To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Sherry Gates entitled "Some Self-Concept Characteristics of the Male Machiavellian Personality Style." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.

Harold J. Fine, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Robert G. Walker

John F. Byrne

Kenneth [illegible]

Jeanette A. Wilson

Accepted for the Council:

Hilton A. Smith
Vice Chancellor
Graduate Studies and Research

Thesis
75b
.G284
cop. 2

SOME SELF-CONCEPT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MALE MACHIAVELLIAN PERSONALITY STYLE

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee

Sherry Gates

June 1975

1227564

,2

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deep appreciation to the members of my committee for their encouragement, direction, and guidance throughout my long, rich and rewarding career as a graduate student. Dr. Harold Fine, my chairman, Dr. Jack Byrne, Dr. Bob Wahler, Dr. Ken Newton, and Ms. Harriette Wilson all contributed suggestions, questions, and support.

A special thanks goes to Dr. Pauline Eastham for critical and editorial assistance. Sharon Smith and Janet Tate provided very capable typing and clerical assistance, for which I would like to express sincere appreciation.

I dedicate this work to N.C. and N.V.G., who taught me to manipulate and stood by throughout the consequences.

ABSTRACT

One hundred male undergraduate volunteers were given the Mach V scale, the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, and the FIRO-B questionnaire. Forty-six scored above the mean (99.27, s.d. 11.17) on the Mach scale; none scored more than 2 s.d. above the mean (Princes). These 46 Ss (Profs or Professionals) were predicted to describe themselves as wanting affection demonstrated more than they express affection, as wanting to control others more than to be controlled, as wanting inclusion more than they include others. Self concept measures for identity, self-satisfaction, behavior, personality disorder, social self, family self, self-criticism, and overall self-esteem were expected to be higher than the norm, while moral-ethical self, personal self, and total conflict scores were predicted to be lower.

The sample included no Princes (Ss with Mach V scores $\overline{X}$ + 2 s.d. and higher). Predictions for Princes' scores could not be tested; comparisons with Profs' scores could not be made. Comparisons were then made with Low Mach (N=52, Mach V scores below 100), T.S.C.S. and FIRO-B scores.

Profs were found to be within the norm ($\overline{X} \pm$ s.d.) on all measures of self concept. They judged themselves as below average on many traits (self-esteem, identity, behavior, five self measures), above average on measures of psychological disturbance and self-criticism, but also above average in self-satisfaction. Low Machs described themselves similarly, with their NDS score falling outside normal limits.

Less controlling behavior was reported than predicted for the Profs, and less desire for inclusion was found. Low Machs seem to prefer being controlled while Profs desire to control. Low Machs want more inclusion and express less.

The results suggest that Profs are realistic in appraising their own personalities, relationships, and expectations. They rate themselves as inferior in many characteristics and behaviors but are satisfied with and accepting of themselves. The pejorative connotations of Machiavellian personality style are not supported by this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	5
	The Manipulative Person	8
	Conditions Which Favor the Occurrence of Manipulative Behavior	19
	Description of the Machiavellianism Scale	21
	Overview of the Machiavellian Research	23
	Issues Investigated in this Research and Hypotheses	37
III.	METHOD	44
	Subjects	44
	Procedures	44
IV.	RESULTS	46
	Mach V Scale	46
V.	DISCUSSION	51
VI.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	58
	Summary	58
	Conclusions	59
REFERENCES		61
APPENDIX		66
VITA		72

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
1.	Predicted Ranges or Scores on FIRO-B for "Profs" and "Princes"	42
2.	Predicted Findings of Prof and Prince on T.S.C.S.	42
3.	Average FIRO-B Scores for Profs (Mach 100-121) and Lows (100)	47
4.	The Prof - Mach V 100-121 Norms: Mean = 50, S.D. = 10 . .	48
5.	Low Machs and Standardization Group	50

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Manipulation, power, control, and social influence appear to be related aspects of acquired social behavior since many of the terms seem to be interchangeably used by different authors and because all, regardless of definition, seem present, in various degrees, in any social interaction. Opinions diverge, however, relative to value judgments of right--wrong, good--bad, moral, ethical aspects of influence in social interaction. For example,

> A generation is coming of age in America that doesn't take the utterances of public figures straight, that doesn't take social games straight. It suspects the whole range of modern experience. It sees giant con games everywhere. It sees "the system" itself as a con game [Brackman, 1967].

> Across the whole of their lives, college students have apparently accepted as an established fact that ours is a managed and manipulated society. In adjusting to this manipulated state of affairs they have developed a striking psychological sensitivity. Despite their attacks on "conformity," college boys and girls are not really individualists in the sense of wanting to stand alone. They can be described more accurately as "personalists" in that so many define right and wrong by "what it means to me," with the emphasis on the "me" [Lubell, 1966].

Modern education is mass manipulation; teachers are trained in methods of manipulating students. Social workers, physicians, psychologists, etc., all manipulate people for their own good. Professional training includes supervised experience in deliberate, conscious manipulation, such as interviewing, psychotherapy, group

process. Parents attempt to socialize their children by whatever means will succeed. The average person could be judged as successful as his or her ability to manipulate.

The conflict about good and bad can be typified in contrasting the professional, who is a salesman, a politician, or teacher, with the prince, who is self-serving, devious, or unethical in his manipulation. The present study uses a heuristic definition of manipulation as any behavior that is socially influencing. Although this is a broad definition, it is necessary to encompass the many behaviors that constitute social interaction. Other definitions will be considered in Chapter II.

Christie, Geis and others (Christie & Geis, 1970) have developed a scale based upon Machiavelli's work which measures attitudes toward interpersonal manipulation and power. This scale is one of the measures used in the present study.

Machiavelli has been characterized as an example of the most negative features of manipulation.

> A wise prince must devise ways by which his citizens are always and in all circumstances dependent on him and his authority; and then they will always be faithful to him [Machiavelli, 1972].

It is noteworthy that another injunction to manipulate is found in Luke 6:

> Go easy on others; then they will do the same for you. For if you give, you will get [Luke, 1971].

As Goffman (1959, 1969) and Fromm (1955) describe social interaction and our society, role playing is not just the province of the stage

performer and maladjusted neurotic but is perceived as an integral and necessary function of daily living whereby one seeks to meet his needs. St. Clair (1966), Goffman (1959, 1969), Shostrom (1972), Fromm (1955), and Bursten (1973) are a good representation of the writers who note the needs of the manipulator can either be mature, appropriate, and reasonable or neurotic, inappropriate, and unreasonable. A mature need can be to please the manipulator himself or it can be sublimated to give satisfaction to the object of manipulation.

The present research is based on the premise that manipulation is a phenomenon present in all of us, varying in motivation, manner, and degree of use at different times and in different situations. It is of especial interest to see how the interpersonal manipulator perceives himself and his interpersonal needs. (Sine the present study focuses primarily on manipulation, elucidation of the different approaches to usage of the related terms, power, control, and social influence, is not within the scope of the present study. Further information regarding the aforementioned terms may be found in the following: French and Raven, 1959; French, 1956; Collins & Raven, 1969; Raven, 1965; Raven & Kruglanski, 1970; Minton, 1967; Heider, 1958; Rotter, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1966; Campbell, 1963; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Druder, 1970; Tedeschi, 1972; Kelley & Thibaut, 1969.)

The present study constitutes a look at undergraduate males' attitudes toward manipulation, abstractly and personally. Differences between the professionals ("Profs") and the princes relative to attitudes and opinions were sought as well as information about self-perceptions

and self-acceptance. The pejorative usage of the term Machiavellian is challenged by the definition of manipulation used in this study.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Manipulation has already been defined for purposes of the present study as behavior that has social influence. While the word has seen much usage in professional circles in referring to a basic dynamic in a wide variety of clinical conditions and everyone seems to know what is meant by it, St. Clair (1967) points out that the word is omitted from the psychiatric dictionary.

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1954) defines "manipulate" as follows: (1) To treat or operate with the hands, or by mechanical means, especially with skill. (2) To treat or manage with the intellect. (3) To control the action of, by management; also, to manage artfully or fraudently. Manipulation is defined thusly: (1) act of manipulating or state of being manipulated. (2) skillful or dexterous management, sometimes for purposes of fraud. Both words are derived from the Latin word manipulus, meaning "handful."

Within the realm of psychiatric usage, St. Clair describes manipulation as being "a psycho-social maneuver which uses aggressiveness, cleverness, and deception to influence others so they will give gratification to the aggressor" (St. Clair, 1967). He feels it should also include the concept that the respondent is assumed to be reluctant, and unwilling to contribute such satisfactions; thus, he must be maneuvered by the aggressor into the activity which will give the

desired effect. Though much of the manipulator's motivation may be unconscious, St. Clair sees the manipulative behavior as generally conscious and planned. The aggressor seeks to force his environment into compliance with his desires to change a frustrating object into a satisfying one. As St. Clair himself notes, his definition of manipulation may be too broad since no behavior is likely to be devoid of at least an unconscious intent to influence the environment for personal satisfaction.

Argyle (1967) conceptualizes social interaction as a kind of motor skill in which practised habits become automatic. He describes social skills as having six characteristics in common with motor skills:

1. aims of skilled performances; as in motor skills, the "social skill" operator may have quite definite goals.
2. selective perception of cues; since one of the goals of interaction is to present one's self in a certain light to others, one learns what cues to attend to and becomes highly sensitive to them.
3. central "translation" processes; central processes in the brain prescribe what to do about any particular perceptual information. In the case of the "social skill" operator central processes store information about which social techniques elicit which responses from others.
4. motor responses; the essence of central processes is to plan while the essence of the response system is to initiate and control the desired responses.

5. feedback and corrective action.

6. timing of responses.

In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, Argyle views social skills as entailing five other unique features not relevant to manual skills:

1. The need to establish rapport with the other person.

2. The need to keep the person in play.

3. The need to motivate the other person.

4. The need to reduce anxiety and defensiveness in the other.

5. A concern about the impression one is making on the other.

In addressing himself to the topic of social influences Argyle has analyzed social behavior as a skilled performance which is intended to elicit certain desired responses from others. How effective a performer is (i.e., in getting results relevant to the task) certainly varies greatly between individuals, but special training (as in the professions) and experience should lead to the acquisition and repertoire of special social techniques. While anyone engaged in social encounters necessarily utilizes social skills to varying degrees, Argyle clearly indicates that those in charge of others can bring about the greatest satisfaction and productive effort by establishing a particular kind of relationship. A leader can thus exercise influence and control, as he feels is right, in a persuasive way and create the responses he desires on the part of others. In general, social influence (and often control, power, or manipulation) is defined as the change in one person which has its origin in another person or group.

As Goffman (1959, 1969), Shostrom (1972), and Fromm (1955) indicate in their writings, Argyle (1967) notes that to get responses, people make more or less deliberate use of social techniques. In addition to the ingenious and devious ways of outwitting people, all the things we do either verbally or nonverbally, or deliberately or unconsciously, may be seen as ways of influencing others. On the one hand one can focus upon different kinds of social activities such as bodily contact, physical proximity and position, gestures, facial expressions, non-linguistic aspects of speech, etc., to study ways individuals manipulate to get others to respond. On the other hand, one can focus upon the different strategies of behavior as indicated by the aforementioned authors (as a small representation of the many involved in such research). The complexities involved in such research are indicated by the fact that each individual has a singular and characteristic set of social techniques which he uses, either deliberately or with little conscious awareness, in trying to get the most out of an interpersonal situation in satisfying his interpersonal needs.

The Manipulative Person

In his conceptualization of the manipulative personality Bursten (1972, 1973) differentiates between the interactions whereby people induce others to care for them and manipulation. His definition seems to be one of the narrowest proposed by the authors reviewed for this study. The degree to which certain mental processes are accessible to consciousness is used as the basis of the differentiation since

Bursten feels the manipulative personality is relatively aware of his activities and enjoys them. While he notes that manipulation occurs in a variety of contexts which can be considered as either socially undesirable or socially acceptable, his description of this intrapsychic phenomenon seems more directed toward the immature, inappropriate, and unreasonable end of the continuum for such behavior.

Like St. Clair, Bursten comments on the various definitions of the word manipulation in psychiatric circles and proposes that the Webster definition be used when referring to this word in the technical sense. In Webster's updated, third new international dictionary (1969) it is defined as follows: "to control or play upon by artful, unfair, or insidious means, especially to one's advantage." Interestingly, a synonym for the verb "manipulate" is the verb "doctor" (which again indirectly suggests a reason for the present research).

Bursten views the manipulator as a fragilely narcissistic individual who must be bolstered by a contempt for others and a need to put something over on them. He sees four essential components involved in "manipulation," as used in a technical sense.

First, "there must be an initial conflict of goals. The manipulator must want something from the other person which that person does not want to give or comply with" (Bursten, 1973, p. 8). In focusing upon this point it should be realized that this conflict of goals must be assessed in terms of the manipulator's (or individual A's) construction of reality. It may have deep, personal, and idiosyncratic meaning to the individual in terms of his needs.

The second element is A's "intention to influence the other person. A manipulator must consciously intend to manipulate. Influence which is accidental or unintended is not a manipulation" (Bursten, 1973, p.8). While any action has an impact upon B if it is perceived, intentionality is described by Bursten as an intrapsychic phenomenon (1973, p. 53). That behavior which is intentional is also experienced as voluntary by A. It is not only conscious, but also anticipatory, and carries with it a sense of activity. Thus planning and deliberation are seen as involved. It does not depend on the carrying out of the activity as much as a sense of A's doing something to achieve a goal.

The third element is deception and insincerity. This is where fraud and the "artful, unfair, insidious means" (Webster, 1969) are involved. Deceiving is defined by Bursten as "the intentional setting up of circumstances in order that the other person will not possess sufficient knowledge of the reality of the situation to allow him successfully to pursue his goal" (p. 75). "In order to deceive, the individual must be in a psychological position not only to assess the conflict of goals, but also to intuit the other person's goal with a high degree of accuracy" (Bursten, 1973, p. 77). This statement leads to the concept of empathy, which requires consideration here since Christie and Geis (1970) use the same term in their work on interpersonal manipulation, but seemingly in a contrasting fashion.

Within a psychoanalytic framework (which is Bursten's orientation) Fliess (1942, p. 212f) described empathy as an "ability to put (one's self) in another's place, to step into his shoes, and to obtain, in this

way, an inside knowledge that is almost first-hand." He also goes on to describe it as "trial identification." Bursten utilizes Fromm-Reichmann's (1950, p. 87f) mention of "intellectual alertness and marked sensitivity" as two aspects of empathic understanding which are felt to denote the ability to intuit the other person's goals. In addition to intuiting B's goals, Bursten feels that the expert deceiver "must also be able to intuit the other's character, his interests, his prohibitions, his propensity for guilt, his anxieties, his loyalties, etc. . . . as the deceiver uses empathy to fashion the nature of the deception--that is the technique of influencing the other person" (1973, p. 78). He, like Fliess and Schafer, also conceptualizes empathy as a transient or trial identification which is useful to the manipulator only as long as he can "sample it, try various plans out on it, and then relinquish it" (1973, p. 8).[1] It is viewed as a very important concept in a discussion of deception and manipulation since Bursten (and others) feel that most successful manipulators can become aware of the contents of empathy and thereafter plan their actions deliberately and with a maximum of knowledge.

Relative to this discussion on empathy, it is important to note that whether a person is the manipulator of manipulated is described by Bursten as in great part determined by his ability to relinquish the empathic identification. In any interpersonal situation where there is

---

[1]Roy Schafer's article (1959) on "Generative Empathy in the Treatment Situation" is recommended for further exposition of the concept of empathy from the psychoanalytic viewpoint.

a conflict of goals A may empathize with B's feelings to such a degree that he ceases to preserve his relations to the object (B) and adopts B's as his own. In such a case A is the one influenced by B. If, however, A has a strong sense of self and the ability to acknowledge his activity in the relationship he will more likely work on the empathic identification and retain it, in part, as a foreign body or introject. He will then use his understanding in influencing B.

The fourth and final essential element involved in Bursten's conceptualization of manipulation is that A must feel that he has put something over on B. In this element the attitude of the manipulator is considered and may possibly be the distinguishing feature which separates the mature, appropriate, and reasonable from the immature, inappropriate, and unreasonable "social skill" operators. In this element the focus is placed more nearly on a power struggle in which the manipulator has little or no real interest in B except as he can be used in satisfying A's needs. B is used as an object, a means to an end. An attitude of contempt may be discerned in A along with pleasure from the success in the interaction; a sense of power and exhilaration are associated with the contempt.

For a behavior to be called manipulative Bursten states that one must see, or reasonably infer, all of the four essential components in A's behavior. While one may observe manipulative behavior in individuals in certain situations where they may be trying to attain satisfaction and pleasure, or in situations where they are working to avoid perceived danger or discomfort, the label of manipulative personality is reserved

for the chronic, repetitive individuals who seem to manipulate for the sake of manipulating; it is a life style or predominant trait of their characters which, to this author, seems descriptive of a psychopathic disorder.

In general, then, Bursten's manipulative personality perceives a conflict in goals, intends consciously to influence the other by some kind of deception, and feels exhilaration at having put something over on the other if his deception is successful. While others may be impelled to use manipulative behavior occasionally on the basis of situations in which they find themselves, the manipulative personality's character structure leads him to seek out situations where he can manipulate; and he will even provoke a conflict in goals to set the stage for his manipulation. The primary goal of such a person seems to be the manipulation itself, whereby he can bolster his fragile narcissism. An intention to manipulate by deception is foremost in his mind as a life-style. He is relatively aware of and pleased by his activities. This narrow definition ignores the expert, strong-minded, goal-oriented manipulator, for example the administrator, who is not contemptuous of others, but who uses manipulation to achieve "desirable" ends.

Greenacre uses the term manipulator in his "Conscience of the Psychopath" (1945). Differing with Bursten's definition, Greenacre describes the manipulator as impulsive, as lacking planning ability and deliberativeness of untoward behavior, and as having a distorted sense of reality. Shapiro's impulsive style is quite similar to Greenacre's

manipulator, although he additionally describes an ability to be self-critical without moral judgment and an ability to be empathic and psychologically sensitive to other people as exploitation and manipulation may require (Shapiro, 1965).

Before turning to Christie and Geis' research on interpersonal manipulation it seems advisable to make some cursory introductory remarks about the 16th Century Italian philosopher, Niccola Machiavelli. In general, his unsavory reputation leads many people to make quick value judgments about those who may agree with his statements.

In the introduction to his translation of The Prince, George Bull states that the general impression left by Machiavelli's life and works "is of a man withdrawn from the crowd, standing aside with a slight, contemptuous smile on his face," (Machiavelli, 1972, p. 8). Bull also refers to the historian Villari's own picture of the young Machiavelli as follows:

> All about him bore the impress of a very acute observer and thinker, but not that of one able to wield much influence over others. He could not easily rid himself of the sarcastic expression playing around his mouth and flashing from his eyes, which gave him the air of a cold and impassible calculator . . . [Machiavelli, 1972, p.8).

Jensen (1960), in presenting a comparison of different scholars' viewpoints over the past four hundred years as to Machiavelli's orientation, clearly demonstrates historians' disagreement as to whether Machiavelli was a cynic who wrote political satire, a patriot, or the first modern political scientist, a true realist. After reading eighteen different opinions given in Jensen's book one can see that the

moral, value-laden question of whether Machiavelli was a Machiavellian remains unanswered.

In contrast to the pejorative connotations typically associated with the mention of Machiavelli's writings, smiles of amusement and appreciation follow Stephen Potter's outrageous descriptions of how to be one-up rather than one-down in situations involving social interaction. Whether speaking of gamesmanship or lifemanship his artful proposals seem to win one over to a more positive and accepting view of manipulation than does Machiavelli's seemingly deadly earnest approach. Is it because Potter describes such devious, blatant, and outrageous methods of manipulation that one can only see them within the context of a social game rather than as a serious approach to meeting one's needs at the expense of others? Or is it because Machiavelli taps one's moralistic values while Potter taps one's sense of humor?

> Glaciation: If someone tells a funny story, do not, whatever happens, tell your own funny story in reply, but listen intently and not only refrain from laughing or smiling, but make no response, change of expression, or movement whatever. The teller of the funny story, whatever the nature of his joke, will then suddenly feel that what he has said is in bad taste. Press home your advantage. If he is a stranger, and has told a story about a man with one leg, it is no bad thing to pretend that one of your own legs is false, or at any rate that you have a severe limp. This will certainly silence Opponent for the rest of the evening [Potter, 1970].

Chessick (1969) seems to agree with those readers of Machiavelli's works who perceive him as having broken from medieval tradition to become the first true political scientist. He continues by quoting Benoit-Smullyan, stating that the change is "from a religious, ethical

approach grounded on faith and authority, to a naturalistic matter of fact approach grounded on empirical evidence and a somewhat cynical conception of human nature." In outlining Machiavelli's pessimistic theory of human nature Chessick includes the following features:

1. One of the fundamental desires of man is to acquire and hold material property.
2. Men are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain.
3. Men are wicked and fools since they are deceived by false glory and false good.
4. Men resemble each other.
5. Men's hatreds usually spring from fear or envy.
6. Because human desires are insatiable, there is constant discontent.
7. Men are ungrateful, fickle, cowardly, avaricious, and deceitful.
8. Men are ruled by fortune; they don't change because they cannot resist the natural bent of their characters.

Chessick feels that Machiavelli's description of man is unfortunately the true condition of most nations today--immersed in defensive operations due to internal or external stress with little capacity for autonomous civilized functioning.

In their research on interpersonal manipulating, Christie, Geis and collaborators used Machiavelli as the focal source in studying those who advocate using guile, duplicity, and other opportunistic strategies

to exploit the weaknesses, failings, and foibles of others to achieve their own purposes. In conceptualizing a hypothetical role model of a manipulator, or operator, they felt that four salient characteristics of such people were relevant.

1. A relative lack of affect in interpersonal relationships; i.e., people are viewed more as manipulable objects rather than as individuals with whom one has empathy. In contrast to Bursten's definition of empathy Christie and Geis' framework connotes more personal/emotional involvement which might lead to greater difficulty in using and relinquishing "trial identification."

2. A lack of concern with conventional morality; i.e., interaction with others is viewed from a utilitarian rather than a moral stance.

3. A lack of gross psychopathology. This characteristic is based on the assumption that one who takes an instrumentalist or rational view of others must maintain contact with more objective aspects of reality within normal limits.

4. Low ideological commitment; this is because a manipulator should be more involved in tactics for achieving possible ends rather than in an inflexible striving for long-range idealistic goals.

They reported that preliminary findings supported their hypotheses. Once the Mach scales were developed and some independent research done, Christie and Geis reported additional salient characteristics of the high Machiavellian which they called "the cool syndrome" (Christie, 1970, p. 86). This "trademark" denotes a person who is extremely resistent to social influence, who is cognitively oriented so that he appraises a

situation logically and cognitively, and who tends to initiate and control the structure of a situation whenever possible. In contrast, the low Machiavellian or "soft touch" is one who is susceptible to social influence, who becomes emotionally involved and empathizes with others, and who accepts the existing definitions of a situation. In general, the latter is described as getting caught in the ongoing human interaction.

Other characteristics of the high Machiavellian or manipulative person either suggested by Machiavelli's writings and/or the research are noted by Hymoff (1970) and include the following:

1. Pursuit of self-denied goals.
2. Cynical and pragmatic attitude.
3. Disregard for the affective states of others and one's self.
4. Suspiciousness of the motivations of others.
5. Ability to assess a situation quickly and accurately as to its potential for self-gain.
6. Not easily distracted from task at hand.
7. Ability to put aside one's own true beliefs and convincingly present self as having total opposite views.
8. No concern with saving face and avoiding embarrassing situations.

In general, then, high Machs are described as cool, pragmatic, rational and opportunistic individuals who function consistently, alertly, and on a more cognitive level without being distracted or becoming involved in their own or others' feelings.

Conditions Which Favor the Occurrence of Manipulative Behavior

Once the Mach scales were developed and utilized in a number of studies Christie and Geis retrospectively looked at the different works and identified three situational variables which seemed to contribute strongly to the appearance of manipulative behavior in people who score high on the Mach scale. If the three conditions were absent, there seemed no significant difference in the degree of success achieved by high or low Machs; however, when the three conditions were present high Mach Ss repeatedly seemed to do significantly better on the required tasks.

The most essential condition ascertained by Christie and Geis is the opportunity for face-to-face contact with another person. In actual interpersonal situations the high Mach S seems to have a greater skill in assessing social cues. The authors (Geis & Christie, 1968) feel that the high Mach S's greater sensitivity is more a function of cautiousness and suspiciousness concerning others rather than a difference in sensitive awareness of others. Hymoff (1970) speculates that high Ss may be more successful in their ability to size up a situation accurately and turn it to their advantage because of their greater commitment to goal-completion, which when achieved provides a sense of security and control. When a situation is devoid of actual interpersonal contact the significant difference in success between high and low Mach Ss is lost. For example, in a study by Daniellian (1964) Ss were asked to describe

people seen in a filmed interview. There were no differences between high and low Machs in their power of observation.

A second important situational variable concerns the degree of structure provided in the interpersonal situation. When the social structure is ambiguous and loosely defined the high Mach S quickly can assess the situation cognitively, initiate control, improvise, and set the stage to achieve his self-defined goals. However, if the latitude for improvisation is absent then the S has little opportunity to control the situation. In this latter condition the degree of manipulativeness in high and low Mach Ss is very similar (Geis & Christie, 1968).

The third condition relates to the affective complexity of a situation. When the situation permits the arousal of emotions the high Mach Ss are favored because of their ability to disregard their own feelings as well as others. While the low Mach tends to be distracted by affect irrelevant to the task, the manipulator never lets up in his performance, regardless of how he may truly feel at the time. There may be two types of high Mach individual suggested here; the individual who never experiences the affect and the person who is aware of the feelings but who can disregard them.

In order to evaluate the importance of these three variables Geis and Christie asked the original researchers to rate their own studies in terms of the presence or absence of the three conditions. In 12 of 13 studies where all three conditions were present the high Mach Ss were more successful and behaved as predicted. In 10 studies where none of the conditions were present there were no significant differences

between high and low Machs. When two conditions were present high Machs did better in 7 of 9 studies. When only one of the three conditions was present, high Machs performed as expected in only 4 of the 12 studies.

Christie and Geis (1970, p. 358) refer to the importance of these three situational parameters in making some final reflections on the research using the Mach scale.

> It is in interpersonal situations which are relatively unstructured, in which face-to-face interaction occurs in an affectively complex situation in which there is latitude for improvisation, that high Machs tend to win . . . they tend to read the situation and remain detached from affective distractions . . .; although low Machs are equally capable of sizing up the situation, they get caught up in the interaction process with the other person(s), and this interferes with "rational" behavior. Somestimes it is not so much that high Machs win as that low Machs lose.

Description of the Machiavellianism Scale

Perceiving Machiavelli as a power theorist who tended to specify his underlying assumptions about the nature of man, Christie and associates at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences during 1954-1955 chose to utilize his writings in studying whether people who agreed with his ideas behaved differently from those who disagreed with him. A pool of 71 items believed to be theoretically congruent with statements based on The Prince and The Discourses constituted the Mach I. The first actual scale (Mach II) followed a Likert format in which subjects were asked to indicate their opinions about the 71 items ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement.

Fifty of the items were found to be discriminating between high and low scorers at the .05 level for three diverse student populations (Christie, 1968).

It was found that the scale could be divided artificially into three categories of items: (1) statements dealing with the nature of one's interpersonal tactics; (2) a philosophy of human nature; and (3) issues of morality. The three categories were retained in subsequent changes in the scale.

To reduce the time required to take the test so as to make it more applicable to a large group of Ss the Mach IV was developed as a twenty-item, Likert format questionnaire. Shortly after its development some difficulties were noted, particularly regarding the issue of social desirability of the items. As a result a forced choice technique replaced the Likert format in the Mach V. In this current version of the scale the S must choose which of three statements is most characteristic of himself, and which is least characteristic of himself. For each item one statement is keyed for Machiavellianism, one matched in social desirability, and one is a buffer item. The buffer item is high in social desirability when the keyed and matched items are low and is low when the other two statements are high.

The form of the Mach scale to be used in this study is the Mach V. It takes approximately twenty minutes to complete the scale. An intricate scoring system has been developed so that S receives a score on each of the twenty items based on how he responds to the matched and buffer items as well as to the Machiavellian items. The resultant

score is found by adding the twenty individual scores and a constant of twenty. Thus, the scores can range from 40 to 160. The normative data provided by Christie indicates that for 764 Caucasian males, the mean score was 99.27 with a standard deviation of 11.17.

Overview of the Machiavellian Research

Since the fairly recent development of the Mach scales, primary concern in research has focused upon the issue of construct validity. Because most studies have tried to assess how well the scales predict behavior in controlled situations no systematic correlation between the Mach scales and other pencil-and-paper measures of individual differences has yet been cited in the literature. Christie (Christie, 1970; Christie & Geis, 1970) has, however, reported a rough idea as to what kind of individuals high and low Machs are as indicated by some available, relevant studies.

While one might think that the more rational, cognitively oriented high Mach would do better on measures of intelligence or ability than the low Mach, seven studies, using various measures of intellectual ability, found no significant relationship between Machiavellianism and intellectual ability. When aptitude was held constant, Singer (1964) did find that male freshmen at Penn State University with a high score on the Mach scale received higher grade point averages which suggested a relationship between higher grades and the utilization of manipulative strategies. Interestingly, when Christie and Geis (1968) tried to replicate the study in a small private high school no significant

relationship was found. They discussed their findings in terms of the differences between a large, rather unstructured atmosphere where greater freedom for improvisation is present as opposed to a small, highly structured atmosphere affording little opportunity for the manipulative student to utilize his skills of initiation and control in the structure.

As yet, no correlations have been found between the Mach scales and measures of psychopathology. Though high Machs are described as detached from others, the MMPI psychopath scale and Lykken's sociopath scale do not describe them as pathologically so detached. Evidence does however suggest that high Machs have a generally unflattering opinion of others and an overall cynical view of people in general. In one study (Harris, 1966) the high Machs' negative view of people was indicated in his ratings of two specific partners. In 19 out of 20 possible comparisons the high Mach Ss had a less positive overall orientation toward the partners with whom they had recently interacted than the low Mach Ss.

Other research did evidence positive relationships with measures of hostility and negative ones with social desirability but, as Christie notes, it remains uncertain whether high Machs are actually more hostile or whether they are perhaps less inhibited in recognizing and expressing it; i.e., more aware of self-percepts and more candid.

Additional preliminary research indicates that Machiavellianism is not related to authoritarianism or to one's "occupational status, education, marital status, birth order, father's socioeconomic position, or most other demographic characteristics" (Christie, 1970). However, high Machs were likely to be found in situations where they primarily

control and manipulate people, such as in certain of the professions. As an example of one of many studies related to this area Klein (1969) found that psychiatric residents were significantly less alienated and authoritarian and scored significantly higher on Mach V than residents in internal medicine. Survey studies have also indicated that high Machs typically come from urban backgrounds.

To date, males have generally scored higher on the Machiavellianism scale than females and in a generally more consistent and reliable manner across studies. Christie suggested that the scale may be more biased toward males since Machiavelli was directing his philosophy toward males. Singer (1964) suggested that females may use different manipulative strategies and hold different attitudes about manipulation than those detected by the Mach scale. As in other areas previously mentioned, further research is needed to clarify the above issue.

Guterman (1970), and Gergen and Marlowe (1970) indicate that the research thus far conducted has substantiated the validity of the Mach scale as a measure of the tendency and ability to manipulate others. A sample of these controlled laboratory studies will be mentioned at this time.

In an early study, Exline, Thibaut, Brannon, and Gumpert (1961) inducted Ss to cheat through the use of a confederate. It was found that high Mach Ss resisted the confederate's attempt to implicate them in cheating more than low Mach Ss but the difference was not significant. However, once involved the high Mach Ss looked E in the eye significantly longer while denying cheating. Two variables of interest were involved

in this research: (1) the high Mach Ss were more manipulative, but as part of a defensive maneuver, and (2) high Mach Ss were apparently more resistive to the influence of others.

The high Machs may have been more resistant to cheating in the Exline study for a number of reasons. Their greater resistance to social influence, a lack of sufficient positive incentive, and their general suspiciousness may have all been involved. Geis and Christie consider the suspiciousness of the high Mach Ss to be an aspect of their protective defenses which act to minimize their susceptibility to social influence, thus protecting them from losing control and feeling vulnerable. In a study by Bogart (1968) high Mach Ss seemed more suspicious in face-to-face situations, while more willing to cheat when the request was presented in written form. Hymoff (1970) also found high Machs to be more suspicious than low Machs in accepting the given purposes of the research study in which they were engaged.

Solar and Bruehl's (1971) study on Machiavellianism and Locus of Control seems related to Geis and Christie's comments of the suspiciousness of high Mach Ss as a protective defense measure. Reser (1972) speculated that high Machiavellianism may be but a social application of the Internal's predisposition to control the contingencies of reinforcement in his environment since "Internal" individuals and high Machs both tend to be very alert and attentive to environmental cues for action and are resistive to subtle influence attempts. However, the findings of Solar and Bruehl (1971) and McClay (1971) indicated that the external-control Ss were significantly higher scorers on the

Mach IV scale. The following hypothesis on the relationship between self-control and manipulation of others were supported: "competence in controlling the environment and manipulation of others may result not from a feeling of power but from a feeling of powerlessness and dependency" (Solar & Bruehl, 1971, p. 1080). While it appears that both internals and high Machs are concerned with producting intended effects the extremes of internality and Machiavellianism seem more likely to be mutually exclusive by the study's results. Machiavellianism does not seem another name for externality but Machiavellians may, as a necessary defense, feel compelled to manipulate others for reinforcements required for survival.

The protective defense stance of high Mach Ss may also be relevant to other results obtained by McClay (1971) and Day (1972). In both studies Machiavellianism was significantly and negatively correlated with Social Conscience and Social Desirability. In Day's study Mach IV scores were also negatively and significantly correlated with Self-Evaluation but not significantly with Self-Potency.

In one study, Geis, Christie and Nelson (1968) addressed themselves to the issue of offensive versus defensive manipulation. Their hypothesis was that if high Machs are unrestrained by self-alleged ethical qualms of low Machs they should engage in more manipulation than lows when given an equal opportunity. In addition, if high Machs do engage in more manipulative behavior outside the laboratory situation their greater experience and skill should be evidenced in a greater variety of manipulative strategies, more original and inventive

strategies, and greater enjoyment of the experiment because they are exercising their skills. All the above hypotheses were confirmed in their findings.

Other studies focused upon the high Mach Ss' greater resistence to being influenced by others. Geis, Krupert and Berger (1965) had four Ss form leaderless groups and discuss a sensitive issue. Low Machs were found to change their opinions about the issues more than high Machs. In the Harris study earlier cited (1966) the same results were obtained; high Mach Ss remained relatively uninfluenced and low Mach Ss changed their views significantly more.

In a follow-up study Harris (1966) presented two kinds of persuasive communications to high and low Mach Ss--factual information and survey data. All Ss changed their views in favor of the factual information but only low Mach Ss changed beliefs in response to the poll data. It seems that both high and low Mach Ss respond similarly to factual arguments but low Mach Ss seem more influenced by general social pressure.

In further consideration of the variable of persuasive influence, other studies have focused upon dissonance situations. Epstein (1966) required Ss to give a spontaneous speech in favor of an issue with which they had previously disagreed. Low Mach Ss changed their opinions significantly more than high Mach Ss. It is uncertain whether low Machs talked themselves into the new opinions they had to justify or whether they were trying to please E.

Bogart (1968), in another dissonance study, exposed Ss to a task in which a partner tried to induce them to cheat. The partners were

introduced as having either a high or low prestige reputation. While the low Mach Ss were found willing to cheat with either a low or high prestige partner, high Machs were involved in cheating only with a high prestige partner. Bogart felt that high Mach Ss will cheat at least as much as low Machs when the reason is consistent with personal gain. Other studies support the view that high Machs will cheat or deceive to a greater extent when it is seen as a necessary method to achieve one's goal.

Other studies have focused upon the high Mach Ss' ability to deceive others. For example, Novielli (1968) formed groups of four in which two Ss debated and two Ss served as judges. Each pair of Ss debated twice, once in defense of an issue in which he truly believed and once in defense of an issue to which he was opposed. Following the debates the judges rated the arguments and determined the winners. Low Machs lost debates most often when they defended a true belief; they did not lose as significantly when they defended issues to which they were opposed. Geis and Christie (1970) suggest that low Machs are more effective when they are not very personally involved with the issue.

Related to the high Mach's apparently greater skill and enjoyment of manipulative strategies and task orientation for success on presented tasks, a game situation was utilized by Geis and Christie (1968) in one of their studies of Machiavellian behavior. High Mach Ss were found to be less reliable in maintaining pledges to a partner. Seven out of eleven Ss who broke a promise to their partners were high Mach Ss. The authors speculated that high Machs were more capable of appearing

involved with their partner but chose doing well on a task over loyalty when a decision had to be made. Situational ambiguities, as well as the high Machs' willingness and manipulative ability, led to success.

It does not appear that high Machs necessarily cheat more than low Machs but that they are more successful in their lies and deceptions once they feel such methods are justified to attain their desired goals. In a study with children, for example, Braginsky (1970) found that high Mach children did not tell more lies but were more successful and convincing in their lies. Kauffman and Steiner (1968) suggest that ingratiation is one of the most used techniques employed by high Mach Ss.

For low Machs desired goals may be perceived in terms of interpersonal needs; a desire to please another (E, for example, or involved partners). The high Machs, on the other hand, may be more task oriented and directed to meet intrapersonal needs; i.e., a success for self. In a study by McLaughlin (1970) on incidental learning and Machiavellianism he found that high Mach Ss were more manipulative but inferior to low Mach Ss regarding incidental learning. While the study does not clearly describe the cognitive style of high Machs (high field-dependent subjects show superior incidental learning), it may be speculated that high Machs are more field-independent than low Machs. His study does indicate that high Mach Ss are more intensely focused on the central task at hand and ignore nonrelevant cues.

In addressing themselves to the issues of dissonance, justification, and attitude change in Machiavellians, Burgoon, Miller, and Tubbs (1972) administered the Mach IV scale to 125 undergraduate college students and

assigned high and low scorers to either a high-or-low justification condition regarding involvement in counter-attitudinal advocacy. Under conditions of low justification low Machs reported significantly greater self-persuasion than high Machs, but this was reversed under conditions of high justification. Like Bogart (1971), Burgoon et al. (1972) indicate that attitude change for high Machs may be more accurately predicted by incentive theory rather than by dissonance effects. When placed in a strongly dissonance-providing situation high Mach Ss did not alter their attitudes toward the advocated belief-discrepant position unless conditions calculated to produce positive incentive were present. In low Mach Ss the dissonance circumstances appear to exert strong pressures for attitude change.

Turning to another area of research, Reser (1972) used 140 male undergraduates in his study on the perception and awareness of manipulative intent. Three empirical questions were addressed: (1) are people generally aware of manipulative tactics on the part of others? (2) how do these manipulative attempts influence the person perception process; and (3) are there resistive consequences? The significant and general findings indicated that individuals who engage in actual manipulation attempts are viewed no less positively than those not so engaged; that the behaviors associated with manipulative attempts actually enhance the Ss' perception of a chronic manipulator but detract from the perception of a not-very-manipulative individual; and that all manipulators are generally quite successful, at least in limited interaction situations.

A last study to be cited at this time is that of Guterman (1970). Viewing the high Mach as an individual who treats others as pawns or things and who feels less bound than others to the moral beliefs of his group, Guterman was interested in conducting an empirical study concerned with moral character and some social variables affecting an individual's decision to act in a Machiavellian fashion.

In seeking to illuminate the sources of Machiavellianism Guterman first focused upon Freud's theory of the superego as embodying the origin and severity of one's moral code. In the same way as other empirical studies had corroborated the theory that children acquire their standards and values by taking over those of their parents (he refers to Hartshorne & May, 1930; Glueck & Glueck, 1950) Guterman found a fairly sizable correlation between the perceived Machiavellianism of the parents and the respondents' score on the Mach scale. Also in accord with Freud's theory, the following results pertaining to severity of superego were obtained:

1. the higher the perceived rapport with parents, the less likely is the respondent to be Machiavellian.

2. the more a respondent perceives his parents as having been punitive, the more likely he is to be Machiavellian. If Freud meant punitiveness in referring to severity of training, internalization of ethical standards is not supported by this finding.

3. the higher the perceived strictness of parents the smaller the percentage of Machiavellians.

4. the higher a person is on aggression, the more likely he is to be Machiavellian.

In general then, the perceived characteristics of a respondents' parents were such as to favor the development of Machiavellian attitudes.

In looking at possible sources of moral ideas Guterman also turns to the works of Charles H. Cooley, who views moral values arising from a process of continual development (emphasizing the ever present influence of social factors) rather than from a single source. In Cooley's "looking-glass self" one's sense of ethics is constantly changing but primarily varies with one's ability to sympathize with others and with the magnitude of one's need for social approval. Guterman's findings suggest that the more important the looking-glass process is in an individual's personality, the less likely he is to be Machiavellian.

A third theoretical framework which Guterman looks into is Toennies' theory of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft which stresses one's moral outlook in relation to the solidarity of the group or society. In Gesellschaft, solidarity is lacking and everyone essentially feels by himself, isolated and stresses privacy; interpersonal ties are permeated by self-seeking motives with cooperation existing only to the degree that one can further his interests by it. Gemeinschaft refers to a higher development of solidarity characterized by an attitude of love, mutual understanding and strong communal life. From the framework of the solidarity concept Guterman's findings with the Mach scale present many paradoxes: the urbanism of one's residential locality during adolescence correlated positively with Mach scores, intimacy of friendship correlated negatively with Mach scores, close ties to kin correlated positively with

Mach scores, and frequency of social interaction with friends correlated in a slightly positive manner. In general solidarity seemed to show a negligible relationship to Mach. In Guterman's analysis of a work milieu solidarity feelings were positively correlated with abasement and negatively with aggression and Machiavellianism.

In general the findings of Guterman's work suggest that the crucial period for the formation of Machiavellian outlook comes before adulthood. In addition, within a work situation high Machs were found to be more effective than non-Machs in a short term situation where participants had not previously known each other. He notes, however, the need to specify the criteria for judging effectiveness in individuals as well as the most beneficial types of effectiveness for a group and the personal qualities necessary for different situations and roles.

Other general findings in the research indicate that high Machs leave many options open, thus avoiding truly dissonant situations, and are able to assume leadership roles because of their ability to impose their own structure and control over situations. Because a high Mach seems to respond to a questionnaire about his values on a purely cognitive level, he may tend to be more honest and accurate in his responses. The studies cited by Christie and Geis (1970) suggest that the high Mach is able to mobilize the latent talent of group members when in a position of leadership.

In attempting to summarize the theoretical issues and research findings, a consideration of the apparent fact that high Mach Ss perform better on the majority of given experimental tasks is indicated. Why is

it that (where given positive incentive and the conditions of face-to-face contact, situational ambiguity, and affect complexity) the high Mach S should be the one chosen most likely to succeed? Christie and Geis turn to Zajonc's (1965) arousal theory, which stresses the disruptive effect of affect on the cognitive processes, in answering this question. They feel that the "soft-touch", person-oriented low Mach S becomes more easily distracted from tasks because of the arousal of affect by other people involved in the research (whether it be E or another S). On the other hand, the high Mach Ss appear more able to ignore irrelevant, distracting aspects of the research and remain cognitively tuned in and task-oriented to what is asked of them. While sensitive to the subtle cues that insure success, they appear able to remain detached and undistracted by either neutral or emotionally laden distractive stimuli which is irrelevant to goal completion.

It appears that the high Machs' greater cognitive involvement may have led to the theoretical proposition that they are not very sympathetic. Yet, from a psychoanalytic viewpoint of empathy, it seems that high Machs may be described as having a great deal of empathy in relevant situations. It may well be that psychiatrists, psychologists, social psychologists, lawyers, etc., choose their professions from a high Mach orientation because they feel more capable and more comfortable in utilizing trial identification to effectively deal with situations fraught with irrelevant affect. No studies have yet dealt with assessing Machiavellianism within such a context. From Erich Fromm's suggestion that our culture fosters and rewards certain types of

manipulative behavior, and that such manipulators are likely to be well adjusted and successful in their interpersonal contacts, it would seem that many professionals may have adjusted to our culture through a manipulative approach with implied faith in the possibility of change. Klein's (1969) study suggests that psychiatrists may have adjusted through a manipulative (and hopefully positive) process rather than an authoritarian and less optimistic approach. It seems reasonable that such people, involved in manipulating a patient's behavior for his own good, and within a context involving the conditions favoring Machiavellianism (face-to-face contact, freedom for improvisation, affect complexity) would score high on the Mach scale. These speculations suggest that more studies are needed to assess the high Machiavellian. For example, how does he perceive himself and his relationships with others? Is he necessarily more detached and less empathic? What is the role of relevancy in situations? Should negative connotations necessarily be attached to the idea of Machiavellianism?

The need for further research concerning the largely unexplored area of manipulation is also indicated by comparing the different approaches of Bursten, Shapiro, and Christie and Geis. For example, although the high Mach may appear quite impulsive, his opportunistic readiness does not seem to reflect a lack of necessary deliberateness and planning. While he certainly appears oriented to meeting his own needs, unlike the psychopath, he seems to weigh the consequences and measures his gains against the risks.

The present research was prompted by these questions of who the high Mach is and how he values his manipulative style.

Issues Investigated in This Research and Hypotheses

Bursten's book on The Manipulator (1973) and Christie and Geis's book, Studies in Machiavellianism (1970), (and secondarily the works of Argyle (1967), Goffman (1959, 1969), Berne (1967), Fromm (1955) and current political events) provided the impetus for the present research. On initial, superficial reading one reacts negatively to the thought of manipulation and immediately thinks of detached, cynical, aloof, uncaring (for others) individuals who do not respect their fellow men, who are devoid of satisfying, deep, meaningful interpersonal relationships, and who are likely to be described as psychopaths, sociopaths or Machiavellians (with focus placed upon the negative connotations).

Yet, if the moral, negative reaction against what is perceived as undesirable traits is ignored, less prejudiced eyes become fascinated with the prospect that Bursten, and Christie and Geis, may be describing the mature, appropriate and reasonable individual as well, who has sublimated some self-seeking needs and is well adapted to the social reality of interpersonal manipulation as a viable, ever-present phenomenon that can be utilized to another's benefit as well as to one's own.

Since no previous attempt has been reported to differentiate two types of high Machs, theoretical reasoning suggested that scores on the Mach V scale could separate the Professional from the Prince. Subjects scoring above the mean on the Mach V scale but less than two standard deviations above the mean (using Christie and Geis' parameters) have been considered Professionals for purposes of this study. Subjects defined

as Princes were to be those scoring above the mean plus two standard deviations (122 and above). Unfortunately, reports of previous research provide insufficient information to define and describe a high Mach. Ranges of scores obtained on the Mach scale were not given. For the most part, high Machs have been defined as those receiving a score above the scale median or mean of the group of Ss used. Specifically this research was intended: (1) to study personality characteristics of individuals scoring between 100 and 160 on the Mach V scale; (2) to ascertain whether two general types, Profs and Princes, can be identified on the basis of their Mach V scores: (3) to find any differences in self-perceptions of the two types in regard to interpersonal needs and behaviors.

If the well-intended, humanitarian, manipulating-others-for-their-own-good, cognitively oriented high Machs do score above the median on Mach V but not above 121--where more psychopathic, self-serving, emotionally uninvolved and uninvested manipulators would likely score--than the subjects scoring 100-121 on Mach V can be called the Professionals (Profs). Their motivation and style are consistent with Machiavellian traits to a moderate degree.

The strongly Machiavellian personality (122-160) may be preparing for a professional career as well; but his motivation and values are likely to be more cynical, shrewd, covertly hostile, and unethical than the "Profs." These subjects will be referred to as the Princes.

Measures of attitudes toward power and control, affection and esteem, relationship and inclusion, etc., were desired to describe the

subjects defined as Profs and Princes. The FIRO-B (Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation - Behavior) Questionnaire was chosen since it purports to measure how an individual characteristically relates to other people. Reported measures of validity and reliability are available for the scale; and previous research has been concerned with conformity, various occupational groups, and even political attitudes (Schutz, 1966).

The Tennessee Self-Concept Scale offers measures of self-criticism and self-esteem, of general maladjustment and of personality integration. Information about a subject's self-concept was required to substantiate predicted differences between the Profs and the Princes.

Since previous research with the Mach scales has, for the most part, not given the obtained ranges of scores nor incidence of highest scores, it was not known whether "Princes" would be included within the sample of the population composed of undergraduate male volunteers. It was planned that if less that 5 Ss obtained Mach V scores of 122 and above, the question of whether there are indeed two distinct types of high Mach individuals would have to be postponed for later study. (The speculation that there may be two basic types of Machiavellian will need further study utilizing different S populations since no "Princes" were found in the present study.) However, the present research remains significant since personality characteristics of the high Mach S relative to self-concepts has not been studied previously. Thus some normative data about the high Mach has been obtained in this study. In view of the popular negative appraisal of such a person's attitudes and

and characteristics, the present study provided some needed data as to the truth of such comments.

Qualitative differences in manipulative functioning of "Profs" (100-121 on Mach V) and "Princes" (122-160) were expected, reflecting motivational and personality style differences, as shown by scores on the FIRO-B and the T.S.C.S.

The FIRO-B (Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behavior) is a 54-item self-report questionnaire developed by William C. Schutz. It is designed to assess a person's needs for inclusion, control, and affection with regard to various aspects of interpersonal situations. Inclusion measures the degree to which the S associates with others, Control measures the degree to which he assumes responsibility or dominates others, and Affection ascertains the degree to which he is likely to become emotionally involved with others. Two scores, "e" and "w" are obtained for each of the three areas. "E" reflects S's expressed or manifest behavior while "w" represents the behavior he wants from other people. There are additional FIRO scales but only the FIRO-B has been studied adequately to recommend its use for research purposes.

The Tennessee Self-Concept Scale consists of 100 self-descriptive statements which the subject uses to portray his own picture of himself. Twenty-nine measures are generated, including a Self-Criticism Score, a P Score (the overall level of self-esteem), Identity, Self-Satisfaction, Behavior, Social Self, etc. This scale has been widely used in research, and norms are available for comparison for all measures.

The null hypothesis for 21 scores on the T.S.C.S. and six scores on the FIRO-B were to be tested for means for male Profs with male Princes, (if each classification had at least 5 Ss). Most of the tests were to be one-tailed in the direction predicted in Tables 1 and 2; statistical tests were to be t-tests of means.

It was hypothesized that Profs would score higher than Princes on the T.S.C.S. measures of overall self-esteem, identity, self-satisfaction, moral-ethical self, physical self, defensive-positive scale, acquiescence, and personality integration.

It was hypothesized that Profs would score lower than Princes on measures of self-criticism, behavior, social self, total conflict, total variability, denial, gross maladjustment, personality disorder scale, and number of deviant signes on the T.S.C.S.

It was expected that no significant differences would be found between Profs and Princes on the T.S.C.S. measures of psychosis and neurosis. In addition, no uniform differences were hypothesized for measures of the family self; 2D (self-satisfaction for family self) for Profs was hypothesized to fall within the norm range; Princes were expected to be equal to or less than the norm. Both Profs and Princes were hypothesized to score within or above the norm range for 3D on the family self (behavior).

Hypotheses relative to the FIRO-B scores included the following:

1. Ss in the Prof group would score higher than the Princes for wanted inclusion, wanted control and wanted affection.

Table 1

Predicted Ranges or Scores on FIRO-B
For "Profs" and "Princes"

FIRO-B Scores	The "Prof" (Mach Score 100-121)			The "Prince" (Mach Score 122-160)		
	I	C	A	I	C	A
Expressed	4-5	> 6	$<_e$I	> 6	> 6	> 6
Wanted	5-8	< 5	$>_e$A	< 3	< 3	< 3

Table 2

Predicted Findings of Prof
and Prince on T.S.C.S.

T.S.C.S. Scales	Prof (Mach score 100-121)	Prince (Mach score 122-160)
S.C.	> norm, < Prince	> norm, > Prof
P.	> norm, > Prince	> norm, < Prof
row 1, identity	> norm, > Prince	< norm, < Prof
row 2, self-satis.	> norm	< Prof
row 3, behavior	> norm, < Prince	> norm, > Prof
col. A, Phys. self	norm	low norm
col. B, Moral-ethical self	< norm, > Prince	< norm, < Prof
col. C, Personal self	< norm, > Prince	< norm, < Prof
col. D, Family self	2D----- norm	2D - < norm
	3D - > norm	3D - > norm
col. E, Social self	> norm, < Prince	> norm, > Prof
Total C	< norm	> norm
Total V	norm to low	> norm
Net conflict	acquiescense	denial
DP	> Prince, norm range	< Prof, norm range
GM	norm	norm to above
Psy	norm	norm
PD	> norm	> Prof
N	norm	norm
PI	norm	< Prof
NDS	< Prince	> Prof

2. Princes' expressed scores would average more than 6 with wanted scores less than 3.

3. Expressed affection for Profs would be lower than expressed inclusion, but wanted affection scores would be higher than expressed affection scores.

4. Wanted inclusion would be the highest score for Profs, and expressed control would exceed wanted control.

Relative to the hypothesis previously stated, the predicted ranges of scores on the FIRO-B and T.S.C.S. are listed in Tables 1 and 2, page 42, for the subgroups of high Machs, the Profs and the Princes.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subjects

The subjects (Ss) were one hundred male college undergraduate volunteers, enrolled in introductory psychology courses at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville. The age range was 17 to 42 years. Subjects were not coerced to participate in this experiment but were encouraged to volunteer to obtain extra credit for their psychology course grade. Informed consent was obtained; the form used is included in the Appendix.

Procedure

All subjects were instructed to complete the Mach V scale, the FIRO-B questionnaire, and the Tennessee Self Concept Scale at one sitting. Approximately 45 minutes were needed to complete the tasks. All Mach V scales were scored, and those Ss scoring 100 or above constitute the sample utilized for the remainder of this study. Subsequent to the above procedure data obtained on the T.S.C.S. and FIRO-B from the remaining Ss (52 Ss scoring below 100 on the Mach V) were studied and compared with the previous results.

The Tennessee Self Concept Scale was scored by a computer service, yielding means and standard deviations for the group as well as individual scores for all measures. The FIRO-B questionnaires were

scored by hand. Table 1, page 42, gives the predicted results for the FIRO-B measures, and Table 2, page 42, shows the predicted results for the Tennessee Self Concept Scale.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Mach V Scale

Of the 100 volunteers participating in this study, 46 obtained scores of 100 or above on the Mach V Scale and constituted the sample studied for personality characteristics and self concepts. The range of scores obtained by the 100 Ss was 65 - 120.

No S obtained a Mach V score higher than the limit set for Profs, $\overline{X} + 2\sigma$ or 121.61. Therefore the comparisons proposed for Profs and Princes could not be done.

Of the 46 Ss scoring 100 or above on the Mach V, the data for the Tennessee Self Concept Scale for two subjects were skipped by the computer due to sequence error. The group means and standard deviations are calculated for the remaining 44. One subject failed to complete the FIRO-B questionnaire properly, so the data for these measures are based on 45 Ss and are given in Table 3. In addition the FIRO-B scores for the Low Mach subjects (N=52) are given in Table 3.

The predicted results outlined in Table 1, page 42, were substantiated for four of the measures, Expressed Inclusion, Expressed Affection, Wanted Control, and Wanted Affection. The Profs did not achieve the predicted level of expressed control in interpersonal relationships, according to their own account. Nor did they express the

expected level of desiring to be included in activities by other people. They exert more control than they want to be controlled by others, and they want more affection to be shown them by other people than they express to other people.

Table 3

Average FIRO-B Scores for Profs (Mach 100-121) and Lows (100)

	Inclusion		Control		Affection	
	Profs	Low	Profs	Low	Profs	Low
Expressed	4.111	4.769	4.044	3.0	3.533	4.462
Wanted	3.955	5.077	3.066	4.0	4.866	5.539

Since no Princes were obtained in the sample, no comparison could be made between groups on the FIRO-B scores. The one subject who scored 120 on the Mach V provided FIRO-B scores as predicted in Table 1, page 42, for Profs.

Table 4 outlines the result of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale scores for the 44 Ss as reported from Counselor Recordings and Tests' Computer Scoring Service.

Specific predictions made in Table 2, page 42, for T.S.C.S. scores that were accurate include the measures for self criticism, self satisfaction, physical self, moral-ethical self, personal self, total conflict, total variavility, personality disorder, general maladjustment, psychosis, neurosis, subtle defensiveness, personality integration. Predictions that were not substantiated include the measures of self concept or self esteem, of identity, of behavior, of family self, of

Table 4

The Prof - Mach V. 100-121
Norms: Mean = 50, S.D. = 10

T.S.C.S.	Mean T-Score	Standard Deviation
Self Criticism	52.932	9.2168
Net Conflict	50.568	9.3421
Total Conflict	46.614	9.9375
P or Self Esteem	45.295	10.7001
Identity	41.795	10.1994
Self Satisfaction	50.205	11.3641
Behavior	43.591	10.3864
Physical Self	45.000	11.2539
Moral-ethical Self	46.227	11.4727
Personal Self	49.227	12.8911
Family Self	43.477	9.7277
Social Self	45.727	9.0203
Total Variability	42.932	10.5111
Defensive Positive	47.000	10.0209
Psychosis	55.000	7.7998
Neurosis	53.955	10.3361
Personality Disorder	56.977	8.8173
Personality Integration	52.545	10.8101
Number Deviant Signs	56.295	9.4539

social self, and of net conflict. The measures of family self and of the number of deviant signes required comparison with statistics that were not available; the measure of net conflict was predicted to reflect acquiescence rather than denial. Further information about these results will be offered in the discussion chapter. Subsequent to these results, the test protocols obtained from the low Mach (52 Ss scoring below 100 on the Mach V scale) were scored and assessed. The FIRO-B scores for these Ss are reported in Table 3, page 47. Table 5 gives the T.S.C.S. scores of the low Machs and of the standardization (norm) group (N=626).

Table 5

Low Machs and Standardization Group

	Low Mach N=52		Norm Group N=626	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Self Criticism	37.231	6.7406	35.54	6.70
Net Conflict	- 3.923	12.5399	- 4.91	13.01
Total Conflict	29.385	8.8165	30.10	8.21
P or Self Esteem	331.461	33.5004	345.57	30.70
Identity	120.327	11.3496	127.10	9.96
Self Satisfaction	102.635	15.3585	103.67	13.79
Behavior	108.500	12.2483	115.01	11.22
Physical Self	68.923	6.7906	71.78	7.67
Moral-ethical Self	66.423	9.1638	70.33	8.70
Personal Self	62.904	8.7879	64.55	7.41
Family Self	67.058	9.1597	70.83	8.43
Social Self	66.154	7.6348	68.14	7.86
Total Variability	43.558	15.0573	48.53	12.42
Defensive Positive	50.750	11.2579	54.40	12.38
General Maladjustment	92.365	9.9511	98.80	9.15
Psychosis	49.115	6.1250	46.10	6.49
Neurosis	79.404	10.8344	84.31	11.10
Personality Disorder	68.654	11.3620	76.39	11.72
Personality Integration	11.077	4.1057	10.42	3.88
Number Deviant Signs	13.385	11.9774	-- 4.37	median -------

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this research was threefold: (1) to study personality characteristics of the high Mach individual (scoring between 100 and 160); (2) to ascertain whether two general types of high Mach individuals (Profs and Princes) can be identified on the basis of their Mach V scores; (3) and to find any differences between self-perceptions of the two types in regard to interpersonal needs and behaviors. The latter two issues cannot be addressed in this study since no Princes were found within the present sample.

Of the 100 Ss who volunteered for this experiment, there were 46 who scored above the mean on the Mach V scale and none who scored more than two standard deviations above the mean. Since no information was available from previous studies about the incidence of high scores until the design was set, one purpose of the study was to look for very high scorers in the experimental group. A personal communication from Dr. Florence Geis indicated that when the Mach V is administered to groups of 300 or more Ss at Columbia University, she generally finds several very high scorers in the group.

Since no Princes were identified within this subject pool (Ss whose Mach V scores were 122 and over), no information is available about their personality characteristics or attitudes. Comparisons and contrasts between Profs and Princes still seem worthy of study, but a

different sample of Ss will be required to obtain Princes. A larger and more diverse sample is suggested. The remainder of this discussion is concerned with personality characteristics of Profs (Mach V scores 100-121) and comparisons with Low Machs (scores below 100).

Characteristics of the volunteers studied included personal attributes as reported by the individual and typical behaviors and attitudes involving other people as also reported by the subject. FIRO-B results are given in Table 3, page 47. The predictions made in Table 1, page 42, were formulated on the supposition that high Machs perceive people as objects to be used; these predictions seem partially supported by the data. In affection needs, the Profs were predicted to want more affection expressed by other people than they demonstrate; this prediction is supported. Perhaps their wish to be loved is greater than their willingness to love because of their cynical, suspicious wariness toward relationships and an unflattering view of others. The results suggest that low Machs tend to express more affection than the Profs and also report wanting more affection from others. These differences suggest that low Machs may be more involved emotionally in relationships.

Profs were expected to show more inclusion behavior than affection behavior; this prediction too is supported. Since the low Mach Ss describe themselves similarly, although with less difference, this may be an usual finding. However, since no normative data has been reported for the FIRO-B, this is mere speculation. Previous research has been idiographic rather than nomothetic. As expected the Profs prefer to

exert more control than they want to be controlled by other people, but the difference is not so great as was predicted. Low Machs, on the other hand, report themselves exactly opposite. Attitudes toward control, therefore, seem related to Machiavellian style.

The one prediction that missed the mark is that Profs would want to be included more than they include other people in activities; the results suggest that Profs prefer slightly to do the including themselves rather than have other people include them. This preference seems related to their wish for control. In contrast, the low Machs report wanting to be included more than they wish to include others.

The manual for the FIRO-B reports correlations between the scales, such that there is a relation between needs measured by this questionnaire. The items making up the expressed inclusion scale begin "I try to . . ." and those making up the wanted inclusion scale, "I like people to . . ." Perhaps the wanted inclusion items are related to wanted control, and Profs scored lowest on the wanted control subset. Interestingly, the Low Machs scored lowest on the expressed control subset. If Profs are concerned with exerting control and manipulation, they may be more receptive to opportunities for inclusion than to having other people "include, invite, ask me to participate, or invite me to participate."

These results tend to support the findings of previous researchers, Geis and Christie (1970), who see the suspiciousness of high Machs as a protective defense measure, and Solar and Bruehl (1971), who suggest that controlling the environment and manipulating others "may result

not from a feeling of power but from a feeling of powerlessness and dependency."

Tennessee Self Concept Scale scores earned by the Profs in this study were all within normal limits; no mean score was as much as one standard deviation from the norm (Table 4, page 48). Figure 1 shows the profiles of the Profs and Low Machs. Generally the profiles appear similar. The Low Machs exceeded the Profs in number of deviant signs.

The T.S.C.S. Manual states that the number of deviant signs is a purely empirical measure based upon Berg's deviation hypothesis, that individuals who deviate sharply from the norm in minor behaviors are likely to be deviant in more major aspects of behavior. The NDS score is considered to be the scales' best index of psychological disturbances, identifying deviant individuals with about 80 percent accuracy. Since the Low Machs exceed the cutoff score for NDS, they describe themselves as deviant. The results obtained in this study do raise a question of the nature of the Ss who participated as well as of the nature of Ss who score below the mean of the Mach V scale.

The identity score (Row 1) is based on items intended to describe the individual's basic identity--what he is as he sees himself. The Profs scored lower than the Low Machs on this scale. However, the Profs rated themselves higher in self-esteem (Total) and self-satisfaction (Row 2) than the Low Machs did.

Overall the results are in keeping with previous studies in describing the Prof as a somewhat wary and cynical individual, candid in describing both himself and his relations with others. While




Figure 1. Tennessee Self Concept Scale Profiles of High and Low Mach Groups

functioning within normal limits in all measured areas, he nevertheless tends to appear somewhat "different" from the average individual in terms of his seemingly honest and candidly realistic self perception. Such an orientation of the Prof in no way substantiates the pejorative connotations associated with the Machiavellian.

Although study of the Prince necessitates further research, the present research supports previous descriptions of the Machiavellian orientation basically but without pejorative connotations. One point of continued interest appears to involve the concept of empathy. The Prof seems indeed able to detach himself from emotional involvement with others, but he does not indicate a desire for no association with others --only that he prefers that others take the initiative in establishing positive and meaningful relationships with control maintained by the Prof. This in no way excludes the usage of "trial identification."

The Prof seems to be a social realist; he distinguishes between man as he ought to be and man as he actually is. He typifies the stereotype of a scientist; utilitarian and rational, his lack of affect in interpersonal relationships and a lack of commitment to an ideal of what man can be combine to picture the Professional.

The failure to find Princes included in the sample may be related to the way the sample was obtained. Undergraduate males in introductory psychology courses were offered extra course credit for participation in this study. Since Princes are expected to be more Machiavellian than Profs, volunteering to disclose personal information, even for extra credit, may be rejected in favor of participation in a more impersonal

research project. If Princes are more wary of being controlled and of being included than Profs, this kind of study would not be selected easily.

Christie and Geis have found very high Mach scores in northern student groups; perhaps the incidence of Princes is greater in a northern exclusive university than in a southern state school. Upperclassmen and graduate students would probably provide an increasing ratio of Princes and Profs to low Machs. A criminal population seems well worth a study in search of the Prince.

Further research could study such student groups as political science majors, law students, graduate students in social sciences to increase the likelihood of including Princes. Additional measures of the Machiavellian personality should include some behavioral tasks (as previous research has utilized) to compare Profs and Princes and perhaps some behavioral or sociometric ratings done by observors. No other attempt has been reported to assess Profs and Princes, and much of the previous research could profitably be reported to differentiate characteristics of the two groups.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

One hundred male undergraduate volunteers were given the Mach V scale, the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, and the FIRO-B questionnaire. Forty-six scored above the mean (99.27, s.d. 11.17) on the Mach scale; none scored more than 2 s.d. above the mean (Princes). These 46 Ss (Profs or Professionals) were predicted to describe themselves as wanting affection demonstrated more than they express affection, as wanting to control others more than to be controlled, as wanting inclusion more than they include others. Self concept measures for identity, self-satisfaction, behavior, personality disorder, social self, family self, self-criticism, and overall self-esteem were expected to be higher than the norm, while moral-ethical self, personal self, and total conflict scores were predicted to be lower.

The sample included no Princes (Ss with Mach V scores $\overline{X}$ + 2 s.d. and higher). Predictions for Princes' scores could not be tested; comparisons with Profs' scores could not be made. Comparisons were then made with Low Mach (N=52, Mach V scores below 100), T.S.C.S. and FIRO-B scores.

Profs were found to be within the norm ($\overline{X} \pm$ s.d.) on all measures of self concept. They judged themselves as below average on many traits

(self-esteem, identity, behavior, five self measures), above average on measures of psychological disturbances and self-criticism, but also above average in self-satisfaction. Low Machs described themselves similarly, with their NDS score falling outside normal limits.

Less controlling behavior was reported than predicted for the Profs, and less desire for inclusion was found. Low Machs seem to prefer being controlled while Profs desire to control. Low Machs want more inclusion and express less.

The results suggest that Profs are realistic in appraising their own personalities, relationships, and expectations. They rate themselves as inferior in many characteristics and behaviors but are satisfied with and accepting of themselves. The pejorative connotations of Machiavellian personality style are not supported by this study.

Conclusions

No information is available from this study about the Prince, and no comparisons can be made between Profs and Princes. Further study is recommended with different samples to obtain Princes and measures for comparison with Profs.

Profs were found to admit behaviors and characteristics that are unflattering and socially undesirable. Their realistic appraisals of themselves and their satisfaction with and acceptance of these appraisals suggest that they are ideologically akin to the realist Machiavelli in their basic theory of the nature of man. They do not resemble the psychiatric description of the psychopath so much as emotionally stable,

reality-oriented normals who have integrated any psychopathology instead of disavowing it or being handicapped by it. Caution rather than impulsivity characterizes interpersonal relating, and affect is not lacking but subject to cognitive awareness.

Previous Machiavellian research was supported. The "cool syndrome" is consistent with the present results. The impulsive style is not characteristic of the high Mach, and his dominant motivation is not manipulation for its own sake. The Prof seems realistic rather than narcissistic. He manipulates to meet his needs and protect his interests, but he does not seem to pursue control or conflict for their own sake.

REFERENCES

REFERENCES

Argyle, Michael. The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour. Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1967.

Berne, E. Games People Play. New York: Grove Press, 1967.

Bogart, K. Machiavellianism and individual differences in responses to cognitive dissonance. Journal of Social Psychology, 1971, 85: 111-119.

Brackman, J. 1967. Cited by R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Braginsky, D. Machiavellianism and manipulative interpersonal behavior in children. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6: 77-99.

Bursten, M., Miller, G., & Tubbs, S. Machiavellianism, justification, and attitude change following counter-attitudinal advocacy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 22: 3: 366-371.

Bursten, B. The Manipulator. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Bursten, B. The Manipulative personality. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1972, 26: 318-321.

Campbell, D.T. "Social attitudes and other acquired behavioral dispositions." In S. Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of Science. Vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, 94-122.

Chessick, R. D. Was Machiavelli right? American Journal of Psychotherapy, 1969, 23: 633-644.

Christie, R. The Machiavellis Among Us. Psychology Today, 1970, 4: 6: 83-86.

Christie, R., & Geis, G. Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Daniellian, G. 1964. Cited by R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Day, H. R. Interrelationships of Machiavellianism, social desirability, self-evaluation, and self-potency in American and Filipino samples: with a Philippines replication. Proceedings, 80th Annual Convention, APA, 1972.

Collins, B. E., & Raven, B. H. Group Structure: Attraction, coalitions, communication, and power. In G. Lindzay and E. Aronson (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology. Vol. 4. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

Epstein, S. 1966. Cited by R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Exline, R., Thibaut, J., Brannon, C., and Gumpart, P. Visual interaction in relation to Machiavellianism and an unethical act. American Psychologist, 1961, 16: 396.

Fitts, W. H. Tennessee Self-Concept Scale - Manual. Nashville, Tn.: Counselor Recordings and Tests, 1965.

Fliess, R. The metapsychology of the analyst. Psychoanalyst Quarterly, 1942, 11: 211-227.

Fromm, E. The Sane Society. New York: Rinehart, 1955.

Fromm-Reichmann, F. Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.

French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. H. The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (ed.) Studies in Social Power. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1959.

French, J. R. P. A formal theory of social power. Psychological Review, 1956, Vol. 63, p. 181-194.

Geis, F., & Christie, R. Machiavellianism and the Manipulation of one's fellowman. In K. J. Gergen and D. Marlowe (eds.), Personality and Social Behavior. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1970, 167-186.

Geis, F., Christie, R., & Nelson, C. 1963. Cited by F. Geis and R. Christie in K. J. Gergen & D. Marlowe (eds.), Personality and Social Behavior. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc., 1970.

Geis, F., Krupat, E., & Berger, D. 1965. Cited by R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Goffman, E. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1959.

Goffman, E. Strategic Interaction. New York: Ballantine Books, 1972.

Greenacre, P. Conscience of the Psychopath. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 1945, 15: 495-509.

Gruder, C. L. Social power in interpersonal negotiation. In P. Swingle (ed.), The Structure of Conflict. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Guterman, S. The Machiavellians. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nesbraska Press, 1970.

Harris, T. 1966. Cited by R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Heider, F. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley, 1958.

Horney, K. Our Inner Conflicts. New York: Norton, 1945.

Hymoff, I. H. An Experimental Investigation of the Relationship of Machiavellianism to Guilt and Compliance. Dissertation, University of Maine, 1970.

Jensen, D. L. (ed.), Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot or Political Scientist? Boston: Heath, 1960.

Kauffman & Steiner, 1968, cited by I. Hymoff in An Experimental investigation of the relationship of Machiavellianism to guilt and compliance. Dissertation, University of Maine, 1970.

Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. Group problem solving. In G. Lindzay and E. Aronson (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 4. New York: Academic Press, 1969, 1-101.

Lubell, S. 1966. Cited by R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Luke. The Way. Wheaton, Illinois: Tyndale House Publishers, 1971.

Machiavelli, N. The Prince. George Bull translation. New York: Penguin, 1972.

McClay, J. D. Interrelationships of internal vs. external control, social conscience, interpersonal relationships, Machiavellianism, and Fascist attitudes among adolescents: an Adlerian oriented investigation. Dissertation Abstracts, 1972, 32 (3793-A).

McLaughlin, B. Incidental learning and Machiavellianism. Journal of Social Psychology, 1970, 82: 109-116.

Minton, H. L. Power as a personality construct. In B. A. Maker (ed.), Progress in experimental Personality Research, Vol. 4. New York: Adademic Press, 1967.

Novielli, M. 1968. Cited in R. Christie and F. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Raven, B. H. Social Influence and Power. In I. D. Steiner and M. Fishbein (eds.), Current Studies in Social Psychology. New York: Holt, 1965.

Raven, B. H., & Kruglanski, A. W. Conflict and Power. In P. Swingle (ed.), The Structure of Conflict. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Reser, J. Perception and awareness of manipulative intent. Dissertation Loyola University of Chicago, 1972.

Ryan, L. F. Clinical Interpretation of the FIRO-B. Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc., 1971.

Schafer, R. Generative empathy in the treatment situation. Psychoanalyst Quarterly, 1959, 28: 343-373.

Schutz, W. C. The Interpersonal Underworld. Palo Alto, California: Science & Behavior Books, Inc., 1966.

Schutz, W. C. The FIRO Scales - Manual. Consultion Psychologists Press, Inc., 1967.

Shapiro, D. Neurotic Styles. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965.

Shostrom, E. L. Man, the Manipulator. New York: Bantom Books, 1967.

Singer, J. E. The use of manipulative strategies: Machiavellianism and attractiveness. Sociometry, 1964, 27: 128-150.

Solar, D., & Bruehl, D. Machiavellianism and locus of control. Psychologist Reports, 1971, 29: 1079-1082.

St. Clair, H. R. Manipulation. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 1966, 7: 4: 248-258.

Tedeschi, J. T., & Bonomea, T. V. Power and Influence: An Introduction. In J. T. Tedeschi (ed.), The Social Influence Processes. New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1972.

Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley, 1959.

Zajonc, R. B. Social Facilitation. Science, 1965, 149: 269-274.

APPENDIX

SUBJECT INFORMED CONSENT FORM

I understand that I am volunteering to participate in a study of personality characteristics. Although answering these questionnaires may involve some self disclosure, I am not obliged to give any identifying data other than age, sex, and academic major. I further understand that I may ask any question of the researcher concerning procedures and that I can discontinue participation in the experiment at any time.

_____ _____

Signature Date

MACH V SCALE

In each of the following questions 1-20, place a "+" next to the letter answer which is most characteristic of your own feelings, and a "-" next to the letter answer which is least characteristic of your own feelings.

1. ____ A. It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than a successful business man.

   ____ B. The phrase, "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" contains a lot of truth.

   ____ C. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property.

2. ____ A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with the clothes their wives wear.

   ____ B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in children be cultivated.

   ____ C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.

3. ____ A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.

   ____ B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should be worked for before anything else.

   ____ C. Since most people don't know what they want, it is only reasonable for ambitious people to talk them into doing things.

4. ____ A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is bad for our country.

   ____ B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.

   ____ C. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others less fortunate than themselves.

5. ____ A. Most people are basically good and kind.

____ B. The best criteria for a wife or husband is compatibility—other characteristics are nice but not essential.

____ C. Only after a man has gotten what he wants from life should he concern himself with the injustices in the world.

6. ____ A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.

____ B. Any man worth his salt shouldn't be blamed for putting his career above his family.

____ C. People would be better off if they were concerned less with how to do things and more with what to do.

7. ____ A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions rather than gives explicit answers.

____ B. When you ask someone to do something, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight.

____ C. A person's job is the best single guide as to the sort of person he is.

8. ____ A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian pyramids was worth the enslavement of the workers who built them.

____ B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out, it is best to stick to it.

____ C. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.

9. ____ A. The world would be a much better place to live in if people would let the future take care of itself and concern themselves only with enjoying the present.

____ B. It is wise to flatter important people.

____ C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing it as new circumstances arise.

10. ____ A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things you do because you have no other choice.

____ B. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.

____ C. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark of decency somewhere within him.

11. ____ A. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.

____ B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding in whatever he wants to do.

____ C. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn't very important.

12. ____ A. A person shouldn't be punished for breaking a law that he thinks is unreasonable.

____ B. Too many criminals are not punished for their crimes.

____ C. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.

13. ____ A. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they are forced to do so.

____ B. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after he commits a serious mistake.

____ C. People who can't make up their minds are not worth bothering about.

14. ____ A. A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his mother.

____ B. Most men are brave.

____ C. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually stimulating rather than ones it is comfortable to be around.

15. ____ A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning oneself about.

____ B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.

____ C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful to society than a well-meaning but ineffective one.

16. ____ A. It is best to give others the impression that you change your mind easily.

____ B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with everyone.

____ C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.

17. ____ A. It is possible to be good in all respects.

____ B. To help oneself is good; to help others even better.

____ C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human life.

18. ____ A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there's at least one sucker born every minute.

____ B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some excitement.

____ C. Most people would be better off if they control their emotions.

19. ____ A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than poise in social situations.

____ B. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place and accepts it.

____ C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.

20. ____ A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don't know what they are talking about.

____ B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.

____ C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that everyone vote.

VITA

Sherry Lee Gates was born in Milford, Connecticut, on October 9, 1942. She attended public schools in Stratford, Connecticut, through the eighth grade. In September of 1956, she entered The Gateway School in New Haven, Connecticut, and graduated in June, 1960. She entered Skidmore College in Saratoga Springs, New York, in September, 1960, and received a Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in biochemistry in 1964. Her graduate studies at The University of Tennessee commenced in September, 1969, and she received a Master of Arts degree in psychology in March, 1970.