To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Allison Lee Hayes entitled "Structure and Representation at the Local Level: The Relative Effects for Male and Female City Council Members." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

William Lyons, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Associate Vice Chancellor
and Dean of the Graduate School

STRUCTURE AND REPRESENTATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE RELATIVE EFFECTS FOR MALE AND FEMALE CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

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ABSTRACT

This research examines the differences in the effects of municipal electoral structure on male versus female city council members. The question guiding this research is one of election versus performance. Two research hypotheses are advanced:

RH1: More women are elected to reformed city councils than are elected to unreformed city councils.

RH2: Female city council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

First, this research examines how a city's electoral structure (i.e., city size, city type, election type, and type of race) affects the descriptive representation (i.e., income and educational attainment) of the men and women elected to city council. I hypothesize that male and female city council members will be drawn from the same high income bracket, regardless of electoral and governing structures. However, I predict that male city council members will be better educated than their female counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

Second, this study examines council members' representational foci (i.e., localized versus city-wide). I

hypothesize that female city council members will have a more localized representational focus than their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

Third, the this study examines council members' policy predispositions. The policy predisposition category is dichotomized into (1) policy - general orientations (i.e., liberal or conservative), and (2) policy substantive focus (i.e., human services, capital expenditures, and development). It is hypothesized that women will favor human services more than their male colleagues, while men favor capital expenditure and development more than their female colleagues. The data considered in this study is attitudinal data collected from city council members in five Southeastern states (Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee) for cities 25,000 and above population.

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Despite an increased research interest in the effects of electoral structure on the candidacy of women at the local level only the easiest of questions have been addressed. Primarily, the interest has been what set of local electoral and governing structures best promote the election of women. Questions about the effects of structure on gender-based representation are largely ignored. However, it is important to examine structure and its consequences because structural arrangements pose opportunity costs differentially to members of a community.

Such an examination leads to the question guiding this research: does electoral structure influence the election of women and their performance once elected? Welch and Bledsoe discovered a relationship between electoral structure and representation; my question is, does electoral structure affect men's and women's behavior differently?

The literature suggests that the election of women to city council may be promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures (i.e., council-manager type: at-large or mixed elections: and nonpartisan contests). However, there is

evidence that female city councilors perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures (i.e., mayor-council type, district elections, and partisan contests).

There has long been a gap between the literatures of (1) local electoral and governing structures and (2) gender in politics. Originally, the literature of local electoral and governing structures suggested that women should benefit from the same sorts of electoral and governing structural arrangements that benefit minorities. The prevailing theory was that if women and minority candidates, alike, are disadvantaged vis-a-vis white male candidates, then what promotes the election of minorities would surely benefit women. The gender in politics literature has suggested, however, that there is a better meshing of interests between women and unreformed electoral and governing structures.

It has been reported that women bring more localized influences to their elected positions than do their male counterparts, regardless of whether they are elected under reformed or unreformed electoral and governing structures (C.A.W.P., 1989). Further research indicates that women give priority to women's issues and liberal policies (Saint-Germaine, 1989). These studies indicate that women "fit" better under unreformed electoral and governing structures. Therefore, this literature hypothesizes that women should be more likely to win reelection under unreformed electoral and

governing structures. However, studies have not supported this hypothesis.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF URBAN HISTORY

Political machines developed out of the crisis in the urban public order. They flourished because of their ability to accomplish three things effectively (Harrigan, 1985). One, the political machines penetrated ethnic neighborhoods and, taking advantage of mass suffrage, delivered the ethnic vote to specific, hand-picked candidates. Two, the machines provided material benefits to both the ethnic and business communities. Three, the political machines built strong centralized party organizations with disciplined workers whose loyalty was guaranteed, with the prospect of material gain in exchange for party work.

The struggle between the political machines and urban reformers led to many questions central to democratic representation (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Was power to be held by the masses working through organized political parties or by a few individuals of high social status and great economic power? Should political participation be open to all or restricted to those who are educated and property owners?

These questions were buried in rather mundane issues such as whether cities should elect council members in district or at-large races, on partisan or nonpartisan ballots (Welch and

Bledsoe, 1988). Reformers argued that structural changes would bring about honest, effective, and efficient urban government. Opponents of reform insisted that reformers were antidemocratic elitists bent on limiting the power of the working class vote (Hays, 1964).

Reformers believed that by "depoliticizing" government and focusing on strict efficiency, they were protecting the city from the ethnic and lower classes (Hays, 1964). The best way to depoliticize government was to replace politics with the methods of business. The concern was not with representativeness but with technical, nonpartisan competence (Kweit and Kweit, 1990).

In 1899, Richard Childs, a prominent structural reformer and a prime force in the National Municipal League, drew up a "Model Charter" for cities to follow in reforming their electoral structures (Schultze, 1974). Today, the reformed city generally employs a council-manager form of government, at-large council elections, and nonpartisan balloting. On the contrary, unreformed cities tend to be of the mayor-council form, with district council elections, and partisan balloting. During the first half of the twentieth century, the reformers prevailed. By the 1980's, 28 percent of all cities had a council-manager system, at-large elections, and nonpartisan balloting, while only 5 percent kept the mayor-council system, district elections, and partisan balloting (Cassell, 1985).

THE IMPACT OF REFORM

Implicit in this debate between reformers and the opponents of reform is the belief that urban political structure affects the kind of person who is elected to city council, the decision-making process, and the nature of the decisions made by councils (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988).

One of the earliest studies to examine the effects of structure was Banfield and Wilson's work, which argued that there is a private-regarding ethos and public-regarding ethos (Banfield and Wilson, 1963). The private-regarding ethos is identified with unreformed structures and focuses on personalized politics (i.e., favoring oneself or one's group). Proponents of the public-regarding ethos, who purportedly support the common good (i.e., the city as a whole), are associated with the reform movement (Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Hofstadler, 1955). Later, Banfield and Wilson attempted to verify their theory with survey data. They reformulated their theory whereby the private-regarding ethos became the Individualist ethos, and the public-regarding ethos became the Unitarist ethos (Wilson and Banfield, 1971; Hennessey, 1970). There is little difference between the new concepts and the previous ones. The Individualist ethos showed a concern for the welfare of specific individuals and groups, and showed less cocnern with good government than with benefits received.

Unitarist values support the interests and welfare of the community as a collective and good government.

Over time, the question of reform versus nonreform was recast in terms of electoral structures (see e.g., Wolfinger and Field, 1966). Lineberry and Fowler (1967) pursued this line of research in their seminal piece whereby partisan elections when combined with a ward system were found to increase the access of minority groups to decision makers. They found that when partisan electoral systems were combined with ward representation the result was increased access of two kinds of minority groups: those which are residentially segregated and groups which constitute identifiable voting blocs to which politicians and parties may be beholden in the next election. Political reforms minimize the role which social conflicts play in decision making. "By muting the demands of private-regarding groups, the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population," say Lineberry and Fowler (1967: 710).

Later, Lyons hypothesized that cities with unreformed structures would be more likely to be sensitive to changes in their social and economic environments that might lead to a demand for increased services (i.e., service focus), while those with reformed structures would be more sensitive to demands of those desiring less spending (i.e., efficiency focus) (Lyons, 1978). Pressures in the environment indicating

a lesser demand for spending may be a population increase, higher percentage of homeowner occupied housing, and greater per capita income, while those demanding greater spending may be a larger percentage of nonwhite residents, and an older median age. His question, like Lineberry and Fowler's, is one of responsiveness, or to what pressures are decision makers more sensitive.

Other research indicates that council-manager cities are less responsive to factionalized interests than strong mayor cities (Durant, Lyons, and Fitzgerald, 1986). This research was the first to explore simultaneously the linkages among group spending preferences, group influences, and actual budget expenditures in manager versus nonmanager cities. The focus was whether differential influence patterns occur in reformed versus unreformed cities in times of fiscal strain. The conclusion was that reformed cities were more sensitive to pressures for fiscal restraint while unreformed cities were more responsive to pressures demanding greater spending.

These and other studies have presented us with portraits of the typical reformed and unreformed city. Reformed structures are found most often in homogeneous communities that have higher levels of education and income (See e.g., Alford and Scobel, 1965; Dye and MacManus, 1976). Generally, heterogeneous communities have higher levels of conflict and rely on political structures for conflict resolution. That heterogeneous communities tend to be unreformed may evidence

a desire to sacrifice efficiency for representativeness or merely the inability to develop a consensus to change an existing system (Kweit and Kweit, 1990).

The choice of local electoral structure has public policy implications. In the last twenty-five years, legislatures and courts have argued the effects of different election structures (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Courts have examined the at-large systems to determine whether they are a violation of equal protection or limit the voting rights of minorities. The Justice Department has been concerned with local electoral structures in regard to provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and amended in 1982. Basically, local governments must convince the Justice Department that any proposed changes in election systems or forms of government will not hinder minority voting rights.

The question of the effect of electoral structures on the representation of minorities has also been the subject of considerable scholarly research. One study of sixteen New Jersey cities found that black representation has not been hampered by nonpartisan elections, at-large elections, or reform-style governments (Cole, 1974). Another study found that a switch from an at-large to a district system did not significantly improve representation of blacks (MacManus, 1978). Most systematic research, however, has concluded that electoral structures do, in fact, impact minority representation. For example, Karnig's (1976) national study

of black representation and reformism found that district systems definitely made it easier for blacks to be elected to council than did at-large systems. A study of Texas cities that had switched from at-large to district systems revealed that minority representation increased after the switch (Davidson and Korbel, 1981). Finally, Engstrom and McDonald's (1978) multivariate study on the effects of form of representation, socioeconomic development, and percentage of the minority population, affected black representation much less than did at-large versus district variable. Consistently, they found that the district system gave more representation to blacks than did the at-large system.

In light of these findings, in 1982 the Voting Rights Act was amended to prohibit any electoral arrangements imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color or language (de La Garza and Weaver, 1986). This opened the door for blacks and other minorities to attack local electoral structures.

In the contemporary era, the success of the reform movement is evident. Nationally, the majority of all cities with 25,000 and above population employ council-manager forms of government (council-manager 60 percent; mayor-council 40 percent)(Harrigan, 1985). Approximately 60 percent of all U.S. cities elect their council members in at-large elections

(Bowman and Kearney, 1990). The nonpartisan ballot is used in 73 percent of cities nationwide (Bowman and Kearney, 1990).

THE FOCUS OF THIS STUDY

The question of interest in this study is whether the effect of urban reform differs for male versus female city council members. Separately for men and women, this research tests Welch and Bledsoe's (1988) thesis that adoption of urban reforms (i.e., the council-manager form of government, the at-large election, and the nonpartisan ballot) has brought an upper-class, conservative bias to local politics. This bias will be examined by looking at three things: descriptive representation (i.e., educational and income levels of council members), representational foci (i.e., the council member's perception of his or her constituency), and policy predispositions of council members. Welch and Bledsoe find that council members elected to reformed city councils have higher levels of education and larger incomes than their unreformed counterparts. The representational foci of these councilors tend to be turned toward the city as a whole and business interests and the policies derived from their political processes favor development (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). However, they offer no distinction between male and female councilors.

The first of the three representational concepts, descriptive representation, refers to who gets elected to city councils. What are the demographics of council members and does the reformed or unreformed electoral structure of their cities have any bearing on them? Demographics are measured as the respondents' levels of educational attainment and incomes. Previous research has indicated that male council members have higher levels of income and education than their female counterparts (see e.g.; Merritt, 1977; Welch and Bledsoe, 1988).

Welch and Bledsoe (1988) found that council members from cities employing reformed electoral structures had higher income and educational levels than did their unreformed city counterparts. Other research indicates that council-manager cities, at-large systems, and nonpartisan elections disproportionately favor candidates of higher socioeconomic standing because they usually cost more money to run (see e.g., Welch and Bledsoe, 1988; Cassel, 1985; Wolfinger and Field, 1966). There is often a perceived need for endorsements from civic organizations, and the outcome relies heavily on the candidate's name recognition (see e.g., Welch and Bledsoe, 1988, 1982; Cassel, 1985; Wolfinger and Field, 1966).

Representational focus refers to whom council members believe they should represent - district versus city-wide constituents. Participants in this study were asked to

indicate the importance of their representation of certain constituencies; the results serve as the measure of representational foci. Unreformed councilors are expected to favor neighborhood and ethnic interests over those of the city as a whole and to be more concerned with factionalized interests, such as labor groups, a result of the district system employed by unreformed systems (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Research indicates that female council members bring a more localized influence (i.e., group affiliation, neighborhood organization, or gender-based organization) to their elected positions (C.A.W.P., 1989).

Policy and allocative representation is evidenced by the policy attitudes that council members bring to their jobs. Council members serving reformed cities have been found to be more conservative in their policy views than their unreformed counterparts (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). They are found to be more favorably disposed toward development, for example. Unreformed councilors tend toward a more liberal, or as Welch and Bledsoe call it - "a more progressive view," of policy. They would, for example, be likely to favor a need-based distribution of resources.

Though women have been found to be more verbally supportive of women's issues and more liberal on other issues than their male counterparts (see e.g., Thomas and Welch, 1992; Dodson, 1989; Welch, 1985; Hill, 1983; Lilie, Handberg, and Lowery, 1982; Johnson and Carroll, 1978; Diamond, 1977;

Leader, 1977; Frankovic, 1977; Gehlen, 1977),[1] these concerns had not translated into women giving women's issues or liberal policies higher priority rankings than did men (see e.g., Mezey, 1978; Johnson and Carroll, 1978). However, recent evidence suggests that women are making women's issues and liberal policies priorities (Saint-Germaine, 1989). This perspective is summed up by U.S. Representative Barbara Kennelly, who has remarked that it is her business to get legislation through to help women (Stanwick and Kleeman, 1983). Most recently, research findings indicate that more women state legislators list as priority legislation bills that pertain to children and the family and women than do their male counterparts (Thomas and Welch, 1992: 450). Women introduce more legislation dealing with children and family, women, and welfare than men (Thomas and Welch, 1992). The change in priority rankings has been attributed, at least in part, to the increase in women serving on legislatures (Thomas and Welch, 1992). The theory is that "increased numbers of women legislators mean a larger potential support network for women who push issues of importance to them" (Thomas and Welch, 1992: 452).

[1]The only exception is the Thomas (1987) study of the California Assembly where women legislators were found to be more supportive of women's issues but no more liberal overall than the men legislators.

REFORM GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATION

Welch and Bledsoe discovered a relationship between electoral structure and representation; my question is, does electoral structure affect men's and women's behavior differently? Despite a recent study's call for an examination of structural impact on the behavior of women serving on city councils (MacManus, 1990), the question has been overlooked.

This study seeks to examine the effects of electoral structure: city type (i.e., mayor-council or council-manager), election type (i.e., district, mixed, or at large), and type of race (i.e., partisan or nonpartisan) on male and female representation and representational behavior on city council. Specifically, focus is on three questions: (1) do men and women elected to council differ in levels of income or education? (2) does the impact of electoral structure on council members' views of their constituencies differ for male and female councilors? and (3) does the effect of local electoral structures on council members' policy predispositions differ for men versus women?

As a framework for the analysis of these questions, this study borrows from Welch and Bledsoe (1988) a three-part conceptualization of the term "representation:" (1) descriptive representation, which refers to who gets elected to city council; (2) representational foci, which refer to what constituency council members believe they represent; and

(3) policy and allocative representation, which refers to the policy predispositions council members bring to their jobs.

In their nationwide study of council members, Welch and Bledsoe (1988) examine alternate electoral structures in an attempt to answer the representational questions for all council members. Overall, they conclude that reformed city councils produce members that are better educated and wealthier, have a broader (i.e., city-wide) focus and are more conservative in their policy predispositions than are members of unreformed councils. Unfortunately, Welch and Bledsoe ignore the effects of gender in their study (see Figure 1). This study is interested in what effect gender has on representation (see Figure 2).

GENDER AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE

Since the urban reform movement, the focus of much local level research has been the impact of electoral structures on representation. However, the majority of these studies has dealt with minority representation (see e.g., Welch, 1990; Renner, 1988; Vedlitz and Johnson, 1982; Karnig and Welch, 1980, 1982; Davidson and Korbel, 1981; Engstrom and McDonald, 1981; Karnig, 1979; Karnig and Welch, 1979; Robinson and Dye, 1978; MacManus, 1978; Taebel, 1978; Jones, 1976; Campbell and Feagin, 1975; Cole, 1974). Only a few projects have looked at the issue of the representation of women in local government

REFORMED VERSUS UNREFORMED ELECTORAL AND GOVERNING STRUCTURES:

REFORMED/UNREFORMED GOVERNMENT----------->DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION--->REPRESENTATIONAL FOCUS/ POLICY PREDISPOSITION

Figure 1: The impact of electoral and governing structure on city council members' descriptive representation (i.e., income and educational levels), representational foci (i.e., city-wide or localized), and policy predispositions (i.e., liberal or conservative) [as examined by Susan Welch and Timothy Bledsoe (1988)].




Figure 2: The impact of electoral and governing structure and gender on who is elected to city council (i.e., gender and descriptive representation) and council members' performance after elected (i.e., representational foci and policy predispositions).

(see e.g., MacManus, 1990; Saltzstein, 1986; Antolini, 1984; Flammang, 1984; Siegelman, 1979; Karnig, 1979).

The studies examining the representation of women have tended to fall into one of two categories: (1) descriptive studies comparing the characteristics of female versus male council members (see e.g., Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977) or (2) studies centering on the question of which electoral structures best promote the election of women to council (see e.g., Welch and Karnig, 1979; Karnig and Welch, 1979; Karnig and Walter, 1976).

In the United States, it is most likely that a woman holding an elective political office does so at the local level (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987). Twenty times as many women hold elective office at the city level than at the federal and state levels combined (Darcy, Welch and Clark, 1987; C.A.W.P., 1989). Yet in terms of local representation, women remain a distant second to men. In their 1978 study, Karnig and Welch found that the representation rate of men on city councils was 87.2 percent, while that of women was 12.8 percent. In none of the 365 U.S. cities included in their study did males fail to capture at least half of all council seats in any city (Karnig and Welch, 1979).

While the degree of the underrepresentation of women at the local level may not be as great as at the state and federal levels, the problem is compounded when viewed as a means of access. With tens of thousands of local government

units across the United States, it is at this level that women are given the greatest opportunity for meaningful participation in electoral politics. Further, many women parlay local government service into careers in state and federal government. For example, Nancy L. Kassebaum (R-Kansas) first served as a member of the Maize County School Board before being elected to the United States Senate (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987). In addition, Mary Rose Oakar (D-Ohio) was elected to the Cleveland City Council and Barbara Boxer (D-California), now a United States Senator, first served as a member of the Marin County Board of Supervisors before they were elected to the U.S. House of Representatives (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987).

Socioeconomic Differences. Studies on local representation of women have tended to emphasize recruitment processes, while treating ecological and structural differences among cities only peripherally (see e.g., Antolini, 1984; Flammang, 1984; Karnig and Welch, 1979; Welch, 1978; Merritt, 1977). Of the few studies that have examined the effects of different environmental and structural variables on a woman's attempt to gain local elective office, Bledsoe and Welch examined the effects of at-large elections and nonpartisan balloting on the income and educational levels of a nationwide sample of one thousand male and female city council members (Bledsoe and Welch, 1985). Descriptive studies of female officeholders at

the local level have generally agreed that while women are less educated than their male counterparts (see e.g., Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987; Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977), the difference is not statistically significant. While mean levels of education are approximately the same for both sexes, men are more likely to have had graduate training. When the question of a council member's income is phrased in terms of family income, there are no differences in income levels. Both female and male council members are drawn from the same high income bracket (see e.g., Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987; Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977). However, when personal income is examined, men have significantly higher income levels than women councilors. This is most likely attributable to the fact that female council members are overwhelmingly housewives reporting their husbands' incomes.

Electoral Structure. Overall, gender-based studies concerning the representational equality of electoral structures have yielded mixed results. The inclination among researchers has been to assume that structure has bearing on levels of female representation because the single-member district system has been found to promote the representation of blacks and Hispanics (see e.g., Welch, 1990; Renner, 1988; Vedlitz and Johnson, 1982; Karnig and Welch, 1980, 1982; Davidson and Korbel, 1981; Engstrom and McDonald, 1981;

Robinson and Dye, 1978; Taebel, 1978). On the other hand, previous research indicates that the election of women tends to be only weakly related to multimember systems (i.e., at-large elections) rather than single-member district systems (see e.g., Herrick and Welch, 1991; Welch and Studlar, 1990; Carroll, 1985; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1990; Darcy, Welch and Clark, 1985, 1987; Clark, Darcy, Welch, and Ambrosius, 1984; Lakeman, 1976).

Nonpartisan Contests. The 1988 **Municipal Yearbook** reports that 72.6 percent of American cities have nonpartisan balloting (Adrian, 1988). There exist two sets of findings on the effects of nonpartisan versus partisan races on the candidacy of women. One finding is that adoption of a partisan system may increase the representation of women, because of the male bias that has been discovered among candidates elected in nonpartisan races (see e.g., Cassell, 1985, 1986; Welch and Bledsoe, 1985, 1987). Because the success of local political party organizations is often heavily dependent on women activists, the thinking is that each political party would be more likely to recruit women candidates to run for local office if elections were partisan. Under nonpartisan systems candidates are more likely to self-nominate.

Other studies have found that nonpartisan races increase the numbers of women elected to council (see e.g., Welch and

Studlar, 1990; Studlar and Welch, 1987; Welch and Karnig, 1979). Ironically, the rationale that both groups of scholars offer for their findings is similar. Because women tend to be more active in local political party, professional, and civic organizations they are frequently well-known and can tap rather large reservoirs of campaign supporters even in nonpartisan settings.

Obviously there is a lack of consensus as to the effect of partisan versus nonpartisan races on the election of women candidates. The difference in findings for the studies mentioned appears to turn on the size of the city. Nonpartisan elections tend to pose a greater problem for women in larger jurisdictions.

District, Mixed, or At-Large Elections. There is evidence that electoral structure (i.e., district, at-large, or mixed elections) has a greater impact on the election of women to city council than their male counterparts (see e.g., Herrick and Welch, 1991; Welch and Studlar, 1990; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1990; MacManus and Bullock, 1989; Bullock and MacManus, 1988; Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1985, 1987; Clark, Darcy, Welch, and Ambrosius, 1984; Welch and Karnig, 1979; Lakeman, 1976; MacManus, 1976). It is weakly confirmed that the election of women is facilitated by certain reform structures (see e.g., Herrick and Welch, 1991; Welch and Studlar, 1990; Carroll, 1985; Rule, 1981, 1987, 1990; Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1985,

1987; Clark, Darcy, Welch, and Ambrosius, 1984; Lakeman, 1976). Because electoral structure has been found to impact the candidacy of male and female council members differently, this study hypothesizes that electoral structure will affect the three facets of representation differently for male versus female members. In subsequent chapters, the impact of electoral structure on each of these facets of representation, for men and women will be examined.

Unreformed council members are expected to be more concerned with factionalized interests, such as the neighborhood, an ethnic group, or labor groups (see e.g., Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Previous research finds that women bring more district influences to their elected positions than do their male counterparts, regardless of whether they are elected under reformed or unreformed structures (C.A.W.P., 1989). This study examines whether electoral structure has an impact on council members' constituency views, and if this impacts gender-based representation.

Policy Views. Welch and Bledsoe (1988) find that unreformed councilors tend toward a service view of policy than reformed councilors. Research indicates that women give priority to women's issues and liberal policies (Saint-Germaine, 1989). The question here is whether electoral structure impacts council members' policy views and, in turn, gender-based representation.

SUMMARY

The great debate between reformers and their opponents evidences a belief that structure effects who gets elected to city council, the decision-making process, and the decisions that are made. Local electoral structures have public policy implications as legislative bodies and courts have stepped in to review the effects of changes on equal protection and minority voting rights. The Justice Department has even taken notice by reviewing any proposed changes in structure for compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The question addressed is whether the choice of political structure affects representation and the policy process of male and female councilors differently.

This study examines three components of representation: descriptive representation, representation focus, and policy and allocative representation. First, the study looks at the effects of electoral structure on descriptive representation (i.e., who is elected to city council) for male and female city council members.

The second behavior refers to policy and allocative representation (i.e., member's policy predispositions) for male and female city council members. Research indicates that reformed councilors are more conservative in their policy views than are their unreformed counterparts. They, for example, would be more likely to favor developmental policies.

Unreformed councilors would be expected to emphasize a need-based distribution of resources or possess a more liberal bent.

CHAPTER TWO

DATA AND METHODS

INTRODUCTION

To what extent do electoral and governing institutions at the local level impact differentially the election of men and women? This project focuses on structural aspects of local governments and certain personal characteristics of council members, and the effects of these factors on specific attitudes and behaviors of council members. In this chapter, a brief overview of the characteristics of these council respondents will be presented to introduce the sample, as well as to provide a useful update of the general patterns previously found to be present in city councils.

THE SAMPLE

The information upon which this analysis is based is the result of a mail survey of five Southeastern states conducted in the summer of 1991. Using names and addresses of council members obtained from the Municipal Technical Advisory Service of The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, five hundred fifty-one council members serving on seventy-one city councils for cities with population of 25,000 and above in Alabama,

Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee were contacted and asked to participate in the study (see Appendix A). At the time of the project, these council members represented 6.6 million people. Cities range in size from Sumter, South Carolina (25,348) to Memphis, Tennessee (646,174).

THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESPONSE RATE

The questionnaire, reproduced in Appendix B, contains items designed to measure council members' perceptions of their constituencies, how they view their jobs, and their positions on several policy issues. In addition, information concerning a number of background characteristics of the individual council members was elicited. Some items on the questionnaire are taken from earlier studies by Eulau and Prewitt (1973) in their San Francisco Bay Area study of council members' attitudes, and others were taken from Welch and Bledsoe's (1988) nationwide study of the effects of electoral structure on council members' attitudes and behavior.

The questionnaire was accompanied by a postage-paid return envelope and a cover letter, included in Appendix B, explaining the objectives of the project in general terms. A follow-up procedure outlined by Dillman (1978) was employed to maximize the response rate. Three weeks after the initial

mailing another copy of the questionnaire was sent to all nonrespondents. Ultimately, two hundred seventy-nine, or about 52 percent of the sample, responded to the survey. The response rate for each city was 25 percent or better, with a high of 100 percent. A total of seventy-two cities are represented in this study.

VARIABLES

While the variables used in this study are explained in depth in succeeding chapters, brief descriptions of the primary variables are presented here. The structural variables of interest to this study are: city type, measured as mayor-council or council-manager form of government; election type, referenced by a district, mixed, or at-large system of council elections; and type of race, indicated by a partisan or nonpartisan ballot.

For the variable city type (i.e., mayor-council or council-manager), the data are almost evenly split. There are thirty-five cities of the mayor-council form and thirty-seven of the council-manager form included in the study.

The variable indicating election type (i.e., district, mixed, or at large) is coded individually for each respondent. This is an important distinction, for in the same city members may be elected within districts while others are elected at large (a mixed electoral system). Therefore, throughout this

project, "district cities" refer to those cities electing all council members within districts; "at large" refers to those cities electing all council members in city-wide races; and "mixed system" refers to cities employing some sort of electoral combination of district and at large.[1]

While the question of type of contest presented little difficulty for respondents overall, in a few cases members from the same city differed as to whether they were elected in partisan or nonpartisan balloting. Where controversy existed, the correct classification was determined by referencing published sources and the responses of a majority of the members.

The first set of dependent variables of interest are demographic characteristics of the participants (i.e., educational attainment and income). These variables are measured by the responses to a set of close-ended questions asking the respondent to indicate (1) the highest level of education completed, and (2) average annual family income. Over 95 percent of all respondents to this survey completed the demographic section in full.

The second set of dependent variables are: (1) representational focus, which refers to the constituency that the council member believes he or she represents, and (2)

[1]See Susan MacManus, "City Council Election Procedures and Minority Representation: Are They Related?," **Social Science Quarterly**, 59, No. 1 (June 1978): 153-161 for a very detailed discussion of various types of mixed council systems.

policy predisposition, which refers to the policy attitudes that the council member brings to the job. To assess representational focus, council members were asked to rate the importance of their representation of different constituencies: "Please indicate the importance of your representation of each of the following constituencies." The list of possible foci are: "geographic area of the city," "racial or ethnic constituency," "the city as a whole," "single-issue group," "labor union or public employees constituency." (see Appendix B, Question 12).

Policy predispositions of council members are measured by council members' agreement or disagreement with seven statements dealing with specific issues (see Appendix B, Question 6). Two of the questions are designed to indicate a fiscal conservatism/liberalism on the part of the councilor: "raising taxes is preferable to cutting back city services," and "new revenue should be generated through user charges rather than new taxes or tax increases." Distribution of a city's resources is the subject of three questions: "a city's resources should be distributed on the basis of need - even if some parts of the city get more than others," "things like city jobs, contracts, and the like should be used to help disadvantaged groups," and "there is not much that the city can do to improve the situation of the poor." Finally, two questions deal with the issue of incentives for development: "most citizens in a city benefit from development" and "it is

necessary to keep taxes low in order to make the city attractive to business." The remaining variable indicates the gender of the respondent.

COUNCIL MEMBERS: A BRIEF PROFILE

When compared to their counterparts at the state and federal levels, local office holders are generally regarded as political amateurs - quite possibly volunteering service out of a sense of civic duty. If a picture of the typical council member were to be drawn from this sample it would be of a white male, 45 to 60 years of age, who owns his own business. He would be educated beyond four years of college and have a comfortable income (the modal range being over $65,000 per year). The average council member has served on the council less than four years, and spends about twenty-one hours per week on council-related duties.

Generally, the characteristics of these council members are typical of those found in other studies. For example, in their nationwide study of council members, Welch and Bledsoe found the "typical" council member to be a white male, age 47, who is a lawyer or other professional, and has an education beyond four years of college. His modal income range is in the "over $45,000" per year category. He has served on council about three-and-a-half years and spends approximately

twenty hours each week on council-related duties (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988).

Gender. In the United States, it is most likely that a woman holding elective political office does so at the local level. Nationwide, twenty times as many women hold elective office at this level than at the state and federal levels combined (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987). In fact, only at the local level are any female-majority legislatures to be found (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987). Yet, in terms of local representation, women remain a distant second to men (Karnig and Welch, 1979).

In this study of Southeastern city councils, membership for men was 78 percent (432 individuals), while that of women was 22 percent (119 individuals). In none of the seventy-one cities included in this study did men fail to capture at least half of all council seats in any city. It follows, then, that women held less than 50 percent of council seats in all of the cities included in this study. In fact, sixteen of these cities had no female members of council.

Women were only slightly more likely to be elected to serve on councils in small cities (25,000 to 49,000) than large cities (100,000 and above), 40 percent and 38 percent, respectively (see Table 2.1). While it may be said that this weakly confirms the general pattern of women being elected to

Table 2.1: City Size by Gender of Council Members
(in percentages)

	Gender of Respondent					
	Men		Women		Total	
City Size						
25,000-49,999	55%	(110)	47%	(34)	53%	(144)
50,000-99,999	14	(28)	19	(14)	15	(42)
100,000 and above	31	(62)	34	(24)	32	(86)
Total	74	(200)	26	(72)	100	(272)

Chi Squared = 1.74
Cramer's V = .08

Bledsoe, 1988; Diamond, 1977), the difference is slight.

Another potential indicator of gender differences in electability is the margin of victory for female as opposed to male city council candidates. Men were much more likely to run unopposed than women, but were also more likely to call a race a "close contest." Women were more likely to claim a moderate margin of victory while the difference between men and women citing a large margin of victory was slight (see Table 2.2).

Once on the council, women behave differently than their male counterparts. Though not statistically significant, women, on the whole, devote a greater amount of time to council activities than men. On the average, women spend twenty-four hours per week on their council-related duties, while men average eighteen hours per week. Exactly why women spend more time on their council jobs is unclear. However, one explanation is the greater likelihood that male members have another, full-time, job, as indicated by survey responses (see Table 2.3).

Length of Service. Optimal length of service is debatable. As Welch and Bledsoe (1988) point out, extremely high turnover rates may produce instability, which damages the coherence and continuity of the policy process. Obviously, this is undesirable. However, very low turnover rates possibly

Table 2.2: Margin of Victory by Gender
(in percentages)

	Gender of Respondent					
	Men		Women		Total	
Margin of Victory						
Close Contest	10%	(19)	4%	(3)	8%	(22)
Moderate Margin	20	(37)	28	(18)	22	(55)
Large Margin	45	(85)	52	(33)	47	(118)
Uncontested	25	(47)	15	(10)	23	(57)
Total	76	(188)	24	(64)	100	(252)

Chi Squared = 6.61
Cramer's V = .16

Table 2.3: Occupations of Council Members by Gender (in percentages)

	Gender of Respondent					
	Men		Women		Total	
Occupations						
Administration	11%	(20)	17%	(11)	12	(31)
Business	15	(28)	9	(6)	14	(34)
Law	7	(13)	4	(3)	6	(16)
Politics	2	(4)	13	(8)	5	(12)
Homemaker	0	(0)	28	(18)	7	(18)
Health Care	9	(16)	3	(2)	7	(18)
Banking	10	(19)	8	(5)	10	(24)
Ministry	2	(3)	0	(0)	1	(3)
Sales	10	(19)	2	(1)	8	(20)
Teaching	7	(13)	8	(5)	7	(18)
Retired	11	(20)	2	(1)	8	(21)
Technical	9	(17)	2	(1)	7	(18)
Service	9	(16)	4	(3)	7	(19)
Total	76	(188)	24	(64)	100	(252)

Chi Squared = 65.33*
Cramer's V = .51

*Significant at the .05 level of probability for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

indicate an institution that is "stagnant and sluggish in its response to a changing environment" (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Councils are typically viewed as having high turnover rates and to a limited degree this is borne out by these data. Of these respondents, 40 percent were serving their first term of office; however, 32 percent had served nine or more years on council. Therefore, while there is considerable turnover in the ranks of city councils, there appears to be a core of stability that belies the image of a revolving door.

Both men (41 percent) and women (39 percent) were most likely serving their first term of office. However, the percentage of women citing nine or more years of council is considerably lower than of men (see Table 2.4). Seemingly, this would indicate that women are being elected in greater numbers than in the past and are just beginning to weave council careers. Men fall into one of two tenure extremes; service for male members drops to its lowest percentage for the category "five to eight years" (25 percent).

There are two potential explanations for this finding. One possibility is simply that men have a higher turnover rate than women. However, that speaks little about the percentage of male members serving nine or more years. More likely, perhaps, is that men have traditionally been elected to council positions. The high turnover rate comes from retirement or death among this group. This view, then, also

Table 2.4: Years of Service by Gender
(in percentages)

	Gender of Respondent		
	Men	Women	Total
Years of Service			
4 or Less	41% (77)	39% (25)	40% (102)
5-8	25 (47)	32 (20)	27 (67)
9 or more	34 (64)	29 (19)	33 (83)
Total	76 (188)	24 (64)	100 (252)

Chi Squared = 1.01
Cramer's V = .06

addresses the question of the high percentage of long serving male councilors.

Finally, in line with federal and state legislative studies, the longer a council member's service, the less likely he or she is to face a contested race. Members serving nine or more years are somewhat more likely to win reelection in uncontested races (see Table 2.5).

STRUCTURE

City Size. Larger cities (100,000 and above population) in this study differ little from smaller cities in terms of members election type, occupations of council members, and decision-making consensus on the council. While councils in larger cities have more members, the average difference is slight (see Table 2.6). In addition, larger cities in this study are more likely to employ mixed electoral systems rather than the generally expected district system (Dye, 1977). In fact, it is the smallest cities, here, that are most likely to elect their council members in district races. There is also the theory that members in larger cities are more likely to be employed as attorneys and professional politicians because of the greater opportunity for political advancement that larger councils offer.

Table 2.5: Margin of Victory by Years of Service
(in percentages)

	Years of Service							
	4 or Less		5-8		9 or More		Total	
Margin of Victory								
Close Contest	7%	(7)	6%	(4)	12%	(10)	8%	(21)
Moderate Margin	28	(28)	24	(16)	17	(14)	24	(58)
Large Margin	52	(53)	40	(27)	42	(35)	45	(115)
Uncontested	13	(13)	31	(21)	29	(24)	23	(58)
Total	40	(101)	27	(68)	33	(83)	100	(252)

Chi Squared = 14.45*
Cramer's V = .17

*Significant at the .05 level of probability for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

Table 2.6: Average Council Size by City Size

	City Size		
	25,000-49,999	50,000-99,999	100,000 and above
Average Number of Council Members	6	8	10

A final assumption about larger councils is that they are plagued with a great deal of conflict in the decision-making arena (Dye, 1977). In this study, respondents from cities with larger councils are no more likely to cite high levels of conflict over decision making than their counterparts in cities with smaller councils.

Election Type and Type of Race. Nationally, 73 percent of all cities employ nonpartisan races (Bowman and Kearney, 1990). Eighty-one percent of the cities in this study elect their council members on nonpartisan ballots, slightly greater than the national average. However, contrary to national trends, these cities employ district, mixed, and at-large systems in near-equal percentages. In fact, the at-large system, which is the national favorite (60 percent of all cities have at-large council elections) (Bowman and Kearney, 1990), finishes third with only 23 percent (see Table 2.7).

SUMMARY

This overview of the data collection procedures and the respondents who participated in this study is intended as a sort of "user's guide" to the remainder of the project. In addition, it serves to update existing information concerning the general patterns that exist in city councils. In subsequent chapters, attention is turned to certain electoral

Table 2.7: Council Elections
(in percentages)

	Election Type			
	Mixed	District	At Large	Total
Government Form				
Mayor-Council	29% (8)	57% (16)	41% (7)	42% (31)
Council-Manager	71 (20)	43 (12)	59 (10)	58 (69)
Total	38 (28)	38 (28)	24 (17)	100 (73)
Chi Squared = 13.84*				
Cramer's V = .44				
Population				
25,000-49,999	27 (12)	42 (19)	69 (14)	62% (45)
50,000-99,999	42 (5)	33 (4)	31 (3)	16 (12)
100,000 and above	31 (11)	25 (5)	0 (0)	22 (16)
Total	38 (28)	38 (28)	24 (17)	100 (73)
Chi Squared = 47.23*				
Cramer's V = .80				

*Significant at the .05 level of probability for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.

structures present in cities and to specific personal characteristics of council members.

Specifically, it is expected that the city's structure will have an effect on the demographics of council members (i.e., educational attainment and income), on the representational foci (i.e., city-wide or localized) of council members, and on council members' policy predispositions [i.e., general policy orientations (liberal or conservative) and substantive focus (facilities, human services, and development). This researcher argues that the reformers were correct. Reformed electoral structures have brought a conservative, upper-class bias to the ranks of urban government, as well as a city-wide view to the focus of representation. Therefore, when council members are asked the importance of their representation of certain groups, respondents serving reformed cities would be more likely to rank "the city as a whole" above all else. On the other hand, councilors from unreformed cities would be more likely to rank a "geographic area of the city" or "racial or ethnic constituency" highest.

Further, this researcher believes that unreformed structures produce council members who are more liberal in their policy views. For example, this study expects that councilors serving unreformed cities would favor new or increased taxes rather than cutting back city services or

implementing user charges. They are also expected to favor a need-based distribution of resources.

The question of interest to this study, however, is whether the effects of electoral structure are different for female versus male council members. In their nationwide study of council members, Welch and Bledsoe examined these representational questions, but they failed to look at gender.

The next chapter tests three research hypotheses. First is that more women are elected to reformed city councils than unreformed city councils. Second is that more women are re-elected to unreformed city councils than reformed city councils. Finally, the hypothesis that female city council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures than reformed electoral and governing structures is examined.

CHAPTER THREE

BIVARIATE TESTS OF REPRESENTATIONAL CONCEPTS

INTRODUCTION

The question guiding this chapter is one of election versus performance: are female council members more likely to be elected under one set of electoral and governing structures, but perform better under a different set of electoral and governing structures? While the literature suggests that the election of women to city council may be promoted by certain reform electoral and governing structures (namely at-large elections and nonpartisan contests), there is evidence that female council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

Female city council members, it has been reported, tend toward a localized representational focus. Further, they are more liberal in their general policy orientations and focus on human services policy. Each of these features (i.e., representational focus, general policy orientation, and substantive policy focus) corresponds with those found for unreformed city councils. It would appear, then, that women would perform better in service under unreformed electoral and governing structures. Is the election and re-election (i.e., do they choose to seek additional terms or are they elected

more frequently) of women to city council promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures? But do women perform better in service under unreformed electoral and governing structures rather than reformed electoral and governing structures?

THE STUDY

In their nationwide study of city council members (1988), Welch and Bledsoe found that reformed city councils (i.e., those employing at-large elections, nonpartisan contests, and serving a council-manager style city government) produced members that were better educated and wealthier; have a broader (i.e., city-wide) focus; and are more conservative in their policy predispositions than members of unreformed (i.e., those with district elections, partisan contests, and serving mayor-council cities). Unfortunately, Welch and Bledsoe ignored the effects of gender in their study (see Figure 1: 16).

The relationship between gender and reformed electoral and governing structure for both the election to city council and a member's performance after election (see Figure 2: 17) is a topic worth further study.

There is evidence that the election of women to city council is promoted by at-large elections and nonpartisan contests more often associated with reformed councils (see

e.g., MacManus, 1990). Male council members' election, it is reported, is facilitated by district elections and partisan contests more frequently features of unreformed councils.

However, when we turn from election to the question of performance on council, a different picture emerges. Reformed councils have been found to produce members who have a city-wide focus and with a general policy orientation that is conservative. Their substantive policy foci tend toward capital expenditures (i.e., waste disposal, traffic and streets, parks and recreation, and public transportation) and economic development.

Members serving unreformed councils have a localized focus, and are liberal in their general policy orientations. Their substantive policy focus is on human services (i.e., housing, education, health care, child care, and affirmative action). These relationships are schematically depicted in Figure 3.

When gender is added to the model, we see that, though the election of women may be promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures, there is little meshing of interests after election. Women bring more localized influences to their elected positions than do their male counterparts, regardless of whether they are elected under reformed or unreformed electoral structures (C.A.W.P., 1989). Further, research indicates that women give priority to women's issues and liberal policies (Saint-Germaine, 1989).

REFORMED COUNCILS produce members with:

CITY-WIDE REPRESENTATIONAL FOCI-->CONSERVATIVE GENERAL POLICY ORIENTATIONS-->SUBSTANTIVE POLICY FOCI ON CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND DEVELOPMENT

UNREFORMED COUNCILS produce members with:

LOCALIZED REPRESENTATIONAL FOCI-->LIBERAL GENERAL POLICY ORIENTATIONS-->SUBSTANTIVE POLICY FOCI ON HUMAN SERVICES

Figure 3: The effect of reformed electoral and governing structures versus unreformed electoral and governing structures on council members' representational foci, and policy general orientations and substantive foci.

The incongruity becomes apparent when gender is added to the structural diagrams (see Figure 4).

The focus of this study is election versus performance. First, is the election of women promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures? And, if so, which ones? Second, does a female council member perform better in service on unreformed city councils?

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

There are three research hypotheses (RH1, RH2, and RH3) that guide this study and address the question of election versus performance. From these research hypotheses, there are several attendant hypotheses (H1, H2, etc.).

The first research hypothesis is that more women are elected to reformed city councils than unreformed city councils. In other words, this study expects that the election of women to city council is promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures (i.e., at-large elections, nonpartisan contests, and council-manager governance).

RH1: More women are elected to reformed city councils than are elected to unreformed councils.




Figure 4: The incongruity between the impact of reformed versus unreformed electoral and governing structures on the election versus performance of female city council members.

The second research hypothesis is that more women are re-elected to unreformed city councils. The researcher hypothesizes that women are better satisfied under unreformed electoral and governing structures than under reformed electoral and governing structures, because the interests and characteristics of female council members and those of unreformed city councils mesh better.

RH2: More women are re-elected to unreformed city councils than reformed city councils.

Further, this study hypothesizes that women perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures (i.e., district elections, partisan contests, and mayor-council governance) than under reformed electoral and governing structures.

RH3: Female city council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

Descriptive Representation. Descriptive representation refers to who gets elected to city councils, the socioeconomic characteristics of council members. In this study, socioeconomic characteristics are defined as income and education levels of council respondents.

Previous research has indicated that male council members have higher levels of income and education than their female counterparts (see e.g., Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977). Welch and Bledsoe (1988) found that council members from cities employing reformed electoral and governing structures had higher levels of income and education than did those council members serving unreformed city councils. The question that this study examines joins these two ideas and asks if there is a link between gender and electoral and governing structures in the representation of women on city councils?

Income. Descriptive studies of female city council members have generally agreed that when the question of a council member's income is phrased in terms of family income, there are no differences in income levels for men and women. Both male and female council members are drawn from the same high income bracket (see e.g., Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987; Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977).

In this study, council members were asked: "What is the average annual income of your family?" "under $25,000," "$25,000-$34,999," "$35,000-$44,999," "$45,000-$54,999," "$55,000-$65,000," "over $65,000." Because this study measures family income and a majority of the female respondents listed "homemaker" as their principle occupation, it is likely that most of the women are reporting their

husbands' incomes. Therefore, the hypothesis is that there will be little difference in income levels of these council members.

H1: Male and female city council members will be drawn from the same high income bracket.

H2: Reformed city council members will have higher incomes than their unreformed city counterparts.

H3: Male and female city council members will be drawn from the same high income bracket regardless of electoral and governing structures.

Education. For the education component of descriptive representation, the literature reports a bit more variation than found for income levels. Female council members tend to be less educated than their male counterparts. However, the difference is not statistically significant (see e.g., Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987; Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977). While mean levels of education are approximately the same for both sexes, male council members are more likely to have had graduate training than their female counterparts.

In this study, education levels of council members are measured by asking each respondent: "What is the highest level of education that you have completed?" "high school or less,"

"some college," "college degree," "graduate school." Based on the findings of earlier research, this study hypothesizes that the male council members of this study will be better educated than the female council members.

H4: Male council members will be better educated than their female counterparts.

H5: Reformed city council members will be better educated than their unreformed city counterparts.

H6: Male city council members will be better educated than female council members regardless of electoral and governing structures.

Representational Focus. Representational focus refers to whom council members believe that they should represent -- district versus city-wide constituencies. Research indicates that female council members bring more localized influences (i.e., group affiliations, neighborhood organizations, or gender-based organizations) to their elected positions (see e.g., C.A.W.P., 1989). In addition, unreformed city council members are expected to favor neighborhood and ethnic interests over those of the city as a whole and to have more localized influences, such as labor groups. This is due in

great part to the district system of election employed by unreformed cities (see e.g., Welch and Bledsoe, 1988).

This study examines whether there is a link between gender and representational focus. To measure representational focus, each respondent is asked to: "Please indicate the importance of your representation to each of the following constituencies," "geographic area of the city," "racial or ethnic constituency," "the city as a whole," "single-issue group," "labor union or public employee constituency," by ranking each as "very important," "somewhat important," "not very important." Based on the findings of previous research, the researcher hypothesizes that women will rank localized interests higher than do their male counterparts. Additionally, it is hypothesized that women will rank localized interests higher than male council members regardless of electoral and governing structures.

H7: Women will have a more localized representational focus than their male counterparts.

H8: Unreformed city council members will have a more localized focus than their reformed city counterparts.

H9: Women serving unreformed city councils will rank localized interests higher than male council members, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

Policy Predispositions. Policy predispositions refers to the policy attitudes that council members bring to their positions. This category is dichotomized into the subcategories: policy - general orientations and policy - substantive focus.

Policy - General Orientations. The first policy subcategory, general orientations, taps a liberal or conservative view of policy. Recent research indicates that women give liberal policies a higher priority ranking than their male counterparts (Saint-Germaine, 1989). In addition, council members serving unreformed city councils are found to be more liberal in their policy views, while those serving reformed city councils tend toward a more conservative view (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Therefore, women and unreformed city council members would, for example, likely favor a need-based distribution of resources. On the other hand, a male or reformed city council member would probably favor, for example, economic development.

This study questions whether there is a relationship between gender and general policy orientations and the election of women to council and, then, their performance after election. To measure general policy orientations, each respondent was asked to respond to a series of statements: "raising taxes is preferable to cutting back city services," "most citizens in a city benefit from development," "a city's

resources should be distributed on the basis of need - even if some parts of the city get more than others," "things like city jobs, contracts, and the like should be used to help disadvantaged groups," "there is not much that the city can do to improve the situation of the poor," "new revenue should be generated through user charges rather than new taxes or tax increases," "it is necessary to keep taxes low in order to be attractive to business," by indicating "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," "strongly disagree." This study hypothesizes that women council members will be more liberal in their general policy orientations than their male counterparts. Further, it is hypothesized that female council members will evidence a more liberal general policy orientation than their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

H10: Female council members will be more liberal in their general policy orientations than their male counterparts.

H11: Unreformed city council members will be more liberal in their general policy orientations than their reformed city counterparts.

H12: Female council members serving unreformed cities will be more liberal in their general policy orientations regardless of electoral and governing structures.

Policy - Substantive Focus. The second policy subcategory, substantive focus, examines three policy foci: human services, the physical plant, and development. Earlier studies indicate that women list as a priority legislation dealing with human services. Women introduce more legislation dealing with children and the family, women, and welfare than men introduce (Thomas and Welch, 1992). Further, evidence suggests that unreformed city council members focus on human services, while reformed city council members focus on the capital expenditures and development (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988).

This study questions whether there is a relationship between gender and substantive policy focus, and the election and performance of female council members. In order to measure substantive policy focus, respondents were asked to: "Please indicate how much time the city council spends on each activity" -- "a lot," "some," "little," "none." For the category human services, the activities are: "housing," "health care," "education," and "jobs and contracts for women and minorities." "Waste disposal," "traffic and streets," "parks and recreation," and "public transportation" comprise the capital expenditures category. Finally, the development category consists of "economic development." This researcher hypothesizes that female respondents will have a greater focus on human services than their male counterparts. A further hypothesis is that females will have a greater human services

focus than male council members, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

H13: Female council members' substantive policy foci will be centered on human services.

H14: Unreformed city council members' substantive policy foci will emphasize human services to a greater degree than their reformed city counterparts.

H15: Female city council members will evidence a greater emphasis on human services than their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

H16: Male council members will place greater emphasis on capital expenditures than their female counterparts.

H17: Reformed city council members will place more emphasis on capital expenditures than will their unreformed city counterparts.

H18: Male council members will score higher than their female counterparts on the capital expenditures scale, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

H19: Male council members will place greater emphasis on development than their female colleagues.

H20: Reformed city council members will place greater emphasis on development than will their unreformed city counterparts.

H21: Male council members will score higher on the development scale than will their female counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

FINDINGS

The question of interest in this chapter, again, is one of election versus performance. This study hypothesizes that certain reformed electoral (i.e., election type and type of contest) and governing (i.e., city type) structures would promote the election of women to city councils.

RH1: More women are elected to reformed city councils than are elected to unreformed city councils.

There is mixed empirical evidence as to the effects of local electoral and governing structures (i.e., election type: district, mixed, or at-large; type of contest: partisan or nonpartisan; and city type: mayor-council or council-manager)

on the election of women to city councils. When separate crosstabulations are performed for gender of the respondent (the dependent variable) by each electoral and governing structure (the independent variables), by and large the hypothesis that the election of women to city councils is promoted by certain reformed electoral structures is confirmed.

For type of contest, women are slightly less likely to be elected in nonpartisan contests (25%) than partisan contests (27%). The relationship between type of contest and gender of the respondent did not prove to be statistically significant (see Table 3.1).

Women are more likely to be elected to council in cities employing the council-manager form of government (31%) than the mayor-council form (21%). For a one-tailed test of statistical significance, this produces a statistically significant relationship (see Table 3.2).[1]

In line with the previous finding, women are more likely to be elected to council under at-large systems (29%) than under mixed or district systems (see Table 3.3).

As a summary test of the relationship between gender and electoral and governing structure, a summary measure of electoral and governing structures is created, dichotomized

[1]For a one-tailed test of statistical significance a Chi Squared critical value of 2.76 is required for one degree of freedom (see e.g., Blaylock, 1979).

3.1: Gender by Type of Contest
(in percentages)

	Type of Contest		
	Nonpartisan	Partisan	Total
Gender			
Male	75% (150)	73% (38)	75 (188)
Female	25 (50)	27 (14)	25 (64)
Total	79 (200)	21 (52)	100 (252)

Chi Squared = .14
Cramer's V = .02

Table 3.2: Gender by City Type
(in percentages)

	City Type		
	Mayor-Council	Council-Manager	Total
Gender			
Male	79% (109)	69% (79)	75 (188)
Female	21 (29)	31 (35)	25 (64)
Total	55 (138)	45 (114)	100 (252)

Chi Squared = 3.04
Cramer's V = .11

Table 3.3: Gender by Election Type
(in percentages)

	Election Type							
	District		Mixed		At-Large		Total	
Gender								
Male	72%	(71)	83%	(73)	71%	(44)	75	(188)
Female	28	(27)	17	(19)	29	(18)	25	(64)
Total	39	(98)	37	(92)	25	(62)	100	(252)

Chi Squared = 1.79
Cramer's V = .08

into the categories of unreformed and reformed cities, and cross classified with the variable indicating the gender of the respondent. The summary measure of electoral and governing structure is created by assigning each respondent a score based on his or her responses to the questions indicating (1) city type (i.e., mayor-council or council-manager), (2) election type (i.e., district, mixed, or at-large), and (3) type of contest (i.e., partisan or nonpartisan). The scale of possible scores ranged from 0 to 3 (the election type categories mixed and at-large were each coded as 1). A score of 0 or 1 indicates unreformed; a score of 2 or 3 indicates reformed. The unreformed category consists of a mayor-council city type and partisan contests. The reformed category is made up of council-manager city type and nonpartisan contests. The complicating factor for this summary measure is the trichotomized variable election type. The choice is made to collapse the mixed (30%) and at-large (28%) categories into a single category and dichotomize the data into unreformed (i.e., district) and reformed (i.e., mixed and at-large) systems. This is an appropriate manipulation of the data as mixed electoral systems are often compromise plans used to forestall legal action that has plagued reformed systems (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). In effect, then, the mixed system is something of a reformed structure.

When gender is cross classified with the summary measure of electoral and governing structures, the data yield results in the anticipated direction. Women are slightly more likely to be elected under reformed electoral and governing structures (29%), while men are more likely to be elected under unreformed electoral and governing structures (76%) (see Table 3.4). However, this relationship is not statistically significant.

Descriptive Representation. To test the hypotheses concerning descriptive representation, the dependent variables of interest are income and education levels of the council respondents. Respondents were asked to indicate their income range from the categories: "under $25,000," "$25,000-$34,999," "$35,000-$44,999," "$45,000-$54,999," "$55,000-$65,000," "over $65,000." For education, each respondent was asked to specify the highest level of education completed. The alternatives were: "high school or less," "some college," "college degree," "graduate school." The independent variable is gender of the respondent.

H1: Male and female city council members will be drawn from the same high income bracket.

H2: Reformed city council members will have higher incomes than their unreformed city counterparts.

Table 3.4: Summary Measure of Electoral and Governing Structure by Gender of Respondent
(in percentages)

	Summary Measure of Structure		
	Reformed	Unreformed	Total
Gender of Respondent			
Male	71% (90)	76% (107)	74% (141)
Female	29 (36)	24 (34	26 (126)
Total	74 (126)	26 (141)	100 (267)
Chi Squared = .65 Cramer's V = .05			

H3: Male and female city council members will be drawn from the same high income bracket regardless of electoral and governing structures.

H4: Male city council members will be better educated than their female counterparts.

H5: Reformed city council members will be better educated than their unreformed city counterparts.

H6: Male city council members will be better educated than their female counterparts regardless of electoral and governing structures.

When the dependent variable, income, is cross classified with the independent variable, gender, the hypothesis that men and women council members are drawn from the same high income bracket is supported. The greatest percentage of both male (48%) and female (39%) respondents report incomes of "over $65,000" (see Table 3.5).

For the education component of descriptive representation, the hypothesis that male council members are better educated than their female counterparts and are more likely to have had graduate training is also confirmed. but the relationship between education and gender is not statistically significant (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.5: Family Income Level by Gender of Respondent
(in percentages)

	Gender					
	Male		Female		Total	
Income Levels						
Under $25,000	2%	(4)	6%	(4)	4%	(8)
$25-$34,999	8	(16)	7	(5)	8	(21)
$35-$44,999	10	(19)	9	(6)	10	(25)
$45-$54,999	12	(23)	13	(8)	13	(31)
$55-$65,000	16	(32)	21	(13)	19	(45)
Over $65,000	48	(90)	39	(28)	46	(118)
Total	75	(188)	25	(64)	100	(252)

Chi Squared = 3.33
Cramer's V = .11

Table 3.6: Highest Level of Education Attained by Gender of Respondent
(in percentages)

	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Levels of Educational Attainment			
High School or Less	7% (13)	7% (4)	7% (17)
Some College	25 (47)	18 (12)	22 (59)
College Degree	25 (47)	39 (25)	32 (72)
Graduate School	42 (71)	35 (23)	39 (94)
Total	75 (188)	25 (64)	100 (252)

Chi Squared = 4.48
Cramer's V = .13

As before, an independent variable used to test the next series of hypotheses is a summary measure of unreformed and reformed electoral and governing structures. Each council member is assigned a score based on his or her responses to the questions concerning election type (i.e., district, mixed, or at-large), type of contest (i.e., partisan or nonpartisan), city type (i.e., mayor-council or council-manager). The unreformed "bundle" consists of a district system of election, partisan contest, and a mayor-council form of government. The reformed "bundle" is made up of an at-large system of election, nonpartisan contest, and a council-manager form of government. As discussed earlier, the mixed system of election is often a compromise plan employed to forestall the legal action that frequently plagues cities operating under reformed electoral and governing structures (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Therefore, it is coded as a reformed electoral structure.

The research model guiding this study presents some expectations concerning the effects of electoral and governing structures on income and educational levels of council members. It is expected that council members serving reformed city councils will have higher incomes and higher levels of educational attainment than their unreformed city counterparts. When a summary measure of electoral and governing structures is cross classified, separately, with the income and education variables, the results are in the

expected direction for the first crosstabulation. A greater percentage of council members serving reformed cities (50%) report incomes "over $65,000" than do their unreformed city counterparts (46%) (see Table 3.7). However, only 38 percent of reformed city council members have had graduate training, as compared to 45 percent of their unreformed city colleagues (see Table 3.8).

The question of interest for this section is whether the relationship between gender and the socioeconomic variables holds when electoral and governing structures are held constant. This question is examined by running crosstabulations for (1) income and (2) educational attainment by gender of the respondent, separately for unreformed and reformed electoral and governing structures.

When electoral and governing structures are held constant and gender of the respondent is cross classified with the income variable, the data yield results in the hypothesized direction. Both male and female city council members are drawn from the highest income bracket, regardless of electoral and governing structures. The relationship between family income levels and gender, controlling for electoral and governing structure is not statistically significant (see Table 3.9)

When the education variable is cross classified by gender, holding electoral and governing structures constant, the hypothesis that male council members will be better

Table 3.7: Family Income Level by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
Income Levels			
Under $25,000	3% (5)	2% (2)	3% (7)
$25,000-$34,999	9 (14)	6 (6)	8 (20)
$35,000-$44,999	12 (19)	8 (8)	10 (27)
$45,000-$54,999	12 (19)	15 (15)	13 (34)
$55,000-$65,000	18 (28)	19 (20)	18 (48)
Over $65,000	46 (72)	50 (52)	48 (124)
Total	60 (157)	40 (103)	100 (260)

Chi Squared = 3.67
Cramer's V = .12

Table 3.8: Highest Level of Education Attained by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
Levels of Educational Attainment			
High School or Less	5% (5)	8% (13)	7% (18)
Some College	21 (22)	26 (42)	24 (64)
College Degree	30 (32)	28 (46)	29 (78)
Graduate School	45 (48)	38 (63)	41 (111)
Total	37 (107)	61 (157)	100 (271)
Chi Squared = 1.97 Cramer's V = .09			

Table 3.9: Family Income Level by Gender of Respondent Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Income Levels			
Under $25,000	1% (1)	3% (1)	2% (2)
$25,000-$34,999	5 (4)	7 (2)	6 (6)
$35,000-$44,999	8 (6)	7 (2)	8 (8)
$45,000-$54,999	15 (11)	14 (4)	15 (15)
$55,000-$65,000	16 (12)	24 (7)	19 (19)
Over $65,000	53 (39)	45 (13)	50 (52)
Total	72 (73)	28 (29)	100 (102)
Chi Squared = 1.79 Cramer's V = .13			

(Reformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Income Levels			
Under $25,000	2% (2)	8% (3)	3% (5)
$25,000-$34,999	9 (11)	8 (3)	9 (14)
$35,000-$44,999	13 (15)	11 (4)	12 (19)
$45,000-$54,999	12 (14)	13 (5)	12 (19)
$55,000-$65,000	17 (20)	22 (8)	18 (28)
Over $65,000	48 (57)	39 (15)	46 (72)
Total	76 (119)	24 (38)	100 (157)
Chi Squared = 5.77 Cramer's V = .19			

educated than their female counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures, is confirmed. A greater percentage of male city council members (43%) report graduate training than do their female counterparts (33%) (see Table 3.10). Because the direction of the relationship has been predicted it is preferable to use a one-tailed test of statistical significance (see e.g., Blaylock, 1979: 163). Therefore, the relationship is statistically significant for reformed city council members.

Re-election. It is to the re-election part of the study that this study now turns and asks is there a better meshing of interests between female city council members and unreformed electoral and governing structures (i.e., district election systems, partisan races, and mayor-council forms of government)? It is hypothesized that more women are reelected under unreformed electoral and governing structures, which is the second research hypothesis:

> **RH2:** More women are reelected under unreformed electoral and governing structures than under reformed electoral and governing structures.

Table 3.10: Highest Level of Education Attained by Gender of Respondent Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structure (in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Levels of Educational Attainment			
High School or Less	5% (4)	3% (1)	4% (5)
Some College	22 (17)	17 (5)	20 (22)
College Degree	29 (22)	47 (14)	38 (36)
Graduate School	43 (33)	33 (10)	48 (43)
Total	72 (76)	28 (30)	100 (106)
Chi Squared = 3.77 Cramer's V = .19			

(Reformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Levels of Educational Attainment			
High School or Less	7% (9)	10% (4)	8% (13)
Some College	28 (34)	20 (8)	26 (42)
College Degree	23 (28)	44 (18)	28 (46)
Graduate School	42 (52)	27 (11)	38 (63)
Total	75 (123)	20 (41)	100 (164)
Chi Squared = 7.87* Cramer's V = .22			

*Significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

To test this hypothesis, length of service of the respondent measures re-election and serves, then, as the dependent variable. Length of service was chosen as the measure for two reasons; if there is a better meshing of interests: (1) constituents will be more likely to return women to office, and (2) the women will be more likely to seek re-election. Both of these reasons are predicated on the thesis that there is a relationship between the interests of women and those of unreformed city councils. In other words, there is a better meshing of interests between women and unreformed city councils.

A summary measure of electoral and governing structure is created by "bundling" election type (i.e., district, mixed, or at-large) type of contest (nonpartisan or partisan), and city type (mayor-council or council-manager) into unreformed (i.e., district, partisan, and mayor-council) and reformed (i.e., at-large or mixed, nonpartisan, and council-manager) categories and assigning each respondent a score based on his or her responses to the electoral and governing structure questions. This measure serves as the independent variable.

To test the second research hypothesis, length of service is cross classified by gender, controlling for electoral and governing structure. However, first, it is useful to examine the zero order relationships between (1) gender and (2) electoral and governing structure and length of respondents' service.

It is hypothesized that more women are reelected to unreformed city councils than to reformed city councils as evidenced by their length of council service:

> **H5:** Women serving unreformed city councils are more likely to be reelected than their reformed city counterparts, as evidenced by length of council service.

Further, the hypothesis is that there is little difference in re-election for unreformed versus reformed city council members, as evidenced by their length of council service:

> **H6:** There is little difference in re-election for unreformed versus reformed city council members, as evidenced by their length of council service.

When a respondent's length of service is cross classified with the variable indicating the gender of the respondent, the results are in the hypothesized direction. Women serving unreformed city councils have longer tenure in office than their reformed city counterparts (see Table 3.11). With a one-tailed test of statistical significance, the relationship between gender and length of service is statistically significant.

Table 3.11: Length of Service by Gender of Respondent
(in percentages)

	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Length of Service			
0-4 Years	39% (75)	27% (19)	39% (94)
5-8 Years	31 (59)	34 (24)	32 (83)
9 or More Years	30 (57)	39 (27)	29 (34)
Total	73 (191)	27 (70)	100 (261)
Chi Squared = 3.17 Cramer's V = .11			

There is not a statistically significant relationship between respondents' length of service and electoral and governing structure. Overall, there is little difference in the length of service of unreformed versus reformed city council members (see Table 3.12).

When length of service of the respondent is cross classified by gender of the respondent, controlling for electoral and governing structure, the data confirm the second that for women serving reformed city councils (32%). It is also greater than the percentage of male council members serving nine or more years on either unreformed (32%) or reformed (28%) city councils (see Table 3.13). Therefore, women are more likely to be reelected under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

PERFORMANCE

Representational Focus. Three hypotheses are advanced for representational focus. They are:

> **H7:** Women will have a more localized representational focus than their male counterparts.
>
> **H8:** Unreformed city council members will have a more localized representational focus than their reformed city counterparts.

Table 3.12: Length of Service by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
Length of Service			
0-4 Years	40% (40)	35% (53)	37% (93)
5-8 Years	30 (31)	34 (52)	33 (83)
9 or More Years	30 (30)	31 (46)	30 (76)
Chi Squared = .68			
Cramer's V = .05			

Table 3.13: Length of Service by Gender of Respondent Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Length of Service			
0-4 Years	37% (26)	21% (6)	32% (32)
5-8 Years	32 (22)	31 (9)	31 (31)
9 or More Years	32 (23)	48 (14)	37 (37)
Total	71 (71)	29 (29)	100 (100)
Chi Squared = 2.54 Cramer's V = .16			

(Reformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Length of Service			
0-4 Years	41% (49)	32% (13)	39% (62)
5-8 Years	24 (37)	37 (15)	33 (52)
9 or More Years	28 (34)	32 (13)	28 (47)
Total	75 (120)	25 (41)	100 (161)
Chi Squared = .75 Cramer's V = .07			

H9: Women city council members will rank localized interests higher than male council members regardless of electoral and governing structures.

To test these hypotheses, a dependent variable is created by performing a factor analysis on the data in order to tap an underlying dimension to representational focus. One factor, representing a localized representational focus, is extracted for further analysis. A high score on this factor indicates a greater localized focus; a low score indicates a more city-wide focus. A positive individual factor score for a council member means he or she scores high on this factor and, therefore, has a greater localized focus (see Table 3.14).

There is empirical evidence to suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between representation focus and gender; however, the relationship is not very strong. The hypothesis that women (56%) have a more localized representational focus than their male (44%) counterparts is confirmed, as well (see Table 3.15).

Again, the research model on which this study is based makes assumptions about the relationship between representational focus and electoral and governing structures. Unreformed cities are expected to have a more localized constituency focus, while reformed cities are expected to have a city-wide view of their constituencies. To test this assumption, the variable indicating respondents' levels of

Table 3.14: Results of Factor Analysis - Representational Focus

Factor	Eigenvalue	% Variance	Cum. %
1	2.08984	41.8	41.8
2	1.03441	20.7	62.5

Table 3.15: Localized Representational Focus by Gender (in percentages)

	Gender					
	Male		Female		Total	
Level of Localized Representational Focus						
Low	56%	(105)	44%	(28)	53	(133)
High	44	(83)	56	(36)	47	(119)
Total	75	(188)	25	(64)	100	(252)

Chi Squared = 3.02*
Cramer's V = .11

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

localized representational focus (created from the factor analysis) is cross classified with a summary measure (unreformed or reformed) of electoral and governing structure.

When the representational focus variable is cross classified with electoral and governing structure, the results are in the anticipated direction. Unreformed city council members (55%) are more likely to score high on the localized representational focus scale than are their reformed city counterparts (40%) (see Table 3.16). This relationship proves to be statistically significant, as well.

The question of interest for this section is whether the relationship between gender and representational focus holds when electoral and governing structures are held constant. In examining this question, the representational focus variable is crosstabulated by gender of the respondent and run separately for unreformed and reformed electoral and governing structures.

When the data are dichotomized into unreformed and reformed electoral and governing structures and representational focus is cross classified with gender of the respondent, the relationship between representational focus and gender is in the hypothesized direction (see Table 3.17). Female city council members score higher on the localized representational focus scale than do their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures. However,

Table 3.16: Localized Representational Focus by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
Level of Localized Representational Focus			
Low	45% (44)	60 (95)	58 (149)
High	55 (54)	40 (64)	42 (108)
Total	38 (99)	62 (159)	100 (257)

Chi Squared = 4.51*
Cramer's V = .13

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

Table 3.17: Localized Representational Focus by Gender Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Gender					
	Male		Female		Total	
Level of Localized Representational Focus						
Low	56%	(38)	47%	(14)	53%	(52)
High	44	(30)	53	(16)	47	(46)
Total	69	(68)	31	(30)	100	(98)
Chi Squared = .78						
Cramer's V = .09						

(Reformed)	Gender					
	Male		Female		Total	
Level of Localized Representational Focus						
Low	64%	(77)	48%	(19)	60%	(96)
High	36	(43)	52	(20)	40	(63)
Total	75	(120)	25	(39)	100	(159)
Chi Squared = 3.58*						
Cramer's V = .15						

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

the relationship is statistically significant for reformed city councils only.

Policy Predispositions - General Orientations. The hypothesis is that female council members, especially those serving unreformed city councils, are more liberal in their general policy orientations than their male counterparts.

H10: Female council members will be more liberal in their general policy orientations than their male counterparts.

H11: Unreformed city council members will be more liberal in their general policy orientations than their reformed city counterparts.

H12: Female council members will be more liberal in their general policy orientations than their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

To test these hypotheses, a summary measure of a liberal or conservative general policy orientation is created and becomes the dependent variable. This measure is formed by assigning each council member a score based on his or her responses to the general policy orientation statements. The statements indicating a liberal policy orientation are: "raising taxes is preferable to cutting back city services,"

"a city's resources should be distributed on the basis of need -- even if some parts of the city get more than others," and "things like city jobs, contracts, and the like should be used to help disadvantaged groups." The statements indicating a conservative orientation are: "most citizens in a city benefit from development," "there is not much that the city can do to improve the situation of the poor," "new revenue should be generated through user charges rather than new taxes or tax increases," and "it is necessary to keep taxes low in order to be attractive to business." The range of possible scores is +3 to -3. A positive score equals a liberal general policy orientation; a zero or negative score indicates a conservative orientation. The independent variables are gender of the respondent and electoral and governing structure.

When general policy orientation is cross classified with gender, the direction of the relationship is in the hypothesized direction -- women (67%) are more likely to rank as liberal in their policy orientations than men (29%) (see Table 3.18). This relationship is statistically significant, as well.

There is empirical evidence supporting the second general policy orientation hypothesis, as well. The research model guiding this study makes assumptions concerning the relationship between electoral and governing structures and general policy orientation. It is expected that unreformed

Table 3.18: General Policy Orientation by Gender
(in percentages)

	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
General Policy Orientation			
Liberal	29% (54)	67% (43)	35% (87)
Conservative	71 (133)	33 (21)	65 (154)
Total	75 (187)	25 (64)	100 (251)

Chi Squared = 33.04*
Cramer's V = .36

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

city council members are more liberal than their reformed city counterparts. When policy orientation and electoral and governing structure are cross classified, the data confirm this assumption and reveal that unreformed city councils (71%) report a liberal policy orientation in greater numbers than their reformed city counterparts (29%) (see Table 3.19). This relationship is statistically significant.

The question of interest for this section is whether the relationship between gender and general policy orientation holds when electoral and governing structures are held constant. To examine this question, the general policy orientation variable is cross classified by gender of the respondent and run separately for unreformed and reformed electoral and governing structures.

The data confirm the hypothesis that female city council members are more liberal in their general policy orientations than are their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures. When general policy orientations are cross classified with gender of the respondent and electoral and governing structures are held constant, a greater percentage of female council members than male council members rank as liberal on the general policy orientation scale. This relationship is statistically significant for reformed city council members only, however (see Table 3.20).

Table 3.19: General Policy Orientation by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
General Policy Orientation			
Liberal	71% (69)	31% (48)	46 (117)
Conservative	29 (28)	69 (118)	54 (135)
Total	38 (97)	62 (155)	100 (252)

Chi Squared = 38.82*
Cramer's V = .39

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

Table 3.20: General Policy Orientation by Gender Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structures
(in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
General Policy Orientation			
Liberal	70% (48)	78% (21)	72% (69)
Conservative	30 (21)	22 (6)	28 (27)
Total	72 (69)	28 (27)	100 (96)
Chi Squared = 1.00 Cramer's V = .10			

(Reformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
General Policy Orientation			
Liberal	28% (33)	62% (22)	35% (55)
Conservative	72 (85)	38 (15)	65 (100)
Total	76 (118)	24 (37)	100 (155)
Chi Squared = 11.57* Cramer's V = .27			

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

Policy - Substantive Focus. The Policy Predispositions category is dichotomized into the subcategories: general orientations (i.e., liberal and conservative) and substantive focus. While the first is designed to measure respondents' ideological leanings, the second examines specific activities and asks the respondent to indicate the amount of time he or she feels that the council should spend on each activity. These activities are trichotomized into three policy areas: human services (i.e., housing, health care, child care, education, and jobs and contracts for women and minorities), capital expenditures (i.e., waste disposal, traffic and streets, parks and recreation, and public transportation), and development (i.e., economic development). Additive scales are created from council members' responses to the questions corresponding with each of the three substantive policy categories. Each scale is broken at the midpoint with the lower scores indicating "low" emphasis on the substantive policy area, and the higher scores indicating "high" emphasis on the substantive policy area.

The study's hypothesis is that women are more likely to emphasize human services than their male counterparts:

> **H13:** Female council members' substantive policy foci will be more centered on human services than those of their male counterparts,

H14: Unreformed city council members' substantive policy foci will be more centered on human services than those of their reformed city counterparts.

H15: Female council members will evidence a greater emphasis on human services than their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

To test these hypotheses, separate crosstabulations are performed for each of the three policy areas (i.e. human services, capital expenditures, and development), which serve as the dependent variables, by gender and electoral and governing structure, which are the independent variables.

Human Services. When the human service variable is cross classified with gender of the respondent, the results confirm the hypothesis that women are more likely to emphasize human services than their male counterparts (see Table 3.21). The relationship between these two variables is statistically significant, as well.

The research model guiding this study makes the assumption that unreformed city council members will evidence a greater substantive policy focus on human services than will their reformed city counterparts. To test this assumption, the human services variable is cross classified with a summary measure of electoral and governing structures.

Table 3.21: Human Services Substantive Policy Focus by Gender (in percentages)

	Gender					
	Male		Female		Total	
Level of Human Services Substantive Policy Focus						
Low	68%	(129)	24%	(15)	57%	(144)
High	32	(60)	76	(49)	43	(109)
Total	75	(188)	25	(64)	100	(253)

Chi Squared = 37.56*
Cramer's V = .49

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

When human services is cross classified with electoral and governing structure, the data yield results in the anticipated direction. Council members serving unreformed cities evidence a greater substantive policy focus on human services than do their reformed city counterparts (see Table 3.22). The relationship proves to be statistically significant, as well.

The question of interest for this section is whether the relationship between council members' policy views toward human services and gender holds when electoral and governing structure is held constant. To test this question, crosstabulations of the human services variable by gender of the respondent are run for unreformed and reformed electoral and governing structures.

The data yield results in the expected direction. Female council members are more likely to favor human services than are their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures and the relationship is statistically significant for both reformed and unreformed city councils (see Table 3.23).

Capital Expenditures. The hypothesis is that male council members will score higher on the capital expenditures policy area than female council members:

> H16: Male council members will place greater emphasis on capital expenditures than their female colleagues.

Table 3.22: Human Services Substantive Policy Focus by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
Level of Human Services Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	31% (32)	66% (99)	52% (131)
High	69 (71)	34 (52)	48 (121)
Total	41 (103)	59 (151)	100 (252)
Chi Squared = 29.41*			
Cramer's V = .34			

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

Table 3.23: Human Services Substantive Policy Focus by Gender of Respondent Controlling For Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Level of Human Services Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	71% (51)	25% (7)	60% (60)
High	29 (21)	75 (21)	40 (41)
Total	72 (72)	28 (28)	100 (101)
Chi Squared = 15.82*			
Cramer's V = .40			

(Reformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Level of Human Services Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	65% (73)	31% (11)	57% (84)
High	35 (39)	69 (25)	43 (64)
Total	76 (112)	24 (36)	100 (148)
Chi Squared = 14.46*			
Cramer's V = .31			

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

H17: Reformed city council members will place greater emphasis on capital expenditures than will their unreformed city counterparts.

H18: Male council members will score higher on the capital expenditures scale than their female counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

To test these hypotheses, separate cross tabulations are performed for the dependent variable, capital expenditures, by the independent variables, gender of the respondent and electoral and governing structure.

When the capital expenditures variable is cross classified by gender of the respondent, the data are in the hypothesized direction. Male respondents (96%) are more likely to emphasize capital expenditures than their female counterparts (92%). The relationship (i.e., policy views toward capital expenditures and gender) proves to be statistically significant (see Table 3.24).

The research model guiding this study hypothesizes a relationship between substantive policy views toward capital expenditures and electoral and governing structures. Specifically, council members serving reformed electoral and governing structures are expected to place greater emphasis on

Table 3.24: Capital Expenditures Substantive Policy Focus by Gender
(in percentages)

	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Level of Capital Expenditure Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	4% (8)	8% (16)	10% (24)
High	96 (180)	92 (48)	90 (228)
Total	75 (188)	25 (64)	100 (252)
Chi Squared = 24.54*			
Cramer's V = .31			

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

capital expenditures than their unreformed city counterparts. To examine this hypothesis, the capital expenditures variable is cross classified with the summary measure of electoral and governing structures.

When capital expenditures is cross classified with electoral and governing structures, the data confirm the hypothesis. Council members serving reformed electoral and governing structures rate capital expenditures higher than do their unreformed city counterparts (see Table 3.25). This relationship proves to be statistically significant, as well.

The focus of this section is whether the relationship between capital expenditures and gender holds when electoral and governing structures is held constant. To examine this question, separate crosstabulations of the capital expenditures variable by gender of the respondent are run for unreformed and reformed electoral and governing structures.

When capital expenditures is cross classified by gender of the respondent, controlling for electoral and governing structures, the relationship between gender and level of capital expenditure substantive policy focus disappears. THerefore, the emphasis on capital expenditures appears to be a product of electoral and governing structure (see Table 3.26).

Table 3.25: Capital Expenditures Substantive Policy Focus by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
Level of Capital Expenditure Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	20% (31)	14% (21)	20% (52)
High	80 (71)	86 (25)	80 (205)
Total	40 (102)	60 (46)	100 (257)
Chi Squared = 10.03*			
Cramer's V = .20			

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

Table 3.26: Capital Expenditures Substantive Policy Focus by Gender Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structure (in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Level of Captial Expenditure Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	7% (4)	14% (4)	9% (8)
High	93 (58)	86 (25)	91 (83)
Total	68 (62)	32 (29)	100 (91)
Chi Squared = 1.17 Cramer's V = .11			

(Reformed)	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Level of Capital Expenditure Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	14% (16)	16% (6)	14% (22)
High	86 (100)	84 (33)	86 (133)
Total	75 (116)	25 (39)	100 (155)
Chi Squared = .09 Cramer's V = .02			

Development. This study hypothesizes that male city council members will emphasize development more than female council members:

> **H19:** Male council members will place greater emphasis on development than their female colleagues.
>
> **H20:** Reformed city council members will place greater emphasis on development than their unreformed city counterparts.

A further hypothesis is that male council members will score higher on the development scale than women, regardless of electoral and governing structures:

> **H21:** Male city council members will score higher on the development scale than their female counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures.

To test these hypotheses, the dependent variable, policy views toward development, is cross classified with the independent variables, gender of the respondent and electoral and governing structures.

The data confirm none of the hypotheses. There is no difference between male respondents (97%) and their female counterparts (97%) in regard to favoring developmental policy

(see Table 3.27). Additionally, when the development variable is cross classified with electoral and governing structure, the results show that unreformed city councils (97%) show the greatest agreement with development (see Table 3.28).

The components of the model yield mixed results. Women tend toward a more localized representational focus than men serving on city councils. They are more liberal in their general policy orientations and emphasize human services to a greater extent than their male counterparts -- regardless of the electoral and governing structures under which they serve. However, women also favor the physical plant and development in greater percentages than expected.

SUMMARY

The focus of this study is election versus performance. In this chapter, three research hypotheses were advanced:

RH1: More women are elected to reformed city councils than are elected to unreformed councils.

RH2: More women are reelected under unreformed city councils than reformed city councils.

Table 3.27: Development Substantive Policy Focus by Gender (in percentages)

	Gender		
	Male	Female	Total
Level of Developmental Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	3% (6)	3% (2)	3% (8)
High	97 (182)	97 (62)	97 (244)
Total	75 (188)	25 (64)	100 (252)
Chi Squared = .21 Cramer's V = .00			

Table 3.28: Development Substantive Policy Focus by Electoral and Governing Structure
(in percentages)

	Electoral and Governing Structure		
	Unreformed	Reformed	Total
Level of Developmental Substantive Policy Focus			
Low	3% (3)	3% (3)	3% (8)
High	97 (101)	97 (154)	97 (255)
Total	40 (104)	60 (157)	100 (263)
Chi Squared = 0.00			
Cramer's V = .00			

RH3: Women perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

After confirming the first two of these hypotheses, attention was turned to the performance side of the equation. Several attendant hypotheses were examined.

It was hypothesized that women would perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures because of a better meshing of interests. Models were constructed in which the incongruity of women's interests and influences and those of reformed city councils was presented. In testing the model, it was hypothesized that women would have a more localized representational focus than their male counterparts. The hypothesis was confirmed.

It was further hypothesized that women would be more liberal in their general policy orientations and favor a substantive policy focus on human services than their male counterparts. Male council members were expected to be more conservative and favor a substantive policy focus on capital expenditures and development. Here, the data yielded mixed results. Women were more liberal than their male counterparts and the percentage of women rating human services highly was greater than male council members. Capital expenditures cross classification with gender confirmed the hypothesis that male city council members would favor the physical plant more often than would their female counterparts. However, when gender

was cross classified with capital expenditure substantive policy focus controlling for electoral and governing structures, the relationship between gender and capital expenditure substantive policy focus disappears. Both male and female council members rated development high as substantive policy foci. Therefore, that hypothesis was not confirmed.

Considering the mixed findings for respondents' substantive policy foci, the researcher believes that it would be interesting to explore the question of policy in greater depth. If electoral and governing structures affect who is elected to city council and their representational foci and policy predispositions, it is conceivable that electoral and governing structures could also affect the policy outcomes generated by council members. The next chapter will examine the question of whether there is a relationship between council members' attitudes toward local policy and electoral and governing structures on local public policy outcomes.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLICY ATTITUDES AND POLICY OUTCOMES

INTRODUCTION

The question guiding this research is one of election versus performance. For the performance side of this question, it was hypothesized that female city council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures:

> **RH3:** Female city council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

As part of the test of this hypothesis, substantive policy foci: human services, capital expenditures, and development of council members were examined; the results were mixed. As expected, women have a greater focus on human services. Male council members have a greater focus on capital expenditures, which was also expected. However, unexpectedly, female council members are as likely as their male counterparts to focus on economic development. Considering the mixed findings, it seems appropriate to explore the question of substantive policy in greater depth.

A relationship was identified between gender and electoral and governing structures and who is elected to city council, their representational foci, and policy predispositions. With those relationships discovered, it is conceivable that gender and electoral and governing structures affect the policy outcomes generated by city councils. In this chapter, the question examined is one of whether there is a relationship between council members' attitudes toward the three categories of substantive public policy: human services, capital expenditures, and development and local public policy outcomes. This question references the local public policy debate of whether city council members' attitudes or the city's socioeconomics more greatly impact local public policy outcomes.

THE STUDY

The question examined in this chapter is whether city council members' substantive policy foci (i.e., human services, capital expenditures, and development) influence local public policy outcomes. Schematically, this relationship is depicted in Figure 5.

In the last chapter, gender and electoral and governing structures were found to impact the substantive policy foci of council members. It is possible, then, that gender and electoral and governing structures affect local public policy




Figure 5: The impact of council members' substantive policy foci on local public policy outcomes.

outcomes, as well (see Figure 6).

This question offers the opportunity to reexamine the local public policy controversy over the impact of council members' attitudes versus the city's socioeconomics on local public policy outcomes, albeit from the attitudinal side only. In examining this question, the study will control for the effects of electoral and governing structures on the relationship between council members' substantive policy foci and local public policy outcomes.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE POLICY OUTCOME LITERATURE

The Effect of Politics Versus Economics on Public Policy Outcomes. One of the earliest and most prominent examinations of the question of whether council members' attitudes toward public policy or the city's socioeconomics has the greater impact on local public policy outcomes is Dye's (1966) fifty state study of public policy outcomes. He holds that economics are the dominant influence on state policies such as education, welfare, and highways:

> Economic development shapes both political systems and policy outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of states with different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels rather than a direct product of political variables (1977: 293).




Figure 6: The impact of electoral and governing structures, gender, and council members' substantive policy foci on local public policy outcomes.

Dawson and Robinson (1963) also conclude that "the level of social welfare programs in the American states seems to be more a function of socioeconomic factors" (265) than political factors. At the state level, then, there has long been much evidence suggesting that political factors are less important than socioeconomic factors in accounting for policy variation.

Politics Versus Economics at the Local Level. It is argued that with the reform movement came a bias toward conservative, upper-class candidates to fill the ranks of urban leadership. If urban electoral structure affects who gets elected, urban structure could affect, albeit indirectly, the policy decisions that these elected officials make.

In the early 1960's, Banfield and Wilson examined this question from the perspective of the individual voter (i.e., "ethos"). They found that middle-class voters are more likely to support public expenditures than lower-class voters (Banfield and Wilson, 1963). Lineberry and Fowler (1967) recast this question in terms of reformed and unreformed structures. Their work showed that cities with reform structures are less responsive than unreformed counterparts to demands for greater spending.

Most of these local level studies have been cross sectional. However, Lyons (1978) looks at the linkage between environment and policy over time. Lyons concludes that reformed cities are more responsive to changes in the

environment indicating a lesser demand for spending (i.e., "efficiency" focus). Unreformed cities are more responsive to changes in the environment indicating a greater demand for spending (i.e., "service" focus). Further, when resources are or become available, unreformed cities increase their spending to a greater degree than their reformed counterparts. In a later study, Durant, Lyons, and Fitzgerald (1986) provide evidence suggesting that council-manager cities tend to respond to pressures desiring fiscal restraint, whereas mayor-council cities tend to respond more readily to those wanting increased spending.

These studies' conclusions are somewhat different than that reached by Eulau and Prewitt, et al (1973) in a study of eighty-two San Francisco Bay area city councils. They hold that:

> the systematic study of public policy cannot be content with correlating indicators of environmental challenges or indicators of resources capability to policy outcomes. Rather it is greatly influenced by the predictions, preferences, orientations, and expectations of policy makers (1973: 468).

Eulau and Prewitt contend that urban policy decisions are based on the attitudes of council members with little regard to available resources or political variables.

Eulau and Prewitt make no attempt to separate the independent effect of council members' attitudes on public policy from socioeconomic conditions (Dye, 1977). However, using this data Robert Eyestone (1971) attempts to do just that. His results undermined much of the importance placed on

the effect of council members' attitudes on policy outcomes. Council members' attitudes contributed nothing of statistical significance in explaining expenditures. In short, "council members' attitudes seldom stray far from the constraints placed upon them by their communities' populations, needs, and resources" (Dye, 1977: 286).

Public Choice Approach - An Economic Theory. Peterson's economic theory is a more contemporary version of the longstanding controversy over the relative influence of political versus economic variables on public policy outcomes. Borrowing from market theory, the public choice approach focuses on economic concepts like competition, growth, and profit-maximizing behavior in an attempt to delineate rational (i.e., economically efficient) political action (see e.g., Kantor, 1988; Ostrom, 1976; Bish, et al, 1973).

Prior to the publication of Peterson's **City Limits** (1981), these studies had limited relevance to urban politics. The thrust of Peterson's argument is that cities in a market economy are inclined to promote economic well-being (i.e., business expansion) over social programs benefitting the needy (i.e., housing programs). Cities compete with other cities to attract productive people and jobs in order to increase their revenue raising capacity. When the choice of a residence locale or business site is made, Peterson envisions the application of a cost-benefit analysis (i.e., how much will my

taxes cost versus the benefits that I will receive in return). Therefore, if the city is to be attractive to tax paying residents and businesses, taxes should be at a minimum and services at a maximum. Often, this means that the poor, who are a drain on city coffers, are virtually shut out through an avoidance of urban public policies that aid the needy (see e.g., Kantor, 1988; Sharp, 1990).

HYPOTHESES

This study looks at the question of whether there is a relationship between council members' attitudes toward substantive public policies: human services, the physical plant, and development and local public policy outcomes. Specifically, this study examines whether there is a relationship between council members' substantive policy foci and local public policy outcomes when gender and electoral and governing structures are held constant. This offers the opportunity to reexamine the effect of council members' attitudes toward public policies on local public policy outcomes. This question references the debate in local public policy literature over whether it is council members' attitudes or the city's socieconomics that more greatly impact local public policy outcomes.

Substantive policy examines three policy areas: human services, capital expenditures, and development. To test

these hypotheses, separate crosstabulations are performed by which the dependent variable, percentage of the city's budget spent on each of the three substantive policy areas[1], is cross classified with council members' substantive policy attitudes, which serves as the independent variable. Both the dependent and independent variables are coded as "high," "medium," and "low." The measure for the dependent variable is obtained by summing the percentage of city budgets spent for each of the three substantive policy areas. The percentages are then trichotomized and each city is given a score of "high," "medium," or "low." For policy attitudes, the independent variable, the measure is created in much the same way. Additive scales are formed from Council members' responses to questions corresponding to each of the three substantive policy areas. These responses are trichotomized and each councilor is assigned a score of "high," "medium," or "low" emphasis on the substantive policy area.

In order to measure substantive policy attitudes, respondents were asked to: "Please indicate how much time the city council spends on each activity" -- "a lot," "some," "little," "none." For the category human services, the activities are: "housing," "health care," "education," and

[1]Data concerning the percentage of a city's budget spent for each of the substantive policy areas was obtained from the United States Census of Population 1989 for local fiscal years that ended between 1 July 1988 and 30 June 1989, and was checked against information obtained from the County-City Data Book 1990.

"jobs and contracts for women and minorities." "Waste disposal," "traffic and streets," "parks and recreation," and "public transportation" comprise the capital expenditure category. The development category consists of "economic development."

Control variables are gender of the respondent and electoral and governing structures. Here, as in the previous chapter's discussion of substantive policy, the three questions centering on electoral and governing structures are collapsed into a single measure and dichotomized as reformed (i.e., at-large or mixed system of election, nonpartisan races, and a council-manager form of government) or unreformed (district system of election, partisan races, and a mayor-council form of government).

Human Services. In the last chapter, women were found to put greater emphasis on human services policy than their male counterparts. This finding is supportive of those of earlier studies which find that women prioritize policies dealing with children, the family, and women.

Additionally, unreformed city council members were more likely to favor human services than reformed city council members. This finding is supportive of the literature of local public policy outcome which finds a "service" versus "efficiency" dichotomy. Unreformed cities tend toward a "service" orientation, which means that they are more

responsive to changes in the environment indicating demands for greater spending. On the other hand, reformed cities are less responsive to such demands. The human services category of substantive policy falls into the "service" dimension.

Based on these findings, the hypothesis is that when council members' human services policy attitudes are cross classified with human services policy outcomes (i.e., percentage of the city's budget spent on human services) and separate analyses are run for men and women, the attitudes of female council members will have greater influence on human services policy outcomes than those of their male colleagues:

> **H1:** Female city council members' attitudes toward human services policy will have greater impact on human services policy outcomes than will those of male council members.

In addition, it is hypothesized that the human services attitudes of unreformed city council members will influence human services policy outcomes more greatly than the attitudes of reformed city council members:

> **H2:** Human services policy attitudes of unreformed city council members will influence human services policy outcomes more greatly than those of reformed city council members.

Capital Expenditures. In the last chapter, male council members and those serving reformed city councils were found to place greater emphasis on capital expenditures than female council members or those serving unreformed city councils. The data were supportive of the literature, as well.

It may be argued that capital expenditure corresponds to a "service" orientation because it references urban services. Therefore, the expectation would be that female and unreformed city council members would evidence the greater focus. However, literature suggests that a focus on capital expenditure indicates an "efficiency" orientation. Peterson (1988) posits that capital expenditure is neutral; it is neither indicative of a spending or nonspending focus. However, he goes on to say that capital expenditure, or adequate urban service provision, supports the development function, which falls into the "efficiency" dimension. Therefore, this study expects male and reformed city council members to emphasize capital expenditures.

Based on previous findings, it is hypothesize that when city council members' capital expenditure policy attitudes are cross classified with capital expenditure policy outcomes (i.e., percentage of the city's budget spent on the physical plant) and separate analyses are run for categories of (1) gender and (2) electoral and governing structures, male council members' capital expenditure attitudes and those of council members serving reformed cities will influence capital

expenditure policy outcomes more significantly than will those of female and unreformed city council members:

H3: Male city council members' capital expenditure attitudes will have greater influence on physical plant policy outcomes than those of female council members.

H4: Reformed city council members' capital expenditure policy attitudes will have greater impact on capital expenditure policy outcomes than will those of unreformed city council members.

Development. It was hypothesized in the last chapter that male city council members and those serving reformed city councils would emphasize developmental policy more greatly than female council members and those serving unreformed city councils. The data, however, were not supportive of these hypotheses and, in turn, contradicted the literatures of gender in politics and local public policy.

Women, by and large, have been found to focus off of development (see e.g., Saint-Germaine, 1992). They run for city council with, first, a human services policy agenda and, second, a focus on the physical plant. Development is a distant third on their list of policy foci. Further, developmental policy falls into the "efficiency" dimension of the "Service" versus "efficiency" dichotomy. As the

literature of local public policy outcomes indicates, we expect reformed cities to focus on efficiency and, therefore, development. In this study, however, women and unreformed city council members were more likely to emphasize development. In fact, females serving unreformed city councils were more likely than any other group to place great emphasis on development.

With the mixed findings concerning developmental policy, the formulation of hypotheses is problematic. However, based on the findings of this study concerning these respondents' developmental policy foci, this study hypothesizes that the developmental policy attitudes of female city council members and those serving unreformed cities will influence developmental policy outcomes more greatly than those of male and reformed city council members:

H5: Developmental policy attitudes of female city council members will have greater impact on developmental policy outcomes than will those of their male counterparts.

H6: Unreformed city council members' developmental policy attitudes will influence developmental policy outcomes more significantly than those of reformed city council members.

FINDINGS

Human Services. It was hypothesized that female city council members' attitudes toward human services policy would have greater impact on human services policy outcomes than those of their male counterparts:

> **H1:** Female city council members' human services policy attitudes will have greater impact on human services policy outcomes than those of their male counterparts.

When the percentage of the budget spent for human services policy is cross classified by city council members' attitudes toward human services policy, controlling for the gender of the respondent, the data produce results that are in the hypothesized direction. The relationship between female council members' attitudes toward human services policy and human services policy outcomes is greater than that of their male colleagues. However, neither is a statistically significant relationship (see Table 4.1).

To examine the question of whether there is a relationship between the percentage of the city's budget spent for human services and council members' attitudes toward human services policy, regardless of electoral and governing structures, the percentage of the budget spent for human

Table 4.1: Percentage of the City's Budget Spent for Human Services by City Council Members' Human Services Attitudes Controlling For Gender
(in percentages)

(Male)	Level of Human Services Policy Attitudes							
	Low		Medium		High		Total	
Percentage of Budget Spent								
Low	5%	(5)	6%	(4)	9%	(1)	6%	(10)
Medium	26	(24)	28	(18)	45	(5)	26	(47)
High	69	(65)	66	(43)	45	(5)	68	(113)
Total	55	(94)	38	(65)	7	(11)	100	(170)

Chi Squared = 2.55
Cramer's V = .09

(Female)	Level of Human Services Policy Attitudes							
	Low		Medium		High		Total	
Percentage of Budget Spent								
Low	0%	(0)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)	0%	(0)
Medium	18	(3)	36	(15)	0	(0)	28	(18)
High	82	(14)	64	(27)	100	(6)	72	(47)
Total	26	(17)	65	(42)	9	(6)	100	(65)

Chi Squared = 5.18
Cramer's V = .20

services is cross classified by the variable indicating council members' human services attitudes, separately for unreformed and reformed city councils:

> **H2:** Human services policy attitudes of unreformed city council members will more greatly affect human services policy outcomes than will those of reformed cities.

When percentage of the city's budget spent for human services is cross classified by city council members' substantive policy attitudes toward human services, the data yield results that are in the hypothesized direction. The relationship between the human services policy attitudes of unreformed city council members and the percentage of the city's budget spent for human services policy is stronger than that for reformed city councils (see Table 4.2). Neither relationship proves to be statistically significant, however.

Capital Expenditures. It was hypothesized that the attitudes of male city council members would have greater impact on the percentage of the city's budget spent for the physical plant:

> **H3:** Male city council members' capital expenditure policy attitudes will have a greater impact on capital

Table 4.2: Percentage of the City's Budget Spent for Human Services by City Council Members' Human Service Policy Attitudes Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structures (in Percentages)

(Unreformed)	Level of Human Services Policy Attitudes			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Percentage of Budget Spent				
Low	2% (2)	6% (4)	10% (1)	4% (7)
Medium	20 (17)	23 (15)	30 (3)	22 (35)
High	78 (64)	71 (45)	60 (6)	74 (115)
Total	53 (83)	41 (64)	6 (10)	100 (157)
Chi Squared = 3.16				
Cramer's V = .10				

(Reformed)	Level of Human Services Policy Attitudes			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Percentage of Budget Spent				
Low	8% (1)	11% (1)	0% (0)	8% (2)
Medium	24 (3)	33 (3)	50 (2)	32 (8)
High	68 (8)	56 (5)	50 (2)	60 (15)
Total	48 (12)	36 (9)	16 (4)	100 (25)
Chi Squared = 1.81				
Cramer's V = .19				

expenditure policy outcomes than will those of female council members.

To test this hypothesis, the percentage of the city's budget spent for capital expenditures is crosstabulated by the variable indicating council members' attitudes toward capital expenditure policy, controlling for the gender of the respondent.

When percentage of the budget spent for capital expenditures is run against the capital expenditure attitudes of male and female council members, the data yield results in the expected direction. The relationship between male council members' attitudes toward capital expenditure and capital expenditure policy outcomes was greater than that of their female counterparts. However, neither relationship is statistically significant (see Table 4.3).

It was further hypothesized that capital expenditure substantive policy attitudes of reformed city council members would have a greater impact on capital expenditure policy outcomes than would those of unreformed city council members:

H4: Reformed city council members' capital expenditure policy attitudes will have greater impact on capital expenditure outcomes than will those of unreformed city council members.

Table 4.3: Percentage of the City's Budget Spent for the Capital Expenditure by City Council Members' Capital Expenditure Policy Attitudes Controlling for Gender
(in percentages)

(Male)	Level of Capital Expenditure Policy Attitudes			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Percentage of Budget Spent				
Low	100% (1)	21% (21)	14% (12)	18% (34)
Medium	0 (0)	54 (55)	58 (49)	56 (104)
High	0 (0)	24 (25)	28 (23)	26 (48)
Total	1 (1)	54 (101)	45 (84)	100 (186)
Chi Squared = 5.84				
Cramer's V = .13				

(Female)	Level of Capital Expenditure Policy Attitudes			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Percentage of Budget Spent				
Low	0% (0)	13% (3)	10% (4)	10% (7)
Medium	100 (2)	48 (11)	52 (22)	52 (35)
High	0 (0)	39 (9)	38 (16)	38 (25)
Total	3 (2)	34 (23)	63 (42)	100 (67)
Chi Squared = 2.52				
Cramer's V = .14				

To test this hypothesis, the percentage of the city's budget spent for capital expenditures is cross classified by the variable indicating council members' attitudes toward capital expenditure policy and is run separately for unreformed and reformed cities.

When the percentage of the city's budget spent for capital expenditures is crosstabulated by council members' attitudes toward capital expenditure, the data yield results in the hypothesized direction. Reformed city council members' attitudes toward capital expenditure have a greater impact on capital expenditure policy outcomes than do those of their unreformed city counterparts. Neither relationship is statistically significant, however (see Table 4.4).

Development. The controversial question for this chapter deals with developmental policy. In the preceding chapter, unexpected results were discovered concerning city council members attitudes toward developmental policy. Female council members were as likely as their male counterparts to favor development, and unreformed city council members were as likely as reformed city council members to agree with economic development. Further, male and female council members were equally likely to agree with economic development, regardless of electoral and governing structure. Each finding was unexpected.

Table 4.4: Percentage of the City's Budget Spent for Capital Expenditure by City Council Members' Capital Expenditure Policy Attitudes Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structures
(in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Level of Capital Expenditure Policy Attitudes							
	Low		Medium		High		Total	
Percentage of Budget Spent								
Low	0%	(0)	14%	(6)	11%	(6)	12%	(12)
Medium	0	(0)	55	(24)	60	(34)	58	(58)
High	0	(0)	32	(14)	29	(17)	31	(31)
Total	0	(0)	44	(44)	57	(57)	100	(101)
Chi Squared = .47								
Cramer's V = .05								

(Reformed)	Level of Capital Expenditure Policy Attitudes						
	Low		Medium		High		Total
Percentage of Budget Spent							
Low	50%	(1)	23%	(19)	14%	(10)	20% (30)
Medium	50	(1)	52	(42)	53	(37)	52 (80)
High	0	(0)	25	(20)	33	(23)	28 (43)
Total	1	(2)	53	(81)	46	(70)	100 (153)
Chi Squared = 4.07							
Cramer's V = .12							

Based on these results, which were not in the hypothesized direction and which run counter to the findings of previous research, constructing an hypothesis concerning the relationship between council members developmental policy attitudes and developmental policy outcomes was problematic. However, based on the findings of this study, it was hypothesized that the developmental policy attitudes of female and unreformed city council members will have a greater impact on developmental policy outcomes than those of male and reformed city council members:

> **H5:** Female city council members' developmental policy attitudes will have a greater impact on developmental policy outcomes than those of their male counterparts.

> **H6:** Unreformed city council members' developmental policy attitudes will affect developmental policy outcomes more significantly than those of reformed city council members.

To test the first hypothesis, the percentage of the city's budget spent for economic development is cross classified by the variable indicating city council members' attitudes toward economic development, separately for men and women. The second hypothesis is examined by crosstabulating the percentage of the city's budget spent for economic development

by city council members' attitudes toward economic development, controlling for electoral and governing structures.

When the crosstabulation of percentage of the city's budget spent by council members' attitudes toward development is run separately for male and female council members, the data yield results in the hypothesized direction. The relationship between the developmental policy attitudes of female city council members and percentage of the city's budget spent on development is stronger than that between male council members and percentage of the city's budget spent (see Table 4.5). The relationship is statistically significant, as well. However, the relationship is not statistically significant for males. The direction of this finding is in line with that of the preceding chapter which found that female city council members were as likely as their male counterparts to favor development, with the data yielding high levels of support from both gender groups.

When percentage of the city's budget spent for economic development is cross classified by council members' attitudes toward development, controlling for electoral and governing structures, the data produce findings that are not in the hypothesized direction. Here, the relationship between reformed city council members' developmental policy attitudes and developmental policy outcomes is stronger than that

Table 4.5: Percentage of the City's Budget Spent for Development by City Council Members' Developmental Policy Attitudes Controlling for Gender
(in percentages)

(Male)	Level of Developmental Policy Attitudes							
	Low		Medium		High		Total	
Percentage of Budget Spent								
Low	33%	(2)	10%	(3)	13%	(21)	13%	(26)
Medium	33	(2)	71	(22)	56	(88)	58	(112)
High	33	(2)	19	(6)	31	(47)	28	(55)
Total	3	(6)	16	(31)	81	(156)	100	(193)
Chi Squared = 4.46								
Cramer's V = .11								

(Female)	Level of Developmental Policy Attitudes							
	Low		Medium		High		Total	
Percentage of Budget Spent								
Low	50%	(1)	25%	(2)	7%	(4)	10%	(7)
Medium	0	(0)	75	(6)	56	(32)	57	(38)
High	50	(1)	0	(0)	37	(21)	33	(22)
Total	3	(2)	12	(8)	85	(57)	100	(67)
Chi Squared = 9.82*								
Cramer's V = .27								

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

between unreformed city council members attitudes and developmental policy outcomes (see Table 4.6). It is statistically significant, as well.

This finding is surprising considering this study's earlier finding that unreformed city council members were more likely to emphasize economic development than were their reformed city counterparts. However, it is more in line with the findings of previous research that indicates reformed city councils are more likely to favor development than are their unreformed city counterparts.

Implications. The question of interest to this chapter is whether city council members' substantive policy foci (i.e., human services, capital expenditures, and development) influence local public policy outcomes. While most of the findings were in the hypothesized directions, the only relationships that proved to be statistically significant were those between the developmental attitudes of female council members and reformed city council members, and developmental policy outcomes.

The concern of this study is the effect of council members' attitudes on local public policy outcomes -- not the socioeconomics of cities. However, these results harken back to the debate over the effects of council members' attitudes versus the socioeconomics of the city on local public policy

Table 4.6: Percentage of the City's Budget Spent for Development by City Council Members' Developmental Policy Attitudes Controlling for Electoral and Governing Structures (in percentages)

(Unreformed)	Level of Developmental Policy Attitudes			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Percentage of Budget Spent				
Low	33% (1)	7% (1)	12% (10)	12% (12)
Medium	33 (1)	80 (12)	60 (51)	62 (64)
High	33 (1)	13 (2)	28 (24)	26 (27)
Total	3 (3)	15 (15)	82 (85)	100 (103)
Chi Squared = 4.51				
Cramer's V = .15				

(Reformed)	Level of Developmental Policy Attitudes			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Percentage of Budget Spent				
Low	40% (2)	17% (4)	12% (15)	13% (21)
Medium	20 (1)	66 (16)	53 (69)	54 (86)
High	40 (2)	17 (4)	35 (45)	33 (51)
Total	3 (5)	15 (24)	82 (129)	100 (158)
Chi Squared = 9.21*				
Cramer's V = .17				

*Statistically significant at the .05 level of probability for a one-tailed test of statistical significance.

outcomes. Since the relationships between council members' attitudes toward substantive public policies and local public policy outcomes were by and large not statistically significant, these findings suggest preliminary support for socioeconomics as the primary influencers of local public policy outcomes. Again, however, the concern here is not with the effect of socioeconomics, but that of council members' attitudes, on local public policy outcomes. Therefore, the question of attitudes versus socioeconomics remains for further study.

SUMMARY

The question of interest to this chapter is whether city council members' substantive policy attitudes (i.e., human services, capital expenditures, and development) affect policy outcomes, which are defined as percentage of the city's budget that is spent for the policy area. This question is examined as an outgrowth of the mixed results discovered in the preceding chapter concerning council members' policy attitudes. It also offers the opportunity to examine the longstanding debate in local public policy literature concerning the effects of council members' attitudes toward public policies versus the city's socioeconomics on local public policy outcomes.

The Local Public Policy Debate: Attitudes Versus Socioeconomics. The debate in local public policy literature is essentially one of internal (i.e., city council members' attitudes) versus external (i.e., economic constraints) factors. In their ambitious San Francisco Bay area study, Eulau and Prewitt (1973) contend that it is council members' attitudes rather than environmental or economic constraints that shape local public policy. However, in their study, they made no attempt to separate the independent effects of council members' attitudes from the city's socioeconomic condition. When Eyestone (1977), using Eulau and Prewitt's data, attempted to measure the unique effects of council members' attitudes on local public policy outcomes, he found council members' attitudes to be of little consequence to local public policy outcomes.

Borrowing from market theory, the economic side of the debate stresses factors such as competition, growth, and profit-maximizing behavior in an attempt to delineate rational (i.e., economically efficient) political action. These studies had limited relevance to local public policy studies until the publication of Peterson's **City Limits** (1981). The gist of Peterson's argument is that cities in a market economy are more interested in economic well-being (i.e., business expansion) than programs benefitting the needy. Cities compete with each other to attract productive (i.e., tax paying) residents in order to enhance their revenue-raising

capacity. When choosing a residence locale or business site, Peterson sees the application of a cost-benefit analysis. Ideally, the city would offer maximum services for minimum taxes. Realistically, then, the poor, who are often a drain on city coffers, are shut out.

Hypotheses and Findings. For human services policy, it was hypothesized that the relationship between the attitudes of women and unreformed city council members would be stronger than that between male council members and those serving reformed cities. In both cases, the data yielded results in the hypothesized direction. When the percentage of the city's budget spent for capital expenditures was cross classified by council members' attitudes toward capital expenditure policy, it was hypothesized that the relationship between the attitudes of male council members and those serving under reformed electoral and governing structures would be stronger than that of female and unreformed city council members. Again, the results were in the expected direction.

For development, hypothesis formulation turned problematic. A review of the findings of previous literature indicates that male council members and those serving reformed city councils would be more likely to favor development. Therefore, the expectation here would be that the relationship between developmental policy attitudes and developmental policy outcomes would be stronger for male and reformed city

council members, as well. However, in the preceding chapter, it was found that for this sample neither gender group, nor electoral and governing structure category was more likely to favor development. In other words, all council members, regardless of gender or electoral and governing structure, favored development. In fact, women and unreformed city council members were more likely to favor development than were male reformed city council peers.

Therefore, based on the findings for these respondents, it was hypothesized that the relationship between the developmental policy attitudes of women and unreformed city council members would be stronger than that of male and reformed city council members. The first hypothesis is confirmed; the relationship between the developmental policy attitudes of women and developmental policy outcomes is stronger than that between men and developmental policy outcomes. On the contrary, the relationship between the developmental policy attitudes of reformed city council members and developmental policy outcomes is stronger than that between unreformed city council members and developmental policy outcomes. Therefore, the second hypothesis is not confirmed.

In the context of the local public policy debate concerning the effect of council members' attitudes versus the city's socioeconomics on local public policy outcomes, these findings lend tentative support to the socioeconomic side of

the debate. However, the interest to this study is only the effect of city council members' attitudes on local public policy outcomes.

In the next chapter, the findings of this chapter and those of the preceding chapter are discussed in hopes of reaching some conclusions. Research findings will be examined in regard to the two research hypotheses presented by this study concerning the election versus the performance of female city council members:

> **RH1:** More women are elected to reformed city councils than are elected to unreformed city councils.
>
> **RH2:** Female city council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

In addition, theories as to why some of the unexpected findings were discovered will be presented.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

Despite an increased research interest in the effects of electoral structure on the candidacy of women at the local level, only the easiest questions have been addressed. Primarily, the research interest has been what set of local electoral and governing structures best promote the election of women. While it is important to examine electoral and governing structures and their consequences because structural arrangements pose opportunity costs differentially to members of a community, this study steps beyond a single interest in election to include performance after election. In other words, does electoral and governing structure affect male and female city council members' behavior differently? Therefore, the question guiding this research is in two parts: does electoral and governing structure influence the election of women and their performance once elected?

This study examines the effects of electoral and governing structure: city type (i.e., mayor-council or council-manager), election type (i.e., district, mixed, or at-large), and type of contest (i.e., partisan or nonpartisan) on male and female representation and representational behavior

on city council. Specifically, the focus is on three questions: (1) do men and women elected to council differ in terms of levels of income or education? (2) does the impact of electoral and governing structures on council members' views of their constituencies differ for male and female council members? and (3) does the effect of local electoral and governing structures on council members' policy predispositions differ for men versus women?

As a framework for the analysis of these questions, this study borrows from Welch and Bledsoe (1988) a three-part conceptualization of the term "representation:" (1) descriptive representation, which refers to who gets elected to city council (i.e., gender, income levels, and education levels); (2) representational foci, which refer to what constituency council members believe they represent (i.e., city-wide or localized); and (3) policy and allocative representation, which refers to the policy orientations (i.e., liberal or conservative) and substantive policy foci (i.e., human services, capital expenditures, and economic development) that council members bring to their jobs.

While the literature suggests that the election of women to city council may be promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures (namely at-large elections and nonpartisan contests), there is evidence that female council members perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures. It has been reported that female city

council members tend toward a localized representational focus. Further, they are more liberal in their general policy orientations and focus on human services policy. Each of these performance features (i.e., representational focus, general policy orientation, and substantive policy focus) correspond with those found for unreformed city councils. It would appear, then, that women would perform better in service under unreformed electoral and governing structures. The questions guiding this research are: (1) is the election of women promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures? and (2) do women perform, or fare, better (i.e., do they choose to seek additional terms, or are they elected more frequently) in service under unreformed electoral and governing structures rather than reformed electoral and governing structures?

Path Diagrams. The interest of this research is in the relationship between gender and local electoral and governing structures for both the election to city council and a member's performance after election (see Figure 2: 17).

There is evidence that the election of women to city council is promoted by at-large elections and nonpartisan contests more often associated with reformed councils (see e.g., MacManus, 1990). Male council members' election, it is reported, is facilitated by district elections and partisan contests, frequently features of unreformed councils.

However, when we turn from election to the question of performance on council, a different picture emerges. Reformed councils have been found to produce members who have a city-wide focus and with a general policy orientation that is conservative. Their substantive policy foci tend toward capital expenditure (i.e., waste disposal, traffic and streets, parks and recreation, and public transportation) and economic development.

Members serving unreformed councils have a localized focus, and are liberal in their general policy orientations. Their substantive policy focus is on human services (i.e., housing, education, health care, child care, and affirmative action). Schematically, these relationships are depicted in Figure 3, page 49.

When gender is added to the model, we see that although the election of women may be promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures, there is little meshing of interests after election. Women bring more localized influences to their elected positions than do their male counterparts, regardless of whether they are elected under reformed or unreformed electoral structures (C.A.W.P., 1989). Further, research indicates that women give priority to women's issues and liberal policies (Saint-Germaine, 1989). The incongruity becomes apparent when gender is added to the structural diagram (see Figure 4: 51).

The focus of this study is election versus performance. First, is the election of women promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures? And, if so, which ones? Second, does a female council member perform better in service on unreformed city councils?

ELECTION

This study hypothesizes that certain reformed electoral and governing structures (i.e., council-manager type, at-large system, and nonpartisan contest) promote the election of women to city council:

RH1: More women are elected to reformed city councils than are elected to unreformed city councils.

By and large, this hypothesis is confirmed by the data. Women are more likely to be elected to council in cities employing a council-manager plan; this relationship is statistically significant, as well. In addition, the election of women to city council is promoted by at-large elections. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. On the contrary, women are slightly more likely to be elected in partisan contests than nonpartisan contests; this relationship is not statistically significant.

These findings are in line with the gender in politics literature which finds weak support for the notion that female candidates benefit from reformed electoral and governing structures. Previous studies have found that the election of women to city council is promoted by reformed electoral and governing structures, but rarely do these relationships prove to be statistically significant (MacManus, 1990).

REPRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Descriptive Representation. Previous research indicates that men have higher levels of income and education than their female counterparts (see e.g., Welch and Bledsoe, 1985; Merritt, 1977). Welch and Bledsoe (1988) found that council members from cities employing reformed electoral and governing structures had higher levels of income and education than did their unreformed counterparts. The question that this study examined joined these two ideas and asked if there is a link between gender and electoral and governing structures in the representation of women on city councils?

Income. This study measures family income of the respondent council members. Descriptive studies of female council members generally agree that when the question of a council member's income is phrased in terms of family income, there are no differences in terms of income levels for men and

women. Both male and female council members are drawn from the same high income bracket (see e.g., Darcy, et al, 1987; Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977).

These data are supportive of previous research which indicates that male and female council members are drawn from the same high income bracket. The greatest percentage of both male (48%) and female (39%) respondents report incomes "over $65,000." However, the relationship is statistically significant only for reformed city council members.

Education. Female council members are found to be less educated than their male counterparts, but the difference is not statistically significant (see e.g., Darcy, et al, 1987; Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Merritt, 1977). While mean levels of education are approximately the same for male and female council members, male council members are more likely to have had graduate training than their female counterparts.

These data are supportive of previous research indicating that male council members are better educated than their female counterparts. A greater percentage of male city council members (43%) report graduate training than do their female counterparts (33%). Again, as with income, the difference is statistically significant for reformed city councils only.

Representational Focus. Representational focus refers to whom council members believe that they should represent -- city-wide versus localized constituencies. Research indicates that female council members bring a more localized influences (i.e., group affiliations, neighborhood organizations, or gender-based organizations) to their elected positions (see e.g., C.A.W.P., 1989). In addition, unreformed city council members are expected to favor neighborhood and ethnic interests over those of the city as a whole and to have more localized influences, such as labor groups. This is due in great part to the district system of election employed by unreformed systems (see e.g., Welch and Bledsoe, 1988).

These data are supportive of those of previous research which indicates that female council members have a more localized representational focus than their male counterparts. Female council respondents score higher on the localized representational focus scale than do their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structures. However, the relationship between gender and representational focus is statistically significant only for reformed city councils.

POLICY PREDISPOSITIONS. Policy predispositions refers to the policy attitudes that council members bring to their elected positions. This category is dichotomized into the subcategories: policy - general orientations and policy - substantive focus.

Policy - General Orientations. The first policy subcategory, general orientations, taps a liberal or conservative view of policy. Research indicates that women give liberal policies a higher priority ranking than do their male counterparts (Saint-Germaine, 1989). In addition, unreformed city council members are found to be more liberal in their general policy orientations than are their reformed city counterparts (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988). Therefore, women and unreformed city council members would, for example, likely favor a need-based distribution of resources. On the other hand, a male or reformed city council member would likely favor, for example, economic development.

These data support the findings of previous research that women are more liberal in their general policy orientations, regardless of electoral and governing structures. Again, however, the relationship between gender and general policy orientations is statistically significant for reformed council members only.

Policy - Substantive Focus. While the first of the policy subcategories is designed to measure respondents' ideological leanings, the second examines specific policy activities and asks the respondent to indicate the amount of time he or she feels that the city council should spend on each activity. These activities are trichotomized into three policy areas: human services (i.e., housing, health care, child care,

education, and jobs for women and minorities), capital expenditure (i.e., waste disposal, traffic and streets, parks and recreation, and public transportation), and development (i.e., economic development).

Earlier studies indicate that women list as a priority legislation dealing with human services. Women introduce more legislation dealing with children and the family, women, and welfare than do men. Men tend to focus on capital expenditure and development more than their female counterparts (Thomas and Welch, 1992). Further evidence suggests that unreformed city council members focus on human services to a greater degree, while reformed city council members focus on capital expenditure and development (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988).

Human Services. The data support the findings of previous research. Female respondents are more likely to favor human services policy than are their male counterparts, regardless of electoral and governing structure. The relationship between gender and human services policy focus is statistically significant for both unreformed and reformed cities.

Capital Expenditure. These data are supportive of the findings of previous research that male council members are more likely to favor capital expenditure than are their female counterparts. When electoral and governing structures are

held constant, male respondents are more likely to favor capital expenditure than are their female colleagues. However, the relationship between gender and a substantive policy focus on capital expenditure is statistically for neither unreformed nor reformed city councils.

Development. These data do not support the findings of previous research in regard to the effect of gender and electoral and governing structures on developmental policy attitudes. There is no difference between male and female city council members in terms of developmental policy support; both male (97%) and female (97%) respondents strongly favor development. By the same token, there is no difference between unreformed (97%) and reformed (97%) city council members in terms of developmental policy support.

The second research hypothesis is that more women are re-elected to unreformed city councils. The researcher hypothesizes that women are better satisfied under unreformed electoral and governing structures than under reformed electoal and governing structures, because the interests and charateristics of female city councilmembers and those of unreformed city councils mesh better.

To test this hypothesis, length of service of the respondent measures performance. Length of service was chosen as the measure of performance for two reasons; if women are performing better on city council: (1) their constituents will

be more likely to return them to office, and (2) they will be more likely to seek reelection. Both of these reasons are predicated on the thesis that there is a relationship between the interests of women and those of unreformed city councils. In other words, there is a better meshing of interests between women and unreformed city councils.

The data are supportive of the second research hypothesis that more women are re-elected under unreformed electoral and governing structures. The percentage of women serving nine or more years on unreformed city councils (48%) is greater than that for women serving reformed city councils (32%). When electoral and governing structures are held constant, however, the relationship discovered for gender and length of service is not statistically significant.

This study discovers two pieces of information that have been missing from both the local electoral and governing structures literature and the gender in politics literature. The literature of local electoral and governing structure finds that the election of women at the local level is promoted by certain reformed electoral and governing structures. The literature of gender in politics suggests that women should fare better under unreformed electoral and governing structures and seems puzzled by findings to the contrary. There has long been a gap between these two literatures that has lain unbridged. This study bridges that gap by examining election and performance. What previous

studies have done is to focus exclusively on what variables facilitate the election of women to local office. They have failed to include the performance component. This study finds that the election of women is facilitated by certain reformed electoral and governing structures, but that women perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures. Therein lies the controversy that has existed between the literatures of electoral and governing structures and gender in politics.

PERFORMANCE

The focus of this study is election versus performance. For the performance part of the question, the study asks: do female city council members perform better in service under unreformed electoral and governing structures (i.e., district election systems, partisan contests, and mayor-council forms of government)? This study hypothesizes that women perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures, which is the third research hypothesis:

> **RH3:** Women perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

The findings for respondents' substantive policy foci (human services, capital expenditure and development) are

mixed. As expected, women have a greater focus on human services than their male colleagues. Male council members have a greater focus on capital expenditure than their female counterparts, which was also expected. However, unexpectedly, female council members are as likely as their male counterparts to focus on economic development.

Considering the mixed findings for respondents' substantive policy foci, it seems useful to explore the question of policy in greater depth. If electoral and governing structures affect who is elected to city council and their representational foci and policy predispositions, it is conceivable that electoral and governing structures could also affect the policy outcomes generated by city council members. The question that the study is examining here is whether city council members' substantive policy foci (i.e., human services, capital expenditure, and development) influence local public policy outcomes. This question also affords an opportunity to reexamine the local public policy controversy over the impact of council members' attitudes versus the city's socioeconomics on local public policy outcomes, albeit from the attitudinal side only.

Human Services. It was hypothesized that the relationship between the attitudes of female and unreformed city council members toward human services policy would be stronger than that of male and reformed city council members. In both

cases, the data yielded results in the hypothesized direction. Neither relationship was statistically significant, however.

Capital Expenditure. When the percentage of the city's budget spent for capital expenditures was cross classified by council members' attitudes toward capital expenditure policy, it was hypothesized that the relationship between the attitudes of male council members and those serving reformed city councils would be stronger than those of female and unreformed city council members. Again, the results were in the expected direction, but neither relationship proved to be statistically significant.

Development. Based on the unexpected findings concerning council members' developmental substantive policy foci, it was hypothesized that the relationship between the developmental policy attitudes of female and unreformed city council members would be stronger than that for male and reformed city council members. The first hypothesis is confirmed; the relationship between the developmental policy attitudes of female council members is stronger than that between men and developmental policy outcomes. The relationship is statistically significant, as well.

On the contrary, the relationship between the developmental policy attitudes of reformed city council members and developmental policy outcomes is stronger than

that between unreformed city council members and developmental policy outcomes. This relationship is statistically significant, as well.

CONCLUSIONS

By and large, the relationships discovered from these data are in the hypothesized directions and are supportive of those found in earlier studies. The notable exception is both sets of findings for developmental policy.

Development - Substantive Policy Focus. This study hypothesized that male and reformed city council members would have a greater focus on developmental policy than would their female and unreformed city counterparts. Neither of these hypotheses were supported by the data. There was no difference between male and female city council members, nor between reformed and unreformed city councils.

Development - Policy Outcomes. Based on the findings of previous research, it was expected that city council members' policy attitudes would have little impact on the local public policies that they generate. However, it was, in great part, due to the unanticipated findings in regard to developmental policy attitudes that local public policy outcomes were examined. Once again, developmental policy produced

unexpected results. The relationship between developmental policy attitudes of female council members and those serving unreformed cities and developmental policy outcomes proved to be statistically significant.

Implications. What do these unexpected findings concerning developmental policy attitudes and outcomes mean? It is believed that the explanation for these findings lies in Peterson's economic argument.

Peterson (1981) argues that cities are limited as to what they can do; they have noticeable constraints. Therefore, cities select policies that are in the interest of the city as a whole. It is in the phrase "in the interest of the city as a whole" that economics becomes the primary influencer of local public policy spending. Peterson (1981) delineates a three part justification for council members' economic focus:

> 1. cities raise most of their own revenue, therefore economic prosperity is necessary for protecting the fiscal base of local governments;
>
> 2. by pursuing policies that contribute to the economic prosperity of the local community, the politician selects policies that redound to his or her own political advantage; and
>
> 3. local officials usually have a sense of community responsibility. Public officials try to develop policies that contribute to the prosperity of a community or, at least, do not detract from it.

Developmental policy is designed to promote the economic position of one city relative to another (Peterson, 1981). It is a competitive arena in which the goal is to attract business or industry and productive, tax paying citizens. The politics of development are nonconflictual because to implement a developmental proposal is to protect a community's fiscal resources. There was no difference between male and female city council members in terms of favoring developmental policy. Both gender groups strongly favored development because it is in their interest and in the interest of the city as a whole to do so.

In Peterson's argument there is justification for the unanticipated findings for the effect of council members' attitudes on developmental policy outcomes, as well. Peterson (1981) hypothesizes that when a cost-benefit analysis is applied to the local policy-making arena, the amount spent for developmental policy (i.e., the cost) will yield economic benefits greater than the costs of implementation. Therefore, because developmental policies are supposed to enhance the fiscal capacity of the city, the current fiscal capacity of the city is not an overweening concern.

Developmental policies are nonconflictual; they produce something of a no-lose situation. It is really not so surprising that all council members showed great support for developmental policies.

The benefits of developmental policies exceed their costs. In a market economy, cities must compete with each other for productive (i.e., tax paying) residents and businesses. The best means of accomplishing this is to offer the greatest number of services for the least amount of taxes. Developmental policies facilitate both goals by enhancing a city's revenue base. The interest, then, is not so much what is the city's current fiscal base, but how much developmental policies can improve that base.

Future Research - Developmental Policy. To adequately examine the question of policy outcomes, the comparison must be made between the city's socioeconomic condition and policy outcomes, as well as council members' policy attitudes and policy outcomes. Therefore, further research to collect socioeconomic data for each of the cities included in this study might facilitate a re-examination of the debate over the impact of council members' policy attitudes versus the city's socioeconomics on local public policy outcomes.

Gender - Election Versus Performance. By and large, the data confirm the two research hypotheses:

> RH1: More women are elected to reformed city councils than are elected to unreformed city councils.

RH2: Women perform better under unreformed electoral and governing structures than under reformed electoral and governing structures.

There has long been a gap between the literatures of (1) local electoral and governing structure and (2) gender in politics. Originally, the literature of local electoral and governing structure suggested that women should benefit from the same sorts of electoral and governing structural arrangements that benefit minorities. The prevailing theory was that if women and minority candidates, alike, are disadvantaged vis-a-vis white male candidates, then what promotes the election of minorities would surely benefit women.

When studies did not support these hypotheses, scholars attempted to apply Diamond's (1977) desirability and competition theory at the local level. In her study of state legislatures, Diamond found that the less desirable and important an office and the less competition there was for it, the more likely it was that a woman would hold it. The theory was that electoral and governing structural reforms made city council seats less desirable and, therefore, more likely that a woman would be elected (Welch and Karnig, 1979).

The gender in politics literature, however, has suggested that women "fit" better under unreformed electoral and governing structures. Since women's interests and influences mesh better with those of unreformed city councils, this

literature hypothesizes that women should be more likely to win election under unreformed electoral and governing structures (Saint-Germaine, 1989). However, studies have not supported this hypothesis.

This study dichotomizes the question of the representation of women on city councils into the component parts of election and performance. Most studies question how to elect more women to council and fail to include the factor of performance after election. It is here that the gap between the two literatures exists. The question boils down to one of election versus performance. This study uncovers the phenomenon of women being elected under one set of electoral and governing structures, but performing better (i.e., serving longer) under a different set of electoral and governing structures.

Gender - Future Research. While this study uncovers the phenomenon of women being more likely to be elected under reformed electoral and governing structures, but performing better under unreformed electoral and governing structures, the cause of this incongruity is left for future research. To examine the cause of the incongruity between the election and performance of female city council members, we must turn research attention to the candidacy of women. In other words, we must look at female council candidates, not merely office holders. In examining female city council candidates, two

attendant questions must be explored: (1) the numbers of female candidates seeking election under reformed versus unreformed electoral and governing structures and (2) a comparison of women candidates seeking election under reformed versus unreformed electoral and governing structures on the basis of the three representational concepts (i.e., descriptive representation, representational focus, and policy predispositions).

Numbers. First, the numbers of women seeking election to city council must be compared for reformed versus unreformed electoral and governing structures. Do more women seek election under reformed electoral and governing structures?

MacManus (1990) finds the greatest barrier to the election of women to local office, as perceived by female local office holders, is a lack of female candidates. When asked to identify the single change that would most directly increase the number of women elected to city council, nearly all of the mayors (91.7%) and over half of the council members (58%) cited getting more women to run for office. Bledsoe and Herring's (1990) study of female city council members suggests that when women run for political office they are not particularly disadvantaged by their gender. "The underrepresentation of women is due to a paucity of women candidates (Bledsoe and Herring, 1990)."

Perhaps, then, the cause of more women being elected to reformed city councils stems from a lack of female candidates seeking election under unreformed electoral and governing structures. Of course, if so, the question becomes one of why more women do not seek election under unreformed electoral and governing structures.

Representational Concepts. Second, women candidates must be dichotomized according to the type of electoral and governing structures under which they are seeking election and compared on the basis of the three representational concepts examined in this study (i.e., descriptive representation, representational focus, and policy predispositions). In other words, do women who run for election under reformed structures have different socioeconomic backgrounds and interests than those running under unreformed structures?

Implications. The rate of increase in the proportion of women elected to office at the local level has slowed; so too has the rate of increase in the number of women running for local office (MacManus, 1990). Ruth Mandel, Director of the Center for the American Woman and Politics, describes the situation as follows: "The conclusion we face on the numbers side is that political women's achievement represents clear progress; but it is incremental progress, progress in slow-paced, small gains" (1990). The slowing down of increases in

female representation at the local level has renewed interest in the identifying phenomena that might impede females elected representation at the local level. This study identifies one phenomenon; the incongruity between election versus performance. However, in order to make any headway in understanding the problem of election versus performance and its implications for the elected representation of women on city councils, we must do more than just identify a phenomenon. The next stage of this research must examine the roots of this phenomenon.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: LIST OF CITIES

	City Size	City Type	Election Type	Type of Contest	Council Size M/F
ALABAMA:					
Anniston	29,523	C-M*	District	Nonpartisan	4/0
Auburn	28,471	M-C*	District	Nonpartisan	6/2
Bessemer	31,729	M-C	Mixed	Nonpartisan	6/1
Birmingham	284,413	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	8/1
Decatur	42,002	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	4/1
Dothan	48,750	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	4/0
Florence	37,029	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	5/1
Gadsden	47,565	M-C	Mixed	Nonpartisan	4/0
Hoover	31,319	M-C	At-Large	Nonpartisan	3/2
Huntsville	142,513	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	5/0
Mobile	200,452	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	5/2
Montgomery	177,857	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	8/1
Phenix City	29,928	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	4/0
Prichard	39,541	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	5/0
Selma	26,684	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	8/1
Tuscaloosa	75,211	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	7/0
GEORGIA:					
Albany	73,934	C-M	District	Partisan	6/0
Athens	42,549	M-C	District	Partisan	5/5
Atlanta	425,022	M-C	Mixed	Nonpartisan	13/6
Augusta	47,532	M-C	Mixed	Nonpartisan	7/5
Byron	31,008	M-C	At-Large	Nonpartisan	4/1
East Point	37,486	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	7/1
Columbus	169,441	C-M	Mixed	Partisan	9/1
Harlem	30,814	M-C	At-Large	Nonpartisan	3/1
Marietta	30,805	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	6/1
Macon	116,860	M-C	Mixed	Partisan	12/3
Rome	29,654	C-M	At-Large	Partisan	8/1
Savannah	141,634	C-M	Mixed	Partisan	6/0
Valdosta	37,596	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	5/0
Warner Robins	39,893	M-C	At-Large	Nonpartisan	4/1
NORTH CAROLINA:					
Asheville	60,429	C-M	At-Large	Partisan	2/3
Burlington	38,860	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	2/1
Cary	39,387	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	4/2
Chapel Hill	37,715	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	6/2
Charlotte	388,995	C-M	Mixed	Partisan	7/4

NORTH CAROLINA: (Cont'd.)

Concord	28,429	C-M	Mixed	Partisan	7/0
Durham	127,343	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	6/6
Fayetteville	78,907	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	7/2
Gastonia	54,606	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	5/1
Goldsboro	35,919	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	5/1
Greensboro	184,124	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	5/3
Greenville	43,760	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	2/4
Hickory	27,944	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	5/1
High Point	67,111	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	6/2
Jacksonville	29,547	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	3/1
Kannapolis	32,543	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	4/2
Raleigh	216,176	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	3/4
Rocky Mount	49,200	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	6/1
Wilmington	55,458	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	3/3
Wilson	37,752	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	3/2

SOUTH CAROLINA:

Anderson	27,313	C-M	Mixed	Partisan	7/1
Charleston	69,510	M-C	District	Partisan	9/4
Columbia	99,296	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	3/2
Florence	30,062	C-M	Mixed	Nonpartisan	6/0
Greenville	58,242	C-M	Mixed	Partisan	4/2
North Charleston	65,630	M-C	District	Partisan	5/1
Rock Hill	35,344	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	6/0
Spartanburg	43,968	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	4/2
Sumter	25,348	C-M	District	Partisan	5/1

TENNESSEE:

Chattanooga	169,514	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	3/1
Clarksville	70,552	M-C	At-Large	Nonpartisan	11/2
Cleveland	29,483	M-C	At-Large	Nonpartisan	4/0
Columbia	27,200	C-M	District	Nonpartisan	5/1
Germantown	31,467	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	5/0
Hendersonville	31,038	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	11/1
Jackson	49,750	M-C	District	Nonpartisan	7/2
Johnson City	48,034	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	4/0
Kingsport	33,799	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	5/1
Knoxville	175,045	M-C	Mixed	Nonpartisan	8/1
Memphis	646,174	M-C	Mixed	Nonpartisan	10/3
Murfreesboro	40,878	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	3/2
Nashville	362,555	M-C	Mixed	Nonpartisan	38/3
Oak Ridge	27,662	C-M	At-Large	Nonpartisan	5/1

* C-M = Council-Manager
M-C = Mayor-Council

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE

The first set of questions deals with how your time as council member is spent.

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1. Approximately how many hours per week do you devote to your job as a member of the city council?

_____ number of hours per week.

2. Please indicate below how much time the city council spends on each activity by checking the category that applies.

	A Lot	Some	Little	None
A. Budget formulation	____	____	____	____
B. Distribution of services	____	____	____	____
C. Handling citizen complaints	____	____	____	____
D. Oversight of programs	____	____	____	____
E. Taxing and spending	____	____	____	____
F. Considering appeals of administrative decisions	____	____	____	____
G. Setting goals for the city	____	____	____	____
H. Doing favors for constituents	____	____	____	____
I. Hiring and firing	____	____	____	____
J. Planning and zoning	____	____	____	____

3. What percentage of time are important decisions that come before the council made unanimously or nearly unanimously?

____Over 75% ____50-74% ____25-49% ____fewer than 25%

4. Please tell us how controversial matters in your city are brought to your attention by indicating whether each of the following sources is important, somewhat important, or not very important.

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important
A. Appearance of individuals or representatives from groups at public meetings	_____	_____	_____
B. Running into friends or acquaintances in the city	_____	_____	_____
C. Local newspapers	_____	_____	_____
D. Business or work associates	_____	_____	_____

The next set of questions deals with your view of policy issues that may come before council.

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5. How much emphasis do you think **should** be placed on each of the following policy issues?

	Great Deal	Some	Little	None
A. Education	_____	_____	_____	_____
B. Waste Disposal	_____	_____	_____	_____
C. Traffic and Streets	_____	_____	_____	_____
D. Parks and Recreation	_____	_____	_____	_____
E. Public Transportation	_____	_____	_____	_____
F. Housing	_____	_____	_____	_____
G. Health Care	_____	_____	_____	_____
H. Child Care	_____	_____	_____	_____
I. Jobs and Contracts for Women and Minorities	_____	_____	_____	_____
J. Economic Development	_____	_____	_____	_____

6. Please express agreement or disagreement with the following statements.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
A. Raising taxes is preferable to cutting back city services.	_____	_____	_____	_____
B. Most citizens in a city benefit from development.	_____	_____	_____	_____
C. A city's resources should be distributed on the basis of need - even if some parts of the city get more than others.	_____	_____	_____	_____
D. Things like city jobs, contracts, and the like should be used to help disadvantaged groups.	_____	_____	_____	_____
E. There is not much that the city can do to improve the situation of the poor.	_____	_____	_____	_____
F. New revenue should be generated through user charges rather than new taxes or tax increases.	_____	_____	_____	_____
G. It is necessary to keep taxes low in order to make the city attractive to business.	_____	_____	_____	_____

7. On the whole, are voters more interested in your taking care of their personal needs or in your stands on issues before the council?

_____ Voters are more interested in my taking care of their personal needs.

_____ Voters are interested in my taking care of their personal needs and my issues positions about equally.

_____ Voters are more interested in my positions on issues before council.

The next section deals with your election to the city council

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8. Elections to the council are:

_____ At large - 8a. If at large, are candidates nominated from districts?

_____ Yes _____ No

_____ District or Ward

_____ Mixed - 8b. If mixed, are you elected at large or within a district?

_____ At large _____ District

- 8c. If mixed, is there much conflict within the council between members elected at large and those elected within districts?

_____ Yes, over many issues
_____ Yes, over some issues
No, there is not much division
_____ of this sort

9. Elections to the council are legally:

_____ Nonpartisan - 9a. If nonpartisan, do political parties play an active role behind the scenes?

_____ Very active
_____ Active
_____ Not very active
_____ None at all

_____ Partisan

10. Please describe your margin of victory in the last election.

___ Ran unopposed ___ Large margin of victory

___ Moderate margin of victory ___ A close contest

11. Including the present year, how many years have you served as a member of the city council?

_____ number of years

12. Please indicate the importance of your representation of each of the following constituencies.

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important
A. Geographic area of the city	_____	_____	_____
B. Racial or ethnic constituency	_____	_____	_____
C. The city as a whole	_____	_____	_____
D. Single-issue group	_____	_____	_____
E. Labor union or public employee constituency	_____	_____	_____

The final questions deal with your background

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13. How many years have you lived in your present community?

_____ number of years

14. What is your principal occupation?

15. What is the highest level of education that you completed?

____high school or less ____some college ____college degree

____graduate school

16. What is your age?

___18-24 ___25-34 ___35-44 ___45-60 ___over 60

17. What is your gender?

____male ____female

18. What is the average annual income of your family?

___under 25,000 ___25,000-34,999 ___35,000-44,999

___45,000-54,999 ___55,000-65,000 ___over 65,000

Thank you very much for your help.

If you have any comments to make about serving as a member of a city council please use the space below.

VITA

Allison Lee Hayes was born in Knoxville, Tennessee on November 7, 1964. She graduated from South-Young High School, Knoxville, Tennessee, in May 1982. The following September she entered The University of Tennessee, Knoxville and in June 1986 received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with a minor in Urban Studies. She reentered The University of Tennessee, Knoxville in August 1986 and in June 1988 received a Master of Public Administration degree. In August 1988 she entered the Doctor of Philosophy program in the Department of Political Science.