




To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Debra Lynn Pressley entitled "Us Versus Them: A Survey of Army Public Affairs Officers and the Press." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Communications.



Dr. Dorothy Bowles, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:



Accepted for the Council:



Associate Vice Chancellor
and Dean of the Graduate School

US VERSUS THEM: A SURVEY OF ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICERS AND THE PRESS

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Science

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Debra Lynn Pressley

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Chapter I. Introduction

The U. S. Army's interest in public affairs dates back to 1877. It was then customary that a report be given to the Congress, and indirectly to the public, by the Inspector General of the Army. The issuance of formal press releases to newspaper correspondents did not begin until the Spanish American War of 1898. Then, on June 30, 1916, the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, named the first press relations spokesman for the War Department, it was, then, Major Douglas MacArthur.

Since then, the armed forces have sought to work with the press to keep the American public informed. However, there has always been a tension between the military and the media. That is nothing new.

Dr. William Hammond, author of Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968, states:

The military and the media are not friends and they should not be, but neither are they enemies. The armed forces seek to preserve their good image with the American people, but that's not why we work with the press. We work with the press because it's our obligation. The public affairs officers essentially keep the relationship running. You can't reconcile the two points of view because they don't reconcile. You can't steer the two sides around some of the

obstacles. It's a hard job; ultimately, the public affairs officer is in the middle. The public affairs officer takes it from both sides. That was certainly the case in Vietnam, especially at the end of the war. It was certainly the case in the Gulf. Overall, though, the presence of the media on the battlefield is good. As General Ulysses Grant pointed out, the public can cut off the war when it cuts off the funds for the war, and the media are there throwing out some of the signals. That forces policymakers to think twice before committing soldiers to battle.

What also is not new is the battle that continues to rage over the dubious question of whether to allow press access to military operations. It is one that is not susceptible to quick resolution. On the one hand, access would undoubtedly allow the press to witness events that might otherwise go unreported and increase the flow of information to the public. However, the possibility of unrestricted press access to the battlefield may lead to the imposition of heavy censorship.

Access to the battlefield by nonmilitary personnel historically has been limited to accredited members of the press. Even accredited correspondents have occasionally been denied access to certain areas and have often been subjected to strict military censorship. However, the press has reported first-hand virtually every military operation involving American forces since the Revolutionary War.

War correspondents typically are not in a position to see important developments. Peter Braestrup described

coverage during the Vietnam war, a war in which the press had wide access, as follows:

Technology has eased access. In Vietnam, one could reach the battle or its environs (by helicopter) and leave it-- with luck -- in three to six hours. Reporters and photographers were plunged alongside uniformed strangers in a remote, often dangerous locale for a brief time, and then whisked away, often with "good film" but without any notion of either why the fight started or its "before" and "after" (Braestrup, 1985).

Correspondents in other wars faced similar problems. One World War II North African correspondent described his experience as follows:

From the first to the last, we never "saw" a battle in the desert. We were simply conscious of a great deal of dust, noise and confusion. The only way we could gather a coherent picture was by driving hard from one headquarters to another and by picking up the reports from the most forward units as they came through on the radio telephone. Then, when the worst was over, we went forward ourselves to observe the prisoners and the booty and to hear the individual experiences of the soldiers (Knightley, p. 308).

Press access to the battlefield is largely irrelevant to gathering the information that is often of the greatest interest to the public. The plans and strategies for upcoming operations as well as intelligence gathered about

the enemy's intentions are all closely held by government officials away from the battlefield. The presence of reporters at the front lines will not help to obtain this information.

During the Grenada incursion of October 1983, Operation "Urgent Fury," the press reported extensively from Barbados even though access to the front lines was denied to them. The press was initially denied access to the island of Grenada, but reported the invasion without censorship from the neighboring island of Barbados. If some members of the press had been allowed to go to Grenada, they could have reported the story as they saw it, albeit with censorship, while the uncensored press in Barbados, and elsewhere, could have freely reported and criticized the operation as they saw it.

The New York Times charged that the Reagan administration had released deceptive information about the Grenada invasion. Case in point, shortly before the attack was launched, White House spokesman Larry Speakes denied reports of an impending invasion, calling them "preposterous" (Speakes, 1989). President Carter's press secretary, Jody Powell, released similar misleading information before the Iran rescue operation. He said "The government has not only the right but sometimes the obligation to lie" (Powell, 1984).

The danger in wide press access is that by demanding access, the press may prompt the military to impose censorship that may be more detrimental to free press concerns than denial of access. This is dangerous because

it creates the risk of manipulation of news through censorship.

The military often conditions access to military operations on acceptance of censorship. Usually censorship is one of the ground rules that the press must accept in order to obtain accreditation, and failure to comply with the ground rules will usually result in revocation of accreditation. Censorship was imposed during the Civil War, both World Wars, the Korean War, Grenada, Panama, and recently in the Persian Gulf. The one counter-example is Vietnam, where combat reporters were given free reign and censorship was virtually nonexistent (Andrews, 1991).

Imperfect thought it may be, our independent press serves as the vital link between the battlefield and the homefront. It has been our source for reliable, disinterested war news. In World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, civilian authorities saw to it that, in keeping with our tradition as an open society, reasonable provision was made for journalists in war zones (Braestrup, 1985). However, since the Vietnam War and Watergate era, distrust of both media and military has become ingrained and unshakable.

Experienced observers say that post-Vietnam military attitudes influenced the decision to shut the media out of the landing in Grenada. The officers and commanders of the Vietnam War, who believed the media had worked against the American troops, had become influential admirals and generals, calling the shots from the Pentagon and

determined not to expose the Grenada operation to what some continue to view as a hostile adversary (Braestrup, 1985).

To this day, some in the pentagon still believe the "press" lost the war in Vietnam. It seems that some military leaders cannot forget the humiliations, and despite assertions that the reporting from Southeast Asia had negligible effect on public opinion, the breach remains unrepaired (Trotta, 1991). Military personnel provided wide access and seemed to have gotten a bonus set of battle scars for their trouble (Trotta, 1991).

Scholarly data, however, casts some doubt on this view. Although the scenes of actual carnage may be most vividly remembered, they were but a small fraction of the footage from Vietnam. In addition, television was not the only source of the public's perception of the horror of the war; there were also widely reproduced photographs that depicted the agony and tragedy of war.

Opinion polls have documented that public support for the Vietnam War declined less rapidly than public support for the Korean War, when television coverage was much less significant and military field censorship was in force. The available evidence also suggests that television coverage of Vietnam reflected a critical view of the war only after public opinion had begun to oppose it (Watkins, 1983).

There have been many suggestions as to what went wrong with reporting the Vietnam War. Drew Middleton, a New York Times correspondent during Vietnam, blames the

very fact that there were no censors. "On three trips to Vietnam," he said in a letter to Phillip Knightley, author of The First Casualty, "I found generals and everyone else far more wary of talking to reporters precisely because there was no censorship. Their usual line with a difficult or sensitive question was 'You must ask the public relations people about that.' The latter, usually of low rank, clammed up, and the reporter and the public got less." (Middleton, 1984).

It appears that the underlying problem is one of mutual comprehension, understanding and trust. The fact is that since 1941, under many trying circumstances, the military and the media have managed to accommodate each other, often in surprising ways, mostly without undue jeopardy to military operations, the healthy flow of information to the U. S. public, or the safety of journalists. This history reflects that all was not in harmony during World War II, that newsmen sought military censorship during the Korean War, that journalists did enjoy unusual freedom and facilities during the Vietnam War, and that the British, out of operational necessity, curbed newsmen during the 1982 Falklands expedition. If nothing else, the Grenada operation showed what happens when the military does not make plans to accommodate the media.

As a result of the confrontation between the media and the military over Grenada, the Defense Department appointed a commission to study the situation and make recommendations for future press coverage of military battles. This panel, named the Sidel Commission after its

chairman, retired Major General Winant Sidel, was made up of members of the media and the military, as well as civilian experts. The commission recommended only sanctioned access in the form of a national media pool.

The Sidel Panel recommendations were:

1. That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning.
2. When it becomes apparent during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should provide for the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before "full coverage" is feasible.
3. That, in connection with the use of pools, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he study the matter of whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool is required or the establishment of a news agency list for use in the same circumstances.
4. That a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established

and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible and should be worked out during the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondent(s) from further coverage of the operation.

5. Public Affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.

6. Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements to assure the earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to the news media.

7. Planning factors should include provisions for intra- and inter-theatre transportation support of the media.

8. To improve media-military understanding and cooperation.

Most journalists seem willing to submit to these guidelines and even censorship in order to gain access to

military operations. It seems censorship is always preferable to no access at all.

Some have suggested it is desirable to have reporters present at military operations because even if censored initially, they can some day tell the story of what really happened.

For example, when Gen. Patton administered the slap heard around the world and when our own paratroopers were shot down by friendly fire over Sicily, the events were initially concealed, but, obviously, the information was later revealed to the American public.

There is no denying that the government must be able to do certain things in secret. Diplomacy is one of them. So are covert activities in which all nations democratic or otherwise, engage.

An ill-informed citizenry is incompatible with effective democracy. Few people would not argue that the conduct of war is one of the government's most critical functions. War threatens the economic well-being and life, itself, as profoundly as does lawlessness. The supreme court has not recognized a constitutional right of press access to any government function other than criminal court proceedings. However, by state and federal statutes, the public has been granted access to government meetings and records except for areas exempt by legislative mandate. This underscores the belief that the American people have a fundamental right to information about the activities of their government. Therefore, it is argued, that the government's conduct in war is no less vital to the process

of democratic government than information about events in a criminal courtroom.

Many have also argued that President Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek re-election in 1968 was in part because of public disapproval of his Vietnam War policy. This is dramatic evidence of the impact of war news on national politics.

Although the military has not always agreed with the press in its coverage of wartime news, it has never attempted to prevent the press from covering a military operation of a significant scale except in the Philippines and in Grenada (Middleton, 1984). Therefore, U. S. history establishes a record of direct press access to military conflict.

Military-media relations have never been entirely smooth, in part because of the nature of war, but also because of historic differences between the two callings. Each tends to attract different personality types and to foster different sets of values. Of necessity, military people are schooled to respect tradition, authority, and leadership; obedience is an inescapable part of military life. More often than not, it seems, commanders regard reporters as interlopers with no understanding of military imperatives: discipline, organization, technology, "the life" (Trotta, 1991). The military public affairs apparatus has not forgotten the days when it could be dangerous to wear the uniform in public. In contrast, because journalists on occasion have the job of challenging official wisdom, their

ranks tend to be filled with those who are more free-wheeling, irreverent, and skeptical of authority.

Certainly, the press has not cornered the market on virtue. Some journalists exaggerate, misunderstand, and mislead. They can act irresponsibly in big ways and in small. It is hard to forgive those television reporters who, after the Beirut attack, intruded on anxious families with fatuous and cruel questions like "How would you feel if your son were among the dead?" On a larger scale it can be argued that ever since Watergate much of the press has been too automatically hostile toward the government (Grunwald, 1983).

Public opinion polls suggest that the media do not bask in universal public esteem. Despite the success of individual television news stars in attracting high audience ratings, journalists as a group have seldom ranked high in popularity, the Watergate Era being the major exception. The military seem to focus its dislike of the media on the adverse impact of television on the public opinion during military operations. Many cite the negative impact on home-front morale of television reporting from the battlefield. This perception has been reinforced by the repeated claims of some network television journalists that powerful pictures alone brought home the brutal reality of war, and this perception is apparently shared to a great extent by the public.

This culture gap is compounded by competing goals. Some tension will always exist between the military's mission of winning on the battlefield and the combat

journalist's mission of providing the public with timely information (Watkins, 1983).

Some see the divide between the military and the media widening. On the media side, the overwhelming majority of young reporters have had no firsthand exposure to military life, let alone to combat. Additionally, eliminating the draft has only widened the gap, producing a press corps often hard pressed to tell a sergeant from a captain, let alone grasp the mysteries of thermal optical sights.

On the military side, the military public affairs authorities may not be ready to deal with the media's ever-increasing ability to broadcast live from the hot spots, and the revolution in communications technology that permitted instantaneous dissemination of news. Realizing that, PAOs know that pictures of a pilot lying in a burn unit or an infantryman slumped over a machine gun - the body bag factor - may erode American will or strengthen the enemy's hand (Trotta, 1991). As a consequence, the potential damaging result of any accidental release of information could be devastating and compounded further by its timeliness.

Additionally, the media's cynicism toward the government and their emphasis on investigative journalism raise the risk that war correspondents will not be as cooperative with the military in the future as their predecessors were (Radolf, 1984).

The U. S. government seeks to safeguard several interests by limiting press coverage of military conflicts.

First and foremost, naturally, is its obligation to protect the lives of soldiers. An inadvertent release of information about troop movements or locations could increase casualties. Secondly, of utmost importance, is the maintenance of operational security. Many wartime actions must be planned and launched in secrecy. Breach of that secrecy could risk the success of an operation and result in otherwise avoidable losses of life.

A total press exclusion from war zones, on the other hand, bars any first-hand reporting of war news. Because the public does not have any access to foreign war zones, it must depend on the news media for all disinterested reporting of war information.

Additionally, because dependable reporting of war news is vital to a democratic society, press access to wartime news warrants the same first amendment protection that guarantees press access to the criminal courtroom. Even if some news reports must be delayed for security reasons, the American people eventually must receive the full story of the government's conduct on the battlefield to ensure the government's continued accountability to the public. The presence of an independent press also guarantees that historians will have accurate accounts from which to pass along lessons learned.

The United States engages in military conflict to protect American interests and values. Permitting press access to war news may indeed increase the chances of a release of damaging information. However, democracy

began in American as an experiment in the ability of a people to govern themselves. This form of government necessarily involves risks. Protecting the ability of the press to keep the American people well-informed on public issues reduces the risk that the people will lose sovereign control over their government.

In the final analysis, the issue of direct press access to wartime news is a conflict between two vital national interests - the protection of national security information and the need of the American people to have access to information about the activities of its government. As one Defense Department official put it, "media relations are important, unless you have public support and confidence, you're going to lose the war."

As the Army's official spokesperson, the PAO (public affairs officer) straddles a thin line between the military organization representing the closed society of the Army and the press as representatives of the people.

Which side of the argument is right? What should the national policy be in reporting wartime situations? Perhaps neither side is entirely right nor wrong.

This study will concern itself with the characteristics and media-related attitudes of the Army public affairs officer, the Army's official spokesperson, and their civilian colleagues, the journalists who cover military installations and activities.

Chapter II. Review of the Literature

After 130 years, the basic argument is essentially the same. It's all about access. How much should the press be allowed to know and see of the conduct of the battle? Freedom of the press as guaranteed by the Constitution is a particularly American concept, while the American press is not impervious to control or attack, it is afforded legal protections not available elsewhere.

This review of the literature first examines a brief history of American press coverage of military operations from the Revolutionary War up to the line drawn in the sand during the Persian Gulf War.

Revolutionary War

History reveals a tradition on the part of the American government of providing the press with direct access to wartime news, with few exceptions. Since the Revolutionary War, American journalists traditionally have been allowed to accompany American troops on military operations. This is undisputed. What is disputed is the degree of freedom the press has been allowed to cover military operations.

In the early days of our nation, there was no press corps or professional war-reporting mechanism. As a result, "newspapers had no organized means of covering the Revolutionary War, but relied almost wholly on the chance arrival of private letters and of official and semi-official messages" (Mott, p. 99). Many of the newspaper stories were provided by soldiers who doubled as correspondents. The absence of a significant amount of direct press coverage of military conflict before the Civil War is attributable to the slow development of the American press, rather than any official action to bar press coverage.

The War of 1812

Mott writes that the coverage of the campaigns and incidents of the War of 1812-14 was almost as haphazard as that of the Revolutionary War. "Organized war correspondence was unheard of" (Mott, p.196). Thirty-seven newspapers existed in the United States at the time of the American Revolution. Since none of these publications employed war correspondents, they received news of the war from other newspapers, sailors, travelers, and the letters of observers (Payne, 1970).

Mexican-American War of 1846-47

The Mexican-American War of 1846-47 marked the beginning of the first "modern" war correspondent (Mott, p. 249). For the first time, the emergence of the war

correspondent allowed newspapers to carry extensive coverage of war news. The extension of newspaper coverage was due in part to the newspaper reporters' widespread access to the war.

During this war, writing men fought and a number of fighting men wrote, however, the news they gathered took a very long to get from the distant armies to the public. Since the process was somewhat slow the information could scarcely offer any help to Santa Anna by the time it reached the headlines.

Ten years before the Civil War, William Howard Russell of the London Times was, for a time, the only reporter with the British Army during the India Mutiny. The British commander allowed Russell to see anything on his desk, provided he used the information only in his dispatches to the Times, and provided that he agreed not to divulge it to anyone in India (Hammond, 1988).

Although unusual by today's standards, allowing this privilege was safe for the British commander because he knew that correspondence between India and England would take several weeks. Several more weeks would pass before the newspaper would arrive in India where it would be available to the enemy.

General George McClellan attempted to do something similar with the American press during the Civil War, by instituting a system of voluntary cooperation with the press. Although the technique had worked well in India, it failed miserably in the United States. The reason was simple. There were too many reporters and the rules of

the relationship between the military and the media were poorly defined. The reporters did not know who was responsible for what and they all were at each other's throats (Hammond, 1988).

The Civil War, 1861-65

The first major American conflict involving significant numbers of war correspondents was the Civil War. In addition, the advance of technology changed how the war was reported.

Most of the Civil War, in contrast to the Mexican-American War, was fought close to a telegraph key. The telegraph was available for large-scale use for the first time. Almost 50,000 miles of telegraph line were in use in the eastern states, and although the rates were high and the companies often demanded cash in advance before they would begin transmission, the by-line "By Telegraph" became more frequent as the war progressed. Additionally, Matthew Brady's photos of the Civil War epitomized the U. S. press's ready access to the battlefield. As a result, the reporting of the Civil War was not only more extensive than in any previous war, but also more immediate (Knightley, p. 20).

Both Northern and Southern generals banished correspondents from camp at one time or another. Some generals completely excluded the press. General Robert E. Lee came to have his favorites among reporters for Northern newspapers. On one occasion, he said that a reporter for the

Philadelphia Inquirer "knows what he writes and writes what he knows."

Probably the most notorious was General William Tecumseh Sherman. General Sherman hated politicians, profiteers, sentimentalists, and above all, he hated reporters, whom he considered worse than spies because, he said, they printed military secrets just to sell newspapers. He attacked the press vigorously and described them as a "set of dirty newspaper scribblers who have the impudence of Satan; they come into camp and poke about among the lazy shirks and pick up their camp rumors and publish them as facts. They are a pest and I treat them as spies which in truth they are." He was convinced if he killed them all there would be news from hell before breakfast (Burns, 1990).

In 1861, when a newspaper man named Florus Plympton arrived at Gen. Sherman's command in Kentucky requesting an interview, Sherman ordered the newsman to take the next train back to Louisville (Andrews, 1991).

When Plympton protested that he had come only to learn the truth, Sherman flew into a rage and said, "We don't want the truth told about anything here. . .We don't want the enemy any better informed than he is" (Andrews, 1991).

In another incident, Gen. Sherman found out that his operations in Kentucky had been exposed by press reports of his movements. Sherman was forced to fight a battle he had hoped to avoid at Goldsboro when the Confederate General

William Hardee read in the New York Tribune where the Yankees were heading. "It's impossible," Sherman told his staff, "to carry on a war with a free press."

Surprisingly, some of the press agreed with him. Henry Villard, a distinguished correspondent and editor, said, "if I were a commanding general, I would not tolerate any of the tribe within my army lines" (Andrews, 1991). Afterward, Sherman banished every newspaper correspondent from the lines and promised summary punishment to all who in the future gave information concerning his position, strength or movements (Randall, p. 318).

Perhaps no American military leader in our history has ever been as malevolently and unfairly vilified in the newspapers as Sherman was by the press. They said he was insane in 1861, and the suspicion of madness clung to him for the rest of the war. They said he was a coward for refusing to commit his troops to frontal assaults and when he did try a bloody charge up Kennesaw Mountain, they accused him of wasting his men for personal glory. They charged him with treason and treachery and one newspaper ran a story saying Sherman had been secretly paid off in Confederate gold to let Jefferson Davis escape to Mexico. Even taking into account the rough-and-tumble mores of the press at the time, the charges were scurrilous. Certainly, this was reason enough for Sherman to hate the press (Andrews, 1991).

Drew Middleton, military correspondent for the New York Times, describes the period between the Civil War and

the Spanish-American War as a time when relations between the press and the military improved during the Indian wars that occupied the Army for a third of a century after the South's surrender at Appomattox. This was largely because so few reporters were on the spot. However, war correspondents did ride with Gen. George A. Custer and Gen. George Crook, and it was said that they subscribed, in the main, to the then-popular doctrine that the only good Indian was a dead Indian (Middleton, 1984).

The Spanish-American War of 1898

Relations deteriorated during the Spanish-American War of 1898. Gen. William R. Shafter, commander of American troops in Cuba, had little use for reporters, including the famous correspondent, Richard Harding Davis, who supported the government's position in The New York Journal (Middleton, 1984).

World War I

When America entered World War I, Gen. John J. Pershing, became the commander of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe. He found that Britain and France, the senior allies, had already instituted press censorship for security reasons; Pershing found the restrictions congenial. Before World War I began, having persuaded the War Department to keep the press away during his pacification of Mindoro Island in the Philippines,

Pershing had managed to fight a successful campaign without any media scrutiny (Middleton, 1984).

Press restrictions imposed included first and foremost that the correspondent had to be accredited; second, rigorous censorship was imposed by military authorities; and lastly, access to the battle lines was restricted (Mathews, p. 169). The British press and army censors acted in concert to keep the horrors of trench warfare out of news accounts. During this time, Winston Churchill seriously suggested that the Times of London be commandeered and turned into an official government publication, to be used as "a sure and authoritative means of guiding public opinion" (Andrews, 1991). By this time, the press had become an unpleasant fact of life for the military. If correspondents could not be kept off the field, it was essential that they be controlled.

As always, American correspondents, who arrived overseas, after posting ten-thousand-dollar bonds to ensure their deportment, had to concern themselves with access. The United Press's Westbrook Pegler, twenty-three years old and the youngest accredited reporter in France, tried to get an interview with the American commander, Gen. John J. Pershing. The interview consisted in its entirety of Pershing's saying, "Pegler, get the hell out of my office" (Andrews, 1991).

There was much news to sit on during the war and the military fell into the practice of restricting information on the basis of the security of the troops. Pegler tried to break a story about the number of American soldiers dying

of pneumonia because of inadequate supplies of heat and clothing. Pershing wrote the United Press saying Pegler was too young to understand the uses of war and asking that he be replaced. He was (Andrews, 1991).

Frederick Palmer, a veteran war reporter for three American news agencies, turned down a forty-thousand-dollar-a-year job as a war correspondent to become chief censor for the American forces for a major's pay of twenty-four hundred dollars. He'd had more combat exposure than any officer in the American Expeditionary Forces by covering a number of conflicts, including the Greek-Turkish War, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine insurrection, the Boxer Rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War, and the American incursion into Mexico. However, trying to organize and discipline the unruly American press corps, he found, "was worse than war" (Andrews, 1991).

The press did not become noticeably warmer to the military in the months and years after the 1918 armistice, but the immense unifying shock of Pearl Harbor changed that, along with everything else. America had never entered a war with such a sense of common purpose.

World War II

America formally entered World War II on December 7, 1941. The years between 1941 and 1945 represented the high-water mark of cooperation between the military and the media. The Army's chief of staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, one of the most close-mouthed men in American

military history, routinely briefed top members of the Washington press corps, giving them the latest war information. The sessions were for background only, but the reporters gained valuable insight into the conduct of the war.

Ten days before the invasion of Sicily, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower filled in some thirty American reporters on the assault planning, down to identifying the specific divisions scheduled to hit the beaches. The press justified the confidence. There were no security breaches at any of these top-secret conferences.

However, as the invasion progressed, the field reporters in Sicily agreed, at Eisenhower's personal request, to sit on the most colorful story of the campaign: the famous slapping incident when Gen. George S. Patton struck a soldier said to be suffering from shell shock. The story was later broken in Washington by Drew Pearson, a popular political gossip columnist, who was not privy to the agreement made in Sicily.

The Korean War

The change in the media-military relationship began during the Korean War, where American troops next saw action. What censorship did occur was largely imposed at the source by senior officers. The main source was Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur, Commander of United Nations Forces in South Korea, a master at putting across the military's

view of operations and keeping quiet about upcoming campaigns (Middleton, 1984).

MacArthur did not make reporting the war easy. One reporter wrote, "Colonel Pat Echols, MacArthur's press chief, apparently regarded the press as natural enemies. He couldn't get rid of us completely, but he could make our reporting life very difficult (Knightley, p. 337).

In one of the most ironic twists in war reporting history, the press itself requested that censorship be imposed when the military authorities started expelling reporters whenever they did not approve of their stories (Knightley, p. 337). Ninety percent of the correspondents apparently supported this request (Mathews, p. 198). The correspondents preferred mandatory censorship to what they called the "you write what you like and we'll shoot you if we don't like it" approach (Knightley, p. 337).

The Vietnam Conflict

The next war, Vietnam, was a controversial war, accompanied by controversy over reporting of the war. Like a great many things in American life, cooperation between the military and the media began to unravel in Vietnam. Here, as in the Civil War a century earlier, America found itself deeply and violently divided about its national purpose. Many officers became increasingly convinced that the growing hostility to the war on the part of the American people was due to biased and inaccurate reporting by correspondents (Middleton, 1984).

An estrangement developed between the top military and civilian levels in Vietnam and the media. As a rule of thumb, reporters like to go to the highest-ranking official they can find who has good information. But correspondents were becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the rosy predictions being given out at the top and worked their way down the command chain to junior combat officers who had a bleaker view. When Joseph Alsop arrived in Saigon in 1969 and grandly declared that he never talked to anyone under the rank of colonel, he became an object of derision. "We had gotten to the point," remembers Kevin Buckley, Newsweek's bureau chief in Vietnam, "that we hardly talked to anyone above the rank of colonel."

Between Vietnam and Grenada, press coverage of American forces was almost nonexistent.

Grenada, October 1983

By the time of the Grenada invasion, Operation "Urgent Fury," on October 24, 1983, the question of media access to combat operations had changed dramatically. There was none.

The fighting in Grenada lasted only a few days; however, the invasion spurred more heated debate over media-military relations than any other single event. Grenada appeared to be a flawless military operation; possibly because there were no reporters allowed into the island country until after the invasion.

During this operation, American journalists were deliberately barred during the first few days of the invasion. For two days the U. S. military banned any authorized visits to the island. On October 27, 1983, the military took the first pool of fifteen reporters on a guided tour of the island. The press was given free access to the island 11 days later when the civilian airport reopened, after the fighting had ceased.

The government enforced the news blackout by refusing to transport the press to Grenada, by turning away chartered press boats, and by removing any reporters who had reached the island. A U. S. warship in Grenada turned back a boatload of newsmen, declaring that their vessel, hired by ABC and CNN, had strayed into a "hostile fire zone." Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III, commander of the Task Force in Grenada said, "Well, I know how to stop those press boats. We've been shooting at them. We haven't sunk any yet, but how are we to know who's on them?" (New York Times, 1983).

"We learned a lesson in the Falklands," one U. S. Lieutenant Colonel candidly told an American reporter (Castro, 1983). The officer was referring to the Thatcher government's restrictions on British journalists covering the Falklands conflict in 1982. British reporters were required to agree in advance to strict censorship and no live television pictures were transmitted from the battle zone. However, as American journalists quickly pointed out, Britain did permit correspondents on their ships and did allow them to land on the Falklands alongside the troops.

Said ABC News Vice President David Burke, ". . .and they don't even have a First Amendment!" (Castro, 1983).

During this timeframe, the American people received all news regarding the Grenadian operation from the Pentagon and the White House. The immediate gain for the military was an absence of any bloody film footage of the Grenada invasion on American television screens. Instead of live action, the networks were reduced to elaborate graphics sometimes accompanied by a crackling voice-over recorded by a ham radio operator. The first Grenada-related pictures with people in them were grateful students evacuated from St. George's University School of Medicine kissing the ground when they reached America (Adams, 1984). Then came the first film from the island itself, taken and censored, by the military. The Washington columnist Haynes Johnson wrote that it was the first military strike in American history "produced, filmed and reported by the Pentagon" (Andrews, 1991).

When the battle was over, the most frequently raised question did not have to do with whether the rescue of the American students on the island was justifiable, nor even whether the Reagan Administration policy of opposing Marxist insurgencies was proper national policy, but rather whether the media should have been excluded from covering the battle.

Although there was much debate among members of the media over the merits of the invasion, there was virtual unanimity in opposing military restrictions on journalists. Complaints were even voiced that in order to defend

freedom in Grenada, the United States was abandoning freedom at home.

Blackouts of momentous, controversial events like the Grenada invasion are difficult to maintain: the press, the people and Congress are angered. This news blackout was virtually unprecedented in American history and reversed a practice of permitting press coverage of military conflict that dates back to the Revolutionary War (Middleton, p. 37).

As expected, the American press reacted angrily to this exclusion policy. Editorials in daily newspapers blasted the news blackout. Newspaper commentators criticized the press ban, contrasting the Grenada blackout with the freedom of access to war stories that reporters had in previous conflicts, especially Vietnam.

At least one survey indicated that the American public also disapproved of the press ban. A December 1983 Louis Harris survey of 1,249 adults nationwide revealed strong public opposition to the Reagan administration's decision to exclude the press from Grenada (Landau, 1983).

On the other hand, public opinion also mounted to back the administration's decision to restrict media coverage of the war. Letters to NBC ran ten-to-one against admitting the press. One letter to NBC reporter John Chancellor, after his editorial on the press exclusion, said, "What do you think we elected President Reagan for? It's damn sure you were never elected" (Clurman, 1983). Public support of the exclusion led to a great deal of soul-searching on the part of the press.

A study of press-military relationships in the aftermath of Grenada conducted at the University of Maryland in 1985 examines that very point. The descriptive study reviewed press-military relationships historically and analyzed the relationship following Grenada. Personal interviews were conducted with civilian news correspondents then currently assigned to the Pentagon. Interviews were also conducted with military officers. The interviews revealed that both the press and the military saw a need for increased understanding between the two groups. Some journalists viewed the relationship as adversarial in nature, while some officers stressed the need for cooperation between the two groups. Both the press and the military questioned the practicality of press exclusion in future operations. It was determined there was a need for further research (Gabriel, 1985).

In November 1983, Gen. John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the Media-Military Relations Panel to develop proposals for future press coverage of military conflicts. This commission, named the Sidel Panel, after its chairman, retired Major General Winant Sidel, was composed of military officers, representatives from journalism schools, and retired journalists.

The Sidel Panel sent questionnaires focusing on press access and censorship to major news organizations. In their answers to the panel's questionnaire, media representatives said that the press has a right to cover

wartime news, either based on the first amendment or historical practice. The press contended that this right was vital to ensuring the existence of a well-informed public essential to democracy. The representatives were split on the question of censorship; whereas some organizations opposed censorship in any form, others recognized its possible necessity in carefully limited circumstances. Additionally, most press representatives acknowledged the need for military accreditation of reporters. Likewise, the military representatives recognized the public's right to information about military operations. Although they did not expressly criticize the military's handling of the press during the Grenada operation, the representatives emphasized that the government must strike a balance between the public's right to know and the military's security needs.

The military officials expressed particular concern about television news coverage and the attendant risk of compromising operation security. They suggested that on-scene review occur before transmission. The military officials also supported the accreditation of reporters by the Pentagon in order to discourage sensational or inaccurate reporting.

On August 23, 1984, Secretary of Defense Weinberger released the final report of the Sidle Panel. It concluded that to achieve the goal of keeping the American public informed, it was essential that the U. S. news media cover U. S. military operations to the maximum degree possible

consistent with mission security and the safety of U. S. forces.

The panel made a number of recommendations for achieving this goal. It urged the Defense Department to use press pools during the initial hours of a military operation until full coverage is tactically feasible. The panel also recommended that the military develop security guidelines governing press coverage of operations; violation of the guidelines would result in a reporter being excluded from the operation. Additionally, the panel suggested that the Pentagon expand programs designed to improve media-military communications and understanding (Sidel Panel Report, 1984).

Fortunately, the Grenada operation achieved its objectives quickly. However, the government's failure to authorize access to the press and to allow an independent flow of information to the public about a major military operation was unprecedented in modern American history. It awoke fresh arguments over the relationship between the press and the military with their sometimes conflicting goals of defending the nation and informing the public. The Grenada incident also highlighted the continuing, deep hostility among many in the Pentagon toward the news media, especially television.

However, all the negative reporting about Grenada could not match the pictures of returning U. S. medical students, surrounded by military personnel, kissing the ground upon their arrival home. Nor could they equal the joy

of most Grenadians who felt that the U. S. had intervened to save their country from a communist takeover. Polls taken six months later by the journal Public Opinion show that 95 percent of the United States medical students and almost as high a percentage of Grenadians favored the military action (Robinson, 1984).

The inability of the media to keep secrets, however, was highlighted after the Grenada invasion. In an effort to reach a compromise with critics, the Defense Department staged a mock military action. A press pool was included in the operation with the stipulation that the correspondents involved could not divulge their whereabouts. Although the pool reporters kept their word, their colleagues in the media reported almost instantaneously that the pool members were on some story associated with the Defense Department. The cover was blown within hours. Advance warning to the enemy, critics argue, would be equally swift.

Panama, 1989

Six years later, the media coverage of Operation "Just Cause," rekindled the question of access to be given to newspeople to the battlefield. Members of the national media pool sent to cover the overthrow of Gen. Manuel Noriega's regime had anticipated being first on the scene of the combat. Their expectations were far from fulfilled. They did not arrive until four hours after the fighting began. They were unable to file their first dispatches until six hours after that. For the four days that they were in

Panama, members of the pool were kept under such tight rein by the Army that they scarcely saw any action. They returned home frustrated and angry at the Defense Department's Southern Command. "We kind of missed the story," complained pool member Steven Komarow of the Associated Press" (Pontuso, 1990).

"The whole first day was devoted to taking us places where the action was already over. It was like forming a White House pool and then showing them an empty hall and saying, "This is where the President spoke" (Cloud, 1990).

The military was no happier. Combat officers argued that valuable transport and logistical resources were squandered on the press operation. When asked to give his reaction, the leader of the U. S. task force that intervened in Grenada in 1983, retired Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III, exclaimed: "But what about the reporters who were already in Panama? They had plenty of indication that something was happening. They could have found out days in advance. If they can't use their knuckleheads, its their own damn fault" (Cloud, 1990). (In Panama, it is argued, there was no strong reason for such a media pool since all the major U. S. news services already had their representatives in the country.)

The Persian Gulf War, 1990

In 1990, during Operation "Desert Storm," as U. S. forces were poised at a line drawn in the sand, in the Persian Gulf, the military and the media once again saw

front action in an old battle. The news from the Persian Gulf did not seem to flow from the Mid East as once did Kuwaiti crude. "The war in the Persian Gulf was the media's Cannae and the press played Varro to Schwarzkopf's Hannibal: the military's victory over the press was total and devastating," one commentator wrote after the fighting ended."

"The media were essentially reduced to being a conduit for official information offered by commanders who could scarcely disguise their scorn for the delivery system they were forced to use. It is a truism of war that to create a victory as massive as Cannae, it takes two generals, a smart one on one side and a stupid one on the other. In the almost twenty years since Vietnam the military has been working on its media problem while the press has been sitting on its First Amendment rights" (Andrews, 1991).

The new system is right out of a Madison Avenue public relations manual. It you want pictures, you will get more than you can possibly use, but they will be our pictures. If you want access you will be personally escorted to the front, but we will determine where and when you get there (Andrews, 1991). Editors back home fumed about military controls as the press versus the military continued to do battle. They, of course, did not willingly accept exclusion from the battlefield.

"Saturday Night Live" even took time off from its traditional political targets to do a devastating parody of

the daily press briefings, with the reporters cast as buffoons. The satire was nothing, however, to the scorn heaped on the press by its own fellows. Peter Braestrup, who covered Vietnam for The New York Times and The Washington Post and is now director of communications at the Library of Congress, was withering in his commentary on the press in the Gulf: "They're ahistorical: they can't remember any precedents for anything. They keep discovering the world anew. They either concentrate on high-tech stories or on what an ABC producer described to me at 'boo-hoo journalism,' that is, asking How do you feel? not What do you know? They're looking for that little emotional spurt. They don't know what the wider vignette means. They're yuppies in the desert" (Andrews, 1991).

The press censorship issues that grew out of the gulf war are not new. These issues have been with us since the Civil War. At the heart of the matter is a tension between two fundamental values: freedom of the press versus national security.

Several years before the Persian Gulf War, the Secretary of Defense had stated in a memorandum dated December 1, 1983, that:

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress and members representing the press, radio and television may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from

organizations and private citizens will be answered responsively and as rapidly as possible. In carrying out this policy, the following principles of information apply:

Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.

A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.

Information will be not classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.

Information will only be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.

The Department's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within the Department and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) has the primary responsibility for carrying out this commitment.

The Army public relations is coordinated by the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C., and by a network of public affairs officers assigned to installation and unit headquarters down to division level. The public affairs officer is the local public relations practitioner wherever assigned. Officers selected to fulfill these assignments maintain a primary qualification in some other skill (such as infantry, armor, field artillery or personnel) with public affairs training as a secondary skill. They are soldiers first, communicators second. After becoming a public affairs officer, the officer will typically alternate between assignments to public relations work and work in primary skills.

After having examined the history of the military-media relationship during critical times of our nation's history, we will next look at the purpose and method of the current research.

Chapter III. Purpose and Method

The purposes of this study are to determine attitudes of Army public affairs officers and journalists toward the military-media relationship. Additionally, the study will examine the perceptions each group thinks the other group holds.

For the purposes of this thesis, the press is defined as a daily newspaper. The interviewees were informed of this definition and were asked to provide comments in relation to the print media except where otherwise explained. This is not to slight the importance of radio and television news reporting, but merely to keep the thesis at a manageable level and within the researcher's scope of experience.

The following is hypothesized:

Hypothesis 1: It is expected that Army public affairs officers and journalists will not be co-oriented. This is in keeping with their different personality traits and goals and objectives for the constituencies they serve.

Hypothesis 2: PAOs are more supportive of national security interests than journalists, who are more supportive of the public's right to know.

To test the hypotheses, small samples of Army Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) and representatives of the working press who deal directly with the military were compared. The samples were carefully selected for comparability, but the author recognized the sample size limited the external validity of the outcomes.

By finding what attitudes were held by the military public affairs officers and the press, and their perceptions of each other's attitudes, some determination could be made about the accuracy of the perceptions held by the military and the media.

Because of time and funding limitations and the size of the geographic area, a telephone questionnaire was employed as the survey instrument and data collection method for this study.

A goal of forty completed questionnaires was set, with twenty Army public affairs officers being surveyed and twenty journalists.

The research consisted of in-depth telephone interviews. The telephone interviews were conducted between September 9 and September 20, 1991, and each averaged about 30 minutes.

The interview sample included a broad cross-section of different types of military organizations and journalists.

In order to have the best comparability in the survey results, the PAO sample was drawn from installations throughout the entire United States. Military organizations were randomly selected from a Department of Defense listing. The organizations' public affairs officers surveyed

in this study included public affairs officers from the national capital region, major subordinate commands, large installations, major continental United States Corps and Divisions, and smaller garrisons.

The journalists were selected using a purposive or non-random, rather than random, sampling procedure. The survey was designed to compare responses given by both the press and the PAO and, then, with estimates of opinions of each other. The press was represented by bureau chiefs, managing editors, photographer/reporters, and general assignment reporters of the newspapers located in the communities directly served by the PAOs. These journalists interviewees were identified by name by the local PAOs who worked with them on at least a frequent or daily basis.

Since the study concerns specific behavioral expectations in the interactions between the PAO and the press, it was important that the survey instrument contain items that reflected as closely as possible the realities of the working relationship between the PAO and the journalists who covered military installations and activities.

Part I requested demographic data of each respondent.

Part II was used to analyze general characteristics of the professional personality of PAOs and the operational characteristics of the public affairs officer as he/she interacted with the press. These were chosen from the job and personnel descriptions contained in Department of the

Army Regulation (AR) 360-5, Army Public Affairs, Public Information (1989) and Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (1977). AR 360-5 is the basic regulation governing the activities of PAOs and DA Pamphlet 600-3 is the professional career guide for commissioned officers.

From these references, twenty descriptive items were developed in the following categories: professional-press interaction, professional-military interaction, personal-professional, and personal-personal.

Professional-press interaction items were those items which described an official interaction between a PAO and members of the working press, or the press in general, brought about as a result of role enactment by the PAO.

Professional-military interaction items described official interactions between a PAO and the military.

Personal-professional items described the PAO's professional orientation towards his official duties and hence the role.

Personal-personal items described the PAO's personal orientation towards his or her duties .

The attitude statements were written in declarative form, i.e., " A PAO should". Respondents completing the questionnaire were asked to rate each item on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree."

PAO respondents were asked to rate each statement according to the degree they personally agreed or disagreed

that a PAO should be expected to act in a particular manner described in the statement.

Press were also asked to rate each statement according to the extent they personally expected the PAO to act in a manner consistent with the statement.

In addition, respondents were asked to provide their opinions of how they thought the other group would rate the statement. For instance, the PAO also rated each statement based on how they thought the press would rate the statement and vice versa.

Part III required the respondent to rank order, according to importance, five items of basic concern to the army public affairs officer and the press. These items are freedom of information, national security, interests of the army, freedom of the press, and the public's right to know. Both groups are asked to rank order these items in order of their priority of importance to their group. These measures are included to assess some of the philosophical differences that bring about conflict between the PAO and the working press.

Part IV contained three open-ended questions to elicit in-depth comments and anecdotes from respondents surveyed.

Open-ended responses were analyzed qualitatively; fixed-response questions were coded and then evaluated quantitatively using the SAS system.

Questionnaires for both the press and the Army public affairs officers were similar (see Appendix 1 and 2). Both groups were asked to indicate their choices for the

appropriate behavioral response by the PAO to the situations given, and both were asked to rate their expectations of the other group's response.

A pre-test among three public affairs officers and three journalists was conducted prior to administration of the survey instrument.

The final instrument included fifteen items of demographic information for Army public affairs officers and thirteen items for the journalists and twenty media-related attitude statements.

Chapter IV. Findings

How sympathetic should army public affairs officers be to the access problems of the press? How tightly should they control information, in the gatekeeping sense? For the present research, the answers to these questions, are possible only by inference from responses to a set of attitude statements by twenty PAOs and twenty journalists who cover Army installations.

The questionnaire was designed to cover a broad range of topics quickly. During a telephone interview, the interviewer asked press respondents about their occupational background, position in the current organization and number of years of journalistic experience; their total number of years with the current organization, their educational background and academic discipline; whether they were members in any professional organizations, whether or not they were a member of the Army Reserves or National Guard, and their age and sex.

PAO interviewees were asked similar demographic data for comparison. The interviewer asked their age, sex, total years of commissioned service, total years in the public affairs field, their basic branch of the Army, their functional area (to ascertain if they held the public affairs

speciality), if they had received training at the Army's public affairs officer course at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, what other formal journalism training they had acquired, their education level and academic discipline, whether they belonged to any professional organizations, and lastly, they were asked to characterize their degree of contact with the working press.

Description of Respondents

The press interviewees were a somewhat diverse group demographically: there were more men (75 percent) than woman (25 percent). Most had considerable journalistic experience, with an average of 13 years in the field; the average age of the interviewee was 36 years. Most of the interviewees had at least a bachelor's degree (80 percent), while two interviewees had a master's degree, one interviewee had only completed high school and another had an associate degree.

Of the 80 percent who did have a bachelor's degree, fewer than half majored in communications or journalism. The academic disciplines were: communications, 2; journalism, 6; business administration, 2; liberal arts, 1; physics, 1; English, 2; and political science, 2. The master's degrees were held in: human relations, 1; and communications, 1.

Additionally, the average number of years of newspaper experience of the respondents was 12 years, and

the average number of years in their current position at the newspaper was 6 years.

The journalists interviewed indicated that they had extensive contact with the military public affairs officer. Seventy percent characterized their degree of contact with the military public affairs as daily, and the remaining thirty percent characterized it as frequent (almost daily).

Eighty-five percent of the press indicated that they did not belong to the Society of Professional Journalists nor did they indicate that they belonged to any other professional organization. Additionally, none was currently a member of the National Guard or Army Reserves, and none indicated any military service.

The public affairs officers were also a diverse group demographically: there were more men (70 percent) than women (30 percent). Responses to demographic questions indicated that the average age of PAOs was 40, they held at least a bachelor's degree and all but three had attended the public affairs officer course, a ten-week basic course taught at the Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Academic disciplines represented among the PAOs were: journalism, 2; mass communications, 2; radio/TV management, 1; English, 3; criminal justice, 1; history, 1; education, 1; and business, 1. Advanced degrees were held in: journalism, 3; business administration, 2; international relations, 1; education, 1; and public administration, 1.

The sample also varied in terms of experience as compared with the working press interviewees. The public affairs officer averaged 7 years of experience in the public affairs field while the working press averaged 12 years of journalism experience. Most of the PAOs had a bachelor's degree (60 percent), of which five PAOs (42 percent) majored in a mass communications field. Of the 40 percent who held a master's degree, three PAOs majored in journalism (see Table 1).

Responses to Opinion Statements

A mean was calculated for the PAOs' and journalists' responses to each of the twenty questions and each group's prediction of how each other would respond to the same twenty questions.

Then, the standard error was calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the square root of N, twenty in this case. Once the standard error was obtained, the standard error was added and subtracted from the mean to construct a confidence interval.

In those instances where the confidence interval does not overlap, the difference in responses by the PAO and the press are statistically significant. In those instances where overlap in the confidence interval does occur, the different response is not considered large enough to be statistically significant and therefore may be attributable to chance (see Table 2).

Table 1

Demographic Profile of Respondents		
	PAO	Press
Male	75%	75%
Female	25%	25%
Average Age	36	40
Communications Degree	40%	45%
Years of Experience	7 years in PAO field	12 years of newspaper experience
Years of Military Experience	14 years	None
Member of Professional Organization	15%	15%

Table 2

Mean Responses and Confidence Intervals to Attitude Statements by PAOs and Press

	PAO	PRESS	PAO ESTIMATE	PRESS ESTIMATE
* 1. A PAO should be aware of the day-to-day problems of the media	1.6 1.35 1.85	1.2 1.09 1.31	1.4 1.22 1.58	2.0 1.79 2.21
* 2. A PAO should freely and willingly admit errors of judgment when ever they occur within the military.	1.9 1.69 2.11	1.35 1.2 1.5	1.45 1.21 1.69	2.75 2.55 2.95
* 3. A PAO should provide all necessary equipment to the news media in connection with the operation of a pool system	2.65 2.32 2.98	2.6 2.32 2.88	1.8 1.6 2.0	3.5 3.26 3.74
* 4. A PAO should have an advanced degree.	2.75 2.46 3.04	3.45 3.24 3.66	2.5 2.25 2.75	3.65 3.42 3.88
* 5. A PAO should be familiar with the deadline times for the local news media and facilitate meeting them.	1.4 1.27 1.53	1.40 1.19 1.61	1.2 1.05 1.35	2.0 1.76 2.24
* 6. A PAO should try to protect the Army from criticism.	3.2 2.89 3.51	3.0 2.64 3.36	3.65 3.31 3.99	1.95 1.68 2.22
* 7. A PAO should have values consistent with those of the military establishment.	1.8 1.59 2.01	1.6 1.41 1.79	2.75 2.49 3.01	1.3 1.16 1.44
* 8. A PAO should stall civilian reporters/editors at times so the Army can protect its public image.	3.9 3.62 4.18	3.95 3.62 4.28	4.55 4.32 4.78	2.2 1.95 2.45
* 9. A PAO should always tell the whole truth as he/she knows it.	1.8 1.5 2.1	1.4 1.13 1.67	1.4 1.21 1.59	2.2 1.93 2.47
* 10. A PAO should favor those media whose stories are favorable to the Army.	3.95 3.67 4.23	3.6 3.2 4.0	3.4 2.99 3.81	2.8 2.48 3.12
* 11. A PAO should be willing to discuss sensitive topics on the record	2.35 2.04 2.66	1.95 1.65 2.25	1.4 1.22 1.58	2.85 2.6 3.1
* 12. A PAO should deal openly with the press on issues detrimental to the Army.	1.75 1.55 1.95	1.3 1.16 1.44	1.20 1.09 1.31	2.7 2.43 2.97
* 13. A PAO should be the sole contact for arranging interviews with key personnel at military installations	1.0 1.0 1.0	3.40 2.99 3.81	3.10 2.83 3.37	1.25 1.11 1.39

*Statistically significant PAO and Press Responses

+Statistically significant PAO and Press Estimates of Responses

Table 2 (cont inued)

	PAO	PRESS	PAO ESTIMATE	PRESS ESTIMATE
* * 14. A PAO should never "leak" information to the press.	2.35 1.97 2.73	4.05 3.8 4.3	3.55 3.28 3.82	1.95 1.71 2.19
* * 15. A PAO should escort the press at all times around military activities and installations	1.75 1.58 1.92	3.65 3.38 3.92	3.9 3.74 4.06	1.9 1.62 2.18
* * 16. A PAO should act as a censor.	4.35 4.1 4.6	5.0 5.0 5.0	4.85 4.7 5.0	3.6 3.33 3.87
* * 17. A PAO should go out of his/her way to bend the rules to provide better access to journalists.	3.45 3.1 3.8	2.05 1.74 2.36	2.45 2.17 2.73	3.45 3.19 3.71
* 18. A PAO should give preferential treatment to major news organizations over smaller ones	4.05 3.79 4.31	4.85 4.77 4.93	3.2 2.89 3.51	3.6 3.34 3.86
* 19. A PAO should engage in disinformation programs if in the best interests of the command.	4.5 4.28 4.72	4.7 4.56 4.84	4.55 4.32 4.78	3.5 3.22 3.78
* * 20. A PAO should allow journalists to make the final decision on whether or not to print borderline material	2.45 2.1 2.8	1.45 1.18 1.72	1.2 1.0 1.4	2.6 2.31 2.89

The responses given by the two groups differed significantly on these eleven of the twenty items. Those items are listed and explained in the following section.

A PAO should be aware of the day-to-day problems of the media. The PAOs interviewed agreed, while the media strongly agreed.

A PAO should freely and willingly admit errors of judgment when ever they occur within the military. Again, the PAOs agreed, while the media strongly agreed.

A PAO should have an advanced degree. PAOs were undecided or neutral on this item, and the press disagreed. PAOs said the most important element was to be a competent officer. The press, many of whom themselves did not have an advanced degree, or if they did have such a degree, did not have the degree in the field of communications, also indicated that an advanced degree was not necessary and that the most important element was competence.

A PAO should deal openly with the press on issues detrimental to the Army. The PAOs interviewed agreed, while the media strongly agreed.

A PAO should be the sole contact for arranging interviews with key personnel at military installations. As might be expected, the PAOs interviewed strongly agreed, and the press were undecided or neutral on this item.

A PAO should never "leak" information to the press. The PAOs interviewed agreed while, as might be expected, the press disagreed.

A PAO should escort the press at all times around military activities and installations. Again, the PAOs agreed, while the media disagreed.

A PAO should act as a censor. The PAOs interviewed disagreed, while the press strongly disagreed.

A PAO should go out of his/her way to bend the rules to provide better access to journalists. PAOs were undecided or neutral on this item, and the press agreed.

A PAO should give preferential treatment to major news organizations over smaller ones. The PAOs interviewed disagreed, and the press strongly disagreed.

A PAO should allow journalists to make the final decision on whether or not to print borderline material. Both the PAOs and the press agreed on this item.

PAO and press respondents were in substantial agreement on nine of the twenty opinion statements. Items of agreement and respondents' opinions are listed in the following section.

A PAO should provide all necessary equipment to the news media in connection with the operation of a pool system. Both groups of respondents were neutral or undecided on this statement.

A PAO should be familiar with the deadline times for the local news media and facilitate meeting them. Both groups strongly agreed with this statement.

A PAO should try to protect the Army from criticism. Both the PAOs and journalists interviewed were neutral or undecided about this issue.

A PAO should have values consistent with those of the military "establishment." Both groups agreed with this statement.

A PAO should stall civilian reporters/editors at times so the Army can protect its public image. Both the PAOs and the press disagreed on this issue.

A PAO should always tell the whole truth as he/she knows it. The PAOs interviewed agreed, while the media strongly agreed.

A PAO should favor those media whose stories are favorable to the Army. Both groups of respondents disagreed on this statement.

A PAO should be willing to discuss sensitive topics on the record. Both groups agreed with this item.

A PAO should engage in disinformation programs if in the best interests of the command. Both the PAOs and journalists interviewed strongly disagreed on this issue.

When each PAO and newsperson was asked to predict how members of the other group would respond to the same twenty items, the predicted answers were further apart for most items than the actual stated opinions (Fig 1). Figure 2 and the last two columns of Table 2 illustrate the amount of differences between the two groups' estimates of each others opinion. When the standard error was added and

Figure 1
PAO AND PRESS RESPONSES
Response Means for Two Samples on 20 Attitude Statements





Figure 2
 PAO AND PRESS ESTIMATES OF RESPONSES
 Response Means for Two Samples on 20 Attitude Statements



subtracted from the mean for each group's response to each item and the resulting ranges compared, the PAOs and press agreed on their predictions on only two of the twenty items. Those two items were as follows:

A PAO should favor those media whose stories are favorable to the Army. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from the neutral to disagree position. In their actual responses, both groups disagreed with the statement.

A PAO should give preferential treatment to major news organizations over smaller ones. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from neutral to disagree. In actuality, the PAO disagreed and the press strongly disagreed.

Figures 3 and 4 compare each group's actual response for each question with the response predicted by the other group. A comparison of data contained in the two figures shows that the press did not accurately predict the responses of the PAOs on as many items (Fig. 3) as the PAOs were able to predict the press responses (Fig. 4).

A PAO should be aware of the day-to-day problems of the media. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from strongly agree to agree. In their actual responses, the PAO agreed and the press strongly agreed.

Figure 3
 PAO RESPONSES AND PRESS ESTIMATES OF RESPONSES
 Response Means for Two Samples on 20 Attitude Statements





Figure 4
 PRESS RESPONSES AND PAO ESTIMATES OF RESPONSES
 Response Means for Two Samples on 20 Attitude Statements



A PAO should freely and willingly admit errors of judgment when ever they occur within the military. Both groups of respondents predicted that the other group's attitude would range from the strongly agree to the neutral or undecided position. Actually, the PAO agreed and the press strongly agreed.

A PAO should provide all necessary equipment to the news media in connection with the operation of a pool system. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would either agree or disagree with the statement. In their actual responses, both groups were neutral or undecided on this issue.

A PAO should have an advanced degree. Again, both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would agree or disagree with this item. In actuality, the PAOs were undecided or neutral on this subject, while the press disagreed.

A PAO should be familiar with the deadline times for the local news media and facilitate meeting them. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from strongly agree to agree. In their actual responses, both groups strongly agreed on this issue.

A PAO should try to protect the Army from criticism. Both groups of respondents predicted that the other group would agree or disagree with the statement. Actually, both groups were neutral or undecided about this item.

A PAO should have values consistent with those of the military "establishment." Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from the neutral to strongly agree position. In their actual responses, both agreed.

A PAO should stall civilian reporters/editors at times so the Army can protect its public image. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from strongly disagree to agree. In actuality, both groups disagreed.

A PAO should always tell the whole truth as he/she knows it. Both groups of respondents predicted that the other group's attitude would range from strongly agree to agree. The PAOs interviewed actually agreed and the press strongly agreed.

A PAO should be willing to discuss sensitive topics on the record. Both groups estimated that the other group's attitude would range from the strongly agree to the neutral position. Actually, both groups agreed.

A PAO should deal openly with the press on issues detrimental to the Army. Both groups estimated that the other group's attitude would range from strongly agree to neutral. In their actual responses, the PAO agreed and the press strongly agreed.

A PAO should be the sole contact for arranging interviews with key personnel at military installations. Both groups estimated that the other group's opinion would range from strongly agree to the neutral position. Actually, the PAO strongly agreed and the press were neutral on this item.

A PAO should never "leak" information to the press. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would either agree or disagree with this item. In their actual response, the PAO agreed and the press disagreed.

A PAO should escort the press at all times around military activities and installations. Both groups predicted the other group's attitude would either agree or disagree with the statement. In actuality, the PAO agreed and the press disagreed.

A PAO should act as a censor. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from the strongly disagree to the disagree position. The PAOs

interviewed actually disagreed and the press strongly disagreed.

A PAO should go out of his or her way to bend the rules to provide better access to journalists. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would either agree or disagree on this issue. In their actual responses, the PAO was neutral or undecided and the press agreed.

A PAO should engage in disinformation programs if in the best interests of the command. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from the disagree to the strongly disagree position. In actuality, both groups strongly disagreed.

A PAO should allow journalists to make the final decision on whether or not to print borderline material. Both groups predicted that the other group's attitude would range from strongly agree to the neutral position. In their actual responses, both groups agreed on this issue.

The research reveals there were no exact matches of both responses and estimates by the public affairs officers nor the journalists.

On the rank ordering of the five items -- freedom of information, national security, interests of the Army,

freedom of the press, and the public's right to know -- as might have been expected, the PAO ranked national security as the top priority while the press ranked the public's right to know as the top priority.

Seventy-five percent of the PAOs said that the item that should have top priority when dealing with the media should be national security. Forty percent ranked the interests of the Army as number two. Item number three was the public's right to know, followed closely by freedom of the press and ranked fifth was freedom of information.

In contrast to the PAO's ranking, sixty-five percent of the press ranked the public's right to know as the top priority, followed closely by freedom of the press and freedom of information. National security was ranked fourth and, as might have been expected, interests of the Army was ranked fifth by an overwhelming eighty-five percent.

This finding supports Hypothesis 2.

Responses to Open-ended Questions

Responding to the open-ended questions, the journalists said the biggest problem in getting access to military stories was the bureaucratic system of having to go through the office of the public affairs to get any information. Most reporters said that using the system doubles the time it takes to get information, making it difficult, at times, to meet deadlines and usually reducing by one-half, the amount of information received. Some

PAOs, journalists commented, work hard at making they system work easier, and others work hard at making it more difficult to get access to information.

The PAOs mainly indicated that their biggest complaint was accuracy. They intimated that a lack of attention to detail and a lack of general knowledge about military subjects caused their biggest problems. Generally, they indicated that the press doesn't know much about the military.

Press respondents said the topics of military stories published in their papers ran the gamut from stories centering on the Persian Gulf War to base realignment and closure decisions pending in Congress and budget and economic impact stories to lighthearted features about soldiers selected as "soldier of the month" or change-of-commander profiles.

Many press respondents commented that the military-media relationship was too adversarial. Many journalists indicated they thought the PAOs still saw the relationship as a dichotomy of "us versus them." The PAOs, conversely, for the most part, indicated they thought they had a good working relationship with the press.

In summary, Figure 1 indicates that the differences were significant on eleven of the twenty items and similar on nine items. These issues seem to focus on an element of control by the PAO over the press.

The data shown in Figure 2 indicates clearly that both the PAOs' and the journalists' perception of each other is quite different from what each actually responded. When

compared to Figure 1, it is interesting to note that although the PAO's and press's perceptions of each other were different and the differences were large, in reality, the only real differences were those which centered around some element of control. This is indicated by the differences on the nine items mentioned above. Actually, both the PAOs and journalists are more similar in their responses than they perceive themselves to be on these issues.

Indeed, the PAOs and press co-orient or agree on more items contained in the survey than they had differences as reflected in Figures 1 and 2. This was an unexpected outcome and does not support Hypothesis 1 as the PAOs and press did co-orient on fifteen out of the twenty statements.

The average difference for the press estimates of PAO responses was .69 and the average difference for the PAO estimates of the press responses was .46. As indicated by Figure 3, the press did not predict the responses of the PAOs as accurately as the PAOs were able to predict the responses of the press (see Fig. 4).

Chapter V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The results of this survey indicate that the relationship between the military and the media, although it may not be entirely adversarial in nature, remains guarded by both the Army PAOs and the press.

Perhaps part of the misconception by the PAOs and the journalists dates back to the tradition of non-cooperation between the military and the media.

History reveals that the spirit of cooperation between the Army and the press has not always been what it should have been. During World War II when the motto of the day was "loose lips sink ships," the spirit of cooperation was certainly controlled.

The military tradition of withholding information and requiring censorship in exchange for access to the battlefield has possibly created an adversarial relationship in which the tradition endures at least in the perceptions of both the PAOs and the journalists. In reality, both groups seem to have been enlightened in comparison to previous circumstances.

The media and the military must continue to work together to improve their relationship, understanding that the mission of the Army is to provide effective, strong leadership and the mission of the press is to be an

independent source of information that helps the taxpaying public know what it's getting for its expenditures.

The media and the military must continue to work together to improve their relationship with the understanding that the mission of the Army is to provide effective, strong leadership and the mission of the press is to be an independent source of information that helps the public (which provides the troops, and pays the bills) to know what it's getting for its expenditures.

The data reveals that the majority of PAOs have a strong conviction to make an honest effort to inform the public within reasonable limitations of national security concerns. The PAOs indicated by their remarks to the open-ended questions that they have a deep conviction in the public's right to know.

The press indicated that a good PAO is one who gets the journalists linked up with the soldier and the unit. A good PAO was one that helped them with the necessary information they need on the unit, the commander, and puts the big picture into perspective, and then leaves the journalist alone to do his or her job.

The overwhelming majority of press respondents indicated that a major concern was that the unnecessary constraints upon the press be relaxed. Reporters expected to coordinate their actions through the office of the public affairs; however, they said that often too much control was exercised over the press. The press respondents reported that the PAOs were often overly rigid, overly suspicious, and overly bureaucratic.

One of the main areas of contention is the escort system. Reporters indicated that they should not be escorted at all times. The key should be balance and not assume that the press is going to do a hatchet job. One journalist said that it was very difficult to try to get the real story with a PAO breathing down his neck while interviewing soldiers. The reporters asked that the PAOs trust their judgment, especially after a couple of stories, and when it's clear that the reporter is not printing negative and inflammatory stories.

Additionally, the press indicated that although the relationship between the press and the PAO may, at times, be adversarial, it is possible to get beyond that when both sides understand the other side's position.

One of the main concerns of the press is access. Journalists themselves tend to have a great deal of concern about the lack of access to information and especially when the military tries to hide behind the shield of national security, when, in fact, national security is really not in jeopardy. One journalist likened this scenario to the boy who cried wolf. He said that when the military tries to protect embarrassing information under the auspices of national security or when national security is used as a screen to steer journalists away from controversy or from dissent within the military, it unduly restricts the opportunity for the free flow of information to the society about its government's activities.

On the other hand, most PAOs indicated that the

relationship was best kept as adversarial or at least with some built in antagonism. The PAOs reported that they try to keep a professional relationship with the press and to be consistent and fair with all press. One PAO indicated, however, that it was extremely difficult not to show favoritism to individual reporters such as Tom Brokaw, Dan Rather and Peter Jennings because the media will pressure PAOs by using well-known reporters in obtaining access. However, the bottom line is that what you do for one you should do for all.

One of the major concerns of the PAOs is the lack of knowledge of military subjects by the press. Most reporters, they indicated, are ignorant about the military, and, as a result, inaccuracies often occur. In general, the PAOs said that a lack of understanding about what the Army or a particular installation does creates problems. One PAO said that most reporters didn't know the difference between a Bradley Fighting Vehicle and an M-1 Abrams Tank, yet they were trying to write stories on this equipment. He said that the press needs to educate itself more on the military before it can report accurately about the military. The very inexperienced journalists create inaccurate stories. If the press has no clue about the military; if the journalist doesn't know the equipment, the military system or the personnel, then, the reporter will not get the facts right and it causes the public sometimes to be misinformed.

The need for journalists to undertake a program of self-instruction is probably greater today than in previous eras before the period of volunteer military service. None of the press respondents in this survey had served in any branch of the military or been members of the National Guard of Reserves.

The consensus is that both sides must be fair and consistent and understand each other's role to get the job done. Both must understand the fundamental conflict between reporters who like openness and the military PAO who works within the confines of a sometimes closed system. The best result is an understanding that each side has a different mission and to realize that they're not incompatible, but that it takes an honest, good faith effort on both sides to make it work.

Principal Recommendations

The following recommendations are offered in an attempt to help restructure the adversarial nature of the relationship between the press and the PAO:

1. PAOs should try to be more flexible in dealing with the press. If at all possible, PAOs should give journalists more leeway in covering stories. Accompany members of the press to specific areas where an escort is necessary, but don't "hover." Let the journalists interview service personnel in as much privacy as possible.

2. PAOs should ensure journalists are well informed on the military organizations, equipment, and personnel they will be covering.

3. PAOs should be consistent and fair in dealing with journalists. Greater access for individual reporters or to larger organizations over smaller ones should not occur.

4. Both journalists and PAOs should work with PAOs to reduce the adversarial nature of their relationship based on misperceptions about each other, which data in this survey indicates exists.

5. Journalists who cover the military beat should take advantage of the local installation's educational programs to increase their knowledge of the military.

Additional research will be required to document the evolving relationship, attitudes, and perceptions between the military public affairs officers and the media as events occur such as Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm.

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APPENDIXES

PAO SURVEY

Part I:

1. Organization: _____ 2. Rank: _____ 3. Age: _____ 4. Sex: M F
5. Total years of military service: _____ 6. Years of commissioned service: _____
7. Years in the PAO field: _____ 8. Basic Branch: _____ 9. Functional area: _____
10. Attended DINFOS: Yes No 11. Any formal journalism training: Yes No
12. Education (highest degree): _____ 13. Discipline: _____
14. Member of any professional organizations (list): _____
15. Degree of contact with working press: _____ never _____ often _____ frequent (almost on a daily basis) _____ daily

Part II: Read the item. On a scale of 1 - 5, with 1 being "strongly agree" and 5 "strongly disagree," please tell me the degree to which you would agree or disagree with the item, or would think the item describes a characteristic essential to the successful performance of duties as a PAO. Then, based on your knowledge of the press's job, please tell me how you think the press would feel about the item using the same scale.

YOUR OPINION						PRESS'S OPINION				
SA	A	N	D	SD		SA	A	N	D	SD
					items:					
1	2	3	4	5	1. A PAO should be aware of the day-to-day problems of the media.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	2. A PAO should freely and willingly admit errors of judgment when ever they occur within the military.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	3. A PAO should provide all necessary equipment such as fax machines and ground vehicles to the news media in connection with the operation of a pool system.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	4. A PAO should have an advanced degree (i.e., Master's or Ph.D.) in the field of mass communications (i.e., Journalism).	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	5. A PAO should be familiar with the deadline times for the local news media and facilitate meeting them.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	6. A PAO should try to protect the Army from criticism.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	7. A PAO should have values consistent with those of the military "establishment."	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	8. A PAO should stall civilian reporters/editors at times so the Army can protect its public image.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	9. A PAO should always tell the whole truth as he/she knows it.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	10. A PAO should favor those media whose stories are favorable to the Army.	1	2	3	4	5

YOUR OPINION						PRESS'S OPINION				
SA	A	N	D	SD		SA	A	N	D	SD
1	2	3	4	5	11. A PAO should be willing to discuss sensitive topics (such as dissent within the military, etc) on the record.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	12. A PAO should deal openly with the press on issues detrimental to the Army.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	13. A PAO should be the sole contact for arranging interviews with key personnel at military installations.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	14. A PAO should never "leak" information to the press.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	15. A PAO should escort the press at all times around military activities and installations.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	16. A PAO should act as a censor.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	17. A PAO should go out of his/her way to bend the rules to provide better access to journalists.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	18. A PAO should give preferential treatment to major news organizations (such as <u>The New York Times</u> or TV networks) over smaller ones.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	19. A PAO should engage in disinformation programs if in the best interest of the command.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	20. A PAO should allow journalists to make the final decision on whether or not to print borderline material.	1	2	3	4	5

Part III: Please rank order these in order of their priority of importance with 1 being the highest and 5 the lowest.

PAO'S OPINION

_____freedom of information

_____national security

_____interests of the army

_____freedom of the press

_____public's right to know

Part IV: Open-ended questions.

1. What is your biggest complaint about the media coverage you get?
2. What type of stories are mostly covered?
3. Any comments on your relationship with the press?
4. Name of reporter?

PRESS SURVEY

Part I:

1. Name of your organization: _____ 2. Position _____
3. Sex: M F 4. Age: _____ 5. Years with current organization: _____ 6. Years of journalistic experience: _____
7. Education (highest degree): _____ 8. Discipline: _____
9. Society of Professional Journalists member: Yes No 10. Of other professional organizations? _____ (list)
11. Currently a member of the Reserves or National Guard?: Yes No 12. Total years of military service: _____
13. Degree of direct contact with military public affairs officer: _____ Never _____ Often (up to twice per week)
- _____ Frequent (almost on a daily basis) _____ Daily

Part II: Read the item. On a scale of 1 - 5, with 1 being "strongly agree" and 5 "strongly disagree" please tell me the degree to which you would agree or disagree with the item, or would think the item describes a characteristic essential to the successful performance of duties as a PAO, based on your knowledge of the PAO's job. Then, tell me how you think the PAO would feel about the item using the same scale.

YOUR OPINION					PAO'S OPINION					
SA	A	N	D	SD		SA	A	N	D	SD
1	2	3	4	5	items:	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	1. A PAO should be aware of the day-to-day problems of the media.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	2. A PAO should freely and willingly admit errors of judgment whenever they occur within the military.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	3. A PAO should provide all necessary equipment such as fax machines and ground vehicles to the news media in connection with the operation of a pool system.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	4. A PAO should have an advanced degree (i.e., Master's or Ph.D.) in the field of mass communications (i.e., Journalism).	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	5. A PAO should be familiar with the deadline times for the local news media and facilitate meeting them.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	6. A PAO should try to protect the Army from criticism.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	7. A PAO should have values consistent with those of the military "establishment."	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	8. A PAO should stall civilian reporters/editors at times so that the Army can protect its public image.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	9. A PAO should always tell the whole truth as he/she knows it.	1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5	10. A PAO should favor those media whose stories are favorable to the Army.	1	2	3	4	5

YOUR OPINION						PAO'S OPINION					
SA	A	N	D	SD		SA	A	N	D	SD	
1	2	3	4	5	11. A PAO should be willing to discuss sensitive topics (such as dissent within the military, etc) on the record.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	12. A PAO should deal openly with the press on issues detrimental to the Army.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	13. A PAO should be the sole contact for arranging interviews with key personnel at military installations.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	14. A PAO should never "leak" information to the press.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	15. A PAO should escort the press at all times around military activities and installations.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	16. A PAO should act as a censor.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	17. A PAO should go out of his/her way to bend the rules to provide better access to journalists.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	18. A PAO should give preferential treatment to major news organizations (such as <u>The New York Times</u> or TV networks) over smaller ones.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	19. A PAO should engage in disinformation programs if in the best interests of the command.	1	2	3	4	5	
1	2	3	4	5	20. A PAO should allow journalists to make the final decision on whether or not to print borderline material.	1	2	3	4	5	

Part III: Please rank order these in order of their priority of importance with 1 being the highest and 5 the lowest.

PRESS'S OPINION

- _____ freedom of information
- _____ national security
- _____ interests of the army
- _____ freedom of the press
- _____ public's right to know

Part IV: Open-ended questions.

1. What is your biggest problem in getting access to military stories?
2. What kinds of military stories are mostly covered?
3. Any comments on your relationship with the military?

VITA

Debra Lynn Pressley was born in Panama City, (Canal Zone), Panama on April 5, 1959. She attended primary and secondary schools in Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas, and was graduated from Killeen High School in June, 1977. The following September, she entered the University of Tennessee at Knoxville and in August, 1981 received the degree of Bachelor of Science in Communications and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant, Regular Army, United States Army. In August 1990, she reentered the University of Tennessee, Knoxville and in December, 1991 received a Master of Science degree in Communications.

She is presently a Captain in the United States Army assigned to the Student Detachment at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.