






To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Frances Cate Fowler entitled "One Approach to a Pluralist Dilemma: Private School Aid Policy in France, 1959-1985." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Education.


Robert K. Roney, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:


Vice Provost and
Dean of the Graduate School

ONE APPROACH TO A PLURALIST DILEMMA:
PRIVATE SCHOOL AID POLICY IN FRANCE, 1959-1985

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Frances Cate Fowler
May 1990

Copyright © Frances C. Fowler, 1990
All rights reserved

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people on both sides of the Atlantic made it possible for me to complete this dissertation research. I was privileged to work with two outstanding major professors, Dr. Robert K. Roney and Dr. Frederick P. Venditti. The other members of my committee--Drs. Clinton B. Allison, Leroy P. Graf, and Thomas D. Unga--also contributed much to the success of the dissertation.

This project required two specialized skills: word processing and French proficiency. Mary Morrell provided invaluable help with WordPerfect. I would also like to express posthumous appreciation to my high school French teachers: Hélène Wittmer, Florence Jassogne, and Mildred Severance.

This research would not have been possible without the generous assistance of a number of people in France: Monsignor Paul Guiberteau, Jean Hassenforder, Claude Lavy, Marie-Michèle Le Bret, Jacques Marie, François Printanier, Jean-Paul Roux, and Daniel Tapin. I would especially like to thank Guillaume Colin. He knows why.

I can think of no better way to end these acknowledgments than to quote the conclusion of a letter which one of the French interviewees sent me. "Vive l'amitié franco-américaine! Long live friendship between France and the United States!"

ABSTRACT

The question of whether or not a government should subsidize private schools is an example of what Dahl (1982) called a "pluralist dilemma." The democratic principle of freedom supports the right of private organizations to establish schools; yet the principles of equality and social solidarity encourage government restrictions on such schools. Since the nineteenth century the United States has permitted private schools to exist while offering them little public funding. Recently this policy has been attacked. Opponents often argue that almost all other Western democracies subsidize private education.

This research investigated private school aid policy in France between 1959 and 1985. The major research methodology was the documentary analysis of primary source materials. Interviews of sixteen French policy actors supplemented the documentary analysis.

France adopted the 1959 Debré Act when political legitimacy was low. A baby boom and financial problems in Catholic education combined to threaten a potential economic crisis in French education. The Debré Act offered substantial public funding to private education while regulating it to protect the superior position of public education. Major policy mechanisms included the subcontracting of secular instruction to private schools,

restrictions on the supply of private education, and the linkage of funding levels in the two sectors. Subsidized private schools also had to accept students regardless of their religious, ethnic, or class backgrounds. In the 1970s increasing cultural pluralism and neo-conservative ideology led to a loosening of some regulations. However, in 1985 the Debré Act was largely restored to its 1959 form, with the addition of tighter financial regulations.

The French policy successfully protected the integrity of the public school system. Private school enrollments did not rise disproportionately, nor did social segregation increase. This success resulted largely from the heavy regulation of private education. The nature of French political institutions and cultural pluralism also facilitated the adoption and maintenance of the program. The policy generated considerable political conflict between 1977 and 1985.

Because of the distinctive nature of American constitutional law, political institutions, and pluralism, it would be difficult to implement such a policy in the United States. Americans should therefore seek to enhance educational freedom by using policies other than the subsidizing of private schools.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of the Problem	9
Purpose of the Study	9
Importance of the Study	9
Assumptions of the Study	12
Limitations and Delimitations	13
Definition of Terms	14
Brief Overview of French Political Institutions	16
Questions Answered by the Study	18
Procedures	19
Organization of the Study	20
II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE	21
Theoretical Framework	22
Arguments For and Against Aid to Private Education	29
Analytical Discussions of Policy Construction	43
Comparative Policy Studies	49
Conclusion	61
III. METHODS AND PROCEDURES	63
General Research Design	64
Handling of the French Language	66
Discussion of Documentary Sources	66
Elite Interviewing Procedures	74
Methods of Analysis	79
Statement of Personal Bias	82
Presentation of Final Research Report	85
IV. PRIVATE SCHOOL AID UNDER CONSERVATIVE FRENCH GOVERNMENTS	87
Introduction	87
The Policy Environment of the Debre Act	93
The Values Behind the Debre Act	103
The Government's behavior in 1959	103
Values revealed in the 1959 debate	109
Efficiency as a value behind the act	117
The Structure of the Policy in the 1960s	119
The Policy Environment, 1970-1981	129
The Values Behind the Policy, 1970-1981	140
Values behind the Pompidou Act	140

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. (Continued)	
Values behind the Guermeur Act	151
Hidden agendas between 1970 and 1981	156
The Structure of the Policy in 1981	161
V. EFFECTS AND PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF CONSERVATIVE POLICY	168
Implementation.	169
General Effects	174
Enrollment effects.	174
Financial effects	177
Segregative effects	187
Effects on public opinion	193
Effects on Public Education	203
Effects on Private Education	212
Survival	212
Increased similarity to public education. .	213
Problems of private school teachers	219
Conclusion	222
VI. THE MITTERRAND ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE POLICY	224
Introduction	224
The Policy Environment, 1981-1985	226
Economic environment	226
The immigrant workers issue	228
Political environment	230
The Provisions of the Savary Bill	238
Values and Value Conflicts Surrounding the Savary Bill	242
The pre-debate uproar	242
Values in the May 1984 debate	247
The post-debate uproar	261
The Return to the Debre Act	269
Was there a secret agreement?	269
The issue is depoliticized	275
The final settlement	280
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN POLICY ISSUE . .	286
Introduction	286
Implications for the Evolution of the American Issue	287
The Divisiveness of the Issue	295
On Adopting the French Policy	298

CHAPTER	PAGE
VII. (Continued)	
Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research	308
BIBLIOGRAPHY	315
APPENDIXES	334
APPENDIX A. LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS, AGENCIES, AND LAWS WITH FRENCH NAMES	335
APPENDIX B. LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS FROM WHOM REPRESENTATIVES WERE INTERVIEWED	337
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW GUIDE	339
APPENDIX D. EXPANDED NOTES FROM TWO INTERVIEWS .	341
APPENDIX E. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL AID LEGISLATION	352
APPENDIX F. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CITATIONS	357
VITA	358

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the nineteenth century a number of Western nations embarked on the challenging task of rapid economic and political modernization. Economic modernization involved the development of an industrial base, large urban centers, and efficient transportation systems. Political modernization entailed the establishment of a legitimate constitutional order, the expansion of suffrage, and the development of governmental bureaucracy. All of these changes brought with them major dislocations of the traditional order, threatening the stability of society. In searching for ways to facilitate the modernization process, many nineteenth century leaders came to advocate mass education. As a result, by the end of the century, most Western nations had enacted compulsory attendance laws and established public school systems (Butts 1978).

It would be a mistake to assume that the major purpose of these new school systems was to produce basic literacy. In actual fact, the spread of literacy in the Western world was a cultural change which began well before the process of modernization (Furet and Ozouf 1982; Tyack 1976). Rather, two of the central reasons for establishing public education and making schooling

compulsory were economic and political. For example, Horace Mann, the leader of the American Common School Movement, saw public education as a way to develop human capital and thus increase the wealth of society. Moreover, he believed that it would create a set of common political beliefs among the young nation's citizens. In a period of increasing social heterogeneity, Mann argued for a common school which would create a strong sense of national cohesion (Spring 1986). Similar concerns motivated those who established the public schools of Europe. In France, for example, Prost (1968) asserted that

[The government] wanted to create loyalty to the principles for which it stood by educating the citizen. . . .The government would always consider the elementary school the place for civic and political education. (Pp. 158-159; Prost's italics; my translation)

It is not surprising that the establishment of public schools provoked bitter struggles in many Western nations (Kaestle 1983; Prost 1968). By claiming the right to participate in the socialization of the young, and especially by insisting on a role in their preparation for citizenship and productive adult life, the state was encroaching on territory which had long been reserved to the family and the church. The ensuing conflict was a classic example of what political scientist Robert Dahl

would later call a "pluralist dilemma"--the issue of autonomy versus control (Dahl 1982).

Modern nation-states are of necessity pluralistic societies which contain a variety of subsystems, including religious and kinship groups, ethnic and linguistic minorities, and a full range of social classes. According to plural theory, conflict is likely in such societies insofar as their constituent groups are free to seek particularistic goals. Thus, democratic nations face a dilemma. The democratic principle of freedom supports the right of such groups to exist and to pursue their interests; at the same time, the democratic principles of equality and fraternity, or solidarity, encourage state intervention to promote equality among individuals as well as national cohesion.

In educational policy this dilemma means that democratic governments must balance the particularistic claims of various social subsystems against the best interests of the polity as a whole. Thus, when most Western nations passed compulsory education laws, they were obliged to strike a political compromise between private and public education. These compromises took various forms, but a number of governments, including those of the United States, France, Australia, the Netherlands, and the Canadian province of British Columbia, reached a similar solution. They decided that

education would be compulsory and that public schools would be free and nonsectarian. Private schools would be permitted to operate, but would receive no direct public funding.

One of the characteristics of pluralist dilemmas, however, is that they tend to persist and recur. The public-private school issue was not settled once and for all in the nineteenth century; the debate was re-opened in the twentieth, with different results in many nations. For example, in 1917 the Netherlands began to subsidize private religious schools. Thirty-four years later both France and Australia initiated small-scale financial aid programs which became large-scale ones by the 1970s. A similar policy change occurred in British Columbia in 1978. Today the United States stands virtually alone among Western industrial democracies in its refusal to subsidize private education (Bruce 1983).

However, the issue has not lain dormant in this country. Since the 1930s numerous Supreme Court decisions have held certain forms of indirect aid constitutional (Hoffman 1974). In 1965, the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act extended federal compensatory programs to disadvantaged children in public and private schools alike. With the growing conservatism of the electorate, efforts further to modify American policy became more intense. Between 1966 and 1981, the U.S.

Senate voted eight times on tax relief for private school parents (Heyns 1981). The Reagan Administration advocated both tuition tax credits and vouchers which could be used in private schools (T. James and Levin 1983). Finally, in 1983 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Mueller v. Allen, that a Minnesota tuition tax credit program which applied to all schools, public and private, was constitutional. Some have interpreted this sequence of events as a slow movement toward subsidies for American private education.

Moreover, the changing demographics of the private sector suggest that it may be gaining increasing political power. Private schools are growing more rapidly than public ones; they are characterized by more racial and religious diversity than in the past; and they are becoming numerous in the South and West. All of these facts suggest that the political base in support of public aid to private education is expanding and may be able to exert increasing pressure on Congress and many state legislatures (Cooper 1984). All of these trends, in conjunction with a worldwide tendency toward the privatization of public services, have led many observers to predict that the United States will eventually choose to grant public subsidies to private schools (Anderson 1981; Cooper 1984; Doyle 1981a; Goldman 1984; Hunt 1986). Others are less sure that such a change will come about but nonetheless see the issue as one of the major

educational policy questions of the last part of the twentieth century (Boyd and Kerchner 1987; Catterall 1984b; T. James 1983; T. James and Levin 1983).

Not surprisingly, in recent years the issue has generated a great deal of controversy. In the United States the debate tends to be ideological, turning on fundamental questions of value rather than on empirical evidence. In general, advocates of private school subsidies base their arguments on various forms of freedom: religious freedom, family choice, and diversity are popular themes. Other advocates emphasize the coercive power of the state as expressed in public school bureaucracies. In recent decades, free market arguments have also been frequently voiced; education is said to be a private good which consumers should be free to choose. Supporters of government aid also advance efficiency arguments, based on the assumption that public schools are of poor quality and that competition would improve them. On the other hand, opponents of subsidies for private education claim that such aid would lead to greater social stratification, increased disadvantage of the poor, resegregation, a loss of support for public education, and a blurring of the line between church and state (T. James and Levin 1983). Such positions are based primarily on concerns about equality and solidarity. In terms of the

theories of pluralism developed by Dahl and other social scientists, this is the predictable shape of the debate.

Most American scholars who have addressed the subject have taken a clear position in favor of one side or the other. However, a few have discussed instead the question of how competing democratic values could be balanced in a private school aid policy which would grant direct or indirect aid to private education, while maintaining "parity of esteem" for public schools (Boyd 1987). For instance, Murnane (1985) argued that the development of a successful American policy would depend heavily on the nature of the regulations imposed on private schools, especially in such areas as tuition, admissions, and expulsions. Several other scholars have debated the nature of the controls which would establish the best equilibrium between freedom, on the one hand, and equality and social solidarity on the other. Naturally, most advocates of private school subsidies would prefer minimal regulation or none at all. Again, this debate has taken the shape which Dahl argued was typical of the pluralist dilemma; it turns on issues of autonomy and control (Dahl 1982).

American discussions of alternative private school aid policies are hampered by the fact that the United States has no recent experience in this domain. As a result, comparative policy studies have assumed

importance; they provide the only available evidence on the issue, clarifying the underlying values and suggesting basic problems which must be addressed in the construction of a sound policy. As Levy (1985) put it:

Cross-national comparisons can not only inform but influence our consideration of policy alternatives. . . . [They] can help raise ideas, debunk myths, . . . and provide some clues as to what to do--and what to avoid. (Pp. 10-11)

American researchers have, therefore, devoted considerable attention to the policies of other advanced industrial democracies, especially those which initiated subsidies recently. Australia has been most thoroughly studied, followed closely by British Columbia. An American economist, Estelle James (1982a; 1982b; 1984) has also provided detailed information about both Dutch and Swedish policy. These studies have proved illuminating; they have made it possible to introduce factual information into the debate and to compare the outcomes of different approaches. They have also indicated some cultural differences between the United States and other industrialized Western nations which should be thoughtfully weighed in any consideration of changing American policy. Yet, these studies have a major limitation; all deal with small, relatively homogeneous polities which have never aspired to great power status. Of course, France, another nation which has recently

changed its private school aid policy, is a large, heterogeneous nation which has played a major role in global politics. Unfortunately, however, detailed information about the French policy is currently available only to those American researchers and policymakers who read French.

Statement of the Problem

The problem which this study addresses is the fact that the current American policy debate on government aid to private education is largely ideological and theoretical since private schools in the United States have not been directly subsidized in modern times. As a result, there is a need for information from elsewhere.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to make available to Americans information about the experience of another advanced, Western democracy with private school subsidies and to relate such information to a theoretical framework, illuminating the American debate on the issue.

Importance of the Study

The American debate about whether or not to provide public aid to private schools is seriously weakened by the lack of empirical data from the United States about how

such policies can be shaped and what effects they have both on education and on society in general. In the absence of such facts, cross-national comparisons offer an important source of information although they must be handled with caution. Some comparative studies exist; however, as already indicated, they deal with countries which differ from the United States in significant ways. Since this issue is an example of a pluralist dilemma, the most appropriate countries for comparison to the United States are large, pluralistic ones.

France is such a country. It has a large and extremely diverse population, for it contains several indigenous linguistic minorities and has also been a major receiver of foreign immigration. Moreover, like the United States, its past was marred by structural pluralism, a form of pluralism in which groups have sharply different levels of access to status and power (Sanday 1976). In addition, among advanced industrial democracies, France shares with the United States the dubious distinction of having the largest gap between the rich and the poor (Reich 1987). France is religiously diverse also, containing significant Moslem, Protestant, and Jewish minorities as well as a large number of politically active free-thinkers. Like the United States, France has legally mandated the separation of church and state.

Finally, France is more divided ideologically than is the United States. Politically it has long suffered from an extreme split between Right and Left which is typical of Latin cultures (Hofstede 1984). It is not surprising, then, that France, like the United States, experienced great political instability during the nineteenth century. However, since the French subscribe with fervor to the ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity and aspire with equal fervor to a role as a major power, they have experienced great tension between their tendency toward social fragmentation and their desire for national cohesion. In short, like Americans, they have acutely suffered the pluralist dilemma.

It is probably not coincidental that in the nineteenth century both the French and the Americans adopted a policy of providing little or no direct aid to private schools. However, unlike their American counterparts, the French changed this policy shortly after World War II. In 1951, with the passage of the Marie and Barangé Acts, they began to offer small vouchers and scholarships to private and public school students alike. Eight years later, the government expanded the program greatly, entering into contractual agreements with private schools for the provision of secular education (Fowler 1987). In the decades since the passage of the Debré Act in 1959, the French government has modified and amended

the policy in various ways; and the question has surfaced as a salient political issue on several occasions. Indeed, in 1984 a reform proposed by a Socialist government provoked one of the largest protest demonstrations in French history. This steadily evolving policy and the highly charged political environment which surrounds it are clearly relevant to the contemporary debate in the United States. Yet, very little on the subject has been published in this country.

This study has made descriptive and analytic information about the French policy accessible to American researchers, policymakers, and theoreticians. Such information serves to illuminate some of the issues in the current American debate. It also suggests ways that private school aid programs can be structured and regulated. In addition, it clarifies some of the interactions between culture and policy which make it impossible for one nation directly to imitate another's policy. Finally, this study provides details about a particular pluralist dilemma as it has evolved in one modern democracy.

Assumptions of the Study

For the purposes of this study, the following assumptions were made:

1. The researcher's knowledge of French language, culture, and politics were adequate for her to carry out the study.

2. Both the United States and France are advanced industrial, pluralistic democracies.

3. The political ideologies and institutions of the United States and France are similar enough to permit meaningful comparisons.

4. French documentary sources available in the United States are representative of the larger body of data available in France.

Limitations and Delimitations

This study was subject to certain limitations and delimitations. Because she had limited time and money, for the most part the researcher limited her selection of documentary materials to those which are available in the United States, either in libraries or in her personal collection. Exceptions to this limitation have been made clear in the chapter on methodology. The study was also limited by the fact that government reporting of financial data on private school costs in France is incomplete and controversial (Corn c and Bouchareissas 1982).

This study was also delimited in certain ways. It was delimited to French private school aid policy between 1959 and 1985. Furthermore, only K-12 policy was studied;

and because specialized French vocational high schools and all schools in Alsace-Lorraine operate within a distinctive legal and financial framework, they were excluded from consideration. The use of an analytical and theoretical framework drawn from the American literature further delimited the study, eliminating such issues as the impact of the policy on French constitutional law.

Definition of Terms

1. Cultural pluralism. Cultural pluralism is a form of pluralism in which members of culturally different groups, though following alternative routes, have equal access to status and power (Sanday 1976).
2. Decree. In the French legal system, a decree is a law which the administration promulgates. It must be signed by the appropriate cabinet minister, the prime minister, and the president and then published in Journal Officiel [Official Journal] (Healey 1974).
3. Efficiency. Efficiency is a political value which includes such concepts as productivity, achievement, excellence, and cost-effectiveness (Kerchner and Boyd 1987).
4. Equality. Equality is a democratic political value which includes such concepts as equality before the law, political equality, equal opportunity, and equality of outcome (Cohen 1971).

5. Freedom. Freedom is a democratic political value which includes such basic liberties as the rights to express one's opinions, join organizations, and select one's religious beliefs. It also covers such free market concepts as the right to make choices and compete freely in the economic system (Cohen 1971).

6. Law. In the French legal system, a law is a piece of legislation which parliament enacts. It must be signed by the president and prime minister and published in the Journal Officiel (Healey 1974).

7. Left. The Left means left-of-center French parties and pressure groups. These include the Socialist Party and its precursors, the French Communist Party, and several smaller groups.

8. Non-sectarian. Non-sectarian is used to translate the French word laïque, an adjective referring to those who advocate a policy of religious, political, and ideological neutrality in government, including public education.

9. Plural society. A plural society is one whose social structure is based on segmentation into groups along such lines of cleavage as language, religion, ideology, class, race, or ethnic origin (van den Berghe 1969).

10. Pluralism. Pluralism and its adjective forms "pluralist" and "pluralistic" refer to any society which is made up of numerous ethnic, social, and economic groups and is thus characterized by "organizational pluralism."

Under democratic regimes, such groups typically compete for power and resources (Dahl 1982).

11. Policy. A policy is a decision by a government about how to reach a particular goal; it usually consists of a number of proposals (Isaak 1987).

12. Right. Right means right-of-center French parties and pressure groups. These include the Union of French Democracy, Rally for the Republic, the National Front, and their precursors.

13. Solidarity. Solidarity is a democratic political value which includes such concepts as fraternity, national unity, social cohesion, and civic consciousness (Cohen 1971).

14. Structural pluralism. Structural pluralism is a form of pluralism in which the constituent groups of the society have differential access to status and power (Lutz and Iannaccone 1978).

Brief Overview of French Political Institutions

Under the constitution of the Fifth Republic, France has both a strong president and a parliamentary legislative system. Popularly elected for a seven year term, the president has several important powers. For example, he or she can withdraw divisive legislation from Parliament and dissolve its lower house, the National Assembly. The president also appoints the Prime Minister

and the Council of Ministers, who as a group comprise the Government (Theen and Wilson 1986).

The legislative branch of the French government is a bicameral Parliament. The indirectly elected Senate is almost powerless. The deputies of the more powerful National Assembly are popularly elected for five year terms. Their terms are brought to a premature end, however, if Parliament is dissolved and new elections held (Theen and Wilson 1986).

France has a multiple party system; four large parties dominate French politics. As a result, virtually all French governments are coalition governments. Political parties develop their platforms and plan their campaigns with potential coalitions in mind. As in most parliamentary systems, party platforms are taken seriously; and governing coalitions are expected to develop legislation consistent with those platforms. The French government develops laws and decrees by means of a form of moderate neo-corporatism. This is a system of interest representation in which major interest groups participate in the policy-making process by engaging in official negotiations with the Government and other groups. The Government then introduces the resulting legislation into Parliament. Because party discipline is expected, the Government is usually certain that its bills will pass. A Majority which hesitates to vote for its own

Government's proposed legislation causes a crisis of confidence. In such a case the Government can demand a show of confidence. Under the French system a Government which feels challenged can demand a show of confidence by declaring that a bill has passed without putting it to an official vote by Parliament. The deputies can then introduce a motion of censure, the passage of which automatically ousts the Government. Such an ouster is likely to provoke the dissolution of the National Assembly as well (Coulter 1984; Dahl 1982; Isaak 1987; Theen and Wilson 1986).

Under the French system the power of judicial review resides in a Constitutional Council. Members of either house of Parliament can request that the Council rule on the constitutionality of a law before it is officially promulgated. Constitutional decisions are usually handed down within a few months (Theen and Wilson 1986).

Questions Answered by the Study

1. How did the policy environment, especially aspects of it relating to theories of pluralism, contribute to the development of France's private school aid policy between 1959 and 1985?

2. How did the political values of freedom, equality, solidarity, and efficiency contribute to the shaping of the policy?

3. What policy mechanisms were used to achieve policy goals between 1959 and 1985?

4. What have been the actual and the perceived effects of the policy on K-12 education in France?

Procedures

The major research methodology was documentary analysis, using primary source materials in the French language. Among the major sources were archival records of the French parliament, French government statistics, and French newspapers. These materials were analyzed thematically, with comparison of information from different sources, including a range of types of data and political positions. An analytic framework, based on American scholarship regarding private school aid, was used to analyze the French legislation.

The major methodology was supplemented by elite interviewing. With the help of personal contacts in France, the researcher set up interviews with sixteen French persons who had been close to the French policy process. These interviews, which were conducted in France, involved the use of an unstructured interview guide in the French language. They focused on the effects and perceived effects of the policy on both private and public education. The expanded interview notes were subjected to

thematic analysis and compared to information from other sources.

The final research report consists of a four chapter historical essay which includes all the elements normally presented in the last four chapters of a dissertation. However, the researcher employed a literary style, "thick description," and verbatim quotations--elements which are characteristic of reports on qualitative research.

Organization of the Study

The study is divided into seven chapters, as follows:

Chapter I. Introduction

Chapter II. Review of Related Literature

Chapter III. Methods and Procedures

Chapter IV. Private School Aid Policy under Conservative
French Governments

Chapter V. Effects and Perceived Effects of Conservative
Policy

Chapter VI. The Mitterrand Administration's Attempts to
Reform the Policy

Chapter VII. Implications for the American Policy Issue

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The proper relationship between government and private education is a persistent dilemma in pluralist democracies. In such polities, the democratic values of freedom, equality, and social solidarity are held in constant tension. On the one hand, the principle of freedom suggests that the groups which make up the society should be at liberty to pursue their own interests, including the establishment of schools. On the other hand, such an exercise of freedom may increase inequality and reduce social cohesiveness. The resulting value conflict has generated a vast literature--one which stretches back to the eighteenth century and includes numerous works not only in English but also in French, German, and Italian. Therefore, it was necessary to limit the scope of this review. Only works in English which appeared in journals available in the United States were included. The initial search was restricted to materials published between 1978 and 1988; however, frequently cited works from earlier periods were also surveyed. The researcher made one exception to these limitations; since current French policy is the subject of this study, she completely reviewed the scholarly literature in English which relates to it. In early 1990, education indexes

were consulted once more, and this review was updated with the inclusion of two additional articles.

The review is divided into four main sections. First, relevant social science theory is discussed. Then the major contemporary arguments for and against public aid for private schools are summarized. The third section presents several analytical approaches to the construction of sound private education policy. The last part contains a summary of comparative policy studies.

Theoretical Framework

The literature on government aid to private schools tends to be ideological and descriptive rather than analytical and theoretical. The literature search revealed only one scholar who had attempted to develop a theory about aid to private education. Estelle James, an economist, conducted several cross-national studies and sketched the outline of a theory in three of her papers. In a comparison of private education in Sweden and Holland, she theorized that the size and nature of non-profit sectors which provide quasi-public goods such as education depend on several variables. Among these she identified cultural heterogeneity, religious diversity, the strength of organized religion, the relative distribution of political and economic power, and the central government's taxing and transfer policies. In

general, she saw a positive relationship between the size of the private sector and cultural heterogeneity, religious diversity, and the strength of organized religion. She argued that these factors explain the fact that less than 1% of Swedish children attend private schools while a majority of Dutch children do so, even though both nations subsidize private education (E. James 1982b). She made a similar, though less detailed, argument in two other papers (E. James 1982a; 1984).

It is apparent that in her theory Estelle James employed concepts borrowed from sociology and political science, although she never articulated this relationship explicitly. It is, therefore, necessary to consider related theories from these two disciplines. Sociologists have long been interested in how societies are structured and in what causes them to hold together or break apart. At the beginning of this century, Durkheim elaborated a theory of social structure involving two forms of solidarity and the social institutions which sustained each (Durkheim 1902). Several decades later, Furnivall (1939) published Netherlands India, a classic study of the social, political, and economic structure of the Dutch East Indies. In the last chapter, he developed a theory of plural societies. Furnivall defined a plural society as one in which two or more social groups live in close proximity without mixing except to carry out economic

functions. Such societies tend to emphasize production rather than social and cultural life. The results are an inability to perceive the needs of the society as a whole and the constant threat of instability. Plural societies usually try to resolve these problems in one of four ways, or in some combination of them: a caste system, regulation through law, nationalism, or federalism. Furnivall identified the United States as a plural society because of racial segregation and argued that Americans had sought to solve the problem primarily through law (Furnivall 1939).

In the late 1960s, a group of sociologists enlarged upon Furnivall's plural society theory. These included Kuper (1969), Mazrui (1969), and Smith (1969a; 1969b). A good synthesis of their views can be found in van den Berghe (1969). He identified two basic features of plural societies: segmentation into groups which frequently, but not always, have different cultures and a compartmentalized social structure which includes parallel institutions. Associated with pluralism are a number of other features such as a weak value consensus, cultural heterogeneity, intergroup conflict, the relative importance of social integration through coercion and/or economic interdependence, and a tendency for one group to be politically dominant. Unlike Furnivall, however, van den Berghe believed that plural societies could adopt a

variety of strategies to promote social cohesion. Among these he mentioned encouraging intergroup relationships, facilitating mobility between groups, promoting consensus on norms and values, and seeking to guarantee equal educational opportunities for all. Van den Berghe argued that all modern nations are plural to some extent, since they all include diverse linguistic, religious, political, ethnic, and social class groups. He described the United States as "moderately" plural (van den Berghe 1969).

Van den Berghe and his colleagues did not specifically link their theory to education, although they did mention the school system as one institution which might not be shared by all groups in a plural society. In 1976, Sanday made an explicit connection between plural society theory and American educational policy. Pointing out that in 1970, 21% of the youngsters in American public schools belonged to ethnic minorities, she argued that a central policy problem in the United States relates to the fact that its social structure is not simply pluralistic; it also reveals a clear pattern of structural pluralism. This form of pluralism is one in which certain groups are excluded from the most valued political positions and occupations. She carefully distinguished structural pluralism from social pluralism. She argued that educational policymakers need to be aware of this difference and of its implications for society as a whole.

It is apparent that sociologists have developed a theory of social structure which expands and deepens Estelle James's concept of cultural heterogeneity. Recently, political scientist Robert Dahl, long known for his theories about political pluralism, developed a theory of organizational pluralism which meshes well with sociological theory (Dahl 1982). Like van den Berghe, Dahl believed that all modern nation-states contain diverse elements. As long as such countries have authoritarian governments, these divisions may remain quiescent; but the advent of democracy causes various autonomous organizations to arise. These groups include political parties, religious organizations, educational institutions, trade unions, commercial associations, and others. They tend to form along the most salient lines of social cleavage, such as language, class, religion, race, and ethnicity. These subsystems pose a dilemma for democratic governments. They are very desirable because they advance freedom, enhance human life, and provide a check on governmental power. They are also very dangerous because they threaten the well-being of society in several ways. If unchecked, they can create and maintain social inequality. They tend to weaken the civic consciousness of the populace, making it difficult for it to discern the public interest. They are likely to deform the public agenda; and, if they become too powerful, activities

which should remain under public control may be alienated to the private sector. The dilemma arises from the need to develop policies which give organizations appropriate autonomy while also maintaining sufficient control over them. As Dahl (1982) suggested, this pluralist dilemma "is a universal problem in modern democracy" (p. 30).

Implicit in Dahl's theory is a value conflict between the democratic principle of freedom, which tends to promote autonomous organizations, and the principles of equality and solidarity, which tend to imply control of them. Iannaccone (1987) linked this value conflict to educational policy in a discussion of the shift from equity to excellence in American educational politics. He then made this theoretical assertion: "Ideas operate as the proximate driving force in American politics. . .and consequently in the politics of education. . . . Policy rest[s] upon value-laden public beliefs. . . ." (p. 49). He identified these values as the three derived from the French Revolution--freedom, equality, and fraternity--along with a fourth which he variously labelled "achievement," "excellence," and "productivity," but which other scholars have called "efficiency" (Coplin and O'Leary 1981; Dahl 1985; Kerchner and Boyd 1987). According to Iannaccone, the relative importance of these values changes cyclically, not only in the United States, but throughout the Western world. From 1932 until about

1980, the dominant policy value was equality; then a shift occurred. Today, the major policy value is freedom. One of the correlates of freedom in the policy arena is the demand for greater reliance on the private sector; in education this means an increased interest in private schooling.

Similarly, Guthrie and Koppich (1987) saw educational policy as shaped by the values of equality, efficiency, and liberty. In their view the public's relative concern for these values shifts regularly, and the "balance among the three flows in a fluid fashion with one or two values ascending in significance only later to be subordinated. . .to one or both of the others" (p. 37). The current movement for a voucher system to aid private schools is, in their estimation, a manifestation of the present ascendancy of liberty.

Taken together, these theories suggest that the more pluralistic a society is, and the higher the relative value which it places on freedom, the more likely it is to permit or encourage the growth of a private education sector. If, however, a pluralistic society is also democratic, the existence of private schools poses a threat to the other democratic values of equality and solidarity. Therefore, in developing policies relating to private education, democratic polities are likely to seek a balance between granting some autonomy to private

schools while controlling them in various ways. This may take the form of permitting them to exist, while granting them little or no direct financial aid. It may also take the form of both subsidizing and regulating them. Since the ideological values upon which democracy is based change in relative importance over time, it is likely that many democratic societies will find it difficult to reach a permanent resolution of the private education issue. The question of public subsidies for private schools is a specific instance of Dahl's pluralist dilemma of autonomy and control. This dilemma is likely to be a persistent and recurring one.

Arguments For and Against Aid to Private Education

Much of the literature consists of arguments for and against aid to private schools. As one might expect, most, though not all, of the advocates of aid defend their position by asserting that it will advance some form of freedom. Opponents typically respond with arguments based on other fundamental democratic values.

One of the oldest arguments for public aid to private education is that it is essential to religious freedom. Thiessen (1982) considered that "the monolithic state system of education prevailing in North America" (p. 58) violates religious freedom because public schools teach their students secular humanism. He suggested three

possible solutions: developing religiously pluralistic curricula; permitting the various schools in a district to emphasize different religions; and abolishing public education altogether and relying on subsidized private schools.

Vitullo-Martin and Cooper (1987) took a somewhat different approach. They provided a lengthy analysis of the impact of the 1985 Aguilar v. Felton decision, which overturned portions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. They concluded that Title I services to children attending parochial schools had been severely curtailed, causing a "chilling effect on religious freedom" (p. 76). They believed that the decision raised issues relating to parents' and children's rights to practice their religion and the right of religious organizations to teach.

Finally, Scalia (1981) advanced the opinion that the Supreme Court's decisions on tuition tax credits and vouchers are simply wrong. He also suggested that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is "in a state of utter chaos" (p. 173) and asserted that limiting financial support to public schools impairs the religious freedom of those parents and children who prefer religious schools.

At one time, most scholars would probably have pointed out that the above positions are almost certainly unconstitutional; recent writers, however, tend to

approach the constitutional issue gingerly. Anthony (1987) summarized the most significant cases in this area, including Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education (1930), Everson v. Board of Education (1947), and Mueller v. Allen (1983). She analyzed Rehnquist's opinion in the last case and O'Connor's dissent in Felton, concluding that they reveal a strong tendency toward political conservatism. She suggested that the emerging "original intent" doctrine and the dissenting opinions of the 1980s are laying the groundwork for decisions in the 1990s which will find aid to parochial schools constitutional. She believed, however, that the change would be gradual and suggested that "one can expect a gradual chipping away at previous 'parochial aid' decisions rather than a total renunciation of those rulings" (Anthony 1987, 604). Similarly, Anderson (1981) noted such a trend, which is encouraged by the fact that the growing financial difficulties of private schools are causing state legislatures to fear that they may close if not assisted. McCarthy (1985) described the court as following a cyclical pattern, alternating between strict separation and accommodation. She detected a distinct trend toward accommodation in recent cases. Thus, legal scholars seem to perceive the question of the constitutionality of public aid to private schools as in flux and unpredictable.

Another traditional argument for subsidizing private schools is that government schools hamper the development of intellectual freedom. Spring (1982) traced his view that public education is "one of the major obstacles to the free development and expression of ideas" (p. 33) back to such earlier libertarians as Priestley, Godwin, and Watt. According to him the unavowed purpose of public education is to develop political docility among the population; he therefore suggested that destroying it would "revitalize U.S. political life" (Spring 1982, 39). In opposition to this argument, Apple (1982) invoked a form of solidarity. He stated that the government was suffering a loss of legitimacy and as a result would be delighted to export its educational crisis into the marketplace. Although vouchers would partially break governmental power, they would also fragment those political organizations which are currently seeking to bring about change. He therefore concluded that "tax credits and voucher systems are contradictory" to meaningful change in American education (Apple 1982, 534).

A third freedom is the freedom of association, or the right to choose the people with whom one will have contact. This value is the major assumption behind Coleman and Hoffer's 1987 book, Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Communities. These authors argued that at one time American communities were "functional,"

homogeneous ones whose local schools were therefore able to communicate values consistent with the values of the home. However, this is no longer true. Functional communities based on residence have been destroyed, and today value communities develop around other dimensions, such as religion. According to Coleman and Hoffer (1987), private schools are more effective than public ones, because their homogeneity causes them to possess the type of social capital which develops in "functional communities with intergenerational closure" (p. 231). The great heterogeneity of public schools, their size, and the complexity of their goals make it difficult for them to offer such benefits to their students. Because many young people today are poorly embedded in both family and community, private schools can offer them an extremely valuable educational experience. Glazer (1983) offered a similar, though less elaborate, argument for private schools as homogeneous settings. However, he carefully explained that he sought homogeneity of values rather than of race or class.

One of the most popular contemporary arguments for aid to private schools is based on a combination of the values of freedom and efficiency. In Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman (1962) devoted a chapter to the role of government in education. He argued that a government had a bona fide reason for requiring that its citizens be

educated, and that it could legitimately subsidize education, but that it should not operate a school system. Instead, it should provide vouchers which parents could use to purchase education for their offspring. Friedman advocated an unregulated, free-market voucher system, in which the government would do no more than inspect schools to see that they met minimum standards, much as it inspects restaurants. Such an approach would promote competition, thereby expanding parental choice, encouraging educational diversity and meeting consumer demand with great efficiency. It might even reduce government spending on education and would have the additional benefit of rewarding meritorious teachers while punishing mediocre ones. Friedman brushed aside several objections to his proposal as conflicting "with the preservation of freedom itself" (p. 90). Friedman's general position has attracted numerous supporters. For instance, West (1982a) argued that public education is a monopoly and a product of "collectivization," supported mainly by teachers' associations. Private schools, in contrast, have to compete for students so cost only half as much as their public counterparts. In another article he outlined the most favorable political and economic situation for passing voucher legislation which, in his view, would weaken the inefficient public education

bureaucracy and greatly reduce per pupil expenditures (West 1982b).

Chubb and Moe (1986; 1987) also seem to be followers of Friedman, for they too have argued that markets are inherently more efficient than political systems. However, unlike Friedman and West, they based their argument on a piece of research. Using the High School and Beyond (HSAB) study, they identified 500 schools and sent questionnaires to their principals and to thirty teachers in each school. The questions related to organizational characteristics defined in the effective schools literature as typical of good schools. They found that public schools are more bureaucratic than private ones, that their principals have less autonomy, that their parent groups are less supportive, that they emphasize basic literacy rather than academic excellence, and that their staffs are not very cohesive. The researchers concluded that public schools conform less well to the standards of school effectiveness than do private ones. In their conclusion, they did not openly call for a market system or voucher plan, but such a recommendation was certainly implied by their statement that "public schools are captives of democratic politics. . . .the key to public school improvement may well be to break the bonds of democratic politics" (Chubb and Moe 1987, 140).

Friedman and his disciples have attracted much criticism, and their arguments have been thoroughly analyzed. Perhaps the most widely cited attempt at refutation is Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970). In this short book the author argued that competition is not the only mechanism which can encourage improvement in the marketplace. Dissatisfied consumers have two choices: they can exit, i.e. choose another supplier; or they can express their dissatisfaction and seek to improve the situation. Hirschman suggested that, especially for public services like education, Friedman's competitive model was inadequate. A readily available alternative to public education, such as subsidized private schools, might not stimulate public schools to compete at all. Instead, it might drain off those very clients who, lacking an exit option, would fight hardest to improve the system. Hirschman (1970) identified exit as a choice which was particularly appealing to Americans and asserted that "the realization that a tight monopoly is preferable under certain circumstances to a looser arrangement in which competition is present comes hard to a Western economist" (p. 55).

Many other scholars have criticized the free market argument. Fisher (1982) and Whitty (1984) contended that such an approach would greatly increase both economic and social inequality. Citing the voucher experiment carried

out at Alum Rock, California, in the early 1970s, Olivas (1981) suggested that the inequality would result in large part from the fact that information about schools would be less accessible to the poor than to the wealthy. Weeres (1987) argued that many of the problems of American education result, not from bureaucratic monopoly, but from the fact that numerous local districts already compete in an educational marketplace. This competition has already segmented American communities. The way to improve education is thus to encourage more "civic behavior," not more competition. Finally, Wise and Darling-Hammond (1984) advanced the idea that ultimately a voucher system would reduce the freedom of private schools. Even under vouchers, the same political forces would be active which are active now, they suggested. Those forces would eventually insist on regulating subsidized private schools much as they currently regulate public ones.

In the early 1980s, Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore published two works which offered research evidence in support of their contention that private education is more efficient than public. Since these two works, Public and Private High Schools (1981) and High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared (1982) were published at almost the same time and contained similar assertions, only the more recent one will be discussed in detail. In their second work, Coleman, Hoffer, and

Kilgore began by laying out the policy premises which underlie both increasing and decreasing the role of private education. Among the premises in favor of encouraging the development of the private sector, they emphasized its personal, orderly environment. As reasons for limiting private education, they mentioned equality and solidarity issues. Their analysis of the HSAB data led them to conclude that private schools are indeed more efficient than public ones and somewhat more divisive along race and class lines. However, they pointed out that since American public schools are "highly stratified," the current system "has few resemblances to the common school ideal. . . ." (p. 196). It should be made clear that the authors did not explicitly recommend public aid to private schools in their books; however, since Coleman is a well-known supporter of vouchers (Heyns 1981), their work has been interpreted by the scholarly community as "evidence. . . assembled to support a particular policy recommendation" (Bryk 1981, 507).

Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore's two books provoked a storm of controversy. In this summary, reactions to one or both of the books will be discussed together. One of the most common criticisms was methodological. Braddock (1981) argued that the researchers ignored the important variable of the racial composition of student bodies. Lomax (1985) accused them of using an inadequate

theoretical model of the variables which produce academic achievement. Murnane (1981) suggested that probably no statistical technique could adequately correct for the fact that private school students are self-selected. Finally, Willms (1984) claimed that Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore had handled nonrandom missing data incorrectly. He also raised the possibility that the HSAB study was invalid as a measure of high school achievement and that it might really measure elementary school achievement.

Several researchers offered studies of their own or reanalyses of the HSAB data in support of their contentions that the conclusions drawn by Coleman and his colleagues were wrong. Lomax (1985) developed his own theoretical model of school achievement and used it to analyze the HSAB data for the senior class of 1980. He found that when all relevant variables were controlled, public school students achieved better than their private school peers. Willms (1984) reanalyzed the HSAB data also. His major finding was that there was a wide range of achievement within both sectors and that both sectors contained poor and excellent schools. He found a few small, but significant, achievement differences favoring private schools; but argued that parents selecting a school needed to evaluate each institution "on an individual basis" (p. 133). Bickel and Chang (1985), using Educational Testing Service data from Florida, found

that public schools severed the connection between home background and English and mathematics achievement slightly better than did private ones. Finally, Bickel (1986) analyzed a random sample of the scores of students who took the Scholastic Aptitude Test in 1983-84. He found an advantage for black students in private schools, but Hispanics and lower income white students tended to achieve better in public schools. The differences were not great.

One of the most thoughtful responses to Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore was offered by Murnane (1981; 1984), who described himself as an economist who was interested in the possibilities of private education but disturbed by some approaches to the problem. He argued that comparisons between private and public school achievement were meaningless because of the different regulations governing each sector. In particular, he suggested that compulsory education laws and the fact that public schools do not charge tuition combine to sort all students who do not attend private schools into public ones, leading to very different clienteles. He warned that attempts to assign some unmotivated students to private schools would probably lower their achievement, concluding that there are some trade-offs among efficiency, quality, and access which Coleman and his co-authors did not address.

More recently, Ornstein (1989) reviewed the literature on private-public school comparisons, using the school effectiveness literature as a theoretical framework. He found that on most of these indicators of educational efficiency, private schools had a slight but definite advantage over public ones. He concluded that in large American cities many parents are choosing private education because they consider it of higher quality than the programs offered in urban public schools. He expressed some concern over the trend, believing that it was one which should be studied carefully by education researchers.

In concluding this discussion, two proposals for aid to private schools which sought carefully to balance the values of freedom and equality must be considered. Christopher Jencks (1972) developed a regulated voucher plan in the early 1970s. Jencks's scheme involved establishing an Educational Voucher Agency which would issue vouchers to parents; poor children's vouchers would be worth more than those of others. Parents could choose any school in the district, public or private. Schools would have to accept all applicants for admission. If they had more applicants than places, half of the places would be filled by lottery; and the final student body would have to contain a percentage of minority students equal to the percentage of minority applicants. Schools

could not charge extra tuition. Jencks believed that his plan would encourage a beneficial competition among schools, increase poor people's choices, and lead to educational diversity.

Several years later, Coons and Sugarman (1978) published Education by Choice. They based their argument for a regulated voucher scheme primarily on the values of freedom and equality: "Our objective for education is equality of freedom" (p.2). Their proposal was similar to Jencks's in several ways, including student selection by lottery and a ban on tuition. The government would have to approve participating schools, but this approval would be restricted to considerations of fraud, safety, and minimal educational standards. Coons and Sugarman were especially worried about the possibility of resegregation and advocated strict regulation to prevent it.

Unlike Friedman's voucher plan, those proposed by Jencks, Coons, and Sugarman have gone beyond the earliest stage of the policy process. A version of the Jencks plan was implemented in California, and the other proposal was the object of a California petition drive in 1979-80. Catterall (1984a) discussed both of these episodes, elaborating on the major argument against regulated vouchers--they have no constituency. The Office of Economic Opportunity backed the Jencks approach and sought to implement it in several districts; however, enthusiasm

for participating in this experiment was noticeably lacking. Only Alum Rock, California, was willing to try it; and in that community private schools refused to participate because they feared a loss of autonomy. The public school system implemented the plan; but it was far from popular with teachers, administrators, and blacks. Parent groups were skeptical, and the poor were uninterested. Similarly, Coons and Sugarman worked hard to generate support for their petition drive to place a regulated voucher plan on a California ballot but failed because they found few supporters. Thus, Catterall concluded that there is no political constituency for regulated voucher plans.

Analytical Discussions of Policy Construction

Several American scholars have utilized analytical approaches to the problem of constructing sound private school aid policy. These authors believe that good private school policy requires balancing a number of values while safeguarding the integrity of both educational sectors.

For example, Levin (1983) argued that private school policy is a "basic paradox" (p. 19) in American democracy which can be resolved only by finding the right equilibrium between choice and the democratic purposes of schooling. In the nineteenth century a workable solution

was found, which was acceptable for a long time; but a number of factors, including desegregation, attempts at financial equalization, the removal of religious practices from the schools, and economic decline have created a disequilibrium. According to Levin, all proposed systems of choice must be evaluated on the basis of how well they support a common core of education for all children. In his view, vouchers probably cannot achieve such a policy goal; however, he argued that the schools do need to meet contemporary demands for greater choice and responsiveness. As possible approaches, he recommended open enrollments, public schools of choice, or providing a common educational core in the public sector while issuing "mini-vouchers" for the purchase of additional private educational services.

An economic model for why people choose private education was offered by Gemello and Osman (1983), who indicated that a crucial issue in policy construction was the threat of major enrollment shifts into the private sector. They argued that demand is affected by the interaction of three variables: price, income, and taste. Raising tuition would decrease demand, while reducing it would increase demand and, probably, private school enrollments. Schools could also increase the supply of desirable educational services (and therefore the demand for them) by such indirect methods as decreasing class

size. All these factors would have to be taken into account in devising a policy.

King (1982) studied a private school in New Mexico which had experienced declining enrollments for several years before launching a program to recruit large numbers of new students. He advanced the argument that sound policy involved striking a balance between diversity, efficiency, and equity and recommended an analytical framework which included these values for evaluating proposals for funding private schools. Among the major issues as King perceived them were admission policies, tuition charges, catering to specialized tastes, overregulation of private schools, and the potential loss of funding and enrollment in the public sector.

Doyle (1981b) considered the major challenge to be developing a policy which would encourage two healthy education sectors. For him the major policy questions were equity, access, excellence, flexibility, feasibility, expense, and the regulation of the private sector. He also offered to other researchers a potentially useful typology of aid to private schools. He thought that aid programs usually took one of four forms. They might involve direct transfer payments to institutions or transfer payments to schools on the behalf of students. On the other hand, payment could be directly to the students' parents, or it could be indirectly transferred

in other ways. In his judgment, the first two types would almost certainly be found unconstitutional by any foreseeable Supreme Court; yet they would also most facilitate the regulation of the private sector. He considered it ironic that "those schemes most likely to be found constitutional are those least subject to close public regulation and scrutiny" (p. 76).

Like Doyle, Hirschhoff (1985) thought it crucial to consider the interests of both sectors in developing policy. She described the major issues as striking the correct balance between public and private schools in a mixed system and determining what kinds of differences between them would be promoted and prohibited. Constructing a sound policy depended on answering several questions: What values should a mixed system serve? How should those values be defined? How well does the current system realize those values? How should the private sector be regulated? Hirschhoff understood the major value conflict as one between parental choice and the promotion of social cohesiveness.

Levy (1985) also stressed the importance of considering "the juxtaposition of the two sectors" (p. 18) in shaping policy. He argued that if either sector felt threatened with decline, bitter competition could develop, especially if the two sectors competed for the same clientele or programs. In his view three major

policy choices had to be made. The first was deciding whether or not to provide aid to private schools. If a positive decision were reached, then the degree and shape of the regulation of private education would be a major consideration. It would also be necessary to develop regulations about establishing new institutions and courses of study which would apply to both sectors.

Muller (1983) stressed the tension between the need to promote common values and the desire to give expression to pluralism, seeing this tension as a central one in American education. She expressed concern about the inequalities which aid to private schools might encourage. Thus, she argued that in policy construction, barriers to access such as tuition, transportation, admissions criteria, and information would have to be considered seriously. She feared that such aid programs might reduce funding for public schools in two ways. Much money currently allocated to public education might be allocated to the private sector. Moreover, such a system of financing might weaken the parent and teacher groups which lobby for public school funds. Policymakers would have to consider both eventualities seriously.

Finally, Murnane (1985) discussed a number of issues which should be addressed if aid to private schools is implemented. He considered the central value conflict to be between access and quality. In analyzing this

conflict, he described three sorting mechanisms which operate in both sectors: self-selection by the family, school dismissal policies, and school admission policies. The ability to choose a private school in the first place depends on two factors: the ability to pay and the desirable attributes of the child. Therefore, Murnane identified several crucial questions relating to the supply response of private schools to government aid: Would tuitions change? If so, how? Where would new private school teachers come from? How would admission policies change? In Murnane's view, the design of the regulations for a government aid system would be crucial to its success. He concluded with this statement:

The implementation of a regulatory strategy that successfully balances demands for access and quality requires not only creative design, but also extraordinary political skills in building support for the proposed design. Without the exercise of significant political skills, the final regulatory policy is more likely to reflect the balance of power among the participants than the original regulatory design. (P. 149)

In conclusion, it is evident that shaping a successful private school aid policy would be a challenging task which would demand serious attention to a number of complex factors. These factors include basic values, supply and demand mechanisms, and the political environment.

Comparative Policy Studies

It is not surprising that, in their search for guidelines for altering current private school aid policies, American researchers have turned to foreign models. Almost all Western democracies subsidize private education, so numerous examples are available for analysis. Understandably, American researchers have concentrated on two English-speaking countries, Australia and Canada. Australia has received the most attention and was involved in a U.S.-Australia Education Policy Project at Stanford in the early 1980s (Bailey 1981). The best overall historical and factual information about Australia's policy is provided by Sherman (1982; 1983). Australia, which modelled its constitution on that of the United States, established a "free, compulsory, and secular" public school system in the 1870s and eliminated all aid to other schools (Sherman 1982, 393). The constitution was interpreted as prohibiting federal aid to religious schools. In the early 1950s, however, rising enrollments and financial problems in both sectors led to the adoption of federal income tax deductions for private school parents. In the 1960s funding was expanded to cover science laboratories and apparatus; in the 1970s a much more extensive aid program was implemented. Today, both private and public schools receive block grants to cover their general operating and capital costs. The

funding level of the public sector is used to set levels for private schools. The latter qualify for one of three levels of assistance, depending on their other resources. Although there was considerable opposition to the policy at first, Sherman argued that it was now well accepted by the public. Government school enrollments have dropped, however, and the Catholic system is building new schools in suburban areas. In general, Sherman evaluated the program positively and as one worthy of American emulation. In his view, the conditions for a successful plan are that all schools must be perceived as receiving aid and that private school benefits should not be "seen as dominating the total package" (Sherman 1982, 402). He recommended that Americans seeking aid for private education use the incremental approach which has been so successful in Australia.

Other Americans have not assessed the Australian program as favorably as Sherman did. For example, Bailey (1981) asserted that the issue was still a very divisive one in Australian politics. Nor did he see the incremental approach to policy as desirable. He argued against "back[ing] into such financing through the potentially regressive devise [sic] of tax credits" (p. 15).

Smart (1986) did an analysis of the Hawke Labor Government's private education policies between 1983 and 1986. He found that in spite of the facts that the Labor

Party officially opposed aid and that serious funding inequities had developed during the 1970s, the Hawke Government refused to seek meaningful reforms. The main reasons were economic problems and the high political cost of attacking private education. In Smart's opinion the private school policy was still divisive in the mid-1980s and was contributing to growing educational inequalities.

Boyd (1987), an American who spent several months in Australia on a Fulbright Fellowship, also questioned Sherman's positive evaluation of the Australian program. He did not believe that the Australian policy, which includes minimal regulation, struck a proper balance between the values of excellence, choice, and equal opportunity. He found that by the late 1970s federal aid to private schools was proportionately higher than that provided to public ones and that funds increasingly went to elite private schools. He believed that the policy was generating divisive issues of class and privilege and that middle class students were increasingly skimmed off the top of the public school system. Even many Socialists and public school leaders sent their children to private schools. Boyd concluded that there was no easy solution to the problem of aid to private education. He did, however, argue that a successful American policy would depend on finding a middle ground between laissez-faire and extreme regulation of the private sector. He was not

optimistic about the ability of the American policy-making process to produce such a result.

Jones (1983), another American who spent a long period of time in Australia, interviewed ten Australian policymakers about private school aid policies. He found that private schools were regarded as academically superior to and higher in status than public ones. Public schools, however, were seen as offering contact with a broad cross-section of the general population. Respondents expressed concern about social class divisiveness, but some also felt that the policy had led to increased public satisfaction with education. Some of the interviewees pointed out that, although there was more diversity between schools in the private sector, within individual private schools the pressures on students and teachers to conform were very great. Jones made no policy recommendations but offered his findings as additional descriptive information about private education policy.

Foon (1988), an Australian scholar, compared the issues surrounding private school subsidies in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Her goal was to seek to illuminate Australian issues through a comparative study. She found that similar issues could be found in all five countries, although certain questions were more important in some countries than in others. She was especially concerned

about the fact that in Australia private school enrollments were proportionately considerably higher--at 25.2%--than in the other four countries and discussed some policy issues related to enrollment. Like many other researchers, she was of the opinion that private education would be a source of controversy in developed Western democracies for a long time to come.

Scholars who write about the Canadian situation face a difficult problem--the Canadian provinces utilize five different approaches to the issue. In all of them, however, private schools, including religious ones, receive subsidies. This diversity can be traced to the British North America Act of 1867. The establishment of the Canadian nation raised a particularly severe version of the pluralist dilemma since the population included not only various immigrant groups of several religious persuasions but also a large, indigenous linguistic minority which was determined not to be assimilated (Wilson and Lazerson 1982). British Columbia, however, adopted the American approach and then abandoned it in 1978 when it began to provide \$500 vouchers to private school students. As a result, researchers have concentrated on that province.

Three years after British Columbia's voucher plan went into effect, Macias and Erickson (1981) reported on their study of school leaders' perceptions of the consequences

of the policy. They based their analysis on data from a questionnaire which had a very low response rate and on interviews with 78 key informants from both sectors. Private school leaders believed that the funding had assured their financial survival. In 84% of the cases they had not used the money to reduce tuition, but rather to expand the curriculum and raise teacher salaries. They thought that they were now more respected by the general public. They were, however, concerned about a loss of autonomy, especially if the Left came to power. A large majority of the public school leaders believed that the policy had had few effects on public education. However, the prevailing view was that the program was "unfair and placed the public school at a disadvantage. . . ." (Macias and Erickson 1981, 14). They feared an eventual loss of enrollment and of better students. A large minority (43%) believed that since the implementation of the program, criticism of public schools had increased.

Erickson (1982) studied the effects of aid on the social climate of private schools. In 1977 he and an associate had used a questionnaire to study how parents and teachers in British Columbia perceived the differences between public and Catholic schools. Almost all saw Catholic schools as having more committed parents and teachers than public ones. They also believed that such schools were characterized by a sense of cohesiveness and

purpose usually lacking in the public sector. A replication of the survey in 1980 (after two years of government aid) revealed that this perception had changed dramatically; Catholic schools were now seen as much less committed and cohesive than previously. Erickson concluded that the sense of jeopardy and distinctiveness which had characterized Catholic schools before they accepted aid had probably contributed to their positive social climate and theorized that with aid they might lose their unique characteristics.

In a further study of British Columbia and Manitoba, Erickson (1985) found once again that government aid tended to deprivatize schools, "obliterating numerous characteristics which elsewhere distinguished Catholic schools from public schools" (p. 99). These changes might have been partially due to regulation, though in British Columbia the regulations were minimal. Erickson predicted that under subsidization parents might become increasingly dissatisfied with private schools.

Brown (1982) concentrated on the financial effects of public aid to British Columbia's private schools. After one year of what he described as a variation of the Friedman voucher plan, he found a slight enrollment shift toward the private sector. His analysis suggested that although the administrative costs of the plan were minimal, the savings were minimal also.

Lawton (1986) studied Ontario. This province has long subsidized religious schools, but until 1984 only elementary schools received assistance. The extension of aid to Roman Catholic secondary schools in that year provoked a major political battle. Lawton discussed several implications of the implementation of choice. He pointed out that choice always means some form of exclusion and that it also inevitably removes some issues from public control. Since choice programs reallocate resources, more choice for some will probably mean less choice for others. Finally, he argued that it might be difficult to avoid religious divisiveness in choice programs. He concluded that in both the United States and Canada the courts would ultimately decide who could choose.

The Dutch situation has been extensively studied by an American economist, Estelle James (1982a; 1984). Much of her research has been carried out in the Netherlands with the cooperation of Dutch officials. In the nineteenth century, Dutch education was a secularized public monopoly. However, the growing power of a conservative Protestant church ultimately led to a political coalition between this group and Roman Catholics. The result was the establishment in 1917 of separate, but equal, school systems, all completely subsidized by the government. Today, Dutch education is divided into three roughly equal

sectors: Protestant, Catholic, and public. This policy has, of course, divided the population along religious lines, but not along economic ones. Estelle James evaluated the policy as relatively successful, primarily because of heavy central government regulation of both the inputs and outputs in all three sectors. For example, the government pays all teachers' salaries, maintains equal pupil-teacher ratios, requires a uniform curriculum, and administers the same national examinations to all students. James found it hard to obtain reliable financial data, but estimated that this system was not as cost-effective as a purely public one would be. She suggested that such heavy regulation probably would not be acceptable in the United States. In a related study she compared the Dutch situation to that in Sweden where, in spite of government subsidies, the private sector has remained very small. She attributed this fact to Sweden's homogeneity and egalitarianism (E. James 1982b).

France is another country whose private school aid policy has been studied by others. Like the United States, Australia, and British Columbia, France established a free, compulsory, secular public school system in the late nineteenth century and subsequently eliminated private school subsidies. Like the United States, France also follows a policy of church and state separation. In 1951 it adopted a voucher and scholarship

plan, followed in 1959 by the Debré Act and the extension of massive aid. Some research on the French policy has appeared in English, although it has not been as intensively studied as the policies of Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. In 1962, Ryan published a short article in a Catholic journal. After lamenting the dearth of English language material on the 1959 Debré Act, he summarized the history of the French struggle over the private school issue from 1789 to 1959. He briefly described the terms of the new policy and identified the political issues which Catholics had used in their campaign for financial assistance. Ryan concluded with some advice for American Catholics:

Such a Law and such tactics used by the Catholics of France to secure its enactment can be studied profitably by Catholics in the United States, where a similar situation exists. . . . (P. 171)

Eight years later Healey (1970), a Protestant theologian, published an article on the Debré Act. In 1974, he published a book, entitled The French Achievement: Private School Aid, a Lesson for America. Since the article was incorporated into the book, both will be discussed together. Healey's work was based largely on research he did in France during 1964-65. It had certain strengths: he used many primary sources and provided a good description of the law and of the early

years of its implementation. However, his work also had serious limitations. It was flawed by strong bias, as his title suggests. The same bias is reflected in his sources. For example, in his introduction he acknowledged the assistance of five French citizens. Three of these are obscure, but the other two are well known as proponents of the Debré Act. Similarly, his documentary evidence was biased; he relied almost exclusively on material produced by the government and by Catholics. Moreover, by 1974, when his book was published, it was already out of date. A series of 1970 decrees and a 1971 law had modified the policy in ways which many people considered significant. Yet, Healey summarized these changes in two pages, relying uncritically on a government report which minimized them. He also stated that the issue had ceased to divide French society. However, in 1972, a coalition of left-of-center parties had issued a platform calling for an end to the subsidies and the nationalization of all schools which had accepted them. In fact, the issue would remain a source of controversy in French politics for the next thirteen years. Thus, Healey's bias, methodological problems, and ignorance of French politics limited the value of his work.

Nothing more about the French policy appeared in American journals until 1985, when the high salience of the issue in France again attracted the attention of

researchers. Capps and Esbeck (1985) published an article on the regulation of religious schools, using contemporary struggles in France, Spain, and Malta as examples. In two pages about France, they included some useful information about the Mauroy Government's attempt to tighten private education regulations. However, the limited value of their work is suggested by the fact that they relied almost entirely on English language wire service releases for their information.

The next year Teese (1986), an Australian scholar, published an article about how government subsidies had changed French Catholic schools. He provided some descriptive information about policy changes since 1970 although he attempted little analysis. His major emphasis was on the negative changes in the private sector, including bureaucratization, centralization, and increasing similarity to the public system. He especially stressed the private sector's role in reproducing the class structure of French society. Teese's article was flawed by a major methodological defect. He relied almost exclusively on documentary evidence of one type--books and articles by French scholars. Reliance on one form of evidence is usually unwise, but in this case it was especially unfortunate; French scholars tend to be highly politicized leftists, belonging to organizations and political parties which have fought the subsidies since

their inception. Thus, French scholarship relating to this question must be interpreted with caution, a fact of which Teese seemed unaware.

Fowler (1987) provided an update on the French situation and considered five frequently raised American questions in the light of the French experience. Her article presented a broad outline of the French policy as it existed in 1984, and some general information about its effects on both sectors. However, like the other authors who have written on France, she offered description rather than analysis. She did not attempt to explain why French private school enrollments have remained stable for thirty years or what policy assumptions shaped private school regulations. As a result, although she made some information available in English, her article shed little light on the major policy questions.

Conclusion

Although the American literature on government aid to private schools is large, it has certain weaknesses. It tends to be descriptive rather than analytical; it also tends to be based on ideology rather than on research. To a great extent these weaknesses result from the fact that American governments have not subsidized private schools in modern times. As a result, comparative studies in this area are valuable. They provide a source of much needed

evidence about how private school aid policies really work. One major gap in the research is the absence of a careful analysis of the French experience in the American literature.

CHAPTER III

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Policy research is a form of historical inquiry which poses special challenges. Like other types of historical research, it relies heavily on the analysis of documents. Yet the nature of the policy process which generates those documents means that they must be interpreted cautiously. The policy researcher must always remember that public policy is developed in an atmosphere of conflict (Coplin and O'Leary 1981); such conflict typically yields great quantities of written material. Moreover, policy is shaped by individuals who, because they must maintain the support of a constituency, are unlikely to express all of their views for the public record (Majchrzak 1984). Finally, policy issues usually turn on questions of value, and the values involved often inspire deep emotions not only in policymakers but also in policy researchers. The danger of biased interpretation is therefore great.

As a result, policy research raises the dilemmas of the historical method in an acute form. First of all, the researcher is likely to discover a plethora of information--government documents, books, statistical reports, newspaper and journal articles, statutes, and much else--from which a manageable, systematic, and representative selection must be made. In order to solve

this problem, most policy scholars recommend using more than one class of data and making sure that the evidence selected for analysis represents the full range of political opinion (Coplin and O'Leary 1981; Majchrzak 1984; Saran 1985). The researcher must also work with a conscious awareness of the fact that each source is biased and provides only partial information. Thus, it is essential constantly to compare the accounts which are being subjected to analysis (Saran 1985). In addition, the policy researcher must deal explicitly with the problem of value by clearly identifying the values which underlie the issue and also by recognizing his or her own position. As Hogwood and Gunn (1984) put it: "There is no such thing as totally neutral analysis. Values are at the centre of policy-making. . ." (p. 267). Finally, as a check on the written sources themselves, policy researchers recommend conducting elite interviews or surveys in order to obtain information which may not appear in the written record (Coplin and O'Leary 1981; Dexter 1970; Majchrzak 1984; Patton and Sawicki 1986; Saran 1985).

General Research Design

This study is an historical, longitudinal policy evaluation based on an approach described by Coplin and O'Leary (1981) in Basic Policy Studies Skills. The

analysis included four components, each corresponding to one of the research questions listed in Chapter I. First, the policy environment in which the private school aid issue became salient was analyzed. This analysis included a thematic analysis of sociopolitical conditions and a chronology. Coplin and O'Leary (1981) and others stress the importance of identifying the values in any policy debate. Therefore, the second component of this study was an analysis of the evidence in order to determine to what extent the values of freedom, equality, solidarity, and efficiency shaped the French policy debate and the resulting private school aid policy. The third component of the study involved the analysis of written data to determine the structure of the policy and to identify the major policy mechanisms which the French have used in granting public aid to private schools. Finally, the researcher used documentary and interview data to identify both the actual and the perceived effects of the policy. In this analysis, it was important to determine to what extent the policy was actually implemented, how it has impacted on both the public and the private sectors, and how French observers believe that it has affected education.

One advantage of using written data is that they permit time-series comparisons (Webb et al. 1966). Since the French policy has not remained static, but rather has

changed over time, the researcher did three comparative longitudinal analyses. She analyzed the policy as it stood on June 14, 1969, the last day of the De Gaulle presidency; on May 9, 1981, the last day of center-right ascendancy; and on November 13, 1985, the date of the last of the Mitterrand reforms of the policy.

Handling of the French Language

Since one purpose of this research is to make information about French private school aid policy readily accessible to Americans, the researcher kept French words and phrases to a minimum in the body of her report. She translated all direct quotations and the names of government agencies, political organizations, and laws into English. The French equivalents and their acronyms, where applicable, are provided in Appendix A. Titles of French publications mentioned in the body of the report are given in French, followed immediately by an English translation in parentheses the first time they appear.

Discussion of Documentary Sources

Majchrzak (1984) warned potential policy researchers that they could expect to find an overwhelming amount of documentary material on any controversial policy issue. Even though only a portion of the written information generated by the French private school aid debate has

reached the United States, that portion is large, especially since microfilm and interlibrary loan agreements have made many archives and virtually all American library collections accessible to the researcher.

The volume of materials which might be used to study the sociopolitical environment in which the French private school aid policy developed is particularly staggering. The history and politics of the Fifth Republic have been well documented by French, British, and American scholars. Moreover, like all its modern counterparts, the French government produces massive documentation of its activities, much of which is available in this country. In addition, France belongs to a number of international organizations which report regularly on French conditions.

The number of sources which deal directly with the French private school aid issue is smaller, but still impressive. The absolutely essential primary source for any study of French policy, the Journal Officiel (Official journal), is available on microfilm in the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, library. This official publication of the National Assembly, or the lower house of the French Parliament, runs to several thousand pages annually and includes the official texts of the laws, decrees, and regulations relating to the policy, as well as copies of speeches, parliamentary debates, reports, and question and answer sessions about it.

Moreover, since the Journal Officiel includes the government's annual budgets and financial reports, some information about the financing of the program is available in this source also.

The mass media provide another rich data source. Virtually all French daily newspapers for the 1959-1985 period are available on microfilm in the United States. The New York Times and the Times of London, which have covered the French schools question in detail, are available as well. American libraries also carry the major French mass circulation magazines. During times when the issue was salient, these periodicals provided extensive coverage; literally thousands of articles on the issue are available in newspapers and magazines. Another source of data is French scholarly works. American libraries carry the major French social science journals and also acquire major French monographs. In preparing her record inventory, the researcher developed a list of the most frequently cited French journal articles and books on the subject; all of the articles and fourteen of the fifteen books originally identified were available in this country. Moreover, her search also yielded a large number of additional journal articles. Finally, several first person accounts of crucial episodes in the struggle over private school aid have been published.

In planning the research, therefore, the researcher found it necessary carefully to select the sources which she would utilize. In making this selection, she used several principles. In order to choose sources which were very close to the events under study, she decided first to limit materials to those produced between 1959 and 1985 by French citizens. Within that group she gave priority to documents which were produced close in time to the events themselves; except for the question of the effects of the policy, it seemed important to eliminate interpretations which have been imposed on the issue through hindsight, even if the interpreters were close to the original events. Next, it seemed wise to choose those materials which were most easily accessible to the researcher and which would permit the most economical use of her time. Finally, following the recommendations of other researchers, she was careful to select documents which belonged to different classes of data (Webb et al. 1966) and which reflected a range of political opinion (Saran, 1985).

In the following discussion of the sources which were selected for use, each will be linked directly to one of the research questions since most seemed especially pertinent in relationship to specific issues. However, it should be understood that whenever a source yielded information which was directly pertinent to another

question, the researcher felt free to use it in her analysis.

A central part of any policy study is the identification of aspects of the sociopolitical environment which caused the issue to become salient. In carrying out this step of her study, the researcher used several sources. First among these was Annuaire Statistique de la France (Statistical yearbook of France), issued annually by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), a government agency. The Annuaire includes chapters on each major aspect of the French economy, including education. Each consists of a descriptive essay, followed by several pages of official statistics. This source was balanced by three others. L'Année Politique (The political year) is also issued annually; however, it is produced by a private publishing house. This work includes descriptive essays, chronologies of major events, and statistics, including election returns. Since internal evidence suggested that both of the above works have right-of-center tendencies, two left-of-center works were also employed. Vincent's Les Français 1945-1975: Chronologie et Structures d'une Société (The French, 1945-1975: Chronology and structures of a society) (1977) is a one volume work which includes an interpretive summary of events for each year, supplemented by essays on general social conditions,

including the condition of education. For the last few years of the period under study, Mermet's Francoscopie (Francoscopy) (1985), a meta-analysis of French statistical data, media content, and opinion polls from 1973 to 1985 was employed.

The above works contained much chronological information about the schools question, but at times these data were insufficiently detailed for this project. Thus, in constructing the chronology, the researcher used three educational sources which contain detailed educational chronologies: Cornec and Bouchareissas's L'Heure Laïque (The nonsectarian hour) (1982), Lois, réformes, et projets de réformes relatifs à l'enseignement (Laws, reforms, and proposed reforms relating to education) (1984), and La Législation relative à l'enseignement privé (Legislation relating to private education) (1985). Finally, when it became necessary to determine the organizational affiliations of specific policymakers, the researcher relied on Who's Who in France, issued about every five years throughout the period.

The research questions relating to the values underlying the policy and the policy mechanisms were addressed by analyzing information from three sources: a government archival source, Journal Officiel and two newspapers, Le Monde (The world) and Le Figaro (The barber). These two newspapers were selected from the many

available for the following reasons. Both are large Paris dailies which are aimed at educated audiences; both are also independent, i.e. unconnected with the government and political parties. Le Monde is left-of-center, while Le Figaro is politically conservative.

These sources were sampled in the following way. In addressing the question of values, the researcher analyzed the parliamentary debates relating to each of the four private school aid laws and the Savary Bill, which was debated but never passed. Political speeches are considered essential sources for determining such values (Majchrzak 1984). The debate rules followed by the National Assembly made these speeches especially valuable. Debates are organized, with each political group registering a representative speaker. All speakers have a specific amount of time. The fact that speakers may not use notes and can be interrupted by questions from other legislators gives the debates a spontaneous and interactive quality. Verbatim transcripts of these debates are printed in the Journal Officiel within twenty-four hours of their occurrence (Interparliamentary Union 1986). However, as is well known, legislators are unlikely publicly to express views which their constituents might dislike. Therefore, this study of the parliamentary debates was supplemented by a study of newspaper coverage of the private education issue in Le

Monde and Le Figaro during the weeks in which the debates occurred. This material included coverage of the debates, editorial comments on the issue, and position statements by prominent people. Questions of value which the legislators hesitated to address were sometimes raised in these articles.

The Journal Officiel was also used to determine how the policy was structured. In this analysis the exact texts of the four laws, one bill, fifty-one decrees, and two Constitutional Council decisions were essential; all were available in the Journal Officiel. However, the implications of legislation are not always clear, even to those who participated in its development. Thus, Le Monde and Le Figaro were sampled for articles which covered the legislation. These were located by scanning issues of these papers which came out when the laws were introduced and promulgated, when the decrees were published, and when the decisions were handed down.

Finally, two types of documentary sources were studied to determine the effects and perceived effects of the policy. One was official government publications, such as the reports, parliamentary debates, and statements of legislative intent which appear in Journal Officiel. To balance this source, the researcher also studied fourteen scholarly books and fifty-seven scholarly articles which were published between 1960 and 1985. Much of this

material reflects the views of the Left, but some of it, such as the ten articles in Etudes (Studies) and Fontaine's 1978 book present Catholic perspectives. Neo-conservative positions were also presented in such works as Giscard d'Estaing's Education et civilisation (Education and civilization) (1971) and Ballion's books and article (1977; 1980; 1982).

Elite Interviewing Procedures

Elite interviewing is a specialized form of interviewing which is often used with unusually prominent or well-informed respondents. Such individuals typically know more about the subject than does the interviewer. Thus, if the researcher is to gain the valuable knowledge which they have to offer, he or she must give them an opportunity to structure the content of the interview. As a result, a very general interview guide is developed, and the interviewer adopts a strategy of flexibility, hoping to encourage the respondent to reveal little known information (Dexter 1970). Elite French subjects pose special challenges but also offer special opportunities to interviewers. After directing a study which included interviews of 1500 important Frenchmen, Lerner (1956) recommended the scrupulous observance of French etiquette and the development of well-delimited questions set in a clear context. He also suggested that the interviewer be

ready to play a "highly participant" role (p. 194) since French people usually turned their interviews into dialogues and asked for the interviewer's opinions on the issues raised. The result was long, but very richly detailed, interview sessions.

The researcher supplemented her major methodology of documentary analysis with sixteen elite interviews of French people who have been involved in the process of developing private school aid policy. She selected the potential interviewees with the assistance of personal contacts in the French education establishment, both public and private. With the assistance of these people, she developed a list of twenty potential interviewees whom she contacted by letter while still in the United States.

Nineteen of these individuals agreed to be interviewed, but three interviews proved impossible to schedule. Two of these cancellations appeared to be due to genuine scheduling problems. The representative of a center-right political party cancelled her appointment when the party called an emergency strategy session; the head of a private school teachers' union who lived a hundred miles from Paris found it impossible to make a trip to the capital because of the pressures of the end of the school year. The researcher was less certain about the French Communist Party representative; it appeared that his constant busyness may have masked reluctance to

talk to her. Significantly, the single outright refusal came from a retired official of the Ministry of National Education who claimed a heavy schedule--and recommended an official of the Catholic school system in his place. The researcher spent two hours talking to her contact at the National Institute for Educational Research, who had recommended this man. He was glad to talk, but unwilling to recommend anyone else--except representatives of the Catholic schools. The researcher concluded that the Ministry of National Education preferred not to participate in her study. However, the man at the research institute did suggest using En toute liberté (In all freedom) by Alain Savary (1985), Minister of National Education from 1981 to 1984, as an "indirect" source of information about the Ministry's position. Accordingly, the researcher added this book to her sources, balancing it with Gérard Leclerc's (1985) book covering the same period, which was recommended by an official at the General Headquarters of Catholic Education.

The sixteen people who were interviewed represented thirteen organizations: three political parties, three public education unions, two groups which lobby for public education, the General Headquarters for Catholic Education, two private education unions, a private education lobbying organization, and another Catholic educational organization. It should be understood that

private education in France is 90% Roman Catholic and that virtually all subsidized schools are Catholic (Fowler 1987). A list of these organizations is provided in Appendix B.

Since the researcher promised confidentiality to the interviewees, their names cannot be used in this report. However, the following information will suggest their level of knowledge about the subject. All sixteen individuals were leaders in their respective organizations at the national level. Seven headed their organizations, and six others headed the division of their organization which was responsible for developing positions relative to the private school issue. In a few cases, more than one leader in a given organization was recommended and interviewed.

The researcher developed a general interview guide in English, which she translated into French, following the question format used in French opinion polls. She piloted the interview protocol with French acquaintances in Paris and modified it somewhat as a result of their reactions. The final instrument appears in Appendix C. She conducted all of the interviews in the French language; but she used the guide flexibly, letting the interviewees structure the conversation when they wished. During the interviews she took notes in French; afterwards she expanded her notes into a summary which included questions, answers, and a

description of the setting and overall situation. These expansions were done as soon as possible, usually immediately after the interview, but always within twenty-four hours. While doing the first expansion, the researcher made her decision about which language to use. She discovered that it was most natural to her to describe the setting and situation in English, but to expand the interview itself in French. This practice had the advantage of preserving many direct quotations intact. In Appendix D, the expanded notes from two of the interviews appear. In them and in all quotations from the interviews included in the research report the dialogue has been translated into English.

Almost all of the interviewees either recommended books to the researcher or gave her copies of books, articles, and other documents relating to the issue. In several cases these gifts were invaluable since they provided information about the 1981-1985 period, which is not as well documented as the 1959-1981 period. The researcher utilized those donated or recommended materials which seemed especially pertinent, although many are unavailable in American libraries. They are included in the bibliography with the other sources, but are clearly indicated with asterisks.

Methods of Analysis

The analysis was carried out in two steps. While gathering data, the researcher did several forms of preliminary analysis. For the most part she used thematic analysis and comparison; however, in addressing the first and third research questions, she used somewhat more structured forms of analysis.

For example, as she carried out her preliminary analysis of the nature of the sociopolitical environment in which the private school aid issue became salient in France, the researcher developed a chronology of relevant events from January 1, 1959, through December 31, 1985. Major events included such incidents as the passage of legislation, holding of parliamentary debates, issuance of decrees, and handing down of constitutional decisions. Also included were pertinent background events such as national elections, major public school reforms, and significant incidents such as the loss of Algeria or the student riots of May 1968. This chronology was developed on a word processor so that it could be modified as necessary. The chronology was used by the researcher in her reflection on and analysis of data relating to the policy environment and all other data as well. Dahl's (1982) theory of the pluralist dilemma suggests that support for private education should rise as government legitimacy declines and as pluralism in a society

increases. Thus, the analysis of the policy environment focused on these themes. However, since economic conditions and demographics always heavily influence educational policy, these aspects of the policy environment were also considered. The researcher took notes on those four themes, using color-coded cards, so that information from different sources could be readily compared.

In the preliminary analysis of the values involved in the policy debate, the researcher used a thematic analysis based on the values of freedom, equality, solidarity, and efficiency, as well as the cross-cutting issues of autonomy and control. Since the parliamentary debates represent verbatim, naturalistic communication, she photocopied them and color coded them with highlighting pens as transcripts of ethnographic interviews are coded. In analyzing them, she also identified the political affiliations of the speakers and summarized all the major speeches, using the six values as categories for analysis. She took notes on the newspaper articles and color coded those notes with highlighting pens in a fashion consistent with the analysis of the debates. In both analyses she attempted to determine which values were most important in the policy debate and how they were defined by the participants. At times she used frequency counts to facilitate comparison.

The preliminary analysis of the mechanisms embodied in the French private school aid policy did not lend itself to a thematic approach. Therefore, using the issues which American policy scholars have raised and which were discussed in the survey of related literature, the researcher developed an analytical framework to facilitate the study of the policy structure and its evolution over time. This framework appears in Appendix E. It was applied to the laws, decrees, and constitutional decisions; the newspaper coverage of the legislation was used to help determine how the legislation related to the framework.

Finally, the researcher sought to determine the actual and perceived effects of the policy by using a thematic analysis based on issues of freedom, equality, solidarity, efficiency, autonomy, and control. Once again, she color-coded the written data and the interview notes. In carrying out her analysis, she defined actual effects as those for which empirical evidence exists and about which all or almost all parties agreed. Perceived effects were understood as those about which significant disagreement existed or for which no empirical evidence could be found.

In the final stage of her analysis of the materials, the researcher set up twelve folders based on the research questions and the three chronological periods. She decided upon the organizing themes or principles to be

used in writing each section of the dissertation. Then she organized all of her reduced data and developed a numbering code for it so that specific pieces could easily be retrieved. She read through all of the reduced data, listing in code the items which related to each of the organizing principles, and filed these lists in the folders. In writing the dissertation, she retrieved pertinent data for each section, re-read them, compared them, and reflected upon them before writing the section of the research report which related to them.

Throughout the research process, the researcher maintained a research journal in which she recorded questions, hypotheses, and observations as they occurred to her. The following "Statement of Personal Bias" was used in conjunction with the journal.

Statement of Personal Bias

In analyzing and interpreting the data, I will have to bear my own biases and values in mind. In reflecting on my relationship to this research project, I find that I have certain prejudices about private education, aid to private schools, and French culture.

Although I acquired most of my education in public schools, I attended an elite private girls' school for a year and a half and received my bachelor's degree from a private, Ivy League university. Moreover, as an

Episcopalian, I belong to a church which supports a number of private schools. As a result, I have somewhat mixed feelings about private schools. On the one hand, I feel that they are often elitist; on the other, I have benefited personally from high quality private instruction. I also have some sympathy for parents who seek to provide a religious upbringing for their children. Since French public schools are generally considered academically superior to private ones, I do not think that my own appreciation of intellectual achievement will particularly bias my interpretation. However, I may discover a tendency to be too sympathetic toward French Catholic parents.

In preparing my prospectus, I became aware of how highly I value equality and solidarity; I suspect that I value these qualities more highly than do most other Americans. As a result, I have some serious reservations about the possible effects of private school subsidies on public education. I fear that such a policy might lead to the development of a dual school system: an elite, academically oriented, private system frequented largely by the white upper and middle classes and a "charity" public school system attended by less affluent students, many of whom would belong to ethnic minorities. I believe that such a dual system would be harmful both to many individuals and to our nation as a whole. Although I

consider it theoretically possible to design a coherent private school aid policy which would protect the integrity of public education, I believe that the American policy-making process is probably so fragmented that it could not develop such a policy. Thus, in doing this research, I must consciously correct for a tendency to sympathize with French supporters of nonsectarian, public education. This tendency may be especially strong because of my past history of involvement in the National Education Association, which strongly opposes public aid to private schools.

Moreover, while preparing the literature review, I discovered a strong bias against free-market models of education like that advocated by Friedman (1962). Most emphatically, I do not believe that human beings are motivated entirely or even largely by economic motives. In my opinion, ideas, values, and irrational prejudices are extremely important in the determination of human conduct. Thus, in doing this research I shall have to be alert for a tendency to discount and ignore free-market competition arguments in support of public aid to private education.

Finally, I have a bias about French culture which could distort my analysis if I do not consciously take it into account. I greatly admire the French emphasis on intellectual achievement, reason, and long-range planning.

As a result, I may tend to overestimate the rationality of the French policy-making process. Although it is probably somewhat more rational than our own process, it has strong elements of irrationality as well. In carrying out this research, I shall have to look deliberately for these irrational elements in order to avoid interpreting the French policy as more successful than it really is.

Presentation of Final Research Report

The findings of this study are presented in a four chapter historical essay, written in the third person. In this essay the author included all of the elements normally presented in the last four chapters of a dissertation. However, she employed a literary style, "thick description," and verbatim quotations--elements which are characteristic of qualitative research reports.

She organized the essay as follows:

Chapter IV. Private School Aid Policy under Conservative French Governments

The first three research questions are answered in relationship to the policy as it stood on each date. In addition, comparative analyses of the policy as it existed on June 14, 1969, and on May 9, 1981, are included.

Chapter V. Effects and Perceived Effects of Conservative Policy

In this chapter the researcher presents her findings about the effects of the policy on French education during the period under study.

Chapter VI. The Mitterrand Administration's Attempts to Reform the Policy

This chapter includes a discussion of the French sociopolitical environment and policy values in the early 1980s. Comparative analyses of the reform bill which the public rejected in 1984 and of the policy as finally amended in 1985 are presented.

Chapter VII. Implications for the American Policy Issue

In this chapter the researcher discusses the implications of her findings for the American debate about providing government aid for private schools.

CHAPTER IV

PRIVATE SCHOOL AID UNDER CONSERVATIVE FRENCH GOVERNMENTS

Introduction

"Liberté--Egalité--Fraternité! Freedom--Equality--Brotherhood!" In either language the slogan is a stirring one. It is easy to understand why it inspired the idealistic leaders of the French Revolution and why it was later emblazoned on banners and waved over other democratic movements. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that these three words have no significance beyond their ability to move crowds. Political theorists have argued that they summarize the value structure which underlies all democratic polities. As Carl Cohen wrote in his 1971 book, Democracy:

Liberty is a condition for the practice of democracy; equality is central to the justification of democracy; fraternity is a presupposition of the existence of any democracy. (P. 273)

However, political theorists have long been aware of the fact that freedom and equality exist in dynamic tension with each other. Since individuals do not in fact possess equal talent, ascribed social status, or family background, it is dangerous to let them compete in complete freedom for power and resources. Such

competition would increase inequality, jeopardizing the sense of brotherhood, or solidarity, upon which democracy depends. On the other hand, it is also dangerous to seek to impose complete equality, as some of the "people's democracies" of the East have done. Such regimes stifle freedom and may compromise economic efficiency, another value which no modern nation can long afford to ignore. As a result, democratic leaders often face the problem of designing policies which appropriately balance freedom and equality (Kainz 1984; Nielson 1985).

Robert Dahl, long famous for his theory of political pluralism, recently addressed the same dilemma as it applies to subsystems, or organizations, within pluralistic nations. In Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (1982), he argued that all modern nation-states are characterized by organizational pluralism; that is, they contain numerous subsystems such as family, religious, ethnic, social class, economic, and political groups. Such subsystems greatly enrich democratic life. They also endanger it, for in the competition between groups which characterizes democratic politics, some groups possess greater advantages than others. Potentially, they could even accumulate so much power that they could usurp prerogatives which properly belong to the state alone. Thus, according to Dahl, every democratic nation faces the dilemma of determining the

appropriate balance between regulating its constituent subsystems and allowing them adequate autonomy.

The sensitive issues raised by this dilemma are felt with special acuteness in any attempt to develop private education policy. Education, dealing as it does with both values and the socialization of the young, is a matter of importance to many of the subsystems which make up any democratic society. It obviously concerns families. Traditionally it has also been a crucial issue for many religious groups and for some ethnic and linguistic minorities. Moreover, the elite private preparatory schools which exist in many countries can probably best be understood as an attempt by certain social classes to perpetuate their values and status by providing a distinctive education for their children.

However, in any democratic society the state itself has an enormous stake in education. First of all, the existence of an educated populace is a basic precondition of democracy (Cohen 1971). Moreover, in many democratic countries, public schools were originally established as a way to build civic consciousness and social solidarity (Prost 1968; Spring 1986). In addition, the public school system has long been understood as an essential tool for building economic capital and achieving economic efficiency (Spring 1986). For all of these reasons democratic nations must be concerned about education;

they cannot simply abandon schooling to the subsidiary organizations within them. On the contrary, they have typically established public school systems and sought to improve or maintain their quality.

Thus, in many Western nations private school policy has been extremely controversial. On the one hand, it has seemed necessary to uphold the freedom of subsidiary organizations to operate schools. On the other, it has seemed equally important to protect the state's interest in maintaining a viable public school system. As a result, the development of private education policy has turned on three basic questions. First, should private schools be permitted to operate at all? Given an affirmative answer to this question--and most Western nations have answered it affirmatively--to what extent, if any, should the government regulate private schools? And to what extent, if any, should the government guarantee equal access to private education by subsidizing it?

Until recently, Americans' answers to these questions were clear. Private schools were permitted to operate with relatively little government regulation; they received no direct financial aid from any government. This policy represented a careful balancing of the four values of freedom, equality, solidarity, and efficiency (Levin 1983). Since the 1960s, however, it has increasingly come under attack from both the political

right and left. Some people have argued that parents should have the right to send their children to private schools without being penalized financially (Scalia 1981; Thiessen 1982). Another argument, heard more often on the left, is that a public education monopoly restricts intellectual freedom (Spring 1982). Neo-conservatives like Friedman (1962) and West (1982a; 1982b) have asserted that public education is an inefficient bureaucracy whose functioning would be improved by competition from private schools. Associated with these arguments have been various political attempts to increase indirect aid to American private schools or to initiate direct aid. To date, however, American governments provide relatively little indirect and no direct aid to private schools. Yet the debate continues.

In the absence of recent American experience with large-scale subsidies of private schools, the American debate of the issue tends to be abstract and ideological. Therefore, several scholars have looked to other countries for factual information about what happens when a government grants large subsidies to private education. Although Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands have been studied extensively, American scholars have largely ignored France--a country whose experience is particularly relevant for several reasons. First of all, the origins of political democracy in France and the United States are

closely intertwined; and both countries have established the separation of church and state. Moreover, France is a relatively large, pluralistic nation. Finally, during much of its modern history France followed a private school policy which closely resembled the traditional American policy. However, in the 1950s France progressively implemented private school subsidies; and by the early 1960s the French government was providing most of the financial support for private schools.

The story of how France came to subsidize private education so heavily, of how the policy has evolved over time, and of its impact on French education is a fascinating one. It provides valuable information about how such policies can be structured and about how they function in actual practice. It illuminates numerous aspects of the pluralist dilemma of autonomy versus control. Finally, it offers Americans an outside vantage point from which to evaluate their own debate of the issue. As the Swiss psychologist C. G. Jung (1965) once said:

We always require an outside point to stand on, in order to apply the lever of criticism. . . . It has always seemed to me that there can be nothing more useful for a European than some time or another to look out at Europe from the top of [an American] skyscraper. (Pp. 246-247)

Similarly, for Americans interested in the private school aid controversy, few things can be more useful than looking at the issue from an outside perspective.

The Policy Environment of the Debré Act

Public policy is not developed in a vacuum. Typically, a policy is designed to resolve a policy issue, or "disagreement between two or more elements of a society over the way that the society's government deals with a given condition" (Coplin and O'Leary 1981, xi). Policy issues, in turn, arise from the complex interactions of societal conditions, political culture, and public opinion which undergird the political process. Therefore, in analyzing the Debré Act--the French law which first granted large-scale subsidies to private schools--one must begin with a careful examination of the sociopolitical conditions which caused the private school aid issue to become politically salient.

Since the vast majority of French private schools were Roman Catholic (Fowler 1987), the conflict over subsidies can be understood as a conflict between one subsidiary organization in French society--the Catholic Church--and the French state. The fact that the French Church is part of a larger international religious organization served to reinforce its power (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Méjan 1960). The Church had long insisted on its right to

operate schools, and the French government had respected its wishes in this regard. However, for several generations virtually no public money had been allocated to Catholic or other private schools (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982).

After World War II, however, the Catholic Church in France found itself in a difficult situation. Traditionally, a high percentage of its teachers had been members of religious orders, who taught without salaries because teaching was for them a vocation. By the late 1940s monastic vocations were declining; increasingly, Church schools were obliged to hire lay people who expected to be paid for their services. As a result, the cost of Catholic education was soaring (Barral 1963). Even in 1989, four decades later, most of the Catholic educators whom the author interviewed mentioned the financial crisis of the post-war period. One man told of a friend whose parents had been lay teachers then and who had raised their children in conditions approaching penury. Several others asserted that without subsidies Catholic schools would not have survived, except for a few elite establishments.

In order to solve their financial problems, Catholics formed several lobbying groups which began to campaign for government aid. Soon the opponents of aid formed lobbying groups as well, and the issue escalated (Barral 1963;

Coutrot 1963). In 1951 the conflict caused three cabinets to collapse in rapid succession, and in the fall of that year the government granted token subsidies in the form of small vouchers and scholarships for students in both public and private schools (Vincent 1977). The issue subsided somewhat after 1951. However, Catholic schools were still in dire straits; and French leaders realized that sooner or later the matter would have to be resolved (Coutrot 1963).

The Catholic demand for financial aid resulted, then, from a genuine financial crisis; but it also represented a demand for a change in the relationship between one social subsystem and the state. In essence, it was a demand for increased power vis-a-vis the government.

According to Dahl's (1982) theory, such demands are likely to be made when a government has suffered a loss of legitimacy. And, as a matter of fact, in 1960 the French scholar François Méjan analyzed the Church's push for school subsidies in precisely those terms. He argued that in the twentieth century the French state--as well as democratic nation-states generally--had suffered a serious loss of legitimacy because of two world wars. As a result, the Roman Catholic Church was seeking a realignment of the power relationships between itself and a number of national governments. His thesis was partially confirmed by a leader of the Catholic school

system whom the author interviewed. This man, a high-ranking member of the church hierarchy, was old enough in the 1950s to have been professionally active. In response to the first interview question, he shifted immediately to the issue of the relationship between the Church and the state and asserted that at the time of the Debré Act the French bishops had deliberately sought a new relationship with the government. It seems clear, then, that in the late 1950s the French Church was reasserting its power.

The evidence also suggests that political leaders themselves were conscious of the fact that the government had lost legitimacy as a result of World War II. The theme of France's humiliation in the early 1940s runs through the parliamentary debate which preceded the passage of the Debré Act like a dark thread (Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats
Parlementaires: Assemblée Nationale [Official journal of the French Republic: Parliamentary debates: National Assembly: J.O.A.N.D.] 1959, 3595-3649). It is necessary, therefore, to consider in some depth the loss of political legitimacy which was a major factor in the change in private school aid policy. In 1939 France was drawn with much of Europe into World War II, and in the late spring of 1940 Hitler's armies invaded. After a short resistance the French government surrendered; there were rumors of high level corruption and treason. For the next four

years part of France was occupied by German regiments, and the rest was governed by the Nazi collaborator Marshal Philippe Pétain (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982). Such a sequence of events would have a devastating impact upon the political processes of any nation, but the effect upon France was particularly severe for two reasons.

First, the surrender of the French government in 1940 meant the collapse of the Third Republic, the only democratic regime which had ever ruled France for any significant period of time. Established in 1871, it had represented a democratic solution to the bitter political battles which had wracked the country since 1789. In spite of its weaknesses, it had given France a constitutional government and had also trained three or four generations of French citizens in democratic politics. However, its rapid and questionable collapse in the face of German aggression led many French people to question democracy itself.

Moreover, the Nazi-collaborationist Pétain regime (1940-1944) pursued policies which revived ancient political antagonisms. It allied itself with the old aristocratic and authoritarian elements of French society and attacked many groups which had played important roles under the Third Republic. Not surprisingly, it persecuted France's influential Jewish minority. However, leaders of left-of-center political parties, the public school

system, labor unions, and Masonic lodges were also attacked and, in some cases, put to death (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982).

As a result, it proved extremely difficult to re-establish democratic political processes after the war ended. For example, De Gaulle formed a government in November 1945, only to quit two months later. In May 1946, the French public rejected a proposed constitution. The constitution of the new Fourth Republic was not adopted until the following October, and a president was not elected until January 1947, fully two and a half years after the Liberation. It is not surprising, then, that the Fourth Republic proved highly unstable. For example, between 1947 and 1958 it had twenty-two different cabinets; and in 1953 thirteen ballots were required to elect René Coty president (Vincent 1977).

As Dahl's theory (1982) would predict, such obvious governmental weakness caused various subsystems to revolt. For example, it was apparent as early as 1946 that the French were going to find it difficult to keep their empire. Over the next twelve years uprisings regularly occurred in French Indochina, Madagascar, and Northern Africa; war broke out in Algeria in 1954 and continued until 1962. On the domestic front, the Church was not the only organization which was causing the government problems. The French Communist Party, which had emerged

from the war as a potent political force, was also pursuing an agenda of its own. Since it had great influence within several labor unions, it orchestrated frequent labor demonstrations and strikes. The years of the Fourth Republic were punctuated with isolated strikes, lock-outs, rotating strikes, and general strikes. Occasionally, these labor protests took an ugly turn; and violent fighting broke out. In 1950 and 1957 protesting workers were killed. By May 1958, the level of conflict within both the empire and the mother country had reached such a level of intensity that the National Assembly declared a three month state of emergency and invited war hero Charles De Gaulle to take over the executive branch of the government once more. De Gaulle came to power determined to resolve two longstanding conflicts in French politics: the war in Algeria and the quarrel over subsidies for private schools (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Vincent 1977).

It seems apparent, then, that the central political characteristic of the policy environment surrounding the passage of the Debré Act in 1959 was a loss of governmental legitimacy which led to great political instability. In this situation the Catholic Church, whose schools were suffering financially, sought to solve a pressing problem of its own by redefining its relationship with the French state. This explanation, however, is not

completely adequate. One striking fact about the 1958-1959 period is that many leaders in public education, in left-of-center political parties, and in the academic community--people who had long opposed private school aid for ideological reasons--proved willing to consider modifying their position (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982). Undoubtedly, the high level of political instability was a necessary condition for their willingness to change. However, it is likely that two other factors in the policy environment influenced them: economics and demographics.

Although the Fourth Republic has to be considered a political failure, it must be regarded as an economic success. Even before World War II, France had been relatively backward economically; on the eve of the war it was still a largely rural country which was surpassed in industrial capacity by several other nations (L'Année Politique [The political year: L'A.P.]). In 1945, the French economy was in a shambles; inflation and unemployment were high and industrial production was just 65% of what it had been in 1938. French leaders felt that the time had come to try a new approach: economic planning. Jean Monnet developed the first plan, which was later officially adopted by the Fourth Republic; and the French entered upon "The Thirty Glorious Years," their term for the 1945-1975 period during which their economic miracle occurred. On the eve of the passage of the Debré

Act, France was half-way through this period. A few facts will suggest its significance. Between 1946 and 1952 French industrial production more than doubled; between 1952 and 1957 it increased by another 41%. By the early 1950s prices had stabilized, and the economy was providing almost full employment. The result was a rapidly increasing standard of living. For instance, in the two year period from 1953 to 1955 alone, French workers' real salaries increased by 20% (Vincent 1977). Thus, the French were experiencing the unusual combination of great political ineffectiveness and extraordinary economic efficiency. However, a sudden increase in inflation in 1958 (Vincent 1977), probably suggested to them that their political problems might jeopardize their prosperity.

It is likely that the economic achievements of the years from 1945 to 1959 partially explain the fact that, starting in the late 1940s, the French underwent what was for them an unprecedented experience. France, one of the first Western nations in which the birth rate declined to modern levels, had a "baby boom" between the late 1940s and the early 1970s. The significance of this demographic surge is indicated by the following statistics. In the eighty-five years from 1861 to 1946, the French population increased from 37,386,000 to 40,125,000, an increase of 7%. Between 1946 and 1975, it grew to 52,675,000, a 31% increase in less than thirty years (Institut National de

la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies: INSEE] 1976). The implications of such growth for the school system are suggested by the fact that between 1946 and 1966 the number of French citizens under the age of twenty increased by 42% (INSEE 1980). In 1960, an anonymous French economist made the connection between population growth and the private school aid issue explicit in a brief article ("Aspects démographiques et économiques du problème scolaire" [Demographic and economic aspects of the school problem]). According to his estimates, by 1970 eleven million young people would be enrolled in French schools; and it would be necessary to provide 144,000 new elementary teachers, 45,000 new secondary teachers, and 10,000 new college professors to teach them. Moreover, a massive school building program would be essential. His major conclusion was a telling one. "Ten million square meters of new school construction and 200,000 new teachers so that we can maintain our role as a great country" (p. 15; my translation).

In summary, then, in the late 1950s the private school aid issue became salient in French politics because the country found itself in a complex and unprecedented sociopolitical situation. A serious decline in government legitimacy, a financial crisis in Catholic schools, a booming economy, and an unusual population

growth rate combined to present the French public with a political problem which demanded a solution.

The Values Behind the Debré Act

Policy issues grow out of a sociopolitical environment, but they are resolved in terms of the values of the policy actors and their constituents. As Hogwood and Gunn (1984) put it: "Values are at the centre of policy-making. . . ." p. 267). Therefore, it will be necessary to determine how the democratic values of freedom, equality, and solidarity contributed to the shaping of the Debré Act and to the decrees which implemented it. It will also be essential to consider the impact of the value of efficiency on the shape of the policy. This analysis will consist of three parts: a study of the behavior of the Debré Government during 1959; a discussion of the National Assembly debate of December 23 and 24, 1959, which preceded the passage of the Debré Act; and a consideration of the possibility that the Debré Government was motivated by a partially hidden agenda.

The Government's behavior in 1959

The Debré Government came to power in January 1959, shortly after the sequence of events which set up the Fifth Republic: a constitutional referendum, the election of De Gaulle to the presidency, and the election of a new Parliament. One of the issues in the parliamentary

election of November 1958 had been aid for private schools; and in early December the Headquarters for Educational Freedom and the Defense of Culture, a private school lobbying group, had announced publicly that 323 members of the new National Assembly had formally committed themselves to private school subsidies (Coutrot 1963). This constituted a solid majority.

De Gaulle's first Prime Minister was Michel Debré, a skillful and experienced politician in his middle forties (Who's Who in France 1959). Although Debré was a conservative, he belonged to the Jacobin wing of French conservatism. A Socialist Party representative whom the author interviewed, himself a current member of Parliament and personally acquainted with Debré, had this to say about him: "Basically, Debré was a Jacobin; he wanted the national government to be strong. He wanted to preserve our national identity, and he succeeded in doing so" (Interview with author, Paris, France, 24 May 1989). Political scientist Aline Coutrot agreed with this assessment in a 1963 article, arguing that a basic premise of the early Fifth Republic was that special interests should be subordinated to the national interest, an understanding of power which she, too, dubbed "Jacobin."

On January 16, 1959, the new Prime Minister made his introductory speech to the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament. Significantly, he did not mention

the private school issue. A deputy, or member of Parliament, asked a question about it. Debré's answer was, in part:

No one denies the existence of a problem; no one denies the necessity of solving it in an atmosphere and under conditions such that its solution will not cause quarrels to start up again. . . .quarrels from which the country has suffered far too much. The Government will work to create those conditions. . . .(Cited in Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982, 102; my translation)

Thus, Debré made it clear from the outset that his Government's major concern would be to maintain domestic peace. In other words, he affirmed the central importance of national solidarity.

By March of 1959 the lobbying groups had swung into action. The Private School Parents' Association held a demonstration and announced its position: a 75 million franc donation by the government to private schools, an expanded voucher program, and funds for private school construction. Soon their opponents, led by the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action, made their stand equally clear: private schools should be abolished. The following weeks were regularly punctuated with additional announcements and demonstrations. On June 1, the Debré Government resorted to a widely used tactic for defusing an escalating situation; it announced that the issue would be referred to a committee for study. The

composition of the committee--called the Lapie Commission--was significant. None of its members represented any of the organizations which were involved in the conflict. Although it included several prominent Catholics, it was headed by a member of a socialist party. Socialists had long opposed private school subsidies. Moreover, the commission would report, not to Debré, but to the Minister of National Education, also a socialist. Debré was communicating a clear message: the supporters of private school aid might have a majority in the National Assembly, but his Government was going to take the lead in developing policy (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Coutrot 1963).

Understandably, this approach frustrated many of the deputies, who were feeling intense grassroots pressure. As a result, in July some of them attempted a parliamentary maneuver which would have had the effect of usurping the power of the Lapie Commission. Under a parliamentary system such a breach of party discipline is a serious matter, and Debré lost no time in dealing with it. He summoned the offending deputies to his office for what was later described as a "stormy" session. They backed down (Coutrot 1963).

For anyone who had missed the point, the Prime Minister spelled it out plainly in a speech to Parliament on July 23. He clarified his view that it was his

Government's role to take the lead in solving the problem, not the National Assembly's. He asserted furthermore that the Government intended to act in accordance with the new constitution and that its major concern would be national unity, a concern which should have the highest priority in the mind of every public official. He had a piece of terse advice for the leaders of all the lobbying groups: "Be quiet." In the event that they found silence impossible, he forewarned them that his Government would not listen to their pronouncements (Coutrot 1963). Faced with the classic "legislator's dilemma," Michel Debré did not waver; he steadily pursued the course of action which he considered wisest rather than yielding to pressures from constituents.

In late October the Lapie Commission presented its report to the Government. In essence, it recommended a compromise: government aid for private schools in the form of sub-contracting in exchange for considerable government regulation. Not surprisingly, Debré kept the contents of the report secret for six weeks. However, he immediately asked his Minister of National Education, André Boulloche, to prepare a bill to introduce into the National Assembly. The bill was ready by mid-November (Coutrot 1963).

Then began the prolonged negotiations which characterize lawmaking in parliamentary systems which use

a form of neo-corporatist interest representation (Theen and Wilson 1986). The bill was discussed and progressively amended in a series of formal meetings, official consultations, and informal conferences. Such groups as Debré's own cabinet, the Council of Ministers, the Majority, and various political parties were involved (Le Figaro [L.F.], 17 December 1959). The central issue was the extent to which the government would regulate private education (L.F., 18 December 1959). Negotiations continued right up until December 23, the date on which the National Assembly was scheduled to debate the proposed law.

This sequence of first page headlines, run by the Paris newspaper Le Monde [L.M.] during that week, suggests the intensity of the conflict: "Supporters of Private School Aid Will Propose Several Amendments to Education Bill" (21 December 1959); "The Government Will Permit Only Token Modifications of Private School Bill" (22 December 1959); "The Government Is Determined to get Its Education Bill Passed" (23 December 1959); "The Government Accepts an Amendment to the First Article: André Boulloche Tenders His Resignation to Michel Debré" (24 December 1959; my translations).

Coutrot (1963) suggested that when Debré entered the National Assembly on the afternoon of December 23, he himself was not certain that the bill would pass.

However, he opened the session with a powerful speech, concluding with these words:

This legislation, designed to establish a new relationship with private schools, starts a new page in your book, a page which is still blank, but which we should eagerly wish to fill up very soon. . . .in the interest of the State, in the interest of Freedom, in the interest of the Nation.

State, Freedom, Nation: our first, your first, our most important, and even our only concerns. (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3599; my translation)

In conclusion, then, it can be said that throughout 1959 the Debré Government indicated, both by its words and by its deeds, that its major concern was solidarity, defined as national unity and domestic peace.

Values revealed in the 1959 debate

The behavior of the Debré Government suggests that its major value was solidarity; however, the Government was not the only policy actor. Rather, it had to act as a mediator in the negotiations which produced the bill which the National Assembly debated and passed in December 1959. Thus, this debate is an important source of information about the values of other policy actors. In his opening speech, Debré identified two other positions, derisively labelling them "pipe-dream positions." One "pipe-dream" was that the government would grant financial support to a relatively unregulated private school system which would then compete against public education. The second

"pipe-dream" was that the government would eliminate private education by nationalizing it. It is most illuminating to analyze the values held by tenants of these two positions and to compare them, not only to each other, but to the values expressed by Debré's Majority.

The first "pipe-dream" was cherished by a group of conservatives who, in terms of current American politics, most closely resembled the Religious Right. Their views were advanced by five speakers: all male; all upper middle class; and, with one exception, all from the "provinces"--that is, from regions far from the Paris metropolitan area. Their primary assumption was the pre-eminent role of the family, a social institution which they perceived as more important than both state and church. For example, Roland Boscardy-Monsservin, a large landowner from Aveyron, argued that the issue of private school aid had little to do with church-state relations, but rather concerned family-state relations. Indeed, for him the issue touched upon "three basic concepts: freedom, family, Christianity" (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3616; my translation). His colleague, Henri Trémolet de Villers, a lawyer from Lozère, went even further in asserting the claims of the family, arguing that "family rights are natural rights, superior to all the laws that man imposes or that society promulgates" (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3621; my translation). Starting as they did with this assumption,

these traditionalists strongly emphasized freedom and its related concept, autonomy. They believed that families--more precisely fathers--had an inalienable right to select the type of education which their children received in order to guarantee the transmission of their own culture, values, and traditions. Since fathers had this natural right, the role of the state was primarily to guarantee them freedom of choice among independent and autonomous schools. The traditionalists' strong emphasis on freedom and autonomy led them to minimize and distort other democratic values. For example, they defined equality as the equal freedom of rich and poor fathers to choose private schools. Solidarity was also unimportant to them; occasionally they mentioned the importance of joining together to fight against Communism, but for the most part they simply ignored solidarity. Indeed, Trémolet de Villers expressed amazement at the general concern about national unity. Not surprisingly, this group perceived an expanded voucher plan as the ideal solution and expressed grave reservations about the proposed government regulation of private education. Trémolet de Villers dramatically summarized the threat of government control :

Then we would see the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action, a despotic Moloch, holding all the children of France in its hands and raising a two-headed statue in honor of Messrs. Boullouche and Debré. . . .And at the end of the process everyone would shout: "What big arms you have, Grandmother!" "The better to strangle you

with, my child!" (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3623;
my translation)

The second "pipe-dream" position was cherished by much of the Left, which hoped for the nationalization of any private schools which wanted financial aid from the government. Philosophically, their position was considerably more complex than that of the traditionalists. They explicitly upheld the importance of educational and religious freedom as well as the rights of families and parents. However, they argued that there were other freedoms, rights, and values which had to be considered in the development of private education policy. Like the traditionalists, they advocated freedom--but their major concern was the right of children to an education in which their freedom of conscience was respected. They found it difficult to understand how a Catholic school could provide such an education, for in their view children developed the ability to think critically when their teachers maintained philosophical neutrality. Guy Mollet, a socialist leader and former teacher, expressed this position:

What [non-sectarian teachers] do is to refuse to impose on others, by force or by pressure, their own beliefs. What they especially value is the development in the child who is entrusted to them of the ability to think freely and to choose without a sense of inner constraint. Such choice and such thinking will not fail to appear spontaneously when the young mind has developed sufficient power; then they have meaning,

dignity, and beauty. (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3608;
my translation)

Unlike the traditionalists, however, the Left also valued solidarity. Its representatives considered public education the major method for developing national unity, because in public schools children from diverse backgrounds come to know and like each other. In arguing against private school aid, they emphasized their dislike for a policy which would encourage the separation of French children into two antagonistic camps. As part of this argument they occasionally raised an equality issue: public schools admitted children of all beliefs and backgrounds, whereas private religious schools did not. However, in attacking the private school aid bill, they focused primarily on the values of freedom, defined as freedom of conscience, and solidarity, defined as national unity. Much of the Left voted against the bill; after its passage, its representatives shifted to fighting to amend it in such ways as to increase government regulation of subsidized private schools (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3639-3649).

Philosophically, the Debré government was closer to the Left than to the traditionalists on its right. Like the Left, members of the Majority stressed the values of freedom and solidarity. Like the Left, they insisted that subsidized private schools should expect some government regulation in exchange for aid. And like the Left, they

saw the importance of balancing several values and rights in developing a new private education policy. Indeed, the theme of the necessity of striking an appropriate balance between different values runs through both the Majority's speeches in the National Assembly and through several articles which were written about this time ("Après la loi Debré" [After the Debré Act] 1960; Hugues 1960; Robert 1962; Rémond 1965). In his opening speech Debré also emphasized the fact that it was essential to keep values in their proper "order"; for him this meant that the dominant position of public education had to be maintained at all costs. In his closing speech the Prime Minister reiterated the point, saying that "the pre-eminent place of the public school system is not and cannot be open for discussion. . . ." (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3637; my translation).

However, the Majority did consider the Left's position dated. They argued that in the late nineteenth century, when the Church had posed a threat to the independence of the government, a policy of refusing to support private education had been wise. However, by the 1950s the Catholic Church had changed greatly and had long since accepted the legitimacy of democratic government. Therefore, it was time to develop a more modern policy--one which would maintain church-state separation while also advancing educational freedom.

The Majority's conception of "educational freedom" was a complex one. Debré and his supporters started from the assumption that it was unacceptable in a democratic society for the government to have a monopoly on education; parents did indeed have the right to select a private education for their children. Similarly, private groups also had the right to found schools. These rights constituted, in their minds, a "basic freedom," similar to freedom of the press. All of this being so, the government was obliged to provide financial support, if necessary, in order to guarantee that educational freedom would continue to be a "concrete" freedom and not be reduced to a "theoretical" one. It should be noted that this logic is consistent with other French practices, a fact which some deputies were careful to point out. For instance, in France, the media, certain cultural activities, and labor unions are partially subsidized so that citizens can exercise their freedoms in these areas. Members of the Majority conceded the importance of both children's freedom of conscience and the freedom of a private school to maintain its "distinctive character." They felt, however, that these values could be simultaneously maintained, along with the value of equal access to any form of education supported by the government.

After freedom, solidarity was the value which the deputies in Debré's ruling coalition stressed most in their speeches. They agreed with the Left; national unity was essential. It could not be jeopardized. However, they took a rather pragmatic approach. National unity was currently jeopardized by the existence of two school systems whose supporters found it difficult to get along, and the issue was a constant irritant in French politics. A refusal to subsidize private schools or a decision to nationalize them would not promote national unity. The best approach was a carefully regulated program of subsidies and policies which would encourage the two systems to work together. Two years after the passage of the Debré Act, Jacques Robert (1960) published an article about the rationale behind the law. In his conclusion, he summarized this conception of how to achieve national unity more eloquently than did any of the deputies:

We must work out a coexistence which, if not entirely peaceful, will at least not be openly hostile; we must force mutual respect; we must learn to love each other.

"If you differ from me, far from injuring me, you enrich me," said Saint-Exupéry. (Pp. 268-269; my translation)

In summary, then, it can be said that the publicly avowed values behind the Debré Act were freedom and solidarity. Freedom was not interpreted simplistically as parental choice--a position which was advocated only by

the traditionalist Right. Rather, it was perceived as a complex interaction between several freedoms and rights. Solidarity was defined as national union and domestic peace. Behind the approach of the Debré Government was a specific theory about the correct relationship between the state and its subsystems. According to this Jacobin concept, the state should use its regulatory powers, or potential for control, to advance general rather than special interests.

Efficiency as a value behind the act

It will be recalled that in 1959 France faced a serious problem. An unprecedented baby boom meant that the government was going to have to hire thousands of new teachers and construct numerous new schools over the next decade. If a number of Catholic schools had closed down during the 1960s because of their own financial crisis, the problem would have been considerably exacerbated. Therefore, a policy of providing large, but not full, subsidies for private schools--as the Debré Act did--would have been cost-effective for both the national government, which pays professional personnel in France, and for local governments, which provide school buildings. Yet this obvious fact was downplayed in 1959, to say the least. For example, it was not mentioned in either Le Figaro or Le Monde during the week in which the law was passed. One searches the Prime Minister's two speeches in

vain for any references to this major problem. To be sure, a few deputies--mostly from the traditionalist Right--did touch on the issue. However, by and large it was glossed over.

It is therefore somewhat surprising to find Nicole Fontaine (1978), a former assistant head of the Catholic school system, bluntly stating in her book--first published in 1969--that the Debré Act was passed primarily to save money. Nor was she alone in holding this view. Hugues had suggested in 1960 that this was a major consideration; and in 1972 Tanguy, a leftist, mentioned Fontaine's assessment and agreed with her. It is also consistent with the interpretations of Ballion (1982), a former private school teacher, and Cornec and Bouchareissas (1982), leaders of major public education lobbying groups. Thus, people from diverse political backgrounds have argued that the subsidies were implemented for efficiency reasons. Significantly, in their interviews almost all of the Catholic representatives and a few of the public school ones as well suggested that the Debré Act was passed at least partially for financial reasons. Thus, it seems that freedom and solidarity were not the only values behind the Debré Act; there was a major efficiency motive as well.

Why was it not stressed during the debate? Anyone who has ever known legislators can guess the answer to that

question. The deputies and the members of the Debré Government were not, for the most part, Johnny-come-latelies on the political scene. They were the same men and women who had tried to run France between 1946 and 1959--and failed. Emphasizing the educational disaster which would occur if the Catholic schools failed would have meant calling attention to a major failure of a regime which they were trying to forget. Legislators are not known for exhibiting such ruthless honesty--at least not within the hearing of voters. As a result, the financial issue was not emphasized. But it seems safe to conclude that the major values behind the Debré Act were freedom, solidarity,. . .and efficiency.

The Structure of the Policy in the 1960s

The Debré Act was promulgated December 31, 1959, and published in the Journal Officiel of the National Assembly three days later (Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets [Official journal of the French Republic: Laws and decrees: J.O.:L.D.] 1960, 66-67). In France it is customary for Parliament to pass a general law, upon which the Government then expands by developing detailed decrees of implementation (Healey 1974). Although Parliament does not vote on decrees, relevant organizations and lobbying groups do participate in their development through a process of consultation (Coutrot

1963). Thus, the law itself was completed with a total of nineteen decrees. Almost all of these were passed within two years of the promulgation of the law; however, one decree was added in 1964, two in 1965, and two more in 1966. Since these later decrees had a relatively minor impact on the policy, it can be said that the private school aid policy of the De Gaulle period had been established by the close of 1962 and changed relatively little thereafter (J.O.:L.D. 1960-1969).

The subtitle of the Debré Act and its first article set out the basic philosophy of the policy. Thus, it will be useful to study these before proceeding to a more detailed analysis. Significantly, the Debré Act was subtitled "on the relationships between the state and private schools" (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 66). The policy was conceived, then, not as establishing a new relationship between the state and the Church or even between the state and private education as a whole. Instead, it was presented as a new relationship between the state and individual private schools, emphasizing the fact that there were not two publicly supported systems, but only one (L.F., 17 April 1960). Article I began with a reaffirmation of public education and of the fact that the French Republic guarantees children and young people access to such an education. Next, the importance of educational freedom and the right of private schools to

exist were asserted. Finally, the nature of the financial aid to be granted to private schools was specified: they could enter into contractual agreements with the national government to offer non-sectarian instruction. If they chose to do so, the classes which were covered by contract would be regulated (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 66). Then followed two key sentences which sought to balance these three values: the freedoms of the private school, children's freedom of conscience, and equal access to education. The wording of these sentences was significant; it would fuel years of debates over the meaning of the law.

The school, while maintaining its distinctive character, must provide its teaching with complete respect for freedom of conscience. All children, without distinction of origin, opinion, or belief, must have access to it.
(J.O.:L.D. 1960, 66; my translation)

With these sentences French legislators sought to balance democratic values and to protect the principle of the separation of church and state. These sentences are, however, ambiguous. How does a religious school maintain its distinctive religious character while respecting its students' freedom of conscience? If a Catholic school is known to have a "distinctive" character, to what extent does the child of Jewish, Moslem, or free-thinking parents truly have access to it? The policy did not resolve these issues. Instead, the law and its accompanying decrees established these general principles and left it to

schools, teachers, families, and children to work out all of their implications through practice.

The policy structure established by the Debré Act and its accompanying decrees related largely to the following four concerns: (1) maintaining the preeminence of the government and its public school system, (2) improving the quality of private education, (3) preserving some autonomy for private schools, and (4) encouraging collaboration between the two sectors. After a brief summary of the law, each of these areas will be examined in detail.

In a general sense, the Debré Act offered private schools four choices. First, they could choose to maintain their status quo, in which case they would receive no financial aid and would also remain relatively free of government regulation. Second, they could choose to sign a "simple contract" with the government under which they would offer public instruction in some or all of their classes. The salaries of the teachers who provided such instruction would be paid directly by the government. Such schools would be moderately regulated. Third, schools could select a "contract of association," under which they would offer public instruction by government-paid teachers, as under the simple contract; but the government would pay additional expenses such as fixed charges and operating costs. Such schools would be subject to heavier regulation than schools which opted for

"simple contracts." Finally, private schools could choose to be integrated into public education. Such a choice would mean complete financial support; it would also mean complete regulation (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 66-67, 3825-3831, 7014-7017). The underlying principle was clear: a direct and positive relationship existed between the amount of government aid accepted and the extent of government regulation imposed.

As already suggested, the private school aid policy which the Debré Government developed was explicitly designed to maintain the preeminent position of the government and its public school system. Of course, the choice of a contractual system and the payment of teachers' salaries rather than the choice of vouchers or large grants was a major mechanism for achieving this goal. There were, however, several others. A review of some of them will indicate the extent to which the French government sought to control subsidized private schools.

First of all, the policy severely limited the capacity of private education to expand. For example, no school could apply for a contract, either simple or of association, unless it had been in operation for at least five years. Since one of the conditions for approval of either type of contract was the possession of "appropriate" facilities, this meant that any group which wanted to found a new school had to both pay personnel for

five years and construct a suitable building in order to qualify for government assistance (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 3827-3831). Moreover, the construction of buildings was not subsidized in any way. Once a school came under either type of government contract, it could charge families fees to cover mortgage payments, major building repairs, and the costs of scientific, educational, or athletic equipment (J.O.: L.D. 1960, 3827-3831). In essence, of course, private schools had to charge fees to cover such costs; this meant that not all families could afford to choose private education, thus restricting the growth of demand. Finally, schools which sought government subsidies had to be able to demonstrate that their services were actually needed. Institutions which applied for a contract of association had to demonstrate to public school authorities that they met "a recognized educational need" (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 3830). Thus, in a variety of ways the policy protected public education by restricting the growth of both the supply of and the demand for private education. Moreover, the funding levels of private education were carefully linked to those of the public sector. The major type of aid offered was the payment of teachers' salaries. The salaries of private school teachers were directly tied to the pay scales on which public school teachers were compensated. Nor were private schools allowed to let their teachers under contract work

significantly longer or shorter hours than did their public school counterparts. Teacher workloads in the two sectors were to be comparable. Local governments could help private schools financially, but under no circumstances could they give more support to private schools than to public ones (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 3827-3831). Thus, private schools were forbidden to engage in such practices as trying to attract teachers by paying them more than public schools or by offering them lighter workloads. Nor could local governments follow funding policies which would encourage the growth of private schools.

In addition to restricting the expansion of private education, the Debré Act sought to improve its quality. To Americans, accustomed to thinking of private schools as academically superior to public ones, this policy goal may seem surprising. However, in France, it is public education which has traditionally been considered academically superior. Moreover, this perception is supported by empirical data. The French government has long had a national examination program. Both public and private school students take the tests, and the results are published. A study of test statistics between 1960 and 1985, as reported in L'Annuaire Statistique de la France (Statistical Yearbook of France [INSEE]) reveals that on virtually all of the tests reported public

education outperformed private education by a considerable margin. Thus, the Debré Government seized this opportunity to improve private schools. Its approach to the problem was multi-faceted. Under both types of contracts it built in incentives to private school teachers and administrators to improve their credentials. Moreover, under contracts of association, the government played a large role in the hiring of private school teachers. Under both types of contracts, the curriculum of private schools was regulated, though this regulation was stricter under contracts of association. Finally, under both types of contracts, private school teachers were evaluated by the same Ministry of National Education inspectors who evaluated public school teachers. In all these ways the policy was designed to improve the quality, or efficiency, of private education (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 3827-3831).

It will be recalled that in the National Assembly debate which preceded the passage of the Debré Act, the issue of private school autonomy was a central one. Private education supporters believed that private schools had to be able to maintain their "distinctive character" if their existence was to have any meaning at all, and Article I of the Debré Act explicitly affirmed this concept. The legislation made it possible for private schools to maintain their distinctive character in two

ways. The first related to curriculum. The decrees explicitly stated that schools under contract could offer classes which were not under contract and therefore not subsidized by the government. This provision made it possible for private schools to continue to teach such courses as catechism, Bible, and Catholic philosophy. Moreover, private schools could charge fees to cover these courses as well as extra activities such as worship services (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 3827-3831).

The second method for maintaining the distinctive character of private schools was administrative autonomy. Principals in French public schools have virtually no power over their teachers. They neither hire, fire, nor evaluate them. In contrast, even in 1960 private school principals were granted considerable power over their schools, largely as a result of intense lobbying while the decrees were being written (L.F., 18 April 1960). From the beginning they were given input into the hiring process; thus, they could select teachers who were likely to respect the school's distinctive character as they defined it. Moreover, and quite significantly, although the government paid the salaries of teachers in schools under contract, it did not pay the salaries of principals or other administrators. In her interview, a representative of a private school principals' union elaborated on this point.

Since we're trying to help another country, I must add something else. What helps us maintain our distinctive character is the fact that although teachers are paid by the government, principals are not. Neither principals nor other administrators. It seems important to me not to place management under government supervision. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 1 June 1989)

Finally, the policy was designed to encourage public and private schools to come closer together as a way to diminish the likelihood that the private school aid issue would become politically divisive again. Clearly, many of the policy mechanisms already mentioned had this thrust. For example, the numerous restrictions on the private sector seem to have been designed in part to prevent public school educators from feeling unduly threatened. Similarly, it may have been expected that the regulations which required similar credentials, curricula, and workloads in private and public schools would create conditions in which positive relationships could develop. Implicit in the law were considerable communication, interaction, and collaboration between administrators of the two sectors. One additional feature of the policy should be mentioned. During the implementation process disputes were to be settled at the departmental and national levels by committees called--significantly--Committees of Conciliation (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 66). Teachers from both private and public education were to be included on these committees, thus expanding personal contacts and

collaboration beyond the administration to the teaching force itself.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that the legislation developed by the Debré Government rather faithfully reflected the values expressed in the National Assembly debate. Most of all, it reflected the Government's determination to remain in control. However, it also contained mechanisms both to protect the freedom of private schools and to encourage the development of solidarity in the educational establishment. Interestingly, neither the private nor the public school lobbying groups were pleased with the Debré Act. The National Committee for Non-sectarian Action, whose leadership was dominated by public school teachers, immediately launched a petition drive, calling for the repeal of the law (Franceschi 1964). Catholic school leaders perceived the law as unsatisfactory, even dangerous (Le Blond 1960). Michel Debré, however, was happy. He had achieved his major goal--a compromise which did not accord either side a clear victory or a plain defeat (Coutrot 1963).

The Policy Environment, 1970-1981

During the presidency of Charles De Gaulle, France's private school aid policy, as established under the Debré Act, remained relatively stable. However, starting in

1970 the policy underwent numerous modifications. In September 1970 it was amended by five decrees; another important decree followed in December; and in June 1971 the Pompidou Act further changed the policy (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 8468-8473; 1971, 5339). In 1977 another major private school aid law, the Guermeur Act, was passed; and in March of the next year the policy was amended by nine major decrees (J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5539; 1978, 970-977). Moreover, during the 1970-1981 period nine other decrees were promulgated; and a decision of the Constitutional Council--France's Supreme Court--upheld the legality of the Guermeur Act (J.O.:L.D. 1969-1981). In a general sense, these modifications extended additional aid to private education, relaxed government regulations, and accorded private schools more autonomy. These changes were widely interpreted as part of a movement by the French government toward the privatization of public services (Ballion 1977; Cogniot 1974b; Goureaux and Ricot 1975; Tanguy 1972; Trégaro 1976).

Of course, in Dahl's terms, privatization can be understood as one way that a government can render an organization within its jurisdiction more autonomous. Thus, the progressive changes in the policy represent a steady shifting of the balance between autonomy and control--in the direction of autonomy. According to Dahl's (1982) theory, a loss of legitimacy on the part of

a government is likely to be associated with such a trend; so it is not surprising to find that in 1968 the Fifth Republic had indeed entered into a period of declining legitimacy. Throughout most of the 1960s, De Gaulle's conservative coalition had remained strong, winning several elections by landslides while the economy continued to boom (L'A.P. 1962-1967). However, in the winter of 1968 student unrest mounted, culminating in a series of riots in Paris during May. When workers went on strike to show sympathy for the students, many feared that the regime was on the verge of collapse. Order was finally restored. De Gaulle immediately dissolved the National Assembly, calling for new elections in June--a classic way under a parliamentary system to restore governmental credibility (L'A.P. 1968; Vincent 1977). The method did not work this time. Rumors that De Gaulle was about to step aside began to circulate; and, after the General lost a national referendum in April 1969, he announced his retirement from public life. In June 1969, De Gaulle's conservative associate Georges Pompidou was elected president (L'A.P. 1969; Vincent 1977).

Then another unsettling event occurred. In the fall of 1973 the oil crisis caused inflation to jump; within a year unemployment had also climbed steeply. The French began to suspect that after three decades of unclouded economic expansion they had finally encountered an

economic crisis. In spite of government austerity plans, economic problems persisted and worsened in 1979 when the Iran-Iraq War caused a second oil shock (L'A.P. 1973-1979; Vincent 1977). As a result of the crisis, the conservative coalition which had ruled France since 1958 found it increasingly difficult to win elections (Legrès 1977).

It seems necessary to put the economic "crisis" in perspective. Although the French agonized about their "crisis" throughout the decade--indeed they still agonize about it--their economy continued to perform comparatively well. For example, between 1973 and 1979 the purchasing power of French citizens increased 3.6%, just slightly behind the West German increase of 3.8% and well ahead of the United States figure of 2.4% (Mermet 1985). In 1980 the editor of L'Année Politique (The political year) felt confident enough to boast that the French gross national product was 150% that of the United Kingdom and that the French standard of living was almost equal to that of the United States. Still, the slowing of the economy deeply concerned the public and steadily weakened the conservative coalition which ran the government (Legrès 1977).

This weakening of the conservatives had visible political effects both within the coalition and outside of it. Since both of these effects ultimately influenced the shaping of private school aid policy, it will be necessary

to examine each of them in turn. Within the conservative coalition the Jacobins lost power; in fact, by 1971 it was already apparent that a new conservative group was gaining ascendancy in the National Assembly (Tanguy 1972). This group propounded an ideology which the French call libéralisme and which many American political scientists call "classical liberalism." However, its more common name in the United States is "neo-conservatism."

In 1971 Olivier Giscard d'Estaing published a book entitled Education et civilisation (Education and civilization), calling for a neo-conservative revolution in French education. Giscard d'Estaing was by no means an obscure author. Scion of a wealthy, prestigious family, he held an M.B.A. from Harvard and worked as a high-ranking executive with the French branch of IBM (Who's Who in France 1973). He was also a member of the National Assembly, and in the April 1971 debate over the passage of the Pompidou Act--which amended the Debré Act--he delivered one of the major addresses in favor of the new law (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1448-1452). In 1974, Giscard d'Estaing's older brother Valéry was elected president. His 1971 book, therefore, provides important information about the French neo-conservatives' educational ideology.

He began Education et civilisation by challenging the preeminent role of the government in education. In his view, its role should be weakened; simultaneously the role

of other groups should be strengthened. Robert Dahl (1982) would not have been surprised to learn that these groups were families, regions, religions, and businesses. Giscard d'Estaing proceeded to advocate that parents be allowed to choose their children's schools without any restrictions whatever and that all schools, public and private, be fully financed by the state. Since schools would compete against each other for students, who would bring vouchers with them, educational productivity would increase and costs would go down. All schools should also have financial, pedagogical, and administrative autonomy. As he summarized it:

Autonomy is for a school what independence is for an individual. It is necessary if the school is to live; it stimulates the school and helps it develop a sense of responsibility and how to use it; it works against the stereotypical, uniform personality of the government. It is the source of creation, hope, and dignity. (P. 123; my translation)

It should be understood that, although the neo-conservatives temporarily triumphed over the Jacobin wing of French conservatism, their views were by no means universally held even in conservative political parties--and certainly not among Catholic educators. For instance, in 1975 two Catholics, Guy Goureaux and Jacques Ricot, published their own book, tellingly entitled Autopsie de l'école catholique (Autopsy of the Catholic school), decrying the influence of neo-conservative doctrines on

Catholic education. They feared "men who have been impregnated with a neo-conservative, American ideology and who lie in wait, hoping for the moment when they can introduce the profit principle into education" (pp. 8-9; my translation). Thus, both the Right and Catholic education were becoming increasingly divided.

However, the Left was becoming increasingly united as a result of conservative problems. After years of fragmented disarray, it began to pull together under the leadership of François Mitterrand. First, several small socialist parties united; then, in 1972 they formally entered into a coalition with the French Communist Party, forming the United Left. At a mass meeting in June 1972, the United Left unveiled its Common Platform. Among other things, it promised in no uncertain terms that when it won a majority of the seats in Parliament it would nationalize all private schools which had accepted government subsidies (Comité National de l'Enseignement Catholique [National Committee for Catholic Education: CNEC] 1977; L'A.P. 1972). From then on private school aid was a major issue in national politics.

An economic crisis and a decline in the legitimacy of the government were, then, two major elements in the French sociopolitical environment between 1969 and 1981. However, another major element must also be considered. In the 1970s both French public schools and French society

were becoming more culturally pluralistic. First of all, it must be understood that traditionally France had operated a school system which practiced a dual form of segregation. It was sex-segregated. It was also segregated on the basis of social class, with the upper classes attending the lycée system and the lower classes enrolling in the école system. Between 1945 and 1975, however, this traditional system was gradually dismantled. In its place was established a unified, coeducational K-12 school system. In 1975, when the Haby Act made coeducation mandatory in all public schools and abolished ability grouping through the tenth grade, the process was finally completed. However, private schools were permitted to continue to practice sex-segregation. And since they could charge fees, they also had a mechanism which they could use to select for social class if they wished (Decaunes 1962; Fontaine 1978; Géminard 1983). Thus, by the fall of 1977 when the Haby reforms were fully implemented, French public schools were legally required to be more culturally pluralistic than ever before. In a book published in that year, sociologist Robert Ballion explicitly stated that private education now offered families who wanted it what they had previously found in the public lycée system, "an environment which is socially and ideologically homogeneous" (p. 250; my translation).

However, both French society and French public schools were simultaneously becoming more culturally pluralistic in other profound ways. Throughout the economic expansion of the 1960s and early 1970s, France had accepted hundreds of thousands of foreign workers. In the early years of immigration, most of these workers were European; by the later years, however, most were African. The large majority of them had North African origins and were therefore Moslems (INSEE 1960-1975). By 1973 immigrants made up 7.2% of the total French population; and the proportion of immigrants was far higher in metropolitan areas, where they tended to live and work (L'A.P. 1973, 1981). Historically, racism has not been a serious problem in France. Even so, the combination of a relatively large percentage of foreigners and high unemployment caused an upsurge of racism, starting in the middle 1970s. In 1973, for instance, some citizens of Grasse, a perfume manufacturing city in southern France, attacked foreign workers. When the police arrived, they joined in the attack instead of helping the foreigners (Vincent 1977). In the same year an extreme right-wing group, called New Order, demonstrated against the government's immigration policy. And in Marseilles, after an Algerian worker killed a bus driver, outraged natives formed a Committee to Defend the Citizens of Marseilles, calling for vengeance (L'A.P. 1973). Race-related

incidents continued throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s (L'A.P. 1974, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981).

Perhaps because the French like to think of racism as a problem of other--especially English-speaking--nations, very few written sources from this period suggest that there was a relationship between growing racism and changes in private school aid policy. However, in a 1978 article Gabriel Gohau did suggest that even the Left was softening its position on private school subsidies because of the problem of increasing numbers of immigrants in some public schools. He feared that there was a real danger of school segregation in France.

In the privacy of the interview situation French educational leaders, especially public school ones, frequently made a connection between racism and private school aid policy. For example, a man who had once been a public elementary principal in a small city in southeastern France told about how in the neighborhood in which he worked his school had become progressively foreign. Meanwhile, a nearby private school had remained almost exclusively French. "Parents want to send their children to school with other little French children where only French is spoken," he explained (Interview with author, Paris, France, 11 May 1989). Another leader of a public school group made the relationship even more explicit:

Now, I am of the opinion that there is a connection between the immigrant problem and the fact that many parents insist on the right to choose their children's schools. They want their children to succeed in school. That's normal; all parents want their children to succeed in school. But they're afraid that the academic level will go down in schools with lots of immigrants. I consider such a situation a potential advantage. Differences are enriching; the teacher can use them. In a school with lots of foreigners a child can learn a great deal, for there are many differences in the world. But some people are afraid of differences. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 16 May 1989)

Understandably, Catholic educational leaders raised this issue far less often than did public school ones. However, one woman did address it. After criticizing English private schools for elitism, she launched into the following statement:

In some regions private schools enroll very few immigrants. In some places there is a sort of discrimination; parents choose private education because there are so many foreigners in the public schools. It's disgraceful! One bishop wrote a pastoral letter on the subject. We must watch that kind of thing closely, and we are. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989)

It seems, then, that the policy environment between 1969 and 1981 was extremely conducive to increasing the salience of the private school aid issue. A combination of declining political legitimacy, economic slowdown, and

increasing cultural pluralism brought the question onto the public agenda once again.

The Values Behind the Policy, 1970-1981

It is considerably more difficult to determine the values which shaped France's private school aid policy between 1969 and 1981 than it is to determine the values which lay behind the 1959 Debré Act. For one thing, the policy was in constant flux between 1970 and 1981. For another, as the period progressed the level of conflict in French politics became increasingly higher; simultaneously the tone of political discourse became increasingly more acrimonious. Therefore, in considering this period one must compare and weigh evidence with great care and accept the fact that not every question can be answered.

However, the National Assembly debates of 1971 and 1977 do provide important information about the values which the major policy actors openly avowed. In addition it will be necessary to consider allegations on both sides that hidden agendas were in operation.

Values behind the Pompidou Act

The Debré Act had stipulated that its program of contracting with private schools for educational services would expire at the end of twelve years. It was therefore apparent to everyone that on or before December 31, 1971, the National Assembly would have to repeal, amend, or

extend the law. In September 1970 the Government revealed the probable direction which its efforts would take. In that month it issued five decrees which both increased financial aid to private schools and loosened the controls over them. In December 1970 the Government began to discuss, behind closed doors, a new bill which would extend but substantially modify the Debré Act. The accounts of this process are confusing and contradictory, apparently because the events themselves were confusing and contradictory and promises were not kept.

A major issue in the discussion was whether or not simple contracts would be made permanent (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982). Since simple contracts involved less government regulation than did contracts of association, this was actually a struggle over the issue of control. After the December 16, 1970, meeting of the Council of Ministers, the newspapers announced that the new bill was ready and that the possibility of signing simple contracts would be extended for nine years and then eliminated (L.F. and L.M., 17 December 1970). The very next day, however, the Ministry of National Education announced that simple contracts would be made permanent--in blatant contradiction to what had been released to the press earlier (L.F., 18 December 1970). On the following two days, the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action made headlines by accusing President Pompidou of having

unilaterally overruled the decision of the Council of Ministers--and of having done so in order to stir up hostilities between the leaders of public and private schools (L.F., 19 December 1970; L.M., 20 December 1970). Twelve years later, Jean Cornec, a leader of the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action and a man who had been close to the events, wrote that the leaders of both private and public education had agreed to the nine year extension of simple contracts and that Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas had promised that this agreement would appear in the bill. In Cornec's opinion, Pompidou, threatened by the growing sympathies of many Catholics for the Left, had overruled his prime minister in order to divide the two groups (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982).

Cornec's comments shed light on a strange little article which appeared in the December 17, 1970, issue of Le Monde. Claiming that a government representative had visited the Vatican on December 15, the author reproduced portions of an article from the Catholic press which claimed that the Government had asked the Vatican to crack down on Catholic leftists in France in exchange for favors to private education. The article concluded with an angry denial by the Ministry of National Education.

These events are important because they reveal how deeply the ruling majority was divided at the time of the development and passage of the Pompidou Act. Therefore,

in analyzing the April 1971 debate of the Pompidou Bill, the author faced a delicate task. At the time of the 1959 debate, the members of the traditionalist Right had not been part of the ruling coalition; they had therefore been easy to identify. In the 1971 debate, however, there was a major division within the Majority. The principles of loyalty and discipline, which are strong in a parliamentary system, meant that this division would not be blatantly obvious in the debate. For example, members of the Majority would not heckle or attack each other. Suspecting, on the basis of external evidence, that the conflict related to disagreements between the Jacobins and the neo-conservatives, the author devised a way to identify those speakers who were probably neo-conservatives. Taking Giscard d'Estaing's criticisms of public education in Education et civilisation (1971), she analyzed the eleven speeches by members of conservative parties in order to determine who had employed any of his arguments. She found that six had done so. She then did a content analysis of the values expressed in the eleven speeches and compared the two groups. The two most important values for the group of six--which included Giscard d'Estaing himself--were freedom and autonomy. In fact, members of this group mentioned those two values more than twice as often as the other five conservatives did. In contrast, the two most important values for the

smaller group were control and solidarity--the values which Michel Debré had most emphasized in the 1959 debate. Therefore, in the following discussion, the group of six will be considered neo-conservatives and the group of five will be regarded as Jacobins.

As has been indicated, the neo-conservative speakers in the April 27, 1971, debate of the Pompidou Bill stressed freedom and autonomy. They also severely attacked public education. In their development of the value of freedom, they drew heavily on the concept of educational freedom which had been elaborated in 1959. They saw it as a basic freedom and one which the government should guarantee by financing it. They emphasized the importance of diversity--without it there could be no choice--and the undesirable features of monopolies of all kinds. Alexandre Bolo expressed a point of view typical of the group as a whole:

We live in a democracy, and we're proud of it. No democracy without choice, no choice without pluralism! It's appropriate, then, for a republican government to set up educational pluralism in a fair way.
(J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1473; my translation)

In arguing for autonomy, some of the neo-conservatives repeated arguments which the traditionalist Right had advanced twelve years earlier--for example, families had inalienable rights over their children. However, they obviously had developed their understanding

of autonomy far beyond concepts related to church and family. In their view, business enterprises should also play a prominent role in education. For example, Pierre Buron argued that the Ministry of National education should no longer be the central agency involved in developing education policy. Instead, it should work within a commission made up of representatives of business, industry, and other similar groups. The Minister of National Education would belong to this commission, but he would only be its Vice-Chairman (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1476). According to André Glon, businessmen had much to offer educators; for "[they] work in the real economy, [they] know what productivity and profitability mean" (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1481).

Probably because of the high value which they placed on private enterprise, these neo-conservatives regarded French private education quite favorably. Alexandre Bolo, for instance, described private schools as "flexible," "free," and "realistic." Because of these qualities they were open to the world outside their own four walls and were therefore in many ways well in advance of public schools (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1473). For this group, the future lay with private education. The growth of the private sector would not only provide a wider range of educational choices; it would also stimulate public

schools to improve. Giscard d'Estaing painted a glowing picture of the future of private education in France:

We can expect a proliferation of private schools, which won't be religious, but which will be based on an orientation towards a particular profession, or on a new teaching method, or which will correspond to a desire expressed by families. (J.O.A.N.D. 1971; my translation)

In contrast, members of this group roundly criticized public education. Their most popular theme was the allegedly radical political views of public school teachers--views which the teachers not only held but also supposedly imposed upon their students. The neo-conservatives also attacked the public school system on other grounds. They criticized its organizational structure, arguing that it was too centralized and too bureaucratic. In their opinion, French public education needed to be decentralized; and individual public schools needed to be granted more autonomy. As part of this restructuring, principals ought to be given more power to run their schools. In addition, public education should be held more accountable, although the neo-conservatives did not completely explain how greater autonomy and greater accountability would be reconciled. Finally, some members of the neo-conservative group argued that public education was inefficient. Glon charged inaccurately that it wasted money because it used its buildings only from

December through May--"a rather extraordinary way to use investments" (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1481; my translation).

His colleague Buron alleged that public schools were not adequately performing their task of teaching students to read. As a former philosophy teacher, he could--and did--relate examples of students who had reached his class unable to spell or "really read." After the deputies on the left side of the house laughed at his allegations, he described a little experiment which he had enjoyed running in his classes.

When I wanted to find a student out, I would start to read something by Plato or Spinoza out loud and, pretending to have a sore throat, I would ask him to go on reading. The student would make a fool out of himself then; for, nine times out of ten, he didn't know how to read. (J.O.A.N.D. 1971. 1476; my translation)

In strong contrast to the neo-conservatives, the Jacobins advanced arguments which emphasized three values: control, solidarity, and freedom. Since their interpretation of educational freedom was essentially identical to that which the Majority advanced in 1959, it will not be discussed here. However, their conceptions of both solidarity and control had changed somewhat and therefore merit attention.

In 1959 the Majority had argued very pragmatically that subsidizing private schools was, in their particular

sociopolitical situation, the only way to bring about national unity. Twelve years later they affirmed that the Debré Act had, in fact, accomplished this goal. For example, Olivier Guichard, Minister of National Education, asserted that the policy had brought about a stability in relative enrollments which had prevented public education from feeling unduly threatened by the subsidized private sector. He believed that it was this balance between the two sectors which had made reconciliation possible (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1452). Because of their concern for solidarity, the Jacobins disliked the idea that the two systems might compete with each other. For example, Jean Capelle introduced a new theme into the debate when he suggested that the greatest potential danger of competition was in small townships where the existence of both private and public schools sometimes led to "a cleavage into two antagonistic camps which are sometimes based on social class" (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1470; my translation). He felt, therefore, that the deliberate encouragement of competition might threaten solidarity at the local level, so should be avoided.

Moreover, the Jacobin group devoted considerable attention to the subject of government regulation of private education. They argued, first of all, that when a government enters into a contract with any subsidiary organization, it must exercise some control over what that

organization does with the power and resources allocated to it. Regulation was, to them, both normal and essential. In addition, they believed that under the regulations incorporated into the Debré Act, private education had improved. They cited the facts that private school teachers were more highly credentialed than they had been before 1959, that technical and vocational programs in private high schools were now of excellent quality, and that private education had developed a more complex organizational structure. Boscary-Monsservin was one who stressed the positive effects of government regulation, saying:

The essential merit of the Debré Act--since no one has yet pointed it out, I'll emphasize it, even though I'm a strong supporter of private education--is undoubtedly the fact that it put an end to what I'll call the "primitive" period of private education. (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1463; my translation)

In summary, then, although the Jacobins did not openly attack their neo-conservative political allies, they expressed values which were clearly distinct from those advocated by them. They did not criticize public education, and they emphasized the importance of government control.

Members of the left-of-center political parties contributed four speeches to the 1971 debate. An analysis of them reveals that their major values were control and

equality. However, their understanding of the autonomy and control issue had changed profoundly since 1959. At the time of the passage of the Debré Act, they had seen the Catholic Church as the major institution which threatened the sovereignty of the state. By the spring of 1971, they considered the Church relatively unimportant; their main concern was now big business. For example, in his speech Michel Rocard specifically mentioned Michelin and IBM as two companies which had already established private schools of their own. In addition, he thought that in some regions of France business interests were seeking to exercise influence over education by electing representatives to local governments (J.O.A.N.D 1971, 1480). Roland Leroy suggested that the neo-conservatives were seeking to implement an overall strategy which would lead to a school system, and indeed an entire society, which was "steadily more completely dominated by the short term interests of a financial and industrial complex" (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1460; my translation). And, in his speech, Guy Mollet explained why business interests were currently becoming involved in education:

At this time, long foretold, when intelligence is becoming a power which is directly linked with production, it is normal that profiteers plan to gain exclusive control of it, not by buying it after it has been developed, for that would perhaps be too late, but by controlling its very development. (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1456; my translation)

Given this understanding of the autonomy versus control issue, it is not surprising that representatives of the Left expressed more concern about equality than they had in 1959. They believed that although in France equal access to schooling had been largely attained, equal access to knowledge had not. They blamed the selection processes of French public education for this failure, claiming that working class children were the major victims of the system. In their view, therefore, French education should not be moving toward the establishment of an elite private school system and encouraging it to compete against public schools. To them the Pompidou Bill was an aberration, and one which would soon be corrected when the Left came to power.

Values behind the Guermeur Act

The Guermeur Act, debated in June 1977 by the National Assembly and promulgated in November of that year, was developed against a background of intense political conflict. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for March 1978; and in the municipal elections of March 1977, the United Left had made deep inroads into political territory which the conservative majority had held securely for almost twenty years (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Legrès 1977). At a May convention at Albi, the president of the National Federation of Public School Parents' Councils, Jean Cornec, had publicly attacked

private education. Although the leaders of the United Left carefully distanced themselves from Cornec's position, this conjunction of events seems to have spurred the Majority to move quickly to modify private education policy (L.F., 28 June 1977). On June 28, Guy Guermeur, a flamboyant deputy from Finistère, introduced a bill which greatly extended benefits to private schools. In its original form, his bill provided for: (1) government aid for private school building construction, (2) equality between private and public school teachers, (3) government support for the pre-service training of private school teachers, and (4) the increased power of private school principals over their teaching staffs (L.M., 28 June 1977). Because of the financial implications of the bill, the Government preferred to avoid a full debate of it in the National Assembly. Therefore, it was listed under supplementary business, which meant that it would be among the last items discussed before the Assembly's June 30 recess. As a result, the debate began at 5:00 A.M. on June 29, at the end of an all-night meeting of Parliament (L.F., 28-30 June 1977; L.M., 30 June 1977). During it, both conservative and left-of-center deputies pointedly commented on the Government's questionable procedures (J.O.A.N.D. 1977, 4380-4382).

The debate of the Guermeur Act was, therefore, atypical in several respects. It was short, including

only nine speeches. Moreover, only two left-of-center deputies participated. Therefore, it cannot be considered a full exposition of the arguments and values which each side sought to communicate to the public, as the two earlier debates appeared to be. Even so, the 1977 debate is interesting.

First of all, its tone was quite different from that of the 1971 debate. Significantly missing were attacks on public education. Indeed, several members of the Right praised public schools and their teachers, emphasizing the valuable service which they rendered the nation. Also absent was neo-conservative ideology. No deputy called for weakening the Ministry of National Education, for a proliferation of private schools, or for increased competition between the two sectors. In fact, one of the most striking facts about the debate was the contradiction between the provisions of the bill--which were thoroughly consistent with the Giscard d'Estaing brothers' neo-conservative ideology--and the arguments advanced by the conservatives who delivered speeches. Two explanations seem likely, and they are by no means mutually exclusive. One is that the conservatives had finally realized how unpalatable neo-conservative ideas were to much of the French public, not only on the Left, but also on the Right. The conservative editor of L'Année politique (1976) had warned of this danger a year earlier. Another

is that the Majority was still deeply divided and that the bill represented the work of one faction, while the debate represented the ideas of another. This theory is supported by André Boulloche's comment during the debate:

At the end of a session which has been marked by unusual dissension within the Majority. . .it was surely necessary for the Majority to strive to reconstruct a facade of unity, even at the cost of the dignity of Parliament and the future of our young people. (J.O.A.N.D. 1977, 4381; my translation)

The bizarre and truncated debate of 1977 is interesting because in it each side can be seen reinterpreting a key value in a way which would be significant not only in 1977, but for years to come. In 1977 the Right showed signs that it had deepened and extended its understanding of equality. Previously, it had focused on the importance of equal opportunity for rich and poor parents to choose private education for their children. This argument was repeated in the 1977 debate. Now, however, the Right also argued that private and public education should be treated equally by the government. This meant two things. First of all, financially the two school systems should be treated equally. Second, the teachers in the two systems should be treated equally as well. In part, of course, this meant that they should receive equal financial benefits. But it also implied that they should have career

opportunities similar to those of the public school teachers--that is, that their training, seniority rights, retirement regulations, and so forth should be improved. This new position had a significance which should not be overlooked. From the beginning, public school teachers had played an active role in the development of private school aid policy. The 1977 debate provides evidence that private school teachers had begun to do so as well.

On the Left, a new understanding of solidarity appeared in 1977. Previously, members of the left-of-center parties had argued that public education was important because it offered children from diverse backgrounds a chance to get to know each other. Now, however, although they certainly did not repudiate their earlier argument, they showed signs of having modified it to incorporate elements of the pluralism and diversity long advocated by the Right. For example, in his speech Jack Ralite, a Communist deputy from a working class suburb of Paris, spoke glowingly of the union in diversity which the United Left sought, "a society of national solidarity, rich in its regional diversity" (J.O.A.N.D. 1977, 4386). Socialist André Boulloche elaborated on this theme in greater detail:

To your arguments in support of freedom of education, we oppose our desire for freedom in education. This freedom will be guaranteed for families, for teachers, for children, by the progressive elaboration of a great national

public education service which will be non-sectarian and decentralized. (J.O.A.N.D. 1977, 4382; my translation)

Thus, there were clear indications in the 1977 debate that much of the United Left was moving toward a vision of union and diversity within a unified but decentralized school system.

Hidden agendas between 1970 and 1981

It will be recalled that at the time of the development of the Debré Act, an obvious problem--the baby boom--was largely glossed over. Few contemporary commentators pointed out that for financial reasons the Debré Government almost had to decide to subsidize private education. In contrast, throughout the 1969 to 1981 period, policy actors and observers on both sides frequently launched charges that a hidden agenda was operating. First of all, people on the Left steadily suggested that the neo-conservatives had a grand plan for French education which they were not fully revealing. At times these accusations resembled classic conspiracy theories. For example, in a column published in Le Monde on July 7, 1977, Jean Cornec alleged that the Government had an overall, but secret, strategy.

It's all carried out patiently, put in place slowly, methodically. If hostile reactions are too strong at a given moment, they tactically withdraw, they become very discreet, very nice. . . .they are putting citizens to sleep so

that they hardly notice that the fortress has already been penetrated. (P. 9; my translation)

Cornec was, of course, a radical. Head of the National Federation of Public School Parents' Councils, he was the leader of the most militant wing of the non-sectarians. However, a somewhat different version of the conspiracy theory was quietly advanced in another article in Le Monde four years later. The author, a regular reporter for the prestigious left-of-center daily, reported on a celebration at the Clock Club, an organization led by prominent members of the two largest conservative parties. According to the article, their celebration of the end of socialism was accompanied by rejoicing that their battle against egalitarianism had largely succeeded. As part of their struggle, the members of the Clock Club were fighting government bureaucracy and advocating a "differentiated" society which would be dominated by private enterprise. Their plan for France involved a "differentiated" school system which would include different tracks or schools for problem, average, good, and gifted students (L.M., 4 March 1981). The reporter did not draw conclusions for his readers, but the piece was published at the height of a presidential campaign in which private school subsidies were a major issue. Therefore, he probably expected his readers to

draw their own conclusions about the educational elitism implicit in the Right's platform.

Comments which suggest similar conspiracy views are scattered through a wide variety of sources. They appeared, for example, in the works of two sociologists, Tanguy (1972) and Ballion (1977; 1980) and also in a book by Communist Senator Georges Cogniot (1974b). The Catholic writers Goureaux and Ricot (1975) also raised the possibility; and another Catholic, Fontaine (1978), touched lightly on the issue. Three years later the theme surfaced again in an article by Plenel and Meury (1981). Determining whether or not such a conspiracy did in fact exist would entail moving far beyond the scope of this investigation. However, at the very least the fact that numerous observers advanced conspiracy theories during this period suggests the extent to which the political environment was characterized by distrust.

Moreover, each side accused the other of exploiting the issue for political purposes. The Left's charges were relatively straightforward. They believed that conservatives were desperately stirring up the private school issue in order to encourage practicing Catholics to vote for them in elections. During the 1977 National Assembly debate of the Guermeur Bill, United Left deputies Boulloche and Ralite explicitly made this charge (J.O.A.N.D. 1977, 4381 and 4386). François Mitterrand,

the head of the Socialist Party, repeated it several months later (L.M., 25 November 1977); and it permeates the book which the non-sectarian leaders Cornec and Bouchareissas published in 1982. The very nature of the accusation is such that it would be almost impossible to determine its truth with absolute certainty. However, two additional pieces of evidence suggest that the conservatives may have deliberately used such a strategy. Careful analysis of the chronology of the period between 1969 and 1981 reveals that thirteen of the twenty-five pieces of private school legislation passed during that time were passed within six months prior to a national election. Moreover, this connection between legislation and elections occurs only late in the period. Parliamentary elections were held March 12-19, 1978; the Guermeur Act was promulgated November 22, 1977, and nine decrees were issued on March 8, 1978. Similarly, in the spring of 1981 three decrees were issued during the two months before the presidential election of May 10. Another piece of evidence emerged in an interview with a representative of a private school principals' union. This woman spontaneously expressed the following opinion about the Guermeur Act: "It was a very political law, designed to help win an election--they didn't even consult us about it. . . ." (Interview with author, Paris, France,

1 June 1989). Thus, the evidence does suggest that the Right may have exploited the issue politically.

However, the Right also accused the Left of using the issue for political purposes. Its charges were somewhat more complex than the Left's. Among the major supporters of the Socialist Party was the National Education Federation, an umbrella organization which includes more than forty public education unions. The National Education Federation had opposed private school subsidies from the beginning. The Right claimed that the Socialist Party had promised the Federation and its largest constituent union, the National Union for Elementary and Middle School Teachers, to nationalize private education in exchange for political support (CNEC 1977; L.F., 8 March and 1 July 1977). This charge would be even harder to verify than the Left's accusations against the Right. However, in an interview with a representative of the National Union for Elementary and Middle School Teachers, the author asked a question about the reasons for public school teachers' opposition to private school aid. The interviewee--a man who emerged as one of the most independent thinkers among the sixteen respondents--immediately answered, "To my way of thinking, the issue has always been used for political purposes" (Interview with author, Paris, France, 11 May 1989). In a long historical and sociological digression, he described and

decried "fundamentalists" within his organization who maintained "old positions" and kept the issue alive for political reasons. Thus, there is some evidence to support the allegations of the Right.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that throughout the period between 1969 and 1981, the French continued to try to balance the political values of freedom and solidarity in their development of private education policy. However, the influence of neo-conservative ideas within the majority caused the balance to tip steadily in the direction of freedom and its institutional equivalent, autonomy. Moreover, as time passed, the issue seems to have become increasingly politicized. The evidence suggests that, ultimately, on both the Right and the Left political considerations as well as ideological values began strongly to influence policy positions.

The Structure of the Policy in 1981

Throughout the twelve years between 1969 and 1981, the Debré Act and its accompanying decrees of implementation remained in effect. Thus, the general structure of the French private school aid policy remained unchanged. The national government continued to sign contracts with private schools, which then offered "public instruction." Most of the money with which the government subsidized private education was offered in the form of salaries,

which were paid directly to private school teachers.

However, between 1969 and 1981 one Constitutional Council decision, two laws, and twenty-four decrees substantially amended the policy. An analysis of these changes reveals that they were not randomly made modifications. Rather, almost all of them fell into one of five categories:

(1) weakened restrictions on supply; (2) increased operating flexibility; (3) increased administrative power; (4) increased funding; and (5) equalization of the employment conditions of private and public school teachers. In the remainder of this section, each of these categories will be discussed in turn.

The original policy had rather severely restricted the growth of the supply of private education. In the early 1970s, however, these restrictions were significantly relaxed. For example, in 1970 the waiting period for new private schools was reduced from five years to two in recently developed urban neighborhoods (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 8468-8469); in 1978 the waiting period was reduced to just one year (J.O.:L.D. 1978, 970-971). Under the policy of the 1960s, private schools had been required to maintain enrollments and class sizes comparable to those of the public sector. Two 1970 decrees, however, made it possible for private establishments to open and operate with significantly fewer students than were necessary in public schools (J.O.:L.D., 1970, 8469 and 11343). For

instance, a private one-room elementary school could open with only sixteen pupils (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 11343). Finally, the Pompidou Act of 1971 redefined the term "recognized educational need," which appeared in the Debré Act, relating it to the right of a private school to maintain a "distinctive character" (J.O.:L.D. 1971, 5339). Previously, public school authorities charged with implementing the policy had been permitted considerable latitude in interpreting the phrase. For instance, they might require evidence that the local public school could not accommodate all the students in a district before they recommended that a private school be allowed to sign a contract with the government. Under the Pompidou Act, however, educational need had to be interpreted in relationship to the availability of a school with a given type of "distinctive character." Thus, the policy as revised in the 1970s made it considerably easier to establish new private schools than before.

The policy revisions of the 1970s also granted private education increased operating flexibility. For example, during the 1960s private schools which accepted aid had been required to follow public education time schedules and curriculum guides. In the early 1970s, the word "general" was inserted before each of these requirements, meaning that private schools did not have to adhere rigidly to them (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 8469; J.O.:L.D. 1971,

5339). In addition, private establishments were granted considerable discretion in assigning extra supervisory duties to teachers, utilizing supplementary hours, and employing part-time teachers (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 8468 and 8471; J.O.:L.D. 1978, 971-972). Since French public education is highly unionized, teacher duties and workloads are carefully spelled out and monitored. Thus, these changes in private education policy meant that private schools could offer services not available in the public sector without incurring additional costs. For example, in an interview one respondent mentioned before and after school child care and piano lessons as extra services offered by many private schools (Interview with author, Paris, France, 11 May 1989).

Throughout the 1970s amendments of the policy strengthened the power of private school administrators, especially principals, over their teaching staffs. In 1970 principals were granted the power to evaluate teachers (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 8468). Throughout the decade they gained steadily greater influence over the hiring process; in 1978 they were accorded the right to recommend the hiring of a teacher to public school authorities, who retained only a veto power (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 8468; J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5539; J.O.:L.D. 1978, 970-971). The most controversial aspect of this increased power was the provision in the 1977 Guerneur Act that

private school teachers had to respect their school's "distinctive character" (J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5539). Many people considered this clause a violation of the French constitution, which guarantees citizens freedom of conscience. As a result, the law was appealed to the Constitutional Council, which ruled that since a private school's right to maintain a "distinctive character" was an inherent aspect of educational freedom, teachers could indeed be required to respect it (J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5530; Plouvin 1979). Since public school principals in France function primarily as head teachers or team leaders, these changes represented a marked deviation from the standard administrative patterns of the public system.

A number of the modifications of the policy, especially after 1976, increased financial aid to private schools. For example, private school buildings were accorded certain tax exemptions in 1970; and in 1977 the Guermeur Act provided funds for private middle schools to use in constructing and equipping workshops (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 12604; J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5539). In 1970 the government increased the percentage of the fixed charges which it paid for teachers under simple contracts. Starting in 1975 it paid all of the fixed charges for fully credentialed teachers (J.O.: L.D. 1970, 8471; J.O.:L.D. 1975, 9352). Under the Debré Act, the national and local governments had paid certain operating costs for

schools under contracts of association. In 1977 and 1978, these operating costs were redefined and new formulas for calculating them were provided. The effect of all of these changes was to increase the amounts paid to private schools by both the national and local governments (J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5539; J.O.:L.D. 1978, 970-971). Finally, under the Guermeur Act the national government assumed the cost of providing both pre-service and in-service training for private school teachers (J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5539).

In the 1970s and early 1980s, a number of policy changes were implemented for the purpose of equalizing the employment conditions of teachers in the public and private sectors. In 1970, for instance, several decrees clarified and defined seniority provisions (J.O.:L.D. 1970, 8471). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, their retirement plans, leave programs, and social benefits were equalized as well (J.O.:L.D. 1977, 5539; J.O.:L.D., 1978; J.O.:L.D. 1979, 2712-2715; J.O.:L.D. 1981, 759). Of course, some of these changes implied increased financing of private schools. And they made it easier for private education to compete against public education in recruiting teachers.

In conclusion, it can be said that from 1960 to 1981, French private education policy changed considerably. Almost all of these changes increased the benefits to the private sector of its relationship with the government.

Indeed, some felt that these changes accorded the private sector a privileged status in comparison to the public one (Ballion 1977; Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982). It was probably inevitable, then, that in the politically charged atmosphere of the early 1980s an attempt would be made to revise the policy. However, before that dramatic confrontation can be examined, it will be necessary to consider the actual and perceived effects of the private school aid program.

CHAPTER V

EFFECTS AND PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF CONSERVATIVE POLICY

Ultimately, policies are not judged on the basis of the values behind them or the elegance of the policy mechanisms devised to realize those values. Ultimately, policies are judged on the basis of their effects, intended and unintended. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to the question of the effects of the private school aid policy which French conservatives developed in late 1959 and pursued until 1981, when France elected a Socialist president. In this discussion, both actual and perceived effects will be considered. The two types of effects will be distinguished in the following way. Effects will be considered actual if there is widespread agreement that they occurred and empirical evidence to support them. Effects will be considered perceived effects if there is either considerable controversy about them, or if they are not well supported by empirical evidence. It should be remembered that in politics perceived reality may be at least as important as objective reality; and, in the confrontation over private school policy which marked the early years of the Mitterrand presidency, perceived reality played a pivotal role.

The first effect which one must always consider in analyzing any policy is its implementation. Policies are not always implemented. Funding may not be voted, or the responsible agencies may not be willing or able to carry out implementation. It is, therefore, essential first to consider the question of the extent to which the Debre Act and its subsequent modifications were actually implemented.

Implementation

All of the evidence suggests that the Debré Act was implemented slowly and with great difficulty, but that it was finally implemented rather fully. The difficulties do not seem to have been financial. Parliament provided funding to support the program; in 1961, the year in which implementation truly began, the national education budget increased by 9.2%. This jump in education spending was followed by a 14.8% increase in 1962, a 19.1% increase in 1963, and a 26.7% increase in 1964 (L'A.P. 1963). Although these new funds were not spent on private education alone, it seems apparent that Parliament did vote enough money to implement the new program.

The difficulties in implementation were caused by the unwillingness and inability of many agencies and individuals to put the policy into effect quickly. In a 1962 article, Catholic author Jean-Marie Le Blond argued

that defensiveness and mistrust on both sides had slowed implementation. Private educators were, in general, not pleased with the law. They considered it risky and therefore highly unsatisfactory. However, they also considered it unlikely that the government would pass a better law. Therefore, in the summer of 1960, the cardinals of France issued a letter suggesting that Catholic educators try to make the new law work. They recommended that elementary schools sign simple contracts; while, with diocesan approval, secondary ones might choose the more heavily regulated contracts of association (Le Blond 1962). Lizop, another Catholic school leader, publicly warned of the dangers inherent in the Debré Act and of the need for constant vigilance during the implementation period (Coutrot 1963).

Catholic educators were not the only ones who were unhappy with the new law; public school teachers were furious. As soon as the law passed, they began a national petition drive, working through the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action, an organization whose leadership they dominated. Purchasing 165,000 petition notebooks with numbered pages, they dispatched them to every section of France. There volunteers circulated them, sometimes in rather aggressive ways. By the end of May, 10,813,697 signatures had been gathered. The notebooks were presented at a mass meeting in June during which the

350,000 participants repeated a solemn oath to fight against the Debré Act until it was repealed ("Campagne d'agitation laïque" [Non-sectarians' agitation campaign] 1960; Franceschi 1964).

Moreover, public school administrators were unhappy as well. In April 1960 the National Union of Departmental Inspectors of Elementary Education held its annual convention. The major subject of discussion was the new policy, for as inspectors they would be required to implement it. The inspectors were experiencing a severe value conflict; indeed, some even considered resigning over it. They were opposed to the Debré Act on ideological grounds, for to them it seemed to violate the traditional non-sectarian position of French public education. Yet as civil servants they felt morally obligated to implement the policy. They decided upon an "honest and scrupulous" implementation--which would also be slow (Franceschi 1964, 82). Thus, because the public school inspectors experienced inner conflict about the law, they contributed to making its implementation painfully time-consuming (Franceschi 1964; Vandermeersch 1968).

Another problem was simply that the new policy involved great amounts of additional school visitations and paperwork which the public school administration was not able to accomplish rapidly (Le Blond 1962). For

example, school buildings had to be inspected and contracts signed. The credentials of private school teachers had to be evaluated before they could be assigned positions on the salary scale. Inspectors had to observe in private schools to determine if they met class size requirements. All of this took time. It is not surprising, then, that the first years of implementation were marked by conflict. For example, in the spring of 1961 the Private School Parents' Association protested the slowness with which payments were coming in, and in September 1962 some private school teachers went on strike to make known their dissatisfactions with the implementation process (L'A.P. 1962 and 1963).

However, slowly the program was put into place. A handful of schools, all non-religious, requested integration into the public education system. A larger number of schools, largely non-religious, opted for independence and no aid. But gradually increasing numbers of Catholic schools signed contracts. By the time the fall of 1962 arrived, 1,038,000 students were attending Catholic schools under simple contracts; 126,000 went to schools which had signed contracts of association. By 1963 these figures had increased to 1,334,600 and 150,400 respectively (Fontaine 1978). By the late spring of 1964, approximately 14,700 Catholic classes or establishments were under contract (Sainclair 1965). At the end of the

1967-1968 school year, 95% of the students enrolled in Catholic elementary schools and 91% of those enrolled in Catholic secondary schools attended institutions under contract. The large majority of the elementary schools had signed simple contracts; the large majority of the secondary schools had selected contracts of association (L'Ecole catholique demain [The Catholic school tomorrow] 1969).

Although the Debré Act was largely implemented, some problem areas remained. The government had a tendency to get in arrears on its payments to subsidized private schools (L'A.P. 1962, 1963; L.M. 20 December 1970). One Catholic interviewee stated that during the 1960s many Catholic school principals had continued to require prospective students to present baptismal certificates, a violation of the equal access provisions of the Debré Act (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989). By and large public school teachers refused to serve on the Committees of Conciliation (L.M. 15 July 1970). Yet, these were relatively minor aberrations. It can be said that, for the most part, the Debré Act was indeed implemented.

General Effects

Enrollment effects

Many Americans worry that subsidizing private education would cause public school enrollments to drop. However, as Figure 1 indicates, the percentage of French school children enrolled in public education did not drop under conservative policy between 1960 and 1980. On the contrary, after a slight decline in the early years of policy implementation, the percentage rose to 84% and remained stable at that level for a decade.

Was this stability a result of the policy itself? A number of observers believe that it was. For example, in the 1971 debate of the Pompidou Act, Olivier Guichard, then Minister of National Education, spoke of the equilibrium between the two sectors which the Debré Act had established and argued that this sensible balance between the systems was the major reason for continuing the policy (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1452). Six years later, Alexandre Bolo gave the keynote speech in support of the Guermeur Act and made the same point. He stated that the policy had been designed to permit private education to maintain, but not develop its position (J.O.A.N.D. 1977, 4378). And in one interview a retired Catholic school administrator who had been active in the 1960s expressed the same view (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989). In addition, several interviewees from both




Figure 1. Percentage of Public School Enrollment, France, 1960-1980.

Source: Based on INSEE statistics, INSEE 1961-1981.

sectors suggested that the fact that private schools almost have to charge supplementary fees was an aspect of the legislation which encouraged stability in relative enrollments (Interviews with author, Paris, France, 16, 17, 23, 24 and 25 May 1989). Thus, it would seem that the policy was deliberately designed to protect public school enrollments and that it has done so.

Some people, however, have argued that a close analysis of the enrollments in different segments of the two school systems would reveal that some portions have gained relative ground while others have lost it. A few interviewees proffered this interpretation (Interviews with author, Paris, France, 19 and 25 May 1985) and two sociologists have tried to marshal evidence in support of it. Tanguy (1972), for example, advanced the position that the private sector was increasingly concentrating on secondary education and on the more prestigious academic curricula within the secondary program. However, her statistics were scanty and did not fully support her argument. Ballion (1977) tried to argue that private education was expanding in large cities, but he studied only the Paris region and did not analyze long term trends. Unfortunately, the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) did not report enrollment statistics between 1960 and 1981 in a manner which was either detailed enough or consistent enough to

permit a precise analysis. As Table 1 shows, in 1977-1978 the relative enrollments of various educational levels and programs did differ in some interesting ways. However, since 28.8% of all secondary students were in private schools in 1960-1961 (DeDainville 1963), these figures do not support the contention that the private sector was increasingly concentrating on secondary education. In conclusion, then, it is fair to say that the evidence supports the view that conservative policy established an equilibrium between public and private school enrollments. The widespread perception that private education has gained disproportionately in some academic programs or geographic regions is not well supported by the available facts.

Financial effects

Although a detailed analysis of the costs of the French private school aid policy would go far beyond the scope of this investigation, it is necessary to consider some of its financial effects or, more accurately, its alleged financial effects. In studying the French source material, one encounters a wide variety of interpretations both of the cost of the program and of the impact of that cost on public education. Some people argue that the policy saves the government a great deal of money. Others claim that it has taken billions of francs away from the public school system. Still others insist that it has led

Table 1. Comparative Enrollments by Program, French
Public and Private Schools, 1977-1978.

Program	<u>Percent of Total Enrollments</u>	
	Public Schools	Private Schools
Kindergarten	87	13
Elementary (1-5)	86	14
Middle School (6-9)	81	19
Non-academic High School	79	21
Academic High School	77	23
Special Education	60	40

Source: Based on INSEE statistics, INSEE 1979.

to a wasteful duplication of services. A number of observers have also complained about other financial effects: difficulty in budgeting for private education expenses, inadequate government control over the development of private education spending, and taxation without representation. Each of these issues will be examined in turn before addressing what is perhaps the most important question of all--why is it so difficult to determine the financial effects of the policy?

It will be recalled that one of the reasons for the passage of the Debré Act was that, given the financial crisis in Catholic education, subsidizing private schools seemed less costly in the long run than permitting them to collapse. Although national and local governments assumed much of the financial burden for private education in the early 1960s, they did not assume all of it. Capital investments, administrators' salaries, teacher training, some fixed charges, and some operating costs were not covered.

Therefore, the argument that subsidizing private schools actually saved the government--and thus taxpayers--money appeared early in the literature. For example, in July 1970 Catholic education officials used it to support the extension of the Debré Act, pointing out that the average private school student cost the government only 400 francs a year while a public school

student cost 1400 (L.M. 15 July 1970). Seven years later leaders of the Catholic system claimed that although their establishments enrolled 16% of French school children, only 8.71% of the national education budget was allocated to them (CNEC 1977; L.F. 16 May 1977). And in 1980 sociologist Ballion used a similar argument, stating that private schools enrolled 16% of all students but utilized only 10% of the education budget. Not surprisingly, this type of reasoning appealed to conservative policymakers; and they used it in the 1971, 1977, and 1984 debates of policy modifications. As late as 1989 two interviewees--interestingly, both were representatives of extreme right wing political parties--utilized it (Interviews with author, Paris, France, 18 and 22 May 1989). However, no spokesmen for the Catholic school system used it in 1989, possibly because it was no longer true. This possibility was supported by Eddy Khaldi (1985) in propaganda which attacked private education and its leaders. Claiming as his source an answer to a question directed at the Senate's Cultural Affairs Commission about the 1984 budget, he alleged that in 1984 (when conservative policy was still largely in effect), the government was paying almost as much per private secondary school student as per public secondary student--and more per private elementary school student.

Given this conflicting evidence, it is possible to do little more than hazard a guess about the truth. Probably, at least until late in the period under study, the program did save the government money. It seems likely, however, that it did not save as much as the Catholic leaders and Ballion suggested. A simplistic juxtaposition of enrollment and budget percentages does not take administrative overhead costs into account, as Cornec and Bouchareissas (1982) and Khaldi (1985) pointed out. Since the Ministry of National Education was processing a great deal of paperwork related to private schools and also inspecting facilities, evaluating credentials, observing teachers, developing curriculum, and administering tests for them, these costs were probably considerable. By 1977 private education supporters were advocating financial parity between the two sectors (J.O.A.N.D. 1977, 4378-4390), and between 1977 and 1981 new legislation moved in this direction. Therefore, it is entirely possible that by the time the Socialists came to power in 1981, the policy was no longer saving money. Since class sizes in private schools were smaller than those in public schools (Savary 1985), it is even possible that, as Khaldi (1985) suggested, the policy was beginning to be costly.

In opposition to private school arguments that the subsidies saved money, public school supporters offered

two major responses. The first, most common, and least tenable reaction was that the program stole billions of francs from public education (L.M. 2 June 1971; Cogniot 1974b; Goureaux and Ricot 1975; Trégaro 1976; Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982). This position was based on the questionable assumption that even in the absence of the subsidy program the government would have enormously increased education spending during the 1960s, allocating greatly increased sums to public schools. Significantly, none of the interviewees who represented public education organizations advanced this argument. Indeed, one of them--the independent union leader who thought that the Left had exploited teachers politically--described this theory as one which was widely believed by public school teachers, but false nonetheless. In its place he proposed another interpretation of the financial effects of the policy--waste through duplication of services (Interview with author, Paris, France, 11 May 1989).

This view appeared frequently toward the end of the period under study. In his 1985 book, Alain Savary, Minister of National Education from 1981 to 1984, argued that such wastefulness was a major problem. Representatives of the United Left also advanced this position during the 1984 debates of their proposed reform of the policy. For instance, Jean Natiez, a deputy from rural Brittany, described a situation in his district.

Learning disabled public school students in a small town were being transported fifteen kilometers to a special class near Nantes; learning disabled private school students in the same town were being transported fifteen miles in the opposite direction. Together, these students would have constituted a large enough group to qualify for a learning disabled class in their own town, saving transportation costs. Natiez also described a township in which both a one-room private elementary school with twelve pupils and a one-room public school with eighteen pupils functioned, arguing that combining the two schools would be cost-effective (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2535-2538). Catholic school leaders were aware of this type of criticism as early as 1977, when they argued that such situations existed only in a few isolated rural areas, so did not waste significant sums of money (CNEC 1977). In the absence of precise figures, it is impossible to know to what extent resources are indeed wasted through duplication of services.

People in both political camps described financial effects of another sort; they alleged that the policy made sound budgeting and accounting practices difficult, if not impossible. For instance, in 1970 the Finance Ministry opposed Pompidou's decision to make simple contracts permanent on the grounds that it was impossible to know at budget preparation time how many schools were

going to request simple contracts for the following year. As a result, the Ministry found that the amount budgeted for private schools and the amount actually spent usually differed greatly (L.M. 21 December 1970).

Eleven years later, when he became Minister of National Education, Alain Savary encountered a similar problem. He found that the national government had no control over how many private school teachers were trained and hired although it financed both teacher training and teacher compensation. As a result, between 1975 and 1981, the number of private school teachers had increased by 13%, although private enrollments had increased by only 4%. The corresponding figures for public education were 7% and 9% respectively (Savary 1985). Labé, a scholar, discussed the same situation in a 1985 article; and both Savary (1985) and Douence (1985) described similar problems at the local level. Indeed, since private schools signed their contracts with the national government, municipalities and townships had no control over the establishment of private schools in their jurisdictions; yet they were expected to contribute some financial support to them. The problem of students from other jurisdictions was especially vexing. City governments resented having to raise taxes to pay educational expenses for students who attended a private school in the city but resided in a rural township. As a

result, large numbers of local governments took their complaints to court, alleging a violation of their rights under the French constitution (Leclerc 1985). Of all the financial effect arguments, this one seems the most solid. It is especially significant that a conservative Finance Ministry spoke out against a conservative president on the issue in 1970. This fact, coupled with evidence from a Socialist Minister of National Education, two legal scholars, and the actions of dozens of local governments, points strongly toward the conclusion that the conservative subsidy program did, in fact, cause budgeting and accounting problems for the governments involved in implementing the policy.

In examining any policy issue, it is important to consider what is missing from the evidence. In the case of the financial impact of French private school aid policy, much is missing. One looks in vain for well documented statistics on per pupil expenditure, funding trends, overhead costs, transportation expenses, and a host of other items. Such statistics do not appear in newspaper reports, parliamentary speeches, or scholarly articles. Nor are they found in the annual yearbook published by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies. What does appear are hints that the government was not reporting all of the facts. As early as 1959, Socialist deputy René Schmitt stated that it

would be interesting to research the use of the Barangé funds--the small vouchers paid beginning in the 1950s (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3629). What this suggests, of course, is that even members of Parliament did not have access to such information. In the early 1970s Senator Georges Cogniot made himself something of a gadfly, constantly asking the Government questions about private school expenses. For instance, in 1973 the Ministry of National Education prepared a brochure on education for deputies and local government officials. In it graphs carefully traced budget increases of many types, but the increases in private education expenditures were not shown in any of the graphs. When Cogniot asked why, the Ministry's representative gave a response which the senator considered evasive. Cogniot directly accused the Ministry of not even knowing how much money was being spent ("Crédits de subvention à l'enseignement privé" [Subsidy funds for private education] 1973). Finally, in his May 1984 speech to Parliament, Alain Savary, the Minister of National Education, was unable to say exactly how much money local governments contributed to private schools (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2476). All of this evidence suggests that government reporting practices made it difficult, even impossible, to calculate exactly how much money was being spent on private schools. Considering the volatility of the issue, it would not be surprising if the

French government deliberately refused to offer fuel to those who might want to light political fires. It does seem, then, that one effect of the policy may have been its impact on the government's reporting of school finance statistics.

Segregative effects

In the United States, many people oppose government aid to private education because of their fears that such a policy would promote segregation, especially racial segregation. In France, too, the danger of segregation has been a major concern. It appeared in the 1959 debate of the Debré Act, and André Ravier raised the issue in a 1961 article in a Catholic journal. Traditionally, French education was segregated in three ways: by sex, by religion, and by social class. More recently, racial segregation has become a concern (Gohau 1978). The apparent effect of the private school aid policy on each of these types of segregation will be examined in turn.

Surprisingly, French writers rarely discuss the relationship between private education policy and sex-segregation. A gradual trend toward coeducation became apparent in French public schools after World War II; and in 1975 the Haby Act made it mandatory in all public schools, but not in private ones (Fontaine 1978). Catholic schools had also been moving toward coeducation during this period (L'Ecole catholique demain [The

Catholic school tomorrow] 1969; Vandermeersch 1983). However, none of the sources consulted indicated how widespread coeducation has become in them. All that can be said with certainty is that since sex-segregated private schools can receive government subsidies the policy permits the continuation of some degree of sex-segregation in French education.

Religious segregation was traditionally maintained by the coexistence of a Catholic school system and a non-sectarian public one. The large majority of the French population had been baptized in the Roman Catholic Church, but only a small minority actually practiced that religion. Thus, Catholic schools tended to serve the children of devout parents who sought to follow the Church's teachings about the importance of a Christian education; while public schools tended to serve the children of nominal Catholics, free thinkers, Protestants, and Jews. The relationship between the students of the two school systems was often characterized by intense hostility (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982).

With the Debré Act, Catholic schools which accepted government money could no longer restrict their enrollments to the children of Catholics. Legally, they were obligated to accept children of any faith or no faith. Interviews with Catholic education leaders revealed that this change was perceived as a major one.

For example, one leader of a large Catholic lobbying group expressed it this way:

The subsidies substantially changed both the image and the reality of private education. Before, the private school was a school of the Church; with the government aid it became a school of the nation with a Christian educational project. A school of the Church is reserved to Catholic families. Its goal is-- if you'll permit me an Americanism--to manufacture little Catholics. Today our schools are open to every one--to Catholics, of course, but also to Protestants, Jews, Moslems, unbelievers. We are part of the national education system. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 24 May 1989)

This point of view was widely supported by the written sources. People on all sides of the issue agreed that French private schools accept children from all religious backgrounds, and polls consistently show that religious reasons are not important for many of the French parents who choose Catholic schools (Ballion 1982; Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Khaldi 1985; Montanet 1969; Savary 1985). Indeed, Monsignor Paul Guiberteau, the head of the Catholic school system from 1981 to 1987, openly admitted in a hearing before the National Assembly that no more than 20% of French families choose Catholic schools for religious reasons (Savary 1985). Thus, it seems clear that one effect of the private school aid policy has been to reduce religious segregation in French education.

It is more difficult to assess the effects of the policy on social class segregation, traditionally a

problem in both public and private education. It will be recalled that the importance of equal access to private education for rich and poor was one of the major arguments which political conservatives used in the 1959, 1971, and 1977 National Assembly debates (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3595-3649; 1971, 1448-1494; 1977, 4378-4390). However, the policy permitted private schools to charge fees; and the fact that capital investments and administrators' salaries were not subsidized made it virtually essential for them to do so. In practice these fees ranged widely. For example, in 1983 fees for a secondary day student ranged from 600 to 2400 francs per quarter, or from about \$100 to \$400 ("Sachez comment choisir une école privée" [Know how to choose a private school] 1983). Obviously, parents with modest incomes could afford to consider schools at the lower end of the scale, but the upper end would probably not be within their reach. Since one of the pieces of financial information which is missing from the sources consulted is the average private school tuition in France as a whole, it is impossible to judge exactly how accessible private education is to families of modest means.

However, several authors present evidence about the social class distribution of private school students, based on paternal occupations (Ballion 1977, 1980, 1982; Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Khaldi 1985; Savary 1985;

Tanguy 1972). Two facts emerge very clearly from these data. The first is that children from modest backgrounds do in fact attend private schools. For instance, in a study of 25,000 public and private school students in urban areas, Tanguy (1972) found that 2.4% of private school students were the children of unskilled blue collar workers, and 11.8% were the offspring of bank and office employees. Similarly, in 1975 the National Ministry of Education published a study which showed that fully 32% of private school students had fathers who were either blue-collar workers or office employees (Ballion 1977). However, another fact which emerges clearly from these studies is that children from high status families are proportionately over-represented in private education. Nor do Catholic leaders dispute this fact. For example, Monsignor Honoré asserted in a 1985 article that the elitist nature of Catholic school enrollments was part of the unfortunate inheritance with which Catholic educators had to deal (Savary 1985). In the absence of any study of long-range trends in the social class composition of French private schools, one must draw conclusions cautiously. It does, however, seem fair to say the following. By subsidizing private education, the Debré Act made it possible for some families in modest circumstances to continue to choose private education; through the years these families have maintained a

presence in private schools. However, the fact that fees--sometimes rather high fees--can be charged has caused private education in France to retain a rather elitist character.

Racial segregation did not become a particularly important issue in French education until the late 1970s. In 1978 Gohau warned that many French parents, including those with progressive views, were selecting private education in order to escape the heavy concentrations of foreign children in some public schools. The problem of foreign children was a major theme in the 1984 parliamentary debates over reforming the subsidy program; and in 1989 a number of interviewees, in both public and private education, raised the issue. The available statistics support the concerns of these people. In 1982 Cornec and Bouchareissas reported that 94% of all foreign children attended public schools, compared to 83% of the general population. Two years later Savary, the Minister of National Education, reported in a speech that 95% of all foreigners were enrolled in the public sector (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2478). It would seem that two aspects of the policy act to sort disproportionate numbers of foreign children into public schools. First, the fact that private schools charge fees undoubtedly plays a role. Most foreign workers have menial jobs; therefore, even very modest charges would undoubtedly be beyond their

means. A second factor is the respect for the school's "distinctive character" which is written into French law. Almost all private schools in France are Catholic; thus their "distinctive character" consists of a Christian atmosphere and religious activities. According to Mermet (1985), many foreigners are Moslem. As a result, they may prefer not to expose their children to this sort of "distinctive character." Therefore, they choose non-sectarian public schools.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that on the whole the French private school aid policy has not had an extremely segregative effect. It has, however, tended to maintain segregation where it existed prior to the passage of the Debré Act. The problem of foreign children surfaced late in the period under study; in the future, much of the conflict over the policy may focus on this issue.

Effects on public opinion

One of the avowed purposes of the Debré Act was to bring about domestic peace on the private school aid issue. During both the 1971 debate of the Pompidou Act and the 1977 debate of the Guermeur Act, conservative deputies argued that the policy had accomplished that goal, citing opinion polls in support of their position (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1448-1494; 1977, 4378-4390). Since public opinion posed a major problem when the Left

attempted to modify the policy in 1984, it is important both to examine the evolution of public opinion under conservative policy and also to consider how the policy itself may have affected that evolution.

There is little doubt that public attitudes toward private school subsidies changed considerably during the period under study. Although regular, consistent polling data are not available, the general outlines of the change can nonetheless be traced. In 1945 only 28% of the French population favored subsidies; by 1951 the figure had risen to 45% (Coutrot 1963; Savary 1985). Apparently, no polls were conducted at the time of the passage of the Debré Act, but the evidence suggests to most observers that public opinion was about evenly divided at that time. In late 1958 French voters elected a Parliament in which a majority supported subsidies. In early 1960 the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action gathered almost eleven million signatures--over half of all registered voters--on its petition calling for the repeal of the Debré Act (Coutrot 1963; Franceschi 1964; Savary 1985). However, by the late 1960s public opinion had become generally supportive of the policy (Goguel 1966; Vandermeersch 1968). In 1974 a SOFRES poll discovered that only 23% of the French population still opposed the subsidies (Savary 1985). By the late 1970s the level of support among the

general population seems to have reached approximately 70% (Rémond 1978).

The National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action and its allies tended to dismiss these polls as faulty because of poorly worded questions (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Savary 1985). Even in a 1989 interview a representative of that organization argued that the polls were misleading, saying:

The question has always been poorly worded in the opinion polls. They always ask something like: "Are you for educational freedom?" Now, everyone favors freedom! (Interview with author, Paris, France, 25 May 1989)

It is clear that the wording of some of the questions was biased. For example, on page 287 of their 1982 book, Cornec and Bouchareissas cited this one from a 1974 poll: "In a country like France, do you think it is good to give parents the opportunity to choose between public schools run by the government and private schools?" Even so, Mermet (1985), a marketing specialist, concluded after looking at all the evidence over the years that by the early 1980s French public opinion massively favored subsidizing private education. Significantly, Alain Savary (1985), the Socialist Minister of National Education, also reached that conclusion after commissioning his own poll in 1982. And at about the same time the General Headquarters for Catholic Education

conducted a poll as well--drawing the same conclusion that Mermet and Savary reached. In 1989 a Catholic school representative recalled:

In 1981 we were surprised. I had a poll conducted among the population as a whole. I discovered that 30-40% of the Socialists supported us! At that moment I understood that we had won, that we were going to win. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989)

Therefore, the bulk of the evidence seems to point to a single conclusion. Under the conservative private school aid policy, public opinion came to support the subsidies overwhelmingly.

How is such a change to be explained? In the first place, the definition of the policy issue for the general public seems to have played a crucial role. One interview question asked for an explanation of the strong public support for the subsidies. Without exception private education leaders attributed it to the love of the French people for freedom. One top leader responded in somewhat greater depth, explaining that in 1981-1984 he and other Catholic leaders had taken care to define the issue as a threat to educational freedom, not as a threat to the Catholic school system (Interview with author, Paris, France, 23 May 1989). It seems clear, however, that this tactic was not new in 1981. Since 1959 Catholic and conservative leaders had consistently defined the issue as

educational freedom, not as religious freedom, and certainly not as a specifically Catholic question. This fact is apparent in all of the parliamentary debates, in much of the newspaper coverage, and in many articles on the subject. Not surprisingly, then, Mermet (1985) argued that the major reason for private education's success in public relations was its skillful identification of its cause with that of freedom.

It may well be that the structure of the policy itself also contributed to its growing popularity. In the interview situation, several respondents, including some Catholic ones, commented on the deep ideological attachment of most French people to public education. For example, one man who had been a high ranking Catholic school administrator for many years had this to say:

Basically, the French people don't want to see private education get larger in relationship to public education. They like private education as a kind of insurance policy for their children. That's all. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 23 May 1989)

If this man is right, the policy established by Michel Debré was consistent with a somewhat paradoxical devotion on the part of the French people to both public education and educational freedom. As long as private education is carefully controlled, restricted, and limited, they can support it enthusiastically because of the element of choice which it introduces into the total system. If this

interpretation is correct, then the Debré Act caused public support of private school subsidies to grow because it both reflected and reconciled two contradictory attitudes which were widespread among French citizens.

In addition to ideological factors, two other characteristics of the French environment seem to have contributed to the development of public support for the policy. The Catholic school leader who was just cited alluded to one of them. Increasingly throughout the period between 1960 and 1981, French parents began to regard private education as an "insurance policy," a "recourse," an "escape hatch," or a "parachute" which they could use if their children encountered difficulties in the public schools. This theme ran through most of the interviews and appeared frequently in the literature as well (Ballion 1977, 1980, 1982; DeDainville 1963; Gohau 1978; Montanet 1969; Plenel and Meury 1981; Vandermeersch 1981). In order fully to grasp its significance, one must understand that French public education is very academically rigorous. Retention rates are high, and in secondary schools students compete for admission to programs of study which lead to differentiated diplomas. National examinations are difficult; 25 to 30% of all students fail them. Since private schools are smaller and more closely supervised than public ones, they often appeal to parents whose children are encountering academic

problems in the public schools (Ballion 1977, 1982). Moreover, since they typically emphasize discipline and traditional values and also enroll largely French populations, they can provide other forms of recourse as well (Gohau 1978; Khaldi 1985). Because they are subsidized, private schools are cheap enough to provide an alternative for much of the French population.

It is not particularly surprising, then, that most parents want to keep their options open. For example, when Savary (1985) commissioned his 1982 poll, he found that 58% of public school parents saw private education as a potential recourse. One interviewee, a Socialist Party representative, described such parents' point of view vividly:

French people like to think: "Right now everything's going quite well with the kid in public school. But if things start going downhill, if he starts failing, there are private schools where I could put him."
(Interview with author, Paris, France,
24 May 1989)

There is also evidence that conservative leaders consciously thought of private education as a recourse for parents who were dissatisfied with the public system. René Haby, Minister of National Education in the late 1970s, struck this theme in a 1978 statement (L'A.P. 1978) and elaborated on it six years later during the debate of the Chevènement Act. Haby's words were quite revealing:

I sincerely believe that private education ought to be considered a safety valve. Everyone of us here knows in his heart that its existence helped keep the lid from blowing off many elementary, middle, and high schools when the conflicts became too intense. That's why the battle against private education in which they've tried to involve us has always seemed to me to pose a real danger to public education itself. (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 7261; my translation)

In sociological terms, then, it seems that private education came to play a specific function in relationship to the public school system. It provided a not too expensive option for parents whose children were failing, who disliked the school reforms implemented between 1945 and 1977, or who were nervous about immigrants. The evidence suggests not only that parents saw private education as playing this role, but also that conservative policymakers understood it in these terms as well.

A final reason for the popularity of the policy seems to be the fact that the French have become increasingly oriented toward consumption rather than toward production. In a meta-analysis of the social trends of modern French society, Mermet (1985) identified consumerism as a tendency which has been apparent since about 1960. In his view, for the contemporary Frenchman, the motto "I consume, therefore I am" (p. ix) has replaced the traditional Cartesian dictum, "I think, therefore I am." As a result, French people place an increasingly great

value on having a multiplicity of choices and perceive any reduction of their range of choices as a threat to their freedom.

In his 1982 book Les Consommateurs d'école (Consumers of schooling), sociologist Robert Ballion described consumerism in education. Although his theory is far too complex to be elaborated fully here, it will be useful to sketch its broad outlines. Ballion argued that modern people use strategies of consumption--e.g., comparison shopping, studying reports on product quality, planning purchases, etc.--in order to obtain a sense of freedom in a society which is increasingly less free. The fact that the feeling of freedom obtained through developing and executing such strategies is largely illusory is not apparent to most people. Education in particular lends itself to such strategies because obtaining educational credentials does indeed appear to affect one's future status and therefore one's relative freedom. Ballion directly linked French private school aid policy to the growth of educational consumerism in French society. He felt that because the policy provided apparent choices in education it had encouraged the development of the belief that parents could maximize their children's chances for success by elaborating complex strategies for schooling. Although skeptical about the underlying assumptions of educational consumerism, Ballion nevertheless felt that in

a modern society it is probably necessary to provide choices in education as well as elsewhere.

Consumerism emerged as a major theme in the interviews of public school leaders and also in some of the later literature in the period under study. Public school respondents described consumerism as "the modern mentality" and attributed the popularity of the private school aid policy to the prevalence of this mentality in French society. They expressed a rather ironic attitude toward consumerism in education and saw its effects as largely negative; still, they saw no way to avoid it. Coq and Mayol (1983) and Vandermeersch (1983) also discussed the theme. An article which appeared in a 1983 issue of a popular education magazine provided a beautiful example of consumerism in action. Entitled "Sachez comment choisir une école privée" (Know how to choose a private school), this article suggested seven criteria which parents could use in selecting a school. It recommended visiting the school and noticing such characteristics as the principal's personality, the average size of the classes, and the quality of the facility. It even suggested waiting outside the doors of the building at the end of the school day in order to question students about their school as they left for home. Most of all, however, parents should check those test scores.

But watch out for manipulations of statistics!
. . . Check the comparative analyses of test
scores that World of Education publishes
each year in March. (p. 26; my translation)

In conclusion, then, it seems that the private school aid policy pursued by conservative French governments between 1960 and 1981 did contribute to a growing consensus in French society in support of the subsidies. In part this favorable attitude resulted from the fact that the policy was consistent with the ideological beliefs of most French people. However, it was also popular because it met a need, or perceived need, for choices in education.

Effects on Public Education

Most Americans who seriously discuss the possibility of subsidizing private schools consider the potential effects of such a policy on public education to be the central issue with which policymakers must deal (Boyd 1987; Murnane 1981; 1984; 1985). It was therefore somewhat surprising to discover that French observers have not reached a clear consensus about how their policy has affected the public school system. It will be recalled that the proportion of children enrolled in public schools increased slightly and then stabilized under the program. It can be said, then, that the Debré Act has had no

significant effect on enrollment patterns. Similarly, segregative effects have been slight. French private schools are currently more elitist than public ones, but they always have been. There is no compelling evidence to indicate that social segregation in schools greatly increased under conservative policy. Nor are arguments that the policy deprived public schools of vast sums of money which could have been used to expand and modernize them particularly convincing. Given the demographic situation of the 1950s and 1960s, the French government was going to have to educate most of the children who attended private schools, either by subsidizing the private sector or by absorbing the children into the public one. Thus, the three major negative effects feared by American policy researchers have not occurred in France.

However, some French observers have argued that the subsidies have affected public education; and those claims must be carefully examined. The first effect which will be considered was suggested only in interviews with representatives of Catholic education. The fact that almost all of them perceived the same effect is interesting and merits attention. These private educators thought that their own school system was more flexible, dynamic, and progressive than the public one. They believed therefore that they served as a model for changes

in the public system. One respondent described the private sector as an "experimental laboratory" for the public one (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989). As evidence of the correctness of their belief, these people cited the provisions of both the 1984 Savary Bill and the Jospin Bill, which was under consideration by the National Assembly at the time that the interviews were conducted. In particular, they believed that their idea that the school should be an "educational community" with its own "educational project" was making its way into public education. One respondent even described the mechanism which, in his view, had led to such changes:

Private education affects public education through the mass media. Between 1970 and 1984 when everyone was constantly criticizing the public school system, the two sectors were compared. Public education changed because it reacted to those criticisms. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989)

However, this perceived effect of the private system upon the public one appeared nowhere else in the sources which were examined for this study. And no serious research evidence was cited in its support. Thus, although private education may indeed be exercising such an influence on French public schools, it is impossible to draw any definite conclusion from the available data.

The second alleged effect on public education is that the private school aid policy caused public school

teachers to become extremely defensive. This theme surfaced in two of the interviews--one with a high ranking Catholic education official and the other with a representative of the Socialist Party, himself a former public school teacher. Moreover, this theme runs through much of the literature. It therefore seems necessary to review the evidence before evaluating it and discussing the most likely causes of alleged teacher defensiveness.

It will be recalled that public school educators fought against the passage of the Debré Act in 1959 and organized a massive petition drive calling for the repeal of the law. In a 1964 book, significantly entitled Les Groupes de pression dans la défense de l'enseignement public (Pressure groups in the defense of public education; my italics), Joseph Franceschi described the teachers' unions and the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action and used their reactions to the passage of the Debré Act as a case study to illustrate their methods of defending public schools. In addition to carrying out the petition drive of 1960, these groups resisted implementation by trying to organize local government officials against the law, pressuring political parties to oppose it, and urging their members to refuse to cooperate with the implementation process. As early as 1963 political scientist Aline Coutrot suggested that the issue probably would not be too important in the future

except to public school teachers, who seemed to her to have been "traumatized" by the implementation of the policy. A few years later Vandermeersch (1968) charged that public school teachers were using private education as a scapegoat, blaming it for all of the problems in their system.

In 1970 and 1971, when the first neo-conservative reforms of the policy were carried out, the problem of teacher attitudes reached the newspapers. The changes provoked angry reactions from the leaders of all the major teachers' unions; and on April 27, 1971--during the debate of the Pompidou Act in the National Assembly--public school teachers across the country went out on strike. The unions' strike orders were widely followed; 85-95% of elementary teachers and 70-80% of secondary teachers did not report for work. Reporters in both Le Figaro and Le Monde commented on the growing gap between the attitudes of the populace and the attitudes of public school educators toward the policy (L.F. 16 December 1970; 26, 27, and 28 April 1971; L.M. 15 July 1970; 15 and 20 December 1970; 25, 27, and 28 April 1971).

The existence of such a gap was confirmed by opinion polls a few years later. In 1973 a poll revealed that fully 88% of public elementary teachers opposed the subsidies. About 55% thought that private schools should be required to function without any subsidization, while

33% favored the more radical solution of nationalizing them ("L'Enseignement en France en 1973" [Education in France in 1973] 1973). Just a year later, however, a SOFRES poll revealed that only 23% of French citizens still opposed the subsidies (Savary 1985).

It seems clear, then, that regarding the issue of subsidizing private education, French public school teachers were becoming increasingly isolated from their compatriots. This fact, in conjunction with the attacks on their school system which characterized the neo-conservative reign of the 1970s, may well have led to considerable defensiveness on their part (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1448-1494; Savary 1985). Alain Savary, Minister of National Education from 1981 to 1984, was a Socialist and thus the teachers' political ally. Yet, after months of consulting with the leaders of the public school unions in an attempt to develop a new policy, he concluded that they had indeed developed a siege mentality.

A certain turning inward, a certain confidence that they were in the right and supported valuable principles which were sure and tested had resulted [from constant attacks against public education]. . . . Certainly, the National Education Federation was a "fortress of the Republic," but if the major characteristic and strength of a fortress are its ability to withstand attack, its weakness lies in the inability of its occupants to imagine and construct exits. (Pp. 111-112; my translation)

As a general rule it can be said that people develop a siege mentality under only two circumstances. They develop it when they have emotional problems, and they develop it when they are actually under attack. Savary referred to attacks in the above citation, and certainly the 1971 debate of the Pompidou Act stands as an incontrovertible piece of evidence in support of the fact that neo-conservative leaders did openly attack public education and its teachers in a way that can accurately be described as vicious (J.O.A.N.D. 1971, 1448-1494).

However, a reading of the 1970-1971 news coverage in Le Monde and Le Figaro sheds light on yet another possible cause for the teachers' feeling that they were under siege. Repeatedly, in the pronouncements of the teachers' organizations, their opposition to the policy changes was linked with their perception that an unfair competition was being set up between the public and private sectors.

This linkage was confirmed in the interviews. One question asked if competition with private schools had improved public education. It provoked more emotional flooding than any other. Initial reactions to it ranged from wry laughter through sarcasm to open anger, but there was no doubt that the issue was a touchy one. It was touchy because every public school representative interviewed considered the competition between the two sectors unequal, unfair, and unjust. They told the author

that a competition for good students tended to develop in regions where both private and public education were strong. In their opinion this competition was not based on educationally important issues, for parents were not well equipped to evaluate educational quality. Rather it was based on such considerations as the provision of extra services, the size of meat servings in the cafeteria, teacher grading practices, and the number of students promoted to the next grade. Far from improving education, this competition lowered its quality, turning both private and public schools into what one man described as a "bargain market" (Interview with author, Paris, France, 19 May 1989). As another respondent explained:

In private schools there are no poor students because the students aren't students; they're customers. They try to flatter the parents, who are often extremely disappointed when time for national examinations rolls around. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 16 May 1989)

These individuals considered the competition between the two sectors unfair because private schools could select their students, whereas public ones could not. They specifically mentioned two ways in which private schools selected their clientele. First, and most obviously, they could refuse to accept or choose to expel problem children. In contrast, public schools had to accept and try to educate every child in the school

district. Second, private schools could decide where to build new schools. . . .and where not to. One man accused the private sector of focusing its building program on "the fashionable sections of big cities," while public education was obliged to offer its services everywhere, even in slums and tiny rural villages (Interview with author, Paris, France, 25 May 1989).

Their belief that private education was in many ways a privileged sector was supported by two people who had researched the question. Ballion (1977; 1980) found that private education enjoyed many advantages over public schools. These included the right to select students, the right to charge fees, and the possibility of maintaining smaller class sizes than could public schools. His conclusions take on added significance in light of the facts that he had been a private school teacher before becoming a sociologist and that he supported private school subsidies. Similarly, Alain Savary (1985), who engaged in extensive fact-finding in the early 1980s before developing his bill to reform the policy, concluded that the conditions under which the two sectors worked had become very unequal. Like Ballion he identified unequal class sizes as a problem. He also believed that the lack of government control over the amount of money spent on the pre-service training of private school teachers conferred an advantage on private education. Meanwhile,

the public sector enrolled almost all of the children of immigrants and provided virtually all instruction in regional languages.

The evidence, then, supports the view that the subsidization of private education contributed to the growth of a defensive attitude among public school educators. This attitude seems to have resulted not only from attacks against them, but also from policy mechanisms which established an unequal competition between the two sectors.

Effects on Private Education

Virtually all observers indicated that government aid has made a profound impact on private education in France. Moreover, there was general agreement about what those effects have been. In this section the effects will be considered under three headings. After a brief discussion of the fact that the subsidies permitted private schools to survive, the ways in which private education has become more like public education will be discussed. Finally, special problems which the policy has caused for private school teachers will be examined.

Survival

In the interviews, the first question asked of private school representatives related to the effects of the subsidies on private education. Almost all of the

respondents immediately replied that the first and major effect had been to prevent private education from dying. They typically mentioned the financial crisis of the post-War years, the extreme poverty of the teachers, the dilapidated condition of the school buildings, and the baby boom. As one woman said, "Without the subsidies private schools would have disappeared except for a few schools for rich children" (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989). These reactions were, of course, completely consistent with other, previously cited evidence relative to the financial crisis in Catholic education and the demographic situation in the late 1950s. It seems clear, then, that one effect of the Debré Act was to make it possible for private education to continue to play a significant role in the academic instruction of French children.

Increased similarity to public education

In 1960, when French Catholic schools began to receive government subsidies, they did not constitute a school "system" in any meaningful sense of the word. Rather, Catholic education consisted of a loose network of relatively autonomous schools which were operated by the Jesuits, Ursulines, Augustinians, and other religious orders, each with its own distinctive flavor and traditions. They rarely cooperated and sometimes even competed against each other for students (La tradition

éducative des congrégations enseignantes [The educational tradition of the teaching orders] 1988; Le Blond 1962; L.M. 27 April 1971). With the acceptance of government aid, this situation was bound to change. Virtually all observers who discussed the changes which had occurred in Catholic education agreed that it had become much more like public education as a result of the Debré Act.

In the first place the general conditions under which instruction was offered became very much like the conditions which prevailed in the public schools. Increasingly, for example, lay teachers were hired to staff Catholic schools. Since the law required new teachers to have credentials corresponding to those of the public sector or to obtain them by 1967, massive in-service training programs were conducted during the summers. These programs of necessity prepared Catholic teachers for evaluation by government inspectors--the same inspectors who evaluated their public school counterparts. Private schools under contract were required to offer the prescribed public school curriculum, use textbooks which were not forbidden by the Ministry, and prepare their students for national examinations. They also had to follow public education timetables which stipulated how many hours per week each subject was to be taught (CNEC 1977; L.M. 27 April 1971; Meury 1981; Sainclair 1965; Trégaro 1976). Outwardly, then, private schools came to

resemble public ones very greatly except for their smaller enrollment of foreign students.

Moreover, their clientele came to resemble that of the public schools. Forbidden by the Debré Act to discriminate against prospective students on the basis of their religious beliefs, Catholic schools gradually became less Catholic. This trend was already apparent by the late 1960s and became increasingly obvious during the 1970s. By the 1980s everyone, including leading Catholic educators, recognized that most parents did not select Catholic schools for religious reasons (L'Ecole catholique demain [The Catholic school tomorrow] 1969; Meury 1981; Plenel and Meury 1981; Savary 1985).

The acceptance of government funds also caused Catholic education to become more highly structured and organized--in short, to become a genuine school system. Although the Debré Act recognized only individual establishments, in practice Catholic education had to develop a centralized organizational structure in order to deal efficiently with the government. For example, the policy generated enormous amounts of required paperwork, necessitating a corps of administrators to cope with it (L'Ecole catholique demain 1969). Schools also had to cooperate in providing in-service training for teachers (L.M. 27 April 1971). And concerns about exercising vigilance during the implementation process and

influencing the Government's wording of new decrees encouraged collaboration as well (Le Blond 1962).

One high-ranking Catholic school administrator spoke of this development in these words:

Now the law had some unexpected effects, too. The Debré Act recognizes only individual schools. Yet it spawned the current structure of Catholic education in France. Quite simply, we had to get better organized. Organization was essential. Also, our employees organized. Today we have unions for teachers, principals, janitors, etc. We have lots of other associations, too. I don't exist in the eyes of the law--but the Minister often calls me. He called me a few days ago to ask me: "Are things working out? Or aren't they?" (Interview with author, Paris, France, 23 May 1989)

In a word, a major effect of the policy was to cause Catholic education to become more bureaucratic--a fact which has been widely recognized by writers from a variety of backgrounds (Goureaux and Ricot 1975; Khaldi 1985; Le Blond 1962; L'Ecole catholique demain 1969; L.M. 27 April 1971; Tanguy 1972; Trégaro 1976; Vandermeersch 1968).

Not surprisingly, these changes led to something of an identity crisis in Catholic education. Signs of this crisis are apparent in L'Ecole catholique demain (1969), a book based on a 1968 conference in which 2000 teachers, parents, and students participated. Two distinct positions emerged in the book. A liberal group wanted to teach religion indirectly by example and move closer to public education, while a conservative group emphasized

the importance of maintaining the traditional Christian character of the Catholic school. In the interviews, one man argued that a beneficial effect of the policy had been precisely that it had forced private educators to reflect seriously on their mission and on the question of how they should seek to differ from public schools. In his view, they had concluded that it was the climate of the private school which should set it apart from its public counterpart. For him, this climate derived from the fact that private educators carefully distinguished being from knowing and stressed the importance of both in the teaching which they offered to their students.

As part of their identity crisis, private school people had also had to grapple with the nature of their relationship with the government, a theme which emerged in several interviews. Apparently, they had reconciled this dilemma by distinguishing the state, or government, from the nation. They believed that in their schools they were offering an educational service to the nation, not to the government. One Catholic education representative described the dilemma and how he personally had resolved it in these words:

Our theory is that education isn't the business of the government, but rather of the nation. The government and the nation aren't the same thing. We have signed contracts in order to participate in national education. . . .But we can't imagine a private system for the rich

and a public one for the poor. Private schools are for everyone. I say: subsidies--yes. But so that we can render a service to the nation. I could even use the word "equality" and also--why not?--"brotherhood." (Interview with author, Paris, France, 9 May 1989)

Not surprisingly, some have argued that French private education has become so similar to public education that there is no longer any meaningful difference between the two sectors (Khalidi 1985). One interview question related to this issue. All of the representatives of Catholic education agreed that this was a real risk but felt that in France private education had succeeded in maintaining special characteristics which set it apart from public education. They defined their major difference as one of "spirit" or "climate" and argued that their schools provided a more supportive emotional environment than public ones. They considered the careful selection and training of administrators the key to the maintenance of "distinctive character." In addition, they saw it as essential to have a "nucleus" of committed teachers and parents in each school. Therefore, it was important for private school principals to have the power to select their teachers; only in that way could they guarantee that their school's distinctive character would be maintained. Without such power in the hands of building level administrators, Catholic schools might indeed "lose their souls." Apparently, no comparative research on

organizational climate in French public and private schools exists. In fact, Alain Savary complained of the lack of adequate empirical data about the relative merits of the two sectors (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2560). Therefore, although it is possible to conclude that French private education became very much like French public education under conservative policy, it is not entirely clear whether or not it has truly managed to maintain its cherished "distinctive character."

Problems of private school teachers

During the 1959 debate of the Debré Act, freedom of conscience was an important topic. Many deputies feared that in Catholic schools attempts would be made to pressure children to profess a faith which they did not understand. Ultimately, freedom of conscience problems did develop under the conservative private school aid policy; but they were not problems which involved children. Instead, they involved teachers.

According to the original law, private schools had a right to maintain a "distinctive character"; the 1977 Guermeur Act required teachers to respect this "distinctive character" (J.O.:L.D. 1960, 66-67; 1977, 5539). In addition, private school principals had considerable power over their staffs from the beginning, and this power increased during the period of conservative ascendancy. As a result, conflicts between private school

teachers and administrators escalated. Controversies centered around job security, since teachers did not have tenure and could easily be dismissed or transferred if they did not respect their school's "distinctive character," as defined by its principal. The fact that some principals interpreted this concept quite broadly, extending it to cover such matters as teachers' private lives, dress, political activities, level of religious practice, and union membership, increased the likelihood of conflict (Khaldi 1985; Tregaro 1976).

Most of the characteristics of this controversy emerge clearly in the 1970 Quimperlé Case. Mrs. Brunou of Quimperlé was a teacher at Our Lady of Kerbertrand Elementary School, a Catholic school under a contract of association. In 1970 she married a divorced man, and her principal dismissed her. She appealed her dismissal to the civil court in Rennes and won her case. Meanwhile, the principal had so turned the parents against her that she found it impossible to resume her former position. The regional Private School Parents' Association issued a press release, protesting the court decision and arguing that private school teachers' life styles should be consistent with the Christian values which they taught in their classrooms. The head of the regional private school teachers' union retorted angrily that perhaps teachers should accept in their classrooms only those students

whose parents practiced the same values which they demanded of teachers (L'A.P. 1970; L.M. 21 December 1970 and 29 April 1971; Trégaro 1976).

Over the years a number of similar cases became causes celebres in the media. For example, in southern France a secondary male teacher was threatened with dismissal because he had run for municipal office on a Socialist ticket; and in 1975 a female teacher was fired because of two successive pregnancies. Not infrequently the parents' associations made it impossible for teachers to return to their positions even if they were victorious in a court of law (Trégaro 1976). In 1984, when conservative policy was still in force, a philosophy teacher in a private high school anonymously described his professional life in a newspaper article called "Un enfer" (A hell-hole) (L.M. 23 May 1984). He described attacks against both teachers' academic freedom and their right to their own political and religious beliefs. He recommended that any private school teacher who was living with a member of the opposite sex hide that fact most carefully and alleged that in his school administrators even looked askance at such articles of dress as tennis shoes, tunics, and long skirts.

It is extremely difficult to assess how widespread such problems were. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that they occurred frequently enough to be

worrisome. In his interview one representative of a Catholic organization spoke at length of the problem, for it troubled him. He was fully aware of the tension between educational freedom and teachers' freedom of conscience and believed that, although a proper balance could be found, it was not always easy to do so (Interview with author, Paris, France, 24 May 1989). Another piece of evidence which suggests that the problem was relatively serious is the position which the private school teachers' unions took on the Savary Bill in 1984. One of the most controversial provisions of the bill--and one which Catholic school leaders fought bitterly--was the granting of tenure to private school teachers. The tenure issue was linked openly and directly to freedom of conscience problems in private schools. Two of the three private school teachers' unions, representing approximately 60% of the teachers, supported the tenure provision, even though this position put them in open conflict with the administration of their school system (Savary 1985). Thus, it seems likely that the conservative private school aid policy did indeed cause some freedom of conscience problems for private school teachers.

Conclusion

The private school aid policy adopted in 1959 had a number of effects, both expected and unexpected. By the

early 1980s some of the unexpected negative effects had become so troublesome that the United Left sought to modify the policy in fundamental ways. Not surprisingly, given the effects which the policy had had on public opinion, this attempt met with fierce resistance. In the battle which ensued, careers were made and unmade and political blood was left on the floor. It is that conflict which will be considered next.

CHAPTER VI

THE MITTERRAND ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE POLICY

Introduction

The late spring and early summer of 1981 were characterized by news events which shocked and intrigued the public around the world. Both the American president, Ronald Reagan, and the Roman Catholic pope, John Paul II, were seriously injured in assassination attempts. The Prince of Wales married Lady Diana Spencer. And France, long considered one of the most politically conservative countries of Western Europe, elected a Socialist president.

After taking office in mid-May, François Mitterrand moved rapidly to consolidate his power by dissolving Parliament and calling for new elections. In the voting held on June 14 and 21, the United Left won a solid victory. On June 22, Mitterrand announced the composition of his first cabinet. It included four Communists, astonishing observers in some countries. However, the success of the United Left did not mean that conservative France was on the verge of going Communist. Rather, the Left's victory should be understood in relationship to the overall political and economic situation. Mitterrand came to power at a time when French people were concerned both

about the health of their economy and about the general direction in which France had moved under the neo-conservatives. They opted for a break with the recent past primarily because they felt a need for change (L'A.P. 1981).

Like all democratic leaders Mitterrand also came to power because he had built a political base. Much of his support was located among public school educators and their unions, who had insisted at an early date that a reform of private school aid policy be included in the United Left's platform. Many of his supporters believed that subsidized private schools should be nationalized; others merely favored tighter regulation of them. There was, however, a general consensus on the Left that the policy should be changed. Under a parliamentary system of government, if a party is elected to power, it is expected to work to turn its platform into public policy (Coulter 1984). Thus, Mitterrand knew that he and his administration would have to deal with the prickly private school aid issue which had divided France for so many generations (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982; Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). He knew that he could not ignore the question and hope that campaign promises would be forgotten.

Some sociopolitical situations might be favorable to imposing additional restrictions on private schools.

Reasoning from Dahl's (1982) theory about the pluralist dilemma of autonomy and control, one can hypothesize about the nature of the environment which would be most conducive to a change in the direction of greater government control over private education. Such a reform would be easiest in a period of high governmental legitimacy. Given the importance of economic well-being in industrialized nations, such legitimacy would have to be based at least in part upon economic prosperity. Moreover, such a reform would be most likely to succeed either at a time when the society was becoming more culturally homogeneous or at a time when its cultural pluralism was not perceived as threatening. In the absence of such conditions, an attempt to move toward greater government control should lead to political conflict. Conflict is, of course, exactly what Mitterrand and his United Left generated when they sought to reform French private school aid policy between 1981 and 1985.

The Policy Environment, 1981-1985

Economic environment

In 1982 the editor of L'Année Politique marvelled at the fact that the Socialists were raising the private school aid issue "right in the middle of an economic crisis" (p. 13; my translation). In retrospect, his interpretation of the economic situation was probably an

extreme one. It is likely that Mermet (1985) was closer to the truth when he suggested that France was not really in an economic crisis. Rather, the "Thirty Glorious Years" of French economic expansion had been an "unprecedented epiphenomenon of history" (p. 221; my translation). They had ended about 1975; and France had entered into a new economic period, not a crisis. However, in the early 1980s most French citizens perceived their country as mired in an economic crisis. Indeed, they had elected the Socialists in hopes that they could do something about it. Therefore, once in office Mitterrand moved rapidly to deal with economic problems--or at least to appear to deal with them. In June 1981 he raised the minimum wage by 10%, increased both family allowances and old age pensions, and created 54,290 new jobs in the public sector. In July he reduced the work week to 39 hours (L'A.P. 1981).

Economic indicators continued to be disquieting. Inflation raced along at 14% in 1981; it dropped to 9.7% in 1982 but remained at approximately that level throughout the rest of the period. Unemployment was also high. Meanwhile, foreign indebtedness was growing; and the value of the franc was falling. By August 1983 the franc, which for decades had been exchanged at the rate of about five francs to one American dollar, was sold at an eight to one rate on the Paris Stock Exchange. Such

figures as these made educated French citizens anxious. The less educated responded more viscerally to dramatic incidents like those of the summer of 1981 when farmers, outraged by the collapse of produce prices, blockaded highways in southern France (L'A.P. 1981, 1982, 1982, 1984).

The first three years of the Mitterrand presidency were not, then, economically rosy. Comparatively, however, they were not really bad years. For example, in 1982 the French gross national product grew by 0.2%, while the West German economy did not grow at all and the British economy shrank by 1.4% (L'A.P. 1982). And in 1983 France ranked third in the European Community in per capita industrial production, surpassed only by Denmark and West Germany (Mermet 1985). Thus, although French people widely perceived themselves as enmeshed in an economic crisis, the situation was not desperate enough to persuade Mitterrand and his administration to abandon their plans to reform private school aid policy.

The immigrant workers issue

The French had begun to feel concerned about their immigrant population in 1973, when the first oil shock caused unemployment to rise (L'A.P. 1973). By the early 1980s, the problem of foreign workers had taken an ugly turn; increasingly, they were blamed not only for unemployment but also for the rising crime rate. This

perception had a certain surface plausibility. French crime rates did jump dramatically between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, and in 1984 26.3% of the men and 22.4% of the women in French prisons were foreigners (Mermet 1985). Moreover, incidents of terrorism were mounting; and many of them were related to the Jewish-Arab conflict in the Middle East. For example, in 1982 alone the car of an Israeli diplomat was machine-gunned, a Rothschild bank was attacked, and six customers eating in a Jewish restaurant in Paris were shot to death. Since a significant percentage of the foreign workers were Moslems, such incidents served to increase French resentment against them (L'A.P. 1982). The situation was compounded by the fact that, although fertility rates among native-born French women had dropped to 1.79, they ranged from 4.7 to 6.0 among the foreign born (L'A.P. 1985).

Thus, by the first half of the 1980s some observers were commenting on signs of growing racism in France. This trend seemed to be confirmed by several objective measures. A 1984 SOFRES poll showed that 58% of French people believed that there were too many immigrants in France (Mermet 1985), and in 1985 another SOFRES poll revealed that 67% of the French believed that no more foreign workers should be permitted to enter their country (L'A.P. 1985). Another indication that racism might be growing in French culture was provided by election

results. The National Front is an extreme right wing French political party. It openly advocates racist views and other positions which are frequently described as Fascist (Theen and Wilson 1986). In the presidential election of 1981 the National Front garnered only 0.75% of the votes cast. However, in the 1984 elections to the European Parliament--the governing body of the European Community--it won fully 11% (L'A.P. 1984). This event led many French people to express concern about racism (L'A.P. 1984).

Political environment

The political environment between May 1981 and July 1984 could be briefly characterized as one of extreme division and mounting confrontation. Because an understanding of this background is essential to an understanding of what happened in 1984 and 1985, the evolution of the conflict will be sketched in some detail.

During the 1981 presidential campaign, the private school aid question had been an issue, although not the major one. Nine days before the election, Mitterrand had expressed his views in an open letter to French voters:

I propose establishing a great, unified, non-sectarian public service of National Education. . . .[I] want the process of establishing this great public education service--which will include all schools and all employees--to result from negotiation and not from a unilateral decision. I mean to

convince people, not compel them. (Cited in Savary 1985, p. 15; my translation)

Ten days later Alain Savary, a former resistance fighter who had been a high level civil servant for years (Who's Who in France 1985), received a telephone call from Pierre Mauroy, Mitterrand's first prime minister. Somewhat to Savary's surprise, Mauroy offered him a position in the new cabinet as the Minister of National Education. Savary was not surprised to be offered a cabinet position; in fact, he had anticipated one. However, since he had never worked in any capacity with the Ministry of National Education, he had not expected the education slot. During the telephone conversation, Mauroy stressed that the assignment would involve attempting to find a permanent solution to the private school aid dispute. He expressed his belief that the problem would have to be handled slowly, carefully, and coolly--and also with a sincere effort to understand people who held widely divergent views. Savary accepted the appointment (Savary 1985).

The major policy actors promptly began to position themselves for the approaching battle. At its July convention in Toulouse, the National Union of Elementary and Middle School Teachers took the offensive, demanding that subsidized private schools be nationalized. Savary quickly issued a statement to the effect that the powerful

union's position was its own and not necessarily that of the Socialist Government. Next, several major newspapers attacked the teachers for their old-fashioned dogmatism. The fact that these included the usually friendly left-of-center Le Matin de Paris (Paris morning) and the Communist L'Humanité (Humanity) was widely noted (L'A.P. 1981; Leclerc 1985). Undoubtedly this sequence of events gave the union's leaders much to discuss in their elegant office building on tree-lined Boulevard St.-Germain.

Several blocks away, in the rambling stone building which housed the General Headquarters of Catholic Education, the atmosphere was becoming tense also. In early June Nicole Fontaine, Assistant Secretary-General of the Catholic school system, had prepared a strong response to Savary which she intended to deliver as a speech to a group of private school principals. Her plans changed when she received a message from a spokesman for the Bishops' Conference, forbidding her to do so. In Catholic education circles rumors began to circulate to the effect that the bishops secretly sympathized with the Socialists, a hypothesis which soon received additional support. The bishops assigned the Secretary-General of the Catholic school system to a new position and appointed Father Paul Guiberteau, a skilled negotiator and less politically conservative leader, to the job. Observers later speculated that as early as May of 1981 the highest

leaders of the French Catholic Church had decided to try to negotiate a settlement with the Socialist Government because they believed that such an agreement would be more permanent than the one which had been reached with the conservative regime (Leclerc 1985).

Thus, by the summer of 1981 the political terrain was becoming extremely complicated. The conflict was not going to be a simple confrontation between those who advocated and those who opposed the subsidies. Fissures were already apparent in both camps; by 1984 some of those fissures would have become major fault lines.

Meanwhile, Savary moved carefully and deliberately. After studying the problem for several months, he began fact-finding meetings in January 1982. All winter and spring he met with the major educational, political, and religious groups, seeking both to understand their positions and to ascertain on what issues they might be flexible (Savary 1985). During this period several additional policy actors staked out their territory. In February the National Education Federation held its triennial convention and carefully outlined a more moderate stance than that of the National Union of Elementary and Middle School Teachers--its largest member organization. In April 100,000 members of the National Union of Private School Parents demonstrated in Paris, but several conservative political leaders were conspicuously

present. In early May a conservative private school teachers' union sponsored an "action week" to affirm its devotion to educational freedom. On the very next day, the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action staged a mass rally at Le Bourget. The crowd of 300,000 was openly rude to Alain Savary and Prime Minister Mauroy, who were invited guests (L'A.P. 1982; Savary 1985). As the French would put it, "the tone was hardening"; additional fissures were also appearing.

Mauroy had recommended that Savary move slowly, and he did. His fact-finding sessions ended in May 1982. On December 20 of that year he finally announced six general themes which would be discussed in further negotiations. These were (1) the renovation of the "schools map," or school districting system; (2) the creation of "public interest establishments" to which both public and private schools would belong; (3) the participation of all concerned constituents in the educational system; (4) the development of responsibility and a sense of identity in all schools; (5) ways to grant private school personnel professional rights similar to those of the public sector; and (6) extra-curricular educational activities. Although the lobbying groups on the Left generally accepted Savary's proposals, the leadership of the Catholic system did not. The new year, therefore, opened with further discussions between the Minister and Catholic

representatives. In March 1983 Savary was at last able to initiate the formal negotiations between "social partners" which characterize much French policymaking (L'A.P. 1982; Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985; Theen and Wilson 1986).

While the negotiations proceeded month after trying month, the educational interest groups began to respond in unpredictable ways. As time passed, the private school aid issue increasingly split groups on both the Left and the Right. For example, in May the most liberal private school teachers' union split, with a splinter group promptly forming a union which joined the public system's National Education Federation (L'A.P. 1983). In June a group of conservative private school unions demonstrated, carrying banners which read: "'No' to the slow death of our 10,000 schools" (L'A.P. 1983, 305). Next, the National Union of Elementary and Middle School Teachers held its biennial convention in Bordeaux, where it became obvious that the private school aid issue had now split the once stalwart teachers' union. A bitter struggle over leadership succession was being waged because its secretary-general would reach mandatory retirement age in September 1983. The major issue was, of course, the position which the union should take on the bill which Savary was negotiating (L'A.P. 1983; Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985).

Although the private school aid issue was slowly shattering the Left, the Right had no reason to rejoice. It too was experiencing the divisive effects of the issue. Beginning in June 1983, members of the conservative party, Rally for the Republic, had started to encourage private school parent groups to revolt against the Catholic hierarchy by seizing control of private education for themselves (L.M. 30 September 1983). In early September Brother Guy Leclerc, a private school principal, staged a hunger strike against Savary's project. At the same time the largest private school teachers' union went out on strike in support of it. And in late September twenty leading Catholic intellectuals published a statement calling for moderation and common sense--qualities which, they implied, were increasingly rare in Catholic circles (L.M. 24 September 1983).

Savary went on developing his education bill. In October 1983 Michel Bouchareissas--the feisty leader of the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action who had just lost his bid to become the head of the National Union of Elementary and Middle School Teachers--announced that his organization would no longer participate in the negotiations (Leclerc 1985). Savary went on. By November much of the Left was in rebellion against his work; it staged a series of demonstrations in late November and early December (L'A.P. 1983; Leclerc 1985). Shortly

thereafter private education supporters also became seriously alarmed about the direction which the negotiations were taking and staged a demonstration of their own. But Savary, armed with a poll which showed that 54% of the public supported his plan, changed his approach slightly and went on. In January 1984 Catholic school leaders, afraid that the bill might grant tenure and civil service status to their teachers, announced a series of five demonstrations to exert pressure on the Government. These demonstrations punctuated the winter of 1984. The great throngs took "freedom" for their slogan and their watchword. In Lyon on January 29, a crowd of 90,000 demonstrators sang the word "liberté" to the melody of Verdi's "Nabucco." The five private school demonstrations culminated in Versailles on a snowy March day. There 800,000 protesters marched against Savary's bill (Leclerc 1985). However, Alain Savary went doggedly on. A year later, he would write: "Even so, I did not despair" (Savary 1985, 154; my translation). His bill to reform private school aid policy was introduced into the National Assembly in April and scheduled for debate in late May (Savary 1985).

As the debate approached, everyone who followed French politics knew that the situation was a highly volatile one. The thirty-six months since François Mitterrand's election had beautifully illustrated the truth of the

opinion which Charles Vial had expressed in the September 30, 1983, issue of Le Monde:

The private school aid issue plunges too deeply into the national unconscious, it stirs up too much which is both rational and irrational, for us to be able to deal with it without risking the release of uncontrollable forces. (P. 1; my translation)

The Provisions of the Savary Bill

Any understanding of the value conflicts which emerged before, during, and after the debate of the Savary Bill by the National Assembly obviously depends upon an understanding of the bill itself. Therefore, its major provisions will be sketched briefly, using the unamended version of the bill as it appeared in Savary's 1985 book. Readers should bear in mind the fact that since the bill was only a proposed law, it did not include the decrees of implementation which would have completed it had it been passed. Therefore, a complete comparison to the conservative policy as it had evolved between 1959 and 1981 is impossible.

The Pompidou and Guermeur Acts, as well as their attendant decrees, had amended the Debré Act. Savary's bill, however, represented an attempt to set up an almost completely new structure within which subsidized private education would operate. In essence, it repealed the Pompidou and Guermeur Acts in their totality and repealed

all of the Debré Act except for a few scattered paragraphs (Savary 1985, 234).

The Savary Bill began, like the Debré Act, with a first article which laid down the general principles upon which it was based. It started by affirming the national government's commitment to free public education, which should be available in every part of France. Next, it expressed adherence to the principle of equal access to education. Finally, it upheld the principle of educational freedom. In the twenty-five articles which followed, it was made abundantly clear that Savary's concept of educational freedom included, and indeed was based upon, the financing of private schools by both the national government and local governments (Savary 1985, 220-234). This position represented a radical departure from the ideological traditions of the French Left (Leclerc 1985).

In general, however, the bill considerably tightened government control over private education. For example, the loosely regulated simple contracts were to be phased out over the next six years; by 1990 private schools would be able to sign only contracts of association with the government (Savary 1985, 232). Control over both private school curriculum and time schedules was also increased (Savary 1985, 222).

Moreover, the bill dealt with several of the practical problems which had developed during the years of conservative ascendancy. Local governments as well as the national government would be parties to the new contracts of association (Savary 1985, 221). In situations where children from several jurisdictions attended a single private school, operating expenses could be divided among the local governments involved; Article 10 explained how (Savary 1985, 224-225). In addition, the national government established procedures which would permit it to exercise greater financial control over private education than it had in the past. New private schools and new classes within existing schools would have to be specifically approved by the government "in reference to the same rules and criteria which are used to open and close corresponding classes in public education" (Savary 1985, 222; my translation). Moreover, secondary private schools would be able to obtain funding for new programs only if those programs were consistent with the long-range economic plans developed by regional governments (Savary 1985, 222-223).

The thorny issues of teacher tenure and job security were also addressed. Teachers under contract would be able to select the same tenure and civil service privileges enjoyed by their public school colleagues if they wished to do so. They would be assigned to specific

schools by a "Consent and Employment Committee," which would be made up of public school officials as well as representatives of private school principals and teachers (Savary 1985, 231-121). In the French environment, however, this latter requirement did not represent an unusual check on administrative power. In French public schools teachers and administrators "co-manage" through a complex committee structure (Lewis 1985).

The implementation of the law would obviously involve setting up a new and complicated bureaucratic structure. The most important element of it would be the "establishments of public interest" to which all private schools under contract would be required to belong. These new organizations would be directed by representatives of the national government, of appropriate local governments, and of the private schools which belonged to them. They would receive and disburse public funds, exchange information, and engage in cooperative planning (Savary 1985, 228-230). Other new committees and structures were either described or hinted at in the bill. In addition to the previously mentioned "Consent and Employment Committees," "Committees of Harmonization" would be created to approve contracts (Savary 1985, 223). The procedures outlined for determining the fair contribution of several local governments to a single private school

seemed to imply a committee structure as well (Savary 1985, 224-225).

In summary, it can be said that with the Savary Bill the French Left attempted to resolve the private school aid question in two ways. First, it finally accepted the principle of granting government subsidies to private education. Second, in return for this concession it sought to set up a framework of very tight regulations and a complex administrative structure within which private education would have to operate.

Values and Value Conflicts Surrounding the Savary Bill

The pre-debate uproar

In his book Alain Savary indicated that he was pleased with his bill, which was made public on March 20, 1984, and introduced into the National Assembly a month later. He believed that it represented a reasonable solution of the problem and that he had found the correct "point of equilibrium" between the opposing values (Savary 1985). Not many people shared his view, however. A few scattered Socialists expressed public support, and a few intellectuals like Jean-Michel Croissandeau (1983) and Catholics Guy Coq and Pierre Mayol (1983) praised his plan. However, by and large the bill pleased no one; and Savary soon realized that "emotion was going to permanently triumph over reason" (Savary 1985, p. 163).

The displeasure was widespread. For example, many supporters of Savary's own United Left were dissatisfied. They wanted private education to be nationalized or at least far more strictly regulated. It goes almost without saying that the leaders of the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action were outraged. They staged a demonstration in late April and paid an angry call on the prime minister ten days later (Savary 1985). More disturbing was the fact that many of the Socialist members of Parliament were displeased. Under a parliamentary system, party loyalty is expected; therefore, the Socialist deputies were obligated to vote for any bill which the Government introduced into Parliament as long as it was consistent with the party platform (Coulter 1984; Theen and Wilson 1986). However, the deputies could and did insist upon amending the bill (Leclerc 1985; L.M. 17 May 1984; Savary 1985). The thrust of their amendments was predictable; they restricted the funding of private education and greatly increased government regulation of it (L.M. 17 May 1984). In Savary's view they also disturbed his carefully negotiated point of equilibrium (Savary 1985).

Of course, the Government could have refused the amendments, but it knew that the political situation was a delicate one. As early as the winter of 1982, the Socialists had lost elections; by 1983 polls showed that

their popular support was below 50% (L'A.P. 1982; 1983). Therefore, the Government did not want to risk any action which might lead to a dissolution of the National Assembly and new elections. As a result it accepted the deputies' amendments. However, it also declared that the passage of the Savary Bill would be a matter of confidence in the Government. This meant that since the Socialists held a majority in the National Assembly, the bill would be considered passed as amended. It would be debated, but there would be no vote. In order to vote against the proposed law, the deputies would have to vote for a motion of censure, whose passage would automatically oust the Government and virtually force Mitterrand to dissolve Parliament (Leclerc 1985; L.M. 22 May 1984; Savary 1985; Theen and Wilson 1986).

The Socialists were not the only supporters of the United Left who were displeased. Their major political ally, the French Communist Party, had been emitting signals of dissatisfaction for months. Therefore, no one was surprised when Communist deputy Guy Hermier announced during the National Assembly debate that even the amended bill did not regulate private education strictly enough. Therefore, the Communists would not be voting for it (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2513-2516; Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). Thus, most of the United Left opposed the Savary Bill because it did not adequately control private education.

Meanwhile, the Right was also displeased with the bill. Leaders of the Right agreed that it regulated private education strictly and threatened its autonomy. However, they could not agree on the severity of the problem. Disagreements which had long been apparent had developed into major conflicts. For example, as early as February 1984 Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris and head of the conservative Rally for the Republic party, had announced on the radio that he would defend Catholic schools even if he had to oppose the Bishops' Conference in order to do so (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). By April Cardinal Lustiger and Monsignor Vilnet--both members of the Bishops' Conference--were making contradictory statements about the bill to the press (Savary 1985). Tensions were also mounting at 277 rue St.-Jacques, the enormous stone office building which housed the General Headquarters of Catholic Education. Leclerc (1985) described the atmosphere in these words:

The confrontations which everyone had expected took place. They burst out in the hallways most of all, but the public meetings reflected the violence of the internal debate. (P. 254; my translation)

The conflicts were legion. Hélène Missoffe, a leading supporter of private education in Parliament, accused the leaders of the Catholic school system of a lack of proper gratitude toward conservative politicians. The National

Union of Private School Parents was deeply split over the issue of holding demonstrations against the bill in Paris, with the Secretary-General bitterly opposed to any such action. Father Guiberteau, head of the entire Catholic school system, and the diocesan leaders of Catholic education were at odds over a similar question.

Meanwhile, at the grassroots level Catholics who thought that the Socialist Government was threatening their freedom to choose their children's schools could not understand why their leaders were so silent. Everywhere people were whispering, "Treason" (Leclerc 1985).

These conflicts related, of course, to issues of autonomy and control. How much government regulation could Catholic schools accept? At what point would they cease to be autonomous and lose their identity, their "distinctive character," their "soul" as one interviewee put it? (Interview with author, Paris, France, 17 May 1989). Did the original Savary Bill go beyond that point? If not, had the Socialists' amendments pushed it over that critical line? And if and when proposed government regulation became excessive, what should they do about it (Leclerc 1985)? In short they were wrestling with some of the deepest meanings of the democratic value of freedom as it applies to institutions. What is it? Where does it end? And how should one defend it?

The debate of the Savary Bill, scheduled to open on May 21, promised to be a stormy one. In that regard at least no one would be disappointed.

Values in the May 1984 debate

The National Assembly's debate of the Savary Bill began late in the afternoon of May 21, in an atmosphere of high political passion. Despite their leaders' discouragement a group of 1500 Catholic school advocates had decided to come to the capital in order to make their support of educational freedom visible. They left the seaport city of Nantes at 1:30 A.M. on the morning of the debate, travelling in a caravan of twenty-five buses. They reached Paris shortly after noon and marched with signs and banners. Meanwhile, their three trucks were also approaching the city; these contained a prefabricated school house which the group wanted to erect in Paris as a sign of protest. The Paris Police Department and Catholic leaders spent much of that tense afternoon trying to decide what to do with the 1500 protesters and their school house. Ultimately they were allowed to erect their symbolic school in the Montparnasse section of Paris, a shopping district within walking distance of the building in which the debate was taking place. There they sang hymns, talked to the crowds, and fortified themselves with thermoses of hot coffee (Crépu 1984; Leclerc 1985; L.M. 23 May 1984).

The debate began at 4:00 P.M. It lasted for a total of fourteen and a half hours, spreading over two days and ninety-eight pages of Journal Officiel. The deputies delivered forty-five speeches: fifteen major ones and thirty brief statements (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2473-2571). They established an adversarial tone at once, interrupting Alain Savary's opening speech thirty times. At first only conservatives interrupted Savary, with shouted comments like: "Why no!" (p. 2476); "Just the reverse is true!" (p. 2476); and "Let's hope that in eight years you won't be part of the Government!" (p. 2480). Soon, however, the Socialists began to shout expressions of support and encouragement to Savary such as: "Very good!" (p. 2476); "Exactly right!" (p. 2477); and "Absolutely!" (p. 2479; my translations). The second speaker, Socialist Bernard Derosier, was interrupted sixty-two times (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2480-2485). The Socialists avenged themselves on the third speaker. Conservative Jacques Barrot, who headed the Union for French Democracy party, was interrupted a total of sixty-seven times (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2484-2490). And so the debate continued for hours, with shouts, insults, and desperate calls to order by the chair.

Several days later Jean-Marie Cardinal Lustiger, the Archbishop of Paris, would publicly criticize all of them, suggesting that the deputies had reduced democratic discourse to the level of a soccer match at which the fans

shout, "Go, Blues!" and "Go, Greens!" (L.M. 5 June 1984, p. 1). His comments momentarily united the warring politicians, who had finally found one point upon which they could agree: His Eminence should stay out of politics (L.F. 6 June 1984; L.M. 8 June 1984).

In spite of the bitterness, anger, and frustration which permeated the National Assembly's debate of May 21 and 22, 1984, it stands as a fascinating monument to democratic theory. It could be entitled, "What Does Freedom Really Mean?" and distributed to political thinkers around the world. The major theme of both the Right and the Left was freedom. The Right had early seized upon freedom as its watchword and its slogan, and the leaders of the Left were determined to make it clear that they too favored freedom. As Socialist Jean Poperen put it:

For several months we have been watching a peculiar show and a reversal of values: the Opposition claims that freedom is on its side in every possible area. Freedom has even become an obsession with them. (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2506; my translation)

Therefore, the leaders of the Left had apparently given much thought to how their conception of freedom in education differed from that of their opponents. In the debate, these two conceptions emerged in sharp contrast to each other.

Poperen accused the Right of being "obsessed" with freedom. A content analysis of the major conservative speeches revealed that his opinion was justified. Almost 80% of the conservative discussion of values was devoted to freedom and to its related value, autonomy. The conservative speakers rarely mentioned the other two democratic political values of equality and solidarity. Interestingly enough, even the value of efficiency had largely disappeared from their discourse, although normally it was one of their favorite themes. Thus, the conservative speeches represented a situation in which freedom had devoured the other major values.

However, in devouring the other values, freedom had not expanded its meaning as one might expect. Rather, it had been diminished to a narrow concept of what freedom in education means. Deputy Jacques Barrot provided the most clearly articulated interpretation of educational freedom from a conservative point of view. He repeated the conservatives' traditional theme that educational freedom is a basic freedom, closely related to the freedom of thought. Therefore, citizens should be able to found private schools; and the government should support them financially. Barrot conceded that a government should exercise some control over the schools which it supports. However, such control should not interfere with the school's "distinctive character." If parents are to make

genuine choices among schools, those schools must differ from each other. And if those differences are to be maintained, school administrators must have the power to establish and enforce them. According to Barrot, the three indispensable tools for private school administrators who wish to maintain their school's "distinctive character" are an educational project, the power to select and dismiss their teachers, and "full authority over the men and women who are responsible for implementing the educational project" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2487; my translation). The educational project should, of course, "conform to parents' wishes" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2488; my translation).

Several things are apparent in this conception of educational freedom. In the first place, the freedom is largely a freedom for parents. Their freedom consists primarily of choosing a school which provides the type of education which they want for their children. Theoretically, they might choose to start a school which met their needs; however, such a choice would obviously be limited to those parents with considerable resources. This interpretation of educational freedom was consistent with the Right's traditional conception of the family. Indeed, in her speech conservative Hélène Missoffe elaborated on the preeminent role of the family in education:

It is impossible. . . in this age of unprecedented scientific, technological, and social change to support the family's important role in promoting responsibility and stability while simultaneously removing from the family its most important role: choosing the type of school which appears best able to transmit to its children those cultural values to which it is deeply attached. (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2522; my italics; my translation)

From this conception of parents' rights in education, it follows that the other participants in the educational process should have relatively little freedom. Although the conservatives spoke eloquently during the debate of the freedom of administrators to manage private schools without such impediments as teacher tenure, even administrators' freedom was subordinated to "parents' wishes." As for the teachers, conservative speakers saw them simply as "the team of men and women who, with the principal, put into practice an educational project consistent with parents' wishes" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2488). In spite of an occasional approving reference to children's freedom of conscience, none of the conservative speakers explained how children's freedom of conscience related to the educational project of the school or to parents' right to transmit their own cultural values. Nor did any of their speeches include recognition of the fact that the family, as well as the state, can act oppressively. In short, the conservatives understood educational freedom as the right of parents to choose a

school which offered an educational program with which they felt comfortable.

It is important to emphasize three implications of the conservative position. First, it represented a powerful assertion of the autonomy of the family vis-a-vis the state, the school, and the educational profession. Moreover, it could also represent an assertion of the rights of the family vis-a-vis the Church in those instances where the Church, rather than the state, operates schools. During the struggle of 1983-1984, it was apparent that many private school parents did indeed hold this exalted view of the family and its rights. Second, this position resembles the attitude which Ballion (1982) analyzed in Les Consommateurs d'école (Consumers of schooling). In fact, Barrot referred to parents as "consumers" near the end of his speech (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2490). Finally, the conservatives' conception of freedom was an economic one. Underlying their thinking was the belief that schools are products which consumers select in an educational marketplace. An educational project and the restriction of teachers' rights are therefore necessary as aspects of quality control and the protection of the school's "brand name." Thus, although the conservatives advocated a variety of products or schools among which parents could choose, they also insisted on

uniformity within each school so that parents could be sure of the nature of their choice.

Freedom was also the central theme upon which the Left elaborated in its major speeches; however, the speakers on the Left carefully differentiated their interpretation of educational freedom from that of the Right. First of all, it is noteworthy that although freedom and autonomy constituted their central theme, they nonetheless expressed considerable concern about maintaining the other democratic values. A content analysis of the Left's discussion of values revealed that it devoted 44% of its discourse to freedom and autonomy. Next in importance--and about equally so--were equality and solidarity. Efficiency and control emerged as lesser concerns, but they too were discussed. Thus, for the speakers of the Left freedom had not devoured the other values.

Moreover, the left-of-center deputies believed that all of the values existed in relationship to each other. In their opinion, no single value should be taken and "raised to the level of a universal moral principle" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2491; my translation). Even freedom was a value which had limits; for, carried to extremes, it would destroy equality by giving unfair advantages to the strong, thereby setting up a school system on the Spartan model: "Woe to the weak and to the poorly adjusted" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2492; my translation). Unlimited

educational freedom would also lead to social segregation, endangering domestic peace and national unity. As Savary expressed it, "If uniformity is harmful, segregation is intolerable" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2480; my translation). Moreover, unlimited educational freedom would lead to economic inefficiency by creating unwieldy administrative overloads, undermining good financial practices, and making educational planning difficult. Thus, freedom had to be balanced carefully against the other values of equality, solidarity, and efficiency. Such balance could be achieved through appropriate government control.

In addition, the speakers on the left side of the National Assembly conceived of educational freedom as a multi-faceted freedom which consisted of several components. Each of these components of freedom had to be balanced carefully against the others. And they all had to be understood in relationship to the right of children to receive an education. Deputy Andre Laignel expressed this view in these words:

What's all this about? It's about children's right to receive at least an elementary education and to receive it free of charge. Everything else is secondary in relationship to this right.
(J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2492; my translation)

Savary and the deputies who were his allies conceded that educational freedom included the right to establish

private schools and the right of parents to choose such schools for their children. In a break with their own traditions they also conceded that the government should finance private education so that all children might have access to it. Moreover, in his opening speech Savary even conceded that some limited choice among schools should be offered in the public sector; he described a public school choice experiment which his ministry was conducting (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2477). However, the Left explicitly rejected the marketplace metaphor which the Right liked to employ. Savary explained:

This bill leaves intact parents' freedom to choose a private school as one form of education, but it does not reduce parents to the level of consumers of schooling. . . . (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2480; my translation)

Deputy André Laignel agreed, saying:

[The Right of our country seeks] competition among schools and also competition among children. Thus, an excess of competition, creating supermarket-schools for commodity-children. (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2492; my translation)

However, the speakers on the Left side of the National Assembly also asserted that educational freedom included several freedoms other than the freedom of parents to choose a private school. Foremost among these was children's right to freedom of conscience. For instance, Jean Poperen argued against any form of education which

indoctrinated children rather than offering them a choice among several ideas. In his view, the worst monopoly was "the monopoly of thought" represented by the inculcation of ready-made doctrines (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2505; my translation). André Laignel vividly described a situation in his home district. There the "gurus" of a well-known religious cult insisted on educating the children of cult members. In his opinion, the state should protect children against such "amputations of the brain" even if their parents wished to choose it (J.O.A.N.D. 1984; 2492; my translation).

Moreover, teachers should have freedoms, too, even if they taught in private schools. Not surprisingly, Didier Chouat, himself a teacher in a public high school in a small town in Brittany, had several comments to make about teachers' freedoms (Who's Who in France 1985). In his view, teachers had a right not only to join a union, but to choose the specific union to which they would belong. They should also be free to choose tenured status. He attacked with sharp words the idea that teachers' freedoms were somehow incompatible with the "distinctive character" of the private school:

This isn't acceptable! What meaning can we give to the word "freedom" if the freedom of each individual is subordinated to that of a community or group? Such a distortion of the idea of freedom is very dangerous, for it contains in embryo the beginnings of

totalitarianism. (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2520;
my translation)

Teachers' academic freedom was a theme upon which deputy André Laignel elaborated at some length. In his opinion, it was necessary for teachers to have tenure so that those above them in the educational hierarchy could not dictate what and how they taught. Ultimately, freedom of conscience for students depended on freedom of conscience for teachers as well. Pushed to its limit, the conservative conception of educational freedom would accord someone like the Ayatollah Khomeini the freedom to establish a totalitarian school in which the exact opposite of freedom would be both lived and taught. Laignel argued that "educational freedom has no meaning, or rather it has a twisted meaning, if first of all freedom is not taught" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2493; my translation).

The Right centered its arguments on parents' choice of their children's school. The leaders of the Left conceded this freedom, but also advanced another freedom of parents which, in their view, the Right usually neglected to consider. They argued that the freedom of association is a basic freedom, so private school parents should be able to choose the parents' association to which they belonged. In order to appreciate this argument, one must understand one aspect of French school governance. In France there

are no school boards as Americans know them; but each school, public or private, is governed in part by an elected council. In French public education the composition of these councils and their election procedures are laid down in national law. The parents of the children in a school are entitled to representation on its council. Although parents can run as independents for council seats, in practice parents' associations run candidates. There are several parents' associations in France, they are organized at the national level, and they have clearly defined educational platforms. In national politics they function like pressure groups; within the public school system, they function like political parties (Berland, 1986; Croissandeau 1986; Lewis 1985).

In contrast, French private education has a single large parents' association, the National Association for Private School Parents, whose headquarters are located in the same Paris office building which houses the administrators of the Catholic school system. Allegedly, Catholic school leaders discourage the development and activity of competing parents' associations and exercise considerable control over the National Association for Private School Parents (Khalidi, 1985). Thus, the Left's advocacy of the freedom of association for private school parents represented support for greater political

diversity within the governance structures of private schools.

Finally, the Left argued that local governments also had freedoms which should be respected. If they were going to have to pay to support private schools, then they should be able to participate in the decision to grant a private school a government contract.

In summary, the Left argued that it also fervently advocated freedom. However, it further argued that freedom had to be balanced against other democratic values. Moreover, in its view, all aspects of educational freedom should be simultaneously maintained. As Jean Poperen exclaimed after a long analysis of the various facets of freedom, "In short, freedom--all the way down the line!" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2506; my translation). And in their opinion the state had an obligation to organize the environment in which this complex freedom was exercised. For example, Bernard Derosier asserted that

. . .it is normal for the national government to provide a framework and to define the legal rules which will facilitate balancing the interests of the various parties involved. (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 2483; my translation)

In contrast to the Right, the Left advocated a concept of educational freedom which was basically political. Behind the speeches of the Left lies the assumption that the educational project and the "distinctive character" of

a private school should be determined through an on-going process of discussion, negotiation, and compromise. This process might, of course, continue to go on within the Bishops' Conference, at the General Headquarters of Catholic Education, and during meetings of private school principals' groups. But they believed that both parents and private school teachers should have more power to participate in the process. Thus, they advocated freedom of association for both parents and teachers and tenure for teachers. Local government officials should also be accorded some voice in the process. Meanwhile, within private school classrooms they advocated an exchange of ideas in a debate in which both teachers and students would be free to express views which might not be completely consistent with the school's "distinctive character." In short, the Right defined freedom using the economic metaphor of the marketplace. The Left defined it using the political metaphor of the parliament.

The post-debate uproar

The Savary Bill passed its first reading in the National Assembly during the early morning hours of May 24, when the Opposition's motion of censure failed (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). From there it went to the Senate. The French Senate is an indirectly elected body which is dominated by conservative rural interests and has virtually no power; the National Assembly can easily

override it (Theen and Wilson 1986). Thus, on May 24 everyone considered that the bill had passed. Observers expected the Senate to employ delaying tactics--Savary (1985) anticipated that its deliberations would last all summer--but everyone understood that ultimately it could do nothing to prevent the Savary Bill from becoming law. Yet the French public had long considered educational freedom a basic freedom; so the stage was set for generalized conflict.

The protests began the afternoon before the motion of censure failed. Across France supporters of parents' right to choose their children's schools employed a variety of techniques to make their displeasure known. In Versailles angry citizens staged an "operation hullabaloo"; at a designated time they all blew automobile horns and beat on pots and pans. In Troye, Tarbes, and Bordeaux, people released brightly colored balloons in protest of the bill (L.A. May 25, 1984). In Paris demonstrators filled the fountains in Honoré-d'Estienne d'Orves Square with flowers (Leclerc 1985). During the following weeks public pressure continued to mount. The majority of French citizens strongly objected to what they perceived as a loss of the freedom to choose a private education for their children.

After the passage of the amended Savary Bill, the Bishops' Conference, the leaders of the Catholic education

system, and grassroots Catholics finally began to unite. Although private school leaders had had serious reservations about the Savary Bill for a long time, the Socialists' amendments had at last persuaded them that they could not support it. The amendments also gave them a plausible excuse for publicly turning against the bill. Their major objection was to an amendment which linked the percentage of tenured teachers in a private school to the amount of local funding it would receive. They saw this as a first step toward a forced integration of the two school systems and the subsequent loss of their freedom to operate a distinctively different system. By the end of May, Catholic leaders had decided to dramatize their disapproval by holding a massive demonstration in Paris on Sunday, June 24 (Leclerc 1985; L.F. 1 June 1984; L.M. 31 May 1984; Savary 1985).

Meanwhile, the Opposition and its political supporters were exploiting the situation to its fullest. During the month of June, the news coverage of the leading conservative Paris daily, Le Figaro, was most revealing. Its pages were filled with headlines and articles attacking the Socialist Government. For example, in a first page headline on June 1, it accused the Government of "playing a double game"; and in a June 11 headline it referred to the Socialists' "crafty tactics." The newspaper steadily interpreted the Savary Bill as a

"threat" to freedom which would reduce parents to "captive" clients of the public school system. It dubbed June 24, the day of the private school demonstration, "Freedom Sunday" (L.F. 1, 11, 18, 19, 20, and 23 June 1984).

The conservatives had reasons for this barrage of attacks which went far beyond their attachment to educational freedom. Elections to the European Parliament, the governing body of the European Community, would be held on June 17. An election defeat would further weaken the Government's already damaged credibility. And under a parliamentary system there is always the possibility that a weakened Government will finally give up and call for new parliamentary elections (Coulter 1984). The conservatives were thus delighted when, in the June 17 election, the Left suffered a resounding defeat. Between them, the Socialists, the Communists, and the Ecologists managed to garner only 36% of the popular vote (L.M. 19 June 1984).

While these political tensions were mounting, the leaders of the private school system were busy planning for their demonstration scheduled for June 24, "Freedom Sunday." Their labors included long negotiations with the Paris Police Department and government representatives, who feared that violence might break out. Finally, the parade permit was granted; so Catholic school leaders

proceeded with their plans (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). Since they expected over a million protesters to march in the capital, the day had to be meticulously organized. It was. Organizers arranged for the protesters to arrive by rail in four large train stations, following a carefully staggered schedule. From the stations they would march to the Place de la Bastille; from there they would march back to the stations, where they would catch waiting trains for home. The marching would begin at 7:00 A.M. and last until 9:00 P.M.; however, most of the demonstrators would spend no more than two hours in the city. By the time the last marchers put down their signs, the ones who had started the parade would have been home for hours.

All of the careful planning paid off, for by any conceivable standard the June 24 demonstration was a success. Over a million people participated in the long march, without any major problems. Except for a few incidents in the Latin Quarter, "Freedom Sunday" was very peaceful (Leclerc 1985; L.F. 11 June 1984; L.M. 26 June 1984). Throughout the day the central theme was freedom. Early in the morning, Monsignor Vilnet read a statement from the Bishops' Conference to the listening crowds:

You've come to Paris in crowds to defend educational freedom. . . .Your bishops have never wavered in their convictions. We want parents to keep their right to choose the type of education they want for their

children. . . .We affirm that freedom cannot be divided. (Cited in Leclerc 1985, 286; my translation)

Naturally, most of the signs, banners, and streamers bore slogans about freedom. The favorite was, "Free schools will survive," but there were many other variations on the theme (Leclerc 1985, 279). After all, the day had been defined as "Freedom Sunday."

The defeat in the June 17 election and the success of the June 24 demonstration shook the Left badly (L.M. 26 June 1984). By early July its leaders were squabbling bitterly among themselves. The top officials of the French Communist Party were angry at their Socialist allies (L.F. 2 July 1984). And within each of the parties a crisis meeting was called to consider the best course of action. The Communists emerged from their session furious at each other and publicly calling Secretary-General Georges Marchais "the man of failure" (L.M. 3 July 1984, 1). Most conservative political leaders were, of course, enjoying the spectacle; several began to call for the dissolution of Parliament. Conservative election prospects were brightening as well; Jacques Chirac published his platform for 1986, and Raymond Barre announced that he would probably run for president in 1988 (L.F. 9 and 10 July 1984). However, former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, though a conservative, was deeply concerned about the political situation. Meeting

with Mitterrand, he described France as more divided than it had been in fifteen years. He urged the president to do something to reduce the level of political conflict (L.F. 8 July 1984).

It was against this background of political tension that Mitterrand delivered a televised speech to the nation on July 12, 1984. That evening Alain Savary turned on his television set to watch the speech. He was stunned to hear the president utter these words:

The Government will introduce a new bill establishing the relationships between the national government, local governments, and private education. . . .(Cited in Leclerc 1985, 309; my translation)

Savary immediately resigned his position as Minister of National Education (Savary 1985).

Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, however, gave the president the benefit of the doubt and waited to be absolutely sure that his televised statement did in fact mean that he no longer supported the Savary Bill. On July 14, the French national holiday, Mitterrand marched in the traditional parade and then appeared on French Television One to answer questions posed by a news commentator. Mitterrand made it absolutely clear in that interview that the Savary Bill would be withdrawn from the National Assembly and that a new bill would be introduced in its place. Mauroy, present in the back of the room, could not

hear the president plainly; but his aides taped the interview on a videocassette recorder. After he had viewed the tape, Mauroy too tendered his resignation (Leclerc 1985).

According to Article 5 of the French Constitution, the president has the power to serve as an "arbiter" when such action is necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the government or its very existence. This article was included to permit presidential intervention "when narrow and self-interested groups threaten to divert government from the general interest or paralyze its action" (Theen and Wilson 1986, 140). Thus, although Mitterrand's action was surprising, it was completely constitutional. In his response to Savary's resignation, Mitterrand indicated that his decision had been a matter of conscience (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). The evidence suggests that a major reason for Mitterrand's withdrawal of the Savary Bill was probably concern about national unity, or solidarity. However, Leclerc (1985) argued that Mitterrand, widely considered a brilliant political strategist, acted on the basis of political considerations. Of course, the two motives are not mutually exclusive. When the general interest and political expediency point down the same road, what political leader would fail to take it?

The Return to the Debre Act

Was there a secret agreement?

It should not be thought that François Mitterrand withdrew the Savary Bill simply because of the pressure of the crowds or the persuasive words of Giscard D'Estaing. Rather, the evidence suggests that he withdrew the bill only after a compromise had been negotiated with the leadership of the Catholic Church.

The strongest support for this hypothesis appeared in one of the interviews. In his interview, a high-ranking Catholic education leader who was involved in the events of May-July 1984 according to Leclerc (1985) made this statement:

Because of our big demonstrations in June 1984 the Government withdrew the law on the condition that certain adjustments--which we had accepted--would be made. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 24 May 1989)

This statement implies that some kind of agreement was reached between June 24 and July 12. Yet, none of the documentary sources refer to such an agreement. If it occurred, then, it must have occurred in secret. Since one piece of evidence is insufficient proof of an event, it is necessary carefully to examine the other sources which recount the events of this eighteen day period--the books by Leclerc (1985) and Savary (1985) and newspaper accounts.

Leclerc (1985) was close to the developments within the Church and the Catholic education establishment, so his account is of particular value. The most important piece of information provided in his book was that Cardinal Lustiger held two secret meetings "immediately after" the June 24 demonstration (p. 311). According to Leclerc the purpose of these meetings was to discuss both ways to make the most of the success of "Freedom Sunday" and ways to ease the tension of the political situation. In attendance at the meetings were Catholic education leaders and a few other individuals. Scattered through Leclerc's book are additional interesting bits of information about the cardinal. For example, Lustiger had a good personal relationship with the president, and rumors circulated in Catholic circles that Mitterrand telephoned him on the morning of July 13, just after his cryptic television announcement of the withdrawal of the Savary Bill. Moreover, in the middle of the book there is an eight page section of unnumbered pictures. The last of these pages contains two pictures of the cardinal; the caption under the top one is of special interest: "Jean-Marie Cardinal Lustiger, Archbishop of Paris. He played a significant, perhaps decisive role." Then Leclerc added these four words: "Interlocuteur de François Mitterrand" (François Mitterrand's interlocutor). The word interlocuteur has no exact English equivalent, and

"interlocutor" is not a word often employed in English. A standard French-English dictionary offers these definitions: "the person he/I was speaking to" and adds as a political meaning: "negotiator ou (or) representative" (Atkins et al. 1987, 381). Thus, Leclerc clearly stated that Lustiger was Mitterrand's "interlocutor." At a minimum this must mean that the two men discussed the issue; it may imply far more.

Leclerc's evidence regarding Lustiger and Mitterrand is consistent with the statement made in the 1989 interview with the author. It indicates that Lustiger acted quickly and secretly after the demonstration. It also suggests that ultimately he dealt personally with the president. One can conjecture that, after some initial discussions between Mitterrand and Lustiger, the negotiation of the details of a secret agreement was entrusted to a few close, reliable associates.

An analysis of the significant events between June 25 and July 14 as reported by Leclerc (1985), Savary (1985), Le Monde and Le Figaro is also interesting. The incidents are not evenly distributed over the twenty days; rather they cluster around three periods--June 28-30, July 5-6, and July 11-14. On June 28, Alain Poher, chair of the Senate, approached Mitterrand and sought to persuade him to delay dealing with the Savary Bill until fall. To his astonishment, the president not only refused to do so but

made an extremely strong statement in support of the bill, which Poher repeated to the press (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). On the very next day Pierre Daniel, head of the National Union of Private School Parents, publicly stated that Catholic education leaders might be able to accept some form of teacher tenure. This announcement made a deep impression on Savary (1985), who knew Daniel well and did not think that he would make such a statement unless it reflected consensus among Catholic leaders. Poor Savary interpreted it as meaning that the Catholic system might yet come to support his bill. Meanwhile, in Rome Pope John Paul II made a strong statement in support of Catholic schools on June 28; on June 30 he had a private audience with Pierre Mauroy. Immediately after it, he issued another statement about the rights of Catholic schools (Leclerc 1985; L.F. 2 July 1984; Savary 1985).

This cluster of events mystified both Leclerc (1985) and Savary (1985). However, they make considerable sense if one hypothesizes that by June 28 the Cardinal had contacted the President and all of the major parties knew that secret negotiations either had already begun or might begin soon. The steady movement of the Savary Bill through the legislative process would have provided Mitterrand with a major tool for exerting pressure on the Catholic leaders during negotiations. Thus, his strong refusal to delay the process until fall would be

understandable. Daniel's statement could be interpreted as a public signal to the president that the Catholic leadership did indeed support the Cardinal's private initiatives.

The Pope's actions should probably be seen as messages to the French Church, not to the French government. Savary (1985) suspected that, although the Vatican had remained discreetly aloof throughout most of the conflict, it began to involve itself in the issue about April 1984, urging greater firmness on the part of the leadership of the French Church. Leclerc's (1985) book confirmed Savary's suspicions. It is obvious that the Cardinal and the Pope were in close contact during the period under study. In fact, they had lunch together during the week of July 1, 1984. The Pope's behavior is understandable if he, too, knew what Pierre Mauroy probably did not suspect: secret negotiations would probably resolve the issue.

All was quiet for several days. Then on July 5 and 6, Mitterrand angrily erupted again; he would not be pressured or intimidated (Leclerc 1985; L.F. 6 July 1984; L.M. 6 July 1984; Savary 1985). Again, Mitterrand's behavior was understandable if secret negotiations were in progress. On July 5 and 6, the President took a trip into the provinces, as political leaders must do now and then. At Aurillac Monsignor Cuminal, Bishop of St.-Flour, privately tried to persuade him to change his position.

Mitterrand reacted stubbornly (Leclerc 1985). Then he travelled to Le Puy, where Catholic school supporters demonstrated against him. He responded with great firmness on the issue (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). At Chamalières the next day, former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing tried to persuade him to change his approach (Leclerc 1985; L.F. 8 July 1984). In all likelihood, the Bishop, the crowds, and the past President acted innocently. They did not realize what was happening. But Mitterrand could not exclude the possibility that these incidents were related to the on-going negotiating process; therefore, he strongly repeated what was probably his current negotiating stance.

On July 9 Mitterrand flew to Jordan, returning to France on July 11, after a brief stop-over in Egypt. Senator Michel Charasse, whom Savary (1985) identified as an "advisor" (p. 179), joined him in Egypt. Prime Minister Mauroy accompanied Mitterrand to the airport and welcomed him on his return. There was no hint of trouble on July 9, but Mauroy was disturbed by some of the president's comments on July 11 (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). The most plausible explanation is that a final agreement had been reached during Mitterrand's trip to the Middle East and that Charasse served as the emissary who took him the news. Such a sensitive piece of information would hardly have been entrusted to telephone or telegraph

communication. Thus, Mitterrand's somewhat contradictory behavior between July 11 and July 14 probably reflected the difficulties presented by the sudden need to retreat from his recent support of the Savary Bill. Of course, he also had to sacrifice both Mauroy and Savary in the process. Leclerc (1985) interpreted the President's comments and actions as signs of a religious conflict. It seems more likely that the conflict was between political necessity and expediency on the one hand and political and personal loyalty on the other.

The evidence does, then, support the conclusion that the conflict over the reform of the private school aid policy was settled through secret negotiations. In other words, the political conflict around the issue became so intense that it could be resolved only by removing it from the public arena.

The issue is depoliticized

Even though a secret agreement had apparently been reached in July, legislation had to be passed to put the agreement into effect. First, Mitterrand had to reconstitute the Government. On July 17 he appointed Laurent Fabius Prime Minister. Soon after, Jean-Pierre Chevenement became Fabius's Minister of National Education (L'A.P. 1984). In planning its strategy for passing a private school aid law, the new Fabius Government seems to have chosen a combination of speed, neutralization, and

obfuscation. On September 26, 1984, the text of the new bill was made public; it was introduced into the National Assembly the next day. Five days later the Opposition requested that a Special Commission be formed to study it and prepare a report; the Government refused. On October 3 the Commission of Laws considered the bill, and on October 8, the National Assembly debate of it began (L.F. 5 and 8 October 1984; L.M. 5 October 1984). This approach stood in marked contrast to the laborious and time-consuming procedures which the Mauroy Government had employed. Such speed had the effect of making it difficult for potential opponents to mobilize for action.

It was obvious, however, that the leadership of the Catholic school system had no intentions of mounting any opposition. The National Committee for Catholic Education had met on Saturday, October 6; afterwards Father Guiberteau held a press conference. Although he mentioned some reservations and concerns, he expressed general satisfaction that the bill preserved educational freedom. In one of its articles about the Catholics' meeting, Le Monde commented on the great calm of the private school leaders (L.F. 5 and 8 October 1984; L.M. 9 October 1984).

As for the National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action, Secretary-General Michel Bouchareissas made some angry comments to the newspapers; but he had probably given up any idea of action long before. During the

summer Mitterrand had invited him and the heads of the National Education Federation and the National Union for Elementary and Middle School Teachers to dinner in a fancy Paris restaurant. There the president had explained to them the new situation (Leclerc 1985; L.F. 8 October 1984; L.M. 9 October 1984). Thus, both of the groups which had sparked most of the earlier demonstrations had been effectively neutralized.

In addition, the Government seems to have deliberately utilized several types of obfuscation to keep the general public uninterested in the Chevènement Bill. This strategy was apparent in the very title of the proposed legislation; it was called "Relationships between the National Government and Local Governments" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 4486). A further aspect of the obfuscation was the fact that most of the Chevènement Bill did not relate to private education at all. It laid down guidelines for the decentralization of various governmental activities to the local level. Only Article 15 concerned private education. Moreover, one could read Article 15 several times without fully understanding its meaning. To a great extent it consisted of a patchwork of references to previous legislation. The wording of the first paragraph suggests the complexity of the task facing anyone who sought to read and understand the bill:

Articles 1 and 4 of Public Law 77-1285 of November 25, 1977, complementing Public Law 59-1557 of December 31, 1959, amended by Public Law 71-400 of June 1, 1971, and concerning private education, are repealed. (Khaldi 1985, 37; my translation)

Additional confusion was achieved by splitting the total legislative package between two laws. Although most of the proposed changes were incorporated in what would later be called the Chevènement Act, a major revision of funding practices was included in the Finance Act for 1985. This meant that it was introduced, debated, and passed separately from the Chevènement Act (L.M. 22 December 1984).

Finally, the strategy for the October 8 and 9 debate of the Chevènement Bill seems to have been obfuscation. For example, the Minister of National Education did not make the opening speech as one might have expected. This honor was accorded to Philippe Marchand, head of the Commission on Constitutional Laws, Legislation, and the General Administration of the Republic. In his opening paragraph Marchand set the tone for the rest of the debate:

Mr. Minister of the Interior and Decentralization, Mr. Minister of National Education, dear colleagues, for a little more than three years a policy of decentralization has been pursued with resolution in our country. (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 4486; my translation)

Only after a long and boring description of how the provisions of the new bill related to numerous aspects of the decentralization of governmental authority did Marchand reach the subject of aid to private education. His discussion of this topic was dry and to the point. He summarized it all in two crisp sentences: "The Guerneur Act is repealed. It's the return to the Debré Act" (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 4489; my translation).

The speakers for the Majority who followed Marchand imitated his approach. Their central theme was the transfer of "governmental competencies"; it most definitely was not aid to private education. Of course, the members of the opposition had some critical comments to make, but even they were subdued. Undoubtedly they understood quite well that the "calm" of the Catholic leaders meant that they had lost their political troops. In its October 10 issue Le Monde described the debate as "bizarre" and on page 9 caricatured it in a cartoon. The cartoon depicted a lantern-jawed speaker standing at the podium and reading: "And now I'm going to talk to you about the hot topic of education!" In the almost empty room, two long-suffering deputies were snoring. The issue had been so thoroughly depoliticized that it had become boring.

The Chevènement Bill passed the National Assembly easily. From there it went to the conservative Senate

which amended it extensively, in effect restoring the Guermeur Act. It returned to the National Assembly on December 19, 1984, almost exactly twenty-five years after the debate of the Debré Act. With a handful of deputies present, the bill was stripped of almost all of the Senate's amendments and passed. A group of senators then appealed to the Constitutional Council, alleging that Article 15 was unconstitutional. On January 18, 1985, the Council upheld the constitutionality of most of Article 15; and on January 25, it became law. Thus ended the long battle to reform the private school aid policy (L.F. 18 and 20 December 1984; 17 and 19 January 1985; L.M. 21 and 22 December 1984; 20 January 1985).

The final settlement

In his October 1984 speech, Philippe Marchand summarized the Chevènement Act as a repeal of the Guermeur Act of 1977 and a return to the Debré Act of 1959 (J.O.A.N.D. 1984, 4489). For the most part, his thumbnail description was accurate. By and large the new policy represented a rejection of the neo-conservative reforms of the 1970s and a reinstatement of the Jacobin solution which Michel Debré had maneuvered through Parliament in 1959. However, the new policy enshrined in the Chevènement Act (J.O.:L.D. 1985, 1088-1097) and in Article 119 of the Finance Act for 1985 (J.O.:L.D. 1984, 4078)

also included a few interesting changes. Therefore, a brief discussion of the 1985 policy seems in order.

Several components of the old Debré Act were either maintained or restored. First of all, the option of the simple contract for elementary schools was maintained. This meant that private elementary schools seeking aid could choose between the more heavily regulated contract of association and the more loosely monitored simple contract. Thus, an element of choice and flexibility which had long been important to private school educators was incorporated into the new policy. The new law also included the famous phrase from the Debré Act which affirmed the right of each private school to have a "distinctive character"; however, it repealed the Guermeur Act's insistence that teachers respect it. Thus "distinctive character," perceived by private school leaders as an inherent aspect of their freedom, was retained in a somewhat softened form. In its decision of January 18, 1985, the Constitutional Council addressed the issue of "distinctive character," arguing that since teacher respect for it was implicit even in the Debré Act, the explicit wording of the Guermeur Act was unnecessary (J.O.:L.D. 1985, 822). Even so, the implementation of a concept which is implicit in a law is likely to be somewhat more flexible than is the implementation of an explicit statement. Thus, private school teachers may

have gained a little space within which to exercise their freedom of conscience.

In two important respects, the return to the Debré Act meant a loss of autonomy for private schools. First, they would once again be required to follow the curriculum and timetables of public schools closely. Second, private school principals lost considerable power over teacher selection. Public school authorities would choose those private school teachers who would work under government contract, but private school principals were granted a veto power in relationship to the actual assignment of teachers to their schools.

In some important ways private education was subjected to greater government control under the new Socialist policy than it had been under the Debré Act. It is significant that all of these changes related to concerns about efficiency. In the first place, Article 119 of the Finance Act for 1985 stipulated precise conditions for the signing of new contracts. Under the Debré Act, private education leaders had been free to expand existing schools or start new ones and then approach the government with requests for new contracts. Under the new policy of "restrictive funding," however, this practice was abolished. Private education leaders who hoped to obtain funding for new programs would have to follow the procedures used within public education. This meant that

government authorities would annually assess all educational needs and requests, both private and public, before deciding how many new schools, classes, or programs would be established (J.O.:L.D. 1984, 4078; L.M. 22 December 1984). Moreover, in allocating funds government officials were to take into account "the specific constraints imposed on public schools because of the existence of special demographic, social, or linguistic conditions" (J.O.:L.D. 1984, 4078; my translation).

In addition, the new law clarified the meaning of "recognized educational need," a vague phrase in the Debré Act which had sparked many controversies. Parents' desires as expressed through applications to private schools were still to be taken into account. However, they were to be "subordinated" to such other considerations as overall educational needs, public school procedures for opening new classes, and economic plans and forecasts developed at the regional level (J.O.:L.D. 1985, 1083; L.M. 22 December 1984).

In effect, these new funding regulations severely limited the capacity of private education for expansion. In the interviews with private school representatives, the "restrictive funding" of the new policy emerged as their greatest concern. Most agreed that if the policy were ever changed, this was the aspect of it which most needed

revision. They tended to agree on the reason. This response was typical:

We must get rid of restrictive funding.
At the present time there is no way that
we can expand except within a proportional
calculation [of private and public school needs].
(Interview with author, Paris, France,
23 May 1989)

Thus, it appears that the new policy is successfully limiting the growth of the supply of private education.

It will be noted that two thorny areas were not addressed in the new policy. One of these was the "freedom" of local governments to refuse to grant contracts to private schools. In actual fact, the Chevènement Act as voted by the National Assembly included provisions to this effect. However, they were declared unconstitutional in January 1985 on the grounds that they were "contrary to the principle of equality before the law" (J.O.:L.D. 1985, 822). The other was the issue of tenure for private school teachers. The fact that teacher tenure was not even proposed in the final settlement suggests the extent to which private school leaders resisted the concept. However, the issue is by no means dead. In the interviews it was raised by virtually all of the public school representatives, by a representative of private school teachers, and by the Socialist Party spokesman. This last respondent expressed his concerns this way:

The [private school] teachers, while good Catholics, have learned that the bosses of the Catholic school system, pious as they are, are also very much bosses, and even very conservative bosses! They don't want their teachers to have tenure, or be unionized, or have job security. They've chosen the CFDT [a union]. We're trying to establish relationships between progressive teachers in both sectors. (Interview with author, Paris, France, 24 May 1989)

In conclusion, then, it can be said that after all the conflict--after all the tensions and all the protests and all the maneuvers--the administration of François Mitterrand managed to obtain a policy which subjects French private education to slightly more control than did the Debré Act. Given the attitudes of French public opinion toward private education, this return to the status quo ante probably represented a major victory and one which only a group of highly skilled political game players could have achieved. However, the dramatic conflict over aid to French private education--"the school war," as the French call it--probably has not ended. Already the outlines of future battles are dimly visible. As Robert Dahl (1982) would explain it, in pluralistic democratic societies the tension between autonomy and control is unlikely to disappear. Rather, it is likely to persist, taking new forms perhaps, but continuing to shape political thought and debate.

CHAPTER VII

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN POLICY ISSUE

Introduction

The story of how the French government came to grant large subsidies to private education, of how that policy changed over time, and of the dramatic struggle to reform the policy in the early 1980s is enlightening in its own right. Like a bright light it throws into relief the conflict between the state and subsidiary organizations which underlies the political process in pluralistic societies. It also illuminates the tension between values which exists in democracies. However, for Americans living in the late twentieth century, the primary significance of the French experience must be its implications for the American policy issue. After all, in recent decades our traditional policy of restricting direct government support to public schools has come under serious attack. Thus, the experience of the French nation is important because it can help us understand our own situation more clearly.

In the following discussion three general implications of this study for Americans will be considered. First, the implications of the French events for the possible evolution of the American policy problem will be suggested. Dahl's (1982) theoretical framework will be

employed to illuminate the history of the American private school aid issue, its current status, and its possible future. Second, the implications for Americans of the divisiveness of the issue in French politics will be discussed. Third, recommendations that Americans adopt a version of the French policy will be evaluated. This evaluation will include an analysis of the reasons for the relative success of the French policy and a critical discussion of the belief that a similar policy could be adopted with success in the United States. In a concluding section the author will present her own position and make recommendations for further research.

Implications for the Evolution of the American Issue

In his 1982 book, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control, Robert Dahl did not discuss private school aid policy. Nonetheless, his theory provided a framework which facilitated a meaningful analysis of the issue in its French context. Therefore, it is with some confidence that one can now utilize the theory to interpret the history of the American policy issue and to suggest how it might develop in the future.

The private school aid question is not new in the United States; on the contrary, it can be traced back to the earliest years of the Republic (Kaestle 1983). However, for decades it lay relatively dormant. Those

decades, stretching roughly from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, correspond rather closely to the life-span of the French Third Republic (1871-1941). According to the French scholar François Méjan (1960), those decades also represented the last portion of a historical period during which nation-states enjoyed high levels of legitimacy throughout the Western world. In Dahl's (1982) terms, those were decades during which subsidiary organizations could be expected to remain relatively quiescent. Indeed, during that time governments in both the United States and France were able to follow educational policies under which public education enjoyed a virtual monopoly and private education was marginalized. Challenges to those policies were few, scattered, and largely unsuccessful.

According to Méjan (1960) World War II undermined the legitimacy of the nation-state. Not surprisingly, then, in France the private school aid issue surfaced immediately after the war ended. In the United States it also became increasingly salient at that time. For example, in 1947 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the reimbursement of bus fares for private school students in its Everson v. Board of Education decision (Anderson 1981; Anthony 1987). Moreover, between 1945 and 1965 the U.S. Congress tried ten times to pass a general aid to education bill which would include private schools

(Vitullo-Martin and Cooper 1987). However, unlike France, the United States did not adopt a policy of large-scale private school subsidies during the postwar period. Dahl's (1982) theoretical framework would suggest that this difference between the two countries probably resulted from their different experiences during World War II. France, which was invaded, defeated, and occupied, suffered a severe loss of political legitimacy. The citizens of the United States were shocked by the devastation and atrocities caused by the war, but their nation emerged in 1945 as a victorious superpower. Thus, political legitimacy declined much less in the United States than it did in France.

Starting in the early 1960s, the salience of the private school aid issue in American politics seems to have increased again. For example, between 1966 and 1981 the U.S. Senate voted on tax relief for private schools eight times; and between 1971 and 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down nineteen decisions on private school aid (Goldman 1984; Heyns 1981). American scholars began to advocate private school aid programs (Coons and Sugarman 1978; Friedman 1962; Jencks 1972). The Reagan Administration supported the policy, and in 1985 the Secretary of Education, William Bennett, launched a drive in support of vouchers (Anthony 1987). Again, Dahl's (1982) theory explains the growing importance of the issue

during this period. During the 1960s and 1970s, governmental legitimacy declined steeply in the United States. Such events as the Kennedy assassination, the Vietnam War, race riots, the Watergate Scandal, the resignation of Richard Nixon, the economic effects of the oil crisis, and Iran's capture of American hostages contributed to a widespread perception that the government was ineffectual.

The growing pluralism of American public education probably heightened interest in private school subsidies also. The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, coupled with the series of school desegregation cases which followed it, literally changed the complexion of many American public schools. Many parents sought a way for their children to escape the consequences of this major social change (Levin 1983). As in France, declining governmental legitimacy and increasing cultural pluralism combined to augment support for private schools.

In the last two or three years, however, the private school aid issue seems to have become somewhat less salient in American politics. Those who favor subsidies should not, however, lose hope; nor should opponents celebrate a victory. The main reason for this decline in salience is probably the increased governmental legitimacy brought about by the eight years of the Reagan Presidency. But both the French experience and Dahl's (1982) theory suggest that the issue will become important again sooner

or later. They also suggest the nature of the policy environment which would be conducive to a reemergence of the issue. As a first precondition, governmental legitimacy would probably have to decline again. A major political scandal, economic problems, or an unpopular war could easily trigger such a decline. The nature of the American political situation in early 1990 suggests that none of these events is inconceivable. The simultaneous existence of a second factor--greater pluralism in the public schools--would increase the likelihood of a renewed interest in private school subsidies. Current trends indicate that such a development is not only possible, but probable. Among educators the rapid growth of the proportion of poor and minority youngsters among American children is a well-known demographic fact ("Here They Come, Ready or Not" 1986). Moreover, recent court decisions in several American states threaten the continuation of those funding practices which have maintained a measure of social class segregation in American education (Weeres 1987). Widespread reforms of school finance might have the effect of increasing social class heterogeneity in public education, just as the Haby Reform of 1975 did in France (Ballion 1982). Finally, parochial schools might experience a major financial crisis in conjunction with one or both of the first two factors, as they did in France in the 1950s. Under those

circumstances, the pressure on policymakers to offer subsidies might become very great indeed. Thus, the American battle over the issue is almost certainly not over.

Meanwhile, both proponents and opponents of private school aid have much to learn from the French experience. Ultimately, the battle was won in France because of a victory in the realm of public opinion. This suggests that Americans on both sides of the question should give considerable thought to their definition of the issue both for the general public and for major policy actors.

Those people who would like to see American governments subsidize private education would do well to study the arguments and strategies of the French Right and French Catholic leaders. In fact, soon after the passage of the Debré Act, an American Jesuit made precisely that recommendation (Ryan 1962). A key element in the success of French private school supporters was that they defined the private school aid issue as a question of freedom. The democratic value of freedom can stir hearts and mobilize crowds more easily than can the other two democratic values, equality and solidarity. Carl Cohen (1971) explains this fact in these words:

Liberty is the most tangible of these [three classical ideals], the most easily identified as present or absent in everyday life. Of the three it is liberty that is the dearest, whose absence is most painful, whose limitation is most quickly noted. . . . The major issues in a democracy therefore frequently concern it, and

policy decisions within a democracy will often be defended as extending freedom, or condemned for restricting it. (P. 273)

In addition to defining the issue as a matter of freedom, French conservative leaders defined it in a way that appealed to a broad public. They interpreted educational freedom, not as a religious freedom particularly dear to Roman Catholics, but as a freedom dear to all parents. By defining it as an intellectual freedom similar to the freedoms of speech and the press, they eventually managed to obtain recognition of educational freedom as a "basic freedom" under the French Constitution (Delvolve 1985; Favoreu 1985). By stressing the theme of parental choice, they also exploited the growing consumerism of French society. It is not surprising, then, that by 1984 conservatives were able to fill the streets of French cities with crowds chanting "Freedom!"

In contrast, French opponents of private school subsidies never succeeded in defining their position in a way that had wide popular appeal. In part, their failure resulted from the inherent difficulty of the problem which they faced. Basically, they advocated government control in order to balance the values of equality and solidarity against freedom. However, equality and solidarity are more abstract values than is freedom. To cite Cohen (1971) again:

Equality has a relation to democracy that is distinctively theoretical, as that between democracy and liberty is distinctively practical. . . . Fraternity is the consciousness of community, the recognition by the members of their fundamental, common enterprise. Democracy's need for it is on the deepest level of all, because it provides the context within which equality can be established and freedom can be protected. (Pp. 273-274)

Not only are equality and solidarity abstract values, but the Left's concept of balancing values against each other was also highly abstract. Unquestionably, the Left's arguments throughout the 1959-1985 period were intellectually both more subtle and more profound than were those of the Right. This difference was especially apparent in the National Assembly debate of May 1984. However, the Left seemed strangely insensitive to the requirements of modern politics. In handling the private school aid question, it never defined the issue in terms that had crowd appeal--in terms that could be readily translated into a fiery speech, a television spot, or a slogan on a banner. It was probably no coincidence, then, that support for the Left's position was largely limited to educators or that Savary's concern for equilibrium appealed primarily to intellectuals.

The failure of the French Left to build popular support for its position has implications for those Americans who oppose subsidies for private education. During the current respite they would do well to give

serious consideration to the problem which they potentially face in the realm of public opinion. In particular they should seek ways to define their position in terms of freedom. They might also develop strategies for defusing the parental choice aspect of the issue, perhaps by implementing some forms of limited choice within public education. The French experience suggests that the position of the American opponents of private school aid is a vulnerable one. Ultimately, they will probably prevail only if they thoroughly understand that vulnerability and utilize political strategies which minimize it.

In conclusion, then, both Dahl's (1982) theory and the events in France between 1959 and 1985 suggest that the American argument over subsidies for private schools has not ended. They also suggest some strategies which Americans on both sides of the issue could use in future political battles.

The Divisiveness of the Issue

One fact which emerges with clarity from the French experience is that the private school aid issue is a potentially divisive, even an explosive, political issue. In France it contributed to the instability of the Fourth Republic and exerted pressure on the Fifth Republic during its first year (Coutrot 1963). It was a major issue in the 1978 Parliamentary election (Cornec and Bouchareissas

1982). In 1984 it brought the nation to a high level of political turmoil (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985).

It is important to realize that this issue is one which can do more than turn the supporters of aid against their opponents. In France, for example, it split the Left and caused the Communists and the Socialists to disagree publicly. It also caused both parties to quarrel internally. The issue split the Right as well, setting conservative political leaders against their allies in the private school system. It split teachers' unions in both the public and the private sectors. It even sowed dissension within the ranks of the Catholic hierarchy itself (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985).

In such a situation orderly political processes can be severely disrupted. In his 1985 book Alain Savary complained that one of the reasons negotiations became so difficult was that he could not be sure of the positions of the leaders of the major interest groups. For example, both the Bishops' Conference and the National Union of Elementary and Middle School Teachers communicated mixed signals during the process. As a result policymaking bogged down. Tension and mistrust grew, contributing to the outbreak of open conflict in May and June of 1984.

The analytical framework used in this study suggests why the issue is so divisive. The private school aid controversy raises the problem of autonomy and control,

posing basic questions about the proper relationships between the state, the church, and the family. It also reveals the inherent tensions between the democratic values of freedom, equality, and solidarity. It touches upon such sensitive matters as children, morality, education, race, social class, and cultural identity. In short, it involves basic questions about those things which are most important in human life. For all of these reasons the controversy is potentially divisive. When they reflect upon questions such as these, intelligent men and women are likely to reach different conclusions. As the events in France revealed, even political and religious colleagues are likely to reach different conclusions. And they are likely to feel deep emotions about the conclusions which they reach.

For all of these reasons, too, the private school aid issue has great potential appeal to politicians. It provides a rich source of themes for speeches, television appearances, and election campaigns. Such exploitation by politicians can further heighten the conflict inherent in the issue itself. That is precisely what happened in France in 1984.

In the American literature on the subject, the potentially explosive nature of the private school aid issue is rarely discussed. However, the French experience suggests that this aspect of the problem should be of

concern to Americans. The events in France between 1959 and 1985 suggest that when private education is subsidized by the government, its leaders become politically active. It is, of course, natural for them to seek additional funding and favorable regulations through the political process just as public educators do. However, because of the value conflicts associated with the private school aid issue, such activity can generate high levels of political tension. It was only with great difficulty that the French were able to contain and resolve the conflict in 1984. Therefore, it seems that all serious American discussions of aid for private schools should address two related questions. How much conflict would such a policy arouse in the United States? And how easily could American political institutions contain and resolve that conflict? The possible advantages of providing greater educational freedom should be weighed carefully against the possible disadvantages of disrupting the political processes of the nation.

On Adopting the French Policy

If one uses the major criteria which emerge from the American debate over private school aid to evaluate the French policy, one must judge it a relatively successful one. It provided French families with a measure of choice in educational matters. At the same time it protected the

integrity of the public school system. Under it, private school enrollments did not rise disproportionately. Nor did segregation in French schools or in French society markedly increase. The vicious sorting and creaming process which some Americans fear did not occur. Moreover, throughout most of the 1959-1985 period, it was probably cost-effective.

It is undoubtedly for these reasons that some Americans have held the French policy up as a model and recommended it as one which this country might consider adopting. Foremost among these was Robert Healey (1970; 1974), a Protestant theologian who spent a year in France during the 1960s. Healey, who had previously opposed subsidizing private education, was very impressed by the French policy. He especially liked the way the French system of subcontracting for non-sectarian instruction apparently resolved the church-state issue. In a book and an article he urged Americans to develop a version of the French system for use here. Similarly, the American Jesuit, Edmund Ryan, (1962) encouraged his Catholic colleagues to study the French approach. Milton Friedman (1962) also commented on the success of the French policy. It seems necessary, then, to consider the reasons for the success of the French policy and to evaluate the belief that a version of it could be duplicated here.

First of all, the French policy probably succeeded because it was based on the careful balancing of conflicting values. Many American scholars have argued that a successful private school aid policy for this country would have to be a balanced one (Boyd 1987; Doyle 1981; King 1982; Levin 1983; Levy 1985; Muller 1983; Murnane 1985). The French evidence clearly revealed that French policymakers were also aware of this necessity. For example, in the debate of December 1959, many of the speeches by the Jacobin Right turned upon the importance of balancing private and public education appropriately. Similarly, the French deputies were concerned about maintaining the correct balance between the democratic values of freedom and solidarity. Prime Minister Debré spoke quite explicitly of the need to keep values in "order" (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3637). Indeed, he summarized the importance of balancing the claims of the government, the freedom of parents, and the solidarity of the French nation in these words: "State, Freedom, Nation: our first, your first, our most important, and even our only concerns" (J.O.A.N.D. 1959, 3599; my translation). This concern was apparent throughout the 1959-1985 period. At times the Left expressed it more clearly than the Right, but the point was steadily made. Savary (1985) also made it through his long attempts to find a point of equilibrium between public and private education.

This aspect of the French success would be relatively easy to duplicate in the United States. The American scholarly literature on private school aid policy is filled with concern for balance, and policy experts are likely to have opportunities to discuss the matter with policymakers. There seems to be no reason why Americans could not conceptualize a balanced system of private school aid subsidies and express it in a bill.

It is not enough, however, to conceptualize a balanced policy. One must also be able to obtain passage of the policy by a legislative body. Michel Debré, of course, did so. However, in an analysis of differences between the Australian and American societies, Boyd (1987) suggested that Americans might find it difficult to pass a well-structured subsidy program because of the nature of the American political process. He mentioned the "rough and tumble" (p. 195) of American politics and the danger that lobbying groups would seek to unbalance such a policy by amending it in the legislature. Similarly, in her discussion of Dutch and Swedish subsidy plans, Estelle James (1984) suggested that political differences between those nations and the United States might render it difficult for Americans to adopt similar programs. These concerns about the efficiency of the American political process are similar to those which some political scientists have expressed (Coulter 1984; Dahl 1982; Isaak 1987). For

example, it is sometimes argued that it is easier to develop and pass laws which reflect the general interest under a parliamentary form of government than it is under the American system of checks and balances (Coulter 1984).

It is therefore possible that part of the French success in passing and maintaining a balanced private school aid policy resulted from the nature of French political institutions. Unlike the United States, France has a parliamentary system of government (Theen and Wilson 1986). The evidence suggests that the resources offered by the parliamentary system may have been important in the original passage of the Debré Act in 1959. During that year Debré maneuvered skillfully to develop the type of policy which he wanted. When a few unwise deputies stepped out of line because of grassroots pressure, Debré was able to bring them under control because of parliamentary traditions of party loyalty and discipline. Nor did he have to send his bill through a complex Congressional committee structure. Rather, he was able to develop it quietly and work out the difficult areas behind the scenes with members of his Majority. It was not easy for Michel Debré to pass the balanced policy which he desired. However, French political institutions provided him with some useful resources for doing so. The evidence suggests that he exploited those resources fully (Coutrot 1963).

It would, of course, be rash to suggest that the American political system of checks and balances could not produce a balanced policy. Under the right set of circumstances, a strong leader could probably do so. Nor does the parliamentary system always achieve desired results; amendments by his own party finally destroyed Savary's point of equilibrium (Leclerc 1985; Savary 1985). Even so, it may be true that it is easier to pass such policies under parliamentary systems than under systems like our own. At the very least it would be well for those Americans who like to point out that most Western democracies subsidize private education to reflect on an additional fact. Most Western democracies other than the United States have parliamentary systems of government (Coulter 1984; Dahl 1982; Theen and Wilson 1986). Their success with private school aid policies may result from their political traditions as well as from the structural details of their policies.

The distinctive nature of French pluralism may also have facilitated the development and maintenance of a balanced private school aid policy. Three features of French pluralism seem especially noteworthy. First of all, like many other Western democracies, France uses a form of neo-corporatism to develop public policy. Neo-corporatism is a system of interest representation in which interest groups play an official role in the policy-

making process. Under such a system, they no longer function merely as pressure groups, but rather as the government's partners in a negotiating process (Dahl 1982; Theen and Wilson 1986). Dahl (1982) argued that this method of policymaking was more highly integrated than that which is used in the United States. One can speculate too that over time neo-corporatist procedures influence the interest groups themselves, encouraging their leaders to think in terms of negotiating with other groups rather than competing against them as lobbyists. Thus, although France has powerful interest groups, those groups probably function rather differently from the corresponding groups in the United States.

In the second place, an important characteristic of French religious pluralism probably also facilitated the success of the private school aid policy. Although France has several influential religious minorities and requires the legal separation of church and state, one church clearly dominates the religious life of the country. Approximately 80% of all French people were baptized in the Roman Catholic Church (Cornec and Bouchareissas 1982), and approximately 90% of all French private schools are operated by that church (Fowler 1987). As a result, the French government had the advantage of having to deal with only one important religious policy actor as it developed, implemented, and reformed its private school aid policy.

In the United States neither the Federal government nor any state government would have such an advantage. They would have to deal with several religious groups, none of which was clearly dominant.

A third characteristic of French pluralism may also have served to prevent the development of serious problems under the policy. France has several ethnic, linguistic, and racial minorities; however, it has no history of structural pluralism based on those distinctions. The French have been deeply concerned about the possibility that various forms of segregation might develop or intensify under their private school aid policy. Yet they had the advantage of implementing it in an environment in which racial segregation had never been practiced. This is another advantage which Americans would not have should they seek to develop and implement such a policy.

Finally, the success of the French policy seems to have resulted from the regulations which it imposed upon private education. Some American scholars have argued that the key to a successful private school aid policy is careful regulation (Doyle 1981b; Murnane 1985). The French experience suggests that they are correct. Although the Debré Act brought subsidized private schools under a broad scheme of government control, two policy mechanisms seem to have been especially important because they protected the integrity of the public school system.

These were the provisions of the law which restricted the growth of the supply of private education and the provisions which linked funding levels through the teachers' salary schedule. Without those regulations French private education would probably have been able to expand, gradually enrolling increasing numbers of students and competing to recruit teachers by offering them superior salaries and working conditions. Such a development could have set in motion a creaming and sorting mechanism which would have had the long range effect of reducing the public schools to a system for those who could not afford private school tuition. The National Assembly debate of December 1959 revealed that the French deputies were acutely aware of the threat which subsidies might pose to the public school system. They explicitly expressed a determination to maintain its preeminent position by protecting it from the effects of such a damaging competition. Although this determination wavered during the 1970s, it continued to be expressed by members of the Left and the Jacobin Right. In the 1980s the Mitterrand Administration modified the policy in order to redress unequal conditions which had developed between the two sectors. Throughout the 1959-1985 period, then, there was considerable awareness of the necessity to protect public schools by regulating private ones. Such regulations were both developed and implemented.

How likely is it that an American private school aid policy would contain sufficient regulations to prevent the harmful effects of a competition between private and public education? It is not likely at all. As Doyle (1981b) pointed out, U.S. Supreme Court decisions--especially Lemon v. Kurtzman--make it difficult for programs which include the regulation of religious schools by the government to pass constitutional muster. As a result, a law similar to the Debré Act would almost certainly be declared unconstitutional in this country. So would any subsidy plan which incorporated substantial government regulation of religious schools.

Thus, it can be said that the prospects for the American adoption of a version of the Debré Act, or of any carefully regulated policy, are remote. Although Americans could easily conceptualize balanced private school aid legislation, they might find it difficult to obtain its passage without the addition of damaging amendments. Even if they successfully managed its passage, it would probably be declared unconstitutional. Any foreseeable American private school aid plan, then, is likely to be loosely regulated. If the success of the French policy resulted from its regulatory provisions--and French people believe that it did--then such a loosely regulated policy would probably fail to protect the integrity of the American public school system.

A final point should be made as an addendum to the above discussion. Although it cannot be explained in terms of the theoretical framework utilized in this study, the fact that French public education is considered academically superior to private education may have contributed to the success of the policy. In the United States, people usually perceive private schools as superior to public ones. This may be a significant cultural difference between the two countries.

Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Research

At the end of a study of a controversial question like the private school aid issue, it is appropriate for the author to suggest the conclusion to which the research has brought her and to indicate the reasons for that conclusion. She has decided that private school aid plans have a certain appeal because they introduce an element of choice and variety into the educational system. Nonetheless, she has also decided that it would be dangerous for the United States to adopt one.

First of all, it should be made clear that the French experience demonstrates that it is possible for a democratic nation to develop and implement a successful private school subsidy policy. The French program has protected the democratic values of freedom, equality, and solidarity as well as the economic value of efficiency.

However, the French experience also clearly demonstrates that in a pluralistic nation such an enterprise is fraught with difficulty. Moreover, it entails considerable risk.

The findings of this research suggest that the French success was partially the result of heavy regulation of private education. Such regulation would not be legal in the United States. This research also suggests that the French success was facilitated by two characteristics of the sociopolitical context within which the French government develops policy. One of these was the use of parliamentary political institutions. The United States does not use the parliamentary system. The other is the nature of French pluralism. French pluralism is marked by neo-corporatist interest representation and by a clearly dominant church. It is not marked by a history of racial segregation. American pluralism differs from French pluralism in these respects.

However, American pluralism has some distinctive features. Two of these seem especially relevant to the private school aid issue. First of all, American religion is very fragmented. There is no dominant church in the United States, where a large number of denominations, sects, and cults flourish. As a result, a program of private school subsidies could encourage the proliferation of a multiplicity of small parochial school systems. Even under a carefully regulated program, the existence of

several such systems would cause difficulties. It would place considerable stress on the policy process and impose an administrative burden on the agencies charged with regulation. Under a loosely regulated system, the difficulties could become much greater. Obviously, such a proliferation of systems might also lead to political divisiveness at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Moreover, one could predict a negative effect on many communities. In small towns several church schools might compete against each other for students, keeping the citizens divided and suspicious of each other. For all of these reasons the religious fragmentation of American society could render any private school aid program unmanageable, inefficient, or both.

American pluralism has a second distinctive feature. In Sanday's (1976) terms, the United States has only recently achieved cultural pluralism. Throughout most of its history it has been characterized by structural pluralism, a system in which one or more groups are systematically excluded from full participation in the political and cultural life of the nation. As a result, Americans cannot afford to consider subsidizing private schools without reflecting seriously on the implications of their country's history of slavery and racial segregation. In the United States schooling was long used to reinforce structural pluralism; only after World War

II was it used as one way to achieve cultural pluralism. Therefore, any program of private school subsidies in the United States would be risky indeed. The first risk is often raised in the literature; American schools might become racially segregated again. The second risk is less frequently mentioned. The political conflict which such a policy might generate here would almost inevitably be colored by racial suspicion and hatred. In France--a country with no recent history of structural pluralism--the conflict over the issue became so intense that it almost overwhelmed the political process. What would happen in the United States?

It seems, then, that because of the special characteristics of American pluralism, any program of private school aid would be risky in this country. An unregulated program would especially endanger the ability of American society to maintain the democratic values of equality and solidarity. It might also jeopardize educational efficiency. In short, Americans should search for other, less dangerous, ways to enhance educational freedom.

As they conduct that search, they should continue to study the private school aid policies of other nations. Because this issue is situated at the heart of several democratic conflicts, it has the power to raise significant educational questions of many types. This investigation yielded several findings which could not

readily be explained in terms of the analytical framework used here but which merit further study nonetheless.

Researchers who study the private school aid policies of other countries in the future should incorporate these issues into their original research designs.

First of all, it emerged from this study that in France public education is considered academically superior to private education. This perception is supported by its superior scores on national examinations. It is possible that this factor contributed to the success of the French private school aid program. Therefore, researchers in other nations should consider the relative academic status of private and public education. This finding raises interesting questions in relationship to the controversy over the relative merits of private and public schooling. Given the obvious organizational advantages of private schools, why do French public schools outperform them? Does French public education have some organizational advantages of its own? If so, what are they? Can such advantages be identified in other nations as well? If public education can provide academic advantages to students, then Americans need better to understand what those advantages are and how they relate to the private-public school controversy in the United States.

A second interesting finding merits further research. In France, the people who were most dissatisfied with the

policy were the teachers in both sectors. Some of the reasons for this dissatisfaction were clear. The neo-conservatives' emphasis on competition struck public school teachers as unfair. Their emphasis on maintaining private schools' distinctive character seemed to restrict the freedom of private school teachers. Thus, researchers who study other nations should explore the effects of private school subsidies on teacher morale and attitudes. They might also investigate the effects upon teacher recruitment and retention. Many Americans currently fear a teacher shortage; they are also concerned about the declining quality of the teaching force. If private school aid programs negatively affect teacher working conditions, we need to be clearly aware of that fact.

Finally, the French evidence suggested that solidarity is a more important value in France than it is in the United States. Hirschman (1970) argued that loyalty is a factor which can inhibit the operation of competition between organizations. Therefore, the strong belief of many French people that public schools enhance solidarity may have restricted their interest in private schools. If so, underlying cultural values also played a role in the success of the French policy. This is another aspect of the problem which should be explored in future comparative studies. Although freedom, equality, and solidarity are important values in all democratic societies, they may

differ in relative importance. These differences might have a great influence on a nation's ability simultaneously to aid private schools and maintain all three values. The impact of such ideological variations needs to be more clearly understood.

Thus, Americans would be wise to continue to study the private school aid programs of other nations. Such research would deepen Americans' understanding of the pluralist dilemma which is raised by the private school aid issue. It would also deepen Americans' understanding of how our own society both resembles and differs from the societies of other Western democracies. Such an understanding would greatly enrich the ongoing debate about subsidizing private schools. For ultimately, all democratic nations face the same pluralist dilemma. They must resolve the autonomy and control problem posed by private education in such a way that they simultaneously maintain the values of freedom, equality, solidarity, and efficiency. However, each democratic nation must solve the problem within the framework of its own constitution, laws, culture, and traditions. As a result, different countries will adopt different policies to achieve the same end. As Americans we must learn to understand our own unique circumstances. In the long run, only such understanding can enable us to deal effectively with the pluralist dilemma which private education poses.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography includes all works which were consulted during the preparation of the dissertation. Writings which the French interviewees recommended are indicated with an asterisk.

Anderson, David L. 1981. "Restrictions on Public Aid to Sectarian Schools." The Educational Forum 45: 215-244.

Anthony, Patricia. 1987. "Public Monies for Private Schools: The Supreme Court's Changing Approach." Journal of Education Finance 12: 592-605.

Apple, Michael W. 1982. "Education and Cultural Reproduction: A Critical Reassessment of Programs for Choice." In The Public School Monopoly, edited by Robert B. Everhart, 503-541. San Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research.

"Après la loi Debré" (After the Debré Act). 1960. Les Cahiers de la République 24: 97-100.

"Aspects démographiques et économiques du problème scolaire" (Demographic and economic aspects of the schools problem). 1960. L'Economie 742: 13-15.

Atkins, Beryl T., Alain Duval, Rosemary C. Milne, Pierre-Henri Cousin, Hélène M. A. Lewis, Lorna A. Sinclair, Renée O. Birks, and Marie-Noëlle Lamy. 1987. Collins-Robert French-English, English-French Dictionary. 2d ed. London: Collins.

Bailey, Stephen K. 1981. The U.S.-Australia Education Policy Project: Implications for American Educational Policy. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 225 268.

Ballion, Robert. 1977. L'Argent et l'école (Wealth and schooling). N.p.: Pernoud/Stock.

_____. 1980. "L'Enseignement privé, une 'école sur mesure'?" (Private education, a school 'made to measure'?). Revue Française de Sociologie 21: 203-231.

_____. 1982. Les Consommateurs d'école (Consumers of schooling). Paris: Editions Stock/Laurence Pernoud.

- Barral, Pierre. 1963. "Forces religieuses et problèmes scolaires" (Religious forces and school problems). In Forces religieuses et attitudes politiques dans la France contemporaine, edited by René Rémond, 211-234. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin.
- Beringer, Richard E. 1978. Historical Analysis: Contemporary Approaches to Clio's Craft. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Berland, Jean-Pierre. 1986. 15 ans pour réussir (15 years to succeed). Alleur, Belgium: Marabout.
- Bickel, Robert. 1986. "Achievement and Social Ascription: A Comparison of Public and Private High Schools." Youth & Society 18: 99-126.
- Bickel, Robert, and Martha Chang. 1985. "Public Schools, Private Schools, and the Common School Ideal." Urban Review 17: 75-97.
- Bouchareissas, Michel. 1984. "Plus que jamais la réponse est: Laïcité" (More than ever, the answer is: Non-sectarianism). Pouvoirs 30: 98-103.
- Boyd, William L. 1987. "Balancing Public and Private Schools: The Australian Experience and American Implications." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 9: 183-197.
- Boyd, William Lowe, and Charles Taylor Kerchner. 1987. "Introduction and Overview: Education and the Politics of Excellence and Choice." Journal of Educational Policy 2 (5): 1-11.
- Braddock, Jomills Henry. 1981. "The Issue Is Still Equality of Educational Opportunity." Harvard Educational Review 51: 490-496.
- Brown, Daniel J. 1982. "Financial Effects of Aid to Nonpublic Schools: The British Columbia Experience." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 4: 443-460.
- Bruce, Michael G. 1983. "Private Education and the Public Interest." Phi Delta Kappan 65: 221-222.
- Brunet, Gilbert. 1978. "A quelles écoles l'argent public?" (Which schools should receive public money?). Les Cahiers Rationalistes 338: 115-117.

- Bryk, Anthony S. 1981. "Disciplined Inquiry or Policy Argument?" Harvard Educational Review 51: 497-509.
- Butts, R. Freeman. 1978. Public Education in the United States. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- "Campagne d'agitation laïque" (Non-sectarians' agitation campaign). 1960. Etudes 304: 404-405.
- Caniou, Janine. 1982. "Les Fonctions sociales de l'enseignement privé" (The social functions of private education). L'Année Sociologique 30: 475-479.
- Capps, Kline, and Carl H. Esbeck. 1985. "The Use of Government Funding and Taxing Power to Regulate Religious Schools." Journal of Law & Education 14: 553-574.
- Catterall, James. 1984a. Education Vouchers. Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation.
- _____. 1984b. "Politics and Aid to Private Schools." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 6: 435-440.
- Chubb, John E., and Terry M. Moe. 1987. "No School Is an Island: Politics, Markets, and Education." Journal of Educational Policy 2 (5): 131-141.
- _____. 1986. Politics, Markets, and the Organization of Schools. N.p.: The Brookings Institution.
- Cocatre-Zilgien, André. 1977. "La liberté de l'enseignement est-elle en péril?" (Is educational freedom in danger?). Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l'Etranger 4-1977: 779-788.
- Cogniot, Georges. 1974a. "Défense de l'enseignement public" (Defense of public education). Les Cahiers Rationalistes 306: 197-198.
- _____. 1974b. Laïcité et réforme démocratique de l'enseignement (Non-sectarianism and the democratic reform of education). Paris: Editions Sociales.
- _____. 1974c. "Le Budget de l'Education nationale au Sénat" (The National Education Budget in the Senate). Les Cahiers Rationalistes 309: 332.

- Cohen, Carl. 1971. Democracy. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press.
- Coleman, James S., Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore. 1982. High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Coleman, James S., and Thomas Hoffer. 1987. Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Communities. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Coleman, James S., Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore. 1981. Public and Private Schools. Arlington, Va.: ERIC Document Reproduction Service.
- Comité National de l'Enseignement Catholique. 1977. L'Enseignement catholique face à l'avenir (Catholic education facing the future). Paris: le Centurion.
- Coons, John E., and Stephen D. Sugarman. 1978. Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Cooper, Bruce. 1984. "The Changing Demography of Private Schools: Trends and Implications." Education and Urban Society 16: 429-442.
- Coplin, William D., and Michael K. O'Leary. 1981. Basic Policy Studies Skills. Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Policy Studies Associates.
- Coq, Guy. 1984. "La deuxième école" (The second school). Esprit 90: 1-5.
- Coq, Guy, and Pierre Mayol. 1983. "La Paix scolaire est possible, si on la veut" (School peace is possible if we want it). Esprit 89: 118-122.
- Cornec, Jean, and Michel Bouchareissas. 1982. L'Heure laïque (The non-sectarian hour). Paris: Clancier-Guénaud.
- Coulter, Edwin M. 1984. Principles of Politics and Government. 2d ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
- Coutrot, Aline. 1963. "La Loi scolaire de décembre 1959" (The schools law of December 1959). Revue Française de Science Politique 13: 352-388. 3
- "Crédits de subvention à l'enseignement privé" (Subsidy funds for private education). 1973. Les Cahiers Rationalistes 299: 295.

- Crépu, Michel. 1984. "Une Affaire de famille: L'Ecole libre" (A family affair: Private education). Esprit 91-92: 135-136.
- Croissandeau, Jean-Michel. 1986. Le Guide du lycée (The high school guide). Paris: Seuil.
- _____. 1983. "Le Ministre et les malentendants" (The minister and the hard of hearing). Le Monde de l'Education 91: 9.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1982. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- _____. 1985. A Preface to Economic Democracy. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press.
- Decaunes, Luc. 1962. Réformes et projets de réforme de l'enseignement français de la Révolution à nos jours (Reforms and proposed reforms of French education from the Revolution to our time). Paris: Institut Pédagogique National.
- DeDainville, François. 1963. "L'Enseignement privé est-il en retard?" (Is private education behind?). Etudes 317: 289-312.
- "Défense laïque au Sénat" (Non-sectarian defense in the Senate). 1977. Les Cahiers Rationalistes 330: 175-176.
- Delvolvé, Pierre. 1985. "Le Conseil constitutionnel et la liberté de l'enseignement" (The Constitutional Council and educational freedom). Revue Française de Droit Administratif 1: 624-634.
- DeMauny, Michel. 1978. "'Francisque' Mitterrand et la réforme de l'enseignement" ('Francisque' Mitterrand and educational reform). Ecrits de Paris 376: 5-12.
- Dexter, Lewis Anthony. 1970. Elite and Specialized Interviewing. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press.
- Douence, Jean-Claude. 1985. "La Porte étroite: Reflexions sur la réforme du système éducatif français par la loi du 25 janvier 1985" (The needle's eye: Reflections on the reform of the French educational system by the Act of January 25, 1985). Revue Française de Droit Administratif 1: 604-623.

- Doyle, Denis P. 1981a. "A Din of Inequity: Private Schools Reconsidered." Teachers College Record 82: 661-673.
- _____. 1981b. "Public Funding and Private Schooling: The State of Descriptive and Analytic Research." In Private Schools and the Public Good, edited by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., 71-78. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Duchac, Rene. 1960. "Instruction religieuse et laïcité" (Religious instruction and non-sectarianism). Les Cahiers de la République 27: 96-102.
- Durkheim, Emile. 1902. De la division du travail social (On the division of labor in society). Paris: Felix Alcan.
- Ellul, Jacques. 1984. "Le Grand débat" (The great debate). Pouvoirs 30: 104-109.
- Erickson, Donald A. 1985. "Choice and Private Schools: Dynamics of Supply and Demand." In Private Education, edited by Daniel C. Levy, 82-109. New York: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 1982. "Disturbing Evidence about the 'One Best System.'" In The Public School Monopoly, edited by Robert B. Everhart, 393-422. San Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Favoreu, Louis. 1985. "La Reconnaissance par les lois de la République de la liberté de l'enseignement comme principe fondamental" (The recognition by the laws of the Republic of educational freedom as a basic principle). Revue Française de Droit Administratif 1: 597-603.
- Fisher, Donald. 1982. "Family Choice and Education: Privatizing a Public Good." In Family Choice in Schooling, edited by Michael E. Manley-Casimir, 199-205. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company.
- Fontaine, Nicole. 1978. La Liberté de l'enseignement: De la loi Debré à la loi Guermeur (Educational freedom: From the Debré Act to the Guermeur Act). Paris: UNAPEC.
- Foon, Anne E. 1988. "Nongovernment School Systems: Funding Policies and Their Implications." Comparative Education Review 32 (2): 197-212.

Fowler, Frances C. 1987. "The French Experience with Public Aid to Private Schools." Phi Delta Kappan 68: 356-359.

France. 1960. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets (Official journal of the French Republic: Laws and decrees). N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1964. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1965. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1970. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1971. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1975. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1977. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1978. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1981. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1985. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. N.p.: n.p.

France. National Assembly. 1959. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats Parlementaires: Assemblée Nationale (Official journal of the French Republic: Parliamentary debates: National Assembly). N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1971. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats Parlementaires: Assemblée Nationale. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1977. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats Parlementaires: Assemblée Nationale. N.p.: n.p.

_____. 1984. Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats Parlementaires: Assemblée Nationale. N.p.: n.p.

- France. National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies. 1959-1985. Annuaire Statistique de la France (Statistical yearbook of France). Paris: INSEE.
- Franceschi, Joseph. 1964. Les Groupes de pression dans la défense de l'enseignement public (Pressure groups in the defense of public education). Paris: Librairies Techniques.
- Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Furet, François, and Jacques Ozouf. 1982. Reading and Writing. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Furnivall, J.S. 1939. Netherlands India. Cambridge, U.K.: University Printing House.
- Gemello, John M., and Jack W. Osman. 1983. "The Choice for Public and Private Education: An Economist's View." In Public Dollars for Private Schools, edited by Thomas James and Henry M. Levin, 196-209. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Géminard, Lucien. 1983. Le Système scolaire: Le collège au centre des réformes (The school system: The middle school at the center of reforms). Paris: La Documentation Française.
- Giscard d'Estaing, Olivier. 1971. Education et civilisation: Pour une révolution libérale de l'enseignement (Education and civilization: For a neo-conservative educational revolution). Paris: Fayard.
- Glazer, Nathan. 1983. "The Future under Tuition Tax Credits." In Public Dollars for Private Schools, edited by Thomas James and Henry M. Levin, 87-100. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Goguel, François. 1966. "Religion et politique en France" (Religion and politics in France). Revue Française de la Science Politique 16: 1174-1180.
- Gohau, Gabriel. 1978. "La Laïcité n'est plus ce qu'elle était" (Non-sectarianism is not what it used to be.) Les Cahiers Rationalistes 338: 118-120.
- Goldman, Jeri J. 1984. "Church and State Relations in Education." The Educational Forum 48: 391-404.

- Goureaux, Guy, and Jacques Ricot. 1975. Autopsie de l'école catholique (Autopsy of the Catholic school). Paris: Les Editions du Cerf.
- Goureaux, Guy, Henri Lafay, and Lucienne Roul. 1968. Ecole catholique: Aliénation? (Catholic schools: Alienation?). Paris: Editions l'Epi.
- Guthrie, James W., and Julia Koppich. 1987. "Exploring the Political Economy of National Education Reform." Journal of Education Policy 2 (5): 25-47.
- Healey, Robert M. 1974. The French Achievement: Private School Aid: A Lesson for America. New York: Paulist Press.
- _____. 1970. "The Year of the Debre Law." Journal of Church and State 12 (2): 213-235.
- "Here They Come, Ready or Not." 1986. Education Week, 14 May 1986, special report, pp. 13-37.
- Heyns, Barbara L. 1981. "Policy Implications of the Public and Private School Debates." Harvard Educational Review 51: 519-528.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Hirschhoff, Mary-Michelle. 1985. "Public Policy toward Private Schools: A Focus on Parental Choice." In Private Education, edited by Daniel C. Levy, 33-56. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffman, Earl. 1974. "Milestones on the Road to Parochialism." NASSP Bulletin 58: 95-101.
- Hofstede, Geert. 1984. Culture's Consequences. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications.
- Hogwood, Brian W., and Lewis A. Gunn. 1984. Policy Analysis for the Real World. London: Oxford University Press.
- Hugues, Emile. 1960. "A propos de l'aide à l'enseignement privé" (On aid to private education). Revue Politique des Idées et des Institutions 49 (1): 20-23.
- Hunt, Thomas C. 1986. "The Supreme Court, Religion, and the Temper of the Times." Momentum 17 (2): 28-31.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 1987. "From Equity to Excellence: Political Context and Dynamics." Journal of Education Policy 2 (5): 49-65.

Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. See France. National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.

Interparliamentary Union. 1986. Parliaments of the World. New York: Facts on File Publications.

Isaak, Alan. 1987. An Introduction to Politics. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company.

James, Estelle. 1984. "Benefits and Costs of Privatized Services: Lessons from the Dutch Educational System." Comparative Education Review 28: 605-624.

_____. 1982a. Pre-conditions, Benefits, and Costs of Privatized Public Services: Lessons from the Dutch Educational System. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 238 178.

_____. 1982b. The Private Provision of Public Services: A Comparison of Sweden and Holland. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 238 179.

James, Thomas. 1983. "Questions about Educational Choice: An Argument from History." In Public Dollars for Private Schools, edited by Thomas James and Henry M. Levin, 55-70. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

James, Thomas, and Henry M. Levin. 1983. "Introduction." In Public Dollars for Private Schools, edited by Thomas James and Henry M. Levin, 3-13. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Jencks, Christopher. 1972. "Giving Parents Money for Schooling." In Education Vouchers, edited by James A. Mecklenburger and Richard W. Hostrop, 42-47. Homewood, Ill.: ETC Publications.

Jones, Thomas H. 1983. Private Schools and National Policy: A Comparative Study of Australia and the United States. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 239 351.

Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats Parlementaires: Assemblée Nationale. See France. National Assembly.

- Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets. See France.
- Jung, C. G. 1965. Memories, Dreams, Reflections. New York: Vintage Books.
- Kaestle, Carl F. 1983. Pillars of the Republic. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Kainz, Howard P. 1984. Democracy East and West: A Philosophical Overview. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Kerchner, Charles Taylor, and William Lowe Boyd. 1987. "What Doesn't Work: An Analysis of Market and Bureaucratic Failure in Schooling." Journal of Education Policy 2 (5): 99-115.
- Khalidi, Eddy. 1985. Vous avez dit liberté, ou les dessous de l'enseignement privé (You said, "Freedom," or the underside of private education). Paris: EP.*
- King, Richard A. 1982. Conceptual Issues in the Financing of Nonpublic Schools. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 218 769.
- Kuper, Leo. 1969. "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems." In Pluralism in Africa, edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, 7-26. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- La Législation relative à l'enseignement privé (Legislation relating to private education). 1985. Enseignement Catholique Documents 1092.
- La Tradition éducative des congrégations enseignantes (The educational tradition of the teaching congregations). 1988. Enseignement Catholique Documents 1345.*
- Labé, Yves-Marie. 1985. "Privé: La Rançon du succès" (Private education: The price of success). Le Monde de l'Education 119: 74-77.
- L'Année politique (The political year). 1959-1985. Paris: Editions du Grand Siècle.
- Latreille, André. 1962. "Ecole et églises" (School and churches). Etudes 313: 330-348.
- Lawton, Stephen B. 1986. "A Case Study of Choice in Education: Separate Schools in Ontario." Journal of Education Finance 12 (1): 36-48.

Le Blond, Jean-Marie. 1962. "Application de la loi scolaire" (Implementation of the schools law). Etudes 313: 110-112.

_____. 1960. "L'Ecole, l'église, et la nation" (The school, the church, and the nation). Etudes 307: 3-18.

Le Figaro (The barber). 16-31 December 1959; 9-17 April 1960; 5-12 March 1964; 8-15 April 1965; 20-27 December 1969; 10-17 July 1970; 4-11 September 1970; 14-20 December 1970; 23-20 April 1971; 1-7 June 1971; 6-14 September 1975; 14-21 May 1977; 23-30 June 1977; 1-7 July 1977; 21-27 November 1977; 3-10 March 1978; 25-31 October 1979; 6-13 March 1981; 6-13 May 1981; 3-10 September 1983; 23-29 September 1983; 1-31 May 1984; 1-30 June 1984; 1-17 July 1984; 5-11 October 1984; 16-23 December 1984; 17-27 January 1985.

Le Monde (The world). 17-31 December 1959; 10-18 April 1960; 6-13 March 1964; 9-16 April 1965; 20-27 December 1969; 11-17 July 1970; 4-11 September 1970; 14-20 December 1970; 23-30 April 1971; 1-6 June 1971; 6-14 September 1974; 15-21 May 1977; 23-30 June 1977; 1-7 July 1977; 3-10 March 1978; 24-31 October 1979; 3-10 March 1981; 5-12 May 1981; 4-11 September 1983; 1-31 May 1984; 1-30 June 1984; 5-11 October 1984; 18-24 December 1984; 17-27 January 1985; 9-15 July 1985; 8-15 November 1985.

Leclerc, Gérard. 1985. La Bataille de l'école (The battle over the school). Paris: Denoël.*

L'Ecole catholique demain (Catholic education tomorrow). 1969. N.p.: Librairie Hachette.

Legrès, Jean. 1977. "Avant les législatives" (Before the parliamentary elections). Etudes 354: 193-201.

"L'Enseignement en France en 1973" (Education in France in 1973). 1973. Sondages 344: 3-160.

Lerner, Daniel. 1956. "Interviewing Frenchmen." The American Journal of Sociology 62 (1): 187-194.

Levin, Henry M. 1983. "Educational Choice and the Pains of Democracy." In Public Dollars for Private Schools, edited by Thomas James and Henry M. Levin, 17-38. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Levy, Daniel C. 1985. "Private Choice and Public Policy in Non-profit Education." In Private Education, edited by Daniel C. Levy, 3-29. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, H.D. 1985. The French Education System. London: Croom Helm.
- Lois, réformes, et projets de réformes relatifs à l'enseignement (Laws, reforms, and proposed reforms relating to education). 1984. Enseignement Catholique Documents 1072.
- Lomax, Richard G. 1985. "A Structural Model of Public and Private Schools." Journal of Experimental Education 53: 216-226.
- Lutz, Frank, and Laurence Iannaccone. 1978. Public Participation in Local School Districts. Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company.
- Macias, Catholeene J., and Donald A. Erickson. 1981. School Leaders' Perceptions of the Consequences of Provincial Aid to Independent Schools in British Columbia. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 206 084.
- Majchrzak, Ann. 1984. Methods for Policy Research. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications.
- Mazrui, Ali A. 1969. "Pluralism and National Integration." In Pluralism in Africa, edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, 333-349. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- McCarthy, Martha M. 1985. "The Use of Public Funds for Private Education." Journal of Education Finance 11: 278-293.
- Méjan, François. 1960. "L'Etat et l'église catholique: Pour une solution concordataire d'ensemble" (The state and the Catholic Church: For a general concordat). La Revue Administrative 73: 115-125.
- Mermet, Gérard. 1985. Francoscopie: Les Français: Qui sont-ils? Ou vont-ils? (Francoscopy: The French: Who are they? Where are they going?) Paris: Librairie Larousse.
- Meury, André. 1981. "La Conversion du bastion breton" (The conversion of the Breton fortress). Le Monde de l'Education 70: 18-22.

- Montanet, Serge. 1969. "Tendances et tensions dans l'enseignement libre catholique" (Tendencies and tensions in private Catholic education). Etudes 330: 528-539.
- Muller, Carol Blue. 1983. "The Social and Political Consequences of Increased Public Support for Private Schools." In Public Dollars for Private Schools, edited by Thomas James and Henry M. Levin, 39-54. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Murnane, Richard J. 1984. "A Review Essay--Comparisons of Public and Private Schools: Lessons from the Uproar." The Journal of Human Relations 19 (2): 263-267.
- _____. 1985. "Comparisons of Private and Public Schools: The Critical Role of Regulations." In Private Education, edited by Daniel C. Levy, 138-152. New York: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 1981. "Evidence, Analysis, and Unanswered Questions." Harvard Educational Review 51: 483-489.
- Nielsen, Kai. 1985. Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, Publishers.
- Olivas, Michael A. 1981. "Information Inequities: A Fatal Flaw in Parochial Plans." In Private Schools and the Public Good, edited by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., 133-152. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Ornstein, Allan C. 1989. "Private and Public School Comparisons: Size, Organization, and Effectiveness." Education and Urban Society 21 (2): 192-206.
- Patton, Carl V., and David S. Sawicki. 1986. Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Plenel, Edwy, and André Meury. 1981. "A quoi sert l'école catholique?" (What good are Catholic schools?) Le Monde de l'Education 70: 10-16.

- Plouvin, Joël-Yves. 1979. "La Notion 'des principes fondamentaux de l'enseignement' au sens de l'article 34 de la constitution et la liberté de l'enseignement" (The concept of 'basic educational principles' in Article 34 of the constitution and educational freedom). Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l'Etranger 1-1979: 53-86.
- Prost, Antoine. 1968. Histoire de l'enseignement en France, 1800-1967 (A history of education in France, 1800-1967). Paris: Armand.
- Ravier, André. 1961. "L'Ecole confessionnelle est-elle ségrégative?" (Are religious schools segregationist?). Etudes 308: 387-392.
- Reich, Robert B. 1987. Tales of a New America. New York: Vintage Books.
- Rémond, René. 1978. "Consensus et querelle de l'école" (Consensus and the schools quarrel). Pouvoirs 5: 113-117.
- _____. 1965. "L'Anticléricalisme comme sentiment et force politique (Anticlericalism as an attitude and a political force). In Forces religieuses et attitudes politiques dans la France contemporaine, edited by René Rémond, 109-119. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin.
- _____. 1977. "L'Anticléricalisme n'est pas mort" (Anticlericalism is not dead). Projet 118: 905-916.
- Robert, Jacques. 1962. "La Loi Debré (31 décembre 1959) sur les rapports entre l'état et les établissements d'enseignement privé" (The Debré Act [December 31, 1959] on the relationships between the state and private schools.) Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l'Etranger 78 (2): 213-269.
- Ryan, Edmund G. 1962. "France Supports Catholic Schools." The Catholic Educational Review 60 (5): 163-173.
- "Sachez comment choisir une école privée" (Know how to choose a private school). 1983. Le Monde de l'Education 96: 25-27.
- Sainclair, Jean. (1965). "La Loi Debré après cinq ans" (The Debré Act after five years). Etudes 323: 772-778.

- Sanday, Peggy Reeves. 1976. "Cultural and Structural Pluralism in the United States." In Anthropology and the Public Interest, edited by Peggy Reeves Sanday, 53-73. New York: Academic Press.
- Saran, Rene. 1985. "The Use of Archives and Interviews in Research on Educational Policy." In Strategies of Educational Research: Qualitative Methods, edited by Robert C. Burgess, 207-241. London: The Falmer Press.
- Savary, Alain. 1985. En toute liberté (In all freedom). N.p.: Hachette. *
- Scalia, Antonin. 1981. "On Making It Look Easy by Doing It Wrong: A Critical View of the Justice Department." In Private Schools and the Public Good, edited by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., 173-185. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Sherman, Joel D. 1982. "Government Finance of Private Education in Australia: Implications for American Policy." Comparative Education Review 26 (3): 391-405.
- _____. 1983. "A New Perspective on Aid to Private Education: The Australian Experience." Phi Delta Kappan 64: 654-655.
- Smart, Don. 1986. The Hawke Labor Government and Public-Private School Funding Policies in Australia, 1983-1986. ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 271 890.
- Smith, M. G. 1969a. "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism." In Pluralism in Africa, edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, 27-65. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- _____. 1969b. "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism." In Pluralism in Africa, edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, 415-458. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Spring, Joel. 1982. "Dare Educators Build a New School System?" In Family Choice in Schooling, edited by Michael E. Manley-Casimir, 33-42. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company.
- _____. 1986. The American School, 1642-1985. New York: Longman.

- Tanguy, Lucie. 1972. "L'Etat et l'école: L'école privée en France" (The state and the school: Private education in France). Revue Française de la Sociologie 13: 325-375.
- Teese, Richard. 1986. "Private schools in France: Evolution of a System." Comparative Education Review 30 (2): 247-259.
- Theen, Rolf H. W., and Frank L. Wilson. 1986. Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Six Countries. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Thiessen, Elmer. 1982. "Religious Freedom and Educational Pluralism." In Family Choice in Schooling, edited by Michael E. Manley-Casimir, 57-70. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company.
- Trégaro, Louis. 1976. "Enseignement et liberté" (Education and freedom). Les Cahiers Rationalistes 321: 121-145.
- Tyack, David B. 1976. "Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling." Harvard Educational Review 46: 355-389.
- van den Berghe, Pierre L. 1969. "Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Explanation." In Pluralism in Africa, edited by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, 67-81. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- _____. 1965. South Africa: A Study in Conflict. Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.
- Vandermeersch, Edmond. 1983. "Enseignement catholique: L'Illusion du 'libre choix' (Catholic education: the illusion of 'free choice')." Le Monde de l'Education 91 46-47.
- _____. 1968. "La Loi scolaire" (The schools law). Etudes 328: 611-630.
- _____. 1981. "Un Siècle de combats pour l'égalité" (A century of struggle for equality). Le Monde de l'Education 70: 24-26.
- Vincent, Gérard. 1977. Les Français 1945-1975. Chronologie et structures d'une société (The French, 1945-1975. Chronology and structures of a society). Paris: Masson.

- Vitullo-Martin, Thomas, and Bruce Cooper. 1987. Separation of Church and Child. Indianapolis: The Hudson Institute.
- Webb, Eugene J., Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest. 1966. Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company.
- Weeres, Joseph G. 1987. "Economic Choice and the Dissolution of Community." Journal of Educational Policy 2 (5): 117-129.
- West, E. G. 1982a. "The Prospects for Education Vouchers: An Economic Analysis." In The Public School Monopoly, edited by Robert B. Everhart, 369-391. San Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research.
- _____. 1982b. "The Public Monopoly and the Seeds of Self-Destruction." In Family Choice in Schooling, edited by Michael E. Manley-Casimir, 185-198. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company.
- Whitty, Geoff. 1984. "The 'Privatization' of Education." Educational Leadership 41 (7): 51-54.
- Who's Who in France. Qui est qui en France. 1953/54-1985. Paris: J. Lafitte.
- Willms, J. Douglas. 1984. "School Effectiveness within the Public and Private Sectors: An Evaluation." Evaluation Review 8 (1): 223-135.
- Wilson, J. Donald, and Marvin Lazerson. 1982. "Historical and Constitutional Perspectives on Family Choice in Schooling: The Canadian Case." In Family Choice in Schooling, edited by Michael E. Manley-Casimir, 1-22. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company.
- Wise, Arthur E., and Linda Darling-Hammond. 1984. "Education by Voucher: Private Choice and the Public Interest." Educational Theory 34 (1): 29-53.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS, AGENCIES, AND LAWS WITH FRENCH NAMES

Bishops' Conference. Conférence Episcopale
Chevenement Act. Loi Chevènement
Clock Club. Club de l'Horloge
Commission of Laws. Commission des Lois
Common Platform. Programme commun
Constitutional Council. Conseil Constitutionnel
Council of Ministers. Conseil des Ministres
Debre Act. Loi Debré
Finance Act for 1985. Loi des Finances de 1985
Finance Ministry. Ministère des Finances
French Communist Party. Parti Communiste Français (PCF)
General Headquarters for Catholic Education.
Sécrétariat Général de l'Enseignement Catholique
(S.G.E.C.)
Guermeur Act. Loi Guermeur
Headquarters for Educational Freedom and the Defense
of Culture. Secrétariat pour la Liberté de
l'Enseignement et la Défense de la Culture
Jospin Bill. Projet de loi Jospin
Ministry of National Education. Ministère de
l'Education Nationale
National Assembly. Assemblée Nationale
National Committee for Catholic Education.
Comité National de l'Enseignement Catholique
(C.N.E.C.)

National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action.
Comité National de l'Action Laïque (CNAL)

National Education Federation. Fédération de
l'Education Nationale (FEN)

National Federation of Public School Parents'
Councils. Fédération Nationale des Conseils
de Parents d'Elèves des Ecoles Publiques
(F.C.P.E.)

National Front. Front National (FN)

National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques (INSEE)

National Union for Elementary and Middle School Teachers.
Syndicat National des Instituteurs et des
Professeurs de Collège (SNI-Pegc)

National Union of Private School Parents. Union Nationale
des Associations de Parents d'Elèves de
l'Enseignement Libre (UNAPEL)

Pompidou Act. Loi Pompidou

Private School Parents' Association. Association des
Parents d'Elèves de l'Enseignement Libre (APEL)

Rally for the Republic. Ralliement pour la République
(RPR)

Savary Bill. Projet de loi Savary

Socialist Party. Socialist Party (PS)

Union for French Democracy. Union de la Démocratie
Française (UDF)

United Left. Union des gauches

APPENDIX B

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS FROM WHOM REPRESENTATIVES WERE INTERVIEWED

Catholic Institute of Paris. (Institut Catholique de Paris)

A Catholic institution devoted to higher education and research

National Federation of Public School Parents' Councils.
(Fédération Nationale des Conseils de Parents d'Elèves des Ecoles Publiques--F.C.P.E.)

A major public education lobbying group

General Headquarters for Catholic Education. (Secrétariat Général de l'Enseignement Catholique--SGEC)

National administrative headquarters of the Catholic schools

National Center for Independents and Farmers. (Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans--CNI)

A conservative political party

National Committee for Non-Sectarian Action. (Comité National d'Action Laïque--CNAL)

The major lobbying group in the fight against subsidies for private schools

National Education Federation. (Fédération de l'Education Nationale--FEN)

A federation of more than 40 public school employees' organizations

National Front. (Front National--FN)

A political party of the extreme right

National Union for Secondary Education. (Syndicat
National des Enseignements de Second Degré--SNES)

The major public secondary school teachers' union

National Union for the Unification of the Public
Educational Service and for the Defense of Private
School Employees. (Syndicat National pour l'Unification
du Service Public d'Education et pour la Défense des
Personnels de l'Enseignement Privé--S.N.U.D.E.P.)

A private school teachers' union

National Union of Elementary and Middle School Teachers.
(Syndicat National des Instituteurs et des Professeurs
de Collège--SNI-Pegc)

The largest public school teachers' and principals'
union

National Union of Private School Parents' Associations.
(Union Nationale des Associations de Parents d'Elèves
de l'Enseignement Libre--UNAPEL)

A major private school lobbying group

National Union of Private School Principals. (Syndicat
National des Chefs d'Etablissements d'Enseignement
Libre--S.N.C.E.E.L.)

A private school principals' union

Socialist Party. (Parti Socialiste--PS)

The largest political party on the Left

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Opening questions

1. In your opinion, how have government subsidies of private education affected (private/public/no adjective) education in France?

D'après votre expérience le subventionnement de l'enseignement privé (libre) quels effets a-t-il produit sur l'école (privée/publique/aucun adjectif) en France?

[Ask first for effects on the sector which respondent knows best; probe after effects on the other sector. Use "libre" to modify "ecole" with Catholic representatives.]

2. What are the greatest advantages/disadvantages of aid to private education?

De votre point de vue quels ont été les plus grands (atouts/inconvénients) du subventionnement de l'école privée (libre) par l'Etat?

[Ask only if this has not emerged clearly in the response to Question 1.]

[If the following subjects are not dealt with in the answers to Questions 1 and/or 2, ask about them specifically.]

a. How have private school subsidies affected public school teachers?

Les subventionnements quels effets ont-ils produit sur les enseignants de l'école publique?

b. Between 1959 and 1984, private school enrollment in France remained quite stable. How do you explain this stability?

Entre 1959 et 1984 le pourcentage des enfants scolarisés dans l'école privée (libre) est resté très stable. Comment expliquez-vous cette stabilité?

c. Public opinion polls reveal that the large majority of the French population supports private school subsidies. How do you explain this high level of support?

Selon les sondages la grande plupart des Français est favorable au subventionnement de l'enseignement privé (libre). Comment expliquez-vous ce niveau de soutien?

d. Some Americans fear that government subsidies of private schools would cause them to become very similar to public schools. To what extent has this happened in France?

Certains Américains considèrent que le subventionnement de l'école privée (libre) par l'Etat la causerait de devenir très semblable à l'école publique. D'après vous, dans quelle mesure cela est-il arrivé en France?

e. Some Americans argue that competition from private schools would encourage public schools to improve. To what extent has competition from private schools had this effect on French public schools?

Certains Américains estiment que la concurrence avec l'enseignement privé (libre) aurait l'effet d'améliorer l'enseignement public. De votre point de vue, dans quelle mesure est-ce que la concurrence entre les deux écoles a amélioré l'enseignement public en France?

Closing question

If the National Assembly decided to amend the current private school aid legislation, what one aspect of the current legislation would it be most important for the National Assembly to modify? Why?

Sans doute à l'avenir l'Assemblée Nationale amendera la législation actuelle qui règle les subventions de l'enseignement privé (libre). A votre avis quel aspect de cette législation serait-il le plus important à amender?

APPENDIX D

EXPANDED NOTES FROM TWO INTERVIEWS

These expanded interview notes represent two basic types of interviews: an interview which was structured largely by the respondent (Interview 1) and one in which, for the most part, the interview guide was followed (Interview 2). Interview 1 is of a male who worked for a public school teachers' union; he was a former secondary teacher in the public schools. Interview 2 is of a female who represented a private school principals' union and was a former private school teacher and principal. These notes are reproduced exactly as they were expanded, with one notable exception: in the originals, all dialogue was rendered in French, and here the French has been translated into English.

Interview 1

Interviewer: Frances Fowler
Interviewee: 102

Date: May 19, 1989
Place: Paris, France

I arrived at union headquarters promptly at 9:57. Downstairs the receptionist was frantically taking phone calls at her desk and she lost her patience with one caller, explaining that she was just taking the place of people who were absent and that her job was hard because of "all the empty spaces in the house today." The reception room was simple, with huge piles of publications stacked around in the floor. She was nice enough to me and directed me to an elevator further toward the inside of the building. I took the elevator, pushing the button for the fourth floor. It stopped, however, on the second floor. I got out, walked back down the stairs and started up on foot, counting floors as I went. I went through the double doors on the fourth floor and told a secretary there whom I wanted to see. She ushered me into his office; he had not yet arrived.

The office was hot and stuffy, even at this early morning hour. It was a simple, barebones sort of office, furnished with a desk and desk chair, two additional upholstered chairs, and a long bookcase along one wall. The wall paper was beige and cream, textured. Hanging on the wall over the bookcases were several posters relating to Latin America; one was in support of Nicaragua. Some

were in French; others were in Spanish. A female figure, or doll, dressed in some kind of native dress, stood on the bookcase. Through an open door, ajar behind the desk, a room lined with shelves and crammed with what the French call documentation [printed matter] was visible.

The secretary was visibly apologetic about the fact that "Monsieur" was late. Finally, she came in at 10:10; "Monsieur" had just called from a phone booth. He was going around and around the square in search of a parking place. "Monsieur" finally arrived about 10:25, full of apologies. He had finally had to park in the vicinity of Les Invalides and walk back to the office.

"Monsieur" was tall and rangy, probably 40-45, with a huge, boyish shock of graying hair. He wore wire-rimmed glasses which he frequently removed during the conversation. He was casually dressed: slacks and a short-sleeved shirt. In personality he was open, talkative, intense, frequently laughing and smiling. Expansif [out-going] as he might put it.

I explained my own background and my research. Before I could even ask the first question, "Monsieur" launched into a discussion of current problems as he saw them.

He: Right now French education is in the process of carrying out an enormous reform.

I: Do you mean the re-evaluation [of teachers' ranks and salaries]?

He: No. Not at all! I'm talking about the fact that secondary education is becoming an education for the masses. Between now and the year 2000, 80% of every age group will reach the level of the baccalauréat. So an enormous building construction program is necessary. We need a new high school every week.

Now, at the moment, private education is beginning to worry about a building program. Private high schools have to be built--that is to say, in certain regions they want to construct new buildings. They need 700 new high schools if they are to maintain their position in secondary education. Of course, they want subsidies from the national government to help them reach this goal. My union strongly opposes it. As you know, the current legislation doesn't permit the national government to finance building programs. Well, private education is turning to the regional governments, and some of them have given private schools subsidies to build high schools.

According to us it's illegal; but as a matter of fact, the law is unclear on this point--and it needs to be clarified. We've told our locals that they must pay close attention to the regional governments. As soon as a regional government grants a subsidy, they are to notify us. We take them to court. There's a trial going on right now; two years ago this question was sent to our Supreme Court. But they don't want to reach a decision; we're still waiting. The regional governments are constructing buildings--they rent them out to private schools for just about nothing--little tricks like that. We take them to court right away!
(He laughs.)

I: Why does your union oppose the construction of new buildings?

He: At the secondary level the school should be a place of encounter for students from all kinds of racial, religious, ethnic, and social class backgrounds. According to us, the negative aspect of private education is that it separates young people, damaging national unity. France has always been a land of encounter, a "melting pot"; in France people from the North and the South encounter each other; people from Western and Eastern Europe meet; and in our day Europe and Africa meet here. Now, more than anything else, schools and sports unify the nation. If people go to school with blacks or Jews, if they play soccer with them, then later on when they are adults it will seem completely natural to work with blacks or with Jews or to live in the same neighborhood with them. Today it's more important than ever because of the new waves of immigration which France has received. If you permit young people to be separated, it could have a tragic effect on the nation, on national unity.

Now, we accept the teaching of religion and philosophy at the high school level. Why not? The high school is a place of encounter. Young people need to know about religions and philosophies. It is precisely in high school that they should encounter them.

A common education makes it possible to build a common nation. Let's take Lebanon as an example. In Lebanon there are seventeen religions, philosophies, and ideologies; there are also seventeen school systems. We know how things are going in Lebanon these days.

The role of a public service is to accept all young people.

I: Between 1959 and 1984 the percentage of children attending private schools has remained very stable. How do you explain this stability?

You must understand that there are several types of private education. There are two--no, three--major types. First of all, there is a private education which has religious--Catholic--roots, especially in certain regions. Since 1959 this type has lost ground considerably because people have left rural areas. The second type is elitist private education, a middle class education which is very important in certain big cities--in Lille, Lyon, Paris. Especially in Paris. This elitist type--like Stanislas College, for example--has remained stable at 2-3%. The third type attracts people who are dissatisfied with public education. It is intended for consumers of schooling. It has grown enormously in the last fifteen years, especially in big cities. Private education is the escape hatch when public education doesn't work. Lots of people move back and forth between the two systems. People judge schools on the basis of their productivity. In France we've seen private education turn into a market where everyone is looking for the best bargain. In 1984 the determining factor was the fact that private education catered to consumers and offered an escape hatch.

Now, if people find that public education is improving, they'll leave these private schools that cater to consumers.

I: Some Americans believe that competition with private education would improve public education. To what extent has competition between the two systems improved public education in France?

You can't ask the question in those terms--in terms of improvement. I would say the reverse, in fact. Certainly, in heavily Catholic areas you can't talk in terms of an improvement of public education.

Really, with these schools that cater to consumers, the reverse happens. (He laughs.) In the competition which develops, you have to show families that you're the best; you have to give good grades to the students or promote all the children to the next grade. Public schools feel pressured to do it, too. And so it goes. So what you see is a lowering of the quality of education.

(He shows me grades at the ninth grade level--the regions with high proportions of private schools have much higher grades than the national average--both in private

and public education. For example, nationally 55% pass-- but in Brittany 81% do.)

Such a situation causes people to stop taking education seriously; it turns schools into a bargain market. The grading system totally loses credibility. (He laughs.) It's really the reverse that happens.

I: Probably in the future the National Assembly will amend the current legislation which regulates the subsidies for private education. In your opinion, which aspect of the legislation would it be most important to change? Why?

First of all, as I've already explained to you, there is the whole issue of school construction.

Second, we need more equality between public and private school teachers. Really, private school employees lack freedom. They have terrible problems in their schools. They need to have tenure.

Finally, there's the problem of lump-sum payments for underprivileged children. They should pay higher amounts in areas where there are underprivileged children. You understand that public schools must accept all children and offer education in every part of the country. Let's take Lozere as an example. They give private schools a lump-sum payment for each student equal to the average cost of a public school student. Now, in Lozere private schools are mostly in the cities; but there are also mountains in Lozere and lots of little villages that it's hard to get to. The government has the obligation to offer education to these children. Often, because of geography, the elementary, middle, and high schools are really small. Obviously that costs more money; from a financial point of view these little schools are less efficient. Inequalities develop between the little public schools and the big private ones. It isn't fair.

Basically, public education has to become better in order to make private education collapse. So we need more money for public schools. When you compare students of equal ability, private schools don't yield equal quality. The basic issue is that public education needs to respond to the needs of the population.

Length: One hour

Expansion completed: May 20, during the morning
Large amount of printed supplements to add.

While running off copies, he spoke of how differently different countries are meeting the economic crisis and of responses such as fundamentalism, religiosity, nationalism. He is quite concerned about the U.S.A., mentioning abortion and creationism, ("I just can't understand it.") In his opinion the poor academic results in the U.S. result from the fact that: "Seen from the outside, Americans have never faced up to the problem of social class. Of course, there are inequalities in France. But one of the advantages of a centralized system is that you can deal with inequalities and problems of social class more effectively."

Attachments:

1. Berguin, Francis. (1986). Le Point sur le Financement public des établissements privés d'enseignement après l'arrêt du Conseil d'Etat du 19 mars 1986. [Update on the financing of private schools after the March 19, announcement of the State Council].
2. Letter from him to the president of the Complaints Section.
3. Letter from him to Lionel Jospin.
4. Financial and accounting regulations.
5. Financing of investments in private schools.
6. Letter from Jacques Vrain to the Administrative Court of Orléans.
7. Functioning of the Civil Service.
8. "Construction of Private Schools."

Interview 2

Interviewer: Frances Fowler
Interviewee: 115

Date: June 1, 1989
Place: Paris, France

I arrived a little late--I had warned her that I might--and I had to wait on her for a few minutes in an outer office where two secretaries were working, and the hum of a copying machine filled the air. On the wall in the outer office hung a sign, urging visitors not to smoke. Opposite it, on another wall, hung an anti-smoking poster which proclaimed that smoking not only endangers one's health but also causes wrinkles and LESSENS ONE'S SEX DRIVE. (!) I was reading this poster when the interviewee came out to greet me.

She was a tall, slender brunette, probably in her mid-fifties. She was wearing a navy blue suit with gold, somewhat military, decorations on the shoulders and a yellow blouse. She wore glasses. During the interview she sat behind her desk, but she suggested that I move my chair up so that I could write on her desk.

Behind her desk, on the wall, was a sign, similar to Paris street signs, saying "Freedom Street."

I: Based on your experience with subsidies for private education, what effects have they had on private education?

She: Well, I've been in education for 25 or 27 years; I'm familiar with the whole history. I'll have to think for a few moments. (She takes a sheet of paper and for 3 or 4 minutes makes notes on it.)

Well, the first effect was certainly that the subsidies permitted us to survive. They guaranteed our survival--that's the most important effect. We were experiencing enormous financial difficulties at that time, because of the great increase in the birth rate and because the period of compulsory schooling had been extended. Without the subsidies private schools would have disappeared except for a few schools for rich people. In 1959-1960 we enrolled 25% of French children; in 1989 we enroll only 17%. So, even with the subsidies, we have decreased in relative size.

In the second place, even under the contracts of association put in place by the Debré Act, but especially since the passage of the 1985 laws, we have experienced great limitations on our freedom. We have to live with

many administrative restrictions, and they increase continually--every year, every decade. The subsidies placed other limitations on us as well. For example, we have to follow the curriculum and schedules of public education; in my opinion, that's actually a good thing. Moreover, they required our teachers to obtain the same credentials that public school teachers have; I consider that, too to be a plus. Since the Chevènement Act the restrictions have become worse. It's hard for us--I'm referring to the principals--to start new classes or to try new approaches to teaching. This problem began with the Guermeur Act, which was a very political law, designed to help win an election--they didn't even consult us about it--but they borrowed our slogan, "Parity." But they changed the meaning of it; we had interpreted the slogan as meaning "parity for teachers." They changed it, and it became "parity between public and private education." Things got terribly out of hand--all we wanted were the same benefits for our teachers that the teachers in public schools have.

I'll give you an example of our problems. A principal wanted to start a bilingual sixth grade in his middle school. A bilingual class is an experimental class, so you have to get the rector's permission. He asked for it; and what do you know, the rector refused. We wage this war every day. Recently we had a conference and used the following slogan: "Let's refuse administrative assimilation."

Thirdly, we have experienced a certain coming together of the two systems since we started receiving the subsidies. We no longer war against each other, or not much, and I consider this development quite positive. Because we've come closer together, the Minister is acquainted with our schools, and there is a beneficial relationship. The Jospin Act borrowed a lot from private schools. To sum it all up, we no longer work in a marginal situation.

A fourth effect has been rather negative. Under the contracts of association, the attitudes of our teachers have changed a lot. More and more they're like public school teachers. They're less dedicated than they were before the Debré Act.

A very positive effect has been the improvement of the quality of our instruction. Our teachers were under-qualified; they didn't have the certificates that public school teachers have. For years during the 1960s we struggled to reach their level of excellence. After 1967 we could no longer hire unqualified teachers. It was an

enormously difficult task, but I'm happy about it. You understand, in the affective domain our schools have always been superior to public ones, which claim that they offer nothing but instruction in cognitive areas. At the beginning, the Ministry was called "Public Instruction." But our level of instruction in cognitive areas was inferior--I'm a graduate of the public system! Therefore, I consider this effect a very positive one.

Finally, the most difficult aspect of the situation for us is the financial restrictions of the current law. We can't expand; we are frozen. There is enormous demand on the part of families, but we have to turn students down. We've lost the possibility of increasing our proportion of the total educational system in France because the government determines the number of teaching positions at the national level. I fear for the future.

I: Some Americans believe that government subsidies for private education would cause private schools to become very like public ones. In you opinion, to what extent has this happened in France?

She: (She hesitates.) I'm trying to analyze the question thoroughly. (She hesitates a little longer.) Public school principals are quite different from private school ones. The strong spiritual and moral traditions of our schools as well as the principals' motivations cause public and private schools to have different atmospheres.

It seems to me that the conditions which maintain this difference are the following: the building administrator must have a strong personality. In addition, the supervisors who are responsible for school climate must always be vigilant. Finally, all administrators must be carefully prepared. If you don't want to lose your soul.

I: Who are these "supervisors"?

She: I'm thinking of administrators at the diocesan level or of religious orders. Therefore, in order to maintain our unique qualities, our distinctive character, we must have those resources. If we do not, there is certainly a danger.

Since we're trying to help another country, I must add something else. What helps us maintain our distinctive character is the fact that although teachers are paid by the government, principals are not. Neither principals nor other administrators. It seems important to me not to place management under government supervision.

I: According to opinion polls the large majority of French people favor subsidizing private education. How do you explain this level of support?

She: (She writes some more on her sheet of paper. She has listed four points with a comment off to the side.)

I don't know in what order I'll mention them. (She hesitates.) First of all, the French kind of rebelled against the idea that they were attacking a freedom. We are a very freedom-loving people. Besides, we don't like monopolies; we detest them in France, especially in a private matter like choosing a school for your children. Free choice in education isn't in our constitution; and France delayed signing the European Declaration of Human Rights because of the section on educational freedom.

Secondly, quite honestly, private schools represent a recourse for children who are having problems in the public school system. There is a lot of coming and going between the two systems. Sometimes the counseling of children [into specific courses of study] in the public schools is--I don't want to say "arbitrary," but "very rigorous"; they don't think of the child as an individual. Counseling a child at the age of twelve; that is, after all, too early. A young person changes a lot after the age of twelve; he is still developing. So private education offers a recourse when people encounter poorly thought out counseling.

In the third place, the good climate of our schools is well known. Also, some parents want religious education for their children. They are a minority, but they play an important role in the school.

Finally, there is the area of school work. In our schools we give personal attention to our students; we keep up with their progress.

I: From your point of view what are the major disadvantages of government subsidies for private education?

She: There are three: administrative restrictions, the effects on teachers, and restrictive funding.

I: Some Americans think that competition with private education would improve public education. In your opinion, to what extent has competition between the two schools improved public education in France?

(She smiles.) It's hard to say. You know, in France the Ministry of National Education is quite large; it's

one of the biggest organizations in the world. I don't have any way to evaluate the question. But, trying to be cautious, I would say that since 1984 public education has felt the shock of public opinion. So people in the public schools have done a lot of soul searching. . . .Could you repeat the question?

(I repeat it.)

Well, it hasn't improved yet, and I don't know if it's going to. But in this area, too, competition is necessary. A monopoly is the worst thing. Before 1984 the public schools didn't know that there was a competition. In 1984, the scales fell from their eyes. In my opinion I'll have to wait ten years to answer that question. The Jospin Act contains some of our basic ideas--you must read it. In it you find "the educational community," "the educational project," contracts with students. But is it possible to create such things with a law? It's people who have to do it. Well, we'll see.

I: Probably the National assembly will amend the current legislation which regulates the subsidies to private schools at some point in the future. In you opinion, what aspect of this legislation would it be most important to amend?

She: Certainly we must do something about restrictive funding. It works against the concept of a recognized educational need. There is a contradiction between the two; if I were a principal right now, I would take it to court. A finance law should not be contrary to a basic law.

We talked for several minutes afterwards; she took me for a proponent of aid. I explained some of the problems. She requested a summary of my conclusions in French and my address. Then she asked me where in the South I came from--"If that's not an indiscreet question." I told her, and then she said to me: " You know, we French people have a special tenderness for the Southern part of the United States." (!)

Length of interview: One hour ten minutes=70 minutes
Written up the next day

APPENDIX E

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL AID LEGISLATION

Date _____

Contract _____

FUNDING MECHANISMS

Types of Aid Offered

Answer yes or no.

_____ Direct transfer payments to institutions

_____ Transfer payments to institutions on students' behalf

_____ Direct benefits to students (vouchers, etc.)

_____ Indirect transfer payments (tax credits, etc.)

_____ Low interest loans

_____ Other (Specify.)

Comments:

Expenses Paid by Government

Answer yes or no.

_____ Teacher salaries

_____ Teacher benefits

_____ Teacher training costs

_____ Teacher inservice

_____ Operating costs

_____ Capital costs

_____ Textbooks

_____ Materials, supplies
_____ Transportation
_____ Food services
_____ Other (Specify.)

Comments:

Other Issues

Are the funding levels of the two sectors linked?

If so, in what way(s)?

Can teachers' salaries, if paid by the government, be supplemented by private schools? _____

If so, to what extent?

REGULATIONS

Regulation of Supply

1. Under what conditions can new private schools qualify for aid?
2. Under what conditions can existing private schools expand?
3. Under what conditions can existing private schools establish new courses of study?

4. Is the geographic placement of new private schools controlled? _____
If so, how?
5. Who decides how many private school teachers will be trained?

Comments:

Regulation of Quality

Answer yes or no.

- _____ Teacher credential requirements
- _____ Class size standards
- _____ Curriculum prescribed
- _____ External examination requirements
- _____ Government inspection of instruction
- _____ Other (Specify):

Comments:

Regulation of Student Access

Answer yes or no.

- _____ Racial/ethnic/linguistic selection permitted
- _____ Academic ability requirements permitted
- _____ Single sex schools permitted
- _____ Exclusion of handicapped students permitted

_____Expulsion of disruptive children permitted
_____Religious affiliation requirements permitted
_____Mandatory religious instruction permitted
_____Mandatory religious practices permitted
_____Tuition charges permitted
_____Fees permitted
_____Parent information requirements
_____Student transportation requirements

Comments:

Regulation of Personnel

Answer yes or no.

_____Teacher hours regulated
_____Teacher working conditions regulated
_____Religious criteria for hiring permitted
_____Life-style criteria for hiring permitted
_____Teacher tenure offered
_____Teacher protection (other than tenure) against
arbitrary dismissal
_____Teacher unionization permitted
_____Other (Specify):

Who hires private school teachers?_____

Who evaluates private school teachers?_____

Comments:

Financial Accountability

Describe how private schools account to the government for their use of funds:

APPENDIX F

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CITATIONS

CNEC	Comité National de l'Enseignement Catholique
INSEE	Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
<u>J.O.A.N.D.</u>	<u>Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats Parlementaires: Assemblée Nationale</u>
<u>J.O.: L.D.</u>	<u>Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets</u>
<u>L'A.P.</u>	<u>L'Année politique</u>
<u>L.F.</u>	<u>Le Figaro</u>
<u>L.M.</u>	<u>Le Monde</u>

VITA

Frances Cate Fowler was born in Jacksonville, Florida on July 16, 1941. She attended elementary schools in Atlanta, Georgia and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. She attended high schools in Milwaukee and in Buffalo, New York. In 1959 she graduated from Bennett High School in Buffalo. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree in English from Cornell University in 1963. The following year she was awarded a Master of Arts degree in English by the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. In 1967 she received the Diplôme Supérieur d'Etudes Françaises Modernes from the Alliance Française in Paris, France.

After teaching English at the college level for five years, Ms. Fowler taught in the public schools of Tennessee for fifteen years. During that time, she was active in the Anderson County Education Association, serving as president in 1983-1984. She served on the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Education Association from 1984 to 1987. In 1986 she began a doctoral program at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. She was awarded the Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in Administrative Theory and Practice in May 1990.

In the fall of 1990 Ms. Fowler will be employed as an Assistant Professor at Miami University of Ohio.