



To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by James W. Lantrip, Jr. entitled "A Study of the Atlantic Union Movement, 1949-1960." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.


Douglas H. Carlisle
Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:


Vice Provost
and Dean of the Graduate School

A STUDY OF THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT, 1949-1960

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

James W. Lantrip, Jr.

August 1985

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ABSTRACT

During the 1940's an atlantic union movement developed within the United States. This movement had as its primary goal the establishment of a supranational political union of western democratic nations. This movement, including its constituent organizations, the Atlantic Union Committee, and Federal Union, Incorporated, is the subject of this study.

Much of this study is concerned with examining the efforts of the Atlantic Union Committee to secure congressional passage of legislation authorizing American participation in an international conference composed of delegates from democratic nations. The proposed conference would then explore means of realizing a supranational political union. The atlantic union movement was not successful in achieving this goal. Yet the movement's efforts were not completely in vain. Congress in 1960 did authorize American participation in a less ambitious undertaking, a citizens conference on north atlantic unity. This study finds that the atlantic union movement had a significant impact upon the legislative struggle involving this particular issue.

The study concludes by evaluating the appropriateness of the strategy and techniques utilized by the Atlantic Union Committee in pursuit of its goals.

Basically, the study finds that the strategy utilized by the Atlantic Union Committee after 1958 was appropriate to the realization of its goals. On the other hand, the study finds that the strategy pursued prior to that time was less appropriate to the realization of the Committee's objectives.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
I. BEGINNINGS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT	7
II. LEADERSHIP PATTERNS AND THE FINANCIAL BASES OF THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT, 1941-1948	41
III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL OPERATIONS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, 1949-60	66
IV. THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING EFFORTS DURING 1949 AND 1950	76
V. THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING ACTIVITIES DURING 1951 AND 1952	112
VI. THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S IMPACT UPON THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, 1953-1954	124
VII. THE ATLANTIC COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING ACTIVITIES DURING 1955-1956	138
VIII. PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT: THE ATLANTIC UNION STRATEGY	157
IX. THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AN ATLANTIC CITIZENS CONFERENCE	173
X. EPILOGUE	199
BIBLIOGRAPHY	204
APPENDICES	209
A. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE BY-LAWS	210
B. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE BOARD OF GOVERNORS	219
C. DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY	222
D. ATLANTIC CITIZENS CONVENTION JOINT RESOLUTION PUBLIC LAW 86-719	225
VITA	228

CHAPTER

PAGE

V.	THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING ACTIVITIES DURING 1951 AND 1952	112
	A. Tactical Considerations	
	B. Early 1951 Developments in the Administration	
	C. The Committee's Promotional Activities in 1951	
	D. The Impact of the Korean War	
VI.	THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S IMPACT UPON THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, 1953-1954	124
	A. The Election of Dwight Eisenhower as President	
	B. Conflicting Alternatives Facing the Atlantic Unionists	
	C. The February 1953 Meeting with President Eisenhower	
	D. The Decision to Postpone Reintroduction of the Resolution	
VII.	THE ATLANTIC COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING ACTIVITIES DURING 1955-1956	138
	A. The Decision to Support Reintroduction of the Resolution	
	B. Actual Revisions of the Resolution	
	C. The 1955 Senate Committee Hearings on Atlantic Union	
	D. Secretary of State Dulles' Attitude	
VIII.	PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT: THE ATLANTIC UNITY STRATEGY	157
	A. Development of the "Moderate" Faction	
	B. The Declaration of Atlantic Unity	
	C. The Proposal for an Atlantic Parliamentarians' Conference	
	D. The 1955 Parliamentarians' Conference and Its Consequences	
	E. The 1959 Atlantic Congress	
IX.	THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AN ATLANTIC CITIZENS CONFERENCE	173
	A. The Effect of the 1958 Congressional Elections	
	B. The Reintroduction of the Resolution into Congress	
	C. The Appointment of Christian Herter as Secretary of State	
	D. The Shift in the State Department's Position	
	E. Senate Hearings on the New Resolution	
	F. The Roles of Senators Fulbright and Johnson	
	G. Congressional Action on the Resolution	
	H. Conclusions	

CHAPTER	PAGE
X. EPILOGUE	199
A. Recommendations of the Citizens Conference	
B. Reactions of the Atlantic Union Supporters	
C. Impact of the Conference	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	204
APPENDICES	209
A. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE BY-LAWS	210
B. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE BOARD OF GOVERNORS	219
C. DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY	222
D. ATLANTIC CITIZENS CONVENTION JOINT RESOLUTION PUBLIC LAW 86-719	225
VITA	228

INTRODUCTION

In the United States during the 1930's and 1940's there was considerable interest in promoting peaceful relations among nations. The peace that was thought to have been achieved as a result of World War I had disappeared in the false prosperity and crushing depression of the 1920's and early 1930's, and the League of Nations which had been created to maintain peace had been abandoned by the United States and was proving more and more to be ineffective in settling disputes between states. There was a growing conviction that it was necessary to have a supranatural political institution that would supersede or even replace the existing nation-state as the locus of sovereignty. Several different groups appeared during these two decades that advocated the development of such an institution in one form or another.

World War II increased an interest in creating an international organization that would improve relations among people and settle disputes peacefully, something that was thought to be urgent especially with the development and use of the atomic bomb. In the latter part of the 1940's this concern polarized around two conflicting movements. The first of these was composed of groups that sought the creation of a world government or a world state and was known as the United World Federalists. This was the largest and most prominent organization within this movement. However, there were also other groups, such as World Republic, that were also

influential within the general world-government movement.

The atlantic union movement was the competing phenomenon confronting the world government proponents. In common with the first group, the atlantic union proponents also believed that the existing nation-state system was outmoded and should, in the interest of peace and security be replaced by allegiance to supranational political institutions. Yet in contrast to attempts to bring about a world government, atlantic unionists backed off from the notion of creating a world-state. Instead, the atlantic unionists sought the more modest goal of creating a federal union composed of western democracies.¹

The atlantic union movement is the subject of this study. First of all this movement contributed significantly to the development of greater political and military unity among the nations comprising the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Specifically, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the Atlantic Institute, as well as the European Economic Community owe their origin in part to proposals emanating from efforts to bring about union of the atlantic nations.

Secondly, the atlantic union movement, and its component elements, merits systematic study on account of the former's unusual characteristics. There are few, if any, recorded instances in

¹For a recent discussion of the aims of the Atlantic Union movement in the 1940s, see Freedom and Union 31 (Summer 1978): 1; also, see Leon N. Lindberg, and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), in passim.

American political history of an organized group advocating the creation of a supranational political union, having any positive impact upon policy-making. The interest groups comprising the atlantic union movement, on the other hand, although only partially successful in the realization of their political goals, at least had access to official Washington; members of Congress as well as the State Department bureaucracy took their cause seriously.² This situation of itself renders the atlantic union movement a relevant subject for political scientists to investigate. What accounts for it's relative lack of success in obtaining its objectives? What do the movement's successes and failures portend for the future when new groups, seeking goals and objectives similar to those advocated by these people, make demands upon the American policy process?

Statement of Purpose

This study is undertaken with several purposes in mind. First, it has the objective of learning more about how interest groups with so-called "ideological" goals can influence foreign policy-making process. As Bernard Cohen has pointed out, political scientists have generally not bothered to investigate how interest groups motivated by abstract principles, rather than economic or

²This conclusion is based upon the fact that high State department officials and members of Congress held numerous meetings with the Atlantic Union Committee's leadership, especially in 1950-51 and in 1959-60. This claim is dealt with more fully in Chapters IV, V, and IX.

ethnic considerations, influence the foreign policy-making process.³ Consequently, the conclusions of this study may provide insight into the dynamics of this process.

Another purpose of this study is to gain insight into the particular set of factors that interest groups seeking creation of new supranational political authority must contend. Specifically, how much of a drawback does advocacy of unconventional goals have upon an interest group's chances of successfully influencing foreign policy-makers in the American setting? Is such a group doomed to failure even before it initiates its lobbying?⁴

The third purpose of this study is to evaluate the atlantic unionists' performance in the policy-making arena. To what extent did the atlantic unionists utilize a course of action and tactics appropriate to their objectives? Presumably, in the future, groups with goals similar to those propounded by the atlantic unionists will develop and make demands upon the American foreign policy-making process. Therefore, the evaluation offered here may have a prescriptive aspect.

Research Plan

This study is concerned with the activities of the atlantic union movement during the period 1948 to 1960. It was during this

³Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy-Making (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), p. 15.

⁴See Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 274.

time that the atlantic unionists were actively intervening in the policy-making arena, lobbying the governmental elite.

Most of the attention will be focused upon examining the operations and activities of the Atlantic Union Committee, which was the political lobbying arm of the movement. However, the focus is not limited to the Atlantic Union Committee. Another organization, known as Federal Union, was closely associated with the Atlantic Union Committee. Some aspects of the Federal Union's activities are examined in this study because Federal Union--which in fact established the Atlantic Union Committee as its policial lobbying arm--also had an impact upon this process.

This study consists of ten chapters and a prologue. Chapters I and II examine the origins of the Atlantic Union concept. Also, these chapters examine the early history of Federal Union, with special focus upon uncovering the financial bases and leadership patterns of this organization during the period prior to 1948. An examination of these early activities is necessary in order to more fully comprehend what took place later. Chapter III examines the financial bases and organizational structure of the Atlantic Union Committee while Chapters IV, V, VI, VII, and IX focus attention upon the role of the atlantic union movement in the legislative struggles occurring over the proposed Atlantic Union resolutions. Chapter VIII examines the role of certain Atlantic Union Committee members who, acting as individuals rather than as agents of the Atlantic Union Committee, set in motion forces conducive to the

development of supranational political institutions. Chapter X is devoted to analysis of the data previously presented.

CHAPTER I

BEGINNINGS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT

This chapter will examine the beginnings of the atlantic union movement.¹ This movement, as is well known, developed directly from the ideas proposed in Clarence K. Streit's book, Union Now. In fact, the book itself served as a vehicle for introducing Clarence Streit's ideas to a wide, popular audience.

Before going further, it is important to understand the concepts expressed in Union Now. Streit's principal thesis can be briefly summarized. He contended that the existing international system, based upon the existence of independent states, was obsolete and inherently unstable. This system, he believed, bred wars and economic misery. His solution, in the long run, called for replacing the existing system with a global federal state.²

In the short run, though, Streit conceded that a global world state could not be established. Instead, for the immediate future, he proposed that the democratic nations of the world join together and form a supranational political union. By "democracies," Streit meant the fifteen or so nations scattered throughout the world that

¹The reader is advised that the terms "atlantic union" and "union now" will be used interchangeably in this study to refer to the same phenomenon.

²Clarence K. Streit, Union Now (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), pp. 46-69.

had long traditions of democratic self-government and respect for the rights of individuals.³

The proposed union would be a federal system with power divided between a central government and local units (i.e., the former nation-states). Specifically, Streit suggested five areas in which the proposed central government would have exclusive authority: (1) The right to grant citizenship; (2) The right to make peace and war; (3) The right to regulate interstate and foreign trade; (4) The right to coin and issue money and establish measurements; (5) The right to govern communications, including the right to operate the postal service and regulate other forms of interstate communications. There would be a Bill of Rights in the proposed supranational charter to guarantee the protection of individual liberties.⁴

Such a political union, according to Streit, would have no difficulty in maintaining peace or in preventing aggression due to the Union's overwhelming military and economic power. None of the would-be aggressor nations of the day, including Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, would dare to take on such a formidable foe as represented by the proposed union. However, if the totalitarian powers misjudged the situation and attacked the union, then the latter would quickly defeat the former.⁵ Consequently, Union Now offered

³Ibid., pp. 46-69.

⁴Ibid., p. 87.

⁵Washington Post, 24 February 1982, p. B1.

the western democracies a means of preserving the peace without resort to appeasement.

As subsequent sections of this study will show, Clarence K. Streit was more than a creative writer; he was above all else a fervent crusader. He strongly believed that his proposals offered the only realistic hope of preventing future wars. In 1939, with European war imminent, there seemed to be little time remaining in which to implement the proposal. Before that could occur though the proposal needed to be publicized and quickly if a favorable grassroots movement was to develop.

Streit completed work on Union Now in August, 1938. The Munich crisis was unfolding at that time, and Streit was anxious that his book be published immediately so that the public in western democracies could be offered an alternative to the policies taking shape. In fact, Streit later commented that he felt in 1938-39 he was "running a race against time."⁶

However, the first three publishers rejected the manuscript. After receiving a third rejection, Streit set a mental deadline for obtaining a publisher for his manuscript. The deadline was for September 15, 1938. Streit resolved that one way or the other he was going to obtain a publisher by that date; he decided to publish the book privately if no publisher accept the manuscript by then.⁷

⁶Freedom and Union 13 (March 1959): 11-13.

⁷Ibid.

Fortunately, at about this time Harper and Brothers agreed to publish it with the title Union Now. The book went on sale in February, 1939. Simultaneously, a British edition was published in London by Jonathon Cape.

The book sold fairly well. By 1941, over 50,000 copies had been sold in the United States.⁸ Of course, the deepening international crisis of the time probably served to increase public interest in this subject. In addition, the book received considerable attention in the press, a factor that must have increased sales.⁹

Union Now even received the attention of the New York Times Review of Books. On February 19, 1939, James Truslow Adams wrote a review of the book for the Times. Overall, Adams' review was favorable. He commended Streit for proposing a route to world order, and promptly without resort to war. However, Adams did express doubts about the willingness of the existing nation-states to cede their sovereignty to the proposed union. Nevertheless, Adams prophetically remarked:

Some day, in the kind of world we live in, with space annihilated and interdependence between nations complete, something like what Mr. Streit suggests will have to pass either now, or after we and our children's children shall be washed anew through flowing rivers of blood into the valley of the shadow of Death.¹⁰

⁸Freedom and Union 13 (September 1959): 4, 5.

⁹Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁰New York Times, 19 February 1939, sec. 6, p. 1.

During the spring and summer of 1939, the union now concept reached an even wider audience when two popular magazines, Fortune and Readers Digest, ran articles on this subject. In general, the articles were favorable to the proposal. The union now proposal received even greater publicity when Life magazine carried an article on union now in its October 23, 1939 issue. In a short, three page report, Life introduced the union now concept to its large audience. Life presented the proposal in a fairly straightforward manner avoiding the temptation to sensationalize the subject. The article depicted the worsening international situation and the expansion of Fascism as offering the rationale for advancing this concept.¹¹

Life utilized linear graphs to depict some of Streit's more cogent arguments for union (i.e., the overwhelming superiority of the western democracies in military and economic strength as compared to the Axis powers). It offered no editorial comment on the subject nor did the magazine venture a prediction on the likelihood of the proposal's being implemented. Overall, the general tone of the article was not unfavorable to the cause of supranational political union. Obviously, the publicity value of reaching a mass audience through a publication such as Life was bound to be favorable to the prospects of this proposal.

The idea of forming a federal union of democracies was publicized in other ways as well. Again, the chief promoter of

¹¹"Talk of Peace Raises the Issue of a New World Order," Life 23 October 1939, pp. 31, 34.

this concept during the early period was Clarence K. Streit. He was certainly a tireless and energetic worker on behalf of this cause. In the spring of 1939 he was twice featured on national network radio programs; in June, 1939, Streit toured midwestern colleges, lecturing at each college on the prospects of union now;¹² in the autumn of 1939, Streit swung into New England, giving addresses at such prestigious institutions as Yale, Radcliffe, and Wellesley.¹³ These are only a few of his activities.

Besides his lecturing engagements, Streit also found other ways of establishing contacts with the general public. His "post card system" was one of the most effective of such methods. Streit reasoned that the readers of his book were potential supporters of the federal union idea. Consequently, he devised a method for establishing contact with the readers. Each copy of Union Now contained a stamped, self-addressed post card addressed to Clarence Streit in care of the publisher. The post card offered to send the reader additional information on how he could help promote the ideas expressed in the book. The post card contained a checklist of responses and the interested reader was invited to indicate those activities in which he or she wanted to participate. Among the checklist of responses were such activities as contacting governmental officials and volunteering to sponsor a study group.¹⁴

¹²Ibid.

¹³Freedom and Union 13 (July-August 1959): 21.

¹⁴Ibid.

As a result of these activities, as well as the publicity surrounding Union Now's appearance groups advocating Streit's proposals almost immediately were organized in New York City, Washington, and Philadelphia.¹⁵ In July, 1939, representatives of these groups met in New York in order to establish a nationwide organization to promote American entry into a supranational political union. This convention was a small affair; only twenty-five delegates were in attendance. The three sponsoring chapters were mainly composed of persons who had either personally expressed their interest in supranational union to Streit, or who had responded to the aforementioned "post card system." After making the initial contact with Streit, each of these individuals was directed to an address in his respective locality where a group interested in Streit's proposals was forming.¹⁶

At the organizing convention, steps were taken to incorporate the movement as a nonprofit organization with "educational and scientific purposes." In essence, its purpose was to lobby for implementation of his proposals. Inter-Democracy Federal Union was the name originally chosen for the new organization. However, many felt that the title was unwieldy so in 1941 the name was formally changed to Federal Union, Incorporated.¹⁷ As a nonprofit educational lobbying group, the new organization could qualify as a tax deduction for those wishing to make financial contributions.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Freedom and Union 10 (May 1956): 16-19.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 19.

This organizing convention elected officers to serve provisionally until a duly elected national convention could be held at a future date. Clarence K. Streit was elected chairman of Federal Union; R. Frazier Potts, a New York accountant, was named business manager, and William Blake of New York was named as correspondence secretary. Having two residents of New York City as national officers of Federal Union had definite practical advantages since it had been decided that a national headquarters would be maintained in New York City. Consequently, the New Yorkers would be in a position to deal with the organization's business as it developed.¹⁸ Besides Streit, Blake, and Potts, nine other individuals were elected to membership on a temporary executive steering committee. These individuals were instructed to plan for and assume responsibility for the holding of a national convention in the near future at which time the organization would be formally constituted. The organizing convention also authorized the temporary steering committee to designate ten additional persons to serve as at-large delegates to the upcoming national convention.¹⁹

By the summer of 1939, a number of influential individuals were members of Inter-Democracy Federal Union as it was then still called. Among them: Roger Baldwin, director of the American Civil Liberties Union; Roger Cowles, publisher of the Des Moines Register

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Freedom and Union 13 (July-August 1939): 11.

and Look magazine; Henry H. Harriman, former president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, Felix Morley, editor of the Washington Post; Mary Wooley, president of Mount Holyoke College, and Dr. Frank Aydellote, president of Swathmore College.²⁰

Several of these individuals occasionally joined Streit in his barnstorming tours. Mostly though, Streit toured the country alone and at his own expense. Streit had taken a leave of absence from his job as a reporter with The New York Times in early 1939 in order to be able to devote all of his time to the union now cause.²¹ He managed to introduce the federal union idea to large segments of the "influential public" in the months ahead. To cite two such examples, Streit appeared before the Foreign Policy Association's convention in April, and the American Security Dealers Association's convention a few weeks later.²²

A number of other prominent public figures showed an interest in the union now proposal about this time. Among them: Dorothy Thompson, Somerset Maugham, Max Eastman, and Eleanor Roosevelt.²³ After reading a review of Union Now in The New York Times, Mrs. Roosevelt contacted Streit and invited him to be the President's

²⁰Freedom and Union 14 (November 1959): 7, 9.

²¹See unsigned memorandum, "Mortal Assets of Atlantic Union," Atlantic Union Committee, January, 1964, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6, University of Tennessee Special Collections, Library, Knoxville, pp. 1, 2.

²²Freedom and Union 11 (November 1956): 7, 9.

²³New York Times 16 December 1941, p. 18.

guest at a small White House dinner.²⁴ At this dinner, Streit got the opportunity to explain his proposal to President Roosevelt. Years later, Streit recalled this particular meeting and remembered Roosevelt as expressing sympathy for the idea, calling it the most promising proposal for halting Hitler without simultaneously involving the United States in the war.²⁵

In the long run, Streit's contact with President Roosevelt did not produce any tangible benefits for the atlantic union scheme. However, at the same time that the above incident took place (February, 1940), the new Federal Union organization was seemingly making general progress towards its goal of building a national following. The slated national organizing convention for Inter-Democracy Federal Union was held in late 1939 in New York City.²⁶ Over 40 delegates were in attendance. There was basically a continuity of leadership with the earlier aforementioned convention. The trio of Streit, Blake and Potts continued as the executive officers.

In this early period, the most notable feature of the new organization was its rapid growth. Business Manager R. Frazier Potts reported that as of November 1, 1939, there were now local chapters in eighteen different states. It is interesting to note that many of the chapters were college-based campus organizations.

²⁴Washington Post 24 February 1982, p. B1.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Freedom and Union 14 (November 1959): 14-18.

Specifically, chapters had been established at Oberlin College, the University of California (Berkeley), and at Yale.²⁷

During 1940, the Federal Union organization continued to grow. Primarily, the growth was due to the continued personal efforts of Clarence K. Streit. He continued touring the nation, his pace never slackening. Some of the places included in Streit's 1940 itinerary were: on January 19, he addressed the General Federation of Women's Clubs in New York City; on March 24, he spoke before the League of Nations Association's meeting in New York City, and on April 17, Streit addressed the Women's Permanent Peace Commission in New Haven, Connecticut.²⁸

As 1940 wore on, Streit revised his union now proposals somewhat. By that time, it was obvious that Europe had settled into a general war between the Allies and the Axis. Streit could not claim that his proposals would prevent a war that was already here. Nevertheless, he still claimed that the immediate realization of a political supranational union between the remaining western democracies would have positive results for them. Streit argued that this step would force Hitler to make an immediate peace since the Axis would then be confronted with the overwhelming military power possessed by the democracies.²⁹

²⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

²⁸ New York Times 17 April 1940, p. 6.

²⁹ Freedom and Union 14 (November 1959): 15.

However, with the fall of France in June, 1940, Streit shelved his proposal for supranational union and instead substituted the idea of an immediate union between the United States and the British Empire.³⁰ After all, with most of the western European democracies now occupied by Nazi Germany, the original proposal could not now be realized. However, the new proposal, though less sweeping in its ramifications, could at least offer some immediate practical value.

The Federal Union organization itself made a public appeal for union along these lines immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In December, 1941, the Federal Union inserted a full-page advertisement in The New York Times. This ad called upon citizens to petition the President to put such a union into effect immediately as an emergency war measure.³¹ The advertisement suggested that the same union could be extended to other democracies as they were liberated from Fascism. A coupon was inserted at the bottom of the page providing the Federal Union's address for those interested in obtaining more information about this idea.³² Interestingly, two sets of names appeared as sponsoring the advertisement. First, the six officers of Federal Union. Secondly, the names of John Foster Dulles, Grenville Clark, Gardner Cowles, Jr., Russell

³⁰For an extended discussion of this proposal, see Clarence K. Streit, Union Now With Britain (London: Jonathon Cape, 1941), pp. 32-36.

³¹New York Times 18 December 1941, p. 8.

³²Ibid.

Davenport, Harold L. Ickes, Owen J. Roberts, Harry G. Scherman endorsed the message; some of the individuals in the second group, such as John Foster Dulles, were not members of Federal Union.

Federal Union, Inc. held annual conventions throughout the war years. Basically, the leadership of the organization remained intact during this time with only some minor changes. Clarence K. Streit, who had originally been termed "chairman" by 1941 was listed as "president." Besides Streit, national officers included Claude Ellis as vice-president. Ellis was a former congressman from Arkansas and was currently serving as director of the Rural Electrical Agency.³³ Jon Howard Ford, a prominent Washington, D.C. manufacturer, was elected treasurer.³⁴

The union now movement during the war years gained a number of adherents, some of whom were public figures. Justice Owen J. Roberts and Percival F. Brundage are two such figures; both of these men were to wield important influence within the organization. Owen J. Roberts first contacted Streit in early 1942. Roberts had just finished reading Union Now. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, a supporter of the union now movement and a friend of Streit's, urged Roberts to contact Streit. Roberts endorsed the union idea publicly in April, 1943 at a time when the organization

³³New York Times 14 November 1943, p. 16.

³⁴Freedom and Union 2 (April 1948): 4.

was experiencing internal dissension over future goals, something that will be discussed later.³⁵

In addition, Roberts began making financial contributions to the Federal Union. The organization was hard-pressed financially during the war years, so they were pleased to receive another source of financial support.³⁶ However, Roberts did place one condition upon his financial contribution. He told Streit that his support should only be construed as that of a private citizen; in other words, Roberts was not endorsing Federal Union in his official capacity as a Supreme Court Justice.³⁷ He was unwilling to take advantage of his official position even for a good cause. Roberts' support for the movement proved to be very valuable. Certainly, his tireless lobbying on behalf of Federal Union in the period 1945-1948 had its positive effects. For one thing, he was acquainted with practically every high governmental official. Consequently, he was able to lay the Federal Union's objectives before such people as General George C. Marshall and Averill Harriman.³⁸ In addition, as we will later see, Roberts' financial contributions were a critically important factor.

³⁵Freedom and Union 13 (May 1959): 17-21.

³⁶Ibid., p. 19.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Freedom and Union 14 (November 1959): 13, 14.

Percival F. Brundage was another influential person who became affiliated with the union now cause shortly after its appearance. Soon afterward, Brundage became an "insider" in the organization and was for many years its treasurer. Like Justice Roberts, Brundage was also an important force in marshalling support for the union now cause among the "attentive public." Brundage was for many years a senior partner in the New York law firm of Price, Waterhouse, and Company. In the 1950's, Brundage served as Director of the Bureau of the Budget during the Eisenhower administration.³⁹

According to Clarence Streit, Percival Brundage was one of the co-founders of the New York City chapter of Federal Union. Brundage was elected to the national executive committee in 1942, and one year later at the national convention he was elected national corresponding secretary.⁴⁰ During the early postwar period Brundage was very important to the Federal Union as a person who could lobby for the cause within the business community. Interestingly, Brundage recruited a number of important businessmen to the Federal Union. Will T. Clayton, a cotton broker and one-time Assistant Secretary of State, and publisher Russell Davenport were two such individuals. Clayton and Davenport in turn became important proponents of the union now cause.⁴¹

³⁹Freedom and Union 10 (May 1956): 27.

⁴⁰New York Times 14 November 1943, p. 8.

⁴¹Freedom and Union 10 (May 1956): 28.

The Federal Union stepped up its activities at the close of the Second World War. It appeared to most observers that the United States was finally repudiating its traditional isolationism; there was bipartisan support for American participation in a multinational peacekeeping organization, the United Nations. At the same time however, there were differences of opinion as to the specifics of future American foreign policy. A significant body of informed opinion felt that American interests could be satisfactorily served through American participation in the United Nations organization. The viewpoint presupposed that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union would be able to work in concert to maintain the peace.⁴²

Most of the Federal Union leadership did not accept this viewpoint. Certainly Clarence Streit and Owen J. Roberts did not adhere to this view. A few months after the war's end, former Justice Roberts addressed the delegates to the annual Federal Union convention. He expressed the view that the United Nations offered no solution to the perennial problems of war and international economic instability.⁴³ The United Nations organization, Roberts declared, could not address these problems because the United Nations allowed the obsolete and dangerous nation-state system to continue. Roberts warned the delegates that the United Nations could never be an

⁴²See Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 7th Ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), pp. 767-770.

⁴³New York Times 18 November 1945, p. 27.

effective institution for preserving peace until it obtained direct authority over individual citizens in the member-countries. Without such authority, the United Nations would have to depend upon the willingness of the member-states to enforce its decisions. Roberts advised that this was a grave shortcoming and would prevent the United Nations from achieving its most important objectives--maintaining peace and preventing aggression--even if the Big Four powers were in agreement on goals.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, despite these misgivings the Federal Union organization's leadership supported American participation in the United Nations as a temporary expedient. For the reasons just noted, there was little expectation that the United Nations would have much influence over important political issues. Eventually, Streit and Roberts hoped that the United Nations organization could be transformed into a global federal union. Until that happened, they advocated the establishment of a political union of western democracies as offering the most promising approach compatible with the objectives found in Union Now.⁴⁵

Eventually, Streit and Roberts conceded that the contemplated atlantic union would be replaced by the global union. In the short-run though they felt it was unwise for the democratic nations to even consider union with the Soviet bloc. East and West were just

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Freedom and Union 1 (October 1946): 6, 7.

too dissimilar in their goals, values, and political traditions. In addition, by 1946 the Federal Union organization's leadership viewed the Soviet Union as an expansionist power, constituting a security menace to the western democratic nations. However, should the United States and Canada join the western European democracies in forming a political union, the resulting union would possess overwhelming economic and military power.⁴⁶ Therefore, the mere existence of the proposed union would serve to deter Soviet aggression. Moreover, Streit argued that the economic advantages of membership in this union would be so obvious that soon the Soviet Union would be willing to make changes in its political system in order to qualify for membership in the union.⁴⁷

Streit and the Federal Union's leadership insisted that the United Nations organization had nothing to fear from the creation of an atlantic union. The latter would in no way conflict with the aims and purposes of the larger organization. Besides, the United Nations Charter itself authorized the establishment of regional arrangements. Atlantic union, the Federal Union leadership claimed, fell into this classification.⁴⁸ Once the proposed union was established, Streit suggested that it could be admitted into the United Nations as a single member.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Freedom and Union 2 (January 1948): 13-15.

In the immediate postwar era a number of other groups appeared that championed in one form or another supranational political institutions. The European Union of Federalists and the United Europe Movement were two such groups that appeared in Europe about 1947. The European Union of Federalists advocated the immediate establishment of a European political union along federalist lines. Initially, the proposed union would consist of western European democracies; however, proponents of this plan hoped to extend the union to include eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as soon as East-West tensions abated.⁴⁹ This group was headed by Dr. H. Brugmans, a Dutch legislator. The United Europe Movement on the other hand was headed by Duncan Sandys, the son-in-law of Winston Churchill. The United Europe Movement's objectives were more modest than those of the European Union of Federalists. For example, the United Europe Movement merely advocated an association or confederation of European powers for economic and military matters. The authority of the contemplated union would be narrow in scope and certainly the European Union Movement did not envision replacing the existing nation-state system in the foreseeable future.⁵⁰ Eventually, many of the proposals put forth by the European Union Movement would be incorporated into the Council of Europe when that organization appeared a few years later.

⁴⁹See unsigned memorandum, "Current European Developments," Atlantic Union Committee, November, 1949; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, pp. 1, 2.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 2.

In the United States, there were also a number of groups aside from the Federal Union organization that were advocating some form of supranational political union. Most of these groups favored establishing some sort of supranational political authority worldwide in scope. Of course there were also some important differences in the specific goals of the respective groups.

On the one hand, there were organizations advocating the establishment of a world government with relatively limited scope. Proponents of this position among the "world government movement" came to be called "Minimalists."⁵¹ The Minimalists contended that it was utopian at the present time to work for the creation of a world government vested with comprehensive powers. Instead, they urged supporters of the world government concept to work for a more modest and (they argued) more realistic objective of establishing a global political authority with limited powers. In fact, the Minimalists claimed that this was the only proposal having any likelihood of being adopted. The creation of a world government with authority limited to maintenance of international peace and prevention of military aggression, the Minimalists argued, was the most critical issue facing the present age. The Minimalists claimed that once the proposed world government was established it could gradually be extended in its scope.⁵²

⁵¹New York Times 22 February 1947, p. 7.

⁵²Ibid.

The leadership of the United World Federalists reflected the Minimalist position. The United World Federalists was led by a young World War II veteran named Cord Meyer, Jr. Meyer and the United World Federalists leadership adopted a flexible attitude toward tactics. This group generally preferred working toward the goal of transforming the existing United Nations structure into world federal government. The United World Federalists in fact called for the convening of a world "constitutiunal assembly" to be held under the United Nations sponsorship to draft a constitution for world government.⁵³ The United World Federalists counted among its supporters Justice William Douglas, William T. Holiday, president of Standard Oil of Ohio, and atomic scientist Harold C. Urey.⁵⁴ Also, Assistant Secretary of State Will T. Clayton who later became active in the atlantic union movement was for several years a supporter of the United World Federalists.⁵⁵

In contrast to the Minimalists, the Maximalists represented the other major approach to the development of world government. An organization known as World Republic was the strongest group among the Maximalists. World Republic members argued that "half-way

⁵³U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on the Structure of the United Nations and the Relationship of the United States to the United Nations, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 326-365 (1948); hereafter cited as 1948 Committee Hearings.

⁵⁴"World Government," Life 21 June 1948, p. 49.

⁵⁵Freedom and Union 3 (April 1949): 11-12.

measures" such as those proposals advocated by the United World Federalists could not possibly prevent World War III. In place of the gradualists plans offered by the Minimalists, the World Republic organization advocated the immediate convening of an "international peoples convention." This contemplated convention would be expected to formulate a constitution for a world government. The new world government would then be granted sweeping authority over all areas of life.⁵⁶

As previously mentioned, the Maximalists were skeptical of the possibilities for working through the existing United Nations organization to reach their goal of a world state. Robert M. Hutchins, chancellor of the University of Chicago, was the leader of this group. College students and faculty members comprised a large portion of this group's leadership. Outsiders described the World Republic members as "fervent." It was reported that a number of undergraduate student members were voluntarily taking a leave of absence from their studies in order to work as full-time volunteers. Obviously, the group had no shortage of enthusiasm.⁵⁷

Public interest in supranational political institutions seemed to increase during the year 1948. Undoubtedly, the increase of interest in this subject was due to several factors. The publicity generated as a result of Congressional Hearings on the subject of United Nations Charter Revision was one important factor accounting

⁵⁶"World Government," Life, p. 53.

⁵⁷Ibid.

for the increase in public interest. During the spring of 1948 the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs considered several proposals which in one form or another called for strengthening the political power of the United Nations to the point where the latter would possess at least some attributes of supranational authority.

A measure sponsored by Congressman Walter H. Judd in the House of Representatives reflected ideas advocated by Ely Culbertson. Known unofficially as the Culbertson bill, Sen. Res. 163 would instruct the United States government to work for revision of the United Nations Charter. Specifically, the resolution called for strengthening the military and political powers of the United Nations Security Council. This bill also proposed abolishing the veto power of the Security Council's permanent members and instead permitting the Council to sanction military actions by majority vote of the Council membership.⁵⁸ Given the political complexion of the United Nations in 1948, adoption of the Culbertson plan by that body would have transformed the United Nations into an instrument for realizing the foreign policy objectives of the pro-western majority.

There was considerable public interest in the Culbertson proposal in early 1948. However, congressional support for the bill declined after Secretary of State George Marshall publicly expressed opposition to it.⁵⁹

⁵⁸1948 Committee Hearings, pp. 341-346.

⁵⁹"World Government," Life, p. 54.

Another proposal on this subject studied by the Foreign Affairs Committee at this time was House Joint Resolution 59. Interestingly, this bill was also sponsored by Representative Judd. This bill stated:

That it is the sense of Congress that the President should immediately take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Nations pursuant to Article 109 for the purpose of making the United Nations capable of interpreting and enforcing world law to prevent war.⁶⁰

House Joint Resolution 59 had the active support of the United World Federalists. A number of prominent public figures such as Supreme Court Justice William Douglas and Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton endorsed the proposal. Furthermore, in the spring of 1948 the legislatures of seventeen different states passed resolutions calling upon Congress to take measures seeking the strengthening of the United Nations' power.⁶¹

At the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings, a number of different people spoke in favor of House Joint Resolution 59. Among them was Cord Meyer, Jr., the president of the United World Federalists. Meyer expressed his belief that it was time to take steps toward giving the United Nations real power to keep the peace under "binding and enforceable world law."⁶² According to Meyer, this goal could be accomplished through revision of the United Nations

⁶⁰1948 Hearings, p. 348.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²"World Government," Life, p. 353.

Charter. Other speakers such as William T. Holiday, a United World Federalists Official, and Samuel R. Leving chairman of the Five-Year Meeting of Friends amplified and reiterated Meyer's remarks.⁶³

A number of congressmen, such as California Representative Chet Holifield and Robert Hale of Maine also appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee to express support for House Joint Resolution 59. However, it soon became evident that there were powerful forces that were opposed to this resolution. In their testimony before the Committee, both Secretary of State George C. Marshall and Ambassador to the United States Warren R. Austin, opposed the idea of United Nations Charter revision as "inappropriate at the present time."⁶⁴

These congressional hearings also provided proponents of the atlantic union concept an opportunity to present their views. Both Justice Owen Roberts and Clarence K. Streit testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee. They used this opportunity to compare the atlantic union proposal with the other measures before the Foreign Affairs Committee dealing with United Nations revision. For instance: Justice Roberts called Senate Joint Resolution 163 (the so-called Culbertson bill) "a half-measure, bound to fail."⁶⁵

Justice Roberts and Streit also had criticisms to level at House Joint Resolution 59, the measure endorsed by the United World Federalists. In his testimony, Justice Roberts claimed that this

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴1948 Hearings, p. 205.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 252-274; 329-333.

resolution was a bad idea since the Soviet Union, in his opinion, would not agree to any changes in the United Nations Charter. Under the existing Charter, the Soviet Union had the power to veto any changes in the Security Council's authority. Roberts and Streit argued that since a Soviet veto of any such proposal was a virtual certainty, it was illogical to waste time and effort in fighting a lost cause.⁶⁶

However, in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union consented to revisions in the Charter, the western democracies would be confronted with a difficult choice. On the one hand, the western democracies could join with the Soviet bloc in an effort to strengthen the Security Council's powers and making the Council responsive to majority rule. Yet this course of action could turn out to be disadvantageous to the West if at some point in the future an anti-western, pro-Soviet bloc gained ascendancy on the Council. According to Owen Roberts, the other alternative open to the western democracies if the aforementioned scenario developed, would be to drop the plans for strengthening the United Nations and concentrate upon building a supranational union of democracies. Of course, the Soviet bloc would not be invited to join the latter. Therefore, in essence the western democracies would be setting up a rival to the existing United Nations. This situation, Roberts declared, would be "just as hopeless or worse" than the existing East-West deadlock in the United Nations.⁶⁷

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 311.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 323.

In summary, Roberts claimed that the great cultural and ideological differences between East and West made any scheme for strengthening the United Nations authority, or transform it into a limited world government, unwise. In addition to the ideological differences, there were also great differences between levels of economic development among the membership. With this in mind, Roberts remarked, "I do not think you can start [world government] with a lot of highly advanced . . . nations and a lot of backward nations that you have to drag along."⁶⁸

Instead of the bill sponsored by the United World Federalists, Roberts urged the Foreign Affairs Committee to report a bill which took into account the union now scheme. "I think that the way to promote economic recovery in western Europe and the rest of the world is to form a union of peoples whose nations provide freedom under the law."⁶⁹

Specifically, Justice Roberts urged, during these 1948 hearings, the Foreign Affairs Committee to adopt a resolution inviting delegates from the British Commonwealth, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and possibly Switzerland and the Philippines to "get together and see if we can form a union something on the pattern of the United States."⁷⁰

Clarence Streit addressed the same Committee hearings a few days after Owen Roberts completed his testimony. Even his critics

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 311.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 314.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 311.

termed Streit's testimony "eloquent and persuasive."⁷¹ Streit's testimony contained the following four arguments: (1) The likelihood of World War III occurring is growing daily due to Soviet expansionism; (2) International peace is desirable to preserve, but individual freedom and the rule of law are even more important values; (3) A federal union of the free (i.e., an atlantic union) offers the only vehicle for preserving both international peace and individual freedoms and rights; (4) A proposed atlantic union would lead to great economic advantages for the countries involved.⁷²

For instance, Streit told the Foreign Affairs Committee members that:

By federating the freest men, instead of merely associating their governments, the policy of union of the free puts much more power, decisive material, and moral power, far more effectively, safely and enduringly behind world recovery and peace, and it does it at infinitely less cost in money, materials, and men.⁷³

Specifically, Streit advised the Committee that it should report a bill reflecting the ideas he had just propounded:

What do you need at this stage to launch the policy I advocate? You need only to make your resolution one that requests the President to invite the nations most experienced in governing themselves on a basis of equal individual freedom to send delegates to meet in convention with our delegates to explore how best they can advance their freedom and therefore, world peace and prosperity by financing a Constitution to unite their people in an organic union.⁷⁴

⁷¹Ibid., p. 312.

⁷²Ibid., p. 316.

⁷³See *ibid.*, pp. 329, 340, 351.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 353-357.

However, Streit's arguments apparently did not convince many of the Committee members that they should report a resolution reflecting the Federal Union's position. Instead, the Foreign Affairs Committee reported a bill vaguely calling for strengthening the United Nations, a bill that will be discussed more fully later. Incidentally, Streit's private notes for this period in 1948 indicate that only about half of the twenty-five Committee members were present on the days that Roberts and Streit addressed the Committee.⁷⁵ Certainly, the published Committee minutes contain remarks by the Committee members indicating some skepticism toward Streit's proposals. For instance, Representative Walter N. Judd expressed concern over the possibility that the Soviet bloc would be angered because it would not be invited to participate in the contemplated union.

Streit countered this objection by remarking that it was preferable to invite only "mature democracies" to the proposed exploratory convention. Using this criterion, there would be a number of nations found ineligible to participate. That being the case, Streit asked, how could the Soviet Union claim it was being discriminated against?⁷⁶ Nevertheless, Judd does not seem to have been impressed by this line of reasoning.

Critics of the atlantic union proposal also raised another main objection. They claimed that the proposed exploratory convention was unlikely to produce any agreement to produce an interstate

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 344.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 345.

republic. Moreover, if the convention failed to produce the desired agreement, this failure would set back the development of supranational political institutions for decades.⁷⁷

Clarence K. Streit has an answer for this pessimistic line of reasoning. He told the Foreign Affairs Committee members: "I cannot conceive really that all of these countries under the pressure of necessity that they face now and with the statesmanship I think they have, would come out with nothing at all."⁷⁸

Streit did concede though that some of the participating nations might "at first" decline to ratify the atlantic union agreement which he expected the exploratory convention to produce. However, he was not too disturbed by such a prospect. After all, Streit reminded the Committee members, the State of North Carolina had initially rejected the American federal constitution. Yet within a few years, it changed its position and ratified the federal constitution. Streit argued that the atlantic union could expect a similar unfolding of events. Once the exploratory convention held completed its work, he expected that a sufficient number of the participating countries would ratify the work of the convention so that the proposed supranational republic could be launched. Once the union was launched and had proved its efficacy, those

⁷⁷Clarence K. Streit to Owen J. Roberts, 10 June 1948, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville.

⁷⁸1948 Committee Hearings, p. 354.

nations originally declining membership in the union would do an about-face and request membership.⁷⁹

A few weeks after the Committee hearings closed, the Committee did report a bill dealing with the subject of United Nations Charter revision. The reported measure though was not what the atlantic union proponents were seeking. The reported bill was basically a generalized statement calling upon the United States government to work for strengthening the United Nations machinery. This bill, which never reached the floor of the House of Representatives, read:

It is the policy of the people of the United States through constitutional processes to strive to accomplish the aims and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and to strengthen the United Nations by--

1. Confirming the status of the United Nations in its site within the United States with appropriate privileges and immunities, facilitating its headquarters building program and increasing the effectiveness of the United States in the work of the United Nations;
2. Seeking by voluntary agreement, interpretations, and practices to improve the functioning of the United Nations, to liberalize the voting procedures in the Security Council, and to eliminate the veto on the questions involving the pacific settlement of international disputes and situations and the admission of new members;
3. Pressing for agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Charter and for agreements to achieve universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including armed forces under adequate safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and evasion;
4. Encouraging and associating the United States with such regional and collective agreements for self-defense as are (1) consistent with the Charter, (2) based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid between

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 356.

- free nations and affect the national security of the United States to exercise the right under the Charter of individual or collective self-defense in the event of any armed attack against a member affecting the national security of the United States; and
5. Initiating consultations with other members concerning the need for and possibility of so amending the Charter as to enable the United States more effectively to prohibit and prevent aggression or other breaches of the peace.⁸⁰

Of course, Clarence Streit and the Federal Union leadership were disappointed that the Foreign Affairs Committee had not reported a measure along the lines that Streit and Roberts had advocated. However, they were not really discouraged by this setback. After all, the atlantic union concept was not too well known among the public at large. Streit conceded in an article in Freedom and Union magazine that he expected no positive action from Congress on this proposal until the Congress became convinced that there was widespread public support for atlantic union.⁸¹

On the other hand, the Congress also did not give the United World Federalists what they wanted either. The watered-down bill finally reported by the Committee did little to really advance their goals. Besides, this measure was really a dead letter since it died on the House Calendar.

In summary, the long-range prospects for success for the atlantic union proposal seemed more favorable at 1948 drew to a close. Of course, success was by no means a foregone conclusion.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 348.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 366; see also 94 Cong. Rec. 7116 (1948).

There were a number of known obstacles that would have to be surmounted. In the political arena, the atlantic union proposal would have to compete for attention with the proposals offered by competing groups such as the United World Federalists. In addition, there were interest groups who could be expected to oppose the type of profound changes in the nation-state system advocated by the atlantic union proponents.

While the long-range prospects for atlantic union appeared favorable, the union now movement's leadership felt that time was working against their ideas. That is, they believed that the atlantic union proposal offered the only hope of preventing World War III without resort to appeasement of the Soviet Union. Yet the Federal Union leadership also believed that they had very little time in which to get their proposals adopted and save the world from the horrors of World War III. Two or three years from the present might be too late. Given this viewpoint, it is not surprising to learn that the Federal Union organization stepped up its activities in late 1948.

As previously noted, Clarence Streit had advised the membership in 1948 that immediate attention should be given to the development of grass-roots citizen support for the union now cause. He believed that the Government and the Congress would be more sympathetic to their proposals once public support became more evident.

It is clear from the statement of Clarence Streit and obvious to any observer of this period that the success of the union now movement depended to a very large degree on the organization to

promote the cause. This required dedicated, capable and effective leadership as well as adequate financing and the proper use of all available resources because there were many issues claiming the attention of the American public.

CHAPTER II

LEADERSHIP PATTERNS AND THE FINANCIAL BASES OF THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT, 1941-1948

Before taking up the development of events that dealt with the possible adoption of the policies of the union now movement, it is important to understand the leadership patterns and know something about how this was all financed. In discussing the leadership a distinction will be made between the formal and informal power arrangement in a major part of the movement known as Federal Union, Inc. These patterns will show who controlled the respective organizations. Also, this analysis will uncover how power was wielded within the movement. Thirdly, there will be a description of the events leading to the establishment of the Atlantic Union Committee which took place in January, 1949.

Federal Union, Inc. had two basic funding sources during the period 1940-48. First of all, about half of the funds raised were derived from hundreds of contributions.¹ For example, 2,300 individuals contributed over \$30,000 in 1941; the total from the same small gift category was over \$14,000 in 1943.² The second

¹Freedom and Union 13 (May 1959): 14, 16.

²See unsigned memorandum, "Mortal Assets of Atlantic Union," Atlantic Union Committee, January, 1964; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, pp. 2, 6.

source of financial resource consisted of large gifts from a few individuals. During the period 1940-44, Clarence K. Streit was the principal large contributor to the union now cause. In fact, Streit's personal contributions were a crucially important factor during the movement's early years. Later in this chapter, the role of Streit's personal contributions will be examined in more detail.³

The Federal Union did not have membership dues. Of course this meant that the organization lacked what could have been an important revenue source. There were limited funding sources available from within. For instance, from time to time some of the stronger of the seventy or so Federal Union chapters then in existence contributed \$1,000 yearly to the national organization.⁴ The total derived from this source amounted to over \$10,000 in 1941 and over \$20,000 in 1945.⁵ Also, during the earliest years, 1940-42, a limited amount was obtained from fund-raising dinners. In 1941, three fund-raising banquets were held under the auspices of the organization: the total attendance was over 3,000 and the net profit to the organization was over \$8,000.⁶ It seems likely that the Federal Union could have easily raised far more money through fund raising had it attempted to do so. However, for reasons discussed

³See pp. 42-44.

⁴"Mortal Assets," p. 2.

⁵Ibid., p. 5.

⁶New York Times, 23 January 1941, p. 10; November 27, 1940, p. 16.

below Clarence Streit and the Federal Union leadership were not inclined to tap this potential revenue source.

In fact, expenditures in the period 1941-44 exceeded income by several thousands of dollars. Clarence K. Streit routinely contributed whatever funds were necessary to meet the deficit from his own pocket. This was rather remarkable generosity on Clarence Streit's part considering his financial circumstances.

Prior to publication of Union Now in 1940, Clarence Streit had been earning about \$8,000 annually as a reporter for The New York Times. In March, 1940, he quit his job in order to barnstorm the country for the union now cause.⁷ During the next six years Streit supported himself financially by free lance writing, lecturing, and through the modest royalties received from his book.⁸ During this time, the Federal Union paid Streit no salary. Streit's yearly income, during the World War II years, averaged on \$4,500.⁹ Obviously, Streit's generosity to the organization exceeded the limits of his income; in fact, he sometimes utilized his personal savings to make up its deficits.

During the World War II years, the Federal Union's financial plight grew worse. Both membership and income decreased after 1941, and each year the expenses exceeded income. Clarence Streit assumed personal responsibility for the organization's debts. His policy

⁷"Mortal Assets," p. 2.

⁸Ibid., p. 1.

⁹Ibid., p. 2.

was to prevent the debt exceeding what he could personally scrape up from his own pocket if worse came to worst. Streit's personal assets in the early 1940's consisted of common stocks estimated to have a market value of \$10,000; also, he owned personal life insurance policies having a cash value of about \$10,000.¹⁰ Therefore, his personal assets were about \$20,000. Several times during the 1940's Streit borrowed money, using the stocks and life insurance as collateral, then donated the borrowed money to Federal Union. Somehow, Streit was able to repay these loans and he was never forced to liquidate his personal assets.¹¹

The reader may wonder why it was necessary for Federal Union to follow such a hand-to-mouth approach to finances. In fact, from hindsight, it appeared that Federal Union left potential sources of financial revenue untapped during the 1941-45 period. Efforts could have been made to solicit large contributions from wealthy members of the organization. Certainly there were a number of wealthy persons serving on the Federal Union's executive committee during the World War II era. (For instance, Gardner Cowles, Jr., Henry H. Harriman, John Howard Ford, and Percival F. Brundage, to name a few.) It seems likely that at least some of these persons would have contributed funds sufficient to cover the existing deficits if approached. Yet there is no evidence of any efforts being made

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

to solicit funds from these well-to-do members until later, after 1955.¹²

It is difficult to understand why the Federal Union's leadership did not show more interest in increasing its funding during the World War II years. Presumably, an organization concerned with introducing a new idea to the public would recognize the need for spending large sums of money in order to obtain public acceptance of its ideas. However, Federal Union's leadership did not show much interest in developing a large budget at that time. In fact, throughout World War II, its budget did not exceed \$85,000 yearly.

One suspects that the organization's leadership here deferred to the wishes of Clarence Streit. As this chapter will show, Streit exercised strong influence over Federal Union policy. Clarence Streit personally detested fund raising and he was reluctant to ask others to help fund what he, to some extent, regarded as his personal crusade. When possible, Streit preferred to maintain personal responsibility for Federal Union's funding and only as a last resort was he willing to acquiesce in fund raising appeals to the rank and file membership or to outside sources, such as foundations.¹³

As Streit viewed the situation, there was no particular need for the organization to engage in massive, systematic fund raising at this time anyway. Along with a majority of the executive committee,

¹²For a discussion of the financial resources of the Federal Union organization's leadership, see Freedom and Union 12 (May 1956): 15, 16.

¹³"Mortal Assets," p. 3.

Streit felt that the time had not yet arrived for a national campaign to secure American entry into a supranational union. After all, World War II was absorbing the interest of the country at the time. Therefore, Streit successfully urged the organization to carry out low-profile "educational" activities during the war years. These activities if successful would make it easier to carry out high-profile massive publicity campaigns after the war when the time was ripe. In the meantime the few low-profile "educational" activities carried out could be funded with a relatively small budget. After the war ended, Streit slightly modified his previous attitude towards the Federal Union resorting to fund raising and the solicitation of outside funding sources. Yet he continued to have some misgivings on the subject. He was particularly anxious that no single gift from a foundation or outside source be accepted that had "strings" attached since in this way outsiders could modify or subvert the organization's goals.¹⁴

Beginning in 1946, the Federal Union began soliciting funding from outside sources on a systematic basis and instituted fund raising activities within the organization. Streit did not oppose these activities which were designed to increase the budget to \$100,000 annually. Yet as the years went by, it was apparent that Streit still held some misgivings about the desirability of relying upon outside funding sources. For example, in 1955 Streit boasted to

¹⁴Ibid., p. 4.

a friend that since the organization had never accepted an individual gift exceeding \$25,000 in any year, it could not be considered to be obligated to an outside viewpoint.¹⁵

After 1945 another "insider" individual began matching Streit's financial contributions. This individual was Owen J. Roberts. Roberts' official connection with the movement began in 1945, the year he retired from the U.S. Supreme Court. That year he formally applied for membership in the Federal Union. Even earlier, however, Roberts had publicly endorsed the union now concept.¹⁶ In that year, Streit approached him and asked that the Justice endorse the union now cause. At that time Streit states that he was seeking "a man of national stature who could give the movement . . . the leadership that was essential."¹⁷ Streit's first choice for a suitable candidate to endorse publicly Federal Union was Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. The Chief Justice though, according to Clarence Streit, was not sympathetic to the union now idea. In fact, Hughes refused Streit's request for a personal interview to discuss the proposal.¹⁸ After failing to secure Hughes' endorsement, Streit next turned to Owen Roberts as his second choice for a "leader of National stature."

Roberts felt that it was inappropriate for him to participate actively in the Federal Union's activities as long as he was still

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C., 2 May 1984.

¹⁷Freedom and Union 11 (May 1956): 10, 15. ¹⁸Ibid., p. 10.

serving on the Supreme Court. He did, however, make one exception to this attitude in 1943. At that time, several members were advocating disbanding or amalgamating with the United World Federalists on account of Federal Union's recent loss of membership and financial decline. At this time (April 21, 1943), Roberts took the initiative and publicly stated his approval of the organization. He also expressed the opinion that the organization should continue its existence.¹⁹

Roberts' financial largesse to Federal Union really began in November, 1945. The annual national convention was being held in Pittsburgh at which time Roberts served as one of the featured speakers. This convention voted to establish a monthly periodical to promote the union now viewpoint.²⁰ The new magazine was intended to replace the mimeographed in-house publication "Federal Union World," which Streit had edited since 1943. Furthermore, Freedom and Union (the new magazine's title) was designed for a general audience, beyond the confines of the organization's membership.

Among the subjects discussed at this convention was the logistics of launching the proposed publication. Streit informed the delegates that in his estimation \$7,000 in new funds would be required initially. Almost \$4,000 was obtained in pledges from attending delegates.²¹ At this point Roberts contacted Streit and

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹"Mortal Assets," p. 3.

offered to contribute \$2,100. Roberts' gift combined with these pledges and Streit's own personal largesse was sufficient to meet the necessary goals. The new magazine, Freedom and Union, appeared in May, 1946. Streit later estimated that Roberts contributed over \$10,000 from his own pocket in the period 1945 to 1955.²²

After 1946, the income was also supplemented by several gifts (some fairly large) from private donors not connected with the organization. The first of these contributions was a gift of stock securities donated by Mrs. William Danforth of St. Louis in 1947. This gift consisted of 500 shares of common stock in a petroleum company. In 1947, the stock had an estimated market value of \$10,000. By 1956, through stock splits and dividends this stock had already yielded \$51,000 in income.²³

In the years following the Danforth gift, the records show that there never again was a time when the Federal Union was without financial reserves. Interestingly, no single gift had exceeded \$25,000 in value at the time that it was made. After 1946, the Federal Union was able to pay Clarence Streit a salary, initially set at \$6,000. The salary was officially designated as compensation for editing Freedom and Union rather than as remuneration for serving as the president.²⁴ Nevertheless, it was at least belated recognition that Streit deserved compensation for his services to the movement.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

Throughout the 1940's there was a small paid staff. Prior to 1946 the paid staff consisted of two full-time clerical employees and occasionally one or two part-time employees. Of course, this paid staff was supplemented by volunteer labor supplied by many of the members. Expenses were kept minimal by renting modest quarters. During World War II years, Federal Union maintained an office at 10 East 40th Street, New York City. After Freedom and Union was launched in 1946, the office was moved to Washington, D.C. This move was made so office space and clerical personnel could be shared with Freedom and Union.²⁵

A second and perhaps more important aspect of this movement was the leadership. As is the case with most organizations there were several patterns but consideration of this subject was limited to finding out if the formal authority structure really described how power was wielded in the organization.

Before describing the formal authority patterns within the Federal Union it is appropriate to note briefly one salient aspect of its formal power patterns: the preponderant personal influence of Clarence K. Streit on the Federal Union's policies. Certainly, this fact should come as no big surprise. After all, the organization owed its existence to the ideas generated and developed by Clarence K. Streit. Of course, both the leadership and the rank and file membership were aware of Streit's unique contributions to the movement.

²⁵Washington Post, 24 February 1982, p. B1.

Furthermore, Streit's leadership style--the way that he wielded power--tended to reinforce his prestige. Streit tended to project a modest, unassuming image to the membership. At the same time, he was perceived as intense in his dedication to the union now cause. His tireless efforts as a writer, lecturer, and spokesman for the union now causes were well known to the members. One recent observer has described Streit's zeal for atlantic union as an emotion equivalent to a religious fervor.²⁶ Given this situation, the members tended to defer to Streit's leadership and to regard themselves as his "followers," which is not particularly surprising. In summary, Streit was in a position to strongly influence if not control the decision-making.

The formal power structure was not especially remarkable. It more or less closely resembled the formal power arrangement of many other private American organizations. For example, the by-laws provided for an executive committee to be elected by an annual national convention. The size of the executive committee varied. Originally it was composed of eleven persons. However, a few months after the Federal Union was founded, the executive committee was expanded to twenty-one persons. Members of the executive committee were elected for three-year terms with the terms of one-third of the committee membership expiring each year. Therefore, the national convention would have at least seven committee positions to fill

²⁶Freedom and Union 13 (July-August 1959): 8-10.

by election every year.²⁷ In addition, the Federal Union had national officers who, according to the by-laws, were made ex officio members of the executive committee. Originally, the officers were: Chairman, Corresponding Secretary, and Managing Secretary, the latter being a sort of executive who was responsible for managing the headquarters in New York City.²⁸

From the information gathered by this writer, it appears that a certain informal leadership pattern quickly emerged. This style--which also appears in the Atlantic Union Committee when that organization was set up--was as follows: There was an inner circle of two or three people who served on the executive committee. These individuals made the important substantive decisions for the organization. The remainder of the executive committee merely acquiesced in the decision-making of this aforementioned "inner circle."²⁹

Most of the executive committee members were quite prominent. About one-fourth of the members were drawn from the academic milieu. Included in this grouping were the presidents of Swathmore College, Antioch College and Mount Holyoke College. The remainder of the committee was roughly divided between individuals associated with private businesses including several publishers and the professions.³⁰

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 10.

²⁹These conclusions represent this writer's opinion. The conclusions are based upon information derived from the internal documents of the Federal Union organization and the Atlantic Union Committee, Kefauver Collection, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville.

³⁰See unsigned pamphlet, "Meet Federal Union, Inc.," 1944,

In the earliest years, the informal power structure was dominated by an inner circle composed of Streit, R. Frazier Potts, and William Blake. Potts, the Federal Union headquarters manager, and Blake were not well-known figures. Potts was a lawyer and Blake an accountant. Certainly, these individuals owed their inner circle position to Streit. Streit's reasoning for following this course of action is not known, perhaps their residency in New York City figured into Streit's reasoning. Potts' and Blake's proximity to Federal Union headquarters made them available for day-to-day decision-making. Streit's backing of these two men for the inner circle also resulted from the belief that Potts and Blake could be counted on to carry out his wishes. Given these circumstances, one must assume that the executive committee's main function was symbolic, to grant legitimacy to whatever endeavors the inner circle decided upon.

The composition of the executive committee for three different years is given in Table I. This information is provided in order to give the reader an insight into the turnover rate within the leadership.

Several observations can be made concerning membership on the executive committee. First, the committee experienced a high turnover rate. Streit apparently was the only person serving continuously on the committee from 1939 to 1948. It is not known exactly

TABLE I
FEDERAL UNION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

Year	Membership
1939	Gardner Cowles, Jr. William Jay Schlieffelin Roger Baldwin Samuel Harding Church Mary Ware Dennett Henry H. Harriman Francis Johnson Mrs. Grace Mitchell Vernon Nash R. Frazier Potts Ernest H. Wilkins* Harry Dennison Frank Aydellote Robert McElroy William P. Blake Lowell Brown James E. Downes Gordon Mannerstedt Felix Morley Henrietta Roelofs Mary Wooley* Clarence K. Streit
1942	Gardner Cowles, Jr. William Jay Schlieffelin Roger Baldwin Herbert Agar Russell Davenport, Jr. Stringfellow Barr* Percival F. Brundage Jon Howard Ford Fred L. Schuman* Carl J. Friedrich* Everett Addams Thomas J. Mahoney J. A. Migel John W. Mason Leslie I. Pennington

TABLE I (Continued)

Year	Membership
1942	A. J. G. Priest John A. Stevenson Edgar C. Taylor* Robert J. Watt Patrick Welch Mrs. J. C. Pryor Sarah Summer Joseph DeSlodges Clyde Ellis Clarence K. Streit
1948	Edgar Bissantz Brice Toole Edmund Orgill Herbert Agar Russell Davenport, Jr. Stringfellow Barr* Percival F. Brundage Jon Howard Ford A. Powell Davies Don Dennis Clarence K. Streit

*Educators and academics.

Sources: New York Times 3 August 1940,
p. 3; Freedom and Union 14 (November 1959): 12,
15; New York Times 29 June 1942, p. 13.

what factors were responsible for the turnover. Quite likely some of the turnover was due to the voluntary retirement of committee members. After all, many of the committee members were prominent public figures and these persons often had many other demands constantly being made upon their time. Under these circumstances, it is likely that at least some of these persons were not interested in serving a second three-year term on the executive committee.³¹

Secondly, an examination of the committee membership over a time period reveals a relative decline in the number of educators and academics serving on the executive committee. In 1939, about one-fifth of the committee membership was in this category, but by 1948 there was only one professional educator serving in such a capacity.

Thirdly, it should be noted that the executive committee had a disproportionately large number of members from the northeastern sections of the United States. If the committee had reflected the geographic distribution of the Federal Union's membership, then 40 percent of the committee would have been from that section, and 30 percent from the midwestern section while the South and Far West would have each received 15 percent. However, in actuality individuals from the northeastern states composed an absolute majority of the committee throughout this period.³² There would be both long-range and short-range objectives. The new organization's long-range goal was to secure American participation in an interstate

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

republic of democracies. The immediate goal, however, was to develop mass support for a Congressional resolution authorizing American participation in an international conference which would be called to explore the possibilities of a federal union.

There were apparently several considerations which prompted the union now movement's leadership to set up a second and somewhat parallel organization at this time. First of all, there seemed to be increased public interest in the possibilities afforded by supranational political organization. For instance, pollster Elmo Roper published results of a public opinion survey in 1948 that indicated there was a growing minority willing to delegate aspects of national sovereignty to a supranational organization.³³ Perhaps the 1948 congressional hearings on United Nations Charter revision stimulated public interest in the larger question of supranational organization.³⁴

In addition, public interest in the possibilities of supranational organization was partly motivated by a fear of further Soviet expansion in Europe. In 1947-48, there was growing public belief that communist expansion constituted a threat to American national interests. At the same time though there was an understandable reluctance to seeing the American government assume formal military commitments to defend western Europe. Schemes such as the previously mentioned Culbertson plan and atlantic union were

³³Freedom and Union 2 (May 1949): 16, 20.

³⁴See Chapter I, pp. 17-24.

perceived by many as offering a solution for this uncomfortable situation.³⁵ These various plans were both seen as offering a means for halting Soviet expansion without requiring a heavy American military commitment.³⁶ Consequently, the schemes enjoyed a degree of public support.

Another consideration prompting the Federal Union leadership to establish a new organization was the desire to be prepared for future Congressional struggles over the issue of supranational political institutions. Streit, Roberts and others felt that circumstances would lead Congress to consider this general question again in the near future. They wanted to be able to influence the shape and outcome of that legislative struggle when it developed. It was important to avoid a repetition of 1948 when the movement was not prepared logistically to influence the Congressional hearings on the subject of the United Nations Charter revision.³⁷

However, the existing Federal Union organization did not seem to be an appropriate instrument for conducting the contemplated lobbying activity. It will be recalled that the organization was supposedly founded in 1939 for "educational and scientific" purposes.³⁸ As a non-profit foundation, the Federal Union organization was exempt from federal taxes; in addition, in August, 1943, the United States

³⁵Istvan Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, 1965), pp. 62-65, 109-112.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 110-122.

³⁷Ibid., p. 109.

³⁸Memphis Press-Scimitar 2 January 1962, p. 8.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that since its activities were entirely educational in nature, contributions to the organization could be claimed as a deductible item on individual income tax returns.³⁹ Yet the United States Government could reverse these favorable tax rulings should Federal Union become involved in political controversy or partisan politics.

In general, the Federal Union organization's activities during the 1940's were of an educational nature.⁴⁰ The principal activities consisted of sponsoring meetings where the union now concept could be discussed, and in continuously publishing tracts and pamphlets that presented the arguments for Federal Union.⁴¹ In any event, Federal Union avoided lobbying activities, and it made no concerted effort to influence Congress aside from Streit's 1948 appearance before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, the proposed new Atlantic Union Committee was designed to engage in the lobbying activities that had been avoided. The Atlantic Union Committee was also expected to be more visible to the public and especially to the Congress. In summary, the new organization was designed to supplement and complement the work carried on by the Federal Union.⁴²

³⁹See Chapter I, p. 13.

⁴⁰"Meet Federal Union, Inc., " p. 2.

⁴¹See "Mortal Assets," p. 2.

⁴²Ibid.

A preliminary meeting composed of some thirty-five persons interested in the formation of a political lobbying committee was held in January, 1949. The site of the meeting was Justice Roberts' farmhouse near Phoenixville, Pennsylvania.⁴³ Besides Streit and Roberts, others attending the meeting included Senator Estes Kefauver, former Assistant Secretary of State Will T. Clayton, and pollster Elmo Roper, Jr.⁴⁴

Istvan Szent-Miklosy, a student of the atlantic union movement, cites two additional reasons why the leadership chose to start the Atlantic Union Committee at this time. First of all, the election of Estes Kefauver to the Senate in November, 1948, encouraged the leadership to undertake more politically-oriented activities.⁴⁵

Kefauver's election to the Senate seemed to signal the dawning of a new era as far as proponents of atlantic union were concerned. Estes Kefauver was a strong supporter of the atlantic union idea. In the midst of his spirited 1948 Senate campaign, he publicly endorsed the atlantic union concept and promised to support this proposal if elected to the Senate.⁴⁶

Therefore, Kefauver's election indicated that at least some elements of the population were ready to listen to the proposal. Beyond that, Kefauver's election had certain practical consequences for the movement. In the past, no senator had been willing to sponsor

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Szent-Miklosy, p. 110.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

legislation along the lines favored by the atlantic union movement. With Kefauver in the Senate, there was now at least one senator available to introduce and sponsor legislation favored by the movement. At this time, there was hope that Senator Kefauver would be able to enlist additional support for the atlantic union proposal in the Senate.

Secondly, Szent-Miklosy claims that Walden Moore's availability to work in a leadership capacity for the proposed new committee was another factor encouraging Streit and Roberts to launch the new organization at this time. In order to succeed, the new organization would certainly require a person with special organization talents to serve as the executive director. Dr. Walden Moore seemed to possess these talents. In 1948, he was completing a stint in the United States Army where he served in the Intelligence Division. Prior to World War II, Moore was a political science professor at the University of Rochester. Still later, Moore was attached to the United States Mission to the United Nations.⁴⁷

Streit and Roberts had so much confidence in the ability of Moore to direct the new organization that they postponed plans to organize the Atlantic Union Committee until he was released from military service.⁴⁸ Dr. Moore strongly influenced the direction of the atlantic union movement over the course of the next ten years.

⁴⁷Memphis Press-Scimitar, 2 January 1962, p. 8.

⁴⁸Freedom and Union 3 (April 1949): 6, 7.

As will be shown later, Moore was the leader of the so-called "moderate" faction in the Atlantic Union Committee.

A number of important decisions were made at this organizational meeting which was held in 1949. The most important substantive decisions were: (1) the decision to lobby for passage of an atlantic union resolution by the next session of Congress; (2) the decision to support American entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization⁴⁹ (the NATO Treaty was then before the Senate).

Inasmuch as both of these decisions had important impacts upon the future development of the movement, it is appropriate to examine briefly the rationale for both decisions. First of all, the decision to lobby for legislation permitting American involvement in a supranational convention composed of delegates from the democratic nations. The contemplated convention would explore the feasibility of forming a "union of the Free."⁵⁰

Until 1948 all of the atlantic union movement's efforts had been generating a grass-roots, citizen's demand for a supranational union. At various times during the 1940's Streit had suggested possible routes to the desired goal. For example, in 1942 he urged President Roosevelt to use his special wartime powers to merge the American and British governments "so far as it is practical."⁵¹

⁴⁹Szent-Miklosy, pp. 111, 114.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 114-125.

⁵¹See Clarence K. Streit, Union Now (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), pp. 112-116; 184-199.

At other times, Streit had advocated American entry into the contemplated supranational union through the regular constitutional processes.⁵² No conscious effort was made to influence the legislative process or to promote the viewpoint of the atlantic union movement before the Congress. However, with the creation of the Atlantic Union Committee, the movement would be adopting a new tactic.

The second decision which was to support American adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was to have important consequences for the movement. A few months earlier, in late 1948, the Truman Administration had decided to commit the United States to participation in a regional defense pact, composed of the United States, Canada, and certain western European democracies. The intent of this contemplated action of course was to defend western Europe from possible Soviet aggression.⁵³

Certainly, the proposed North Atlantic Treaty presented a dilemma for the Atlantic Union Committee leadership. Clarence K. Streit had earlier written a great deal in Union Now about the negative aspects of a military alliance system; and in fact the North Atlantic Treaty more or less resembled the old, prewar alliances. The proposed treaty would rest upon the old nation-state system which this group wanted to see discarded and replaced by the proposed atlantic union. Therefore, it was difficult for them to perceive much benefit in the long run to be derived from membership in the North Atlantic Treaty.

⁵²New York Times, 25 January 1942, p. 6.

⁵³Streit, pp. 184-188.

In fact, some of the members, notably Clarence Streit, argued that the North Atlantic Treaty proposal actually represented an obstacle to the development of a supranational union. Streit correctly foresaw that the new treaty organization would furnish certain opponents with a pretext for avoiding action on more far-reaching proposals for supranational political union. Opponents of atlantic union could now argue that the United States government should concentrate all its efforts upon developing the potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and avoid "parallel" movements.⁵⁴

The Committee leadership, while holding no illusions regarding the long-run potential of the North Atlantic Treaty, nevertheless felt that it had some short-run benefits that made it worthy of support. In the short-run, this military alliance would be useful to the cause of supranational political union because it would at least create a multilateral endeavor composed of democratic nations. Hopefully, the Treaty's scope of authority could later be extended beyond military matters.⁵⁵ In addition, some Committee members such as former Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton claimed that it was good practical politics for them to support ratification of the proposed Treaty. It was argued that the Truman Administration would be far more receptive to the atlantic union proposal later

⁵⁴See Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 7th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), pp. 807-808.

⁵⁵Streit expressed these misgivings in an article in Freedom and Union 3 (April 1949): 3.

if the former had received the Atlantic Union Committee's enthusiastic support for the pending Treaty.⁵⁶ After a lengthy discussion, the convention approved a motion to support ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The vote was 34 to 1; Clarence Streit cast the only negative note.⁵⁷

This organizational meeting of the Atlantic Union Committee voted to postpone lobbying efforts on behalf of the atlantic union proposal until the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified. As will be shown later, this decision was to have important consequences for the atlantic union movement's future.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Szent-Miklosy, p. 124.

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCIAL OPERATIONS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE, 1949-60

The organizational and financial arrangements of the Atlantic Union Committee during the period of its existence, 1949 to 1960, will be examined here. Examination of these factors provides insight into how power was wielded within the Committee.

Once the Atlantic Union Committee was established in early 1949, it naturally faced several "housekeeping" tasks. One of these tasks was obtaining office space and staff. Early in 1949, the Committee established offices in New York City and Washington, D.C.¹ The New York City office was located in downtown Manhattan and cost \$200 monthly to rent. However, the Washington office had no rental charges since it shared a building already leased by the Federal Union's publication Freedom and Union.²

The Committee staff were selected soon after the organization's initial meeting in January, 1949. Robert Bishop, an Orlando, Florida attorney was named as executive director, chief lobbyist and head of the Washington office. Don Dennis, formerly executive secretary of the Foreign Policy Association, was named to head the New York

¹See unsigned memorandum, "Mortal Assets of Atlantic Union," Atlantic Union Committee, January, 1964; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6, University of Tennessee Special Collections, Library, Knoxville, p. 5.

²Ibid.

City office. Between them these two offices had five full-time employees.³

At its organizational meeting, the Atlantic Union Committee established a ten-man executive committee to function between meetings of the Board of Governors. These ten individuals were:

Hugh Moore, Chairman
Arnaud Marts
Gardner Cowles
Henry C. Fowler, Jr.

Walden Moore
Edmund Orgill
Elmo Roper (ex officio)
Owen Roberts (ex officio)
Clarence K. Streit⁴

Under the By-laws⁵ of the Atlantic Union Committee, the Board of Governors constituted the supreme executive authority. The By-laws did not specify a specific size for the Board, so consequently it fluctuated in size. In 1949 the Board had twenty-seven members but later it had over 40 members. Members of the Board of Governors were elected for three-year terms with rotating expiration of terms. One-third of the Board's terms would expire annually.⁶ At the same time, the By-laws did not place a restriction upon immediate re-election of a Board member.⁷

³See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, October 21, 1950; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, pp. 2, 3.

⁴See *ibid.*, April 1949, Box 7.

⁵The By-laws of the Atlantic Union Committee are printed in the Appendix of this study.

⁶See By-laws, Article VII, sec. 2.

⁷This conclusion can be deduced from reading Article VII of the By-laws.

The By-laws required the Board of Governors to meet at least once a year. Beyond that, the Board was given discretion as to when it would hold additional meetings. In practice, the Board of Governors usually met four times a year.⁸ Since the members were scattered across the United States, it would have been inconvenient to have convened Board meetings with any greater frequency. Between these meetings, the By-laws permitted them to establish a standing executive committee which would have the authority to act on behalf of the Board.⁹

The executive committee met on the average of twice each month. There was relatively little turnover on the executive committee during the period of the Atlantic Union Committee's existence. To illustrate this point, the executive committee's membership for the year 1954 is shown below. This can be compared with the membership of the original executive committee.

Elmo Roper, Chairman
Lithgow Osborne
A. W. Schmidt
George Shea
Clarence K. Streit

Edmund Orgill
Leland Henry
Gerald Henry
Livingston Hartley
Henry Fowler, Jr.
Mrs. Frank C. Baker¹⁰

⁸Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C., 1 May 1984.

⁹See By-laws, Article VII, sec. 10.

¹⁰See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, May 5, 1954; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7.

The By-laws empowered the annual Atlantic Union Congress to elect the Board of Governors. However, the organization was in existence over two years before the first annual Congress was held in November, 1951.¹¹ So for the first several years of its existence, the Board operated as a self-perpetuating body, co-opting new members from time to time into its body.

Two other factors appear to have operated to limit the annual Congress' control over the leadership. First, the Board of Governors rather than the annual Congress was given the authority to elect the organization's officers.¹² Secondly, the annual Congress had no direct voice in the selection of the day-to-day decision-making since that function was handled by the executive committee, a body selected and amendable to the Board not the annual Congress. Thirdly, the annual Congress' control over the Board was somewhat constrained by the latter's power to fill its own vacancies between meetings of the Congress.¹³ Granted that the annual Congress had the formal authority to overrule any such interim appointments made by the Board, as a practical matter this was highly unlikely since the interim Board member could have served for several months before the annual Congress met and voted upon his confirmation.¹⁴

¹¹See Freedom and Union 6 (December 1951): 9.

¹²See By-laws, Article VI, sec. 1.

¹³By-laws, Article VII, sec. 4.

¹⁴This conclusion is based upon this writer's examination of the Board of Governor's membership rosters for the period 1950 to 1960.

To summarize, the oversight powers of the annual Congress were limited. Certainly its control over the Atlantic Union Committee leadership was indirect at best. Nevertheless, the Congress did possess certain powers which could affect policy decision. First, it did have the formal power to elect the Board of Governors. Secondly, the Congress had the authority to review general policy questions, including the total amount budgeted each year by the organization. Nevertheless, the annual Congress was not the structure that made the important decisions for the organization. Instead, the Congress tended to act as a ratifying body for decisions and policy made by the Board of Governors.

Obviously, a command of financial resources is an important factor for an interest group concerned with influencing public policy as the Atlantic Union Committee was. The objectives sought would, if adopted, cause profound changes in the status quo. This in turn would require a great deal of publicity to be successful. Normally, publicity and agitation require the expenditure of large amounts of money.

Certainly income for the Atlantic Union Committee fluctuated widely. However, it was generally in better shape financially than was its sister organization, Federal Union. At least the Atlantic Union Committee was never dependent upon the personal generosity of one or two individuals as had been the Federal Union in its early years.¹⁵

¹⁵See Chapter II, pp. 44-46.

At the initial meeting of the Committee in early 1949 membership dues were set at one dollar annually for regular membership with higher dues for special sustaining memberships.¹⁶ From the beginning of its existence, however, the Committee leadership planned expenditures which would far exceed the few thousands of dollars anticipated in membership dues. Obviously, other means had to be devised to meet the anticipated deficit.

Certain members of the Committee provided a solution to the problem of an operating deficit. Specifically, the initial organizational meeting provided tentative budget expenditures of \$8,000 monthly. It was anticipated that membership dues would produce only \$15,000 the first year. The Committee planned to meet this deficit in two ways. First, certain members of the Board of Governors collectively pledged \$30,000 for a one-time "start-up fund."¹⁸ This money was supposed to provide operating income during its first few months of existence. In addition, members of the Board of Governors pledged an additional \$4,000 in monthly income for 1949.¹⁹

During the first year, the Committee budgeted \$40,000 monthly for its paid personnel, both full- and part-time. Printing expenses,

¹⁶See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, February 27, 1949; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 8.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

special secretarial help, and rent were three additional large items in the 1949 budget. Printing expenses, for instance, averaged \$650 monthly while special secretarial help often cost over \$300 monthly.²⁰

A total of over \$100,000 was raised for expenditures in 1949. This amount does not include the special \$30,000 "start-up" fund referred to above. The latter was scheduled to terminate in May, 1950. With that certainly in mind, the Board of Governors' executive committee met to draw up a budget for calendar 1950 in January of that year.²¹

At that time Don Dennis, the newly appointed executive secretary, told the executive committee that the Atlantic Union Committee was maintaining a surplus in its accounts. Dennis warned, however, that this could not be expected to continue when the "start-up" fund was eliminated. Dennis advised them to step up their fund raising activities so as to be ready for this eventuality. On a positive note, Dennis reported that the local Atlantic Union Committee was engaging in successful fund raising activities and this was proving to be an unexpectedly large income source for the national headquarters, about \$2,000 a month on the average. Dennis also reported that the headquarters were receiving about \$1,500 monthly after expenses from a mail solicitation campaign which had recently been inaugurated. He suggested that both fund raising activities

²⁰The Atlantic Union Committee's budget for 1949-50 is listed in an unsigned memorandum, June 4, 1950, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7.

²¹See internal minutes, Board of Governors, January 19, 1950; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 8.

and the mail solicitation campaigns be stepped up in the spring to replace the funds lost when the "start up" fund dried up.²²

To some extent the executive committee followed through with Dennis' advice. Plans were soon made for the holding of a gala banquet at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria in the fall of 1950 as a fund raising function. As it turned out the banquet was not held until March, 1951. However, as a fund raising affair, this banquet exceeded all expectations. Over 660 individuals attended the banquet and it produced over \$50,000 in financial pledges to the Committee.²³ Since it cost about \$7,700 to produce this banquet, there was a net profit to the organization of about \$42,000.

The Committee's finances seem to have been adequate for its purposes until the spring of 1951. At that time the organization was entering a period when it made seemingly little progress towards the attainment of its goals. Membership in local organizations declined slightly. Not surprisingly, financial contributions during this period also declined.²⁴

The decline in financial contributions encouraged the Committee to consider belt-tightening measures. Consequently they voted in August, 1951 to curtail expenditures for the 1951-52 year. Beginning

²²Ibid.

²³See internal minutes, Board of Governors, June 2, 1951; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7.

²⁴Clarence K. Streit to Senator Estes Kefauver, 9 September 1951, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6.

in November of that year the monthly budget of the organization was cut to \$2,500. The largest decrease was in promotional activities. That item had averaged \$4,000 monthly. After that November such activities were allocated only \$500 monthly.²⁵

At the same time there was a sharp decline in the amount spent on staff salaries. This item decreased from \$3,500 in August, 1951 to about \$1,600 monthly afterwards. The decline in this category was partly due to a reduction in personnel. Several administrative positions, such as the publicity director and the production assistant in the New York office, were eliminated through attrition.²⁶ These comparatively low budgetary levels were maintained through 1954. Thereafter, the Committee budget rose slightly. From 1955 to 1960 the budget hovered between \$50,000 and \$65,000 yearly. The organization never again though quite matched the \$100,000 spent during the first year of its existence.²⁷

One should keep in mind that these figures do not represent the total amount of funds spent by the atlantic union movement during the period 1949-60. The Federal Union organization was also raising between \$40,000 and \$75,000 annually for the movement

²⁵See internal minutes, Board of Governors, September 12. Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7; see also, internal minutes, Board of Governors, February 20, 1952, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 8.

²⁶See "Mortal Assets," p. 2.

²⁷Ibid., p. 5.

during this time.²⁸ Of course, the Federal Union could not spend money directly on political lobbying activities since such action might result in the revocation of its status as a tax exempt, philanthropic institution.²⁹ Yet by working in close cooperation with the Atlantic Union Committee, the Federal Union organization was able to promote the activities of the former without actually engaging in political lobbying. For example, the Federal Union sponsored seminars and meetings to acquaint the public with the objectives of the atlantic union movement. This work certainly complemented the Atlantic Union Committee's more overt political lobbying activities on Capitol Hill. Moreover, this division of work between the two organizations freed the Atlantic Union Committee from having to spend funds on such grassroots activities, and allowed it to concentrate its efforts upon political lobbying.

Nevertheless, though, it appears that the Committee could have been more effective with a larger budget. Much of the time they had only \$2,000 to spend monthly on promotional activities. This was certainly not much money for an organization vying for attention on Capitol Hill.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹See Chapter I, p. 13.

CHAPTER IV

THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING EFFORTS DURING 1949 AND 1950

With the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee a great effort was made to attain its objectives by influencing governmental decisions during the second term of President Harry Truman. It is the purpose here to reveal the struggles that took place during 1949-1952 and to examine particularly the lobbying that was conducted. It was a time of irony when the atlantic union idea enjoyed a growing level of popular support while at the same time experiencing a decreasing amount of support among officials in the executive branch of the government. It was during the time when the first "atlantic resolution" was first introduced into Congress.

The misgivings of certain Atlantic Union Committee insiders most notably C. K. Streit toward the proposed North Atlantic Treaty alliance have already been described. To summarize these misgivings, some of the Committee felt that once established, the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would prove to be an obstacle to the establishment of the proposed supranational atlantic union. Nevertheless, the viewpoint was rejected by the majority of the leadership which felt that the political advantages to be derived from being recorded as among the Treaty supporters outweighed the possible threat the alliance posed to atlantic union's future. After all, the argument went, the administration would be far more

likely to look favorably upon the proposal if the administration felt politically indebted to the group for its previous support in a close battle.¹

Publicly, Clarence Streit writing through the atlantic union organ, Freedom and Union, expressed qualified, cautious support for the proposed Treaty. In the April, 1949 issue, Streit stated his "personal view" that the Treaty was a "mixed blessing."² Yet Streit managed also to have a few positive things to say about the pending Treaty. First, the Treaty would clear the way for more far reaching innovations proposed by the atlantic unionists. Furthermore, the Treaty at least would establish a structure (i.e., a multi-lateral alliance) which could hopefully be transformed into something more, a political union. Finally, Streit noted that the Treaty marked a step forward in that it gave official recognition to a unified Atlantic region with common interests.³

At the beginning of 1949 the Atlantic Union Committee was busy attempting to line up Congressional support for passage of atlantic union legislation. At this point there were a number of alternate strategies open. For example, they could have organized mass meetings and demonstrations across the nation in the hope of

¹Istvan Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, 1965), p. 107.

²"Atlantica's Future," Freedom and Union 3 (April 1949): 3.

³Ibid.

demonstrating to Congress the extent of popular support for their idea.

Instead, however, the Atlantic Union Committee decided to follow a different strategy. At a leadership meeting in February, 1949, they authorized their president, Owen J. Roberts, to approach key members of Congress and the Administration and solicit the support of these individuals for atlantic union endorsed legislation.⁴ Roberts was given a wide latitude as to the manner in which he would approach this task. Pleading that he was "inexperienced in political matters," Justice Roberts immediately sought the counsel of his personal friend on the "Hill," Senator Walter F. George of Georgia. Senator George advised Roberts that the atlantic unionists' best chance of achieving success would be to seek out President Truman, explain the logic behind the atlantic union proposal to the President, and then seek his support for the measure.⁵

Justice Roberts followed Senator George's advice and sought an interview with President Truman. On February 11, 1949, Roberts, accompanied by Atlantic Union Committee supporter William L. Clayton, had an interview with Truman. According to the later recollections of Owen Roberts, President Truman showed a degree of sympathy for the idea of holding the proposed federal exploratory convention. Truman in fact supposedly told them that he was willing to endorse

⁴Clarence K. Streit, Freedom and Union 10 (May 1956): 23, 24.

⁵Ibid., p. 23.

atlantic union publicly, provided Secretary of State Acheson did not object.⁶ However, Acheson did object to the proposal.

Moreover, during the next four years, as subsequent sections of this study will show, Acheson utilized a variety of pretexts for postponing action on the atlantic union proposal.⁷

At this particular time, Acheson objected to the proposal on the grounds that its implementation would interfere with Senate ratification of the pending North Atlantic Treaty.⁸ Of course, the atlantic unionist leadership had already anticipated this objection that the Committee would not lobby for enactment of its proposal until after the Senate had ratified the Treaty; in addition, the Atlantic Union Committee would actively work for the North Atlantic Treaty's ratification.⁹

The North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the Senate in July, 1949. Supposedly, there were no longer grounds for the Committee to defer lobbying for its objectives. Accordingly, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, a longtime atlantic union supporter, introduced into Congress a bill calling for the convening of an atlantic union exploratory convention:

Whereas the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have declared themselves determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law "and

⁶Ibid.

⁷See pp.

⁸Freedom and Union 10 (May 1956): 24.

⁹Ibid.

resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security"

and

Whereas, they have agreed in article 2 of that treaty to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being" and to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies" and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them,"

and

Whereas, the principles on which our American Freedom is founded are those of federal union, which are applied for the first time in history in the United States Constitution,

and

Whereas, our federal Constitution of 1787 worked out these principles of union as a means of safeguarding the individual liberty and common heritage of the people of thirteen sovereign states strengthening their free institutions, uniting their defense efforts, encouraging their economic collaboration, and severally attaining the aims that the democracies of the North Atlantic have set for themselves in the aforesaid treaty,

and

Whereas these federal union principles have succeeded impressively in advancing such aims in the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and wherever other free peoples have applied them,

and

Whereas, the United States, together with the other signatories to the treaty, has promised to bring about a better understanding of these federal principles and has, as their most extensive practitioner, and greatest beneficiary, a unique moral obligation to make this contribution to peace,

and

Whereas the United States and the other six democracies which sponsored the treaty have, by their success in drafting it, and extending it to others, established a precedent for united action toward the attainment of these aims, and the creation of a free and lasting union: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representative concurring), That the President is requested to invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet this year with delegates of the United States in a Federal Convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can

apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.¹⁰

Nineteen other Senators joined Senator Kefauver in co-sponsoring the resolution. The sponsoring Senators were:

Raymond Baldwin (Rep.--Connecticut)
 Harry P. Cain (Rep.--Washington)
 Virgil M. Chapman (Dem.--Kentucky)
 Zales R. Ecton (Rep.--Montana)
 J. Allen Frear (Dem.--Delaware)
 J. William Fulbright (Dem.--Arkansas)
 Walter F. George (Dem.--Georgia)
 Guy M. Gillette (Dem.--Iowa)
 Frank P. Graham (Dem.--North Carolina)
 Robert C. Hendrickson (Rep.--New Jersey)
 Lister Hill (Dem.--Alabama)
 Harley M. Kilgore (Dem.--West Virginia)
 Burnet R. Maybank (Dem.--South Carolina)
 Bert H. Miller (Dem.--Idaho)
 Joseph R. McCarthy (Rep.--Wisconsin)
 John H. Sparkman (Dem.--Alabama)
 Edward J. Thye (Rep.--Minnesota)
 Milton R. Young (Rep.--North Dakota)
 Garrett L. Withers (Dem.--Kentucky)¹¹

The senators listed above represented a diverse coalition of interests. For instance, the coalition sponsoring SCR 57, the atlantic union resolution, was bipartisan, thirteen Democrats and seven Republicans. Furthermore, these senators were drawn from all sections of the United States.

On the same date, an identical resolution was introduced into the House of Representatives. In that chamber, the bill was sponsored

¹⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, S. Con. Res. 57, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 26 July 1949, Congressional Record 96:3206.

¹¹Ibid., p. 3209/

jointly by Hale Boggs (Dem.--Louisiana), and Walter H. Judd (Rep.--Minnesota). Twenty other representatives promptly announced their support for this bill; consequently, the bill enjoyed support from a bipartisan coalition.¹²

Both the Senate and House atlantic union bills were introduced into the Congress without a great deal of publicity or fanfare. Therefore, it is surprising just how much grass-roots interest was immediately shown in the proposal. A number of different interest groups, representing divergent points of view, promptly began urging Congress to pass their resolution.

Several veterans organizations, for example, were included among the groundswell of support for the atlantic union proposal. The annual meeting of the Marine Corps League, held in September, 1949, passed a resolution endorsing the atlantic union proposal as offering the most promising means of avoiding World War III. About the same time, local chapters of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Detroit, Minneapolis, Peoria, Illinois, and Sacramento, California petitioned Congress to pass the aforementioned measure.¹³

Simultaneously, a number of civic organizations were also endorsing the proposal. It is interesting to note the wide range of such groups endorsing the convening of an atlantic union convention. They ranged from the California state chapter of the liberal-

¹²New York Times, 27 July 1949, p. 1.

¹³Freedom and Union 4 (November 1949): 9-11.

oriented Americans for Democratic Action to the Florida and Tennessee state conventions of the Junior Chamber of Commerce.¹⁴

Surprisingly, a number of leading American newspapers quickly lined up behind the atlantic union bill. To cite a few instances of this support, the Louisville Courier-Journal endorsed the resolution, calling it more "realistic" than the plan offered by the United World Federalists.¹⁵ Likewise, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, a leading midwestern newspaper, also endorsed the same bill; the Post-Dispatch observed that "by far, the most distinguished group in the Senate is behind the measure introduced by Senator Kefauver." The Des Moines Register and slightly later The Washington Post were among some of the other prominent newspapers supporting the atlantic union bill.¹⁶

Of course, support for the atlantic union proposal was not limited to interest groups and the media. A number of prominent individuals endorsed the atlantic union bill soon after its introduction into Congress. To cite a few of the many such examples available, former Assistant Secretary of War Robert Patterson announced his support for the atlantic union resolution on September 27, 1949.¹⁷ Even earlier in the New York U.S. Senate election, both the democratic nominee, Herbert Lehman, and the republican nominee, John Foster Dulles, endorsed the bill. Both candidates in fact stated that they

¹⁴Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷New York Times, 27 September 1949, p. 31.

would vote for the resolution if it were brought to the Senate floor.¹⁸

Of course, not every group in the United States approved of the proposal. Negative reactions appeared from some quarters. Specifically, the New York Times reported that the national leadership of the Daughters of the American Revolution had voted to oppose the atlantic union bill. Furthermore, when their executive committee learned that the national leadership of the Veterans of Foreign Wars was similarly inclined, the former voted to join forces with them in opposing atlantic union. As a result, these two groups organized a Patriots' Executive Committee to oppose the atlantic union measure.¹⁹ These organizations leading the opposition to the atlantic union bill supposedly feared that the creation of an atlantic union would lead to a loss of national sovereignty.²⁰

As the year 1949 closed, the leaders of the Atlantic Union Committee were very hopeful that the pending bill would be acted upon in the upcoming session of Congress. As this study has shown, the Truman Administration's attitude towards the atlantic union proposal remained unclear. On the other hand, President Truman had in private expressed sympathy for the idea; however, it was becoming clear that his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was cool to the proposal.

¹⁸Ibid., 28 October 1949, p. 19.

¹⁹Ibid., 15 August 1949, p. 26.

²⁰Ibid.

At the same time, it was also true that the Administration had not publicly gone on record as either favoring or disproving the idea. Therefore, one could, at this point, still argue that the Administration could be "won over" to the proposal. Of course, the Committee leadership understood that Congress generally tends to defer to Administration wishes in foreign policy matters. In any event, Congress would be unlikely to insist upon innovations in existing foreign policy in the face of the Executive Branch's opposition. Therefore, they quickly realized the importance of obtaining Administration support for their proposal. Without such backing, the plan would face a difficult future.²¹

Consequently, the Atlantic Union Committee's executive committee decided once again to seek the President's personal support for the proposal. President Truman granted a second interview with Atlantic Union officials. The interview was held at the White House on January 26, 1950. On this occasion, Owen Roberts, accompanied by the executive secretary Walden Moore and Senator Estes Kefauver, presented their viewpoint to the President.²²

The leadership felt a particular sense of urgency in obtaining the Administration's support at this time. It was known that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was about to open hearings on

²¹Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D. C., 1 May, 1984.

²²See letter, Walden Moore to the Atlantic Union Committee, 10 February, 1950, Kefauver Collection, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville.

proposals calling for the maintenance of international peace through the strengthening of international institutions. Therefore, this would be a very strategic time to obtain the Administration's endorsement of atlantic union as offering the best alternative for maintaining peace.²³

At any rate. they did not have very long to wait for a definite answer from the Administration. The Senate Foreign Relation Committee hearings opened on February 7, 1950; on February 16, 1950, in response to a question posed by a reporter, President Truman remarked that "now is not the time to press for Atlantic Union. There are more important matters to be dealt with."²⁴

Nevertheless, even in the face of this setback, the Atlantic Union Committee continued to hold out hope of somehow bringing the Administration around to their viewpoint. Certainly, Congressional supporters of atlantic union continued to press Secretary of State Acheson to explain his opposition. Moreover, during the spring and summer of 1950 several meetings were held between the movement's congressional supporters and State Department officials went to some lengths to assure the atlantic union supporters that their bill was not being singled for particular hostility. In fact, as was pointed out the Department also opposed with equal ardor other far-reaching proposals such as the one offered by the United World Federalists. Furthermore, the State Department officials promised

²³Freedom and Union 4 (March 1950): 3-5.

²⁴New York Times, 17 February 1950, p. 21.

to hold additional meetings with Congressional supporters of atlantic union in the hope of working out a compromise acceptable to both sides.²⁵

Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign relations Committee's subcommittee on International Organization began hearings on bills that proposed among other things increasing the political authority of the United Nations. Some of these bills called for the transferring of sovereignty from the nation-state to a new supranational institution. Consequently, their proposals were to some extent rivals of the atlantic union bill and therefore merit examination.

This Senate subcommittee had five members. They were: Elbert D. Thomas (Dem.--Utah), Theodore F. Green (Dem.--Rhode Island), Brian McMahon (Dem.--Connecticut), Alexander Wiley (Rep.--Wisconsin), and H. Alexander Smith (Rep.--New Jersey). Senator Elbert Thomas served as subcommittee chairman.²⁶ Subcommittee hearings opened on February 7, 1950; the hearings focused upon four different proposals described below.

First, the subcommittee considered Senate Concurrent Resolution 52, co-sponsored by Senators Elbert Thomas and Paul Douglas (Dem.--Illinois). This bill called for strengthening the authority of the United Nations in order to allow that body to maintain international

²⁵See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, March, 1950, Kefauver Collection, File 2, Box 6, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, p. 1.

²⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Review of the United Nations Charter, S., Rept. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, pp. 825-831. Hereafter cited as United Nations Charter Hearings.

peace. Specifically, the plan proposed increasing the Security Council's authority so that it could deal with threats to peace by a majority vote and this would eliminate the Big Powers' veto over Security Council decisions.²⁷ Under this plan, the Soviet Union would no longer be able to prevent a majority on the Council from acting to oppose aggression or maintain peace.

The proposed transformation of the Security Council into a supranational political organ would be accomplished through a multinational treaty open to all nations. Signatories to the treaty would pledge to come to the aid of any nation found by the Security Council to be the victim of aggression.²⁸ In summary, the Thomas-Douglas bill proposed a means of surmounting the practical problem of the Soviet veto while at the same time strengthening United Nations system.

The second bill considered by the subcommittee was sponsored by Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan, the senior Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The general aim of this bill was similar to the Thomas-Douglas bill. However, the Ferguson bill was more vaguely worded. It called for strengthening the political authority of the United Nations through "co-operation between likeminded states" and progressive interpretation of the United Nations Charter by appropriate international tribunals. Also, "if necessary" the United Nation's authority was to be extended by supplementary agreements.²⁹ Interestingly, the Ferguson bill was the only one

²⁷Ibid., pp. 787-816.

²⁸Ibid., p. 818.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 819-820.

of these measures that obtained the outright endorsement of the State Department.³⁰

Besides having the important State Department endorsement, the Ferguson bill was also supported by several prestigious organizations. For instance, the American Association for the United Nations and the League of Women Voters passed resolutions calling for the enactment of this measure.³¹ In addition, several prominent students of international organization, such as Clark Eichelberger and Clyde Eagleton, testified in behalf of the Ferguson bill.³²

It remains unclear why the State Department officials endorsed the Ferguson bill. Of course, observers at the time speculated on this matter. Clarence K. Streit offered a seemingly credible explanation for this behavior. According to Streit, the State Department did not really want any bill enacted that portended significant changes in the existing nation-state system. After all, under the existing nation-state system of diplomacy, the State Department exercised strong if not exclusive control over the conduct of foreign relations. However, under the atlantic union proposal, the conduct of foreign relations would be transferred to a new supranational authority. Therefore, Streit argued, State Department personnel could be expected

³⁰Ibid., p. 817.

³¹See Freedom and Union 4 (March 1950): 8-10.

³²United Nations Charter Hearings, pp. 806-809.

to resist what they regarded as encroachments upon their bureaucratic turf.³³

Nevertheless, the State Department officials realized that there was a possibility, perhaps a likelihood, of Congress enacting some sort of legislation proposing changes in the traditional nation-state sovereignty system. This being the case, the State Department preferred what they regarded as the least objectionable of the bills under consideration, the Ferguson bill. Perhaps by supporting the Ferguson bill, which was admittedly mostly of symbolic value, the State Department could head off the clamour for more far-reaching measures such as the Thomas-Douglas bill or the Atlantic Union bill.³⁴

The third measure considered by the Thomas subcommittee at these hearings was sponsored by Senator Glen Taylor, a Democratic senator from Idaho. Taylor's bill called for the establishment of a world government. This resolution, termed Senate Concurrent Resolution 66, specifically instructed the president to issue invitations to all nations, inviting their attendance at an international convention. The latter would then draw up a world government charter, to become effective one year after the president issued the call for the international convention.³⁵

Taylor's proposal was generally viewed on Capitol Hill as a utopian scheme with no chance of enactment; no other member of

³³See Freedom and Union 4 (May 1950): 1, 3.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵United Nations Charter Hearings, pp. 819-821.

Congress was known to be in favor of it. Outside of Congress, the measure enjoyed little popular support. Only one group, World Republic, a militant off-shoot of the United World Federalists, endorsed the bill. Given this situation, it is not surprising that Taylor's bill got nowhere in Congress.³⁶ In essence, the bill was considered to be an extremist measure. Moreover, aside from these connotations the bill probably would have been doomed just by virtue of its being sponsored by Senator Glen Taylor. Taylor, a flamboyant left-wing Democrat, was regarded with suspicion by most of his Senate colleagues; therefore, any measure associated with his name was likely to have rough sledding.³⁷

Senator Charles W. Tobey (Rep.--New Hampshire) sponsored the fourth measure considered by the Thomas subcommittee. Senator Tobey's bill proposed strengthening the United Nations, gradually turning the latter into an organ for world government. This resolution would have realized world government as the final step in a series of phases.³⁸ It was designated Senate Concurrent Resolution 56 and was co-sponsored by seventeen other senators. It commanded a wide range of support on Capitol Hill. Among its supporters were Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (Dem.--Minnesota), Wayne Morse (Rep.--Oregon), and Claude Pepper (Dem.--Florida). A number of prominent individuals

³⁶See Freedom and Union 4 (March 1950): 10.

³⁷Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D. C., May 1984.

³⁸See Freedom and Union 4 (March 1950): 10.

outside of the government also announced their support for the Tobey bill. Among them were: author James P. Warburg, Byrd A. Whitney, director of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen's Research Bureau, and author Scott Nearing.³⁹

In addition, the United World Federalists appeared to favor the resolution, at least unofficially. In any event, several high officials of that group testified at the hearings on behalf of the Tobey bill. For instance, Alan Cranston, the United World Federalist president and later United States Senator from California claimed this measure offered the only realistic plan for avoiding a costly nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

Lastly, the Thomas subcommittee considered the atlantic union bill. The subcommittee actually began its hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 57, Atlantic Union measure, on February 16, 1950. A number of prominent supporters of the movement testified before the subcommittee. Owen J. Roberts, atomic scientist Harold C. Urey, Will L. Clayton, and Senator Estes Kefauver.⁴¹

Former Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, now the Atlantic Union Committee president, was the first witness to speak on behalf of the resolution and he presented a forceful argument in favor of the pending bill. In general, Roberts argued that the atlantic union

³⁹U.S. Congress, S. Con. Res. 56, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 726 July 1949, Congressional Record 93: 10143.

⁴⁰Freedom and Union 4 (March 1950): 11.

⁴¹United Nations Charter, Hearings, pp. 824-829.

plan offered the only practical solution to the formidable problem of reconstructing the European economies and preventing further Soviet expansion in Europe.⁴²

In the course of this testimony, Robert drew some comparisons between the atlantic union proposal and existing political institutions. The newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he conceded, was a positive factor in the short-run. Nevertheless, he argued, the alliance with its overwhelming emphasis upon purely military matters, was an inadequate instrument for handling the broad range of problems faced by the western democracies. Unfortunately, Roberts said that he did not expect that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance would expand its scope in the foreseeable future. In this vein, the former Justice commented:

I don't think that you can straighten out a common defense policy without some kind of political mechanism. I do not think that you can straighten out our economic difficulties without political machinery. I don't think that you can do it by treaties.⁴³

Apparently Roberts anticipated the objections likely to be made by some opponents for he met the objections head-on in his remarks. For instance, certain opponents such as the Daughters of the American Revolution had denounced the proposed Atlantic exploratory convention as a guise to foist world government upon an unsuspecting American public.⁴⁴ With such objections in mind, Roberts carefully

⁴²Ibid., p. 312.

⁴³Ibid., p. 242.

⁴⁴United Nations Charter, Hearings, p. 322.

explained the resolution's working with respect to the calling of the proposed convention. Roberts pointed out that the resolution only authorizes delegates to meet with their counterparts. Any agreement drawn up by such a convention would require Congressional approval and possibly a constitutional amendment before becoming effective.⁴⁵ Therefore, he argued, there was no credibility to such an objection.

Harold C. Urey followed Roberts in offering supportive testimony, and his arguments largely repeated and reinforced the remarks made earlier by Roberts. Overall, they offered logical and coherent arguments in favor of holding the proposed atlantic union convention. The proponents claimed military, economic and political benefits would result from the creation of such a union. They foresaw no disadvantages in such a course of action.⁴⁶

While the testimony of these supporters was persuasive, perhaps other factors had a more crucial bearing upon the resolution's fate. Certainly, students of the foreign policy-making process know that many factors affect the outcome of the legislative struggles over foreign policy issues.⁴⁷ In this particular instance, the attitude of the State Department for reasons that have been discussed earlier became the most important factor. In short, the Congress was unwilling, in the absence of compelling circumstances, to demand innovations in foreign policy matters.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 351-353.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 360.

⁴⁷Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973), p. 5.

As the subcommittee hearings wore on, it became evident that the democratic members of the subcommittee were likely to follow the Administration's wishes in this area.⁴⁸ At least one receives this impression from reading the testimony offered at the hearings. To cite one instance of this tendency, Senator Elbert Thomas, subcommittee chairman, remarked early in the hearings that he feared passage of the atlantic union bill would offend the Soviet bloc and thereby intensify the existing Cold War.⁴⁹ At another point Democratic Senator Brian McMahon said he feared that the plan would scare the American public and consequently produce an isolationist reaction.⁵⁰

The State Department of course had ample opportunities for expressing opinions on the resolution since Department officials were present at the hearings. Specifically, Assistant Secretaries of State John T. Hickerson and Dean Rusk represented the Department at the hearings.⁵¹

Outwardly, Rusk and Hickerson maintained an aloof attitude toward all of these proposals. They did not actually condemn or endorse any of the pending bills. However, through the course of the subcommittee members' questioning, it became possible to ascertain

⁴⁸Chicago Tribune, 18 February 1950, pp. 1, 7.

⁴⁹United Nations Charter, Hearings, p. 221.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 229.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 415-463.

their general attitude toward each bill. For instance, in response to a question posed by Senator Wiley, Hickerson remarked that the Department believed the Thomas-Douglas bill increasing the Security Council's power was unwise.⁵²

When the atlantic union bill was brought before the subcommittee for scrutiny, these same officials pursued the same approach. In answering a question posed by Senator Wiley, Rusk remarked that he did not believe the western European democracies were ready for the sort of political union contemplated by the atlantic union plan. Moreover, Rusk claimed that ". . . there is greater danger in our raising with other governments major questions of American sovereignty unless we know exactly what we want . . . and we are willing to pay the costs."⁵³ After more questioning, Rusk let the subcommittee members know that he did not believe the American government had reached any such consensus on the question of atlantic union. Therefore, it was better at present to postpone action on this proposal.⁵⁴

During these hearings, Rusk also leveled another criticism at the proposal: that it would complicate the conduct of American foreign relations in those parts of the world not included in the atlantic union, specifically South America and Asia. Here Rusk meant that in areas of the world outside the contemplated atlantic union bilateral diplomatic relations would presumably continue. What reason, he asked, was there for believing that the proposed atlantic union

⁵²Ibid., p. 425.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 440-441.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 444.

would be an improvement over the conventional State Department in representing American interest in those areas of the world?⁵⁵

Senator Kefauver took upon himself the task of answering and rebutting the criticisms made by Rusk and Hickerson. Kefauver had only limited opportunities for engaging in this course of action since he was not a subcommittee member. However, he had been invited to testify before the subcommittee on behalf of the resolution. During his testimony he used the opportunity of his testifying to answer criticisms that Rusk and Hickerson had made earlier the same day of the atlantic union bill. These remarks by Senator Kefauver offer the only public effort by a member of Congress to delve into the reasons for the Truman Administration's hostility toward the atlantic union proposal.⁵⁶ Therefore, this refutation deserves attention here.

To begin with, Kefauver challenged the assertions made by Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson that Europe was not ready for the type of union contemplated by the proposal. The Tennessee senator quoted from recent statements by prominent western European political leaders such as Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, French general Pierre Billotte, and Belgium foreign minister Frans Van Cauwelaert stating that Europe was ready for close union with the United States.⁵⁷

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 451.

⁵⁶Clarence K. Streit to William L. Clayton, 2 June 1950, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 8, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 428.

Secondly, Kefauver criticized as inaccurate Hickerson's claim that the American public was not ready for the profound changes contemplated by the atlantic union proposal.

I think the State Department is assuming the prerogative of speaking for the American people and for the Congress. I think that if this same attitude had been present before 1787, we would never have had our great Federal Union here because nobody can ever be certain what is going to come out of a genuine effort to improve relations.⁵⁸

Thirdly, Senator Kefauver challenged John Hickerson's claim that the proposed atlantic union would cause economic disruptions within the United States. The same fears had been voiced when the Marshall Plan was proposed, and Kefauver contended that history had proven the fears without substance.⁵⁹ At this point, Hickerson interjected that atlantic union went beyond the Marshall Plan since the latter involved no transfer of National sovereignty. Kefauver rejoined that the proposed atlantic union exploratory convention would have opportunity to study carefully all possible consequences of proposed union, including the economic aspects. Besides, the United States Congress could be relied upon to reject any agreement drawn up by such a convention if the agreement was unfavorable to American economic interests.⁶⁰

At the close of his testimony, Senator Kefauver remarked:

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 429.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 431.

As one who has always supported the policy of the State Department and who believes . . . that we have to take our place in working for peace and world security, I want to say that . . . I am terrifically disappointed with the attitude of the State Department.⁶¹

However, the State Department representatives at the hearings remained opposed to the resolution. The State Department viewpoint on the measure can be summarized by a statement made by John Hickerson at the hearings.

The proposed Resolution directs its attention primarily to calling a convention to explore the possibilities of Atlantic Union. We believe that if the Government should sponsor such a convention at this time, it would raise false hopes. If such a convention did not succeed, it would lead to re-actions unfavorable to the cause of collective security.⁶²

In addition to the State Department officials, two other sources of opposition appeared at the subcommittee hearings.

First, several members of Congress received permission from the subcommittee to testify in opposition to the atlantic union bill. Representative Lawrence H. Smith (Rep.--Wisconsin) and Representative Clare E. Hoffman (Rep.--Michigan) denounced the measure in their testimony. Both men remarked that the Founding Fathers would be ashamed of the allegedly underhanded methods they felt that the Atlantic Union Committee was using to "subvert our nationality."⁶³

Smith's criticisms were somewhat more moderate than those offered by Hoffman. Smith was concerned mostly with procedural

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., p. 434.

⁶³Ibid., p. 490.

objections to Senate Concurrent Resolution 57. For example, Smith argued that it was inappropriate for Congress to go on record as favoring the atlantic union resolution without first obtaining strong expressions of public support. After all, he contended, the contemplated atlantic union would result in profound changes in the American constitutional system; therefore, Congress should withhold support for such a plan--regardless of its merits--without evidence of a popular mandate.⁶⁴

Hoffman's denunciation of the atlantic union proposal was more far-reaching. In fact, it could be described as venomous. Certainly his personal attacks upon Clarence K. Streit went beyond the normal limits of decorum observed by high government officials. In his remarks, Hoffman repeated accusations that he had first made in January, 1942; Streit and Justice Owen Roberts were subversives who unwittingly were aiding America's enemies by advocating World Government. Hoffman also indicated that he believed that the Atlantic Union Committee should be investigated by Congress.⁶⁵

Representative Hoffman summarized his general feelings about the atlantic union movement in his closing statement before the subcommittee.

It seems logical to believe that anyone who advocates scrapping our Constitution--and that is what this proposal in my humble judgment does--who advocates the hauling down

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 471, 472.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 482.

of the Stars and Stripes, and the putting up in its place . . . an international flag, lacks faith not only in our form of government, in the principles enumerated in the Constitution, but also lacks faith in the courage and endurance . . . of our people.⁶⁶

Veterans groups and so-called patriotic organizations comprised the second source of opposition to atlantic union appearing at the hearings. These groups presented several witnesses who denounced atlantic union before the subcommittee hearings. Omar B. Ketchum, director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Legislative Service, was one of these witnesses. Ketchum declared that the Veterans were "staunch supporters" of the United Nations and of the idea of collective security. However, he declared that they regarded the atlantic union proposal in a different light since it would require a "substantial yielding of our sovereignty."⁶⁷ Therefore, the national executive of the Veterans of Foreign Wars had voted to oppose both the atlantic union proposal and the World Federalist idea. However, as had already been indicated there were individual chapters acattered across the United States who took the opposite stand on the atlantic union bill.

Besides the veterans groups, there were also representatives of the Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense appearing before the subcommittee to denounce atlantic union. Mrs. William Leetch of Trenton, New Jersey, was one of these witnesses. She argued

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 484.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 625-627.

that the United States could best serve the cause of humanity by not joining in atlantic union but by "remaining free and independent."⁶⁸

On February 24, 1950 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed public hearings on all of the resolutions. Thereafter the subcommittee considered the measures in executive session.⁶⁹ The Thomas subcommittee did not actually issue a formal report until September, 1950. However, by late February, 1950 it was being rumored in Washington that the odds were against the subcommittee reporting favorably on any of them, including the atlantic union proposal. In the aftermath of the subcommittee's hearings on this subject, Time commented that the mass of conflicting arguments had left the senators "bewildered" and increasingly skeptical about the wisdom of adopting any of the impending bills.⁷⁰ The same article indicated there was evidence that the subcommittee would report a weak compromise bill on this subject. Time predicted that such a measure would merely call for the strengthening of the United Nations without committing the United States government to any course of action.

As might have been expected, the issue of atlantic union received less publicity after the subcommittee completed its hearings. Proponents of the bill realized the need to keep the proposal well publicized. Publicity would serve two positive functions. First,

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 624.

⁶⁹See Freedom and Union 4 (April 1950): 4-6.

⁷⁰Time, 27 February 1950, p. 21.

publicity would serve to spread and further the proposal among the general public. Despite years of continual agitation and lobbying by its proponents, there were obviously million of people in the United States unfamiliar with the proposal. Secondly, through grass-roots activities, the Committee could demonstrate to the Congress that the resolution bill had widespread popular support.⁷¹

Several activities were undertaken at this time with the purpose of keeping the atlantic union issue before the public. Mass meetings were held in several locations under the auspices of the Atlantic Union Committee. At meetings held in Memphis, Tennessee, Oakland, California, and Buffalo, New York, resolutions were passed requesting the Congress to pass the pending atlantic union bill. Hundreds of signatures were attached to these petitions. Incidentally, the petitions received their fair share of publicity in the newspapers.⁷²

Apparently the subcommittee hearings and the attendant publicity also captured the attention of many individuals not heretofore connected with the atlantic union movement. For instance, in the personal files of the late Senator Kefauver, this writer found hundreds of letters, written in early 1950, from individuals concerning this subject. Most of the letters appeared to be favorable to the

⁷¹Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C., 2 May 1984.

⁷²See Memphis Press-Scimitar, 16 March 1950, p. 1; Buffalo Courier-Express, 19 March 1950, p. 18; found in Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7.

atlantic union idea, and many of the letters commended Senator Kefauver for his championing this cause.⁷³

Interestingly, the proposal appears to have appealed to people from all walks of life and from all sections of the nation. For example, Kefauver's office received letters from the District Attorney of Lawrence County, Tennessee, a Chicago housewife, and a contractor from Chicago. Many of the letters seem to have been written as a result of hearing about the Atlantic Union Committee's grass-roots meetings.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, several additional newspapers endorsed the atlantic union measure: The Dallas Morning News, the Minneapolis Tribune, the Buffalo Courier-Express and the Christian Science Monitor.⁷⁵ These newspapers varied in the reasons that they gave for endorsing the idea. The Dallas Morning News took no position on the relative merits of the proposal. However, the newspaper's editor felt that no harm and possibly much good could result from exploring the possibilities of a federal union.⁷⁶ On the other hand, the Minneapolis Tribune was a partisan advocate of the bill. This newspaper blamed the State Department's hostility for the lack of Congressional action so far. The Tribune complained the Department had "embraced ultra-nationalism" and had made common cause with the "reactionary Chicago Tribune."⁷⁷ The Chicago Tribune had been denouncing the atlantic

⁷³Ibid., Box 6, Box 7.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Freedom and Union 4 (May 1950): 7, 9.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 9.

⁷⁷Ibid.

union proposal since 1947. When the State Department officials opposed the resolution at the Thomas subcommittee hearings, The Chicago Tribune editor was delighted. At this point The Chicago Tribune offered one of its rare words of praise for the Truman Administration. "Miracles do happen," the Tribune declared.⁷⁸

As the State Department's opposition to the atlantic union proposal became known, proponents of the atlantic union cause in Congress changed their tactics. Heretofore, for example, such supporters as Estes Kefauver and Guy M. Gillette (Dem.--Iowa), had avoided criticizing the State department's lukewarm attitude toward atlantic union in the hopes that the Department would eventually become supportive of the idea. However, once it became obvious that the die was cast on this matter, that State's opposition was likely to continue for the duration of the present administration, the proponents began publicly criticizing the State Department for its "shortsightedness."⁷⁹

Senator Kefauver's Senate speech of March 13, 1950 served notice that even senators of the president's political party were willing to challenge the Administration on this issue. This particular speech definitely received the most attention of such efforts. Not only did it get considerable attention in the press but in addition the Federal Union organization, the educational "arm" of the atlantic

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹U. S. Congress, Senate, remarks of Senator Guy M. Gillette, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 13 March 1950, Congressional Record, 96: 3206.

union movement, reprinted thousands of copies under the title, "A Reply to the State Department," and mailed them to thousands of citizens.⁸⁰

In this speech, Kefauver repeated many of the arguments that he had made in his testimony before the Thomas subcommittee. Again and again he lambasted the State Department for its "timidity" and "shortsightedness." Why, he asked, should the State Department oppose even the holding of such a conference? Since no one could foretell in advance what the proposed Atlantic Exploratory Conference might accomplish, why not at least give it the opportunity of demonstrating its potential?⁸¹

While the atlantic union supporters were stepping up their public attacks on the Department's policy, at the same time there were a number of unofficial contacts taking place between State Department officials and the organization's supporters. Apparently these contacts were deliberately kept low-key. At any rate, the contemporary press largely ignored these contacts.⁸²

The first of these meetings was held on March 2, 1950. No information is available on who attended or what was accomplished. Two days later, however, a second meeting took place, about which more is known. Senator Estes Kefauver, Senator J. William Fulbright,

⁸⁰See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, 24 May 1950; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 8, pp. 2, 3.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²See Edmund Orgill to Senator Estes Kefauver, 1 April 1950, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6.

and Senator John Sparkman, all representing the atlantic union forces on Capitol Hill, met with Secretary of State Dean Acheson.⁸³

According to Senator Kefauver's later recollection, the meeting lasted less than one hour. During this time, Secretary Acheson outlined "details of a piecemeal program."⁸⁴ Senator Kefauver then advised Acheson that the Administration would never "be able to get this message across to the people" due to its alleged abstractness. "Frankly, I had difficulty understanding it myself," Kefauver later confided to his friend Edmund Orgill.⁸⁵

Within a few months after this meeting, the Korean War began. Obviously, the top-level policy-makers in the State Department were more and more forced to focus attention upon the problems growing out of the new crisis.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, even in these very busy times, State Department officials agreed, at the urging of atlantic union proponents, to another informal meeting which occurred on August 7, 1950.

At this conference, several former State Department officials met with Dean Acheson and requested that the Administration reverse its position on the atlantic union resolution. William H. Standley, formerly stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, Arthur Bliss

⁸³See Estes Kefauver to Edmund Orgill, 8 April 1950, *ibid.*

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 411-425.

Lane, a former State Department official in Greece, former Assistant Secretary of State Garrison Norton, former Undersecretary William Phillips, and former Ambassador Joseph G. Grew were present.⁸⁷

Two days later a more formal contact took place between Secretary of State Acheson and a bipartisan Congressional delegation. Several prominent persons not at present associated with government service, such as John Foster Dulles, John Sherman Cooper, and Averill Harriman, were also in attendance. The members of the bipartisan Congressional delegation, the composition of which is not known, urged Acheson to reconsider his position on the atlantic union proposal.⁸⁸

By this time, Congress was nearing adjournment. A new Congress would meet after the November, 1950 Congressional elections. It was becoming obvious that there was little possibility of bringing the resolution before either house for a vote before Congress adjourned. Therefore, the atlantic union supporters on Capitol Hill began planning their strategy for dealing with the next Congress.

An informal "strategy" meeting was held by the Congressional supporters at Washington's Hotel Statler on September 6, 1950. This meeting was attended by Senators Edward Thye (Rep.--Minnesota), J. William Fulbright (Dem.--Arkansas), Kefauver, and Representatives James Wadsworth (Rep.--New York), Hale Boggs (Dem.--Louisiana), Christian Herter (Rep.--Massachusetts). Those present generally

⁸⁷ See memorandum by Walden Moore to the Atlantic Union Committee, 27 September 1950, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

agreed that somehow they must win over the Truman Administration to their proposal in order to have any likelihood of achieving success.⁸⁹

Most of the individuals present at this meeting felt that the Administration might be won over if certain changes were made in the resolution. Perhaps the revised measure might contain the following provisions:

1. The United States government reaffirms its policy of co-operation with the United Nations, and working through that organization, strengthening the United Nations organization in "every way that the Charter permits."
2. In order to strengthen further the forces of peace the United States President is requested to invite the Democratic nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Pact to name delegates to a convention to explore the possibility of creating a federal union.
3. The United States government pledges that once the danger of war has passed, it agrees to place the large expenditures now allocated for military items into a technical assistance program for undeveloped nations, to be administered by the United Nations.⁹⁰

On the same day that this conference took place, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report on the hearings conducted earlier in the year on international organization. Not surprisingly, the report declared that the Foreign Relations Committee would not be reporting the atlantic union resolution or, for that

⁸⁹Estes Kefauver to Senator Edward J. Thye, 7 September 1950, *ibid.*

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

matter, any proposal calling for significant changes in the existing nation-state system.⁹¹

With respect to the specific resolution, the report enumerated a number of different reasons for not recommending its passage. The reader will recognize the similarities between these arguments and those voiced earlier by the State Department officials:

1. The Atlantic Union proposal would entail profound changes in the American constitutional system; it is unlikely that the American public are ready for such changes.
2. The Atlantic Union proposal would have profound economic repercussions upon American agriculture and industry. These consequences of such action cannot be fully foreseen.
3. Government endorsement of the Atlantic Union proposal at this time might raise false hopes that would be dashed if the exploratory convention failed to produce the desired results.
4. Establishment of such a federal union might actually be a source of weakness and internal division within the North Atlantic Treaty, rather than a way of strengthening the democracies.⁹²

In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted that the existence of the Korean War was raising questions about the efficacy of collective security arrangements. Since the answer to such questions was not yet possible, obviously more time was needed to study how such agreements operate in times of crisis.⁹³

⁹¹United Nations Charter, Hearings, pp. 816-825.

⁹²Ibid., p. 825.

⁹³Ibid., p. 819.

The Committee report at one point revealed the difficulties perceived by the subcommittee members in trying to sift through the five aforementioned proposals. "There was no agreement as to what to do, who should do it, what the result of specific proposals would be, nor was there any evidence that the American people are aware of the full implications of the various proposals." Under these circumstances, the subcommittee recommended further study and discussion of all the proposals rather than immediate Congressional action.⁹⁴

The 1950 Congressional elections followed soon after the release of this report. Atlantic union was not a prominent campaign issue. Even Clarence Streit conceded that none of the Senate and probably only a few House races were influenced by opinion on the issue.

Overall, the Democrats maintained majority control of both Houses of Congress, but their majorities were reduced.⁹⁵ Estes Kefauver estimated that the atlantic union proposal would have slightly more support in the newly elected House of Representatives and about the same strength as before in the Senate.⁹⁶

⁹⁴See untitled preliminary draft of forthcoming Committee report, Subcommittee on Internal Organization, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August, 1950, p. 5; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 46.

⁹⁶See New York Times, 9 November 1950, pp. 1, 6.

CHAPTER V

THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING ACTIVITIES DURING 1951 AND 1952

Special efforts were made by the atlantic union supporters to obtain Congressional passage of an atlantic union resolution during the life of the Eighty-second Congress, 1951-52. As the atlantic union supporters looked ahead to 1951, they were hopeful of reversing the proposal's fortunes experienced in 1950. Obviously, a great deal would depend upon being able to secure either the Administration's support for the bill, or failing that, eventually at least building up a groundswell of support in Congress for the measure. Once the latter scenario was achieved, perhaps the Truman Administration would find it politically advantageous to go along with the proposal.

In any event, atlantic union proponents chose to attempt wooing both the Executive and Legislative branches at the same time. Soon after the 1950 Congressional elections, Clarence K. Streit prepared a strategy memorandum for Atlantic Union Committee president Owen J. Roberts. In this memorandum, Streit took notice of the political realities with which the Atlantic Union Committee would need to deal in the upcoming months. First of all, Streit advised Atlantic Union Committee president Roberts that since Republican strength in the new Congress would be increased, they should concentrate more effort upon recruiting more Republican Representatives and Senators to their camp.¹

¹See memorandum by Clarence K. Streit to the Atlantic Union

Streit conceded in this memorandum that the atlantic union proposal had enjoyed bipartisan support in the past session. However, it was also true, as he pointed out, that most of the prominent proponents of the bill, at least with respect to the Senate, were Democrats. Since it was mostly Democratic members of Congress who had been most closely identified with the atlantic union cause, Streit feared that perhaps the "freshman" members of the new Congress might so regard the atlantic union measure as a "Democratic idea." Since most of these "freshman" Representatives would be Republicans, such perceptions could work to the disadvantage of their cause. In order to head off any such misperception before it got started, Streit proposed to Roberts that they ask Republican supporters of the atlantic union resolution, such as Representative Walter H. Judd (Minnesota) and Senator Edward J. Thye (Minnesota), to explain the bipartisan nature of the atlantic union proposal to their Republican colleagues, and attempt to enlist their support.²

In this memorandum, Streit mentioned that he had recently talked to several prominent Republicans regarding the need to include more Republican representation in the movement; however, Streit admitted that he had not asked any of these prominent Republicans (specifically, Streit mentions conversations with John Foster Dulles, International Business Machines chairman of the board Thomas J. Watson, and Christian A. Herter) to do the recruiting themselves.

Committee, 16 November 1950, Kefauver Collection; University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, File 1, Box 7.

²Ibid.

In addition, Streit included in this memorandum a copy of suggested revisions in the atlantic union resolution that had been recently formulated by the executive committee.³ The following paragraphs, Streit noted, were to be inserted in the bill "after the usual preamble paragraphs":

1. The United States reaffirms its policy of strengthening both the United Nations and the Atlantic Community, and is determined to press forward all the program in the field it has now under way to prevent aggression, preserve freedom, without war, reduce armaments, speed recovery, and open a better future for all.
2. To advance this peaceful policy still further, the President is requested to invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates representing the principal political parties to meet this year with delegates of the United States in a federal convention to explore how far their peoples and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite, to send delegates, can apply among themselves, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.
3. The United States pledges that if, as it hopes, this action results in permitting a reduction in the present arms burden of the American people, and the other parties thereto, it will do its best to arrange that a substantial percentage of this savings shall be devoted to financing a United Nations "Point Four" program of education, health, and technical assistance to those underdeveloped nations where ignorance, disease, and poverty threaten individual freedom.⁴

The reader can observe here the similarities between these revisions and the suggested revisions formulated by their supporters in Congress. Both revision attempts sought basically to broaden support for the proposal by identifying its purpose as being consistent with an existing, ongoing institution, the United Nations.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., pp. 2-3.

Secondly, the revised bill was designed to allay suspicions that the proposed atlantic convention might somehow produce an agreement undermining the American constitutional system. Under the new proposal, the "exploratory" nature of the proposed convention would be made explicit; that is, the convention would lack treaty-making authority.⁵

As 1951 opened, proponents of atlantic union were hopeful that their resolution would pass Congress during the upcoming year. On the positive side, there was some evidence that the proposal was gaining support abroad. For instance, the Canadian Senate had, in June, 1950, passed a resolution that placed that body on record as favoring the holding of an atlantic union exploratory convention.⁶

In addition, by this time an atlantic union resolution was pending before the British House of Commons. So far, neither the Conservative nor the Labour Party had adopted the proposal as part of its legislative agenda. However, Tom Leathers, a Conservative M.P. and a atlantic union supporter, was hopeful that support for the proposal would grow.⁷ By this time there was also a small British Atlantic Union organization already in operation.⁸

⁵Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D. C., May 2, 1984.

⁶See Memphis Press-Scimitar, 30 June 1950, p. 17.

⁷See Mrs. Hattie Pavlo to Senator Kefauver, 12 June 1951; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7.

⁸Freedom and Union 4 (June 1950): 11-12.

Early in 1951 Senator Kefauver reintroduced the atlantic union resolution into the Senate. Designated Senate Concurrent Resolution 4, the new atlantic union measure was identical in form to the preceding one.⁹ This is surprising considering the sentiment expressed by atlantic unionist insiders for modifying the existing proposal during the previous autumn.¹⁰

As the new Congressional session opened, Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, tried to ascertain the State Department's position on this matter. Perhaps the latter was now willing to drop its opposition to the proposal. The State Department's views on this matter were important for Connally, a loyal Democrat. Senator Connally told certain atlantic union supporters in Congress that he would not authorize the Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings on the resolution unless the State Department indicated a change of attitude.¹¹

However, when contacted by Senator Connally, State Department officials provided evasive answers to his questions relating to atlantic union. Basically, the State Department officials told Connally that since the atlantic union proposal envisioned going outside normal, conventional diplomatic channels to accomplish their

⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Con. Res. 4, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 15 January 1951, Congressional Record 97:261.

¹⁰As explained above, pp. 1-4.

¹¹See Livingston Hartley to Walden Moore, Executive Secretary, Atlantic Union Committee, 8 March 1951, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6.

desired goals,¹² the proposal was not strictly speaking a matter within the Department's jurisdiction.

Privately, State Department officials John Hickerson and Dean Rusk told Senator Connally that the Department still had misgivings about the appropriateness of the proposal at the present time.¹³ Not surprisingly, these remarks had an influence on Connally's attitude toward the pending bill; the resolution was allowed to die in Committee, and no Foreign Relations Committee hearings were scheduled on the matter.

In the House of Representatives, the treatment of the atlantic union bill was slightly different. A resolution identical to the Senate version was introduced by Representative Hale Boggs in January, 1951. A few months later, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs got around to holding hearings on the measure. For some unexplained reason, that Committee considered the atlantic union resolution at the same time that it was holding hearings on such disparate subjects as: (1) a declaration recognizing that the Yalta Agreements were "null and void," and (2) a resolution declaring the "sense of Congress" that Communist aggression anywhere in the world was grounds for appropriate action by the United Nations Security Council.¹⁴

Since the House Committee on Foreign Affairs considered the proposals in executive session, it is not possible to determine exactly

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Preliminary Hearings on Various Bills. S. Rept. 1313, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 6.

exactly how the Committee members deliberated on the bill. Certainly the prevailing sentiment must have been unfavorable since the resolution was not reported back to the House.

In the meantime, during the summer of 1951 supporters of atlantic union engaged in a number of promotional activities designed to increase public awareness of the atlantic union bill. Federal Union, the sister organization to the Atlantic Union Committee, printed an additional 20,000 copies of Senator Estes Kefauver's previously mentioned March, 1950 Senate speech on the atlantic union issue at a cost of \$439.00 to the Federal Union.¹⁵ At the same time, the Atlantic Union Committee was utilizing the medium of radio to reach an even wider audience. For a nominal charge, a Washington radio station prepared a series of recordings for the Committee. Five different one-minute recordings were produced. All of these recordings featured Senator Estes Kefauver explaining how the atlantic union proposal, if enacted, would help solve the problem of unemployment, the threat of World War III, the danger posed by international communism, the Korean War stalemate, and the high cost of living. At the close of the presentation, the listener was urged to write the Committee headquarters for more information on the subject.¹⁶ The Atlantic Union Committee made the recordings available to any radio

¹⁵See Gil Lamb, Federal Union Executive Committee member, to Senator Kefauver, 4 May 1951, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6.

¹⁶See texts of these recordings, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 8.

station that agreed to place them on the air. It is known that at least ten stations used these recordings during 1951-52.¹⁷

Meanwhile the Atlantic Union Committee organization attempted to build up its support in Congress for the resolution while waiting for the State Department to drop its opposition. Several different tactics were realized in pursuing this objective. First of all, twice during the 1951 Congressional session Senator Kefauver sent each member of the Senate a letter outlining his reasons for sponsoring the measure and requesting that his colleagues keep an open mind on the subject.¹⁸ In addition, Kefauver's office sent a questionnaire to each "veteran" senator and representative who had supported the proposal in the last Congress. Each recipient of the questionnaire was asked to indicate by return mail whether he was willing to support the bill in the new Congress.¹⁹ In this way, the atlantic union supporters hoped to prevent erosion of their support while waiting for the time that it would be brought up for a vote.

In the spring of 1951 the Committee's leadership produced a confidential assessment of their support within the Congress. The memorandum listed forty-six senators who could be counted upon to support the resolution should it come up for a vote.²⁰ An

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸See copies of letters to each United States senator, Kefauver Collection, *ibid*.

¹⁹For a copy of this questionnaire, see Kefauver Collection File 1, Box 5.

²⁰See confidential memorandum by Clarence K. Streit, 5

additional ten Democratic senators were listed as being willing to vote for the resolution if the Truman Administration dropped its opposition. The latter group combined with the first group would produce the necessary majority.²¹ According to the memorandum, only twenty senators were firmly opposed to the atlantic union bill.²²

However, the widespread support in Congress would mean little apparently in the face of continued State Department opposition. Unfortunately for the atlantic union supporters, there was no indication of that opposition ending. In fact, in April, 1951 Estes Kefauver told an executive session of the leadership that he believed that Secretary of State Dean Acheson was ignoring the proposal, hoping the latter would be withdrawn. Kefauver remarked that this condition would not change as long as Acheson remained Secretary of State.²³

Senator Kefauver had advised the Committee's officers in May, 1951 that the next thirty days would be crucial to the fate of the measure in this session of Congress. That is, either the resolution would be reported out of committee and voted upon in the near future, or it would be allowed to die in committee. Time was running out on the current Congressional session.²⁴

February 1951, Kefauver Collection, *ibid.*

²¹The Democratic senators so listed were Anderson (New Mexico); Connally (Texas); McFarland (Arizona); Clements (Kentucky); Kerr (Oklahoma); O. Johnson (South Carolina); Hoey (North Carolina); Ellender (Louisiana); and W. Smith (North Carolina); see *ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, 16 May 1951; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7.

With this impending deadline in mind, the Committee made one last attempt to obtain the Administration's support. It happened that the Board of Governors of the Atlantic Union Committee were holding a scheduled meeting in Washington, D.C. the week of May 15-20, 1951. The convening of this meeting apparently offered members of that body a convenient excuse to send some of their number to call upon the President and request his support one final time. Therefore, a committee composed of Owen Roberts, Atlantic Union Committee vice-president William L. Clayton, and committee executive secretary Walden Moore were sent to call upon President Truman and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Tom Connally. Although this was accomplished, there is no indication that the President was influenced by this delegation and neither was Senator Connally.²⁵

By July, 1951 the Atlantic Union Committee leadership realized that it would not be able to obtain the desired legislation during the current session of Congress. They looked ahead to 1952, but the prospects for success looked bleak for that year also. Nineteen fifty-two would be a presidential election year. It is generally acknowledged that Congress is not receptive to far-reaching policy innovations in an election year.

Furthermore, it was common knowledge around Washington in the summer of 1951 that Senator Kefauver would likely be a presidential

²⁵See Richard Harless to Charles Neece, 16 June 1951, Kefauver Collection, *ibid*.

candidate next year.²⁶ This would mean that he would not be available, as in the past, to make speeches for their cause, nor would he be in a position to help the cause on Capitol Hill. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Committee made no serious lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill during the 1952 session of Congress. Instead, it concentrated in 1952 upon educational activities. Also, the leadership devoted time to recruiting candidates for public office from individuals sympathetic to their cause. Those candidates endorsing the resolution were given help by the Atlantic Union Committee.

During 1951 and 1952 the atlantic union proponents also faced the drawback of having to lobby for their objective while the United States continued involvement in the Korean conflict. It is difficult to determine just how much this factor operated to impede the atlantic union cause. Of course, the Truman Administration's opposition to the proposal cannot be attributed to the Korean War since the former had shown opposition to the proposal before the war broke out. Yet, in another sense, the existence of the Korean conflict may have acted to doom whatever slim chance might have remained for obtaining the Administration's support. This was because the problems and issues arising out of American involvement in the war placed additional responsibilities and burdens upon the already overworked top policy-

²⁶See Richard Harless to Senator Kefauver, 28 August 1951, Kefauver Collection, *ibid*.

makers in the State Department.²⁷ Consequently, the Secretary of State and his immediate subordinates had very little time for subjects seemingly removed from the salient "Cold War" issues. It is not surprising that under these conditions these officials found no time for further study and consideration of atlantic union, which the policy-makers regarded as a secondary matter. This development was unfortunate from the atlantic union supporters' view since it meant that there were no opportunities for the Administration to formulate an alternative response to the atlantic union proposal.

²⁷ For an idea of the extent of these responsibilities, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 441-467.

CHAPTER VI

THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE'S IMPACT UPON THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, 1953-1954

The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as president in November, 1952 confronted the atlantic union supporters with a new reality. Not only would there be a new Administration, but for the first time in twenty years the nation would have a Republican administration. Naturally, the atlantic union movement's leadership was anxious to learn what the new Administration's attitude would be on the atlantic union issue. The past Administration had been cool toward the proposal but there was cautious hope that the new Administration would view the matter more favorably.¹ In private the Atlantic Union Committee officers expressed the sentiment that the new Secretary of State-designate, John Foster Dulles, would be a great improvement over Dean Acheson.²

On November 10, 1952 the Atlantic Union Committee's standing executive committee held a meeting to consider, among other things, how they should deal with the incoming Administration. This meeting, attended by eight of their officers quickly devised a temporary course

¹This optimism is reflected in a letter, Clarence K. Streit to Owen J. Roberts, 10 November 1952, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 7, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville.

²See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, 10 November 1952, *ibid.*

of action to follow. It was decided that for the time being, the Committee should suspend all lobbying activity in Congress in order to give the new Administration the opportunity to outline its foreign policy positions.

The members of the executive committee realized that it might take several months for the new Administration to complete the process of formulating its policies. In the meanwhile, they voted to authorize several of their officials to confer with the new Secretary of State and hopefully obtain his unqualified support for the holding of an atlantic exploratory convention.³ Once such support was secured, they could resume the lobbying activities.

The Atlantic Union Committee received an abundance of advice from supporters as the year 1953 opened. As will be shown later, some of the advice offered contradicted other suggestions given.

Since the new Congress was going to be under Republican majority, the Atlantic Union Committee was particularly interested in obtaining suggestions from its Republican supporters on Capital Hill. One such supporter, Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky advised Streit that the "first order of business" for atlantic union supporters should be the arranging of a meeting with the new Secretary of State-designate, John Foster Dulles. Cooper suggested holding such a meeting as soon as possible, preferably before the new Administration took office on January 20, 1953 in order to ascertain the new Administration's views

³Ibid.

on atlantic union. Senator Cooper advised that no further lobbying for atlantic union should take place until such a meeting could be set up.⁴

Another Republican supporter, however, gave Streit slightly different advice. Senator Frank B. Carlson of Kansas suggested that their leaders should wait until after the January 20th inauguration of the new Administration before meeting with Dulles. Carlson also wanted them to reach an understanding soon with the new Administration. However, he contended that the new Secretary of State would be burdened by so many different responsibilities as the result of launching a new Administration that they would be wise in not adding to Dulles' existing responsibilities at the moment. To insist upon meeting the new Secretary of State under these circumstances might actually work to the disadvantage of the atlantic union cause.⁵

George Nelson, on the other hand, advised them to pursue a different strategy. Nelson, chief lobbyist for the International Machinist Union and an atlantic union supporter, advised them to press hard for early Congressional action on the proposal. Nelson warned that the resolution could not afford to wait for its turn to be considered by the new Congress. The new Congress would be so overloaded with requests for legislation that only those proposals "first in line" would stand any chance of consideration in the present session.⁶

⁴See memorandum by Clarence K. Streit, prepared for Executive Committee, Atlantic Union Committee, 14 January 1953; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

In practical terms, Nelson warned that bills not reported out of Congressional Committee within the first sixty days of the new Congressional session would have no chance of passage.⁷

Nelson dismissed Streit's fears that such a course of action would engender hostility from Dulles. This was because the new president, Eisenhower, had assured Nelson back during the campaign that he was "favorably inclined toward the Atlantic Union idea." Nelson also observed, "During last year, you had no chance, for you were bucking Acheson. But these fellows want to make a record."⁸

Interestingly, there were also some Republican Senators who advised them to aim their lobbying at the White House; perhaps the new president could be persuaded to make a reference to the Atlantic Union proposal in his first message to Congress. Senator Robert Hendrickson (Republican--New Jersey) was a proponent of this view. Hendrickson argued that the new Republican-controlled Congress would likely be very receptive to policy recommendations coming from the newly elected Republican president.⁹

After weighing all of these suggestions, they chose to follow the course of action suggested by Senator Carlson and to press for a face-to-face meeting with the new Secretary of State after he had been in office for a few weeks. On February 10, 1953 Dulles' office wrote

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹See Clarence K. Streit to Owen J. Roberts, 8 January 1953; *ibid.*, Box 8.

Committee president Owen Roberts that the Secretary of State would grant the requested interview on February 17, 1953. This letter left the impression that President Eisenhower would also attend the meeting. On the day of the scheduled meeting, the Atlantic Union Committee representatives were ushered into President Eisenhower's White House office. The President was introduced to Owen Roberts, Clarence Streit, Lithgow Osborne, and Livingston Hartley and proceeded to make a few general comments praising the work of the Atlantic Union Committee. Then, President Eisenhower announced he would be leaving this meeting in order to turn to other urgent matters. He told the delegates that in a few minutes they would be meeting with Secretary of State Dulles who would continue the discussions and later make a report to the President on what had been discussed.¹⁰

Consequently, in a few minutes, the representatives were ushered into an adjacent room where they met with Dulles and Deputy Secretary of State James Bonbright.¹¹ Roberts presented several different arguments in support of his project. Roberts tried to use Dulles' past association with the atlantic union proposal to his advantage. Roberts reminded Dulles that the latter had endorsed the atlantic union bill when a candidate for the United States Senate in 1949.

¹⁰See unsigned memorandum, "Draft Report of the Meeting with the Secretary of State," February 1953; *ibid.*, p. 2.

¹¹*Ibid.*

Dulles, for his part, conceded that he had endorsed the atlantic union bill in 1949, but he did all that he could to downplay his earlier endorsement of the idea. For instance, Dulles pointed out that he had not been one of the formal sponsors of the measure. He insisted that he had only agreed to vote for the resolution if it came before the Senate.¹²

After sensing that this tactic was not working, Roberts tried another argument. He told the Secretary of State that adoption of the proposal would enable the North Atlantic Treaty countries to slash millions of dollars from their respective defense budgets with no decrease in their security. This would be accomplished through elimination of unnecessary duplication in research, purchasing, and deployment.¹³ At the same time, the atlantic union would result in greater world trade and a higher living standard for the peoples involved. Nevertheless, Secretary of State Dulles did not appear to be receptive to these claims. When Roberts and Streit spoke of the supposed advantages of an atlantic union, Dulles raised objections. In general, his objections paralleled those raised by his predecessor, Dean Acheson, although there were some differences in specifics.

Dulles told the representatives that the Eisenhower Administration had high hopes for achieving military integration in western Europe through the proposed European Defense Community. Dulles remarked that he was anxious that nothing be allowed to interfere with

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

this project. However, he said that if the United States government endorsed the atlantic union proposal immediately, some of the North Atlantic Treaty nations might somehow use the existence of this proposal as a pretext for avoiding following through with plans for military integration. The result, Dulles claimed, would be that their proposal would compete for the policy-makers' attention with the European Defense Community and probably neither would be realized.¹⁴

At this point, Clarence Streit tried to reassure Dulles that Administration support for the atlantic union proposal would have no such consequences. Streit emphasized the time factor in his argument. A minimum of several years would be required in order to actually get the Union into operation. By that time, Streit argued, the military integration contemplated by the European Defense Community would already be an accomplished fact. Therefore, the atlantic union could not possibly interfere with realization of the European Defense Community.¹⁵

At the conclusion of the meeting, Dulles told the representatives that he would consider their viewpoints carefully. However, he promised nothing.

As matters turned out, there was to be no Administration action on the proposal during the life of the eighty-third Congress. In fact, for reasons explained further in this study, the atlantic union supporters in Congress did not even introduce such legislation at

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

this time. The Eisenhower Administration officials while commending the Committee for its "fine work" actually found excuses for avoiding endorsement of the proposal.¹⁶

Pierre Streit, Clarence Streit's son, later referred to the year 1953 as a "year of stagnation for Atlantic Union."¹⁷ That remark was somewhat of an exaggeration since the movement did achieve some success in broadening its appeal during 1953 as will be explained later. Nevertheless, it certainly was not a time when much progress was being made toward the achieving of the movement's immediate goal, the enactment of legislation calling for the holding of an atlantic union convention.

After an interval of several months spent observing the new Administration in action, the Committee's leadership came to the conclusion that its wait-and-see policy was not achieving anything. Therefore many in the leadership advocated resuming the overt lobbying for a Congressional resolution. Clarence Streit operating without the Committee's authorization informally continued to lobby for the proposal on Capitol Hill. He sought a Republican Senator who would

¹⁶In fact shortly after the election of Dwight Eisenhower to the presidency in November, 1952, John Foster Dulles sent the Atlantic Union Committee the following telegram commending its work.

"As you know, I am quite familiar with the work of your committee. I feel that it has an understanding of the nature and infinite capacities of the federal system. It is important that this be understood in connection with the development of the NATO organization, because NATO can hardly succeed if it is merely a political alliance of temporary expediency." The text of this telegram is found in Freedom and Union 9 (March 1955): 6.

¹⁷Freedom and Union 8 (January 1954): 18, 19.

reintroduce the old atlantic union resolution in the Senate. Several Republican Senators were willing, but they advised against such action in the present session of Congress.¹⁸ Apparently, they felt that it was useless to reintroduce the measure without first obtaining Administration support since it was highly unlikely that the Republican-controlled Senate would even consider it without President Eisenhower's endorsement.¹⁹ Streit himself admitted that the atlantic union cause had much to lose in the way of momentum if the resolution was reintroduced and then floundered in Committee. Observers would regard this contingency as a serious setback for the cause; the following year it would be even harder to get anywhere with the bill.²⁰

It was in this setting that the Atlantic Union Committee's Board of Governors held their regular quarterly meeting on May 14, 1953. Some highly important decisions were made at this meeting. To begin with, there was consensus among the Governors that the resolution should not be reintroduced into Congress for the time being. Most of the Governors felt that this postponement would only be temporary.²¹

¹⁸Senators Cooper and Carlson were the unnamed Republican Senators. This information is given in correspondence of Don Dennis, executive secretary, Atlantic Union Committee to Elmo Roper, Jr., 2 April 1953, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹See internal minutes, Board of Governors, May 1953, p. 3, ibid.

The leadership discussed the recent conversations with the State Department officials regarding the future of the resolution. Dulles' professed fears concerning the possible interference to the European Defense Community caused by the Administration's endorsing atlantic union, were discussed. Most of the Board felt that Dulles' fears in this regard were groundless. However, in order to remove any possible basis for such fears the Board of Governors voted to postpone reintroduction of the atlantic union bill until after the European Defense issue was "settled."²² It was expected that the issue would be decided by the Fall of 1953. At any event, it was hoped that this gesture would reassure the Administration.

This same Board meeting also tackled some other basic issues having a bearing upon the Committee's strategy. The Board was specifically interested in the question of how far the Atlantic Union Committee should be willing to compromise or revise its bill in order to widen Congressional support. The Board members generally agreed that some revisions were perhaps necessary. However, some felt that too much compromising in the bill's language might result in a measure so watered-down as to be worthless.²³

Livingston Hartley, a committee staff support person, made a motion at the meeting to change key phrases in that clause of the resolution dealing with authority of the delegates to the proposed Atlantic Convention. Hartley's motion read:

²²Ibid., p. 4.

²³Ibid.

Whereas a Convention of delegates from political parties and peoples appointed officially but acting as individuals uninstructed by their governments and unable to commit their governments would constitute a flexible instrument for such exploration supplementing existing diplomatic machinery, would arouse greater interest among North Atlantic peoples than can diplomatic machinery in the problems of greater unity, would undermine Communist leadership by refuting its doctrine that these peoples are destined to disunion and conflict, and would create a new confidence in the future among all peoples: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) that the President is requested to invite the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates from their principal political parties, and their peoples, to meet this year in a Convention with delegates from the United States and delegates from such other democracies as the Convention may invite to explore means of achieving greater unity within the framework of the United Nations, and to respect these recommendations to their respective governments and peoples.²⁴

The motion generated considerable discussion at the Board Meeting. Several of the Board members had misgivings about it. Clarence Streit for instance warned that Hartley's motion represented a "minimalist" position. Anything less would be worse than no bill at all.²⁵ In his remarks, Streit reminded his colleagues of the realities of the legislative process. Even a revised watered-down bill similar to Hartley's proposal would nevertheless still face opposition in

²⁴For a text of this resolution, see memorandum by Livingston Hartley to the Atlantic Union Committee, 25 March 1953, *ibid.*

²⁵Streit's reaction to Livingston Hartley's motion is discussed in minutes of the Third Annual Congress, Atlantic Union Committee, November 1953, *ibid.*, Box 8.

Congress. Therefore, he warned, the pressure would build upon the atlantic union supporters in Congress to water-down the bill even more in the hopes of gaining the final margin of votes necessary for passage. Unfortunately, Streit claimed, there would be nothing left in this instance for the atlantic unionists to salvage for the final compromises would render the bill worthless to the movement.²⁶

Nevertheless, Streit reluctantly voted for the Hartley motion as a symbol of his solidarity with the Board. At that point, the motion unanimously passed.²⁷

Although no one knew it at the time, the adoption of Hartley's resolution was to have eventual consequences for the atlantic union movement. The resolution was designated to placate a type of opposition to the atlantic union proposal that appeared frequently over the years. That is, that the United States delegates could somehow commit the American government to a course of action without the latter's approval. More proponents of the atlantic union bill believed that eliminating this objection would go a long way toward overcoming the opposition. At any rate, the atlantic union-sponsored bill that finally passed Congress in 1960 contained language similar to its aforementioned motion.²⁸

Contrary to expectations expressed in the May, 1953 meeting, the European Defense Community issue was still unsettled in late 1953;

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

Great Britain and France still had the matter under consideration.²⁹ Therefore, Secretary of State Dulles was provided with another convenient pretext for postponing State Department endorsement of the atlantic union proposal.

Finally in July, 1954 the French National Assembly rejected the European Defense Community agreement, and at that point the European Defense idea became a dead letter. In retrospect, it appears that the Atlantic Union Committee should have been less concerned with accommodating the State Department's wishes during the period 1953-54. As Clarence Streit pointed out, two precious years had been lost while the atlantic unionists patiently waited for the Administration to realize its pet objective, only to see the Administration fail in that regard.³⁰

On the other hand, the Committee's decision to postpone its political lobbying during 1953-94 may have had some positive long-term consequences. After 1955 the Eisenhower Administration on the whole treated the atlantic union proposal with more sensitivity and deference than was the case previously. Certainly the Committee's leadership was on better terms with Dulles than had been the case with his predecessor. Partly perhaps this was because key officials in the Eisenhower Administration were aware that the Committee had cooperated with them and therefore the Administration owed a

²⁹Freedom and Union 8 (December 1953): 9-11.

³⁰Clarence K. Streit makes this argument in Freedom and Union 9 (October 1954): 2, 3.

political debt of sorts to the atlantic unionists.³¹ At any event, when the new Congress convened in January, 1955, the Eisenhower Administration would have a slightly different constituency. The new Congress would be under the opposition party's control.

³¹This idea was suggested to the writer in a personal interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C., 2 May 1984.

CHAPTER VII

THE ATLANTIC COMMITTEE'S LOBBYING ACTIVITIES

DURING 1955-1956

The struggle to obtain atlantic union legislation continued during the life of the eighty-fourth Congress. As 1954 ended, the Atlantic Union Committee made plans to reintroduce its now perennial proposal into Congress. A Board of Governors meeting held in October, 1954 deliberated over what course of action to take in the near future. There was general agreement that the Committee should resume lobbying Congress to pass an atlantic union resolution. The Board members argued that the defeat of the European Defense Community proposal had removed the Eisenhower Administration's excuse for stalling on this proposal.¹

Moreover most of the Committee's leadership felt that the time for deferring to the Administration's wishes on this matter should end. After all the movement had achieved little during the past two years while waiting for the Eisenhower Administration to take the initiative. Therefore, there was probably little to lose and potentially much to be gained through resumption of lobbying. Even if such activities irritated the Administration the movement would

¹Justin Blackwelder, Atlantic Union Committee, to Senator Estes Kefauver, 26 October 1954; Kefauver Collection, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, File 1, Box 6.

probably be no worse off than at present as far as achieving its objectives.

Besides, there was an additional reason why they felt the time had come again for taking the initiative. By the time that the October, 1954 Board meeting was held, there was widespread belief that the Democrats would recapture control of Congress after the mid-term elections two weeks hence. Should this occur, Congress could be expected to show more independence on foreign policy matters; at least the Democratic majority would probably be less hesitant about the possibility of supporting an atlantic union resolution not endorsed by the Administration.

While there was agreement on the matter of reintroducing a resolution in the new Congress, there was disagreement over the exact form that such a resolution should take. According to Justin Blackwelder, their executive secretary, the majority of the twenty-eight man Board desired to replicate the language utilized in the 1951 resolution. However, Board member Livingston Hartley held out for a revision. Hartley wanted the resolution changed so that now all NATO members not just the North Atlantic Treaty democracies would be invited to participate in the proposed Convention.² Presumably, this revision would allow authoritarian Portugal and Greece to participate. One suspects that Hartley's plan was designed to overcome an unofficial, specific State Department objection: that the proposal would cause dissension among those countries not invited to participate in

²Ibid.

the exploratory convention. In any event, Hartley's motion was defeated.

On February 9, 1955, Senator Kefauver reintroduced the atlantic union resolution in Congress. Twelve other Senators joined Kefauver in cosponsoring. They were: Hubert H. Humphrey (Democrat-Minnesota); Ralph E. Flanders (Republican-Vermont); Henry Jackson (Democrat-Washington); Russell Long (Democrat-Louisiana); Pat V. McNamara (Democrat-Michigan); James Murray (Democrat-Montana); Mathew Neely (Democrat-West Virginia); Richard Neuberger (Democrat-Oregon); Joseph C. O'Mahoney (Democrat-Wyoming); Frederick G. Payne (Republican-Maine); W. Scott Kerr (Democrat-North Carolina); John J. Sparkman (Democrat-Alabama).

The new resolution closely resembled those introduced previously. After the usual enabling clauses, this resolution read:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) that the President is requested to invite the other democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates including members of their principal political parties to meet in a convention, with similarly appointed delegates from the United States and from such other democracies as the convention may invite to explore and to report to what extent their peoples might further unite within the framework of the United Nations, and to agree to form, federally or otherwise a defensive, economic and political union.³

This resolution, known as Senate Concurrent Resolution 12, differed from its predecessor resolutions in one notable respect. It

³See Freedom and Union 9 (February 1955): 1, 2.

contained the phrase "explore and report." This phrase was added at the personal suggestion of Senator Kefauver. Kefauver felt that by the use of such language, he could disarm many previous critics of the measure. After all, S.C.R. 12 stated that the exploratory convention was to first report its work to the respective sponsoring governments. Only then, and with their approval, could the project proceed beyond that point.

At this time (1955) the name of the bill was changed to broaden its popular support while simultaneously overcoming hostility. Heretofore, the resolution had been known as the atlantic union resolution. However, the new bill was termed the "Atlantic Exploratory Convention Resolution."⁴

In his remarks introducing S.C.R. 12 Senator Kefauver spoke of the critical international situation and "the chronic failure of diplomacy to assure concerted action by the democracies" to remedy this situation.⁵ Kefauver claimed that only by the establishment of an atlantic union could international aggression be deterred and tensions reduced.

In the spring of 1955, there were other signs indicating the atlantic union movement had grounds for optimism. On the one hand, two prominent "establishment" newspapers, the Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor endorsed the atlantic union proposal.⁶

⁴Ibid., p. 1.

⁵Ibid.

⁶See Washington Post, 12 March 1955, p. E4.

The Washington Post apparently was impressed by the new revisions in the new atlantic union resolution. It noted,

The fresh resolution is more calculated to win support than the last. It is entitled "Resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention" which more accurately represents what the sponsors are driving at than the title of the old Atlantic Union resolution. The object was then and is now to discuss, and only to discuss, the possibility of such a union. It does not even commit the sponsors to a federal solution. . . . We urge the acceptance of the Kefauver Resolution as now reframed.⁷

Alongside of this development was an encouraging sign from the State Department. In an interview with a reporter, Secretary of State Dulles remarked that he would have no objection to the atlantic union proposal once the Paris Agreements recognizing West Germany's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, were ratified.⁸ Now, with the Paris Agreements ratified the Committee leaders felt that Dulles could be expected to acquiesce in if not endorse the proposal.⁹ Senator Kefauver sought immediately to exploit this turn of events to their advantage. Kefauver wrote to Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In his letter he reminded Senator George that Dulles now apparently had no more grounds to oppose atlantic union since the Paris Agreements were out

⁷Ibid.

⁸Freedom and Union 9 (March 1955): 6, 7.

⁹Ibid., p. 7.

of the way.¹⁰ Consequently, Kefauver urged him to schedule committee hearings on the atlantic union proposal.

Two weeks later, General George C. Marshall endorsed the atlantic union measure. Marshall was immediately offered a membership on the Atlantic Union Council.¹¹ Furthermore, at the urging of William Clayton, former President Truman endorsed the atlantic union proposal; Truman also was named to the Atlantic Union Council.

Compared to its immediate predecessors the Democratic-controlled Eighty-Fourth Congress was more sympathetic to the atlantic union proposal. During the 1953-54 period the proposal had gotten nowhere in Congress and no further hearings had been held on the proposal. However, atlantic union's prospects slightly brightened in 1955. Senator George, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was in a position to exercise jurisdiction over this subject and greatly influence the bill's future.¹²

As had already been shown, Senator George was a sponsor of the 1949 atlantic union resolution. One may question the degree of his commitment to the idea; in fact, George's support was probably due to his close personal friendship with Justice Roberts as much as anything

¹⁰Senator Estes Kefauver to Senator Walter F. George, 20 April 1955; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5.

¹¹Freedom and Union 11 (May 1957): 11-14.

¹²See Walter J. Oleszek Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 2nd Ed., (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1984).

else.¹³ Nevertheless, at least George was not actively opposed to atlantic union and most likely was slightly receptive to the proposal.

Early in the session Senator George told Kefauver and Streit of his intention to schedule hearings on the bill. In fact, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled public hearings on S.C.R. 12 in July, 1955. These hearings were noteworthy in that for the first time the Foreign Relations Committee considered atlantic union apart from other proposals dealing with the question of United Nations Charter revision.¹⁴ The fact that the Foreign Relations Committee would consider the atlantic union bill by itself seemed encouraging to the proponents. This action could indicate that the Senate Committee was now taking the proposal more seriously.¹⁵

Certainly the hearings afforded Atlantic Union Committee proponents plenty of opportunity to present the atlantic union viewpoint. Clarence C. Streit, Elmo Roper, Dr. Harold C. Urey, and Mrs. Chase Osborn were the Committee members testifying at the hearings.¹⁶ In addition, Senators Estes Kefauver, Herbert Lehman (Democrat-New York), and Richard Neuberger (Democrat-Oregon).

¹³This conclusion is based upon information presented in a memorandum by Livingston Hartley, Atlantic Union Committee, 25 May 1951; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 8, p. 1.

¹⁴Freedom and Union 10 (November 1955): 5, 6.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings Relating to the Calling of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 12-46 (1955); hereafter cited as 1955 Hearings.

Harold C. Urey and Elmo Roper seem to have offered the most powerful testimony in favor of the proposal. Certainly their respective remarks were more extensive than those delivered by the other witnesses. For his part, Elmo Roper concentrated on pointing out the military and economic advantages of an atlantič union. Roper noted that there would be great military advantages for the western democracies in their creating a common supranational military establishment.¹⁷ The new supranational military establishment would be supposedly stronger than all the existing constituent North Atlantic Treaty Organization units operated under separate national command. Furthermore, Roper claimed that atlantic union by bringing about such military unification would also realize high economic savings. That is, the overall costs of maintaining an atlantic union military establishment would be considerably less than the costs of maintaining separate nation-state military establishments.¹⁸ Interestingly, Roper claimed that opinion surveys conducted by his polling organization indicated that a majority of the American public favored American participation in a supranational political union.¹⁹

Elmo Roper told the Senate Committee that the North Atlantic Treaty structure was an inadequate instrument for bringing about the profound political changes that he had addressed.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 17, 17.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 18-23.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 23.

NATO is five years old and the Cold War even older than that and yet we have not as yet even approached the problem of greater unity. Its roots go so deep in the ways of thinking and habits of the Atlantic Nations, that it cannot be solved by one government alone, but has to be approached from an overall Atlantic Community basis.²⁰

Harold Urey's testimony focused upon a different perspective. Urey was interested in demonstrating to the Senate Committee that the plan offered the most promising means for avoiding World War III. To some extent, Urey's arguments are still being repeated by present-day apologists who advocated peace through strength. Urey argued that the western democracies could prevent war and prevent further Soviet aggression by amassing a preponderance of power. Urey argued that under an atlantic union, the united democracies would be much stronger militarily than the Soviet bloc.²¹ Consequently, the militarily inferior Soviet bloc would be deterred from aggression or starting wars.

Curiously, in his testimony, Urey made no attempt to minimize the potential consequences of the contemplated atlantic union convention. Kefauver and Streit, for instance, went to great lengths in assuring committee members that the contemplated convention could do nothing more than "explore" (study) the problems associated with union.²²

²⁰Ibid., p. 16.

²¹Ibid., p. 24.

²²Ibid., pp. 32-43.

In contrast, Harold Urey was more candid in his testimony. Specifically Senator Wayne Morse (Democrat-Oregon) asked Dr. Urey if the latter believed that the proposed convention would be merely a fact-finding body. Urey replied,

No, I do not picture . . . that at all. And I would not like to have the committee misunderstand my own view in regard to it. I believe that nothing but the establishment of effective government over the western democracies will get the unity and strength that is required. I would say that the resolution would permit the convention to take that action or any other action that it so felt.²³

Besides the proponents, the Foreign Relations Committee also invited opponents to testify. About 12 individuals opposed to the resolution testified. One suspects that these individuals had little impact upon the outcome of this legislative struggle. To begin with, no prominent public figure testified in opposition. In fact, the opposition testimony was generally composed of obscure individuals representing veterans and "patriotic" associations,²⁴ including the Association of Pro-America and Daughters of the American Revolution.

In addition, the opposition witnesses used the same rather shopworn arguments used in the past for opposing the proposal. Among these arguments were: (a) that the proposal would force the United States to relinquish its sovereignty; (b) that America has

²³Ibid., p. 23.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 62-80.

"everything to lose and nothing to gain from such a union."²⁵ The witnesses made no particular effort to interject new arguments for their opposition.

However, a much more damaging source of opposition to atlantic union appeared at the 1955 hearings. This opposition emanated from the State Department.

As may be remembered, the State Department's position on the proposal in 1954 and early 1955 had been ambiguous. On the one hand, Secretary of State Dulles had never attacked the basic principles to which the atlantic union organization was committed. Therefore, there was hope that eventually he would lend his support to the proposal for holding a convention. On the other hand, Dulles had found a variety of reasons for withholding his support in the past two years. For instance, the alleged damage that the proposal posed to the European Defense plan and later the alleged desire to avoid diplomatic innovations while the issue of Austrian reunification was under consideration. Now with these issues disposed of the Committee was anxious to see if the Secretary of State had been won over.

In June, 1955 the first signs appeared indicating that Dulles was still opposed to the proposal. At that time, Clarence Streit held one of his many meetings with the Secretary of State. Streit, aware that the Foreign Relations Committee would soon hold hearings on S.C.R. 12, was eager to ascertain Dulles' position. At this time, Dulles first expressed misgivings over the clause in the resolution

²⁵Ibid., pp. 79-81.

instructing the President to call the contemplated Atlantic Convention. Dulles complained that if the President issued such an invitation to the other North Atlantic Treaty signatories the latter would interpret this action as meaning that the United States Government endorsed the atlantic union scheme.²⁶ Dulles proposed that this problem for the administration could be avoided by having the resolution revised. The resolution would direct Congress, rather than the President to issue the invitations.

Perhaps the Committee leadership could have met this particular objection offered by Secretary of State Dulles. The 1960 version of the measure, as will later be shown, did follow this suggested procedure. However, in 1955 the Committee showed no inclination to adopt this suggestion.²⁷

It is doubtful though whether such a course of action would have had any positive results as far as the atlantic union movement was concerned. This was because Dulles had other reasons for objecting to the bill. This became apparent when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings on the resolution in July, 1955. Secretary of State Dulles did not personally appear before the aforementioned committee hearings. Instead, Dulles sent a written, prepared statement to the committee on this subject. Dulles' prepared statement contained the same criticisms that he informally

²⁶Clarence K. Streit, Atlantic Union Committee, to David Lloyd, 11 July 1955, Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5.

²⁷See below, Chapter 9.

communicated to Clarence Streit earlier such as the alleged inappropriateness of having the President initiate the convening of an atlantic convention.²⁸

In addition, Dulles injected a few new arguments against the proposal. First, he claimed in his statement that Congressional passage of the measure would be interpreted by our North Atlantic Treaty allies as constituting an expression of United States foreign policy. Even though this would be an incorrect interpretation, it would be a factor that the Administration would have to contend.²⁹

Secondly, Dulles specifically criticized the language of the resolution in limiting the contemplated convention to "democracies." This particular criticism was not wholly unexpected as has already been shown.³⁰ In fact, Committee staff person Livingston Hartley had warned that executive committee in October, 1954 that the State Department would be displeased with such a reference since this would implicitly exclude nondemocratic countries namely at this time Portugal from participation. However, the executive committee did not adopt Hartley's suggestion at that time.³¹

Thirdly, Dulles objected to the phrase in the resolution calling upon each invited country to send delegates drawn from their respective political parties. Dulles complained that such action

²⁸1955 Hearings, p. 84.

²⁹Ibid., p. 86.

³⁰See above, p. 3.

³¹Ibid.

would result in the French Communist Party, and the Italian Communist Party being included among the delegates.³²

Once the hearings were completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went into executive session in order to decide the fate of S.C.R. 12, the atlantic union bill. At that time, the Committee voted not to report such legislation.³³ Since the Committee met in secret, it is impossible to determine how each member votes on the proposal. However, a few conclusions can be deduced from what is known about the general situation prevailing at that time. Senator Walter F. George, the Committee's chairman, was generally willing to go along with the Eisenhower Administration's wishes on foreign policy matters. Perhaps in this particular instance, he was also inclined to defer to Administration wishes. The fact that Senator George belonged to a different political party from the President does not seem to have appreciably interfered with their ability to cooperate. Therefore, the incident seems to illustrate another example of the bipartisan-ship so prevalent in American Foreign policy making during the 1950s.³⁴

Granted that Senator George was a sponsor of the original proposal and that the Atlantic Union Committee continued to count him

³²1955 Hearings, p. 86.

³³The Foreign Relations Committee did not actually take action on the resolution until January, 1956. This was almost six months after the Committee had concluded hearings on the measure. See Freedom and Union 10 (February 1956): 11.

³⁴Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 274, 275.

as one of their firm supporters,³⁵ there is some evidence that Senator George's support for the measure was more apparent than real. One suspects that it mainly rested upon his close personal friendship with Atlantic Union Committee president Owen Roberts, rather than devotion to the atlantic union idea.³⁶ Certainly there are a number of recorded instances in the Atlantic Union Committee's files of Senator George's voicing reservations about the wisdom of bringing the bill before the Senate in 1950 and 1951.³⁷ This being the case, it was probably not very difficult for George to go along with the Administration wishes at this point.

In addition, it is known that there were only three firm supporters of the proposal on the Foreign Relations Committee at that time, Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, and Mansfield. Consequently, it possibly could have been an uphill fight to obtain a favorable Committee report of the measure even if Senator George had tried to secure such approval. Yet contemporary observers believed that Senator George could have obtained the necessary eight votes in the Committee had he really sought such support. After all, none of the Democratic members of that Committee in 1955 were known to be hostile to an

³⁵See Senator Estes Kefauver to Senator Walter F. George, 20 April 1955; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5.

³⁶See above, pp. 79-82.

³⁷Ibid.

atlantic union resolution; their support alone, on a strictly party vote would have been sufficient to insure a favorable report.³⁸

As the 1955 session of Congress drew to a close, supporters of the atlantic union proposal were generally encouraged by the prospects for success in the near future. Of course, they were disappointed in being unable to obtain Congressional approval for their measure in the current session. Yet these supporters were optimistic about the long-term prospects.

After all, 1955 was a water-shed year for the atlantic union movement. This marked the first time that the advocates had been able to get the Senate Foreign Relations to consider the proposal by itself. In the past, the Foreign Relations Committee had always considered the measure along with a variety of other bills.³⁹ This procedure probably worked to the disadvantage of the atlantic unionists' cause. At any rate, officers Elmo Roper and William L. Clayton expressed this view.⁴⁰ But in 1955, this problem at least had been removed. As will be shown, it would not reappear in the future. Writing in Freedom and Union, Clarence Streit attributed the Senate Committee's willingness to study the proposal apart from other measures to the growing prominence of the atlantic union idea. He

³⁸The Democratic Party had an absolute majority on all of the standing committees in the Senate during the life of the 84th Congress.

³⁹See Chapter 3, pp. 12-17.

⁴⁰Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C., 2 May 1984.

pointed out also that this was occurring at the same time that the United World Federalists were declining in strength.⁴¹

In addition, some of the Committee most notably Clarence Streit held out the hope at this time that the Secretary of State was on the verge of endorsing the plan.⁴² From the perspective of later events, this appears as mostly wishful thinking on Streit's part. At that time though members of the Committee naturally tended to search for any sign that the Administration was about to reverse its position on atlantic union. Perhaps this was a subconscious desire to maintain morale. At any rate, the leadership seems to have viewed any move by the Administration on this subject, short of an outright condemnation, as constituting possible latent support for the bill. Clarence Streit's interpretation of Dulles' recent letter to Senator Kefauver on the subject of the atlantic union bill offers an example of this tendency to grasp at straws.

In August, 1955 Secretary Dulles had responded to an earlier inquiry from Kefauver, requesting that the former explain his continual opposition to the proposal. In his letter, Dulles offered technical grounds for his opposition. Specifically, he repeated his earlier criticism of the phrase in the bill directing the President rather than the Congress to issue the invitation for the Convention.⁴³

⁴¹Freedom and Union 10 (September 1955): 1.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, to Senator Estes Kefauver, 28 August 1955, File 1, Box 8.

Dulles did not offer any substantive reasons for opposing the bill. This led Streit to make the statement that the Administration's basis for opposition to the bill was merely technical and if these technicalities were surmounted, Administration support could be obtained. Along this line, Streit wrote that Dulles had not "expressed his opposition to any exploration, pursuant to Congressional initiative of the possibilities of increased unity between some or all members of the Atlantic Community."⁴⁴ This being the case, Streit claimed that the Committee had reason to believe that some sort of an accommodation with the Administration could be soon worked out, thus allowing Congressional passage.⁴⁵

However, Streit's rosy prediction for the upcoming year was soon confounded by events. In January, 1956 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, voting in executive session, postponed indefinitely action on S.C.R. 12.⁴⁶ Presumably, the Foreign Relations Committee membership felt that this was an inappropriate time to report a bill with such far-reaching implications for foreign policy. After all, 1956 was a presidential election year, and in election years, Congress is even more hesitant than usual to consider innovative proposals.⁴⁷ The tendency is to consider only essential on-going

⁴⁴Freedom and Union 10 (October 1955): 4-6.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁶Ibid., (February 1956): 11.

⁴⁷Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1984), pp. 85-92.

matters in election years. With the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee viewing the atlantic union proposal as something possible only in the far-off future, it is not surprising that the Committee chose to postpone action on this matter. In summary, this meant that the bill was déad for the remainder of the Eighty-fourth Congress.

CHAPTER VIII

PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT: THE ATLANTIC UNITY STRATEGY

After 1953 a new "moderate" faction became increasingly in evidence within the Atlantic Union Committee. Individuals belonging to this faction shared with Clarence Streit a desire to bring about an atlantic union. Yet in contrast to Streit, the "moderates" wanted to utilize incrementalist tactics in order to achieve the long-range goals of realizing supranational political union. Specifically, the "moderates" favored extending the political and economic authority of the North Atlantic Treaty alliance institutions as a means of strengthening "atlantic unity." They felt that even modest steps taken in this direction would facilitate the eventual realizations of an Atlantic Union.¹ Some of the "moderates" held leadership positions within the Atlantic Union Committee.² However, most of their endeavors designed to strengthen atlantic unity took place outside the formal structure of the Committee. Since some of these activities of the "moderates" had important consequences for the future of the

¹Istvan Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, 1965), pp. 91-131.

²Livingston Hartley, Walden Moore and William Clayton were some of the prominent members of the "moderate" faction. See *ibid.*, pp. 108-111.

entire atlantic union movement, these efforts to strengthen atlantic unity will be discussed here.³

As has been discussed earlier, some members of the Atlantic Union Committee had misgivings about the desirability of establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance system. Events from 1950 to 1953 seemed to give substance to these earlier misgivings. Yet whatever their private feelings on the matter might be, the members of the Committee gradually came to the realization that for the most part the public and Congress accepted the legitimacy of the North Atlantic Alliance. In fact, support for the Alliance was far more extensive than was support for the more far-reaching atlantic union proposal.

In fact, after 1952 some of the individuals within the atlantic union movement began to rethink their attitudes toward the new alliance. These individuals might still hold the view that the North Atlantic Alliance as well as any other arrangement predicated upon the continuation of the existing nation-state system was inferior to the contemplated atlantic union. Yet, at the same time they were realistic enough to see that the Pact was a more or less permanent fixture with which they would have to contend in the foreseeable future. Moreover, since it was regarded favorably by a majority of the public, perhaps it would be good political strategy for the atlantic union movement to somehow, where possible, relate its goals to the operations of this

³See Chapter II, pp. 61-62.

ongoing concern.⁴ At the very least, it was felt that any support that the Committee offered to its operations would necessarily result in greater public acceptance of the atlantic union proposal.⁵

The subject of the atlantic union movement's relationship to the North Atlantic alliance system was discussed at length at an Atlantic Union Committee Board of Governors meeting in May, 1953. Specifically, three of the Board members spoke in favor of the Atlantic Union Committee going on record as favoring the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One Board member argued that since the Eisenhower Administration was strongly pro-North Atlantic alliance such action would delight the Administration and perhaps rebound to the atlantic union's political advantage later. "We should out-NATO NATO," the same Board member said.⁶ He claimed that this action would result in the Administration looking much more sympathetically at their proposal.

Consequently the Board adopted a resolution at this same meeting affirming its support for all administration policies designed to strengthen the North Atlantic alliance. This resolution was a harbinger of things to come. In the future as this study will show the

⁴See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, 30 October 1954; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5, University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville, pp. 2, 3.

⁵See unsigned memorandum, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentarians Conference, 1955-1959," Atlantic Union Committee, 1960; *ibid.*, Box 53, pp. 2, 3.

⁶Internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, 26 May 1953, *ibid.*, Box 5, p. 2.

Atlantic Union Committee leadership more and more regarded the North Atlantic alliance and its institutions as offering vehicles through which at least some aspects of the atlantic union proposal could be launched.

After all, if certain aspects of the atlantic union objectives could be made to appear as adjuncts of the North Atlantic system, the atlantic unionists would have a much easier time obtaining approval for at least part of their program. However much the leadership might voice their disdain for "alliance systems" and president Owen Roberts and treasurer Elmo Roper frequently voiced such sentiments, the Committee as a whole had to concede that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at least was an ongoing operation while atlantic union remained an unfulfilled dream.⁷ Perhaps it was easier to strengthen an existing institution which from the viewpoint of the atlantic unionists was an imperfect one than it was to create a new one, especially if the latter was perceived as "radical" by many influential persons.

The Declaration of Atlantic Unity, released in December, 1954 was the work of certain atlantic union supporters who had come to accept the North Atlantic Treaty as offering an important vehicle for further supranational development. This Declaration was written by Hugh Moore, Walden Moore, General William H. Draper and Lithgow Osborne, all of whom were active in the Atlantic Union Committee

⁷ Ibid.

leadership.⁸ Yet the Declaration was not officially connected with the Committee. Certainly the Declaration represented a different course of action than that called for in the Atlantic Union resolutions. For example, in the Declaration there is no mention of a supranational federal union, or of the desirability of convening an Atlantic exploratory convention. Instead, the Declaration spoke only of increasing the political, military, and economic ties between the North Atlantic Treaty nations. While all of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity authors on other occasions expressed the hope that the North Atlantic Treaty institutions would someday evolve into a supranational political institution, union, such statements are missing from the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.⁹

The Declaration of Atlantic Unity is printed in the appendix of this study.¹⁰ As later sections of this study will show, certain proposals advocated in the Declaration, such as the North Atlantic Parliamentarians Conference, were realized in the following years.

In retrospect, the Declaration of Atlantic Unity appears to have enhanced the public's favorable image of the Atlantic Union proposal although of course this was a secondary aspect of the Declaration's impact. At any rate, a few days after the Declaration was unofficially leaked to the press, the New York Times commented

⁸Szent-Miklosy, pp. 73, 126.

⁹Ibid., p. 126.

¹⁰See Appendix for the text of the Declaration.

favorably upon the Declaration while at the same time making a favorable passing reference to the atlantic union proposal.

While proposals that built upon NATO are certainly not new, they take on greater urgency with the passage of each month. as long ago as 1949 Senator Kefauver, one of the signers of the statement, and nineteen colleagues introduced in the Senate a resolution asking the President to call a conference to explore ways in which NATO and associated countries "can apply among themselves . . . the principles of free federal union.

One does not have to be an all-out federalist to recognize the need and desirability of closer cooperation among the democracies in other fields additional to the military. It is no vaporous ideal but a vital necessity if our kind of civilization is to live and flourish.¹¹

Before leaving the subject of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity, it should be noted that the Declaration attracted a number of signatories; eventually over 400 persons in each of the North Atlantic Treaty countries signed the Declaration. Included within this group were a number of prominent American signers: Former President Harry Truman, General George C. Marshall, Joseph C. Grew, Averill Harriman, Chester Bowles, Christian Herter, Estes Kefauver, Ellsworth Bunker and Dean Acheson.¹²

Within a few months after the release of this document, one of the proposals it advocated was translated into reality. A North Atlantic Treaty Parliamentarians Conference was held in the summer of 1955. The Parliamentarians Conference was the result of several

¹¹New York Times 11 October 1954, p. 26.

¹²"Parliamentarians Conference, 1955-1959," p. 6.

factors, but the Declaration appears to have been the most important of these.

According to Livingston Hartley, the Parliamentary Conference was first proposed by Senator Guy M. Gillette (Democrat-Iowa) in November, 1951. This was at a conference of Canadian and American legislators held in Montreal. At this meeting, Gillette suggested that the legislators from the various North Atlantic countries meet several times a year to discuss common problems and make recommendations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Council of Ministers.¹³

The movement for a parliamentary conference also received a boost at the December, 1953, Ministerial Conference. At that meeting, Lord Ismay, Secretary-General, submitted to the ministerial conference a draft resolution, calling for creation of a parliamentary organization in each North Atlantic Treaty member country. The purpose of these organizations would be to promote transnational contacts between legislators in these countries.¹⁴

Soon afterward such groups appeared in Canada and Norway. By the summer of 1954, a movement was underway to convene an international meeting composed of legislators from the various North Atlantic countries. Specifically, the government of Norway began sounding out informally the other countries in the region regarding their willingness to authorize such a conference.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

The Norwegian government looked with favor upon the proposal, but only if the United States was willing to participate also. Consequently, the Norwegian government was reluctant to commit itself officially to such a course of action without first ascertaining the American government's position.

At this point certain individuals closely associated with the Committee played an important role in the informal negotiations between these countries. Walden Moore, the executive director of the Atlantic Union Committee and Lithgow Osborne, an Atlantic Union Committee executive committee member and former American ambassador to Norway, acted as unofficial go-betweens. Moore and Osborne were determined to do what they could to remove any impediments to the holding of a Parliamentarians Conference.¹⁶

Specifically, Board member and Declaration instigator Lithgow Osborne contacted Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant on November 23, 1954. Osborne explained to Merchant the need for the American government to inform Norway that the United States government would have no objections to its own legislators participating in the project.¹⁷ In response to this request, Merchant replied that the State Department had no objection to the holding of such a conference. Moreover, Merchant advised Osborne that the State Department would be willing to unofficially support the Norwegian diplomatic

¹⁶See Walden Moore, Atlantic Union Committee, to Senator Walter F. George, 26 November 1954; *ibid.*, Box 5.

¹⁷See Lithgow Osborne, Atlantic Union Committee, to Livingston Merchant, 23 November 1954, *ibid.*

initiative seeking to organize such a conference. At this point though Merchant laid down a condition. The State Department would want to make sure that the proposal had the backing of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs before taking such a step.¹⁸

Soon afterwards, Senator George, the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative James Richards, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, expressed their willingness to support the proposal.¹⁹ At this point, the State Department passed the desired informal assurances on to the Norwegian government concerning the likelihood of American participation.²⁰

As a result of this activity, the Council of Ministers approved the Norwegian government's formal request for the holding of such a meeting, in January, 1955. Requests were sent to all of the member countries inviting them to send delegates to a forthcoming meeting of legislators. Each nation was requested to include as delegates individuals representing all of the principal political parties with representation in their respective parliaments. The meeting was scheduled for July, 1955, in Paris.²¹

The official invitation, extended by the Council of Ministers requested that presiding officer of each legislative body in each of

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹See Freedopm and Union 9 (January 1955): 7, 8.

²⁰"Parliamentarians Conference, 1955-1959," p. 6.

²¹Ibid., p. 7.

the nations select that particular country's delegation.²² Countries having bicameral legislatures were to divide their representations between each of their legislative bodies.

Plans called for the United States to be represented by a delegation of fourteen persons; seven from the Senate and seven from the House of Representatives. However, only the House of Representatives actually got around to appropriating money for the project. On May 7, 1955 the House authorized \$30,000 to cover the expense of American participation. The Senate never got around to selecting its own delegation due to pressing business at the close of the legislative session. Consequently, the House of Representatives was the sole American legislative body to send delegates.²³

The first meeting of the officially-termed "Conference of Members of Parliament from North Atlantic Treaty Organization Countries" was held in Paris in July, 1955. Over 200 delegates, representing legislators from all the North Atlantic democracies (authoritarian Portugal sent no delegates) met for six days as planned.²⁴ The meeting had been envisioned by its proponents as a forum for legislators to exchange views. To an extent, the meetings conformed to that expectation; certainly the legislators devoted several hours to a general floor debate on the future role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.²⁵

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 8.

²⁵Ibid.

Yet the first Parliamentarians Conference went beyond what had been expected of it. The conference also made some substantive decisions which showed that it could behave independently. First of all, the Conference took steps to insure its own future existence. Specifically, the Conference voted to set up an executive committee responsible for organizing a similar Parliamentarians Conference one year hence.²⁶ Of course this decision implied that the meeting was to become a yearly occurrence, perhaps even become an institution.

In addition the executive committee was given responsibility for establishing a secretariat. To minimize costs, the secretariat was to use where possible personnel from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters as its employees.²⁷ Looking toward the establishment of the secretariat, the executive committee immediately began to consider what kinds of research could most appropriately be done by that body. The committee decided to poll individual legislators in order to obtain a broader range of research options. Therefore over 5000 questionnaires were sent to the legislators in the various North Atlantic Alliance countries. Among other things, the questionnaires asked for opinions on such questions as:

1. How can the North Atlantic Treaty be strengthened?
2. Should the member-nations have a common foreign policy?
3. What shall be the role of the North Atlantic Parliamentarians Conference and how often shall it meet?

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

4. Should there be a multilateral North Atlantic overseas investment program?²⁸

During the period 1955-60 and beyond the period examined by this study, the Parliamentarians Conference continued to meet annually. It is not necessary for our purposes to examine in detail all of the activities of that body. However, at least one of its activities had a direct impact upon the Atlantic Union Committee's operations, and therefore that activity should have special attention.

The 1957 meeting of the Parliamentarians made a noteworthy contribution to the advancement of atlantic unity. First, this meeting endorsed the idea of holding an atlantic citizens conference in the near future. The citizens conference's purpose would be to examine and recommend how greater cooperation and purpose could be achieved within the North Atlantic Treaty bloc.²⁹ Secondly the 1957 Conference voted to have its secretariat prepare a study on the possibility of establishing an atlantic research institute. The latter would be concerned with investigating matters dealing with the question of closer political unity among the North Atlantic countries. It is worth noting that the atlantic institute proposal became a reality in late 1960 and has operated ever since that time along the purposes outlined above.

The Atlantic Citizens Congress also became a reality fairly soon after being first proposed. The Congress was held in May, 1959.

²⁸Ibid., p. 9.

²⁹Ibid.

More than 650 individuals, uninstructed by their governments, met to discuss common problems.³⁰ Incidentally, this meeting was funded by private sources. The 1958 Parliamentarians Conference had taken the position that the respective North Atlantic countries who would be sending delegates already had sufficient authority under the Treaty for convening such a meeting without seeking additional legislation in each country.³¹

One result of the Atlantic Congress was the adoption of a specific resolution pertaining to future developments. This resolution read, "The time is ripe for these nations to build an atlantic community with responsibilities extending to military, political and economic fields." To accomplish these objectives, the Congress directed the Organization's Council to convene "not later than the Spring of 1960" a convention to explore how to achieve greater unity within the atlantic community.³²

There was at least one other way in which the recommendations of the Atlantic Congress complemented the atlantic union objectives. The latter had been on record since at least 1954 as favoring the revision of the existing Organization for European Economic Cooperation.³³ Specifically, the Atlantic Union Committee leadership wanted the United States and Canada included as full members in the organization. Also, the Atlantic Union Committee was on record as

³⁰Freedom and Union 13 (July/August 1959): 13, 14.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 14.

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

favoring changes in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to allow that organization wider authority to review multilateral trade agreements between the North Atlantic pact nations and the developing nations.³⁴

Given the Atlantic Union Committee's interest in these revisions, one can understand why the Committee leadership was pleased with the Atlantic Congress' recommendations regarding economic cooperation efforts. Secondly, the Atlantic Union Committee since 1956 had been promoting the idea of establishing an atlantic research institute, so the action taken on this matter was also complementary to the Committee's objectives.

Taken together, the accomplishments of the Atlantic Congress may seem, superficially, to be very modest in scope. However, reality is sometimes more than one sees at first glance. Certainly, the work of the Atlantic Congress had a positive effect upon operations of the Atlantic Union Committee; that is, the publicity surrounding the Atlantic Congress helped to establish the legitimacy for some of the proposals that the Committee had been promoting for years, such as the plan for holding a conference for the purpose of studying means whereby the North Atlantic pact nations might establish closer unity between themselves. To be sure, a majority of the delegates to the Atlantic Congress were probably not for creating a supra-national political union composed of democracies such as advocated in Union Now. Nevertheless, much of the American public was probably

³⁴Ibid.

unaware of these subtle distinctions.³⁵ The new result was to blur the distinctions for many persons, a factor which probably worked to the advantage of atlantic union. Certainly, any factor that helped them appear "mainstream" and free of a visionary, utopian image, worked to their advantage when they prepared to lobby on Capitol Hill.

This being the case, it was a great tactical boon to the Atlantic Union Committee when the Atlantic Citizens Conference with its prestigious delegates, which included the president of the Radio Corporation of America, the president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, as well as eight United States senators, endorsed the idea of holding an exploratory citizens convention. Now the cause of the atlantic union would be immeasurably strengthened when they resumed their lobbying for an atlantic convention. For now such a proposal could be presented to Congress and the interested public as a practical means of strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance and having the support of practical, realistic leaders in all countries rather than as the product of a few visionaries.³⁶

In this writer's view, this factor probably accounts for the differences between the 1959-60 legislative struggle to secure Congressional approval for the holding of an atlantic convention,

³⁵Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C.,
2 May 1984.

³⁶Ibid.

and all of the previous struggles over this issue. This point will be examined later.

CHAPTER IX

THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AN ATLANTIC CITIZENS CONFERENCE

The final legislative struggle with which the Atlantic Union Committee was associated took place in 1959 and 1960. This struggle culminated in the passage of a congressional resolution authorizing American participation in an Atlantic Citizens Convention. Enactment of this legislation represented a degree of success for the Committee. Yet the Citizens Convention did not live up to the hopes and expectations of the Committee's leadership for reasons that are discussed below.

One may wonder why the Atlantic Union Committee achieved success at this time rather than earlier. The following question should be kept in mind as this analysis proceeds: Was the success due to actions of the Atlantic Union Committee, or can it be explained as due to external factors?

After the presidential elections of 1956, the movement for an Atlantic Convention appeared on the ebb. The Atlantic Union Committee's annual convention, held in December, 1956, voted to support the reintroduction of the perennial atlantic union resolution in the next session of Congress.¹ However, most of the Atlantic Union Committee's

¹Louisville Courier-Journal, 8 December 1956, p. B1.

leadership realized that the time was not yet ripe for success in this endeavor. Therefore the resolution was not reintroduced until 1959.

In early 1959 conditions appeared to be much more favorable for passage of an atlantic union resolution in the new Eighty-seventh Congress. As Clarence Streit noted, this was because the so-called "Old Guard" wing of the Republican Party had suffered devastating losses in the November 1958 elections. Among such Republicans defeated were William Knowland of California, John Bricker of Ohio, and William Jenner of Indiana.² It was expected that the new Congress would be more favorable to atlantic union.³ Furthermore, during 1959 there would be another major change which would work to the advantage of the movement. The State Department would drop their opposition to the resolution.⁴ Of course, this later development was not known at the beginning of that year.

On March 19, 1959, the resolution (Senate Joint Resolution 147) was reintroduced into the Senate. In that body, the measure was cosponsored by Democratic Senators Estes Kefauver, Hubert H. Humphrey, and Republican Senators Clifford Case and John Sherman Cooper. The bill read,

Resolved by the Senate (with the House of Representatives concurring)

1. That the legislatures of the other Democratic governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be invited to name delegates to meet in a Convention with

²See New York Times, 7 November 1958, pp. 1, 3.

³Ibid.

⁴See below, pp. 3, 4.

delegates from the United States and from such other democracies wherever situated that the Convention may invite to explore and to report to what extent their peoples might within the framework of the United Nations, and in accordance with the basic principles of the Constitution of the United States achieve more effective and democratic unity in advancing their common economic and political affairs, their joint defense and the arms of world peace and individual freedom.

2. That the Convention should be composed of leading representative citizens officially appointed on a non-partisan basis but free to explore the problem fully as individuals without being officially instructed or able to commit their governments.⁵

Soon after this was introduced, it became gradually evident that the State Department was becoming more synpathetic to the atlantic union viewpoint. The first evidence of such a change occurred in July, 1959. At that time, Lewis Douglas, a member of the Atlantic Union Committee Board of Governors, reported that the new Secretary of State Christian A. Herter had no "substantive" objections to the bill; in fact Douglas claimed that Herter was very much interested in their proposal.⁶

Undoubtedly, the shift in the State Department position can be attributed to personnel changes, namely, John Foster Dulles had died and had been replaced by Christian A. Herter. As this study has shown John Foster Dulles was never too supportive during his tenure as

⁵For text, see Public Law 86-719, Statutes at Large 74(1960).

⁶Lewis W. Doublas, Atlantic Union Committee, to Senator Estes Kefauver, 10 July 1959; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 51; University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville.

Secretary of State.⁷ Herter, on the other hand, had been an advocate of atlantic union before becoming Secretary of State. In 1951, while serving in the House of Representatives Herter had cosponsored the atlantic union resolution.⁸

Of course Herter's previous record on this subject offered no guarantee that he would continue to be sympathetic once he became Secretary of State. After all, his predecessor, John Foster Dulles, had gone on record as favoring atlantic union while serving as a United States Senator. However, Dulles showed little sympathy for the proposal after becoming Secretary of State in 1953. In fact, during the first month of his tenure as Secretary of State, there was some evidence that Herter might be following Dulles' policies with regard to atlantic union. On June 3, 1959, acting through a subordinate official, the State Department asked the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, Thomas Morgan, to postpone action on the measure. Secretary Herter claimed that the holding of committee hearings on it could interfere with the work of the Atlantic Citizens Conference due to convene in London in a few days.⁹ According to Herter, the Atlantic Citizens Conference should first be given the opportunity to present a set of recommendations to the Council of the

⁷See Chapter 6, pp. 3-6.

⁸See internal minutes, Board of Governors, Atlantic Union Committee, 2 May 1951; Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 6.

⁹See Freedom and Union 14 (October 1959): 2. 3.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization on methods of increasing North Atlantic unity. Only then would it be appropriate for Congress to tackle this issue.¹⁰

Atlantic union leaders were inclined at first to regard such remarks as just an updated version of the familiar State Department vacillation so often experienced in the past. However it soon became apparent that this was not the case. Herter as Secretary of State continued to hold the plan in high regard. This was conclusively demonstrated on August 25, 1959. At that time, the State Department sent the following letter to Thomas E. Morgan.¹¹

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your letter of July 14, 1959, on the subject of House Concurrent Resolution 107, 108 and 146, calling for a convention of delegates from the NATO countries.

The Department has given further careful consideration to this proposal, which was discussed at the Atlantic Congress held in London from June 5-9, 1959. I am pleased to inform you that, with due account taken of the considerations outlined below, the Department had objections to the proposed resolutions.

From the language of the first operative paragraph of these resolutions which reads in part "that the legislatures of the other democratic governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be invited to send delegates to meet in convention . . . " the Department assumes that the delegates to the proposed convention will be named by the Legislative branch of the government. We have also of course noted the provision of the second operative paragraph which states in part that the delegates should be "free to explore the problem fully without being officially instructed or able to commit their governments." This requirement, which

¹⁰Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹Ibid.

in the Department's view is obviously in the interest of full and free exploration of the problem, would also appear to militate in favor of appointment of delegates by the legislative rather than the executive branch of government.

It would be difficult for the executive branch to appoint delegates to an international convention without providing for instructions to the United States delegation. It would also appear that governmental commitment would, to a certain degree, be implicit in appointment by the executive branch of delegates to a convention dealing with matters directly involving the conduct of United States foreign policy. However, as I stated above, I believe this difficulty can be avoided if the delegates to the proposed convention are not appointed by the President.

With these considerations in mind the Department has no objection to the resolution.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report.

For the Secretary of State,
William B. Macomber,
Assistant Secretary

Soon after Macomber released this letter both the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs announced plans to hold hearings on the bills when Congress convened in January, 1960.¹² The Senate Foreign Relations Committee actually was the first to initiate hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 19. That Committee opened hearings on January 19, 1960.

Before discussing these hearings attention should be given to the Foreign Relations Committee. After all, one of the central propositions of this study is that the influence of an interest group upon

¹²Ibid.

the legislative process depends more upon the group having shared values with the "legislators" than it does upon the group's ability to wield power through utilization of skillful techniques.¹³

This being the case, one can perceive how it might make a difference who occupied the legislative (i.e., Committee assignments) at this time. Did these committee members share a predisposition to support a proposal of this type?

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959-1960 was composed of fifteen members. The majority (Democratic) party members were J. William Fulbright, Chairman (Arkansas), Theodore F. Green (Rhode Island), John J. Sparkman (Alabama), Wayne Morse (Oregon), Russell B. Long (Louisiana), Albert Gore (Tennessee), John F. Kennedy (Massachusetts), Frank Church (Idaho), Mike Mansfield (Montana), and Frank Lausche (Ohio). The Republican members of the Committee were Homer Capehart (Indiana), Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Iowa), George Aiken (Vermont), John F. Williams (Delaware), and Frank B. Carlson (Kansas).

Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Committee, was a longtime supporter of the atlantic union proposal. In a series of executive sessions, he used his formidable authority as Committee chairman to facilitate a favorable Committee report on the resolution.¹⁴ Since the working sessions were held in secret the information available on this subject is scanty. Fortunately, Senator

¹³Harmon Ziegler, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 274.

¹⁴See Freedom and Union 14 (March 1960): 9, 10.

Fulbright leaked (intentionally) some information, regarding Committee proceedings to the Atlantic Union Committee leadership.¹⁵ This information provides several examples of Senator Fulbright's efforts to facilitate Senate passage of the bill.

First of all, Senator Fulbright worked with the executive branch in order to render the bill more acceptable to the State Department. Earlier versions of the atlantic union bill had involved the President as well as the legislative branch, in the selection of delegates to the proposed Convention.¹⁶

According to Clarence Streit, the State Department still had misgivings about involving the executive branch in the selection of delegates. The State Department leadership apparently felt that if the President participated in the delegate selection process, this would be interpreted abroad as an implicit governmental endorsement of the plan.¹⁷ This action would be so interpreted, according to the State Department view, even though the authorizing congressional resolution clearly stated that the delegates did not represent or commit their respective governments.¹⁸ William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State, expressed these views to Chairman Fulbright through correspondence.¹⁹

¹⁵Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C., 2 May 1984.

¹⁶See Chapter 4, p. 5.

¹⁷Freedom and Union 14 (March 1960): 11.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Interview with Clarence K. Streit.

Fulbright immediately set about to do what he could to make the bill more acceptable to the State Department officials. Fulbright used his influence as Committee chairman to obtain desired revisions in the proposal. One of the principal revisions involved changing the way in which delegates to the Convention were to be selected.²⁰ He persuaded a majority of his colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee to accept changes in the delegate revisions making the Vice-President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives responsible for selecting the delegates.²¹ In fact, the revised resolution--now termed Senate Joint Resolution 170--completely eliminated the direct presidential participation in the selection process.

There is some evidence that this seemingly minor revision, in the atlantic union bill, favorably impressed the State Department leadership.²² At any rate, at this time (January, 1960) the State Department released a statement much more complimentary toward the resolution. The statement said in part,

The Department considers that meetings such as the one proposed in this resolution might well serve a good purpose. We would be in favor of any useful meetings in which the future of the Atlantic Community can be discussed realistically by thoughtful and responsible people. We, in the Department of State, would certainly welcome any constructive and practical ideas which might emerge from the proposed conventions.²³

²⁰Freedom and Union 14 (May 1960): 14-16.

²¹Ibid., p. 16.

²²Ibid.

²³U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Convention, Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.C.R. 107, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 28-29. Hereafter cited as 1960 House Hearings.

The hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee were completed by January 21, 1960. Interestingly, attendance at the hearings was unusually high when one considers the competing pressures operating to divert Committee members to other tasks.²⁴ The public hearings revealed the existing divisions of opinion on the Committee with regard to this subject. During the hearings there were several occasions when the Committee members made remarks indicating their position. On one occasion during the hearings, Senator Alexander Wiley remarked that the movement to bring about an atlantic union was "idealism," but claimed that the proposal was impractical because it involved a ceding of national sovereignty.²⁵

For his part, Senator Theodore F. Green (Democrat-Rhode Island) wanted to know, what if anything the proposed Convention could accomplish, which had not already been dealt with by the annual North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Conference.²⁶ Later on, both Green and Wiley publicly questioned the wisdom of participating in a conference which could only "talk," but not commit the government.²⁷

Only three outside witnesses appeared at the Senate Committee hearings; all three (Elmo Roper, Jr., General William H. Draper, and Lithgow Osborne) were strongly in favor of the resolution.²⁸ Soon

²⁴Freedom and Union 14 (March 1960): 3.

²⁵1960 House Hearings, pp. 2, 3.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 16, 17.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 21, 22.

²⁸Freedom and Union 14 (March 1960): 3.

after the hearings were completed and the revisions adopted, Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright pressed his colleagues for a vote on the revised measure. On February 10, 1960, the Foreign Relations Committee voted eight to seven to report the revised bill. The text of this bill is in the Appendix of this study. The Committee members supporting the resolution were: J. William Fulbright (Democrat-Arkansas), John J. Sparkman (Democrat-Alabama), Hubert H. Humphrey (Democrat-Minnesota), Wayne Morse (Democrat-Oregon), Russell Long (Democrat-Louisiana), Albert Gore (Democrat-Tennessee), Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho), and Frank Carlson (Republican-Kansas). Opposing reporting the bill were: Theodore F. Green (Democrat-Rhode Island), Mike Mansfield (Democrat-Montana), Frank B. Lausche (Democrat-Ohio), Alexander Wiley (Republican-Wisconsin), and John Williams (Republican-Delaware). Two members of the Committee, Bourke Hickenlooper (Republican-Iowa), and George D. Aiken (Republican-Vermont) were not present when the vote was taken.²⁹

Several observations can be made about this vote. First, the vote had a definite partisan color. Only one Republican joined several Democrats in voting to report the resolution.³⁰ Curiously, opposition to the bill seems to have cut across philosophical divisions. Liberal Democrat Mike Mansfield joined conservative Democrat Frank B. Lausche, and conservative Republicans Alexander Wiley and John J. Williams in opposing the bill.³¹

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

A second observation to be made about the Committee vote concerns the role of Senator Fulbright. His influence with his fellow Democratic committee members seems to go a long way to account for why the bill was favorably reported. As Committee chairman, Senator Fulbright perhaps was able to induce several of his Democratic colleagues to support the resolution as a personal favor. This argument seems plausible when one considers the composition of the winning coalition. Of the seven Democrats supporting the measure, four were Southern Democrats and three were Northern Democrats. To this writer, at least, it seems that quite diverse elements comprised this coalition. No other explanation beyond personal loyalty to Chairman Fulbright comes to mind as a means of explaining this phenomenon.

During the next four months there was seemingly no further action. However, in contrast to past legislative struggles over the atlantic union issue, the atmosphere was definitely more favorable to securing passage. To begin with, both the House and Senate standing committees having jurisdiction over the bill (i.e., the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs) were chaired by individuals very sympathetic to the proposal. In addition, the State Department, which possessed critical input into this subject, was no longer an obstacle. Finally, the atlantic union movement had a powerful ally in the Senate who had great influence over the Senate's agenda, Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson. Senator Johnson had been a supporter of an atlantic union convention

since 1950.³² Several times in recent years he had told atlantic union supporters that he would gladly use his formidable power over scheduling the Senate's agenda for considering bills, to facilitate Senate consideration of the atlantic union resolution.³³ Unfortunately for atlantic union enthusiasts, Johnson had very little opportunity to help prior to 1960. This was because as long as the bills were bogged down before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as was the case in 1955 there was little that he could do to schedule Senate consideration. In 1960 due to these favorable circumstances, Senator Johnson expected to have the resolution brought to the Senate floor before the inevitable last-minute rush occurred.³⁴ As events developed, this was the way things turned out.

The next phase in the struggle over the Atlantic Citizens Congress measure occurred in May, 1960. At that time, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on the measure. Public hearings on the "Atlantic Convention" opened on May 17, 1960. Thomas E. Morgan (Democrat-Pennsylvania) was Committee chairman.³⁵ Representative Morgan was a strong supporter of the resolution, and in fact had supported the earlier atlantic union bills.³⁶

³²See Freedom and Union 14 (September 1960): 2.

³³Interview with Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D.C., 2 May 1984.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵See 1960 House Hearings, p. 2.

³⁶See Freedom and Union 13 (January 1959): 2.

In addition to Morgan there were several atlantic union proponents on this Committee. Among them were Clement Zablock (Democrat-Wisconsin), Wayne L. Hays (Democrat-Ohio), Armistead I. Seldon (Democrat-Alabama), Walter F. Judd (Republican-Minnesota), Frances Bolton (Republican-Ohio), and James Fulton (Republican-Pennsylvania).³⁷

The hearings by the House Foreign Affairs Committee were conducted in a manner designed to facilitate a favorable Committee report. For instance, the witnesses invited to testify before the Committee were all its strong proponents. Edward H. Litchfield, William L. Clayton, Percival F. Brundage, and Clarence K. Streit. Individuals opposed to the proposal were given the opportunity to state in writing their objections. These statements were made a part of the printed transcript.³⁸ All of the four speakers presented effective arguments for the proposal. Perhaps, Clarence K. Streit was the most effective speaker of the four in terms of allaying opposition to the measure. In his previous appearances before congressional committees, Clarence Streit had often extolled the virtues of the proposed atlantic union. Streit had, on such occasions, depicted the exploratory convention as a forerunner of the atlantic union.³⁹ However, in his 1960 appearance, Streit was much more guarded in his

³⁷The support of these individuals for the atlantic union resolution can be discerned by reading their remarks in the Foreign Affairs Committee hearings on Atlantic Convention.

³⁸1960 House Hearings, pp. 38-46.

³⁹See Chapter 1, pp. 27-28.

comments than when he appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in earlier years.

At this time Streit set out to downplay the resolution's connection with the atlantic union movement. Referring to the pending measure (Senate Joint Resolution 170), Streit remarked,

[It] . . . does not involve any endorsement of the Atlantic federation. Nor does it mean that I no longer urge federation of the free. It means this: I find that the security of the United States and of freedom has gone down so much since 1949 that any measure that promises as does this resolution, to assure early consideration at least of how to unite the Atlantic allies more strongly, deserves support, however short it falls of what I think necessary.⁴⁰

In the 1960s the Senate permitted the Majority Leader to arrange in advance the unanimous consent agreements.⁴¹ Since the process of obtaining the unanimous consent agreement was, at the time, carried out orally no record is available of the transactions. This is unfortunate for the purposes of this study since a written transcript of the proceedings could provide insight into the accompanying complex bargaining. The Senate as will be shown was divided on this issue. This being the case one wonders what concessions Senator Johnson had to grant in order to secure the unanimous consent agreement.

The official Congressional Record states that the unanimous consent agreement limited debate to two hours on the general questions

⁴⁰1960 House Hearings, p. 29.

⁴¹Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 2nd ed., (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1984), pp. 28, 158.

with time to be divided equally between proponents and opponents. One additional hour was allowed for debating amendments offered from the floor.⁴² Senator Frank B. Church acted as the floor leader for the resolution. Church was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee; however he was not an original sponsor of the bill, as was his colleague on the Foreign Relations Committee, Hubert H. Humphrey. Probably Humphrey would have led the Senate fight for adoption of this bill except for a practical consideration. At this time, he was campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination. In this situation, Humphrey had very little time left for the additional responsibilities that being a floor leader would entail.⁴³

For his part Church was modest in his predictions as to what the Citizens Convention would accomplish. Church declared in the Senate debate: "We have the opportunity to plant a seed which may grow into great constructive measures for strengthening the free world."⁴⁴ A diverse coalition of Senators joined Church in speaking on the Senate floor for adoption of this resolution. Included in this group were Democrats Estes Kefauver, John Sparkman, Hubert Humphrey, Russell Long (Democrat-Louisiana), Thomas Dodd (Democrat-Connecticut), and R. Vance Hartke (Democrat-Indiana).⁴⁵ Republican

⁴²U.S. Congress, Senate, S. Con. Res. 170, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 20 June 1960, Congressional Record 105: 12621.

⁴³Congressional Record, 11 June 1960.

⁴⁴U.S. Congress, Senate, S. Con. Res. 170, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 June 1960, Congressional Record 105: 12547.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 12629, 12647.

Senators John Sherman Cooper, Clifford B. Case, Frank B. Carlson, and Jacob Javits also spoke in favor of the bill.⁴⁶

On the other hand, the opposition forces consisted also of a bipartisan grouping. Republicans Bourke Hickenlooper (Iowa) and Homer Capehart (Indiana) were joined by Democratic Senators Sam Ervin (North Carolina) and Frank J. Lausche (Ohio) in attacking the proposal.⁴⁷ The Senate opposition brought forth two basic arguments against holding the Atlantic Citizens Convention. First, there was the argument advanced by some opponents that the bill attempted somehow to usurp the President's constitutional authority over the conduct of foreign relations. Opponents pointed out that the American delegates to the proposed Convention would not be officially representing the government. Therefore they claimed such delegates would be accountable to no one.⁴⁸ Senate opponents warned that foreign observers might mistake the Convention delegates' remarks as constituting official governmental positions. Along these lines Senator Sam Ervin warned: "This [resolution] is an effort on the part of the Congress to take charge of the foreign affairs of the United States in violation of the plain letter and living spirit of the Constitution."⁴⁹ Secondly, the opponents used the argument that the proposed conference was an unnecessary expenditure of public funds. Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, for instance, expounded upon these lines. Hickenlooper complained that the so-called Citizens Convention would merely restudy

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 12548, 12621, 12624.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 12623, 12627.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 12647.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 12624.

and rehash the same agenda and problems considered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council. This being the case, Hickenlooper asked why spend tax payers' money duplicating an existing effort.⁵⁰

Senate supporters of the resolution offered rejoinders to the criticisms. Senator Estes Kefauver pointed out that there was precedence for appointing a private commission to study policy. Kefauver argues that the Hoover Commission presented such a precedent.

Senator Hickenlooper's criticisms were challenged by Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey. Case argued that the proposed Citizens Conference would have opportunities for decision-making not available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council. Case reminded his colleagues that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council conformed to the traditional rules of diplomacy, unanimity was required before any proposals could be adopted. In addition, Case pointed out each delegate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council strictly reflected the official viewpoint of his respective country. By contrast, the Citizens Convention would be composed of individuals holding diverse views from each country; therefore it would tend to more realistically reflect the wishes and aspirations of the common man.⁵¹

Furthermore, Case pointed out, the Citizens Conference would not be saddled with the burden of reaching unanimous agreements as was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council and this fact

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 12623.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 12629, 12630.

presumably would be an advantage in formulating agreements.⁵² Surprisingly, no amendments were offered on the Senate floor. The resolution passed by a vote of 51 to 44.⁵³ Joining in support were 16 Republican Senators and 35 Democrats. There were 27 Democrats and 18 Republicans who voted against the bill. Both support and opposition appeared to cut across traditional lines; for instance, 7 Democratic Senators from the old Confederacy voted to support Senate Joint Resolution 170 while 12 others from that region voted in opposition.

The House of Representatives did not get around to voting on this measure until August 24, 1960. Proponents used the intervening time to marshall support on Capital Hill. Along these lines, the United States Committee for an Atlantic Congress (the group which organized American participation in the 1959 London Atlantic Congress) deluged the congressional leadership with letters urging adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 170. The letters were primarily but not exclusively directed to Speaker of the House Sam B. Rayburn and Majority Leader Johnson.⁵⁴ The letters apparently were designed to reinforce these individuals in their commitment in bringing the resolution up for a vote. At the same time newspapers such as the New York Times came out editorially in support of the bill.⁵⁵ All of these factors must have had a cumulative effect upon the legislature.

⁵²Ibid., p. 12630.

⁵³Ibid., p. 12631.

⁵⁴Some of the letters written to the Congressional leadership are found in the Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 53.

⁵⁵New York Times, 5 June 1960.

The House of Representatives debated and voted upon Senate Joint Resolution 170 on August 24, 1960. For some reason, floor debate was more strident and acrimonious than had been the case in the Senate. The arguments used by Senate opponents of the bill were reiterated in the House. Additional new arguments were also raised against the proposal which were left unstated in the Senate. For example, Representative H. R. Gross criticized the Convention as an excuse for a "junket." Gross demanded to know "Who really was promoting the conference."⁵⁶ Representative Claire Hoffman (Republican-Michigan) presented the most vehement attacks upon the bill. Hoffman took the unusual step of attacking the atlantic union movement at the same time he was criticizing the Citizens Convention proposal. Representative Hoffman warned his colleagues that the Atlantic Union Committee and especially Clarence Streit was real instigator of this proposal.⁵⁷ Hoffman advised his colleagues that Atlantic Union Committee "radicals" would somehow find a means of subverting U.S. sovereignty if the proposal were adopted.⁵⁸ Hoffman reminded his peers that he considered the Atlantic Union Committee a subversive organization; he had been trying since 1942 to obtain a congressional investigation of the "Union Now idea."⁵⁹

⁵⁶U.S. Congress, House, S. Con. Res. 170, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 24 August 1960, Congressional Record 105: 17489.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 17490.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 16491.

⁵⁹Ibid.

Representatives Ray Madden and Wayne L. Hays led the floor fight for adoption.⁶⁰ They had to repel both substantive and procedural attacks on the bill.

Opponents attempted three separate procedures to weaken or kill the measure. First of all, Representative H. R. Gross demanded several times a quorum call to present further consideration of the bill.⁶¹ These attempts failed when it became evident a quorum was present. Secondly, opponents attempted to weaken the bill through amendment. Specifically, Representative Flynnnt of Georgia sought to have the section of the bill defining the delegate selection process amended. Under the Flynnnt proposal, the Speaker of the House was required to name at least two members of Congress to be included in the Citizens Convention delegation.⁶²

Proponents of Senate Joint Resolution 170 objected to the proposal on practical grounds. Hays and Madden pointed out that whatever the merits of the idea, adopting such an amendment would have the effect of killing the bill. Amending the bill, would require the Senate to reconsider action on the proposal; there simply was not time so late in the session for such actions. After Madden explained the supporters' opposition to Flynnnt's amendment, it failed passage in the Committee of the Whole by a vote of 59 to 33. Secondly, opponents of Senate Joint Resolution 170 attempted to weaken the bill by

⁶⁰Ibid., 17488.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 17488, 17496.

⁶²Ibid., p. 17506.

reducing the contemplated appropriations. Under Senate Joint Resolution 170, the United States government was to be authorized to spend up to \$100,000 as this country's share of the total cost of holding the Convention.⁶³ An amendment offered on the House floor would have reduced this authorization to \$40,000. However, this amendment was defeated in the Committee on the Whole, 38 to 17.⁶⁴

A few minutes later, the House approved Senate Joint Resolution 170 by a vote of 289 to 103⁶⁵ and Senate Joint Resolution 170 was proclaimed as Public Law 86-719. The long contemplated Citizens Conference was soon to become a reality.

At this point it is appropriate to summarize the findings of this study and to assess the importance of the various factors in accounting for the fate of the atlantic union proposal. First of all, the atlantic unionists obviously never achieved their primary goal of establishing a supranational political union of democracies. Passage of the Atlantic Citizens Conference legislation by Congress in 1960 by no stretch of the imagination fulfilled the objective sought by the atlantic unionists. This was because the Citizens Convention, with its purely advisory authority, could only produce unofficial opinions and was not equipped to make the sort of authoritative decisions necessary if one were to launch a new political institution.

The environment seemed to be the most important factor in accounting for the movement's failure to achieve its primary goal.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 17512.

⁶⁵Pub. L. 86-719, Statutes at Large 74 (1960). The text of this law is produced in the Appendix of this study.

In essence the atlantic unionists were calling for profound changes in the existing nation-state system. Under their plan the nations joining the proposed union would transfer the conduct of foreign relations to the new central government of atlantic union. Many officials in the State Department undoubtedly found this proposal disturbing. Perhaps this apprehension was partly based upon selfish considerations; bureaucrats tend to have an understandable desire to perpetuate their jobs and the status of their departments. Yet such considerations do not explain all of the opposition within the State Department. Undoubtedly along with the selfish motivations there also existed genuine misgivings concerning the atlantic union proposal. For instance, one can sympathize with the reluctance of a State Department official to substitute an unproven structure for the existing known method of dealing with international affairs.

In reality the sweeping innovative nature of the atlantic union proposal probably doomed it to failure from the beginning. It is difficult to envision the American government going along with sweeping changes in the international system without the stimulus of some very exceptional external event. In the past much less sweeping measures, such as the League of Nations and American adherence to the International Court of Justice failed to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate. If these proposals encountered difficulties, then it is not difficult to perceive why a more far reaching proposal might also have great difficulty in obtaining Congressional approval.

The failure of the movement to attain its objectives can to a lesser extent be attributed to the political strategy adopted by the

Atlantic Union Committee during the period 1949-58. As this study has shown, Clarence K. Streit and Justice Owen Roberts were fervent believers in the cause for which they were lobbying. They were impatient of any delays in realizing the desired Atlantic Union. Both individuals used their formidable influence within the Committee to lobby for the immediate implementation of the desired Union. They tended to regard anything less as a diversion and thus a waste of time. This viewpoint led Streit and Roberts to prevent the Committee from identifying itself directly with goals, such as the establishment of a Parliamentarians Conference institutions and the setting up of a multilateral Atlantic institution to deal with the loans to the developing nations until 1959. Therefore, by their dogged insistence upon sticking to their primary goals and ignoring other matters, the Atlantic Union Committee leadership may have made their admittedly uphill struggle even more difficult.

By contrast after 1958 the political strategy pursued by the Committee appeared to be more rational for realization of its long-term objective. It is true that American participation in the Atlantic Citizens Conference was probably more due to the appointment of Christian A. Herter as Secretary of State in 1959 than it was due to the Atlantic Union Committee's activities. However the tactics pursued by the Committee at this time at least facilitated, rather than hindered efforts to obtain Congressional approval for the Atlantic Citizens Convention resolution. The fact is that the Atlantic Union Committee faced a choice in 1959. They could either throw their support behind the Citizens Convention plan then shaping

up even though this proposal obviously fell short of the Committee's primary goal. By supporting the plan, the Atlantic Union Committee hopefully could help create a precedent that could later be expanded. Or alternatively, the Committee could have used its influence in Congress to defeat the Citizens Convention plan, acting under the belief that the proposal was so weak as to be worthless to the cause of atlantic union. This possibility seems plausible when one considers the narrow margin by which the resolution passed the Senate. Yet the Committee avoided this temptation; instead it supported the proposal. By doing so perhaps the Atlantic Union Committee helped lay the framework for the development of political supranational institutions in the future.

One of the stated purposes of this study was to learn more about how interest groups motivated by abstract principles may influence the American foreign policy making process. The basic findings of this study indicate that one such interest group, the Atlantic Union Committee, was able to exercise influence upon the policy making process. At the same time, the study has shown that the Committee operated at a disadvantage in the policy making process as compared with non-ideologically motivated interest groups. Even though public opinion data indicated that a majority of the public was sympathetic towards the idea of closer ties with other democracies, the Committee's proposals nevertheless aroused intense opposition from certain groups.

Perhaps this took place because the Atlantic Union Committee raised issues laden with symbolic overtones, and certain individuals

considered these symbols as threatening. For example, the Atlantic Unionists raised the cry "union now," and for various reasons, the leadership of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Daughters of the American Revolution perceived a threat to American culture. Examples come to mind of other ideologically-motivated interest groups attempting to influence the policy process. Specifically, the interest groups comprising the nuclear freeze movement in the United States appear to have experienced similar difficulties with their opposition.

From the evidence available in this study it appears that ideologically-motivated interest groups arouse an unusually high level of opposition; therefore, there will be special problems associated with their attempts to influence the policy process. Such groups will probably require a higher level of public support in order to achieve success with their policy objectives than would be the case if they sought more conventional objectives. Also, it will probably be necessary for such groups to neutralize or disarm segments of the opposition. The Atlantic Union Committee utilized this tactic in 1959 when it agreed to certain changes in the congressional resolution concerning the Citizens Convention. Apparently this concession was crucial to the obtaining of majority support for the resolution in Congress. Perhaps at other times, other types of accommodation may be appropriate for such interest groups to utilize.

CHAPTER X

EPILOGUE

The long-awaited Citizens Conference on atlantic unity was finally held in Paris during December, 1961 and January, 1962.¹ Under provisions of the legislation passed by Congress, the fourteen member delegation was appointed jointly by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. Former Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and former Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton were named as co-chairmen of the delegation. Since both of these individuals had been active proponents of the atlantic union proposal, the atlantic union movement could be said to have had an impact upon the deliberations of the Citizens Conference.

Some of the Conference's recommendations were of a specific nature while other recommendations were general. The Conference recommended:

1. Establish a governmental Commission on Atlantic Unity to draw up a Charter for an Atlantic Community suitably organized to meet the challenges of the era.
2. Create a permanent High Council which should act in designated cases by a weighted majority on matters of common concern.
3. Develop the NATO Parliamentarians Conference into a Consultative Assembly which would review

¹New York Times, 11 January 1962, p. 11.

the work of all Atlantic institutions and make recommendations to them.

4. Form a trade partnership between the European Economic Community and North America as a basis for an Atlantic Economic Community, but open to all other qualified nations of the world.
5. Establish an Atlantic High Court of Justice to decide specific legal controversies which might arise under the Community treaties.
6. Promote measures to insure more effective defense including further development of a unified Atlantic Command, a common strategy, both inside and outside the Atlantic area; greater standardization and more rational production of arms and equipment; and defense contributions fairly shared among our respective countries.
7. Support and expand the Atlantic Institute as an intellectual and spiritual center of the Atlantic Community.²

Supporters of the atlantic union movement disagreed over the value of the aforementioned recommendations. The so-called "radical" wing, of the movement (led by Clarence K. Streit and Elmo Roper) criticized the Convention for not going further. Roper and Streit had hoped that the Citizens Convention would actually draw up a constitution for the envisioned atlantic union. These individuals were disappointed when the Convention instead limited its work to recommendations. Streit's feelings on the matter were that "timidity" had won out over courage at the Convention.³

²Freedom and Union 17 (April 1962): 3, 4.

³Istvan Szent-Miklosy, The Atlantic Union Movement (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, 1965), p. 68.

On the other hand, the so-called "moderate" faction of the atlantic union movement was pleased with the Convention's recommendations. According to Szent-Miklosy, the "moderate" faction within the movement had always looked upon the goal of creating the "interstate" republic envisioned in Union Now as a distant objective.⁴ In the short-run, the "moderates" preferred to work for almost any proposal which furthered the military, political, and economic unity of the Atlantic Community. The "moderates" also held to the view that incremental objectives could gradually move the western Democracies closer to an atlantic union without at the same time, stirring up potential opposition.⁵

The "moderates" in the Atlantic Union Committee could point to the specific recommendations of the Convention, such as the proposal for establishing a Commission to draw up an atlantic charter, as evidence that the cause of atlantic unity was being advanced. The "moderates" argued that these recommendations represented the maximum objectives obtainable at this time.⁶ At least something had been accomplished from which future advances could be added later.

As mentioned above, Streit and Roper felt that the Citizen Convention should have seized the opportunity presented to draw up a proposed Constitution for a political union of western democracies. The delegates to the Convention really had no such mandate, though.

⁴Ibid., pp. 13-18.

⁵Ibid., pp. 135-141.

⁶Ibid., p. 50.

The Convention, it will be recalled, was basically charged with exploring how greater unity of purpose could be achieved. It seems probable that at the very least, the delegates would have set off an uproar in the United States if they had exceeded their instruction along the lines advocated by Streit. For his part, Streit claimed that there was historical precedent for such action. He pointed out that the framers of the American Federal Constitution had exceeded their instructions; these individuals were authorized only to recommend revisions in the Articles of Confederation. However, Streit seems to have forgotten that while the American Constitutional framers had no formal authorization for their actions, at least the framers represented powerful interests who were interested in transforming the weak Articles of Confederation into a strong federal Constitution. It is very doubtful that the atlantic unionist possessed within the United States the degree of support necessary to have made such a venture work.

On balance, the accomplishments of the Atlantic Convention appear modest in scale. The most important recommendations from the standpoint of the atlantic unionist, the drawing up an atlantic charter, remains an unfulfilled dream. At most, the Convention represented a small step forward.

The atlantic union movement, on the other hand, accomplished considerably more. Of course, it failed in its primary objective of bringing about an interstate republic of democracies. At the close of the period under consideration, there was little, if any evidence that the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty countries were

closer to the proposals expressed in Union Now than they had been in 1949 when the Atlantic Union Committee was set up.

Nevertheless, the atlantic union movement has certainly contributed to the development of supranational political institutions. This study has shown how the North Atlantic Parliamentarians Conference--now known as the Atlantic Assembly--largely owes its existence to the efforts of certain individuals closely associated with the atlantic union movement. To be sure, the Atlantic Assembly has so far made only slight progress towards development into a full-fledged supranational institution. However, in recent years this body has finally obtained the authority to establish and control its own budget. In any event, the precedent has been established of legislators deliberating supranational questions with their counterparts in other democratic nations outside the limits of traditional government-to-government diplomacy.

In addition, the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development, which has limited supranational authority over certain trade matters, owes its inception to the ideas furnished by atlantic unionists. The Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development is certainly no full-fledged supranational institution at present. Yet, in common with the Atlantic Assembly it may represent an institution which someday takes on additional powers and responsibilities. In that event, the dream of supranational political union will live on.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE BY-LAWS

A Nonprofit Membership Corporation Incorporated under the Laws of the State of New York.

Article I

The purposes of the Corporation are:

1. To promote support for Congressional action requesting the President of the United States to invite other Democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet with delegates of the United States in a federal convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other Democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.
2. To promote a widespread understanding of the principles and advantages of a federal union of free peoples so as to make possible a fair evaluation of any plan that may be recommended by such convention, and to proffer advice and assistance in formulating the terms on which any such union is to be established; and
3. To promote the formulation of such a union of Democracies as in the opinion of the Committee, offers the best prospect of obtaining world peace.

Article II

1. Eligibility. Membership in the Corporation shall be open to all citizens of the United States, and membership in any chapter thereof shall be open to all persons without reference to creed or color except as provided in paragraph 5 of this Article II. Membership in this Corporation shall be granted only upon application to the Board of Governors, who may reject such applications for cause.
2. Members-at-Large. Members not belonging to any special or local chapter, and residing in communities not within the jurisdiction of any local chapter shall be members-at-large.
3. Associate Members. The term "associate members" shall include every member of the Corporation not required to pay dues. Associate members shall have no voting rights except such as may be granted by the chapter to which they belong and which relates solely to matters affecting such chapter.
4. Classes of Membership. All members, except associate members shall have equal voting rights, and be required to pay annual dues of not less than \$1.00. The Board of Governors may establish other classifications of membership with higher dues.

5. Original Members. Immediately upon the adoption of these By-Laws, the members of the Corporation shall consist of (a) the original incorporators, (b) all officers and members of the Board of Directors, and all members of the Council of the Atlantic Union Committee for a Federal Convention of Democracies, a corporation of the District of Columbia, (c) and all other members of the latter corporation as of said date.

Article III

1. Issuance of Charters. Charters creating local or special chapters may from time to time be issued upon application of not less than seven voting members eligible for membership in the chapter to be created. The issuance of every such charter shall first be approved by the Board of Governors; provided that the Board may delegate such authority to a committee appointed by it.

2. Chapter Memberships. Each local chapter shall, except as provided below, include all members residing in any one designated district, together with such other Corporation members as shall upon their application, be elected to membership in such chapter. Each special chapter shall include all members of any particular group who apply for membership therein. Any member may belong to one or more chapters (whether local or special) and may resign from any chapter by filing written notice with it of his election to do so.

3. Revocation. Any such charter may be revoked for cause at any time by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Governors present at any meeting of the Board.

4. Powers and Duties. The powers and duties of each chapter shall be set forth in its chapter.

Article IV

Congress of Delegates

1. Powers. The powers of the Corporation shall be vested in its membership and exercised by them through a Congress of Delegates and a Board of Governors, as hereinafter provided.

2. Election of Delegates. The Congress shall consist of delegates elected by the chapters and by members-at-large of the Corporation. One or more delegates shall be chosen by each chapter for each meeting of the Congress. All members-at-large shall be entitled to be represented at each meeting by delegates. Delegates representing members-at-large residing in any state or geographical area shall be chosen by and from among such members in accordance with such procedures as shall be established by the Board of Governors. No person not a voting member shall be eligible to serve as a delegate.

3. Voting Rights.

(a) The delegates representing each chapter shall be entitled to one vote and to an additional vote for each twenty-five voting members of such chapter. Each chapter may elect one or more delegates but in no event more than the number of votes to which it is entitled, and the votes to which any chapter is entitled shall be divided as nearly equally as possible among its delegates. For the purpose of determining the voting rights of any chapter no member shall be included who is also a member of another chapter which he joined at an earlier date. Delegates representing members-at-large shall have one vote for each twenty-five members-at-large or major fraction thereof they represent.

(b) In the event that a duly elected delegate is unable to attend any meeting of the Congress, a duly elected alternate delegate may be seated in place of the absent delegate upon the presentation of proper credentials; and if no such alternate be present, the votes which any such absent delegate would be entitled to cast if present, may be cast by the other delegate, or delegates, if any, of such chapter present at the meeting.

(c) Each delegate of any chapter shall be a member thereof, except that if any chapter is unable to send any of its members as delegates, it may appoint as its delegate or delegates any other voting member or members of the Corporation residing in the State, or of the states, wherein the chapter is located.

(d) Each chapter present at any meeting of the Congress shall be authorized to cast the full number of votes to which it is entitled on any matter properly brought before such meeting.

(e) Votes of delegates may not be cast by proxy.

Article V

Meetings of the Congress

1. Annual Meeting. An annual meeting shall be held in each year, beginning with the year 1951, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the Board of Governors, for the purpose of electing Governors, establishing policy, and programs, and transacting such other business as may properly come before the meeting.

2. Special Meetings. A special meeting of the Congress may be called by the Board of Governors at any time, and shall be called by the Board upon the request in writing of twenty per cent or more of the voting members. The Board shall fix the time and place for holding of every such special meeting.

3. Notice and Place of Meetings. Notice of every meeting of the Congress shall be mailed to every chapter at least thirty days in advance of the date set for such meeting, stating the date, place and principle purpose or purposes of the meeting. A similar notice shall, if practicable, be included in any periodical currently being issued by the Corporation. Any annual or special meeting may be held either within or without the State of new York.

4. Quorum. Delegates representing twenty per cent or more of the voting members shall consistute a quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the Congress.

5. Procedure. The President, or in his absense, a Vice-President, and if neither the President nor any Vice-President shall be present, a person appointed by vote of a majority of the delegates present, shall preside at each meeting of the Congress. The Secretary, or in his absence, a person appointed by the presiding officer, shall act as the secretary of every such meeting.

Article VI

1. Election. The officers of the Corporation shall consist of a President, one or more Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers as may from time to time be provided by resolution of the Board. All such officers shall be elected by the Board of Governors from among its membership to serve for a term of one year or until the election of their successors. No member of the Board of Governors shall serve as a salaried officer of the Corporation.

2. Duties. The duties of each officer shall be such as are commonly denoted by the title of his office, or may be otherwise provided by the resolution of the Board.

3. Removal. Any officer may be removed from office at any time, with or without cause, by resolution, of the Board.

Article VII

1. Powers. The business of the Corproation shall, subject to the provisions of these By-Laws and to such policies as shall from time to time be established by its Congress, be managed by its board of directors (elsewhere herein referred to as its "Board of Governors").

2. Election. The incorporators of the Corporation shall, at the meeting of the incorporators at which these By-Laws shall be adopted, elect a Board of twenty-six Governors, each of whom shall be a Director of the Atlantic Union Committee for a Federal Convention of Democracies, of whom nine shall be elected to serve until the annual meeting of the Congress to be held in 1953, nine to serve until the annual meeting to be held in 1952, and nine to serve until the annual meeting to be held in 1951. At each annual meeting, Governors shall be chosen to replace

those whose term expires on the date of such meeting, each of whom shall serve until the third annual meeting following the date of his election. Nominations for election to the Board of Governors may be made by a nominating committee in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, but opportunity shall always be given for nominations from the floor. Any procedure so established may be altered by the Congress.

3. Increase in Membership. The Board of Governors may at any time, by resolution, increase the number of members of the Board, but such number shall never exceed fifty.

4. Vacancies. Upon the death, resignation, or removal of any Governor, and upon any increase in the authorized number of the Board, the vacancy or vacancies so occurring or created shall be filled by any remaining members of the Board. Each person elected to fill a vacancy caused by an increase in the number of members of the Board; shall serve until the particular annual meeting of the Congress specified by the Board at the time of his election, but no meeting shall be so specified if, as a result thereof, the number of Governors whose terms expire in any one year would exceed by more than one the number of Governors whose terms expire in any other year.

5. Meetings. A regular meeting of the Board of Governors shall be held immediately after the final adjournment of each annual meeting of the Congress, at which meeting the Board shall elect officers for the ensuing year; and regular meetings may be held at such times as may be provided by the resolution of the Board. Special meetings may be called at any time by the President or by any seven members of the Board. Meetings may be held either within or without the State of New York.

6. Notice of Meetings. It shall be the duty of the Secretary to give notice of each meeting of the Board to every Governor by mail at least ten days or by telephone, or telegraph, at least three days before the meeting.

7. Quorum. One-third of the Governors in office shall constitute a quorum of the Board.

8. Failure to Attend Meetings. Any Governor who shall fail to attend any three consecutive meetings of the Board shall be deemed to have resigned and shall cease to be a Governor upon the final adjournment of the third such meeting unless such failure shall be excused by a majority vote of the Governors present at the meeting.

9. Removal. Any governor may be removed from office by a resolution adopted by two-thirds of the Governors present at any meeting of the Board, stating that he had made it evident that he is no longer in sympathy with the states purposes of the Corporation.

10. Executive Committee. The incorporators may, at the meeting at which Governors are elected by them as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article 7; appoint an Executive Committee, consisting of five or more Governors elected at that meeting. The Board of Governors may thereafter change the composition of said Committee from time to time, provided that the President shall always be a member thereof ex officio, and that the total number of its members (all of whom shall be Governors) shall never be less than three. The Executive Committee shall, unless otherwise provided by resolution of the Board, have all the powers of the Board, except the power to elect Governors and the power to amend these By-Laws. One-third of the members may constitute a quorum.

11. Other Committees. Additional Committees may be appointed from time to time by the Board or by the President with such duties as may be prescribed by the appointing authority. Any such other Committee may include members who are not Governors, but no such other Committee, except as otherwise provided in the By-Laws, have power to act for, or bind, the Board of Governors or the Corporation.

Article VIII

Council

1. Election. All persons who on the date of the adoption of these By-Laws are members of the Council of the Atlantic Union Committee for A Federal Convention of Democracies, shall forthwith become members of the Council of the Corporation. Additional members of the Council may be elected from time or by the Board of Governors.

2. Terms of Office. All members of the Council shall hold office until resignation or removal.

3. Duties. It shall be the duty of every member of the Council to proffer his aid and counsel from time to time, as the occasion may arise, and to respond, within reasonable limits, to all requests for advice or assistance from the Board or from any officer of the Corporation; provided, that the event which he shall be so obligated shall in every instance be determined by such member.

4. Meetings. Meetings of the Council shall be called from time to time by the Board of Governors, and shall be called by the Secretary upon the written request of twenty per cent or more of the members of the Council.

5. Removal. Any member of the Council may be removed at any time by the affirmative vote of a majority of the Governors then in office.

Article IX

Corporate Seal

1. The corporate seal of the Corporation shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors. It shall be circular in form and set forth the name of the Corporation and the year of its incorporation.

Article X

Rules of Procedure

1. All meetings of the Congress shall be conducted in accordance with Roberts' Rules of Order, Revised, unless otherwise provided for in these By-Laws.

Article XI

Dissolution

1. Upon the dissolution of the Corporation, its Board of Governors shall continue to act as trustees of all assets. After payment of all its just debts, any assets then remaining shall be disposed of in such manner as shall be directed by a majority of such trustees, and as they shall determine by resolution to the best calculated (I) to promote the purpose for which the Corporation was organized, (II) Otherwise, to promote the cause of human freedom.

Article XII

Amendments

1. How Adopted. The By-Laws may be altered or repealed, in whole or in part, either by resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote of all the Governors present at any meeting of the Board, or by a resolution adopted by two-thirds of the votes represented at any meeting of the Congress; provided, in either case, that notice of the proposed adoption of such resolution shall have been given as hereinafter provided.

2. Notice of Proposed Adoption. It shall be the duty of the Secretary to include a statement that such a resolution will be offered (i) in the notice of any meeting of the Board of Governors if a copy thereof has been submitted to him at least five days before the meeting accompanied by the written request of not less than five Governors that such statement be so included, and (ii) in the notice of any meeting of the Congress if a copy thereof has been submitted to him at least sixty days before the meeting accompanied by the written request of not less than five per cent of the voting members that such statement be so included.

3. Limitations. The Board of Governors shall have no power to adopt any amendment to these By-Laws limiting or restricting the powers of the Congress or altering or repealing this paragraph 3 or any other present or future provision of the By-Laws as to which such alteration or repeal shall have been prohibited by any amendment to these By-Laws adopted by the Congress. No amendment of these By-Laws shall be adopted which would affect the term of office of any Governor then in office.

APPENDIX B

ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

1. Committee Composition, 1949-50

Owen Roberts
William L. Clayton
Elmo Roper Jr.
Arnaud Marts
Clarence K. Streit
Robert Patterson
Walden Moore
Hugh Moore
Edmund R. Orgill
Henry Atwood
Edgar Bissantz
Sevellon Brown
Mrs. Ellen Garwood

Rev. Leland Henry
George Shea
Ralph Stoddard
Harold Urey
William A. White
Herbert Agar
Gardner Cowles
Maurice Bent
Henry Flower, Jr.
T. C. P. Martin
Mrs. Hattie M. Pavlo
Adolph Schmidt
John Orr Young

2. Committee Composition, 1954-55

Owen J. Roberts
William L. Clayton
Lithgow Osborne
Elmo Roper, Jr.
Gerald B. Henry
Herbert Agar
Mrs. Sadie Alexander
Mrs. Frank C. Baker
Mrs. Margaret C. Banning
Robert Bishop
Edgar Bissantz
Helmuth G. Braendel
Thomas Cook Brown
Harry A. Bullis
thomas H. Burke
Harry Cohen
Don Dennis
F. Joseph Donohue
Dr. Ralph C. Epstein
Ernest Estwing
Henry C. Flower, Jr.
Dr. Ralph C. Flynt
Livingston Hartley
Rev. Leland Henry

Herbert W. Will
Franz Martin Joseph
Horace H. Koessler
Mrs. Lucy B. Lehman
Thomas C. P. Martin
Col. John A. Mathews
Frederick C. McKee
Walden Moore
Garrison Norton
Edmund Orgill
Mrs. Chase S. Osborn
Mrs. Hattie May Pavlo
Dr. Allan Rice
John Q. Robinson
Mrs. Thomas Sayman
Adolph W. Schmidt
George E. Shea
Clarence K. Streit
Hollis E. Suits
Dr. Harold C. Urey
Col. R. W. Valimont
Marshall Webb
Mrs. Lynn Williams

3. Committee Composition, 1958-59

Elmo Roper, Jr.
William L. Clayton
Lithgow Osborne
John Q. Robinson
Gerald Henry

Thomas C. Brown
Harry A. Bullis
Thomas H. Burke
Harry Cohen
Don Dennis

3. Committee Composition, 1958-59 (Continued)

Herbert Agar
Sadie Alexander
Mrs. Frank C. Baker
Mrs. Margaret Banning
Robert Bishop
Helmuth C. Brandel

F. Joseph Donohue
Mrs. Raymond T. Elligett
Dr. Ralph Epstein
Ernest Estwing
Henry Flower, Jr.
Dr. Ralph C. Flynt

APPENDIX C

DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY

We 169 citizens of Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Denmark address this APPEAL FOR ATLANTIC UNITY to our fellow citizens and to our governments which are represented on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

President Eisenhower has warned that "unity among free nations is our only hope of survival" and has declared that "NATO symbolizes the unity of free men in an age of peril." This is our conviction also. We must never forget that we are all bound together by our common belief in freedom under law.

The fourteen members of NATO have mutually guaranteed each other against armed aggression and merged under one command parts of their land, sea and air forces to make their pledge effective. NATO has succeeded in vastly reducing the danger of direct military attack in Europe. This success has caused the enemies of freedom to divert their military aggression to other areas and to concentrate on diplomatic manoeuvres to disrupt the unity of the NATO nations. Their efforts have been aided by voices of isolationism in each of our countries and by mutual recrimination. Thus, our peril from disunity has increased.

This is no time for half-hearted measures. While welcoming the progress made towards European union, we believe that nothing less than an effectively integrated Atlantic Community, which would include German defense forces, will in the end adequately meet the challenge of the times. Defense in today's terms extends beyond military requirements and into the political, economic and cultural aspects of our lives.

Yet NATO is still basically a military alliance. It is as long ago as 25 April 1953, that the NATO Council of Ministers stated in their communique: "Convinced that in unity lies their greatest strength, they are resolved to broaden cooperation in every field, economic, political and social, as well as military, and so make the Atlantic Community a lasting reality." But little has since been done.

We call upon our governments to proceed now to redeem that pledge by initiating the following measures for which there is already authority under the North Atlantic Treaty:

1. The development of NATO as a central agency to coordinate the political, trade and defense policies of the member nations.
2. The elaboration, pursuant to Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, of a comprehensive mutual program for lowering tariffs, freeing currencies and eliminating trade restrictions so that there may be established an adequate economic basis for the Atlantic Community and associated nations.

Common economic action will give us not only better defense at less cost, but also the benefits of an expanding and thriving economy, thus raising the standards of living for the Atlantic Community and the whole free world.

3. The establishment by each of our legislatures of a parliamentary committee or association for NATO to further understanding in each member country of its progress and potentialities.
4. The creation of an advisory Atlantic Assembly representative of the legislatures of the member nations, which would meet periodically to discuss matters of common concern. Observers could be invited from associated states.
5. The establishment by NATO of an Economic Advisory Council comprising representatives of employers and employees to advise Council and other NATO bodies on the effect of their policies on the standard of living in the NATO countries, especially upon the working population.

We endorse the words of the Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, spoken at Bonn on February 10:

"Perhaps the time has now come to consider whether some of the steps toward closer integration which we must take if our concept of civilization is not to perish, should be taken within the larger framework of the North Atlantic Community ... many of us believe the peoples living about the great basin of the Atlantic Ocean might well seek the solution of their problems of economic betterment, political stability and self-defense in this closer integration of their national resources and of their machinery of government."

We remind our governments that NATO, in the words of its Secretary-General, "Is something new and exciting and revolutionary, the most challenging and constructive experiment in international relations ever attempted."

We ask our fellow citizens to urge our respective governments to make this experiment succeed. We are convinced that in our ability to do so lies the well-being of us all.

October 4, 1954

Source: Kefauver Collection, File 1, Box 5, The University of Tennessee Special Collections Library, Knoxville.

APPENDIX D

ATLANTIC CITIZENS CONVENTION

JOINT RESOLUTION

PUBLIC LAW 86-719

"Joint Resolution"

"To authorize the participation in an international convention of representative citizens from the North Atlantic Treaty nations to examine how greater political and economic cooperation among their peoples may be promoted, to provide for the appointment of United States delegates to such convention, and for other purposes."

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that (a) the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives acting jointly are hereby authorized, after consultation with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives to appoint a United States Citizen Commission on NATO, hereafter referred to as the Commission. Said Commission shall consist of not to exceed twenty United States citizens, not more than one-half of whom may be from any one political party, and who shall be appointed from private life.

(b) Vacancies in the Commission shall not affect its power. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 2ca. It shall be the duty of such Commission to endeavor to arrange for and to participate in such meetings and conferences with similar citizens commissions in the NATO countries as it may deem necessary in order to explore means by which greater cooperation and unity of purpose may be developed to the end that democratic freedom may be promoted by economic and political means.

(b) The United States Citizens Commission on NATO is not in any way to speak for or to represent the United States Government.

Sec. 3. To promote the purposes set forth in section 2, the Commission is thereby authorized--

- (1) to communicate informally the sense of this resolution to parliamentary bodies in NATO countries;
- (2) to seek to arrange an international convention and such other meetings and conferences as it may deem necessary;
- (3) to employ and fix the compensation of such temporary professional and clerical staff as it deems necessary: Provided, that the number shall not exceed ten; And provided further, that compensation shall not exceed the maximum rates authorized for committees of the Congress.

- (4) to submit such reports as it deems appropriate;
and
- (5) to pay its share of such expenses as may be involved as a consequence of holding any meetings or conferences authorized by subparagraph (2) above, but no in excess of \$100,000.

Sec. 4. Members of the Commission, who shall serve without compensation, shall be reimbursed for, or shall be furnished, travel subsistence and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties under this joint resolution, upon vouchers approved by the Chairman of said Commission.

Sec. 5. Not to exceed \$300,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State to carry out the purposes of this resolution, payments to be made upon vouchers approved by the Chairman of the Commission subject to the laws, rules, and regulations applicable to the obligation and expenditure of appropriated funds. The Commission shall make semiannual reports to Congress accounting for all expenditures.

Sec. 6. The Commission shall cease to exist on January 31, 1962.

VITA

James W. Lantrip, Jr. was born in Nashville, Tennessee in 1943. He attended public schools in Nashville, Tennessee and later in Louisville, Kentucky. In 1967, he earned the Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Evansville. From 1969 to 1971, he was a graduate student at The University of Tennessee. He received the Master of Arts in College Teaching degree, with a major in political science, from that institution in December, 1971.

From September, 1971 to August, 1973 he was employed as an instructor in the political science department at Young Harris College, Young Harris, Georgia. He returned to the University of Tennessee in September, 1973 in order to pursue further graduate studies in political science.