To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Phillip E. Raschke entitled "A Survey of Professional Army Officers' Affective Attitudes Towards the News Media." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Communications.

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A SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL ARMY OFFICERS' AFFECTIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEWS MEDIA

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Science

Degree

The University of Tennessee

Phillip E. Raschke

June 1975

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This section is, without a doubt, one of the most important in a thesis--important, because it gives a heart-felt thank you to those who worked so very hard to insure that there was indeed a thesis. In this particular instance, these thank you's go to:

Dr. Jerry R. Lynn, Chairman, Graduate Studies, College of Communications. His patience, guidance, and constant support proved invaluable.

Dr. Kelly Leiter, Assistant Dean, College of Communication, who was willing to "stand in" at the last minute, and whose unselfish dedication to the teaching profession this author will always remember.

Dr. John Morrow, Jr., Assistant Professor of History, for putting up with the author's crash schedule and for his most helpful suggestions.

The author is also indebted to the two best and most faithful typists in the world--Margaret Cook and Brenda Tucker--who always managed to make the final deadline no matter how "last minute" the work was received.

Many thanks to Ron Gross, computer consultant, who was able to decipher what it was the author wanted "run" through the computer. Also thanks to Colonel Jim Fry, USA Retired, for his advice on statistical procedures and for the loan of reference material; and to Angie Jollay, Bill Myers and John Myers for their help in tabulating the survey results.

The author expresses gratitude to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Rilling and his staff at the Army War College. Without their help

1207498

and personal interest, this study would not have been possible.

Appreciation is also expressed to the United States Army for allowing this author to acquire the advanced education received at The University of Tennessee.

Finally, something should be said about the people who shared my house and wondered who the stranger was in the basement. They did everything humanly possible, and sometimes more, to "make it happen." No husband or father could ask for more--thank you, Beverly, Butch, Dana, and Ragan.

ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this study was to obtain data pertaining to professional Army officers' affective attitudes toward the news media. To accomplish this, a mail survey was conducted among Army officers enrolled in the 1975 class at the Army War College.

The data collection instrument was a 15-page self-administered anonymous questionnaire. Determination of affective attitudes was made through the use of Likert-scaled questions, semantic differential concepts, and one sentence-completion type question. Completed questionnaires were received from 133 (71.1 percent) of the officers.

Briefly, the major findings were:

1. Overall, the officers held ambivalent or somewhat unfavorable attitudes toward the news media.

2. A significant positive correlation (0.61) existed between an officer's attitude toward the news media and his desire for some form of military or civilian censorship control over the news media.

3. An officer's source of commission and type of command experience did not make effective predictors of his attitude toward the news media. Membership or political preference for the Democratic party, however, was an effective predictor (12.5 percent) of favorable attitudes.

4. There was no significant difference between an officer's

attitude toward the news media and the size of the town in which he was born, the section of the country in which he was born, or his branch of service within the Army.

5. Officers' attitudes toward television news accuracy were significantly more negative than their attitudes toward the accuracy of other news media.

6. Officers' attitudes toward ABC Evening News were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward other network news programs. Similarly, officers' attitudes toward anchorman Howard K. Smith (ABC) were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward John Chancellor of NBC or Walter Cronkite of CBS.

7. The officers' attitudes toward U.S. News and World Report magazine were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward Time or Newsweek magazine.

8. Officers' attitudes toward the New York Times and the Army Times were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward the Washington Post.

9. Finally, the officers did not perceive the news media treatment of the Army to be significantly different from the news media treatment of the Air Force or the Navy. A significant difference did exist, however, in their attitudes toward news media treatment of the Marine Corps. The officers indicated the Marine Corps was treated more favorably than the Army.

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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL VIEW OF ARMY-NEWS MEDIA RELATIONSHIPS SINCE 1950

The United States Army's relations with the nation's news media have traditionally varied with the mood and temper of the times. Each institution has taken its turn at being ally and adversary of the other. Unfortunately, the complex events of the last decade may have produced an adversary relationship beneficial to neither and dangerous for both.

This situation appears to have begun with the Army's involvement in the Vietnam War. The daily activities of America's fighting forces were obviously of news interest to the public at home. But from the very beginning newsmen were divided over the type of coverage the war should be given. Some, such as Malcolm Brown of the Associated Press (AP), Neil Sheehan of United Press International (UPI), and David Halberstam of the New York Times, expressed skepticism about the military and political situation. Others, like Joseph Alsop, the syndicated columnist, Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News, and Jim Lucas, correspondent for the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain, chastised their contemporaries for being irresponsible and unpatriotic (Emery, 1971).

While some reporters in Vietnam raised doubts, most of those back home appeared supportive of the military's efforts. Critical reports received back home found older, more experienced military reporters attempting "to dismiss them as the product of the inexperienced" (Witcover, 1971, p. 9). When President Johnson ordered U.S. air strikes

against North Vietnam because of alleged attacks on two Navy destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, American editorial comment almost universally supported the President's response (Stillman, 1971).

Why the news media initially supported American military involvement in Vietnam is not entirely clear, but three probable and interrelated explanations are worthy of mention. First, the majority of American newspapers in the early sixties were pro-Republican and politically conservative (Bagdekian, 1972). Secondly, the managing editors on newspapers and news magazines are usually older, more experienced journalists (Gilmore and Root, 1971). Many of the managing editors active in the news media in the early sixties had cut their teeth as younger journalists on the cold war realities of the 1950's. The collapse of Nationalist China, the French defeat in Indochina, and the Cuban missile crisis were all part of their memory. It was only natural that Vietnam be viewed as nothing more than a continuation of American efforts to contain the Communist menace (Witcover, 1971). Lastly, only a few newspapers and news magazines maintained a full-time correspondent in Saigon. Reliable sources on the war were scarce. Even the Washington press corps relied heavily on government spokesmen and government-gathered information (Witcover, 1971).

Broadcast journalists (radio and television) appear to have been in the same situation as their counterparts in the print media (newspapers and newsmagazines). Those who traveled to Vietnam in the early days went the same way they "went into World War II and Korea--'as a member of the team'" (Friendly, 1971, p. 14). That is they were expected by officials, both military and civilian, to cooperate by reporting factual but not unpleasant events pertaining to the war.

The "team" concept was not limited to broadcast journalists alone, it was meant to apply to all journalists. "It is a concept that officialdom, both military and civilian (but especially military), tends to take for granted" (Minor, 1970, p. 37).

The news media were not the only elements of American society inveigled by the circumstances described above. Even Hollywood had been caught up in it all. One study (Shain, 1972) failed to find one war film critical of the military during the period 1948 to 1964. Instead, Hollywood supplied movie audiences with glowing accounts of American military technology, professionalism, and teamwork. But regardless of what Hollywood or the "team" concept had produced in the past, the image of a gallant and professional American Army was soon to be challenged in Vietnam.

In the early years of the Vietnam War, American military personnel acted only as advisors. But as the war intensified, American military involvement deepened. By the end of 1967 almost a half-million American troops were serving in Southeast Asia. But still the elusive enemy could not be brought to bay. No end to the conflict was near. The government and the military were hard pressed to explain this without repudiating their own plans and programs. To admit that things were not going well was difficult. Instead, a program of guarded optimism was adopted (Fitzgerald, 1972). Each new phase was interpreted as a possible end to the fighting, a "light at the end of the tunnel," or a "last roll of the dice" for the enemy (Whitney, 1972, p. 16).

As the war dragged on, there developed what has commonly been called the "credibility gap." This term came into use because of the continual practice of civilian and military officials saying one thing

and doing another. For example, in mid-1965, General William Westmoreland, American military commander in Vietnam asked that troop strength be increased from about 150,000 to 350,000, and declared that the war could be won. More troops were requested in 1966. And still more troops, 463,000, were needed in 1967 ("Chronology: Generation of Conflict," 1972).

But the greatest blow to the Army's credibility occurred on January 30, 1968. The North Vietnamese "Tet" offensive demonstrated the enemy's ability to strike at will throughout the length and breadth of Vietnam. Frances Fitzgerald in her Pulitzer Prize winning book Fire in the Lake (1972) said:

> Over the past year Westmoreland, Bunker, and Komer had given the impression that the enemy threat had receded, that the American troops had pushed the main force units out of the populated areas into the jungles of the border. Now there were pictures of the mission coordinator, George Jacobson, leaning out of the chancellery window with a pistol, and television reports of fighting in the center of Saigon. It was incomprehensible. . . . The fact that the American command had been unprepared for such a gross movement raised doubts about the quality of American intelligence and wisdom of American military strategy over the past two years. (p. 521-522)

Also, David Halberstam in his book The Best and the Brightest (1972) observed:

> The credibility of the American strategy of attrition died during the Tet offensive; so too did the credibility of the man who was by now President Johnson's most important political ally, General Westmoreland. (p. 787)

But Tet was only the beginning. Many members of the news media who had initially supported America's military commitment to Vietnam began to have second thoughts. In order to uncover the truth, the news media dispatched more than 500 additional correspondents to Vietnam.

Soon there was one news correspondent for every 1,050 American servicemen in Vietnam (Blanchard, 1969).

The close scrutiny and enormous daily output of these correspondents quickly exposed the American public to the realities of the war. Disturbing news stories flooded the American press: "Viet Reds Storm U.S. Camp" (Chicago Tribune, February 7, 1968, p. 1); "Unofficial Tabulation Indicates U.S. Casualties Exceed Those of Korean War" (New York Times, March 9, 1968, p. 2); "General Westmoreland Makes Clear Recent Enemy Offensive Was Unexpected" (New York Times, March 21, 1968, p. 1); "U.S. Planes Bomb Saigon Suburb But Viet Cong Fight On" (Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1968, p. 1); "Army and Marine Corps Are Sending 24,000 Men Back for Involuntary 2d Tours of Duty" (New York Times, October 15, 1968, p. 1). Home-front support for the war began to divide.

Evidence of this division is reflected in the surveys conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC). In 1964, the SRC asked, "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam, or should we have stayed out?" Sixty percent of the respondents thought we did the right thing. In 1968, only 36 percent took the same stance. Gallup polls using similar questions had essentially the same results (Dawson, 1973).

How the Army reacted overall to these changing views is not known, but several high ranking Army officers, General Maxwell Taylor and General Hamilton Howze to name two, blamed the reporting habits of the news media for the loss of public support. General Taylor said, "This division at home has been furthered by the behavior of the publicity media" (Norman, 1969, p. 5). General Howze had this to say:

> There has been ample evidence of slanted reporting--reporting specifically designed to denigrate the military service no matter the price to national honor and well-being and to the outcome of the war. (1973, p. 5)

Major General Franklin M. Davis, Jr., recently retired commandant of the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, made this observation:

> Virtually any Army officer with Vietnam experience--and this includes about 95 percent of the officer corps today from captain up--feels that the news media, particularly television, are responsible . . . for fomenting much of the antiwar attitude that burgeoned in the United States and abroad early (sic) in the 1960's. (1974, p. 16)

Respected historian, retired Army Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall claimed news coverage of Vietnam was the worst since "Zach Taylor at Buena Vista" (Blanchard, 1969, p. 24). Marshall also accused correspondents of violating the team concept of reporting mentioned earlier. In a July 1970 syndicated column he said:

> In days of yore, the American correspondent when moving with a field army, was expected to behave no less accountably than a line officer. He was not a sacred being with limitless freedom, privileged to move between lines or to traffic with the opposing camp. The rules of security were as binding on him as on any soldier. He was an American first, a correspondent second.
>
> This old-fashioned standard seems to have been forgotten in Southeast Asia. Some old-timers still play the game according to the rules. There is a new breed that acts as if it believes a press ticket is a license to run wild. (Dudman, 1970-71, p. 35)

A more descriptive attack is the following unattributed comment by a high ranking military commander excerpted from the April, 1969 issue of The Journalist: "You news people get your stories at the Carabelle Bar. Some of the stories I have seen are really outrageous" (Norman, 1969, p. 4). And finally, retired Army Colonel Delbert L. Bristol had this comment: "The national defense actions of both the

United States and Vietnam were adversely affected by the actions of the press in Vietnam" (Bristol, 1974, p. 2).

The Army was not alone in its criticism of the news media. Fred Friendly, former president of CBS News, claims to have been told that the late President Lyndon Johnson used to swear and denounce NBC and CBS news reports on Vietnam. In his book, The Best and the Brightest (1972), David Halberstam reported the story that Secretary of State Dean Rusk once burst forth with the following comment concerning a Vietnam news story, "Why can't the New York Times get things right? Why does it always have to lie? Which side is it on" (p. 771)? Unfortunately for Mr. Rusk, according to Halberstam, the story turned out to be accurate.

Are these criticisms of the mass news media valid? Once again there is no clear-cut answer. Research on the subject has produced varying results. One study (Johnson, 1969) found that a group of academicians tended to rate newsmen lower on the subject of Vietnam War news than did the newsmen themselves. Another study (Eskenazi, 1972) found that Vietnam correspondents who responded to a questionnaire generally tended to disagree with United States policy toward the war. James D. Wright (1972) observed, however, that "during the four years from 1964 to 1968, the major media in the country shifted their editorial stance markedly, from a prowar to a fairly antiwar position" (p. 42).

On the other hand, a study (Russo, 1971) of the nightly newscasts of NBC and CBS during the 1969-1971 period concluded that they were "at worst" only slightly anti-Vietnam. Emery (1971) believed the military's problems with the news media in Vietnam were partly their

own fault. He criticised the military for withholding information believed to be detrimental to stated policy, and for the establishment of "elaborate statistical counts to justify the policies of the White House and the Pentagon" (p. 621). But perhaps an overall assessment of the situation can be derived from the conclusion of a study of the American business press by DiBacco (1968). After analyzing 33 business periodicals from August 1964 to October 1967, DiBacco summarized that "the arguments of the American business press mirrored those of the general public, with all the ecstasy and the agony that the martial spirit engenders" (p. 435).

As some in the Army were willing to express their views on the reporting of the war, there were also those in the news media willing to express their views of the war's effect on the Army. Journalist David Halberstam (1972) had this to say about Vietnam and the Army:

> The war of course had ravaged the Army. . . . And the gap between the Army and society as a whole did not close, it widened; there was a growing sense of antimilitary feeling in the country, and the Army was of course selected as the scapegoat. (p. 799)

Noted author and Washington Post correspondent Ward Just made this observation in his book Military Men in 1970:

> Society's distrust of soldiers is equalled only by the distrust of soldiers for society, or that part of it--a part they still describe as "the liberals"--which they feel have brought them under attack. Suspicious, resentful, angry beyond measure at what they consider to be indulgent and unfair criticism, the professionals have drawn together at the barricades of the institution. The thing that binds military men together in 1970 is the belief that the country is falling to pieces and the military is the only place where duty, honor and country are put above self. (p. 5)

But as the Army moved into the 1970's even the concept of duty, honor, country above self was to be stained by a series of

self-inflicted wounds. These wounds were brought before the public's eye by the nation's news media and caused the Army serious embarrassment. One of the first wounds of news media exposure involved the Command Sergeant Major of the Army, William Woolridge. Woolridge, along with four other career non-commissioned officers, was accused of swindling the Army club and mess system. One of the non-commissioned officers, Master Sergeant William F. Higdon, received a dishonorable discharge and $25,000 fine ("Sergeant Convicted of Stealing," 1971). Woolridge was allowed to retire after being indicted by a federal grand jury in Los Angeles.

The investigation of the Army club and mess system uncovered several other irregularities. Although not enough evidence was available to justify criminal prosecution, Brigadier General Earl Cole was demoted to colonel, retired, and stripped of the Distinguished Service Medal for his failure to maintain personal and professional integrity. The Chicago Tribune reported Cole's demotion on page one ("General, PX Chief Demoted," 1970). The New York Times also reported the story on page one ("General Cole Demoted," 1970). Other major newspapers reported the story in a similar manner.

Another wound involving personal gain in the higher echelons of the Army was the case of Major General Carl C. Turner, former Provost Marshall General of the Army. Turner was sentenced by a civilian court to three years in prison for unlawfully soliciting 136 firearms from the Chicago Police Department and keeping them for his own personal use ("General in Service," 1971). Late that month, the general pleaded no contest to charges of evading federal income taxes.

In May, 1971, Major General Samuel Koster was demoted to

Brigadier General for his failure to conduct an adequate probe of the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam ("General Koster Demoted," 1971). Along with Koster's demotion came other stories of alleged cover-ups of war crimes. The most notable story involved the accusations of Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Herbert. Herbert accused a general and a colonel of covering up war crimes allegedly committed in Vietnam in 1969. He also claimed that he attempted to report incidents of war crimes to his seniors while in Vietnam. Herbert said his efforts were "rewarded" by his being relieved of his command and shipped back to the United States. The Army contested all of Herbert's claims. But his image of a conscientious career officer under attack by a vindictive Army received a good deal of news media exposure (Wooten, 1971). Herbert's charges were ultimately proven to be false, but not before they "had been in the headlines and before the TV cameras for two years" (Ewing, 1973, p. 14).

Other news stories that dug deep into the integrity of the officer corps concerned the acceptance of fabricated awards for heroism. The most notable news story involved Brigadier General Eugene Forrester. Forrester accepted an award for heroism just prior to departing his unit in Vietnam. A short time later, three enlisted men in the unit claimed they had been ordered by a Major to fabricate the heroism citation for the award. The claim was true, but Forrester was found innocent of any wrongdoing. He had accepted the award believing he had performed essentially similar feats. But the dike had been broken, and soon the news media published other stories concerning unmerited decorations for officers (Hauser, 1973). But it should also be noted that

within this general area the news media continually provided copious coverage to legitimate deeds of valor.

As the wounds in the officer corps became more serious, it appeared to some that the Army itself was in trouble with the ranks. Morale and discipline were on the verge of collapse. A survey published on the front page of the New York Times in late 1971 observed:

> The bitter Vietnam experience has left the United States Army with a crisis in morale and discipline as serious as any its oldest and toughest soldiers can remember. . . .
> The men themselves are fed up with the . . . draft, questioning orders, subverting, smoking marijuana, shooting heroin, stealing from their buddies, hurling racial epithets and rocks at their brothers. (Ayres, 1971, p. 1)

Two other events had major impact on the Army and the military in general in the early 1970's. The first event involved the Columbia Broadcasting System's televising of the documentary "The Selling of the Pentagon" on February 23, 1971. Part of the program's introduction, delivered by CBS News Correspondent Roger Mudd, contained the following commentary:

> There have been recent charges in the press and in Congress that the Department of Defense is using these public relations funds not merely to inform but to convince and persuade the public on vital issues to war and peace. Ten months ago, CBS News set out to investigate these charges and to examine the range and variety of the Pentagon's public affairs activities. (Barrett, 1971, p. 33)

For its efforts in examining those charges, "The Selling of the Pentagon" received an Emmy from the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences and also the George Foster Peabody Award.

But the program was not without controversy. The Pentagon charged CBS with electronically tampering with answers given in an interview by Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Henkin. The

Pentagon said the answers to one question were rearranged so as to appear to be the answers to another question. Other charges included claims of factual errors and the misattribution and rearrangement of quotes from a lecture given by a Marine colonel.

Several Congressmen were also unhappy with the program. One, Representative William L. Springer of Illinois, accused the program of "deceit bordering on fraud" (Barrett, 1971, p. 45). A Congressional subcommittee issued a subpoena to CBS president Frank Stanton demanding that CBS News supply the subcommittee with all program out-takes, transcripts, or unused pieces of film and tape (Barrett, 1971). Stanton refused saying:

> If newsmen are told that their notes, films and tapes will be subject to compulsory process so that the Government can determine whether the news has been satisfactorily edited, the scope, nature and vigor of their news gathering and reporting activities will inevitably be curtailed. (Long, 1971, p. 14)

Upon hearing Stanton's refusal, the subcommittee initiated action to seek a contempt of Congress citation. When the Congress voted on July 13, 1971, the citation was defeated 226 to 181. This quotation by Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) appears to sum up the gist of opposition to the citation:

> The censure of CBS at this time would be an unnecessary political act and foolish as well. Unnecessary since it would not provide the committee with any specific information it does not already have and foolish in that if it has no constitutional basis, it will be thrown out of court. (Long, 1971, p. 16)

To some, "The Selling of the Pentagon" represented one more nick in the military's image. Realizing this point, the Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1970-1971 observed:

> There was no question that "The Selling of the Pentagon" was almost immediately linked in the Congressional and the public mind with the continuing dilemma over whom to believe--network newscasters or government spokesmen, particularly where military matters were concerned. (p. 41)

The second major event occurred about the same time the Congressional subcommittee was preparing to question Dr. Stanton. This event concerned the publication of the so-called "Pentagon Papers" in June, 1971. The Papers were actually a detailed compilation of written data pertaining to American decision-making on Vietnam. Some of the documents carried "Top Secret" markings. The New York Times was the first newspaper to begin publication of the documents. The Washington Post and several other papers soon followed. The papers were made available to the news media by a former government employee named Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg had stolen the Papers while working at the defense-oriented research organization known as the Rand Corporation. Because of the high security classification of some of the Pentagon Papers, the government claimed that continued publication would cause irreparable injury to American defense interests. A Federal judge issued an injunction enjoining the newspapers from further publication until the issue could be decided in court. Within two weeks of the injunction the United States Supreme Court ruled on the case. By a 6-3 vote the court said the government had failed to carry its heavy burden of proof to obtain a prior restraint. The newspapers, therefore, were allowed to continue publication of the Papers.

The court's decision on the Pentagon Papers appears not to have been well received by some officers in the Army. Retired Major General H. T. Johnson (1974), expressed one opinion on the matter:

> I am not, and cannot indict the media as a whole, but there are many media people who regard the military as the enemy of the people and security regulations as an attempt to muzzle them. The Ellsberg case indicates that the news media, in general, is perfectly willing to print classified information if they feel that it will sell newspapers and magazines, or gain radio listeners and TV viewers. (p. 2)

Although not mentioned specifically, the Pentagon Papers' case and other alleged violations of national security seem to be part of the reasons for Colonel Delbert Bristol's (1974) recent comment in Army Magazine:

> We should never be lulled again into the senseless position where "freedom of the press" is superior to the security of our armed forces, either in combat or in readiness to defend our country. (p. 2)

If the major American news media did adopt an antiwar, anti-Army stance during the latter years of the Vietnam War, and if some Army officers were critical of that stance, it would seem logical that the relationship between the two would improve with the ending of American involvement in the war. The logic of such an improvement is seen in the campus experiences of the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). According to a recent Associated Press news story (September 17, 1974) the Vietnam War produced "demonstrations and protests that hurt many ROTC programs, forcing some colleges to abandon them completely. . . ." The story continued that an Associated Press survey found increased interest in Army ROTC spreading "across all areas of the county." It appears from this story that the ending of American involvement in Vietnam helped in part to end the campus hostility toward ROTC.

How are the Army and news media getting along today? Unfortunately the answer is not as clear as the ROTC issues appear to be. Embarrassing stories about the Army still court the attention of the

major media. For example, the report that General Alexander M. Haig's dog had been chauffered 130 miles in an Army staff car by the order of an over-zealous subordinate received wide circulation by both the broadcast and print media. The Los Angeles Times featured the story in three columns on page one ("Dogface Rats on General's Hound," 1975). The Chicago Tribune reported it in one column on page three ("Haig's Dog Unleashes GI Furor," 1975), and the Washington Post used two columns on page 15 ("Haig To Pay," 1975).

More recently, the NBC Nightly News of February 8, 1975, aired an interview with Army Lieutenant Matthew Carroll, the defendant in an up-coming general court-martial. The interview noted that Lieutenant Carroll's refusal to obey an order to get a haircut was the reason for the court-martial.

On the other hand, serious attempts are being made to mend any ill-feelings that may currently exist between the news media and the Army. In July, 1974, Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway made an unprecedented personal visit to the editorial offices of the New York Times and the Washington Post. The primary reason for Secretary Calloway's visit was to gather editorial support for the Army's new all-volunteer concept. The following month, the Secretary declared August 31, 1974, as "News Media Day." The event was publicized as an opportunity for the press, radio, and television to see first hand the day-to-day operations of the volunteer Army. On January 8, 1975, Calloway sent a memorandum to every member of the Army staff urging them to cooperate with the press and Congress. The memorandum was part of the new "Glad You Asked" campaign being initiated by the Secretary. Calloway hoped the program would show everyone that the Army is confident,

open, and competent ("Calloway Wants Openess," 1975). Even though it may be too soon to see any tangible results, the seriousness of the effort is clearly indicated.

Other voices of encouragement have also been heard. On August 31, 1974, a Public Broadcast System television program stated that academia and the mass media must support and encourage the young to join the new volunteer Army or else face the possibility that the Army may feel a loss of affection--a loss serious enough to cause it to turn on the nation!

Even more interesting are the recent views of Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger. In a television interview Schlesinger said he felt the departure from Vietnam and the war in the Middle East had helped end the public hostility toward the military. But, he added, "Now we're faced with a crueler fate, which is indifference rather than hostility. . . . People don't care very much" ("From Hostility to Indifference," 1974).

No one knows for certain what cumulative influence all these events may have on the parties concerned. But quite possibly it was some form of interaction that prompted Army magazine to headline on its September, 1974 cover, "The Army Vs. The Press: A Cease-Fire Proposal."

Where then do we stand? Was the news media fair in its reporting of Army events? No one can say with any degree of certainty. Are the allegations of some Army officers accurate? Once again, no one can say with certainty. But what did occur may be secondary to what some in the Army believed to have occurred. Thus, believability may supersede accuracy. In view of all this, one may logically ask what attitudes

today's Army--specifically, the professional officer corps--holds toward the news media? Providing answers to this question is the primary purpose of this thesis.

Why would a study to determine these attitudes be beneficial? Primarily because so little empirical data is available on the subject. Additionally, what is available tends to be dated information; it may or may not be valid among those officers in the Army today. Furthermore, the study should prove useful in determining the officers' attitudinal position in relation to the questions posed. Any similarities and dissimilarities in attitudes of officers educated through the ROTC or OCS programs could also be compared with those officers educated through the United States Military Academy. Such comparison could provide insight into the merits of various forms of officer education. Finally, any trends or conclusions developed could stimulate additional research or provide a basis for corrective action, if appropriate.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The preceding chapter has introduced the problem and offered a brief glance at the historical relationships between the military and the news media. What is needed now is a discussion of some of the major variables of the study. For example, what are attitudes and what factors influence their formation? In order to answer these and other questions, a review of some of the current literature relative to communications theory is needed. This chapter will also review the literature pertinent to the military and the news media in addition to introducing the hypotheses to be tested.

Before reviewing the literature, however, two terms need to be clarified. First, what is meant by the term "professional" officer? The term professional has often been used to describe someone who has undergone prolonged training to acquire a special skill that enables the individual to perform a unique or specialized service. In relation to the military, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) defined a professional as one "specializing in instruments of violence" (p. 195). Samuel P. Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State (1957) said the military qualified as a profession because it possessed the essential requirements of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Two career Army officers, Bradford and Brown (1973), offer a different definition. They say:

> The military's status as a profession . . . can be defined only in terms of its unique, unconditional obligation to serve the lawful authority of the state. It will

> develop whatever expertise is required to fulfill its unlimited contract for public service. (p. 222)

By definition then, those military careerists who by training, experience, schooling, dedication, and promotion have demonstrated themselves capable of managing violence are considered to be professional Army officers.

The second term needing clarification is "news media." For this study news media will mean the channels of mass communications that are generally recognized as the primary transmitters of timely, formal news content and comment. Specifically, this means television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. Motion pictures, wire services, and books are not included in this definition.

With "professional Army officer" and "news media" defined, the literature review may now begin. Defining the variable "attitude(s)" serves as an appropriate starting point.

Definitions of Attitude

Attitudinal studies and definitions of attitude(s) are abundant within the realm of the social sciences. Here is some of the current thought on the subject:

Thurstone (1929) described attitude as an affective concept. He believed an attitude was the degree of positive or negative affect associated with a psychological object. He went on to say that this psychological object may be a symbol, phrase, slogan, person, institution, ideal, or idea toward which individuals differ with respect to positive or negative affect. Positive affect can be interpreted to mean the individual likes, or has favorable attitudes toward the object. Negative means the individual dislikes or is unfavorable toward the

subject. A person having doubtful attitudes toward some psychological object would be said to be neutral.

Mortensen (1972) supports the affective conceptualization of attitudes:

> Attitudes . . . constitute a predisposition to or readiness to respond to message cues in stable and consistent ways. Typically, the state of readiness is grounded in a judgmental bias, either positive or negative, toward classes of ideas, events, or objects of perception. Attitudes, then, enable each observer to respond to whatever features of an environment he regards as pertinent while ignoring or discounting items he views as having little or no import. (p. 101)

But Allport (1935) felt that attitudes were composed of more aspects than just positive or negative feelings. He said:

> An attitude is a mental and neutral state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related. (It connotes) a neuropsychic state of readiness for mental and physical activity. (Klineberg, 1954, p. 482)

Following along the lines of Allport, Newcomb (1950) spoke of attitude as "a state of readiness for motive arousal," a person's attitude toward something "is his predisposition to perform, perceive, think, and feel in relation to it" (Klineberg, 1950, p. 482).

Katz (1960) not only attempted to define the nature of attitudes, but also their dimensions. Katz believed:

> Attitude is the predisposition of the individual to evaluate some symbol, or object, or aspect of his world in a favorable or unfavorable manner. Opinion is the verbal expression of an attitude, but attitudes can also be expressed in non-verbal behavior. Attitudes include both affective, or feeling core of liking or disliking, and the cognitive, or belief elements which describe the object of the attitude, its characteristics, and its relation to other objects. All attitudes thus include beliefs, but not all beliefs are attitudes. When specific attitudes are organized into a hierarchical structure they comprise value systems. (Macdonald & Schnellenberg, 1971, p. 71)

After summing up much of the theoretical thought on the subject of attitudes, Rosenberg and Hovland (1960) indicated that attitudes are multi-dimensional. They are "predispositions to respond to some class of stimuli with certain classes of responses and designate the three major types of response as cognitive, affective, and behavioral" (p. 3). Rosenberg and Hovland then illustrated how these response classes are inferred through the use of the simple schematic reproduced below in Figure 1.




FIGURE 1

CLASSES OF ATTITUDE RESPONSE

Each specific response class is inferred by the measurable response indicated on the righthand side of the schematic.

Rosenberg (1960) went on to state that "overt actions are guided by underlying affective and cognitive responses" (p. 15). Rosenberg said that earlier studies by Smith (1949), Cartwright (1949), and Woodruff and DiVesta (1948) had found certain degrees of consistency between the affective and cognitive components. Continuing this line of investigation, Rosenberg (1953, 1956) conducted additional studies and concluded that beliefs (cognitive component) associated with an attitudinal feeling of like or dislike (affective component) tend to be congruent with it.

As mentioned earlier, the theoretical and experimental research available on the concept of attitudes is abundant. Limitations of space and time do not permit a more detailed discussion here. A thorough review of the current literature on attitudes, however, is provided by McGuire (1960).

For the purposes of this study, then, the attitudes of professional Army officers may be said to be composed of three major components: affective, cognitive, and behavioral. These components manifest themselves in feelings of like or dislike, favor or disfavor and are generally congruent with the officers' personal beliefs. These feelings and beliefs, in conjunction with the situation at hand, may produce some form of overt behavior.

Attitude Formation

Attitudinal components, however, represent only one part of a complex picture. Equally important is how attitudes are formed. For example, what causes a professional Army officer to acquire and hold the attitudes that he has? Once again, extensive investigation has

produced a wealth of information on the subject. Here are some of the findings pertinent to attitude formation.

Information. Myers and Reynolds (1967) state that "Attitudes are based to some extent upon the kind and amount of information an individual receives and upon the nature of its source" (p. 148). But the factors that determine what kind and how much information an individual receives and believes, varies greatly from individual to individual. DeFleur (1970) points out that biological endowment, parental upbringing, and interaction in the "social milieu" all serve to influence what information a person selects and how he perceives it (p. 121).

Along this line, Hovland and Sherif (1965) reported that "individuals with strong personal involvement will tend to see issues pretty much in all black or white rather than find distinctions," and that "statements even mildly critical of their position will be judged to be more hostile by them than by more neutral individuals (p. 81).

Similarly, Haskins (1966) found that the presentations of factual information did not necessarily influence an individual's opinions or behavior toward an object or event.

Also, Hovland (1959) found that an individual's perception of the source of a communication tends to influence the individual's interpretation and acceptance of the communication's content. Low credibility communicators were considered to be more biased and unfair than individuals attributed with high credibility (Berelson & Steiner, 1965).

Expanding this, in McGuire's "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change," Kelman (1961) conceptualized that a communicator's influence or source valence is dependent upon how a receiver perceives the

source in terms of credibility, attractiveness and power. Kelman theorized that the strength of these characteristics may cause attitude formation or change via three distinct psychological modes. He listed these modes as internalization, identification, and compliance. Kelman described the relationship between modes and characteristics as follows:

1. The internalization mode--This mode is linked to the characteristic of source credibility. If a receiver perceives a source as having expertise in a subject or the "right" answer on a particular issue, the receiver will tend to integrate the arguments used by the source into his own belief and value system.

2. The identification mode--The characteristic of source attractiveness, as determined by the receiver's similarity to, familiarity with, or liking of, is the key to understanding identification. When a receiver finds a source attractive, the receiver will tend to adopt or identify with positions similar to those held by the source. Adoption will be stronger if the relationship with the source is strong or salient. Likewise, if the source adopts a new position, the receiver will also tend to switch to that position. Source, as used in this conceptualization, may be either an individual or some form of receiver reference group.

3. The compliance mode--This mode is associated with the characteristic of source power. When a receiver perceives a source to have power over the receiver's means to obtain certain desirable goals, the receiver may publicly acquiesce to the source's attitudinal position without privately adopting it himself. The degree to which compliance occurs depends upon whether the source has the power to apply positive or negative sanctions to the receiver, how much compliance the source

requires, and the ability of the source to observe if compliance occurs (McGuire, 1969).

From what has been presented, it appears that one could expect professional Army officers to have strong personal involvement with any news issues pertaining to the Army. The degree and direction of that involvement may depend in part on the perceived credibility, attractiveness, and power of the source from which the officer gets the news information.

Research in this area has produced some interesting results. After conducting 160 telephone interviews Chang (1968) concluded that a majority of people use and believe television more than any other medium regardless of demographic differences. But Swift (1971), in studying the news media habits of military personnel in a closed post environment, found that the higher the rank the greater the preference for the print media. Also, enlisted personnel picked television first in credibility whereas officers picked magazines first and television last. Why did the officers pick television last in credibility? Certainly additional research in this area seems justified.

Personality. A person's personality can cause him to adopt some attitudes and reject others. Along these lines, Daniel Katz (1960) believed attitudes perform major functions for the personality. These functions can be grouped according to their motivational basis. He listed four specific functions:

1. The adjustment function--This function concerns individual efforts to maximize rewards and minimize penalties. Attitudes depend upon the present or past perceptions of the utility of the attitudinal object. Does the attitude offer reward or punishment, acceptance or rejection?

2. The ego-defensive function--This serves to protect the individual's ego from acknowledging the basic truths about himself or his world. It helps to relieve anxiety and to reduce internal conflict.

3. The value-expressive function--The main purpose of this function is to allow the individual to express attitudes appropriate to his personal values and his self-concept. For instance, when an individual comes into contact with a new group, the values, ideology, and activities of the group may appeal to his own self-values. If such is the case, the individual will tend to internalize the values of the new group.

4. The knowledge function--Individuals seek knowledge in order to provide standards or frames of references. Without such information they would lack internal stability, and chaos would result. The information need not be complete. It only has to be sufficient enough to allow the individual to adapt to it.

Based on Katz's comments, a person seeking a military career as an officer would do so primarily because it appeals to his personal values and self-concept. The attitudes he holds toward such objects as the military and the news media would be dependent upon their utility in maximizing reward and minimizing penalty.

Experience. An individual's everyday environment produces a wide variety of experience either good or bad, favorable or unfavorable. Myers and Reynolds (1967) noted that actual experience with an object, event, or idea might produce a strong negative reaction "even if all previous factors predisposed us toward a favorable impression. . ." (p. 149). Thus, each experience an officer has with some element of

the news media, particularly if it involves news about the Army, may cause him to form, alter, or reinforce his attitudes toward that news medium.

Social strata. Berelson and Steiner (1964) said, "There are differences in opinions, attitudes, and beliefs that derive from the social strata in which people find themselves or from the social characteristics that they have" (p. 570). They went on to state that these differences are influenced by such factors as an individual's place of residence, his ethnic status, his class, his religion, and his age. For example, Stouffer (1955) found that a young person of today is likely "to be more tolerant when he reaches 60 than were his own parents at 60, he may at the same time be less tolerant than he was in his own younger days" (p. 573). Thus, the older a person is, the more conservative or authoritarian he may tend to be.

In conjunction with Stouffer's findings, Janowitz (1954) found politically conservative attitudes increasing with the higher the military rank. But Janowitz's (1950) classical demographic profile of Army leaders is even more enlightening. From survey data he determined that 86 percent of Army leaders in 1910 came from rural (farm and towns under 2500) areas. Also, 93 percent of these leaders came from southern states or states with southern affiliations (such as southern Ohio or southern Illinois). More importantly, 92 percent of these officers came from the upper or upper middle-classes of American society. Only 7 percent, however, had fathers who had been professional military officers. A similar survey in 1950 found that only 66 percent of the Army leaders were from rural areas. The number of Army leaders coming from southern states or southern affiliated states had declined to

46 percent, but that still represented a hefty, over-representation for the South. Additionally, those leaders coming from the upper or upper middle-class had dropped to 50 percent. Army leaders coming from lower middle-class backgrounds increased from 8 percent in 1910 to 23 percent in 1950. Although Janowitz's study provided no data on the number of officers who came from military families, he did cite that 25 percent of the West Point class of 1960 were sons of active duty Army officers--a possible indication of a future trend.

Janowitz also produced data on the religious affiliations of Army leaders. He found that in 1935 approximately 88 percent were of the Protestant faith, 12 percent of the Catholic faith, and none were of the Jewish faith. The findings in the 1950 survey were almost identical.

Research examples cited by Berelson and Steiner (1964) lend interpretation to Janowitz's findings. They reported that conservative views are often held by persons from the upper strata of society who belong to the dominant church and who come from rural areas.

Groups. Many researchers, such as Curtis (1960) have expressed the belief that emotional and intellectual attitudes are learned in a process of interaction of the individual with others. Often this interaction occurs through the individual's association with various groups. Here are two views concerning the influence of group contact on an individual's attitudes:

> Many of the attitudes held by an individual come either directly or indirectly from the groups of which he is a member (e.g., family, church, work, athletic, social). Groups are important not only in the values which they hold, but also in the amount and type of information which they transmit to an individual. . . . Many authorities believe that "primary

> groups" (e.g., family and work groups) are a major force in determining attitude development. (Meyers and Reynolds, 1967, p. 149)
>
> A basic finding in social psychology is that the attitudes a person holds depend in part upon his social contacts and particularly upon the groups in which he holds membership. (Berelson & Steiner, 1964, p. 566)

A significant characteristic of a group is its cohesiveness, or the degree to which its members refer or feel identified with it. Commenting along these lines, Klineberg (1964) referred to studies by Festinger and pointed out that a "person may be expected to move--if he can--into groups which satisfy his particular needs, and to move out of them when they no longer do" (p. 465).

In discussing the techniques of persuasion, Karlins and Abelson (1970) highlighted the theory that a person's opinions and attitudes are strongly influenced by the groups to which he belongs and wants to belong. Also, they pointed out that the people who are most attached to a group are probably least influenced by communications which conflict with group norms.

According to Berelson and Steiner (1964) "Homogeneity in characteristics normally makes for cohesiveness within the group and for agreement on controversial matters" (p. 567). For example, they said that the longer people live in a community, the more likely they were to hold opinions that agree with the majority of the community.

Another characteristic of group attitudes is that they tend to find agreement with the introduction of a salient issue. Concerning this Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) said:

> An opinion aggregate is more likely to attain solidarity the more highly controversial the opinion, and the more the aggregate is in the minority. . . . Intense conflict with

> other opinions enhances mutual identification of those sharing the given opinion. (Berelson & Steiner, 1964, p. 568)

The last group characteristic to be discussed concerns the role of opinion leaders. According to Berelson and Steiner (1964):

> Opinions, attitudes, and beliefs within a group are particularly subject to influence by the most respected and prestigious member(s) of the group, the opinion leader(s). (p. 569)

Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) provided support for this position with their classic study of voter preference in the Presidential election of 1940. They found that individuals with high news media exposure were helping to influence the vote intentions of those with less news media exposure. Those individuals with high news media exposure were named "opinion leaders" because in addition to news information they also passed on their interpretations of that news information. These findings caused Katz and Lazarsfeld to suggest that a "two-step flow of communication" existed. In brief, this meant that ideas flowed from the news media to opinion leaders and from them to the general population.

In terms of the Army, many agreed (Huntington, Janowitz, Hauser) that the professional officer corps possesses a strong sense of group identity. Within the corps itself, a certain degree of homogeneity exists based on the similarities in social-economic background, military experience, and psychological needs of the individual officers. It would be expected, therefore, that as a group they would exhibit a reasonable amount of attitudinal agreement on various issues or events. The case for attitudinal agreement toward the news media appears even stronger when considered in the light of the various salient issues presented in Chapter I.

The professional officer corps is also a hierarchical group. The higher one goes, the closer he becomes to joining the small group at the top which Mills (1957) called the "power elite." The elite group contains those officers who, because of rank or position, possess a great deal of actual and potential control over the behavior of others. But as indicated earlier, the higher the rank, the greater the conservative tendencies. Thus, when the group feels attacked or threatened, it will probably engage the threatening force with some successful lesson obtained from its past experiences. In relation to conflicts with the news media, this response has usually taken the form of some type of censorship. It would be interesting to know if today's professional Army officers feel the same way.

Even though Army officers may be of the same rank or group, differences exist in the amount of influence and prestige each member possesses. Those officers who have command experience in combat are held with a bit more military esteem than those who have not. Some officers are known as "five percenters" because of being recommended for accelerated promotion when they were younger. Still, others hold the distinction of being graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point. The opportunities and influence derived from being a West Point graduate are numerous. Ward Just (1970) made these observations:

> When the Civil War ended 16 or 17 regular generals in the Union army were West Point graduates; in World War II, 57 percent of the 155 most senior generals . . . were West Pointers. In today's Army, although only 5 percent of the Army's officers are West Point graduates, 30 percent of its generals are (154 of 520 general officers). (p. 109)

Just went on to say that a West Point class ring "opens doors"

and that in "the great middle range of Army officers it does a good deal more than a Harvard Law School degree does for an ambitious corporate lawyer" (p. 110).

But regardless of whether an officer is a "five percenter" or a graduate of West Point, a major indicator of his potential for advancement into the elite group is his selection to attend the Army War College. Addressing this point Just (1970) said:

> As lieutenant colonel and colonel there is a second elimination point, this one known as selection for the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania . . . . At the Army War College in 1970, about one third of the 184 students were West Point graduates . . . and selection is regarded as a virtual certainty that the officer is on his way to a star. (p. 117)

If the Army War College provides a bridge into the elite group, and if the goal of most professional officers is to cross that bridge, then it seems reasonable to assume that those officers selected to attend would represent behavior models for those under their influence. Thus, their attitudes and behavior would carry more importance. They could, in effect, operate as opinion leaders.

The opinions, attitudes, and beliefs of professional Army officers, however, are not necessarily limited to the internal structures of the Army. Their influence outside the military is considerable. Mills (1957) in his book the Power Elite pointed out that:

> Since Pearl Harbor those who command the enlarged means of American violence have come to possess considerable autonomy, as well as great influence, among their political and economic colleagues. Some professional soldiers have stepped out of their military roles into other high realms of American life. Others, while remaining soldiers influence by advice, information, and judgment the political matters, as well as in educational and scientific endeavors. In and out of uniform, generals and admirals have attempted to sway the opinions of the underlying population, lending the weight of their

> authority, openly as well as behind closed doors, to controversial policies. (p. 198)

Thus far the components of attitude(s) and the factors which influence attitude formation have been presented in terms of a broad overview. Certainly the value derived from measuring professional Army officers against the many variables mentioned would be of importance to the Army, the news media, and the general public. Hopefully, such detailed investigation in the future may be possible. But at this point it seems advisable to limit the investigation to certain specific areas. For the purposes of this study, therefore, professional Army officers' attitudes towards the news media will mean their individual affective mental position as indicated by feelings of like or dislike, favor or unfavor. These affective positions towards the news media or news media personalities will be reflected by the officer's verbal self-description as recorded on a self-administered questionnaire. Investigation will center on four main areas: First, attempts will be made to determine the source valence of the various channels of communication within the news media as perceived by the officers. Second, officers' affective attitudes towards some form of censorship control over the news media will be explored. Third, officers' affective attitudes toward news media treatment of all the armed forces will be investigated. Finally, two demographic characteristics (source of military commission and type of military command experience) will be tested to see if there is a significant relationship between these characteristics and the officers' affective attitudes towards the news media.

With the scope of this study now defined and the information on

attitudes and attitude formation serving as background, it is now appropriate to discuss some of the material available on the military and the news media.

The Military and the News Media, Some Opinions and Some Findings

As was suggested in Chapter I, the military and the news media have historically been adversaries. Janowitz (1960) pointed out that the military's long-standing tradition of hostility toward the press was a result of its dislike of contradiction. He said, "They say journalists are particularly obnoxious sources of public criticism" (p. 395). But technological inventions in the latter half of the 19th century soon forced a modification of views. Fuller (1961) cited the internal combustion engine and the wireless as the two inventions having the greatest influence on peace and war. In addition to having direct impact on civil life and military strategy, the wireless, according to Fuller:

> . . . went far, if not to create psychological warfare, to give worldwide power to propaganda; to dement entire nations by transforming the spoken and written word into a weapon of war possessed of the velocity of light and in radius global. (p. 137)

In order to avoid becoming a victim of this new psychological warfare, governments needed to concern themselves with homefront public opinions and morale. But modern warfare in addition to homefront morale requries tremendous mobilization in terms of men and materials. These requirements would be difficult to achieve and impossible to sustain without adequate public support. One only has to look at the Vietnam War to grasp the impact of public support of modern warfare.

President Wilson's concern for public support in World War I manifested itself in the creation of the propaganistic Committee on Public Information. This committee, sometimes referred to as the Creel Board after its head George Creel, was the first of its type in American history. Never before had the government had an organization exclusively designed to control the release of government and military information. In World War II, the government's Office of War Information (OWI) accomplished a similar function. Although the OWI did not engage in the extreme propaganda techniques used by the Creel Board, it did mark the first time a federal agency attempted to maintain homefront morale by supplying the public with a steady flow of war news. These government initiatives caused the military to adopt a public relations type approach toward public news and the news media.

But as Davis (1968) and Summers (1942) pointed out, the military services in World War II interpreted this approach differently than the news media did. The military believed that any bad news aided the enemy and caused the public to lose confidence in their military leaders. Thus, only good news or news favorable to the military should be presented to the public. As mentioned in Chapter I, this evolved into "the team" concept of military news reporting.

Intense competition for various strategic programs caused the military to continue this philosophy in times of peace, according to Huntington (1960). Inter-service rivalries were keen, and an individual service could not expect to have its strategic programs approved without Congressional or public support. It was feared that such support would be denied if unfavorable information obtained national interest.

Not everyone was happy with the military's concept of public relations. New York Times Pentagon correspondent Jack Raymond in his book Power at the Pentagon (1964) said:

> The military establishment must not be an automated juggernaut whose operations we take for granted. We ought to raise hell with it constantly, ask questions, demand truthful answers. (p. 334)

But truthful answers were not always thought to be in the best interest of the military or the government. Commenting on this, Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester said:

> It would seem to be basic, all through history . . . that it's inherent in that Government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself when it's going into nuclear war. This seems to be basic. Basic. (Raymond, 1964, p. 322)

Richard Dudman, Washington correspondent for the St. Louis Post Dispatch, took exception to this. Dudman felt a reporter was not doing his job if he felt "bound to support current American policy and let himself be made, in effect, a public relations man for a group of American officials" (1971, p. 35). Along similar lines, Curtis MacDougall in his book Interpretative Reporting (1972) said:

> The American press is a patriotic one which means that often it is duped itself and misleads readers by rushing into print with statements by prominent public officials which later have to be modified or counteracted. (p. 24)

The apparent falling out between the military and the news media during the Vietnam War has been detailed in Chapter I. Here, however, are two opinions that may be reflective of the current post-Vietnam military-media relationship:

> There has been such obfuscation, distortion, and mishandling of interpretation concerning Vietnam--such a climate of distrust between Government and the news media--that the end result may be a deadly sense of cynicism. (Friendly, 1971, p. 20)

> Except for the still-embargoed Peers report on My Lai and the trail of the unhappy Ohio National Guardsmen, there does seem to be an issue on hand to whip up a new wave of anti-military sentiment in this country. (Schweitz, 1974, p. 15)

It should be noted, however, that Army Secretary Callaway has since released the Peers Report, and the Ohio National Guardsmen were exonerated of any wrongdoing. Both events were reported by the national news media, but neither seemed to have caused any renewed anti-military feelings. This uncertainty over what the current climate may be, coupled with the fact that there is little empirical research to assist in making any conclusions, highlights the need for additional investigation. What empirical data that is available will now be discussed.

Strole (1970) conducted a study of military news correspondents assigned to the Pentagon. Of the 29 regulars who were interviewed, most responded that "secrecy or overclassification," "complexity and enormity of the Department of Defense," and "news management" were the three worst obstacles encountered in reporting military news. At the time of the survey, the respondents also felt news sources were tighter and the news barriers more severe than they were ten years earlier. Much of the blame for this was attributed to the policies of former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The use of deception and the telling of outright lies, as in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Polomares (Spain) H-bomb incident of 1966, were strongly criticized. The regular reporters, however, pointed out that the outspoken critics of the military were not the reporters assigned to the Pentagon, but outsiders who believed that the regulars were "kept lackeys" of the Department of Defense.

Greer (1971) discovered that television news directors as a

group do not object to the military presenting themselves in a favorable light. The news directors, however, did show antagonism toward the sheer volume of military releases and the quality of the news content. On the other hand, those television news directors having the least contact with the military information programs tended to have the most favorable attitudes towards these programs.

Some in the military think television thrives on sensationalism. But research indicates news decision makers operate along conventional news lines. Bailey and Lichty (1972) examined the background of NBC's controversial telecast of a street execution of a Viet Cong officer by a bullet to the brain. They concluded that decisions by NBC personnel which may have appeared to be personal acts were in fact governed by powerful journalistic norms. Each NBC gatekeeper involved with the film assessed the newsworthiness of the story along traditional, identifiable news standards.

Winston (1965) surveyed 100 Washington-based Army generals and found that only 52 percent believed the press was performing properly in serving the people's right to know. Those who disapproved of the press' performance blamed the press for sensationalism at the expense of the significant. One-third of the generals endorsed pre-publication clearance of stories written about the Army. They also favored imposing some sort of control on the flow of information in the interest of cold war victory. Most of the generals were dissatisfied with the caliber of press coverage given the Army. But they agreed that the press performs effectively in serving as society's "watchdog" over the Army. Interestingly, most of the generals held Army information officers in low esteem.

Concerning attitudes toward Army information officers, Highlander (1972) surveyed 397 Army captains and concluded that the junior officers understood the need for public relations advice to senior commanders. But, the captains also held negative attitudes toward information officers and their ability to perform the information function.

A survey of 148 Army information officers by Bryan (1972) found most had a print media orientation. Characteristics of familiarity and personal ability were positively related to favorability toward a particular mass communication medium. Furthermore, the respondents perceived the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) as having the greatest threat value of the three major networks.

Moore (1972) surveyed both military information officers and newsmen who had served or were serving in Vietnam. He found information officers rated the wire services, newspapers, and magazines high on accuracy and objectivity and low on sensationalism. On the other hand, the officers rated television high on sensationalism and low on accuracy and objectivity. On the subject of censorship, both information officers and newsmen agreed there was little formal control. But, approximately 65 percent of the newsmen believed the military used security classifications to withhold legitimate or public news. Almost 70 percent of the information officers disagreed.

Vietnam correspondents were also the subject of a study by Hagley (1968). Findings indicated that American military commanders were considered the best overall news source by the 100 correspondents surveyed. But, only one-third of the correspondents thought the

commanders were highly accurate and objective. Another one-third indicated they rated their own observations above all sources.

The military reporting efforts of one particular news correspondent was the subject of investigation by Miller (1968). The correspondent was Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times. Salisbury created a good deal of controversy in American news circles when he began filing news dispatches from North Vietnam in December, 1966. Salisbury primarily reported what effects American bombing of the North was having on the North Vietnamese. After careful study, Miller concluded that Salisbury "went beyond the confines of interpretive reporting, observation, attribution, substantiation, documentation . . . he should have been more precise. . ." (p. 55). Miller went on to state that Salisbury "indirectly advocated that his readers form certain opinions on the U.S. war aims" (p. 55).

Other studies of the print media have pertained directly to Vietnam. Westling (1970) considered Time magazine's news coverage during the period 1965 to 1967 supportive of the American position in Vietnam and highly biased in favor of the military. Everhart (1973) studied U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, and Time during five key events of the war. He found the magazines to be slightly more critical than supportive of American war policy. He did note that this attitude varied from event to event. Only U.S. News and World Report continually supported American policy.

How six metropolitan newspapers reported Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Herbert's allegations of war crimes and their cover-up was studied by Sharp (1964). His findings presented numerous incidents of erroneous, or careless reporting, especially by the New York Times.

The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (listed as two of the best newspapers in the last decade by Time) (January 21, 1974, p. 58) had also taken an editorial position based on unsubstantiated allegations. Sharp stated that none of the newspapers involved investigated Herbert's allegations until after the Army announced it was unable to substantiate his claims.

Orwant and Ullmann (1974) compared the attitudes toward reporting of military news of 204 Pentagon officers and 110 male civilians. On the topic of the Pentagon papers, 65.1 percent of the officers felt their publication had "no effect" on the Army's mission in Vietnam. "More harmful than helpful" was the response of 27.4 percent, while only 7.4 percent found publication "more helpful than harmful." Only 37.8 percent of the civilians picked "no effect," while 45.6 chose "more harmful" and 16.7 selected "more helpful." When asked what effect the Pentagon Papers' publication had on foreign policy, 61.2 percent of the officers felt they were "more harmful than helpful." Only 42.9 percent of the civilians agreed with them. The investigators contributed the large "no effect" response by officers on the Vietnam question to be a result of personal expertise in the military art. Overall, officers generally had less favorable attitudes than civilians did concerning the right to publish military news. Also, both groups seemed to indicate a particularly high degree of uncertainty about the credibility of media-reporting of military affairs.

Concerning credibility, Stonecipher (1971) found that newsmen considered the newspaper press more socially responsible than did persons occupying four non-media occupational roles. The same results held

true when evaluating press performance. Stonecipher indicated that newsmen may need to re-examine their "illusions" about being socially responsible.

Finally, Sims (1971) asked a group of Naval officers, "Which branch of the armed forces is most favored by the news media?" In analyzing the responses of 97 Admirals and 47 Public Affairs officers, Sims found that both groups ranked the Air Force first, the Marine Corps second, the Navy third, and the Army last. Based on Sims' findings, one might logically wonder if Army officers perceive the situation in a similar manner.

Conclusions. Much of the research to date concerns either Army information officers or the Vietnam War. Only one study (Winston, 1965), specifically deals with the attitudes of professional Army officers toward the news media. In Winston's study, the survey group was composed of general officers who, by definition, comprise the military power elite. In that regard, their answers may have been somewhat guarded. Still, they expressed views accusing the news media of sensationalism and irresponsibility. Also, they felt a need for some form of censorship control over the news media as pertains to military news. Winston's study, however, was conducted in 1965 before the major Vietnam build-up and before the events of the early 1970's. Thus, his findings may have become institutionalized with the passing of time. There exists, therefore, a current need to re-examine the direction and significance of the attitudes held by professional Army officers towards the news media. An area of particular interest appears to be the officers' attitudes toward television news.

Additionally, little information is available which indicates

the potential relationship between certain demographic characteristics of professional Army officers and their attitudes toward the news media. For instance, does the initial source of military education have any influence on the officers' attitudes towards the news media? What about command experience in combat units as opposed to command of non-combat units? By identifying and analyzing the effects of these variables, among others, on officers' attitudes, the Army may be able to formulate needed corrective measures.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM

As indicated by the literature review, there are no recent empirical studies dealing specifically with the attitudes of professional Army officers towards the news media. Earlier studies appear to be outdated by recent events and the turnover of personnel within the Army. More recent studies have tended to deal primarily with Army information officers or news media coverage of the Vietnam War. Data obtained from information officers appears to be of limited value in relation to the rest of the officer corps. In the Army, public information is a specialized field outside the normal routine of things. Furthermore, the evidence clearly indicates that information officers neither serve as opinion leaders, nor have high status with their professional contemporaries.

Findings presented on the news media were either inconsistent or of such a limited scope as to preclude postulating their effect on Army officers' attitudes. But the opinions and events cited earlier indicate a definite need for investigation into this vital area. The American public, the news media, and the Army can ill-afford the luxury of not knowing how each basic institution views the others.

The specific problems to be investigated in this study are stated as follows:

1. What are the current attitudes of professional Army officers toward the news media?

2. Is there a significant relationship between these attitudes and certain demographic characteristics (source of commission, command experience, etc.)?

3. In terms of the news media, what controls or corrective action, if any, do these officers feel a need for?

4. Is there a significant relationship between their attitudes towards the news media and some particular news event, news source, or news personality?

5. Do professional Army officers feel that other military services have received more favorable news coverage by the news media than the Army?

Hypotheses

One individual study cannot hope to contribute significantly in all the areas mentioned in the preceding chapters. For this study, four general hypotheses were constructed. The first three were based primarily on research findings cited in Chapter II. The last hypothesis was exploratory in nature. Previous research on the military had not yielded any findings on the possible relationships between an officer's attitude toward the news media and his source of commission or type of command experience. Specifically, the hypotheses are:

H_1 There is a significant positive correlation between professional Army officers' affective attitudes toward the news media and their desire for some form of censorship control over the news media on military related news.

H_2 Professional Army officers' affective attitudes toward television news are significantly more negative than their affective attitudes toward other news media.

H_3 Professional Army officers' affective attitudes toward news media treatment of the Army are significantly more negative than their affective attitudes toward news media treatment of other armed services.

H_4 Source of military commission and type of command experience account for a significant proportion of variance in professional Army officers' attitudes towards the news media.

Operational Definitions

The following additional operational definitions were utilized in this study:

1. News media personalities--nationally known individuals who write or broadcast news for national consumption on a daily, weekly, or syndicated basis.

2. News editorial--any expression of an opinion or a statement of position by individuals associated with the news media.

3. News censorship--suppression, removal or slanting of news information by those in the news media to avoid possible punitive action by government or military sources.

4. Military censorship--suppression, removal, or slanting of news information by military or government officials which may be of news value to the news media or the general public.

5. Command experience--actual military command of a company-size or larger Army unit in either a combat or non-combat environment for a period in excess of six months.

6. Combat army officers--officers who hold Army commissions in either Infantry, Armor, or Field Artillery.

7. Combat support officers--officers who hold Army commissions

in either Combat Engineers, Military Intelligence, Military Police Corps, Signal Corps, or Air Defense Artillery. It should be noted here that Air Defense Artillery officers are considered by the Army to be combat army officers. Their inclusion here is based on this investigator's judgment that their role in South Vietnam was more a supportive role than a direct combat role.

8. Other officers--officers who hold Army commissions in the Adjutant General Corps, Chemical Corps, Finance Corps, Judge Advocate General Corps, Medical Corps, Medical Service Corps, Ordnance Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Transportation Corps, and Chaplain Corps.

9. Combat unit--company-size or larger TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) Army unit composed predominately of infantry, armor, cavalry, or field artillery.

10. Non-combat unit--any company-size or larger Army unit not included in the definition of combat unit.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Sampling Procedure

Bob Schweitz, Army Times editorial writer, made this observation following his participation in a media conference at one of the military War Colleges:

> . . . (there seems) to be a little understanding among the students about the media's role in America.
>
> By the time officers reach the War College it may be too late to change their minds about the media. Instruction about the constitutional role of the press should begin earlier, perhaps in ROTC and in the academies. (Media Should be Heard, 1974, p. 15)

Based on Schweitz's remarks and the earlier comments of Ward Just in Chapter II, it appears that student officers at the Army War College represent an ideally select group of professional Army officers upon which to test the study's hypotheses.

Pursuing this objective, a letter was sent to the Army War College requesting permission to conduct a mail survey of the current class in residence (see Appendix A). By return letter the Army War College granted approval for the survey (Appendix A). Additionally, the following information was supplied through a telephone conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Rilling, Information Officer at the Army War College:

1. The total number of students enrolled in the present class was 219. Of that total, 35 were graduates of the United States Military Academy, 96 were graduates of the ROTC, and 43 were graduates of the Officers' Candidate School. Other sources of commission included

eight officers commissioned through the Army Reserve, four through the National Guard, and one direct commission officer. The remaining 32 students were members of other armed forces, or high ranking federal employees.

2. The total Army student population at the War College, therefore, was 187 officers. Of that total, 112 were considered to be combat arms officers, 42 were combat support-officers, and 33 were classified as other.

Based on the information supplied by Lieutenant Colonel Rilling, this investigator decided source of commission and branch of Army service were of sufficient distribution as to allow all hypotheses to be tested. The data collection procedure selected, therefore, was a census of the attitudes of the 187 Army officers enrolled in the 1975 class at the Army War College.

Selection and Administration of the Mail Survey

The decision to use a mail survey was based on several major advantages. The most important of these considerations were: (1) privacy when answering, (2) sufficient time for considered answers, (3) naturalistic conditions. A possible disadvantage, however, was the problem of nonresponse. Along this line, Paul Erdos in his book Professional Mail Surveys said, "No mail survey can be considered reliable unless it has a minimum of 50 percent response" (p. 45). Erdos continued by outlining several guides which could be used to help control the problem of nonresponse. These guides included use of an advance post card, selection of an important-sounding title for the questionnaire, and the use of a follow-up post card. All of the above guides

were used in addition to identifying the investigator as a fellow Army officer (see Appendices A, B, and C). Furthermore, respondents were told their answers would be kept confidential and that they would remain anonymous. It was hoped that measures such as these would help increase the return and encourage respondents to answer with candor.

Final administrative procedures for distribution of the survey were coordinated through telephone conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Rilling. It was agreed the advance post cards, the questionnaire, and the follow-up post cards would be bulk-mailed through United Parcel Service to the Information Office at the Army War College. When the material arrived, the Information Office would then have responsibility for distributing it to the respondents' military mailboxes, collecting the completed questionnaires, and returning them to the investigator. Additionally, the Information Office attached a cover letter to the questionnaire. The letter indicated a suspense date for return of the questionnaire and encouraged students to participate (see Appendix A). The final schedule maintained is depicted in Table I.

Data Collection Instrument

As mentioned in Chapter II, the affective dimension of attitudes is usually observed empirically by use of verbal behavior measures, such as self-reported questionnaire items. This approach is often used in communications research to produce data representing mental attitudes and to determine the direction and intensity of such attitudes. Based on general acceptance, therefore, a specially designed self-reported questionnaire was used as the data collection instrument for this survey.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION AND MAILING SCHEDULE

Investigator	Army War College	Date Mailed or Distributed
1. Total Survey Mailed		April 4, 1975
2.	Advance Post Cards Distributed	April 10, 1975
3.	Questionnaire Distributed	April 11, 1975
4.	Follow-up Post Cards Distributed	April 16, 1975
5.	Cutoff Date for Completed Questionnaires	April 18, 1975
6. Last Questionnaires Received From Army War College		April 25, 1975

Two scaling procedures were used in the questionnaire to determine the officers' affective attitudes toward the news media. The first was an equal-interval appearing intensity scale developed by Likert (1932). This technique allows an individual to indicate his agreement or disagreement with an item through the use of a five-interval rating system. Because of the equal-interval appearing characteristics it was assumed that Likert-scaled statements provided interval rather than ordinal measurement. For this study, the five intervales were: Strongly agree, Agree somewhat, No opinion, Disagree somewhat, and Strongly disagree. Scoring was accomplished by assigning values of 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Scoring was reversed for

negatively worded items. A respondent's attitude toward the news media was determined by summing his score on each Likert-scaled statement, then dividing that score by the total number of Likert-scaled statements. This obtained each subject's overall mean score. Individual means were then summed and divided by the number of respondents. This produces an overall mean score for all respondents. It is this mean that is used to represent the officer's affective attitudes toward the news media.

The other scaling procedure used was the five-interval version of the semantic differential by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957).

This technique is designed to measure the connotative meanings of concepts as points in what Osgood calls "semantic space." The main premise is that while individuals may perceive things differently, there must be some common core of meaning or perception in all concepts. This meaning is usually determined through the use of bipolar adjective scales which measure the intensity of an individual's attitude. The semantic differential was selected for use in this study for three reasons: (1) it provided interval-scaled data for statistical analysis, (2) it allowed for the respondents' attitudinal positions toward various news media concepts to be determined by calculating the mean of the ratings on the six scales used, and (3) it allowed for mean scores of various news media concepts to be placed into groups, such as television or newspapers, and then those group scores compared with similar group scores obtained on the Likert-scaled statements.

Additionally, one question was included which used the sentence-completion technique. This procedure was used in order to allow respondents to volunteer information without specific prompting. Also,

a greater variety of respondent answers could be obtained. Thus, it offered this investigator assistance in identifying potential variables. Care, however, was used in interpreting the data obtained by this method. This was because such data could not be added, ranked, or scaled with any degree of reliability. Sentence-completion type questions are generally considered to represent nominal data and to be of little statistical value.

Pre-test Procedure and Results

A pre-test of the mail questionnaire was conducted among 14 Army officers currently enrolled as students at The University of Tennessee. The purpose of the pre-test was two fold. First, it was intended to eliminate any confusion or ambiguity in the various statements or news media concepts used in the questionnaire. Second, it was intended to provide feedback on any possible fatigue or boredom produced by the 15-page length of the questionnaire.

Responses obtained on the Likert-scaled statements were submitted to the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Test (Nie, Bent, & Hull, 1970). Six of the Likert-scaled statements were eliminated from the final questionnaire because their correlation coefficients with at least two other similar questions were found to be significant at the .05 alpha level. Also, a visual scan of the pre-test responses resulted in the elimination of four semantic differential concepts. All four involved the names of news media personalities. Two of the four were dropped when over 50 percent of the respondents indicated they were unfamiliar with the name. The other two were dropped in order to provide better balance among the remaining news media concepts.

When asked about the length of the questionnaire, all respondents said it posed no problem. Average time needed to complete the questionnaire was 19.5 minutes.

Variables

The following independent and dependent variables were used in the study:

Dependent variables--attitudes of professional Army officers toward the news media in general, toward individual news channels, and toward individual news personalities. Likert-scaled statements and the semantic differential were used to measure these variables.

Independent variables--source of commission, type of command experience, branch of service within the Army (Armor, Transportation, etc.), political affiliation, area of birth, and the amount of selective exposure to the news media (see Appendix B, Questionnaire).

Statistical Analysis of the Data

Six statistical procedures were used in analyzing Army officers' attitudes toward the news media. Four of the six procedures came from the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The first SPSS program used was Codebook. This program computed and provided a display of one-way frequency distributions for all values in each question. Supportive descriptive data, such as the mean, the standard error, the variance, and skewness were also provided.

The next program used was Condescriptive. This program provided descriptive data similar to Codebook, but these data were based on mean scores of all respondents to specific groupings. For instance, one grouping included all the Likert-scaled statements. Another

grouping included only those Likert-scaled statements that pertained to censorship.

The third program, Pearson Corr, was used to test hypothesis H_1. This method of correlation analysis measured the strength of the linear relationship between the two variables mentioned in the hypothesis (overall attitude toward the news media and the desire for some form of censorship control). Additionally, it produced simple summary statistics that described the strength of the association (correlation coefficient), the number of cases upon which the correlation coefficient was computed, and the test of significance. Obtaining normally-distributed and interval-scaled data were prerequisites for the use of the Pearson Corr program. A scattergram was also obtained to help understand and interpret any relationship the Pearson Corr detected.

Hypothesis H_4 was tested by the SPSS program, Regression. This multiple regression analysis program studies the linear relationship between a set of independent variables and a dependent variable, while taking into account the interrelationships among the independent variables. In short, the program was used to identify the amount of variance the source of commission and command experience (independent variables) accounted for in the officers' attitudes towards the news media (dependent variable). An added advantage of this program was the summary table presented at the conclusion of the final step. This table listed the simple correlation, the multiple correlation, the total variance, and the change in variance accounted for by each independent variable.

Hypotheses H_2 and H_3 were tested by use of a t-test. This statistical procedure tests the significance of the difference between

two sample means. Means used in these tests were provided by the Codebook program.

One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was the last statistical method used. Unlike the t-test, one-way ANOVA is capable of comparing more than two sample means at a time. Thus, it was used in an exploratory manner to determine if any significant differences in attitude toward the news media existed within sub-groups of various independent variables, e.g., area of birth, political affiliation. The result of the ANOVA comparisons was presented in terms of an F value which was then tested for significance. ANOVA does not, however, determine where the differences lie when the F value proves significant. To make this determination a post hoc comparison was conducted using the Scheffé test (Huck, Cormier, and Bounds, 1974).

Limitations

There were several limitations associated with this study. In brief they were as follows:

1. The attitudinal results obtained may not, in fact, be representative of the attitudes of the professional Army officer corps in general. Based on what has been previously presented, however, it does seem reasonable to assume that officers selected to attend the Army War College represent opinion leaders, or at least maintain high status among the majority of the professional officer corps.

2. Bias may have been introduced by the investigator's inability to control the Army-news media environment prior to the administration of the questionnaire. For example, the deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam was receiving widespread news media

attention at the time the questionnaire was being administered (see Appendix B, Statement 29).

3. The respondent's knowledge that he was being tested may have biased his answers. Hopefully, the promises of confidentiality and the previously mentioned advantages of a mail survey assisted in minimizing this limitation. One question in the demographic section was specifically developed to determine how much formal instruction the officers have had in the techniques of survey research (see Appendix B, Question 11).

4. Human errors and investigator bias (this investigator is a member of the Army officer corps) may have contaminated the results. It is hoped that this was overcome to some degree by the use of sound statistical methods and the pre-testing of the questionnaire.

5. The data obtained in this research may be limited by time. That is, the attitudes prevalent today among professional Army officers may be less prevalent tomorrow, hence the need to reconstruct the data from time to time.

6. The problems associated with ex post facto research may have placed certain limitations on this study. These problems include the inability to manipulate independent variables, the lack of power to randomize, and the risk of improper interpretation.

7. The one-shot design used in this study precluded the deduction of any causal relationships.

Assumptions

There were several assumptions made in the preparation of this study. These include:

1. The assumption that the news media influence the attitudes of professional Army officers.

2. The assumption that professional Army officers have selective interests and therefore may not have been aware of all the events that occurred between the Army and the news media.

3. It was assumed that the use of Likert-scaled statements, semantic differential, and sentence-completion type questions as data collection forms were valid and reliable methods of obtaining attitudinal positions of professional Army officers.

4. It was assumed that the pre-test study was a reliable method of obtaining valid concepts for use with the data collection forms.

5. It was assumed that an individual's affective domain toward an object represents a valid measure of his attitude toward the object.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

Return Rate

A total of 133 questionnaires were received from the student officers at the Army War College. Based on a sample size of 187, this represented a return rate of 71.1 percent. All returned questionnaires were considered useable although some contained one or two missing observations.

Descriptive Analysis of Demographic Characteristics

Demographic characteristics of the respondents provided both a description of the sample and a data base upon which to make comparisons with other studies. Questions 1-12 at the end of the questionnaire were used to collect this data.

Source and type of commission. Slightly more than half of the respondents (50.4 percent) were commissioned through the ROTC program (see Table 2). Those commissioned through OCS comprised 23.2 percent; those from USMA comprised 22.6 percent; and only 3.8 percent indicated they had received a direct commission. These percentages may represent a slight numerical increase over the figures given in Chapter IV. This is probably the result of the Reserve and National Guard officers being excluded from those original source-of-commission figures. Along this line, 127 officers said they held Regular Army (RA) commissions, while six indicated they held Reserve Commissions. More importantly, both these figures and those given earlier point to a continuing increase

TABLE 2

SOURCE OF COMMISSION AND POLITICAL PREFERENCE

Source	Source of Commission Cumulative Relative Frequency (Percent)	Adjusted Frequency (Percent)	Absolute Frequency	Political Preference Democrat N(Percent)	Republican N(Percent)	Independent N(Percent)	Missing N(Percent)
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)	50.4	50.4	67	22(32.8)	26(38.8)	14(20.9)	5(7.5)
Officer Candidate School (OCS)	23.3	73.7	31	14(45.2)	8(25.8)	6(19.4)	3(1.6)
United States Military Academy (USMA)	22.6	96.3	30	11(36.7)	9(30.0)	7(23.3)	3(10.0)
Direct Commission (DA)	3.7	100.0	5	4(80.0)	1(20.0)	-- --	-- --
Totals			133	51	44	27	11

in representation among officers commissioned from sources other than the Military Academy. Ward Just, in Chapter II, said that about one-third of the 184 students at the War College in 1970 were graduates of West Point. Moreover, he noted that West Point officers normally represent about 50 percent of the class. In this study of the 1975 class, they represented slightly less than 19 percent of the total student population. The results of this study, therefore, may be considered to be based on a more cosmopolitan representation of "elite" elements of the professional officer corps than previous investigations may have been.

Branch of service within the Army. Based on earlier definitions, over half (56.8 percent) of all respondents belonged to the combat arms category; 24.2 percent belonged to the combat support category; and 19.1 percent belonged to the "other" branch category. Additional information on this characteristic is provided in Table 3.

Command experience. Nearly all respondents (97.7 percent) indicated their background included some type of command experience (see Table 4). Only three officers said they had never commanded. Of these, one was in the Medical Corps, one in the Finance Corps, and one in the Judge Advocate General Corps. Average length of time in command for those with company or battalion level experience was approximately 12 to 18 months.

Contrary to what might have been intuitively expected considering the length of the Vietnam War, only half (49.9 percent) of those respondents with command experience indicated they had commanded in combat (see Table 5). Furthermore, 30 percent of the command experience

TABLE 3

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR BRANCH OF SERVICE

Branch	(NWC)[a]	Absolute Frequency[b]	Relative Frequency (percent)	Adjusted Frequency (percent)	Cumulative Adjusted Frequency (percent)
Combat Arms					
Infantry	46	39	29.3	29.5	29.5
Armor	15	10	7.5	7.6	37.1
Artillery	37	26	19.5	19.7	56.8
Total	98	75	--	56.8	--
Combat Support					
Air Defense Artillery	14	10	7.5	7.6	64.4
Combat Engineers	16	6	4.5	4.5	68.9
Military Intelligence	12	8	6.0	6.0	74.9
Military Police Corps	4	2	1.5	1.5	76.4
Signal Corps	10	6	4.5	4.5	80.9
Total	56	32	--	24.2	--
Other Branches					
Adjutant General Corps	5	3	2.3	2.3	83.2
Chaplin Corps	1	0	--	--	--
Chemical Corps	3	2	1.5	1.5	84.7
Finance Corps	3	3	2.3	2.3	87.0
Judge Advocate General Corps	2	1	0.8	0.8	87.8
Medical Corps	3	3	2.3	2.3	90.1
Medical Service Corps	1	0	--	--	--
Ordnance Corps	5	5	3.8	3.8	93.9
Quartermaster Corps	3	3	2.3	2.3	96.2
Transportation Corps	7	5	3.8	3.8	100.0
Total	33	25		19.1	
Totals	187	132			

[a](NWC) = Number enrolled at Army War College

[b]N = 132 (one observation missing)

TABLE 4

COMMAND EXPERIENCE

Unit Size	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Percent)	Adjusted Frequency (Percent)	Cumulative Adjusted Frequency (Percent)
Company Command Experience	111	83.5	--	--
Under 6 months	11	8.2	9.9	9.9
Over 6 months	17	12.8	15.3	25.2
Over 12 months	38	28.6	34.2	59.4
Over 18 months	45	33.8	40.6	100.0
Battallion Command Experience	116	87.2	--	--
Under 6 months	5	3.8	4.3	4.3
Over 6 months	13	9.8	11.2	15.5
Over 12 months	31	23.3	26.7	42.2
Over 18 months	67	50.4	57.8	100.0
Brigade Command Experience	7	5.3	--	--
Under 6 months	3	2.3	42.9	42.9
Over 6 months	1	0.8	14.2	57.1
Over 12 months	--	--	--	57.1
Over 18 months	3	2.3	42.9	100.0
No Command Experience	3	2.3	--	--

TABLE 5

TOE[a] COMMAND EXPERIENCE AND COMMAND ENVIRONMENT

	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Percent)	Adjusted Frequency (Percent)	Cumulative Adjusted Frequency (Percent)
TOE Command Experience				
1. Company size	78	58.6		
2. Battalion size	63	47.4		
3. Brigade size	2	1.5		
4. No TOE command experience	40	30.0		
Type of Command Environment				
1. Hostile only	8	6.0	6.1	6.1
2. Both hostile and non-hostile	57	42.8	43.8	49.9
3. Non-hostile only	65	48.9	50.1	100.0

[a]TOE = Table of Organization and Equipment

group said they had never commanded a TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) combat unit (see earlier definitions).

Size and place of birth. More than one-third of the officers indicated rural (farm and towns under 2500) areas as their place of birth. Another 43.9 percent specified nonindustrialized urban areas over 2500 population. Southern states were the most often cited (34.1 percent) places of birth. These findings seem to compare favorably with those cited in Janowitz's study (page 27). The percentage of officers with rural backgrounds has declined, but this is probably consistent with trends in the national population. As in the past, the number of officers from industrialized metropolitan areas remained small (15.2 percent). A summary of those findings is presented in Table 6.

Military background. Seventeen officers (13.0 percent) said they came from families with military backgrounds. Of this total, 13 (9.8 percent) said their father or grandfather had been a career officer. The remaining 3.2 percent said their father or grandfather had been a career enlisted man. As a result of these figures, there does not appear to be a link between attendance at the Army War College and the concept of a self-perpetuating military elite.

Political affiliations. Of those officers who responded to the question of political party, 42.1 percent said they were Democrat; 36.4 percent said Republican; and 22.3 percent said Independent (see Table 2). Eleven officers failed to respond to the question. Those who indicated they were Independent were forced to write it on the questionnaire as provisions for that response were purposely omitted. This

TABLE 6

SIZE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

	Absolute Frequency (N=132)	Relative Frequency (percent)	Adjusted Frequency (percent)	Cumulative Adjusted Frequency (percent)
Size				
Rural/Farm	26	19.5	19.7	19.7
Small Town (less than 2500 pop.)	21	15.8	15.9	35.6
Urban Industrial (over 2500 pop.)	20	15.0	15.2	50.8
Urban Commercial (over 2500 pop.)	58	43.6	4.39	94.7
Military Installation	4	3.0	3.0	97.7
Not Ascertained	3	2.3	2.3	100.0
Total	132			
Place				
New England Area	7	5.3	5.3	5.3
Middle States	27	20.3	20.5	25.8
Southern States	45	33.8	34.1	59.8
North Central States	38	28.6	28.8	88.6
Western States	3	2.3	2.3	90.9
Northwest States	7	5.3	5.3	96.2
Other	5	3.8	3.8	100.0

was done to keep respondents from disguising their actual political affiliation.

Prior instruction in the techniques of survey research or statistical analysis. A large plurality of the respondents (75.2 percent) reported they had received formal instruction in the techniques of survey research. The majority of these (62.0 percent) said their instruction included both survey research and statistical analysis; 26 percent said survey research only; and 12 percent said statistical analysis only.

Attitudes Toward the News Media--Likert-Scaled Statements

Mean scores on the 29 Likert-scaled statements ranged from a high of 4.684 for statement 7 (agree strongly) to a low of 1.827 for statement 3 (disagree somewhat). The overall mean score for all 29 statements, based on 130 valid observations, was 2.646. Officers' attitudes toward the news media, therefore, appear to border on ambivalence (3.0). At worst, they are only "somewhat unfavorable." Table 7 gives the mean score and other descriptive information for each statement. While inspecting Table 7, it is important to note that a difference of 1.27 points exists between the highest mean (4.684, statement 7) and the next highest mean (3.414, statement 10). Furthermore, the order of presentation in Table 7 differs somewhat from that of the questionnaire. Hopefully, such rearrangement aids discussion of statistical tests which occurs later in this chapter.

The correlation between officers' attitudes toward the news media and their desire for some form of censorship control over the news media. Mixed in among the Likert-scaled statements were eight statements

TABLE 7

FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF LIKERT STATEMENTS

Likert Statements	Mean	Values[a] 1 AF(RFP)[b]	2 AF(RFP)	3 AF(RFP)	4 AF(RFP)	5 AF(RFP)	Missing AF(RFP)
Most Accurate Channel of News Information							
S-3 Television	1.827	58(43.6)	57(42.9)	3(2.3)	13(9.8)	2(1.5)	
S-9 Newspapers	3.203	7(5.3)	43(32.3)	8(6.0)	66(49.6)	9(6.8)	
S-15 Magazines	2.759	5(3.8)	73(54.9)	9(6.8)	41(30.8)	5(3.8)	
S-21 Radio	2.414	10(7.5)	76(57.1)	30(22.6)	16(12.0)	1(0.8)	
Attitude Towards Censorship							
S-2 Too much information withheld because of national security	2.504	35(26.3)	48(36.1)	3(2.3)	42(31.6)	5(3.8)	
S-4 Stronger libel laws needed	2.504	30(22.6)	50(37.6)	14(10.5)	34(25.6)	5(3.8)	
S-5 In combat zone, military control of news	2.301	51(38.3)	42(31.6)	1(0.8)	27(20.3)	12(9.0)	
S-7 Freedom of press vital	4.684	0(0.0)	4(3.0)	0(0.0)	30(22.6)	99(74.4)	

TABLE 7 (continued)

Likert Statements	Mean	Values 1 AF(RFP)	2 AF(RFP)	3 AF(RFP)	4 AF(RFP)	5 AF(RFP)	Missing AF(RFP)
S-12 Media correct in publishing "Pentagon papers"	2.195	50(37.6)	43(32.3)	9(6.8)	26(19.5)	5(3.8)	
S-17 Media violated national security by reporting CIA attempts to salvage Soviet sub	2.241	46(34.6)	46(34.6)	8(6.0)	29(21.8)	4(3.0)	
S-19 Reporting of the My Lai massacre helped the Army	3.368	10(7.5)	30(22.6)	18(13.5)	51(38.3)	24(18.0)	
S-20 National security is a legitimate reason for withholding information	1.444	87(65.4)	40(30.1)	0(0.0)	5(3.8)	1(0.8)	
Fair and Unbiased Treatment of Armed Forces							
S-28 Marine Corps	2.887	10(7.5)	54(40.6)	16(12.0)	47(35.3)	6(4.5)	
S-28 Air Force	2.759	11(8.3)	58(43.6)	19(14.3)	42(31.6)	3(2.3)	
S-28 Navy	2.737	13(9.8)	56(42.1)	19(14.3)	43(32.3)	2(1.5)	
S-28 Army (N=132)	2.667	15(11.3)	64(48.1)	5(3.8)	46(34.6)	2(1.5)	1(0.8)

TABLE 7 (continued)

Likert Statements	Mean	Values 1 AF(RFP)	2 AF(RFP)	3 AF(RFP)	4 AF(RFP)	5 AF(RFP)	Missing AF(RFP)
Other Statements							
S-1 News is edited in best interest of public	2.090	36(27.1)	73(54.9)	0(0.0)	24(18.1)	0(0.0)	
S-6 Foreign governments influence American opinion thru skillful use of American news media	1.865	50(37.6)	64(48.1)	9(6.8)	7(5.3)	3(2.3)	
S-8 Monopoly conditions in news media industry have led to irresponsible use of power	2.301	21(15.8)	75(56.4)	16(12.0)	18(13.5)	3(2.3)	
S-10 Americans have lost respect for the Army due to news media	3.414	5(3.8)	44(33.1)	4(3.0)	51(38.3)	29(21.8)	
S-11 News media reporters work in a conscientious, responsible way	2.759	18(13.5)	57(42.9)	2(1.5)	51(38.3)	5(3.8)	
S-13 The news media does a fair and balanced job of reporting news	2.947	15(11.3)	47(35.3)	7(5.3)	58(43.6)	6(4.5)	

TABLE 7 (continued)

Likert Statements	Mean	Values 1 AF(RFP)	2 AF(RFP)	3 AF(RFP)	4 AF(RFP)	5 AF(RFP)	Missing AF(RFP)
S-14 Today, most Army officers would rate Army-news media relationship as poor or unfavorable	2.301	25(18.8)	74(55.6)	6(4.5)	25(18.8)	3(2.3)	
S-16 The news media has given fair and objective treatment to the Volunteer Army concept	3.406	3(2.3)	28(21.1)	21(15.8)	74(55.6)	7(5.3)	
S-18 News media persons weaken an individual's critical powers by doing his thinking for him	2.541	22(16.5)	63(47.4)	10(7.5)	30(22.6)	8(6.0)	
S-22 The news story of an Army staff car used to transport a general's dog had little news value	2.481	37(27.8)	47(35.3)	6(4.5)	34(25.6)	9(6.8)	
S-23 In general, the news media does a fair and unbiased job of reporting Army related news	2.639	16(12.0)	67(50.4)	1(0.8)	47(35.3)	2(1.5)	

TABLE 7 (continued)

Likert Statements	Mean	Values 1 AF(RFP)	2 AF(RFP)	3 AF(RFP)	4 AF(RFP)	5 AF(RFP)	Missing AF(RFP)
S-24 News media reporters make little attempt to understand the Army's legitimate problems	2.519	17(12.8)	68(51.1)	14(10.5)	30(22.6)	4(3.0)	
S-25 Nixon was treated fairly by the news media during his second presidential term	2.857	24(18.0)	44(33.1)	7(5.3)	43(32.3)	15(11.3)	
S-26 The news media performs well in its "watchdog" role over the Army (N=131)	2.847	18(13.5)	43(32.3)	15(11.3)	51(38.3)	4(3.0)	2(1.5)
S-27 The news media places too much emphasis on news of conflict	2.135	43(32.3)	59(44.4)	4(3.0)	24(18.0)	3(2.3)	
S-29 The current Vietnam situation is being fairly and accurately reported by the American news media	2.667	15(11.3)	64(48.1)	5(3.8)	46(34.6)	2(1.5)	
Overall mean (29 statements, n=130)	2.646						

[a] 5=strongly agree; 4=agree somewhat; 3=neutral; 2=disagree somewhat; 1=disagree strongly

[b] AF = Absolute value; RFP = Relative frequency (percent)

dealing with the subject of censorship (see Table 7, statements 2, 4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 19, and 20). Each statement was worded so as to disguise the nature of the attitude being measured. Through the use of Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation, officers' scores on the eight censorship statements were correlated with their mean scores on the remainder of the Likert-scaled statements. The result of this test, based on 130 valid observations, was a correlation coefficient of 0.6112. In statistical terms, this coefficient represented a moderately positive correlation. In other words, individual mean scores representing attitudes toward the news media (total Likert-scaled statements minus censorship statements) corresponded with the individual's mean score for censorship. A direct relationship, therefore, existed between the two variables.

Using a one-tailed test, the coefficient was found to be statistically significant at the .001 level ($p < .001$). Thus, the probability of this relationship occurring by chance is one in a thousand. A high correlation, however, does not necessarily infer a causal relationship exists between the two variables measured. It is possible that a third factor, such as educational level, may be responsible for the correlation (Huck, Cormier, & Bounds, 1974).

The strength and direction of the correlation between attitude toward the news media and attitude toward censorship is graphically represented by the scattergram in Figure 2. Each pair of observations used in the correlation is represented by a point on the scattergram. Included on the scattergram is a regression line. This line was plotted using the values of Intercept (A) and Slope (B). The regression line provides an average statement about the change in one variable with




FIGURE 2

SCATTERGRAM

Vertical axis represents attitudes toward censorship; horizontal axis represents attitudes toward news media

Statistics:	Correlation (r) = 0.6112	Intercept (A) = 0.7884	
	Plotted Values = 130	Slope (B) = 0.7044	
	Total Variance = 0.3737	Significance = 0.0001	

change in the other (Ferguson, 1966). In brief, it describes the trend in the data. For example, when an officer's censorship score is known, the regression line can be used to help predict his overall attitude toward the news media.

Another prediction aid was provided by the total variance (see Figure 2). When expressed in percent, total variance states the amount of variance in one variable which is predictable from the variance of the other variable (Ferguson, 1966). Using the correlation of 0.6112, total variance for this measure was computed to be 37.36 percent. Thus, about 37 percent of the variance in an officer's attitude toward censorship was predictable from the variance in his attitude toward the news media in general. Statistically speaking, this percentage is rather high.

Inspection of the sentence-completion responses (question 30 on the questionnaire) gave the correlation added emphasis. Although these responses were assigned no statistical value, they do appear to indicate officers' support for military censorship as well as support for tighter legal controls over the news media in general (see responses to statements 4 and 5 in Table 7). The number at the left of each comment simply indicates the order in which the questionnaire was received from the Army War College. The sample comments were:

016 "Establish certain codes punishable by law when reporters damage U.S. interests flagrantly."

017 "In time of war, I would impose censorship. I don't feel the news media should be allowed any place near the fighting lines like they were in Vietnam."

091 "Restrict access to data affecting national security."

While the majority of comments relating to censorship were negative,

there were a few with positive approaches. Here is one example:

> 004 "Provide the news media greater access to government documents."

Sentence-completion responses aside, the statistical evidence clearly indicated a significant positive relationship existed between an officer's attitude toward the news media and his attitude toward some form of censorship. Hypothesis H_1, therefore, was accepted.

Attitudes Toward News Media Concepts

Seventeen news media concepts were included in the questionnaire. Table 8 gives the mean score and the relative familiarity value for each concept. The familarity value was derived from the number of times respondents rated a concept neutral (3) on all six scales. It was assumed that such ratings indicated the officer was unfamiliar with the concept. For example, a high familiar score on Table 8 would indicate that many officers were not familiar enough with the concept to evaluate it. On the opposite end, a low score would indicate the concept was known to most respondents.

Television news. Looking at the means for the network nightly news programs proved interesting. Officers' attitudes toward the programs were almost the reverse of the programs' national ratings. According to Nielsen, CBS Evening News is normally first; NBC Nightly News is second; and ABC Evening News is third ("Good evening: Inside," 1974). With the officers, the highest mean score was obtained by ABC Evening News; NBC Nightly News was again in second place; but CBS Evening News dropped from first to last place. Mean scores for the three network news anchormen showed similar rankings.

TABLE 8

MEAN AND FAMILIARITY SCORES FOR SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL CONCEPTS

Concept	Mean[a]	Familiarity[b]
Television News Networks		
ABC Evening News	3.686	12.0
NBC Nightly News	3.350	4.5
CBS Evening News	3.186	6.7
Television News Anchormen		
Howard K. Smith (ABC)	3.856	12.0
John Chancellor (NBC)	3.494	14.3
Walter Cronkite (CBS)	3.355	6.7
Television News Correspondents/Reporters		
Tom Brokaw (NBC)	3.339	37.3 (n=125)
Peter Jennings (ABC)	3.336	31.25(n=128)
Dan Rather (CBS)	3.279	12.9
Newspapers		
Army Times	3.596	5.2
New York Times	3.542	3.0
Washington Post	3.320	4.5
News Magazines		
U.S. News and World Report	3.901	15.3
Newsweek	3.521	13.5
Time	3.497	6.8
Radio News Personalities		
Paul Harvey	3.864	9.8
Newspaper Personalities		
Jack Anderson	3.129	0.8
Political Figures in National News		
Governor Ronald Reagan	3.901	6.3 (n=128)
Representative Les Aspin	2.746	7.8 (n=129)

[a]The means for the semantic differential concepts are "true" values as they were calculated from continuous data. (Individual responses were coded with a given--1, 2, 3, 4, or 5--on the basis of the five-interval scale, e.g., 1 = unfair, 5 = fair, etc.).

[b]The percent of neutral or no opinion responses received on all six scales. The lower the score the more familiar the subjects appear to be with the concept.

Paired t-tests were conducted among the mean scores of the network nightly news programs to determine if the differences in the means were significant (see Table 9). Resultant t-values indicated that statistically significant differences did indeed exist. Thus, it can be said that officers' attitudes toward ABC Evening News were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward NBC Nightly News or CBS Evening News. The same was also true for the difference between NBC and CBS.

These results take on added importance when one remembers Bryan's (1972) study of Army information officers cited in Chapter II. Bryan found that these officers perceived the CBS television network as having the greatest threat value. Why did CBS fair poorly in Bryan's study and in this study? Perhaps, a polarization has occurred from CBS News's controversial telecast of "The Selling of the Pentagon." Further research in this area could certainly prove enlightening.

Analysis of familiarity scores for television news correspondents also proved interesting. In the cases of Tom Brokaw (NBC) and Peter Jennings (ABC) over 30 percent of the officers (35.3 percent and 30.3 percent, respectively) marked the "no opinion" or neutral position on all six scales. Several other officers declined to make any observations on the scales (see Table 8). What did these ratings indicate? They appear to indicate that the officers found it difficult to identify television news personalities other than the network anchorman. Perhaps the same is true for television viewers in general. The only exception in this category was CBS's Dan Rather. His score, however, may be reflective of his semi-regular anchorman status with CBS News.

TABLE 9

RESULTS OF *t*-TESTS BETWEEN TELEVISION NEWS PROGRAMS

Television News Programs	Mean	SD	*t*
NBC Nightly News	20.08	3.73	-6.08*
ABC Evening News	22.19	4.19	
NBC Nightly News	20.08	3.73	2.38*
CBS Evening News	19.15	4.90	
ABC Evening News	22.19	4.19	6.16*
CBS Evening News	19.15	4.90	

*t value indicates significant difference exists between means, $p < .02$ two-tailed df = 130

There appeared to be no correlation between an officer's familiarity with a concept and his attitude toward it. For instance, only one officer out of 133 (0.8 percent) gave syndicated news columnist Jack Anderson a neutral rating on all scales. But Anderson's overall mean score was the lowest of any news media concept used. Similarly, only four officers (3.0 percent) gave the New York Times a neutral rating, but the Times overall mean was 3.542.

News magazines. Among the news media concepts, U.S. News and World Report received the highest overall mean score (3.901). The officers' favorable attitudes toward this news magazine is noteworthy. As cited in Chapter II, Everhart (1973) found that among Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report, only U.S. News and World Report continually supported American policy during various key events of the Vietnam War.

In light of this, paired t-tests were conducted to determine if officers' attitudes toward U.S. News and World Report were significantly different from their attitudes toward Time or Newsweek (see Table 10). Results indicated significant differences did exist between the mean for U.S. News and World Report and the means of Time and Newsweek. Similarly, a t-test between the means for Time and Newsweek failed to indicate significance. It appears, therefore, that officers' attitudes toward Time and Newsweek are about the same. But their attitudes toward U.S. News and World Report are significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward either Time or Newsweek.

Newspapers. The same procedure was followed with newspapers as with the other news media concepts. An initial t-test between the

TABLE 10

RESULTS OF *t*-TESTS BETWEEN NEWS MAGAZINES

News Magazines	Mean	SD	*t*
Time	20.98	3.98	-0.56
Newsweek	21.18	4.03	
Time	20.98	3.98	-5.79*
U.S. News and World Report	23.45	3.91	
Newsweek	21.18	4.03	-5.35*
U.S. News and World Report	23.45	3.91	

*t value indicates significant difference exists between means, $p < .02$ two-tailed df = 130

means of the New York Times and Army Times failed to reach significance. Subsequent t-tests between the means for these newspapers and the mean for the Washington Post, did, however, result in t values indicating significant differences. The results of these tests are given in Table 11. Why officers hold significantly less favorable attitudes toward the Washington Post than they do toward the New York Times or Army Times is unclear. Perhaps the Post's reporting of the Watergate episode caused some type of alienation.

Tests of significance among the three news media groups. Looking at the overall mean score for each of the three major groups (television news programs, news magazines, and newspapers) showed the officers appeared to prefer printed sources of news information (see Table 12). A t-test between the mean scores of the television group and the newspaper group failed to reach significance. Significance was reached, however, when the mean score for the news magazine group was compared against the means of each of the other two groups. Thus, officers appear to hold significantly more favorable attitudes toward news magazines as a group than they do toward similar groupings of newspapers and television news programs.

Results among remaining semantic differential concepts. The three remaining concepts needing discussion are all names of prominent individuals. Two of the concepts, newscaster Paul Harvey, and former Governor Ronald Reagan, are well known advocates of a strong military. Additionally, Governor Reagan is currently co-leader of the conservative elements of the Republican party and a possible 1976 Presidential candidate. The other concept, Representative Les Aspin (D. Wis.), is

TABLE 11

RESULTS OF t-TESTS BETWEEN NEWSPAPERS

Newspapers	Mean	SD	t
New York Times	21.27	4.79	-0.67
Army Times Newspaper	21.62	4.12	
New York Times[a]	21.24	4.79	3.34*
Washington Post	19.95	4.93	
Army Times Newspaper	21.62	4.12	-3.01*
Washington Post	19.95	4.93	

[a] df = 131

*t Value indicates significant difference exists between means, $p < .02$ two-tailed df = 130

TABLE 12

RESULTS OF t-TESTS BETWEEN MAJOR CHANNELS OF NEWS INFORMATION (SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL)

Major Channels of News Information	Mean	SD	t
Television Networks	60.72	10.60	-3.93*
News Magazines	64.73	10.13	
Television Networks	60.72	10.60	-1.55
Newspapers	62.06	10.80	
News Magazines	64.73	10.13	2.73*
Newspapers	62.06	10.80	

*t value indicates significant difference exists between means, $p < .02$ two-tailed df = 130

a frequent and outspoken critic of the military.

Merely rank-ordering the respective means found Governor Reagan first with 3.901, Paul Harvey second with 3.864, and Representative Aspin a poor third with 2.743. Representative Aspin's score represented the lowest mean score of any of the nineteen concepts used.

Perhaps a better indication of the officers' attitudinal positions toward these three concepts is provided in Table 13. This table gives the officers' responses to the fair-unfair scale of the semantic differential. These responses represent the intensity of the officers' attitudes toward each of the three subjects. In this instance, only 6.8 percent of the officers assigned ratings of "somewhat unfair" or "unfair" to Governor Reagan. About the same was true for Paul Harvey (6.0 percent). But Representative Aspin was rated "somewhat unfair" or "unfair" by 70.7 percent of the officers. Table 13 also gives the ratings for other concepts used in the questionnaire.

Television Versus Radio, News Magazines, and Newspapers

A key area of investigation concerned officers' attitudes toward news media accuracy, particularly television news accuracy. In order to generate testable data, four Likert-scaled statements were randomly scattered throughout the first section of the questionnaire. Each claimed a major news medium was the most accurate source of news information (see Questionnaire, and Table 7, statements 3, 9, 15, and 21, page 68).

Results were similar to those obtained with the semantic differential concepts. Simply rank-ordering mean scores showed the officers believed printed sources of news information are more accurate than broadcast sources. But even though printed sources may be the most

TABLE 13

FAIR-UNFAIR RATINGS OF SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL CONCEPTS

Concepts	Fair 5 AF(AFP)[a]	4 AF(AFP)	3 AF(AFP)	2 AF(AFP)	Unfair 1 AF(AFP)
Networks					
ABC	25(18.9)	59(44.7)	34(25.8)	13(9.8)	1(0.8)
NBC	5(3.8)	65(49.6)	25(19.1)	31(23.7)	5(3.8)
CBS	8(6.0)	43(32.3)	20(15.0)	39(29.3)	23(17.3)
Anchormen					
Harry K. Smith	39(29.8)	57(43.5)	28(21.4)	6(4.6)	1(0.8)
John Chancellor	16(12.1)	62(47.0)	36(27.3)	16(12.1)	2(1.5)
Walter Cronkite	14(10.8)	37(28.5)	25(19.2)	32(24.6)	22(16.9)
Television Correspondents					
Tom Brokaw	9(7.4)	37(30.3)	63(51.6)	11(9.0)	2(1.6)
Peter Jennings	9(7.1)	40(31.5)	66(52.0)	11(8.7)	1(0.8)
Dan Rather	14(10.6)	38(28.8)	28(21.2)	33(25.0)	19(14.4)
Newspapers					
Army Times	30(22.9)	65(49.6)	27(20.6)	8(6.1)	1(0.8)
New York Times	14(10.6)	50(37.9)	27(20.5)	32(24.2)	9(6.8)
Washington Post	11(8.3)	30(22.6)	25(18.8)	46(34.6)	21(15.8)
News Magazines					
U.S. News and World Report	39(29.5)	60(45.5)	31(23.5)	2(1.5)	0(0.0)
Time	11(8.5)	57(43.8)	33(25.4)	25(19.2)	4(3.1)
Newsweek	15(11.4)	62(47.0)	37(28.0)	15(11.4)	3(2.3)

TABLE 13 (continued)

Concepts	Fair 5 AF(AFP)	4 AF(AFP)	3 AF(AFP)	2 AF(AFP)	Unfair 1 AF(AFP)
Other Personalities					
Ronald Reagan	21(16.4)	61(47.7)	37(28.9)	9(7.0)	0(0.0)
Paul Harvey	33(25.2)	55(42.0)	34(26.0)	8(6.1)	1(0.8)
Jack Anderson	2(1.5)	20(15.0)	11(8.3)	44(33.1)	56(42.1)
Les Aspin	1(0.8)	18(14.0)	16(12.4)	35(27.1)	59(45.7)

[a]AF(AFP) = Absolute Frequency (Adjusted Frequency, Percent)

accurate, the officers did not, in general, give any particular news medium a high rating on accuracy. Means ranged from a high of 3.20 (neutral or ambivalent) for newspapers, to a low of 1.83 (strongly disagree) for television. The average for all four means was a rather low 2.55 (disagree somewhat).

Additional insight into officers' attitudes toward news media accuracy was provided by their responses to the first Likert-scaled statement. Eight-two percent disagreed with the statement, "News stories are edited in the best interest of the public."

What about television news? Once again, paired *t*-tests were used to determine if officers' attitudes toward television news were significantly more negative than their attitudes toward other news media. Results of these tests are presented in Table 14. May it suffice to say that in each case the difference in the means was found to be significant. Thus, officers' attitudes are significantly more negative toward television news than toward other news media. Hypothesis H_2, therefore, was accepted.

Here again are a few sentence-completion examples which serve to amplify the findings discussed in this section:

009 "Require more accurate reporting with sources publicly listed."

014 "End television news coverage."

131 "Make them report on 'pure fact.' Leave the analogies to the people and stop slanting what's reported."

035 "Eliminate the editorializing done by television newscasters."

104 "Fire Walter Cronkite and the entire CBS news staff."

TABLE 14

RESULTS OF *t*-TESTS BETWEEN MAJOR CHANNELS OF NEWS INFORMATION (LIKERT)

Attitude Toward Major Channels of News Information	Mean	SD	*t*
Television	1.83	0.98	-10.14*
Newspapers	3.20	1.13	
Television	1.83	0.98	-7.18*
Magazines	2.76	1.05	
Television	1.83	0.98	-5.08*
Radio	2.41	0.83	

t value indicates significant difference exists between means, $p < .02$ two-tailed df = 130

Officers' Attitudes Toward News Media Treatment of the Army

Several Likert-scaled statements were placed in the questionnaire to provide data on officers' attitudes toward news media treatment of the Army (see Table 7, statements 10, 14, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, and 28). Responses proved revealing. For example, a majority (60.8 percent) agreed that the Volunteer Army concept had been given "fair and equal coverage" by the news media. Over half (56.3 percent) agreed the news media reporting of the My Lai massacre ultimately served the best interests of the Army. Furthermore, over sixty percent (60.1 percent) of the officers disagreed with the statement, "Because of the news media, Americans have lost respect for the Army." One respondent took time to insert this comment next to the statement: "Army lost respect because of the Army."

On the other hand, nearly three-quarters (74.4 percent) agreed that the "current" Army-news media relationship was "poor or unfavorable." Moreover, a comparison of mean scores to statement 13 (2.947) and statement 23 (2.639) indicated that officers' believed Army-related news was reported as fairly or unbiasly as general news. Although no statistical test of significance was performed on these means they do appear far enough apart to be significantly different.

Why did these officers believe the current relationship with the news media was unfavorable? Part of the answer appears to involve officers' perceptions of the news value or news appropriateness of particular news stories. For instance, nearly 70 percent (69.9 percent) of the officers felt the news media was wrong in its decision to publish the Pentagon Papers. Another 70 percent (69.2 percent) felt the news media violated national security by publishing the CIA efforts to

recover a sunken Soviet submarine. Moreover, 63.2 percent agreed that the news story about General Haig's dog being transported in an Army staff car "had little, if any, legitimate news value."

The sentence-completion comments echoed similar sentiments:

027 "Exercise restraint in printing stories which disclose information better retained as classified for national security reasons."

030 "Allow equal time for military services to present their side of the story."

040 "Eliminate muckraking and sensationalism by convincing them of their stake in America's future."

108 "Temper approach to reporting of national security data."

An important, related issue was whether or not the Army officers believed the Army alone was subject to unfavorable news media treatment, or whether they believed all armed services were unfavorably treated by the news media. The answer to this question was provided by the officers' responses to statement 28 (see Table 15). Rank-ordering the resultant means placed the Marine Corps first (2.887), the Air Force second (2.759), the Navy third (2.737), and the Army last (2.667). These results were similar to those reported in the study by Sims (1971) cited in Chapter II.

To determine if these results represented significant differences, the mean score for the Army was submitted to a t-test with the mean score for each of the other services (see Table 15). Results of tests between the Army and the Air Force and between the Army and the Navy failed to reach significance. The t-test between the Army and the Marine Corps did, however, reach significance. Why the respondents believed the Marine Corps received fairer news media treatment than the Army is unknown. Perhaps it is reasonable to assume that the John

TABLE 15

RESULTS OF *t*-TESTS BETWEEN MILITARY SERVICES

Attitude Toward News Treatment of Military Services	Mean	SD	*t*
Army	2.67	1.12	
			-1.42
Air Force	2.76	1.06	
Army	2.67	1.12	
			-3.00*
Marine Corps	2.89	1.12	
Army	2.67	1.12	
			-1.12
Navy	2.73	1.07	

*t value indicates significant difference exists between means, $p < .02$ two-tailed df = 131

Wayne image of the Marine Corps is still operational in the minds of many Americans. Despite this exception, Hypothesis H_4 was rejected.

Relationships Between Attitudes Toward the News Media and Officers' Demographic Characteristics

A major objective of this study involved investigation into the possible relationships between certain officers' demographic characteristics and attitudes toward the news media. In line with this, a regression program was conducted using an officer's mean on the 29 Likert-scaled statements as the dependent variable. Initial independent variables were source of commission and command experience. In order to test all the sub-groups represented by each independent variable, eight "dummy" variables were created for insertion into the program. Four of these variables represented the possible sources of commission. The other four represented the types of command experience. Explanations for each of these variables is given in Table 16.

Subsequent analysis found that the independent variables accounted for only 3.1 percent of the variance in attitude toward the news media. F-ratios for all independent variables were well below that needed for significance. Table 16 provides a summary of the relationships found. Based on these findings it appears that source of commission and command experience are not effective predictors of attitude toward the news media. Hypothesis H_4, therefore, was rejected.

Rejection of Hypothesis H_4 prompted exploration into another demographic characteristic of interest, that of political affiliation.

TABLE 16

SUMMARY OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD NEWS MEDIA AND VARIOUS OFFICERS' DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Independent Variables	R[a]	Total Variience (Accumulative)	Change in Total Variance	df	Mean Square Regression	Mean Square Residual	F
Direct Commission	0.136	0.01851	0.01851	1/128	0.67518	0.27966	2.41
Combat Unit-NH[b]	-0.069	0.02247	0.00396	2/127	0.40975	0.28072	1.45
USMA	0.037	0.02630	0.00383	3/126	0.31978	0.28184	1.13
Non-combat Unit-Both[c]	-0.031	0.02788	0.00157	4/125	0.25419	0.28364	0.89
Non-combat Unit-NH[d]	-0.006	0.03025	0.00238	5/124	0.22068	0.28523	0.73
Combat Unit-Both[e]	0.037	0.03131	0.00106	6/123	0.19033	0.28723	0.66
ROTC[f]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
OCS[f]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total		0.03131					

[a]Correlation with dependent variable.

[b]Command of TOE combat unit in non-hostile environment only.

[c]Command of unit(s) other than TOE combat unit in both hostile and non-hostile environments.

[d]Command of unit other than TOE combat unit in non-hostile environment only.

[e]Command of TOE combat unit(s) in both a hostile and non-hostile environment.

[f]Tolerance level insufficient for further computation.

Dummy variables were again used to represent the three sub-groups (Democrat, Republican, and Independent) associated with political affiliation. Analysis showed these independent variables accounted for 13.8 percent of the variance in attitude toward the news media. Democrat, however, was the only independent variable positively correlated with the dependent variable. More importantly, Democrat was the only predictor which proved significant, and it alone accounted for the major proportion (90.7 percent) of the variance (Democrat, total variance = .125, F = 8.49).

In summary, it can be said that an officer's democratic political preference is an effective predictor of a favorable attitude toward the news media. The evidence does not support saying the same for officers who hold other political preferences.

Results of One-Way ANOVA Tests On Branch Designations, Size of Place of Birth, and Place of Birth

The last area of statistical investigation centered on the possibility that differences in attitude toward the news media could be accounted for by differences in either branch designation (Infantry, Armor, etc.), size of place of birth (farm, small town, etc.), or place of birth (Southern states, etc.). Attitude toward the news media was again represented by the officer's mean score on the 29 Likert-scaled statements. A one-way analysis of variance was used to determine if significant differences existed between any of the mean scores contained within each major characteristic. In all cases, mean differences between the various sub-groups failed to reach significance. A summary of the results is given in Table 17.

TABLE 17

SUMMARY OF ONE-WAY ANOVA TESTS ON BRANCH DESIGNATION, SIZE OF PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF BIRTH

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Branch (Infantry, Armor, etc.)				
Between Groups[a]	1.9063	6	0.3177	1.04
Within Groups	28.0549	98	0.3047	
Size of Place of Birth (small town, etc.)				
Between Groups	0.8745	5	0.1749	0.60
Within Groups	35.5115	123	0.2887	
Place of Birth (north, central, south, etc.)				
Between Groups	1.8152	6	0.3025	1.07
Within Groups	34.5708	122	0.2834	

*$p < .05$.

[a]Includes only those brances which contained six or more respondents (Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defence Artillery, Combat Engineers, Military Intelligence, and Signal Corps).

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

During April, 1975, a mail survey was conducted among Army officers enrolled in the current class at the Army War College. The purpose of the survey was to obtain data pertaining to professional Army officers' affective attitudes toward the news media. The instrument used to collect this data was a 15-page self-administered anonymous questionnaire. Procedures used to determine the officers' attitudes included Likert-scaled statements, semantic differential concepts, and sentence-completion questions.

Completed questionnaires were received from 133 (71.1 percent) of the officers. Statistical treatment of the data obtained from the returns included computation of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, tests for significance, regression analysis, and analysis of variance. Here is a brief summary of the findings:

1. Overall, officers held ambivalent, or somewhat unfavorable attitudes toward the news media.

2. A significant positive correlation existed between an officer's attitude toward the news media and his desire for some form of military or civilian censorship control over the news media.

3. The officers' attitudes toward television news accuracy were significantly more negative than their attitudes toward the accuracy of other news media.

4. Officers' attitudes toward ABC Evening News were

significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward other network news programs. Similarly, officers' attitudes toward anchorman Howard K. Smith (ABC) were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward John Chancellor of NBC or Walter Cronkite of CBS.

5. The officers' attitudes toward the New York Times and the Army Times were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward the Washington Post.

6. The officers' attitudes toward U.S. News and World Report magazine were significantly more favorable than their attitudes toward Time and Newsweek magazine.

7. Source of commission and type of command experience did not make effective predictors of an officer's attitude toward the news media.

8. There were no statistically significant differences between an officer's attitude toward the news media and the size of the town in which he was born, the section of the country in which he was born, nor his branch of service within the Army.

9. Officers' attitudes toward news media treatment of the Army were not significantly different from their attitudes toward news media treatment of the Air Force and the Navy. A statistically significant difference did exist, however, in their attitudes toward news media treatment of the Marine Corps. The officers believed the Marine Corps is more favorably treated than the Army (see Recommendations).

10. Membership in or political preference for the Democratic party was an effective predictor (12.5 percent) of favorable officer attitudes toward the news media (see Recommendations).

Conclusions

A principle conclusion derived from this study is that the officers appear to prefer conservative sources of news information. Evidence for this is provided by the high ratings given individuals and printed sources of news information normally associated with conservative points of view, such as the Army Times and Ronald Reagan. On the other hand, sources associated with liberal viewpoints, such as Jack Anderson and CBS Evening News received very low ratings.

Ratings for news media accuracy showed a continuation of this trend. The officers selected newspapers as the most accurate, followed by news magazines, radio, and television. Negative attitudes toward television news appeared to be based on the officers' perceptions of liberal or biased reporting, especially on the part of CBS Evening News. In line with this, several officers alleged that television news correspondents violate objective news reporting by giving end-of-story comments which reflect the correspondent's personal feeling on the story. Additional criticism seemed to indicate that television news was overly dependent on sensationalism or action-oriented news.

Another conclusion is that officers have a keen concern about news stories which they believe contain information pertaining to national security. The officers disagreed with news media decisions to publish the Pentagon Papers and to expose the recent CIA efforts to recover a sunken Soviet submarine. Several officers made comments calling for stiff penalties for those in the news media who release stories containing national security information. Other officers called for licensing of newsmen. Furthermore, officers strongly

believed that national security was a legitimate reason for withholding information from the news media. They also expressed their desire for military control of news releases involving military operations or personnel when in a combat zone.

It may also be concluded that officers seemed resentful of the news media for allowing itself to be used by outsiders. Some officers critized the news media for continually reporting the "unsupported" comments about the Army made by political representatives. Ratings given Representative Les Aspin (D. Wis.) appear to be indicative of this resentment. Indications are that the officers felt the news media should at least give "equal" time or space to the military for rebuttal purposes. In conjunction with this, over 85 percent (85.7 percent) of the officers agreed that foreign governments could influence American public opinion by skillful use of the nation's news media.

Although resentful of such criticism and influence, the officers did not feel the news media was biased against the Army. Results indicate the officers perceived the news media treatment of the Army, Air Force, and the Navy to be about the same. Only the Marine Corps was perceived as having more favorable news media treatment.

In reviewing the demographic variables, it appears, except for political preference for the Democratic party, that demographic characteristics as a whole are not effective predictors of an officer's attitude toward the news media. More specifically, an officer's military education and experience accounted for very little of the variance in his attitude toward the news media.

The final conclusion of this study, however, is based on a rather noteworthy demographic finding. Results indicate that over three-quarters

of the respondents (75.2 percent) had received formal instruction in the techniques of survey research or statistical analysis. If this trend continues, it could become increasingly difficult to obtain valid test data from such a survey-wise group of individuals.

Recommendations

This study, in general, has provided a broad overview of Army officer attitudes toward the news media. Additional information pertaining to these attitudes, however, can be obtained by continued investigation into the findings presented earlier in this chapter. For instance, exploration of the Army officers' attitudes toward CBS Evening News could prove enlightening. Moreover, do Army officers really perceive the Marine Corps as having received fairer news media treatment, or is their attitude clouded by Marine advertisements which stress the "elitism" of the Corps? In line with this, what effect, if any, have television reruns of old Marine Corps war movies had on these perceptions.

Certainly, investigation should be undertaken to determine the nature and extent of the relationship between an officer's political affiliation and his attitude toward the news media. Such an investigation may find that favorable attitudes toward the news media are more a result of his basic liberalism or conservatism rather than of his political affiliation.

Surveys or controlled field experiments should be conducted at all service colleges. Results could be used to form a composite view of the overall military attitude toward the news media. Such a study would allow service differences to be analyzed and would identify existing or potential problem areas.

Before saying that officer attitudes are good or bad, favorable or unfavorable, there should be some basis of comparison. As mentioned in Chapter V, there are indications that the officer corps is becoming representative of society. If this is true, officer attitudes toward the news media may be a reflection of the attitudes of society in general. Thus, surveys from other segments of society are needed for comparison. For example, do business leaders or members of the medical profession hold views of the news media similar to those of the military?

Because the United States needs both a free, responsible press and an effective military, it seems equally prudent to obtain the views and attitudes of the news media toward the military. This would not only allow a three-way comparison but possibly open the door to improved relationships and create a better understanding of the needs and requirements of each.

Although some of these recommendations may not prove feasible, the overall need for continuing research in this area is self-evident. The passage of time and changes in the composition of the Army will necessitate follow-up studies to determine if the findings in this investigation are indicative of a genuine unfavorable attitude toward the news media or just a temporary aberation produced by the events of the last decade.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LETTER OF SOLICITATION, LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION, FIRST REQUEST FOR LITERATURE, SECOND REQUEST FOR LITERATURE, LETTER OF APPROVAL

Cpt. Phillip E. Raschke
1212 Hoss Road
Powell, Tennessee 37849
Phone: (615) 947-9472

September 30, 1974

Office of the Secretary
Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013

Dear Sir:

My name is Captain Phillip E. Raschke, USA. At present I am a student officer enrolled in two years of graduate study at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. My purpose in writing you is to obtain your assistance toward the conducting of a survey among the senior Army officers currently attending the college. The survey and its results will constitute the basis of my thesis for a Master's degree in Communications. The details are as follows.

About mid-way through the Vietnam War the Army and the American mass media engaged in a series of verbal clashes. Cessation of armed hostilities has not produced a lessening of tension between these two basic institutions. Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway has expressed concern over this dilemma on several recent occasions. Even the latest issue of Army magazine headlined "The Army vs. the Mass Media: a Ceasefire Proposal."

In light of the above, one can logically ask, "What are the current attitudes of professional Army officers toward the mass media?" It is this question that I wish to research.

The research would consist of a single, twenty-minute questionnaire administered to approximately 250 randomly selected student officers. Individual answers would be kept strictly confidential and used only in combination with others to assist in getting a composite picture. Hopefully, the results would be of assistance in clarifying or isolating pertinent problem areas. I feel identification of these problem areas is essential to the continued success of the all-volunteer Army concept. In any event, the results will be made available to both the Army and the mass media.

What I need, therefore, is your assistance in obtaining permission to conduct the survey. The survey will involve no cost whatsoever to the government. A suitable date for conducting the survey would be predicated on the needs and requirements of the college. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have concerning the survey.

Sincerely,

Phillip E. Raschke
Cpt, Armor

LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

October 4, 1974

Office of the Secretary
Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

Dear Sir:

This is to recommend to you Captain Phillip E. Raschke, USA, a graduate advisee of mine. Phil is interested in doing his Master's thesis on the question of "What are the current attitudes of professional Army officers toward the mass media?" I feel that the subject concerns the War College as well as the civilian community.

Phil has recently completed a research survey for the Army ROTC department. The results of his survey have drawn widespread interest and comment. In fact, a feature article on the results has been selected for publication in the upcoming January-February issue of Armor magazine.

We here at the School of Journalism would certainly appreciate any help you can offer him. On a personal note, as a retired Army Reserve officer, I am keenly interested in his doing this study and disseminating the results to the Army.

If you have further questions about Phil or the project, I would appreciate your writing or phoning me (615-974-5155).

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Dozier C. Cade, Director
School of Journalism

DCC/sm

FIRST REQUEST FOR LITERATURE

Cpt. Phillip E. Raschke
1212 Hoss Road
Powell, Tennessee 37849
Phone: (615) 947-9472

October 4, 1974

Head Librarian
Academic Library
Adjutant General School
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana 46216

Dear Sir:

My name is Captain Phillip E. Raschke, USA. At present I am a student officer enrolled in two years of graduate study at The University of Tennessee. A fellow student, Captain Helen Wright, USAF, a former staff member at the Defense Information School, advised that your library could possibly be of assistance to me.

This is my situation. I plan to investigate the question, "What are the current attitudes of professional Army officers toward the mass media?" The results of this investigation will constitute the core of my thesis requirement for a Master's degree in Communications.

I would appreciate having from you information on any books, dissertations, theses, magazine articles, or professional polls that you have on file and which you consider germane to my thesis topic. To clarify matters, I have defined mass media as those elements of radio, television, newspapers, and magazines that deal primarily with the gathering and reporting of news. The term "the press" may also be used interchangeably with mass media.

I will be most appreciative of any help you can give me.

Cordially,

Phillip E. Raschke
Cpt, Armor

SECOND REQUEST FOR LITERATURE

Phillip E. Raschke
1212 Hoss Road
Powell, Tennessee 37849
A/C 615 94709472

October 22, 1974

Defense Documentation Center (DDC)
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Dear Sir:

My name is Captain Phillip E. Raschke, USA. At present I am a student officer working on my graduate thesis at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville. My thesis topic is entitled "What are the current attitudes of professional Army officers toward the mass media."

In order to make my review of the literature on the topic as complete as possible, I request copies of the following 1973 Army War College monographs:

1. Adessa, Anthony J., "TV News--Right or Wrong." Unclass., pages 18, DDC control number AD-760 903.

2. Baddaker, William L., "An Examination of Bias in the News." Unclass., pages 25, DDC control number AD-760 922.

3. Bray, Gaither C., "The Impact of Mass Media Upon Public Opinion." Unclass., pages 35, DDC control number AD-761 424.

4. Cook, Larry L., "What's wrong with TV News?" Unclass., pages 23, DDC control number AD-760 909.

5. Fitzgerald, Thomas E., "The Evolution of Propaganda." Unclass., pages 46, DDC control number AD-761 435.

6. Gillick, Richard O., "Radio and Television News: A Health Report." Unclass., pages 17, DDC control number AD-706 877.

7. McKenzie, Colin W., "A Look at the News Media." Unclass., pages 29, DDC control number AD-761 045.

8. Sunell, Robert J. and John R. Villas, "Bias in Broadcasting News." Unclass., pages 70, DDC control number AD-760 873.

9. Underwood, Bibb A., "Attitude of College Males Toward ROTC on Campus." Unclass., pages 17, DDC control number AD-761 572.

All materials received will not be used in open publication, but cited for reference only.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Phillip E. Raschke
Cpt., Armor

jjc

LETTER OF APPROVAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

9 OCT 1974

Captain Phillip E. Raschke
1212 Hoss Road
Powell, Tennessee 37849

Dear Captain Raschke:

This is in response to your recent request to conduct a survey of our student officers.

We will be pleased to furnish information that may assist you in conducting the survey, however, there are several points about the students and the basis of your thesis that should be clarified. You mentioned "250 randomly selected student officers" as the basis of your survey. The total number of Army officers in attendance here is only 188 and consequently represent a very small sampling of only one level of the officer corps.

If it is your intention to sample this group as the basis for determining what all professional Army officers think of the mass media, you may want to also conduct surveys at other service schools such as the Armed Forces Staff College, Command and General Staff College, and the Career Courses. We also suggest that you contact the Office of the Chief of Information, Washington, D.C. 20315 for information on any surveys conducted on this subject.

We can provide you a list of student mail box numbers so that students will not be identified by name since participation would be on a voluntary basis. We request a letter of solicitation to accompany the survey that states its purpose, use and an explanation that it would not be attributed to any participating individual. We can randomly select box numbers and provide a central collection point so that the survey may be returned in one package (otherwise it is suggested you provide return address envelopes).

Future correspondence on your project should be addressed to the Information Officer, LTC Henry C. Rilling.

We wish you the best in your scholastic endeavors.

Sincerely,

ADOLPH L. BELSER
Colonel, QMC
Secretary

"Not To Promote War, But To Preserve Peace"

APPENDIX B

ADVANCE POST CARD, WAR COLLEGE COVER LETTER, QUESTIONNAIRE COVER LETTER, QUESTIONNAIRE, FOLLOW-UP POST CARD

ADVANCE POST CARD

Dear Fellow Officer:

I am asking your help in a graduate research project.

In a few days you will receive my simple questionnaire. It will take but a short time to fill out--and your answers will be of the greatest importance to the success of my survey.

I would appreciate your cooperation.

PHILLIP E. RASCHKE
Cpt. Armor
Communications Graduate Student

WAR COLLEGE COVER LETTER

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

AWCA 10 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Army Students at USAWC

SUBJECT: Questionnaire on the News Media

1. Request that you complete the attached questionnaire concerning the attitude of professional Army officers toward the news media. The questionnaire has been provided by a communications student, CPT Phillip E. Raschke, who is studying at the University of Tennessee.

2. You are reminded that completing this questionnaire is voluntary on your part.

3. Completed questionnaires should be returned to the USAWC Mail Room, Box 406, NLT 18 April 1975.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

ADOLPH L. BELSER
Colonel, QMC
Secretary

1 Incl
as

Copies Furnished:
Comdt
DComdt
DAA
Secy
IO

"Not To Promote War, But To Preserve Peace"

QUESTIONNAIRE COVER LETTER

Phillip E. Raschke

1212 Hoss Road

Powell, TN 37847

615-947-9472

April 4, 1975

Dear Fellow Officer:

I am the University of Tennessee graduate student who is conducting research on the attitudes of professional Army officers toward the news media. As mentioned in my earlier post card, I need your help!

It will take but a few minutes of your time to answer the simple questions on the attached form. You may even find it a pleasant experience.

Your answers will be kept confidential and will be used only in combination with others to get a composite picture. Your answers are essential to the accuracy of my research. Please return your questionnaire to the location specified by the Army War College as soon as possible.

Thank you for your valuable assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Phillip E. Raschke
Cpt, Armor
Communications Graduate Student

P.S. A copy of the research results will be made available to the Army War College.

QUESTIONNAIRE

SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL ARMY OFFICERS

INSTRUCTIONS: I would like your opinions on each of the questions below. Please record the opinion that first occurs to you. Do not go back and change an answer once you have marked it. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. For this questionnaire the term "news media" means the channels of mass communications that are generally recognized as the primary transmitters of timely, formal news content and comment. Specifically, this means television, radio, newspapers, and magazines.

IMPORTANT: There are no codes used in this survey which would identify an individual respondent. All answers will be kept confidential and you will remain completely anonymous.

PLACE AN __X__ : UNDER THE CATEGORY HEADING THAT BEST DESCRIBES YOUR OPINION.

1. News stories are edited in the best interest of the public.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

2. Too much information is withheld from the news media on the grounds of national security.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

3. Television is the most accurate source of news information.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

4. Stronger libel laws are needed to protect individuals and organizations from unwarranted news media attack.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

5. In a combat zone, the ranking military commander should have the final authority on the release of news stories which involve American military operations or personnel.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

6. Foreign governments can influence American public opinion through the skillful use of the American news media.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

PLEASE TURN

7. Freedom of the press is vital to the maintenance of democracy.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

8. Monopoly conditions in the news media industry have led to an irresponsible use of power.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

9. Newspapers are the most accurate source of news information.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

10. Because of the news media, Americans have lost respect for the Army.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

11. News media reporters conduct their work in a conscientious and responsible manner.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

12. The news media was correct in its decision to publish the "Pentagon Papers."

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

13. Overall, the news media does a fair and balanced job of reporting the news. (News here means general news as well as military news.)

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

14. Today, most Army officers would rate the Army-news media relationship as poor or unfavorable.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

PLEASE TURN

15. Magazines are the most accurate source of news information.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

16. The news media has given fair and objective coverage to the Volunteer Army concept.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

17. The news media violated national security by reporting on recent CIA efforts to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

18. News media personalities weaken an individual's critical powers by doing his political and economic thinking for him.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

19. The news media reporting of the My Lai massacre ultimately served the best interests of the Army.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

20. National security is a legitimate reason for withholding information from the news media.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

21. Radio is the most accurate source of news information.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

22. The recent news story concerning the use of an Army staff car to transport a general's dog had little, if any, legitimate news value.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

PLEASE TURN

23. In general, the news media does a fair and unbiased job of reporting Army related news. (Army related news means anything and everything related to the Army and the personnel in the Army.)

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

24. News media reporters make little attempt to understand the legitimate problems of the Army.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

25. Richard Nixon was treated fairly by the news media during his second term as President.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

26. The news media performs well in its "Watchdog" role over the Army.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

27. The news media places too much emphasis on news of conflict.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

28. Do you believe the news media gives fair and unbiased treatment to news stories about the: (Please place an "X" for each service.)

	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
Air Force	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:
Army	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:
Marine Corps	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:
Navy	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

29. The current situation in South Vietnam is being fairly and accurately reported by the American news media.

Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	No opinion	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly
_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:	_____:

PLEASE TURN

PLEASE RESPOND TO THE NEXT QUESTION AS YOU FEEL APPROPRIATE.

30. If I could change one thing in the news media I would: _____

_____

_____

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION: On the following pages are the names of various information sources. Following each name are six pairs of descriptive statements about that particular information source. On the scale between each pair of statements, please mark with an "X" the position that comes closest to matching your opinion. Once again, there are no "right" or "wrong" answers. Please pay particular attention to the polarity of each scale.

Here is how these scales are used:

If you feel that the concept is very clearly related to one end of the scale, you should place your check-mark as follows:

fair__x__:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

OR

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:__x__:unfair

If you feel that the concept is quite closely related to one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your check-mark as follows:

fair_____:__x__:_____:_____:_____:unfair

OR

fair_____:_____:_____:__x__:_____:unfair

If you have no opinion or are neutral on the concept, you should place your check-mark in the center space:

fair_____:_____:__x__:_____:_____:unfair

IMPORTANT: (1) Place all your check-marks in the middle of the spaces, not on the boundaries:

__x__:_____:_____:_____:_____:
x

THIS NOT THIS

(2) Be sure you check every scale for every concept--do not omit any.

(3) Never put more than one check-mark on a single scale.

PLEASE TURN

Sometimes you may feel as though you've had the same item before on the questionnaire. This will not be the case, so do not look back and forth through the items. Do not try to remember how you checked similar items earlier in the questionnaire. Make each item a separate and independent judgment. Work at fairly high speed. Do not worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your first impressions, the immediate "feelings" about the items, that we want. On the other hand, please do not be careless, because we want your true impressions. Please begin.

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS

fair____:____:____:____:____:unfair

dishonest____:____:____:____:____:honest

strong____:____:____:____:____:weak

cowardly____:____:____:____:____:brave

active____:____:____:____:____:passive

realistic____:____:____:____:____:idealistic

TIME MAGAZINE

fair____:____:____:____:____:unfair

dishonest____:____:____:____:____:honest

strong____:____:____:____:____:weak

cowardly____:____:____:____:____:brave

active____:____:____:____:____:passive

realistic____:____:____:____:____:idealistic

PLEASE TURN

PETER JENNINGS

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

JACK ANDERSON

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

PAUL HARVEY

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

PLEASE TURN

JOHN CHANCELLOR

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

NEW YORK TIMES

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

ABC EVENING NEWS

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

PLEASE TURN

TOM BROKAW

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

ARMY TIMES NEWSPAPER

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

CBS EVENING NEWS

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

PLEASE TURN

GOV. RONALD REAGAN

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT MAGAZINE

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

WALTER CRONKITE

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

PLEASE TURN

WASHINGTON POST

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

DAN RATHER

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

REPRESENTATIVE LES ASPIN

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

PLEASE TURN

HOWARD K. SMITH

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE

fair_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:unfair

dishonest_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:honest

strong_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:weak

cowardly_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:brave

active_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:passive

realistic_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:idealistic

IN ORDER THAT THE COMMENTS AND OPINIONS GIVEN CAN BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE, PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, ALL RESPONDENTS HAVE COMPLETE ANONYMITY.

(1) What was the source of your original commissioning? (check one)

USMA_____ ROTC_____ OCS_____ DIRECT COMMISSION____ OTHER_____ (specify)__

(2) Do you presently hold a Regular Army or Reserve commission? (check one)

Regular Army_____ Reserve_____

(3) What is your career branch (Infantry, Transportation, etc.)?

_____(please do not abbreviate)

PLEASE TURN

(4) Please indicate your command experience by checking the spaces appropriate to you:

Commanded a company-size unit: _____
Commanded a battalion-size unit: _____
Commanded a brigade-size unit: _____

(5) Please indicate the amount of time you commanded the units checked in question 4.

Company-size unit	Battalion-size unit	Brigade-size unit
Under 6 months___	Under 6 months_____	Under 6 months____
Over 6 months____	Over 6 months_____	Over 6 months_____
Over 12 months___	Over 12 months_____	Over 12 months____
Over 18 months___	Over 18 months_____	Over 18 months____

(6) Was your command experience in a (check one):

a. hostile environment_____
b. non-hostile environment____
c. in both a hostile and non-hostile environment____

(7) Does your command experience include command of a TOE Infantry, Armor, Cavalry, or Field Artillery unit?

a. company-size unit experience	YES	NO
b. battalion-size unit experience	YES	NO
c. brigade-size unit experience	YES	NO

(8) What was the size of your place of birth at the time of your birth?

a. rural/farm___
b. small town___ (less than 2500 pop)
c. urban industrial___ (over 2500 pop)
d. urban commercial___ (over 2500 pop)
e. military installation____
f. not ascertained____

(9) Was your place of birth in the:

New England area____ ME., VT., N.H., MASS., CONN., R.I.

Middle States area___ N.Y., N.J., PA., MD., DEL., District of Columbia

Southern States area_____ TEX., LA., MISS., KY., TENN., ALA., GA., FLA., S.C., N.C., VA.

North Central area___ W.VA., OHIO, MICH., ILL., IND., WIS., MINN., N.DAK., S.DAK., WYO., COLO., NEB., KAN., OKLA., ARK., MO., IOWA., N.M., ARIZ.

Western States area___ CALIF., HAWAII

Northwest States area_____ WASH., ORE., NEV., UTAH, IDAHO, MONT., ALASKA

Other area_____
(please specify)

PLEASE TURN

(10) Do you consider your family to have a military background?

Yes_____ No_____ (if yes, please check appropriate spaces below)

a. father was career enlisted_____
b. father was career officer_____
c. grandfather was career enlisted_____
c. grandfather was career officer_____

(11) Have you ever had formal instruction in the techniques of survey research or statistical analysis? YES____ NO____ (If yes, please check appropriate spaces below.)

a. survey research only____
b. statistical analysis only____
c. both survey research and statistical analysis____

(12) In politics, do you consider yourself a Republican, or a Democrat, or a member of some other political party?

REPUBLICAN____ DEMOCRAT____ OTHER POLITICAL PARTY____
(please specify)_____

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP

FOLLOW-UP POST CARD

Hello Again:

Recently I mailed you a questionnaire asking for your participation in an important survey.

If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider this card a "thank you" for your valuable help.

If you have not had a chance to do so as yet, may I ask you to return the completed form now? Your participation is vital to the success of my study.

Sincerely,

PHILLIP E. RASCHKE
Cpt, Armor
Communications Graduate Student

APPENDIX C

RESPONSES TO QUESTION 30

RESPONSES TO QUESTION 30*

*Officers were asked to respond to the statement: "If I could change one thing in the news media I would:_____." The following list represents the results obtained. The three-digit number on the left represents the order in which the questionnaires were received from the Army War College. Twenty-four of the 133 respondents declined to make a comment.

003 "Require sources of leaks to be identified."

004 "Provide the news media greater access to government documents."

005 "Have it control itself much as the ABA does and as is strongly suggested by responsible individuals within the profession. Also, through threat of strong legal action, insist equal representation of all sides to a situation."

006 "Split up the extent of the existing networks control. Smaller operations would reduce onesidedness of reporting."

007 "Encourage editors to print all, or at least not change the direction of the story a reporter files."

009 "Require more accurate reporting with sources publicly listed."

011 "Hold them financially and legally responsible for reporting."

013 "Change nothing. People write the news as they see it and since people are biased and prejudiced it is a waste of time to talk of unbiased news. It is the individual's responsibility to read or hear several versions and then form his own opinion."

014 "End television news coverage."

015 "Preclude 'reporters' from making 'comments'."

016 "Establish certain codes punishable by law when reporters damage U.S. interests flagrantly (i.e., submarine-CIA-Anderson)."

017 "In time of war; I would impose censorship. I don't feel the news media should be allowed any place near the fighting lines like they were in Vietnam."

018 "Force them to be more responsible."

019 "Prohibit the release of any classified matter, such as the Pentagon Papers."

021 "Have them report the <u>facts</u> not opinion of editors."

022 "Remove bias and try to really present both sides of a question."

024 "Insure balanced reporting."

026 "Assure that all positions on a controversial subject were given equal coverage."

027 "Exercise restraint in printing stories which disclose information better retained as classified for national security reasons."

028 "Legislate a prescribed news format that precludes the development of 'news personalities.' The need to gain fame overrides good judgement in selection and presentation of stories."

029 "Require TV to report the facts, not their interpretation of the facts, and report it with less emotionalism."

030 "Want equal time for the services to present their side of the story."

031 "Make them report on 'pure facts.' Leave the analogies to the people and stop slanting what's reported."

032 "Require proof of all items released."

033 "Require only reporting of news--do not allow commentaries or opinions of newscasters."

034 "Enforce objectivity, reduce bias, and assure that national security's not dangered."

035 "Eliminate the editorializing done by the TV newscasters."

036 "Encourage news media to be more responsible by self-policing in national interest."

037 "Establish an ethics commission to police itself. Eliminate self-seeking and irresponsible news personnel."

038 "Review all information related to national security prior to its release."

039 "Require commentators, editors, by-line reporters, etc., to be regulated by a professional organization similar to AMA, ABA, etc. An organization dedicated to professional ethics."

040 "Eliminate muckraking and sensationalism by convincing them of their stake in America's future (other than $ profit)."

041 "Not permit editorializing unless it is in a debate format with all views represented."

042 "Bring social responsibility and a code of ethics to the news media."

043 "Reduce the action bias of television! An impossible dream!"

044 "Pass laws that insure greater accountability and responsibility on the part of news personnel."

045 "Establish a code of ethics for reporters and have a peer review board."

047 "Establish some system of control by the media itself."

048 "Establish a professional code of ethics and standards."

049 "Deny monopolistic control."

050 "Hold reporters and commentators responsible and liable for legal action and publicize their irresponsible reporting to the public. Imposition of fines and suspension from journalistic work would be considered."

051 "Eliminate editorial opinion from news stories and report only the facts."

052 "Make media members responsible to a media board (self-policing)."

053 "Make it a public utility."

054 "Remove competition between reporters."

055 "Promote better debate on the real issues."

056 "Nothing in the media--would however put <u>real</u> teeth in laws related to disclosure of <u>truly</u> national security information--determinations per the courts."

057 "Ensure that false or irresponsible reporting would not be tolerated."

058 "Put more 'bite' in their internal ethical standards. Journalists 'ride herd' on journalists."

059 "Encourage an SOP or reporting both sides of stories and issues."

062 "Insist that news commentaries be eliminated. The media should report the news, not give their opinions of the news."

063 "Insist that they become more responsible for their actions, i.e., incorrect reporting."

064 "Establish a code of ethics for reporters/editors/publishers, which if violated would be grounds for dismissal from the journalism profession."

065 "Retire Walter Cronkite."

066 "Urge the other 1700 news editors/publishers to write 'national' editorials (instead of 'local' editorials); so that 'public opinion' is something more than The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post."

067 "Break the monopoly over the news that is reported that is exercised by the New York Syndicates: CBS, NBC, ABC, Times, etc., AP/UPI--et al.

068 "Restrict their power."

069 "Try to make the theory of 'the composite of truth' a fact, not a theory. Most newspapers follow the lead of major papers--the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, etc. Most local TV stations follow the major networks--CBS, NBC, ABC. Therefore you get pretty much the same news no matter where you look."

070 "Have journalists licensed."

071 "Insure that they report only facts and hold them responsible for half truths and falsehoods."

072 "Accredit reporters."

073 "Instill a sense of responsibility, integrity and fair play in all those who report the news."

074 "Have them establish within themselves a 'monitoring' or 'standard setting' organization."

075 "Insure that editorials and commentary were properly identified as such."

078 "Set up an official news source (weekly publication) independent of private news sources. (Make a government corporation like the post office.)"

079 "Chance the criteria that success in journalism is measured by 'copy' run. This, therefore, encourages conflict stories, and neglects any good that might be done. Most human interests stories are buried in a magazine or back pages of a newspaper."

081 "Two things: Improve selection of news for more comprehensive coverage. Increase investigative reporting."

082 "Impose certain restrictions based on national security."

083 "Install a panel of newsmen to monitor television coverage on an educational/welfare/ and the news appropriateness basis--reason: unusual monopoly nature of television."

085 "Restrict commentary vs. reporting to limited amount of space (time)."

086 "Increase their liability if not accurate."

088 "Favor policing of the media from within and propose closer connection between media and national security agencies. Insure better understanding by media of the impact of leaking national security in information."

089 "Require them to indicate sources and show alternatives."

090 "Put some balance in the reporting, not all negative sensationalism. There are a lot of great things being done by this country."

091 "Restrict access to data affecting national security."

092 "Establish an enforceable code of ethics.

094 "Attempt to build a better relationship with news sources to build confidence between the source and the reporter."

095 "Weed out the irresponsible members of media."

097 "Insist on by-lines on all editorials."

098 "Change nothing."

099 "Reduce programs that provide instant analysis. Increase parts that provide facts/happenings."

100 "Eliminate the 'canned' editorials for sale to newspapers with editors too lazy to write their own."

101 "Control TV editorializing, or allow additional views."

102 "Prevent the use of 'media opinion' on any reported subject. Reporting should be restricted to objective facts even if the subject is left hanging."

103 "Make news media responsible (libel) for all coverage. Additionally, reveal news sources for libel (only)."

104 "Fire Walter Cronkite and the entire CBS news staff."

106 "Insure that the general public knew more about the reporters politics, backgrounds, etc."

108 "Temper approach to reporting of national security data."

109 "Give all reporters a sense of responsibility and balance in reporting the news. I believe in limiting them only under extreme circumstances of national security."

110 "Make no changes."

111 "Hold the writer more accountable for his report. Read 'Your Right to Know' by Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr."

113 "Not slant the news."

114 "Require it to take a stronger role in policing itself."

115 "Require less interpretation of events--more facts."

117 "Require that all retractions be printed on p. 1 in BOLD TYPE or announce during prime time if the error occurred on TV or radio broadcast.

118 "Require that more balance on editorials be mandatory (point-counterpoint)."

119 "Have them stop putting opinion in factual news stories, unless clearly labeled opinion."

120 "Eliminate sensation seeking or misleading headlines used by most newspapers."

121 "Leave out the interpretations of events by newsmen."

122 "Establish a board to self-police ethical standards as in ABA, AMA, etc."

123 "Establish a code of ethics for news reporters and editors."

124 "Present both sides of an issue. Let audience decide on merit, pro or con."

125 "Lower the princes of weekley news magazines, such as Newsweek, Time."

126 "Be more selective in deciding what is really news and what instead is a critric's comments, e.g. Congressional statements which are really P.R. gimmicks."

128 "Reporters giving opinions as facts."

129 "Somehow eliminate the profit motive from their systems."

130 "Have the conservative and other viewpoints receive the same coverage as the liberal."

131 "Reduce the amount of analysis, e.g., this 'could mean' that tends to mold public opinion because anything is possible. Such analysis interjects personal feeling and reduces objectivity."

132 "Give more comprehensive coverage of both sides of the issue."

VITA

Captain Phillip Edward Raschke, United States Army, was born in Chicago Heights, Illinois, on October 19, 1939. In early 1955 he moved to Whittier, California, with his parents. He completed his high school education at California High School in Whittier in 1958.

In 1963 he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from George Pepperdine University, Los Angeles. While attending Pepperdine he served as president of Phi Sigma Alpha fraternity. Shortly after graduation he entered the U. S. Army. Upon completing helicopter flight training in 1965 he served two tours in the Republic of Vietnam. During his first tour he saw action with the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile). His second tour was with the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

In 1973, after commanding I Troop, 17th Cavalry and attending the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, he entered graduate school at The University of Tennessee. He received the Master of Science degree from that institution in June, 1975. Presently, he is serving in the Information Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Captain Raschke's wife is the former Beverly Jean Jennings of Charleston, South Carolina. They have three children, Butch 7, Dana 4, and Ragan, 6 months.