To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Fatemeh Seyedebrahimi entitled "Cultural Incorporation of Iran into the Western Capitalist Culture: Westernization of Iranian Education." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Sociology.

Donald A. Clelland, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Associate Vice Chancellor and Dean
of The Graduate School

CULTURAL INCORPORATION OF IRAN INTO THE WESTERN CAPITALIST CULTURE: WESTERNIZATION OF IRANIAN EDUCATION

A Dissertation Submitted In Partial
Fulfillment of The Requirements For The
Doctor of Philosophy Degree

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Fatemeh Seyedebrahimi

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the importance of the cultural incorporation of Iran into Western capitalist culture as a component of incorporation into the capitalist world-system. The concept of cultural incorporation itself is a new concept developed in this research. Discussing the phenomenon of incorporation, world-system theory, associated with the Wallerstein School, theorizes two aspects of economic incorporation and political incorporation but ignores a third aspect of incorporation, i.e. cultural incorporation. It is argued, in this research, that the realm of culture is independent from the other two realms of economics and politics. Culture is not, as Marx and many neo-Marxists believe, merely a reflection of economy. It rather has its own dynamics. Cultural incorporation is related to the broadening and deepening of the capitalist world-system, both as stimulant and as a source of resistance.

In order to examine the cultural incorporation of Iran, this research investigates the Westernization of education in Iran during the Qajar, Reza Shah, and Mohammad Reza Shah periods. In Iran cultural incorporation initially occurred, concurrently with economic/political incorporation, during the Qajar period. However, full-blown movement toward cultural incorporation happened only in the period of deepening, during the reign of Pahlavi. Iran's quest for inclusion and ascent within the world-system entailed the establishment of a modernization/Westernization educational

project. The very success of the universalistic/secularistic components of that program produced a cultural/political explosion. The case of Iran illustrates the uneven nature of the development of the capitalist world-system.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The world-system theory, associated with the scholarly work of Immanuel Wallerstein, a world system theorist in sociology, contains a thorough discussion of the emergence, in the 16th century in Europe, of the capitalist economic system, and its expansion throughout the entire world by the 19th century. This theory discusses processes involved in the expansion of the capitalist world-economy. These processes are 'economic incorporation', that is inclusion of new territories within the world-economy, and 'political incorporation', that is the creation of weak state structures participating in, and constrained by, the interstate system. It is also acknowledged that these processes produce some pressures at the level of culture (Wallerstein, 1983: 82).

Numerous case studies--such as works on the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire, Caribbean, South Asia, and Middle East--have been conducted for investigating the phenomenon of incorporation (Cizakca, 1985; Kasaba, 1988; Palat, Barr, Matson, Bahl, Ahmad, 1986; Phillips, 1987; Wallerstein, Decdeli, and Kasaba, 1987). Using the world-system approach, Foran (1989), an American scholar, investigates the period of Iran's Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), when the initial contact of Iran and the West, i.e. Europe, occurred, but on an equal basis without Europe

playing a dominating role and Iran a subordinate one. Gerami (1987), an Iranian scholar, investigates the incorporation of Iran into the capitalist world-economy. His argument is that the initial incorporation of Iran, in the form of a 'marginal periphery', occurred in the first half of the 19th century (1800-1830) during the Qajar Dynasty. By the end of the 19th century (1870-1905), Iran was a 'full-blown periphery', and in the last decade of the deposed shah's era (by the mid-1970s), it ascended to a semi-peripheral position (Gerami, 1987).

However, almost all the literature on the world-system focuses on two aspects of incorporation, namely economic incorporation and political incorporation. What the present research intends to add to the efforts already made is to investigate a third aspect of incorporation, cultural incorporation. Wallerstein confirms the interdependence of the three realms of economics, politics, and culture. He speaks of 'civilizational project', a term invented by Anour Abdel-Malek (Wallerstein, 1983: 89). However, he does not focus on the cultural aspect of incorporation in his theoretical efforts, perhaps partly because he, as well as most Marxists, is too economistic to pay attention to the priority of culture and the independent role it plays in the social system.

Cultural incorporation of a region takes place through different mechanisms, namely religion, education, mass media, art, literature, family, economic ideas and institutions, political

ideas and institutions. Because a detailed discussion of all of these elements are beyond the scope of this research, this study concentrates on education, and investigates the Westernization of education in Iran. Using the historical case of Iran, the secularization of education will be examined as a form of cultural incorporation.

The Research Method

'Secondary analysis' is the method of research in this study. Books and documents will be used to examine Iran's system of education before and after coming into contact with the West. This literature will be used to answer the following questions:

1- What is cultural incorporation?

2- In order to incorporate Iranian culture into the Western capitalist culture, what changes occurred in the Iranian educational system?

3- What was the traditional education?

4- How did the educational Westernization occur? This question is concerned with the mobilization of resources, i.e., money and people, necessary for the conduct of the Westernization.

5- When did the educational Westernization occur, by whom--not merely which individuals but what group, class, faction, or network, if any--and who were affected--i.e. what class, group, faction, or network?

6- How were the oppositional movements mobilized?

7- What was the educational philosophy of Shah's educational project?

Basic Hypotheses

1- The Westernization project in general (cultural incorporation), and Westernization of education in particular, has been driven by some factions of Iranians themselves, rather than through direct imposition by the West.

2- The traditional government itself took the initiative in meeting the challenge of modernity (cultural incorporation).

3- Secularization in general (a key component of cultural incorporation), and secularization of education in particular, was imposed by political decree, rather than emerging necessarily and automatically from economic change.

Importance of Study

Importance of this project, with its concentration on the 'cultural incorporation', is its emphasis on the 'centrality of meaning', the fact that things have ultimate meanings for human and that humans symbolize in a manner that no other animal does. What happens in 'cultural incorporation' entails basic changes in the meanings that people apply to themselves. Marxists, as well as neo-Marxists, including Wallerstein, made the mistake of overlooking the 'centrality of meaning'. Wallerstein acknowledges the important point that economy, politics, and culture are

inseparable. His argument is that one can not deal with economy, without thinking about politics and culture, and vice versa. However, there is an economistic thinking at the heart of his, as well as Marxists', project. He, as well as Marxists and most of the neo-Marxists believe that the human being is an essentially materialistic animal. They do not acknowledge directly that what made human beings human, in its proper sense, is the ability to create culture. This project emphasizes these human capabilities and needs, which give the culture the potential for having a relatively independent role in the social system.

Limitations of Study

This research is concerned mainly with investigating 'education' as a mechanism, among other mechanisms such as mass media, art, etc., for incorporation of the Iranian culture into the Western capitalist culture. A detailed analysis of all of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, because this work is an historical analysis conducted in the United States, the study will be limited to the sources available to the writer within the United States Thus, many primary sources available in Iran, which might prove useful, are unfortunately, eliminated from consideration.

Format of Study

This study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter I provides an introduction, the research method, research questions, research hypotheses, as well as the importance and the limitations of the study. Chapter II discusses the theoretical basis of the study. It deals with the world-system theory and presents a synthesis of the literature. Chapter III provides a brief discussion of the economic incorporation of Iran into the capitalist world-economy. Chapter IV deals with the historical background of Iranian education. Chapters V, VI, and VII discuss the Westernization of education in Iran during the Qajar, Reza Shah, and Mohammad Reza Shah periods respectively. The eighth chapter summarizes the major points of the study and draws conclusions.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research will apply, and modify and revise if necessary, the world system theory associated with the scholarly work of Immanuel Wallerstein and his colleagues. This theory discusses the phenomenon of 'incorporation', the process through which different regions of the world are brought into the capitalist world-economy. The previous work presents a detailed discussion of economic and political incorporation. The present study is an extension of this theory to a third aspect of incorporation, i.e. cultural incorporation, which is widely neglected by this theory.

World-System Theory

Even though the literature on the world system theory gives the impression that this theory is an invention of the 1970s and later, it has its intellectual root in a century of theoretical efforts European economists, Marxist writers of the early 1900s, the Latin American dependistas, and even the Fascist author Manoilesco (Clelland & Dunaway, 1990: 308; Chirot and Hall, 1982).

There are numerous varieties of world system theories. The most famous includes Wallerstein and his students; a second example is Stanford School, associated with such writers as

Rubinson, Meyer, and Modelski (Clelland & Dunaway, 1990: 309). While the former concentrates on the long-range historical studies and theoretical work, the latter focuses on more quantitative research about the world-economy. The Stanford school and Wallerstein school each propose a different analysis of the role of state (Clelland & Dunaway, 1990: 310; Modelski, 1983).

In spite of disagreement of these two groups on some fine points, they both agree on the following theoretical themes: development occurs within the framework of the world-economy; capitalism is a world-wide mode of production; the political structure plays a constitutive part in the world-economy; the economic crises and internal contradictions play a solidifying role in capitalism's world domination (Clelland & Dunaway, 1990: 311).

To these theorists, the historic world is made up of large scale social systems, not of just a set of independent societies. In other words, social action and social change occurs not within 'society', but within 'worlds'. Today there is a single modern world system. This global system has a life of its own and is independent from the national societies existing in its boundaries (Clelland & Dunaway, 1990: 309; Bergesen, 1982; Chirot & Hall, 1982). This system emerged in the 16th century as a European centered world-economy (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977). Therefore, the social structure of societies can not be analyzed

by focusing merely on their internal events; rather, all societies must be understood within the context created by a larger system, i.e., the economic and political relationships that has dominated a major portion of the globe (Shannon, 1989: 20). In the 16th century, this system was limited to Europe and South America. It, however, expanded and at present it has incorporated all or almost all areas of the world (Shannon, 1989: 21; Hopkins, 1982; Wallerstein, 1984b; Chase-Dunn, 1984).

In terms of economic organization, these theorists believe in the existence of a world-system with a single division of labor in which multiple cultural systems are unified. They, unlike the theorists with the conventional modernization approach do not believe in the existence of isolated and independent national economies that just happen to trade with each other. To Wallerstein,

> there is an ongoing, extensive and relatively complete social division of labor with an integrated set of production processes which relate to each other through a 'market' which has been 'instituted' or 'created' in some complex way (Wallerstein, 1984b: 59).

Wallerstein explains what he means by the word division of labor. To him, the exchange of 'essential' goods in the capitalist system entails the interdependence of various trading partners. It is through this exchange that the trading partners can continue the economic activities they consider central to their well-being

(Wallerstein, 1979: 14; Shannon, 1989: 21). As a result, a number of cultural areas, states, or societies, each having a specialized role in producing goods, make a single economic system based on a complex division of labor. A network of global economic exchange, thus, ties the world-economy together in a system of exploitation from which few escape. Historical capitalism evolved as a mechanism for the transfer of surplus, over the long run, from peripheral to core areas (Shannon, 1989: 21; Wallerstein, 1984b: 60; 1979: 14).

Wallerstein states that the interdependent division of labor is not unique to the modern period. Differentiating between world-economy and world-empire, Wallerstein claims that the latter was created in ancient empires, such as Rome and China. He maintains that world-empires, even though characterized as world-systems, had economic and political organizations quite different from the modern world-system (Shannon, 1989: 22; Wallerstein, 1979: 5). In a world-empire, there is a single social economy i.e., a single division of labor with an overarching political structure; whereas in a world-economy there is a single social economy with multiple state structures (Wallerstein, 1979). The modern world-system has a capitalist mode of production organized into a single interstate system. The world-empire contains a tributary/redistributive mode of production with an overarching political system. In the capitalist mode, the driving force is the ceaseless accumulation of capital, pursued

through markets. Markets, in turn, are only partially free from political and social constraints (Wallerstein, 1979). In a redistributive/tributary mode, the maximization of capital is not present. Instead, the basis of 'redistribution' rests on political decisions.(Wallerstein, 1979).

Actually, Wallerstein (1979: 4-5) distinguishes two types of historical social systems: world-systems and mini-systems. However, the 19th and 20th centuries witness the emergence of only a capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1979: 5). Within mini-systems, which are found only in very simple and agricultural or hunting and gathering societies, there is a complete division of labor, and a single cultural framework (Wallerstein, 1979: 45). However, no mini-system is found in the world any longer. Even the existing number of such systems in the past was overestimated because by tying to an empire and by the payment of tribute, such a system ceased to be a system any longer and participated in a larger redistributive economy (Wallerstein, 1979: 5).

Therefore the only kind of system present in the world is the world-system, which can be defined as a system with one single division of labor, an interstate system, and multiple cultural systems. There are, as stated earlier, two varieties of world-systems: world-empires and world-economies (Wallerstein, 1979: 6).

Prior to C. 1500 (and since the Neolithic Revolution) there was a co-existence of multiple social systems, namely world-empires, world-economies, and mini-systems, on the planet. In this long period, world-empires were the 'strong' form, incorporating within them world-economies and mini-systems. While world-empires were relatively long-lasting, the world-economies or mini-systems were relatively unstable and short-lived (up to 100-150 years), being either disintegrated or conquered by one group and transformed into a world-empire (Wallerstein, 1979: 5-6). When these three systems came into contact, an expanding world-empire absorbed surrounding world-economies or mini-systems. All the great civilizations of pre-modern times, such as China, Egypt, and Rome are examples of world-empires emerging from world-economies (Wallerstein, 1979: 5-6). When world-empires reached the limits of their expansion, they contracted and gave way to new world-economies and mini-systems to grow-up (Wallerstein, Decdeli, & Kasaba, 1987).

In C. 1500, for the first time in history, a new world-economy grew up, which was able to develop fully the capitalist mode of production, with economic predominance of market, and the inter-state system which is the structured correlate of the world-economy (Wallerstein, Decdeli, & Kasaba, 1987; Wallerstein, 1979: 56). Rather than being transformed into a

redistributive world-empire, this European world-economy developed as a capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1979: 6).

In this world-system, as well as every previous world-system, there has always been a trimodal structure with core, periphery, and semi-periphery (Wallerstein, 1979: 349). As a matter of fact, world-system theorists differentiate three different kinds of the production processes, i.e. core, periphery, and semi-periphery in the world division of labor. However, because each type tends to predominate in particular geographical regions under the control of particular states, they finally speak of geographical areas and states as the core, periphery, and semi-periphery (Shannon, 1989: 24). "The core and the periphery of the world-economy were not two separate 'economies' with two separate 'laws' but one capitalist economic system with different sectors performing different functions" (Wallerstein, 1974a: 2). For Wallerstein, these three structural levels, i.e. core, periphery, and semi-periphery, are not static; a country can move backward or forward from one level to the other (Wallerstein, 1974b: 350). Wallerstein maintains that countries in the periphery seek to become semi-periphery, those in semi-periphery attempt for ascension to the core economic position, and those in the core are fighting against their decline.

Core states, located at one extreme of the world hierarchical division of labor, are specialized in the production of the most advanced goods, with the usage of highly mechanized

mode of production and the most sophisticated technologies. These states are administratively well organized and militarily the most powerful of those in the world-system (Hopkins, 1982: 12-13).

A limited number of Western countries constituted the core states for most of the history of the capitalist world-system. However, in this century, the United States and later, in 1970s, Japan ascended to the core (Shannon, 1989: 24).

The states in the periphery are located at the other extreme of the world division of labor. In terms of economic activities, these countries are more 'labor intensive' and less technologically sophisticated than core countries. These countries are weak both militarily and organizationally (Hopkins, 1982: 12-13). Parts of South America, Central America, Africa, and Asia have constituted the periphery for most of the history of the world-system (Shannon, 1989: 25).

The semi-peripheral states are located in between these two extremes. They perform some 'core-like' and some 'peripheral-like' economic activities. In terms of access to capital-intensive industry, they are in between the core and peripheral countries. In comparison with peripheral states, the semi-peripheral countries have stronger states, being more autonomous from the core influence. They play an 'intermediary' role in the world-system (Wallerstein, 1984b: 61; Thompson, 1983b: 12; Hopkins, Wallerstein et al., 1982b: 47). Examples of

the present day semi-peripheral countries are South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina and Iran.

In terms of dynamics, these two social systems are quite different. "A world-empire expands to the socio-technical limits of effective political control of the redistributive process, and then either shrinks or disintegrates. Its history tends to be one long cycle of expansion and contraction, but it also has secular linear trends of development" (Wallerstein, 1979: 30). According to Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977), the growth of the capitalist world-economy, through cycles of expansion and contraction, has been fourfold: Its geographical scope is expanded to the extent that, now, it encompasses the globe; its productive capacity, capital formation, is increased; there is an increase in the world-scale integration and interdependence of its constituent parts; and there has been a growth of commodification and class formation, i.e. "organization and penetration of social relations" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977: 112).

As a matter of fact, the modern world-economy, due to its capitalist mode of production characterized by the endless accumulation of capital, is the only world-economy which does not have an overall tendency toward disintegration (except over the very long run). Quite the contrary, it "expands its boundaries over time, as part of the general process of the expansion of capitalist production" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987: 764). The constant accumulation of capital is facilitated by the increasing

exploitation of labor. This process has taken two forms of 'broadening' and 'deepening' (Shannon, 1989: 114; Hopkins, Wallerstein et al., 1982c: 123; Wallerstein, 1984b: 63). The tendency toward 'broadening' and 'deepening' of the capitalist world-economy entails 'incorporation' of different nation-states into the capitalist world-economy as well as their 'peripheralization' respectively. However, before going into a discussion of incorporation, the cycles of hegemony, as discussed by Wallerstein and his associates, will be reviewed here.

Cycles of Economic And Political Hegemony

Wallerstein and his associates talk about cycles of economic and political hegemony. At several points in the world-system history one core power achieved, over other powers, an economic as well as military superiority, known as hegemony. Then when one state enjoys a major economic advantage over all other core states in the areas of production, commerce and finance, it is in a position of 'full hegemony' (Shannon, 1989: 120; Hopkins, Wallerstein et al., 1982b: 62). Because of its economic predominance, the hegemonic power can maintain the largest strategic military force, and is thus enabled, more than any other core state, for effective military interference all over the world. But this military superiority is not built to the extent that it strongly threatens the political independence of other core states (most of which are coopted as allies within the interstate

system) (Hopkins, Wallerstein et al., 1982b: 62; Shannon, 1989: 121).

Wallerstein believes that there have been only three fairly short such periods of full hegemony in the modern history: 1620-1650/1672 (United Provinces of Holland); 1815-1850/1873 (Great Britain); and 1945-1967 (United States) (Hopkins, Wallerstein et al. 1982b: 62; Shannon, 1989:121). Therefore, the history of modern era is portrayed as a series of 'ascending' and declining hegemony, with a brief period of full hegemony in each cycle. There are four stages in each cycle: ascending hegemony, hegemonic victory, hegemonic maturity, and hegemonic decline. In the first stage--ascending hegemony--there is conflict between rival powers seeking hegemony. The previous hegemonic power, which has lost its predominant economic and military advantage, is still a major core power. In the second stage--hegemonic victory--one state gains a large productive and military advantage over the other states and bypasses the 'old' hegemonic power. In the third stage--hegemonic maturity--one state enjoys the position of full hegemony, i.e. productive, commercial, and financial predominance. During the last stage--declining hegemony--the economic and military position of the hegemonic power, while still the most militarily powerful, is in a steady erosion and faces increasing challenges from other states. In the long periods outside these cycles (such as the 18th century), there is a

struggle for hegemony between two or more powers, but no one is able to gain a clear advantage over the others. (Hopkins, Wallerstein at al., 1982a: 116-117; Thompson, 1983a: 52-53; Shannon, 1989: 121-122). The cycles of hegemony as given by Wallerstein and his associates (1982a: 118) is shown in the Table II-1.

Table II-1: Cycles of Hegemony

HEGEMONIC POWER	DATES	PART OF CYCLE
United Provinces of Holland	1515-1590	Ascending Hegemony
	1590-1620	Hegemonic Victory
	1620-1650	Hegemonic Maturity
	1650-1700	Hegemonic decline
Great Britain	1798-1815	Ascending Hegemony
	1815-1850	Hegemonic Victory
		1850-1873
	Hegemonic Maturity	
	1873-1897	Hegemonic Decline
United States	1897-1913/1920	Ascending Hegemony
	1913/1920-1945	Hegemonic Victory
	1945-1967	Hegemonic Maturity
	1967-?	Hegemonic Decline

Source: Hopkins, Wallerstein, et al., 1982a: 118.

Incorporation

Incorporation is the process through which broadening of the capitalist world-economy, that is the spread of its activities into new geographical areas, occurs. Incorporation of a new zone generally occurs when the world-economy goes from phases of contraction to expansion in a period of restructuring. Through the incorporation, "the production process of [a] region [becomes a] part of the integrated division of labor of the capitalist world-economy, responding to the imperatives of the drive for accumulation of capital" (Wallerstein, Decdeli, & Kasaba, 1987: 89). The incorporation of new areas facilitates the reproduction of the world-system through links that bind the two areas together. These links undermine the preincorporation networks in the area and bind the incorporated area to the global system. This area, thus, will not be a proper historical unit by itself.

The structural and reciprocal dependence of core and peripheral production is a new phenomenon for the peoples involved. People who were once masters of their history become, through incorporation, bound into a world network and its history, and bound at least initially in a subordinate position. This inclusion normally entails a decline in the well-being of the communities concerned.

Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987) state that initially, in the 16th century, the capitalist world-economy covered most of Europe and Iberian America. Colonized North America and the

Caribbean were incorporated in the 17th century. In the late 18th century, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, the Indian subcontinent, and the coastal West Africa were incorporated. Finally, in the second half of the 19th century, Africa, Oceania, and other parts of Asia were incorporated.

The geography of expansion has its own logic. An insufficient argument is that distance from the original core of the world-economy played a role in determining priorities for incorporation, with further zones from the original heartland of the world-economy being incorporated later. Also an elementary role is mentioned for the economies of transport and communication. However, the Ottoman Empire is an anomaly to this argument because in spite of its relative closeness to the core of the world-economy, it was not incorporated "early" (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1987: 775). A more promising argument is that 'resistance' is an important factor; "the more strongly structured existing political systems in the areas external to the capitalist world-economy were, the smaller the gap between their level of military technology and that of the 'expanders', and conversely the less attractive they seemed as objects of expansion" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987: 775). Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987) further argue that geographic expansion is a search for cheap labor in order to balance the cost of labor, which tended to rise within the core and semi-peipheral zones, and thereby reduced the rate of accumulation of surplus.

Hopkins and Wallerstein state that expansion "often did not involve military-political conquest at all, or at least in its full-fledged form. The object of expansion was to 'incorporate' a zone, to make what was external internal, to restructure activities in the zone so that they conformed with and fully participated in the ongoing functioning of the capitalist world-economy" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987: 776). This implies two things: on the one hand, the sphere of production is transformed in such a way that some major production activities, integrated into the axial division of labor is created. On the other hand, the sphere of governance is transformed in such a way that state structure functions within the rules of interstate system (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987). These reorganizations, in the incorporated zone, of economic and political structures are no simple task. Economic activities have to be "responsive to the pressures emanating from 'market' of the world-economy. In order to be responsive, this economic activity [has] to have a work-force that [is] both available and dispensable, and [is] relatively well disciplined when working" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987: 777). In terms of the political change, an incorporated zone needs a state structure in line with the state structures of the rest of the world-economy both in form and in the mode of production. This kind of state structure facilitates the operations of the world-economy. Furthermore, the state structure in the incorporated zone has to be neither too weak nor too strong, for "if they were too strong, they could

obstruct flows of commodities, capital, and labor; if they were too weak, they could not prevent others from obstructing them" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987: 778). According to Hopkins and Wallerstein, there is another area in which social reorganization is required: that is, the development of state structure personnel who operate within the ideological boundaries of the interstate system and are part of the world-system's status groups and class system (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987).

As indicated above, the literature of the world-system considers a twofold process for incorporation. One is the linkage of the production processes of an area external to the capitalist world-economy with the production and consumption in the capitalist world-economy. The second is the integration of the political structures of an external area with the interstate network of the world-system.

This research would like to add, to these two aspects, a third aspect of incorporation, cultural incorporation. Wallerstein, instead, speaks of Western civilizational project. In fact, civilizational project is a term invented by Anouar Abdel-Malek (Wallerstein, 1983: 89). We now turn to a discussion of Western civilizational project and cultural incorporation.

Western Civilizational Project

What Wallerstein has in mind by the term Western civilizational project is the spread of Western civilization which

comes along with the economic and political incorporations of an external zone. He considers the concept of civilization very important, but he gives neither any detailed discussion of this issue nor a clear example of the civilizational project (Wallerstein, 1984a)

Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977) mention the cultural aspect of the world-system. They acknowledge the existence of "a multiplicity of interrelated (and....often overlapping) cultural communities, language communities, religious communities, ethnic communities, scientific communities, and so forth" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977: 113). They continue that "some pre-existent communities were incorporated and reconstituted, others destroyed; entirely new communities were formed, including whole 'peoples'" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1977: 113).

However, in 1983, Wallerstein begins a discussion of the scientific culture of historical capitalism. He distinguishes two ideological pillars of historical capitalism: racism and universalism. Racism, to Wallerstein, is "the ideological justification for the hierarchization of work-force and its highly unequal distribution of rewards" (Wallerstein, 1983: 78). Racism is the mode by which various segments of the work-force within the same economic structure are constrained to relate to each other. Wallerstein states that:

> What we mean by racism is that set of ideological statements combined with that set of continuing practices

> which have had the consequence of maintaining a high correlation of ethnicity and work-force allocation over time (Wallerstein, 1983: 78).

Wallerstein continues that "the ideological statements have been in the form of allegations that genetic and/or long-lasting 'cultural' traits of various groups are the major cause of differential allocation to positions in economic structures" (Wallerstein, 1983: 78).

Racism, therefore, more than being an ideology justifying inequality, socializes groups into their own role in the economy. it is, thus, a cultural pillar of historical capitalism (Wallerstein, 1983: 79).

While racism has been important in construction and reproduction of appropriate work forces, universalism has been the ideological pillar for creation, socialization, and reproduction of cadres, without whose management the work-forces could not be expected to perform efficiently (Wallerstein, 1983: 80).

Universalism, Wallerstein states, is "an epistemology. It is a set of beliefs about what is knowable and how it can be known" (Wallerstein, 1983: 80). In other words, what is implied by 'universalism' is that there are universal and permanent true statements about the physical and social world and that science eliminates all the subjective elements, in order to produce these universal statements (Wallerstein, 1983: 81).

However, Wallerstein argues that 'truth' functions as an opiate. He, unlike Karl Marx who saw 'religion' as the opiate of the masses, or Raymond Aron who considered, in turn, Marxist ideas as the opiate of the intellectuals, claims that universal, scientific truth is the real opiate of both masses and intellectuals (Wallerstein, 1983: 81). Universal scientific truth and its correlate, the idea of 'progress' are thus viewed as 'myths' (Wallerstein, 1986: 15-16). Against this myth Wallerstein counterposes his own 'myth' of a single world-system, which develops, not by universal laws or stages, but as the outcome of historical conjunctures (Taylor, 1986: 273-76).

Wallerstein (1983: 82) states that expansion of the capitalist world-economy through incorporation of new zones which involves economic and political transformations in the incorporated zone creates pressures at the level of culture. He gives some examples of these cultural pressures: "Christian proselytization; the imposition of European language; instruction in specific technologies and mores; [and] changes in legal codes" (1983: 82). These changes at the level of culture were mostly made through using military force or were made by educators backed by military force. To Wallerstein, this is the process which is sometimes labeled as 'Westernization' or 'modernization'. The process of Westernization contains forced cultural change and destruction of traditional societies. Wallerstein continues that the Westernization of culture is

legitimated by "desirability of sharing both the fruits of, and faith in, [the] ideology of universalism" (Wallerstein, 1983: 82). The result of this adherence to universalism, Wallerstein explains, is the growth of a scientific and moral ideology which justifies capitalism as a means for 'modernization' and advancement of the traditional societies of the world (Clelland & Dunaway, 1990: 324). The doctrine of universalism is what legitimizes this world-wide struggle between modernity and traditions. The concept of a desirable universal culture (seen as 'progress') is used to justify the world-wide expansion of capitalism.

In short, Wallerstein argues, 'universalism has served to facilitate the accumulation of capital, not to modernize the world. Universalism is an 'opiate' operating to facilitate the accumulation of capital; it operates under the guises of truth, rationality, and progress; and it has been manipulated to socialize the world-wide work force", and especially the national elite cadres (Clelland & Dunaway, 1990: 324-325).

Therefore, to Wallerstein, racism and universalism are two components of the Western civilizational project. Universalism, despite its claim of cultural transcendence, is a cultural construct of the West. Thus, its propagation as a central value is implicitly culturally demeaning, that is, universalism is dialectically racist.

Westernization is defined, by all scholars, as the acceptance of the West. What differentiates their definitions is the kind of accepted Western values which symbolizes a person as Westernized. In spite of significant difference among Western countries, Westernization contains certain common elements (Srinivas, 1962).

According to Hall (1964), 'Westernization' is the import and assimilation of Western institutions, technology and culture into a non-Western country. Black et al. (1975) contend that the term 'Westernization' implies that the source of change is the West, and the Western institutions are the essence of modernity. To Yogendra Singh (1973) Westernization refers to the acceptance of the cultural, scientific, and technological values of the West. While he sees Westernization as an urban and upper class phenomenon, V. K. R. Rao (1978) considers Westernization as a process of social change which is not totally limited to the urban areas.

John Friedl defines Westernization as the adoption of Western cultural patterns. To him, Westernization makes "changes in values, attitudes, and beliefs, that is, in the psychological make up of people in non-Western societies" (Friedl, 1976: 322).

The word 'modernization' is derived from the Latin word *modo*, meaning 'just now' and 'modern' (Mulay and Ray, 1973). The presently used concept of 'modernization' goes back to the

concept of Western development used in the 19th century (Brown, 1976).

Some scholars suggest that modernization must be viewed in psychological or individual terms. Lerner (1958) argues that as persons increase their empathic capability, i.e. the ability to psychologically project themselves across social and occupational class lines, they move from traditional to modern styles of life. McClelland (1961), on the other hand, argues that the key to the level of modernization of individuals or groups is the level of achievement motivation. Similarly an economist, Hagen (1962) speaks of innovational personality. He concludes that personality change is the first step in the modernization sequence, involving urbanization, increased media participation, increased literacy, and further change in personality. For him, urbanization and other outward signs of modernization are merely steps in the process of change, not its point of departure.

Most economists, on the other hand, see modernization "primarily in terms of man's application of technologies to the control of nature's resources in order to bring about a marked increase in the growth of output per head of population" (Weiner, 1966: 3). Walter Rostow (1961), sees a series of stages for the occurrence of development and modernization everywhere. These stages are:

1) traditional society, 2) precondition for take-off, 3) take-off,

4) drive to maturity, and 5) high mass consumption. Rostow believes that modernization and industrialization are almost identical and embody progress.

This, however is not true. While the modernization process involves the acceptance of the scientific and technological values of the West, it is not identical to 'progress'. C. E. Black's argument in this regard is that 'modernization' is certainly not 'progress' in any simple sense of the term. The changes brought by modernization may produce conflict as well as benefit (Black et al., 1975: 9). Wallerstein's position is more extreme: modernization, as the continuing expansion and deepening of the capitalist world-system has brought more problems than benefits to the ordinary people of the world (Wallerstein, 1983: 97-110).

While political scientists focus particularly on problems of nation and government building as modernization occurs, sociologists and social anthropologists are primarily concerned with the process of differentiation that characterizes modern societies (Weiner, 1966: 3).

In their definition of modernization, most Western scholars, unlike Iranian scholars, differentiate between the processes of modernization and Westernization. D. A. Chekki (1974) contends that the concept of Westernization is too narrow to represent the complex process of modernization in developing countries. Apter (1965) sees 'Westernization' as a particular form of 'modernization'

To Dr. Ali Shariati, an Iranian sociologist, "modernization is changing traditions, mode of consumption and material life from old to new" (Shariati, 1969: 16-18). His argument is that to become modernized means to become modernized in consumption. Modernity, to him, is the best means by which Westerners can change non-Europeans' thought and personality. To become modernized, one needs to become like the Europeans. Therefore, modernization and Westernization are synonymous (Shariati, 1969).

Frantz Fanon's argument is that what Europe has in mind is to enslave non-Europeans by the machine. The prerequisite for this captivity is to deprive non-Europeans of their personality. Shariati acknowledges Fanon's point that the personality must be wiped out first (Shariati, 1969: 33).

In the introduction to Frantz Fanon's "The Wretched of the Earth", Jean Paul Sartre says that:

> The European elite undertook to manufacture a native elite. They picked out promising adolescents; they branded them, as with a red-hot iron, with the principles of Western culture; they stuffed their mouths full with high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words that stuck to the teeth. After a short stay in the mother country, they were sent home, whitewashed. These walking lies had nothing left to say to their brothers; they only echoed (Sartre, 1961: 7).

Shariati's argument is that these mindless imitators of the West, as pictured by Sartre, keep capitalism running through their desires to purchase Western goods (Shariati, 1969: 16-18).

Jalal Al-e Ahamd (1962), in his book titled Gharbzadegi (Weststruckness) describes Gharbzadeh as a person who is struck by the Western modes of culture. He has no personality and is a devout consumer of Western products. He listens to the West and echoes the Westerners' voice.

C. E. Black distinguishes seven patterns of political modernization. The first pattern is formed of the earliest countries to be be modernized: i.e., Great Britain and France. The second pattern is formed of countries--such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand--settled by peoples of the old world who became politically dominant in the new societies. They differ from other colonies in that their dominant population was the same as that of the mother country. The third pattern is comprised of European countries where modernization of the political institutions occurred after the French Revolution, as a direct or indirect result of it, and somewhat later than Great Britain and France. The fourth pattern is formed of twenty two independent countries of Latin America. The fifth pattern is formed of the relatively few societies--Russia, Japan, China, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Thailand--that modernized without direct outside intervention, but under the indirect influence of societies that modernized earlier. The sixth

and seventh patterns consist of more than one hundred independent and dependent societies of Asia, Africa, the Americans, and Oceania, that have experienced colonial rule. The societies forming the sixth pattern are composed of thirty-four now independent and twenty-nine dependent societies, with a population of about one billion. The traditional culture of these societies was fully developed enough to enable them to interact with the culture of modern societies in their adaptation to modern functions. The societies in the seventh pattern--the thirty-one independent and approximately twenty dependent societies of sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania, with a population of 200 million--did not have sufficiently developed religion, language, or political institutions when they faced the challenge of modernity. They, therefore, borrowed modern ideas and institutions from more modern societies. Because this research is a case study on Iran, the fifth pattern will be more fully discussed here.

Because of long experience with centralized bureaucratic governments, the governments of the societies in the fifth pattern are sufficiently effective to resist direct and comprehensive foreign rule for a long period of modern times. Unlike most other societies, they modernized at their own initiative, with a significant continuity of territory and population. A variety of circumstances account for the ability of these societies to preserve their independence. The balance of

power, i.e., the divisions among the modern rivals, was a more important factor than military strength in protecting China, Turkey, and Iran's independence. Inaccessibility and isolation also played a role in the case of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Thailand. Military strength, on the other hand, was the primary factor in preserving Russia and Japan's independence (Black, 1966: 119).

One of the characteristics of the societies in the fifth pattern is that "they established the territorial and human base of their states before--and in China, Japan, and Iran many centuries before--they encountered the challenge of modernity" (Black, 1966: 120). In the terminology of world-system theory, these countries remain 'external arenas' to the world-economy. An external arena may have notable trade and political relations with the core, but it is not dependent on the core. Most trade is in non-essential goods. That is, the trade is in goods not defined as fundamentally central to the maintenance of either country. Furthermore, the production processes are controlled from within the external arena (Wallerstein, 1989: 130).

These countries, furthermore, did not face direct foreign rule characteristic of colonialism. "All have experienced some degree of foreign intervention in modern times--periods of foreign occupation in parts of their territory, preferential treatment for foreigners in the form of capitulations, and extensive reliance on foreign loans and advises. These various kinds of intervention were nevertheless a very different

experience from the direct and prolonged foreign tutelage represented by colonialism" (Black, 1966: 120).

In these societies, the traditional government itself took the initiative in meeting the challenge of modernity: "Russia under the Muscovite and Petrine traditions, in Tokugawa Japan, in Ch'ing (Manchu) China, in Ottoman Turkey, in Persia under the Qajar dynasty, in Ethiopia under Theodore and Menlik, and in Siam under Chakri rulers" (Black, 1966: 120).

These countries had strong enough governments to resist the incorporation of their countries into the modern world-system. They were also realistic enough to know that they would ultimately succumb to the foreign rule, unless they introduced modern reforms. They, thus, initiated the programs of limited or defensive modernization, to preserve the traditional society and protect it from the more intensive modernization by foreign or domestic modernizers. "These reforms were concerned with providing modern training and equipment for the bureaucracy and army, improving transportation and communications and establishing institutions of higher education" (Black, 1966: 121). They invited foreign specialists to train their native scholars and artisans; native leaders went, at the same time, abroad to study modern techniques.

Instead of transforming the traditional system, the reforms, initiated by the defensive modernization, were designed to strengthen the traditional system against foreign pressures.

These reforms left unaffected the way of life of the peasants--who formed over four-fifths of the population--as well as the agrarian economies. The elites retained their traditional privileges. These reforms, however, did meet the challenge of more modern societies at least temporarily. "Programs of intensive modernization was delayed for several generations" (Black, 1966: 121).

In these countries, the traditional leadership itself made the fundamental break with the past; it "was made not as a result of revolution by domestic forces outside the government, or of occupation by a foreign power, or of a national uprising against foreign rule" (Black, 1966: 122).

Therefore, the countries in the world all have experienced at least some degrees of Westernization, which is either initially driven by the traditional government itself, such as the case of Iran, or imposed directly by the colonial rules. Von Laue (1987) discusses the 'world revolution of Westernization'. The initiative for this phenomenon was European's will to power and to take advantage of all opportunities for their own aggrandizement. The Europeans exploited the world's resources for their own gain and subjected people around the world to core mastery. The base for this initiative was Europe; it was later enlarged into 'the West'. The West expanded its qualities on the unwilling and unprepared majority of humanity, and transformed the entire world in its image and established "a hierarchy of prestige defined by the

success of imitation" (Von Laue, 1987: 4). The world revolution of Westernization had the major effect of discrediting and undermining all non-Western cultures. Traditional authorities and local customs crumbled away with no future. At the same time, the important ways of the West did not fit societies whose cultural sovereignty had been crushed (Von Laue, 1987: 5).

Different parts of the world witnessed different forms of the subversion of traditional cultures. Japan was a unique case where native tradition proved miraculously compatible with Western imports. The results among the majority of peoples around the world were cultural chaos: there was a loss of purpose, moral insensibility, a penchant for violence, social and political fragmentation, and the psychological misery of knowingly belonging to a backward society (Von Laue, 1987).

The culturally subverted countries, in search for answers, were led to experiments of communism and fascism in the wake of World War I. Then Communist Russia emerged, after World War II, as the most powerful self-proclaimed challenger to the Western model. At the same time, the new states emerging from decolonization were inspired by the state-centered growth experiment. Instead of self affirmation, what was obtained turned out to be further Westernization through 'reculturation', i.e. a revamping of indigenous institutions and human values under external pressure, to meet alien goals (Von Laue, 1987: 5).

The experiments in state-socialism, even though emerged as national liberation revolutions, merely carried the world revolution of Westernization one step further. Western-oriented indigenous leaders tried to convert their own people by force and violence--what characterized the elemental expansion of the West--into "organization-minded citizens as disciplined, loyal, and cooperative as their counterparts in the Western democracies" (Von Laue, 1987: 6). They were going to achieve, in a hurry and by conscious design, what in the West had been accomplished over centuries of mostly invisible cultural conditioning. Therefore, communism and fascism, seen in this light, were idealized versions of Western (or capitalist) society; they were to inspire the humiliated and the disadvantaged. This disguised form of cultural colonialism was to create, out of the resentful people, a new society capable of competing with the West on more equal terms.

The world revolution of Westernization was, by 1900, more than ever the product of the competition among the Great Powers of Europe. The central contest was among the European themselves, not between the Europeans and the other peoples of the world (Von Laue, 1987: 36). As a matter of fact European history and culture have witnessed invidious comparison of wealth and power among European countries. The winners in this competition, mainly Britain, continuously escalated political ambitions. This competitiveness rose to a new height by 1871,

when the struggle for supremacy within Europe was deliberately expanded around the world. The two Atlantic states, France and England, were pacesetters in this fierce competition. The late 19th century was the culmination of the expansion of Europe (Von Laue, 1987: 36).

The world revolution of Westernization, i.e. reculturation of people around the world in line with Western capitalist culture, was led by England. Other European countries, above all France, and soon Germany and Italy, were pressing the same revolution by 1878. As a matter of fact, all of Western Europe had competitively expanded its power into the non-European parts of the world through several centuries. The Atlantic states--i.e. Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, England, and France--had formed major colonial empires. In the Eastern Europe, the tzars of Russia had pushed their version of European culture through Siberia, to the Pacific, and into Central Asia. Ever since Columbus, the European settlers, in the Western Hemisphere, manipulated the Amerindians' culture far more drastically than that of British in India. The United States joined the European empires in the Westernization of the world. A liberal statesman, Lord Rosebery, said in 1893 that "we have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, shall receive the Anglo-Saxon, and not another character" (Von Laue, 1987: 16).

Subversion of non-Western societies to Western culture began at the apex, with the defeat, humiliation, or even overthrow of traditional rulers. It ended not only political but also cultural and economic self-determination of these societies. After subversion of the rulers' authority, there was intensification of Western attack on other parts of society. Local gods and their guardians were discredited by missionaries, whose security was guaranteed by Western arms. This led to a weakening of the spiritual foundation of society. Meanwhile, the channels of trade and economic life were redirected by Western businessmen and their local agents to make local producers and consumers dependent on a world market beyond their control. New sets of rewards and punishment, of prestige and authority were introduced by colonial administration and its allies. The change was even obvious in the externals of dress: Chinese men cut off their queues and adopted Western cloths; the Africans became ashamed of their nudity; " the boldest even tried to become like Westerners in taste, in opinion, in morals, and intellect" (Von Laue, 1987: 28).

The speed of this subversion depended on Western policy and the resilience of local society. The things fell apart in most of the small African states, and much more slowly in India or China (Von Laue 1987: 28).

As part of the general pattern of Westernization, the Westerners introduced their education. A new category of cultural

half-breeds--the Westernized non-Western intelligentsia--was created as part of the general pattern of Westernization. Examples of these intelligentsia are Jawaharlal-Nehru, the prime minister of India, President Sukarno of Indonesia, Colonel Naser of Egypt, and Nkrumah, the leadership of Ghana (Von Laue, 1987).

While struggling for purpose, identity, and recognition, these intelligentsia acquired a taste for the dominant ideals of the West, especially the liberal plea for equality, freedom, and self-determination, as well as the socialist cry of social justice for all exploited and oppressed peoples. These intellectuals turned these lessons to their own use. The ideals of freedom and self-determination justified struggling for free reign over their own minds and souls as well as their countries and cultures. Therefore, as a result of their Westernization, they became anti-Western nationalists and curtailed outwardly the abject imitation of the West (Von Laue, 1987: 28).

By decolonization, the world revolution of Westernization was reaching its culmination. The first phase of this revolution, accomplished through colonialism and imperialism, was ended by decolonization. Now the revolution proceeded in new states, patterned after the European nation-states through the newcomers themselves, who for their own self-respect, transformed 'Westernization' into 'modernization' or plain 'development'. The two latter terms imply a culturally neutral conceptual framework for liberation from dependence. However,

liberation from Western domination implied or openly promoted further Westernization. "Liberation meant a far more intensive submission to the Western model than had been possible under colonial rule" (Von Laue, 1987: 240).

In the global state system, state-building was the challenge of the age, and statehood was an inescapable necessity. "The new states were built from the outside-in, and from the top-down" (Von Laue, 1987: 307). Being an alien institution derived from Western experience and imposed by Western-trained intellectuals, the 'nation-state' introduced an alien structure of government. It was, no doubt, a manifestation of neocolonialism. It was a hostile and overpowering state, undermining or destroying all familiar relationships. Through the emergence of the nation-state, the imperialism had been indigenized, and its battles were fought internally (Von Laue, 1987: 308). Like the subversion under colonialism, the ways of the past suffered by the inroads of modernity, which promoted not only statehood and opportunity for advancement, but also alienation, disorientation, hopelessness, violence, criminality, or outright brutishness (Von Laue, 1987: 309).

Amin (1989) discusses the phenomenon of Eurocentrism and situates it "within the overall ideological construct of capitalism" (Amin, 1989: IX). He asserts that a two-fold radical transformation, that shaped the modern world, began with Renaissance. On the one hand, the capitalist society emerged in

Europe; on the other hand, there was the European conquest of the world. The new world developed a material foundation for its construction. As a result of this material foundation, the way was open for an explosion of scientific progress, the development of the forces of production, and the formation of a secularized society. At the same time, Europe constructed the myth of universality and claims for the universal scope of its civilization, being capable of conquering the world (Amin, 1989: 71).

Amin contends that what distinguishes this new world is that it is, for the first time in history, "unified by the fundamental rules of [a] capitalist economic system and founded upon the domination of private enterprise, wage labor, and free trade. It is also distinguished by the rational character of the decisions that direct not only the new enterprises but also the policies of states and of groups" (Amin, 1989: 71). It is economic interest, instead of an exclusive logic of power, that shapes the states' policies in the new world society.

Amin argues that neither rationality, nor universalism are the products of modern world. Rationality has always accompanied human action, and "the universal concept of the human being, transcending the limits of his or her collective membership (in a race, a gender, a social class) had already been produced by the great tributary ideologies" (Amin, 1989: 72). However, before the development of European capitalism,

universalism had remained only a potential "because no society had succeeded in imposing itself and its values on a worldwide scale" (Amin, 1989: 72).

As a matter of fact, the modern thought, developed since the Renaissance, breaks with the medieval thought in the sense that the preoccupation with metaphysics is renounced and scientific research stimulated. Recognizing the decisive value of inductive reasoning, modern science puts an end to the errors of a reason confined strictly to deduction (Amin, 1989: 79).

The first characteristic of the new modern world is the autonomy of civil society. The direct consequence of this autonomy of civil society was secularity: religion loses its status as an instructional force; instead, it is left to the individual conscience to satisfy metaphysical yearnings (Amin, 1989: 82).

Amin's argument is that "Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different peoples" (Amin, 1989: VII). Therefore, Eurocentrism, Amin insists, is anti-universalist because it is not really interested in looking for general laws of human evolution. "It does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western model by all peoples is the only solution to the challenges of our time" (Amin, 1989: VII).

Even though Eurocentrism, the dominant capitalist culture, claims to be founded on the universalist ambition, this ambition is negated by the contradictions which the Enlightenment culture confronted. The new world, i.e. Europe, where the nascent capitalism and its Enlightenment culture unfolded, was superior, at least materially, to earlier societies in its own territory as well as in other regions of the world. The culture of Enlightenment could not reconcile this superiority with its universalistic ambition. In order to explain this contrast between itself and other cultures, the Enlightenment culture gradually drifted toward racism. Beginning in the 19th century, it drifted in nationalistic directions and was impoverished in comparison with its earlier claim for cosmopolitanism. Enlightenment culture "had little success in harmonizing its original European cosmopolitanism with the nationalist conflicts on which the crystallization of European capitalism came to be based" (Amin, 1989: 105).

According to Amin, the roots of Eurocentrism, which is a specifically modern phenomenon, go back to the Renaissance, but it did not flourish until the 19th century. From the period of Renaissance, Europeans developed the idea that the conquest of the world by their civilization is a possible objective. From this moment on, i.e. 1350-1550, Eurocentrism crystallizes. Amin insists that--through stages from the Renaissance, through the Enlightenment up until the 19th century--this European ideology

has been constructed; and eternal truths have been invented for its legitimation. "The 'Christianophile' myth, the myth of Greek ancestry, and the artificial construct of Orientalism define the new European and Eurocentric culturalism" (Amin, 1989: 77). Eurocentrism "constitutes one dimension of the culture and ideology of the modern capitalist world" (Amin, 1989: VII).

If the term 'Eurocentrism' refers to an essential dimension of the ideology of capitalism, its manifestations characterize the common dominant attitudes of all of the societies in the developed capitalist world, i.e. the center of the world capitalist center. The countries consisting this center today are Western Europe, North America, Japan, and a few other states (Australia, New Zealand). North America is the very center of these centers. Latin America and the Antilles, Africa, and noncommunist Asia (except Japan) constitute the peripheral states.

Amin states that Eurocentrism rests upon teleology. This European ideology claims that the entire history of Europe necessarily led to the blossoming of capitalism because Christianity, the European religion, "was more favorable than other religions to the flourishing of the individual and the exercise of his or her capacity to dominate nature" (Amin, 1989: 85). This ideology claims that Islam, Hinduism, or Confucianism constitute obstacles to social change necessary for capitalist development.

Amin's argument is that the Eurocentric culture invented an 'eternal West', the product of which is the well-known vision of 'Western history': a progression from ancient Greece to Rome to feudal Christian Europe to capitalist Europe. Amin states that a later artificial construct of Eurocentrism is the opposition "Greece=the West/Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia=the East" (Amin, 1989: 89). In order to annex Hellenism to Europe arbitrarily, this construct removes Ancient Greece from the very milieu in which it unfolded and developed, i.e. Orient. This construct also retains the mark of cultural racism, on which basis European cultural unity was constructed. The principal factor in the maintenance of European cultural unity is considered, by this construct, to be Christianity, which is arbitrarily annexed to Europe. On the same racist foundation, Eurocentrism constructs a vision of the Near East and the more distant Orients (Amin, 1989: 90). Eurocnetrism is therefore a prejudice that distorts social theories; it is not social theory integrating various elements into a global and coherent vision of society and history.

In order to summarize the Eurocentric vision, Amin begins with a set of common ideas and opinions transmitted by the media: the Eurocentric West is the world of material wealth and power, including military might, as well as the scientific spirit, rationality, practical efficiency, tolerance, diversity of opinions, respect for human rights and democracy, concern for equality--at least the equality of rights and opportunities--and social justice.

According to this vision, other societies, i.e. the socialist East and the underdeveloped South, have nothing better to offer, and can only progress to the extent that they imitate the West.

Therefore, according to this vision, progressive Europeanization, i.e. diffusion of the European superior model, is the only possible future for the world and functions as a necessary law. The Eurocentric vision justifies the conquest of the planet by Europe. "The Westernization of the world would impose on everyone the adoption of the recipes for European superiority: free enterprise and the market, secularism and pluralist electoral democracy..... This prescription assumes the superiority of the capitalist system" (Amin, 1989: 108).

This vision of the world is based on two erroneous axioms. One is that internal factors are decisive for the evolution of each society. The other is that the Western model of developed capitalism can be extended to the entire planet (Amin, 1989: 109).

The question Amin raises is whether the inequality accompanying with the worldwide expansion of capitalism is a result of detrimental internal factors that have slowed the process of 'catching up', or whether this inequality is the product of capitalist expansion itself and thus impossible to surpass within the framework of this system.

The prevailing opinion regards this inequality to be a consequence of different cultures, technological development and

historical accidents. It holds people responsible for their condition and claims that the polarization between centers and peripheries are resolvable within the framework of capitalism.

Even though the dominant view recognized the role of colonialism in the unequal development of capitalism, it refuses to accept that the centers-peripheries contradiction constitutes the fundamental contradiction of the modern world. In spite of modern world's claim for being founded on humanist universalism, its Eurocentric version negates any such universalism because "universalism has brought with it the destruction of peoples and civilizations who have resisted its spread" (Amin, 1989: 114).

Cultural Incorporation

Before going into a discussion of cultural incorporation, the term 'culture' will be defined. Stone defines 'culture' as the entire social heritage of a man, i.e., all knowledge, beliefs, customs, and skills he acquires as a member of a society (Stone & Schneider, 1971).

The idea of culture is relatively new as a technical concept, only a century old. It was originally defined, in 1871, by Sir Edward Tylor, the pioneer British anthropologist, as a complex of knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society (Pearson, 1974). As a matter of fact the term culture is a Western construct, and is a part of the Western scientific project

of understanding the 'other'. In its later stages, the Western Civilizational Project used the concept as its central component.

The concept of culture was later narrowed down from Tylor's broad usage. Otton, a sociologist, defines the term culture as the symbolic core of a society. This symbolic core is made up of a cognitive element, i.e. what people know or assume to be reality, and a normative element, or the rules of behavior and the standards of right and wrong (Otten, 1981).

Collins, an anthropologist, discusses the components which constitute culture. These components are ideas, i.e. thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and rules; activities, i.e. what people do; and artifacts, i.e. the man-made products of the ideas and activities (Collins, 1975).

What is meant in this research by the term culture is a set of intellectual, ideal, religious, and emotional expressions, accumulated in the course of history, in forms of traditions, customs, morals, symbols, and signs. In other words, the emphasis will be on the 'consciousness' component of culture.

What is meant by the term 'cultural incorporation', in this study, is the manipulation of culture of the incorporated zone to bring it in line with Western capitalist culture, to secure the Western interests, and to assure the better functioning of the capitalist world-economy and world-politics. The economic, political, and cultural incorporations are interrelated: the political incorporation is needed to secure the economic project

of the world-economy; the cultural incorporation is required to assure that the political and economic projects work efficiently. However, when each aspect of incorporation, from which cultural incorporation is no exception, come into existence, each becomes a relatively autonomous project.

Cultural incorporation is, as process, an 'articulation' of Western culture with a second culture. The concept of 'articulation', meaning the synthetic joining of distinct cultures in the development of new cultural forms, is chosen judicially. Opponents of world-system theory often chastise it as a 'top down' theory that stresses the dominance of the core and the absolute plasticity of the periphery (that is, as a theory that disregards the necessity of articulation from the 'bottom up') (Corbridge, 1986: 61). Here, the idea of cultural incorporation is not viewed as a simple movement towards some unitary Westernization. Rather, cultural incorporation as articulation varies by time, circumstance and resistance. This process is not, therefore, expected to produce "the same" change in every incorporated zone, but only "massive" change. Cultural incorporation generally first occurs among national elites. Whether it is primarily externally or internally driven, whether the result of force/persecution or hungerful acceptance, and whether resistance is relatively weak or strong varies by historical circumstances.

Despite the continuance of cultural varieties throughout the world-system, the most striking characteristic of cultural change is the hegemony of Western culture within the various articulations. In this research, for the most part, the terms Westernization, modernization, and cultural incorporation are used interchangeably, though some important differences will be examined later.

Cycles of Cultural Hegemony

Jonathan Friedman (1989) discusses cycles of cultural hegemony, which are fairly compatible with Wallerstein and his associates' cycles of economic and political hegemony. Friedman distinguishes six stages, in his civilizational cycles of hegemony, in each of center and periphery (see Figure II-1).




Figure II-1: Civilizational Cycles of Cultural Hegemony
Source: Friedman 1989: 258

To simplify, these two cycles can be rearranged in straight-line continuum (see Figure II2).




Figure II-2: Stages of Cultural Hegemony

Friedman's argument is that, in the late 1970s and 1980s, there was a marked change in the cultural state of the world that was not predictable in the 'progressive years' of the 1950s and 1960s, i.e. the period of cultural hegemony in the center and assimilation to modernism in the periphery. In the centers of the world-system, there has been a loss of faith in the progress of Western capitalist civilization, and there has been an explosion of new cultural movements, ranging from religious revival to primitivism and traditionalism. "All of this activity has been accompanied by an increasing 'national' and ethnic fragmentation in the center--from Basques and Catalans to the Irish and Scots--

and an exponential increase in cultural-based political movements, collectively referred to as the 'Fourth World': Amerindians, Hawaiians, the Melanesian Kastom movement, etc." (Friedman, 1989: 246). In the periphery, as well as the center, of the world-system, there has been a rapid increase of ethnic-based movements, for national autonomy. Friedman continues that the tendency to cultural fragmentation is a part of "real economic fragmentation, a decentralization of capital accumulation, an accompanying increase of competition, a tendency for new centers of accumulation to concentrate both economic and political power in their own hands, i.e. the beginning of a major shift in hegemony in the world-system" (Friedman, 1989: 254). The process corresponds to a cyclical expansion and contraction in the world-system.

In periods of expansion, local self-reproductive systems tend to disintegrate and become integrated into the larger colonial and international systems. This entails breakdown of culture in the culture III sense, and often its transformation into culture II (cultural decline).

Friedman differentiates among three types of culture: culture I, culture II, and culture III. By culture I, he means 'objective culture', i.e. "objective description of the lives of the population 'out there' defined by its distance from 'us'" (Friedman, 1989: 256). It therefore can be described as the culture of social analysis. What he means by culture II is a set of elements used by

a population in its own self-identification. "The specificity of culture II is that it is a structure of identity in conditions where the population reproduces itself in essentially the same conditions as the rest of a larger sovereign population" (Friedman, 1989: 256). Culture II thus corresponds to the culture of ethnic identity, based exclusively on commonality of language, the belief in common blood and descent regardless of the nature of the social conditions in which it may be found. Culture II is as prominent in periods of global expansion as in periods of contraction. Culture III is, to Friedman, organizer of total life processes, including material reproduction. It is in fundamental opposition to the larger system and "harbors a model of a different society that can only exist external to the present system" (Friedman, 1989: 256). Culture III is organized for exit from the system, not for advantage within the system. Therefore, movements organized on the lines of culture III are anti-systemic movements that do not demand for jobs, welfare, and equal rights, but for a land base upon which reinstate and practice their culture. Culture III, as a political ideology, "combines cultural identity with a culturally defined resistance to modern capitalist civilization" (Friedman, 1989: 257). It flourishes in periods of contraction of the world-system. "It may flare up in periods of expansion, which for the populations in questions are periods of marginalization, 'ethnocide' and cultural collapse, but it is only in periods of civilizational decline that it can appear to be a

superior ideology to that of the center itself and that it can gather massive support for its goals" (Friedman, 1989: 257).

In periods of expansion in the center, there is ultimately a strong tendency, for the population in the periphery, toward assimilation with modernism, i.e. to cultural incorporation of the region, and its deepening, into the Western capitalist culture. The process of cultural decline in periphery occurs concurrently with the strengthening of modernist identity in the center, i.e. Western cultural hegemony. With the collapse of modernism in the center, there is an increase of cultural identity at home as well as abroad (Friedman, 1989: 258). "At home there is a search for that which has been lost, and in the periphery for a cultural or even national autonomy previously repressed by the center" (Friedman, 1989: 258). There is a flourishing of cultural identity, from ethnicity (culture II) to 'way of life' (culture III) at the expense of the system (Friedman, 1989: 258).

Culture, in the culture III sense, is not merely a consequence of economic factors, as Marxists and Wallerstein claim. It is a realm, relatively independent from economics and politics, and can produce causal consequences for change. It is, as Friedman truly mentioned, the organizer of total life processes, including material reproduction.

Human beings, in this regard, are not merely economistic animals; what made them human is that they are enabled to create culture, and symbolize in a way that no other animal does.

It is a common, if not the basic, human need to believe that things have ultimate meaning.

G. H. Mead put emphasis on the concept of meaning. What makes conduct meaningful is our ability to use our mind to put ourselves in the place of others so that we can interpret their thoughts and actions (Ritzer, 1983: 304). For Mead, however, mind stems not from mental processes but from the process of interaction. Meanings and symbols are learned in social interaction. The central concern is, therefore, how people learn meanings and symbols during interaction and socialization (Ritzer, 1983: 308). People respond to symbols in a thoughtful manner. Using symbols, people can act in a distinctively human way. Symbols enable human being not to respond passively to a reality that imposes itself. They can, rather, actively create and re-create the world acted in (Ritzer, 1983: 308). Mead, among other theorists, has a discussion on 'human capacity for thought'. To him, individuals in human society are not motivated by external or internal forces beyond their control. Likewise, they are not confined within more or less fixed structures. They are, rather, interacting or reflective units, comprising the societal entity. People, using their thinking ability, are enabled to think reflectively (Ritzer, 1983: 307).

W. I. Thomas also points to this creative capacity of human being. Although he recognizes that most of our definitions of situations have been provided by society, he makes a distinctive

emphasis on the possibility of 'spontaneous' individual definition of situations, which allows people to alter meanings and symbols. He underscores this creative capacity in his concept of definition of the situation: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas &Thomas, 1928: 572).

Blumer emphasizes that human beings are active creators of the world to which they respond; they create symbolically the world of objects to which they respond. They are not simply pushed and pulled around by social and psychological forces. He maintains that there is always the potential for spontaneity and indeterminacy in human behavior (Turner, 1986: 337).

Describing the cycles of cultural hegemony, Friedman states that the two phenomena of traditionalism and post-modernism are reactions against modernism. They are expressions of the dissolution of civilized identity. To both traditionalist and post-modernist constructs civilized identity refers to the structure of behavior, manners, rules, and ideas, characteristic of the capitalist center as opposed to periphery. The so-called civilized culture is specified by its formality and abstractness. It is a system of impersonally defined roles, contracts, wages, markets, or bureaucratic positions. A person is considered as a self-developing independent agent focused on the future, and with no interest in the past: a modernist (Berman, 1982; Friedman, 1989: 249).

According to the traditionalist construct, this civilized culture is repressing the traditional culture existing in the periphery of the capitalist world, as well as in the historical past of the center itself (Diamond, 1974; Friedman, 1989: 249). The traditional culture is an expression of real human needs; it is a set of coherent values, for a meaningfully organized existence. It can appear in this way as "a political movement for the re-establishment of local community self-determination, ethnic autonomy, traditional values and fundamentalist religion" (Friedman, 1989: 249). Friedman maintains that capitalist civilization is, in this model, the negation of traditional culture.

According to the post-modernist construct, however, the civilized state is not obliterating authentic culture; it is rather repressing nature. "Here again, 'primordial' is located 'out there' or 'back then'--now nature instead of culture. It is again founded in basic human needs--not, however, for community, for meaning and for the directly personal, but for the full expression and elaboration of basic human desire" (Friedman, 1989: 250).

Therefore, the opposition of the traditionalist to the post-modernist is the need to return to culture as opposed to the nature. The self-definition of modernism, on the other hand, is opposed to both nature and culture.

According to Wallerstein's cycles of hegemony (Hopkins, Wallerstein et al., 1982a: 118), the United States was enjoying economic and political hegemony (hegemonic maturity) during

1950s and most of the 1960s (1945-1967). Friedman, discussing civilizational cycles of hegemony, likewise proposes that the 1950s and 1960s were progressive years for the center in terms of cultural hegemony. Both Wallerstein and Friedman believe that center is in a period of decline. For Wallerstein, the hegemonic decline of the United States began about 1967; Friedman sees a decline in the Western capitalist civilization, which occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s. Friedman believes that decline in the cultural hegemony is a consequence of the decline in economic and political hegemony.

World System And The Expansion Of Education

There are mechanisms for incorporating a country's culture into the Western culture. Among these mechanisms are education, religion, mass media, literature, art, family, economic ideas and institutions, political ideas and institutions. This research, focuses on education. As a matter of fact, culture and education go hand in hand and each induces changes in the other. In addition to the economic exploitation and political domination, the owning class, both on an internal and international scale, uses culture as a tool to serve its own ends. That is why they maintain an educational system and cultural media best suited to their purpose. Therefore, education is not apolitical; it is instead ideological. The system of education is used not merely to

transfer knowledge, but to change attitudes, that is the values of the people as a whole.

The changes made in the educational system of a country is not merely induced by internal factors. As a matter of fact, in the modern world-system factors exogenous to national societies are important for understanding changes made in all realms of economics, politics, and culture, including education.

Presenting descriptive data, Meyer et al. (1979) suggest that the rapid expansion of national educational system throughout the world in the period 1950-1970 is affected by factors exogenous to national societies. They first consider theories which explain educational expansion as a function of variations in national structural characteristics. The analysis indicates that measures of national, economic, political, and social modernization account for very little expansion in education during this period. They propose some emergent features of the world-system which may have caused this world educational revolution.

The authors briefly summarize theories of educational expansion which are based on endogenous economic, political, and social characteristics of nations. They summarize these arguments by discussing the following five propositions:

Proposition 1: Economic development increases educational expansion.

Proposition 2: Political and social modernization increase educational expansion.

Proposition 3: Powerful and authoritative states expand education.

Proposition 4: Ethnically plural societies expand education more slowly.

Proposition 5: Dependent societies expand education more slowly.

In the twenty-year period between 1950 and 1970, there had been a tremendous universal increase in education. The mean primary enrollment rate increased form 58% to 83%. The mean secondary enrollment rate more than doubled in richer countries, and more than tripled in poorer ones. Enrollment in higher education increased almost four times in both richer and poorer countries. Therefore, there was a universal expansion of national educational systems between 1950 and 1970.

Meyer and his associates contend that it is unlikely that the five propositions based on national structural characteristics can account for such a tremendous and universal increase in education during this period. "The findings indicate that education everywhere expanded independent of the constraints and stimuli that economic, political, and social structures provided in previous times, i.e., there is the absence of a national structural [explanation]" (Meyer et al., 1979: 40). Therefore they see that the causes of this expansion to lie in the characteristics of the

contemporary world-system, because such characteristics would affect all nations simultaneously.

Their first hypothesis was that the universal expansion of education resulted from the organization of the world into a set of nation-states. This hypothesis was not supported by the analysis. Therefore, other features of the contemporary world are speculated by the authors to explain for the worldwide expansion of education. Three possibilities are considered based on conceptualizing the world as a single social system with a cultural milieu that penetrates all countries. There is a common demand, in this system, to increase education, independent of various structural characteristics.

First, all nations, in spite of differences in terms of wealth and economic structure, pursue common national economic development goals, that requires rational planning and technically trained personnel. Therefore, "the expansion of education may reflect convergence in the meaning and value of development despite differences in economic performance" (Meyer et al., 1979: 52).

Second, from all political perspectives, an educated citizenry is a highly valued asset. It is politically desirable to expand education, to create good citizens, as well as to legitimate responsible government.

Third, in the contemporary world, 'human progress' is praised and insisted on. Rather than being static, individuals as

well as countries are improvable. According to Mao, Nyerere, Nkrumah, and Castro, the 'new person' and 'new society' require more education (Meyer et al., 1979: 52).

All this occurs in a capitalist world-economy, in which elites pursue economic and political development as ends, and education as a means to these ends. Those who do not follow this path are likely to fall from power and be replaced by more aggressive elites who better conform to the demands of the world market. These elites promote education as a means of national mobilization (Meyer et al., 1979: 52).

These findings are in line with those of Wallerstein and Friedman. As we observed in the writings of Wallerstein and Friedman, The United States was, during 1950s and most of 1960s, in a state of full hegemony, and the Western culture was, during this period, in its hegemonic state. The findings of Meyer and his associates likewise indicate that there was a worldwide rapid expansion of education, in the same period, independent from the endogenous structural factors. They propose that some emergent features of the world-system have caused this expansion of education. The United States, the hegemonic power, attempted to assimilate population segments in the periphery with educational modernism.

There are components to modernization and Westernization. A selection of the most common of these components, as discussed by Eisenstadt (1966), Arndt (1987), and Shepard

(1960), is as follow: secularism, individualism, achievement, universalism, rationality, progress, affective neutrality, specificity, equality, materialism, dynamism, democracy, urbanization, efficiency, freedom, social mobilization, differentiation and specialization, happiness and spontaneous expression of abilities and feelings, and self. Because the focus of this study is on the secularization of Iranian education, some theories of secularization will be discussed here.

Theories of Secularization

By discussing secularization, Weber does not argue that 'God is dead', but that modern society produces numerous, contesting gods who have no power, either individually or collectively. The progressive development of science and the increasing specialization of all fields of knowledge give rise to countless world-views and interpretations of reality, but precisely because these interpretations are infinite, they can not lay claim to any absolute value. The unitary cosmos of Christianity and of Greek civilization has been replaced by a pluralist world in which no set of values can give a coherent and compelling significance to life at the personal or public level (Fenn, 1969).

Durkheim also believed at the turn of the century that the traditional boundaries which gave meaning and coherence to life were removed by social change. To him, the old gods were growing old and already dead, and others were not yet born. He observed a

considerable state of anomie and uncertainty, reflected in the rise of suicide rates in the transitional period between traditional normative orders and new forms of conscience collective. Durkheim however thought "the future would produce religious upsurges of 'creative effervescence'" (Turner, 1974: 154). Weber, by contrast, believed that modern religious movements would be highly artificial and insincere.

Weber's thesis is that secularization is the social product of capitalism and Protestantism (Turner, 1974: 155). As an economic embodiment of rationalization, capitalism produces institutional and cultural differentiation as well as specialization of different social spheres, namely politics, economics, religion, and morality. Each of these spheres is autonomous, with no claim to universal relevance or communal authority. The individual is forced to make choices between values which are partial and shifting. Since values are no longer authoritative, choice is ultimately arbitrary and irrational. The result is an existential crisis in terms of the meaning of life. In this secular world, the only place for religion is in the area of interpersonal rather than public relations. Therefore, Weber's theory of secularization involves pluralism of conflicting values, and relegation of religion to purely private choices.

Peter L. Berger (1969), like Weber, believes that secularization is a process set in motion by Protestantism and capitalism. He distinguishes objective secularization (i.e. the

structural isolation and relegation of religion), from subjective secularization (i.e. the loss of religious credibility at the level of human experience). Because traditional Christianity has lost a monopoly of religious symbols, beliefs, and rituals, men are faced by a plurality of contending systems of beliefs. Therefore, the 'plausibility structure' of religious views are shaken.

To Alasdair McIntyre (1967), secularization was caused by the processes of urbanization and industrialization. These processes shattered the communal morality of rural England. No moral claims can have significance and authority without a shared system of values and symbols. They can only be partial claims of special interests, especially class interests. In the process of industrialization and urbanization, traditional communal values gave way to particular class moralities, which resulted in secondary virtues. Secondary virtues can only tell us how to operate once a particular goal has been decided upon; there is a lack of primary virtues to give authoritative statements about the good life.

Daniel Lerner (1958) has an important theory of global modernization, which entails as part of the model a global theory of secularization. The basic features of modernization, to Lerner, are urbanization, literacy, media participation, and electoral participation. These are important preconditions for the 'participant society', which leads to institutions of civil liberty, public welfare, and democratic governance.

Lerner's theory of modernization involves a parallel theory of secularization. In a participant society, people buy modern ideas and social roles in exchange for their participation in the political system. Institutional monopolies, whether religious or secular, will disturb the equilibrium of the social market. There is no place, in this model, for passionate commitments to religious or nationalist symbols. Modernization therefore, involves the end of ideology, whether sacred or secular.

Lerner views secularization as progressive. More typically, as in the case of the other theorists here mentioned, secularization is viewed more ambiguously. In Weber's terms rationality, science and secularization result in 'the "disenchantment of the world" (Gerth & Mills, 1946: 51). What is ignored here is the longer run capacity of these very processes to establish a re-enchanted world based on the dream of material progress. Secularization reduces the power of religion to provide ultimate values, rational universalism provides an alternative 'plausibility structure' quite capable of providing authoritative statements about the good life.

I have selected secularization as the axial component of cultural incorporation, first, because even a surface reading of the contentious development of cultural modernization in Iran indicates its centrality. Secondly, secularization is a key sub-component of modern universalism, which lies at the very heart of Wallerstein's theory of the Western Civilizational Project. For

Wallerstein, "the belief in universalism has been the keystone of the ideological arch of historical capitalism" (1983: 81). In the early stages of the capitalist world-system, this universalism was most strongly embedded in Christianity and cultural incorporation often took a direct proselytizing form. By the middle of the nineteenth century, scientific, secular universalism was replacing Christianity as the cultural keystone of the modern world-system (Wallerstein, 1991: 95-96, 127). This modern universalism provided a more pleasing ideological attire for historical capitalism than did Christianity, both in the core and in the periphery. In the core, Enlightenment, rationality and science arose in direct opposition to Christianity, a worldview having an 'elective affinity' for early capitalism (Weber, 1958; Gerth & Mills, 1946: 62). The secularized universalism of the Enlightenment and modern capitalism replaced and reformulated Christianity, but more importantly, displaced it from the public to the private sphere, thus limiting the determinative relative autonomy of a world-view that was dialectically oppositional as well as supportive of capitalism. In the periphery, the replacement of orthodox Christianity (in theory and doctrine, at least, a totalistic world-view), by secular, scientific, rational universalism eased the strain of the cultural articulation process of incorporation within the world-system. Secular universalism demanded only the segmented privatization rather than the eclipse of traditional religion. But even a supposedly segmented

form of universalism was still a massively disruptive and disturbing form of cultural incorporation. And when met by alternative civilizational projects with universalistic and totalistic claims of their own, cultural incorporation through secular universalism generated resistance. Such resistance was a major factor in all national liberation movements (movements of liberation not only from economic and political dependency, but also from dependent cultural incorporation). The Islamic Revolution of Iran, no doubt, represents the most extreme instance of struggle against such incorporation.

CHAPTER III

IRAN'S ECONOMIC INCORPORATION INTO AND ASCENT IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY

Iran's history of economic, political, cultural, military, and diplomatic relations with the West goes back to the Greek and Persian wars of the fifth century B. C. However, the contact between Iran and the West was almost cut off due to the Dark and early Middle Ages in Europe, coupled with the rise of Islam (seventh to fifteenth centuries) and the Ottoman Empire (eleventh to fifteenth centuries). Iran's principal relations shifted to its immediate west neighbors--the Ottomans--and east neighbors--the dynasties of India (Foran, 1989: 71).

A new interest arose--with the reign of the Safavid king, Shah Abbas, (1587-1621) and the beginning of the seventeenth century--in Iran and Europe for commercial and military alliances. In 1619, Shah Abbas established a Safavid monopoly on Iran's valuable raw silk exports. In addition to the longstanding overland route through Ottoman territory, Shah Abbas attempted to open up alternative water routes through Russia or the Persian Gulf. Inalcik suggests that the annual production of raw silk, in the 1620s, was 1000 tons, two-thirds of which was exported to Europe (Foran, 1989: 72; Inalcik and Steensgaard, 1979: 210).

A direct trade was started up, in the 1620's, between the Safavid state and the Dutch and English West India companies.

This trade was between more or less equal parties. Shah Abbas determined, in free negotiations with the Europeans, the terms and partners in the trade of silk, which was the key commodity. This trade was in favorable balance for Iran. Exchanged products involved manufactured and raw materials on both sides. There was also a favorable balance for Iran in terms of an inflow of silver bullion. Europeans, however, had the transport in their hands because of their direct sea-routes to the Middle and Far East. Due to the revolution in long-distance shipping after 1500, Europeans could bring the products to their final markets and thus enjoy a favorable share of total profits. This was the less favorable side for Iran (Foran, 1989: 91). This gap in technology widened into a whole new pattern of trade in the coming two centuries. However, there was no possibility of dependence in Iran's relation with the West at this early stage of the emergence of the capitalist world-economy (circa 1630) (Foran, 1989: 91).

Using Wallerstein terms, seventeenth-century Iran, up until 1630, would be classified not as a periphery but as a world-empire in the external arena of the capitalist world-economy. A periphery is a geographical sector within a world-economy, wherein production is primarily of lower-ranking goods, i.e. goods whose labor is less rewarded. Because the bulk of the commodities involved are essential for daily use in the core, a periphery is an integral part of the overall system of the division

of labor. In addition, the export of these commodities becomes essential for maintaining the basic economic structure of the (now restructured) periphery. "The external arena of a world-economy consists of those other world-systems with which a given world-economy has some kind of trade relationship, based primarily on the exchange of preciosities, what was sometimes called the 'rich trade'" (Wallerstein, 1974b: 301-302). In a world-empire, clusters of merchants are engaged in long-distance trades, which however large, is a minor part of the total economy; it is not fundamentally determining of the total economies' fate. As Polanyi argues, this long-distance trade tended to be 'administrative trade' not 'market trade' (Wallerstein, 1979: 6). This characterization is applicable to the pattern of trade and commerce in Safavid Iran. Iran, from 1500 to 1630, was engaged "in roughly egalitarian patterns of trade with the European core countries that centered on luxury items such as silk rather than large-scale bulk commodities" (Foran, 1989: 95). If European wanted Iranian silk, they were forced to come to Iran with bullion, without imposing their terms on the seller. Therefore, Iran was, as of ca. 1630, a world-empire in the external arena of the emerging capitalist world-system, and likewise had Europe as part of its external arena. This implies that "both Iranian and European economies, though now in contact with one another, were relatively self-sufficient and when

seeking the products of the other, did so as equals" (Foran, 1989: 93).

The key change that occurred between 1630 and 1720 was the collapse of royal monopoly on the silk trade in 1630 which shifted the profit shares in favor of Armenian middle men at the expense of Safavids. The East India company found, by 1650, a cheaper source of silk in Bengal, which led to a drop in demand in the Persian Gulf. Decline of the price of silk in Europe, had an impact on Armenians' abilities to sell Iran's silk. Iran's balance of payments turned increasingly unfavorable: "As less silk was sold, and wool failed to make up the difference, it became necessary to spend more and more cash for the spices the Dutch brought from Asia" (Foran, 1989: 112). However, there was fairly slight impact of these relations on the Iranian social structure. "There was no major reorientation of the economy for exports, and no significant dependence on any imports, except for pepper and sugar, which were consumed by some urban classes but not yet the mass of the population" (Foran, 1989: 113). The seventeenth century witnessed no dependency of Iran on the West. It remained a world-empire in the external arena of the world-economy. However, this long period in the external arena was the beginning of a gradual, relative decline vis-a-vis the expanding Europe.

Iran retained, until the mid-18th century, some degree of autonomy and power despite the decentralization and decline of the Persian Empire. Although Portuguese presence in the Persian

Gulf marginally connected Iran to the capitalist world-market, it was the conflict between the two colonial powers of Russia and Great Britain over spheres of influence in Asia that dragged Iran into the world-system in the late-nineteenth century. In order to maintain its domination of the Indian subcontinent, Britain had to secure the adjacent countries particularly Iran which was, as Sir Rawlinston stated in 1857, the gate to this treasure:

> We can not ignore the existence of Persia, its geographical position prevents that.....[I]t is to be hoped that she will see her own interest in allowing us to revert to our old policy, which had guided us for 40 years, in determining that her strength is our strength and looking upon Persia as our best bulwark for India against Russia (Graham, 1967: 262).

British involvement in the southern provinces of Iran and the Gulf was felt as a threat by Tzarist Russia on the north. This led to the Anglo-Russian rivalry over spheres of influence in Iran, and ultimately to the incorporation of the country into the capitalist world-economy in the late-nineteenth century, during the Qajar reign.

Gerami (1987), an Iranian scholar, examines Iran's peripheralization in the 19th century, as well as its structural mobility to a semi peripheral position in the 1970s. He divides Iran's peripheralization into three historical periods: the period of marginal periphery, 1800-1830; the period of granting capitulations to Britain and Russia, 1830-1870; and the period of

full-blown periphery, 1870-1905. Using a world system approach, Araghi (1990), another Iranian scholar, investigates agrarian change in Iran in two periods of pax Britannica, in the late nineteenth century and pax Americana, after the Second World War.

Rather than a rich colony, Persia was initially considered by British as a gateway to India. Russians however had expansionist plans for northern Iran. They were in constant border dispute with Iranian government because of the desire to increase their control of the Caspian Sea and annex the rich Trans-Caucasian territory. Russia found a golden opportunity to expand its territory in the 19th century because of internal disputes of Iran's central government and its declining power. Georgia was separated from Iran in 1803. The two Russo-Iranian wars in this period led to the Gulistan Treaty in 1813, and Turkemanchai treaty in 1828. According to the former, Russia gained the province of Armenia and an important section of Azerbaijan, as well as exclusive rights for having warships on the Caspian Sea (Keddie, 1981: 41). In the second dispute in 1827 Iran lost the territory west and north of Caspian Sea. This led to the Tukemanchai treaty in 1828 according to which Iran was confined to the present boundaries on the north, granted capitulation rights to Russian subjects in Persia, and paid fines to Russia (Upton, 1960: 6). This treaty is of historical significance because it gave Russians colonial power in Iran. The capitulation rights

granted to Russians were later demanded by other foreign powers.

There was a strong British claim on Afghanistan against which Iran attempted to establish its claim. This led to Iran's final defeat in 1858, and to the signing of a treaty with Britain, according to which Iran relinquished all the claims to Afghanistan and granted trade privileges and capitulatory rights to British citizens (Upton, 1960). According to another concession, telegraph lines were established across Iran by the Indo-European Telegraph Company for the British Indian government. At the same time, the annexation of the area east of the Caspian Sea was completed by the Russian Tzar. In addition to suffering territorial losses to Russia and Britain, Iran granted exclusionary rights to the merchants of these countries through a number of commercial treaties.

Signing territorial treaties with the colonial powers, as well as granting economic concessions to them, are signs of the weakness of the country, or probably as Gerami mentions are indicators of dragging Iran toward a state of marginal periphery. However, it can not be claimed that Iran was incorporated into the capitalist world-economy during the first half of the 19th century. In terms of trade, as Table III-1 indicates, even though total cloth imports are high in 1850s, at about 66 percent of total imports, the total cloth exports are also high making 61 percent. Furthermore, raw cotton makes only 1 percent of total exports. Therefore, there is no sign of incorporation which

Table III-1: The Composition of Foreign Trade: Percentage Distribution by Various Categories.

	1850s	1880s
	%	%
Imports		
Cotton Cloth	43	48
Woolen & Silk Cloth	23	15
Total Cloth Imports	*66*	*63*
Tea	9	2
Sugar	2	8
Metal Goods	2	2
Paraffin	- -	1
Others	21	24
Total	*100*	*100*
Exports		
Silk and Products	38	18
Cotton & Woolen Products	23	1
Total Cloth Exports	*61*	*19*
Cereals	10	16 [a]
Fruits	4	6
Tobacco	4	5
Raw Cotton	1	7
Opium	- -	26
Total Primary Exports	*19*	*60*
Carpets	- -	4
Others	20	17
Total	*100*	*100*

a: mainly rice.

Source: H. Katouzian, Political Economy of Modern Iran. Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism. 1926-1979, (New York: New York University Press, 1981), P. 41.

requires an increase in the export of raw products at the expense of manufactured products.

In order to investigate the incorporation of Iranian economy into the world-system in the late 19th century and later after World War II, during the two hegemonic powers of Britain--pax Britannica--and the United States--pax Americana--respectively, it is required to briefly discuss the three types of accumulation, namely mercantile capitalism, competitive capitalism, and monopoly capitalism. Mercantile capitalism, which increased tremendously through colonial trading, was the type of accumulation of capital during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The essence of colonialization was based on accumulation through merchant capital. This type of accumulation had two effects on the center and periphery.

> [It] temporarily prevents the penetration of capitalism in the spheres of production and results in high profits for the industrialized countries through plunder and trade (De Janvary, 1981: 9-10).

Therefore, merchant capital played an important role in the rise of the capitalist mode of production and modern industry in the center, while peripheries were marked by the persistence of precapitalist modes.

Competitive capitalism is the second type of accumulation marked by the rise of the Industrial Revolution, a period associated with increasing industrial production. The basis of the

expansion of the capitalist mode of production during this stage of capitalism was import-export relations between center and peripheries. The relations between industrialized centers and peripheries were characterized by the export of manufactured goods and the import of raw materials. Development of manufacturing industries required increasing export of products, as well as importing of raw materials necessary for the expansion of industry and accumulation of capital (e.g., cotton industry in England). Therefore, the peripheral social formation was the constant source of supply for the center.

Monopoly capitalism, the third type of accumulation of capital, is marked by the export of capital and capital goods from center to periphery, with an emphasis on capital investment in the periphery. Accumulation takes place through the transformation of profit from the periphery to the center.

With the transition of the feudalist to the capitalist mode of production in Europe, there was a decline of the 'mercantile capitalism' and a rise of 'competitive capitalism', as the dominant form of accumulation (Hobsbawm, 1969: ch. 1-7). During the second half of the 19th century, Britain was the greatest exporter of the manufactured goods for the supply of raw materials to reproduce the capitalist mode of production.

It was in the second half of the 19th century when the impact of competitive capitalism appeared in Iran. During this time, both Britain and Russia were the dominant colonial powers.

However, the existence of rivalry over Iran between Britain and Russia prevented Iran from falling under direct colonial rule similar to that of India under British rule. Iran, rather expanded as a semi-colonial state during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

From the middle of the 19th century, the two superpowers of Britain and Russia stopped territorial aggression against Iran and reached agreement over spheres of influence. They instead intensified their politico-economic control of Iran. During the last quarter of the 19th century, British and Russian capital entered Iran, in Keddie's words, hunted for ways to make "quick profits" and "to get as much money with as little trouble as possible" (Keddie, 1966: 7). The major economic concessions granted to Britain in the late 19th century were: immunity from road tolls and internal transit taxes, which were collected from Iranian merchants; a comprehensive nationwide monopoly of railway construction, mining and banking, given to the Baron de Reuter, a British citizen (Even though Reuter lost a major portion of his concession due to opposition of nationalist forces, he maintained mining and banking rights. These rights were later developed into Imperial Bank of Persia, which was a British bank. A monopoly was awarded to the Imperial Bank of Persia over printing bank notes, opening branches in provinces, and the right to collect tolls in the southern part of the country); a monopolization of oil and tobacco exploitation in Iran (A

nationwide protest led to the withdrawal of the tobacco concession). Britain also granted loans to the Iranian government in various forms (Curzon, 1966: 528-585; Yeganegi, 1934: 15-45). Russia established Banque des Compte in Iran. A railway concession from Jolfa to Tabriz, as well as a concession to the Caspian Sea fisheries were granted to Russia. They also signed contracts to build roads and install telegraph lines (Lenczowski, 1949). In addition to British and Russian companies which held the lion's share of the Iranian market, Belgian, French, and German companies operated in Iran.

These activities indicate the economic interest and commercial activities of the colonial powers whereby Iran was incorporated into the capitalist world-economy as a peripheral state. Even though both rivals expanded their economic interest in different parts of the country during this period, British state of hegemony in the capitalist world-economy gave her greater control over Iranian trade.

Iran toward the end of the nineteenth century, experienced a sharp decline in the export of silk products form 38 percent of total export in 1850s to 18 percent in the 1880s. there was a similar drop in the export of cotton and woolen cloth during the same period from 23 percent to 1 percent (Issawi, 1971: 136). Their places were taken by increasing export of raw cotton and silk-worm eggs (Issawi, 1971: 231-38 & 246-47). Opium was another product which was increasingly exported during the same

period. Until 1864, opium was produced in Iran and exported for medical purposes. By the recommendation of British council, in 1867, cultivation of opium increased for world market. Production rose from about 13,000 pounds in 1867 to 540,000 pounds in 1869 of which 250,000 pounds were exported mainly to China (Issawi, 1971: 238). Because of the considerable profits in the cultivation of opium, cultivators focused on the production of poppy instead of vital agricultural products. The consul of Bushire reported in 1873: "a few years ago the profits of opium attracted the attention of the Persians, almost all available or suitable ground in Yazd, Isfahan, and elsewhere, was utilized for the cultivation of opium to the exclusion of cereals and other produce..... [This], combined with drought and other circumstances, resulted in the famine of 1871-72" (quoted in Issawi, 1971: 238). Therefore, agricultural production of Iran shifted from local consumption to the demands of foreign competition.

Therefore, as the Table III-1 indicates, there is not a strong sign of incorporation of Iranian economy into the capitalist world-system during the first half of the 19th century. In 1950s, even though total cloth imports are high at about 66 percent of total imports, the total cloth exports are also high making 61 percent of the total exports. Raw cotton makes only 1 percent of total exports. This figure changes toward the end of the 19th century. In 1980s, while the total percentage of cloth imports is still high at 63 percent, the percentage of total cloth exports has

decreased sharply from 61 percent in 1850s to 19 percent in 1880s. There is at the same time a rise in the export of raw cotton from 1 percent in 1850s to 7 percent in 1880s. This figure of trade is in line with the mechanism of the competitive capitalism in which Britain, the hegemonic power of the time, exported at increasing amount the manufactured products and textiles (mainly cotton) and imported raw cotton and raw products. Through this mechanism, surplus was extracted from Iranian society to the core countries, mainly Britain. Therefore, by the late nineteenth century, i.e. in the 1980s, Iranian economy was certainly incorporated into the capitalist world-economy.

At the turn of the century, the movement of the capital and goods from capitalist countries intensified, especially with the discovery of oil in the East and technological advances in transportation in the West. This affected the country both economically and politically.

Britain and Russia signed a treaty in 1907 in Petersburg to settle their differences in Asia. According to this treaty, Iran was divided into three zones: northern and central zones became monopoly of Russia, the southeast zone became the British sphere and the area in between became the neutral zone, where both British and Russian governments were free to act and obtain concessions, which were not negotiable (Keddie, 1981: 75; Curzon, 1892).

However, the Russian Revolution of 1917 played a role in Russia's loss of influence. The new government pulled back its remaining forces from Iran and did not intervene in Iranian affairs. Therefore, Iran was dragged into the hands of Western European capitalist countries, primarily Britain. This further pushed the country toward the capitalist world. Economically, the discovery of oil, in 1903, and the establishment of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in 1909, which was later in 1933 renamed to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, made Iran an important supplier of Western industrial needs. Politically, the Coup de'tat of 1921, planned by British power, and the emergence of the Reza Shah, established a favorable political structure for the West.

William Knox Darcy, a British engineer, obtained a concession form the Shah of Qajar, in 1901 for sixty years, through which he gained exclusive rights for the discovery, exploitation and export of oil across Iran, except for the five northern provinces within the traditional Russian zone. Darcy agreed to pay, in return, sixteen percent of his annual profit, as well as 20,000 pounds in cash and another 20,000 pounds in paid-up shares of stock. Oil was discovered in 1903. The First Exploitation Company was formed subsequently with a capital of 100,000 pounds. Darcy became part owner of the newly founded British Oil Company in 1905. In 1908, a British government representative bought Darcy's shares. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was founded in 1909 with an initial capital of

two million pounds. As Sinclair indicates, the concession of 1901 left the future development of oil, the country's most important resource, under the control of concessionaire for over half a century (Walden, 1962: 65). Now, it was not merely Iran's geographical position, but also its immense petroleum resources that made it important for imperialist powers.

In the first half of the 20th century, Iran was in a state of political instability, economic dependence and social upheavals. Despite its non-belligerent treaties with all powers, Iran was dragged into the two world wars. The Qajar dynasty, deprived of the Russian support due to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, was overthrown by a group of army officers in February 1921. Reza Khan who was formerly a low ranking officer seized power, through a British-led Coup-d'etat and established Pahlavi Dynasty (Farvar, 1980: 6). He established a centralized government by combating separatist movements in the southern and eastern provinces. He launched a program to modernize the economy and Westernize the cultural system (Abrahamian, 1982).

The British government realized that its presence and its direct political intervention in Iran could end up in driving Iran into the hands of the Russians. They planned to help create a strong nationalist government in Iran that would serve as a strong bulwark against Russia, while protecting British interests by suppressing revolutionary movements. The British officer, Major General Sir Edmond Ironside, who had the most experience

in commanding troops against the Bolsheviks and had commanded, during 1918-1919, the inter-allied North Russian expedition, was now the commander of the North Persia Force. He suggested a policy of helping create a military dictatorship which would be capable of imposing sufficient order on the Persian armed forces in order to prevent Soviet invasion (Ullman, 1972: 384). A 'situation report' to the War Office, concluded that this prospect "..... would solve many difficulties and enable us to depart in peace and honor" (Ullman, 1972: 384). As Ullman writes, the candidate which Ironside had in mind was Reza Khan, a Persian Colonel who became Commander of Cossack Division.

> He was to supply the forceful leadership necessary to preserve Persia's independence and prevent any possibility of a Soviet take over.....It is idle to speculate upon whether or not he would eventually have come to power had Ironside not singled him out; but it is clear that Ironside and his British colleagues were largely instrumental in placing Reza Khan in a position to bring about the coup-d'etat of 21 February 1921 which put effective power into his hands (Ullman, 1972: 385).

Ironside encouraged Reza Khan, on February 8, 1921, to seize power. Reza Khan marched before dawn, on February 21, 1921, on Tehran. Heading three thousand Cossacks, he overthrew the government, and took over the War Ministry in the subsequent cabinet meeting. He immediately reorganized the armed forces and initiated the suppression of revolts, and the control of the

country. He defeated Kuchick Khan and his Bolshevik-aided movement in northern Iran. He became the prime Minister in 1923, and in 1925 he ascended the throne and established the Pahlavi Dynasty.

The rapid success of Reza Khan from an ordinary soldier to king would be comparable with the rise of Napoleon in France or Kemal Ataturk in Turkey (Lenczowski, 1978: XVI). The major objective in the rise of Reza Shah to power was to suppress any genuine movements while securing the interests of British Imperialism in Iran. Great Britain, which totally controlled Iranian oil resources, wanted all changes that were to be implemented to be in accordance with its own interest. The events that followed proved to be so.

Relying on Western powers, Reza Shah created a state capitalist system, with state owning the major means of production, controlling most of foreign trade, and possessing the largest commercial firms in the country. The state monopoly controlled, by 1936, 33 percent of imports and 49 percent of exports (Ashraf, 1971). In addition, the establishment of several state banks, commercial agencies, and industrial units, such as sugar, cotton, textile, cement, chemical, etc., led the state to emerge as the largest industrial, financial, and commercial bureaucratic corporation (Bharier, 1971: ch. V). In both finance and industry, competitive capitalism had been replaced by monopoly capitalism, or according to Lenin 'imperialism', with

the principal feature of exporting capital to invest abroad (Lenin, 1966: 236). This movement of capital, which was due to the unprofitability of investment at home, was destined for underdeveloped countries where "profits are usually high for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap" (Lenin 1973: 73).

The monopoly stage of capitalism, therefore, affected the formation of state capitalism in Iran. Significant industrial units were established during the late 1930s. Thirty-three new large factories (with 10 workers or more) were established between 1934 and 1938. The number of workers also increased by 25 percent (Bharier 1971: 172-3). In order to form a new organization of capitalist reproduction, the government developed infrastructures and financial institutions in the context of what is introduced as nezam-e-jadid (a new order). However, the major incorporation of Iranian society into the world capitalist system at this stage was through the development of oil industry by monopolies. The establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909, which was later in 1933 renamed to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, made Iran an important source for capitalist countries.

In 1933, the Iranian Parliament, frustrated with its fluctuating receipts, terminated the monarchy granted concession of 1901, and signed a new agreement with the British. According to this contract, the Company became Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The new contract reduced the area of concession from

400,000 to 100,000 square miles, and assured a minimum payment of 225,000 to 300,000 pounds annually as a tax on the production of crude petroleum, and provided a royalty of four shillings per ton of the oil sold. Iran was also supposed to receive twenty percent of the net profit over and above dividend guarantee of 671,250 pounds (Walden, 1962: 66).

The new treaty had certain advantages, for British, over the 1901 concession: it extended for additional thirty-two years, until 1993, while the previous contract was to expire in 1961; the 1933 contract, unlike the concession of 1901, was not an agreement between a private individual and the king of Iran, which could be terminated without much difficulty. The 1933 contract was a public law, ratified by the Iranian Parliament, and its termination would create political complications (Nirumand, 1969: 32). The question of ownership was also modified, in the new treaty, in favor of the British, giving them fifty percent of Company's share.

The 1933 agreement turned out to be less favorable for the Iranians in some respects; particularly its article nineteen was disadvantageous. Under this article, prices for refined petroleum products in Iran were based upon average Romanian or Gulf of Mexico prices, whichever was lower, plus actual transportation and distribution costs, less a ten percent discount. In other words, the cost of Persian-produced oil for local consumers was to be based upon prices established in areas with production

costs having no relationship to the operating condition in Iran (Walden, 1962: 71). The unfairness of such an agreement would become evident from the fact that the cost of production in Middle East averaged $1.2 per ton as against $12.45 per ton in the United States (UN Department of Economic Affairs, 1958-59: 28-29). British made a 500 percent profit from the domestic sale of petroleum products in Iran (Walden, 1962: 71). The Company sold oil to Iran at such a high price that the country had to import oil from the Soviet Union.

Neither oil nor industrialization contributed much to Iran's development. The share of oil in the government's budget was only 15 percent. People who benefited from oil were bureaucrats, contractors, and army generals (Ashraf 1971: 106). Industrialization was also unsuccessful. There was a decrease in the industrial output; some of the industries were shut down in mid-1940s, and few new establishments were founded (Bharier 1971: 173-174). This was due to the nature of industrialization, which was a short-term project, with no tendency to attain maturity (Polit 1965: 40-47).

Reza Shah was forced by the Allies to step down, in August 1941, due to his overt support for the fascist in the World War II, and his refusal to cooperate with the Allies and allow them to use Iranian railroad for sending supplies to the Soviets. The Allies granted the kingdom to his 22 year old son Mohammad Reza

(Keddie, 1981; Lenczowski, 1978; Nirumand, 1969). He ruled Iran for the next 38 years, until the 1979 Revolution.

The world powers acquired, during the Second World War, hegemony over the politico-economic affairs of the country. A commercial agreement was signed, in 1943, between Iran and the United States. This agreement resulted in favorable custom duties and taxes toward American products. After India, with 33 percent in external trade with Iran, the United States became second with 23 percent in external trade with Iran in 1944-45 (Ivanow, 1976: 101). American monopolies rushed into Iran. Imports from the United States increased to 847 million rials as against exports to the United States (mainly oil) which was 302 million rials. Britain, even though it lost some markets to the United States for the exports of her products, was still the superior imperialist in Iran due to the control of the Khuzestan oil.

The colonial powers, especially Britain, were severely damaged due to the World War II. The imperialist powers temporarily lost their dominant economic and political position over their peripheries. For less than a decade after World War II, Iran experienced an absence of dominant political powers which was a good opportunity for the growth of a national bourgeoisie. National bourgeoisie challenged the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as a symbol of foreign intervention, and the nationalist movement led by Dr. Mossadeq began to grow.

After the establishment of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, petroleum played an important role in Iran's place in the world-economy. America was a newcomer to the Middle East, but due to the monopolistic nature of the British contract, American companies did not gain access to the Iranian oil. As a matter of fact, the AIOC, backed by the British government, was controlling the oil industry in Iran. Even though the initial concession, signed in 1901, was revised in 1933, there was no significant increase in royalty payment to Iran. The company derived, in 1950 alone, a profit between $500 and $550 million from its oil enterprise in Iran, at the international market prices. Of this amount, Iran received only forty-five million dollars, or about sixteen million pounds as royalties, share of profits and taxes. "The profit of the company in the year 1950 alone, after deducing the share paid to Iran, amounted to more than the entire sum of 114 million pounds cited by the representative of the United Kingdom of the past half century" (Saleh, UN Security Council Official Records: 15). Therefore, social discontent and frustration raised as a result of the British domination in the oil industry. The nationalists organized under the leadership of Dr. Mossadeq, a veteran of Iranian politics, demanded renewal of the negotiations.

Negotiating with the AIOC, the Iranian government demanded a new contract with 50-50 profit sharing. The company refused the Iranian demand of equal participation and offered a 'supplementary agreement'. The prime minister who was pushing

for the acceptance of agreement was assassinated the next year. Finally, the Shah submitted to the national demand and gave Mossadeq the premiership. Mossadeq submitted to the Majlis, a week later, on March 15, 1951, a nationalization bill which was approved. Therefore, all the petroleum industry throughout the country was nationalized, bringing all the activities, from exploration, to extraction and exploitation under the domain of the government (Rouhani, 1971: 48).

The British, enraged by this act, withdrew from the negotiations and rejected Iran's offer of compensation for their installation. They sent the British army to the Persian Gulf and enacted a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil. They cut diplomatic relations with Iran and appropriated the Iranian deposit of funds in British banks. The United States cooperated wholeheartedly with the British in placing an embargo on Iran's oil. It actively discouraged any transaction for the purchase of Iran's oil by the American companies. Until 1953, there were national unrest and severe economic problems followed. The temporary abdication of the Shah was ended by a CIA-aided coup which led to the overthrow of Mossadeq and his cabinet and its replacement with a new one. The fact that the coup was primarily engineered by the United States Government and the British is well documented. Roosevelt, the chief CIA agent directing the coup operation (AJAX) declared:

> AJAX was the cryptonym assigned to the operation..... What AJAX was intended to be was a cooperative venture. It allied the Shah of Iran, Winston Churchil, Anthony Eden and other British representatives with president Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The alliance was to be formed for the purpose of replacing an Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq (Roosevelt, 1979: 2).

After the coup, the new cabinet was quick to come to terms with international petroleum companies. The negotiations and consultations resulted in an agreement in 1954 according to which a consortium of the large international oil companies was set up to take over the operation of the oil industry in Iran. The consortium owned two operating companies: one engaged in production and exploration, the other engaged in refining. Among the shareholders, there were five American oil companies (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, Texaco, and Gulf) which acquired 40 percent of Iranian oil. Since this was against the United States anti-trust rules, nine other American oil companies received five percent of the major 40 percent. British Petroleum (formerly AIOC) received 40 percent of Iran's oil, Royal Dutch Shell acquired 14 percent, and Compagnie Francaise de Petroles the remaining six percent. Therefore oil production shifted from being a British monopoly to multinational companies. The agreement resulted in a division of profit on a 50/50 Middle Eastern Standard between the Iranian government

and the oil companies. However, Iranian revenue was still dependent on oil companies' decision to increase or decrease oil production.

This incident opened a new era in contemporary Iran. Britain lost its predominance in Iran, and America, which had emerged as the major core country after World War II, played a major role in the 1953 coup and became the major foreign power in the country.

Because of differences in the stages of capitalist development in the world-economy, the two hegemonic powers of Britain and the United States concentrated on different methods for accumulation of capital.

Britain, the old hegemonic power, made investment on the production of raw materials, i.e., exploiting oil, and controlling custom duties, while exporting manufactured goods to Iran. Britain, therefore, was concerned with maintaining Iran's status quo and supporting the feudals and tribal leaders who dominated the state apparatus of the country and secured the extraction of wealth from Iran to British enterprises. The British policy in Iran, thus, encouraged landlordism, rather than contributing to the growth of bourgeoisie.

The new imperialism, the United States, adopted different strategies for capital investment and capital accumulation. They emphasized manufacturing, industrialization and finance based on import substitution and service industries. They also necessitated expanding consumer markets, which required the

development of a social class whose interests were in harmony with the bourgeoisie at the center. This policy needed penetration of The United States' capitalism in Iran politically, economically, militarily, and culturally.

The policy of import-substitution required the development of a pro-Western social class, a dependent bourgeoisie. This policy led to the import of the capital goods and technology from the center to produce luxury consumption items, previously imported by the bourgeoisie. The import-substitution policy accelerated capital accumulation due to accessibility of cheap labor, raw materials, and internal markets, which saved the cost of transportation for the imported goods. Despite higher surplus value, the periphery had a lower rate of accumulation and much of surplus were transferred to the center due to the structure of import-substitution industrialization. The profits were transferred to the center without restriction through the government's protection of foreign capital.

In the post-Mossadeq era, the United States became involved with long range development plans in Iran in order to transform the Iranian socioeconomic structure. The dominant precapitalist formation had blocked accumulation of capital because it did not offer an expanding market, the availability of cheap labor, or domination of the bourgeoisie class in alliance with foreign capital. The United States, therefore, financed Iran with a set of technical assistance programs and aids. The

establishment of Plan Organization, the central bureaucratic body of a new development policy, was the first step toward development activities in Iran.

Major facilities for direct and indirect foreign investment were provided by the state. The establishment of the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI) initiated by new York, was the major step towards incorporation of Iranian industrial activities into the United States' ventures. This bank, which was totally controlled by the United States' companies, was the major financial institution for the growth of the private sector and foreign investment. Other foreign and semi-foreign financial agencies such as Lazard Feres, Chase Manhattan Bank, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) were also instrumental in the transfer of capital and technology form the United States to Iran and the return of profit from Iran to the United States. The establishment of assembly line, by the late 1950s, further incorporated Iran's economy within the capitalist world-economy.

This attempt at industrialization and modernization did not stimulate Iran's economic growth. It caused rapid deterioration of economy, which led to inflation and recession and consequently to an economic crisis in Iran during the late 1950s and 1960s. The excess of imports over exports, the decline of domestic products, the increasing public debts, and the increase of prices all created a catastrophic situation.

In order to provide alternative to the power base of landlords, the new United States' policy forced the Shah and the Iranian government to introduce some measures of social reform toward the end of the 1950s. The Kennedy administration took this policy under serious consideration and suggested land reform to the Shah as an inevitable program in the process of capitalist development in Iran. Land reform was introduced to remove the main barrier to the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, mainly landlordism, and facilitate the United States' policy of import-substitution. Furthermore, the exploitation of peasants and laborers by the landowners, state and comprador bourgeoisie posed a potential threat for class struggle and a radical transformation of the state aimed at transferring power and the means of production to the public. Therefore, state introduced land reform to temporarily overcome political and economic crisis.

The pattern of development in Iran was not, however, based on the expansion of an independent private sector. It rather was directly related to oil and state activities. Through the establishment of a consortium, the United States became strategically involved in Iranian economic affairs. Oil production increased during the late 1950s and late 1960s due to, on the one hand, the increase of world demands for energy, and on the other, Iran's need for further exchange and new Western oriented economic development.

Iran's revenue increased, due to oil price hikes, from $181 million in 1956-57 to $358 million in 1960-61, reaching to $1.2 billion in 1970-71 (Danielson, 1982: 160). The biggest increase came in 1973, when the annual oil revenue rose from $5 billion in the early 1973 to $19 billion by the end of the year (Graham, 1980).

As a result of this huge surplus capital, and some initial military and financial aid from abroad, Gerami argues, Iran attained a structural mobility from a poor peripheral country to a capital-rich semi-peripheral country by the mid-1970s (Gerami, 1987: 17). In addition, Iran was semi-peripheral in that its military was strengthened by the United States aid for the explicit purpose assisting the maintenance of the United States regional hegemony. Iran raised its domestic capital, had valuable human and natural resources, and had access to a regional market. However, its growth was limited and incomplete due to political and economic dependency (primarily reflected in the enormous drain of surplus through oil exports), which in turn intensified the effect of internal conflicts, leading to the 1979 revolution.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IRANIAN EDUCATION

The Iranians, the descendants of a branch of the Indo-European race, settled in the Iranian Plateau in the middle of the second millennium B.C. As a matter of fact, the name Iran comes from the word Arya, meaning brave and wholesome, which was given to the tribes who lived in Asia and moved to the plateau between the Persian Sea and the Persian Gulf about 3,000 years ago (Abbott, 1977: 11). The people were called Persians by Westerners since the Greek period (Wilber, 1975a: 3). The country's name was changed from Persia to Iran by Reza Shah in 1935 in order to unify all the Iranian tribes (Sadeghy, 1972: 1). This nation has a history divided into two parts, each 12 to 13 centuries long. The Arab invasion in 640 A.D., which converted the Zoroastrian Iranians into Moslems, ended the first 12 centuries and initiated a new period of 13 centuries.

There were two great periods, in Persia, before the arrival of the Arabs. Between the sixth and fourth century B.C., Iran, under the Achaemenid rule, sent 30 governors to rule lands between Cyprus and the Indus, and from Memphis as far as Armenia. Then came Sassanid Empire, between the third and eight century A.D. It was geographically in the center of three other empires--Byzantium, China, and India--and therefore the meeting point of different cultures.

During this long history, the kingdom dynasties were struggling for developing their power and dominance. Each dynasty needed trained and educated people for the army, as well as capable and knowledgeable people for the governmental affairs. Therefore, education at higher levels received special attention in each period.

This long Iranian history also reflects a story of foreign power rivalry to conquer and influence the country. Iran's strategic position, as a landbridge between Asia and Europe, has attracted many foreign powers in various periods. Greeks and Arabs invaded the country from the west, Great Britain from the south, and Russians from the north, to mention only a few. Even though much of its territory, which was once stretched from the desert of Algeria to the border of China, has been lost, a core territory has been maintained over the millennia. The contact with other cultures and civilizations have influenced the way of life and thought, as well as the educational system of Iran.

Here, there will be a short review of the historical fluctuations of Iranian education, in order to provide the background necessary for understanding the contemporary aspects of the study.

Iranian Education in the Ancient Period

During this period which lasted until the introduction of Islam into Iran by Muslim Arabs in 640, the education of the

nation was under the influence of Zoroastrianism in both the Achaemenid (546 to 330 B.C.) and Sassanid (226 to 641 A.D.) rules. In the period in between (330 B.C. to 225 A.D.) Iran went under a period of foreign domination. With the Achaemenid fall before Alexander, the Greek culture spread throughout the Persian Empire. During the Alexandrian period (330 to 200 B.C.) and after that for another 425 years under Parthian rule (200 B.C. to 225 A.D.), there was a decline of Zoroastrian belief and spread of Greek culture and language in Iran. In this period, Zoroastrian education was influenced considerably by Hellenistic education (Nakosteen, 1965: 49).

During the Achaemenid rule, Zoroastrianism, the predominant religious belief of the Iranians, had great influence on the education of the young. The religion of Zoroaster and Avesta scriptures became the foundations of Persian education and civilization. A synthesis of piety with healthy useful citizenship was the aim of education. An early Zoroastrian prayer highlights the importance of education in early Iran:

> Oh Ahuramazda, endow me with an educated child; a child who will participate within his community; a child who will fulfill his duty in society; a child who will strive for the happiness of his family, his city and his country; an honorable child who may contribute to others' needs (Yasna, Nos. 62-65; from Arasteh, 1962: 3).

The "Pandnameh Azarabad" another Zoroastrian book, besides Avesta, includes the following advice:

> See that your wife and children pursue knowledge and virtue. If you have young children, boys or girls, send them to school, because the torch of learning is the light and vision of the eye (Arasteh, 1962: 2).

There were three aspects to education which derived from Zoroastrian ideals: religion and morals, physical education, and reading and writing (Sadiq, 1963).

Purity in thought, tongue, and act was the motto of Zoroastrianism. Honesty was repeatedly emphasized to the extent that Zoroaster called his creed 'the creed of honesty'. The truthfulness of Iranians in the ancient world was so famous that it is reflected in Herodotus writings. To him, riding, shooting, and honesty were three things that Iranians taught their children.

According to Zoroastrian religion, sickness is related to Ahriman and everything should act against him and improve the health of the body (Ahriman is the force of darkness and evil, whereas Ahura Mazda created man, light, and all goodness). Physical education was emphasized as a means to achieve this end.

The language used for reading and writing was Aramaic. These skills, as well as arithmetic were taught only by the priests (Hurat, 1927: 154). The sacred Zoroastrian book, the Avesta, discussed and explained the desired characteristics of

teachers and differentiated between the teaching roles of parents, nannies, and teachers (Sadiq, 1963: 56).

Education was organized, during the Achaemenid period, at three levels. The first level was home. The family was responsible for educating children at home until the age five. From the age of five to sixteen, the students attended state schools to learn reading, and writing, as well as good habits such as the truthfulness, purity, obedience, simplicity, thrift, and the hunting skills of throwing the javelin and swimming. At the third level the student was devoted to higher education. He continued his education learning the principles of government and justice for 10 years. He was also given insight into various official posts and methods of administration. Then at the age of 25, he was taught the specific details of military life. After that, some of the students were chosen to be brought up as priests, lawyers, and governors (Strabo, 1936: 17-18; 153).

Because of the Persia's vulnerability to threat and outright invasion by conquering nations, there were politico-social demands upon the populace. These demands were reflected in educational curriculum; students were heavily trained in military and physical education.

Students attending the state school were from three different social classes: a) the children of aristocratic families, who were to study political science and art of ruling the country; b) professional students who inherited special occupations from

their families; and c) public students, the children of teachers, employers, and businessmen, who were to learn about public relations and economics (Khosravani, 1982: 16). The majority of people who were poor did not have access to this kind of formal education.

Institutions of higher education were founded during the Achaemenid Dynasty. There is little information available about them but it is known that philosophy, literature, and medical training were emphasized. A number of medical schools were founded in this period in the cities of Borsepa, Miller, Orkahoe, Azarbaijan, Ray, and Balkh (Khosravani, 1982: 16). Higher education was aimed at supplying the state with manpower needed for service in the office of the empire as well as battlefields.

A considerable number of educated manpower was trained in the centers of higher learning during Achaemenid Empire. Before the Empire fell to the force of Alexander the Great in 330 B.C., the Achaemenid civilization reached a relatively advanced stage of development. The Empire developed a postal system, public hospitals, military schools, and national highways on a large scale. It dug canals, made geographical explorations, kept national records, founded legations, and made use of statistics in the study of social problems (Nakosteen, 1965: 49).

After more than five centuries of foreign domination, during which time there was a decline of Zoroastrian belief, the

Persians gained their ascendancy back in 224 A.D. and established the Sassanid Empire, which lasted for more than four centuries and brought Zoroastrianism back.

The church and state were unified in Sassanid Iran. Two kinds of education were fostered in the youth by the state. One was the physical and military education for the health of the nation and for the national defense; the other was religious and social education for moral discipline and citizenship. Physical and military exercises, as well as reading, writing, arithmetic, and fine arts were among the most essential subjects of education.

During the Sassanid Empire, Iran served, for over four centuries, as a central market of intellectual and material exchange between East and West (Nakosteen, 1965: 49). The University of Jundi-Shapur played an important role in this international market.

The University of Jundi-Shapur

The University of Jundi-Shapur was founded 1700 years ago, long before the oldest European universities. It was founded by Shapur I, the second Sassanid emperor, in the province of Kuzistan in the southern part of Iran.

> Long before Europe could boast of Salerno and Bologna in Italy, Montpellier and Paris in France, and Oxford in England, Iran possessed Jundi-Shapur University located in the

present province of Kuzistan.... Jundi-Shapur was a university of which any nation would have been justifiably proud (Fatemi & Burroughs, 1969: 21).

There was a strong emphasis, at the Academy of Jundi-Shapur, on literature, philosophy (the Zoroastrian Greek, and Indian), astronomy, law and government, finance, morals (Zoroastrian), theology, religion, and medicine (Nakosteen, 1965: 48). The university had an international flavor and many students came to it from every corner of the world. Many scholars, mostly from Greco-Roman world, who had escaped from persecution in their homeland found refuge at this university. They were expelled of their homeland by the intolerance of the Emperor Justinian. In fact the existence of freedom of religion in Iran, as well as Sassanid emperors' respect for men of learning led to the migration of a number of these scientists to Iran during Kobad's rule in A.D. 489. These scientists were followers of Nestorians. They were thrown out of their homeland in Constantinopole because they had combined Christianity with Greek philosophy.

> Long before the advent of Islam, Hellenistic, Alexandrian, Syrian, and Hindu philosophy and science had spread out to the Sassanian centers of learning within the Persian Empire. When the tradition of Greek education had all but faded away in Europe in the early Christian centuries, when the Academy of Athens was closed in 529 by Emperor Justinian, and when the Nestorians were being driven from cities and academies that were under orthodox Christian

> domination, it was in Sassanid Persia that Syrian, Alexandrian, and Jewish scholars found refuge. There they presented these traditions, improved upon and added to them, and later passed them on through Islamic scholarship to European educators. Among these Persian centers of learning were Salonika, Ctestophon, Nishapur, and most particularly Jundi-Shapur (Nakosteen, 1964: 17).

Sadiq mentions that some of the curriculum made its way from India into early Persian education. India also contributed to Western education in such fields as mathematics, astronomy, medicine, literature, grammar, logic, and philosophy. However, this Indian contribution to European education was at second and third hand through Zoroastrian, Nestorian, [and later Muslim] channels (Sadiq, 1931). According to Sadiq, such studies as civics and history, religion, jurisprudence and ethics, philosophy including psychology, literature including the languages and the arts are attributed to early Persian curricula (Sadiq, 1931).

The University was at its peak from 531 to 579 A.D. Various learning traditions, namely Hindu, Greek, Judaic, Syriac, Christian, and Persian traditions, were brought together with the Zoroastrian influences. At the University, many philosophical and scientific books, particularly medical texts, were translated from Greek to Pahlavi (Iranian language at the time). Many books in various subjects were also translated from Hindu, Syrian, and Greek into Arabic. Western scholars later translated these books into Latin and Hebrew (Khosravani, 1982). Therefore, the

University of Jundi-Shapur in Iran was the first important channel of preservation and eventual transmission of Hellenistic, Hindu, and Persian learning to the Western world.

Jundi-Shapur University lasted for several centuries. One century after the introduction of Islam, it was still one of the greatest scientific centers in the world. Physicians from this University served several generations of the caliphs in Baghdad (Tritton, 1957: 175). However, many of the scholars who were engaged in scientific research gradually emigrated to other centers of higher learning in Baghdad and other parts of the Islamic world (Fatemi & Burroughs, 1969: 21). This entailed a decline in the quality of scientific work achieved at the University. Eventually, Jundi-Shapur ceased to function as a major center of higher learning in the second half of the ninth century.

There was also another important center of Nestorian-Persian learning, namely Beit Ardeshir, where translations and interpretations of the works of Aristotle and works in medicine, astronomy, and other sciences were carried on (Nakosteen 1964: 18).

Iranian Education in the Islamic Period

It was in the seventh century A.D., during the Sassanid era, that the Arab invasion of Iran occurred. Toward the end of A.D. 634, the first confrontation between Arabs and Iranians took

place, and the final defeat was at the battle of Nahavand in A.D. 642.

This conquest ushered a new era and introduced a new religion, Islam, which eventually converted the vast majority of the population. The entire habits and pattern of life of the people were to change for the first time in a thousand years.

Islamic civilization, unlike that of ancient Iran, has maintained continuity with the present. What is meant by Islam is not simply a body of dogmas. Islam is a complete and integrated way of life. It is a system which includes religious beliefs, a theory of government, rules of taxation, moral standards, rules of behavior, laws of social and educational life, as well as rules of etiquette (Mojawer, no date: 13; Dorman, 1949). Therefore, Islamic heritage, is not an ancient culture which Iranians desire to revive; it is a way of life which claims the right to be preserved while adjusting itself to modern conditions (Munir, 1974: 236).

In Islam education is made inseparable from religion. The first verse of Quran is about the primacy of knowledge and its relation to the Divine.

> 1) Recite, in the Name of Thy Lord who created, 2) created man of a blood-clot. 3) Recite, and Thy Lord is the Most Generous, 4) who taught by pen, 5) taught man that he knew not (Holy Quran, Chapter 96, Verses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5).

The word Quran itself comes from the Arabic root qara'a, meaning to read. Quran was, therefore, the very agency and direct cause of the need for education in Islam.

The Prophet of Islam gave Muslims a book to read, the Quran, and a place to study it, the mosque. He repeatedly emphasized, in word and action, the importance of learning. He freed literate prisoners of war on the condition that they teach Muslims to read and write. He requested his wife be taught writing. There are several hadith (the sayings and doings of the Prophet of Islam) that emphasize the importance of knowledge: "Seek knowledge even if it is in China", "The scholar and the students are the best of human beings", "The men of knowledge are the heirs of prophets", "To seek learning is the duty of every Muslim man and woman", "Seek learning from the cradle to the grave", "The ink of the learned is as precious as the blood of the martyrs", "Honoring a learned man is worth honoring seventy prophets", and "The learned hold the third rank, preceded only by God himself and his angels" (Hamiuddin Khan, 1968: 20).

In Islam, education is concerned with both spiritual and material matters. However, human knowledge is noble only so long as it is subordinated to Divine wisdom.

> Islam is a unitarian faith and makes no distinction of the religious and the secular. In the eyes of Islam no knowledge as such is profane, and everything that promotes life and contributes to the health, strength, peace, prosperity, and well-being of men and nations is RELIGIOUS and has the

same weight in the scale of values as anything purely religious. In act, the mundane and the supra-mundane are so mixed....and inter-related in Islam that it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between them without creating confusion in the fundamental values laid dawn by the faith. The Islamic system of education began with the study of the Holy Quran. As civilization developed, every branch of knowledge that came within the ken of the early Muslims was integrated within the study of religion, and we find in the heyday of Islamic civilization Medicine, Chemistry, Mathematics, Astronomy, Philosophy, Geography, History, and every other known science being taught under the patronage and shadow of the mosque (Durrani, no date: 8).

The Arab invasion of Persia, in A.D. 642, was followed by the golden age of Persian learning.

Europe was in its medieval period when the Muslims wrote a colorful chapter in the history of education. Many of their greatest contributions, particularly to Western education, have gone unnoticed because of religious prejudice, language barriers, the decline of Islamic culture, and inaccessibility of historic materials for Western historians of education.... The Muslims assimilated through their educational system the best of classical cultures and improved them. Among the assimilated fields were philosophy and Hellenistic medical, mathematical, and technological sciences; Hindu mathematics, medicine, and literature; Persian religious, literature, and sciences; and Syrian commentaries on Hellenistic science and philosophy (Nakosteen, 1964: 37).

Nakosteen's argument is that Islam offered Persian educational curricula religious, literary, and scientific elements. The Muslim conquerors of Persia encouraged free inquiry and introduced the instruments of research and scholarship (Nakosteen, 1964: 37). During their golden age, the Arabs searched into various branches of human knowledge, including philosophy, history, historiography, law, sociology, literature, ethics, philosophy, theology, medicine, mathematics, logic, jurisprudence, art, architecture, and ceramics (Nakosteen, 1964: 37).

From the introduction of Islam until the advent of Western education in the country, the Iranian system of education consisted of two levels: a primary level performed at maktabs and masjids; and a secondary level performed at madrasehs and nezamiyehs.

Maktabs and Masjids

Maktabs were the early schools of Persians, where upper and middle class youth--children of landlords, government officials, shopkeepers, and businessmen--learned reading and writing. Familiarity with Quran and classical Persian texts were subjects included in the curriculum of the maktabs. Maktab was a one-room school and was financed by endowments. It was often associated with a mosque. Traces of maktabs still remain in today's Iran. Maktabs existed in the Arab world even before the

advent of Islam. They were located in teacher's house. After the advent of Islam, there were other types of maktabs which taught exclusively Quran and religion (Nakosteen, 1964: 46). Masjids (or Mosque Schools) were another type of school in Muslim countries. Both maktabs and masjids served as elementary schools (Arasteh, 1962: 8).

Madrasehs and Nezamiyehs

Higher education was taught in madrasehs, which served as Islamic colleges for higher learning. Even though several of these madrasehs existed before Nizam al-Mulk (the great Persian scholar and minister of Malek Shah Seljuk), he was the first one to establish them under a sound, and organized administration. In his honor, these madrasehs were called nezamiyeh. The first nezamiyeh was established in Nishapur (in the northeast of Iran) early in the eleventh century. More than a hundred of them were established throughout Iran, Iraq, Syria, Arabia, and Palestine. The one in Baghdad which was established in 1057 was the most famous of all. These schools were all standardized in terms of finance, administration, and curricula. They were supplied with libraries, and a system of scholarship to aid students. These madrasehs were financed by huge endowments. The faculty were made up of several professors with a very high rank and intellectual attainment. The general curriculum during the Muslim golden age included:

> instruction in mathematics (algebra, trigonometry, and geometry), science (chemistry, physics, and astronomy), medicine (anatomy, surgery, pharmacy, and specialized medical branches), philosophy (logic, ethics, and metaphysics), literature (philology, grammar, poetry, and prosody), social sciences, history, geography, political disciplines, law, sociology, psychology, and jurisprudence, theology (comparative religions, history of religious study of the Qur'an, religious tradition,.... and other religious topics) (Nakosteen, 1964: 52).

The madraseh combined ancient Iranian culture and Islamic thought and contributed to the development of science, art, and literature in the country during the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. During this period of lively intellectual activities, some of the great Iranian philosophers, writers, poets, and artists came into existence. Among them were scientists, philosophers, and musicians such as Farabi, Biruni, Ibn Sina (called Avicenna by Europeans), Al-Razi, Umar Khayyam, Maulana Jalal-udin Rumi, known as Mawlana, and Al-Ghazali. These world-renowned learned men were all either students or teachers and administrators at some Iranian madraseh or nezamiyeh.

The invasion of mongols, in the thirteenth century, was the greatest calamity that occurred to Muslim learning; with it came the demise of the golden age of Muslim learning and education (Nakosteen, 1964: 52). In terms of Iranian education, the Mongol invasion did not bring an 'end' but a 'quiescence'. There was a

recession in educational endeavors from nearly 1350 until the advent of the twentieth century.

As Ghengis Khan's army advanced through Iran, entire cities were put to the sword and most schools were destroyed. Tamerlane's invasion, in the fifteenth century, brought a second devastation to Iran. The country, which was already reduced to near anarchy by the Mongol invasion, was further reduced to tribal federations. The institutions of higher learning either ceased to exist or they became empty shells (Fatemi & Burroughs, 1969: 22). The country was reunified, in A.D. 1500, under Safavid Dynasty. However, even then, progress in education was minimal.

The early Safavids who faced severe challenges by the Sunni Ottoman Empire, declared a particular brand of Shiia as the official religion of Iran. To promote this official religion, and thereby gain public support against the Sunni enemies, they established formal religious schools in Iran. Maktab and madraseh were revived as two state-supported educational institutions. These institutions were aimed at spreading the official religion and ideology. The influence of this effort on higher education was that religious education was emphasized to the detriment of science, and free speculation and inquiry were discouraged. Intellectual activities were limited in scope, and tradition governed almost every aspect of scholarship. This period of educational decline in Iran was contemporaneous with the European Renaissance and the great scientific and technological

advancement in Western world. Consequently, when Iran was awakened in the 19th century, it had to ask Western countries for technical and educational assistance. The European pattern of education began to penetrate the educational system of Iran from the nineteenth century; however, the maktab-madraseh system continued to exist in the country until the twentieth century.

CHAPTER V

MODERNIZATION OF EDUCATION DURING THE QAJAR PERIOD

During the Qajar period, prior to which Iran was a relatively independent and sovereign state, Iran became politically, militarily and economically dependent to foreign powers, including Britain and Russia. Therefore, from the 19th century onward, the history of Iran should be studied in relation to these incidents that mark the beginning of the foreign intervention, which in turn affected the internal structures, the Iranian socioeconomic and political structures as well as the development of education. These changes resulted in gradual incorporation of Iranian culture into the Western culture. Secularization in general, and the secularization of education in particular, was part of the larger process of the incorporation of the Iranian culture.

Unlike Latin America or Africa, Iran has never been directly colonized. During the nineteenth century, Iran remained, at the most, a semi-colonial country. There is an important distinction between colonial and semi-colonial countries in terms of the extension of the foreign intervention. Unlike the colonial countries, Iran, with its semi-colonial condition, had administrative and educational institutions not imposed by outside powers. The educational system, in Iran, remained under

the control of the indigenous social classes. The characteristics of colonial education are described by Altbach and Kelley:

> The education under colonialism lay beyond the control of persons or groups being educated. The content, medium, format, and uses of education were determined by the colonizer, not the colonized. The schools regardless of the motive force behind their establishment--bureaucratic manpower needs, the missionary desire to do good works and save souls, exploitation of the resources of the colony, or a simple desire to bring progress to so-called backward areas--were set up by the colonizer on his own terms to meet needs of the colonizer, not the colonized (Altbach and Kelley, 1978: 19).

Rather than in outright imposition, the Western educational system permeated Iranian society in a very indirect way.

As was discussed earlier, Iran was defeated in the three wars with Russia and Britain. The Iranian economy was gradually penetrated by British and Russian interests, and was incorporated into the capitalist world economy, through different concessions and treaties. These interventions at the economic and political levels had a profound effect at the ideological level. The Qajar period (1796-1925) is the era during which the Westernization and modernization of Iranian culture and education started in Iran through several means, the most important of which were: A) missionary education, B) sending students abroad, C) establishment of the Persian printing press, D) the modernization

of the army by French and English advisors, E) the establishment of modern schools.

Missionary Education

One development for introducing Western ideas into Iranian education was establishment of the foreign, European as well as American, missionary schools in the first half of the 19th century. Prior to this, except for the training of army personnel, all of the educational activity was done by the clergy, and schools in the modern sense did not exist. However, compared to the colonial countries, the scope of the missionary education was very limited. The non-Muslim minorities are the population on which the missionary work was mostly centered. The number of missionary schools increased significantly from the middle of the 19th century. John Elder shows the following trend concerning these schools in the village schools of the Urma Plain (see Table V-1). These missions were welcomed by the government. The king of Persia sent a special edict to express his pleasure that teachers had come from the New World to instruct his subjects (Hall, 1920: 119).

American Missionaries

In comparison to British and French missionaries, the American missionary was more substantial in Iran. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions sent out Smith and

Table V-1: Village Schools And Students In The Urma Plain 1837-1895

YEARS	NUMBER OF SCHOOLS	STUDENTS
1837-1847	24	530
1847-1857	50	948
1857-1867	51	1,096
1867-1877	58	1,024
1877-1887	81	1,823
1895	117	2,410

Source: Elder, J., History of the American Presbyterian Mission to Iran, Literature Committee of the Church Council of Iran.

Dwight to survey the Near East and to report the opportunities for missionary services. Travelling through Syria, Armenia, and Persia, this mission remained in the city of Urumieh, in the northwest of Iran, for several weeks meeting the Assyrian Bishops. Smith, speaking of Assyrians, pointed out that "I see that this field is white and ready for the harvest. In all my journey, I have seen no people as willing to accept the Gospel as the Assyrians of Persia. It is a good field for the work" (Elder, no date: 7).

The congregationalists (The American Board in Boston) was the first American church mission to Iran. They selected Urumieh in Azarbaijan (northwest of Iran) as the site of their mission because of the large numbers of Arminians and Nestorians there.

Revered Justin Parkins was assigned, in August 1834, to direct its activities. Asahel Grant joined him, a year later, as his medical assistant. They started constructing a church, schools, and a hospital. This was the first permanent Christian mission in Iran (Ministry of Information, 1976: 6).

> [Dr. Parkins] established a boys' school, also referred to as the Male Seminary at Rezayeh in 1836. In 1878 the School was reorganized as a college; besides offering an academic program, it gave industrial, theological and medical courses. Almost all the boys who studied in these schools were Nestorians and Arminians, but the missions were eager to work among Muslims too (Haghighi, 1970: 158).

This missionary also opened, in 1838, the first girl's school (Wherry, 1893: 211).

American missions increased their educational work among Muslims by 1870s. The affluent urban class showed a rising desire for Western education (Annual Report of the Board of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1873: 56). This led the Missionary schools to increase the number of science and math courses in their curriculum and secularize it more.

The missionary schools, where Muslims had regular students by 1883, offered a modern education for both boys and girls from kindergarten through high school in several of the large Iranian cities (Barton, 1913: 114). The number of Muslims, especially Muslim women, attending missionary schools increased

tremendously during the Constitutional Revolution (Annual Report, 1911: 330). There was rising opposition to these schools as they became larger and more influential in the Muslim community (Historical Sketches of the Missions Under the Care of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, 1881: 20). Ulama (Muslim religious scholars), as well as some reformers, were opposed to the activities of these foreign schools. Ulama were concerned about the religious influences of the missionary institutions, as well as the corrupting influences of the Western ways. The reformers, while appreciating the importance of modern education, were concerned about indoctrination of the nation's youth into an acceptance of foreign loyalties that would destroy the identity of the Muslim community (Szyliowics, 1973: 176). There were pressures to open similar schools run by the Muslims.

As a response to these pressures, a private elementary school was established in Tabriz in 1889 by Mirza Hassan Rushdiyeh, a former clergyman, who named the school after himself (Browne, 1910: 407-408).

In addition to the Presbyterian Church missionaries, the Seventh-Day Adventist missionaries were involved in Iranian education. Their early school was established in 1911 in Iran. It expanded education to many villages in and around Urumieh, Tabriz, Arak, Hamadan and Tehran (Ministry of Information, 1976: 6-7).

Therefore, missionaries were the means by which the American impact on Iranian education started and then continued into the 20th century. The Presbyterian mission built the American Alborz college in a 44-acre site of land, purchased in 1915, in Tehran. This college, opened in 1925, was affiliated with the elementary and high school program. It received a charter from the Board of Regents of the State of New York, through which it enjoyed a status of Liberal Arts college. The American-trained faculty of this college taught in departments of chemistry, biology, commerce, philosophy, and social sciences. Samuel Martin Ordan, its president and headmaster, shared in the education of many of the Iranian leaders (Ministry of Information, 1976: 7-8).

Some American advisors, who came to Iran for economic and financial missions, also had some impact, directly or indirectly, on the Iranian University system. Mr. Shuster, a financial advisor, went to Iran in 1907, and Mr. Millspaugh, an economist in 1922. Mr Rubin, an analyst of an Iranian culture and politics, says in this regard that:

> The Persians had more success with a new mission of American financial advisors, led by Arthur Millspaugh, who worked in Iran.....he had taught economics at several universities, before joining the United States government where he enjoyed some success, in Iran and many of his experiences were as frustrating as those faced by Shuster some 15 years earlier (Lenczowski, 1978: 307).

Through the missionary schools, particularly Alborz College, and through the religious activities, American advisors paved the way for other educational agents of America to come to Iran. Iranians may also have gotten the ideas of establishing independent Western-style colleges, and attraction to the Western ideologies for resolving educational, economical, and political problems, from these missionaries.

Other countries, such as French, Scotland, Britain and Germany, began to establish missionary schools in Iran. However, the American mission became the most successful, stayed the longest, and established more schools. In 1841, 17 American missionary schools were operating in Iran; while 10 years later, they increased to 45 schools with 871 students (Waterfield, 1973: 103-105). The American mission had 117 village schools with 2,410 students among the Christian districts of Iran by 1895 (Afzal 1956: 163). In 1870, they opened a boys school in Hamadan for boys, and 12 years later, one for girls. They also opened one school for boys in Tehran in 1873, and one year later one for girls (Wilber, 1975a: 203). There were also, by 1943, eight American missionary high schools in Iran. Many of the graduates of these schools played important roles in the modernization and Westernization of the country (Banani, 1961: 89).

French Missionaries

French Catholic missionaries came to Urumieh in 1840 and opened a school with 10 students. They established, in Tehran, St. Luii School and St. Joseph School in 1861 and 1876 respectively. Many other schools were established by Cincent-de-Paul in other cities in 1866. In 1900, in Tehran, a school named Alians was under the supervision of the association of Alians-de-France (Sadiq, 1963: 356). There were 76 French missionary schools throughout the country by the end of the 19th century. French missionaries influenced Persian education through various cultural ties, rather than through direct promotion of education, as the American missionaries did (Arasteh, 1962: 156).

English Missionaries

Among British missions, the Church Missionary Society, made the most progress in educational and medical work in Iran. They made an agreement with the American mission, through which they restricted their activities to the South of Iran. In 1896, they established their center at Isfahan (Arasteh, 1962: 157). They established around sixty schools in Iran by 1935. In 1906, another British society, the Association of Stewart Memorial College, maintained a college in Tehran and spread their activities to Shiraz, Yazd, and Kerman (Sadiq, 1963: 356). The London Society for Jews operated in Hmadan, Isfahan, and Tehran,

and established one school for boys and one for girls (Arasteh, 1962: 157-158).

The missionaries who came to Iran in the 19th century introduced to Iran many aspects of Western culture. These missionaries tried to convert the people to Christianity. But realizing the impossibility of that, they attempted to change the attitude of the young through education and the introduction of the Western values. Being unable to spread Christianity in Iran, the missionaries often accepted offers from Western governments to serve as political experts on Iran, or to act as advisors to companies which had large commercial interests in Iran (Amirsadeghi, 1977). In other words, they acted as agents of the core to secure core's interests in Iran. The missionary work was to be, by nature, the vanguard of the policy of colonization and to protect Western interests.

Sending Students Abroad

Iranian government began sending students to Europe in the early part of the 19th century. The first student was sent, in 1810, to England to study medicine. He was followed, in 1816, by five more students, who went to England to study modern sciences. Another group of five went to France on 1845 to study modern sciences (Sadiq, 1963: 303-304). In 1861, 42 top students of the first graduating class of Dar al-Fonun (Polytechnic College) went to France, probably because the spirit of the

College, as well as its language of instruction were French. They were financed by the government through the Ministry of Education, which had just been founded. During the second half of the 19th century there were a total of 300 Western educated Iranians (Ashraf, 1971: 279). Thirty more students, the most of whom were financed by the government, went to Europe in 1911 to study military science, agriculture, and various social sciences. In 1918, 500 Iranian students were studying in foreign countries, 200 of whom were in France 33 in England, 9 in Germany, and the rest in Switzerland and other countries (Arasteh, 1962: 39-40).

These groups, upon their return home, enjoyed high social status and received newly created positions in government. These students, along with learning technical knowledge, were influenced by the life and culture of Europe. They introduced the Western ideas to Iranians through their writings. Most of these intellectuals developed anti-clerical views, and thought that the only way to progress and improvement was to follow the Western way of life (Azarnoosh, 1976). Therefore, these people paved the way for the incorporation of Iranian culture into the capitalist culture, which was a necessary step for the economic and political incorporation of the country. According to Banani, "no single institution or group of people was more responsible for bringing Western influences into Iran than the students who had been educated in Europe and America" (Banani, 1961: 101). Al-e

Ahmad comments that "those first Westernized among Iranian intellectuals only paved the way for the Weststruckness, and due to this phenomena, alienated the Iranian nation from themselves. We are alienated in our clothes, home, food, literature, and the most dangerous in our education" (Al-e Ahmad, 1962: 78).

Establishment of the Persian Printing Press

The first printing press was set up in Tabriz in 1812, by Abbas Mirza, followed by the establishment of several more in other cities. Eventually, the first Persian newspaper was printed in Tehran in 1838, and several books, religious as well as European books, were published (Sadiq, 1963: 304-305). This factor hastened people's attention to the modern sciences as well as Western culture.

The Modernization of the Army

At the beginning of the 19th century, the rulers of Iran recognized the need for modern weapons and military techniques, in order to be able to resist foreign arms. This required a political modernization, as well as more control of the central administration over the entire system. This led to the political and military modernization, that is, the reorganization of army, and the creation of new government bureaucracy and new institutions.

Military and political modernization led to educational modernization. Iran's development of modern education has been intimately linked with political reorganization. The first experience of modern education in Iran was during the Iran-Russian wars, through a French military mission of advisors and instructors. Iran made various attempts, during the course of the century, to form a European fashion regular army. To this end, European military instructors were employed, and Dar al-Fonun was established in 1851.

Therefore, the first steps towards the modernization and cultural incorporation of the country was taken. But at this stage, it was more in the form of defensive modernization, without a radical change in the culture of the country. A radical state-sponsored secularization of the culture, i.e. intensive modernization, was initiated later in the twentieth century during the Pahlavi era.

Establishment of Modern Schools

After Iranian army suffered defeats in the three wars with Russia and Britain, the Iranian government initiated a policy for establishing modern schools in order to create a modern army and bureaucracy in the country. The first attempt at founding modern schools was the establishment of Dar al-Fonun (a polytechnic college) in 1851.

Dar al-Fonun

The Qajar government, after almost sixty years of rule, began to pay attention to the state of education in the mid-19th century in the reign of Naser al-Din Shah (1848-1896). He was a corrupt person, thinking of his own gain and strengthening his own position. During his rule, there was dramatic increase in the interference of the foreign powers in the affairs of the state. Iran was further weakened vis-a-vis the British-Russian rivalry; and the economic state of the country became worse than before.

During this period, many factions of the clergy were opposing his rule as well as the British-Russian influence in the affairs of the government. There was an increase in direct clashes between the Ulama and the state (Keddie, 1978). It was clear, especially to his capable premier, Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir, that the military superiority of the Western powers was related to the Western access to modern science and education. Statements from the records of the Imperial Court support this:

> The Russian government at the time of the Peter the Great used modern education from the West and the teaching of the natural sciences and military skills to form an organized army using modern weapons to become powerful and attack the empire of Iran and wrest the rich lands of the northern Caucasus from us, and Britain had gotten very powerful from the adoption of modern science and industry (Zonis, 1971b: 166).

As a matter of fact, Amir Kabir's thoughts and ideas were nationalistic. By introducing the new sciences, he intended to lift the Iranian place and status in the modern world and mobilize the Iranians to confront the Western countries. Iran which was once a strong and sovereign state was losing its independence. Adoption of the modern science and technology, to Amir Kabir, was the key to solving this problem. The plenipotentiary minister of Prussia said that Amir Kabir did not like Westerners; he wanted to use their science and inventions for the benefit of the Iranian people (Adamiyat, 1977).

Ironically, this attempt at secularization of education was to ease the strain of the process of incorporation. The growth of the secular, scientific universalism in the educational system of the country, was to ease the strain of the cultural articulation process of incorporation within the world-system. The term 'cultural articulation' is very similar to the term 'cultural fusion', applied in the mainstream anthropology. The term implies that when two cultures come together, one does not obliterate the other. They rather change and adapt to the new situation.

In order to modernize his 20,000 man army, Amir Kabir founded the Dar al-Fonun (House of Sciences) in which new modern officers could be trained for the improvement of the army. The construction of the college, the employment of the teaching staff, and the course of study was supervised by Amir Kabir (Arasteh, 1963: 327-334).

The opening of Dar al-Fonun was the most important step toward modernization of education. It was the first secular state school, in modern Iran, not run by the members of clergy. The need for well-trained officers and administrators, in the Iranian army and her growing bureaucracy, is the primary reason behind the establishment of Dar al-Fonun. Dar al-Fonun was similar to French lycee because it included secondary and rudimentary higher education. In this school, the study lasted 6 or more years, with technical and practical knowledge.

Initially, students admitted to Dar al-Fonun were from the higher classes--the sons of aristocracy, great landlords, and top government officials. Dar al-Fonun was an elitist Institution. Entrance was restricted to the children of the social, economic and political elites (Szyliowics, 1973: 71). The main objective of establishing this institution was to train the sons of the elites along modern lines for state service. They were of the ages 14 and 16 years. The school was tuition free and students were paid a stipend. The medium of instruction was French. Up-to-date textbooks in French, Russian, and other languages were used. Many of these books were translated to Farsi.

Because of the political rivalries between England and Russia over Iran, Amir Kabir sought Austrian professors. Upon Amir Kabir's request for educational assistance from Austria, seven Austrian professors came to represent a variety of faculties, including chemistry, engineering, mathematics,

medicine, military training, mineralogy, physics, and surgery (Arasteh, 1962: 210). Eventually, there came scientists as teachers from France, Holland, and Hungary to this institution. In time, teachers came from Italy and Germany (Sadiq, 1975). A few of the Iranians, who had been sent abroad since 1810 for training, were also recruited. There were, at the beginning of the 20th century, forty-two professors, 26 from European countries and 16 from Iran, serving Dar al-Fonun (Farhangi, 1980: 167).

The college began with 30 students; this number increased to 105 during the first year of enrollment. In the first year of the establishment of Dar al-Fonun, the curriculum included army science (61 students), medicine (20 students), engineering and mining (12 students), chemistry and pharmacy (7 students), and mineralogy (5 students); 61 out of the 105 students enrolled in military science. Even though this curriculum seems to be broader than what is required for a strictly military education, each of the subjects in the curriculum was suited for national defence in some way (Arasteh, 1962: 21). According to Sadiq (1975), the curriculum eventually included military science, engineering, medicine, pharmacy, mining, French, natural sciences, mathematics, history, geography, English, Russian, painting, and music. Following is the description of an Englishman who visited the Dar al-Fonun:

> The first room we entered was the French classroom, where under a Persian teacher, a large class was reciting and

> taking good hold of language. In the English room, professor Tyler showed us a class of bright boys translating our mother-tongue. These, with Russian, Arabic, and Turkish are the foreign languages taught. Had we come in the morning the sciences would have been on the programme. There was scientific apparatus and a small library representing many languages. The number in attendance was two hundred and fifty..... All the native races and religions are admitted.....all are in some degree supported. His Majesty's object in maintaining the college is to prepare educated officers for the army and the civil service (Wilson, 1895: 151-152).

In a short period of time, Dar al-Fonun expanded from what Amir Kabir had conceived into an institution of higher learning which was calling out to grow and expand.

> The students received good technical training. They had an opportunity to produce scientific equipment in the chemical and physical laboratories and in an adjoining wax factory they utilized some of their acquired skills. In 1864, one of the teachers with the help of a student set up the first telegraph wire in Iran: it ran from the central office of the School to the main garden in the middle of the city (Arasteh, 1962: 21).

This school continued to print Iran's first official newspaper, Ruzname-ye Waghaye Attifaghye (The Newspaper of Current Events), which had already been started by Amir Kabir. The college graduates supervised, later on, the establishment of other publications, such as a journal in 1876 on scientific and

general events. Many books on science, mathematics, medicine, military science, philosophy, and history were also published in the college.

Dar al-Fonun existed as a polytechnic college for 40 years. It was made into a high-school, by the end of the 19th century, because of the fear of the importations of student unrest from the Ottoman Empire into the country. Dar al-Fonun was the first government attempt at introducing modern education into the country. There were 1,100 graduates most of whom served as important army officers, and many became active in the intellectual and political movements developed before the Constitutional Revolution (Arasteh, 1962: 23). The graduates of this school were to be sent to Europe for further training (Avery, 1965: 82).

Education was perceived, in this period, as a preparation for governmental service. Admission to this school was restricted to social, economic, and political elites. Among the social effects of the modern educational system was the reinforcement of the elitism of the upper classes. Modern education became a primary requirement for entering the upper levels of the administrative/military bureaucracies and the foreign service (Zonis, 1971b: 66-67).

Dar al-Fonun tried to familiarize its students with the Western culture. From its establishment in 1851 to the end of the century, its growing number of graduates undertook the

responsibility for beginning the movement toward foundation of mass education in Iran (Sadiq, 1975). There were 48,848 students in higher education in the country by the end of the century due to Dar al-Fonun emphasis on modern higher education (Sadiq, 1975).

Amir Kabir who was the man most responsible for initiating the modernization process was assassinated at the order of the shah 40 days after the establishment of Dar al-Fonun. This was driven by the harem intrigue and the enmity of the Shah's mother (who was in close touch with colonial powers) (Farvar, 1980: 4).

The problem of adoption of modern science and technology within the milieu of the Western culture is observed by such intellectual critics as Al-e Ahamd. To Al-e Ahamd the fundamental problems of higher eduction in Iran started right from the beginning of the formation of Western higher educational thought in the traditional society of Iran:

> Why from the first day, in the era of the Qajar rule, did we established modern schools for modern science, instead of placing modern science in our traditional madrasehs? By doing so, we got rid of all our traditional universities. One of the buildings of one university in England is an imitation of Madar-Shah Madraseh of Esfahan, and we changed our madrasehs to museums. Instead we have established the University of Esfahan which produces mostly degrees, and not much research activities and scientific studies which are contributions to the world of knowledge. We destroyed our active traditional schools which were the center for intellectual studies (Al-e Ahmad, 1978: 41).

Therefore, even though the adoption of the modern education was for the strengthening of the nation and acquisition of the economic and political independence from Western powers, it ended up with more and more cultural dependence, i.e. cultural incorporation, which in turn facilitated the economic and political incorporations.

Other Modern Institutions of Higher Learning

In the 19th century, no major development besides the opening of Dar al-Fonun was initiated by the government. Even though the reform and secularization of education had been started by the state, education was neglected after the establishment of Dar al-Fonun, unless for a bureaucratic development--i.e., the establishment of the Ministry of Science in 1860. It was the first government office, in the history of Iran, concerned with the education of the citizens (Akhavi, 1980: 32). The only task of the new Ministry was sending students to Europe for study. In the first year of its establishment, in 1861, forty-two of the Dar al-Fonun graduates were sent to France. The government made no initiative at institutionalizing elementary and secondary education (Sadiq, 1963: 352). There was no conception of popular education, and education was only concerned with the specific needs of the state.

Twenty two years after the establishment of Dar al-Fonun, in 1873, the Foreign Ministry established School of Languages to

train cadres who knew foreign languages (Sadiq, 1963: 353-354). Two military schools were established, one in Tehran and one in Isfahan in 1877. The government of Iran was politically run by a number of ministries. These ministries, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, felt, at the beginning of the 20th century, the need for more trained personnel (Arasteh, 1962: 23).

> At this time Mirza Hassan Khan Mushir al-Dawleh, one of the sons of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a former student of political science at Moscow University, returned home. The father and son drew up a proposal to establish a school of political science in Tehran; the Shah approved it (Arasteh, 1962: 23-24).

The school of political science was established in 1901. By the year of 1910, the course of study was extended from three to five years (Arasteh, 1962: 23-24). The subjects offered in the first three years included Islamic jurisprudence, history, geography, astronomy, politics, mathematics, international law, and French. The students specialized during the last two years of study, in such fields as international, administrative, or commercial law, the principles of judicial trials, logic, jurisprudence, or even the science of taxation (Arasteh, 1962: 24). Most of the teachers at this school were Iranians.

Other ministries received stimulation to initiate similar programs.

> In 1902 the Ministry of National Economy (late the Ministry of Agriculture) established a college of Agriculture at Karaj, about 30 miles northwest of Tehran. It provided education at the high school level and two years of university work, but offered little field work. A school of Fine Arts, under the direction of the Ministry of Education received a charter in 1911. In 1918, the Ministry of Education founded the Boys Normal School to train both elementary and high-school teachers.....Ten years later in 1928 the school (renamed Teachers Training College) had split into two branches, one affiliated with the Faculty of literature, the other with the Faculty of Science.....The Ministry of Justice, similarly in need of trained personnel, established the school of Law in 1921. Its faculty consisted of both Persian and French professors (Arasteh, 1962: 24-25).

Table V-2 shows colleges sponsored by different ministries. The Qajar period witnessed development of modern education in Iran, while the traditional education was still strong.

Modern Elementary and Secondary Education

Modern elementary and secondary education were not given attention until the late 19th century, except for missionary schools which had produced Western education, primarily for non-Muslim communities in Iran in the 19th century.

Modern Elementary Education

The first modern school of Iran, Dar al-Fonun, was a mixed high-school and college, but not an elementary school. Iran's

Table V-2: Establishment of Some Important Schools Following the Establishment of Dar al-Fonun and Before the Establishment of the University of Tehran.

NAME OF MINISTRY	NAME OF COLLEGE	YEAR ESTABLISHED	PURPOSE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	School of Political Science	1901	Provide Necessary Personnel
Ministry of National Economy	College of Agriculture	1902	Provide necessary Personnel and Improvement of Country's Agriculture
Ministry of Education	School of Fine Arts	1911	Development of Fine Arts
Ministry of Education	Boys Normal School	1918	Train Elementary and Secondary Teachers
Ministry of Education	Teachers Training College	1928	Train Secondary Teachers
Ministry of Justice	School of Law	1921	Train Necessary Personnel

Source: Sadiq, (1977).

modern elementary schooling was advocated by the Iranian travelers to Europe impressed by European schools, and by the advocates of the adoption of Western civilization. The newspapers published by Iranians out of the country--such as, Qanun (The Law) published in London, Akhtar (Star) published in Istanbul, and Hablul-Matin (Social Code) published in Calcuta--expressed the idea of modern schooling.

The first modern primary school was founded by Mirza Hassan Roshdiyeh in Tabriz in 1889. Rushdiyeh used new methods of teaching, and changed the traditional patterns of schooling. In the maktab system--the traditional school--the dominant teaching method was rote learning and memorization. Even though the curriculum of the new schools was much like the maktabs, the new schools were more European and less religious than the maktab (Arasteh, 1962: 71). Gradually, the demand for modern schools increased and some private schools were founded. By the opening of Rushdiyeh, the parents were stimulated to call for educational reform and the opening of modern schools in all cities. As a result, Anjoman-e Moaaref (The Council for Learning)--composed of prominent intellectuals in Tehran, many of whom had been to Europe--was established in 1898, financed by the wealthy (Sadiq, 1963: 33). This was the first systematic effort to create a network of modern schools. The Council founded ten modern elementary schools, private elementary schools competing with maktabs, in Tehran in 1898, and some in

provinces soon afterwards. There were, by 1901, 17 elementary schools in Tehran and four in other locations for a population of 10 million, 50% of whom were under 25 years of age (Bharier, 1971: 3-5). These schools were financed by individuals. The government had little interest or support for these schools.

A report from one of these schools, the Madraseh Hemat, represents the curriculum of these schools:

> The program of study consisted of: elementary reading, writing, reading of Persian texts, religious instruction, ethics, history, arithmetic, geometry, and such handwork as watch repair, shoe-making, sewing, agriculture, and commerce.....(Arasteh, 1962: 52).

The government did not contribute to the establishment of elementary education until after the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. Therefore, until that time, primary schools were running through the aid of wealthy benevolent people and/or tuition fees.

Constitutional Revolution and Education

The increasing Western penetration, the spread of modern science and education, the improved literacy, and the spread of newspapers created serious dislocations within the social order.

Segments of the intellectuals, bazaar merchants, and clergy were brought together by the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. They asked for a constitution and a Majlis (Representative

Parliament). This promoted the idea of secular and modern schools (Elwell-Sutton, 1944: 33).

In terms of education, two factors, namely an adaptive factor and a defensive factor, are reflected in the Constitution of 1907. On the one hand, the Western educated people, representing the middle class, demanded secularization of education and modern schooling (the adaptive side). On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of clergy (the defensive side) opposed secularization of education, advocating the traditional system of education (Mashari, 1980: 68).

The Constitution of 1907, which was established through the replacement of absolute monarchy by the constitutional monarchy, mandated the sponsorship of education for the government. The government, since that time, has contributed to the elementary education by establishing some schools and aiding some private schools. This led to an increase in the number of elementary schools. There were, in 1910, just a few years after the Revolution, 113 elementary schools, about a third of them girls' schools, in which 10,531 children enrolled (Arasteh, 1962: 53).

In spite of allocation of the education of the nation to the government by the Constitutional Law of 1907, the government did little. However, it was the private sector which continued to deal with education.

After the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the first legal provision for education appeared in articles 18 and 19 of the Constitutional Law of 1907.

> ARTICLE 18: All individuals are eligible to pursue the study of science, arts, and crafts, except as limited by religious law (Arasteh, 1962: 135).

This article implies the modernization, the adaptive factor, as well as the exclusion of what is being conceived as against the religious law, the defensive factor.

> ARTICLE 19: The government is to establish schools at its own expense and support and administer them through a Ministry of Science and Arts. (This Ministry was later renamed the Ministry of Education). Furthermore, this Ministry will direct and supervise all schools and colleges (Arasteh, 1962: 135).

The government gradually brought educational institutions under its influence. This situation was further intensified by the later developments taken by the Constitution. The "Ministry of Science and Arts" was renamed, in 1910, to the "Ministry of Education, Pious Foundations (or Waqf), and Fine Arts". Through this development, Pious Foundations, which were the endowments of the traditional schools, came under the control of the state. Now, the Ministry of Education decided on how to spend the revenues of Pious Foundations. The Pious Foundation was a source of wealth, power, and independence for the clergy. Its

confiscation, which was a substantial loss for the clergy, was important action on the way to secularization.

The Constitutional Law of 1907 provided education for all by the government; but it was not compulsory according to this Law. Article III of the Fundamental Law of Education made elementary education compulsory for all Iranians. Approved in 1911, the Fundamental Law of Education, which laid the foundation for the future development of education up to the late 1970s, reinforced the previous measures concerning the control of education, and made the Ministry of Education responsible for setting the curricula at all levels. Article II states that: "All school curricula will be planned by the Ministry of Education so as to provide for the growth and development of scientific, industrial, and physical education." (Arasteh, 1962: 134-144). The emphasis on the modern subjects reflects the idea that modern knowledge would bring about progress and a catching up with European nations. However, articles 7, 14, and 17 reflect religious preservations:

> ARTICLE 7: Non-Muslims are not to be taught their own religious teachings, nor are they obliged to study Islam.
> ARTICLE 14: The Ministry of Education may ban the study of any books which are detrimental to the ethics and religion of the students; books which are rejected on this basis may not be brought into any school.
> ARTICLE 17: The curricula of schools (elementary and secondary) should provide necessary religious training (Arasteh, 1962: 134-144).

Article 12 further reinforced the control of the schools by the government : "government inspectors are given the authority to inspect public and private schools and principals must cooperate" (Arasteh, 1962: 134-144).

The elementary education was being mandated by the Fundamental Law of Education; however, it was left to the parents to decide whether to send their children to school or educate them at home.

> ARTICLE 3: Elementary education is compulsory for all Iranians.
> ARTICLE 4: Although the pursuit of learning is free, everyone must complete the amount of elementary education prescribed by the government.
> ARTICLE 5: Every parent is responsible for the education of his children from the age of seven on, whether it be at home or in school (Arasteh, 1962: 134-144).

In terms of school finance, the government was responsible for the expenses, which were to be paid by the Treasury out of the local taxes. In the villages, landlords and peasants had to pay taxes to finance for the school expenses.

> ARTICLE 22: The government will finance elementary schools in the villages and cities. Funds for meeting these expenses will come from a tax, collected according to law.
> ARTICLE 23: The expenses of the village schools will also be borne by the government, but the landlords and peasants must pay a tax, as fixed by law (Arasteh, 1962: 134-144).

Four types of schools were provided by the Law according to the article 16: 1) elementary schools in villages, 2) elementary schools in cities, 3) high schools, 4) higher education. Even though article 19 provided for the establishment of elementary schools in every village and district, there was no development of village schools. This was because the rural population was the least affected by the changes taking place in the society.

The wealthy family, according to the law, had to pay for the education of its children. The free education was, however, available to the children of the poor families, According to the article 25, "government-conducted free schools are open only to the poor and those individuals of limited ability whom the Ministry of Education recommends" (Arasteh, 1962: 134-144).

The growth of modern schools from 1911 to 1925 was limited because Iran was in a troubled situation and occupied before, during, and after World War I; the treasury was empty and the economic and political situation was disastrous. This situation left little room for the Ministry of Education to advance education. The following statistics (Table V-3) represents the growth of modern elementary schools.

Further interaction of Iran with the West, made the adaptive factor of Iranian nationalism dominant over the defensive side (Mashari 1980: 75). A new phase of anti-religious nationalism was growing. This nationalism with its

Table V-3: Comparative Primary Educational Statistics for 1911 and 1925:

	1911	1925
Number of Primary Schools	123	685
Number of Students in Primary Schools	10,531	55,960

Source: Ministry of Education, Yearbook and Statistics for Corresponding Years, Tehran, Iran.

secularization trend, led to the constant weakening of clergy. The clergy, resentful of Western influences, shared the first phase of nationalism with other Iranians. However, the secularization process of this nationalism made the clergy more suspicious of Western-inspired nationalism. The clergy, thus, took a strong position against Western measures.

The Ulamas responded in two ways to the ideas of educational reform during this revolutionary period. While some were both anti-constitution and anti-reformist, others comprising the bulk of clergy, were in support of a constitution and parliament but against far-reaching educational reform (Akhavi 1980: 35). There were a few individuals, even though not themselves clergy, who had close ties with the religious institutions. This group, among whom are the founders of the first modern secular elementary school, as well as the intellectuals, were both constitutionalist and reformist.

Modern Secondary Education

The modernization of secondary education occurred later than the modernization of higher education and elementary education in Iran. The education provided by the traditional madraseh was considered as sufficient secondary education for the students who entered the Dar al-Fonun. The Schools of Political Science and Agriculture, established later, found the traditional madraseh's education insufficient. Therefore, a demand for modern secondary schooling was raised. Another motivation for the establishment of modern high schools was to eliminate the shortage of trained teachers for the growing elementary schools. The first school opened at the turn of the century. Anjoman-e Moaaref (The Council of Learning) established, between its formation and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, several secondary schools. There was royal protection for these modern schools against the traditional elements (Abrahamian, 1982: 75). The following statistics (Table VI-4) represent the growth of modern secondary schools for the years 1911 and 1925:

The government's lack of attention to the growth of modern elementary and secondary education, during this period, can be explained in the context of social and economic conditions of Iran. In this period, the commercial activities involving raw materials were developing, local industries were in a process of destruction, and the development of modern industries was

Table V-4: Comparative Secondary Educational Statistics for 1911 and 1925:

	1911	1925
Number of Secondary Schools	2	86
Number of Students in Secondary Schools	154	4,927

Source: Ministry of Education, Yearbook and Statistics for Corresponding Years, Tehran, Iran.

prevented. Such an economy hardly needed any type of training. There was no need for modern schools to provide for the socialization of a modern wage-laboring class and for their integration into the labor market as a modern industrial proletariat.

The development of modern higher education, can also be explained in in terms of the socioeconomic structure of the country. The government needed to initiate a process of centralization and modernization due to the pressures exerted on the country by the Western powers. The government introduced modern education along the Western lines in order to train personnel for the modern bureaucratic administration (i.e., for administration of a peripheral capitalist state and for social control).

Modernization of Iran During the 19th Century

In the 19th century, Iran witnessed a process of incorporation of Iranian culture--following the economic incorporation of the country into the Western capitalist economy --into the Western culture, in the form of articulation of modes of culture. As the Western political and economic influences increased in Iran, the contacts with the Western culture increased. The whole situation was contradictory. On the one hand, there was a desire for internal reforms along Western lines. Western cultural contact introduced new ideas and outlooks for social life to the people of Iran, particularly the intellectuals. On the other hand, there was a reaction against Western influences because of the increasing economic and political domination of the West.

The West became the model of modernization and Westernization, as the elites who were exposed to the Western culture began to look to the West as a source of inspiration.

The advocates of Westernization were a growing category of active people, mostly foreign-educated young men from the upper class, the sons of officials, the sons of the clergy and even the young ex-clergymen, who were completely secular or even had anti-clerical outlook. They were professionals, journalists, teachers, lawyers, doctors, government officials, and army officers.

Toward the end of the century, the plays and novels, as well as social and political writings, inspired by Western contacts, attacked Iranian patterns of administration and social conditions, and advocated the ways of life in Europe. Malkum Khan, one of the influential figures of the 19th century, wrote: "The survival of Persia depends on the adaptation of Western civilization" (Quoted in Farman Farmayan, 1968: 130). He believed in adopting the European ways of life, without any modification. Akhundov, an influential writer of the late 19th century, advocated the changing of Arabic alphabet to Latin. He believed this was vital to the progress in Iran, as well as all Muslim societies. The demand for the change of alphabet was an important sign of Westernization. This was only the beginning of the Western cultural impact on the Iranian society (Farman Farmayan, 1968: 137).

The intellectuals, impressed by the material development and progress of the West, especially under liberal governments, advocated constitutional rights. Their model for government was the democratic national states of Western Europe. They advocated the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers (Lambton, 1957: 12-15).

It was believed that learning Western science and technology would result in resisting Western economic and political domination, and hence in maintaining the autonomy of the country. Ironically, this strategy led to the imitation of the

West, the praising of the Western culture, and developing a sense of distrust and inferiority with respect to the Iranian culture. There was acceptance of the supremacy of the Western culture at the expense of the national culture. The Western culture began to impose itself on Iranian society through a process of articulation of Western culture with Iranian culture. This was engendered under, and further contributed to, Western penetration, which was in turn due to an increasingly dominated social and economic structure, i.e., economic and political incorporation of the country. The mental status of assuming inferiority of national culture vis-a-vis the Western culture reflected the exploited and dominated reality of social life in Iran and was necessary for further exploitation of the country and its domination by the West. Incorporation entails a tacit acceptance of the Western domination and develops a mode of thinking which conforms to the Western cultural pattern and thereby secures the Western economic and political interests in the country.

CHAPTER VI

MODERNIZATION OF EDUCATION DURING THE REZA SHAH'S PERIOD

Westernization of Education

In the Reza Shah's reign, a type of modern, Western-modeled state emerged in Iran within the context of Iran-West relationships in which Iran was economically and politically geared to Western interests. What was required for this modern state was a rational bureaucracy. The rationalization of this bureaucracy could be effective only under a central government. As documented, outside forces encouraged, fostered, and supported the creation of this government. Western education was required to train a modern elite group at two levels of modern bureaucratic skills and modern secular ideology. Therefore, measures were taken during the Reza Shah's period to modernize education and expand it.

In the first few years of his rule, however, the general state of education in the country was not a high priority concern of his government. He concentrated most of his energies, in these years, on establishing internal security and reorganizing the army. He developed a network of military schools, including army high schools in the provinces and a war college in Tehran. The

graduates of these schools were to be sent to Europe for further training.

Reza Shah's far-reaching socio-political and economic changes had their effects on the educational affairs. Education became more secular and continued to become so from this time forward. The educational reforms of Reza Shah were aimed at reducing the influence of the religious classes in Iran.

> [Reza Shah] resolutely proceeded to a radical reform of the educational system. Resistance was centered in the [Muslim clergymen], who at the time of the Shah's ascension to the throne still dominated the primary and the higher education. Their dispossession opened the door to reorganization in roots and branches (Hass, 1946: 160).

Formal education in Iran was centered, until the middle of the 19th century, in the religious class. The maktab functioned as the primary school, and the madraseh operated as institutions for higher education in theology, law, and medicine. While the maktabs were organized around individual mullahs (Muslim clergymen), the madraseh was a more formalized school, attached to a mosque or religious shrine (Wilber, 1975b: 26).

The elimination of traditional education in Iran was in direct relation with the growth of the Ministry of Education, established in 1911 (Wilber, 1975b: 31). As the maktabs and madrasehs declined, there was a growth of the modern, private institutions under the supervision of the Ministry.

However, the Ministry of Education, Waqf, and Fine Arts was felt, in 1921, to be without enough centralized authority, and its control over educational affairs was negligible. A bill was submitted by the Ministry of Education to the Majlis for the creation of the High Council of Education (Shora-ye Alee-ye Farhang) in 1921. This Council was formed in order to create a more centralized Ministry with complete authority over all phases of education in the country. The Ministry would attempt, through this Council (which had 10 members, one of whom a clergy) to implement the powers assigned to it by the Constitution and by the Education Laws of 1910 and 1911. In other words, even 10 years after the passage of the educational reform laws of 1910 and 1911, the Majlis and the Ministry of Education were still trying to develop a bureaucratic apparatus to implement measures assigned to it.

This Council, which was attached to the Ministry of Education, was a consultative, supervisory, and policy-making body. Among the tasks assigned to the Council were: examination of the school curricula (at all levels) in Europe, particularly in France, in order to make similar programs in Iran; evaluation of texts; appraisal of examination procedures; discussion of the uses of Waqf for the public schools support; selection of students to be sent to Europe on government funds; and creation of a subcommittee to discipline, reform, and supervise the teachings

in the maktabs (Arasteh, 1962: 227-228; Banani, 1961: 92; Akhavi, 1980: 36).

Elementary and Secondary Education

With the growth of the primary and secondary schools, the Ministry of Education reformed and reorganized secondary schools and established state examinations at the end of the primary, as well as at the end of secondary schools. In 1921, the Ministry of Education set up the first full program for the elementary and secondary education, which had already been set at six years in 1910, based on the European models, specifically the French. The secondary education was divided into two three-year cycles of junior and senior high schools. There were uniform national examinations to be administered to both private and public schools at the end of the sixth, ninth, and twelfth grades. All the primary and secondary schools were to exclusively use a series of textbooks provided by the Ministry of Education.

In the elementary school, the curriculum included Quran/religious instruction, Persian (reading, Writing, spelling, and dictation) Arabic (reading), arithmetic, Iranian history, Iranian and world geography, penmanship, and physical education. In 1930, Arabic was eliminated. Art and music were added in 1936 (Arasteh, 1962: 56-66). The elimination of Arabic (the language of Quran, the holy book) and the addition of music are signs of movement toward greater secularization of education.

The secondary schools curriculum was vastly expanded. In the seventh grade the curriculum included geometry, foreign language (usually French), Arabic, natural science, world history, and hygiene. In the eight and ninth grades, the curriculum included the following additional courses: Algebra, biology, physics, chemistry, geology, and mathematical drawing. Trigonometry, solid geometry, zoology, and elementary economics were added to the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades (Banani, 1961: 93).

During the 12th year, the courses were divided into three areas of specialization, namely, natural sciences, pure sciences, and humanities, in anticipation of college training. Emphasis was placed upon anatomy, botany, zoology, and biology in natural sciences. The pure sciences included such areas of study as calculus, analytical geometry, mathematics, and astronomy. The subjects studied in the humanities included: history of philosophy, logic, Arabic literature, Arabic language, Persian prose, Persian poetry, Persian language, and literary analysis. These courses, however, were gradually incorporated into the general curriculum. Religion and Persian, including composition, grammar, literature, and literary history, were also taught throughout high school (Sadiq, 1931: 103). The result of this secondary school curriculum, which loaded students to as many as 15 subjects during any of the high school years, was a broad number of subjects offered but with a shallow depth.

There was an emphasis on the traditional methods of rote learning and memorization. Knowledge was valued more than its application, and theory was emphasized more than practice. There was a lack of laboratory approach.

What followed Reza Shah's centralization of the government was the centralization of education in Iran. An absolute control was exercised over every phase of the educational process, which entailed great inefficiency due to lack of attention to the varied local needs and problems.

Forty elementary and eight public high schools were opened in Tehran in 1928. At this time, there was also an expansion of school systems in other large urban areas. However, expansion of the secondary and college-level institutions occurred at a far more rapid pace than did the elementary schools, owing to the Shah's emphasis on the higher levels to supply administrative personnel. While the enrollments increased markedly at the elementary level, rising from 100,600 in 1928-29 to 262,200 in 1938-39; at the secondary level, the number of students rose from 3,300 in 1924 to 14,500 in 1934 and 28,200 in 1940 (Zonis, 1971a). In spite of this increase in the enrollments, only a small percentage of the school-age children were actually enrolled in school.

There was very little change in the rural Iranian educational system during the Pahlavi Dynasty. Because the new regime aimed primarily at creating a centralized administration, the attention

was focused on urban development, and rural life was neglected. So the education of rural population was overlooked. In rural areas, the quality of schools were poor, and few educational opportunities were available for young peasants.

Higher Education

During this period, educational reform was focused on higher education in order to train personnel for ministries. A school of Law was founded, in the first year of Reza Shah's rule, in 1921, to train personnel for the Ministry of Justice. This school was staffed by French and Iranian teachers.

The Normal School for Boys founded in 1918 was reorganized in 1928 into a teachers college with a faculty of science and faculty of arts (Afzal, 1956: 179). The Teacher Training Act was passed in 1934. According to this measure, Normal Schools were to be opened throughout the country. There were thirty-six Normal Schools throughout the country in the final year of Reza Shah's era (Banani, 1961: 94).

The University of Tehran was founded in 1934 by bringing together colleges established by different ministries. It was the first such institution in Iran. The University of Tehran consisted of the colleges of Medicine, Law, Engineering, and Arts and Science. Three already existing faculties of Fine Arts, Theology, and Agriculture were added shortly thereafter (Elwell-Sutton, 1944: 137). The University of Tehran was under the influence of

French universities in terms of curriculum, administration, and organization (Taban, 1979: 18). The University granted no doctorate until 1941, except for the school of medicine (Banani, 1961: 99). The teaching staff of the University consisted of a number of European professors, along with Iranians who had been trained in Europe, mostly in France (Elwell-Sutton, 1944: 138).

Because the University of Tehran was used as a pattern for other Iranian institutions of higher education to be established under Mohammad Reza Shah, especially up to the early 1960s when some changes were introduced under the American influence, a description of this University would describe the Iranian higher education. The French system of education influenced the entire Iranian system of education, the administration, the methods of instruction, the curriculum, the textbooks, and the laws and regulations. France was the country where the majority of Iranian students abroad were studying. As a matter of fact, the Iranian court and the intelligentsia favored the French cultural attributes. In both Dar al-Fonun and the ministry schools, the Iranian members of the faculty were educated mainly in French universities. Moreover, 640 students were sent, from 1928 through 1934, to European universities, mainly to France, in order to provide the necessary basis for the establishment of the University of Tehran. Therefore, the University of Tehran was under strong French influence. Even the

name of 'license' was borrowed from the French for the basic university degree.

The Iranian system of education absorbed the highly elitist nature and the philosophy of the nineteenth-century French system of education, which can be characterized as follows:

> [The French system of education is] essentially authoritarian, highly centralized, and based upon a theory of the encyclopedia of knowledge. The French justify their advocacy of an authoritarian administrative structure and teaching methods on the grounds that those best qualified to lead obviously should lead, and that it was natural for the intellectual elite, the relatively few people with the native capacity to be highly educated in any society, to guide the affairs of the masses. This being the case, the intellectual elite should be gathered together to render mutual assistance and to reinforce their respective individual efforts.....Since a wise (which obviously was interpreted to be synonymous with educated) man obviously would know best what education was necessary for the uneducated, the intellectual elite were called upon to determine what should be taught in the schools. The curriculum, therefore, was based upon the relatively limited experience of the intellectual elite and came to revolve around an assumed core of indispensable knowledge which it was taught all citizens should possess.....Moreover, the entire system, its curriculum, and its methods, were imposed on local educational units with little or no allowance for originality of modifications to meet local requirements (Overseas Consultants, 1949: 93).

The French authoritarian educational system suited the political structure of the Iranian society, which was highly authoritarian in nature. It was, therefore, adopted as the system of Iranian education. The University of Tehran was centrally administered, and the appointment of chancellor was by the Minister of Education and approval of the Shah. The University's organization can be described as follow:

> [The University of Tehran was] organized along the lines of nineteenth century French universities: separate, largely autonomous faculties covering each major subject area; a notable absence of unifying administrative services giving leadership and coordination to the university; didactic instruction by lecture methods that emphasize rote learning; all-or-nothing testing through a single written examination at the end of the year; few contacts between faculty and students; little reading beyond lecture notes; and a pattern of part-time service from faculty members who tend to regard their posts as bases from which to engage in outside employment that often get the lion's share of their attention (Baldwin, 1967: 161).

Following the French practices, the University of Tehran established a chair system in which the chair gained this status through longevity of service to the University and was held to the chair status until retirement or death. This system was in conformity with the normal practice in the Iranian bureaucracy.

This educational system presented--in terms of the content--a low quality education, characterizing the dependent

structure of Iranian education. The teaching method was based exclusively on lectures; the professors would read a lecture, which was often translated from a French text, and the students would take notes. In order to prepare for examination, a memorization of these notes was the only requirement (Banani 1961: 100). Moreover, among the shortcomings of the educational process were lack of laboratory experiments, lack of adequate library facilities, little or no appreciation of library services on the part of students, low salary university personnel, and the practice of part-time service in the teaching profession.

Even though higher education developed under Reza Shah, statistics show the limited nature of this development. There were only 91 students in higher learning in 1922, it increased to 1,645 students in 1935; there were by 1944, only 3,395 students for a population of about 15 million (Szyliowics, 1973: 241).

Higher Education Abroad

There was an acceleration in sending students abroad for higher education during Reza Shah's period. 1500 students studied abroad (mainly in France) between 1922 and 1938 (Elwell-Sutton, 1944: 138). These students were partly sponsored by the Ministry of Education, partly by other ministries, and some by their own families.

The government devised, in 1928, the first regular program for sending students abroad. According to the Law of May 23,

1928, the Ministry of Education was required to annually send at least 100 students abroad for the next six years in order to overcome the lack of qualified human resources. Thirty five percent of these students were to study education, while the remaining were to study mathematics, engineering, natural sciences, and medicine (Sadiq, 1963: 367; Sadiq, 1931: 77-78). Six hundred and forty students were sent abroad, mainly to France, between 1928 and 1934 (Hass, 1946: 34). Students had been sent to Europe prior to 1928 were mostly the privately sponsored sons of the ruling class. While the state-sponsored scholarships--given, under Reza Shah, on the basis of competitive examinations

--potentially increased the opportunity of foreign higher education for deserving but poor students, favoritism, and bribery played a role in the selection of students.

Following the Ministry of Education, other institutions and ministries began sponsoring the study abroad of more Iranian students. France, Germany, England, Switzerland, and Belgium were the major countries of destination (Naficy, 1966). The number of these students exceeded two thousands within a few years.

These students, upon their return home, had an influence in spreading Western influence in Iran. They adopted Western modes in everything from dress, to food, to manners and even frequently used European words.

Missionary Education

The attempt at centralization and standardization of education also included the missionary schools. Foreign schools were brought under the control of the Ministry of Education. Beginning in 1926, various decrees specified that both primary and secondary missionary schools had to follow the official curricula; their language of instruction had to be Persian; their textbooks had to be identical with those of the public schools; and their teachers had to be approved by the Ministry of Education (Sadiq, 1931: 53-54). Because the elementary mission schools refused to carry out these measures, the Iranian students were forbidden, in 1933, to attend them, costing these schools seventy-five percent of their pupils.

The government issued an order, in 1934, due to which all foreign-operated primary schools in the country were closed down. Therefore, all Russian, French, British, and American primary schools operating in the country were terminated. However, Russian's formal educational activity in Iran were completely terminated because they operated only primary schools. It was primarily because of the communist activities in the Soviet schools that this action was taken. But in order to avoid discrimination against one government, the Iranian government ordered all foreign-operated primary schools to be terminated. All foreign secondary schools and colleges were ordered nationalized in 1939. The reason for this act might be

attributed to the nationalist policy of Iran. Another reason might be Reza Shah's determination at eradicating religious influences, whether Islam or Western religions, from the Iranian education (Avery, 1965: 175). As a result, foreign schools became completely responsible to the Ministry of Education. Therefore, many of the foreign schools, mostly English and American, were closed down. Only a few French schools which accepted the new situation continued working.

Education for Women

The first coeducational primary schools were opened in 1935. In the following year, women were admitted to the schools of higher education (Szyliowics, 1973: 245). However, during his rule, only a very small fraction of school-age women was in school. A very small percentage of girls enrolled at the primary and secondary levels, with a very high dropout rate. Out of 128,000 girls enrolled, in 1949, in the first grade of the elementary school only 30,000 reached the sixth grade. Likewise, only 2,000 out of 20,000 women enrolled in the first year of the secondary level, were still enrolled in the sixth year (Overseas Consultants Inc., 1949: 103).

It was not until the Mohammed Reza Shah's reign, Reza Shah's son, that women were admitted into the University of Tehran. Women's only choice for getting a higher education were

The Teacher Training Schools and a few various ministry schools of higher education.

Technical Schools

A number of ministries started the opening of technical schools for the training of specialists in their fields. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraph opened the School of Posts and Telegraph, and the Ministry of Communication opened the Railway Technical School.

In addition to the establishment of technical schools by various ministries, the first polytechnic school was founded, in 1922 in Tehran, by a group of German technicians. A generous subsidy from the government aided this program (Banani, 1961: 97). Until 1935, there existed no other technical school in the country. Several technical schools were finally opened from 1935 onward, mostly at the secondary level.

Foreign companies in Iran also offered courses for technical training of their Iranian personnel. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, for example, established, in 1940, a vocational secondary school and the higher institute of petroleum industry: Abadan Technical School.

Adult Education

Reza Shah initiated programs for adult education, realizing that such a program could provide a broader mass support for his

regime and his attempt at Westernization. The purpose of this program was noted, by the Ministry of Education: "To provide adults with useful individual and social training conducive to good citizenship" (Ministry of Education, 1938: 4). Three thousand classes for adults were opened in the country in the academic year 1936-37 (Ministry of Education, 1938: 1). Soon after, more classes were added which were of two types: classes for the illiterate, and classes for the semi-illiterate. The government pursued its adult education program through a secular curriculum, rather than in a Shiite context.

The number of classes had risen to 4,226, by the end of 1940, and 157,197 students enrolled (Elwell-Sutton, 1944: 143). However, there were limited results for these classes. Only those living in urban areas were affected by this campaign.

Western Cultural Impact

The economic and political incorporations of Iran had their impact upon the country's culture and led to the cultural incorporation of the country which was initiated during the Qajar period and intensified during the Pahlavi era. After Reza Shah's seize of power, the process of Westernization was intensified (the period of intensive modernization). He was in favor of the West and everything Western. He made an attempt at Westernizing the country and adopting the materialistic civilization of the West. His son, the ex-Shah, speaks about his father as follows:

"He understood that the country's genuine Westernization and modernization required.....changes in basic Persian culture and psychology" (Mohammad Reza Shah, 1961: 242).

Motivated by the Western-inspired ideals, he tried to circumscribe the religion of Islam. To Reza Shah, Moslem tradition, which he tried to fight against, was a barrier to the modernization of the country. In his movement toward modernization and Westernization, he forced men to wear Western dress, raised the age of marriage, started co-educational schools, substituted European laws for the religious laws, encouraged the adoption of Western music, architecture, and films (Forbis, 1980). The wearing of veils for women was banned. The women veils were removed, if necessary by force, in the streets. Shivers comments that "in an Islamic society where Islamic law encourages women to dress modestly, this would amount to symbolic rape" (Shivers, 1980: 61).

An increasing number of influential Iranians became, in the Reza Shah's rule, strong advocates of Westernization. The chief officials working for the government were, in the late 1930s, graduates of European, and to some extent American, universities. Secular interests, Western acculturation, and academic achievement were the values they stressed. The more radical of these people demanded a large immigration of Europeans to Iran for the spread of modern way of living and the introduction of Western civilization into the Iranian way of life. The majority of

them, however, opposed a blind adoption of Western customs, while advocating the learning of Western science, technology, law, sense of responsibility, and initiative. The power of the clergy was perceived, by the supporters of Reza Shah, as the strongest obstacle to progress (Banani, 1961).

In line with his general policy of Westernization and secularization, Reza Shah moved toward secularization of education. He introduced a gradual program of mass education on national and non-religious lines. There was a rapid and uncritical borrowing of Western educational methods during the Reza Shah's rule. His goals at mobilization of education were assertion of nationalism, the glorification of the pre-Islamic past, and autocratic centralism (Bausani, 1971; Thomas, 1952: 223).

Along with the Westernization of education, the power and involvement of clerics in educational affairs were curbed. Even though a Press Censorship Law was passed, early in his rule in 1922, according to which the Shiite clergy had the power to censor articles and books judged to be harmful to Shiism, the government could indirectly control the application of this measure because the Mujtahid in charge of censorship was appointed by the Ministry of Education (Sadiq, 1931: 34).

Reza Shah moved against the traditional religious schools because he was concerned partly with creating an integrated national system of education; in addition he was responding to the power of the Ulama and the felt need to secularize various

aspects of Iranian life. The traditional schools were still the only available educational opportunity for the majority of people.

He took steps to reduce the importance of Islamic institutions in the society. In order to strip the Ulama of much of their power, Reza Shah often ordered their brutal suppression and persecution. He restricted the bases of their power and treated them with contempt. The Shah's move to control the Waqf funds and divert them away from purely religious purposes was a measure to restrict the bases of the clergy's power. The Waqf funds which included lands, orchards, houses, and shops, were the financial holdings of the Shiite clergy. They financed their madrasehs, or religious seminaries, for training the clergy, using these funds.

The madrasehs were, at the same time, made more responsible to the Ministry of Education, Waqf, and Fine Arts. The government, therefore, harassed the clerics and clerical students at the madrasehs for a variety of reasons, leading to numerous arrests and bloodshed (Algar, 1978: 240-242). Laws were also passed concerning the curriculum of the madrasehs, the opening of new madrasehs, and the establishment of certification for both the teachers of the madrasehs and the students (Akhavi, 1980: 45).

The number of madrasehs, as well as the number of their students declined, as a result of such measures. The elementary

religious schools, i.e. the maktabs, were, however, not affected until late in his reign (Zonis, 1971a) (see Table VI-1).

Table VI-1: Statistics of Traditional Schools, 1922-1941.

YEAR	MAKTABS	STUDENTS	MADRASEH	STUDENTS
1922-23	83	2,81	40	626
1928-29	1,891	35,931	321	5,532
1935-36	2,935	55,645	353	2,935
1940-41	1,797	37,289	206	734

Source: Ministry of Education, Yearbook and Statistics for Corresponding Years, Tehran, Iran.

In the earlier years of Reza Shah's reign, the Islamic subjects were included in the curriculum at all levels. Various religious practices, such as prayer, and fasting during the month of Ramadan, were observed by the students (Sadiq, 1931: 34). In the last years of his rule, however, religious instruction and practices were omitted from the first three grades of the elementary schools. They were totally abolished, in 1941, from the curriculum of the elementary schools.

Therefore, by the measures taken during the Reza Shah's era, the clergies' control over the education of the people was ended, and education became state-controlled. This control was part of a modernization project, but the result was further structuration of underdevelopment.

One of the strong critics of Reza Khan's policies was Sayed Hassan Modarres, a well-known cleric and deputy of the Fourth Majlis, where he led the group opposed to Reza Khan. Modarres recognized that Reza Khan was a British agent, brought to power to carry out British orders. He severely criticized Reza Khan. Modarres, as the leader of the minority group (Aghalliyat) in the Fourth Majlis, prevented Reza Khan from achieving the premiership during 1921-1923 (Khajenuri, 1941). He also, upon Reza Khan's call for a republican government staged an anti-republican campaign. This was part of his general campaign against secularization. He was familiar with the republican experience in Turkey, where the caliphate was abolished by the Turkish republic and secular policies were implemented by Ataturk. Upon public demonstrations, Reza Shah compromised (Abrahamian, 1982: 134).

Modarres was one of the most remarkable personalities in the history of the Constitutional movement in Iran (Soroush, 1981). He was admired not only by Iranians, but by foreign diplomats and advisors, for his courage, simplicity, and directness. Millspaugh, an American advisor to the Iranian Department of Finance wrote:

> Modarres has a reputation of caring nothing for money: he lives in a simple house and garden unfurnished except for rugs, books, and benches. He wears the beard and simple clothing of the old Persian, and a scholar among Persians, he speaks no foreign language. Meeting him, one can not fail

> to be impressed by his simplicity, directness and common sense. In his public acts.....he is consistent.....and courageous (Millspaugh, 1925: 145).

Other than few prominent Ulama, such as Modarres, who vigorously fought Reza Shah's policies, other leading Ulama, such as Shaykh Abd-al Karim Hairi, either did not concern themselves with politics, or if they did on occasions, as Naini did, they supported the government especially at the beginning of Reza Shah's rule when he pretended to be a religious person. (Hairi, 1977).

CHAPTER VII

MODERNIZATION OF EDUCATION DURING THE MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH'S PERIOD

American Involvement on the Iranian Education

By the end of the World War II and the rise of the United States to the hegemonic power, Iran became a client state of the United States; therefore, the United States replaced Great Britain in the political games concerning Iran. As the American political and economic influence increased in Iran, there was a gradual shift of education toward American patterns. As a result, the Iranian educational system, along with the ideological and cultural determinants of education--as other aspects of Iranian society--came under the influence of that country. Most of the educational developments under the Shah had allegiance to American educational theories and was modeled after American institutions. The United States and Iran entered into negotiations, during the final days of World War II, for a series of programs of assistance.

The beginning of a deep American involvement in the educational affairs of Iran was in 1944, when the Near East Foundation of the United States came to Iran to conduct a program of rural improvement. Supported by contributions from individuals and corporations in the United States, the Near East

Foundation was established in 1915, in order to assist governments of developing nations in launching programs of rural and community improvement (Akey, 1983: 12756). The Near East Foundation became involved in different projects including education in rural Iran. It focused on illiteracy and held classes in the less remote villages to instruct the peasants in reading and writing.

A "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed, in 1950, between the United States and Iranian governments. This established the first Point Four Program in the world under the Act for International Development (AID). Although the Point IV methods of application were largely economic, it had geopolitical intent from its birth. "President Truman set forth the concept that the United States develops the backward areas of the world as a step in the effort to contain communism" (Rickard, 1950: iii).

The Point IV Program was aimed at setting up a program of training and technical assistance for the development of Iran, mainly at the rural level. Agriculture, industry, communication, transportation, health, and education were the areas to which special attention was given. In education, the purpose was to modernize the Iranian educational system in terms of its basic philosophy, curricula, methods of teaching, choice of textbooks, physical facilities, and administrators (Amuzegar, 1966: 13). Point IV became the precursor of many international and national assistance programs (Hendershot, 1975: xiii).

American Influence on Iranian Higher Education

Modernization of the Iranian higher education was of particular interest to Americans, because it could provide trained manpower for Iran's economic expansion, or more explicitly for deepening of Iranian economic and political system into the capitalist world-economy and interstate system.

In the late 1950's, after an agreement had been reached between the governments of Iran and the United States, American higher educators were officially dispatched to Iran in order to assist the Iranians to reform their universities and to open new ones in the late 1950's. The unofficial educational relations between the two societies had been going on for at least a century prior to this time.

In the 1950s and 1960s, private and United States government higher educational officials became involved, directly or indirectly, in either reforming and reorganizing or establishing the Iranian institutions of higher education. Over seventy major American universities with faculties, advisors, administrators, and technicians were in Iran forming new colleges and reforming the old ones. It became common in Iran during 1970's to create ties with the United States institutions. In the late 1976, there was a total of 42 formal links between fifteen Iranian universities and 32 American universities (Labelle, 1984: 63).

The educational voyage of Mr. G. P. Harnwell, president of the University of Pennsylvania, to Iran during the 1950's is an

example of the early beginning of higher education relations of the U. S. with Iran. Harnwell was a member of the first group of American higher educators went to Iran to assist in reforming its higher educational system.

> "Would you like to go to Iran?" Said the secretary.... The letter with which she capped the stack of correspondence awaiting my return from a winter holiday was from the International Cooperation Administration of our State Department. It inquired whether I would be free for an interval of a month or two in the not-too-distant future to participate in a brief survey to determine the feasibility of establishing a university of American type in the ancient city of Shiraz....lying within the south-central massif of Iran....(Harnwell, 1962).

A political technical assistance project strengthened the relations between Iran and the United States during the 1950's.

> Barely two months after president Harry S. Truman signed the Act for International Development on June 5, 1950, Dr. Franklin S. Harris was dispatched to negotiate an agreement to provide technical assistance to the government of Iran (Hendershot, 1975: 13).

Two types of actions were launched. On the one hand, consultant groups got engaged in dealing with problems concerning the faculty and administrative organization of the university system. On the other hand, contracts were made with

American universities to assist in the educational development of Iranian universities.

Changes in the Administrative Organization

In order to deal with the problems concerning the faculty and administrative organization of the university system, the American consultants emphasized the need for a full-time faculty and abolishment of the chair system. To achieve the latter, which would provide the faculty with the opportunity for promotion based on merit rather than longevity of service, it was recommended that the two ranks of assistant professor, professor, be replaced with the three professional ranks of assistant professor, associate professor, and full professor, derived from American system. With the addition of the rank of associate professor, one had an opportunity for promotion in the meantime of his/her academic career. There was no easy solution for the problem of full-time faculty because there was insufficient funds to provide payment to such faculty.

These changes, however, were of minor importance. In fact, it was from 1963--when Dr. Jahanshah Saleh, an American-educated Iranian, who also had a close relationship with the Iranian Court, was appointed Chancellor of the University of Tehran--that significant changes began to take place. He started making some reforms in the system of higher education in line with American educational system. In order to implement

reforms, he requested consultants from the Point IV Office in Tehran. The Point IV provided massive assistance for him in many areas.

> There was hardly an agency or program of the Iranian Government concerned with training or education that did not have its Point IV experts or U.S. contract group. There were U.S. advisors in all the ministries active in education and training, most importantly in the Ministries of Education and Labor (Baldwin, 1967: 145).

The older professors and deans with French education resisted the new Chancellor's plan for changes. In order to succeed in his plan, the new Chancellor tried to abolish their positions--because he realized that he could not succeed as long as they held positions of power--by reducing the age of retirement from seventy-five to sixty-five and increasing the number of full-time American-educated professors.

Among the numerous changes made, following the American model, were adoption of the semester system and the letter-grade system; establishment of a central library, and its substitution for the traditional practice of maintaining a separate library within each faculty; reforms in administration and financial affairs, student services, and academic planning.

Educational Assistance Programs

Educational assistance provided by the Near-East Foundation, and the Fulbright-Hays Program, as well as the

American university contracts, including those with Utah University, the University of Southern California, and the University of Pennsylvania, were the major American educational assistance programs to Iran.

Upon an agreement with the Ministry of Education in 1959, the Near East Foundation assumed responsibility for the development of Ahwaz Agricultural College. A second contract was signed by the Foundation with the Ministry of Education in 1968 for giving assistance to the Rezaieh Agricultural College in northern Iran. Under the agreements, the Ahwaz Agricultural College--established in 1955 as a part of the University of Jundi-Shapur, and already involved with agricultural planning in southern Iran--as well as the Rezaieh Agricultural College restructured their organizations. They adopted an American curriculum, the semester system, and credit hours based on sequence of courses. Rather than giving examinations at the end of the course year, faculty began giving a number of examinations and daily tasks in courses.

In 1946, the Fulbright-Hays Program was signed into a law. Even though this Program was superseded by the National Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, it continued to be known as the Fulbright-Hays Program. This Program was agreed to by Iran to promote:

> studies, research, instruction, and other educational activities of citizens of the United States of America in schools and institutions of higher learning located in Iran or

> of nationals of Iran in the United States and institutions located outside the continental United States.....including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other expenses incident to scholastic activities; or furnishing transportation for nationals of Iran who desired to attend United States schools and institutions of higher learning in the continental United States....whose attendance will not deprive citizens of the United States of America of an opportunity to attend such schools and institutions (U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 1949: 443).

More than being interested in educational development of foreign nations, the Fulbright Program was concerned with the United States' diplomatic interests. With the invasion of Korea in 1950 and the United States' involvement in the war, the Board of Foreign Scholarship

--which was a presidentially-appointed committee for overseeing all aspects of the Fulbright Program--became instrumental in strengthening the "free world". Overseas foundations and commissions were directed by this committee to develop programs

> in relation to the current world situation, the immediate needs of their countries, and the achievements of immediate and short-range results.... Particular emphasis was to be given to field which fulfill country needs and U.S. objectives. For university lectures, one example was the field of American studies--history, government, literature, and others--to the extant that such objectives are requested, or can be appropriately stimulated but should not

be forced on a country, and top flight lectures specializing in this field can be provided (Johnson and Colligan, 1965: 69-70).

Therefore, foreign policy considerations were a prime reason behind the Fulbright-Hays Program (Laves, 1967: 19). American studies and American literature were introduced by this program in the Iranian universities curriculum. One-third of all American Fulbright-Hays grantees sent to Iran were in American literature. There was, however, little success because the curriculum in Iranian universities allowed for no course in American literature; there was more interest in English than American literature. Therefore, specialists in the American literature mostly became involved with teaching the English language.

This program was, however, instrumental in introducing the field of library science in Iranian universities as an academic discipline. In 1960, through a series of short summer courses financed by UNESCO, the United States Government, and the Ford Foundation, the first formal study of library science was undertaken in Iran.

Prior to this formal study of library science, all the Iranian libraries operated on the closed stack system. The Fulbright Program assisted Iranian educational institutions to develop central libraries with an open stack system. The Fulbright

grantees served as directors of libraries and also established a school of library science at the University of Tehran.

University Contracts

Utah State University, the University of Southern California and the University of Pennsylvania were the American universities which received long-term assistant contracts with the Iranian universities. Utah State University assisted the faculty of Agriculture of the University of Tehran; the University of Southern California established the School of Public and Business Administration; the University of Pennsylvania assisted in the development of Pahlavi University in Shiraz. Other universities, such as Brigham Young University and Syracuse University, were involved in AID-financial contracts in order to assist specific projects in Iran in terms of technical training. These contracts involved neither institution-building nor sending personnel to Iran for long periods of time.

Utah State University was the earliest American university involved in educational assistance program in Iran. It was among the first American universities to attract Iranian students, as early as 1915, to study agricultural methods (Haws, 1963: 7).

Utah State University signed, between 1951 and 1958, three contracts with Point IV in order to provide assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture in modernizing farming methods, and in

order to provide advisory assistance to the College of Agriculture of the University of Tehran.

> Early in 1951 Director Harris negotiated a contract with the University of Utah, Utah State Agriculture College, and Brigham Young University under which these three institutions undertook to provide personnel in the fields of agriculture, education, health, and sanitation. In June 1951, three advisors recruited by the letter arrived in Tehran (Wilber, 1975a: 207-298).

Fourteen Iranian students were sent, during the years of the contracts, to Utah State University for training. They formed the core of the American-trained faculty of the Agricultural College of Tehran University. A university professor in the Middle Eastern studies from University of Utah comments about bilateral higher education relations between the University of Tehran and the University of Utah:

> After ten years of a publication exchange program inaugurated in 1966, Utah and Tehran reached an agreement in 1975 for the annual exchange of four students: two Iranians in computer Science, and two Americans in Humanities (Persian language, literature, history, etc.) (Fereshteh, 1987: 92).

The Utah State University provided services, such as modernization of curriculum, development of student services, and the initiation of a research program, for the college. The most important service offered was in the realm of curriculum. Before

1950, agricultural education was modeled after the old systems in which the place of learning was separate from the place of work, and men of learning were separate from the practitioners of knowledge by social status, outlook, and mental capacity (Amuzegar, 1966: 10). The advisors from the Utah State University introduced an integrated curriculum which combined theory with practice, so that the students, in the late 1950's could visualize the relationship between book theory and direct practice. An Iranian comments on the introduction of the American system of education into the French oriented Karaj College:

> This was done by changing the status of the college professors from part-time to full-time, by training programs in U.S. universities, and by familiarizing of the faculty with scientific literature.... Moreover, the mission's emphasis on the practical aspects of agriculture is of great value to the Iranian technicians who previously were not exposed to actual farming practices and field work (Kazemian, 1968: 83).

This Project was merely concerned with the faculty of agriculture, and its impact on other faculties of the University was limited because Karaj College of Agriculture was a separate campus relatively far from other faculties of the University of Tehran and with limited contact.

The second American university involved in Iranian higher education was the University of Southern California. In 1954, the

University signed a contract, for a period of seven years, with the United States International Cooperation Administration to assist the University of Tehran in establishing an Institute of Business and Public Administration. This project followed the efforts of the University of Michigan in Philippines and was an experiment for the I.C.A. (Storm and Gable, 1960: 176). Some thirty Iranian students studied at the University of Southern California, during the seven-year program, to staff the Institute at Tehran University. The project had the following impact on the University of Tehran:

> The administration of the University has been markedly improved during these years. The system of student record-keeping has been revised. The development of a central library has been undertaken. The position of dean of students has been introduced. The transferability of credit among the several schools of the University is being experimented with. Perhaps most important of all, an effort is being made to convert the present basis for employing faculty members from part-time to full-time (Storm and Gable, 1960: 181).

Additional direct and formal higher education relations between the United States and Iran started under the United States' technical assistance program (USAID) in the early 1960s. The deposed Shah expressed to American government officials, during a state visit to the United States in 1959, his intention to create an American-style university in Iran. This program

encompassed fundamental changes at Shiraz University, renamed Pahlavi University in 1962, in order to make it a completely American-style university in Iran. This experiment was aimed, on the one hand, at keeping many well-qualified Iranian undergraduate and graduate students in Iran, and, on the other hand, at attracting Iranian scholars in Western countries to return to Iran and work for an Iranian university.

At the same time by introducing American-type education, he sought to compete with the long-established French practices led by the University of Tehran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 1961: 262). The small University of Shiraz, was selected as the location to carry out this project. The University of Shiraz had been established in 1949 as a medical school, organized in accordance with American standards, with English as the official language of instruction. Therefore, the University of Shiraz was chosen to be transformed, following the modern American pattern, into a new type of university.

To make a pilot study, the International Cooperation Administration selected the University of Pennsylvania because of its reputation in the medical area. In the Summer of 1960, a survey team was appointed by the University of Pennsylvania to go to Iran. A board of trustees was elected, two years later, for the new university, which was later called Pahlavi University. The university structure suggested by the University of Pennsylvania was approved by the board of trustees and the

contact with AID was agreed upon. Funds were provided by the United States government to assist the medical advisors arrived in Shiraz.

The Pennsylvania-Pahlavi program, which was originally concerned with the field of medicine, was extended in 1964 to permit advisory assistance to other faculties as well. It assisted in development of all segments of Pahlavi University, including the University administration. The Pennsylvania team advisors encountered some difficulties in terms of the University administration.

> [T]he period of transition in changing the University of Shiraz into Pahlavi University was not particularly smooth..... Many of the faculty and administrators had received their educational training at the French-oriented University of Tehran and had no American-type education. On the other hand, only a smaller proportion of the faculty and staff were American-trained (Copeland, 1971: 29).

Moreover, the Chancellor of the University, Dr. Suratgar, was an Oxford graduate. Except as a visitor, he had no experience with American universities and was strongly pro-British. The Vice-Chancellor of the University, Walter A. Groves, was nevertheless an American who served for two years 1962-1964 and was replaced by an American-educated Iranian.

The shortage of personnel was the most serious challenge to the Pahlavi University. About half of the faculty were

American, and hiring Iranian faculties was faced with severe obstacles. W. A. Copeland the director of Pennsylvania-Pahlavi program, comments on this issue:

> From the date of its founding, the shortage of personnel presented the most serious challenge to Pahlavi. Most departments were understaffed, student enrollment was increasing at a rapid rate, and the new College of Engineering, founded in 1964, desperately needed faculty. Indeed when the College admitted its first students some departments had only one person who served concurrently as chairman, academic advisor, teacher, and sole member of the department (Copeland, 1971: 30).

G. H. Muller, an assistant professor in the Department of English at Pahlavi University from 1968-1970 comments on the obstacles faced by faculty recruitment program:

> Because of strict political control over the hiring of teachers, no department can hire promptly a professor whom it might consider a valuable addition to its staff. Departmental requests for personnel must be submitted to a college committee, then to the provost's office, and finally to the secret office. At every stage, the procedures inaugurated by the department are duplicated; communications are poor and frequently administrative units do not cooperate.....(Muller, 1971: 241).

Assadollah Alam, the new Chancellor appointed in 1964, tried to overcome the problems of recruitment through using his prestige for rapid clearance of candidates by the secret police,

and by securing additional government funds for additional employments. A recruitment program initiated in 1966, when the University of Pennsylvania recruiting office began to locate well-qualified American-educated Iranian faculty members, using statistics of Iranian graduate students in the United States as recorded by the Iranian Embassy. This program was successful in attracting a large number of qualified Iranian graduate students studying in the United States In 1965-66, a central library system was instituted in Pahlavi University. A Fulbright-Hays grantees served as the director responsible for the development of the system. An open-stack policy was introduced by him to allow direct access of the students and faculty to all the sources. All the books purchased for the University were in English because the medium of instruction was English. In fact, the University was self-consciously American both in organization and methods. The students were exposed to American-style instruction. All colleges had American-style curriculum. A system of major-minor fields, as well as elective and required courses for each field was established.

Indeed Iran's incorporation, and its consequent deepening, into the capitalist world economy entailed borrowing the Western models of education by the country. The Iranian educational system tended to reflect this deepening status of the country. Since Iran has lacked sufficient domestic facilities and manpower resources to build and modernize its system of

education, it has increasingly relied on educational assistance, particularly at higher levels, from abroad.

After World War II, with the United States ascension to the hegemonic power in the spheres of economics and politics, her influence in the cultural realms, including education, increased. Iran was one of the most advised countries of the world. Because of close political and military ties with the United States, Iran sought assistance from the United States and at the same time was encouraged by the United States government.

Therefore, in the 1950's, the United States officials, with the help of missionaries and private institutions, became directly involved in Iranian higher education. The United States government, state universities, and private institutions were involved, in 1960s and 1970s, in reforming and Americanization of Iranian French higher education system. As a matter of fact, the secularization of the Iranian educational system, which had been started during Reza Shah period and was almost complete, particularly at the secondary school level and above, not only continued but became increasingly Americanized during Mohammad Reza Shah's rule.

Development Planning

After World War II, national development planning began in Iran with American assistance. In fact, Americans were

instrumental in promoting the idea of economic and educational planning.

A committee called the High Plan Commission was created in 1946 in order to prepare a comprehensive development plan for the country. In 1948, the government contracted--following the advice of the World Bank and the United States Department--the American engineering firm of Overseas Consultants Inc. to make a survey of the conditions of the country and submit a seven-year development plan (Amuzegar, 1966: 101). The First Seven-Year Development Plan was approved by the Majlis in 1948.

Educational Programs in the First Development Plan (1948-1955)

There was no fund allocated to education in the First Seven-Year Development Plan. Education was financed through the general government budget and was not an aspect of development planning. From 1940 to the concluding year of the First Plan in 1955, there was an impressive growth of education (see Table VII-1). There was, however, major problems in the absorption of high-school and university graduates because of the lack of employment opportunities.

Meanwhile, the deepening of Iranian economy into the capitalist world-economy was being intensified and expanded. The United States, which emerged as the post-war super-power, extended its influence in all areas of politics, economy, and

Table VII-1: Educational Expansion, 1940-1955

YEAR	PRIMARY STUDENTS	SECONDARY STUDENTS	STUDENTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
1940	287,245	28,196	3,395
1945	287,905	29,047	4,218
1951	650,355	83,507	5,502
1955	823,983	146,208	10,097

Source: The data are combined from a) report on Seven-Year Development Plan in Iran, Overseas Consultants, Inc., V. II Exhibit B-17, New York, 1949, and b) United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1980.

education in Iranian society. The United States began, in 1948, her assistance program to Iran, which included aid to education. This aid was stopped during the oil nationalization movement, and after the fall of Mossadeq in 1953 it was resumed.

A number of American firms known as Overseas Consultants composed an advisory group and conducted, in 1948, an extensive survey within the Iranian educational system. They made some recommendations, including the revision of the existing educational system which was introduced under Reza Shah in 1939. Under the new system which was introduced in 1955, the six-year elementary school and the three-year first cycle remained unchanged, while the second cycle of the high school

was divided into three choices of mathematics, natural sciences, and literature. Therefore, some changes were made in the curriculum, textbooks, and teacher training, particularly in terms of the second cycle.

Educational Programs In the Second Development Plan (1955-1963)

In the Second Development Plan, launched in 1955, education was still not a part of development planning in Iran. Funds allocated to education were through the general government budget. Primary enrollments rose, during this plan, from 823,983 in 1955 to 1,719,353 in 1962. There was a rise of secondary enrollments from 146,208 to 326,856, and university enrollments from 10,097 to 24,344. The opening of private schools through subsidies was also encouraged by the Ministry of Education to meet the demand for education. This policy contributed to the expansion of a dual system of education, by developing the number of primary and secondary schools which enjoyed greater resources, better teachers, and higher quality education, attended mainly by the children of the upper class.

This period also observed some expansion of vocational schools. There were, by 1962, eighty-six vocational schools with 9,396 enrollments, which was less than 4 percent of the total secondary school enrollments. However, this vocational training was almost useless because of the lack of systematic planning,

inadequate facilities, irrelevant curricula, a poor job market for such skilled laborers, and negative traditional attitudes toward manual jobs (Page, Evers, and Mohler, 1971).

During this period, neither the educational reform, nor the expansion of eduction was on a firm basis, and none had much of an effect on society.

Educational Programs in the Third Development Plan (1963-68)

The changes made from above by the "White Revolution" created incentives for educational expansion. For the first time a comprehensive educational development plan was represented in the Third Development Plan in Iran. The plan was based on a twenty-year educational plan (1960-80). Following the recommendations made at the Conference of Asian Ministries of Education held in New Delhi in 1959 and in Tokyo in 1962, the Third Plan was developed with the assistance of the United Nations Mission (Plan and Budget Organization 1969: 259). In the Third Plan, education was being coordinated with the country's social and economic exigencies. There was a recognition of the necessity for long-term educational programs. A total of 17,566 million rials ($251 million), or about 9 percent of the total Third Plan budget, was allocated to this plan (Plan & Budget Organization, 1968: 120).

In this plan, over 60 percent of the total educational budget was allocated to primary enrollments. In fact, the result exceeded the planned number. The number of students in primary school reached 2,575,537 by the end of the plan, as against 2,225,000 envisaged. The secondary enrollment doubled to almost 697,000 as compared with the planned 400,000 (UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1980). In spite of the emphasis on the qualitative transformation of education, the development was achieved in quantitative expansion, and in far greater proportions than planned. As a result of the high rate of growth in student enrollments, there were serious shortages of physical facilities and human resources. Therefore, any attempt to achieve quality goals was set aside. In the area of higher education the emphasis was also placed on the improvement of the quality of education, that is improving library facilities, and recruiting new, young, and well-educated faculties. Only one university, Pahlavi University, was planned to be established during this period. However, several new specialized higher institutions of education, in the public and private sectors, were established. Therefore, the number of university students rose to 58,774 as against 37,500 planned.

The Education Corps

Literacy Corps, later renamed as Education Corps, was a

widely publicized project as a point of White Revolution, particularly in relation to Land Reform. Land Reform and transformation of peasant economy into a modern economic system required peasants' socialization into new model of life. The corpsmen, recruited from high school graduates, received a four-month training in the army and were sent to the villages in the uniform of army sergeants for a fourteen-month (later for a twenty-month) tour of duty. The education of rural children was their primary task. However, they were also engaged in evening adult education classes, youth activities, scouting, recreational groups, helping to improve the health and sanitation of the community, influencing the political orientations of the villages, and transforming the peasant orientation.

The Literacy Corps, in its own turn, had considerable educational achievements during the Third Plan. Nearly 270,000 village children were educated by almost 35,000 corpsmen in 34,000 villages. Also upon the completion of their village services, one-fourth of the corpsmen (i.e., 8,323) were recruited as primary school teachers (Plan and Budget Organization 1968: 122).

The "White Tent" program--started in the early 1950s, with American assistance gaining some momentum in 1960s--was a far less publicized program which provided educational opportunities for the nomadic tribes. Because the adjustment of early teachers to the nomadic life was difficult, nomads

themselves were recruited and trained as teachers for tribes. In 1956, a special school was established for this purpose. One hundred twenty seven teachers were trained and worked with various tribes by 1961. This number rose to 14,000 by 1971 (Szyliowics, 1973: 417).

Educational Programs in the Fourth Development Plan (1968-1973)

In the first half of the 1960s, the imbalanced educational expansion and its shortcomings began to be felt. Such an educational system could not meet the manpower demands of the rapid industrialization of the country. The educational system was described by officials, in the late 1960s, as one that wasted the time of the youths, put all the emphasis on quantity rather than quality, and taught nothing to the students (Keyhan International, July 30, 1969).

Authorities took measures that seemed necessary to them. In November 1964, the royal decree was issued for the change of educational system. In only a few months, in 1965, the decision-making, policy formulation, and planning of a new educational system were completed. The Ministry of Education was in charge of its enforcement.

The new educational system was made of a five-year elementary school, a three-year guidance period, and a four-year high-school, as well as some technical and vocational schools.

The three year guidance cycle was the major innovation of this system. It was to identify the talents, abilities, and interests of the students and to channel them into educational institutions and careers best suited to them. Courses in both practical and theoretical level were to be taught in the guidance cycle, which began to accept students in 1971. The students were to be directed, upon the completion of the guidance cycle, into either a four-year technical school, a two-year vocational school, or a four-year academic school. Therefore, the secondary education was divided into two clusters: a technical, and a general academic. The technical schools included technical, services, and rural vocational education. The general academic schools included mathematics-physics, science, literature-art, and finance.

In October 1967, a new measure, namely "Revolution in Education" was introduced as the twelfth point of the White Revolution. The Charter of the "Revolution in Education" came into being in August 1968. The Revolution in Education became only concerned with higher education, even though it was supposed to be applied to all levels of education. A series of conferences were held annually with the Shah, following the codification of the charter. These conferences began with opening remarks by the Shah and the Queen, followed by a series of reports from high ranking officials about the progress as well as problems of educational development in the country.

In the Fourth Plan, the educational goal was to create a more balanced educational growth, and to meet the manpower demands by channeling more students into vocational-technical education.

The number of preschoolers was expected to increase from 15,000 to 20,000. Therefore, kindergarten expansion was almost on target; the enrollments increased from 15,208 in 1968, to 21,773 in 1972. However, the responsibility of Kindergarten expansion was placed on the private sector. The number of primary students was expected to grow from 2.9 million to 3.7 million, including 93 percent of the urban and 55 percent of the rural school-age children by the end of the plan. The growth of the primary school enrollments including students trained by the Education Corps was short of the target. Primary enrollments increased from 2,845,104 in 1968 to 3,443,000 in 1972. The Guidance Cycle was expected to enroll 737,000 students by the end of the plan. It achieved only about two-thirds of its target; that is, 571,456 students. The general secondary education was expected to enroll 1,328,000 students in 1972, that is, about double the number of secondary students in 1968. Twenty percent of these students were to attend public schools, and 80 percent in private schools. However, secondary enrollments increased from 674,058 in 1968 to 943,000 in 1972, i.e. 385,000 fewer than expected. Even though there was a three-fold increase in the technical and vocational enrollments, i.e. it increased from

16,237 to 50,000 (still about 33,700 shorter than planned), there was a general shortage of trained manpower in the rapid industrialization of 1970s (Plan & Budget Organization, 1973). Therefore, in addition to high-level manpower that the country had to import anyway, this situation resulted in the import of middle-level manpower.

Higher education faced the most striking development. Even though 60,000 students were envisaged to enroll in 1972, the actual number increased from 42,000 to 115,311, that is a three-fold increase from the beginning of the plan and twice the number planned (Plan & Budget Organization, 1973). Increase in private institutions of higher education, encouraged by government, accounts for much of this growth. More rapid expansion of higher education occurred in 1970s which was mainly due to political pressures.

Educational Programs in the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978)

Education, in the Fifth Plan, received ambitious targets because in this period, there was an increase in oil prices followed by an economic boom and rapid industrial growth. The budget allocated to education in the Fifth Plan was 4.7 percent. The private sector investments was to be at 3.6 to 5.1 percent of the G.N.P. A nationwide free education of primary and guidance

cycle programs was planned to be achieved in 10 years, extending into the next development plan to be started in 1978.

The Table VII-2 represents the number of enrollments at each level as well as their percentage of expected growth during this period.

Table VII-2: Educational Targets in the Fifth Plan, 1973-1978 ('000 Persons)

LEVEL	NUMBERS IN 1973	NUMBERS PLANNED	%INCREASE
Kindergarten	22	580	2,636
Primary	3,446	5,550	61
Guidance Cycle	571	1670	192
Secondary	617	904	46
Technical & Vocation.	95	560	490
Higher Education	115	190	65
Literacy	8250	15600	89

Source: Keyhan Research Associated, A Guide to Iranian Fifth Plan (1973-78) (Tehran: Keyhan Publications, 1973), P. 132.

As the Table VII-2 indicates, the number of kindergarten enrollments were to increase to over 2500 percent. This goal was far from attained. At the end of the plan, the enrollment was at about 250,000, or 43 percent of the expected target of 580,000. There was highly uneven distribution of these students between

rural and urban areas, with 82 percent of enrollments allocated to the urban children (Plan & Budget Organization, 1976: 335).

Primary education was planned to reach all school-age children in both urban and rural areas. The growth of primary school enrollments was almost on target (Ibid, 338). The planned number of primary enrollments was about 5.6 million, while the actual number of primary students was about 5.2 million by the end of this year, or 95 percent of the planned number. Urban areas embraced 46.3 percent of these enrollments, and rural areas 53.7 percent. Of these students, 760,000, i.e. 14.6 percent, were educated by Education Corps. These figures imply that primary education had reached rural areas successfully.

It was planned to have a three-fold increase in the guidance cycle enrollments, from 571,000 in 1973 to 1,670,000 by the end of the plan (see Table VII-2). The enrollments almost reached the envisioned target with about 1,540,000 students enrolled in the guidance cycle by the end of the plan. But there was a very uneven distribution of students in rural and urban areas: 22 and 78 percent respectively (Plan & Budget Organization, 1976: 345).

The planned rate of growth in general secondary education in this period was to be 46 percent (see Table VII-2). More students were, furthermore, to be directed toward vocational and technical institutions, so that by the end of the plan the number of vocational and technical students in the skilled and semi-skilled secondary programs would reach 560,000, or a six-fold

increase. Part of the funds were to be supplied by the Ministry of Labor. Secondary education attained an enrollment of 926,000, which was 22,000 above the planned target. Moreover, there was a great discrepancy in distribution of educational opportunities between rural and urban areas: 94 percent of students lived in urban areas (Plan & Budget Organization, 1976: 348). The major expansion of education in rural areas was, therefore, in primary education. Rural people, comprising more than half of the total population, enjoyed little kindergarten, guidance cycle, and secondary education.

Therefore, in spite of significant expansion since the Third Development Plan, when educational planning in Iran was not part of development planning, there was discrepancy between the planned targets and the achievements. In some cases the achievements exceeded double the number planned, and in other cases they were half the number envisioned. This imbalanced expansion of education has had a negative impact on the quality of education.

Higher Education

Since World-War II, there has been a considerable growth in the area of higher education in Iran. While there were around 3,000 enrollments in higher education in the country in the early 1940s, this number rose to 190,000 by the late 1970s.

In order to train personnel required for building his modern state with a strong centralized government, Reza Shah established the University of Tehran in 1934, the first university of this type, by bringing together various schools of higher education operated by the ministries. Later more academic areas were added.

Several provincial universities were founded, following the World War II, throughout the country: in 1946, a university was founded in Tabriz; a university was founded in each of the three cities of Shiraz, Meshad, and Isfahan in 1948, 1949, and 1950 respectively; in 1955, the University of Jundi-Shapur was established in Ahwaz; and in 1960, the National University was founded in Tehran (Iran, Department of Economics of Education and Manpower Planning , 1973: 13).

Iran had a total of 21 universities and 206 colleges and other institutions of higher learning by the late 1970s (Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1977: 411). There are two types of institutions of higher education in Iran, namely, public higher educational institutions, and private higher educational institutions.

Public institutions of higher learning are founded by government and are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. They are financed by public funds as appropriated by the Central Budget Bureau of the Plan Organization. Public educational institutions are of two main

types: autonomous higher learning establishments, and affiliated higher learning establishments (Iran, Department of Economics of Education and Manpower Planing, 1973: 11-12). The autonomous institutions are required to operate within the guidelines set out by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, but are not under the direct control of any government body. The twenty-one existing universities of Iran are autonomous establishments; eight of them are the most important (see Table VII-3). The colleges and other institutions of higher learning below the university level are independent of state control.

Table VII-3: Iran's Eight Autonomous Public Universities

UNIVERSITIES	YEARS OF ESTABLISHMENTS
Tehran University	1934
Tabriz University	1946
Shiraz University (renamed Pahlavi University)	1948
Meshad University	1949
Isfahan University	1950
Jundi-Shapur University	1955
National University	1960
Aryamehr University	1966

Source: Iran, Department of Economics of Education and Manpower Planning, Analytical Study on Financing of Higher Education in Iran, Tehran, Institute for Research and Planning in Science and Education, May 1973, P. 13.

The affiliated institutions of higher learning are directly attached to a governmental body and are under direct supervision of the responsible government agency. These schools train the skilled manpower needed by the governmental agencies. Of the 115 such establishments in Iran, 42 are affiliated with the various Ministries and governmental organizations, and 73 are affiliated with the Ministry of Education.

Private higher institutions of education need government permission for their existence. These institutions are financed through private sources, such as tuition fees, donations, and endowments. Since they do not receive financial support from the government, they are not obliged to submit their annual financial records to the government. However, they should be non-profit organizations. While these institutions are independent in internal policies and administration, they must operate within the limits of educational policy and the regulations established by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Iran, Department of Economics of Education and Manpower Planning, 1973: 18-19).

Government was the primary source of providing financial resources for education. While the government funds for higher education in 1975 amounted to 99.04 percent, the private funds, i.e. grants and student tuitions made .096 percent of the total funds (Plan and Budget Organization, 1976 & 1977: 19). This represents the strong role of government in educational decision-

making as well as in the size, content, and direction of the educational system.

In spite of substantial increase in the total expenditure of higher education (from $26.3 million in 1965 to $287.0 million in 1975), capital expenditures increased from 17.4 percent to 43.5 percent of the total expenditure, while the current expenditure declined from 82.6 percent to 56.5 percent (see Table VII-4).

Table VII-4: Total Expenditure on Public Higher Education from 1965 Through 1975 (U.S. Million Dollars)

YEAR	TOTAL		CAPITAL		CURRENT	
	AMOUNT	PERCENT	AMOUNT	PERCENT	AMOUNT	PERCENT
1965	26.3	100	4.5	17.4	21.8	82.6
1966	35.4	100	10.1	28.8	25.3	71.2
1967	40.8	100	10.4	25.5	30.4	74.5
1968	62.3	100	19.9	32.0	42.4	68.0
1969	69.2	100	15.7	22.7	53.5	77.3
1970	74.5	100	21.9	25.3	52.6	74.7
1971	87.6	100	21.9	25.0	65.7	75.0
1972	101.8	100	29.0	28.5	72.8	71.5
1973	132.3	100	49.2	37.2	83.1	62.8
1974	216.3	100	83.5	38.6	132.8	61.4
1975	286.8	100	124.8	43.5	162.0	56.5

Source: Plan and Budget Organization, The Budget of the Imperial Government of Iran, for the Year 1977, Tehran: PBO Publications, 1977, Section 6, P. 19; The Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Center of Iran, Statistical Yearbook 1976, Tehran: PBO Publication, 1975, P. 108, Table 56.

The rise in the capital expenditures can be explained by the increased number of institutions of higher education, whereas the relative decline in current expenditures was a negative reflection of the salaries and consumable items of faculty and staff. Because of extreme inflation of prices and wages, a considerable part of the rise in the higher education expenditure was not real (Aghazadeh, 1977: 66). Therefore, the real purchasing power of education was reduced, which in turn exerted negative impact on the entire conduct of higher education. In spite of a 30 percent rise of the current expenditure per student, from $750 to $1066, this amount was not adequate to match the quantitative growth of higher education during this period, from 29,074 in 1965 to 151,905 in 1975 (i.e. more than five times) (Aghazadeh, 1977: 67). This is an explanatory factor for the decline of quality in Iranian higher education.

Higher Education Abroad

Many Iranian students, university faculty members, and administrators were coming to the United States either for studying or for a short-term training. The approximate number of Iranian students, both government sponsored and independent, in the United States were between 60,000 to 75,000 in early 1987. Labelle talks about government-supervised students:

> In 1978, some 60,000 Iranian students were estimated to be studying under official government auspices in 40

countries. Forty percent of these individuals were studying in the United States where they constituted the largest non-U.S. citizen student population of any foreign country (Labelle, 1984).

Sending students to Western countries for further education and employing Western teachers and experts for development and modernization of education resulted in a deviant Westernization. Banani states that "no single institution or group of people was more responsible for bringing Western influences into Iran than the students who had been educated in Europe and America. (Banani, 1961: 101).

Al-e Ahmad's critical view of the higher education is as follows:

> With regard to educational and university issues, another big problem is the problem of this flood of returnees from Europe and America. They are undoubtedly a windfall for us, like an odd shoe in desert, but be realistic and look what garbage every one of these windfalls turns out to be after coming back and finding a place in an organization and becoming established.....especially since those in this group consider themselves and their opinions to be worthless alongside those of the Western consultants and advisors who dominate the situation. They are perfect examples of culturally transplanted Gharbzadegi [Weststuckness], people with their feet in the air, transmitters of the opinion of foreign advisors and experts. Contrary to its reputation, the larger this group of returnees from abroad becomes, the less it accomplishes, and the greater is the helplessness

and discord within the organization under its influence (Al-e Ahamd, 1978: 41).

Secularization of Education

The Process of cultural incorporation of Iran, following the economic and political incorporations of the country, continued under the ex-Shah and reached its height during the years from 1963 to 1978, when relations with the Western countries expanded and thousands of Western economic and political experts were brought into Iran. Living in Iran, these experts introduced Western culture and behavior to the country (Forbis, 1980).

In addition to the direct introduction by foreigners, Western culture was introduced to Iran through several other means such as the establishment of secular schools at all levels, the importation of large numbers of books, newspapers, journals, fashions, and films, and the adoption of Western music, literature and architecture (Forbis, 1980).

Once incorporated into the capitalist world-system, a peripheral zone is erratically subjected to, and usually tries to promote, a deepening of the secular trends of capitalism. Similarly, a deepening of the hegemonic articulation to the Western Civilizational Project is promoted by the core and by comprador elites. Strong educational modernization projects are characteristic of peripheral states aspiring to mobility into the

semi-periphery. When the path to mobility is sponsorship by a hegemonic power, such projects work. The educational project promoted dependent economic development. But it was associated with political stasis and cultural disruption.

This intense program of Westernization "deeply alienated the people-at-large whose institution, culture, and religious values were being attacked" (Shivers, 1980). There was strong resistance by the people against this trend. People began to learn more about the Islamic culture and values. At the same time they attempted to reduce their dependence on the West and Western values (Shivers, 1980).

The Ulama (Moslem religious scholars) had exerted control over education and the judiciary until the rise of Pahlavis, when the government schools intruded into the traditional territory of the Ulama. The Ulama's opposition to the modern schools started from their objection to such matters as coeducation and the lack of emphasis on Islamic morality. As a matter of fact, the history of the Ulama's political and intellectual life, at least during the last two centuries, has been one of constant struggle against the surge of Western values in Islamic societies.

Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini has been the most articulate and politically relevant member of clerical hierarchy. He, as a young man, studied Islamic theology and became a lecturer in Faiziyah (one of the prominent theology schools of Shiite

Moslems). He turned out to be the most outspoken cleric since Reza Shah was dethroned in 1941.

To Ayatollah Khomeini, an anti-imperialist, nationalist, and religious figure, modern schools were creatures of the imperialist West, to brainwash colonized Moslems. He made his critique of secularization along three major lines. First, colonialism, hand in hand with the Pahlavis, has created modern schools in which students were taught to doubt the validity and pertinence of the teachings of the traditional madraseh. Second, modern sciences taught in the schools are futile since those sciences are devoid of moral exaltation. Third, all the evils of society are caused by the newly educated who have no sense of moral exaltation.

According to Ayatollah Khomeini (1983), the independence of culture is the priority of a Moslem nation. He states that "the survival of every society rests upon its cultural independence.....it is no accident that the colonialists target the culture of the subordinate countries first" (Khomeini, 1983: 121).

Secular universities are, stated Ayatollah Khomeini, the means of influencing the culture of the incorporated zones. "They [foreign powers] created universities to be totally at their service.....if someone stepped into the universities, he could observe that [the foreign powers] have a firmer grip there than anywhere else [in society]"(Khomeini, 1983: 121).

According to Imam Khomeini, the deficiency of the university is its neglect of the moral and spiritual aspects of life. "If when universities were introduced [in Iran], the two pillars of science and religious training were combined, then the graduates of those universities would have been refined and creative and the country would have not been in the [bad] shape which it is now" (Khomeini, 1983: 147). Imam Khomeini believes that expertise and faith should accompanied each other: "If there is expertise unaccompanied by faith, then that expertise is harmful. If there is an expert in a country with no belief, that country will perish" (Khomeini, 1983: 144). He applies the same criticism to sciences unguarded by creed:

> If there is only science in the universities, this science would annihilate the people.....If we presume that there is the best of science in the universities.....by the side of it [grows] a propaganda which uses this science to cause a country to decline. All those who were university graduates became ministers and other government officials who made us dependent on the West and the East (Khomeini, 1983: 143).

Most of the intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s, unlike the intellectual leaders at the turn of the century and through the 1930's who were fascinated with Western ideas and Western materialism, were worried or angry about the overwhelming impact of Westernization. To them, the modernization of the

country should not mean its Westernization, since Westernization is perceived as cultural change (Forbis, 1980).

Shariati, an Iranian intellectual, argues against the Westernization of Iran and adoption of Western values. He comments that Iranians must accept that their society is a religious society, while the Western insight is materialistic. He feels that Western education is based on rational and scientific thinking and the spiritual part of learning is not considered. He advocates, for Iran, Islamic education in which thought and emotion are on the same side and complete one another. He argues that while the scientific movement in Islam moves toward the truth and human exaltation, the Western rational science pushes the world toward a human crisis. Abandoning morality and spirituality for the sake of science, the West now has people who are only 'things' in the society and are easily abandoned. He comments that in Islam the stress is on two principles of purification and education; and that purification is prior to education (Shariati, 1976). Purification means, roughly, the cleansing from evil, and the continuance of spiritual growth.

Shariati mentions some differences between Islamic education and Western education: Western education seeks power and has a tendency toward glorifying technology and profit. It promotes the seeking of comfort and happiness. Its goal is to increase one's efficiency. The dominant spirit of education in the West is pragmatism and realism, and has a tendency toward

civilizing people. Science is the base for its thought. In the extreme, it would help to make a powerful person capable of dominating his environment. Islamic education, on the other hand, seeks the truth and has a tendency toward ideology, values, training, and the promotion of beauty and accomplishment. Its goal is to increase human virtues. The dominant spirit of Islam is radicalism and idealism and its tendency is toward culture. Metaphysics is the base of its thought. In extreme, it would make a good person, capable of dominating himself (Shariati, 1976).

Sharifi, another Iranian scholar, argues that the educational system in Iran accepted Western values and paid little interest to moral and spiritual concerns, and to ethical values. In the past, he continues, Iranian people were trained to acquire such virtues as patience, generosity, devotion, self-sacrifice, tolerance, purity, morality and the accomplishment of honors. With the influence of the Western ideas and thought in education, the social conditions are in disorder and the direction of training is based on attempting to achieve a comfortable material life. Therefore, physical welfare replaces the morality and spirituality which used to give strength to the people to enable them to deal with the hardships in life (Sharifi, 1978). Sharifi believes that this kind of training will not entail happiness and no society can progress without acquiring the virtues.

As a matter of fact, the Western society spread the idea that the developing countries, which wanted to use the new

technologies and sciences to become modernized, must adopt a version of Western social structure, including Western culture, as well as its educational and economic life. This was part and parcel of the whole process of incorporation: economic, political, as well as cultural incorporations. The West believed that its culture was universal and all other cultures were secondary. In order to make any progress, they argued, all people must become Westernized. Therefore, the scientific, secular universalism served as a means for incorporating the culture of the peripheral zones into the Western culture and thereby paved the way for economic and political incorporations. To Al-e Ahamd, another Iranian intellectual, the education existing in Iran since the turn of the century puts an accent on the quantity rather than quality and its goal is to train people as Westerners or as he puts it 'Weststricken'. His argument is that the school curriculum lacks Iranian traditions or anything concerned with Iran's culture. The school program does not connect Iran's past with its present and there is no relationship between home and school. While most people in the country are religious, the school program advocates Westernization (Al-e Ahamd, 1962).

It is revealed, in this study, that the Westernization project was a failure in Iran. It deeply alienated the people-at-large whose institutions, culture, and religious values were being attacked. It created a cultural crisis which, later in 1979, developed into the Islamic Revolution. This Revolution, beyond

being an economic or political reality, was a cultural event. It was a response to the cultural dilemma caused by the modernization strategy applied by the Pahlavis. The cultural contradictions of capitalism in semi-peripheral Iran fed on the systematic political persecution by the state and the external concentration of wealth in the hands of the patrimonial, rentier, dependent state to produce revolution.

After the Islamic Revolution, there has been an attempt at unifying the two systems of higher education namely the madrasehs (the traditional higher education institutions) and universities. Faker, a faculty member of Madraseh Ilmiyeh of Qum comments regarding the unity of madraseh and university:

> It is our responsibility to keep madraseh and the university function side by side based on Quranic values. I believe that if these two systems work together in a cooperative way, we will overcome major problems of our higher education system (Kayhan, 1984: 20).

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This research examines the importance of the incorporation of culture for further economic and political incorporation of a region into the capitalist world-economy. There is actually a reciprocal relationship here: economic incorporation of a region leads to its cultural incorporation, which in turn entails further economic incorporation.

As was discussed earlier, the core capitalists incorporate new geographical zones as peripheries in order to broaden the spheres of their production. Incorporation entails the spread of capitalist activities from core countries to the peripheries. However, this does not imply that the newly incorporated areas would develop their economic process to the level of core countries. Quite the contrary, the division of labor in the modern system is such that the peripheral countries produce more labor intensive goods and are less technologically sophisticated than core countries. They are specialized in producing raw materials. Through incorporation of these countries to the capitalist world-system, the core can extract their surplus by the import of cheap raw materials, produced by cheap labor, from these zones and export of expensive, high wage, capital-intensive goods to them. Therefore, the core is committed not to change, but to preserve this pattern that secures its self-interest. Thereby, in this

world-system with its division of labor, it is reasonable for the core not to allow the incorporated zones to achieve a complete level of economic progress, which requires a thorough development of the modern science and technology.

Iran, as a result of its incorporation and further deepening into the capitalist world-system, needed manpower for its bureaucratic apparatus, as well as skilled and semi-skilled labor power for its economy which was to transform from predominantly peasant economy to a type of dependent capitalism from the 1960s onward, after the so-called White Revolution. Therefore, in order to train this manpower, one of the institutions that did undergo periodic transformations was the educational system.

As it was discussed earlier, the initial attempt at establishing modern schools in Iran was in the middle of the 19th century, through the opening of Dar al-Fonun, the first modern academy, by the premier Amir Kabir. The first university in the modern sense was established during the Reza Shah's reign and by his order. Later during the deposed Shah's era, institutions of higher learning, as well as elementary and secondary institutions of learning, were being expanded and several provincial universities as well as hundreds of other institutions of higher learning were founded. Therefore, as it is hypothesized in this research, the government itself took the initiative in meeting the challenge of modernity. Amir Kabir established Dar al-Fonun in

order to modernize the army and empower the country against foreign invasions. It was clear, especially to Amir Kabir, that the military superiority of the Western powers was related to the West access to modern science and technology. But at this stage, the traditional government initiated what at best might be called programs of limited or defensive modernization, designed to preserve the traditional society and protect it from the more intensive thoroughgoing changes. These reforms were concerned with providing modern training and equipment for the bureaucracy and army, as well as establishing institutions of higher education. The essential feature of these reforms was that they were designed not to transform the traditional system but to strengthen it against foreign pressures. It was later during the Pahlavi reign (1925-1979) that the programs of intensive modernization were initiated by Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah.

The evidences support another hypothesis that the modernization of education in Iran was not initiated and accomplished through direct imposition by the West, as in colonial countries. Quite the contrary, the Iranian government itself was behind establishing modern institutions of learning. Westerners were brought in as educators and advisors.

Therefore, the initial incorporation of Iranian culture in terms of modern education occurred in the middle of the 19th century by establishing the first modern academy, Dar al-Fonun.

This process continued and the 20th century witnessed the deepening of Iranian culture and education into the Western culture during the Pahlavi era. Reza Shah and his son attempted a broad-scale Westernization of the country.

The transformation of the educational system of Iran was part of the larger process of cultural incorporation of the whole country into the Western culture. In order to fully exploit the resources of the peripheral countries smoothly, the core countries need to change the idea system and the pattern of thinking of the people in the incorporated zone. They therefore attempt to manipulate the culture of the incorporated zone in a way that their interests are secured. This does not mean that they attempt to eradicate the culture of the incorporated zone and replace it with the Western culture, but to change and manipulate it so that it loses certain dynamics that contradict Western interests.

The basic feature of Iranian culture that shapes the idea system and the pattern of thinking of the people is Shiite Islam. This ideology is, in essence, a totalistic world-view that opposes oppression, and is thereby anti-imperialist. Because this world-view was an impediment to the interests of the West, attempts were made by them, as well as their indigenous agents in the country to secularize the society and to limit religion to the performing of personal duties. The founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty viewed Islam as an obstacle against his policies of

Westernization. Since then, the Pahlavi rulers vigorously attempted to separate religion from politics and to secularize Iranian society. Various regulations were devised to curtail the influence of religion in all areas of social life including politics, economy, and education. The clergy was deprived of its constitutional rights and all Islamic institutions were brought under the centralized control of the state. At the same time, education was secularized to the extent that even madrasehs were required to teach a curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education. Therefore, as it is hypothesized, secularization was imposed in Iran by political decree, rather than emerging automatically from economic change. The Pahlavis succeeded in secularizing the Iranian political system and political elites while a great majority of population remained faithful to Islam. Thus Iranian society was polarized into a secular minority and an Islamic majority. The secularized minority, however, remained powerful because it had control over all the structures of political and military power.

Friedman's argument concerning culture III, as was discussed earlier, fits the case of Iran very well. Friedman speaks of anti-systemic movements, organized around culture III --which is the organizer of total life processes including material reproduction. These movements, he argues, do not demand for jobs, welfare, and equal rights, but for a land base upon which to reinstate and practice their culture. The Islamic

Revolution of 1979 was actually a kind of anti-systemic movement, organized around culture III. In fact, the religious opposition against Westernization goes back to the 19th century, getting its momentum during the early 1960s--after the introduction of White Revolution, with Ayatollah Khomeini as the symbolic figure of this opposition. These oppositions finally led to the 1979 Revolution which was in the first place a cultural revolution, seeking a land base upon which to reinstate and practice the Islamic culture.

In spite of the impressive quantitative development of higher education particularly during the 1967-79, as the statistics indicate, there was a lack of qualitative growth of Iranian education. After more than a century of teaching modern sciences, the country was in a state of dependency in terms of science and technology and achieved no self-sufficiency in these areas. Modern education, furthermore, brought with it elements of Western culture which alienated the people and diminished their self-esteem.

It should be noted that my project not only does not reject the adoption of the modern science and technology; it strongly advocates its adoption, but not as a dependent institution serving the interests of the core capitalists, rather as an institution serving the interests of the nation. The achievement of independence in the science and technology, requires, in the first

place, independence in the cultural system as a whole, as well as the economic and political independence.

After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, one of the institutions which was targeted for radical transformation was the educational system of the country and universities. As a matter of fact all economic, political, and educational institutions of Iran began to undergo revolutionary changes. The process of reorganization of the educational system was one of the first priorities of the new government and higher education received special attention. In a message delivered on the occasion of Iranian new year, on March 21, 1980, Imam Khomeini stated:

> A fundamental revolution must take place in all the universities across the country, so that professors with links to the East or the West may be purged, and the university may provide a healthy atmosphere for cultivation of the Islamic sciences. The evil form of instruction imposed by the previous regime must be stopped because all of the miseries of society during the reign of that father and son were ultimately caused by such evil instructions..... All of our backwardness has been due to the failure of most university educated intellectuals to acquire correct knowledge of Iranian Islamic society (Khomeini, 1981: 291-292).

In another speech which was delivered in April 1980 to an audience composed of university students, the leader of the Islamic Revolution outlined a general guideline for the

reorganization (cultural disincorporation) of higher education. He emphasized that:

> We demand fundamental changes in our university system so that the universities come to serve the nation and its needs instead of serving foreigners..... We are not rejecting modern science, nor saying that each science exists in two varieties, one Islamic and the other non-Islamic.
>
> The place for the strictly Islamic sciences is the traditional madraseh; the other sciences are to be taught at the university. However, the universities must become Islamic in the sense that the subjects studied in them are to be pursued in accordance with the needs of the nation and for the sake of strengthening it. The curricula that have been followed up to now at the universities have resulted in the gravitation of one part of our young people toward communism and another part toward the West..... To Islamize the universities means to make them autonomous, independent of the West and independent of the East, so that we have an independent country with an independent culture (Khomeini, 1981: 296-298).

The attempt of the Islamic Revolution to develop modern technology in conjunction with an Islamic Civilizational Project is an experiment of long duration.

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