


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AN APPLICATION OF R. S. HARTMAN'S AXIOLOGY

TO THE VALUE SYSTEM OF AUGUSTINE

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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ABSTRACT

There is a logical difference between an axiological application and a philosophical comparison. While philosophy uses analytic concepts to compare still other analytic concepts, axiology uses synthetic, formal relations to structure and order value phenomena. The three formal relations of R. S. Hartman's axiology, systemic value, extrinsic value, and intrinsic value may be used to scientifically explain Augustine's value system.

Although Hartman's axiology does have its own metaphysical presuppositions which require careful notice in making an application, it is clear that Augustine's philosophic system can be explained axiologically as an example of systemic value. This is obvious in that each item in Augustine's universe necessarily is completely defined in the mind of God. The concepts of each item of the universe, therefore, are denumerably finite and arranged in a definite order of internal relations structured by and arising from God. Since being and goodness are identical in Augustine's system, and since the more being a creature has the better it is, all value exists in a definite hierarchy. This is precisely the kind of relation termed systemic value in the Hartman system.

However, Augustine himself is not entirely consistent in that he was attempting to combine a moral, existential religious experience with a formal, logical philosophical system. The moral, existential side of his thought--especially in his religious conversion--points strongly toward intrinsic value. Axiology shows clearly how these two diverse strains are at odds with one another by demonstrating that two entirely different kinds of value and, thus, two entirely different kinds of universes are present.

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SIGLA

All references to the writings of Saint Aurelius Augustinus are to J. P. Migne's edition, *Patrologiae, Cursus Completus, Series Latinae*, Paris, 1865. The first numbers identify divisions in the text of Saint Augustine, and the second numbers refer to the volume and page of the 1865 edition.

Abbreviation

Title

De Anima et ejus Or.

*De Anima et ejus Origione
contra Vinecentium libri
quattuor*

De Immort. An.

*De Immortalitate Animae liber
unus*

De quant. Animae

De Quantitate Animae liber unus

De Lib. Arbit.

De Libero Arbitrio libri tres

De Beata Vita

De Beata Vita liber unus

De Civitate Dei

*De Civitate Dei contra Paganos
libri viginti duo*

Conf.

Confessionum libri tredecim

De Doct. Christ.

*De Doctrina Christinana libri
quattuor*

Enchir.

*Enchiridion de Fide, Spe, et
Charitate*

Enarr. in Ps.

Enarrationes in Psalmos

Epist.

Epistolae

In Epist. Joan. ad Parth.

*In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos
tractatus libri decem*

De Fide et Sym.

De Fide et Symbolo liber unus

De Gen. ad Litt.

*De Genesi ad Litteram imper-
fectus liber*

In Joan. Evang.

*In Joannie Evangelim tractatus
centum libri viginti quattuor*

De Ord.

De Ordine libri duo

De Div. Qaest.

*De diversis Quaestionibus
octoginta tribus liber unus*

Contra Secund. Manich.

*Contra Secundinum Manichaeum
liber unus*

Soliloq.

Soliloquia

De Trin.

De Trinitate libri quindecim



INTRODUCTION

Neither the style nor the method of this dissertation is characteristic of philosophical writing; rather this work is a kind of scientific treatise, the application of a formal axiomatic framework upon a given phenomenal field. There are some, perhaps many, who may discount such attempts as being misguided and even wrong and who may point out that axiology is a science without academic departments in universities, without empirical proof, and without hardware and the backing of a well established and accepted discipline. Such criticism could also have been made of Galileo's science. While it is not proposed here to prove the foundations of axiological science,¹ it is needful to distinguish carefully between the theoretical and practical methods of science and

¹Several careful analyses of the foundations of science in general and of axiology in particular have already been made, e.g. Robert S. Hartman, "Is a Science of Ethics Possible?" *Philosophy of Science*, 7: 238-246. July, 1950; ———, "Anthropology and the Scientific Method," *American Anthropologist*, 53: 591ff. October, 1951; ———, "The Language of Science and the Language of Value," *Papers of the Twelveth International Congress of Philosophy* (Venice), 7: 219-226. September 12-18, 1958; ———, "Value, Fact and Science," *Philosophy of Science*, 25: 97-108. April, 1958; ———, "Discussion: Axiology as a Science," *Philosophy of Science*, 29: 412-433. October, 1962; ———, "The Logical Difference Between Philosophy and Science," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 23: 315-379. March, 1963; ———, *The Structure of Value* (Carbondale: The University of Southern Illinois Press, 1967), 384 pp.; ———, "Kant's Science of Metaphysics and the Scientific Method," *Kant-Studien*, 63: 18-35. January, 1972; ———, "System and Pseudo-System in the Social Sciences" (Discussion Paper for the Eighth Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, Brasilia, October 30, 1972. Mimeographed.); John W. Davis, "Scientific Ethics," (Discussion Paper for International Conference on Creativity in the Life of a Nation, Bicentennial Symposium on Philosophy, Oct. 6 - 10, 1976). [Mimeographed but shortly to be published in H. N. Wieman *Festschrift*.]

philosophy and to explain clearly what an application of axiology does and does not do. Axiological applications have been and are being made to such diverse value phenomena as mental illness and health, the explanation of philosophical and religious systems of value and ethics, aesthetics, decision theory and even to horse racing and to the evaluation and development of football players.² There are, of course, differences in applications among so many items; and although this application to the value system of Saint Augustine concerns itself with the scientific explanation of a religious/philosophical system, the nature and characteristics of such an analysis will hold true in other kinds of applications.

Most people are quite familiar with the applications of physical science to the phenomenal field of any given science. In physics, for example, one may determine the velocity of a moving body by replacing the variables in the formula $v=d/t$ with determinate data. By the use of such formulae velocities may be predicted or explained. An application of formulae upon hypothetical future velocities may be termed "prediction" while an application upon past determinate velocities may be called "explanation." Both the prediction and the explanation are said to be capable of verification. The process of explanation seems to be one of placing a formal, mathematical frame of reference given by a system in juxtaposition with empirical phenomena. Although there

²These are only a few of the applications. Others include applications to teaching methodology, personnel selection, etc.

has been and is much controversy about the nature of scientific explanations and the elements (general laws, empirical content, etc.) required for a truly satisfactory explanation,³ one curious and immediately obvious point arises--many of the fundamental formulae serve as definitions which are given as analytically true and are not derived from observation. $F=ma$, for example, is both a formula and a definition which founds a system of mechanics; whatever empirically based formulae may be added to mechanics rely on this basic definition. Hartman calls such definitions axioms and states that no matter how long one makes observations or analyzes philosophically one will not derive an axiom from the empirical data which the science will order. The axioms form the ground for any science; however, as we shall see, Hartman does not allow such axioms to be termed analytic definitions; they are rather synthetic a priori statements which create a theoretical system. Such a way of putting the matter produces this important definition of a science:

A science is *a theoretical system applied to a set of observations* [Hartman's italics]. There are, thus, three parts to a science, (1) a theoretical system, (2) a set of observed events, (3) the connection between the two, variously called the application of the theoretical system to the observations, the interpretation of the observations in terms of the theoretical system, or the subsumption of the observations under the system. Neither the theoretical system nor the observations alone are the science, but only their combination is.⁴

³See for example Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. Baruch A. Brody (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 8-23.

⁴Robert S. Hartman, "The Language of Science and the Language of Value," *Papers of the Twelveth International Congress of Philosophy* (Venice), 7:219. September 12-18, 1958.

The theoretical system of a science is logically distinct from other systems which Hartman calls "ideologies"⁵ or "pseudo-systems."⁶ The distinction is based on the difference between analytic concepts used in the ideologies or pseudo-systems and synthetic concepts used in true scientific systems. Hartman, following Kant, states that "analytic concepts are those whose intensions consist of *predicates*, while synthetic concepts are those whose intentions consist of *formal relations* [Hartman's italics]."⁷ An analytic concept, in other words, belongs to ordinary language; it is an abstraction defined by other abstractions in an implicative net of language. Although every analytic intension implies every other such there is virtually an infinity of analytic systems,⁸ there is no particular order connected with these implications. One may start where one wishes, make the emphases important to the purpose at hand, and ignore the inconvenient. Hartman attacks the usefulness of philosophic and other pseudo-systems which use such concepts in "system" building:

These predicates, the "members" of the intension, as we may say, lack exact interrelationship, just as do the members

⁵Robert S. Hartman, *The Structure of Value* (Carbondale: The University of Southern Illinois Press, 1967), p. 47.

⁶Robert S. Hartman, "System and Pseudo-System in the Social Sciences" (Discussion Paper for the Eighth Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, Brasilia, October 30, 1972), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

⁷Hartman, *The Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 31.

⁸Ibid. Hartman gives a very thorough description of this fact here.

of the extension. They have their meanings, but these meanings in turn are vague, and so are the meanings of these meanings, and so on. Hence, the vagueness of everyday language, and even more (because of its higher abstraction) the vagueness of philosophical language.⁹

A synthetic concept, on the other hand, consists of formal relations; it is not abstracted from experience--it is constructed. It does not vaguely mirror the world; it creates a world:

For these [two kinds of] intensions determine in their turn different extensions, or referents: the "things" to which analytic intensions refer are different from the "things" to which synthetic intensions refer.¹⁰

Analytic concepts are those of pseudo-systems, "systems" using ordinary language; synthetic concepts are pure mathematics (or at least fully and completely defined technical terms):

The difference between a pseudo-system and a system proper is the difference of language used in each. *A pseudo-system is any account of a set of phenomena in everyday language.* [Hartman's italics] Nobody would call a newspaper editorial a system; but a work in philosophy is often called a system, though its logic is essentially the same as that of an editorial: its concepts are abstracted from sense reality, albeit to very great height, and its procedure is by implication and analogy. *A system proper is an account of a set of phenomena in technical language, in particular in the formulas of mathematics* [Hartman's italics]. . . . A scientific or systematic account, in this sense, is not an abstraction from sense reality but a *construction* of such a reality; it constructs its own sense reality. It does not proceed by implication and analogy, but it constructs itself, by formal deduction, into an analogue of the reality it accounts for.¹¹

⁹Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 36.

¹¹Hartman, "System and Pseudo-System in the Social Sciences," loc. cit.

A true scientific system, then, does not contain ordinary language but is constructed. But from what is it constructed or deduced? Hartman's account of how a science is discovered is fascinating, combining both the intuitive leap of imaginative insight of a discoverer, who so immerses himself in the analysis of phenomena that he sees its logical core, and the logical structure of scientific thinking.¹² This logical core is a constructed concept isomorphous to the concrete reality--or an axiom which "arises from *the identification of something logical with something nonlogical* [Hartman's italics]."¹³ To say the same, the axiom is the major premise which will unfold by deduction into a scientific system--or one might say that the intension of a synthetic concept is its system. Outside a deductive system there are no synthetic concepts and, hence, no science.

The language of scientific discourse is, therefore, not one of subjects and predicates but consists of "terms." Hartman distinguishes terms and concepts like this:

The difference between *term* and *concept* is that the term has neither intension nor extension. All its significance derives from its position within the system, its interrelationship with other terms. The term is so formal that it does not refer to anything--it is neither abstract nor abstracted, it

¹²This method of discovery is discussed by Hartman in many places. By far the best account is given in a mimeographed paper, "The Scientific Method of Analysis and Synthesis" (no date) which later was published in part as "Kant's Science of Metaphysics and the Scientific Method, *Kant-Studien*, 63:18-35. January, 1972.

¹³Hartman, *The Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 74.

is *constructed*. The only "reference" to reality which concerns it is the applicability of the network, of which it is a part, to a *totality* of phenomena which through this application became interrelated but do not derive any individuality from it. The term, in other words, is not a name referring to anything; it is a *variable* which can be applied to any individual whatsoever that fits into the network of interrelations in question. [Hartman's italics]¹⁴

This distinction is easily seen in mathematics and physics. A circle may be defined as the loci of points equidistant from a common center on a plane. "Circle" in this statement is not a concept abstracted from experience but rather belongs to the system of geometry; it is a term and is defined by other terms, e.g. "locus," "point," "equidistant," "center," "plane," etc. Although terms have no meaning apart from the system to which they belong, sometimes a word may serve both as an everyday word and a term. For example, the double use of a word first as an everyday word and then as a term in physics may be seen in the following sentences: (1) "The *force* of the explosion was great," (2) "*Force* equals the product of mass and acceleration." In sentence two the meaning of "force" is complete--it is perfectly defined within the system of Newtonian physics, and it is defined by other terms, "mass" and "acceleration."

The second part of the three is the field to be ordered by the system, the observable phenomena. These are what people take to be the "world of fact" or the "objective world;" however, Hartman quickly points out that objectivity is often more of a psychological nature than a logical one:

¹⁴Ibid., p. 85.

As we have seen, the "world of fact" is the result of an historical development. What in the modern world is "fact" was not fact in the ancient and medieval world and vice versa; and what even today is "fact" in some advanced western societies. . . is not fact in the underdeveloped countries. . . . What to an American appears as one thing, appears to an African as an entirely different thing. If an American and a North African were to draw the battleship Missouri--the experiment has been made--the American's drawing would look like a photograph and the African's like a dream, for the latter lacks a frame of reference to make it understandable to his intellect, even though his eyes see it--just as the schoolmen did not see what Galileo showed them. We see what we have a mind to see.¹⁵

"Fact," then, depends on one's frame of reference--even the "brute" facts and "raw" data of observation. Hartman is not here advocating an Hegelian idealism; he is simply stressing that the "so-called world of the senses. . . is dependent on the higher rational faculties, not to mention the complexities of the perceptual apparatus itself."¹⁶

The third part of Hartman's account of science is the combination of the theoretical system and the observable phenomena. This combination is the "application" which creates scientific reality. Unlike ordinary language an application has no reference; ordinary language refers to the items of sensible intuition, but "circle," "force," and (axiological) "good" do not refer to anything capable of sensible intuition.

Hartman strongly makes this point:

Scientific discourse has no *reference*, either directly or indirectly, to the sensible world. It is *applicable*; and application is not reference. It is, at best, a very special

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 65-66.

kind of reference, a creative enterprise, the use of a tool, as in all art. A formal system is like a chisel that sculptures the world in the image of the artist. If the chisel's--and that artist's--application to the marble is "reference" to the statue, then application of a system is reference to the world. . . . The relations [of a system] do not *refer* to *them* [items of sensible intuition] but form a pattern to which the world, by intricate procedures of application, is made to conform. The pattern does not mirror the world nor does the world reflect it; it orders the world, and the world is that of science insofar as it follows this order.¹⁶

To make such an application, to find in concrete situations those formal relations corresponding to the system is an art, "a true art and can only be learned as an art, and like any art, by practice."¹⁷

Having explained these three elements, Hartman's thumbnail sketch of science should make it instantly evident that science is not restricted to any particular turn of mind, any devotion to empirical evidence, nor any "objective" attitude. Nor is science limited to any content--say, limited to "physical" items of experience; science is a logical method of moving from analytic concepts to synthetic concepts via an axiom or axioms which form an analog of "reality." The difference between science and philosophy, sociology, psychology, astrology, etc. consists in the method and not in the content. There may be true sciences of sociology etc. someday; but as yet they all use analytic concepts, categories (abstracted, implicative, and material concepts) instead of constructive, deductive, formal synthetic concepts required for a system proper.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 65.

Since the approach of this paper to Saint Augustine's system of thought is based on a network of formal relations, it will be considerably different from usual philosophic approaches. For example, a theological, psychological, or sociological approach to his thought differs from this paper's and from each other's in that each theologian, psychologist, or sociologist is involved in his own abstractive mental process or is using ready-made ideological paradigms provided by the peculiar slant of his own particular branch of his discipline. In such a situation one may make up whatever categories seem meet for the task at hand. The *Confessions*, for example, may be seen from the framework of Augustine's psychological make-up--there are many such treatments--or the book may be seen from the perspective of developing church doctrine as a kind of "necessary" culmination of theological ideas--this would be a fine theological piece of work--or the book could be studied in terms of the social setting of the collapse of Rome and the driving needs of the society to discover permanence and certainty amid chaos and decay. While there is no doubt that some or all of these methods will yield insight into the thought and times of Augustine and while they are completely proper studies within their respective fields, they all lack precision and are subject to the insight or the lack of it on the part of the individual commentator.

More to the point, from a specifically philosophic point of view, the methodological difference between axiology and philosophy can be seen very clearly if one will but consider several perfectly proper

procedures in handling such material. One approved way to "explain" any system, Augustine's included, is to show how it evolves by historical influence or logical necessity from antecedent thought. In this way one might "explain" Augustinian value as the logical culmination and synthesis of neo-Platonic and Christian biblical exegesis, both heavily colored by pastoral and apologetic concerns. Another kind of philosophical approach might be the consideration of the entire corpus of Augustinian writing as a self-contained unit such that a determination could be made as to internal consistency and coherence. For a philosopher to catch another philosopher in an inner contradiction--especially a "hidden" one--has always been considered very neat and warrants no small amount of back-slapping and congratulations. Or if one were not if so nasty a disposition, a careful unraveling of the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical strands of Augustine's system followed by a re-weaving of these strands so as to thus eliminate or "explain" (away) a contradiction might even be better. Further, comparison and contrast with another system--say, Aquinas'--certainly constitutes a valid philosophical study. One might in this case present Augustine's system, then Aquinas', and perhaps devise a method of "translation" by which their handling of various systemic items may be compared. Yet in each of these customary philosophic approaches--and it would be simple to add several more standard methods for which the same would hold true--the analyses are all made in everyday language; concepts in ordinary language are put into more (but different) ordinary language; analytic concepts are

translated into still other analytic concepts, and the implicative game goes on forever. All this is not to say that such analysis is not useful; it most certainly is, even to a writer with purely axiological motives. It is the job of philosophy ever to struggle with analysis, and the struggle has been and will continue to be essential for philosophical understanding. However, axiology is not philosophy.

Axiology is a system proper with a technical mathematical language and not one more ethical system to lay beside another. Axiological science makes no claims of its own; it makes clear the meaning of phenomenal values and value systems. It is not the case, for example, that Augustine is making certain statements about intrinsic value while Hartman, on the other hand, is making others--as might be the case between Augustine and Aquinas. Hartman's axiology contains a term, "intrinsic value," by which Augustine's system, Aristotle's system, Marx's system, etc. may be related and by which their claims may be scientifically formulated and exhibited. For this reason axiology is entirely metaethical. The procedure for an application is to explain fully the terms of the system which will be required to structure the material under consideration and then to seek to discover the correspondence, the isomorphism, between Augustine's "system" and formal axiology including any necessary links between axiology and the system in question.

However, such an application cannot count as "proof" for axiology. Although it is by such an application that any particular, empirical (or non-empirical) value-event or value system may be interpreted in

a clear, distinct, and precise manner, neither such an application itself nor the fact of the applicability of axiology to any part of or to the whole of the field of value constitutes verification, proof, or disproof of the formal principles of axiology. The "proof" for axiology lies in its "inner convincingness" and freedom from contradiction. "There is no corresponding check in the science of ethics [as in the natural sciences]," Hartman states. "This science has to arise by the strength of its inner consistency. It has to carry its checks within itself."¹⁸ This situation is not without parallel; however, for it is in the same way that a physicist does not feel constrained to offer a defense for the foundation of his science each time he applies it to some problem that an axiologist makes an application. An axiologist, like any other scientist, is interested in increasing the range of application of his science by unfolding the system. Also an axiologist, like any other scientist, need not spend time "philosophizing" about the science's foundations; that is the business of the philosophers of science. Just as the mighty ship of physics sails serenely on no matter what philosophic squalls may be kicked up by its method, so axiology, even though it be a dinghy, may follow in its wake.

In short, this dissertation is not strictly philosophy; it will be philosophical in part, especially in the second chapter, but its main purpose and method is the unfolding of the system of axiology by applying

¹⁸Hartman, "The Language of Science and the Language of Value," op. cit., p. 225.

it to the value-system of Aurelius Augustinus. As will be seen in a later chapter, a "value-system" does not refer to ethics alone but rather is a description of the kinds of axiological value to be found in the system. Since meaning and value are identified in axiology, the question of what kind of value-system Augustine has is bound up closely into the question of what kind of universe he has--into questions regarding God, man, and the world.

CHAPTER I

HARTMAN'S THEORETICAL SYSTEM

I. THE AXIOM

An application must begin with a thorough statement of the systemic terms to be applied--the axioms, definitions, formulae, etc. This chapter will present those items of formal axiology which will be used in evaluating Saint Augustine's value system. There are some clarifications needed in respect to the various types of formal axiological categories which will be brought forward in this chapter, and there are some dangers inherent in the system itself with respect to applications in general. These dangers will be discussed at some length in the next chapter.

The most crucial and important aspect of Hartman's axiology is his definition of "good," yet this definition is certainly not a definition in any traditional or ordinary sense. From a philosophical point of view there are two possible ways of arriving at a "perfect" definition of a word other than a term with a constructed definition. One way, ostensive definition, would require the listing of all possible referents of the word or concept.¹ This set of possible referents is

¹Although there are many who feel that extension properly applies only to actual referents rather than possible referents, Hartman follows the more traditional logics at this point. For example, in Raymond J. McCall, *Basic Logic* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), p. 16, we find this formulation (italics, capitals, etc. as they appear in the text): "So the extension of the concept 'man' is its REFERENCE TO ALL POSSIBLE MEN, those that are, that were, that will be. These are what 'man' denotes. By the same token, the concept 'animal' denotes *all possible animals*, of the past, present, and future, rational as well as irrational."

termed the "extension" of the concept. Even in the case of "cow" this is clearly an impossible task since even the most diligent bovine collector does not have access to past and future cows; in the case of "good," however, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which items would merit listing at all--everyone would compile a different list. On the other hand, a "perfect" intensional definition requires a *complete* analysis of the concept. "Chair," for example, might be analyzed into "seat;" but then "seat" will need further analysis into "curved plane" and so on. This process turns out to be an Alice-in-Wonderland chase through the dictionary since "all analytic intensions imply each other."² Even if such lexical exertions were not circular, it is far from clear that "good" is capable of any analysis whatsoever. This at least is the position of G. E. Moore who, after giving an example of typical word analysis by dividing "horse" into the constituent equine parts, claims of "good" that "it is not composed of any parts which we can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it."³ It seems, then, that "good" is simply incapable of traditional definition--it certainly has no clear empirical referents which could be listed in an ostensive definition; and whether one despairs because of the circular property of intensional definitions or gives up like Moore because "good" simply has no parts, the second method of definition fails as well.

²Hartman, *The Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 32.

³G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 8.

However, both these ways of definition and their failure to yield "perfect" results presuppose analytic concepts (Kant's analytic concepts--not to be confused with analytic judgements). Hartman's definition is not analytic but synthetic; it is an axiom which creates the science of axiology. Such formal, synthetic concepts, like "circle" and the number "two," are constructions and, as such, are perfectly definable. Hence, "*good*" becomes a synthetic term within the system of axiology; and in respect to this system ceases to be the ordinary language, analytic concept "good." Moreover, the axiological formulation or definition of "*good*" is perfectly defined and gives rise to a system which "*is adequately defined as the combination of the intension and extension*" [Hartman's italics]⁴ of the axiom. Some other term could have been used to refer to the axiom besides "good," and Hartman did toy with that idea from time to time because it is important to distinguish carefully between a reference to axiological "good," which is a synthetic term, and analytic "good," which is a word of ordinary language.

His axiomatic formulation is as follows:

a thing x is a good C if and only if (I) x is a C , (II) C has the intension ϕ consisting of properties ϕ , (III) x has all the properties ϕ .⁵

This axiom does not contain one formal relation but three of them, interrelated in a small network of logical relations, a kind of "mini-

⁴Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 76.

⁵Ibid., p. 154. This axiom is explained in great detail on pp. 154 ff.

logic." Hartman's explanation of them is technical, and the reader should be aware that his logical notation is unique in some respects. Moreover, the very symbols he chooses sometimes invite confusion.

The first of these relations, " x is a C ," may be written " $x \in C$ " in usual form. Hartman very specifically wishes his notation to refer to class extension. As in regular logical notation this formulation may be read as "something or other belongs to a given class;" if the expression were " $a \in C$," the convention holds that " a " would refer to a particular item as in the expression "John is a man." Through specification or quantification the expression could become a proposition.

However, the relationship between a concept and its analytic parts has not been treated extensively in modern logic and has no standard form of notation. Hartman says that the analytic parts "are contained in" the intension of a concept and uses the Greek letter " ω " to symbolize this. Keeping to his distinction between the extension of a concept and the intension, he chooses to refer to the extensional side of a concept by capital Roman letters as " C " and to the intensional by capital Greek letters as " Ω ". Expressions symbolizing analytic parts contained in a given intension are normally written with " ω " and " Ω ":

If by " C " in " $x \in C$ " is meant the extension of the class concept rather than this concept itself--strictly speaking it should--then φ is contained in the intensional part of the class concept, which we designate by " Ω ". Rather than " $\varphi \in C$ " we should then write " $\varphi \omega \Omega$." Then " C " signifies Extension, " Ω " Intension, " ϵ " the relation between C and the extensional instances, x, y , etc., and " ω " the relation between Ω and the intensional properties, φ, ψ , etc.

⁶Ibid., p. 155.

There is, however, in this formulation an ambiguity which can cause difficulty; for " ϕ " seems to have two distinct uses. Hartman, with his characteristic proclivity for neatness and balance, wishes for his intensional notation to correspond to standard extensional notation. Just as "a," "b," "c," etc. are used conventionally for particulars like "John" and "Fred" and "x" and "y" are used for indefinite "something or other," he intends for " α ," " β ," " γ ," etc. to stand for particular "values" or "predicates" (analytic parts of an intension) and " Φ " and " Ψ " etc. for "some predicate or other." In such a case " $\alpha \omega \Phi$ " might be the notation for "rational is contained in human;" further, " $\phi \omega \Phi$ " could properly be read as "some predicate or other is contained in a given intension." By specification the expression " $(\exists \phi) \phi \omega \Phi$ " should be interpreted as "there is at least one predicate contained in a given intension." " $(\phi) \phi \omega \Phi$ " would yield the unlikely sentence "all predicates whatsoever are contained in a given intension."⁷

However, this is extremely misleading, for almost everywhere in his work Hartman uses " ϕ " as a technical class symbol which refers to a set of predicates, not some predicate or other. Certainly in all references to the axiom use " ϕ " in this technical way. Hartman specifically remarks that " $\phi \omega \Phi$ " is to mean "any and all values [predicates] of ϕ are contained in Φ ."⁸ Thus, Hartman's formula " $(\phi) \phi \omega \Phi$ " appears to be logically misleading and may be a slip. Perhaps a better formula

⁷ It is difficult to conceive of anything of which it might be asserted that it contained all properties whatsoever. Some theologians might wish to affirm that this could be true of God in some paradoxical way. Certainly Hartman never uses this notation to symbolize such an unlikely meaning.

⁸ Ibid., p. 156.

for what Hartman wishes to express is " $(\varphi) (\varphi \omega \Phi \supset \varphi x)$ ". Once this distinction is appreciated, several problems of notation are solved.

The second relation of the axiom, " C has the intension Φ consisting of properties φ ," also requires some exact distinctions. Ordinarily the members of C would be thought of as the set of those items which share Φ such that if an item did not contain all the predicates of Φ , it would be no such item. Implicit in this is the notion that to be C the item would require the entire set of predicates φ which constitutes Φ . If this were the case, then Hartman's distinction between x 's being a C and being a good C would collapse. While in Hartman's system a concept does have both extension and intension, the two are related in such a way that a given item x may belong to the extension without possessing all the predicates of the intension.

For example, the complete intension of man surely includes "biped." Yet few would hesitate to include "John" in the extension of man simply because he had lost a leg. If intension is taken as a set of absolutely logically proper defining characteristics, those which set apart the thing being defined from *all* other items, then to be such a thing is to share those defining predicates or properties. However, definitions of concepts include more than these. "Man" includes fingers, toes, facial hair, etc. Hartman's notion of intension includes a complete set of descriptive predicates. From this point of view there is a considerable distinction between a mere x and a good x . " $x \in C$ " does entail that x has the minimum number of defining properties to be classed as C ; it does not entail that x has *all* the properties possible to C .

The third relation of the axiom, φx , serves to define axiological good or more precisely the axiological range of goodness since x may not have all the values of φ . To the degree it fulfills its *concept*, x is good, fair, poor, etc.

Hartman formulates his axiom and his logical symbology and notation in this way partly to insure that there is a difference, albeit a "razor-thin" one, between fact and value, between " x is a C " and " x is a *good* C ." The difference is that (I): $x \in C$ does not entail (III): $(\varphi) \varphi \omega \odot$. Thus, fact and value are intertwined--a thing's "meaning" is its value, yet the mere ability to place an object in a given class is distinguished from its being a *good* member of its class. Or to say the same, *good* depends on the properties of an object but is not itself a property--an object may have the minimum number of properties to allow its classification as chair without being considered a *good* chair.

Since the first statement of this axiom Hartman has refined its language somewhat, although the axiom itself has never been recast. In "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value" Hartman gives these definitions:

A value is a set of qualities. Qualities can be either thought or perceived. When thought they are called predicates; when perceived, properties. A predicate is the name of a property, a property the referent of a predicate, (e.g. "red" is the predicate which refers to, or is the name of, the property *red*.⁹

⁹Robert S. Hartman, "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 8:82. Summer, 1974.

His distinctions, which will be kept throughout this paper, would result in a revised formulation of the second relation of the axiom, i.e. " C has the intension Φ consisting of properties ϕ " should be amended to " C has the intension Φ consisting of *predicates* ϕ ."

The identification of meaning and value in terms of value referring to concept fulfillment--even with the "razor-thin" distinction--immediately leads to a logical development within the system. The value of a given item depends directly upon its concept; however, since there are several *kinds* of concepts, e.g. analytic and synthetic, it follows necessarily that there are several kinds of "*good*." Hence, Hartman, who postulates three specific concept-types, quickly moves from the statement of his axiom to the explanation that "the axiom thus contains not just one formal relation but a set of three of them interrelated in a small network of relations."¹⁰ "*Good*" varies according to the type of concept and the possibility of its member to fulfill its intension. Moreover, as the types of concept differ in respect to their intensions, so do the referents (extensions) differ. The system, immediately becomes far more complex and far more fecund in its applicability.

II. SYSTEMIC VALUE

This development requires a careful analysis of the possibilities of concept-types. Two of the three types put forth by Hartman are immediately--recognizable--the synthetic and analytic concepts of Kant;

¹⁰Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 154.

the third, however, will require considerably more explanation due to its novelty. Hartman calls this third type a "unicept" whose extension refers to a singular thing. The three will be examined according to the complexity of their structure, especially to their respective quantitative structure or their "cardinality."

The first of these is the synthetic or formal concept; its cardinality is finite and represented by "n."¹¹ In other words, there are a finite number of predicates belonging to the intension of such a concept. Hartman defines it as follows:

Finite intensions consist of a definite number of definitely defined predicates with definite meanings, systematically interrelated in a "horizontal" network of synthetic, formal, or constructed concepts; *e.g.* the geometrical definition of "circle." Finite things [the extension] consist of a definite number of definitely defined properties arranged in a "horizontal" order or system. Such things are thought constructions or schemata; *e.g.* the geometrical circle.¹²

In other words, a synthetic concept defines a "term" whose intension consists of "*terms which are related to other terms* [Hartman's italics]."¹³ In the formula of Newton " $F=MA$," for example, "force" is a term defined by two other terms, "mass" and "acceleration;" none of the terms have any meaning apart from each other. "Circle," Hartman's favorite example, belongs to the system of geometry and is defined by its relation to other terms, such as "point," "locus," "plane," etc. as in the sentence

¹¹Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," loc. cit.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 84.

"A circle is the loci of points equidistant from a common center on a plane." Synthetic concepts always and necessarily belong to systems.

Since the axiom makes value to depend on concept fulfillment, and since a term, by virtue of a definite number of properties, refers to a "complete" and formal "thing," two important points follow. First, the finite "thing" either fulfills its intension completely, or it is not that thing. A circle is either a "perfect" circle, or it is no circle. A "citizen" in a given system of law has a definite definition --one is either completely a citizen, or one is not a citizen at all. There are no shadings possible. It is necessarily the case that *all* predicates in the intension correspond to *all* properties in the thing-- or more abstractly it is the case with synthetic concepts that $x \in C_s$ (where C_s = a synthetic concept) entails $(\phi) \phi \omega \Phi$. From this, of course, follows the second point: the value of a given, finite "thing" of this type is that of perfection. If the "thing" *is* a circle, then it is a perfect circle. Hartman makes this very clear indeed:

Finite intensional sets (definitions) define *formal concepts* (synthetic concepts in the sense of Leibniz and Newton and of Kant's *Logic*). The things corresponding to them are constructions of the human mind, such as geometrical circles. Such things either fulfill their concept or else they are not such things; they either are or they are not what they are said to be. There are no good or bad geometrical circles. A circle lacking a single one of the properties of the concept "circle" is not a circle. Constructions of the human mind thus have only two values, which we shall call *systemic values*: either perfection or nonvalue. This is the model of black and white valuation of things, the simplest kind of valuation there is.¹⁴

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 112.

But Hartman does not stop with strictly synthetic concepts. He extends the application of systemic value to prejudice and dogmatism:

Since it [systemic value] belongs to constructions of the mind it is obvious that when applied to actual things it "prejudges" them--it is the model of prejudice. This kind of thinking is based on the logical category of limitation; the variety of the world is limited to only two distinctions: A and non-A Systemic valuation is the model of schematic and dogmatic thinking.¹⁵

John W. Davis takes this even further; after giving the formal definition of systemic value, he writes, "Here too are the concepts of prejudice and rationalization, 'nigger,' 'honky,' 'pig,' etc. Formal things are always perfect. There are no 'no good' electrons or 'fair' numbers; and there are no 'bad' niggers, for niggers are always perfect as niggers."¹⁶

However, this extension of systemic value to such concepts as "honky," "nigger," etc. requires some explanation since prejudice words do not always have the strict logical structure demanded for synthetic concepts. It is quite common to use any term of prejudice to refer to some actual individual. The sentence "That man is an *x*" (where "*x*" is a term of prejudice) can function in the same way as "That man is a Democrat." One may use "*x*" also in a way that admits of degree; for example, upon observing any given set of physical or behavioral criteria

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ John W. Davis, "Scientific Ethics" (Discussion Paper for International Conference on Creativity in the Life of a Nation, Bicentennial Symposium on Philosophy, Oct. 6-10, 1976), p. 3. (Mimeographed.)

used to distinguish a given group to whom " x " might be applied, one could meaningfully assert, "Now there is a real x ." Of course, any concept for which there is a possible range of predicates is analytic, and its value is extrinsic. The concept "circle" invariably follows the axiological pattern of " $(\phi)\phi\omega\Phi$ "; however, if a prejudice term " x " may be logically asserted as more or less, then its range of axiological application is greater than systemic.

However, perhaps one might suggest the same of "circle." Someone viewing a very accurate drawing might be inclined to say, "Boy, that's a *real* circle!" Of course, in this case there is no doubt that a logical mistake is being made, for generations upon generations of geometry teachers have required their pupils to chorus that circles truly exist only the mind. "Circle" is not so liable to confusion as is " x " since " x " may refer to (1) a mental construction to which no empirical thing corresponds, (2) an analytic concept which refers to empirical things, and/or (3) nothing at all since its use is simply to insult. Often the look, intonation, and gesticulation of the user of a prejudice word is a better guide as to the word's meaning (and hence its intension) than any formal definition of the word itself. Prejudice words have psychological implications and uses that purely systemic words do not.

One possible dodge for this problem is to assume that just as a person who exclaims, "Boy, that's a *real* circle!" is making a logical mistake since real circles necessarily by definition are mental constructions and do not refer to empirical circles, so a person who applies

a term "x" to a person is simply mistaken because "x" is not a descriptive, analytic concept but strictly a construction of the mind. Yet even if this be allowed, "circle," "electron," and "citizen" do seem to be quite different kinds of mental constructions from "wop," "greaser," and "nigger." In fact, it seems quite evident that prejudice words, whether or not they are mental constructions and regardless of psychological intent, fail to be synthetic concepts for purely logical reasons.

A synthetic concept, as has been shown above, has a strict, complete definition; it is a term whose intensions consists of horizontal relations to other terms; and all the terms together belong to a formal, deductive system. It is very difficult to see how any prejudice word would meet such strict criteria. *Not all mental constructions are synthetic concepts.* Further, it is far from clear that prejudice words, *as they are used in ordinary language*, function as constructions at all--a more common use would be that of a simple analytic concept. For example, what "terms" might be used to form a network of relations defining "nigger?" To what system, formal and deductive, would such terms belong? Could one even arrive at a *finite* intension for a prejudice word at all? Whatever kind of mental construction prejudice words may be, they cannot be synthetic concepts as defined by Kant and Hartman.

It may be that such words are defective analytic concepts, vague in meaning and with no empirical referent. A defective analytic concept would be a concept which functions as an analytic concept yet has no actual referent--a word like "unicorn," for example. However, "unicorn"

and "x" are not alike in that "unicorn" is a simple descriptive concept of a item which is generally agreed does not exist. An "x" has, in addition to the descriptive predicates, value predicates--or rather dis-value predicates--as well. Neither "unicorns" nor "niggers", "honkies," "pigs" etc. exist, but that does not mean they are synthetic concepts. And if value is based on conceptual analysis, on the kind of concept an item has, how could systemic value possibly apply to such words?

Although the concepts of dogmatism, prejudice, and rationalization fail to be formal concepts because of their logical properties, what Hartman and Davis are driving at is not difficult--such concepts *function* in the minds of their users in exactly the two-valued way characteristic of systemic value. On the other hand, it is not impossible for a prejudice word to function in some expressions as an analytic concept; and if it did, another type of value would be expressed. However, from the point of view of a given value expression uttered by a concrete valuer, a prejudice word has the "force" of a synthetic concept and, hence, is represented by systemic value. Hartman uses the careful wording that "it [systemic value] is the *model* [author's italics] of prejudice."¹⁷ *Concepts of prejudice, dogmatism, and rationalization, regardless of the logical content of their intensions, function exactly as synthetic concepts in their use.*

In applying systemic value, then, the axiologist must use extreme care in determining whether or not the concept in question formally meets

¹⁷Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 114.

the logical criteria for synthetic concepts. If the word or concept belongs to a synthetic system consisting of terms etc., there is no problem in applicability. However, making a determination as to whether other words or concepts are functioning as synthetic concepts in the psychological intent of their users or the grammatical force of their expressions is a task to be carried out gingerly. Prejudice words are logical mistakes on the part of their users: the user takes a mental construct--ill-defined at that!--and uses it as if it were an analytic concept. If in a given context a claim is being made that a concept which is not formally synthetic results in systemic value, it must be clearly shown that the concept is being used as a synthetic concept. A too loose and cavalier respect for the logical niceties results in sloppy axiology.

III. EXTRINSIC VALUE

The movement from systemic to extrinsic value is a movement from the axiologically "worse" to the axiologically "better." The same pattern will also hold from extrinsic to intrinsic value. The reason for this distinction lies in the cardinality of qualities of their respective concepts; there are more qualities in analytic concepts to which extrinsic value applies than in synthetic concepts to which systemic value applies. There are times when "more is better" does not apply, but in the case of axiological value the adage holds true. A perfect geometrical figure, an image of schemata, is a ghostly thing

like a mental will-o'-the-wisp. Rocks, rills, and refrigerators seem far more solid even if they lack the exact definitions of a mathematical system. Few would swap the items of empirical, sensuous experience for a whole library of synthetic systems no matter how cleverly the concepts are constructed. A "fair" dinner in one's stomach is somehow more compelling and valuable than the most exquisite mental cuisine. Yet the "more" of axiological value is not the addition of sensorial experience to a concept. Circles are less axiologically valuable than horses not because horses are pretty to look at or nice to ride but because "horse" is a different kind of concept, richer in qualities. In other words, it is upon the logical structure of the concept that axiological value depends. The concept with more qualities is axiologically better. Hartman expresses this point with clarity:

Systemic value, extrinsic value, and intrinsic value are the three value dimensions. They constitute a hierarchy of richness, intrinsic being richer in qualities than extrinsic value, extrinsic richer in qualities than systemic value. "Richer in qualities" is the definition of "better," "poorer in qualities" is the definition of "worse."¹⁸

Analytic concepts themselves are distinguished from other types by the cardinality of their intensions and by their peculiar referents. The cardinality of the intension of an analytic concept is denumerably transfinite and is expressed in axiological notation by " N_0 ".¹⁹ The circular nature of analytic definitions has already been pointed out in

¹⁸Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," loc. cit.

¹⁹Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 32.

the introduction. The process of defining one concept by analyzing it into others which in turn must be similarly defined produces an indefinite definition only after a prodigious number of words have been used. Hartman illustrates the nature of this process by pointing out that there are around fifty thousand analytic concepts in the English language and that

we can arrange these words in series of implications 50,000 times; and by taking series of less universal implications, that is, of implications that do not exhaust the entire dictionary but only parts of it, we would arrive at all the permutations of the 50,000 words possible, which are 50,000 factorial, an astronomical number ($1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \dots \times 50,000$); and we could do this in 250,000 groups of words--a supra-astronomical number. . . . Thus, practically even though not mathematically, there is possible an infinity of analytic "systems."²⁰

The intension of an analytic concept may be defined, therefore, by saying that it consists "of an indefinite number of indefinitely defined predicates of indefinite meaning each of which . . . *etc.*, arranged in a 'vertical' (implicative) nest of analytic, material, or abstracted concepts."²¹

The extension of an analytic concept consist of "an indefinite number of indefinitely defined properties in a 'vertical order' (genera and species)."²² These denumerably transfinite things are such things

²⁰Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," *loc. cit.*

as cabbages and kings, the items which make up the world, but *which are not considered in the fullness or their reality.*

It seems strange to say that a person who is eating a cabbage and complimenting the cook by exclaiming, "I love cabbage!" may not be considering the cabbage "in the fullness of its reality." It would seem very difficult to get any closer to a cabbage's reality than one would get by seeing, smelling, touching, tasting, and even digesting the cabbage so that the person would even be "at one" with it. In fact, even applying the descriptive epithet "in the fullness of its reality" to a cabbage seems somewhat incongruous. The point of such an odd way of drawing attention to the distinction between a "mere" cabbage and a cabbage "in the fullness of its reality" is to point out that it is a logical mistake to identify an analytic concept which refers to class words with a "unicept" which refers to singular items of experience. Analytic concepts refer to particulars, not singulars.

Perhaps the nature of this error may be explained by recalling that the definition of a noun given in grammar school is "A noun is a word used to name a person, place, thing, or idea."²³ This definition implies that a noun refers to *a* person, *a* thing, etc., just *one*, in other words. But such nouns are really class words. If a group of students were told to define "cabbage," they might give a list of the qualities of cabbages and come up with, "a leafy garden plant, usually

²³ John E. Warriner, *English Grammar and Composition: Fourth Course* (Atlanta: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), p. 1.

green, with a short stem and a dense globular head." If the same group then were to be taken to a garden and asked to find cabbage, it is possible that lettuce might be brought back. If some were, a more detailed definition would be required such that the lettuce could be distinguished from the cabbage. The process of making a workable definition is that of taking the common characteristics of cabbage until some distinguishing characteristic is reached which will enable the students to bring only cabbage back. But if, finally, all the students get back with their cabbages and they are asked to distinguish the various cabbages, the definition grows much longer and more descriptive: "My cabbage has a worm hole on the left quadrant approximately two centimeters in depth," for example. If the students are then pushed to give account of the characteristics which make their individual cabbages unique items of experience, they will discover that class words or analytic concepts do a poor job in dealing with uniqueness; in fact, about all that can be done in the case of uniqueness is to point, and that is exactly what a proper name does. In ordinary language class words like "cabbage" are used to refer to unique items of experience; however, in order to do this, the uniqueness must be forgotten or suppressed. The lowly cabbage placed in front of one might just defy definition if it be considered in its uniqueness. On the other hand, to give every item of experience a logically proper name would make no one but dictionary enthusiasts happy.

The point of this rather long example is that analytic concepts do not refer to unique, singular things but to class concepts, to definitions made by drawing off or abstracting qualities from at least two things which have them and by purposely forgetting those qualities which serve to differentiate one of the two from the other and from everything else. A noun is anything of which there can be two. Hartman makes this point in a much more concise and logical manner:

They [denumerably finite things] are things classified in space and time; *e.g.* chairs and other furniture, which are not considered singularly in the fullness of their reality. A chair can never be sat upon, just as *a* man, as Bertrand Russell rightly observed, can never be met in the street; he is the creature of the logic books. Yet, we do live mostly among such creatures; their class properties are all that interest us. Living in space and time means living among classifications.²⁴

The referents or extension, then, of analytic concepts are logical particulars, mental entities to be sure, but mental entities which have counterparts in the world, in the space and time continuum.

The process of value measurement requires the matching of predicates and properties. In the case of a synthetic concept this is quite straightforward since there is a one-to-one finite correspondence involved. Like the synthetic concept the analytic concept also has a denumerable intension because each predicate is drawn off or abstracted one at a time from at least two subjects which have it. The number of

²⁴Ibid., p. 86.

predicates is indefinite, however. The process of extrinsic measurement itself

consists in mapping the units of this kind of intension upon the corresponding thing, which itself is a particular, that is a member of a class. Depending on whether it has all, some, some not, or none of the units, the thing is a good, fair, bad or no good such thing, *i.e.* member of its class. Here mapping to begin with, is not continuous; it is matching rather than mapping. For the "points," the abstracted predicates, are not continuous, each is "drawn off," by itself, from at least a couple of things which have it in common. The matching is here a process in the mind only, from the intension, which is in the mind, to the particular which is in the mind but which has a counterpart in space and time.²⁵

In the same way as concepts which are not strictly synthetic may function as synthetic concepts in respect to systemic value, so concepts which are not analytic may function as analytic concepts in respect to extrinsic value. If a word like "circle" is used to refer to a circle on a blackboard, its use is then analytic. It functions in this sentence as the name of an empirical item which shares abstracted qualities with other empirical items, e.g. circles drawn in the sand, etc. Any concept which is finite or whose use is finite, whether it is synthetic or analytic, measures systemic value; and any concept which functions as a denumerably transfinite concept and whose use is analytic, whether the concept itself is synthetic or analytic, measures extrinsic value. The practical determination depends on whether the measuring admits of degrees or is one of perfection or non-value.

²⁵Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 50.

The category of extrinsic value, therefore, is measured in terms of analytic concepts whose intensions are denumerably transfinite in their cardinality and whose extensions are class words. Class words are, strictly speaking, creatures of logic and refer to particulars, i.e. members of a class, although ordinary language uses them to refer to singular things. A singular thing considered only in its relation to others of its class, even though the "concept" of such a thing is not analytic, is functioning as a class member or as an analytic concept such that its goodness or badness varies as it completes or fails to complete the intension of its class. Further, the extension of denumerably transfinite concepts contains the items of empirical experience, items which belong to space and time.

IV. INTRINSIC VALUE

The final type of value, intrinsic value, has really attracted the most attention; for here Hartman's intensional logic rescues moral, aesthetic, and psychological phenomena from the limbo of non-sense to which they have been condemned by the developers of pure extensional logics, logics based on "object languages" whose ideal is that the "meaning" of any word ("concept" rarely appears in their indexes) is the empirical object to which the word refers.²⁶ Hartman blasts such purely extensional logics by saying, "By identifying conceptual extension

²⁶ Ibid.

with the intension of 'concept' they amputate, at one stroke, one half of logic--and it may well be the better half. . . .Extensional logic can as little be applied to the phenomena of moral philosophy as scholastic logic could be applied to natural phenomena."²⁷ Especially are the positivists singled out for censure:

In their positivistic school which, negatively applies extensional logic to value phenomena and thus, magically, causes them to disappear, they act in the same way as "the professor of philosophy of Pisa laboring before the Grand Duke with logical arguments, as if with magical incantations to charm the new planets out of the sky."²⁸

Extensional logics, to say the same, define away moral phenomena by the presuppositions of "meaning" inherent in their systems. However, the very fact that Hartman is radically departing from logic as it has been developed in the last one hundred years, makes even the suggestion of a science of value based on an intensional logic a stumbling block to many professional philosophers.

Intrinsic value is the value of artists for art, of mystics for God, and of lovers for their beloved. That this type of value, which has often been simply defined as a "mystical feelings" which is beyond language, has been expressed in a logical system seems absolutely incredible to many. Yet this is just the claim of axiology. The first

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

logical point to be made is that a concept which measures intrinsic value refers to a singular item, an item considered in the fullness of its own unique being. A lover may wax dithyrambic about his beloved; and if he does, he is not considering her as one among many whose virtues and faults are to be cataloged such that a rating from one to ten may be constructed. A musician rapt in music has no object; *he* is the music. Later he may try to compare what he has heard with other pieces of music, but then the spell has gone. Intrinsic value is the "I-Thou" experience of Martin Buber in which the subject-object distinctions have been dissolved into a transparent "now" beyond space and time.²⁹ All these examples characterize intrinsic value--it is absolutely singular with no possible means of comparison, and it is known by identification in a continuum in but not of the space and time world.

Hartman defines the singular concept as follows:

The intension of the singular concept consists of a non-denumerable infinity of attributes. This means that the singular thing, if it fulfills this intension, forms one uninterrupted whole or *Gestalt*. Such wholeness will be called *concreteness* and may be possessed by both sensory and non-sensory things. In the first case the thing in question is apprehended by perception, in the second case by intuition.

The singular thing has no properties in common with any other thing, it is *unique*. To extensional singularity belongs intensional uniqueness. Uniqueness and concreteness both characterize the things that fulfill a singular intension; and, since each fulfillment is intrinsic value, both characterize intrinsic value.³⁰

²⁹For a complete argument of this see Charles H. Wilson, "A Comparison of Martin Buber's and Robert Hartman's Categorization of Value" (MA Thesis, The University of Tennessee, 1973).

³⁰Robert S. Hartman, "The Logic of Value," *The Review of Metaphysics*, 14:408. March, 1961.

A singular "object" then does not have qualities which are drawn off by abstraction from at least two subjects. Its definition is not simply that of an infinitely differentiated particular; there is rather a fundamental logical difference between the infinitely differentiated particular and the singular as a continuum. The nature of this gap is made clear by the mathematics of transfinite numbers which defines both denumerable and non-denumerable infinities. An example of a denumerable or arithmetical infinity is the series of rational numbers; an example of a non-denumerable or geometric/topological infinity are the points on a geometrical line. Hartman is very particular about this:

The topological definition of the continuum is different from the arithmetical definition, due simply to the fact that these definitions refer to two different objects. The arithmetical notion "continuum" refers to entities *equipollent* to the straight line; the topological notion "continuum" refers to the line itself.³¹

A denumerable infinity (N_0) is a one-to-one correspondence whereas a non-denumerable infinity (N_1) is not. The non-denumerable infinity is grasped as a unity.

In respect to a singular concept or "unicept" this means that the predicates consist of concepts "each of which stand for an infinite totality of meanings."³² Hartman gives an example of this by using the example "peach of a ———." No matter what word fills in the blank, e.g. "peach of a girl," "peach of a dog," or even "peach of a peach,"

³¹ Ibid., p. 409.

³² Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 113.

the intension of "peach" remains unaltered. Yet its meaning is not analytic; a "peach of a girl" is not covered with pink fuzz and grown in Elberta, Georgia, i.e. there is not one-to-one correspondence between "peach" and "girl." Rather the metaphorical meaning is an "adjustment" of the concept "peach" to "girl;" she is sweet, luscious, mouth-watering, desirable, etc. There is an intertwining of predicates, an interpenetration of meanings; and this occurs again in respect to "dog," "car," "airplane," etc. Yet throughout all the transformations and even distortions of meanings the sequence of predicates of "peach" remain invariant although they vary infinitely as they intertwine with an infinity of concepts within a language. Hartman writes of these concepts as words of infinite meaning:

Such words are metaphors. A metaphor is a set of predicates used as a variable. Hence, it can, in principle, replace every other word of the language--and even itself as an ordinary word, as in a "peach of a peach." Since the totality of all possible ordinary languages has n_0 words, *each one* of which may signify as metaphor n_0 senses or meanings, the total meaning of the metaphorical language is of $2N_0 = N_1$ meanings. The metaphorical language therefore is a nondenumerable infinity, a continuum [geometrical].³³

In "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value" Hartman writes at considerable length and with great profundity in an attempt to clarify intrinsic value. In fact, the article covers so many areas and is so richly suggestive that an entire philosophical system complete with a well-worked out metaphysics and epistemology could be constructed.

³³Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," op. cit., p. 85.

No summary is here possible; however, one aspect of metaphors, their topological character, is worked out in detail. Hartman points out that topology is the mathematical science which deals with invariant transformation. In topology, just as in the case of metaphors, things may be twisted and distorted but still remain topologically invariant in that their points remain in the same sequence. "Thus, a doughnut," he writes, "may be distorted into anything with one hold and thus remain invariant, topologically the same thing, even if it looks like a teacup with a handle."³⁴ The process of comparing the two items, the original and the transformation, is called "mapping." This is literally what happens in the case of the metaphorical intertwining of predicates between two concepts. Using this allusion he is able to define a metaphor as

as intension of infinite, applicability and adjustability to an infinity of subjects, the constituents of which, its predicates, never lose their original order, no matter how they are transformed in these applications; they are topologically invariant. The totality of the metaphorical meanings and subjects, its transformations and environments, is one continuum ruled by the original meaning of the intension which, no matter how bent and turned, twisted and distorted, never loses its topological properties, the sequence of what corresponds to its predicates in any transformation.³⁵

But what is the referent of a metaphor and where is it to be found? To use a metaphor is to leave the boundaries of the literal. Ordinary language is a system which creates a world, a world of classifications, a world of space, time, cause, etc. Ordinary language is the language of everyday life; it is the language of "reality." A

³⁴Ibid., pp. 84-85.

³⁵Ibid., p. 88.

metaphor, on the other hand, creates a new universe, a world of imagination, of intrinsic value. Is it then the case that intrinsic value belongs to the imagination? The referents of metaphor do not dwell within the space-time continuum; no expeditions will ever discover them-- yet at the same moment the metaphor has the invariant, etymological origin from ordinary language. "For this reason all that happens to us in metaphorical imagination appears to, and actually does, *happen to us*. We are beyond and yet within reality."³⁶

This point is clearest made in respect to space and time. The singular thing is a unity, a *Gestalt*. It is known not discursively but by identification and interpenetration.³⁷ Simply put, the subject or knower becomes one with the known as the examples of lovers, musicians, and artists have suggested. The singular thing arises then as a value-event. There is no object which the metaphor characterizing the event may refer. The truly singular does not belong to the analytic net of empirical experience; and "the fundamental fact . . . is that *the total thing transcends space and time*."³⁸ But what does this translate into practically? If two lovers, Charles and Jane, have an intrinsic value experience and thus transcend space and time, where do they go? Do

³⁶Hartman, "Logic of Value," loc. cit.

³⁷Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," op. cit., p. 89.

³⁸Robert S. Hartman, Personal Letter to Raymond Pruitt, July 16, 1971.

they vanish? No, the intrinsic value experience is *in* the empirical world even if it is not *of* it. A chaperone, listening in on Charles and Jane, might report that they talked the most disgusting drive for an hour and fifteen minutes. An intrinsic "moment" viewed from the outside may be timed with a stopwatch. One should not mix up

. . . the time within the intrinsic experience with the time outside of the intrinsic experience. These are two entirely different times, intrinsic and extrinsic, respectively. From the outside, an intrinsic experience can be said to endure a certain number of minutes or hours, measures which belong to extrinsic time. So we can say that a person has an intrinsic experience for five minutes. But then we speak of the temporal length of the experience measured from the outside. Within the experience the measurements are not minutes and hours but intrinsic measures which are differentiations of the infinite.³⁹

The measurement of intrinsic value is not a one-to-one checking off of properties from a singular thing by a list of unique predicates. One does not add the predicates of "heaven" and those of "Jane" together and look for some particular "heavenly Jane" to be judged "fair" or "no good." The degree of knowing, of interpenetration of subject and object, of identification is the measure:

Intrinsic value, as the other forms of value may be *more or less fulfilled*. The singular concept may be more or less differentiated; but its differentiation is different from that of the analytic concept. The singular intension may contain a single word--"Dorothy," "Ike," "I"--and yet this word may be more or less fulfilled. In its minimum meaning it is a mere point indicating a singularity. In the degree of its fulfillment, as more and more properties are added to its referent, the point like a cell issues a *Gestalt* which becomes more and more differentiated as the

³⁹Hartman, "Logic of Value," op. cit., p. 419.

word assumes richer and richer and meaning until at the maximum of fulfillment it assumes infinite concretion: The word grows intensionally from a point to denumerable to non-denumerable infinity, that is from a label to a quasi-metaphor to metaphor.

In the same degree grows the involvement of the valuer from mere mention and observation to identification. Logically since both singular extension and intension are continuous infinities, it follows that both can form a single continuum, that the things and its meaning may be one. This is the logical expression for what we called vaguely *interpenetration* between singular thing and its meaning. Singular apprehension is identification in the exact sense that he who knows supplies the thing's meaning and that the thing fulfills itself in him who knows. Knowledge here is *fulfillment*--intrinsic knowledge is intrinsic value. . .40

V. SUMMARY

The science of axiology comes into existence with the formulation of its axiom. Yet the axiom immediately differentiates itself into three distinct value dimensions according to the type of concept substituted in it. Concepts with a cardinality of "n" which either function as finite or are formally synthetic measure systemic value as "perfect" or "no good." The systemic things are mental constructions which do not belong to the empirical world and, therefore, are beyond space, time, and causality. Ordinary languages and special constructed languages like Esperanto, i.e. languages employing analytic concepts with a cardinality of " N_0 ", constitute the realm of extrinsic value in terms of which the particular class member is rated by comparison to its ideal type. The extrinsic things belongs to empirical experience which is itself vague since no final definitions are possible. Extrinsic things

belong to and are created by classificatory logic; therefore, they are the things of space, time, and causality. Singular concepts with a cardinality of " N_1 " measure intrinsic value. Such singular things are known as a *Gestalt* between knower and known and necessarily must arise in a meeting, an aesthetic, mystical experience which could be termed "love." The realm of intrinsic value is that of metaphor. Metaphors create new universes which are part both of the empirical world and the infinite. The degree of intrinsic value depends on the degree of interpenetration or identification between the valuer and his "object" although, strictly speaking, it is a mistake to analyze the two into separate entities--such an analysis is done "outside" the value experience itself.

A practical difficulty of some importance arises in that language is a many-layered item. Sometimes even a "simple" word like "I" may function in all three value dimensions. "I" may function as a systemic concept when used in a legal or ceremonial statement. An expression using "I" when one is referring to an abstraction ("myself as a baby," "myself as a boy," "myself as a husband" . . .) is clearly analytic since the intension is the result of drawing off common properties. And, of course, "I" may serve to denote a non-empirical self as a singular thing. Concepts, phrases, sentences, and systems must be painstakingly analyzed for there to be axiological accuracy.

Some applications require an even more precise formulation than merely "systemic," "extrinsic," or "intrinsic." A systemic thing like

a circle may be used as an analytic concept as in the sentence, "That circle is particularly well-drawn." In this case a systemic thing would be valued extrinsically; this may be abbreviated as " S^E ". Or an intrinsic, singular thing like a unique person may be valued extrinsically as in the sentence, "John is a 'fair' pilot." This may be noted as " I^E ". There are nine possibilities of value compositions:

S^E	E^S	I^S
S^E	E^E	I^E
S^I	E^I	I^I

Hartman has worked out an entire calculus although it is not required for this treatment of a philosophical/religious system like Saint Augustine's.

CHAPTER II

ONE METAPHYSICAL ASPECT OF AXIOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent article Professor Rem B. Edwards divides Hartman's system into two parts:

A) a *formal system* of axiology in which basic value concepts, including the concept of "value" itself, are defined in formal terms, in which a hierarchy of value concepts is propounded, and in which axiological inter-relationships are explored, and so on; and B) *suggested application* of the formal system.¹

Such a division is certainly accurate although Hartman might well have considered the case for accepting his own proffered applications stronger than just a "suggestion." One reason Dr. Edwards emphasizes the two parts of the system as he does is that he finds the formal metaethical scheme brilliant and suggestive but feels that certain doctrines or "applications" which are claimed to follow, e.g. the proposition concerning the infinite value of man, are less than compelling. In a sense Dr. Edward's unhappiness is an "exegetical" problem; he does not feel that Hartman's "reading out" or deductive development of the system is necessarily infallible. Indeed the "infinite value of man" as a doctrine of axiology seems full of metaphysical and epistemological implications. It is one thing to set down a synthetic definition of

¹Rem B. Edwards, "The Value of Man in the Hartman Value System," *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 7:141. Summer, 1973.

"good;" it is quite another, however, to claim then that this definition or axiom leads necessarily to the dogmas that optimism represents "correct thinking," that the world is "good" if not the best possible, that Anselm's ontological proof is valid when cast in axiological terms, and that at least four proofs demonstrate the infinite value of man.² Obviously, Hartman thinks those applications follow necessarily from the axiom even though others may find such an exegesis an unwarranted excursion into metaphysics. The gainsayers, such as Dr. Edwards, probably feel that the axiom is a very useful and descriptive explanation of what happens in valuing; however, they are uneasy when philosophically "outlandish" doctrines are trotted out on stage wearing the uniform of axiology.

It is possible that axiology may be viewed in isolation from these applications, and it may be that Hartman may have exceeded the deductive authority of his axiom from time to time. However, much of the metaphysics and epistemology which Hartman reads out of the axiom is not "optional equipment," so to speak, but "built-in at the factory." Hartman, of course, depends upon Kant for the paradigmatic account of what a science formally is:

The method of analysis and synthesis was for him [Kant] a *logic for creating a science*, as it had been for Descartes and Leibniz; only that Kant, at the culmination of a scientific achievement Descartes and Leibniz could only divine, was able to take all the verbiage out of the method of discovering a science and present it in pure and exact logical terms.

²Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., pp. 111ff.

A philosophy, for him, was part of analysis, a science part of synthesis in the Newtonian sense. . . .The difference between philosophy and science is that between the logical character of the concepts used in these two branches of knowledge.³

Kant's account of science and, consequently, Hartman's, as well, depend on the logic developed by Kant which is based on the analysis and classification of the concept "concept." For Hartman the *analysis* of "concept" revealed both extension and intension; however, by axiomatic formulation the two sciences of extensional logic and intensional logic might arise. The science of intensional logic is the foundation of and the systematic development of axiology.

This adoption and adaptation of Kantian accounts of science and, even more importantly, logic is at once the philosophical foundation and metaphysical homeland of axiology. In the bedrock of axiology far from the surface are found those applications which are apt to strike a modern reader so forcefully; and, naturally, Hartman knows just where to dig.

Axiology is the science of intensional logic just as natural science is the science of extensional logic. Hartman is always careful to draw a clear line between the two branches of logic because he is not at all in sympathy with the metaphysical development of extensional logic at the hands of Bertrand Russell and later positivistic schools.

³Hartman, "Kant's Science of Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 18.

For example, in 1903 Russell

believed that every phrase, long or short, must denote something, or else be meaningless. Now that theory does not imply that a word like "dragon" denotes an actual species of animal. . . . But, when a phrase lacks an actual denotation, the theory would credit it with a denotation not belonging to the actual world. . . . [Dragons] are supposed to exist in another world whose discovery is generally attributed to Plato.⁴

The existence of mental entities in some sense is an important truth for Hartman; however, Russell soon left this intensional kind of meaning. His theory of Definite Descriptions is an attempt to show that such sentences as those involving dragons do have meaning although they do not refer to any actual things. Hartman, like Alexius Meinong, insists that the meaning of such sentences refers not to actual things but to mental things. Hartman refers to any logic which might completely identify meaning and extension as "extensional logics." It might be difficult to find any actual logician who would be willing to go as far as Hartman suggests one could go in identifying extension and meaning, but it does seem to be the case that if one were to identify meaning and extension, values would disappear; they would become literal nonsense. Likewise, when Hartman identifies meaning with intension, the extensional "object in the external world" begins to fade, and the realm of mental entities sought after and described by Plato shine forth in the starlight of the value realm. Yet despite Hartman's claim that both extensional

⁴D. F. Pears, *Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 13.

and intensional logics may exist side-by-side each with its own proper sphere, the rigor and dialectic of his logic make this position of "separate but equal" much harder to support. The intensional logic itself eventually collapses the distinction between predicate and property, between phenomena and object. There can be no direct reference to objects because very simply "objects" do not exist; intensions are meanings--"objects" are constructions. Reality becomes at last metaphorical as the metaphysics of Kant inexorably force Hartman to confess that "the world of facts is really the world of abstractions, classifications, fragments of things combined to units which exist only in the mind."⁵

This metaphysical goldmine which is full of ore waiting to be extracted gives rise to a distinction which must be made in respect to "applications." One kind of application may be termed "external." Here the formal "machinery" of the system is applied to an empirical value phenomenon, like horse racing or the system of Augustine. This corresponds to the application of $v=d/t$ to a problem of physics. However, there are also purely "internal" applications which look like applications but are not. "Internal" applications are pure deductions within the system of axiology; they arise from the axiom just as the postulates of geometry arise from its axioms. This kind of "application" is not that of a formal, synthetic system being laid aside an empirical phenomenon but

⁵Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," op. cit., p. 100.

that of an internal, deductive generation of a term which itself will later be laid aside an empirical phenomenon. The infinite value of man is precisely this kind of application. Hartman's definition of man in his argument is entirely done in axiological "terms." Hartman is not applying his system on Henry Jones or even on the species; he is giving an axiological definition. Man's value is infinite because the system demands that he be infinite. John W. Davis makes much the same point in his discussion of this issue:

What he [Hartman] has established is that *theoretically* or *formally* speaking, Henry is of infinite worth. He is of infinite worth in so far as Formal Axiology is sound and can be applied to individual men. Bob [Hartman] also had an axiological proof for the existence of God. I would say that he has proved, using formal axiology, the existence of God.⁶

Dr. Edwards does not believe the men he knows much resemble the "Man" of formal axiology, but in this case Dr. Edwards is making an "external application," an application to empirical beings. The axiological "Man," however, arises in the system as a term. The question being raised is whether the systemic creation is in fact isomorphous to "reality." However, that "Man" should be of infinite worth is deductively necessary within the framework of axiology itself. To say the same, Hartman's postulate that "Man" is of infinite value did not arise from a survey of empirical men but as a postulate of his axion; Dr. Edwards, on the other hand, is looking at empirical men and claiming that there is something amiss with the application of the system.

⁶ John W. Davis, "Epistle to Mark (Moore) on the Infinite Value of Man" (University of Tennessee, 1977), pp. 1-2. (Mimeographed.)

Much care must be taken to ensure that a distinction is made between an empirical and axiological "man" in the statement "Man is of infinite worth." The point of this, though, is that some "discoveries" arise from the internal metaphysical structure of axiology. Some arise from the strict application of the system as a formal system upon empirical content. This present chapter will look at one metaphysical aspect of axiology, the world generated by the science of intensional logic, both as a means of demonstrating that the system does in fact have metaphysical and epistemological bases and as a finer sharpening of terms for use in the application upon Augustine's system. All of this is most important for the axiologist. When one sets out to make an application, he must know not only *how* the system of interpretation works but *why*.

II. INTENSIONAL AND EXTENSIONAL LOGIC

The system of axiology begins with a definition of "concept:"

A concept is a *mental* content having a "double" aperture." On the one hand it has *meaning* or intension, on the other, reference or extension. The intension is a set of words or symbols, the extension a set of items, concrete or abstract. [author's italics]⁷

Meaning is mental. How different from asserting that the meaning is the object! The double aperture of reference and sense or extension and intension serves as the foundation of both extensional and intensional logic although only the extensional side of logic has been developed:

⁷Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 31.

The extensional characteristic of "concept" has been developed in modern logic--up to a point--but not the intensional. On the contrary, the extension of concepts has been explicitly identified with the Intension of "concept"; and it has been held that all that there was to the meaning of "concept" was "extension." As we have said, only one half of logic has been converted into a science and the other half has been neglected. A logic of intension is missing, a logic which investigates and structures conceptual intension; and which examines and structures the interrelationships between intensions, up to and including the totality of all intensions. Such a logic would give us *Meaning* as such--rather than what logic gives us today, an inventory of the world. [Hartman's italics]⁸

The structuring of the space-time world in terms of mathematics gives rise to natural science; however, the development of extensional logic by which the rise of natural science has been made possible has meant that value, aesthetics, etc., as have been mentioned earlier, become literal nonsense. However, extensional logic in itself is not a mistake; the mistake is that many, especially the logical positivists, take extensional logic as the one true logic. Hartman's benevolent and tolerant stance toward extensional logic, to whose good offices great credit is to be given, does not extend to its champions, the positivists, or to any others not inclined toward acceptance of *both* logics, at least on a "separate but equal" basis:

. . .our contemporary positivists hold fast to an obsolete frame of reference which distorts the reality to be discoveredhowever, in their attitude toward value, they deny their own principles: supposedly positivists, they are in truth negativists, if not nihilists; standard bearers of science, they are really obscurantists; champions of empiricism, they speak with a priori certainty about what is not; advocates of precision, they are imprecise; upholders of

⁸Ibid., p. 49.

expertness, they are inexpert; pioneers of analysis, they refuse to analyze; and paragons of criticism, they are uncritical.⁹

Hartman goes on with some relish in this vein, thoroughly castigating the positivists and certainly creating a great text for any axiological camp meeting and revival service--all this because they refuse to admit intensional logic to the same status as extensional logic.

What Hartman means by extensional and intensional logic is apt to be misleading for those who are accustomed to the ordinary definitions of these terms. Intensional logic, for example, is today largely identified with modal logic. Modal logic, of course, qualifies copulas; it does not seek, as Hartman does, to structure and elaborate the meanings of concepts. Modal logic is a logic of propositions; Hartman's intensional logic is a logic of concepts.

Hartman's language in respect to his distinction between extensional and intensional logic is very exact and is given here in full:

The concept "concept" has been determined with scientific precision in logic only in its extensional but not in its intensional aspect. Logic has investigated what the application of concepts to classes means but it has not investigated what concepts mean. The concept "concept" has this peculiarity, that "extension" and "intension" are the characteristics of its Intension. While the Extension of the concept "concept" is the class of concepts, the Intension of the concept "concept" is the set of properties which each concept has in common with every other concept. . . . Thus, conceptual extension and intension are the content of the Intension of the concept "concept." The Intension of "concept" is relational--it contains the formal relation between "intension" and "extension" which is either direct or inverse--and hence this concept is a synthetic one,

⁹Ibid., p. 57.

and the branch of knowledge that deals with it, namely logic, is a science. But the intension of "concept" can also be represented analytically, when no formal relations are given between the intensional characteristics, "intension" and "extension," and the "relation" between them is left undefined. In this case, the Intension is predicative rather than relational. Here logic is philosophy rather than science.¹⁰

What this comes to is this: philosophy proceeds by the analysis of words; science, on the other hand, contains a formal system of synthetic concepts and relations. While the physical sciences have been successful by means of mathematics, the moral disciplines have languished because no formal relations have been brought forth so as to transform them from a philosophical to a scientific discipline. A formal synthetic system based upon intensions will create a science of value even as physical science is based upon mathematics *which is itself the science of the Extension of the concept "concept."*

As we shall see, the scientific precision of moral philosophy is based on the precision of the intensional characteristic of the concept "concept," just as the scientific precision of natural philosophy is based on the precision of the extensional characteristic of this concept.

The latter precision is that of mathematics. The fundamental concept of mathematics, that of "Number," is defined in modern logic by the extensional characteristic of the concept "concept." This characteristic is the concept "extension" of "class." Mathematical number is defined by the concept "similarity of classes" or "similarity of extension." There ought to be a concept which is defined by "the class of all intensions similar to a given intension."¹¹

Formal axiology is the science of intensional logic, for it elaborates and structures the Intension of the concept "concept" which,

¹⁰Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 49.

¹¹Ibid., p. 51.

therefore, produces a formal, synthetic system rather than an implicative, analytic one in which relations are left undefined.

The extensional characteristic of "concept" has been developed in modern logic--up to a point--but not the intensional. On the contrary, the extension of concepts has been explicitly identified with the Intension of "concept;" and it has been held that all that there was to the meaning of "concept" was "extension." As we have said, only one half of logic has been converted into a science and the other half has been neglected. A logic of intension is missing, a logic which investigates and structures conceptual intension; and which examines and structures the interrelationships between intensions, up to and including the totality of all intensions. Such a logic would give us *Meaning* as such--rather than what logic gives us today, an inventory of the world.¹²

For Hartman, therefore, extensional logic has produced physical science; extensional logic is but a part of the analysis of the concept "concept," however. Both logics have their proper sphere; they are analogous to each other in that number is to the extension of objects in extensional logic as value is to the intension of concepts in intensional logic. Thus, while extensional logic yields an inventory of things in the world, intensional logic yields value, meaning as such.¹³

This leads him to the metaphysically interesting idea that extensional logic, when taken to metaphysical "heights" and when it is used exclusively, causes values etc. to vanish. It is the reverse of this that applies to Hartman's intensional logic: once "meaning" equals

¹²Ibid., p. 49.

¹³Ibid.

"intension" the objects vanish, i.e. they become as illusory as "value" is to a positivist. Intensional logic drives a wedge between the knower and the "world" where "world" refers to the space-time continuum which is the concern of the natural sciences; extensional logic drives the same wedge from the other direction where "world" is the realm of value, aesthetics, etc.

In all this the hand of Kant can be seen. It is Kant who supplies "synthetic," "analytic," "system," and above all "concept"--the whole apparatus of axiology. Indeed his name is never far from Hartman's lips when an explanation must be made or authority is called for. To adopt Kant's terminology and method means to divide experience into phenomena and noumena. It may be possible to combine the two, but axiology can not quite do that. On the other hand, there is more to what Hartman's system comes to than just a bifurcation of reality. Perhaps the best way to show this is to examine carefully just what all this comes to in the concrete instances of the value system.

III. THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AXIOLOGY

Introduction

Axiology by building upon intensional logic ultimately comes to the point where any definite distinction between "property," as Hartman uses the word, and "predicate" collapses. The objective world of science ends up as a "naturalistic construction" in the mind, and value comes to be a checking off of mental "predicates" with mental "properties."

The hard and fast brute "world of facts" is largely written off as a cultural, historical, psychological, physiological, and (most important) logical fiction, though "fiction" is perhaps a bit too strong. The phenomena of Kant are "fictions" in that they are not "really" things-in-themselves.

There are few places where Hartman discusses the types of concepts and does not mention *both* the mental set of predicates, their cardinality etc., *and* the "entities" to which these predicate-types refer. Each of the types and its entities will be examined in this section. Each entity is a construction; and there are many possibilities although, of all the various "worlds" or "universe" which might appear, the focus here will be on the "world of fact," the good, old space-time world full of cabbages, kings, sealing wax, and the like.

Most of the material for this section comes from the last of Hartman's writings, published after his death, "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," the stated purpose of which is to clear up the obscurity of earlier accounts and provide greater distinctness and detail.¹⁴ There is no great departure here from his earlier work nor any great surprises, but he does state things with exactness in unequivocal detail.

The Entities of Systematic Value

There is nowhere in Hartman's work any doubt that referents of systemic concepts, whether purely synthetic or pseudo-analytic (like a

¹⁴Hartman, "Aximetric Structure of Intrinsic Value," op. cit., p. 81.

term of prejudice), are entirely mental constructions to which no perceptual thing corresponds. In fact, by their very definition, any "reference" to the space-time world is forbidden. It is true that a synthetic concept like the geometrical circle when it is *used* ". . . as denumerably finite it refers to the tokens, on blackboards, in the sand, or wherever found."¹⁵ However, in this case "circle" functions as analytic concept whose characteristic value is extrinsic not systemic.

Hartman, however, is never explicit as to the meaning of the phrase, "exist in the mind." The phrase engenders several questions:

(1) What kind of existence is "mental existence?" Does Hartman posit such entities so that there will be something opposite the intension so that "fulfillment of concept" has a meaning?

(2) The word *in* in the phrase "exist in the mind" is a space-word; it answers "Where?" Hartman claims an intrinsic space-time over against and beyond extrinsic space-time.¹⁶ Is there a systemic space-time as well?

(3) *Whose* mind? Hartman's? Tom's? Dick's Alfredo's? In respect to systemic concepts which are alleged to be identical in each individual mind is *Mind* to be capitalized? Certainly no individuation can be claimed in respect to "individual" minds whose total contents are systemic concepts. Hartman seems to feel that there is one and only one "circle";¹⁷ what does this notion do to the concept "mind?"

¹⁵Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 87.

There are more questions that some intemperate and impolite interlocuter might fire at Hartman at this point. No doubt such a questioner would have been answered. Perhaps it is a shame no one ever pushed hard enough on this point as to cause Hartman to write an explanatory article clarifying things. But Hartman does not deal with such questions, at least not directly; he simply leaves the matter by saying, "In the first, the finite intension, no perceptual thing exists at all, the referent of this intension is a pure thought construction."¹⁸

Yet there must be an "object" or else there is no extension such that its properties may be compared with its predicates--that is the "name of the game" in axiology. Yet it seems that unless Harman wishes to posit an ontological "Circle" or some such, then the distinction between property and predicate begins to fade. What is more difficult, if there *is* no extension, real in some sense, not only does property collapse into predicate but the concept "concept" crumbles. It would seem that Hartman would be forced into *Gegenstandtheorie*, and so he is --but not in the usual way. For the moment though it should be clear that in terms of the "entity" of systemic value, there is no connection between the ordinary space-time world and the mental referent or concept of systemic value.

The Entities of Extrinsic Value

It has already been shown that the referents of denumerably transfinite concepts are the "things" of the empirical world, i.e. the world

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 99.

of the positivists with their extensional logic. Yet it is not quite that simple. The meaning of "automobile" for extensional logic is an automobile. However, for Hartman the automobile ultimately is a construction in the mind. This is not quite what the positivists had in mind; nor upon first reading Hartman is it the impression that comes across.

The first point to keep in mind with respect to extrinsic entities like an automobile is that the referents of analytic concepts are logical particulars. "An automobile just as *a* man is not something met with in reality, though we usually cut reality down to such things."¹⁹ This idea, taken at face value when it was presented in Chapter One, now requires a more careful analysis. If one does not "meet" *an* automobile in reality, what then *does* one meet? If an automobile is not the given of perception, what is?

The answer, the same one that Kant would have given had he run across automobiles, is that the perception "automobile" is the complex result of organizing reason. "Automobile" is phenomenon not noumenon. Hartman says that part of the perception "automobile" is the contribution of the singular thing before one;²⁰ part is the result of the mind organizing the data. The illustration of the native trying to draw the battleship *Missouri* is apt here along with Hartman's comment that the

¹⁹Ibid., p. 86.

²⁰Ibid.

"world of fact" is an historical development such that ". . .we see what we have a mind to see."²¹ Culture determines the interpretation of sense data to some degree. What is a "fact" to a given society may not be for another--or even for the same society in different periods. However, the individual psychological and physiological processes of each person are also included: "Objects of our senses, *i.e.* the referents of the words of everyday language, are naturalistic constructions brought about by complicated physiological, psychological and epistemological processes, and classifiable in space and time."²² The singular thing before one is beyond language by its very definition--what is absolutely singular and unique is precisely that thing which has no common property and, hence, no concept. Or from a more psychological point of view one might say that the singular *thing* does not and cannot enter consciousness as a meaningful unity until the mind has organized it and brought forth *a* fact, *a* concept, *i.e.* a word with its cultural and historical context. So organized and so clothed in the "reality" of space and time, the singular arises before consciousness, but not as a singular *thing*.

The process of perception is, therefore, Kantian in nature. The perceptual "thing" arises in consciousness partly due to its own noumenal

²¹See page six of this dissertation.

²²Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," *op. cit.*, p. 93.

character, partly due to the contribution of the mind, especially logic. Hartman simply adopts the Kantian mode of expression on this point, "The Kantian metaphysical deduction, thus, has a deep axiological meaning: it shows that the thing in space and time arises from classificatory logic."²³ No doubt the culture supplies the exact concepts so that the mind recognizes the spatio-temporal "thing", and no doubt the complex psychological and physiological make-up of the individual play their parts as well.

The perception of an automobile, for example, seems to work like this:

(1) There seems to exist for Hartman a given singular *thing*, a noumenon. It is, as has been stated, not capable of being conceptualized. No one can point and say, "Oh, look! There's an *x*." The singular *thing* as such is *not* the spatio-temporal "thing" and is not the object of the senses.

(2) The object of the senses, the perceptual "thing", is the result first of classificatory logic. The categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality apply. The object of the senses is, therefore, a construction, a phenomenon, although it has a "counterpart" beyond space and time. The consciousness does not perceive the noumenon, however. Even if it could, it could not "know" it conceptually.

(3) Thus, the consciousness has before it an object, a spatio-temporal "thing." What is it? Hartman says in *The Structure of Value*

²³Ibid., p. 89.

that "our perception cuts out of the undifferentiated chaos of properties a certain set for differentiation into thinghood."²⁴ In this sentence, "perception" refers to the entire process of coming to consciousness, not mere the reception of sense data. The "properties," however, though used here almost as sense data, are logical particulars themselves, e.g. "red," "hard," "big," etc. Later in "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value" Hartman changes the words "cuts out" to "project" or "map" to make certain no misunderstanding arises.²⁵ The mind does not directly perceive properties; it has no direct *perceptual* access to logical particulars since logical particulars exist "in the mind." The sentence, to be accurate, should read, "Our perception projects or maps out of the undifferentiated chaos of properties a certain set for differentiation into thinghood."

(4) After the bare minimum number of properties are mapped on the "thing" such that definition and/or recognition occurs, the consciousness goes on to description and eventually differentiation. The squinting consciousness first recognizes the "thing" to be *a* car and afterwards, noting the color, make, and dents, exclaims, "That's *my* car!"

Perception begins with the recognition of a space-time "thing" as *an x*, a member of a class (Kantian "definition"²⁶). The consciousness

²⁴Hartman, *Structure of Value*, op. cit., p. 218.

²⁵Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," op. cit., p. 86.

²⁶Hartman, *Structure of Value*, loc. cit.

then goes on to make finer and finer distinctions (Kantian "description"²⁷). It may go on in its differentiation so that it will be able to pick the x out of six million x 's. A story is told that in one class the teacher gave each student a lemon and told them to take it with them wherever they went, to talk to it, sleep with it, etc. At the end of the week all the lemons were put into a basket and mixed up; however, the students infallibly and directly identified *their* lemons. Yet *my* lemon is not a singular *thing*; it is a well differentiated class member, a logical particular, still. There is no interpenetration, no identification going on. Picking one's own lover out of a line of six possible lovers is a skill each lover had *better* have. But simply pointing to *my* lover is still an analytic activity. The referents of such pointings are well-defined logical particulars, not singular *things*.

Having made these remarks, the process of extrinsic valuation and the entities thereof should be clearer. The valuer has *in his mind* a class concept, say "automobile." This class concept is a mental entity made up of an intension with a denumerably transfinite number of predicates. Arising in consciousness, via the categories, culture, physiology, etc. is an object of sense. This spatio-temporal "thing" is not merely the set of predicates; it has "accidents" as well. It can be pointed to and contrasted with others in its class. But even so, even if it is extremely well differentiated, it remains a logical

²⁷ Ibid.

particular also *in the mind*. The noumenon, the thing-in-itself is not perceived.²⁸ "Value, thus, is not perceived," Hartman says, "and there are, strictly speaking, no value properties but only value predicates."²⁹

Hartman describes this whole process as follows:

The matching is here a process in the mind only, from the intension, which is in the mind, to the particular which is in the mind but which has a counterpart in space and time. Thus, the class properties of any automobile which make it *an* automobile rather than *my* automobile (the Aristotelian properties vs. the accidents) are not as such perceptible but inhere in my automobile. . . . Since there is more to things [spatio-temporal] than their class properties, namely their continuous thing-nature itself, matching becomes mapping. We may map upon the latter more or fewer of these class properties. The thing's spatio-temporal nature serves, so to speak, as substratum upon which to project the mapping; and indeed makes this kind of mapping both possible and necessary. In as far as the mapping is projected on the space-time substratum, *this* thing, *my* automobile, it assumes the form of the space-time thing itself --the goodness or badness of *my* automobile as *an* automobile.³⁰

Whatever difficulties may arise from this view of perception, epistemology, and metaphysics, it is clear that the tradition of idealism, particularly Kantian idealism, is at the root of axiological formulation. The entities of extrinsic value, the members of the space-time world, are constructions; and extrinsic value itself is largely mental even as are its referents. How far Hartman would allow himself to be pushed in this direction is questionable, however. He does hold that

²⁸ Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," op. cit., p. 89.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 100.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

extensional logic has its place although it would seem that the claim that the meaning of a concept is its extension would be modified considerably in his system. One may be sure in any case that the entities of both systemic and extrinsic value are not of this space-time world, i.e. the "objective" world: "Strictly speaking, then, neither the systemic nor the extrinsic . . . entity as referents of their corresponding intensions are *things* in the perceptual sense."³¹

There are two ways of looking at the result of such metaphysical inclinations concerning the space-time world. Axiology, for example, does tend toward idealism; in fact, the further one goes, the more it begins to resemble absolute idealism. This means very simply that if one does not care for Kant, one is not very likely to become an enthusiastic axiologist. However useful or brilliant the definition of "good," the metaphysical baggage may be too much.

On the other hand, men live in a world of classifications, a world given to them in some sense by logic and culture. They value phenomenal automobiles and phenomenal cabbages. Extrinsic value is the characteristic value of appearance not being. However automobiles and cabbages arise for consciousness, they are valued *qua* cabbage and *qua* automobile *as they appear*. It does seem that the development of Kant's "concept" into an intensional logic appears to drive a wedge between appearance and reality; the "objects" of extensional logic have indeed disappeared,

³¹ Ibid., p. 99.

but so what? Axiology is not so much a metaphysical program which aims at an ontological inventory as it is a description of what happens in valuing. Cabbages seem to be a part of the "real" world however they get here--when one picks up a cabbage at the market and "values" it, he is checking properties: firmness, color, size, worm holes, price, etc. Axiology is the science of value, not an inventory of the world. And yet, although axiology is pragmatically effective, it does have its implications which serious axiologists must take into account.

The Entities of Intrinsic Value

It seems then, in respect to the entities of systemic and extrinsic value that they exist "in the mind" although extrinsic entities have noumenal counterparts. They are both mental constructions, however. The distinction between "predicate" and "property" has merged such that intension and extension seem identical. This brings about a bit of epistemological uncertainty. In the case of intrinsic valuation the account of intrinsic "perception" and of the referent is considerably clearer, however. There are philosophical debates concerning just what kind of entities or objects words like "automobile" and "cabbage" may refer to, but no one requires that the referent of a metaphor be brought into class for "show and tell!" There are two ways to approach the epistemological experience of intrinsic value; they are often intertwined. Here they will be separated into their psychological and into their logical aspects.

"Perception" of an intrinsic "object" or entity is only in the barest sense physiological. In intrinsic perception ". . . the perceptual thing shrinks to an infinitesimal yet determining *point* of the referent, which in infinite scintillations organizes the referent and makes a world in itself."³² There is still a reference to the noumenon. If a human being is before one in the fullness of his singular being, he is still before one just as is a cabbage. The distinction is in the consciousness of the valuer, not in the noumenon. However, the object of intrinsic perception, the "person" in this case, does not arise in consciousness as a spatio-temporal "thing:" the thing-in-itself transcends space and time and as such, "as the two later *Critiques* demonstrates, [is] *the thing of intrinsic value*."³³ Psychologically speaking,

In the universe of intrinsic value, subject and object form one close continuum; one internal relationship encompasses and enshrines them, as it were, the *Urbeziehung* in the sense of Buber, the primary relation in which the Other, no matter whether a person, a thing, or a thought, becomes a Self identified with the valuing Self, a Thou to the I.³⁴

The valuing self identifies and intertwines with the "other" who is no "other" any longer. No *via negativa* is involved. There is no death of self, no emptying of consciousness so as to be "informed" by another presence. The one in singular completeness becomes one with the other

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., p. 89.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 98.

who likewise is not diminished but enhanced. "One" and "other," "subject" and "object" are only seen by analysis, but analysis is the bane of intrinsic valuation--"Any intrinsic value experience casts an 'unreal' spell over the valuer, yet, in this spell he feels more alive than in the 'real' world. Often a realist fool can destroy this spell by a word of 'fact'[but] the world of facts is really the world of abstractions, classifications, fragments of things, combined to units which exist only in the mind."³⁵

In this experience sense perception is diminished, or perhaps a better term would be "focused." The world is reorganized, a new synthetic a priori causes all things to become new. It is a *gestalt* experience simply because the perception is not filtered, as it were, through the categories, through culture, through history. The valuer in his total being "locks onto" another total being; it is no longer the case of a single unitary being who has over against him a manifold. No longer is self defined by what it is *not* but by what it *is*. Intrinsic valuation is affirmation.

Psychologically, therefore, intrinsic value is a perception of the soul, of the noumenal self. Its world, object, or referent, is different each time it occurs--even with the "same" object. Lovers, for example, do not return serially for the "same" time-out-of-time dallying.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 100.

Each "time" is a new experience, just as each prayer is a new encounter with God. The language is here is not meant to posit an ontological inventory of intrinsic entities; the "existence" of "soul," "noumenal self," "God," or even "lover" is not at issue. The language here is metaphor designed to intimate and suggest and is reminiscent of remarks once made by Rudolf Otto on the subject of religious "feeling" which from an axiological view is of intrinsic feeling:

The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion. . .but cannot recally any intrinsically religious feelings. We do not blame such an one, when he tries. . .to advance as far as he can with the help of such principles of explanation as he knows, interpreting "aethetics" in terms of sensuous pleasure, and "religion" as a function of gregarious instinct But the artist, who for his part has an intimate personal knowledge of the distinctive element in the aesthetic experience, will decline his theories with thanks, and the religious man will reject them even more uncompromisingly.³⁶

The language of intrinsic value is the language of metaphor, and attempts to "explain away" the reality of it are not easy for those who have had such experiences to accept.

There is another way of putting all this, however. It is an examination of the logical possibilities in positing a non-denumerably transfinite concept or metaphor. The world of metaphor seems like a

³⁶Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 8.

new world, a "real" or even "more real" world because it *is*. Hartman brings this to light when he points out that a metaphor is a synthetic a priori of a new type:

This universe [intrinsic], as well as the worlds of which it consists, is not merely a universe of discourse, *i.e.* a discursive context which, through, the complement of its contradictory (A,-A) becomes a total though formal universe. It is a system as is the physical universe--only that its systematicness is non-naturalistic rather than naturalistic, as is that of a mathematical or a musical system. It is a synthetic a priori of a new kind.³⁷

A synthetic a priori concept is precisely that concept which creates a world. It does not mirror the space-time world. Intrinsic experience is not a short-cut to the world of noumena. The metaphor creates an alternative world; as synthetic a priori it is that category without which no experience is possible. Just as the Kantian synthetic a priori brought forth the world of physical phenomena, just as the synthetic a priori of Galileo brought forth the world of physics, so *any* metaphor brings forth its own world with its own internal relations, a universe with just as many items as any other:

In a naturalistic scientific system the universe thus arising is the system of nature. In the reverse formulation, we have the totality of natural phenomena themselves, this time as extrinsic value, in abstraction and classification, in space and time. These two aspects of the universe are what Kant calls the synthetic a priori system of nature, synthetic insofar as the phenomena are connected merely by experience, a priori insofar as they are connected by a constructed system.

³⁷ Hartman, "Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," *op. cit.*, p. 100.

An axiom of a scientific system, however, is only one specific kind of metaphor, to wit, a combination of a systemic with an extrinsic value (S^E or E^S); and an axiomatic identification is only one kind of metaphorical identification, *i.e.* transformation. Hence, a Kantian synthetic a priori is only one kind of such an a priori. There are, as has been shown before, nine axiological possibilities of metaphorical identification, namely the exponentiations of every value dimension (S, E, I) by every value dimension.³⁸

A metaphor is a non-naturalistic synthetic structure just as a scientific system is a naturalistic synthetic structure. Just as the referents of a science arise as "real" things, e.g. "mass," "force," "electron," etc., so are the referents, the entities of a metaphorical, non-naturalistic system "real."

This is the logical explanation for the psychological experience of intrinsic value. The experience is tied to the space-time world--just as physics is. Physics formalizes the world; it creates the "world of physics." Any metaphor, any synthetic a priori, does the same. The entities of any such formal world are as real as or more real than the so-called "world of fact."

In this explanation, however, it is unmistakably clear that "No Kant--no explanation" applies. It may well be that even Kant would be shocked by Hartman's claim of a multiplicity of synthetic a priori's. The logical positivists would be no doubt flabbergasted--*one* synthetic a priori is unthinkable for them.

The system here is internally consistent, however. It accounts in a logical way for what happens in intrinsic experience. The referent,

³⁸ Ibid., p. 92.

the entity of intrinsic experience is formal, an axiom. A literal new world is generated by each intrinsic experience, a world whose items are just as real as "electron" and "mass." No claim is made that there is a dramatic tearing back of the veil between phenomena and noumena. The valuer does not by some super-sense pierce the objects of space-time and reveal their grisly contents like some psychic with the second sight. The "object" of intrinsic valuation begins with the same noumenon that the "object" of extrinsic valuation does, but because of an entirely different system arises in consciousness in its own universe.

Summary of Concepts

The entities of the three types of concepts differ in several ways, but they are at least alike in one--they all exist "in the mind." The world of nature and the universes of intrinsic value arise because of a different synthetic a priori's. A geometrical circle arises out of the structured system of mathematics; Hartman does say that no concrete thing in the space-time world is the referent of such a concept. But even the concrete things of the space-time world begin to fade when it is considered that they, the world of facts, are the result of a naturalistic construction. Hartman is determined to have a physical, objective, concrete world--noumena from which, because of which, and in the light of which, all the various worlds are founded. With the introduction of a multiplicity of synthetic a priori's this determination is all the

more praiseworthy, but the noumena seem to fade just as did the objects of sense. Universes begin to be multiplied exponentially as the consciousness creates metaphor after metaphor. Hartman states that every metaphor is tied to "reality" because each concept has a definite meaning. "Peach of a dog," for example, still is a joining of two concepts both of which may be said to be founded in "reality."

A thorough and far-sighted philosopher might be to Hartman as Hegel was to Kant, but the point of this chapter is this: the acceptance of Hartman's scheme is tied to a specific, though not completely developed, metaphysics and epistemology. The setting forth of intensional logic in a system of relations has produced axiological positivism, just as Hartman said it would. It is hard to accept the logical positivists' account of logic without becoming a logical positivist; it is equally hard to accept Hartman's account of logic without becoming an axiological positivist.

IV. APPLICATIONS

An axiologist needs to keep this foundation of his science before him. An axiological interpretation of value phenomena does not so much refer to the ontological character of the objects valued as it does to the way in which the valuer is viewing the objects. When a valuer values is he viewing his object systemically, extrinsically, or intrinsically? The words themselves, the concepts he uses, are no sure guide to his meaning. The entities of systemic value, as have been

shown, do not belong to the extrinsic world. The furniture of each intrinsic universe cannot be moved haphazardly about from one intrinsic relation to another.

"God," for example, may be used in all three ways, in the same book, by the same author, who may *think* that the word has the same kind of referent (or be the same concept) each time it is used. "God" may refer to a formal, explicit term in a theological or philosophical system. "God" need not be a purely constructed term, of course, any more than "honky" must. The question is whether the writer is in fact using "God" as part of an over-arching system, a "great chain of being," for example. The axiologist must ask himself if "God" refers to a concept with a denumerably finite intension.

Or "God" may be used discursively as a word of ordinary language. In this case the concept "God" itself and the relation of God to the world are left vague and undefined within the implicative net of everyday discourse. Yet many, if not most, sentences in respect to God belong to this category; these, of course, are sentences which follow the pattern "God is x ." The predication of various attributes to God by means of ordinary language has produced in Christianity a theological nightmare of "all-" attributes, e.g. all-powerful, all-knowing, etc. "Omniscient" and "omnipotent," for example, have given theologians centuries of difficulty because of the problem of evil these two terms seem to generate when applied together to God. The inherent vagueness of an analytic concept produces only difficulty in any theological system.

Often mystics who usually seem to be attempting to influence people or to lead them to an intrinsic experience use metaphorical language. Often such attempts are accepted by believers and are rejected by gainsayers largely because the mystics are using "God" as in item in an intrinsic universe which the believers understand automatically and which the gainsayers find unintelligible. If the axiologist will keep the three kinds of entities strictly before him, then he is not as likely to misinterpret the meaning of given sentences in respect to value.

An axiologist, therefore, must be an expert in determining the kind of concept and, hence, the kind of universe in question. This is all the more difficult because those who are doing the valuing do not always keep *their* universes straight. In the case of Saint Augustine, as we shall see, "God" gets used all three ways. He is at the top of the "Great Chain or Being," a systemic concept. He is used as a logical particular about which certain things are predicated. He is that person of metaphor and paradox to whom Augustine confesses. One sometimes wishes for the "real" God to stand up, for Augustine does not keep straight exactly which "God" he is talking about, "God" the system, "God" the logical particular, or "God" the singular. Similar difficulties arise in respect to "man."

Oft times apparent contradictions often arise because the level of meaning is not clear. Axiology provides a theoretical platform such that the various "uses" of concepts and the entities to which they refer

can at least be partially determined. The following application is not a complete rendering of Saint Augustine's system into axiological perspective. However, it does show how axiology may be applied to several crucial concepts within the system, e.g. "God" and "man". It also resolves a problem or two with respect to the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic time where Augustine fell into difficulty by not distinguishing the two.

CHAPTER III

AXIOLOGY AND SAINT AUGUSTINE'S ORDER OF BEING

I. INTRODUCTION

Eckard König begins a philosophical study of Saint Augustine with some very sound advice; he admonishes modern commentators that

*manche Untersuchungen über Augustins Gotteslehre scheitern daran, dass eine moderne Fragestellung an den Text hergetragen wird, die Augustin selbst völlig fremd war.*¹

many investigations concerning Augustine's doctrine of God run aground on the fact that a modern formulation of a question, which was totally foreign to Augustine himself, has been applied to the text.²

Not only is this true in respect to the doctrine of God but to many other topics as well. Augustine does not pretend to be nor wish to be a philosopher. He belongs to a time when theologians are not university professors living in a rarified academia but bishops being buffeted with heresies which must be combated. Accordingly, he is not concerned so much with the building and polishing of a philosophical system proper as he is with the defense of the faith, once and for all delivered

¹Eckard König, *Augustinus Philosophus* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1970), p. 27.

²All translations in this dissertation are the author's.

to the saints. Indeed almost everything Augustine ever writes is in response to a crisis; sometimes the crisis is personal and existential, but more often it is ecclesiastical and dogmatic. He is preacher and pastor first; philosophy may be useful, but it is Scripture and creed that really supplies the "grist" for the mill. After remarking that Augustine was little more than an episcopal dean whom "the more casual officials cheerfully kept waiting in their anterooms," F. Van der Meer says:

From 391 till 426, he was every inch a pastor of souls, and this despite the monastic life which he lived together with his clergy, despite the care for the churches of all Africa which his metropolitan put upon him, and despite his growing literary fame. What ultimately compelled him to travel was the concrete demands which were made upon him by the necessities of the Church. It was the fear of seeing truth clouded over and violence done to the purity of the Church's doctrine, for what was in question was freedom and grace and unity and holiness of the Church--those very matters which most deeply touched his mind. Of his greater works, one only owes its existence to pure interest in speculation--that on the Trinity. The others all came into being to meet the particular needs of the time.³

What this means is that although Augustine writes philosophically, he is not attempting a great system. He is not *trying* to make Plato or Plotinus "agree" with Christian dogma in the same sense as Saint Thomas tries to bring Aristotle and Christainity into harmony. Augustine's first emphasis is on the data of revelation; his theology is derived

³F. Van der Meer, *Augustine the Bishop* (New York: Sneed and Ward, 1961), pp. xvi-xvii.

from sacred text and is written with the God of Abraham and of Isaac in mind--not with reference to the "One." Augustine uses philosophy to explain points suggested by Scripture, sometimes even to harmonize contradictory passages; but usually he turns to philosophy not by logical demands created by his system but from the demands of biblical exegesis.

Accordingly, a modern commentator, whether philosopher or axiologist, must be very careful not to misunderstand what Augustine is doing or how he does it. It is easy to point out inconsistencies here and there, for there are some. It is easy to claim that he has overlooked this or that. However, the first duty of a commentator is to explicate sympathetically exactly what his writer *is* saying, not what he says badly or misses altogether. Philosophical criticism and axiological analysis come only after this process.

After all the warnings, however, Augustine does build a system. It stretches in a perfectly determinate way all the way from God to a very curious kind of matter which is "somewhat nothing." There are several reasons why he builds the way he does; some of the reasons relate to the very pressing heresies of his day, and some come from the demands of dogma. But it is a system, and it is a system which identified fact and value in a way interesting to an axiologist.

Yet Augustine probably did not start out to build it; it happens as he goes along from crisis to crisis. Moreover, as many critics have pointed out, it is taken from neo-Platonic systems which are really not suited for Augustine's purposes. Often writers claim that Augustine

simply does not understand what Plato or Plotinus is saying, or that a certain problem has been utterly twisted. The fact is that although Augustine ends up with a system, in many, many places he does not write in its formal light, as Kant does or Hegel. From an axiological point of view Augustine breaks out of his own system, especially in respect to God. The God of the "great chain of being" is not the axiological equivalent of the God of prayer and praise as found in the *Confessions*. In this chapter Augustine's system will be discussed, beginning precisely where Augustine does--with the account of creation. Not everything in the system will be covered; that is not needful or even helpful in this study. Rather those aspects of the system will be stressed which bear directly on its axiological interpretation, and at the last of the chapter that interpretation will be given.

II. CREATION

The best place to start, especially when one is able to do so, is "in the beginning." Few metaphysical systems start with so straightforward a phrase. That particular phrase seems to fascinate Augustine, and he returns to it again and again in his writings. For example, there is a detailed analysis in Book XII on the *Confessions*; *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* is devoted to its unraveling; and even in *The City of God* he returns to the theme in the context of time and eternity along with the problem of evil. Of course, at all times Augustine is an exegete; he is trying to interpret Scripture correctly and truthfully.

Had he stuck strictly to the Scripture, most likely this paper would have never been written; but as it turns out, the interpretation has a philosophical ground--"in the beginning" sounds a deeper note than mere temporal happening.

"Before" the first morning of creation while the Spirit of God moved over the face of the deep, nothing was. Already difficulties arise! "Before" is not a temporal word; it is strictly logical, for time itself is not yet, nor spaces, nor order, nor form, nor number. Yet the "nothing" which was on that first day is not entirely not.

Augustine contemplates the problem like this in the *Confessions*:

*Nonne tu, Domine, docuisti me quod priusquam istam informem materiam formares atque distingueres, non erat aliquid, non color, non figura, non corpus, non spiritus? Non tamen omnino nihil: erat quaedam informitas sine ulla specie.*⁴

Have You not taught me, Lord, that before You formed that unformed matter and made it manifold, there was nothing, not color, not figure, not body, not spirit? Nevertheless, it was not altogether nothing: there was a certain formlessness without any visible appearance.

It is a hallmark of Augustine's thought that creation is *ex nihilo*.

Yet it seems here that there is "something" somewhat "there" upon which God works to produce the universe, a "certain formless, invisible matter." Well, in a certain sense there is; however, Augustine goes to great lengths not to be misunderstood on this point. Augustine feels

⁴ *Conf. XII, 3, 3; PL 32, 829.* See Sigla for abbreviations.

that an ultimate prime Aristotlean matter, entirely real and actual only in virtue of its accidents, is a "true" nothing and, as such, is unthinkable. When he tries to be strictly logical about his position, i.e. an unformed matter, and strip away every quality whatsoever, he feels that the result is simply a logical impossibility. Thus, he returns to his original position of matter as a "somewhat nothing." He understands that this is not a philosophically "neat" idea, but he seems to be stuck with it:

*Verum autem illud quod cogitabam, non privatione omnis formae, sed comparatione formosiorum erat informe: et suadebat vera ratio, ut omni formae qualescunque reliquas omnino detraherem, si vellem prorsus informe cogitare; et non poteram. . . Si dici posset, Nihil aliquid, et, Est non est, hoc eam dicerem; et tamen jam utrumque erat, ut species caperet istas visibiles et compositas.*⁵

In truth, however, that which I conceived was without form, not absolutely as a privation of all form but in comparison with the more beautiful forms: but true reason persuaded me that I must utterly strip away the remaining qualities of any kind of every form if I straightway wished to conceive it as unformed; but I was not able. . . [As a result] if it were possible for it to be said, it is a somewhat nothing, an "is-is not"--I would say this is the case. And yet in some way it was even then capable of receiving these visible and composite appearances.

Augustine does not wish to allow matter any existence of its own as an independent principle co-eternal with God; that is not according to Scripture. Etienne Gilson explains his formulation well:

⁵ *Conf. XII, 6, 6; PL 32, 827.*

Although this material formlessness never existed apart from the forms which clothe it, it should not be thought of as a pure nothingness. When we try to define it, we can only conceive it negatively by refusing to it every form, be it sensible or intelligible. . . . However, undetermined though it may be, it is still something, for through it bodies constantly change from one form to another and it is, so to speak, their very mutability. . . . From this point of view, it is of all existing things the farthest removed from God. for He is being and it is almost nothing, and yet it is not pure nothingness.⁶

However, Frederick Copleston insists that whatever, a "somewhat nothing" is, it too owes its being to God. God did create from nothing:

If you are speaking . . . of matter which has no completed form, but which has inchoate form, in the sense of possessing the capacity to receive form, then such matter is not altogether nothing indeed, but, as something, it has what being it has only from God. "Wherefore, even if the universe was created out of some formless matter, this very matter was created from something which was wholly nothing." . . . We should also remember that the Saint is not so concerned with developing a philosophical doctrine for its own sake as with emphasising the essential dependence of all creatures on God. . . .⁷

The emphasis in this account of creation is not so much on how the eternal creates the temporal as it is on how the immutable creates the mutable. God, who is immutable, clearly cannot make the world of His own substance since then the part of God which is formed into the world is subject to decay, change, and even death--an absurdity for Augustine. Further, Augustine no doubt keeps in mind that the Manichees

⁶ Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 198.

⁷ Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, II (New York: Newman Press, 1971), p. 75. His quotation from Augustine is found in *De Vera Relig.* 18, 35-6; PL 34, 137.

hold that God is material--light--and wishes to avoid that position. Hence, God has no choice, so to speak, if Scripture is to be believed, but to create from nothing. This is a radical departure from classical thought, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, yet it is demanded from Scripture. It certainly does violence to the emanation-theory of Plotinus. It keeps the hierarchy of being, but it preserves the absolute freedom of God. Plotinus holds that "God does not act freely (since such activity would, he thought, postulate change in God) but rather *necessitate naturae*, the Good necessarily diffusing itself."⁸

All this discussion concerns what is logically prior to God's first command, "*Fiat Lux!*" Yet inchoate matter is not the only item of logically prior beings. God not only created earth but heaven. Both arise out of nothing: "*In Principio, quod est de te, in Sapientia tua qua nata de substantia tua, fecisti aliquid et de nihilo. Fecisti coelum et terram; non de te.*"⁹ "In the beginning, which is of You, in Your wisdom which is born of Your substance, You made everything from nothing. You made heaven and earth; but not of Yourself." But unlike earth, heaven is not a literal place but is beyond space and time in the same sense that inchoate matter is. Augustine explains this is a somewhat difficult way:

Ideoque Spiritus doctor famuli tui, cum te comemorat fecisse in principio coelum et terram, tacet de temporibus, silet de diebus. Nimirum enim coelum coeliquod in

⁸ Ibid., p. 74.

⁹ Conf. XII, 7, 7; PL 32, 827.

*principio fecisti, creatura est aliquae intellectualis; quanquam nequaquam tibi Trinitati coeterna, particeps tamen aeternitatis tuae, valde mutabilitatem suam prae dulcedine felicissimae contemplationis tuae cohibet, et sine ullo lapsu ex quo facta est inhaerendo tibi, excedit omnem volubilem vicissitudinem temporum. Ista vero infirmitas, terra invisibilis et incompressa, nec ipsa in diebus numerata est. Ubi enim nulla species, nullus ordo; nec venit quidquam, nec praeterit: et ubi hoc non fit; non sunt utique dies, nec vicissitudo spatiorum temporalium.*¹⁰

And so the Spirit, teacher of Your servant [Moses], when it recounts that You made heaven and earth in the beginning, is silent concerning the times and speaks not of days. For without doubt the heaven of heaven is some intellectual creature. Although it is in no way co-eternal with You, triune God, nevertheless participating in Your eternity, it strongly resists its own mutability through the sweetness of most blessed contemplation of You; and by cleaving close unto You without any fall since its first creation, it is placed beyond the rolling vicissitudes of times. Indeed that formlessness, the invisible and uncompounded earth, is not itself numbered in days. For where there is no order, no appearance, nor anything comes nor goes--where nothing becomes--there are not any days nor vicissitude of spaces belonging to time.

What Augustine is getting at is best put by Gilson:

The "heaven" spoken of in the first verse of Genesis signifies a spiritual matter completely and definitively formed from the very moment of its creation: it is the angels. The angels, being creatures and so not coeternal with God, probably have a material and changeable substratum like every other creature, but the bliss of beatific contemplation fixes, as it were, their natural mutability and binds them inseparably to God. Since they are immutable *de facto* as a result of their beatitude, they are preserved from change and consequently do not fall within the order of time. . . .¹¹

¹⁰ Conf. XII, 9, 9; PL 32, 830.

¹¹ Gilson, op. cit., pp. 197-198.

Thus, at least in the *Confessions*, matter, angels, and "heaven" do not belong to time although their priority is again logical not temporal since everything arose together in one instant, as will be shown later. Angels, then, are fully informed spiritual matter; the "earth," on the other hand, is fully unformed matter. However, Augustine is very particular that the reader not mistake logical priority for temporal priority. It is a mistake to conceive of God creating inchoate matter on "one day" and then whipping up a world the next:

*. . . ita creator Deus non priore tempore fecit informem materiam, et eam postea per ordinem quarumque naturarum, quasi secunda consideratione formavit.*¹²

. . . thus, the creator God did not make unformed matter at an earlier time and afterwards form it through the order of certain natures as an afterthought.

The main points to be made here are (1) God created the world from nothing; (2) He is apart from the creation; it does not emanate from Him, nor is it a part of His substance; (3) heaven and angels are next to God while matter is furthestest away, and the measure of "closeness to God" lies in mutability--angels are less mutable while matter is most mutable.¹³

The stage is now set for God's command. In terms of causality, though not of time, heaven and matter are ready to be determinate. At this point two contradictory passages of Scripture compel Augustine to

¹² *De Gen. ad Litt. I, 15, 29; PL 34, 257.*

¹³ *Cont. Secund. Manich. 8; PL 42, 584; De Civitate Dei. IV, 12; PL 41, 123. De Gen ad Litt. VII, 2, 3; PL 34, 356-6.*

decide the question of time and eternity. One passage from *Genesis* 1-2:1 states that the world was made in six days; but another, *Ecclesiasticus* 18:1, clearly proclaims that all things were created together, in one instant, so to speak. Since Scripture does not contradict itself, one of the passages must be suitably "interpreted." Since the sun was created on the fourth day, Augustine does not believe the days of creation are of the twenty-four hour variety. Further, the picture of an immutable God creating things in six days, as if He were Himself in time, is not a pleasurable image for Augustine. Thus, Augustine says that *everything* was created in one instant, "*in iotu*,"¹⁴ in a single blow or the beat of a pulse. Thus, creation occurs before time all at once: "*Haec enim jam per moras temporum fiunt, quae tunc non erant, cum fecit omnia simul, unde etiam tempora inciperent.*"¹⁵ "For now these things [i.e. creation] came to be through the delays of times, which were themselves not yet, since he made everything all at once--from thence even the times take their beginning." This somewhat paradoxical statement means simply that time itself is a creature, beginning with things. After puzzling about this and admitting that it is "impenetrable to human knowledge," Augustine clearly says as much: "*omnem creaturam habere initium; tempusque ipsum creaturam esse, ac per hoc ipsum habere initium, nec coaeternum esse creatori.*"¹⁶ "Every creature has a

¹⁴ *De Gen. ad Litt. IV, 33, 54; PL 34, 318.*

¹⁵ *De Gen. ad Litt. IV, 6, 19; PL 34, 328.*

¹⁶ *De Gen. ad Litt. III, 8; PL 34, 223.*

beginning, and time itself is a creature; and because of this, time itself has a beginning and is not coeternal with the Creator."

Very well, God created everything all at once, including time. There is, therefore, no "before" about creation. No one can *ask* what God was doing "before" creation. God's will, His word of command bringing about creation, is the ultimate category of explanation, the "therefore" for every "wherefore"--there is no going beyond that. God formed the trees, the grasses, the beasts of the field, etc. from primal matter, yet there is still a problem here--if the objects of creation are not "informed" by God's substance or do not emanate from Him, where do the forms come from? Did God also create a world of forms? Each thing is a *concreatum* of matter and form such that the matter which almost does not exist and jointed with form in a concrete item of experience, but how does the ever-shifting matter which is virtually unable to be without form get its form?

In Platonism, of course, there is the world of forms; but Augustine sharply departs from pure Platonism here. Yet the question is a Platonic kind of question; this is to say that the problem facing Augustine at this point is not so exegetical as philosophical. Augustine must give a "good" philosophical account without doing violence to his conception of God. Above all the ideas or forms must not be different from God and coeternal. Konig, whose book is a careful study of the philosophical origins of Augustine's thought, compresses Augustine's answer into one sentence:

Die drei Ursachen des mittleren Platonismus (Gott, Ideen, und Materie) reduziert Augustin (darin anderen Denken folgend) auf eine, indem er die Ideen als Gedanken Gottes auffasst und die Schaffung auch der Materie behauptet.¹⁷

Augustine (following other thinkers) reduces the three primal principles of middle Platonism (God, the ideas, and matter) into one, in which he understands ideas as God's thoughts, and so asserts the creation of matter. ["Matter" here refers to the visible kind, i.e. creation]

Simply put, the "forms" exist as ideas in the mind of God.

"Form," however, is a somewhat technical term as Gilson explains:

Actually the correct Latin translation of the Greek word for them [forms] would be *forma* or *species*. It is often translated by *ratio*, but *ratio* corresponds exactly to *λόγος*, not *τοῖς δέαις*. If we want to be correct we should translate the term by "form." However, since *ratio* may signify ideas as principles of knowledge and of the intelligibility of things, we can say that it means fundamentally the same thing. In Augustine, then, *idea*, *forma*, *species*, *ratio* are practically synonymous terms.¹⁸

Augustine himself deals with this problem of translation and meaning and explains the notion of forms as ideas in the mind of God:

Ideas igitur latine possumus vel formas vel species dicere, ut verbum a verbo transferre videamur. Si autem rationes eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus; rationes enim graece λόγος appellantur, non ideae: sed tamen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non aberrabit. Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriuntur, neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari potest, et omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit.¹⁹

¹⁷König, op. cit., p. 128.

¹⁸Gilson, op. cit., p. 199.

¹⁹*De Div. Quaest. XLVI, 2; PL 40, 30.*

We are able, therefore, to render "ideas" in Latin either as *formae* or *species*, so that we may seem to have a word for word translation. If, however, we translate them as *rationes*, we indeed depart from exactness of translation since in Greek *rationes* strictly means , not *ideae*: but nonetheless whoever wishes to use this designation does not wander far from the thing itself. For these ideas are certain principles of form or stable essences of things, immutables which themselves are not formed, keeping themselves through eternity always in the same [unchanged] way since they are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they neither arise nor pass away, it is said that by their agency everything was formed which is able to arise and pass away and everything which in fact arises and passes away.

Things of creation, then, exist as a coming together of primal matter and ideas in the mind of God. Things exist both in themselves and in God and their eternal ideas. Most importantly, the ideas in the mind of God unlike Plato's are not only ideas of species like "man" and "fish" but are rather ideas of individuals like "Gaius" and a singular fish. This, of course, is an interpretation of Augustine's position, but it is not at all foreign to him. If this were not the case, some agency would have to be at work in the world mediating the general ideas in the mind of God and the singular individuals of existence. Moreover, Augustine clearly affirms this in the case of men,²⁰ and in the following passages the doctrine seems to be extended to all created beings:

Quia igitur unum Verbum Dei est, per quod facta sunt omnia, quod est incommutabilis veritas, ibi principaliter atque incommutabiliter sunt omnia simul; non solum quae nunc sunt

²⁰ Epist. 14, 4; PL 33, 80.

*in hac universa creatura, verum etiam quae fuerunt et quae futura sunt.*²¹

Since, therefore, the Word of God is one, through which everything was made (which is the unchangeable truth), all things there are originally and immutably simultaneous, not only the things which are now in this whole creation, but also those which have been and which are yet to be.

The force of "things" in this passage seems to refer to each thing and not to species. Further, and more telling, evidence can be found in

The Literal Meaning of Genesis:

*Sed etiam si hoc legamus et intelligamus Quod factum est, in illo vita; manet ista sententia, ut id quod per ipsum factum est, vita esse in illo intelligatur, in qua vita vidit omnia, quando fecit; et sicut vidit, ita fecit: non praeter seipsum videns, sed in seipso ita enumeravit omnia quae fecit.*²²

But even if we read and understand this "That which was made is alive in Him," it follows by that sentence²³ that that which was made through Him is understood to be alive in Him, in which life he saw everything. And just as he saw everything, he created everything: not seeing it as outside Himself, but in Himself, He thus counted up everything which He made.

God sees each thing as it eternally is, and so He must. Otherwise, there would be individual things in space and time which do not exist simultaneously in God, which would involve God's not knowing everything and God's incomplete creation. In Whiteheadian paraphrase all existence,

²¹ *De Trin.* IV, 2, 3; PL 42, 888. Although this is, of course, a questionable interpretation, Jules Martin takes this position in his book *Saint Augustin* (Paris: Akan, 1923), p. 31, and Gilson, op. cit., p. 199, agrees.

²² *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 15, 33; PL 34, 332-333.

²³ Translation suggested by variant manuscripts which use *monet* and *mouet* in place of *manet*. See PL 34, 332, note 3.

concrete existence, is "subjectively" and "objectively" immortal in the living present of God's mind. To say otherwise would involve serious difficulties for God's omniscience and would suggest that creation yet continues.

It is exactly this once and for all doctrine of creation which is opposed to continuing creation that leads Augustine to a further refinement in his metaphysical theory. Experience seems to give evidence that creation continues. Novelty seems to be a fact both in nature and in the works of man, in the production of novel life and in art and technology. Creative evolution is a theory which tries to give account for such phenomena in the natural realm. But if Augustine is correct and God created everything once and for all, in an instant, then it is his task to explain novelty away and introduce a principle of stability rather than novelty. In order to do just this, Augustine introduces the idea that there are two kinds of creatures brought forth at creation, those which are fixed and determinate and those which were created only in "germ", potentially, and must still develop.

Gilson draws together many passages and gives a collection or catalog of the two types:

The following were in finished form from the moment of creation: the angels, who were the work of the first day, day itself, the firmament, earth, sea, sir, and fire, i.e. the four elements, stars, and finally man's soul, which was created, as we see before it was placed in the body. Only preformed at the time of creation [but not complete] were the primordial seeds of all living things to come, whether animal or vegetable, including

Adam's body which, through its union with a soul already in finished form, was to constitute the first man.²⁴

What Augustine is in fact introducing here are "seminal reasons" (*rationes causales* or *rationes seminales*). These too are ideas in the mind of God, eternal and immutable ideas, which "refer," if that is what forms do, to animals, seeds, everything which is yet to develop. Augustine no doubt noticed that in the biblical account herbs, etc. appeared before seeds. Obviously, the herbs could not come up with their own seeds since this would be creation out of nothing; nor could God create again and produce them as a divine afterthought. Thus, he is forced into the position of asserting that the development of seed and what moderns might call the creative rush of evolution was already in principle effected at creation. The causes of everything were created with the items mentioned by Gilson as finished at creation.

Thus, far from being a principle of novelty, seminal reasons are the basis of stability. What is being asserted is that the universe is closed, a system within itself. Things only *appear* to be novel. Man only *believes* he is creating art. Creative activity is, thus, only the working out of divine creativity. The Word of God which called *everything* into being has already been spoken.

In trying to describe Augustine's ontological scheme, philosophers often try to divorce the metaphysical aspects of Augustine's account

²⁴Gilson, op. cit., p. 206.

from the concrete exegetical problems and personal struggles which prompted them. Philosophers, thus, produce technical systems from Augustine's Christian writings which are formulated in the technical language of philosophy. No doubt Augustine himself would have been appalled by such abstraction; and, in fact, such procedure is indeed misleading. To give an account of creation from Augustine's point of view is not an intellectual exercise but an act of worship and praise, as anyone who reads his voluminous accounts cannot but discover. Hardly a sentence goes by without prayer and praise, supplication and worship. Modern readers might sometimes wish that the editors of *Reader's Digest* would produce a more direct and readable text. No doubt what would be left would be direct and readable, philosophical and academic. Yet, at least from Augustine's point of view, it would not lead to knowledge and understanding. Understanding arises through faith.

It is most difficult for moderns to conceive of what hardly needed to be mentioned in that far away world--understanding has moral pre-conditions. Plato certainly holds this view, and so does Augustine. Simply to read Augustine as a mere philosopher is to do violence to the spiritual essence of his work. Moderns generally feel that "objective" truth is open to all who may master the symbology required to state it correctly; for Augustine it is first and last a great mystery, the gift of God to the faithful. Intellectual and logical expertness avails nothing, as indeed he illustrates in his own quest for certitude and enlightenment.

Yet, though this is the case, philosophers in general and this dissertation in particular must still take Augustine seriously enough to try to understand what he is suggesting. This task generally means translating and abstracting from a "confession," which indeed is what his philosophy as well as his life is, so that his scheme may be stated in the light of logical and intellectual analysis. One can only hope that such philosophical activity is as harmless as it seems. Philosophical light is a poor light in which to study Augustine, and he would say that it is no light at all--though better than nothing.

Still, philosophically speaking this sketch of creation has shown some fascinating and novel ideas used by Augustine for the interpretation of Scripture. Each metaphysical development in one way or another has reference to Scripture and to the complicated problems of harmonizing creed and exegesis. God is revealed as a non-temporal being, or rather non-temporal Being without the "a." "In the beginning," which was the beginning of all creation, including time, God formed primal matter. Yet primal matter is invisible; it never exists *as* primal matter. It functions, then, as an ontological principal, for it is not required by Scripture. It provides a reason for change, decay, and death; yet it is not thereby a principle of novelty--there is no novelty. It is simply the most mutable "element," the "thing" furtherest from the absolutely immutable. Since it is, thus, an ontological principal, real only in virtue of his accidents, Augustine does not conceive of it as existing temporally. It never

exists at all apart from some form, and in fact this curious quality almost makes it a category of explanation. But, of course, that it cannot be for Augustine--whatever it is or is not ("is-is not," after all is its defining characteristic), it is derived from God. It cannot be a nothing, for Absolute Being can not bring forth a nothing. This primal matter results from the reverse of "from nothing, nothing comes;" it results from "from something, nothing does not come." It is, therefore, the principle of mutability; and it answers the question of how an immutable God creates the mutable.

The other logically prior item is heaven, i.e. angels. Since the angels, though created, by virtue of their ceaseless beatific vision are not subject to change, they are thereby not subject to time either. Of the "items" of creation angels by their *de facto* immutability are closest to God.

Yet it is in Augustine's treatment of forms as being in the mind of God that his solution is offered to a difficult theological problem. In Plato's account the mediation of form and matter is taken care of by the demiurge such that novelty does occur. This creative principal cannot be distinguished from God so far as Augustine is concerned. These forms, as they have been interpreted here, are forms of individuals. There are great metaphysical problems which result from such a formulation, but there are greater theological difficulties which result from denying it. Creation takes place once. If God only has forms of species in His mind, then He does not

specifically inform each emerging individual--but if He does not, then who does? Some other creative force would have to be postulated. Now Augustine does have a division of labor theory in his doctrine of the Trinity; but the point is that once forms become ideas in the mind of God, and once creation is postulated as the unique act of God Himself carried out in an instant, then if each individual is not already complete, one finds oneself introducing new unScriptural beings and generally floundering about plugging leaks in the ontological dike. These are the considerations which lead Augustine to affirm that individual ideas exist immutably and eternally in the mind of God. From an axiological perspective this is a difficult but fascinating idea. God knows each individual *as* an individual, and this would seem to argue intrinsic value; however, this will be shown later not to be the case. God alone has intrinsic value.

The doctrine of seminal reasons, of course, is simply a way of denying novelty. Creation belongs exclusively to God. From an axiological view, this doctrine simply means that the universe is closed, a universe which has arisen as a completely determinate system, a universe which has arisen *in toto* from a single principle, i.e. God. There is no vagueness in such a universe: everything has a perfectly definite meaning, unchangeable and eternal.

III. THE "GREAT CHAIN OF BEING"

In the closed system of the universe all being, then, is derived from God who is absolute being. God is the highest essence, and all other creatures may be classified according to their ability to "participate" in God. There is no essence contrary to Highest Essence. Further, creation is in definite "grades."

*Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo immutabilis sit; rebus quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut ipse est; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus; atque ita naturas essentialium gradibus ordinavit. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere vocatur sapientia; sic ab eo quod est esse, vocatur essentia: novo quidam nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt latini sermonis auctores, sed jam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant ΟΥΣΙΑ. Hoc enim verbum e verbo expressum est, ut diceretur essentia. Ac per hoc ei naturae, quae summe est, qua faciente sunt quaecumque sunt, contraria natura non est, nisi quae non est. Et quippe quod est, non esse contrarium est. Et propterea Deo, id est, summae essentiae, et auctori omnium qualiviscunque essentialium, essentia nulla contraria est.*²⁵

For since God is Highest Essence, i.e. he supremely *is*, he is accordingly immutable. He gave being to the things which he created from nothing, but not being in the highest degree He Himself is. Rather He gave more being to some and less to others. And, thus, he arranged natures of essences in grades. For just as that which comes of being wise is called "wisdom," so that which comes of being itself is called "essence:" indeed by this new term, which ancient authors of Latin discourse did not use, but which now by its use in our times, that which the Greeks call ΟΥΣΙΑ is not lacking in our language. Thus, "essence" is a literal translation of ΟΥΣΙΑ. And, having said this, to that nature which supremely is and by which is made whatsoever things that are, there is no contrary nature, except

²⁵ *De Civitate Dei* XII, 2; PL 41, 350.

that which is not. Certainly to that which is, non-being is a contrary. And on that account, for God, for that which is Highest Essence, and for the Author of all essence whatsoever, there is no contrary essence.

But why grades? Granted that everything is derived from God and "participates" in some way in His being, why did God not make all things equal rather than giving more to some and less to others? Lovejoy supplies the Augustinian answer:

Augustine. . .reduced the Plotinian argument on the matter to an epigram of six words: *non essent omnia, si essent aequalia*: "if all things were equal, all things would not be; for the multiplicity of kinds of things of which the universe is constituted--first and second and so on, down to the lowest grades--would not exist." The assumption here, once more, is manifestly that literally all--that is, all possible--things ought to be.²⁶

Augustine does say that the universe contains the most good by being the "best" balance of good and evil, but more of that latter.

Very well, there is a chain of being which stretches from the most trivial puff of existence to Highest Essence. There is a form in God's mind for each individual creature; there are forms for "things" like numbers, wisdom, beauty, etc. But what does "participation" mean? If "participation" is the operation by which things find their place in the great scale of value, what is Participation itself? Plainly, everything which *is* is like God because of its imitation of the ideas. There must be an absolute Wisdom, an absolute Beauty, etc. which wise souls or beautiful things share and by which they are wise or beautiful. The criteria of the thing with the quality, so to speak, is sameness with the Father. But what is the form Sameness by which things may participate?

²⁶Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 67.

The model or form of participation is found in the relation of the Father to the Son; this relation is called by Augustine "resemblance," and by this Resemblance Itself all things conform to the ideas and in fact have what being they have:

*Ut autem nihil castius ipsa castitate, et nihil sapientius ipsa sapientia, et nihil pulchrius ipsa pulchritudine, ita nihil similius ipsa similitudine dici aut cogitari aut esse omnino potest. Unde intelligitur ita Patri esse similem similitudinem suam, ut ejus naturam plenissime perfectissime perfectissimeque impleat.*²⁷

Thus, nothing is able to be said, thought, or even to be more chaste than Chastity Itself, more wise than Wisdom Itself, or more similar than Similitude Itself. From thence it is understood why the Father's Resemblance [the Son²⁸] is so like the Father that He reproduces the Father's nature absolutely fully and perfectly.

It is, thus, in the relation of the Son, the *Verbum*, to the Father that the model by which all things participate in God's being is found. The Son reproduces the Father exactly, a mirror image so to speak; however, it is only relatively that all creation is like the Father. In so far as their likeness is like the likeness of the Son to the Father, they have being. There can be no form Difference, however, for God can only be like Himself. Further, since God is perfect being, most full, most complete, etc., then only non-being could be a contrary; but, of course, non-being is not. Difference is simply lack of sameness, a privation --not an ontological model like Sameness. The difference between Sameness and Difference is that Sameness is unity with the Father, Being, while

²⁷*De Gen. ad Litt.* 16, 58; PL 34, 242.

²⁸Augustine makes this identification explicit in *De Gen. ad Litt.* 16, 57; PL 34, 242.

Difference is lack of unity, or, to say the same, lack of participation in the form Sameness. To allow "difference" to be the form Difference, there would have to be a contrary principle to Being, i.e. Non-being. This will not work in Augustine's system at all.

With the mention of the Son, however, arises the triune nature of God. While a complete account of the Trinity is beyond the scope of this study, a few remarks are needful so that no vagueness is left in this explanation of Augustine's system of being. God is one, pure Being, as He Himself defined Himself to Moses in Exodus 3:14, "I am that I am," (KJV)--Being *par excellence*. Despite the fact that the triune nature of God's being surpasses man's understanding, Augustine does manage this terse explanation:

Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur Deus, et de singulis personis singulariter dicitur, id est, de Patre, et Filio, et Spiritu sancto, et simul de ipsa Trinitate, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicitur. Quoniam quippe non aliud est Deo esse, et aliud magnum esse, sed hoc idem illi est esse quod magnum esse: propterea sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem. Essentiam dico, quae οὐσία grace dicitur, quam usitatius substantiam vocamus.

*Dicunt quidem et illi hypostasim; sed nescio quid volunt interesse inter usiam et hypostasim: ita ut plerique nostri qui haec graeco tractant eloquio, dicere consueverint, μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, quod est latine, unam essentiam, tres substantias. . . non audemus dicere unam essentiam tres substantias; sed unam essentiam vel substantiam, tres autem personas. . .*²⁹

²⁹De Trin. V, 8, 9-10; PL 42, 917-918.

Therefore, whatever is said of God in respect to Himself and in respect to each single person, i.e. in respect to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and together in respect to the Trinity itself, is to be predicated in the singular to each divine person and not in the plural. For God, "to be" is not one thing and "to be great" another; rather, for Him, "to be" is the same as "to be great." Hence, just as we do not speak of three essences, so we do not predicate three greatnesses. I give the name "essence" to what the Greeks call " " but which more customarily we call "substance."

They indeed call it "hypostasis;" but I do not know what distinction they make between "ousia" and "hypostasis:" thus many of our writers, when they discuss these questions in Greek, are accustomed to say, *μὴν οὐσίαν, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, which is translated into Latin as "one essence, three substances". . . we actually ought not to say "one essence, three substances," however, but "one essence *or* substances, and three *persons*."

To put this another way, the being of God is absolutely simple. His divine essence has no accidents; each attribute belongs substantially to His essence. The Father is great; the Son is great; the Holy Spirit is Great--but there are not now three greatnesses but only one. In the same way the Father is God; the Son is God; the Holy Spirit is God--there are no more three Gods, therefore, than there are three greatnesses. Very well, but how may the three then be distinguished? Augustine's answer on this is less than illuminating, "*Tamen, cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquim. Dictum est tamen: tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.*"³⁰ "But when it is asked, 'three what?' [asking for a distinction] then the great poverty of human language becomes apparent. Nevertheless, the three-person formula was coined not so that a definitive explanation might

³⁰ *De Trin.* V, 9, 20; PL 42, 918.

be given but so that we might not be forced to keep silent."

Thus, having made this brief excursion into theology, it should be clear that in terms of Augustine's system that one may speak of God without always adding the appositive, the Trinity. Since whatever is predicated of the Father is predicated of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Augustine does work out an enormously intricate and complex parallel between the inner, triune nature of God and the existent world which, after all, ought to reflect traces of God's triune nature. Ultimately, metaphysical structure corresponds to and expresses the inner relation of the Trinity; Augustine ferrets these out at great length and with great relish. These traces or images are to be found everywhere; "Augustine successively proposed the most diverse *traces* of the Trinity," Gilson comments, ". . . *mensura, numerus, pondus* [measure, number, weight] in *De Trinitate*. . . *unitas, species, ordo* [unity, form, order] in *De Vera Religione*. . . [etc.]"³¹ Augustinians ever after have delighted in commenting upon, explicating, and even adding new examples of this great metaphysical pattern. However, this is not important here. What is important is that the participation of every creature in God's being is modelled upon the inner harmony of God's own relations with Himself.

Yet this inner harmony of inner relations is and must be a unity since each relation is predicated substantially of divine essence. To

³¹Gilson, op. cit., p. 351. note 21.

exist is to be one. Only God absolutely exists; hence, only He is absolute unity. On the other extreme end of the scale, absolute plurality would be absolute non-being, nothingness. Of course, absolute plurality is a theoretical notion since everything that is is a unity to some degree. The middle term between the absolute unity of the Father and the plurality of the world is the Son, i.e. the Father's Resemblance in itself.

To every created thing belongs number, not Number itself which belongs to the Godhead, but empirical number. Each thing is divisible; and yet if each thing were not a unity to some degree, it could not be. Created things are not units of existence as in the case of Whitehead's actual entities. Created things do not exist of themselves as *sui causa*, self-caused; nor even is matter itself, whether spiritual or material *sui causa*. All existence is a flickering indecision between being and nothingness. Things hover between plurality and unity; they are grounded, however, entirely in God. Yet each has its own order, higher or lower; from lowest grain of dust to highest archangel there is organization, numerical organization. It is by this very order that things arise from the chaos of primal matter. Augustine sees in Number, then, a divine ordering principle. As such, Number is identified with Wisdom as an integral part of the structure of the world; in discussing this with Evodius in *On The Free Will* Augustine speculates why men treat number in so cavalier a fashion:

. . . plurimum mirror, ut dixi, quare, numerus vilis sit multitudini hominum, et chara sapientia. Sed nimirum illud est, quod una quaedam eademque res est; verumtamen quoniam nihilo minus is divinis libris de sapientia dicitur, quod attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter (Sap. VIII, 1), ea potentia qua fortiter a fine usque ad finem attingit, numerus fortasse dicitur: ea vero qua disponit omnia suaviter, sapientia proprie jam vocatur; cum sit utrumque unius ejusdemque sapientiae.

*Sed quia dedit numeros omnibus rebus etiam infimis, et in fine rerum locatis; et corpora enim omnia quamvis in rebus extrema sint, habent numeros suos. . . et eos propterea vilius habere habemus.*³²

I wonder very much, as I have said, how to the multitude of men number is considered vile while wisdom is thought dear. Yet number and wisdom are somehow the same thing, since the Divine Writings say of wisdom that "it reaches from end to end and sweetly disposes all things." (*Wisdom of Solomon 8:1*) The power "that reaches from end to end" is perhaps known as number: that which in truth orders all things sweetly is now properly thought of as wisdom although both belong to the same Wisdom.

But because Wisdom [i.e. God] gave numbers to all things even the lowest that have been placed at the very end of the scale (for all bodies even at the bottom of things have their own numbers . . . even on this account we consider them more vile [than wisdom]).

Augustine is guessing that the apparent lack of awe in men for Number is due to the fact that numbers are so common, so much a part of the lowest existence of all. Yet the point here is that the system of things is ordered numerically.

In summary, the "great chain of being" is in actuality a closed system, derived entirely from God. The objects of creation exist as the extension of their concept in God's mind. They are not equal to

³² *De Lib. Arb. II, 9, 30-31; PL 32, 1257-1258.*

one another but are arranged in a definite, numerical ordering of grades. Each thing "participates" in God on the explicit model of the Father's Resemblance, i.e. the Son. This very participation, based on the form Resemblance or Sameness, implies that Difference cannot exist as a form; difference is simply the lack of Sameness, a privation of form. The metaphysical structure of the world arises from the apparent multiplicity of God's relations with Himself, yet this multiplicity is in actuality a unity since anything predicated of God belongs to his essential definition. Traces of the triune nature of the Godhead may be found everywhere (literally), but unity and order are the hallmarks of all being such that multiplicity becomes a lack of unity rather than an ontological principle in its own right. To say the same, the multiplicity of God is His unity in Himself; but the multiplicity of the world is a measure of its lack of unity.

IV. MAN

It is interesting to note how the place of Man in various metaphysical systems seems immensely important to men. Many times philosophical schemes are accepted or rejected purely on the grounds that the place of man is somehow out of harmony with the notions of those to whom the system as a whole is being proposed. It seems that the most sensitive areas in metaphysical schemes are those which claim to explain man to himself. Somehow the ontology of trivial puffs of primal matter at the end of worlds, about which knowledge is hard to

come by, does not carry the significance of the ontology of dieting, an item about which men seem to know a great deal.

Yet within the framework of a coherent, logical, and adequate system, the metaphysics of staying slim ought to follow in some definite way from the general features of the ontological scheme itself. The view of man should be presupposed by the general structure of the system such that man himself, knowledge, ethics, etc. all are exemplifications of the workings of the system and not exceptions thereto. Many philosophies have hedged just at the point where metaphysics touch man, adding cosmological loopholes to save man from some otherwise horrible philosophic fate. Some philosophies have not flinched but have fearlessly followed their promises to some unsavory revelation. Philosophies which follow the latter course of scandalous expose of the awful condition of man do not in general "sell well;" people seem to feel that something must be wrong with the principles of a system if those principles result in an abysmal and unsympathetic conception of man.

Augustine's conception of man is frankly confusing. From a Christian point of view his instincts are doubtless correct; however, from the point of view of metaphysical philosophy he only manages to bequeath to the middle ages some well nigh insoluble problems. His difficulty comes about by trying to combine two different traditions with very different ideas. From the point of view of the Hebrew Scriptures, for example, when it is written, "Let us make man,"

(*Genesis* 1:26, KJV) and then "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul," (*Genesis* 2: KJV), what is being described is the creation of a *man*, not a soul and a body. The dual principles of soul and body, spirit and matter, substance and essence, etc. are simply foreign to Hebrew thought. But the thought of Augustine is one of the great foci of the synthesis of the Hebrew and Greek worlds. In his hands the simple and direct story of the Bible, which indeed he once had scorned, becomes a cosmological epic; heaven and earth, grass and firmament, become items of a Plotinian universe.

It is perhaps not far from the truth to say that at the root of Augustine's difficulties here is the fact that from the biblical perspective man is chiefly, even entirely, a moral phenomenon. After asserting that God created man a living soul, there is no further formulation in the Bible. Its readers are never given an epistemological or ontological account. What they are given is an ethical account; man is defined in terms of his moral or immoral relationship to God. Moreover, it is not man in general which is discussed, but concrete individuals, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc. who relate well or badly to a very concrete God who is distinguished not ontologically but personally as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Covenant, not ontology, provides the key to an understanding of who and what man is and what God expects of him. This individual and existential orientation of Scripture does not escape Augustine, and the problem of theology for Augustine is to

explain man's moral dilemma and find the way to eternal happiness. Gilson even goes so far as to say, "We are sometimes surprised that he [Augustine] did not discuss or even notice, the metaphysical difficulties implied in . . . [his] definition [of man]. The reason is simply that the abstract problem of man's metaphysical structure seemed to him an idle one."³³ Such a statement is cold comfort to someone trying to determine exactly how man functions in his metaphysical scheme; however, it does serve to point up the fact that the problems and solutions of a view of man as a being whose essence is chiefly moral and existential produce only puzzlement if one then views the result from the perspective of metaphysics and ontology. Yet Augustine's whole approach is to frame a system conjoining these two incompatible elements. If there is anything wonderful about the attempt, it is that Augustine brings it off as well as he does; for metaphysical man as a systemic creature can not be found in the Bible, and Augustine never strays far from the Bible. There ought to be, so philosophers say, a unified system whereby morals and ontology are conjoined; in Augustine's account, however, this ideal belongs in the realm of things hoped for but not yet seen.

There are, therefore, systemic demands and Scriptural necessities between which Augustine finds himself. The study of systemic adjustments, definition and redefinition, and even outright retractions as

³³Gilson, op. cit., p. 45.

Augustine tries to accomodate system and Scripture would be in itself a long and complicated dissertation. In this study only the systemic and metaphysical aspects of man will be mentioned with occasional reference to some causes for this or that position or to some internal difficulties produced by various formulations, and even these remarks will be confined to footnotes. What is important here is a look at the metaphysical system itself with a view to seeing how man fits into the system so that some axiological determination can be later made as to the value structure involved. There is much in his teaching concerning man that does not fit into the system. His moral orientation often leaves him with irreconcilable opinions about which he can only wonder and express ignorance at the mystery of it all. Anthropology, psychology, and epistemology are all part of the account, but here it is the metaphysical man that is at the center of the stage, the man which arises as a term in the great system of being.

Augustine's terminology is not entirely consistent; however, the general uses of words used to describe man give some insight into his view of what man is. There are two words, for example, which are used for "soul," *anima* and *animus*; the former is used to refer to the animating principle of all living bodies, animal and man. *Animus*, on the other hand, is used to distinguish man from animals and to indicate that vital substance which is also rational. Sometimes *animus* is identified with *mens* (mind).³⁴ *Spiritus* (spirit) is another element of

³⁴*De Civitate Dei* XI, 3; PL 41, 318.

man's make-up and has two distinct meanings. One of these which comes from or designates imagination or sensible memory,³⁵ thus placing it above mere life (*anima*) but below mind (*mens*); however, the word usually refers to the meaning Augustine takes from his reading of Scripture: the special faculty of rationality in man.³⁶ Augustine often says that man is soul, spirit, and body; but such tripartite formulations seldom occur in his definitions.

The soul itself (*animus*) is divided into a lower part which is simply an animating principle and a higher part consisting of mind (*mens*), reason (*ratio*), and intelligence (*intelligentia*) or intellect (*intellectus*). Mind (*mens*), being the higher part, is seen as clinging to the intelligible order in God and as consisting of reason and intellect: (. . . *mens, cui ratio et intelligentia naturaliter inest.*"³⁷) (" . . . mind, wherein naturally are found reason and intelligence.") Reason itself is the active intellect, the operation of thought; Augustine formulates it thus: "*ratio est mentis motio, ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens.*"³⁸ ("Mind is the motion of the mind, by which those things which are learned are distinguished or connected.") *Intelligentia* and *intellectus* are sometimes though rarely distinguished; intelligence or intellect is above reason because it is possible to have reason without

³⁵ *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 24, 51; PL 34, 474-475.

³⁶ *De Fide et Sym.* 10, 23; PL 40, 193-194.

³⁷ *De Civitate Dei* XI, 2; PL 41, 318.

³⁸ *De Ord.* II, 11, 30; PL 32, 1009.

intelligence but not *vice versa*. Intelligence is the inner sight,³⁹
directly illuminated by the divine ideas:

*Sic in anima nostra quiddam est quod intellectus vocatur.
Hoc ipsum animae, quod intellectus et mens dicitur, illuminatur
luce superiore. Jam superior illa lux, qua mens humana illumi-
natur, Deus est.*⁴⁰

Thus, in our soul [note "*anima*" not "*animus*"] there is indeed that which is termed "intellect." This part of the soul, which is said to be intellect and mind [The two seem identified here.], is illuminated by a superior light. Now that superior light by which the human mind is illuminated is God.

One can see by this particular quotation that consistency of terminology is not particularly a driving force for Augustine; accordingly, this paragraph's distinctions must be taken as generally, or as at least sometimes, correct.

The soul of man, nonetheless, can be seen as a lower animating force and a higher, rational part. The higher part is in direct contact with God's ideas and is illuminated by them. The vision of the ideas of "passive intellect," though this term may suggest a bit too much, takes place in the intellect or intelligence; the operation of mind in distinguishing and connecting ideas and things is termed "reason."

Having disposed of these somewhat technical introductory matters, the definition of man proposed by Augustine should be somewhat clearer.

³⁹ *Enarr. in Ps. 32, 22; PL 36, 296.*

⁴⁰ *In Joan. Evang. XV, 4, 19; PL 35, 1517.*

He says that man is composed of a soul which is a rational substance equipped to rule a body⁴¹ and a body which is also a substance although a material one.⁴² Yet both soul and body, spiritual and material substance are required for "man" although soul is a higher principle than body:

Quamquam enim duo sint, anima et corpus, et neutrum vocaretur homo, si non esset alterum (nam neque corpus homo esset, si anima non esset; nec rursus anima homo, si ea corpus non animaretur).⁴³

For although the soul and body are two, neither one or the other is called "man" by itself if the other is lacking. (For neither is a body a man if the soul is lacking; nor again is a soul a man if it does not animate a body.)

There is not in Augustine, however, any suggestion (indeed it would be a contradiction!) that the body is an evil principle designed to punish the soul for previous misconduct, a prisonhouse in other words, as Origen suggests. Being material substance, the body is more a nothing than the soul and indeed could not be without the soul's

⁴¹*"Nam mihi videtur esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata."* ("For to me it [the soul] seems to be a certain rational substance, designed to rule the body." *De Quant. Animae* 13, 22; PL 32, 1048. Already the moral and ethical considerations are evident. Once the soul is postulated as superior, its good is to preferentially sought over that of the body; it is to order the body. Ethics, then, in outline, is complete.

⁴²The insoluble problem which Augustine here leaves to medieval thinkers is how to relate these two substances. Even sense perception begins to appear enigmatic in such a formulation--how can the soul, being a higher principle and as such unable to be acted on by the body, know what is happening to the body? Augustine's attempt to answer this, his doctrine of "vital attention" fails miserably by only giving a verbal designation to what remains a mystery. Further, the whole matter of substantial relation makes man a complete mystery to Augustine, who says as much himself.

⁴³*De Anima et ejus Or. I, 4, 4; PL 44, 477.*

function of animating it, informing it, ordering it, and relating it to the ideas. The soul's chief function, from a metaphysical point of view, is to be the middle term between God's ideas, particularly the idea of God of the individual man whose soul it is; man is a rational substance composed of both soul and body, form and matter, in the same way that trees or cabbages are constituted, except, of course, trees and cabbages are not rational but material substances. The soul is, thus, metaphysical principle which, on the one hand, orders the matter of the body as a sort of ontological D.N.A. and which is the part of man which is in direct contact with the ideas. This formulation bristles with metaphysical difficulties; the soul is a substance as is the body as is man. How to get all these substances into any kind of rational order is a problem Augustine really does not set before himself.

The soul itself is the more problematic of the two since it is the place where metaphysics and morals meet. It is the creation of God. Of this Augustine can be sure since the Bible tells him so. But after this piece of useful albeit puzzling information, the Bible leaves Augustine more or less on his own. On the moral side of the issue, Augustine must leave room for sin, for the fall, for an explanation of original sin and its transmission to each subsequently stained soul; and at the same time he must do this within a coherent Plotinian system. Within so many conflicting pre-conditions, no formulation can be satisfactory. Is the stain of original sin, for example, transmitted by

parents? This would seem to make the soul in some way extended and material, an anathema to Augustine. Is the soul a once-and-for-all fixture for mankind after its creation for Adam? (While individual *men* have corresponding ideas in God's mind, Augustine does not assert this for soul!) God cannot create a stained soul; therefore, free will enters the discussion and hopelessly muddies things. Augustine does say unequivocally that the creation of the soul, as with all other beings, is the act of the omnipotent God who called all things into being out of nothingness.⁴⁴ But after saying this, with the Bible silent, Augustine hesitates and wavers, never really deciding on the correctness of the several solutions he proposes since none of them seem forbidden by Scripture nor imposed with certainty by reason.⁴⁵

Gilson sums up his choices as follows:

The only question left to ask is how God creates souls. Augustine has not left us a definite answer to the question. It can be said, however, that he was always tempted to concede that in creating the first human soul, viz. that of Adam, God created in it once and for all the souls of all men to come. . . . Nevertheless, he did consider three other hypotheses as possible: God creates each individual's soul expressly for him; or all souls exist first in God and then are sent by Him into the bodies they are to animate; or finally, souls exist first in God and then descent voluntarily into bodies to animate them. Augustine never wished to choose between these four hypotheses.⁴⁶

⁴⁴*De Anima et ejus Or. IV, 11, 15-16; PL 44, 532-534. See also Epist. 166, 4, 9; PL 33, 724 and De Lib. Arbit. III, 20-21; PL 32, 1297-1302.*

⁴⁵Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁴⁶Augustine has all sorts of proof for this ranging from Plato's reasoning in the *Phaedo* to arguments based on the principle that the soul is life itself and could not be its contrary, death. See *Solilog. II, 19, 33; PL 32, 901-902; De Immort. An. ch 1-6; PL 32, 1021-1027.*

Understandably a bishop is more interested in the salvation of souls than in speculation, especially this bishop.

In summary, though, it may be said that man has a soul whose origin is somehow directly related to God and which acts metaphysically as intermediary between the ideas and matter. It may be briefly characterized as:

- (1) a substance in its own right,
- (2) a part of the substance "man" when conjoined with material substance or body,
- (3) illuminated directly by the ideas,
- (4) the vital principle,
- (5) immortal and non-material,⁴⁷
- (6) non-extended,⁴⁸
- (7) middle term,
- (8) created out of nothing,
- (9) possessing direct knowledge of itself,⁴⁹
- (10) not to be loved for its own sake.

Actually this list could go on much further if one but considers the moral side of the soul. One could add "flawed" or "searching for God" etc., a whole concordance of qualities and characteristics which

⁴⁷*De Anima et ejus Or. IV, 21, 35; PL 44, 544.*

⁴⁸*De Trin. X, 10, 15-16; PL 42, 981-982.*

⁴⁹*De Doct. Christ. I, 23, 22 - I, 32, 35; PL 32, 30-32.*

Augustine mentions in one place or another in the vast corpus of his work. This list, however, will serve to display the metaphysical dimensions of the soul.

The last item on the list, "not to be loved for its own sake," is not actually a metaphysical quality, however. It is there because this will be mentioned later in the axiological section. This point arises in an ethical section of Augustine's which deals with the love of God, neighbor, and self.⁵⁰ This section flatly states that man has no intrinsic value, either as man, soul, or body. Now man's body is a good, even a great good; therefore, he should have regard for his body. Yet the soul is higher than the body, systemically speaking, and is, therefore, of more worth, i.e. more deserving of love. But the soul is only a means to God; one should use his soul not enjoy it. The delight in life itself, in sticky green buds, feelings of beauty, etc. are fine if and only if they lead to God; otherwise, they are idolatry. The soul is to be used to enjoy God. One might say here that the soul may be viewed as an extrinsic value on the part of man by which he may attain to God. In this sense there are many items of extrinsic value to be found. But all these belong to the specifically moral aspect of Augustine's thought, not to the value system itself. The next step, however, is to observe what value is in the system.

⁵⁰*Enchir. I, XII, 4; PL 32, 236.*

V. AUGUSTINE'S SYSTEM OF VALUE

The problem of evil is one which concerns Augustine greatly. How could evil arise? Surely, an all-good God could not create it; since causes and effects are proportional, this would require a logical contradiction, a paradox--although Augustine seems to relish paradox when he is not systemically writing. Augustine's solution, that is his *systemic* solution has already been hinted at. If God is to *be* fully and completely, as He must, one realizes that one cannot add everything to something (Someone) that already fully *is*; hence, to say God *is*; is already to claim that He is *good*.

Yet evil does seem to exist. At least if a man has a cancer, it seems meaningful for him to claim that it is an evil, even a great evil. Augustine finds a solution to this by claiming that evil does not refer to any positive principle. To posit evil as a something produces an utter dualism, i.e. there would not be one God but two, exactly as the Manichees in fact asserted. Moreover, such a positing would require a finite God since His power and being would be limited precisely by His contrary. Augustine flatly refuses this gambit. Since the postulation of evil as a real principle yields, therefore, either a limited, finite God or a logical contradiction, Augustine simply says that evil is a lack of good, i.e. being, a privation. It is a perfect systemic solution; however, like Augustine's other systemic solutions, it is very difficult to relate such a metaphysical item to the existential message

of Scripture and faith.

This difficulty can be seen readily by considering the story of Job. What happens to Job is evil; there are few people to whom such misfortunes might occur who could not but call them evil. Even Job considers what happens to him as an evil, an evil without cause since he cannot recall any sin great enough to warrant such calamities. Yet Job's story is not a metaphysics of evil; it is the concrete story of Job and God, just as was Abraham's and Isaac's. It is *Job's* experience with God. No solution is given--why did God do it? God never says, and Job never discovers it either. When Job finally confronts God directly, the answer from the whirlwind is as mysterious as the wind itself. He asks Job where he was when the foundations of the earth were etc. The message, insofar as there is a message, is that God loves Job. A strange love! Yet this story does not become a paradigm for the explanation of evil. The Hebrews never did produce metaphysical schemes. In Scripture, just as man is a moral being, evil is a moral, not a metaphysical, phenomenon.

In a word, in Augustine's system his answer is a metaphysical one. Again the tension between Greek and Hebrew traditions is felt. When Augustine turns his metaphysical argument concerning evil toward the moral realm, much the same difficulties result as do with his argument about the soul. It is one thing to discuss the "vice" of an eye as its failure to see; it is quite another to discuss "vice" as the result of a perverted and sinful nature.

CRANES & CREST

But relating the adequacy of Augustine's metaphysics to the realm of Christian thought, i.e. asking whether his metaphysics is truly useful in making a real synthesis of Greek and Hebrew traditions, is not the purpose here. What needs to be done is to look carefully at his metaphysical account and interpret it axiologically. One of the best places to look for a brief but complete account is in the *Enchiridion*, a handbook written for a youthful convert, Lawrence, concerning faith (mostly), hope, and charity. After telling Lawrence that all things are good to some degree and that evil serves to highlight good, Augustine presents a dialectical argument:

*Naturae igitur omnes, quoniam naturarum prorsus omnium Conditor summe bonus est, bonae sunt: sed quia non sicut earum Conditor summe atque incommutabiliter bonae sunt, ideo in eis et minui bonum et augeri potest. Sed bonum minui malus est; quamvis, quantumcumque minuatur, remaneat aliquid necesse est (si adhuc natura est) unde natura sit.*⁵¹

All creatures of nature are good since the Creator of every one of them is supremely good; but since they, unlike their Creator, are not supremely and unchangeably good, they are capable of diminution and increase. But the decrease of good is an evil; however, even though it is diminished, some good must necessarily remain, if its being is to continue.

Being and goodness, in other words, are identical terms; further, the more being, the more goodness. God, being perfect and absolute, is also perfectly good. The more a thing is like God, the better it is. Thus, value and fact, the chain of being and the chain of value, are conjoined absolutely, as indeed Augustine goes on to say:

⁵¹ *Enchir.* I, XIII, 4; PL 32, 237.

*Ac per hoc nullum est quod dicitur malum, si nullum sit bonum. Sed bonum omni malo carens, integrum bonum est; cui verum inest malum, vitiatum vel vitiosum bonum est, nec malus unquam potest esse ullum, ubi bonum est nullum. Unde res mira conficitur, ut quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bonum est, nihil aliud dici videatur, cum vitiosa natura mala esse natura dicitur, nisi malum esse quod bonum est: nec malum esse, nisi quod bonum est; quoniam omnis natura bonum est, nec res aliqua mala esset, si res ipsa quae mald est, natura non esset. Non igitur potest esse malum, nisi aliquod bonum. Quod cum dici videatur absurde, connercio compellit hoc dicere.*⁵²

Accordingly, that which is called an evil does not exist if there is no good. But a good wholly lacking any evil is a perfect good; to a thing possessing evil belongs a defective and faulty good; nor is there any evil able to be where there is no good. From this a strange thing results. Since every being, insofar as it is a being, is good, when we call a defective being an evil being, we seem to be saying what is good is evil, and that only that which is good can be evil since every being is good nor could there be an evil thing if the thing which is called evil were not a being. Nothing, therefore, can be an evil thing but a good thing. Although this seems to be an absurd statement, the sequence of our argument forces us to it.

Augustine's solution is paradoxical only if "evil" is considered as a positive principle. He quickly resolves this and gives a formulation of his position:

*Omnis itque natura, etiamsi vitiosa est, in quantum natura est, bona est; in quantum vitiosa est, mala est.*⁵³ [Moreover,] *Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt, et nisi in aliquibus bonis non sunt: nec erat alias unde oriretur ulla mali natura.*⁵⁴

Therefore, every being, even if it is defective, insofar as it is a being, is good; insofar as it is defective, it is evil. . . . [Moreover,] evil things arose from good and do not exist except in certain good things; nor was there any source other whence any evil thing could arise.

⁵² *Enchir. I, XIII, 4; PL 32, 238.*

⁵³ *Enchir. I, XIV, 4; PL 32, 238.*

⁵⁴ *De Doct. Christ. I, XXXII, 35; PL 34, 32.*

This is the Augustinian version of Hartman's axiom: a thing is good insofar as it fulfills its concept. A good thing, where "thing" is any item in the created order, is good as far as it tends toward being. Each item, moreover, has a distinct and calculable value since all created things are arranged in definite (and even numerical) grades of being.

Nor does Augustine shrink from applying this to "metaphysical" man:

*Deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Quia enim bonus, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus. Porro autem quia etiam justus est, non impune sumus mali; et in quantum mali sumus, in tantum etiam minus sumus.*⁵⁵

In truth God refers us to His own goodness. Since He is good, we exist; and to the degree that we are, we are good. Furthermore, since He is just, we are not evil with impunity; and to the degree that we are evil, in just that amount our being is diminished.

Augustine's system of value, therefore, corresponds exactly to his system of being. Since his system of being is made up of creatures whose being is defined exactly in terms of sameness to God, so then is the system of value an exact, well-defined system. Metaphysical good and lack of good follows exactly from metaphysical being or lack of being.

VI. AN AXIOLOGICAL APPLICATION

Both Augustine and Hartman define the concept "good" by direct reference to richness of being. Although this parallel and several

⁵⁵*De Doct. Christ. I, XXXII, 35-XXIII, 37; PL 34, 32-33.*

others might be presented, such a comparison is not the point of an axiological application. The technique of comparison and contrast is philosophical and not scientific: a comparison or contrast places two or more systems side by side and with analytic language abstracts or points out items in the systems which are common to or different from one another. This is done from the point of view of still another system or even from the perspective of a categorical framework haphazardly supplied by the person making the comparison. Such comparisons are necessarily vague and often pointless.

The systems of Augustine and Hartman are logically distinct: the former is a philosophic system using implicative, analytic language; and the latter is a science using synthetic, formal language. Any comparison of the two would be forced to go beyond the foundations of either and comment on them from the perspective of some third system.

A scientific application or interpretation, on the other hand, structures and elaborates a field of phenomena, in this case Augustine's system, in terms of the synthetic terms and formal relations of the science. Augustine's characteristic value is systemic, but Augustine did not know this; moreover, it is not inconceivable that Augustine would dislike such a claim. In other words, what Augustine means becomes clear by the application of axiology to his system; an explication of the kind of kinds of concepts ("Concept" is a technical term in axiology.) and the relationships of their predicates (e.g. implicative and analytic or formal and synthetic) yields the characteristic axiological value.

The chief question, therefore, is not whether Augustine or Hartman agree or disagree as to the meaning of "good." Nor does the question of whether they arrive at the same or different methods arise. The question is what kind of axiological value is to be found in Augustine's system. The answer to this is found by examining the kinds of concepts, the relationship of predicates and properties to their concepts, and the conceptual structure of the system itself. As we shall see, Augustine is not entirely consistent from an axiological point of view.

The first step in arriving at an answer is to point out the kind of concepts to be found in Augustine's system. As we have seen, each created item has a singular, unique idea in the mind of God. This is a requirement for Augustine since if only species were ideas, some other explanation than God would be required for individuals. The concept "soul" may be an anomaly in this regard, but each man at least owes his being to God's unique idea of him as an individual. Since God knows everything and since the doctrine of seminal reasons precludes anything from ever "surprising" God, it is clear that God knows the ideas perfectly by virtue of their being in absolute unity with Him. Thus, the ideas or intensions of things are well-defined, even perfectly defined.

Further, since it is necessary that the properties of each extensional thing correspond to the predicates of its intension in the mind of God (Otherwise, another category of explanation beyond God would be needed.), the universe, speaking extensionally, and the intension or

idea, speaking intensionally, correspond exactly to each other in direct proportion. Each idea is perfectly defined and corresponds exactly to its extension. Each of these beings or created things is finite, for God alone is infinite.

Each thing in the universe, then, may be said to be the extension of a concept or idea which is strictly defined, containing a finite number or predicates related formally to each other so as to vary directly with the properties of the things. As we have seen, such a concept is termed a construct in axiology, a systemic, synthetic concept. This, of course, is not Augustine's formulation; he does not employ such terms.

Since goodness for Augustine is a function of the richness of being and since each thing resembles Pure Being to a greater or lesser degree, the degree of resemblance is the degree of goodness. Further, since all things are arranged in an order of grades, there is a chain of goodness corresponding exactly to the chain of being. The goodness of each thing, then, is exactly determinable by reference to a denumerably finite concept or idea.

The type of concept for every created thing is systemic. The value varies directly and correspondingly with the richness of being. The characteristic value, therefore, is systemic. The Augustinian universe is a closed system of divine constructs whose being and value correspond exactly.

But what about God? "God" is not another concept like "Fred." Augustine says that God is infinite. Axiologically speaking, how does this fit into the demands of the systemic value pattern? First of all, if one were making an inventory of beings, i.e. listing the set of things constituting the extension of "Being," God would not appear on the list. God is not *a* being, but Being itself. It would be a dreadful category-mistake to lump Being itself with the beings which constitute its extension. The concept "God," therefore, is quite different from all others.

To get at this difference from an axiological perspective it is helpful to recall that systemic value requires a system whose concepts are denumerably finite and whose relation between extension and intension varies directly. This has been shown. However, a system only comes about because of an axiom, a formula that gives rise to a system. The concept "God" in Augustine functions in exactly this way.

At this point it is easy to fall into contradictions. First of all, what possible sense could the statement "God is a formula giving rise to a system" have? Certainly in the entire set of theological oddities such an assertion would hold a position of preeminence. The point to be made is not that "God" is literally an axiom but that "God" functions in this way in terms of Augustine's system.

Sentences of the form "God is *x*" predicate things of God. As is the case in all predication, the implicit idea is that of one affirmed

all the proper predicates, one would have a perfect definition. Moreover, equally important is the requirement that predicates make meaningful sentences. The assertion "God is a multiplication symbol" does not seem either to be a proper predicate or make a meaningful sentence. However, if one were to come upon a mysterious, ancient metaphysics with three elements: (1) a spiritual number-essence of "three", (2) a material number-essence of "two," and (3) a god; and if concrete reality's number essence were "six" and brought about by the mediation of the wise and kind god, then one might say that the god *functions* in that system as a multiplication symbol even though he might be *defined* as wise, kind, etc. The point is that a given concept in some system may have a function, as seen from another system, utterly unrelated to its definition in that system.

Obviously, "God is an axiom," or better written, "'God' functions as an axiom" is not a candidate for adoption into a new Christian creed. It is not an article of faith but a simple observation that the concept "God" in Augustine's system, whatever else it may mean, functions as a third mediating term between the created universe and the ideas. "Created universe" and "idea" in turn function as "extension" and "intension" with respect to the concept "concept." Thus, there is found a closed system of denumerably finite concepts whose extensions and intensions vary directly which correspond analogously to the logical requirements for a system.

This correspondence, however, is metaphorical. "Axiom," "extension," "intension," etc. are terms of logic. "God," "creation," "ideas,"

are ontological categories. Yet this is precisely the pattern of axiological interpretation. The terms of axiology, which are formal and logical, are applied to a given field. In this case the field is that of Augustine's system. The categories of the system are examined in the light of axiology and a determination is made.

In this way one can point out that "God" as a concept in Augustine's system functions axiologically as an axiom. As an axiom, whose value is intrinsic or infinite, the requirement of Augustine that God be infinite is met. However, the sentence "God's value is infinite" does not mean anything like the same when spoken from an axiological perspective as it does when spoken by Augustine. However, although the sentences do mean quite different things, there is nonetheless an axiological consistency in Augustine. In any given system, whether logical or ontological, the value of everything in the system is systemic save the axiom itself which is intrinsic. Augustine is most specific that God and God only has intrinsic worth.

The ontological world, then, as Augustine presents it, is a logical, consistent realm, ordered and structured to perfection. There is a chain of being and goodness running from Divine Being to the lowliest puff of existence. Its value is consistently systemic. Yet the moral system, unlike the ontological system, sometimes runs counter to the teachings of Scripture. Scripture says little about the structure of being, but it says much about morality. It is not surprising that

when trying to accommodate his ontology to Scripture, Augustine sometimes introduces other types of value which are inconsistent to his structure of being. These internal strains are to be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

ANOTHER VALUE DIMENSION OF AUGUSTINE'S SYSTEM

I. INTRODUCTION

Augustine's system of ontology and value is not isomorphous to the field of existential phenomena which it is to order and interpret. This is true both in respect to the concrete and non-philosophical presentation of God and man in biblical formulation and in respect to the existential dimension of Augustine's own encounter with God. His systemic formulations concerning "being," "form," "participation," etc. deal with metaphysical entities while many of the spiritual phenomena to be interpreted lack such an ontological base. Sometimes the requirements of his faith introduce elements into the system which reduce it to incoherence, e.g. free will; sometimes the ontology demands an item which is quite alien to the faith, e.g. a "metaphysical" soul. Like most systems, Augustine's is set up to account for certain phenomena, in his case chiefly metaphysical and abstract, and is quite successful in handling the field for whose explanation the system is designed. Also like most systems, certain items fail to be exemplified coherently within the system; they are "missed" and must be "added on" later or explained away or simply regarded as true but mysterious. When conflicts do arise, however, Augustine keeps his title, "saint" because he

holds fast to his faith. This serves to place him in some difficult places; but if he finally reaches a place where his system offers to no help, he confesses the mysterious nature of the situation, as, for example, he does in respect to the origin of the soul. In other words, though he is building a system by which his faith may be interpreted, he keeps to his own existential experience with God.

It is this blending of personal encounter with God and an urgent drive to philosophically understand this encounter which gives Augustine's writings their peculiar tone and force. The most metaphysical passages are punctuated with pious appeals to God who is conceived of as an ever present help. There is an almost anxious interchange between Augustine the Christian and Augustine the philosopher, between soul and mind; yet there is no doubt about which of the two is dominant before he ever begins writing. The *credo ut intelligam* has two distinct elements, the existential *credo* which is more than mere intellectual assent, even though Augustine sometimes says that belief is speaking a proposition with assent, and the *intelligam* which is the production of a theoretical system which accounts for what is present as experience and which requires interpretation. Theories and systems, "understanding," attempt to give accounts what is accepted as the grounds of existence and life.

The existential *credo* does focus on the notion of "assent." Assent has many levels, of course, ranging from a very hesitant affirmation to absolute certainty. Augustine is searching for certainty, and

this he finds in the beginning of his own Christian experience. The last chapter has looked at the value implicit in the *intelligam*, in the Neoplatonic system, from an axiological perspective. In this chapter a sharp distinction will be drawn between the kind of value found in the system and the kind found in the existential *credo*. The tension between the two can be found in many places in Augustine's works. The system belongs to the *intelligam*; to the *credo* belongs another kind of "understanding" and value altogether. All systems as systems produce systemic value. Pseudo-systems or "improper" systems like the system of ordinary language or "culture" produce extrinsic value by virtue of imperfect formulation or definition and the resultant vagueness. Deep existential experience, by definition beyond all language save metaphor, is the realm of intrinsic value. It is to this last realm that the *credo* belongs.

What is being asserted here is that proper systems create intellectual understanding *par excellence*; there are no dark places and no vagueness in such systems. They are complete; yet even in such brilliant light doubt may creep in, as it does in the axiological system when Dr. Edwards wonders whether "real" men are the same as "axiological" men. At the other end, the ~~existential~~ experience of intrinsic value is also an understanding *par excellence*; the knower and the known are one: no doubt comes here. When looking for models of knowledge thoughtful men usually cast out the cultural world of ordinary language and either build scientific systems or rely on mystical intuition. Even

if both elements, the scientific and the mystical, are included, one is usually subordinate to the other or interpreted in the "light" of the other. Science and intuition, intellect and spirit, mind and soul, all these "opposites" become paradigms for knowing. For some, perfect knowledge consists in a well-defined system by which all phenomena is adequately interpreted; for others, perfect knowledge in a unity between observer and object, and no other verbal flim-flam can ever attain to knowledge. Augustine wants to have both; he wants a system, and he wants faith, i.e. an existential relation to God. When difficulty arises, he sticks to his faith. But when he does this, when the paradigm for certainty becomes founded on his own religious experience, the kind of value which arises is not systemic but intrinsic. Just as the *credo* is prior to and more important than the *intelligam*, so is intrinsic value prior to and more profound than systemic value when one considers the entire range of Augustine's work.

II. AUGUSTINE'S CONVERSION

Once again it is possible to start "in the beginning." This time the beginning is not the metaphysical, axiomatic formulation which lies outside of and beyond space and time, but rather the existential conversion by which Augustine enters the Christian life and by which he finds certainty. The certainty which he finds is not intellectual; before his conversion, many of his intellectual objections to the Catholic faith had already been adequately answered. His conversion

is not the adoption of a better method of handling abstract metaphysical problems concerning the nature of reality or of evil. Perhaps his conversion would not have come about without such intellectual work; but when Augustine "meets God," it is a moral, existential experience, not an intellectual insight.

His conversion comes about in a time of very deep depression. All his unaided reason has done is place him in an utter despair of certainty and knowledge; all his living has done is place him in a moral bog in which he is tortured by carnal desire and guilt. Augustine finds himself in a garden with a close friend, Alypius, virtually unable to function. He is close to panic or what would be called today a complete breakdown. He remembers it like this:

Ubi vero a fundo arcano alta consideratio contraxit et congressit totam miseriam meam in conspectum cordis mei, oborta est procella ingens, ferens ingentem imbrem lacrymarum. Et ut totum effunderem cum vocibus suis, surrexi ab Alypio: solitudo mihi ad negotium flendi aptior suggerebatur. . .¹

But when deep consideration from the secret ground of my being had drawn out and collected all my misery in the sight of my heart, a great storm arose bringing a mighty shower of tears. And so that I might pour forth everything in its own natural expressions, I rose from Alypius; for solitude seemed to be for me a more fit place for weeping. . .

Augustine then left an astonished Alypius, for the presence of Alypius only seemed to increase his anxiety. Alone he poured out in sobs and

¹ Conf. VIII, 12, 28; PL 32, 761.

in great agitation his restless heart which had not yet found its rest in God. "Why wait any longer? he asked himself.

Dicebam haec, et flebam amarissima contritione cordis mei. Et ecce audio vocem de vicina domo cum cantu dicentis et crebro repetentis, quasi pueri aut puellae, nescio: Tolle, lege; tolle, lege. Statimque mutato vultu, intentissimus cogitare coepi utrumnam solerent pueri in aliquo genere ludendi cantitare tale aliquid: nec occurrebat omnino audivisse me usquam. Repressoque impetu lacrymarum, surrexi, nihi[¹] aliud interpretans, nisi divinitus mihi juberi ut aperirem codicem, et legerem quod primum caput invenissem. . . . Itaque concitus redi ad eum locum ubi sedebat Alypius: ibi enim posueram codicem Apostoli, cum inde surrexeram. Arripui, aperui, et legi in silentio capitulum, quo primum conjecti sunt oculi mei: Non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et impudiciis, non in contentione et aemulatione; sed induite Dominu Jesum Christum, et carnis providentiam ne fecreitis in concupiscentiis (Rom. XIII, 13, 14). Nec ultra volui legere; nec opus erat. Statim quippe cum fine hujusce sententiae quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo, omnes dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt.²

I kept asking myself this and kept on weeping in most bitter contrition of heart. And behold I heard the voice of a boy or of a girl (I don't know which) from a neighboring house. The voice kept chanting, "Take, read;" "Take, read!" Instantly my countenance changed and most intently I began to wonder whether boys in any of their games were accustomed to chant anything like this: I could not remember every having heard the like. Checking the force of my tears, I arose, interpreting it to be nothing else than a command from God to open the book and read whatever I found there first. . . . Eagerly then I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting. For there I had laid the volume of the Apostle when I had gotten up. I seized it, opened it, and read that section upon which my eyes first fell: "Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in contention and envying; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in concupiscence." (Rom. 13: 13-14). I wished to read no further. Immediately at the end of this sentence, as if by a light, security infused my heart, and all darkness of doubt fled away.

² Conf. VIII, 12, 29; PL 32, 762.

A fascinating passage is this, bringing forth headshaking and amens. But this event, a personal encounter with God, removes all Augustine's doubt. Yet when he could not but ask himself, "Why wait?" he is not wavering between alternative intellectual schemes. He is hesitating between alternative ways of defining himself, or at least this is an existential formulation of the event. This existential meeting with God becomes the very foundation of a new self. And the certainty which arises is self-certainty. Augustine does not doubt his own self, and it is this self which arises with the voice of God. This is the foundation of Augustine himself--and the system by which he attempts to explain it to himself and others, though this is frankly secondary. One comes to God first and figures it out later, so to speak. If this account strikes one as belonging to the category of "personal testimony" in a fundamentalist revival service, it is because that is the precise category in which it belongs. Much is heard of Augustinian "intellectualism," but this conversion experience lies at the root of all that follows.

Indeed, the entire story in the *Confessions* is a recounting of a life of frustration and doubt, of false hope and deep despair. It is the confession of a life of emptiness and meaninglessness. But after his conversion, meaning arises in this life. His account of himself is an interpretation of his life. It is a remembering in the light of a new understanding; it is a "remembering as" as Sarte might say. Each heretofore meaningless event in a life of random happenings takes

on a new significance in the drama of salvation. Mere history becomes salvation-history. Mere continuance, mere change becomes the process of ordered movement from despair to joy, from sin to salvation, from darkness to light. Augustine remembers his life from the vantage point of his great encounter with God--this encounter becomes a moral axiom, so to speak, by which everything which was before vacuous becomes full of meaning.

But however one would interpret this conversion account, one thing is perfectly obvious--it is not a systemic or metaphysical account. It belongs to the other side of Augustine, the side which it is the function of the system to interpret. Such as experience sounds infinite depths; it belongs to a different order of interpretation--this is not a metaphysical event but a moral one. Augustine as a complete self, not as "metaphysical" man, comes face to face with God. And this encounter colors all that follows.

III. THE LANGUAGE OF THE *CONFESSIONS*

The conversion account, then, is mystical; the life story is an existential reappraisal. In the new light of understanding Augustine sees the true meaning of events. He sees the hideousness of sin even in what those who have not met Absolute Holiness would call harmless pranks. It is written with God close at hand and addressed to God. Accordingly, there are no long passages devoted to the precise meaning of terms or highly abstract comparisons of Greek and Latin words.

It is direct, about inner experience, in a word, metaphorical.

This metaphorical, even paradoxical, character can be seen in Book One when Augustine calls upon God:

Quid es ergo, Deus meus? quid, rogo, nisi Dominus Deus? . . . Summe, optime, potentissime, omnipotentissime, misericordissime et justissime, secretissime et praesentissime, pulcherrime et fortissime, stabilis et incomprehensibilis; immutabilis, mutans omnia; nunquam novus, nunquam vetus; immovans omnia; et in vetustatem perducens superbos, et nesciunt: semper agens, semper quietus; colligens, et non egens; portans, et implens, et protegens; creans, et nutriens, et perficiens; quaerens, cum nihil desit tibi. Amas, nec aestuas; zelas, et securus es; poenitet te, et non doles, irascēris et tranquillus es; opera mutas, nec mutas consilium: recipis quod invenis, et nunquam amisisti; nunquam inops, et quades luoris; nunquam avarus, et usuras exigis. Supererogatur tibi, ut debeas; et quis habet quidquam non tuum? Reddis debita nulli debens, donas debita nihil perdens. Et quid diximus, Deus meus, vita mea, dulcedo mea sanota? aut quid dicit aliquis, cum de te dicit? Et vae tacentibus de te; quoniam loquaces muti sunt.³

What are you, therefore, my God? What, I ask, unless the Lord God? . . . Most highest, most good, most powerful, most all-powerful; most merciful, yet most just; most secret, yet most présent; most beautiful, yet most strong; stable, yet incomprehensivile; unchangeable, yet changing all; never new, yet never old; all-renewing, and bringing age on the proud though they do not know it; ever working, yet ever at rest; still gathering, yet lacking nothing; supporting, filling, and overspreading. You love but without passion. You are jealous but without anxiety; You repent but do not grieve. You are angry yet are serene. You change your works but not your plan; You receive what You find but nothing was ever lost. You are never in need yet You rejoice in gains. You are never covetous yet You exact usury. You receive over and above that You may owe; and who has anything that is not Yours? You pay debts owing nothing. You forgive debts losing nothing. And what have I now said, my God, my life, my holy joy? or what says any man when the speaks about You? Yet woe to those keeping silence since even the eloquent are mute!

³ Conf. I, 4, 4; PL 32, 662-663.

This is simply not metaphysical talk. It is not inconsistent with metaphysical talk since anything which truly *is* can be predicated of a being so complete that His very accidents are essences. But this is not logic; it is paradox; and, as such, it is metaphor. Prayer is not ontology though in some ways each presupposes the other. The language here is not intended to be systemic and didactic; the "knowledge" of God here comes by identification and wonder not by intellectual apprehension. Augustine gives testimony to this very identification in his next sentences:

*Quis mihi dabit acquiescere in te? Quis mihi dabit ut venias in cor meum, et inebries illud, ut obliviscar mala mea, et unum bonum meum amplectar te? Quid mihi es? Miserere, ut loquar, Quid tibi sum ipse, ut amari te jubeas a me, et nisi faciam irascaris mihi, et mineris ingentes miserias? Parvane ipsa est, si non amem te?*⁴

Oh, that I might rest in You! Oh, that You might come into my heart and inebriate it so that I might forget my evils and embrace You, my only good! What are You to me? In pity show me that I may speak it. What am I to You that You demand my love, and, if I do not give it, are angry with me and threaten me with grievous woes? Is it then a slight woe if I love You not?

It is not a slight woe, and Augustine is not addressing an ontological abstraction. God is here a self, the object of infinite passion and concern. To be without God, to be apart from God is to be lost. It is like the parting of two lovers--their *mutual* desire for one another is infinite. Such a relation is one of identification, not mental apprehension of an ontological axiom. God here is the God

⁴ Conf. I, 5, 5; PL 32, 663.

of Abraham, and of Augustine. He is Person, and the meeting creates the world. This is not science at all though it be spoken as scientifically as possible.

Augustine is seeking in this prayer union with a Self, a divine Self to be sure, but not with a principle of being however lofty. The wounded, trembling, wretched self of man may enter unity with God. This is the goal of life; this is true happiness; this is man's end and his purpose--but it is not able to be fitted into the system. The longings and language of the *Confessions* does not belong to the *intelligam* although it presupposes enlightenment; these longings and the language in which they are cast belong to the *credo*, to the existential and not to the ontological experience of Augustine.

IV. THE LOVE OF GOD

However, this intrinsic side of Augustine may be approached from another way. The goal for man according to Augustine is happiness. Now while knowledge of Truth is essential in reaching this goal, mere truth is not in itself the goal. Truth is the means to the end, not the end in itself. Man may seek for Truth, but Truth does not seek itself. Truth, then, is to be sought because it is by it happiness comes; and it is happiness that all men desire--"*Beatos esse se velle, omnes in corde suo vident*"⁵ (They all see in their own hearts that they will to

⁵*De Trin.* XIII, 20, 25; PL 42, 1034.

be happy.) But, Augustine asks, what should one desire in order to be happy? How should one obtain it?

A life of disappointment, a life of ceaseless running after this and that, a life of inessential identifications has taught Augustine that the only object which can make man happy must be a permanent one. If it is not, then together with the happiness it brings is a gnawing fear that it will be taken away. Wealth, power, love, physical pleasure, etc. do not qualify. The only suitable object is God:

*Ergo nullo modo dubitamus, si quis beatus esse statuit, id eum sibi comparare debere quod semper manet, nec ulla saeviente fortuna eripi potest. . . Deus [noīne], inquam, vobis aeternus et semper manens videtur? . . . Deus igitur, inquam, qui habet, beatus est.*⁶

Therefore, there is no doubt that if anyone decides to be happy he ought to take something for himself which always remains, something which is not able to be ripped away by savage fortune. . . Does it not seem to you that God, I should say, is eternal and always remains? . . . I say, then, that whoever has God is happy.

"Whoever *has* God," not "whoever *knows about* God," or "believes in," etc. This is an interesting phrase. But what is the peculiar force of *has*? Gilson interprets this like this:

But a good is not an end if we regard it as something to be known; it is an end only in so far as it is something to be possessed. And although it is certainly true to say that knowledge of a thing means possession of a thing, we cannot say that knowledge is the same as perfect possession. The mind is adequate for sight but it does not suffice for love. . . The whole soul, then, should love what the mind alone can contemplate, and it will finally reach its goal through love enlightened thus by reason; not only know

⁶ *De Beata Vita* II, 11; PL 32, 965.

its end but in a certain sense become its end. In the case of love, the object reacts in some way on the loving subject so as to transform it into its own image and thereby assimilate it. To love material and perishable things is to be materialized and doomed to perish; to love the eternal is to become eternal; to love God is to become God.⁷

What this comes to is that man achieves his goal of true happiness only when he becomes one with God. Augustine does not envision intrinsic relations with other persons as productive of happiness since these persons may not always remain. However, the possibility, even the divine command, of coming into unity with God as the ultimate happiness for man is clearly stated by Augustine himself:

*Et quoniam id quod amatur afficiat ex se amantem necesse est, fit ut sic amatum quod aeternum est, aeternitate animum afficiat.*⁸

And since it is necessary that that which is loved affects the one loving it out of its own nature, it follows that because what is loved is eternal, it affects the mind by its very eternity.

Even more directly, he says:

*... talis est quisque, qualis ejus dilectio est. Terram diligis? terram eris. Deum diligis? quid dicam, Deus eris.*⁹

... so is anyone just as his love is. Do you love the earth? You will be earth. Is it God you love? what I will say is that you will be God.

These passages are quite frankly mystical and metaphorical although it may be that for Augustine they have a literal force not

⁷ Gilson, op. cit., p. 8.

⁸ *De Div. Quaest. LXXXIII*, 35, 2; *PL* 40, 24.

⁹ *In Epist. Joan. ad Parth. II*, 2, 14; *PL* 35, 1997.

now often acknowledged. Whether metaphor or the plain truth, they indicate that man may "have" a mystical, direct, union with God, a beatific vision in which all evils are forgotten. This is not a systemic understanding; it is a living experience. This does not belong to a system but to intrinsic value.

A man in such an account is not a particular niche in a scale of being; he is one with the Father. His worth is, therefore, infinite. This, to be sure, does not arise on man's part but God's. But even so, it is unaccountable if viewed strictly in terms of the system. This is knowledge, but it is the intrinsic kind, the utter intuitive and mystical kind. Love is the paradigm of complete understanding; it is knowing even as one has been known all along. As such, this existential encounter belongs to the intrinsic side of the ledger.

V. INTRINSIC VALUE IN RELIGIOUS ENCOUNTER

Hartman's explanation of intrinsic value describes an intrinsic "event" as one in which the knower and the known, the subject and the object, merge into a unity. Experience is in this case a *gestalt*. It is an "I-Thou" encounter beyond space and time although to an outside observer empirical clocks would continue to tick. This experience can only be described in metaphorical language and constitutes a living relation best termed "love." It is, thus, existential, not ontological, though here again each supposes the other. The object of intrinsic experience is another self, a self who instead of standing opposite

one becomes a part of one. Even stronger, it is a self which in company with another self becomes together a single self. Intrinsic knowing *is* intrinsic valuing. Intrinsic value lives in the "real" world of real relation.

When the existential side of Augustine is presented, when one looks at the *Confessions*, when one considers knowing God as loving God and discovers that loving is unity with God, the intrinsic dimension of Augustine's thought emerges. It precisely fits Hartman's model, just as the value of his system fitted the model of systemic value. Augustine's conversion is a total happening in his life. It is intellectual perhaps, but the intellect is only a part of the man; it is also moral and emotional. Augustine hears the voice of God and responds with his whole being. He loves, and thus he becomes God.

The language used to describe this event is not systemic but metaphorical. Prayer and praise are expressed in outright paradox. True happiness, true existential founding of one's self, means that one *has* God. This is not talk about God, not abstract discussion of possible realms of being. That belongs to his systemic attempt to account for the very experience which calls out for the system. This relation with God is an intrinsic experience which comes to may by grace and in which man most deeply defines himself and understands at last who he is.

Thus, there are two value dimensions to Augustine's thought. One kind belongs to his Neoplatonic system of being. It is intellectual

and open to all who will sit down and run through the arguments. It is well-defined although it does not always isomorphically match the phenomena to which it is applied. This lack of isomorphous matching has been a reason for many criticisms of Augustine's thought. Inconsistencies have been duly noted, and incoherent sections have been shown in sharpest detail. But there is no doubt that it is a system; and there is no doubt that from an axiological standpoint, its value is strictly systemic.

However, the rigor of the strictly systemic demands creates a tension with the moral and existential traditions of Christianity. Man must be finite according to the system, but Augustine's own intense, personal experience belies this finitude. In this experience the value is clearly intrinsic. To become one with God is to partake of God's eternity. The experience is total, consuming, an I-Thou experience, expressed as love. For Hartman the intrinsic experience is expressed as an absolute unity, an uninterrupted whole or *Gestalt*. The distinctions between subject and object have been dissolved into a transparent "now" beyond space and time. Augustine's account of experience with God meets every criteria of Hartman's formulation of intrinsic value.

One suspects that whatever Augustine might have said about ontology and metaphysics the core of religion always was existential for him. True religious fervor seldom arises from the contemplation of a system, however metaphysically "tidy" the system may be. Augustine began his life as a Christian with an audible command; he spent much

time in prayer, fasting, and meditation, he lived a life of service. These characteristics are usually based on a living faith, an encounter, a meeting--not on logical niceties.

Axiological value dimensions serve to highlight Augustine's thought and bring it into sharp relief. With such tools one may see exactly what his motives in making philosophical moves may be and how he tries to account for a living faith by means of reason and logic.

CRANES CREST

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study belongs to a new field, the field of axiological application. An application of this sort presents relevant principles of axiology beside a given set of phenomena. The phenomena may be a set of empirical observations, e.g. the performance of horses in horse racing; or the application may be made upon a given philosophical or religious ethical system. As was stated in the introduction, the applicability of axiological principles to a given set of phenomena does not constitute proof for the system of axiology itself; however, in many cases axiology produces novel and important insights into the nature and structure of the items which it orders.

Often in philosophy the *being* or ontological status of phenomena are investigated; in axiology, on the other hand, the same phenomena are investigated in terms of *value*. This is not to say that there is a large difference between the two approaches; on the contrary, it is a premise of philosophy and a formal principle of axiology that the two, being and value, arise together, i.e. certain kinds of value follow from certain kinds of being. To interpret a system or field of phenomena from an axiological standpoint is to discover the kind of being the system or field of phenomena has by virtue of the value structure of the item(s) under consideration.

The application in this case has been to a system of thought. This system has been shown to have three separate components: (1) a set of existential phenomena arising from Scripture and personal experience, (2) a Neoplatonic scheme of being, and (3) the interpretation of the existential phenomena by means of the scheme. While these components are not sharply defined in Augustine's writings, and while it is doubtful that Augustine was even consciously attempting such a program, nonetheless, by observing the characteristic being and value of various items within the scheme itself and without it, clarification and strict application of axiological principles has been possible.

Axiology provides three models of possible value; it also provides three kinds of being or kinds of concepts which necessarily are connected with the various kinds of value. Two of these, systemic and intrinsic value, have been discovered within the range of Augustine's thought. This does not mean that extrinsic value may not also be found there. But extrinsic value is relative value, and for Augustine relative value is generally relative to the absolute scale of being. This systemic thoroughness often appalls his readers; for example, for Augustine, sin is sin--there is really no systemic distinction between "big" sins like murder and "little" sins like stealing pears. Sin is not so much a concrete act as a condition of being or lack of being, to be more precise. Accordingly, extrinsic value plays no large part in his thinking, at least from a moral point of view. It plays even

less of a part in his metaphysical thinking. Here, officially at least, things are absolutely defined by the Absolute. Extrinsic entities by their very nature are vague and imperfectly defined. There may well be some poorly defined items in the system; but they are due to Augustine's lack, so to speak, and not to the Absolute who, by virtue of being the Absolute, says exactly what they are. Augustine may not be sure of the origin of souls, for example; but God is. It is, thus, the case that both from a moral and a metaphysical view, extrinsic entities and extrinsic value are at least rare in Augustine, although perhaps some other interpreter might find them.

In fact, it is somewhat less than certain that Augustine would allow an interpretation of man as is required by intrinsic value. Since in intrinsic valuation the two selves become one, the value of the continuum resulting is intrinsic. It might seem that man, then, is himself potentially infinite. However, even if man must remain finite for Augustine, even systemically finite with a finite number of denumerable predicates, still the merging of this finiteness with the absolutely transfinite non-denumerable set of predicates of God would result in intrinsic value. In fact, it is just this value relation that gives man his true being and happiness. Viewed in this way, it is probable that Augustine would not object. Man, for Augustine the philosopher, may not be infinite, but it is the continuum of being when man joins with God mystically which produces the intrinsic value. This formulation removes a difficulty for Augustine at any rate.

Yet though intrinsic value in Augustine *may* be expressed in a way that would satisfy the demands of his system, it is equally possible to speculate that there is simply an unbridgeable gap between feeling and formula. Intrinsic value could conceivably arise between a man and a tree, yet this would seem to be an exception rather than what is to be expected in the normal run of things. If it did occur, axiology forces one to say that the tree in this case is being regarded as a singular item of experience. God, by virtue of his perfect knowledge, is required to know each item of creation as a singular item of experience and as *an* item in the entire system of things. God, accordingly, seems to be forced into valuing each item of creation intrinsically. From the point of view of the Bible there does not seem to be any reason why this should not be so, and indeed there seems to be at least some reason why it should be. From an axiological viewpoint, then, it seems that there is a value contradiction built in to Augustine's system. It is value-defective, so to speak. Man, by virtue of his ability to intrinsically value things that he should not, things which do not seem to be non-denumerably transfinite, must be an infinity himself. Yet Augustine says not. Further, God seems necessarily to know each thing as a *gestalt*, yet Augustine is most emphatic about the worthlessness of men and creation in the sight of God.

In fact, if any case could be made for extrinsic value in Augustine, a good place to begin would be with God. For God, at least in Augustine's eyes, compares each item with Himself and judges it worth.

Yet here again, such a claim would be faced with the absolute definiteness and unerring accuracy characteristic of the Absolute.

These items of discussion, however, do not arise from the application itself. They come to the front when one considers Augustine's thought philosophically in the light of axiology. One here notices things Augustine did not say or points in which he diverges dramatically from what the system of axiology demands. Axiology demands that if God knows each item of his creation as a singular *gestalt*, He, therefore, "loves" it intrinsically. Augustine simply denies this. From an axiological point of view Augustine's thought is defective. And so also would be the case in respect to the finiteness of man.

All this comes around to this: there certainly is a metaphysical basis to axiology, just as chapter two of this paper suggests. An application itself makes no value judgments on a system; it simply describes it scientifically. Yet it is quite possible to go beyond mere application and criticize a system in terms of its agreement or lack of it in respect to the metaphysical presuppositions of axiology.

In the case of a critique, axiology functions as a philosophy. It is no longer being placed beside a system so as to order or describe it, i.e. to give the system back again reformulated according to its axiological structure. Rather, the two systems are then seen as competing; and in this case a meta-structure must be formulated by which some judgment may be given. Yet axiology itself is a meta-system. There is a limit to how many "meta's" may be added to "system,"

but this number has not yet been established as finite. To say the same, an application is not a critique. One may be tempted to make a critique when seeming contradictions are spotted; however, when one yields to temptation in this regard, he is doing philosophy.

Thus, this application has sought to describe what Augustine has said in axiological terms. It is beyond the scope of this paper to say if Augustine is right or wrong. It is one thing to describe phenomena in the light of a system; it is quite another to metaphysically judge one system by another. Yet it is inescapable that, if pressed far enough, that axiologists would be forced into metaphysical assertions just as physicists would. Perhaps like the physicists, the axiologists would calmly go on without worrying about them. Yet a physicist worrying about his system is no longer a physicist but a philosopher of science, and the same is true of an axiologist. A scientific application is just that and no more, and that is exactly what this present study has attempted to be.



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