To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Amadou Scattred Janneh entitled "The Creation of Senegambia: An Integrative Process With Uncommitted Gambian Elites." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.

Robert L. Peterson, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
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Accepted for the Council:

Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

THE CREATION OF SENEGAMBIA:
AN INTEGRATIVE PROCESS
WITH UNCOMMITTED
GAMBIAN ELITES

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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December 1987

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis research would not have succeeded without the invaluable guidance and active support of Professors Robert L. Peterson, Gill Evans, and Juan Allende, who served as my advisor and committee respectively. Their criticisms and comments proved very useful in giving a defined direction to this work. Any errors that may be found in this thesis are, however, entirely mine.

I would like to express gratitude to The McClure Fund For The Study of World Affairs for funding my field trip to The Gambia.

And finally, sincere thanks go to all those people in The Gambia who assisted me in gaining access to information and in administering the questionnaire.

ABSTRACT

There have been several attempts to integrate The Gambia and Senegal, but these efforts have been without success. The Senegalese authorities have consistently pushed for a political union between the two states in spite of continued Gambian reluctance.


The 1981 revolt in The Gambia and the role played by Senegalese forces to bring it to an end however changed the whole character of Senegambian relations. The Senegalese essentially "ensured The Gambia's security," while a confederal accord was "hastily" drawn up and ratified in that same year.

Despite the signing of an array of documents, the confederal states have not gained significant ground in the pursuit of their integrationist ideals. What accounts for the "foot-dragging" pace of Senegambian integration; and are Gambian political elites committed to integration or the eventual unification of The Gambia and Senegal?

These questions were pursued by analyzing the state of Senegambian relations and by examining the statements or the reticence of a sample of key Gambian political figures on Senegambia. A questionnaire on the issue of integrating the two neighbors was also administered to 40 Gambian

elites--businessmen, politicians, and civil servants or bureaucrats--and 27 responded to the questions.

The data drawn from the statements of political elites and the questionnaire indicate that Gambian elites are not emotionally or intellectually bound to the idea of a Senegambian state. And it was also found that a significant number of the subjects were opposed to integration of even the looser type that the framers of the Confederation Agreement hoped to achieve. Finally, it is concluded that the chances of a peacefully constituted Senegambian suprastate are very slim, and that there will be continued Gambian opposition to the concept.



THE SENEGAMBIA REGION

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Approximately six years have now elapsed since a confederal agreement between The Gambia and Senegal was drafted and signed. The accord setting up the Senegambia Confederation was "hastily" concluded after Senegalese troops helped put down a 1981 revolt that nearly toppled the government of Sir Dawda Jawara. The initial haste has now slowed down to what a critic calls "a foot-dragging pace," even though an array of documents has been signed and ratified. Protocols on Information and Telecommunications, External Affairs, Road Transport, Defense (armed forces), and Security (police and gendarmerie) have been signed. But the confederate states have not gained significant ground in negotiations on matters that involve sovereignty and the other hard issues related to political and economic integration.

Despite propaganda for the concept of a Senegambian entity, Gambian resentment of the Senegalese "occupation forces" has intensified; the Confederal Army is nowhere close to being an integrated force by any definition; the two states' foreign policies are as uncoordinated as ever before; cross-border smuggling of groundnuts, resulting from

a price war between the two countries and Senegal's much stronger currency, is now a common phenomenon; Gambians travelling to other countries through Dakar's Yoff Airport have consistently complained of Senegalese heavy-handedness; and even a football match staged in The Gambia to promote Senegambian sentiment ended in a fierce brawl between Senegalese and Gambian fans. The list of cracks in the Senegambian Confederation could take pages, but the underlying point is that there has been an apparent lack of progress in efforts to integrate or unify the two neighbors. What accounts for the deadlock in the attempts to create an integrated Senegambian state?

This research is built around the hypothesis that efforts to create an integrated state of Senegambia have moved at a snail's pace due to the lack of commitment on the side of Gambian political elites. The 1981 revolt in The Gambia provoked the birth of the Senegambia Confederation, rather than any desire to reunite "the same body and soul to men who were only artificially separated by the hegemonic and domineering desires of England and France," as the authorities claim ("Le Soleil," March 1985). Colonial experience is being used to blanket and rationalize the hidden motives of the Senegalese and Gambian authorities in their drives to "reunify" their two states. As an opponent of the current confederal framework pointed out, "The

pre-colonial politics of the Senegambian region ... lends little legitimacy to the pseudo-historical propaganda of the confederal authorities (Manjang, Part I, p.2307).

Critics have charged that President Jawara was coerced into reaching the confederal agreement with the Senegalese authorities. This is almost indisputable given the environment and the circumstances under which the accord was drawn and signed. Jawara's primary interest during the 1981 crises and in the immediate aftermath of the revolt was to regain power at any cost. Despite government rhetoric and pronouncements that indicate a seeming commitment to the unification of the two states, there is considerable evidence to show otherwise. In fact, the foot-dragging pace of the integration process could accurately be attributed to the lack of commitment on the part of Gambian political elites.

To address the basic research questions and issues, this paper examines the integration of Senegambia in its various aspects. First, the July 1981 revolt in The Gambia which provoked the proclamation of the Senegambia Confederation will be discussed in detail. This will give us greater insight into and understanding of how and why the two states are "working towards unification." Secondly, changes under the confederal framework will be assessed, in addition to an examination of the current state of affairs. Thirdly, there

will be a presentation and analysis of data on the attitudes of key political elites towards unifying The Gambia with Senegal. This analysis will be based largely on published statements and interviews. Finally, a brief evaluation of the prospects for the creation of an integrated state of Senegambia and a statement on the implications of the current state of affairs will be made.

To begin with, however, it would be appropriate to define the concepts employed in this paper and to discuss relevant literature on international integration. "Commitment" is defined here as "the state of being bound emotionally and intellectually to some course of action" (Webster's Dictionary). "Elites" is used to refer to those people who have a disproportionate share of political, economic, intellectual, or other valued resources. "Political elites" refers to those people with "greater political sophistication, education, and motivation than most of their compatriots" (Welch, p.345).

Integration is defined as "the process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and

political activities to a new center" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.421). The current Senegambia Confederation is not a unified state, but it is nonetheless undergoing integration in certain areas which will be discussed later. Unification results from the process of integration.

In much of Africa today, most politically conscious people express belief in an ideology of integration, or in Pan-Africanism, as it is frequently called (Nye, p.3). Hence President Diouf's desire to carve out a single political unit from The Gambia and Senegal is sheltered under both the umbrellas of Senegambian brotherhood and the ideology of Pan-Africanism. But what are the various avenues that must be taken and the conditions to be met for the creation of a Senegambian suprastate?

A single center of decision making must ultimately be created to have a fully integrated state. How this should best be done is a matter of debate. The so-called European theory of integration places emphasis on the significance of functional cooperation as a means of achieving political union. "Economic unions of various kinds increase trade and transactions so much that the increased flows across borders create problems which are difficult to solve by separate state machinery. A supranational bureaucracy is created to deal with these problems. ... Gradually, loyalties follow

economic interests and become focused on the new center, and a new political union comes into existence" (Nye, p.18).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Customs Union of Central African States are examples of efforts by African states to achieve the goal of continental unification through regional functional cooperation. But some statesmen place emphasis on the integration of political structures as a prelude to unification. As the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana once said: "Seek Ye first the political kingdom, and all things else shall be added unto you" (Kofele-Kale, p.xv).

The creation of a single center of decision making is complemented by the delegation of sovereignties to a supranational agency capable of making binding decisions; the shifting of loyalties to the new center; and the adoption of new national symbols.

We have so far discussed the requirement for, and approaches to, the creation of a single center of decision making in attempts to unify previously independent states. The study conducted by Karl Deutsch and associates in the North Atlantic area is very instructive here. The study will enable us to identify some other requirements of political community, especially in the Senegambian context. Ten conditions were found to be essential for peaceful voluntary union "of two or more previously independent units

into a single large unit, with some type of government after amalgamation." (Foltz, p.189). As the Senegambia issue is an attempt to ultimately unify The Gambia and Senegal into a single state, we will review the main points of the North Atlantic study as it was used by William Foltz in his study, From French West Africa To The Mali Federation.

The North Atlantic data "showed that the `compatibility of the main values held by the relevant strata of all the political units involved,' and `mutual responsiveness' leading to the ability to predict each other's behavior and ability to act in accordance with prediction is `essential to the maintenance of even the most minimal political community'" (Foltz, p.190). A study by William Foltz has also shown that it is precisely the lack of these two factors that brought on the crisis between Senegalese and Soudanese and led directly to the Mali Federation's breakup. A situation similar to the Malian scenario exists today in Senegambia, where Senegalese authorities are energetically pushing for a union in contrast to their Gambian counterparts who have consistently dragged their feet on crucial issues. Also, as was evidenced in The Gambia's resumption of diplomatic ties with Libya well before the Senegalese contemplated such action, the two states sometimes act unpredictably in external affairs.

Another fundamental consideration for the creation of a political community is a distinctive way of life. This was lacking in the Mali Federation because, "There was nothing distinctively different about Senegal and Soudan that made their union any more `natural' than if it had included any other members of French West Africa. Perhaps, had the federalists been able to include all of (French West Africa), the necessary distinctiveness based on historical experience would have been present" (Foltz, p.190). In the case of Senegambia, the consideration of a distinctive way of life may not seem to hamper moves towards unity.

"The Gambia and Senegal were first drawn in 1889 during a meeting of French and British delegates in Paris, and were only slightly modified. ...The boundaries of The Gambia are completely artificial, having nothing to do with natural, ethnic or geographic lines of demarcation. ...These lines exclude The Gambia from free access to its natural hinterland and divide The Gambian Wollof, Jola, Mandingo, and Fulbe people from their kinsmen in Senegal" (Gailey, p.1). Thus, despite the influences of decades of French and British domination, the fact remains that Senegal and The Gambia share a dinstinctive way of life.

But, as mentioned earlier, skeptics see the factor of common historical experience in Senegambia as "pseudo-historical propaganda." Ousman Manjang of the

Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA-Gambia) pointed out that, "Many, if not most, of the peoples (of the Senegambian region) had never coexisted together within any statal or political formation before European colonial conquest" (Manjang, Part II, p.2359).

The third essential factor for the constitution of a political community from previously independent political entities Deutsch and associates discuss is that "more important than the maintenance of a balance between amalgamating units is the existence of a strong core or nucleus possessing advanced economic, political, and administrative capabilities" (Foltz, p.191). The Mali experience suggests that a "more equal balance of power-- which at least assures the leaders of each unit continued undisturbed control over their own domestic political life-- is a necessary precondition" (Foltz, p.191).

A disequilibrium prevails in Senegambia. The Gambia had no army until after the 1981 revolt which sent shock waves through its 500-man paramilitary force. The Senegalese forces are relatively well equipped and are no match for The Gambia's tiny and inexperienced army. The Gambia's small size (4,000 square miles) and population (about 800,000), and the fact that it is surrounded by Senegal on all sides except its Atlantic seafront, puts The Gambia at a severe disadvantage in terms of resources and

from a strategic stand point. Senegalese political elites are also much more sophisticated than their Gambian counterparts.

Deutsch and associates also indicate that "superior economic growth" and "the expectation of joint economic rewards" are essential conditions for political community (Foltz, p.191). Senegambia would unquestionably benefit from the larger market and other economic advantages that a bigger political entity brings, but these rewards will be important "only as they are perceived as important by the political leaders" (Foltz, p.191). The authorities in Senegal and The Gambia undoubtedly have different perceptions of the economic rewards that unification would bring. This will be discussed later in this study.

Relations between the amalgamating units also need consideration. A "wide range of mutual transactions" and "greater mobility of persons" between the units are said to be necessary conditions for the creation of a political community (Foltz, p.191). Even though citizens of Senegambia travel back and forth each year, this has not significantly helped in the advancement of Senegambian sentiment. Anti-Senegalese sentiment has grown considerably in The Gambia; and there were reports of Gambians using Senegal's Yoff Airport being mistreated by Senegalese authorities.

"Two final considerations from the North Atlantic study relate particularly to the politically relevant strata of society. These are `a broadening of the political, social, or economic elites,' and `the presence of unbroken links of social communication between the political units concerned and between the relevant social strata within those units" (Foltz, p.192).

This review of Deutsch and associates' suggests elements that might be relevant for political community in the Senegambia region. Having looked briefly at these conditions of political community, we may then ask the question: Under what conditions would The Gambia and Senegal be considered integrated?

If The Gambia and Senegal reach a unified state, major decisions affecting their citizens would be made from a new center. Gambians and Senegalese would begin to think of themselves as Senegambians, loyal only to the state of Senegambia. A single set of national symbols (like a flag, a national anthem, and so on) and activities (such as national holidays and festivities) would also be adopted. So that instead of two distinct national flags, anthems, and events for The Gambia and Senegal, the new, unified state of Senegambia would harmonize these into single sets of activities and symbols. Rather than two different currencies,

central banks, customs authorities, legal systems, and pricing systems, a fully integrated Senegambia would mould each of these into a single instrument, entity, or system.

At this juncture it is helpful to outline two other essential theories of political integration and state their relevance to the Senegambia case. The first theory is that "political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system. Such systems are based on procedural consensus, or general agreement about the political framework and of the legal processes by which issues are resolved, and substantive consensus or general agreement about the solutions to problems the political system is called upon to serve" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.417).

Applied to Senegambia, this theory would suggest that the cohesiveness of the new state will be greater with more procedural and substantive consensus among members of its components. The Senegambia Confederation, by all indications, lacks legitimacy within The Gambia. Hence the government's reluctance or refusal to put the issue before the electorates in the form of a referendum. Also, research data indicate that a widely shared agreement does not exist between Gambian political elites and Senegalese authorities on the issue of unifying their two states. The data support

the contention that Gambian authorities reached the Confederal Agreement with their Senegalese counterparts as a result of pressures brought about by the 1981 revolt rather than any consensus with the latter on the necessity or wisdom of integration.

Another essential theory of integration states that "political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat, of force" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.418). From this perspective, one may look at the Senegambia integrative process in the light of the Senegalese military intervention in The Gambia and the continued presence of relatively large numbers of Senegalese troops in and around the country. These troops are more equipped, disciplined, and better trained than The Gambia's small army, and should "things fall apart," they could easily overrun Gambian forces, remove Jawara, and install a puppet regime in the interim. Jawara is perhaps well aware that revoking an agreement reached for his pragmatic interests at the expense of Senegalese lives could have serious repercussions for himself and his administration. This presence of the threat of force may account, to some degree, for Gambian authorities' ambivalent positions of an ostensible commitment to integration and an insistence on the maintenance of The Gambia's independence.

To prevent a confrontation or any escalation of tensions, then, foot-dragging appears to be the only alternative strategy that Gambian authorities could pursue. They have entangled themselves in a difficult relationship and could not find a safe passage out.

From the "unhappy look" that President Jawara reportedly displayed at the "not-quite ceremonial" signing of the Confederation Agreement to the slow pace of negotiations and integration in virtually every sphere of Senegambian relations, one thing is clear: Gambian political elites do not wish to see their country unified with Senegal, something the Dakar authorities are striving hard for. The Gambia was referred to as an "improbable nation" before its attainment of independence from Britain in 1965. But the nation apparently survived and Jawara showed "less eagerness than ever at forming part of a Senegambian entity" (Gailey, p.viii). The recent integration process has therefore only been intensified and forced on Gambian authorities by the tragic 1981 revolt and the subsequent Senegalese military intervention.

The second chapter of this thesis discusses in detail the events that provoked the proclamation of the Senegambia Confederation.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES OF THE RESEARCH

Information on elites' attitudes towards the unification of Senegal and The Gambia, which this study deals with, comes from various sources. Historical materials, published interviews, party publications, and news stories provide much of the background information. Some published materials were also gathered from The Gambia's Information Department, party officials, and from journalists in The Gambia. Questionnaires were administered to a limited sample of Gambian elites, but the responses seem to have been dictated by political caution. News interviews with Presidents Jawara and Diouf, published news articles by Ousman Manjang, and several party publications form a major source of the information on attitudes.

The scope of the work on elite attitudes has been limited to a few political personalities due to the small size of The Gambia's political elite. The elites chosen for this thesis are, however, representative of the larger group we are concerned with. This leads us to a discussion of what qualifies the various members of the sample as representatives of Gambian political elites.

The President and his cabinet ministers, by definition, represent the country's key governmental elites. They hold crucial positions in shaping the nation's political direction, and that makes their attitudes towards unification or

integration of The Gambia with Senegal of great significance. The ministers occupy a central position in the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP), which has ruled The Gambia for more than 22 years now, but they merely serve as rubber stamps for Jawara's initiatives. In other words, the ministers react to the President's decisions. He makes the important policy decisions and the ministers' main function is in lending legitimacy to such decisions. The recent presidential and parliamentary elections (1987) have seen the PPP increase its dominance of the Gambian political machinery. And it is unlikely for it to be defeated at the polls in the near future, or to be removed from power through the barrel of the gun, unless this is done in cahoots with the Senegalese. President Jawara has also ruled out retirement, which might have altered the nature of the game to some degree. Thus the rationale for our emphasis on Jawara's attitude towards integration and unification.

Other (nongovernmental) members of the ruling party have very little input in major policy matters. Not surprisingly, most of these people lack a clear understanding of the issues at stake in the Senegambian affair. These political elites endorse and assist in propagating decisions handed down to them by those in government circles. No case has ever been reported where the policy objectives of

nongovernmental members of the PPP have diverged from those of the administration. Serious debates are not conducted within the party, and support for the government is mostly unanimous. Again, this makes Jawara's attitudes towards Senegambia of greater relevance, as far as the government or ruling party's side is concerned.

As has been implied throughout in this paper, it is the political elites who are most critical to bringing about the "desired" Senegambian nation-state. As our definition goes, the attitudes of other political elites (mainly, opponents of the government) are also taken into serious consideration. Even though the opposition as a whole does not play a major role in determining the country's direction, it should not be counted out prematurely. After all, Third World politics is characterized, among other things, by unexpected political developments: defections, coups, and so on. The Gambia is not immune to these phenomena, as was made crystal clear by the events of July 1981. Also, a further plunge in the country's present decadent economic and social conditions could give a new lease of life to the opposition. Members of opposition groups and parties whose views were examined in this study include: Ousman Manjang of the Movement for Justice in Africa--Gambia (MOJA-G), based in Sweden; and Halifa Sallah, a leader of the Peoples' Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS).

These opposition leaders had been subjects for this study by virtue of their greater education and political sophistication. They display a serious and rare understanding of the issues at stake in Senegambia. Some other opponents of the government have not spoken strongly, or made their policy stances clear on Senegambia. These include: Sheriff Mustapha Dibba of the National Convention Party (NCP) and Assan Musa Camara of the Gambia Peoples' Party, both former vice presidents under the Jawara regime.

Other groups or elites may have played some strategic roles in the integration process from the Gambian vantage. Businessmen, due to their support of political candidates and their economic clout in an impoverished country like The Gambia, do play an important role in influencing some policy decisions. The fact that Gambian businessmen derive a lot of benefits from "re-exporting" products to Senegal, brings their interests to light on Senegambian economic integration. Their influence, however, does not have enough muscle and force to control the direction the pendulum swings in The Gambia, which is not the case with Senegalese merchants.

The Senegalese merchant class had been instrumental in putting pressure on President Diouf to realize Senegal's unification dreams. Some had even pressed for "annexation." In the case of The Gambia, President Jawara's father-in-law, Alhaji Momodou Musa Njie, has been the most influential

businessman in the country for decades. He and his few business compatriots have very little influence in foreign policy decision making, but any initiative that would attempt to eliminate the "re-exporting" business could bring Jawara's administration at loggerheads with its campaign financiers.

Also, Gambian bureaucrats in strategic positions do have some influence on major governmental decisions. It is not uncommon for the administration to seek expert advise from them before making certain decisions. But this influence too is limited by the caliber of controls instituted against public bureaucrats by the government. Retribution in the form of dismissals prevents most bureaucrats from making extensive use of their expertise to influence government policy decisions. Civil servants who show any form of opposition to the government are generally denied promotions, fired, and ostracized. Once they are out of public office too, the government uses its many supporters who head private companies and corporations to deny jobs to its opponents. Thus, bureaucrats both in government and in the private sector become so reticent that even the value of constructive criticism is sacrificed.

No "public opinion" survey on the issue of Senegambia has yet been conducted in The Gambia. "Public opinion" would be very doubtful in the country, particularly in the

provinces. The man in the street or in the field knows very little about the issues involved. They may learn from political broadcasts and rallies that Senegambia is a good thing, but essentially without any knowledge of what it is entirely about. Thus no data on public opinion are presented.

Data from published materials, however, will shed more light on the Senegambia integration process and the commitment of Gambian political elites to the concepts. The data will help us understand the extent to which Gambian political elites desire the integration of their country with Senegal.

Various methods of research were used to arrive at a conclusion on elite commitment. First, 40 questionnaires were administered to a sample of Gambian elites. This included businessmen, bureaucrats/civil servants, and politicians. An array of questions on Senegambian integration was asked, to which respondents indicated the extent of their support or opposition. Some interviewees responded reluctantly, some demanded assurances of anonymity as a precondition, and others did not respond at all.

For other elites--political figures like President Jawara, Assan Musa Camara, Sheriff Dibba, Ousman Manjang, Halifa Sallah, Sam Sarr, and Sidia Jatta--a variety of published news interviews and articles, public statements,

and party publications provided information on their attitudes. Taken into consideration were how and and to what extent Gambian political elites are emotionally and intellectually bound to the various facets of Senegambian integration--like creating a single center of decision making; economic integration and monetary union; adopting a unified judicial system; and so on. These are areas considered essential to the creation of a fully integrated Senegambian nation-state.

CHAPTER II

THE GAMBIA'S TROUBLED TIMES, AND RELATIONS WITH SENEGAL

To provide insight into the nature and evolution of political elite attitudes in The Gambia, this chapter will review Senegambian relations and the various events leading to the proclamation of the Senegambia Confederation.

For sixteen years prior to July 1981, The Gambia was regarded as one of the remaining bastions of democracy in Africa. The country's image as a democratic and peaceful state was extensively promoted, and its regard for human rights was considered to be distinguished. The country was always known as "an island of stability and order in Africa" (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749). When most African countries were under military rule, President Jawara maintained some form of democracy in The Gambia. Elections have, since independence, been held every five years.

At the international level, the administration had embarked on an impressive campaign aimed at bolstering Jawara's image as a staunch advocate of the cause of human rights. And it was in the Gambian capital that the committee drawing up the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.)'s

Charter of Human and People's Rights--"The Banjul Charter"--held its final meetings.

These, however, concealed the true nature of the state of affairs in The Gambia at the time. The country lacked an aggressive press and outspoken opposition leaders to challenge whatever image was being portrayed by the government. The media--broadcast and print--have been dominated or tightly controlled by the government, and opponents of the government seldom get the opportunity to be heard. Ruling party propaganda and political rhetoric also swelled through the media under the cover of "meet-the-farmers" tours.

The country's image, nevertheless, was suddenly tarnished by the July 1981 revolt led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a native of Wassadu, Foni district, when the "calm of The Gambia became surface thin ... largely because of economic recession" (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749).

The messy situation that the Gambian economy found itself prior to the 1981 revolt worsened the country's social and political climate. The average production of groundnuts, the main export earner, was 132,000 tons in 1973-74 and had dropped to 78,000 tons in 1980-81. The Sahelian drought crippled agricultural production, and this had effects on other sectors of the economy.

The country's gross domestic product fell from 251.4 million dalasis in 1978/79 to 200.1 million in 1979/80. The

per capita income decreased from D526.09 to D440.42 during 1978/79 and 1979/80 respectively (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749).

"Economic activity was rather sluggish." Barely 71,120 tons of groundnut were bought by licensed buying agents. This was about sixty percent of the tonnage delivered in 1978/79 and seriously affected earnings of the Gambia Produce Marketing Board, which also had to contend with low world prices (West Africa, November 17, 1980, p. 2281).

Other developments followed the country's downward trend. These included an increase in the "amount and frequency of white-collar crimes by those placed in charge of public funds, the drift from rural areas, the increase in urban unemployment, the drought-induced migrations from neighboring countries to Gambian towns, and the frustrations inherent in all this" (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749). Frequent power outages, dating back to an explosion in the main Banjul power station in 1978, added to the miseries.

The Gambia's decadent economic, political and social atmosphere, and the administration's seeming hopelessness gave rise to, or intensified, a spate of anti-government and anti-establishment activities. There was the "Voice of The Future", a clandestine publication that blasted both government and business persons seen as "enemies of the people"

(West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749). The paper appeared irregularly and was widely distributed on the streets of major towns. The government assigned a Special Branch of the Gambia Police Force to crack down on the culprits, but this was largely unsuccessful. The authors of the "Voice" appeared to be politically conscious and seemed to have known the inside dealings of the government. A wave of suspicions and rumours continued to circulate for a while, but the "Voice" remained a mystery to the government.

And as if all these troubles coupled with the decline in groundnut production were not enough, tourism, the only other source of foreign exchange, started falling off. The Scandinavians, who led the field for years, decided to go elsewhere and the increase in British and German visitors was not sufficient to compensate. After all, real gain from tourism in foreign exchange was small, and the adverse effects serious. "These include corruption, sexual and financial exposure to consumer society attractions that The Gambia cannot afford, and seasonal unemployment of numerous young men attracted to the towns." The biggest difficulty came from its inflationary effects (West Africa, November 3, 1981, p.1803).

"Economic strains inevitably produced political tensions. ...The Gambia depended on foreign aid, and President Jawara made numerous trips abroad to beg for economic

support for Gambia's ailing economy. But there was also an appearance of mismanagement and insistent stories about corruption" (West Africa, November 3, 1981, p.1803). The burning in 1980 of a yacht and dinghy belonging to the President were acts of protest against his regime.

The disillusioned state of those who sought to change the political order through the established political parties would be seen in graffitti on walls and buildings in and around Banjul by persons calling for support for MOJA (West Africa, November 3, 1980, pp.2172-2173).

Founded in 1979, MOJA aims to change what it described as a situation where "the whole wealth of the country is at the disposal of the political and administrative ruling clique." It alleged "nepotism, corruption and patronage at the top, shareholding in foreign companies by government officials and profitable collaboration in the development of tourism to the detriment of local culture." The movement alleged political intimidation and increasing repression. One of its aims is to work for African unity (West Africa, November 3, 1980, pp.2172-2173).

MOJA was not alone in its view of the country's situation. Pap Cheyassin Secka, a leader of the National Liberation Party now in jail for complicity in the 1981 revolt, expressed his views in a December 1980 interview with West Africa magazine. Secka pointed to corruption and "influence

peddling" in the country and saw the main problem as "the exercise of power not being accountable to any group, reason or even politics."

He "spoke of a growing sense of `hopelessness': `People are queuing for firewood, they 're queuing for rice, they 're queuing for oil, they 're queuing for every basic commodity and now that charcoal has been banned they 're finding it difficult to even have cooking amenities.'"

Secka warned in 1980: "If we do that (consultations) we may be lucky enough to have dramatic and drastic changes in our country for the better, without having to go through the bloodshed and violence that our brothers and sisters in other places have had to undergo" (West Africa, December 15, 1980, p.2554).

Other events occurred which seemed to support Secka's prognosis. First, in October 1980, President Jawara felt sufficiently threatened by the country's political situation to send for Senegalese troops to help keep order--despite the fact that The Gambia had its own 500-man paramilitary force. An official statement in Banjul said the Senegalese troops were in The Gambia for joint exercises, under an agreement between the two countries. Jawara alleged that Libya was trying to destabilise the country. Diplomatic relations were then cut off with the Libyans.

The Gambian government's break with Libya followed a similar move by Senegal in July. Both states alleged that Sheikh Ahmed Niasse, a Senegalese who had been openly working to overthrow the government of President Senghor "--avowedly on a platform of Islamic Republicanism--" had been trying to recruit their nationals for military training in Libya.

With the arrival of the Senegalese troops, The Gambia government banned MOJA and The Gambia Socialist Revolutionary Party, a sort of shadowy organization. Six MOJA members, referred to by the government as "clandestine activists," were later arrested. (West Africa, November 10, 1980, pp.2216-2217).

A few days before the break with Libya was announced, the shooting death of Eku Mahoney, deputy commander of The Gambia's Field Force, was reported. The official version of the incident was that Commander Mahoney caught a member of the Field Force smoking marijuana while on duty, and when he told the man that he would face disciplinary action, he responded with two rifle shots. This official version was doubted by most people. Forty of the Senegalese troops who came "to keep order" in The Gambia parachuted unexpectedly into McCarthy Square during the funeral procession of Commander Mahoney.

It was believed that, "At the heart of the ... incidents in The Gambia (lay) the issue of relations between Banjul and Dakar." This "central problem" was said to have been "obscured somewhat by allegations of subversion brought against Libya" by the two governments.

> ... What remains unclear is The Gambia's reason for taking the momentous diplomatic step of permitting Senegalese troops to be sent to Banjul to ensure the security of the government. The convoluted and self-contradictory communiques that were issued following the Senegalese intervention (testified) to a degree of apprehension in Banjul. The Senegalese government, for its part, issued a statement saying that the Senegalese troops had been sent to Banjul at the invitation of the Gambian government and in accordance with a defence pact signed in 1967. As far as Dakar was concerned, the Gambian talk of `combined manouvres' appeared too much like Gambian reluctance to admit the fact that it had invited the Senegalese to send troops (West Africa, November 17, 1980, pp.2278-2279).

The Gambia's reluctance was consistent with its determination to demonstrate that it could exist as an independent and sovereign entity despite all odds. It is this kind of attitude that is evident in the slow pace of attempts to integrate The Gambia with Senegal. Let us take a retrospective look at the two countries relations.

> In the early sixties the Senegalese had seen the existence of The Gambia, then still a British colony, as a thorn in their side. The Gambia

> used to be refered to by the Senegalese as `Our Quebec'. Before Gambian independence in 1965, protracted negotiations took place, following a United Nations' report on the possibility of some close link between the two countries, to see if some formal relationship could be established. Union, for which the Senegalese pressed, was rejected by the Gambian representatives. Some looser federated relationship met with Senegalese disapproval after their ... unhappy problems with [Mali] (West Africa, February 13, 1965).

When The Gambia became independent in 1965, concerns were expressed about the possibility of a union with Senegal. At that time it became "quite certain that the union will not come soon, and may never come at all... ." Political pundits had then anticipated that The Gambia's political worries would likely be external, or at any rate arise from her external relations: "One cannot, for example, exclude the possibility that if union does not come soon, causes of conflict between The Gambia and Senegal may arise, either because of smuggling from The Gambia to Senegal, or because Senegalese political exiles find refuge in The Gambia (West Africa, February 13, 1965). The present Confederation may not have come about as a result of conflict between the two states, but the fact remains that Gambian authorities reluctance to form a union with Senegal was overshadowed by The Gambia's "security needs" following the 1981 revolt. Thus the relations between the two countries is not determined by Gambian political elites' desire

to unify their country with Senegal, but by Senegalese forcefulness and Jawara's determination to stay in power.

> ...Until recently one could describe the Gambian position towards Senegal as being successfully avoiding Senegalese encroachment, while trying to apply some economic flesh to formal sovereignty. This means that the presence of Senegalese troops in Banjul is of great significance. [It showed that for yet another time,] Banjul has had to have recourse to Dakar for domestic political security. With this the Senegalese ... acquired a vital lever for ... negotiations with the Gambian Government (West Africa, November 17, 1980, p.2280).

The Senegalese have partially succeeded in their drive to force reluctant Gambian authorities to at least superficially endorse moves towards the creation of a Senegambian state. The series of unfortunate events in The Gambia, resulting from the country's decadent economic and political situation, opened the way for the Senegalese. The incidents have been described here not only to project the Gambian condition before the 1981 revolt, but also to point out Senegalese involvement and the forces that finally compelled Jawara to "seek" for the integration of the two countries. As has been pointed out, The Gambia had consistently asserted its independence and viability as a nation. But that was possible and real before Senegalese troops were invited into the country in 1981, which gave Senegalese authorities

greater muscle to force The Gambia to the table for unification and integration talks.

Let us now take a look at the 1981 revolt itself, which suddenly made "confederation," "union," "federation," "integration," "African unity," and so on, the focal points of relations between The Gambia and Senegal.

It was early in the morning of July 30, 1981 when a scheduled Radio Gambia broadcast was abruptly interrupted with an unfamiliar boast of Marxist rhetoric accompanied with expressions of anti-Jawara, anti-establishment sentiments by one Kukoi Samba Sanyang. Sanyang, who was scarecely known by then, said that power had been taken over by a 12-man Supreme Council of the Revolution. Three of the Council's members belonged to the paramilitary police unit known as the Field Force. The remaining nine, including Sanyang, were civilians. All Council members were political nonenties, and at least one was a taxi driver.

The rebel leader was christened Paul Dominique Sanyang, but changed his name to Kukoi Samba Sanyang when he turned to left-wing politics as a student, according to a report in West Africa magazine. He was also an unsuccessful candidate for the National Convention Party in the 1977 elections in The Gambia. Sanyang's emergence was a total surprise, since he was not the "expected messiah" to save The Gambia from its economic and political decadence. But it was widely

believed that he was only a frontman for established politicians who had become frustrated with the system and cannot effect change through the ballot box.

Whether the belief is genuine or not has never been established, but the revolt was clearly spearheaded by Sanyang, and President Jawara was in Britain at the time for the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana.

The group had seized control of the Field Force armoury, and then captured the national radio station, State House (the President's residence), and Yundum Airport. The rebels, as the government called them, were strengthened when a large majority of the 500-man Field Force decided to join them. Civilian volunteers were also supplied with the Soviet-made Kalashnikov SLR rifles contained in the armoury at Bakau. Also armed were many prisoners released on the day of the revolt.

The rebels, however, failed to take control of the Banjul Police Headquarters, where Vice President Assan Musa Camara and several government officials sought refuge under the protection of a few loyalist forces. The mild resistance convinced Jawara that it may not be a bad idea, afterall, to attempt a comeback.

Meanwhile, the new regime announced that the courts and the constitution had been suspended, frontiers closed, and all political parties banned. A dictatorship of the

proletariat was proclaimed, and Sanyang was named Head of State. The new leader said in a radio broadcast that the coup was directed against "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism".

The announcement of the coup was initially met with surprise and widespread jubilation, until it became apparent that events were taking dangerous turns. "The handing out of guns from the Field Force Armoury to youths, freed prisoners, and everyone who asked resulted in an orgy of looting, wild and indiscriminate firing, and the settling of old scores" (Africa Research Bulletin, August 1981, p.5782). Also the initial announcement of Senegalese plans to intervene and the rebels' pledge to fight to death raised great fears among the population.

While in London, Jawara disclosed plans to urge Senegalese intervention in the crisis. He said he urged Vice President Camara to liaise with President Diouf to see if provisions of a 1965 mutual defense treaty between Senegal and The Gambia could be invoked to put down the rebellion.

Senegalese troops were subsequently sent to The Gambia, and by the second day of the revolt, they recaptured Yundum Airport, and other troops moved across the border into the country. It was then revealed on Radio Gambia, however, that one of Jawara's two wives, Lady Chilel Njie, eight of

their children, her father, the Minister of Education, several local authorities, at least two Senegalese soldiers, Senegalese diplomats and their families, and the National President of the ruling party had been "arrested" by the rebels.

A war of words, which the rebels called "psychological warfare," ensued between Sanyang and Jawara, who was then based in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. The rebels broadcast threats to execute hostages since Senegal was intervening in their country's internal affairs. The Senegalese responded by arguing that the 1965 defense treaty between The Gambia and Senegal provides for military cooperation in the event of external aggression. Broadcasts from Radio Gambia included pleas from the hostages for Senegalese troops to withdraw, while Jawara gave stern warnings from Dakar that no hostages be harmed.

It could be seen from such a dangerous situation how easily Jawara might have been coerced into concluding agreements he had resisted for years. He was virtually "impotent". His presidency was at stake and his family and some of his close associates were held hostage with continuous death threats. Under the circumstances described, it is almost inconceivable that any leader could reach an agreement or make a genuine proposal of the magnitude of integrating two nation-states with a "cool and clear-headed"

understanding of the costs and consequences of his/her decisions. He was neither on home territory nor on neutral ground, and public opinion was not taken into account. In fact, up to now, the Jawara administration has ignored calls for a national referendum on Senegambia before any further decisions are made.

With the way almost cleared by the Senegalese interventionist forces, Jawara flew back to Banjul on August 2, 1981. At the same time, reinforcements of Senegalese troops flew in by helicopter to join the few loyalist Gambian paramilitary forces there. They later took over control of the capital and all major points leading to it.

Assuming control did not come as easy for the Senegalese as they had expected. They were met with stiff resistance. A Senegalese helicopter was shot down, a jeep captured, and an undisclosed number of Senegalese soldiers killed by civilians with no military training and by Field Force men who had no sophisticated weaponry.

On August 6, the rebels escaped when commandoes entered their stronghold in Bakau and freed all the hostages. The commando force that went into the camp reportedly included three members of the British SAS (Special Air Service).

Some members of the short-lived Supreme Council of the Revolution were later arrested, but Sanyang and several others fled the country by fishing boats to Guinea-Bissau,

where they were granted political asylum. Some were later to be extradited to The Gambia.

Order was restored about a week after the incidents began, but Senegalese troops have since remained in The Gambia "to ensure the government's security."

"After the defeat of the July 1981 revolt, the Senegalese immediately went on pressing for the union of the two countries on a Gambian President who was only ready for what he called `the integration of the security forces' of the two countries" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307).

"The ... coup attempt and the decisive role of Senegal ... changed everything. Senegambian unity, never taken seriously as a political reality by many Gambian leaders, was soon thrown onto their laps. The gravity of the situation and the growing political insecurity of the Jawara regime combined to make Senegambia an attractive proposition" (Nyang, p.47-49).

President Jawara paid an official visit to Senegal less than a month after the revolt, and his Senegalese "hosts waved aside protocol and broke diplomatic norms to parade him in front of a then-going congress of the (ruling) Parti Socialiste that noisily called for nothing less than `immediate annexation'" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307).

"Days before Jawara's arrival, a petition sponsored by powerful sections of the Dakar-based merchant class, which

called for `immediate annexation', had been in circulation in the Senegalese capital. By the time of his departure, a couple of days later, Jawara was now talking `confederation' to appease the Senegalese while keeping at bay the formidable menace of immediate annexation" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307).

It becomes evident from the chain of events just described and others to follow that Jawara was under duress when decisions on the Senegambia Confederation were made. His vision and commitment, as well as those of his close associates, were limited to the integration of the security forces of the two countries, while President Diouf reportedly said "he wants to work towards an integrated state and foresees a new country called Senegambia ..." (West Africa, August 24, 1981, p.1912).

As stated above, Jawara opted for a strategy that would protect his regime from collapse and secure The Gambia's independence at the same time. What he did not realize he was bargaining for was The Gambia's loss of sovereignty in the face of Senegalese encroachment. The Senegalese authorities pressed for a union, and confederation and the integration of security forces were seen only as steps towards unification. This view was expressed in the ruling Socialist Party (Senegal)'s organ--"Unite."

A brief round of shuttle diplomacy intensified as the dust began to settle on the revolt. And on December 17, 1981, an agreement on the establishment of The Senegambia Confederation was signed in Dakar by Presidents Abdou Diouf and Dawda Jawara for Senegal and The Gambia, respectively. The Confederation came into effect on February 1, 1982. A statement by the Gambia Government said, "The Agreement confirms the wish of the two countries to strenghthen their solidarity and their commitment to the ideals of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)" (Fact Sheets On The Gambia). The next chapter takes a close look at the Confederation, and how and why the confederal partners have succeeded or failed in attaining their stated goals.

CHAPTER III

THE CREATION OF "SENEGAMBIA"

Politicians in The Gambia began expressing opposition to the moves towards integration even before details of the Confederation Agreement were made public. One obvious reason for their opposition is the influence that Dakar would hold over Banjul, where administrative and industrial infrastructure is less developed. Businessmen in Dakar were on the whole in favor of some kind of union, with the expectation that The Gambia's preferential tariffs would be abolished as a result. Most goods were cheaper in The Gambia and smuggling (or "re-exporting" as Gambians prefer to call it) into Senegal affects that country's trade.

Gambian businessmen, on the other hand, were opposed to integration--especially the economic dimension. Though somewhat influential, they lacked the kind of economic clout necessary to reverse the trend of events. The Jawara administration's security interests and the confidence that Senegalese protection would bring to the government overrode the interests of the country's business elite.

Despite mushrooming opposition among Gambian political elites to any form of union with Senegal, Presidents Diouf

and Jawara went ahead with their plans for Confederation. According to an outline of the Confederal Agreement, the Confederation shall be based on:

(1) The integration of the armed forces and of the security forces of the Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal, to defend the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and independence of the Confederation;

(2) Economic and monetary union;

(3) Coordination of policy in the field of external relations;

(4) Coordination of policy in the field of communications and in all other fields where the Confederal states may agree to exercise their jurisdiction jointly;

(5) Joint instructions.

The terms of the Agreement specify that, "The President of the Confederation shall command the Armed Forces and the Security Forces of the Confederation. He shall be responsible for the defence and security of the Confederation" (Fact Sheets On The Gambia, pp.1-2). The Gambian president, however, remains Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of The Gambia.

The Agreement also provides for:

(a) A Confederal Presidency and Vice Presidency. The President of Senegal is the President of the Confederation, and the President of The Gambia, its Vice President;

(b) A Council of Ministers whose members are appointed by the President of the Confederation in agreement with the Vice President. This Council meets under the leadership of the President and Vice President of the Confederation;

(c) A sixty-member Confederal Parliament elected from the national parliaments of the two countries; one-third consists of Gambian parliamentarians, and two-thirds Senegalese legislators. There is a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker. Members meet in Dakar for main sessions and Banjul for bureau/committee sessions; and

(d) A Secretariat for the Presidency based in Dakar. Under the Agreement, the Confederal President has to consult and have the prior agreement of the Vice President to implement any confederal Act. Also, the confederal states retain the powers to formulate their own domestic and foreign policies, but decisions affecting the Confederation or its institutions have to be made jointly.

In case dispute or difference arises out of the interpretation and the implementation of the Agreement, it would be submitted to the President of the Confederation for settlement, in agreement with the Vice President. If the two Heads of State fail to agree upon the settlement of a

difference submitted to them, either of them may refer the matter to arbitration. The requirement, though not a complete safeguard, seems to reduce The Gambia's fears of a Senegalese leader taking matters into his/her own hands. A protocol of implementation was to "lay down rules constituting an arbitration tribunal for the settlement of differences and for regulating its procedure" (Fact Sheets On The Gambia, p.2). The text of the Confederation Agreement concerning the confederal president's powers to declare a state of emergency "in consultation with" (meaning by informing) the Vice President of the Confederation was amended to "in agreement with" at the insistence of the Gambian president. It was argued that only the president of The Gambia can declare a state of emergency in The Gambia (Gaye, p.63).

From the signing of the Agreement to this day, "a chain of confusion has been rocking the Senegambian Confederation process" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307). The discordant nature of what the two partners were creating became evident when disagreement broke out between them just a few weeks after the signing of the confederal accords in December 1981. The problem was that The Gambians regarded the Agreement a "`document of intent' while the Senegalese insisted that it was `binding'" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307). It was submitted to the Gambian parliament for "debate" and formal approval,

while the Senegalese Assembly also deliberated on the character of the "marriage." Both legislatures ratified the Agreement.

But before we get into developments after the signing of the Agreement, we need to peruse the accord with a view to understanding the foot-dragging attitude of Gambian authorities. It is an undisputable fact that political power in Senegambia is not evenly distributed, at least as spelt out in the Confederal Agreement. This may have had an impact on Gambian political elites' attitudes towards a closer union with Senegal. As pointed out earlier, the current framework was agreed to when Gambian leaders were facing a crisis situation in their country. Thus it is in no way a reflection of the values they cherish in terms of Senegambia.

But what is the evidence to substantiate the position that Senegambia is based on unequal partnership? The President of the Confederation is Senegalese; Senegal has a two-thirds representation in the legislative assembly; Senegal has virtual control over the armed and security forces, and ensures the security of the Confederation; Senegal contributes two-thirds of the confederal budget, giving it a major say on how funds are disbursed; and Senegal has more ministers in the Senegambia cabinet.

The confederal framework that is now in force is lopsided since it gives the Senegalese a clear and decisive superiority. Gambian politicians had severely compromised their position before the announced "negotiations" as a result of the domestic turmoil they were facing. Also, the Gambian politicians who "negotiated" on confederation were no match for the better educated and sophisticated Senegalese authorities. Information about the negotiating process is very sketchy, except as it relates to the formal signing ceremonies.

Another element in the Senegambian confederal agreement demonstrates the lopsidedness of the distribution of political power between The Gambia and Senegal. This point could be best illustrated by drawing examples from the failed Mali Federation of Senegal and the Soudan (now Mali). Under the Mali Federation, even though Senegal covered 76 thousand square miles and the Soudan 465 thousand square miles (the population balance also was marginally in favor of Soudan) there was equal distribution of political power between the two states. The offices of chief of state and head of government were separate, with the latter maintaining control over foreign affairs. Even though Senegal was the smaller partner, it was agreed that a Senegalese might be chosen as a chief of state. The President of the Mali Federation was chosen by a Congress composed of an equal

number of Senegalese and Soudanese Territorial and Federal Assembly members (Foltz, pp.189-190).

Given these data, and the fact that The Gambia is the much smaller partner under the Confederation, one should have expected a similar arrangement with the Senegalese. Instead, the Senegambian accord reserves the Presidency for the Senegalese, who also hold a two-thirds representation in the Confederal Assembly. Why should the Senegalese insist on equal partnership with a geographically but not demographically much larger Soudan, and then remain adamant on dominating relations with The Gambia based on size? Obviously, the Senegalese authorities pursue their own national interest, and it is the Gambian side that has been outwitted. The confederal accord is lopsided partly because Gambian statesmen were not in the same position as the Senegalese were with the Soudanese to negotiate on an equal footing. The Gambia was enmeshed in political turmoil, which the Senegalese seized upon as an opportunity to pursue their long-sought goal of creating a Senegambian nation. But they have so far failed to sway Gambian political elites' attitudes in their favor.

And though Senegambia has started out as a confederation, there are other factors about its Confederation Agreement that have a striking resemblance to that of the successful union of French- and English-speaking Cameroons.

> Federalism as a concept was interpreted differently by political elites on both sides of the Cameroon border. The Francophone elites were in principle opposed to any form of federation, preferring instead a very centralised unitary state. But for tactical reasons were prepared to concede to a temporary federation with Southern Cameroons. Anglophone politicians, on the other hand, wanted a loose federation and saw this as the best arrangement under existing circumstances for preserving the individuality of the Southern Cameroons political persona (Kofele-Kale, pp.xxxi-xxxii).

In the case of Senegambia, it is the Senegalese who have consistently and forcefully pushed for the creation of a federation or unitary state, while Anglophone Gambia has opted, at most, for a looser union that would ensure its independence, identity, and sovereignty. Existing circumstances, rising mainly from the 1981 revolt, forced The Gambia in the direction of confederation. But in contrast to Anglophone Cameroon, which was also much smaller than its French-speaking partner, Gambian political leaders have dodged calls for a national referendum on the issue of confederation. The overwhelming majority of Anglophone Cameroonians opted for Cameroon (federal) citizenship in February of 1961, ironically Senegambia was also officially established in February 1982. What this points to is that the Senegambia Confederation is not a manifestation of the wills of either the Gambian masses or their political elites. A referendum would have proved this, and the Gambian government was well aware of that.

It would, however, be fair at this juncture, to say that most "Senegambians" who are opposed to the present confederal framework are not outright against unifying Senegal and The Gambia. Instead, they generally see unification as a desirable goal, but one that should be approached cautiously and in stages. Some political elites believe that citizens should be educated about the concept of integration before moves are made to create Senegambia. It is a fact that very few Gambians have any but the slightest notions as to what unification or confederation could mean or what kind of society to expect.

Having considered the lopsidedness of the Senegambia Confederation, we will now gauge the Confederation against its own stated objectives. This would give us a picture of the slow process of Senegambian integration and show that Gambian political elites are not committed to the creation of Senegambia.

Senegambia was established in response to The Gambia's security concerns; thus it should come as no surprise that the integration of security forces preceded all other areas in the confederal accord. A confederal force has been established to operate side by side with national forces, but it is stationed mainly in The Gambia. "The force is rather ambiguous. It is a force which is supposed to include both Senegalese and Gambian nationals and serving

the two neighbors under the Senegambia Confederation." It is, however, permanently in The Gambia and reputedly dominated by members of a crack Senegalese unit (Momoh, p.554).

Also, little progress has been made in the sphere of communications, even though a Senegambia Information Commission has since been established. This was acknowledged by the Confederal Minister of Information and Telecommunications, Djibo Ka, a Senegalese national. The Commission was set up to assist the authorities of the two countries in formulating confederal policy in the field of information and to make recommendations. But Minister Ka claimed that "apart from television, which `can be considered Senegambian,' the other media were not yet in tune with each other" (Africa Research Bulletin, February 15, 1987, p.8298). Actually, nothing in the sphere of communication is in tune with integrationist ideals. Since only Senegal has television, considering that as a measure of integration was at best misleading. Programming over the so-called Senegambian television station is done primarily in French and Wollof. The Gambia is, of course, English-speaking and Mandingos constitute the majority ethnic group.

There is no newspaper or other publication that operates from a Senegambian perspective. The media are still constrained by their nationalistic outlooks, since the two governments have not worked hard enough to instill a

Senegambian perspective in them. The present state of telecommunications infrastructure between the confederal states could make it even more difficult for media to broaden their activities in the region. A few phone lines have since been installed for faster communication between a few major Gambian and Senegalese towns, but this was more a token gesture than anything else. The number of people with phones in these towns is quite dismal, and very few residents could afford a call to the other country. What is more urgently needed instead is a faster mail service between the two neighbors. It takes at least more than a week for mail to reach its destination in the other state.

"In external affairs, where the semantics of the term `confederation' would have suggested more understanding, chaos and confusion prevails even more remarkably" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310). The protocol for the coordination of foreign policy is expected to afford Senegambia greater bargaining power in international negotiations, but this is almost impossible in view of the chaotic nature of the two states' foreign policies. Key foreign policy issues faced by the two states included the issuance of visas, diplomatic representation, membership in international organizations, foreign military training, and positions on other international and intra-African affairs. Let us discuss a few cases in point.

Jawara went to Libya to resume diplomatic relations with that country before his Senegalese counterparts had even thought of such a move.

> Gambian authorities also worked up an official attachment to Britain that, in the words of (an) official Senegalese daily ... `bordered on colonial nostalgia'. The Gambian authorities insisted on asking for continued British military aid in spite of strong Senegalese dissuasion (Manjang, Part I, p.2310).

It is beyond argument that Jawara's constitutional powers as Gambian Head of State allow him to execute the country's foreign policy and to make alliances if necessary, but the Senegalese contended that given the existence of the Confederation, due consideration should be given to the need to coordinate foreign policy. And the Gambian insistence on asking for British military aid may have been interpreted as distrust of such assistance from the Senegalese.

Another controversial issue in the arena of external affairs was the June 1986 issuance of Gambian visas by Senegalese diplomatic missions in the United States without even seeking approval from The Gambia Government. A mild protest from The Gambia sparked the mistreatment of Gambian nationals travelling through Dakar's Yoff Airport. Some had argued that the airport harassments--unnecessary searches, delays, and interrogations--were aimed at opponents of Jawara and were carried out with his consent. The pattern

of the acts, however, did not seem to implicate Gambian authorities since some government officials received similar mistreatment. The Gambia subsequently filed a protest with the Senegalese authorities.

These and other strains in the Confederation were not mere accidents or miscalculations. The obstacles arise from Gambian political elites' unwillingness to see their country unified with Senegal. The interests of the Confederation's architects coincide in some areas, like security, but diverge in almost every other sphere, including monetary and trade issues, transportation, and relations with other countries. Trapped by agreements reached under duress, the Gambian leaders' only rational strategy for maintaining their country's independence while appeasing the Senegalese has seemed to be "foot-dragging." The Gambia Government's strategy of "preserving the last external signs of Gambian national sovereignty" can be evident in several incidents (Africa Research Bulletin, March 15, 1985, p.7891).

For example, a football match in The Gambia between the two confederal states gave rise to anti-Senegalese sentiments among the Gambian spectators. The Senegalese ambassador then gave orders for the Senegalese army to enter the hostel reserved for players to ensure the safety of the Senegalese team despite the fact that the hostel was guarded by the Gambian police. Even President Jawara publicly took

exception to the Senegalese diplomat's behaviour during the incidents. The ambassador was later recalled by his government (Africa Research Bulletin, April 15, 1985, p.7563).

During that same period in 1985, the Nigerian Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari was invited to celebrations of The Gambia's twentieth anniversary of independence. This was viewed by many in Senegalese circles as The Gambia's desire to say it did not want to become a region of Senegal and as an attempt to "court Nigerian friendship as leverage against them" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310).

The two states have also not been able to move forward with economic integration. Gambian leaders may have realized the difficulties the two states would face in trying to reverse the trend towards unification once economic institutions and regimes are fully integrated.

It appears that all that has been achieved in the sphere of economic integration is the detailed studies that have been presented. Of primary concern in this area is the objective of monetary union, which is complicated by the existence of separate currencies for the confederal states. Senegal's CFA currency has a high value against the dalasi, and is very much in demand in The Gambia.

> At present, (CFA) francs which find their way into The Gambia cannot be returned to Senegal ... to be exchanged into other currencies, but are shipped,

> usually to Switzerland, to fetch what they can earn. The dalasi is not welcome in Senegal.
>
> In other words, the Confederation's two currencies are not directly quoted against each other and are not interchangeable (West Africa, January 6, 1986, pp.17-18).

Another roadblock to economic integration is the question of The Gambia's membership of the UMOA (West African Monetary Union). Senegal wants The Gambia to join the CFA currency zone, and The Gambia agrees. The problem is that The Gambia remains strongly opposed to the concept of applying for membership on Senegal's ticket or together as a Confederation. The Gambia insists on applying and joining the organisation as a sovereign independent state, while Senegal thinks this would be embarrassing given the existence of the Senegambia Confederation. The Jawara administration maintains that doing either of these would tantamount to reading a federal meaning into a confederal agreement (West Africa, January 20, 1986, p.123).

"... The Gambia's gradualist approach to confederal economics seems to suggest that it is looking somewhere else for economic salvation" (West Africa, January 20, 1986, p.123).

Two study groups, one on monetary union and another on customs union, were set up in connection with the protocol on monetary and economic union, but the present state of economic integration indicates a lack of progress. The

raison d'etre of these study groups was to recommend ways of achieving the eventual integration of the two countries' economic regimes; and the establishment of a monetary union and a customs union would be first steps in that direction. Their recommendations have been "studied" by the two governments, but no agreement is yet in sight.

The establishment of a customs union with a common external tariff, in any case, is to be preceeded by the creation of a free trade area between The Gambia and Senegal. But little, if anything, has yet been achieved. It is noteworthy to state that the free trade arrangements deal only with products of the two states, hence an attempt to stifle The Gambia's "re-export" business. Free trade in local products, which has still not been agreed to, would only go to benefit Senegal.

> So great ... is the disparity in the industrial capacity of the two states ... that the flow of consumer goods would be one-way, particularly if Senegal insisted that it could no longer accept 're-exports' not of local manufacture from The Gambia (West Africa, January 6, 1986, pp.17-18).

A common external tariff structure would have other negative effects on The Gambia's economy. Adopting Senegal's higher structure would mean higher prices for Gambian consumers. Re-exports constitute a subtantial

proportion of The Gambia's imports, and it is argued that these go not only to Senegal but to other countries in the region. The deadlock in this area is partly due to The Gambia's insistence that it be compensated for the higher tariffs; "but apart from the fact that it has no funds for such payments, Senegal could reject any payment for the end of a system which for many years has lost it revenue" (West Africa, January 6, 1986, pp.17-18). The Gambia's insistence on compensation may not be termed as "foot-dragging," but it does slow moves towards economic integration.

The stalemate in economic integration extends a bit further to negotiations on the harmonization of official prices for local produce, particularly groundnuts. A form of price war continues between The Gambia and Senegal. During a recent trade season, The Gambia was obliged to raise its price for groundnuts in the middle of the buying season, and to undertake the burden of paying the difference to farmers who had already sold nuts to The Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB).

The harmonization of official prices for groundnuts is also complicated by the means of payment. GPMB agents pay cash for produce while Senegalese buyers often pay partly in credit. But this is off-set by the higher prices groundnuts yield in Senegal. The frequent repercussion is that The

Gambia ends up loosing a significant portion of the produce to Senegal, even though it subsidizes the production.

The lack of substantial progress in the economic sphere, as well as other areas, is a clear signal of President Jawara's unwillingness for Senegambian integration. But he is not alone in his reluctance to see a Senegambian nation carved out of The Gambia and Senegal, as we shall see in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

ATTITUDES OF GAMBIAN POLITICAL ELITES

Having analyzed The Senegambia Confederation in terms of its stated objectives, its current state of affairs, and its terms of agreement, we may now look at how various Gambian political elites view the Confederation and why they hold their particular views. This study is centered on the hypothesis that Gambian political elites are not committed to the idea of a union between The Gambia and Senegal, or any moves in that direction.

Gambian elites whose views and attitudes consitute the basis of this chapter are: President Jawara; Sheriff M. Dibba, leader of the National Convention Party; Assan M. Camara of the Gambia Peoples' Party; Halifa Sallah, Sam Sarr and Sidia Jatta of the People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism; and Ousman Manjang, a member of the Movement for Justice in Africa--Gambia. These subjects represent a sample of Gambian political elites. All are relatively well-educated and politically sophisticated or motivated. In the cases of Dibba and Camara, both of these men had served in the post of Vice President under Jawara. Also, Dibba received 28 percent of the total votes cast in

the 1987 presidential elections in The Gambia, and Camara collected 13 percent. But we begin by looking at the attitudes of President Jawara, who is also Secretary-General of the Peoples' Progressive Party.

President Jawara's lack of commitment to the concept of a Senegambian nation or a union of any sort between The Gambia and Senegal is not now as obvious as in the past. It was only his "impotence" during and immediately after the 1981 revolt and the consequent Senegalese military dominance that have made Jawara ostensibly change his overall attitude towards Senegambian integration.

A look at the views expressed by Jawara during various stages in his political life will be quite instructive. Once in office as Premier of The Gambia in 1961 (that is before the country became independent), "Jawara showed his willingness to discuss closer relations with Senegal--so long as Gambia's right to independence was recognized" (Welch, p.281). It is noteworthy that he had emphasized a relation that would recognize the independence and sovereignties of both countries, and not moves towards the formation of a federal or unitary state. Jawara did realize that "political independence without economic independence had no lasting value, and that for a nonviable territory such as Gambia, the best solution might be closer ties with Senegal." He was by the same token impressed by the appeals

for "African unity and the elimination of artificial frontiers" (Welch, p.281). Since The Gambia was not at this time militarily or politically dominated by Senegal, Jawara was able to negotiate on an equal footing with his counterpart.

During talks with the Senegalese, Jawara "insisted that association could occur only after Gambia had become independent, a decision in which Great Britain and Senegal concurred" (Welch, p.283). With the assurance of independence, The Gambia was able to negotiate with Senegal on a stronger basis.

Before agreeing to association with Senegal, Jawara demanded major safeguards of autonomy to protect The Gambia's distinctive background and identity. In a memorandum published in October 1962, the government of The Gambia, with Jawara at the helm, listed conditions under which association might come about. Gambia would retain control of internal administration, police, civil service, and local government; and its civil and criminal law, as well as educational and professional standards, would be kept; and the close ties between The Gambia, Great Britain, and the Commonwealth would be maintained. The Gambia and Senegal, it was maintained, would share defense, foreign policy (including joint representation overseas), financial matters, and development (Welch, p.283). What Jawara opted

for, and insisted upon, was functional cooperation and not a union of any sort--confederation, federation, or unitary state. He was able to make The Gambia's position loud and clear partly because Senegalese influence over The Gambia was quite minimal.

To continue with our analysis of Jawara's attitudes towards Senegambia, we can look at the budget session of The Gambia's House of Assembly in January 1964, during which he expressed his determination to pursue negotiations with Senegal. But while Jawara's emphasis was on "association," President Senghor talked of something broader. Speaking in different languages during a visit to The Gambia in March 1964, he said: "It is our duty to strengthen these (human) relations which must inevitably end in unity" (Welch, p.285).

A 1964 report by the United Nations on the idea of association between Senegal and The Gambia once again helped to expose Jawara's view of Senegambia. The report stated that:

> ... The supporters of the idea of an association are unquestionably still in the majority in The Gambia as a whole; but many of them, and even more those who lend an attentive ear to the opposition's arguments, feel apprehensive about the proposed association and wonder what its consequences, and more particularly its economic effects, will be on the community and on individuals. ... What seems to trouble most people is the economic aspect of the matter, and this is mainly

> or wholly responsible for the political attitude adopted by some of them (Welch, p.287).

The same apprehensions prevail in the Jawara administration now, as could be seen from the stall in negotiations on economic integration. The only change that could be made to the above observation now is that the supporters of integration are clearly in the minority, even though no official polls have been conducted.

The United Nations' report discussed three broad approaches to political association:

(a) the **complete integration** of The Gambia into Senegal;

(b) the establishment of a **federation**, preserving the legal personalities of the two partners internally but setting up a central state organization superior to both; and (c) the ratification of treaties establishing a "Senegambian" entente or **confederation**, in which both countries would retain full sovereign rights (Welch, p.287).

Jawara's unwillingness to see the two countries unified became apparent once more. As it was left to Jawara and his cabinet to push ahead for some type of accord, they tended to favor the confederal proposal so as to maintain Gambian identity. The confederal state, according to Jawara, would be vested with joint and sovereign responsibility for matters of joint concern, defence and foreign affairs and

overseas representation. He said a special relationship between The Gambia and the Commonwealth would be specifically reserved (Welch, p.287).

A series of hard negotiations ensued after the UN report, with the government of Senegal suggesting a much greater concentration of power in the joint unit of government; and The Gambian representatives rejecting that as "beyond what we felt public opinion in The Gambia would accept, and ... not in the best interests of The Gambia" (Welch, p.284). It appears now that concerns for public opinion and The Gambia's security interests have been superceded by Jawara's concern for his administration's security. He had consistently stood for functional cooperation rather than making strides towards the creation of a Senegambian suprastate, thus preserving Gambian autonomy and independence.

But even despite guarantees of autonomy, very little was achieved in the way of integrating the two countries. The grant of international sovereignty to The Gambia (in 1965) meant that Jawara had a vested interest in maintaining undivided control over the country.

A more recent illustration of Jawara's attitudes is given in an interview with Africa magazine in 1975 on the tenth anniversary of The Gambia's independence. President

Jawara responded to speculation on his country's relations with Senegal by saying:

> Well, when we approached our independence, there were, as you may know, many sceptics. There were many who doubted whether The Gambia would be viable as an independent entity. All this has proved to be false. The Gambia has made a success, a reasonable success of its independence. Now, even if The Gambia and Senegal had become one country, the size of their domestic market, which many think is one of the biggest constraints for a small country, would still be comparatively small ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'"p.12).

Jawara hoped that both Senegal and The Gambia will become members of organizations such as ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), a wish that has been realized. That was another way of saying no unification between "our" two states. As Jawara alluded in the Africa magazine interview:

> I do not see that the solution to the problem of the smallness of our two states in West Africa can be solved by the union of just one or two states such as the merger of Senegal and The Gambia. This would not solve the problem. Their combined resources, their markets, are still comparatively small, and of course there would be greater political and social problems. This situation has arisen in a few cases such as the Mali Federation. I see a much greater chance for success in any union of states in this region if the process of union or federation were to involve four or more countries. In this way, no state would feel it was being dominated ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'" p.13).

These views expressed by Jawara in 1975 completely diverge from his present position, at least as far as his pronounced policy is concerned. But even as late as August 1981, he responded to a question on the possibility of a federation by stating that: "It is very difficult to say at this stage. I have given it as my view that it was time we looked at the possibility of integrating our security forces" (West Africa, August 17, 1981, p.1869).

His propaganda for Senegambian unity placed increasing emphasis on the ethnic similarities of Senegal and The Gambia, and on the notion that integrating the two states would enhance Pan-Africanist ideals by alleviating one of the oddities of the partition of Africa.

The question to be answered now is: How could Jawara's stance on integration between The Gambia and Senegal be suddenly revolutionized? In fact, Jawara essentially holds to the same views, but the growth of Senegalese influence since the 1981 revolt changed the rules of the game. He is no longer free to express views on Senegambian relations that may be perceived in a negative light from a Senegalese perspective; after all, he must be concerned about remaining "secure" under the arms of Senegalese troops. He has entangled himself and the country in what a West Africa magazine article called "A Marriage of Confusion."

A brief analysis of some aspects of the present military, economic and political climate of Senegambian relations will help us find answers to the previously raised issue of factors responsible for Jawara's ostensible change in attitude towards integration.

President Jawara felt he owed credit to the Senegalese for his return to power in August 1981, after being temporarily deposed by a civilian-led revolt. A number of Senegalese soldiers were killed in the process, and Jawara began to feel obligated to Senegal. Senegalese military presence in The Gambia and overt diplomatic pressures from Dakar apparently forced Jawara and his administration to restate their position on relations with Senegal. Currently, the government radio station, State House, Banjul International Airport, and other strategic points within the country are being "secured" by Senegalese troops; and the so-called Confederal Army stationed in The Gambia is dominated by them. A number of Jawara's bodyguards are Senegalese, but they do not travel with him abroad. There have been unconfirmed reports of protests by Senegalese guards to the fact that Jawara does not travel with them to foreign countries.

It is against this backdrop of increased Senegalese military presence in The Gambia and the consequent political power it brought for Senegal that we should view Gambian

leaders' pronounced policy towards relations with their neighbor.

Jawara's attitude towards economic integration makes clear his regime's consistent lack of commitment to any form of union with Senegal. He has, even before independence, favored functional cooperation with Senegal. Functional cooperation is, however, something that is almost inevitable between the two countries given their propinquity. Jawara still maintains, though more quietly, that it would not be in the interest of The Gambia to surrender its sovereignty and independence to a supranational authority.

A case in point is The Gambia's refusal to join the West African Monetary Union on Senegal's ticket or as a confederation with Senegal. This is a manifestation of Jawara and his associates' resistance to single representation or membership at international organizations or foreign countries for the confederal states. The Gambia government contended that doing these would tantamount to reading a federal meaning into a confederal agreement. And this has been one of Jawara's rationales for not moving forward in the areas of foreign policy coordination and economic integration.

On the slow process of the proposed customs and monetary union, the Gambian President reiterates the fact that studies are being conducted. A report on the tariff

structures, trade practices and restrictions, and third-party arrangements of the confederated states has been under study for years without any practical outcomes. The two governments have yet to agree. The committee set up to conduct the studies recommended the creation of a free trade area between The Gambia and Senegal, the long-term goal being a customs union. Reports, however, indicate that Jawara is willing to go ahead with customs and monetary union only if Senegal compensates The Gambia. This would be compensation for the higher tariffs The Gambia would have to adopt, resulting in higher prices for Gambian consumers.

Another indication of Jawara's attitude towards "Senegambia" was evident in his speech in 1985 during the launching of The Gambia's Economic Recovery Programme. The programme was to revive the economy as well as achieve economic growth over the medium term. If Senegambian economic integration was something Jawara had envisioned, or if it were something he was committed to, it would at least have been mentioned in his speech. He gave no indication that The Gambia might ease its foreign exchange problems a bit by gaining access to a more convertible currency and eliminating the black market, tasks the Confederation seeks to undertake (West Africa, January 20, 1986, p.122).

Now that we have uncovered Jawara's stance on various integration issues, we may now turn to the views of other

political elites, specifically those in the opposition. Political elites examined in this part of the study include: Ousman Manjang of the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA); and Halifa Sallah, Sidia Jatta, and Sam Sarr of the Peoples' Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS). They display a serious and rare understanding of the issues at stake in Senegambia. They have vehemently made their positions known on Senegambian relations through publications and, in the case of PDOIS leaders, through public debates.

Two other opposition parties have been reticent on the issue of integration and on the whole area of Senegambian politics. Their positions are not as explicit as those of PDOIS and MOJA. The two, the National Convention Party (NCP) and the Gambia Peoples' Party (GPP), are breakaway factions from the ruling Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP). And both Sheriff Dibba of NCP and GPP's Assan Musa Camara once held the post of Vice President under President Jawara. In fact, Camara was The Gambia's Acting President during the 1981 revolt and he had participated in drawing up support for the Confederation Agreement.

Camara and Dibba have not spoken out strongly yet on Senegambia issue. Camara did not include Senegambia in his political agenda partly because of his past association with the Confederation. Political pundits have even gone to

the extent of labelling the GPP's programs as a carbon copy of the PPP's.

The NCP leader also failed to make any mention of the Confederation in a statement on the occasion of the Party's eleventh anniversary; no word on Senegambia was uttered in a statement released by the Party demanding Jawara's resignation before the 1987 General Elections; and the issue was left out in a statement broadcast to the Gambian nation on February 27, 1987 (just before the General Elections) by Sheriff Dibba. Though the reasons behind Dibba's reticence on Senegambia are not clear, it will be important to point out that he was detained for several months by the Jawara administration in 1981-82 for alleged complicity in the 1981 revolt. He was released without any charges being brought against him. This may have had some effect on how he expresses his political convictions. But not making Senegambia an issue could also be a strategy of demeaning its political significance to Gambian political elites.

One could also infer from Dibba and Camara's reticence that either they are not essentially opposed to Jawara's foot-dragging strategy, or for fear of retribution, they are maintaining a degree of unpredictability on the issue. Unpredictability may ensure a degree of Senegalese non-intervention in The Gambia's internal political struggles, especially when Senegal has no natural allies. But

basically, we could conclude that the two do not favor the unification or complete integration of The Gambia with Senegal, at least under the current atmosphere.

The leadership of PDOIS, on the other hand, has not made any secrets of its stance on the Senegambia issue, as could be evidenced from the party's programs. PDOIS, or the Peoples' Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism, was formed in August 1986. And the party aims "to safeguard the economic and political independence of The Gambia so that the nation and the Gambian people could live in equality and peace with all other nations and peoples." A statement from the party after its inauguration pointed to "the fact that the PPP has compromised the sovereignty of The Gambia by negotiating an unequal relationship between The Gambia and Senegal."

Two of the party's leaders, Halifa Sallah and Sam Sarr, were detained without trial by the PPP government after the 1981 revolt for allegedly running an unlawful society and publishing an underground newspaper--"The Voice of The Future" (West Africa, Aug. 25, 1986, p.1803).

Sallah and Sarr are adamantly opposed to the "Marriage of Confusion" between Senegal and The Gambia and any form of union which would entail the loss of Gambian sovereignty. The two wrote in a party publication that the Senegalese and Gambian peoples can only create "a strong and unbreakable

bond of friendship" if their relation is "based on equality and respect for each other's sovereignty, political independence and right to self-determination" (Sallah, p.14). Sallah stated that "Gambians wish to live in peace and friendship with all peoples and nations who respect their sovereignty and political independence and recognize the territorial integrity of their country." He said Gambians do not wish to dominate or be dominated (Sallah, p.22-23).

For Sallah, a "Sene-Gambia Nation" exists only "in the mind and mouth" of Senegalese President Abdou Diouf. "A `Sene-Gambia Nation' is certainly nonexistent nor can it be created without a referendum behind the back of the Gambian people" (Sallah, pp.11-12).

Sallah expounded on his position in relation to Senegambia and the basis for his opposition to the present confederal framework. From the denial of the existence of "Senegambia" as a nation, he argued that the relation between The Gambia and Senegal is not one based on "the mutual recognition of the sovereign equality and political independence of both states." Instead, the Confederation is a step towards what he considered "the absorption, assimilation, integration, amalgamation or annexation of The Gambia into a larger Senegambia nation" (Sallah, pp.11-12).

The Confederal President came under strong attack by Sallah. He said there is a tendency in Senegal to disregard

Gambia's political independence and sovereignty in violation of the confederal agreement. A speech by Abdou Diouf was quoted to substantiate this allegation. Diouf reportedly said in a speech to the Gambian and Senegalese peoples that:

> "The process is irreversible and the Senegambian nation is constructing itself and shall continue to be constructed without a break nor without seam, it has at its service men of service and courage, and also a hard working youth and one of faith and truth also." (Sallah, pp.11-12).

It is also Sallah's contention that by uttering certain statements, President Diouf had interfered in the domestic affairs of The Gambia. Diouf, by stating that: "It is therefore imperative that during 1985, we move faster with ... negotiations, than we had done in 1984. We must go forward for we can no longer go back ..." had indeed compelled representatives of The Gambia to hasten the ratification of agreements and protocols (Sallah, p.14). Resentment of Senegambia is not limited to utterances made by the Confederal President.

PDOIS leaders point to several reasons for lack of commitment to the integration of The Gambia with Senegal by looking at various dimensions of the process. It is their contention that the Senegalese President "had no lawful ground to intervene" in the 1981 revolt in The Gambia. The mutual defense agreement which was signed between the two

countries addresses "external security and defence" (Sallah, p.14). An excerpt from the Agreement reads:

> The Government of The Gambia and the Government of the Republic of Senegal, pending the institution of a closer association between The Gambia and Senegal, aware of the responsibilities incumbent upon them regarding the maintenance of peace as declared in the charter of the United Nations, desirious of setting out their Common Approach to closer cooperation in matters of External Security and Defence, have agreed on the following:
>
> ARTICLE 1: The Government of The Gambia and The Government of the Republic of Senegal will, on request by either side, help and assist each other to secure their External Security and Defence against any form of threat ("Swaebou Conateh vs. PDOIS," p.37).

PDOIS leaders point out that the Agreement talks of mutual assistance if any one country is threatened by an external or foreign force or power. Since there was no "concrete proof of foreign intervention in the launching of the coup," there was also "no legal justification" for Senegalese involvement. The Jawara administration failed to give any proof of foreign involvement in the revolt, thus giving Senegalese troops the image of an occupation force ("Swaebou Conateh vs. PDOIS," p.38).

Expressing general opposition to the Senegambia Confederation, Sallah said the stall in negotiations is history trapping President Diouf until "true sons and daughters of this nation could emerge to enligthen our people." Abdou

Diouf did manage to outwit our old brand of politicians, he added, but he has "neither outwitted history nor the Constitution of The Republic of The Gambia. The unconstitutionality of his seemingly lawful protocols now stand exposed" (Sallah and Sarr, p.6).

Another PDOIS leader, Sidia Jatta, together with Sallah, held a press conference on October 18, 1986 at which they "affirmed that the agreement establishing the Senegambia Confederation and the protocols connected with them have violated the Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia" ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'" p.6). Sallah and Jatta stated that the protocol on defense, which gave power to the President of Senegal to declare a state of emergency in The Gambia, was in contravention of The Gambia's constitution. This was equated with giving a foreign power the mandate to order Gambians around. Sallah and Sarr added:

> One thing should be clear to (President Diouf), that if he fakes an invasion of our country and use it as a pretext to declare a state of alert in our country, we will defy his pronouncements. We will be at the forefront of those Gambians who will tell him that Gambians are an independent and dignified people who will not cring or cower before any foreign power. We will tell him that we Gambians prefer death than to be forced under the allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state. We will be the first to declare that we have not given any foreign power the mandate to declare a state of alert in our country (Sallah and Sarr, p.7).

What this alludes to is the resistance of the political elites in question--Sallah, Sarr and Jatta--to any acts by the governments of The Gambia and Senegal which would legitimize a supranational authority or institution for the two countries. They are not committed to the idea of granting the Senegalese President, who is also President of the Confederation, the powers to declare a state of emergency in The Gambia.

PDOIS leaders also reject the Senegambian Confederation for what they see as its reduction of the Gambian President to a figurehead. They pointed out that the Gambian President will never act as President of the Confederation since Senegal can never be without a President. "Even if the President of Senegal travels abroad, there will be someone acting as President in his stead" ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'" p.14). According to the confederal agreement, the President of Senegal shall be President of the Confederation and the Gambian President shall be its Vice President.

It is also quite obvious that PDOIS leaders not only challenge the constitutionality and equality of the Confederation, but they also vehemently refuse to accept a "Senegambian" identity.

On Senegambian economic integration, PDOIS's Sallah and Sarr said Senegal has been unable to pay her external debts, and her deficit has been mounting for years now. Under such

a situation, we could not expect her to save The Gambia from economic crisis. "In fact, if the Senegalese authorities were realistic they would not call for an economic union which obviously will not solve the problems of the two countries..." It is believed by Sallah and Sarr that such an economic union may "lead to political tensions between the two countries as peoples' hardships intensify under such a union" (Sallah and Sarr, p.8).

The potential for conflict resulting from an unsuccessful economic union may partly be responsible for Gambian authorities' stalling of negotiations on "monetary union and economic integration." A climate of political instability, rising from such a union, would not be favorable for the economic development or peaceful co-existence of the two countries. As "economic union fails to meet the aspirations of the people, as public outcry is raised against the hardships, the Senegalese government would have to become repressive, which will naturally give rise to National Resistance," according to Sallah and Sarr (Sallah and Sarr, p.8).

In general, then, PDOIS is strongly opposed to the Senegambia Confederation and does not subscribe to the existence of "Senegambia." The party's leaders emphasize that the Gambian people wish to live in peace and friendship

with the Senegalese, but would resist any attempts to usurp Gambian sovereignty and political independence.

Let us now turn to the views expressed by MOJA's Ousman Manjang on the Senegambia Confederation and on moves towards unifying The Gambia and Senegal. Founded in 1979, the Movement for Justice in Africa--Gambia aims to change "what it describes as a situation where `the whole wealth of the country is at the disposal of the political and administrative ruling clique." It alleged nepotism, corruption, and patronage at the top, shareholding in foreign companies by government officials and profitable collaboration in the development of tourism to the detriment of local cultures. MOJA also alleges political intimidation and increasing repression. It also aims to work for African unity. (West Africa, Nov.3, 1980, p.2172).

The movement was, however, banned in October 1980 when President Jawara called in Senegalese troops to help keep order in The Gambia after allegations of a Libyan attempt to destabilize the country. Six MOJA members were arrested and charged with possessing "weapons (decorative bows and arrows and hunting cartridges) and belonging to an illegal organization (it was declared illegal hours before their arrest)" (West Africa, Aug.3, 1981, p.1748). A long trial of the members ensued, and it was not until the 1981 revolt that some of them were able to flee into exile in Europe.

As stated earlier, Manjang wrote strongly against the Confederation, attacking it from its roots.

Official reference to a "common historical past" and claims that Senegal and The Gambia had belonged to a single pre-colonial state are refuted by Manjang as wrong and propagandistic. He traced the history of Senegambia, pointing out that a "host of medium-sized successor states that were normally independent" but that may have been related through economic exchanges and family ties had coexisted in the region (Manjang, Part II, p.2358).

> Therefore, European partitioning of the Senegambian region cannot be accurately termed "balkanisation". The style of colonial rule certainly brought divisions, but they only deepened the divisions that were already there. The pre-colonial politics of the Senegambian region ... lends little legitimacy to the pseudo-historical propaganda of the confederal authorities. Many, if not most, of the peoples had never coexisted together within any statal or political formation before European colonial conquest (Manjang, Part II, pp.2358-2359).

These statements underscore Manjang's disapproval of the Senegambia Confederation, and of the rationale given by the confederal authorities for its creation. He may be against the Confederation, but not necessarily against Pan-Africanism, which the architects of Senegambia claim to be advancing. Gambians may feel ... "that people across the border are their brothers and sisters and they may know that

African unity is worth having, but they cannot reasonably be expected to sacrifice all of the little they have in the name of counterfeit `Pan-Africanism'" (Manjang, Part II, pp.2358-2359). This is an expression of unwillingness on Manjang's part to see The Gambia's sovereignty surrendered to a supranational Senegambian authority in the pursuit of "Pan-Africanist" ideals.

MOJA's Manjang also stated that the Confederation is the "expensive price President Jawara had to pay for the restoration of his regime," and Senegalese intervention is viewed as an expansionist expedition rather than a mission to protect The Gambia from external threat. Senegambia cannot be truly unified on this basis or on the ground of a common historical past. "Their true unification can only be realised, not out of the sentimental appeal of the past, but out of their collective struggles against the common odds of the present." A true Senegambian union, Manjang contends, cannot come about through the enforced amalgamation of two neocolonial states, or the pseudo-historical pronouncements of official propaganda (Manjang, Part II, pp. 2358-2359).

"Confederation" in the Senegambian context is a word "conjured up" by Jawara "more because of its ambiguity than its exactitude but one that served to appease the greedy expansionism of the Senegalese while keeping at bay, even if only for a while, the formidable menace of immediate

annexation" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310). This theory, expressed by Manjang, is one that has now become a widely held belief, even among those in the Jawara administration.

On the question of "endless discord" between the confederal states, Manjang stated that indeed the confederal accord was merely a desperate ad hoc arrangement made out of the stalemated talks between two hopelessly discordant partners. It is the Senegalese, he contended, who appear to be the ones striving for speedier implementation of the process while Gambians opt for a strategy of "rather reluctant gradualism" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310). The concept of "reluctant gradualism" is something most Gambian supporters of closer relations with Senegal would opt for, instead of Senegal's strategy of immediate unification.

The public statements of party leaders are supported by information obtained from a questionnaire on Senegambian integration distributed in the summer of 1987. Twenty-seven of the 40 subjects responded to the questions, which covered various spheres in the integration process. The questionnaire comprised twenty questions on Senegambian integration and unification, including: merging political parties; adopting a single currency; forming a customs union; shifting political authority to a supranational agency; identifying citizens as Senegambian nationals; merging the civil services of the two countries; and having single

representation for both countries at the international level. Some respondents had refused to cooperate with the research until they were promised complete anonymity. Every effort is therefore made not to present data that could be traced to any individual respondent.

The 27 respondents comprised 3 businessmen, 7 bureaucrats or civil servants, 9 opposition party or group elites, 5 political elites within the ruling party--but not in government, and 3 top officials of the Jawara administration.

Businessmen, whose economic clout enable them to exercise a limited degree of political influence in The Gambia, do not seem to be concerned about most aspects of Senegambia, except as they directly affect their privileged positions. Five businessmen were selected as a representative group of influential Gambian businessmen. They were chosen based on their economic power or size of business operations and involvement in national politics--such actions as supporting candidates and taking stands on issues. These characteristics are important in determining who is a business elite in the Gambian context. The 3 businessmen who responded had different views on matters such as harmonizing judicial systems, integrating security forces, official identification of citizens as "Senegambians" and so on.

All three businessmen, however, strongly opposed the creation of a customs union, and shifting political authority to a supranational agency. In general, therefore, they are opposed to the complete integration of The Gambia with Senegal. What explains the unanimity in their opposition to the creation of a customs union?

Gambian businessmen derive a significant portion of their income from re-exporting (or smuggling, as the Senegalese prefer to call it) goods to Senegal and other West African countries. The creation of a customs and monetary union with Senegal would abolish this enterprising venture for Gambian businessmen, thus a basis for their opposition to steps in that direction. The Gambia's geographic location and low tariff structure have made it an important entrepot for re-exporting goods to other West African countries.

Civil servants who responded to the questionnaire tended to be against integration in virtually every dimension mentioned. Ten civil servants/bureaucrats from various ministries and departments were chosen for the research. The individuals selected hold influential positions and generally serve as advisers on or executors of delicate policy matters within their domains. Six of the seven respondents in this category were strongly opposed to bilingualism, while one favored it. All seven were strongly

opposed to the merger of the civil services of the two states. Some of the subjects opposed to bilingualism and the merging of The Gambia and Senegal's civil services contend that it would amount to the disintegration of the Gambian civil service, which would be swallowed by French-oriented bureaucrats. Surprisingly, however, five of the civil servants said they favored or strongly favored a uniform wage and salary system between the two states. This attitude results from Senegalese civil servants' traditionally fat salaries relative to what their Gambian counterparts earn. Despite their admiration for fat salaries, the civil servants were adamantly opposed to a union of any sort between The Gambia and Senegal, especially if the outcome is likely to be a dimunitive role for them.

Nine political elites from The Gambia's opposition parties and an "independent" politician were targeted for the attitudes of opposition political elites on Senegambian integration. The ten were chosen based on their level of political influence, motivation, and sophistication, which in turn were partly determined by talking to several political activists. The nine subjects who responded to the questionnaire consistently expressed opposition or strong opposition to almost every move towards unifying The Gambia with Senegal. The only area where there was support was in

the area of closer cooperation. Six of the respondents favored closer cooperation between the two neighbors.

Ten political elites of the ruling party but outside the government hierarchy were selected for this thesis research. Two are with the PPP's political bureau, and eight others are influential and active members of the party. The five who responded seemed to follow the government and ruling party's policy line on the Senegambia issue. They supported integration at all the different levels except as it related to the creation of a unified electoral system, merging of political parties of the two countries, and shifting political authority to a supranational agency. Four were strongly opposed to merging political parties and the creation of a supranational agency, while two strongly opposed and two opposed the institution of a unified electoral body for Senegambia. These data point to the fear by Gambian political elites, even those in the ruling party, of being "swallowed" by a much larger Senegalese state.

Senegal's population is about ten times that of The Gambia, and the merging of political parties would amount to the liquidation of Gambian political parties. This could explain the opposition of PPP members to integration at this level, though they favor the present cooperation between their party and Senegal's ruling Socialist Party.

Five members of the ruling PPP (not necessarily members of parliament) who are also within the government hierarchy were also chosen as subjects for this thesis research. They serve in the ministries most involved with Senegambian relations. The three respondents strongly supported virtually every move that furthered the pronounced integrationist ideals of the administration. Two, however, were opposed to shifting political authority to a supranational agency, while one strongly opposed the idea. All were opposed to the official identification of citizens as Senegambians at this stage, as well as single representation for the two states in foreign countries. The respondents, understandably, followed the Gambian government's line of promoting the ideals of eventually unifying The Gambia and Senegal, but opposition to some of the areas mentioned indicates a lack of sincere commitment to their pronounced goals.

Table I provides a synopsis of the data. Overall, 26 out of the 27 respondents opposed the shifting of political authority to a supranational agency; while 24 opposed single representation for The Gambia and Senegal at the international level and the adoption of a unified electoral system. Twenty-three expressed reluctance for the merger of Gambian and Senegalese parties; while 22 were against the use of both French and English as official languages, as well as the official identification of citizens of the two countries

TABLE I

DATA BASED ON 27 RESPONDENTS TO ISSUES ON SENEGAMBIA

	SUPPORT		OPPOSE	
	No.	%	No.	%
Speeding the integration process?	10	37.0	17	63.0
New national symbols for Senegambia?	7	25.9	20	74.1
Merging political parties of Senegambia?	4	14.8	23	85.2
Unified electoral system?	3	11.1	24	88.9
Harmonizing the two judicial systems?	9	33.3	18	66.7
Uniform pricing system?	6	22.2	21	77.8
Uniform wage and salary system?	13	48.1	14	51.9
Customs union?	7	25.9	20	74.1
Closer cooperation?	23	85.2	4	14.8
Adoption of a single currency?	6	22.2	21	77.8
Shifting political authority to a supranational agency?	1	3.7	26	96.3
Bilingualism?	5	18.5	22	81.5
Single representation at international organizations?	3	11.1	24	88.9
Merging the two civil service systems?	7	25.9	20	74.1
Central policy making agency for educ.?	8	29.6	19	70.4
Integrating armed and security forces?	10	37.0	17	63.0
Integrating the two banking systems?	11	40.7	16	59.3
Single rep. in foreign countries?	3	11.1	24	88.9
Official identification of the citizens of the two countries as Senegambians?	5	18.5	22	81.5

as "Senegambians." There was, however, an almost even split on the question of adopting a uniform wage and salary system. Thirteen of the subjects supported the idea. There was also overwhelming support for closer cooperation between The Gambia and Senegal, with 23 in favor. But with the generally defiant attitudes of Gambian political elites towards integration, as evidenced in the statements of key politicians and from data just presented, what is the likelihood of the creation of a fully integrated Senegambian nation? The next and concluding chapter discusses the prospects for a Senegambian suprastate.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The present stalemate in Senegambian confederal relations and the "foot-dragging" pace of integration are consequences of a divergence of interests between Gambian political elites and Senegalese authorities. In view of the data presented in this study and other factors, it becomes clear that the chances for a peacefully-constituted Senegambian nation are considerably low.

There is very little hope for the unification of The Gambia with Senegal, at least as far as evidenced from the way events have been unfolding for the past three decades. This may not be the kind of prognosis that the authorities would appreciate, but it is based more on reality than mere ideals. The resistance of Gambian political elites is a major roadblock to unification. But at this point, we will consider elements associated with these political elites that stand in the way of a fully integrated Senegambia.

Contrasts in political development between The Gambia and Senegal have made the path to unification very difficult, if not impossible to follow. "Neither cogent economic or geographic factors nor a fervent belief in African unity [appear] sufficiently strong to overcome the centripetal

forces resulting from independence" (Welch, p.249). Independence, in the case of The Gambia, has meant a desire to maintain her sovereign rights against the backdrop of Senegalese forcefulness for a union of the two neighbors.

Once Jawara and other Gambian elites began realizing the prestige inherent in exercising political authority over a sovereign and independent nation, the desire for a unified Senegambian nation became more of an illusion. And so it remains. The administration has entrenched itself too deep in the soil as a sovereign state and has enjoyed too much autonomy to willingly yield to Senegalese calls for unification. This could be observed from the areas in which concrete agreements were made and actions taken in the integration process. It has proved far easier to reach agreements on peripheral matters than on substantial issues dealing with sovereignty and national independence.

The contrasts in political development between The Gambia and Senegal are paralleled in their economic structures. Senegal forms an integral part of UMOA--the customs and monetary grouping of French-speaking West Africa. And because of their access to larger markets, industries located in Senegal operate on a vast scale, producing more than Senegal could absorb. High earnings from groundnuts and a restrictive trade policy help bring about a high standard--and cost--of living (Welch, p.267).

Manufacturing has not developed in The Gambia for the obvious reason that production for a population of about 800,000 is uneconomic. Also, Senegal maintains a relatively high-cost, high-salary system (Welch, p.268).

These contrasts in economic structures impose severe difficulties on the path to unification. To harmonize the economic structures of the two states would require a great deal of sacrifice on the side of Gambian elites, who are very unwilling to shoulder the burden.

And as suggested by Karl Deutsch and associates' study, used by William Foltz and reviewed in Chapter I of this thesis, "the `compatibility of the main values held by the relevant strata of all the political units involved' ... is `essential to the maintenance of even the most minimal political community'" (Foltz, p.190). But data presented in this thesis point to Senegalese forcefulness for the creation of a "new country called Senegambia" on one hand, and consistent reluctance by Gambian elites for an integrated state on the other.

Thus the ideal of a peacefully-constituted Senegambian nation-state cannot be realized as long as the political leaders of The Gambia continue to be reluctant. This author conjectures that Gambian political elites will not voluntarily accept any plan that would culminate in the loss of

Gambian identity and the revamping of The Gambia's political and economic structures.

On the other hand, looking from the current trend of events, it could correctly be stated that the creation of a Senegambian suprastate seems somewhat possible. It is possible in the sense that the Senegalese authorities have become even more determined to unify the two neighbors. And The Gambia seems to be falling into Senegal's trap as a result of the confederal accords. But it must be pointed out that a fully integrated Senegambia could only come about at this stage with the use of force against the wishes of Gambian political elites. Whether such a state created by force would become cohesive or gain legitimacy in the long run is very doubtful.

However, some things are clear: (1) A Senegambian suprastate seems likely in the near future, even if its existence is going to be temporary in nature due to wide-spread Gambian secessionist acts. Senegal has the military might to annex The Gambia, but anti-Senegalese sentiment in that country may assume a violent form and groups could rally to make things too difficult for Senegal to handle; and (2) The chances for a Senegambian state to which Gambians, as a whole, will give their full-hearted support and allegiance are virtually nill.

Consider, for example, what PDOIS' Halifa Sallah had to say about the possibility and consequences of total Senegalese encroachment upon The Gambian state. He said: "We will tell him (the Senegalese President) that we Gambians prefer death than to be forced under the allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state" (Sallah and Sarr, p.7).

This sounds like pure rhetoric, but it indicates a determination to see The Gambia remain independent of Senegal at all costs. However, whether most people will be as willing as Sallah and Sarr seem to lay down their lives to preserve Gambian independence from Senegal is another question. Also, the fact that The Gambia is surrounded on all its sides except on the Atlantic seafront by Senegal will make it almost impossible for any strong resistance movement to grow from within The Gambia, not to mention the difficulty of smuggling arms to the country. Thus threats by some political elites like Sallah to stand firm against any attempt to annex or invade The Gambia would not be taken too seriously by the Senegalese.

Instead, The Gambia may become to Senegal what Eritrea is to Ethiopia. The Senegalese would not succeed in inculcating the "virtues" of unification in Gambian elites and masses, leading to disaffection and some form of small-scale, violent resistance to the new authority.

Gambian resistance would not have enough steam to drive Senegalese forces out, but as the costs of the occupation become too expensive and unbearable, the Senegalese would opt for a way out.

Of course Senegambia's future is not yet doomed. It would only head for such an unfortunate scenario only if the current trend and pace of events persist; if the interests of Gambian political elites and Senegalese authorities remain divergent; if force, rather than reason and persuasion, underlies Senegambian relations; and if the current political leaders or their appointed disciples remain in power in both countries. One cannot rule out the possibility of a looser union than the one Senegalese authorities are pushing for. But even that could only come as a consequence of Senegalese forcefulness.

Perhaps the fact that some political elites are making their voices heard against the "Marriage of Confusion" between The Gambia and Senegal under the aegis of confederation will save the region from turmoil. Outright opposition to the integration or unification of the two neighbors may not be a desirable solution. Instead, what is needed is a framework that will be arrived at by Gambian and Senegalese authorities as equals and without coercion. A Senegambian state created under such an atmosphere would very likely receive the unflinching support of Gambian political elites.

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE ON SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION

	Strongly support	support	oppose	strongly oppose
Speeding the integration process?				
New national symbols for Senegambia?				
Merging political parties?				
Unified electoral system?				
Harmonizing judiciaries?				
Uniform wages & salaries?				
Customs union?				
Closer cooperation?				
Adopting single currency?				
Shifting political authority to a supranational agency?				
Bilingualism?				
Single representation at international organizations?				
Merging the civil services?				
Central policy-making agency for education?				
Integrating security and armed forces?				
Integrating banking systems?				
Single representation in foreign countries?				
Official identification of citizens as Senegambians?				

VITA

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Mr. Janneh attended Boggs Academy in Keysville, Georgia for a semester and then moved to Knoxville, Tennessee. He enrolled at Knoxville College where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree With High Honors in Communications in June 1986. He also worked as a reporter for "The Knoxville Journal"--a daily newspaper--from February to August 1986.

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