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To the Committee on Graduate Study:

I am submitting to you a thesis written by Irene McCall entitled "The British Mandate in Palestine." I recommend that it be accepted for nine quarter hours credit in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

Major Professor

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and recommend its acceptance:

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THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE

A THESIS

Submitted to
The Committee on Graduate Study
of
The University of Tennessee
in
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for the degree of
Master of Arts

by

Irene McCall

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PREFACE

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the disposal of the colonies and dependent territories which formerly belonged to the Central Powers was a matter of some importance. After much discussion, the idea of creating mandates was promulgated and Article 22 of the League Covenant provided for the establishment of the mandate system.

Because of the promises which she had made the people of the country, and because of its strategic location in regard to important parts of the British Empire, England was granted the mandate of Palestine - that small country which contains shrines sacred to three of the main religions of the world. As a result, for over two decades the two principal races of Palestine, the Jews and the Arabs, have been trying to force England to carry out her conflicting promises which were made to them when she was in need of their help. This force was at times applied through words at diplomatic conferences and at other times through bloodshed.

England, in trying to appease the people, offered them various constitutions and forms of government. All of these were rejected by one of the two factions or often by both. Each race wanted to rule the land which it claimed as its own.

This paper attempts to trace the development in this country since it was made a British mandate and to present all sides of the problem in such a way as to enable the reader to gain a fair, accurate idea of the events which have taken place. As to which race has the better right in the country, I cannot attempt to say, but must leave that to the individual reader.

I wish to thank Dr. Ruth Stephens, of the History Department of the University of Tennessee, for her interest in the preparation of this thesis and for her kind suggestions and criticisms. Also, I am indebted to Dr. S. J. Folmsbee and Dr. J. W. Hoffmann, of the University of Tennessee, for their reading of the manuscript.

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CHAPTER I


CONFLICTING PROMISES

The small country east of the Mediterranean, which is sacred alike to Jew, Mohammedan, and Christian, received its name, Palestine, from the strangers or immigrants who inhabited the southern coast, the Philistines. A more fitting name for this country whose control passed from one powerful nation to another would have been difficult to find, for surely Palestine has, through the ages, been the "land of the sojourners," which is the meaning of the term translated from the Hebrew. From all outward appearances today there is little in this land that would warrant the fighting of battles in order to gain control, but there is evidence enough that these hills which now are dry and barren were in the earlier days wooded and productive:

a good land, a land of brooks of waters, of fountains and depths that spring out of the valleys and hills; a land of wheat, and barley, and vines, and fig trees, and pomegranates; a land of olive trees and honey - a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills thou mayest dig brass. 1

From the very beginning there was conflict in the country - one nation striving for supremacy over the others.

1. Holy Bible, Deuteronomy, VIII, 7-9.



THE BIBLICAL KINGDOM OF DAVID

When, according to the Bible record, the Israelites were first sent to conquer this "Promised Land," they were instructed to possess it and

. . . cast out many nations before thee, the Hittites, and the Girgashites, and the Amorites, and the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations greater and mightier than thou. 2

It became afterwards the land of Israel; but when judgment fell upon the Hebrews for their sins (according to the Bible), they were removed, and there was at different times a large influx of foreign population. Even in the time of Christ, the inhabitants of Palestine were of a mixed character; and in later ages additional foreign elements have been added.

The most influential people who conquered this territory after the first century were the Arabs, who began their expansion in the latter part of the second century.³ By the third century they had penetrated into the regions bordering the Mediterranean coast, and in less than three generations the people of Syria, and especially of the territory now known as Palestine and Transjordan, had been absorbed by the Arab stock and to a large extent had adopted their language and manners.⁴ This dominance by the

2. Ibid., VII, 1.

3. Harry Emerson Fosdick, A Pilgrimage to Palestine (New York, Macmillan Company, 1927), Introduction, p. vi.

4. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939), pp. 15-17.


Arabs lasted until the beginning of the sixteenth century⁵ when the Turks marched into the country and gained control of the largest portion of the territory under the Arabian rule and thus laid the foundations for the Ottoman Empire, which included the Near East until it was crushed by the Allied Powers in the Great War, 1914-1918.⁶

When, on November 5, 1914, the Allies declared war against the Ottoman Empire and the Allied warships blockaded the coast of Syria and Palestine, England realized at once the necessity for making an agreement with the Arabs in these countries and for trying to win them away from their allegiance to the Turks. Consequently, during the year 1915 negotiations were carried on between the British High Commissioner in Egypt and Sherif Hussein of Mecca. It was the object of the British to crystallize the dissatisfaction which the Arabs had with the Turkish rule; it was the object of Hussein to gain the support of a powerful European nation which would enable him to arouse the Arabs and cause them to declare their independence from Turkey and establish once again an Empire which would include all of the Arab lands.⁷

5. Fosdick, op. cit., Introduction, p. vi.

6. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

7. United States Department of State, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Mandate for Palestine (Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office, 1927), p. 5.



THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD

The shaded portion represents the area of Arab independence as defined in the Sharif Hussein's note of July 14, 1915

The conditions on which the Arabs were willing to stage a revolt and thus aid the Allies were set forth in what is known as the Damascus Protocol and were sent to Sir Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, July 14, 1915. The main provisions were as follows:

1. Great Britain recognizes the independence of the Arab countries which are bounded on the north, by line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37 degrees north and thence along the line Berejik-Urfa-Mardin-Mediat-Gazirat (ibn' Umar)-Amadia to the frontier down to the Persian Gulf; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden whose status will remain as at present); on the west, by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

2. The Sharifian Arab government undertakes, other things being equal, to grant Great Britain preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries.

3. With a view to insuring the stability of Arab independence and the efficacy of the promised preference in economic enterprises, the two contracting parties undertake, in the event of any foreign state attacking either of them, to come to each other's assistance with all the resources of their military and naval forces; it being understood that peace will be concluded only when both parties concur. 8

McMahon's reply was very evasive and indefinite, and he refused to discuss the question of boundaries because the matter seemed to be "premature and a waste of time."⁹

Britain had not yet realized the importance of immediate action and thus played for time until she learned more about

8. Antonius, op. cit., Appendix A, note 1, pp. 414-415.

9. Ibid., note 2, pp. 415-416.

the opinion of the Arabs concerning a revolt to aid the British. This delay was not to be overlooked by the Sherif and his note was immediately dispatched. He made it clear that further negotiations between the two countries depended entirely upon whether the proposed frontiers were rejected or accepted. He said he was not speaking for himself, but was presenting the demands of the Arab people, who considered the boundary settlement a matter so vital that it was the "very substance and essence of our existence," since the future of the country depended upon the definite settlements which might be made before the revolt.¹⁰

On October 24, 1915, McMahon sent Hussein the note which was to become the basis for the later Arab demands for independence. It contained the pledges which caused the Arabs to join their forces with those of the Allies in the war against the Turks. Because the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and portions of Syria which were to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo were not inhabited entirely by Arabs, they were to be excluded from the territory which was to gain independence. The communication then went on to outline the provisions to which England was willing to agree.¹¹

As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to her ally France, I am authorized

10. Ibid., note 3, pp. 416-418.

11. Ibid., note 4, pp. 419-420.

to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note:

1. That subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.

2. That Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression, and will recognize the obligation of preserving them from aggression.

3. That when circumstances permit, Great Britain will help the Arabs with her advice and assist them in the establishment of governments to suit those diverse regions.

It will be noticed at once that Palestine was not mentioned as being part of that territory which would not gain its independence. There was no question at the time about the position of that country as everyone believed it to be included in the agreement to grant political freedom to the
12
Arabs.

The Sherif, as is indicated in the correspondence which followed, was not willing to accept wholeheartedly these propositions put forth by McMahon, but because of the pressing need for immediate action he decided to rely on the British government in which he had every confidence and postponed the matter of a definite settlement. He did so, however, only after he had received the full guarantee that the British would not make a separate peace and thus leave

12. Ibid., pp. 179-180.

the Arabs to face the Germans and Turks without adequate support.¹³

On June 5, 1916, the Arabs began their revolt and, although it developed slowly at first, it soon gained momentum, and the main British advance, aided by the Arab forces, began in October, 1917.¹⁴ On December 9 of the same year, Jerusalem fell into the hands of the British and when the new year began they had gained most of the territory that was included in the Sanjak of Jerusalem.¹⁵ The southern part of Palestine, west of the Dead Sea, was occupied by February, 1918, and by the end of October the northern part of Palestine and the rest of Syria was under the control of the British military forces.¹⁶

Thus the Arabs, relying on the British pledge of independence, had backed the English in their struggle to destroy the Ottoman Empire, which had become a threat to them in the Mediterranean and in the Near East.

England, in the meantime, had been carrying on secret negotiations with the French. Already she was beginning to try to play two hands at once. When the French realized that the Arabs were going to revolt in favor of the British, they immediately began to press their interests in Syria. France knew that the Arabs were not friendly toward

13. Ibid., note 6, pp. 423-424.

14. Ibid., p. 184.

15. Ibid., p. 229.

16. Ibid., pp. 233-239.

her and that if she were going to gain the position which she wanted, it was necessary that she have England behind her in everything she did.¹⁷ The British were in a hazardous position, because it was necessary that they respect the promises made to the Arabs but they also had to maintain the friendly relationship with their European allies. Then, too, they had to be cautious about placing Palestine, the Holy Land, under the absolute rule of the Arabs, for this would arouse the anger of the Jew and the Christian the world over. England was compelled to make an agreement with France, regardless of the apparent danger, and Sir Mark Sykes, a British scholar who had traveled extensively in the Ottoman Empire, was appointed to meet with M. Georges Picot, who had been consul-general in Bairut in the years preceding the war, to formulate the terms of the treaty. They drew up the Sykes-Picot agreement.¹⁸ It laid down the claims of each country in the Near East and provided for

an international administration of which the form shall be determined after consultation with Russia and later in agreement with the other Allies and with representatives of the Sherif of Mecca. 19

In each sphere of influence claimed by the separate powers the government which should be established was to lead to Arab sovereignty. The Arabs were not willing to accept the

17. H.W.V. Temperly, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London, Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), Vol. VI, pp. 14-15.

18. Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (New York, Doubleday, Page & Company, 1929), Vol. I, p. 67.

19. Temperly, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 16.

agreement because, although it did promise a government by the Arabs, it divided the Arabian territory and put the people under the control of two separate nations, one of which, France, was totally despised by the majority of the Arab people.²⁰

So the matter was not as simple as it might seem, and there was still another people who wished to have a voice in the future settlement of the country. Ever since the Hebrews had been dispelled from their native land when it was conquered by Titus the Roman in 70 A.D. with a final destruction of the kingdom in 135 A.D., they had harbored the idea of return and were ever watchful for such an opportunity. Napoleon I, in his attempt to reach India through Asia, had urged the Jews to join his army with the promise that he would aid their return after he had conquered the country.²¹ In 1840, when the anti-Jewish riots occurred in Damascus, England intervened on behalf of the Jews, and Disraeli, the Prime Minister of England, said that his ideal ambition was to lead the Jews back to their homeland and away from oppression and misery.²²

In 1873 a small band of Jews migrated to Palestine and bought a small tract of land seven miles from Jaffa and

20. Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 18.

21. Norman Bentwich, England in Palestine (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, 1932), p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. 5.

attempted to establish a Jewish colony. Due to the hostility of the local people and the diseases which spread among them, the colonists abandoned their settlement and moved to Jerusalem.²³ A few years later another attempt to settle a Jewish community was made at Petach Tikvah but was about to fail when Baron Edmund de Rothschild of Paris took over the settlement and built up a thriving colony there and began to establish others. The Jews who came to the country at this time did so almost entirely because of their devotion to the land of their ancestors and because of a determination to free themselves from the Western civilization and to return to their Eastern customs.²⁴

Modern Zionism began in 1880 after the persecutions which the Eastern European countries began to inflict upon the Jews.²⁵ It was first formally promulgated in 1897 at the first Zionist World congress held at Basle, Switzerland. Here the Zionists stated their intention to be the creation of a home in Palestine for the Jewish people which would be secure and would be recognized by all the people of the world.²⁶

At the outbreak of the First World War the Zionist leaders realized their opportunity and began to present

23. R. N. Salaman, "Prospects of Jewish Colonization in Palestine," Contemporary Review, 117: 666, May, 1920.

24. Ibid., p. 667.

25. U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 7.

26. Salaman, op. cit., p. 667.

their cause to the British government. It was not, however, until the Lloyd George ministry was inaugurated two years later that an official delegate of the government met with the Zionist leaders to open negotiations.²⁷ Although England was in no position to endorse the Jewish program because of the agreement made with the Sherif in 1915 and her secret treaties with the Allied Powers regarding the future of the Near East, she nevertheless appointed Sir Mark Sykes²⁸ to meet with the Jews and formulate an agreement. There were two principal motives which prompted England to this action.²⁹ One was the fact that she wanted to win the support of the Zionists in Germany and Austria who were trying to get those countries to endorse their plan; the other was that she saw the necessity of gaining control over Palestine, which was a vital link in her overland route from Egypt to India. Should the Central Powers gain control over the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, England's position at the Suez Canal would be threatened. Consequently, at the conference held with the Zionists on February 7, 1917,³⁰ England promised to help the Zionists in their attempt to establish a National Home in Palestine if they in turn would back England in the establishment of a British protectorate in

27. Antonius, op. cit., p. 259.

28. Temperly, op. cit., pp. 13-16.

29. Antonius, op. cit., p. 261.

30. Ibid., p. 263.

the same territory. On November 2, 1917, Mr. Balfour made his famous declaration from which came the Palestine of to-
 31 day. It was as follows:

His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. 32

There immediately arose a great protest from the Arabs and also from the non-Zionist Jews, who were not in favor of establishing a nationalistic state in the Arab land. The non-Zionist Jews were in favor of a "cultural Zionism" with the aim of giving the Jews a place to go to develop themselves individually and not a "political Zionism" which
 33 would give the Jews special political privileges. There was also a difference of opinion among the members of the British cabinet as to whether the policy "of recognizing Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people" or "of recognizing Palestine as a national home of the Jewish people" should be adopted. The British were not willing to go so far as to use "the" and thus single it out as the place which would be governed by the Zionists. The Jews were forced to accept the terms originally proposed and the

31. Temperly, op. cit., p. 170.

32. Ibid.

33. Antonius, op. cit., p. 265.

declaration was immediately sent to the Jews all over the
³⁴
 world.

To the Arabs, the Balfour Declaration was a complete reversal of the British pledges giving them political freedom, and protests began to pour in on the British government from all sides. Sherif Hussein wrote for an explanation and the answer was given by Commander Hogarth, an outstanding member of the Arab Bureau in Cairo and one who had been in Cairo during the war. Hogarth told Hussein, now king of the new state, the Hejaz, that "Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population."³⁵ With this assurance, the Arabs were quieted and once again took up the British cause in a wholehearted manner. Hussein accepted the Balfour Declaration with faith in the British and looked upon it as merely a promise to give the Zionists a home "in a house owned by Arabs."³⁶ It is not difficult to see, however, how contradictory these two pledges were; the one assuring political and economic freedom, and the other promising to the Arabs only their civil and religious rights. In these two promises lies the basis for the conflicts which have taken place in Palestine in the past twenty years and the absolute failure

34. Ibid., p. 266.

35. Ibid., p. 268.

36. Temperly, op. cit., p. 132.

to get the Arabs and the Jews to cooperate. Fewer difficulties had arisen over the Sykes-Picot agreement than over the declaration, for it was not so widely known and did not involve the two nationalities. Many questions of a territorial character did arise between the pledges made to the Sherif and to the Jews. Was or was not Palestine included in the Arab territory which was to be granted independent government? If so, what place was the Jew to have in this government? George Antonius, in his book The Arab Awakening, holds steadfastly to the idea that had the British kept their pledges to the Arabs all would have been well, because they were perfectly willing to open their country to the persecuted peoples, but they were not willing to sacrifice their political autonomy for a people of a different race and language, with whom they had very little in common.

There were several other treaties and agreements which the British government made that dealt with this same problem of the Jewish and Arab territory. One was the Declaration to the Seven, which was made on June 16, 1918, by the Foreign Office to the seven Arabs who were doubting the sincerity of the actions of the British. The Arabs were assured that the policy of His Majesty's Government would always be to aid the oppressed peoples to gain their freedom and independence and to help them establish a government which would be based upon the consent of the people to be governed.

37

Another declaration was made by the Foreign Offices of the French and British governments and was a further assurance that the purpose in carrying on the war in the Near East was to free the peoples who lived there and to insure "the smooth working of the government and administrations which those populations will have elected of their own free will to have."

³⁸ This document was looked upon as a promise to disregard the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Treaty and hold to the agreements between His Majesty's Government and Hussein.
³⁹ The Arabs were convinced by this promise that they were to have a definite share in the government and the idea of nationalism was once again uppermost in the minds of the leaders. It is true that Lloyd George did intend to revise the Sykes-Picot Treaty, but it was not to give the Arabs their freedom, but to gain France's consent to British control of Palestine. These two declarations served their purpose of appeasing the Arabs and of gaining their support until the end of the war.

By the time of the Declaration of the Seven, there was talk everywhere of a British protectorate over Palestine and when the war was won the idea was generally accepted. The question that then arose concerned the character of the administration. If it were based on the pledges to King Hussein, the Jews the world over would turn against England

38. Ibid., Appendix E, pp. 435-436.

39. Ibid., pp. 274-275.

and accuse her of being unfaithful to her promises. If the Balfour Declaration were carried out, the Arabs in Palestine would rise in revolt and England would have another war to contend with when her treasury had been emptied by the struggle just completed. Then, too, there was the Wilsonian policy as put forth in the twelfth point of his famous "Fourteen":

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. 40

France was holding steadfastly to the Sykes-Picot agreement and refused to discuss terms of settlement which provided for anything other than French rule in Syria and a joint rule in Palestine. All of the contentions came out into the open at the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919, when the question arose as to whether France was willing to recognize Arab independence as was put forth in the agreement with King Hussein. M. Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, and one of the French delegates to the Peace Conference was not willing to abide by any agreement except the Sykes-Picot and especially one which he claimed was not known to France when the 1916 agreement was made.⁴¹ Finally it was agreed that the British troops should evacuate Syria and leave the future of that territory in the hands of the

40. Baker, op. cit., p. 44.

41. Temperly, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 147-148.

French, but should continue the military occupation of Palestine.⁴² Up until this time, the position of Palestine in relation to Syria was of little importance, but now that the two were to be separated, agitation arose among the Arabs who argued that Palestine was a part of Syria and the Arab country and thus had a claim to independence along with the rest of Syria.

Until something definite could be settled, England continued her military control in Palestine and progress was made in the direction of establishing a government which would be stable and would restore economic prosperity to the country. When General Allenby, the British commander in the Near East, had entered Jerusalem with his force, he laid down the terms under which the administration would be carried on. These were embodied in a speech which he made to the citizens of Jerusalem and are worthy of quotation, since they are the basis of the government which lasted in the country for about five years.⁴³

To the inhabitants of Jerusalem the Blessed and the people in the vicinity.

The defeat inflicted upon the Turks by the troops under my command resulted in the occupation of your city by my forces. I therefore here and now proclaim it to be under martial law under which form of administration it will remain so long as military considerations make it necessary. However, lest any of you should be alarmed by reason of your experience at the hands of the enemy who has retired, I hereby inform you that it

42. Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 175.

43. Bentwich, op. cit., p. 20.

is my desire that every person should pursue his lawful business without fear of interruption.

Furthermore, since your city is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many centuries, therefore I do make known to you that every sacred building, monument, Holy Spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three religions, will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred.

The whole country was put under the administration of the British Commander-in-Chief, who in turn appointed administrators for the local governments who got their authority directly from the commander.⁴⁴ It was difficult to establish a government which would be satisfactory because of the destitution of the people. As the Turks had retreated, they had carried with them everything that they could and the remainder they destroyed. Thus the people were left without homes and food, and it was up to the British government to provide for them.⁴⁵ In the summer of 1918 the military administration began to institute reforms and organize the government. They improved the health and sanitary conditions, appointed departments of Law and Justice, made loans to the farmers, and founded the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.⁴⁶

44. Ibid., p. 32.

45. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

46. Ibid., pp. 27-29.

Considerable progress was made, and the people were comparatively satisfied until just before the Commander-in-Chief signed the Turkish armistice when he issued a proclamation which aroused them. In this proclamation he stated that the purpose of the war had been the "complete and definite emancipation" of the people oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations which would derive their authority from the "free choice of the indigenous population."⁴⁷ The hopes of the Arabs were immediately aroused, but to the Jews the proclamation was another reversal of the Balfour Declaration. Every step which England took was contrary to the wishes of one of the two races who were vying for the right to rule in this small section of the one-time Ottoman Empire. Yet England did not seem to be trying to do much that would bring the two peoples together. Was she waiting for time to take its course, or did she have a definite purpose in her delays and contradictory actions?

At the Paris Peace Conference one of the pressing problems which confronted the delegates was the place that Palestine was to have in the future. The matter was difficult and tedious because of the claims of the Arabs and the Jews as well as the secret Allied agreements which had been made. It was here that the mandate system of government was

47. Ibid., p. 33.

worked out, and those who were at the conference believed that they had at last found a solution for the Palestine problem.

CHAPTER II

THE FORMATION OF THE MANDATE

At the close of the first World War Germany was deprived of her colonies and it was also decided that parts of the Ottoman Empire should not be returned to the tyrannical rule of the Turks. Therefore, when the leaders of the Allied nations gathered in Paris to draw up a peace treaty, one of the most important questions was that of the disposition of the colonies and dependent territories which had belonged to the enemy countries. President Wilson, the head of the American delegation to the Peace Conference, came with the hope that the peace about to be made would be

an open covenant, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public eye. 1

It was also hoped that the much discussed principles of "non-annexation" and "self-determination" and "consent of the governed" would not be forgotten. The European leaders, Lloyd George of England, Clemenceau of France, and Orlando of Italy, came to the conference with imperialistic ideas and thus set forth opinions which were very contradictory to those of the President. It was then up to the conference

1. Baker, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 42-43.

to decide whether the colonies would be given to the conquering nations or whether they would be governed according to the principles which were set forth by Wilson.

The provisions for the government of the colonies and territories were finally expressed in the Covenant of the League of Nations and so it would be well to trace to some extent the history of the formation of this Covenant. It was realized that there was a need for an international organization which would have the power to deal with the disputes which might arise between nations, and during the war it had also been realized how much international co-operation could mean. But it was not until the latter part of the war that a form for an international society was devised and this became the first draft of a constitution for a League of Nations.² This first draft was drawn up by a committee which was headed by Lord Phillimore of England. This committee met on the request of the British Foreign Office and its report, which was made on March 29, 1918, became the foundation for the Covenant of the League of Nations. In May, 1918, Colonel E. M. House, Wilson's confidential diplomatic agent, at the request of President Wilson drew up another draft for a covenant which was very similar to that of the Phillimore committee except that it went into further details.³ President Wilson then took

2. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 216.

3. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 218.

these two plans and combined them to form a plan of his own which was known as Wilson's First Draft.⁴ He took this to Paris with him, but upon his arrival he was given the proposals which General Smuts, a Cabinet Minister of the Union of South Africa who became one of the leaders of the conference, had written, and after reading these Wilson decided to change his draft and he wrote another plan which was known as Wilson's Second Draft.⁵ General Smuts was the first to include in his plan for an international association a scheme for the disposal of enemy colonies and dependencies.⁶ No other plan before this had even mentioned the question of colonies. It was these suggestions which had caused Wilson to rewrite his plan. He included some definite provision for the colonies, but he went a little further than Smuts in that he included the former German colonies in his settlement, whereas Smuts had dealt only with those dependencies belonging to Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Thus the idea of mandated territories came into the foreground and was set forth in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

To understand the Mandate System and its operation, one must study carefully the provisions set forth in Article 22.⁷

4. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 88.

5. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 100.

6. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 94.

7. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 184.

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the state which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well being and development of such people form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Because of the great differences between the areas, the people who lived there, and the degree to which each one had advanced, Article 22 provided for three distinct types of mandates which were determined by the location of the country, the development of the civilization there, and the economic conditions. These types were known⁸ as "A," "B," and "C" mandates. The class A mandates included the territory in which

certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to

8. David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1928), Vol. I, p. 105.

the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. 9

In the B mandates the power which was given to the mandatory country was much larger. The Mandatory had certain duties which she must perform in the country, such as abolishing the traffic in slaves, liquor, and arms; maintaining an open door policy towards all members of the League; guarding against the establishment of military or naval bases or of compelling the natives to train in a military way for anything except police purposes; and guarding the religious freedom of the natives in the colony. 10

The C mandates included such territory as that in Southwest Africa formerly belonging to Germany which was considered absolutely unable to govern itself because of its remoteness or because the sparseness of its population. These colonies were to be governed by the laws of the mandatory power. 11

When the final draft of the Covenant was completed and adopted at the Peace Conference on April 28, 1919, 12 it was found that fourteen mandates had been created and that these had been given over to eight mandatory Powers. Of the fourteen, only three countries came under the A group: Iraq


9. Baker, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 184.

10. Ibid., p. 185.

11. Ibid., p. 185.

12. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 339.

MAP OF
PALESTINE
(BRITISH MANDATE)



or Mesopotamia, Syria and Lebanon, and Palestine and Transjordan. Great Britain received the mandates for Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan.

The draft of the mandate for Palestine was different from that of the other countries in that it considered largely a group of people who formed only about 10 per cent of the population and this made it necessary to include changes to provide for this Jewish minority group. By this mandate England was not given the duty of establishing laws which would provide for the government of the people in Palestine, but she was told to recognize the "historical connections of the Jewish people with Palestine"¹³ and also their "grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country." Therefore, the Mandatory was

responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the other Allied powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. ¹⁴

They were not, however, to do anything which would be contradictory to "safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion."¹⁵ The Mandatory was also responsible for such things as the establishment of a judicial system, the control of foreign affairs, the Holy Places and religious sites and

13. U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 12.

14. Ibid., p. 13.

15. Ibid., p. 13.

buildings, the complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, the organization of military forces for police duty only, and an open door policy towards all other members of the League of Nations.¹⁶

The House of Lords rejected the mandate on the grounds that it violated the pledges of His Majesty's Government which were made to the Arabs in October, 1915, and November, 1918, and it also was contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people in Palestine.¹⁷ The vote was overruled, however, on July 4 in the House of Commons by a vote of 292 to 35 and England agreed to accept the mandate for Palestine.¹⁸ Up until this time there had been a great deal of disturbance in the country. Lord E. Percy in the House of Commons made the statement that the dissatisfaction in Palestine in the past two years which had resulted in bloodshed was due to the fact that Great Britain would not take a definite stand as to what her future policy would be.¹⁹ England had now accepted the mandate which provided for a Jewish national home in a country where 90 per cent of the people were Arabs.²⁰ In drawing up this draft which was to be the basis for the future government of Palestine, even

16. Ibid., pp. 13-17.

17. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Official Report (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1922), Vol. L, column 1034.

18. Ibid., House of Commons, Vol. CLVI, cols. 341-342.

19. Ibid., col. 308.

20. Bentwich, op. cit., p. 13.

the Balfour Declaration had to a certain extent been disregarded because even it provided that nothing should be done which would prejudice the non-Jewish population and now the Jews were being thrust upon them. No attempt had been made to ascertain the wishes of the people as had been promised by the spokesman for His Majesty's Government in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence.

The non-Zionist Jews who had come to Palestine had not done so in order to rule the country, but had wanted a place where they could settle peacefully and develop their agricultural and economic interests.²¹ The Zionist Jews claimed to be coming for the same reason and said they could not understand the Arab objections.²² But if they were not interested in the government, why was it that the mandate provided for a Jewish Agency whose purpose it was to advise and cooperate with the administration of Palestine? Why should Jewish cooperation be provided for more specifically than the Arab? Then, too, the mandate provided that the administration should arrange with the Jews to construct and operate public works and utilities and develop the natural resources. The Zionists were already far advanced in their attempts to gain an economic control of the country and it was feared that they would go a step farther and get political control. It was not difficult for the Arabs to see that

21. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. CLVI, col. 298.

22. Ibid., col. 297.

with Britain's accepting the mandate for Palestine as it was, there was no hope for the independence that they had fought so gallantly to gain.

After the Balfour Declaration had been definitely included in the mandate the question arose more sharply than ever as to what was meant by the term "a national home for the Jews." This was a question which had been a bone of contention ever since the document was issued in 1917. Twenty years later, even, Leonard Stein, who was the advisor to the Jewish Agency in London, spent almost three hours trying to explain the meaning and when he finished, Earl Peel, chairman of the British Royal Commission, said, "Thank you for your able exposition, which now makes the document more obscure than ever."²³ Dr. Weizmann, the leader of the Zionist movement in England and the President of the Zionist Organization, in giving the meaning said,

I declare that in the Jewish national home the conditions would be such that we should be allowed to develop our institutions, our schools, and the Hebrew language, that there should ultimately be such conditions that Palestine would be Jewish as America is American and England is English. ²⁴

This would involve a complete reversal of the conditions in the country. To make Palestine Jewish would mean that the Arabs would have to be pushed into the background and that

23. New York Times, January 1, 1937.

24. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. CLVI, cols. 297-298.

the 10 per cent Jewish population would have to be increased to 55 per cent if not more. One writer, in an article in the Living Age, said that what the British Government and the League of Nations and the Zionist Jews meant by a national home was the "cooperation between Arabs and Jews in the making of a Palestine nation."²⁵ Of course, the author continued, to accomplish this, the Jews should have their own culture, language, and institutions and should have equal electoral rights with the Arabs and should be allowed free immigration as long as their economic life could be provided for. This practically means the same thing as Dr. Weizmann's definition, for if those things were accomplished, surely Palestine would be Jewish.

Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the Churchill Memorandum, in which he tried to answer this question, said:²⁶

When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of the Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect

25. Mrs. Philip Snowden, "Palestine Under the Mandate," Living Age, 321: 940-946, May 17, 1924.

26. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925 (London, Oxford University Press, 1925), Vol. I, p. 366.

of free development, and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of the Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connections.

The demands of the Jews had changed since the Zionist movement had become so strong that what they now wanted was a Jewish state where the Jew would be dominant in the political and economic life and not merely a home where the Hebrew language and literature could be revived. It was not easy to distinguish between the motives of the different Jews because the two things, their religion and their spirit of nationalism, which demanded a Jewish state, were almost inseparable. They argued that their motives were religious, that their laws had come from Jerusalem, and that a Jewish church of the truest nature could be founded only in Palestine. Freedom, they felt, came with the establishment of the Hebrew language and citizenship in the country which had been promised to their forefathers. It was likewise true that, because Palestine was the home of the Jewish history and religion, it was only natural that they should hope that in the future the country should be theirs to have and to govern.²⁷ The Zionists were ever putting forth the idea that "Israel is one,"²⁸ but was this oneness political or religious or both?

27. W. O. Gore, "Great Britain, Palestine and the Jew," Nineteenth Century, 86: 621, October, 1920.

28. Ibid., p. 622.

In Palestine the Arab nationalist felt that the mandate system was just another way that the Allied Powers had for assuming imperial control. They felt that England did not want to come out in the open and admit that she was adding the small state of Palestine to her vast Empire. The Jews generally supported the idea of the mandate, but they were restless because they felt that England was slow in carrying out the system and in aiding the Jews to gain their access into the country.

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It was known from the beginning that the administration of Palestine would be a difficult one, and England saw that there would be no peace or self-government until the population could see the benefits which could be reaped from the influx of the Jews and the capital which they would bring into the country. Already they had improved the system of agriculture by introducing a scientific system of irrigation. The industries which the Jews were building were attracting many Arabs and they were leaving the hill-sides to work in the factories.

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It was difficult to see at the time why a policy which promised a Jewish return to their native country and also protected the Arab in his civil and religious rights would not eventually be acceptable to both races and lead to prosperity.

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29. Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 45.

30. H. N. Brailsford, "Storm Over Palestine," New Republic, 87, 230, July, 1936.

31. J. Ramsey Macdonald, "Zionism and Palestine," Contemporary Review, 121: 440, April, 1922.

After England had been fully recognized as the mandatory power for Palestine, her first step was to replace the military administration with a civil government. On July 1, 1920, "with a view to advising upon questions of administration and finance,"³² Sir Herbert Samuel was appointed the first High Commissioner of Palestine. Samuel was a Jew and so there was rejoicing among his people, while the Arabs again felt betrayed.³³ Immediately upon his arrival in Palestine, however, the High Commissioner assured the Arabs that there would be no discrimination between the two races and they would be ruled with equity. In the message of the King of England, sent to the people of Palestine by Sir Samuel, the basis for the new administration was said to be to

insure to the country peaceful and prosperous development, absolute impartiality on the part of the mandatory power, respect for the rights of every creed and race, and the gradual establishment of a Jewish national home which would not affect the civil or religious rights of the population. 34

In this same communication there were certain rules set up which would be followed. Some of these were complete freedom and equal justice for all, suppression of corruption, equal taxation for all the people, the promotion of economic

32. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. L, col. 1027.

33. Bentwich, op. cit., p. 43.

34. Ibid., p. 46.

development and the attempt to increase the prosperity of
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 the inhabitants of the country.

The Arabs seemed to be reconciled to the idea that the British Government was going to carry out its promises in regard to the national home and they did not try to interfere. Sir Samuel was able to begin his administration under peaceful conditions. One of his first measures was an attempt to turn a part of the government over to the people of the country. He proposed to establish an advisory council which would be composed of twelve official members who would be nominated and ten unofficial members
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 who would be elected by the people. This council was to control the important matters which came up concerning the executive work of the government, and, although the unofficial members could not vote, they were free to raise questions and enter into the discussion. Even this move was looked upon with suspicion by the Arabs, however, because they felt that, since ten of the members were to be appointed by the Jew and two of the twelve elected delegates were to be Jews, this practically guaranteed a Jewish majority on all questions. Nothing of any importance developed from this objection, however, and the council was elected and a meeting was called. At the first meeting on November 9, 1920, the discussion centered around such topics as food

35. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

36. Ibid., p. 54.

control, land ordinances, the tobacco monopoly, and plans for the future education of all people, both Jew and Arab. ³⁷

In 1921 Winston Churchill, in trying to settle the question of commitments to the Arabs and Jews, made a visit to Palestine ³⁸ and his very presence aroused the Arabs who distrusted any official who in any way might have had anything to do with the granting of the Balfour Declaration. They also felt that this would be an opportune time to voice their objections, since Churchill was a direct representative of the government in London. Consequently, an Executive Committee of an Arab Conference which had met recently at Haifa handed him a list of demands which included the abolishment of the principle of a national home for the Jews, a national government which should be elected by those inhabitants of Palestine who were there before the war, the cessation of Jewish immigration until the National Government was formed, and that Palestine should not be separated from her sister states, Syria, Iraq, and Hejaz. ³⁹ Churchill's reply was almost a reprimand to the Arabs for even suggesting such ideas. He told them it was the plan of the British government to continue carrying out the promises made to the Jews and as for the national home, he said,

37. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

38. Antonius, op. cit., p. 317.

39. Bentwich, op. cit., p. 61.

We think that it will be good for the world, for the Jews, and for the British Empire; but we also think that it will be good for the Arabs who dwell in Palestine and we intend that they shall not be sufferers or supplanted in the country in which they dwell or denied their share in all that makes for its progress and prosperity. 40

Thus the Arabs were quieted for a while and the Jews continued to send thanks to the British Government for accepting the mandate.

It was not until September 29, 1923,⁴¹ that the British mandate in Palestine was established upon a legal foundation. Since 1920 Sir Samuel had been ruling as High Commissioner with an Advisory Council which was made up of ten British officials and ten Palestinians, seven of whom were Arabs and three of whom were Jews. In anticipation of the legal adoption of the mandate, however, a Palestine constitution which was embodied in an Order in Council had⁴² been drawn up and signed by His Majesty in August, 1922.

The order gave the agreement of the Allied powers to carry out the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, to turn the administration over to a mandatory power, to put the Balfour Declaration into effect, and to select England as⁴³ the mandatory for Palestine. Norman Bentwich, a legal advisor for the Government of Palestine for thirteen years,

40. Ibid., p. 62.

41. Ibid., p. 88.

42. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 363.

43. Bentwich, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 318.

describes the constitution as being "a rigidly practical document which defined the different parts of the government, the executive, legislative, and the judicial."⁴⁴ The executive department was placed in the hands of the High Commissioner, who was appointed by His Majesty. It was his duty to execute all things pertaining to the executive department in carrying out the provisions of the mandate.⁴⁵ To assist the High Commissioner in the performance of his duties an Executive Council was to be formed, the members of which would hold their places on the council "during his Majesty's pleasure."⁴⁶ The public land, mines and minerals of the country were to be placed in the hands of the High Commissioner, whose right it was to make leases or grants of them for temporary occupation. It was also his privilege to appoint and dismiss such local officials as he deemed necessary and in him was vested the power of pardon.⁴⁷

Article 17 of the mandate provided for the formation of a Legislative Council which was to replace the existing Advisory Council. The new council was to have the authority "to establish such ordinances as may be necessary for the peace, order and good government of Palestine."⁴⁸ These

44. Ibid., p. 91.

45. Ibid., p. 92.

46. Ibid., Appendix B, p. 322.

47. Ibid., Appendix B, p. 322.

48. Ibid., Appendix B, pp. 323-324.

powers were always to be subject to the supreme power which belonged to His Majesty. The Legislative Council was to consist of twenty-two members besides the High Commissioner; ten official members were to be appointed and twelve unofficial members were to be elected at a general election to be held not later than six months after the publication of the Order in Council. Each member had to swear to be "faithful and loyal to the Government of Palestine."

Part 5 of the Order in Council established a system of civil courts throughout Palestine which would "exercise jurisdiction in all matters and over all persons."⁴⁹ Magistrates courts were to be established in each district and sub-district, as were also district courts which were to act as courts of first instance in all cases not within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates court and in all criminal matters not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Assize. They were also to act as an appellate court from the Magistrates courts. The Court of Criminal Assize was to deal with all offenses which would be punishable by death and the Supreme Court was to hear appeals from the lower courts and sit as a High Court of Justice. The courts of the various religious communities were to have control over such questions as marriage, divorce, alimony, and the confirmation of wills of persons other than foreigners.

49. Ibid., Appendix B, p. 326.

The last section of the Order in Council provided for the fulfillment of the various provisions of the mandate which had not been dealt with previously. Article 82 provided that all official notices and forms should be written in English, Arabic, and Hebrew. The next article recognized the right of all persons to enjoy "liberty of conscience" and "free exercise of their forms of worship."⁵⁰

To carry out the elections of the unofficial members of the council, it was necessary to take a census to determine the number of qualified voters. It was found that there were approximately 800,000 qualified voters, of which 650,000 were Moslems, 80,000 were Jews, and 73,000 were⁵¹ Christian. Even though they had been willing to register, on the day of election it was found that very few Arabs would take any part in the voting, and in order to have time to try to persuade them to vote the election was extended⁵² twelve days, but with no better results. By so doing, the Arabs completely repudiated the attempt on the part of the British to establish a permanent, secure government in the turbulent land. It would be hard to determine the definite reasons which the Arabs had for such action - if indeed there were any. Ordinarily it was generally conceded that they were willing to put complete trust in His Majesty's Government. Could it be that now they were beginning to feel

50. Ibid., Appendix B, p. 333.

51. Ibid., p. 98.

52. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. LIII, col. 641.

that Britain could not be trusted? Was the great European power losing her prestige in the Eastern world?

At any rate, England's plans were thwarted and it became necessary for the shrewd politicians to find another way out of their dilemma, since it was perfectly evident that the Arabs were not going to assist "in setting up this tricky and deceptive constitution," as Lord Sydenham called it in the debate before the House of Lords.⁵³ To the Arabs the constitution killed all hope that in the future Palestinian "sentiment" could be voiced by the majority.⁵⁴ They still held that there was no future security for the Arabs so long as the policies of the Zionists played such a prominent part in the administration of the country. Out of a population of approximately 800,000, only about 80,000 were Jews. Of these, a half had lived in Palestine for many years and had very little sympathy for the Zionist movement. It was easy for the Arabs to see that England was trying to establish a government which was designed to please, in particular, 40,000 Jews who had been imported from the various countries of Europe.⁵⁵

On May 4, 1923, another Order in Council was issued by the British Government with the hope that by inaugurating certain changes, the Arabs might be pleased. This amendment

53. Ibid., Vol. LIII, col. 649.

54. Ibid., col. 639.

55. Ibid., col. 642.

to the first Order abolished the Legislative Council and made the High Commissioner the executive and legislative power. He was, however, to set up an Advisory Council which he would consult on all important questions. The composition of this new council was to be like that of the Legislative Council, but the members were to be appointed and not elected. Ten of the leading members of the Arab population were then invited to become members of the council and each sent his written acceptance.⁵⁶ It seemed that a form of government had at last been worked out to suit all who were concerned. When, however, the ten Arabs accepted the position on the Advisory Council, they were immediately swamped with protests from their people asking them not to cooperate with the British and thus destroy all that had been accomplished by the non-participation in the elections.⁵⁷ It was believed that if they would not cooperate in this and would hold out long enough, His Majesty's Government would be forced to make concessions in order to establish some form of acceptable government and the Arab case would be won. Seven of the ten men withdrew their acceptance and the second attempt to give the people of Palestine a form of self-government, however objectionable it might have been, failed because of the non-cooperation of the Arabs.

56. Toynbee, op. cit., note 2, p. 364.

57. Ibid., p. 364.

It was generally recognized that one of the principal objections which the Arabs had was to the Jewish Agency which in cooperation with the Zionist organization was to "advise and cooperate with the administration in Palestine." The High Commissioner therefore proposed that an Arab agency be established which would have equal authority with the Jewish Agency. The proposal was rejected by the Arabs on the grounds that they had never recognized the authority of the Jewish Agency and it would be impossible to establish an Arab Agency on the terms which they did not recognize as being legal. Britain now realized that as long as she, regardless of the form, included any provision for a Jewish national home, it would be objectionable to the Moslems of Palestine. Lord Balfour had called the mandate as it was set up in Palestine "an adventure."⁵⁸ It seemed that now the time had come for Britain to determine just how far she wanted to adventure into this undeclared war between the Arab and the Jew and how many times she was going to allow the Arabs to interrupt her adventurous policy. Already, though, the Arabs had realized that even if they could not change the mandate, they could keep Britain from carrying it out by non-cooperation and they have never forgotten that.

It was finally decided that it was necessary to make a definite declaration as to the government to be

58. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. L, col. 1018.

established and to all but defy anyone to make any charges against it. Britain needed to stop trying to please so many people and take a stand and stick to it. This she did in December, 1923, and it brought with it a lull which lasted for several years.⁵⁹ The legislative and executive functions were placed in the hands of the High Commissioner who was to be assisted by an Advisory Council made up of only official members.⁶⁰ From this time until 1936, England tried to rule by asserting her authority in such a way that the people accepted it without question.

In 1925 the immigration law of 1920 was changed. The Churchill Memorandum had laid down the principle that immigration should not exceed "whatsoever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals." There were now two main groups of immigrants: first, those who were laborers with definite prospects of jobs; and, secondly, persons who had sufficient means to allow them to be independent.⁶¹ The Jewish immigration from the time of the first Ordinance, issued in 1920, until the last of April, 1921, was 9,625 persons, including dependents who had come to join their relatives who were already in the country. In 1925 the number was 33,801, a little more than three and a half times as many.⁶² These immigrants

59. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 364.

60. Ibid., p. 364.

61. Ibid., p. 371.

62. Ibid., p. 372.

were mostly from the thickly populated eastern and south-eastern countries of Europe, and when they reached Palestine they were perfectly able to form Jewish communities which were sufficient within themselves.

At the end of his term as High Commissioner, Sir
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Samuel was able to report that during his five years the Jewish population had almost doubled and that they had as the basis for their return the agricultural development of the country. His report was especially strong concerning the Jewish settlements in the Valley of Esdraelon; it ran as follows:

When I first saw it in 1920 it was a desolation. Four or five small and squalid Arab villages, long distances apart from one another, could be seen on the summits of low hills here and there. For the rest of the country was uninhabited. There was not a house, not a tree. . . . A great part of the soil was in the ownership of absentee Syrian landlords. The River Kishon, which flows through the valley and the many springs which feed it from the hillsides, had been allowed to form a series of swamps and marshes, and, as a consequence, the country was infested with malaria. . . . At the expenditure of nearly 900,000 English pounds, about fifty-one square miles of the valley have been purchased by the Jewish National Fund and other organizations; 20 villages have been founded with a population numbering about 2600; about 700 acres have been afforested; 20 schools have been opened; there is an agricultural training college for girls in one village and a hospital in another. All the swamps and marshes have been drained, and cases of malaria are proportionately rare. The whole aspect of the valley has been changed. The wooden huts of the villages, gradually giving place to red-roofed cottages, are dotted along the slopes;

the plantations of rapidly growing eucalyptus trees already begin to give a new character to the landscape; in the spring the fields of vegetables or of cereals cover many miles of the land, and what five years ago was a little better than a wilderness is being transformed before our eyes into a smiling country.

These things the Jews had accomplished without any material aid from any government, but only through the efforts of the Jewish people themselves.

In the country in general, Sir Samuel reported that the lawlessness had stopped and that both races of the people were once again quietly taking up their daily tasks and were beginning to have faith in the courts which had been established by the government. Telephone and telegraph systems had been spread all over the country and the roads and railroads had been improved so that the people were now in closer contact with each other.

Considered as a whole, Sir Samuel's rule was one of transition in which a turbulent people were quieted and a government established which had furthered the economic prosperity of the country. This was to pass on into the administration of Lord Plumer, who took up the threads where Samuel left off and tried to carry on as he had started. Since Plumer was not a Jew, he was readily accepted by the Arabs, but they were quickly given to know that he did not intend to show any partiality, but that he did intend to carry out the principles of the mandate as much as he possibly could.⁶⁴

64. Ibid., pp. 143-144.

Peace could not last, however, in a country whose people were divided on every issue. The Jews did not trust the Arabs and the Arabs did not trust the Jews and neither of them had much confidence in the British Government. All of this was bound to cause trouble sooner or later, and already it was brewing in the minds of the inhabitants of this "Land of the Sojourners."

CHAPTER III

WAR IN PALESTINE

In March, 1927, an article in the Literary Digest began with this sentence,

Arab fear of the Zionist Movement has been reduced to the vanishing point and the Jew and Arab are learning to cooperate in building up Palestine and their own fortunes.

The same article then goes on to outline the various accomplishments in the country and ends with this:

The peaceful rebuilding of Palestine has implications which stretch out far beyond Palestine. Granted the success of the experiment, there can be created in the Near East new relationships between the Christian, the Moslem, and the Jewish worlds. Individual institutions devoted to world peace should watch the experiment with the most sympathetic attention. 1

It was impossible at that time for even the most farsighted observers to imagine that in a little more than a year the small territory of Palestine would be seething with discontent and hatred.

This change in the attitude of the people can be traced directly to the progress which the Jewish National Home movement had made and the effect this had on the economic, political, and social welfare of the Arabs who already resented the fact that the Jews were in the country.

1. Literary Digest, 92: 28, March 5, 1927.

At the outset the Jews had claimed that all they wanted was a chance to establish a home in Palestine which would be a spiritual center for the Jews the world over. Since Lord Balfour issued his Declaration promising the home to the Jews, the Hebrew press had been established and a Hebrew theater had been opened in Palestine. The literature of the ancient Jews was being developed and taught in all of the Jewish schools.² Surely the Jews could not have asked for a more rapid development of their home, and if the Jewish aims had been merely cultural, there would have been no conflict.

In the decade between 1920 and 1930 the economic development of Palestine was not based upon the Arabs and their accomplishments, but upon the land purchases that had been made by the Jewish immigrants and the improvements that had been made on this land.³ Along with the economic prosperity of the Jews came the opposite condition for the majority of the Arabs. It was somewhat similar to the results of the Industrial Revolution which had taken place in England almost two centuries before. With the Jews came Western civilization, Western machinery, and Western methods. The Arabs were not able to cope with this situation and although thousands of them sold their land and then moved to

2. Vincent Sheean, "The Hebrew Revival," Asia, 935: 41, December, 1929.

3. Toynbee, op. cit., 1930, p. 241.

the cities to try to secure work running the machinery brought by the Jews, all were not able to find employment. The Jew from Europe already knew how to run the plants and operate these iron giants and hundreds of them immigrated into Palestine to do this work. This, of course, did not please the Arabs who now became dependent on relatives or the government for their support and they were not willing to cooperate with those whom they blamed for their deplorable condition.

The social status of the Arab had been reversed by the large influx of Jews who brought with them their Western mode of living. They were more advanced than these Eastern peoples and the cities which they built were noted for their cleanliness and sanitation. This gave the Jews the world over a strong argument in favor of furthering the national home, for they could easily point out the differences between the two ways of living and show how the Western was much better than the Eastern. Improvements in the standard of living, however, could not change the mental attitude of the Arabs, who felt that they would rather live in undesirable surroundings than give up their freedom and individuality. The Arab tenant farmers who were not financially able to move from the land which was bought by the Jews were the ones who were mostly affected by the Jewish immigration and their social standing was reduced to that of virtual serfdom. They had nothing they could call their

own, but were entirely dependent upon these foreigners for their livelihood. This they greatly resented and it was not difficult to arouse them against their overlords.

The political changes which had been caused by the authority which the Jews had acquired were most obnoxious to the Arabs. When Britain was fighting the Turks, the Arabs had joined with them on the promise that they would be granted their independence along with the rest of the Arabian peoples. At least, this was the viewpoint of the Arabs. The inhabitants of the Hejaz and the Yemen and of Iraq and Transjordan had been granted an independent government and the Palestinian Arabs felt that they were more highly civilized than the Arabs in these countries and therefore ought also to have an independent government.⁴ The Arabs had become reconciled to the terms of the mandate only because they knew that Palestine had been put in class A, which meant that the Mandatory was to work toward the development of self-government in the mandated areas.

The British Government, however, could not find a solution to its problem. Britain had tried to establish a certain amount of self-government by having a popular election and also by trying to establish an advisory council whose members would be partly Arabs. These plans had been blocked, however, by the non-cooperation of the Arabs because

4. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 254-255.

they resented the fact that the Jews should have any part whatsoever in the government of the country. The Arabs were clamoring for self-government and yet they would not work with the British in establishing it. The attitude that they were being cheated became the basis for the Arab grievances. Everything that was bad in the country they blamed on the Jews and especially, as has been pointed out, their economic conditions, which they associated with the Jews and the national home. This changed an economic grievance into one that was so closely connected with political questions that the two could hardly be separated.

In the Survey of International Affairs Mr. Toynbee presents another factor that was back of the disturbances of 1929 and later in 1936. This was the psychological factor of fear;⁵ the fear of the Arabs that the aim of the Jews was to overrun the country and establish a Jewish majority and gradually to run the Arabs out of the country entirely. In other words, they were afraid of the phrase "as Jewish as England is English." There were so many contradictory statements as to just what the aims of the Zionists were that the Arabs could not help but feel that they were being driven from their country and that His Majesty's Government, if not openly, was secretly furthering this plan.

5. Ibid., pp. 261-266.

Thus the Arabs and the Jews were living in the same small country under conditions that were anything but peaceful. Each race resented the presence of the other, and each was suspicious of every move which the other made. In between the two was the British government, which had made promises that were contradictory and could not under any circumstances be carried out peacefully.

Signs of conflict became apparent in 1928 on the eve of the Jewish Day of Atonement. Up until now religion had played no part in the struggle. Zionists who came to Palestine were more interested in economic and political developments than they were in religion, and few of the Jews who came into the country held to any strictly religious views. This was likewise true of the Arabs. Those who had furthered the revolt in 1916 did so to gain political independence and not religious freedom. The hostility of the two races, however, took on a religious aspect and the orthodox and non-orthodox Jews became united in their struggle against the Moslem Arabs. Articles 13 and 14 of the draft of the mandate for Palestine had provided that the mandatory power should be responsible for the Holy Places in the mandated country and that a special commission was to be appointed to settle the questions which arose over these places.⁶ The British government and the League had neglected these articles, however, and when the clash

6. U. S. Department of State, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

came there was no direct authority to deal with the matter. As a consequence, the British were not prepared to cope with the situation and it got completely out of hand.

For generations the Jews had been ill-treated and persecuted wherever they settled. They had become wanderers seeking for a place of refuge. Throughout the centuries, in spite of the fact that they were scattered all over the world, they had been held together by their religion.⁷ They were ever mindful of the belief that they were the chosen people of God and they always looked for the fulfillment of the promise that the Temple in Jerusalem would some day be restored. The only tangible thing that these wanderers had to hold to was the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. It had long been the custom of the Jews to make a pilgrimage to the Wall to pray at least once a year, and if they were unable to do this they paid a Jew in Palestine to offer their prayers for them. To the Jews, this Wall was the only section of the wall of Solomon's Temple which was left when Titus destroyed Jerusalem in 70 A.D. The Arabs, however, believed that the Wall was a part of the Haram esh-Sherif and had been the property of the Moslems for about 1300 years⁸ and that the Jerusalem which was so sacred to the Jews, the Jerusalem of Solomon, had been completely destroyed and there remained now only the Moslem city which

7. Vincent Sheean, "The Stone Symbol of Jewish Dreams," Asia, 30: 31, January, 1930.

8. Literary Digest, 102: 5-6, September 7, 1929.

with Mecca and Medina formed the true Holy spots for the Arab people. Nevertheless, the Jews had picked out one segment of the Wall to be their sacred spot and it had remained so for centuries. Now that the national home was being built, they felt that it could not be complete until they had gained possession of the Wall, for to them it symbolized the past destruction of the Temple and the suffering of the Jews and the future fulfillment of the promise of restoration. To them it was the love for ages past and the hope for years to come.

But the Wall was also sacred to the Islamic world and was an important Moslem Holy Place. The tradition was that the steed of the Prophet Mohammed, El Burak, on which he had visited the place, had been tethered there by the Archangel Gabriel.⁹ Underneath the Wall and the pavement in front of it, was the subterranean Mosque of El Burak, and surrounding it was the Waqf of Abu Madian. Thus it is hard to understand why the Jews picked this particular spot as their sacred place, since it is so completely surrounded by the Moslem sanctuaries. These places did not hinder the Jews, however, and through the centuries they had come to this spot for their prayers and lamentations.

The basis for their trouble lay in the fact that the Jews had come to think of the Wall in terms of ownership.¹⁰ They claimed that it was rightfully theirs to use

9. Literary Digest, 110: 25, July 4, 1931.

10. Ibid., 99: 30, December 8, 1928.

as they pleased. They refused to look at the situation from the Arab point of view and they did not realize that the Arabs had developed a civilization which was strong and could not be eliminated in a few years. They would not become reconciled to the fact that the Wall was also sacred to the Arab and that his rights must be respected. Most of all, however, they failed to see that the British government must try to make sure that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine."¹¹ Every problem that arose hinged on some one of the far-reaching statements of the Balfour Declaration and, as Vincent Sheean wrote, "oily, cynical, inapplicable, and iniquitous as the Balfour Declaration is, it remains the only fundamental statement of policy one has to go on in this country."¹²

For years the Jews had been trying to gain possession of the Wall either by fair means or foul. In 1840, when Palestine was being ruled by the Egyptian conqueror, Mohamed Ali, the Jews asked permission to pave the territory adjoining the Wall.¹³ They were refused the request on the grounds that it was not permitted by the sacred law and had not been done in the past. The Jews were told to hold to their old custom of making their visits quietly without

11. Bentwich, op. cit., p. 22.

12. Sheean, op. cit., p. 34.

13. Bentwich, op. cit., p. 172.

raising their voices or in any way causing a disturbance. In 1912 the Jews tried to bring furnishings to the Wall which would make it resemble a synagogue but were prohibited on the grounds that in later years they might try to use this as grounds for a claim of possession.¹⁴ In 1919 the Jews insulted the Arabs by trying to buy the Wall for \$4,-¹⁵ 000,000. Here, again, was the Jewish idea that the Arabs were still such a backward people that they could be bought with a few pieces of silver. When all these plans failed, the Jews by 1928 felt strong enough in number and influence, because of the promise of a national home, to assert their claims of ownership without waiting for any legal transactions. Gradually they began to bring chairs and tables and all types of furnishings from the synagogue to the Wall.

On September 24, 1928, they brought enough furnishings to make the Holy Place resemble an open synagogue.¹⁶ They had even gone so far as to bring a screen with which to separate the men worshipers from the women. The Arabs reported the incident to the British officials and a Deputy District Commissioner was ordered to go down and remove the screen. Thus bloodshed was avoided and for a while the Arabs were appeased.

14. Sheean, op. cit., p. 34.

15. Ibid., p. 61.

16. Literary Digest, 99: 29, December 8, 1928.

As a consequence, the British government issued the White Paper of November 19, 1928.¹⁷ This recognized the right of the Jewish people to use the Wailing Wall for purposes of devotion and they were allowed to bring such appurtenances as had been formerly allowed by the Turkish government. What these appurtenances were was never clearly defined and as a result the provisions of the paper were never enforced. From this time until August, 1929, the British government failed to do anything to relieve the situation or pay much attention to the slight skirmishes which took place at the Wall every week./ On August 15, 1929, a crowd of Jewish youths from Tel Aviv marched through the streets of Jerusalem and to the Wailing Wall, where they erected the Jewish flag and sang their national anthem. On August 17 a Jewish youth was stabbed by an Arab and fifteen¹⁸ Arabs were wounded. Each day the tension grew and each side seemed to be waiting for the opportune moment in which to strike.

This moment came on August 23, when the Arab¹⁹ villagers came to Jerusalem for their mid-day prayer. Those who came were armed with clubs and sticks and began rioting around the Jaffa gate. From here they moved to the Jewish suburbs and it was not until the British forces had

17. Albert Howe Lybyer, "The Conflict Between Jews and Arabs in Palestine," Current History, 31: 190, October, 1929.

18. Toynbee, op. cit., p. 276.

19. Lybyer, op. cit., p. 191.

arrived from Transjordan that peace could be restored. When the news of the outbreaks in Jerusalem reached the outlying towns and districts, the people were immediately aroused and fighting began. The most serious incident occurred at Hebron, where the Arabs attacked the Jewish ghetto and the homes on the outskirts of the city and destroyed everything they could. It was found afterwards that more than sixty Jews, men, women, and children, had been killed and more than fifty were wounded. The rioting ended with an Arab attack on Safed, where there was general destruction as at Hebron. After the rioting had ceased and the casualties were counted, it was found that by August 31, 196 were dead, of which eighty-three were Arabs and 109 were Jews. There were also 315 wounded, 122 Arabs and 183 Jews.

On August 29, the High Commissioner returned to Palestine from London, where he had been holding conferences. He immediately made a proclamation to the people denouncing their actions and outlining his immediate plan for restoring order.²¹ He proposed to discover and punish the guilty parties and to end the discussions which he had been carrying on with the British government looking towards a change in the constitution of Palestine. On

20. Ibid., p. 192.

21. London Times, September 2, 1929.

September 4, 1929, the Colonial Office issued a statement in answer to the rumors that Britain was going to disregard²² the Balfour Declaration and terminate the Mandate. This statement declared that "no alteration in the Mandate or the policy laid down in the Balfour Declaration is under consideration." This same statement announced that the Secretary of State for the Colonies would appoint a Commission of Inquiry whose task it would be to make "an investigation²³ of the immediate causes of the recent outbreak." The commission was to determine whether it had been a spontaneous affair or whether it had been planned. It was also to investigate the truth of the accusation that the British officials had aided the Arabs in acquiring their weapons. The commission was to be headed by Sir Walter Shaw.

The report of the commission was published in June, 1930. It recognized the Moslem ownership of the Wailing Wall, but it also asserted that the Jews were to have free access to worship there. They were not, however, to bring chairs and screens and mats to be left there permanently. They might, on special occasions, bring two tables on one of which they might put the Ark of the Covenant containing the scroll of the law and on the other they might place the scroll while it was being read. Neither of the two groups were to make any noises at the Wall while the

22. Ibid., September 4, 1929.

23. Ibid., September 5, 1929.

other was having religious service and neither was in any way to disfigure the Wall by the use of nails or engravings. 24

The Shaw Commission further reported that it found that the disturbances were not premeditated and especially were they not directed against the British authority, although the Mandatory Power had not done much that would bring satisfaction to either the Jews or the Arabs. It proposed that Britain should at once proceed to achieve two main obligations, namely, the establishment of a Jewish National Home and the development of self-government in the 25 country.

The future policy of the British government was then outlined in the White Paper of October, 1930. 26 The keynote of the paper was the contention that the future peace of Palestine depended upon the establishment of better relations between the Jews and the Arabs. The future policy was to be based upon the statements made in June, 1922, and the paper denied emphatically that the primary object of the mandate had been the establishment of the Jewish Home and that the establishment of Arab sovereignty had been secondary. It proposed a measure of self-government which was to be enforced and not violated as the former attempt had been.

24. Albert Howe Lybyer, "The Near and Middle East," Current History, 32: 395-396, May, 1930.

25. Ibid., p. 396.

26. Harold Loeb, "Zion for Arabs," New Republic, 64: 346, November, 1930.

By the Jews this document was taken as a direct act of hostility towards the Zionist Organization and they declared that they could no longer cooperate with the Mandatory government; Dr. Weizmann even went so far as to resign from the Presidency of the Zionist Organization.²⁷

Along with this came Jewish demonstrations of their objections throughout the world. The Arabs accepted the White Paper and looked upon it as a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration. There was also serious objection to the Paper in Parliament by the members who had taken a direct stand in favor of one of the two races. After several months, however, the Arabs realized that it only partially fulfilled their demands and they began to clamor for the complete repudiation of the Declaration and the future prohibition of Jewish immigration.

Despite these objections, the government organized in 1932 a legislative council as called for in the White Paper and tried to establish peace throughout the country. Gradually the hatred that had been aroused in 1929 became less important than the more pressing problem of economic development. In 1933 there was some rioting and a few were killed, but the police were always able to keep the situation in hand and the riots did not spread. These riots were of a different nature from the former ones, for they were directed more against the government than against the

27. New York Times, October 21, 1930.

Jews. The Arabs were so strongly opposed to the system of Jewish immigration that they were continually fighting against it. Here, again, was the fear that they were going to be outnumbered by these foreigners.²⁸

By 1936 the country was once again engaged in strife which was outwardly similar to that which had preceded except that it was more serious and more prolonged. By this time it was plain that as long as there was no real rioting the Palestine government looked upon the situation in a disinterested manner and ruled with a very lenient hand.²⁹ The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Husseini, had sent to the High Commissioner a list of the Arab demands which must be fulfilled before the cooperation of the Arabs could be won.³⁰ These included:

1. The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

2. Complete independence granted to the Arabs and a National Government established.

3. The abandonment of the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine as it was set forth in the Balfour Declaration.

4. The immediate termination of the British Mandate in Palestine.

5. The conclusion of a treaty with the Arabs of Palestine which would establish an Arab state in Palestine with full sovereignty and with the Jews having only minority rights.

28. Israel Cohen, "Situation in Palestine," Contemporary Review, 144: 697-704, December, 1933.

29. New York Times, May 4, 1936.

30. Linton Wells, "Holy Terror in Palestine," Current History, 49: 26, December, 1938.

In answer to these demands, the British Government proposed that a legislative council be established whose membership would be made up of a majority of elected members who did not already hold some official position. This council was to see to it that the future immigration would be based upon the economic absorptive capacity of the country and the sale of land be restricted so that the Arabs would be assured of enough to afford a means of subsistence.³¹ In May the Arabs assailed the British rule and at a conference announced that after May 15 they would boycott everything that was Jewish and there would be civil disobedience and non-payment of taxes.³² In answer to a request that the strikes be called off, a youth leader, Akrom Zuetar, spoke for the Arabs in general when he said, "We must continue to strike and fight until the Palestine government grants our demands."³³ By May, 1936, the whole country was in turmoil. The Arabs everywhere united against the government and for months the whole country was put under martial law. The Jewish shops in the cities were destroyed, and their industries were stopped. In the rural sections their crops were burned and their fruit trees were uprooted. Telephone and telegraph wires were cut, railroads were destroyed, and trains were fired upon. The

31. New York Times, January 30, 1936.

32. Ibid., May 7, 1936.

33. Ibid., May 2, 1936.

police force in the country was entirely inadequate to cope with the situation and two battalions of the English Coldstream Guards were sent down to restore order. Along with these came six transports from Southampton and one from

³⁴ Liverpool. The Arab leaders who continued to propagate the riots were arrested and sent to concentration camps, and river boats were stationed on the Jordan to prevent

³⁵ smuggling. Even the Grand Mufti, however, would do nothing to stop the Arabs, but declared that they would continue to fight until all Jews who had come to Palestine since the

³⁶ war were expelled. In all Arabian history there had never been such unity of action. Not only the Arabs in Palestine, but those of neighboring countries entered into the struggle. In Egypt youth organizations were started to raise funds to aid the Moslems in Palestine, and in Cairo one of the sheiks received a letter threatening him with death unless he donated fifty pounds to aid the Arabs in

³⁷ carrying on their struggle.

As has been pointed out from time to time, there were a number of causes for these disturbances which had been appearing at intervals and which now resulted in what

34. Literary Digest, 122: 15-16, September 19, 1936.

35. Ibid., 121: 16, June 20, 1936.

36. Ibid.

37. New York Times, May 30, 1936.

might be termed a civil revolution.³⁸ One of these was the desire of the Arabs for the national independence which they believed was promised them in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. They felt that England had violated her promise by annexing the country and throwing it open to the foreigners who were about to gain control of the country. Along with this came the resentment that the Arab countries, Iraq and Hejaz, which were far less advanced, had been granted their independence and Palestine had not.

Another major cause was the hatred that had developed for the Jewish National Home. There was always the fear that when the Jews became strong, the British administration would be removed and the Jews would take over the government and deprive the Arabs of the right to hold any of the important government positions. This argument was voiced by Abraham Revusky when he wrote: "We cannot sell the priority of our national rights for material advantages."³⁹ Regardless of how much the Jews improved the conditions in Palestine, the spirit of Arab nationalism had been so aroused that material things were of little consequence. The Jews, on the other hand, had just as much political ambition and were just as anxious to reach their

38. "Text of the Official Summary of the Royal Inquiry Commission's Report," New York Times, July 8, 1937.

39. Abraham Revusky, "Conflict in Palestine," Current History, 44: 66, July, 1936.

goal. They did not want to drive the Arabs out of the country; they only wanted Palestine to be as Jewish "as England is English."⁴⁰ They did not object to self-government as was called for in the mandate, but they wanted at least equal representation with the Arabs, regardless of population.⁴¹ They always pointed to the fact that in many countries the Jews were being persecuted and driven from their homes and they felt that surely Palestine should be a haven for these people to find rest and establish a home.

During the years the attitude of the Arabs toward the British government had changed almost entirely. In 1918, when Hussein was negotiating with the British government, he did not force several of the issues which were so important because he had absolute faith in His Majesty's Government and he had never dreamed that he would be betrayed as he now felt that he had been. Since that time the British had proved to the world that they would not stick to one direct policy and the Arabs had come to distrust their every move. Britain certainly had done little towards granting an autonomous government to the Arabs and she did not seem to have much interest in the riots. It was believed by some that Britain was using this attitude to cover up the inadequate program which she had

40. Albert Viton, "Can Palestine Have Peace?" Asia, 371: 433-435, June, 1937.

41. Israel Cohen, "Palestine Strides Forward," Fortnightly Review, 143: 92, January, 1935.

devised. An article in the New York Times states emphatically that the British were the ones who were to blame for the hatred of the Jews in Palestine.⁴² Now that the Jews were allowed to come into the country in such large numbers, it had become a question of whether the Arabs would or would not be in Palestine and they turned against the Jews because their existence was being threatened.

Britain finally realized the situation was in a deadlock and that some change must be made. The Mandate, as it had been for fifteen years, had failed completely. Consequently, a Royal Commission was appointed which was to find the "underlying causes" of the disturbances and the failure of the Mandate and to work out some form of administration which would be practicable and yet would conform to the obligations to the Jews and the Arabs.⁴³ The commission, in their report, recommended that the Mandate be terminated and an administration be established on the basis of a partition plan, which they outlined.

42. New York Times, June 21, 1936.

43. Ibid., May 19, 1936.

CHAPTER IV

THE PARTITION PLAN

By the time that peace had been restored after the disturbances of 1936, the Palestinians, the British, and the world knew that the mandate system had been a complete failure in Palestine and that a new policy must be devised for the administration of this small country west of the Jordan which had been a headache to the British for over fifteen years. It was true that much had been done to place the country on a more stable economic basis, but this did not outweigh the political failure. It was also realized that only an understanding between the Jewish Zionists and the Arab extremists could bring peace to the country. In 1937 the time seemed opportune for bringing about this understanding, because the strikes of 1936 had economically ruined many of both races and there was much poverty and starvation throughout the country. More than ever the Arabs were now dependent upon Jewish capital and Jewish industries.¹ Then, too, England was receiving a great deal of criticism for not having accomplished more towards bringing about a settlement between the two peoples. For fifteen years she had been the supreme power in the

1. Viton, op. cit., p. 453.

country and there was not a single political achievement that she could point to with pride. Something had to be done.

Finally a Royal Inquiry Commission was appointed which was

to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to inquire into the manner in which the mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to obligations of the mandatory towards the Arabs and the Jews, respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances on account of the way in which the mandate has been or is being implemented; and if the commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrences. 2

The Commission found that in Palestine a conflict had arisen between two "national communities" whose national ideals were "incompatible and between whom there was no meeting ground."³ The Arabs once again presented their demands for the abandonment of the Jewish Home idea and the stoppage of Jewish immigration.⁴ On the other hand, the Jews were becoming stronger and more emphatic in their claims. David Ben Gurion said,

We are coming to our own country by our own right of historic connection with the land - a right prior to the mandate. As a matter of fact,

2. "Text of the Official Summary," op. cit., New York Times, July 8, 1937.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., January 13, 1937.

the Bible is our Mandate and the Balfour Declaration incorporated in the mandate only confirmed our ancient connection. 5

The Arabs were trying to gain their independence and return to the "Arab Golden Age" and the Jews wanted a chance to show the world what they could accomplish if restored to "the land in which the Jewish nation was born."⁶ Neither of these ideals could be realized in one small country. The neighboring countries of Syria and Lebanon had been promised national sovereignty in a few years and this stirred up a desire among the Arabs of Palestine to share in the freedom which other Asiatic Arabs were acquiring. Through the years of British administration the government had remained unrepresentative and had been unable to satisfy the grievances which had been presented by the two dissatisfied races. The Commission even reported that one of the outstanding features of the mandate as it had been carried out was the leniency with which the Arab agitations and revolts had been treated and even this conciliatory policy had failed. In fact, the Commission concluded that the Arabs had been allowed to carry out their methods of revolt to such an extent that they were "artificially puffed up" and that the introduction of a rigid policy of government would "deflate" them and they would become reconciled

5. Ibid., January 8, 1937.

6. Ibid.

7

to the British government and the Jews.


The Commission reported, however, that regardless of how the Jews felt, the Arab demands must be met even if it meant the termination of the mandate, which they found to be the root of the trouble. Therefore, they recommended that the mandate system should be replaced by a treaty system which would mean the partition of the country into two parts.⁸ Treaties of alliance were to be drawn up between Britain and the government of Transjordan and the Arabs of Palestine on one hand, and the Zionist organization on the other. These treaties were to provide that in a short while two sovereign states should be established - one an Arab state including Transjordan and the part of Palestine which lies to the east and south of a frontier which would be worked out, and the other a Jewish state consisting of the part of Palestine lying to the north and west of the frontier. Each treaty, however, must guarantee the protection of the minorities which might be living in each territory.⁹

This plan, the Commission thought, was a solution to the problem and one which would deal justly with both the Arabs and the Jews. It was recognized that no line could be drawn in this country where the Arabs and the Jews

7. "Text of the Official Summary," op. cit., New York Times, July 8, 1937.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.



were so intermingled which would separate all the Jews and their land from all the Arabs and the land which they possessed.¹⁰ It was also impossible to find natural boundaries to separate the two states and artificial ones would have to be devised.¹¹ The proposed Jewish state would be largely in the northern part of the country and would cover about one fifth the area of Palestine not including Transjordan. The total area of the state would be about 2,000 square miles, with an average width of about thirty miles. The total population of this territory was estimated to be about 490,000, of which 265,000 were Jews and 225,000 Arabs. Included in the Jewish state would be the cities of Haifa, Tiberias, Safed, and Acre, which were to remain under a temporary mandate because of their strategic position in relation to the oil pipe lines and because of the interest of the British capitalist in these places.¹² The main objection raised by the Jews at the time was the position of Jerusalem. They did not feel that they could fulfill the ideals of Zionism when their capital, Jerusalem, was not in their hands. Above all, they wanted the control of the section of Jerusalem upon which was located the Hebrew University, the center of learning for the Jews.¹³

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. CVI, col. 818.

13. Ibid., col. 651.

The Arab state was to include Transjordan and all of Palestine not included in the Jewish state or in the territory reserved for a mandate for the British government. The Arab population of this territory was about 960,000 which was spread over an area of 42,000 square miles, including Transjordan.

The mandated corridor which was to be reserved for Great Britain was located between a point north of Jerusalem and a point south of Bethlehem and extended to the sea. It was to include the main road and the railroad as well as the towns of Lydda and Ramle and was to terminate at Jaffa. The basic idea for this territory was to be a good and just government without regard for sectional interests. It was also necessary to make provision for the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem to be maintained and to assure the peoples of all races and creeds that they would have free access to these places. Thus, these places were to be left in the hands of Great Britain as was also the protection of religious endowments and places in the Arab and Jewish states which were sacred to the Jews and Arabs,
14
respectively.

Because the Jews and Arabs could not live together peaceably, they were to be put into separate states and the mandate which had been in operation for fifteen

14. "Text of the Official Summary," op. cit., New York Times, July 8, 1937.

years was to be discarded. The Royal Commissioners believed they had devised a satisfactory solution, but they failed to consider very seriously the 225,000 Arabs who lived in the section that was to become a Jewish state and the 1,200 Jews who would be left in the Arab state.¹⁵ The Royal Commission proposed that the 45 per cent of the population of the Jewish state which was Arab and which lived on 75 per cent of the land should be removed to some part of the Arab state. Those who formulated the plan evidently did not take into consideration the feelings of the Arabs or whether it could actually be worked out in a satisfactory manner. Since 1920 the natural increase of the Arab population had been over 50 per cent and a large part of these Arabs lived in or near Jewish cities because of the opportunities for employment and because it was easy to sell their farm produce to the Jewish inhabitants. Thus, in spite of all that could be done, there were going to be Arabs in the Jewish state and Jews in the Arab state, because these people had a definite purpose in settling where they did. It would be impossible to remove the Arabs from a prosperous section of the country to one that was less prosperous. The Jews were trying to prove to the world that through the economic system the two peoples could be brought together and now if they were to be entirely

15. Ibid.

separated, how could this be accomplished? In the House of Commons,¹⁶ Mr. Morgan Jones asked how, if 1,000,000 Arabs could not live peaceably with 400,000 Jews, were they expecting 225,000 Arabs to live with 255,000 Jews without a struggle.

The Arab state would not be capable of supporting a great increase in the population, and many Arabs would be without employment and even without homes and means of subsistence. This put another burden upon the British government. The Commission recommended that the government should develop and provide irrigation in the Arab state so as to make the proposal for moving more attractive to the Arabs.¹⁷ If the British were going to have to spend millions of dollars to develop the Arab state in order to induce the people to move, it was logical to think that this could bring peace without partition. If in the past fifteen years Britain had invested her capital in the development of Arab towns and industries and in improving the status of the Arab farmer, as the Zionist organization had done for the Jews, one could easily believe that this would have satisfied a large majority of the Arabs and that they would not have felt that they were being ignored while so much was being done for the development of the Jews.

16. Official Report, House of Commons, CCCXXVI, col. 2259.

17. "Text of the Official Summary," op. cit., New York Times, July 8, 1937.

In thinking of separate states, the question immediately arises as to whether the Arab state would be able to endure from an economic and financial standpoint. The Commission indicated in its report that it did not believe the Arabs could be self-supporting by the suggestion that the Jews were to pay a subvention to the Arab state. The British government was to grant 2,000,000 pounds to the state, besides furnishing the money for the cost of the development and irrigation of the land.¹⁸ The Jews were to pay the subvention because now that the two races were to be separated, the Arabs would no longer profit from the taxes which the Jews paid. Then, too, the government had been able to maintain public services for the Arabs with revenues which the Jews paid and this would no longer be possible. The grant of 2,000,000 pounds from the British government was to be paid to help with the upkeep of Transjordan, which was to be included in the Arab state. Each year since Transjordan was separated from Palestine, it had been necessary for Great Britain to contribute to the finances of the country because its own revenues were not sufficient to carry on the administration.

The official report held that the partition plan would be advantageous to the Jews because it "secures the establishment of the Jewish National Home" and enables them to call "their national home their own" because it was to

18. Ibid.

become a Jewish state and there would no longer be any danger of its being subjected to Arab rule in the future.¹⁹ This sounded very well, but how was it to be carried out? The Commission said that the "volume of Jewish immigration should be determined by the economic absorptive capacity." The Jews would now be crowded into a very small section, where it would not take long to absorb the number of Jews that would fill it to capacity. Then the immigration must stop and when this happened the Jewish capital would cease to come into the country. The Jews the world over had been supporting the Zionist movement in Palestine, but it was doubtful that they would be willing to continue sending money for the development of only a small section of Palestine and especially when this section did not include the Holy City, Jerusalem.²⁰

This problem of capital was not the real threat to the National Home, however. Far more serious was the small territory in which the Jews were to live without any hope of expansion. In the original plan for founding the National Home the movement had been that of "back to the soil." The Jews first intended to go to Palestine, acquire land, and build up agricultural communities. The large number of Jews admitted to the country made it impossible for this idea to endure. There were too many Jews and too little

19. Ibid.

20. Literary Digest, 124: 9, July 24, 1937.

land to be bought, and they had to turn to industry for a livelihood. This called for more Jews to run the factories and gradually the Jewish centers were found in the cities rather than in the rural districts. As a result of the partition plan, the main cities which the Jews had developed and where they lived were either included in the Arab state or were placed under a special mandate and were not left for the Jews to carry on their work. The Jewish state was not large enough for all the urban Jews to become farmers, especially when 75 per cent of the land in the Jewish state²¹ still belonged to the Arabs. With these hindrances, how was the Jew to develop his national home to the fullest extent?

The partition plan was believed to be advantageous to the Arabs because it provided the independence they had been demanding for so many years. Each state was to be sovereign and independent even to the extent of making its own tariff laws and controlling the immigration and all internal affairs.²² Thus, it was believed that the Arabs would have an equal standing with the surrounding Arab nations who had gained their independence and be able to make progress through an Arab unity. There would be no more danger that they would be swamped by the Jews and become a

21. New York Times, July 8, 1937.

22. Ibid.

minority people and lose their national individuality.

There could be no danger that the Jews would gain control of the government and subject the Arabs or drive them from the country entirely. They could also be sure that the Jews would not get exclusive control of the places which were holy to the Arab people because they were to be left in the hands of the British under the rule of a new mandate which protected the "Holy Places" for all to whom they were sacred. The Jews were confined to a definite territory and could not control places outside of this state, but it was also equally true that the Arabs were confined to their state and were not willing to give up their ownership of the Wailing Wall and such places as were also claimed by the Jews, because this would be contrary to the principles for which they had fought earlier. It was also believed that the Arabs could be appeased by the promise of a subvention from the Jewish state. Again, however, the British were confronted with the fact that Arab nationalism could not be bribed with material wealth.

If this plan of partition were to be adopted, it would be necessary to have a period of transition during which the existing British government should give way to the independent states. ²⁴ The report suggested that during this period the mandate should continue to be the governing

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

instrument but certain changes should be made. The purchases of land by Jews in the Arab state and by Arabs in the Jewish state were to be prohibited and the Jewish settlement in plane lands in the Jewish state was to be completed within two years.²⁵ No Jewish immigration was to be permitted in the Arab state, and in the Jewish state immigration was to be determined, as was so often planned, by the economic absorptive capacity. Another important step that was to be taken during this transition period was in the direction of increasing the number of Arab schools and of supporting the schools which would be in the new mandated area. The new plan for establishing a British university was to be considered, with the hope that both Jews and Arabs would attend and this would bring about ultimate reconciliation of the races.²⁶

In its conclusion, the Royal Commission admitted that probably neither race would be satisfied with the plan upon the first examination, because it did not give either of them all that they wanted. The Arabs were to give up part of the land which they had ruled and occupied for a long time and the Jews would have to be content to establish a national home in only a small section of the "Promised Land."²⁷ It was hoped, however, that the feud which

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

was not "natural" or of "old standing" would end in the realization on the part of the Arabs of what a place in which they might settle peaceably would mean to the thousands of Jews who were being persecuted and driven from their homes.²⁸ The partition plan, it was believed, offered a way to solve the difficulties which had steadily grown since Britain had accepted the Mandate for Palestine. "Partition," the report stated,

offers the final solution of the problem which does justice to the rights and aspirations of both the Arabs and the Jews and discharges the obligations undertaken toward them twenty years ago to the fullest extent that is practicable in the circumstances of the present time. ²⁹

In the official approval of the partition plan, His Majesty's Government stated that in the past seventeen years it had hoped that in time the two races with their national aspirations would have adjusted themselves to each other and it was on this assumption that the country had been governed. Now it was realized that the conflict was irreconcilable and that the two races could not be satisfied under the provisions of the mandate system and so the partition plan was accepted on the belief that it was the "best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock."³⁰

The partition plan met with immediate opposition and aroused the interested parties the world over. It was

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

not liked by the Jews, the Arabs, the Permanent Mandates Commission, or even the United States.³¹ Everywhere the Jews and Arabs were disappointed and yet they could not help but respect this document and feel that it came a little nearer to the solution of their problem. But even this was not enough. It gave to the Jewish state the greater portion of fertile land and left to the Arabs the portion that was largely unproductive and mountainous. The Jews were also to receive the only deep sea harbor, Haifa, and that meant that the Arabs would have to cross the Jewish state in order to export their commodities or to receive the imports from other nations.³² In between these two factions was the British mandated territory, which was really common ground and yet was very heavily fortified.³³ The Arabs also resented the idea of dividing the country. It had been their home for centuries and the Arabian people were scattered over the country to such an extent that the partition plan, if carried out, would practically divide them into separate nations and peoples. There would be 225,000 Arabs left in the Jewish state and there would be only 1,200 Jews in the Arab state. This meant that Galilee,

31. Wells, op. cit., p. 25.

32. Christopher Lumby, "Letter from Palestine," Contemporary Review, 152: 154, August, 1937.

33. Wells, op. cit., p. 25.

whose population was 87 per cent Arab, would be given to the Jews. The Jewish state would also block the direct route to the most important neighboring Arab mandate, Syria, and thus make the Palestinian Arabs feel more secluded than ever. They also felt that they would not have free access to the "Holy Places" which were all placed under British guardianship.³⁴

Aside from the fact that they were losing their national capital, Jerusalem, the Jewish objections were largely economic ones. The most important Jewish industries, the Dead Sea Potash Works, and the Jordan River Power Station, along with some of the oldest, most established colonies were to be turned over to the Arab state. This would mean that many Jews would have to find some other means of gaining a livelihood or would have to live under the Arab rule. The Jews also objected to the subsidy which the Jewish state would have to pay because they felt that it would be a burden and also a drain upon the treasury. There was some territory in southern Palestine which was not being utilized by the Arabs and yet the Jews were not to be allowed to develop it into farming lands by fertilization³⁵ because it was in the Arab state. This, they felt, was unfair.

34. Lumby, op. cit., p. 155.

35. Ibid.

This unrest and opposition naturally led to the same type of warfare as had occurred in 1936, except that it was now on a much larger scale. Religion now entered into the struggle and it became a fight between Islam and Christians and Jews. The Arab rioting was turned not only against the Jews but also against His Majesty's Government and its forces and representatives in Palestine.³⁶ The British forces, at first, were not prepared for such an attack. It was known that the plan did not offer either party all that it wanted and yet it was believed that it offered enough freedom and security to keep both quiet for a while.³⁷

Therefore, due to the failure to look upon the situation in a realistic manner and the lack of initiative, the civil government was paralyzed and the military machine was found lacking in men. The District Commissioner, Mr. R. E. H. Crosbie, had been warned of the plans of the terrorist, but when the time came he had done nothing and had to flee from Jaffa.³⁸ The revolt finally resulted in the death of about 2,400 people. At first, martial law had been declared in sections, but as the fighting continued, it was spread throughout the whole country. In October

36. Wells, op. cit., p. 26.

37. New Republic, 91: 292, July, 1927.

38. Albert Viton, "Is It the End of Partition?" Asia, 38: 708, December, 1938.

the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem had been deposed and had fled to Syria. From there he carried on his agitation against the rule of the British and also against the proposed partition plan.³⁹

Finally, it was realized by all, and especially by the House of Commons, that peace was not to be achieved by enforcing the plan, and a commission headed by Sir John Woodhead was appointed to re-examine it and make any recommendations that it deemed plausible. The commission reported that it was impossible to divide the small country into satisfactory economic, political, and racial unities. Thereupon, the British government decided to abandon the partition plan as "impracticable."⁴⁰ The commission also recommended that a joint conference of Jewish and Arabian leaders be called in 1939 to meet in London and try to agree on peaceful terms at a round-table discussion.⁴¹

Albert Viton, writing an article for Asia, said, "Partition, at least in the radical and final manner envisaged by the Royal Commission, is, therefore, probably dead."⁴²

Once again His Majesty's Government had proposed a method for satisfying the Jews and the Arabs which was refused by both parties. Britain, in presenting her various plans for Palestine, had done so in a half-hearted

39. Literary Digest, 124: 11, November 27, 1937.

40. Viton, op. cit., 38: 711, December, 1938.

41. Scholastic, 33: 14, December 3, 1938.

42. Viton, op. cit., p. 711.

manner. When the Jews and the Arabs objected to her suggestions, she immediately withdrew them. This British vacillation arose from the fact that the Middle East has 75,000,000 Moslems who were sympathetic with the Arabs in Palestine; the safety of India could be threatened by Moslem hostility; and British freedom of action was limited by the Balfour Declaration.

CHAPTER V

BRITISH FAILURE IN PALESTINE

For two years, 1937 to 1938, Palestine was comparatively peaceful and the people there and throughout the world were anxiously waiting for the conference of the Jewish and Arabian leaders, which had been called to meet in London in 1939. The question which was uppermost in the minds of all who were interested was whether the Jews and the Arabs would be able to meet peaceably around a table and discuss with calmness the future of the country which they both claimed.

Britain set forth formally her reasons for¹ calling the conference as follows:

The British government would wish to see in due course an independent Palestine state under which the whole people of Palestine would enjoy the rights which other people enjoy of self-government. They would declare that it was their intention that the mandate should come to an end and that an independent Palestine state should be created in treaty relations with Britain.

A round table conference composed of British, Arab, and Jewish representatives should be summoned in London to work on the problem of a suitable constitution for Palestine. The Arab and Jewish representatives would not be elected but would be nominated and invited to attend the conference by His Majesty the King. The High Commissioner would nominate the Arab and Jewish

1. New York Times, February 27, 1939.

representatives after communicating with the various parties in Palestine.

Pending the inauguration of the round table conference and the presentation of its report, as an earnest of the intention of the British government to give the people of Palestine a part in their government, representatives of both the Arab and the Jewish communities in Palestine would be added to the existing Executive and Advisory Councils, both of which at present consist of officials. The Arabs and Jewish representatives would be nominated, not elected, and the title of the advisory council changed to "Council of State."

Before the conference opened formally, Sir Ronald Storrs, the former British Governor of Palestine, set forth four principles which he considered important if the conference were going to succeed. These were:²

1. We must put down terrorism with a steel rod, as a matter not to be accepted from the Arabs, or indeed, from much greater nations.

2. We must not abandon the Balfour Declaration for our honor or interest.

3. Emigration to Palestine must not be cut off.

4. Some assurance must be given to the Arabs in the country that they have so long inhabited.

It was also generally believed that the British government would ask the Arabs to support a "United States of Arabia."³ Through this plan it was proposed that Palestine be divided into two autonomous cantons, each with its

2. Ibid., January 20, 1939.

3. Scholastic, 34: 8, February 25, 1939.

own autonomous government having the right to control immigration in its own area. Both of these cantons were to be joined to a federal government which would be under the British Mandate. In this way it was hoped that an Arab unity could be attained because it was believed that these two states would naturally join with the other Arab countries represented at the conference and the questions would be settled by the Federation rather than by the prejudiced leaders from Palestine.

When the delegates came to the conference each group came with demands to be made of the British government and the British had plans to propose to the Jews and the Arabs. Jamel Hussein brought the Arabs' demands. They asked for the recognition of the rights of the people in Palestine to have complete independence with free elections in the country; the complete stoppage of immigration and the abandonment of the principle that Palestine should be a national home for the Jews; and to put an end to the mandate under which Britain administered Palestine and the substitution of a treaty between Great Britain and an independent Palestine.⁴ Mr. Hussein also said that the methods which England was using amounted to a complete dictatorship and that Palestine should not be asked to solve the refugee problem for the whole world which was as responsible for the Jewish refugees from Germany as she was.

4. Newsweek, 13: 26, March 6, 1939.

5 The British immediately put forth their proposals. Theirs consisted of a plan by which they hoped to stabilize the Palestinian government by adopting a constitution under which the Jews would have to concede something on the immigration question, but under which they would never have the political status of a minority. The plan was that the future immigration into Palestine would be determined by a formula which would establish a permanent proportion of the two races in the Holy Land. Although this scheme would keep the Jews in a minority in regard to population, it would insure them of complete political parity. The constitution was to achieve this by guaranteeing to the Jews the same voting power as the Arabs in a legislative assembly or whatever form of government might be established.

The Zionists refused even to discuss this plan and the executive board of the Jewish agency for Palestine met and formed a refusal to be submitted to the British. The Arabs, who had not been brought into the proposed federation, were divided in their opinion. The Palestinian Arabs still insisted on immediate and complete independence while the other Arab leaders were urging them to accept the British proposals which they considered to be the most complete Arab victory which had been suggested. Even if in the future governing body the Jews were guaranteed equality,

they did not have enough faith in the British government to feel certain that this plan would be carried out and they believed that eventually they would become subject to an Arab majority. In this lay the worst fear of the Zionists. They feared that the question would be referred to a Palestine government in which the Jews would have only minority rights and they thus became determined that they would have nothing to do with the suggestion. They even went so far as to say that the proposals were "not even worthy of discussion," and they also gave notice that they intended to withdraw from the conference if the British plans were in any way carried out.

6

When the news of the plan reached Palestine rioting began again and bloodshed continued. A twenty-four hour curfew was imposed in the Jewish quarter of the older section of Jerusalem. Therefore, another scheme was proposed in London. This was a plan for conciliation by the creation of a Palestine legislature with an upper and lower house. The members of the lower house were to be elected on the basis of population and those of the upper house on the basis of political equality. The upper house was to have control of all the important questions, such as immigration of the Jews and the transference of land from the Arabs to the Jews.

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6. New York Times, February 28, 1939.

7. Ibid., March 7, 1939.

Several other plans were suggested but none could be agreed upon. Finally the meetings were suspended and the British withdrew to draw up a plan which they said both sides would have to accept in principle, if not in detail.⁸ This was set forth in the White Paper in which the British said the Jews should have a "Homeland in Palestine in so far as it had already been established but that they were not to be allowed to increase in number so as to deprive the Arabs of their majority."⁹ Using the mandate as a guide, there were found to be four main obligations which the British government should carry out.¹⁰ These were: first, the protection of and access to the "Holy Places" and religious buildings; secondly, to place the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as would secure development of self-government institutions; thirdly, to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all people; and, fourthly, to place the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as would secure the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

His Majesty's Government felt that it was necessary to formulate a clear definition of its policy and government. Therefore, the following section of the paper defined that

8. Ibid., March 9, 1939.

9. Time, 33: 25, May 29, 1939.

10. New York Times, May 18, 1939.

policy.

His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the mandate, in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied, could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country.

Also,

His Majesty's Government therefore now declares unequivocally that it is not a part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state. 11

Then, to explain what was meant by the Jewish National Home, the paper went on to say that

When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride. 12

The British, at the time, were not willing to draw up any exact constitutional forms which the future government might have, but their objective, as was stated clearly, was self-government in an independent Palestine - a state in which both the Arabs and the Jews would share the authority in the government so that the interests of each would be able to succeed.

13

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

The two main questions to settle were those of government and of immigration. As to the first, the White Paper outlined the plan in five points, which were very similar to the others that had been proposed at the conference. They were as follows:

1. The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future.

2. The independent state should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in the government in such a way as to insure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

3. The establishment of an independent state will be preceded by a transitional period through which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country.

4. With this object in view, His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain departments with British advisors. The number of Palestinians in charge of the departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of departments are Palestinians, exercising administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials.

5. At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government, will be set up to review the working of constitutional arrangements during the transition period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the Independent Palestine State.

As for immigration, the White Paper went back to the mandate in which Britain was required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions" and also to
 15
 the Command Paper of 1922. This provided that

it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to insure that immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.

Along with this, the White Paper made several proposals,
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 which were as follows:

1. Jewish immigration in the next five years will be at a rate which will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. This would amount to about 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. In each of the five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed. In addition, 25,000 refugees as soon as adequate provision is made.

2. After five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it.

3. Illegal immigration will be checked.

17
 The proposal was rejected by both sides. Jews objected to the limitation which was imposed upon Jewish immigration and Arabs objected to waiting ten years for the

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Newsweek, 13: 19, May 29, 1939.

establishment of the independent Palestine state. As a result, the conference was adjourned and the delegates returned to their respective homes. The conference had been a failure so far as getting the Jews and Arabs to agree on a form of government, but the Arabs went home with a definite feeling of friendliness toward Britain and in this the conference had accomplished something. For some time it seemed that the British felt the absolute need of maintaining friendly relationships with the Arab states.¹⁸

George Antonius, the secretary of the Palestine Arab delegation, said:

The break up of the conference came not on one of the three major questions - independence, immigration, and land - upon which the discussions here have been turned, but on the question of the constitutional changes to be made with regard to the establishment of an independent state in Palestine.

On that the conference broke up without ever entering into discussion of the British Government's proposals regarding immigration, land sales, or constitutional changes.¹⁹

Abdol Rahman Azzam, a member of the Egyptian delegation, said:

The Arabs and the Jews always have been friends and they should meet on common grounds and not quarrel over Palestine. We can find a great deal on which to agree to cooperate, but if the Palestine question is always placed in the foreground as the only question with the dogma of political Zionism, we must separate, which is equally bad for the Jews and the Arabs.

18. Scholastic, 34: 8, May 27, 1939.

19. New York Times, March 18, 1939.

If we can make Palestine a ground for cooperation and continue our historical friendship, then we shall be able to forward this friendship elsewhere and everywhere. 20

Dr. S. S. Wise, a Jewish delegate to the Palestine conference, voiced the opinion of the Jews when he said that

The British had "let down" the Jewish delegates and had refused to cooperate with them in their efforts to seek a peaceful solution of the British problem. 21

It was realized that many things had been achieved since Britain had been placed in charge of Palestine. There had been a 20 per cent increase in population where the natural increase had been only 8 per cent. Land values had risen because of the Jewish immigration and the amount of public revenue devoted to improvement of agriculture had increased decidedly. Public works had increased and there had been a large extension of the roads and railroads all over the country. Large agricultural colonies had been formed and cement, silicate brick, soap and other factories had been established which employed about 6,000 persons. The total imports in five years (1920-1925) rose 35 per cent and the per capita trade was \$43.00. Health and education departments had been established in practically every section of the country. Most of this had been accomplished by the large investments of the Zionist

20. Ibid., March 22, 1939.

21. Ibid., March 10, 1939.

22

organization and the Jewish immigrants. Still it was realized, however, that material wealth and improvements were not enough to bring peace to Palestine or even to make Britain more favorable toward carrying out her promise of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

It could be seen that any arrangement for the future of Palestine must have the interest of the Arabian people at heart. The reasons that the government gave for making these changes in favor of the Arabs were: first,

They cannot allow the indefinite expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration since this would mean rule by force; and, secondly, they are charged "to secure the development of self-governing institutions." 23

The real reason for the government's new policy could be found in the wish to secure the loyalty of the Arabs in the event of war.

The Palestine problem had been made harder by the rise of Arab nationalism and the persecution of the Jews in Europe. With the limitation of immigration, it was found that refugee Jews from the European countries were being smuggled, so to speak, into Palestine. They were being run out of their country and they had to go somewhere; they preferred the possibility of arrest in Palestine to the certainty of concentration camps in Germany.

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22. Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 570-574.

23. Israel Cohen, "The Future of Palestine," Nineteenth Century, 126: 30, July, 1939.

24. Victor Cazalet, "Palestine Policy," Fortnightly Review, 152: 266, September, 1939.

The situation in Palestine was now very similar to the one that England found when over twenty years before General Allenby had persuaded the Arabs to fight with the British; and, in order to win the support of the Jews, the National Home had been promised. Once again, war became the main consideration. This new proposal had been a war move, a compromise to secure the loyalty of both

²⁵ races. There were about two Arabs to every Jew in Palestine and the whole of the population had been subjected to the influence of propaganda which was put out by the Germans and the Italians. As far back as 1936, Italian funds were coming in to the Arab rioters through French Syria. Bedouins had been promised \$15.00 a day, plus food and loot,
²⁶ for attacks on the Jews in Palestine. To England, Palestine was a vital link in British communications with the eastern portion of her Empire, and to the Germans and Italians, Palestine was an easy point from which to attack the Suez Canal. At Haifa there was a good harbor, a potential naval base, and the terminus of a pipeline where British tankers filled up with oil from Iraq. Another thing that made it necessary for the British to appease the Arabs was that there were five other Arab states besides Palestine whose influence would be felt if war should come

25. Scholastic, 34: 9, April 1, 1939.

26. Time, 27: 16, June 8, 1936.

in that section of the world. These were Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. All of these countries were friendly to Britain, but they also had a great amount of sympathy for their brethren in Palestine, and so²⁷ it was necessary that Britain retain their friendship. The Jews also realized that war was near, and Dr. Einstein, the eminent scientist, urged the Jews to

Remember in the midst of your justified embitterment that England's opponents are also our bitterest enemies, and that in spite of everything the maintenance of England's position is of utmost importance to us. 28

All during the meeting of the conference in London the fear of the Germans and Italians could be felt. The claims of the Arabs and the Jews were subordinated to the question of the defense of the British Empire, which was then threatened with as much danger as it had been in 1915. Viscount Halifax said:

Gentlemen, there are times when the justice of ethical considerations must give way to administrative necessity. There is the necessity of keeping friendly relations with the Arab states against a German or Italian attack in the Near East, an attack that might be made with arms and already is being made with propaganda. 29

Dr. S. S. Wise said that the attitude which Britain had towards the whole conference was due to the presence of Hitler,

27. Newsweek, 13: 26, March 6, 1939.

28. New York Times, May 28, 1939.

29. Ibid., March 5, 1939.

Mussolini, and the Mufti "in the shadow."³⁰ Many of the disorders down through the years had been conducted by hired bands with the help of foreign money. The assistance had come from Italian sources at first and then Germany had joined in and furnished money and ammunition. There had been an Arab propaganda bureau in Berlin and a Palestinian Arab delegation attended one of the Nuremburg rallies in Germany.³¹ The tension that arose between Great Britain and Italy brought out the importance of Palestine as a part of the British Empire. England's air force needed air bases that were solidly established in countries where the people were friendly and under complete domination. England needed an air base near the Suez Canal and Palestine was the logical place and so it was necessary to win the friendship of the people.

Soon after the Royal Commission's report the nephew of the Mufti made a special trip to Berlin. When he returned, he assured the Arabs that they had been promised arms and ammunition. In 1938 a number of German officers arrived in Palestine to instruct the rebel bands. The Nazis were trying to gain the friendship of the Arabs so that they might bring up again the old plan for a Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railroad. They also realized that Palestine would be an

30. Ibid., March 10, 1939.

31. Israel Cohen, "The Future of Palestine," op. cit. p. 27.

ideal field from which to harass the British and French
 Empires and bleed them of their troops.³²

As the Italians and Germans continued to stir up trouble in Palestine, the Prime Minister delivered a warning to them that England still stood by her declaration of 1922, in which she said that she "would regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference." He also said that the British Government was responsible for the administration and protection of Palestine "and intends to discharge that responsibility to the full."³³ Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden protested in the House of Commons against the anti-British propaganda which was being radioed by Italy to the inhabitants of Palestine. In these broadcasts, he reported, the British motives had been assailed, the British intentions misinterpreted, and the British influence flouted.³⁴ In answer to these warnings and accusations, the editor of the Falastin, an Arab newspaper, wrote:

Let us say, to end this foolish argument, that we are receiving German and Italian money. What of it? Are not the British paying the Turks right now; and did not half the civilized Western world accept money from them for fighting? ³⁵

England was now in need of help from these people that she

32. Albert Viton, "Hitler Goes to the Arabs," Asia, 39: 422, July, 1939.

33. New York Times, May 22, 1936.

34. Ibid., May 26, 1936.

35. Albert Viton, "The Evil Plight of Palestine," Asia, 38: 666, November, 1938.

had not been able to subdue, and it was a question of how much England was willing to concede in order to gain their wholehearted support.

After the war began in 1939, the Jews and Arabs began to sink their differences with the English. It also helped them to forget their differences with each other. Even the Jews were asked not to "strike out blindly in anger and disappointment," but to realize that their real enemies were not the British or even the Arabs, but the Nazi and Fascist governments who had armed, financed, and fomented the Arab revolts. ³⁶ Both the Jews and the Arabs were now beginning to see that it was the pressure of the threats from these countries that intimidated the British Government and brought forth the White Paper.

The situation in Palestine, therefore, remains unsettled so far as the Jews and the Arabs are concerned. It is difficult to determine whether the British, the Arabs, the Zionists, or all three are to blame for the unrest that has persisted in Palestine ever since the country was made a British Mandate. One can clearly see that the promises which His Majesty's Government made to the Arabs in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence and to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration are contradictory and under no circumstances could be carried out completely. Britain had

36. New York Times, May 28, 1941.

promised two races of people the right to rule the same country - a thing that was absolutely impossible. One could not say with certainty which of the two races, the Jews or the Arabs, is most responsible for the uprisings in the country. The Zionists were strong economically, due to the money which was supplied by Jews all over the world, and this aided them in getting control of certain sections of the country and in exerting their influence in others. The Arabs did not have as much capital to aid them and they, therefore, had to resort to violence to make their influence felt and to keep the attention of the British government. They had been quiet and peaceful until the Jews had received the promise of a national home and they were not inclined to allow themselves to be forgotten again. If one is going to say that the Arabs started the fighting, he must remember that the presence of the Jews was the cause of Arab unrest.

It would be useless to attempt to forecast what the outcome of the British rule in Palestine will be. We can say with some degree of assurance that the Arabs are not going to be satisfied until they receive an independent government and by that we might mean a government apart from the Jews. As for the Jews, they will probably continue in their efforts to reestablish themselves in Zion. To understand their position, we might go back to one of their ancient songs and read it with modern knowledge and

understanding. It reads like this:

By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down,
yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion.

We hanged our harps upon the willows in the
midst thereof.

For there they that carried us away captive
required of us a song; and they that wasted us
required of us mirth, saying, Sing us one of the
songs of Zion.

How shall we sing the Lord's song in a
strange land?

If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right
hand forget her cunning.

If I do not remember thee, let my tongue
cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not
Jerusalem above my chief joy.

Remember, O Lord, the children of Edom in
the day of Jerusalem; who said, Rase it, rase it,
even to the foundation thereof.

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