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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Jack Michael Bernardo entitled "The Organizational Republic: Societal Corporatism in the United States." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Robert B. Cunningham, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation and and recommend its acceptance:

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Graduate Studies and Research

THE ORGANIZATIONAL REPUBLIC: SOCIETAL CORPORATISM IN THE UNITED STATES

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Jack Michael Bernardo

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ABSTRACT

This study deals with the recent evolution of the American political system. It contends that a major change is taking place within that system, and considers whether current political science theorizing can account for this transformation. The histories of the elitist, pluralist, and corporatist schools of political thought are traced, the concept of political development is re-examined, and recent analyses of American politics are culled to present an argument that a form of societal corporatism is emerging.

This analysis emphasizes the growing role that formal organizations are acquiring in making authoritative community decisions, examines the current decision-making structure in the United States, and classifies it as corporatist in nature. American politics has become organizational politics, it argues, and should begin to be studied as such. Elements of organization theory and general systems theory are used to describe the combination of fragmentation and concentration that is occurring, and a tentative model of the resulting structure is offered. The study portrays the system as a set of Vertical Policy Complexes as recent outgrowths of bureaucratic subgovernments, and concludes by urging further research along corporatist lines.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> President Carter has been operating as though he were thirty-ninth president of the republic of 1787 when actually he is the fifth president of the Second Republic. Apparently he has not learned any better than his four predecessors that the historic continuity of American politics has been broken.[1]

> A polity must constantly scrutinize and re-evaluate the presuppositions upon which it orders its political life, because the polity which is unable to transcend a body of accepted ideas that have become anachronistic and incongruous may find itself inadequately prepared for responding to a world of becoming.[2]

The above quotations were selected to introduce this study because they spotlight the two key issues with which it deals. First, has "the historical continuity of American politics" been broken? That the political system of the United States has modified itself in response to both internal and external events cannot be disputed; whether it has fundamentally restructed itself, however, is open to debate. Second, is the theoretical apparatus currently used by political scientists "anachronistic and incongruous" with respect to the contemporary realities of American politics? Although they are certainly not the only guardians of "the presuppositions" upon which our society "orders its political life," political scientists are

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[1]Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (2d ed.; New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1979), Preface.

[2]Norman Keehn, "A World of Becoming: From Pluralism to

definitely among the principal ones. This second question, moreover, is significant whether the answer to the first is yes or no. It is a question that needs to be asked periodically, if the process of science is truly to be served. It is a question that must be asked when major social changes appear. If it is found that adequate and useful explanations can continue to be provided using current theories and models, their value is increased. If it is found they cannot, or as Thomas Kuhn expressed it, if "anomaly" appears and reappears,[3] better theoretical apparatus must be constructed.

When the question of basic structure has been addressed, not only with respect to the United States but for Western democracies in general, a rather limited debate has ensued. Both the analysts and their treatments have tended to fall within one of two major schools of thought: "pluralists who argue that power is widely distributed among competing groups, and those who argue that power is concentrated in the hands of an elite or a number of elites within a ruling class."[4] Most political scientists would agree, moreover, that both elitist and pluralist models, and the theories from whence they are derived (hence "schools of thought"),[5] have some explanatory value. Hybrid models,

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Corporatism," Polity, 9, 1 (Fall, 1976), 20.

[3]Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 52-53.

[4]Alan Cawson, "Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Role of the State," Government and Opposition, 13 (1978), 188.

[5]In this study, models and theories are considered to be distinct entities, with the differences between them akin to those

e.g., Robert Dahl's "polyarchy," have even been offered and well accepted. While the field as a whole continues to rely on opposing ideas to construct adequate explanations, the majority of members seem to cling to pluralism.

The pluralist-elitist debate has continued for centuries, although the context within which it has been carried on has changed dramatically. A brief history and analysis of this debate is presented in the next chapter. It concludes that neither school can alone provide an adequate explanation of our contemporary process, after tracing the long evolution of "pluralistic democratic elitism." That is the label applied by Grover Starling[6] to the contemporary synthesis that the historical debate has produced.

Having concluded that current explanations are not adequate, the proper course is to consider others. This search is not a quest for The Explanation, such as those undertaken by our classical counterparts. Instead, it consists of the systematic consideration of a plausible alternative. That and other differences between the classical and modern contexts of political theorizing are discussed at some length in my review of the pluralist-elitist debate. Following that review,

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presented by Dean Champion in The Sociology of Organizations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 13-15; there are significant interactive links between the two when they deal with the same subject matter, however, and when considered together they are herein labeled "schools of thought."

[6]Grover Starling, The Politics and Economics of Public Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1979), pp. 126-30.

a third school of thought is presented. Chapter III is an overview of the corporatist school of political thought. With roots that go back further than its two counterparts, corporatism in theory and practice has dominated Iberian and Latin American politics throughout modern history. Although it has been basically ignored by American and European theorists, especially since World War II, corporatism has popped up in some recent analyses of non-Hispanic Western political systems.[7] Most of these have focused on economic policymaking; it is dealt with here in a broader political sense, however. The corporatist school of thought, it is suggested, may be a source for more useful explanations of contemporary Western politics. An example is provided; an alternative model of contemporary American politics, derived by using corporist ideas, is tendered for consideration in the final chapter.

The first issue noted above will also be addressed. When proposing a new model or theory, a scientist is making one of two types of claims: either an intellectual breakthrough is being touted, or one is arguing that reality has changed sufficiently to render the dominant model obsolete. The Copernican model of our solar system and the germ

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[7]Literature on British politics in particular has recently included the theme of corporatism. Several works by J. T. Winkler and Alan Cawson's "Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Role of the State," are prime examples; Andrew Shonfield's Modern Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), seems to be the work that reintroduced the theme to European theorizing, and Leo Panitch more recently attempted a broad application of the concept in "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," Comparative Political Studies, 10, 1 (April, 1977), 61-90.

theory of disease are the classic examples of the former type. A superior understanding of reality was reached, conceptualized, proposed, and eventually accepted, although only after an intense struggle in both those cases. This exercise falls within the latter category, however. No claim is being made that pluralist models of American politics, or their supporting theory, were in error when presented; American political development has simply superseded that school of thought. To support such a claim, a rather thorough discussion of political development is in order. The general concept and its specific application to the American system are covered in Chapters IV and V, respectively. Not only is the conclusion that the historic continuity of American politics has been broken supported, but also a theoretical assumption tendered that such breaks are integral elements of political development.

In Chapter V, these diverse analytical strains are brought together. A modern, structural definition of corporatism, developed in Chapter III, serves as the basis for the alternative model presented there. The model offered is general, some will say vague. It is primarily an exercise, a particular illustration of the potential utility of a corporatist explanation that will hopefully stimulate further efforts. That such an explanation can relieve some of the anomaly we now face is also demonstrated. Corporatism has remained in the background of Western political theory since its misappropriation by the fascists prior to World War II. Although it may not yield all the answers we seek, it deserves renewed consideration. It might be a dead

end; it might be the next big step. Most likely, it will be something in between.

The Study

Having stated where we hope to get, let us consider how we expect to get there. Since this is principally a theoretical study, its theoretical underpinnings need to be clearly presented. First, the general approach to political science within which the study is rooted will be outlined, then the specific approach to be utilized will be discussed. By "approach" is meant an umbrella strategy for study that serves primarily as a heuristic device, but that can have some explanatory value.[8] Approaches usually involve "an organizing concept or set of concepts"[9] that chiefly offer guidance and/or direction. Certain general concepts become more and more useful to individual scientists as they pursue their personal intellectual objectives; this cluster of orienting concepts is here labeled one's general approach.

The general approach underlying this study is the systems perspective. This author does not agree with Morton Kaplan, who asserted that "a scientific politics can develop only if the materials of politics are treated in terms of systems of action,"[10] but does find

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[8]Alan C. Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science (2d ed.; Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1975), p. 155.

[9]Ibid., p. 156.

[10]Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 4.

the approach intellectually useful and stimulating. Stephen Wasby, who labeled it a "frame of reference," noted that "the political system idea serves to keep us attuned to the broad implications of political acts and institutions, and to the interrelatedness of events rather than to their idiosyncratic or particularistic aspects."[11] The most appropriate description of political systems analysis as a general approach that this author has encountered was provided by Alan Isaak:

> For political scientists who use it, systems theory is primarily a way of looking at phenomena--it is in many ways a state of mind. The commitment is made to concentrate on the system and its behavior, including the interaction of its elements, but not the characteristics of the elements. Systems theory is most accurately placed within the category of macro, as opposed to micro, approaches to politics. Now, as it is used by political scientists, systems theory seems to be of heuristic, not explanatory, significance. Thus the label "theory" is a misnomer; it is much more accurate to think of the systems approach as a conceptual scheme, perhaps even more realistically, as we just pointed out, as a state of mind or general orientation which serves as a jumping-off place for more specialized political research.[12]

The first and most thorough proponent of the systems approach to political analysis was David Easton. His trilogy of books on the subject[13] continue to provide insight to interested analysts, and certainly aided the study of comparative politics. Using the approach, moreover, Easton formulated one of the now-classic definitions of

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[11]Stephen Wasby, Political Science: The Discipline and Its Dimensions (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 109.

[12]Isaak, op. cit., p. 216.

[13]David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953); A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

politics: "the authoritative allocation of values for society."[14] For this author, that eloquent formulation is unsurpassed in parsimoniously capturing the essence of politics in words. Elegance, however, brings with it little utility for analysis. What is needed is a specification of political activity without sacrificing Easton's essence, and it is available.

In terms of scope and utility, and fortunately with little loss of parsimony, William Bluhm's definition of politics is very attractive:

> Reduced to its universal elements, then, politics is a social process characterized by activity involving rivalry and cooperation in the exercise of power, and culminating in the making of decisions for a group.[15]

It was this definition that steered this author toward decision-making as a specific approach to studying politics. The very complex process that politics is, makes it very difficult to analyze. Bluhm's usage of decisions as culmination points seemed to alleviate a good deal of that difficulty. Here was a firm starting point, a focus that the entire process touched somehow, and could therefore be reached through, if desired. This choice, of course, is personal. Each analyst selects from among the variety of available definitions, perhaps based on intuitive appeal, but more likely for reasons of utility. What helps

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Prentice-Hall, 1956); A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

[14]This definition was first presented in Easton, The Political System; it appears in the 1960 revision on p. 129.

[15]William Bluhm, Theories of the Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 5.

one better understand the phenomena under investigation, in a usable way, is the formulation one should choose. Each researcher must select exactly what activity to study, and this cluster of operating concepts is what has here been labeled one's specific approach. To this author, Bluhm's definition seemed both appealing and useful. Moreover, it appeared to elaborate Easton's notion, and William Riker provided the final linkage:

> Now if, as Easton asserts, politics is the authoritative allocation of values and if, as I interpret it, "allocation" refers not to a physical process but to the social process of deciding how a physical process shall be carried out, then the subject studied by political scientists is decision-making.[16]

This was not a new discovery. Decision-making was a popular focus for analysis during the late 1950's, stimulated primarily by the work of Richard Snyder.[17] It had been studied even before this, but in terms of models of rationality and actions by "the state." Snyder changed this; he initiated "a shift away from the analysis of reified abstractions and toward the investigation of empirical choices."[18] His work was part of the larger behavioral revolution occurring in the

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[16]William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 10.

[17]There are several works involved, the most complete single effort being Richard Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. Roland Young (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 3-38.

[18]James Rosenau, "The Promises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James Charlesworth (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 189-211.

social sciences, so much so that he exclusively focused on individual behavior:

> At the heart of Snyder's original decision-making framework is the simple notion that political action is undertaken by concrete human beings and that comprehension of the dynamics of that action requires viewing the world from the perspective of these identifiable actors. The observer may regard the action as unwise and it may in fact prove disastrous, but neither the judgement nor the outcome serves to explain why the actors proceeded as they did. Only by transcending his own judgements and adopting the perspective of the actors can the observer engage in explanatory analysis.[19]

Despite the spurt of studies that followed Snyder's "breakthrough," the "approach as such has tended to disappear from sight."[20] Why? Its focus was too narrow:

> Theories of political decision-making, in other words, can never be exclusively comprised of propositions about the officials who make choices. Processes located in the environment toward which officials direct their decisions are no less relevant than those which occur in their minds or interactions.[21]

Research about decision-making did not cease altogether, however. A variety of studies examined many different aspects of the subject, and one pair of authors has compiled and categorized an inventory of these efforts in terms of the "variable clusters" studied.[22] For the most part, such studies focused on particular cases; those that did not tended to search for underlying behavioral patterns (e.g., game theory

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[19]Ibid., p. 194. [20]Ibid., p. 207. [21]Ibid., p. 209.

[22]James A. Robinson and R. Roger Majak, " The Theory of Decision-Making," in Charlesworth, op. cit., pp. 175-88.

analyses), an implicit return to the search for the rational decision-maker.

To make the decision-making approach useful for theory development, a new focus is needed. The study of individual decisions or the actors involved is too specific; the search for presumed underlying groundrules too abstract. What is needed is what Robert Merton labeled a "middle-range theory":

> Middle-range theory is principally used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry. It is intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote from particular classes of social behavior, organization and change to account for what is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalized at all. Middle-range theory involves abstractions, of course, but they are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing. Middle-range theories deal with delimited aspects of social phenomena, as indicated.[23]

Although this notion of middle-range theory has not been used frequently in political science, it seems too appropriate for this study to ignore. Pluralism, elitism, and corporatism are certainly not general theories of politics; they represent, in fact, rival structural explanations of how authoritative decisions are made. This study, therefore, seems to fall squarely within Merton's middle-range category. What is needed is a useful middle-range set of concepts that can encompass all three rivals, but that avoids any explanatory claims of its own. Fortunately, just such a framework is available.

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[23]Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 39-40.

Several years ago, Paul Deising produced an analysis of societal decision-making in which he constructed five types of decisions, and presented his elaborate interpretation of the rationality underlying each.[24] The last of these, and the order of presentation was intentional, was political rationality, "the rationality of decision-making structures":

> I call this type of rationality "political" because politics is concerned with decisions and how they are made. The politics of a country or group is the process by which the group decides on its own activity and on the part to be played in that activity by members. The political structure of a group is the organization of forces which determines how its decisions are made, that is, its decision-making structure. Political science is the study of decision-making structures.[25]

Furthermore, he specified what a decision-making structure is by describing its three basic components:

1. . . . discussion relationships--talking and listening, asking questions and answering them, suggesting courses of action and accepting them. These relationships are combined in a set of roles which, in a settled group, get recognized and assigned to individuals.
2. . . . a set of beliefs and values, more or less held in common by participating members. These define the kinds of ideas that can seriously be considered during discussion and decision.
3. . . . the commitments already accepted by a group, and the courses of action in which it is already engaged. All decisions have to be made in an actual context of actions and commitments resulting from previous decisions.

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[24]Paul Deising, Reason in Society (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1962).

[25]Ibid., p. 170.

> The three components appear in all decision structures, though in a great variety of forms. In general, the larger structures are more highly differentiated, more formalized and rigid, more explicit and self-conscious, while the smaller ones are simpler, more fluid, and unself-conscious.[26]

Throughout this study, the three components will be labeled roles, rules, and circumstance, respectively. It should be noted that Diesing's ideas were not totally unique. David Miller and Martin Starr, for example, described the act of decision-making as follows:

> The decision-maker wishing to achieve some objective selects a strategy from among those available to him. This strategy, together with the state of nature that exists, and the competitive strategy that occurs, will determine the degree to which his objective is obtained.[27]

"Decision-maker strategy" and "competitive strategy" are, in essence, specific applications of role behavior and rules. Miller and Starr's "state of nature" is the equivalent of what we have here labeled "circumstance," although the latter seems more appropriate since it avoids any connotation of naturalness. Moreover, this is an important concept. It emphasizes that what has happened is shaping what will happen in subtle and complex ways. Many social scientists seem to view our social processes as "mechanical" in nature. Like a machine with some operational defect, many presume we can stop our government, economy, even society itself, and repair or rebuild it. An excellent example of this is the belief that wage and price controls will cure inflation. Human communities simply do not operate that way, and we

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[26] Ibid., pp. 171-72.

[27] David Miller and Martin Starr, The Structure of Human Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 27.

must acknowledge this. Diesing's simple statement of this bears repeating: "All decisions have to be made in an actual context of actions and commitments resulting from previous decisions."[28]

Thus, the selected approach leads to the analysis of the roles, rules, and circumstances that shape authoritative community decision-making. These are assumed to be the key elements of a society's political system, and will be examined within the specific context of American politics in the final chapter. Although the approaches that guide this study can be outlined, the method of analysis cannot. This effort is a case study of the classic type, and clearly displays the two major characteristics of such studies. First, the pattern model of explanation permeates it. Under this model, "something is explained when it is so related to a set of other elements that together they constitute a unified system. We understand something by identifying it as a specific part of a unified whole."[29] Roles and rules, for example, will be described and categorized as pluralist, elitist, or corporatist in Chapter V. Similar linkage efforts pervade the study. The second characteristic that marks this as a case study is its structure; it is concatenated. Several distinct analyses are offered, each with a separate conclusion, which then "converge on some central point, each specifying one of the factors which plays a part in the phenomenon which

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[28]Diesing, op. cit., p. 172.

[29]Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 333.

the theory is to explain."[30] That description seems to fit rather well the outline for this study provided above.

As a case study, this effort has both strong and weak points. No scientific conclusions can be offered; systematic empirical testing would be necessary before that. On the other hand, in-depth explorations of pluralism, elitism, corporatism, and political development are offered, as well as one trained participant-observer's perceptions of contemporary American politics. The conclusions that both current major schools have been rendered outdated, and the proffering of an alternative, are not presented under any pretext of wisdom. Other conclusions are certainly possible. This author firmly believes that a better understanding of our political process would yield better governance. My purpose is to stimulate that better understanding by challenging some current ideas and offering some useful alternatives; hopefully, the field of political science will be served.

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[30] Ibid., p. 298.

CHAPTER II

ELITISM AND PLURALISM: A BRIEF HISTORY

Origins

The literature dealing with elitism and pluralism is both voluminous and historically deep. It begins, in fact, with the very first political scientist, Aristotle. During the fourth century B.C., he compiled and compared the "constitutions" of 158 city-states, and generated his famous typology of political systems.[1] Although his prescription of monarchy as the most desirable form of government has been rejected, for the most part, in Western civilization today, the typology is still used. Based on his review of the "constitutions," which included systems from throughout the then-known world, Aristotle offered a very simple proposition: "The civic body of every polis is the sovereign; and the sovereign must necessarily be either One, or Few, or Many."[2] Despite the complexity of political structures and social systems today, that difference among governments is still used by analysts as a significant distinguishing characteristic. As noted earlier, the major debate regarding the American political structure today is between those who conclude that a "Few" control the government

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[1]Ernest Barker, ed., The Politics of Aristotle (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), Appendix V, Section III, Part I, pp. 386-87.

[2]Aristotle, Politics, Book III, Chapter VII, in Barker, op. cit., p. 114.

and those who conclude that "Many" can, and do, participate in that control.

The second major characteristic that Aristotle used to construct his typology would be troublesome for a modern social scientist to deal with, but it was actually his primary concern:

> The constitution is to Aristotle the State; and the constitution is not only "an arrangement of offices," but also "a manner of life." It is more than a legal structure: it is also a moral spirit. This is indeed its inward essence and its vital meaning. In treating of the State, therefore, a thinker must approach his subject from an ethical point of view.[3]

Thus, Aristotle's first concern was "the nature of the end for which the state exists."[4] His analysis was philosophical and his judgement was sharp and straightforward:

> The conclusion which follows is clear. Those constitutions which consider the common interest are right constitutions, judged by the standard of absolute justice. Those constitutions which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all wrong constitutions, or perversions of the right forms.[5]

Since our concern herein is a review of pluralist and elitist thought, we shall leave consideration of his forms of the singular sovereign for some other effort. With respect to government by the "Few," Aristotle was certainly not displaying humility when he labeled

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[3]Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Russell and Russell, 1959), pp. 5-6.

[4]Aristotle, op. cit., Chapter VI, p. 111.

[5]Ibid., p. 112.

the "good" form. Perhaps his choice was circumscribed by the Greek vocabulary, but it seems that such a rich language would have offered some suitable alternative. Whatever the case, he labeled it aristocracy, "that name being given to this species either because the best (aristoi) are the rulers, or because its object is what is best for the state and its members."[6] "Perversion" of this form occurs when the purpose of governance shifts. "Oligarchy is directed to the interest of the well-to-do";[7] the general welfare is subordinated or ignored when public policy is made.

Governance by the "Many" is similarly classified. Interestingly, Aristotle applied the label polity, "the generic name common to all constitutions," to the "good" type in which "the masses govern the state with a view to the common interest."[8] Its "bad" counterpart would serve a particular interest; "democracy is directed to the interests of the poorer classes."[9] Was polity the "normal," or most prominent type? In fact, it was not; two of the "perversions," oligarchy and democracy, were the "ordinary forms" among the Greek city-states Aristotle studied.[10] By using the generic name, perhaps he was hinting that, given the realities of human nature, polity is the best we can usually expect to achieve. Aristotle certainly questioned

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[6]Ibid., Chapter VII, p. 114.

[7]Ibid., p. 115.

[8]Ibid., p. 114.

[9]Ibid., p. 115.

[10]Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 446.

the capabilities of the average man, and population pressures seemed to doom his personal preference, monarchy.[11] Moreover, he rank-ordered all six types: monarchy, aristocracy, polity, democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny was the resulting list.[12] In Aristotle's schema, as a colleague succinctly stated it, "popular participation is the worst among the good, but the best among the bad."[13]

All typologies are, by nature, simplifications of reality. We have seen that Aristotle used two basic "variables," the mission of the government and the number of rulers, to establish his basic types. He was very concerned, however, that analysts, particularly reformers, seek to discern "the exact variety" of any political system if they sought true knowledge of it.[14] Moreover, Aristotle's structural criteria were never mere numbers.

> It is not the number, but the social class of the governing body, which has been made to constitute the differentia of these constitutions; the rule of the wealthy, the rule of the poor, have been the phrases used.[15]

Although he did not specifically address the two relevant "good" forms when he made this point,

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[11]Ibid., p. 445. [12]Ibid., p. 314.

[13]Robert Cunningham, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in an unpublished manuscript.

[14]Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 446.

[15]Ibid., p. 312.

> from hints elsewhere given we may learn, that what makes aristocracy is the rule of a class distinguished by inherited excellence, and that the polity is constituted by the rule of the middle class.[16]

The sophistication of Aristotle's analysis, which has certainly not been done full justice to here, might surprise some readers. It should not:

> Many of the problems and issues which had bothered the ancients have continued as topics for political theorists to the present day. This gives Western political theory a certain continuity. But major changes affecting political theory occurred when thinkers began to alter radically the context and conditions under which any answers and solutions to the problems could be made.[17]

Aristotle, along with Plato who is discussed in the next chapter, firmly established the "context" of political theorizing for some time to come. The label "classical" is usually applied to theory developed within the framework. One of the major differences between such works and what is labeled "modern" theory, i.e., the moral nature of the state, has already been noted; the other has not:

> The conception of the State as an ethical association for the attainment of virtue meant a conception of the relations of the state to the individual different from any which is current today. . . . Both by Plato and by Aristotle the positive inculcation of goodness is regarded as the mission of the State. They start from the whole: they look for the means by which its life and purpose may be impressed upon the individual. To the modern thinker the mission of the State is preventive: its function is

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[16] Ibid.

[17] William C. Baum, "Political Theory," in Wasby, op. cit., p. 290; many of the ideas discussed herein are drawn from Baum's essay.

> the removal of hindrances (rather than the application of a stimulus) to the moral life. We start with the individual . . . .[18]

This classical combination of philosophy and politics should not surprise any experienced student, because "until quite recently, political theory was political philosophy."[19] The most basic elements of inquiry were different. This essential distinction between the philosophical approach and the modern empirical approach has been captured very well by William Baum: "Classical theorists repeatedly argued the question: Who should rule and why? A behavioral scientist today would change the wording to who does rule and how?"[20] Philosophy, of course, sired all branches of learning, including political science, so its reign over early efforts should not be unexpected. Aristotle, furthermore, dominated all of early philosophy; the permeation of classical political thought by his ideas was the natural result, and this domination of context continued for quite some time. Francis Bacon, in fact, chided sixteenth century academics for clinging to Aristotle, "their dictator."[21]

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[18]Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 6.

[19]Baum, op. cit., p. 279.

[20]Ibid., p. 283; emphases modified.

[21]Quoted in Lee McDonald, Western Political Theory: The Modern Age (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 11.

The Transition

The path from classical to modern empirical theory was not a straight line, nor was it purely an intellectual movement. Baum again succinctly tells us a great deal: "theories are not brought by philosophical storks."[22] Change is the catalyst; it generates both its attackers and defenders. Recall the second difference between classical and modern theory noted above, the shift of primary focus from the community to the individual. This was not the product of revelation, but rather a response to realities:

> Many of the modern political thinkers rebelled against the monarchs and rulers who ruled in their own selfish interest with little or no regard for the material or moral betterment of their subjects. In order to break out of this tradition, modern thinkers developed a concept of individual sovereignty which was sui generis in Western thought. It is this concept, individualism, which above all else distinguishes modern political theory from its classical predecessor. In fact, the bulk of modern political theory is a debate over the meaning and consequences of individualism.[23]

Thomas Hobbes was the progenitor of this radical concept. In the seventeenth century, he rejected the basic assumptions of classical rationalism across the board, but particularly those related to politics.[24] Hobbes openly challenged both the idea of the natural community and the dependency thesis, i.e., that an individual's well-being depended upon the common well-being.[25] With a few short sentences, he

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[22]Baum, op. cit., p. 278.

[23]Ibid., p. 291.

[24]M. M. Goldsmith, Hobbes's Science of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 177.

[25]Ibid., Chapter 5, pp. 129-74.

shook the foundations of classical thought, and changed political theory forever:

> The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.[26]

Political communities, he argued, were formed by "social contract," a concept first clearly formulated by Thomas Hooker in the previous century.[27] Individuals joined together for reasons of self-interest, particularly self-preservation. There is some interesting irony involved here; individual rights, Hobbes argued, would best be protected under an absolute monarchy. Although he had rejected Aristotle's premises, he reached the identical conclusion.

Hobbes did not transform political theory singlehandedly; the transition involved many intellectuals and politicians, most of whom are probably lost in history. One other key link must be considered, however, in this admittedly bare-bones review of that long chain of change. In 1513, an exiled Florentine public administrator attempted to regain favor by preparing and presenting to the ruling Medici family a small political tract entitled The Prince. Niccolo Machiavelli was not recalled to service at that time (he was later), but his slim

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[26]Michael Oakeshott, ed., Leviathan (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962), p. 103.

[27]Peter M. Blau and Joan W. Moore, "Sociology," A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences, ed. Bert F. Hoselitz (New York: Free Press, 1970, p. 5.

treatise is considered by many political scientists to be the first work of modern political theory. Two aspects of The Prince are involved. First, Machiavelli totally rejected the classical concept of the state. In his analytical scheme, "the state is no longer an instrument for achieving the good life. It has become a dynamic, amoral entity."[28] He thus originated what Thomas Weldon astutely labeled the "machine theory"[29] of the state, "the notion that the state is an artifact--an artificial contrivance devised by man to do only what he wills it to do."[30] In so doing, Machiavelli actually preceded Hobbes in breaking out of the Aristotelian context.

The second major difference between Machiavelli and his classical predecessors was the basic thrust of his inquiry. He did not debate the question who should rule; like Hobbes, he had rejected Aristotle's premises but still concluded that a monarch was needed to insure order. The Prince represented "the starting point for a pragmatic examination of politics."[31] Machiavelli directly addressed the question how to rule, and his answer cut through the facade of rights and duties that prevailed in his milieu. He concluded that "the core of the state was

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[28]Christian Gaus, Introduction to the Mentor Edition, The Prince (New York: New American Library, 1952), p. 16.

[29]Thomas Weldon, States and Morals (London: Whittlesey House, 1947), pp. 130-41.

[30]Baum, op. cit., p. 292; he states, however, that this reformation was "a consequence of the development of individualism and government based on contract . . . ," but The Prince preceded both these developments.

[31]Wasby, op. cit., p. 204.

power,"[32] and presented his best advice on how to acquire it, use it, and expand it. When these two aspects of The Prince, i.e., the re-conceptualization of the state as an instrumentality and the "cookbook" approach based on power, are combined, his radical departure from tradition becomes evident: "Machiavelli therefore completely divorced the study of politics from the study of ethics."[33] Aristotle and philosophy would never reign completely over politics again.

What, then, of Aristotle's typology? Just as his basic concept, the state, was reformulated, so were his types. Hobbes's individualism and social contract approach, together with Machiavelli's instrumental state, stirred a revision of Aristotle's low rating of democracy. Baron de Montesquieu and John Locke truly shattered the classical context when they not only rejected the dependency thesis, but actually asserted the priority of individual rights, rejecting monarchy and all forms of non-representative government. They claimed, moreover, that these rights are not granted by the state. Man and his rights exist before the state is created, and certain of these cannot be bargained away, i.e., they are "inalienable."[34] Having now asserted these premises, however, the problem of how to rule the atomized community had to be treated. How could the will of the "Many" be translated into an operational formula? While some, most notably Rousseau, postulated a mystical "general will" that would permeate public policy-making,[35] others

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[32]Gaus, op. cit., p. 27.

[33]Ibid., p. 22.

[34]Baum, op. cit., pp. 291-92.

[35]Wasby, op. cit., p. 325.

realized that a concrete specification was needed. As has often been the case, a classical idea was resurrected; majority rule, taken from the Athenian constitution, was advocated by most democratic theorists. Henry Mayo expressed the underlying presumption of this modern concept of democracy very well: "democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half of the time."[36]

Two points about majoritarian democracy should be clarified. First, majority rule did not imply direct choice on all, or even all "important" questions. "The principal idea in democratic theory is that of rule by a majority, of all the people or of their representatives who would in turn be chosen by majority vote."[37] Pure democracy died in its birthplace, Athens, if it can be said to have ever truly existed at all. The second point is related to the first; again, a classical concept was modified to fit modern needs.

> Majority rule . . . does not refer to a single determinate majority formed at a particular time in relation to a particular issue. Instead, majority rule is a general way of arriving at decisions.[38]

Modern government by the "Many" would be a far cry from classical democracy. Modern democracy, in fact, might well fall under Aristotle's definition of polity. If one accepts the notion that the

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[36]Henry Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 175.

[37]Wasby, op. cit., p. 50.

[38]Howard Dean, Judicial Review and Democracy (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 46.

common interest is the legitimately expressed majority interest, it does.

As noted above, intellectual change does not occur in a vacuum. The revisions of these basic concepts were part of a very real political struggle:

> Beginning with the humanism of the Renaissance, continuing with the tradition of skepticism and Cartesian doubt, and culminating in the "self-evident natural rights" of the Enlightenment, this philosophical evolution never stopped challenging traditional authority and monarchy by divine right. Finally, the dam of entrenched privileges and venerable prejudices was breached by the British civil wars of the seventeenth century, the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the American and French revolutions of the late eighteenth century. In these four great upheavals, the revolutionaries put on their banners those individual rights and constitutional schemes for government by consent that had matured in over two centuries of modern philosophical reflection.[39]

Machiavelli and Hobbes might well have denounced those revolutions, although their radical ideas indirectly spawned them. Machiavelli's demythologization of politics rattled the foundations of the classical context; Hobbes's rejection of the natural community concept and his claim that individuals had personal rights shattered it. With its underlying premises in disarray, the quest for revelation regarding the "true" natural social order would not long remain the center of attention for political analysts. Thereafter, political theorizing increasingly took the shape of a debate over the form and function of government. The products of that debate, moreover, tended to converge

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[39]Peter Merkl, Political Continuity and Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 180.

within two basic schools of thought, modern pluralism and elitism. We will briefly review each.

Pluralism

Historically, a definite reaction against change tends to follow its success. Such was the case with respect to political theory:

> The new age of individualism had hardly begun to flower into actual institutions and guarantees of individual rights, when its tenets were contradicted both in theory and fact by a return to the collectivism of community-oriented life.[40]

The past is never fully recaptured, however. Although one of the major figures in modern political theory would resurrect Aristotle's focus on class as the critical political collectivity in society, newer phenomena demanded, and received, attention. Nation and race were paid homage to; Mussolini even mixed these two, within a revived classical context, to generate his cult of the state.

Civilization has been consistently advancing, moreover, but we have only recently come to understand what that means in structural terms.

> The main sociological characteristic of modernization is differentiation . . . whereby the various functions which were carried out in one social unit, the extended family, come to be served by a number of distinct social units.[41]

In that statement, however, Amital Etzioni does not mention the second

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[40]Ibid., p. 49.

[41]Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 106; he cites Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), with respect to these assertions.

of the major "cohesive forces of such strength that they alone could completely dominate and integrate a society," organized religion.[42] It was the merger of these two forces that created the pinnacle of traditional political organization, the hereditary absolute monarchy justified by divine right. Charlemagne's "spontaneous" coronation by Pope Leo III as Holy Roman Emperor on Christmas Day 800 A.D. was the historical event that created the precedent for future divine right monarchies. Some theoretical implications of this development are discussed a bit later.

As the state grew stronger, and Christianity fragmented, however, new doctrine was sought to protect clerical interests. F. W. Maitland in England, drawing heavily on the ideas of the German jurist Otto von Gierke, provided the starting point for just what was needed. He "was led to embrace the doctrine of the 'real personality' of the group":

> No permanent group, permanently organized for a durable object, can be regarded as a mere sum of persons, whose union, to have any rights or duties, must receive a legal confirmation. Permanent groups are themselves persons, group-persons, with a group-will of their own and a permanent character of their own; and they have become group-persons of themselves, without any "creative" act of the State. In a word, group-persons are real persons; and just because they are so, and possess such attributes of persons as will and character, they cannot have been made by the State.[43]

The purpose of seeking to establish this premise was to equate group

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[42]Merkl, op. cit., p. 71.

[43]Ernest Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914 (2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 153.

claims with those which recently had been so articulately and/or forcefully asserted for individuals. J. N. Figgis, in fact, specifically advocated its application to religious groups in his 1913 work Churches in the Modern State.[44]

Although the "real personality" doctrine failed to take root, it served as the basis for a new concept that was, eventually, to revolutionize political life. The attempt to equate groups with real persons undoubtedly ran smack up against some touchy theological issues. A more modest claim, however, that groups were "juristic personalities" entitled to certain legal rights, gained significant attention.[45] Over the centuries, force had been challenged by law as the primary medium of power. During the Middle Ages, when ecclestiatical law dominated via the Catholic Church, it gained its first real victory. While ecclesiastical law waned in influence, it generated a legacy that became one of the cornerstones of constitutional government. At its peak, law permeated social action; "the notion of the law, which Oliver Wendell Holmes called 'a brooding omnipresence in the sky,' was perceived everywhere and in every human and natural relationship."[46]

Although its influence diminished generally, law retained a much greater presence in politics than in other spheres of life. The impact

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[44]John N. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (London: Longmans Green, 1913).

[45]Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, p. 154.

[46]Merkl, op. cit., p. 175.

of new legal doctrine was direct in the political arena; in fact, the ascension of the "juristic personality" of groups created a whole new ballgame:

> It is obvious, that if this position be accepted, the theory of the state is vitally affected. For one thing, the mere emphasis laid on groups, whatever may be our ultimate theory of their origin, in itself affects our theory of the State. We see the State less as an association of individuals in a common life; we see it more as an association of individuals, already united in various groups each with its common life, in a further and higher group for a further and more embracing common purpose. In the second place we shall not only give a new nuance to our general conception of the State; we shall also tend to alter our theory of the relations of the State and associations. If we hold that a juristic person is born of a common conviction, and that it may exist in and through a social recognition which treats an association as such a person apart from and prior to any legal act of "creation," we shall at once in one respect limit, and in others enfranchise, our associations. We shall limit them in the sense that we shall treat them as persons, subject to the liabilities of persons, whether or not there has been a legal act of creation. If juristic personality does not depend on creation, a juristic person may be liable to responsibilities without creation; and it cannot evade those responsibilities by pleading that it had not been made a person de jure, at the same time that it acts as a person de facto.[47]

Maitland et al. sought recognition for social groups as legitimate political actors, independent of state sanction. In essence, therefore, they pressed the same claim for groups that earlier theorists had argued for individuals, i.e., that certain group rights were inalienable. The die was cast.

Recall how the early claims that individuals were legitimate political actors soon evolved into the proposition that they were, or should be, the primary political actors. The basic concept of

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[47]Barker, Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, pp. 154-55.

individualism, that is, spawned modern democratic theory. A similar development followed the legal personification of groups; the result was pluralism. Barker noted above that the acceptance of the juristic personality of groups led to changes in formal political relationships. The impact was actually far greater. Pluralism envisioned the community in a new way, one that touched informal political and even non-political facets of life:

> "Society" is the conglomeration and interaction of the many spontaneous and creative group activities. The state is the instrument for ordering and adjusting society in accordance with and by the authority of the will of the sovereign. It is also the largest and most inclusive group of the body politic, counting all citizens as its members. Since most citizens, however, belong to at least one other group, and often a number of other groups, the loyalty of the citizen is likely to be divided. He feels beholden not only to his country, or state, but also to his labor union, his church, his fishing club, or his neighborhood group.[48]

Early pluralist theory first gained significant attention in America through the works of Harold Laski, an Englishman. He argued that the state no longer wielded absolute sovereignty over modern communities, and cited the English government's recognition of the autonomy of religious groups in the nineteenth century as evidence. That recognition came only after a protracted struggle, but it was an historical fact to Laski, and portended more of the same.[49] The essence of these early theories tended to be "that politics was molded by the group influences upon it, not by the abstract forces of law, precedent, and

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[48]Merkl, op. cit., p. 72.

[49]G. David Garson, Power and Politics in the United States (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977), p. 42.

reason so emphasized by the jurists."[50] Arthur Bentley, however, who is often cited as the founder of the pluralist school, carried the argument a step further. He asserted that group activity was politics: "When the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated. When I say everything I mean everything."[51] The new wave followed the old path; claims to basic legitimacy as political actors generated eventual arguments for group primacy in politics.

Democratic Pluralism

And what of individualism and its offspring, modern democracy? There could not be two primary sets of actors in the political process; something apparently had to give. Instead, however, what occurred was something this author considers to be one of the major historical examples of Hegel's dialectic in action. Pluralism and modern democracy merged, via the group concept of the public interest, into democratic pluralism. Early modern democratic theory had stressed the primacy of the individual, including an implicit assumption that the average person was capable of rational participation in politics. It was from Aristotle, who ironically distrusted the common man, that this assumption derived. He had argued for rationalism, which included the notions

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[50] Ibid., p. 41. Garson labels this "classic pluralism," but his sole basis is a contrast with the post-World War II revival of pluralist theory.

[51] Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), pp. 208-9.

that "knowledge is both accessible and public," that "the demonstration of truth is public," and that "the public can comprehend it."[52] Twentieth century political science, however, was very wary of behavioral assumptions. The empirical wave, bolstered by borrowed means and renewed interest in politics stirred by international conflict, challenged all existing theories. Studies rooted in psychology and social psychology generated an antithesis to the rationalist assumption, apparently leaving democratic theory without an anchor:

> The very basis of democratic theory had been severely damaged by research after World War I on the limitations of public opinion, on the new science of propaganda and later, on opinion control and psychological warfare. Traditional theory, with its assumption of interested and rational citizens, seemed irrevocably rebutted by studies that showed apathy, ignorance, and prejudice widespread.[53]

Democracy seemed doomed, and Walter Lippman's The Phantom Public, which "crystallized the mood of pessimism,"[54] seemed to be its epitaph. Recall also that totalitarian and other radical nationalist movements were spreading in Europe; democracy was being threatened by much more than statistical correlations. The need to revive confidence in democratic institutions was very real, and a response was soon

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[52]Baum, op. cit., p. 286; he states, in fact, that "there is in rationalist tradition a suggestion of democracy."

[53]G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), p. 58.

[54]Garson, Power and Politics in the United States, p. 43; Lippman's work was published in 1925 by Harcourt and Brace, New York.

forthcoming. Quite simply, the most basic premise of pluralism was applied to the problem, with Francis Wilson firing the first volley. Meaningful participation was "the crucial test of the existence of a 'public,' and, therefore, of democracy," he argued, but why continue to focus on the individual?[55] In a complex, differentiated society, all social interaction tends to revolve around clusters of individuals who share some common concern, or social groups. As a social interaction process, politics would share that characteristic. Wilson rejected a focus on individual behavior (e.g., voting, opinion polls) in a world that functioned via group processes, as unscientific. "Many historic reforms in government," he asserted, "have been attempts to reorganize participation, and many new ways of making participation effective, especially by organized or conflicting groups or interests, have been developing."[56] Moreover, Wilson cited empirical studies, such as those reported by Peter Odegard in The American Public Mind[57] that drew attention to the influence of pressure groups, unions, churches, etc., on public thought, to support his assertion.

Political participation, therefore, took place via group advocacy of distilled individual preferences, but what of the common

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[55]Garson, Group Theories of Politics, p. 59.

[56]Francis Wilson, "Concepts of Public Opinion," American Political Science Review, 27, 3 (June, 1933), 375.

[57]Peter Odegard, The American Public Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930).

interest? Under early modern democratic theory, a majority of individuals determined what was best for the community at large. How was such determination to be made under democratic pluralism? It was not to be made at all. E. Pendleton Herring drove the final nail into the coffin of classical pluralism when he rejected outright the notion of an objective common good:

> The conception of the public welfare draws its content in any given case from the substance presented by certain special interests, not in terms of some abstract ideal, but rather in terms of the parties at conflict and in relation to the law . . . . Hence the public interest cannot be given concrete expression except through the compromise of special claims and demands finally effected. Special interests cannot be banished from the picture, for they are the parts that make the whole . . .[58]

Thus, democratic pluralism was born, or more precisely synthesized. Herring's reformulation certainly represented a major normative shift, but it was welcomed for the most part. The Politics of Democracy,[59] the most complete statement of Herring's position, was hailed as "probably the most thoroughgoing defense of American politics ever written by a reputable scholar."[60] Since positive reinforcement was wanted, and needed, at that time (1940), the radical philosophical

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[58]E. Pendleton Herring, "Special Interests and the ICC," American Political Science Review, 27, 6 (December, 1933), 916-17.

[59]E. Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy (New York: Norton, 1940).

[60]E. E. Schattschneider, American Political Science Review, 34, 1 (August, 1940), 788-89.

nature of this new group theory of politics was basically ignored.[61] Scientific aspects were not ignored, however. If our political structure was characteristically fragmented, what held the system together? Consensus, replied Charles Merriam in A Prologue to Politics,[62] and most pluralists agreed. How could the process be studied, given the variety of form and function among groups? Access to decision points, David Truman argued, is "the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups. The development and improvement of such access is a common denominator of the tactics of all of them."[63] When access is studied, do the results support the tenets of democratic pluralism? Robert Dahl offered a resounding affirmative response. "There is," he wrote, "a high probability that an active and legitimate group can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage of the process of decision."[64]

Democratic pluralism involves much more than what has been presented here. In its more developed form, moreover, it remains "the

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[61]Garson, Group Theories of Politics, states that Herring's "positive and patriotic assessment" was "the foremost reason for the welcome," p. 62.

[62]Charles Merriam, A Prologue to Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

[63]David Truman, The Governmental Process (2d ed.; New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 264.

[64]Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 145.

dominant way of looking at how politics works" in America.[65] As such, it will be encountered again as this study progresses. Our purpose so far has been to trace its evolution, not in a comprehensive way, but by noting highlights. Since very early in this discussion, however, its major rival, elitism, has been neglected. A somewhat incomplete picture has thus been provided, because rivalries do tend to affect developments. We must now return to elitism, and consider its geneology. In the clash between these two schools of thought, moreover, the major historical intellectual thrusts of American political science can be seen.

Elitism

The reader should recollect the contrasts drawn above between classical and modern political theory. Classical theory is herein defined as those tendered explanations that fall within the classical, i.e., essentially Aristotelian, context. The basic tenets of this context were an organic conceptualization of society, a normative concept of government, the presumption of an objective common good, and the social dependence of the individual. Thus, Aristotle presented his two classical types of elitism, aristocracy and oligarchy, as distinguished not by form, but by operation. An aristocracy exists when the "Few" rule to benefit all; an oligarchy exists when the "Few" rule to benefit themselves. These types remained rather stable in Western political

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[65]Garson, Group Theories of Politics, p. 43.

thought well into the eighteenth century. Although Machiavelli launched his assault on the classical context in 1513, it should be noted that "for nearly three centuries it will remain dissevered from the main currents of modern political thought."[66] The effective break with Aristotle began in the following century, when Hobbes asserted that individualism was the basis for the social contract by which men governed themselves.

Until Hobbes and those who followed challenged the basic tenets of the classical context, there was little change in elite theorizing. Aristocracy flourished in theory, with a variety of supporting concepts offered to complete particular arguments. Heredity was the apparent favorite source of leadership qualities, so the dynastic monarchy was a favored form of aristocracy. As Europe progressed through its intense struggle to establish workable nation-states, while the Catholic Church fought to retain its political clout, a curious merger took place. The ability to rule was not merely inherited from one's earthly father, it was argued, but from "Our Father God Almighty." This "divine right" to rule represented the epitome of classical elite thought; one was not merely plugged into an organic community by accepting that brand of absolutism, one was linked to an organic universe. As long as civil law melded with ecclestical law and teaching, the aristocracy was legitimate. Should it stray from the path of the common good, as defined by the Church, it lost its legitimacy. Oligarchy was not

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[66]Gaus, op. cit., p. 15.

condoned, at least not in theory. Catholic political thought will be discussed again, in some detail, in the next chapter.

In spite of the normative rhetoric, some analysts "rediscovered" Machiavelli's insight that power was the real concern of politics, not some abstract state of virtue. It was the long struggle against tyranny and oligarchy that spawned individualism and its aftermath.[67] We noted above that a return to collectivist thinking occurred not long after the rise of individualism, and discussed how pluralism evolved from those early efforts. Prior to those developments, however, there was a strong neoclassical backlash spawned by the French Revolution in 1789. As part of that backlash, which is usually considered the birth of conservatism as a school of political philosophy, both major embellishments of classical ideas and the seeds of the final demise of the classical context were produced.

The most famous product of that movement is Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France,

> which excoriated the French revolutionaries for the boundless human arrogance with which they believed they could step out of the stream of historical continuity, and out of their place in society and in God's universe, in order to determine their own fate.[68]

This work, and his others, exemplified the neoclassical approach. More

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[67]Alpheus T. Mason traces the struggle back to the Putney debates" of 1647 in which the Puritans opposed the policy of Charles I in Free Government in the Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 3-21.

[68]Merkl, op. cit., p. 127.

important, however, it clearly presented a concept that had permeated classical elite theory since Aristotle, but that had never been sufficiently specified to allow careful analysis. Burke could not undo what had been done; individualism could not be totally rejected. Instead, he attempted to resurrect the dependency thesis of individual good, at least with respect to politics. There was an organic nature to all communities, he argued, and everything fit into God's universe in its proper place. A natural aristocracy should rule, but each individual's welfare would be protected by it. How was this achieved? By "virtual representation"; "the king is the representative of the people; so are the lords; so are the judges. They are all trustees for the people."[69]

Some analysts have equated Burke's concept with modern notions of trustee representation, in part perhaps because he used that term. William Baum, for example, states that arguments urging representatives to apply their own best judgment and to consider broad rather than narrow interests are "most often associated with Edmund Burke."[70] This author disagrees with that assessment. Burke did not argue for that kind of representation, he claimed it as fact. His context was neo-medieval; society was an organic whole with all its parts properly

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[69]Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France,"(1790) Burke's Politics, eds. Ross J. S. Hoffman and Paul Levak (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), p. 301.

[70]Baum, op. cit., p. 396.

placed by divine plans. If the social process was allowed to flow, the natural aristocracy would inevitably pursue the common good, and the best interest of all members would thereby be served. Trustee representation in the modern sense deals with a world of elected representatives and competing interests; Burke wished to reject that world. The modern trustee concept implies choice on the part of both representor and representee, while Burke's approach was distinctly different. He envisioned social progress as a process that unravels around us; the only choice was God's. The concerns of every human being were assimilated in Him and administered by his agents; de facto individual representation resulted.

Burke thus explicated an idea that had always been implied in classical theory, but had never been articulated. Why? It is not necessary to account for something that does not exist, and individual political rights did not "exist" until Thomas Hobbes "discovered" them. Burke was, in fact, attempting to reconcile individualism with the basic tenets of classical thought when he formulated his concept. Hanna Pitkin, who has thoroughly analyzed this aspect of Burke's theory, states that for him "all representation might be virtual."[71] He later acknowledged that some element of "actual" representation might be justified (more below), but believed that each individual would best be served by "an aristocracy of virtue and wisdom governing for the good of

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[71]Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 173.

the entire nation."[72] Burke's theory was permeated by elitism: not only should elites rule, but only they could rule properly. Since the individual's well-being was dependent upon the successful functioning of the whole society, it behooved him to accept elite rule. By explicating this idea, however, Burke created a target for modern analysts. First, as Pitkin points out, the concept is tautological; when it is applied, representation "becomes a synonym for good government."[73] Moreover, virtual representation can only function within a classical context. Without an objective common good to measure the elite's performance against, it cannot be evaluated. Burke's concept is rendered useless.

Burke was somewhat of a transitional figure, however, despite being wrapped up in his neoclassical beliefs. He recognized that demands for representative government were becoming louder and louder, but remained vehemently opposed to democracy. Due to his antipathy toward the average person, he sought to base whatever actual representation would be allowed on "interests" rather than individuals:

> Burke conceives of broad, relatively fixed interests, few in number and clearly defined, of which any group or locality has just one. These interests are largely economic, and are associated with particular localities whose livelihood they characterize, and whose overall prosperity they involve. He speaks of a mercantile interest, an agricultural interest, a professional interest. To a very great extent, these interests are conceived as "unattached"; it is not the interest of farmers, but the agricultural interest--an objective reality for Burke apart from any individuals it might affect.[74]

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[72]Ibid., p. 172 [73]Ibid., p. 171. [74]Ibid., p. 174.

This strikingly modern notion, i.e., that something other than the common good existed and should be served by government, stands out among Burke's ideas. He attempted to reconcile this notion with his claims for virtual representation, but could not. The result is "another instance of Burkean inconsistency";[75] his particular proposals were impossible to implement. Burke filled an important theoretical gap, however, by explicating the concept of virtual representation, but at the same time he exposed it to the analysis that would eventually discredit it. Virtual representation could not long hold standing in the real world of late eighteenth century politics; classical elitism was dying. Once again, an attempt to defend the old spurred the birth of the new.

Modern elitism had many parents. Machiavelli's proposition that politics was a power struggle rather than an ethical endeavor is one of the critical elements in its evolution. Power is the focus of all modern political theory; where pluralist and elitist schools diverged was in locating the power struggle. The former, seeking to continue claiming individual rights while recognizing that individuals were limited social actors in large, differentiated communities, located the struggle among numerous clusters of individuals with common concerns. The latter, also recognizing the limited capabilities of individuals, returned to Aristotle and viewed the struggle as taking place between social classes.

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[75]Ibid., p. 171.

What constitutes elitism? Geraint Parry, in his synopsis and analysis of modern elitist theory, offers the following "definition":

> The core of the elitist doctrine is that there may exist in any society a minority of the population which makes the major decisions in the society. Because these decisions are of such wide scope, affecting the most general aspects of the society, they are usually regarded as political decisions even where the minority taking them are not "politicians" in the usual sense of members of a government or legislature.[76]

Although he states that "the character of elitist thinking cannot be fully understood if the impact of Marxism on it is not appreciated," and that "elitism parallels Marxism very closely in the problems discussed," Parry does not include Marx in the elitist school.[77] Apparently he classified Marx according to his vision of the future and his normative stance rather than his contribution to political analysis. Admittedly, Marxism is a complicated, ideological body of social philosophy, and as a social philosopher Marx is anti-elitist; but as a social scientist, Marx can be considered the first major modern elitist thinker. He is so considered in this study.

It was noted very early in this chapter that Aristotle based his typology of political systems on "the social class of the governing body."[78] Of course, the Aristotalian context included the organic concept of the state; the classes did not struggle, they naturally

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[76]Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 30.

[77]Ibid., p. 27.

[78]Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 312.

organized themselves in different ways to fit different circumstances. Moreover, elite rule, properly executed, was rated second only to monarchy by Aristotle. Modern theorists, with their focus on power, rejected the neutrality of Aristotle toward elitism as a form of governance. For some, it would be deemed necessary and good for society to have a ruling elite. For others, elitism implied exploitation. Marx was not the very first modern theorist to view politics as class struggle. "The class conflict was central to the theories of both British socialists and economists" and others who preceded Marx.[79] His unique contribution was twofold. First, he posited class conflict as the centerpiece of social evolution: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle."[80] Second, he linked the conflict inextricably to economics; "the existence of classes is bound to definite historical phases of the development of production."[81]

The significance of economic activity in the political process had been recognized earlier. James Madison and the Federalists were apparently the first directly to address the question.

Madison's argument against "factions" in Federalist,

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[79]Dirk J. Struik, Birth of the Communist Manifesto (New York: International, 1971), p. 65.

[80]Karl Marx, "The Communist Manifesto," in Struik, op. cit., p. 89.

[81]Struik, op. cit., p. 66, paraphrasing a letter from Marx to Joseph Weydemeyer dated March 5, 1852.

> Number 10, for example, alluded to the need to protect propertied interests from debtor factions gaining power in seven states prior to the ratification of the Constitution.[82]

Burke's acknowledgement that certain basic, "largely economic" interests should be represented in political deliberations was noted above. Moreover, John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy was published the same year (1848) as Marx's Communist Manifesto, and while they disagreed on specifics, both thinkers strongly asserted the politics-economics linkage:

> Mill believed government's foremost functional tendency was its role as the protector of person and property. In particular, Mill noted that governments everywhere serve to protect the "productive classes" from the masses. Marx agreed with this, but said Mill was wrong in assuming all governments were the same. Rather, Marx held, governments differ according to the stage of production in society (feudal stage, capitalist stage for example). In each stage, production creates its own legal relations, its own form of government, and its own culture.[83]

Marx, therefore, envisioned political development as the rise and fall of oligarchies; aristocracy was a myth. Through some mystical awakening of the masses, however, this process of serial economic oligarchy was to generate a classless society. In so concluding, Marx actually spurred the development of the modern elitist school of thought. Parry tells us, in fact, that Vifredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, two of the most noted members of the school, "were as much concerned to refute Marx as they were to explore an ethically neutral political

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[82]Garson, Power and Politics in the United States, p. 329.

[83]Ibid.

science."[84] It was Mosca who authored the most famous formulation of the modern elitist thesis:

> In all societies . . . two classes of people appear--a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first . . .[85]

The contrast with the classical context is clear. "Power," "advantages," "controlled"--these are the operative words; there is no reference to ethics. Nor is there any mention of natural abilities. Membership is based on the possession of "some attribute which is valued in the society," perhaps "wealth, a concern for the public good, military prowess, or status in a religious hierarchy."[86] Different societies venerate different qualities in their leaders. Moreover, the success of an elite was not automatic. It had to be achieved, and the "key" to success for Mosca was the "capacity for organization."[87]

Mosca was not only anti-Marx, but also anti-Aristotle. He was committed to advancing social science, and considered Aristotle's classical typology a genuine obstacle. In an early work, he bemoaned the fact that it was "still in our day universally accepted," and criticized it as being based on "mere trivialities and appearances."[88]

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[84]Parry, op. cit., p. 27.

[85]Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50.

[86]Parry, op. cit., p. 37. [87]Ibid.

[88]Gaetano Mosca, Teorica dei governi e governo parlamentare (2d

Moreover, Mosca directly contradicts Aristotle's basic assertion; as paraphrased by Parry, he argues:

> Neither one man nor the mass of people (Aristotle's "the one" and "the many") can rule. The single ruler needs the backing of advisors and administrators, propagandists and police. On the other side, "the people" can only act politically under the direction of a small group of leaders.[89]

Having rejected the alternatives, Mosca proceeded to elaborate the composition, functioning, and circulation of elites. He acknowledged that different forms of elite rule existed, with the critical differential being the flow of authority (up or down) and the source of recruitment (aristrocratic or democratic).[90] In addition, all elites are further divided into upper and lower "stratums." Members of the lower stratum generally staff the bureaucracy, function as opinion leaders, and ultimately renew the upper stratum via cooptation. Rensis Likert's concept of the "linking pin"[91] seems applicable here.

Mosca's concept of the "ruling class," therefore, does not refer to the same phenomenon described by either Aristotle or Marx. The grouping it refers to is less fixed, more open; "the ruling class is now implicitly defined in terms of the extent of the political influence of the individuals and groups within it rather than in terms of its unity

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ed.; Turin, 1925), p. 15; as translated by Parry, op. cit., p. 36.

[89]Parry, op. cit., p. 36.

[90]Mosca, The Ruling Class, Chapter 15.

[91]Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 113-15.

and exclusiveness."[92] Ability and ambition are important qualities for membership; when successfully used to generate sound organization (not necessarily formal) among other members, they breed influence. Mosca envisioned an expanded elite as compared to Aristotle or Marx. In his later work, in fact, he argued for "mixed regimes";

> in them neither the autocratic nor the liberal principle rules supreme, and the aristocratic tendency is tempered by a gradual but continuous renewal of the ruling class, enabling it thus to absorb the better elements into its ranks.[93]

Mosca admitted, furthermore, that this is really nothing other than "the old doctrine of the golden mean," but of course, "there would still be the difficulty of determining just where the golden mean lies."[94] It is interesting to note, as James Meisel pointed out, that Mosca "made peace with Aristotle."[95] It is more interesting to note, however, as Parry does, that under close examination "Mosca's elitism finally sheds its scientific clothing and is revealed as ideology--a political theory for the middle class."[96]

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[92]Parry, op. cit., p. 41.

[93]Gaetano Mosca, Storia delle dottrine politiche, 1933, Chapter 40, as reproduced in English in James Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 390.

[94]Mosca, The Ruling Class, pp. 428, 429.

[95]Meisel, op. cit., p. 215.

[96]Parry, op. cit., p. 42.

Although it may appear that Mosca lapsed into tautology in his final formulation, this is not the case. Recall that the critical skill for Mosca's ruling class was the capacity to organize. This alleviates the circularity in defining a political elite in terms of its political influence. Successful political organization becomes the behavioral trait that identifies the "ruling class." Mosca anticipated the later realization of the importance of organizational capacity by the post-World War II pluralists, and introduced a theme that was to appear again and again in modern political writings.

One of the most famous applications of this theme is the "iron law of oligarchy" formulated by Mosca's disciple, Roberto Michels.[97] In a manner not unlike Marx's revision of Hegel's dialectic, Michels reversed Mosca's proposed relationship: elites do not really bring about organization, organization brings about elites. This process, moreover, is universal:

> Once again the central theme is that elite control depends upon organization. Michels extends this to mean not merely that organizational ability grants power but that the very structure of any organized society gives rise inevitably to an elite. In Michels' celebrated formulation: "Who says organization, says oligarchy."[98]

This formulation, based on the most "scientific" of the modern elitist studies,[99] for the first time tenders a complete explanation of elite functioning. Some few must direct any large-scale cooperative action,

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[97]Roberto Michels, Political Parties (New York: Free Press, 1958 reprint), p. 418.

[98]Parry, op. cit., p. 42.

[99]Ibid.

if it is to be successful. This "technical indispensability of leadership" provides the initial power base; by controlling resource allocation and information flow, the few use this base to increase and consolidate their power. Oligarchy is the inevitable result.

Michels was able to demonstrate, therefore, "that power breeds power--a central tenet of elitism,"[100] and to explain the circulation of elites. When one group was no longer able to successfully direct an enterprise, a new elite was generated who could, or the organization disintegrated. There are no claims regarding inevitability or natural selection; skill determines who shall rule. Such a process would likely be characterized by widespread, cutthroat competition, it would seem. Not so:

> While social theorists have often assumed a high degree of political interest and spontaneity on the part of the bulk of the population, Michels alleges that the majority is apathetic towards public matters. Most people are only concerned with politics when it affects their private interests. They have no knowledge of how the political system works . . . . For Michels apathy goes with technical incompetence in political matters. Political knowledge has to be organized to be effective and in Michels' description the majority is too apathetic to organize itself. Such men have, he believes, a psychological need for guidance. They are glad to have others take on political responsibilities. Even revolutionary agitation has to be undertaken by a small minority on their behalf.[101]

Individualism, it seems, led to a very different path for Michels than it did for the democratic and pluralist theorists. Rather than seizing upon individual rights to press for justice and equality, the majority retreats from the fray. When demands are voiced, they tend

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[100] Ibid., p. 43.

[101] Ibid., p. 44.

to be specific, and can usually be handled without difficulty by the elite. Successful handling of demands generates deference to the elite's skill. Michels argues that these psychological elements reinforce the structural tendencies noted above; "such apathy, submissiveness and deference provide ideal conditions for the few with the interest and the organizational ability to lead."[102] The structural and cultural dynamics of modern society will generate either oligarchy or anarchy; that is Michels' conclusion. His "iron law of oligarchy," moreover, remains one of the most intriguing products of modern social science to this day.

The work of another contemporary of Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, also deserves to be noted. While Michels stressed the structural tendencies toward elitism in modern society, Pareto stressed psychological forces. Pareto also used a very modern technique for his analysis. He began by stating several "sociological laws, derived from facts, which we will now once more confront with these facts."[103] These are not presented as laws in the same sense used by Michels, but rather "more or less plausible hypotheses" to be scrutinized.[104] The most recent commentator on Pareto's work has, in fact, labeled it "the first explicitly

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[102]Ibid.

[103]Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of Elites (Totawa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 26; originally published in Revista Italiana di Sociologica (1901), pp. 402-56.

[104]Ibid., p. 27

propositional theory of sociology."[105] His most interesting proposition, moreover, portends the development of phenomenology:

> First, let us note that the greater part of human actions have their origin not in logical reasoning but in sentiment. This is principally true for actions that are not motivated economically. The opposite may be said of economic actions, especially those connected with commerce and industry. Man, although impelled to act by nonlogical motives, likes to tie his actions logically to certain principles; he therefore invents these a posteriori in order to justify his actions. So it happens that an action A, which in reality is the effect of a cause B, is presented by its author as the effect of a very often imaginary cause C. The man who thus deceives his fellowman begins by deceiving himself, and he firmly believes his own contentions.[106]

Pareto proceeds to elaborate a typology of sentiments, using terminology that tends more to confuse than to clarify the issues involved. Readers are urged to consult Pareto directly, if they are interested in the full elaboration. We will focus only on the most relevant elements:

> For his analysis of the elites, Pareto makes use primarily of the first two--innovation and consolidation--or, as it is expressed somewhat clumsily, the "instinct of combination" and the "preservation of aggregates," Where they are concentrated in persons we may speak of "innovators" and "consolidators." One is out to get, the other to hang on to what he has. In today's society, the consolidators want old-age pensions, life insurance, fall-out shelters, job security, tough divorce laws, union shop; they put their money in savings banks or government bonds, and they are quick to call the police. The innovators make novel things and interpretations, put their money in stocks, sell

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[105]Hans L. Zetterberg, "Introduction" to Pareto, op. cit., p. 6.

[106]Pareto, op. cit., p. 27.

fall-out shelters, start new ventures, negotiate deals.[107]

Ideally, the elite will contain a balanced mix of innovators and consolidators, and replenish itself by open recruitment. Due to changes in general sentiment within the society, particularly with respect to religiosity, the need for innovation or consolidation constantly shifts, however. The ideal of equilibrium is also embattled when open recruitment is not practiced.

> Revolutions come about through accumulation in the higher strata of society--either because of a slowing down in class circulation, or from other causes--of decadent elements no longer possessing the residue suitable for keeping them in power and shrinking from the use of force; while meantime in the lower strata of society elements of superior quality are coming to the fore, possessing residues suitable for exercising the functions of government and willing enough to use force.[108]

Pareto tenders, therefore, an explanation of both unusual and usual elite turnover. Closed, decadent elites foster revolutions from below; open, active elites replenish themselves in accordance with changing societal sentiments:

> The "circulation of elites" implies more than that new men of money and power replace old ones. It means, above all, that the dominant residue in the elite changes: consolidators replace innovators, and innovators replace consolidators.[109]

Marx, Mosca, Michels, and Pareto, therefore, all concluded that elites ruled, but based that conclusion on different "evidence." Two

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[107] Zetterberg, op. cit., p. 7.

[108] Vilfredo Pareto, Treatise on General Sociology (New York: Dover, 1963), paragraph 2057; originally published in 1916.

[109] Zetterberg, op. cit., p. 8.

of them even projected contradictory "inevitable" futures. Marx claimed that elites would be swept away and eventually rendered non-existent by the abolition of their "cause," private property. Michels implied that oligarchy would proliferate as a result of the growing human tendency to organize. Mosca and Pareto had drifted toward pluralistic elitism, but became overly fascinated with Mussolini's manic Italian nationalism. World War II sidetracked many endeavors, moreover, political theorizing (not propagandizing) included. The behavioral revolution also swept through social science soon afterwards; supporting empirical data was demanded before any hypothesis would be considered acceptable. Mosca and Pareto were discredited by their association with Fascism, and their ideas seemed inappropriate to the new world situation. Complexity abounded, and the pluralists had a heyday, but "as for theorists of the elite, they were surrounded by Missourians, shouting: Show me."[110]

That challenge was initially ignored by political science, but C. Wright Mills, a sociologist, attempted to do just that when he published The Power Elite.[111] In it he argued

> that essentially self-perpetuating elites have such independence and such preponderance of power within the American system that they are for practical purposes the sole determinants of government policy. In Mills' eyes, the

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[110]Meisel, op. cit., p. viii.

[111]C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

> relevant elites included wealthy, politically involved families, corporate managers, and high military officers.[112]

What linked them? Not concerted action, only similar socialization experiences. Despite criticism of this rationale, it was used again by G. William Domhoff a decade later in Who Rules America?[113] He located our "governing class" by cross-tabulating the Social Registers of key cities, the membership lists of certain exclusive clubs, and the alumni rosters of selected private schools. The same criticisms voiced against Mills were repeated:

> But this facile interpretation is vulnerable in several respects. Domhoff's identification of the "governing class" rests on a form of social background analysis which is at best uncertain and at worst circular and self-fulfilling: men are members of the "governing class" if they are found to be listed in the Social Register--but the Social Register is a publication that lists prominent people in many fields of endeavor, including politics, so that a man could be listed simply because he held public office.[114]

Pluralistic Elitism

Despite criticisms, both schools of thought continued to argue that each was more correct than the other, and sought new avenues to demonstrate this. For this author, the most useful recent contribution to improved understanding of our political process has been provided by

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[112] Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Power and Change in the United States (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969), p. 11.

[113] G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

[114] Dolbeare, op. cit., p. 255.

the elitist school. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz[115] were the first political scientists to "discover" that a very important phenomenon was being ignored, not only by the pluralists, but by the elitists themselves:

> Finally, the traditional concept of elite is defective in that it ignores a significant attribute of elite power--the capacity of elites to make decisions through the form, paradoxically, of making nondecisions. An elite not only wields an inordinate amount of power in making decisions to initiate, approve, or veto policies within the scope of his [sic] influence, but he also exercises a great amount of power by preventing issues from being publicly considered that might threaten his interests. The exertion of power to achieve the latter objective may properly be called nondecision-making.[116]

This concept of nondecision-making added a new dimension to the pluralist-elitist debate. Apparently rooted in existentialist thought (i.e., the notion of constant choice), it also influenced social thinking in general. One of the most prominent poster slogans during the 1960's youth rebellion in America seems to have been drawn from this very idea: "Not to decide is to decide."

This basic concept, however, was insufficient. It had to be integrated into a model of policy development to be usable for systematic research; an example of this was produced by Roger Cobb and

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[115]Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 947-52; and Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 632-42.

[116]Peter Bachrach, ed., "Introduction," Political Elites in a Democracy (New York: Atherton, 1971), p. 6.

and Charles Elder in the early 1970's. They formulated a model of policy-making that incorporated the notion of nondecision-making by introducing and elaborating the concept of agenda-building.[117] The following summary of their ideas was provided by Grover Starling, a policy analyst whose work we will refer to again below:

> Cobb and Elder distinguish between systemic and institutional agendas. System agendas refer to all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority. Every political system--national, state, and local--therefore has a systemic agenda. It is essentially a discussion agenda, a reflection of public concern.
>
> Cobb and Elder define the institutional agenda as that set of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decisionmakers. They distinguish between serious and "pseudoagenda items" to account for issues which get only vocal attention from decisionmakers. Once again, the precise identification of the agenda is no simple matter since one must establish criteria for determining what constitutes "active and serious consideration." But surely we can include here such formal expressions of agenda items as the State of the Union message, specific policy messages by the president, counterassessments by Congressional party leaders, and major bills introduced into Congress.[118]

Charles Jones further elaborated this latter concept in a recent work:

> Not all institutional agenda items reach the White House. Much research, definition, planning and building support occurs within the labyrinthian structure of government. In

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[117] Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).

[118] Grover Starling, The Politics and Economics of Public Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1979), p. 132.

> fact, the really crucial agenda-setting processes for certain problems may occur deep within a department or congressional committee where specialists determine priorities and negotiate solutions.[119]

Unfortunately for the elitist school, their great discovery did not serve them well. In fact, when the process of agenda-building is closely examined, the notion of a monolithic power elite in American politics crumbles under its own weight:

> What determines whether something will or will not become an issue for public consideration and action? Some sought for years to make poverty a public issue, but in vain; public support for reform of the Selective Service System was sought for some time and with cogent arguments, but little broad awareness was accomplished. In order for a matter to enter broad political discourse, there apparently must be some visible members of established elites willing to carry it in specific form into public prominence; there must be an available and willing forum, either in the sense of extended previous discussion coupled with new and awakening events or a conveniently timed election campaign where attention has been focused by events; and the subject itself must be something that can be linked with one or more of the deeply held values or ideological elements of the American tradition. The first condition requires that elites be internally divided--so divided that one component is willing to risk the uncertainties of public participation rather than acquiesce in the alternative preferred by the dominant portion.[120]

One could, of course, discount the implications of this observation. An analogy could be drawn between the power elite and a family, for example, with the divisions Dolbeare describes as being merely "family squabbles" that do not detract from the underlying unity that exists. Not so. Dolbeare himself labels the process of agenda-building "perhaps the most significant stage of elite-mass interaction."[121]

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[119]Charles Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (2nd ed.; North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury, 1977), p. 41.

[120]Dolbeare, op. cit., p. 253.

[121]Ibid.

Moreover, no family would hold its fights in public, at critical times, over major questions, and long maintain its unity. The realities of competition and conflict had to be acknowledged by the elitists; pluralistic elitism became the norm within the school.

Democratic Elitism

Even the notion that plural elites controlled our political process was troublesome to many. What of our old friend democracy? The pluralists had reconciled democratic principles via group theory, at least normatively. Elitists, however, tend to favor empirical analyses, such as Bachrach's. Nondecisions are real phenomena. Agenda-building can be studied, and has been. When closely examined, elite control of the agenda implies much broader elite influence in the political process, and systematic research has verified this. Bachrach reported this, and tried to illuminate its full implications, but only got halfway:

> The empirical finding that mass behavior is generally in response to the attitudes, proposals and modes of action of political elites gives added support to the position that responsibility for maintaining "the rules of the game" rests not on the shoulders of the people but on those of the elites.[122]

It remained for Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler to carry these findings to their logical conclusion. Their "irony of democracy" thesis asks and answers the questions Bachrach stopped at. How are/have

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[122]Beter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 48.

our elites been meeting their responsibility for maintaining our system? Have they been "tilting" the system more and more in their own favor? Have they tried to suppress the rights of the masses? Ironically, no:

> Democratic values have survived because elites, not masses, govern. Elites in America--leaders in government, industry, education, and civic affairs; the well-educated, prestigiously employed, and politically active--give greater support to basic democratic values and "rules of the game" than do the masses. And it is because masses in America respond to the ideas and actions of democratically minded elites that liberal values are preserved.[123]

In fairness to Bachrach, it must be said that he has taken an admirable analytical approach to democratic elitism. His understanding of its development is quite thorough:

> I doubt if there exists a more striking illustration of Hegel's dialectic than the interaction between democratic and elite theories that has occurred over the course of the past two hundred years. Beginning with the attack against hereditary aristocracy by Machiavelli and Hobbes, neither of whom were democrats, theorists of democratic persuasion from Rousseau to Paine and Jefferson appeared to demolish the claim to rule by the rich, the wise, and the wellborn. But with the growth of industry and bureaucracy, both of which called upon the skills of the administrator and the expert, and the apparent gap between the democratic ideal and the practice of elite rule, the elitist writings of Saint-Simon and Michels on the left, and Mosca and Pareto on the right, very much deflated the anti-elitist position of the democrats. The elite-democratic controversy appeared at a standoff for many years until quite recently when American social scientists, drawing upon both schools of thought, developed a theory of democratic elitism. This synthesis has been accepted by a broad range of scholars in both America and Europe. Its appeal is due largely, I suspect, to its realistic cast. It is a theory which is chiefly explanatory, rather than normative, a theory which is based

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[123]Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (2d ed.; Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1972), p. 20.

> upon principles that are, in large part, adhered to in politics that are generally recognized as democratic. In the process of forming this synthetic theory, the overriding question was no longer centered, as it had previously been, among classical democratic theorists, on the ideals and aims that could serve as guide lines for an inspiring democracy, but rather upon the operating rules and principles that are an integral part of the political process of ongoing democracies.[124]

Pluralistic Democratic Elitism

So, we find ourselves still with two opposing explanatory theories, democratic pluralism and democratic elitism. Or do we? Grover Starling thinks not; he argues that a final synthesis has been, or should be, recognized. He labels it, justifiably, pluralistic democratic elitism:

> The modern view of democracy, while lacking the sharp edges of a full-fledged theory, can be roughly described in terms of three characteristics: social pluralism, diverse, competing, and accessible elites; and a basic consensus on the rules of democratic competition.[125]

The first characteristic is generally recognized as a primitive among American social scientists; the second has been demonstrated, as Bachrach conveyed above. What the rules of "fair" democratic competition are in a modern (i.e., large, complex) society are still being defined, however. Joseph Schumpeter, one of the earliest, and most convincing, democratic elitists argued that "democracy means only that the

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[124] Bachrach, Political Elites in a Democracy, pp. 8-9.

[125] Starling, op. cit., p. 126.

people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them."[126] Emmette Redford, an oft-quoted democratic pluralist, asserts a different view: "Workable democracy is the inclusive representation of interests in the interaction process among strategic organization centers."[127] Although these views do not constitute the totality of the pluralistic democratic elitism school, they certainly are representative of the two avenues from which it emerged, and interestingly they touch upon our two primary concerns: roles and rules.

Is pluralistic democratic elitism the answer we have been seeking? Yes and no. Its "discovery" certainly represents a fine example of the scientific process in action, whether or not one concurs with the particular portrayal of its evolution depicted herein. That very same process, however, demands further questioning. Most political scientists apparently have not yet accepted pluralistic democratic elitism, preferring to cling to the tenets of one school or the other. Therefore, they tend to repeat the same questions and continue to generate conflicting answers. Part of the problem may be that it is difficult to accept a synthesis based upon apparently diametrically opposed principles. The source of such hesitancy would seem to be the opposing normative aspects, which have their roots in the classical

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[126]Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 285.

[127]Emmette Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 197.

context. Acknowledging rule by the "Few," even in multiples, remains philosophically distasteful to certain analysts. Likewise, some cannot abide the fact that the "Many" have penetrated the political process in any way, shape, or form. Moreover, the very label itself would seem to aggravate such concerns and fuel the ongoing debate. Robert Dahl, who has offered the most systematic formulation, avoids it; he labels his version "polyarchal democracy."[128]

To this author, the solution to the dilemma is clear. The paradigmatic nature of the pluralist-elitist debate with respect to the field of American politics should be obvious. Continuation of the debate between the two schools might produce some further insights, but is more likely to stall the scientific process. A new theory or model is needed, as explained in the previous chapter, and pluralistic democratic elitism has not filled that need. Is there a "true" model waiting to be discovered? Not unless we wish to revert to the classical context, but there are alternative models and theories available for consideration. The remainder of this study is just such an exercise. Corporatism, a body of theory which also has roots that reach back to the very origins of political science, will be reviewed and applied to the American political system as outlined in the previous chapter. This author perceives it to be the most useful explanatory device currently available, but the final judgement must rest, of course, with the community of social scientists.

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[128]Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); and Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).

CHAPTER III

CORPORATISM: A BRIEF HISTORY

Corporatism is not a new school of political thought, and is actually older than pluralism and elitism. Although they have been treated separately here, the reader should keep in mind that their histories ran parallel and were at times intertwined. All three schools underwent the transition from the classical to the modern context of theorizing, in fact, but not simultaneously and not with the same results. The emergence of modern elitism and pluralism involved the de facto demise of their classical counterparts, for example, while classical corporatism remains prominent within its school today. Four branches of contemporary corporatism will be identified at the end of this chapter. Two of these espouse what are essentially classical theories that have survived into the modern era, one clearly falls within the modern context, and one represents a hybrid mode of theorizing. Both "classical context" and "modern context" refer to the same sets of basic presuppositions described in Chapter II. These will be pointed out below, but the entire transition will not be reexamined. The evolution of modern corporatism will be described within an historical narrative similar in nature to the presentation on pluralism and elitism. That transition involved the misappropriation of corporatist ideas by various Fascist movements prior to World War II; this "Fascist interregnum" is included in the narrative.

The origin of classical corporatism in the writings of Plato will be outlined first, followed by the story of its consociation with Catholicism, an affiliation that continues to this day and constitutes one of the school's major contemporary branches. Catholic Corporatism also indirectly spawned another of these branches. Iberic culture was infused with Catholic ideology, and these ideas were transplanted to Latin America when the Spanish and Portuguese colonized that area. Latin American Corporatism is briefly described below, and elaborated upon in Chapter IV as part of a discussion of Brazilian politics. A hybrid strain has also developed as a mutation of the Hispanic branches, and I have labeled it Progressive Corporatism. This has generated some negative reaction, but no other term quite expresses the desired connotation. Corporatism, particularly with respect to Catholic and Latin American variants, represents a tradition of raw conservatism. It tends to evoke anti-progressive and even reactionary associations. The mutant Hispanic branch, however, which is the newest and least developed, stresses national progress as a basic goal. There are only a few cases of this type, including Brazil. Progressive Corporatism will be outlined below, and elaborated in the analysis of that country's political history in the next chapter.

The only clearly modern branch of corporatism is, like modern elitism, a progeny of the Industrial Revolution. Societal Corporatism, a label chosen because it spans the literature of the school, is also outlined below and elaborated later in the study, in this case in Chapter V. Both of the classical holdovers and the hybrid describe/promote versions of state corporatism, which involves strong central

control and direction. Societal corporatism, on the other hand, emerges almost spontaneously within a system. The differences between these two major subtypes of corporatism will be an underlying theme in the latter parts of this study. These differences are sketched below and amplified via contrasting illustrations in Chapters IV and V.

Based on my historical review and an analysis of the literature on the subject, an updated definition of modern corporatism is tendered for consideration. It appears to capture the most important structural and behavioral characteristics of the phenomenon, in terms of the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter I. The four contemporary branches are then delineated, with important but previously neglected differences noted. To help the reader follow the ensuing narrative, Figure 1 has been prepared. It is an oversimplified diagram of the evolution of the corporist school of political thought, but it will hopefully provide a useful overview and frame of reference.

Origin

Corporatism originated in The Republic,[1] Plato's attempt to prescribe the ideal human community during the fourth century, B.C. Since Aristotle was Plato's pupil, one would expect a good deal of similarity between their ideas, and this is the case. Both agreed on

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[1]Plato, The Republic (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), translated by Francis Cornford; Ronald Rogowski and Lois Wasserspring, Does Political Development Exist? Corporatism in Old and New Societies, Sage Professional Papers, Series 01-024, Vol. 2 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 11, concur in this view.




Figure 1. The Evolution of Corporatist Theory

the organic nature of the community and state and on the existence of an objective common good,[2] and both were monarchists. Many of these ideas, of course, were actually derived from the work of Socrates and his predecessors, a source they both shared. There are distinguishing features, however. Aristotle does seem to deserve credit as the father of the general classical context for his role in systematically presenting and explaining general formulations of its key basic elements. Plato's work reflects a somewhat different approach. In contrast to Aristotle's "empiricism," he chose to argue for ideals, and specified them:

> Once he has introduced the city in 369b-d, he immediately advances the thesis, which is to dominate the rest of The Republic, that the needs of its inhabitants can best be met if each person in it performs that single task, and that single task alone, for which he is naturally suited (369e-370c; cf 423d). . . . This thesis, which can be called the Principle of the Natural Division of Labor, is then applied to the entire organization of the city.[3]

This "natural" division, furthermore, was rigid and hierarchical:

> "Platonic" corporatism, by far the more traditional view, is distinguished by the belief that the different categories of men are categories of permanent inequality of "quality" and status, and hence, are related to each other in an accepted hierarchical way.[4]

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[2]See Nicholas P. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1979), pp. 15, 35; R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 76-78, 260-61.

[3]White, op. cit., p. 17; the reference numbers used are the standard Stephanus numbers.

[4]Rogowski and Wasserspring, op. cit., p. 13.

Plato tendered, therefore, a distinct conceptualization of human society, and this elaborated notion of the organic community was the foundation of the corporatist school of thought. He certainly advocated the dependency thesis, and also specified what he believed the common good to be, his formulation usually identified as "justice." These ideas fall squarely within the classical context of political theorizing defined earlier, and will herein be labeled classical corporatism.

Although his main purpose was to describe the ideal "city," the bulk of The Republic deals with how that ideal might be made real. He was convinced, and argued convincingly, that a true Philosopher-King and a dedicated class of Guardians could be created by proper training and education:

> But as Plato so ingeniously foresaw, the political problem consisted less in knowing how to order the segments than in convincing them that the place to which they were assigned was in fact both natural and just.[5]

The solution? He advocated the "Noble Lie," a grand myth which every citizen would be socialized to believe in totum.[6] The particular myth he proposed for his republic was that the gods had originally created all people in three species: gold, silver, and iron; a person's place within the community was determined by heredity.[7]

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[5]Ibid.

[6]Plato, translated by Cornford, op. cit., p. 106.

[7]Ibid., pp. 106-7.

Catholic Corporatism

Classical corporatism was certainly not the theoretical basis for the Roman and Byzantine Empires, but corporatist ideas and structures were evident.[8] The school survived, moreover, and received its first real welcome in the institution that replaced the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church:

> The Platonic solution to the problem of legitimizing a society thought to consist of unequal categories of men--a solution grounded in the notion of hierarchy and differential justice--remained intact, with minor variations throughout the Medieval period. Indeed, from the point of view of its corporatist element, Platonic corporatism and its "Catholic" Thomistic version are, and have continued to be, identical.[9]

The Church, of course, did not need to generate a myth to justify the social system it supported. God, through his anointed agents, revealed which role structures and rules were the correct ones. The Platonic influence was very evident, particularly during the Middle Ages. A "Philosopher-King," the infallible Pope, ruled over everyone through his host of "Guardians," the priests. Everyone had their place, and sons usually replaced their fathers in the workforce. Deviation was allowed, but only with the local priest's blessing. The human race was portrayed as the body of Christ; failure to do as you should could

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[8]Phillipe Schmitter cites H. H. Scullard, A History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B.C. (New York: Methuen, Inc., 1962), and Speros Vryonis, Byzantium and Europe (Malibu, Calif.: Udena Publishers, 1967), in his outstanding treatment of the school in "Still the Century of Corporatism?" The New Corporatism, eds. Fredrick Pike and Thomas Stritch (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1974), pp. 85-131).

[9]Rogowski and Wasserspring, loc. cit.

condemn not only yourself, but the entire world. Church doctrine fully supported the primogenitor system of inheritance to maintain the positions of the noble families. It also served to replenish the ranks of the priesthood and the military officer corps; other than first-born sons had little choice but to become priests or soldiers. The cult of the Blessed Virgin also appears to have been designed to help maintain pure bloodlines.[10]

Alfred Stepan has outlined the long-standing parallels between the Catholic context of political theorizing and what is here called classical corporatism.[11] He seems to err, however, by tracing the lineage of Catholic thought back to Aristotle rather than to Plato. After first noting the permeation of Catholic thought by the concept of the organic community, which Plato and Aristotle shared, he continues:

> The second, and historically more important, principle is that, although the state is the most perfect political community, all the component parts (individual, family, private association) have a proper function of their own within the organic whole. Thus, each part has a sphere of natural action that the state should not eliminate. Since the 1930s this concept has been explicitly referred to as "the principle of subsidiarity."[12]

This idea seems to be much closer to Plato's Principle of the Natural Division of Labor than to Aristotle's less-specific formulations about communities. This does not detract from the general utility and

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[10]These assertions are my own, based on historical readings and twelve years of Catholic education.

[11]Alfred Stepan, The State and Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 27-35.

[12]Ibid., p. 35; emphases added.

quality of Stepan's analysis, but it is important with respect to placing Catholic theorizing within the Platonic, corporatist context as well as the more general Aristotelian classical context. The most complete formulation of classical corporatist theory is probably the work of St. Thomas Aquinas;[13] modern writers who espouse similar ideas today are still sometimes labeled "neo-Thomist."[14]

Moreover, some major theoretical contributions were made by these Catholic thinkers. From this author's analysis, the very label "corporatism" is derived from the Catholic notion of humanity as the living body of Christ; note that the Latin word for body is corpus. Probably the most significant contribution to Western political thought that emerged from this period, however, was the introduction of what William Baum called "the utopian future":

> Aristotelian Natural Law stressed the idea of tendency--that each character or quality is tending toward something to be reached in the future. This concept of time was peculiarly atomistic and limited. Entities had a nature to fulfill and they were fulfilled during the course of growth and maturation, ceasing at a given point. This naturalistic view undoubtedly reflected the Greek belief that nature itself moved in cycles of conception, growth and decay.
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> Through adaptation and embellishment, Christian thinkers changed Natural Law in a manner which profoundly affected Western political theory. The change, simply, was to free purpose and fulfillment from the cycle which began with great

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[13]His political theory is included in his Summa Theologica (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981); St. Thomas and the period in general are discussed in A. P. D'Entreves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).

[14]William Baum, "Political Theory," in Wasby, op. cit., p. 289.

> hope but which included inevitable death and to tie it instead to a concept which progressively developed to a time of Divine Deliverance. Whether expressed radically for centuries by Millenarian sects or more softly in the idea of attaining Grace, the Future as Progress is perhaps the point of departure in our political heritage. The "Good Vessel Natural Law" was loosened from its confining moorings by centuries of Christians who steered it toward a vision of distant fulfillment. This image is dominant in both ecclesiastical and secular political thought in the West. Whether expressed in the Utopian writings of a More or a Marx, in the totalitarian message of a Hitler, or the hopes outlined by a Jefferson, we find the central idea of linear time. In Western theory, past and present are future.[15]

Catholic corporatist theorizing, it thus appears, helped pave the way for the demise of the classical context; "Christian corporatism," however, would survive. That label was applied by Eugene Golob in his extremely thorough historical review of the school, the last such work since World War II, which is highly recommended to the interested reader.[16] Europe's domination by the Catholic Church was ended by waves of change; the Reformation and the discovery of America, the rise of national states, and the birth of capitalism, all whittled away at the foundations of Catholicism. Finally, "the French Revolution, the horrible Reign of Terror, and the military sweeps of Napoleon shocked the collective consciousness of Europe as much as, and perhaps more than, anything that has happened since."[17] Philosophers and politicians alike

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[15]Ibid., p. 288; emphases added.

[16]Eugene Golob, The "Isms": A History and Evaluation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. 541-98.

[17]Ibid., p. 544.

wondered whether the disintegration of civilization was at hand. Many blamed "eighteenth century rationalism and its attendant social movements" and argued that "the obvious cure was to return to the older values and institutions which had proved their stability."[18] Catholic theorists led the way:

> The idea of reincarnating the Middle Ages was naturally most congenial to conservative Roman Catholic romantics, to whom, in a sense, the Reformation could be classed with the French Revolution as an audacious attempt to destroy divinely inspired order. The neomedievalism in the guise of which corporatism made its bow to the modern world was therefore in part a Catholic intellectual movement.[19]

The past could not be recreated, however, and corporatist thinkers eventually broke out of the classical mold, as we shall see below. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, moreover,

> corporatism was democratized somewhat, now appearing as a program for the improvement of the conditions of the working class, for the betterment of employer-worker relations, for countering the appeal of Marxian socialism.[20]

Catholic thinkers absorbed some of these new ideas, but did not abandon their ecclesiastical approach. "Social Catholicism" was founded by Bishop Wilhelm von Kettler of Mainz, Germany, at about this time, and eventually received expression as Church doctrine in Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum.[21] This doctrine, which "confronted Marxian socialism with the motto of class cooperation and harmony rather than struggle,"[22] was also propounded by Pius XI in Quadregesimo Anno in 1931.

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[18] Ibid., p. 545. [19] Ibid. [20] Ibid., p. 543.

[21] Ibid., pp. 548-51 [22] Ibid., p. 550.

Catholic theorists continued to promote corporatism through World War II. The following definition was authored in 1935; the fifth edition of the volume containing it was published in 1951:

> A society formed upon a weft of organizations intermediate between the individual and the supreme civil society and completed by the state would be a corporative society. Of course, there should not be any leaping from the individual to the state, the peak in the economic and social order; but rather we must pass through a series of intermediate organizations, like the limbs that form the framework in individuals and collective bodies in the corporative system.[23]

Although the classical organic notion of community is not specified in the definition, the metaphor used certainly implies what the author envisioned. Pope John XXIII, moreover, clearly restated the principle of subsidiarity in his most important encyclical, Mater et Magistra, in 1961.[24] Considering the public rejection of the alternative "Marxist theology" by John Paul II at the 1978 Latin American Bishops' Conference, one can assume that the classical notion of a naturally ordered harmonious society still plays a large role in Catholic political thinking.

Transitional Ideas

In Chapter II, an outline of the transition from the classical to the modern context of political theorizing was presented, with some

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[23]Jose Joaquin Azpiazu y Zulaica, The Corporate State, translated by William Bresnahan (St. Louis, Missouri: Herder, 1951), p. 127.

[24]See Anne Freemantle, ed., The Social Teachings of the Church (New York: New American Library, 1963).

details related to the evolution of the pluralist and elitist schools of thought. The demise of the twin conceptual pillars of the classical context, the organic community and the objective common good, will not be restated here; it would serve little purpose. It was noted above that corporatist theorizing, inspired by the Christian notion of salvation, laid part of the groundwork for those developments by rejecting the Greek concept of cycles and replacing it with the idea of linear time. That was really the only major transitional contribution to Western political theory generated by the classical corporatist school. Limited as it was by its Catholic umbrella, the school could do no exploring until the Reformation, and little afterwards. The Industrial Revolution, which literally redesigned the elements of European society, provided new opportunity for the school, however. Golob relates the development of "secular corporatism"[25] alongside Social Catholicism in early twentieth century Germany, but another author warns us not to look for any clear early modern formulation:

> Thus, in the first decades of the twentieth century there was no single coherent corporatist doctrine, nor any dominant corporatist doctrinaire. Corporatism was, rather, an untidy intellectual kitchen midden comprised of brilliant social insights as well as the effluvia of some badly cracked pots, strategies of working-class resistance to the capitalist order and proposals for the reconstitution of a harmonious and hierarchical Christian society, limited projects for political and administrative reform through functional representation and the garbled verbalizations of the insecurities of individuals--artisans, intellectuals, aristocrats--threatened by marginalization in the onrushing change of industrializing Europe.[26]

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[25]Golob, op. cit., pp. 574-75.

[26]Ronald C. Newton, "Natural Corporatism and the Passing of

The most notable strain of early modern corporatism developed as a secular branch of German corporatist thought during World War I. Corporatist ideas were welcomed during and after the war because they "emphasized social stability and efficiency." This particular branch, epitomized by the work of Walter Rathenau and Richard von Moellendorf, was important because within its products, Golob tells us, corporatism "was for the first time linked with the idea of the planned economy."[27] That is not precisely correct, however. Catholic corporatism included specific concern for economic roles and conduct; the most fully developed planned economies that ever existed may well have been the European city-manor farm fiefdoms of the Middle Ages. The medieval guild system, particularly when functioning within a divine right absolute monarchy, probably produced the premier examples of corporatist organization in Western history. What Golob was actually referring to, it would seem, is that the "German collective economy" branch was the first to link the corporatist school with the planned industrial economy. Medieval Catholic corporatism had revolved around agriculture originally, and succeeded in coopting first the craft industry sector, then the merchant sector (at least for a time), before being overrun by liberalism during the Enlightenment. The Rathenau and von Moellendorf model represented a complete industrial-based system, including "an economic council topping a pyramid of management-labor assemblies" to

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Populism in Spanish America," in Pike and Stritch, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

[27]Golob, op. cit., p. 543.

replace the parliament as "the highest economic legislator."[28] They offered their scheme to those who were designing the government for the Weimar Republic, but had little influence.

Germany was not the only arena of secular corporatist theorizing. The British rejection of Catholicism was the most complete victory achieved by the Reformation. One result may have been a narrowing of British corporatist theorizing. Any classical influence, especially Catholic notions, seems to have evaporated; that is, if such a branch of the classical school even existed. The British branch of the corporatist school is strikingly modern; economic competition is its dominant concern. Furthermore, British Guild Socialism, most often associated with the work of G. D. H. Cole, advocated many corporatist notions, but its rationale for economic restructuring was more Marxist than corporatist.[29] Interestingly, contemporary British corporatist analyses continue to focus almost exclusively on economic planning and policymaking, while continental theorists take a somewhat broader view. The lingering association between corporatism and economic planning, a general characteristic of European theorists, is probably a legacy of early German concerns, i.e., reactions to industrialization, and to the German domination of Western social science at the turn of the century. Another point that makes the German collective economy branch noteworthy, was that it served as the catalyst for the most significant incursion of corporatist thought into American politics to date. Herbert

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[28]Ibid., pp. 574-75.

[29]Ibid., pp. 575-76.

Hoover, who served as director of the American relief effort in Germany after World War I, was exposed to the branch's ideas and apparently influenced by them.[30] Amidst the cross-pressures of the times, and due to its own state of disarray, the corporatist school gained little real influence among European and American political theorists, however.

While intellectuals struggled with the paradoxes of corporatist theory, moreover, devious politicians seized upon them and corporatism's association with authoritarianism was born. Interestingly, Golob tells us, "corporatism struck most people as a novelty when it reappeared, together with irresponsible nationalism, among the doctrines of the Italian fascist state."[31] This seed was then transplanted to the Nazis, the Falange of Spain, the Vichy regime in France, and Peronismo in Argentina, according to Golob. He missed Salazar's Portugal, but this is understandable considering its relative position in the world at that time. Why corporatism? Golob's reply:

> Fascism laid claim to revolutionary novelty in all important respects. It needed a social and economic doctrine that differed both from Western capitalism and Russian Marxism, a doctrine, moreover, that had certain attractions of its own

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[30]Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and American Corporatism, 1929-1933," The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal, eds. Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 1974), pp. 101-19; see also his essay in Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of American Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1973), pp. 3-33.

[31]Golob, op. cit., p. 543.

> and could fulfill the need of an industrial society for organization and social discipline. In time of peace corporatism met the criteria admirably; in time of war it was superfluous . . .[32]

This association of corporatism with authoritarianism remains intact today for many analysts,[33] and some still connect it with Fascism.[34] Golob tells us that "ideologically, the combination of corporatism and manic nationalism equals fascism," but also, "it is quite clear that in the practical world the essence of fascism was the organization of power to exploit weakness."[35] A more recent analysis concurs: "as Pirou notes in relationship to Italian Fascism and Neuman with reference to the Nazis, corporatism in these countries was not, and could not be, much more than a decorative facade for force."[36] Fascism, therefore, appears to be in essence a perversion of Plato's formulation, with manic nationalism serving as the "Noble Lie" (Hitler himself more appropriately called his the Big Lie): you are what you are because your nation requires it! It represents only one twentieth century version of classical corporatism, moreover. Catholic

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[32]Ibid., pp. 572-73.

[33]For example, see James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); and Note #19 in Schmitter, op. cit., p. 92.

[34]For example, see Lowi, op. cit., p. 50.

[35]Golob, loc. cit.

[36]N. Harris, Competition and the Corporative State (London: Methuen, Inc., 1972); the references are to F. Neumann's Behemoth, The

intellectuals continued to promote their vision of a harmonious, interdependent community, and their influence survived that of Fascism, as noted above. Furthermore, ideas from the secular branch began to gain influence within the school; the face of corporatism was changing:

> Corporatism itself survived, apparently entering the post-war world stronger than ever, for now it had returned to its democratic and religious affiliations of the late nineteenth century. It was indeed more democratic than ever before, since the paternalistic traits of the 1890's had yielded before the equalitarian trends of the modern times. The principal exponents of corporatism following World War II, the Catholic parties of France, Italy, and Western Germany, were major mass parties, with strong popular and working class appeal.[37]

Modern Corporatism

The tenacity of classical corporatism, along with the confusion within the school noted above, makes it quite difficult to pinpoint the birth of modern corporatism. One pair of authors credits Machiavelli with the transition:

> That Machiavelli himself accepted the corporatist assumption is clear. His frame of reference was always a social universe in which distinct segments of like-qualified men were the basic actors. The existence of these "classes" or "parties" or "orders" as he interchangeably called them was simply assumed to be a fact of both social and political life. But Machiavelli diverged from Plato in that he saw these segments as

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Structure and Practice of National Socialism, (London: V. Gollancy, Ltd., 1942); and G. Pirou, Essais sur le corporatisme (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1938).

[37]Golob, loc. cit.

> actually competing political forces, not passive and apolitical rungs of a hierarchy.[38]

Although these same authors agree that Plato is the originator of corporatism, it appears they have misassociated Maciavelli with him. If Machiavelli believed that "segments of like-qualified men were the basic actors," he was in opposition to Plato's Principle of the Natural Division of Labor, a key ingredient in "the corporatist assumption." My reading of Machiavelli places him in the elitist school; the above quotation would seem to place him in the pluralist one. Rogowski and Wasserspring are correct when they claim that "Machiavelli created a new vision of politics--a vision which contrasted sharply with the static and fixed character of Platonic society," but incorrect when they claim "he denied the possibility of ordering society on the principle of hierarchy."[39] Machiavelli rejected the Platonic assumption of a natural hierarchy, not the concept of a hierarchical society. It was noted in the previous chapter that his blatant rejection of the organic state, and consequent focus on power, were critical elements in the shift from the classical to the modern context of political theorizing. He recognized that competition established who would rule, but certainly envisioned the result as hierarchical in nature. An absolute monarchy could not take any other basic shape.

Rogowski and Wasserspring contend that Machiavelli's Prince was only "a temporary solution."[40] My reading differs again, but if that

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[38]Rogowski and Wasserspring, op. cit., p. 14.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid., p. 40.

point is assumed, the critical transitional nature of his work is revealed by his failure to argue for any permanent one. As a transitional figure, Machiavelli is certainly subject to interpretation. Also, "corporatism," Golob tells us, "is truly chameleonlike."[41] Rogowski and Wasserspring, however, appear to lump all political regrouping under corporatism, which is inappropriate. They do differentiate two sub-types, but their "egotistical corporatism" sounds like pluralism, and "reciprocal corporatism" seems redundant.[42] Corporatism implies interdependence; in its classical form this might imply symbiosis, in the modern context reciprocity would be the minimum requirement. This and earlier disagreements are not intended to denigrate the authors' effort; their refutation of Mancur Olson's argument that corporatist action is irrational is, in fact, a major development in corporatist analysis.[43] It is important, however, to remember that Golob also warned against allowing "the word 'corporatism' or the ideas it connotes," from trying to "mean anything one wishes them to mean."[44]

Nevertheless, like its Catholic counterpart, secular corporatism did manage to survive the Fascist interregnum and emerge in a more focused modern form:

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[41]Golob, op. cit., p. 542.

[42]Rogowski and Wasserspring, op. cit., p. 31.

[43]Ibid., pp. 19-25.

[44]Golob, op. cit., pp. 543-44.

> Secular corporatism was also restated, largely as a deduction from the bureaucratization of big business, the increased strength of the labor unions, and the growth of government intervention. In this guise it served as a response to the disillusionment with classical capitalism, born of the Great Depression, and disillusionment with Marxism, born of the destruction of individual liberty in Russia. Finally, corporatism gained added interest, not so much as a program of what ought to be, but as a description of the major trends operating in the Western democratic world, and as a prediction of their future development.[45]

The labor movement was a major concern of all political analysts, and "not a few analysts" interpreted its success "as a trend toward laboristic corporatism."[46] Charles Lindblom's Unions and Capitalism typified the more pessimistic analyses; he foresaw:

> . . . labor leaders driving for oligarchy not so much because of the attractions of power itself, but because their role as chieftains of mass movements compelled them to interfere and create rigidities at every point of the capitalistic market economy, and to create inflationary pressures that ruthlessly undermined the self-adjusting free enterprise system. Since neither management nor government can halt this trend, a laboristic corporatism ruled by a union oligarchy would come into being.[47]

Interestingly, Golob spends the final dozen pages of his review discussing this very issue and refuting Lindblom's conclusion. He expresses great faith in both union leaders and the democratic nature of their organizations. Apparently he was unfamiliar with Roberto Michels' claims regarding the inevitability of oligarchy, even within organizations that profess democracy the loudest;[48] perhaps he was merely unconvinced. What Golob himself foresaw, moreover, was that

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[45]Ibid., p. 543. [46]Ibid., p. 580. [47]Ibid., p. 587.

[48]Roberto Michels, Political Parties (New York: Hearst, 1915).

industry and labor would not long continue to monopolize the stage on which the drama of politics is played:

> Nor are management and labor left alone to fight their battles in a sealed ring. Agriculture, professional and white-collar groups, intellectuals, have not lost their voice in American life, are creating and perfecting their own organizations, and are far less disposed to prejudge in labor's favor than they were a brief decade ago.[49]

Therein the essence of modern corporatism is revealed. If a father of modern corporatism can be named, it would likely be James Burnham, who was a product of both British Guild Socialism and Marxism. He viewed the world through the lens of class struggle, which certainly placed him in the modern age of theory, but broke with the Marxist school regarding the outcome. His theory also incorporated other ideas. Thorsten Veblen's praise of the engineer was combined with Berle and Mean's thesis of management control displacing ownership control of industry, Golob tells us; this author also senses the influence of Roberto Michels in Burnham's work. The result was The Managerial Revolution,[50]

> a revised version of Marxian class struggle. The managers in both industry and government, would take over actual sovereignty in the new society as the bourgeoisie had once displaced the feudal lords.[51]

Burnham was sure this revolution was taking place as he wrote, in

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[49]Golob, op. cit., p. 590.

[50]James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1941); citations will refer to the 1960 edition.

[51]Golob, op. cit., p. 579.

1940. The New Deal was in but an early stage of its success in America, while European nations were farther along.

What both Golob and Burnham projected was the rise of the formal organization as an actor in the political process. Just as labor had successfully organized, other groups would; thus, labor's power would be blunted. If this sequence of events did come about, who would really gain? The managers, Burnham replied,

> those who already for the most part in contemporary society are actually managing, on its technical side, the actual process of production, no matter what the legal or financial form--individual, corporate, governmental--of the process.[52]

If one strips away the Marxist terminology in the above description, and takes the "no matter what" clause at face value, an interesting claim emerges. A new social grouping, created by the proliferation of formal organizations, would soon control society. Burnham used the Marxist designation "ruling class," not foreseeing that the organizations would actually dominate. "Ruling class" has always implied some sort of indispensibility of its members, some natural "fit"; bureaucratic managers, however, are interchangeable by design. So Burnham's thesis was flawed, but insightful. His Marxist preoccupations, which had probably been somewhat reinforced by his exposure to British Guild Socialism, led to an overemphasis on economics. He was, nevertheless, the first theorist to perceive the major change taking place with respect to decision-making roles, and to predict that the trend would

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[52]Burnham, op. cit., p. 80.

continue. Because of this, he can be called the father of modern corporatism.

The continental secular branch, however, was not inactive. To the contrary, the most fully developed treatise on secular corporatism was produced in Paris in 1934 by an exiled Rumanian politico. Mihail Manoilesco's Le Siecle du Corporatisme, unfortunately, is unavailable in translation. Phillipe Schmitter, one of the major figures in the contemporary corporatist school, has fortunately included an extensive review of that work in one of his treatments.[53] Given this situation, we have relied upon Schmitter's review. Manoilesco presented a fascinating analysis of developing trends toward economic interdependence both among and within nations in that treatise. In fact, he appears to have detected the basic premises of the noted "Prebisch thesis,"[54] regarding the continued disadvantage of raw material suppliers in an international capitalist economy, long before Prebisch. This growing interdependence and its recognition among the "peoples" of the world would make our century, the twentieth, the "century of corporatism just as the nineteenth was the century of liberalism."[55] Several key ideas about corporatism were clarified by Manoilesco, moreover; two have particular significance to this discussion.

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[53]Schmitter, op. cit., pp. 117-25.

[54]United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America (UNECLA), The Economic Development of Latin America, E/CN.12/Rev. 4-27-50.

[55]Schmitter, op. cit., p. 85; he drew his title from this quotation.

First, two distinct subtypes of corporatism were identified. Schmitter, borrowing eclectically from past theorists, applied the labels state and societal corporatism. The latter refers to a system "in which the legitimacy and functioning of the state were primarily or exclusively dependent on the activity of singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representative 'corporations.'" A state corporatist system exhibits a similar structure, but the units would be "created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases."[56] In essence, societal corporatism evolves within a political system; state corporatism is imposed. The fascist states of World War II were state type systems, with force being the core of their "other bases" of legitimacy. Manoilesco's other relevant contribution is his prediction regarding the emergence of state corporatism:

> Corporatism, as he understood and advocated it, is an institutional-political response to a particular process of transformation that the world political economy and its attendant system of international stratification is presently undergoing. Its "dominant cause" lies in the relations between peoples, rather than between classes within national units. In fact the latter are conditioned, if not determined, by the former. The entire spectrum of political forces has shifted: "The Nineteenth Century knew the economic solidarity of class. The Twentieth will know the economic solidarity of nations."
>
> According to Manoilesco, the dynamic element in this process of world economic transformation consists of a radical "national" demand for restructuring the international division of labor and its distribution of benefits. Peripheral capitalist nations are becoming increasingly aware of the disparity in returns generated by their exchange of raw materials and foodstuffs for the manufactured goods produced by the

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[56] Ibid., pp. 102-3.

> advanced, earlier developing economies; and are beginning to implement new national economic policies, especially ones aiming at import-substituting industrialization and control of foreign trade. This diffusion of industrialization and policy techniques was greatly accelerated by World War I, but is an autonomous secular trend which can be expected to continue on throughout the century . . . .
>
> To this, he added a second, more static observation: the end of territorial expansion. The twentieth century, he felt, would see the exhaustion of open internal frontiers and manifest external imperialism. . . .
>
> These compound changes in international relations--the collapse of the prewar liberal economic order, the rising demand for equality of benefit and status between nation-states, the definitive demarcation of territoriality--provided the materialistic (and speculative) foundations for Manoilesco's ideology of defensive, nationalistic modernization from above.[57]

Manoilesco's thinking differed from Burnham's in many significant ways, but they did not reach unrelatable conclusions. Burnham's concern was the United States and Europe; Manoilesco's view was international. Burnham analyzed internal processes; Schmitter tells us that "Manoilesco was a theorist of 'external dependence.'"[58] Both, however, saw organizational roles becoming critical, and while Burnham was locked into his Marxist conceptualizations, Manoilesco foresaw the declining significance of horizontal role structures (classes) and the rising significance of vertical ones (peoples, nations). Combining the lessons of both analysts, modern corporatism takes the form of increasing vertical segmentation, ratified by formal organization, which in turn makes organizational leaders key actors. Schmitter, in fact, takes Manoilesco's ideas and his own thorough knowledge of

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[57] Ibid., pp. 118-19.

[58] Ibid., p. 118.

classical corporatism, and formulates the following definition, an admittedly ideal-type construct:

> Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetetive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.[59]

Schmitter's definition is different from those proposed by most contemporary corporatist analysts. Nothing in his formulation demands a linkage between corporatism and capitalism, and it is probably more descriptive of the medieval guild system than of any system of interest competition produced under capitalism. All other corporatist analysts of non-Hispanic systems seem to insist that capitalism is an integral part of the phenomenon. Andrew Shonfield, who resurrected the concept for application to Western Europe after the fascist interregnum, considers it a byproduct of Modern Capitalism.[60] Leo Panitch recently attempted a general analysis of "liberal democracies," and concluded that corporatism is "a political structure within advanced capitalism."[61] The British branch still retains its Marxist heritage

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[59]Ibid., pp. 93-94.

[60]Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

[61]Panitch, op. cit., p. 66.

of economic determinism, exemplified by the works of J. T. Winkler.[62] A recent effort by Alan Cawson, however, expresses a somewhat modified view, defining it as "a politico-economic system."[63]

Although Schmitter's definition does not portray corporatism as a product of capitalism, his attempt to explain its development clearly does:

> As a macrohypothesis, I suggest that the corporatization of interest representation is related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. Differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different stages in the institutional development and international context of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting class interests, account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms of corporatism.[64]

That hypothesis presents a serious analytical problem, however. How could a phenomenon that existed in the Roman and Byzantine Empires, and flourished during the Middle Ages, be "related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism?" It was noted above that his definition seems much more descriptive of feudal Europe than of any contemporary political situation; the closest approximations are found in Latin America. It was, in fact, the study of Latin American and

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[62] J. T. Winkler, "Corporatism," Archives Europeenns de sociologie, 17 (1976), 100-36; and J. T. Winkler, "The Corporate Economy: Theory and Administration," Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage, and Control, ed. R. Scase (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), pp. 43-58.

[63] Cawson, op. cit., p. 187.

[64] Schmitter, op. cit., p. 107.

Iberic politics that reintroduced the school to contemporary political analysis, and Schmitter himself played a part in that effort.[65]

Schmitter hedges on the question of economic determinism. Rather than claiming a direct link, he points to "the constraints, opportunities and contradictions placed upon political actors by the operation of the economic system."[66] He first astutely summarizes the circumstances that generate the two subtypes:

> In a nutshell, the origins of societal corporatism lie in the slow, almost imperceptible decay of advanced pluralism; the origins of state corporatism lie in the rapid, highly visible demise of nascent pluralism.[67]

His ideological bent is revealed, however, when he argues that the former change "can be traced primarily to the imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeois-dominant regime," and that the latter "seems closely associated with the necessity to enforce 'social peace' . . . where the bourgeoisie is too weak" to allow "incipient pluralism" to gain a legitimate foodhold in the political structure.[68]

No one can deny that economics plays a significant role in politics. Economic activity tends to be the most prevalent form of

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[65]Phillipe Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1971); Phillipe Schmitter, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America," Proceedings of the American Academy, XXX, 4 (1972), 83-108; Phillipe Schmitter, "The Portugalization of Brazil," Authoritarian Brazil, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 198-219.

[66]Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 107.

[67]Ibid., p. 106.

[68]Ibid., pp. 107-8.

public interaction, because people today are very interdependent with respect to providing for their material needs and wants. Assuming this to be the case, economics would then likely be the most frequent arena for public decision-making and the recurrent subject of authoritative decisions. Even that fact, however, would not make economics determinative regarding political development. Economic interests will not be ignored in politics, and do dominate many public decisions. To claim that they alone give form to the decision-making structure, however, is to deny the existence of constraints, opportunities and contradictions placed upon economic actors by the operation of the political system, to paraphrase Schmitter.

For this author, the basic notion of exclusive determinism is obsolete in today's complex world. Politics and economics certainly impinge upon each other, and this interaction process surely deserves study. The recent revival of political economy as a subfield in both relevant social science disciplines appears to be an appropriate response to that need. Politics is more than economics, however. Brute force, kinship, law, and a variety of ideologies all played important parts in Western political development, along with economics. No single cause generated the events we call history. Changes within these various rationales for social activity have at times reinforced each other, leading to a major break with the past. More often, however, they tended to counteract each other's budding breakthroughs as their wielders maneuvered for power. These notions are discussed again in the next chapter.

With respect to the evolution of modern corporatism, liberalism should be considered just as important as capitalism. Both were products of eighteenth century rationalism, and since economic freedom and political freedom go hand-in-hand[69] capitalism can be regarded as the economic expression of liberalism. Employing this perspective, the following summary of the development of corporatism results. Societal corporatism emerges from the competition among plural interests in a liberal society, with economic interests often in the forefront. State corporatism is imposed by a leadership element that fears it cannot guarantee both stability and real competition. Liberalism, which gave legitimacy to social differentiation and interest competition, i.e., pluralism, can thus be said to have paved the way for the "century of corporatism." Differences in the circumstances surrounding the introduction of pluralism into diverse social systems set the stage for their reaction to it. Each system's individual history shaped its peculiar path of development, but basic patterns, i.e., state versus societal, would be discernible where corporatism was at all relevant. This "explanation" seems to be as plausible as Schmitter's, and avoids any claims regarding "imperatives" and "necessities."

Schmitter's work has certainly added to our understanding of corporatism, however. His definition represents the only recent attempt to isolate the political characteristis that constitute it, and

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[69] Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

is certainly the most usable formulation currently available. It has two major limitations, however; its ideal-type format and its exclusive focus on "interest representation." That focus, although it does reflect a major concern of contemporary political science, does not seem to capture enough of the political process in its conceptual net. In a later effort, Schmitter substituted interest "intermediation" for "representation," in an attempt to expand the definition's scope, but there seems to be little real difference.[70]

The ideal-typical nature of the definition generates a different problem. Unless it is clearly recognized as such when applied, cases can too easily be rejected. This rigidity in the formulation makes it difficult to apply to modern systems. Hierarchy, for example, is a concept with an unerasable classical taint. It implies an extremely high degree of subordination, and immediately invokes the image of the pyramid. The reader should note that Schmitter's early work with corporatism dealt with Brazil and Portugal, premier examples of continued Catholic influence in the modern world. Contemporary social structures are recognized by many analysts as being much more complex than the concept hierarchy can convey. One relevant example is Rensis Likert's call for a reconceptualization of organizational management; one key role they must now play is that of "linking pin" between their subunits and surrounding ones.[71] The old top-down versus bottom-up

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[70]Phillipe Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," Comparative Political Studies, 10, 1 (April, 1977), 35-36, footnote 19.

[71]Likert, op. cit., pp. 113-15.

flow of authority debate, one of the key questions in the analysis of hierarchical structures, has been essentially rendered moot.

A revised definition would seem to be in order, one that is broader in scope, more flexible, and that "updates" the notion of "hierarchical" interest sectors. Fortunately, a very usable concept is available to start with. Some years ago, Arthur Koestler formulated a

> new term to designate those Janus-faced entities on the intermediate levels of any hierarchy, which can be described either as wholes or as parts, depending on the way you look at them, from "below" or "above." The term I proposed was the "holon," from the Greek holes whole, with the suffix on, which, as in proton or neutron, suggests a particle or part.[72]

The critical difference between a holarchy, and the more general type, hierarchy,

> is that each member of this hierarchy, on whatever level, is a sub-whole or "holon" in its own right--a stable, integrated structure, equipped with self-regulatory devices and enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy or self-government.[73]

There are certainly organic overtones to this concept of holarchy, which does not seem inappropriate given corporatism's history, but its use does not require an organic context. It does fit rather nicely into a systems context, however. Since that is the general approach in which this study is rooted, it is quite compatible here.[74]

Schmitter's definition also ignores modern realities in another way; contemporary political interests are based on more than functional

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[72]Arthur Koestler, Janus: A Summing Up (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 33.

[73]Ibid., p. 27.

[74]Isaak, op. cit., Chapter 14, pp. 213-27; my choice of

differentiation. Matters of conscience such as freedom of religion, abortion and birth control, and the right to die have become public concerns. Civil/human rights, the role of women, and environmental protection have become serious issues, and have even achieved government sponsorship in some systems. Disarmament, immigration, and opposition to nuclear power are now political topics that span the globe. Schmitter again seems to be too narrowly focused on economics. Moreover, he is unclear regarding the role of "the state." His terminology implies total control of interest aggregation, if not articulation (i.e., deliberate monopolies are "granted"), but that would seem to eliminate the societal subtype. Charles Anderson, another contributor to the recent revival of corporatist analysis, offers a more general interpretation: "In corporatism, the role of the state is to rationalize the relationships between critical organizations."[75]

By applying the selected approaches, and combining insights and ideas from Burnham, Golob, Manoilesco, Schmitter, Koestler, and Anderson, the following definition of modern corporatism was formulated: Corporatism refers to a political system in which holarchic, vertical subsystems tend to monopolize authoritative decision-making within their respective sectors, in which the primary subsystem units are formal organizations, and in which systemic decision-making is

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approach is elaborated in Chapter I.

[75]Charles Anderson, Statecraft: An Introduction to Political Choice and Judgement (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 289.

characterized by reciprocal action rationalized by the government. This definition subsumes both subtypes. Reciprocal action is born of interdependence, and can be the product of either cooperation or coercion. Furthermore, cooperation can take the form of backroom horse-trading or joint pursuit of an ideal; coercion might involve subtle legal maneuvers or outright brute force. Power can be fully centralized within the government, or dispersed among and within the subsystems. By "the government" is meant that social apparatus granted formal public decision-making authority. To this author, "the state" seems classical, and its use could create confusion regarding the subtypes.

Contemporary Corporatism

Corporatism as a school of political thought is not as confused as it was at the turn of the century, but it remains eclectic. Four distinct branches can be identified; Figure 1, page 69, outlined their evolution as portrayed in this narrative review. Social Catholicism, the direct descendant of the Catholic doctrine that circumscribed all social action during the Middle Ages, continues to be espoused by the Church, at least officially. Moreover, Catholicism permeated Iberic culture; its strong advocacy of deference to central authority probably facilitated the later acceptance of fascism in Spain and Portugal (and Italy, the "home port" of Catholicism). The Iberic culture was transplanted to Latin America with colonization, including political corporatism. A state version that emphasizes stability and order, Latin American Corporatism has been succinctly described by

Charles Anderson.[76] No attempt will be made here to duplicate general arguments about Latin American politics, but selected aspects of theory and practice will be discussed below and in Chapter IV.

A mutant strain of Hispanic corporatism has also evolved. It stresses economic progress directed by state action, and seems to represent at least a partial fulfillment of Manoilesco's prediction. Although all three of these branches involve state versions of corporatist politics, the Catholic and Latin American strains differ from what is here labeled Progressive Corporatism with respect to a crucial presupposition. The former two have retained the notion of some form of natural order; the latter recognizes the modern reality of interest competition. All three, however, share the assumption of an identifiable, objective common good that must be dutifully pursued. The progressive corporatists have substituted national economic progress for Catholicism's will of God and the Latin American priority for order. In essence, Social Catholicism and Latin American Corporatism are classical theories that have survived well into the modern era. Progressive Corporatism is difficult to classify using the criteria we have established; it mixes elements of both contexts. Also, it may turn out to be, as fascism was, merely a facade for authoritarian rule. Brazil, Peru, and Portugal are the current settings for this mutant strain. Brazil will be analyzed as an

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[76]Charles Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition, ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1974), pp. 249-65.

example of state corporatism, with reference to both Progressive and general Latin American characteristics, in the next chapter.

The fourth branch is the most relevant to this study. Following Schmitter's interpretation of the literature, the label Societal Corporatism will be used here. It refers to the emergent type, which results from the bureaucratization of plural vertical interest sectors competing for control over public policy. With roots in the German collective economy and British Guild Socialism efforts, Societal Corporatism is a thoroughly modern branch. There are no presumptions about a natural order or an objective public interest. Various political interests compete; the authoritative decisions produced become public policy. There are "ground rules," of course, as we will see.

The key distinction between state and societal corporatism is the relationship between interest organizations and the government. Howard Wiarda, one of the small group of scholars who revived corporatist analysis during the 1970's, highlights this distinction in his recent excellent textbook on Latin American politics, co-authored with Harvey Kline.[77] Interestingly, they discuss the subject in pluralist terms:

> Another difference has to do with the fact that while in the United States the major groups, religious agencies, and the like are assumed to be independent from the government, in Latin America such agencies as the Church, the army, the university, and perhaps even the trade unions are often more than mere interest groups: they are a part of the state

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[77] Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds., Latin American Politics and Development (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1979).

> system and inseparable from it. Of course there are degrees of government control over these groups, ranging from almost complete control to almost complete freedom as under liberalism. But the usual pattern involves considerably more state control over interest groups than in the United States, and this helps put interest- (or what some have preferred to call corporate-) group behavior in Latin America in a different framework than is the case in the United States.[78]

It should be noted that Wiarda conceptualizes corporatism more in ideological than structural terms, but his analyses have shed a great deal of light on Latin American and Portuguese political development.[79]

Structural aspects of this "different framework" are rather significant, moreover. Interest organizations are often literally created by the national governments of Latin America; "they are a part of the state system and inseparable from it," Wiarda and Kline have told us. Without a personeria juridica ("juridical personality"), a granted legal license, an organization cannot function in Latin American politics.[80] The granting of that license, in fact, is itself a major political decision. Contrast those conditions with the parallel situation in the United States. Under our system, corporations are also chartered by a government, but it is a technical rather

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[78]"Interest Groups and Political Parties," in ibid., p. 41.

[79]Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977); Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and National Development in Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981).

[80]The author was introduced to the concept of the personeria juridica by Professor Nelson M. Robinson in his course on Latin American Politics taught at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in the fall of 1976; Howard J. Wiarda discusses the significance of a group's "juridical personality" in Latin American politics in "Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Framework for

than political act. Formation of a corporation is a contractual arrangement ratified by one of fifty state governments; no special powers are granted. A new legal entity is created that "can hold property, contract, and sue and be sued in a common name."[81] Robert Hessen has likened the process of chartering to that of registering births; no act of creation is involved, merely the maintenance of clear legal records.[82]

This is a critical difference, particularly when the role of formal organizations in the decision-making process has been designated as a defining characteristic for political systems. The granting of a personeria juridica in Latin America represents the acknowledgement that political power has been demonstrated; a corporate charter issued to an interest organization in the United States represents merely a license to compete for power. When licensed, an interest organization in the United States can legitimately solicit members and money; that is it. Legal recognition in Latin America, however, grants political rights, or fueros, and often carries with

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Analysis in Wiarda, Politics and Social Change, p. 211; and Ronald C. Newton traces this feature back to Roman Law in "On 'Functional Groups,' 'Fragmentation,' and 'Pluralism' in Spanish American Political Society," in Wiarda, Politics and Social Change, pp. 141-42.

[81]Edward S. Mason, "Corporation," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 3 (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 396.

[82]Robert Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1979).

it some levels of government support. Perhaps a seat on a board or commission is included, an office provided, or dues check-off permitted. Sometimes, outright subsidies are involved.

The personeria juridica is also a powerful control mechanism, because it tends to lead to co-optation. Once the fruits of recognition are tasted, seldom are they sacrificed. Anderson relates how "power contenders" in Latin America must first demonstrate that they are a potential threat to the existing decision-making structure, but then clearly indicate no intention to actually threaten it, before they will be accepted as participants in the policy process.[83] Recalling Michels' findings about organizations and oligarchy, and other works on bureaucratic politics, one can easily envision how most newly accepted leaders would act. They would seek to protect and consolidate their power, within both their own organizations and the larger structure. Such behavior also comes into play in systems with de facto acceptance mechanisms, but the government must maneuver organizations into position, rather than dictating what will be. The primary difference between state and societal systems is the manner of control the government is allowed. That, of course, roughly translates into the degree of political freedom permitted the citizenry.

Having identified and differentiated two distinct subtypes of the same political phenomenon (and even claimed a mutant strain for one of them), the question of how they develop deserves some attention. Together with one of the central issues of this study,

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[83]Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," pp. 256-57.

i.e., whether the historical continuity of American politics has been broken, that problem requires a rather thorough discussion of political development. Chapter IV begins with just such a discussion, one that includes some interesting theoretical propositions. To illustrate their plausibility, moreover, and the utility of corporatist analysis before addressing my basic concerns, a brief preliminary case study will be presented. Brazilian political history will be outlined, then analyzed as an example of political development within a state corporatist context.

That exercise should be helpful to most readers, because corporatism has been generally ignored in the literature since World War II. Quite possibly the McCarthy phenomenon frightened people away from any inquiry with "foreign" connotations. Perhaps many individual decisions to avoid a subject with distasteful associations (i.e., fascism) added up to a trend. Whatever the case, recent European efforts have paved the way for corporatism's resurrection in American political science, and certain evidence indicates this may be occurring. American Political Science Review, for example, recently featured a lead article on corporatism.[84] Perhaps resurrection is not the appropriate word, also. While Catholic corporatism survived within its own circles here, what could be called an American secular "branch" never seems to have developed. There were some corporatist writings, and it was noted above that Herbert Hoover subscribed to

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[84]Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating Corporatism," American Political Science Review, 73, 4 (December, 1979), 967-86.

many corporatist notions. He had hoped to institute some programs based on these ideas during his Presidency, but did not succeed. Knowing how Americans love winners and shun losers, perhaps Hoover's thrashing at the polls in 1932 helped relegate corporatism to the back shelves. It was also noted above that some argued the New Deal and the rise of labor represented corporatist incursions into American politics. These arguments will be reviewed in Chapter V.

The main conclusion of Chapter II was that a new school of thought seems needed to help us better understand the American political circumstance today. The conclusion of this chapter is that a well-developed alternative to both the pluralist and elitist schools is available. Some still wish to avoid the corporatist school because of bad memories, but that choice seems counterproductive. This author's position is that the distasteful possibilities that corporatism, particularly state corporatism, can include <u>demand</u> its study. Ostrich-like behavior is not only unscientific, it is downright anti-intellectual and dangerous.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, BRAZIL, AND STATE CORPORATISM

Political Development

Political development received extensive treatment in the literature immediately following World War II, as the new field of comparative politics evolved. No attempt will be made here to review that literature; that task has been admirably accomplished. Helio Jaguaribe, for example, recently provided an extensive discussion and an excellent summary chapter in Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study,[1] and Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez contributed a stimulating summary essay on the subject to the more recent Handbook of Political Science.[2]

The term "development" can, of course, be utilized in several senses. A recent treatise on political development, for example, restates the view that dominated the early literature:

> "Development," it would be agreed, is essentially an evaluative concept. In most contexts, its use expresses

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[1]Helio Jaguaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

[2]Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominquez, "Political Development," Macropolitical Theory, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, Vol. 3 of the Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 1-114.

> a positive evaluation, and thus, unless otherwise stated, it should be interpreted as such.[3]

Samuel Huntington, however, clearly contradicted that assumption, at least with respect to politics, when he "discovered" political decay back in 1968.[4] A neutral connotation is also possible, implying only some pattern of activity. In keeping with the general approach used in this study, political development can be considered the political aspects of social system evolution. In keeping with the specific approach adopted for this study, "political aspects" are considered to be those related to authoritative decision-making.

Paul Diesing's concept of decision-making structure was introduced in Chapter I to depict a social system's political component. Applying the neutral connotation of development to that concept, a rather clean definition of political development results. Political development is the evolution of the decision-making structure of a society. Specific changes can be judged positive or negative, i.e., as "modernization" or "decay," depending upon the criteria applied. One might applaud, for example, widening control over a system's environment through closer cooperation among men, to paraphrase Dankart Rustow.[5] Such control, however, could be the

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[3]Daya Krishna, Political Development: A Critical Perspective (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 180.

[4]Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

[5]Dankart Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1967). On page 3 he defines modernization as

consequence of imperialistic aggression, and greater cooperation the result of the deliberate generation of citizen apathy. All criteria are relative, which is another reason why the third component of Diesing's formulation, circumstance, is so useful. For example, Salazar's assumed role as dictator and the totalitarian rules he imposed were beneficial when the basic circumstance facing the Portuguese people was chaos in the early 1920's; they became counter-productive when they alienated those same people, and other Western nations, in later years however.

Some readers undoubtedly winced when the term "evolution" was used above. It was selected because no other word denotes what it does: the interaction of an entity and its environment that produces one of three types of consequences. No significant change in the entity's situation tends to be the most frequent product, but either an improved or deteriorated situation can result. For a political entity, the labels "modernization" and "decay" usually indicate those two respective possibilities. As was the case with the term "development," a neutral connotation for "evolution" is intended. Some might contend that no such connotation is possible, that "evolution" necessarily implies progression of some sort. A neutral definition is admittedly new, but it has recently been added to Webster's Dictionary.[6] The

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"rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men."

[6]Although a 1971 edition of Webster's Dictionary did not include such a definition, a 1978 does, i.e., "the process of working

reader should also recollect the fact of natural history that many species have "evolved" into extinction.

The label used is not really important; the denotation is. Interaction is the key element here, because it implies that neither the entity nor the environment produces the actual result; both do. This notion may be difficult for some social scientists to accept, particularly within a systems frame of reference, which is too often equated with equilibrium analysis. According to equilibrium analysts, the environment generates problems which the system counteracts. This is, however, "a special type of system-maintaining explanation,"[7] which has very serious limitations for social system research. David Easton reported this years ago, expressing particular concern with respect to political analysis.[8] Modernization and decay, moreover, must be treated as significant deviations from a prior system state or they are meaningless, and the onset of one or the other must imply some sort of continuing deviance. Given the assumption of interactive interdependence among elements that constitutes the very essence of the systems approach,[9] it is logical to further postulate that

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out or developing," Webster's New Ideal Dictionary (New York: G & C. Merriam Co., 1978), p. 173.

[7]Isaak, op. cit., p. 222.

[8]David Easton, "Limits of the Equilibrium Model in Social Research," Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, eds. Heinz Eulau et al. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), pp. 397-404.

[9]Isaak, op. cit., p. 214.

continued, significant deviation by one element will produce at least some, although perhaps minor, deviation among other elements. Deviation, therefore, will be amplified within the system.

This is not a novel assertion. In an article published almost two decades ago, Magoroh Maruyama called for the creation of a new track in general systems theory, a "second cybernetics."[10] Cybernetics, Maruyama argued, had tended to focus exclusively on "deviance counteracting feedback networks," and ignored "deviance amplifying mutual causal processes":

> . . . processes that are loosely termed as "vicious circles" and "compound interests": in short, all processes of mutual causal relationships that amplify an insignificant or accidental initial kick, build up deviation and diverge from the initial condition.[11]

For convenience, the acronym DAMC will be used for the remainder of this study to represent the phrase "deviance-amplifying mutual causal." From the discussion above, the reader has hopefully anticipated the author's intention: political modernization and decay will be assumed to be DAMC processes.

The theoretical implications of such an assumption are significant, and Maruyama discusses them in the cited article. For our purposes here, the major implications involve causality and

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[10]Magoroh Maruyama, "The Second Cybernetics: Deviance-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes," American Scientist, 51 (1963), 164-79; reprinted in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, ed. Walter Buckley (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 304-13.

[11]Maruyama in Buckley, p. 304.

consequences, and that portion of Maruyama's explication is reproduced for the reader's benefit:

> A sacred law of causality in the classical philosophy stated that similar conditions produce similar effects. Consequently, dissimilar results were attributed to dissimilar conditions. Many scientific researches were dictated by this philosophy. For example, when a scientist tried to find out why two persons under study were different, he looked for a difference in their environment or in their heredity. It did not occur to him that neither environment nor heredity may be responsible for the difference. He overlooked the possibility that some deviation-amplifying interactional process in their personality and in their environment may have produced the difference.
>
> In light of the deviation-amplifying mutual causal process, the law of causality is now revised to state that similar conditions may result in dissimilar products. It is important to note that this revision is made without the introduction of indeterminism and probabilism. Deviation-amplifying mutual causal processes are possible even within the deterministic universe, and make the revision of the law of causality even within the determinism [sic]. Furthermore, when the deviation-amplifying mutual causal process is combined with indeterminism, here again a revision of a basic law becomes necessary. The revision states: A small initial deviation, which is within the range of high probability, may develop into a deviation of very low probability (or more precisely, into a deviation which is very improbable within the framework of probabilistic unidirectional causality).[12]

The assumption that political modernization and decay are DAMC processes helps to explain several elements from our earlier discussion of corporatism. It provides, for example, a plausible footing for Manoilesco's prediction that corporatism is the fate of all nations, but by two very different paths. Just as similar conditions can produce dissimilar consequences, dissimilar conditions can yield similar results. More important, the former proposition, particularly

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[12]Ibid., pp. 305-6.

when elaborated by the explicated potential of the initial kick, helps to explain the divergence in the political development of the "New World." Two resource-rich continents with indigenous civilizations were both colonized, but in very different ways. South America was colonized by conquering armies acting as royal agents; North America by various groups, many acting on their own behalf, and sometimes composed of misfits. Latin America was subjected to Catholic religious authoritarianism; the northern colonists were overwhelmingly Protestant, and often free-thinkers. An acquaintance noted that the indigenous populations themselves were differently organized; South America's Indian civilizations were much more centralized than the tribes of the north. Moreover, revolution against colonial masters occurred wherever colonialism was tried; it is a high probability event. Formation of a successful republic like the United States, however, has been rare. That point will be raised again in Chapter V.

Metaphors and Mathematics

Scientists deal in abstractions; without them they could not generalize about reality. These abstractions take many forms, moreover, and are used in many different ways. One very useful type of abstraction that scientists employ is what Scott Greer has called a "guiding metaphor":

> Guiding metaphors are created by analogizing. Forms useful in other contexts are applied to the problem at hand; they are forms that lead us to abstract certain aspects in terms of their interrelations in the observed event.[13]

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[13]Scott Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry (Chicago:

Guiding metaphors help analysts organize information they have gathered and communicate it to others. This latter use probably represents their greater contribution. Guiding metaphors do not explain, but rather aid in the construction and transmission of explanations. In Chapter II, the concept of the organic state and its importance to the classical context of theorizing was discussed; that was essentially a guiding metaphor. It appears to have been overused, however, and even reified by some Catholic theorists.

That can be a very real problem when using metaphors. As Greer warns us, "they can lead to a kind of theoretical 'tunnel vision' ";[14] the metaphor becomes mistaken for the message. My concern about misapplication of the machine metaphor, which Greer uses as an example,[15] was expressed earlier. Just as men once operated under the assumption that the world was flat, and justified that assumption via personal observation, some choose to ignore the scientific facts that we are hurtling through space at eighteen and a half miles per second and spinning at close to 1,000 miles per hour. Brute empiricism tells us that we can stand still if we choose to, so why can we not cause our social processes (e.g., "economics," "politics") to do likewise? Perhaps we can, but it would entail undoing our social fabric. We could not restart them as easily as we can step off again, or turn on a mechanical device that was turned off and repaired, perhaps even rebuilt. Motion is a fact of nature; one of the difficult challenges

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Aldine, 1969), p. 142.

[14]Ibid., p. 148.

[15]Ibid., pp. 145-46.

facing contemporary social science is to incorporate this notion into our theoretical apparatus.

Properly used, however, metaphors can be powerful tools. They can enhance understanding, foster communication, and generate insights. More important, "concrete theories usually result from known (or assumed) laws ordered by guiding metaphors," Greer states.[16] Theories of political development have often involved guiding metaphors; the two most prominent have been the notions of "stages" of development and "cycles" of development. Post World War II studies in comparative politics tended to favor the former one. "Developing nations" were expected, and often urged, to follow a standard path. To follow such a path, however, implied a standard goal. For most American political scientists, moreover, that goal was to emulate the Western industrial democratic countries, regardless of initial conditions--or desires. The inherent ethnocentrism of that orientation was soon revealed, and its popularity waned. Greer associates cycles with the machine metaphor,[17] but they can also be elements of an analogy to nature. This was the Greek conceptualization of social processes that was negated by the Christian promise of salvation. The notion of cycles has been used mostly by historians to depict the rise and fall of empires and civilizations, and has been somewhat useful in that regard. It includes, however, a potentially dangerous implication that limits its applicability to the ongoing development

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[16] Ibid., p. 142.

[17] Ibid., p. 145.

of social systems. The machine version in particular implies a return to some prior status, but the past never is, and never can be, replicated. To adopt a metaphor that implies otherwise invites reactionism.

A more appropriate metaphor is also available. Political development can be envisioned in terms of waves. Systems are dynamic; some elements are always "in motion," because a continuous process of interaction with the environment is taking place. In the discussion above, however, it was acknowledged that most political activity within a system generates no significant change. Competing elements within a system will often counteract any deviation, or something in the environment will. There are events, however, that are not counteracted, but rather are reinforced by the environment. In other words, a DAMC process is initiated. Political development, therefore, can be envisioned as usually proceeding like "little" waves of deviance, with the system essentially maintaining its status quo. Modernization or decay occur, however, when a small deviation is reinforced somehow, and a DAMC process, or "big" wave, is successfully initiated.

How, it must be asked, are these "big" waves created? Is some major deviating event required, some crisis or breakthrough? Not necessarily. Such events certainly can, and likely would, trigger DAMC processes; they are rare, however, too rare to account for all the modernization and decay that occurs. Again, the usual pattern of activity would be represented by "little" waves moving through time. Until recently, combining that proposition with the assumption that modernization and decay are DAMC processes would have been untenable within a systems approach. The ideas were irreconcilable. Minor

events could produce only minor consequences, it was assumed, especially with respect to entities that are as self-protective as political structures. Major changes were attributed to internal calamities (e.g., epidemics, depressions) or breakthroughs (e.g., the rise of a great leader, the discovery of a resource bonanza), or to external causes (e.g., invasion, loss of an important market or ally). A new body of theory, however, disseminated only within the last decade, offers an alternative perspective.

This author is certainly not the first analyst to project that series of minor events can produce major consequences. The problem has always been how to conceptualize the turning points, often referred to as thresholds. Robert Heilbroner, attempting to deal with this problem as it related to economic modernization, resorted to a metaphor. He argued in The Great Ascent[18] that economic development was like an airplane trying to take off. Only when certain thresholds were achieved (i.e., speed, momentum, etc.), with the proper timing, could a successful take-off be accomplished. His metaphor led to no concrete theory development, to the best of this author's knowledge, however. It could not be applied either empirically, to specific cases, or abstractly, via construction of a model. Nevertheless, the "take-off point" analogy did enhance our understanding of the problem. Economic modernization was never again merely a matter of enough

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[18]Robert Heilbroner, The Great Ascent (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

dollars or factories to those who read Heilbroner's work. Circumstances (e.g., wind speed and direction) became important considerations in social development problem-solving.

"Catastrophe theory," whose origin is usually attributed to Rene Thom, a French mathematician, might have rescued Heilbroner's metaphor:

> Catastrophe theory is a new mathematical method for describing the evolution of forms in nature. . . . It is particularly applicable where gradually changing forces produce sudden effects. We often call such effects catastrophes, because our intuition about the underlying continuity of the forces makes the very discontinuity of the effects so unexpected, and this has given rise to the name.[19]

Despite its unfortunate appellation, this new branch of mathematics is an intellectual breakthrough. This author makes no claims to expertise in mathematical modeling, and no attempt to elaborate catastrophe theory will be offered. Few writings are generally available on the subject, but those that are indicate that a tool of considerable potential is now available to those who do have the requisite mathematical skills. Is its applicability limited to the natural sciences, as E. C. Zeeman's statement, quoted above, might imply? No. In fact, in another paper from the same collection, he and a co-author:

> . . . suggest to specialists in the social sciences the possibility of applying catastrophe theory to similar discontinuous phenomena in their fields. The objective, in

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[19]E. C. Zeeman, ed., "Catastrophe Theory," Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers, 1972-77 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 1.

> each of our examples, is the qualitative characterization of those points where small variations in some variable may cause large variations in a dependent variable, in other words those points where "catastrophic change" may occur.[20]

The missing link in the analysis of DAMC processes, therefore, appears to have been found. Is mathematics a suitable analytic tool, however? When operating in the arena of general systems theory, it certainly can be:

> It is a language which crosses the boundaries of human groups, which holds true without respect to environment. It is a form of logic and, like all logic, is analytical--but it is the purest and highest technique of analysis.[21]

Within the realm of abstraction, therefore, the metaphor of political development as waves of deviation from the status quo appears to offer considerable potential. What has been discussed so far, however, is what Diesing and others have labeled "formal theory."[22] That type of explanation operates at the very highest level of abstraction, and is truly useful only when it can be linked to quantitative empirical data. The fact that the tendered assumptions seem to fit together nicely, yielding good possibilities for formal modeling, provides support for their potential analytical utility at one end of the chain of inquiry. That potential would have to be evaluated all along the chain before

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[20]C. A. Ismard and E. C. Zeeman, "Some Models for Catastrophe Theory in the Social Science," in Zeeman, op. cit., p. 303.

[21]Greer, op. cit., p. 95.

[22]Paul Deising, Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Atherton-Aldine, 1971).

any general utility claims could be made, but such a task exceeds the scope of this study. Their particular compatibility with the selected theoretical scheme does deserve attention, however, before they can be applied within it. We can "hop" along the chain, stopping at appropriate levels to match the assumptions with the conceptual surroundings they will have to blend with in this study, so we will.

Politics and Waves

The first step should be to consider their compatibility with our selected specification of the political process. Applying the general systems approach, our unit of macro-analysis would be the political system. Again, the spectre of equilibrium analysis hovers about, and must be dealt with. Stephen Wasby, discussing the applicability of the system concept to political analysis, addressed this question directly, echoing the concerns of David Easton:

> Frequently connected with the system concept has been the idea of equilibrium. If the parts of a system develop a set of relationships to which the system returns when disturbed, so that a steady-state exists, equilibrium is said to occur; in the physical sciences, this is known as homeostasis. In the social sciences, where subjects studied undergo constant change, an equilibrium would be a special case, not a general occurrence. However, equilibrium as an analytical concept applied by the observer, not a goal in the mind of the system's actors, can be used to provide a base-line from which movement can be measured, thus allowing observers to ascertain how far a system can move from a posited point without serious strains being produced.
>
> The idea of disequilibrium may provide an escape from equilibrium's static connotations. To Easton it suggests more than change but contains recognition that events occur to block a full return to or arrival at equilibrium. Disequilibrium, while containing a more accurate description of political reality than does equilibrium, by shifting emphasis from stability to disturbance, does not adequately provide for "forward motion." To surmount this problem, some have talked

> of a "dynamic equilibrium," in which the entire system moves with respect to its environment and no single steady state even occurs, "with the position of equilibrium of the system itself always shifting."[23]

It should be noted that assuming modernization and decay are DAMC processes can provide for the "forward motion" that was Wasby and Easton's concern, as well as any "retrograde motion." The metaphor of usual political activity as "little" waves seems very compatible with the conceptualization of continuous minor disequilibrium-counteraction system dynamics. The combined assumptions of "big" and "little" waves of political activity, with threshold transitions accounted for by elements of the new catastrophe theory, thus allows us to move the metaphor out of general systems theory and into political science.

Our use of the political system concept, the reader will recall from Chapter I, demanded further specification. Authoritative decision-making was selected as the most useful and appealing activity to study, and Paul Deising's conceptualization of societal decision-making structures adopted to allow for comparative analysis. Nothing in that formulation, moreover, expresses or implies that decision-making structures are fixed entities. The opposite is true, in fact. Deising's vision of politics is that of a dynamic process of decision that produces, among other things, rearrangements of itself. Those decisions that generate restructuring, furthermore, are considered to be the most important ones produced.[24] It seems, therefore, that we

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[23]Wasby, op. cit., pp. 111-13; the quotation is from the Easton article, op. cit., p. 399.

[24]Paul Deising, Reason in Society, p. 228.

can move down the levels of abstraction within the selected framework, and still apply the proposed assumptions.

To really build a case for their acceptability, however, at least some evidence that the operation of real world systems can be usefully portrayed by the assumptions should be tendered. Since they have never been directly tested, indirect usage in a relevant, systematic comparative historical analysis of political systems would be the best one could hope to offer. Such a reference is available. Phillipe Schmitter, describing the peculiar historical process by which "interest intermediation systems" develop, recently wrote that "they are laid down, frequently in waves of accelerated organization and counterorganization, in distinct time periods, for divergent purposes, and under different legal and political circumstances."[25] Among all that diversity, he envisioned only one common element--waves of organization and reorganization. His subject was social change in Western Europe, and the analysis spanned his entire typology of systems: monism, corporatism, syndicalism, and pluralism. Schmitter is one of the more knowledgeable contemporary analysts of political interest competition, moreover. His description represents only a single example of the use of the metaphor, but it is a relevant one.

Having illustrated (nothing else is claimed) that the assumptions can usefully span the spectrum of abstraction from the highest level

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[25]Phillipe Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," Comparative Political Studies, 10, 1 (April, 1977), 13.

(mathematics) to the middle-range (typological comparisons), individual cases remain to be considered. No less an authority on political development than Gabriel Almond has addressed this question in the literature. Borrowing Albert Hirschman's approach to the study of economic development, he has touted attempts to found a new study in political science, polimetrics, "to lay out the development of specific political systems in terms of statistical series based on aggregate data."[26] Hirschman's suggestion, Almond tells us, is "that economic development may most usefully be viewed as a sequence of disequilibria."[27] His application yielded the following analysis:

> If one looks at the histories of specific political systems, it is quite clear that there are points in time which might be characterized as crisis periods, periods of greatly increased pressures for structural and cultural adaptation coming to bear on the political system, such as wars, revolutions, or threats of revolution. For example, if we were to represent the historical experience of such countries as Britain, France, and Germany, in the form of sets of quantitative indicators such as I have sketched out above, these crisis points would be reflected in the form of large quantitative variations in the values of the variables, i.e. rapid increases in the rates of demand, rapid declines in the incidence and intensity of support, radical fluctuations in the relationships between the conversion processes, and sharp increases or decreases in the various categories of political system output.[28]

Perhaps some future effort will generate the required data, and polimetrics will provide the means for an empirical test of the

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[26]Gabriel Almond, ed., "Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives," Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 282; his reference is to Albert Hirschman, Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958).

[27]Ibid., p. 186.

[28]Ibid., pp. 283-84.

applicability of catastrophe theory to political development; one can only speculate. Meanwhile, we must use the tools available. Almond further describes these "crisis periods" as "critical choice points, periods of relatively acute disequilibria, during which political elites make significant 'system-development' decisions."[29] "Big" waves of deviance, he might have said, generate fundamental decisions (or non-decisions). These "disequilibrium situations," moreover, are not all cataclysmic in nature; passage of the Reform Act of 1832 by the English Parliament is one of the specific examples he discusses.

The proposed wave assumptions regarding political development, therefore, do seem compatible with the theoretical scheme in use here. To demonstrate their utility, however, and introduce the reader to corporatist analysis, a brief case study will be presented. The political history of Brazil will be outlined, then analyzed as illustrative of political development within a state corporatist context. Brazilian politics represent both Latin American Corporatism, and, since 1930, one of the few cases of Progressive Corporatism, as both were defined in the previous chapter. Catholicism has also played a key role in that nation's history, so Brazil is an excellent example of the spectrum of corporatism. This presentation will pave the way for our treatment of the basic issues, moreover, by further enlightening the reader about corporatism and displaying a preliminary application of the conceptual framework that has been erected.

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[29] Ibid., p. 285.

Brazil: A Brief History

To a certain extent, the configurations of all nation-states are the products of arbitrary decisions made and accepted by authoritative agents, but Brazil is one of the premier historical examples of this. When the "New World" was discovered, it was claimed for colonization by both Spain and Portugal. The former had sponsored the successful and much-heralded voyage of Columbus; the latter had been probing south of Africa for decades, and claimed secret landings by explorers that pre-dated the Spanish success. Despite its sullied reputation across the continent at that time, the Catholic Church was still highly respected in the Iberian kingdoms, and the dispute was taken to the Pope for arbitration. Alexander VI, patriarch of the infamous Borgia clan (he fathered Lucretia, the notorious murderess, and Cesare, the ruthless politico on whose career Machiavelli based The Prince), may have been "the exemplar of an evil pope,"[30] but he was an astute statesman. When presented with a purported accurate map of the newly discovered continent (North and South America had not yet been delineated), he simply drew a line down the middle. Everything to the east of this "Line of Demarcation" (approximately 50° west longitude) was reserved to Portugal, and these continental lands still constitute the bulk of modern-day Brazil. That "last great international ruling by the papacy"[31] was formally accepted by the two kingdoms in the 1494

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[30]Michael de la Bedayere, "Alexander VI," in Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 517.

[31]Ibid.

Treaty of Tordesillas. Brazil's boundaries, of course, did not remain unchanged; they were expanded (mostly) and contracted by wars and subsequent treaties until they reached their present status.

The fact that Brazil was colonized by Portugal rather than Spain produced some significant cultural differences. Portuguese colonization was essentially a commercial enterprise, and when Vasco da Gama finally discovered the water route to India that had eluded Columbus, Brazil was basically neglected. This situation allowed both the French and the Dutch to make inroads; both left cultural residues and, more important, became the external enemies that later fostered early Brazilian nationalism, paving the way for The Empire.[32] Spanish colonization was essentially a military enterprise, intensively carried out by conquistadores. The Spanish were also much more racist in attitude and practice; only direct intervention by the Church on several occasions prevented the total extermination of the Indians of Spanish America. While Portuguese colonization was certainly not benign, they readily mixed and intermarried with both indigenous peoples and imported slaves. This difference in the treatment of Portuguese colonials was still evident in twentieth century Africa. While economic and political exploitation continued, nothing even akin to apartheid was evident.

One thing that Spanish and Portuguese America shared, however,

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[32]Rollie E. Poppino, "Brazil: History," Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 4 (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 507-8.

was the inculcation of corporatism. Kenneth Erickson, in the chapter on Brazil he contributed to the Wiarda and Kline text cited in the last chapter, tells us: "One can trace corporatism's origins in Brazil back to Portuguese colonial officials, for colonization coincided with a revival and adaptation of St. Thomas's thought in Iberia."[33] He also credits two institutions with perpetuating the corporatist tradition:

> First, the Brazilian legal system, with its roots in the Roman law tradition, protects the supremacy of government elites by actively subordinating interest groups to the state. The state therefore regulates minutely the activity of such groups as trade unions and industrialist organizations. For example, workers may form an association at a factory, but they have no right to make demands of their employers or to attempt to bargain with them unless their association has first obtained official recognition by the ministry of labor and has agreed to follow the principles of organization and behavior laid down by the state.[34]

What Erickson is describing is the granting of a personaria juridica, as explained in Chapter III. Who benefited from this legal system? A plantation oligarchy "dominated Brazilian politics"[35] for the nation's first century of independence, but the impact of the Industrial Revolution could not be resisted forever:

> New groups have been brought into the political arena, diversifying and expanding the electorate. Urban industrial, commercial, and financial elements have largely won national political control from the conservative landowners

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[33]Kenneth Erickson, "Brazil: Corporatism in Theory and Practice," in Wiarda and Kline, op. cit., p. 147; several parts of this discussion are derived from Erickson's excellent summary history.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., p. 167.

(who, however, still dominate the internal politics of many states, particularly in the north and the interior).[36]

The second institution that Erickson discusses is the Catholic Church. He stresses its role in reviving corporatist thought in the wake of industrialization, i.e., the relatively recent Social Catholicism movement reported on in Chapter III. This was certainly important, but the significance of the initial enculturation of the people into Catholic ideology must also be acknowledged. It was noted within our historical review of the school how Catholicism and classical corporatism fit together like hand in glove. The common good was determined by God, and transmitted to humanity through the Church by its agents. Each individual had a solemn duty to obey; disobedience meant eternal damnation. Two very important psychological traits were thus fostered by Catholic Corporatism: absolute deference to established authority and a penetrating concern for the afterlife. The infusion of these beliefs was strongly reinforced by the patrimonial fazenda (plantation) culture, and although definitely diluted by industrialization and its aftermath, their presence is still felt. In the northeast, where agriculture still dominates the economy, their impact remains pronounced. The following successful (at least temporarily) retort by a landlord to his tenants' request to organize a peasant league during the late 1950's provides striking evidence of this:

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[36]Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 4.

> Everything has been ordained by God. He knows what He is doing, If he gives land to me and not to you, to reject this is to rebel against God. Such a rebellion is a mortal sin. . . . You have to accept poverty on earth in order to gain eternal life in heaven. The poor live in God's grace. The rich don't. In this way you are more fortunate than I since you are closer to heaven.[37]

These two institutions served the fazendeiros well, through both The Empire and The Old Republic. When the Portuguese crown prince (the royal family had fled Napoleon in 1808) declared Brazil's independence and himself emperor in 1822, it was really only the continuation of an established monarchy. The independent Empire strengthened Brazilian nationalism, and generally reinforced the positions of the plantation and Church oligarchies. This elite continuity and symbiosis was the key to its success. Conflicts eventually developed, however, and it was the Church's and landowners' abandonment of the monarchy that later undermined The Empire (1822-1889). Amid spreading discontent, a disenchanted military leadership "took on themselves the moderating power, seized the government, exiled the emperor, and, after a brief military dictatorship, ultimately allowed a constituent assembly to draft a republican constitution."[38] That constitution changed the arena of politics, but not its essence. A federal republic was created that located most power at the state level, and national politics became dominated by the two most powerful ones, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. This "politics of the governors" included alternating

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[37]Quoted by Joseph A. Page, The Revolution that Never Was: Northeast Brazil 1955-1964 (New York: Grossman, 1972), p. 43.

[38]Erickson, op. cit., p. 150.

the presidency and negotiating all major decisions. The landowners retained control through the states, however, and used the government to preserve their power; they "vigorously suppressed labor unions and maneuvered to exclude all urban interests from meaningful political participation."[39] This attempt to perpetuate themselves as an exclusive ruling elite led to the collapse of The Old Republic. Greed for power and the Great Depression set the stage for an upstart state governor and some key members of the officer corps to seize power.

The Old Republic had theoretically been based on liberal principles, created as it was in reaction to a deteriorating monarchy. The fazendeiros had welcomed this, "because its decentralizing principles enabled them to take possession of many government agencies and functions denied them under the empire."[40] Elections were controlled by party machines whose leaders were subject to the wishes of the landowners; "for most Brazilians, therefore, the democracy of the Old Republic was only a sham."[41] The ascendance of a third state, Rio Grande do Sul, thrust its governor, Getulio Vargas, into national politics. In 1930, when the outgoing president violated the alternation-in-office agreement between the parties of Sao Paulo and Minais Gerais, he ran against the designated successor. The challenge failed (fraud was charged), but Vargas had developed a national following. With the "politics of the governors" undermined, and the economic crisis worsening, he garnered his civilian support, co-opted

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[39]Ibid., p. 152. [40]Ibid., p. 151. [41]Ibid.

a budding coup within the military, and overthrew the Republic.

The new rulers harshly attacked the fazendeiros and the liberal principles of The Old Republic (1889-1930). They aligned themselves with the new urban, industrial interests, but also sought to re-establish strong central authority. More liberalism, touted by some as the way to broaden representation, was renounced as a failure; it had merely allowed the strong to exploit the weak. Francisco Campos added the argument that democratic reforms would likely lead to a communist takeover, given the realities of the situation at that time. Fascism, then on the rise in Europe, drew some support as the best means to the second desired end, a strong national government. The fascists revealed their true nature, however, when they staged an armed insurrection, as did the communists. Both attempts failed, but the spectre of totalitarianism had been raised for all to see.

Neither liberalism nor fascism was suitable, Vargas and his advisers concluded. The Estado Novo (New State), therefore, would ironically be based on old principles; corporatism would be revived and revitalized. Francisco de Oliveirs Vianna was the primary architect of the Estado Novo. He had studied under Albert Torres, a prominent politician, jurist, and advocate of corporatism, and had absorbed his teachings. Vianna argued for a return to corporatism, but also contended that a formal organizational hierarchy would be needed to make it work in an industrial nation-state. He suggested a structure of local sindicatos, state federations, and national confederations, and "given their absence, he argued in elitist and

paternalistic terms that the state should create them";[42] Vargas and his "cabinet" agreed. They feared both democratic liberalism and totalitarianism; "authoritarian corporatism, therefore, offered the golden mean, a solution that would avoid either extreme."[43]

Vargas first ruled as a populist dictator for fifteen years, and his Estado Novo changed Brazil irrevocably. The national character of the country was solidified, the newer interest sectors and lower social strata brought into the political process, and a major role in economic matters established for the national government. He originated what Latin American leaders today call "an independent foreign policy," i.e., independent of the United States (including extensive dealings with Nazi Germany), and professionalized the civil service. The Vargas regime left Brazil with a different political system, "and, not least, it left the legacy of corporative organizations to represent (and control!) workers and employers."[44] Vargas was overthrown in a 1945 coup not unlike the one he himself had led, but neither his career nor his influence was ended. The candidate he supported was elected president in 1945, and he himself elected in 1950. Rocked by scandals in his administration, however, Vargas committed suicide in the summer of 1954.

The "populist democracy" (Erickson's label), which the Vargas regime had paved the way for, continued to function for another decade.

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[42] Ibid., p. 154.

[43] Ibid., p. 155.

[44] Ibid., p. 156.

Both before and after his death, however, the political structure of the Estado Novo (1937-1945) went unchallenged. Three parties dominated during this period, and:

> Two of the three perpetuated Vargas's corporative legacy. . . . The third, which claimed to be the liberal democratic opposition party, never expressly challenged the corporative principle or moved to liberate the worker and employer organizations from state tutelage and control. Throughout this democratic interlude, therefore, the corporative system remained intact--a separate nondemocratic set of institutions parallel to the elective offices established by the constitution of 1946.[45]

Vargas's death only slightly diminished his influence, moreover. Ronald Schneider states:

> Although Vargas was dead and most of his associates pushed out of the center of the political arena, the tension between pro-Vargas and anti-Vargas forces continued to dominate the political scene.[46]

Erickson, in fact, concludes that: "Throughout the period 1946-1964, therefore, the major dividing line between parties and politicians remained the one drawn between the Vargas and anti-Vargas forces."[47]

Like Peronismo without Peron,[48] "Vargasismo" without Vargas was organized and powerful, but often more disruptive than constructive. Rivalries among his heirs created factions, and their competition

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[45] Ibid.

[46] Schneider, op. cit., p. 68.

[47] Erickson, loc. cit.

[48] See, for example, Peter G. Snow, "Argentina: Politics in a Conflict Society," in Wiarda and Kline, op. cit., pp. 105-8.

resulted in the movement's fragmentation. Frequent military interventions to maintain order, moreover, thrust the top officers into political roles; Schneider reports how frustration and fear of the leftist faction (led by João Goulart) built up among them:

> Mistrust of Goulart, as well as exasperation with the political class as a whole, lay at the root of each of the four military interventions into politics in the 1954-1964 decade. Indeed, it may be helpful to view the 1954-1964 period as a continuous crisis broken by an "artificial" stability during the Kubitschek years (1956-1960).[49]

Goulart's proposals became more radical, and the economic situation worsened, but disagreement among the officers themselves initially precluded decisive action. When Goulart (who had been elected Vice President and assumed the presidency when Janio Quadros resigned) summarily released a group of jailed navy mutineers, however, he triggered "the beginning of the end for his regime."[50] What Goulart thought would be one of the final moves toward success in his drive for "basic reforms," a nationally broadcast address to a rally of non-commissioned officers appealing for support, turned out to be his last speech as President. "Indeed, before he was through speaking at midnight the revolt was launched . . . ."[51]

That revolt initiated the current era of Brazilian politics. The generals, of course, downplayed Goulart's blatant undermining of their military authority. "To justify their coup, the new rulers

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[49]Schneider, op. cit., p. 7; Chapters 1 through 3.

[50]Ibid., pp. 96-97.

[51]Ibid., p. 97.

pointed to economic decline, runaway inflation, capital flight, political instability, corruption, and 'Communist' subversion."[52] Both military and civilian elites truly had feared economic collapse, and that was the major concern of the new rulers. Economic revitalization would become the goal of the revolution, but the form of the new regime had to be determined first. It must be noted that many of the generals involved in the Revolution of 1964 were graduates of the Revolution of 1930. As junior officers, they had played a key role in the overthrow of The Old Republic; Brazilian historians have labeled that movement tenentismo.[53] Throughout their careers, moreover, they had been involved in military interventions, each time turning control back to civilian politicians. Their frustration had grown with each civilian failure to achieve "Order and Progress," the nation's motto, and Goulart's attempt to openly subvert military authority was the last straw for some of them:

> Even among the veterans of tenentismo, there were some who were ready in 1964 to work with the politicians, as they had in the other crises since the 1930's. Others felt they had learned a lesson and wished to purge the political class more deeply than they had ever before, and to retain for themselves greater initiative and autonomy of action with regard to the conduct of national affairs.[54]

The various components of the revolutionary movement, who had been united only by the threat Goulart posed to their interests, soon

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[52]Erickson, op. cit., p. 160.

[53]Schneider, op. cit., p. 45.

[54]Ibid., p. 111.

reverted to their normal postures. Moreover, "beyond their desire to end this perceived 'subversion' of political order, consensus among the victorious elements was quite limited."[55] Conflicts among the generals eventually led to a series of "coups within the coup," but the "most evident" and "most fundamental" differences were between the military and civilian components.[56] After the initial "Revolutionary Supreme Command" issued an "Institutional Act" that granted the executive sweeping authority, including the power to purge political figures, one of the generals was chosen to lead an interim government:

> The inauguration of Castelo Branco as President in mid-April ushered in an eighteen month period of coexistence of military and civilian elements behind a facade of formal democracy in an administration pledged to undertake a transition toward re-establishment of a competitive, although thoroughly reformed or renovated, political system.[57]

Disagreement and division within the movement was pronounced during his selection, and continued afterward. The civilians, moreover, were essentially shunted aside; infighting among the officers became the dominant political activity, and the purges began. The First Institutional Act had provided for the election of a new president in October, 1965, and when questions regarding succession, reform, and recovery began to be debated, the new role of the military was revealed.

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[55] Ibid., p. 108.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., p. 109.

> By mid-1964, it was evident that the old pattern of civil-military relations, one in which the Armed Forces set the limits of the political game, but only within the context of broad currents of elite group opinion, had disappeared into the realm of historical memory.[58]

Most of the new leadership element had witnessed, respected, and learned from the success of Vargas during the 1930's, and sought to emulate it. In many ways, they did: "Although they professed to have democratic intentions, the political system they established is as authoritarian and corporative as Vargas's Estado Novo."[59] Economic recovery, moreover, was deemed an absolute requisite to establishing a successful regime, and they also believed that only a centrally controlled and directed effort could achieve a turnaround. Economic development took priority over all other concerns: "In this regard, the regime's 'reformist vision' included an 'orthodox' neocapitalist emphasis on productivity at the expense of delaying the incorporation of new groups into the money economy."[60] To this end, even Vargas's tactics were borrowed:

> Also reminiscent of the 1930's, the new rulers vigorously applied the corporative labor laws to subject worker organizations to strict state control and to oust the most militant labor leaders from union office.[61]

Advanced technocratic planning coupled with strict political control, therefore, was the path chosen by the new leadership for

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[58]Ibid., p. 142.

[59]Erickson, op. cit., p. 160.

[60]Schneider, op. cit., p. 113.

[61]Erickson, op. cit., pp. 160-61.

pursuing their goals, and they succeeded. After a time-lag, Brazil experienced a "remarkable seven-year boom" between 1968-1974.[62] The end of that boom has been blamed on the oil crisis by sympathizers and on "fundamental contradictions within the growth model" by critics.[63]

Continued dissension among the leaders generated several internal crises, but the Revolution of 1964 entrenched itself, just as Vargas's had. Opposition was suppressed, sometimes ruthlessly, and the constitution amended several more times. By the end of the sixties, "the democratic fig leaf had been eroded to the point where the regime was all but a naked dictatorship. . . ."[64] Alfred Stepan has historically analyzed the entire "military generation"[65] involved in the Revolution, and divided the officers into two groups: "liberal internationalists" associated with Castelo Branco and "authoritarian nationalists" linked to Marshall Costa e Silva.[66] This latter group supported an initial extension of Castelo Branco's presidency, primarily for reasons of continuity, but gained control of the government when Costa e Silva was "elected" in 1967. They retained control

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[62]Werner Baer, "The Brazilian Growth and Development Experience: 1964-1975," Brazil in the Seventies, ed. Riordan Roett (Washington, D.C D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 46.

[63]Ibid., p. 42.

[64]Schneider, op. cit., p. 110.

[65]Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 242.

[66]Ibid., p. 250.

through the next election, but the former group succeeded in recapturing the office in 1974. Although not truly "liberal," this group proposed and attempted political "decompression" (loosening)[67] during the second half of the seventies.

Growing success by the government-sanctioned opposition party in local and legislative elections, renewed economic troubles, and the Iranian revolution,[68] however, all contributed to a resurrection of support for the "hard-line" approach of the "authoritarian nationalist" group. The choice of General Joao Baptista Figueiredo to succeed to the presidency in 1979 seems to represent a compromise between the groups. Although he must be considered a member of the "hard-line" group (he was raised to star rank by Costa e Silva himself), he has pledged to continue the abertura (opening) initiated by his predecessor. Several indicators point toward an upcoming threshold for the Revolution. The mandatory two-party system was dissolved by the new president in late 1979, but municipal elections were also cancelled to allow time for party reorganization. President Figueiredo has promised that the first scheduled direct national elections since the takeover will be held in late 1982. The leadership is hoping that a divided opposition will be less formidable at the polls, but a

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[67]Thomas Skidmore, "Brazil's Changing Role in the International System: Implications for U.S. Policy," in Roett, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

[68]John Wicklein and Joseph B. Treaster, "Brazil: Everything is Booming but Democracy," Atlantic Monthly, 244, 2 (August, 1979), 6-21.

"fusion" effort is being attempted. One point of interest: during 1981 the civilian Vice President was allowed to serve as interim President when the General temporarily stepped down due to medical problems.

The struggle between the two military factions (each with some civilian backers) continues, as evidenced by recent cabinet changes, but the accommodation that resulted in Figueiredo's succession to the presidency could become the basis for some sort of reconciliation. November's election results will set the stage for the next major development. Hopefully, an acceptable working coalition will be produced; if not, the military will probably retreat from reform. It is doubtful that strong, open opposition to the regime will be tolerated, and military control will still be assured through their control of the executive branch. Most likely, the Revolution will continue under military direction for some time to come.

Brazil: State Corporatism in Theory and Practice

I have borrowed Erickson's title[69] for this section, because it so accurately describes Brazil's political history, but I have amended it to indicate that the state subtype of corporatism is precisely what it exemplifies. Corporatism pervades Brazilian politics, and this has been demonistrated in various ways. Schmitter, for example, has systematically studied Brazil's political culture, with special attention to "the political subculture of associational leaders," and

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[69]Erickson, op. cit.

concluded that corporatism permeates both.[70] His diagram of the operation of cultural forces that shape leader behavior is reproduced in Figure 2, and he offers the accompanying comments.

Most of the concepts in this figure should be familiar to the reader, with the probable exception of pactualismo; this Schmitter defines as "preferring and seeking nonviolent means to resolve their differences."[71] The Brazilian people were continuously socialized, both directly and indirectly it appears, to accept corporatism. Transplanted Portuguese and Catholic ideas, moreover, eventually generated indigenous corporatist theorizing, some of which (e.g., the work of Alberto Torres) had a significant political impact. The reader might recall that the primary architect of the Estado Novo, Oliveira Vianna, was strongly influenced by Torres's teachings. Seeds planted by colonial masters, and nurtured by the Catholic Church, thus bloomed and became part of the natural landscape. Schmitter's research revealed some attitudinal differences among certain elements of the Brazilian polity (most notably students, who reflect a strain of liberalism), but his study stresses a history of corporatist consensus. He viewed this dramatic continuity, moreover, as one of the major sources of the durability of "o sistema" in Brazilian politics.

The history of that system, furthermore, reflects operating patterns typical of Latin American Corporatism. Established interests

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[70] Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, especially Chapters 3 and 4.

[71] Ibid., p. 93.




Figure 2. The Formation and Maintenance of Corporatist Attitudes

The positive relationships just described are presented in (Figure 2) in a way that shows how the various political values help form and maintain Brazil's corporatist attitudes toward the political process. Traditionalism and religiosity would seem to be basic values relatively unrelated to each other. Both, however, are strongly associated with authoritarianism, which in turn is positively linked with corporatism. Nationalism is weakly associated with the other antecedent variables, but it seems to make an independent contribution to corporatism. Religiosity may also be linked to corporatism by way of its positive relationship with pactualismo. The fact that so many negatively correlated or unrelated attitudinal syndromes are in some way positively associated with corporatism hints at both its ideological inconsistency and its capacity for accommodating actors with diverse motives and values. This may explain why corporatism has had such a persistent impact upon the pattern of public policy.

Source: Phillipe Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 106-7.

tend to retain influence, with change generally characterized by the incremental co-optation of new "power contenders" (Anderson's term) into the decision-making structure.[72] The political restructuring stimulated by industrialization in Brazil serves as an excellent example of this. Although the rural oligarchy's dominance was ended by the Revolution of 1930, the fazendeiros "have retained enough power to prevent the ascendant urban forces from fundamentally violating their interests."[73] While established interests are seldom eliminated, therefore, shifts in relative influence do occur. Without the benefit of something akin to Almond's polimetrics, it is difficult to defend any serial rank-orderings of power contenders, but this has been attempted in Figure 3. The listings are certainly not definitive, since they are based on subjective historical interpretation, but they do facilitate discussion regarding the interplay among various interest sectors.

Certain changes are historically obvious, the most notable involving control of the government. That role is important in all political structures, but carries peculiar weight in systems characterized by state corporatism, given its attendant formal and informal powers. In Latin American systems, where mechanisms at least akin to the personeria juridica are involved, the role can be critical. Although all interests must be taken into account in decision-making,

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[72]Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," pp. 249-65.

[73]Erickson, op. cit., p. 167.




Figure 3. Relative Influence of Interest Sectors Under Various Brazilian Regimes

the degree of control over the deliberative process that accompanies formal governance is considerable. Applying Karl Deutsch's notion of politics as a "steering" operation,[74] navigational control of the system results, which is something rather significant. Where it applies, that proposition would make government control an extremely useful focus for analysis. Understanding the circumstances surrounding fundamental changes involving that role should reveal a good deal about the political development of relevant systems. I believe such studies would constitute carrying out Almond's suggestion with respect to a specified category of political systems. Brazil is a relevant case, and will be so analyzed, although without the precision Almond prescribed.

During The Empire (1822-1889), the monarchy steered the ship of Brazilian corporatism. That institution lost favor with the other interests when it became too neglected and self-protective, however, and was deposed. The governing role fell to state politicians during The Old Republic (1889-1930), but they tried to ignore the realities of change and eventually could not survive their own infighting. Vargas and his followers revitalized the corporatist structure by recognizing the "power capabilities"[75] of the new industrial interests. More significant, they turned the conservative tendency of Latin American Corporatism on its head. "The principal figures who seized

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[74]Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 76.

[75]Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," p. 265, footnote 3.

power in 1930," Erickson tells us, saw themselves as "modernizing nation builders" rather than preservers of the traditional order.[76] Their primary goals were industrialization and the diversification of agriculture, and they believed that only centrally directed efforts could accomplish them. The incorporation of industry and labor into the decision-making structure, therefore, was intended as much to facilitate control as to provide representation. The fate of Brazil was to be guided by national politicians, epitomized by Vargas himself.

Factionalism existed from the Revolution onward, and there were several flash points that generated military interventions. It was one such incident that spurred Vargas's death. Although fragmented afterward, the network did remain sufficiently intact to retain control, but only for one turbulent decade. Vargas had been el lider to both the elites and the masses. Without him, competition among the former stimulated the manipulated radicalization of the latter. Goulart truly believed he could lead a leftist revolution. Given the divisions among those who opposed him, he might have succeeded had he not directly challenged the military hierarchy. When he did, however, the generals not only intervened, but reassessed their tradition of quickly restoring civilian rule. They feared chaos, knowing that outside forces would likely exploit such an opportunity. Moreover, blatant self-interest began to surface:

> Increasingly, the younger generation of officers expressed a sentiment they were to articulate in

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[76]Erickson, op. cit., p. 153.

> unmistakably clear terms in December, 1968; that they were tired of holding the cow while others received the cream.[77]

Whatever the balance involved, a combination of motives led the Armed Forces to take the tiller of state; they have retained it since.

These changes in the operational control of the Brazilian political structure have been labeled "revolutions" in Figure 3; some analysts would dispute that designation. Anderson has argued that "revolution occurs when some power contenders or some type of power capabilities are successfully eliminated from political participation."[78] If that formulation is applied to the case of Brazil, however, an interesting result accrues. The two changes generally considered by both inside and outside analysts as revolutionary, the accession of Vargas and the military takeover, must be stripped of that label; no contenders were eliminated. The overthrow of the monarchy on the other hand, which has seldom been called a revolution because the political dominance of the fazendeiros was continued and probably strengthened, fits his definition rather neatly.

I must lodge the same complaint voiced earlier regarding Schmitter's treatment of corporatism against Anderson; his criteria are too rigid. His intention was sound, to dispel the myth that Latin American political history has been characterized by turbulence, but his formulation almost vaporizes the concept. Contenders seldom (if ever) "disappear" from the political scene. Individuals might be

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[77]Schneider, op. cit., p. 111.

[78]Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," p. 260.

exiled or banned (or worse), but even that does not "eliminate" the interest cluster they represented from participation; at least some residue of power tends to remain. Recall that Schmitter was quoted earlier regarding the waves of organization and reorganization that crease "interest intermediation systems"; he added:

> Successive layers with their peculiar compositions often remain in a sedimentary state, relatively unaffected by subsequent or antecedent developments. Even the potentially metamorphic impact of revolution, civil war, rebellion, defeat in war, and/or foreign occupation may fail to rearrange or displace them.[79]

Dictators, monarchs, and colonial rulers are probably the only categories of contenders that come close to elimination, but even their impact does not evaporate when they are deposed. An unusual but interesting example of resurgent influence was provided in Portugal recently. A small royalist party emerged after the 1974 Revolution, even though that monarchy had been "eliminated" nearly a century earlier. The persistent influence of Vargas and Peron has already been noted.

In addition to basing his definition on an almost impossible necessary condition, Anderson ignored innovation as a basis for revolution. National officials were basically figureheads before Vargas infused their organization with power after 1930. Although no one was eliminated, an older interest acquired a significant new power capability. Similarly in 1964, the Armed Forces increased their capability immensely when they chose to retain control of the

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[79]Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," p. 13.

government. What Anderson describes would definitely constitute a revolution, but other events might also. My suggestion is that his formulation be amended. The requirement for elimination of a power contender or capability should be dropped; that would be reduced to a sufficient condition. The injection of a new power capability into the decision-making process, via either a new contender or the enhancement of an existing one, might also generate a revolution, but would not be sufficient evidence of one per se. Some marked impact on the structure would have to be demonstrable.

Operating within the conceptual framework already constructed, a useful definition can be formulated that incorporates all these ideas. The basic necessary and sufficient condition involved would be restructuring, i.e., changes in decision-making rules or roles that, in effect, result in a different structure. A major turn in circumstance (e.g., conquest) would also be revolutionary, but would be readily evidenced by changes in the other two elements; its inclusion is implied. Within my interpretation of the political process, the essence of revolution would be a major change in how authoritative decisions are made. For systems that fall into the appropriate category, such a change would be manifested by a reshuffling of the corporatist deck, a major revision of the rules, or both.

In the history of Brazil, both have tended to be involved. The Revolution of 1889 primarily involved rule changes in the form of decentralization, but the monarchy was also formally removed and a new set of contenders, state politicians, created. Vargas reversed the rules again in 1930; in so doing he created still another set of

contenders, national politicians, and downgraded their state counterparts. The power of the fazendeiros was more diluted than reduced by his recognition of the new industrial interests, and his decision to organize the university system provided the basis for a greater student power capability. Seizure of control in 1964 by the Armed Forces directly reduced the power of Vargas's creation, the national "political class," and indirectly changed other roles. Labor, Students, and the Church became active opponents of the regime, a situation that reduced all their relative power positions. On the other hand, the military has actively sought to incorporate the rural peasantry into the structure for the first time. Their motive might be pre-emption, but so was Vargas's with respect to the urban workers in the 1930's. Industrialists have also benefited from the takeover, both economically and politically.[80] Furthermore, by changing its own role so dramatically, the Armed Forces also changed the rules. The moderating power of the military was an essential part of "the operational code" of Brazilian politics, as Schmitter expressed it. He also noted, however, that:

> . . . the functional justification for this role in terms of the code, the need to provide an outside check on politicians' failure to limit themselves, depends on the role occupant's not becoming an active agent in the apportionment of favors and enjoyment of privileges. In this respect, the nature of the role has been altered radically, if not irrevocably, by the Brazilian military since the coup of 1964.[81]

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[80]Some of this analysis is drawn again from Erickson, op. cit.; he discusses each interest sector individually on pp. 161-69.

[81]Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, pp. 73-74.

The events of 1889, 1930, and 1964 thus all resulted in demonstrable differences in how authoritative decisions would be made thereafter in Brazil. In each instance, moreover, the necessary and sufficient condition suggested above as constituting the core of a revolution, i.e., restructuring, was met. In more conventional terms, Schneider basically concurs in this assessment:

> In addition to several military interventions and coups, Brazil has encountered three "crises of regime" during the nearly 150 years of its existence as an independent country. . . . these crises, which resulted in major reshaping of the nation's political institutions, share many structural similarities as well as common contextual features.[82]

He later elaborated:

> The crises that led to the demise of each of these regimes involved an essentially similar process, the basic components of which were industrialization and the concomitant social change leading to modifications in the patterns and extent of mobilization and participation beyond the capacity of the country's political institutions for adequate response.[83]

The monarchy's self-centeredness rendered it obsolete when budding industrialization appeared; the "politics of the governors" developed the same problem, due to early industrial successes and their accompanying urbanization, and suffered the same fate. Vargasismo's success was due in part to those very same trends, but was later undermined by demographics. Schneider tells us that

> fairly rapid broadening of the political base (there was a doubling of the Brazilian electorate between 1950 and 1962) could not help but bring in its wake a change in the composition of the policymaking elite.[84]

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[82]Schneider, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[83]Ibid., p. 13.

[84]Ibid., p. 7.

The form that change took, however, was unexpected and eventually rejected. Goulart's ascension to the presidency was accidental in nature, and the course he wished to set was unacceptable to the majority of decision-makers. His ouster in 1964 had broad support. Vargas's movement, it appears, was the "most revolutionary" of the three. It both successfully restructured and redirected the political process, and marked Brazil's turn toward Progressive Corporatism. The Armed Forces retained that new direction after their takeover, because national progress was considered necessary to insure an acceptable international position. Since it was also triggered by a desire to preserve the existing order, however, there was a strong trace of traditional Latin American Corporatism involved in their action.

Vargas (with military backing) thus initiated a DAMC ("big") wave of expanding political participation in Brazil, but the Armed Forces later stopped it, returning that nation to a much more closed type of decision-making. Ironically, they used the enhanced power capability of the national government that Vargas had reinstated to accomplish that end. That overall swing, moreover, was itself composed of "little" waves of turbulence. Schneider relates that a local observer described political competition during the entire period as "a kind of dynamic equilibrium, unstable and changeable";[85] his own portrayal reflects a similar view:

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[85]Fernando Pedreira, Marco 31: Civis e Militares no Processo da Crise Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), p. 66, as translated by Schneider, op. cit., p. 142.

> The 1964 hybrid "revolution-counterrevolution" was in a very real sense but another step in the zigzag chain of political abnormalities and military interventions that extends from the 1930 Revolution that brought Getulio Vargas to power, through the 1945 revolt that ousted the dictator, the 1954 golpe that led to his suicide, the "countercoup" that paved the way for the return to power of his political heirs, and the succession crisis of August-September, 1961, precipitated by Janio Quadros' abrupt resignation.[86]

Continuing the application of the set of wave assumptions introduced above, both the beginning and the "ending" of this pulse of development would be characterized as intentional, cataclysmic (sudden, drastic), as opposed to catastrophic (gradual, drastic), events. Given the predominant top-down flow of authority within state corporatist systems, coupled with the extraordinary coercive nature of a military power capability, this would not be unusual.

A concern for participation as a significant aspect of political development is not new; nor is a focus on centralization and decentralization. Few analysts, however, have linked them together as integral parts of the same process. Schmitter summarizes the conventional approaches in the literature quite well, then eloquently expresses the alternative:

> Theoretical discussions of the structural implications of political development can be divided, broadly speaking, into two categories. On the one hand are those that emphasize the emergence of a permanent, depersonalized, and centralized set of institutions, "an organ distinct from the rest of society," engaged in authoritative decision-making and implementation. On the other hand are those that equate political development with "politicization," or "increased participation or involvement of the citizens in state activities, in power calculations and consequences."

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[86]Schneider, op. cit., p. 7.

> In fact, despite their obvious differences, these two views are not irreconcilable. Indeed, just as societal development can be seen as an interplay between role differentiation and structural integration, political development can be seen as an interplay between two distinctive but interdependent subprocesses, the one tending toward the centralization or concentration of authority and the other toward the dispersion or distribution of participation.[87]

It is this interplay that I have suggested can be usefully conceptualized by the interlocking wave assumptions. The "ratio" of concentration to dispersion with respect to decision-making authority never remains constant. Minor fluctuations continuously occur; major changes occasionally. The actual activity, of course, takes various forms in different systems, at different times.

Gilbert Siegal explored this phenomena in the Brazilian system, and produced the following formula to represent his conclusion:[88]

Diffused power > consensus building institutions ⟶ centralization and control

When differentiation did take hold in Brazilian society, the new sectors merely imitated the old ones. Colonization, The Empire, the fazenda, and the Church had all infused the culture with authoritarian patrimonialism; the "natural" way to be organized was to be organized from above. Schmitter's diagram (Figure 2, page 143) illustrated how these traditions reinforced political corporatism. Siegel's analysis, moreover, highlights an important point. One of the key linkages

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[87]Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, p. 4.

[88]Gilbert B. Siegel, "Brazil: Diffusion and Centralization of Power," Development Administration in Latin America, eds. C. E. Thurber and L. S. Graham (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973), p. 380.

between the two "distinctive but interdependent subprocesses" of concentration and dispersion of decision-making authority is interest aggregation. By looking at what devices are used for that purpose in a system, and how they operate, one can ascertain a good deal about the nature of the system and its major developmental direction.

When I stated that the Armed Forces had "ended" the wave that Vargas had initiated, that did not imply a return to the status quo ante. To the contrary, the generals welcomed the enlarged role of the national government in economic planning, and expanded its control over interest aggregation. They have manipulated and suppressed (at times, repressed) their adversaries, and the means they have employed are typical of state corporatism. A single legal opposition party was initially authorized, in conjunction with the formation of their own Alliance for National Renewal (ARENA). That arrangement succeeded in providing control over state and local elections for over a decade. When the Democratic Movement of Brazil (MDB) appeared to have become a bit too formidable, however, the mandatory two-party system was abolished. This same tactic, control of interest aggregation by manipulation of relevant organizations, was applied in other ways. The National Union of Students (UNE) was de-certified. Uncooperative labor leaders were purged from the unions and the bureaucracy under various Institutional Acts. When the popular Luis Inacio da Silva ("Lula") flaunted his opposition by leading an illegal metalworkers strike in 1980, he was arrested. A military court later convicted him for inciting "class violence," and sentenced him to three and a half years in prison.

Control of the citizenry through their "representative" organizations is a central feature of corporatism. The fazendeiros retained enough influence after 1930 to prevent the recognition of official peasant organizations, but some "civil associations" had been formed and even a few militant peasant leagues. Rural worker sindicatos were not authorized until 1963. After 1964, however, Erickson tells us:

> . . . the military smothered most independent rural organizations . . . then fostered in most counties [sic] the creation of official sindicatos under approved leadership, provoking one analyst to comment: "The last remaining uncorporatized arena that caused so much anxiety during the Goulart regime will then have been preempted and, presumably, placed beyond the reach of any future mobilization."[89]

Both commentators seem to imply that no benefit whatsoever will be forthcoming to the peasants from that program. They discount the realities of organizing as a social process, however; once a functioning human network is established, it cannot be destroyed by decree. Unless a government pursues total control of its citizens, the informal structure of an "abolished" formal organization can continue to operate if the members desire it to. Erickson expresses agreement with the recent conclusion of another observer that "Brazil is not a totalitarian state,"[90] so this is a pertinent consideration. He also provides a

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[89] Erickson, op. cit., pp. 168-69; the quote is from Phillipe Schmitter, "The 'Portugalization' of Brazil?" in Stepan, op. cit., p. 209.

[90] Roett, op. cit., "Introduction," p. 6; Erickson, op. cit., p. 172.

relevant example: although "closed" by the military in 1964, Erickson acknowledges that the students' UNE has continued to operate "underground."[91] Organized action, moreover, tends to breed more of the same. Erickson also reports that "industrialists have established a number of autonomous organizations outside and often parallel to the official corporative bodies";[92] he further notes that they have influenced government decisions.

Most analysts have had difficulty categorizing the Brazilian political system, which has created further difficulty in "cross-matching" between typologies. Schneider offers a useful appendix on "Comparative Formulations,"[93] in which he relates his findings to the works of David Apter and Martin Needler, but he relied primarily on the ideas of Samuel Huntington[94] as his bases for comparative analysis. He directly applied Huntington's typology of systems and his conceptualizations regarding political development in his study, and agrees with Huntington that Brazil has been "a praetorian (i.e., military controlled) rather than a civic policy for most of its existence."[95] Schneider notes, however, that Brazil's path of

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[91]Erickson, op. cit., p. 167.

[92]Ibid., p. 166.

[93]Schneider, op. cit., Appendix A, pp. 363-69.

[94]Ibid., pp. 9-18, 353, and 356; the specific work cited is Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.

[95]Schneider, op. cit., p. 353; parentheses added.

development has been "one of crossing and recrossing the boundary between civic and praetorian at generational intervals," and concludes that "it may be more meaningful to view Brazil as being most frequently in an intermediate category."[96] Huntington's classification highlights the important political role played by the Brazilian military, but fails to explicate that role.

Until 1964, the Brazilian Armed Forces neither directly dominated nor sought to dominate the nation's political process. Instead, they represented the system's "safety net." In attempting to explain why they periodically intervened, Schneider acknowledged that "Huntington's concept of a 'veto coup' is of some utility," but argues that "the more salient feature is of course the Brazilian military's concept of the 'moderating power' and the substantial legitimacy accorded by other groups to its exercise of this function."[97] Although Schneider does not deal with it as such, this "feature" fits neatly only within a corporatist analytical framework. The change of military role that has occurred, moreover, does not negate the utility of such a framework. The fact that the change can be accounted for within a corporatist context seems to enhance its utility, and reinforces my decision to employ corporatist analysis.

My conclusion is that Brazil can most usefully be classified as a state corporatist system which is currently being "piloted" (more in the maritime than the aerospace sense) by its Armed Forces. It is

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid., p. 356.

certainly not a fascist state. Corporatism is a distinctive type of politics, one that accommodates multiple interests, but places limits on them. State corporatism tends to be authoritarian at times, but it also tends to be inclusive. The central control that state corporatism affords can readily be turned toward repression, but the converging of interests that its very nature entails does not allow such abuses to proliferate or continue for long. If they do, the corporatist identity is soon lost. Finally, change can be easier to bring about in such systems. Many salubrious reforms have failed because integrated political action could not be achieved. State corporatism depends on such efforts to function, and because of that might offer nation-states an edge in our increasingly interdependent world.

Précis

In this chapter, I have proposed that political development can be usefully envisaged as interlocking waves of minor (usually) and major (occasionally) deviance from a system's status quo. Major change, moreover, was depicted as the product of serial reinforcement of such deviation. Magoroh Maruyama's concept of deviance-amplifying mutual causality (DAMC) and René Thom's catastrophe theory were introduced as possible sources of explanation for such changes also. Within the specific conceptualization of politics selected for this study, furthermore, this deviation relates to a social system's decision-making structure, and political development was defined as the evolution (in a neutral sense) of that structure.

A succinct political history of Brazil was then presented, followed by a brief analysis of the most significant changes just described. Three revolutions (defined as major changes in how authoritative decisions are thereafter made) were examined in terms of modifications in decision-making rules and the ascendance and descendance of interest sectors with respect to their decision-making roles. Particular attention was paid to control of the formal institutions of government, since that confers the role of "pilot" for the system within a context of state corporatism. The primary means of "steering," the manipulation of representative organizations, was highlighted within the historical review.

Brazil's transition from the conservative Latin American branch of state corporatism to the Progressive approach was also examined, including an application of the proposed interlocking wave assumptions regarding political development. Hopefully, this demonstrated the different ends that state corporatism can pursue, and illustrated the utility of those assumptions. The primary purpose of my review of Brazilian political history, however, was to enhance the reader's familiarity with corporatism. This has also, hopefully, been accomplished, but state corporatism still represents only half the story. Let us proceed with the other half, and then move directly on to the basic issues of this study.

CHAPTER V

THE ORGANIZATIONAL REPUBLIC: SOCIETAL CORPORATISM IN THE UNITED STATES

To this point, the reader has been presented with four rather detached discussions. After introducing the basic issues that stimulated this research, a conceptual framework rooted in a systems orientation and focused on decision-making was outlined. Next, a brief historical examination of the pluralism-elitism controversy was offered, along with my personal conclusion that this debate has reached a stalemate. A third school of thought, corporatism, was reviewed and proposed as a potential basis for resolving that deadlock. A revised approach to studying political development was also tendered, in part to help explain the existence of two very distinct subtypes of corporatism, and in part to lay some important groundwork for my treatment of the basic issues. Brazilian political history was then summarized and analyzed to both illustrate that approach and elaborate the nature of state corporatism, one of the major subtypes.

The disjointed character of this effort so far, moreover, is not atypical of case study research, as noted back in Chapter I. The framework, the pluralist-elitist synthesis, corporatist theory, and the interlocking wave assumptions are all essential elements of the alternative interpretation of contemporary American politics that will be constructed below. Before that can begin, however, one preliminary step remains to be completed. The roots and operation of state

corporatism were explained through my review of Brazilian history; societal corporatism requires similar treatment. Rather than present another entire case study, however, descriptions from the literature will be offered. Some brief references to the Netherlands will be made, and contrasts drawn with Brazil where useful in clarifying a point. Having accomplished that, the major concern of this study, the current status of the decision-making structure of the United States, will then be addressed. It will be argued that a restructuring has been occurring and is continuing, and that the product of this DAMC ("big") wave of political development can most usefully be analyzed as a form of societal corporatism. While several authors, including Schmitter,[1] have hinted that societal corporatism has been evolving in the United States, only two (to the best of my knowledge) have systematically addressed the proposition; Norman Keehn[2] and Robert Salisbury[3] present opposing conclusions, moreover. Their ideas will be combined with other relevant contemporary analyses in my presentation below.

Having argued that modern societal corporatism, as a general concept, offers the most useful basis for understanding and analyzing contemporary American politics, I will contrast it with its theoretical

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[1]Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 104.

[2]Norman Keehn, "A World of Becoming: From Pluralism to Corporatism," Polity, 9, 1 (Fall, 1976), 19-39.

[3]Robert Salisbury, "Why No Corporatism in America" Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, eds. Phillipe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), pp. 213-30.

rivals. Elitism, pluralism, and the synthetic product of their long competition, pluralistic elitism, will all be compared with corporatism, within a personal historical perspective regarding American political development. The basic components of Paul Deising's concept of the decision-making structure (i.e., roles, rules, and circumstance) will provide the general framework for that comparison. I will then follow my own advice. A conceptual model of the current decision-making structure of the United States will be outlined, as an example of the potential offered by corporatist analysis. The implications of that model with respect to the basic nature of our political system will then be examined, and the normative question of whether what I perceive constitutes modernization or decay will be briefly considered. Finally, my concerns and recommendations for the future will be offered. Before proceeding, however, I want to reiterate my awareness of the exploratory nature of this effort, and remind the reader that no claim to scientific conclusiveness accompanies the tendered argument or model. This will hopefully preclude premature rejection of either, and orient the reader toward the potential, not the precision, of both.

Societal Corporatism: Organizing From Below

Renewed interest in Latin American politics during the 1960's spurred the resurrection of corporatism within Western political science, but also generated a tendency to equate all corporatism with the state subtype. Such analytical prejudices are often reflected in definitions. I suggested earlier that Schmitter's formulation was somewhat tainted by his early immersion into Latin American and

Iberic corporatism; Erickson's seems to have been similarly skewed:

> Corporatism is basically a special institutional arrangement linking interest associations and the state. The state lays down the rules governing the activities of these bodies and, when it legally recognizes them, grants them monopoly rights in representing their socioeconomic categories.[4]

Charles Anderson is certainly familiar with Latin American politics,[5] but his conceptualization of corporatism expresses a less rigid, broader understanding of what it entails:

> In corporatist thought, the state is expected to play an active role in the design of political order. The government is not indifferent to the overall form of the associational life of the community. Organizations are something more than voluntary contracts among individuals. . . . In corporatism, the role of the state is to rationalize the relationships between critical organizations.[6]

A key distinction between subtypes of corporatism, therefore, would seem to be the means involved in achieving this rationalization. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, expressing a concern similar to mine that the concept has not been sufficiently specified in the literature, have suggested that corporatism be "disaggregated."[7] More important, they propose a very useful method for accomplishing this, a focus on "the distinction between 'inducements' extended by the state to win the cooperation of groups and 'constraints' through which the

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[4]Erickson, op. cit., p. 161.

[5]Charles Anderson, The Politics of Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

[6]Anderson, Statecraft: An Introduction to Political Choice and Judgment, pp. 288-89.

[7]Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, op. cit., pp. 967-86.

state directly controls groups."[8] I expressed earlier my preference for the use of "government" rather than "state," primarily to reinforce the separate identities of the subtypes, and my contention that organizations rather than groups are the primary actors in corporatist systems. The Colliers' research, in fact, deals with labor unions. They state in their conclusions that a broader analysis, including "the workers themselves (as opposed to labor organizations) and employers,"[9] would provide a better understanding of state-labor relations, but offer no suggestions for pursuing such an inquiry. By its very nature, moreover, corporatism precludes "any leaping from the individual to the state";[10] intermediary agents have always been an intrinsic part of it. The parish guild, fiefdom, and fazenda (hacienda in Spanish) have all cornered that role in various historical situations. Since approximately the turn of this century, however, a phalanx of formal organizations have gradually appropriated it. In fact, are not "worker" and "employer" primarily organizational designations in today's world?

On the other hand, the Colliers astutely recognized that both inducements and constraints, in varying combinations, are employed by all governments, and propose that these configurations would be useful for classifying systems. The diagram they constructed to illustrate

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[8]Ibid., abstract, p. 967. [9]Ibid., p. 980.

[10]Azpiazu y Zulaica, op. cit., p. 127.

the possibilities involved is reproduced as Figure 4. It very clearly contrasts the two subtypes, and distinguishes them both from repressive government; it is a major contribution to corporatist analysis. The lower-left corner of the figure represents an admitted "residual category,"[11] which explains its rather confusing label, but that does not detract from the overall utility of the classification scheme. The Colliers' use of inducements and constraints also spotlights the role of government. Any organization can "refuse" to accept an inducement, as they define them.[12] The choice rests with the leaders as the representatives of the membership; there is an implication that some kind of bargaining occurs. Constraints, however, are imposed. Failure to comply automatically places an organization in direct opposition to the government, which exercises the only real choice. It is this element of choice that truly differentiates state corporatism from its societal counterpart.

The development of societal corporatism within a nation, therefore,is very different from what occurred in Brazil, for example. Schmitter has described it as an "osmotic process whereby the modern state and modern interest associations seek each other out."[13] Alan Cawson, who has attempted to broaden the almost-exclusive concern of British corporatist analysts with economic policymaking, has suggested that "the crucial transformation occurs when interest groups change

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[11]Ibid., p. 980.

[12]Ibid., p. 969.

[13]Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 111.




Figure 4. Hypothetical Relationship between Inducements-Constraints Distinction and Broad Types of Group Representation

Source: Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" American Political Science Review, 73, 4 (December, 1979), p. 980.

from being private protective associations and move towards the establishment of regularly and mutually supportive relationships with government."[14] Inducements are used to garner the cooperation or support of important interest organizations, which must then comply with certain constraints if they desire to maintain the relationship. Hobart Spalding has interestingly used the metaphor of "seduction" to describe some cooptation efforts of this kind.[15]

The government, moreover, need not be the initiator. The same result can accrue when an organization seeks some favorable policy decision, and the government determines that a connection might be beneficial. Both scenarios tend to occur, in fact, as societal corporatism sets in. The reader should note, however, that what has just been described is functioning pluralism in a modern society. Ironically, it is a preponderance of such practices that eventually undermine their very basis:

> The more the private citizens succeed in organizing themselves into powerful combines and association for the promoting of their manifold and often conflicting interests, the more they undermine the conditions that are essential to the actual functioning of the classical Liberalist concept of an automatically achieved equilibrium of freely competing social forces. And the more this spontaneous harmonization proves to have little relation to reality, the more the government is impelled to interfere in order to secure a deliberately regulated and planned integration of interests.[16]

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[14]Cawson, op. cit., p. 191.

[15]Hobart Spalding, "The Parameters of Labor in Hispanic America," Science and Society, 36, 2 (Summer, 1972), 211.

[16]P. E. Kramer, The Societal State (Meppel: J. A. Boom, 1966), p. 83, quoted in Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 110.

Emergent corporatism, however, is more than just "hyper-pluralism"; it is bureaucratized pluralism. Interest "groups" are not plugged into the decision-making structure, interest organizations are. Group hierarchies are involved, and these leaders must be careful not to displease their "sponsors" within the government if they want to continue to receive favorable treatment. Should they "rebel," they lose the benefits of the relationship for the organization they represent. In such cases, their leadership position becomes jeopardized, and they either mend fences or find themselves replaced by ambitious subordinates. Organizational "politics" have never been confined to government agencies. In addition, the exchange of benefits must be mutually worthwhile. There are, of course, various ways the sponsors can be placed in jeopardy, depending on the particular political system involved. Controls over organizational leaders, moreover, when skillfully applied, can be readily translated into control over demands. Exceeding accepted limits on demands can invoke not only the displeasure of sponsors, but also the wrath of other interests. Reciprocal deference to specialized "expertise" tends to become an important ingredient in this emerging structure. The various sectors seek to monopolize influence over policy directly related to their interests, and that requires an absence of opposition. Schmitter describes this feature of societal corporatism in terms of "preemption of issues" and "vertical or sectoral policy compartmentalization."[17]

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[17]Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 101.

The role of government gradually changes also. It becomes much more than one interest among many, more than "an umpire or referee among contending parties," and even more than "primus inter pares (first among equals)."[18] If the sports metaphor can be carried forward, the most appropriate analogy would seem to be that of "league commissioner." The control mechanisms used are formal and informal constraints on "teams," contingently associated with inducements. These are primarily directed at "management," but can be aimed at "players," and are usually reinforced by the other "teams." The government chaperones the system, therefore, by maneuvering within the rules of the game, and occasionally manipulating them. This is one of the critical contrasts between state and societal corporatism. Under the former, the reader should recall, whoever controls the formal institutions of government can literally "steer" the entire system. Control is rather direct; all state corporatist systems display authoritarianism to a greater or lesser degree, over time. Under societal corporatism, the exercise of authority is more indirect. Interests are still controlled through their organizations, but the methods are more subtle and the results less definite.

One reviewer objected to this analogy, however, claiming that a sports league commissioner is merely an employee of the team owners. That is true to some degree, but so are government functionaries. Technically, moreover, commissioners are elected by team

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[18]Wasby, op. cit., pp. 113-14.

representatives in accordance with an established constitution, and serve fixed terms under renewable contracts. Team "owners" also tend to be large business syndicates today, and are often giant corporations, whose "representatives" are professional business managers. Certainly, league "politics" is involved in the selection of the commissioner and in his operational decisions, but that is partially what the analogy is all about. A superordinate organizational role is filled by subordinate organizational representatives of various ilk, and an essentially cooperative relationship among them "steers" the league as a whole. The "commissioner," moreover, is actually an organization (i.e., his office is) that must deal with other relevant organizations. Finally, I do not contend that this analogy is isomorphic, only that it portrays the expanded role of the government and the interdependent, organizational nature of the relationships among the parts of a political system under societal corporatism.

There is also another very noteworthy difference. The process of change that produces societal corporatism within a system presents a sharp contrast with its state counterpart. No newsworthy revolutions, such as those that occurred in Brazil, mark its arrival or its turning points. The bureaucratization of the interest sectors, once firmly initiated, appears to spread almost spontaneously where the appropriate resources are available. As an example, Schmitter describes how societial corporatism "crept into the policy" of The Netherlands: "The resultant pattern evolved pragmatically and unevenly, not by the

unfolding of some concerted, grand corporatist design."[19] Since that seems to be a general characteristic of such transformations, one interesting corollary tendency would be that these revolutions (i.e., major restructurings of the decision-making process) are leaderless in the traditional sense. Neither an individual leader (e.g., Vargas), nor a guiding movement (e.g., the Alliance for National Renovation, ARENA) are needed for their success. They seem to be "catastrophic" by nature, in fact, and the appearance of either a lider maximo or an advocating ideology would signal an entirely new turn of events. Schmitter continued his description of the way "creeping corporatism" overtook the Netherlands by stating it "moved up and down . . . back and forth . . . and sideways"[20] through the decision-making structure; i.e., it infiltrated by halting steps.

Ripples of minor change, therefore, seemed to accumulate to a point where a major difference had to be acknowledged but without any identifiable central orchestration. This DAMC ("big") wave of development, while somewhat similar to the Estado Novo/ARENA sequence in Brazil with respect to the ripples, was very different with respect to its overall character. The summary contrasts that Schmitter offers regarding state and societal corporatism seem very appropriate for application to the two cases I have been discussing. Brazil's revolutions were reactions to pluralism; what occurred in the

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[19]Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" pp. 111-12; his primary source on the Netherlands was Kraemer, op. cit.

[20]Ibid., p. 112.

Netherlands was the product of pluralism.[21] The processes of corporatization, moreover, were markedly distinct. Brazil's was "dependent and penetrated"; the Netherlands' "autonomous and penetrative."[22] Schmitter's general conclusions about the two subtypes closely reflect my own:

> When viewed statically, descriptively, institutionally, these two subtypes exhibit a basic structural similarity, one which sets them apart from pluralist, monist or syndicalist systems of interest representation. When viewed in motion, however, they are revealed as the products of very different political, social and economic processes, as the vehicles for very different power and influence relations, and as the purveyors of very different policy consequences.[23]

How American Politics Has Changed

The editor's introduction to a recent collection of readings on American politics includes the following remarks:

> This volume arises out of the puzzlement felt by many political scientists--and by many ordinary Americans--when they contemplate the workings of the American political system in the late 1970's. The old landmarks are still there. The Supreme Court and Congress still meet, the White House still stands, the national nominating conventions still select two presidential candidates every four years. Yet the old landmarks are features of a landscape that has changed in all sorts of ways, some of them dramatic, some more subtle. Were someone to return to the United States today, having been out of the country and out of touch with its politics for the past twenty years, he would be like a man returning after many years to his childhood home. Everything would be familiar and unfamiliar at the same time.[24]

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[21] Ibid., p. 106

[22] Ibid., p. 103.

[23] Ibid., pp. 104-5.

[24] Anthony King, ed., "Introduction," The New American Political

That statement conveys the very sentiments that stimulated this study. My introduction to American politics was, fortunately, very broad and thorough. The professor continuously stressed the complexity of modern government, and the assigned readings reflected a wide spectrum of political thinking. Although we did not specifically deal with competing theories about the system, a crude model emerged: interest groups actively competed over the direction and shape of government policy, shifting positions as circumstances changed the needs and feelings of their constituencies. Follow-up courses introduced me to political philosophy and theory, and I learned that "my" model was called "pluralism." I was also exposed to and considered the elitist alternatives, but rejected them. My experience growing up in New York City left me convinced that infighting permeated modern politics; no leadership clique could dominate a large, complex social system such as the United States. Class analysis also struck me as being obsolete at first, but some course work on Latin America made me aware that was not necessarily the case. I concluded, however, that it was not really very helpful for understanding the United States. Although I had some questions, pluralism seemed to be the most useful model available.

An advanced course in American politics introduced me to Theodore Lowi's original The End of Liberalism,[25] moreover, which

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System (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 2.

[25]Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Politics,

convinced me I was on the right track. While he did not answer all my questions, he clarified two very significant issues. First, he argued that the debate over positive government had been rendered moot. In his preface, he stated: "The idea of government limited to a specific set of activities had been a characteristically American invention which, characteristically, was discarded once it became too confining."[26] I initially interpreted his title to be a reflection of this conclusion. The liberal-conservative dichotomy had historically focused on the promotion or rejection of positive government, and the question had apparently been resolved in favor of the former. What puzzled me was why he had not titled the book "The End of Conservatism," since the liberals had been victorious. I concluded it was for marketing reasons; liberalism was the much more popular subject of the two at that time. The second issue he considered far more serious, because it had not been resolved. Limited government, by its nature, offered the individual a degree of protection from abuse. With that notion abandoned, what control mechanism now served the citizen? Lowi framed the issue in terms of "due process of law," and argued that the answer was none:

> Instead, the new theory and jurisprudence of the liberal state defined it away. This was done by borrowing from political science the pluralist notion that the pulling and hauling among competing interests is sufficient due process.

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and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969).

[26]Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2d ed., p. xvi.: all subsequent citations refer to this newer edition.

> Pluralism became the model and the jurisprudence of the good society.[27]

To further his argument, Lowi elaborated the basic propositions of the pluralist school. In so doing, he also reinforced my doubts about the elitist alternatives:

> In these simple propositions, reaching back to James Madison, lies the pluralist critique of capitalism and of Marxism. To summarize: (1) Groups, of which corporations are one type, possess power directly over a segment of society and also a share of control of the state. (2) Groups, rather than entrepreneurs and firms, are the dominant reality of modern life. (3) As long as even a small proportion of all interests remain strong and active, no unitary political class, or "power elite" will emerge. That is, in the pluralist system it is highly improbable that a consensus across a whole class can last long enough to institutionalize itself.[28]

Therein, to me, the basic problem of control was resolved. Our old friend "checks and balances" provided the saving mechanism, but this time in the form of competing groups. Government served as referee, moreover, and was itself still subject to both its internal checks (primarily the separation of powers) and the ultimate vox populi, the voting booth. One related question still disturbed me, however; could a minority interest expect to be heard? This was the old problem of access, and my anxieties were calmed by Robert Dahl:

> A central guiding threat of American constitutional development has been the evolution of a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision.[29]

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., p. 34.

[29] Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 137.

The model could work, it seemed. Having accepted that the real world never matched the ideals of theory, I was not very upset when Lowi described American politics as "a vulgarized version of the pluralist model."[30] I dismissed his "interest group liberalism" label as jargoneering, and brushed aside his tone of concern. He was bemoaning the end of liberalism, I finally concluded. Although positive government might be here to stay, an effective method of preventing sweeping government action (every liberal seemed to have a grand design for social reform back then) had accompanied its incorporation into the system. The warnings he included about the "costs" of this "new public philosophy" sounded like standard liberal complaints: (1) the atrophy of institutions of popular control; (2) the maintenance of old and the creation of new structures of privilege; and (3) conservatism in several senses of the word."[31] I was satisfied that modern pluralism worked just fine. Legitimate demands could be achieved through sustained group action, but the government could not institute any grandiose scheme and run roughshod over the citizenry. Groups would check each other's demands, and "cross pressure"[32] provided added protection, preventing the rise of a dominant faction. It all fit together rather nicely.

I had, of course, misinterpreted Professor Lowi. Nevertheless, my conclusions were reinforced when I returned to political science

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[30] Lowi, op. cit., p. 51.

[31] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

[32] Wasby, op. cit., p. 136.

after a hiatus of several years to find pluralism still very much the dominant school of thought. Despite a 180° shift in attitude toward presidential power, the basic operating model of American politics being taught had changed very little in the near-decade since I had taken my first course. Interest groups still competed very actively, it seemed, and an insurgent group could redirect government policy, as the anti-Vietnam War movement had demonstrated. My study of public administration, however, introduced an entirely new element into my thinking: bureaucracy. The more I learned about how formal organizations permeated our political process, and how they function, the more suspicious I became that something much more complex than pluralism was at work. An internship with a state health department and a stint with a local government reorganization commission, moreover, convinced me that my suspicions were well-founded.

About this time, the revised edition of The End of Liberalism was published. As I read it, it did not take long to realize what I had missed the first time:

> Interest groups do compete and coalesce, as political scientists say. Yet they also possess an important administrative dimension. They would have no staying power at all if they did not have an efficient bureaucracy.[33]

Pluralism did operate, for a time. Even when organization became a prerequisite for recognition and influence, competition among interests still provided some degree of control; Lowi acknowledged that in his earlier study. The "vulgarized version" of pluralism that evolved,

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[33]Lowi, op. cit., p. 30.

however, produced two irreversible mutations of the basic model. First, organizational representatives were treated as, and soon became equated with, interest group representatives. Second, the role of government changed from that of referee to "one of insuring access to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the agreements and adjustments worked out among competing leaders."[34] Once established, moreover, these trends tended to reinforce each other; a major change in the American political process got underway.

Were these developments unseen by the proponents of pluralism? Yes and no. Dahl clearly acknowledged that bureaucratization and vesting would occur:

> In time, all these manifold specialized groups become vested interests with leaders and non-leaders dependent upon the permanence, the income, the prestige, and the legitimacy of their organizations. They become part of the fundamental warp and woof of society.[35]

His counter, however, was that organizational rivalry, enhanced by the separation of powers and fostered by our constitutional guarantees, would create "a system of checks and balances, with numerous groups of officials in competition and conflict with one another."[36] Unfortunately, this argument rested upon an untrue implicit assumption that group self-interest would preclude any significant degree of informal collusion, and that government "refereeing" would keep the

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[34]Ibid., p. 51.

[35]Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 136.

[36]Ibid., p. 137.

formal process essentially impartial. Lowi tells us that "agriculture policy set the pattern of organizing the government along pluralist lines,"[37] however, and that pattern was not what Dahl had expected it to be. When its dominance within the society and the economy was whittled away by the industrial revolution, the farming sector sought a way to protect itself, and found one. "Organized agriculture was early to discover the value of political power as a counterweight to industrial wealth."[38] More important, it established the precedent of policy encapsulation:

> That agricultural affairs should be handled strictly within the agricultural community is a basic political principle established before the turn of the century and maintained since then without serious reexamination.[39]

Having instituted that principle, several valuable service programs (e.g., research, quarantine, and education) were lobbied for, authorized, and instituted. Despite strong conflicts over monetary policy and tariffs, a relatively close relationship with the federal government was maintained. That relationship, moreover, was turned into an "elaborate and complicated system of 'cooperation'"[40] under the New Deal, that in essence resulted in self-regulation. Lowi labeled that system the "government-agriculture complex,"[41] and his evaluation of it was rather critical:

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[37] Lowi, op. cit., p. 67.

[38] Ibid., p. 70.

[39] Ibid., p. 69.

[40] Ibid., p. 71.

[41] Ibid.

> Agriculture is that field of American government where the distinction between public and private has come closest to being completely eliminated. This has been accomplished not by public expropriation of private domain--as would be true of the nationalization that Americans fear--but by private expropriation of public authority.[42]

In addition, according to Lowi, the process that created this complex was soon repeated for two other interests:

> The Department of Commerce and Labor, along with Agriculture, are very special units of government. From the very beginning, these departments were founded upon their dependence, not their independence. Widely known as clientele departments, they are organized around an identifiable sector of the economy and are legally obliged to develop and maintain an orientation toward the interests that comprise this sector.[43]

Although these three are not typical of all federal cabinet departments, the pattern of interest group-government interaction that they epitomize was serially reproduced on a smaller scale. The first step, policy encapsulation, became widespread soon after the New Deal launched the era of positive government, as Ernest Griffith reported in 1939:

> One cannot live in Washington for long without being conscious that it has whirlpools or centers of activity focusing on particular problems. . . . It is my opinion that ordinarily the relationship among these men--legislators, administrators, lobbyists, scholars--who are interested in a common problem is a much more real relationship than the relationship between congressmen generally or between administrators generally.[44]

This mutuality of concern led to close working relationships. More

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[42]Ibid., p. 68.

[43]Ibid., p. 77.

[44]Ernest S. Griffith, The Impasse of Democracy (New York: Harrison-Hilton, 1939), p. 182.

and more, both legislators and administrators began to focus their efforts on these particular problems, and the programs designed to deal with them; specialization began to set in and soon became the norm. Meanwhile, Congressional committee activity became an increasingly significant part of the lawmaking, appropriations, and oversight processes. General action was still always needed, however. Party leaders certainly played a key role in such actions, but a very important ingredient in getting things done soon evolved, "the norm of reciprocity, which reinforces that of specialization: you defer to the work of my committee, in which I am an expert, and I'll defer to the work of yours."[45]

The full consequences of these trends did not become evident for several years, and were not reported on until the mid-1950's. J. Leiper Freeman was the first political scientist to detect a major change in our decision-making structure;[46] Emmette Redford eloquently summarized his findings:

> Leiper Freeman in 1955 found that the over-all political setting promoted "considerable autonomy for bureaus, committees, and interest groups." The result was the development of "policy-making subsystems formed by the interactions of the leaders" of these three. A subsystem tended "to have a decisive quality of its own," the chief participants interacting with and to one another "to some degree independently of the larger political world of which the system is a part."[47]

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[45] Wasby, op cit., p. 405.

[46] J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process: Executive-Bureau-Legislative-Committee Relations (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955).

[47] Redford, op. cit., pp. 96-97; the quotations are from

Redford noted that an earlier case study of river development programs,[48] and his own research on domestic commercial civil aviation a few years later, tended to confirm Freeman's findings, but with some variance regarding the internal cohesiveness of subsystems.[49] Douglas Cater, a long term Washington journalist, reasserted Freeman's argument a decade later, moreover.[50] He labeled the structures "subgovernments," and expressed serious concern about this monopolization of policy-making by specialized minorities. Howard McCurdy, writing a dozen years after Cater, described these subgovernments as "the most important feature of administrative pluralism in the twentieth century."[51] Their composition and nature will be closely examined below.

A New American Political System?

Have the changes just described left the American political system basically intact, or has a restructuring occurred? Anthony King, the editor quoted at the beginning of the previous section, asked the same question: "Particular features of the system are new, of course,

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Freeman, op. cit., pp. 1, 14-15, 33.

[48]Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951).

[49]Redford, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

[50]Douglas Cater, Power in Washington (New York: Vintage, 1965).

[51]Howard McCurdy, Public Administration: A Synthesis (Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings, 1977), p. 108.

but is the system really new?"[52] Having digested the analyses of his nine contributors, he concluded that the latter view was more correct, for he entitled the volume The New American Political System. Professor Lowi shares that conclusion, and his pronouncement of it is rather blunt:

> During the decade of the 1960s the United States had a crisis of public authority and died. A Second Republic was left standing in its place. We had held no constituent assembly and had written no second Constitution. Yet at some point, beginning in the 1930s and culminating in the 1960s, cumulative changes in national power, national institutions, and in ideology altered our relationship to the Constitution of 1787, making the Second Republic a reality, not a metaphor.[53]

The first step towards this "Second Republic," according to Lowi, was the "repeal" of the concept of limited government in conjunction with Roosevelt's New Deal. This did not mean merely that the federal government would do more of what it had always done; it assumed "two entirely new functions," regulation and redistribution, with significant ramifications:

> Although regulatory and redistributive policies are quite different from each other, they share one very important characteristic which also distinguishes the two of them from almost everything the federal government was doing prior to the 1930s: These two new functions involved the federal government in direct and coercive use of power over citizens.[54]

That change was certainly significant in its own right, but the more notable consequence was actually indirect. When subgovernments

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[52]King, op. cit., p. 4.

[53]Lowi, op. cit., p. 271.

[54]Ibid., p. 273.

appeared, they appropriated that power. Lowi's argument moves along a different line of thought than my own, and our views on specific developments and their consequences differ somewhat, but our general conclusions converge. Recall his original contentions about the "vulgarization" of American pluralism. He argued that organizations came to dominate interest representation in the policymaking process, and that government soon reinforced that trend by "insuring access to the most effectively organized."[55] What he related was not an alternative to subgovernments, but rather two of the basic conditions that underwrote their formation. I doubt that our federal bureaucracy ever was truly monolithic, given its piecemeal creation, but it surely was not after its tremendous expansion during the New Deal and World War II. The rising importance that Congressional committees assumed during this period was already noted above, moreover, so the "government" that Lowi discusses was actually an array of organizations. In essence, then, one of Lowi's important discoveries was the transformation of the arena of American politics into an organizational field.

Formal organizations, particularly Congressional committees, executive bureaus, and interest associations, became the key elements in the public policymaking process. Individuals, for the most part, accrue influence only within organizational positions. To this basic situation, add two other ingredients. First, recall how policy

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[55]Ibid., p. 51.

encapsulation became widespread soon after the New Deal began, and how "subsystems" evolved within two decades. Redford tells us,

> Freemen believed that the relationships between the bureau and the committee tended to be institutionalized and depersonalized and to grow out of different orientations and role requirements of committee members and bureau leaders.[56]

What he described, therefore, were organizational rather than interpersonal interactions. Second, gradually shatter the relative calm and cooperative spirit that marked postwar American politics. As Anthony King states, "No one who lived through the period between the inauguration of John Kennedy and the inauguration of Jimmy Carter needs to be reminded that this was an enormously turbulent period."[57]

A seminal article in modern organization theory provides a general explanation of what occurs when "organizations and linked sets of organizations" find themselves operating within "turbulent fields":

> . . . turbulent environments require some relationship between dissimilar organizations whose fates are basically, positively correlated. This means relationships that will maximize cooperation and which recognize that no one organization can take over the role of "the other" and become paramount. We are inclined to speak of this kind of relationship as an organizational matrix.[58]

These matrices, moreover, exhibit certain identifiable behavior patterns. They become protective and exclusionary, and the strategies of member organizations begin to reflect "a selection of goal-paths that

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[56]Redford, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

[57]King, op. cit., p. 2.

[58]F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," Organizations: Systems, Control and Adaptation, ed. Joseph A. Litterer (2d ed.; New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969), pp. 224, 226.

offer maximum convergence as regards the interest of other parties."[59] Thus, justified by the new "interest group liberalism" and spurred by social commotion, Freeman's "subsystems" solidified into Cater and McCurdy's "subgovernments." Although I have been unable to pinpoint the origin of the term, the cores of these subgovernments have on occasion been labeled "iron triangles." A current polemic against pork-barrel politics devotes an entire chapter to the concept, and includes the following analogy:

> In engineering, a triangle derives its strength from that fact that each point is bound to the other two by a set of rigid objects which assures that a force applied to any one point will be felt equally by all three. The Iron Triangle works much the same way, except that the binding material is not a set of rigid objects but a mutually felt need for the pork-barrel project.[60]

One aspect of the subgovernment concept contradicts Professor Lowi's model of the "Second Republic," however. His interpretation includes, as one of its centerpieces, the near-abdication by Congress of its primary function due to "the rise of delegated power" after the New Deal:

> Although Congress continued to possess the lawmaking authority, it delegated that authority increasingly in statute after statute to an agency in the Executive Branch or to the president, who had the power to subdelegate to an agency. At first this delegation of power was rationalized as merely "filling in the details" of congressional intent and therefore consistent with even the most orthodox definition of the separation of powers. But ultimately,

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[59] Ibid., p. 226.

[60] William Ashworth, Under the Influence: Congress, Lobbies, and the American Port-Barrel System (New York: Hawthorn/Dutton, 1981), p. 104.

> delegation was recognized for what it really was--administrative legislation.[61]

This resulted in "the probably irreversible change from a Congress-centered government to an executive-centered government," he argued.[62] I believe Lowi was correct about the initial trend, but wrong about its irreversibility. Executive power ebbed and flowed, and probably reached its peacetime zenith under Lyndon Johnson. Moreover, while Congress as a whole may seem to have ignored its oversight function, the committees (and subcommittees after 1946) did not. Policy encapsulation, in fact, generated important structural consequences within the executive branch as new programs were authorized:

> What may appear to be structural eccentricities and anomalies within the executive branch are often nothing but mirror images of jurisdictional conflicts within the Congress. Congressional organization and executive branch organization are interrelated and constitute two halves of a single system.[63]

Furthermore, as the subsystems solidified more and more energy was directed inward:

> Growth of a congressional bureaucracy and institutionalization of committees have deepened the moats dividing the fiefdoms and accentuated the innate disposition of the Congress to concentrate on administrative details rather than basis issues of public policy.[64]

In constitutional terms, this development of subgovernments can

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[61] Lowi, op. cit., p. 274. [62] Ibid.

[63] Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization (2d ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 38.

[64] Ibid., p. 40.

be considered more ominous than what Lowi feared. Institutional rivalry probably contributed as much to the system of checks and balances that was the heart of the Constitution of 1787 as the formal separation of powers did, and the latter was always a less definite factor than the former in practice. The merger of the bureaucracy and the legislature within subgovernments certainly crimped that system as Dahl had envisioned it.[65] This compartmentalization of policy formulation and implementation has also severely diluted the elected executive component's ability to direct, or even coordinate, those activities.[66] Thus, while Lowi and I disagree regarding its evolution and specific form, we share the same conclusion. The cumulative effect of several reinforcing minor mutations has been the emergence of a new decision-making structure within the United States. As Professor Lowi pointed out, this is not the first restructuring that has occurred. I would suggest, however, that it is the first catastrophic, as opposed to cataclysmic, restructuring our society has experienced. As such, it has gone basically unacknowledged, even by many whose life work is directed toward our political process.

It would require the support of a lengthy, comprehensive, and systematic study of the American decision-making structure to contend that my conclusion is definitive. First, no such claim is being made. Second, given the complexity of such a task today, I do not believe

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[65]Dahl, op. cit., p. 137.

[66]McCurdy, op. cit., pp. 112-13.

any individual could accomplish it alone. I view this effort as a first step, and as a challenge to those engaged in the study of American politics. As the recognition of Professor Lowi's early work indicates,[67] the field realizes that something big has been happening; it is our responsibility to find out precisely what. Although my argument is not tendered as definitive, I believe it is plausible and offers a sound theoretical basis for further inquiry. My proffered assumptions regarding political development, moreover, could underwrite a variety of interpretations regarding the United States, but they do square rather well with my constructed explanation, which continues below. The notion of catastrophic (gradual, drastic) restructuring is probably the most difficult element of the argument for readers to accept, given our scientific tradition of cause and effect. A very recent analysis by a distinguished senior scholar, however, offers some support for my trial application of the idea:

> Because the United States has had no large, spectacular revolution in modern times, the extent to which the nation has undergone small and medium-sized transformations may be underappreciated. A consolidated look at a bundle of these transformations may provoke thought about what social scientists ought to be doing about making sense of them and their cumulative impact on American politics and society.[68]

Given the realities of history, however, it is logical to question whether a political revolution (which was defined as a major

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[67] A 1976-77 survey of the members of the American Political Science Association listed Lowi as the political scientist who made the most significant contribution during the 1970's.

[68] Nelson W. Polsby, "Contemporary Transformations of American Politics: Thoughts on the Research Agenda of Political Scientists," Political Science Quarterly, 96, 4 (Winter, 1981-82), 552.

restructuring in Chapter IV) can occur on its own. That is not being claimed, either. One of the primary intellectual stimulants that prodded me to consider seriously the possibility of restructuring, in fact, was sociologist Daniel Bell's hypothesis about the coming of post-industrial society.[69] A noted political scientist, Zbigniew Brezezinski, succinctly captured the essence of that hypothesis and offered a pointed analysis about its political implications:

> As the world's first post-industrial society, the United States is no longer shaped by the same forces that have stimulated social change in the advanced countries ever since England first confronted the machine. This broad transformation is causing a crisis of established American values and institutions, particularly the tradition of liberal democracy, and as the nation's two-hundredth birthday approaches, it therefore calls for a redefinition of the American system.[70]

While that conclusion might seem a bit abrupt, historical precedent does indicate that some serious effects should be anticipated, and recent events might be manifestations of that impact:

> If this transition from industrial to postindustrial society was, indeed, of the same order as the transition from agrarian to industrial society, then presumably the accompanying political problems, dislocations, and needs might also be comparable in intensity and conceivably similar in nature. And a theoretical base could, indeed, be made for this proposition, which the political traumas and disruptions that characterize American and to some extent Western European society in the late 1960s and early 1970s certainly did nothing to disprove.[71]

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[69] Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[70] Zbigniew Brezezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: Viking, 1970), p. 197.

[71] Huntington and Dominguez, op. cit., p. 114.

The Nature of the Transformation

To recapitulate, my observations lead me to conclude that mutually reinforcing changes have produced a new decision-making structure within American society. A DAMC wave of change was initiated with the New Deal, accelerated by World War II, and may have peaked during the Great Society. Lowi states that "the return of the Democrats to power in 1961 really signaled the beginning of the Second Republic":

> If the 1930s had established a strong national state as politically feasible and constitutionally acceptable, the 1960s made the strong national state a positive virtue, desirable for its own sake.[72]

That wave is continuing to run its course, however, and has itself involved serial "ups and downs." In a very insightful analysis first presented two dozen years ago, Herbert Kaufman put forth the thesis:

> . . . that an examination of the administrative institutions of this country suggests that they have been organized and operated in pursuit successively of three values, here designated representativeness, neutral competence, and executive leadership. Each of these values has been dominant (but not to the point of total suppression of the others) in different periods of our history; the shift from one to another generally appears to have occurred as a consequence of the difficulties encountered in the period preceding the change.[73]

Representativeness, primarily in the form of legislative supremacy, dominated American politics throughout our first century, he

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[72]Lowi, op. cit., p. 274.

[73]Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration," The Politics of the Federal Bureaucracy, ed. Alan A. Altshuler (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968), pp. 72-3; this article originally appeared in American Political Science Review in December, 1956.

argued. In reaction to rampant political bossism and the spoils system, however, the latter half of the nineteenth century saw the ascendance of neutral competence. This shift in values produced the politics-administration dichotomy and calls for merit civil service appointments. Unfortunately, some unanticipated consequences followed:

> . . . as these officials and agencies became more accomplished in their respective areas of specialization, they tended to resent efforts of "laymen" and "amateurs" to intervene; this tendency revealed itself even in some civil servants nominally under the chief executives, who, though formally subject to dismissal, turned out in practice to have quite secure tenure, and who, by adept maneuvers in negotiating bureaucratic armistices ("memoranda of agreement") and in forming alliances with legislative committees and clientele groups, succeeded in carving out for themselves broad areas of discretion free of real supervision by their political chiefs.[74]

This evolution of "subsystems" generated a new demand, this time for greater executive leadership. Since "no one seemed to be steering the governmental machinery, though everyone had a hand in it . . . chief executives had to be built up to take charge . . . ."[75]

The executive leadership movement rose to prominence during the first half of this century, according to Kaufman, and produced executive budgets, executive staffs, and numerous attempts to "rationally" reorganize government bureaucracies. An interesting merger also occurred; the proponents of neutral competence began to argue that further professionalization of the civil service and professional staffs would bolster executive leadership. Once again,

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[74]Ibid., p. 75.

[75]Ibid., pp. 78-79.

however, at least at the federal level, the result was not what had been hoped for:

> For though the mechanisms of neutral competence were remarkably successful in reducing the influence of the political parties on the administrative hierarchy, they did not necessarily increase the President's control over administration. Rather, they encouraged the development of "self-directing" groups within the bureaucracy, and these groups in turn cultivated their own sources of support among professional groups concerned with the subject matter over which the services have jurisdiction, among their clienteles, and among appropriate Congressional committees and subcommittees. The components of the "neutral" bureaucracy, by virtue of their expertness and information and alliances, have become independent sources of decision-making power, and Presidents will probably find them no easier to direct--indeed, perhaps even more intractable than their partisan prececessors.[76]

Although based on a different approach, therefore, Kaufman's analysis converges with my own. Professor Robert Avery introduced me to Kaufman's thesis during a seminar, and used a metaphor to explain it.[77] He diagrammed Kaufman's portrayal of the evolution of modern public administration as the movement of a pendulum. Representativeness was the left apex, executive leadership the right, and neutral competence the midpoint. The field had moved completely from left to right, and was now returning, he argued. Neutral competence had recently been the dominant value, as evidenced by the prominence of management science in the theory and practice of the sixties, but representativeness was on the ascendant. His extension of Kaufman's

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[76]Ibid., p. 85.

[77]Dr. Avery presented these ideas in his graduate seminar on the politics of administration at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, during the Fall Quarter, 1975.

basic idea seems to have been a fairly accurate prediction, given the resurgence of Congressional power that occurred during the late seventies. I believe, however, that my proposed wave metaphor would more accurately relate the reality of the overall situation. Professor Avery's pendulum does portray the rise and fall of the different values, but does not capture the mixing that occurred or the cumulative nature of these developments. Kaufman's own summary would seem to support these contentions:

> For expository purposes, the quest for the three values has been treated as sequential, and, to be sure, each had a different high point in time. Nevertheless, it is worth pausing to reiterate that at no point was any of them pursued to the complete exclusion of one or both of the others; evidence of interest in all three can be found at any stage of our history, sometimes in a single document by a single author. As has been observed, the defense of any one was often framed in terms of advancement of the others simultaneously. The story is thus one of changing balance among the values, not of total displacement.[78]

Nevertheless, the key realization is that the push and pull of forces over time has reshaped our political system into one composed of basically independent subgovernments. Even despite attempts to curtail them, subsystems spawned by the New Deal solidified and multiplied to parcel out what the national government was accumulating, political power. The ability to make authoritative public decisions has been redistributed via the transformation of our decision-making structure:

> In the United States, public power has now been supplemented, if not supplanted, by centers of private power even

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[78]Kaufman, op. cit., p. 82.

> more oligarchic than regular government. The weak citizen, steadily stripped of what little participatory capacity he still has in public politics, now faces irresponsible centers of power in his private world which are even more inimical to his civic virtue. For these private areas of power not only discourage participation but by maintaining the fiction that they are "voluntary," invite any person adopting an independent view relating to their politics to leave the group's premises.[79]

The author of that evaluation, Robert Pranger, may seem to have been a bit harsh, but his point regarding voluntary associations is important. Lowi specifically addressed that question:

> The American Farm Bureau Federation is no "voluntary association" if it is a legitimate functionary within the extension system. Such tightly knit corporate groups as the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), or the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) or American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) are no ordinary lobbies after they become part of the "interior processes" of policy formation.[80]

Should this not be expected in modern pluralistic politics? In his latest discussion of the subject, Robert Dahl tells us that "in polyarchies . . . subsystem autonomy and organizational pluralism are always marked features of the social and political order."[81] By "organizational pluralism," however, he means proliferation, not predominance: "organizational pluralism is greater, other things being equal, the greater the number of organizations and the greater their

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[79]Robert J. Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 76.

[80]Lowi, op. cit., p. 60.

[81]Robert Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," Comparative Politics, 10, 2 (January, 1978), 191.

autonomy.[82] More important, he clearly defines "polyarchy," his version of the hybrid concept "pluralistic democratic elitism" discussed in Chapter II:

> Let me continue to use the term "polyarchy" to refer to a regime in which the right to participate is broadly extended and the institutional guarantees to oppositions are, by historical standards, comparatively strong and barriers to oppositions comparatively low.[83]

That is not what Pranger sees in the United States, nor Lowi, nor myself. Instead, we all see a significant degree of corporatism, and Charles Anderson explains why:

> In many areas, interest group representation is not pluralist but corporatist in nature. One association is recognized de facto as the appropriate spokesman for a specific interest by government bodies. In only a few areas of society are there really adversary interest groups in operation. We accept the notion that competition between parties is essential to democracy, but we do not apply the same norm to interest organizations. In true pluralism, it will be recalled, the individual's ultimate source of power is the existence of a competitive alternative.[84]

It should be noted, however, that we do not all concur on exactly what corporatism is (both Anderson and Pranger reflect interesting mixtures of the two historical contexts), and that Lowi specifically rejected it as a label for his "new public philosophy" because of "unwanted connotations, such as conservative Catholicism or Italian fascism."[85] Hopefully, my earlier discussion satisfactorily

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[82] Ibid., p. 192.

[83] Ibid., p. 197.

[84] Anderson, Statecraft: An Introduction to Political Choice and Judgement, p. 300; Pranger, op cit., p. 73; Lowi, op. cit., p. 50.

[85] Pranger, op. cit., p. 74; Anderson, Statecraft: An Introduc- to Political Choice and Judgement, p. 290; Lowi, loc. cit.

distinguished modern corporatism from its classical counterpart, and erased any automatic associations between it and Catholicism or fascism. I want to make it clear, moreover, that I perceive the emergence of societal corporatism, not the state variant, in the United States today.

Corporatism in the United States

Corporatism was not always shunned in this country. Early this century, in fact, it could boast some noteworthy support. It was mentioned in Chapter III that Herbert Hoover absorbed certain corporatist ideas while administering the American relief effort in Germany after World War I.[86] He endorsed association participation in business regulation while serving as Secretary of Commerce in the 1920's,[87] and had hoped to institute more such practices as President, but was unsuccessful. There was intellectual support as well; the writings of Mary Parker Follett, particularly The New State,[88] were heavily corporatist. As Alfred DeGrazia's analysis revealed, however, her ideas were basically neoclassical:

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[86]Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover and American Corporatism, 1929-1933," pp. 101-19.

[87]Lowi notes this, op. cit., p. 79, and cites Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1966); and Peri Arnold, "Herbert Hoover and the Continuity of American Public Policy," Public Policy (Autumn, 1972), 525.

[88]Mary Parker Follett, The New State (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918).

> Harmony would come naturally, she believes, if constructive individuality has a chance to work its way out of natural associations. The essence of liberty lies not in the disorganized state but in a state thoroughly and correctly organized.[89]

These notions almost mirrored the tenets of Social Catholicism, as DeGrazia recognized. Although her work did achieve some degree of respect in the field, American political science never really took to corporatism.

Nevertheless, an experiment in corporatism was tried. When the Great Depression hit, a National Economic Council composed of sector representatives and empowered to make recommendations to the Congress was proposed. That proposal was rejected, primarily because the Council would have been a governmental body, but two years later the National Industrial Recovery Act(N.I.R.A.) sanctioned cooperative private sectoral planning:

> A representative group in each industry was encouraged to adopt a code of fair competition, provided that the code expressed the general desires of the participants and the participants were composed of industry members allowed into the group without discrimination.[90]

DeGrazia argues, however, that this did not constitute "integrated pluralism" (his term for corporatism), because "the central controls were weak, and the internal components of each functional element were isolated from the management of the total element."[91] I believe this

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[89]Alfred DeGrazia, Public and Republic: Political Representation in America (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 226.

[90]Ibid., p. 231.

[91]Ibid.

criticism relies on a restricted understanding of corporatism, i.e., that it must be directed from above. The National Recovery Administration was certainly not an example of state corporatism, but its program of induced self-regulation did smack of the societal version. DeGrazia's related observation also deserves qualification. He argued that "the corporatism was one of capital alone," but acknowledged that the Act "guaranteed labor the right to organize and bargain collectively."[92] Again, the limited activism of the government, here with respect to collective bargaining, seems to have been his distinguishing factor, and that distinction fades within a conceptualization of corporatism that includes an emergent variant.

As it turned out, the authorizing legislation was soon declared unconstitutional:

> In 1935 and 1936, the Supreme Court struck down federal legislation giving the force of law to regulatory codes drawn up by industry associations. The Court ruled that "since, in the very nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the business of another, and especially of a competitor," such legislative delegation of responsibility to provide groups "is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress."[93]

Moreover, DeGrazia's reaction to the Court decisions was, in retro-retrospect, ironic:

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[92] Ibid.

[93] Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation, 1978), p. 290.

> The N.I.R.A.'s unhappy demise put a definitive end to experiments in the larger pluralism. It postponed the use of corporate experimentation during World War II, which, if the experience of World War I had been the exclusive source of precedent, might well have turned out a number of significant examples of delegations of authority to private bodies. Instead, increasing reliance was placed on the type of delegation which had escaped legal and popular attack during the New Deal--the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to administrative agencies, assisted by interested groups.[94]

This alternative approach he labeled "administrative pluralism." Unwittingly, therefore, while the direct initiation of corporatism had been precluded, the groundwork for its indirect emergence had been laid. DeGrazia acknowledged that the two types of decision-making structure were similar, but also argued that they were distinct:

> Administrative pluralism differs from corporatism in this respect; the role of the constituency under it in relation to the act of power is considerably less than under corporatism . . . even though the difference is often not clear, the distinction is important, for the end result of the difference in either case happens to be the difference between the bureaucratic state and the corporative state.[95]

Another analyst, Robert Pranger, also perceived these two as the most likely alternatives for the post-positive United States, but concluded that corporatism had prevailed, as noted above.[96] DeGrazia, moreover, had projected what changes would bring it about:

> Where the representation of the interested groups is sporadic, very limited, temporary, or based on insubstantial constituencies, the powers of the administrators on the government's side are correspondingly increased. When the opposite is true, the important constructive and destructive social forces of corporate pluralism may operate more freely; the

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[94]DeGrazia, op. cit., p. 233.

[95]Ibid., p. 236.

[96]Pranger, op. cit., p. 73.

> prestige of the interest groups is increased; the interest, attention, and participation of such groups are likely to be more wholehearted; and the trend toward group autonomy is more definite and apparent.[97]

Circumstance, of course, played a part; what was spawned by the Great Depression was spurred by the Great War. "A great flowering of interest representation occurred during World War II,"[98] DeGrazia reported, including the blossoming of the labor union movement.

> In 1939 both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Unions declared in convention that they were entitled to adequate and controlled representation on any newly created war agencies.

Since then,

> both organizations, and the large independent unions as well, have been eager to furnish personnel for administrative bodies possessing important quasi-legislative or administrative power over economic affairs.[99]

The unions suffered some setbacks, notably the voiding of the N.I.R.A., but Golob relates that:

> Long before labor leaders and prolabor intellectuals and politicians had ceased declaiming about labor's right to organize, as if that were still seriously in question, many acute observers were wondering how labor would employ powers of monopoly that greatly exceeded any ever held by a private corporation.[100]

Charles Lindblom was one of the earliest Casandras regarding labor monopolization by unions, as noted in Chapter III. He did not fear collective bargaining, but echoing Michels, he warned against the rise of union oligarchies that would undermine the free enterprise

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[97]DeGrazia, op. cit., pp. 236-37. [98]Ibid., p. 235.

[99]Ibid., p. 237. [100]Golob, op. cit., pp. 580-81.

system.[101] Golob dismissed Lindblom's fears by expressing faith in American labor leaders and by noting that he was using theoretical classical capitalism as an "ideal standard."[102] Labor's success in organizing was certainly significant, however, but for a different reason:

> The point to emphasize is that strong unions, effectively carrying out strictly trade-union objectives, inevitably feed the roots of corporatism, replacing the market with organized group action.[103]

DeGrazia had acknowledged that other sectors were also organizing, and even admitted that "a number of professions and trades had worked their way as groups into an official relationship to the government."[104] Golob projected that these trends would continue, and that a corporatist structure would eventually evolve:

> The corporatist institutions and practices that have been developing in great variety, in agriculture, the professions, and even in the arts would round out the intricate pattern of a highly organized but decentralized society.[105]

Since almost all historical examples of the phenomenon have been characterized by an executive-centered governmental role (usually bureaucratic subordination of interests), it is understandable that the policy subsystems "discovered" by Freeman and others in the early

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[101] Charles Lindblom, Unions and Capitalism (Shoe String, 1970), reproduction of 1949 original.

[102] Golob, op. cit., p. 587.

[103] Ibid., p. 583.

[104] DeGrazia, op. cit., p. 235.

[105] Golob, op. cit., p. 595.

fifties were not quickly connected with corporatism. The role of the Congressional committees was just too important to discount. Even as they solidified over the years, passed the point where Cater relabeled them subgovernments, they were still considered to be a feature of pluralism. It was Harold Seidman who provided the "missing link" for this author. When he revealed that "Congressional organization and executive branch organization are interrelated and constitute two halves of a single system,"[106] the corporatist nature of the subgovernment's arrangement became too apparent to ignore. I was not sure how far corporatization had progressed, however, until I dissected Lowi's revised study to determine whether his new and tantalizing subtitle was justified. My conclusion was that, for practical purposes, corporatism superseded pluralism in the United States (at least temporarily) with the War on Poverty. Just as the Brazilian military regime has been organizing the rural peasantry to pre-empt any uncontrolled mobilization, Lyndon Johnson's Great Society tried, at least in part, to co-opt the American poor.

A case can certainly be made that federal anti-poverty programs helped stem the wave of ghetto riots in the late sixties, but their broader political consequences should also be considered in any overall evaluation. Lowi leveled a number of criticisms against the War on Poverty, which he considered a showpiece example of interest group liberalism in action; two are most relevant here. First, he charges

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[106]Seidman, op. cit., p. 38.

it with "dulling the edge of civil rights . . . by falsely focusing the attentions of responsible persons sincerely committed to social change":

> The demand for civil rights declined as the demand for poverty money increased. The one cause was deserted for the other. Civil rights was for the South. Social injustice in the North was not to be rectified, but only indemnified. For the South there was morality, for the North equity.[107]

Second, the participation and delegation provisions actually resulted in bureaucratization:

> Delegation of the program to private groups requires official recognition of groups and representatives. In the first round we may be impressed by emergence of new groups--and at least impressed by the amount of effort expended to bring new groups about. However, once the situation is stabilized by official recognition of groups and representatives, the situation tends to militate against emergence of still newer groups. Official recognition is a very conservative force; at the neighborhood level, federal recognition becomes a valuable resource with which some groups can demoralize others. In South Chicago a gang called the Blackstone Rangers maintained its monopoly position through intimidation: "You belong to our gang or I'll knock your head off." Government recognition can work the same way: "Now we are official. If you don't join us you won't have any access."[108]

Extending his previously quoted observations on the voluntary nature of interest associations, Lowi commented:

> . . . one can only appreciate the effort to organize the poor by going back and pondering the story and characters in The Three Penny Opera. The "Peachum factor" in public affairs may be best personified in Sargent Shriver and his strenuous efforts to get the poor housed in some kind of group before their representation was to begin.[109]

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[107] Lowi, op. cit., p. 233.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid., p. 60.

His allusion? Simply that ". . . as Peachum and MacHeath teach in 'The Three Penny Opera,' the poor are the easiest of all to intimidate, especially with symbols of authority."[110] I am not suggesting that no political benefits accrued to the poor from this process of organization. To the contrary, as noted with respect to the Brazilian peasants and students, organizations are habit-forming and are difficult to destroy if their members desire to continue concerted action. What I am suggesting is that cooptation was as strong a motivation in the War on Poverty as was compassion. I also concur with Lowi that the process exemplified a new type of politics in the United States; he labeled it interest-group liberalism, I call it corporatism.

A decision-making structure, of course, is composed of more than roles. I argued above that formal organizations are the primary subsystem units of a corporatist structure, but their method of interaction is also critical. What I summarily labeled decision-making rules is Diesing's second basic component of such structures, as discussed in Chapter I. A political system composed of formal organizations can take different forms. If they are horizontally segmented and substantially controlled from above, you have a bureaucracy. If they are vertically segmented and still substantially controlled from above, you have state corporatism. If they are vertically segmented, but the sectors retain a significant degree of autonomy, you have societal corporatism. In the first two cases the highest government

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[110] Ibid., pp. 233-34.

authority controls, by invocation or "piloting," respectively, all general actions. Under societal corporatism, however, the power of the government is limited, and common decisions are at best orchestrated:

> Such government gives substance to John Calhoun's ideal of the "concurrent majority," where various interests must be pulled into a coalition sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority, but in the process the numerical majority is subject to checks by groups affiliated with the majority.[111]

Pranger, the author of that description, was attempting to define "modern corporatism" with it, and went on to state that "American society . . . best fits this ideal."[112] He was not the first to propose that Calhoun's ideas had infiltrated the American system, however. Back in 1948, Peter Drucker argued that "Calhoun's Pluralism" was a key ingredient in the American political process already:

> Of course, the specific occasion for which Calhoun formulated his theories, the Slavery issue, has been decided; and for the constitutional veto power of the states over national legislation, by means of which Calhoun proposed to formalize the principle of sectional and interest compromise, was substituted in actual practice the much more powerful and much more elastic but extra-constitutional and extra-legal veto power of sections, interests, and pressure groups in Congress and within the parties. But his basic principle itself: that every major interest in the country, whether regional, economic, or religious, is to possess a veto power on political decisions directly affecting it, the principle which Calhoun called--rather obscurely--"the rule of concurrent majority," has become the organizing principle in American politics.[113]

I concur with both authors. Pranger was correct when he identified the concurrent majority rule with corporatism; Drucker was correct when he argued it had informally taken effect decades ago in our

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[111] Pranger, op. cit., p. 73. [112] Ibid.

[113] Peter F. Drucker, "A Key to American Politics: Calhoun's Pluralism," Review of Politics, 10, 4 (October, 1948), 413.

country. Drucker was also right when he observed that political parties were the original instruments and carriers of the rules:

> In stark contrast to the parties of Europe, the American party has no program and no purpose except to organize divergent groups for the common pursuit and conquest of power. Its unity is one of action, not of beliefs. Its only rule is to attract--or at least not to repel--the largest possible number of groups.[114]

He was only partially accurate, however, when he attributed the rising importance of the committees in Congress to the rule.[115] I would argue that the "norm of reciprocity," discussed earlier, evolved at least partially on its own, as a matter of practicality. After the 1909-1911 revolt against Speaker Cannon in the House of Representatives, "seniority soon became an automatic, nearly inviolable rule for choosing the committee leadership."[116] This both fostered the budding professionalization of Congressmen, and redefined the committees as power bases. Power yields to power, moreover, and reciprocity and specialization go hand in hand, as noted earlier. These norms and the rule of concurrent majority easily merge under subsystem politics; in fact, they clearly tend to reinforce each other. Mutual causality, therefore, propelled these "deviations" from basic pluralism into prominence within the system.

Societal corporatism, therefore, gradually superimposed itself over administrative pluralism. Subgovernments replaced interest groups and parties in the policymaking process, and the rule of

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[114]Ibid., p. 417.

[115]Ibid., p. 415.

[116]Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 96.

concurrent majority became entrenched. That is my personal conclusion, of course, and it has been disputed. Robert Salisbury recently tried to explain why there was no corporatism in America, apparently responding to those theorists who have projected it as a necessary response to the advance of capitalism.[117] His argument, however, is weak. He relies almost exclusively on Schmitter's definition, which Schmitter himself labeled an ideal, constructed type,[118] and his primary reason for denying the presence of corporatism is the absence of formally recognized "peak associations." Salisbury, I believe sees the trees but fails to acknowledge the forest, because the arrangement is not precisely what he expected. He goes so far as to demand a "monistic state" for "the other side of the corporatism equation."[119]

In addition to lacking official recognition and hierarchical organization, moreover, Salisbury notes that "heterogeneity of interest or situation characterizes most sectors of American life,"[120] and contends that this has spilled over into the policy process:

> When Oliver Garceau's splendid study was published in 1941 there was little doubt of the AMA's dominance over the "medical profession in politics." This remained largely true through the 1950s. But it is not true any longer. Rival organizations of doctors have been formed, and other groups with different interests, such as the hospital administrators, have emerged to contest with the AMA for position and power in health policy making.[121]

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[117] Salisbury, op. cit.

[118] Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporitism?" p. 94.

[119] Salisbury, op. cit., p. 219

[120] Ibid., p. 227.

[121] Ibid, p. 217.

Unfortunately, he failed to carry that line of questioning to its next logical step. Although rivals have challenged the AMA's position, they have not undermined it. I would wager that the doctors' association can probably still effect a veto over any proposal that seriously threatens its members' or its own interest, and that its acquiescence is a minimum requirement for the approval of any important change in health care policy or programs. Salisbury's analysis reflects a shaky awareness of how policymaking is structured. At one point he states that "bureaucrats in America deal directly with constituent units, not with associations."[122] That may be true with respect to program administration; it is certainly not true in policymaking.

That same problem may have precluded his understanding of how *de facto* recognition is achieved:

> What makes an organization the legitimate spokesman for a socio-economic sector? Confidence that the organization is representative of the values, opinions, and interests (which terms may all mean the same thing) of the members of that sector.[123]

I must disagree. Organizations achieve input by being accepted into their relevant subgovernment. Member support helps, but expertise and funding are also important. The critical element, however, is sponsorship; a working relationship with the appropriate Congressman or bureaucrat is what gets you invited to the right hearing at the right time. There is an official (at least formal) component involved

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[122]Ibid., p. 221.

[123]Ibid., p. 222.

also. Salisbury himself notes that "no democratic nation even remotely approximates the seriousness of the American effort to regulate the details of group-government interactions."[124] Compliance with all legal requirements is essential. A tainted organization can quickly lose any recognition it may have achieved, and staff members are readily sacrificed to maintain an association's reputation.

To summarize, Salisbury's denial that corporatism has arrived in America is based on an overemphasis on formalities and an underawareness of the policymaking process. Despite the heterogeneity of interest sectors, and the informality of their relationships with the government, they all go to the mountain when they would like to see something done--or not done. Public policymaking in America became encased in subgovernments some time ago, as several analysts have reported in one way or another. The growing diversity of organizations that operate within the system that Salisbury notes, moreover, is not indicative of the fragmentation or destabilization of subgovernments, but rather of their proliferation:

> In other words, political observers are aware that cozy little groups of congressmen, bureaucrats, and interest group representatives make numerous day-to-day policy decisions. What has been less obvious is the manner in which the number of these subgovernments has been proliferating as the power of the twenty-odd full committees has been dispersed among the 120-odd subcommittees.[125]

Norman Keehn has also addressed the point in question.[126]

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[124] Ibid., p. 221.

[125] Fiorina, op. cit., p. 66.

[126] Keehn, op. cit.

Salisbury acknowledged his analysis, but did not review his argument; his only reaction was "I think he is wrong."[127] Again, I disagree. Keehn asserted that he perceived "the gradual, almost imperceptible transmutation of American pluralism into corporatism."[128] How? By ". . . the ascendancy of agglomerations of private power within the ambit of a system where public power is Balkanized among a confounding array of organs. . . ."[129] I suspect that he would agree that he was referring to societal corporatism and subgovernments, respectively; as is the case with Lowi, we share ideas but not terminology. Moreover, like Lowi he argues that the new arrangement has undermined the essence of pluralism:

> What prevails, then, when ties are closely knit between fragments of government and special interests is that the fragments become insulated from countervailing power. Ambition no longer checks ambition. Favorably situated established clienteles, who inhibit, deflect, or simply defeat the creation of countervailing ones, are thus in a strong position to influence public policy and minimize, postpone, or block action. The central and most obvious implication of clientele relations is that the traditional notion of decisions emerging out of the impersonal interplay of opposed interests is compromised by deliberate agreements between public and private interests.[130]

I do not agree with all of Keehn's analysis, and I do not endorse his recommendations. We share a common perception that corporatism has supplanted pluralism, however, and a belief that American political science should recognize that the change has occurred. Why?

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[127] Salisbury, op. cit., p. 230, footnote 11.

[128] Keehn, op. cit., p. 23.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid., p. 24.

Because it is still working itself out. Corporatism, like pluralism, can take many specific forms and produce a variety of results. We are still riding the DAMC wave that brought us into the world of corporatism, and as political scientists we should be tracking that wave. Our new political system is not yet fully in place, and, like it or not, our "fan of possible futures"[131] now includes the alternatives of state corporatism and government disintegration. Neither would be pleasant, but they are genuine possibilities in our current "world of becoming."[132] Before carrying forward with this analysis, by constructing a conceptual model of our new decision-making structure, some old business must be completed. I suggested back in Chapter II that corporatism would be a more useful general concept for analyzing contemporary American politics than either pluralism or elitism. I will now explain why.

Elitism, Pluralism, and Corporatism: A Conceptual Comparison

Back in Chapter II I presented an outline of the historical debate between the elitist and pluralist schools of political thought as I perceived it, and argued that the two had recently converged in the formulation of pluralistic elitism. In Chapter III, I traced the development of corporatism. Based on those reviews, I have attempted

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[131]Bertrand deJouvenal, The Art of Conjecture, translated by Nikita Lary (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 16.

[132]Keehn, op. cit., p. 20.

to distill the essential differentiating characteristics among the three basic concepts. Pluralistic elitism, which has been discussed primarily within the context of American politics in this study, will be added to the comparison when we return to that context shortly. The results of my reduction are presented in Table 1. Three differentiating characteristics have been identified: basic cleavage outline, principal aggregation agents, and the primary interaction mode. They deal with the basic internal structure, or "shape," of a political system, a specification of substructures within those basic configurations, and the interplay among those subunits, respectively. These "variables" will hopefully be useful to analysts in classifying systems within this typology, but the comparisons are admittedly general in nature. Taken together, however, they do reveal the distinctiveness of the three basic types, and provide some basis for identifying hybrids.

TABLE 1

DIFFERENTIATING CHARACTERISTICS AMONG ELITISM, PLURALISM, AND CORPORATISM

	Elitism	Pluralism	Corporatism
Basic cleavage outline	Horizontal	Changing	Vertical
Principal aggregation agents	Classes	Groups	Formal organizations
Primary interaction mode	Hierarchical	Competition	Reciprocity

I argued in Chapter II that pluralism was an outgrowth of individualism, which itself had been a reaction to absolutism, a particular form of elitism. This process of dialectical development continued through several centuries, producing the current hybrid. That argument also included the assertion that political theories were not purely intellectual creations. Like Marx, I reject Hegel's dialectical idealism, but the reader will also recall that I rejected economic determinism in Chapter III. I wonder if Marx realized that when he rejected Hegel's assumption in favor of materialistic determinism he was himself initiating a new dialectic. That was probably his most important contribution to knowledge, moreover, since it set the stage for the development of modern social science. The synthesis of Marx's and Hegel's propositions, i.e., the realization that social realities and theories are engaged in continuous interplay, stands at the center of systematic empiricism. An assumption that social progress results from this interfusion seems logical to this author, and leads to an analytical approach based on mutual causality.

When that notion and the differentiating characteristics just presented are incorporated into a review of the evolution of American politics, an interesting pattern emerges. In Table 2, using Paul Deising's formulation, I have attempted to outline and compare the development of the American decision-making structure from an elitist origin, through pluralism and pluralistic elitism, toward corporatism. My application of the idea he expressed for the third basic component, which I have labeled circumstance, is obviously very broad, and some of the other entries are certainly oversimplifications, but I do think

TABLE 2

GENERAL COMPARISON OF DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Basic Characteristic \ Type of Structure	Elitism	Pluralism	Pluralistic Elitism	Corporatism
Primary role source	Class	Group	Group hierarchy	Formal organization
Basic decision rule	Ascriptive/divine insight	Vector sum theory	Norm of reciprocity	Concurrent majority
Role of government	Protect elite interests	Ratify compromises among interests	Facilitate compromises among interests	Guarantee compromises among interests
Role of government (sports metaphor)	Board of directors	Referee (tabula rasa)	Referee (primus inter pares)	League commissioner
Circumstance (United States)	Agrarian society	Pre-positive industrial society	Post-positive industrial society	Post-industrial society

a useful comparison is offered. Briefly, this is the pattern I have tried to portray in Table 2. Elitism probably was applicable during our first, agrarian, century; those who owned land had considerable political power, those who did not had little. Pluralism more accurately described early industrial America. Business gradually displaced agriculture as the dominant economic force, generating genuine rivalry over government policy. The old agricultural elite did not simply vanish, either. Its power withered over time, but it did manage to institutionalize its access to the government. The newer business elite, which tried to emulate its predecessor but could not dominate for long, also succeeded in institutionalizing its access. Urbanization, immigration, and education created more new sources of power, and competition increased. Newer interests did not have the standing or wealth to follow the same path taken by agriculture and business, but the big city political machines had demonstrated that there was another route available: organized action. Labor was the first interest group to employ that approach as a general strategy successfully, and analysts often label what took place "mobilization":

> Such mobilization takes the form of a power structure within the interest group. Here, as with representation of all kinds, leaders are empowered to act jointly, in advance, on behalf of their constituents and to bind them by their collective decisions. In other words, the same principle of plena potestas operates within the broader public context of power and in the narrower confines of special interests.[133]

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[133]Pranger, op. cit., p. 74.

That process was serially repeated, and pluralism evolved into pluralistic elitism, or what Dahl called "polyarchy." By its very nature, however, evolution does not stop. The subsystems that marked postwar American politics became immersed in the turbulence of the sixties and emerged solidified, as described earlier. Nixon's direct attempt to break the subgovernment structure via reorganization failed miserably,[134] and the bureaucratization of American pluralism continued until:

> As a result, the great organizations of labor, business, medicine, and even science, resemble more the medieval versions of representative government by notables than they do the democratized versions found in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe and America. At the peak of American political interests invariably stand oligarchies who specialize in controlling organized groups, but with little or no orderly responsibility to their followers.[135]

Pranger's ominous evaluation is based on the failure of interest associations to incorporate democratic practices into their operating prodedures. I imagine that some readers were dismayed when I pronounced democracy dead back in Chapter II. Actually, my implication was that it had never really lived, not as an active decision-making structure. A functioning democracy would have represented the operationalization of individualism in the political process. Individuals would have created their own basic political roles, and majority rule would have determined common actions. That was never achieved;

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[134]Seidman, op. cit., Chapter 4.

[135]Pranger, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

citizenship has always been restricted. In Athens, the birthplace of democracy, all women and slaves were excluded from participation. When American "democracy" was established, citizenship was even further restricted in many respects--to property owners.

Most political analysts and historians readily admit that democracy was always an ideal, so they talk of "democratic principles" instead. The essence of such tenets devolves back to their source, however, when carefully examined. Individual access and individual rights are their basic concerns. Golob, for example, projected that "democratic corporatism" would evolve here in America, which "is restricted to the economic sectors of society, and allows for the vigorous existence of political, religious, cultural, and social institutions not subordinate to economic groupings."[136] Individual choice was to be maintained in all areas of life beyond production and consumption of material goods. He was, of course, incorrect. Campaign financing controls, mandatory busing, and community development programs are examples of political, social, and cultural incursion, and the pending ban on abortion smacks of religious coercion to me. Democracy is no longer a useful concept for analyzing the American political structure, if it ever was. As Dye and Ziegler finally openly admitted,[137] the core of the democratic ideal, the protection of individual rights, has survived in America only because social serial elites have endorsed such protection. Although I

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[136]Golob, op. cit., p. 588.

[137]Dye and Zeigler, op. cit.

think Pranger's assessment is overly pessimistic, I also believe we do a disservice to the public by propping up erroneous myths. The underlying cynicism that abounds within my generation is not, I believe, a rejection of the American tradition, but rather a reaction to being raised on contrived fabrications about it.

For these reasons, democracy was not included in my comparison of decision-making structures. Its applicability to contemporary American politics, especially at the macro-level of analysis, is minimal. I am not suggesting that political theorists should ignore democracy. As a philosophy, it infiltrated all three schools of thought we have covered, as demonstrated in Chapter II and illustrated by Golob's attempted synthesis; that is how it should be studied. Pranger's contention about irresponsible oligarchies will be raised again later, but other aspects of the evolution portrayed in Table 1 will now be considered. Most of the entries represent summary conclusions based on earlier treatments scattered throughout this study, and do not need elaboration. Some do, however, and the role of government deserves particular attention. In my earlier discussion I extended the sports metaphor in one direction, but not the other. Carrying it back to elitism, the government can be envisioned as a team's board of directors, but remember there was only one team. Appointed or approved by the stockholders, the board members' primary duty was to protect their interests. The referee analogy has also been further specified. Under "pure" pluralism, the government is a tabula rasa (blank slate). Its mission is to ratify the compromises worked out among competing interests, primarily by monitoring

compliance with legal requirements. The nature of the competition changes when pluralistic elitism sets in; so must the role of government. "Public" elites must assume greater responsibility for the system, since the vector-sum aspect of pluralism becomes diluted, if not negated, as "private" elites become more and more influential in the policy process. This change is in keeping, moreover, with a general shift toward positive government.

Human history shows us, furthermore, that the more government does, the more people tend to expect from it. Such was the case here, but recall how it operated. Public policy and programs were effectively controlled by subsystems composed of governmental and interest sector elites. The working relationships involved grew closer and closer; the subsystems eventually institutionalized themselves. Lowi describes this as "a state of permanent receivership":

> The state of permanent receivership is a state whose government maintains a steadfast position that any institution large enough to be a significant factor within the community may have its stability underwritten. It is a system of policies that sets a general floor under risk, either by attempting to eliminate risk or to reduce or share the costs of failure. The stress here is on organizational stability, not upon the stabilization of a particular class or power elite. It is biased not so much in favor of the rich as in favor of the established and the organized.[138]

Alan Cawson, borrowing in part from J. T. Winkler, described the transition to corporatism in Great Britain as involving a shift in the government's role from "facilitative" to "supportive" intervention

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[138]Lowi, op. cit., p. 280.

with respect to economic interests.[139] A similar shift occurred here, but in a more general manner. The War on Poverty was discussed above as epitomizing the new, aggressive approach taken by the government at one point. In other areas where particular interests could not effectively pursue their goals, to the perceived detriment of the whole system, "public" elites also stepped in. Civil rights was such an area, and note what occurred: equal opportunity became affirmative action, and desegregation took the form of mandatory busing. Also, when the norm of reciprocity broke down due to a direct clash between subgovernments (e.g., cigarette smoking[140]), the government components actively arbitrated a compromise.

Viewed altogether, these new tactics translate into another new role for government: guarantor of compromise. By direct regulation, incentive, and coercion, the national government began actively to adjust the competing demands of all interest sectors into a workable general program of public action during the 1960's and 1970's. The input from the sectors, moreover, was provided by interest associations of various ilk in the overwhelming majority of cases. This new strategy of government continues to be practiced at present, and is likely to continue in the future, but is now being tested. The Vietnam War, Watergate, and the energy crises of the 1970's all undermined the

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[139] Cawson, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

[140] A. Lee Fritschler, Smoking and Politics: Policymaking and the Federal Bureaucracy (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975).

American people's basic faith in the national government which the New Deal and World War II had rather firmly established. President Reagan is trying to capitalize on those doubts by putting the brakes on national social programs, but the real results of his efforts still remain to be seen.

Societal Corporatism in Action: Vertical Policy Complexes

From every perspective I have approached it, therefore, the American political process appears to have evolved beyond pluralistic elitism into the realm of societal corporatism. That could mean many things in practice, however, and only systematic research can determine the exact nature and extent of the transformation. Such studies will require some preliminary conceptualizations on which to base testable hypotheses, and I hope to stimulate such efforts somewhat by offering a tentative alternative model of the American decision-making structure. Hugh Heclo recently noted that the iron triangle concept, which had been used for years, "is not so much wrong as it is drastically incomplete."[141] He later includes its companion concept, the subgovernment, in that indictment, and argues that they have been replaced by something new, "issue networks":

> The notion of iron triangles and subgovernments presumes small circles of participants who have succeeded in becoming largely autonomous. Issue networks, on the other hand, comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or of dependence on others in

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[141]Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in King, op. cit., p. 88.

> their environment; in fact it is almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environment begins. Iron triangles and subgovernments suggest a stable set of participants coalesced to control fairly narrow public programs which are in the direct economic interest of each party to the alliance. Issue networks are almost the reverse image in each respect. Participants move in and out of the networks constantly. Rather than groups united in dominance over a program, no one, as far as one can tell, is in control of the policies and issues. Any direct material interest is often secondary to intellectual or emotional commitment. Network members reinforce each other's sense of issues as their interests, rather than (as standard political or economic models would have it) interests defining positions on issues.[142]

Heclo stated that he was searching for "the configurations through which leading policy makers move and do business with each other"[143] when he uncovered these networks. His analysis of the changes in politics and policymaking is both useful and interesting, and his "discovery" is important, but I must contend that he did not complete his search. Louis Fischer recently endorsed Heclo's findings, and suggested a different approach for studying American politics:

> The configurations are too complex and variable to warrant shorthand descriptions of "iron triangles." To understand representation and shared power, there is no substitute for investigating the total political system, especially as it operates and adjusts over time.[144]

I have attempted to do this, but I find I must now dig deeper; the original denotation of "analysis," after all, was to dissect. I agree with both Heclo and Fisher that the iron triangle/subgovernment concept

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[142] Ibid., p. 102.

[143] Ibid., p. 88.

[144] Louis Fisher, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 192.

(the former being the core of the latter) is obsolete, but I do not believe they have been succeeded by issue networks.

At one point, Heclo asks whether these networks can or should govern.[145] Those questions are unnecessary, however, because they do not. Policymaking triangles still exist, but they are no longer the simple arrangements they were portrayed to be. Subgovernments did not disappear, they grew both in size and complexity, like just about every other social structure in America over the last thirty years. Within Heclo's issue networks are subsets of participants that actually make the authoritative decisions pertinent to the respective issues. I am, of course, referring to public policy, in the straightforward sense employed by Thomas Dye: "whatever governments choose to do or not to do."[146] There are important differences between issues and policies. The former tend to involve broad questions and general strategies, while the latter tend to be concrete proposals regarding specific matters. They are interrelated, but distinct. As Robert Eyestone expressed it, "issues are the fuel of politics," but they must be "tamed" before they can sustain the "business of government."[147]

Heclo's issue networks, I would suggest, have replaced interest groups within the American political system, while Vertical Policy

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[145]Heclo, op. cit., p. 118.

[146]Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (4th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 1.

[147]Robert Eyestone, From Social Issues to Public Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978), p. 1.

Complexes (VPC's) have succeeded subgovernments. Helco took note of their existence, but discounted their role.[148] His specific reference was to the accompanying analysis of Samuel Beer, who both summarily described the complexes and offered a glimpse at how they developed:

> As science itself grows by the creation of new fields of special knowledge, professionalism in government seems to expand by the creation of specialized programs. Between different levels of government, common disciplines and subdisciplines promote cooperation within vertical hierarchies. These bureaucratic elements in turn establish cordial relations with specialized legislative committees and with the groups of consumers who benefit from their services.[149]

Recall that these represent subsets of issue networks, moreover; they are both formed from the same basic components:

> The fluid networks . . . can best be thought of as proto-bureaucracies. There are subordinate and superordinate positions through which they climb from lesser to greater renown and recognition, but these are not usually within the same organization. It is indeed a world of large-scale bureaucracies but one interlaced with loose personal associations in which reputations are established by word of mouth.[150]

Organizational theorists would prefer the designation "organizational field" to "proto-bureaucracy," but his description tells us that Heclo considers formal organizations to be the principal constituent elements of issue networks. VPC's, therefore, are similarly constructed.

To a significant degree, however, relationships within the policy complexes are more formalized. As Salisbury pointed out, the

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[148]Heclo, op. cit., p. 100.

[149]Samuel Beer, "In Search of a New Public Philosophy," in King, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

[150]Heclo, op. cit., p. 107.

operations of interest associations are well-regulated, and both tradition and statute circumscribe how committees and agencies may interact. Add to those circumstances the regularity of their contact, and stir briskly, as the events of the 1960's did. I do not believe it was a coincidence that Ernest Griffith found "policy whirlpools" where others had found "iron triangles," when he studied Congress in the late 1930's and early 1960's.[151] When the dust settled, the subsystems had solidified into subgovernments, as Cater labeled them; earlier I had described this change as the formation of organizational matrices within the fields. These matrices, moreover, did not remain fixed. They grew in size because their components grew, a great deal of this involving extension below the national level. Why? Because that is where much of the policy action was taking place, spurred by categorical grant programs at first, and later by revenue sharing. The Congressional components grew in their own way--an explosion of staffing.[152] I have attempted to diagram the resulting structure in Figure 5. It certainly is an idealized outline, but I believe it does portray the basic alignment of the matrices within which national policy is formulated today.

The organizations indicated as surrounding the complex are the other elements of Heclo's issue networks. They do influence policy,

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[151]Griffith, op. cit.; and Ernest Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary Role (New York: New York University Press, 1961).

[152]Fiorina, op. cit., discusses certain aspects of both of these developments, see pp. 56-60 and Appendix.




Figure 5. An Idealized Vertical Policy Complex (VPC)

and at times participate in making it, but they are not routinely involved. The members of the triangular matrix are; their daily business is to develop acceptable authoritative decisions for formal or informal ratification. Beer was not the first to report on these complexes. A dozen years ago the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations reported that some policy areas had become dominated by "vertical functional autocracies."[153] One former governor even charged that such arrangements had become pervasive, and had undermined state and local government:

> The lines of authority, the concerns and interests, the flow of money, and the direction of programs run straight down like a number of pickets stuck into the ground. There is, as in a picket fence, a connecting cross slat, but that does little to support anything. In this metaphor, it stands for the governments. It holds the pickets in line; it does not bring them together. The picket-like programs are not connected at the bottom.[154]

I would suggest, however, that the nature of the complexes is not as ordered as he implies. Both Beer and Heclo use the term "vertical hierarchy," which I believe is not truly appropriate. While the policy complexes are vertical, the issue networks are really not. They tend to vary in shape and rearrange themselves over time. One useful representation of their configuration might be that of a star revolving around (not orbiting) the policy complex. Both VPC's and issue networks tend more toward holarchic (see Chapter III) rather

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[153]Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Tenth Annual Report (Washington, D.C., January 31, 1969), p. 8.

[154]Terry Sanford, Storm Over the States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 80.

than hierarchical relationships, moreover. Heclo's own description seems to reflect this.

Governor Sanford's "picket fence" model may have been misleading in another respect. The lines of demarcation between VPC's are not as rigid as that analogy implies, and the triangles are no longer "iron," if they ever really were. Salisbury was correct when he noted that parallel interest associations were appearing, but wrong when he assumed they regularly compete. As Fiorina pointed out, many of these new associations have their own VPC based on recently created sub-committees and programs; the remainder tend to form small clusters. The norm of reciprocity usually operates among them, and more often than not they work not necessarily together, but on the same side. When there are disagreements, my perception is that the older, more established associations seem to prevail. As Fisher points out,[155] there are jurisdictional disputes between VPC's, but these do not negate the basic alignments. They do overlap in varying degrees, and even collide at times, but VPC's appear to generally go about their own business relatively undisturbed. The rule of concurrent majority tends to prevail when major decisions are made, but individual VPC's do not always get their way. In situations where the rule breaks down, Presidential appointees and/or the courts often become important participants.

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[155]Fisher, op. cit., p. 190.

In actual operation, the complexes constitute a functioning system. I believe that this system is what Fiorina meant by "the Washington establishment":

> There is a Washington establishment. In fact, it is a hydra with each head only marginally concerned with the others' existence. These establishments are not malevolent, centrally directed conspiracies against the American people. Rather, they are unconsciously evolved and evolving networks of congressmen, bureaucrats, and organized subgroups of the citizenry all seeking to achieve their own goals.[156]

Given the usual connotation of that label, which includes those within the orbit of political power as well as those who wield it, it would probably be more accurate to reserve that term for the larger, combined system of issue networks and the VPC labyrinth. Together, moreover, they constitute our decision-making structure, with the set of VPC's as its nucleus, and the issue networks as overlays of relevant organizations.[157]

VPC's: What Do They Mean?

I have argued, therefore, that a new decision-making structure has evolved within the United States. Roughly parallel (but somewhat overlapping), specialized, holarchic organizational matrices now formulate public policy, within an environment of somewhat similar,

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[156] Fiorina, op. cit., p. 3.

[157] To the best of my knowledge, the overlay as an analytical concept was introduced by John Pfiffner and Frank Sherwood in Administrative Organization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 19.

but much less ordered, organizational fields. At least a brief evaluation of this situation seems in order. I noted earlier my disagreement with Robert Pranger's conclusion that unaccountable oligarchies now control public decision-making, but I do not deny that oligarchy has become pervasive:

> As traditional beliefs are being shattered, the leadership of contemporary society is confronted with the staggering problems of creating new confidences, for confidence is the essential component of legitimacy. Where the old legitimacy was fashioned out of confidence in the efficacy of individual endeavor and the effectiveness of our pluralistic institutions, the new legitimacy is being forged from assumptions that support the modern organization. . . .
>
> When people are fearful and uncertain about the forces affecting them, they tend to fall back upon what they do best regardless of its relevance to the problems at hand. In the face of doubts about who governs, there has not been a re-examination of values, where real answers lie. Instead, increasing reliance has been placed upon the most successful American social invention, the modern organization. The resolution of the modern crisis of legitimacy has been achieved through the modern organization and the kind of leadership it requires.[158]

These authors go on to summarize the ideas of Michels and Burnham, which I reviewed earlier, and add the voice of Jacques Ellul, who argues that "this conjunction of state and (management) technique is by far the most important phenomenon of history."[159]

That is probably an overstatement, but the significance of formal organizations in modern politics cannot be denied. Their

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[158]William Scott and David Hart, Organizational America (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), pp. 23-24.

[159]Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, translated by J. Wilkinson (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 233; quoted by Scott and Hart, op. cit., p. 26, parentheses added.

propagation has not been confined to the United States, moreover, and as Joseph LaPalombara revealed, seems to exemplify a DAMC process: "It is a striking historical irony that man generally tries to cope with the problems and pathologies of organized society by creating more organizations."[160] American political science has not ignored the rise of organizations, but neither has it fully recognized the qualitative change this represents for our system. In a highly regarded analysis, for example, Emmette Redford described our policy-making process as similar to what I outlined above:

> Policy is made for and applied to us by minorities composed of men occupying strategic positions in specialized organizations, operating only in part from organizations directly representative of the people.[161]

Redford argued, however, that "workable democracy" was still achievable within such a system. He did openly deal with democracy as a normative concept, outlining what he called the "tenets of democratic morality" and then applying them to the political process:

> Democratic morality posits that on all matters where social action is substituted for individual action, liberty exists only through participation either in decision making or in control of leaders who make the decisions.[162]

Unfortunately, his translation of these conditions into "workable democracy" entailed some highly questionable assumptions. First, he hypothesized:

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[160]Joseph LaPalombara, Politics Within Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 279.

[161]Redford, op. cit., p. 196; italicized in original.

[162]Ibid., p. 6; author's italics.

> . . . that power to make policy on the basic felt needs of the people of a nation will gravitate toward the most comprehensive jurisdiction; and second, that such power will gravitate to the most democratic centers within the society. This is to say, combining the hypotheses, that comprehensive, democratic jurisdiction attracts power.[163]

It seems, therefore, that Redford placed great store in Presidential control. In contrast, McCurdy argued that chief executives can seldom compete with VPC's for the loyalty of their own supposed subordinates;[164] their power over Congress and interest associations is much more tentative. Redford eventually defined workable democracy, moreover, as "the inclusive representation of interests in the interaction process among strategic organization centers," and further stipulated that such representation must rest on a "universal capacity for participation in meaningful ways."[165]

I do not doubt that Professor Redford's evaluation represented an honest, scholarly effort to reconcile harsh realities with cherished ideals, but his criteria are simply unattainable in modern America. His conclusion that our decision-making structure "contains in its broadest outlines a framework for workable democracy"[167] is misleading. Many of his readers have accepted his theory as descriptive rather than analytical, and have thus been set up for severe disappointment. I expressed my displeasure over such exercises earlier, and I repeat

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[163]Ibid., p. 184; author's italics.

[164]McCurdy, op. cit., pp. 112-13.

[165]Redford, op. cit., p. 197; italicized in original.

[166]Ibid., p. 204.

my reasoning here. Active public concern is vital to the scheme of bounded representation that sustains our republic. Raising false hopes generates cynicism. It is counter-productive, therefore, to the goals of those who seek to preserve an open political system. McCurdy, for example, listed and discussed several limitations on the functioning of VPC's, but a close examination reveals that all but one are really corollary activities to their operation.[167] That sole remaining avenue of control is citizen participation, and it offers no guarantees.

Let us examine citizen participation today. Charles Lindblom, who has shed considerable light on the subject of public policymaking in recent years, characterizes our process as one of "interactive problem solving":

> In any case, interaction among a variety of interest groups effectively makes the decision that no one official can conclusively analyze or reach exclusively through his or her own authority.[168]

The products of that process, moreover, are "settlements" rather than "solutions,"[169] a fascinating notion that he and David Cohen elaborate in another study.[170] One form of interaction involved, Lindblom acknowledges, is voting, but he also notes that such activity "can

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[167]McCurdy, op. cit., pp. 114-40.

[168]Charles Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 88.

[169]Ibid., p. 122.

[170]Charles Lindblom and David Cohen, Usable Knowledge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979).

handle only a few of the many issues government must decide."[171] For most "segments of the citizenry," he argues, "interest group activity" is "their principal method of influence on policy."[172] Are we back to square one, to pluralism? No, because Lindblom almost immediately rejects it. "Group theory," he states, "turns out not to tell us much about interest groups."[173]

The interactive nature of the process, he continues, shapes it. There are laws and regulations, and norms play a very important part; "to some degree, interest-group politics becomes a kind of game played by rule by interest-group leaders and policymakers."[174] Finally, moreover, he pinpoints how access is achieved: "to get into the game an organization is required."[175] Robert Eyestone endorses that declaration. He states that "mobilization of an issue public requires organizational resources," and devotes a special section to the topic "How to Build an Effective Organization."[176] That conclusion, however, directly raises the question of representation. Pranger argued that "few private interest groups organized for political in America could be called 'democratic' in any sense of the word, after their internal organization is examined."[177] I concur, but state

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[171] Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, p. 87.

[172] Ibid., p. 83.

[173] Ibid., p. 84.

[174] Ibid., p. 89.

[175] Ibid.

[176] Eyestone, op. cit., p. 173.

[177] Pranger, op. cit., p. 75.

again that such a yardstick is not really useful, I propose that we squarely face the realities of our modern, complex society; the best means of input such a social system can yield is a process of bounded representation.[178]

Because I have repudiated democracy does not mean I have forsaken all standards. The most comprehensive study of the concept of representation that I have encountered was done by Hanna F. Pitkin. After an in-depth historical analysis she concluded that representation was not a matter of form, but of substance:

> The notion is closely related to the view of representing as substantive activity. For in a representative government the governed must be capable of action and judgment, capable of initiating government activity, so that the government may be conceived as responding to them. . . . Correspondingly, a representative government requires that there be machinery for the expression of the wishes of the represented, and that the government respond to these wishes unless there are good reasons to the contrary. There need not be a constant activity of responding, but there must be a constant condition of responsiveness, of potential readiness to respond.[179]

I cannot argue that our current decision-making structure meets these standards perfectly. Instead, as is characteristic of corporatism, our system of representation is bounded, and relies for the most part on organized clusters of self-interest. We do meet her two specific criteria for representative "machinery," regular elections and "some sort of collegiate representative body in a more

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[178]This label was inspired in part by Herbert Simon's concept of "bounded rationality" first presented in Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

[179]Pitkin, op. cit., pp. 232-33.

than advisory capacity,"[180] but I myself have argued that they do not constitute the heart of our public policy apparatus. VPC's do, and they receive direct citizen input primarily through interest associations. These do tend to be special interest organizations (SIO's), but as Lindblom points out, SIO's do not exercise a monopoly:

> Moreover, much interest-group activity pursues not narrow, self-serving segmental interests but visions of a common interest. . . . As the point was once put, "the members of the American League to Abolish Capital Punishment were not a group of people in danger of being hanged."[181]

Such associations I label common interest organizations (CIO's), and differentiate from another category of citizen conglomerate. Most people, at one time or another, also associate through church, political, fraternal, or other community organizations, usually for personal or social reasons. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus have termed such associations "mediating structures," "institutions standing between the individual in his private life and the large institutions of public life."[182] They acknowledge that such structures have been neglected in favor of governmental agencies of late, but note that there are still tens of thousands of them going strong. These mediating structures may regain importance, they suggest, when people accept the

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[180] Ibid., pp. 234-35.

[181] Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, p. 93; his reference is to E. E. Schatschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 26.

[182] Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, "To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy" (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 2.

lesson that they and Lindblom are trying to teach, "that public policy must come to terms with perduring contradictions" within society.[183] SIO's, CIO's, and mediating structures, therefore, all serve to aggregate and articulate citizen interests within our political system, in that order of importance, but are they representative?

My appraisal is that, within a context of bounded representation, they can be and generally are. How? Pranger argues that SIO's in particular have resurrected "virtual representation,"[184] but I disagree. Yes, few if any interest associations democratically elect their leaders and operatives, but they do select them in accordance with established, approved procedures. Members usually ratify association constitutions which spell out such procedures, and expect them to be complied with. Admittedly, members tend to allow association leaders and staff a free hand, as long as they get the job done. They are also in position to manipulate the rules in their favor. When they fail, however, they can be removed much more expeditiously than most elected representatives. Some will counter that most citizens pay so little heed to public affairs that monitoring of "selected representatives" would be sporadic at best. Remember, however, that we are primarily talking about associations designed and funded to promote the peculiar (usually economic, critics say) interests of member individuals or organizations; that would tend to sustain their attention, I suggest.

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[183]Ibid., p. 43.

[184]Pranger, op. cit., p. 75.

I am not contending that this process allows for individual input. Some extremely active members might accomplish this, but in general group interests are the stuff of selected representation. If the concerns of the general membership are being effectively handled, by individuals chosen in accordance with standard operating procedures, representation is achieved. Compliance with the rules is very important. The epitome of selected representation in our history was Gerald Ford's presidency. Although not popularly elected, his selection was carried out under established procedures fully authorized by the Constitution. That fact gave it legitimacy that could not have otherwise been obtained. Following the rules carries general significance within our political culture. I noted earlier that violation of laws or regulations can cost an individual or organization their sponsorship, which is the real ticket to input. The importance of informal general rules, or norms, has also been discussed, and to these I have just added the specific rules and norms of individual associations. Together they constitute the operationalization of the overarching norm that is the essence of our process of bounded representation, the American penchant for fair play.

Pitkin, incidentally, does not exclude indirect methods from her concept of substantive representation:

> Because this kind of political representation requires only potential responsiveness, access to power rather than its actual exercise, it is perfectly compatible with leadership and with action to meet new or emergency situations.[185]

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[185]Pitkin, op. cit., p. 233.

Many will find bounded representation a poor substitute for democracy; all I can offer are condolences. Others, however, will recognize that it constitutes a victory within a world permeated by political centralization.[186] VPC's provide more than an avenue of indirect representation, moreover. They also serve the basic purpose for which the American Revolution was fought, the establishment of limited government. On this point I openly disagree with Professor Lowi. He argued that the institution of positive government in effect repealed the principle of limited government. VPC's do allow special interests to "use" the government to further themselves, but that is not all they do. Lindblom argues, for example, that interest organizations now seem to have assumed "the surveillance function" for the citizenry, and that it is "in some eyes, their principal one. They blow the whistle."[187] More important, in my mind, is their ability to block government action. Due to the complex nature of our deliberative process, it is much easier to do this than it is to get something done: "To stop a policy move, they need influence only one of the many persons or bodies that can exercise a veto. To move a policy ahead, they must influence all potential sources of veto."[188]

This is important given the current context of American politics. Despite Reagan's victory in 1980, which supposedly

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[186]This thesis has been convincingly argued by Henry Jacoby in The Bureaucratization of the World, translated by Eveline L. Kanes (Berkely: University of California Press, 1973).

[187]Lindblom, The Policy Making Process, p. 87.

[188]Ibid., p. 93.

symbolized a conservative resurgence, the people still want government to do things. Several analysts have addressed the inherent inconsistency this represents; Berger and Neuhaus capture it as well as any:

> Two seemingly contradictory tendencies are evident in current thinking about public policy in America. First, there is a continuing desire for the services provided by the modern welfare state. Partisan rhetoric aside, few people seriously envisage dismantling the welfare state. The serious debate is over how and to what extent it should be expanded. The second tendency is one of strong animus against government, bureaucracy, and bigness as such. This animus is directed not only toward Washington but toward government at all levels.[189]

What problem does that imply? As Eyestone points out, "most of the responsibilities given to American bureaucracies require voluntary cooperation from the regulated interests if they are to be successful."[190] That was one of the main reasons why subsystems developed in the first place. There is an alternative, "to grant a firmer hand to our government bureaucracies to allow them to act effectively on their own initiative."[191] It seems, then, that we must choose among something at least akin to VPC's (the Congressional committees are not going to fade into the background), more powerful bureaucracies, or less service and protection. The second choice, in my view, would be the most dangerous.

Our political system, therefore, can be classified as a republic. It provides for both indirect representation and, more important, direct checks on government activities. The modifications that have accrued within our decision-making structure, however,

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[189]Berger and Neuhaus, op. cit., p. 1.

[190]Eyestone, op. cit., p. 166.

[191]Ibid.

suggest to me that we forego the label "democratic" altogether. An appropriate adjective should indicate the primary political means by which republican government is achieved; I propose that the most descriptive term in that regard would be "organizational." Formal organizations dominate our political landscape, and that fact deserves full recognition, whether or not one subscribes to the particular model constructed here. The changes that have brought us to this point are continuing, moreover. We have entered the realm of corporatism, riding a DAMC wave of organization, and the future is uncertain. This broader development also deserves at least a brief evaluation.

The Organizational Republic: Modernization or Decay?

The conceptual model of American politics that I have presented portrays an organizational republic. Bounded representation is provided by semi-voluntary interest associations that seek to limit outside intrusion, and that operate within vertical organizational complexes that seek to monopolize policymaking directly relevant to their sectors. That might not satisfy some analysts as constituting corporatism, but I suggest it is much closer to that than to any other available classification. It is a version of societal corporatism. I outlined the political history of Brazil to provide a direct contrast between state corporatism, the other major type, and what has developed here. The most important difference relates directly to the decision-making structure.

State corporatism requires a "pilot" to function; that is the nature of direction from above. That role can be filled by either a

lider maximo (top boss), or a group that can act decisively in concert. Classical corporatism, exemplified by the Roman Catholic Church, used both (i.e., the Pope and the clerical hierarchy). When there is no official "pilot," a poder moderator (moderating power) is usually designated to settle any major disagreements. The reader may recall that Brazilian corporatism floundered only twice, when the state politicians split among themselves and when Vargas's pervasive influence disintegrated. Societal corporatism does not even entail a similar role. Since it is not controlled from above, there is no tiller to take. The direction of public policy emerges from the interaction of the various interests, but in a much less competitive manner than under pluralism. There is no presumed clash; compromise and accommodation are expected. Competition exists, both within and among the sectors, but it is not the norm. When it does occur, moreover, it is circumscribed.

How? In contrast to state corporatism, which provides controlling roles, societal corporatism is contained by rules. Lindblom stressed the general importance of rules in our policymaking process, as noted earlier. "Even in time of crisis," he stated, "the play of power depends heavily on remaining or new rules."[192] Inclusion in the process, moreover, is only granted to "interests entitled to consideration by rule."[193] Redford, describing the directed (which complements the adjustive) aspect of American public administration, stated that:

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[192]Lindblom, The Policy Making Process, p. 47.

[193]Ibid., p. 89.

> . . . purpose is stated or implied, organizations are established, rules are prescribed, and by these means roles are created for actors within administration. . . . All are embodied in practice in the roles of actors, and hence the summarization could be symbolized as POR→R (purpose, organization, rules, all producing roles).[194]

Under state corporatism, the arrow would be reversed. The top roles in the holarchy determine purpose, structure, and rules. There is, of course, a "highest authority" by which we evaluate all our rules, both formal and informal: the Constitution. The United States seems to be unique in having a written, but living, Constitution. Core rights and duties are spelled out, but circumstance can be dealt with via judicial review. Despite grumblings about both judicial imperialism (e.g., busing) and neglect (e.g., anti-trust), that tradition continues to function well as a means of control. One outside observer, H. G. Nicholas, recently noted that "judicial review looks as secure as ever it did."[195]

Many analysts do not appreciate the importance of the Constitution in our political system. Andrew Shonfield, for example, produced an elaborate explanation of why corporatism was not established here during the 1930's, which Schmitter summarized and seemingly endorsed.[196] For some reason, they could not accept the basic reality

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[194]Redford, op. cit., p. 193.

[195]H. G. Nicholas, The Nature of American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 42.

[196]Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 114; the reference is to Shonfield, op. cit., pp. 298-329.

as it occurred, probably because it clashed with their personal assumptions about economic determinism. The National Industrial Recovery Act, which would have imposed something akin to societal corporatism, was rejected because it was unconstitutional. This was a political decision; it simply violated our basic set of rules. The United States is a rarity in the world. It was established on a decentralized basis, as a federation of sovereign subsystems, based on the same Constitution we still operate under. If the reader will recall my discussion of political development in Chapter IV, the long-range impact of that fact is very significant. I assumed political development to involve interlocking waves of deviance counteraction and amplification, with major political changes characterized as DAMC processes. Within such a context, the "initial kick" establishes a persistent pattern. While most other nation-states existing today are the products of initial centralized political control (i.e., monarchy or imperialism), we have been riding a different wave.

If those assumptions are plausible, they offer some validation of the picture of American and Brazilian political development that I have painted in this study. Schmitter, in his analysis of Brazil, conceptualized political development in a manner similar to mine. He described it as the "product of the contrapuntal, if not dialectical, interplay between concentration and dispersion."[197] In more conventional terms, state corporatism can be viewed as centralized control

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[197]Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, p. 5.

over evolving decentralization, or "nascent pluralism" as Schmitter elsewhere labeled it.[198] Societal corporatism, on the other hand, represents centralization in a decentralized manner. Public policy-making in America has undoubtedly become a national activity, but it is constrained by organized minorities, who have supplanted the States. The battle, however, is ongoing.

Given that a corporatist structure has evolved in America, I would suggest that state corporatism is now a much more likely possibility than it ever was before. Salisbury argued that "peak associations" are unlikely to form in the United States; let us hope he is correct. As it stands now, VPC's are dynamic structures. They also must endure waves of cohesion and conflict, and are thus vulnerable at times. Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin revealed this a few years ago,[199] and Eyestone offers the following pointed advice regarding such targets of opportunity:

> In all such cases the lesson for outside groups is simple; be prepared to take advantage of any break in the sub-government's defenses. Seize opportunities for change whenever they occur.[200]

Although it is not easy, a VPC can be penetrated. Lindblom plainly states the only way how, moreover: "people must move that very machinery in order to rebuild it."[201]

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[198]Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" p. 106.

[199]Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1976), pp. 6-7.

[200]Eyestone, op. cit., p. 170.

[201]Lindblom, The Policy Making Process, p. 123.

Can this be considered a representative system? Only if we make it one:

> No institutional system can guarantee the essence, the substance of representation. Nor should we be too optimistic about the capacity of institutions to produce the desired conduct; even the best of representative institutions cannot be expected to produce representation magically, mechanically, without or even in spite of the beliefs, attitudes, and intentions of the people operating the system.[202]

We do have a republican structure, but we have to make it work as such. As Lindblom aptly puts it, "one does not play at the play of power. One must toil at it."[203] The major danger we face, in my view, is still big government. There are many big, powerful special interests operating in VPC's today, not just business interests as Lindblom seems to imply. That is one of the facts of modern life, however; something to be dealt with, not debated. My biggest fear is inadvertent catastrophic political centralization. A well-intentioned reform could "misfire" as Lindblom expressed it, as they "constantly" do "to a significant degree."[204] One current trend and one specific proposal will be addressed below in that regard. History, however, seems to be on our side. As Salisbury noted, "even national emergencies have not suppressed for long the centrifugal tendencies built into America's governing institutions."[205] If we remain alert, moreover, we need not even fear corporatism. Golob argued over twenty years ago that

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[202]Pitkin, op. cit., p. 239.

[203]Lindblom, The Policy Making Process, p. 124.

[204]Ibid., p. 95.

[205]Salisbury, op. cit., p. 220.

"American society appears to be changing in a corporatist direction,"[206] and I believe he was correct. He continued, moreover:

> . . . this change, while rather rapid on the scale of past transformations, need not outstrip our capacity to assimilate it and adjust to it, always given the continuing vitality of the essential beliefs and institutions of the American branch of Western civilization.[207]

The heading of this section asked the question whether our organizational republic represented political modernization or decay for America. Since it seems to embody a rational response to growing complexity and centralization, and at the same time to preserve in large measure our basic traditions of limited and representative government, I must consider it modernization. To date, at least.

Prospects for the Future: Concerns and Recommendations

There are two ways we could almost immediately cause our republic to go belly up. First, we could tamper with the independence of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court. There have been some recent attempts to modify the Court's jurisdiction by legislation, and cries for "moral" standards for justices. Both salvos have been deflected to date; I hope they, and any similar movements, fade away. Second, we could shackle our free press, which has taken up some of the slack in the system generated by breakdown of the parties and the restructuring of interest competition:

> The political role of the mass media has changed drastically not only because of changes in the capacity of the media to claim the attention of citizens but also because of the

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[206] Golob, op. cit., p. 596.

[207] Ibid.

> corresponding weaknesses of competing political institutions, notably the political parties, and of other intermediary organizations, such as labor unions and business groups.[208]

Because of this new role for the mass media, communications technology has also assumed new importance:

> By virtue of the enormous consequences for patterns of public attention and information, patterns of concentration, control, and regulation of present and future communications technology are critical issues for political analysis and public policy.[209]

The danger, of course, is abuse of such technology for the purpose of mass indoctrination. Ironically, Lindblom contends that we have already been indoctrinated:

> . . . if citizens tend to agree on primary political issues, it is because they somehow have learned to believe much the same facts, to make roughly the same guesses about future events, to formulate the same crude hypotheses, to hold the same attitudes and values, and to weigh all these considerations together in much the same way.[210]

If that is the case, political scientists are partially responsible. You cannot tell people that "overhead democracy" and "partisan mutual adjustment" protect them, and then expect them to seek basic reforms. Today, individuals are no longer the primary political actors, and democratic criteria are obsolete. Most pluralists recognized that fact years ago. Moreover, there are reforms that can be made to help provide greater access on behalf of the general citizenry.

If we acknowledge that organizations are now the principal political agents in our system, we can begin to address concrete

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[208]Polsby, op. cit., pp. 560-61.

[209]Ibid., p. 561.

[210]Lindblom, The Policy Making Process, p. 117.

problems that relate to that situation. Again, the rules of the game are involved; William Ashworth offers an excellent example:

> Not only are the public-interest lobbyists outgunned and outmanned, but the rules are bent subtly against them as well. Internal Revenue regulations, for example, allow corporations to deduct the cost of lobbying from their taxes as a legitimate business expense. But any nonprofit organization which openly lobbies Congress can have its tax-exempt status removed, and deductions to it cannot be deducted come April 15. Since most of the pork lobby is composed of profit-making corporations and most of the public-interest body is made up of nonprofit organizations, the effect of this pair of IRS regulations is to encourage lobbying for pork and discourage lobbying against it. It also means that a citizen who unsuccessfully fights a pork-barrel project will get stuck at least three times--once for the project itself, once for his lobbying costs against it and once for the pork lobby's lobbying costs for it, the last in the form of higher taxes to make up for the government's loss of revenue on all that money the pork lobby is paying to rob it blind--and then blissfully deducting from its taxes.[211]

Since citizens must rely a great deal on CIO's for the input of outside, generalist perspectives into the policymaking process, something should be done to correct such imbalances. I am not an expert on tax law, but it appears that some reasonable redress is in order.

The other category of citizen organization, what Berger and Neuhaus labeled "mediating structures," also need help. They are being victimized by "the trend toward professionalization":

> Whether in government or nongovernment agencies, professionals attack allegedly substandard services, and substandard generally means nonprofessional. Through organizations and lobbies, professionals increasingly persuade the state to legislate standards and certifications that hit voluntary associations hard, especially those given to employing volunteers. The end result is that the trend toward government monopoly operates in tandem with the

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[211]Ashworth, op. cit., pp. 116-17.

> trend toward professional monopoly over social services. The connection between such monopoly control and the actual quality of services delivered is doubtful indeed.[212]

I have no quarrel with standards or certifications, but I do object to "formulas" for achieving them and de facto association control over accreditation. The optimum resolution of the problem would be a working partnership between professionals and volunteers, SIO's and mediating structures. Paraprofessional certification of some sort (e.g., by examination) is another viable possibility. I am sure that some accommodation can be reached, and it should; mediating structures have too long been ignored as public assets.

The problems discussed so far could be dwarfed, however, if one specific proposal currently making the rounds were enacted. A decade ago, Ralph Nader urged that federal chartering of corporations replace the existing procedure of incorporation under state laws,[213] and he has continued to actively promote that idea. One critic, Fred Baldwin, writing in conjunction with "Big Business Day" (April 17, 1980), summarized the basic issue and questioned Nader's underlying assumption:

> Nader and his associates argue that state chartering has "failed" to control corporate abuses, so federal intervention is required. This is a bit of deceptive packaging. The "Big Business Day" documents read as if the only laws standing between the public and the corporate giants are a few watered-down Delaware statutes. This is no more true than an implication that an individual is subject only to the laws of that

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[212] Berger and Neuhaus, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

[213] Ralph Nader, "The Case for Federal Chartering," Corporate Power in America, eds. Ralph Nader and Mark Green (New York: Grossman, 1972), pp. 68-85; he repeated and expanded his proposals in Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York: Norton, 1976).

> state in which he happened to have received his birth certificate. Because it has a major bearing on management discretion, and shareholder rights, the source of a corporation's charter is more important than that, but it is ridiculous to write as if corporations were not already regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Products Safety Board, and the Federal Trade Commission, just to mention a few agencies with almost universal jurisdiction.[214]

After evaluating the proposal, moreover, Baldwin concludes that it is actually "an elaborately justified exercise in judge-shopping." The main intention is to effect a shift in the adjudication of cases against big corporations "to the federal courts, especially those of the District of Columbia, whose judges are more attuned to the pleas of public interest lawyers."[215]

Nader's proposals include several other provisions, but my concern centers on the chartering issue. If the major consequence of that "reform" would merely be the de facto change of venue that Baldwin predicts, my anxiety would quickly dissipate. Instituting federal incorporation, however, would place that process directly or indirectly within the reach of the VPC's, depending on the specific procedures established. That would clear the way for the initiation of state corporatism. SIO's. CIO's, and mediating structures are all corporations, and must be to have legal standing. National jurisdiction over their very existence would effectively place all VPC components within the purview of the federal government. Any limited

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[214]Fred Baldwin, "Naderism: Commerce on the Babylonian Model," The American Spectator (April, 1980), 19.

[215]Ibid.

application to "big business" corporations would not long remain, if it could legally be accomplished at all; the history of the interstate commerce clause forebodes that. A transition to state corporatism would not be automatic, I admit. If it did occur, it would probably come about in a piecemeal (i.e., catastrophic) fashion. The stage would certainly be set for it, however, and its likelihood dramatically increased.

Reforms frequently misfire, as noted earlier, but Nader's proposal could result in a death blow to our republic. Political science would have to share in the blame; we have been misinforming those we are charged with educating. If Mr. Nader were made aware that his proposal might play right into the hands of "the Washington establishment," he might reconsider. If he were to reexamine our political system as a web of organizations, including several he was instrumental in establishing, Mr. Nader would more than likely suggest some very different reforms. I am not talking about ideology, but rather about analytical theories and models. It is time to adopt a new school of thought. Anthony King offers the following observations:

> If we examine the literature on American politics there is one word that keeps recurring in all kinds of different contexts. That word is "coalition." American politics is almost universally seen as the politics of coalition building . . . (however) . . . . The materials out of which coalitions might be built simply do not exist. Building coalitions in the United States today is like trying to build coalitions out of sand. It cannot be done.[216]

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[216]Anthony King, "The American Polity in the Late 1970's: Building Coalitions in the Sand," in King, op. cit., pp. 388, 391.

I believe he is incorrect. The building blocks are there; they are the variety of public affairs organizations (PAO's) I have discussed. They usually operate within VPC's and issue networks, but they also interact across the organizational universe they occupy. Today's coalitions are subsets of that universe. Political science should build a new theory to reflect this new reality. Just as it acknowledged in the early part of this century that the individual was no longer the primary actor in American politics, that groups made things happen, the field should now consider whether formal organizations have supplanted groups. I submit they have, and as the principal agents through which we conduct our public affairs, they should be a central concern in both our teaching and research.

To the best of my knowledge, however, only one recent general textbook, Charles Anderson's Statecraft: An Introduction to Political Choice,[217] includes a direct treatment of the subject of organizations in politics. That must change. The rise of formal organizations in public affairs constitutes an important mutation of that activity. As an oversimplified example, I would suggest that the oft-cited competition between "business" and "labor" takes on a very different character when it becomes the United States Chamber of Commerce versus the AFL-CIO. There is a significant qualitative difference involved that our current theories do not take into account. Part of the difficulty, I suspect, stems from a lack of generalist training today.

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[217] Anderson, Statecraft: An Introduction to Political Choice, Chapter 15.

I have little doubt that most political scientists would readily acknowledge the importance that formal organizations have acquired within their areas of specialization, ranging from voting analysis to foreign policy. The problem is a lack of common ground, and there may be a solution. Perhaps we can all get together under the umbrella of societal corporatism. It seems worth a try.

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VITA

Jack Michael Bernardo was born in New York, New York on November 17, 1949. He attended elementary schools in that city and was graduated from Xavier High School in June, 1967. The following September he entered Syracuse University, and completed his undergraduate studies supported by a combination of scholarships. In June, 1971 he received the Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science cum laude and, as a Distinguished Military Graduate of the ROTC Program, was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Regular Army of the United States.

A minor service-connected disability ended his military career, however, and he entered the Graduate School of The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in January, 1975. He received the Master of Public Administration degree in December, 1975, and began his advanced studies with an internship at the Tennessee Department of Public Health in Nashville. In the fall of 1976 he returned to The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, as a teaching assistant. Supported by a Hilton S. Smith Fellowship, he served as Research Associate to the 1977-78 Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Charter Commission, and subsequently worked as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science at the University. In the fall of 1979 he joined the faculty of Stockton State College in New Jersey as Instructor in Public Administration, and remained until August, 1981. The following year he devoted to completing his dissertation, and he received the Doctor

of Philosophy degree with a major in Political Science, in August, 1982.

The author is a member of Phi Kappa Phi, the American Society for Public Administration, and the Academy of Political Science. Mr. Bernardo is currently a Research Assistant in the Office of the County Administrator, Morris County, New Jersey.