To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Michael Calvin Hawthorne entitled "The Human Experience of Reparation: A Phenomenological Investigation." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.

Howard R. Pollio, Major Professor

Charles P. Cohen, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE OF REPARATION:

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Michael Calvin Hawthorne

December 1988

Copyright © Michael Calvin Hawthorne, 1989
All rights reserved

DEDICATION

To my esteemed teacher, colleague and friend

C. Eugene Mallory

who opened a way of knowing
and understanding,
and dialogue,

who quietly offered himself as a mentor
when I most needed
self-definition,

and whose pride and belief in me
has continued to be
an inspiration.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Four years have passed since I first envisioned this research project. I feel fortunate to have stumbled upon a topic that captivated my attention and demanded my best effort: this study required the integration of all I have learned as a scholar, researcher and clinician. Conducting the investigation and writing the dissertation has been a labor of love. Although I recognize this document is far from perfect, I am satisfied with the beginning it represents.

As I complete my graduate education, I am keenly aware of the many friends, colleagues and loved ones to whom I am truly indebted. I want first to acknowledge my deep respect and appreciation for my two major professors. Howard Pollio and Charlie Cohen are most responsible for creating the interpersonal and intellectual contexts in which I have matured as a person and as a psychologist. Over the years they consistently challenged me to become and to grow, while consistently matching that challenge with their support and warm friendship. From them, I learned more than theories; I learned a way of thinking. When I reflect back on my training, it is the hours I was fortunate enough to spend with these men that will come to mind first. I am proud to have been their student.

I also appreciate the contributions of the other members of my doctoral committee. Jack Barlow played a significant role in my clinical training: in his classes, he introduced me to the British object relations perspective; in our hours of supervision, he worked to temper the immoderate optimism of a young therapist. He frequently reminded me I was "green." Although he never told me what color I will turn next, he allowed me to believe that I could, in time, become a competent therapist. I deeply appreciate his contribution to, and enthusiasm for, both my training and my study.

Stan Lusby kindly put in many hours to assist me with the background scholarship for this investigation, and he steered me toward meaningful insights. The dissertation is richer because of his contribution. Bill Calhoun provided several helpful practical ideas for the study and played an important role of skeptic for the committee.

The Phenomenology Group has been a tremendous source of intellectual inspiration, criticism and direction over the years. It is rare that a group of individuals can develop such purpose and passion for a common perspective, and I've enjoyed being part of the creative process. Special acknowledgment is due to several group members: Tracy Henley took time to read and critique a number of incarnations of the initial chapters. In

encouraging me to adapt the procedure of narrative analysis, Bruce Seidner gave me the conceptual tool that proved to be most helpful in the data analysis. Larry Ross' encouragement sustained me during the dissertation process; his excitement about the study often renewed my my confidence. Laurel Goodrich has been a dear friend to me throughout our training. I have appreciated her consistent presence and support. To these people, and to the Phenomenology Group as a whole, I give my thanks.

I also want to express my appreciation to three friends who have gone out of their way to be helpful to me. Mike Krstich spent hours with me perfecting the design of the Figures in the Results chapter. Peggy English was the first Tennessean with whom I spoke, and she has made life easier for me since the week I arrived. Mike Smith has been a great friend over the years whose ideas and experience have enriched my life.

I am indebted to two groups of people who were directly involved in this research endeavor. This study would have been superficial and trivial if the participants had opted not to share their stories so openly. I am extremely grateful to each of them for their good-faith efforts to make this dissertation a meaningful exploration of human experience. My thanks also go to the crew of transcribers who worked diligently on a tedious, but very important, aspect of the research.

They were: Cheryl Herman, Mike Dalton, Alice Bradley, Darryl Scott, Joyce Francis, Kim Craig, Melissa McClung and Patricia Irish.

I feel especially indebted to the members of my family who have supported me throughout my (extended) graduate student career. Collectively and individually, they have consistently communicated their belief in my abilities and dreams. In particular, I want to thank my parents for imbuing my life with the discipline, commitment and courage that made this pursuit possible. Without their steady and unselfish nurture, I surely would have achieved less.

Lastly, I want to express my loving appreciation to Caryn Conklin. There is simply no way I could have completed the project in this decade without her unflagging support, tireless assistance and steadfast love. We made many sacrifices together for the sake of my training and this dissertation; it seems ridiculous that only one of us gets a degree. Though she has several degrees of her own, I know she will always share this one with me.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to describe the human experience of repairing interpersonal relationships. The selection of present procedures was guided by an empirical phenomenological methodology. Fourteen well-functioning adults volunteered to participate in open-ended, dialogic interviews concerning their experience of past reparation situations. A hermeneutic "narrative analysis" systematically reduced transcripts to summaries. Analysis of summaries revealed a set of inter-related themes which together were sufficient to describe participant experiences.

Participants embedded narratives in both temporal and interpersonal contexts. Such statements provided a background for describing two figural experiences: that of relationship breach and that of coming to terms with breach. Awareness of interpersonal breach was described in terms relating to locus of responsibility, changes in relational boundaries, and degree of urgency.

Three distinct modes of coming to terms with the experience of breach were described: retaliating (moving <u>against</u> the other), retaining (moving <u>away</u> from the other) and repairing (moving <u>toward</u> the other). Nine different interpersonal situations were described when the (perceived) mode of coming to terms of both parties

were considered. Reciprocal repairing was described as the only situation which allowed restoration of dialogue and a closing of the rift imposed by the breach.

Results were discussed with reference to biological, religious, legal and psychological contexts which bound the experience of reparation in Western culture. Applications were suggested for conflict resolution and psychotherapy. The merits and promise of phenomenological research and narrative analysis also were discussed, as were the means of assuring rigor in phenomenological analyses.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
INTRODUCTION		1
	Reparation and Perfection	2
	The Restoration of Perfection	6
	The Inevitability of Damage and the Need for Repair	8
	Overview of the Research	10
I.	THE HUMAN CONTEXT OF REPARATION	12
	Ethological Context: Appeasement and Aggression	12
	Religious Context: Atonement and Repentance	18
	Jewish tradition	
	Christian tradition	
	Religion and reparation	
	Legal Context: Retribution and Restitution	36
	Retribution	
	Restitution	
	The law and reparation	
	Psychological Context: Forgiveness, Guilt and Reparation	44
	The psychology of forgiveness	
	The experience of forgiveness	
	The psychodynamics of forgiveness	
	The psychology of guilt	
	Martin Buber	
	Herbert Fingarette	
	Reparation: Melanie Klein	
	The death instinct and paranoid anxiety	
	Oedipus reconsidered	
	Achievement of the depressive position	
	Depressive anxiety	
	Love, guilt and reparation	
	The social attitude	
	Summary	85
II.	QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY	87
	Qualitative Methodology	87
	Psychology	89
	Re-Humanizing Psychology	91
	Phenomenology	95
	Phenomenological Rigor	97
	Structure in Variation	98
	Objectivity	99
	Tests of Rigor	102
	Limits of Qualitative Research	103

CHAPTER PAGE

III. METHOD 106
Collecting the Data 107
Bracketing
Selecting participants
Interviewing
The interview
Interview qualities
Closure
Analyzing the Data 122
Creating a transcript
Becoming familiar with each transcript
Clearing the text
Creating a summary
Checking summaries with participants
Searching for structure across
Participants
Recognizing characteristics
Categorizing contextual experiences
Categorizing experiences of breach
Categorizing experiences of "coming to terms" with the breach
Checking the structure with participants
Cataloging summary statements
Writing a comprehensive description

IV. RESULTS 151
The Grounds for Experiencing Breach 152
Time
Relationship boundaries
Experiencing the Breach 156
Locus of responsibility
Changes in self/other/relational
degree of urgency
Relationship of the Grounds to the
Experience of Breach 164
Coming to Terms With Breach 166
Retaliating
Retaining
Repairing
The posture of repairing
The object of repairing
The action of repairing
The mutuality of repairing
Reparations that fail
The experience of reparation

CHAPTER PAGE

IV. (continued)

Perceived Interpersonal Aspects of Coming to Terms With the Experience of Breach . 198
Retaliation as provocation:
Situations 1, 2 and 4
Situation 1: war
Situation 2
Situation 4
Preludes to war
Situation 5: stalemate
Asymmetrical reparations: situations 3, 6, 7 and 8
Situation 3
Situation 6
Situation 7
Situation 8
Cell 9: Dialogue

V. DISCUSSION 236
Breadth of the Results 236
Reparation as Dialogue 242
Relationship of Present Results to Other Contexts of Reparation 248
Ethological context
Religious context
Legal context
Psychological context
Applications 258
Conflict resolution
Psychotherapy
Methodological Issues 266
Rigor
Suggestions for Future Research 274

LIST OF REFERENCES 280

APPENDICES 291

APPENDIX A. PROJECT INFORMATION SHEET 292

APPENDIX B. INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM: INTERVIEW 294

APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION 296

APPENDIX D. ILLUSTRATIVE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT . . 297

CHAPTER PAGE

APPENDIXES (continued)

APPENDIX E. TRANSCRIBER CONFIDENTIALITY PLEDGE . 314

APPENDIX F. APPLICATION OF TEXT CLEARING RULES . 315

APPENDIX G. ILLUSTRATIVE CLEARED TEXT 317

APPENDIX H. ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY TEXT 328

APPENDIX I. PARTICIPANT FOLLOW-UP LETTER 337

APPENDIX J. INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM: SUMMARY 339

APPENDIX K. DEMOGRAPHIC INVENTORY 340

APPENDIX L. INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM: PUBLICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT AND CLEARED TEXT 341

VITA 342

INTRODUCTION

> Life is an experience in which we expiate the sins of others in the intervals of expiating our own.
> Henry James

This study concerns the human experience of reparation. At first glance, this might seem an odd topic for a psychologist to investigate. We are most familiar with the root verb "to repair" not in the interpersonal realm, but in the objective world of things that break and machines that malfunction.

But people can be broken, too. Individuals with broken hearts and broken lives seek relief and ways to "put the pieces back together." People routinely have difficulties in interpersonal relationships such that they become alienated and distant from one another; they "break up." We all know what it is to go about the work of "making up" on our own. At times, we consult others about how to mend a strained friendship or marriage. When the stakes are high or when the damage is deep, we often solicit the advice of professionals. Clinicians and clergy are called upon daily--in one way or another--to assist in the repair of relationships which have become damaged.

Instead of it being an strange topic of investigation for a psychologist, the broad process of reparation may well be the most important activity in

which he or she participates. This is not because reparation is the professional therapist's exclusive domain; rather, it is because repairing damaged relationships is among the most important activities in which any of us participates. It thus behooves the psychologist to understand the effective reparative process so that he or she is in a position to be discerning and helpful when patients request assistance with broken relationships. This study, then, concerns the human experience of repairing interpersonal relationships.

Reparation and Perfection

Several ideas and assumptions about the linguistic and philosophical context of damage and reparation merit discussion. Upon close inspection, one finds that the way that we talk about the interpersonal reparative process is really not much different from the way we talk about fixing a broken vase. Our ideas of intactness and disrepair are anchored deeply in cultural experience and, hence, in our language. Images of perfection and imperfection are among the most elementary archetypes in human consciousness, and a entire family of metaphors has been generated to represent experience of this concept--just as the ideas of hot/cold, up/down, and open/closed

are expressed in a variety of metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

Four related sets of images embodying our experience of perfection can be readily identified. First, consider how we speak of something being either complete or incomplete. When we sense that something is missing from a domain we survey, we speak in terms of incompletion or of something not being finished. Beethoven's unfinished symphony is imperfect not because it is "bad" musically, but because it was never completed. A student may have earned top grades on every assignment turned in but may still receive an "incomplete" for failing to do all assigned work. A chef may taste a sauce and determine that "it needs something." An individual pining for a lost love or grieving a death often represents the experience of loss as feeling "incomplete" without the other; the person feels an empty void in the absence of someone who was present before. In all of these ways, the metaphor of perfection is symbolized by our experiences of wholeness and incompletion.

Some psychologists have focused on a slightly different aspect of perfection in so far as they were influenced by ideas of equilibrium and homeostasis. They recognized that human beings are quite sensitive to the perception of balance and imbalance. When we admire the beauty of a painting or the elegance of a fine athlete,

we respond to aesthetic qualities of fluidity and proportion. The well known fairy tale "The Princess and the Pea" highlights our potential to be exquisitely attuned to a minute lack of balance. The Gestalt Law of Pragnanz suggests that we quite naturally seek to create a sense of balance in a figure when it is experienced as unbalanced. Thus, we at times "fill in the gaps" of an incomplete figure to restore equilibrium. The experienced "goodness" of a figure relates in part to qualities such as symmetry, smoothness and balance.

A related experiential anchor for the concept of perfection is the notion of clean and dirty. New garments with stains are sold with a warning marking of "imperfect." A smudge on an otherwise clean typewritten page makes it unacceptable to the typist. He or she can attempt to cover the smudge with correction fluid, but the page may not be experienced as a perfect copy, i.e., one without errors. The Old Testament instructed people to offer unblemished animals for perfect sacrifices, and the concept of sin is often referred to by way of the image of "stain." A mistake is a "blot," a black mark. Driving records are considered "clean" if there have been no convictions. To be perfect is to be pure and without blemish.

Images of things broken and intact appear to be

among the most primary ways that perfection is understood and experienced in our culture. Wholeness implies a continuity that extends into time, whereas brokenness represents a vexing interruption. A child cannot play with a toy that is broken in the same way as she did when it was new. A damaged transmission renders an automobile useless. When we read, "Out of order," on a machine, we know to expect that it will not function in the way it was designed to. Wholeness also connotes unity, cohesiveness and the absence of distance. We recognize that an imperfect bond is not secure, and that it threatens to allow dissolution of the whole. Death is experienced by many people as the ultimate break--the final failure of the body which forces irrevocable separation from others.

In contrast, our images of intactness help anchor the experience of vitality, usefulness and extension into the future. For example, when we purchase something new, we expect that it is in perfect condition and that it will work. One goes to the gym--or, perhaps, the hospital--to maintain or regain a sense of health and well-being. We revel in personal reassurances of oneness and unity such as "Nothing can ever tear us apart" when we do not want to imagine distance coming between us and another. An important aspect of our implicit understanding of perfection, then, has to do with the

perception of something being whole, functional and without damage.

It is important to remain mindful that perfection is an experiential--not an objective--phenomenon. For example, it would be difficult to convince a compulsive person that a carpet is ever perfectly clean. A teacher may notice spelling errors undetected by a student who supposed he had turned in a perfect paper. Why is it that one judge can award a gymnastics vault a perfect score of 10.0 when another sees it only deserving a 8.5? A wife may know that her husband is limited in many ways and yet still declare that he is "perfect" for her. A number of sayings such as "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" remind us that perfection is never an objective reality; it is a personal, experiential phenomenon.

The Restoration of Perfection

Perhaps because perfection is experienced as such a fragile feeling which can vanish in any of a variety of circumstances, the creation and/or restoration of a sense of perfection is also a very powerful motif in our culture. Consider again the metaphor groups identified above. A settlement from an insurance company is designed to make the person "whole" after a loss. Musicians and dancers practice for years to perfect their skills in order to make their performances aesthetically

pleasing. Athletes are sometimes given more than one chance to "get it right." Soap ads promise that products will remove "even the toughest stains" from our clothing. Perfection can be lost and regained.

Though all the perfection metaphors are relevant to the present topic, those in the broken/intact group seem especially close to our experience of reparation. In this study, we will look at the process of putting shattered pieces back together, of restoring wholeness to a broken situation or relationship.

Many broken things can be mended and restored to wholeness. Repair shops offer to fix our shoes and appliances so that they are "as good as new"--certainly a reassuring claim. We take our dented car fenders to a body shop at the direction of the insurance agent who specializes in brokering repair. The child who takes his damaged toy plane to his mother is amazed by her omnipotence when it is repaired with some loving care and a little glue. The world is a safer place when we are afforded the belief that our mistakes can be amended.

Yet there are aspects of our lives which can appear to be irreparable. The more one moves from the objective world of shoes and appliances to personal and interpersonal phenomena, the less one is sure that damage can be easily repaired. A reputation is a difficult

thing to salvage. Hurt feelings can be slow to heal. Tensions and enmity between individuals may prevail for decades when grudges are maintained. Even when one desires to make amends, it is not always possible to do so. The world is a much more complicated place when one recognizes not all of one's mistakes can be amended.

The Inevitability of Damage and the Need For Repair

Human beings are imperfect. When we take stock of what is instinctively human, we see that we are as capable of aggression as of beneficence. Crime is an inevitable aspect of a society and a community. In our contemporary culture, we seem to enjoy discovering the errors and indiscretions of other people. Consider also our nearly insatiable fascination with the downfall of powerful figures in our culture. For centuries, men and women of alleged virtue have disappointed us by falling prey to one vice or another. After our surprise wears off, we are forced to intone the familiar lamentation, "They're only human."

When we engage in virtually any aspect of the interpersonal world, we automatically run the risk of disappointing and/or hurting someone else. Our actions--and, at times, the actions we do not take--inevitably breach relationships and cause hardship for others. Though no relationship is ever "perfect," we know the

experience of being "in good standing" with another person--just as we know the pain of seeing that sense of harmony and connection vanish.

Human relationships could never last very long unless there was a process available to address and resolve trouble and tension. The urge to do something to mend relationships seems to be as normal and universal as our tendency to damage them. A central theme in most religions is the atonement of sin and reconciliation with God. A people honor the memory of those who have courageously led them into war, yet they also revere those who, with the same fortitude, led them into peace. Is there a more powerful theme in literature than that of reclamation and redemption? The repair of relationships and the restoration of "good standing" goes on constantly in the inter-human world--between individuals, between groups and between countries.

But what do we know about the process of reparation? Many of the ways we go about restoring good standing with others are trivial and likely go unnoticed. A quick "Sorry" to a person accidentally bumped in an elevator repairs a breach in an unreflected way. Television situation comedies have educated us of the shortcomings of perfunctorily offering gifts to pacify an angry spouse. At greeting card stores, one can now purchase birthday, anniversary and apology cards in the same

aisle. Most of us issue and accept simple apologies without reflecting on the process.

The questions posed by this research are, "What is the experience of the person engaged in the reparative process?" What of situations in which the damages are profound and the urge to take responsibility is keenly felt? How is a damaged relationship repaired? What is the experience of the person who attempts to apologize for a wrong that has truly injured another?

Conversely, what is the experience of the person who has been hurt? How does one go about fixing the hurt in oneself and in the relationship? How does one forgive?

How is it that some apologies fail? What are the components of the successful reparative gesture? How is it that some people are loathe to give apologies while others are loathe to accept them?

The answers to these questions seemed most likely to emerge from a qualitative study that aimed for a careful description of the phenomenon of reparation. The goal of this research was to obtain and analyze first-hand accounts of the experience of mending relationships so that general themes of reparation could be described.

Overview of the Research

The research is introduced in Chapter I by a survey of contexts in which reparation is experienced in our

culture. This includes a brief review of ethological, religious, legal, and psychological perspectives. Because some readers may not be familiar with the theory that supports a qualitative research design, Chapter II provides a general introduction to qualitative methodology--most specifically, that of phenomenology. The specific procedures employed in the present study are detailed in Chapter III, whereas Chapter IV offers an exhaustive description of reparation from the perspective of the participants in this study. The final chapter discusses these results by referring them back to the general contexts introduced in Chapter I. Implications for clinical and other applications are presented along with suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER I

THE HUMAN CONTEXT OF REPARATION

The concept of reparation is anchored in and influenced by a variety of contexts in Western culture. A selective review of four relevant disciplines will be presented in this chapter to situate reparation in its relevant contexts. Exploration of key concepts deriving from the ethological, religious and legal perspectives will set the stage for a psychological analysis of reparation. Each of these four fields is vast, and a complete survey is not possible. The goal of this chapter, however, is to trace the major contexts within which the topic of reparation has been considered.

Ethological Context: Appeasement and Aggression

This survey starts at perhaps an unlikely place: that of ethology. Ethology is a comparative study of animal (and human) behavior from an evolutionary perspective (Burghardt, 1973). Among the interests of this science is understanding innate or instinctive bases of behavior that complement the role of learning in the environment. Exploring a biological basis for limiting the scope of aggression may illuminate the present discussion.

Though the influence of innate patterns of action

had been pondered by many before him, Darwin was among the first to write about instinct on the basis of systematic observations of animals. Among his most interesting discoveries was the principle of postural antithesis in emotional expression. The posture of a hostile dog differs radically from that of a dog demonstrating a "humble and affectionate frame of mind."

> In almost every conceivable way, the postures are the antithesis of one another: archness of back, ear position, angle of head, nearness to the ground, tail position , to name a few. Darwin clearly saw the importance of this principle to communication in animals and humans (Burghardt, 1973, p. 326.)

The basic message communicated in these behaviors is the intention to be aggressive or meek.

Influenced by the writings of Konrad Lorenz, the ethologist Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1971) noted similar phenomena among rival animals. Dominance is established in many species by a ritualized "tournament" where two animals will fight according to "rules" which serve to limit the contest to non-lethal aggression. When the weaker animal realizes it is beaten, it breaks off the fight by offering a submissive appeasement gesture. For example, the presentation of yielding, infantile behavior by a wolf arouses a "friendly mood in the opponent." From these observations, Eibl-Eibesfeldt concluded that social animals have instincts inclining them to be both hostile and peaceful.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt further concludes that every species that lives in closed groups must invent rites to resolve contradictory impulses. He observed that many animals and humans have developed ways to "keep the peace," including third-party intervention, friendly greetings and the giving of appeasement gifts.

Observations of these rites among the flightless cormorants on one of the Galapagos Islands were especially interesting. Eibl-Eibesfeldt watched a soaking wet male cormorant waddle up to his mate who was sleeping in the nest on the seashore. The male brought a bunch of seaweed in tow. Upon waking, the female greeted the male with a loud crow, to which he responded by bowing his head. The female then violently snatched the seaweed and built it in to the nest. Eventually, she invited the male to take charge of the nest. Other bird pairs were observed, and this same behavior pattern held consistently. The males never failed to bring a nest material gift upon their return.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt wondered what would happen if the male failed to bring a greeting gift. He described an "experiment" in this way:

> On another occasion, when a male was waddling up with his gift, I went over and stole the gift from his beak. . . . The cormorant looked round in momentary puzzlement, but he had obviously not grasped what had happened, for he waddled up to the nest, where a little domestic drama was now acted out. Far from being met with a cry of greeting, the

> male received a pecking. He quickly made himself scarce, fetched a piece of driftwood, and tried approaching the nest again. This time it worked. The female took the gift and allowed the male to remain close to her (1971, p. 109).

Careful observations of human beings show that the same principle of peacekeeping and limiting aggression operates across many cultures. Ethologists believe that bowing and prostrating universally communicates submission among humans because making oneself "small" is the instinctive opposite of threatening behavior. Appeasement gifts serve to defuse tension and conflict. The Christian ethic of loving an enemy (to be discussed later) and the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" are regarded by Wickler (1972) as cultural adaptations to the innate biological norm to restrain the expression of hostility.

In his book The Biology of Peace and War, Eibl-Eibesfeldt wrote about peacemaking behavior in several cultures he considered "primitive." The first step in many of these rituals is communicating the wish to end the war. The Kiwai-Papua do this by placing a tree branch over the path to the enemy village. If the enemy also wishes peace, they reciprocate. If they do not wish to reconcile, they instead point the enemy's stick back toward their village. By placing small sticks on the branch, they suggest how many enemies they want to kill before they will allow peace. Presuming a cessation of

hostility is agreeable to both parties, a series of rituals ensue.

> If the idea of peace is acceptable, a number of men accompanied by their wives make their way to the enemy village. . . . The men break their knives as a sign of peace and exchange arm bands. During the night, the hosts sleep with the visitor's wives--a practice known as "putting out the fire." . . . Everyone drinks together and hostilities are declared to be ended. Girls are married to close relatives of the dead, as a means of compensation (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975, p. 213).

The men of the Mount Hagan tribes continue to fight until comparable numbers of each tribe have been killed. As tensions gradually decrease, the enemies decide to negotiate a peace. With intermediaries between them, the two sides sit down to recite a vow. One line is spoke by one and then echoed by the other:

> The birds Towa and Kopetla shall again leave their footprints behind.
> Women and pigs shall again go backward and forward between us.
> The trampled grass will rise again and grow over everything.
> So shall we again have peaceful relations with each other.
> We shall live in peace and multiply.
> We shall make no more war on each other
> (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975, p. 214).

Next, both tribes sit down to discuss the war and to negotiate reciprocal reparations. Meat is exchanged to pay for the dead.

Finally, the ritualized fighting that was witnessed between two rival Yanomami tribes reveals another form of peacemaking process. As the men gathered to work out a

reconciliation, they agreed that they were full of "excitement" which needed to be calmed. The ritual fight that followed allowed them to drain their hostility.

> Men took turns striking each other's chests muscles with their fists. Then, with long hardened staves, they struck each other alternately on their clean-shaven heads. Before doing this, they said: "I sent for you to see whether you really are a man. If you are a man, we shall now see whether we shall soon become friends and whether our anger is passing." To which the reply was: "Speak to me like that, go on speaking to me like that, strike me, we shall be friends again." Many beat each other into a state of insensibility. Finally they said: "We have struck some good blows, and you have struck us some good blows. Our blood has flowed, and we made your blood flow. I am no longer excited, our anger has subsided" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975, pp. 214-215).

The existence in many different cultures of rites that re-establish and maintain social bonds is compelling evidence to Eibl-Eibesfeldt that humans, like many animals, are predisposed to limit the scope of their aggression.

> My thesis in this book is that both aggressive and altruistic behavior are preprogrammed by phylogenetic adaptations and that there are therefore preordained norms for our ethical behavior. In my opinion, man's aggressive impulses are counterbalanced by his equally deep-rooted social tendencies. It is not only conditioning that programs us to be good--we are good by inclination (1971, p. 5).

Though various cultures ritualize avoidance of conflict and peacemaking efforts in different ways, ethologists believe that humans are a single species and thus share the same innate behavior patterns--including those that

aim for war and peace. They point out that while human beings have demonstrated over the centuries their capacity to be ruthless and bloodthirsty, they have also shown that the urge to reconcile and make reparation is instinctive as well.

Religious Context: Atonement and Repentance

Religion is a second context from which to learn about the concept of reparation. The precepts and mandates of both Jewish and Christian traditions have had an inestimable influence on Western culture, and in many ways continue to shape our understanding of repairing both spiritual and secular relationships.

The Jewish and Christian faiths are centered on the notion that sin separates people from God and from each other; repentance and atonement effect a restoration of those relationships. Their teachings emphasize the ways in which devotees can maintain peaceful, harmonious relationships with God and each other. Religion provides both a representation and a solution for the basic human problem of feeling disconnected. The related theological themes of sin, alienation, guilt, expiation, restitution, forgiveness and reconciliation have become part of our cultural experience. The expressions and metaphors we use to describe our experience of reparation are bound up with these themes.

In this section, several major influential ideas from both Jewish and Christian traditions will be discussed to illuminate salient facets of the reparative experience. Needless to say, these traditions are both so broad that interpretations of the importance of different doctrines and beliefs abound. The attempt here is to present a few basic notions in the mainstream of each faith which are relevant to the topic at hand.

The Jewish tradition. Two fundamental principles in Jewish tradition offer insight into the development of our cultural experience of reparation: restitution and repentance. According to rabbinic tradition, the Hebrew people have never been without laws to educate them regarding their legal, ethical and moral responsibilities to each other as well as their spiritual duties to God. The function of law was to promote peace, justice and "lovingkindness," and was understood as the "dynamic expression of a sovereign God by which he creatively instructed, guided, warned and rewarded his people" (Priest, 1980, p. 13). The law was a vital aspect of God's covenant with the Hebrews; He was to be their God and they were to be His people. Obedience to the law was positively encouraged by incentives in the form of blessings; disobedience was discouraged by threats of

calamities and disaster. Moreover, sanctions were written for disobedience of law.

The Jewish law written in the Pentateuch demanded punishment that was equal to a crime. The talion principle ("an eye for an eye") existed in other cultures before Israel, but the concept of "measure for measure" became a fundamental basis of Jewish civil law. The Jews understood lex talionis as part of the nature of God. Cohn wrote:

> . . . by punishing the offender according to the measure of his offense, God's fury is exhausted and His anger "accomplished" (Ezekiel 7, 8). The vengeance of the Lord can be satisfied by doing unto the offender exactly as he himself has done (Jeremiah 50, 51). Thus, measure for measure can be said to be God's own way of doing justice. . . (1971, p. 74).

The question of motive was often a decisive factor in determining guilt punishable by the measure for measure rule. "If it could be proven that a person intended to do injury to another . . . then what he intended to do to his fellow man was done to him" (Priest, 1980, p. 148). Examples of the actual sanctions follow:

> And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him; breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again (Lev. 24:19-20).
>
> And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe (Exod. 21:23-25).

To many rabbis, the administration of these literal punishments was impractical and inhumane. Some scholars insist that lex talionis was already obsolete in Biblical times and that "the only unquestionable law of retaliation in the Mosaic code refers to intentional murder for which there is no other retribution but life-for-life in the literal sense" (Miklisanski, 1947, p. 300). In any case, most agree that during the talmudic period there was a shift away from strict, literal enforcement of the measure for measure principle to more humane forms of punishment.

Compensation for damages by exchanging money and/or property became an alternative to vengeful retribution. The concept of positive compensation was implied within the measure for measure principle, i.e., the victim got some satisfaction from the perpetrator for whatever suffering he/she had to endure. The formal judicial practice of exacting a monetary cost for damage moved the Jewish society into a more symbolic experience of law. Both victims and the state could be satisfied with a compensatory payment of restitution, knowing that it "cost" the perpetrator of the crime.

If restitution took care of the victim's experience of breach, Jews believed that repentance was the way for the guilty party to address his/her experience vis a vis

God. As the law was written, the mere presentation of a "sin offering" sacrifice without repentance did not relieve the debt incurred by committing a crime or by breaking a commandment. The role of repentance (teshuvah) in Jewish tradition was explored in a volume written by Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik and translated by Pinchas Peli. It will be used as the primary source for the balance of this discussion. Peli noted that the concepts of sin and repentance are bound together in a dialectic in Soloveitchik's essays; thus, to understand repentance, one must also comprehend his notions of sin.

Soloveitchik contended that, by definition, all sin demands punishment and the payment of a penalty to God. It has two fundamental actions--binding and defiling. Sin binds the person in a juridical sense with an obligation to repay, much like a commercial debt. Knowledge of this kind of sin comes through the intellect, and the rabbi stated that a nominal level of repentance, kapparah, was effective to remove the need for punishment. By expressing regret for erring and by resolving not to err again, the confessor earns an acquittal that terminates liability. A barrier is put up between the sinner and punishment.

Soloveitchik suggested that people who experience their sin in only this juridical sense and who offer the minimal confession to indemnify themselves typically do

so out of a fear of punishment. The Talmudic concept of "Repentance from Fear" is to Soloveitchik an imperfect repentance because it limits the experience of sin and punishment to the human order only. The public, communal confession on Yom Kippur ("Pardon us our sins on this Day of Atonement") brings acquittal, but it stops short of a more self-revealing confession which would lead to a transformation. He gave the example of men who confess their adultery while keeping the addresses of the women with whom they sinned.

Soloveitchik wrote that sin also defiles. This, clearly, is the more profound sense of sin. The pollution of sin "deforms and damages the innermost part of man--his soul" (Peli, 1984, p. 19). If one is open to comprehending the existential consequences of defiling sin, it brings a self-effacement, a lessening of one's own worth, an "aesthetic revulsion" in the soul. Impurity necessitates purification through taharah, repentance (literally, cleanliness). The rabbis believed that the "personality" of the sinner remains defiled after kapparah, whereas the perfect taharah repentance worked a complete cleansing. The second prayer of Yom Kippur ("Erase and pass out of your sight our transgressions and iniquities") brings redemption in addition to acquittal.

The process of taharah was described by Maimonides as "a service of the heart," motivated by love and a desire to change. It was not to be confused with calculated, strategic confessions to avoid punishment. Soloveitchik put it this way:

> It is a precept whose essence is not in the performance of certain acts or deeds, but rather in a process that at times extends over a whole lifetime, a process that begins with remorse, with a sense of guilt, with man's increasing awareness that there is no purpose to his life, with a feeling of isolation, of being lost and adrift in a vacuum, of spiritual bankruptcy, of frustration and failure--and the road one travels is very long, until the goal of repentance is actually achieved (Peli, 1984, p. 75).

The most important aspect of the experience of sin is feeling cut off from God, the loss of shekinah. Soloveitchik stated that this experience is comparable to mourning the loss of a loved one, for in sin, the person has lost God.

> Every person, during his lifetime, is confronted by the tragedy of longing for one who was near just a short while ago and now is irrevocably gone. These longings are accompanied by severe pangs of guilt which plague one relentlessly and may even drive one mad. How intense is the desire to make contact with a loved one who has gone afar! But how unrealistic it is, how impossible it is to achieve . . . . The penitent one who does teshuvah undergoes a similar experience. When a Jew sins, he banishes the Holy One, blessed be He, from his presence. . . . [Sins] set an iron curtain between man and God. . . . Mourning by the sinner over his separation from the Holy One, blessed be He, is like mourning over the death of a beloved mother or father. . . . Then comes the fear and loneliness, the estrangement and alienation. The emptiness of life becomes devastating and a deep sadness clutches at the soul. Only the intimacy with God that man attains while

> standing in prayer sustains the joy in life, gives man a ray of hope (Peli, 1984, p. 260-261).

He also noted that mourning inevitably contains a "masochistic" element of self-torture and torment. So too does the sinner begin to feel "contempt and disgust toward himself."

This pain pushes the Jew to "knock on the locked gates" that separate him/her from God. Three elements of teshuvah (literally, "return") are found in this confession suggested in the Laws of Repentance:

> How does one confess? By saying, "I beseech You, O God, I have sinned, I have acted perversely; I have transgressed before you, and have done such and such; I am contrite and ashamed of my deeds, and I will never do this again" (Peli, 1984, p. 228).

First, there is acknowledgment of sin, followed by expression of remorse and resolution for the future. This was the formula for repentance which, when prayed by a truly penitent Jew, not only cleansed him/her, but also re-enacted the covenant with God. The presence of and connection with God, shekinah, was restored as a divine gift of a merciful God.

The role of suffering in repentance is central in Jewish tradition. The degree to which one was required to agonize about the consequences of one's sin depended on the severity of the sin. Repentance for transgression of a positive commandment (e.g., Honor thy father and mother) brought immediate pardon from God. If one

transgressed against a negative commandment (e.g., Thou shalt not take the Lord's name in vain), repentance brought a suspension of sentence until the Day of Atonement which then afforded an expiation.
But violation of commandments which were punishable by the death penalty were not completely pardoned as a result of repentance, nor were they expiated on the Day of Atonement. Almost all of the debt is released and pardoned by a gracious God upon repentance, but "a trace of something" remained to be repaid.

> Man is too weak, his life too short, to pay all of his debts in full. So the Almighty makes do with the nominal payment of a single penny (Peli, 1984, p. 282).

Soloveitchik wrote that suffering was the process by which the person was cleansed and made kosher, like an eating utensil that is defiled and then scoured. In Judaism, suffering is a debt to be paid to reclaim the self. One exchanges suffering to remove the "trace of something." The offering of something which has no monetary value (such as suffering) moves the transaction of repentance from a commercial, economic system to a symbolic, spiritual realm. Soloveitchik quoted Rabbi Tam about symbolic substitution:

> "And Abraham went and took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering in the stead of his son" (Genesis 22:13). Is the sacrifice of the ram, indeed, comparable in any way to the sacrifice of Isaac? It certainly is not equivalent, even in a partial sense. Then why was the sacrifice of the

> ram accepted instead of Isaac? This is due to the divine quality of mercy which is willing to make do with a substitute for the thing itself. This is the basis of the idea of redeeming one thing for something else (Peli, 1984, p. 287).

The Christian tradition. Hundreds of Christian theologians have explored different aspects of the reconciliation motif and the doctrine of atonement (formerly "at-onement"), and it is clear that Western culture has absorbed a number of general concepts from Christian theology. A brief look at several topics in Christian theology reveals useful insight into our cultural notions of forgiveness and reparation.

Like Jews, Christians view the primary consequences of sin as estrangement from God as well as alienation from fellow human beings. Many New Testament scriptures suggest that sin made us "enemies" of and "hostile" to God.

> Sin thus sets up an estranging obstacle between God and men. It isolates them from their true home, makes them enemies of the Father who loves them, and alienates them from other persons with whom they should be bound by the ties of closest brotherhood (Tull, 1982, p. 54).

Christians also believe that Jesus defined sin as going beyond the realm of action to the realm of intention:

> In the first place He deepened morality by the emphasis which He laid upon the intention, the motive, the state of the heart and the will. The lascivious thought, prevented from passing into act by fear of the consequences, was as bad as adultery. The angry word might be as bad as murder if it expressed as much hatred (Rashdall, 1929, p. 14).

One of the fundamental differences between Judaism and Christianity is the proposed remedy for the effects of sin. Christians believe that Jesus established a new covenant with the world that was based not on law, but on grace. Over time, the Mosaic law appeared to be followed in a very literal sense, and many Jews (notably the Pharisees) believed that they could earn God's favor by strict adherence to it.

> Legal observance crowded out personal devotion. In much of postexilic Judaism, the way of salvation tended to be equated with a rigid obedience to the requirements of the law (Tull, 1982, p. 13).

Christians believe that Jesus' death reconciled them to God. Some Christian theologians believe that the atonement was effected because Christ, through His death, propitiated the anger of God: He died in our place. They feel that the grace of God was shown in that He allowed His son to be payment for our debt. This view is in line with the Judaic understanding of "satisfaction" of juridical and commercial claims. Christ's death is thus represented as the ultimate sacrifice which allows God to accept us. "By payment of our debt with his blood, Christ reconciles the Father to us" (Tull, 1982, p. 56).

Other theologians emphasize that the new covenant Jesus embodied was founded in grace that supersedes forensic satisfaction. They see God's fundamental character not in terms of justice and lex talionis, but

in love and mercy. "A God who forgives because His justice has been satisfied does not really forgive" (Wolf, 1957, p. 113). Further, these theologians believe that God was the initiator of reconciliation, that the barrier that existed between them and God was something only God could remove. They point to New Testament scripture that suggests that, through Jesus, God reconciled Himself to us--not that Jesus reconciled us to Him.

This view presents a very different conception of grace and forgiveness, and it seems to represent the broad understanding in Christian experience. Grace is the unsolicited giving of unmerited favor; forgiveness is offered to those who will accept it. These theologians are quick to point out that God does not condone sin, but chooses to forgive it. Inasmuch as the suspension of a retributive attitude is opposed to a "natural" or rational perspective, the Christian ideal of forgiving even the person who does not deserve it is a "logical paradox" (Kolnai, 1977). For many, Christ's last words on the cross ("Forgive them, father, for they know not what they do") was the perfect expression of Christian forgiveness.

Christians believe that Jesus understood the basis of the law in terms of reconciliation and restoration of

relationship, and He said the entire law could be summed up in the commandments to love God and one's neighbor. In this sense, one's relation to the law and to God was made much more simple. Jesus' disciples were encouraged to look upon God as a father who loved His children and who cared for them individually. The imagery of the New Testament covenant personalizes God's relationship with His people. The parable of the prodigal son teaches that there is joy in heaven upon the return of even just one repentant sinner. Jesus also used the analogy of the shepherd to describe God's love of and connection with the individual:

> What man of you, having a hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it? And when he hath found it, he layeth it on his shoulders, rejoicing. And when he cometh home, he calleth together his friends and neighbors, saying unto them, Rejoice with me: for I have found my sheep which was lost. I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance (Luke 15:4-7).

Rashdall (1920) stated that in all Jesus' teachings, repentance was the sole requirement for God's forgiveness. Soloveitchik's description of the attitude of penitence and process of true repentance would likely be accepted by most Christian theologians. The recognition and confession of sin, the expression of remorse, the request for forgiveness and reconciliation, and a pledge to avoid the error in the future are

considered the essential components of both the Jewish and Christian understandings of repentance. An essential difference between them, though, is that Christians believe that their forgiveness is immediate, regardless how severe the sin. No waiting period or suspension of sentence is ever involved.

Though it was Rashdall's (1920) premise that repentance alone is sufficient for redemption, he also wrote that forgiving others is a "test and pledge" of the reality of the sincerity of the Christian's penitence. In the New Testament, the offer of divine forgiveness was always closely associated with the injunction to forgive other people.

> For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses (Matthew 6:14-15).

The Lord's Prayer contains the same association: "forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors" (Matthew 7:12). When Peter asked if a person should forgive a person as many as seven times, he was told, "Seventy times seven" (Matthew 18:22). A parable in Matthew 18:23-35 tells of a servant who refused to forgive the miniscule debt of a fellow servant after he himself had been forgiven a very large debt by the king. Hearing this, the king changed his mind and required the servant to pay his large debt. Jesus taught that God would also require full payment of

debt from people if they did not freely forgive others their wrongs.

In the the book of Luke, Jesus added dimension to the paradox of Christian forgiveness. He commanded His followers to "turn the other cheek," a teaching which corresponded to His forgiveness of those who crucified Him. Not only were they to forgive the unrepentant, they were to forgive the outwardly hostile.

> But I say unto you which hear, Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you, Bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you. And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloke forbid not to take thy coat also (Luke 6:27-29).

Christians believe that Jesus' commandment to forgive others was anchored in the sense that God's forgiveness was an unspeakably generous gift. His interpretation of the law suggested that no person could ever <u>deserve</u> salvation through good deeds, piety or scrupulous obedience of the law. In a sense, it recalls the Hebrew concept of the "trace of something." Christians were never to forget that they were saved by grace, and that they merited God's forgiveness as little as the worst sinner. God freely exchanges forgiveness of sin for an attitude and the action of repentance; He requires only that the experience of divine grace alters

the Christian's demand for rational justice from others in the inter-human world.

The Christian commandment to love and to forgive others unconditionally altered the logical negotiation of conflict. The drive to retaliate and hold a grudge appeared to be as common in Jesus' day as it is in contemporary times. A passage in Matthew 18 quoted Jesus issuing a counter-intuitive injunction to initiate the reconciliation with those who do the injuring.

> Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother (Matthew 18:15).

Religion and reparation. The topics selected for discussion among the Jewish and Christian traditions are familiar in secular contexts in our culture. It is important to review them here because they undoubtedly influence our experience of reparation. The Jewish and Christian religions teach that the fundamental effect of sin is the cessation of relationship with God. Though New Testament images of relationship appear more personal, Soloveitchik's description of mourning the loss of shekinah demonstrates that the most powerful experiences in both faiths is the presence and loss of God. We are drawn to religion because it instructs us on the most primary of human problems: how one is to deal with alienation--both from God and from one another.

The disrepair of relationship is more than a spiritual problem; it is an interpersonal problem. In our world, we experience the malignant motives and actions of others at times as "cutting us off," or as creating "irreconcilable differences." We know the despair of loss and estrangement. The most elementary metaphor for loss of relationship in both the inter-human and spiritual contexts is death. The religious themes of the restoration of connection and presence, of conquering the power of death, are very influential in our culture and our experience.

We are also influenced by a natural impulse to retaliate "measure for measure" against those who hurt or disappoint us. Getting "satisfaction" is perhaps the only intuitive, instinctive response to injury. It seems all Western religions instituted means to civilize that tendency which ultimately have become part of our culture. The ancient practice of making a sacrifice to God made its way into the fabric of everyday life in the form of restitution to make up for a wrong. Incurring and repaying "debt" are images that have been defined in many contexts, including religious ones.

That the formula for our verbal apologies seems similar to a prayer of repentance is not surprising. For an apology to arouse a spirit of forgiveness in our

culture, we typically look for the familiar elements of the admission of fault, the expression of regret and the pledge to try to avoid a recurrence of the problem. Clearly, our religious heritage has shaped those expectations.

The Christian injunction to forgive unconditionally came as a radical restatement of one's ethical responsibility to others, and it still appears to be counter-intuitive. Grace is an odd phenomenon which surprises and impresses us. We think and write about acts of charity, altruism and mercy as extraordinary.

Discerning the motives of the penitent is a matter for rabbis, priests and God in a spiritual realm; it is also familiar in our experience. We know what it is to scrutinize the apology of another person to determine whether or not the person is genuinely sorry. Some reparative gestures seem to conform to the "letter of the law," but fail to restore the relationship because they seem too easy, impersonal or perfunctory. The analysis of sincerity in interpersonal affairs has roots in a religious context and practical application in our lives everyday. In each of these ways, we see religion as one of the contexts that grounds our understanding and experience of the repair of relationships.

Legal Context: Retribution and Restitution

Violations of relationships also have legal implications. We are constantly exposed to images of the legal process in the media, and are generally acquainted with many terms of legal parlance: rights, innocence and guilt, confession and defense, breach of contract, negligence, responsibility, intent, punishment and pardon.

Western legal tradition is the distillation of many centuries worth of religious, social, cultural and moral influences. Our implicit understanding of fair and reasonable dispositions of interpersonal problems are anchored partly in conceptions of civil and criminal justice, and what we expect in the process of a reparation is shaped by our traditions of jurisprudence.

Retribution. The legal realm also affirms the universal pull toward reciprocity and balance in interpersonal exchange (Eckhoff, 1974). As noted previously, the principle of lex talionis has seemed for centuries to be the underlying rationale behind defensible retribution. As brutal as this practice was, it did represent an attempt to administer justice fairly and according to law. Regardless of one's social class, influence or wealth punishment was dictated solely by severity of the offense (Cohen, 1950).

Many cultures have developed systems to ensure that punishment "fits" a crime. The contemporary technical legal term for balance in western civil and criminal justice is proportionality. Even a cursory survey of history teaches that proportionality has always been defined within the context of society. Forer wrote:

> The customary penalties imposed by the courts of England and France as well as most European countries in the eighteenth century were execution, torture, maiming, flogging, and banishment. The death penalty was imposed in England for more than two hundred offenses, including poaching and smuggling. It was not until 1839 that branding of felons was abolished in England (1980, p. 138).

The amount of pain society deems criminals deserve for a particular offense depends upon how heinous the crime is in its eyes--at the time. In early America, men were hung for stealing horses. The death penalty is now reserved in this country for the punishment of first-degree murder. One culture's misdemeanor is another's felony. Justice is contextual.

But justice can also be illusive. Consider the following two true vignettes:

> In a park at Hillside Avenue and 20th Street in the Queens Village section of New York, a radio plays rock music and nineteen-year-old Robert Loftman relaxes, tapping out the rhythm on the grass. Clifford Smith comes by. He's only sixteen, but he acts tough. He objects to Loftman playing the radio. "Get the...out of the park," he orders. Loftman stands up. Smith warns: "If you take another step, I'll blow you away." Loftman takes another step. Clifford Smith produces a .38 caliber handgun and pulls the trigger crazily. Twice the gun fails to fire. The third time it finds its

> mark, and Loftman is struck in the stomach. Loftman subsequently dies. Smith is found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to five years probation by Justice Kenneth N. Browne of State Supreme Court. D.A. John Santucci of Queens complains that the judge should have given a prison sentence. Loftman's mother, on hearing the sentence, cries: "There's no justice! He snuffed out my son's life for no reason. Why shouldn't he be made to suffer?"
>
> ---
>
> William James Rummel was convicted of theft for a third time, and was prosecuted under the Texas recidivist statute which mandates life imprisonment for anyone upon his third conviction of a felony. The total amount of goods and services Rummel stole came to $229.11. He appealed the conviction all the way to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court refused to rule that this punishment was grossly disproportionate to the offense. So, Mr. Rummel continues to serve his life sentence (Decided March 18, 1980) (Newman, 1983, pp. 3-4).

These stories of proportionality gone awry inspire an outrage based on a sense of fairness and retribution, and it is easy to identify with the indignant rage Mrs. Loftman must have felt. But would we have been as offended by these stories if the two punishments had been reversed? Probably not, because (with what limited facts are presented) Clifford Smith seemed to <u>deserve</u> what William Rummel in fact got.

Our need for retribution has been civilized to the extent that we leave it to the state to capture, prosecute and punish violators. Nevertheless, the urge to "get even" remains strong. One criminal justice expert has gone so far as to speculate that revenge in

the form of just retribution is the "glue that holds the social fabric together" (McAnany, 1977, p. 210). Without it, offenders would be compelled to "take the law into their own hands," creating anarchy.

Restitution. Legal scholars note that the gradual tempering of the literal expression of the lex talionis principle was a natural historical process that reflected a general decline in the use of violence as a means to solve disputes. As societies evolved, direct retaliation and barbaric physical punishments were replaced by more symbolic sanctions.

> As tribes settled down, reaction to injury or loss became less severe. Compensation or composition served to mitigate blood feuds, which, as tribes settled and became more or less stable communities, only caused endless trouble: an injury once committed would start a perpetual vendetta. Composition offered an alternative which was in many ways equally satisfactory to the victim (Schafer, 1970, p. 5).

Schafer (1970) added that toward the end of the Middle Ages, violations of laws in which one party hurt another party became subject to private compromise of a proper restitution. Practice of the civil law of "torts" became distinct from criminal law, and compensating the injured for loss took the place of any other punishment. For example, one could not be flogged if the offense was adjudicated by means of monetary settlement.

> The injuring party offered a certain monetary satisfaction or something of economic value to the

> injured party, and if the latter accepted it, then revenge was satisfied and the "criminal procedure" was complete. This monetary satisfaction was due entirely to the victim or his family, and served as a requital of the injury. The amount to be handed over was dependent on the importance and extent of the injury (Schafer, 1970, pp. 5-6).

The intent of "paying damages" is to restore the person to a "pre-event status" or to "wholeness." Consider the settlement of a minor car accident suit. To the cost of car repair and medical treatments, a jury might add an extra sum to compensate for "pain and suffering." The legal notion of wholeness is based on the idea that a monetary award restores the individual and property to the way things were before the offense.

But there are limitations to legal applications of the reparative concept. Responsibility of offenders often goes beyond the loss of property. If the car accident led to a fatality, how is the payment of money an effective restitution for the death of a child or spouse? Compensating the family in the amount of the potential life's earnings of a single mother, for example, may provide for food and shelter, but it certainly does not restore a sense of wholeness to her children. Seeing an offender punished may reduce angry emotions, but vicarious vengeance does even less than compensation to address the lasting experience of incompleteness.

The role of remorse is often important in the

victim's experience of satisfaction in a legal reparation. If an offender shows regret that is, in a sense, "proportional" to the extent of the crime, it may be easier for the victim to adjust to their lack of wholeness--though it can never be completely requited. That the offender must live with a "life sentence" of guilt matches the pain and disruption of their own lives. When an offender expresses remorse, a sense of balance between the parties is restored in a way that is probably more important than financial considerations.

We hope that offenders feel badly about their breaches of law. The principle of "just deserts" suggests that individuals who have put themselves above the law deserve to suffer for their arrogance. The criminal justice system, however, cannot mandate remorse. Judges can incarcerate, fine, and even attempt to humiliate criminals; they cannot coerce them to feel guilty. Justice seems incomplete when an offender is able to to escape the legal system without feeling or expressing remorse.

There is a hope in our system of justice that compelling an offender to make amends by paying damages will serve not only a punitive function, but a reformative function as well. Schafer's survey of systems of restitution in countries around the world

convinced him that almost every culture attempts to elicit a sense of guilt from their criminals. He goes on to cite his own research, however, which indicates that men and women convicted of violent crime show little guilt and refuse to accept their responsibility to society or their victims.

> Their understanding of incarceration seemed limited to what they viewed as merely a formal or normative wrong, which had to be paid for to the agencies of criminal justice, but to nobody else (Schafer, 1965, p. 254).

Schafer recognized that offenders cannot be <u>forced</u> to feel guilt or to understand their responsibility for the consequences of their actions but he also believes that compelling them to pay compensation to victims maximizes chances that they will be "educated" in these matters:

> Besides reports that "rectification" or "making good" is an effective disciplinary technique with children, preventing repetition of misbehaviour and creating little resentment, there are grounds for believing that even with grown-up criminals the relationship between offender and restitution to his victim may, in addition, to recompensing the victim, be reformative as well. Punitive restitution may be one of the penal instruments through which guilt can be felt, understood and alleviated (1970, p. 126).

In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest in the criminal justice system to increase the scope and sophistication of restitution programs. An entire volume edited by Galway and Hudson (1977) is devoted to innovative victim compensation plans and research. Judges are starting to sentence offenders in

ways that provoke awareness of responsibility. For example, sentencing a negligent slumlord to live in one of his own dilapidated, unsafe buildings probably does more to arouse a sense of guilt than would the imposition of a fine.

The law and reparation. When negotiation of conflict and damage is viewed from a legal standpoint, the focus is decidedly on punishment. Law provides for the execution of penalties and sanctions for those who put themselves above its restrictions. Victims get a kind of satisfaction in the punishment of offenders. Knowing that a person does not "get away" with a crime restores a critical balance to the individual as well as to the society. Law protects the rights and equality of those who live under it.

But punishment often comes up short in our experience of justice in civil matters. The legal system may constrain a person to pay compensation to victims of their crimes but it cannot make that victim whole. Neither can it compel an offender to feel bad for the crime or to empathize with victims. One can only be partially satisfied with vicarious vengeance.

The end result of most civil legal proceedings is minimally satisfying at best; reconciliation and improved understanding are rarely outcomes of a legal trial. We

typically go to court with torts when efforts to negotiate directly have failed, when differences are "irreconcilable." Courtrooms are not a place for dialogue. Lawyers stand in our place to argue one position; judges and juries unravel our stories of disagreement and damage. Guilt and responsibility are not dynamic, human concepts in a courtroom; instead, they become concrete realities written in the judgment. As important as the law is in society, it is limited in the ability to restore a sense of balance, wholeness and community.

Psychological Context: Forgiveness, Guilt and Reparation

Psychological perspectives offer insight about intrapsychic and interpersonal dynamics of resolving conflict. What are the psychological experiences which are figurally involved in reparative exchanges? Two complimentary phenomena seem to be related to the process of repair: guilt and forgiveness. Guilt is often associated with the spiritual realm, but it is fundamentally a psychological phenomenon often experienced adjacent to the urge to apologize or to repair. Likewise, our notions about forgiveness of "debt" are anchored in several important contexts, although forgiving another human being is an interesting phenomenon which can usefully be described by

psychologists. How do guilt and forgiveness work together to bring about reconciliation?

The psychology of forgiveness. The field of psychology has largely ignored the phenomenon of forgiveness, leaving it to theologians. It seems peculiar that the broad study of human behavior has left untouched a topic so universal and so vital to the survival of interpersonal relationships. Psychologists are more accustomed to discussing the experience of guilt and its relationship to efforts to restore relationship.

If two people are to be reunited, however, it generally takes both working in concert to attain that goal. Understanding the process of reparation requires that we know more than the experience of the guilty one asking for forgiveness; we must also inquire about the experience of the one who is asked to forgive. Two papers will be reviewed here--one dealing with the experience of forgiveness; the other dealing with the dynamics of forgiveness.

The experience of forgiveness. A group of investigators at Seattle University recently performed a phenomenological study on the experience of forgiveness (Rowe, et al., in press). They asked a group of participants to discuss specific times in their lives when forgiving an important person became an issue for

them. After analyzing interview data, they described a developmental process which moves from the event of injury to resolution through forgiveness of the injuror. While the researchers stated that this progression is not linear, they emphasized that certain experiences seem more figural at different points in the process.

Participant statements suggested that the experience of injury was a "disruption to the wholeness or integrity" of their lives (Rowe, et al., in press, p. 865). The fabric of their world was torn, and the future as it was anticipated prior to the injury was radically altered. They felt up-rooted, angry, off-center and distant from the other. Moreover, their experience of injury was quite self-referential, i.e., they believed themselves to be the target of the other's intentional malignance.

These researchers suggested that an initial preoccupation with the event of injury was common, frequently involving fantasies of "balancing" injustice with actions of revenge. Participants acknowledged that they felt an apology was necessary for any movement to occur in the relationship. They were still "clinging" to hurt and anger, refusing to "let go." The researchers speculated that hanging on to hurt helped participants keep distance from the more threatening experience of

grief; holding securely to grievance kept the other alive.

If the relationship was indeed an important one to participants, thoughts of revenge often became interspersed with wishes for reconciliation. An important aspect of this development was the "unraveling" of the self-referential perspective. Questioning the self was common: "Did I do something to bring about his or her actions?" (Rowe, et al., in press, p. 870). It was this unraveling that allowed participants to feel "freed from hanging onto the injury" (Rowe, et al., in press, p. 873).

Participants were "surprised" by their openness to forgive as it came at an unexpected moment and in an unexpected context. The willingness to allow resolution was seen as the critical component in forgiving, and it was always recognized <u>after</u> it had occurred.

> Rather than being aware of changing, one realizes that one <u>has</u> changed, one has forgiven the other. Forgiveness comes as a revelation and is often viewed as a gift (Rowe, et al., in press, p. 873).

The conditions for resolution previously thought to be necessary rarely matched the actual experience of the forgiving event.

> The focus has been on what "the other should do" and less on what <u>one</u> needs to do in order to overcome the injury. Even when apologies were forthcoming, this did not enable people to forgive and, likewise, people forgive even without acknowledgment on the

> part of the wrongdoers (Rowe, et al., in press, p. 874).

Forgiveness could not be manufactured, forced or predicted. It happened as a quiet, unforeseen resolution to change the relationship to the injury.

In forgiving the other, participants experienced a shift in their relationship both to themselves and to the other. The situation was seen in a new light which allowed them to connect in new ways, other than simply as "victim and victimizer." They enjoyed a restoration of their sense of wholeness, integrity and future. In gradually opening themselves to the other, they reclaimed a world which was familiar, yet transformed by the experience.

The psychodynamics of forgiveness. Mansell Pattison, a psychoanalyst, addressed the psychodynamics of forgiving and failing to forgive (Pattison, 1965). He understood the need for forgiveness as stemming from the ambivalence of early child-parent relationships. Since the "pleasure oriented" child is frustrated by parental restrictions, he/she first learns to obey rules strictly out of fear of retaliation. "Forgiveness is sought to relieve the anxious fear attendant to seeking gratification in defiance of the rules" (Pattison, 1965, p. 106). Pattison believed that at this level of superego morality, punishment is the only resolution for

guilt. As long as the child relates to the parent (in Martin Buber's terms) in an "I-It" relationship, there can be no experience of forgiving because only the self exists. "Forgiveness is not a superego phenomenon" (Pattison, 1965, p. 109), and it must involve two parties.

Pattison argued that the child gradually develops the capacity to relate to parents as "persons." Piaget's notions of the development of "moral realism" were introduced to suggest that the child learns morality has more to do with attitudes that specific acts. The anxiety arising from ego morality is

> . . . not over punishment but over estrangement; the driving force for the resolution of guilt is the deprivation of love (Pattison, 1965, p. 107).

When both parties are capable of intimate relationships, the process of forgiveness is reconciliation of the loving union. Though punishment may be anticipated as "the requisite" for forgiveness, no sacrifice brings forgiveness and the restoration of I-Thou relatedness.

> . . . one can only seek to re-establish the I-Thou. Likewise, the forgiver can only accept back the forgiven into the love relationship. If the forgiver demands payment, he is violating his end of the I-Thou. I call this the reconciliation model of forgiveness which involves the ought--the conscious willingness of forgiver and forgiven to seek reunion (Pattison, 1965, p. 107).

Pattison identified four steps which define the completed act of reconciliation of the guilty one with

the one offended: confession, remorse, restitution, and mutual acceptance. Each can be distorted by the influence of the punitive model of forgiveness. The first three steps involve actions and intentions of the offender alone. Confession is the recognition of the part one played in the estrangement of the other. Pattison wrote that remorse is more than punitive self-flagellation; it is a "recognition of the hostility expressed toward the Thou and the desire to be reconciled in love" (Pattison, 1965, p. 110).

If a person provides restitution in order to avoid retaliation, the punitive model of I-It relationship is operative. Properly conceived, restitution re-establishes the conditions of the I-Thou relationship. It is not given because it is demanded or because punishment is threatened; it is given because love compels a restoration of the other. "Restitution consists of returning to Thou anything I have taken in disregard of Thou" (Pattison, 1965, p. 111). Pattison observed that when we are guilty, we seem to be loathe to give up our need of punishment and of giving restitution to expiate our wrong. He noted that many insist on an image of God as full of wrath, demanding satisfaction.

> Man would rather take punishment than admit to Christ's demand for total love and accept that love as the measure of forgiveness (Pattison, 1965, p. 111.)

Forgiveness requires the willing participation of a forgiver. Both parties must accept dependence on the love of the other and meet to work out their reunion. Forgiving is the extension of one's love to a person who has violated it. Pattison quoted Ferenczi as saying that the forgiver must share the experience of "guilt, anguish and estrangement" with the offender. The willingness to reconcile is shown by the forgiver in the (conscious) choice to forego retaliation and to receive the reparative efforts of the offender.

Both papers suggest that it is this mutual acceptance of the desire and opportunity to reconcile that defines the experience of forgiveness. But finding the ground on which two people can establish such mutuality is fraught with difficulty. It is common for the injured to feel that a "pound of flesh" is needed before a release of their experience of hurt is possible. Conversely, it may be difficult for an injuror to give up the experience of guilt without trying to offer that sacrifice.

The psychological experience of forgiveness seems to have little to do with the adequacy of expiatory gifts. It has been described here as a conscious, deliberate resolution to turn away from the instinctive urge to retaliate in order to embrace the opportunity to re-establish relationship. It is serendipitous and

surprising; forgiveness happens when it should not. The desire to reconcile overwhelms the need to require a balancing of accounts. This recalls the religious concept of grace--unmerited favor. Pattison concluded that theology and psychology share a reconciliation model of forgiveness.

The psychology of guilt. Nearly all who study the topic of guilt conclude that it is a fundamental reality of the human condition (Amato, 1982). Guilt appears to be a basic category of human experience--like power, identity, death and love--without which it would be difficult to explore the human condition (Smith, 1971). Many human scientists have studied and written about various theoretical and clinical aspects of guilt.

Martin Buber and Herbert Fingarette have both contributed papers to clarify their positions on what had been a popular issue in the 1950's: the bifurcation of the concept of guilt in psychological literature into "real guilt"--which theologians were to analyze--and "neurotic guilt"--which psychologists were to analyze. Their views will be presented here to illustrate the competing psychological notions about the "reality" of guilt, the action(s) needed to resolve it (including reparation), and the appropriate role of therapists who assist patients in dealing with experiences of guilt.

Their debate provides many interesting points of similarity and contrast to other views of reparation.

Martin Buber. Buber addressed the topics of guilt, responsibility and relationship throughout his writings. His views on guilt are founded on the belief that an individual's primary responsibility is to enter into dialogue with God. He spoke of conscience as God's voice which calls the individual "to fulfill the personal intention of being for which he was created" (Schlipp, 1967, p. 175). Guilt is the experiential consequence of failure to answer the call "to become."

Buber's contribution to the present discussion concerns the way in which he brought guilt out of an abstract, religious realm and into the world of concrete, practical situations. Friedman commented on Buber's position on this matter:

> When we are guilty, it is not because we have failed to realize our potentialities, which we cannot know in the abstract, but because we have failed to bring the resources we find available to us at a given moment into our response to a particular situation that calls us out. This means that we cannot be guilty a priori to any ideal conception of the self, but only in relation to those moment-by-moment choices to authenticate ourselves that come to us in the concrete situation (Friedman, 1965, pp. 49-50).

Buber concretized the phenomenon of guilt by placing it in the interpersonal world. Responding to the call of conscience was, to Buber, responding ethically within "real" inter-human relationships. Schlipp described

Buber's perspective in this way:

> Guilt . . . is the product of not taking the direction toward God. But since the direction toward God is found in the meeting with what one encounters in each new hour, we can say at one and the same time that the guilty man is he who shuns the dialogue with God and he who does not enter into the dialogue with man and the world (1967, p. 186).

In his essay, "Guilt and Guilt Feelings," Buber addressed the experience of guilt and its ontic character. Buber charged that (psychoanalytic) psychology tended to view guilt only as a <u>feeling</u> derived from fear of violating parental rules and values; therefore, guilt wasn't "real."

> As a result of this basic attitude, guilt was simply not allowed to acquire an ontic character; it had to be derived from the transgression against ancient and modern taboos, against parental and social tribunals. The feeling of guilt was now to be understood as essentially only the consequence of dread of punishment and censure by this tribunal, as a consequence of the child's fear of "loss of love" or, at times, when it was a question of imaginary guilt, as a "need for punishment" of a libidinal nature, as "moral masochism" which is complemented by the sadism of the "superego" (Buber, 1957, p. 115).

Buber also was troubled by the psychoanalytic "solution" for guilt, i.e., the practice of seeking to trace back the hidden elements of "unconscious guilt" and to unmask the neurosis that evokes the guilt feelings.

Buber did not deny that neurosis existed or that a person could be guilty for a neurotic fear of taboo. But he was concerned that psychoanalysis was obscuring the

fundamental situation of guilt; when an individual knows he/she <u>really</u> <u>is</u> <u>guilty</u>. He suggested that guilt does not exist because there are taboos, but rather that the invention of taboos proves the primal fact that "man can become guilty and know it" (Buber, 1957, p. 117).

Buber defined "existential guilt" as that which has real world importance. Each person stands in an objective relationship to other human beings, and is responsible for injuries to the human order he/she actually causes. Real guilt is <u>dialogical</u> in the sense that responsibility to authenticate one's own existence can not be separated from responsibility to respond to others (Friedman, 1965, p. 47). Humans are never guilty toward themselves alone (Schlipp, 1967, p. 188).

> An objective relationship in which two men stand to one another can rise, by means of the existential participation of the two, to a personal relation; it can be merely tolerated; it can be neglected; it can be injured. Injuring a relationship means that at this place the human order of being is injured. No one other than he who inflicted the wound can heal it (Buber, 1957, p. 120).

Buber suggested that the function of guilt is to push the individual to make reparation for the injuries caused by action or lack of action.

> Guilt is an essential factor in the person's relations to others: it performs the necessary function of leading him to desire to set these relations to rights (Friedman, 1965, p. 48).

It was Buber's opinion that guilt feelings are typically quite complex because this kind of existential

guilt mingles with aspects of "neurotic guilt." He felt that the method and stance of the psychotherapist promotes interest in the latter and diverts attention away from the former guilt.

> It lies essentially nearer to the doctrine and practice to occupy itself with the effects of repressed childhood wishes or youthful lusts gone astray, than with the inner consequences of a man's betrayal of his friend or his cause (Buber, 1957, p. 117).

Buber also observed that we often wish to turn our heads from the knowledge of guilt, and that a patient welcomes avoidance of authentic guilt by focusing on an "unambiguous neurotic one." In silencing a neurotic guilt feeling, therapists conspire with patients to cover existential guilt. The opportunity is thus missed to assist the patient in taking appropriate reparative action for real injury.

> The price paid for the annihilation of the sting was the final annihilation of the chance to become the being that this created person was destined to become . . . . (Buber, 1957, p. 118).

Buber distinguished between three different spheres in which reconciliation and reparation for injury can occur in the human world: the spheres of law, faith, and conscience. Each sphere dictates a different but related reconciliation process. First, in the realm of law, the process of reconciliation begins with the demands a society places on a person for breaking its rules. A

public confession of guilt is followed by penalty and indemnification.

Buber called the sphere of faith a "higher sphere" because it involves the relation of a guilty person to, and with, God. The breach relevant to this sphere is that of sin--a break in honest and responsive dialogue with God. Reconciliation in the realm of faith begins with the confession of sin and is followed by repentance and penance. Guilty individuals step before judgment to obtain absolution from guilt; this is only possible in private encounter with God.

The "middle sphere" of conscience is the sphere of real, existential guilt in the inter-human world. Buber spoke of conscience as the capacity to reflect upon and to distinguish between actions which should be approved or disapproved. Buber stated that while therapists have nothing to do with the realms of law and faith, they must assist patients in the sphere of conscience.

The action demanded by conscience to fulfill reparation for existential guilt is found in three events analogous to those of the other spheres: self-illumination, perseverance and reconciliation. The event of illumination corresponds to the confession of guilt and sin in the spheres of law and faith, respectively. Buber noted that confession takes place in a dialogue with representatives of society or with God, although the

illumination process

> . . . is in its realest moments not even a monologue, much less a real conversation between an "ego" and a "superego": all speech is exhausted, what takes place here is the mute shudder of self-being (Buber, 1957, p. 123).

Buber described self-illumination as an intense examination of the depths of guilt. Buber spoke of light illuminating the "abyss of I-with-me." It is only in this light that an individual can come to know his/her guilty condition. Unless one overcomes the resistance to illumination, confession is meaningless.

> . . . without this powerful wave of light which illuminates the abyss of mortality, the legal confession of guilt remains without substance in the inner life of the guilty man, no matter how weighty its consequences may be, and the religious confession is only a pathetic prattle that no one hears (Buber, 1957, p. 123).

The next event--perseverance--is best interpreted as an ongoing process rather than a discrete event. Buber suggests that this process is a matter of actively seeking to remain in the illumination. "Persevering" connotes a continuous and steady desire to understand and acknowledge how one is truly guilty, and this leads to a humble, responsible and conscientious participation in the inter-human world.

Buber noted that if people were only guilty toward themselves, they would only have to take the roads of self-illumination and persevering. Because one is always

guilty in relation to another person, reparative action to the one injured is required.

> Reconciliation means, first of all, that I approach the man toward whom I am guilty in the light of self-illumination--insofar as I can still reach him on earth--acknowledge to his face my existential guilt and help him, insofar as possible, to overcome the consequences of my guilty action (Buber, 1957, p. 128).

Reconciliation is not complete without 1) the direct encounter with the injured which communicates the assumption of responsibility and 2) the sincere effort to make reparation. Buber's perspective was that these acts are only authentic if they emerged from a person transformed by the experience of illuminated existential guilt. Premeditated, strategic restitutions reveal an attempt to escape the recognition of one's guilty state.

Herbert Fingarette. Fingarette wrote a series of papers on the topic of guilt from the perspective of an existential psychologist informed by psychoanalysis. His essay "Real Guilt and Neurotic Guilt" was written as a response to Buber. Though many points of similarity can be noted in their conceptions of the character of guilt, Fingarette was critical with Buber on several important issues.

Fingarette noted that while Buber intended to discriminate between authentic, ontic guilt and the neurotic guilt feelings commonly mistaken for existential guilt, he only further obfuscated the issue by his

analysis. While Fingarette agreed with Buber that there is a difference between guilt associated with neurosis and guilt which is not, he questioned the value of splitting human beings into two parts: the realms of the spiritual and the "merely psychological."

Fingarette argued that there is an experiential unity to all kinds of human suffering. The therapist must accept all guilt as "real" guilt. A neurotic's guilt is painful.

> With exceptions which do not concern us here, all guilt with which we deal should properly be taken as real guilt, as real as any other guilt, and real in the very same sense of "real." Guilt may be assigned by the patient to the wrong source, but that is a common neurotic error which only makes the guilt seem foolish (Fingarette, 1967, p. 82).

Fingarette's understanding of guilt was rooted in his notions about what it is to be responsible as well as in his perspective of the complexity of making choices--especially neurotic choices. In his essay, "On Responsibility," he observed that society expects an individual to accept responsibility by a certain age. Acceptance of responsibility is manifest by a kind of social concern.

> There are many marks of such concern: inner moral conflict, self-restraint, remorse, guilt, as well as its more direct expression in taking care of that which one is responsible for (Fingarette, 1967, p. 21).

In this view, capacity to feel and express remorse is a

developmental achievement; absence of the capacity to experience guilt is evidence of immaturity or defect (e.g., the psychopath).

Fingarette felt a responsible person becomes guilty when a choice is made that corresponds to a morally bad wish. "To be good and evil, there must be choice" (Fingarette, 1967, p. 85). As a psychotherapist, Fingarette was compelled to view these choices as compromises among conflicting internal tendencies. Though he did not wish to reify this concept, he saw people composed of competing "sub-selves" which represent various values and desires which press for expression in a stubborn fashion. Sub-selves are not in and of themselves good or evil, although they push the individual toward an immoral choice. In every situation, however, the <u>whole</u> individual chooses from among competing sub-selves to direct overt action. The <u>whole</u> individual is culpable.

> The person faces options, then, and not his sub-selves; therefore the person, not a sub-self, can be guilty (Fingarette, 1967, p. 85).

Guilt is a consequence of a person possessing "a sub-self [that] is surreptitiously dedicated to aims and modes of conduct which betray his basic values" (Fingarette, 1967, p. 86). Fingarette adds that guilty people turn their gaze away from the incompatible sub-self. In so doing, they secretly cooperate with that

sub-self. People are truly guilty when they tacitly or explicitly become allied with sub-selves that aim to violate their own basic values.

Fingarette wrote that our fundamental responsibility as human persons is "to face our guilt, to accept it, all of it, and, of course, to do something about it if we will" (Fingarette, 1967, p. 82). This process of accepting guilt begins by recognizing that the source of the guilt is inside the self. Once identified, the person makes "a fresh and honest commitment to living openly with that guilt and the self which engenders it, or a new commitment and a reorganization of the self such that we are no longer guilty" (Fingarette, 1967, pp. 82-83). Fingarette suggests that the person has a choice to modify the self so that no new guilt is created or to live openly with the guilty wish. The mature, moral individual does more than simply live with the guilty wish: he/she feels the moral demand to accept responsibility for the future.

> Guilt is retrospective, but responsibility is prospective. Responsibility is based on a willingness to face the world as it is <u>now</u> and to proceed to do what we can to make it the world as we would like it to be. To accept responsibility is to be responsible for what shall be done (Fingarette, 1963, p. 164-165).

In his book, <u>The Self in Transformation</u>, Fingarette looks to psychoanalytic theory to discuss how the process

of identification of guilt and modification of the self is fostered by analysis. He assumes that neurotics have special difficulty with identifying guilt because it is typically unconscious and they are afraid to uncover it, fearing to take on adult moral responsibility.

> "Neurotic guilt" is the guilt of a person self-blinded, afraid, and secretly untrue to his own adult commitment. "Authentic guilt" is no more authentic as guilt; it is the person who acts more authentically toward the guilt by fully acknowledging it and its source (Fingarette, 1967, p. 91).

Patients often struggle to hide, disguise and/or repress the actual ground for guilt, which Fingarette typically finds to be deeply rooted in the patient's response to some fundamental human relationship. The event of recognition is more than an intellectual awareness of the wish responsible for his guilt; patients must acknowledge that it is their wish--they must consciously experience themselves as wishing the wish.

Fingarette disagreed with Buber's statement that the goal of psychoanalysis was simply to remove guilt or to alter the basic value system of the individual. Inasmuch as he believed that all guilt has an appropriate ground, Fingarette works to lead patients "to acknowledge with the full vividness of complete and immediate reality his identity with these hitherto unacknowledged, unconscious sub-selves" (Fingarette, 1967, pp. 86-87).

From the psychoanalytic viewpoint, guilt plays a

constructive role in preventing actualization of evil wishes. Fingarette had no desire to alter relationships between wishes and guilt for he assumed they had an appropriate relation. He intends, in analysis, to remove both evil wishes and their attendant guilt.

> We are now able to see, in something of a proper perspective, how essentially alien it is to the major objectives of psychoanalytic therapy to loosen conscience, weaken ideals or reduce guilt by reminding the patient that he has not done what he consciously wished. . . . [The analyst's] practice and theory show that the wish must be taken seriously, that the guilt is appropriate, and that the rational aim of therapy is, where possible, to eliminate or modify the wish. From this it is clear that the psychoanalyst, far from relaxing our moral judgments in fundamental questions is, in fact, aiming at helping us to be moral (and rational) (Fingarette, 1963, p. 154).

In therapy, the patient comes to the realization that the unconscious is part of the Self, not alien to it. Fingarette believed that the essence of therapeutic and moral progress is the acknowledgment of guilty wishes as a very real part of the self.

Several points should be highlighted from this debate between Buber and Fingarette. First, both men represent valid perspectives on the goals of psychology and the removal of guilt. Buber's complaint that psychology was trying to make guilt disappear has substance. In popular culture, the process of psychotherapy has become synonymous with the effort to rid oneself of the pangs of conscience. The simpleminded

notion that all guilt is neurotic and can be usefully excised flourished in the 1960's and beyond. Books with titles like Guilt: Letting Go (Freeman and Strean, 1986) and Guilt-Free (McDonald and McDonald, 1977) still sell easily. Psychology likely has done a great deal to earn the derision of moralists who have condemned it for de-realizing guilt.

Fingarette's rebuttal is also important to consider. It is unfair to represent psychoanalysis as saying that because neurotics are burdened by excess guilt, the healthy person is guilt-free. Thoughtful psychologists do not dismiss all guilt as unreal or as a sign of pathology. They recognize that people do indeed cause (or wish) each other real harm and that the emotion of guilt is an appropriate reaction to an awareness of culpability. Fingarette points out that the psychiatric diagnosis of psychopath was created to describe people who are deficient in the capacity to experience guilt. The greater illness is to live devoid of guilt than to live with it.

Secondly, Buber and Fingarette suggest that in the psychological, inter-human world, the solution for existential guilt involves an uncomfortable process of identifying oneself as guilty. Abandoning the safety of repression and denial, the psychologically mature

individual squares up to guilt and accepts responsibility. Psychology offers an understanding of the inadequacy of perfunctory sacrifices and coerced restitutions: we have to choose to participate in self-illumination. It is human nature to struggle with the choice to move toward or shrink away from self-knowledge. Fingarette suggests that the authenticity of one's relationship to guilt is revealed in the commitment to be act responsibly in the future.

Lastly, both Buber and Fingarette agree that the process of reconciliation does not stop with recognition of guilt. Buber suggested that empathy develops as a result of illumination, which compels the individual to apologize and to assist in the restoration of the other. Although they are not explicit about this process, both believe that deliberate action to repair the damage done is required to complete the exchange.

Reparation: Melanie Klein. A different psychological perspective which was explicit about the process of repairing was offered by Klein. A controversial contemporary of Freud, Klein focused attention on the infant's earliest relationships. She attempted throughout her career to explicate the infant's phenomenal world and to account for personality

development and psychopathology in the light of their "internal" world.

Many readers have a distaste for Klein's theory because they feel she emphasized aggressive instincts of infants almost to the exclusion of naturally positive or conflict-free experiences. Ironically, many of these critics agree that this was apparently due to her strong desire to remain loyal to Freud and his "drive model" of motivation. Rather than subverting an established way of thinking, she tried to explore newer and more radical ideas of Freud such as the "death instinct."

The foundation of Klein's theory is that all of a child's experience is necessarily interpersonal. Because she saw the child's phenomenal world inhabited (if not dominated by) sadistic impulses, she posited that the essential task in emotional and interpersonal development was managing and resolving inherent aggression vis a vis the mental representation of significant people in the child's environment.

Klein's contributions to psychoanalytic literature are thought to be her papers concerning the topics of mourning, the "depressive position", normal development of conscience and guilt, and a description of the measures available to the child to deal effectively with these feelings. Klein believed that the healthy mechanism of reparation was the primary mode of dealing

with guilt. She defined reparation as an act (or action in fantasy) in response to guilt for injurious actions or fantasies which restored the loved one back to a good condition. Reparation thereby manages the inevitable ambivalence in interpersonal relations: i.e., the conflict between love and hate.

Reviewing Klein's child-oriented theory may seem out of place introducing a study concerned with the experience of adults. It is included for two reasons: First, it is the most articulated psychological theory of reparation and thus merits attention. Secondly, I became interested in studying the present topic after reading Klein's theory of reparation. For these reasons, a thorough review of her writings is necessary for me to set this research in its final context.

The death instinct and paranoid anxiety. Klein agreed with Freud that every child develops anxiety about impulses vis a vis the parents and that personality is largely determined by the management and resolution of this anxiety. However, she noted existence of Oedipal concerns much earlier in development than did Freud, and she proposed that original anxiety must be focused on something other than conflicts over emerging sexual interests. She understood the presence of a superego as the advent of an Oedipal complex. But what Oedipal

complex could exist for children as young as two years old? She concluded that castration anxiety must be secondary to a more fundamental fear which evokes the primitive superego and which signals the initial phase of the Oedipal complex.

In sessions of child analysis, Klein saw her patients dramatically expressing intense "fear of being devoured, or cut up or torn to pieces, or its terror of being surrounded and pursued by menacing figures" (Klein, 1933, p. 249). Given that these children were not subjected to situations of such terror in real experience, Klein believed that the source of this anxiety about annihilation was <u>internal</u> rather than external.

Klein believed children come into the world with a powerful, innate urge to destroy and to consume. She called this early phase of life the period of "maximal sadism" because the death instinct is experienced as immediate and intense. The fledgling ego's vital first function under the influence of the life instinct is to project the experiential source of this sadism outward, making the internal world safer from destructive power.

The consequence of this early projection is that the external world is experienced as malevolent, devouring and menacing.

. . . the child . . . is therefore prepared from the

> outset to view the real, external world as more or less hostile to itself, and peopled with objects ready to make attacks on it (Klein, 1933, p. 254).

According to Klein, the resulting anxiety is paranoid in the sense that the child fears persecution in the form of sadistic attacks by objects, even though the danger is displaced and projected from the infant. She stated that the child comes into the world in a "paranoid position," meaning that all interactions are charged by awareness of vulnerability and fear of retaliatory attack.

Oedipus reconsidered. Klein suggests that the infant's key aim in the first few months of life is to control the mother and her loving provision. The infant does this possessing with all the vigor of both the libidinal and aggressive instincts. Klein posited that the infant can not take for granted the mother's survival of such a cannibalistic consumption. She believed that temporary absences of the mother--psychological and physical--are experienced as punishment for the vigor with which the infant has "scooped out" the breast's contents. The object world is experienced as ready to retaliate for the depletion and destruction of the breast. When something happens in the real world that threatens the infant's experience of unity with and exclusive possession of the mother, Klein felt the child would interpret this in paranoid fashion as a persecutory retaliation for sadism.

Klein concluded that the earliest expressions of hatred and envy toward parents (which Freud felt was implicit in the Oedipal complex) was to be found in response to events experienced as frustrating by the still suckling infant. Indeed, Klein came to believe that weaning is often the situation when frustration caused by disruption of unity previously enjoyed with the mother reaches its peak.

> The actual experience of weaning greatly reinforces these painful feelings or tends to substantiate these fears; but in so far as the baby never has uninterrupted possession of the breast, and over and over again is in the state of lacking it . . . he is a constant state of being weaned or at least in a state leading up to weaning. Nevertheless, the crucial point is reached at the actual weaning when the loss is complete and the breast or bottle is gone irrevocably (Klein, 1936, p. 295).

Klein posited that the child's response to weaning is a growing awareness of separateness and of the fact that the mother is shared. The zenith of the early Oedipal complex according to Klein was an intensifying struggle between two competing impulses.

> . . . since the objects it hates are at the same time objects of its love, the conflicts which arise become very soon unbearably burdensome to the weak ego; the only escape is flight through repression, and the whole conflicting situation, which is never cleared up, remains active in the unconscious mind (Klein, 1927, p. 173).

Several of Klein's later papers clarified her views on internalization of relationships and development of psychological defenses in the paranoid position. Infants

first come into contact with the mother's breast which, according to Klein, soon comes to represent the entire mother in the infant's mind. This representation--the "internal object"--becomes increasingly complex, replete with a myriad of emotional and cognitive associations.

Klein described a defensive process of "splitting" of the breast which occurs in response both to the extremes of feelings characteristic of the infant's emotional life and to the struggle between life and death instincts. She felt that in the infant's first four months, he/she could not yet be expected to integrate disparate and seemingly mutually exclusive personal and interactional qualities in others. For example, Klein believed that the infant would not identify the mother who participated in a warm, secure experience as the same mother who was seemingly depriving sustenance.

As a consequence of immediate experiences with the mother which are comforting or threatening, the internal object becomes split into two part objects: an "ideal object" and a "persecutory object." The <u>ideal</u> object is associated with satiety, warmth and security and is experienced as present, generous and all loving; the <u>persecutory</u> object is associated with frustration of needs, pain and intense feelings of anxiety and insecurity and is experienced as absent, selfish and

depriving. It is probably more phenomenologically correct to say, as D. W. Winnicott suggests, that the mother is experienced in accordance to the baby's own state: the "ideal object" is the experience of the quiet, contented infant while the "persecutory object" is the experience of the excited, anxious infant.

Klein believed that preservation of the ideal object is essential to life; losing the secure possession of the protective and integrative functions of an internal all-good source is tantamount to annihilation. To obtain its protective and reassuring power, the infant attempts ". . . to acquire, to keep inside and to identify with the ideal object, seen as life giving . . ." (Segal, 1964, p. 26). Klein thus conceptualized the anxiety of the paranoid position as interpersonal and object relational, rather than as an battle of instincts.

Achievement of the depressive position. These essays painted a rather dark and desperate picture of the phenomenal world of infancy and early childhood. Klein seemed to be dedicated to disabusing both lay and psychoanalytic communities of the notion that the first years of life were a calm before the Oedipal storm. But Klein did not limit her observations to these negative and disturbing aspects of development. She felt that the tremendous conflicts inherent in the paranoid stance of the infant pushed for resolution later in life through

positive, creative means. In 1927 she wrote:

> A child is entirely dominated by his impulses, which, however, we see to be the foundation of all the attractive and socially important creative tendencies. I must say that the impression I get of the way in which even the quite small child fights his unsocial tendencies is rather touching and impressive. One moment after we have seen the most sadistic impulses, we meet with performances showing the greatest capacity for love and the wish to make all possible sacrifices to be loved (Klein, 1927, p. 176).

These positive, creative tendencies are highlighted in her work in the mid-1930's as she developed the concept of the "depressive position." She felt that (given enough positive experiences in the early life) sadism, ruthless attack and paranoid anxiety recede and are replaced by love and concern--which are expressed in both in reparative fantasy and behavior. Though she understood the child to be dominated early by aggressive impulses, she also believed that capacities to love, to recognition is more than an intellectual awarenesies to love, to sacrifice and to give unselfishly are evoked in the process of managing these impulses and in the resolution of anxiety regarding these impulses.

In 1935 Klein presented new formulations of the psychodynamics of the first year of life. Klein believed that at age six months changes begin to occur to bring about a new form of object relations, a new chief anxiety and new defenses--all of which relate to the depressed

mood that is quite normally noted. The paranoid position drama occurs during the phase of "maximal sadism", but depressive position developments unfold as love comes to the fore of the child's experience.

As the infant develops, Klein felt that a more holistic perception of the mother emerges. Children naturally begin to remember and integrate experiences which seem to offer contradictory information. Good feelings, and ideal objects can now no longer be separated so dramatically from bad feelings and persecutory objects. Primitive splitting diminishes, leaving the child to interact with objects which are experienced as possessing a variety of motives. In this new depressive position, both internal and external objects are represented in a more realistic, complicated fashion.

The good internalized object is the aggregate of good interpersonal experience, and it provides a sense of continuity and constancy in the world of others thereby allowing the individual to move from paranoid anxiety to a more mature anxiety. It allows for an assumption of benignity in the world. The persecutory object is also modified by reality to render a representation of an essentially "bad object." It becomes the familiar memory of anxious, frustrated, and interpersonally disconnected experiences. Essentially, it is the sum total of bad

interpersonal experience and represents (in a less distorted way) the potential for disappointment, harm, pain and personal injury in the interpersonal world.

The child is increasingly likely to interpret other's actions and motives based on real experience instead of paranoid fantasies. The child relates to external objects more as whole people, and whole people necessarily evoke contradictory feelings over time. In recalling Freud's use of the term "ambivalence," Klein noted that it is in the depressive position that one can truly feel ambivalent toward an object. Because the splitting that had previously kept these emotions apart recedes, the child can <u>remember</u> that the object of love in one moment is the same person who was the object of hate in another moment. <u>One</u> mother is now seen as the source both of gratification and pain.

<u>Depressive anxiety</u>. The baby pays for the more realistic world view with a new, depressive anxiety. Klein points out that depressive anxiety amounts to fear of losing the loved object as a result of expressing impulses. The external loved and needed mother is now subject to hatred previously reserved only for the persecutory object. Because of the omnipotent power of fantasy, sadistic fantasies are experienced as working a destruction of the mother.

> . . . the baby feels that what he desires in his phantasies has really taken place; that is to say he feels that he really has destroyed the object of his destructive impulses, and is going on destroying it (Klein, 1937, p. 308).

Klein saw the mother in peril in the child's fantasies not only because of sadism evoked by frustration, but also because of sadism expressed with libidinal drives.

> And it is not only the vehemence of the subject's uncontrollable hatred but that of his love too which imperils the object. For at this stage of development, loving an object and devouring it are very closely connected. A little child which believes, when its mother disappears, that it has eaten her up and destroyed her (whether from motives of love or of hate) is tormented by anxiety both for her and for the good mother which it has absorbed into itself (Klein, 1935, p. 266).

Depressive anxiety is thus a dread about the fate of a <u>whole</u> object whom the child fears is destroyed as a consequence of ambivalent loving. The child becomes identified with the mother--and her plight. If the child is to survive, she must also; for once the child loves the mother as a whole, her loss can be felt as a whole. Survival of the ego and the object becomes synonymous.

Klein posited that the child's central task in the depressive position was to secure the good internalized object, to "possess" oneself of it. She was strongly influenced by Freud's ideas on the relationship between depressive experiences of melancholia and the process of identification with the "lost" object. Like Freud, she

felt that we attempt to save objects by means of internalizing them to the safety of the ego. The baby is thus compelled to get as much of the mother inside as possible, but she is still not safe. The full burden of depressive anxiety is

> . . . when the ego becomes fully identified with its good internalized objects, and at the same time becomes aware of its own incapacity to protect and preserve them against the internalized persecuting objects and the id (Klein, 1935, p. 265).

There is no "safe" place for the good object. It is subject to ambivalent love and is in constant danger, and the infant is seen by Klein to be full of anxiety about the fate of the object. She summarized the concept of depressive anxiety in this way:

> It seems to me that only when the ego has introjected the object as a whole, and has established a better relationship to the external world and to people, is it able fully to realize the disaster created through its sadism and especially through its cannibalism, and to feel distressed about it. . . . It requires a fuller identification with the loved object, and a fuller recognition of its value, for the ego to become aware of the state of disintegration to which it has reduced and is continuing to reduce its loved object. The ego then finds itself confronted with the psychic reality that its loved objects are in a state of dissolution - in bits - and the despair, remorse and anxiety deriving from this recognition are at the bottom of numerous anxiety situations (Klein, 1935, p. 269).

Hence, the term "depressive position" describes the new emotional state in which the infant must work out a resolution to innate aggression and ambivalent love.

Love, guilt and reparation. Klein suggested

that the primitive superego evokes anxiety about aggressive impulses, which impels the child to destroy objects. This, in turn, leads to an increase of anxiety about the consequences of destruction. So long as the child is fixated in the paranoid position, the superego only arouses anxiety and the "most violent of defense mechanisms," which Klein saw as "unethical" and "asocial." When the child's sadism diminishes and love comes to the fore, the superego's character is modified. Instead of evoking anxiety, the more mature superego generates feelings of guilt.

> . . . those defensive mechanisms which form the basis of a moral and ethical attitude . . . are activated, and the child begins to have consideration for its objects, and to be amenable to social feelings (Klein, 1933, p. 252).

In these papers, Klein brings up an unelaborated theme scattered throughout earlier works: "constructive tendencies" and "restitutive phantasies." These reparative fantasies are to mature superego guilt what destructive fantasies are to primitive superego anxiety. Klein felt that the feelings of guilt

> . . . have far reaching effects in the child's future mental well being, his capacity for love and his social development. From them springs the desire to repair, which expresses itself in numerous phantasies of saving [the mother] and making all kinds of reparation (Klein, 1936, p. 294).

Now Klein's concept of reparation can be explicated. Reparation is seen as the only effective resolution of

depressive anxieties and as a fundamental element in the capacity for love. She thought that the development and elaboration of reparative motives "profoundly influences the course and force of the emotional lives of grown up individuals" (Klein, 1937, p. 309).

The Kleinian depressive dilemma is this: If the internalized object must be preserved for the ego to survive and if defenses of incorporation and identification fail to provide it safe haven, something else--something more--must be done.

> The ego feels impelled (and I can now add, impelled by its identification with the good object) to make restitution for all the sadistic attacks that it has launched on that object (Klein, 1935, p. 265).

Klein speaks of the growing "urge" to restore and recreate the mother in order to regain her--both as a real, external object and as a good, internal object, safely installed in the ego.

> The baby finds support against these [depressive] fears in omnipotent phantasies of a restoring kind . . . . If the baby has, in his aggressive phantasies, injured his mother by biting and tearing her up, he may soon build up phantasies that he is putting the bits together again and repairing her (Klein, 1937, p. 308).

Herein a cycle of loss and reclamation of the mother ensues. Klein felt that an infant's repeated experiences of recovery of the mother by means of reparative fantasy (and later by reparative actions) facilitate development and integration of the ego. Normal experiences of

frustration then serve ultimately to mobilize reparative drives; rather than leading to disintegration and increased anxiety, these experiences allow the child to gradually to discover that objects are more resilient than imagined and that fantasies and impulses do not lead to the dreaded loss of the object. By restoring the object back to wholeness, fullness and perfection, the child disproves the idea of disintegration.

D. W. Winnicott (1955) elaborated on Klein's notion of a "benign cycle" of using and replacing, of destroying and recreating, of damaging and repairing. Insofar as the baby continues to find relief from depressive anxiety by means of reparative phenomena, Winnicott stated that the baby is freed to become more bold in the experiencing of id drives. All instinctual drives become less frightening to the child because of his or her confidence that something can be done to restore the object. Hostility is decreased and love is increased.

The emergence of whole object love leads to guilt in Klein's view. She states further that concern for the object, a sense of responsibility for preserving it intact, and sadness relating to its potential loss all become fundamental elements of the experience of love. Thus, a mature love (i.e., a depressive position love) involves concern about the <u>result</u> of one's loving and

willingness to be responsible both for damage imagined in destructive fantasy and for depletion of the object which accompanies voracious loving.

> Even in the small child one can observe a concern for the loved one which is not, as one might think, merely a sign of dependence upon a friendly and helpful person. Side by side with the destructive impulses in the unconscious mind both of the child and of the adult, there exists a profound urge to make sacrifices, in order to help and to put right loved people who in phantasy have been harmed or destroyed. In the depths of the mind, the urge to make people happy is linked up with a strong feeling of responsibility and concern for them, which manifests itself in genuine sympathy with other people and in the ability to understand them, as they are and as they feel (Klein, 1937, p. 311).

Another essential component of mature love that accompanies depressive position developments is the capacity for identification. Klein felt that it is only when a person can put aside his/her own interests, emotions and impulses that he or she can truly identify with and love another person as a whole object. Because of a relaxation of paranoid anxieties, the child is increasingly able to focus on the condition and feelings of others. Indeed, Klein felt that a moral attitude is thus formed in the child; in other words, a capacity to consider the situation of another and to sacrifice one's own gratification is developed in this period of evocation of guilt and mature love.

In this sense, Klein considered both depression and guilt to be tremendous achievements in development. In

Klein's theory, pangs of guilt are healthy and proof of maturity when they are not overwhelming. Guilt is at the heart of the social motives which demonstrate a capacity for identification and love. Ultimately, it is the sense of guilt relevant to one's fantasies and actions that leads to a steady operation of "conscience". A healthily guilty child mourns the potential loss of objects and is impelled to restore them.

D. W. Winnicott preferred to call this feeling "concern" rather than guilt because it connoted a much more positive quality. His discussion of this topic suggests that, with further development and ego integration, the experience of guilt is attenuated.

> The word "concern" is used to cover in a positive way a phenomena that is covered in a negative way by the word "guilt". A sense of guilt is anxiety linked with the concept of ambivalence, and implies a degree of integration in the individual ego that allows for the retention of good object-image along with the idea of destruction of it. Concern implies further integration, and further growth and relates in a positive way to the individual's sense of responsibility especially in respect of relationships into which the instinctual drives have entered. Concern refers to the fact that the individual <u>cares</u> or <u>minds</u>, and both feels and accepts responsibility (1963, p 112).

This position seems to be consistent with Klein's views. The de-escalation of sadism in normal development gradually diminishes a need for destruction in the paranoid vicious cycle. Thus, guilt will gradually become less violent, less extreme and more socially

oriented. As the child masters depressive anxieties by means of reparation, he/she is plagued less by fear of annihilation. This encourages the child to trust that there is something creative and constructive that can be done in response to guilt and concern.

> Normally, the drive to make reparation can keep at bay the despair arising out of feelings of guilt, and then hope will prevail, in which case the baby's love and his desire to make reparation are unconsciously carried over to the new objects of love and interest (Klein, p. 334).

The social attitude. Klein writes of depressive position anxieties, identifications and reparations as gradually extending to people other than the mother. The infant who experiences conflict between jealousy of and love for siblings begins to feel guilty about any aggressive impulses that are aroused. This leads to wishes to "make good" and to repair damage done. In like-fashion, as the growing child interacts with an increasing number of others in the world, he/she has the opportunity to test the capacity to identify with others and to repair.

> The new companionships prove to the child that he is able to love and is lovable, that love and goodness exist, and this is unconsciously felt also as proof that he can repair harm which has been done to others in his imagination or in actual fact (Klein, 1937, p. 328).

> Thus making reparation - which is such an essential part of the ability to love - widens in scope, and the child's capacity to accept love and, by various means, to take into himself goodness from the outer world steadily increases (Klein, 1937, p. 342).

Summary. In this review of psychological perspectives on guilt, forgiveness and repair, many themes emerged which were discussed in other sections. The particular context shapes the boundaries and experience of these general themes; together they situate the present research.

The fundamental experience of guilt appears to be alienation and mourning. When one violates a relationship, one loses the presence of the other and a future with them. This loss can be experienced as catastrophic to the individual. Though we can develop neurotic relationships to guilt, the more important human situation is when we actually are responsible for behavior that tears relational bonds apart.

The balancing of interpersonal accounts and getting even appear to be universal instincts. If injured, we retaliate; if we have done the injuring and know it, we fear retaliation. Human beings appear to be well equipped with psychological defenses to avoid full consciousness of responsibility, and may even deny culpability. Relating to others in a self-absorbed, I-It, fashion keeps us bound to a punitive, paranoid position, lex talionis model of negotiating conflict. Appeasement gifts and sacrifices can be offered to expiate sin and satisfy anger; they can also be

experienced as hollow and fail. If intended merely to escape punishment, they do not help to restore relationship. This is not the realm of forgiveness.

The sources surveyed suggest that reconciliation happens only when the offender examines the situation and willingly acknowledges guilt. The person's desire for restoring the wholeness of his or her world and that of others compels the person to pay a debt and to "put back" what has been "taken." This is more than a coerced penance to gain acquittal. By apology, compensation, and even reparative fantasy, an image of wholeness is recreated.

This still does not guarantee reconciliation. The literature on forgiveness indicates that <u>mutual</u> acceptance of the opportunity to restore harmony is required. Courts are not commonly known for mercy, but the expression "I'm throwing myself at the mercy of the court" represents an awareness that sometimes we ask for a release of anger not merited by anything we are or have done. Forgiveness by the offended involves a conscious decision to suspend a rightful retaliatory response, choosing to extend grace instead. "At-onement" takes two.

CHAPTER II

QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Harding (1987) made a useful distinction between the related research terms "method" and "methodology." She suggested that a method is a procedural technique for gathering evidence whereas a methodology is a more general theory of how research should proceed. The present research is situated methodologically within the tradition of qualitative investigation and, more specifically, within the tradition of existential phenomenology.

Qualitative Methodology

Qualitative methodologies are those which allow a researcher to gain first-hand knowledge of a topic from participants in the research and which then require the researcher to interpret data from the perspective of those participants (Filstead, 1970). In contrast, quantitative methodologies generally call for "a more distanced, objective, standardized, classifiable mode of investigation" (Denzin, 1978, p. 3).

Qualitative research methodology has been used widely in a number of contexts, including those of psychology, (Piaget, 1954; Barker, 1968), ethology

(Lorenz, 1966), anthropology (Geertz, 1973; Emerson, 1983), sociology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Filstead, 1970; Goffman, 1974; Denzin, 1978) and education (Jackson, 1968; Goetz & LeCompte, 1984; Jacob, 1987).

Typically, the goal of qualitative research is to describe human phenomena rather than to explain them in terms of theoretical mechanisms or laws. Qualitative methods such as describing and evaluating in-depth interviews, field studies, direct observations, participant-observations, and ethnography have long had a place among the array of research approaches available to the social sciences. It is true, however, that this general paradigm has never been widely approved in any of the social sciences. The hypothetico-deductive tradition borrowed from the natural sciences has perennially occupied the preferred position of orthodox methodology. Patton (1980) observed that "the dominant paradigm assumes quantitative measurement, experimental design, and multivariate, parametric statistical analysis to be the epitome of 'good' science" (p. 19). Across the social sciences, texts describing the utility of qualitative methods seem invariably to begin with a preface lamenting the almost exclusive sovereignty of the natural scientific method. The most consistent and important critique seems to be that content has taken a

back seat to method. Filstead (1970) stated the case for sociology:

> The import of this natural science approach to the subject matter of sociology is that sociologists have tended to bend, re-shape, and distort the empirical social world to fit the model they use to investigate it. Wherever possible, social reality is ignored. Most sociologists seem to have forgotten that reality exists only in the empirical world and not in the methods sociologists use to measure it (p. 3).

There are those in the social sciences who feel that both quantitative and qualitative methodologies can and should co-exist in the same discipline (Sperry, 1987). Patton (1980) expressed that social science researchers ideally should be adaptive and methodologically flexible, able to select an approach that maximizes the chances of obtaining useful data. He saw the Zeitgeist of the absolute dominance of one methodological approach over another changing:

> The issues of selecting methods is no longer one of the dominant paradigm versus the alternative paradigm, of experimental designs with quantitative measurement versus holistic-inductive designs based on qualitative measurement. The debate and competition between paradigms is being replaced by a new paradigm--a paradigm of choices. The paradigm of choices recognizes that different methods are appropriate for different situations (pp. 19-20).

Psychology

Psychology has perhaps been the most reluctant social science to embrace qualitative methodology. The debate regarding psychology's identity as a (natural)

science has persisted throughout its history. Many early psychologists endorsed the natural science model and aspired to imitate the approach, methods and critical standards of the relevant sciences. In emerging from its philosophical and metaphysical foundations, psychology endorsed empiricism as its epistemological standard and attempted to apply the principles of objective experimentation to human beings.

Giorgi (1970) pointed out that sole reliance on the natural science approach led psychology to ask a set of research questions which artificially defined the boundaries of the study of psychology. In Giorgi's view, much of the data of psychology resists a reductionistic, analytic, quantitative approach and remains unexplored. His statements about the constraining methodology of psychology echo the comments of Filstead about sociology. While neither writer advocates abandoning experimentation, they ask their respective disciplines to make room for more than one methodology.

It can be argued that the issue of rigor was--and continues to be--a primary factor in psychology's insistance on natural science methodology. In the pursuit of a position of respectibility among the (natural) sciences, psychology became appropriately self-conscious about its empirical endeavors, and rigor became an essential test for the adequacy of method. The

subject matter of psychology, complicated by the problems of human consciousness, intention and passion, made this rigor requirement not only difficult to achieve but also essential if the discipline was to succeed.

Natural science methodology offered procedural techniques which led to reliable, dependable results for humans studying other humans. In the natural sciences, the method--not the researcher--ensures accuracy and veridicality. Indeed, one might even say that the purpose of the scientific method is to remove an investigator from the phenomenon under consideration so that he/she does not corrupt the data--a process that is assumed to occur automatically if an investigator takes an engaged position relative to the subject of study. The objective method of science is believed to assure the scientist of the purity, reliability and accuracy of results. Many psychologists have felt that there are no such assurances for the dependability of data generated by a qualitative paradigm.

Re-Humanizing Psychology

If psychology has tried to maintain methodological purity and rigor, what has it given up? Cronbach (1975) pointed out that while it is true that the application of natural science goals and methods have not been without success in psychology, it is also true that as a

discipline we have over time adopted some bad habits. He argued that experimental methodology, which values both fixed-condition laboratory studies and the making of broad generalizations, has preoccupied psychologists to the point of impairing their ability to observe the complex interactions among the various factors of human behavior. Cronbach urged that psychology could do better in understanding and accounting for that complexity by balancing their explanatory, nomothetic efforts with a return to a more observational, descriptive, humanistic mission:

> . . . experimental control and systematic correlation answer formal questions stated in advance. Intensive local observation goes beyond discipline to an open-eyed, open-minded appreciation of the surprises nature deposits in the investigative net. This kind of interpretation is historical more than scientific. I suspect that if psychologists were to read more widely in history, ethnology, and the centuries of humanistic writings on man and society, he would be better prepared for this part of his work (p. 125).

Similar thoughts were expressed by Royce (1973) as he pondered what a humanistic psychology might look like, and, in particular, what its primary epistemological source might be. He found no fault with the application of scientific methodology and a rational-empirical way of knowing to the study of phenomena such as sensation and perception. To study other more existential topics, he advocated the legitimation and deliberate incorporation

of metaphoric and intuitive epistemologies into traditional methodology. The "two-way traffic" (p. 16) between these two approaches in a humanistic psychology would allow for rigor on the one hand and openness and flexibility in method on the other. The essential charge he gave was that researchers should use all the data of psychology.

> Herein lies the challenge for the humanistic psychologist: to tap these symbolic dimensions of reality by invoking the knowledge giving tools of the humanistic trade on the one hand, and by doing all that is possible to provide empirical tests for whatever is so revealed on the other hand. But this must be done without the error of reductionism--that is, by throwing out as invalid those humanistic insights which are not amenable, or reducible, to empirical confirmation. If the reductionistic error is committed we simply will not have a humanistic psychology, for we will have reduced it to scientific (or empirical) psychology (Royce, 1973, p. 17).

Royce believed the core of psychology's epistemology rests so firmly in empiricism that a move to integrate qualitative methods would introduce little danger of "regressing" to our philosophical, speculative heritage.

The writings of Rychlak (1977) offer a sobering admonition to humanists who want respect for their efforts to explore the existential subject matter of psychology but who persist in conducting loosely designed, intuitive investigations which have no claim to rigor. He believed that many humanists and phenomenologists offer a straw man argument against

natural science when they propose a revolution in methodology. In his view, there simply is no inherent conflict between humanism and the goal of rigorous experimental validation in research.

> There is no reason why humanistic constructs cannot be framed and put to test in the most rigidly controlled arid realms of laboratory science imaginable (p. 192).

While Rychlak would agree with Royce about the value of incorporating the "wisdom of philosophy" and knowledge from the arts into research methodology, he also insisted that "any so-called humanistic methodology that falls short of validation is doomed to failure" (p. 201).

Rychlak's claims about the lack of rigor in humanistic research are not without substance, but he may have been guilty of setting up his own straw man. In maintaining a rigidly monocular view of scientific validation, he dismissed the efforts of many researchers who employ qualitative methodologies and who are open to discovering measures to ensure rigor that do not do violate the nature of the phenomenon they study. Rychlak's bias about the single character of scientific procedure and evidence is revealed in the following statement about the futility of qualitative methods:

> . . . to expect a scientist to run after each person's phenomenal reality in hopes of capturing each possibility that might be subjectively concocted is surely unnecessary and a waste of time. . . . Science means a stand on evidence <u>not</u> a stand on the human image (p. 201).

Phenomenology

Though the great majority of psychologists have adopted a natural science viewpoint, a persistent voice of dissent has been presented from phenomenological philosophers and psychologists such as Dilthey, van Kaam and Giorgi. Over the years, they have pointed out that although the prevailing methodology is an appropriate model for some aspects of human behavior, it is but one method among many.

Phenomenologists argue that other research methods arising out of qualitative methodology, may indeed be more appropriate for the descriptive study of specifically human phenomena. They believe the epistemological assumptions of natural science methodology are not equally valid when applied across the study of all human phenomena, and that these assumptions may serve to delimit the study of psychology so as to preclude the study of experience. Collaizzi (1978) noted that

> . . . if only observable, duplicable and measurable definitions have psychological validity, then a crucial dimension of the content of human psychological existence, namely experience, is eliminated from the study of human psychology . . . (p. 51).

An alternative approach to a rigorous psychology has been referred to as a "human science" by van Kaam (1966) and Giorgi (1970, 1971, 1975, 1984, 1987). In human

science, respect for the integrity and unity of the life-world as it is experienced assumes the privileged position afforded objective method in natural science. Husserl is credited with coining the maxim which instructs the phenomenologist to go "back to the things themselves," a dictum which suggests that methods ought to be designed to allow the results of phenomenological research to be very close to participant experiences. In human science, the unit of analysis is never smaller than the person in an experiential context.

The phenomenologist attempts to choose methods which maximize the opportunity to be faithful to the data. Methodological strategies are guided primarily by the injunction to remain close to the person's experience and to preserve the unity of the lived-world. Collaizzi asserted that there is no such thing as <u>the</u> phenomenological method. Each particular psychological phenomenon, in conjunction with the particular aims and objectives of a particular researcher, evokes a particular descriptive method (Collaizzi, 1986, p. 53).

The essence of doing phenomenology involves the process of coming to understand, and then describe, the human life-world at the level of human experience. Participants in phenomenological research are asked to share their experience of a particular topic. Typically, this is done in the context of an open-ended, dialogic

interview (Kvale, 1983). By means of any of a variety of qualitative analytic procedures, the researcher then deals with these data so as to render a description of the themes which are found to be centrally important to the phenomenon.

Phenomenological Rigor

The rigor of the natural scientist is bound to expectations of the nature of the objective world, the methods of objectivity and decontextualization, and the demand for certitude as proven by replicability. The phenomenologist argues that requirements for a stance of "practiced disinterest" (Romanyshyn, 1978) and for controlling the context of experiments necessarily mean that potentially valuable data is lost.

Rigor is equally important to the phenomenologist, but ensured in different ways. Because the integrity of the life-world takes first priority in human science research, means of collecting and analyzing data are designed that allow the phenomenon to present itself without artificial methodological constraints. Rather than de-contextualizing an aspect of the world in order to explain it, the phenomenologist attempts to re-contextualize in order to describe it.

The rigor of phenomenology is found in being faithful to the primacy, integrity, and complexity of the

data. By integrating the context of experience and by avoiding reductionistic analyses, the phenomenologist believes that more rigor is achieved than by following uncritically a natural science methodology.

> If anything, a phenomenological approach is even more rigorous than a traditional approach because it tries to account for more of the phenomenon. . . . It does not demand less; it demands more (Giorgi, 1971, p. 14).

Structure in Variation

Phenomenologists seek to produce a rich, "thick" description of the underlying structure of phenomena (Geertz, 1973). Rather than planning methodological strategies to eliminate variability, the phenomenologist expects to find diversity in the experience of every human phenomenon. Ultimately, the phenomenologist seeks to uncover and explicate the structural invariants of the phenomenon under consideration (Idhe, 1977).

With regard to the discovery of structure, Straus (1963) offers a useful analogy of the musical theme that can be known and recognized through its variations. Though the individual notes sound different when played by different instruments, one can still hear a theme or melody pattern in all parts of a symphony. So too with human phenomena; the essential themes can be extracted through--and actually noticed because of--the variety of experience. Giorgi agrees with this position:

> For the human sciences, it is not necessary that a phenomenon to be investigated be duplicated identically (even if that were possible) but simply that its essential theme can be identified through its varying manifestations. To demand that the essential theme of a phenomenon and its manifestations be constant is an unnecessary reduction that not only does violence to the phenomenon, but also prohibits a correct understanding of it because the various ways it manifests itself also sheds light on its essential nature . . . (1971, p. 24).

In doing phenomenology, one does not limit variety in the data to demonstrate statistical reliability; indeed, it is this variety that ultimately helps one to discover and explicate the "commonality running through the many diverse appearances of the phenomenon" (Valle and King, 1978, pp. 16-17).

Objectivity

Phenomenologists understand the concept of objectivity in qualitative psychological research as "fidelity to phenomena" (Collaizzi, 1978). Being faithful to one's data does not require the researcher to disengage from the phenomenon being considered; rather, it is assumed that one cannot investigate any human experience phenomenologically without being personally engaged in both the research and the interpretive process. Given this assumption, the phenomenologist is obliged to recognize and reflect upon his/her engagement with the topic and the participants. Phenomenological

engagement implies both a stance and an intention.

Collaizzi (1978) stated that the objective stance of the human scientist can be defined as a "respectful listening to what the phenomenon speaks of itself" (p. 52). Giorgi (1970) described the stance as an openness that allows what is present in experience to present the way it is to the observer. Doing research phenomenologically means that one intends simply to describe the experience of a given phenomenon as it is experienced by the participants, not as it fits a theory or expectation.

Objective rigor in the natural sciences obviates the need for interpretation; the instruments of measurement render values which speak for themselves. Most phenomenologists, however, acknowledge that they cannot describe their data without an interpretive stance. We are all necessarily hermeneutic interpreters (Mallory, 1986). It is the phenomenologist who must transform experiential protocols into a meaningful structural description, and this cannot be done without a reflective interpretation. Titelman wrote:

> From a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective, there is no . . . "object" independent of the investigator. In the construing of the meaningful relationship between the whole and the parts of the "object" of phenomenological psychology, the descriptive protocol(s), a certain kind of judgment or interpretive process is involved . . . . Therefore the comprehension and elucidation of the

> meaning of the data of phenomenological psychology involves interpretive judgment (1979, p. 187).

Given the inescapable hermeneutic nature of qualitative research, the investigator is encouraged to "bracket" any preconceptions relevant to certain theoretical or perspectival biases he/she might have. van Kaam (1966) referred to "phenomenological suspension" as the process of 1) making explicit the investigator's notions relevant to the phenomenon investigated which may bias the observation, and then 2) suspending them during the study.

> The anthropological psychologist must penetrate into the structure and meaning of behavior itself. But theoretical views, personal bias, and psychological jargon may dim his objective vision. He must therefore avoid these influences in order to be able to observe the phenomena of behavior itself. Consequently, the phenomenological psychologist suspends temporarily all theoretical frames of reference, all statistical, experimental and symbolical classifications. An absolute suspension of all these influences is impossible, to be sure, but he is aware of the danger of their subtle impact on his perceptions (van Kaam, 1966, p. 249).

Giorgi (1970) spoke of this strategy for rigorous, phenomenological objectivity as a "presuppositionless knowing" of the phenomenon. Like van Kaam, he felt that because one can never achieve the ideal of being completely presuppositionless, "the next best thing is to clarify those presuppositions that one has" (p. 162). Aanstoos (1986) stated, "By so deliberately avoiding concentrating attention on any pre-determined aspect, the

researcher is able to escape the danger of finding only what one expects to see" (p. 85).

Tests of Rigor

Concerned with rigor and the threat of bias, the phenomenologist tests objectivity in two important ways: by soliciting both intra- and inter-subjective agreement for the interpretation of the data. The phenomenologist first tests objectivity in listening, analyzing and interpreting by returning to each of the participants to validate his/her understanding. If participants endorse the researcher's description as an accurate reflection of their experience, intrasubjective agreement is found. If one has discovered the essential, dynamic structure of the phenomenon in depth across co-participants, this structure should encompass the lived experience of each co-participant. Thus, the phenomenologist seeks validation of the descriptive structure by testing its "fit" with those who generated the data, knowing that to be faithful to the phenomenon, the investigator must be true to each individual's experience.

The rigorous human scientist also seeks validation in intersubjective agreement. The description and explication of the essential structure of a phenomenon is considered dependable and accurate to the extent that others find the interpretation clear and useful. In

reading and discussing results, other individuals should be able to follow the researcher's descriptions. Giorgi (1975) posited that a key criterion of intersubjective agreement is whether a reader, adopting the viewpoint articulated by the researcher, can see what the researcher saw whether or not he or she agrees with it.

The primary test for rigor in human science methodology is the degree to which the resulting thematic analysis and the explication of the essential structure of the phenomenon is clear, comprehensible and leads to greater understanding. The fundamental test of the "reliability" or dependability of phenomenological research results is the "reappearance of various essential themes which initially led to a greater intersubjective understanding of the phenomenon concerned" (Kruger, 1979, p. 124).

Limits of Qualitative Research

Just as traditional psychological research has its drawbacks, qualitative methodologies also have their limitations. It can be argued that a hermeneutic approach may lead to results that are flawed by subjective bias and/or limited by the interpretive skill of the researcher. Most phenomenologists, however, do not assume that human phenomena can be described in only one way nor do they seek absolute closure on the

phenomenon under study. A perfect rendering or a perfect interpretation of a phenomenon is not the expected outcome of any phenomenological investigatation.

Faithfulness to the phenomenon includes the responsibility of being able to defend an interpretation given the nature of the data and the limits of one's perspective. Accuracy in hermeneutic understanding cannot be quantified with a statistical value, for it is more conceptual than technical. Giorgi (1986) stated that the product of the human scientist is "neither arbitrary nor univocal," that is, the essential thematic structure that emerges from phenomenological analysis is neither one of many nor the only one. If an analysis has been done well, an investigator replicating a phenomenological study should not derive a structure widely discrepant from the one originally proposed. Kruger notes:

> The criterion for validity is not whether another researcher (or a judge) would use exactly the same words or arrive at an identical description of the data. Rather validity is indicated by whether such differences in wording may be intersubjectively understood to reflect an identical meaning or indicate similar essential themes to those which emerged from the data as explicated by the original researcher (1979, p. 131).

Obtaining intersubjective agreement does not offer a validation of certitude; rather, it suggests that the interpretation is the <u>best</u> that can be offered given present procedures. With reference to a hermeneutic

approach to the study of history, Collingwood remarked:

> . . . the game is not won by the player who can reconstitute what actually happened, but by the player who can show that his view of what happened is the one which the evidence accessible to all players, when criticized up to the hilt, supports (Goldstein, 1972, pp. 47-48).

CHAPTER III

METHOD

There have been a number of texts and articles published regarding the practice of phenomenological research (Collaizzi, 1978; Kruger, 1979; Kvale, 1983). Instead of codifying an orthodox procedure, they instruct the investigator to be open to data collection and analysis methods that maximize fidelity to the particular phenomenon studied. Each human experience has a unique set of characteristics which require the phenomenological investigator to tailor his or her method to the particularities of the topic.

Members of the Phenomenology Group at the University of Tennessee have carried out a number of studies employing a qualitative / phenomenological methodology (for example, Barrell, 1988; Dapkus 1985; Goodrich, 1988; Macgillivray, 1985; Myers, 1985; Ross, 1987; Seidner, 1986; Sproule, 1988). Their specific methods of data collection and analysis varied because of the unique dimensions of their topics. The procedures selected by these researchers also reflected the significant advances in sophistication with phenomenological methodologies that occurred during this period of time.

Each of these research projects had essentially the same basic procedural structure, centering in a open-

ended, in-depth, dialogical interview which elicited an understanding of the experience of a particular phenomenon from a selected group of participants. These interview data were then analyzed phenomenologically, and a description of the thematic structure of the investigated phenomenon rendered.

The same general method was adopted in the present study, although there were significant points of departure with regard to the methods of data analysis. The present project involved two broad phases--Collecting the Data and Analyzing the Data. The following description is meant to provide a detailed explication of the specific steps taken in both phases. Measures built into the method to ensure rigor will also be discussed.

Collecting the Data

Three primary steps were involved in the data collection process:

1) Bracketing
2) Selecting Participants
3) Interviewing

Bracketing. The investigator prepared for data collection by attempting to make explicit any assumptions he had about the topic as well as any expectations about what the analysis might reveal. This was the first of

many measures designed to ensure fidelity and rigor. Kvale (1983) noted that becoming "critically conscious" of preconceptions, theories and hypotheses reduces the potential for distortion in data collection and description.

Bracketing must occur formally before data collection; it is also critical it continue throughout the project. Each phase of the research may bring out assumptions not detected or understood previously. Conscientious bracketing is to phenomenological methodology what careful controlling of (for) confounding variables is to natural science methodology; both activities are designed to minimize ambiguity in the interpretation of the results.

In a phenomenological-hermeneutic methodology, being interested in or informed by a particular theory does not disqualify a researcher for it is assumed that every interviewer (interpreter) brings a set of experiences and aspirations to a study. The phenomenologist attempts to bracket presuppositions as much as possible so that he/she is open to new and unexpected aspects of the phenomenon being investigated (Kvale, 1983). Seidner (1987) stated that in a hermeneutically oriented phenomenology:

> Presuppositions are seriously problematic only when unacknowledged and unstated. When stated they serve

> as the horizons which both inform and circumscribe the study (p. 39).

Halling (1988) and Thompson, Locander and Pollio (1988) argued that conducting research in the context of a group allows for identifying subjective biases through the presence of multiple perspectives. The present investigator's collaboration with members of the Phenomenology Group at the University of Tennessee was extremely helpful in the process of bracketing. It was in this context that I identified what in my background and clinical training had made reparation such a compelling topic for me. The most important bias that was exposed in the bracketing process was my latent interest in using this project to test or prove the theories of Melanie Klein discussed in the introductory chapter. I found that this aim did not fit with the descriptive methodology I had proposed. It was very useful--indeed necessary--to set aside the desire to find "Kleinian" themes in the data. This undoubtedly cleared the interview process of some of the biases I would have introduced, and it allowed me to describe the data as they presented themselves rather than as they fit with theory. Slowly, I found a comfortable congruence between my personal reasons for conducting the study and the general goals and methods of phenomenological investigation.

Two other bracketings deserve mention--one during the interview phase and one during data analysis. First, in returning from the initial interviews, I became aware of a significant bias that made itself known as my disappointment with the quality of the dialogues. Something seemed to be missing in some of the interviews, and I wondered if some of the participants were really talking about the same phenomenon I had set out to investigate. I also wondered if some participants were able, for one reason or another, to explore the topic on an in-depth level, and if those data would be helpful in the description of reparation I wanted to write.

After consulting with a colleague, it became clear to me that each of the participants had indeed been talking about <u>their</u> experience of the topic. The fact that some of those experiences were different from mine, and different from the way I had anticipated other people talking about it, made it difficult for me to see some of the interviews as relevant data. Once this bias was identified and bracketed, I was able to appreciate all of my data. I had to recognize that though I had tried to remain open to the data, the variety of the data had actually surprised me.

The second example of a bracketing that occurred after the initiation of the project involved literature relevant to the investigated topic. Immediately before I

began the analysis phase, I obtained a copy of a paper on the topic of forgiveness that employed a method similar to the one used in the present study (Rowe, et al., in press). To protect against the possibility of being influenced by this paper, I chose not to read this paper until after the analysis was completed.

Selecting participants. The depth and quality of the interviews give phenomenological research its power and meaning. The selection of participants who generate such data is thus a critically important phase of the research. Collaizzi (1978) and de Rivera and Kreilkemp (1981) suggested that the minimal criteria for participants in phenomenological research are twofold: 1) personal experiences of the topic to be investigated and 2) a willingness to talk about those experiences. Articulate, reflective and introspective individuals who are motivated to explore and share their experience are generally thought to be most capable of producing rich, in-depth protocols. Also, the presence of variety in the demographic characteristics of participants both broadens the potential experience base and enhances the opportunity for the thematic structure of the phenomenon to reveal itself. Inasmuch as no one individual is likely to discuss the phenomenon in a way that exhausts the thematic possibilities of the data, interviewing a

number of participants ensures that the data will possess a variety of perspectives.

Volunteers were solicited for the present study from groups likely to include articulate, reflective and motivated individuals. Because the investigator wished to focus on the experience of reparation from the perspective of adults, he hoped to select a group of at least a dozen participants who ranged between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-five and who were divided equally between males and females.

Presentations regarding the project were made to several church groups, undergraduate classes, and graduate student seminars at the University of Tennessee. The goal at these meetings was to give a general introduction to the topic, at which time the investigator emphasized that he understood reparation as a normal, healthy and universal human phenomenon. He also mentioned that he was not conducting an "experiment" but simply wanted to ask people to discuss their experiences of reparation. Confidentiality of personal information was assured. An information sheet appropriate to the particular group describing the aims and methods of the study was made available to all those who were present at these talks (Example in Appendix A). This sheet included

details about how to contact the investigator if they were interested in participating.

Approximately twenty people approached the investigator at a presentation or telephoned to get more information. It is interesting to note that all of these individuals had heard about the project in one of the university contexts. Fifteen people agreed to be interviewed. One individual failed to show up for the interview appointment and did not return a phone call to reschedule. No one who asked to be interviewed was denied the opportunity to participate, and no attempt was made to solicit specific individuals in these groups. The investigator was not personally acquainted with any of the people to whom he presented the option to participate.

Table 1 presents general demographic information of the fourteen participants. It can be seen that a good balance was achieved with regard to most of the characteristics without any manipulation in the selection process. The participants were seven men and seven women, with ages ranging from 24 to 57. The persons in the group were well educated, half having earned advanced graduate degrees. The two doctoral level participants were educators; the other twelve were currently working on a degree. The group was fairly evenly distributed in terms of marital status and the socio-economic status of

Table 1. General Demographic Characteristics of the Fourteen Participants

	Number of Participants
Gender	
Male	7
Female	7
Age	
21 - 25	1
26 - 30	2
31 - 35	2
36 - 40	5
41 - 45	3
46 - 50	0
51 - 55	0
56 - 60	1
Educational Level	
Doctoral Degree (Ph.D. or Ed.D.)	2
Master's Degree (M.A. or M.S.)	5
Bachelor's Degree (B.A. or B.S.)	5
In college	2
Marital Status	
Never Married	3
Married	5
Divorced	5
Remarried	1
Socio-economic Status of Family of Origin	
Upper-Middle Class	4
Middle Class	7
Lower-Middle Class	3

Table 1 (Continued)

	Number of Participants
Number of Children	
None	5
One	4
Two	3
Three	1
Four	0
Five	1
Occupation	
Graduate Student	5
College Professor / Educator	2
Personnel, Retail Manager	3
Business Owner	1
Minister	1
Engineer	1
Mental Health Worker	1

their family of origin. The notable exceptions in the demographic balance concern the lack of representation of any minority racial or religious groups; all participants were white and all indicated that the religion of their family of origin was Christian, be it a Protestant or Catholic denomination.

Interviewing. The goal of the interview was to collect first-person accounts of the phenomenon of reparation from the perspective of each participant. The model for the phenomenological interview used in the present research was adopted from de Rivera and Kreilkemp's (1981) ideas about a "conceptual encounter" as well as Kvale's (1983) description of a semi-structured, qualitative research interview. According to Kvale, meaning is generated in the dialogue between an interviewee, who is considered the "expert" about his/her own experience, and an interviewer, whose sole wish is to understand. In this sense, phenomenological dialogues are similar to good "client-centered" clinical interviews.

Kvale wrote that interviews should be "theme-oriented and not person-oriented" (1983, p. 174). The interviewer and interviewee are both invested in coming to an understanding of the topic through the revelation and exploration of personal experiences. After being

directed to consider a particular human phenomenon, the participant is asked to think of and speak about specific times in his/her life when this experience was figural.

Questions by the interviewer were kept to a minimum, and were restricted to following up on aspects of experience already introduced by the participant. The interviewer attempted to avoid imposing his own ways of talking about the topic; only the language and terms introduced by the participant were used in queries. This important practical extension of the concept of bracketing builds rigor into the interview process itself. An interview based on a standard set of prepared questions not only constrains the flow of the dialogue, it also introduces a strong bias; namely, those aspects of the phenomenon the investigator thinks are important. In the interview phase of phenomenological research, fidelity means allowing participants to identify and express what is important in their experience in their own words. The interviewer only asks questions to confirm an understanding or to invite the participant to think of other examples which might enhance that understanding.

The interview. Participants met at the investigator's office in the Psychology Department of the University of Tennessee for an interview that was scheduled to last between sixty and ninety minutes. All

participants were led to a room in the same building selected for good audio recording properties.

After a few moments of introduction, participants were asked to read and consider signing the Information and Consent Form (Appendix B). Questions about the form and their participation were solicited and answered. Special care was taken to make it clear to participants that they should feel free to discuss only those topics and events they were comfortable sharing. The collaborative nature of phenomenological research was discussed, and their role as "experts" about the investigated topic was clarified. When it was clear participants understood its contents, they signed the form and were given a copy for their records. At that point, the interview was started.

The interview guide presented in Appendix C was used to begin the dialogue. In the introduction, reparation was defined in a general way and participants were asked to think of a specific time in their lives that they were very aware of the reparative process. Each participant in this study easily understood what the topic was and, in many cases, stated that they had been pondering it before the interview. It is important to note that the introduction was crafted to be <u>specific</u> enough to guide the participants to the topic of reparation and <u>general</u>

enough to avoid pre-structuring their discussion. The initial question in an interview is always of critical importance as it sets the tone and direction for what follows.

Some participants used the first few minutes of the interview to discuss the topic on an abstract or opinion level. For example, some individuals spoke of the general value of reparation in relationships; others spoke of what they considered to be the necessary components for a successful reparative exchange. The general discussion seemed to be a way both to become comfortable in the interview and to frame more concrete examples given later. If at some point a participant did not move into a more specific focus, the investigator encouraged him/her to talk about a particular time that would exemplify the general principals described.

Most participants spoke spontaneously about several different situations; many could easily think of other examples when asked. One participant used the entire interview to talk about a single event in detail. Each narrative story offered was explored, and the meaning of the events clarified in the dialogue. When appropriate, the investigator took opportunities to test out his understanding by summarizing themes presented in the interview. There were times when he was apparently accurate in his comprehension, and his summaries were

answered by affirmations. There also were times when the participants made it clear that he did not yet understand, and they were invited to continue their description so that he could "get it right." The commitment to being faithful to the data leads the phenomenological investigator to persist in this clarification of meaning until the participant feels understood.

Interview qualities. Several properties of the interviews should be mentioned. First, it was clear that the topic was important to each of the participants and that they were invested in relating experiences which reached beyond a superficial understanding of reparation in their lives. The specific examples selected for discussion by participants often were times in their lives which were painful and troubling. Without prompting, many participants told narratives which ultimately focused on the failure of a reparative process. These events often were hurtful, and continue to be sources of conflict and agitation for them.

Affective expression in the interviews ranged from crying to anger to laughter. It was common for participants to use humor in the process of relating how they felt about a given situation. The presence of an interested interviewer, in the context of a dialogue

focused on their experience, allowed many participants to explore aspects of their lives in a depth and intensity which surprised both them and the investigator.

It was clear that although the events discussed had happened in the past, the experience of these event was still quite near. Dialogues between individuals were recalled and recreated in the interview with affect. The verb tense used in the telling of the story often changed from past to present tense. Reflected abstractions were balanced by comments that clearly suggested the contemporaneous quality of the experience during the interview. Thus, the interview data were judged to represent the present life-world of participants.

Kvale (1983) noted that an important aspect of the qualitative research interview is that it frequently offers a "favorable experience for the interviewee." This seemed to be the case in the present research without exception. The dialogue gave many participants an opportunity to understand something new about themselves and/or the interpersonal situation they described. There was a feeling that the participant was able to get something in return for taking time to help the investigator.

Closure. After every narrative offered by the participant was explored, the investigator asked if there was anything about the topic the participant wanted to

add. A mutual sense of understanding and closure was achieved by the end of each interview, and the time originally allotted was adequate to complete the dialogue for all but one participant. (One individual asked for and received the opportunity to schedule another interview in order to complete the description of an important experience.) At the end, participants were thanked for their time and told that a thirty minute follow-up interview would be scheduled with them after a summary of the encounter was written.

The interview was audiotaped with a recorder placed in full view between the investigator and the participant. Tapes were labeled with a numerical code only. The identity of participants was known only to the investigator, and the master list of codes and names was kept in a safe place. Participants' names were never attached to tapes nor to transcripts produced later.

A verbatim transcript of a particularly powerful and useful interview is presented in Appendix D to illustrate the interview techniques and the qualities of the interviews discussed above.

Analyzing the Data

Selection and execution of data analysis procedures were guided by the following goals:

1) To capture the essence of each individual's

experience within the natural context of their lived interpersonal world.

2) To preserve the unity and meaning of the text while maximizing its accessibility for analysis.

3) To proceed with the analysis in a rigorous and respectful fashion, taking steps at each phase to ensure fidelity to the phenomenon.

4) To interpret text conservatively.

5) To render a description of the general structure of the human experience of reparation as it is lived in ordinary context(s).

The general procedure of analyzing the data was informed by suggestions made by Collaizzi (1978), de Rivera and Kreilkemp (1981), Kruger (1981) and Aanstoos (1986). It was also informed by analytical methods developed and refined in the Phenomenology Group at the University of Tennessee. Seidner's (1987) discussion of narrative analysis was particularly instructive. Nine steps emerged as appropriate for this study to transform the data from the taped interviews to a descriptive, thematic structure. These steps were as follows:

1) Creating a Verbatim Transcript

2) Becoming Familiar with Each Transcript

3) Clearing the Text

4) Creating a Summary

5) Checking Summaries with Participants

6) Searching for Structure Across Participants

7) Checking the Structure With Participants

8) Cataloging Summary Statements

9) Writing a Comprehensive Description

The results of this study will be fully articulated in the next chapter. It would be impossible, however, to discuss present methods without describing what emerged from the various steps of the analysis. In phenomenological research, the distinctions between method and results often are blurred because they overlap. The emerging meaning of the data at any one phase guides the researcher in designing subsequent procedures as well as in revising previous interpretations. As Sproule (1988) noted, the steps in a phenomenological analysis "delineate a dialectical movement, which traces something more like a spiral than a straight line" (p. 98). In interpreting interview texts for the present study, the investigator engaged in a "hermeneutic circle" with his data, meaning that he constantly was in conversation with them in an attempt to learn about them.

Creating a transcript. Phenomenological investigations and data analyses have been conducted that do not involve the step of transcription. (e.g., Dapkus, 1983; Koelln, 1987). The present investigator felt that it was important to transcribe all interview tapes for three reasons: First, the availability of two different mediums through which to study and learn about the data

enhances the rigor and depth of analysis. Secondly, a transcript can be systematically and carefully shortened in a concrete fashion on a word processor whereas it is not easy to reduce audio tapes. Thirdly, transcripts are a convenient format for making the data public.

The procedure of creating a verbatim transcript is one that may sound like the simplest and most routine aspect in a qualitative research program. Most publications concerning phenomenological research tend to gloss over this phase as if a perfect transcript is easy to produce. For example, between Kruger's (1979) pages of explication of the methods of data collection and data analysis is the following single sentence paragraph:

> The taped interviews can then be transcribed and the scientific phase of the explication can begin (p. 127).

The present investigator discovered early in the project that transcribing was not only a grueling task difficult to do well, but it was also one from which he could not absent himself. Readers familiar with hermeneutic thought recognize that a level of data interpretation is involved even at this early stage. The words of the interview are taken from one mode to another by the careful interpretation of a transcriber whose intention is to record the interview as faithfully as possible. Despite this intention, errors can be made in

this process that distort the data and which, in turn, distort subsequent analysis. Because the preservation of the integrity of the data assumes such an important priority in phenomenological research, the investigator decided to be very deliberate in the transcription process. A system was designed to check and recheck drafts of the transcript.

Transcription of interview tapes was performed by the investigator and a team composed of a professional medical transcriptionist and eight senior psychology students. Each member of the team was selected on the basis of their interest in the project and their commitment to perform quality work. Before they began listening to tapes, the importance of the confidentiality was discussed. Each team member was asked to sign a pledge (Appendix E) to refrain from talking about what they heard in the tapes except in the context of research meetings. These pledges were kept in a file by the investigator.

Members of the transcription team were assigned to work on different tapes with the goal of producing a verbatim record of the interview. Because tapes were not always perfectly audible, transcribers were encouraged to mark sections about which they were unclear. The first draft of a transcript was typed directly into a computer by means of a word processor. A different team member

then listened to the tape again with a printout of the draft to check for inconsistencies or possible errors, and corrections were made for a second draft.

The investigator then listened to each interview tape at least two more times, making whatever changes were necessary on the second draft. The number of errors found in the drafts in the early stages of the checking process was surprising. Most inaccuracies were relatively minor and would not have greatly altered the meaning of the particular interview; some errors, however, were detected that had a profound impact on certain protocols.

The investigator added underlines to the text where he felt participants had emphasized a word or phrase. All proper names and other identifying information were either deleted or changed to protect confidentiality. The investigator assumed final responsibility for the accuracy of transcripts. The finished transcripts ranged in length from eight to eighteen single-spaced pages with an average length of over thirteen pages.

Becoming familiar with each transcript. The process of checking and rechecking the transcripts afforded the investigator an opportunity to "know" the data. Over a period of several weeks, he read and studied all fourteen protocols to become intimately familiar with their

content and to apprehend their meaning. This was not yet the phase of interpretation or description; rather, the goal was to obtain what Kruger (1981) called a "holistic grasp of the data." He stated:

> . . . the repeated reading of the protocols in this early phase assists the researcher in retaining a sense of the wholeness of the data despite its dissection in the subsequent phases (p. 128).

Clearing the text. In almost any spontaneous dialogue--be it a casual conversation or a formal interview--there are portions which are not essential for understanding the meaning of the speaker. Repetitions, false starts, and pausing to select words are examples of expectable conversational clutter. Interviews also can temporarily get off track so that some comments are irrelevant to the topic investigated. When transcribed, these comments and interruptions may obscure meaning in the transcript by making it hard to read and comprehend--both because of is length and its lack of a smooth flow.

Virtually every phenomenological data analytic method reviewed by the investigator included some form of abbreviation where protocols were edited to facilitate analysis. The particular style and intent of editing depended on the nature of the data and the aim of the project. By far the most common style of reduction is the "significant statement" method recommended by

Collaizzi (1978). In this procedure, the investigator selects statements from the protocol which are seen as especially important for a description of the phenomenon. These statements are then grouped into categories suggested by the data. Low order categories are sorted into higher order categories until they can no longer be grouped further. These most general categories are seen as the primary thematic elements of the phenomenon from which a description can be written.

In some applications of this strategy, the investigator changes the exact words used by the participant to a slightly more general, descriptive gloss so that they may match and be grouped with comments made by other participants. Some researchers choose to cast statements in the third person, changing the data at this very early stage from that of participant experience to that of investigator description. These procedures seem to do violence to the fundamental intent of phenomenological research: to remain close to participant experience.

A different abbreviation process was considered in the present research for several reasons. First, the method of significant statements appears to invite the exercise of a premature understanding and the importing of theoretical loyalties (Seidner, 1987). Secondly, the data of the present study compelled the investigator to

keep them whole. Participants told stories which had a beginning, middle and end. Separating portions of the text from the entire protocol would have stripped it from the relevant context, and the narrative flow from and meaning of data would have been lost. The story form of present protocols contraindicated a segmenting reductive process that preceded an articulation of the complete narrative.

The method of narrative reduction was adapted from Seidner (1987) for the present research. A basic metaphor for understanding this process is threshing chaff from wheat. One starts with a verbatim transcript and then systematically eliminates portions that are not essential. Given the context of the protocol as a whole (or as amended by a previous step), the investigator sifts through the data to find what is insignificant. The meaning and contexts are preserved as text is cleared of distracting, superfluous information.

To prepare for the clearing phase, the present investigator created a computer word processing file for each transcript. After reading through a given text several times, he edited it making changes according to the following five rules:

> 1) Eliminate conversational clutter: Delete false starts, hesitations and filled pauses (e.g., um, well, you know) which are not necessary for comprehension of the meaning of the text. When an

unfilled pause seemed important, an ellipse was inserted.

2) Eliminate obvious repetition: Delete portions of the text which repeated statements already made--especially duplicated statements which refer to the same topic.

3) Punctuate to shorten sentences: Delete conjunctions in some run-on sentences when it does not distort the meaning of the passage. Change commas to periods.

4) Eliminate presence and perspective of the interviewer: Excise interviewer's questions and comments unless needed to frame the participant statements. If an important summary statement made by the interviewer is followed by clear agreement or endorsement (e.g., "Exactly" or "That's right"), change the words so that it appears as a statement made by the participant. Put braces around the statement to identify it. The entire protocol is presented from the perspective of the participant.

5) Add words when necessary to enhance readability and comprehension: When portions of text are deleted, it is not always be clear to what participants were referring when they use a shorthand word such as "it" of "that". When immediate context is insufficient to inform the reader about such a reference, specify what words are referred to by the participant. Put brackets around the addition for identification.

Examples of the application of each of these rules is presented in Appendix F. Whenever the investigator questioned whether or not the meaning of a portion of text would be altered by editing, he left it in its original form. The cleared texts ranged in length from five to eleven single-spaced pages with an average length of eight pages. Appendix G contains the full Cleared Text version of the interview transcribed in Appendix D.

Creating a summary. Although cleared texts were more accessible than verbatim transcripts, further summarization and reorganization was undertaken to assist in discovering the essential aspects of each protocol. The goal was to create an abbreviated version of the protocol which would retain all vital information using the words and perspective of the participant.

After reading cleared texts several times, the investigator felt there still was some redundancy. Another characteristic of cleared texts was that elements of the stories told by the participants were frequently related in an order that did not match the temporal sequence of the lived event. For example, a participant might have started talking about a reparation experience by telling about an apology before speaking about the breach that preceded it. All narrative stories possessed a beginning, middle and end, although the order in which these portions were presented was inconsistent--a fact one expects to find in spontaneous dialogue.

It was common for participants to interweave the discussion of several distinct reparative events and themes throughout the interview. The thorough and spontaneous investigation of themes brought up in dialogue often led to a comparison of different reparative situations, and stimulated new thoughts about (and a perspective from which to clarify) stories

primarily covered in a previous portion of the interview.

To enhance comprehension of the interview, the investigator pulled together all statements regarding a particular topic and also reordered story elements to create a natural sequence. The following rules were followed in summarizing cleared texts:

1) Mark the position of topics: Study and mark where each each topic discussion begins and ends. Locate the position in the interview where each topic is most figural relative to the whole text.

2) Gather together statements regarding a topic: Move all the material relevant to a narrative topic to the location in the interview identified above. This includes statements in the telling of the specific experience as well as any general, abstract comments that are made in relation to that story.

3) Order the statements in a temporal sequence: Move general contextual comments to the beginning of the section. The description of the specific event or experience should follow. The narrative section should close with any statements about resolution and reflections on the consequences of the experience.

4) Eliminate redundancy: In each narrative section, delete the repetition of descriptions of and reflections on the experience. Retain the rich, essential statements that defined the context and meaning of the event.

5) Edit conservatively: To condense the text further, shorten and/or combine sentences when meaning can be preserved in an economical form. This alteration of sentences must be done with great care so that meaning is not distorted.

6) Remove braces and brackets: Any words and statements that had been identified with these marks that were not deleted should be absorbed into the flow of the summary.

The investigator proceeded patiently and

conservatively in the summary process, recognizing that this phase of the analysis--more than any other--required him to act as an interpreter. He alone was making crucial judgments about the relative insignificance of certain statements as well as the most useful ordering of text within the protocols. He attempted to be faithful to the data by being vigilant about threats to rigor in the summarization endeavor. If there was a question about the importance of a particular statement or a concern that editing its position would distort its meaning, the investigator chose to leave the text stand unabridged.

Some phenomenological methodologies have involved a more active, aggressively interpretive stance in this phase of data reduction (Collaizzi, 1978). At no time did the investigator have the experience that he was taking interpretive "leaps" in preparing summaries; rather, modest condensations were made that left the data clear to speak for themselves. The investigator was an interpreter only in terms of selecting and reordering protocol statements; he was <u>not</u> an interpreter in the sense of being an "expert" who presumed to explain the data in language more powerful and true to experience than the participants themselves: the words used in the interview were the words of the summary.

It is important to note that the interview data excised in the summary were not lost to analysis; they remained available to the investigator in both the cleared text and the transcript. If the context of a particular statement was unclear at this or a later phase in the analysis, the investigator returned to the full protocol. This ensured that data interpretation consistently emerged from their appropriate context.

The average summary was five pages long, with the range of summary length from three to seven pages. An example of a summary is presented in Appendix H. Application of the rules listed above can be seen throughout this illustrative text by comparing it with the Cleared Text version in Appendix G.

Checking summaries with participants. One of the most important ways rigor was built into this method was to allow participants the opportunity to read and modify summaries to ensure they were accurate reflections of their experience. This process protected the data from any possibility of distortion due to editing.

Goodrich (1988) noted that the follow-up interview situation may create a strong demand for compliance on the part of the participants, and she warned that it is incumbent on the investigator to make the participant feel that "disagreement is welcome rather than feared" in

this context. For this reason, each participant was called by phone to arrange a time and place for a follow-up interview scheduled to last approximately thirty minutes. During this conversation, it was stressed that it was critically important to the investigator for the participant to make sure that the summary included every important point made in the interview and did not alter what they intended to express.

Copies of the summary were prepared and mailed to all participants with a cover letter (Appendix I). In it participants were thanked for their interest and involvement in the study. They were asked to read the summary of their interview very carefully to see if any portion of it did not fit with their experience. The suggestion was made for them to mark sections about which they were unclear. The cover letter also asked them to consider signing an Information and Consent release (Appendix J) authorizing the investigator to print all or parts of their summaries as needed. All but two of the participants were able to meet with the investigator in person; the follow-up interviews with these two individuals were conducted by telephone after they had read and studied the summary.

The follow-up interview began with a question regarding the participant's experience of reading the summary. Several participants described a sense of

distance from or "coldness" to the data, saying that they felt one step removed from the spontaneous, lived experience of the interview. Instead of the personal encounter of the interview, their experience was captured in words on paper. One participant reported that it was "like looking at a photograph."

Many participants were pleased with the quality and depth of their interview; several added that they had previously been concerned that they were not as helpful as they had wanted to be in the interview. Some stated that they were pleased that the summary made their points seem more clear and coherent than they had remembered making them in the interview. The summary made it obvious to participants that their interviews had been surprisingly "complete"; several participants commented that there was little, if anything, they could add about their experiences of reparation.

Some surprise was also noted with regard to the intensity of emotional expression in the interviews. Several individuals seemed to be slightly uneasy with the hostility that was expressed. One person said that she "winced" when she read the "vindictive" parts.

The interview progressed to the question of the adequacy and faithfulness of the summary. Every participant endorsed the summary as presented to them as

an accurate reflection of their experience. It was at this point that the investigator asked participants to answer questions for the demographic inventory (Appendix K). Next, the Information and Consent form mentioned above was discussed. It was stressed that absolutely no identifying information would accompany quotations from summaries. All participants signed consent forms, which were later filed in a safe place.

The interview closed with the investigator sharing with each participant the tentative themes that had emerged from the data as a whole. Their comments and ideas were solicited, some of which proved to be helpful in the next phase of the analysis. Most participants stated they had enjoyed being part of the project and that they had benefited from it. Participants were thanked again and the second interview came to a close.

One participant authorized the investigator to print his verbatim transcript and cleared text in addition to his summary in order that the reader might have access to an illustrative example of each phase of the data reduction process. The Information and Consent Form he signed appears in Appendix L.

Searching for structure across participants. The phenomenologist assumes that there is natural organization to human experience, and the primary task of

data analysis is to discover the general themes essential to describing the structure of the phenomenon. The phenomenologist also assumes that a vital component of a comprehensive description of a phenomenon is the identification of grounds out of which an experience becomes figural. In writing descriptions, the phenomenologist explicates the essential structure and its interrelationships as well as the grounds which are selected by participants as proximal to the phenomenon. Discovery of thematic organization is an intuitive process which requires the investigator to be open to structural aspects of the data as they present themselves; he/she cannot bring any predetermined theories or organizational rubrics to guide the search for themes as that would bias the discovery process.

Recognizing characteristics. Categories within the data had suggested themselves throughout the analysis process as the investigator immersed himself in the data. Wishing to remain open to further possibilities in the data, the investigator kept notes on these ideas and resisted any premature closure concerning their organization. Three conspicuous characteristics of the data stood out. First, narratives centered on the experience of a "breach" (or break) in a relationship and the resolution or "coming to terms with" that breach. This organization was influenced by the original

interview question which essentially asked participants to recall and discuss a time when they recognized that there was a problem in a relationship. The two consistent focal points in stories were the experience of a breach and the response(s) made to it.

It is important to note that the emphasis in this study was on the experience of the participant. The perspective on the event offered by the participant was always accepted as valid for him or her. Thus, a participant's story about a breach she experienced but which went unnoticed by anyone else was equally as important as a breach recognized by all concerned. The experience of participants included not only their recall of events, but also their fantasies and feelings integral to the living of the event(s). It was not the investigator's task to speculate about what "really" happened. Instead, his focus was on understanding from the perspective of his participants, recognizing that intense subjectivity is what made the data significant.

Secondly, it was clear that reparation was only one of several basic ways in which people came to terms with their experiences of breach. Some stories focused on the failure, or complete absence, of reparative response to a breach. It seemed that among other ways to describe the experience of reparation, many participants chose to

describe what it was not. Thirdly, statements related to events subsequent to a breach indicated that coming to terms with the experience of breach was an on-going process. Participants' feelings about themselves and others were constantly influenced by the passage of time, re-evaluations of the breach, the intervention of third parties and, especially, the action (or inaction) of the other. Some patterns were more stable over time than others; it was clear, however, that participants were still experiencing breaches recalled in the interviews.

Categorizing contextual experiences. In the time period between completing summaries and initiating follow-up interviews, the investigator began to search more systematically for a natural structure to the summaries. It was during this phase that the investigator noted a critically important aspect of the data which revealed a useful preliminary categorical structure in the summaries: Before participants spoke about their experience of breach, or the particular ways of coming to terms with breach, they consistently--and without prompting--embedded those experiences within a context. The contextual data provided information which served to make comprehensible the ways in which breach was experienced and resolved.

For example, participants gave information about their personal values and the history of the relationship

prior to breach. In telling the story this way, they "backed up" to give details that laid the intrapersonal and interpersonal foundation for understanding the central, figural events of the narrative.

When contextual comments were evaluated across all participants, two general categories emerged: Time and Relationship Boundaries. To test the usefulness and sufficiency of this tentative categorization, the investigator read each summary and marked contextual statements with a colored pen designated for a particular category according to the following rules:

> 1) Time: All statements regarding the experience and consequences of the passage of time should be marked as belonging to this group. Include comments about people and circumstances changing and/or staying the same over time. Participant's reflections about how time did or did not alter their experience of breach are of particular importance.
>
> 2) Relationship Boundaries: Identify all statements that provide definition of various relational boundaries between the characters of the narratives--before, during and after the breach, and response to breach. This will include comments regarding self/other characteristics such as values, background, and relationship history. Also included will be relationship descriptors such as power, trust, empathy, closeness/distance and significance.

The investigator found that every narrative account required the participant to set the story relative to both context categories. The investigator came to understand these contexts as distinct--yet interdependent--grounds for the experience of breach. In

other words, it was out of these grounds that a breach (and coming to terms with it) emerged as figural. Each ground was necessary but not sufficient for an understanding of the narrative; together, they co-constituted the grounds out of which the experience and resolution of breach emerged as figural.

Categorizing experiences of breach. A separate category of statements regarded the participant's experience of breach as well as their perceptions of how the breach was experienced by the other. Inspection of the dialogues revealed three inter-dependent sub-categories which comprised the Experience of Breach: Locus of Responsibility, Changes in Self/Other/Relational Boundaries, and Degree of Urgency. When people were aware of a breach, their comments reflected these three thematic aspects.

The investigator read all summaries again, marking statements pertaining to the experience of breach according to the following rules:

> Experience of Breach: Statements regarding specific aspects of the experience of breach should be marked as examples of one or more of the following three sub-categories:
>
> a) Locus of Responsibility: All comments relating to the perceived locus of responsibility for the breach are identified as being in this sub-category. Include statements about the participant's perception of motivation, intention, limitations, and misunderstanding.

b) Changes in Self/Other/Relational Boundaries: This sub-category should include statements focusing on the participant's sense of how they and the other were affected and changed by the breach. Exemplars of this sub-category are feelings of unfinished business, guilt, anger, and hurt as well as comments regarding self-image and the perception of the other. Statements describing the changes in the relationship such as distance, barrier and rift should be marked. Include comments regarding changes in self/other/relational boundaries that result from the response to breach.

c) Degree of Urgency: Statements focusing on the degree of conscious awareness of the breach and the circumstances that hinder or foster awareness should be identified in this sub-category. The urgency referred to here is the felt need to do something about the breach.

The investigator found that all statements referring to an experience of breach could easily be identified as belonging to at least one of the three general sub-categories. There were a number of statements which suggested an identification with more than one category. The following comment is an example of one requiring multiple codings:

> One of the things that got my attention was just how hurt I was and how hurt she was.

The fragment "got my attention" relates to a circumstance that increased the participant's awareness of the problem, and of his need to do something about it; thus, it was identified as a Degree of Urgency statement. This comment also describes how the breach had affected them, so it was also coded in the Changes in Self/Other/ Relational Boundaries sub-category.

Categorizing experiences of "coming to terms" with the breach. A fourth general category emerged to include summary statements which related to the ways in which people resolved or came to terms to breach. These comments ranged from descriptions of actions taken or contemplated to more abstract, reflective statements. Participants routinely provided their own perspective on responses taken by both the injured and the injuror; they did not discuss a victim's response without also presenting their observations about the response made by the person whom they saw as responsible--even if those responses and people were only imagined.

Further examination of the interviews revealed that participants spoke of three basic modes of coming to terms with breach: moving against the other to retaliate, moving away from the other to hold onto a status quo in the relationship, and moving toward the other to repair the breach. These three Coming to Terms With Breach sub-categories were named: Retaliating, Retaining and Repairing.

To test this tentative categorization, the investigator again read each summary carefully, and marked all response statements with a colored pen designating each sub-category according to these rules:

1) Retaliating: Include statements which involve getting even and exacting revenge for a perceived breach. These comments typically involve the

expression of some hostility and an escalation of conflict.

2) Retaining: Include statements focusing on the active or passive measures of at least one of the parties to maintain a status quo in the relationship are marked as Retention. Examples would be avoiding a direct confrontation of the breach, waiting for the other to initiate a reconciliation, refusing to accept the reparative efforts of the other, and being unable to resolve the breach because of special circumstances (as in the death of the other). These comments often refer to a feeling that one is "stuck" with unwanted feelings or circumstances.

3) Repairing: Select summary comments which describe the active work done (or imagined) to repair a breach. These statements focus on participant's ideas about what defines a sincere and effective reparation as well as what is required of the other.

Again, the investigator found that all coming to terms statements could be sorted into one or more of these categories. At times, a double marking was indicated when the statement seemed related to both categories. The following statement illustrates this:

> A reparation could feel complete from my perspective without me feeling the expectation that the other would necessarily have to relinquish their anger or bad feelings.

This particular comment provided useful and important information about both the Repairing and Retention sub-categories and, thus, required dual identification. The statement clearly described the possible context for a reparative effort; when the focus is changed, however, it is possible to see that it provides insight about the context of a retentive stance.

Tentative impressions about all categories were shared with colleagues and participants in follow-up interviews. The investigator made several revisions in the labeling of category groups based on suggestions offered by individuals. The natural units, which had originally suggested themselves, appeared to be clear to others and useful in talking about reparation. A full description of these categories follows in Chapter IV.

Checking the structure with participants. As a final check of the fidelity of the categories to the data, the investigator returned to the interview summaries and applied the structure developed to each narrative story. He confirmed that the structure developed was flexible enough to illustrate the particular configuration of the grounds in relation to one another and to the figural experiences of breach and coming to terms with breach. Thus, he concluded that the data analysis had successfully yielded both a useful set of categories which accounted for all of the interview data and a working understanding of dynamic relationships among them.

To make sure the descriptive structures were capable of accounting for narratives and experiences beyond the data collected from participants in the present study, the investigator analyzed a number of historical and

current events in local, national and international arenas. He was satisfied that the structure was useful and sufficient to describe the ways in which people experience and come to terms with breaches as well as the grounds from which those experiences emerge.

Cataloging summary statements. To prepare for writing a description of these categories, the investigator went through the data once more to catalog all summary statements marked by colored pens in previous steps. Master lists were compiled of all statements used by participants for each category. These statements were coded with the number of the participant as well as with the number of the page and paragraph where it could be found in the summary.

Inspection and study of the cataloged lists of statements facilitated the investigator's understanding of the breadth and depth of each ground and figural experience category. Grouping similar statements together made it easier to notice implicit structure within each category as well as subtle differences in among comments.

Writing a comprehensive description. The final step involved drafting an exhaustive and comprehensive description of the experience of reparation in the

context of the grounds it selects. The cataloged lists of statements were used for writing descriptions of ground categories, figural experience categories and inter-relationships among them. This description appears in Chapter IV.

It may seem odd to include such a step in the method. In a hermeneutical approach to phenomenology, however, communicating the description of data is as critical a part of the method as any other. It is impossible to separate the communication of meaning from its discovery. Description and explication are the heart of phenomenological research.

At this transition between method and results, it is important to acknowledge that the data will always be "more" than any single attempt to describe them. This is true largely because a phenomenologist seeking to write a general description has the challenge of highlighting what is common across participant narratives without obscuring the nuance of individual experience. Each participant provided a unique view of the experience of reparation. Regardless of how poignant or captivating any particular account is, capturing structural essences required the investigator to turn attention to the most salient <u>shared</u> aspects in the data. Some subtleties which might enrich a case study were likely under-

emphasized; the description that follows is limited by this intention and purpose.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The goal of this investigation was to render a comprehensive description of the experience of reparation. Analysis of interviews revealed two figural phenomenon: the experience of breach and the experience of coming to terms with that breach. Reparation was only one of three ways people came to terms with their experiences of breach. The analysis also suggested that coming to terms with a breach can only be understood when cast against the grounds it routinely and naturally selects. For this reason, descriptions of many experiences must be presented before the experience of reparation can be described.

This chapter will begin with a description of the ground categories and their perceived interrelationships. Next, a description of the figural aspects of the experience of breach will be presented. A detailed discussion of the three basic modes of coming to terms with the experience of breach will follow. The complexities of this process will be described, and the structure that emerged to symbolize relationships among the various modes will be elucidated. Finally, salient themes of the experience of reparation will be described.

The Grounds for Experiencing Breach

Within the various protocols, the experience of a breach invariably selected two primary grounds: Time and Relational Boundaries. Both grounds were attended to at some point in each narrative, and thus are interwoven within the experience of reparation. In the following sections, a brief characterization of each ground will be presented on the basis of excerpts from summary protocols. These descriptions may provide the impression that the categories are more discrete, independent, and uniform than they were in the dialogues. In fact, the narrative focus constantly moved back and forth among grounds and figural experiences.

Time. The experience of time was the broadest and most general ground. An awareness of the passage of time was implied throughout the narratives even when not referred to explicitly. The statements comprising this category set the following general context for the stories: time passes; some things change; others stay the same. Time emerged as the most fundamental ground because the experience of all other grounds was influenced by its passage.

For example, relational boundaries change between the time of a first date and a fortieth wedding anniversary. The stinging experience of being assaulted

by a group of bullies in high school may be vivid and painful even after thirty years. A person may have a change of heart and decide to respond differently to a breach by releasing a grudge held for years. In each of these cases, the passage of time re-configures grounds which are closer and more specifically related to the contemporary experience of breach.

In the present set of protocols, one of the most basic ways time was introduced was to establish a temporal context for stories. All narratives were set with respect to a particular age (e.g., "when I was only fourteen") and/or a life era (e.g., "around the time of my divorce"). Summary statements also provided an important temporal frame. Consider the following example:

> I stayed twelve years in a marriage that had about seven good days.

Participants pointed out that the passage of time had led to a change in them, the other, and/or the situation which, in turn, altered their relationship to and experience of breach. The statements below are examples of this group of comments:

> It's a tragic thing that it took so many years for me to realize the importance of communication and of saying thank you. Now that I've grown older, I realize that there are things you can't take for granted.
>
> At this point, it really doesn't matter to me if reparations could be made. . . . It's been so many

years. It's not forgotten, but at this point it makes no difference.

Participants also conveyed the continuity of their experience of breach despite the passage of time.

> It's not cool to come back and want to fight somebody two years later about something when you were a kid. You're supposed to forget about it. I think I was a little different in that I really did remember the situation . . . .

Time was experienced in terms of limitations it imposes. Participants were aware that opportunities to act in response to a breach were limited by time. The following comments present this theme:

> He knew he was going to die two years ago, and I'm sure that was another reason that he was making amends.

> At it's best, life is just a transitory period. It's easy to say, "I need to apologize, but I just can't bring myself to it now. I'll do it tomorrow." Nobody promises us tomorrow . . . .

Relationship boundaries. Another major ground relating to the experience of breach concerned the participant's experience of relationships that were breached. Six different groups of statements were noted. The most general relational definition related to what kind of relationship was involved. The relationships described included friends, lovers, spouses, ex-spouses, siblings, business partners, and strangers as well as relationships between parents and children, employees and employers, and individuals and their God.

The qualities of the relationship were made specific by introducing information about significance, closeness, history and former status. The statements below illustrate this:

> My mother and I are constantly at an uneasy truce. Even though I have grown children, she still thinks I'm her child and tries to tell me everything I should do.
>
> I loved him as a brother. I could tell him anything, everything. I would have done almost anything for him.
>
> My father and I are not that close emotionally. We have kind of a distant relationship . . . .

Further specificity related to the personal characteristics of both parties:

> He used to get his feelings hurt very easily. He felt like he was neglected.
>
> She'd rather not think about unpleasant things.
>
> I am a person who very much needs to be needed and he was a person who needs to have somebody take care of him. He needs a mother, and so we fit very well.
>
> My mother does not believe in apologizing for anything and my dad was even worse. She grew up believing that parents were supposed to be gods to their children, and to admit to any kind of weakness was making herself less than a god and less than a parent.

Comments regarding personal values established the basis upon which decisions in interpersonal matters were made. These statements ranged from a discussion of religious heritage to comments about beliefs which have emerged from experience. Examples are presented below:

> I've learned from the Biblical teaching on

> reparation and reconciliation that the responsibility is placed on the shoulders of whomever senses a problem.
>
> I'm a recovering alcoholic. One of the steps in the A.A. program is making amends by identifying people you have harmed over your period of alcoholism and being willing to repair those relationships . . . .

Another way the participants experienced relational boundaries was in terms of familial heritage--in both its positive and negative aspects. These statements made it clear that interpersonal styles were influenced by what was experienced as "correct" in the family setting.

> That may go back to the relationship with my father. There were many times where he would make those judgments which I knew were wrong, but I never saw anything come in terms of an apology. Never, never in my life did I hear him say he was sorry.
>
> Maybe my family is where I picked up my style because I can't think of many times when I saw people apologizing.

A final group of statements revealed the general interpersonal style of the characters in the narratives.

> People can bring problems and angers or whatever in my office and we can sit down and hash them out. No matter what it is, we can work it out.
> She is likely to carry a grudge whereas I'm not likely to hang onto or remember them.
>
> It would be rare that I would completely trash somebody. I'm capable of it, but I can't remember an instance in which someone came to me and made themselves vulnerable that I didn't respond sympathetically to that vulnerability.

Experiencing the Breach

Specific incidents of breach discussed in the narratives represented a wide spectrum of events, ranging

from mild verbal insults to killing enemies in war. Stories centered on such events as a fiance breaking her engagement, a clerk stealing money from a customer, a person expressing anger at God, and a mother losing control of her temper when dealing with her child.

When participants reflected on breaks in relationship, they were aware of three inter-dependent aspects of the experience: Locus of Responsibility, Changes in Self/Other/Relational Boundaries, and Degree of Urgency. Experiences of breach were described by referring to a particular configuration of these three interrelated themes.

Locus of responsibility. One of the most fundamental aspects of the experience of breach was a concern with who was responsible for the break. In most narratives, participants clearly experienced one person as injuror and the other as victim--even in complicated situations in which both parties contributed to the tension preceding the breach. Awareness of the responsibility theme was expressed in several ways. Many statements focused on determining who was at fault:

> I did feel that I had something to apologize for with her. That was definitely my wrong.
>
> I really didn't think I had done him wrong. . . . I didn't feel that I made a contract with him when we moved in together that I'd take care of him in that kind of way.

> It is clear to me we are both at fault. She is clear that I was at fault and she is just now becoming clear that she was at fault.
>
> Most of the time there's not fault to be given. It's just a difference of opinion.

Acceptance or avoidance of blame also appeared in the narratives. Some participant statements clarified the difference between the experience of "owning up to" a breach and that of "excusing" it. People described situational and personal factors influencing the perception of who was to blame.

> At the time, I felt it relieved me from my guilt, but it didn't. The alcohol removed the inhibitions so that I did things that I really wanted to do. It put my superego on hold. That doesn't excuse me. That excuse doesn't hold water. I was still responsible.
>
> The offended person can make reparation. But for me to do that now, I would have to sell myself and lie. The reparation with him would be possible if I said, "I was wrong, you were right. I take full responsibility for it."
>
> You have to remember that you're also at fault. Somehow, in some way you have contributed--even if it's only a miniscule amount.

A final way in which participants introduced the topic of responsibility was to discuss the injuror's intention. This was a critically important aspect of many participant's experience of breach. The degree of blame assigned or assumed was typically related to the perception of whether the person had acted with a conscious intention to hurt. If an action could be seen

as accidental, unconscious or forced, most participants understood the event as less serious. The following statements illustrate these comments:

> I felt like a rat because I deliberately created a very hurtful situation.
>
> I didn't realize at the time that she needed me for support more than she needed me working. I sort of ignored that or wasn't aware of it. I was kind of blind to it.
>
> I'd like to be able to find those people I hurt someday and explain that I wasn't there out of choice and that some of the things I did were not necessarily of my own volition. I did what I was told to do.

Changes in self/other/relational boundaries. A related aspect of the experience of breach was the perception of how both parties were affected by it. Perceptions of the level of impact varied a great deal across narratives; in most cases participants spoke of their impressions of lasting and profound (generally negative) changes. Their experience of the world and of the relationship changed as a consequence of the breaching event.

Many statements concerned changes in the self that occurred as a consequence of breach. Comments focused on the disruptive experience of dealing with the break at the time as well as uncomfortable memories that still linger about the event. For some, the experience of breach was felt to make little impact; others described

their experience as one of personal devastation. Self-image was often affected. Participants who were injured recalled the pain experienced; participants who were the injuror lived with feelings such as guilt. In both cases, the experience was of being "stuck" with unwanted feelings or situations. Most participants experienced a significant loss of the sense of wholeness; the smoothness of their experience had been interrupted by breach. Examples include the following:

> I didn't eat, study, or go to class. I lost twenty pounds. I was very hurt and very angry and very confused.
>
> I have always felt really guilty because I had made the decision. . . . His hurt has always stayed with me. I've always felt guilty about it.
>
> You have something in your mind and it was left unfinished. It's not how you are or how you feel.

Another vital aspect of participant experience was the perception of how the other was changed by the breach. The content of these changes matched those that occurred in the self. For example, participants worried if the breach had disrupted them or caused irreparable harm--or if it had even been noticed; most times they did have some basis on which to judge its impact on the other. Participants often spoke of their assessment of how the other now felt about them, i.e., were they angry, fed up, disappointed, or waiting to get revenge? The following statements illustrate these perceptions:

I can still see the withdrawal in her years later.

> The customer was very wealthy and what I took was such a miniscule amount by comparison that it was never detected. . . . He didn't even miss it . . . .
>
> I'm sure that it's still in the back of his mind. "He never admitted that to me. He lied to me."

Participants also highlighted interpersonal consequences of breach. Part of the experience of breach is an awareness of changes in the relationship. In general, participants felt cut off and alienated from the other. The relationship which existed before was interrupted or shattered in some respect, leaving them to describe their experience in terms such as "distance" and "barrier." Consider the following excerpts:

> It went from a benign or a non-involved relationship to a rather hostile relationship.
>
> Over the years it's taken a toll on our relationship, because I feel like we could have been much closer.
>
> It definitely hurt the relationship as far as being able to be honest. We had to sacrifice a little of that just to be able to endure living together.

People who had felt they could trust each other implicitly now felt distrust at a most basic level. Where there once was closeness, there now was a "rift"; where there was openness, there was now a sense of "closed." Relationships were experienced as broken.

Degree of urgency. A third facet of the experience of breach concerned the person's awareness of the breach.

Participant comments indicated the perceived degree of urgency felt about doing something about the problem in the relationship. When participants were aware of a breach, they made some estimate of the extent to which they and/or the other experienced a need to act in response to the breach. The following statements illustrate this aspect of experiencing breach:

> Feelings have variable strengths, so it's hard to articulate exactly when you reach the threshold at which the emotion becomes so palpable that you must act. Nevertheless, in any particular situation there is some level at which you do or don't.

> The importance to me of making reparation at a given time runs on a continuum, depending upon which burner these things are on. I notice different degrees of gnawing or discomfort depending upon how inevitable or how urgent pulling out and dispatching things are.

Applying this participant's metaphor, it was possible to see a continuum of perceived urgency. Statements indicating least urgency reflected a simple awareness of breach. In this case, the breach was peripheral to consciousness, and was neither agitating nor troublesome. Other comments indicated that awareness of breach was uncomfortable and led to a feeling of uneasiness. These statements reflected a tolerance for discomfort, and though a response was sometimes seen as inevitable, the individual was content to postpone action. The next level was an awareness that was experienced as an urgent need to act promptly. Examples

of such awareness include:

> I could tell he was hurt and felt bad. . . . I tried to overlook it. . . . Really, it shouldn't have been a problem. I tried to say, "Let it blow over." It bothered him a lot more.

> They do not feel urgent, but they're on the back burner as something I will take care of in due time. . . . it's still something that bugs me. It's there, but it's not that urgent. It's something I'm going to do.

> I was angry for a long time. I wondered when it would resolve itself, and finally decided I couldn't afford the anger. It was eating me, not just hurting her. . . . I eventually decided I was going to have to . . . forgive her and be done with it.

The perceived severity of the violation often influenced the degree of urgency felt with regard to responding to the breach.

> I guess that the severity of the offense and the intensity of the anger of hurt determines whether or not an apology is seen as necessary in my family. A really hurtful act would probably require a lot of crying.

> I guess the degree of violation is what makes it stick and what lets it go.

Experiences of breach cut across more than one sub-category. The themes of responsibility, changes and urgency were interwoven in the description of breach experience. The following passage is an example of how one participant experienced the inter-relatedness of these aspects:

> I start feeling all this guilt. "How could I do that to her, it's not her fault". All this really makes me feel guilty like I'm a monster or a horrible person. Scum of the earth. I don't know how I could say that to someone that I'm supposed to

> love. I don't know who said "I hate you" first, but it really doesn't matter, because I'm the adult - supposedly.

The figural experience of breach was described by participants as an unwanted interruption which forced them to be (at least nominally) aware of unpleasant feelings such as guilt, anger, hurt, betrayal, distrust and disappointment. They experienced separation and loss of unity with the other, and were aware that the breach had taken a toll on the other. Compelled to account for why the rift appeared, they puzzled about who was responsible for the breaching event. Related to these experiences was a perceived degree of urgency to do something about it. Preoccupation with all these concerns defined the participant's experiences of breach.

Relationship of the Grounds to the Experience of Breach

The grounds of Time and Relationship Boundaries were related to the experience of breach in a stable yet dynamic pattern which is best represented by Figure 1. The position of the grounds symbolizes their relative proximity to each other and to the person's figural experience of breach. Themes located nearer the center of the figure are grounded by more peripheral ones; outer grounds set a context for the pattern of inner grounds.

Complex experiences such as breach--and coming to terms with it--can neither be represented nor discussed




Figure 1. Structural Relationships Among the Grounds of the Experience of Breach.

as linear phenomena. As with all figure-ground phenomena, changes in one aspect of the pattern affect all other aspects. No representation of a set of grounds will ever be correct for every circumstance; Figure 1 is an attempt to draw a "least wrong" structure.

Each account of breach was uniquely situated in terms of experiences of time and relationships. Relationship boundaries were always set relative to a temporal context and to the individual's experience of the passage of time. Relationship boundaries became the ground out of which a violation of boundaries (i.e., a breach) stood out as figural. The particulars of each experience of breach (responsibility, change, urgency) were always co-constituted by temporal and interpersonal contexts.

Coming to Terms With Breach

Emerging from the context set by the experience of breach were three distinct modes of coming to terms with it: Retaliating, Retaining and Repairing. These reactions addressed the relational status quo in different ways, and each allowed for different levels of resolution.

Retaliating. Participants told narratives in which characters came to terms with a breach by retaliating. By re-engaging the other in a hostile manner, they

responded to the breach by escalating conflict. When people were injured--and, consequently, hurt and/or angry--their first response was often impulsive and retaliatory. Participants described hasty, unthinking actions intended to change the status quo in the relationship by "getting even" with the other whom they saw as responsible for the breach. Often they were outraged at the action (or inaction) of the other which left them with a powerful sense that something had to be done to restore a sense of balance, a sense of justice. Fantasies of retaliation that accompanied other, more temperate actions were also described.

In most of these situations the participant's focus is on the other, moving against and attacking them to exact "revenge." The goal of many retaliating individuals was neither to reconcile nor to establish closure in the relationship; rather, they expressed hostility and ultimately escalated conflict. The experience of time for a person seeking retaliation was generally limited to the present; concern about the welfare of the other and the future of their relationship were pushed aside. Examples of the retaliating mode of coming to terms follow:

> The first thing that popped into my head regarding resolution of that event was just an eye-for-an-eye: try to get that guy back, confront him openly about it and get him to fight or something like that.

> I was surprised by his very hostile and very ugly response. . . . It wasn't so much verbal as it was a look of almost utter hatred. Just a real anger in his eyes that I'd not seen before . . . .
>
> For a moment, I didn't care. I probably thought that I really meant it. I know I don't hate her, but I hate some of her actions. I was just really ticked. I just want away. If I could have walked out the door and just kept going I probably would have liked it.

Retaliatory feelings also were present in lingering fantasies and premeditated responses calculated long after the event. The intensity of fantasies and the desire to act on emotion were related to the severity and importance of the breach. The passage of time did little to dull the piercing anger some participants felt.

> Occasionally, I have fantasies about fighting him, about getting him alone and saying, "Let's see how tough you are now."
>
> I was angry at my mother. I hate her. I am so frustrated with her. I think I had a right to dislike her so much because she had done some very destructive things toward me. . . . I felt a great deal of anger towards my mother when I realized that she hid her eyes to my father raping me. She should have known. There were signs all over the place. . . . The bottom line is that I was angry at her for not being the mother I wanted her to be. It was telling me I was crazy. I was angry, really furious. And I have to watch it still yet. There are times when it comes up and I will become angry and want to do something.

Such comments revealed that the prospect of forgiving (or of accepting the reparative efforts of) the other was quite remote for some participants. Other comments concerning retaliation involved situations where

people were distant from the breach event and yet still quite conflicted, feeling torn about turning fantasies of retaliation to hostile action.

> When I'm angry at somebody, I want to be angry and I don't want to know about them. . . . I know that the moment I start trying to understand them, I'll start forgiving them and I want to be mad.
>
> It would have given me some gratification, but it would have put me in the situation of having to make a reparation. If I get even, I'd just be on his plane and be the same jerk he was.

Some retaliation statements concerned hostility expressed in a failed reparative attempt. Within this set, participants spoke of their experiences when aspects of retaliation were noted in what was initially designed to be a reparative encounter. Participants distinguished this "getting even" resolution from a true reparation. Such comments were helpful for defining a separation between reparation and retaliation. The following excerpts illustrate this point:

> "You really hurt me. I want to get my wounds bandaged. I want you to do penance. I want you to hurt 'cause I'm hurt."
>
> I think Matthew 18 is a model for dealing with offense. If your brother has sinned against you, go to him and tell him. If he hears you, you've won a brother. I see abuses of it a lot where somebody's done something that you don't like and you just go give them hell. "You got me, I'm going to get you back." That's really missing the motivation of that passage which is to win your brother. . . . That kind of motivation has to be central for a successful reparation, and it's different than just, "I want to feel better."
>
> In most cases, the result of retaliating was an

increase in the experience of interpersonal tension and distance. Few participants saw resolution of the breach event resulting from an expression of hostility.

> I see folks choosing a lot to inflict pain on other people rather than bear it themselves. When we are angry or frustrated, we yell at somebody else. Then we feel great because we've had an emotional catharsis, but the other person feels rotten. That seems to be a natural response to hurt. . . . We're just transferring pain in such a way that there can be no resolution.

One participant spoke about the value of an open communication style which allows for the quick expression and resolution of anger.

> We just thrash it out and get it over right then. I don't feel that it's done any damage to our relationship.

Clearly, personal and familial styles determine the context for resolution of breaches and how much hostility can comfortably be allowed into the process.

The first mode of coming to terms with the breach is active or fantasized retaliation. It is experienced as an intense, brooding state which easily spills over into impulsive, hostile action. This mode was most often experienced by people who felt victimized unjustly by the other, creating a sense of angry separation. Acting on the strong emotions experienced in regard to these situations led to increased distance and tension.

Retaining. Other experiences of breach were related

to a different mode of coming to terms which involved holding on to status quo in the relationship. There were many ways in which this mode was experienced; a common thread concerned the theme of moving away from the other. Instead of moving against the other to retaliate or toward the other to repair, the person who held on to the breach experience typically focused on the self. They felt "stuck" and harbored painful feelings.

Participants who opted for the retaining response did so because they could not or did not wish to move in either of the other two modes. The retaining option was one of waiting--either by choice or necessity. Closing the breach through any interpersonal encounter did not appear possible, desirable or likely. Participants frequently experienced being entrenched in positions from which compromise--or even discussion--was impossible.

Analysis of narratives told from the perspective of injurors suggested that guilt was the primary feeling held onto or retained. These people were painfully aware that they had not been forgiven by the other, and were not able to successfully initiate a reparative encounter on their own.

> I have always felt really guilty because I had made that decision. . . . His hurt has always stayed with me. I've always felt guilty about it. . . . There is something I remember and carry along unresolved.

Not surprisingly, those who experienced themselves as

injured carried feelings of hurt and anger. They felt that they had been mistreated and had not found an opportunity to have their grievance addressed in a way that relieved them from their sense of injustice and violation.

> He had done a lot for me, but I was--and still am--tremendously hurt by what he did . . . . It is really painful, but I don't know any way to get out of it. I've carried a lot more than what I ought to. I'm just that type of person. It's hard for me to just let loose of stuff. You lay there in bed and things come back from junior high. There's no reason to be worried about that. That's over with.

> I didn't seek reparation through formal lines of justice. I don't tell many people about it even. I've sort of carried it with me. I guess thinking that I would get even someday...somehow. But I never did. It's been really mental anguish for me. I guess I resolved it by just letting it eat me. Reparations were made just from the inner dialogue that I had about it. . . . You're supposed to forget about it. I think I was a little different in that I really did remember the situation, but I never really did anything about it.

A static, passive quality may seem to characterize this position; this is deceiving because the frustration felt by those holding onto breaches could be intense.

> I get frustrated when I can't fix problems in relationships--especially when we're not dealing on the real level. I have a lot of emotion attached to that, because I fell like there's nothing I can do, there's no resolution and there's no way to win. It's a no win situation. It leaves a bad taste in your mouth because you can't have the sense that, "We've repaired our relationship."

The bulk of discussion concerning the retaining mode dealt with reasons why another way of coming to terms was

felt to be impossible. Sometimes the death of the other person prevented the completion of a reparative exchange.

> Another example of a reparation that was not finished that stands out to me now is not spending more time with my grandfather before he died. We were really close. I was in college during his last few years and I didn't get to see him that much. He died, and I've always felt some guilt. . . . I was sort of locked into my own life at that stage, and before I knew it, he was gone. It's a reparation that I never completed--both to myself and him. . . . There is no way to repair it with him because he passed away.
>
> If I had my father back today, those are things I would say I was sorry for. I didn't take advantage if the opportunity then, and now it's not there. I sits with me badly.
>
> My father is dead. . . . (T)here was no going back and getting an apology from him. I made myself remember the good things because Lord knows I could remember the bad ones. The bones in both my wrists are cracked or chipped at one point or another because of him.

Pride and inhibitions also were mentioned as obstacles to repairing relationships. It was extremely difficult for individuals to muster the courage to approach the other to ask forgiveness.

> It took him ten years to offer an apology. . . . He said, "Many times I wanted to say it and just couldn't." Inhibitions play a big part in whether or not someone does make reparations for an injustice. It takes a bigger man to say I'm sorry than to just walk away. I probably just needed to catch him after he'd had a few beers . . . .

Another reason given for retention was the feeling that status quo was better than the disruption a reparative attempt would cause. Although some participants expressed dissatisfaction with their present

situation, they believed that more harm than good would come from efforts to reconcile:

> I act like nothing's wrong. Only rarely do we talk about what's wrong. Then she does not really want to; she just wants to think everything is just fine. She just does not want to acknowledge that there is a problem. And we go right on. . . . My sister and I have both learned that's just the way it is. We do what we can to kind of keep things on an even keel even though we don't like it. We feel like we don't have a choice. Acting like nothing happened wasn't the <u>best</u> thing; it was the <u>easiest</u> thing. It might be the only thing. . . . If we don't discuss it we can at least have some semblance of normalcy.
>
> If I could find her, I would apologize to her. I think she's probably married now and wouldn't want to hear it. She might want to hear it, but wouldn't want me to interfere.

In the first case, the participant made some accommodation to the interpersonal limitations of her mother. In the latter case, the individual valued the protection of his former friend's feelings over his own relief. In both situations, participants were aware that a breach was unresolved but opted to carry uncomfortable feelings as they imagined the situation only getting worse as a result of intervention.

Other participants spoke of deciding to maintain the status quo because they no longer had any hope the damage could be repaired. They experienced the breach as so pervasive that no effort could salvage it. They were resigned that retaining was the only available means of coming to terms with the breach.

> For a reparation to take place, it would take something from him, but I don't know what it would be. I don't know how I could forgive him. I don't know if it would work if he would just say, "I'm sorry. I was wrong." It might make even make it worse. It's just like there is too much hurt. . . . But it wouldn't work for me to go to him and say, "I'm sorry," because I'm <u>not</u> really sorry. I don't know what I would be sorry <u>for</u>.
>
> Some things you can repair, but some things can be kind of messed up so badly that it's just not possible. I said to the counselor once, "I'm tired of this. I don't even care." She said, "There is too much pain and too much baggage and too much hurt that you would have to sit down every day for the next ten thousand years and discuss and argue and fight about it before it would ever work out. And <u>you</u> just don't want to do that, do you?" I said no.

Participants spoke of various ways the passage of time influenced the resolution of a retained experience of breach. Many of the passages above suggest that participants remain uncomfortably aware of both the rift and their feelings about it. It is a persistent source of irritation and agitation, and the sense of incompleteness did not diminish.

"Time heals all wounds" is a maxim that described how some people were able to "release" the experience of breach. Although problems in a relationship were quite figural to them at one point, the participants recognized years later that they were not now as aware of such feelings--even though they took no action to resolve the problem. They got "farther away" from the experience of breach because of increased interpersonal distance and because intervening events that took place.

> I don't know how I'm ever going to forget. I can forgive and I don't wish him any harm, but I just don't want to be around him. He did some stuff that I still can't believe, and it's unresolved and I don't know how it's going to get fixed. It will get fixed because it always does. When we were growing up, he used to do things that hurt me and I always somehow got over it.
>
> I never really even mentioned it to her or that I was hurt. She was there and she knew I was there and it was just never spoken of. It took me a week or so until I got over it.

Although the passage of time attenuated the experience of breach for some participants, most were aware that hurt feelings accumulated over time. The passages below capture the experience of participants who feel that a remnant of the breach is always retained when a conflict goes unresolved.

> I think things between them were more or less forgotten. They probably just wanted to just forget about it after a while. But in some ways I think a lot of hurt accumulated. It seems like it would be likely to since they didn't talk about it. Usually time would heal it. My dad's job at that time kept him gone a lot. While that was often the source of the problem, the time away would heal it a lot of the time.
>
> She eventually forgets and forgives even though he never says "I'm sorry" unless something really drastic happens. He'll eventually come back and say he really didn't mean to hit her or whatever. But usually it just sort of gets tucked away somewhere.

The second mode of coming to terms with the breach involves holding securely to the experience of breach. The interpersonal and/or situational context sometimes does not permit people to feel as if they can approach

the breach in a different mode in order to release it. Participants described retaining as a painful, self-absorbed, ruminative experience. They felt entrenched in a position of distance from the other, frequently experiencing little hope of reconciliation. Often participants experienced the other as failing to do (or be) something that would allow both to move out of a retaining mode. When participants came to terms with breach by holding onto it, their temporal focus was in the past and they doggedly protected themselves and the maintenance of relational status quo.

Repairing. Participants also described situations in which they moved toward another person with the intention of repairing a breached relationship. These individuals not only offered and accepted apologies, but also tried to work through the forgiveness process through contemplation and imagination. The word "apology" was used often by the participants to denote a broad range of reparative actions beyond the stereotyped, "I'm sorry."

In contrast to many retaliatory actions, reparation was never described as a rash or impulsive act pushed by intense emotion; rather, repairing was presented as the result of reflection and "cooling off." Unlike retaining, reparation was not described as coming from a

closed, protective posture marked by brooding self-absorption. Instead, participants presented repairing as an active, constructive, other-oriented response to breach which required an open, vulnerable interpersonal posture. While not every reparative attempt led to a comfortable resolution, consensual closure on the breach experience only occurred as a result of an effective exchange between people.

It is important to point out that participants were aware of an underlying assessment process about the intentions of both the apology giver and the apology receiver. Part of a reparation is to judge the sincerity and trustworthiness of the other. Participants made boundaries between reparation and other modes distinct by describing the difference between "good faith" and "bad faith" reparative efforts. Many actions described in the interviews failed to elicit closure for one person and/or the other, and participants addressed themselves to reasons for the failure. On the other hand, many reparative actions were experienced as effective, and participants offered their sense of how and why that was so.

To begin the general description of reparation, examples will be presented that relate to effective, "good faith" reparations, i.e., what participants said reparation was. In this section, the most salient,

defining attributes of the reparative process will be highlighted. This will start with a discussion of the posture of repairing. Secondly, a section describing the figural object of the reparative experience will be presented. Next, three characteristic aspects of the action of an effective reparative exchange will be described. After the mutuality of repairing is described, examples of "good faith" repairs that came as a result of actions other than apologies will be contrasted with "bad faith" repairing, i.e., explanations that failed to effect a repair.

The posture of repairing. The experienced interpersonal stance of the reparative mode is significantly different from those of retaliating and retaining. The words and metaphors used to describe repairing connote a posture of opening, bridging, receiving. In fact, the very word openness recurred throughout the interviews. Breaches were experienced in terms of rifts or barriers which separated people and closed off communication; reparation was experienced as an effort to "clear the channel" of what formerly obstructed it and which led to a consensual understanding.

> If you offend someone, you cut that person off. You limit your ability to have that positive, mutual inter-relationship because the other person withdraws. If you hurt me, I am not going to make

> myself open to you. And that interpersonal openness is what relationships are about. And so I must open that channel back up. I must say, "I'm sorry I hurt you. Let me massage it, apologize, explain," so the communication relaxes and opens up again.

Openness was frequently associated with bringing problems "up," "on to the front burner," "out into the open"; this is in contrast to keeping them "down," "buried," "on the back burner," "out of sight."

Interestingly, the test of a successful reparation often focused more on an openness which allowed for free discussion of the present interpersonal situation than on restoring a relationship to its former status:

> It's not necessary to be resolved so we all love each other, but at least the channels are still open. Or we have chosen together to close those channels. It is resolving with that other person about where we stand right now. Even if you choose to agree to disagree or resolve that you're going to work on it, there is some kind of communication between two people.

Another metaphor frequently used to describe the experience of coming to terms by repairing was "bridging the gap." This imagery suggests one faces and confronts a rift, reaching across to re-establish connection.

> I'm big on going back and trying to make amends, doing whatever it takes short of selling myself. I have spent a lot of time in the last seven years going back to people trying to bridges a gap that I thought was there. . . . I believe that there is always something that that can bridge a gap, and I have lots of energy and I sense that I can figure out a way to pull it off.
>
> Although it would be very problematic for me to be around him a lot, there seems to have been a bridge that's been crossed where there's a certain amount

> of trust and it's different from the broken relationship. A different feeling. Probably if I reached my hand out to him, it would be taken. There would be some sense of at least community between us at this point. . . . It is as if he has taken his accident and used it as a bridge for re-establishing the good, old relationship and being forgiven the transgressions that either of us might have committed in the middle.

Related to the experiences of openness and bridging is the motif of receptiveness. Instead of withdrawing from the other, a person who participates in a reparation experience moves toward the other in a receptive position. The experience of breach is released, and there is openness to a fresh start. The participant quoted below clearly had a sense that a relationship was salvaged because both she and her brother were willing to let go of their own sense of grievance and to accept the intention of the other:

> So he's willing now to accept the offer of friendship that I kept trying to make to him. Nothing has been said, but it's a sense, a feeling. I think after a long history you have a sense of another person's intention. If you can accept the intentionality and forget the vitriolic bitterness in the middle, then it can work. I'm perfectly willing to do that because he needs that old relationship.

Another critical aspect of the experience of the reparative mode is vulnerability. Participants described their experience of the humility reparation requires in physical terms. They felt that the act of asking for forgiveness opened them up to tremendous risk.

> I think it's just a matter of being able to let your

guard down. To put down the stereotypical macho image and just go ahead and say you're sorry. That macho image has probably hurt more relationships than anything I know of. Because if you can't humble yourself enough to say you're sorry, then you're not much of a human being.

You've got to realize how impotent and powerless you are. When you apologize, you're absolutely vulnerable to the whims and the will of the person to whom you;re apologizing because you've opened yourself up. You've set yourself in a position where you're begging forgiveness. An you are extremely vulnerable and just struck down if you run up against a hard case who doesn't accept your apology.

The object of repairing. A new start reparation affords begins with at least one of the parties recognizing a desire for change as well as a willingness to let go of the breach. Repairs did not happen without some instigation toward change by one party or the other. The typical pattern was for one person to initiate an encounter by inviting the other to consider a change. In a successful reparation, the temporal perspective shifts from the troubled past to the possibilities of the present and future.

Depending on the particular experience of breach, participants hoped their actions would restore a sense of wholeness to the self, the other and/or the relationship. In some situations, participants experienced the urgency of the breach situation as relating to their own feeling of incompleteness. They focused on how they would be changed. Others experienced the reparation action as for

the other person; their experience centered on what a change in the status quo would allow for the other. Finally, some participants experienced their urgency to act as most related to restoring the relationship.

In the following quote, a young man asks his father to let go of his disappointment in him and to meet him on new terms. Unless the father can release the disappointment, both are stuck with the experience of breach. While it is clear that the young man wants to feel better himself, he is primarily concerned with changing his father's hurt feelings.

> Like most children, I'm sensitive to my parent's attitudes about me. One of the things I said I was sorry about is that I had to be involved in an unhappy view that my father had of me. I was sorry that I had disappointed him. I <u>hate</u> to do that because I admire him and respect his position. I said, "I'm sorry. We have a relationship and certain attitudes toward each other which are uncomfortable. I want to repair these, I'm doing it this way because I care about and respect you."

The next excerpt was given by a woman who re-established a connection with a former friend by suggesting to him that she was willing to "open the door" to relationship. The "object" of her reparative efforts was the relationship.

> Recently I've re-established the relationship and talked to him about those feelings which I had stuck some place in the back of my mind until about a year ago. To initiate the process, I wanted to put three or four well-chosen words on a postcard that would convey everything that was on my mind. I wanted to say, "I'm sorry I slammed the door. There's a crack in it now. Would you like to stick your foot in

> it?" . . . I wasn't so much saying, "Please accept my apology for that," as I was saying, "I still think of you. You still have the ability to be a good friend to me. Do you want to try this one more time?" Maybe it was an apology. I don't know. But I wasn't thinking of it in terms of, "I'm sorry for what happened." I was thinking of it more in terms of, "Let's try this one more time and see if our perspectives have changed."

Several other participants provide examples of repairing that was experienced as restoring a personal sense of integrity and balance. In the first, the participant was much more focused on what his apology would do for him than for the others. He wanted very much to be released from his experience of breach, but this could only occur by interacting with those he had offended.

> I am a recovering alcoholic. One of the steps in the A.A. program is making amends by identifying people you have harmed over the period of alcoholism and being willing to repair those relationships - if it's possible to do that without causing them further damage. And then actually doing it. A.A. is pretty much a selfish program; you're doing it for yourself, your own survival. Getting rid of some of that garbage--primarily guilt--is one way of letting go of some of the things that are causing the need to drink. . . . It's an actual hands-on process of working through and admitting to accepting what has happened--and letting it go. Until I do that, I can't let it go because it's down there saying, "Let me out." It's just I know it's there.

He continued by suggesting that both his self-image and the view that others have of him could be altered by his action of apology.

> An important motivation that would push me to go ahead and do this is to change the image that I

> think he has of me. . . . I'm creating or restructuring my image of his image of me. It also restructures my image of me . . . .

Additional insight about reparation experienced as for the self was offered by a man who attempted to reconcile with his wife after a period of alienation.

> The kind of reparation I tried to make was to take a close look at what we had in common and to try to do more things together and to talk more. Instead of getting locked into a role and going two different ways. I made up my mind to try to be a better listener and to not just assume things when I could find out more accurately by just being close to her. I made a vow to myself to be more attentive to myself as well as to her, not to deny my feelings. I had the tendency to sort of gloss over dissatisfaction. I just made a vow to myself to be very open and direct--even if that meant being uncomfortable. The vow had some meaning for her but it seemed to have as much or more meaning for what I owed myself somehow. The reparations certainly had some value in terms of paying someone back, but the other part of that was for me to get over what I'd done. To forgive myself--not forget--and to grow from that.

In certain circumstances, the experience of the participant was that both the self and the other were restored by the reparative action taken. The following quote is an example of a dual focus on the self and on the other.

> I was consciously looking for ways to make atonement. Rather than do things to destroy their marriage--which I could have done--I did things to enhance their marriage. . . . But my motivation was two-fold. Consciously, I wanted to atone for the problems I had caused. Less consciously, I wanted to change myself, to be the person I wanted to be. It's sort of an identification with my own ideal self.

The action of repairing. Three aspects of the reparative process stood out as hallmark characteristics. First, people experienced re-establishing relational boundaries by directly addressing the issue of responsibility for the breach. Most of the time this occurred in the context of a confession--the explicit admission of fault. This action speaks directly to one of the critically important aspects of the experience of breach: locus of responsibility. The communication opens up so the dyad can talk about what went wrong. In general, the person who takes the first step in the reparation assumes a greater part of the responsibility for the breach than he/she did before the apology. The fact that the locus of responsibility for breach shifts allows him or her to feel relief from the experience of breach. This is particularly true for those whose primary experience of breach was of being victimized unjustly by another person.

> When my cousin talked about how she was mean to me, she legitimized the feelings that I had at the time. I knew then that I wasn't making it up. I wasn't out of bounds in my reactions when I felt hurt. It was a pretty accurate perception of the event. I think when someone hurts you and comes back to apologize, they take some responsibility. Then I don't have to be the only person to think about this. There is relief when you don't have to bear all the responsibility alone anymore. It is kind of completing the circle or it made things whole again. There is just something about the image I get that it just makes the other feel more complete about things.

The passage above contrasts sharply with the following (failed) reparation with regard to the experience of the restoration of balance that results from accepting responsibility.

> I felt like I was the one who made the amends inasmuch as it was left to me to decide things. It's not quite making amends. It's me taking responsibility for determining where the relationship is going to go. And if I don't do something, nothing's going to happen. It seems unbalanced.

Many of the narratives involved reparations in which an individual felt he/she took all of the blame for the breaching event, while others involved a reconsideration and re-distribution of the locus of responsibility. The following passage illustrates this point:

> I wrote a letter to him after I had tried to objectively analyze my handling of money. I tried to sort out where the charges were appropriate and where they were not. Where it could fairly be said that I had been financially irresponsible, I apologized. . . . The tricky thing was that I did shoulder some responsibility but made it pretty clear that I didn't want to accept all of it without being clarified.

Secondly, participants describe a changing of perspective that characterizes the effective reparative process. In breach situations, people are emotionally invested in maintaining their view of the breach. Participants felt they lost the capacity to judge history objectively--sometimes to the extent that they were completely blind to the outlook of the other. A primary component of a good faith reparation is the willingness

to consider and/or adopt the other's view of events. Instead of remaining apart because of a rigid hold on their own interpretation of history, participants were willing to take the perspective of the other. The empathy described in the narratives related to the willingness to see and know the extent of the other's experience of injury.

> If you never really talk it through or never really apologize to one another, you're probably just both blaming each other in the back of your mind, thinking of your own hurt. Probably each person is thinking that they're more right. And the person doesn't recognize the other person's perspective unless you talk about it. When you talk to someone about it at least you get it in the open and hear the other person's side. You know what they're thinking, what their perspective is. Some of it might make sense to you if they presented it.
>
> When we finally did talk again, he communicated how hurt he had been. He explained from <u>his</u> perspective that one of the <u>big</u> reasons that he agreed to come for that convention was to have some of the face-to-face interaction that we'd had so little of. I didn't realize how much of a part <u>I</u> had played in him coming down here. I had a better understanding of his hurt and disappointment when he was able to talk about it.

The proof of the sincerity of a person's empathy was often felt if it <u>"cost"</u> him/her to make the apology. When participants experienced the other as attempting to placate them or to put them off, they felt the other was attempting to "get off cheap." This perception of the other's bad faith frequently interrupted the reparation action. Conversely, when participants could see that the

other was making a sacrifice to apologize and to try and understand the extent of their experience of breach, they were satisfied of the genuineness of the reparative offer. The following passages illustrate these contrasting experiences:

> It's just a glimmer for him. If someone you've known twenty years has only acknowledged being wrong eight times and only said he was sorry for minor things, you know it doesn't really affect him fundamentally. It doesn't work. He eased into that and then he goes right out. There's not any really intense desire on his part to make reparation.

> I feel that my efforts at repairing the relationship were met with a brick wall, but that his efforts at repairing the relationship now--although uniquely set--is worthy. It's costing him to do it. He has the emotional <u>intention</u> to go back to this better relationship.

Thirdly, the action of reparation provides the injuror an opportunity to <u>do</u> something to earn relief. Apologies and other reparative gestures were experienced as "taking care of" a wrong done and, thus, worked an <u>expiation</u>. Participants expected such actions to erase their experience of breach. For many participants it was difficult to imagine a reconciliation being possible without action. Several compared this experience to the giving of penance.

> I had a sense that making the call would take care of something for me--regardless of his response.

> What I did seemed to take care of the feeling that I had inside that provoked me to do something. . . . I had tried to be honest and to get to the point where I could resolve in my own mind, "I messed up. I made a mistake. I have done all that I can right

> now to repair it. I'm sorry it happened and this is what I've tried to do." At that point, I felt pretty good about what I'd done. I felt like I'd tried to make amends in that way.
>
> When it goes in the mail, I will feel relieved. I don't think my feelings about myself are going to change because the fact that I'm planning it tells me that I have already made the needed change. My feelings about the situation <u>itself</u> will change once it's done. "It's done, it's over, I've dealt with it." When I actually do it, I'll remember it, but it will no longer be a source of stress or discomfort or urging. Something that needs to be completed, When I do remember it, it will be a thing of the past.

In some protocols, the participant perceived an implicit correspondence between an injury and the action that repaired it. To repair both the self and the other, people recognized they had to measure their action according to the experienced severity of the offense.

> If I make a mistake and apologize for it directly . . . . there is a sense of relief that everything has been put into its place. "I did something wrong, and I admitted it and accepted the blame. I did the action that was called for to address it." . . . If I feel really embarrassed or guilty, or if I feel that an apology is what is absolutely necessary but perhaps not quite good enough to satisfy me or enough to genuinely appease the other person, then I'll do the face-to-face apology and I will somehow <u>add</u> something to my behavior with respect to the other person. . . . The link is clear when you apologize explicitly and then add something implicitly. It's like there is a one-to-one correspondence between an offense and the reparation that fixes it.

One participant anchored this point both around her experience in doing penance in a religious context and in her understanding of penalties imposed by a judge. Her analogy is apt, and the following excerpt illuminates the

concept that a good faith apology goes beyond merely wanting to escape from the guilt associated with the breach.

> I think priests should take the time to assign a penance that is related to the sin to help. A lot of judges now are saying if you're caught driving drunk, you have to help with rescue squads and help pick up the pieces from accidents. That's an appropriate penance. You hurt, but it's a healing kind of a hurt. It's an alert that if you continue, then something destructive is going to happen. It's not so much a penance as it is, "I don't want to forget that at one point I've been involved in hurting someone and that I have potential to hurt someone.

The mutuality of repairing. Coming to terms with the breach in a reparative mode requires the participation of the other. The situations in which participants experienced a satisfying bridging of the rift were described as reciprocal encounters. Once an initial invitation was made, the distinctions between injured and injuror faded as the two people took advantage of the opportunity to look together to discover the means by which to restore the relationship. The willing offer of mutual forgiveness was experienced as flowing from the meeting of two people resolved to release their experiences of breach. Reparation was experienced as a "we" and not an "I" event.

> . . . it goes two ways. I'm forgiven and he's forgiven me for screwing up.

> We found a better way to live. I guess it's a form of reparation. Understanding that the way we were

> heading was destructive and unhappy and not fulfilling for with one of us. We saw how we had each been self-destructive. Reparations were really made most meaningfully to ourselves. As that worked out, it spilled over into each other. The reparations that we really made may in a a real, positive, direct way benefit somebody else. In this situation, we paid each other back by making an effort to better understand ourselves. We made amends that way.

Reparations that fail. Participants described several breach situations that were resolved with actions other than apologies. Good faith efforts to explain and clarify the circumstances or intentions were experience as belonging to the reparative mode of coming to terms with breach:

> Reparations in this case is not strictly speaking only apology. It is also education or explanation or clarification or historiography. We are analyzing and repairing a situation that has existed for a decade in order to make it clear and to and to move ahead with a clearer understanding of our relationship.
>
> If I think somebody has misunderstood me or if I think I've misunderstood somebody else, I try to clarify misunderstandings. Maybe somebody had a funny look on their face and I didn't think about it until later. I try to straighten that out.

An example of an explanation that brought about a reparation is presented below:

> This is a case in which someone felt that they had offended me and I never even noticed it. . . . I had asked him if I could get a discount at the store he worked at, and he had said it wasn't possible. . . . Several days later he came to me and said, "I really want to apologize. Several people had tried to pump me for discounted goods that day and I was getting tired of it. The fact is I can't." So he explained. . . . I tried to make it disappear for him because I hadn't been hurt and there was no need

> for him to bother. . . . The important part was that he tried to make reparation for an offense he felt he had committed.

Participants drew distinctions, however, between sincere clarifications and reparative attempts that were experienced as insensitive and off-putting. While some explanations were judged to be trustworthy efforts to settle a dispute, many were experienced as self-justifying actions that failed to address the grievance of the injured. These explanatory maneuvers did not work because they did not convince the injured that <u>their</u> perspective was understood and important to the other. Their experience of breach could not be released unless that occurred.

> She kept me up until five in the morning talking, a lot of it about those years. I think she wanted to explain her behavior. I think she was so into the telling that she was not paying much attention to its effect on me. I do not recall that she even asked questions. She was really into the telling and the explaining.

In the process of describing a failed reparative attempt, one participant stumbled upon the reason why his explanation did not work in bringing about the resolution he desired. Though he had sincerely wanted to repair the relationship, he reasoned that the excuse he offered was not what his friend had wanted to hear.

> Probably what's going on at that point is that I'm not attending to the need behind the complaint. . . . (M)y apology could have been experienced as a brush off. . . . If all I talk about is how my active style on Sundays contributed

> to my oversight of her, I don't address the real issue and I'm not going to get off the hook. She really doesn't want to understand the circumstances or to hear my assurance that I'm going to do better about saying hello in the future. What she probably really wants to know is that on a much more basic level I affirm her, I care for her, I'm connected to her.

Gestures experienced as perfunctory, hollow, and impersonal were also poorly received. In two cases presented below, a reparative attempt failed because the participants did not discern the other assuming responsibility for breach, adopting their perspective and/or being personally concerned for their welfare.

> I guess he apologized for not telling me or lying in the first place about breaking up with his girlfriend. But it seemed to me that it was still very perfunctory. "I'm doing this because I know I have to and it's going to make me feel better, not because I really want to."

> In the past, my wife has forced him to come to me and apologize. That comes grudgingly and it doesn't sit right. There's no sincerity. I think the key underlying drive or force is sincerity--to any reparation. If it's not a sincere giving, then it's not valid. What needs to happen is for him to realize when he's done that himself.

Presenting material <u>gifts</u> to the injured without sincerely apologizing was adding insult to injury, and often created a more difficult situation.

> Offering me a gift wasn't effective at bridging the distance somehow. I wouldn't even accept what he was offering and I wouldn't even accept the method. I wouldn't even allow the process to take place. He needed to deal with me as a human being by saying, "I'm sorry I hurt you. I shouldn't have done this. I want to make amends with you, person-to-person." Rather than giving me a gift to make it okay. He didn't even own up to what he had done.

> My father had a unique way of saying I'm sorry: he would go buy something. I watched what he did with my mother. He did it every time he did something overtly wrong in relation to her, and it was usually something substantial. He would take his liberties, drinking a lot and womanizing a little. One time when he got caught, the apology for it was a set of silver. That more or less got him back in the house. Another time my mother got a big diamond. . . . No words at all. It's a lot cheaper and a lot easier ultimately to say you're sorry. And it means a lot more because it's personal.

Another aspect of some failed reparative efforts was the perception that the gesture was manipulative and consciously strategic:

> A lot of times I made amends just to save face. I knew I had committed a social faux pas, and I wanted to do something to repair my reputation, to smooth it out socially. I wasn't really sorry for what I did and that wasn't a legitimate reason for making amends. I was sorry only that I got caught. It was just strategic.
>
> I guess I really want to always keep him on my good side because I'm always wanting little things done. Part of it is out of a sense of guilt and part is practical. It's a trade off.

A final disqualifying feature was the repetitive nature of the affront necessitating apology. Participants were not inclined to accept an apology from someone who had hurt them before in the same way. This is another dimension of the experience of sincerity.

> If a person were to offend me with the same behavior again and again, then I grow not to trust them. The I feel that it's done consciously. . . . "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." The bond of trust falls apart and an apology would fall on deaf ears. It would be hollow, without validity, not spoken in truth. I guess it would be like if I were to go out and cheat on my wife and

she caught me, and I said, "I'm sorry," and she said, "Okay," and them I did it again. I hardly think that she would accept a second apology. It would definitely hinder the relationship.

The experience of reparation. Reparation was a process experienced by participants as restoring a lost sense of wholeness. Each of these people described relationships which were experienced as broken in some respect. They felt interrupted by the breach such that their experience of themselves, the other and their world was changed. They experienced the loss of a sense of closeness, of communion, of trust--all of which may have been taken for granted at an earlier time. They were now aware of a sense of distance, barrier and alienation. They felt compelled to relive painful events, carrying uncomfortable feelings of guilt, anger, betrayal, hurt and disappointment. They lost the vital, engaged, present-focused experience of the other.

As a mode of coming to terms with these experiences, the experience of reparation was described as an effort which directly addresses and changes the sense of distance and loss. Participants who described the repairing mode wanted to fix what felt broken--and they were able to imagine a way to accomplish the restoration; not only did they experience the hope for reconciliation, they experienced its possibility. The actions they took

were sensibly related both to their experience of breach and to expectancies of the future.

In contrast to the closed, protective posture of retaining and the aggressive, attacking posture of retaliating, the posture of reparation was described as open, vulnerable humble and receptive. Reparation was risk. When met by another person who appreciated their initiation, participants were aware of a relaxation in the tight grasp on their perspective of the breach event; they felt understood and were willing to consider the other's experience as distinct from their own.

Repairing gestures initiated by those perceived as injurors helped both parties to sense relief from the oppressive experience of breach. Instead of seeing a barrier between them, people were able to re-establish open communication which allowed them to look <u>together</u> for a solution. A sense of balance returned to the relationship when responsibility for the breach was addressed, and relational boundaries were either reaffirmed or re-defined. Participants thus experienced closure of the open breach. The experience of repairing is reclaiming the other while setting aside the experience of breach.

If these descriptions revealed nothing else, they demonstrated that reparation is an important process in every kind of interpersonal relationship. The

negotiation of forgiveness and reconciliation was vital to participants who experienced breach as devastating. The following description conveys the power of the reparative moment as experienced by one participant:

> This time I was able to walk in and say hello, and he looked at me in a very calculated way and then we began to talk. This was a moment of truth and he decided on the relationship--between my hello and his response. It's eerie. It was really an outstanding moment in my life. It was like waiting for the baby's first cry. It was a moment when you catch your breath. When he began to talk to me, it almost brought tears to my eyes. Relief that I was able to reach him. I just knew what was happening. He was counting and discounting what he wanted. He could've chosen to ignore me or to be violent to to push me away. But he chose to repair the relationship in that moment. To be with me again, to be part of my life. It was a real sense of dramatic moment. It was one of those rare moments we have in life where we know something is happening and we don't know what the mystery is.

Perceived Interpersonal Aspects of Coming to Terms With the Experience of Breach

Analysis of the present interviews revealed that participant experiences of encountering the other were quite complex. They could not be described by making reference only to the three modes of coming to terms. Experiences discussed in the interviews were centered in the world of others; they were almost invariably interpersonal. The descriptions of participant's thoughts, feelings and actions were always cast against the perceived presence and involvement of other people. One perspective of the experience of breach was obtained

in interview dialogues; this perspective always includes the perception of the other.

Symmetry in the modes of coming to terms with breach was not always present in the narratives. The way in which one person tried to resolve the experience of breach did not necessarily match the intentions of the other. For example, some participants who attempted to repair described situations in which they experienced the other stubbornly holding on to a different experience of breach. The perception of another person's actions and motives complicated participants' experiences of coming to terms with breach. This general point can be illustrated with the following excerpt:

> The person who is hearing an apology is put in a role of power. The person approaching you has made themselves vulnerable and you can do any of a variety of things. You can slash and hurt them. "Fuck you. What you did was really mean and I can't see you as a person I like." Or you can discuss it and work it out. Maybe it will hurt some more and maybe it will be repaired and maybe not. That depends on how it is negotiated and if you want it repaired. A person can say, "I accept," or--if you weren't really offended--brush it aside and make the person feel that there was no harm taken.

The intention of the <u>other</u> must also be considered in describing how people came to terms with breach since it was never experienced as a solitary event. Three modes of coming to terms were experienced as directed <u>toward</u> someone who, in turn, was coming to terms in some way themselves. Even when the other was not physically

present because of separation or death, participants spoke in transactional terms; that is, they imagined what the other would do. The experience of coming to terms with breach is best described according to the participant's perception of what both parties did or would do.

Over time people change their relationship to breach and, hence, their mode of resolving it. Maturity, intervening events, and reflection on the situation of breach that occur with the passage of time all affect the way a breach is experienced and dealt with. The quality of an interpersonal exchange can be dramatically transformed in a moment. Moreover, a change in one person's way of dealing with breach frequently allows change for the other--for better or worse.

The emergent structure of coming to terms with breach thus demanded consideration of both the interpersonal and temporal aspects of the experience. Since participants' perspectives in the various narratives was cast in terms of an injured and an injuror, a structural representation was developed to incorporate both views of breach and resolution. The three-by-three matrix shown in Figure 2 represents one way in which to describe these possibilities of




Figure 2. Structural Dynamics of Coming to Terms With the Experience of Breach.

experiencing the interpersonal complexity of coming to terms with breach.

The top row of the figure refers to the perspective of the injured, who can adopt a retaliating, retaining or repairing mode vis a vis the injuror. The left side refers to the injuror's perspective of coming to terms. The nine "cells" of the matrix correspond to distinct interpersonal situations in which the participant's mode of coming to terms was met with that of the other. Different narratives described experiences of all nine situations.

The numbers 1 through 9 will be used in the following pages to help keep track of the various situations. The three situations corresponding to symmetrical experiences of retaliating, retaining and repairing (situations 1, 3 and 9) are characterized as War, Stalemate and Dialogue, respectively. The experience of these situations was sufficiently uniform to warrant a common descriptive label. The other six situations lack this uniformity and are left unlabeled.

Retaliation as provocation: situations 1, 2 and 4. The hallmark characteristic of a retaliatory mode of coming to terms with breach was the experience of altering relational boundaries by moving against the other person. Retaliatory actions were immediately

experienced as a provocation to reciprocate in a war. As a consequence of this provocation, the relationship was almost always experienced as modified in some way.

The triad of situations 1, 2 and 4 frequently occurred together in narratives which described retaliatory modes of coming to terms with breach. Each of these situations will be described separately below; it is important to note that they share some similar properties. These exchanges were perhaps the most unstable situations since they tended to be experienced as blending into one other. Typically, exchanges experienced as unfolding in situations 1, 2 and 4 were seen as distinct moments--in action or fantasy--within the same heated, angry exchange. Although these transactions could be replayed repetitively without resolution or diminution in vigor, retaliatory situations tended to be brief because they were experienced as intense and distancing. Hostility was experienced as occurring in bursts rather than in sustained interactions.

Situation 1: War. Situation 1 exchanges were described as symmetrical as both parties were seen as actively engaged in an attempt to provoke change--albeit in an impulsive and hostile manner. When both people wanted to come to terms with the breach by retaliating, their actions escalated tensions and were

experienced as solidifying boundaries between them, if only for that moment. Both parties focused on the other, aiming to get even or to make the other pay for their experience of breach. This was a situation in which angry provocative action and counter-action was experienced.

It was often difficult for the participant to discriminate between the injured and injuror in this situation because both people frequently experienced themselves as victim. Each person felt entitled to exact some revenge at the expense of the other. Several examples of cell 1 encounters are presented below.

> This morning I wished my daughter good luck in some things I knew she was doing. She put me off a bit and I got mad. That is unusual for me, but it hurt my feelings. We exchanged more words and she got mad because I was mad.

> The other day my son became angry with my wife because he felt he deserved a car. He threatened to move out. His mother responded by cutting up his driver's license which cut his feet out from under him.

Some retaliatory actions were described as a mix of impulsive anger and provocation for positive change in the relationship. When the focal experience described was frustration with status quo, a retaliatory mode could express hope that forcing some movement might lead to a more tolerable situation--possibly reconciliation. The passage that follows is a good illustration of this

situation:

> The letter also said some things that really were upsetting which may not have been true. I wanted to get back at him. I knew it would upset and hurt him. That's why I wrote it. I was intending to upset him. It was like withdrawing my support from him. "You're acting like a jerk. Grow up. Because you're acting this way I'm not going to be your friend anymore." He wasn't responding to me at all, so I wrote this letter just to see if it would get a rise out of him. Maybe we could go from there. And he didn't respond to that well at all. The night he got the letter, he came over very angry and said, "I don't think that we even need to see each other any more--in anything that we do!"

Situation 2. A different interpersonal situation described in the interviews involved a person holding on to a sense of grievance while experiencing the other person directing even more hostility toward him/her. Whereas the injured person desired to maintain distance in a protective position, the injuror further agitated the situation toward change. This situation was most often described from the perspective of the injured.

When parties were equal with respect to power, this situation moved into "War," and an argument ensued. If, however, the injured was weaker than or dependent upon the injuror, he/she experienced a terrific bind. Not being in a position where it made sense to engage the injuror in a verbal or physical battle, the individual felt trapped in an abusive situation. This kind of encounter was the most difficult for participants to describe during the interviews, and narratives were told

with tremendous emotion. Not only were these individuals victimized by the original breach; they also were hurt by the persistence of hostility from the other, even when they were attempting to avoid further damage. These individuals felt stuck, and themes of bewilderment, passivity and impotence recurred in their statements.

The participant who chose to spend the entire interview focusing on one breach situation described his experience primarily in this way. He had gone to work for an independent business on the basis of an informal, gentleman's agreement. After years of hard work to make the business prosper, this individual recognized that the owner had defrauded him such that he was not sharing in the profits of the business as promised. Without a legal contract, he had little chance of forcing the owner to pay him his due. This situation was painful enough; he also sensed that the man <u>enjoyed</u> seeing him suffer about his impotent circumstances.

Although the owner did not ignite the situation with overt expressions of hostility, he was experienced by the participant as expressing smug contempt and/or calculated malevolence. This was a powerful experience. In the excerpt below, he describes his humiliation of feeling stuck:

> It wasn't just me that he hurt. Over the years I've seen him do it too many times to too many different people. A friend of his once warned me, "The time

> is going to come when he's going to cut you off like you don't exist. He's never going to look back." That's just him. It is definitely not his pattern to acknowledge when he hurts people. He's the type of person that will put you in a position to where you either have to go full, face-to-face war with him or else back off. When you back off without getting what you should have had to begin with, he thinks it's your fault. He gets what he wants out of it, but it's your fault he got it.

A different example of such an encounter was described by a woman who was sexually abused in a brutal fashion over a period of years by her alcoholic father. Each "violent rape" to which she was subjected added measure to her unspeakable sense of breach. Because of her size, age and dependent status, she experienced herself as incapable of fighting on equal terms. She felt helpless. Her only defense to his continued attacks was to retain her sense of pain in as protective position as was possible.

Situation 4. Some individuals experienced their circumstances as allowing them to seek revenge. Another relational possibility in the narratives was for the person perceived as the injuror to respond to vengeful actions by turning away from an escalation of conflict. Participants frequently described these situations from the perspective of the injuror. Basically, the perception of the roles in this situation is opposite to the one described above: it was the

injured who experienced the need to change the status quo preserved by the injuror.

Participants experienced these situations as agonizing and sad because they were forced into a stance of withstanding the attack by the other--an attack which they had no interest in returning. In many of these situations, the participant did not wish to escalate tensions because he/she did not intend harm in the first place. When confronted by the injured, these individuals felt they had no option but to wait for the other to stop their attack. Coming to terms with this situation was experienced as a resignation that nothing could be done. Moving either to reciprocate or repair made no sense.

One participant spoke of her father's anger and retaliatory reaction after she joined the Catholic church. He clearly felt breached by her action, and proceeded to attack her. She felt confused about the attack, and her father's stance toward her seemed to preclude any possibility of a reparation. She managed this experience of breach by increasing her distance from him, waiting for him to change his reaction to the breach.

> My dad is anti-Catholic, and he just got whipped up into a fury one day and phoned to scream and tell me that I was going to Hell in a handbasket. . . . I said, "Get angry with me for robbing a bank or beating an old woman, but not for joining a church . . . ." I just thought that I didn't need to deal with all that, and I quit. My grandmother

> constantly egged me on to speak to him, saying, "You just can't not talk to your father." I replied, "Well, he just can't not talk to me." . . . Maybe I felt that the apology was due from him, and if he would make it, we could get on with the relationship. . . . I was probably waiting for him to make the first step because I didn't think I had done anything wrong, and you don't know how to apologize in that situation.

A man who inadvertently offended a friend offered the following story. He stated that he would have preferred to apologize to the woman when she confronted him, but his experience of her unwillingness to release the experience of breach prevented him from doing so. He experienced her dogged retaliatory stance as only allowing him to adopt a defensive posture:

> I remember one instance in particular when a young woman dropped by my office and said, "I'm mad at you. You hurt me." It turns out that I hadn't acknowledged her presence one Sunday morning. I tend to be a scurrier and apparently I had greeted someone who was next to her and didn't greet her. And that was hurtful to her. When she came and told me that, I got defensive. I guess I felt that her motivation was just to tell me I had done wrong and to rub my nose in it rather than to build the relationship. I know from my perspective when people come to me trying to help me learn how I can care for them better, it provokes a different response.

Participants who felt injured fantasized about retaliation. The businessman whose story was told in the previous section felt stuck although he imagined turning the tables on his boss.

> I asked him two or three times through the years for the increase he promised me. After the second or third time, I decided that I wasn't going to again. I don't have a bad temper, but I was feeling so

> emotional about it that we probably could have had some problems. He's a good deal smaller than I am, and I'm a black belt. I'm getting emotional about it right now. Even when I sat there and talked to him about it, my voice was quivering and I had tears in my eyes. I might have lashed out. "Damn it! I didn't work all these years to get shit on."

Preludes to war. When the experience of breach is patterned in such a way as to make retaliation the emergent response, the other is engaged in hostile, angry confrontations. The person most dissatisfied with the relational status quo generally initiates the fight. In some situations, the other person can choose to move away into a safer, more protected mode of retaining breach. Despite this, they experience the other as challenging them to war. In all of the narratives, every War situation was preceded by an experience of combative provocation. Situations 2 and 4 were experienced as preludes to war. The statement of one participant provided an apt analogy to this triad of situations:

> One night I was sitting talking to a couple about conflict resolution when I had a moment of blinding insight. We tend to take up camp on either side of an issue and shoot verbal barbs back and forth at one another. Like in the "B" movies, where the guys duck behind the rock and then stick out and fire the shot and duck back behind the rock. The other person becomes the problem.

To illustrate this process, consider the following narrative passage. Surprised and provoked by hostility, the participant reciprocates with a symmetrical retaliation which, in turn, led to a fight.

> When my friend arrived, we went out to have a drink and ostensibly to chat. What actually ensued though was my explaining to him that I didn't care to pursue the relationship any longer because it would only get in the way of my relationship with my husband and that I really didn't want to talk to him anymore. . . . It was a very distancing thing that said, "This is the way it's going to be. There's no hope, so it's over." . . . I think I expected a very understanding response from my friend's perspective. It hadn't occurred to me that it would disappoint or hurt him because I was looking at it very rationally. . . . I was surprised by his very hostile and very ugly response. . . . It wasn't so much verbal as it was a look of almost utter hatred. Just a <u>real</u> anger in his eyes that I'd not seen before, and I guess I didn't even know he was capable of it. I was angry at his response, and then the two angers played against each other.

<u>Situation 5: stalemate</u>. The descriptive label for situation 5 was chosen because it connotes the experience of impasse. Status quo is preserved in these situations because both parties do not want to, or are unable to, move toward either reconciliation or retaliation. The basic structure of these situations involves an injuror who holds on to the experience of guilt and an injured party who holds on to a sense of grievance. The experience of breach was active to a greater or lesser degree for both parties even though both individuals focused on--or were resigned to--maintaining the status quo. People described this situation as an extremely frustrating experience of <u>waiting</u> for the other to change. The symmetrical acceptance of holding on to the breach did not allow for resolution.

A number of participants felt that, as the injured

party, reparative gestures were not theirs to make. Though willing to forgive if asked, they were unwilling to initiate the process. They experienced a single option for coming to terms: waiting for an apology.

> I think the reparation needs to go from his part to me. That may be it: when I talk about reparation from him, I can't imagine him asking forgiveness from me for anything.
>
> I sure wish I could fix it. I don't know what it would take for me to forgive and forget and get over it. It probably is his move to make, but I hate the way that sounds.
>
> I really feel like that there's no good way for that to be amended, unless he came to me and said, "I know I was a jerk." But a fourteen year old is not going to do that . . . . Part of the helplessness that I felt was that I had no expectation that he would ever apologize.
>
> I was not going to be the one to bring it up to him since I hadn't done any harm at the time or afterwards.

The protective, insulated position of retaining a breach is experienced as encouraging the other to assume a similar posture. The breach is not addressed directly or productively; instead, each individual withdraws to focus on his/her own experience of breach.

> I think we have a real tendency to see clearly what another person has done to create difficulty for us, and we think, "If only they'd get their act together and change." However, pointing fingers and saying, "If you'll just get your act together, we won't have a problem." generally evokes a response of defensiveness and mistrust. You can end up pointing fingers at each other.
>
> Stalemate situations were experienced as quite

stable. Decades passed in some narratives with characters separated by such an impasse. Every other situation was experienced as requiring more energy to sustain than was true of a Stalemate. If the experience of breach continued to be urgent and if characters were not doing anything about it, they were automatically responding by "retaining" the breach.

After intense retaliatory exchanges were completed, individuals found protection and a respite in the situation of Stalemate. Moreover, when reparative attempts failed for one reason or another, both parties felt obliged to wait for new developments.

> After that we sat down one night and talked about some of the things that had gone on and how we had felt and why we had perceived things the way we had and why we had or hadn't said things we should have. But there was still a lot of hurt and anger there and we knew that if we pursued it much more, we would just get hurt and angry again. So we kind of parted company on speaking terms, but we never really resolved anything. The he left school. I guess I was <u>still</u> harboring a lot of ill feelings.

Stalemate stories told from the perspective of the injured often focused on the <u>injustice</u> of the breach and the discomfort they experienced in waiting for the other to apologize. The passage below represents these exchanges.

> I don't know what happened, because he doesn't communicate at all. He bottles up everything inside. He's one of these people who refuses to have problems--very logical, analytical, practical and intelligent. He had everything worked out in his head, but he didn't tell me anything about

> that. . . . So I just sat there. I said, "You're going to defend yourself and throw all this stuff at me and you don't even care what I think, so I'm not going to bother at all with this." So for a week or two we pulled apart and he just let me work it through. I felt like he had severed our relationship. I was the one who was hurt and offended by what had happened, and he knew that I was going to be upset. I had reacted to that by pulling away and saying, "Fine, then you can just survive on your own, buddy."

On the other hand, Stalemate stories told from the perspective of the injuror often focused on the experience of guilt and urgency for which they could not find relief. If they were unable to sense or imagine a pardon from the other, they were stuck in a frustrating sense of incompletion.

> I was angry at God for a lot of things going on in my life. I felt betrayed and abandoned. I cursed him and I stomped on the crucifix and I told him I wished him in hell. . . . I myself felt damned--totally unforgivable. The only way I could imagine getting forgiveness was to be perfect from then on. I just couldn't do it. There was no way that I could even be good.

Issues of trust were experienced as crucial to reconciliation. When participants had little confidence that their reparative efforts would be met kindly or at face value, they felt compelled to keep their feelings to themselves. Anticipating rejection or further injury, they opted to maintain a retentive mode.

> The number of times that he gets real and genuine are so limited. The kinds of things I'd want him to say he's just not ever going to say. How he would hear me is in his own terms and our terms are so different. . . . If I tried to repair with him, I couldn't trust him to even come close to

> understanding me or what my intent was. I would feel very vulnerable. I just don't trust him.
>
> I've had to say, "Let's bury the hatchet," in lots of different instances, and while it's never easy, it's especially difficult in this instance. I don't think that I could go into his office tomorrow and sit down and say, "We need to square this. It has been bothering me for several years. I feel bad about it. I hope you feel bad about it." I think he would smirk and take that as the biggest sign of weakness that he has seen in a long time. In which case, "Now what am I going to do? Am I going to fight him here or am I going to break down and cry?" I am a very emotional person, and I might just do it. That would be hard to swallow. Damn, this hurts. If I felt like he had some compassion and would be feeling the same way, it would not be near as bad.

A final example of a Stalemate described the reluctance a person felt in initiating a reparation when the history of the relationship suggests the other is slow to repair. One participant spoke of withholding his apology because he had not yet received an apology for an earlier breach.

> I think that there are other factors that will modulate whether you actually do apologize even when you can recognize a need to apologize. There has to be a motivation and a desire to clear away what is blocking the relationship. For instance, I may feel the responsibility but refuse to make the effort to apologize because I don't like the person. Where you can admit responsibility but wouldn't act on it. You may just be lazy or you may want to leave it there so it balances the original offense, as in an eye-for-an-eye philosophy. . . . I may think you don't deserve it. My decision to apologize could be influenced by your failure in the past to either stop hurting me or to apologize to me. So I feel, "Looking at the larger history, now we are really in balance because you are hurting, too."

Asymmetrical reparations: situations 3, 6, 7 and 8. The situations described so far have not concerned the process of reparation, per se. They are helpful, however, in providing a frame of reference for those experiences involving reparations. The asymmetrical reparation encounters were among the most complex and painful for participants: they all involved situations in which one individual moved toward the other with reparative intent but felt rebuffed in this attempt. Participants described situations in which they put themselves at some risk only to be cast down or ignored.

When a relationship was torn by conflict in this way, its resolution was unpredictable. These situations were experienced as failed reparative attempts, with the most frequent resolution that of Stalemate. It was possible for one person to experience letting go of a breach despite the other's refusal to participate; this was the exception rather than the rule. This type of release typically occurred at the prompting of values and religious beliefs.

Situation 3. The Biblical injunction "turn the other cheek" enjoins the believer to forgive in all circumstances, even if the enemy continues to antagonize and injure. One of the relational possibilities introduced in the narratives was a situation in which a person offers reparative gestures to the person who had

hurt him/her once--only to be hurt again. The injured offers an invitation to dialogue and forgiveness while the injuror adds injury to injury.

Only one narrative fit this pattern. A woman spoke about her experience as a child living with her abusive, alcoholic father. He was described as a capricious man who frequently flew into frightening rages. She was made to feel responsible for actions which incited him, but she was never sure what in particular her offenses were.

> There's a whole <u>series</u> of instances in that particular relationship where there was a lot of verbal abuse for no immediate cause. Just really out of the blue. I never knew where it was going to come from next or for what particular because it didn't take anything to trigger it. . . . Knowing that it could come from anywhere and so you're just kind of waiting.

She experienced breach and felt a great deal of responsibility and urgency to do something about his anger; as a child she was without the benefit of knowing <u>what</u> she was responsible for or what she could do. The metaphor she offered for her childhood experience was "walking on eggshells." She developed a style of <u>perpetual apology</u> as a way to keep the peace. In this way, she continued to meet her father's hostility with reparative intent. Though she felt that it was <u>he</u> who needed to apologize, she asked him for forgiveness in this situation.

(I)t wasn't in his nature or in the nature of the

> relationship for him to apologize to me. The nature of the relationship was that I continually apologized for anything that I thought might even vaguely have been wrong in order to get his approval. . . . I'm very good at apologizing. I'm not good at not apologizing. . . . It's a need to keep peace at any price. I'm the ultimate conciliator.

The price for relating to her father in this style was a dishonesty to which she never got accustomed. She felt that she traded her integrity for the momentary relief of tension. When her father died, she lost the opportunity to have a more honest dialogue regarding their relationship. She reflected on her experience in this way:

> You sacrifice what you know to be true in order to achieve peace. You have to weigh how important harmony is against integrity maybe. You make sacrifices on that continuum at any rate.

There was, then, a sense in the narrative that her memory of these unbalanced transactions did not allow for a resolution completely relieving her of her sense of breach. She felt resigned to a mode of coming to terms with the breach that left her with painful feelings of injustice and frustration. If she had experienced her father as able to respond with even a glimmer of reparative intent, she might have been able to at least imagine a more balanced encounter.

Situation 6. All situation 6 narratives were told from the perspective of the injured. Participants spoke of failed reparative efforts in which they

experienced the other as unable or unwilling to respond by acknowledging of their role in the breach. Because their perceptions and experience of the breach did not match, the resulting situation did not allow a consensual resolution. Participants experienced the relational status quo changing in this situation only if they felt the injured was willing to release the breach and forgive unconditionally. If that was not possible for them, the relationship remained unchanged.

Again, one moving story will be presented in some detail to characterize the interpersonal dynamics of this situation. The participant who was sexually abused by her father spoke of a deep anger at her mother for failing to protect her. Over a number of years, she held her mother responsible and could not forgive her. As an adult, she consulted with a clergyman about her anger toward her parents for their "destructive" actions. She recognized that her value system demanded that to be forgiven herself, she would have to be willing to forgive those people who had offended her--including her mother.

> But I didn't feel I could go ask for God's forgiveness for <u>my</u> misbehavior when I was still angry at my mother for <u>her</u> misbehavior. Remember the line in the Lord's prayer--forgive me as I forgive others?

The clergyman asked the participant to write a list of grievances she held against her mother so they could

work through them together. After working on the list for some time, the woman decided she would write a more positive list of aspects of the relationship with her mother. She found this activity helped release her sense of breach. She forgave her mother without any evidence of reciprocal openness in the reconciliation process.

> I realized that my relationship with my mother had changed. I found a way of getting along with her. My mother and I have not had a bad quarrel in years. She thought that we were getting along better because of something she had done, but it was really me really trying to appreciate her qualities and being able to see the good.

This participant's actions led to a changed experience of the relationship and to a feeling of relief. She still did retain a memory of the breach and its unbalanced resolution; the mother's failure to receive and match the woman's repairing motives left her with a remnant of the original grievance. Eventually, the mother was able to disclose information that allowed them to move together into a more balanced mode of coming to terms. The important aspect of this participant's experience was, however, that she forgave her mother before the relationship was reciprocal. Her decision to forgive had much more to do with her values than with any quality her mother possessed or relational condition she made possible.

> If there is a standard pattern to forgiveness, the process with my parents probably didn't follow a standard sequence of apologizing and someone

> accepting an apology with good feelings resulting. It's Biblical, though. Scripture says to love your enemy. It doesn't say to wait until they apologize. Healing comes around when you love them anyway. . . . It always starts off with you forgiving the other, and healing will happen whether you see the results of it or not.

Situation 7. The next asymmetrical reparative exchange to be considered is one in which the injuror experiences a retaliatory rejection to his/her efforts to repair. This situation is experienced as a transaction of revenge. Instead of being able to accept the reparation, participants described an unwillingness to relinquish their anger and they proceeded to get even with expressions of bitterness. In this situation, the "injured" person feels compelled to block a restoration of the relationship.

Descriptive information about this situation was given both from the perspective of the injured and the injuror; participants only told such narratives in which they were injurors. These stories focused on feelings of impotence and pained helplessness because the participant's best efforts were thrown back in their faces without appreciation.

> I let the relationship lie for several years and finally sent him a Christmas card with a letter in it, thinking, "This is a time of year when maybe he'll open his mail and be a little softer." And he shot back another really terrible letter, and none of us in our family could ever figure out what happened. There was no logic in it. The letters were accusatory of not being nice to my parents, of being unkind toward him and his family. It was as

> if we had done something really evil and vile to him, but it was never explicated. The whole relationship just went on hold. I made no further attempts to contact him.

This class of situations often started--and ended--in a Stalemate. It was possible, though, for the injured to feel as if he/she had done all that was needed to take care of the breach. Some people were able to move to a new mode of coming to terms with breach that allowed them to disengage from the other. They experienced a release of the relationship as well as of the sense of breach. Thus, the only resolution of breach in this situation was one-way. Even if the injuror was able to release the sense of breach, he/she might remember the injured still held the grudge.

Other participants spoke of <u>anticipating</u> a retaliatory response to an apology they were considering making. In an earlier section, a situation was described in which a woman planned to send a postcard to a friend whom she had offended. When this participant imagined what his response might be, she feared retaliation.

> I really had no idea how he would receive it. . . . If he was still very angry at me, he would just throw it up. He'd rip that up and maybe I would anticipate that he would write something <u>nasty</u> in return.

A woman who broke her engagement to a man carried guilt for this action over a period of fifteen years. Though they had no contact over that time, she felt sure

that he was still hurt by her decision and, consequently, very angry with her. Because he did not marry for twelve years after their break-up, she also felt sure that she had damaged him in ways that were irreparable. When she discovered that her business was going to take her to the city in which her ex-fiance lived, she pondered contacting him to apologize and to explain her perspective on their relationship. She could only imagine that he would still be furious with her and that he would take that opportunity to retaliate.

> I felt like that I needed to talk to him no matter how it was going to hurt me. I thought he was going to drag me back to some of those feelings again about what a rat I was, but I needed to make that connection. . . . When I imagined our meeting, I thought I would have to work hard at patching things up and that it might be impossible. He held grudges, and when he was angry at somebody, he got them back. That's scary. I thought that he had a right to be angry and that he still would be. I thought he would say that I was a horrible person, that I had really done him wrong, that he didn't want to talk to me, and that I didn't have any idea how much grief I had caused him.

In both of these cases, fantasy was important in helping the individual prepare for a potential outcome of an actual encounter--as in rehearsing worst case scenarios. Imagining the possibility of a retaliatory response, however, did not keep these individuals from offering a reparative gesture to those whom they felt they had injured.

Comments from the perspective of the injured

accentuated the power a person has in the situation of hearing an apology. , An earlier excerpt introduced this point clearly and a portion is repeated here:

> The person who is hearing an apology is put in a role of power. The person approaching you has made themselves vulnerable and you can do any of a variety of things. You can slash and hurt them.

Most participants experienced some discomfort in owning the hostility of a retaliatory reaction. The dearth of situation 7 stories told from the perspective of the injured suggests that it was especially difficult to discuss the experience of acting in a vengeful fashion in the context of the vulnerability of the other. Participants experienced less discomfort when speaking about being the <u>victim</u> of retaliation than when they admitted to retaliatory actions. The participant quoted above seemed honest when he added:

> I think the fact that I can identify those alternatives means that I can do any of those things.

<u>Situation 8</u>. The final asymmetrical reparation exchange concerned situations in which the experience of breach held by the injured person was unchanged by a repairing gesture offered by the injuror. By holding on to the experience of breach, the reparative transaction was blocked. Despite the injuror's efforts to establish dialogue, the other person made it clear that he/she was unwilling to relinquish their anger. Again, the conflict

in what both wanted to happen prevented a reciprocal effort. The breach was left unresolved.

When participants who experienced being injured by a breach told their stories, they focused on an apology they had deemed to be inadequate or in bad faith--or else tied to terms felt to be unacceptable. Although these individuals often were willing to reconcile, the apologies they heard did not address the experience of breach in an empathic way. The words and actions of the injuror did not convince the injured that their perspective had been understood. They perceived a "slickness" to the effort that made it feel easy and cheap; they felt that they had no choice but to reject the demeaning apology.

> He would just call me a day or two later and sheepishly ask me if I need something that he found he had two of. I knew what he was doing. He was trying to make amends in the best way he could. But I didn't want to accept that. I couldn't accept that. It was like, "If you can't talk to me like a human being, if you can't express your feelings to me or acknowledge mine, then don't come at me with this bullshit of trying to hand me something." Like toss a dog a cookie and he's going to be okay--even though you did kick him. That doesn't get it. I used that to keep us apart.

Narratives told from the perspective of the injuror highlighted the experience of frustration and anxiety when an apology is rejected or blocked. Despite good faith efforts to mend the relationship, participants felt

were unable to evoke (or imagine) a sincere expression of forgiveness from the other.

> On occasion, I have said I am sorry and she really doesn't acknowledge it. Instead of accepting an apology, she just more or less changes the subject.
>
> We thought about how to try to get him back and to repair whatever it was that we had done wrong. I couldn't imagine what was wrong. I did a number of things like calling, and he hung up on me. I asked by letter, "I don't understand what's wrong. Will you please tell me what we've done or that I have done? What can we do to make amends?" Those went by ignored or returned to me unopened.
>
> I think it would have been easy for him to say, "Don't worry about it,' and cut me off. I would have been left with, "And not only that, it's not okay to even talk about it anymore." . . . I would have been left with the nagging feeling , "He was pissed off about it and I'm going to feel like shit about it for a long time. And that's the way he <u>wants</u> me to feel about it." . . .I've been in situations where I've felt they <u>wouldn't</u> really let me apologize. They didn't let me say what I meant or they'd just say it's okay and didn't want to talk about it or something. I was left feeling I couldn't close it out, and I am left carrying the baggage. There's a step necessary for completion that one can withhold. It's like they just want to hear your apology in so many words. "I know you're a shit. I'll let you apologize so I can hear you say you're a shit."

<u>Cell 9:</u> <u>dialogue</u>. The situation of dialogue is possible only when two people meet in a joint effort. Such exchanges are initiated by one person whose words and/or actions express a sincere apology or offer of forgiveness. The other responds in a way that communicates a similar openness to dialogue in the present--both to work out the problems of the past and

the possibilities of the future. People feel relief and overjoyed when the dialogue is re-established after the frustrating experiences of alienation.

The single most important characteristic of dialogue is that both parties release the experience of breach. By coming to terms with breach in this way, both individuals feel a satisfying resolution. The following participant comment highlights the central features that distinguishes such transactions from all others:

> I've often made an apology for something that I didn't think was necessary to apologize for. I would continue to think about it and try to understand what was wrong with what I did. I guess it's just as frustrating to try to apologize for something for which you're guilty and not have it accepted. Maybe the key thing here is some degree of honesty is missing from that process. If an apology is sincerely offered and accepted, then it's a very healthy outcome. If apology is offered and you can't understand why, and it is accepted, it's not quite as good an outcome--because there is some dishonesty there. Or if an apology is sincerely offered and not accepted, again there's a lack of trust or perhaps enough mis-communication to at least call honesty into question. Maybe the only positive outcome of apology is when it's freely given and freely accepted.

Narratives told by participants who experienced themselves as injured highlighted situational factors and interpersonal qualities of the other which evoked an offer of forgiveness. In the following example, a participant tells about the resolution of a long-standing dispute with a man who ten years earlier had provoked a brawl with him. His experience of the breach was such

that he waited for the other to initiate reconcilement. When the man finally came to apologize, the participant was able to trust the sincerity of his simple, unelaborated reparative request.

> Over the years I would occasionally run across this fellow. A few years ago I saw him in a tavern and he walked up and said, "I've been wanting to tell you that I'm sorry for that for so long." He said that he recognized that it was a stupid and futile thing to do. I thought it was amazing. Apparently, it had stayed with him, too. Once he said it, I accepted it, bought him a beer, and it's all over. It was at rest and the hostility was erased. But it took him ten years to offer an apology. . . . I guess the reason that it impressed me was that he finally came to the realization that it was futile.

Another example involves the reconciliation of a man with his father. After years of emotional distance and tension, a tragic event brought them together in a dramatic, no-holds-barred confrontation. In that context, the father apologized for being unable to be close in a way his son would have liked. Surprised by the intimacy of that admission, the participant felt a new dialogue had begun that altered his experience both of the years of breach and of the current relationship.

> The biggest reparation for me has been making amends with my father for a very <u>bad</u> relationship. For years, my father and I were not close at all. He was very judgmental. Though he would do anything in the world for me and provide material gifts, he would never hug me, never be close to me, never take me in as a son. "Don't try to get close to me as a person. I can't do that." My father <u>knew</u> I was gay but we never discussed it until a good friend of mine suddenly died of AIDS. He used that event as an excuse to get me to open up. That was the starting point of the change in our relationship.

> We had a very emotional, almost knock-down-drag-out, and we both were able to tell how we had felt mistreated by the other. We screamed, cried, and laughed as we discussed the breakdown in our communication over the previous thirty-seven years. He said, "I did the best I could. I'm sorry. I don't know how to be close." It was unfathomable to think that would ever come out of his mouth. The whole scene changed when he said that. I thought, "Well, maybe I can teach him. Even though this is so rough, rocky and unsettling and far from the epitome of a good father-son relationship, at least the door is open. We can do something about it now." Later, he asked me to help him for a few minutes, and he yelled and cussed at me like he always had before. But it was okay. It felt good. I understood that he didn't know how to do anything else.

Both of these relationships moved into dialogue when the injuror made a good faith effort to apologize that was accepted by the injured. Note statements regarding the complete, voluntary release of the breach. When both parties were able to meet with the same intention of mending the relationship, they worked together to set aside their breach. In the second quote, although much of the father's behavior remained the same, it clearly meant something new to the participant.

In discussing a reconciliation with her brother, one participant concluded that her efforts to repair were ineffective because he refused to accept her apologies. She experienced maintaining an open stance over a period of years until a car accident forced him to be more dependent than he had been previously. It was at that point that he received her reparation.

> It's as if he has taken his accident and used it as a bridge for re-establishing the good, old relationship and being forgiven the transgressions that either of us might have committed in the middle. So he's willing now to accept the offer of friendship that I kept trying to make to him. . . . That's my sense of reparation. He has been able to reach back and pick up something that was meaningful to him at a time when he needed it. Although my attempts were futile, his attempts are perhaps even more genuine at this point and much more desperately based.

In some instances the person who was experienced as injured initiated the reparative encounter. He or she did so not because they felt responsible for the breach, but because they were unwilling to stand by and watch the relationship deteriorate. These individuals placed a high priority on maintaining good standing with others, and the way they felt led to approach the other to reconcile--regardless of who was at fault. By making the first move, they hoped to evoke an openness in the other.

The following excerpt illustrates reparative initiation on the part of the injured. The participant felt that he was insulted and "slashed" verbally upon being introduced to a man with whom he was going to work. After several months of tension, he took the lead to address the strain in their relationship.

> I've learned from the Biblical teaching on reparation and reconciliation that the responsibility is placed on the shoulders of whomever senses a problem. My experience in this situation and others had been if I'll be willing to assume responsibility for my contribution to the problem--regardless of how minor or major it's been--that it creates an openness and a context in

> which the other person can do the same. It was some months later when we really had an opportunity to work through that. We were together at a retreat, and one of the sessions concerned the unity of believers and relationships between Christians. In that context, I felt a real need to clear the air. I took the initiative and said, "I sense that there's been difficulty and an underlying tension in our relationship, and I don't understand its source. I really value your friendship, and I want your input into my life. Your original greeting of me is an illustration of the kind of tension I'm talking about. Your comment seemed to have a lot behind it, and it hurt me. I don't want this problem to be there. If I've offended you in any way, if I've done something that's been a difficulty for you, I really would like to set that right. Help me understand how I can work to make this relationship the way we want it to be." . . . My initiative and my willingness to assume responsibility for the problem and the solution helped him to take responsibility for his contribution. He said, "I'm sorry. I didn't mean to hurt you. These folks were saying your writing was the greatest stuff since sliced bread. It was threatening to me. I was just intimidated." He began to share with me the sense of jealousy and competition that was behind the tension. We wound up talking about the initial comment as an illustration of the relationship dynamic in general.

This is an excellent description of the dialogue resulting from an effective invitation. Though the participant felt reasonably sure he had done nothing to merit such malignancy, his Christian values directed him to discuss things assuming that he could have. Thus, he placed himself in a position of increased vulnerability to salvage the relationship. The two men were able to disclose their own thoughts and feelings and, in dialogue, they developed a shared perspective.

Participants made it clear that they could not force

dialogue, no matter how desperately they wanted it. They described a mysterious, intangible moment when both no longer experienced breach, but relationship. The woman who described her experience of forgiving her mother felt surprised when her openness to dialogue was reciprocated; suddenly, they were communicating.

> One day out of the blue she said, "I wish I had known. I wish I had it in me to stop it." That cleared up a lot of bad feelings. It was a big relief. It's a burden to feel as if your mother doesn't care. And even though you can forgive, <u>emotionally</u> it's such a relief to know, "I care. I just can't allow myself to admit it." That's a <u>whole</u> different statement than, "Tough luck. Too bad!" . . . As a result of her being able to say that to me and me saying, "I needed to hear that and I'm trying to get over the anger," she started telling me about her sexual abuse as a child. My mother <u>never</u> shared things like that. These were things she hadn't even shared with herself. They would not have happened if I had not been able to forgive her, if she had not been able to tell me she was sorry, if I had not been able to tell her, "I forgive you anyway, whether you're sorry or not."

Stories which involved participants as injurors focused on the factors which made their decision to ask for forgiveness seem sensible. These individuals felt considerable urgency 1) to take responsibility for the problem in the relationship, 2) to repair the other and 3) to rid the self of the experience of guilt. Apologies were accepted as sincere by the other and were effective in allowing both parties to release their experience of breach. Participants were sometimes surprised by the mysterious, spontaneous experience of forgiveness and

restoration of dialogue. Several examples illustrate this situation, beginning with a quote from the woman who anticipated a retaliatory response from her ex-finance.

> He was willing to let me repair. In fact, I'm not sure he thought there was anything that needed to be repaired. I was surprised that he didn't seem to require that I make some kind of apology. He wasn't angry at me. . . . The experience of the reunion was different than what I'd expected and it changed the two things I carried with me: the guilt and the sense that it was unfinished. I just felt so much better.
>
> I started spending more time away and started seeing a girlfriend I used to date. She found out about that. . . . I did feel that I had something to apologize for with her. That was definitely my wrong. Faithfulness was something that she felt strongly about. I should have been more honest in the first place when I started losing interest. Instead of sneaking around and going out on her. I guess that hurt her quite a bit. I did try to apologize for that by just admitting that it was wrong and that I should have talked with her before. I think the apology worked. I think she understood. We are pretty good friends now. We just couldn't live with each other.
>
> My father and I . . . have kind of a distant relationship, bit I feel like it's important to me to show that I do care. Once I meant to get my dad a birthday present but forgot. I was concerned that he might be hurt, perhaps thinking that I didn't care about him. Putting myself in his shoes gave me an idea that the possibility existed that he was hurt and it led me to check it out. I'd be real hurt if he got hurt. So I called him up and invited him to come and see me to try to give him something to make up for me forgetting. . . . I felt guilty about it. I got said what I needed to say which was exactly what I felt: "I did think about you. Just because I didn't call doesn't mean I don't care." . . . Apparently he didn't take it awful. What he said made it easier for me to limit how guilty I felt about forgetting. . . . When my dad said that his experience of the day was okay with him, I felt like I gave up the responsibility to have to take care of his birthday and for him having

a good time. Had he been pissed off when I called, it would have been harder for me to take it. But I felt like he listened to me and understood that what happened was just a screw up.

The next excerpt describes the memory of a reparative event that happened more than thirty years before the interview. When this participant was a three year old child, he accidentally injured his brother during play. He remembers quite vividly how badly he felt and his urgency to <u>do</u> something about it. The concept of "being present to his mistake" which he described in this passage fits in well with the other reparative actions described in the situation of dialogue. Though his age limited his moral reasoning skills, he did all he knew to do to repair his brother.

> One of the earliest memories is of feeling the need to apologize. I don't know if I actually did, but I think I did. There is trauma associated with it, so it is the kind of exciting moment that is burned into memory. I am the youngest of four boys in my family. When I was three, all my brothers got toy knives for Christmas--the kind where the blade disappears into the hilt so it looks like it is stabbing. I thought they were cool, but I didn't get one. Because I wanted to join in their play, I took a pencil to participate. I finally stabbed one of my brothers with this pencil. He cried, expressing great pain, and my mom got all excited because I left some lead in his shoulder. I felt sorry. I felt bad because I made my brother weep. I didn't want to do something that was hurtful. I certainly wanted to apologize. I <u>wanted</u> to repair the situation but I didn't have a clue as to how, so I just felt bad. I remember hovering over my brother as he was being administered to. He didn't want things to be in the manner that I had made them, so I felt responsible at that point. As I think about it now, I think that hovering...being

> present to the mistake...being in a sense accountable...was my reparation.

Some people described reparations that were a mutual effort from joint initiation. People in these stories experienced that in some sense they were both the victims and agents of each others' injuries, but they resolved to move past the argument of "who's right - who's wrong" to grapple in dialogue about the reconcilement of their relationship.

> I really wanted to make up with her. We both wanted that kind of relationship badly enough to do whatever it took. It takes two people who want to make it work. So we tried hard from that point on to be honest with each other. I said, "I want you to know that if there's anything that hurt you, this is why I did it and I'm sorry that I hurt your feelings." She was willing to forgive me. We genuinely apologized to each other and said, "We are both going to be big enough that if this ever happens again, we'll get it out and over with. We'll be mature and honest enough to tell each other what problems we're having with the other and admit to mistakes. We'll agree to disagree, if that's what it takes."

In conversation, these individuals discovered a new way to come to terms with their experiences of breach. Their sense of alienation was replaced by an awareness of wholeness, unity and dialogue.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

There are many ways in which we represent our experience of feeling whole and complete and at least as many to express our sense of incompleteness, imbalance, and loss. The concepts of wholeness and disrepair are anchored across many contexts in our culture, and many people have addressed this fundamental dialectic from a variety of theoretical and scholarly perspectives. But the presence and absence of wholeness comes down from the realm of abstraction to personal experiences that have profound and far-reaching effects in our lives.

Breadth of Results

Research that is conceived and conducted with a respectful stance--both toward a topic and those from whom one wants to learn about that topic--allows for the emergence of what had not been anticipated. If a piece of research confirms every hypothesis, nothing has been learned. Through the process of dialogue, participants in this study taught me a great deal about the experience of reparation; I also learned about other experiences I had no idea would be introduced or explored. By describing experiences which were felt to be "adjacent" to those involving reparation, participants described a

landscape which is now a more coherent whole for me.

This coherence came when I was able to see the inter-relationships of the two figural experiences they described (the experiences of breach and that of coming to terms with breach) in the context of the grounds these experiences select (time and relationship boundaries). To embed narratives in an interpersonal context, participants first described their perspective on the relationship that existed prior to the breach. It was out of that experience of relationship boundaries that breach emerged as figural.

Participants described breaches as experiences of feeling separated from another person as well as of losing a sense of trust and connectedness. In a variety of ways, they felt at odds with and distanced from someone with whom they once enjoyed feelings of closeness and intimacy. Instead of experiencing openness in communication, they were aware of tension and barriers to dialogue. Participants felt stuck with unpleasant feelings and memories; their present-oriented experiences of the world were interrupted, and they felt compelled to relive the past to find answers for questions of responsibility for the breach. In certain circumstances, they had an ill-defined sense that something was <u>owed</u> to them or to the other; how to solve their feeling of unbalance was unclear, although they knew in which

direction it tipped. In other circumstances, participants felt very clear about what was wrong and what would have to be done. Participants were aware that they had lost a sense of intactness and engagement in their world.

Generally, people lamented that a breach had occurred. At a practical level, rifts in relationships imposed new hardships. For example, partners both lost money when a business split up. Divorce created logistical problems with houses and cars, and it brought disruption to children's lives. Breaches were practically inconvenient because separation meant replacing the functions done by the other person.

But the pain of breach was often most figurally--and most meaningfully--felt as a loss of the presence of the other. Participants mourned the ending of the relationship, especially if the person was important to them. They often sensed great urgency to change the situation as it was uncomfortable to have the breach unresolved. In terms of Gestalt psychology, the breach was experienced as an "open figure," creating a sense of personal disequilibrium. Something was "wrong" which continued to draw their attention.

In certain situations, people resolved this tension by moving toward the other to repair imbalance of the

rift. They initiated reparation or received reparations from the other, and thereby experienced a closing of the breach. A sense of wholeness returned.

Reparation was not the only way in which people addressed their sense of incompleteness. In some circumstances, neither the experience of breach nor the perception of the interpersonal situation from which it emerged was patterned for the person in such a way as to allow any act to close the rift. For example, a person may imagine being willing to accept an apology which is never offered; in this case, the breach remains open despite a receptiveness to the other person.

Although people in these situations want to be rid of their troubling experience, they often stabilize it and make it fit comprehensibly into their world in the best way they know how. In situations where they are not able to imagine or create a circumstance(s) that will restore a sense of wholeness, they adjust to breach circumscribed by their experience and their capacities.

Kurt Goldstein's (1940) concept of "coming to terms" with catastrophic circumstances is an apt way of describing significant losses, and it has been used in this study to describe the process of accommodating to the experience of breach. Given our experience of a breach event in the context of a particular history of relationship boundaries, the way in which we go about

thinking, fantasizing, organizing, interpreting, feeling and behaving with regards to the breach makes sense when named as a coming to terms with the perceived structure of the newly changed self-other world.

When people experienced another person as attacking and hurting them, one way to come to terms was to retaliate and to get even. They described feelings and actions in terms of wanting to balance the experiences of hurt. "He hurt me so I wanted to hurt him, too." Descriptions of the retaliatory mode evoke images of the ancient principle of lex talionis and its contemporary analog, proportionality. Though the mode of retaliation affords no possibility of reconciliation, retaliatory actions and fantasies serve as an attempt to bring some closure to the personal experience of a disrupting breach.

Another interpersonal mode described in the interviews was of holding on to the experience of breach. Many people experienced breach situations as allowing them only a single option: waiting in a protective posture. Given their experience of breach and relationship, neither retaliating nor repairing made sense. Instead, they held tightly to a grudge or a guilt vis a vis the other, waiting for something (someone) to alter the situation. Retention was the most common

accommodation to breach because there were many ways for the process of reparation to be foiled. It was also described as a particularly painful mode of coming to terms because it rarely led to a resolution of the breach. The situation was experienced as an open wound that couldn't be healed; people felt that there was no end in sight.

Participants also made it clear that coming to terms is a dynamic, interpersonal event. The intentions and actions of a person are never comprehensible in a vacuum; making sense of and responding to breach always involves the (real or imagined) presence of the other. The experience of coming to terms with breach could only be characterized by describing the experience of <u>both</u> parties. The nine distinct interpersonal situations described by participants represent all possible interactions of the modes of retaliating, retaining and repairing.

Coming to terms with breach was not described as an event, but as a lived-process. A person's experience of breach is constantly updated, particularly as a result of new encounters with the other that feel different to them. Experiences of breach also may be transformed by third-party intervention, by imagining the possibility of change in the other, and by value-directed initiatives--as well as by the simple passage of time.

Coming to terms with breach alters the world in which the person lives. For example, one man found that apologizing and making vows to his wife changed their joint experience of breach. Together, they explored the question of responsibility, realizing they were both at some fault. They came to appreciate the changes in themselves, in the other and in their relationship which were signs of alienation. His action "satisfied" his feeling of needing to do something; thus, his sense of urgency receded. Finally, their reconcilement redefined the boundaries of their relationship. They moved forward from that point--changed--with a memory of the experience of distance and a restored closeness.

We experience our relationships as constantly evolving, always in a process of change. Among the most powerful influences to such transformation is when we experience breach and attempt to resolve it. When we are fortunate enough to engage the other in a joint move toward reconciling, reparations are experienced as the re-opening of dialogue.

Reparation as Dialogue

Dialogue was chosen to label the situation of two people meeting with reparative intent because it describes both the process and the result of meeting to jointly address the experience of breach. This study has

shown that achieving dialogue is not particularly common, simple nor predictable. Consider the difficulty many participants had in meeting the other in reparative dialogue--if indeed they were ever able to experience it. The majority of narratives focused on situations in which people fail to find common ground. They described situations in which someone even did "all the right things" but still failed to reach the other. The negotiation of conflict is unpredictable; formulas or prescriptions for repair do not necessarily work. A situation might have been experienced by one person as ideal for dialogue and experienced by the other as degrading. Coming to terms with breach in a mutual way is easier to describe in the abstract than it is to actualize in the inter-human world. Of all the possible ways that breach can be resolved interpersonally, reparation is rare.

One useful way to describe the fragility and rarity of the reparative process is by briefly reviewing Buber's notions of dialogue. Buber (1958) described two basic "attitudes" or relationships people have with each other. The first, the I-It relation, we all have with others. The I-It relation represents the possibility of seeing the other as a thing or a set of functions which have value for the I. The It is the object of the I's

experience; they are related only instrumentally.

Buber said that the second relation, the I-Thou, is not necessarily experienced by all people. I-Thou represents the possibility of meeting the other in a moment of "pure relation"--in dialogue. The realm of I-Thou has no space or time; it transcends the experience of logic, order and rules. Friedman described I-Thou as one in which "two people stand in a direct, mutual, open and present relationship" (1959, p. 2). Note these same adjectives were used by participants to describe their experience of repaired relationships.

The womb symbolized for Buber an experience of "purely natural combination" and the "undivided primal world that precedes form" (1958, p. 25). This is where the primary, inborn I-Thou experience is anchored. Out of this original unity Buber stated that we learn the I-It relation as we gradually discriminate ourselves from other people and things.

> . . . time is granted to the child to exchange a spiritual connexion, that is, <u>relation</u>, for the natural connexion with the world that he gradually loses (Buber, 1958, p. 25.)

Our earliest experiences of <u>separateness</u> force us to set up a barrier between subjects and objects. Our sad fate, said Buber, is to be an It for someone else; we have no choice but to feel separate from others.

Buber said it is human nature that to desire reunion

with a "cosmic" sense of connection. Our first efforts to establish relations are in the I-It mode, by actions of touching and feeling. It is only later, that the child is able to become an I through relation with a Thou. In the experience of "tenderness," the child rediscovers the wholeness of relationship. Throughout life, we continue to experience alienation and the desire for reunion--the logical extension of our melancholy fate.

> At times the man, shuddering at the alienation between the I and the world, comes to reflect that something is to be done. As when in the grave night-hour you lie, racked by waking dream--bulwarks have fallen away and the abyss is screaming--and note amid your torment: there is still life, if only I got through to it--but how, how? (Buber, 1958, p. 70).

This way of describing distance, and the anxiety of loss, matches the experience of breach given by participants of this study in many ways. Separation from the other--becoming an It to the I and an I to an It--is tragic and painful. Instead of having the possibility of living in the present in a direct relation, the I-It relation lives in the past. We feel incomplete without the Thou, and are driven to restore his/her presence.

Because we cannot sustain the I-Thou routinely, Buber stated that we tend to ask ourselves, "How? How are we to go about restoring the presence of the other?" He implies that one cannot talk about a "process" or a

"recipe" for the creation of I-Thou relation. Dialogue is a lived-event that is not coerced or scheduled; true meetings happen only when there is mutual giving:

> Between you and it there is a mutual giving: you say Thou to it and give yourself to it, it says Thou to you and gives itself to you. You cannot make yourself understand with others concerning it, you are alone with it. But it teaches you to meet others, and to hold your ground when you meet them. Though the graciousness of its comings and the solemn sadness if its goings it leads you away to the Thou in which the parallel lines of relations meet (Buber, 1958, p. 33).

Thus, we cannot create dialogue with another human being; we can only set a context for it by providing the other an opportunity to step toward us. It is by grace that dialogue occurs in any moment, but grace is not discovered because it is sought. It is ours only to move toward the other, hoping for reciprocity.

> Of the complete relational event we know, with the knowledge of life lived, our going out to the relation, our part of the way. The other part only comes upon us, we do not know it; it comes upon us in the meeting. But we strain ourselves on it if we speak of it as though it were some thing beyond the meeting. We have to be concerned, or be troubled, not about the other side but about our own side, not about grace but about will. Grace concerns us in so far as we go out to it and persist in its presence; but it is not our object (Buber, 1958, p. 76).

Participants of this study made it plain that for many breach situations, there was no way to imagine the restoration of a relationship. One way to understand this is to see that dialogue requires mutual meeting, i.e., a meeting in which the joint experience of It-ness

is transformed into presentness. Participants were quite sensitive about the quality and sincerity of the other's interpersonal presence. Most of the stories regarding the retaining mode involved an assessment of the other and/or of the situation as not encouraging mutuality. For instance, when they sensed that their hurt feelings were being disregarded or belittled, it was clear to the person the other had not done their part in the meeting; instead of feeling drawn to move toward the other in a position that allowed for the possibility of repairing, they felt the need to protect themselves by remaining an It to and for the other. Those who were able to see only retaliatory modes were even more entrenched in an I-It relation, and the sense of alienation was more intense.

Reparation restores dialogue and presence. It is mutual meeting that sometimes transforms the It to Thou. It happens only when interpersonal conditions allow, and it does not always happen simply because conditions are right. In our culture, there are gestures and attitudes that demonstrate empathic presentness and signify the authenticity of our intentions. Confession, repentance and apology are ways we go about taking our step to the other. But these measures do not guarantee that the other will experience them as genuine or as "enough." When a person experiences a situation as one in which he/she is made to feel like an It, dialogue simply does

not happen. Sadly, this is the most common situation; reparation is rare.

Perhaps it is the unpredictability and rarity of dialogue that make it stand out as one of the most powerful moments human beings enjoy. When situations are experienced as ones in which there is a mutuality of reparative intent, each person may choose to make his or her step in vulnerability toward the other. What can occur then is what participants described as a mysterious moment of dialogue. Repeating part of what one participant told me emphasizes this point:

> This was the moment of truth and he decided on the relationship--between my hello and his response. It's eerie. It was really an outstanding moment in my life. It was like waiting for the baby's first cry. It was a moment when you catch your breath. When he began to talk to me, it almost brought tears to my eyes. Relief that I was able to reach him. I just knew what was happening. . . . He could've chosen to ignore me or to be violent or to push me away. But he chose to repair the relationship in that moment. To be with me again, to be part of my life. It was a real sense of dramatic moment. It was one of those rare moments we have in life where we know something is happening and we don't know what the mystery is.

Relationship of Present Results to Other Contexts of Reparation

Ethological context. Eibl-Eibesfeldt suggested that a primary way in which both animals and humans make peace is through appeasement. He observed that we exchange valuable possessions or useful objects for acceptance

and/or the cessation of hostility. Participants in this study also described giving of gifts as a means to pacify the other. In fact, the story told by the man who recalled his mother accepting a new silver set from his father who had been caught in an affair bore a good deal of resemblance to Eibl-Eibesfeldt's observation of the flightless cormorant mates. In the participant's own words, "That more or less got him back in the house." Participants had strong feelings about appeasement. By and large, these gestures were experienced by the person to whom they were offered as cheap, perfunctory, and manipulative attempts to avoid dealing with breach in a more substantial, personal way. They recognized that the other was trying to "buy them off" or to deflect their attention away from their pain to something shiny. In Buber's terms, they were experienced as being given to an It. By accepting gifts, participants felt that they would allow the other to "get away" without appreciating the damage that was done. Though a present was accompanied by "all the right words," the statements and gestures were experienced as hollow, insincere and without value. Present results demonstrate that dialogue does not take place when the other is perceived as attempting to shrink from responsibility.

A key element in the rituals of human tribes

described in Chapter I is mutuality. When a line of a vow is spoken by one side, it is spoken by the other. When a member of one tribe strikes a blow, it was matched by a member of the other tribe. The ethologist says this is proof of a biological basis for the "instinct" of peacemaking. From a phenomenological viewpoint, these observations, in the light of the present study, suggest that given the experience of breach, one sensible way to come to terms with it is to seek balance. The mutual speaking of a vow, or even the striking of symmetrical blows, restores the sense of equality. The experience of breach is addressed in reciprocity.

Religious context. The concept of repentance was introduced in Chapter I as the way in which both the Jewish and Christian faiths teach their followers to deal with estrangement from God. The prayer of repentance was characterized by Soloveitchik as a "knocking on the locked gates" separating a person from God.

Certainly, participants felt separated from the other in circumstances of breach. Apology, confession, and repentance were all important motifs in their experience of reparation. Though a person may falsely represent him/herself as guilty and remorseful, repentance is the interpersonal exchange we seem to understand as setting conditions for dialogue and, thus,

the restoration of relationship. Saying "sorry" is how we acknowledge our responsibility for breach and communicate our empathy for the perspective of the other. Gestures alone are experienced as hollow without the personal encounter that changes the experience of breach for the one felt to be injured by the breach.

That many participants referred to Christian themes of forgiveness is not surprising since all of them were raised in a Christian faith. Among the most interesting narratives told were those involving the counter-intuitive measure of <u>initiating</u> forgiveness when the person experienced him or herself as the injured party. In none of these stories was there a suggestion that this was a masochistic or self-defeating action; instead, participants described these situations as discovering a freedom to recast their experience of the breach in new terms. The agony of these narratives was not in the release of a grudge, but in the moments and years of experiencing self-confinement. The decision to continue holding another accountable for a breach kept both people prisoners of their past. As one person put it:

> I could not wait for my mother to apologize because it was not going to happen. I was angry for a long time. I wondered when it would resolve itself, and finally I decided I couldn't afford the anger. It was eating <u>me</u>, not just hurting her.

Situations in which there was an alteration of the experience of breach--whether it was by letting go a debt

or by feeling forgiven by the other--were described in ways that match the religious concept of grace. Both the experiences of receiving mercy and of extending mercy to another are vital moments of freedom, possibility and relationship.

Legal context. This point of grace finds its counterpoint in the realm of law. It was the dogged insistence on holding out for "justice" that prevented a person from participating in a reparative moment. When we interact with each other on a legalistic basis, we are compelled to hold the experience of breach steady until there is a feeling of "satisfaction." Many participants reported that the achievement of, or fantasies about, retribution often ended up feeling un-satisfying because the relationship was still severed. Their experience of breach had not yet been appreciated by the other. Legalistic vengeance may restore a sense of balance; it never restores a relationship.

The theme of restitution per se did not often come up in the interviews, perhaps because the term implies a positive relationship to the concept of payment of debt. When material possessions were exchanged, typically they were experienced as merely gestures of appeasement rather than as a good faith effort to atone for a wrong done. One participant did speak, however, of his plan to repay

money he had embezzled from a customer. Curiously, he planned this act as an anonymous gesture; this seemed to be in contrast to other stories he told of very personal reparative encounters. In this particular circumstance, he felt that an impersonal compensation was sufficient to absolve him from his guilt. While it is true that he anticipated a great change in his experience of the breach, it was not to be as a result of the establishment of dialogue.

This is not to say that legal restitution cannot change the experience of breach if one or both parties feel the act effectively addresses the questions of responsibility and damage. A recent example of such a restitutive measure was the decision of the United States government to pay reparations to each surviving Japanese-American veteran of World War II internment camps. An Associated Press story on August 11, 1988 quoted President Reagan as representing the bill with these words:

> What is most important in this bill has less to do with property than with honor. For here we admit a wrong. Her we affirm our commitment as a nation to equal justice under the law.

Japanese-Americans who were quoted in the account agreed that the money was understood as symbolic of acknowledging error. The following statements characterize the change of the breach experiences of two

men who were age 10 and 3, respectively, at the time of internment.

> Today the unjust burden of shame which 120,000 loyal Americans have carried for 46 painful years has at long last been lifted.
>
> We see this as a healing process which says the country recognizes that a wrong was being done and in one small way perhaps is trying to make amends for this.

Experiences of the restoration of wholeness can happen in the legal realm, but they are rare.

Psychological context. Hannah Arendt (1958) observed that human beings need two dialectical faculties for interpersonal relationships in the world: the capacity to promise and the capacity to forgive. The former is the remedy for "unpredictability" and represents the possibility of anchoring a secure future; the latter is the remedy for "irreversibility" and represents the possibility of redemption from one's past.

> Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell (Arendt, 1958, p. 237).

While she also recognized that vengeance was very much a part of the human condition, she noted that unless people were able to "release" trespasses, they are "bound" to the chain reaction process of action and

reaction, offense and retribution. She characterized the process of forgiveness as the opposite of vengeance in the sense that it is not a predictable reaction, but an "original" action which has the effect of spontaneously releasing both parties from the past.

> Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven (Arendt, 1958, p. 241).

Participants who described the experience of forgiving and being forgiven spoke of "being freed from the past." It was as if their gaze were turned away from a troubled past and toward a new future. In seeing a new way to cast their experience of breach against the grounds of time and relationship, they felt released from an oppressive burden. People who had been anticipating a retaliatory response were surprised by the willingness of the other to forgive and to focus in the present. For example:

> He was willing to let me repair. In fact, I'm not sure he thought there was anything that <u>needed</u> to be repaired. I was surprised that he didn't seem to require that I make some kind of an apology. He wasn't angry with me.
>
> When my dad said that his experience of the day was okay with him, I felt like I gave up the responsibility to have to take care of his birthday and for him having a good time. I really gave that up. Had he been pissed off when I called, it would have been harder for me to take it. But I felt like

> he listened to me and understood that what happened what just a screw up.

Forgiveness, like dialogue, can never be predicted, and it is difficult to understand how we arrive at the moment of forgiveness. Arendt believed that the only reasonable justification for the decision to forgive is the primacy and significance of the relationship; one forgives the offense to recover the presence of the other.

> Perhaps the most plausible argument that forgiving and acting are as closely connected as destroying and making comes from that aspect of forgiveness where the undoing of what was done seems to show the same revelatory character as the deed itself. Forgiving and the relationship it establishes is always eminently personal (though not necessarily individual or private) affair in which <u>what</u> was done is forgiven for the sake of <u>who</u> did it.

Ernest Becker wrote about forgiveness as relinquishing the power one holds over the other when one is breached; forgiving establishes the possibility of a new present-oriented relationship:

> Thus, we can see more fully why it is that only mature love has the power to forgive. When we respect the object, we lose, in a sense, our power over it. But we gain something in the loss: repeat of the object relinquishes power over it to gain the harvest of the object's privacy; that is . . . our world is enriched by the very uniqueness of the love object. But the object gives us even more when we have the strength to forgive it and accept it on its terms. Forgiveness absolves the object from <u>any connection</u> from its own <u>past action</u>. This means that with forgiveness we harvest a potentially new object, in the form of a new spontaneity (1964, p. 250).

The mode of one's coming to terms with breach

changes only as one's psychological experience of breach changes. Despite the importance of relationship, some participants found themselves feeling "stuck" with a breach that effectively cut them off from the other because they could not imagine or allow the spontaneity of renewed dialogue. This was true both in regard to the experiences of not forgiving and guilt.

Melanie Klein's theory of the infant's paranoid position is an interesting and evocative rendering of a way in which the world can be experienced. If one is continually aware of danger and can only attribute malevolence to others, the world is an anxious place. We know what it is to feel incomplete without a Thou. Such anxiety takes a different, sad character if one is painfully aware that the presence of the Thou, through whom one has become an I, has been lost. We know what it is to mourn, to desperately seek a remedy that will bring the other back. We know what it is to try to repair our experience of void.

Klein confirmed what Buber called our melancholy fate: that we inevitably lose our Thou, sometimes due to our own actions and wishes. In our loving and in our hating, we turn away from our Thou. We have no choice but to bear the pain of acknowledging that the damage done is irreparable; that a sense of wholeness may not be

restored. We must also recognize that nothing we do can guarantee us secure present possession of the Thou. No amount of effort or agony makes either the Thou return or the depression of separateness depart. One can merely do what is appropriate to stand next to the other, creating the opportunity for the spontaneity of relatedness to emerge again in dialogue.

Applications

Conflict resolution. The present results can be useful in many different contexts, including the understanding and negotiation of conflict at a variety of levels. Consider the setting of a labor dispute. Typically, what one hears in the reporting of such matters is the experience of breach from entrenched perspectives. Each side claims that promises were made and broken and that the other is negotiating in bad faith. The atmosphere is one of contention and mistrust. Often there is a wide gulf between what each side is willing to settle for, and, in the course of the dispute, each side loses. More times than not it seems that the side who can most afford to "hold out" gains more concessions from the other in their compromise agreement. The resolution of breach in these practical, everyday circumstances rarely resembles a settlement based on a legitimate attempt to work out what is fair and best for

both parties; rather, it is power-playing with high stakes.

Recently, there has been considerable interest in the training of corporate and labor professionals in new modes of conflict resolution (see Jandt, 1985; Fisher and Ury, 1981). The underlying rationale for these new perspectives is that the survival and health of the relationship between sides is more important than one side winning. These writers point out that too often the goal of negotiations has been to get as much as possible from the other. They suggest that when people see situations as limited to outcomes that are advantageous for only one or the other, negotiation serves to weaken relationship. The aim of this evolving style of negotiation is to achieve agreement that is mutually beneficial for both sides--that is, a "Win-Win" outcome (Jandt, 1985). The basic advice for turning conflict into agreement is to view the situation of negotiation as a dialogue to invent options for mutual gain.

The present results can easily be coordinated with such a perspective. Participants made it clear that when people are stubbornly locked into a single view of a problem, they rarely are able to consider the perspective or future well-being of the other. Present results demonstrate how often negotiations end up statemated when

two sides come to terms with breach in a defensive, protective posture; they also demonstrate that mutual benefit can come as a result of a reciprocally open, vulnerable stance in conflict resolution. One potential application of this project is to supplement the educative resources of these innovative and insightful negotiation styles currently being developed.

Psychotherapy. These results suggested that the experience of interpersonal breach is a powerful theme in the lives of all people. The experience of separation and alienation from those whom we love and need can be devastating. Feelings of hurt, anger, betrayal and guilt can be slow to heal, and the sense of lost wholeness distorts our experience of the world. Among the most common complaints of those who go to a therapist for help is a breakdown in relationships. Across diagnostic groups, dysfunction in interpersonal relationships is a compelling symptom to the patient, the family and the therapist.

The implications from this study for therapists are at least threefold. First, it is crucially important for the therapist to persist in exploring the patient's experience of the breached relationship. This may seem self-evident, and indeed ought to be, but therapists sometimes move away prematurely from the experience of

the event to working on how the patient is to resolve it. Therapists who begin to focus exclusively on altering what appears to be a neurotic response to a past experience miss the important point that the patient's mode of coming to terms must be sensibly related to his/her present experience of the breach. There is no therapeutic value in dismissing or covering experience--or in interpreting it away.

Buber's critique of psychoanalysis discussed in Chapter I relates to this point. He stated that sometimes the person who complains of guilt feelings really is guilty and needs help to discover appropriate ways to atone; the therapist who deflects attention away from the guilt experienced to a synthetic, theoretical one conspires with the patient to desert the patient's experience. Similarly, the therapist who tires of hearing about the feelings of bitterness and urges the patient to forgive another person may help seal the experience of breach. Therapists may be inclined to gloss over the patient's experience of breach when they feel helpless to change it.

A second application relates to the therapist's notion of change. Present results suggest that the particular experience of breach selects a range of ways people might conceptualize and come to terms with breach. People who seek treatment often do so because they feel

"stuck" with a breach; they wish to excise it. At the risk of oversimplifying, we might say that people come to therapy with two fundamental issues of unresolved breach: in the first case, they may feel that they cannot ever forgive another for an injury in the past; in the second, they may feel they cannot escape from the pain of feeling unforgiven. Classic notions of neurosis center on the restriction of possibilities; neurotic suffering represents an inability to shift the grounds of the experience to see alternatives. In his book How People Change, Alan Wheelis stated:

> Sometimes we suffer desperately, would do anything, try anything, but are lost, see no way. We cast about, distract ourselves, search, but find no connection between misery we feel and the way we live. The pain comes from nowhere, gives no clue. We are bored, nothing has meaning; we become depressed. What to do? How to live? Something is wrong but we cannot imagine another way of living which would free us (1973, p. 111).

If neurosis is the restriction of possibility, therapy can be the opening up of a range of alternatives that were not seen previously. Present results suggest that as an individual's experience of breach changes new modes of coming to terms emerge. If a therapy remains focused on the evolving nature of the patient's experience of breach, the therapist and patient may together discover how options for coming to terms have been experienced as limited.

It seems that there are at least three types of different accommodations that can be made, two of which may lead to reparation. First, patients might decide they can do what they previously felt they could not, i.e., approach the other in a vulnerable, reparative posture. For example, a person may come to understand that the danger in apologizing had been over-estimated; he/she may find relief from the experience of breach and, then, because an appropriate action was taken, bring a new openness to dialogue. A different accommodation would allow the other to do something that previously was felt to be too risky. With a change in the the experience of breach, one might find a freedom to accept the reparative offer of the other and to meet them half-way. The third new accommodation would be the decision that one needs distance from a troubled relationship. The recognition that a dyad is destructive and unlikely to change (i.e., that it is irreparable) may allow some patients to consider the option of leaving. Issues of power and dependence would likely be the figural aspects of the re-patterned relationship boundaries in this case.

A third application of the present study to psychotherapy relates to transferential relationships. If one understands the process of therapy as addressing the patient's fundamental unresolved experience of breach, one would expect a patient to experience in the

therapist the figural conflictual characteristics of the breaching other. The patient's loss of the capacity for spontaneity in relationship means that the dysfunctional pattern is lived again in the therapy. Here we must be reminded that the experience of breach is widely defined: people experience breach not only when they feel attacked or exploited, but also when they feel ignored, disappointed or abandoned. The discerning therapist listens to the figural aspects of the transferential relationship to understand the genesis of conflict as well as the foci of the feeling of incompleteness.

Present results may supply a heuristic tool for that purpose. If a therapist were to identify figural aspects of the transferential relationship as one of the nine interpersonal situations described in the Results, he/she may be able to use such information to understand how to counter the patient's expectations. To assist the patient to see new alternatives, it is certainly incumbent upon the therapist to avoid completing frustrating transactions that have characterized the patient's relationships outside treatment. But simply being the "opposite" kind of person will not often assist the patient to experience the breach in new ways.

For example, a patient who appears to experience the therapist as abandoning, aloof and indifferent may be

ascribing to him/her the experienced withholding style of a parent. Recalling descriptions of the frustrations offered by participants who were thwarted in their attempts to repair might enrich a therapist's understanding of such a transference. It might also help the therapist know how best to "be different" from the abandoning parent. If the therapist merely attempts to evoke idealized images of caring and rock-solid dependability, the conceptual pair of present/absent remains unchanged. For progress to be made, the patient must become confounded so that completely new ways to understand the breach of abandonment emerge. In those moments of stark newness, the patient may be able to meet with the person of the therapist for the first time. As in all moments of dialogue, the temporal focus will be the present and not the past.

People give up their devotion to pathological relationships and to their sense of incompleteness when their experience of breach makes it a sensible way to come to new terms. Therapists cannot coerce the creation of dialogue any more than anyone else. They cannot do the work of openness for the patient; they cannot undo the harm of relationships experienced as destructive. By understanding and then confounding the transferential relationship, they can provide new <u>opportunities</u> for

dialogue and for the restoration of the sense of wholeness. And then they must wait.

Methodological Issues

Qualitative methodology seemed especially well-suited for the present research for several reasons. First, establishing a relationship and conducting an open-ended interview with each participant created conditions clearly facilitating the study of relationship and dialogue. The descriptions offered by the various narratives are powerful largely because present procedures allowed participants to express the rich and dynamic nature of human experience. Thoughts and feelings about coming to terms with breach were vivid to participants, and their narratives reflected the central importance these experiences have in their lives.

But the intention of interviewing was not simply to discover what participants did or thought in breach situations, for any number of traditional designs could have served that purpose to some degree. The dialogue with participants allowed for a joint exploration and understanding of their life world. Dialogue was the exchange of meaning--or better, dialogue was the creation of meaning. Together, the participants and I sought to comprehend the complexity and intensity of a particular aspect of their lives, in the context of the whole of

their lives. Participants did not tell me only what they already knew; our conversation transformed this investigation from reporting to discovery.

Buber said that experience in and of itself belongs to the world of I-It. Research designed to observe and recover experience without dialogue leaves it in the realm of I-It.

> Just as the melody is not made up of notes nor the verse of words nor the statue of lines, but they must be tugged and dragged till their unity has been scattered into these many pieces, so with the man to whom I say Thou. I can take out from him the colour of his hair, or of his speech, or of his goodness. I must continually do this. But each time I do it he ceases to be Thou (Buber, 1958, pp. 8-9).

Phenomenological methods allow for the emergence of an I-Thou encounter. Dialogue affords a "meeting" wherein meanings in the life world can be discovered and described. Methods employed in this research did not require that I distance myself from the studied phenomenon or from the participants; quite the opposite was true.

Qualitative design not only suited the topic, it also suited the investigator. As a clinical psychologist, my training has focused on developing skill in dialogue as a tool for coming to understand the experience of other people. The distinctions between doing therapy and research blur to some degree in phenomenological investigation. The intention of

phenomenological interviews in research and clinical settings are similar: to comprehend the experiential world of the other through dialogue. Sills (1988) wrote the following of her research interviews:

> To a large extent, these are clinical interviews, except that the investigator refrains from comments which have as their goal, a change in the participant. One soon comes to realize that both participant and investigator are changed through the dialogue (as in therapy) due to the depth and authenticity of speaking with one another (p. 188).

Just as my experience in doing therapy informed my work as a phenomenological researcher, research experience has taught me about being a clinician. In particular, the activities of developing and delivering interpretations have taken on new dimension as a result of learning about a hermeneutic approach to understanding texts, and hence, people. Levy (1984), and others, has written that the interpretive process is the central therapeutic activity of the therapist. If interpretation is to be therapeutic, assignment and communication of meaning must be solidly anchored in the patient's (almost conscious) experience. Freud stated:

> . . . one must be careful not to give the patient the solution of a symptom or the translation of a wish until he is already so close to it that he has only one short step more to make in order to get hold of the explanation himself (1913, p. 140).

Clinicians' notions and theoretical preferences help them organize and understand patient material as well as their own experience of the therapeutic process. If

theory-based interpretations are remote from the patient's experience, however, the therapist loses connection with that patient. When this occurs, the interpretation is for the therapist rather than the patient. Experience must take a preferred position over theory in the hermeneutic task of assigning meaning to acts, wishes, thoughts and dreams--not simply because it is technically advantageous, but also because it conveys an appropriate respect for the uniqueness of patient experience (Boss, 1963; 1977).

By attempting to bracket preconceptions and biases before and during data analysis, I learned of the difficulty and importance of continually explicating one's interpretive framework. The phenomenological injunction to remain at the level of description and experience is apt for both the therapist and the researcher. Clinicians must bracket their notions about human development, psychopathology and therapeutic technique so that they do not become confused with intrinsic, inviolable truth. They are tools for understanding and helping, not its end-product.

I learned of the phenomenological approach and its methods from general and practical texts (Pollio, 1982; Giorgi, 1970; Kruger, 1981; Idhe, 1977; Collaizzi, 1978) and from the work of specific investigators (Barrell,

1988; Dapkus, 1985; Goodrich, 1988; Macgillivray, 1985; Myers, 1985; Ross, 1987; Seidner, 1986; and Sproule, 1988). Participating in developing rigorous qualitative methods as a member of the Phenomenology Group at the University of Tennessee has been a rewarding experience for me. I feel I have had the opportunity to be involved on the frontier of alternative research in psychology.

It was in this supportive and creative context that I was able to adapt a particular set of procedures to study the phenomenon of reparation. It is the flexibility of phenomenological method which allows investigators to remain true both to participant experience and to the integrity of the studied phenomenon. There is considerable satisfaction in feeling that those two important goals were achieved.

Rigor. A continuing challenge for phenomenologists is to describe their findings to peers who, by and large, have been trained in a different research tradition. The philosophical heritage of phenomenology has not helped it attain stature in psychology as a endeavor fit to be called "scientific"; many think of its methods as the antithesis of rigor. As Goodrich (1988) pointed out, the burden is on phenomenological researchers to develop a clear methodological perspective and to demonstrate that their methods can be rigorous.

Until recently, researchers in the Phenomenology Group at the University of Tennessee have gone about the task of rigor by borrowing measures from more traditional paradigms. In addition to building many internal checks of faithfulness to data into their methods, they have routinely chosen to run reliability studies, a practice anchored in a natural science epistemology. Raters have been trained to score interview protocols for themes which emerged from data analyses. After obtaining acceptable inter-rater agreement figures, researchers have stated that their analyses were, in essence, repeatable by trained others.

It is this researcher's opinion that this practice has forced an awkward straddling of two different epistemologies. In a natural science paradigm, replicability of results ensures accuracy. The intention of including reliability estimates in phenomenological research was to assure readers that the derived thematic structure was not arbitrary--certainly a reasonable intent. But publishing reliability statistics also implies a certitude of the results, i.e., that the derived structure was the "right" one or the "only" one. Is that what these phenomenologists meant to convey by demonstrating reliability?

No claims of certainty ought to be made from a hermeneutically oriented phenomenological study, for the

epistemology of phenomenology suggests that a single correct description of data never exists. Doing reliability studies on results of a phenomenological study seems akin to using a ruler to attempt to measure volume: it simply is the wrong instrument. The solution to the challenge of respectability is not borrowing psychometric tools from natural science. It is time for phenomenologists to step firmly on one side of the epistemological fence.

Recently, there have been significant advances in redefining the concept of rigor within the context of phenomenological research (Wertz, 1984; Wertz, 1986; Barrell, et al., 1987; Goodrich, 1988). Accordingly, there has been a growing confidence in alternative strategies to ensure rigor which fit better within the tradition and epistemology of phenomenology. The standards of rigor appropriate for phenomenology are based on the notion of fidelity to data. Careful adherence to this principle assures that derived thematic structures are conservative, experience-based descriptions of phenomenological data and not arbitrary, unique interpretations of one investigator.

Many procedures instituted in the present research represent attempts to remain faithful to the experience of participants. This process started with building a

respectful rapport with each participant before interviewing him or her. Interviews were open-ended and participant-directed; no new ideas or themes were introduced by the investigator. This procedure allowed participant experience to become articulated in the dialogic process without being shaped or coerced by pre-existing concerns of the investigator. Extraordinary care was taken in transcription so that the words of the protocol were the words of the dialogue.

Protocols were left in the first-person to allow the data to speak for themselves and to avoid premature interpretation by the researcher. At no time did the summarization method require the investigator to "leap beyond what was said to what was meant," as some methods suggest as necessary. Protocol condensation was performed in a careful, gradual and conservative process, according to explicit editing rules. The narrative reduction system adapted from Seidner (1987) shows great promise for a rigorous analysis procedure.

A <u>critically</u> important step to ensure rigor was the inspection of tentative digests by participants themselves to confirm that further analysis would be based on summaries accurately reflecting their experience. This was a test of intrasubjective agreement. The descriptive thematic structure then emerged from grouping and labeling natural categories

among summary statements; no attempt was made to "force" data into a predetermined theoretical schema. Interpretation was clearly involved in this analysis phase, but again on a conservative level.

The dependability of the descriptive structure derived from the present research can best be assessed by the degree of intersubjective agreement it finds among readers and in terms of its compatibility to results of future research. The criteria for its usefulness relate to whether results are clear, and lead to an enhanced understanding of reparation. It is assumed that future research on reparation will not produce a structure greatly discrepant from the one described in this study. It is also assumed, however, that experience can never be described in an absolute or univocal fashion. Enhanced understanding will most certainly come in future dialogue with the data and images of this study.

The compatibility of the present results with those of Rowe, et al. (in press) is encouraging. It will be a continuing challenge to sharpen further the description and understanding of reparation with continued research undertaken in coordination with other investigators.

Suggestions for Future Research

As stated above, the scope of these results were broader than expected. What started out to be a study of

the process of repair provided a description of three different modes of coming to terms with breach yielding nine distinct interpersonal possibilities. Future research concerning the ways in which people experience and come to terms with breach would be useful to confirm the usefulness of this description.

Narratives in this study afforded clearer impressions of thematic possibilities of some situations than others. For example, only one narrative described the exchange labeled Situation 3. This was the situation in which a woman continued to forgive her father despite feeling that he persisted in a hostile mode of relationship. Future research efforts might be directed at eliciting more focused descriptions of each of the nine situations suggested by present results.

This could be accomplished by starting interviews with more specific questions, i.e., asking participants to describe their experience of more narrowly defined phenomenon. For example, the research question designed by Rowe, et al. (in press) asked participants to describe situations in which they were injured and then forgave someone. These descriptions supplement understanding of the various interpersonal exchanges involving the reparative experience of a person who experiences him/herself as injured. It is conceivable that one could

further narrow the interview by asking participants to describe their experiences of a single situation. An example of such a question might be: "Can you tell me about a time when you were involved in a situation in which you wanted to apologize to another person and it appeared to you that they wanted to hold a grudge?"

Based on present research, it would be expected that, in the course of telling narratives, participants would discuss more than one mode of coming to terms with breach, and, thus, more than one kind of interpersonal situation. Interviews focused on any one of the nine situations described in the present research would render new insights about other, adjacent situations and about the structure as a whole. Therefore, a comprehensive research plan might be an effective way to assess the usefulness of the present descriptive structure.

Phenomenological analysis of interview texts is so time-consuming that one is severely limited in the number of studies that can be conducted. Now that a descriptive structure has been rendered, it may prove useful to coordinate present findings with other qualitative or traditional methods. For example, a large group of participants could be asked to write several paragraphs concerning their experience of coming to terms with a particular pattern of breach. Reducing the amount of text would simplify analysis. Although these protocols

might not be at the same level as a dialogic interview, this procedure would have merit as a way to check if themes introduced could be easily coordinated with the present results. The expectation would not be to come up with new dimensions of the topic; rather, it would be to confirm the descriptive structure is useful and can account for new data.

The question of generalizability of phenomenological research findings is interesting. The thematic structure described in the present study came from a very small number of participants when judged by the standard of conventional psychological research. Moreover, participants were a fairly homogeneous group with respect to religion, race and socio-economic status. They were an extremely well-educated group. Phenomenology does not suggest that these characteristics are disqualifying features of a participant population. But what might a similar investigation reveal if the participants were selected from a minority group or a less well educated population? If the structure is to be useful, it must account for the experience of more than those interviewed. Future research must be done to answer this question.

The intention of this study was to discover what themes were <u>common</u> across participants. The study of

individual and group differences regarding the experience of reparation might also reveal new facets of the phenomenon. For instance, Carol Gilligan's (1982) recent (controversial) interpretations of gender differences in moral development suggest that the meaning of reparation may be different across gender. She posits that boys and men resolve moral dilemmas within an orientation of "justice and rights" while women and girls do so on the basis of concerns for "responsibility and caring." An interesting way to go about testing this hypothesis would be a qualitative study with the two groups regarding the meaning of their experiences of repairing relationships.

Finally, the present study concerned an experience considered by the investigator to be normal and healthy; no attempt was made to consider participants' experiences as representative of dysfunction of any kind. Failing to develop the possibility of the healthy reparative mode may predispose one to experience the world in neurotic ways--or worse. Clinical research could be designed to investigate the experience of breach and repair from the perspective of individuals representing certain "diagnostic" groups. For example, an obsessive-compulsive person goes about repairing and undoing and in a much different way than does a person diagnosed as an hysteric. The notion of "masochistic rapprochement" introduced by Cohen and Rasch (1979) suggests that

borderline personality patients typically understand reparation with another person only in terms of sacrifice and exploitation. Discovering more about breakdown in the reparative process may provide important insight into the theory and treatment of psychopathology.

LIST OF REFERENCES

LIST OF REFERENCES

Aanstoos, C. (1986). Phenomenology and the psychology of thinking. In P. Ashworth, A. Giorgi & A. de Koning (Eds.), Qualitative research in psychology (pp. 79-116). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Amato, J. (1982). Guilt and gratitude: A study of the origins of contemporary conscience. London: Greenwood Press.

Ansbacher, H. and Ansbacher, R. (Eds.) (1956). The individual psychology of Alfred Adler: A systematic presentation in selections from his writings. New York: Harper Colophon Books.

Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Barker, R. (1968). Ecological psychology. Stanford University Press.

Barrell, J. (1988). A phenomenological investigation of feeling alone. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Becker, E. (1964). Revolution in psychiatry. New York: Free Press.

Boss, M. (1963). Psychoanalysis and daseinanalysis. New York: Basic Books.

Boss, M. (1977). "I dreamt last night...". New York: Gardner Press.

Buber, M. (1957). Guilt and guilt feelings. Psychiatry, 20, 114-129.

Buber, M. (1958). I and thou. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Buber, M. (1965). The knowledge of man. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Burghardt, G. (1973). Instinct and innate behavior: Toward an ethological psychology. In J. Nevin (Ed.), The study of behavior: Learning, motivation, emotion and instinct (pp. 323-400). Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co.

Cohen, C. & Rasch, N. (1979). Object constancy and the psychotherapist: A response to the borderline patient ina fluid society. Unpublished manuscript.

Cohen, M. (1950). Reason and law. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Cohn, H. (1971). Jewish law in ancient and modern Israel. New York: KTAV.

Collaizzi, P. (1978). Psychological research as the phenomenologist views it. In R. Valle & M. King (Eds.), Existential-phenomenological alternatives for psychology (pp. 48-71). New York: Oxford University Press.

Cronbach, L. (1975). Beyond the two disciplines of psychology. American Psychologist, xx, 116-127.

Dapkus, M. (1985). A thematic analysis of the experience of time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(2), 408-419.

Darwin, J. (1859). The origin of species. London.

de Rivera, J. & Kreilkamp, T. (1981). Conceptual encounter. In J. de Rivera (Ed.), Conceptual encounter: The exploration of human experience (pp. 1-31). New York: Universities Press of America.

Eckhoff, T. (1974). Justice: Its determinants in social interaction. Rotterdam University Press.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1971). Love and hate: The natural history of behavior patterns. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1979). The biology of peace and war: Men, animals and aggression. New York: Viking Press.

Emerson, R. (1983). Contemporary field research. Boston: Little Brown.

Filstead, W. (Ed.) (1970). Qualitative methodology. Chicago: Markham.

Fingarette, H. (1963). The self in transformation. (Harper and Row, New York).

Fingarette, H. (1967). Acceptance of responsibility. In H. Fingarette, On responsibility (pp. 17-45). New York: Basic Books.

Fingarette, H. (1967). Real guilt and neurotic guilt. In H. Fingarette, On responsibility (pp. 79-101). New York: Basic Books.

Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. New York: Penguin Books.

Forer, L. (1980). Criminals and victims. New York: W. W. Norton.

Freeman, L. & Strean, H. (1986). Guilt: Letting go. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Freud, S. (1913). On beginning the treatment. Standard Edition, 12, 123-144.

Freud, S. (1917). Mourning and melancholia. Collected Papers, IV, 152-172.

Friedman, M. (1959, January). Martin Buber: The religious dialogue of Judaism. Address to the Contemporary Philosophies of Religion Symposium, Cincinnatti, Ohio.

Friedman, M. (1965). Introductory essay. In M. Buber, The knowledge of man (pp. 11-58). London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Galway, B. & Hudson, J. (Eds.) (1977). Offender restitution in theory and action. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a human science: A phenomenologically based approach. New York: Harper and Row.

Giorgi, A. (1971). Phenomenology and experimental psychology: I and II. In A. Giorgi, W. Fischer & R. von Eckartsberg (Eds.), Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology: Volume I (pp. 6-29). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Giorgi, A. (1975). An application of phenomenological method in psychology. In A. Giorgi, W. Fischer & E. Murray (Eds.), Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology: Volume II (pp. 82-103). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Giorgi, A. (1984). Phenomenology and psychological research. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Giorgi. A. (1987). The crisis of humanistic psychology. The humanistic psychologist, 15(1), 5-20.

Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. Chicago: AVC.

Goetz, J. & LeCompte, M. (1984). Ethnography and qualitative design in educational research. New York: Academic Press.

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis. New York: Harper & Row.

Goldstein, K. (1940). Human nature in the light of psychopathology. New York: Shocken Books.

Goldstein, L. (1963). Toward a logic of historical constitution. In R. Cohen & M. Wartoksky (Eds.), Epistemology, methodology and the social sciences. Amsterdam: Reidel.

Goodrich, L. (1988). Deafness as difference: A phenomenological investigation of the experience of being deaf. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Green, N. (1973). International law: Law of peace. London: Macdonald & Evans Ltd.

Halling, S. (1988). Meaning and truth in the practice of collaborative research. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Atlanta, August 1988.

Husserl, E. (1962). Ideas. London: Collier. (Originally published, 1913.)

Idhe, D. (1979). Experimental phenomenology. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Jackson, P. (1968). Life in classrooms. New York: Holt, Rineholt and Winston.

Jacob, E. (1987). Qualitative research traditions: A review. Review of Educational Research, 57(1), 1-50.

Jandt, F. (1985). Win-win negotiating: Turning conflict into agreement. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Klein, M. (1927). Criminal tendencies in normal children. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 170-185). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1928). Early stages of the Oedipus conflict. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 186-198). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1929). Infantile anxiety-situations reflected in a work of art and in the creative impulse. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 210-218). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1930). The importance of symbol-formation in the development of the ego. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 219-232). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1933). The early development of conscience in the child. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 248-257). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1934). On Criminality. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 258-261). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 262-289). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1936). Weaning. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 290-305). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1937). Love, guilt and reparation. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 306-343). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Klein, M. (1940). Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states. In, Love, guilt and reparation & other works (pp. 344-369). London: Delacorte Press, 1975.

Koelln, J. (1987). A phenomenological investigation of humor in psychotherapy. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1987). Dissertation Abstracts International, 49, 1391B.

Kolnai, E. (1977). Ethics, value and reality: Selected papers of Aurel Kolnai. London: Athlone Press.

Kruger, D. (1979). An introduction to phenomenological psychology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Kvale, S. (1983). The qualitative research interview: A phenomenological and a hermeneutical mode of understanding. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 14(2), 171-196.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levy, S. (1984). Principles of interpretation. New York: Jason Aronson.

Lorenz, K. (1950). The comparitive method in studying innate behavior. Symposium of the Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine, 4, 221-268.

Lorenz, K. (1966). On aggression. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Macgillivray, W. (1986). Embodiment and ambiguity: A phenomenological investigation of the experience of the lived-body. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1985). Dissertation Abstracts International, 47, 797B.

Mallory, G. (1986). Psychology and selfhood: An inquiry into the hermeneutics of self-understanding. Unpublished manuscript.

McAnany, P. (1977). Restitution as idea and practice: The retributive prospect. In B. Galway & J. Hudson (Eds.), Offender restitution in theory and action (pp. 15-31). Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

McDonald, P. & McDonald, D. (1977). Guilt-free. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.

Miklisanski, J. (1947). The law of retaliation and the pentateuch. Journal of Biblical Literature, 66, 296-300.

Myers, E. (1985). Special possessions: Their characteristics, meaning and developmental function through life. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1985). Dissertation Abstracts International, 46, 981B.

Newman. G. (1983). Just and painful: A case for the corporal punishment of criminals. London: Macmillan.

Pattison, E. M. (1965). On the failure to forgive or to be forgiven. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 19(1), 106-115.

Patton, M. (1980). Qualitative evaluation methods. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Peli, P. (1984). Soloveitchik on repentance. New York: Paulist Press.

Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books.

Pollio, H. (1982). Behavior and existence: An introduction to empirical humanistic psychology. Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing.

Priest, J. (1980). Governmental and judicial ethics in the bible and rabbinic literature. New York: KTAV Publishing House.

Rashdall, J. (1920). The idea of atonement in Christian theology. London: Macmillan.

Romanyshyn, R. (1978). Psychology and the attitude of science. In R. Valle and M. King (Eds.), Existential-phenomenological alternatives for psychology (pp. 18-47). New York: Oxford University Press.

Ross, L. (1987). The experience of death and dying: A phenomenological study. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1987). Dissertation Abstracts International, 48, 888B.

Rowe, J., et al. (1989). The psychology of forgiving another: A dialogal research approach. In R. Valle & S. Halling (Eds.), Existential-phenomenological perspectives in psychology: Exploring the breadth of human experience. New York: Plenum. (To be published, 1989.)

Royce, J. (1973) The present situation in theoretical psychology. In B. Wolman (Ed.), Handbook of general psychology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Rychlak, J. (1977). The psychology of rigorous humanism. New York: Wiley.

Schafer, S. (1965). Restitution to victims of crime--An old correctional aim modernized. Minnesota Law Review, 50, 245-254.

Schafer, S. (1970). Compensation and restitution to victims of crime. Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith.

Schlipp, P. (1967). The philosophy of Martin Buber. London, Cambridge University Press.

Segal, H. (1964). Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. London: Heineman.

Segal, H. (1979). Melanie Klein. New York: Viking Press.

Seidner, B. (1986). A phenomenological analysis of the experience of "falling apart". Dissertation Abstracts International, 48, 889B.

Sills, A. (1988). A phenomenological investigation of the experience of aging in midlife women. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Smith, R. (1971). Guilt: Man and society. New York: Doubleday.

Sperry, R. (1987). Structure and significance of the consciousness revolution. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 8(1), 37-66.

Sproule, J. (1988). Intuition and insight: The therapist's experience of psychotherapy. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Straus, E. (1963). The primary world of the senses. Glencoe: Free Press.

Straus, E. (1966). Phenomenological psychology: The collected papers of Erwin W. Straus. New York: Basic Books.

Thompson, C., Locander, W. & Pollio, H. (1989). Putting the consumer back into consumer research: The philosophy and method of existential-phenomenology. Manuscript submitted for publication, 1989.

Titelman, P. (1979). Some implications of Ricoeur's conception of hermeneutics for phenomenological psychology. In A. Giorgi, R. Knowles & D. Smith (Eds.), Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology: Vol. III. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Tull, J. (1982). The atoning gospel. Mercer University Press.

Valle, R. and King, M. (1978). An introduction to existential-phenomenological thought in psychology. In R. Valle and M. King (Eds.), Existential-phenomenological alternatives for psychology (pp. 6-17). New York: Oxford University Press.

van Kaam, A. (1966). Existential foundations of psychology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Wertz, F. (1984). Procedures in phenomenological research and the question of validity. West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences, 23, 29-48.

Wertz, F. (1986). The question of the reliability of psychological research. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 17(2), 181-205.

Wheelis, A. (1973). How people change. New York: Harper Colophon Books.

Wickler, W. (1972). The biology of the ten commandments. New York: McGraw Hill.

Winnicott, D. W. (1955). The depressive position in normal emotional development. In, Through pediatrics to psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.

Winnicott, D. W. (1963). The development of the capacity for concern. In, The maturational processes and the facilitating environment. New York: International Universities Press.

Wolf, W. (1957). No cross, no crown. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

PROJECT INFORMATION SHEET

The Human Experience of Reparation: A Phenomenological Investigation

My dissertation study is about a normal aspect of interpersonal relationships which I think is universal and happens commonly between people in all kinds of relationships. Literally, the term "reparation" refers to a "making of amends" for a wrong or an injury. Interpersonally, a reparative act is that which is intended to restore a relationship back to a formerly good condition. Reparative phenomena are quite common in the everyday, interhuman world; people in all kinds of relationships at some point become aware of "damage" they have done to a relationship and quite naturally have an urge to do something about it.

The purpose of the present study is to render a description of the structure of the human experience of reparation. It is anticipated that an inclusive and integrative descriptive structure of the experience of reparation will emerge from the analysis of interviews with the study's co-participants. Because the research design is phenomenological, there will be no attempt to test hypotheses or a particular theoretical viewpoint; rather, the sole objective is to obtain a rich, experiential description of the phenomenon of reparation from the perspective of the co-participants.

I am appearing before your group today to see if there might be any individuals who would consider volunteering to be co-participants. If you agreed to participate, the interview would take approximately 60 - 90 minutes of your time at a location which would be convenient for you. Basically, I would be asking you to tell me about experiences you have had involving reparation. Later, I would schedule a 30 minute follow-up interview to discuss with you what I learned from our interview and to see if you would agree, disagree or add anything to my summary description of your experience.

During the interviews, I would ask you to discuss only the personal experiences of reparation about which you would feel comfortable speaking. You should feel free to disclose as much or as little as you care to. You could end the interview and withdraw from the study at any time if for some reason you did not wish to continue. The interviews will be audio-taped in order that I may review and, possibly, transcribe them. However, the information obtained in this study and your personal identity would be held in the strictest confidence by means which I would review with you prior to the interview.

I would be very happy to speak with you further about the study and answer any questions you might have. If you are interested in participating, please call me at one of the numbers below. Thank you very much for your time and interest in my project.

Michael C. Hawthorne, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate in Clinical Psychology

Home: 1320 Francis Station Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37909
690-7957

Campus: Austin Peay Building
Room 401 E
974-2161

APPENDIX B

INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM: INTERVIEW

The interview in which I have asked you to participate today will serve as data for my doctoral dissertation. The purpose of my study is to gain a better understanding of the common human experience of reparation - the things people do to make amends or to repair a relationship. I am interested in learning about reparation from your perspective and from your experience.

If you agree to participate, our interview today should take from 60 - 90 minutes. Basically, I will be asking you to tell me about experiences you have had involving reparation. Later, I'll schedule a 30 minute follow-up interview to discuss with you what I learned from our interview today and to see if you agree, disagree or have anything to add to my summary description of your experience.

During the interviews, you should feel free to discuss only the personal experiences of reparation about which you will feel comfortable speaking. Please feel free to disclose as much or as little as you care to. You may end the interview and withdraw from the study at any time if for some reason you do not wish to continue.

The information obtained in this study and your personal identity will be held in the strictest confidence. The interviews will be audio-taped in order that I may review and, possibly, transcribe them. These tapes and transcripts will be identified only by means of a code number known only to me. Thus, your anonymity will be protected. Any possible transcription of the tapes will not include names or other information that might compromise confidentiality. You may review the tapes and transcripts to delete any portion you wish.

Other than myself, the only individuals who will be allowed to see the transcripted interviews are members of my dissertation committee and my research group in Tennessee. Absolutely no interview data will be published in my dissertation or anywhere else without your review an explicit permission.

If you have any questions at this point or at any point during or after the study, please do not hesitate to ask. You will be given a copy of this information and consent form to keep, should you wish to contact me at any time in the future about this research project.

Michael C. Hawthorne, M.A.
Doctoral Student in Clinical Psychology

Home: 1320 Francis Station Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37909
690-7957

Campus: Austin Peay Building
Room 401 E
974-6060

I have read the above information and consent form and agree to participate in this project.

Signature:_____ Date:_____

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION

My study is about a particular aspect of interpersonal relationships which I think is universal and happens commonly between people in all kinds of relationships - perhaps in every kind of relationship. I believe it is part of normal human experience.

Specifically, the study is about what some people have called reparation. People have described reparation as a "making amends" for a wrong done . . . doing something that repairs a relationship . . . something that restores a relationship back to a good condition.

1) Does this way of describing the experience make sense to you?

2) Can you think of a specific situation in which you were involved in an interaction like this . . . a time when you were very aware of this process happening?

3) Can you think of another time when you were involved in a reparation interaction?

   (Continue to ask for narratives until the co-participant is no longer productive or he/she wishes to discontinue the interview.)

   If no narrative is given of a repairer experience, ask: Can you think of a time when you did the reparation?

   If no narrative is given of a repairee experience, ask: Can you think of a time when someone did the reparation toward you?

4) Is there anything else you would like to tell me about reparation?

APPENDIX D

ILLUSTRATIVE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT
(I: Interviewer / P: Participant)

I: I was wondering if you can think of specific times in which you've been involved with a reparation or making amends experience.

P: When you first mentioned the topic, I kept being confused a little bit about reparations to me or reparations that I've made. I guess I'm still a little confused about where you really want me to go for.

I: I'm interested in both. And if you focus on one or the other, I'm likely to ask for you to tell me then about the one we haven't talked about yet. So which ever one you want us to start on. What seems most compelling for you at this point?

P: I guess the things that are, that are closest to pop up...closest or...it seems a little bit odd at first but it seems to me the reparations to me that were or were not made. I think I've certainly been involved in situations where I had to make reparations for other people; those don't seem as salient to me, for some reason. If anything in my life I've really tried real hard to be in a situation where I wouldn't. Maybe its part of my background or whatever...I've tried to be good...a lot...and I sort of have mixed feelings about that sometimes. I've had a couple of situations where...where I can think that reparation...one where reparation wasn't made and one where it was made. So I think I was real hurt in those situations and so I can see how two...the two things...where one got resolved and the other didn't. I guess I was about fourteen. Anyway it was during high school and got ganged up on one...ganged up on one day in the gym. The instigator of the event was somebody that I really couldn't care for and I guess he knew it. He got some really big guys - and I'm not a big person - but a bunch of really big guys to throw me in the shower and beat on me and stuff like that. And I wasn't in a position where I could fight back. And I've always carried that. It was just one incident, but I've always carried that around. No reparations were ever made or even attempted and I wasn't in a position where I felt like I could...the guy sort of protected himself...a bunch of confederates and...
I: What protected him?

P: Well, he had a bunch of friends. I felt like he wouldn't for one reason or another confront me openly about it. He had to protect himself...the security of friends or whatever. I've always carried that around. It's pretty funny that it popped up in my head when you were asking about that. I wouldn't want to be in that situation. A) where I used other people to try to get my dirty work done for me, wouldn't want anybody to be in that situation that I was in. The other thing is I really resent him...at least let me get him back or try or be open or something like that. It's just a situation where reparations weren't made and it really did bother me.

I: It's not only that you were physically hurt, but something about...

P: Yeah, that wasn't the big part. The big part was just feeling really helpless. It felt like I was victimized but not being able to do anything about it.

I: Is - as you think about it now - what kind of resolution did you think might be made or should be made at the time or around the time. You said reparations were never made, but did something seem...? I'm wondering...

P: I guess it did. The first thing that popped into my head was just an eye-for-an-eye. You know, try to get that guy...to confront him openly about it and get him to fight or something like that. But that situation didn't...You know I didn't feel real comfortable with that either. It really it cut against my values even at the time. I was real torn up about it, you know. Of course I grew up in a quote Christian home. Turn the other cheek. We live in sort of a crazy society, I think like that. It's really condoned in the media to get people back, but morally we're told to follow other examples. So I was torn about it. I guess I resolved it by just letting it eat me. Reparations were made just from the inner dialogue that I had about it. Wanting to do the same to him but not wanting to, not really feeling comfortable with that. And so went this long, long ordeal about it and I read the Bible. I was only fourteen years old. Eventually, I just wasn't part of that circle of friends anymore. So the opportunity never arose...like you know it's not cool to come back and want to fight somebody two years later about something when you were a kid. You're supposed to forget about it. I think I was a little different. I really did remember the situation...I never felt comfortable with the guy but

I never really did anything about it...never wanted to fight him. Occasionally, I have fantasies about it. You know, about getting him alone or just saying "Hey, you know, here we are. Let's see how tough you are now." So...that doesn't strike me as being a real good reparation. I don't think...I think that would have given me some gratification, but it really wasn't...

I: You mean you would have felt more resolved than it does now? I wonder if...

P: It would have put me in the situation of having to make a reparation. I guess the buck has to stop somewhere. I guess that felt like, "Ah, let it stop here". I really didn't want anything to do with him anyway, but somebody I valued or whose attention I valued or friendship I valued or something like that, so I guess I sort of moved away gradually from that whole circle of people. Sometimes I really feel like that situation always...there's no good way for that to be amended. Unless someone comes and says, "Hey, I know I was a jerk!" But a fourteen year old is not going to do that in a situation where obvious power moves and you know, thoughtless, meanness...things like this...that's not going to happen. I didn't really...I didn't go to complain to anybody or tell the coach about it or anything like that. It just wasn't my way of getting things done. I didn't seek reparation through formal lines of justice or whatever.

I: Sounds like part of the helplessness that you felt was that you had no expectation that he would ever come to you and say, "Hey...

P: Yeah, I knew better, I think really he was a jerk. I think he did it to say, "Well, I've got all these big friends I can do whatever I want to do. I don't give a shit about you".

I: Would it have...How would the resolution been different if he was able to come and say at some point that "That was a stupid thing for me to do."

P: I guess it would have helped some of my anxiety... about wondering if I did the right thing about...about not resolving it...just letting it go. I think that would have helped me feel like, "Okay I did the right thing by not pushing his face in the dirt when I got the chance" or something like that. I felt a real conflict of values here. I felt like something should be done but I shouldn't do it. I felt like, "Well, I'm just going to

throw this up to a higher power and develop patience and whatever," but that didn't feel real satisfactory either. I felt like if anything, it encouraged me to be passive about a situation where I might be hurt. Thinking that might be the right thing to do, not to try to get amends from somebody. And I think its at best a mixed blessing where...you know, I don't tell many people about it even. I didn't tell my parents about it. I've sort of carried it with me. I guess thinking that I would get even someday...somehow.

I: But you never did?

P: No, no. It was, it was real mental anguish for me. Because I knew if I get even I'd just be on his, his plane...be the same jerk he was.

I: And you would have something to feel bad about?

P: Yeah.

I: Not that you were confident that he necessarily felt bad, but...

P: Yeah, it would be the same, you know, I wouldn't be any better than he was in terms of...That was back in the early years of high school...and something like that... (Pause) I guess that if I look back on things that I've done that I feel - we're switching the subject - I probably keep doing that - if I look back at the reparations that I've made or haven't made...I guess the ones that stand out are the ones that aren't finished... the ones that I didn't make. I guess a few of those that stand out are not spending more time with my grandfather before he died. We were really close. I feel like it's always nagged me a little bit. His last couple of years I was in college and didn't get to see him that much. He died, and I've always felt some guilt. Sort of a reparation that I never made...

I: To who?

P: I guess to myself and him...I felt like in his old age, that I could have - not should have - but could have if I had that opportunity to spend more time with him and try to learn more from him...not sort of locked into my own life at that stage. Before...it was over...before I knew it, he was gone. (Pause) I can think of other situations where I didn't make reparations. It's disgusting how good I've been. (Laugh) In a sense...not a lot of overt stuff that I've done against

people...where I've had to go back and sort of fix up the mess or whatever. (Pause) I guess the one thing that sticks out is...my wife was in Nebraska pursuing her masters degree up there, and I working two or three jobs. I was really trying to work more than full-time to make ends meet. I didn't realize that at the time that she needed me more than she needed me working...that she needed me for support more than anything else. I sort of ignored that or wasn't aware of it or any thing else. I was kind of blind to it. I feel like I sort of abandoned her, in that respect. I had already made up my mind what we needed and didn't pay any attention to what she needed at the time. I think she felt sort of lost and lonely. I think that at the time...I tried to think that, well...working and working and trying to make money was possibly just an excuse on my part. Not having to be around so I really wasn't that comfortable with what she was doing. I feel like I kind of abandoned her. I made up my mind to try to be a better listener, not assume what I thought when I could find out more accurately by just being close to her. We really grew apart that year. I felt like...I was really distancing myself and...the same kind of reparations I tried to make...in that experience was to take a real look at what we had in common and try to do more thing together and talk more together. Instead of getting locked into like a role and going two different ways.

I: Its an interesting side of reparation. There were some things you did...but it kind of highlighted some of what you didn't do that was - when you look back on it - the stuff that ended being what was hurtful to the relationship somehow.

P: Yeah, I think it was a sin of omission. You know, you can ignore somebody and kill them and they'll die a slow death. You ignore someone...a lack of, lack of attention. That would be my way of hurting somebody. Not so much to hurt them overtly by doing anything but not paying attention...getting so involved in something else that I didn't realize what was going on...with them.

I: How did you become aware that this what you were doing and not doing was something that was...it sounds like it ended up being painful or hurtful to her?

P: Yeah, it did. Both of us really. I got attracted to another woman there. Somebody that wasn't in her program. She was really involved in her program and I felt like basically I didn't have anybody there. So I became friends with a woman there...and I really didn't get

involved with her very much; and she got involved with another guy. It was a real hard situation for both of us, we were trying to grasp for something. I think we had...we had everything we needed for each other, we just weren't paying attention to each other too much. You know, like I needed her and she needed me. I felt real alone and she felt real alone. But it did end up being very hurtful for both of us. And I think we both owned up to our roles and...I guess I have a tendency - like when I become unhappy or dissatisfied - to kind of disassociate...kind of pull back a little bit and I feel like that's what I was doing there. I didn't even realize it. Working these jobs and that's the way I was really distancing myself or something and I was kind of blind to that.

I: Can you talk about the process of getting some sight back about what had been going on?

P: Well, I think I'm...One of the things that made me...sort of got my attention was just how <u>hurt</u> I was and how hurt <u>she</u> was. I realized how far apart we were. I had gone through this experience alone and the dissatisfaction and anger and hurt at that time...and that's one thing. I felt like I was really unhappy and it wasn't all <u>her</u> doing and it wasn't all <u>my</u> doing. So I was just sort of trying to figure what was going on. How had things gotten that far and had we become so dissatisfied and without really catching it? How had things gotten so out of hand? I feel like what we both weren't doing was...we weren't really trying to work hard enough to figure out what our needs were or listening to ourselves. Real scared.

I: It's sounding more and more like...instead of you becoming aware that you had done and not done some things that ended up hurting her as, it was the <u>balance</u> of these things...

P: Yeah.

I: Not necessarily that you were doing anything in isolation or without some other factors. But <u>both</u> of you certainly became aware of your part and maybe the other's part in the distance.
P: I'd say we both felt abandoned but then grew to realize that that feeling came out of our own inability to explore what we were going through at the time, and pushing our feelings off...and trying to ignore our own needs...and trying to make the other person do too much, take care of each other. I think both expected each

other to provide too much for the other person. Especially, we're in a new place, a new environment and a lot of stress. We really expected too much. There wasn't enough safety. Safety and...we didn't have a good enough safety net...and there wasn't enough room there.

I: Within the context of both of you acknowledging your own roles in this, I'm curious about how you dealt with confronting your part and what feelings did you have about your contribution to the distance.

P: Well, I, I felt, I felt like I was lost. That my part, my part in it was - for lack of a better word - reclaiming my energy. Standing up and realized I've got something at stake here, and realizing that it was okay for me to say "Okay, I'm realizing that I'm hurting and you're hurting" and to say that I still wanted to be in that relationship. For me it took a real odd sort of confrontation in confronting myself. You know, what was it I was running away from and what I really wanted? I went through a...I guess I went through a real brief period where I felt like, "Hey, you know..." I realized that I, that I had placed a...given away too much.

I: Given...?

P: I'd given away too much to my wife. I expected her to do too much for me. I felt like part of my owning up to that was realizing, "Hey, I have real needs and I have to take care of myself and I can't let anybody else have that much influence over me anymore." That was difficult to own up to...to realize that I had been somewhat really childish and not paying very much attention to the family situation, not claiming my part. Of saying, "Well, I'm in this too but I'm not here to take care of you. I guess now that I'm thinking about it - my role in that was to sort of wake up, start living in the real world. I felt real energized by that. In a sense we were both real direct with each other. I felt like I made a commitment to myself...real honest with what I wanted... real honest with my anger. I think I became a new person. It was the time I turned thirty. It was a real interesting crisis, a turning point for me emotionally. At that point I had been sort of passive and denying knowledge of my roles and letting things sort of slip by and that's okay. I guess I realized what I thought...I sort of identified the way I was feeling more accurately.

I: The word confrontation seems to be important in the process for owning up to some stuff within you and being honest. I get the feeling that time kind of stood still

somehow and you had a...crisis.

P: It was like I was stuck. I was really stuck there and didn't realize it until something happened and realized, "You might have been part of that". I wasn't just...I wasn't just a victim or I wasn't just a spectator; I was involved in it - the whole situation. I guess I made sort of a vow to myself to get to be more attentive to myself as well as her, not to deny my feelings. I guess I had the tendency to sort of gloss over...gloss over her...gloss over dissatisfaction up to that point. I just made a vow to myself not to do that. To be very open and direct even if that meant, even if that meant being uncomfortable.

I: I get the sense that in this experience there was... this vow had something to do with - of course we were talking about this in reparation or making amends - both to your wife and somehow to yourself as well. The vow had some meaning for her but it seemed to have as much or more meaning for what you owed to yourself somehow.

P: Yes, I guess from going by your questioning that the reparations were certainly like paying someone back or somebody making reparations and paying back. The other part of that is getting over what you've done. Doing whatever you need for yourself to take care of yourself for that, so you don't get caught up in the guilt... replaying that tape...replaying that tape over and over.

I: Can you say some more about what it means to "take care of" so that you don't have the guilt. I want to make sure...

P: I think it's one thing to be sorry and really regret having done something; it's another thing to be more active in that and say, "Okay that's happened, and that's really happened and I'm going to deal with this in a positive way. I'm going to be more active about it." I think the idea is that that's such a real important part in that process for me. To forgive myself...not forget. To grow from that. To be able to be my own best friend on that. Part of it is dwelling on what happened doesn't change anything. In fact, I think it can basically keep you in the same situation.

I: Is there something about being more active? Is that the contrast, instead of just dwelling on it that...?

P: Yeah, I think I made up my mind to basically pay a little closer attention to myself and not to be...not to

let things go, not to let thoughts go, not to let feelings go. But to, but to ask, be more communicative. I think up until that time I'd been - not a quiet person per se, but I am a quiet person - more passive and I didn't like that. If anything I had done against other people, it happened more by omission by not doing something rather than by doing it. That, that's one thing I mentioned earlier. But for me, it's not so much making amends for things I had done but making amends for things I hadn't done. And I really think that for me is the biggest question, in terms of dealing with myself and situations like that. Trying to be more active instead of waiting for something to happen and realize I got jumped on or I didn't get what I wanted out of that. I tried to realize that I play more of a role than that. That was also a little rough being in that type of role or fix or rut or whatever. Just as much of a game as somebody who is really acting overtly with you. Just playing out a tape just a surely.

I: So being too passive and not doing things was then the problem. The solution which comes to mind was being more active, being more...

P: More attentive. I think...realizing that about myself changed the way I viewed, I viewed me...sort of woke up...I felt like there was some things about myself I really didn't like, that I thought were okay at that point. It was difficult to...Okay, I feel like I'm getting a little muddled right now.

I: Maybe a question would help direct that. In the example - I don't experience it as muddled or off the topic at all - but in the example of the time when you kind of woke up to some things that were going on in the marriage, and you confronted yourself and owned up to some things and you talked about making a vow to be more active and more attentive - did you have the experience that some of these things you were doing were for her? I get the idea that some of it was for you, but am I right that...were you conscious or aware of "This is what I'm doing..."

P: Yeah, yeah. I think that I had a, I think that I hadn't been all that attentive. One thing we both hadn't communicated very much. I think we had both been doing too much reading of each other, not enough of open discussion. From that point on, I felt like we've both been able to confront each other better. In some way, the type things we started doing differently were a form of reparation. But I don't look upon it as like

correcting something, just finding a better way to live. I guess it's a form of reparation. Understanding that the way, the way we were heading...it was destructive and unhappy. It wasn't very fulfilling for either one of us.

I: I'm wondering if...you probably already touched on this...was part of that confrontation - especially as it involved both of you - an acknowledgment of how each of you had in sense hurt the other? Or was that more of an implicit kind of...

P: I kind of...I got from it that the way things worked out well...we thought we saw how we had each been <u>self</u>-destructive. And reparations were made most meaningfully to ourselves. And as that worked out, it spilled over into each other. The reparations that we really made may...may in a real positive direct way benefit somebody else. And in this situation, I felt like what we both did was to have better understanding of ourselves and we really make an effort to do that and that way we pay each other back. And we made amends that way. It's kind of an indirect way of doing it, but I felt like that was at the root of it. To make promises, "Well, I'll do this, and that will make me feel better"...that wasn't the way. I felt it was more personal. Understanding some things we were both doing that had been hurting each other...and ourselves.

I: Yeah, that's the point that...

P: Most meaningfully ourselves. I don't think at that point I'd be willing to just change for her, or change my own feelings just for her. I was pretty unhappy with myself and didn't realize it. (Tape side change)

I: I'm trying to remember the second example that you gave. You mentioned it very briefly and I can't bring it back now. Do you remember?

P: Was it about my grandfather?

I: Yes. Thank you. What I remembered from it was, uh, what maybe sticks with you about that...Because he passed away, there would be really no way to repair it with him and make him - if <u>he</u> was offended in any way by you not spending time - there's no way to make that up but seems you still envision the possibility of repairing it with <u>yourself</u> somehow. Or that what's left is for you to acknowledge it, that you can deal with it somehow internally. And that was so important also in situation with your wife that...

P: Yeah.

I: And also with the kid in the high school. It was left to you to repair, the stuff. The circumstances of course were a little different, but somehow it's been very important for you to negotiate and handle these things internally.

P: I think that's my natural way to look at it. I tend to take a lot of responsibility, even undue responsibility. I don't see that now as much. I seem more balanced, I'm more balanced now to not be the victim. It doesn't mean...It means partly that I'm not going to be in the position to be. I guess I'm more attentive to myself. My grandfather...I've always felt a bit incomplete about that. I guess the way that I tried to repair that would be to really understand how much of...how much of life I really did enjoy with him. And feeling guilty about the way I spent a couple of years could only cloud the enjoyment that I had before that. And try to, I think I've really tried to focus on the the times I had with him. And to realize there wasn't anything I could repair. It was like a hurt that can't be fixed...for me. I felt like in all possibility, that it was more of an imagined hurt anyway. Like he didn't feel like I ignored him. I felt like part of it was me just missing him and feeling like I could ease my own grief without doing something...that would straighten that out. A lot of that feeling that I was feeling was just grief from losing him. That's just not being able to have more time of course that's part of it I guess. I guess I'm just less willing to feel guilty about things like that, or other feelings maybe. I was feeling hurt and maybe even anger for him leaving. The initial feeling of guilt was deceptive in that it covered up other things.

I: Sounds like you felt abandoned.

P: Yeah.

I: When you said there was a hurt that may not be able to be fixed...who's hurt?

P: I think...Well you know if indeed he felt like I ignored him, I had no chance to fix it.

I: It was his hurt then.

P: Yeah, if it...I had no real intention...no real the knowledge of that. I think that we enjoyed each other so

much...things were so good that we didn't have to...I think I've worked my way through that by saying, "Well, it would've been good if we'd been together." By seeing it more as if it didn't have to.

I: Are there other instances that come to mind?

P: Where I've made reparations or not made them or what?

I: Is there something that either where you made the reparation or someone making amends?

P: I don't know why this is so hard. Cause I know its not that uncommon. It's so strange, not saying a lot.

I: I think the examples that you have given have been important ones. Ones that stand out for you for a number of reasons. Its kind of interesting; they have highlighted another side of reparation. In those examples, somehow repairing <u>yourself</u> is critical and is at least important if not more important than having an awareness that there was something you needed to do for someone else.

P: There are a number of things...they don't have as much...they don't stand out as much. One would be an example of that kind of phenomenon. I meant to...I meant to get my dad a birthday present and forgot. And so what I did was called him up and invited him to come and see me or something like this to try to add more of a tit-for-tat kind of thing. I guess I didn't really feel...well, I felt guilty about it, but on the other hand I feel like one thing that didn't make that so difficult was that it didn't seem to be a big deal. And not contacting him on that day and it going by - it wasn't major...it wasn't such a big thing. They may have been important at some point. There are times when people have made me feel like it was okay and that they weren't bothered by it as much as I thought they were. They gave me permission to feel okay about it and those are the kind of reparations which are easy.

I: Is the birthday thing with your father...does that stand out as a good example of...

P: Yeah.

I: ...what you're talking about? Let's talk about that one specific thing. There are two points of the process that I was curious about: the first is when you became aware of like, "Oh, gee, what have I done?". There was

some kind of feeling of concern or...?

P: That was concerning that he might be hurt that I'd forgotten because I'd be real hurt if he got hurt. And it's not so much...I remembered but just forgot to mail something. We...we're not that close emotionally; we have kind of a distant relationship. I feel like it's important to me anyway to show that I do care and...I called him up. He happened to be alone that day. My mother was out of town so I felt worse. His birthday had come and gone and nobody had gotten him even a card or...

I: So you were concerned when he thought about it...that he would make out of the situation was idea about how much you cared about him that was wrong?

P: Yeah. I think he would think I didn't care. He didn't think that apparently. And I really don't think he did. Its easy for him not to think birthdays are important. I think one of his characteristics is self-effacement is good. You don't hold yourself up as really important. Moved away from that to some extent but I think he really believes that. I think they are into thinking birthdays aren't such a big deal anymore for people our age. They're into that. I think I got said what I needed to say that "I'm really..." I said exactly what I felt. That helped me get the whole message out. "I did think about you. Just because I didn't call doesn't mean I don't care"...because I really did. I think getting the whole word out helped.

I: I guess because of what you said earlier, I'm aware of the possibility when you say "helped", there was a part of it that helped him and a part of it that helped you.

P: Yeah, yeah. I think, I think it would be easy for him to say, "Oh, well. Don't worry about it" and cut me off. "Ah, it's okay". Where I would have been left with..."And not only that, its okay to even talk about it anymore". That didn't happen.

I: As you would have been left with...?

P: I think I would have been left with the nagging feeling that - "Hey, he was pissed off about it and I'm going to feel like shit about it for a long time."

I: Yeah, that's fair enough.

P: "And that's the way he wants me to feel about it."

But I didn't get that reading.

I: By getting the whole...

P: Yeah, I mean he really did say and I got the feeling that it's not something that important. He had a good time and I had not done something terribly awful. It may be more important to me than it is to him. I'm gauging my own response to his response. I'm learning. I'm learning that such is not always the case, there are different perspectives.

I: But it sounds like putting yourself in his shoes gave you an idea that the possibility existed that he was hurt and led you to check it out - and a little more than just check it out - you were willing to say what you really felt whether or not this happened. There was another part of it - when I said there were two parts - there was another part. You said it's nice and easier to make reparations in these kinds of instances when the person sounds like forgivenesses to something that is easy enough to give, there's...

P: Well it goes two ways. If I'm forgiven and he's forgiven me for screwing up. I'm saying I'm sorry for it.

I: Uh-huh.

P: And it's going both ways. That message is taken on it's face value as it really is. It allows me to finish that. I think that...I'm trying to think of situations where - I know this has happened - and I've felt like they wouldn't really let me apologize. They didn't let me say what I meant. They'd just say it's okay and they didn't want to talk about it or something. Its the type of situation where I was feeling I couldn't close that out.

I: And you are left carrying...?

P: The baggage, yeah.

I: In the case with your father - when he listened to what you had to say and then said apparently, "it's okay" - what...Can you tell me about what closed up...what finished and how did you feel...how were you able to feel that...?

P: I felt like I gave it up. I gave up the responsibility to have to take care of his birthday. I

felt like I wanted to tell him something. I wasn't taking the responsibility of him having a good time...for him...his birthday being what I wanted it to be. That I really gave that up...that I...It helped for me to hear that he...his experience of that was okay with him. That he didn't at least say that he was hurt by me not calling or whatever. Because I could sense that he felt like, "Well, he'll call tomorrow or sometime". His happiness wasn't depending on me calling that day. Had I called and he had been pissed off, it would have been harder for me to take it. But I felt like he listened to me and understood that what happened was just a screw up. I had always called before. What happened was really not normal and in the fact he wasn't sitting around waiting for me call him or...Well, maybe he knew me well enough to say that so that I could feel better. I don't deal on that basis anymore. I gave him the chance to get his part of it out, and if he wanted to tell me he was pissed off, then he could have done it at the time. At least not right before he died.

I: You mentioned that...didn't you say someone could be as sorry as they could be and make an apology but there's, there's a step for that completion to really happen and that's for the other person to really accept it somehow. One could withhold?

P: Yeah. It's like, "Well, okay I know you're a shit. I'll let you apologize so I can hear you say you're a shit". Just to hear their apology in so many words. As far as I'm concerned, it would be okay for somebody to be angry with me about something I did. Five years ago it might not have been okay for me, but they could be angry with me now as long as they let me basically tell them how I felt about my part of it at the time. It would be okay for me to say "I know you're really angry with me. I needed to tell you from my point of view how I felt. I wouldn't feel like I had to repair their anger, too.

I: So that's again another interesting thing. Sounds like you're saying reparation is not necessarily bringing a relationship to a point that everyone feels good about each other again or without anger.

P: Yeah. I don't see it. I guess there has to be some letting go...from both points of view 'cause sometimes the person who is hurt is not going to be helpful. I guess there's a role that...I feel like if I did something to somebody, they are capable of doing something about it. And I wouldn't necessarily have to cure them. That wouldn't be my part of my...to take away

their anger. See what I mean? That is, it's okay for them to be angry but I needed to tell them that I'm sorry. Play the real role in building the bridge.

I: So that you can imagine a reparation that you would feel as complete as far as you're concerned but you wouldn't feel the expectation that the other person would necessarily have to relinquish their anger, bad feelings or whatever they have about you. But you would still feel like "I did what I needed to do and there's no more that I need to do"?

P: Yeah. That's what I feel like. I guess I feel like that's the way that will allow me to get along better - for <u>them</u> <u>too</u> eventually. It's real important for me to tell them, "Well, I played this part in it." And beyond that I have no control over their reaction, especially if you don't tell me what I can do. I guess it gets to be a request of "What can I do?" I think there definitely needs to be. But you can't <u>make</u> people forgive. With that in mind, I guess some forms of anger never really go away as long as the interest is there, so maybe I shouldn't try to take it upon myself to try to expunge that from somebody that I hurt. To take a lot of responsibility for stuff I've done.

I: You don't have a prayer.

P: I don't have a prayer. Right. (Laugh)

I: So to speak, I know where that came from. I mindful of your time. I guess I want to summarize some of this. I guess I'm feeling like you added to the general terrain that people have been talking about...that part of reparation is really taking care of yourself and setting your own house in order, so to speak. Getting it to where you can live with yourself - realizing there are limits on what you really can do for them. I think a willingness to acknowledge your role and to do what it takes to get the relationship back on track. But realizing the limits that you can't make them forget, forgive, accept your apology...

P: Right.

I: ...all those things. It can leave you with a sense of "This is unresolved; you never really took my apology but they're...

P: But I said it.

I: Yeah, but you did say it and...

P: Yeah.

I: ...you did all that you could do.

P: Right.

I: Well, I think that's an important part of the terrain.

P: It's a repair. Its like you see a lot of potholes filled with loose dirt. Yeah, you're repairing. You're really mending it. And maybe if you've got a weak partner on either your side, it doesn't work too well. The best thing you can do is make sure your side is strong.

I: And to play with the metaphor a bit...in order to get one of the real asphalt repair jobs, it sounds like, from your perspective, you really need two people working together toward that; otherwise it's going to be less than an optimal kind of repair. One that might do...one that may be all you can do by yourself. I really appreciate you talking.....

APPENDIX E

TRANSCRIBER CONFIDENTIALITY PLEDGE

In participating in the Reparation study, I understand that I will be listening to the interview tapes of people who rightfully expected that the information contained in those tapes would be kept confidential. I understand that I have a responsibility to honor their privacy and confidentiality. I agree by signing this form to keep all of the information from these tapes to myself, that I will not discuss any of the information with any person not directly involved in this project (i.e., approved by Michael Hawthorne). To violate this contract would be a very serious ethical breach and I pledge not to do so.

_____

Signature of Project Team Member

_____

Michael C. Hawthorne
Project Director

APPENDIX F

APPLICATION OF TEXT CLEARING RULES

Rule 1: Eliminate conversational clutter

Verbatim transcript version:

"I guess the things that are, that are closest to pop up . . . closest or . . . it seems a bit odd at first, but seems to me the reparations to me that were or were not made."

Cleared text version:

"I guess the things that are closest [are] the reparations to me that were or were not made."

Rule 2: Eliminate obvious repetition:

Verbatim transcript version:

"You know, you can ignore somebody and kill them and they'll die a slow death. You ignore someone . . . a lack of, lack of attention."

Cleared text version:

"You can ignore somebody and kill them and they'll die a slow death. A lack of attention."

Rule 3: Shorten sentences

Verbatim transcript version:

"And I think we both owned up to our roles and . . . I guess I have a tendency--like when I become unhappy or dissatisfied--to kind of disassociate . . . kind of pull back a little bit and I feel like that's what I was doing there."

Cleared text version:

"I think we both owned up to our roles. I guess I have a tendency when I become unhappy or dissatisfied to kind of pull back a little bit. I feel like that's what I was doing there."

Rule 4: Eliminate the presence and perspective of the interviewer

Verbatim transcript version:

I: So that's again another interesting thing. Sounds like you're saying reparation is not necessarily bringing a relationship to a point that everyone feels good about each other again or without anger.

P: Yeah. I don't see it. I guess there has to be some letting go . . . from both points of view 'cause sometimes the person who is hurt is not going to be helpful.

Cleared text version:

{Reparation is not necessarily bringing a relationship to a point that everyone feels good about each other again or without anger.} I don't see it. I guess there has to be some letting go from both points of view because sometimes the person who is hurt is not going to be helpful.

Rule 5: Add words to enhance readability and comprehension

Verbatim transcript version:

I: It's not only that you were physically hurt, but something about . . .

P: Yeah, that wasn't the big part. The big part was just feeling really helpless.

Cleared text version:

The big part wasn't [being physically hurt]. The big part was just feeling really helpless.

APPENDIX G

ILLUSTRATIVE CLEARED TEXT

<Interviewer's words>
[Words added to clarify references]

I guess the things that are closest [are] the reparations to me that were or were not made. I think I've certainly been involved in situations where I had to make reparations for other people; those don't seem as salient to me for some reason. In my life I've really tried real hard to be in a situation where I wouldn't. Maybe its part of my background. I've tried to be good - a lot - and I have mixed feelings about that sometimes. I've had a couple of situations where I can think that reparation wasn't made and one where it was made. I think I was real hurt in those situations. One got resolved and the other didn't.

I was about fourteen. During high school [I] got ganged up on one day in the gym. The instigator of the event was somebody that I really couldn't care for and I guess he knew it. He got some really big guys - I'm not a big person - but a bunch of really big guys to throw me in the shower and beat on me and stuff like that. I wasn't in a position where I could fight back. I've always carried that. It was just one incident, but I've always carried that around. No reparations were ever made or even attempted and I wasn't in a position where I felt like I could [get him back]. The guy sort of protected himself [with] a bunch of confederates.

He had a bunch of friends. I felt like he wouldn't for one reason or another confront me openly about it. He had to protect himself. The security of friends or whatever. I've always carried that around. It's pretty funny that it popped up in my head when you were asking about that. I wouldn't want to be in that situation: where I used other people to try to get my dirty work done for me. [I] wouldn't want anybody to be in that situation that I was in. The other thing is I really resent him. At least let me get him back or try or be open or something like that. It's just a situation where reparations weren't made and it really did bother me.

The big part wasn't [being physically hurt]. The big part was just feeling really helpless. It felt like I was victimized but not able to do anything about it.

The first thing that popped into my head [regarding resolution of that event] was just an eye-for-an-eye. Try to get that guy. To confront him openly about it and get him to fight or something like that. But I didn't feel real comfortable with that either. It really it cut against my values even at the time. I was real torn up about it. I grew up in a quote Christian home. Turn the other cheek. We live in sort of a crazy society. It's really condoned in the media to get people back, but morally we're told to follow other examples. So I was torn about it. I guess I resolved it by just letting it eat me. Reparations were made just from the inner dialogue that I had about it. Wanting to do the same to him but not wanting to, not really feeling comfortable with that. So I went this long, long ordeal about it and I read the Bible. I was only fourteen years old. Eventually, I just wasn't part of that circle of friends anymore. So the opportunity never arose [to resolve it]. It's not cool to come back and want to fight somebody two years later about something when you were a kid. You're supposed to forget about it. I think I was a little different. I really did remember the situation. I never felt comfortable with the guy but I never really did anything about it, never wanted to fight him. Occasionally, I have fantasies about it. About getting him alone or just saying, "Here we are. Let's see how tough you are now." That doesn't strike me as being a real good reparation. I think that would have given me some gratification, but it really wasn't [a good reparation].

It would have put <u>me</u> in the situation of having to make a reparation. I guess the buck has to stop somewhere. I guess that felt like, "Let it stop here". I really didn't want anything to do with him anyway. But somebody whose attention or friendship I valued, [that would be different]. I guess I sort of moved away gradually from that whole circle of people. Sometimes I really feel like that there's no good way for that to be amended. Unless someone comes and says, "I know I was a jerk!" But a fourteen year old is not going to do that in a situation where [there is a lot of] obvious power moves and thoughtless meanness. That's not going to happen. I didn't go to complain to anybody or tell the coach about it or anything like that. It just wasn't my way of getting things done. I didn't seek reparation through formal lines of justice.

<Part of the helplessness that I felt was that I had no expectation that he would ever come to me and say, "Hey,

I was a jerk."> I knew better. I think really he was a jerk. I think he did it to say, "I've got all these big friends. I can do whatever I want to do. I don't give a shit about you".

<If he had come at some point to say, "That was a stupid thing for me to do,"> I guess it would have helped some of my anxiety about wondering if I did the right thing. About not resolving it, just letting it go. I think that would have helped me feel like, "Okay, I did the right thing by not pushing his face in the dirt when I got the chance" or something like that. I felt a real conflict of values here. I felt like something should be done but I shouldn't do it. I felt like, "Well, I'm just going to throw this up to a higher power and develop patience and whatever," but that didn't feel real satisfactory either. If anything, it encouraged me to be passive about a situation where I might be hurt. Thinking that might be the right thing to do, not to try to get amends from somebody. And I think its at best a mixed blessing. I don't tell many people about it even. I didn't tell my parents about it. I've sort of carried it with me. I guess thinking that I would get even someday...somehow.

<But I never did.> It was real mental anguish for me. Because I knew if I got even I'd just be on his plane. Be the same jerk he was. I wouldn't be any better than he was.

If I look back at the reparations that I've made or haven't made, the ones that stand out are the ones that aren't finished, the ones that I didn't make. A few of those that stand out are not spending more time with my grandfather before he died. We were really close. I feel like it's always nagged me a little bit. His last couple of years I was in college and didn't get to see him that much. He died, and I've always felt some guilt. Sort of a reparation that I never made. I guess to myself and him. I felt like in his old age that I could have - not should have - but could have if I had that opportunity to spend more time with him and try to learn more from him. Not sort of locked into my own life at that stage. Before I knew it, he was gone. I can think of other situations where I didn't make reparations. It's disgusting how good I've been. (Laugh) In a sense, [there is] not a lot of overt stuff that I've done against people where I've had to go back and sort of fix up the mess or whatever. I guess the one thing that sticks out is my wife was in Nebraska pursuing her masters degree up there, and I working two or three jobs. I was trying to work more than full-time to make ends

meet. I didn't realize that at the time that she needed me more than she needed me working. That she needed me for support more than anything else. I sort of ignored that or wasn't aware of it. I was kind of blind to it. I feel like I sort of abandoned her in that respect. I had already made up my mind what we needed and didn't pay any attention to what she needed at the time. I think she felt sort of lost and lonely. I think that at the time I tried to think that working and working and trying to make money was possibly just an excuse on my part. Not having to be around [because] I really wasn't that comfortable with what she was doing. I feel like I kind of abandoned her. I made up my mind to try to be a better listener, not assume what I thought when I could find out more accurately by just being close to her. We really grew apart that year. I felt like I was really distancing myself. The kind of reparations I tried to make in that experience was to take a real look at what we had in common and try to do more thing together and talk more together. Instead of getting locked into like a role and going two different ways.

<It highlighted some of what I didn't do that ended being what was hurtful to the relationship somehow.> I think it was a sin of omission. You can ignore somebody and kill them and they'll die a slow death. A lack of attention. That would be my way of hurting somebody. Not so much to hurt them overtly by doing anything but not paying attention. Getting so involved in something else that I didn't realize what was going on with them.

[It ended up hurting] both of us really. I got attracted to another woman there. Somebody that wasn't in [my wife's] program. She was really involved in her program and I felt like basically I didn't have anybody there. So I became friends with a woman there. I really didn't get involved with her very much; and she got involved with another guy. It was a real hard situation for both of us. We were trying to grasp for something. I think we had everything we needed for each other. We just weren't paying attention to each other too much. I needed her and she needed me. I felt real alone and she felt real alone. It did end up being very hurtful for both of us. I think we both owned up to our roles. I guess I have a tendency when I become unhappy or dissatisfied to kind of pull back a little bit. I feel like that's what I was doing there. I didn't even realize it. Working these jobs was the way I was really distancing myself and I was kind of blind to that.

One of the things that got my attention was just how hurt

I was and how hurt she was. I realized how far apart we were. I had gone through this experience alone and the dissatisfaction and anger and hurt at that time. I felt like I was really unhappy and it wasn't all her doing and it wasn't all my doing. I was just sort of trying to figure what was going on. How had things gotten that far and had we become so dissatisfied and without really catching it? How had things gotten so out of hand? I feel like what we both weren't doing was we weren't really trying to work hard enough to figure out what our needs were or listening to ourselves. Real scared.

<Both of us certainly became aware of our part and the other's part in the distance.> I'd say we both felt abandoned but then grew to realize that that feeling came out of our own inability to explore what we were going through at the time. Pushing our feelings off and trying to ignore our own needs. Trying to make the other person do too much, [to] take care of each other. I think both expected each other to provide too much for the other person. Especially, we're in a new place, a new environment and a lot of stress. We really expected too much. There wasn't enough safety. We didn't have a good enough safety net...and there wasn't enough room there.

<In confronting my contribution to the distance>, I felt like I was lost. My part in it was - for lack of a better word - reclaiming my energy. Standing up and realizing I've got something at stake here, and realizing that it was okay for me to say, "I'm realizing that I'm hurting and you're hurting" and to say that I still wanted to be in that relationship. For me it took a real odd sort of confrontation in confronting myself. What was it I was running away from and what I really wanted? I realized that I had given away too much.

I'd given away too much to my wife. I expected her to do too much for me. I felt like part of my owning up to that was realizing, "Hey, I have real needs and I have to take care of myself and I can't let anybody else have that much influence over me anymore." That was difficult to own up to, to realize that I had been somewhat childish and not paying very much attention to the family situation, not claiming my part. Saying, "Well, I'm in this too, but I'm not here to take care of you. I guess now that I'm thinking about it, my role in that was to sort of wake up, start living in the real world. I felt real energized by that. We were both real direct with each other. I felt like I made a commitment to myself [to be] real honest with what I wanted, real honest with my anger. I think I became a new person. It was the

time I turned thirty. It was a real interesting crisis, a turning point for me emotionally. At that point I had been sort of passive and denying knowledge of my roles and letting things sort of slip by and that's okay. I guess I realized what I thought. I sort of identified the way I was feeling more accurately.

<It was a confrontation and a crisis.> It was like I was stuck. I was really stuck there and didn't realize it until something happened and realized, "You might have been part of that". I wasn't just a victim or a spectator; I was involved in the whole situation. I made a vow to myself to get to be more attentive to <u>myself</u> as well as her, not to deny my feelings. I guess I had the tendency to sort of gloss over...gloss over her...gloss over dissatisfaction up to that point. I just made a vow to myself not to do that. To be very open and direct even if that meant being uncomfortable.

<The vow had some meaning for her but it seemed to have as much or more meaning for what I owed to myself somehow.> The reparations were certainly like paying someone back or somebody making reparations and paying back. The other part of that is getting over what you've done. Doing whatever you need for yourself to take care of yourself for that, so you don't get caught up in the guilt, replaying that tape over and over.

I think it's one thing to be sorry and really regret having done something; it's another thing to be more <u>active</u> in that and say, "Okay that's happened, and that's really happened and I'm going to deal with this in a positive way. I'm going to be more active about it." I think the idea is that that's such a real important part in that process for me. To forgive myself - not forget - to grow from that. To be able to be my own best friend on that. Dwelling on what happened doesn't change anything. In fact, I think it can basically keep you in the same situation.

I made up my mind to basically pay a little closer attention to myself and not to let things go, not to let thoughts or feelings go. But to ask, be more communicative. I think up until that time I'd been - not a quiet person per se, but I am a quiet person - more passive and I didn't like that. If anything I had done against other people, it happened more by <u>omission</u> by not doing something rather than by doing it. But for me, it's not so much making amends for things I had done but making amends for things I hadn't done. Trying to be more active instead of waiting for something to happen

and realize I got jumped on or I didn't get what I wanted out of that. I tried to realize that I play more of a role than that. That was also a little rough being in that type of role or rut. Just as much of a game as somebody who is really acting overtly with you. Just playing out a tape just a surely.

<Being too passive was then the problem. The solution was being more active.> I think realizing that about myself changed the way I viewed me. [I] sort of woke up.

I think we had both been doing too much reading of each other, not enough open discussion. From that point on, I felt like we've both been able to confront each other better. The type things we started doing differently were a form of reparation. But I don't look upon it as correcting something, just finding a better way to live. I guess it's a form of reparation. Understanding that the way we were heading was destructive and unhappy. It wasn't very fulfilling for either one of us.

We saw how we had each been <u>self</u>-destructive. Reparations were made most meaningfully to ourselves. As that worked out, it spilled over into each other. The reparations that we really made may in a real, positive, direct way benefit somebody else. In this situation, I felt like what we both did was to have better understanding of ourselves and we really made an effort [and that's how] we paid each other back. We made amends that way. It's an indirect way of doing it, but I felt like that was at the root of it. To make promises, "Well, I'll do this, and that will make me feel better." That wasn't the way. I felt it was more personal. Understanding some things we were both doing that had been hurting each other...and ourselves.

Most meaningfully ourselves. I don't think at that point I'd be willing to just change for her, or change my own feelings just for her. I was pretty unhappy with myself and didn't realize it.

<Because my grandfather passed away, there is no way to repair it with him, but I still envision the possibility of repairing it with <u>myself</u> somehow. What's left is for me to acknowledge it so I can deal with it internally. And with my wife and the kid in the high school. It was left to <u>me</u> to repair. The circumstances of course were a little different, but somehow it's been very important for me to negotiate and handle these things internally.> I think that's my natural way to look at it. I tend to take a lot of responsibility, even undue responsibility.

I don't see that now as much. I seem more balanced now to not be the victim. It means partly that I'm not going to be in the position to be. I guess I'm more attentive to myself. I've always felt a bit incomplete about [my grandfather]. I guess the way that I tried to repair that would be to really understand how much of life I really did enjoy with him. Feeling guilty about the way I spent a couple of years could only cloud the enjoyment that I had before that. I've really tried to focus on the the times I had with him, and to realize there wasn't anything I could repair. It was like a hurt that can't be fixed...for me. I felt like in all possibility, that it was more of an imagined hurt anyway. Like he didn't feel like I ignored him. I felt like part of it was me just missing him and feeling like I couldn't ease my own grief without doing something that would straighten that out. I was feeling just grief from losing him. Just not being able to have more time of course is part of it. I'm just less willing to feel guilty about things like that, or other feelings maybe. I was feeling hurt and maybe even anger for him leaving. The initial feeling of guilt was deceptive in that it covered up other things.

If indeed he felt like I ignored him, I had no chance to fix [his hurt]. I had no real intention...no real the knowledge of [hurting him]. I think that we enjoyed each other so much, things were so good that we didn't have to....I think I've worked my way through that by saying, "Well, it would've been good if we'd been together." By seeing it more as if it didn't have to.

I don't know why this is so hard [to think of examples] cause I know its not that uncommon.

There are a number of things that don't stand out as much. I meant to get my dad a birthday present and forgot. And so what I did was called him up and invited him to come and see me to try to add more of a tit-for-tat kind of thing. I guess I didn't really feel...well, I felt guilty about it, but on the other hand, one thing that didn't make that so difficult was that it didn't seem to be a big deal. Not contacting him on that day and it going by, it wasn't major, it wasn't such a big thing. They may have been important at some point. There are times when people have made me feel like it was okay and that they weren't bothered by it as much as I thought they were. They gave me permission to feel okay about it and those are the kind of reparations which are easy.

[It] was concerning that he might be hurt that I'd

forgotten because I'd be real hurt if he got hurt. I remembered but just forgot to mail something. We're not that close emotionally. We have kind of a distant relationship. I feel like it's important to me anyway to show that I do care and I called him up. He happened to be alone that day. My mother was out of town that day so I felt worse. His birthday had come and gone and nobody had gotten him even a card.

I think he would think I didn't care. He didn't think that apparently. And I really don't think he did. Its easy for him not to think birthdays are important. I think one of his characteristics is [that] self-effacement is good. You don't hold yourself up as important. [He has] moved away from that to some extent, but I think he really believes that. I think they are into thinking birthdays aren't such a big deal anymore for people our age. I got said what I needed to say. I said exactly what I felt. That helped me get the whole message out. "I did think about you. Just because I didn't call doesn't mean I don't care," because I really did. I think getting the whole word out helped.

I think it would be easy for him to say, "Don't worry about it," and cut me off. I would have been left with, "And not only that, its not okay to even talk about it anymore". That didn't happen. I think I would have been left with the nagging feeling that, "Hey, he was pissed off about it and I'm going to feel like shit about it for a long time. And that's the way he wants me to feel about it." But I didn't get that reading.

I mean he really did say and I got the feeling that it's not something that important. He had a good time and I had not done something terribly awful. It may be more important to me than it is to him. I'm gauging my own response to his response. I'm learning that such is not always the case, there are different perspectives.

<Putting myself in his shoes gave me an idea that the possibility existed that he was hurt and led me to check it out. Its easier to make reparations in these kinds of instances when forgivenesses to something that is easy enough to give.> Well, it goes two ways. I'm forgiven and he's forgiven me for screwing up. I'm saying I'm sorry for it. And it's going both ways. That message is taken on it's face value. It allows me to finish that. I'm trying to think of situations where - I know this has happened - and I've felt like they wouldn't really let me apologize. They didn't let me say what I meant. They'd just say it's okay and they didn't want to talk about it

or something. Its the type of situation where I was feeling I couldn't close that out. <And I am left carrying> the baggage.

<When my dad said its okay>, I felt like I gave it up. I gave up the responsibility to have to take care of his birthday. I felt like I wanted to tell him something. I wasn't taking the responsibility of him having a good time, for his birthday being what I wanted it to be. I really gave that up. It helped for me to hear that his experience of [the day] was okay with him. That he didn't at least <u>say</u> that he was hurt by me not calling or whatever. Because I could sense that he felt like, "Well, he'll call tomorrow or sometime". His happiness wasn't depending on me calling that day. Had I called and he had been pissed off, it would have been harder for me to take it. But I felt like he listened to me and understood that what happened was just a screw up. I had always called before. What happened was really not normal, and he wasn't sitting around waiting for me call him. Well, maybe he knew me well enough to say that so that I could feel better. I don't deal on that basis anymore. I gave him the chance to get his part of it out, and if he wanted to tell me he was pissed off, then he could have done it at the time. At least not right before he dies. (Laugh)

<There's a step for completion to really happen that one could withhold.> It's like, "Well, okay I know you're a shit. I'll let you apologize so I can hear you say you're a shit". Just to hear their apology in so many words. As far as I'm concerned, it would be okay for somebody to be angry with me about something I did. Five years ago it might not have been okay for me, but they could be angry with me now as long as they let me basically tell them how I felt about my part of it at the time. It would be okay for me to say "I know you're really angry with me. I needed to tell you from my point of view how I felt." I wouldn't feel like I had to repair their anger, too.

<Reparation is not necessarily bringing a relationship to a point that everyone feels good about each other again or without anger.> I don't see it. I guess there has to be some letting go from both points of view because sometimes the person who is hurt is not going to be helpful. I guess there's a role that....I feel like if I did something to somebody, they are capable of doing something about it. I wouldn't necessarily have to cure them. That wouldn't be my part to take away their anger. It's okay for them to be angry but I needed to tell them

that I'm sorry. Play the real role in building the bridge.

<I can imagine a reparation that I would feel as complete as far as I'm concerned but I wouldn't feel the expectation that the other person would necessarily have to relinquish their anger, bad feelings or whatever they have about me. "I did what I needed to do and there's no more that I need to do."> I feel like that's the way that will allow me to get along better - for <u>them</u> <u>too</u> eventually. It's real important for me to tell them, "I played this part in it." And beyond that I have no control over their reaction, especially if you don't tell me what I can do. I guess it gets to be a request of, "What can I do?" I think there definitely needs to be. But you can't <u>make</u> people forgive. With that in mind, I guess some forms of anger never really go away as long as the interest is there. So maybe I shouldn't try to take it upon myself to try to expunge that from somebody that I hurt. To take a lot of responsibility for stuff I've done.

<Part of reparation is really taking care of yourself and setting your own house in order. Getting it to where you can live with yourself - realizing there are limits on what you really can do for them. A willingness to acknowledge your role and to do what it takes to get the relationship back on track. But realizing the limits that you can't make them forget, forgive, or accept your apology.> But I said it.

It's a repair. Its like you see a lot of potholes filled with loose dirt. You're repairing. You're really mending it. And maybe if you've got a weak partner on either your side, it doesn't work too well. The best thing you can do is make sure your side is strong. <And to play with the metaphor a bit, in order to get one of the real asphalt repair jobs, you really need two people working together toward that. Otherwise it's going to be less than an optimal kind of repair.>

APPENDIX H

ILLUSTRATIVE SUMMARY TEXT

Locker Room
If I look back at the reparations that I've made or haven't made, the ones that stand out are the ones that aren't finished. I've certainly been involved in situations when I had to make reparations for other people, but those don't seem as salient to me as those when others had to make reparations to me. Perhaps because of my background of growing up in a Christian home, I've really tried hard throughout my life to be in a situation where I wouldn't have to make reparations. I've tried to be good and I have mixed feelings about that sometimes. It's disgusting how good I've been. (Laugh)

When I was about fourteen, I got ganged up on one day in the gym. The instigator of the event was somebody that I really couldn't care for and I guess he knew it. I'm not a big person, and he got some really big guys to throw me in the shower and beat on me. I think really he was a jerk and he did it to say, "I've got all these big friends. I can do whatever I want to, and I don't give a shit about you". I was really hurt by it. It was just one incident, but I've always carried that around. No reparations were ever made or even attempted, and it really did bother me.

I wouldn't want to use other people to try to get my dirty work done for me. And I also wouldn't want anybody to be in the situation that I was in. The big part wasn't being physically hurt. The big part was just feeling really helpless. I was victimized and wasn't able to do anything about it.

The first thing that popped into my head regarding resolution of that event was just an eye-for-an-eye: try to get that guy back, confront him openly about it and get him to fight or something like that. But I didn't feel real comfortable with that either. It really cut against my values at the time of turning the other cheek, and I was real torn up about it. In our crazy society, it's really condoned in the media to get people back, but morally we're told to follow other examples. So I was torn about it.

Also, I wasn't in a position where I could fight back or

get him back because the guy sort of protected himself with a bunch of confederates. For one reason or another, he wouldn't confront me openly about it. He protected himself with the security of his friends. I really resent him. I should at least have had the opportunity to try to get him back or openly confront him.

I didn't go to complain to anybody or tell the coach or my parents about it or anything like that. It just wasn't my way of getting things done. I didn't seek reparation through formal lines of justice. I don't tell many people about it even. I've sort of carried it with me. I guess thinking that I would get even someday...somehow.

But I never did. It's been real mental anguish for me. I guess I resolved it by just letting it eat me. Reparations were made just from the inner dialogue that I had about it. I wanted to do the same to him but at the same time I didn't want to because I didn't feel comfortable with that. So I went this long, long ordeal about it. I read the Bible. Eventually I just wasn't part of that circle of friends anymore, so the opportunity never arose to resolve it. It's not cool to come back and want to fight somebody two years later about something when you were a kid. You're supposed to forget about it. I think I was a little different in that I really did remember the situation, but I never really did anything about it.

Occasionally, I have fantasies about fighting him, about getting him alone and saying, "Let's see how tough you are now." But that doesn't strike me as being a real good reparation. It would have given me some gratification, but it would have put me in the situation of having to make a reparation. If I get even, I'd just be on his plane and be the same jerk he was. I guess I felt, "Let the buck stop here". I really didn't want anything to do with him anyway. It would have been different if I had valued his friendship.

I really feel like that there's no good way for that to be amended, unless he came to me said, "I know I was a jerk." But a fourteen year old is not going to do that in a situation where there is a lot of obvious power moves and thoughtless meanness. That's not going to happen. Part of the helplessness that I felt was that I had no expectation that he would ever apologize.

If he had come at some point to say, "That was a stupid thing for me to do," I guess it would have helped some of

my anxiety about wondering if I did the right thing in not resolving it, just letting it go. It would have helped me feel like I did the right thing by not pushing his face in the dirt when I got the chance. I felt a real conflict of values here. I felt like something should be done but I shouldn't do it. "I'm just going to throw this up to a higher power and develop patience." But that didn't feel real satisfactory either. If anything, not trying to get amends from somebody encouraged me to be passive about a situation where I might be hurt. I think not doing something about the situation is at best a mixed blessing.

Grandfather
Another example of a reparation that was not finished that stands out to me now is not spending more time with my grandfather before he died. We were really close. I was in college during his last few years and I didn't get to see him that much. He died, and I've always felt some guilt. I felt like I could have spent more time with him to try to learn more from him. But I was sort of locked into my own life at that stage, and before I knew it, he was gone. It's a reparation that I never completed - both to myself and him. I feel like it's always nagged me. I've always felt a bit incomplete about him.

There is no way to repair it with him because he passed away. But I still envision the possibility of repairing it with myself somehow. What's left is for me to acknowledge it so I can deal with it internally. I guess the way that I would try to repair that would be to really understand how much of life I really did enjoy with him. Feeling guilty about the way I spent a couple of years could only cloud the enjoyment that I had before that. I've really tried to focus on the the times I had with him, and to realize there wasn't anything I could repair. It was like a hurt that can't be fixed...for me.

I felt like it was very possible that it was more of an imagined hurt anyway. Maybe he didn't feel like I ignored him. I felt like part of the reason I was feeling guilty was just missing him and feeling like I couldn't ease my grief about losing him and our time together without doing something that would straighten that out. I was feeling hurt and angry about him leaving. The initial feeling of guilt was deceptive in that it covered up other feelings.

If indeed he felt like I ignored him, I had no chance to fix his hurt. I had no real intention of hurting him and no real knowledge that I did. I think that we enjoyed

each other so much, that things were so good that we didn't have to go through a formal process of apology. I think I've worked my way through that by seeing it more as if that process didn't have to happen.

In a way, it's like with the kid in high school. It was left to me to repair. The circumstances of course were different, but somehow it's been very important for me to negotiate and handle these things internally. I think that's my natural way to look at it. I tend to take a lot of responsibility - even undue responsibility. Now I seem more balanced so that I'm not in the position to be the victim. I guess I'm more attentive to myself. I'm just less willing to feel guilty about things like that now.

Wife
There isn't a lot of overt stuff that I've done against people where I've had to go back and sort of fix up the mess or whatever. I guess one that sticks out is when my wife was doing her internship and I was working two or three jobs to make ends meet. I didn't realize at the time that she needed me for support more than she needed me working. I sort of ignored that or wasn't aware of it. I was kind of blind to it. I had already made up my mind what we needed and didn't pay any attention to what she needed at the time.

What I didn't do ended being what was hurtful to the relationship. I think it was a sin of omission. You can ignore somebody and they'll die a slow death from a lack of attention. That would be my way of hurting somebody. Not so much by overtly hurting them but by getting so involved with something that I stopped paying attention to what was going on with them.

I feel like I sort of abandoned her, and I think she felt lost and lonely. We really grew apart that year. I felt like I was really distancing myself, and it ended up hurting both of us really. My wife was really involved in her program and I felt like I didn't have anybody there. So I got attracted to and became friends with a another woman during that time. My wife also got involved with another guy. We were trying to grasp for something. We had everything we needed for each other, but we just weren't paying attention to each other. I needed her and she needed me, and we both felt alone. One of the things that got my attention was just how hurt I was and how hurt she was. I realized how far apart we were. I had gone through the experience of dissatisfaction and anger and hurt alone. I felt like it

wasn't all her doing and it wasn't all my doing. I started trying to figure what was going on. How had things gotten so out of hand that we had become so dissatisfied without really catching it? I feel like we weren't listening to ourselves to discover what we needed. We were both real scared.

Both of us certainly became aware of our part and the other's part in the distance, and I think we both owned up to our roles. We were both real direct with each other. We both felt abandoned, but then grew to realize that that feeling came out of our own inability to explore what we were going through at the time. We were pushing our feelings off and ignoring our own needs. I think we both expected each other to provide too much for the other person. We really expected too much.

In confronting my contribution to the distance, I felt like I was lost. I know that when I become unhappy or dissatisfied, I have a tendency to pull back a little bit. Though I didn't realize it at the time, working those jobs was just an excuse to not be around because I really wasn't that comfortable with what she was doing. I had to reclaim my energy, to stand up and realize, "I've got something at stake here. I'm hurting and you're hurting, but I still want to be in this relationship." It took an odd sort of confrontation. What was it I was running away from and what was it I really wanted?

It was like I was stuck. Not until something happened did I realize my part in it. I wasn't just a victim or a spectator; I was involved in the whole situation. I realized that I had given away too much to my wife and that I expected her to do too much for me. Part of my owning up to that was realizing, "Hey, I have real needs and I have to take care of myself and I can't let anybody else have that much influence over me anymore." It was difficult to own up to and to realize that I had been somewhat childish in not paying very much attention to the family situation and not claiming my part.

My role in that was to sort of wake up, to start living in the real world. I felt real energized by that. I made a commitment to myself to be real honest with what I wanted and real honest with my anger. I think I became a new person. It was a crisis and a turning point for me emotionally. I had been passive and denying knowledge of my roles and letting things sort of slip by. I sort of identified the way I was feeling more accurately.

The kind of reparation I tried to make was to take a close look at what we had in common and to try to do more things together and to talk more. Instead of getting locked into a role and going two different ways. I made up my mind to try to be a better listener and to not just assume things when I could find out more accurately by just being close to her. I made a vow to myself to get to be more attentive to myself as well as her, not to deny my feelings. I had the tendency to sort of gloss over dissatisfaction. I just made a vow to myself to be very open and direct - even if that meant being uncomfortable.

The vow had some meaning for her but it seemed to have as much or more meaning for what I owed to myself somehow. The reparations certainly had some value in terms of paying someone back, but the other part of that was for me to get over what I'd done. To forgive myself - not forget - and to grow from that. To be able to be my own best friend. I think it's one thing to be sorry and really regret having done something and it's another thing to deal with it in a more active, positive way so you don't get caught up in the guilt, replaying that tape over and over. Dwelling on what happened doesn't change anything. In fact, I think it can basically keep you in the same situation.

Being too passive was then the problem. The solution was being more active. I think realizing that about myself changed the way I viewed myself. From that point on, I felt like we've both been able to confront each other better. The type things we started doing differently were a form of reparation. We found a better way to live. I guess it's a form of reparation. Understanding that the way we were heading was destructive and unhappy and not fulfilling for either one of us. We saw how we had each been self-destructive. Reparations were really made most meaningfully to ourselves. As that worked out, it spilled over into each other. The reparations that we really made may in a real, positive, direct way benefit somebody else. In this situation, we paid each other back by making an effort to better understanding ourselves. We made amends that way.

Father

There have been times when people have made me feel that they weren't bothered by what I had done as much as I thought they were. They gave me permission to feel okay about it and those are the kind of reparations which are easy.

My father and I are not that close emotionally. We have kind of a distant relationship, but I feel like it's important to me to show that I do care. Once, I meant to get my dad a birthday present but forgot. I was concerned that he might be hurt, perhaps thinking that I didn't care about him. Putting myself in his shoes gave me an idea that the possibility existed that he was hurt and it led me to check it out. I'd be real hurt if he got hurt.

So I called him up and invited him to come and see me to try to give him something to make up for me forgetting. It turned out that my mother was out of town that day, so he was alone. I felt worse. His birthday had come and gone and nobody had gotten him even a card. I felt guilty about it. I got said what I needed to say which was exactly what I felt. "I did think about you. Just because I didn't call doesn't mean I don't care."

I think it would be easy for him to say, "Don't worry about it," and cut me off. I would have been left with, "And not only that, it's not okay to even talk about it anymore". That didn't happen. I would have been left with the nagging feeling, "He was pissed off about it and I'm going to feel like shit about it for a long time. And that's the way he <u>wants</u> me to feel about it."

But I didn't get that reading. At least he didn't <u>say</u> that he was hurt by me not calling. I could sense that he felt like, "Well, he'll call tomorrow or sometime". His happiness wasn't depending on me calling that day. He really did say that it wasn't that important. At this point in our lives, my parents don't believe birthdays are important. He believes that self-effacement is good. You don't hold yourself up as important. Apparently he didn't take it that I didn't care. He had a good time and I hadn't done something terribly awful. What he said made it easier for me to limit how guilty I felt about forgetting. It may be more important to <u>me</u> than it is to him. I'm gauging my own response to his response. I'm learning that that is not always so accurate because there are different perspectives.

When my dad said that his experience of the day was okay with him, I felt like I gave the responsibility to have to take care of his birthday and for him having a good time. I really gave that up. Had he been pissed off when I called, it would have been harder for me to take it. But I felt like he listened to me and understood that what happened was just a screw up. I had always

called before. What happened was really not normal, and he wasn't sitting around waiting for me call him.

Maybe he knew me well enough to say that so that I could feel better. But I don't deal on that basis anymore. I gave him the chance to get his part of it out, and if he wanted to tell me he was pissed off, then he could have done it at the time. At least not right before he dies. (Laugh)

Two Ways

It's easier to make reparations when forgivenesses to something that is easy enough for the other to give. And it goes two ways. I'm forgiven and he's forgiven me for screwing up. The message is taken on it's face value, and it allows me to finish that. I've been in situations where I've felt they wouldn't really let me apologize. They didn't let me say what I meant or they'd just say it's okay and didn't want to talk about it or something. I was left feeling I couldn't close it out, and I am left carrying the baggage. There's a step necessary for completion that one could withhold. It's like you just want to hear their apology in so many words. "I know you're a shit. I'll let you apologize so I can hear you say you're a shit".

As far as I'm concerned, it would be okay for somebody to be angry with me about something I did as long as they let me tell them how I felt about my part of it at the time. Five years ago that might not have been okay for me. Now it would be okay for me to say "I know you're really angry with me. I needed to tell you how I felt from my point of view." I wouldn't feel like I had to repair their anger, too, because reparation is not necessarily bringing a relationship to a point that everyone feels good about each other again or without anger. I don't see it that way. I guess there has to be some letting go from both points of view because sometimes the person who is hurt is not going to be helpful. I guess there's a role that they have to carry through with for reparation to occur. If I did something to somebody, they are capable of doing something about it. I wouldn't necessarily have to cure them. It wouldn't be my part to take away their anger, but I need to tell them that I'm sorry. I play a real role in building the bridge.

A reparation could feel complete from my perspective without me feeling the expectation that the other would necessarily have to relinquish their anger or bad feelings. "I did what I needed to do and there's no more

that I need to do." I feel like that's the way that will allow me to get along better - for them too eventually. It's real important for me to tell them, "I played this part in it." And I think there definitely needs to be the question, "What can I do?" But beyond that, I have no control over their reaction - especially if they don't tell me what I can do. You can't make people forgive. With that in mind, I guess some forms of anger never really go away as long as the interest is there. So maybe I shouldn't try to take it upon myself to try to expunge that from somebody that I hurt. To hold onto the responsibility for stuff I've done when the other doesn't participate in the process.

Part of reparation is really taking care of yourself and setting your own house in order. Getting it to where you can live with yourself - realizing there are limits on what you really can do for them. A willingness to acknowledge your role and to do what it takes to get the relationship back on track. But realizing the limits that you can't make them forget, forgive, or accept your apology. But I said it.

It's a repair. It's like you see a lot of potholes filled with loose dirt. You're repairing. You're really mending it. And maybe if you've got a weak partner on either side, it doesn't work too well. The best thing you can do is make sure your side is strong. And to play with the metaphor a bit, in order to get one of the real "asphalt" repair jobs, you really need two people working together toward that. Otherwise it's going to be less than an optimal kind of repair.

APPENDIX I

PARTICIPANT FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Michael C. Hawthorne
1320 Francis Station Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37909

July 21, 1988

Dear <Participant>,

When I met with you in the Fall, I had no idea it would be so long before I was ready to meet with you to go over your interview. The process of transcribing, summarizing and analyzing the protocols has been time-consuming and arduous but clearly rewarding and exciting as well.

I want to thank you again for your time and involvement in my study. I've spent a great deal of time with each of the interviews and learned a great deal from every one. I was impressed with the vividness of the stories and I was grateful for your openness in telling me about some very important and difficult experiences. The quality and richness of my study truly depended on the interviews. I can't thank you enough, for you have indeed helped make my dissertation a meaningful and useful work.

I am looking forward to our meeting on <day>, <date> at <time>. My first priority for that meeting is to make sure I have summarized your interview in a way that "fits" with your experience. I tried very hard to use your words to convey what I understood you to say. If I have misunderstood you, I <u>really</u> want to know. So please read over the summary and mark any sections that you have questions about.

Also, I would like to ask you to consider signing the enclosed release. My results section will need to contain excerpts from the interviews, and I would like to put at least a few full summaries in an appendix. Of course, there will be <u>no</u> identifying information connected to any excerpt, and you will notice that I changed names, dates, cities, relationships, etc., to disguise your identity.

Signing the release will let me know that you have no problem with me printing part or all of your summary as you have it today. We can talk about this at our meeting if you have any questions. I certainly will not quote your interview without your written consent.

Please feel free to contact me at 974-6060 if you need to change our appointment for any reason or if you have any questions. Thanks again and see you on <day>.

Sincerely,

Michael C. Hawthorne

APPENDIX J

INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM: SUMMARY

As I mentioned to you at the time of our interview, I am interested in using part or all of the summary of your interview in my dissertation. Excerpts will be used in the body of the text to give specific examples of the way people describe their experience of reparation. Full summaries might be included in an appendix to give the reader access to the data I described in the dissertation.

I have provided you with my summary of our conversation. I deleted identifying information, my questions and parts of the talk which were not related to reparation. I changed names, dates, places and the precise nature of some relationships to disguise your identity. You may notice that a few of the statements were actually spoken by me. I chose to include these only when my words in the interview seemed to precisely summarize your ideas and when you followed by agreeing with that statement. I trust that the product is an accurate rendition of our conversation and that it does not leave out any important point you wanted to make.

I very much want you to tell me if I've misinterpreted what you said. If after reading the enclosed summary you find a section which I misunderstood, please mark it. It is absolutely crucial to me that the summaries accurately reflect your experience of reparation.

If you are comfortable with the summary being published in its present form, please sign this permission slip. If you have questions or problems with any portion, we can go over it in our follow-up interview.

Your participation in this research project is greatly valued and appreciated. Please feel free to contact me at any time in the future if you have questions.

Michael C. Hawthorne, M.A. 974-6060
1320 Francis Station Drive Knoxville, Tennessee 37909

I have read the above Information and Consent Form. I agree to the reproduction of the summary of my interview with Mr. Hawthorne regarding my experience of reparation.

Signature_____ Date_____

APPENDIX K

DEMOGRAPHIC INVENTORY

Age_____ Sex_____ Marital Status_____

Number of Children_____ Occupation_____

Educational Level (Highest grade completed)_____

Religion of Family of Origin_____

Socioeconomic Status of Family of Origin_____

APPENDIX L

INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM: PUBLICATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT AND CLEARED TEXT

As I mentioned to you in our recent phone conversation, I am interested in providing the readers of my dissertation with several illustrative examples of the reduction process I used to analyze the reparation interview data.

Previously, you authorized me to print the Summary of your interview. I now want to ask your permission to publish the Verbatim Transcript and the Cleared Text versions of your interview as well in the dissertation appendices.

I have provided you with copies of these documents for your study. You will note that I have deleted or changed identifying information such as names, dates, places and the precise nature of some relationships to disguise your identity. Neither your name nor any identifying demographic information (other than your gender) will be presented in or with these appendices.

If you are uncomfortable with the publication of any part of these texts, please feel free to mark it out; I will delete those portions. I will not publish any part of the Transcript or the Cleared Text without your explicit permission on this consent form. Please feel free to say no if you are at all uneasy about this option.

If you are comfortable with the Transcript and the Cleared Text being published in a form we have agreed upon, please sign this permission slip.

Your participation in this research project is greatly valued and appreciated. Please feel free to contact me at any time in the future if you have questions.

Michael C. Hawthorne, M.A. 974-6060
1320 Francis Station Drive Knoxville, Tennessee 37909

I have read the above Information and Consent Form. I agree to the reproduction of the verbatim transcript and the cleared text versions of my interview with Mr. Hawthorne regarding my experience of reparation.

Signature_____ Date_____

VITA

Michael Calvin Hawthorne was born on May 19, 1957 in Coeur d' Alene, Idaho. He attended several elementary schools in Los Angeles, California and was graduated from Burroughs High School in Ridgecrest, California in June, 1974. His Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology was earned from Point Loma College in San Diego, California; he was graduated in June, 1978 with highest honors, summa cum laude. In June, 1979 he completed a Master of Arts program in Counseling Psychology at the University of Denver in Denver, Colorado.

Dr. Hawthorne entered the Clinical Psychology Training Program at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville in September, 1981. In 1981-86 and 1987-88, he was a recipient of the Hilton Smith Graduate Fellowship, the highest honor fellowship awarded by the Graduate School at The University of Tennessee. His internship training was completed in the Harvard Medical School system at the Children's Unit of Massachusetts Mental Health Center in Boston. In December, 1988 he was awarded the Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in Psychology.