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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Robert Thiele entitled "Political Socialization and Teachers' Training in Rhodesia." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Robert Cunningham, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
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POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND TEACHERS' TRAINING IN RHODESIA

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Robert Thiele

August 1982

3063169

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by

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ABSTRACT

The principal question of this dissertation is: Do Rhodesian teacher trainees possess the attitudes and behavorial dispositions believed to be functional for democracy. It was foreseen that only an approximate answer could be given, both because of limited opportunities to gather information in Third World societies and because the necessary and sufficient conditions for development and maintenance of a democratic polity have not been determined.

A questionnaire was administered to teacher trainees and interviews were conducted with trainees, their teachers and with Ministry of Education officials.

Principal findings: Most trainees were suffering from cultural adjustment problems, being torn between the value systems of their traditional village and that of their training college. Males appeared more alienated than females. The more educated the trainees were, the more alienated.

There appeared to be a consensus on the desirability of an African political majority but with a continued European contribution. An educational test for voting was more acceptable than was an income test. Ndebele trainees sought some mechanism that would prevent a Shona political majority.

Many trainees showed a general commitment to democracy, although unsure exactly what democracy is. A number of

trainees favored African socialism, having been led to believe that with it toil and poverty would miraculously cease and Rhodesia would become a land of ease and plenty. Other trainees argued for a reorientation of the capitalist system so that Africans could compete more successfully. Many pupils seemed more concerned with improving their economic status and that of their families than with public affairs.

This dissertation's conclusion is that, although most trainees had internalized many attitudes and behavioral dispositions necessary to function as citizens of a democratic state, their commitment was not so unequivocal that they would actively resist any non-democratic order.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Council
AT	African Times
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BSA	British South Africa Company
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigations Division
DC	District Commissioner
Def	Definitely
Grad.C.E.	Graduate Certificate in Education
LMS	London Missionary Society
NDEA	National Defense Education Act
NDP	New Democratic Party
Non-lin	Non-linear
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PF	Patriotic Front
Prob	Probably
R$	Rhodesian dollar
RBC	Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation
RH	Rhodesia Herald
RT	Robert Thiele
Radio RSA	South African Broadcasting Corporation (external service)
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation (domestic service)
SES	Socio-economic status
sig.	Significance (statistical)
SJ	Society of Jesuits
SM	Sunday Mail (Salisbury newspaper)
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
sq	Squared
SSR	Statistically significant relationship
Std.	Standard (primary school educational level)
T1	Training programme for academic secondary teachers
T2	Training programme for practical secondary teachers
T3	Training programme for higher grades primary teachers
T4	Training programme for Grades 1-2 primary teachers
TTC	Teachers Training College
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
UANC	United African National Council
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UR	University of Rhodesia
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 HOW AND WHY THIS RESEARCH PROBLEM WAS CHOSEN

1.1.1 A World Safe For Democracy?

America's announced aim in World War I was to make the world 'safe for democracy.' That safety never developed and, two decades later, America and other democratic states (in alliance with the Soviet Union) fought the totalitarian Axis of Germany, Italy, and Japan. While our alliance won the war, the Soviets alone significantly expanded their area of control in the ensuing peace, seizing Japan's northern islands as well as establishing satellite regimes in North Korea and those areas of Eastern Europe that they did not annex outright. Communist regimes were also quickly established in three states the Red Army did not seize: Albania, Yugoslavia and, in 1949, China. Although these latter three usually have not acted like puppets on Moscow's string, they have nonetheless made their own contributions to movements seeking to establish totalitarian communist regimes elsewhere in the world, including democratic states. By the 1970s, Soviet ability to impose its will was increasing, especially in states where an anti-communist consensus was lacking (see Adelman, 1978; Ikle, 1980).

While the communist political system was being imposed in most of the Soviet Union's neighbors, beginning with the granting of political independence to India and Pakistan in 1947, a great experiment in extending democracy was embarked upon: Western Europe's vast colonial empires were largely liquidated in less than two decades, with freedom and democracy extended in constitutions drafted by the departing colonial powers. Alas, freedom and democracy proved elusive. In most instances one man one vote may have operated reasonably well once, after which the winner consolidated his power until, often, his regime became so unpopular (Chesterton, 1973, pp. 57-109) that his own army overthrew him. One of Rhodesia's leading Africanist[1] politicians, Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa, observes (1978, p. 242):

---

[1]Reasons for employing 'Africanism' and 'Africanist' instead of the more commonly used 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' are given by Hailey (1957, pp. 251-60). Hailey observes that nationalism refers to attachment to a more or less specifically defined territorial area; a nationalist wishes autonomy for that area. In contrast Africans have practically no sense of loyalty to the geographic area of European possessions in Africa; they largely accept colonial boundaries as they find them, because of problems developing if they open the Pandora's box of frontier changes. So 'African nationalism' is not what is commonly referred to as nationalism in Europe; use of the same term to describe two substantially different phenomena can only produce avoidable confusion. 'Africanism' is a drive to replace the European political, economic and social elites of a territory with Africans, specifically, the Africanists themselves.

The concept Africanist as here defined includes those who would cooperate with other ethnic groups in a democratic order, as well as authoritarians advocating Black exclusiveness.

> We have watched and observed some of the new states in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. . . .
> What have we seen? We have seen states emerging as happy, prosperous dominions at independence only to fall into the grip of local tyrants who treat the state as their own fiefdoms. We have seen states emerge as 'independent' but owing their independence to some external country which then proceeds to hold them to ransom--the former ally overstaying her welcome and exploiting the people's wealth. We have seen states emerge at independence as rich, self-sufficient entities but later become poverty-stricken 'banana republics' through frivolous spending, laziness, and maladministration. I have come across independent peoples who rue the day they obtained political freedom, who furtively wish that the former colonizer were back.

At the end of a visit to Africa, a leading American economist observed:

> Of the 49 countries in Africa, fifteen are under direct military rule and 29 have one-party civilian governments. Only five have multiparty political systems . . . the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia . . . Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius. (Friedman, 1976).

In the years since World War II ended, the world in general and Africa in particular have looked anything but safe for democracy.[2] Presently only 20% of the world's population "live in relatively free, politically pluralist societies." (Cline, 1980, pp. 484-85). Western politicians

---

[2]In the 60 page index to Lord Hailey's African Survey (1957) there is no entry for 'communism.' Shortly after Hailey published, the situation changed rapidly; a Soviet writer contends that communist party membership in Africa increased tenfold in 1960 and 1961 alone (quoted in McKay, 1963, p. 204).

and political scientists alike are forced to review their former optimistic assumptions that democracy is the wave of the future or that democratic states can implant democracy in their relinquished colonies by endowing them with democratic constitutions. In 1968 Lofchie wrote: "The implicit premiss[3] that the survival of civil institutions [in Africa] could be taken for granted [by political scientists] has disappeared."

To determine what had gone wrong and how to salvage those areas where political democracy still has a chance has become a serious concern for an increasing number of political scientists. 'Democracy' is defined as a system similar to that operating during the 20th century in such countries as Britain or Switzerland, meeting the conditions prescribed in Kelsen (1955); such non-democratic aberrations as 'peoples' democracy,' 'guided democracy,' or

---

[3]Spelling and punctuation in quotations follow the author's usage; hereafter, in cases such as this, where a less frequently used form is employed, no reference to the usage will be made; in cases where there is an error or usage that is not considered an acceptable form of English, the offending passage will by followed by '[sic].' In preparing this dissertation, all formatting and usage are subject to the constraints of the computer hardware and software used, and to university rules for dissertation preparation.

In citing publication dates, the date month year notation system is used; for example, 12.2.71 is 12 February 1971.

Although the distinction is sometimes hard to make in practice, in other than quoted passages, Government will be capitalized when reference is to a country's top political leadership; lower case will be used when reference is to the polity in general.

'one-party democracy ' are explicitly excluded.

Although concern with the requisites for democracy and with the political education of youth extends at least as far back as Plato's Republic, this concern has been far from continuous. In 1957, David Easton wrote (p. 304): "In political science as a whole, attention to problems of education has all but disappeared." In the following two decades, education's reappearance as an interest for political scientists was swift. The revival began in 1959 when Herbert Hyman published Political Socialization, summarizing 20th century research; much more has been written on the subjects since Hyman wrote than in the 2300 years separating Plato and Hyman. During the two decades following Hyman's book, many political scientists came to the view that constitutional arrangements are of lesser importance in the establishment and maintenance of democratic orders than such 'behavioral' phenomena as elite and mass attitudes (see the review article by Huntington and Domenguez, 1975).

One of the most ambitious studies in the developed world dealing with the requisites for democracy is that of Almond and Verba. In their landmark study "of the political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it," (The Civic Culture) they foresee (1963, pp. 3-5) the development of a common world culture based upon "industrial technology and an efficient bureaucracy":

> While the movement toward technology and rationality of organization appears with great uniformity throughout the world, the direction of political change is less clear. But one aspect of this new world political culture is discernable [sic]: it will be a political culture of participation. . . .
>
> Though this coming world political culture appears to be dominated by the participation explosion, what the mode of participation will be is uncertain. The emerging nations are presented with two different models of the modern participatory state, the democratic and the totalitarian. The democratic state offers the ordinary man the opportunity to take part in the political decision-making process as an influential citizen; the totalitarian offers him the role of the "participant subject." . . .
>
> If the democratic model of the participatory state is to develop in these new nations, it will require more than the formal institutions of democracy . . . .

1.1.2 What Does Democracy Require?

Precisely what this 'more that the formal institutions' constitutes is as important as it is elusive. One problem that has plagued me throughout the research for and writing of this dissertation has been an attempt to establish logical boundaries of inquiry--when no one has yet specified the necessary and sufficient citizen dispositions to establish and maintain a democratic polity nor the role played by formal education in fostering or retarding these dispositions.

So I started looking for presence or absence of a variety of attitudes and attributes that are believed to be functional for democratic development and maintenance.

The specific question of this dissertation is: to what

extent do Rhodesian teacher trainees possess the political, cultural, family, economic, and religious attitudes that are believed to be functional for the development and maintenance of a democratic polity. It is recognized from the start that only an approximate answer can be given. A list of some of the things that will be looked for follows; a summary of the findings relating to these questions will be presented in Chapter 6.

A reasonably empathetic attitude towards one's fellow men is considered desirable. If one sees public affairs principally as a 'war of all against all,' electoral victory by 'them' will be a disaster, because 'they' will keep 'us' in a permanent state of political, economic and social subjection. Thus social trust is very important.

Family size must be limited. Since efforts to improve the quality of life are doomed to failure in the sort of exploding population situation that characterizes Rhodesia and most of the underdeveloped world, and since the farther a society comes from meeting the aspirations of its citizens the greater will be their desire to restructure that society, checking the population explosion is a sine qua non for development and maintenance of a stable democratic order.

A substantial change in the status of women is required, not necesarily one that would be adequate to please Western 'women's libbers,' but much closer to that point than the

status of women in African states. So long as the mothers who bring up the children of both sexes are living in an earlier century, lack of the appropriate stimulants and information in childhood reduce the ability of children of both sexes to function in the modern world.

Children should be raised in a way that demonstrates some deference to their elders, but should not be excluded from the family decision-making process--especially when issues that concern them are being decided. These discussions are considered functional for democratic development because they encourage critical thinking about the likely outcome of various courses of action, an analytic ability believed necessary properly to weigh public policy questions.

Group activities are generally considered to contribute to attitudes and skills that are believed functional for democracy; so trainees' group involvement will be examined.

A belief that one gets ahead more through his own efforts than because of ascriptive factors is also functional; that economic and social upward mobility are as possible, or nearly as possible, for the political 'outs' as for the 'ins.'

A religious belief that those who do not get what they seek in this life will be the most rewarded in the hereafter: "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye

of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God," or "the meek shall inherit the earth" can have a powerful stabilizing influence in any society. The greater the gap between ordinary citizens' desires and their actual status, the more important such religious beliefs are.

Ideally, trainees' analysis of questions facing the society should be based much more upon present and probable future conditions, than largely or exclusively on past problems and conflicts.

An understanding that a political order has definite limits to what it can do--that the best-run government in the world cannot--in the short run at least--make a poor country rich. Tied with this should be recognition that a bad regime's capacity for rapid harm is substantially greater than a good regime's capacity for good.

The central problem of political development in Rhodesia was ethnic divisions--that largely coincide with linguistic, economic and cultural differences (and to a somewhat lesser extent, with religious and territorial differences). Democratic theorists find these overlapping cleavages much harder for polities to handle than cross-cutting ones. Jennings (1956, pp. 46-47) points out three methods have been tried to overcome communal cleavages: 1) attempt to "achieve a balance between communal ideas, but to form a single State which does its best to develop the larger patriotism";

2) create separate states based on communal differences; 3) establish a federation with communally-based subdivisions cooperating in a national government.

South Africa was attempting to apply two of these techniques and in Mozambique and Rhodesia itself such arrangements were being considered, so each of Jennings' suggestions was being tried and/or discussed in the Southern African environment.

The 1961 Rhodesian constitution (provisions retained in the 1964 constitution) provided for multi-racial 'A' and 'B' voters' rolls, 20% crossover strength between the two rolls and a single transferable vote. Although opponents denigrated this as a 'fancy franchise,' I am convinced that a constitution of this nature provided the greatest hope for establishment and maintenance of a democratic system--for it encouraged development of a centrist majority of MPs who would be beholden to both Black and White voters. These constitutions promised an initial European political majority for a parliament or two, approximate parity in the next and a clear African majority thereafter.[4]

Another functional attitude is that government should be

---

[4]These franchise provisions were not favored by the Rhodesian Front nor by radical Africanists, for a constitution that strengthened centerist elements would have left both out of power. I found some middle of the road Europeans and moderate Africans believing this approach had considerable merit--although the latter felt that the 'B' roll's influence should grow more rapidly than these constitutions envisaged.

limited. If government encroaches on most aspects of an individual's life, victory by the opposition will be just that much more threatening. One's opponent's head on a postage stamp and name on a plaque on a new bridge are not nearly as threatening as if the state determines who controls what land, who can import or export, what wages are paid or prices charged, who can be hired and fired, what the media report, or even what it is safe for an individual to say.

Also, when a society cannot meet the aspirations of most of its own people (a general Third World problem), the smaller the portion of the economy that is subject to government control, the less likely is transfer of economic frustration into political frustration.

Realization that friction is reduced by deciding many issues within a local community, especially if there is a regional homogeniety lacking in the nation as a whole, would be functional for democracy.

Economic attitudes should stress that sustained economic growth is largely the product of individual and community 'self-help' efforts, that the central government's capabilities to hinder economic growth are greater than those to help--that there is no 'magic elixir' or 'five year plan' or 'new economic policy' that will make the poor rich--albeit such schemes have sometimes spectacularly made the rich poor.

Realization that the performance of free market

economies has been substantially better than socialist ones, that African socialism has typically meant bloated bureaucracies, arrested economic development, and intensified political competition.

While an egalitarian ethos may have some positive features, when success lays one open to a witchcraft charge, a serious brake is clamped on potential entrepreneural efforts.

This list is by no means exhaustive, but knowing something about trainees' dispositions on these issues should contribute an understanding of their propensity, or lack thereof, to support democracy.

1.1.3 New Light On Darkest Africa?

When I went to Africa in 1971 it was my intention to gather information on how close the attitudes of a group of young aspirational elite came to those Almond and Verba found functional for democracy. My original target area was the Portuguese province of Angola. Armed with the linguistic ability acquired in a year of NDEA-sponsored intensive Portuguese, plus a summer session at the Universidade de Lisboa, with such social science research documents as could be examined in Knoxville and Lisboa, with helpful advice from numerous scholars in America, West Germany, and metropolitan Portugal, and several letters of introduction, I disembarked

at Luanda airport ready to make my mark in political science research. Of course, I already knew that I would not be able to ask as directly political questions as many asked by Almond and Verba. In any case the special political circumstances of Angola and the fact that I expected to query an audience too young to have much political experience made many of Almond and Verba's specific questions inappropriate. But nothing had properly prepared me for the tremendous gap between American and Portuguese academic outlooks. For example, a Portuguese Ph.D. candidate in modern history and sociology was writing his dissertation on the abolition of slavery in Angola--which was first decreed in 1764 and was finally implemented following a second decree in 1836. One Portuguese university lecturer told me that most researchers found it wisest not to work on any topic concerning events since Dr. Salazar came to power in 1932; more recent happenings were considered 'current events.' She added that leaders of Portuguese scholarship believed that one lives too close to current events to have the proper objectivity to deal with them in a scholarly manner. Since her sentiments were decidedly more reformist than those of the existing Government, I at first thought she was exaggerating; not so.

I was advised by one of the very few American-trained social scientists in Angola that I might eventually get much of the information I wanted--except for anything concerning

political aspirations or contemporary politics. But it might take years to build the sort of rapport I would need with the appropriate officials--my interests were likely to be viewed with suspicion, especially since I came from a country whose Government was anything but sympathetic to Portuguese policy in Africa. Another Angolan had a similar message:

> Our efforts for the past decade to get the American Government to understand what we are doing in Africa and to realize the true objectives of those trying to dislodge us have all come to nothing. So the fear that any American who asks too many questions is with the CIA or with some radical publication out to destroy us is a real fear.

Although all Portuguese scholars and officials were very courteous (and ready to supply lists of people who would be much more useful to me than their humble selves), I realized that the American-trained scholar was correct: to do any study with a contemporary political focus in Angola would be a very long and daunting operation, with a low probability of ultimate success.

1.1.4 From Angola To Rhodesia

Rhodesia was one of the few other areas in Africa where European control remained, where there still existed a chance to avoid the mistakes that had been made in attempting to establish democratic independence elsewhere in the Third World. I thus decided to transfer my research project to

Rhodesia, a territory like Angola where African advancement remained under European tutelage and, again like Angola, where the rate and nature of that advance was subject to considerable international controversy. However, unlike Angola, Rhodesia is in the Anglo-American tradition of academic research, so the Government and academic community would have no difficulty understanding what I was trying to do and why: to determine the extent to which teacher trainees had acquired beliefs, attitudes and behavioral dispositions that are consistent with their playing an effective role in a democratic polity, and their propensity to pass those dispositions on to their own pupils--my purpose being not to subvert the local political and social order, but to write a doctoral dissertation.

1.2 DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN RHODESIAN RESEARCH

When I arrived in Rhodesia, I learned that another American political scientist, Kevin Maguire, had been at the University of Rhodesia (UR) and had started administering a questionnaire based upon the Almond and Verba one to teacher trainees and secondary pupils--approximately what I intended to do. He had just been expelled from the country! Grope ("The Official Newspaper of the University of Rhodesia Students' Union") stated (11.71) that Maguire had been

deported simply for opposing the policies of the ruling Rhodesian Front Government. Several UR faculty members confirmed that Maguire had gained the reputation of taking a more activist political role than foreign scholars may safely play in most countries; but they added that the nature of the questionnaire he had prepared and his methods of administering it were probably more important in getting Maguire in the authorities' bad graces than any imprudent political statements. Thus rule one for any questionnaire I hoped to administer was for it not to appear similar to the Almond and Verba one, or other previous studies (e.g., those covered in Robinson, 1968 and 1969). A letter concerning this unexpected roadblock from Clyde Ingle (who had taught African politics at the University of Tennessee and who had assisted me in planning my research project) contained the suggestion that I get from informal interviews the information I was unable to acquire in a questionnaire. Insofar as possible, this advice was followed. In addition to the Maguire incident, academic research was also under fire because another University of Rhodesia faculty member, Anna Weinrich (Sister Mary Aquina), had recently published a book (Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia) which had probed African attitudes and produced findings contrary to the wishes of many Europeans (e.g., Property & Finance, 5.71).

At about the same time, an American anthropologist,

Harry Wolcott, intended to do research on African schools; lack of official enthusiasm for his project caused him to change his research topic to African beer gardens (1975, p. 99).[5] My research was conducted at a time of delicate negotiation with Britain over Rhodesia's constitutional future, so the desire 'not to rock the boat' was especially strong.

A Ministry of Education official explained their reluctance to allow questions that would not be considered objectionable in other Western countries:

> You must remember that Rhodesia is under continuous attack from the outside world. If your study produces 99 findings that are favorable to us, the world will ignore them entirely; however if there is 1 finding that could be used against us, it will be splashed in headlines in the Observer, the Guardian, and one hates to think how many other papers from one end of the world to the other. Thus officially I have to object to questions that seem reasonable and that I would like to see the answers to myself.

What survived the process of gaining Ministry of Education approval for my questionnaire was not the systematic examination of the political socialization of new Rhodesian teachers that I had hoped for. But the questionnaire that emerged did produce a considerable amount of information relating to the socialization process.

Sensitivity was not confined to the African Division.

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[5]His chapter is an excellent discussion of the possibilities and problems of modifying, conducting, and focusing a field study in Rhodesia in the early 1970s.

Although I was allowed to administer my questionnaire at the European, Coloured, and Asian Division's Teachers' Training College (TTC) (Hillside), the senior civil servant granting permission hoped that no results would be published until after he retired. He also requested that no copies of the questionnaire be allowed to leave the room--fearing that they might fall into the hands of those interested in making political mischief (both wishes fulfilled). Concerning a questionnaire for non-Africans given in 1974, Joan May observes (1978, p. 132):

> The questionnaire used in this survey was submitted to the Ministry of Education before it was administered and any question which was considered liable to yield a political answer was struck out.

Cefkin (1975, p. 145) also writes of the difficulties of student attitude research:

> Quantified data of student attitudes and student political affiliation are unavailable. Surveys cannot be taken freely. The Rhodesian government is not likely to remain uninterested in surveys undertaken for research purposes. Yet if a projected study of political attitudes were to be sanctioned by the ministry responsible, its purposes would immediately be suspect in the eyes of African students.

Despite these difficulties, several social scientists have conducted studies in Rhodesia in recent years. Where their published works fill gaps in my findings they will be cited.

1.3 LIMITED RESEARCH RELATED TO MY SUBJECT

Pierre van den Berghe has called the study of race relations a "theoretical non[sic]-man's land" (quoted in Hodder-Williams, 1978, p. 95). Similar complaints have been voiced about other topics central to this dissertation--e.g., political socialization in developing nations, and education in Southern Africa. A British educational anthropologist with considerable African experience, including work in Rhodesia, writes concerning British scholars that:

> there has been little evidence of the interest of anthropologists in the process or results of modern education in former pre-literate societies. (Read, 1955, pp. 68-69).

As recently as 1978, Keller wrote:

> Students of Western societies have long been concerned with the study of the role of the formal educational environment in the political socialization of the young, but very little attention has been devoted to study of the process in developing areas. . . .

Others' findings are similar:

> Current interest in the relationship between educational systems and their socio-political contexts is understandably high in southern Africa, but in the sub-continent we are short of empirical studies which are substantial, thorough and well related to theory. (Hunter, 1978).

> Just as we need to know more about how children are transformed into pupils, so must we know more about how young persons (usually college students) are

> transformed into teachers. The research in this area has been limited. (Wax and Wax, 1971, pp. 10-11).

This shortage of studies means that a researcher has fewer building blocks or signposts than one working elsewhere. Golembiewski, et al., (1969, p. 363) believe:

> In an area in which there is [sic] little reliable data, 'fishing expeditions' or the mere indiscriminate collection of facts is justifiable and even potentially useful. If there is a backlog of information, a more promising approach would call for the design of a tightly knit project that draws extensively on what is known, organizes this information into a coherent framework, establishes some theoretical focus for the investigation, and then empirically tests the theory.

There is a modest backlog of data concerning Rhodesia; this study falls somewhere between random fishing and a tightly knit project.

1.4 RESEARCH ON RHODESIA

Leonard's observations concerning South African research apply even more to the smaller country of Rhodesia (1969, p. ii):

> In the first instance, this has not been an expeditious topic to investigate. Five years of research . . . . Reams of superfluous materials lacking any formal expertize had to be sifted and analyzed in hopes of finding some new, worthwhile observations on the topic.

The first major Rhodesian political study (Leys, 1959) and the only published[6] nation wide public opinion poll (Rogers and Frantz, 1962) focus on the White minority. Two principal studies of education (Parker, 1960; Atkinson, 1972) say very little concerning education's political socializing role; somewhat more helpful is the Report of the Southern Rhodesian Education Commission, 1962 (Judges' Commission, 1963), which surveyed African education just before the Rhodesian Front (RF) era (1964-79).

A good summary of developments relating to race relations from Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) (11.11.65) to 1973 is in Davies (1975). The best view of the independence controversy is given by Young (1969); it is updated by Joyce (1974), brought nearly to the end of the RF era by Berlyn (1978) and Meredith (1979); a retrospective look after the Patriotic Front came to power appears in Gann and Henriksen (1981). The best general histories of Rhodesia are Gann (1969) and Blake (1977).

There have been a number of anthropological studies of Rhodesia's tribal peoples and the impact on them of European settlement; one of the earliest book-length ones is Bullock (1928); Rayner (1962) discusses both the Matabele and Mashona

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[6]Weinrich (1979) presents a few figures from a nation-wide representative survey of Africans that she supervised; I have no information on most questions in the survey or when more data will be published.

tribes. Holleman (1969) emphasizes changes in political structure. Gelfand has written a large number of studies, as has Weinrich (although her radical bias and pedantic style mar her works). Studies that emphasize religion include Murphree (1969) Bourdillon, and Daneel. A large number of articles of varying quality appear in NADA; several have appeared in Zambezia.

In a review of research in Rhodesia, Ivey (1968, pp. 36-40) notes a shortage of studies concerning social studies and student attitudes:

> I personally should like to see a thorough investigation made into the teaching of history of Central Africa at secondary school level.
> . . . . . .
> The complex field of human relations in schools remains to be investigated.

1.4.1 Biases

Concerning political research on Africa, Lofchie (1968, p. 6) states:

> Despite fairly consistent obeisances to the need for scientific, value-neutral analysis, most political scientists are of strongly liberal sentiments, and this is especially true of those interested in Africa. . . . [They have] a pervasive disinclination to produce a conceptual terminology which, by even the most remote stretch of the imagination, could be construed as 'conservative'. There is a concealed but very real fear that political research which is critical of independent African states, might, somehow, lend credence to the premiss of black inferiority, or to that of an African incapacity for self-government.

The same could be said of the penchant of many academics to use 'freedom fighter,' rather than 'guerrilla,' to refer to those who are considered by pro-system Rhodesians as 'terrorists.'

While this radical bias has been most pronounced since World War II, the first book-length Marxist attack on Rhodesia (Rolin, 1913) was published before World War I!

Most works concerning Rhodesia, especially those published since UDI, have been anti-regime propaganda, some more or less openly polemic (e.g., Mlambo, 1972; Todd, 1966 and 1973), more frequently the polemic work has a facade of scholarly objectivity (e.g., Lake, 1976; Arrighi, 1967; and various works by the Marxist editor of the Journal of Southern African Studies, Charles van Onselen). There have been a smaller number of pro-system polemics (e.g., Harrigan, 1966; Chesterton, 1973).

While many of the anti-regime publications have been written from the outside or by foreign scholars who temporarily worked within Rhodesia, several University of Rhodesia faculty members have written a number of works highly critical of various facets of Rhodesian life (e.g., Giovanni Arrighi, Anna Weinrich [also writing as Sister Mary Aquina], Duncan Clarke, and Kenneth Good). Phimester (1979) approvingly reports that "Zimbabwean Economic and Social Historiography Since 1970" has increasingly abandon the

liberal tradition in favor of Marxist analysis. This means that all facets of Rhodesia's social, economic, political and educational orders have been subject to increasingly uncompromising attack, because they all deviate sharply from the dictates of 'scientific socialism.'

More balanced works by UR faculty members include those by Betty Jo Dorsey (Murphree), M. F. C. Bourdillon, Milton Kalso, Marshall Murphree, P. Stopforth, R. H. Christie, George Kay, Joan May, and Norman Atkinson. Several works by Rhodesian journalists (e.g., Berlyn, Shamuyarira, Vambe, Paver) contain valuable information, as do previous dissertations on Rhodesia (e.g., Harlin, 1973; Harper, 1959; Thomas, 1964; McHarg, 1959). Unfortunately, very little directly relating to political socialization in the schools has appeared, so research for this dissertation has involved massive examination with little to show for it.[7]

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[7]For example, a book with the promising title Education and Social Control in Southern Rhodesia is described by its author as "a study of the racial development of secondary and higher education for blacks in pluralistic Southern Rhodesia from 1946 to 1974." (Kumbula, 1979, p. iii). In fact it is a polemic which does mention the existence of TTCs but says nothing about them; neither does it actually discuss the "social control" role of any educational facilities in Rhodesia.

1.4.2 Availability

Availability of works that have been published is also a severe problem. The University of Tennessee libraries' budget is too small for much purchasing (especially of periodicals) on such exotic matters as Southern Africa, or even on political socialization. Book orders one thinks have been made tend to 'fall through the cracks' of the system. Although three Bulgarian language newspapers were subscribed to, none is taken from Southern Africa.

> Administered by the Farmington Plan Committee of the Association of Research Libraries, its [the Farmington Plan's] purpose is to ensure that at least one copy of a book or document from a foreign country which "might reasonably be expected to interest a research worker in the United States" is obtained and on deposit in the United States. (Coleman, 1964, pp. 99-100).

Under the Farmington Plan, the University of Wisconsin (Madison) assumed responsibility for Rhodesia (Coleman, 1964, p. 208); while its collection is substantially better than UT's, its holdings are woefully short of the commitment it made. The Africana Library of Northwestern University has also been utilized in my literature search, as was the library of the University of Rhodesia. It is possible, however, that some issues of such publications as Teacher in New Africa, its successor, Teachers' Forum, the Bulletin of the Institute of Education of the University of Rhodesia, supplements to Zambezia, International Review of Education,

Ethnic and Racial Studies, or other sources unavailable to me contain information that would be of use in analysis of the role of education in political socialization in Rhodesia.

1.5 DATA COLLECTION

My research began with surveys of literature on political socialization, on the Rhodesian society and polity, and on the Rhodesian educational system; standard printed indices and bibliographic information in numerous books and articles were examined. Finally an ERIC computer search was employed. In Rhodesia a questionnaire was administered to African and non-African teacher trainees; furthermore, numerous interviews were conducted with trainees, teachers at training colleges and at the University of Rhodesia, and with officials in both the European and African Divisions of the Ministry of Education; additionally, many primary school and some secondary school textbooks were read and a detailed analysis of typical social studies textbooks was made.

In addition to subjects covered in the formal syllabus and in organized extracurricular activities such as debating societies, some consideration is given to other socializing influences encountered within the school environment, such as magazines, newspapers, and radio programs; since many African peasant families own little if any printed matter other than

the Bible and perhaps a few religious tracts, and since many still do not own radios, the schools often provide pupils from peasant families with their principal or sole mass media exposure.

1.6 INTERVIEWING

1.6.1 Ideal

Ideally an interviewer should select a carefully drawn sample of the target population with the aim of seeing a representative cross section (representative on what are perceived to be significant independent variables, e.g., ethnic group, sex, SES, urban-rural residency, training program, boarding vs. day secondary school, church vs. state run schools). Respondents should be met singly in an unhurried, relaxed atmosphere during an interview that covers all points on the interview schedule. The opportunity to explore potentially useful 'side lines' that develop during the discussion should be taken. Rosenberg (1968, p. 200) writes: "that much can be learned in survey analysis which is not based on the explicit testing of clearly stipulated preformulated hypotheses." This is even more true at the interview stage, where opportunities to follow an unexpected lead are greater than when dealing with data already collected.

As Bonilla (1964) and Weiner (1964) point out, resources and circumstances always limit what is gathered to considerably less than the ideal. This is particularly true in projects such as the present one--where there is only one researcher with limited time, limited access to the target populations, and when a potential for negative reaction--both from the civil and educational authorities and from those being interviewed--was high.

1.6.2 Actual

Interviews with teacher trainees and their teachers were conducted as circumstances permitted. Most African teachers training colleges I visited were located in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL), areas that theoretically could be visited only with permission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. No one seemed to pay much attention to these regulations, but they could be enforced if Internal Affairs got word of any activities they found suspect. Also there was some feeling amongst Africans that individuals who asked questions about issues of social and political importance might be investigators for the Government.

Several individuals familiar with teacher training in Rhodesia said that African trainees would generally give fairly complete and honest answers to most questions so long as they were strictly 'off the record'; if they felt their

identities were being associated with remarks made, most would say what they thought the Ministry of Education would like them to say. For these reasons, it was felt that less would be gained by trying to establish systematic interviews with carefully drawn samples, or by use of a tape recorder or taking notes during discussions, than by making the questioning as informal as possible, with notes written privately afterwards. This had the additional advantage--for interviews conducted prior to my questionnaire being answered --that I often needed not to reveal fully my background or motives prior to asking the questions. The problem with early full disclosure was that many of the trainees were of the opinion that, if I were working on a doctorate in social science, it would be much more appropriate for any conversation to provide them with the benefits of my wisdom, rather than for them to discuss their partially formed feelings on political and social issues. To surmount this problem, several times I had to promise to answer their questions at the end of our discussion. This produced the problem of deciding what to do with trainees' statements made near the end of interviews that tended to agree with what I had just said; these are given considerably less weight in the following discussion than views elicited before I had to say anything that might 'taint' trainees' views.

More often than not several students were interviewed at

the same time, with not all pupils discussing every question. While students generally seemed willing to present divergent points of view in each others' presence, the possibility that those with extremely conservative or radical views were constrained from fully expresssing them should not be ruled out. My summarizing of the views presented tends to give trainees responses a breadth they lacked, for some trainees appeared to lack well thought out views on any of these issues, and few, if any, at the TTCs were prepared to speak on all issues raised. This approach also precludes any precise quantitative measure of how many trainees fall into each response category.

1.7 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND POLITICAL RESEARCH

Attention in this introduction is next turned to aspects of the relationship between this research project and what and how social science research is conducted. Merton (1969, pp. 39-40) believes social science should:

> focus on what I have called theories of the middle range: theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change.
>
> Middle-range theory is principally used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry. It is intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote from particular classes of social behavior, organization and change to account for what is observed and to

> those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalized at all. Middle-range theory involves abstractions, of course, but they are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing. Middle-range theories deal with delimited aspects of social phenomena, as is indicated by their labels. . . .
>
> [S]uch theories are characteristically simple . . . . Each . . . provides an image that gives rise to inferences. . . . The initial idea . . . suggests specific hypotheses which are tested by seeing whether the inferences from them are empirically confirmed.

Although Merton's work (first published in 1949) is one of the most influential social science publications since World War II, many of the studies that have been conducted subsequently, including reviews of the field (e.g., Coleman, 1965; Holt and Turner, 1970; Dennis, 1973), contain little or no theoretical discussion in the middle range. For example, Sjoberg (1955) moves from a section discussing Parsons' pattern variable schema (which most would consider at a greater level of generality than middle range--although, as is usual amongst social scientists, there is no general agreement on the boundaries of middle range theory) to "sampling and the standardization of operations." Some works such as Mayer's (1972) Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey, fail to mention middle range theories. Lane's (1973, pp. 50-52) literature search has results similar to mine:

> [T]here are few attempts at theoretical clarification intended to bridge the area between . . . highly generalized theory and the real world of behavior. . . .
>
> The investigator into the numerous social disciplines that converge on the question of political man finds a

> plethora of material, much of it at one or the other methodological extreme. . . . The point is devastating: at no point, be it man's political predispositions, his roles, or his adult personality and its political ramifications for societal institutions, at no point have we even a primitive conceptual model for describing what we are talking about. So, to suggest one particularly unfortunate case, "political socialization" studies are reduced to the trivial definitions of political, rather than asking what types of citizens are possible? what sorts of situations produce them? and so on. Surely political science will not reassert its master-science prerogative unless it is willing to ask questions, the answers to which have implications. . . .
>
> [Although The Civic Culture comes closer to asking the correct questions than most studies do, it] has been hampered by the same barrier, or hiatus, that has arrested the development of theoretic substance in American surveying--the failure of middle-range analytic frameworks. In the large and theoretically interesting range between the pollster's trivia and the psychoanalyst's couch we have few if any guidelines.

LaPalombara (1968) criticizes from a similar position, arguing that comparative politics suffers from a "widening chasm" between its "macrotheories" and their "micro-applications."

The authors of a review article conclude that:

> most mainstream works [in comparative politics] are only nominally cumulative, rarely possess precisely comparable meanings to what appear as common terminology, and are usually difficult or impossible to examine empirically. (Melanson and King, 1971, p. 211).

Of course it is much easier to criticize than to create. Very often the conditions under which research is conducted preclude meshing a study with extant theories and previous work. Even when this option is available, a researcher may wisely conclude that previous work is not as solid a foundation to build on as he would like, that he probably can do better by starting more or less afresh. It is not my intention here to castigate previous research projects.

Kenneth Langton argued in 1965 (p. 19): "A major weakness in the contemporary literature is the lack of broad conceptualization to guide research in political socialization." I am more inclined to agree with Merton (1968, p. 45) that much theoretically oriented work has been too broad. Like almost everything else in the quest for a science of politics, there is no agreement as to what middle range theory is. While many scholars see middle range theory as not directly testable and as linking together a number of related hypotheses, in his classic call for middle range theory, Merton (1968, p. 40) is not as unambiguous as one would like, first presenting a series of definitions that imply that middle range theories are not directly testable; but then he cites such simple formulations as Boyle's Law as characteristic middle range theories. As most students who have taken a physics lab course know, Boyle's Law is relatively easily tested; thus, however vital it is for

understanding the behavior of gasses, Boyle's Law is not analytically distinct from low-level hypotheses. In this dissertation, the phrase 'middle range theory' will be used to refer to theoretical constructs that are too broad or too generally stated to be amenable to direct testing, but which can be evaluated by use of lower-level hypotheses and/or reasoned arguments.

Lane's monograph, along with a number of other works that are concerned with theory building, appears in a now discontinued series, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics. The best list of middle range propositions I have encountered appears in the now discontinued Political Science Annual (Dawson, 1966). Either systematic theory building is much more popular with social science professors than with publishers or book purchasers, or few middle range theories have actually been devised, their prescription being simpler than their construction. Holt and Turner (1970, pp. 6-7) suggest reasons for this state of affairs:

> The theoretical structure in political science is not deductively powerful, and hence the rigorous deduction of hypotheses is, with few exceptions, impossible. Most hypotheses that are tested by political scientists are either the loose implications of a rather amorphous theory or are simply the researchers' hunches about a reasonable outcome of empirical research. Indeed, much of the research in the field is not oriented toward hypothesis-testing at all, but is exploratory in nature and is undertaken to aid in the development of hypotheses. But, regardless of how the research questions have been arrived at, a major purpose of the research is to identify the relationships among variables.

W. G. Runciman (1963, p. 93) observes that most contemporary social science theories that appear to develop an adequate set of predictors in reality have:

> predictors that are conceptually indistinguishable from the dependent variable itself or, if conceptually distinct, they are so close to the behaviour they purport to explain that prediction becomes a trivial exercise.

The road to adequate, elegant theory is a long and perhaps never ending one. Runciman's warning is too often partially or completely ignored by researchers. I tend to agree with Macridis (1968, pp. 86-88) that:

> [A] distinct trait of superficiality typif[ies] the state of a discipline [political science] that has consistently eschewed the hard and persistent empirical phenomena that ought to concern it in the name of theory-building and theory testing. . . .
> [W]e do not and cannot have a science of politics. We can have, at most, an art. A series of solidly supported inductive generalizations may in the last analysis be the most fruitful way to move gradually to a scientific approach, as it provides us with a rudimentary form of behavioral patterns; our knowledge of politics is then at most an understanding of our accumulated experience.

Mayer (1972, p. 60) similarly laments:

> Political science is in a state where the leading scholars are more devoted to the process of constructing competing paradigms or research frameworks than in actual substantive research.

Welsh (1973, p. 138) discusses how political socialization relates to some of the various theoretical approaches

and models currently popular in political science:

> The socialization process exerts considerable influence on the nature of citizen supports available to the political system and on the nature of the demands likely to be made by societal groups seeking influence on political decisions. Political socialization, similarly, is central to system maintenance, in that the sustenance of a particular political order depends, in part, on society's ability to transmit a supportive political culture across generations.
>
> Somewhat like political culture, the concept of political socialization may be used at two distinct levels of analysis. Using the term in the same sense as Almond and Powell, and Easton do, one is led to think of political socialization as a system-level concept. That is, the focus in these models is on the role played by political socialization in the stable change and integration of political systems. At the same time, it seems clear that the empirical study of the socialization process must focus on individuals, since it is in the acquisition by individuals of values, attitudes, and behavioral dispositions that we are interested. Thus, although political socialization may be viewed as a factor contributing to the particular state of a political system at a given point in time, the actual study of the phenomenon of socialization must proceed at the individual level.

1.8 STUDY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Concerning the study of political socialization at the individual level, Greenstein concludes (1968, p. 552):

> Although there is no generally accepted approach to the study of political socialization, much of what is known and of what ought to be known can be summed up in the following paraphrase of Lasswell's formulation of the general process of communication: (a) Who, (b) learns what, (c) from whom, (d) under what circumstances, (e) with what effects?

How this dissertation relates to Lasswell's five categories will now be discussed.

1.8.1 Who

This dissertation focuses upon one group of citizens in one developing country: teacher trainees in Rhodesia.

In most developing nations teachers are the largest group within the modern elite and, with the possible exception of ministers of religion, are best placed to influence the thinking of non-elite members of their societies. Teacher trainees are a group who are nearing the end of their formal instruction by their society and are about to take their places as educators. Thus their attitudes are an important indicator of political socialization that has just occurred, as well as a forecast of the socializing role they will soon play in the classrooms and, especially in rural areas, in the community. Many peasants acquire many, perhaps most, of their orientations toward the modern polity as adults; Frey (1970, p. 183) is impressed by similarities of adult peasant political socialization to that of children; so the possibility that teachers play a similar socializing role for both their pupils and the pupils' parents should be kept in mind. Weinrich discusses teachers' position in Rhodesia (1965, p. 263):

> The majority of people look to their teachers for advice in their contacts with Europeans, especially Government officials. But whereas teachers have the confidence of the people, they lack the chiefs' authority. . . . Government legislation prevents teachers from taking an active part in nationalist politics. Thus they cannot legitimize their position in a modern political system. They form an educated and economic elite and their affiliation with the mission gives them many openings for leadership in Church organizations. Teachers have therefore many means of making their influence felt in the local community. They are moreover influential men without official leadership status.

Teachers' potential as a Rhodesian political elite is also broadly hinted at in an official report prepared shortly before the Rhodesian Front (RF) Government came to power (end of 1962); the Judges' Commission carefully examined Rhodesian education for Africans; it reported on the "Status and Rewards of the Teaching Profession" (1963, p. 131):

> The school teachers are now a self-conscious community within the society of Southern Rhodesia, the only African group that can truly be called a professional entity; and aware, as this group is, of its place and power as an effective elite striving to lead educated opinion.

Social Responsibilities

> Looking towards the future, we recognize the responsibility which the profession as an elite must be prepared to shoulder. It has to act as a trustee for the future of Africans who have yet to reach the same cultural standard. We see it also as constituting a reservoir of talent from which in certain circumstances men and women may have to be drawn off pretty rapidly into other occupations calling for ability to organize and direct. There is, in fact, no other pool of talent of appreciable dimensions. And for this reason alone it is clear that any who have an eye on the development of policy must maintain an alert and critical watch on conditions of service, on the recruitment of new blood

> to the profession, and on the capacity of teachers' organizations to preserve a liberal and statesmanlike view of the trusteeship for African advancement they are involuntarily accepting . . . .

What attitudes were being encouraged by the educational administration and what attitudes were held by Africans in teachers training thus seemed subjects worthy of investigation by one concerned with the development and maintenance of democracy in Rhodesia and in democratic polities generally. The Rhodesian case is a relatively rare one in the annals of political socialization, one in which an ethnic minority within a country that had been self-governing for half a century was successfully socialized (if we define success as producing individuals supportive of the existing polity) while the ethnic majority was not. The Judges' Commission believed (1963, p. 30):

> The fact that Southern Rhodesia, unlike most areas of Africa, has a large white minority of permanent citizens must create many features of superlative interest to any comparative educationist. The inter-racial situation, the claim to the fruits of conquest, the liveliness and relative wealth of the money economy over many years encouraged a big outlay on the education of Africans as a welfare proposition, whilst discouraging any policy which propounded the need to create an elite among non-Europeans. 'Why is that necessary?' it was asked. 'Have we not already got an adequate leadership?'
>
> Viewed within the whole continental framework, the territory of Southern Rhodesia is, in many ways, in a unique position. It can boast of a high rate of common literacy, a sophisticated educational administration, full of experience and, within defined limits, skilled in its capacity to invent and adapt.

Sigel (1970, ch. 7) and Kavanagh (1972, p. 35) argue that adult experiences are sometimes more important in political socialization than those of childhood; however, most studies agree with Dawson and Prewitt (1969, pp. 43-44):

> The experiences and developments that contribute most to the acquisition of political orientations are concentrated in the early years. This is especially true of basic political loyalties, identifications and values.
>
> By late teens or early twenties, the individual has acquired relationships with the political world that are generally similar to those of older people in his society or subculture, as well as to those he will possess through his adult life.

So a study that focuses on teacher trainees would seem to focus on critical individuals, both from the standpoint of socialization that has recently occurred and from that that is likely to occur. Additionally, the elite position of teachers makes them politically important.

1.8.2 What

This dissertation was to be an exploratory study of available information on how the Rhodesian Front Government attempted to socialize politically Rhodesian youth to its concepts of a just society, and how the regime's socialization goals relate to the attitudes actually held by teacher trainees. However, well into my Rhodesian research, it became obvious that the regime had no clear, coherent idea of

what its political socialization goals were, possibly because it was reluctant to face up to the political consequences of creating an educated class of Africans who could expect their political role to be minimal for the foreseeable future, or possibly because there was no consensus in Government and the Ministry of Education as to what the political socialization goals should be. The British educational tradition of supposedly ignoring political questions in education (Abramson, 1970) was doubtlessly a strong influence encouraging similar neglect in Rhodesia. So the regime's socialization goals had to be constructed by this author, and then compared with the limited political content of the curriculum. This exercise did not produce as much useful information on the socialization process as had been expected. Harper's (1959, pp. 37-39) findings parallel mine:

> Despite the explicit forms and teaching techniques that have been written [in official documents], the writer has been unable to find in written form the philosophy of education on which this system is based. In the way it functioned he believes the following to be a fair interpretation of the classical British educational system in Southern Rhodesia. Education seems primarily to be a process of acquiring the written word. It has come to mean learning the contents of books. The strong believers in this type of school have great faith in memorizing. There seems to be little concern for the whole person in his cultural setting. The major concern was developing the intellect as though it were a separate compartment of a person[.]
>
> The main concern seemed to be focus on preparing the student for better living later rather than on the process itself. Little concern was manifested for the concomitant kinds of learning. The fact that a child might be learning attitudes of hate or ideals of cheating while he was having to memorize passages from

> the Scripture seemed irrelevant.
>
> The teachers were so occupied with following the material out of the government syllabus according to the way the law stated they should follow it, that the interest in the student became secondary. The teacher's job, then, was to fit the student into the government syllabus rather than adjusting the syllabus to meet the needs of the student.
>
> The teaching was geared toward cramming the students full of facts that would assure their success in passing the examinations created and administered by the government.

An additional facet was added to my research project: political, economic, cultural, religious, and family attitudes that various authors believe are functional for citizens of a democratic polity are specified; then there is a search for relationships between the hypothesized attributes and the actual attitudes of Rhodesian trainees. The available Rhodesian data usually do not permit any rigorous testing of hypotheses; but they are adequate for tendency statements to be made with some degree of confidence. This work is at the discovery end of the 'discovery to justification' continuum.

Queries that were made in the 'what' area can be grouped in five categories: politics, economics, culture, family, and religion. Since many of the hypotheses to be tested are based on only one or a few studies in societies considerably different from Rhodesia, falsification in the Rhodesian context is more likely than it would be in societies similar to those in which the hypotheses were generated.

1.8.3 From Whom

American writers on political socialization (e.g., Hess and Torney, 1967; Hyman, 1959; Jennings and Niemi, 1968) generally agree that the two most important socializing agents are the family and the educational system--although they differ as to which of these is more important. Similar conclusions have been reached in other countries. For example, Samuel Gomez (1968, p. 162) concludes in a study of "Education in Portugal": "[T]he educational system is the major vehicle through which the character of the Portuguese citizen is shaped." Concerning Rhodesia, Harper (1959, p. 6) writes: "The mission teacher training program is . . . the primary institution through which the new culture is transmitted."

Pertaining to the political importance of the classroom, the curriculum followed there, and a regime's objectives, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, pp. 146, 155) state:

> It is through this agency [the classroom] that the most comprehensive and deliberate efforts are made by modern and modernizing polities to shape the political outlooks of new citizens.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Although it is not always successful in meeting the regime's objectives, the classroom curriculum stands as a key means through which school children acquire knowledge about political life and loyalty to the nation. As more of the population of the world comes to spend an increasingly larger portion of their [sic] formative years in classrooms, we can expect the curriculum to assume increasing importance in political socialization.

Interactions of forces for change in Rhodesia are so numerous and complex that it is often impossible to separate them, even for analytical purposes:

> Among the many factors which have combined to effect change in tribal society perhaps the most important are money economy, the Christian message and Education, European administration, and the introduction of public and veterinary health measures. None of these operated in isolation. All operated concurrently and formed part of a complex process of social, economic and spiritual interaction of which the multiple strands are so interwoven as to be indivisible in the total aspect of change. (Holleman, 1969, p. 57).

My questionnaire includes queries concerning trainees' perceptions of who and what has most influenced their political attitudes and whom they would be likely to turn to if troubled by a political problem. Other important socializing agents have been identified as the church, peer groups (both through unstructured contacts and through memberships in organizations) and the media. Questions concerning their influence were asked Rhodesian trainees.

1.8.4 Under What Circumstances

Prewitt, et al., believe (1970, p. 220):

> It is not easy to theorize about the way in which the political socialization process occurs when the data available are neither collected over time nor contain detailed materials on the process itself.

Unfortunately, in this study it was not possible to overcome either of the above-mentioned problems.

In the first American studies, early orientations were uniformly reported to be pro-system, especially pro-president. Having personally spent the latter years of primary education in an American school where hatred and contempt for the president were the established norm amongst pupils--and where expressing a contrary opinion was an invitation to be beaten up--I read Easton, Hess, Torney, Dennis, Greenstein, et al. in a very skeptical frame of mind. Other writers (e.g., Tapper, 1976) add the vital corrective that, where anti-government sentiment is prevalent amongst adults, it is more important than anything the textbooks say. For example, Wylie (1957, p. 207) reports how French civic textbooks extol the virtues of la patrie and its government; he adds:

> The children have no difficulty in accepting the concept of la patrie, for at home and throughout the village they hear la patrie spoken of only with love and respect. . . .
>
> Theoretically, Government may be an alter ego of la patrie, but [according to their parents and other adults in the village] in point of fact it is made up of men--weak, stupid, selfish, ambitious men. It is the duty of the citizen not to cooperate with these men, as the civics books would have people do, but rather to hinder them, to prevent them in every possible way from increasing their power over individuals and over families.

Similar findings have been made in America's Appalachia (Jaros, 1968) and amongst American Negroes (Abramson, 1977).

The problem of loyalty to government in Rhodesia is further complicated by the fact that there is no primary loyalty to *la patrie*, but rather to one's own ethnic group. Thus there is a strong tendency to see most issues--not just political ones--primarily in ethnic terms. Even without these limitations of French *incivicisme* or of Rhodesian ethnicity, limitations on use of schools for socialization remain great; the Vice-Principal of the University of Rhodesia cites the case of a society that is generally considered to be an especially cohesive one, Britain:

> If we want to develop minds to think along lines acceptable to us, we may find that we do not have control over the means, for these means are to be found in the forces and influences pouring out all the time from the total environment. A striking example of this is the creation and development of a national system of schooling in England over the last one hundred years. The purposes of that schooling were, almost to the exclusion of anything else, to perpetuate the existing social class structures, to equip pupils with such skills as were deemed useful in the labour force required by industrialization, and to make them physically sturdy and train them in habits of cleanliness and hygiene so that they would be neither offensive in the eyes and ears of their betters nor, through sickness and ill-health, a charge on the pockets of those betters through the rates [RT:[8] in American terminology, property taxes]; furthermore the schools were structured, organised, and administered, their content chosen, their system of training developed and their methodologies systematically exerted precisely to achieve those purposes. In short, if anything could have succeeded in entrenching the English class system of one hundred years ago, the

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[8]Bracketed material within quotations that includes information or ideas the quoted writer did not provide has my initials (RT) preceding it.

> schools as they were designed and operated could have done so. But they have--witness the times we live in--totally failed. The tide of social change has run steadily against them. . . . [T]he overall environment [has] been exerted in ways making a mockery of the work of the schools. (Bone, 1976, pp. 1-2).

In addition to societal circumstances, Froman (1970, p. 16) hypothesizes that:

> the 'explanation' of political behavior seems to require the postulation of a set of variables having to do with the child's psychic makeup which intervene between the environment and his behavior.

When individuals go through seemingly identical socializing experiences only to emerge with substantially different political orientations, indirect evidence for Froman's hypothesis is generated. Langton (1969, pp. 162-63) has also observed that much of the contemporary terminology of political socialization research implies that the individual is a passive recipient of information fed to him from his environment. As Greenstein's survey of "The Impact of Personality on Politics" (1967) makes clear, properly to explore the psychic dimension would require resources beyond those for most socialization studies, including mine.

1.8.5 With What Effects

Those who wish to use the schools or other institutions for social engineering should keep in mind that:

> It is easy to calculate that reforms which prove to be contrary to the desires of the people, because they have gone against certain customs or deeply rooted religious fundamentals, have little chance of turning out well. (Soares, 1961, p. 95; my translation).

Even if pupils acquire the desired attitudes, Sears points out (1975, p. 130): "data are fragmentary and scarcely support any very final conclusions about the persistence of early socialization." A study such as mine that does not retest respondents can provide little information concerning lasting effects of socialization.

Although only one of her 1963 questionnaire questions directly concerned a political matter, Dorsey (1972) shows "The Acculturative Effects of Schooling on [Rhodesian] African Attitudes and Values." She asked the same set of questions of: 1) residents of a remote village that had no road, store or school (Mazoe River); 2) residents of a village at the end of a road that had a school, church, store and bus line (Nyahuku village); 3) students in Nyahuku's school (Nyahuku Std. III [fifth year of schooling]); 4) students at the secondary school in the nearest large town (Mrewa secondary). Her findings are summarized in Table 1:1; they tend to confirm the hypothesis that the greater the

contact with European education, values, and ways, the greater their acceptance by Rhodesian Africans. But the persistence question remains largely unanswered in Rhodesia as elsewhere.

TABLE 1:1 Acculturative effects of schooling on African attitudes and values

Story Response	Group questioned: Mazoe River	Nyahuku Village	Nyahuku Std. III	Mrewa Secondary
Legal and administrative story				
Traditional	90.0%	10.0	24.0	15.0
Neutral/intermediate	0.0	70.0	20.0	15.0
Accultured	10.0	20.0	56.0	72.0
Summary of 12 stories				
Traditional	76.7	40.8	12.7	14.9
Neutral/intermediate	10.8	21.7	28.0	14.7
Accultured	12.5	37.5	59.3	70.4

Source: Betty Jo Dorsey [Murphree] (1972) "The Acculturative Effects of Schooling on African Attitudes and Values," Zambezia, pp. 11-21.

Harper (1959, pp. 90-92) feels that much of the learning African trainees do is not internalized; his description of the 'conversion to Christianity' of one trainee, early in his first year at a TTC, provides a good example:

> Kodzai [a second year student] polked Tafa [a first year student] in the ribs - "Come on let's go down--it's part of the initiation into the white man's tribe. They treat you better if you go down and do what they tell you." Tafa felt very lonely. The missionary was a very wise man, also a very successful

> one; for he had a car, lots of furniture in his home and even servants. Surely he must be favored by his "mudzimu." Perhaps the missionary was right; perhaps he should accept the missionary's God so that he too would become very successful. He did feel the need to belong to the group. Tafa walked down to the front of the church and knelt at the altar. He listened to the people pray, but he could not make out what they were saying for they all talked at once. Finally one man came to Tafa and said,
>
> "Tafa, have you confessed all your sins? Have you told God that you will throw away all your charms, your idols, that you will not pray to your "mudzimu," that you will stop drinking beer, that you will live now for Jesus?"
>
> Tafa didn't know what to do, for he could cease sinning, and he could stop drinking "doro," [home brewed African beer] he had put on European clothes already, but he dare not stop praying to his "mudzimu.". . . The missionary began to get more aggressive and began to shake his finger in Tafa's face. Tafa froze, completely terrified. The missionary was accusing him of witchcraft, for pointing a finger at someone spelled witchcraft. . . .
>
> With great diffidence, Tafa pulled out the charm from his pocket and put it on the altar. The missionary leaped into the air and became flushed with exuberance.
>
> "Bless you, my boy, God will make a great Aggrey (famous African Christian) out of you." Then he lifted Tafa by the hand and told everyone that Tafa had been converted. The missionary was overjoyed, and many of the students rose to pump his hand. . . . He had become great. . . . Left out since he had been at the mission school, he was now suddenly held up as a shining example . . . .

That evening Tafa sneaked back into the church, retrieved his charm from the altar, and retained it until the day he died; this behavior pattern appears not to be atypical.

1.9 OVERVIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS

A brief overview of subjects covered in subsequent chapters is now presented. A historical survey of development of Rhodesian society and its educational system are presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will discuss the impact of education in general and teacher training in particular on cultural attitudes, including beliefs on family and religion. Chapter 4 will present political hypotheses and data relating to them. Chapter 5 will explore economic attitudes. In Chapter 6, a summary of findings and speculation on their implications for Rhodesia's future will be presented, along with suggestions concerning future research.

1.10 TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL SCIENCE INQUIRY

An indication of the gap between contemporary Western social scientists and those who think in a traditional mould can be gained from the following quotation--which well conveys the gap between Western social sciences and the thought process in many societies, the sort of attitude that should be kept in mind while framing hypotheses and testing same in other cultures:

> My illustrious friend and joy of my liver:
> The thing you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this

> place, I have neither counted the houses nor have I inquired into the number of inhabitants; and as to what one person loads on his mules and the other stows away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But, above all, as to the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it. O my soul! O my lamb; seek not after the things which concern thee not. Thou camest unto us and we welcomed thee: Go in peace. (Letter from a 19th century Turkish official to an English scholar; quoted in Hyman, 1964, pp. 153-54).

1.11 DEMOCRACY IN ETHNICALLY FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES?

Mention should be made of an unsettled question in political research that hangs over this and similar research projects: the analysis by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) of a number of plural societies that concludes that conflicts in such societies are inherently too intense to be managed in a democratic framework. If they are correct, any study looking for conditions that will make democracy work in Rhodesia is chasing a chimera.

While this study involves a priori acceptance of Lijphart's (1977) counter-argument, it must be kept in mind that this is a leap of faith, not a scientifically validated step.

1.12 FINAL NOTE

Any study that attempted to explore all aspects of the socialization process would not be a dissertation but a more than lifetime project. One desirable way of proceeding would be to conduct a more or less exhaustive study of some narrow facet of the socialization process; in the Rhodesian circumstances of the 1970s an in-depth look at a small area was impossible. Political research, like politics, is often the art of the possible. If one considers the total political socialization process to be a jigsaw puzzle, instead of a researcher being able to piece together an entire quadrant, available information only concerns numerous smaller sections of the Rhodesian puzzle, and does not permit most of them to be examined as thoroughly as one would like.

CHAPTER 2

RHODESIAN SOCIETY: PAST AND PRESENT

2.1 RHODESIA BEFORE RHODES

Lack of written records and conflicting interpretations of the limited archaeological evidence obscure details of Rhodesian history prior to the arrival of Europeans. Before recorded history, only the Bushmen inhabited Rhodesia. The first European penetration of Rhodesia was by the Portuguese Antonio Fernandes in 1514. The largest tribal grouping in Rhodesia today--the Shona (or Mashona)--were still arriving about the same time as the Portuguese.[9]

The Shona were exterminating those Bushmen who did not flee westward into the harsh Kalahari Desert.

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[9]There is evidence that some Shona--especially the Karanga--had been arriving since about the 15th century. Histories, including Ministry-approved textbooks, do not agree on arrival dates. It appears that Shona entry into Rhodesia began well before 1514 and continued long after that date. Most scholars (e.g., Salt, 1969, pp. 8-9) believe the Shona arrived from the north; however, archeological evidence from pottery research has recently been presented suggesting they came from the south (Huffman, 1977). The issue of who arrived when may seem rather trivial to some foreign scholars. But in this dissertation it is assumed that what is considered important in Rhodesia will be the prime determinant of Rhodesian attitudes. There arrival dates and what are appropriate conclusions to draw from them are issues considered quite significant by many people of both races.

2.1.1 Education Prior To Contact With Europeans

Aside from severe puberty rites and training in home pastoral and, for males, military duties, there seems to have been little formal instruction given children prior to contact with Europeans. Atkinson (1972, pp. 8-9) reports:

> Priests of Mwari [their Supreme Being] apart, Mashona society does not appear to have contained a learned class in any accepted sense of the term. . . . [T]he witch-doctor did not owe his position either to any previous training or to appointment by the chief but simply to his own insistent clamourings that the gift of prophecy had descended upon him. . . . He cannot be said to have fulfilled the role of a repository of tribal tradition, or a guardian of tribal rules of conduct. . . .
>
> 'The children of this land are nonentities,' observed one European missionary during the early part of this century, 'nothing at all is done for them.' . . . There seems to have been no kind of formal schooling.

A more favorable evaluation of traditional socialization is presented by Dorsey (1975, p. 39):

> In Rhodesia, as elsewhere in many parts of Africa, traditional socialization was characterized by two types of knowledge passed on to the younger generations; one was that body of knowledge which was necessary to carry out daily activities and occasional rituals in the household and village and secondly, the body of traditional lore concerning natural phenomena, custom and tribal history. Such education was not only imparted at initiation ceremonies but also in an informal way and often on a family basis. Frequently it was imparted through stories and riddles told by senior relatives around the fire after the evening meal and particularly by the grandmothers (vambuya). This constituted the principal education of the African child and was designed to fit him for adult life in his society.
>
> Traditional education, then, tended to be an integrative function for a relatively non-competitive society whose main aim was the transmission of a common

culture from one generation to the next and the maintenance of social cohesion. In true Durkheimian tradition it was eminently suited to its milieu, before the coming of European settlement.

2.1.2 The Portuguese In Rhodesia

The first European-style education provided in Rhodesia came from the Portuguese. Goncala da Silveira, a Jesuit priest, reached the Monomotapa's Zimbabwe in 1560. He had previously studied the language. After a few weeks of teaching and preaching, da Silveira baptized the young Monomotapa, his number one wife, his sister and some 300 Court-associated persons (Dickinson, 1968, pp. 22-24). Da Silveira's success was short-lived, however, for Arab traders saw the Portuguese presence as a menace to their activities; they convinced the Monomotapa that da Silveira was a powerful sorcerer who wished to take his kingdom. There was some truth to their charges. On the Monomotapa's orders da Silveira was fed to the Mzingezi River crocodiles on Sunday, 16 March 1561.[10]

Portuguese missionary educational efforts continued. In 1640 at least 12 communities had Catholic churches (Murphree, 1969, p. 6). In addition to providing basic literacy and rudimentary religious training at the missions inside

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[10]"[L]ocusts, floods, disease, famine ensued, and convinced him he had made an unfortunate mistake. His Muslim counsellors were in their turn put to death . . . ." (Blake, 1977, p. 12).

Rhodesia, sons of important chiefs were sometimes sent for advanced training at Sena or Tete or to the theological college on Mocambique Island or even to far away Goa. The son of one Monomotapa even received a theological degree at Goa in 1670; however, he remained there to head a Dominican convent--perhaps Rhodesia's first case of 'brain drain'!

For various reasons Portuguese power in Mocambique and Rhodesia went into a decline in the late 18th century; by 1775 mission education in Rhodesia had ceased (Randolph, 1971, p. 8).

What lasting effects these two centuries of Portuguese presence had is difficult to assess. When Europeans next established themselves in eastern Rhodesia over a century later, no direct evidence of the Portuguese legacy was noted. Tindall (1968, pp. 50-51) concludes that the Portuguese influence in Mashonaland:

> never made any vital impact on African society. The Portuguese were too few to disrupt the social fabric and establish western ways. Only a few individuals were profoundly influenced . . . .

Murphree (1969, p. 6) wisely cautions:

> The fact, however, that they penetrated into Shona territory and stayed there a considerable time should be kept in mind, since it may have influenced Shona religion [and other facets of life] in ways not easily ascertained today.

Some of the similarities between 'traditional' Shona religious beliefs and Christianity may not be happenstance. Early in this century Junod wrote (1912, p. 410):

> It is wonderful to notice how easily the idea of God of Christianity is accepted by the Bantu. They have almost no difficulty in believing that this is the real God to be worshiped. Livingstone long ago remarked this, and the truth of it has been confirmed by . . . most of those who have endeavored to win over these tribes to Christianity. It seems as if one were telling them an old story, with which they had been quite familiar but had now half forgotten.

2.1.1 The Matabele Minority

Over three centuries after the first European penetration, tribal wars in South Africa caused the Matabele (also known as the AmaNdebele or Ndebele) to separate from the Zulu nation and migrate to Rhodesia in 1838--half a century prior to the Pioneer Column that resulted in permanent European settlement. The Matabele considered the Shona as a sub-human group--fit only to be killed or kept as slaves; had the Europeans not put an end to Matabele persecution of the Shona, it is likely that the latter--who today constitute nearly 80% of the African population--would have gone the way of the Bushmen or the American Indians.

The Matabele were an extremely cruel people--even by 19th century Bantu standards. For example, King Mzilikazi, who had led his people into Rhodesia, tried to kill all his sons to prevent them from displacing him. A Matabele youth

was not considered a man until he had killed a member of another tribe--usually Bushmen or Shona.[11]

> The neighbouring Mashona, to the east and north, were subjected to a precarious vassal existence, in which the Matabele overlords regarded them as little better than victims to be killed or tortured at pleasure. . .
>
> Though the education of Matabele youth did not differ greatly in form from the practice among the Mashona, it was nevertheless characterised by a more aggressive military zeal. (Atkinson, 1972, pp. 9-10).

Rhodesia, prior to European settlement, "witnessed civil strife of a ferocious nature, with refined forms of torture and ruthless liquidations." (Gann and Duignan, 1967, p. 141). At the 'grass roots' level, inter-tribal animosities remain; a retired District Commissioner observes:

> [The African] is basically and abidingly suspicious of the intentions of all Europeans, but, and this is important, he is even more suspicious of his fellow Africans, except those in his immediate family circle. (Wright, 1972, p. 240).

Vambe (1976) reports that Africans in Harare (the oldest African township in Salisbury) even insisted upon European

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[11] A number of years after the migration one son, Lobengula, was found with his dying mother by Sara, a Boer girl who had been captured by the Matabele. She cared for him for some 10 years and was living with him with the Kalanga people (the Mashona tribe most closely integrated in Matabele society) when the death order was made. Lobengula was far enough from the court that he was overlooked. Sara herself was not so lucky; she was killed by a snake while fleeing from a Boer posse searching for her (Berlyn, 1967, pp. 22-23). But Lobengula was to be heard from again.

judges at dance contests, because only Europeans were considered impartial by those involved.

Mugabe's Minister of Information, Nathan Shamuyarira (1965, p. 118), discusses how the Matabele spoke of the Mashona at the Methodist TTC he attended:

> [They] referred to us Mashonas derisively as 'Maswina' (meaning 'those people who are supposed to have remained cleaning and eating the intestines of an animal when other tribes were moving on').

These events and animosities are significant today because some Africanists have tried to portray pre-conquest Rhodesia as a harmonious dreamland--where poverty, wickedness, and inter-communal strife were largely absent. Also some foreign analysts apparently fail to take past and present conflicts into account in their discussions, seeing all the country's problems as a Black and White struggle (see the discussion in M. Sithole, 1980).

2.1.4 English-Language Education Prior To The Pioneer Column

American Methodists began working with the Matabele in the early 1830s; but their ranks were decimated by fevers and their efforts abandoned before the end of the decade (Atkinson, 1971, p. 20). Dorsey (1975, p. 39) relates that:

> The history of formal education for Africans in Rhodesia is synonymous with the history of Christian missions. Mission schools were established in Rhodesia 31 years before permanent European settlement.

The first of the mission efforts to persist to this day is the Inyati Mission of the London Missionary Society (LMS) (Congregational Church) established in 1859. Another mission was opened at Hope Fountain, south of what is now Bulawayo, in 1870. While the Portuguese had worked with the Shona (also known as the Mashona), the LMS struggled with the considerably more warlike Matabele (Ndebele). Four years after Inyati was established, missionary John McKenzie wrote to London about the 'never exposed to Portuguese missionaries' Matabele in terms that sharply contrast with Junod's reference to the Mashona:

> Repeated attempts have been made in the way of teaching the young, but hitherto without success. Learning to read seems to be regarded by the people with fear; they are not sure how [King] Moselekatse [sic] would regard such a movement. . . . The training of the Matabele; their habits of plunder and bloodshed, and their social usages, all combine in direct opposition to the requirements of Christianity. Your agents are labouring amongst a population, the male portion of which has been gathered from all tribes; knows little or nothing of home or kindred; lives in barracks; robs and slaughters at least once every year, without reference to sex or age, and knows no law but that of the King. The females are also the children of nearly all the surrounding tribes, and are as unpromising as the men--if not more so--as subjects of the Gospel. . . . [We] cannot as yet point to a single individual and say, 'We have good hopes of this person', or 'Here is our first convert.' (Quoted in Atkinson, 1972, pp. 208-09).

Tindall (1968, p. 101) writes:

> Though not openly actively hostile to the missionaries, Mzilikazi would not accept the new teaching and put to death any of his subjects who wished to become

Christians. After twenty years neither mission could claim any converts among the people.

These experiences are not unlike those elsewhere in Africa; du Toit (1962, pp. 16-17) reports that the first school for Africans in South Africa opened at the Cape in April, 1658: "To induce regular attendance, at the end of each day each student was given a tot of brandy and some tobacco." Apparently no such bribery was employed in Rhodesia, but medical care and physical safety probably induced many of the early pupils to attend more than Christianity or education did.

In 1879 Roman Catholic missionaries again entered Rhodesia, but had no more success than the Congregational ones. Prior to effective European control "the efforts of the [19th century] missionaries to evangelise and educate were almost total failures." (Bone, 1968, p. 5).

2.1.5 Scramble For Africa Reaches Rhodesia

While early mission activities had limited impact, exposure to other European influences than education had a great effect on Rhodesian Africans in the last half of the 19th century. The ambition of the gold diggers and the greed of the ivory hunters were especially evident (Matabeleland's huge elephant herds were almost entirely shot out in the 1860s;[12] one small hunting party in 1865 returned with 10,000

pounds of ivory). How to deal with the increasingly numerous and varied European requests and inducements became a major concern for Central African tribes in the last third of the 19th century.

Ndebele King Mzilikazi died in 1868. A fruitless search for his son Nkulumane followed, for many did not believe that Mzilikazi had had him killed. The Matabele chieftainship finally was gained two years later by Lobengula, a younger son by a lesser wife. In the interregnum most of the king's cattle and other assets had been appropriated by local magnates (Gann, 1969, pp. 53-54).

2.2 CECIL RHODES SHOULDERS THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN[13]

In 1888 it was a financially embarrassed Lobengula who raised armaments and cash by signing the Rudd Concession (which gave mining rights to Rhodes' De Beers Company). He gained some protection against others interested in his

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[12]Newly armed Africans were partly responsible for this slaughter.

[13]Cecil Rhodes, son of an Anglican clergyman, emigrated to South Africa in 1870 for reasons of health. He quickly amassed a fortune by selling claims to the diamond fields, and he founded the famous de Beers Company. "One of Rhodes fondest dreams was to color the map of Africa red [the color traditionally used for British possessions]." (Mutambirwa, 1980, p. 19). He looked forward to the day when all the land between the Cape and Cairo would be under British control, and in the 1880s acquiring what was to become Rhodesia was an important step toward that objective.

kingdom by signing the Moffat Treaty (which placed his country in the British sphere of influence). The British Government equivocated on the agreement with Rhodes, first opposing the Rudd Concession; it advised Lobengula:

> not to put too much power into the hands of the men who come first . . . for a king gives a stranger an ox not his whole herd of cattle, otherwise what would other strangers arriving have to eat? (Quoted in Tindall, 1968, p. 144).

This advice led Lobengula to murder not only an indura, Lotje (who was also his commander-in-chief, chief advisor, and brother-in-law), but also his entire family--just because Lotje had favored the concession. Rhodes' agent in Bulawayo left in haste before he might meet the same fate. The British Government wished to keep the Boers, Germans and Portuguese out of Rhodesia without burdening the Exchequer; so in 1889 it reversed itself and Rhodes was granted a Charter for his British South Africa Company to rule and develop an ill-defined area which included the present states of Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi. Another letter was sent by the British Government to Lobengula, reversing the advice about the ox, urging him to deal with one approved group of White men. This pattern of the British Government equivocating and trying to control Rhodesia events without spending money was to persist for over nine decades.

Several thousand applied for the 200 places in Rhodes'

Pioneer Corps. Careful selection by family and occupational background insured the nucleus of a complete society and widespread support for them in Britain and at the Cape. A further 200 White men were recruited to form the British South Africa Police and 200 Ngwato under the brother of the Kama (the paramount chief in what is now Botswana) assisted in road building and transport. This 600-man force made the 400 mile journey to what is now Salisbury in less than three months during the dry season of 1890 without a single loss of life. When it is recalled that a 1,000-man Portuguese expedition to Mashonaland had lost 820 men (Dickinson, 1968, p. 25), the Pioneer Column's accomplishment is remarkable. Although medicine made some advances in the 320 years between expeditions, the main difference was between a highland route in dry season and up the Zambezi valley in the rainy season.

Relations with the Matabele were strained from the start. Although the settlers had carefully avoided Matabeleland and had the Rudd Concession allowing them to mine in Mashonaland, many of the Matabele warriors were unhappy about the Europeans' presence. Lobengula apparently had not expected as many settlers as in fact arrived. In April, 1891, Lobengula sought to limit the power of Rhodes' British South Africa Company by granting land rights to a German in the Lippert Concession. Rhodes reportedly called this grant, which violated the British agreements with Lobengula, a

'humbug concession'; but he in the end strengthened his right to settle Rhodesia by buying it.

Nothing in the agreements said that the Matabele could not continue to slaughter and enslave the Shona. Aside from the Europeans' moral repugnance at such activities, how could they mine or farm if the Shona they hired or bought food from frequently disappeared into hiding or were killed? Matters came to a head in 1893 when a Shona chief called Gomalla stole 800 yards of the telegraph line near Fort Victoria. Gomalla was caught and paid his fine with cattle Lobengula considered his; he then told Lobengula that the Europeans had stolen the cattle. An attempt was made to smooth over this incident, but another Shona chief (Bere) appropriated more of the King's cattle. Now Lobengula ordered his warriors (impis) to punish the Shona. A Ministry of Education approved textbook describes what happened next:

> The warriors came on a July morning, and killed every muShona [singular] they could find. Heaps of bodies lay on all the roads to Fort Victoria. Some vaShona [plural] ran into the fort for protection. Then the amaNdebele [Matabele] forgot their king's orders and ran into the farms of the miners, where they began to spear the vaShona.
>
> The magistrates at Fort Victoria ordered the amaNdebele to leave, and Dr Jameson was asked to come to put things right. The amaNdebele said the vaShona hiding in the fort must be given up. Jameson refused. The three thousand amaNdebele refused to go and began to drive away the cattle belonging to the Europeans. Jameson sent out thirty-eight mounted police who fired at the amaNdebele. About fifty were killed and the rest escaped across the Tokwe River. (Dickinson, 1968, p. 67).

Lobengula sanctioned war in the traditional manner: by hurling his spear into the ground in the direction of the enemy. Feelings were at such a fever pitch that few noticed that his assegai had broken on impact--a very bad omen!

Although there were 15,000 Matabele warriors facing a force about a tenth as large, the superior weaponry of the Company's forces proved decisive. Lobengula's death in early 1894 (possibly suicide) marked the end of effective resistance. But peace was not to last for long. Most European policemen were demobilized, and Europeans turned their attention to farming and prospecting. Many of the new police force were the Ndebele-despised Shona. Lobengula's cattle were taken as a prize of war by the Company; since they were herded by the people, there were disputes as to which were his and which were private. Establishment of European farms and mines and economic pressures to work on them were irksome to the warrior tribe. Many Matabele had not seen action in the 1893 debacle and were eager to show their prowess against the Company. Drought, locusts and rinderpest (a cattle disease) came in quick succession.

> The Africans naturally gave a religious interpretation to this series of disasters. . . . They must have felt most strongly that the troubles were caused by the new white rulers who had failed to respect and propitiate the spirits in the accustomed way and then insisted on what seemed to them quite senseless measures of slaughtering the cattle [actually done to prevent the spread of rinderpest].
>
> The people were therefore well prepared to accept the call for a religious war to evict the white man when it

came from the priests of Mlimo. (Tindall, 1968, pp. 167-68).

In October, 1895, Jameson sent 280 of the British South Africa Company's Police south as part of an abortive attack on the Transvaal. All were killed or captured. With only about 40 White policemen left in the country and evidence from the Transvaal that the Company's forces were far from invincible, the priests and chiefs felt that the time to strike was at hand. In March 1896 the Matabele attack came; within two weeks 143 Europeans were killed. Few rural residents in Matabeleland who did not quickly get to town survived. A few days after substantial relief forces arrived from South Africa, the Shona joined the rebellion. Shona participation was partly due to the mediums of the tribal spirits' (mhondoros) blaming the Europeans and the changes they had introduced for the natural disasters that had occurred, partly due to resentment at the taxes and labor obligations that the Company had imposed, and partly due to fear of what the Matabele would do to them if the rebellion were successful without their participation. All told, 600 White civilians were killed and many more lost all they possessed (Berlyn, 1978, p. 102).

Just over three months after the Shona joined the rebellion, Rhodes began his famous series of 'indabas' with the Matabele induras. By mid-October 1896 the Matabele

rebellion was over. The Shona lacked a centralized leadership capable of negotiating peace; they continued sporatic resistance for another year.

A TTC-trained African describes how his grandfather, Jakobo, discussed these events:

> He was outraged by the apparent blindness, the spinelessness and the easy-going nature of all black people, and expressed these views most outrageously when he had drunk some beer. . . .
>
> He would, for instance, remind those prepared to listen to him that we had only ourselves to blame for defeat in the 1896 struggle. We had begun the war with many advantages, but as time went on, he would say, our stamina and resourcefulness dwindled to such an extent that many of our people lost heart . . . . Since then, bullied and corrupted, we had made no other attempt to free ourselves and were willing enough to slave for the settlers. In Jakobo's view, all black people, whoever they were and wherever they came from were mbuzi (goats), whose passive patience was unending. . . .
>
> Had such a point of view been expressed at any modern African political rally, the speaker would have been stoned. (Vambe, 1976, p. 13).

2.2.1 Relevance Of The Past To The Present

It may be wondered why events of nearly a century ago are discussed in a dissertation on contemporary political socialization. The answer is that those events have had a considerable impact on political attitudes in the 20th century.

> Defeat must have led to a great loss of Africans' confidence. The rebellions had been to a considerable extent a religious war to evict the white man. The Mlimo cult was of Shona origin and the call for rebellion, though answered first by the Matabele, had certainly made a deeper appeal to the Shona. When the

> rebellions ended in defeat, the failure of the religious leaders was therefore widely felt and the subsequent African attitude of awe and submission surely reflected the belief that the white men had a power superior to that of the tribal spirits. Any further resistance would be unthinkable since the outcome was obvious before opposition began. Many Africans must have reconciled themselves to their own religious traditions by assuming that the spirits though powerful among themselves were powerless against Europeans. Others, disillusioned with tribal religion, turned in increasing numbers to Christianity. Here, in the rebellions, is the beginning of the slow process of erosion of tribal beliefs and customs which is an important theme of the next fifty years. (Tindall, 1968, p. 175).

2.3 PEACE, PROGRESS, AND UNEQUAL PROSPERITY

From 1897 to 1960 Rhodesia held a record, probably unique in the world, that no one was killed or injured by police or military use of firearms. Administrators in recent times can only envy the conditions the Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, reported in 1907 (pp. 1-3):

> Attitude of Natives.--I am pleased to report that the attitude of the natives in Mashonaland leaves nothing to be desired. They are perfectly contented with their lot. Their wants are so small that they have little trouble in procuring all they desire. . . . I have visited a number of districts during the year under report, and I am pleased to say the amicable disposition of the natives was most noticeable.
>
> Crime.--I have little to report under this heading. The natives continue to uphold their reputation as a most law-abiding and contented race. Occasional fights take place at beer drinks. . . .
>
> Crops. --. . . the natives will reap an abundant harvest next June. The rains have been heavy and general, and the natives have increased the acreage under cultivation to a great extent.
>
> Labour.--. . . The Labour Bureau has spared no effort to obtain a reliable supply of labour for mines and

other works, but I regret to say their efforts have not met with the desired results.

Revenue.--. . . The natives have paid their tax cheerfully, and with the exception of those living in remote parts and bordering on Portugese [sic] territory, no difficulty has been experienced in the collection . . . .

General.--. . . Several kraals in the Mazoe district were reported to be destroying their pigs, as they had been informed by their witch doctor that the Government intended placing a tax on them. I called the natives together at the Native Commissioner's station and went thoroughly into the matter, explaining to them that the Government had no such intention. I also cautioned the witch doctor named "Nyamita" that she would be prosecuted if she continued to instil wrong ideas into the minds of the natives.

Two items in the above report were to continue to plague race relations in the ensuing years: 1) the European desire for a dependable, inexpensive supply of African labor, versus Africans' 'high leisure preference'; 2) an African mistrust of European motives, intentions, and deeds, a mistrust that was sometimes well founded, sometimes not.

2.3.1 Europeans: Exploiters Or Benefactors?

Africans often underrate the Europeans' contribution to their present well-being. In most traditional societies: "Activities and states of mind are much alike for all persons in corresponding sex and age positions; and the career of one generation repeats that of the preceding." (Redfield, 1955, p. 4). Gann and Duignan (1962, p. 113) point out:

> It is the modern money economy that for the first time has given to the African the choice of real economic alternatives--the foundation for liberty . . . . The long term alternative to imperialism was not some tribal dreamland, but a kind of rudimentary gunpowder feudalism that could only have kept Africa back.

It is understandable that Africans, upon noting that Europeans are generally much better off, may feel that they are exploited--especially when there is no shortage of voices telling that that is the case. But the fact remains that without the White man the African would be considerably less well off than he is now. One need only contrast Rhodesia with the one African state to escape a long colonial history:

> It is instructive to compare the record of Ethiopian achievement, or more specifically that of its Amhara rulers, with that of Southern Rhodesia. Comparisons, of course, can never be exact, for in this case the odds favor Ethiopia. Southern Rhodesia's size and population are much smaller than Ethiopia's. Pre-colonial Rhodesia, moreover, was a much more backward country than the northern mountain state. At the time of white conquest the indigenous tribes had no written language; their material culture was less highly developed than that of the Ethiopian ruling group; their military strength was much smaller, and even Lobengula's warrior kingdom in Matabeleland, the most powerful community in preconquest Rhodesia, could in no way bear comparision with the Amharic Empire. Furthermore, Southern Rhodesia was colonized by European settlers. In the language of contemporary anticolonialism, its people became the victims of the worst, the most oppressive, and the most reactionary form of colonial rule in existence. (Gann and Duignan, 1967, p. 366).

Gann and Duignan then cite figures showing that--although Rhodesia's African population was less than one-

sixth as large as Ethiopia's population--over twice as many Africans were in school, more were receiving post-primary schooling, there were more hospital beds available for Africans, total wages paid were 11.5 times as great, etc.[14]

> It seems likely that in areas where Europeans have settled in Africa the territories concerned got their original accumulation of capital at bargain rates, at the price of certain economic, social and political privileges for the European minority; these special rights weighed less harshly on the masses than the sacrifice demanded by the deliberate under-consumption of a communist state or the forced labour programme of Sekou Toure in the Republic of Guinea, not to speak of China. (Gann and Duignan, 1962, p. 121).

While those Rhodesian Africans who see themselves as their country's Nyereres, Kaundas and Amins--were the European-dominated Government replaced by an Africanist one--are doubtlessly not as well off as they would be were their dreams to come true, for the ordinary African, nearly all Europeans and many Africans believe, conditions are much better than they would be under an Africanist Government.

This feeling was frequently reenforced by reports in the

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[14]Portuguese "political, economic and religious ascendancy was complete" (Ullendorff, 1965, pp. 5-7) in Ethiopia during much of the century following aid by a force led by Christopher da Gama (son of Vasco) in routing Muslim invaders in 1541. In a generally anti-Italian work, Barker (1968, pp. 299-300) credits the Italians with many of the modern developments and attitudes in Ethiopia. British military administration began in 1941 and did not completely end until 1954. Many foreign experts and much aid have been sent to Ethiopia ever since. Thus a case can be made that much of Ethiopia's progress since the mid-16th century has been due to foreign assistance.

Rhodesian media of the deterioration of many facets of life in most states north of the Zambezi.

While public service corruption in Rhodesia was virtually unknown, the opposite is true in most Africanist states; for example, Tanzania's Ministry of Home Affairs admitted that thefts by government officials from state-controlled organizations amounted to US$7,680,000 in the year ending 31 May 1977 (Moore, 1977, p. 20); President Nyerere has even accused most of his top officials of being corrupt (BBC, 25.1.82). Zambian officials have periodically voiced similar complaints (Radio RSA, 23.9.81).

A TTC-trained Rhodesian laments that this sort of problem also plagues Rhodesian Africans in the modern sector:

> This attitude was quite the reverse of the tribal tradition whereby co-operation in ploughing, weeding, harvesting and threshing was traditionally the very essence of the African agricultural system. . . . In effect theirs was an admission that the African could not be trusted with anyone's money other than his own. . . .
>
> This outlook is as rife all over this puzzling continent as [is] tribalism. (Vambe, 1976, pp. 210-11).

2.4 PIONEERS, MISSIONARIES AND EDUCATION

From the Education Ordinance of 1899 to the present the government has slowly increased its role in education. But until the 1956 reestablishment of the Native Education Department (later the African Division of the Ministry of

Education), African schooling was provided almost exclusively in mission schools.

Missions long provided education when the government had neither the human nor material resources to do so. But the primary objective of the missions has been not to educate in the broad sense nor to socialize the students into appropriate roles in the extant society, but to socialize them into appropriate roles as members of a particular denomination.[15]

From the earliest days, friction between settlers and missionaries has not been uncommon. Stanley Hyatt (1914, pp. 242-43) wrote of the early missionaries in Rhodesia:

> Oh, if only the people of England could see the missionary at work, if only they could realize one tenth of the harm he is doing in South[ern] Africa alone, if only they could look forward a few years and grasp something of the ghastly horrors of that coming Native War, there would be a fierce revulsion of feeling. At Home, in certain circles, the missionary is a combination of saint and hero; on the spot, amongst those who know him and his ways, he is a public nuisance. . . . [A]t least half the native unrest in Africa can be traced directly to them. They live comfortable, almost luxurious, lives, in good camps, surrounded by native scum--only in missionary camps will you find numbers of native women. . . .
>
> I think that a good many missionaries, especially the female ones, are sincere when they go out first, every whit as sincere as those foolish folk out of whose

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[15]Father R. J. Randolph, S. J., (1971, p. 12) states the Roman Catholic position: "The fundamental purpose of missionaries being 'in education' on an academic basis, has been, not that they can do the academic side and produce the academic results as well as, or better than anyone else, but that they can thus teach Christian principles effectively at the same time. Not only in teaching, but also in teacher training . . . ."

> bounty their passage money and salaries are paid; but a few years' practical experience produces radical changes. Some become fanatics, refusing to face facts, sweeping aside all practical considerations, gorging themselves on formulae; others, saddened, weary, true Servants of their Master, recognize the essential hollowness of it all . . . and yet stay on, trying by the goodness of their own lives to atone in part for the evil wrought by their colleagues . . . .

Concerning the people amongst whom the missionaries worked, Hyatt (1914, p. 91) felt:[16]

> They were not bad at heart, those savages of the Mabouka Hills [an area near the South African border], but there was a mission station on the other side of the range, and it had contaminated the whole neighbourhood. There was hardly a village which had not a mission-trained boy in it, which meant that the authority of the old men was being undermined, and that the young men were becoming thieves, merely through the evil example of the one youngster.

Hyatt's observations concerning schooling are similar to those of a District Commissioner who was stationed at nearby Nuanitsi half a century later:

> The power of the Chiefs and Headmen--diluted as a result of European occupation of this country--was being increasingly challenged by young men with upper primary or secondary education, which our quaint system churned out in their thousands even though this academic-type schooling benefited them hardly at all. (Wright, 1972, p. 6).

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[16]Hyatt is a rather opinionated character. He is cited not as one providing an objective assessment of missionaries and their work but rather as representative of a substantial body of settler opinion that has persisted to this day (e.g., Early, 1977, pp. 29-39).

If the settlers have often thought ill of the missionaries, many missionaries and their home churches have reciprocated. For example, in 1901, settlers in and near Melsetter, a small town near the Mocambique border, desired a school for their children. They approached an American Zulu Mission at Mount Silinda (a site given that mission by Rhodes a decade earlier)[17] for a teacher. One agreed. However:

> The Mission's parent Society in America was not at all certain that one of their missionaries would really want to teach white children and needed to be reassured, so there was some cabling between Silinda and Boston before permission was granted . . . . (Sinclair, 1971, p. 48).

Discussing her school's socializing role for Europeans, Miss Gilson (the missionary from Mt. Silinda, teaching at Melsetter early in the 20th century):

> said that the school afforded the only opportunity which more than 100 children had for gaining even the simplest rudiments of education, and more important than the knowledge gained from books was the training in habits of industry and faithfulness, respect for law and order, and the wholly new ideals of life and duty. If those privileges were taken from them she felt that there would be a vicious if not criminal class who would be a greater expense to the Government than the cost of maintaining the school. (Sinclair, 1971, p. 56).

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[17]By 1900 Rhodes' British South Africa Company had given 325,730 acres for 10 mission stations and their support; nearly half was given to the Roman Catholic Church (Randolph, 1971, p. 61).

To what extent has education for the African served a useful function, either for his personal betterment or for the betterment of African society or for Rhodesian society as a whole?

> The primary school system which we have inherited from Britain is in fact mainly a 19th century product. It was designed primarily to teach the poor to read the Bible and thus keep them in their barely literate place. The secondary school system, which has since been arbitrarily attached to it, was framed with a view to elevating the British middle classes to those white-collar and even minor professional jobs considered appropriate to their station. . . .
>
> [T]o this day many Africans believe that Education, exactly as Europeans receive it and preferably by the same teachers, is the only key to success such as the white man enjoys. . . .
>
> [A]lthough the African insists on European formal education to the letter, and we give it to him, it is not what he primarily needs at this state . . . . (Reader, 1972).

With the appropriateness of European-style education for Africans being seriously questioned in the 1970s, its suitability in the previous three-quarters of a century is in even more serious question.

> Over the first 50 years or so of European occupation in Rhodesia there was broad agreement between the aims of the providers of African education--the missions--and those of its financial supporters--the Rhodesian Government and the electorate. Substantially these aims were to provide the literacy without which evangelization could not effectively take place; and to provide those elements of training and of "discipline" that would lead to higher and healthier standards of living within the African communities. On the whole both parties were agreed on the emphasis that the desirable higher standards of Africans should be WITHIN their communities, WITHIN their way of life, WITHIN their culture (purified of its less acceptable

> features: witchcraft, superstition, the lowly status ascribed to women, the concept of cattle in quantity rather than quality representing wealth, and so on).
> . . . . . .
> Neither the Government nor the missions were particularly concerned to extend education beyond this basic level except in so far as it was necessary to produce teachers . . . .
> More critically, very rarely was the concept propounded, still less frequently practised, that the ultimate target must be the uplift of the African until he could take his full responsible role in the social, economic and political life of the country as a whole. (Bone, 1968, pp. 6-7).

At first, many missions appear to have considered Africans substantially, probably inherently, inferior to Europeans:

> In the words of a worthy Baptist missionary, "lying, stealing, gluttony, polygamy, licentious debauchery, and cannibalism" were all second nature to the natives, who represented a lower stage of human evolution, and who were undoubtedly getting worse from generation to generation. Without the whites' Gospel, the blacks were thought to be lost. (Gann and Duignan, 1962, p. 9).

Some of the problems that have occurred as a result of mission activity were probably inevitable in the transformation of tribal peoples into at least quasi-members of a modern society. Many missionaries have been astute enough to understand the dangerous thing a little knowledge can be and have conscientiously tried to foster attitudes appropriate for inter-racial cooperation. Some of the undesirable results are an indication that the missions have tried to do too much with too little.

It must be added that European education has often not been especially functional for the development of attitudes appropriate for inter-racial understanding and cooperation. Failure to teach European children much about African ways and customs often fosters misunderstandings. A teacher (in Shona, Mufundisi) at a TTC describes some of the different customs that facilitate friction:

> [During a visit to a trainee's village,] Mufundisi discovered that many of the behavior patterns of the students that he had considered disrespectful according to his own standard were actually the height of respect. He discovered that in the African culture it is never polite for a person of low rank to leave the presence of a person of high rank unless he has been told to leave. To Mufundisi it was impolite to tell a person to leave, so that after he would talk to a student about his problems, he wondered why they did not have enough sense to leave when it was obvious that the discussion was over. He was being polite in not telling them to leave, they were being polite in not leaving him until they were told to go.
>
> He also discovered that a person of low rank never looks a person of high rank in the eye, because this is disrespectful. Mufundisi had been annoyed by this because he had interpreted this as an indication of shiftiness or guilt.
>
> He also discovered . . . [that] an important person must always show dignity, and never become too familiar with the people under his guidance. When Mufundisi had thought that he was being democratic in asking the opinion of the students about school matters, they interpreted it as a lack of knowledge on his part. (Harper, 1959, pp. 206-07).

2.5 AFRICAN EDUCATION AFTER WORLD WAR I

Most Africans in the 1920s did not see the value of European education as offered by the missionary schools. Attendance was irregular and the schools were often half-empty. Muzorewa (1978, p. 17) states that even a decade after World War I had ended, "the benefits of education were still not fully evident amongst my people. The advantages of an academic education were still nebulous."

However, some Africans began to realize that they could raise themselves from the ranks of common laborers if they could read and write. Yet, it would be years before the desire for education became wide-spread, because, "African society, with its traditional values, sharply discouraged social climbing; black children for long lacked educational incentives." (Gann, 1965, p. 332). A Rhodesian teacher trainee's dilemma in reconciling traditional values with those in a European-oriented TTC is presented by Harper (1959, pp. 155-56):

> [Of his five teachers,] three teachers were white. This was his first learning experience under the guidance of a white person. Each of the whites stressed how important it was to study. One teacher quoted the Bible, "Study to shew yourself approved unto God." Evidently, the white man's God approved only those who study. Then the teacher reminded them that he would see only half of them on graduation day, because the rest would be weeded out. He chided them to be at their best, to be at the top of the ladder, to be different from their fellow students. The teachers seemed to think that it was a bad thing to be just average like everyone else. Tafa [the beginning

> trainee] thought this pep talk good, but he knew that he did [not] want to be different from his brothers. To stand out from the group caused suspicion and resistance; witches stood out. He was learning the importance of competition from the missionary. "Only the fit survive," he had heard him say. If he expected to be accepted by the white world he must fight. He must surpass his brothers, even if he had to step on them to accomplish it. He surely hoped that he would be one of God's chosen ones.

Traditional religion compelled native Rhodesians to follow the way of their ancestors whose influence would be lost to them by any departure from traditional ways. "Perhaps the greatest weakness of missionary teaching was its wholesale rejection of African religion." (Hutson, 1978, p. 24). The missionaries would not tolerate polygyny, and witchcraft or magic (which even some Europeans feel had a valuable role in reducing fears and anxieties).

By the 1920s, the philosophy of education had been established that was to prevail until after World War II. African education was the exclusive preserve of the missionaries. "They became, as a Native Commissioner observed, the real rulers of large areas of rural Mashonaland." (Blake, 1977, p. 161). Apart from some small grants by the British South Africa Company (BSA), education was both administered by them and financed too. Wherever there were missions there were schools whose purpose was to increase the Africans' understanding of Christianity and to select a few promising students as evangelists. Their first aim was to promote

literacy in the vernacular, and the curriculum consisted of enough English for the natives to be able to communicate, plus the three Rs, and some hygiene, carpentry and agriculture to improve the standards of village life.

The missions had been opened 30 years before the first permanent White settlement. The purposes of the missionaries and the White settlers were not always in harmony. Dorsey (1975, p. 41) observes:

> European settlers were particularly critical of what they called mission "bookish" education. If Africans were to be educated at all (and some preferred they were not) they wanted it to be of a practical nature related to agriculture and industry that would fit him as a labourer, but not to an extent to where he could compete with Europeans.

After the Rebellion the White attitude was one of caution tinged with fear. Atkinson (1972, p. 4) describes the settlers' attitude toward education:

> The feeling of insecurity among the European community has frequently proved a decisive factor in the development of educational policy in Rhodesia. In effect, it has ensured that plans for education must always receive careful scrutiny, not only from the viewpoint of efficiency and value for money, but also with reference to their possible impact on the balance between the races which make up Rhodesian society.

Despite these fears and desires within the European community, there was never any careful tailoring of Africa education either to the short- or long-term interests of the Europeans. Neither was any systematic "imposition of British

ideas by means of education" ever attempted in Rhodesia (McHarg, 1962, p. 27).

2.5.1 Government's Role Increases

The mission schools could no longer support the burden of education solely from funds supplied by their churches. After the BSA charter terminated in 1923, the government of the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia began to give regular financial grants to the schools. Government expenditure for African education was approximately $5,560 in 1910, and rose to $140,734 in 1923, $2,076,449 in 1953 and $23,763,000 in 1973 (Division of African Education, 1977, p. 16.5).

By the late 1920s, the government began to assign grants according to the schools' contributions to education and to social needs. "There was a sense of the need to prepare the African, not just as a churchman, or as a labourer, but as a responsible member of society." (Atkinson, 1972, p. 107).

> While most missionaries disparaged traditional Manyika religion [and that of other tribes], they believed that converted Africans could assimilate the best of Christianity and Western culture. . . .
>
> A pivotal question remained, however, for all Europeans in the colony--what position shall Africans be trained to fill in Rhodesian society? Shall they become assimilated as equals of the whites, or shall racial separation be maintained indefinitely with the government in white control?
>
> On this issue most missionaries diverged from prevailing European opinion. Many of the settler minority feared that education of the African would

> only increase competition for jobs and land and African dissatisfaction with European rule. Most missionaries, on the other hand, upheld the liberal tradition that every man has the right to education as preparation for participation as a citizen in government. (Thomas, 1968, pp. 37-38).

Under the first Director of Native Development, Harold Jowitt, appointed in 1929, an educational policy began slowly to develop that was concerned with the social needs of Africans.

> However, the speed of development must be carefully regulated, so that intellectual progress did not run ahead of social and economic progress which African peoples found it possible to achieve; if that were to happen, the processes of education might well be found to have accomplished more harm than good. (Atkinson, 1972, p. 111).

Failure to heed warnings such as this sowed some of the seeds for the society's destruction.

Until the 1920s the missions had been staffed mainly by Europeans who were not trained to teach. However, their complete command of English and their wider perspectives added a dimension to their teaching that was lacking in trained African teachers. Although as early as 1901 Anglican Bishop Gaul had written: "Our whole future development, under God, depends on our training the choicest of our pupils from the various mission schools and centres as teachers," (Thomas, 1968, p. 40), his idea was not quickly acted upon; the first African teachers were recruited from missions in

South Africa. Peaden (1973, p. 72) reports that in 1920 the Wesleyan church first acted to train its own teachers as well as evangelists. But as late as 1928, "teachers were almost anybody who could read and write." (Taylor, 1970, p. 149).

In 1929, in order to improve the kraal schools by improving the quality of teachers, Jeanes Centres for teacher training were established and operated for two decades at two schools: Domboshawa, for men, and Hope Fountain, for women.

> The scheme [Jeanes] was well fitted to assist the programme of African education which the Southern Rhodesian authorities had in mind. It was designed to raise the living standards of whole communities by 'placing emphasis on the essentials of education'--health, family life, use of environment, both human and material, recreation and religion. Interest was focused--in theory at any rate--on village or tribal groups rather than the individual, and on small schools rather than large. In Southern Rhodesian conditions, it has the effect of bringing new interest and activity into the lives of many teachers in inaccessible places, who had previously been left very much to their own devices. Yet, despite these features, it could scarcely be regarded as more than a temporary expedient, capable of supplying some of the deficiencies of an inadequate system of training teachers, until more satisfactory arrangements could be made. (Atkinson, 1972, pp. 113-114).

The decade following the onset of the depression, "was one of consolidation rather than expansion. . . . Attempts were also made to improve the very low standards of teaching that prevailed." (Taylor, 1970, p. 4).

However, the percentage of untrained teachers was not rapidly reduced. "Of the African teachers 94 per cent were

untrained in 1934, 70 per cent in 1950 and 50 per cent in 1958." And a government teacher-training school with 60 trainees enrolled was not opened until January 1955 (Parker, 1960, pp. 87, 95-96).

Separate school systems for Africans and Europeans were deemed necessary partly because of language and cultural differences and partly because of White attitudes (Young, 1969, pp. 16-17).

Education for Europeans expanded nearly as slowly as that for Africans. In the early years, many Europeans were sent out of the country for secondary education or took correspondence courses. Not until 1932 was education compulsory for Europeans 7 to 15 years old. Fees were abolished in 1935 in government schools, which the White settlers justified by the fact that the budget for education came from taxes mainly paid by Europeans (Tindall, 1968, p. 233).

"In all of the African primary and secondary schools, the pupils are required to pay fees." (Parker, 1960, p. 136). Atkinson (1972, p. 122) comments that it was:

> scarcely surprising that the Africans should contrast the free education provided for European children in urban areas, with the fee-paying conditions at mission schools. True, the fees were low, at least by European standards, and were apparently calculated to make the African appreciative of the facilities which he received.

This resentment was partially responsible for the reintroduction of European school fees in 1956 and tuition in 1964. Even though African school fees amount to only about 2.6% of the government's expenditure on African education, and were about one-third as high as European ones, most African parents still paid a higher portion of their income for school fees than did most Europeans (Bull, 1968, p. 69).

The plans of the Department of Native Development in the 1920s to expand and improve African education had to be shelved, first because of the depression, which brought about reduced government revenues and contributions from overseas to the missions, and next because of the acute shortage of teachers during World War II. No great progress was made in education for nearly two decades. Although Africanists today chide Europeans for slowness in providing secondary schooling for Africans, Europeans point out that the first secondary school for Africans (opened in 1939) attracted only six pupils during its first year of operation (Dorsey, 1975, p. 72).

Until World War II produced a teacher shortage, school places for Africans usually exceeded qualified applicants. "The rejection of pupils greatly increased the demand [for places]. African children in school doubled from 1943 to 1948." (McHarg, 1966, pp. 46-49).

Tindall (1968, pp. 232-33) summarizes the most

significant changes that occurred during the 1940s:

> The government increased its participation in African education in the 1940s to meet the great demand for education which had developed. In urban areas it assumed responsibility for education and began to build its own primary schools. . . .
>
> Schools in the rural areas were also expanding and the government gave valuable assistance to these when it took over payment of all approved teachers in mission schools in 1947.
>
> Another important step was taken during the 1940s when it was accepted that secondary education was essential if Africans were to take full part in the life of modern society.

Two of the most important changes that occurred after World War II were occasioned not by government action but by the rising political activism of the missionaries (see section 2.8) and the changed attitudes of the African people.

> After the Second World War, few ordinary Africans were interested in moderate politics, and anyone who wished to command the attention of the masses had to speak with due regard to their belligerent mood, otherwise he was ridiculed or treated with hostility. (Vambe, 1976, p. 297).

Although the Judges Commission (1963, p. 77) believed: "Secondary education, in its own right and for its own sake, is a preparation for the fullness of citizenship," and Senator Ellis (1973, p. 102) stated:

> It has always been the aim of Rhodesian Governments to build up an extensive African middle class, which, like any other middle class anywhere, would be a powerful guarantee of stability and moderation,

an African teacher, who had returned to school as a University of Rhodesia social science major at the time of UDI, presents an argument that is better supported by the available data:

> The more education the Africans acquire, the more bitter they become. When the literacy rate was still low in Rhodesia, the whites were happy, but as it grew higher the struggle intensified. (Mlambo, 1972, p. 299).

The reasons for this failure of education and development of a middle class to have as stabilizing an effect as is believed to be the case in other countries can probably be found in the various discriminatory practices in Rhodesia--practices that probably grate harder on the educated and those in the monied economy than they do those in the traditional sector.

2.6 THE FEDERAL DECADE: 1953-62

When America pressed Britain to give up its colonial empire after World War II, the idea of a federation of three Central African territories (Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland) was revived and reached fruition in October 1953. Although a major purpose of the Federation was to bring the races together, it had the opposite result and stimulated the growth of Africanism. For example, during the

Federation, European education was a Federal responsibility while African education remained a territorial concern; thus the practical effect of the Federation on education was to drive the two systems farther apart.[18] The most positive aspect of educational advancement during this period was the establishment of the multi-racial University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which later became the University of Rhodesia.

In 1963 the British Government bowed to Africanist pressure to end the Federation and turned control of Northern Rhodesia (renamed Zambia) and Nyasaland (renamed Malawi) to those territories' Africanist movements.[19]

2.7 QUANTITY, QUALITY AND AFRICANIZATION OF EDUCATION

In Rhodesia, some churches had a policy of advancing African teachers as rapidly as possible, not only because they felt it would further African progress, but also because it was cheaper than providing home-leave and other fringe

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[18]Similarly, if tsetse flies gave sleeping sickness to European-owned cattle, Federal veterinary officers were called in; if the same flies flew on to an African-owned herd, they became a territorial problem.

[19]Works that place most blame for the Federation's failure on Britain and Africanists include: Phillips (1960), Welensky (1964), and Haw (1961). Leys and Pratt (1960), Mlambo (1972) and Keatley (1963) place principal blame on settlers and White politicians in Central Africa.

benefits for expatriot teachers. Also World War II had shown that expatriot teachers would not always be available.

> More Africans assumed positions of responsibility in education both in administrative positions as inspectors of schools and at the secondary level where graduate teachers were needed in the higher classes. Others became headmasters at large government or mission primary schools. (Tindall, 1968, p. 307).

However fast that advancement is, it is not fast enough for Africanist politicians:

> A few ignorant politicans, or well informed ones looking for a cheap applause, will rant at the crowd, shaking their fists at the microphones, 'Why did the missionaries open up so many schools? Did they want us to be educated? No, my friends, all they did it for was to make jobs for themselves with better pay than they got where they came from, bigger houses and motor cars!' (Loud applause). The same people do not apply the principle of the best man for the job to educational appointments--which should apply in the interests of the children--but seem to think the education system exists so that advanced Africans may be employed as headmasters, inspectors, and administrative officers. (Partridge, 1961, p. 59).

Pro-system Rhodesians argue that the Africanists have little regard for education; in 1964 they brought African education to a nearly complete halt with "a calculated policy of school boycotts, burnings and intimidation." (Atkinson, 1972, p. 184). They resumed this policy in 1976. Rhodesia's educational record is outstanding in Africa--second only to that of the Republic of South Africa.

In 1966, the year after UDI, 90% of Rhodesian African

children received five or more years education; 50% received eight years (Statistical Yearbook, 1968-69, p. 560).[20] Only 34% of the pupils in Britain stayed in school to age 16; the 1966 Rhodesian education plan called for 50% of African students to receive two or more years of secondary education (Atkinson, 1972, p. 186); yet 1 in 2 Rhodesians is under 17 years of age versus 1 in 3 British (Lardner-Burke, 1966, p. 88). At about the time of UDI, 1 in 6 Rhodesian Africans was in school; this compares with 1 in 12 Algerians, 1 in 18 Tanzanians, 1 in 40 Liberians, 1 in 60 Malians and 1 in 108 Ethiopians (Harrigan, 1966, p. 85; Berlyn, 1967, p. 57).

> There were 11,500 African students at secondary level in Rhodesia during the year 1965, a figure which compares favorably with, say, Zambia's 7,000.
> This figure does not take into consideration the 2,819 [Rhodesian] African students at teacher training establishments, 832 at technical and vocational schools, and the 174 full-time and 20 part-time students attending the local university, all of them on full government grants or subsidies. (Berlyn, 1967, pp. 54-55).

Since 1965, copper-rich Zambia had received generous foreign aid for educational and other purposes, while Rhodesia had been subject to sanctions. Yet, in 1971-72, only 14,000 of its 68,000 primary school leavers were able to enter secondary school, versus 29,000 of Rhodesia's 53,000 African primary school leavers (Chesterton, 1973, p. 75).

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[20]Dorsey (1975, pp. 46-52) finds these figures to be too optimistic.

The University of Rhodesia has capacity for more students than it receives; all qualified applicants are accepted. If more selective admissions should become necessary, both the University's Royal Charter and the inclination of its administration and faculty would ensure that African applicants would not be discriminated against (conversations between the author and numerous UR faculty and administrators).

In the view of pro-system Rhodesians, the major problem relating to African education is not too few school places but rather too few job opportunities for school leavers. They see three reasons for this: 1) The slowing of economic growth caused by sanctions. 2) Unrealistically high job expectations by school leavers. 3) Too much emphasis upon liberal arts, producing plenty of Africans who may know their Shakespeare, but who are quite useless when it comes to proper farming techniques, repairing machinery, honest and accurate bookkeeping, etc. For example, the first M.Ph. granted by UR was gained by Ephrim Madnivenga, whose thesis is entitled "An Examination of the Theistic Philosophy of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648)." (Davies, 1975, p. 411).

2.8 MISSIONARY POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Sometime around World War II, missionaries' opinions of the African tended, on balance, to become much more favorable. Their conception of the ignoble savage has been almost entirely reversed; many missionaries today ascribe more virtue to their African charges than to their fellow Europeans. Natives (at least practicing members of their denomination!) are now inherently good, such bad as they have has been mainly acquired from the White man, perhaps even forced upon them by him.[21]

This change in attitude has been reflected in many missions' educational philosophy. At first African education was not especially oriented toward making Africans partners with Europeans because Africans were not considered suitable for partnership. More recently, many missionaries have directed their teaching to the ideal of African self-sufficiency--at least implicitly assuming that Europeans might not be worthy partners for the African.

This does not mean that there was any general approval of the Africanist movement, either by missionaries or indigenous clergymen; Thomas (1964, pp. 72-73) reports:

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[21]Gann and Duignan (1972, pp. 108-11) observe that this transformation has also occurred in the minds of overseas critics and is reflected in literature, as well as in works by historians and social scientists.

> Leading African clergy joined with the Europeans in condemning the new nationalist leaders. As early as 1954 the Southern Rhodesia African Missionary Conference threw down the gauntlet, saying:
> "This Conference is concerned to help to preserve the much valued peace of this country and to avoid any danger of troubles like Mau Mau arising here. It is not to be doubted that peace has been preserved among the African population by the leadership of Christian Ministers, Evangelists and Teachers, but it is seen that the younger generation of Africans is not as willing as the older generation of Africans to be led by Christian leaders, who have been blamed for hindering unduly certain revolutionary tendencies on the part of modern Africans."
> . . . . . .
> Archdeacon E. Chipunza expressed vividly the moderates' sense of betrayal: "We thought we had carefully baptized the movement, but others led it back to heathenism. They favored violence, while we wanted negotiation."

By the 1970s Rhodesian churches and churchmen were more divided on ways, means and objectives concerning political and social change. It is probably fair to say that a large majority favored substantial change and that a large majority remained opposed to violence.

Missionaries who stress the 'social gospel' aspects of Christianity are especially likely to facilitate development of dissatisfied Africans. The teaching 'the meek shall inherit the earth' has been extended into doctrines of highly emotional content that have bred a disrespect for civil authority. The civil rights movement in the United States, in which many churches were actively involved, and the increased 'anti-colonialism' that developed in Western Europe, especially in parties of the left, had a profound

affect on the political attitudes of the missionaries who administered and taught in the schools.

> The missionaries were, indeed, not uniformly unsympathetic to African aspirations . . . . [Some societies] like the American Board Mission were more ready to grant that Africans had to be trained to assume eventually their rightful place in the social and political life of the country. (Brand, 1977, p. 74).

Missionaries in Southern Africa in general were influenced by the prevailing intellectual climate in the countries from which they came.

> Beginning with Bishop Dodge of the United Methodist Church (U. S. A.) in 1964, there has been a steady procession of missionaries who have been deported or failed to get their residence permits renewed, presumably because they have offended the government.[22] (Brand 1977, p. 77).

> Since 1959 the Roman Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia have commented in more than 30 [instances] . . . on current political events in this country. . . .
> A recurrent theme among the numerous issues--social, political and economic--on which the Bishops confronted the legislators during the past 13 years is their protest against discriminating measures with regard to

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[22]Bishop Dodge had previously been expelled from Angola because the Portuguese authorities found him too radical.
Another American missionary who was director of education for the United Methodist missions in Rhodesia had also been at a mission in Angola where he was arrested for subversive political activity and imprisoned.
While I was in Rhodesia some United Methodist missionaries were upset upon receipt of a questionnaire from its Board of Foreign Missions which they felt was putting pressure on them to become more radical, even to the point of encouraging illegal activity.

> the distribution of land and the advancement of African education. (Scholz, 1973, pp. 199-200).

A non-Catholic principal of a TTC comments:

> The Roman Catholic Council of Bishops makes some strong statements, though sometimes their clarity and effectiveness is [sic] lessened when the bishops have been misinformed about some of their facts. (Partridge, 1961, pp. 34-35).

Referring to missionaries in the French Congo, Lucas (1967, p. 468) suggests another reason missionaries side with the Africanists on political and social questions: "By identifying with Congolese aspirations, they [the church leaders] sought to channel feeling of rebellion and hostility against the system, and, thus away from themselves."

Ken Mew, the liberal principal of Salisbury's multi-racial Ranche House College, spoke from bitter experience when he said: "All too often the notion of a non-racial society is paid only lip-service by those who hold the purse strings of international charitable funds." Instead, funds are channelled in ways that often promote African exclusiveness (Davies, 1975, p. 387).

Many leaders of the Africanists' movement were clergymen who had been educated in mission schools and abroad on church-provided passage money and scholarships.

> It is, of course widely known that [Ndabaningi] Sithole, a product of a number of well-known missionary institutions and an American theological seminary is an ordained Congregational minister. Joshua Nkomo, again,

> was a local preacher before he embarked on his political career. (Brand, 1977, p. 76).

After three others had declined the job, in 1957 Nkomo became the president of an African National Congress--which became ZAPU (Vambe, 1976, pp. 277-78); in 1963, Sithole formed ZANU in a split with Nkomo. Robert Mugabe, a Catholic who had been educated at Kutama Mission and had been a teacher in mission schools (and later married a radical Ghanaian girl while teaching in her country), seized the leadership of ZANU in 1970 while Sithole was serving a sentence for plotting the murder of Ian Smith and other officials.

Abel Muzorewa was educated in Rhodesian mission schools prior to five years of study in Missouri and Tennessee.[23] Muzorewa subsequently led the successful effort to thwart the 1971 'settlement' between the British and Rhodesian Governments; he was also to become the country's first African prime minister.

Another clergyman, the Reverend Canaan Banana, became President of Rhodesia (by then renamed Zimbabwe) after the

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[23]In their overseas travels these Africanists had the opportunity to compare racial attitudes and practices with those in Rhodesia. For example, on his first day at Scarritt College, Nashville, Abel Muzorewa (1978, pp. 47-52) was thrown out of a nearby restaurant; on the first Sunday the Muzorewa family were in Fayette, Missouri, 20 members of the congregation walked out when the Muzorewas entered the local Methodist church.

British conducted an election prior to internationally recognized independence in 1979.

Nearly two years after the Federation ended on 31 December 1963, the European-dominated Rhodesian Government despaired of getting the British Labour Government to agree to an independence constitution acceptable to it; consequently, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was promulgated on 11 November 1965.

> The Christian Churches, which by means of a resolution passed on 26 November 1965, condemned the declaration of independence as an unlawful act. . . . In this way it was made clear that churchmen intended to take a stand on the continued responsibility of British ministers to safeguard the interests of the African population. A quarrel with Rhodesian leaders could be expected sooner or later, if the revolt were allowed to run its course. And in such a quarrel, the huge investment of the Churches in facilities for education was likely to pose problems for the implementation of government policy. (Atkinson, 1972, pp. 181-82).

However Vambe criticizes the church with its "fine dogma and message of brotherly love" for not influencing the European Rhodesians:

> It [the church as representative of Western culture] has failed because it has not been able to influence the heart and the mind of the European in that unfortunate country into accepting his fellow African citizen as a full human being. . . . It has not been able to change the structure of our system which rests firmly and unashamedly on race and colour and therefore consigns the African to a permanent position of inferiority. . . . [It] has failed to make the white man in Southern Rhodesia see the terrible wrongs and injustices he is imposing on the black Rhodesian. (Vambe, 1972, pp. 234-35).

The World Council of Churches was an active supporter of the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front.[24] Even the very liberal New Republic (21.10.78) headlined an article on WCC involvement in Rhodesia: "Killing for Christ: Rhodesians Die for Your Sins." Radical Catholics (e.g., Bishop Lamont and the Maryknoll, Bethlehem and Burgos orders) similarly sided with the revolutionaries. At first, it seems ironic that during the warfare in the 1970s main targets for attack included the missions, missionaries, and the mission schools. In the opinion of Kapungu (1974, p. 84), this irony could be explained by the fact that:

> The Africans who go through the missionary schools are the bitterest critics of the churches. . . . The African student . . . asks himself whether the good the missionary does outweighs the evil that the missionary supports. . . . Bitterness outweighs gratitude, and the missionaries have seen the very people they educate turn against them.

Reverend Sithole (1959, p. 54) relates another anti-mission argument often heard around the fires in African villages:

> You see, the missionary came here and said, "Let us pray." And we closed our eyes. And when we responded "Amen" at the end of his prayer we found the Bible in our hands. But lo! our land had gone.

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[24]The Patriotic Front was an uneasy alliance of ZAPU and ZANU, formed in 1976 to present a united Africanist front in protracted independence negotiations in Geneva that autumn.

Lessing (1962b, pp. 73-75) offers a different explanation of why:

> mission stations and mission schools usually become the first target of any African nationalistic violence. . . .
>
> The missions were invariably extremely poor and that they were able to do so much with practically no funds is an achievement any church can be proud of. But there was seldom enough money to give any other kind of education [than adequate literacy to read religious books], especially as the aim was, and still is, to reach as many Africans as possible.
>
> The result is that the kind of education to equip a person for the competitive life of the modern age was seldom attempted.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Preferential treatment for Christians or potential Christians by a missionary would not appear to be a crime. But the effect has been that now that there is a great demand for educated Africans it is the African with the Christian background who has the advantage . . . because most of the educated Africans have a Christian background. This has embittered many pagans . . . , first, against the Christian missions and, second, against educated Christian Africans.

Muzorewa (1978, p. 17) takes a different attitude toward the missionaries:

> I was fortunate to go to Old Umtali, for that school was, and still is, one of the finest in the country. We soon came to respect the missionaries because they brought such opportunities for education to us.

These contrasting opinions of the mission schools are not surprising for mission education is far from a uniform commodity and, even within one classroom, there are students who admire and respect their teacher and those who harbor hostility. But whatever attitude people took toward the

missionaries, no one could deny that the mission schools had showed the African Rhodesians the path to modernity.

By the time the Federation ended and, two years later, UDI was announced, the stage was set, the actors taking their places, and the curtain about to rise on nearly two decade of an increasingly bitter struggle for majority rule.

2.9 IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON AFRICANS

The principal African actors in the ensuing tragic drama had all received European education which had produced Africanists eager to end colonial rule and to establish African self-government. Western schooling had educated the Africans out of their culture, which brought about the kind of person that Malinowski (1943, pp. 42-48) describes as "between two worlds."

The culture of the African Rhodesian was based on traditional religious beliefs, moral values and social attitudes of the tribe. Tribal culture with its emphasis on kinship associations is in direct contrast with Western culture which is individual and status depends on one's position in the moneyed economy.

> Forms of the new "African individualism" are one and all negative or pathological phenomena, due partly to the fact that transition means duality of control, and that double morals are hardly ever real morals. Disintegration of the family and kinship solidarity is not due to the influence of the individualism of the

> European culture as against African "communism"; it is a phase which occurs in all societies under the stress of economic misery.
>
> Thus the African in transition finds himself in a no-man's land, where his old tribal stability, his security as to economic resources which was safeguarded under the old regime by the solidarity of kinship, have disappeared. The new culture, which has prompted him to give up tribalism, has promised to raise him by education to a standard of living worthy of an educated man. But it has not given him suitable and satisfactory equivalents. It has been unable to give him rights of citizenship regarded as due an educated Westerner; and it has discriminated against him socially on practically every point of the ordinary routine of life. (Malinowski, 1945, p. 60).

In order to appreciate the new "African individualism" that emerged in Rhodesia one must contrast it with the old tribal "communalism" (in Malinowski's terminology, "communism"). Traditional religion draws together the extended family group with its beliefs in ancestral spirits:

> It is impossible to understand Shona society and individuals unless one understands the conception of corporate personality. . . . The Shona individual has no standing apart from the larger family group. . . . He is their representative in all that he does. (Hatendi, 1973, p. 137).

Even when a Shona elder dies his spirit is believed to linger with his tribe and to guide and protect all members of his family group.

> The presence of these spirit guardians and their power over the lives of their descendants are so real to the traditional Shona that in many respects they remain part of the community, spirit elders whose influence remains very much alive. (Bourdillon, 1976, p. 263).

> The Supreme Being is considered so powerful that no living human being would communicate directly with Him. A person has to ask his spirits, his dead ancestors, to intercede for him with the Supreme Being. Thus, one has to be on good terms with the spirits so that they may always intercede for him. (Kapungu, 1974, p. 82).

There is an interesting parallel between this practice of Shona people's asking the spirit elders to intercede for them and that of the Portuguese and other Roman Catholics of praying for intercession by the Virgin Mary or by a favorite saint, rather than praying directly to God. In his interviews, Thomas (1968, p. 165) found that:

> many Roman Catholics expressed the desire to substitute prayers to the ancestral spirits for prayers to the "European" saints. . . . An African nun at Monte Cassino [secondary school and, at that time, TTC] confessed, "I ask the ancestors to intercede for me for they are the Shona substitute for the saints." Students at Inyanga High School were almost unanimous that "our ancestors appeal for us to God" and that "our safety lies in the protection of the vadzimu."

Although the African found the Christian concept of One God compatible with his own religion, it was indeed difficult for him to adjust to other aspects of Western culture.

> An individual who has the protective support of his ancestral spirits can be certain that all will go well for him and his family. But it is not enough to remember the spirits at a ritual ceremony. An individual must carry out the traditional practices of the ancestors. . . . The ancestral spirit at first resisted any change from the home life lived for generations. The good man does everything which his spirit elders approve. (Gelfand, 1970, p. 56).

But in spite of the culture shock which the introduction to Western ways and education brought to the African, many younger ones eventually began to move away from tribalism. Gelfand (1970, p. 180) continues by observing: "There is no denying that Western culture has entered the lives of the Shona people . . . ."

More recently there has been a conflict of feeling among the Shona people concerning the influence of spirit elders in relation to Western education. Older people in the tribes are more conservative and they interpret the attitude of the spirit elders along more traditional lines than the younger, better-educated people. Gelfand (1970, p. 56) comments on the spirit elders' opposition to education:

> Nowadays this opposition is very much less. The people realize the advantage of formal education and many would disregard the feelings of the spirit elders on this matter. But the spirit elders also, we are told, have largely changed their views and now see the virtue of Western education even though they consider much of it dangerous. The more educated a person is the more readily will he forsake them.

Western education has created a wide gap between generations. A teacher trainee (Maveneka, 1970, p. 102) writes: "The children argue that they come from school where they learn much that the parents do not know and therefore they consider their parents old fashioned."

> The elders of the Shona generally regard young educated Africans as possessing too much pride [feeling of superiority] and believe them to have been spoiled by Western Civilization. (Gelfand, 1973, p. 90).

Frazier (1955, pp. 166-171) also mentions the conflict between generations and between men and women:

> [Western education] has created conflicts between generations and it has tended to erect cultural barriers between men and women. This latter has been due to the fact that it has generally been the male who has received Western education, and they have found it difficult to form satisfactory marriages with women whose habits and mental outlook have been molded by the traditional culture.

Bourdillon (1976, p. 365) explains that in a traditional society, a person lives with his kin who exert "considerable pressure on his behavior." The African finds it difficult to adjust from a culture which depends upon membership in a tribe to a Western culture where it is every man for himself. In his confusion the African tends to lose some of his moral standards; a Rhodesian African student explains:

> Crimes were fewer in traditional society because misbehavior, besides being severely punished, strained the whole family in a way it does not today. People would not talk of how badly some man or woman acted, but of how badly the man from Mr. Gudo's family acted. Therefore, one had to be aware not only of his name, but also that of his family. Also, if a person stole, he stole from a relative, because almost everyone in the kraal was a relative and the ancestors would punish one who stole from relatives. . . .
>
> In the townships neighbors are often strangers from different parts of the country; a man does not mind if he acts badly. If he steals from someone in the township, he will not disgrace his name. . . . The spirits will not punish him because his victim is a

> stranger, and, he reasoned that his wage is unjustly low, so what else can he do if he wants to live. (Maveneka, 1970, p. 102).

The inability to purchase Western luxuries was an especial source of discontent to the African because in his traditional culture prestige and the applause of kinsmen were important. "In an oral society fame was established through ostentation, patronage, and hospitality." (Mazrui, 1978, p. 340). Harper (1959) reports that the list of modern purchases a new Rhodesian African teacher expects to make strains his budget for years.

> The "Poor Black" becomes a problem when he has been given the one half of civilization which raises ambition and establishes claims but does nothing to satisfy them.
>
> Thus successful culture change in Africa demands enormous expenditure. For it is one of the soundest and most important principles of social science that people are prepared to pass only from worse to better. Only such change is encompassed without much friction and with relative rapidity. (Malinowski, 1945, pp. 55-56).

Doob (1960, p. 80) states that "aggression results from the increased discontent arising from the changes and frustrations characteristic of acculturation." Malinowski (1945, pp. 60-61) warned that if Western education opened wider horizons to the African but failed to grant the "economic, political and legal" benefits of higher education, it brought about "the birth and growth of new forces of nationalism and racialism, which, may be hostile,

unmanageable, and dangerous in the long run." In a similar vein, Lawrence Vambe (1972, p. 167) has much to say about the detrimental affect of Western culture in Rhodesia:

> What in effect white enterprise in Southern Rhodesia had done, particularly at this period of rapid economic change [between the World Wars] was to divide African society psychologically into the old and the young. The old people despaired. . . . They saw the Western system as essentially selfish, rapacious and inward looking. . . . On the other hand, the younger generation had a more favorable view. Stated simply, the African tribal system . . . was disintegrating.
>
> Although the old people tried stoutly and desperately to preserve their old world which was being imperilled by the new order, they realized that their people did not have sufficient reserves of moral and physical stamina to resist the corrupting influence of the white men. . . . What they thought and said in a country run by a Government which neither represented or cared about African opinion made no difference whatsoever to the situation. The stage was set for the country's political, social and economic revolution . . . .

However critical Africanists are of the European impact, none really wishes to return to the conditions prevailing prior to the Pioneer Column; Vambe (1972, p. 198) continues:

> Yet the majority of the young people were more than willing to be sucked into the materialistic machine of the white men. In fact they hurled themselves into the new order with enthusiasm that made the bitterness and despair of their elders seem all the more hopeless. They were lured from their tribal environment by the promise of education and economic enterprise, which, with their emphasis on individual fulfilment, were now clearly the main motivating forces in materialistic man in Southern Rhodesia. In this way the old bonds of tribal and family cohesion, loyalty, discipline and other things . . . were torn asunder.

Vambe (1972, p. 235) acknowledges the debt of the Africans to missions and Western education:

> But it must also be said that no fair-minded African underestimates the role the Church has played in the education of his people. It was largely through Mission education that we became aware of ourselves as part of the family of man and acquired the political sophistication necessary for our struggle . . . .

Also Kapungu (1974, p. 84) admits: "Without missionary schools most Africans would be illiterate, and this African would not be writing this book."

There is no indication that one could say of Rhodesian Africans what Harry Wolcott (1974, p. 411) does of a school for Canadian Indians:

> I found there [in a school for Kwakuitl Indian children on the coast of British Columbia] a firmly entrenched pattern of pupil hostility toward the teacher and toward nearly every nonmaterial aspect of the way of life the teacher represented.

It is evident that European education influenced the African in Rhodesia to move away from tribalism, but it did not give him the advantages he expected as an educated Westerner. As Malinowski notes, the African's ambitions had been raised, but little had been done to give him the benefits of higher education. All but the most conservative segments of the White community slowly concluded that the African must eventually be given the opportunities and advantages for which he had been educated. Conservative

White Rhodesians feel that no one 'gave' Europeans the benefits of the education they acquired; they had to go out and earn them. Thus disagreements over ways, means and speed of change have been numerous and continuous.

2.10 FROM DEATH OF FEDERATION TO DEATH OF 1971 'SETTLEMENT'

"In 1953 we had welcomed the formation of the Central African Federation . . . ." (Muzorewa, 1978, p. 45).

During the Federal period:

> Rapid change took place in economic, industrial and social conditions and in educational opportunities, and these modified the ideals and attitudes of the people who lived through these changes. Moreover, any one part of the world has become startlingly less isolated from other parts in recent years, and events beyond the borders of Central Africa had had a very important bearing on developments within. (Tindall, 1968, p. 298).

> Towards the end of the 1950s even the so-called African 'moderates' were expressing their misgivings about the Federation. The African nationalists had already come to the conclusion that it had been founded purely for the purpose of curtailing the progress of the Africans toward independence. . . .
> [A]n upsurge of nationalism came to the surface catching the Europeans unawares. The new forces of nationalism sought equality of opportunity in the economic, social and political institutions of the country. Its policies and principles where a challenge to white rule. Most important of all, it demanded the implementation of universal adult suffrage in the Rhodesian political system. (Mlambo, 1972, pp. 114, 117).

After the Federation was dissolved, independence was quickly granted to Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi), with power transferred to their Africanist politicians. Negotiations for independence for Southern Rhodesia were not as easy. The British Labour Government and the Rhodesian Front Government were unable to agree on independence terms and, on 11 November 1965--in a document patterned after America's unilateral declaration of independence--Rhodesia decided to seize independence.

In his analysis of Rhodesia and Independence (1969), Kenneth Young supports the Rhodesian contention that Wilson's Government were very slippery bargainers. Sills (1974) and Joyce (1974) present a similar view. Had they not convinced White Rhodesian leaders that they were out to trick them, an independence agreement would probably have been reached. The opposing position, not surprisingly, appears in Wilson's own autobiography (1971)! Most British historians (e.g., Blake, 1977, pp. 387-402) tend to be more sympathetic to their Government than to the Rhodesian one. However, Roy Jenkins (Wilson's Home Secretary and, later, Chancellor of the Exchequer) complained that Wilson lacked any long-term plan concerning Rhodesia; Richard Crossman (Labour MP since 1945, sometime leader of the House of Commons) was even more blunt:

> [I]n this Rhodesian affair his [Wilson's] main concern is to prove himself right . . . . It's winning that matters here, whether by settlement or by defeating Smith. He can't make up his mind, but he's going to go

> on hammering, manoeuvring, intruding, evading to prove himself right. (Quoted in Berlyn, 1978, p. 190).

By 1971 questions concerning the rights and wrongs of UDI had long become academic in Rhodesia. European doubters in 1965 about UDI had quickly joined in the demand that Britain end sanctions and agree to a constitution that would preserve European as well as African rights.

To those who charged that African political parity might take a century or more under the Republican constitution, European trainees and other Europeans I spoke with observed that only a few Europeans looked on the 1970 Constitution's franchise as a permanently desirable one. Most felt that a settlement with Britain would eventually be necessary and that would require some concessions to the British point of view. Thus the Rhodesian starting point in negotiations must be sufficiently 'White supremacist' that, after concessions are made, the European position will remain strong enough for government to remain in responsible hands. To the right wing, 'responsible hands' means European hands. Other Europeans felt that power-sharing with moderate Africans is a practical necessity.

While the Rhodesian Front (RF) leadership has insisted on communal representation, many other Europeans see danger in a Parliament made up of a majority beholden only to European voters facing an ever increasing minority beholden

only to African voters, with a handful of 'national' seats added ONLY when parity of communal representaion is achieved (the constitutional proposal of the 1971 'settlement'). These Europeans and many moderate Africans feel that a constitution more like the 1961 and 1964 ones would be preferable, although Africans want more political weight given to B roll voters than these constitutions provided.[25]

Under the 1961 and 1964 Constitutions, both European and African votes helped determine the results for every seat, with the best educated and best paid Africans having electoral equality with most Europeans on the A voters' roll, while less well educated and/or affluent Europeans and middle class Africans cast a less potent B roll vote.

Leading Africanist politicians, such as Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole, initially accepted the 1961 Constitution (Day, 1969). They repudiated that acceptance after they realized that Britain was giving complete control of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi)[26] to their

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[25]These constitutions gave 20% of the voting strength for 50 constituencies to the B roll, 80% to the A roll; for the remaining 15 Assembly seats, 80% of the voting strength came from the B roll, 20% from the A. A single transferable vote was provided for, so that one could register his support for his real favorite and, at the same time, not really waste his vote on an Africanist or right-wing European who had no chance of winning. Franchise qualifications under those two constitutions are summarized by Phillippa Berlyn (1967, p. 63). Had eligible Africans participated, this system would have encouraged election of Europeans acceptable to Africans in the 50 constituencies and Africans acceptable to Europeans for the 15 electoral districts.

Africanists, after the left wings of the British Labour and Liberal parties had denounced the new constitution that the Conservative Government had prepared, and after Nkomo had conferred with his communist and other leftist supporters in London, and after the most radical elements in ZAPU strongly objected. Rhodesian Africanists and their overseas backers hoped that a little 'hot politics' would win them the same result as in the North.

Africanists in Rhodesia then embarked on a campaign of intimidation to wreck the 1961 Constitution. "If you vote you will be killed" read pamphlets shoved under many African doors.

> The ZAPU leaders held weekly meetings, and their paid Zhanda [a corruption of gendarmerie] made sure that people attended these meetings. The Zhanda, financed by funds from Russian and Chinese and Pan-African sources, would move through the African townships, advertising the meetings and warning people of what would happen if they failed to attend. Just to make sure that the message got through, it was physically beaten into anyone with the temerity to object. (Berlyn, 1967, p. 64).

For those still not taking ZAPU's message seriously, petrol bombings averaged 15 per day in the pre-1962 election period (see late 1962 issues of East Africa & Rhodesia). In that fateful 1962 election campaign the moderate, governing United Federal Party (UFP) made promises of a serious attack on

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[26]Both at that time joined politically with (Southern) Rhodesia in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

racial discrimination and of substantial African advance. The Africanists successfully disenfranchised their own people. Nearly a million Africans were estimated eligible to register (Berlyn, 1967, p. 66).[27] Only 10,000 actually registered; most of these were dissuaded from voting, votes actually cast by B roll voters numbered only 2923--and some B roll voters were Europeans.

This tiny poll meant, paradoxically, that a B roll vote was equal to an A roll vote in deciding the 50 constituency contests and much more valuable in determining the 15 electoral district winners. However, since the B roll vote in constituency contests fell far short of 25% of the A roll vote, the overall African influence in the 50 constituencies was far less than the expected 32%. The Africanists' campaign also frightened many European voters into deserting the UFP in favor of the farthest right of major Rhodesian parties: the 'law and order' RF. The Africanists' efforts provided the RF with its margin of victory--had another "5000 'B' Roll voters turned out for the UFP, Whitehead would have won. . . . Joshua Nkomo was the true architect of the victory of the Rhodesian Front." (Blake, 1977, p. 344).

Had the Africanists operated within the system in the early 1960s, African and European voting strength a decade

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[27]Other estimates (e.g., Blake, 1977, p. 341) are lower than a million; yet all agree the number of Africans eligible for B roll was many times 10,000.

later would have been approximately equal--with the African portion steadily increasing--and Rhodesia would have been an accepted member of the world community. Europeans not bitter about Africanist actions in 1961-62 could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. Militancy paid for no one, the whole population ending up the worse for it.[28]

> Today, there are many among the lower ranks of the Nationalist [RT: in the terminology of this dissertation, Africanist] hierarchy who recognise that it was a mistake not to have worked within the constitutional limits offered, though they lack the courage to say so in public. (Berlyn, 1967, p. 66).

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[28]Over 12% of A roll registrants were Africans a year before the 1962 election (Atkinson, 1972, p. 145). Since anti-registration intimidation was being exercised against all Africans, it is reasonable to assume that a higher percentage of Europeans eligible to register did so than Africans. Cross-over voting provided B roll voters with 20% electoral strength on A role, or one-man-one-vote value if, as happened, B roll turn-out in constituencies were much lower than A. Thus African political strength for A roll seats could easily have exceeded one-third in 1962. If one ignores the small number of Europeans on B roll (536), Africans would have reached parity in selection of constituency MPs when they gained 37.5% of A roll registrations (37.5% x .8 = 30.0%; 30% + 20% [crossover strength] = 50%). From the start, Africans dominated electoral district elections. In 1962 the Rhodesian Prime Minister estimated that, under the existing constitution, there would be a Black political majority in 12 to 15 years (Mlambo, 1972, p. 247). Since it was in the Prime Minister's interest not to alarm Europeans who feared rapid political change, it is possible that as great an effort to get Africans to register and vote as there in fact was to dissuade them would have led to an African political majority in less than a decade--but the winners would have been moderate Africans, not the ZAPU zealots.

Pro-system Rhodesians, including European trainees I spoke with, argue that the events of the early 1960s, and subsequent actions of Africanist leaders, prove that political power for ZAPU or ZANU would be a disaster for ordinary Africans as much as for ordinary Europeans. One of the items cited as proof that Africanist leaders are extremists solely interested in personal power is the Christmas Eve 1966 edition of ZANU's Zimbabwe Review:

> [W]e mean to crush Smith--if it means involving the whole of southern Africa in a blood bath, then let it be. If it means the semi-annihilation of the four million indigenous people of Zimbabwe, then let it be! (Quoted in Young, 1969, p. 517).

Veteran Africanist Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU have made similar statements. Violent men rarely make a successful transition to moderate leaders. Once violence and intimidation have been legitimized and shown to be efficacious in a society in a major dispute, a powerful socializing influence has been established in that society, one encouraging further violence and intimidation.[29]

Liberal Europeans argued that the quickest way to increase African political influence would be to convince a

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[29]Although, in general, Arendt (1969) believes that there are specific motivating factors for the start of most violence, she adds that, once violence starts, many people fall "under the intoxicating spell of the practice of violence. . . . The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world."

majority of European voters that their vital interests would not be jeopardized by that increase. They believed that, for the ordinary European as well as the ordinary African, the important concern should NOT be the color of the skins of the Cabinet but rather that its members govern fairly and efficiently. I encountered no European who did not believe that a rapid transfer of power to an African Government would be a disaster.

Africanists naturally saw these events quite differently. Weinrich (1979, p. 40) quotes an interview with a member of the Patriotic Front:

> Soon more and more parents began to think that children should go to school in order that they would be able to fight politically for the rights of the African people. . . . [But they discovered that education] to fit us for the political struggle was insufficient. What we needed was not formal education but the armed struggle.

A TTC-trained African, while very critical of the European community, nonetheless recognized a great interdependence:

> Black servants were a necessity of life to every white person in his home, at his office and in every other sphere except in his thinking. Black servants worked in white bedrooms, kitchens, dining-rooms, and gardens. Black nannies nurse, washed, clothed and fed white children and also gave them the love and affection which their parents were reluctant to show to them. . . .
>
> By the same token, I realized that these working Africans could not do without the whites either. Every black person who came into the town became wholly dependent for his very survival on the white people. . . . [I]n the event of the white man pulling out, the

> African would be left with nothing more than shattered dreams. It was an interesting discovery. (Vambe, 1976, p. 33).

At the time of my interviews, a professor at UR felt:

> [T]he paradox of modern Rhodesia is that while white attitudes towards Africans have improved markedly since 1890 and integration has come to be accepted in many spheres, race relations have reached their lowest ebb since the Risings. The explanation lies in the rising tide of expectation on the part of an increasingly educated and westernized African population. The tragedy of modern Rhodesia is that the races are so concerned with promoting their own sectional interests that they ignore the hopes and fears of the other group. The Whites, despite notable achievements, have created a society based on inequality and denial of human rights. The Africans, despite widespread discrimination, have derived considerable benefit from the presence of the Whites. But neither side is prepared to face up to the consequences of their interdependence. The story of race relations in Rhodesia is what Disraeli, in other circumstances, called a 'tale of two nations.' (Warhurst, 1973, p. 19).

So in the seven years before my questionnaire was given, the political polarization increased, with the Rhodesian Front Government much more sensitive to European interests than African, but lacking the fanaticism for anything approaching the sort of controls needed to stifle opposition --nothing comparable to Soviet-style suppression of the majority by the ruling minority. Many RF supporters sincerely believed that only self-seeking troublemakers and those they misled opposed RF policies; they had convinced themselves that their policies were as much in the long-run interest of the generality of Africans as they were in the

short-term interests of the voters who put them in office. While selfish self-interest was certainly a factor in the decisions of some Africans to work outside the system, to consider it the sole or even primary motive for most who entered Africanist politics is to ignore the very deeply and sincerely held feelings of many Africans that the European power structure would never yield enough for African aspirations to begin to be met.

2.11 HISTORY AND THIS STUDY

This discussion of the development of Rhodesian society from the first European penetration until the time of my field research must be quite selective to keep the chapter a reasonable length. But it is hoped that enough has been included to give the reader a reasonable idea of the milieu within which teacher trainees were being socialized--information necessary for understanding the socialization process itself.

2.12 EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM FOR AFRICANS

There were a number of changes in the African educational system that had been made and were being made during the Rhodesian Front era; but for our purposes the

exact sequence is unimportant and we may speak of the old and the new systems.

2.12.1 Old System

Primary schooling was an eight year course (although only a minority completed it), with Substandards A and B followed by Standards 1 through 6. Beyond this was secondary education with Forms I through IV. There were two teacher training programs: Primary Teacher Lower (PTL) for the substandards and the lower standards, and Primary Teacher Higher (PTH) for the upper standards. Secondary teachers were either Africans trained in South Africa or Europeans.

2.12.2 New System

University of Rhodesia entrance requires Form VI work, so since the University College of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was established, a few (five in 1971) African schools have offered advanced secondary education (Lower and Upper Form VI). There was a pre-university program at UR to help Africans reach sufficient proficiency to begin university work; however it was soon in the hands of radical elements--Gelfand (1970) writes that involvement in Africanist politics was virtually a prerequisite for admission. This radicalism influenced the RF Government to

withdraw funding from this program. So subsequently those with admission deficiencies had to remove them with correspondence courses or private tuitors.

African primary schooling was cut to seven years, with the levels being renamed Grades 1 through 7. The academically top half of primary leavers were supposed to be able to go to secondary school (supposed, because facilities were not being expanded rapidly enough to meet this goal), three-fourths in a two-year practical program called Grades 8 and 9 (soon to be expanded to four years with the addition of Grades 10 and 11), the other fourth in an academic program that ran for four years (Forms I through IV); those with good pass levels in these Forms could gain admittance to teachers' training or to the pre-university Form VI.

Teachers' training was reorganized into several categories. T4 was a two-year program to train teachers for Grades 1 and 2; as of 1971 only females were admitted; as of 1972-73 the program was phased out, being replaced with a three-year course called T3(I).

Higher Grades (3 through 7) were taught by either male or female teachers who had completed a three-year T3 course.

Teachers in the more practically oriented secondary schools went through a three-year T2 program at government-run colleges. For academic secondary students, training of science and math teachers (especially for the

lower forms) was in a government T1 college; trained Europeans or university graduates who had completed a one-year full-time, or a two-year part-time Graduate Certificate in Education (Grad.C.E.) program were sufficient in number to teach higher forms as well as non-scientific subjects in the lower forms.

There were also a number of other programs, such as adult literacy, training of accountants for local African councils, vocational training, several programs to teach agriculture, and schools for the handicapped.

CHAPTER 3

BETWEEN TWO CULTURES

The process of moving from a tribal value system to Western values needs to be examined to understand adequately the contemporary position of African trainees.

> The young African of today lives in two worlds and belongs fully to neither. European education has alienated him from native traditions and imbued him with the values and expectations of European culture. At the same time European interests exclude him from the white community and deny him the material basis for the style of life he has been taught to aspire to. (Malinowski, 1943, p. 649).

Major differences between African and European students are well described by Lessing (1964, pp. 72-73):

> [For a European student, t]he learning he acquires at school is merely additional to that which he has been acquiring in a never-ending process from the moment he first opened his eyes. . . .
>
> His African counterpart never has that opportunity. The beginning and end of his education is more often than not in the limited hours of the school. The interests of his parents, who are probably illiterate, belong to a different century. Round the fires, at night, he squats and hears about the spirits of his forefathers and the power of the local witch-doctor. By day, when he is not at school, he herds cattle or goats. . . .
>
> He seldom sees a newspaper or a book, and never hears either discussed. His first contact with the twentieth century often comes when he goes to school, and his school remains his only contact with what we like to call civilised life. He cannot discuss with his parents anything he learns there, because they will probably not understand what he is talking about. He cannot ask them to explain anything that puzzles him,

> because it will puzzle them equally much.
>
> In the end he emerges from school or university with considerable learning, but with much of it still undigested because he never had the opportunity to digest it. . . . He has often lost his old sense of values--the sense of values his parents had--but is as yet without the capacity to see the values of his new world in proper perspective or to accept its responsibilities and ethics . . . .
>
> The outcome, irrespective of his brilliance as a student, is that he is often still unequipped for the life of the late twentieth century . . . .
>
> It is not his fault. He has achieved perhaps much more than his European counterpart . . . .
>
> The African's problem does not end there. When he marries it is almost inevitably to an African girl who is even more backward in time than the point from which he had started. . . . She is also a stumbling-block when he seeks to let his sons' upbringing start from the point he himself has so painstakingly attained.

The principal of a TTC for Africans believes:[30]

> There is no doubt at all that from log cabin to White House was but a step compared with the mighty leap that millions of Africans are making today in the course of a life-time. (Partridge, 1961, p. 42).

Lawrence Vambe--an African who received his education, including teachers training, from Catholic missionaries (and became a teacher, then a journalist, civil servant, and Africanist politician)--sees the differences from a different perspective (1976, pp. 17-18):

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[30] I was not adequately prepared for the very humble backgrounds of most trainees--I had expected most to be second generation assimilados (to use the Portuguese term; evoules is used in French Africa; there seems no single English word for this, although accultured comes close), whereas most come from quite humble homes. Only one trainee listed English as the language most frequently used in conversing with his parents.

> Among white Rhodesians, a child merely exists on the fringes of adult society until he is grown up. Up to at least the age of eight, he has a black nanny to provide him with the care, love and companionship that would otherwise come from his parents. We saw much evidence of this in Chishawasha [a rural Catholic mission--the earliest one in Rhodesia]; most of the white families who stopped their cars on the side of the road for picnics had African nannies in constant attendance on the children. These Europeans only seemed concerned with their food and freedom, leaving it to their African employees to feed, amuse, and keep their children from harm. In other words, white children were closer to their black guardians than to their natural parents. The strange thing was that once their offspring had reached a certain age, these same white parents stopped at nothing in poisoning their minds against the very black men and women who had looked after them with such devotion at their tenderest age.
>
> My childhood, like that of any other African child, was very different from that of my European opposite number. We were intimate with the life, opinions, virtues and weaknesses of the adult world of Gopera [an African village on the mission]. The older people accepted us completely as themselves at an early age, and we were free to pick up and absorb the essentials of our environment. I certainly cannot recall anyone of my relatives saying, 'Have a sweet and go away and play'. On the contrary, I learned constantly, by listening and observing, and noticed how adults behaved, whether they were happy or sad, sober or otherwise. In this way, not only a rich variety of personalities, but also something of the strange customs of the tribe were unfolded to me.

While there is some truth in Vambe's comparison of the first few years, how significant it is for the whole maturation process is questionable; for the learning in a European home, even if a nanny has a large role in early child care, usually meshes reasonably well with that in a European-oriented school and with the requirements of a modern industrial society, while learning in a tribal African

home does not. Thus nearly all Africans are at a disadvantage when it comes to competing in the modern sector.

By the time an African reaches secondary school, he or she has surmounted obstacles that cause the educational efforts of most Africans to end before that point. Yet movement from a village primary school to a secondary boarding school usually involves substantially greater changes than the pupil had yet had to face.[31] It is well described by Harper, an American Methodist missionary who was head teacher at a combined secondary school and teachers college run by that church (1959, pp. 80-81):

> These first few months were filled with loneliness and pain. He [Tafa, a new student at secondary boarding school from a rural village] had been made the victim of all the traditional jokes. Even some of the other new students had exploited him, which had opened deep wounds in him. At night he stiffened with shame in his dark bed as the thoughts of his gullibility burned his brain. He saw himself in clown's trappings and thought of his former vision of grandeur with lacerating self-contempt. There was no one to whom he could turn; he had no friends. His conception of mission life was a romantic blur. No one had given him the rudimentary enlightenment of the new life of an American mission. Of the taboos of his village he had complete knowledge, but of the general taboos of the mission he was completely ignorant. For this new life he was totally unprepared, bewildered for his old sanctions made no sense at all. He was lonely--desperately lonely. . . .
>
> It was difficult to leave his village and become a

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[31] Not only those with uneducated or poorly educated parents have major adaptation problems; even the son of a head teacher at a primary school found adjustment difficult at a British Methodist boarding school and TTC (see Shamuyarira, 1965, pp. 114-21).

> part of mission life. In his village he had status as a member of the group. He was a member of the ingroup, he knew what events were occurring and the meaning of them. Now he was not aware of what was happening to him, but whatever it was he disliked it. In this new place he was alone without the support of his old habit patterns and the meaningful social structure of his village. Either he must undergo a basic and prolonged transformation or remove himself.

Even after making the necessary adjustments to conform at the mission school, a student's problems are far from over; for he must still relate to two cultures. While few have as great a problem as the above-mentioned student,[32] his reaction to his visit home seems typical of most tribal Africans who have decided to become educated:

> Tafa was glad to be back at the mission school, his village home had been very disappointing in every way. His girl was not as pretty, the food his mother and sisters cooked was not as good as he had remembered, and the customs he had forgotten. The visit to his village had been such a disappointment that he felt eager to learn more of the European way of life. The village was small, in buildings, in area, and in the outlook of the people. His experience at the mission school had made him unfit for his former life. He loved his parents, but his loyalty to them clashed with his loyalty to his [school] friends and to the western culture which they symbolized. "The elders just didn't know how to live in modern Africa," was Tafa's comment to Mufundisi [the head teacher]. (Harper, 1959).

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[32]During his return home between school sessions, his failure to conform to traditional norms 'caused' the witch doctor's bones to point to him in a ceremony to determine why the rains had not come. "A few years before, this would have meant his death; and it would now if the elders did not fear the white law, which made it a crime. He felt quite sure that they would not dare destroy him, because the missionaries would have the case examined by the district commissioner." (Harper, 1959, p. 146).

This clash of cultures is one of the greatest factors inhibiting inter-racial harmony and African advancement into the modern world, in Rhodesia as well as in the rest of the continent. This should always be kept in mind as an essential background element in the following discussion. A summary of many of these differences by a sociologist at UR is presented in Table 3:1. Differences between the races on seven social issues are reported in Table 3:2.

It is possible here to discuss only a few of the conflict situations that African trainees face: attitudes toward family size, traditional vs. modern beliefs, and feelings of alienation; these are issues that trainees were facing and were going to have to confront in ensuing years. Since socio-economic status is usually considered a key variable in social science research, it is also discussed in this chapter.

3.1 APPROACH TO DATA

To test hypotheses with data from my questionnaire, the analysis of variance capability of the SPSS program BREAKDOWN is used. This is largely done for data reduction purposes, for even the bivariant crosstabulation of large numbers of variables produces huge outputs that are harder to interpret than the summary statistics generated by BREAKDOWN. This

TABLE 3:1 African in contradistinction to European cultural values

African values	European values
(1) an agricultural time-sense oriented to the slow rhythm of the seasons;	industrial time-sense, target-oriented with time as an accountable commodity;
(2) simple hand-technology, implying rough finish and lack of quality sense;	machine-technology, implying a "feel" for machinery, high-quality finish expectations and care of the final product;
(3) communal attitudes to propery, in which property is given or taken when available, and services are rendered without expectation of immediate return;	individualistic and exclusive rights over property and services, guarded by severe and enforceable legal sanctions;
(4) personalized relationships, primarily in the kinship rather than the economic field;	impersonal relations, largely in a sophisticated economic market system;
(5) communal action, in which personal initiative is discouraged and abnormal;	mental flexibility and personal problem-solving are accentuated;
(6) loyalty and morality only within the social group: all outsiders may be exploited or disregarded;	impartial morality and honesty in all dealings, especially in professional matters;
(7) appeal to supernatural causation in all situations which are not under cultural control;	demand for scientific and/ or empirical approach in all matters;

TABLE 3:1 (continued)

African values	European values
(8) collective accountability, or the referring back of all reports or accountability on any social issue to a group of kinsmen and their senior spokesman;	individual accountability, or the acceptance in Law of personal responsibility for one's actions;
(9) anticipatory exploitation or over-individualization; or the expectation that in a new individual social context, one may legitimately take for oneself all that previously had to be shared in a communal context.	responsible compromise, or the realization with experience that a social contract prevails in which all may have some if none takes all.

It may be that the very real differences between these two cultures can largely be subsumed under two major premises:

(a) the long-standing contrast in European and African cultures between the use of inanimate sources of power (e.g., steam and electricity) on the one hand and human and animal power on the other;
(b) a proposition formulated long ago by the famous anthropologist, Malinowski, that in every culture there are areas of the known and unknown, the controllable and uncontrollable; and that the smaller the area of the known in a given culture which will be useful to him the greater the appeal to supernatural forces.

However that may be, the conclusion to be drawn from this cultural comparison is apparently that the rural African at any rate, far from learning items in his home culture which will be useful to him in the western industrial milieu, still absorbs values which actively disqualify him from competition in it against Europeans of comparable formal education.

Source: D. H. Reader (1972) "African Education and the Rhodesian Employer," Rhodesian Journal of Economics, pp. 1-8. (Format slightly modified; emphasis from the original).

TABLE 3:2 Information and beliefs on various social questions (percentages across for each race)

Question	African percentages				European percentages			
	Def. true	Prob. true	Prob. not true	Def. not true	Def. true	Prob. true	Prob. not true	Def. not true
A#	27.6	41.1	17.3	14.0	26.7	61.8	10.7	0.8
B	29.7	27.9	21.3	11.1	4.4	7.9	7.0	80.7
C	77.3	15.0	4.7	3.0	69.5	24.4	3.1	3.1
D	28.3	29.0	22.9	19.9	0.9	1.9	10.4	86.8
E	62.6	28.3	6.3	2.8	36.2	46.5	12.6	4.7
F	50.2	31.9	11.7	6.1	40.5	50.4	6.1	3.1
G	31.6	25.1	16.4	26.9	22.3	46.3	21.5	10.0

#A = If present birth and death rates do not change, Rhodesia's population will double in less than 25 years (PEOPLE2X).

B = Some sicknesses are caused by an avenging spirit (NGOZI).

C = A person's degree of success in life is most influenced by his own ability and hard work (HARDWORK).

D = A number of witches exist in our society. They must be exorcized to prevent them from doing further harm (WITCHES).

E = If a person treats those he deals with fairly, most of them will be fair with him (FAIRTRET).

F = Tobacco smoking is harmful to health (TOBACCO).

G = Alcohol has no beneficial effects when consumed by humans (ALCOHOL) [n.b., some respondents were unfamiliar with 'beneficial,' so these percentages must be interpreted with caution].

Note: The capitalized variable mnemonics correspond with variable names listed in the Appendix. In tables where a mnemonic does not appear, a card and column number reference is used, e.g., Q3.53 would refer to the question whose listing starts in column 53 of card 3. A photocopy of the questionnaire I used in Rhodesia appears in the Appendix.

procedure is appropriate if the independent variable is at any level of measurement, so long as the mean of the dependent variable "represents a meaningful measure of central tendency." (Nie, 1975, p. 249). The five most useful statistics produced are: significance of F 1) for the overall relationship, 2) amongst groups for the independent variable (meaningful only if the independent variable is not at the nominal level of measurement), and 3) for deviation from linearity of the relationship (the likelihood that the differences amongst means of the dependent variable for each independent variable category could have occurred by chance); also, 4) eta squared ("the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable"); and 5) Pearson's r squared ("the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is linearly explained by the independent variable"). "If r squared is subtracted from eta-squared we have a measure of the nonlinear proportion of the variance explained." (Nie, 1975, pp. 260-61). Of course, if there are only two categories of the independent variable (e.g., SEX) the relationship has to be linear and r squared is not calculated. Also, if the independent variable is at the nominal level of measurement, r squared will have no meaning; if the independent variable is at the ordinal level of measurement, r squared should be interpreted with caution, for Pearson's r squared was

designed for use at the interval and ratio measurement levels; authorities disagree as to its 'robustness' (and to that of most other statistics)--as to how serious deviation from some of its statistical assumptions are.[33]

3.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

It was assumed that trainees from low socio-economic status homes would have considerably different responses from those from higher status backgrounds. The high SES trainees are predicted to be more likely to be from Christian, monogamous homes, have urban backgrounds, be more likely to expect economic progress, be less likely to believe in witches and ngozis, be more aware of the population explosion and the need for family planning, more likely to have been involved in school discusions and be more likely to have been consulted in family decision-making.

I would also expect them to discuss, read about, and hear about current events, to be more active in groups, and to feel that current events should be discussed more in school (many of these hypotheses derived from Dawson

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[33]Readers interested in more details of these statistics and discussion of their use should consult Nie (1975) and the references he lists. Many other statistical procedures were tried in data analysis. In the end it was decided not to include many of these analyses, partly to keep this dissertation (almost) within manageable size and partly because they added little unambiguous information.

and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 175-80).

A variable SES was generated from parents' education, income, and employment. It was run as an 'independent' variable against most other variables. When one takes into account the importance attributed to SES in most Western studies, the number of statistically significant relationships (SSRs) was surprising small. Dorsey (1975, pp. 140-41) similarly found SES to be a poorer discriminator for African secondary students in Rhodesia than British and American literature would lead one to expect.

3.2.1 Parents' Education

Orbell (1978, p. 3) reports that R. J. Theisen's research in Rhodesian rural areas shows that those families in which both husband and wife have completed most or all of primary school are much more able to cope with the problems of contemporary society "and seem to be enjoying observed progress." Orbell continues:

> families in which the parents have less [sic] than five years of combined education subsist under conditions of considerable poverty, show great resistance to change, suffer high infant mortality rates and experience pronounced malnutrition.

Flood (1973, p. 107) describes a progressive educational advance in families of the minority Ndebele:

> Case histories of Ndebele carried out in 1969 reveal, in the vast majority of instances, an initial adaptation by grandfathers to white rule, the education of parents in village schools and their subsequent participation in the cash economy. These parents in turn invested their earnings in the education of their children. These children, frequently by means of a teaching career, have moved on to various forms of business. And in latter years, their own children have entered the growing secondary school system and the University of Rhodesia, which opens the way to higher professions. This kind of development offers instances of deliberate choice regarding mission education and a place in the western economy over several generations.

Thus it was decided to report in detail (in Table 3:3) on that aspect of SES that had been found to be significant in the Rhodesian context (although not necessarily for the subpopulation of youth in secondary or higher education). Actually, parents' education relates so closely in most cases with SES that their covariances with most questionnaire variables are similar.

It was expected that parents' education would have SSRs with numerous trainee beliefs and activities. The relationships would probably not be as numerous or strong as Theisen's research suggests, for to become a trainee, a peasant child has to be atypical of the offspring of peasant families. Those with more educated parents, it is hypothesized, will attend church more frequently than other trainees, but have lesser religious faith relative to their parents; be more favorable to equal pay for females and to women voting; be less favorable to traditional individuals

such as chiefs and ngangas; be less inclined to believe in witches, ngozis, or polygyny; be more likely to consult their parents on social and political questions and less likely to consult 'educated substitutes' such as teachers, religious leaders and government officials. Those with educated parents are expected to feel happier in their home and school influence, because they are not undergoing the degree of cultural change that characterizes peasant family trainees.

3.2.2 Findings

As can be seen in Table 3:3, the number of SSRs with parents' education, as with most 'independent' variables in this study, is smaller than expected. The principal reason that parents' education is a poorer predictor than expected appears to be that too few of them have enough education to have much influence in a statistical analysis of all African trainees; only 15.8% of trainees' fathers and 7.1% of mothers have any post-primary education.

Educated parents are better able to assist their offspring both intellectually and financially, so it is not surprising that the better educated the parents, the younger the trainee.

Especially for trainees' parents' generation, African education means mission education, so parents educated by missions generally are closer to the church than other

TABLE 3:3 Relationship between parents' education and other variables

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
AGE	.0000	.0000	.0924	-	.0794	.0916
NOWIVES	.0000	.0000	.5619	-	.0637	.0668
MOTHERNO	.1832	.0765	.4244	-	.0090	.0139
BOARDING	No significant relationships					
CLASRANK	No significant relationships					
FACHURCH	.0000	.0000	.5207	-	.0816	.0850
MOCHURCH	.0000	.0000	.7934	-	.1065	.1077
STCHURCH	.0760	.0141	.6534	-	.0168	.0192
CHILDREN	No significant relationships					
OLDER	.0182	.0208	.0933	-	.0146	.0275
PARCASH	.0000	.0000	.2409	+	.1623	.1695
GROUPFA	.0000	.0000	.8326	+	.0846	.0856
GROUPMO	.0000	.0000	.2208	+	.1029	.1107
GROUPST	.0309	.0416	.0920	-	.0117	.0252
PRIEST	.0549	.4010	.0317	+	.0019	.0208
CHIEF	No significant relationships					
PTEACH	.0011	.0002	.2727	+	.0366	.0435
STEACH	.0042	.0105	.0338	+	.0179	.0363
CTEACH	.0399	.6415	.0175	+	.0006	.0227
PARENTS	No significant relationships					
AUNTUNCL	No significant relationships					
SIBLINGS	No significant relationships					
FRIENDS	No significant relationships					
OBSERVAT	.0249	.0085	.2937	+	.0194	.0261
PTEXTS	.1157	.0806	.2373	+	.0084	.0163
STEXTS	.0223	.0336	.0770	+	.0124	.0265
CTEXTS	.0048	.0207	.0216	+	.0152	.0370
RELIGBKS	No significant relationships					
MAGAZINS	No significant relationships					
NEWSPAPR	.1907	.8520	.0947	+	.0001	.0131
BOOKS	No significant relationships					
POLPAMPH	No significant relationships					
RBCRADTV	No significant relationships					
FORRADIO	.1571	.0343	.6960	+	.0130	.0151

TABLE 3:3 (continued)

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
INTEREST		No significant relationships				
FASATISF		No significant relationships				
MOSATISF		No significant relationships				
PEOPLE2X	.1062	.2766	.0848	+	.0033	.0169
HARDWORK		No significant relationships				
FAIRTRET		No significant relationships				
MORTALKP		No significant relationships				
MORTALKS		No significant relationships				
MORTALKC		No significant relationships				
COURTEUS		No significant relationships				
MCHMONEY	.2871	.0759	.7348	-	.0090	.0107
ADVICE	.1540	.0376	.6271	+	.0122	.0148
COYBOSS	.1729	.8470	.0846	-	.0001	.0142
LOCCONCL	.0136	.0028	.4108	+	.0252	.0302
CLUBPRES		No significant relationships				
VARSTYED		No significant relationships				
RESPECT		No significant relationships				
NEWCAR		No significant relationships				
LPRIEST		No significant relationships				
LTEACHER	.0485	.3330	.0310	+	.0026	.0222
LDC		No significant relationships				
LCHIEF	.1158	.0407	.4206	+	.0118	.0166
LPARENTS		No significant relationships				
LANTUNCL	.0623	.0091	.7760	+	.0192	.0206
LSIBLING	.3242	.0765	.8481	+	.0090	.0099
LNGANGA	.1428	.0900	.2770	+	.0082	.0155
LFRIENDS		No significant relationships				
HOMETALK		No significant relationships				
UINFLNCE		No significant relationships				
HOMEHAPY		No significant relationships				
PCHRULE		No significant relationships				
SCHRULE	.0665	.4392	.0373	-	.0017	.0200
CCHRULE		No significant relationships				
READHEAR		No significant relationships				
NORACIAL		No significant relationships				
TRADITON		No significant relationships				
ASKPOL	.3478	.0914	.8012	-	.0080	.0092

Africans; thus it is understandable that trainees' relative faith is less for those with educated parents. Similarly, as expected, there is a direct relationship between parents' and trainees' church-going and parents' education.

There is no SSR with number of children in the family, but the more educated the parents the fewer children older than the respondent. This is exactly opposite of my expectation that educated parents would have fewer children but would find it easier to educate later born children. A possible explanation is that education has more recently become widespread. The older the parents, the greater the probability they would have children older than the respondent and the less likely they would have been well educated.

Parents' education relates fairly strongly with their cash income (r sq. = .162). Parents' group activities have a direct SSR with their education; there is no SSR with trainees' group memberships, but an inverse relationship with trainees' office holding. Perhaps trainees with poorly educated parents become more active in groups to compensate for their lack of 'modern' background in the home.

No SSR exists with relatives' influence or that of friends. This is probably due to friendships at school being an equalizing factor and that one's panopoly of relatives often are at different educational levels.

There is no SSR between parents' education and perceived influence of other printed sources or Rhodesia radio and television. The SSR with foreign radio is inverse--the more educated parents, the less influence of foreign stations. In general, trainees with less educated parents have more radical information sources.

The poor may be divided between the passive fatalists and those who realize they are suffering and believe that something can be done about it (Huntington, 1968, pp. 40-47). I had originally expected those from the poorest families to be most satisfied and most grateful for the educational opportunities they had received. This proved not to be the case. I should have realized that making the effort for a son or daughter to become a teacher is a characteristic of the 'do something about it' group; those who are alienated by their own lack of opportunities, I now believe, are especially susceptible to the call to militancy of foreign radio stations, as are their trainee children.

No SSR exists with beliefs on various social issues: whether ngozis cause some sicknesses, whether a person's success is mostly due to his own hard work, if others are treated fairly will they be fair, the influence of witches, or the effects of tobacco and alcohol. This further suggests that trainees from peasant homes have in many respects 'caught up' with their classmates prior to leaving the TTCs.

As expected, those with less educated parents hold more pro-male-dominance positions. This is probably partly due to different family attitudes, but also female trainees typically hold fewer pro-male-dominance attitudes and tend to come from homes where the parents are more educated.

There is no SSR with degree of satisfaction with influence in family and school affairs. Those with poorly educated parents would probably have lesser influence, but their influencing expectations would also tend to be lower.

As expected, greater parents' education relates inversely with likelihood to consult primary and secondary teachers (but no SSR with college teachers' influence). Trainees with more educated parents would have them (and probably others in their social circle) who would be about as knowledgeable as their former primary and secondary teachers --so there would be less reason to consult them. On the other hand, few if any trainees would have other acquaintances as educated or worldly wise as their college teachers. Thus the likelihood to consult college teachers being independent of parents' education while there is a relationship with primary and secondary teachers is not surprising.

Concerning textbooks, no SSR exists with primary or secondary texts while there is an inverse relationship with trainee-perceived influence of college texts. Rhodesian

educational authorities have conducted investigations that have found few if any books in the homes of many Africans who have enough education to be considered literate. Thus, generally, it would be only those whose parents are at the upper end of the educational range who would have access to considerable reading material other than what they read at school. This difference would be mainly felt during vacation periods, although the more spending money a trainee has, the greater the chance some of it may go on reading material.

The expected positive SSR between parents' education and trainees' media exposure is not borne out. As suggested above, trainees from better educated families have greater access to media sources; but perhaps this is balanced by greater efforts by trainees from peasant families to read and hear what they can. Also, reading the free African Times or spending five cents for a newspaper is less related to family circumstances than are other acquisitions of reading matter. And opportunities while at the TTCs are fairly equal.

Neither is there a SSR between parents' education and knowledge of population growth rates, nor the effects of alcohol and tobacco. This lack of informational differences indicates that trainees from peasant families find alternate sources of information (or that poorly educated parents of trainees utilize the radio or other information sources to make up for their poorer or non-existent reading ability).

A few trainees indicated they had, on occasion, heard broadcasts from Africanist stations at home, but that it would not be prudent to listen at their TTC; I have no data to indicate any way these trainees may be different from their compatriots.

Civic attitudes about success being related to hard work lack a SSR with parents' education, as does belief that others who are fairly treated will themselves be fair. This is not as hypothesized; but since the poor and the affluent were more alienated than trainees from middle class homes, the limited data base may be responsible for the expected relationship not emerging.

Parents' education does relate inversely with desire to have relatives consult trainees for advice and with likelihood of the trainee to consult a nganga.

No SSR exists between home, primary school or college influence and parents' education. There are nice bell shaped curves when freedom to suggest secondary rule change and feeling that secondary rule change requests were seriously considered; those whose parents had little or no education and those whose parents had the most education, had been active in the rule-change field; those whose parents have moderate education felt less efficacious. I have no suggestion why this should be so.

3.3 ALIENATION

A variable was generated from trainees' responses to questions as to whether one's own work was the most important determinant of success and whether most people, if treated fairly, would themselves be fair. This of course is far from an exact measure of feelings of racial discrimination; however, it is as close an approximation as can be made from questions I was permitted to include in the questionnaire. Results are summarized in Table 3:4.

The more older siblings a trainee has, the more alienated he is. This could be due to transmission of alienated feelings by the older siblings, or it could be due to belief that these older siblings are unfairly favored in the trainees' own families.

There is no SSR with age, attending boarding school, family's religious activity or relative religious faith, education or income. This is not to say that none of these variables have anything to do with feelings of alienation, merely that any relationships are not demonstrated by data from this questionnaire.

No SSRs exist with perceptions of who had influenced trainees on social or political questions (although sig. of F for college teachers at .08 perhaps shows a tendency to influence in the non-alienated direction). A strong direct relationship exists with perceived influence of college

TABLE 3:4 Relationship between alienation and other variables

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
AGE		No significant relationships				
NOWIVES		No significant relationships				
MOTHERNO	.0019	.0008	.1533	-	.0266	.0354
BOARDING		No significant relationships				
CLASRANK	.0368	.0946	.0571	-	.0068	.0208
FACHURCH		No significant relationships				
MOCHURCH		No significant relationships				
STCHURCH		No significant relationships				
CHILDREN	.3290	.0994	.6980	-	.0063	.0080
OLDER	.0709	.0180	.4868	-	.0130	.0163
FAEDCATN		No significant relationships				
MOEDCATN		No significant relationships				
PARCASH		No significant relationships				
GROUPFA		No significant relationships				
GROUPMO		No significant relationships				
GROUPST		No significant relationships				
PRIEST		No significant relationships				
CHIEF		No significant relationships				
PTEACH		No significant relationships				
STEACH		No significant relationships				
CTEACH	.3599	.0793	.9377	-	.0072	.0075
PARENTS		No significant relationships				
AUNTUNCL		No significant relationships				
SIBLINGS		No significant relationships				
FRIENDS		No significant relationships				
OBSERVAT		No significant relationships				
PTEXTS		No significant relationships				
STEXTS	.0461	.0106	.4802	-	.0153	.0187
CTEXTS	.0005	.0000	.9706	-	.0432	.0433
RELIGBKS		No significant relationships				
MAGAZINS	.0595	.3050	.0412	-	.0024	.0173
NEWSPAPR		No significant relationships				
BOOKS	.0027	.0006	.3129	-	.0274	.0327
POLPAMPH		No significant relationships				
RBCRADTV		No significant relationships				
FORRADIO		No significant relationships				

TABLE 3:4 (continued)

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
INTEREST		No significant relationships				
FASATISF		No significant relationships				
MOSATISF		No significant relationships				
PEOPLE2X	.1984	.0487	.6802	-	.0090	.0108
HARDWORK	.0000	.0000	.0000	-	.5368	.5786
FAIRTRET	.0000	.0000	.0136	-	.6226	.6300
MORTALKP		No significant relationships				
MORTALKS	.2235	.0414	.9000	-	.0100	.0105
MORTALKC	.0705	.2788	.0529	-	.0028	.0168
COURTEUS		No significant relationships				
MCHMONEY		No significant relationships				
ADVICE	.0529	.1743	.0535	+	.0043	.0180
COYBOSS		No significant relationships				
LOCCONCL		No significant relationships				
CLUBPRES		No significant relationships				
VARSTYED	.1051	.0669	.2478	-	.0078	.0143
RESPECT	.0559	.9528	.0229	-	.0000	.0178
NEWCAR		No significant relationships				
LPRIEST		No significant relationships				
LTEACHER		No significant relationships				
LDC		No significant relationships				
LCHIEF		No significant relationships				
LPARENTS	.0318	.0326	.1177	-	.0107	.0207
LANTUNCL	.0402	.0082	.5183	-	.0165	.0196
LSIBLING		No significant relationships				
LNGANGA		No significant relationships				
LFRIENDS		No significant relationships				
HOMETALK		No significant relationships				
UINFLNCE		No significant relationships				
HOMEHAPY		No significant relationships				
PCHRULE	.0722	.7172	.0325	+	.0003	.0163
SCHRULE		No significant relationships				
CCHRULE	.0139	.0145	.0957	-	.0140	.0249
READHEAR		No significant relationships				
TRADITON	.1449	.0630	.3775	+	.0086	.0134
ASKPOL		No significant relationships				

texts; secondary texts and books trainees have read on their own also positively correlate with non-alienation. However, there are no SSRs with frequency of listening or talking about social and political questions; this is surprising, for interviews led me to believe that those who most concern themselves with current events generally tend to have more doubts about fair treatment and about own efforts being the principal determinant of individual advance. There is a direct relationship between unalienated responses and knowledge of how fast Rhodesia's population is growing and the harmful effects of tobacco; before one generalizes that unalienated correlates directly with modern knowledge it must be added that there is also a direct relationship with belief in witches and ngozis! This suggests that traditionalist trainees are less alienated than those who have moved farther into the 'modern' world.

The greater perceived opportunities for discussion in college, the less alienated the trainee. A number of faculty members at TTCs mentioned that they have debating clubs where the advisor encourages critical thinking by encouraging decision-making on the basis of carefully collected and analyzed evidence; emotive outpourings are discouraged. This correlation tends to suggest that this approach was working.

As expected, those with more pro-system news sources give less alienated answers.

To summarize, the degree of alienation revealed by this procedure is not as high as critics of the regime would lead one to expect. The less alienated trainees have few if any older siblings, feel that their reading has influenced their feelings, do not reject traditional beliefs, recognize the population growth problem, and feel that there were reasonable opportunities in college to discuss issues of social and political importance.

3.4 TRADITIONAL BELIEFS

Before the questionnaire was given, I was cautioned that one area where respondents were quite likely to answer queries in accordance with what their schools teach, instead of their true feelings, is the degree of their traditional beliefs. If we accept the view of such observers as Allan Wright (1972, pp. 125-27, 360-62) that 99%, if not 99.9%, of Rhodesian Africans believe:

> there are so many witches around just waiting for a chance to get at your family that a request or inducement from one of your enemies will have them on the backs of their hyenas in no time at all,

and that mission education changes only a few minds in this area, then the slightly over 57% believing in witches and ngozis is perhaps 40% too low. Ignatius Zvarevashe (1970, p. 50) observes:[34]

> Among the Shona-speaking people, witchcraft is a traditional practice which continues into the present. Even today it is common to find a witch in nearly every village.

Bourdillon (1976, p. 199) concurs:

> Witchcraft can explain all types of misfortune . . . and many Shona believe that death is always due to witchcraft. The art of witchcraft is believed to be as wide in its scope as the art of a traditional herbalist [nganga], and the belief in witchcraft persists strongly in all strata of Shona society.

Of course, it is much easier to doubt the existence of witches, ngozis, etc. when facing them as an academic question in a mission teachers training classroom than it is on a dark night in the TTL when those who claim skills in the occult arts are actively invoking them! One missionary observed to me that many Africans will apparently shed traditional beliefs when things are going well, only to revert to them when they encounter a misfortune.

Harper (1959) relates the example of an African employed at a TTC, who was childless after several years of marriage. He and his wife consulted a missionary, who discussed diet and fertility cycles; he also prayed with them. The couple also went to a nganga, who threw the bones and prepared a

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[34]Zvarevashe's editors find it advisable to conclude their section on "Shona Beliefs and Rituals:" "N.B. Witchcraft, or the imputation of such, is illegal and subject to heavy penalties under The Witchcraft Suppression Act, Chapter 50." (Kileff, 1970, p. 52; emphasis in the original).

smelly potion for the wife to rub on her abdomen prior to sexual relations; he also kept her at his kraal for several nights for 'further instruction.' Harper does not attempt to identify the causal factor in the resulting pregnancy!

There is some evidence that ambivalence toward traditional and Christian religion is increasing; Madziyire (1973, pp. 132-33) writes:

> At present there is a great deal of movement between African religion and Christianity. Witchdoctors . . . and others have expressed the will to become Christians. . . . [N]ganga, old people and young have all advised others to go to hospitals. . . . [T]here are many Christians who have hidden themselves during these terrible days of political crisis in Rhodesia. The politician has contributed something towards the desire to return to ancestral cults.
>
> The boys and girls of ten years ago used to take great pride in being seen walking along the road to church on Sundays in spite of distance, weather or clothing. Now they style themselves the champions of the spirits and offer sacrifices to the gods of their ancestors.

A number of trainees who were willing, indeed eager, to discuss low salaries, colour bar, inadequate political opportunities, etc., became uneasy and evasive on the subject of traditional beliefs, especially in reference to their families and themselves. Less reticent trainees faulted missionaries for a general assault on African traditional beliefs and customs, arguing that the missionaries tended improperly to tie Christianity to European ideas and ways and to condemn wholesome or harmless aspects of traditional

culture simply because they were different from the customary practices in the Europeans' background. This position is also taken by a number of contemporary missionaries, who feel that an earlier generation of missionaries unnecessarily undermined aspects of the traditional culture without successfully implanting suitable substitutes (see Weinrich, 1973; Kapenzi, 1979). This is a continent-wide problem; concerning the impact of Church and State schools in Senegal, Kessler (1958, p. 142) writes that for long the curriculum intentionally uprooted the child from his traditional environment:

> Today, some French educators are beginning to question whether this concept of education has been wise. They see that the product of their schools, the rising younger generation, consists of restless unhappy youths who are greatly susceptible to Marxist propaganda. They feel that the schools closely modeled on those in France have destroyed the African's way of life and morality while contributing nothing to fill the void thus created. The result is that this void is being rapidly filled by Marxist propaganda.

Westermann's (1937, p. 23) conclusion concerning the European attack on traditional values seems to apply in Rhodesia:

> School teaching will seldom succeed in destroying religious and magic beliefs altogether, but it will push them into the lower regions of the mind, and gradually their best features, reverence for the ancestors and gods with the moral sanctions growing out of them, will disappear, while the darker side, fear of spirits, spells, witches, remain.

What was until recently the typical missionary approach to traditional Rhodesian African life is contained in the following conclusion to the welcoming sermon for new trainees at a church-run TTC:

> "Many of you Africans come from heathen villages, villages that are full of sin and wickedness. Your parents drink beer and commit other ungodly sins. They are immodest. They wear no clothing. They pray to idols of wood and stone. God is not pleased with this. You are now coming to the mission school where you will find the true God. There may be some of you here today that have already felt guilt in your hearts. You want to turn from your way of superstition and heathenism. Come down now, and let Jesus forgive your sins."
> As they [returning pupils] started singing . . . some of the boys and girls were crying. Many were going down to the front of the church where they were praying and yelling just as . . . [their] elders did when they wanted the rains to come. (Harper, 1959, p. 91).

It would be wrong to conclude that the atmosphere at TTCs is uniformly overbearing. One of the more progressive principals prided himself that, while his TTC had a number of "Thou shalts" as rules for student conduct, it had no "Thou shalt nots." Partridge (1961, pp. 20-21, 55) adds that parents often show little reticence at expressing their feelings:

> Complaints at parents' meetings are directed . . . mainly at African staff members and [European] missionaries, and what fun you can have being really rude and downright abusive to these people with impunity! Laws of libel do not count, truth does not matter, there is no risk of personal assault, and if you have come from a beer-drink there is no limit to what you might say. If teachers, or better still the missionaries, become annoyed by your remarks and begin

> to lose their tempers, why then it is a really successful meeting.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> In fairness it should be pointed out that not all the parents feel compelled to use up all the meeting time with complaints. Sometimes one or other of the grandparents present will speak with real gratitude and appreciation of what is being done for the children.

3.4.1 Traditional Attitude Measurement

A traditional attitude variable was constructed from trainees' beliefs concerning witches, ngozis, polygyny and rule of an African village in the traditional manner. The results are summarized in Table 3:5. The above-mentioned possibility that some trainees probably understated their degree of traditional feeling should be kept in mind while reading the sometimes surprising results reported below.

My expectation that female trainees would score higher on the tradition variable was not validated, with no significant relationship recorded.[35]

It was expected that the more intense involvement of being a secondary boarding student would reduce traditionalist feelings; instead there is a linearity sig. of .93! An intervening variable that affects this relationship is that traditional beliefs are less prevalent in urban areas (where the day schools are).

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[35] In an adult urban African survey, Stopforth (1972, p. 75) found 19.0% of female respondents listing traditional objectives to a question "what do you want most to achieve in life?" vs. 27.3% of males.

TABLE 3:5 Relationship between traditionalism and other variables

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
AGE	.2107	.0744	.5126	-	.0079	.0113
NOWIVES	No significant relationships					
MOTHERNO	No significant relationships					
BOARDING	No significant relationships					
CLASRANK	No significant relationships					
FACHURCH	No significant relationships					
MOCHURCH	.3532	.0857	.8604	+	.0076	.0083
STCHURCH	No significant relationships					
CHILDREN	No significant relationships					
OLDER	.0295	.2577	.0211	+	.0032	.0224
FAEDCATN	.1098	.0685	.2553	-	.0094	.0170
MOEDCATN	No significant relationships					
PARCASH	.1210	.0194	.8431	-	.0151	.0160
GROUPFA	No significant relationships					
GROUPMO	No significant relationships					
GROUPST	No significant relationships					
PRIEST	.0206	.0034	.5496	-	.0211	.0240
CHIEF	.0000	.0000	.2486	-	.1718	.1775
PTEACH	.0049	.0004	.9605	-	.0315	.0317
STEACH	.2281	.0814	.5243	-	.0076	.0109
CTEACH	No significant relationships					
PARENTS	No significant relationships					
AUNTUNCL	.0979	.1600	.1144	-	.0049	.0156
SIBLINGS	.0397	.0074	.5613	-	.0178	.0207
FRIENDS	No significant relationships					
OBSERVAT	.0671	.0183	.4514	+	.0140	.0180
PTEXTS	No significant relationships					
STEXTS	.0312	.0169	.2037	-	.0141	.0220
CTEXTS	No significant relationships					
RELIGBKS	.2006	.0928	.4040	-	.0070	.0115
MAGAZINS	No significant relationships					
NEWSPAPR	No significant relationships					
BOOKS	No significant relationships					
POLPAMPH	No significant relationships					
RBCRADTV	.0661	.0436	.2086	-	.0101	.0178
FORRADIO	.1122	.0752	.2426	-	.0082	.0156

TABLE 3:5 (continued)

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
INTEREST		No significant relationships				
FASATISF		No significant relationships				
MOSATISF		No significant relationships				
PEOPLE2X	.0908	.7124	.0422	-	.0003	.0160
HARDWORK	.0460	.1570	.0494	-	.0049	.0198
FAIRTRET		No significant relationships				
MORTALKP		No significant relationships				
MORTALKS		No significant relationships				
MORTALKC		No significant relationships				
COURTEUS	.1893	.0315	.9337	-	.0116	.0120
MCHMONEY		No significant relationships				
ADVICE		No significant relationships				
COYBOSS		No significant relationships				
LOCCONCL	.1352	.0408	.5023	-	.0106	.0141
CLUBPRES	.0626	.2616	.0483	-	.0032	.0185
VARSTYED	.0364	.0044	.8277	+	.0202	.0212
RESPECT	.1042	.0627	.2588	-	.0087	.0155
NEWCAR		No significant relationships				
LPRIEST	.0044	.0085	.0441	-	.0169	.0322
LTEACHER		No significant relationships				
LDC	.0004	.0013	.0180	-	.0252	.0446
LCHIEF	.0000	.0000	.1351	-	.2412	.2487
LPARENTS	.0663	.0340	.2588	-	.0111	.0177
LANTUNCL	.0845	.0171	.6248	-	.0141	.0164
LSIBLING		No significant relationships				
LNGANGA	.0000	.0000	.0019	-	.0759	.1045
LFRIENDS		No significant relationships				
HOMETALK		No significant relationships				
UINFLNCE		No significant relationships				
HOMEHAPY	.0013	.1686	.0010	-	.0046	.0385
PCHRULE		No significant relationships				
SCHRULE		No significant relationships				
CCHRULE		No significant relationships				
READHEAR		No significant relationships				
NORACIAL	.0801	.0626	.1915	+	.0086	.0167
ASKPOL	.0000	.0000	.4382	+	.0892	.0929

It was hypothesized that the greater parents' education and income, the lower the traditional attitude score. Father's education has a tendency in the expected direction but mother's education shows no tendency. Only the income correlation hypothesis is supported. A likely explanation is that traditionalist parents' group activities are largely in traditionalist groups; in her study of an African urban location, Weinrich (1976) finds each social stratum tends to have its own distinct groups.

The hypothesized inverse relationship between parents' and trainees' group activities and traditionalism is supported only for trainees' group memberships.

It was also hypothesized that attendance of church services by trainees and, especially by their parents, would relate inversely with the tradition variable; there are no SSRs. This suggests that the churches are not uniformly an anti-traditional force, a point made by other researchers (e.g., Thomas, 1964; Daneel, 1971 and 1974; Dachs, 1973; Harlin, 1973).

Direct SSRs exist between the tradition scale and perceived influence of religious leaders, primary and secondary teachers and secondary textbooks. This result is open to varying interpretations. Perhaps pastors and teachers are not as modernizing influences as is commonly thought. Especially in the decades when many of those

employed in the 1960s were trained, the amount of learning that separated many pastors and primary teachers from the rest of their community was, typically, quite small. However, it is also possible that those with the most traditional background felt more influenced by their pastors and teachers because these were their sole or principal windows on the modern world; their influence may have been in the hypothesized direction, but was insignificantly strong to move peasant trainees attitudes as far from the traditional mould as the attitudes of trainees who come from at least partially Westernized homes. It appears to this writer that both explanations are likely to have some validity.

An expected SSR with influence of parents or aunts and uncles is not found; the influence of siblings correlates directly with traditionalism. This is a real surprise since it was thought that, while older relatives would be expected to be a traditional influence, siblings' influence was expected, in general, to be in a modernizing direction.

A direct relationship with perceived influence of Radio Rhodesia is not too surprising because during the Rhodesian Front era the Government sought to enhance the prestige of traditional authorities.

There is a non-significant tendency (F sig. .07) for perceived influence of foreign radio stations to correlate positively with traditionalism. The Africanist radio

stations regularly sought to manipulate traditionalist feeling in their favor;[36] poverty, feelings of relative privation--and the radicalization they produce--tend to go together with a traditionalist background, although this clustering is not strong enough to justify combination of these variables into a single variable.

Traditionalists are more convinced of the harmful nature of tobacco and that alcohol has no beneficial effects. In interviews they tended to separate feelings related to traditional beer from what is drunk in towns.

Traditionalists place more value on being treated courteously in daily dealings and in being spoken of with respect by their neighbors; they also are more eager to live in rural areas. While these findings are as expected, not expected is the traditionalists' greater interest in being elected to local councils. Since traditionalists frequently contrast what they believe to have been a more mannered and orderly yesterday with contemporary Rhodesia, their interest in council membership is perhaps due to a desire to legislate a return to the values they cherish, or because they express views modal to a village constituency.

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[36]It is noteworthy that Africanist forces made almost no military progress in Rhodesia until they enlisted the support of many spirit mediums. Events in Rhodesia in the 1970s are more closely patterned after those of the 1890s than is generally realized; the crucial exception for the outcome is that the outside world largely switched sides (Meredith, 1979, pp. 107-09).

In summary, analysis of the presence, absence and direction of SSRs between traditional values and other questionnaire variables does not leave a clear consistent picture of how traditionalism relates to other aspects of trainees' lives. Part of the problem is that the measuring instrument does not include some questions that might clarify the picture. But I am convinced that in large measure this lack of clarity is related to tentative and inconsistent feelings by trainees relative to traditional and non-traditional influences. By becoming trainees the young Africans I questioned were not taking an extremely traditionalist position. But that does not mean that many of them did not have serious reservations about some aspects of contemporary society, nor that there are not doubts and inconsistencies in their feelings.

3.5 FEMALE STATUS

The lowly status of females in African society is believed by many (e.g., Paver, Lessing, Bourdillon) to have a detrimental effect on advancement by both sexes, because a child whose mother lacks knowledge of the modern world will do a poor job of providing her children with the nutritional, health care, and informational background that an educated mother does.

While this poor status is largely traditional, one female trainee strongly suggested that women's status had dropped with the coming of the White settler. She defined 'traditional status' as the interpretation White Victorian males put on what they were told by aged, autocratic, male chiefs (her opinion of chiefs was anything but high). She said chiefs had a distorted view because their estimation of their own states was absurdly exalted; also they are polygynous, and wives in polygynous families are of lower status than other women. Harper's (1959, p. 24) description of initial education for women in one tribal area gives an indication of the sort of thing the Victorian Europeans were told:

> In the beginning it was impossible to get the girls to come to the school. When the first missionaries approached the old chief, Mtasa, and asked if the girls could attend school, he said that it was better for him to send his cattle for they were more intelligent and could learn faster. After several years without girls at the school, the chief was finally persuaded to send one girl who was abnormal and would have ordinarily been killed. This was the the humble beginning of the school program of African women.

There seemed to be a considerable difference between male and female trainees as to how great a change in female status was desirable, with many of the men apparently thinking in terms of quite modest change. My questionnaire reveals that 41.5% of African males oppose the concept of equal pay for equal work for women; similarly 41.2% approve

of the major institution that Rhodesian African 'women's libbers' oppose: polygyny.

3.6 ATTITUDES ON FAMILY SIZE AND POPULATION GROWTH

3.6.1 Importance

Many people concerned with progress (or lack thereof) in the underdeveloped world consider a change from traditional to 'modern' attitudes about family size to be essential for sustained economic growth. High infant mortality, children being elders' social security, the tendency of chiefs to assign land on the basis of family size, and a putative relationship between number of children and manliness all encouraged large families in traditional society. Hatendi (1973, p. 137) observes:

> Celibacy has no place in Shona society for marriage is the natural goal of both sexes and procreation is the flower of marriage for the parents are survived by their children in whom they live. As the saying goes . . . 'he who begets is resurrected.' The blessing of children also means that the parents have security in old age and protection from attacks by an enemy. Childlessness is a serious curse. An unmarried person is regarded as ungrateful to his parents and family-group.

If a wife has fewer than five or six children, a husband is likely to expect his father-in-law either to provide him with an additional wife or "to return a goodly proportion of the pfuma [bride price]." (Gelfand, 1973, p. 174). Where

modern medicine and improved nutrition have cut infant and child mortality--in societies where there has been little or no change in beliefs on family size--a situation largely validating Malthus' hypotheses is generated. While in the long run: "One of the best ways to encourage parents to have smaller families is to make sure that those children which [sic] are born to them shall survive into adulthood" (Teachers' Forum, 1.79, p. 20), Rhodesia has reached the point where infant mortality has dropped enough for a soaring population, but not enough for the typical African peasant family to have confidence that their children will reach adulthood.

In a modern society, a large family is a burden. Children may play their traditional economic roles of helping the family at an early age only if they are condemned to remain in the traditional sector by not being able to go to school. If they go to school, they remain an economic burden until their schooling is complete. Education 'pays off' in an economic sense only if it results in substantially higher income; this higher income is likely only if the quantity and nature of education are such as to provide the basis for higher-level employment. These facts are not clearly seen by the average peasant, not only in Rhodesia but in any developing country.

When European settlement of what became Rhodesia began

in the 1890s, the African population was probably about half a million. By 1971 it had grown to over 5 million and, if the present rate of increase does not change, will double every 19 years (Rhodesian Commentary, February 1973). The African birth rate was 52 per 1000 vs. 18 per 1000 for Europeans (Davies, 1975, p. 182). Many qualified observers have noted that rapid African population growth can more than wipe out even substantial economic and educational progress. "It must, therefore, be regarded as the highest priority that Rhodesia throw itself single-mindedly into the task of controlling its population growth." (Bone, 1968, p. 19). In contrast to the Africans, it would take 65 years for the European population--in 1971 only about a quarter of a million--to double by natural increase (Weinrich, 1973, p. 16).

According to the 1969 census Rhodesia had a dependency ratio of 104, compared to 48 for Japan and 55 for the United States.[37] The Rhodesian ratio was rising (Division of African Education, 1977, p. 12.3). Even in May, 1978, a Cabinet Minister considered population growth a greater problem than either the guerrilla war or sanctions (SM,

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[37]A dependency ratio is calculated as follows: 100 x ((number of people under age 15) + (number of people aged 65 and older)/(number of people in 15-64 age range)). Since many African Rhodesian males and most females do not have jobs, the dependency ratio per employed African is actually much higher.

21.5.78). Most problems associated with this rapid population growth are shared with other under-developed countries (see Hardin, 1981).[38] However, population questions have several important additional ramifications in Rhodesia.

Despite the demographic time bomb thus created, many Rhodesian Africanists argue that a rapidly growing African population is a valuable weapon in their drive for Black-rule. They also grossly over-estimate (at least in statements for public consumption) the efficacy of both birth control programs and White immigration promotion efforts when they argue that the two efforts are aimed at producing a White majority in Rhodesia. Weinrich (1973, p. 16) finds "demographic trends and economic and political developments are closely linked." The higher proportion of Europeans and the greater their hopes that numerical parity, or something approaching parity, might be achieved, the more liberal Rhodesian European political and economic attitudes have been. Dr. Gordon Chavundka (a Shona lecturer in sociology at the University of Rhodesia) discounts the sometimes presented

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[38]Africa exported 5 million tons of grain per year in the early 1950s; by the 1970s grain imports were running around 9 million tons, reaching 18 million in 1981; imports are expected to double again by the end of the century (assuming that someone will have that volume of grain on terms that impoverished African states can meet); in spite of the imports, half the people of Africa are undernourished, and in a number of countries 1000 or more die per day from malnutrition (Radio RSA, 16.11.81).

argument that traditional religion is a significant barrier to birth control. He says that the presumed advantage of many children as old age insurance, Christianity (as taught by some denominations), and the political objective of keeping the European percentage of the population from rising are the main sources of opposition to family planning. "If the Shona people saw a real need for birth control, the Svikiro [the medium for the Mhondoro spirit--the spirit of fertility] would accept the change of attitude." (Quoted in RH, 6.6.72). In a speech at UR, one of the most radical Europeans (Guy Clutton-Block) endorsed the population weapon: "This year you black mothers will bear more babies than there are Europeans in Rhodesia!" This sentence was greeted with a roar of approval from a predominantly African student audience (Brand, 1976, p. 125).

Traditional religion as well as some Christian denominations, and peasant inertia for long largely thwarted the limited efforts to encourage effective birth control. By the late 1970s the Government finally embarked on a population education campaign; soon African public demand for birth control was straining available financial resources (Focus on Rhodesia, n.d., vol. 2, no. 8).

3.6.2 Trainees' Beliefs

Clarke (1972) argues that the success of family planning is much greater amongst educated Africans who better understand its methods and reasons. Respondents are amongst the best educated Africans, but, as Table 3:6 shows, their beliefs on birth control vary considerably from those of European trainees; need for birth control is one of the questions on which differences between sexes assume importance, so response percentages are given by sex also. Write-ins include such statements as "It's against our customs" and "We don't want it." Five Europeans and one African wrote in that the need applies only to Africans (these six show up in the 'great need' category in the tables). On the most fundamental social and political issue that I was permitted to raise on the questionnaire the difference between European and African respondents is profound.[39] Table 3:7 reports a great difference also exists in beliefs on appropriate methods of birth control.

Table 3:8 shows differences in information on how fast Rhodesia's population is growing are not nearly as great as differences in opinions on what, if anything, should be done about it. When 31.3% of African and 11.5% of European

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[39]Hills (1978, p. 161) reports that Gwelo TTC males overwhelmingly oppose birth control, while the girls generally are favorable; I found the difference between sexes to be in the same direction as Hills does, but not as great.

TABLE 3:6 Present need for birth control in Rhodesia

Need	African %			European %		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
Great	21.5	16.8	35.9	59.5	56.5	60.2
Moderate	30.4	30.0	30.1	30.5	30.4	30.6
Slight	22.2	22.0	22.3	7.6	4.3	8.3
Non-existent	23.8	28.4	10.7	2.3	8.7	0.9
Write-in	2.1	2.4	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Q.2.52.

TABLE 3:7 Appropriate methods of birth control

Response	Africans	Europeans
Any safe method	35.2	73.8
Only certain methods	28.4	23.1
No method	36.4	3.1

Q2.53

TABLE 3:8 If present birth and death rates do not change, Rhodesia's population will double in less than 25 years

Answer	Africans	Europeans
Definitely true	27.6	26.7
Probably true	41.1	61.8
Probably not true	17.3	10.7
Definitely not true	14.0	0.8

Q3.58.

trainees either are not aware of, or tend to doubt the validity of, demographic evidence of this importance, a gap in the trainees' education (though not necessarily in the information to which they have been exposed!) is revealed.

Since only one in five African trainees recognize that Rhodesia's need for family planning is great, efforts to improve the lot of TTL farmers and unskilled laborers are likely to be frustrated; for trainees' attitudes on this question correspond with the actual practice of most African families.

3.7 BIRTH CONTROL AND OTHER ATTITUDES

Attention is now turned to how trainees' beliefs on family planning relate to their beliefs on other questions. While the other key variables in this chapter are treated as independent, birth control attitudes will be treated as dependent. Findings are summarized in Table 3:9. Since it appeared that African trainees varied more on this question than on others, in addition to reporting results for all African respondents, trainees are broken down more into various subgroups; to discuss all these results and their ramifications would be a dissertation in itself; so the following discussion is quite selective.

TABLE 3:9 Birth control need by all Africans and by subgroups

Variable	Group	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
PROGRESS	All	.0043	.0016	.1510	+	.0232	.0354
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0001	.0001	.0205	+	.0439	.0727
	Radicals	.0347	.0084	.4217	+	.0872	.1080
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0161	.0032	.3163	+	.0253	.0355
DCDECISN	All	.0007	.0000	.8187	+	.0385	.0394
	Females	.1435	.0485	.4631	+	.0401	.0557
	Males	.0242	.0082	.2935	+	.0215	.0290
	Radicals	.0196	.0052	.9199	+	.0969	.0971
	Catholic	.0151	.0325	.0470	+	.0526	.1232
	Non-Cath	.0134	.0013	.8371	+	.0302	.0312
ONLYCHEF		No significant relationships					
CHFELDRS	Catholic	.0534	.3457	.0334	+	.0103	.0920
	Others	No significant relationships					
ALL4		No significant relationships					
ELECTED		No significant relationships					
MAJORITY	Catholic	.1723	.7667	.0872	-	.0010	.0601
	Others	No significant relationships					
CONSNSUS	Radicals	.0388	.4156	.0211	-	.0079	.1037
	Others	No significant relationships					
READVOTE	Catholic	.0743	.0569	.1843	+	.0428	.0825
	Others	No significant relationships					
CASHVOTE	All	.2035	.0347	.9373	+	.0105	.0108
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0385	.0060	.6618	+	.0233	.0258
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.2008	.0402	.8130	+	.0124	.0136
MENVOTE		No significant relationships					
BOTHVOTE	Catholic	.0434	.0069	.6664	-	.0889	.0984
	Others	No significant relationships					

TABLE 3:9 (continued)

Variable	Group	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
AGE		No significant relationships					
NOWIVES		No significant relationships					
MOTHERNO	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Others	No significant relationships					
BOARDING		No significant relationships					
CLASRANK	All	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0552	.6467	.0182	-	.0007	.0185
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0815	.0319	.5221	-	.0141	.0153
FACHURCH	Females	.0597	.0050	.7664	-	.0775	.0883
	Others	No significant relationships					
MOCHURCH	Catholic	.0724	.0091	.6159	-	.0843	.1055
	Others	No significant relationships					
STCHURCH		No significant relationships					
CHILDREN	Radicals	.0167	.8425	.0098	-	.0004	.2206
	Others	No significant relationships					
OLDER		No significant relationships					
FAEDCATN	Catholic	.0164	.1260	.0191	+	.0300	.1885
	Others	No significant relationships					
MOEDCATN	All	.0329	.3366	.0252	-	.0024	.0358
	Females	.0196	.4087	.0115	-	.0070	.1260
	Males	.0919	.8637	.0546	-	.0001	.0377
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0055	.3408	.0038	-	.0028	.0581
PARCASH	Catholic	.0861	.9468	.0514	+	.0001	.1373
	Others	No significant relationships					
GROUPFA		No significant relationships					
GROUPMO		No significant relationships					

TABLE 3:9 (continued)

Variable	Group	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
GROUPST	Catholic	.0999	.9621	.0519	+	.0000	.0950
	Others	No significant relationships					
PRIEST	Males	.0251	.2268	.0193	+	.0044	.0285
	Others	No significant relationships					
CHIEF		No significant relationships					
PTEACH		No significant relationships					
STEACH	Catholic	.0303	.0031	.9694	-	.1043	.1050
	Others	No significant relationships					
CTEACH	All	.1513	.0311	.7254	+	.0108	.0123
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Radicals	.0359	.0276	.1464	+	.0587	.1045
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0644	.0099	.7457	+	.0193	.0209
PARENTS		No significant relationships					
AUNTUNCL		No significant relationships					
SIBLINGS		No significant relationships					
FRIENDS	All	.1170	.8659	.0535	+	.0001	.0137
	Females	.2035	.0731	.4980	-	.0316	.0452
	Males	.0179	.2448	.0126	+	.0041	.0309
	Radicals	.1353	.7360	.0667	+	.0014	.0692
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0163	.3846	.0085	+	.0022	.0297
OBSERVAT		No significant relationships					
PTEXTS	All	.0035	.2833	.0020	+	.0026	.0314
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0127	.2852	.0078	+	.0035	.0331
	Radicals	.1748	.6282	.0951	+	.0029	.0620
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0220	.5392	.0098	+	.0011	.0278

TABLE 3:9 (continued)

Variable	Group	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
STEXTS	All	.0108	.0503	.0248	-	.0089	.0260
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0458	.0792	.0838	-	.0095	.0248
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0178	.0379	.0540	-	.0124	.0293
CTEXTS		No significant relationships					
RELIGBKS	Females	.0156	.5883	.0065	-	.0027	.0991
	Others	No significant relationships					
MAGAZINS	All	.0620	.5504	.0306	-	.0008	.0171
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.1145	.8647	.0522	-	.0001	.0184
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	.0115	.0521	.0235	-	.0419	.1267
	Non-Cath	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
NEWSPAPR	All	.0723	.0106	.7985	-	.0152	.0162
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	.1192	.0183	.8920	-	.0666	.0693
	Non-Cath	.2631	.0729	.6821	-	.0094	.0116
BOOKS	All	.1406	.0288	.7112	-	.0112	.0128
	Females	.1266	.0691	.2953	-	.0325	.0563
	Males	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	.0786	.0394	.2702	-	.0498	.0800
	Non-Cath	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
POLPAMPH	All	.0209	.0085	.2409	-	.0161	.0226
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0824	.0506	.2359	-	.0117	.0205
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	.0364	.0108	.3512	-	.0757	.0993
	Non-Cath	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
RBCRADTV	Females	.1423	.0356	.6001	-	.0438	.0537
	Males	.0187	.0334	.0634	+	.0137	.0305
	Others	No significant relationships					

TABLE 3:9 (continued)

Variable	Group	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
FORRADIO	All	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Females	.0324	.0413	.0932	-	.0424	.0905
	Males	.0345	.3765	.0196	+	.0025	.0277
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	.0866	.5711	.0442	-	.0039	.0824
	Non-Cath	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
INTEREST	All	.0062	.0052	.1230	-	.0182	.0237
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0780	.1105	.1091	-	.0078	.0157
	Radicals	.1441	.0533	.7291	-	.0470	.0485
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0075	.0037	.2438	-	.0245	.0283
FASATISF	All	.0001	.0009	.0041	+	.0253	.0555
	Females	.1942	.0861	.4108	+	.0292	.0467
	Males	.0007	.0091	.0054	+	.0204	.0588
	Radicals	.0405	.0287	.1441	+	.0589	.1248
	Catholic	.3622	.0788	.7460	+	.0380	.0528
	Non-Cath	.0005	.0088	.0041	+	.0194	.0573
MOSATISF	All	.0000	.0013	.0013	+	.0237	.0540
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0007	.0044	.0108	+	.0247	.0522
	Radicals	.0199	.0245	.0819	+	.0609	.1208
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0001	.0029	.0015	+	.0251	.0621
PEOPLE2X	All	.0000	.0000	.4393	+	.0669	.0705
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0000	.0000	.3609	+	.1156	.1212
	Radicals	.0245	.0026	.8962	+	.1117	.1142
	Catholic	.0106	.0027	.3166	+	.1046	.1300
	Non-Cath	.0000	.0000	.7559	+	.0688	.0703
HARDWORK		No significant relationships					
FAIRTRET	Males	.0519	.0247	.2580	+	.0154	.0237
	Others	No significant relationships					
COURTEUS	All	.0618	.8618	.0187	-	.0001	.0132
	Females	.0229	.0691	.0369	-	.0329	.0764
	Males	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Radicals	.1977	.0736	.8860	-	.0410	.0412
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.

TABLE 3:9 (continued)

Variable	Group	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
MCHMONEY		No significant relationships					
ADVICE	All	.1576	.8675	.0556	-	.0001	.0087
	Females	.0430	.6898	.0134	+	.0016	.0635
	Males	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	.0478	.8395	.0143	+	.0005	.0732
	Non-Cath	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
COYBOSS		No significant relationships					
LOCCONCL		No significant relationships					
CLUBPRES	All	.0263	.0072	.8103	+	.0172	.0173
	Females	.0236	.4481	.0085	+	.0057	.0766
	Males	.0853	.0657	.2137	+	.0106	.0154
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0148	.0039	.7489	+	.0247	.0250
VARSTYED	Radicals	.0286	.9093	.0079	+	.0002	.0882
	Others	No significant relationships					
RESPECT		No significant relationships					
NEWCAR	Catholic	.0376	.3904	.0157	-	.0086	.0787
	Others	No significant relationships					
LPRIEST	All	.0670	.0333	.2670	+	.0107	.0169
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.0324	.0196	.1862	+	.0168	.0271
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	.3587	.0850	.8942	+	.0370	.0397
	Non-Cath	.1519	.0685	.3722	+	.0098	.0156
LTEACHER		No significant relationships					
LDC	All	.1336	.0289	.6665	+	.0113	.0133
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	.2695	.0550	.8890	+	.0115	.0123
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.1274	.0346	.5402	+	.0132	.0168
LCHIEF		No significant relationships					

TABLE 3:9 (continued)

Variable	Group	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
LPARENTS		No significant relationships					
LANTUNCL		No significant relationships					
LSIBLING		No significant relationships					
LNGANGA	All	.1015	.3916	.0644	-	.0017	.0148
	Females	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Males	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Radicals	.0586	.9453	.0247	-	.0001	.0965
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0760	.5087	.0400	-	.0013	.0204
LFRIENDS		No significant relationships					
HOMETALK		No significant relationships					
UINFLNCE	Non-Cath	.0104	.0092	.1028	-	.0200	.0334
	Others	No significant relationships					
HOMEHAPY	All	.1501	.8464	.0717	-	.0001	.0124
	Females	.0059	.2484	.0037	+	.0125	.1224
	Males	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Radicals	.1744	.0392	.7089	-	.0550	.0636
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0498	.9098	.0203	-	.0000	.0226
READHEAR	Radicals	.0004	.0015	.0099	+	.1090	.2321
	Others	No significant relationships					
TRADITON	Radicals	.1951	.0345	.9161	+	.0613	.0636
	Others	No significant relationships					
ASKPOL	All	.0159	.5212	.0136	-	.0009	.1603
	Females	.2962	.0400	.4063	+	.0408	.3672
	Males	.0086	.0149	.0196	-	.0168	.2070
	Radicals	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Catholic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	+	n.s.	n.s.
	Non-Cath	.0225	.2897	.0219	-	.0030	.1870
NORACIAL	Males	.0323	.0526	.0795	-	.0114	.0269
	Radicals	.0536	.6881	.0239	+	.0019	.0941
	Others	No significant relationships					

Since opposition to birth control is an attitude of both radicals and traditionalists, as well as many Roman Catholics, little attempt was made in advance to specify expected statistically significant relationships (SSRs) for this variable. These categories are run as separate analyses.

The number of children in trainees' families lacked a SSR with feelings of need for birth control. This is probably due to two conflicting influences in large families: The tendency to believe that one's own background is a natural and proper one, vs. evidence of the great economic burden that a large family is. Those with more older siblings are more aware of the desirability of birth control. The wider window on the world that older siblings may provide is probably partially responsible for this; however, worries over whether there would be means available for their own education after their older siblings had been educated may also have given younger children a lesson in economics that was not available to elder children.

Attitudes to birth control, surprisingly, show no SSR with parents' education, income or group memberships; for it had been expected that each would relate directly with perceived need for birth control. Trainees' own group activity relates <u>inversely</u> with awareness of the need for family planning, an indication that group membership

had a more radicalizing than informing role for African trainees during the Rhodesian Front era.

No SSR is recorded between need for family planning in Rhodesia and perceived influence on social and political attitudes of parents, siblings, friends, religious leaders, chiefs and headmen, or teachers. However, the greater the influence of aunts and uncles, the less favorable trainees are to birth control.[40]

No SSR exists with perceived influence of primary textbooks, while inverse SSRs are found for secondary and college textbooks; in other words, the more influential trainees felt their textbooks had been on their thinking on social and political questions, the less they felt Rhodesia has a need for birth control. It would be especially interesting to have data on later trainees on this point; for shortly after this questionnaire was given, the first serious attempt was made to introduce population education into the Rhodesian curriculum.

Also, the government began to provide substantial aid to the Family Planning Society. Before long African requests for birth control devices were straining available

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[40]It was initially assumed that this influence of aunts and uncles covaries with opposition to family planning mainly because they are a traditionalist influence; however, the data do not exclude the possibility that some of this anti-family-planning covariance is due to a radicalizing influence of relatives.

resources. So a considerable number of African women are prepared to avail themselves of family planning information and devices when they are readily and cheaply available.

Since some of the strongest objections to the most effective methods of family planning come from the Roman Catholic Church and since 19.6% of respondents are Catholic, the lack of a SSR between perceived influence of religious books and leaders and beliefs on birth control is surprising. Catholics and non-Catholics are also considered separately in Table 3:9.

Similarly, there is no relationship with perceived religious faith nor satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life--relative to parents' satisfaction.

An inverse SSR exists between birth control beliefs and perceived influence of newspapers and books; a similar relationship with political pamphlets just misses the significance of F cutoff of .05 (sig. of F = .06). Frequency of reading magazines also has an inverse SSR with family planning attitudes. Thus overall media influence and exposure are either in the opposite direction to that expected or are lacking. However, when opposition to birth control is run against a generated variable measuring anti-system news sources, a direct SSR exists.

There is an inverse SSR with perceived interest in social questions and current events (along with an inverse

tendency [sig. of F = .09] with those who would like to be elected to a local council). This suggests that interest in social and political questions tends more to be associated with radicalization that with objective acquisition of knowledge.

No SSR exists with primary school or college discussion opportunities nor with trainees' perceptions of their own participation in such discussions.

It was hypothesized that those who feel that a person's success in life is mostly due to his own hard work would tend more to see a need for birth control; in fact no SSR exists. Since belief that family planning is not necessary is a traditional attitude, it was expected to relate directly to beliefs in witches and ngozis; no SSR emerges. It is possible that two conflicting tendencies are responsible for this: those who hold more traditional attitudes tend to be less alienated from the extant social order than those who have an Africanist political orientation. But for different reasons, both oppose birth control.[41]

At this point a summary variable of traditional attitudes was generated; its relationship with attitudes on birth control proved to be non-linear, with those feeling the

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[41] Africanists also tend to be ambivalent in their attitudes to traditional beliefs. See also the opinion of Chavundka (section 3.5.1) that traditional opposition to family planning is subject to modification.

need great and those feeling it non-existent having given more traditional responses than those whose responses to the need question were in the middle. This explains some of the surprising bivariant results, but does nothing to answer the question as to why this non-linear relationship with traditionalism exists.

One expected relationship that in fact is reasonably strong is the direct one between awareness of how fast Rhodesia's population is growing and the need for birth control. The education system can be faulted for failing to make many African teacher trainees aware of the existence of one of the country's greatest problems.

3.7.1 Interviews

I only asked questions concerning family planning a few times, partly because the Ministry of Education was raising no objections to a couple of questionnaire queries on this subject and partly because female trainees seemed embarrassed to discuss it. One did say that attitudes would have to change but that the change would neither be rapid nor easy--nor was it likely to occur as long as there are large areas of underutilized land reserved for Europeans. After one of the other girls had prompted her in Shona, she added that the fact that many measure a man's importance by the number of his children was also a problem. Several male

trainees expressed the opinion that availability of birth control methods merely encouraged "loose women." When specifically asked about "loose men," one added it probably would encourage them also. He promptly changed the subject.

In summary, the belief that population stability was necessary for progress was far from firmly implanted in African teacher trainees; several information sources that were expected to increase this belief mostly either show no influence or have an influence in the opposite to expected direction; female comprehension of the problem is substantially greater than male.

3.8 MEDIA EXPOSURE AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Frequency of exposure to media sources is hypothesized to be related to changing attitudes, with those most exposed expected to have the most 'modern' orientations. Results are shown in Table 3:10.

Those born of other than a father's first wife read and hear about current events less than those born of first wives.

Those who feel that various people have influenced their views on social and political issues, and those who would favor more discussion of such issues in the schools, are also the trainees who report greater media exposure. A common

TABLE 3:10 Read and hear about current problems

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
AGE		No significant relationships				
NOWIVES		No significant relationships				
MOTHERNO	.0010	.0028	.0210	-	.0211	.0440
BOARDING		No significant relationships				
CLASRANK		No significant relationships				
FACHURCH		No significant relationships				
MOCHURCH		No significant relationships				
STCHURCH	.3521	.0795	.7188	-	.0073	.0105
CHILDREN	.0850	.6032	.0479	-	.0006	.0191
OLDER		No significant relationships				
FAEDCATN		No significant relationships				
MOEDCATN		No significant relationships				
PARCASH		No significant relationships				
GROUPFA		No significant relationships				
GROUPMO		No significant relationships				
GROUPST		No significant relationships				
PRIEST	.1132	.0085	.9133	-	.0162	.0174
CHIEF	.0247	.0074	.2583	-	.0166	.0259
PTEACH	.4692	.0994	.8406	-	.0064	.0084
STEACH	.0583	.0076	.5735	-	.0168	.0214
CTEACH	.1101	.0566	.2706	-	.0085	.0176
PARENTS	.1272	.0740	.2624	-	.0075	.0168
AUNTUNCL	.0207	.0123	.1461	-	.0145	.0269
SIBLINGS	.0489	.0615	.1081	-	.0082	.0224
FRIENDS	.0235	.0102	.1918	-	.0153	.0263
OBSERVAT		No significant relationships				
PTEXTS		No significant relationships				
STEXTS	.0020	.0292	.0065	-	.0109	.0394
CTEXTS		No significant relationships				
RELIGBKS		No significant relationships				
MAGAZINS		No significant relationships				
NEWSPAPR		No significant relationships				
BOOKS		No significant relationships				
POLPAMPH		No significant relationships				
RBCRADTV	.0734	.0055	.8396	-	.0180	.0200

TABLE 3:10 (continued)

Variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
INTEREST	.2762	.0267	.9799	-	.0117	.0121
FASATISF	.3245	.0657	.7375	-	.0081	.0111
MOSATISF	No significant relationships					
PEOPLE2X	.0221	.0152	.1338	-	.0136	.0265
HARDWORK	No significant relationships					
FAIRTRET	No significant relationships					
MORTALKP	.0866	.0185	.4566	-	.0134	.0197
MORTALKS	.0790	.0053	.8999	-	.0188	.0202
MORTALKC	.1764	.0231	.7630	-	.0125	.0153
COURTEUS	No significant relationships					
MCHMONEY	No significant relationships					
ADVICE	No significant relationships					
COYBOSS	.1056	.0093	.8326	+	.0161	.0181
LOCCONCL	No significant relationships					
CLUBPRES	.3935	.0744	.8240	-	.0076	.0098
VARSTYED	.0440	.0045	.6336	-	.0188	.0228
RESPECT	No significant relationships					
NEWCAR	.1227	.4144	.0860	+	.0016	.0173
HOMETALK	.1271	.0753	.2591	-	.0074	.0168
UINFLNCE	No significant relationships					
HOMEHAPY	.1389	.5608	.0857	-	.0008	.0162
PCHRULE	.1936	.0883	.3650	-	.0068	.0143
SCHRULE	.0251	.0279	.0958	-	.0113	.0262
CCHRULE	.0609	.1803	.0650	-	.0042	.0213
READHEAR	.0546	.0721	.1084	+	.0075	.0217
NORACIAL	No significant relationships					
TRADITON	.0000	.0000	.6681	+	.0790	.0826

dimension of greater interest in and awareness of the world around them would explain these responses covarying.

Those who felt that they had an opportunity to participate in decisions in the home also read and heard about current affairs more than other trainees. It is possible that there is a causal relationship between being involved in weighing alternatives in home decision-making and in keeping abreast of what is going on around one--so that weighing alternatives on issues of community and national concern can also be done.

3.9 IMPLICATIONS

No group painlessly undergoes the sort of transformation that rural Rhodesian African trainees are experiencing. It is well described by Harper (1959, pp. 1-5):

> [T]he village mission schools [are] where the conflict begins. The African teachers for these schools are trained in the mission teacher training schools. These training schools are similar to the plan used in the European countries where they originated. These training programs are transplanted into the African culture without being adapted to the indigenous culture. When the African student has completed his training and returns to the village, he follows the cultural ways he has borrowed, rather than following his own indigenous cultural ways. Intense conflict and anxiety are observed in the mind of the teacher as he is continually meeting resistance to his program from the villagers; however, much of the resistance is to him rather than to the innovation in the program. The African teacher appears to be a marginal man, "walking a tight rope," as it were, between two cultures, trying to make the village school a replica of the European

> school. Since the villagers resist so strongly, the teacher loses his bearings and becomes disturbed in his personality. Resistance from the villagers to a new educational system and the inability of the teacher to readjust to village life create the need to assess the preparation of the African teacher. The academic training is successful in helping students pass the government examinations and [acquire] certification, but the question arises as to whether it is adequate in preparing the students to teach in the villages.
> . . . . . .
> When the mission schools fail to take into account the broader cultural ways, they produce educated Africans who have no place in either the tribal world or the European community.

I could not help being impressed, especially at the smaller, more isolated TTCs, how narrow a window on the world trainees were acquiring. But later, comparing the generally more optimistic outlook of these trainees with the corrosive alienation that had set in amongst many Africans at the University, I concluded that there is a lot to be said for the gradualist approach. Partridge (1961, pp. 48-49) has similar feelings:

> When they first came to us they were students of sixteen or so, most of them from bush schools, unacquainted with libraries or newspapers, movies or market places or any other of the educative influences in a town child's life. . . . What can they learn in two years . . . ? [RT: Now three years.]
> A miserably inadequate preparation this, for teaching in an isolated primitive community with a minimum of equipment and hardly any experienced and informed assistance from head teacher or school manager. Yet these are the people who have made more than half the Africans in their land literate, literate in two languages. . . . Had they been matriculants they would not have done as well; their people would have been too far behind, they themselves too far ahead for any effective leadership to take place.

Others have suggested that the pace and magnitude of change tend to overwhelm tribal Africans; Drury (1967) believes that trainees adjust better at smaller TTCs; Thomas (1964) contrasts the relatively good race relations in the large town of Umtali with those in the cities of Salisbury and Bulawayo; Haw (1967) believes that a period of consolidation of the changes already made would be more beneficial than the quickening pace that had developed by the mid-1960s. These Rhodesian observations conform with the general thesis of Huntington (1968) that, while a society with an educated, urbanized middle class is the most stable, reaching that point is a process filled with destabilizing situations.[42]

Although the Rhodesian regime's opponents characterize it as a uniquely evil society, I am struck by how closely what I (and others) found in Rhodesia corresponds with the findings of several other studies of education elsewhere in Africa; just change a few proper nouns and much of Jane Kessler's (1958) study of education in Senegal could as easily have been written about Rhodesia. While it is outside the scope of this study to evaluate the extent to which the

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[42]Kileff (1975) discusses how even 'close to the people' African teachers have difficulties handling some situations, such as when a first grader is "The Rebirth of Grandfather's Spirit," and must be accorded the special treatment and vocabulary reserved for a tribal elder if he is to participate constructively in classroom activity.

experiences of Africans in Rhodesian teachers training is unique, I have no hesitation in concluding that, in many respects, the Rhodesian case is anything but atypical.

CHAPTER 4

TRAINEES' POLITICAL POSITION

4.1 WHY TRAINEES' ATTITUDES ARE BELIEVED TO BE IMPORTANT

In a review of world-wide student activism in the 1960s and early 1970s, Lipset (1971, pp. 50, 61) concludes:

> [S]tudents have played a major role in stimulating unrest and fostering change in many countries.
>
> Although it may be argued that student activism is the result rather than the cause of social discontent, it is important to recognize that student groups, once activated, have played a major role in mobilizing public opinion . . . . Social unrest causes student unrest, but once students and intellectuals start expressing their disquiet, they have been in many ways the vanguard of revolution.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Any efforts to analyze the future of politics, whether on the domestic or international scene, will ignore the students at the peril of being in error.

Rhodesian educational authorities--in some respects at least--were attempting to prevent this activism by pretending in the schools that politics does not exist. When I quoted a statement by an official of the African Division of the Ministry of Education to the effect that they were not concerned with politics, a faculty member in the University of Rhodesia's Institute of Education burst out laughing and remarked that he believed they seldom thought of anything else. Whether this was true or not, there were good reasons

that they should have been concerned with the political orientations that trainees were developing.

Trainees were just finishing their period as pupils in the Rhodesian educational system. Their views thus give an indication of the socialization they have received. Soon they will be taking their places as teachers; so their views are an indication of the socialization message they will convey to their pupils. Trainees who do not stay in education will presumably leave for more elite positions.

Clignet and Foster (1966, p. 201) state:

> Few observers of the African scene have failed to notice the extraordinarily humble origin of many contemporary leaders in politics and other realms of behavior. . . . [T]he local mission or government school seems to have played a salient part in facilitating their upward mobility.

Even in settler-ruled Rhodesia, Weinrich (1973, pp. 38, 100) finds:

> Teachers occupy key positions in Karangaland. Not only do they bring more money into local circulation than any other group, but they are also looked up to socially as leaders, especially in the political sphere, and their ideas and values influence many peasant farmers.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Many Europeans consider the emergent African elite as unrepresentative of African society. In doing so they overlook one of the dynamic factors working for the transformation of the country in which they live. For African society is changing rapidly in spite of government policies which try to arrest social change and to foster the traditional African life.

In addition to their importance after certification, post-primary pupils have influenced political developments in many countries, including Rhodesia. Although Thomas (1968, p. 54) specifically mentions only secondary schools in the following remarks, they are also applicable to the TTCs in the early 1960s--a situation that the Government was determined to prevent from redeveloping:

> Politics in the schools. It was natural that secondary students and their teachers should be swept up in the rising tide of African nationalism in Rhodesia. Among party militants and African teachers were those who had studied together in South Africa. Both had drunk from the same fountain of history--of Luther and Lincoln, of the Bill of Rights and the Manifesto [see Sithole, 1959, p. 59]. Little did most missionaries realize that their teaching of the dignity of man under the fatherhood of God would develop that self-respect and self-consciousness among Africans which is the seedbed of nationalism.
>
> Among students nationalism was a heady wine. When political parties began recruiting in schools, saying, "join with us to throw off the yoke of European authority," students resented first the authority of their missionary (and even African) teachers. A climax came in September 1962 when student riots erupted in protest against the banning of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. Reprisals were swift and effective. More influential than the expulsion of student ringleaders at Old Umtali and Chikore was the government's threat to close the schools if further disorders occurred. Even the nationalist leader, the Rev. N. Sithole, counselled students, saying, "Your only job is to study, preparing yourselves to be future leaders. Leave the political struggle to your elders."

Atkinson (1972, p. 184) concludes:

> The situation in African schools appears to have played an important part in motivating the right-wing reaction which resulted in replacement of Winston Field

by Ian Smith as Prime Minister of Rhodesia [on 13 April 1964].

Thus it appears that Africans in and with secondary and higher education are, generally, politically aware, and that that awareness has had political consequences and is likely to have even more political consequences in the future.

4.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE RACES

As was the case in discussing cultural questions, a comparison of European and African responses to political questions will be followed by more detailed examination of African replies.

4.2.1 'Taught In School' Emphasis Variations

The questionnaire contained 15 things possibly important for political socialization that might be emphasized in school. Trainees were asked whether MUCH attention, SOME attention, LITTLE attention or NO attention was paid to each at the primary, secondary and post-secondary (i.e., college) level. Table 4:1 reports means, and rank of "MUCH attention" responses, for each subject at each level.

The fact that most Africans receive their schooling at church-run establishments while most Europeans go to government schools easily explains the difference in rankings

TABLE 4:1 Mean and MUCH attention rank of taught in school emphases, by race and level of school

Subj ect#	Primary School				Secondary School				College			
	African		European		African		European		African		European	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
A	1.46	1	1.86	1	1.55	1	1.83	2	1.5	1	2.09	3
B	1.61	3	2.68	5	1.62	2	2.57	6	1.5	2	3.13	8
C	2.17	8	2.41	6	1.90	5	2.13	5	1.5	3	1.89	1
D	1.61	2	1.98	2	1.71	3	1.95	1	1.6	4	2.13	2
E	2.07	5	2.37	4	2.05	6	2.33	4	1.8	5	2.41	5
F	2.19	4	3.03	7	2.05	4	2.96	9	1.8	6	3.14	9
G	2.71	11	3.06	9	2.47	2	2.70	7	1.9	7	2.84	7
H	2.38	7	2.91	8	2.19	8	2.79	8	2.0	8	2.90	6
I	2.29	6	2.26	3	2.14	7	2.16	3	2.1	9	2.47	4
J	2.74	10	3.54	11	2.35	9	3.28	12	2.2	10	3.35	11
K	2.64	12	3.57	12	2.25	11	3.24	10	2.1	11	3.38	12
L	2.78	13	3.64	13	2.58	14	3.18	14	2.2	12	3.28	14
M	2.88	15	3.65	14	2.58	13	3.35	13	2.3	13	3.28	13
N	2.61	9	3.32	10	2.28	10	3.22	11	2.33	14	3.32	10
O	2.93	14	3.65	15	2.76	15	3.48	15	2.60	15	3.44	15

Q2.7-51 (questions 7 thru 51 on card 2).

#A = Respect those in authority.
B = Importance of religion in contemporary life.
C = Respect the right of others to have opinions different from yours.
D = Always obey the law.
E = Always be polite, especially with people of other races.
F = Love your country.
G = Tolerate different religions.
H = Role of Africans in Rhodesian history.
I = Role of Europeans in Rhodesian history.
J = Rhodesian history, 1964 to present.
K = Other African history, 1945+.
L = Rhodesian local government.
M = Rhodesian national government.
N = Rhodesian history, 1945-1963.
O = Have faith in Rhodesia's leaders.

Order of subjects in table determined by African trainees' "much attention" responses. Rank is based on "much attention" responses only, whereas the means are based on all responses. If all students had replied "much attention," mean would be 1.00; if all had replied "no attention," mean would be 4.00.

of "the importance of religion in contemporary life."

My analysis of books in use in African classrooms shows they tend to place considerable emphasis on Africans' roles in Rhodesian society. So the difference in ranking of "the role of Africans in Rhodesian's history" is probably an objective assessment of the relative emphases the subject receives in the two school systems.

The only other subject for which there is considerable difference in rankings (three to five places) between the ethnic groups is "love your country." Since those who desire a radically different social and political order for Rhodesia aim their appeal principally at the African, the educational authorities probably consider special emphasis on patriotism more important in the African Division than in the European. In both systems, the patriotic emphasis is diffuse rather than directed towards the specifics of the Rhodesian political system: thus, although "Respect those in positions of authority" (which, of course, includes non-political authority) and "Always obey the law" are at the top of the list for both races, how the Rhodesian local and national governments work are next to the bottom for both and "Have faith in Rhodesia's leaders" is the lowest ranked item for both Europeans and Africans.

Variations amongst educational levels seem very limited except for two topics involving toleration: "Be tolerant of different religious beliefs" and "Respect the right of others to have opinions different from yours." The concepts involved in both of these are of such a nature as to be grasped better by post-primary pupils, so the emphasis difference amongst educational levels probably does not represent any major difference in belief of the educators at the different levels. It should be reiterated that what was asked was the emphasis actually given to the various subjects in the schools the trainees had attended, not students' feelings concerning their importance. As shown in Table 4:2, these 45 questions do not indicate any great differences between the two educational systems.

4.2.2 Socializing Influence Of People, Books And The Media

Tables 4:3 and 4:4 show trainees responses to the following question: "In developing attitudes towards any question, an individual is influenced by the information he receives and by the opinions of others. Please indicate the degree to which each of the following has influenced your attitudes on the best way for Rhodesian society to be organized and for the country to be governed." There were 10 personal categories and 10 impersonal sources listed, along with the opportunity to write in additional sources.

TABLE 4:2 Percentages saying MUCH ATTENTION for taught in school subjects, by level and race

Subject	Primary		Secondary		College	
	Europ.	Afric.	Europ.	Afric.	Europ.	Afric.
Faith in leaders	0.8	18.0	1.6	18.9	1.6	25.1
Tolerate different opinions	15.0	35.2	22.8	41.4	41.7	68.0
Always be polite	22.5	43.0	22.5	39.5	22.7	53.7
Always obey the law	39.5	66.9	39.5	56.1	34.1	60.3
National gov.taught	3.1	17.4	4.7	21.9	3.9	33.7
Local gov. taught	2.4	20.3	3.2	19.9	3.2	36.1
Religion important	14.8	63.6	18.8	60.1	8.6	70.5
Tolerate other religions	7.8	21.9	12.4	25.4	10.9	51.0
Love country	11.1	43.9	9.5	45.1	7.1	52.9
Respect authorities	40.3	74.8	37.2	65.3	27.1	71.4
Africans in history	8.7	37.6	8.7	36.3	12.6	48.3
Europeans in history	26.0	37.3	25.2	39.5	23.6	41.9
Rhodesian history, 1945-63	5.6	26.5	4.8	30.8	23.6	41.9
Rhodesian history, 1964 to present	3.3	23.8	4.1	31.5	5.7	41.1
African hist., 1945+	2.4	21.4	6.5	28.5	5.7	37.3

Q2.7-51.

TABLE 4:3 Personal influences on political attitudes: greatly influential percentages and ranks

Influence	Africans		Europeans	
	Rank	%	Rank	%
Personal observations	1	66.8	1	69.0
Parents	2	52.7	2	53.0
College teachers	3	51.2	7	5.0
Friends own age	4	46.8	3	16.9
Religious leader	5	44.4	8	4.6
Secondary teachers	6	38.0	5	12.2
Primary teachers	7	35.4	6	6.1
Brothers and sisters	8	32.0	4	13.1
Aunts and uncles	9	17.8	9	3.9
Tribal chief or headman	10	11.4	10	1.0

Q3.7-16

TABLE 4:4 Text and media influences on political attitudes: greatly influential percentages and ranks

Influence	Africans Rank	Africans %	Europeans Rank	Europeans %
College texts	1	49.4	2	14.8
Non-assigned books	2	46.9	1	25.1
Religious literature	3	43.7	7	5.5
Foreign radio broadcasts	4	42.0	8	3.9
Newspapers	5	40.0	8	3.0
Magazines (non-religious)	6	39.4	6	7.7
Secondary textbooks	7	39.2	10	3.1
Soc. & Pol. organ. publications	8	39.0	5	8.5
Rhodesia radio and television	9	33.0	4	9.2
Primary school textbooks	10	19.0	9	3.8

Q3.22-31.

With the exception of "your own personal observations" (and, by an insignificant margin, "your parents"), a higher percentage of Africans considered every source greatly influential.[43] So comparative rank orders are probably more interesting than comparison of percentages.

Why should college teachers be seventh in European rankings--below primary and secondary teachers--when they are third in African rankings? Most political socialization studies so far completed have been done in the United States; findings from some of them suggest a possible reason. A study of urban American White children concludes:

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[43]This is what one would expect from White and Negro data from the United States (see Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 151-52).

> Every piece of evidence indicates that the child's political world begins to take shape well before he even enters elementary school and that it undergoes the most rapid change during these [elementary school] years. (Easton and Hess, 1962, p. 235).

By the time American students reach secondary school:

> For the white student, the material presented in a [high school] civics course is more or less redundant; he has heard it all before. For many Negro students, on the other hand, the material is new and presents them with political images and ideas that have not yet been part of their socialization experiences. (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, p. 152)

Since on the average differences in home environment between races in America are less than those in Rhodesia, it seems reasonable to suggest that the home atmosphere of the average Rhodesian European trainee provides more politically socializing information and experiences than the average African trainee's home. So political maturation probably comes later for the African student. In Rhodesia Weinrich (1971, p. 97) has observed: "There seems to be a consistent correlation between upper primary and lower secondary education and African nationalism." Gann (1972) considers African students at the University amongst the country's most politically alienated residents. Thus the political maturation that education seems to provide the Rhodesian African student in many cases is of exactly the opposite nature to the one that the Government which is largely paying for their education desires.

For my sample, modal secondary education for Africans is two years, for Europeans, five.[44] So it is not surprising that secondary school had a relatively greater impact than college for the Europeans.

Adding credence to the hypothesis that European parents are more important in the political socialization process than African parents is the fact that several other personal influences received nearly as many "greatly influential" responses from Africans, while no other personal category (excepting own personal observations) got a third as many European "greatly influential" responses as parents did. A rank of fourth for European brothers and sisters versus one of eighth for African siblings is additional evidence of the greater importance of the European home as a socializing influence.

The extended family is often considered of considerable importance in African society. "Both the paternal aunt and the paternal uncle are highly respected and hold authoritative positions in the Shona family circle." (Gelfand, 1973, p. 36). Thus the low African ranking for aunts and uncles is surprising.

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[44]Two or fewer years of secondary school were reported by 68.7% of African trainees; five or more by 95.2% of Europeans. Had responses been received from African T2s (minimum entry requirement: Cambridge School Certificate) or T1s (5 'O' level passes required, including the English language), this disparity would not be nearly as great.

4.2.3 Media Exposure And Discussion Of Current Events

Both races report surprisingly high frequencies for reading newspapers and news-magazines: 62.9% of the European and 20.6% of the African trainees report that they do so daily, with an additional 25.8% of the Europeans and 48.5% of the Africans saying that they do so several times a week. Although the question asks: "on the average during the last year . . .," it is possible that some students responded in terms of then-current behavior. The questionnaires were given during the final days of negotiations for the 1971 'settlement' with Britain, so Rhodesian interest in news was exceptionally high. However, Vambe (1976, pp. 120-21) reports the same high interest when he was at Kutama TTC:

> We read and listened almost as much as the settlers did. However hard the Rhodesian Government tried to keep us immune from influences, it could not regulate our thinking.
>
> When I was a student at Kutama, we read every newspaper from cover to cover. We also used to gather in the evenings outside Father O'Hea's office [the headmaster's office] and listen to the world news from his radio . . . .

Over a fifth of the trainees (22.9% of Europeans, 20.4% of Africans) reported that they daily "talked with other people about current events, public affairs, and other questions of general social importance"; an additional 26.0% of the Europeans and 38.9% of the Africans responded that they engaged in such conversations several times a week.

Mlambo (1972, p. 100) suggests that Africans often embarrass Europeans by knowing more about Rhodesian political matters than they do. Partridge (1961, p. 33) writes that greater attention to politics by educated Africans has been a regular feature of the Rhodesian political scene:

> Europeans in this country are neither expert nor informed on political questions, whereas most educated Africans are both, able to quote not only chapter and verse but statute and regulation.

Trainees were also frequent listeners to Radio Rhodesia, with 49.0% of Africans and 58.3% of Europeans listening daily and 31.9% of Africans and 12.9% of Europeans listening several times a week.[45]

Africans report a higher frequency of reading "magazines that discuss current events and questions of general social or political importance": 49.8% read one a least once a week, only 25.7% rarely or never; comparable European figures are 36.0% at least weekly and 33.6% rarely or never. A possible reason is that there were at least three news-magazines catering to Africans (African Times, Moto, and Umbowo) while there was only one roughly comparable publication for Europeans (Rhodesian Financial Gazette). The Citizen and, especially, Property & Finance appealed to

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[45]A question concerning frequency of watching Rhodesian Television is not analyzed because too few African trainees had access to a receiver.

conservative adults and seemed to attract little trainee readership; Illustrated Life Rhodesia--similar to, though smaller than, America's Life--infrequently considered basic political questions--at least prior to 1973.

4.2.4 Discussion Of Future Government Proposals

People who had influenced trainees' political and social attitudes have already been considered. A related but separate set of questions mentioned nine categories of person and asked which ones the respondent would be likely to consult on important national and local government policies. Table 4:5 summarizes the results.

TABLE 4:5 People with whom respondents would be "very likely" to discuss government proposals

	National Gov. proposal				Local Gov. proposal			
	Africans		Europeans		Africans		Europeans	
Person	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%
Friends your own age	1	71.2	2	66.7	1	64.2	2	64.9
Brothers and sisters	2	55.3	3	66.7	3	52.6	3	49.5
Parents	3	53.1	1	76.3	2	55.0	1	75.4
Religious leader	4	43.3	7	6.3	6	33.1	7	7.1
Teachers	5	40.2	4	19.3	4	38.1	4	18.3
Aunts and uncles	6	37.9	5	14.3	5	37.7	5	15.2
District commissioners or other civil servant	7	26.1	6	10.8	7	28.0	6	11.7
Tribal chief or headman	8	20.5	8	3.1	8	27.6	8	4.2
A nganga [witchdoctor]	9	11.0	9	2.4	9	12.2	9	2.4

Q4.22-39.

Less knowledge of modern government and lower educational attainment of typical African parents probably account for the lesser tendency of African trainees to turn to their parents for political guidance. The much higher percentage of Africans indicating they would probably consult their teachers and religious leaders perhaps indicates they serve as 'educated substitutes' for relatively poorly educated African parents.

Since tribal chiefs deal mainly if not exclusively with local problems (important exceptions include 10 Senators who were chiefs), it is not surprising that trainees would turn to most chiefs more on local matters than national ones. Yet 32.7% of African trainees say that they definitely would not consult a chief on a national issue and 32.1% definitely would not consult one on a local issue. Chiefs' low ranking both as previous influences and as people to turn to for counsel in the future indicated that most new teachers tend not to hold traditional authorities in especially high esteem.

The humble background of most trainees has already been mentioned; Weinrich (1965, pp. 149-51) relates this to the typically poor relations between chiefs and teachers in the TTLs where she did field work:

> Houses [=extended families] . . . which have little or no chance of providing a chief, have all endeavoured to have one or more of their sons trained as teachers.
>
> This absence of teachers in the important traditional houses is all the more surprising since the position of a teacher, especially that of a headteacher, confers great prestige and carries considerably [sic] local influence.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> [Teachers'] relations with chiefs are tenuous and often animosity exists between chiefs and teachers; for chiefs tend to impose higher fines on teachers when they come as litigants to their courts because they are only distant relatives, and above all because they are believed to be rich through their regular salaries. Teachers therefore tend to become opposed to chiefs. On the other hand, teachers today are often the most honoured people in their rural communities. Although frequently very young, more deference is shown to them than even to their elders.

4.2.5 Current Events And Their Discussion In School

When asked to compare interest in current events and questions of social importance with that of classmates, 16.9% of European respondents felt they have above average interest, 75.4% about average and 7.7% below average; for Africans, the percentages are 35.5%, 59.8% and 4.7% respectively.

At all three school levels--as Table 4:6 shows--Africans feel that discussion opportunities are greater than European trainees do. But the differences decrease considerably the higher up one goes on the educational ladder. It should be noted that these measures are based on the students' own individual perceptions of 'considerable' etc. Many observers believe that participation by youth in

discussions of political and social questions conforms much more to European than to African norms--thus it is entirely possible that the actual level of discussion opportunity is equal or greater in the European trainees' educational experience. On the other hand, others felt that by the 1960s modern politics had become a matter of such concern to the African community that discussions both in and out of school may actually have been more frequent and lengthy for evolving Africans than for Europeans.

TABLE 4:6 Opportunities for discussion of current events

School level	African percentages			European percentages		
	Considerable	Moderate	Little or none	Considerable	Moderate	Little or none
Primary	21.0	38.1	40.8	3.2	34.7	62.1
Secondary	34.6	47.1	18.3	20.2	59.7	20.2
College	60.3	22.2	14.8	59.5	36.4	4.1

4.2.6 The Non-teaching Of Political Subjects

My finding that there was little attention to current events, political and economic questions in Rhodesian education prior to university-level study conforms with the findings of other researchers in Rhodesia:

> One who hopes to find church high schools to be strong training grounds for democracy is doomed to disappointment. The prevalent philosophy of benevolent

> paternalism parallels that of the government. Teachers place high priority on instilling attitudes of obedience to authority. Staff members usually choose the school captains and prefects to lead the students. No school studied has a student council. An Old Umtali student government, nutured in former years by missionary staff members, was abolished in 1961 when African teachers opposed granting freedom to students to express criticisms of staff and school policies through a student council. Student organizations and activities are usually supervised closely by staff members. Nevertheless, student religious groups and sports committees do provide a modicum of opportunities for student initiative and leadership.
>
> The traditional pattern is exemplified by the Monte Cassino High School (RC). There nuns choose the prefects and direct and supervise all student activities, "because African prefects will not take responsibility." As a result school prefects are viewed more as representatives of staff than of students. (Thomas, 1968, pp. 48-49).

Not only is there a lack of practical training in democratic behavior. A lack of formal instruction in how democracy should work is also evident; how that lack developed, and the dilemma faced by educators in remedying that lack are all well conveyed in the following quotation:

> Education for citizenship? Does the classroom provide an opportunity for training of future citizens? During the first fifty years of African education in Rhodesia, missions were free to develop syllabi and to produce textbooks within broad outlines provided by the government. The latter included by 1925 the teaching of "rights and duties of natives" to Standard 4 history students (Report of the Commission on Native Education, 1925, p. 57). Two years earlier the Umtali Native Commissioner could report:
>
> "Lessons are given at both institutions [Old Umtali and St. Augustine's] in Civics: and every opportunity seems to be taken to impress on the natives the advantages of living under a beneficent Government which not only allows but gives them every encouragement and assistance in their efforts to rise in the scale of civilization." . . . [Quoted from a

> report by the Native Commissioner, Umtali, in 1923].
>
> As the government began to produce syllabi the study of civics was omitted. Concentration upon colonial history left no time for the discussion of contemporary competing ideologies of communism, socialism, fascism, nationalism, and democracy. Students learned more about the governments of Canada or Australia than they did of their own country.
>
> Today there is a growing awareness of this deficiency. Protestant leaders have admitted that "among the people of the country there is inadequate knowledge of the functions and methods of government, which should be remedied by a considerable extension of the teaching of civics in all schools." Roman Catholic educators concur: "Students should be given correct ideas on nationalism and patriotism. The teaching should be realistic, through discussion and interpretation of current news and views in modern Africa." (Seminar on Catholic Education, 1963, p. 144).
>
> Still the dilemma remains in Rhodesia--what brand of "nationalism" or "patriotism" shall be taught? The European minority prefer new textbooks which extol the unilateral declaration of independence as "a blow struck for civilisation and Christianity." African nationalists would teach "one man one vote" as the essence of democracy. (Entire quotation, including references to other sources, from Thomas, 1968, pp. 49-51).

Several TTC professors indicated to me that the discussion of political questions continues at their schools in extra-curricular debating clubs, where there is a conscious effort to apply rules of evidence and logic. 'Bull session' discussions were discouraged because they were too prone to degenerate into emotive outbursts that upset all concerned without doing much to further understanding of the issues and alternatives involved.

At some TTCs, the attitude to political and social questions seemed more, 'if we ignore them, maybe they will go

away.' Gobbett's (1969) description of social studies in the formal curriculum at most Rhodesian TTCs indicates that they are not taught as an important subject:

> Social Studies is usually regarded as a composite of History, Geography, and Civics (whatever this may be) and may be taught by the Physical Education specialist.

Gobbett continues that, at the largest T3 and T4 college (United College of Education, Bulawayo [UCE]) social studies is broader than this, with "Anthropology, Economics, Politics, Sociology and Theology" added. Although he finds this approach superior, one may wonder if the result is not an even more superficial skimming of the material involved.

Table 4:7 shows that most Africans would encourage more student discussion than they remember in their schools. This is also true for Europeans at the primary and secondary levels; but for college, a bare majority of Whites feel that the amount of discussion was about right.

Studies in other countries have shown that basic orientations on political questions are formed in the early teens and younger. If we assume these findings also hold for Rhodesia, it is not surprising that Rhodesian trainees feel that more discussion of political and social questions would be desirable. The relative lack of other political socializing experiences for members of less advantaged groups could, if also present in Rhodesia, easily explain at least

in part the continued desire for more discussion at the teachers training level by 69.9% of Africans but only 47.6% of Europeans. Another possible explanation is that educated Africans' political interest *is* higher than Europeans', a position taken by, *inter alia*, Mlambo, Partridge, and Vambe.

A much higher percentage of Africans (11.7% vs. 0.8%) feel that the training institutions have too much discussion of political, social and current affairs questions. This strongly suggests, but does not prove, that some TTC teachers (in the African sector) deviated from the assigned syllabus to present their own political views, or at least did not discourage activist trainees from leading class discussions in that direction.

TABLE 4:7 Comparison of the amount of discussion trainees would encourage with amount occurring while they studied

Amount of discussion respondent would like	African percentages			European percentages		
	Primary	Secondary	College	Primary	Secondary	College
More	69.0	66.1	69.9	70.0	72.9	47.6
About same	20.6	26.4	18.4	27.7	27.1	51.6
Less	10.4	7.5	11.7	2.3	0.0	0.8

4.2.7 Rhodesian Vs. Foreign Radio Stations

Questions concerning specific foreign radio stations were disallowed by the African Inspectorate. Apparently this was a source of considerable worry for the Government, so much so that it began a nationwide FM network, because the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) on medium and short wave often comes in more poorly in some areas than hostile programming from OAU and Communist bloc countries (RH, 18.8.72). Before the FM service began full-time operation in January 1975, over a million Africans listened to the RBC every day (RH, 3.1.75); no reliable estimate of the number listening to foreign stations is available. My discussions with a number of Africans lead me to believe that a substantial portion of trainees and other educated Africans listen to foreign broadcasts on occasion, although most would spend more hours listening to the RBC. Except for the most alienated Rhodesians, the political harangues and incitements to violence by terrorist leaders appear not to be listened to regularly by many. A number of quite alienated trainees said that the guerrilla broadcasts were no more, or even less, reliable sources of information than the RBC.

How important do trainees consider foreign broadcasts in influencing their attitudes "on the best way for Rhodesian society to be organized and for the country to be governed?" In that the government was paying most of the costs of their

education, hired the inspectors who determined which trainees received teaching certificates, paid the salaries and determined the conditions of service for teachers, and was--rightly or wrongly--believed to have an extensive network of informers, I had some fears about systematic errors in response to such questions as frequency of listening to and influence of foreign radio. However, even when one keeps in mind that African trainees indicated every printed and other media source was reported to be much more influential by Africans than by Europeans, the 42.0% of Africans who consider foreign radio greatly influential of their political and social views looms large in comparison with the 3.9% of European trainees who also indicated greatly influential. Cross-tabulation of RBC influence with foreign broadcasts' influence, as reported in Table 4:8, still shows a considerable difference between the ethnic groups, albeit much more modest than the raw figures indicate. The questionnaire contained several blanks where trainees could write in other information and attitude sources. Very few listed stations in radical countries. The BBC, South African stations and stations in then-friendly Mocambique were more frequently mentioned. However, some trainees would have been even more reluctant to put on paper that they listen to radical stations than they were in off the record interviews. The authorities at one TTC refused to allow

their trainees to answer the questionnaire query on foreign radio--which is probably more revealing than the lost responses would have been!

TABLE 4:8 Influence of the RBC compared with foreign radio

Influence	Africans	Europeans
Radio Rhodesia greater	27.1	39.4
About equal	40.5	50.0
Foreign broadcasts greater	32.3	10.6

Locally made radios of sufficient quality regularly to pick up stations as far away as Scituate, Massachusetts, were available for under R$30; Ray-O-Vac batteries cost less than half as much at F. W. Woolworth, Salisbury, as they cost at F. W. Woolworth, Madison, Wisconsin--the city where the home office and principal factory of Ray-O-Vac are located! So listening to the world was within the means of all but the poorest Africans.

Questions concerning perceived reliability of Rhodesian and foreign media were disallowed by the Inspectorate for African education. Stopforth's findings for Rhodesian media from urban Africans are reproduced in Table 4:9; my conversations with trainees lead me to believe that a higher percentage of them would have been skeptical about Rhodesian

broadcasting than was the case for Stopforth's sample, but that his figures are about what I would have found from trainees concerning Rhodesian newspapers. Unfortunately, he combined the two in his questionnaire; I found African skepticism about the radio's veracity considerably greater than it was for newspapers'.

TABLE 4:9 Do Highfield Africans believe what is written in newspapers and what is said over the radio?

Response	Total	Males	Females
Yes	16.1	18.2	9.5
No	19.5	21.2	14.3
Not everything	58.6	57.6	61.9
Don't know	5.7	3.0	14.3

Source: P. Stopforth (1972) Two Aspects of Social Change Highfield African Township. Salisbury, University of Rhodesia, p. 86.

4.2.8 African Village Rule Alternatives

Although questions relating to national politics were all disallowed by officials in the African Division of the Ministry of Education, they did not delete a group on local government in an African village. Results appear in Table 4:10.

TABLE 4:10 Preferences for ruling an African village and electing councillors (percentages across by race)

	African percentages				European percentages			
	Very good	Good	Satisfac tory	Poor	Very good	Good	Satisfac tory	Poor
A#	5.2	11.9	27.1	55.8	20.9	29.7	28.6	20.9
B	2.6	8.3	17.7	71.4	8.8	11.0	22.0	58.2
C	19.4	30.8	34.8	14.9	20.0	26.7	41.1	12.2
D	37.7	30.9	21.0	10.4	40.0	40.0	16.7	3.3
E	6.9	18.7	40.8	33.6	3.3	8.9	44.4	43.3
F	69.7	17.0	8.0	5.2	31.9	24.2	29.7	14.3
G	49.9	21.2	13.4	15.5	31.8	23.9	28.4	15.9
H	11.7	18.9	25.5	43.9	9.1	21.6	36.4	33.0
I	4.3	5.7	18.4	71.6	2.3	9.1	23.9	64.8
J	4.5	13.5	20.4	61.5	1.1	1.1	4.5	93.3
K	57.9	24.4	12.7	5.0	28.9	41.1	17.8	12.2

Q4.48-58.

#A = Decisions made by District Commissioner and staff (DCDECISN).

B = Decisions made by Chief alone (ONLYCHEF).

C = Decisions by Chief, Headmen and elders (CHFELDRS).

D = Decisions made by Chief, Headmen, elders and elected Councillors (ALL4).

E = Decisions made be elected Councillors alone (ELECTED).

F = Decisions made by majority vote (MAJORITY).

G = Decisions made by talking until an agreement acceptable to all is reached (CONSNSUS).

H = Voting for Councillors restricted to literates (READVOTE).

I = Voting restricted to those with annual cash income of $240+ (CASHVOTE).

J = Voting restricted to men (MENVOTE).

K = Voting by both men and women (BOTHVOTE).

It is hardly surprising that African respondents are less favorably disposed to the idea of African village rule by the District Commissioner and his staff than Europeans are. But the fact that 44.2% of African trainees consider such an arrangement at least satisfactory should dissuade one from accepting at face value statements by Africanist politicians about oppressive control of tribal areas by the central government.

In recent years the Government has tried to include elected councillors in a hybrid ruling system with the traditional rulers. This effort has so far met with perhaps as much failure as success (Weinrich, 1971). But the principle is supported by a higher percentage of both races than any other alternative. Overwhelming African support for elected councillors ruling alone is claimed by many Africanists, but is not particularly popular with most trainees. This is fortunate, for as Huntington (1968, p. 136) has observed:

> Mass participation goes hand-in-hand with authoritarian control. . . . Democracy, on the other hand, is more likely in those countries which preserve elements of traditional social and political pluralism. Its prospects are brightest where traditional pluralism is adapted to modern politics. . . .

Political and anthropological writings typically contrast traditional village decision-making processes--in which talk continues until a consensus is reached--with the

'modern' method of "Decisions made by majority vote." Thus an individual would be likely to favor majority decisions--but be less favorably disposed to requiring consensus be reached--if he had a 'modern' political outlook. If such a distinction exists amongst Rhodesian teacher trainees, the questions as asked failed to tap it. Association amongst Europeans responses to these two questions was even higher (gamma=.49) than it was for Africans (gamma=.32).

Should voting be restricted to literate people?[46] Africanists loudly proclaim 'one man one vote' as a sine qua non for any just society; many Europeans insist that, at least at present, a qualified franchise is a necessity to have qualified leadership. Differences between the trainee groups on this question are not nearly as great as one listening to the general public debate would expect, for 30.7% of Europeans consider such a qualification good or very good, while the African figure is virtually the same--30.6%.

Since 1912 (11 years before Rhodesia gained internal

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[46]African qualifications to vote in national elections under the 1969 Constitution were $400 annual income for those with two years of secondary education, $600 for other literates. A number one wife can qualify on husband's income. No income or education qualifications exist in the Local Government Act of 1961 (Passmore, 1966, pp. 25-26). In practice, some councils are traditionally chosen. "In an area where [local councils'] members are elected, all the men are voters, and women may have the vote if the inhabitants wish." (Tindall, 1970, p. 115). Tindall does not state whether or not the wishes of female inhabitants are ascertained (if so, how?) or considered in this decision, nor does she indicate what proportion of elected councils have women electors.

self-government) Rhodesia has had income qualifications for voting (Holleman, 1969, p. 24). Similar qualifications were common in the early history of most countries that are mature democracies today. How appropriate was it, in Rhodesia of 1971, to restrict voting "to those with annual cash income of R$240+?" This figure is below the then-existing African roll requirement and is less than half the starting salary for T4 teachers (R$504); it is also below average African per capita income in 1970 of $312 (Gann, 1972, p. 137). But it would exclude many Africans, including the parents of most African trainees--if their estimates of parental income are reasonably accurate.

Racial differences on income qualification are also surprisingly slight, with a $240+ minimum for local voting being considered poor by 71.6% of African trainees and by 64.8% of European respondents.

Had questions concerning national voting been possible, the number of respondents considering educational and economic qualifications appropriate for voting might have been higher. Certainly, the ability to follow distant events and persons is more enhanced by literacy than is knowledge of local community happenings and residents. Those in the moneyed economy are more affected by national government actions than are those largely outside it--the same is not necessarily true with community decisions.

Restricting voting to men is considerably less acceptable to European trainees than to African ones. Part of this difference is due to the different sexual ratios in the two trainee groups (Africans 76.0% male, Europeans 84.0% female). Fully 95.9% of European females and 70.3% of African females responded "poor." While a fairly high 81.3% of European males agreed such a restriction is poor, only 59.1% of African males answered "poor."

In summary, there is a considerable gulf between African and European trainees' responses to these political questions; but this gulf is not as great as one would expect after reading what many critics of Rhodesian society have written.

4.3 AFRICAN TRAINEES ONLY

Next is presented an analysis of the relationship, for Africans only, between political variables included in the questionnaire and other variables.

4.3.1 SES

Contrary to findings in North America and Western Europe, SES relates poorly with political variables, just as it did with cultural ones.

4.3.2 Participation In Discussions Of Current Events

As shown in Table 4:11, those who discuss current events are less optimistic about economic progress. This could be due to the discussions making the trainees more aware of the problems facing Rhodesia, or it could be due to those more worried about the future talking about it more, or both.

It appears from the sign of r in other SSRs in Table 4:11 that those who discuss more frequently are more opposed to restricted democracy alternatives (e.g., income test or educational or sexual qualifications to vote), rule by district commissioner, or election of an easy-going relative, or even a mixed elected-traditional system of village rule. But no SSR exists with relative merits of an educated vs. experienced candidate, or with whether a candidate is progressive or traditionalist.

Thus, participation seems to be related to rejection of less democratic attitudes, but not related to such things as rule by elected individuals, or to both sexes voting.

4.3.3 Talk And Hear About Current Events

Table 4:12 shows the relationships between media exposure and frequency of discusion of political questions--with political variables. Significant relationships are in favor of progressive change candidates and elected village rulers, against DC and staff ruling a

TABLE 4:11 Discussion of current events and political variables

Dependent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
PROGRESS	.3032	.0313	.9777	-	.0109	.0114
WISDOM	No significant relationships					
TRADITIN	No significant relationships					
RELATIVE	.0654	.0109	.5020	-	.0152	.0206
DCDECISN	.0277	.0168	.1563	-	.0133	.0254
ONLYCHEF	.3951	.0978	.7199	-	.0064	.0095
CHFELDRS	No significant relationships					
ALL4	.0029	.0004	.2862	-	.0285	.0370
ELECTED	No significant relationships					
MAJORITY	.0321	.0856	.0542	-	.0068	.0245
CONSNSUS	No significant relationships					
READVOTE	.1296	.3593	.0986	-	.0020	.0167
CASHVOTE	.2143	.0332	.7371	-	.0106	.0135
MENVOTE	.0088	.0005	.7039	-	.0283	.0315
BOTHVOTE	No significant relationships					

TABLE 4:12 Frequency of reading and hearing about politics and political variables

Dependent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
PROGRESS	No significant relationships					
WISDOM	No significant relationships					
TRADITIN	.0000	.0000	.0438	-	.0635	.0810
RELATIVE	No significant relationships					
DCDECISN	.0001	.0000	.3116	+	.0580	.0647
ONLYCHEF	.1190	.2967	.0921	+	.0032	.0175
CHFELDRS	No significant relationships					
ALL4	No significant relationships					
ELECTED	.1978	.0321	.9686	-	.0138	.0140
MAJORITY	No significant relationships					
CONSNSUS	.1045	.8217	.0476	-	.0001	.0183
READVOTE	No significant relationships					
CASHVOTE	No significant relationships					
MENVOTE	.0710	.1042	.1103	+	.0079	.0211
BOTHVOTE	.0796	.0767	.1607	-	.0094	.0203

village. So, to the extent there are SSRs, they suggest greater media exposure positively correlates with 'modern' political values. These correlations are as expected, because these values are favored by most media sources.

4.3.4 Media Bias[47]

In addition to effects of the quantity of media exposure, the ideological bias of sources of information was hypothesized to make a large difference in trainees' political beliefs.

A generated variable BIAS was used as the independent variable in an SPSS BREAKDOWN run, with political ones dependent. BIAS was created by assigning pro- and anti-system values to information and influence sources that could be so categorized (e.g., sources like the African Times, the Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation, and district commissioners are categorized as pro-system; Umbowo, Moto,

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[47]While it is sometimes easy to assign the labels 'dependent' and 'independent' to variables (e.g., while sex [or rather the differential roles assigned to sexes in African society] may be a causal factor in media bias (BIAS), media bias has no role in determining sex), in other instances determination is more arbitrary. Does a trainee have an anti-system bias to his news sources because he is opposed to the regime, or does he oppose the regime because he adopts the issue orientation of publications he reads and broadcasts he hears? There is no way for data such as mine to answer such a question. In short, statistically significant covariation is all that is proven in this discussion.

and political pamphlets are categorized as anti-system; sources like relatives' influences were left out because I lack information on their orientations).[48]

It is hypothesized that those with greater anti-system media exposure (BIAS) will hold values less consistent with those that the regime wishes to propogate than other trainees: They will be less favorable to birth control, be less likely to recognize how rapidly the population is expanding, be less inclined to believe that HARDWORK is the key to success, be less likely to doubt the existence of witches and ngozis, believe that economic progress is unlikely, be less influenced by or eager to consult DCs and their staffs, not favor a mixed traditional-elected political system, and be less favorable to educational and income tests for votings.

BIAS shows surprisingly few SSRs with political variables.

As expected, anti-system media BIAS correlates directly with preferring a progressive change candidate over a traditionalist, but the tendency to favor an energetic non-relative over an easy-going relative is not statistically

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[48]Attempts to categorize religious influences were dropped, partly because of the large number of denominations trainees belonged to and partly because there is considerable variation in beliefs among pastors of numerous denominations; I do not feel I have enough information to establish with confidence a rank order of churches' political activism.

significant. The expected relationship with chief alone ruling an African village was not found, with the very anti-system and very pro-system media exposure categories being more favorable to rule by traditional authorities than those with moderate BIAS. It is possible that this represents a degree of ambivalence toward traditional authorities by those with BIAS. Interviews showed that many trainees felt superior to chiefs and headmen, but they also felt too educated to wish to live in a traditional village. Thus they would not feel a chief worth consulting on any political or social issue that puzzled them, nor do they feel influenced by chiefs; but they are not especially opposed to customary methods of rule in an African village. The position of chief, being a traditional one that has been modified by circumstances, is one concerning which trainees generally have rather mixed feelings that are, on balance, much more negative than positive.

BIAS overall correlates directly with BOTHVOTE, but the strongest BIAS trainees are not as favorable; strongest BIAS individuals are disproportionately male, so sex is an intervening variable.

Several SSRs with BIAS that are not strictly political, and therefore not shown in Table 4:13, are nonetheless of potential interest.

As expected, the more anti-system the bias of trainees'

news sources, the less favorable they are to DCs and staff having major roles in ruling African villages, and the less favorable they are to an economic means test for voting.

Those with strong anti-system BIAS were, as predicted, most opposed to birth control; however, there is no SSR with knowledge of the population growth rate.

The reformist nature of much of the Rhodesian clergy is indicated in direct covariation of BIAS and likelihood to consult a religious leader on a political question. Covariations with consulting a chief and district commissioner are indirect.

BIAS and hostility to chiefs does not carry over to ngangas (witch doctors, traditional healers, herbalists--depending upon the translation one uses and the emphasis one wants)--for BIAS correlates directly with consulting a nganga. It should be mentioned that in modern times the government must approve selections of chiefs, has on occasion removed a recalcitant chief, expects them to help administer national laws as well as tribal customs, and pays them a salary. No such connection exits between the regime and ngangas, so opposite trainee responses are understandable.

It had been expected that BIAS would indirectly correlate with closeness to parents and aunts and uncles on political matters; the opposite proved true. This suggests that older generation family influence may be an important

source of political alienation. The direct relationship between BIAS and consulting with siblings and friends one's own age that was expected in fact was found.

A TTC-trained African writes:

> The notion that the tribal African, if not misled by people with Communist leanings, is apolitical, is one of the most dangerous delusions nursed by white Rhodesia. (Vambe, 1976, pp. 12-13).

For families producing trainees, my questionnaire and interviews partially support Vambe's contention although there are a number of apparently apolitical trainees, especially T4 females.

The relationship between BIAS and parents' income is significant, but non-linear, with those who believe their family's cash income to be under R$50 per year having the greatest BIAS, with upper income next, and least BIAS for middle class African trainees. Trainees from low income families are peasants aspiring to middle class status, a category Huntington (1968, p. 289) finds the most revolutionary. Trainees whose families are in the upper income category for Africans are more likely to chaff against Rhodesia's discriminatory practices. Rhodesia had jobs, schools, residential areas, etc. for middle class Africans. My observations are that it was the top 10% or so of the African middle class, who were aspiring to upper class status, who most firmly came up against the Colour Bar. Thus

these non-linear findings, while not predicted in advance, are reasonable in the light of other evidence.

While the much higher BIAS recorded for trainees who grew up in a mother-only home is consistent with Langton's Jamaican (1965) findings, no theoretical work I have examined, or any information gleamed in Rhodesia, had led me to expect BIAS to be much lower for trainees from father-only homes than for any others--yet this is the case.

The expected relationship between BIAS and urban residence is found.

Those who went to mission-run primary and secondary schools show less BIAS than those attending government schools--an initially surprising finding, especially since two of the leading anti-system publications in Rhodesia are church-run papers, Moto and Umbowo, published by the Roman Catholic and United Methodist churches respectively. I had expected that the government-run secondary schools would make greater efforts to insure that only pro-system political influences would be present there, and that this would be reflected in trainees' responses. However, when one remembers that through the 1960s opposition to the regime was more an urban than rural phenomenon (and that government primary and secondary schools are urban), this finding is understandable.[49]

Years of secondary schooling trainees had completed correlates directly with BIAS; this tends to confirm Weinrich's (1965) findings.

In summary, BIAS covaries with a number of attitudes contrary to those the regime wished its African citizens to hold. However, as shown in Table 4:13, statistically significant covariations were fewer than expected, with the value of eta squared seldom above .06.

4.3.5 Group Activities

Parents' group activities relate poorly to trainees' political attitudes. As shown in Table 4:14, the greater trainees' own group activities, the more they favor change-oriented candidates and energetic non-relatives; the less they like DC or chief alone rule of an African village, or restricting voting to men.

Those who most frequently read about, listen to, and discuss current events have more group activity, hold more 'modern' political attitudes, have a higher sense of home and school efficacy, and show a greater tendency to receive information from radical media sources.

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[49]Baron (1969, p. 123) finds that a disproportionate number of Rhodesians who studied in an American program for refugee students had attended large, government secondary schools; two schools alone produced 25.8% of his Rhodesian sample, although only 8.2% of African secondary school leavers come from them (Dorsey, 1975, pp. 347-48).

TABLE 4:13 Media exposure bias and political variables

Dependent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
PROGRESS	.0704	.0245	.2502	-	.0118	.0272
WISDOM	No significant relationships					
TRADITIN	.0013	.0000	.4235	+	.0389	.0500
RELATIVE	No significant relationships					
DCDECISN	.0002	.0000	.7114	-	.0542	.0607
ONLYCHEF	No significant relationships					
CHFELDRS	No significant relationships					
ALL4	No significant relationships					
ELECTED	No significant relationships					
MAJORITY	No significant relationships					
CONSNSUS	No significant relationships					
READVOTE	No significant relationships					
CASHVOTE	.0037	.0016	.0940	-	.0229	.0443
MENVOTE	No significant relationships					
BOTHVOTE	.0241	.0003	.9242	+	.0308	.0340

Note: Anti-system bias has negative values.

TABLE 4:14 Student group activities and political variables

Dependent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
PROGRESS	No significant relationships					
WISDOM	No significant relationships					
TRADITIN	.0062	.0004	.5848	-	.0301	.0347
RELATIVE	No significant relationships					
DCDECISN	.0025	.0001	.5594	+	.0348	.0397
ONLYCHEF	.0294	.0506	.0725	+	.0092	.0260
CHFELDRS	No significant relationships					
ALL4	No significant relationships					
ELECTED	No significant relationships					
MAJORITY	No significant relationships					
CONSNSUS	No significant relationships					
READVOTE	No significant relationships					
CASHVOTE	No significant relationships					
MENVOTE	No significant relationships					
BOTHVOTE	No significant relationships					

4.3.6 Religious Leaders

Those more likely to talk to a priest or pastor on a national issue tended to support progressive change candidates over traditionalists. They were more favorable to a mixed traditional and elected system of rule of an African village. Those more likely to consult religious leader were less favorable to a literacy test for voting, but there was only a statistically insignificant tendency to be relatively more favorable to an income qualification for voting.

A statistically significant but not easily interpretable relationship exists with restricting voting to men. Those who probably would not discuss political or social issues with a religious leader are most favorable to restricting voting to men, while those who possibly would discuss are least favorable, with very likely to discuss and definitely not discuss in the middle!

There is a tendency for those who are more likely to talk with a religious leader to favor voting by both men and women.

The overall weakness of relationship between talking with religious leaders and political variables can best be explained by the great variation in political beliefs of the Rhodesian clergy, rather than that the clergy is apolitical. Muzorewa observes (1978, p. 90):

> Students of comparative African politics may be surprised at the extent and depth of the Church's

> participation in politics in Rhodesia, in contrast with what happened in other countries. Because their political parties had been banned and rallies had been outlawed, African congregations tried to fill the void. 'Freedom', 'justice', 'liberation'--these biblical terms were given new interpretations as a result of our struggle for survival. Gradually preachers began to speak from their pulpits of the new nation 'Zimbabwe' and of the aspirations of its people.
>
> It is not surprising that political leaders emerged from among those trained by the churches. Not only did the Church provide the schooling for future Zimbabwean nationalists, but also it gave significant opportunities for leadership. For example, the United Methodist Church is proud of its team of black primary school headmasters, principals of high schools, hospital matrons, superintendents of mission schools, doctors, theological lecturers, church lay leaders and treasurers. The councils of the Church have been under their direction for more than a decade. The Church conducts elections by secret ballot as fairly and smoothly as any independent state. It provides a practical training ground for self-government.

4.3.7 Teachers

Those likely to consult teachers are more favorably disposed to a mixed elected and appointed ruling group in a village, but less likely to favor the traditional talk until consensus is reached method of decision making.

Those most likely to discuss national questions with teachers were more optimistic about economic progress. Those who were likely to talk with teachers were relatively more favorable to a progressive change candidate than to a traditionalist. As Table 4:15 shows, SSRs are few, a finding of some interest in a study attempting to shed light on the role of education in the political socialization process.

TABLE 4:15 Teachers' influence and political variables

Dependent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
PROGRESS	.1387	.7672	.0670	+	.0002	.0131
WISDOM		No significant relationships				
TRADITIN	.0055	.0005	.7797	+	.0286	.0297
RELATIVE		No significant relationships				
DCDECISN		No significant relationships				
ONLYCHEF		No significant relationships				
CHFELDRS		No significant relationships				
ALL4	.0133	.0150	.0886	+	.0139	.0252
ELECTED		No significant relationships				
MAJORITY	.0919	.7994	.0413	+	.0002	.0153
CONSNSUS		No significant relationships				
READVOTE		No significant relationships				
CASHVOTE		No significant relationships				
MENVOTE		No significant relationships				
BOTHVOTE		No significant relationships				

4.3.8 Personal Observations

Table 4:16 shows that the more trainees feel that their own personal observations influence their political feelings, the more reformist are their attitudes to voting and to ruling an African village.

4.3.9 District Commissioners

Those not likely to talk to a DC show a greater tendency to favor an energetic non-relative for political office; however, only a minority of trainees in any category was willing to mark greater likelihood of voting for an easy-going relative. Of course, in any country respondents are likely to understate the degree to which, in practice, they

would vote for an easy-going relative; but draft questions trying to get around this were discarded in the interests of keeping the questionnaire a reasonable length.

TABLE 4:16 Personal observations important and political variables

Dependent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
PROGRESS		No significant relationships				
WISDOM		No significant relationships				
TRADITIN		No significant relationships				
RELATIVE	.0000	.0001	.0024	-	.0334	.0612
DCDECISN	.0136	.0019	.6016	-	.0230	.0254
ONLYCHEF	.0324	.0070	.4699	-	.0173	.0208
CHFELDRS		No significant relationships				
ALL4		No significant relationships				
ELECTED		No significant relationships				
MAJORITY	.0004	.0003	.0749	+	.0310	.0430
CONSNSUS		No significant relationships				
READVOTE	.0857	.1318	.1139	+	.0054	.0158
CASHVOTE		No significant relationships				
MENVOTE	.0015	.0127	.0092	-	.0145	.0365
BOTHVOTE	.0112	.0037	.2583	+	.0201	.0265

Predictably those who definitely would not consult a DC are least favorable to a DC and his staff ruling an African village. Those most likely and those least likely to consult a DC are less economically optimistic than those in the less sure categories. Interview data are consistent with this finding, for those two groups probably include the most politically and economically aware trainees, who realized to a greater extent the cumulative effects of sanctions and

guerrilla actions on the economic order. Those most pessimistic were the definitely not consult DC group; most of these believed that the decade of the 1970s would include more struggle than progress; then they expected a Black-supremacy Zimbabwe to rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of White-supremacy Rhodesia. The expectations of the 'most likely to consult a DC' group include more ashes than Phoenix; however, none put it to me as graphically as one trainee did to Hills (1978, pp. 184-85):

> 'Rhodesia by 1984, will be radically Communist. Death will be stinking everywhere, unattended diseases will spread like a bush fire. Salisbury will be a derelict city and the beautiful buildings will be destroyed. Wherever black and white Rhodesians meet there will be bloodshed. We will be living in a second Uganda.
>
> 'People will be grovelling for food like dogs. Death and mutilations will be inflicted on the poor defenseless people in the TTLs.'

4.4 THE ELUSIVE PATTERN

These scattered SSRs in a sea of non-significant relationships do not seem to contain any theme or pattern that would assist in developing a theory of political socialization; nor are they much help in answering questions concerning whether these trainees were likely to make a contribution to democratic development in Rhodesia.

A cannonical correlation relating these 15 political variables with 32 'independent' variables produced one

statistically significant CANVAR, with fathers' relative satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life, fathers' frequency of going to church, and trainees' own frequency of reading and hearing about political matters loading most heavily--these home, religious and media exposure variables all having virtually identical loadings.

4.5 UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA VS. THE TTCs

The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (later the University of Rhodesia) opened its doors as a teaching institution in March 1957; six months later the African National Congress (which became ZAPU) was formed. "Its operations thus coincide with the rise of African nationalism as a significant force in Southern Rhodesia." (Cefkin, 1975, p. 139).

Thus is not surprising that, since from shortly after its establishment, students, faculty and staff at the University have periodically demonstrated considerable political activism; this has been true for both races, but more so for Africans.[50] A liberal Black American professor

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[50]In mid-1973, of the some 400 African students at the University of Rhodesia, about 160 were involved in a demonstration in which 'Varsity Black or White not both' and similar signs were prominent. (RH 31.8.73). After the Muzorewa Government came to power, a number of faculty and staff members demonstrated for total Africanization at UR, demanding that only Africans should teach Africans.

went to UR favorably predisposed to its Africanist students; after actually meeting them, he commented: "Those people are fanatics." (Evans, 1979a).

This politization is exactly opposite to the situation found at East African Universities:

> [S]tudents are careerists. For years they have regarded a university degree as the key to upper-middle class status. Most have struggled hard to reach the college gates, and once there only a fraction ever entertain the idea of leaving before the completion of their studies. In terms of his achieving long term security and a better life, the marginal utility of each additional year an East African student spends in school is greater than the preceding one. Everything hinges on his completing his course of study, for career prospects are basically determined by educational qualifications. It is little wonder, then, that those who do succeed in obtaining their degrees are not willing to risk all they have gained for the few additional rewards and satisfaction which a position of leadership might bring. Most students conceive of success in terms of gaining security. . . . [W]hile most students will work hard in their chosen professions, few will attempt to be outstanding.
>
> Although most students follow political events quite closely, they do so as spectators rather than as potential participants. (Barkan, 1971, p. 193).

However Barkan's observations <u>do</u> apply to teachers' training colleges in Rhodesia. Several factors explain these differences. In East Africa political control of the universities seems much greater than in Rhodesia, so the risks of dissident behavior are much higher. At UR the faculty selection committee hired many liberal and some Marxist lecturers--especially in the arts and social sciences. So faculty contacts often encouraged student radicalism.

Although RF backbenchers and other conservative Europeans repeatedly called for a crackdown on radicalism at UR, these calls were largely unheeded (see Gelfand, 1978). Furthermore, when some African students at UR acted sufficiently militantly to have their government grants withdrawn, in many cases overseas funds--and donations from liberal Rhodesians--replaced the withdrawn government grants; in the other instances, termination of studies at UR proved to be a passport to much sought-after grants to study overseas. Also, the more radical UR students expected an Africanist Government in Rhodesia within a few years. They had seen university graduates affiliated with independence movements rise phenomenally fast in states to the north, so they hoped and expected that student activism would in a very real sense 'pay off' for themselves.[51]

In a study of UR students, it is argued that even militancy sufficient to produce arrest is seen as paying off:

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[51]Subsequent to my field work, UR radicalism increased, with verbalization and demonstration being joined by violence. In August 1973, UR demonstrators did R$7000 damage; 115 African students were sentenced to jail; all but 13 were out by the end of October (Nelson, 1975, p. 349).

In July 1978 (after some off-campus Whites had beaten up some African students and the students' union's bar-man), Africanist students attempted to ban Europeans from using UR's students' union. Of the some 900 students then in residence halls, only five were White, with interracial friction a major factor in the decision of nearly all Europeans to live off campus (SM, 30.7.78). In 1971-72 there was still a substantial number of Europeans in residence halls.

> To be detained, restricted, or imprisoned for nationalist activities was to win the esteem of one's peer group. It could be the road to high office--witness the examples of Nkrumah, Kaunda, Banda, and Kenyatta.
> . . . . . .
> University education in the United States may well serve to facilitate the socialization process of the Black students into the American community and allow him to be part of an educated elite. This is not the case in Rhodesia. The African university student may become part of a revolutionary elite and enjoy elite status within African society. But under present conditions formal education cannot "be viewed as presumptively determinative of political elite status . . ." and African students cannot be "regarded as preordained members of the second- or third-generation elites." . . .
> Of the thirty-one students rusticated for the July 16 demonstrations, all but seven were in the faculties of arts and social science. . . . This is hardly exceptional given the interest of students in social and human problems as an impetus in selecting arts or social science as their field of study. Neither is it surprising that faculty in the arts and social sciences share the concerns and views prevalent among students in these fields. All of the nine lecturers picked up in the raid on July 26, 1966, and who were later deported, taught in the faculties of arts and social science. Students and faculty sharing a common outlook toward Rhodesia sought one another out and reinforced their mutual activism. (Cefkin, 1975, pp. 150, 156-57; quoting Coleman, 1965, p. 4).

UR's library subscribed to many anti-regime publications and even had an 'examinable by special arrangement' collection of works banned in Rhodesia. Thus many factors encourage radicalism by UR students.

TTC trainees find themselves in a very different position. A former lecturer at Gwelo Teachers' College discusses its principal, Paddy Bragg,[52] and his school:

> 'Staff and students must at all times be properly dressed' means that in our dusty enclave in the bush, pullovers and shorts are forbidden, ties and long-sleeved shirts obligatory even during the hottest weather when the temperature soars to 37° Celsius [99° F].
>
> Outside calls have to go through his personal telephone. He withholds library periodicals if they contain matter that offends him.
>
> At mealtimes Mr Bragg stands in the cookhouse watching out for youths without ties (whom he ejects) and assessing the dollops of mealie meal (sadza) soaked in stew that Mrs Orange, the Coloured matron, ladles from steaming pots. The wastage of left-over food pains him. Yet when the sadza helpings are reduced, students object. The bolder ones irritate Mr Bragg, or the duty warden who sits with a note pad at the little dais in a corner of the dining hall, by showing them a plate of soup with a fly in it, or a rotten potato. One suspects these gestures to be symptomatic of a deeper frustration.
>
> Mr Bragg's Irish voice penetrates along corridors and into lecture rooms. At staff meetings it cows us. It is his policy that no student should fail his final exams. Doubtful candidates are asked to leave before they spoil the record.
>
> The Irish pitchfork, the birch, and the shepherd's crook wage unceasing conflict over Paddy's mind and moods. As a benevolent despot he has had some successes. But the time has come when black teachers and students long to escape the iron grip of institutionalised hectoring and obstinacy. They want equal salaries and opportunities with whites. (Hills, 1978, pp. 78-79).

Gwelo is one of the government-owned TTCs; thus its principal has less freedom to set and implement policy than those in most colleges. This opening statement of an African teacher to a new class of trainees in a church-run TTC very

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[52]Apparently a pseudonym; P. M. Brett became principal in January, 1970, and retained the post until retirement nine years later (Teachers' Forum, 1.79, p. 28).

effectively captures the atmosphere at many, perhaps most, colleges:

> [H]e told them how they were suppose[d] to behave. "Every day you will be in your seats five minutes before the bell rings. You are to be absolutely quiet and when I walk into the room you will stand at attention. When I say, 'Good-morning, class,' you will respond with 'Good-morning, Teacher.' Then I will tell you to be seated. You will always stand to recite and stand when another teacher walks into the room. These ways must be followed, for they are the customs of the Europeans." (Harper, 1959, p. 70).

Not only college atmospheres but also post college prospects differentiate TTC students from those at UR. Primary and lower form secondary teachers in Africanist-ruled states have, generally speaking, remained teachers. Economic stagnation, political instability, unpaid civil servants and general breakdown of the quality of life are what the Rhodesian media report is the general rule in states to the north. Some African trainees felt the media exaggerate the problems, but most realize the reports' overall validity. They know they would be likely losers in such a situation.

Hills (1978, pp. 188-89) similarly finds a combination of belief with disinclination to accept evidence of failures of Africanist regimes; one trainee told him:

> 'It is most unfortunate that we, the suffering black Rhodesians, should be made to believe by writers like Armah [who wrote about corruption and inefficiency in Nkrumah's Ghana] that most African States are corrupt. If we believe this, then how are we going to overthrow the oppressive yoke from our necks? What incentive is there? What advantage for us? It is therefore

necessary to accept such criticisms as Armah's with caution.'

It is worth noting that this trainee did not actually disbelieve Armah. He reduced the dissonance this information was capable of producing by simply refusing to include Armah's evidence in his own world view. Several European Rhodesian educators expressed exasperation at this trait; whether, as they believed, the African population is more prone to such mental activity than the European is is a question I am not in a position to answer.

A question-by-question comparison of UR and TTC trainees' responses is not attempted because the number of UR trainees responding is small and because this number is further divided between full-time and part-time students. My data indicate that the more mature African part-time students lack the radicalism that typifies full-time UR Africans.

4.6 INTERVIEWS

At the time of my interviews, a recent publication that presented both the pro- and anti-system political arguments was by Theodore Bull (1968, pp. 141-42), editor of the Central African Examiner (a left-wing monthly news journal, founded by London's Economist, which ceased publication rather than abide by the censorship regulations introduced at

UDI). Bull is White; his wife is Rhodesian African. His position is that of the most liberal minority in European society, so he does not state the European case with as much conviction as he does the African. Nonetheless, I used his presentation as a guideline in formulating questions for trainees, so it is quoted at length:

> "When we first came to this country we found large tracts of it empty. The black population, poor souls, were running around in skins, and we have done our best for them. Look at the schools and hospitals we have built! But of course you never hear a word of gratitude. I don't think they know how to say 'thank you'.
>
> "It's the Europeans who have made this country what it is. Everything that's worth while here has been brought by us. The farming techniques are ours and the mining and the industrial development and commerce. So are the teachers and doctors, the engineers, the pilots, the train drivers, the administrators out in the bush! We have provided an efficient police force, army and air force, newspapers, Parliament, and a University open to all races. It's we who pay the taxes. What the native contributes to the budget isn't worth a row of beans. Seventy-odd years ago we had just put down a rebellion and a tiny handful of white men were starting to mine, to farm, and to trade and bring some order to the place. And look what we've got now! A well-run little country full of hard working people: our standard of living is high and we're proud of it. We've worked to build this place and we've done a lot to bring the native up to a decent level too. As he advances, of course he will have a bigger share in running the country, but I can hardly see his running it in my lifetime. We're proud of Rhodesia. Wouldn't you be?"

Bull states the Africanist counter-case as follows:

> "We [the African population] are the people of this country. The whites came in by trickery, and established themselves by conquest. They destroyed our chiefs, and set up their own administration by right of

the gun, and by that right alone have continued to rule.

"They have held us down in ways that make a cynical farce of their claims to have brought 'civilization' to an uncivilized land. To quote but a few examples: secondary and higher education available to us has been deliberately restricted. The white school leaver or graduate has every conceivable advantage over his African opposite number. The Government has long ago declared most of the land to be 'white', and has made it over to white farmers whose productivity, taking all 'white' land into account, is pitifully low, largely because they have far more land than they can possibly use. Our massive rural population has been penned into areas that are quite inadequate to support their numbers. Our title to land and property has been restricted so that we have hardly been able to raise loans.

"It is we who have provided the labour for all the development, which the whites take credit for, and at very low wages. And why have these wages not been forced up to a reasonable level? Because we have been prevented by the whites, who control the Government, from organising proper and effective trade unions. And of course every time we have been able to better ourselves in terms of earnings and education, the Government has raised the voting qualification. To make absolutely sure of their position, they have armed themselves with a battery of security laws under which they can control any political activity that might possibly threaten them.

"Europeans boast about their standard of living. Of course it is high: indeed it is grossly inflated considering how little work the average white man does. It is true that whites have been enterprising but their wealth is founded on their exploitation of the people whose very country they have stolen and who account for 95% of its population. Is that anything to be proud of?"

Of course it was not possible to have a complete discussion of all of these issues with any trainee without imposing a burden on his or her time that I could not reasonably do. However an attempt was made to raise each of the issues sufficiently often to get some idea of the scope

of trainee feelings and some idea of the portion of trainees holding each position. Such an approach seems too impressionistic to those who believe a datum is necessarily a number, but it is the best that could be done in the circumstances.

4.6.1 Occupation Of Rhodesia

There is considerable diversity of African trainees opinions about the role of early European settlers. Some see Europeans as especially greedy and exploitive conquerors. Some Shona respondents consider early Europeans, whatever their faults, as considerably more benevolent conquerors than the previously invading Ndebele; they feel the Mashona would have been much worse off, at least in the short run, had Europeans not put an end to Ndebele persecution.

The negative impact of the Ndebele on the Shona varied directly with distance from Ndebele strongholds in western Rhodesia. A Mashona trainee from an area in eastern Rhodesia relates an oft-told history of his people:

> [He] had heard it [a folk tale of a lion and a hare] many times; Lobengula was the powerful lion. With a great host of Matabele warriors from the Zulu tribe, he had marched up to Southern Rhodesia, and conquered the weakly organized Mashona. They enslaved the Mashona in rather a loose way, so that the Mashona could continue to work in the fields and grow crops for the Matabele warriors to raid. The saying went that a Matabele boy was not a man until he had bloodied his spear with the life of a Manyika or a Mashona. But the Mashona had the cleverness of the hare. They furnished the

> warriors with women and beer; and it became a question of which group had been enslaved.
> Then they had made the fatal mistake of being kind to the white man and allowing him to come into their country. The white man had spoiled their medicine and left them helpless. (Harper, 1959, p. 135).

There seemed a consensus amongst trainees I spoke with that--irrespective of the rights and wrongs or details of past events--Europeans ended up with too much of the land and other sources of wealth. While some conceded that Africans were not exploiting these resources and were not then in a position to do so, these trainees still fault Europeans in subsequent years for being too slow to allow evolving Africans to participate in more recent development and for underpaying those who have been hired by European enterprises. Lord Malvern's remark comparing Rhodesian interracial partnership with the partnership between a horse and its rider appeared to be the best known and most widely appreciated quotation from a White Rhodesian, for it well describes the feelings of many trainees: Africans are the horse, Europeans are the rider.

4.6.2 Voting Qualifications And Political Advance

Trainees were divided fairly evenly between those who felt universal suffrage was desirable and those who felt voters needed at least primary school education to read political tracts and newspapers and to have enough knowledge

of government and society to be able to evaluate campaign promises. Fully 56.1% of African trainees considered a literacy qualification for voting for local councils at least satisfactory; in interviews a number felt that literacy was much more important for wisely choosing a candidate in a national campaign than in a local election--where a candidate's qualifications would be known from personal contact. So had a question about national elections been possible in the questionnaire, the percentage favorably disposed to a literacy requirement would have been higher.

Income qualifications were distinctly less popular, with the fact that some teachers do not make enough to vote being mentioned numerous times. One trainee observed: "If you are out of work and have no money, political change is much more important to you than if you have a good job."

There appeared to be consensus that voting qualifications should not be so high as to exclude any teachers and that African political power should be, at a minimum, equal to European and that within a few years the African political role should be substantially greater than the European one.

These findings are similar to others in Southern Africa, e.g., Thomas' study in Manicaland (1968, pp. 187-88):

> [T]he support among Africans for a broad franchise is not as great as politicians and others might assume.
> . . . . . .
> More than one-third of the respondents . . . would deny the vote to the uneducated. Leo Kuper, [1965,] pp. 178-79, [presents] . . . similar findings in South

Africa that a majority of African teachers preferred a qualified to a universal franchise.

Alongside trainees' support for the incremental ideal, the feeling was often expressed that the Rhodesia Front was unlikely ever to engage in power sharing or to permit an eventual African political predominance. Trainees generally recognized that there were some Europeans who would in good faith embark on a power sharing political process leading to Black majority rule; but they despaired of this group ever becoming a majority in the European community. This feeling was especially noticeable in early interviews; as it became obvious a settlement with Britain was near, this position was much less frequently heard.

Even some African trainees who opted for gradualism (but not glacial gradualism) in African political advance saw political change as coming through a sudden switch from 'them' to 'us.' Sometimes implicit in the argument was armed struggle, although some trainees made it clear that power for those then in Zambia, Tanzania or farther afield would just be a transfer from White to perhaps even more selfish and arbitrary Black masters. Most Black trainees appeared to favor the sort of change that was to come--albeit temporarily --in 1978 and early 1979, although few were optimistic about it ever happening. Hills received similar answers at Gwelo TTC (1978, p. 100):

> I have had many frank talks both with my African colleagues and with students. . . . None of them wants the black extremists to win. Mugabe's sharp sword is currently useful; but he is not their man. . . .
>
> Now that they have reached, after many years, the threshold of the establishment, they do not want to lose everything in a future of revolutionary chaos. They say they are ready to share with whites--at any rate, to start with--in a free and independent Zimbabwe.

4.6.3 Law And Order

African trainees generally felt that the existing security regulations restricted political behavior that ought to be allowed; yet many agreed that control should remain tight enough to prevent the sort of politically inspired lawlessness that had occurred in earlier years. One male trainee stated: "Police raids in the [African] townships [around Salisbury] are bad, but my [older] brother says it was much worse when ZAPU and ZANU were terrorizing everyone." Another student mentioned an incident his uncle had witnessed that seemed to be known by the other trainees with him: The death of Dr. Parirenyatwa was a time when members of the NDP (National Democratic Party, predecessor of ZAPU and ZANU) made it unsafe for Africans who were not thought to be sufficiently radical even to attend a funeral. The incident is more noteworthy (prophetic?) when one learns two names of the "several nationalist leaders" the trainee's uncle stated had unsuccessfully tried to stop the incident. Several years later I was reminded of that interview when I

read Vambe's description of his arrival at Parirenyatwa's funeral (1976, p. 287):[53]

> As I was arriving, I witnessed a sad demonstration of the lack of control sometimes to be found among my people. Lying by the side of the road was Reuben Jamela, that powerful African trade union leader who was thought to be inclined towards the United Federal Party. He had made the effort, despite the hostility he knew he had incurred from the nationalists, to attend the funeral of the man we had all admired and loved. Some of the younger members of the N.D.P. took it into their heads to punish him. Thus, despite the tragic occasion, they set upon him and left him almost dead. Nothing that Mugabe and other leaders, including Nkomo, could do would restrain them. Jamela was lucky to survive.

Lawlessness such as this by Africanists and the integrity of nearly all law enforcement officers dampen enthusiasm for the Africanists' cause, and help explain findings like the following:

> The majority of both adults and students concluded that "when a person has been arrested, he should be considered to have done wrong until he demonstrates clearly that he did not do wrong.". . .
> "No one is taken [=arrested] without evidence against him" another student replied. (Thomas, 1968, p. 195).

With the important exception of arrests for political or minor regulation offences, trainees I interviewed appeared to feel as those Thomas surveyed did.

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[53]It was an offense to mention the name or activities of anyone in detention, as Nkomo and Mugabe then were; while this did not inhibit many Rhodesians, its effect was noticeable in discussions between Black trainees and campus visitors.

There was far from a clearcut answer to the question of the fairness of the legal system. While there were a number of criticisms of the laws that the courts had to enforce, the main criticisms trainees made to me of the courts *per se* related to: 1) an occasional lack of understanding of African customs and circumstances leading to inappropriate decisions; 2) judges not taking into account (when levying fines) how few dollars had to support how many people in African families; 3) how desperate the circumstances of one breaking the law often are; 4) an assault by an African on a European invariably being considered a much graver offense than the other way around. The fact that some Africans have been graduated from the University of Rhodesia's law school but never became successful attorneys was mentioned as another example of anti-African bias in the legal system. Several times it was added that, whatever the faults of the 'European' legal system, it was better (or at least no worse) than the decisions handed down in chiefs' courts. Stopforth (1973) finds urban Africans generally preferring European courts to tribal ones, even for such traditional issues as bride-price.

Gann and Duignan (1967, pp. 145, 329) point out that:

> [A]mong the [pre-European-conquest] Matabele . . . there was no concept of equality before the law; punishments for crimes were meted out according to the castes of the criminal and the injured party.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Traditional Matabele society had been infinitely more

> stratified than the settler society which took its place; the Matabele called their subjects dogs . . . .

The Shona, of course, were these despised dogs.

Thomas (1968, pp. 280-81) finds an interesting relationship between perceptions of the European contribution to African welfare and obligation to obey the law:

> [D]iscrimination erodes one's commitment to civil obedience. Among [African] adults 64.9% of those who strongly disagreed with the statement that we should thank Europeans for national progress (N=191) also disagreed that they must obey all government laws. In contrast only 35.0% of those who strongly agree that we should thank Europeans for national progress (N=243) held that opinion. Among [African secondary] students the comparable figures were 81.1% and 61.8%.

The much lesser student propensity to civil obedience (especially amongst those who recognize an important European contribution to African welfare) that Thomas reports is perhaps an indication of lessened feelings of awe by younger Africans of European institutions. They have no memories of the defeats of 1896-97, but they are aware that African regimes have been established in most countries on the continent--thus they resent laws which they see as retarding African political progress in Rhodesia.

There was considerable trainee feeling that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was too paternalistic; a couple of times the fact that there were no African District Commissioners or even Deputy District Commissioners was cited as evidence of

racial discrimination. Generally the details of how the government was organized appeared of little concern to trainees. There was considerable feeling that Africans ought to have greater opportunities in private as well as government employment--especially that they should not be virtually excluded from any post from which they would even indirectly supervise Europeans.

A pervasive feeling existed that the society's institutions preferentially served Europeans; but interview data provide no indication of precise ideas as to how government departments should be restructured--except that they should employ many more Africans in high-level posts.

4.6.4 Militancy And 'Freedom Fighters'

The pro-militancy position of many African students at the University was generally not reflected in the training colleges. An exception at one college was when a pupil openly declared that killing the Whites was the first thing that needed to be done; the second item on his list of priorities was getting rid of the Ndebele; once these two objectives were accomplished, this student believed, the country's other problems would be relatively minor. Several of his classmates believed his approach was too extreme, although there was a greater strain of radicalism in trainee views at this college than at most others.

It would not have been prudent to ask trainees questions concerning those in detention. Several trainees volunteered the opinion that some of those in detention had only engaged in what should be considered normal political activity--as opposed to subversive political activity.

Only one teachers college trainee mentioned ZAPU or ZANU favorably. Another professed personal neutrality, but discussed a friend who had joined ZANU. The friend had been unsuccessful in getting into advanced secondary school or teachers' training. He also failed to get a city job. So the only prospect facing him was to return to his TTL family and help his father farm--something he could have done without any schooling. He could not marry because the resources necessary to pay lobolo (bride-price) had gone to finance his secondary schooling. Then a ZANU recruiter promised him travel to Tanzania (and probably further afield), advanced training and a "top job in liberated Zimbabwe." The trainee added that his friend had not previously seemed particularly political or alienated. He had accepted the offer as his only prospect for advancement. According to my informant, neither the recruit's family nor he had heard from him in the ten months since he had slipped across the border.

Several UR students mentioned armed struggle as a possibility if the then-in-progress negotiations with the

British Government did not lead to meaningful political change. Other students, apparently a substantial majority, opposed armed struggle, because they doubted its efficacy, or because the price in destruction would be too high, or because the guerrilla leaders might be in their own way as bad as they felt the Rhodesian Front Government to be. Amongst African students at UR there was a consensus that the RF regime should be replaced. Training college students likewise showed no enthusiasm for the RF regime, but seemed less sure that any political change would necessarily be a change for the better.

4.6.5 Political Awareness?

Many trainees said they more or less followed political developments but did not have many firm views of their own, at least partly because what they had heard was so conflicting. Some added that teachers were expected not to express political views, so it was best not to have any; while this could easily be a way of ducking questions, I am convinced that the response is more or less accurate for some trainees. Thomas (1968, p. 188) finds Roman Catholic girls to be apolitical:

> [There is] a consistent pattern of rejection by Catholic girls in our sample of the nationalists' call for one-man-one-vote, participation in political groups, and political activism by church leaders.

I found quite a few Dutch Reformed females also to be in this apolitical category.

Harlin (1973, p. 18) was able to include "political awareness" as one of eight possible responses to the question: "If you became a parent, what would you try to develop in your son? Tick two!" There was a steady rise in choice of this alternative amongst secondary students, from 2% in Form I to 20% in Form IV; however, it drops back to 6% for both UCE and Morgenster teacher trainees. Overall, 8% ticked this response, 10% of males, 2% of females; of those with no church affiliation, 40% marked political awareness. Harlin offers no interpretation of these findings. To me, these data suggest that teacher trainees are considerably less politically interested than most secondary school leavers, and that those estranged from Christian churches are the most politically motivated. The fact that teachers are expected not to be actively involved in politics[54] is another possible explanation for the difference between secondary and

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[54]It should be reiterated that, in general in this discussion, I am not making any evaluation of the extent to which any argument is an 'objective' assessment of either Rhodesian or external political and social situations. However, the vehement protests by several UR trainees showed that they felt Rhodesian restrictions on political activity by public servants were especially and uniquely evil features of Rhodesian society; they seemed either unaware or unwilling to accept that in most countries in the World there are significant constraints on partisan political activity by teachers and other public service employees--and that Rhodesian regulations apply just as much to Europeans as to Africans.

trainee figures, although more data would be needed to reach any firm conclusions.

While Morgenster's faculty appeared to make an especial effort to keep their TTC apolitical, I would have expected UCE responses for political awareness to be much higher than Morgenster's, not identical.

Weinrich states the dilemma faced by teachers desiring to be politically active (1965, pp. 220-21):

> [Teachers'] claims to modern political leadership are frustrated by Government laws and regulations which rule that teachers may not take an active part in politics. . . . Unless they make nationalist politics their career and give up other employment, they must be satisfied with remaining in the background of political movements.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Although chiefs are the official leaders of their people and although the teachers remain in the background of the political struggle, the influence of teachers over their fellow rural Africans is most likely greater than that of the chiefs over their subjects.

4.6.6 Government Efficacious?

There was a widespread feeling amongst African trainees that the problems of the African community were not being adequately dealt with by the extant polity and that exasperation was growing. Concern with government seemed mainly a desire for it to improve their and their families' economic prospects; changing laws that were felt to be detrimental to Africans was mentioned less frequently.

Prosperity was the important thing; details of political arrangements to accomplish it generally were of slight interest to Africans at TTCs.

Stopforth's (1972) finds that the generality of urban Africans are not as concerned with politics per se as with issues that more immediately concern them; this finding surprised a professor who was used to the politically charged atmosphere at UR (Bourdillon, 1976). It is my impression that T4 and T3 students are generally more politically concerned than the ordinary urban African, but are closer to their position than to that of UR Africans.

4.6.7 Militancy And 'Freedom Fighters'

In a discussion with African males at the University, they complained of detentions and restrictions of African dissidents, including UR students and faculty. From the anti-regime talk and writings that freely flowed at the University, it appeared that actions or statements would have to have been decidedly seditious before the authorities would take action. It was, however, generally agreed that more liberty existed at UR than would be tolerated in training colleges or amongst the tribesmen in the Tribal Trust Lands.

Although most trainees conveyed the impression that they were accurately and honestly answering my queries, there were a few exceptions. For example, several African students at

UR presented what appeared to be a carefully edited version of an incident to encourage me to reach the 'correct' conclusions, when they told me the sad tale of Mr. X. He supposedly made a speech forcefully revealing how Africans were suffering, and demanding they be given their rights. A couple of days later the police raided his house in the middle of the night, ransacked it, and hauled everyone there off to jail. Mr. X was then serving a long prison sentence.

This was far harsher action than any other I had heard of, so I suspected I had not been told everything. I asked a CID (Criminal Investigation Division) officer about Mr. X:

CID: Speech, what speech? What did they say about the crates of AK47 rifles?

RT: Nothing.

CID: What about the boxes of ammunition and the guerrilla training manuals?

RT: They never mentioned them, either.

> CID: 'Poor' Mr. X had enough weapons for a battalion, a few in his house--but he had to rent a warehouse to store most of them. Also plenty of 'commie' literature on how to use them and why. What worries me is that some day another Mr. X will get a cache like this and start using it before we get word of it. Customs officials on the Zambian border are going to have to start checking every car and lorry really thoroughly or one day there is going to be a very nasty incident.

There seemed to be a rather ambivalent feeling toward the 'freedom fighters'--a sympathy with their feelings of

frustration, coupled with doubts that armed struggle was the best approach or that it would lead to a more just society. In two colleges I met trainees who admitted knowing individuals who had been trained as 'freedom fighters' but who had deserted and quietly returned to their villages at the first opportunity. One had been promised an academic scholarship but was instead trained as a terrorist. The other had voluntarily gone to Tanzania, but became disillusioned by poor conditions and by the growing feeling that the leaders of the 'freedom fighters' were more interested in power and prestige for themselves than in ameliorating the conditions of ordinary Africans. If any trainees knew any enthusiastic 'freedom fighters,' they felt it prudent not to mention them--just as I felt it prudent not to ask such a question directly.

The position of T1 trainees described in the following quotation is more militant than that I found at the TTCs; however, it describes mid-1977, when an Africanist take-over seemed a distinct possibility; my interviews were conducted in 1971, when it was a distant dream--or nightmare.[55]

> In this college, African teachers and students remain in a quandary. On the one hand, there is an emotional

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[55]It is also a more militant position than that shown in a previous quotation from Hills (1978, p. 100). Several European TTC teachers and a retired district commissioner mentioned how rapidly the political mood of African communities (and individual Africans) could change.

> and growing desire, especially among students, for a desperate solution, a victory for 'the boys' which will put an end once and for all to the white man's master role in this country, and to Western prevarication. On the other, there is the more considered hope of teachers and maturer individuals that a moderate government will prevail--with less honour and glory but with less bloodshed. (Hills, 1978, pp. 167-68).

While there was quite a bit of trainee frustration on political matters, they generally doubted the desirability or efficaciousness of 'hot politics.'

It is difficult to summarize trainees' views as conveyed to me on political activism because they varied from some apparently completely apolitical T4 and T3 females to passionately Africanist UR males--with all possible nuances in between.

4.6.8 Europeans' Future

May's summation of the views of European secondary students helps provide perspective for the African position (1978, p. 131):

> [P]upils' conceptualization of their futures is [characterized by] the narrowness of so many of the views expressed. The majority felt that the status quo would inevitably continue and all would be well, or that the structure of the state would change by the implementation of the vaguely conceived but fearsome threat of 'majority rule' which would make Rhodesia like 'countries to the north' which would be intolerable, and necessitate their immediate departure. Only a handful were prepared to contemplate taking part in the process of change. Alternatives had not been presented to most of the children and they had not been given the opportunity to develop more flexible

> attitudes through the presentation of other perspectives.

European trainees I spoke with showed somewhat greater awareness of alternatives than the secondary pupils May discussed; nevertheless, many of those who do "contemplate taking part in the process of change" stressed that a careful tutelage of two or more decades would be an absolute minimum before an African political majority would stand a chance of making democracy work.

Questionnaire responses show that nearly two-thirds of European trainees consider an income qualification to vote to be poor. Unfortunately, the Government of the day was--like so many Governments in many countries--paying too much attention to lining up votes for the next election and not enough attention to the nation's long-term interests. A sizable group of Europeans felt White political predominance until sometime in the 21st century was unattainable, and that an orderly increase in African rights and responsibilities was preferable to any other available alternative. Included in this group were many alienated by RF policies, although not as alienated as a sizable majority of Africans were. My findings are similar to those of Cefkin (1975, p. 146):

> A considerable number of European students consider RF policy unenlightened and continue to favor policies of moderation and the goal of a democratic multiracial society.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Insistence on moral solutions to the country's

> problems often marked their [White students at UR's] approach.

African trainees generally felt that most Europeans would have a reasonable future in majority rule Rhodesia; those who were unwilling to treat Africans with respect or pay their employees a fair wage were exceptions. African students typically replied "White farmers," (especially Afrikaners) or "Rhodesian Front supporters," or "those who are contemptuous of Africans and African ways" when asked if they could mention any category of Whites whose departure would be likely or welcome under majority rule.

Although not mentioned directly by any trainee I spoke with, there is another group of Europeans who is more disliked by most Africans who come into contact with them: European supervisors of unskilled labor. Too often they are the sort of people who, were they in Europe, would themselves be the char women, waiters and latrine cleaners. In Rhodesia they supervise the menial workers, by screaming threats and insults. Lacking both training and aptitude for their posts, they usually do a wonderous job of exacerbating race relations. Most trainees apparently have not come into personal contact with such persons, for other Rhodesians (Europeans as well as Africans) put them at or near the top of their lists of what is wrong in Rhodesia. The principal of a TTC for Africans writes:

> It is in the field of personal relationships in the day to day contacts of the individuals of the different races that the race problem generates the most friction. Ask any educated Bantu what it is that riles most. He will answer that he is not treated as a human being, but "as a piece of dirt," that he is treated as a child; that he is despised and sworn at simply because he is black; that he is addressed as "boy" or "Jim", no matter what his age or status, and frequently by children; that he is kept waiting at counters while the Whites who come in after him are served; that he is treated with contempt by shop assistants and by civil servants at public offices; that many Whites recoil at his physical proximity; that he is usually addressed in uncivil, stentorian tones; that he is, in short, treated as a sub-human being. (Haw, 1961, p. 82).

Africans are too frequently prone to see slights where none is intended, and numerous private and official bodies try to impress upon the European community the need for common courtesies. But it was only natural that the behavior of one rude White man[56] would be better remembered than that of many other Europeans who behaved in a civil manner. The situation had improved markedly in the decade after Haw wrote, especially for those who had adopted European attitudes to soap, water and deodorants. But liberal Europeans as well as Africans agreed more changes were needed. Harper (1959, p. 7) notes: "Generally the more

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[56]Vambe (1976, pp. 158-59) presents a typical African view of lower-class Europeans: "Finding themselves suddenly so elevated in status, these people wanted to experience how it felt to have someone beneath them, and swallowed the country's master-race doctrine whole, simply wallowing in its full intoxicating glory, indeed almost to the point of open hatred of the Africans. It was as if we and not they were the immigrants. The lower they came down the social scale, the coarser they proved to be."

informed the white man, the more intelligent the Black appears, since there are reasons for behavior."

The Europeans African trainees had most come into contact with were teachers who had voluntarily taken jobs to help the Africans--a group that would include few if any with the 'bloody kaffir' approach to race relations.

Although none stated it so precisely, it appears that a sizable portion of trainees felt that all Europeans who were not demonstrably harming African interests were welcome to stay; more militant trainees (especially at UR) were less eager to grant any large numbers of Europeans permanent rights. This would be due partly to greater UR radicalism, and partly due to a greater confidence by university-trained Africans that they could successfully do most of the jobs that Europeans were doing. I have no satisfactory way of determining what proportion of trainees fell into each category.

Implicit in much of what was said was that Europeans are unduly favored by the existing regime and that they would be unhappy to lose any of their perquisites, a position that tends to refute those who argue that European fears for the future are completely groundless.

4.6.9 African Racism

While there was some awareness that Europeans and other ethnic minorities have sometimes been poorly treated in Black-ruled Africa, there appeared to be little feeling amongst Mashona respondents that there was anything sufficiently dangerous in early majority rule to justify its delay. Some Ndebele feared they might be oppressed by the Mashona under a one man one vote system; the idea that political equality should mean equal representation of the Ndebele and the Shona was several times expressed. When asked what was equal about giving 14% of the African population the same representation as nearly 80%, Ndebeles argued it was necessary to protect minority rights and merely maintained the tribal balance already existing in the Senate.

Most African trainees appeared to feel--while there were hazards in a majority rule political system--the benefits would surely outweigh the risks. Problems Africans and others have in countries north of the Zambezi seemed far less real to African trainees that did the problems they and their families faced in RF-ruled Rhodesia. In contrast, European trainees generally felt that everything that had gone wrong to the north was likely to go wrong in Rhodesia also if an African Government came to power, especially if the change were the least bit precipitous.

Racial laws questions were not generally asked of pupils because the subject generated considerable emotionalism and because previous work indicates that support for enforced separation is very nearly exclusively a European position. Table 4:17, based on two surveys in the 1960s, gives an indication of the differences.

Most Rhodesian Africans, educated and otherwise, are quick to criticize the selfish self-interest orientation of the settlers; they have no difficulty citing plausible examples of the injustices they suffer. However, Europeans do not find it hard to detect equal selfishness in the Africanist position. None of the Africanists would be happy living in pre-conquest Rhodesia. Stripped to its essence, many Europeans trainees and other Whites believe, the Africanists' case can be described as wishing that the Europeans had given the Africans as much as they wanted of whatever aspects of European culture, technology and wealth they wanted--and nothing more; and that the Europeans should have asked for little or nothing in return. Thus each group looks at its own carefully selected portion of the realities of the Rhodesian situation and, generally, comes to diametrically opposed conclusions.

TABLE 4:17 Comparison of Manyikan and European attitudes towards segregation

Area of segregation	European mean	African mean
Labor unions	2.82	5.22
Restaurants and hotels	1.71	5.76
Sporting and social clubs	1.58	4.96
Schools	1.28	5.18
Areas of land ownership	1.08	4.67
Hospitals	1.05	5.44
Dance halls	.57	5.49
Swimming pools	.46	5.67
Public lavatories	.41	5.71

Note: For each item the possible range of scores was from 0 (strongly desiring to maintain racial segregation) to 6 (strongly desiring changes in laws or customs which maintain racial segregation.) Manicaland is Rhodesia's easternmost province; the European sample is nationwide.

Sources: Norman E. Thomas (1968) "Christianity, Politics and the Manyika." Boston, Boston University dissertation, p. 270; Cyril Rogers and C. Frantz (1962) Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia. New Haven, Yale University Press, pp. 92-94.

4.7 THE WORLD AND RHODESIA

> In the course of this conflict [the Cold War], the white colonists in Africa appeared as a political liability, though white Slav colonists in Siberia or Sakhalin did not, and this factor may well prove to be the decisive one in the future of the white man in Africa. (Gann, 1961).

In the two decades since this was written, the success of the Soviet disinformation apparatus in propagating this artificial distinction has, as Gann feared, had a major impact on African developments. A TTC principal (whose children are sixth generation White Africans) worries:

> The new concepts of democracy and civilization, struggling against the forces of tribalism, witchcraft, ignorance and poverty are being stirred by the intrigues of Communism to produce a witches' brew that may boil off the flesh of freedom and democracy; and leave the bare bones of autocracy as the mocking symbol of misguided hope. (Haw, 1967, p. 19).

To trainees, names such as the United Nations Organisation, the World Council of Churches, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had a ring of authority and impartiality to them. Although the Rhodesian Government and the local mass media frequently pointed out what they felt to be the duplicity of such organizations and their leftist leadership, the result amongst African trainees seemed to be more mild skepticism than actual disbelief.

One of the easiest things for an individual to believe

is that his efforts and talents are not fully appreciated, that some arbitrary and capricious force is holding him back. When repeated authoritative-sounding statements by putatively impartial organizations say that this is the case and that European Rhodesians are the culprits, there is a tendency to believe. The fact that there is at least some truth in the overseas criticism of the Government's and the average European's attitude toward African advancement tends to give an aura of truth to the overseas critics' more questionable criticisms.

The only direct measure of external influences I am able to make from my questionnaire is a comparison of the influence of Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation programs with that of foreign stations (which, with the exception of the South African Broadcasting Corporation's programs and those of Portuguese stations, was predictably hostile). Table 4:8 (p. 213) shows a greater relative influence of foreign stations on African trainees, but not as overwhelming a difference as those seeing all educated Africans as bitterly anti-regime would have us expect.

Official Rhodesian Government pronouncements concerning development often relate local progress and goals to UNESCO statistics and objectives. For example, on just one page of Population Education Resource File (Division of African Education, 1977, p. 14.1) the UNESCO Courier, the World

Assembly of Youth Population File, 1974, the United Nations General Assembly, and two further references to UNESCO appear. This puts the regime in the awkward position of sometimes endorsing UN activities in general while denouncing UN activities concerning Rhodesia itself. For example a UNESCO-published book on Rhodesia purports "to present an irrefutable portrait of oppression and discrimination." (O'Callaghan, 1977). Another makes Procrustean efforts to fit Rhodesian data in a Marxist Weltanschauung (Weinrich, 1979).

In short, pronouncements by supposedly impartial overseas organizations appear to have been a significant weapon in Africanist attempts to win the hearts and minds of African trainees.

Furthermore, American taxpayers provided two high schools in Tanzania and Zambia that could be attended only on recommendation of the 'liberation movement' the child was affiliated with. The first objective of these programs was to train students "to participate effectively in the struggle for freedom." (Jacqz, 1957, pp. 11-12). Other Western states and the UN had similar programs. These were powerful inducements for those wishing to study out of the country to join an Africanist movement; these programs encouraged Rhodesian Africans to believe that the West was in favor of a take-over by ZANU and/or ZAPU.

4.8 CONCLUSION

On balance it appeared that most African trainees neither wholly accepted the pro-system nor the anti-system world-view. They seemed intellectually attracted to the idea of orderly change and a political power sharing situation between liberal White and African leaders. But there was a strong feeling that this was not an especially likely denouement. They did not see the Rhodesian Front as sufficiently flexible to make power sharing work, nor did they consider a swing to the Centre Party by a majority of White voters likely. No African politician working within the system had attracted nearly as much attention or support as the two principal Africanist leaders then in detention: Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole. This seemed as much a measure of the weakness of the active African politicians as of strong support for the restricted ones. Their feelings seemed to parallel those, shown in Table 4:18, that were found at the same time by Stopforth in Highfield African township at Salisbury--with the exception that UR students felt that <u>they</u> represent African opinion, rather than that nobody does.

TABLE 4:18 Who represents African public opinion?

Representative	All	Males	Females
Within-system party	5.7	7.6	0.0
Africanist party	4.6	6.0	0.0
Chiefs	3.4	3.0	4.8
Multi-racial party	1.1	1.5	0.0
European conservative party	1.1	1.5	0.0
Nobody	55.2	60.6	38.1
Don't know	28.7	19.7	57.1

Adapted from: P. Stopforth (1972) Two Aspects of Social Change. Salisbury, University of Rhodesia, p. 93.

Especially in interviews conducted in September and early October 1971, there was a feeling that continued Black-White political polarization was unfortunate but likely to continue. Subsequently it became apparent that a political settlement based on Britain's six principles was, after all, likely to be reached. Pessimism about Black progress and about interracial accommodation became progressively less. When the settlement was announced and published, trainees ranged from cautiously optimistic to euphoric about the future. Even many at the University of Rhodesia felt the settlement was much better than the status quo, though a considerable distance from the best outcome they could imagine. Even Moto, the leading anti-system publication for

Africans, headlined its first issue after the settlement terms were announced: "We accept under protest." Before various factors made it de rigueur for Africans to oppose the 1971 settlement, trainee reaction seemed fairly favorable. The end of the school year and the end of my interviewing occurred before anti-settlement feelings became pronounced in the African community.

As reported in section 2.10, the 1961 constitution was repudiated by the Africanist leadership only after overseas critics had loudly denounced it; the same was true of the 'settlement' in 1971-72 and the Smith-Muzorewa agreement of 1978. In each case the result was to exacerbate racial feelings, encourage violence, and reduce the possibility of development of the sort of democratic order that European and American critics of the Rhodesian polity putatively desired. To nearly all European Rhodesians I have spoken with, this is strong, probably conclusive, evidence of the bad faith of the critics. An alternate explanation is that Western leaders were looking so hard at what they perceived as shortcomings in these proposals that they failed adequately to weigh the dangers of the alternatives. The typical African reaction to these criticisms from overseas was that, if even many members of the White 'tribe' felt the proposals were prejudicial to African interests, this was conclusive proof that they should be rejected out-of-hand by Africans.

Another reason that a democratic future was not to be in Rhodesia is the narrowness of perspective of many internal leaders, as well as that of many ordinary citizens. Haw (1961) observes that there has always been a strong strain of liberalism in Rhodesia's European community. But, especially under the RF, the good work frequently was at least partially negated by some comparatively trivial bit of pettiness toward some Africans that caught the headlines and inflamed African public opinion without providing substantial compensating advantage for anyone; Peck (1977, p. 7) blames this on "the total inability of the R.F. to see things in Rhodesia from the point of view of black Rhodesians."

If one accepts the Africanists' definition of what are important factors to include in an analysis of Rhodesian society and polity, their conclusions seem reasonable enough. Similarly, if one evaluates the evidence pro-system Europeans feel is important, their conclusions logically follow. The tragedy of Rhodesian politics has been the failure of each group to give adequate weight to the factors the other considers important.

CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

I had not originally intended to write a chapter on economics in this study. However, there was a recurring theme in responses to my interview questions on Rhodesian society and polity: many trainees indicated that who votes for whom, whether the Cabinet is all White, all Black, or mixed, whether secondary schools are integrated or separate were, for many, secondary issues. Trainees and their families have made great sacrifices for them to reach their present position. Many trainees stated that as soon as they started making money, they would be expected to assist with the education of younger siblings. But their financial rewards as teachers will be, relative to most Europeans, fairly modest--even below those of many Europeans who have had to overcome far fewer financial and educational barriers. African trainees' pleasure at coming as far as they have is tempered by a frustration at not being able to go even farther.

The editor of University Students and African Politics similarly finds that students' political concerns throughout Africa tend to be subordinated to economic considerations:

> African university students are apparently aware of the importance of politics to them, but there are other

> domains of concern--especially economic affairs--which are perceived to be even more important. Fully 76% of McKown's Nairobi respondents disagreed with the following statement: "What happens in government and politics is not really going to affect my life very much." Of Rooke's Nigerian respondents, 26% indicated that they had a "great deal of interest" in politics, 61% indicated a "mild" interest, and only 13% indicated no interest at all. And yet, comparing the political concern of university students with concerns in other domains, it becomes clear that economic and (sometimes) other matters are ranked higher. (Hanna, 1975, p. 49).

5.1 COLOUR BAR: FACT AND FANCY

Economic issues had a particular saliency in Rhodesia because there were a number of laws and practices that constituted 'affirmative action' for its ethnic minorities, and were thus considered discriminatory against its ethnic majority. Nearly half of rural areas were designated as 'European,' where Africans could live only as employees.[57] Urban housing for Africans was inadequate in quantity and quality. Because urban areas were 'European,' even urban Africans with the money for good housing faced numerous restrictions.

Employers were extremely reluctant to put Africans in

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[57]While there was controversy over causes, African peasant farmers made perhaps one-third as much as employed urban Africans; Africans averaged about one-tenth the income of Europeans (Dorsey, 1975, p. 361).

African reserves were first established in the late 19th century, largely at the urging of the same humanitarian organizations that were so severely critical of them by the 1960s, even though the African areas were expanded from 22.4% of the country in 1925 to over twice that in 1965.

supervisory positions over Europeans, and were generally sensitive to European employees' complaints about being made to work in close proximity to Africans.

On the other hand, pro-African bias was shown in the half of the country reserved for Africans. Churches and other liberal employers preferentially hired Africans. A small number of Africans had become wealthy businessmen, farmers, contractors, bus line owners, etc.

With many subjects dealt with in this dissertation, Truth is on two levels: what might be 'objectively' considered to be true vs. what relevant individuals believe to be the truth. This distinction is especially important in assessing the extent to which the Colour Bar is a significant factor in African advancement; most Africans and liberal Europeans consider it axiomatic that it is the principal inhibiting factor affecting African advance; most Europeans see it as a minor factor, with limitations in African ability and character being far more important.

5.1.1 Employers' Perspective

I did not make any attempt to get a representative sample of White employers' views; however, the manager of one medium-sized Salisbury business stated his position and indicated that it is fairly typical; it is not inconsistent with the positions Mothobi and Cheater (1975) found:

My duty is to produce quality products at a competitive price, and to show a profit for our shareholders. Thus the reliability and efficiency of employees is the important thing, not their skin colour. At the same time, any businessman must realize that his long-term prospects in this country require African good-will; so we hire and promote as many Africans as we can afford. No matter what they tell you out at Varsity [UR], Africans require much more training, much more supervision, and are much more likely to disappear suddenly.

They consider each of their father's brothers "father," each of the father's and [his] brothers' wives "mother," and all the resultant piccanins "brother" or "sister." It depends upon the tribe how many mother's relatives are included. Add to this whatever wives and children the employee himself has--and all the grandparents--and there is a non-stop string of illnesses, weddings, and funerals that have to be attended--never in the townships in the evening, but a day's bus ride away in the TTL. In contrast a White employee sends a cable and maybe some flowers back to England for a similar occasion.

Much of our African help used to come from Nyasaland, partly because it was too far away for them to jump on a bus at the slightest whim, partly because coming this far shows more enterprise and likelihood to stay long enough to be worth having. But now the government doesn't let any more come.

. . . . . .

They [UR sociologists] say that with education this [unreliability and lack of aptitude for use and care of machinery] will change--and it does--for the worse. The African who has gone beyond Std. 6 [eighth year of schooling] (and some who haven't) considers himself intelligentsia--who ought to be given an office, clerk, and a messenger--not a place on the production line.

I don't have any solution for African unemployment--nobody does--here or to the north; but driving out the White worker, manager, and consumer is not it. If no African had more than two children, by the end of the century, the economy might catch up--as it is it is hopeless.

Sure, there are a few who hire and advance Whites as a matter of political principle; but at least 9 times out of 10 the decision is an economic one.

5.1.2 The Official View

The Chairman of the Public Services Board stated:

> African arts graduates are often difficult to assimilate into the [Public] Service even though they may possess qualifications similar to those gained by European students. It is perhaps regrettable but true that African [liberal] art[s] students at the University of Rhodesia have gained a reputation for political activism coupled with violence and the support of external groups hostile to this country, and for this reason ministries are reluctant to accept arts graduates from the local university on their administrative staff. Also the European student tends to regard a degree, whether in social science or politics, as the rounding off part of his education whereas the African sees it as a career training. This makes ministries doubly reluctant to employ an African graduate in, for example, political science, which is widely regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a subject that provokes discontent and racial friction.
>
> On the other hand the same problems are not encountered to the same extent in the professional field. . . . Consequently there have been few difficulties in appointing Africans with professional qualifications, particularly where they can be employed in their own areas. (Quoted in Quenet Report, 1976, pp. 35-37).

Another memorandum to the Quenet Commission (1976, pp. 60-61), this one from the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare, notes that the problems associated with evading sanctions militate against hiring Africans for jobs that have access to trading secrets; additionally:

> While this [racial discrimination] is true in some cases, Africans find it difficult to realize that there is frequently another side to the problem. Employers form opinions from their experience and many whites believe as a result of their experience that many African employees are unreliable, unpunctual, dishonest if they can get away with it, are unable to maintain output at required levels, and lack 'feeling' for

> mechanical equipment; many, in general, are unsatisfactory employees. Much of this criticism could be applied to Europeans as well, but in general employers find Europeans have more integrity and are able to accept greater responsibility. Through no fault of their own many Africans lack suitable training or job background, have language difficulties, are expected to carry responsibilities or handle equipment for which they do not have adequate training or aptitude. The attitude of many white employers is that they have been let down time and time again by African employees and become understandably reluctant to place themselves in the position of being let down again. In these ways the African has proved himself his own worst enemy and his reputation for unreliability is not entirely without foundation.

5.1.3 A TTC-Trained African's Assessment

Vambe (1976, pp. 196-97) discusses some reasons why African job performance is often so low, and why Europeans often doubt if Africans are capable of reaching or even approaching equality:

> Freed from the restraining influences of their tribal chiefs, wives and other relatives, they [Black urban employees] lived dangerously and drank any amount of the poisonous skokiaan [=moonshine]. They could not have been a particularly energetic and efficient group of workers, and it was no wonder that they were the least healthy and least stable. Indeed, many stole sugar, bread and anything edible at the slightest chance. . . .
>
> Thus, in terms of serious industrial production, this type of African was almost a wasted asset. He was generally inefficient, and probably an economic burden to a lot of employers. He was invariably confused and lost in the whirl of events around him. He caught syphilis just as easily as he caught the common cold, and went tearing in panic to the common, but dubious urban witchdoctor saying that some evil person had put a curse on him. He hit back as violently for the theft of a sixpence by his room-mate as he did for the theft of his girlfriend . . . . He asked his 'baas' or 'missus' some of the most stupid, child-like questions

> and irritated them to the point of despair. He said 'Yes' where he should have said 'No' . . . . Characteristically, the settlers used him as the yard-stick with which to judge all Africans.

5.1.4 At The University

Nutrition and housing are the two factors in poor African job performance that were most often mentioned to me. The traditional African diet was reasonably balanced, but this was trial and error or 'survival of the fittest,' not based on any understanding of dietary principles. With the increasing use of purchased food, Africans tended to buy what was cheapest and tasted best, rather than what was needed for adequate nutrition. The tradition of men eating first, with women and children eating the leftovers, aggravates the problem. While most families spent enough on food for adequate nutrition, most were inadequately nourished. This had a detrimental effect on mental capacity and learning ability of children, and on-the-job performance of adults.

The fact that most workers had to leave their families in the TTLs encouraged the living patterns Vambe describes and the 'jump on the bus' mentality the businessman mentioned.

Add to this linguistic and cultural differences, and most UR faculty members I spoke with felt the employers are correct that it is more difficult to turn a just-hired African school leaver into a satisfactory higher-level

employee than is the case with Europeans. But they added that Africans could usually surmount these difficulties if employers would do more to recognize them and would adjust training programs accordingly.

5.1.5 Ministry Of Education

Ministry of Education officials generally conveyed the feeling that African advance was occuring and that, given adequate time and resources, the African could and would play a full role in modern society. "I believe in the African, or I wouldn't have taken this position," stated one official.

On the currently burning economic issue for African teachers, one European official in the African Division of the Ministry of Education, on a strictly off the record basis, expressed his opinion that the Government was earning itself far more ill-will and headaches by ending equal pay for Grad.C.E. and T1 teachers in the African Division than could possibly be justified by the sum to be saved. An editorial in the Bulletin of the Institute of Education (Kalso, 1971b) suggested that this opinion was unanimously, or nearly unanimously, held by senior officials in the African Division.

5.1.6 African Trainees On The Colour Bar

To the extent that they were aware of arguments that African advance is primarily hindered by their own limitations, African trainees appeared either to feel that they were without foundation or that the foundation was an absurdly slim one in relation to the edifice of differential treatment that was built on it. In the view of one male trainee:

> If you have to queue at dawn in a township for a bus, work hard all day while being looked down to, get out at sundown, and be $2-3 (less bus fare) richer . . . . What reason is there to expect the African to be as steady a worker as the White with the same education who gets in his motor car [to go to work] when he feels like it, has everyone say "Yes baas" to him all day, and gets paid 10 to 20 times as much?
> Africans will start working as good [sic] as Europeans--probably better--when they have the same pay--and as good a house where servants do all the work.

The very large discrepancy in average African pay, and the fact that the policy of equal pay for equal qualifications was in the process of being ended in the educational system, convinced all African trainees with whom I discussed the issue that Africans, generally, were unjustly discriminated against in terms of pay and terms of service and that--at least in education--the situation was getting worse.

While racial discrimination is doubtlessly a significant factor in establishing the limit of upward mobility for some

Rhodesian Africans, including some trainees, it is the only limiting factor that the most alienated appear able to see.[58]

"Even the hardest drinking and least capable European can always get a job, while many thousands of sober, educated Africans seek work," according to one male trainee.[59] "The more educated we are, the harder it is." Teaching in African schools is the only exception he could think of--although becoming a pastor is another long-established upward mobile career.

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[58]I was surprised personally to encounter quite a few more Africans holding jobs beyond their capabilities than was the case for Europeans. While I make no claim that these instances are a representative sample, they, along with the very disappointing performance of states north of the Zambezi--where Africans are preferentially hired--caution me not to accept automatically the African and liberal European assumption that the Colour Bar is the main brake on African advance. The answer to the question of the relative importance of discrimination in holding the African Rhodesian back is not known and is likely to continue to defy precise measurement.

[59]Dorsey (1975, p. 150) finds that six months after writing secondary school leaving examinations, 11.6% of Africans were employed, 25.6% were in further schooling, 50.2% were unemployed and 12.6% did not respond; the higher the job aspirations, the lower the percentage employed. Senior Chief Ndiweni has remarked: "[G]eneral education does not seem to fit these young people for anything." (Quoted in Davies, 1975, p. 450).

5.2 TRAINEES' ASPIRATIONS AND ABILITIES

Fletcher (1958, p. 25) and Drury (1967) find that Africans tend to enter teachers' training only because they fail to gain admittance to higher secondary education. "Almost to a man they are certain that they could have gone further with their studies had the teaching been better, or if more places had been available."[60]

Possibly related to this is Bucher's (1980) finding that Rhodesian Africans generally look to causes other than themselves for misfortunes large and small that befall them. For example, where a European would say, "I missed the bus," the typical Shona would say, "The bus left me behind."

At the government TTC at Umtali (T2) Drury reports that

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[60] 'O' Level examinations, normally taken at the end of Form IV, were still being graded in Britain in 1971! Berlyn (1967, p. 55) finds that there are in fact a fair number of vacancies in the top two forms of African schools that give 'A' Level preparatory sixth form training. While Government policy is to provide 12.5% as many academic (and 37.5% technical) secondary places for Africans as there are primary school leavers, once one is in secondary school, there are, generally, as many places as qualified students.

Some TTC teachers and school inspectors were of the opinion that many trainees were admitted with inadequate preparation and ability. While I am in no position to make any overall assessment on this point, considering the fact that their education had been almost exclusively in English--and that they would soon be teaching in that language--some trainees showed a surprisingly poor command of English--hardly a mark of overqualified trainees.

TTC principal Haw (1966) considers the number of secondary places adequate for qualified applicants. Still, in a country that provides secondary schooling for D-stream Europeans, "qualified for secondary schooling" seems to have considerably different definitions in the two school systems.

it was not unusual for 40% of accepted applicants to fail to show up on opening day. Even a deposit payment made little difference. A decade after Drury wrote, there were 300 unfilled places in TTCs as the term began (Division of African Education, 1977, p. 15.5). Dorsey (1975) similarly finds secondary leavers in T2 and T3 training programs more dissatisfied with their lot than most other school leavers (excepting the unemployed). In contrast, Drury believes that non-African students at Hillside generally feel they have reached their academic ceilings and their state of mind leads them to accept teachers' training as a suitable culmination to their studies.

In addition to the use of the Colour Bar as a scapegoat for all disappointments,[61] there are several other possible reasons for this difference in satisfaction between races with becoming teachers: one is that education to many Africans is the modern equivalent of the nganga's magic amulet or potion--become educated and all things are possible. The rapid rise of teachers and other educated persons in the states to the North has led educated Rhodesian Africans to hope for the same and to be disappointed by their

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[61] Vambe (1976, p. 211) observes: "The stupid man, the indolent, the loafer, the unimaginative, the incompetent, all picked on the crafty, selfish settler as the cause of his lack of progress in any particular direction. By the same token, the smallest success or the least talent displayed by the African assumed huge proportions . . . ."

own less than meteoric rise. In contrast, European trainees tend to be more realistic about what education can do. Also, the more selective nature of African education, plus the typically lower per capita income level for African trainees' families (which make family financed overseas and/or graduate training less likely) combine to make African trainees more elite in modern African society than European trainees are in theirs.

The feeling of racially restricted opportunities often demonstrably exceeds its factual base. For example, several African girls said they would rather become air hostesses than teachers, but that only Whites can get such a job. In fact, Air Rhodesia had begun hiring African air hostesses several years earlier. Other restrictions were real enough, but they came from the trainees' own backgrounds. Several girls would have preferred to become state-registered nurses, but their families would not hear of it: Nurses sometimes have to deal with naked men, work night shifts in hospitals far from home, and are required to, and have opportunities to do, things disapproved of by protective, traditionalist parents. Male trainees told similar stories, such as those who indicated a preference for public service jobs, but who said that Africans can not get such posts. In fact, a number of Africans were in responsible posts in the public service (and had been since 1960); but their number was dropping.

The reason, public service officials contended, was in large part that qualified Africans failed to apply.[62] May (1978, p. 54) also notes "confusion as to which jobs were open to the non-European . . . ."

5.2.1 Europeans As A Reference Group

Runciman (1966, p. 9) posits that "people's attitudes, aspirations and grievances largely depend on the frame of reference within which they are conceived." The educated poor are an alienated group in any society. However, the Africans' sense of deprivation is especially great in Rhodesia for several reasons: Firstly, trainees and other Africans feel that education ought to advance them to equal economic status with Europeans. Several UR faculty members who had taught in other African countries felt that the fact that expatriot teachers were better off was not as much a source of envy there, perhaps because they were not conceived of as a reference group to the extent all Whites are in Rhodesia. Dorsey (1975, pp. 42, 173) finds:

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[62]The general view of Rhodesian society held by the informant seemed to determine the reason given for the drop of Africans in the public service: The three reasons I most frequently heard are: 1) racism of the party in power; 2) poor performance by Africans who had been given responsible posts; and 3) increasing reluctance of Africans to be identified with the White regime.

> Education in Rhodesian society . . . effectively socializes the African secondary school pupil to anticipate a life style which is Western and orientated [sic] to the European life style of the country.
> . . . . . .
> African expectations and aspirations ran counter to this [vocationally oriented education]. Having adopted the European as their reference group Africans wished to have a similar type of education to that provided for Europeans; basically an academic curriculum. The African expected education to enable him to obtain a job in the European community and to enjoy a standard of living different from that of his father. Any education which did not purport to do so was viewed with dismay and a suspicion that he was being purposely consigned to a inferior status.

5.2.2 The Outside World

Secondly, the outside world constantly told trainees and other Rhodesian Africans that their poverty is due to exploitation and selfishness of the settlers. In a South African professor's opinion:

> The ruling philosophy, at least as it is being expressed in international circles, discourages self-reliance and the assumption of responsibility. A disadvantaged person or nation cannot but be the victim of another's wickedness, and it is incumbent on this other to compensate for it. This wickedness usually takes the form of greater material welfare which has resulted from hard work, initiative and enterprise and which has to be redistributed. At a special meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 24 October 1970 the governments of the world pledged themselves 'individually and collectively to pursue policies designed to create a more just and rational world economic and social order in which equality of opportunities should be as much a prerogative of nations as of individuals within a nation.' (Sadie, 1976, p. 18; citing U.N. Population Newsletter [1970, p. 1]).

Even liberal European educators, who in many respects were strongly critical of the RF Government, were also critical of some of the simplistic attacks on Rhodesia; numerous times I was told that only rarely do the outside critics present a broad perspective on the problems of African poverty; they usually ignore the key fact that the areas of Africa where there has been the greatest advance--for Black and White alike--are those areas where the European population is relatively large.

Egalitarians often compare the status of Europeans and Natives in a given African territory, find the White much better off, find many Africans living in conditions that are appalling by contemporary American or British standards, and at once jump to the conclusion that the Whites are holding the Blacks down and exploiting them. When overseas writers dig a bit deeper, they find that nearly all the evils liberals see in multi-racial Rhodesia, and blamed on the settlers, are present to an equal or even greater degree in African territories that have few permanently resident Whites in them. Where settlers have gone they have taken not only their economic wealth but what can be called their social wealth: the technical know-how for commerce and industry and for running a modern state. These things are received <u>gratis</u> when a settler arrives in an African state but they have to be paid for dearly--in both time and money--when they must be

taught to a Native. Also, the rate of investment capital is much higher in states that have appreciable European communities, capital that makes a modern state possible. While a few works include this more balanced view (e.g., Southall and Gutkind, 1956; Gann and Duignan, 1967) it is not surprising that the more frequently presented 'settler as exploiter,' 'capitalism as evil' views have made a greater impression on most trainees and other Africans.

A more conservative White Rhodesian, the principal of a TTC for Africans, puts this case even more strongly:

> Where one race is on a lower rung in the ladder of civilisation it is inevitable that discrimination will appear to be "racial". Inability, which results in envy, uses the cover of "racial discrimination" to hide an unpleasant admission.
>
> This factor of envy also operates on the international plane. In Africa, the campaign against Rhodesia is not legitimately based on racial discrimination--since all, regardless of race, are equally free to advance economically and politically according to merit and ability. The phenomenal success of Rhodesia's able administration, which appears to be based on white privilege but is really based on merit and ability discrimination, stands as un [sic] uncomfortable rebuke to the inability, poverty and backwardness apparent elsewhere, where racial majority rule takes the place of "ability majority rule".
>
> The tragedy of the whole situation is that the expectations of the underprivileged everywhere, are, more often than not, impossible to satisfy. The conditions generating racial tensions have not been remedied even in the United States, the most affluent society of all. Everyone cannot own Rolls Royces, or be millionaires, or presidents, or have palatial homesteads; and envy will continue to fire movements designed to wrest power and privilege from those who probably earned these through their drive, ability and enterprise.
>
> The remedy surely does not lie in an undifferentiated, drab, Communistic mediocrity. It lies rather in

> working through organised community initiative towards amelioration, and in the honest recognition that people are not all the same (the world would be a pretty dull place without differences). At the same time the channels of advancement must be kept open for individuals to advance according to their merit and ability, regardless of race. (Haw, 1966).[63]

An Institute of Education faculty member cited a case where European liberalism and economic realism collided within a mile or so of the University. A European hotel owner had let it be known that Africans were welcome to patronize its bar. Africans flooded in, European customers left; the Africans spent so little money that a formerly very profitable bar was now going broke.

5.3 RURAL STAGNATION--WHY?

Since about 80% of Africans are farmers and since the urban unemployed were there as much from rural 'push' as from urban 'pull,' this dissertation's assessment of the extent to which trainees are acquiring and internalizing values consistent with citizens of a free enterprise democracy includes a brief discussion of Rhodesia's rural areas and trainees perceptions of their problems and prospects.

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[63]After Haw wrote, the 1969 Constitution put a major hurdle in the path of political advance by introducing a communal franchise that tied African parliamentary representation to direct African tax payments in a formula that would insure that African seats would remain a small minority for as long into the future as anyone could see.

The slowing of economic growth caused by sanctions and the diminishing ability of the TTLs to support their population (due to continued use of traditional agricultural practices, Africanist-inspired refusal to continue such modern practices as had been introduced--such as dipping of cattle to kill parasites--to erosion and, above all, the African population explosion) all meant that for many Africans their economic circumstances were declining and had been declining during the years trainees were old enough to be aware of such things. In the TTLs, an "economic and conservation system [already] strained to the breaking point" had to support 50% greater population in a seven year period (1961-68) (Kay, 1970, p. 91). According to the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union, real earnings for African workers employed in agriculture fell 16.5% from 1963 to 1971 (Davies, 1975, p. 431). Thus the African workers and their sympathizers felt they were being shamelessly exploited by the European farmers. But thanks to the sell cheap, buy dear agricultural economy (caused largely by sanctions), a majority of commercial farmers were just breaking even or going into debt; thus they were equally sincere in their protestations that they could not afford to pay more.

Malinowski (1945, pp. 55-56) considers it "one of the soundest and most important principles of social science that people are prepared to pass only from worse to better"; the

opposite was the case with many Africans throughout the continent in the 1960s and 1970s, a situation that was destabilizing everywhere, but especially where the polity and the economy were largely in the hands of a considerably better off ethnic minority.

5.3.1 Cultural Restraints

At first my Western orientation caused me to classify agricultural issues as purely economic; but as I examined the matter more deeply, most issues seem as much cultural as economic. That cultural restraints are the main economic brake is also the conclusion Banfield (1958) reached in a study in a moderate sized town in southern Italy: "culture may be the limiting factor which determines the amount and character of organization and therefore progress in the less developed parts of the world."

In Rhodesia, T. R. Stanning and associates found this out when their African Farm Development Organisation operated, largely successfully from a short-term economic point of view, a self-financing program in the Chiweshe Reserve; three years into the scheme, he wrote (1967):

> The mental adjustments required for a person who has been unable to feed himself and his family to go in one year into the cash economy are too much for about 30 per cent of the plotholders in our scheme. Twenty per cent of these will never make the grade. To try and teach these people how to manage the least sophisticated co-operative is a task that is going to take many

> years, if not many generations, to accomplish. With a sudden increase in spending power that our plotholders have acquired, we are unable, at this stage, to show any [long-term] material benefits that have accrued to them. Instead of spending their profits on buying equipment which will assist in reducing the amount of work that the family has to do on the plot and thus relieving their women-folk of the arduous task of cultivating by hand, they would much prefer to increase their labour force by buying an additional wife. They are unable to realize that by doing this they are in actual fact putting themselves in a worse position, as with each passing year they have an additional mouth to feed, clothe and school. The wives are regarded by their men-folk as being next to cattle in importance in the social structure and have virtually no say in the budgeting of the family, although they do nearly all the work.

A few African female trainees referred to this male attitude as part of what is wrong in Rhodesia.

Government efforts to get Africans to improve their farming techniques have also met with limited success; Weinrich (1965, p. 45) observes:

> For many years the Agricultural Department has given instructions in agriculture and animal husbandry to any African willing to learn advanced methods. Those who at the end of a three-years' training course pass a test in agricultural efficiency receive certificates as master farmers. These master farmers reap consistently a much greater harvest than ordinary farmers. In spite of this . . . for the whole of Victoria Reserve . . . [only] 105 or 2.8% of 3,700 landholders are master farmers.

5.3.2 Cattle Complex

In the early days the African economy was based almost exclusively on the possession of cattle. Even as late as 1968, this was still true to a somewhat surprising extent. Out of 20 essays written by students in TTCs and the University and collected by Clive and Peggy Kileff, one-fifth were about the role of cattle in the Shona society.

> First and foremost, they [cattle] are regarded as the most essential source of wealth. A Shona man calculates his wealth in terms of the head of cattle he possesses. . . . They are not to be slaughtered but left to increase their numbers and thereby his wealth.
> A man's social status is determined by how many head of cattle he possesses. The larger his herd the more he is regarded as an important person in his society. (Makamure, 1970, pp. 14-16).

Two of the students mention the necessity to sell cattle at times to pay school fees:

> After about seven years of service an ox may be sold. The average price is about $20 but some fetch up to $40 or $60. The money serves as a weapon in chronic battles against hunger and school fees. . . . The problem of school fees is threatening to empty all the cattle kraals. Indeed, if suddenly the Shona were left without cattle by some natural disaster, then over half the students would be financially crippled and consequently out of school. (Bere-Chikara, 1970, p. 22).

> Cash is needed to send the children to school, to pay taxes, to buy clothes and utensils and other things needed by the family. (Tsodzo, 1970, p. 17).

Wright (1972, p. 232) comments on the reluctance of Africans to sell their cattle even if by not doing so they face a disastrous loss of fortune:

> The Rhodesian . . . looks on his cattle as an asset to be kept and increased not as a revenue-earning commodity and we still read about thousands of head of cattle in tribal lands being allowed to die of starvation in drought years because their owners refuse to sell them.

One retired District Commissioner said that, without a strict destocking policy, Africans in the TTLs get the land in such bad shape from overgrazing of cattle that it will no longer support cattle; "then they really finish it off with goats."

Stopforth (1972, p. 76) finds that less than a third of urban Africans would prefer a pension to cattle on retirement. Sithole (1972, pp. 73-74) argues that amongst the minority Ndebele cattle ownership is almost as much a contemporary prestige factor as it is a traditional or economic one:

> Among the Ndebele people cattle play a very important role. They are of great economic value; a man with many cattle feels secure since he has something with which to feed himself, his wives, his relatives and his friends. A man's real wealth is measured in cattle. To interfere with a man's cattle is therefore to interfere with his very livelihood. A man who has many cattle is a rich man and other men look up to him. In the affairs of the Ndebele his voice usually carries over that of the poor man. He is often trusted by his fellowmen because he has demonstrated success in his own affairs, and hence others readily trust him with their own affairs.

Educated Africans who tried to modify their community's attitudes to cattle, and other matters, encountered more resistance than approbation; Harper (1959, pp. 241-42) relates:

> Baba Mutambanengwe [a mission-educated African who had returned to his native village to establish a school] introduced the first plough into African culture . . . . The first day he tried to use the plough the villagers gathered to witness the magic the white man had created. He yoked the oxen to the plough and began his work. All were baffled at the way it would turn the soil over. The women rolled on the ground hilarious with laughter.
>
> After the initial curiosity of the villagers had been satisfied, they refused to have anything to do with the plough. Digging the field was woman's work--the plough had to be pulled by oxen--it was taboo for women to work with oxen, therefore, they would violate the division of labor or else they would violate the taboo of women working with animals. Since neither of these choices were acceptable they could only reject the plough and use their old customs of cultivation.

5.3.3 Farming As A Career

Trainees' views on government efforts to change rural ways varied. Many seemed to feel that African acquisition of lands then reserved for Europeans would solve many, if not all, problems. The government was criticized for its attempt to change rural practices through the late but unlamented Land Husbandry Act, and for giving control of land allocation back to the chiefs when the Act was abandoned; sometimes both views were stated by the same individual!

Mention has already been made of the charge that African

education seemed to mesh poorly with the requirements of industrial employment. The education system's deficiencies may be even greater relative to agriculture. The Judges Commission (1963, pp. 13-14) found:

> rural pursuits and village life are, frankly, unpopular with the educated--or even partly educated--populace. Those who have tasted educational ambition make vigourous efforts to come to town, and as far as the labour market permits, they seek to enjoy the fruits of urban production and commerce. We do not accept the inference that in adding to rural discontent, the schoolmaster is an enemy of a balanced society. But can we altogether exonerate the school curriculum?

In the Commission's opinion part of the problem was caused by the examination system:

> The view has also been expressed to us that subjects such as the vernacular, religious knowledge, hygiene, 'civics' and manual skills, which are not examinable as a matter of course at the Standard 6 leaving examination [RT: then the end of elementary school, since replaced with a Grade 7 exam] receive only off-hand attention from both teachers and pupils. It is as if subjects had a ranking order determined by their use in securing promotion.

It should be noted that economics does not even receive this "off-hand" attention in Rhodesian schools. Janet (Mrs. Ian) Smith feels her husband was wise to take an economics degree at Rhodes University; she adds: "Most farmers that fall by the wayside do so because they do not know whether they are making money or losing money, and the economic side of farming is vital to survival." (Quoted in Berlyn, 1978).

I am left with the impression that most African trainees had a low opinion of farming as a career. Dorsey (1975, p. 121-22) apparently feels the same for secondary students, because she does not even include TTL farming as an occupation to be rated for prestige or preference, even though her list includes waiter, domestic servant and vegetable seller.

5.3.4 Land Ownership

There seemed to be no more divisive single question in Rhodesia: "No issue is of greater dimension, and of deeper emotional appeal, to Africans in Southern Africa than land shortage." (Shamuyarira, 1965, p. 90).

> The repeal of the [Land Apportionment] Act,[64] more than any other single event, would have ensured that Rhodesia could never become a white man's country, and thus the majority of Europeans would not accept it.
> . . . . . .
> No constitution, settlement or dialogue between the races can hope to be successful while the existence of the Act remains. (Rifkind, 1968, pp. 148, 220).

When Rifkind discussed his thesis at the University of Rhodesia in 1971, one of the African students mentioned that African families have, typically, seven or more children, while White ones have two or three; he reasoned that a fair

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[64]The Land Apportionment Act was repealed in 1969; however Africanists looked no more favorably on its successor, the Land Tenure Act.

land policy would provide Africans with considerably more land per family than Europeans! A chorus of approval came from the predominantly Black audience. I encountered no training college pupil who expressed this drastic a land redistributive philosophy.

Both European and African faith that the educational system was the magic elixir was waning at the time of my fieldwork. The Government's solution was to establish a new system of vocationally oriented secondary schools and to get local communities more involved. At least the more alienated Africans were transferring their faith to political change, even if armed struggle were necessary to bring this about (Weinrich, 1979, p. 40).

How fair the Land Tenure Act was depended upon which set of figures are looked at. The Africanists complained that 5 million Africans were assigned half the country while one quarter million non-Africans had the other half. Pro-system Rhodesians replied that this ignored the fact that 1.73 million Africans resided in nominally European areas, that, in reality, 2 million lived in half the country, 3 million in the other half (Davies, 1975, pp. 260-61).

White Rhodesians point out that in 1923 they paid the British Treasury 2,000,000 pounds (then still a substantial sum) for Crown lands; no other British colonial people was ever required to make such a payment. A similar settlement

was made with the British South Africa Company for mineral rights. If Africans believe that the White Rhodesians were sold something to which London did not have clear title, one European UR student suggested, London was where they should seek compensation: "Even in your Old West, they hung the horse thieves, not those they sold the horses to."

5.3.5 Europeans Divided

A number of European educators and trainees felt that the Land Tenure Act ought to be modified so that Africans would not be excluded from buying land in European farming areas. Some argued that only the more capable Africans could raise the money to buy European land, and that a requirement that a buyer have a Master Farmer's Certificate and abide by conservation regulations would answer legitimate fears that African farms would 'ruin the neighborhood.'

European trainees who came from farming families hotly disputed this position. They said that funds from foreign organizations bent on undermining the European position in Rhodesia would be used to acquire farms--thus the more they disrupted life on neighboring White farms the better. Several cited the British Methodist Epworth Mission as an example of where African farmers were ruining the land, even though it was owned and theoretically 'managed' by a 'European' church; others mentioned Cold Comfort Farm as an

example of European farmland being used primarily as a base for revolutionaries.[65]

"Once Africans gain control of an area, regulations are bloody useless" in controlling or removing them, according to one European trainee; he (and others) cited the protracted and less than successful efforts to get Tangwenda tribe squatters off a large European farm in eastern Rhodesia.

Wherever African and European farm lands meet, problems of disease, rustling, theft and squatting multiply, insisted one girl; she very convincingly professed her compassion for the plight of the rural African--but she just as strongly felt that the various land 'reform' proposals being bandied about would destroy the already financially strapped White commercial farmers without doing much--or anything--to alleviate African poverty.

5.3.6 Africans United

African trainees I spoke with generally conceded that European farmers have, on the average, considerably higher per acre productivity than typical African ones. Several qualified this with the observation that if these European

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[65]Cold Comfort Farm was formerly Lord Acton's estate; it was purchased in the 1960s with World Council of Churches funds, and was reputed to be a regular gathering place for radical Africanists and their European sympathizers. See Clutton-Block (1972) for a favorable assessment of Cold Comfort Farm.

farmers had to make do with the resources available to an African farmer, they would not do any better.

Although African female trainees generally expressed fewer and more hesitant opinions than African males, I was treated to a lengthy and heated discourse by one girl--who had to stop and backtrack when she inadvertently switched into Shona. She said African holdings are almost always too small and on poorer land than European ones, that agricultural extension and other facilities (e.g., credit and market roads) are poorer, that the government takes a big percentage of the price of African sales while European farmers get full price, that chiefs favor their relatives--and others who one way or other show obeisance to them--in assigning farming land; if a farmer uses good practices and improves the land he has been assigned, the chief takes it away to give to a relative and her family (here she switched from generalizing to her specific grievance) is assigned to land that is worn out and eroded, and miles from a market road--"but that hardly makes any difference because now we have nothing to sell." Her father had to take a job on a European farm. "Yes, it is more productive. If you call growing tobacco to give people cancer while the country is starving being productive!" The four or five other female trainees present seemed uneasy at this vehement statement, but had nothing to say to modify it.

After editing by the African Division of the Ministry of Education, nothing in my questionnaire concerned land tenure or agriculture; but other interviews made it clear that many of the sentiments expressed by the just-quoted young lady are widely held.

5.4 THE ALCHEMISTS' LATEST ELIXIR: AFRICAN SOCIALISM

There was a naive assumption on the part of a disturbingly large number of trainees that there was some magic elixir that would transform them and their families from poor to rich. Sometimes this belief was explicitly linked with a feeling that the Rhodesian Whites were capriciously withholding that elixir. More often the linkage was weaker, with the assumption that the magic elixir's name is 'African socialism'; when I inquired what African socialism consisted of, it seemed to be the end of exploitation and plenty for all; even the 'from each according to his abilities' aspect of Marxism seemed to be lost on many trainees.

Many of the trainees were at least partially aware of the oppression and hardships that have accompanied socialism in the Soviet bloc; but somehow adding the word 'African' to socialism would strip socialism of the unpleasant realities where it has been tried, while providing all its supposed

advantages.[66] Inquiry as to what they expected to gain showed that what the trainees who were opting for 'African socialism' wanted were the rewards that go with being successful capitalists--or with being members of a real-life socialism's exploiting 'new class.' Others' findings elsewhere on the African continent are similar:

> Socialism (or African socialism) is given many meanings by African leaders and university students. If it is taken to mean subordination of individual interests in favor of collective ones, if "acquisitiveness for the purpose of gaining power and prestige is unsocialistic," if "the very desire to accumulate is an expression of insecurity, and must be interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the social system," then there are many African students who in word and deed appear to have moved away from this ideal. Considerable self-interest and (increasingly) consideration of entrepreneurial careers are in evidence. (Hanna, 1975, p. 61).

Partridge (1961, pp. 9-10) similarly finds that trainees often will state an altruistic motive for their drive for upward mobility:

> Education in Africa is not just something your parents want you to have, and which you go on getting until you can decently give it up and begin to find out what you want to know. Nor is it the gateway to worlds undreamed of, magic casements and all that. Rather it is a means to an easy, easeful life, away from the toil and soiled hands and monotony of life in the village. It makes a person modern, up-to-date, enables a man to

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[66] Although in a couple of instances this awareness was qualified with the wonder if the picture presented by the Rhodesian media of conditions in the Soviet sphere was distorted by pro-system displeasure at communist support for 'liberation' movements.

> wear glasses, carry a brief case, and look like the young men in the advertisements. But ask any African teacher trainee why he is one, and the answer comes pat, 'Because I want to help my people.'

5.4.1 Is Education The Elixir?

For several decades prior to my field research, education was considered by many to be the answer to economic backwardness, as well as other ills such as ethnic chauvinism and other anti-democratic attitudes (see Hoernle, 1939 and 1945; Malherbe, 1946). By the 1960s a reaction had set in, with responsible criticism from Abernathy (1969) and Hauf et al. (1975), as well as more widely read polemics by Reimer (1971), Illich (1971) and Carnoy (1974).

In this critical vein, W. R. Lewis (1962), among others, argues that education in a traditional rural environment is, at least in the short term not the solution to a country's problems, that it is necessarily a destablizing force; so Lucas' (1965, pp. 255-56) observations concerning the ex-French Congo are probably applicable to much of the underdeveloped world, including Rhodesia:

> Formal education . . . makes a negative contribution in the area of Congolese agricultural development. Farming, as currently practiced in the Congo, offers no opportunity to fulfill the aspirations of educated youths, and the school does not communicate to them the desire nor the skills.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> There seems to be an inherent conflict between the three main legitimate social aims of Congolese education. If formal education succeeds in arousing in the young ambitions necessary to sustain their efforts

> to acquire the tools of leadership, the same education "spoils" the young for the agricultural and industrial tasks which must still be performed by the majority of the population at this stage of Congolese economic development. When the industrialized European countries were at a comparable stage of economic development, a type of formal, leadership-oriented education was offered to a socio-economic elite and another type of education was offered to a number of children from the lower classes. . . . [T]he majority of the Congolese school children are being taken part of the way toward posts that do not exist and turned away from occupations which badly need performing if the Congolese are to make their full contribution to the economic development of their country.

A similar observation has been made by a leading opposition spokesman in Rhodesia:

> Education creates discontent with a backward environment and the higher the education the greater the desire for social advancement. Frustration occurs when education cannot be used to satisfy the ambitions engendered. This happens if no skill is acquired or if there is no satisfactory outlet for the skill achieved.
>
> From the community point of view an educational system which fails to meet the needs of its labour market contributes nothing to the economy or economic development and adds to its burdens and stress. Undeveloped countries cannot afford the expenditure on education which cannot be absorbed, applied, or for which there is no use. Higher learning per se is a luxury.
>
> In traditionally agrarian societies education in the lower grades . . . must be by practical demonstration and translated into effective and purposeful action in uses which are relevant to the pupil's life. . . .
>
> In addition to skills, the development of qualities of character and attitudes to meet the new life are necessary both for productivity and reward--integrity, habits of order and discipline, conscientiousness and initiative. . . .
>
> The Rhodesia University lacking [RT: at the time Hirsch wrote] engineering and allied courses produces a majority of graduates with a higher general education and no specific professional skills.
>
> We are accordingly beginning to suffer the consequences--a growing body of frustrated semi- or

> fully-educated malcontents, unemployment in the midst of need for skills, the wastage and burden of dropouts and a relatively static level of productivity. The danger is disenchantment with education for the mass, discounting its benefits and necessity, instead of recognising the defects in the system and correcting them. (Hirsch, 1973, pp. 106-07).

A TTC principal discusses one way his school accomplished tasks it could not hire outsiders to do, at the same time as it attempted to deal with the danger that its students would feel that they were too good to soil their hands:

> At 6.30 on a Saturday morning, then you would find each one of our two hundred or so boarders and five of the teachers going to appointed jobs. . . .
> Apart from enjoying ourselves and getting to know one another--emptying a rubbish pit with him teaches you a lot about Temba and doubtless [sic] vice versa--School Improvement does a lot to create a family atmosphere in the school; everyone at home has his work to do, and does it. It also has enormous curative powers, or preventive ones where the disease of white-collaritis has not taken too strong a hold. (Partridge, 1961, pp. 8-9).

The high occupational aspirations of African secondary students in Rhodesia is a factor in their dissatisfaction. Dorsey (1975, p. 379) categorizes the career aspirations of 84.6% of African males and 92.7% of African females at Form IV as high; comparable figures for black-ruled Botswana are 64.0% and 62.6%.

A number of Rhodesian educators I spoke with suggested that lack of vocational counseling is a serious problem in

African schools; thus, school leavers too often aim unrealistically high, especially for the initial job. Retiring Secretary for African Education, D. W. Stewart, "cited the case of a Form IV leaver [12 years of schooling] who had applied for a job as bank manager." (RH, 20.4.72).

Parental expectations in Rhodesia are even more unrealistically high. Only 2.2% of African students entering school for the first time in 1959 completed Form IV in 1971 (Dorsey, 1975, pp. 53-54); so Dorsey's population of secondary school leavers <u>are</u> an elite group. Yet when a random sample of urban African adults (whose progeny would include many who had not and would not climb very high on the educational ladder) was asked: "What type job will your children get?" 78.2% replied professional, while an additional 14.9% said white-collar or well paying (Stopforth, 1972, p. 82). Most of these parents and their offspring would be disappointed in Rhodesia (or in any other society). The Judges' Commission (1963, p. 95) concludes:

> If all children attended school compulsorily for substantial periods, the individual would not regard himself so often as one elected to be distainful of common things.

In conversations with the author, other Rhodesian educators expressed the belief that compulsory education, even when and if practical, would be a serious mistake; people value what they strive to do, not what they are forced

to do. This is doubly true when the people in question are Black, while those responsible for the compelling would be White. In this view, the "bright, eager, Monday faces of the school children remind[ing] us that they want us and need us" (Partridge, 1961, p. 21) would, with compulsory schooling, quickly turn to the faces of sullen captives reported by some who have 'taught' North American Indians (Wolcott, 1974), or Negroes (private conversation with teachers in the American Virgin Islands).

At the time of my fieldwork, both Africans and Europeans were losing faith that the existing educational system was the magic elixir for African development. The Government's solution was to establish a new system of vocationally oriented secondary schools and to get the local community more involved. Africans tended to transfer their faith to political change, even if armed struggle were necessary to bring it about (Weinrich, 1979, p. 40).

5.4.2 Educational Economics

The social service where there was the greatest discrepancy between African and European facilities was the one I was studying--education.

Everyone agreed that African education was not as well provided for as European. The Government quite accurately pointed out that human and financial resources to bring

African education to equality were not available, that levelling would greatly lower European standards, and perhaps African ones too, because it would lead to a massive departure of the Europeans essential to the running of African education and of a modern economy. Yet trainees who realized that instant equality of African education was impossible nonetheless were understandably unhappy that the Government was not committed to a rapid reduction of the gap.

When I solicited African trainees' views on the European argument that their school system was better because their taxes were so much higher and that, even with the differences, European taxes provided much of the funding for African schools, responses varied. Some doubted that the actual tax collections were as different as the official view would have it; others said that African tax payments were low only because Africans are underpaid. Some argued that the tax and benefit pies in other countries are national ones and should be in Rhodesia also; nearly all believed this to be the case in America; surprise was expressed by those I informed that each of many thousands of school districts in the United States has its own budget and salary levels--and that the local tax base is an important factor in determining them.

While equality of educational opportunity was clearly favored, racial integration was rarely mentioned. This

corresponds with the findings of other investigators in Rhodesia (e.g., the Judges Commission).

5.4.3 Attitudes To Free Enterprise

Marshall Murphree, head of the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies at the University of Rhodesia, pointed out that most African school leavers are inadequately motivated to develop skills in the directions required by expanding industrial economies. The problem is common throughout Africa; Murphree specifically mentioned parallels in neighboring Botswana--a country where an industrial economy is much farther from reality than in Rhodesia (RH, 25.4.74).

When trainees complained of the low salaries they contemplated receiving, I several times asked if they had considered a career in business or industry. I was told that the best jobs all go to Whites, the intermediate ones are reserved for Asians and Coloureds; Africans get only what is left.[67] When I reminded them of the periodic stories in the Rhodesian media that told of successful African businessmen, I was usually told that they hired only their own relatives, although one trainee added that if they hired non-relatives

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[67]Dorsey (1975, pp. 158-59) reports that, of secondary leavers who found employment, 1.0% were self employed and 3.0% worked for African firms; in contrast, 54.8% worked for the government; the remainder for non-African firms and individuals. Of those with jobs, 46.4% said they got them through relatives or friends.

for higher level posts, they were likely to do the ultimate in prestige and ego building by hiring a European!

The newspapers were reporting court cases concerning use by businessmen of witchcraft to improve their business or to damage that of their competitors. Several times I asked trainees for their reactions to these reports. Some denounced the activity as bad, superstitious, sinful, and ignorant. Others said the belief in witchcraft may (or does) make it effective for the believer. When I asked if fear of the accusation of witchcraft is really a brake on business enterprise, a few trainees agreed that it could be, although others said it was a detriment only for those who disregarded the welfare of their families and communities. Usually when I mentioned witchcraft, I got some indication that my informants would really rather talk about something else.

Gann (1977, p. 13) finds that those Africans who are successful in business tend not to become involved in Africanist movements:

> The African leaders [of ZANU and ZAPU] are overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks of teachers, clergyman, social welfare workers, etc. . . .
> Engineers, agronomists, industrial chemists, technicians, or businessmen are conspicuous by their absence--a serious deficiency for modern political cadres, no matter whether they wish to sabotage or take over an industrialized society.

5.5 SATISFACTION WITH THE RHODESIAN WAY OF LIFE

After considering the above points, it should not come as any surprise that, when asked in my questionnaire to compare their own satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life with their mothers' and fathers' satisfaction, a distressingly high percentage of African respondents (37.1%) are much less satisfied than either parent. These respondents are amongst the best educated and potentially best paid Africans and can be expected to exert an influence in African society quite disproportionate to their numbers (Weinrich, 1971, p. 38). Comparisons with European responses appear in Table 5:1.

TABLE 5:1 Trainees' satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life, compared with parents' satisfaction

Relative satisfaction of trainees	African		European	
	Fathers	Mothers	Fathers	Mothers
Much greater	5.2	6.6	3.5	3.4
Greater	17.3	19.7	23.5	30.2
Equal (write-in)	0.7	0.0	25.2	22.4
Less	34.0	29.4	40.0	35.3
Much less	42.8	44.3	7.8	8.6

Q3.40-41.

It was not possible, in my questionnaire, to explore any aspects of Rhodesian life respondents would like to see changed nor to learn the nature of changes desired. In interviews, their overriding concern relating to the Rhodesian society was that they are poor, aspiring to be rich. The fact that an unreasonably high percentage of African trainees (31.4%) indicated that their parents had a cash income of R$49 per year or less is a strong indication of their feelings of poverty. This is a common phenomenon throughout Africa, where 'the wants' greatly exceed societies' abilities to deliver. It is also common for advanced students to look like a privileged few in others' eyes, but not in their own. Dorsey (1975, p. 172) observes concerning Rhodesian Africans:

> The experience of pupils in the educational system . . . seems to enhance their feelings of relative deprivation. Particularly revealing is the increased weight given to the racial discrimination factor by pupils as they proceed up the educational ladder . . . . This suggests that the educational process is producing a shift in the pupils' reference perspectives; their comparison is no longer . . . to 'nonmembership groups' [in the sense the phrase is used by Merton, 1957, p. 242] but is also . . . a comparison with those whom they consider to be of the same status or social category, but with whom they do not have sustained social interaction. . . . The significance of the Rhodesian data is that this shift in relationship is seen as a normative one, the aspirations of our respondents indicating that equality of status attributes [with educated Europeans] is what they consider should be the norm for the society.

The position of teacher trainees in Rhodesia in many ways resembles that of trainees elsewhere in Africa; Grindal (1974, pp. 366-70) had teacher trainees and senior secondary students in northern Ghana write essays entitled: "My autobiography from now to the year 2000"; he found:

> One of the dominant characteristics of these essays is the optimistic, and indeed naive perception that an almost one-to-one correspondence exists between formal educational achievement and success in later life.
> . . . . . .
> Students from more advanced backgrounds are more realistic about the limited possibilities of educational and occupational advancement, and their responses reflect a deeper understanding of the actual workings of the modern nation state.
> . . . . . .
> A second characteristic theme in the essays is the relationship between the students' desire to escape his inferior status as a schoolboy and his need to attain a position of power and dominance over others. Students describe their present status as one of "wretchedness and poverty."

An SPSS BREAKDOWN of relative satisfaction of African trainees with the Rhodesian way of life (compared with parents' satisfaction) with other variables was run, and is reported in Table 5:2.

It shows that those whose fathers are more active in groups are relatively less satisfied, while there is a direct relationship with trainees' own group memberships. It is possible that group activity tends to relate to economic and political satisfaction; however it is also possible that the sense of belonging <u>per se</u> is the key.

TABLE 5:2 Satisfaction with Rhodesian way of life and other variables

Independent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
AGE	.0487	.0606	.0966	+	.0080	.0357
NOWIVES	No significant relationships					
MOTHERNO	No significant relationships					
BOARDING	No significant relationships					
CLASRANK	No significant relationships					
FACHURCH	No significant relationships					
MOCHURCH	No significant relationships					
STCHURCH	No significant relationships					
CHILDREN	No significant relationships					
OLDER	No significant relationships					
FAEDCATN	.0253	.2035	.0259	-	.0041	.0450
MOEDCATN	No significant relationships					
PARCASH	.1471	.8355	.0994	+	.0001	.0306
GROUPFA	.2687	.0489	.7285	-	.0096	.0128
GROUPMO	No significant relationships					
GROUPST	.1094	.0405	.3380	+	.0100	.0180
PRIEST	No significant relationships					
CHIEF	.0007	.0020	.0206	+	.0215	.0390
PTEACH	.0660	.0203	.4038	+	.0124	.0166
STEACH	No significant relationships					
CTEACH	.0363	.0493	.0960	+	.0088	.0196
PARENTS	.1193	.0249	.6656	+	.0116	.0135
AUNTUNCL	.1567	.0234	.9666	+	.0119	.0120
SIBLINGS	.1041	.0322	.4551	+	.0106	.0143
FRIENDS	No significant relationships					
OBSERVAT	.0150	.0037	.3584	-	.0196	.0243
PTEXTS	.0001	.0000	.1340	+	.0383	.0473
STEXTS	No significant relationships					
CTEXTS	No significant relationships					
RELIGBKS	No significant relationships					
MAGAZINS	.0295	.0263	.1302	-	.0113	.0207
NEWSPAPR	.0089	.2142	.0065	-	.0035	.0265
BOOKS	.1332	.0189	.9665	-	.0128	.0129
POLPAMPH	.0000	.0000	.0067	-	.0416	.0638
RECRADTV	.0368	.2150	.0307	+	.0035	.0195
FORRADIO	.0005	.0001	.3087	-	.0366	.0421
INTEREST	.0069	.0020	.5523	-	.0222	.0230
PROGRESS	.0000	.0000	.7167	+	.0729	.0758
PEOPLE2X	.0224	.0154	.1533	+	.0134	.0220

TABLE 5:2 (continued)

Independent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non+lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
HARDWORK		No significant relationships				
FAIRTRET		No significant relationships				
MORTALKP	.0084	.0051	.1890	-	.0186	.0227
MORTALKS	.0320	.0123	.4319	-	.0149	.0164
MORTALKC		No significant relationships				
COURTEUS		No significant relationships				
MCHMONEY		No significant relationships				
ADVICE	.0313	.0102	.5728	+	.0154	.0162
COYBOSS		No significant relationships				
LOCCONCL	.1513	.0238	.9154	-	.0121	.0125
CLUBPRES	.0936	.0638	.2529	+	.0081	.0112
VARSTYED		No significant relationships				
RESPECT		No significant relationships				
NEWCAR		No significant relationships				
LPRIEST		No significant relationships				
LTEACHER		No significant relationships				
LDC	.0222	.3749	.0121	+	.0018	.0225
LCHIEF		No significant relationships				
LPARENTS		No significant relationships				
LANTUNCL		No significant relationships				
LSIBLING		No significant relationships				
LNGANGA		No significant relationships				
LFRIENDS		No significant relationships				
HOMETALK		No significant relationships				
UINFLNCE	.1085	.0421	.3785	-	.0098	.0144
HOMEHAPY		No significant relationships				
PCHRULE	.0051	.6788	.0018	-	.0004	.0295
SCHRULE	.0032	.9139	.0010	-	.0000	.0318
CCHRULE		No significant relationships				
READHEAR	.0170	.0063	.2001	+	.0171	.0276
TRADITON		No significant relationships				
ASKPOL		No significant relationships				
NORACIAL		No significant relationships				

5.5.1 Influence Of People And Information Sources

All significant relationships with personal influences are directly related (the greater the perceived influence, the greater the relative satisfaction). On the contrary, the greater the perceived influence of the trainee's own personal observations, the less relative satisfaction. There were no SSRs with religious leaders, secondary teachers and friends own age; this suggests that these individuals may provide inconsistent indicators of relative satisfaction with Rhodesian life.

All significant relationships with impersonal sources are inversely related to relative satisfaction, with the relationship strongest for the most radical information source--political pamphlets. There is no SSR with Radio Rhodesia and Rhodesian TV, but the sign of *r* is the only one that shows a direct relationship with greater relative satisfaction. Since most sources in all other categories are anti-system, these findings are as expected. The fact that Radio Rhodesia's relationship is very weak indicates that the RBC has less of a satisfaction-inducing bias than its critics charge, and that its supporters hope.[68]

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[68]I found RBC programming to be pro-system and generally conveying economic optimism, but considerably more objective than programming from neighboring states, regardless of direction.

5.5.2 Faith In People And Society

It was hypothesized that those who believe hard work is the key to success and that those who believe that those one treats fairly will themselves be fair would correlate positively with satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life. This was the case in interviews. No such relationship shows up with questionnaire data. It must be remembered that the only aspect of satisfaction I was permitted to measure in the questionnaire was relative satisfaction, compared with parents' satisfaction. Those whose home training most strongly emphasized hard work as the way to succeed and that others would be fair would presumably have parents more satisfied with the Rhodesian way of life than others; those who internalized such values would themselves be more satisfied--hence the lack of relationship with relative satisfaction.

The inverse relationship between desiring more discussion of current events in primary and secondary school and relative satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life, not surprisingly, indicates that dissatisfaction and a desire to discuss current events go hand in hand.

The inverse relationship with the desire to be elected to a local government council probably indicates a national-issue focus of the dissatisfied. The direct relationship with wishing to become a club president further suggests that

the local aspect of the council question is the governing one.

The strongest relationship between relative satisfaction and other tested variables is, not surprisingly, with PROGRESS; the more optimistic trainees are about economic progress, the more relatively satisfied they are with the Rhodesian way of life.

5.6 EXPECTED ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND OTHER VARIABLES

As reported in Table 5:3, relationships between expectations of economic progress within the next 10 years and other variables are relatively few.

Of the perceived influential people and sources, only college teachers and Radio Rhodesia are statistically significant; while the direct relationship with Radio Rhodesia was expected, there was enough ambivalence toward the regime amongst TTC and UR professors that I did not predict the direct SSR with college teachers. However, even many teachers who were critical of the regime gave it at least grudging praise for keeping the economy as healthy as it was in the face of international sanctions. The feeling in much of the European community was that the worst was over as far as sanctions were concerned and that threats to the society's stability would in the future primarily come from

TABLE 5:3 Economic progress expectations and other variables

Independent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
AGE	.1585	.0938	.2485	-	.0066	.0279
NOWIVES	No significant relationships					
MOTHERNO	No significant relationships					
BOARDING	No significant relationships					
CLASRANK	No significant relationships					
FACHURCH	.0233	.1016	.0341	+	.0063	.0268
MOCHURCH	No significant relationships					
STCHURCH	No significant relationships					
CHILDREN	No significant relationships					
OLDER	No significant relationships					
FAEDCATN	No significant relationships					
MOEDCATN	No significant relationships					
PARCASH	.0663	.3360	.0562	+	.0024	.0380
GROUPFA	No significant relationships					
GROUPMO	.0218	.1191	.0283	+	.0059	.0280
GROUPST	No significant relationships					
PRIEST	.0263	.0745	.0477	+	.0074	.0216
CHIEF	No significant relationships					
PTEACH	No significant relationships					
STEACH	.1144	.6724	.0562	+	.0004	.0141
CTEACH	.0016	.0006	.1690	+	.0275	.0357
PARENTS	.0711	.1349	.0904	+	.0053	.0166
AUNTUNCL	No significant relationships					
SIBLINGS	.1371	.0756	.3047	+	.0075	.0131
FRIENDS	No significant relationships					
OBSERVAT	No significant relationships					
PTEXTS	.2233	.0869	.4844	+	.0069	.0103
STEXTS	No significant relationships					
CTEXTS	No significant relationships					
RELIGBKS	.0902	.9078	.0394	+	.0000	.0152
MAGAZINS	.0774	.0691	.1698	-	.0078	.0161
NEWSPAPR	No significant relationships					
BOOKS	No significant relationships					
POLPAMPH	.1124	.0756	.2420	-	.0074	.0141
RBCRADTV	.0141	.0323	.0483	+	.0107	.0248
FORRADIO	No significant relationships					
INTEREST	No significant relationships					
STSATISF	.0000	.0000	.8556	+	.0729	.0729
PEOPLE2X	.0000	.0000	.6440	+	.0631	.0651

TABLE 5:3 (continued)

Independent variable	Total sig. F	Linear sig. F	Non-lin sig. F	Sign of r	R sq.	Eta sq.
HARDWORK	.0328	.0156	.2310	+	.0137	.0205
FAIRTRET		No significant relationships				
MORTALKP		No significant relationships				
MORTALKS	.1313	.6338	.0503	+	.0005	.0099
MORTALKC		No significant relationships				
COURTEUS		No significant relationships				
MCHMONEY		No significant relationships				
ADVICE	.1012	.0359	.6764	+	.0105	.0109
COYBOSS		No significant relationships				
LOCCONCL		No significant relationships				
CLUBPRES	.0195	.0057	.6432	+	.0184	.0189
VARSTYED		No significant relationships				
RESPECT		No significant relationships				
NEWCAR		No significant relationships				
LPRIEST	.1407	.0256	.7873	+	.0118	.0130
LTEACHER	.1387	.7672	.0670	+	.0002	.0131
LDC	.0017	.2096	.0011	+	.0037	.0356
LCHIEF		No significant relationships				
LPARENTS		No significant relationships				
LANTUNCL		No significant relationships				
LSIBLING		No significant relationships				
LNGANGA		No significant relationships				
LFRIENDS		No significant relationships				
HOMETALK		No significant relationships				
UINFLNCE	.4157	.0923	.9968	-	.0069	.0069
HOMEHAPY	.1821	.0465	.6379	-	.0094	.0115
PCHRULE	.0231	.9906	.0086	+	.0000	.0225
SCHRULE	.0009	.0101	.0068	+	.0154	.0388
CCHRULE	.0589	.0581	.1439	+	.0085	.0177
READHEAR		No significant relationships				
TRADITON		No significant relationships				
ASKPOL		No significant relationships				
NORACIAL	.1739	.0279	.9390	-	.0114	.0117

other quarters, a feeling justified by subsequent events.

The strong direct SSR between realization of how fast the population is growing and expectations of economic progress is harder to explain, for in interviews most who acknowledged the population growth rate recognized that it was an economic minus. Thus, I believed that those who thought in terms of larger population being positively related to prosperity were in a minority. However, the instruction being given in African Division textbooks did stress the relative smallness of the Rhodesian market, while discussion of such subjects as dependency ratios, or arithmetic growth in facilities and production, vs. geometric population growth, was still several years away in the official syllabus (see Rea, 1974; Division of African Education, 1977a, 1977b, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c). Also, Africanists promised a bountiful society with a minimum of toil when they came to power; they also encouraged population growth as a weapon to overwhelm the Europeans; so their influence might also have contributed to this relationship.

The direct relationship between expectations of economic progress and belief that hard work is the key to success is as expected.

5.7 SUMMARY

Exact measures of the economic (as well as the political) effects of education on Rhodesians are woefully inadequate. My and others' impressions are that they are at least partially dysfunctional for many Africans. Yet, as is shown in Table 5:4, ordinary urban Africans, especially females, place educating children at the top of their list of what they want to achieve in life; except for the remotest areas, this is also true for most rural residents. Thus education was still seen as highly desirable by most parents.

TABLE 5:4 What do you want to achieve in life?

Response	Total	Males	Females
To educate children	28.7%	22.7	47.6
Traditional objectives	25.3	27.3	19.0
Economic prosperity	21.8	25.8	9.5
Buy a farm	5.7	6.0	4.8
Self education	5.7	3.0	14.3
Other	11.5	13.6	4.8
Don't know	1.1	1.5	0.0

Source: P. Stopforth (1972) Two Aspects of Social Change: Highfield African Township Salisbury. Salisbury, University of Rhodesia, p. 75.

Neither is it possible to make a definite determination of the relative importance of the Colour Bar in African progress. Available evidence leads me to the tentative

conclusion that, looking at the economy as a whole, it is a relatively minor economic factor but a huge emotive one. With a gross domestic product per capita in 1974 only 1/622 that of the United States (Division of African Education, 1977, p. 16.3), there simply was not an economic base for any sudden uplift in the standard of living of the African masses; the nation's economic pie was growing--but not as fast as the population; consequently, the average 'piece size' was slowly shrinking. However wealthy Europeans looked from the Africans' reference point, almost none were above (and many were below) upper middle class--judged from their reference point--standards in northern Europe, North America, and amongst White South Africans.[69]

So one has to define one's terms very carefully if any discussion of whether the Europeans in Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s 'exploited' the Africans is going to be anything but emotive rhetoric. If by exploitation one means that the gap between European skilled wages and African unskilled ones was substantially higher--and that skin color was more

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[69]May (1978, p. 96) reports a serious emigration rate for skilled and professional people, especially women; the Rhodesian Financial Gazette blames the departures solely on low pay, although May herself adds that political uncertainty is also a factor. In 1971 political uncertainty was much less of a factor, and physical safety was greater than it would be in nearly all alternate places to live. Yet several educated Europeans told me that they would not remain in Rhodesia permanently because their remuneration was considerably less than it would be elsewhere; these individuals felt they were the antithesis of exploiters.

important in securing a good education, a good job, and a good home--than was the case in Western Europe and North America in the 1960s and 1970s, and that the 'haves' desired a greater degree of social distance from the 'have-nots,' then Africans in Rhodesia were unquestionably more exploited than the Western European and North American proletariats during the same time frame.

However, if one's frame of reference is not the 1960s and 1970s--but differences in culture, hygiene, and in aptitude for operating in a Westernized society--differences between races in Rhodesia were probably greater than they had been in North America a century earlier, and even longer ago in Western Europe. Comparing inter-group relations when the gap was comparable, Rhodesian Whites in the 1970s were a model of munificence--for the cultural gap was comparable with that in Mississippi in 1850, while the social and economic distances were closer to that in Mississippi in 1950.

Although the overall effect of the Colour Bar may be difficult to determine, there is no question that its application, or other actions by Europeans that are felt to be arbitrary, in specific cases had produced embittered Africanists. Thomas (1968, p. 313) mentions that the leading Africanist in Umtali became politically active after a reforestation project caused his family to be evicted from

well watered lands and relocated on dry sandvelt; Harper (1959) describes how what look to Europeans as necessary conservation measures look to tribesmen as unwarranted interference in their lives; Muzorewa (1978) relates how a school-boy came to join the guerrillas after he felt he was unfairly dismissed from his job for expecting a European to abide by posted regulations. In my presence and that of several Rhodesians and a South African (all White), an African had an argument with his White supervisor; we were all of the opinion that right was on his side; nonetheless he was the one who was fired; he reversed his previous position that Africans in Rhodesia had it better than those to the north, and mentioned thinking of going to Tanzania--since the only unskilled Rhodesians welcome in that country were those in guerrilla training, we had no doubts as to what he would end up doing there, irrespective of what his intentions were.

However great the gap between the generality of Europeans and the generality of Africans, a growing body of Africans was becoming Westernized; those who were economically successful and were bridging the cultural gap too often found more slights than acceptance from Europeans --sometimes envious Africans would also put them down.

However much land Africans were not using when the Europeans arrived, some have regularly been displaced either for European farms and cities or such projects as the Kariba

hydro-electric scheme; however reasonable and necessary these relocations appeared to Europeans, they produced resentment in those concerned. This of course is true elsewhere: the growth of TVA and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, and the recent taking of homes, businesses and university property--and mass evictions of tenants--in Knoxville, Tennessee, for Expo 82 (or World's Fair 82) are similar examples close to where this dissertation is being written. Because in Rhodesia those displaced were nearly all Africans, while those in charge of the displacement were Europeans, the World's press could be counted upon to feature the story and to play up its racial angle; thus the element of bitterness is magnified in such situations in Rhodesia.

Ironically, the Rhodesian Europeans' better economic status, special privileges, and separate facilities were probably relatively less than the status differential enjoyed by Communist Party members in the Soviet bloc (or even those enjoyed by foreigners in Peking). Unfortunately for the White Rhodesians, this comparison was almost completely lost on the World's news media and on Rhodesian Africans. So those who, in reality, were much worse exploitive oppressors where they had acquired power (and whose interests in Africa are hardly philanthropic) were looked upon as potential liberators by many Africans.

5.8 IMPLICATIONS

Since economic questions were at the core of Rhodesia's problems, releasing each year into the teaching field hundreds of Africans who were economic illiterates was a mistake of the first magnitude. For an understanding of what the country's economic possibilities and limitations were--and what were the available options and their likely consequences, would be essential for teachers and others to distinguish between feasible alternatives and 'pie in the sky' proposals. One obvious problem is the underdeveloped nature of economics. Even in a relatively stable and much studied country such as the United States, one finds economists with the highest credentials disagreeing on nearly every point. Those favoring statiste solutions are completely at odds with free market advocates, with no extant economy (with perhaps some tiny exceptions such as Hong Kong or Albania) close to being a 'pure' example of any system. But since the Rhodesian Government was firmly committed to a regulated, free-enterprise economic order, emphasis on the economic evidence supporting this system would have been an appropriate role for a pro-system educational system.

Because 'African socialism' was a magic phrase for many trainees and other Africans, a factual discussion of what had happened in countries that tried it could have had a strong pro-system socializing influence.

While the cut-off of African migrant labor from other states was perfectly understandable from the point of view of reducing indigenous unemployment, it did have the unfortunate result of insulating Rhodesian Africans from personal experience stories of how the generality of Africans were faring under Africanist Governments.

It appears that--a superficial commitment by many to African socialism notwithstanding--trainees in general really knew so little about economic matters, that the battle for their hearts and minds on economics was largely lost be default.

In a society where there was a close (but far from perfect) correspondence between ethnic group and economic status, the climate was especially ripe for an 'arise my exploited people' Messiah. With seemingly limitless communist bloc weapons available for those who would adopt that philosophy, and with the Africans in the horse position of Rhodesia's 'horse and rider' economy, even with the best possible presentation of economic questions, there would have been a serious problem in providing a thorough grounding in free-market economics that trainees would accept. Yet an educational system firmly committed to maintaining the extant polity and economic system should have tried.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 RELATIONSHIP WITH POLITICAL METHODOLOGY

For me the most difficult part of this dissertation is to relate it to the methodologists' pronouncements as to how social science research should, ideally, proceed. This is particularly true because, in this case, the practical difficulties caused the actual to deviate considerably from the ideal.

As mentioned in section 1.2, my original objective was to use the methodology of survey research very nearly exclusively, employing identical or similar questions to those used elsewhere. This proved impossible, partly because another American political scientist had been doing just that and had just been expelled from the country, and partly because of the extreme sensitivity of the Ministry of Education to political issues.

A questionnaire of more than eight pages would be less likely to be acceptable at the college level (both because of finding time to schedule its administration and problems with inattentive response to long questionnaires), so building internal consistency measures in could be done only at the expense of entirely excluding other queries. In a

questionnaire given to the same trainees who answered my questionnaire at two TTCs, Harlin (1973, pp. 92-98) did include some internal consistency queries and reports 93.5% internal consistency for T3 trainees. Harlin also ran a pretest on some UCE students; he finds good consistency between two occasions six weeks apart. While this is not the same as including these measures in my test instrument, it does provide an indication that African trainees generally answer queries with some care and attention; Dorsey (1975) also found that most Africans answered her questionnaire with good consistency and apparent honesty.

When I realized that any questionnaire that would be approved would not cover many areas that I wished information concerning, I turned to the use of interviews. Early conversations were useful in sensitizing me to the fact that--while the political arena was where the 'sound and fury' of the Rhodesian situation centered--cultural and economic questions were what largely fueled these political fires.

Furthermore, questions that covered a broad range of matters were more likely to be considered by trainees (and any government informers) as general curiosity (acceptable), rather than political querying (suspect). Thus I began to develop an informational base on non-political matters as the awareness grew that they were largely the life-blood of

political controversy. My research thus was acquiring a holistic character.

A professor who had taught at two African Division TTCs (and who was then at UR's Institute of Education) and three officials in the African Division (one European, two African, all intimately concerned with giving written tests to Africans) provided valuable assistance in changing the wording of a few queries.

The only questionnaire problems I am aware of that slipped through are: 1) failure to provide a traditional and Christian religion category; 2) not controlling for deceased or otherwise out of contact parents in church-going and influence questions; and 3) use once of the word 'beneficial'--a word numerous African trainees were unfamiliar with.

As I have read other Rhodesian studies (and those from other underdeveloped nations) I have been surprised with the high degree of contextual validation demonstrated. Where there are variations, determining and adjusting for "the characteristic pattern of distortion in a source" (Diesing, 1971, pp. 146-55) usually greatly narrows the variation. For example, the most prolific social science writer on Rhodesia is Anna Weinrich; when one remembers that she is a radical Catholic nun--whose position has steadily become less Catholic and more Marxist--differences between her findings

and mine become easy to understand.[70] Keeping in mind that Africans had a different value-system background, different past experiences, in some respects different legal position, and different perceptions of what would further their own, and their ethnic group's prosperity and well-being, the gap between their positions and those of Europeans also becomes understandable.

The subsequent steps Diesing suggests in dealing with informants (gaining their opinions of researcher's hypotheses, acting on his interpretations, provoking challenges) were not suitable for this project, in which no trainee, other than a few at UR, was spoken with more than twice (most only once) and where a low profile for the researcher was absolutely essential.

Even with a perfect crystal ball, my two biggest difficulties could probably only have been lessened, not overcome: 1) inability to acquire some desired information; 2) inability to establish firm boundaries for the study,

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[70]Weinrich tends to place blame for all the country's woes on the Government and settlers. While she has no criticism of the Catholic Church, I feel its opposition to family planning and the almost automatic 'if the Government is for it, we must be against it' reaction of many Catholics (especially in the Maryknoll, Bethlehem and Burgos orders) have exacerbated race relations. In my view Weinrich also does not give adequate weight to cultural factors in explaining lack of economic progress by the African community. Especially in her earlier works, she is too optimistic that universal franchise democracy could be quickly and successfully implanted. With these exceptions, Weinrich's findings are not greatly different from mine.

resulting in huge amounts of information being gathered and worked on that never find their way into a rather long dissertation.[71]

Diesing next suggests that a case study should include building a model. However, most of the most distinguished social scientists since World War II have been working on models much of the time. Models galore have been prepared, argued over, revised and discarded. None adequately presents the 'necessary and sufficient' conditions for democratic polities to develop and be maintained; nor is the actual or possible role of education specified.

Many of these efforts have had substantial financial backing, large research teams to gather and evaluate evidence; some have had opportunities to retest groups and individuals after themes and models have reached a fairly developed stage. The opposite to Winston Churchill's statement concerning the RAF does not seem an unduly harsh verdict on these efforts: 'Seldom have so many labored so hard with so little in the way of concrete results.' Thus it is likely that any study such as this would at most make a very modest contribution to what Merton (1969) calls "theory of the middle range." Unfortunately, this in fact proves to be true in this case.

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[71] Diesing (1971, p. 203) indicates that this is an inherent problem with the holist approach.

6.1.1 Fragments Of A Theory

Rhodesian Africans, especially rural ones, remain at least partially within a social order that is disintegrating. This disintegration is due to the Africans' inability to adapt to the changes Europeans and their ways are making in Rhodesian society. The fact that some Africans are eager to accept at least portions of Western ways, while others resist most everything, produces large fissures in African society.

Desires to gain functional substitutes for the lost cultural integration has led to some behavioral modifications, the first generally being to become a member of a Christian church. Membership in church groups provides at least partial replacements for the cohesive fabric lost in the disintegration of traditional society. A convert can also expect preferential medical and educational treatment from his denomination, whether or not the conversion is complete or irreversible.

Early primary education by a poorly educated member of one's own tribe is a relatively gentle break with the past, much less disrupting than such Christian demands as foregoing polygynous marriages or (in some denominations) beer drinking. But as a student rises higher on the educational ladder, the conflict between the ways of the home and the ways of the school intensify. As Barkan (1971, p. 193) has

pointed out, the marginal utility of each year of schooling is greater than that of the previous year, so the incentive to continue in school increases irrespective of the cultural alienation generated.

To most parents, trainees and other students, equivalence of education with European education was more important than any specifics of its content. Thus African pressures to make education relevant to everyday life were few. This had the undesirable effect of encouraging the disease of qualificationism--looking at diplomas and certificates for their own sake rather than as signs of useful knowledge acquired.

From an economic point of view, the Rhodesian Government's decision to provide two-thirds of African secondary school entrants with a vocationally-oriented, rather than pre-university, education was in the interests of both the society and the students in question. Unfortunately, there were enough articulate Africans and liberal Whites with the attitude, "If the RF is for it, there has to be something wrong with it," that opposition to the reform was considerable.

The fact that trainees retain some loyalty to the culture of their parents, while developing the feeling that it is inferior, produces strains that are not easily overcome. Because of the changes produced by education they

are them no longer happy in a traditional village. Neither are they accepted in European society. They end up between two worlds--that of the village and that of the European-oriented school. Typically the more energetic African seeks to break out of this dilemma by getting still more education.

Failure to get into Form VI (pre-university) education shatters dreams of going to the top; a more realistic assessment is made and the student tries second best by entering teachers' training.

At the TTC he is exposed to further conflicting pressures, including differing opinions about the actual and proper roles of Europeans and Africans in Rhodesian society. Confusion and skepticism increase.

Since everyone is in favor of democracy, so is the trainee, but he is unsure what democracy is because definitions vary; also he and his family have had no experience in the roles of a democratic citizen.

Economically, the trainee hopes to better himself. But he can do so only if he resists pressures from his extended family for various forms of aid. This is extremely difficult to do because one who fails to be generous with his family is universally considered to be a bad man. Also, a trainee has reached his present position only because of sacrifices by his immediate family and, often, other relatives. Thus his

dreams of economic well-being are impossible of fulfillment, especially if he meets obligations to his family. This is a cause of anxiety. He has no training in economics and little in civics. Because his understanding of what determines his wages is dim, he is receptive to arguments that he ought to be paid much more--and would be if some arbitrary and capricious force was not holding him back.

Because the new teacher is filled with economic worries and uncertainties, he is ripe for manipulation by those who offer various economic panaceas. African socialism is the cure most frequently presented. Since the trainee is an economic upward mobile, the last thing he really wants is an economic system that reduces opportunities for upward mobility. Therefore he tends in his own mind to visualize African socialism as an idealized system in which everyone is well off without great toil. This image is carefully cultivated by those who wish to be the political leaders in a socialist regime. The trainee can see with his own eyes that there is poverty in capitalist Rhodesia. His information concerning societies where African socialism has been tried is limited and conflicting. Thus socialism in his mind is likely to be romanticized.

This above formulation as to how trainees typically gain their view of the society they live in--and of possible modifications in it--seems consistent with the facts

researchers in Rhodesia, including this one, have gathered. It is not proven to be accurate, nor would any attempt to prove it be any easier to operationalize than are tests of most complex human phenomena.

6.1.2 Some Steps In The Case Study

I had not read Diesing's "Main Steps of a Case Study" (1971, pp. 142-68) until after field work was completed. Nonetheless, my procedures in large measure followed the outline he presents. He observes that the original research design "is usually transcended, supplemented, or left behind . . . ." This happened as I transferred from Angola to Rhodesia, as data sources other than a questionnaire and as non-political subjects assumed more importance.

Discovery and interpretation of themes was a continuous effort, not only in Rhodesia, but in subsequent review of my notes--as well as when I made comparisons with other works on Rhodesia and on the socializing role of education in other developing societies--this is not to say that the search was an especially successful one.

Diesing mentions difficulties of access to individuals of different sex or race. Perhaps some of the failure to discuss social and political issues that I noted amongst African females was related to this, but I doubt if much is, for other researchers such as Betty Jo Dorsey and Anna

Weinrich (and the former's female research assistants) all report lesser female interest in and awareness of contemporary questions. I do not believe that race per se was a major factor in gaining information from African trainees because the Western academic community is perceived to be receptive to the African position; those who had reasonably well formed views seemed eager to get them to the outside world. Had I been aware of more cultural factors that might inhibit trainees' adjustment to Western ways, I could have interviewed more skillfully.[72] But I suppose any researcher could better conduct a given project if he started with much of the information the project and hindsight provide.

The perception of foreign scholars being pro-African worked in a negative direction with a few European students. "Since you Yanks will remain against us regardless of what we say, why should we make your attack easier by answering you questions" seemed to be the attitude of a minority of Europeans. But most acted upon this perception by going to greater lengths to explain why theirs was the moderate and reasonable position.

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[72]On the other hand, African trainees tended to appear threatened by cultural questions more than others, so on some subjects I had to be very circumspect, while others (e.g., clitoridectomy) had to be ignored entirely. There is a danger that a more informed questioner could appear as a more threatening one.

In Chapter 1, the specific question of this dissertation is stated to be: to what extent do Rhodesian teacher trainees possess the political, cultural, family, economic, and religious attitudes that are believed to be functional for the development and maintenance of a democratic polity. I shall now present a summary of principal findings that help answer that question.

6.2 CULTURE

The fact that trainees were partially uprooted from the culture of their parents, while neither fully accepting the culture of their mission teachers--nor being fully accepted by Europeans--left African trainees uneasily poised between the two cultures, at home in neither. My interview and questionnaire data are inadequate to provide a complete picture of their dilemmas, but enough information was gathered to indicate that the troubled position reported by others (e.g., Harper, Gelfand, Harlin) had not greatly changed.

The female trainees seemed more bothered by this than the males, because they were departing from their traditional role to a greater extent. The fact that those from more traditional backgrounds appear to have the greatest adjustment difficulties, while on the average female trainees

come from less traditional homes is a factor that helps mask this difference.

It should be added that greater awareness on the part of educational authorities of cultural adjustment problems of African trainees and greater attempts to overcome them were being made in the early 1970s; thus some of the severest problems reported in the 1950s had been modified by the time of my field work.

While trainees seemed to have at least partially internalized many cultural attitudes compatible with democracy, their tradition of confining the 'we' group to immediate family (a process that in a modernizing society Banfield [1958] describes as amoral familism) is a negative factor that so far defies precise measurement. Although nearly all Africans (91.6%) said on my questionnaire that they would support an energetic non-relative for political office in preference to an easy-going relative, I am inclined to put more weight in the opinion of several experienced Rhodesian educators who suggested that, if this question were changed from an academic one to a real one, many answers would also change.

Empathy: Trainees appeared to have more empathetic orientations than other studies of Rhodesian African society would lead one to expect. Although Partridge (1961) is probably correct that the initial "to help my people"

response as to why trainees have decided to become teachers is actually a much less important one for most trainees than are factors associated with upward mobility, the fact that they do state it first is an indication that helping one's people is the socially most acceptable response. Similarly, mention of Jaros Jiri as an admired African is additional evidence that the schools' efforts to instill attitudes of empathy had had an effect.

Several times tribalism was mentioned as a major problem in what is wrong with Rhodesia. This of course does not mean that those recognizing tribalism is a problem will not operate in a tribalist manner themselves.

Most trainees had experienced a reasonable amount of group activity. It was not possible to determine the extent to which trainees had acquired skills in their group activity that they could transfer to other fields.

The fact that 77.3% of African trainees said it is definitely true that "A person's degree of success in life is most influenced by his own ability and hard work," and that 62.6% marked definitely true to "If a person treats those he deals with fairly, most of them will be fair with him," both indicate a lack of misanthropy that should be healthy for citizens of democracy. These findings are more optimistic than those of Thomas (1968) a few years earlier. Even though one must realize that these are abstract responses

unconnected to specific issues, they are encouraging predispositions.

6.2.1 Religion

In that most trainees are baptized Christians, as are most of their parents, it was only slowly that I realized that many trainees (and perhaps even more of their parents) were in a position of conflicting religious feelings, having partially accepted Christianity and moved away from some traditional beliefs, but not having made a complete transition. Many baptized Christians converted not because of any sudden 'getting of the spirit,' but because of perceived economic, educational, and social advantages from the conversion. Thus the extent and duration of conversion were often considerably below missionary hopes and expectations.

Much more thorough examination of religious issues as they relate to Africans (including trainees) are presented by others (e.g., Murphree, Harper, Harlin, Thomas, Bourdillon, Bucher, and Dachs). Despite these studies, the political impact of religion in Rhodesia appears to be very important but little studied (Thomas' dissertation is the best work discussing politics and religion).

It appears that churches vary considerably in the extent to which they channel African interests in the problems of

society in a non-political direction. Activist churches such as the Roman Catholic and United Methodist encourage involvement in the political kingdom. In contrast, African separatist churches are largely concerned with eternal salvation, not mundane matters of this world.

It is clear that religious schisims have divided previously united families, communities, and friends--divisions not only between traditionalists and Christians, but amongst Christian denominations. Resistence of Africans to attempts to combine Christianity with prevalent European mores and values has helped lead to the development of numerous separatist churches. These churches attract very few educationally ambitious Africans (including teacher trainees) because they are not in a position to provide comparable educational facilities to those of 'European' churches; but their impact on African society in some areas has been considerable. Among European churches, those best able to provide schools and hospitals and those that made fewest demands for change in African behavior patterns attracted the most converts.

The main religious theme that emerged from interviews is that most churches unjustifiably tie Christianity to European customs and definitions of morality, that harmless or beneficial aspects of traditional ways should be more tolerantly treated.

6.2.2 Family

Family attitudes seemed in a state of flux, with trainees feeling obligations to their extended families, yet recognizing that their income as teachers would not permit as much munificence on their part as their relatives hoped.

Many of their problems were associated with displacement of tribal mores without a new morality being firmly implanted. They were caught between the nuclear family model encouraged at the training colleges and the large, polygynous, extended family norms of the traditional village.

Population: There was some awareness that family planning was desirable, but no African male and few females I spoke with considered the problem nearly as pressing as Europeans did. The feeling seemed widespread that if underutilized European land were made available to Africans, the problems associated with population growth would at least be alleviated. The fact that 31.3% of African trainees were unaware that the population will double in less than 25 years and that 23.8% felt the need for birth control to be "non-existent" (an additional 22.2% said "slight") shows an unawareness by a majority of African trainees of the demographic time bomb that was ticking away.

Differences between the sexes were apparent on family planning, with females much more favorable.

Not surprisingly, female trainees were more in favor of 'women's lib' than males. To most males, desirable changes in the social order included a modest adjustment in females' status. The more vocal of female trainees, at least, were pressing for something closer to Western-style equality. This issue seemed certain to cause additional controversy in years to come. It could have implications for democratic development if women seek and are denied upper level employment, or if the existing discriminatory laws and practices are not soon modified.

The question of lobolo (bride-price) was a devisive family issue, with some male trainees who stated they desired educated wives not being able to afford them. One may reasonably speculate that the position of a UR girl who felt pressured to marry someone whom she found unattractive, but who could afford a high bride-price, was similar to that many female trainees would face.

The fact that most trainees were reasonably satisfied with their home influence (and that Vambe [1976] even considers African children more involved in family discussions) indicate that some training in decision making occurs in many African trainees' homes.

6.3 POLITICAL

Obstacles to a democratic future: I was distressed by the narrowness of focus of many trainees who sought a multi-racial democratic future for their country. Most still considered European selfishness and rigidity as the principle or sole obstacles to be overcome; they failed to see that--however accurate that analysis may have been in previous decades--the future threat lay in the communist armed and indoctrinated forces then developing outside the country's borders. Most trainees had poor understanding of the limitations of the Rhodesian polity and economy. There was a tendency to believe that European selfishness and short-sightedness prevented many benefits from reaching Africans in general and African schools in particular--to an extent they were correct, but typically they failed to realize that limited resources was at least as important a factor as was limited inclination.

The degree of cultural change students experience appears closely related to the degree of political change desired; this is evident when one compares the lesser alienation of T4 and T3 trainees with that of UR students, who are in an integrated university run in the British tradition. It should be noted, however, that one cannot speak of this as a unidimensional matter. UR students' greater alienation from the extant political order can easily

be explained by their greater potential for advancement with an Africanist regime. A British cartoon of the 1960s well captured the mood of the times--albeit with a cartoonist's license for exaggeration: It shows one Commonwealth student asking another what he would do at the end of term; the other replies, "I'm not sure. I may stay in London as a bus conductor, or I may go home and become a cabinet minister."

In contrast with the 'sky's the limit' hopes of university graduates, those in the North with TTC credentials have mostly remained teachers; thus Rhodesian trainees at university level could reasonably hope for greater personal advancement with an Africanist take-over than could TTC trainees. Rhodesian trainees were generally aware of the reports in the Rhodesian media of unpaid civil servants and other problems Africans, other than top officials, were facing in Africanist-ruled countries. This is an alternate explanation of the lesser enthusiasm of TTC students for an Africanist takeover. More data would be needed to determine the relative importance of these (and possibly other) factors in causing differences in attitudes.

Over a decade prior to my field work, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Roger Howman (1956), observed that we need to know much more about educated Africans in order to assess their likelihood of participating in the development and continuance of a

democratic state, and of selecting leaders who will strive to establish and perpetuate democracy:

> We do not know much about the kind of attributes the modern African in the mass looks for in a leader, nor what value, if any, is given to moral character, integrity, quickness of decision, common sense, fairness, kindness, hard work, ability for the work at hand, responsiveness to the needs of those he leads, readiness to tell them exactly what to do or think. All these attitudes are of the greatest importance in sketching the outlines of future leaders, and it may well be that in a bewildered society our greatest administrative difficulty will be to change a tendency towards authoritarianism and blind submission to emotional leadership into a democratic and rational appraisal of ability to lead.

If the educational authorities had shared this concern, they would have sought answers to Howman's questions. Instead, they neither did the research themselves nor would they permit others to do it. This policy was apparently adopted with the belief that the fewer in-class references to political matters, the less politicized trainees would become. So on some of the most significant questions for political scientists, no data are available.

The author of a study of political socialization in South African schools believes:

> An educational philosophy is the mirroring of the political philosophy, at least as far as keeping order and survival of the culture are concerned. Stripped of its refinements, education's initial purpose to society is doing whatever is necessary to ensure that culture's survival. On the primitive level, this may mean relating the cultural myths, teaching suitable respect for the canonized heroes, and justifying and ensuring the commitment of all members to the group's mores.

> Any other roles education may have are subsequent to this primary one and result from the security the culture feels. (Leonard, 1969, p. 59).

Using Leonard's criteria, I must conclude that Rhodesia's educational philosophy has failed to mirror its political philosophy. The polity's leading "cultural myth" was that the higher status, social distance, and political preeminence of Europeans are justified by their greater skill in operating in a modern economy and polity. Yet there is little if anything in the curriculum to encourage development of such attitudes in primary, secondary, trainee or university education; the vast majority of African trainees do not have such attitudes.

Although past leaders, especially European ones, are generally spoken of in a favorable light, the presentation is far from that of "canonizing heroes"--nothing comparable with the presentation of Washington, Revere, Franklin, Lincoln, etc. that I encountered in American schools.

There is almost no mention of contemporary leaders in the syllabus; trainees of both races list "have faith in Rhodesia's leaders" 15th out of 15 choices of things emphasized in school. My desire to have trainees rate on my questionnaire their feelings toward prominent Africans mentioned by the Rhodesian media was thwarted by African Division officials striking the questions.

In interviews, two of the three most mentioned admired

Africans were foreign leaders: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania. The third is Rhodesian Jaros Jiri, who is well known for his apolitical program to provide training and employment for handicapped Africans.

The fact that most Africanist leaders were in detention or exile, and that mention of them was perhaps not felt to be a completely safe thing to do, should be kept in mind; however as nearly as I could tell, African trainees suffered from a dearth of heroes. This conforms with Stopforth's (1972, p. 93) finding that 55.2% of Highfield residents felt that nobody represents African public opinion, with an additional 28.7% in the don't know category, for a total of 83.9%.

What limited efforts at "justifying and ensuring the commitment of all members to the group's mores" that were made seemed at best partially successful among African trainees. There was a partial acceptance of Christian mores, a general rejection of the society's political mores, and skepticism about economic mores. Again, this position did not differ much on these issues from what appeared to be the position of urban Africans, as reported by Stopforth (1972). Thus it would appear that the impact of coming into contact with Europeans and their ways has a greater influence on African trainees than anything distinctive about their educational experience. Thus these Rhodesian data tend to

give more support to Foster's (1969) position that education's separate effect in political socialization is small, than they do to Court and Prewitt's (1972) belief that schooling's socializing influence can be fairly large. It is not possible to draw any precise conclusion on the extent to which it would have been possible for the TTCs and other elements of the educational system to inculcate attitudes the regime desired. But, faced with hostility to the regime's objectives by most other socializing agents, it appears that the schools' pro-system influence--even with the most skillful possible effort--would have been small.

In discussing TTC trainee complaints, what is being described is, for most trainees, the latent basis for discord, rather than burning dissatisfaction. This was also my impression of the generality of Africans. Virtually all population groups in all countries can think of some things that they would like changed, so the fact that most Africans were dissatisfied should be kept in perspective.

Leftist authors overseas despaired at "La difficile naisance de la Guerilla Rhodesienne" (Chenu, 1970). It took a decade of urging and inducements from the outside, plus the instant upward mobility of a few thousand FRELIMO guerrillas in Mozambique, before any large number of Africans were prepared to take up arms against the regime.

While the regime's socializing efforts with regard to

trainees and other Africans were not very successful, neither, prior to the Portuguese revolution of April, 1974, were revolutionary aggitators very successful in selling an alternate package of political beliefs.

Weinrich's (1973) and Mlambo's (1972) findings that the farther Rhodesian Africans go in the educational system, the more politically alienated they become tend to be validated by my evidence. But nothing pinpoints exactly why this change occurs.

The Rhodesian Front Government is never accused of being overly eager to further African political advance. So long as secondary education encouraged Africanism, one might assume that the RF would hold constant, or even find reasons to reduce, secondary education for Africans. In fact, enrolment more than tripled, from 11,500 in 1965 to 37,500 in 1975 (Division of African Education, 1977, p. 15.7).[73]

This seems a clear example of it doing what its critics charged the RF would never do: placing African desires ahead of European ones on an important issue. This suggests the hypotheses that in a country with a limited franchise, a regime interested in system maintenance pays some attention to the wishes of disenfranchised elements. One may speculate

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[73]These figures do not include Africans in private 'European' schools; their numbers also grew in the decade in question. For comparison, in Africanist-ruled Kenya, secondary enrolment in the aided system grew from 23,166 in 1963 to 91,494 in 1972 (Keller, 1974, p. 61).

that the regime felt that failure to do so would intensify the desire for political change.

I found a general commitment amongst African trainees to a democratic political system. However, this commitment was not as firm nor unqualified as supporters of democracy would like. In the first place, the nature of democracy was not fully understood. Also, there was considerable enthusiasm for 'African socialism'; while socialism can be democratic (as Kelsen, 1955, defines democracy), the African socialist regime best known in Rhodesia was that in Tanzania. Irrespective of its excellent image in many Western liberal circles (e.g., Lewis, 1970), Tanzania in reality was a one-party dictatorship actively involved in training guerrillas to overthrow the governments in a number of its neighbors (including Rhodesia). Internally, students, peasants, intellectuals and anyone else not showing sufficient obeisance to Nyerere and his philosophy have been harshly dealt with (Morrison, 1976). In Tanzania's province of Zanzibar, it was a crime for a non-African female to refuse the marriage proposal of an African (NYT, 14.4.72; Economist, 14.11.70), an example of racism and indifference to civil rights that is especially glaring when one recalls the frequency and vehemence of the President of Tanzania's criticisms of what he perceives as racism and human rights problems in other countries.

So, to the extent that Tanzania was looked to as a democratic model, African trainees were not committed to democracy in the sense the word is used in the West and in this dissertation. Another neighboring state committed to socialism was Zambia; it also was moving toward a one-party state, so neither was it an appropriate model of democracy. Thus the evidence suggests that trainees would be ready to operate in a democratic system, but that they would not actively oppose a political order that was not democratic.

I feel that Hills (1978, p. 239) captures the position of a majority of trainees when he writes that their desire is much greater to be on the winning side than is their commitment to the democratic side:

> It follows that many Africans who are attached by occupation or profession to the white establishment are in a dilemma. They can't help wanting 'the boys' to win successes in the guerrilla war. But they do not want them to inherit the power; for they relish neither revolution nor Marxism. Mugabe's killers are an invaluable weapon; but he is not their man in the long run. Meanwhile they keep their eyes on the wind, whose direction, if they wish to prosper, will determine their declaration of allegiance and its timing. A mistake could jeopardise their lives.

Concerning the specifics of a democratic system, some sort of literacy requirement for voting was considered desirable or at least satisfactory by most African trainees; but an income or property test was much less popular, especially if it were high enough to exclude any teachers.

Thus the Africanist demand for "one man one vote" was not echoed by many African trainees; but they did desire a considerable expansion in the franchise so that they would all be able to vote and so that there would be a clear African political majority.

Limited, decentralized government: Government actions that were seen as favoring European interests at the expense of Africans were understandably unpopular with African trainees; however, the feeling seemed more that 'affirmative action' for Rhodesia's minority should be replaced by 'affirmative action' for its majority, rather than that the government should govern less. The political kingdom was largely thought to be responsible for the woes in the economic realm; but the preferred solution seemed to be different political control, rather than less political control.

The Rhodesian Front was trying to reduce pressures on the central government by strengthening local government. This action accords with the recommendations of various democratic theorists (e.g., Jennings) that government be made as close to the people as possible, that tutelage in local politics is excellent training for national politics, and that the case for local control is doubly strong when local areas have ethnic and other forms of homogenity lacking at the national level.[74]

Add the facts that the Government sought to strengthen the chiefs in its devolutionary plan, that trainees generally were not enthusiastic about the chiefs, that the plans envisaged local resources being more utilized to expand African education and other services, and that even some Europeans were telling them that devolution was not in their best interests, and the basis of African trainees' opposition is easy to find.

I did encounter a number of Ndebele trainees and a couple from small tribes who had some favorable things to say about decentralized government, although in no case was there an explicit endorsement of the government's proposals--and in some cases it was made clear that the general principle rather than the RF's plans was what was being favored.

Attempts to get information on trainees' views on constitutional issues were less than successful for several reasons: since neither visitors to TTCs nor trainees were encouraged to have exceptional interest in political matters, questions on franchise provisions could not be pursued with

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[74]However, the Rhodesian atmosphere appeared to be too polarized for the pro-decentralization case to make a favorable impression on many Mashona trainees. The Catholic Bishops and Moto had told Africans that provincialization and community development are code words for apartheid, permanent African impoverishment and a Bantustan policy.

In my view the bishops' position was too simplistic; the case against community development and decentralization became even more simplistic and biased by the time it filtered down to trainees and other Africans.

safety. More important, since none of the African trainees had voted nor had most of their parents or other relatives, questions about representation systems dealt with issues most trainees had never thought of, and that were not particularly suitable for instant analysis.

As far as could be determined (and keeping in mind that some may have felt inhibited in speaking on this subject) there seemed hope that new political leadership would emerge, with little enthusiasm for those in detention, and perhaps less for those in exile.

Opinion was more divided about those working within the system. Some saw them as stooges inhibiting African advance and giving the regime propaganda points. Others pointed out that the Africans in parliament consistently called for most of the changes trainees and other Africans desired; in this view the main problem with African MPs was that they were in a permanent, ineffectual minority.

On the position of Europeans in the political order, there seemed to be general agreement amongst trainees I interviewed that their political strength should be substantially less than that of Africans, although not necessarily as small as a head count would indicate. Ndebele trainees were supportive of some arrangement that would prevent there being a Shona political majority, with a one-third Ndebele, one-third White and one-third Shona

Parliament being mentioned by some--giving Africans the balance of power on inter-racial matters, with Europeans holding the balance on inter-tribal ones.

There seemed little sentiment for the 'let them pack their bags and go' position--although the fact that the interviewer is White and that expression of such a sentiment, if learned of by the authorities, could jeopardize trainees' careers, should be kept in mind.

The fact that the then-extant polity was considered democratic by most Europeans--even though it excluded most Africans from a meaningful political role--helped compound confusion as to what is meant by democracy. Harper (1959, p. 160) well captures this confusion at Old Umtali TTC:

> Midway in the first period of school came the election of officers. The teachers talked to the students about the qualifications for the different offices. They made dramatic presentations of how voting works in a democracy, and why they must learn this as students. Tafa [a first-year student] wondered if democracy were so important to the missionaries, why they didn't practice it in the training school. He wished he understood more about democracy.

During their schooling, trainees had heard democracy mentioned favorably many times. However Old Umtali's abovementioned experiment with limited student democracy was unique, and was terminated soon after Harper wrote--because African staff insisted that students should not be given the right to criticize them. Thus even African teachers who

objected to a lack of democratic participation for Africans at the national level felt that college students were too immature to have limited democratic rights at their TTC.

Trainees experience with, perceptions of, and commitment to democracy seemed quite weak. They wanted political change that would make the polity much more responsive to African aspirations. But for the most part, their political thinking had not advanced much beyond this point.

In summary, it appears that trainees had internalized enough of the values believed to be functional for democracy that they could participate satisfactorily as citizens of a democratic state; but they were not sufficiently committed to democracy that they would provide much of a bulwark against any ambitious politicians who wished to institute a non-democratic political order.

6.4 ECONOMICS

Two economic themes dominated statements by African trainees: First, they were poor, aspiring to be rich. While becoming a teacher was for most an upward mobile move, their own wants, plus obligations to their families, would be far from being met by their salaries. Considering how much lower their salaries would be than those of most European teachers (all European Division teachers are T1 or Grad.C.E., so the

differences being discussed, relative to T3 and T4 teachers, are the cumulative effect of lesser training and the newly different salary scales for teachers in the two divisions), added to their sense of frustration and relative privation.

Because the Ministry of Education set salary scales, some seemed to believe the main constraints on African teachers' pay were the Government's niggardliness. Even those who realized that the treasury must take in, or print, what was expended felt that African teachers' pay could be higher, except that the extant polity placed European interests above African ones.

The second theme was that there is something called 'African socialism' that could miraculously turn Rhodesia from a land of hard toil and poverty into an easeful land where there would be plenty for all. At the TTCs, the most sophisticated trainees grasp that prosperity could not be that simple, but they were also influenced by the external propaganda that African poverty was primarily due to European selfishness. Couple this with the lack of any meaningful consideration of economics in their education, and trainees' considerable confusion on economic questions is understandable. At UR those committed to African socialism had at least a rudimentary knowledge of differences among economic systems, but they too seemed generally unaware of how poor was the economic performance of states

where socialism had been tried. At both the TTCs and UR there were less vocal trainees who felt that what was needed was not a change to socialism but a reorientation of the capitalist system so that Africans could compete more successfully. While fewer expressed this view than opted for African socialism, when queried as to what they meant by it, quite a few who used the 'African socialism' label actually seemed to want a capitalist system reformed to favor small producers (and which paid its teachers a lot more!).

Trainees had acquired the desires to be part of a consumers' society, but would not be able to realize their desires even if they formed a nuclear family without obligations to their less educated relatives; in fact for most these family ties would drain away much of their income. Those with Mercedes-Benz tastes on a bicycle budget are dissatisfied in any society. There were a score or more African millionaires in Rhodesia, so trainees' feelings that only Europeans could prosper in the extant society were not accurate; but their perception that economic success was exclusively a European phenomenon was what determined their attitudes, even if a more objective analysis is: while it was easier to become well-off if one were White, it was also entirely possible for a sharp, energetic African.

It was not possible to make a detailed analysis of trainees' beliefs on such subjects as witchcraft. But those

who had long experience in teaching at TTCs generally felt that belief in witchcraft was extensive. The media regularly reported accusations of witchcraft, especially in connection with African business enterprises.

Sometimes those jealous of success had sought supernatural aid to eliminate their more successful competitor. Sometimes supernatural help was sought by a businessman to become more successful. It was generally believed that only a small portion of witchcraft cases ever reach courts. Thus at least in one sense witchcraft does exist and is an important factor in African life. It is a serious impediment to modern economic activity.

An additional economic worry expressed by some trainees was the use of the word 'standard' to refer to T1 teacher's training--implying that lower levels were all 'substandard.' Supply of teachers was catching up with demand and pressure to raise qualifications were present for all to see; T4 trainees (whose two year program was being replaced with a three year one) were especially worried that their training would soon be considered inadequate.

In short, on economic matters, African trainees' confusion was considerable and ignorance abounded. This lacuna in trainees' education boded ill for system maintenance.

6.5 PERSISTENCE AND ITS MEASURE

The question of persistence or (nature of modification) of the beliefs of trainees is one that can not be answered with the available data. When a major American foundation advertized support for research in Zimbabwe, I hoped to be able to analyze persistence and change (after this dissertation is completed) with a follow-up study on those in teachers' training in 1971 and on those currently in training. However, the foundation's reply was that, contrary to a published announcement concerning their grants, support was available only for indigenous Zimbabwean scholars. So a follow-up is not financially possible at present.

One may speculate that now that Black majority rule has existed for two or three years, those who saw it as the answer to all the country's problems have had ample time to reconsider that view. Similarly, the realities of African socialism could be compared with the mystique it had developed amongst many trainees.

I have no information on the attitude to research of the Mugabe Government. But the record of other Marxist states leads one to fear that research in the 1980s in Zimbabwe would be even more difficult that was research in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front. Government policy throughout the developing world often increases the problems of cumulative research; Zimbabwe may be no exception.

6.6 EPILOGUE

At the time of my field work in Rhodesia I assumed that any constitutional settlement with Britain would install a democratic government and that internal forces would principally determine whether democracy survived in Rhodesia after the advent of Black majority rule. The extremely moralistic stance the World community took to Rhodesia's UDI (in contrast, for example to Sudan's UDI or to India's activities in East Pakistan or Tanzania's in Uganda) were assumed to insure especial efforts in the Rhodesian case to establish and maintain a democratic system.

The first major doubts about this democratic commitment came when Tanzania's Julius Nyerere revealed that American President Carter had agreed with him that the future security forces in Zimbabwe would not be based on the 80% Black Rhodesian security forces but on the 100% Black communist armed, trained and indoctrinated guerrilla armies--a feature of the Anglo-American settlement plan of 1977 that was not hinted at in the Department of State's Bulletin (3.10.77).

Critics charged that this meant that the ruling British Labour and American Democratic parties were committed to a communist take-over. This was also how Nyerere's announcement was interpreted in Rhodesia (see late August and September, 1977, issues of the Rhodesia Herald and Sunday Mail). This revelation helped shock Europeans and moderate

African leaders into drafting a constitution that was tailored to do exactly what Britain and America had demanded for over a decade: provide for universal adult suffrage, protection of minority rights, end of pro-European discrimination, and use of a color-blind merit system of recruitment for the public service.

Although the election under this internal settlement was open to any party that agreed to eschew violence and abide by its results, the guerrillas and their supporters announced that they would wreck the election; in this they failed for two-thirds of Rhodesian adults voted. The British and American Governments refused invitations to send observers. However, the overwhelming verdict of the 270 newsmen and foreign observers who were there was that the election was as free and fair as the war situation allowed, some adding that it was perhaps the freest Africa had ever known (Evans, 1979b). None of this favorably impressed the Wilson or Carter Governments.

Gann and Duignan (1980, p. 854) contend:

> The record of radical movements that have come to power in recent years is so bad as to make all but hard-line Marxists blanch. No sensible or humane person wants radical regimes to come to power--with their confiscation of property, their reeducation centers, the civil wars that such regimes have produced in Angola and Ethiopia, or their purging of the opposition, as in South Yemen and Mozambique. In Angola, civil war reigns and the economy has collapsed; only Cuban guns keep the MPLA in power. Radical parties cooperate in fronts only until they gain power--witness Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia.

> They bring neither peace (witness warfare in Angola and Ethiopia); prosperity (all African Marxist regimes have lowered the well-being of their people); nor democracy (arrests, shootings, reeducation centers, confiscation, and the flight of people mar the records of all radical regimes). It is hard to see how a Patriotic Front takeover in Rhodesia can lead to liberation or democracy.

Yet it should have been obvious that the most likely outcome of a policy of continued sanctions and disapprobation of the Rhodesian moderates would be a take-over by the Marxists.

As outlined in Chapter 1, independence Governments have, despite extensive foreign aid and universal recognition, more often than not faltered and failed thoroughout the Third World. So it is not surprising that the Muzorewa Government, which was subject to economic sanctions and guerrilla warfare (and not recognized by any state), was unable to endure.

Shortly after the April 1979 Rhodesian election, there was a general election in Britain which brought to power the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. The Conservative Party was committed to support the Rhodesian internal settlement if the Rhodesian election were free and fair. The Conservative observers in Rhodesia had so reported.

However, once in power and subject to considerable pressure from the Carter Administration and radical Commonwealth states (e.g., Nigeria), Thatcher equivocated and then caved in. At a Commonwealth conference in one-party

Zambia, Thatcher denounced the provisions of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian constitution that were to protect European and other minority rights and to insure that the public service was a meritocracy as "defects"; she announced that a constitutional conference would be held in London at which the guerrillas would have comparable status to that of the newly elected Zimbabwe Rhodesian Government.

In the run-up to and during fresh elections, there was to be a British Governor with full powers, including the obligation to ban any party that engaged in widespread intimidation and other serious electoral malpractices. Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF threatened that anyone who did not vote for it would be killed, that it had special Russian 'black boxes' that would detect how each voter voted, and that if it did not win, the guerrilla war would continue. Many thousands of ZANU-PF guerrillas ignored the requirement of the Lancaster House Agreement that they go to special assembly points and stay there until after the election--instead they roamed the countryside, campaigning with AK47s in hand. While there were some rule infractions by the other parties, they were comparatively trivial. The British Governor, Lord Soames, later admitted that he never seriously considered banning ZANU-PF and that he had told this to Mugabe before the election (SM, 15.6.80).

There were many pressing needs in war-torn Rhodesia in

the pre-election period; the only ones that the international community rushed to meet were those of the guerrillas at the assembly camps and of those outside Rhodesia desiring to return. Thus it was very easy for Rhodesian African voters to be convinced that neither the PF nor the outside World would accept any result other than a guerrilla take-over. And 15 years of standing up to the World and 7 years of fighting the guerrillas had brought the country to the brink of ruin.

Although ZANU-PF's original election manifesto was strictly Marxist-Leninist, in the electoral campaign Mugabe tried to be on both sides of the militant-moderate fence; he largely reversed his Black rule exclusiveness, collectivize everything rhetoric; he promised to make Zimbabwe a paradise on earth for all citizens of all races, where free enterprise would flourish alongside socialism, where the rule of law would prevail, and where any nationalized property would be fully paid for.

In the February, 1980, Commonwealth-supervised election the relative promises of the parties, or the voters' perceptions of democracy, of African socialism, or of the qualities of the candidates, etc. all became secondary issues to 'peace at any price.' And that price was a Marxist take-over. Although during his first few months in office Prime Minister Mugabe largely continued playing the moderate

role he had switched to during the election campaign, by late 1981 he was reverting to his previous positions, being firmly pledged to a one-party Marxist state that his ZANU-PF would rule "forever." Although British military instructors were available free, North Korean ones were hired to train a palace guard to make him as coup proof as Kim il Sung himself. Radio and TV became party mouthpieces to a far greater extent than was ever the case under the RF; the press had been a vigorous and effective critic of the RF--Mugabe nationalized it and turned it into a party organ. The University's Royal Charter was to be scrapped to make it more amenable to party control.

Before the press was nationalized, Salisbury's leading newspapers, the Herald and the Sunday Mail, carried a large number of reports that ZANU-PF militants were seriously mistreating those they believed were their political opponents.

Veteran Africanist Joshua Nkomo spent a decade in detention under the Smith regime; until mid-February 1982 his perspective on the Mugabe Government was that of a cabinet minister. Yet he admitted that freedom of expression was greater under Smith than under Mugabe (Times, 6.1.81).

Unfortunately, I have no direct measure of what the trainees I surveyed or other teachers did or thought during this period. However, trainees' favorable evaluations of

both democracy and African socialism are entirely consistent with voting for a democratic party in the first universal-franchise election and--when the resulting Government did not bring peace, progress, and prosperity--then the next time around vote for African socialism. This is exactly what a large portion of the African electorate as a whole did.

The schools' socializing power was paid a strong, albeit backhanded, compliment by the guerrillas. For during the war they embarked upon a systematic campaign to destroy schools and force teachers to quit--torture or death were likely consequences of ignoring PF requests. From the perspective of winning the hearts and minds of the peasants, this made no sense at all. Most peasants have made contributions, sometimes substantial, to building and maintaining the schools. When a son or daughter returns with a teaching certificate to the local school, it is a source of community pride. Typically the new teacher's extended family has invested in his education and hopes to benefit from his or her success. If instead the teacher is unemployed (not to mention abducted, tortured or killed), grievances toward the guerrillas intensify. That the PF found these costs acceptable apparently shows how dangerous it considered education of the next generation in schools largely modelled after the British.

The textbook discussion of foreign policy has the

knowing professionals having to contend with the lack of information and limited perspective of the public. But in the Rhodesian case, the opposite appears to be true; Allen (1973) finds that a majority of pronouncements by American editors, Congressmen and the general public opposed the position of the State Department; similarly a 1969 British Gallup poll found 27% approval of the Government's handling of the Rhodesian issue.

I found that the denigration of the Rhodesian Right and Centre by the American and British Governments was widely known by trainees and other Africans; it appeared to be a strong socializing factor.

With hindsight it is clear that the vital research project would have been: why did putatively pro-democratic leaders in the West consistently pursue policies that their critics correctly observed at the time could only 'succeed' by establishing not democracy but Marxist dictatorship?[75]

While in the Rhodesian tragedy the culpability of the democratic Left in the West is greater than that of the Right, it was a British Conservative Government that

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[75]This is not to say that such a research project would have been successful, for what happened may defy rational explanation. One factor, as Senator Moynihan had noted, is that the Marxists have been very successful in getting their vocabulary accepted: while it is easy to be against a 'communist terrorist organization shooting its way to power,' it is much harder to be outraged by a 'freedom fighter' in a 'war of national liberation.'

ultimately destroyed the position of the Rhodesian moderates. It was Winston Churchill's son-in-law who delivered the coup de grace by shirking his obligation to disqualify any party that flouted the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. As early as 1963, Rita Hinden of the Labour Party's Fabian Society predicted:

> One day, no doubt, we will find ourselves supporting Africans in a new freedom crusade--not against imperial oppression this time, but against their own harsh rulers. (Letter to the Guardian, quoted in East Africa & Rhodesia, 2.1.64, p. 371).

Considering the situation in Zimbabwe in February, 1982--and its Government's announced plans for the future--I believe many of those who were teacher trainees a decade ago would warmly welcome such a crusade, and feel sorely let down that the West facilitated development of the circumstances that would make such a crusade desirable.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A:1 Mnemonic, label, card and column positions for variables in Rhodesian questionnaire

Mnemonic	Variable label	Position
COLLEGE	College respondent trained in	1.2
ETHNIC	Respondent's ethnic group	1.9
SHONAGRP	Shona tribal group of respondent	1.10
TRNGPRGM	Which teachers' training programme	1.11
PARLANG	Lang. parents use most freq. with stu.	1.12
FRNDLANG	Lang. used most freq. with friends	1.13
STUMARTL	Student's pres. marital status	1.14
MOMARTL	Mother's pres. marital status	1.15
NOWIVES	Max. # of wives father had at 1 time	1.16
MOTHERNO	"Your mother was his 1st, etc. wife"	1.17
PRMRYLOC	Location of primary school longest attended	1.18
SCNDLOC	Loc. of 2ndary school longest attended	1.19
BOARDING	Boarding student in 2ndary school	1.20
FARELGN	Father's religious denomination	1.21
MORELGN	Mother's religious denomination	1.23
STRELGN	Student's religious denomination	1.25
PRMRYRUN	Who ran prim. school longest attended	1.27
SCONDRUN	Who ran 2ndary sch. longest attended	1.30
SCONDLEV	Highest level 2ndary school completed	1.31
CORSSCHL	# Yrs. private study, incl. corres. schl.	1.32
OLEVEL	Have O-level exam pass	1.33
AMLEVEL	Have A- or M-level exam pass	1.34
CLASRANK	Where rank in class at end of this term	1.38
PARHOMEP	Live with parents at end of primary	1.39
PARHOMEC	Live with parents when teach. tr. began	1.40
FACHURCH	How often does father attend church	1.41
MOCHURCH	How often does mother attend church	1.42
STCHURCH	How often does student attend church	1.43
CHILDREN	# of children in home with respondent	1.44
OLDER	# of children older than respondent	1.45
FAEDCATN	# years of father's formal education	1.46
MOEDCATN	# years of mother's formal education	1.47
PARCASH	Parents' combined annual cash income	1.53
FAORGMEM	# of organizations father active in	1.54
FAOFICES	# org. offices held by father	1.55
MOORGMEM	# of organizations mother active in	1.56
MOOFICES	# org. offices held by mother	1.57
STORGMEM	# of organizations student active in	1.58
STOFICES	# org. offices held by student	1.59
FAITHP	Faith in Rhod's leaders taught in primary	2.7
DIFOPINP	Tolerate dif. opins. taught in primary	2.10
POLITEP	Be polite, esp. with other races, primary	2.13
OBEYLAWP	Always obey law taught in primary	2.16
NATLGOVP	Rhodesian nat'l gov. taught in primary	2.19

TABLE A:1 (continued)

Mnemonic	Variable label	Position
LOCGOVP	Rhodesian local gov. taught in primary	2.22
RLGNIMPP	Contemp. impt. of religion taught in primary	2.25
TOLRLGNP	Religious tolerance taught in primary	2.28
LOVCTRYP	Love your country taught in primary	2.31
RESPECTP	Respect authorities taught in primary	2.34
AFRICANP	Africans' role in Rhodesia's history, primary	2.37
EUROPNSP	European role in Rhodesia's history, primary	2.40
HIS4563P	Rhodesia history, 1945-63, taught in primary	2.43
RH64PRSP	Rhodesia's history, 1964+, taught in primary	2.46
MODAFRP	Other African history, 1945+, in primary	2.49
FAITHS	Faith in Rhod's leaders taught in 2ndary	2.8
DIFOPINS	Tolerate dif. opins. taught in 2ndary	2.11
POLITES	Be polite, esp. with other races, 2ndary	2.14
OBEYLAWS	Always obey law taught in secondary	2.17
NATLGOVS	How Rhod. nat'l gov. works in 2ndary	2.20
LOCGOVS	Rhodesian local gov. taught in secondary	2.23
RLGNIMPS	Contemp. impt. of religion taught in 2ndary	2.26
TOLRLGNS	Religious tolerance taught in secondary	2.29
LOVCTRYS	Love your country taught in secondary	2.32
RESPECTS	Respect authorities taught in secondary	2.35
AFRICANS	African role in Rhodesia's history, 2ndary	2.38
EUROPNSS	European role in Rhodesia's history, 2ndary	2.41
HIS4563S	Rhodesia's history, 1945-63, taught in 2ndary	2.44
RH64PRSS	Rhodesia's history, 1964+, taught in 2ndary	2.47
MODAFRS	Other African history, 1945+, in 2ndary	2.50
FAITHC	Faith in Rhod's leaders taught in college	2.9
DIFOPINC	Tolerate dif. opins. taught in college	2.12
POLITEC	Be polite taught in college	2.15
OBEYLAWC	Always obey law taught in colllege	2.18
NATLGOVC	Rhodesian nat'l gov. taught in college	2.21
LOCGOVC	Rhodesian local gov. taught in college	2.24
RLGNIMPC	Contemp. impt. of religion taught in college	2.27
TOLRLGNC	Religious tolerance taught in college	2.30
LOVCTRYC	Love your country taught in college	2.33
RESPECTC	Respect authorities taught in college	2.36
AFRICANC	Africans' role in Rhodesia's history, college	2.39
EUROPNSC	European role in Rhodesia's history, college	2.42
HIS4563C	Rhodesia history, 1945-63, taught in college	2.45
RH64PRSC	Rhodesia history, 1964+, taught in college	2.48
MODAFRC	Other African history, 1945+, in college	2.51
BIRTHCON	Need for birth control in Rhodesia is	2.52
BCMETHOD	Acceptable birth control methods	2.43
POLYGYNY	Beliefs on polygyny	2.55
BALANCE	Subject matter-education balance in TTC	2.56

TABLE A:1 (continued)

Mnemonic	Variable label	Position
GOODTCHR	TTC making you effective teacher	2.57
EQUALPAY	=pay for =work for Rhodesian females	2.58
PRIEST	Pol. attit. influenced by religious ldrs.	3.7
CHIEF	Pol. attit. influenced by chiefs, headmen	3.8
PTEACH	Pol. attit. influenced by primary teachers	3.9
STEACH	Pol. attit. influenced by 2ndary teachers	3.10
CTEACH	Pol. attit. influenced by college teachers	3.11
PARENTS	Pol. attit. influenced by parents	3.12
AUNTUNCL	Pol. attit. influenced by aunts & uncles	3.13
SIBLINGS	Pol. attit. influenced by siblings	3.14
FRIENDS	Pol. attit. influenced by friends own age	3.15
OBSERVAT	Pol. attit. influenced by own observations	3.16
PTEXTS	Pol. attit. influenced by primary texts	3.22
STEXTS	Pol. attit. influenced by 2ndary textbooks	3.23
CTEXTS	Pol. attit. influenced by college texts	3.24
RELIGBKS	Pol. attit. influenced by religious books	3.25
MAGAZINS	Pol. attit. influenced by other magazines	3.26
NEWSPAPR	Pol. attit. influenced by newspapers	3.27
BOOKS	Pol. attit. influenced by non-assigned books	3.28
POLPAMPH	Pol. attit. influenced by political pamph.	3.29
RBCRADTV	Pol. attit. influenced by Rhod. radio & TV	3.30
FORRADIO	Foreign radio affect pol. & soc. beliefs	3.31
INTEREST	Cur. events & social ques. interest level	3.36
PROSPERS	Chance of good life, comp. with parents'	3.37
FAFAITH	Religious faith, compared with father's	3.38
MOFAITH	Religious faith, compared with mother's	3.39
FASATISF	Satis. with Rhod. life, comp. with father	3.40
MOSATISF	Satis. with Rhod. life, comp. with mother	3.41
FREQREAD	How freq. are newspapers & mags. read	3.46
TALKNEWS	How freq. do you talk about cur. events	3.47
AFRNRBC	How freq. listen to African serv. of RBC	3.48
EURRBC	How freq. listen to other services of RBC	3.49
FREQMAGZ	Freq. read magazines on soc. & pol. ques.	3.51
FREQOTHR	Social & pol. info. from other sources	3.54
PEOPLE2X	Rhod's population 2X in 25 yrs. or less	3.58
NGOZI	Ngozis cause some sicknesses	3.59
HARDWORK	Person's success most due to own work	3.60
WITCHES	Witches must be exorcized to stop harm	3.61
FAIRTRET	If treat others fairly, they be fair	3.62
TOBACCO	Tobacco smoking is harmful to health	3.63
ALCOHOL	Alcohol has no beneficial effects	3.64
PDISCUSS	Discussion opportunities in prim. school	3.65
SDISCUSS	Discussion opportunities in 2ndary school	3.66
CDISCUSS	Discussion opportunities in college	3.67
PARTICIP	Student's discussion participation is	3.68
MORTALKP	Encourage more discussion in primary	4.7

TABLE A:1 (continued)

Mnemonic	Variable label	Position
MORTALKS	Encourage more discussion in 2ndary	4.8
MORTALKC	Encourage more discussion in college	4.9
COURTEUS	Treated courteously in daily dealings	4.10
MCHMONEY	To make much money	4.11
ADVICE	Relatives & friends seek advice	4.12
COYBOSS	To become director of a large company	4.13
LOCCONCL	To be elected to local gov. council	4.14
CLUBPRES	To become pres. of (wo)men's club	4.15
VARSTYED	For son to get university education	4.16
RESPECT	Neighbours speak of you with respect	4.17
NEWCAR	For you to own a new motor car	4.18
SALIS100	To earn $R1000 a year in Salisbury	4.19
TOWN125	Earn $R1250 in town with pop. of 1500	4.20
RURAL150	Earn $R1500 far from a town	4.21
NPRIEST	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with priest	4.22
NTEACHER	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with teacher	4.24
NDC	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with DC	4.26
NCHIEF	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with chief	4.28
NPARENTS	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with parents	4.32
NANTUNCL	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with aunts-uncles	4.36
NSIBLING	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with siblings	4.34
NNGANGA	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with nganga	4.36
NFRIENDS	Discuss nat'l gov. policy with friends	4.38
LPRIEST	Discuss local gov. policy with priest	4.23
LTEACHER	Discuss local gov. policy with teacher	4.25
LDC	Discuss local gov. policy with DC	4.27
LCHIEF	Discuss local gov. policy with chief	4.29
LPARENTS	Discuss local gov. policy with parents	4.31
LANTUNCL	Discuss local gov. policy with aunts-uncles	4.33
LSIBLING	Discuss local gov. policy with siblings	4.35
LNGANGA	Discuss local gov. policy with nganga	4.37
LFRIENDS	Discuss local gov. policy with friends	4.39
PROGRESS	Economic change in next 10 years	4.44
WISDOM	Age wisdom vs. education for candidate	4.45
TRADITIN	Progressive candidate vs. traditionalist	4.46
RELATIVE	Easy-going relative vs. energetic nonrelative	4.47
DCDECISN	DC & staff rule African village	4.48
ONLYCHEF	Chief alone rule African village	4.49
CHFELDRS	Chief, headmen & elders rule Afr. village	4.50
ALL4	Traditional & elected rule African village	4.51
ELECTED	Elected councillors alone rule	4.52
MAJORITY	Decisions made by majority vote	4.53
CONSNSUS	Talking until consensus on decisions	4.54

TABLE A:1 (continued)

Mnemonic	Variable label	Position
READVOTE	Voting restricted to literate people	4.55
CASHVOTE	$R240+ income as voting qualification	4.56
MENVOTE	Voting restricted to men	4.57
BOTHVOTE	Voting by both men & women	4.58
HOMETALK	Free to enter family disc. at age 13-15	4.59
UINFLNCE	Family consider your opinions	4.60
HOMEHAPY	Satisfied with your influence at home	4.61
PCHRULE	Free to req. rule change in primary school	4.62
SCHRULE	Free to req. rule change in 2ndary school	4.63
CCHRULE	Free to req. rule change in college	4.64
PDIDREQ	Ever ask for rule change in primary school	4.65
SDIDREQ	Ever ask for rule change in 2ndary	4.66
CDIDREQ	Ever ask for rule change in college	4.67
PEFECTIV	Rule change req. considered in primary	4.68
SEFECTIV	Rule change req. considered in 2ndary	4.69
CEFECTIV	Rule change req. considered in college	4.70

Note: A photocopy of the questionnaire I used in Rhodesia immediately follows this table.

Dear Teacher trainee,

It has long been recognized that an educational system--in addition to providing students with specific facts and skills--has a major role in the socialization of students. By "socialization" we mean aiding students to adjust to living in society as it is, as well as preparing them to help make an even better society in the future.

Studies of the schools' socializing role have recently been made in several other countries. Your careful answers to the questions in this booklet will aid in the study of the socialization process in Rhodesia.

I shall use the information gained from these questionnaires to prepare a dissertation for a graduate degree from an American university (The University of Tennessee). A copy of this dissertation will be offered to the library of the University of Rhodesia. Also, I plan to submit an article to a Rhodesian scholarly journal in which findings from this questionnaire will be summarized. Thus Rhodesians who have aided with this survey will be able to learn its results.

This is not an examination. Many questions concern matters of opinion and belief for which there are no "right" or "wrong" answers. Others ask for your assessment of your own educational experience. I am interested in your honest feelings and impressions.

You are not requested to sign your name. Your answers will be kept completely confidential. Only aggregate data from the responses of many teacher trainees will be released.

Your assistance in this research project is greatly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

Robert Thiele

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HOW TO ANSWER THIS QUESTIONNAIRE:

If you are UNSURE of the answer to any question, write your BEST GUESS as the answer. Since there are many questions in this booklet, please do not ponder unduly long on any one question.

FOR MOST QUESTIONS YOU WILL NEED TO WRITE ONLY ONE NUMBER ON A LINE ON THE RIGHT-HAND SIDE OF THE PAGE. If there are no answer numbers provided for a question, use the numbering system from the question before.

For a few questions, you will also be asked to fill in a blank. In all cases, PLEASE WRITE OR PRINT VERY CLEARLY so there will be no doubt about your answers.

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First, please answer some questions about yourself and your family:

Sex: 1. male; 2. female. . . . . (7)___
(Example: If you are male, write 1 on the line after (7).)

Age: 1. 17 or less; 2. 18; 3. 19; 4. 20; 5. 21; 6. 22-24; 7. 25-27; 8. 28-30; 9. 31 or over. . . . . (8)___

Ethnic group: 1. Asiatic; 2. Coloured; 3. European; 4. Ndebele; 5. Shona; 6. other African _____ 7. other non-African _____. . . . . (9)___
(Examples: If you are Ndebele, write 4 after (9); if you are American Indian, write American Indian on the blank after 7. AND write 7 on the blank after (9).

If you are Shona, which group do you belong to? 1. Kalanga; 2. Karanga; 3. Korekore; 4. Ndau; 5. Nyika; 6. Zezuru; 7. mixed ancestry. (If you are not Shona, write 0). . . . (10)___

What teachers training programme are you in? 1. T1; 2. T2; 3. T3; 4. T4; 5. B.A. or B.Sc. + education certification; 6. other _____. . . . . (11)___

2

Language your parents most often use in speaking to you: 1. Afrikaans; 2. English; 3. Portuguese; 4. Ndebele; 5. Manyika; 6. Karanga; 7. Zezuru; 8. other _____ (12)___

Language you most often use in speaking to friends your age: 8. _____ (13)___

(Note: For the above question and for others that do not have a complete set of answer alternatives, use the same answers and numbering system as provided for the question before it.)

Your present marital status: 1. single; 2. traditional marriage; 3. religious marriage; 4. separated; 5. divorced; 6. widowed; 7. divorced & remarried; 8. widowed & remarried; 9. other _____ (14)___

Your mother's present marital status: 9. _____ (15)___

The maximum number of wives your father has had at one time is: (16)___

Your mother was his: (1. 1st; 2. 2nd; 3. 3rd; 4. 4th, etc.) wife: (17)___

Where did you live when you attended primary school? (If you lived in more than one place, answer for where you attended longest.) 1. greater Salisbury or greater Bulawayo; 2. Ft. Victoria, Gatooma Gwelo, Que Que, Shabani, Umtali, or Wankie; 3. smaller town; 4. European farm; 5. Tribal Trust Land; 6. Purchase area; 7. Mission; 8. out of Rhodesia; 9. other _____ (18)___

Where did you live when you attended secondary school? (If you did not attend secondary school, write 0. If you were a boarding student, answer for the school's location) 9. _____ (19)___

Were you a boarding student in secondary school? 1. yes; 2. part of the time; 3. no; 4. did not attend secondary school. (20)___

What is your father's religious denomination? 01. Anglican; 02. Brethren-in-Christ; 03. Dutch Reformed; 04. Evangelical Lutheran; 05. Methodist Missionary Society; 06. United Methodist (American); 07. United Congregational; 08. Roman Catholic; 09. Seventh Day Adventist; 10. Church of Central Africa Presbyterian; 11. Free Methodists; 12; Evangelical Alliance; 13. Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland; 14. United Church of Christ; 15. Salvation Army; 16. Vapostori; 17. Hindu; 18. Jewish; 19. Muslim; 20. Traditional African; 21. None; 22. other _____ (21,22)___

What is your mother's denomination" 22. _____ (23,24)___

What is your denomination? 22. _____ (25,26)___

Who ran the primary school you attended longest? (If run by a church, use the numbers listed for Father's denomination; if not, use the following numbers) 23. Committee; 24. Community Board; 25. Council; 26. Government; 27. Sponsored; 28. Farm School in European area; 29. Private; 30. other _____ (27,28)___

Who ran the secondary school you attended longest? (If you did not attend a secondary school, write 00)30. _____ (29,30)___

What is the highest level you completed in secondary school? 0. less than a year; 1. Form I; 2. Form II; 3. Form III; 4. Form IV; 5. Lower VI; 6. Upper VI; 8. Grade 8; 9. Grade 9. (31)___

Number of years of correspondence school or other serious study completed on your own: (If none, write 0): (32)___

Do you have: 1. Cambridge School Certificate; 2. G.C.E. O-level; 3. neither. (33)___

Do you have: 1. Cambridge Higher School Certificate; 2. G.C.E A-level; 3. neither. (34)___

3

If you are going to specialize, what subject(s) do you expect to teach? (List up to 3, each on a separate blank) 0. Primary teacher, not going to specialize; 1. African language; 2. English; 3. agriculture; 4. domestic science; 5. mathmatics; 6. metal, wood or building work; 7. science; 8. social studies; 9. other _____. (35)___ (36)___ (37)___

At the end of this term, where do you expect to rank in your class? 1. top one-third; 2. middle third; 3. lower third. (38)___

Were/was (1. both your parents; 2. only your mother; 3. only your father; 4. neither parent) living in the same household with you at the time you completed primary school? . (39)___

. . .at the time you began teachers training? . . (40)___

How often does your father attend church? (If he is deceased, indicate his practice while alive) 1. one or more times per week; 2. one or more times per month; 3. occasionally; 4. never or almost never; 5. don't know. . . . . (41)___

How often does your mother attend church? . . . (42)___

How often do you attend church? . . . . . (43)___

How many children (brothers, half-brothers, etc.) grew up in the same household as you did? . . . . . (44)___

How many of these children were older than you? . . (45)___

How much formal, full-time education did your father have? 0. less than a year; 1. 1-3 years (e.g., Sub-Std A, B, or Std 1) 2. 4-5 years (Std 2 or 3); 3. 6-8 years (Std 4, 5, or 6); 4. 9-10 years (Form I or II or P.T.L.); 5. 11-12 years (Form III or IV or P.T.H.); 6. 13-14 years (Form VI); 7. 14+ years; 8. university graduate; 9. don't know. . . . . (46)___

How much formal, full-time education did your mother have? (47)___

What is your father's occupation? (If he is deceased or retired, indicate what his principal job was) 1. TTL farmer; 2. farm employee; 3. farm owner; 4. domestic servant or messenger; 5. clerical or sales; 6. factory worker; 7. teacher; 8. other (specify) _____ _____ (48) (49) (50) (51)___

(Note: This questionnaire has a few numbers in parentheses that are only for technical use in analysis of your answers (e.g., 48, 49, & 50). Please write your answers ONLY on blanks following numbers)

If your mother has a job, or held one for two or more years, what is it?(If not, write 0) 8. _____ (52)___

What is your parents' combined annual cash income? (Indicate average income for the past 3 years. If you are unsure of the answer to this or any other question, an answer one category off will be much more valuable than no answer) 1. $49 or less; 2. $50-174; 3. $175-349; 4. $350-699; 5. $700-1399; 6. $1400-2799; 7. $2800-5599; 8. $5600-11,199; 9. $11,200 or more. (53)___

Has your father ever belonged to any voluntary club or organization (religious, charitable, social, etc.) whose meetings he often attended? If so, indicate the number of such organizations he has joined; if he has not joined any, write 0. (54)___

How many offices (President, committee chairman, etc.) in any organizations has he held? . . . . . (55)___

How many voluntary organizations has your mother joined? (56)___

How many offices has she held? . . . . . (57)___

How many voluntary organizations have you joined? . (58)___

How many offices have you held? . . . . . (59)___

p. 4 CARD 2

Here is a list of things that might be taught in school. Please indicate how much attention your teachers paid to each in your primary, secondary and post-secondary education: 1. MUCH attention; 2. SOME attention; 3. LITTLE attention; 4. NO attention.

	primary	secondary	post-secondary
Have faith in Rhodesia's leaders. . .	(7)___	(8)___	(9)___
Respect the right of others to have opinions different from yours.	(10)___	(11)___	(12)___
Always be polite, especially with people of other races.	(13)___	(14)___	(15)___
Always obey the law.	(16)___	(17)___	(18)___
How the Rhodesian national government works.	(19)___	(20)___	(21)___
How local government in Rhodesia works.	(22)___	(23)___	(24)___
Importance of religion in contemporary life.	(25)___	(26)___	(27)___
Be tolerant of different religious beliefs.	(28)___	(29)___	(30)___
Love your country.	(31)___	(32)___	(33)___
Respect those in positions of authority.	(34)___	(35)___	(36)___
The role of Africans in Rhodesia's history.	(37)___	(38)___	(39)___
The role of Europeans in Rhodesia's history.	(40)___	(41)___	(42)___
History of Rhodesia from the end of World War II to the end of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1945-1963). . . .	(43)___	(44)___	(45)___
History of Rhodesia since the end of the Federation (1964 to the present). . .	(46)___	(47)___	(48)___
History of other countries in Africa, from 1945 to the present.	(49)___	(50)___	(51)___
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Recently the government has urged limitation on family size as a necessity for increased prosperity. Do you feel that the need for birth control in Rhodesia at present is: 1. great; 2. moderate; 3. slight; 4. non-existent; 5. other _____ (52)___

Do you believe that it is all right to use: 1. any safe method of birth control; 2. only certain methods of birth control; 3. no method of birth control. . . . . (53)___

Many religions have rules against a man having more than one wife. What is your personal belief? 1. A man should never be allowed more than one wife; 2. a man should be allowed more than one wife only if he can well provide for all his wives and children; 3. a man should be allowed another wife only if his previous wife/wives agree to it; 4. if you believe that BOTH 2 & 3 should be conditions, write 4; 5. a man should be allowed as many wives as he wants; 6. a man should be allowed several wives only if he and they are African non-Christians; 7. other _____ (54)

_____ _____ _____ _____. (55)___

What is your assessment of the present balance between subject matter courses (e.g., English, science) and education courses in your teachers training programme? 1. more time should be spent in subject matter study; 2. balance is about right at present; 3. a higher percentage of time should be spent in education classes. . . . . (56)___

How well do you believe that your studies are preparing you to be an effective teacher? 1. very well; 2. well; 3. adequately; 4. poorly. . . . . (57)___

Do you believe that, under present Rhodesian circumstances, equal pay for equal work should apply regardless of sex? 1. yes; 2. no (58)___

p. 5 CARD 3

In developing attitudes towards any question, an individual is influenced by the information he receives and by the opinions of others. Please indicate the degree to which each of the following has influenced your attitudes on the best way for Rhodesian society to be organized and for the country to be governed. Which has been: 1. GREATLY influential; 2. MODERATELY influential; 3. SLIGHTLY influential; 4. NOT influential.

Your priest or other religious leader. . . . . (7)___

Tribal chief or headman. . . . . (8)___

Your primary school teachers. . . . . (9)___

Your secondary school teachers. . . . . (10)___

Teachers at the school you are now attending. . . (11)___

Your parents. . . . . (12)___

Your aunts and uncles. . . . . (13)___

Your brothers and sisters. . . . . (14)___

Friends your own age. . . . . (15)___

Your own personal observations. . . . . (16)___

Any other PEOPLE who have been especially influential? (Specify by their connexion to you--e.g., father's employer--rather than by name) (17) (18)

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ (19) (20)

Attitudes are also affected by information gained from impersonal sources. Please indicate the influence of each of the following: (21)

Primary school textbooks. . . . . (22)___

Secondary school textbooks. . . . . (23)___

Post-secondary school textbooks. . . . . (24)___

Religious literature. . . . . (25)___

Other magazines. . . . . (26)___

Daily, tri-weekly or weekly newspapers. . . . . (27)___

Books you have read on your own. . . . . (28)___

Pamphlets etc. put out by social & political organizations. (29)___

Rhodesia radio and television. . . . . (30)___

Radio broadcasts from other countries. . . . . (31)___

Any other information source you have found especially influential? (32) (33)

_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ (34)

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Compared with most of your classmates, would you say that you have an (1. above average; 2. about average; 3. below average) interest in current events and questions of social importance? (35) (36)___

Compared with your parents' life, do you believe that your liklihood of leading a happy, prosperous life are: 1. much greater; 2. greater; 3. less; 4. much less. . . . (37)___

Compared with your father, would you say that your religious faith is. . . . . (38)___

Compared with your mother, your religious faith is. . . (39)___

Compared with your father, how great is your satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life? . . . . . (40)___

Compared with your mother, how great is your satisfaction with the Rhodesian way of life? . . . . . (41)___

If you read a newspaper or news-magazine, which one(s) are you most likely to read? (List numbers for up to 3) 1. Rhodesia Herald & Sunday Mail; 2. Bulawayo Chronicle; 3. Umtali Post; 4. African Times; 5. Property & Finance: 6. Moto; 7. Umbowo; 8. others (42) (43)___ (44)___ (45)___

On the average during the last year, how often have you read a newspaper or news-magazine? 1. daily; 2. several times a week; 3. about once a week; 4.several times a month; 5.rarely or never (46)___

How often have you talked with other people about current events, public affairs & other questions of general social importance? (47)___

How often have you watched Rhodesia television? . . (48)___

How often have you listened to the African service of the RBC? (49)___

How often have you listened to other sound services of the RBC? (50)___

How often have you read magazines that discuss current events and questions of general social or political importance? (51)___

Which ones? ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ (52)

How often have you received information on current events and questions of general social or political importance from sources (53)
other than those mentioned above? . . . . . (54)___

What other sources?___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ (55)
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ (56)

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Which of the following statements do you believe are:
1. definitely true; 2. probably true; 3. probably not true;
4. definitely not true?

If present birth and death rates do not change, Rhodesia's population will double in less than 25 years. . . (58)___

Some sicknesses are caused by an avenging spirit (ngozi) . (59)___

A person's degree of success in life is most influenced by his own ability and hard work. . . . . (60)___

A number of witches exist in our society. They must be exorcized to prevent them from doing further harm. . . (61)___

If a person treats those he deals with fairly, most of them will be fair with him. . . . . (62)___

Tobacco smoking is harmful to health. . . . . (63)___

Alcohol has no beneficial effects when consumed by humans. (64)___

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In some schools, when current events or questions of social importance are mentioned, there is little or no discussion. In other schools, the opportunity for student discussion is considerable. In general, the opportunity for student discussion in your primary school was: 1. considerable; 2. moderate; 3. little or none. . . . . (65)___

Student discussion opportunities in your secondary school were: (66)___

Student discussion opportunities in your present school are: (67)___

In such discussions, is your participation usually: 1. above average; 2. average; 3. below average; (4. no discussions) (68)___

(CARD 4)

Suppose that you were teaching a class where current events or questions of general social importance were mentioned. Would you encourage (1. more; 2. about the same amount of; 3. less) student discussion than was customary in your primary school? (7)___

... in your secondary school? . . . . . (8)___

... in the school you are now attending? . . . (9)___

p 7

Below are several sets of three. For each set, indicate; 1. the alternative you would most like; 2. your second choice; 3. your third choice:

To be treated courteously in day-to-day dealings. . . (10)___

To make much money. . . . . (11)___

To be turned to for advice by your relatives and friends. (12)___

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To become a director of a large company. . . . (13)___

To be elected to a local government council. . . (14)___

To be chosen president of a men's (or women's) club. . (15)___

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For your son to get a university education. . . . (16)___

For you to be spoken of with respect by your neighbours. . (17)___

For you to own a new motor car. . . . . (18)___

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To earn $1000 a year working in Salisbury. . . . (19)___

To earn $1250 a year working in a town with population of 1500. (20)___

To earn $1500 a year in a rural area far from a town. . (21)___

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If either the national or local government proposed some important policy that left you puzzled as to its effect on people like you, which of the following people would you: 1. be very likely to discuss it with; 2. possibly discuss it with; 3. probably not discuss it with; 4. definitely not discuss it with?

	national government proposal	local gov't proposal
Your priest or other religious leader. . . .	(22)___	(23)___
A present or former teacher of yours. . . .	(24)___	(25)___
District Commissioner or other civil servant. .	(26)___	(27)___
A tribal chief or headman.	(28)___	(29)___
Your parents.	(30)___	(31)___
Your aunts or uncles.	(32)___	(33)___
Your brothers and sisters.	(34)___	(35)___
A nganga.	(36)___	(37)___
Friends your own age.	(38)___	(39)___
Others (specify by connexion with you--e.g., father's employer--not by name) ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___	(40) (42)	(41) (43)

In the next ten years, how much economic progress do you expect in Rhodesia? 1. rapid progress; 2. moderate progress; 3. little or no progress; 4. things will get worse. . . (44)___

In voting for a local councillor to represent you, would you prefer a candidate who: 1. had gained wisdom through living in the community for many years; or 2. was well educated? . (45)___

Would you prefer a candidate who: 1. promised progressive change; or 2. wished to do things as they had been done traditionally? (46)___

Would you prefer a candidate who: 1. was an easy-going relative of yours; or 2. was an energetic non-relative? . . (47)___

Various ways exist for ruling an African village and electing councillors. Indicate which of the possibilities listed below you consider: 1. very good; 2. good; 3. satisfactory; 4. poor.

Decisions made by District Commissioner and his staff. . (48)___

Decisions made by Chief alone. . . . . (49)___

Decisions made by Chief, Headmen and elders. . . . (50)___

Decisions made by Chief, Headmen, elders & elected Councillors. (51)___

Decisions made by elected Councillors alone. . . . (52)___

Decisions made by majority vote. . . . . (53)___

Decisions made by talking until an agreement acceptable to all is reached. . . . . (54)___

Voting for Councillors restricted to literate people. . (55)___

Voting restricted to those with annual cash income of £240+. (56)___

Voting restricted to men. . . . . (57)___

Voting by both men and women. . . . . (58)___

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When you were about 13 to 15 years of age and family decisions that affected you were being made, did you feel free to enter the discussion: 1. often; 2. sometimes; 3. never? . . (59)___

If you did participate, were your opinions seriously considered? 4. did not participate. . . . . (60)___

In general, how satisfied are you with the amount of influence you had in family affairs when you were about 13 to 15 years old? 1. very satisfied 2. moderately satisfied; 3. moderately dissatisfied; 4. very dissatisfied. . . . . (61)___

If you felt that some school rule were unfair or unreasonable, would you feel: 1. completely free to suggest change; 2. reluctant to say anything; 3. definitely not free to say anything; 4. free with some teachers but not free with others:

in your primary school? . . . . . (62)___

in your secondary school? . . . . . (63)___

in the school you are now attending? . . . . (64)___

Have you actually suggested that a school rule be changed: 1. a number of times 2. rarely; 3. never:

in primary school? . . . . . (65)___

in secondary school? . . . . . (66)___

in the school you are now attending? . . . . (67)___

If you have suggested changes in school rules, do you feel that your opinion was seriously considered: 1. usually; 2. sometimes; 3. never; 4. never suggested changes:

in primary school? . . . . . (68)___

in secondary school? . . . . . (69)___

in the school that you are now attending? . . . (70)___

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

Please look this questionnaire over carefully to be sure that you have not left out any question and that all your answers are easy to read. Your careful and thoughtful response to these questions is greatly appreciated.

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VITA

Robert Thiele was born in Grand Rapids, Minnesota, and attended primary school in Sarasota, Florida, Marcell, Minnesota, Harlingen, Texas, Hot Springs, Arkansas, Madison, Wisconsin, Forest Hills, New York, Cambria, Wisconsin, and Grand Rapids, Minnesota. He was graduated, valedictorian, by Grand Rapids High School.

He received Greene and Alworth fellowships while attending the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. He was awarded a B.S. in chemistry and had the equivalent of a major in government.

Mr. Thiele attended the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he was student assistant to Leon Epstein, Fred von der Mehden, John Armstrong and James McCamy; part of his research for the latter was published in The New Diplomacy. He received an M.A. from Wisconsin, with a major in political science, a minor in anthropology, and language proficiency certification in Portuguese and French.

The increasing radical orthodoxy at the University of Wisconsin, especially in its African Studies Program, was a major factor in his decision to abandon plans to seek a Ph.D. from that institution.

He was hired to fill a one-year vacancy at Midwestern University, Wichita Falls, Texas, where he taught American and comparative government.

The following year he was hired by Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, where he taught comparative government until he went to the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, to finish work toward a Ph.D. in political science. When he left Bowling Green, he was granted preferential rehiring status by Western Kentucky University.

He attended summer session at the Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal, where he improved his knowledge of Portuguese and gathered data for research in and concerning Angola. When it appeared unlikely that he could gather the data he desired concerning political socialization in Angola, he proceeded to Rhodesia where he conducted the bulk of his field research. A grant from the McClure Foundation assisted his work in Africa.

In high school and at William and Mary he was a member of the debate team. He was in the Young Democrats at the University of Wisconsin and a member of the Young Americans for Freedom at Tennessee. He is a member of the American Political Science Association, and Pi Sigma Alpha, national honorary society in political science.

He has travelled extensively in Europe, Northern and Southern Africa, the Caribbean, Peru, New Zealand and Australia.

Mr. Thiele is unmarried.