course, Wilder declined to participate in the call. The news that disturbed the

lieutenant governor even more was that the governor already had enough votes for the CERA to accomplish passage in the Senate committees and on the floor of the Senate. Since everything had been accomplished in "his" Senate but without his participation, the lieutenant governor sought a means of regaining control and of maintaining his role as a participant. The means employed was in the expansion of the Senate committees to include all senators. The fact that Wilder did not disturb the balance of power within the Senate in making his committee assignments confirmed his need to be a participant for CERA. The fact that he gave himself the "swing vote," the power to break any tie, confirmed his need to regain control over "his" Senate and lessen the governor's control.

As a further effort to exert power, Lieutenant Governor Wilder used the special session and the governor's willingness to negotiate as an opportunity to give greater power to the State Board of Education and lessen the power enjoyed by the Commissioner of Education. As noted in the lieutenant governor's influence on the origin of TCES, he had long sought an opportunity to increase the power bases of certain education agencies. Although he was not able to obtain all of his goals in the Governance Bill, it gave him definite participant status.

The failure to address the lieutenant governor's power needs or to pay the price for his power needs was the governor's only behavior which significantly hindered his efforts toward accomplishing his goal of education reform. Although the circumstance did not prevent

passage of CERA, it certainly delayed it and complicated the strategy for gaining the Senate sponsors and majority votes for CERA passage.

Although Alexander's task of education reform was "as difficult as moving a graveyard" (Rickover, 1983), the governor's behaviors indicated that he held a fierce determination to accomplish that reform. His genuine personal appeal in carrying his proposals to the public was one of his most effective behaviors. His quiet nature and absolute determination were best captured in an article in the Cincinnati Post as follows:

Lamar Alexander is a soft-spoken, likable fellow from the mountain country of East Tennessee, but when the conversation turns to education, his eyes tighten with intensity (April 9, 1983).

Throughout the conflict, the governor's behaviors reflected an iron-clad commitment to improve education in Tennessee.

The Tennessee Education Association (TEA)

The most helpful behaviors exhibited by TEA were in the lobbying efforts. Well-practiced communications with legislators benefitted the association and aided the accomplishments of such goals as delaying the Master Teacher Program in 1983, influencing numerous committee considerations, compromises, as well as final passage of various tax and education bills. The lobbying effort was coordinated by the very effective legislative liaison, Betty Anderson. Her intellectual approach and her political astuteness resulted in behaviors which were most beneficial to TEA goals.

The effectiveness of the TEA lobby was already well established in Tennessee history. That powerful status was demonstrated by former governor Frank Clement's attitude toward the association during his first campaign for governor in 1952, as evidenced in the following:

As always, the teachers, through the Tennessee Education Association, were a power to reckon with; some observers of Tennessee affairs have considered them the most powerful and the most ruthless lobby in the state. What they wanted in the way of greater education appropriations was likely to become a nonissue, for most candidates would not buck them (Greene, 1982, p. 53).

With that type of history of effectiveness on which to build, the TEA pursued their efforts to stop the governor with the same vigor that they had applied for half a century.

With a history of strongly representing Tennessee teachers, TEA exhibited a very helpful move in fostering group cohesion during the CERA conflict. In the manner described by Filley (1975), the members closed ranks, displayed a high degree of loyalty, and intensified their perception of common values and purposes. TEA was effective in communicating with their members and in involving the teachers. While their communications were frequently confined to the associations' view of the conflict, they presented them very effectively to their membership.

Another area of effectiveness was in TEA's scrutiny of the proposals made by the governor, the legislation constructed by the Select Committee, the evaluation methods researched by the Interim Certification Commission, and in other parts proposed in CERA. TEA

found every possible problem or loophole in the legislation and proposals. While they were not always successful in having the problems viewed by the public, they were most successful in making the governor, the legislators, and their own membership aware of their view of the problems. The proof of that effectiveness was demonstrated in the inclusion in the CERA of numerous TEA ideas and concerns.

One of the more helpful behaviors exhibited by the TEA leadership was in the acceptance of the political climate and the virtual certainty that the CERA would be enacted with or without TEA endorsement. There were numerous articles in the printed data which indicated that education reform was certain. An editorial in the Jackson Sun cautioned the association as follows:

TEA's refusal to change--to shift in reaction to a groundswell that grows stronger each day--could leave it isolated, frozen out of one of the most exciting debates on the future of education in years (July 8, 1983).

The major shift toward helpful behaviors began with the change in TEA presidents, from Jim Booth to Marjorie Pike. The former librarian's approach to the realities of the governor's influence resulted in increased communications between TEA and the governor's forces. President Pike's leadership behaviors were most helpful throughout the conflict. Several participants interviewed for this study gave her a major share of credit for the success of CERA and the conditions which led to TEA's endorsement of the plan. The fact that a female teacher assumed

the leadership role was also helpful to TEA's public image since the majority of TEA membership consists of female teachers.

Perhaps the most significant behavior which hindered TEA's goal accomplishment was the lack of centralized leadership. While the governor was clearly the person in charge of the education reform movement, TEA lacked such centralized leadership. Although it appeared that Marjorie Pike seized a major portion of control when she took office during the summer of 1983, she was unable to accomplish final TEA acceptance of the compromises which she and Betty Anderson were able to reach with the Select Committee, Speaker McWherter, and others who negotiated with TEA. Despite the fact that Executive Secretary Cavit Cheshier became less vocal and less evident with the advent of President Pike, it appeared that he held the final decision-making power.

Whether due to the lack of centralized leadership or the lack of a carefully planned strategy, TEA appeared to have sent contradictory messages during the period of the conflict. For example, in an article published in the Johnson City Press-Chronicle in the third month of the conflict, Cavit Cheshier defended the need for teacher tenure to protect the profession from local politics. His reasons were as follows:

For decades, politics in this state permeated many local school districts. In some systems political empires were built through the manipulation of local school employees. Back in the late forties and early fifties, teachers in some school districts were hired and fired on the basis of where they shopped, how they voted, and whom they knew.

. . . There also was a time when local politicians were able to reward their friends and relatives through pay bonuses (April 9, 1983).

By the time of the special session, however, TEA's attitude toward "the home folks" had changed. In considering the amendment which reflected the association's needs for local influence, the Chattanooga News-Free Press reported as follows:

TEA wanted more local control, while the proposal pushed by Gov. Lamar Alexander puts more power in the hands of state and regional certification committees (January 24, 1984).

TEA President Marjorie Pike said that teachers have learned that local school boards are more responsive to teachers' needs and would be more inclined to be fair than the state (Jackson Sun, January 20, 1984).

To clarify the confusion, TEA News carried the following explanation:

Senator J. B. Shockley (R-Morristown) said he is confused with what appears to be a switch in TEA position and a change of attitude in teachers, particularly East Tennessee teachers. Shockley said when merit pay talk first began teachers told him they opposed it because they lacked confidence in the objectivity of local evaluators. Now, he said, these same teachers are writing him requesting local evaluations. 'It's a 180-degree turn,' the senator said. 'The fear of what was being talked about at that time is not as bad as what they now know,' Cheshier answered (March 1, 1984).

A more relevant reason for TEA's change in attitude toward local control of evaluation may have been a desire to protect the tenure law at all costs. Since tenure is granted by the local boards, the change in advocacy was necessary to avoid situations in which the local systems might grant tenure but the state would evaluate a teacher's performance negatively. Thus, the teacher could have had tenure but no job.

An additional inconsistency in behavior occurred when TEA released the news that it would make an "all-out effort to defeat Gov. Lamar Alexander's Master Teacher Program" on the same day that Master Teacher sponsors were negotiating on including some of TEA's concerns in the bill (Kingsport Times-News, March 20, 1983). Such communication errors jeopardized TEA's image of solidarity.

Perhaps one of the behaviors most hindering to TEA goals occurred with regard to the union image. While expressing a preference for being called a professional organization and insisting that TEA members were professionals, the overt behavior was more consistent with the definitions of a union. The advocacy for more money for all teachers and a single pay scale for all teachers was consistent with the labor union model. In addition, Columnist Reid Ashe accused TEA of the following ego-centrism:

TEA has a built-in flaw. It collects the same dues from a rotten teacher as it does from a great one. Thus it's as dedicated to protecting the bad ones as the good ones and it's vigorously resisting the Better Schools Plan's attempt to differentiate among them (Jackson Sun, November 13, 1983).

An examination of definitions in the literature on unions and professional organizations gave clear indications of the direction which TEA took. Despite the damage to its public image within the state, the association pursued a course which affirmed the union label but without the benefits of a coalition with other supportive union groups within Tennessee.

TEA further damaged its image by raising dues during the CERA conflict. In order to be a member of the association, Tennessee

teachers were also required to join the local affiliate and the national organization, the National Education Association (NEA). That block of dues took approximately \$190.00 annually from each member. What it meant to the TEA, however, was an annual budget of more than 3.5 million dollars. Reports in the printed data of the increase in dues were also accompanied by the news of a decline in TEA membership. The Tennessee association was not unique in its decline. National statistics indicated that teacher union membership had declined throughout the nation (TSBA Bulletin, May/June, 1983).

As indicated in the section of this study on communications, the TEA tended to focus its communications on personalities rather than on issues. That focus was not always complimentary. That style of communication was an unfortunate behavior for TEA leaders; Cavit Cheshier and Gene Bryant. Realizing that TEA would be important during the implementation of any education reform, Governor Alexander was usually diplomatic in his communications, even when criticizing TEA actions. Distorted perceptions and defensiveness resulted in such inappropriate communications as the following:

Cheshier likened Alexander's evaluation boards to Nazi Germany's Gestapo, saying they would be a 'bunch of people snooping around and seeing how they can fire people' (Knoxville Journal, March 15, 1983).

At the time that Cheshier made the above comment, the proposed certification boards had not been appointed nor had decisions been made regarding the exact procedures of such boards. Such

inappropriate communications, therefore, probably had a reverse effect of that intended by Cheshier.

Despite the fact that the president and lobbyist made attempts to be rational and communicative, they were unable to achieve control of TEA leadership and TEA image. They were also hindered in their attempts to use strategy and to negotiate effectively. Thus, throughout most of the 13 month period, TEA behaviors were marked by a pattern defensiveness and a pattern of reaction to behaviors exhibited by their opponents.

Perhaps the most damaging TEA behavior was the failure to recognize opportunity. TEA failed to grasp either the juncture of the situation or the determination of the governor. That behavior resulted in TEA's loss of control over education in Tennessee in 1984.

The Legislators

The behaviors of legislators were primarily influenced by their political affiliations, their position in the legislature, and their personal styles. Many legislators were observed to have behaved during the CERA debates in the same manner as during any other legislative consideration. Other legislators, however, were influenced by their own particular involvement with the issues and other participants.

The most outstanding and helpful behaviors for accomplishing legislative goals of policy and decision-making were exhibited by

the leadership. Speaker McWherter's behaviors were consistently goal directed and situational. At times, he sat silently. During other occasions, he was assertive and thorough in his insistence that attention be focused on the issues. He did not allow the CERA bills to be lost in committee procedures. When some legislators exhibited obstructionist behaviors, the speaker quietly moved in and took control. He was a perfect example of Hersey and Blanchard's (1982) situational leadership model.

Other positive behaviors demonstrated in the legislature were observed in Senators O'Brien, Rucker, Burks, Elkins, Crouch, Hamilton and others who pursued their goals with reason and respect. They used strategy, planning, and communication to manage the conflict. Even though not all were on the same side of the controversy, their behaviors were generally goal oriented and positive with regard to their respective positions.

Perhaps the most positive behavior exhibited by legislators in resolving the CERA conflict was their gaining a sense of ownership of their own Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study, and especially of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984. That move was a necessity for finding common ground on which agreement could be reached about the proposed legislation. For both proponents and opponents of CERA, they needed to be able to deal directly with the final controversy in their committees and on the floor of both houses. They had to go through the process of adding and subtracting ideas from the governor and TEA, and yet establish legislative ownership of the product.

One of the most striking behaviors exhibited by legislators was the virtual absence of overt behaviors by Republicans. Even the usually vocal Victor Ashe was silent with regard to CERA. The minority party in the legislature, the Republicans were generally supportive and exhibited leadership when needed, but usually allowed the Democratic legislators to carry the CERA campaign. Representative Zane Whitson was involved in some meetings regarding final compromises, Senator James Elkins was most evident in his involvement in the Select Committee proceedings, and Representatives Henry and Kelley were involved in some leadership roles, but none assumed a forefront position in the controversy. Instead, they fostered the bi-partisan effort by allowing Democrats to be the major sponsors and conduct the major efforts to influence votes.

The public behavior of most senators was usually marked with dignity and respect. Perhaps because of the smaller space and size of the Senate and its longer membership terms, the senators usually conducted their debates in a civil manner. House sessions, however, were sometimes marked by the attention seeking behaviors of a few members. Those occasions received swift responses from the speaker, who reminded members of their duties, an action resulting in quick restoration of order.

Legislators' communications were usually indicative of their positions regarding the issues. Most were respectful and focused on the issues. There were, however, some unfortunate remarks made to the press which did not contribute to improving relations to

understanding. Senator Jim Lewis's remark that the Master Teacher Plan was "an el stinko piece of trash" (Kingsport Times-News, August 7, 1983) was typical of a communications style which was not conducive to positive conflict management.

The most notable general behavior exhibited by the legislators was the obsession with compromise. As discussed earlier in this study, compromise is not indicated in the literature as the most desirable means of resolving conflict since it involves some loss by all participants. Yet, compromise seemed to be considered the magic solution for political disputes.

It appeared that the major goal held by legislators in their meetings between the TEA and the administration was to effect a compromise between the governor's proposals and TEA's needs. Legislators apparently viewed the participants as having a certain amount of "issue chips" which were used to purchase a solution. Many of the considerations were marked by an attitude of "give up something and you get to keep something." It seemed apparent that the legislators viewed the outcome of the conflict with a great deal of win/lose philosophy. That attitude caused each side to fight for what it wanted to win and to avoid what it did not want to lose.

An examination of the legislators' behaviors when they tried to reach a compromise on the class size issue demonstrated the obsession with the process. The scenerio began when TEA forces attempted to reduce pupil/teacher ratios in the Select Committee's version of the CERA. Receiving no response on the issue from that

group, since class size was not included in the agenda set for the committee by the legislature, TEA then carried the idea to the special session. With the contention that a reduction in class size would be a major factor in improving the quality of education--at least in kindergarten through third grade, TEA also proposed that a reduction to 20 students per class would raise teacher morale. The opposition responded by introducing education research which indicated the extremely high cost of such a reduction entailing additional classroom space and additional teachers. They also insisted that such a cost would skew the anticipated new appropriations for education and interfere with plans for a career ladder.

Representative Steve Cobb decided to vote in favor of the class size reduction despite its harmful consequences for the CERA in an effort to reach a compromise with Representative Paul Starnes, TEA's primary supporter in the legislature. In essence, he appeared to be ready to "give up something big" in order to compromise with Starnes. After expressing his support for the amendment, he asked Starnes if he would then support CERA. When Starnes responded negatively, Cobb quickly withdrew his efforts to compromise and forged ahead without the opposition, finally winning passage of CERA in the House with Starnes responding "present, not voting" when the final vote was taken.

From that example, it was possible to ascertain some legislators' practice of compromising, despite the ensuing loss. Whether emanating from a Puritan work ethic or from a lack of knowledge

regarding superior ways of resolving conflicts, the political process in Tennessee seemed obsessed with "quid pro quo." In contrast, the process of integrative problem-solving could have resulted in a gain for both sides and a greater a win/win outcome.

The teacher aide provision which was inserted into the bill after the failure of the class size amendment could have been perceived as a new solution; however, observation of the process indicated that it was done with more of a conciliatory attitude than an actual agreement by both sides on a new solution.

Behaviors in Response to the Rosenholtz Resignation

The behaviors of the governor's staff and the commissioner of education to the news of Dr. Rosenholtz's decision to resign from her position as a consultant were diplomatic and restrained. They left the caustic remarks about the consultant's behaviors and skills to the legislators. The manner in which the commissioner responded had a considerable influence in avoiding a conflict.

As discussed in the critical incident describing Dr. Rosenholtz's resignation, a definite reason that an open conflict was averted was due to Dr. Rosenholtz's own behaviors, her remarks to the press, and the timing of the resignation. Although TEA attempted to seize on the incident in their own newspaper, they failed to use the incident to discredit the work of the Interim Commission. In their praise of Dr. Rosenholtz, they ignored her earlier statements to the Select Committee and the Interim Certification Commission regarding evaluation. They also ignored the fact her opposition

to teacher input was a major source of contention. Consistent with previous communication styles, the TEA could have used the incident to cast doubt on the work of the Interim Commission. To do so, however, would have required an immediate response. By the time Dr. Rosenholtz was invited to address a TEA meeting and became involved with that group, she had been discredited in the press. Thus, TEA lost an opportunity to embrace a Master Teacher defector and utilize her inside knowledge. They also failed to use the incident to publicly question consensus in the SDE.

The outcome of the incident revealed that Dr. Rosenholtz's behaviors were imprudent and inconsistent with her goals; the governor's team's behaviors were very helpful in avoiding an escalation of the conflict, and the TEA's behaviors were again reactive and unsure. The Rosenholtz incident was an incident in which the CERA forces acted with decisiveness and swiftness while the TEA forces reacted--but too late.

Summary

The behaviors of the major participants were a factor in the interactions during the critical incidents and influenced the outcome of the conflict. In order to pursue their goals, the participants exhibited a variety of behaviors, some effective and some ineffective. Those which were regarded by this study as helpful were the behaviors which aided the participants in reaching their particular goals.

Table 2 reviews major participant behavior with regard to the critical incidents and indicates the specific behaviors which were helpful in the participants' pursuit of their goals.

Table 2. Participant Behavior

CRITICAL INCIDENT	THE GOVERNOR		THE TENNESSEE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION		THE LEGISLATORS	
	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors
TCES	* Interest and use in most reform proposals			* Lack of observation or anticipation of recommendations	* Established ground for ownership of education reform	
GOVERNOR'S SPEECH	* Timing, content, personal style; established credibility risk taking			* Lack of anticipation timing and mixture of responses	Individual responses	
GOVERNOR'S PRESENTING ISSUES	* Participation; depth of commitment, time, energy; effective communications; charisma; focusing attention on education; relationships with legislators; O'Brien, Rucker, Cobb, Bivens	* Giving credit to Dr. Finn for advice on Master Teacher plan	* Lobbying legislators; membership communications; increased loyalty	* Lack of consensus among leaders; re-active responses; failure to introduce attractive alternative proposals		* Unproductive communications
INTERIM COMMISSION	* Timing and choice of appointments allowed development of evaluation procedures to continue	* Inadvertent inclusion by a staff member of Arthur Wise as endorsing evaluation plan	* Participation; finding problems with evaluation proposals * Using Wise faux pas and other errors	* Lack of problem solving behaviors	* Observed progress	
DECISION TO STUDY	* Dignified response to setback; regarded as a new challenge; refusal to accept as a defeat		* Effective lobbying; use of power alliances; insistence on consideration of additional issues; problem finding	* Failure to perceive only a short-term gain	* Resolution for Joint Senate/House Select Committee; inclusion of broader coverage than Master Teacher; appropriations to support activities	* Yielding to pressure from special interests
SELECT COMMITTEE	* Maintained appearance of distance from Select Committee; used opportunity to improve proposals; positive response to product--CERA		* Openness in communications; participation of president and lobbyist; finding problems with proposed legislation	* Failure to adopt a strategy to deal with Select Committee based on realities of skewed appointments	* Committee accomplished decision making	

Table 2 (continued)

CRITICAL INCIDENT	THE GOVERNOR		THE TENNESSEE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION		THE LEGISLATORS	
	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors
BI-PARTISAN SUPPORT	* Established relations with Democratic leadership; recognized necessity of establishing power alliance with Democrats; choice of Cobb, Rucker, Bivens, O'Brien			* Failure of lobby to stop and divert the governor's eroding TEA support	* Cooperation on behalf of leadership	* Loss of Democratic Party unity on reform issue
SECURING SENATE SPONSORS	* Effective appeal to parallel concerns; effective choice of articulate, influential leaders	* Overlooking a way to accomplish Senate votes without alienating Wilder, or unwillingness to "pay the price"		* Failure to anticipate strategy	* Cooperation on behalf of education	* Potential enactment without debate
McWHARTER'S ENDORSEMENT	* Diplomacy; appeal to parallel concerns for the state and for education		* Continuation of relationship despite his endorsement; Pike's gaining the speaker's confidence	* Loss of full alliance potential	* Response to strong leadership	* Ineffective responses in attempt to lessen the speaker's strength
HART POLL	* Use of Democratic pollster established credibility; use of results to substantiate position	* Failure to obtain similar information earlier in conflict		* Failure to counter with a credible poll or to perceive trends in public attitudes	* Realization of public attitudes	
TEA OPPOSITION	* Anticipated; planned strategy to deal with opposition; excluding TEA from development of reform proposals	* Failure to establish a mechanism for communicating with the teachers early in the conflict	* Established opposition in public forum, questioned governor's credibility and motivation	* Poor choice of time in making decision public; raised questions about TEA motives	* Supporters' responses	

Table 2 (continued)

CRITICAL INCIDENT	THE GOVERNOR		THE TENNESSEE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION		THE LEGISLATORS	
	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors	Helpful Behaviors	Hindering Behaviors
CALL FOR SPECIAL SESSION	* Strategy of focusing attention on education; involvement of legislators; giving Senator O'Brien credit for idea; risk taking	* Failure to recognize lieutenant governor's power needs and to anticipate the consequences of his need to be a power figure and expand Senate committees	* Lobbying; realization of political realities	* Lack of anticipation of the governor's actions	* Responded to governor's call	* Undignified public remarks
LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISES	* Willingness to compromise on many points		* Willingness to negotiate; cooperation with legislative leaders	* Lack of leadership consensus in decision making	* Encouragement of compromise; use of leadership	* Lack of consideration of other ways of solving conflict
TEA ENDORSEMENT	* Diplomacy		* Participation in CERA Economic opportunity for members	* Almost too late to be significant	* Allowed greater participation by some legislators	
PASSAGE OF CERA	* Low profile during legislative session credit given to legislators		* Amendments	* Lack of attractive alternative proposals; narrow focus on TEA membership goals and issues	* Established ownership of CERA; bi-partisan interactions to accomplish reform; quiet Republicans; Democratic leadership	* Inappropriate attention seeking behaviors rather than genuine strategy
PASSAGE OF TAXES	* Allowed legislative leaders to carry process		* Endorsement	* Failure to perceive opportunity for additional education revenue	* Plan to remove tax from groceries	* Response to special interests in amusement tax
ROSENHOLTZ RESIGNATION	* Diplomatic restraint; Avoidance of conflict			* Failure to attempt to use incident to discredit evaluation; failure to use insider's information	* Statements to press	* Failure of TEA supporters to respond effectively
GOVERNANCE BILL	* Utilized opportunity to involve Wilder; Obtained new mandate; stronger board of education	* Failure to anticipate and deal with Wilder	* Encouragement		* Respectful consideration of leadership proposal	

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Introduction

In this final chapter, the conflict and its analysis are summarized, the research questions answered, and the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for further research are presented.

Summary

A Summary of the Conflict

Beginning his second term as a popular governor, Lamar Alexander used the national attention in 1983 on the needs for quality education to focus attention on the needs for Tennessee's education system. Utilizing the December 1982 legislative study of education and a few close advisors, the governor formulated a ten-point plan for improving education. He presented that plan, which was called The Better Schools Program, during a televised speech on January 28, 1983. That event marked the beginning of the conflict.

Anticipating opposition from the Tennessee Education Association (TEA), the governor immediately embarked upon a campaign to foster support for his proposals. Although not thrilled with his interest in education, TEA accepted most of his proposals but became

livid over his advocacy for a Master Teacher Program which involved incentive pay, performance evaluation, and a career ladder.

While the governor had the advantages of outstanding support from Democratic representatives and senators, including Speaker of the House McWherter, the effectiveness of the TEA's influence on the legislature was sufficient to stall passage of the Master Teacher Program. Concerned about the situation, the governor appointed an Interim Certification Commission and charged them with the task of developing an evaluation instrument.

As the governor feared, on April 12, 1983, the Senate Education Committee voted to study education proposals until the 1984 session of the legislature. A resolution was passed regarding the appointment of a special joint committee and appropriations for its operation. The Select Committee, as it was called, assumed the task of developing a bill which reflected both the governor's proposals and the concerns expressed by TEA. Refusing to accept the delay as a setback, the governor simply used the months to increase his base of support and nurture the Select Committee's development of ownership for education reform.

When the Select Committee agreed on a proposed bill on November 23, 1983, the governor's forces quietly pursued the task of obtaining sponsors for the bill and enough Senate votes to ensure passage through the Senate committees and on the Senate floor. When that was accomplished, the governor responded to the suggestion of Senator O'Brien to call a special session of the legislature

restricted to the subjects of education and taxes, having already researched the procedures for such a call.

Although the governor had obtained the support of Speaker of the House McWherter, he had not achieved the same relationship with Lieutenant Governor Wilder. When the special session was convened, Wilder managed to increase his own influence and prevent swift passage of the CERA by expanding the Education and Finance Committees to include all senators. With the acceptance of Wilder's bill to increase the power of the State Board of Education, the lieutenant governor finally supported CERA.

After many amendments, numerous compromises, and considerable leadership from Speaker McWherter, CERA was finally endorsed by the TEA and passed by the General Assembly. That, however, was only half of the task of reform. Even more difficult was the passage of a tax increase necessary to fund the reform measures. Although an increase in the sales tax, the corporate franchise tax, and an insurance tax was passed with some reluctance by the legislators, an amusement tax caused severe problems because of the tendency of the Tennessee legislature to yield to special interest groups. After much debate and incredible lobbying, the tax bill was enacted by the legislature. The end of the special session on February 23, 1984 marked the end of this study of the CERA conflict.

Summary of the Conflict Analysis

The conflict involved in the development of the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984 evolved as the popular governor

attempted to stimulate the state's economic growth through an improved education system. To accomplish that improvement, he sought to upgrade the teaching profession through a performance evaluation based incentive pay plan tied to a career ladder. To achieve enactment of the legislation necessary for such reform, it was necessary to form bi-partisanship relations with legislators and power alliances with certain groups of individuals. That type of behavior resulted in the usurping of power from the long established Tennessee Education Association, the state's chief education leader. Thus, the conflict developed over who would control the future of education in Tennessee.

The governor exerted strong leadership in marshaling all of the resources available to him as he attempted to achieve his goals. The degree of his personal involvement was unprecedented in Tennessee gubernatorial history. With careful planning, he outmaneuvered the teachers' association on almost every move. Although delayed in his first attempt to achieve reform, he ignored the initial defeat and approached the task with renewed vigor. In fact, he did not appear to have considered defeat at any point. With a competent team of intelligent and eager individuals, the governor used the time which he had originally intended for implementation of the program to improve the plan. As Fisher and Ury (1983) recommend, he did not become defensive, rather, he invited advice and suggestions for improvement. During the months of refining the program, however,

he adamantly resisted changes with regard to the goals of incentive pay, performance evaluation, and a career ladder.

The process of refinement of the reform proposals also fostered legislative ownership of the governor's ideas and made acceptance in the legislature more likely. Despite countless delay tactics and an unprecedented amount of lobbying by the TEA, the governor's goals were accomplished when the legislature enacted his proposals. While he approached the task of education reform with ten points, he had to accept changes in some proposals. In the end, he succeeded in accomplishing his major goals and several additional goals not on his original agenda.

With enactment of the CERA, the governor adopted a new set of goals involving CERA implementation and additional reforms. Although TEA had endorsed the CERA, they did not accept the reform happily. Their new goals involved finding flaws in the evaluation process and in laying the groundwork for presenting changes in the CERA to the 94th session of the General Assembly.

Questions Answered by the Study

The researcher explored five questions and their ramifications related to Tennessee and the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984. The major findings, based on these questions, are summarized as follows:

1. Who were the major participants in this conflict? The participants were divided into three major groups which represented

the administration and State Department of Education (SDE), the Tennessee Education Association (TEA), and the General Assembly. The individuals involved in those groups are listed in Appendix B.

2. What were the issues which divided the participants? The issues which divided the administration and the SDE from the TEA were largely determined by the struggle over control of education in Tennessee. The governor's efforts toward economic development for the state through improved education quality led him to attempt to restore the Commissioner and SDE to the role of educational leader and change agent. The TEA fought to retain control of its role as change agent and leader which had been gained during the past 35 years.

Additional issues which separated the governor and the TEA included how monies should be spent for education and how the teaching profession could be improved. While the TEA advocated higher salaries for all teachers and more money for existing programs, the governor insisted on incentive pay based on performance evaluation, a career ladder, and an improvement in the quality of education through basic skills, computer skills, and improved curricula. In addition, the governor was a Republican and the TEA had fierce loyalties to the Democratic Party.

The third group of participants, the legislators, were largely influenced by their loyalties to either the governor or the TEA. In addition, however, they had to deal with such issues as a tax increase to fund any education reform, their loyalties to the special

interest groups which had long dominated Tennessee politics, and the reactions of their various constituencies, especially during the 1984 election.

3. What were the incidents around which the conflict developed? Eleven critical incidents were identified from the printed data collected for this study. Seven additional incidents were identified during the personal interviews conducted for the study. The 18 critical incidents identified by this study are as follows:

- The Tennessee Comprehensive Education Study
- The governor's speech on January 28, 1983
- The governor's taking the issues to the public
- Tennessee Education Association opposition
- Endorsement by Speaker of the House Ned Ray McWherter
- Securing of bi-partisan support
- Appointment of the Interim Certification Commission
- Senate Education Committee's decision to study and establish the Select Committee
- Peter Hart Poll
- Select Committee decision of November 23, 1983
- Resignation of Dr. Susan Rosenholtz
- Acquiring sponsors for the CERA
- Governor's decision to call a special session of the legislature
- The Governance Bill
- Legislative compromises

- TEA decision to endorse CERA
- Passage of CERA
- Passage of the taxes and funding

Those 18 events were the incidents which involved the participants in controversy and which were perceived by the participants as being a series of related events which led to the final outcome of the conflict.

4. What were the participants' goals and strategies? The governor's goals involved the future of the state, the quality of life for its citizens, and an improved education system. His goals for education reform included an upgrading of the teaching profession through a performance evaluation based incentive pay and career ladder plan.

The TEA goals included increases in all teacher salaries, increases in teacher benefits; improvement in working conditions; the protection of the collective bargaining process, the tenure law, certification processes; and greater influence and control over demotion and retention.

The major difference in the two sets of goals was in the apparent beneficiaries. While the state and its people were the recipients of benefits from education reform, TEA membership appeared to be the primary beneficiaries of their goals. In addition, the governor had a larger constituency for his goals.

The governor's use of strategy was a significant factor in the outcome of the conflict. He and his staff carefully planned their

actions and tactics, taking care to anticipate various consequences. Among their major strategies was the use of the governor's personal appeal to the public, key legislators, and the Democratic leadership. His formation of power alliances with various leaders was an important strategy. One of his most significant strategies was the exclusion of TEA in the preparation of the reform proposals but the inclusion of TEA and the state's teachers in the planning and implementation phases of the reform. In general, the governor's use of strategy indicated knowledge of planned change, conflict management, and revealed extensive research.

Conversely, the TEA relied on the strategy of using past power and influence with the legislature, its very effective lobbyists, and its loyal membership during the first part of the conflict. The major tactics were a reaction to the governor's strategies and problem finding with his proposals. In addition to its forceful lobby, TEA used a "well-oiled amendment machine" as a most effective strategy during the special session of the legislature.

5. How was the resolution of conflict achieved? The conflict was resolved when TEA endorsed the CERA and the legislature enacted both the CERA and the tax increase to fund the reform. The point was reached through numerous compromises, the application of considerable pressure by all three participant groups, and by the realization that the public wanted the CERA.

Findings

Findings Regarding the Governor

Lamar Alexander's major priority was to be a good governor and to be remembered as a good governor. To accomplish that goal, he tried to increase the state's economic development and its stature among the other states. His goals for the state were future oriented. He was aware of the economic and population shifts toward the south (Naisbitt, 1982) and of the potential which Tennessee possessed in its diversity in geography, natural resources, and its people.

In his attempts to accomplish his development goals for Tennessee, he surrounded himself with highly competent individuals whose own skills complemented those of the governor. As they planned the task of fostering economic development, the need for major reform of the state's education system became apparent. The governor's advisors and his participation in national events gave the insight necessary to begin that reform. Since "the teacher is at the center of American education" (Boyer in Guggenheim, 1983), Alexander made the profession the focus of his reform.

The idea of a career ladder was not new. In fact, a similar idea had been advocated by one of the members of the SDE staff as early as 1966 (Trusty). The idea of achieving acceptance and implementation of the plan were the major tasks. In order to accomplish such reform, the governor was able to achieve a number of phenomena through his total commitment to the plan. He was able to involve

more people as advocates for education than had ever been accomplished in the state's history. More than \$400,000 was raised through private sources to promote acceptance of the plan. An additional significant factor was his ability to secure commitment similar to his own from numerous individuals among his staff, the cabinet, and the SDE. The commitment to their shared goals was strong enough to suppress or eliminate the natural friction which might have occurred when several agencies are meshed together in such an intense effort. In essence, friction was not often apparent among his team members.

The governor's strong goal commitment was a most significant factor in his success. In addition, his ability to prioritize his goals contributed to his accomplishments. For example, his major education goal was to increase quality. His first subgoal was then to upgrade the teaching profession. He would not consider adopting a goal of lowered pupil/teacher ratios, which involved the addition of many new teachers to the system, until the profession was first improved.

He was convinced of the merits of the proposed education reform, a major change in public policy. With regard to CERA's effect on the state and on accomplishing his goals for development, he said, "I am convinced that it will do more for the future of all Tennesseans than anything ever done by the Legislature" (personal communication, September 26, 1984).

The major finding regarding the governor's role in the CERA conflict was that the reform would not have been established without

the leadership and the unique characteristics of Lamar Alexander.

Findings Regarding the Tennessee Education Association

The teachers' association was a powerful opponent which resisted the governor's attempts to regain control of educational leadership and the legislature's attempts to enact reform. In order to have maintained the role of education leader/change agent in Tennessee during the early 1980's, the TEA would have had to actively pursue a broader range of future oriented educational goals and abandon some of its preoccupation with the past and present.

The overwhelmingly female organization was dominated by male leadership in the decision making areas. A lack of consensus among the leaders probably contributed to numerous difficulties in goal pursuits, negotiations with their opponents, and with development of the organization as a professional association. It was the lack of strong centralized leadership which prevented TEA from prevailing in the CERA conflict.

The association's behavior during some of the critical incidents of the CERA conflict probably contributed to the loss of influence among certain legislators. TEA's almost total dependency upon lobbying as their major strategy with the legislature was harmful to their outcome. That powerful lobby was observed by some legislators as coercion. Deutsch (1973) cautioned that excessive use of coercive power usually results in resistance. TEA could have retained credibility with many legislators by broadening its approach and fostering relationships.

TEA lacked an understanding of effective use of the news media during the conflict. When unable to achieve communication of their perspective through the public media, they turned inward to communicate internally with their membership. Although that means of communication was very effective with their teachers, it did not enhance their public image. An improved public image and accessibility to the public media could have been enhanced by goals which appeared to be concerned with more than just the welfare of TEA members.

While the governor was TEA's most powerful opposition in the history of the organization, and he was able to place numerous restraints on the association's intentions, TEA remained a major source of influence in Tennessee education at the end of the CERA conflict. Although the association expressed the fear that the governor wanted to destroy their organization, he never indicated that intention publicly nor did he succeed in destroying TEA.

Findings Regarding the Legislature

The legislature gained a stronger public image through the efforts of Governor Alexander. His praise and credit for their actions added credibility to their work.

During the CERA conflict, the legislature experienced intense interactions, new behaviors from a governor, and the emergence of new legislative leaders. The additional public attention served to improve the image of the General Assembly as a body which was capable of efficient decision making. Although historically dominated by

special interests, the legislature demonstrated that sound public policy could be developed and that it was responsive to voter concerns.

During the endless debates, hearings, and meetings, it became apparent that interpersonal skills and knowledge of conflict management were not a prerequisite for being elected to the legislature. During the conflict, it became obvious that new legislators, and perhaps some experienced ones, could have benefitted from a training session on using effective means of communication, understanding when communications are necessary, and employing other interaction skills which could have fostered more efficient and effective actions in the legislature.

While the CERA conflict left some scars on the legislature, and some of its members suffered public losses, the enactment of education reform was perceived to outweigh any damage. In addition to the greater financial support for education, the passage of the tax increase significantly enhanced the environment for major tax reform.

In summary, the CERA conflict produced new leaders and new power alliances, broke or weakened some of the old power alliances, and resulted in a legislature with a better self-image and an improved public image.

Conclusions

Every conflict is unique to its environment, participants, and critical incidents; however, an analysis of the CERA conflict produced the following conclusions:

1. Education reform is a non-incremental change which disrupts the status quo of the system. The changes implemented by the passage of the CERA were not small incremental modifications in the education system. Instead, those changes represented bold departures from the status quo and resulted in innovations such as performance-based evaluation, incentive pay, and a career ladder. The reformation resulted in a significant change in the education system in Tennessee.

2. An attempt toward non-incremental change of public policy results in conflict. Disrupting the system which had been largely devised and perpetuated by the TEA resulted in resistance to change. The association had long protected the status-quo and did not accept threats to that system. The size and scope of the change greatly influenced the size and scope of the conflict.

3. Education reform is unalterably tied to a time pressure. Changes in the education system are motivated by the needs of the students in schools at the time of the proposed changes. For the changes to be meaningful and to accomplish the intended goals, they must be implemented in time to benefit those same students and before the students move through or exit from the education system. CERA

forces felt that the needs of the students in today's schools could not wait for change to occur in future years. Such delayed change would not have the desired effect on Tennessee's economic development which the governor anticipated.

4. Non-incremental change efforts require strong centralized leadership, necessitate total group commitment, and involve risks.

One of the main conclusions reached by this study is that the governor's centralized leadership was a significant factor in the success of the CERA. While he had considerable talent and commitment from a large administration staff, cabinet members, and State Department of Education staff, he was perceived as the top management. With the help of his diverse and energetic team, the governor was able to take risks such as the involvement of members of the Democratic Party, the call for the special session of the legislature, and the use of the legislators to protect his primary goals in the legislation. Conversely, TEA's lack of centralized leadership caused problems for the association's attempts to prevent the changes, utilize the media for effective communications, and to negotiate resolution of the conflict. While TEA appeared to have had strong group commitment, the group did not exhibit risk-taking during interactions with the Select Committee, the governor's staff, or the legislators.

5. Conflict involved in major policy changes revolves around certain incidents and people. Increased participation in an incident increases the chances for conflict to occur. Certain events occur

during the development of conflict. These incidents represent the action and the interaction around which the controversy evolves. As the number of participants who are directly involved in the incident increases, the opportunity for greater conflict increases. For example, all of the participants were involved in the governor's taking the issues to the public, either as a staff member involved in the campaign or as part of the audience for that campaign. The result was that this particular critical incident was perceived as spanning the entire time period of the conflict and having a tremendous effect on the outcome of the conflict. In contrast, the work of the Interim Commission directly involved fewer of the major participants. It was, therefore, mentioned less frequently in discussion and regarded as a lesser area of controversy.

6. Before an attempt toward any major change is begun, an assessment of the sources and degree of opposition should be made. In order to accomplish a major reform, opposition to such reform must be overcome. In planning such a move, it is essential that an assessment of the intensity of the opposition, the goals of the opposition, and the needs of the individuals in the opposition group be carefully anticipated. For example, the governor anticipated that the TEA would object to any major reform of the teaching profession and to his proposals of that reform. He knew that his plans were in opposition to TEA's stated goals and to their power needs. Anticipating the intensity of the opposition, the governor sought public support for his plans through his first presentation on television to his year-long campaign for the program.

7. When strong opposition to a major change effort is anticipated and when the opponents possess distinctly different values and goals, the opposition should not be included in the preparation of change proposals. Although the literature suggests that involvement in planned change is essential to participant acceptance of that change, Governor Alexander chose not to follow that axiom. His knowledge of the failure of past attempts which were begun under opponent involvement led to a decision not to involve the TEA until after some basic decisions were made. The fact that the teachers' association possessed very different values and goals for education led to the assumption that TEA involvement in the preparation stages of the reform effort would result in no effort ever being made. Once the proposed reform was made public, it was then possible to involve TEA without jeopardizing the initial reform proposal.

8. Under the circumstances of strong opposition and after the proposed changes have been made public, the opposition should be involved immediately in the planning and implementation of that change. This conclusion follows the literature on change and suggests the involvement of participants in making planned changes. Once the proposed change has been made public and has achieved a certain state of acceptance, it is then safer to involve the participants without placing the basic tenets of the plans in jeopardy.

9. In considering where people should be involved in the change process, their needs, priorities, and values must be a factor. Participants' goals, values, and interests must be

considered with regard to their opportunities for involvement. If they are involved, but not at the places which they consider important, future conflict may be anticipated. Thus, since TEA had assumed the role of education leader/planner for Tennessee, and was not involved in the creation of the reform, it may be anticipated that the association will attempt to change the CERA at every opportunity. The total effect of conclusions 7 and 9 may have been that the governor chose to exchange a certain amount of continued conflict with TEA for success in passage of the CERA.

10. An assessment should be made of opponents' power and of potential supporters' power needs. It is essential to know the strength of the opposition in planning strategy to managing any conflict. It is equally important to assess the power needs of participants who may be proponents or potential supporters of the reform. For example, the governor's failure to recognize the power needs of the lieutenant governor or his refusal to pay the price to meet those needs proved to be costly during the special session of the legislature. That occurrence diluted the impact of the Senate sponsors and votes for the bill. It also contributed to a less efficient action for the CERA's passage through the Senate committees.

11. Consideration should be given to an opponent's history of performance in conflict and decisions should be made regarding strengths, weaknesses, and effective performance in past conflict. Much in the same manner that athletic teams "scout" their opponents, a study should be made of the opposition in any conflict. In the

CERA conflict, the governor knew that the TEA would prevent any education reform movement from ever beginning because he was familiar with the association's actions during 1980 budget cuts. He was very aware of the TEA's influence with legislators. At the same time, TEA was well aware that the governor's political party was in the minority, that the association had many loyal legislators who would come to TEA's aid during a crisis, and that the legislators did not like to vote for an election year tax increase.

12. When goals and values are similar, efforts to negotiate should be pursued. With both sides seeking an end to the conflict and more funds for education, the environment for integrative problem solving was improved and the agreement for "fast tracking" was reached. Because both sides wanted to secure additional funding for education, TEA endorsed the tax increase and both sides promoted passage of the tax bills.

13. Strategies should be utilized which maximize support and minimize the opposition and time required to reach the desired outcome. The governor used a public campaign which carried him across the nation in gathering support for his proposed reform. He also used the strategy of appealing to parallel concerns for education in securing bi-partisan support for his proposals. That tactic succeeded in gaining the support of such Democratic leaders as Speaker McWherter, Representative Cobb, Senator Rucker, and Senator O'Brien. He was able to minimize opposition generated by his unflattering remarks about TEA's union-like behavior by securing the

support of the AFL-CIO affiliated American Federation of Teachers union. Thus, he embraced the union loyals while still detracting from the TEA's behavior. In calling a special session of the legislature, the governor definitely minimized the time needed to accomplish his goals.

14. Issue focused communications foster better post-conflict communications. Communications which are focused upon issues rather than persons are less damaging to the participants. In win/win outcomes, many of the issues may have been resolved; therefore, they are no longer residual areas of conflict. In contrast, inappropriate communications focused upon persons are not as easily forgotten.

15. When it is not possible to avoid conflict in the pursuit of goal accomplishments, preparation for and expectancy of conflict may be necessary. In order to change the education system's status quo in order to accomplish such goals as performance based incentive pay and a career ladder, the governor accepted the possibility of conflict. With the knowledge that his goals were in conflict with the TEA goals of a single pay scale, across-the-board salary increases for all, and protection of collective bargaining, tenure, and other membership issues, the governor expected conflict to occur. Rather than avoid such conflict in pursuit of the status quo, Alexander surrounded himself with a team of competent, committed individuals who knew how to plan their actions and to solve anticipated problems. They understood where to minimize the risks of conflict, such as in the resignation of Susan Rosenholtz. They also knew how to increase

the conflict and manage it for their advantages as in the call for the special session of the legislature.

16. Rather than adopting actions which are necessary to avoid conflict, a better strategy may be to prepare for conflict. For example, rather than accepting a premature solution to the CERA conflict when the Senate Education Committee voted to study education proposals on April 12, 1983, an acceptance which might have resulted in minimal gains for his goals, the governor merely sharpened his tactical and negotiation skills and renewed his commitments. He and his supporters launched a new effort with endurance and preparation for pursuing their goals. They sharpened their tactical skills by creating a new energy group in the State Department of Education; they also established the practice of daily planning sessions, a communications network, a lobbying group, and numerous other strategies for pursuing the conflict. In addition, they were prepared to move forward in the midst of conflict. Anticipating any possibility of delay, the governor appointed the Interim Certification Commission and established that group's task of developing an evaluation instrument. The latter group was then able to move forward in the midst of conflict but with minimal influences from the conflict.

17. In such circumstances, the avoidance of conflict is replaced by an understanding that conflict will be useful and can lead to goal accomplishment. In making a decision to pursue specific goals, despite the fact that such pursuit may cause conflict, the governor rejected the premise of early conflict theorists who

regarded conflict as undesirable and a negative aspect of human interactions. Instead, Alexander and his team prepared for the conflict and demonstrated that through their techniques of managing the conflict, they were able to achieve a large degree of success in the outcome of the conflict. Concomitantly, the TEA's action in opposing the governor demonstrated the decision to pursue the association's goals and not merely to accept the governor's plans. TEA's success in the conflict was demonstrated by their achieving a 10 percent salary increase for all teachers, local administration of the evaluation process on the lower end of the career ladder, and protection of collective bargaining, protection of tenure, and job security for teachers.

18. A part of winning is maintaining workable relationships. Achieving the goal of upgrading the teaching profession, and at the same time alienating the teaching profession, would not have resulted in long-term success for the governor. One of his main objectives was then to attain his goals without crushing the opposition. Instead, the teachers' association became an important group with regard to communicating with teachers and fostering acceptance of the CERA. For that reason, it was essential that the outcome of the conflict be regarded as a win/win situation. Both sides were able to achieve some of their goals while still maintaining communication channels and working relationships which, while not loving, held the potential for cooperation on behalf of the education system.

19. An adequate agenda which can afford losses in compromise but still achieve gains on important goals is essential. The governor proposed a ten-point plan on January 23, 1983. He immediately indicated a willingness to compromise on most of his proposals but stated the three main goals on which he would not compromise. In the final outcome, as illustrated by Table 3, the governor had to lose on his proposal for state-paid teacher liability insurance. He also had to abandon his proposal for mandatory kindergarten and for a revision of the vocational curriculum. Despite the fact that he had to lose those areas in compromises and pursuits of other goals, he still had enough points on his agenda that he could afford to lose a few without suffering a total loss.

20. It is important to avoid such lengthy agenda that accomplishments overwhelm the opponents. Table 3 illustrates that the governor actually achieved considerable education reform, including several points which were not on his original agenda, thus illustrating that it is possible to accomplish some goals without having placed them on the original agenda. By utilizing that tactic, it did not make his "win" seem totally overwhelming. Since much of the win which TEA achieved was not in accomplishing new agenda but rather in not losing some of what they had at the time of the conflict, such as tenure and collective negotiations, it became important that the governor's successes not include his total agenda.

Table 3 illustrates the governor's original ten proposals, the portions of those which were enacted by the legislature, and the

Table 3. Governor/Legislature Outcomes

Area	Proposed by the Governor	Enacted by the Legislature
TEACHER TRAINING	No proposal	All new teachers pass the California Achievement Test. Colleges which have 30 percent or more of their students fail the test lose accreditation
BEGINNING TEACHERS	Receive a one year certificate after graduation from an accredited college	Teachers serve a one-year probationary period; the waiting period for tenure increased from three to four years
APPRENTICE TEACHERS	Complete three years with successful evaluations and a passing score on the National Teacher Examination	A fast track system allowing teachers to take the National Teacher Exam, the Basic Skills test, undergo classroom evaluation, or further study and receive an additional \$1,000 per year in pay
TEACHER CAREER LADDER	For four years experience, earn \$1,000 in extra incentive pay; for eight years experience, earn \$4,000 extra pay; for 12 years, earn \$7,000 extra pay; all based on good evaluations	A five step career ladder program based on years of service, evaluation of successful performance, and incentive pay ranging from \$1,000 to \$7,000 per year and with 10, 11, or 12 month contracts
PRINCIPAL AND SUPERVISOR CAREER LADDER	A four rung career ladder to earn up to \$7,000 in extra pay on a program similar to that proposed for teachers	A three rung career ladder program to earn up to \$7,000 in extra pay

Table 3 (Continued)

Area	Proposed by the Governor	Enacted by the Legislature
EVALUATION AND CERTIFICATION	Re-evaluation every five years for performance and subsequent pay supplements; evaluations conducted by regional certification commissions made up of peers, excluding teachers from the same school as those being evaluated; state could ask the local board to dismiss the teacher and withhold salary funds for teachers with negative evaluations	Five year certification for career level teachers, principals, and supervisors. Certification Commission responsible for all certification and evaluation
TEACHER AIDES, GRADES 1-3	No proposal	State provided funds to hire one aide for each three teachers in grades 1-3 in 1984-85; \$6.5 million will go to aides in 1984-85 and \$13 million in 1985-86; and \$20 million for additional aides in 1986-87
IN-SERVICE TRAINING	No proposal	A larger portion of in-service training focused on skills measured in evaluations; the days for in-service training reduced from ten to five
LENGTH OF SCHOOL YEAR	No proposal	School year increased from 175 days to 180 instructional days

Table 3 (Continued)

Area	Proposed by the Governor	Enacted by the Legislature
STATE CERTIFICATION COMMISSION	Thirteen members, including ten educators and three lay persons, appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature	Thirteen members, eleven educators, two lay persons, appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature
STATE SALARY INCREASES	Across-the-board increase of 7.5 percent	Across the board increase of 10 percent
CLASS SIZE	No proposal, opposition to reduction in size at present	No action except for additional aides
COMPUTERS	A computer for every 30 students in Grades 7 and 8	Appropriated \$9 million for computers, one for every 30 students in Grades 7 and 8
MATH AND SCIENCE TEACHERS	\$3.5 million for more math and science teachers	Appropriated \$3.5 million for math and science teachers, allocating 100 college scholarships to education majors who study math and science and promise to teach in Tennessee
DISCIPLINE AND BEHAVIOR	Create state-funded schools for disruptive students; pay teacher liability insurance	Creation of state-funded schools for disruptive students, appropriating \$1.2 million for the program

Table 3 (Continued)

Area	Proposed by the Governor	Enacted by the Legislature
CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AT UNIVERSITIES	Encourage teaching and re- search efforts at state universities	Creation of centers of excellence with a \$10 million appro- priation for the program
AUTONOMOUS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION	No proposal	Passage of the Governance Bill to establish an autonomous board with its own executive director
KINDERGARTEN	Mandatory kindergarten	Additional funding for kinder- garten programs
BASIC SKILLS	By 1990 every child should pass the basic skills competency test at the end of eighth grade	Additional funding for computer scoring of basic skills tests to aid teacher efficiency and increase teacher time
GIFTED STUDENTS	Special residential summer schools for gifted juniors and seniors	\$450,000 appropriated for special residential summers schools for the gifted
VOCATIONAL CURRICULUM	Redefine, tie to technical skills of the 1980's and provide more equipment	No action
TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION MANAGEMENT	Move the management of the tech- nical institutes and area voca- tional schools from the SDE to the State University and College System	Management for all technical and vocational schools moved to the State University and College System

Table 3 (Continued)

Area	Proposed by the Governor	Enacted by the Legislature
TEXTBOOKS	No proposal	Appropriations of \$2.4 million in recurring funds for textbooks and instructional supplies; an additional \$3.4 million for instructional supplies as a one-time appropriation; moved textbook commission under new state board

Sources: Governor Lamar Alexander, January 28, 1983; Nashville Banner, February 24, 1984.

additional areas of reform which were included in the CERA but not a part of the governor's original presentation on January 28, 1983.

21. The factors which influenced the outcome of the CERA conflict were numerous, complex, and effected by circumstances which existed at the time of the conflict. During the period of the conflict, the United States was experiencing an improving economy, an absence of major military conflict, and an increase in national pride. Those factors made it possible for education to become a focus of national attention. Further, an increased awareness of the need for improved quality in education was fostered by the release of numerous national studies and events. The nation was led by an extremely popular Republican president. All of those factors made a favorable environment for an education reform effort in Tennessee, also led by a very popular Republican. The development of the CERA conflict in Tennessee and the political climate in the nation held certain similarities in public attitudes, such as a high regard for leadership qualities and referent power and attention to political conservatism. There was a greater public response to leadership style and personal appeal than to issues. That situation in 1984 left the Tennessee Education Association with an outlook similar to that of the national Democratic Party. Time magazine made the following assessment of the Democrats which ironically indicates parallel caution for the TEA:

For the first time in generations, the G. O. P. (Republican Party) is viewed as the party of change. To arise from

the debacle of 1984, Democrats must regain that distinction. Most now seem to realize that pointing to past achievements, no matter how glorious, is not enough (November 19, 1984).

Recommendations for Further Research

There is a dearth of information about how conflict develops and is resolved during major changes in public policy. It is, therefore, recommended that future research be conducted in the following areas:

1. A study of the leadership roles during education reform conflict and how the use of leadership skills, strategy, effectiveness as a change agent, personal commitment, and motivation effect conflict resolution.
2. A parallel study of conflict in the development of education reform in the states of Florida, North Carolina, and Arkansas.
3. A study of the training and preparation of legislators after their election to the Tennessee General Assembly with special emphasis on an assessment of their interpersonal skills, conflict management skills, and knowledge of policy development.
4. A study of the Tennessee Education Association to determine any changes which may take place in the organization as a result of the CERA.
5. A study to determine what, if any, circumstances existing at the end of the CERA conflict resulted in future conflict.
6. A study of the behaviors of the governor, TEA, and the legislators during the 94th session of the General Assembly to

determine changes which may have occurred in their various goals, strategies, communications, power, and attitudes toward conflict.

7. A study of the role of education associations within other states and how such associations relate to policy changes.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

TENNESSEE NEWSPAPERS

Bristol <u>Herald-Courier</u>	Martin <u>Press</u>
Chattanooga <u>News-Free Press</u>	Maryville <u>Times</u>
Chattanooga <u>Times</u>	Memphis <u>Commercial Appeal</u>
Columbia <u>Daily Herald</u>	Memphis <u>Press-Scimitar</u>
Cookeville <u>Herald</u>	Millington <u>Star</u>
Greenville <u>Sun</u>	Morristown <u>Tribune</u>
Harriman <u>Record</u>	Nashville <u>Banner</u>
Jackson <u>Sun</u>	Oak Ridger
Jellico <u>Advocate-Sentinel</u>	Pulaski <u>Giles Free Press</u>
Johnson City <u>Press-Chronicle</u>	Smyrna <u>Courier</u>
Kingsport <u>Times-News</u>	Tennessee <u>Journal</u>
Knoxville <u>Journal</u>	<u>Tennessean</u>
Knoxville <u>News-Sentinel</u>	Trenton <u>Herald-Gazette</u>
Lebanon <u>World</u>	Tullahoma <u>News</u>
Manchester <u>Standard</u>	

MAJOR PARTICIPANTS INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY
IDENTIFIED FROM THE PRINTED DATA

1. Lamar Alexander, Governor of the State of Tennessee
2. Betty Anderson, Legislative Liaison, Tennessee Education Association
3. Steve Bivens, Representative
4. Tom Cannon, President-Elect of the Tennessee Education Association
5. Cavit Cheshier, Executive Secretary, Tennessee Education Association
6. Dr. Steve Cobb, Representative
7. James Elkins, Senator
8. Dr. Robert McElrath, Commissioner of Education
9. Ned Ray McWherter, Speaker of the House of Representatives
10. Anna Belle Clement O'Brien, Senator
11. Marjorie Pike, President, Tennessee Education Association
12. Dr. Susan Rosenholtz, Consultant; Professor, Vanderbilt University
13. John Rucker, Senator
14. Paul Starnes, Representative
15. John Wilder, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Tennessee
16. Bill Willis, Chairman of the Interim Certification Commission

MAJOR PARTICIPANTS INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY
SUGGESTED BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS

1. Bracy Campbell, Administrative Aide to the Governor
2. Charles Carrick, Assistant to the Commissioner of Education
3. Dr. Chester Finn, Professor, Vanderbilt University
4. Dr. Russell French, Executive Director, Interim Commission
5. Dr. Carol Furtwengler, Assistant Commissioner of Education
6. Keel Hunt, Administrative Aide to the Governor
7. Dr. Lewis Lavine, Administrative Aide to the Governor
8. Billy Stair, Executive Director, Select Committee on Education

APPENDIX B

CRITICAL INCIDENTS

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION REFORM ACT, 1984

1. TENNESSEE COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION STUDY, DECEMBER 1982
2. GOVERNOR ALEXANDER'S SPEECH, JANUARY 28, 1983
3. GOVERNOR'S PRESENTING BETTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM TO PUBLIC
4. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERIM CERTIFICATION COMMISSION
5. EDUCATION COMMITTEE'S DECISION TO STUDY PROPOSALS AND
ESTABLISH SELECT COMMITTEE, APRIL 15, 1983
6. SELECT COMMITTEE DECISION OF NOVEMBER 23, 1983
7. GOVERNOR'S DECISION TO CALL SPECIAL SESSION
8. LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISES, E.G. WEAKLEY COUNTY AMENDMENT
9. TEA DECISION TO ENDORSE LEGISLATION
10. PASSAGE OF THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM ACT
11. PASSAGE OF TAXES AND FUNDING

OTHERS _____

APPENDIX C

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
KNOXVILLE 37916
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
AND SUPERVISION

Dear

While much has been written about the Better Schools program in the newspapers and elsewhere, there is no analysis of the critical incidents, decisions, and major participants in comprehensive educational reform during the past year in Tennessee.

As a doctoral student at The University of Tennessee, I am attempting to analyze the conflicts which surrounded the major issues in comprehensive educational reform in 1984. Your participation in my dissertation study will be most valuable in helping to understand the events and strategies used by participants with regard to the recently passed legislation. I am most eager to obtain your thoughts and perceptions through a short interview.

If you are willing to participate in the research, I shall contact your office to arrange an interview during the next few days.

Most sincerely,

Zelma Lansford
Doctoral Student

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW GUIDE

I. Introduction

A. Introduction of research

As a doctoral student at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, I am trying to develop a systematic record of the critical incidents associated with the Comprehensive Education Reform Act of 1984. I need your perspective to understand how these critical incidents and the people who were involved in them effected the development and passage of this educational reform.

B. Use of interview information and confidentiality

I would like your permission to tape record the interview to insure that I get everything accurate. If, however, there are things which you would like to tell me, which you think would be helpful to my study but which you do not wish to be recorded, just indicate this and I shall turn off the recorder. Of course, everything which you tell me in confidence will be kept in confidence. I will not quote you in my study without prior approval. Rather, I shall use the information you provide to help describe the incidents and the strategies used by the participants to achieve their goals and objectives.

II. Interview questions

- A. From newspaper articles, I have identified those incidents (give copy of list) which appear to have been critical in the development of the recently enacted educational reform legislation. Of the incidents listed, could you identify the ones which you view as being particularly important, (and the ones with which you were most involved)? If there were other important incidents which effected the development of the educational reform legislation, please identify them.

- B. In what ways did _____ (critical incident) effect the development of educational reform legislation in Tennessee?

What were the goals of:

- a. TEA
- b. The governor
- c. SDE
- d. Legislators
- e. Your goals
- f. Others?

What strategies, if any, were used by:

- a. TEA
- b. The governor
- c. SDE
- d. Legislators
- e. You
- f. Others?

What happened as a result of the strategies used by

- a. TEA
- b. The governor
- c. SDE
- d. Legislators
- e. You
- f. Others?

- C. Repeat sequence for each critical incident mentioned.

III. Wrap-Up

- A. Is there anything else which you can tell me which you think will help me to better understand what happened during these incidents?
- B. Are there people, other than those frequently mentioned in the newspapers, who should be interviewed?

V. Summarization

- A. Signature on consent form
- B. Feedback on study
- C. Appreciation for participation

CONSENT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY

The following protection measure will be provided for all participants in the study of conflict in comprehensive educational reform in Tennessee conducted by Zelma Lansford.

- A list of participants will be included in the study.
- Information obtained from the participants will be treated accurately.
- Confidentiality is assured with regard to any information which the participants want to communicate but with which they do not wish to be identified.
- Upon completion of the study, the tape recordings will be erased.
- Participants may receive a copy of the completed study.

I HAVE READ THE ABOVE EXPLANATION OF THE PROTECTION MEASURES AND
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY.

Signature _____ Date _____

PARTICIPANT _____	CRITICAL INCIDENT _____		TEA	LEGISLATORS	YOU
C.A. CATEGORY	GOVERNOR AND SDE				
CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERS					
CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIZATIONS					
COMMUNICATIONS					
GOALS					
ECONOMICS					
POWER					
COMPROMISES					
STRATEGIES					

NOTE: This form has been reduced (originally 11" x 14") xerographically to conform to dissertation requirements.

VITA

Zelma Lansford was born on June 6, 1941 in Catoosa County, Georgia. She attended Boynton and Fort Oglethorpe Elementary Schools and was graduated from Chattanooga Central High School in 1959. She received a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Theory and History of Music from the University of Chattanooga in June 1964. The following September, she accepted a position with the Hamilton County School System where she taught choral music at Ooltewah High School for two years.

In 1971, she accepted a position as director of early childhood education at Saint Nicholas School in Chattanooga. During her nine years at Saint Nicholas, she organized and developed a program in elementary education for the gifted which was accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. After leaving that school in 1980, she became administrator of the Hickory Valley School where she developed an individualized program for able students.

In 1978 she received a Master of Education in special education for the gifted from The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. In 1980, she entered the Graduate School of The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, where she received a Doctor of Education degree in December 1984. Her major was Administration and Supervision with collaterals in Counseling Psychology and Industrial Organization Psychology.