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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Amadou Scattred Janneh entitled "Dilemmas of Senegambian Integration." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

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DILEMMAS OF SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION

A Dissertation

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Amadou Scattred Janneh

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ABSTRACT

Several attempts have been made to integrate The Gambia and Senegal into a Senegambian political union, but these efforts have been without success. The Senegalese authorities consistently pushed for a political union between the two states in spite of continued Gambian reluctance.

The 1981 putsch in The Gambia and the significant role played by Senegalese forces to suppress it, however, changed the whole character of Senegambian relations. A confederal accord was "hastily" drawn up and ratified in that same year, and the Senegambia Confederation came into existence.

The integrative process under the Confederation had been rather slow. Eight years after it was created, the Confederation had hardly moved in many crucial areas. It finally collapsed in September 1989; and it failed because it lacked legitimacy and President Jawara was coerced into reaching the confederal agreement with Senegalese authorities. Thus despite a common desire for African unity, propinquity, common socio-economic factors, the predominance of Islam, the use of Wollof as a lingua franca and political considerations, the Senegambian dream continues to fade.

The bases of Senegambian integration and the extent to which the different colonial experiences have affected Senegalese and Gambian political elites' stances on Senegambian unity are discussed. The study also examines significant events in Senegal-Gambia relations to give insight into the dilemmas and prospects of Senegambian unity. It is concluded that the divergence of political elites' attitudes is a major impediment to the creation of a Senegambian nation-state.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There have been several attempts by Senegalese and Gambian leaders to create a Senegambian political union. And several studies have highlighted the opportunities for integrating The Gambia with Senegal. This study focuses on the potentialities and the major problems of integration in Senegambian politics. The main thrust of the research is that the divergence of political elites' attitudes is the major impediment to Senegambian unity.

There are a number of reasons why a study which focuses on the Senegambian case is valuable at this time. First, studies by Paul Joseph Coppa, Jeggan Senghor, Claude Welch Jr., Peter Robson, Uka Ezenwe and other scholars have emphasized the potentialities of integrating The Gambia with Senegal, and some have used Senegambian integration to draw conclusions on the prospects of unity on the African continent. These studies were conducted before the eight-year Senegambia Confederation collapsed, and the authors generally expressed optimistic views about Senegambian unity. Work on the problems or dilemmas is

scarce; and this study is therefore an attempt to fill the gap in our knowledge of Senegambian integration.

Second, the Senegambian case allows one to look at specific problems of developing unity on the African continent. It is different from other attempts at unification and these unique elements make it essential to study it as a special case. These same unique elements increase its importance for understanding more general problems of unification in Africa. The hurdles ahead of Senegambian integration characterize some of the elements to be found at the continental level. The Senegambia Confederation was the only case in Africa where two previously independent countries with different colonial backgrounds seriously attempted to unify their states.

The Senegambia Confederation was further distinguished from other cases in specific ways. Unlike the case of integration in Cameroon, mass involvement was deliberately limited. A referendum was conducted in Cameroon to decide whether the two units should be integrated or not, but this procedure was not followed before the Senegambia Confederation was founded. Gambian and Senegalese authorities were well aware of widespread opposition to Senegambian integration in The Gambia, and a referendum was therefore avoided. President Jawara of The Gambia said in an interview that public opinion was "irrelevant" because,

as an elected official, he had the mandate to carry out the policy ("`Public Opinion Will Be Tested,'" p.1).

The Senegambian integration process was accelerated by violence in The Gambia. The notion of a Senegambian nation-state, "never taken seriously as a political reality by many Gambian leaders, was soon thrown onto their laps" (Nyang, p.47-48). According to Professor Sulayman Nyang, the "gravity of the situation and the growing political insecurity of the Jawara regime combined to make Senegambia an attractive proposition" (Nyang, p.47-48). Tanzania, Mali, and Cameroon were all peaceful voluntary unions. The Gambian president was under duress during the immediate aftermath of the revolt in his country, and confederation was the price he paid for the Senegalese role in crushing the putsch.

Propaganda for Senegambian unity however places emphasis on the ethnic similarities and the propinquities of Senegal and The Gambia, and on the notion that integrating the two states would enhance Pan-Africanist ideals by alleviating one of the "geographic oddities" of the partition of Africa (Welch, p.4). The dream of unity is "abetted by the ideology of Pan-Africanism and the belief that disunity could jeopardize the independence of [the] individual territories" (Welch, p.4-5).

The desire for Senegambian unity is nevertheless limited by such factors as the administrative, economic,

cultural, linguistic, and institutional differences and the existence of separate elites with separate interests. Therefore, a discussion of the manner in which Gambians and Senegalese deal with these problems should shed light on possible future attempts at integration in Africa. In other words, the issue of Senegambian integration represents a microcosm of unification at the continental level--from the different colonial experiences and legal and economic systems to the hardening of political frontiers resulting from independence.

What are the bases of Senegambian integration? To what extent have the different colonial experiences affected Senegalese and Gambian political elites' stances on Senegambian unity? How have political elites' attitudes differed on issues of the political and economic integration of Senegambia? How has the conflict between national sovereignty and the desire for unification inhibited integration? These questions will constitute the main focus of this research. In other words, research will deal specifically with the differences in political elites' perspectives on Senegambian integration in addressing the above stipulated questions.

The study will look at past developments, the current situation, and future prospects of Senegambian integration. An examination of Senegal-Gambia relations from the dawn of Gambian independence to 1981 will underscore Gambian

authorities' determination to maintain their country's sovereignty. But the 1981 revolt in The Gambia forced the Jawara regime to ostensibly change its views on integration, leading to the proclamation of the Senegambia Confederation. The two states failed to gain significant ground in negotiations on matters related to sovereignty, and the Confederation collapsed in 1989.

Until the dismantling of the Confederation, "a complex of external and internal pressures [had] been leading to a gradual narrowing of the divergencies in inherited systems of government and administration" (Senghor, p.16). But other "background features" weakened the potentialities of Senegambian integration (Senghor, p.5), and the gap between the Senegambian dream and reality widened as the Confederation collapsed. The examination of various phases of Senegal-Gambia relations will give insight into the dilemmas and prospects of Senegambian unity.

ELITES

This paper will focus on elite attitudes toward Senegambian integration for several reasons, including: the overlap of elite and mass views, the special interests of elites, the vantage position occupied by elites, and the availability of substantial data on elite opinions.

"Elites" is used to refer to those people who have a disproportionate share of political, economic, intellectual,

or other valued resources. Elites in Senegal and The Gambia essentially reflect the attitudes of the masses on the issue of integrating their two countries. Elite and mass views overlap considerably in each of the countries. For instance: Mandinka elites and masses in The Gambia share the same concern about becoming a secondary ethnic group in a unified Senegambia; the potential for an increase in the cost of living in The Gambia resulting from Senegambian unity bothers Gambian elites and masses alike; Senegal's numerical superiority (her population is about ten times that of The Gambia) makes most Gambians nervous and uncertain about integration; and an end to re-exporting activities from The Gambia would have repercussions for all segments of the society. Beyond the overlapping areas of concern, elites are interested in maintaining authority over their own small realm; they have vested interests in preserving Gambian national sovereignty; and The Gambia's English-oriented bureaucrats fear being swallowed-up by the relatively better educated and trained French-oriented Senegalese.

In addition to the special interests of elites, this study will focus on elites for several other reasons. Elites in The Gambia and Senegal basically determine their countries' political courses. Unlike the situation in Cameroon, for example, Senegalese and Gambian leaders established and dissolved the Senegambia Confederation

without consulting the masses. Another reason for focusing on elites is the absence of polls and other scientific measurements of mass public opinion on confederation. Elites--including academicians, bureaucrats, politicians, businesspersons and journalists--have expressed strong views on the issue through party publications, journals, political rallies, news interviews, and so on. Data from these sources give a clear understanding of elite attitudes toward Senegambian unity.

The evidence also shows that other elements--such as ethnicity and the fear of Senegalese cultural dominance--influence the positions taken by both elites and masses. So looking at elites in this context will provide a reflection of mass views as well. It must be noted that there is no clearcut boundary between (Gambian and Senegalese) elites and masses, but the subjects for this research clearly fit the conception of "elites" used here.

The study does not generally distinguish between the roles of male and female elites. Most of the information relates to male elites. Female elites may well play a distinct role in the process discussed here, but it is not possible to distinguish the role on the basis of available information. There are several reasons for the lack of substantial and systematic information on the role of women in Senegambian politics.

First, official positions in the formally organized institutions of Senegal and The Gambia are almost entirely held by men. There are cases of Senegalese and Gambian women holding high offices, "but these are exceptional cases and do not invalidate the general rule" (Hammond and Jablow, p.126). And a perusal of the "formally defined rights of women to participate in political processes" in the Senegambia region would suggest that they enjoy equality with men (Hammond and Jablow, p.128). This would be quite misleading. There is a great deal of disparity between the formal political rights of women and the power they actually enjoy. Men continue to dominate Gambian and Senegalese politics despite recent gains made by the women. This is more so in the rural areas "where there are fewer educated women and where families tend to vote as a block, following the lead of the male family leader" (Gellar, p.102). The consequent lopsided distribution of political power in The Gambia and Senegal in favor of men is partly responsible for the emphasis on male elites.

Another reason for the lack of substantial information on the role of women in Senegambian politics is related to research bias against so-called "women's issues." Greater access to education guaranteed men dominance in not only the political sphere, but in other areas as well, including the academic arena. There is relatively less attention paid by male scholars and writers on the roles of women in Gambian

and Senegalese affairs. There is a tendency in academia, as in the larger society, to relegate women to the backburner.

But despite the blatant discrimination against women in various spheres, their dominant position in the day-to-day affairs of Senegalese and Gambian communities is, however, indisputable (Hammond and Jablow, p.128). Women's organizations and the Women's Bureau in The Gambia, for instance, had been instrumental in shaping official policies on issues specifically realting to women and family affairs. Women's political organizations--"kafos" and "kompins"--also play a significant part in drawing up support and enthusiasm for local political candidates. And the concerns of women and their statuses in The Gambia and Senegal had recently been given public recognition. There is a formal recognition "that women must be incorporated into the decisionmaking process in order to improve their situations" (O'Barr, p.155). The successes of these efforts will ensure a better political atmosphere for, and more research on the role of, women in Senegal-Gambia affairs.

INTEGRATION

Senegalese and Gambian political leaders use unity in different senses, and the concept of integration as a process leading to unity has different definitions in the theoretical literature. The type of unity emphasized here involves the political unification of The Gambia with

Senegal and the establishment of a central government with clearly defined powers (welch, p.4). This concept of unity is compatible with Lindberg's definition of integration as

> the process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decisionmaking process to new central organs; and the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center (Lindberg, p.6).

The United Nations in a report released in 1964 recommended three possible forms of association for Senegal and The Gambia. These were: (a) federation, (b) confederation, and (c) the integration of The Gambia into Senegal as a province. Since the report, the two countries adopted a functional approach to their relations. Functionalism, or the gradualist approach, links functional cooperation and integration in the following ways:

> Economic unions of various kinds increase trade and transactions so much that the increased flows across borders create problems which are difficult to solve by separate state machinery. A supranational bureaucracy is created to deal with these problems. ...Gradually, loyalties follow economic interests and become focused on the new center, and a new political union comes into existence (Nye, 1965, p.18).

The gradualist process was "expected to lead to a quality of supranationalism in the international institution, and to the erosion of some aspects of the sovereignty of member states..." (Taylor, p.4). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Customs Union of Central

African States are examples of efforts by African states to achieve the goal of unification through regional functional cooperation. But some statesmen place emphasis on the integration of political structures as a prelude to unification. As the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana once said: "Seek Ye first the political kingdom, and all things else shall be added unto you" (Kofele-Kale, p.xv).

An essential theory of integration is that:

> political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system. Such systems are based on procedural consensus, or general agreement about the political framework and of the legal processes by which issues are resolved, and substantive consensus or general agreement about the solutions to problems the political system is called upon to serve (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.417).

Applied to Senegambia, this theory would suggest that the cohesiveness of the new state will be greater with more procedural and substantive consensus among members of its components. The Senegambia Confederation, by all indications, lacked legitimacy within The Gambia. Hence the government's reluctance or refusal to put the issue before the electorate in the form of a referendum. Also, research data indicate that a widely shared agreement does not exist between Gambian political elites and Senegalese authorities on the issue of unifying their two states. The data support the contention that Gambian authorities reached the Confederal Agreement with their Senegalese counterparts as a

result of pressures brought about by the 1981 revolt rather than any consensus with the latter on the necessity or wisdom of integration.

Another theory of integration states that "political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat, of force" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.418). From this perspective, one may look at the eight-year Senegambia confederal process in the light of the Senegalese military intervention in The Gambia and the presence of relatively large numbers of Senegalese troops in and around The Gambia from 1981 to 1989. These troops were better equipped, disciplined, and trained than The Gambia's small army, and they could have easily overpowered Gambian forces, removed Jawara, and installed a puppet regime in the interim. Jawara was perhaps well aware that revoking an agreement reached for his pragmatic interests at the expense of Senegalese lives could have had serious repercussions for himself and his administration. This presence of the threat of force accounted, to some degree, for Gambian authorities' ambivalent positions on Senegambian unity.

"Foot-dragging" appeared to be the only alternative strategy that Gambian authorities could have pursued--at least until the Jawara regime felt secure enough to do without Senegalese troops.

CONFEDERAL PARTNERSHIP

President Diouf subsequently pulled out Senegalese troops from their confederal posts in The Gambia. A look at the evolution of Senegal-Gambia relations will make clearer the reasons the Senegambia Confederation collapsed after the troop withdrawal. Attempts to integrate The Gambia and Senegal in the early 1960s were without success. The 1981 agreement which was drafted and signed by the two states was scrapped in September 1989 after about eight years of unfruitful confederation. The accord setting up the Senegambia Confederation was "hastily" concluded after Senegalese troops helped put down a revolt that nearly toppled the government of Sir Dawda Jawara in 1981.

The Senegambia Confederation was born ostensibly out of the desire to reunite "the same body and soul to men who were only artificially separated by the domineering desires" of European colonial forces ("Le Soleil," March 1985). Before its death, the initial speed of confederal relations slowed down to what a critic called a "foot-dragging" pace, even though an array of documents was signed and ratified (Manjang). The confederal states failed to gain significant ground in negotiations on matters that involved sovereignty and the other hard issues related to political and economic integration.

Despite confederal authorities' propaganda for the concept of a Senegambian entity, Gambian resentment of the Senegalese "occupation forces" intensified; the Confederal

Army was not an integrated force by any definition; the two states' foreign policies remained as uncoordinated as ever before; cross-border smuggling of groundnuts, resulting from a price war between the two countries and Senegal's much stronger currency, became a common phenomenon; even a soccer match staged in The Gambia to promote Senegambian sentiment ended in a fierce brawl between Senegalese and Gambian fans; and Gambians travelling through Dakar's Yoff Airport have over the years complained of Senegalese harassment. The list of cracks in the eight years of confederation is ample, but the underlying point is that Senegalese and Gambian political elites' could not agree on a viable framework for integrating their two states.

Since the signing of the Kaur Declaration in 1981, the hitherto cordial relations between Presidents Diouf and Jawara became progressively strained to the point where "only skilled management ... kept the tensions in check. But patience finally snapped" in 1989 ("Unity That Was," p.1634).

A "tightening up on the borders" ensued as the process of the winding up of the Senegambia Confederation began in September.

> The atmosphere in which the confederation broke up was certainly not the happiest. Although there was little public recrimination, below the surface there were charges and countercharges as to where the blame lay.
>
> The Senegalese had taken the first step by pulling out their troops. [President] Jawara's

> request to rotate the confederation's presidency [seemed] to have been the last straw, but even President Diouf had only announced a `freezing' of the confederation, even if his impatience had been made clear. It was Jawara who took the vital step of requesting the winding up of the confederation ... ("Impact of the Senegambia Fall-out," p.1971).

Critics charged that President Jawara was coerced into reaching the confederal agreement with the Senegalese authorities. This is almost indisputable given the environment and the circumstances under which the accord was drawn and signed. Jawara's primary interest during the 1981 crises and in the immediate aftermath of the revolt was to regain power at any cost. In essence, Jawara was like a "drowning man, who will clutch at any straw" for help ("Unity That Was," p.1634).

THE EFFECTS OF COLONIALISM AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

President Jawara's reluctance and other impediments to Senegambian unity are partly a consequence of the balkanization of Africa by European powers in the nineteenth century--which compounded old problems and created new ones for political community in the continent.

> The Gambia and Senegal [for example] were first drawn in 1889 during a meeting of French and British delegates in Paris, and were only slightly modified. ...The boundaries of The Gambia are completely artificial, having nothing to do with natural, ethnic or geographic lines of demarcation. These lines exclude The Gambia from free access to its natural hinterland and divide the Gambian Wollof, Jola, Mandingo, and Fulbe people from their kinsmen in Senegal (Gailey, p.1).

Colonialism, which served to integrate various ethnic groups under statal formations, also fostered the development of different micronational identities among inhabitants of the various African states. The inhabitants of the European-created states began to have a sense of identity separate from those of their kinsmen outside the artificial boundaries; and they developed different structures, lifestyles, and orientations.

The granting of independence to Senegal and The Gambia under different conditions and at different times also helped widen the gap between the two statal formations, especially in terms of their economic and political development. As Hilling states, "[a]lmost inevitably, political independence brings with it enhanced sensitivity on questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity and in many parts of Africa has resulted in the hardening of political frontiers" (Hilling, p.2827).

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Research data from published statements and news reports indicate that the absence of a widely shared agreement between Gambian elites and Senegalese authorities has posed a barrier to the full integration of the two states. Data for this research is derived from a variety of sources--about 100 news items, journal articles, party publications and chapters from books--and these adequately

address both the past and present states of relations between The Gambia and Senegal. West Africa magazine is an important source of information on current and historical political developments in West Africa, particularly the Senegambia region. Other magazines like Africa, Africa Now, Africa Research Bulletin, New African, The Economist, Africa Report, Africa Confidential, and local newspapers such as "Le Soleil," "Foroyaa," "The Senegambia Sun," "The Gambia News Bulletin," "The Gambia Times," "The Nation," and "The Gambia Outlook" were quite invaluable for this endeavor. Within the same context, articles or chapters on Senegambian integration by Jeggan Senghor, Paul Joseph Coppa, Claude Welch Jr., Peter Robson and Uka Ezenwe provide useful information on various aspects of efforts to unify The Gambia with Senegal. Party publications and recorded radio broadcasts were also used. PDOIS's publication Foroyaa, for instance, contained transcripts of radio interviews on Senegambian integration conducted by the BBC at various times between 1981 to 1989. The publication also included the views of Gambian authorities as well as those of the PDOIS leadership--Halifa Sallah, Sam Sarr and Sidia Jatta--on Senegambian unity. The nature of elite opinions is determined through an analysis of these sources.

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The second chapter of this study will deal with the political history of Senegal-Gambia relations from the early 1960s to the 1981 revolt in The Gambia. The chapter addresses some questions raised earlier: What are the bases of Senegambian integration? There is a discussion of the opportunities for and Senegalese interests and pressures for Senegambian unity. This will provide an understanding of the incompatibility of the positions taken by Gambian and Senegalese political elites on Senegambian integration.

For Senegal, the partial isolation of the southern province of Casamance by The Gambia; the inability to fully use the River Gambia; the fear that The Gambia could become a base for operations of banned political parties or for subversion from outside; and the cross-border smuggling of goods have been its major concerns (Robson 1965, p.395).

Pressures for integrating The Gambia with Senegal have, however, focused on the notion that it is "more natural than between any other two units in Africa. [T]he strong unities in geographical and socio-cultural features [are said to] make continued separation a blatant absurdity" (Senghor, p.5).

The similarity of ethnic groups across political frontiers, the sociological dominance of the Wollof language in both Senegal and The Gambia, and economic and political rationality have been suggested as logical bases for Senegambian integration (Senghor, p.5-24).

Another major potentiality for Senegambian unity is the fact that Islam is the majority religion in both Senegal and The Gambia. The role of Islam as a force for Senegambian unity will be discussed.

The third chapter is a discussion of the proclamation and objectives of the Senegambia Confederation, and the state of confederal relations before Senegambia was wound up in 1989. This section is an overview of the structures created and of the policy proposals, progress, and failures during the period of confederation. It also underscores one of the theoretical bases of the study, specifically the role of force in integrating political units.

As the dust began to settle on the 1981 revolt in The Gambia, Senegalese and Gambian authorities began talking of some kind of closer relationship between the two states. Senegalese President Abdou Diouf reportedly said "he wants to work towards an integrated state and foresees a new country called Senegambia" (West Africa, Aug. 24, 1981, p.1912). President Jawara, on the other hand, had a vision of a pluralistic security community (confederation) rather than an amalgamated one (Deutsch, 1957). These conflicting views highlighted the problems of Senegambian integration.

A seemingly serious round of negotiations ensued immediately after the 1981 revolt. And on December 17, 1981, an agreement on the establishment of the Senegambia Confederation was signed in Dakar, Senegal, by Presidents

Abdou Diouf and Dawda Jawara for Senegal and The Gambia, respectively. The atmosphere of the negotiations is discussed, relying generally on reports by authoritative magazines and journals such as West Africa, Africa Now, Africa Report, Africa, New African, Jeune Afrique, and Africa Confidential. A statement by The Gambia government said, "The Agreement confirms the wish of the two countries to strengthen their solidarity and their commitment to the ideals of the Organisation of African unity" (Fact Sheets On The Gambia).

The relatively short life span of the Confederation will be evaluated. The two partners marked the eighth anniversary of the Senegambia Confederation in Dakar with a military march past on February 1, 1989; but from the Senegalese perspective, "there was very little to celebrate. Crucial matters, such as economic integration, one of the confederation's professed objectives, [lagged] behind schedule" (West Africa Feb. 6-12, 1989, p.208).

While other areas of cooperation included transport, communications and information, these were sadly neglected in favor of the confederal armed forces. Information from the confederal secretariat in Dakar indicated that 84 percent of the first budget went to defense and security. A Senegalese national was quoted as saying during the time: "We put down their coup and now we 're paying for their defence" (West Africa, Feb. 6-12, 1989, p.208).

But if we take into account that the "main aim of the confederation was to repair the damage done by colonisation which separated one entity into two separate countries," then we would see what had been achieved, according to then Senegambian Secretary-General Pierre Diouf (West Africa March 6-12, 1989, p.352).

The few concrete realizations of the confederacy included a project to improve road and telephone links between the Gambian town of Basse and the Senegalese town of Wellingara; the establishment of a joint transport licensing system; and the harmonization of the telecommunications systems of the two states.

But, as Pierre Diouf had emphasized, "Colonisation had a profound effect on both [The Gambia and Senegal] and ... we have to concede that a certain rivalry between the two colonisers, France and Britain, was reflected in the attitudes of the colonised" (West Africa, March 6-12, 1989, p.352).

The fourth chapter will therefore be an examination of the plethora of views held by Senegalese and Gambian political elites on Senegambian integration. How have political elites' positions on the political and economic integration of Senegambia differed? To what extent have the different colonial experiences affected Senegalese and Gambian attitudes on Senegambian unity? The bases for the divergence are given and examined in detail.

Senegalese political elites generally favor the establishment of a "new country called Senegambia" in the future. They have been quite persistent in their efforts to see The Gambia integrated with their country. About a year before The Gambia attained independence in 1965, there were discussions about the possibility of closer association with Senegal. The form of association "which Senegal favoured were rejected by The Gambia and the looser ties which might have been acceptable to The Gambia did not get Senegalese approval" (Hilling, p.2827).

Other elements of the separate interests of Senegalese and Gambian political elites in Senegambia are The Gambia's geographic location and low tariff structure, which have made it an important entrepot for re-exporting (or smuggling, as the Senegalese prefer to call it) goods to Senegal and other West African countries. The creation of a customs union with Senegal would abolish this enterprising venture for Gambian businesspersons, thus a basis for their opposition to steps in that direction. Gambian and Senegalese authorities agreed on a compensation mechanism to be used if there should be a loss of revenue on either side after the setting up of a free trade zone by February 1990 (West Africa, March 6-12, 1989, p.352). But The Gambia expected to gain less from economic union, and as such, its political leaders remained reluctant to move in that arena without guarantees of adequate compensation. Such

guarantees were not forthcoming up to the 1989 break-up of the Confederation.

The government of The Gambia, while ostensibly pushing for Senegambian unity, had in fact taken a strategy of "preserving the last external signs of Gambian national sovereignty" during the confederal partnership with Senegal (Africa Research Bulletin, March 15, 1985, p.7891). The Gambia, like many other African countries, has entrenched itself too deep in the soil of independent statehood to willingly shift authority to a supranational entity. The elites would not risk any shift in authority which may result in their displacement.

Also, the European powers bequeathed to African states different economic structures or institutions; and Senegal belongs to an economic grouping of Francophone African countries, while The Gambia--which is English-speaking--is not a member and refused to join on Senegal's ticket or as a confederation.

The fifth and concluding chapter of this research deals with the dilemmas of integration in Senegambia within the context of the failed confederation. How has the conflict between national sovereignty and the desire for unification inhibited integration? What are the prospects for Senegambian unity? An examination of the period leading to the dissolution of the Confederation and its aftermath will help answer these questions. Actions taken by the former

confederal partners and statements made by Gambian and Senegalese leaders after the break-up of the Confederation will give insight into the likelihood of a Senegambian nation-state.

CHAPTER II

SIGNFICANT EVENTS IN SENEGAL-GAMBIA RELATIONS (1960-1981)

This chapter deals with: significant events in Senegal-Gambia relations from the early 1960s to the 1981 revolt in The Gambia; the bases of Senegambian integration; and Senegalese interests and pressures for Senegambian unity. This will provide an understanding of the conditions that led to the incompatible positions taken by Gambian and Senegalese political elites on Senegambian integration. The historical account will underscore Gambians' persistent opposition to unifying their country with Senegal. It will also highlight the background to, and the "paper-thin" nature of, the Senegambia Confederation.

GEOGRAPHY OF SENEGAMBIA

The Gambia "owes its existence entirely to colonial policy" in that it is "[t]he product of colonial rivalries between Britain and France in the `scramble for Africa'" (Robson 1983, p.124; Coppa, p.47). The Gambia:

> forms an irrational intrusion into the very much larger country of Senegal, stretching from the coast inland along both sides of the Gambia River to form a strip some 322 kilometers long and only 19-21 kilometers wide. Its frontiers roughly

> follow the course of the river, but they do not reach the natural limits of the river basin on either side, nor do they extend to the sources of the river itself, which lies in Guinea (Robson 1983, p.124).

The Gambia's frontiers not only cut through natural features, they also cut across human settlement patterns. The country is wholly surrounded by Senegal except on its seaward margin; and it isolates the southern region of Casamance from the rest of Senegal. The people of the region are ethnically of similar stock (Robson, 1983, p.124). Approximately 11 percent of The Gambia's population was born outside the country, chiefly in Senegal. The five main ethnic groups in The Gambia are the Mandinka (37.7%), the Fula/Peul (16.2%), the Wollof (14%), the Jola (8.5%) and the Serahuli (7.8%). The Wollof constitute the largest ethnic group in Senegal (with 36.2%); and the other groups

Table 1. The Distribution of Ethnic Groups

ETHNIC GROUP	SENEGAL (%)	GAMBIA (%)	SENEGAMBIA (%)
Wollof	36.2	14.0	33.6
Peul/Fula	21.5	16.2	20.9
Serer	19.0	1.9	17.0
Mandinka	6.4	37.7	10.0
Jola/Diola	7.0	8.5	7.2
Serahuli	2.1	7.8	2.8
Moors	1.5	---	1.3
Other	4.8	3.2	4.6
Nonindigenous	1.5	10.5	2.6
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Senghor, p.9.

are the Fula/Peul (21.5%), the Serer (19.0%), the Jola (7.0%), and the Mandinka (6.4%). From the Senegambia vantage, the Wollof also comprise the largest group (33.6%), followed by the Fula/Peul (20.9%), the Serer (17.0%), the Mandinka (10.0%), the Jola (7.2%), and the Serahuli (2.8%) (Senghor, p.9).

For a short period between 1765 and 1783, much of what are now The Gambia and Senegal formed the single British colony of Senegambia. From the demise of the colony:

> until independence in the 1960s, the two countries have been subjected to the separate influences of British and French colonial systems. This has created administrative, cultural, economic, and monetary differences that have been and continue to be important obstacles to the closer association of the two countries (Robson 1983, p.124).

In the educational sphere, for instance, the length of study and the types and standards of professional and technical training institutions differ in The Gambia and Senegal. Also, university education is available in Senegal whereas The Gambia continues to send qualified students to the United Kingdom and the United States. And, as Senghor pointed out, "it is more in the content and cultural thrust of the curricula that the outlook is divergent" (Senghor, p.16-17).

Because of the anomalous geographical position of The Gambia, "some form of integration with Senegal has often been suggested as its natural destiny" (Ezenwe 1983, p.111).

Both Senegal and The Gambia are predominantly agricultural, and peanuts are the main crop. Peanuts provide 95 percent of The Gambia's export earnings. International sales are monopolized by a government marketing board, which sets the price paid to producers.

THE BASES AND PRESSURES FOR SENEGAMBIAN INTEGRATION

After Senegal attained independence in 1960, with the prospect of early independence for The Gambia, pressures for integrating the two states gained momentum. The case for Senegambian integration in the early 1960s centered on three main considerations. First, there were doubts about the economic viability of The Gambia. At the time that active discussions began, The Gambia had a budget deficit and was dependent on the United Kingdom. The fear that The Gambia might not be economically viable had been based largely on the country's small size (Robson 1965, p.395). Even after independence, The Gambia continued to depend on Britain, which provided more than 60 percent of its development budget finance up to the beginning of the 1980s (Ezenwe 1983, p.111-112).

Secondly, there was the argument that the anomaly of The Gambia's geographical position was disadvantageous to both The Gambia and Senegal. The present economic frontiers isolate the southern province of Casamance from the rest of Senegal; and the Senegalese are also deprived of the

opportunity to fully use the River Gambia. For The Gambia, it was argued that it cannot exploit its main natural resource--the river basin--fully and that Banjul could serve as the port of a larger economic entity for which it has several advantages (Ezenwe, p.112; Robson 1965, p.395).

The economic frontiers impose other difficulties on the two states' relationship. As an enclave within a country with twenty times its own area, The Gambia not only serves as an inconvenience to Senegal, but it is also a smuggling (re-exporting, Gambians would say) base. The amount of goods "smuggled" from The Gambia to Senegal constitutes less than one percent of Senegal's imports, but it has been an important source of revenue for The Gambia. The practice assumed a new dimension, rather than being reduced or eliminated. Thus, "illegal border trade has long been a constant, if not permanent, source of irritation and friction between the two countries" (Ezenwe, p.112). Formal trade between the two countries has, however, increased dramatically over the years. From 1965 to 1972 Senegal's exports to Gambia rose from 22,380 to 293,459 pounds sterling. The Gambia's exports to Senegal grew from 126 to 5,751 pounds sterling during the same period. Processed and manufactured products constituted much of Senegal's exports. And for some of these exports--such as oil, tomatoes and building materials--The Gambia became "overly dependent on Senegal. ...Rather than matches and cigarettes, it is now

television sets and other luxury goods that are smuggled [to Senegal]" (Senghor, p.19-20).

A third factor for seeking the integration of The Gambia with Senegal is political. The Senegalese have some fear that The Gambia could become a base for operations of banned political parties or for subversion from outside (Robson 1965, p.395). Various rebel or secessionist groups in the Casamance region have engaged in armed conflict with Senegalese government forces in their efforts to win independence ("Rebels Kill," p.36-37). In fact 105 people accused of taking part in the Casamance separatists' demonstrations in December 1983 were tried in Dakar at the state security court ("Separatists' Trial," p.7865). This points to the continued security concerns of Senegal, particularly with regard to the region isolated by The Gambia. For its part, The Gambia, lacking an effective army, recognizes its extreme vulnerability to attack from Senegal.

Those who argue against a "union beyond a cooperative relationship point first to the differences between the two countries which were created by the remnants of a British and French colonial system" (Coppa, p.55). For example, there is considerable difference between the judiciaries of The Gambia and Senegal. The administration of justice in Senegal is the responsibility of the Supreme Court, the Appeals Court, the Assiz Courts, the Courts of first

instance, the Magistrate's Courts and the Labor Tribunals (United Nations' Report). The highest courts in The Gambia are the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. But "[b]esides lower courts operating under Anglo-Saxon legal rules, indigenous courts have both civil and criminal jurisdiction among different ethnic groups" in The Gambia (Paxton, p.377).

There is also the fear by Gambian elites of being swallowed up by the political, economic and monetary systems of Senegal. Senegal had a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $490 in 1982 with an average annual growth rate of 6.9% in 1981-82. Senegal's GDP grew by 4.5 percent in 1986. The Gambia, on the other hand, had a per capita GDP of $360 in 1982, but this fell to $290 in 1983 and $230 in 1985. The government, however, claimed that "economic decline has been reversed since the inception of the economic recovery programme, with real GDP growth of 5.3% in 1986/87" (The World Book Encyclopedia vol.8, p.234 & vol.17, p.504; Third World Guide, p.276 & 119).

Some "[o]ther reasons for opposing a union include the potential for the financial dependence of The Gambia shifting from Britain to Senegal, the financial loss to The Gambian [re-exporting or] smuggling trade resulting from economic integration with Senegal and Senegal's concern that if The Gambia were integrated into Senegal with a degree of autonomy greater than that of the other Senegalese

provinces, those other provinces might demand a similar status" (Coppa, p.55-56).[1]

Besides these considerations to support the case for Senegambian integration; other bases for unity have been suggested. A very important factor for Senegambian integration is the fact that Islam is the majority religion in both The Gambia and Senegal. Approximately 90 percent of The Gambia's population is Muslim. Banjul is the seat of an Anglican and a Roman Catholic bishop. There are some Methodist missions and traditional religions are practiced by a few Jola and Fula groups. Senegal is 91 percent Muslim, 6 percent Christian (mainly Roman Catholic) and 3 percent traditional (Pragnell & Castle). Muslims readily participate in the religious events and gatherings of their compatriots across borders. Islamic sentiment has somewhat contributed to bringing Gambians and Senegalese closer together, in mitigating problems resulting from different colonial experiences. The religion "has brought the same set of beliefs, similar dress, etiquette," and so on, to the various ethnic groups (Gamble, 1967, p.14). Both Senegalese and Gambian muslims also have a high level of religious tolerance. They readily celebrate and actively participate in Christian religious observances.

> `Islam has acted toward unifying African culture. It is a strong cultural influence, and once it has been adopted by an African community it becomes eventually dominant. Certain Islamic institutions are universally adopted, and these elements not

> only create a bond of understanding between peoples but develop common attitudes and patterns of behaviour. A distinctive utlook on life is created and a new religio-social pattern is woven' (Trimingham, quoted by Senghor, p.13).

And while Senegal and The Gambia are constitutionally republics, Islamic religious traditions have remained factors of economic and social development in both countries.

Also, Gambian and Senegalese authorities have expressed "the wish of the two countries to strengthen their solidarity and their commitment to the ideals of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)" through integration (Fact Sheets). Thus, the desire for solidarity and African unity is viewed as a logical basis for unifying The Gambia and Senegal.

Pressures for integrating The Gambia with Senegal have, however, focused on the notion that it is "more natural than between any two units in Africa. [T]he strong unities in geographical and sociocultural features (are said to) make continued separation a blatant absurdity" (Senghor, p.5).

The similarity of ethnic groups across the political frontiers is considered to be one of the most notable features of the Senegambian situation. The case of Senegal and The Gambia is unlike situations in "many other African states where boundaries cut across some ethnic groups" because "the political boundaries cut across all ethnic groups" (Senghor, p.8). As a result, "there is an overlap

in the distribution of ethnic groups in both countries" (Senghor, p.8). The six major ethnic groups in the Senegambia region make up over 85 percent of the population in each country (see table on ethnic distribution).

Senghor concludes from this overlap that "indigenous languages, religious beliefs, social values, patterns of living, traditional social and political organization are approximately identical within each ethnic group and across political boundaries" (Senghor, p.8). There are potential obstacles, however. For example, there is a difference in the proportion of each of the six major ethnic groups in the total population. The Mandinka constitute the majority group in The Gambia, whereas the Wollof occupy this position in Senegal. The Serer are the third largest group in Senegal whereas they are only two percent of the Gambian population. Senghor and others argue, however, that such differences are "reduced in significance in that Wollof culture has attained a sociological predominance in Senegambia" (Senghor, p.10).

> Wolof culture has very little that is not shared in some degree by neighboring peoples. Islam has brought the same set of beliefs, similar dress, etiquette, etc. to Mandinka, Fulbe, Serehuli and Wolof alike (Gamble, 1967, p.14).

Wollof culture now extends to an enormous range, from small rural villages where old ways predominate to the large cities; from lineage and village headship to political

parties and ministerial government (Gamble, 1967, p.vii). It is further argued that there are no sharp inter-ethnic rivalries; that even though "ethnic identities and allegiances are important, their impact is minimized by the existence of relationships cutting across groups and by intense interaction between ethnic groups over long periods, even before colonial rule" (Senghor, p.10). And students of West African linguistics indicate that "there is a close organic relationship between most of the languages of Senegambia" (Senghor, p.12).

These observations and conclusions regarding the similarity of ethnic groups across The Gambia and Senegal underscore the potentialities of Senegambian integration. They are, however, seriously inadequate in several respects. First, Senghor failed to recognize fully the influence of the remnants of the different colonial systems. The separate influences of British and French colonial systems on The Gambia and Senegal respectively have created cultural, economic and political differences that seem to obscure the dominance of any particular groups in the Senegambia region. For instance, whilst linguistic boundaries in Senegal and The Gambia overlap, political boundaries do not. But as a result of the impact of colonial language policies and "linguistic cross-fertilization," a lack of internal cohesion now exists in each Senegambian language as spoken by the same group of

people in the two countries (Senghor). Also, elites in The Gambia (both Wollof and Mandinka) have consistently expressed their fear of being swallowed up by the Senegalese system and have, therefore, resisted moves towards fully integrating their country with Senegal.

There is also a failure to recognize or an attempt to marginalize inter-ethnic concerns in the region. Perhaps the fact that Senghor is Senegalese may have predisposed him to overlook certain realities in Senegambian politics. The Mandinka, for example, constitute the largest single group in The Gambia and have dominated that country's government. The Mandinka make up the fourth largest group in Senegambia with 10 percent, whereas the Wollof constitute the largest group with 33 percent (Senghor, p.9). It is almost certain that the Wollof would dominate any Senegambian state. The Gambian Mandinka have been well aware of this, and their elites have been unwilling to fully support moves which may culminate in their loss of dominance.

A "prevailing fact is that, as with Wolof culture, the Wolof language has also acquired a sociological predominance in both Senegal and The Gambia and can be said to be the lingua franca of the area" (Senghor, p.12). Mandinka is dominant in The Gambia, but knowledge of Wollof is a necessary means of communication outside of the rural areas. In some rural parts of The Gambia, however, there are apprehensions about using the Wollof language for anything.

Certain Wollof urbanites also seem to frown upon speaking Mandinka, and some (particularly civil servants) almost require the usage of Wollof in the conduct of business. So, the predominance of the Wollof language in the Senegambia region also has its drawbacks.

INITIAL TALKS ON SENEGAMBIA

It was against this conflicting background of propinquity and the desire for unity on the one hand and separate group interests and concerns for Gambian national sovereignty on the other that talks on integration began.

The "unquestionable ties between the peoples of [The Gambia and Senegal] could not help but foster discussion of some type of formal union, and in fact, such discussion took place in earnest beginning with the period of independence from colonial rule" (Coppa, p.50). The possibilities of association began to be explored in 1961, when both countries agreed to form an interministerial committee to conduct discussions on matters of joint interest. The committee considered matters such as posts, telecommunications and feeder roads. It was agreed that a basis for formal cooperation between Senegal and The Gambia could be possible once The Gambia achieved independence (Coppa, p.51; Robson 1983, p.125).

During the talks on possible association, the Gambian government insisted that "it would only consider association

on terms that would guarantee it a high degree of autonomy -- which amounted in effect to a willingness to consider only a weak confederal relationship" (Robson 1983, p.125). In anticipation of Gambian independence, both countries requested that a study be authorized under the United Nations on alternative forms of association and cooperation.

Discussions on the possibility of closer association between The Gambia and Senegal intensified in 1964 with the assistance of the United Nations' Technical Assistance Mission (Ezenwe, p.113; Robson 1965, p.395). The three alternatives to joint political association recommended by the experts were federation, confederation, or The Gambia's complete integration as a political unit into Senegal (United Nations' Report no. TAO/Gambia/Senegal/1).

Debate continued on the merits of Senegambian integration, particularly the economic aspects of closer association. It was argued that the economic prospect for The Gambia as an independent country was bleak. The Gambia remained a poor territory, dependent upon grants-in-aid to meet even minimal self-sustaining economic growth.

> Only by becoming a part of a larger market and using the river to a greater extent might Gambia shake off the fetters of underdevelopment. If satisfactory terms can be negotiated with Senegal on the basis of the team of U.N. experts, who recently examined problems of unification, terms that would guarantee development of the river and maintain Gambia's liberal trading policies, Gambia would benefit economically by closer association ("From Our Files," March 20-26, 1989, p.448).

After a series of talks between the Gambian and Senegalese governments, a "brief and guarded" communique "notable for the absence of any reference to future political association," was released. The communique said the parties had recognized the "necessity of instituting in the near future a system which would reinforce the natural solidarity" between The Gambia and Senegal. They also agreed on the necessity of continuing their work. The communique added that the two delegations had "a broad exchange of views on the recommendations" of the U.N. team of experts ("From Our Files," June 19-25, 1989, p.1019).

While the discussions dragged on, the Senegalese government "scrupulously avoided any involvement in Gambia domestic politics lest unwarranted fears of Senegalese `imperialism' be aroused" ("From Our Files," August 14-20, 1989, p.1334). It was recognized that integrating The Gambia and Senegal would be hampered if a narrow chauvinism arose in either state.

Since the initial discussions between the two neighbors began, The Gambia's opposition United Party strongly criticized the moves. The United Party (UP)[2] discounted the economic benefits of association with Senegal, stating that "No form of union with Senegal would solve the economic difficulties of Gambia or otherwise bring it any benefit" ("From Our Files," March 27-April 2, 1989, p.487).

The UP also took issue with other concerns. On the contention that Senegal is one of the most zealous advocates of African unity, the party's deputy leader said "every informed person connected with or interested in Africa knows that [then Senegalese] President Senghor is regarded by many African states as a hindrance to African unity. Economics may at one time have been his design for bringing The Gambia into Senegal, but now he speaks privately of his fear, that another West African state may have designs for closer relations with The Gambia after independence, a fear that his rule may thus be threatened" ("From Our Files," May 1-7, 1989, p.695).

Despite the opposition, two agreements on security and defense against external threats were signed in Dakar between The Gambia and Senegal on July 11, 1964. But both countries remained hesitant. The agreements provided for either country to request for assistance from the other "to secure their External Security and Defence against any form of threat" (1965 Defence Agreement).

While The Gambia had a number of obvious reasons for being reluctant (Senegal's population is 10 times The Gambia's), Senegal's main reason was economic. Could it, at the time, afford a union with a country which had no foreseeable means of balancing its budget, and no way of achieving capital development except through foreign aid ("From Our Files," August 14-20, 1989, p.1334)?

When The Gambia became independent in 1965, concerns were again expressed about the possibility of a union with Senegal. At that time it became "quite certain that the union will not come soon, and may never come at all..." (West Africa, February 13, 1965). Political pundits had then anticipated that The Gambia's political worries would likely be external, or at any rate arise from her external relations:

> One cannot, for example, exclude the possibility that if union does not come soon, causes of conflict between The Gambia and Senegal may arise, either because of smuggling from The Gambia to Senegal, or because Senegalese political exiles find refuge in The Gambia (West Africa, February 13, 1965).

The Senegambia Confederation may not have come about as a result of conflict between the two states, but the fact remains that Gambian authorities reluctance to form a union with Senegal was overshadowed by The Gambia's "security needs" following the 1981 revolt. Thus the relations between the two confederal partners was not determined by Gambian political elites' desire to unify their country with Senegal, but by Senegalese forcefulness and Jawara's determination to stay in power.

> ...Until recently one could describe the Gambian position towards Senegal as being successfully avoiding Senegalese encroachment, while trying to apply some economic flesh to formal sovereignty. This means that the presence of Senegalese troops in Banjul is of great significance. [It showed that] Banjul has had to have recourse to Dakar for domestic political security.

> With this the Senegalese ... acquired a vital lever for ... negotiations with the Gambian Government (West Africa, November 17, 1980, p.2280).

THE GAMBIA'S STATE OF AFFAIRS BEFORE THE 1981 REVOLT

The proclamation of the Senegambia Confederation followed a series of unfortunate events in The Gambia which led to the 1981 revolt. For sixteen years prior to July 1981, The Gambia was regarded as one of the remaining bastions of democracy in Africa. The country's image as a democratic and peaceful state was extensively promoted, and its regard for human rights was considered to be distinguished. The country was always known as "an island of stability and order in Africa" (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749). When most African countries were under military rule, President Jawara maintained some form of democracy in The Gambia. Elections have, since independence, been held every five years.

At the international level, the administration had embarked on an impressive campaign aimed at bolstering Jawara's image as a staunch advocate of the cause of human rights. And it was in the Gambian capital that the committee drawing up the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.)'s Charter of Human and People's Rights--"The Banjul Charter"--held its final meetings.

The country's international image, however, concealed the true nature of the state of affairs in The Gambia at the time. The country lacked an aggressive press and outspoken opposition leaders to challenge the image portrayed by the government. The media--broadcast and print--have been dominated or tightly controlled by the government, and opponents of the government seldom get the opportunity to be heard at the national level.[3] Ruling party propaganda and political rhetoric also swelled through the media under the cover of "meet-the-farmers" tours.

The country's image, nevertheless, was suddenly tarnished by the July 1981 revolt led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a native of Wassadu, Foni district, when the "calm of The Gambia became surface thin ... largely because of economic recession" (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749).

The messy situation that the Gambian economy found itself in prior to the 1981 revolt worsened the country's social and political climate. The average production of groundnuts, the main export earner, was 132,000 tons in 1973-74 and had dropped to 78,000 tons in 1980-81. The Sahelian drought crippled agricultural production, and this had effects on other sectors of the economy.

The country's gross domestic product fell from 251.4 million dalasis[4] in 1978/79 to 200.1 million in 1979/80. The per capita income decreased from D526.09 to D440.42

during 1978/79 and 1979/80 respectively (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749).

Economic activity was quite sluggish. Barely 71,120 tons of groundnut were bought by licensed buying agents. This was about sixty percent of the tonnage delivered in 1978/79 and seriously affected earnings of the Gambia Produce Marketing Board, which also had to contend with low world prices[5] (West Africa, November 17, 1980, p. 2281).

Other developments followed the country's downward trend. These included an increase in the "amount and frequency of white-collar crimes by those placed in charge of public funds, the drift from rural areas, the increase in urban unemployment, the drought-induced migrations from neighboring countries to Gambian towns, and the frustrations inherent in all this" (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749). Frequent power outages, dating back to an explosion in the main Banjul power station in 1978, added to the miseries.

The Gambia's troubled economic, political and social atmosphere, and the administration's seeming hopelessness gave rise to, or intensified, a spate of anti-government and anti-establishment activities. There was the "Voice of The Future", a clandestine publication that blasted both government and businesspersons seen as "enemies of the people" (West Africa, August 3, 1981, pp.1748-1749). The paper appeared irregularly and was widely distributed on the

streets of major towns. The government assigned a Special Branch of the Gambia Police Force to crack down on the culprits, but this was largely unsuccessful. The authors of the "Voice" appeared to be politically conscious and seemed to have known the inside dealings of the government. A wave of suspicions and rumors continued to circulate for a while, but the "Voice" remained a mystery to the government.

And as if all these troubles coupled with the decline in groundnut production were not enough, tourism, the only other source of foreign exchange, started falling off.[6] The Scandinavians, who led the field for years, decided to go elsewhere and the increase in British and German visitors was not sufficient to compensate. After all, real gain in foreign exchange from tourism was small, and the adverse effects serious. The negative effects "include corruption, sexual and financial exposure to consumer society attractions that The Gambia cannot afford, and seasonal unemployment of numerous young men attracted to the towns." The biggest difficulty came from its inflationary effects (West Africa, November 3, 1981, p.1803).

The country's economic problems "inevitably produced political tensions. ...The Gambia depended on foreign aid, and President Jawara made numerous trips abroad to beg for economic support for Gambia's ailing economy. But there was also an appearance of mismanagement and insistent stories about corruption" (West Africa, November 3, 1981, p.1803).

The burning in 1980 of a yacht and dinghy belonging to the President were acts of protest against his regime.

The disillusioned state of those who sought to change the political order through the established political parties would be seen in grafitti on walls and buildings in and around Banjul by persons calling for support for the Movement for Justice in Africa--Gambia (MOJA) (West Africa, November 3, 1980, pp.2172-2173).

Founded in 1979, MOJA aims to change what it described as a situation where "the whole wealth of the country is at the disposal of the political and administrative ruling clique." It alleged "nepotism, corruption and patronage at the top, shareholding in foreign companies by government officials and profitable collaboration in the development of tourism to the detriment of local culture." The movement alleged political intimidation and increasing repression. One of its aims is to work for African unity (West Africa, November 3, 1980, pp.2172-2173).

MOJA was not alone in its view of the country's situation. Pap Cheyassin Secka, a leader of the National Liberation Party now in jail for complicity in the 1981 revolt, expressed his views in a December 1980 interview with West Africa magazine. Secka pointed to corruption and "influence peddling" in the country and saw the main problem as "the exercise of power not being accountable to any group, reason or even politics."

He "spoke of a growing sense of `hopelessness': `People are queuing for firewood, ... for rice, ... for oil, ... for every basic commodity and now that charcoal has been banned they are finding it difficult to even have cooking amenities.'"

Secka warned in 1980: "If we do that [consultations] we may be lucky enough to have dramatic and drastic changes in our country for the better, without having to go through the bloodshed and violence that our brothers and sisters in other places have had to undergo" (West Africa, December 15, 1980, p.2554).

Other events occurred which seemed to support Secka's prognosis. First, in October 1980, President Jawara felt sufficiently threatened by the country's political situation to send for 150 Senegalese troops to help keep order--despite the fact that The Gambia had its own 500-man paramilitary force. An official statement in Banjul said the Senegalese troops were in The Gambia for joint exercises, under an agreement between the two countries. Jawara alleged that Libya was trying to destabilise the country. Diplomatic relations were then cut off with the Libyans.

The Gambian government's break with Libya followed a similar move by Senegal in July. Both states alleged that Sheikh Ahmed Niasse, a Senegalese who had been openly working to overthrow the government of President Senghor

"--avowedly on a platform of Islamic Republicanism--" had been trying to recruit their nationals for military training in Libya ("The Gambia Breaks Off Relations With Libya," p.2217).

With the arrival of the Senegalese troops, The Gambia government banned MOJA and The Gambia Socialist Revolutionary Party, a sort of shadowy organization. Six MOJA members, referred to by the government as "clandestine activists," were later arrested. A government statement said the groups were "being used for purposes considered prejudicial to the public interest" ("The Gambia Breaks Off Relations With Libya," pp.2216-2217). Among those arrested was Koro Sallah (the MOJA leader and a former professional soccer player) who later fled to Sweden during the Senegalese military intervention in 1981.

A few days before the break with Libya was announced, the shooting death of Eku Mahoney, deputy commander of The Gambia's Field Force, was reported. The official version of the incident was that Commander Mahoney caught a member of the Field Force smoking marijuana while on duty, and when he told the man that he would face disciplinary action, he responded with two rifle shots. This official version was doubted by most people. Forty of the Senegalese troops who came "to keep order" in The Gambia parachuted unexpectedly into McCarthy Square during the funeral procession of

Commander Mahoney ("The Gambia Breaks Off Relations With Libya," p.2217).

It was believed that, "At the heart of the ... incidents in The Gambia [lay] the issue of relations between Banjul and Dakar." This "central problem" was said to have been "obscured somewhat by allegations of subversion brought against Libya" by the two governments.

> ... What remains unclear is The Gambia's reason for taking the momentous diplomatic step of permitting Senegalese troops to be sent to Banjul to ensure the security of the government. The convoluted and self-contradictory communiques that were issued following the Senegalese intervention [testified] to a degree of apprehension in Banjul. The Senegalese government, for its part, issued a statement saying that the Senegalese troops had been sent to Banjul at the invitation of the Gambian government and in accordance with a defence pact signed in 1967. As far as Dakar was concerned, the Gambian talk of `combined manouvres' appeared too much like Gambian reluctance to admit the fact that it had invited the Senegalese to send troops (West Africa, November 17, 1980, pp.2278-2279).

The Gambia's reluctance was consistent with its determination to demonstrate that it could exist as an independent and sovereign entity despite all odds. It is this kind of attitude that was also evident in the slow pace of integration under the Senegambia Confederation.

> In the early sixties the Senegalese had seen the existence of The Gambia, then still a British colony, as a thorn in their side. The Gambia

> used to be refered to by the Senegalese as `Our Quebec'. Before Gambian independence in 1965, protracted negotiations took place, following a United Nations' report on the possibility of some close link between the two countries, to see if some formal relationship could be established. Union, for which the Senegalese pressed, was rejected by the Gambian representatives. Some looser federated relationship met with Senegalese disapproval after their ... unhappy problems with [Mali] (West Africa, February 13, 1965).

The Senegalese had partially succeeded in getting reluctant Gambian authorities to at least superficially endorse moves towards the creation of a Senegambian state. The series of unfortunate events in The Gambia, resulting from the country's decadent economic and political situation, opened the way for the Senegalese. The incidents have been described here not only to project the Gambian condition before the 1981 revolt, but also to point out the factors that finally compelled Jawara to "seek" the integration of the two countries. As has been noted, The Gambia had consistently asserted its independence and viability as a nation. But that was possible and real before Senegalese troops were invited into the country in 1981, which gave Senegalese authorities greater muscle to force The Gambia to the table for unification and integration talks.

PRELUDE TO CONFEDERATION: THE 1981 REVOLT IN THE GAMBIA

Let us now take a look at the 1981 revolt itself, which suddenly made "confederation," "union," "federation," "integration," "African unity," and so on, the focal points of relations between The Gambia and Senegal.[7]

It was early in the morning of July 30, 1981 when a scheduled Radio Gambia broadcast was abruptly interrupted with an unfamiliar burst of Marxist rhetoric accompanied with expressions of anti-Jawara, anti-establishment sentiments by one Kukoi Samba Sanyang. Sanyang, who was scarcely known by then, said that power had been taken over by a 12-man Supreme Council of the Revolution. In addition to Kukoi, the other Council members were: Demba Janneh, Kantong Fatty, Junkung Saho, Simon Talibo Sanneh, Cambeng Badjie, Husenu Jawo, Momodou Sanyang, Demba Camara and Apai Sonko. At least a majority of Council members, including Kukoi, belonged to the minority Jola ethnic group. Three of the Council's members belonged to the paramilitary police unit known as the Field Force. The remaining nine, including Sanyang, were civilians. All Council members were political nonenties, and at least one was a taxi driver.

The rebel leader was christened Paul Dominique Sanyang, but changed his name to Kukoi Samba Sanyang when he turned to left-wing politics as a student, according to a report in West Africa magazine (August 24, 1981, p.1912). He was also an unsuccessful candidate for the National Convention Party in the 1977 elections in The Gambia. Sanyang's emergence

was a total surprise, since he was not the "expected messiah" to save The Gambia from its economic and political decadence. But it was widely believed that he was only a frontman for established politicians who had become frustrated with the system and could not effect change through the ballot box. One of these politicians was Pap Cheyassin Secka, who is currently serving a life term for complicity in the revolt. Secka, an attorney and leader of the small National Liberation Party, had contested and lost at least two parliamentary elections in Banjul and the rural areas. He was widely believed to be the author or one of the authors of the text of Kukoi's statement on the first day of the revolt.

Whether the belief is correct or not has never been established, but the revolt was clearly spearheaded by Sanyang, and President Jawara was in Britain at the time for the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana.

The group had seized control of the Field Force armoury, and then captured the national radio station, State House (the President's residence), and Yundum Airport. The rebels, as the government called them, were strengthened when a large majority of the 500-man Field Force decided to join them. Hundreds of civilian volunteers were also supplied with the Soviet-made Kalashnikov SLR rifles contained in the armoury at Bakau. Also armed were the prisoners released on the day of the revolt.

The rebels, however, failed to take control of the Banjul Police Headquarters, where Vice President Assan Musa Camara and several government officials sought refuge under the protection of a few loyalist forces.[8] The mild resistance convinced Jawara that it might not be a bad idea, after all, to attempt a comeback.

Meanwhile, the new regime announced that the courts and the constitution had been suspended, frontiers closed, and all political parties banned. A dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed, and Sanyang was named Head of State. The new leader said in a radio broadcast that the coup was directed against "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism".

The announcement of the coup was initially met with surprise and widespread jubilation, until it became apparent that events were taking dangerous turns. The reckless distribution of guns from the Field Force Armoury in Bakau "to youths, freed prisoners, and everyone who asked resulted in an orgy of looting, wild and indiscriminate firing, and the settling of old scores" (Africa Research Bulletin, August 1981, p.5782). Also the initial announcement of Senegalese plans to intervene and the rebels' pledge to fight to death raised great fears among the population.

While in London, Jawara disclosed plans to urge Senegalese intervention in the crisis. He said he urged Vice President Camara to liaise with President Diouf to see if provisions of a 1965 mutual defense treaty between

Senegal and The Gambia could be invoked to put down the rebellion.

Senegalese troops, about 2,700 in number, were subsequently sent to The Gambia, and by the second day of the revolt, they recaptured Yundum Airport, and other troops moved across the border into the country. It was then revealed on Radio Gambia, however, that one of Jawara's two wives, Lady Chilel Njie, eight of their children, her father, the Minister of Education, several local authorities, at least two Senegalese soldiers, Senegalese diplomats and their families, and the National President of the ruling party had been "arrested" by the rebels.

A war of words, which the rebels called "psychological warfare," ensued between Sanyang and Jawara, who was then based in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. The rebels broadcast threats to execute hostages since Senegal was intervening in their country's internal affairs. The Senegalese responded by arguing that the 1965 defense treaty between The Gambia and Senegal provides for military cooperation in the event of external aggression. Broadcasts from Radio Gambia included pleas from the hostages for Senegalese troops to withdraw, while Jawara gave stern warnings from Dakar that no hostages be harmed.

It could be seen from such a dangerous situation how easily Jawara might have been coerced into concluding agreements he had resisted for years. He was virtually

"impotent". His presidency was at stake and his family and some of his close associates were held hostage with continuous death threats. Under the circumstances described, it is almost inconceivable that any leader could reach an agreement or make a genuine proposal of the magnitude of integrating two nation-states with a "cool and clear-headed" understanding of the costs and consequences of his/her decisions. He was neither on home territory nor on neutral ground, and public opinion was not taken into account. In fact, up to the break-up of the Confederation, the Jawara administration ignored calls for a national referendum on Senegambia.

With the way almost cleared by the Senegalese interventionist forces, Jawara flew back to Banjul on August 2, 1981. At the same time, reinforcements of Senegalese troops flew in by helicopter to join the few loyalist Gambian paramilitary forces there. They later took over control of the capital and all major points leading to it.

Assuming control did not come as easily for the Senegalese as they had expected. They were met with stiff resistance. A Senegalese helicopter was shot down, a jeep captured, and an undisclosed number of Senegalese soldiers killed by civilians with no military training and by Field Force men who had no sophisticated weaponry.

On August 6, the rebels escaped when commandos entered their stronghold in Bakau and freed all the hostages. The

commando force that went into the camp reportedly included three members of the British SAS (Special Air Service).[9]

Some members of the short-lived Supreme Council of the Revolution were later arrested, but Sanyang and several others fled the country by fishing boats to Guinea-Bissau, where they were granted political asylum. Some were later to be extradited to The Gambia.[10]

Order was restored about a week after the incidents began, but Senegalese troops remained in The Gambia "to ensure the government's security" up to the 1989 break-up of the Confederation.

Reaction among elites in both countries was predictable. It centered around "the maintenance of existing self-interests" ("Senegal: Diouf Calls The Tune," p.6). In Senegal, the main opposition parties[11] initially responded to President Diouf's military involvement in suppressing the Gambian revolt by condemning it as an "annexation of The Gambia" ("Senegal: Diouf Calls The Tune," p.6). Mamadou Dia of the Mouvement Democratique Populaire (MDP) said the Senegalese role in The Gambia was aggressive in nature. "It is veritable annexation. You must call a cat a cat" (Bentsi-Enchill, p.80). Fara Ndiaye of the Parti Democratique Senegalaise (PDS) echoed some of Dia's views. She concurred that The Gambia had been under military occupation and that Senegal had to continue "acting as a

gendarme to make sure that Gambians remain tranquil" (Bentsi-Enchill, p.81).

Politicians in The Gambia, on the other hand, had a compelling reason to either support the government's positions or remain quiet. Senegalese forces proved quite invaluable for the Jawara regime because without their help "...the prospects for any Gambian government would be dim" ("Shotgun Marriage," p.42). It must also be noted that opposition leaders were "either in the process of being tried for alleged complicity in the [revolt] or [were] keeping quiet for fear that any noise they make may be misconstrued as treason" ("Shotgun Marriage," p.42).

AFTERMATH OF THE 1981 REVOLT

After the July 1981 revolt, "the Senegalese immediately went on pressing for the union of the two countries on a Gambian President who was only ready for what he called `the integration of the security forces' of the two countries" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307).

> The ... coup attempt and the decisive role of Senegal ... changed everything. Senegambian unity, never taken seriously as a political reality by many Gambian leaders, was soon thrown onto their laps. The gravity of the situation and the growing political insecurity of the Jawara regime combined to make Senegambia an attractive proposition (Nyang, p.47-49).

President Jawara paid an official visit to Senegal less than a month after the revolt, and his Senegalese "hosts

waved aside protocol and broke diplomatic norms to parade him in front of a then-going congress of the (ruling) Parti Socialiste that noisily called for nothing less than `immediate annexation'" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307).

Shortly before Jawara's arrival powerful sections of the Dakar-based merchant class reportedly sponsored a petition for Senegambia. According to Manjang, the petition called for "immediate annexation" and had been in circulation in Dakar, the Senegalese capital (Manjang, Part I, p.2307). When Jawara departed from Senegal, a couple of days later, he began "talking `confederation' to appease the Senegalese while keeping at bay the formidable menace of immediate annexation" (Manjang, Part I, p.2307).

It becomes evident from the chain of events just described and others to follow that Jawara was under duress when decisions on the Senegambia Confederation were made. First, a hostage situation, involving, among others, one of Jawara's wives existed at the time he was supposed to have entertained preliminary discussions on Senegambian integration. Second, the Senegalese built up support for integration in Dakar at the time of Jawara's initial visit after the revolt was put down. This was reflected in the noisy calls by Senegalese deputies for nothing short of Senegambian unity in August 1981. His vision and commitment, as well as those of his close associates, were limited to the integration of the security forces of the two

countries, while President Diouf reportedly said "he wants to work towards an integrated state and foresees a new country called Senegambia ..." (West Africa, August 24, 1981, p.1912).

As stated above, Jawara opted for a strategy that would protect his regime from collapse and secure The Gambia's independence at the same time. The Senegalese authorities pressed for a union, and confederation and the integration of security forces were seen only as steps towards unification. This view was expressed in the ruling Socialist Party (Senegal)'s organ--"Unite." Pressures for unification included radio and television programs aimed at the Gambian population, as well as regular statements by the Senegalese President calling for nothing short of unification.

A brief round of shuttle diplomacy intensified[12] as the dust began to settle on the revolt. And on December 17, 1981, an agreement on the establishment of The Senegambia Confederation was signed in Dakar by Presidents Abdou Diouf and Dawda Jawara for Senegal and The Gambia, respectively. The Confederation came into effect on February 1, 1982. A statement by the Gambia Government said, "The Agreement confirms the wish of the two countries to strengthen their solidarity and their commitment to the ideals of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)" (Fact Sheets On The Gambia).

CONCLUSION

The discussion in this chapter underscores the difficulties of fully integrating The Gambia with Senegal despite the apparent opportunities. The desire for African unity, proximity, kinship, common socio-economic concerns, political considerations, the predominance of Islam, and the use of Wollof as a lingua franca have served as strong bases for Senegambian unity.

But the separate influences of British and French administrations on The Gambia and Senegal respectively have created cultural, economic and political differences that have impeded moves toward building a Senegambian nation-state. For instance, the separate colonial influences are blamed for the "lack of internal cohesion which now exists in each Senegambian language as spoken by the same group of people in The Gambia and Senegal" (Senghor, p.12). This has created some gaps in communication between members of the same ethnic group across political boundaries.

Also, the Gambian Mandinka's unwillingness to play a secondary role in a Wollof-dominated Senegambia, the Gambian strategy of maintaining the country's national sovereignty, and differences in expectations of the economic rewards of integration have widened the gap between the Senegambian dream and reality. The Mandinka constitute the single largest group in The Gambia (with 37.7%) and dominate that

country's politics. But Senegambian unity would place the Mandinka at fourth place (with 10%) behind the Wollof (33.6%), the Fula/Peul (20.9%), and the Serer (17%) (Senghor, p.9). This fact has served as a source of Mandinka reluctance to support the unification of The Gambia with Senegal.

The dilemmas support the theory that "political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.417). The lack of consensus on the framework of Senegambia -- resulting from the different colonial influences and other factors -- has posed a barrier to Senegambian integration.

The next chapter indicates, however, that Senegal and The Gambia achieved a degree of cohesiveness because of the presence, and threat, of force in The Gambia stemming from the 1981 revolt and the Senegalese intervention in that country.

CHAPTER III

THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

This chapter discusses the proclamation and objectives of the Senegambia Confederation, and the state of confederal relations up to August 1989--when "Senegambia" was "frozen." It is an overview of the structures created and of the policy proposals, progress, and failures during the period of confederation. This section also underscores one of the theoretical bases of the study, specifically the role of force in integrating political units.

The 1981 revolt and the decisive role of Senegal changed the nature of Senegambian relations. As indicated earlier, many Gambian leaders had considered a Senegambian nation-state as a remote possibility until 1981. The significant part played by the Senegalese to suppress the putsch and the increased security threat posed by Gambian opponents of the Jawara regime "forced" Gambian authorities to reconsider their position on Senegambia (Nyang, p.47-48).

But, as then Confederal Secretary-General Pierre Diouf had emphasized, "colonisation had a profound effect on both [The Gambia and Senegal] and ... we have to concede that a certain rivalry between the two colonisers, France and

Britain, was reflected in the attitudes of the colonised" (West Africa, March 6-12, 1989, p.352).

Politicians in The Gambia began expressing opposition to the moves towards integration even before details of the Confederation Agreement were made public. While opposition leader Sheriff Dibba only criticized the coup attempt and Senegalese military intervention, PDOIS's Sallah and Sarr stated later that the Gambian people were not committed to the integration of their country with Senegal ("My Conscience Is Clear," p.18-19). One obvious reason for their opposition is the influence that Dakar would hold over Banjul, where administrative and industrial infrastructure is less developed. Businesspersons in Dakar were on the whole in favor of some kind of union, with the expectation that The Gambia's preferential tariffs would be abolished as a result. Most goods were cheaper in The Gambia and smuggling (or "re-exporting") into Senegal affects that country's trade.

Gambian businesspersons, on the other hand, were opposed to integration--especially the economic dimension. Though somewhat influential, they lacked the kind of economic clout necessary to reverse the trend of events. The Jawara administration's security interests and the confidence that Senegalese protection would bring to the government overrode the interests of the country's business elite.

PROCLAMATION OF THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

Despite opposition among Gambian political elites to any form of union with Senegal, Presidents Diouf and Jawara went ahead with their plans for Confederation. According to an outline of the Confederal Agreement, the Confederation was to be based on:

(1) The integration of the armed forces and of the security forces of the Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal, to defend the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and independence of the Confederation;

(2) Economic and monetary union;

(3) Coordination of policy in the field of external relations; and

(4) Coordination of policy in the field of communications and in all other fields where the Confederal states may agree to exercise their jurisdiction jointly;

The terms of the Agreement specified that, "The President of the Confederation shall command the Armed Forces and the Security Forces of the Confederation. He shall be responsible for the defence and security of the Confederation" (Fact Sheets On The Gambia, pp.1-2). The Gambian president, however, remained Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of The Gambia.

The Agreement also provided for:

(a) A Confederal Presidency and Vice Presidency. The President of Senegal was the permanent President of the Confederation, and the President of The Gambia, its permanent Vice President;

(b) A Council of Ministers whose members are appointed by the President of the Confederation in agreement with the Vice President. This Council met under the leadership of the President and Vice President of the Confederation; and it consisted of four Gambians out of nine members. The ministers were responsible for "strictly confederal matters" ("Protocol on the Institutions," art. 14). Therefore, only matters of joint interest came to the attention of the Council. The Council's agenda was set by the President in agreement with the Vice President. The Council appeared "to serve only in an advisory and fact-finding role for Senegal and The Gambia on matters sought to be decided by the two nations" (Coppa, p.80).

(c) A sixty-member Confederal Parliament elected from the national parliaments of the two countries; one-third consisted of Gambian parliamentarians, and two-thirds Senegalese legislators. A quorum required the presence of three-quarters of the parliament, meaning that the Senegalese representatives could not have formed a quorum on their own. The confederal parliament also served an advisory and fact-finding role. It deliberated on matters submitted to it by the Confederal President or Vice

President. There was a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker. Members met in Dakar for main sessions and Banjul for bureau/committee sessions; and

(d) A Secretariat for the Presidency based in Dakar. The size of the secretariat was unspecified. Under the Agreement, the Confederal President was required to consult and have the prior agreement of the Vice President to implement any confederal Act. Also, the confederal states retained the powers to formulate their own domestic and foreign policies, but decisions affecting the Confederation or its institutions had to be made jointly.

In case dispute or difference arose out of the interpretation and the implementation of the Agreement, it would have been submitted to the President of the Confederation for settlement, in agreement with the Vice President. If the two Heads of State failed to agree upon the settlement of a difference submitted to them, either of them may have refered the matter to arbitration. The requirement, though not a complete safeguard, seemed to reduce The Gambia's fears of a Senegalese leader taking matters into his/her own hands. A protocol of implementation laid down "rules constituting an arbitration tribunal for the settlement of differences and for regulating its procedure" (Fact Sheets On The Gambia, p.2). The text of the Confederation Agreement concerning the confederal president's powers to declare a state of emergency "in consultation with" (meaning

by informing) the Vice President of the Confederation was later amended to "in agreement with" at the insistence of the Gambian president. It was argued that only the president of The Gambia can declare a state of emergency in The Gambia (Gaye, p.63).

UNFAIR AGREEMENT?

From the signing of the Agreement to this day, "a chain of confusion" rocked the Senegambian Confederation process until it was finally dissolved in 1989 (Manjang, Part I, p.2307). The discordant nature of what the two partners were creating became evident when disagreement broke out between them just a few weeks after the signing of the confederal accords in December 1981. The problem was that The Gambians regarded the Agreement an expression of intent while their Senegalese counterparts maintained that it was legally binding (Manjang, Part I, p.2307). It was submitted to the Gambian parliament for "debate" and formal approval, while the Senegalese Assembly also deliberated on the character of the "marriage."

The Gambia House of Representatives met to ratify the agreement simultaneously with the Assemblee Nationale of Senegal. Three opposition members of parliament walked out during the debate in The Gambia, and the remaining 32 legislators voted "yes" to confederation. Foday Makalo, an opposition MP, said the NCP should have been consulted on

"this fundamental change to the lives of Gambians" ("Signing on the Dotted Line," p.353-354). Ruling party MP's also uttered various threats in the form that "confederation was so popular that opposition MP's daring to speak against it in their constituencies would be beaten up by an irate populace" ("Signing on the Dotted Line," p.353-354). The PPP legislators emphasized the "overwhelming support" of the Gambian people for confederation even though there was no evidence of that. The Senegalese National Assembly also ratified the agreement, but with less debate and controversy.

But before we get into developments after the signing of the Agreement, we need to peruse the accord with a view to understanding the foot-dragging attitude of Gambian authorities. It is an indisputable fact that political power in Senegambia was not evenly distributed, at least as spelt out in the Confederal Agreement. This may have had an impact on Gambian political elites' attitudes towards a closer union with Senegal. As pointed out earlier, the confederal framework was agreed to when Gambian leaders were facing a crisis situation in their country. Thus it was in no way a reflection of the values they cherished in terms of Senegambia.

But what is the evidence to substantiate the position that Senegambia was based on unequal partnership? The President of the Confederation was Senegalese; Senegal had

a two-thirds representation in the legislative assembly; Senegal had virtual control over the armed and security forces, and ensured the security of the Confederation; Senegal contributed two-thirds of the confederal budget,[13] giving it a major say on how funds were disbursed; and Senegal had five out of nine ministers in the Senegambia cabinet.

The confederal framework was lopsided since it gave the Senegalese a clear and decisive superiority. Gambian politicians had severely compromised their position before the announced "negotiations" as a result of the domestic turmoil they were facing. The circumstances of the actual negotiations are still not clear--particularly information about the length of the negotiations and the participants in the process. Available information relates mainly to the formal signing ceremonies and communiques.

Another element in the Senegambian confederal agreement demonstrated the lopsidedness of the distribution of political power between The Gambia and Senegal. This point could be best illustrated by drawing examples from the failed Mali Federation of Senegal and the Soudan (now Mali). Under the Mali Federation, even though Senegal covered 76 thousand square miles and the Soudan 465 thousand square miles (the population balance also was marginally in favor of Soudan) there was equal distribution of political power between the two states. The offices of chief of state and head of

government were separate, with the latter maintaining control over foreign affairs. Even though Senegal was the smaller partner, it was agreed that a Senegalese might be chosen as a chief of state. The President of the Mali Federation was chosen by a Congress composed of an equal number of Senegalese and Soudanese Territorial and Federal Assembly members (Foltz, pp.189-190). Senegal is about ten times the size of The Gambia in terms of population, but both are independent sovereign states with equal legal standing.

Given these data, and the fact that The Gambia was the much smaller partner under the Confederation, one should have expected a similar arrangement with the Senegalese. Instead, the Senegambian accord reserved the Presidency for the Senegalese, who also held a two-thirds representation in the Confederal Assembly. Why did the Senegalese insist on equal partnership with a geographically but not demographically much larger Soudan, and then remain adamant on dominating relations with The Gambia based on size? Obviously, the Senegalese authorities pursue their own national interest, and it was the Gambian side that seemed to have sacrificed its national interest. The confederal accord was lopsided partly because Gambian statesmen were not in the same position as the Senegalese were with the Soudanese to negotiate on an equal footing. The Gambia was enmeshed in political turmoil, which the Senegalese seized upon as an

opportunity to pursue their long-sought goal of creating a Senegambian nation. But they failed to sway Gambian political elites' attitudes in their favor, as the demise of the confederation clearly illustrated.

Though "Senegambia" had started out as a confederation, there are other factors about its Confederation Agreement that had a striking resemblance to that of the successful union of French- and English-speaking Cameroons.

> Federalism as a concept was interpreted differently by political elites on both sides of the Cameroon border. The Francophone elites were in principle opposed to any form of federation, preferring instead a very centralised unitary state. But for tactical reasons were prepared to concede to a temporary federation with Southern Cameroons. Anglophone politicians, on the other hand, wanted a loose federation and saw this as the best arrangement under existing circumstances for preserving the individuality of the Southern Cameroons political <u>persona</u> (Kofele-Kale, pp.xxxi-xxxii).

In the case of Senegambian integration, it was the Senegalese who had consistently and forcefully pushed for the creation of a federation or unitary state, while Anglophone Gambia had opted, at most, for a looser union that would ensure its independence, identity, and sovereignty. Existing circumstances, rising mainly from the 1981 revolt, forced The Gambia in the direction of confederation. But in contrast to Anglophone Cameroon, which was also much smaller than its French-speaking partner, Gambian political leaders had dodged calls for a

national referendum on the issue of confederation. The overwhelming majority of Anglophone Cameroonians opted for Cameroon (federal) citizenship in February of 1961. What this points to is that the Senegambia Confederation was not a manifestation of the wills of either the Gambian masses or their political elites--as evidenced from the statements of MOJA's Manjang, the NCP's Foday Makalo, and PDOIS's Sallah, Sarr and Jatta. A referendum would have proved this, and the Gambian government was well aware of that.

It would, however, be fair at this juncture, to say that most "Senegambians" who were opposed to the confederal framework were not outright against unifying Senegal and The Gambia. Instead, they generally saw unification as a desirable goal, but one that should be approached cautiously and in stages. Some political elites, particularly Sallah, Sarr and Jatta, believed that citizens should be educated about the concept of integration before moves are made to create Senegambia. It is a fact that very few Gambians had any but the slightest notions as to what unification could mean or what kind of society to expect.

EIGHT YEARS OF UNFRUITFUL CONFEDERATION

Having considered the lopsidedness of the Senegambia Confederation, we will now gauge the Confederation against its own stated objectives (See Figure 1.). This would give a picture of the slow process of integration under the

Senegambia Confederation and show that the conflicting stances of Senegalese and Gambian political elites is a major impediment to Senegambian unity.

Armed and Security Forces

Senegambia was established in response to The Gambia's security concerns; thus it should come as no surprise that the integration of security forces preceded all other areas in the confederal accord. A confederal force of about 400 men (with approximately 300 Senegalese) was established in 1982 to operate side by side with national forces, but it was stationed mainly in The Gambia. "The force [was] rather ambiguous. It [was] a force which [was] supposed to include both Senegalese and Gambian nationals and serving the two neighbors under the Senegambia Confederation." It was, however, permanently in The Gambia and reputedly dominated by members of a crack Senegalese unit (Momoh, p.554).

While other areas of cooperation included transport, communications and information, these were sadly neglected in favor of the confederal armed forces. Information from the confederal secretariat in Dakar indicated that 84 per cent of the first budget went to defense and security. A Senegalese national was quoted as saying: "We put down their coup and now we are paying for their defence" (West Africa, Feb. 6-12, 1989, p.208). The confederal budget, however, continued to decline drastically over the years--from 4.3

DIMENSION	GOALS	ACTIONS	FAILURES	SUMMARY EVALUATION OF PROGRESS
Institutions	To strengthen the unity of their economies and coordinate their policies in other fields through the establishment of an institutional framework	(a) creation of confederal parliament (b) council of ministers appointed	(a) Institutions lacked initiative (b) Parliamentary meetings merely of symbolic significance	Substantial matters not debated or decided
Armed and Security Forces	To strengthen the unity of their defense	Confederal Army created	(a) Army stationed permanently in The Gambia (b) Senegalese troops were seen as occupation forces in The Gambia	Forces not fully integrated
Economic and Monetary Union	To harmonize the economies of The Gambia and Senegal into one functioning unit benefitting both nations	Report on the tariff structures, trade practices and restrictions and third-party arrangements; study on customs union	(a) existence of separate currencies (b) free trade in local products not agreed to (c) single membership in West African Monetary Union not attained	Economic regimes not harmonized
External Relations	To devise similar policies regarding foreign affairs through consultation	(a) resumption of ties with Libya (b) military aid for The Gambia (c) issuance of Gambian visas by Senegal	no consultation	(a) chaos and confusion (b) uncoordinated policies
Telecommunications	To plan the development of telecommunications network	(a) joint transport licensing system (b) phone lines between Basse and Wellingara installed	only one major town on either side benefitted from the new phone lines	relatively significant progress
Information	To coordinate policy in the field of information	(a) Confederal Information Commission established (b) some radio programs produced jointly	(a) media not in tune with each other (b) little exchange of information	activities not coordinated

Figure 1. EIGHT-YEAR SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

billion CFA francs in 1983/84 to 2.99 billion CFA francs in 1989/90. The 1989/90 budget marked a 12 percent drop over the previous year's budget.

Throughout the life-span of the confederation, the Senegalese army--responsible for presidential security and surveillance of the Banjul port and airport--continued to be perceived as an army of occupation by the Gambian population.

Economic Integration

The two states were also not able to move forward with economic integration. Gambian leaders may have realized the difficulties the two states would face in trying to reverse the trend towards unification if economic institutions and regimes were fully integrated.

It appeared that all that had been achieved in the sphere of economic integration were the detailed studies on tariff structures, trade practices and third party arrangements and on a customs union that were presented to the confederal partners by the appropriate technical committees set up for that purpose ("Confederal Economics," p.123). Of primary concern in the economic arena was the objective of monetary union, which was complicated by the existence of separate currencies for the confederal states. Senegal's CFA currency had a high value against the dalasi, and was very much in demand in The Gambia.

> [By 1986], (CFA) francs which find their way into The Gambia cannot be returned to Senegal ... to be exchanged into other currencies, but are shipped, usually to Switzerland, to fetch what they can earn. The dalasi is not welcome in Senegal.
>
> In other words, the Confederation's two currencies are not directly quoted against each other and are not interchangeable (West Africa, January 6, 1986, pp.17-18).

Another roadblock to economic integration was the question of The Gambia's membership of the UMOA (West African Monetary Union). Senegal wanted The Gambia to join the CFA currency zone, and The Gambia agreed. The problem was that The Gambia remained strongly opposed to the concept of applying for membership on Senegal's ticket or together as a Confederation. The Gambia insisted on applying and joining the organisation as a sovereign independent state, while Senegal thought this would have been embarrassing given the existence of the Senegambia Confederation. The Jawara administration maintained that doing either of these would have amounted to reading a federal meaning into a confederal agreement; and his regime's "gradualist approach to confederal economics [seemed] to suggest that it [was] looking somewhere else for economic salvation" (West Africa, January 20, 1986, p.123).

Two study groups, one on monetary union and another on customs union, were set up in connection with the protocol on monetary and economic union, but confederal economic

integration lacked significant progress--no actions were taken. Senegal had two-thirds representation on the confederal institutions, compared with one-third for The Gambia. The raison d'etre of these study groups was to recommend ways of achieving the eventual integration of the two countries' economic regimes; and the establishment of a monetary union and a customs union would have been first steps in that direction. Their recommendations were "studied" and the two governments agreed to establish a free trade zone in 1990.

The establishment of a free trade zone between The Gambia and Senegal was to be followed by the creation of a customs union with a common external tariff. It is noteworthy that the free trade arrangements dealt only with products of the two states, hence an attempt to stifle The Gambia's "re-export" business. Free trade in local products, which was not agreed to, would have gone to benefit Senegal. The Gambia has a liberal system of trade, exchange and transfer, while the foreign trade policy of Senegal is considered protectionist (Senghor, p.19; Fact Sheets On The Gambia).

> So great ... is the disparity in the industrial capacity of the two states ... that the flow of consumer goods would be one-way, particularly if Senegal insisted that it could no longer accept 're-exports' not of local manufacture from The Gambia (West Africa, January 6, 1986, pp.17-18).

A common external tariff structure would have other negative effects on The Gambia's economy. Adopting Senegal's higher structure would mean higher prices for Gambian consumers. Re-exports constitute a substantial proportion of The Gambia's imports, and it is argued that these go not only to Senegal but to other countries in the region. The 1985 deadlock in this area was partly due to The Gambia's insistence that it be compensated for the higher tariffs; "but apart from the fact that it [had] no funds for such payments, Senegal could reject any payment for the end of a system which for many years has lost it revenue" (West Africa, January 6, 1986, pp.17-18). The Gambia's insistence on compensation may not be termed as "foot-dragging," but it did slow down moves towards economic integration--the discussions were revived, but the sticky issue of compensation was not resolved by the time the confederation collapsed.

The stalemate in economic integration extended a bit further to negotiations on the harmonization of official prices for local produce, particularly groundnuts. A form of price war continued between The Gambia and Senegal. During one trade season, The Gambia was obliged to raise its price for groundnuts in the middle of the buying season, and to undertake the burden of paying the difference to farmers who had already sold nuts to The Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB). This was due to the fact that the Senegalese

began paying more to groundnut producers, which encouraged smuggling into Senegal and deprived The Gambia of an important source of revenue.

The harmonization of official prices for groundnuts was also complicated by the means of payment. GPMB agents paid cash for produce while Senegalese buyers often paid partly in credit. But this was off-set by the higher prices groundnuts yielded in Senegal. The frequent repercussion was that The Gambia ended up losing a significant portion of the produce to Senegal, even though it subsidized the production. Figures were not available on the extent of the loss to The Gambia because of the nature of the practice.

The foot-dragging pace of confederal relations prevailed throughout Senegambia. Integrating the economic systems of The Gambia and Senegal proved to be an unsuccessful endeavor in view of the perceived severely detrimental consequences for The Gambia. The different economic systems of the two states resulted from colonialism, which "bequeathed major differences in the ... systems of the two countries. The system in The Gambia is very liberal, while in Senegal the government plays a much stronger role; so there is a difference in approach" (West Africa, March 6-12, 1989, p.352). And The Gambia benefits largely from re-exporting goods into Senegal.

The proposed creation of a free trade zone by February 1990 was supposed to curtail the big trade in smuggled

imports into Senegal, but the idea was abandoned with the confederation's fall-out.

External Relations

In international relations, "where the semantics of the term `confederation' would have suggested more understanding, chaos and confusion [prevailed] even more remarkably" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310). The protocol for the coordination of foreign policy was expected to afford the Senegambia Confederation greater bargaining power in international negotiations, but this was almost impossible in view of the chaotic nature of the two states' foreign policies. Key foreign policy issues faced by the two states included the issuance of visas, diplomatic representation, membership in international organizations, foreign military training, and positions on other international and intra-African affairs. The confederal partners were expected to consult each other up to the highest levels to devise similar positions on international affairs. Let us discuss a few cases in point.

Jawara went to Libya to resume diplomatic relations with that country before his Senegalese counterparts had even thought of such a move.

> Gambian authorities also worked up an official attachment to Britain that, in the words of (an) official Senegalese daily ... `bordered on colonial nostalgia'. The Gambian authorities insisted

> on asking for continued British military aid in spite of strong Senegalese dissuasion (Manjang, Part I, p.2310).

It is beyond argument that Jawara's constitutional powers as Gambian Head of State allowed him to execute the country's foreign policy and to make alliances if necessary, but the Senegalese contended that given the existence of the Confederation, due consideration should have been given to the need to coordinate foreign policy. The Senegalese were not consulted on the issue, something the two states were supposed to do in their foreign relations. And the Gambian insistence on asking for British military aid may have been interpreted as distrust of such assistance from the Senegalese.

Another controversial issue in the arena of external affairs was the June 1986 issuance of Gambian visas by Senegalese diplomatic missions in the United States without even seeking approval from The Gambia Government. A mild protest from The Gambia sparked the mistreatment of Gambian nationals travelling through Dakar's Yoff Airport. Some had argued that the airport harassments--unnecessary searches, delays, and interrogations--were aimed at opponents of Jawara and were carried out with his consent. The pattern of the acts, however, did not seem to implicate Gambian authorities since some government officials received similar mistreatment. The Gambia subsequently filed a protest with

the Senegalese authorities without any outcome. In fact the practice was resumed after the confederation failed in 1989.

These and other strains in the Confederation were not mere accidents or miscalculations. The obstacles arose from the unwillingness of most Gambian political elites to see their country unified with Senegal. The interests of the Confederation's architects coincided in some areas, like security, but diverged in almost every other sphere, including monetary and trade issues, transportation, and relations with other countries. Trapped by agreements reached under duress, the Gambian leaders' only rational strategy for maintaining their country's independence while appeasing the Senegalese seemed to be "foot-dragging." The Gambia Government's strategy of "preserving the last external signs of Gambian national sovereignty" was evident in several incidents (Africa Research Bulletin, March 15, 1985, p.7891).

For example, a football match in The Gambia between the two confederal states gave rise to anti-Senegalese sentiments among the Gambian spectators. The Senegalese ambassador then gave orders for the Senegalese army to enter the hostel reserved for players to ensure the safety of the Senegalese team despite the fact that the hostel was guarded by the Gambian police. Even President Jawara publicly took exception to the Senegalese diplomat's behavior during the

incidents. The ambassador was later recalled by his government (Africa Research Bulletin, April 15, 1985, p.7563).

During that same period in 1985, the Nigerian Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari was invited to celebrations of The Gambia's twentieth anniversary of independence. This was viewed by many in Senegalese circles as The Gambia's desire to say it did not want to become a region of Senegal and as an attempt to "court Nigerian friendship as leverage against them" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310).

Telecommunications and Information

Also, little progress was made in the sphere of communications, even though a Senegambia Information Commission was established. This was acknowledged by the then Confederal Minister of Information and Telecommunications, Djibo Ka, a Senegalese national. The Commission, which was composed of Gambian and Senegalese officials, was set up to assist the authorities of the two countries in formulating confederal policy in the field of information and to make recommendations. But Minister Ka claimed that "apart from television, which `can be considered Senegambian,' the other media were not yet in tune with each other" (Africa Research Bulletin, February 15, 1987, p.8298). Actually, nothing in the sphere of communication was in tune with integrationist ideals. Since only Senegal has television, considering that as a measure of integration was at best misleading.

Gambians do own television sets and receive broadcasts from Senegal, but programming over the so-called Senegambian television station was done primarily in French and Wollof. The Gambia is, of course, English-speaking and the Mandinka constitute the majority ethnic group. Programs were produced jointly by the two states to generate support for Senegambian unity. Funds for such programs came from the Confederation, but some were paid for by the individual countries.

There was no newspaper or other publication that operated from a Senegambian perspective. The media were still constrained by their nationalistic outlooks (focused on The Gambia's or Senegal's national interest, rather than that of Senegambia), since the two governments had not worked hard enough to instill a Senegambian perspective in them. Papers from either country were not common in the other. The state of telecommunications infrastructure between the confederal states made it even more difficult for media to broaden their activities in the region. A few phone lines had been installed for faster communication between a few major Gambian and Senegalese towns, but this was more a token gesture than anything else. The number of people with phones in these towns was quite dismal, and very few residents could afford a call to the other country. What was more urgently needed instead was a faster mail service

between the two neighbors. It took at least more than a week for mail to reach its destination in the other state.

The few concrete realizations of the confederacy included the project to improve road and telephone links between the Gambian town of Basse and the Senegalese town of Wellingara; the establishment of a joint transport licensing system; and the harmonization of the telecommunications systems of the two states. For example, taxis registered or licensed in either country were allowed to operate in the other without any hurdles.

CONCLUSION

The eighth anniversary of the Senegambia Confederation was celebrated in Dakar, Senegal, with a military march past on February 1, 1989. But from Dakar's point of view, there was very little to celebrate. Such a crucial matter as economic integration was lagging behind the confederation's other professed objectives (West Africa, Feb. 6-12, 1989, p.208).

Thus the Senegambia Confederation entered its eighth year with the security pact which gave birth to it -- Senegal's intervention to restore the Jawara government -- remaining as the main link between the two countries (West Africa, March 6-12, 1989, p.352).

The lack of substantial progress in the economic sphere, as well as other areas, was a clear signal of

President Jawara's unwillingness for Senegambian unity. But he was not alone in his reluctance to see a Senegambian nation carved out of The Gambia and Senegal. The lack of progress also highlighted the divergence of Senegalese and Gambian political elites' interests in and attitudes toward the creation of a unified Senegambian entity.

CHAPTER IV

DIVERGENCE OF POLITICAL ELITES' ATTITUDES

Having analyzed The Senegambia Confederation in terms of its stated objectives, its state of affairs from 1981-89, and its terms of agreement, we may now look at a plethora of views held by Gambian and Senegalese political elites on Senegambian integration.

The bases for the divergence will be given and examined in detail. Senegalese political elites generally favored the establishment of a unitary Senegambian nation-state. They have been quite persistent in their efforts to see The Gambia integrated with Senegal. But Gambian political elites have consistently adopted a strategy of "preserving the last external signs of Gambian national sovereignty" (Africa Research Bulletin, March 15, 1985, p.7891). The views expressed by various Senegalese and Gambian political elites on several dimensions of Senegambian integration will underscore the conflicting perspectives of the former confederal partners on an array of issues.

ELITES' VIEWS

We now begin the discussion by examining the views expressed by various Gambian and Senegalese political elites. Gambians whose views and attitudes consitute the basis of this chapter are: President Jawara; Sheriff M. Dibba, leader of the National Convention Party; Assan M. Camara of the Gambia Peoples' Party; Halifa Sallah, Sam Sarr and Sidia Jatta of the People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism; and Ousman Manjang, a member of the Movement for Justice in Africa--Gambia. These subjects represent a sample of Gambian political elites. All are relatively well-educated and politically sophisticated or motivated. Their views reflect those of other elites--such as intellectuals and businesspersons. In the cases of Dibba and Camara, both of these men had served in the post of Vice President under Jawara.

Also, Dibba received 28 percent of the total votes cast in the 1987 presidential elections in The Gambia, and Camara collected 13 percent. During the 1977 elections, when the NCP first emerged as the major opponent of the PPP, it was accused of tribalism, since the vast majority of its support came from the rural Mandinka ethnic group, particularly those in Baddibu. The fact that President Jawara is himself Mandinka suggested that most of the NCP's support had been instigated more by dissatisfaction with the condition of the Gambian economy than by ethnic antagonism" ("Political Systems," p.378). The GPP was formed just before the 1987

elections. Its leader, Camara, broke away from the ruling PPP after he lost his post as Vice President following the appointment of a new cabinet in 1982. The party does not hold a seat in the Gambian legislature, but Camara enjoys some support among the rural Fulani ethnic group.

The views expressed by President Abdou Diouf and his predecessor, Leopold Senghor, and officials of the Senegal government, as well as the opinions of Senegalese officials of the now defunct Senegambia Confederation constitute the general Senegalese perspective on Senegambian unity. However, the views of other Senegalese political figures are taken into consideration. These include Mamadou Dia of Mouvement Democratique Populaire, Fara Ndiaye of Parti Democratique Senegalais, and Boubacar Gueye of Mouvement Republicain Senegalais. Let us now look at the attitudes of President Jawara, who is also Secretary-General of the Peoples' Progressive Party.

President Jawara

President Jawara (born in 1924), a former veterinarian educated in Britain, has led the PPP since the early 1960s. Jawara has served as leader of The Gambia since 1962, and he remains personally popular across the country.

Jawara: opposition to unity

President Jawara's lack of commitment to the concept of a Senegambian nation or a union of any sort between The Gambia and Senegal was not always as obvious as it is now. It was only his "impotence" during and immediately after the 1981 revolt and the consequent Senegalese military dominance that made Jawara ostensibly change his overall attitude towards Senegambian integration.

An analysis of the views expressed by Jawara during various stages in his political life (from 1964 to the present) will demonstrate the conditions of his attitudes. Once in office as Premier of The Gambia in 1961 (that is before the country became independent), "Jawara showed his willingness to discuss closer relations with Senegal--so long as Gambia's right to independence was recognized" (Welch, p.281). It is noteworthy that he had emphasized a relation that would recognize the independence and sovereignties of both countries, and not moves towards the formation of a federal or unitary state. Jawara did realize that "political independence without economic independence had no lasting value, and that for a nonviable territory such as Gambia, the best solution might be closer ties with Senegal." He was by the same token impressed by the appeals for "African unity and the elimination of artificial frontiers" (Welch, p.281). Since The Gambia was not at this time militarily or politically dominated by Senegal, Jawara was able to negotiate on an equal footing with his

counterpart. In 1964, the two countries presented the matter of association for study by a United Nations team of experts before any decisions were taken. The team presented three recommendations: federation, confederation, or the total integration of The Gambia into Senegal as a province. Debate between the two governments then centered on these options.

During talks with the Senegalese, Jawara "insisted that association could occur only after Gambia had become independent, a decision in which Great Britain and Senegal concurred" (Welch, p.283). With the assurance of independence, The Gambia was able to negotiate with Senegal on a stronger basis.

Before agreeing to association with Senegal, Jawara demanded major safeguards of autonomy to protect The Gambia's distinctive background and identity. In a memorandum published in October 1962, the government of The Gambia, with Jawara at the helm, listed conditions under which association might come about. Gambia would retain control of internal administration, police, civil service, and local government; and its civil and criminal law, as well as educational and professional standards, would be kept; and the close ties between The Gambia, Great Britain, and the Commonwealth would be maintained. The Gambia and Senegal, it was maintained, would share defense, foreign policy (including joint representation overseas), financial

matters, and development (Welch, p.283). What Jawara opted for, and insisted upon, was functional cooperation and not a union of any sort--confederation, federation, or unitary state. He was able to make The Gambia's position loud and clear partly because Senegalese influence over The Gambia was quite minimal.

Jawara's attitudes towards Senegambia were further expressed at the budget session of The Gambia's House of Assembly in January 1964, during which he stated his determination to pursue negotiations with Senegal. But while Jawara's emphasis was on "association," President Senghor talked of something broader. Speaking in different languages during a visit to The Gambia in March 1964, he said: "It is our duty to strengthen these (human) relations which must inevitably end in unity" (Welch, p.285).

The 1964 report by the United Nations on the idea of association between Senegal and The Gambia once again helped to expose Jawara's view of Senegambia. The report stated that:

> ... The supporters of the idea of an association are unquestionably still in the majority in The Gambia as a whole; but many of them, and even more those who lend an attentive ear to the opposition's arguments, feel apprehensive about the proposed association and wonder what its consequences, and more particularly its economic effects, will be on the community and on individuals. ... What seems to trouble most people is the economic aspect of the matter, and this is mainly or wholly responsible for the political attitude adopted by some of them (Welch, p.287).

The same apprehensions prevailed in the Jawara administration, as was evident from the lack of progress in negotiations on economic integration during eight years of confederation. The only change that could be made to the above observation now is that the supporters of integration are clearly in the minority, even though no official polls have been conducted. Supporters include recent immigants from Senegal and a small segment of the Wollof population--particularly those living along The Gambia's borders.

Jawara: preference for alternative frameworks

Jawara's unwillingness to see the two countries unified became apparent once more. As it was left to Jawara and his cabinet to push ahead for some type of accord, they tended to favor the confederal proposal so as to maintain Gambian identity. There was no evidence of discussions among cabinet members on the matter. The confederal state, according to Jawara, would be vested with joint and sovereign responsibility for matters of joint concern, defense and foreign affairs and overseas representation. He said a special relationship between The Gambia and the Commonwealth would be specifically reserved (Welch, p.287).

A series of hard negotiations ensued in 1964 after the UN report, with the government of Senegal suggesting a much greater concentration of power in the joint unit of

government; and The Gambian representatives rejecting that as "beyond what we felt public opinion in The Gambia would accept, and ... not in the best interests of The Gambia" (Welch, p.284). It appeared that concerns for public opinion and The Gambia's security interests were superceded by Jawara's concern for his administration's security during the years of confederation (1981-1989). He had consistently stood for functional cooperation rather than making strides towards the creation of a Senegambian suprastate, thus preserving Gambian autonomy and independence.

But even despite guarantees of autonomy, very little was achieved in the way of integrating the two countries. The grant of international sovereignty to The Gambia (in 1965) meant that Jawara had a vested interest in maintaining undivided control over the country.

Another illustration of Jawara's attitudes was given in an interview with Africa magazine in 1975 on the tenth anniversary of The Gambia's independence. President Jawara responded to speculation on his country's relations with Senegal by saying:

> Well, when we approached our independence, there were, as you may know, many sceptics. There were many who doubted whether The Gambia would be viable as an independent entity. All this has proved to be false. The Gambia has made a success, a reasonable success of its independence. Now, even if The Gambia and Senegal had become one country, the size of their domestic market, which many think is one of the biggest constraints for a

small country, would still be comparatively small ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'"p.12).

Jawara hoped that both Senegal and The Gambia would become members of organizations such as ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), a wish that had been realized. That was another way of saying no unification between "our" two states. As Jawara alluded in the Africa magazine interview:

> I do not see that the solution to the problem of the smallness of our two states in West Africa can be solved by the union of just one or two states such as the merger of Senegal and The Gambia. This would not solve the problem. Their combined resources, their markets, are still comparatively small, and of course there would be greater political and social problems. This situation has arisen in a few cases such as the Mali Federation. I see a much greater chance for success in any union of states in this region if the process of union or federation were to involve four or more countries. In this way, no state would feel it was being dominated ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'" p.13).

These views expressed by Jawara in 1975 completely diverged from his position at the initial stages of confederation, at least as far as his pronounced policy was concerned. But even as late as August 1981, he responded to a question on the possibility of a federation by stating that: "It is very difficult to say at this stage. I have given it as my view that it was time we looked at the possibility of integrating our security forces" (West Africa, August 17, 1981, p.1869).

Jawara had been much more cautious than Diouf in his statements on the nature of confederation, presenting it as a "bilateral agreement" through which the "sister republics" of The Gambia and Senegal agreed to establish much closer cooperation in all fields concerning economic and monetary matters, security and defense. The Gambian leader had been "unequivocal on the subject of sovereignty, emphasizing that the agreement of December 1981 `insisted that each state would maintain its sovereignty and independence within the context of the Senegambia Confederation ...'" ("Unity That Was," p.1634).

Jawara: attitude toward economic integration

Jawara's attitude towards economic integration makes clear his regime's consistent lack of commitment to any form of union with Senegal. He has, even before independence, favored functional cooperation with Senegal. Functional cooperation is, however, something that is almost inevitable between the two countries given their propinquity. Jawara still maintains, though more discretely, that it would not be in the interest of The Gambia to surrender its sovereignty and independence to a supranational authority.

This position is illustrated by The Gambia's refusal to join the West African Monetary Union on Senegal's ticket or as a confederation with Senegal. From Jawara and his government's perspective, single representation and

membership at international organizations for the confederated states was unacceptable since it would amount to a surrender of The Gambia's national sovereignty. And this has been one of Jawara's rationales for not moving forward in the areas of foreign policy coordination and economic integration.

On the slow process of the proposed customs and monetary union, the Gambian President reiterated the fact that studies were being conducted. A report on the tariff structures, trade practices and restrictions, and third-party arrangements of the confederated states was under study for years without any practical outcomes. The two governments never reached agreement. The committee set up to conduct the studies recommended the creation of a free trade area between The Gambia and Senegal, the long-term goal being a customs union. Reports, however, indicated that Jawara was willing to go ahead with customs and monetary union only if Senegal compensated The Gambia. This would be compensation for the higher tariffs The Gambia would have to adopt, resulting in higher prices for Gambian consumers. The idea was rejected by the Senegalese.

Another indication of Jawara's attitude towards "Senegambia" was evident in his speech in 1985 during the launching of The Gambia's Economic Recovery Program. The program was to revive the economy as well as achieve economic growth over the medium term. If Senegambian

economic integration was something Jawara had envisioned, or if it had been something he was committed to, it would at least have been mentioned in his speech. He gave no indication that The Gambia might ease its foreign exchange problems a bit by gaining access to a more convertible currency and eliminating the black market, tasks the Confederation sought to undertake (West Africa, January 20, 1986, p.122).

Jawara: Perceptions of The Senegalese and Integration

As indicated earlier, Senegal was the more eager partner for unification; and it continued to press on towards not only confederation but a unitary state. A further examination of statements made by Senegambian leaders will indicate that they were poles apart on the issues involved. Jawara had been inclined to accept delays as inevitable. Diouf was adamant that union should proceed as quickly as possible, stating that "[t]he Senegambian nation is constructing itself and shall continue to be constructed without a break, or without seam..." ("Unity That Was," p.1634). And as Diouf was making statements emphasizing that the confederation had done little to achieve its purpose of integrating the two countries, Jawara said that the two states had always had divergent opinions on its objectives ("Senegal: Jawara's Riposte," p.1578).

In a September 1989 interview with a Gambian reporter after the Confederation was frozen, President Jawara said it

was clear that The Gambia and Senegal differed fundamentally on what the objectives of the Confederation should be.

Senegal, it then appeared to Jawara, saw confederation as a "first step, only a first step, towards a closer integration of the two states, probably leading to a federation and ultimately a unitary state. The Gambia, he said, saw the Confederation as "an expression of the very special relationship existing between the two countries," which was reflected in Clause Two of the Confederation Agreement ("Diouf Calls For Freezing," p.1).

Jawara reportedly pointed out that under the confederation agreement each state maintained its independence and sovereignty. He added that the security and defense arrangements were designed to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the two states.

The Gambian president noted that, in the context of The Gambia's constitution, that was as far as the government could go. According to President Jawara, "The Gambia cannot go beyond this form of association ... without seeking the mandate of the Gambian people through a referendum, as clearly defined in the ... constitution of the country" ("Diouf Calls For Freezing, p.8).

The Senegalese President said, however, that The Gambia had never played the game right, having dragged its feet as regards the economic and monetary union much-wanted by Senegal. Jawara responded to that topic by indicating "that

there was no need to hurry" ("Senegal: Herculean Tasks," p.1551).

Pundits and laypersons alike had also indicated that the confederation meant different things to the confederal partners. From the Senegalese perspective, "it was meant to be a first step towards a complete union of the two countries, whilst [Gambian] leaders saw it merely as a marriage of convenience and fulfilling a pre-condition to the Senegalese intervention in restoring the regime back to power after having been almost completely uprooted by Kukoi's gang" (The Nation, Sept. 2, 1989).

Jawara's overall perceptions

Jawara's propaganda for Senegambian unity placed increasing emphasis on the ethnic similarities of Senegal and The Gambia, and on the notion that integrating the two states would enhance Pan-Africanist ideals by alleviating one of the oddities of the partition of Africa. President Jawara reiterated these bases of Senegambian unity during his annual "meet-the-farmers" tours across the country and through statements sent to "The Gambia News Bulletin" or broadcast over Radio Gambia from 1981 to 1989.

The question to be answered is: How could Jawara's stance on integration between The Gambia and Senegal be suddenly revolutionized in the aftermath of the 1981 revolt in The Gambia? In fact, Jawara essentially held to the same

views, but the growth of Senegalese influence from the 1981 revolt to the 1989 break-up of the Confederation changed the rules of the game. From 1981 to the time the Confederation failed in 1989, he was not free to express views on Senegambian relations that would have been perceived in a negative light from a Senegalese perspective; after all, he must have been concerned about remaining "secure" under the arms of Senegalese troops. He had entangled himself and the country in what a West Africa magazine article called "A Marriage of Confusion" (Manjang, p.2307).

A brief analysis of some aspects of the military, economic and political climate of Senegambian confederal relations will help us find answers to the previously raised issue of factors responsible for Jawara's ostensible change in attitude towards integration.

President Jawara felt he owed credit to the Senegalese for his return to power in August 1981, after being temporarily deposed by a civilian-led revolt. A number of Senegalese soldiers were killed in the process, and Jawara began to feel obligated to Senegal. Senegalese military presence in The Gambia and overt diplomatic pressures from Dakar apparently forced Jawara and his administration to restate their position on relations with Senegal. The Senegalese President made several statements over Radio Senegal underscoring the need for Senegambian unity and the costs (referring to more "internal subversion") the Gambian

government could pay for not working towards this goal. During the years of confederation, the government radio station, State House, Banjul International Airport, and other strategic points within the country were being "secured" by Senegalese troops; and the so-called Confederal Army stationed in The Gambia was dominated by them. A number of Jawara's bodyguards were Senegalese, but they did not travel with him abroad. There had been unconfirmed reports of protests by Senegalese guards to the fact that Jawara did not travel with them to foreign countries.

It is against this backdrop of increased Senegalese military presence in The Gambia and the consequent political power it brought for Senegal that we should view Gambian leaders' pronounced policy towards relations with their neighbor. The foot-dragging pace of integration under the Senegambia Confederation was said to be due to "a change of heart in Banjul, ...a stubborn attitude on the part of the Gambia government and a deliberate misreading of the original agreements signed at Kaur," the terms of which had been subject to different interpretations by both sides ("Unity That Was," p.1634). The Gambia's "foot-dragging" involved refusal to compromise on crucial matters and deliberate attempts to prolong the resolution of issues or to present unacceptable propositions to the Senegalese. This Senegalese allegation underscored the divergence of attitudes between Gambian and Senegalese political elites.

OPPOSITION POLITICAL ELITES

Now that we have uncovered Jawara's views on various integration issues and how these diverge from those of Senegalese authorities, we may now turn to the views of other political elites, specifically those in the opposition. Political elites examined in this part of the study include: Ousman Manjang of the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA); and Halifa Sallah, Sidia Jatta, and Sam Sarr of the Peoples' Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS). They display a serious and rare understanding of the issues at stake in Senegambia. They had vehemently made their positions known on Senegambian relations through publications and, in the case of PDOIS leaders, through public debates.

Leaders of the People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism

Sallah, Sarr and Jatta: opposition to Senegambian unity

The leadership of PDOIS, or the People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism, did not make any secret of its stance on the Senegambia issue, as could be evidenced from the party's programs. PDOIS was formed in August 1986. And the party aims "to safeguard the economic and political independence of The Gambia so that the nation and the Gambian people could live in equality and peace with

all other nations and peoples." PDOIS's support is based in the urban areas, where it contested in five constituencies in 1987 without winning a seat. A statement from the party after its creation in 1986 pointed to "the fact that the PPP has compromised the sovereignty of The Gambia by negotiating an unequal relationship between The Gambia and Senegal."

Two of the party's leaders, Halifa Sallah and Sam Sarr, were detained without trial by the PPP government after the 1981 revolt for allegedly running an unlawful society and publishing an underground newspaper--"The Voice of The Future" (West Africa, Aug. 25, 1986, p.1803). Sallah was an employee of the social welfare department and he regularly broadcast socially-oriented programs over the government radio station up to the 1981 revolt. Sarr was a secondary/high school teacher; while Sidia Jatta, another PDOIS leader, was a senior curriculum development officer who resigned his post in 1987 in protest of the government's policies.

Sallah and Sarr were adamantly opposed to the "Marriage of Confusion" between Senegal and The Gambia and are against any form of union which would entail the loss of Gambian sovereignty. The two wrote in a party publication that the Senegalese and Gambian peoples can only create "a strong and unbreakable bond of friendship" if their relation is "based on equality and respect for each other's sovereignty, political independence and right to self-determination"

(Sallah, p.14). Sallah stated that "Gambians wish to live in peace and friendship with all peoples and nations who respect their sovereignty and political independence and recognize the territorial integrity of their country." He said Gambians do not wish to dominate or be dominated (Sallah, p.22-23).

Expressing general opposition to the Senegambia Confederation, Sallah said the stall in negotiations was history trapping President Diouf until "true sons and daughters of this nation could emerge to enlighten our people." Abdou Diouf did manage to outwit our old brand of politicians, he added, but he had "neither outwitted history nor the Constitution of The Republic of The Gambia. The unconstitutionality of his seemingly lawful protocols now stand exposed" (Sallah and Sarr, p.6).

PDOIS leaders: opposition to confederal framework

For Sallah, a "Sene-Gambia Nation" existed only "in the mind and mouth" of Senegalese President Abdou Diouf. He further stated that "a `Sene-Gambia Nation' is certainly nonexistent nor can it be created without a referendum behind the back of the Gambian people" (Sallah, pp.11-12).

Sallah has expounded on his position in relation to Senegambia and the basis for his opposition to the present confederal framework. From the denial of the existence of "Senegambia" as a nation, he has argued that the relation

between The Gambia and Senegal was not one based on "the mutual recognition of the sovereign equality and political independence of both states." Instead, the Confederation was a step towards what he considered "the absorption, assimilation, integration, amalgamation or annexation of The Gambia into a larger Senegambia nation" (Sallah, pp.11-12).

Another PDOIS leader, Sidia Jatta, together with Sallah, held a press conference on October 18, 1986 at which they "affirmed that the agreement establishing the Senegambia Confederation and the protocols connected with them have violated the Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia" ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'" p.6). Sallah and Jatta stated that the protocol on defense, which gave power to the President of Senegal to declare a state of emergency in The Gambia, was in contravention of The Gambia's constitution. This was equated with giving a foreign power the mandate to order Gambians around. Sallah and Sarr added:

> One thing should be clear to [President Diouf], that if he fakes an invasion of our country and use (sic) it as a pretext to declare a state of alert in our country, we will defy his pronouncements. We will be at the forefront of those Gambians who will tell him that Gambians are an independent and dignified people who will not cring or cower before any foreign power. We will tell him that we Gambians prefer death than to be forced under the allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state. We will be the first to declare that we have not given any foreign power the mandate to declare a state of alert in our country (Sallah and Sarr, p.7).

What this alludes to is the resistance of the political elites in question--Sallah, Sarr and Jatta--to any acts by the governments of The Gambia and Senegal which would legitimize a supranational authority or institution for the two countries. They were not committed to the idea of granting the Senegalese President, who was also President of the Confederation, the powers to declare a state of emergency in The Gambia.

Sallah, Sarr and Jatta also rejected the Senegambian Confederation for what they saw as its reduction of the Gambian President to a figurehead. They pointed out that the Gambian President will never act as President of the Confederation since Senegal can never be without a President. PDOIS's leaders emphasized that "[e]ven if the President of Senegal travels abroad, there will be someone acting as President in his stead" ("PDOIS vs. `The Gambia Times,'" p.14). According to the confederal agreement, the President of Senegal shall be President of the Confederation and the Gambian President shall be its Vice President.

It is also quite obvious that PDOIS leaders not only challenged the constitutionality and equality of the Confederation, but they also vehemently denied the existence of a "Senegambian" identity.

Sallah and Sarr: opposition to economic integration

On Senegambian economic integration, PDOIS's Sallah and Sarr said Senegal had been unable to pay her external debts, and her deficit had been mounting for years. Under such a situation, we could not expect her to save The Gambia from economic crisis. The two contended that "if the Senegalese authorities were realistic they would not call for an economic union which obviously will not solve the problems of the two countries..." Sallah and Sarr believed that an economic union may "lead to political tensions between the two countries as peoples' hardships intensify ..." (Sallah and Sarr, p.8).

The potential for conflict resulting from an unsuccessful economic union may partly be responsible for Gambian authorities' stalling of negotiations on monetary union and economic integration. A climate of political instability, rising from such a union, would not be favorable for the economic development or peaceful co-existence of the two countries. As "economic union fails to meet the aspirations of the people, as public outcry is raised against the hardships, the Senegalese government would have to become repressive, which will naturally give rise to National Resistance," according to Sallah and Sarr (Sallah and Sarr, p.8).

In general, then, PDOIS was strongly opposed to the Senegambia Confederation and did not subscribe to the existence of "Senegambia." The party's leaders emphasized

that the Gambian people wish to live in peace and friendship with the Senegalese, but would resist any attempts to usurp Gambian sovereignty and political independence.

Sallah and Sarr: attitudes toward security arrangements

Sallah pointed to several reasons for lack of commitment to the integration of The Gambia with Senegal by looking at various dimensions of the process. It was his contention that the Senegalese President "had no lawful ground to intervene" in the 1981 revolt in The Gambia. The mutual defense agreement which was signed in 1965 between the two countries addresses "external security and defence" (Sallah, p.14). An excerpt from the Agreement reads:

> The Government of The Gambia and the Government of the Republic of Senegal, pending the institution of a closer association between The Gambia and Senegal, aware of the responsibilities incumbent upon them regarding the maintenance of peace as declared in the charter of the United Nations, desirious of setting out their Common Approach to closer cooperation in matters of External Security and Defence, have agreed on the following:
>
> ARTICLE 1: The Government of The Gambia and The Government of the Republic of Senegal will, on request by either side, help and assist each other to secure their External Security and Defence against any form of threat (1965 Defence Agreement).

PDOIS's Sallah, Sarr and Jatta pointed out that the Agreement talks of mutual assistance if any one country is threatened by an external or foreign force or power. Since

there was no "concrete proof of foreign intervention in the launching of the coup," there was also "no legal justification" for Senegalese involvement. The Jawara administration failed to give any proof of foreign involvement in the revolt, thus giving Senegalese troops the image of an occupation force ("Swaebou Conateh vs. PDOIS," p.38).

Sallah and Sarr: perceptions of the confederal leader

The Confederal President came under strong attack by Sallah. He said there was a tendency in Senegal to disregard Gambia's political independence and sovereignty in violation of the confederal agreement. A speech by Abdou Diouf was quoted to substantiate this allegation. Diouf reportedly said in a speech to the Gambian and Senegalese peoples that:

> "The process is irreversible and the Senegambian nation is constructing itself and shall continue to be constructed without a break nor without seam, it has at its service men of service and courage, and also a hard working youth and one of faith and truth also." (Sallah, pp.11-12).

It is also Sallah's contention that by uttering certain statements, President Diouf had interfered in the domestic affairs of The Gambia. Diouf, by stating that: "It is therefore imperative that during 1985, we move faster with ... negotiations, than we had done in 1984. We must go forward for we can no longer go back ..." had indeed

compelled representatives of The Gambia to hasten the ratification of agreements and protocols (Sallah, p.14). Resentment of Senegambia was not limited to utterances made by the Confederal President.

Movement for Justice in Africa's Manjang

Let us now turn to the views expressed by MOJA's Ousman Manjang on the Senegambia Confederation and on moves towards unifying The Gambia and Senegal. Founded in 1979, the Movement for Justice in Africa--Gambia aims to change "what it describes as a situation where `the whole wealth of the country is at the disposal of the political and administrative ruling clique.'" It alleged nepotism, corruption, and patronage at the top, shareholding in foreign companies by government officials and profitable collaboration in the development of tourism to the detriment of local cultures. MOJA alleged political intimidation and increasing repression. It also aims to work for African unity. (West Africa, Nov.3, 1980, p.2172).

The movement was, however, banned in October 1980 when President Jawara called in Senegalese troops to help keep order in The Gambia after allegations of a Libyan attempt to destabilize the country. Six MOJA members were arrested and charged with possessing "weapons (decorative bows and arrows and hunting cartridges) and belonging to an illegal organization (it was declared illegal hours before their arrest)"

(West Africa, Aug.3, 1981, p.1748). A long trial of the members ensued, and it was not until the 1981 revolt that some of them were able to flee into exile in Europe.

Manjang: Views on Senegambia's Historical Past

As stated earlier, Manjang wrote strongly against the Confederation in 1986, attacking it from its roots.

Official reference to a "common historical past" and claims that Senegal and The Gambia had belonged to a single pre-colonial state are refuted by Manjang as wrong and propagandistic. He traced the history of Senegambia, pointing out that a "host of medium-sized successor states that were normally independent" but that may have been related through economic exchanges and family ties had coexisted in the region (Manjang, Part II, p.2358).

> Therefore, European partitioning of the Senegambian region cannot be accurately termed "balkanisation". The style of colonial rule certainly brought divisions, but they only deepened the divisions that were already there. The pre-colonial politics of the Senegambian region ... lends little legitimacy to the pseudo-historical propaganda of the confederal authorities. Many, if not most, of the peoples had never coexisted together within any statal or political formation before European colonial conquest (Manjang, Part II, pp.2358-2359).

Manjang: opposition to unity

These statements underscored Manjang's disapproval of the Senegambia Confederation, and of the rationale given by the

confederal authorities for its creation. He may have been against the Confederation, but not necessarily against Pan-Africanism, which the architects of the Confederation claimed to be advancing. Gambians may feel "that people across the border are their brothers and sisters and they may know that African unity is worth having, but they cannot reasonably be expected to sacrifice all of the little they have in the name of counterfeit `Pan-Africanism'" (Manjang, Part II, pp.2358-2359). This is an expression of unwillingness on Manjang's part to see The Gambia's sovereignty surrendered to a supranational Senegambian authority in the pursuit of "Pan-Africanist" ideals.

Manjang: perceptions of the confederal framework

MOJA's Manjang also stated that the Confederation is the "expensive price President Jawara had to pay for the restoration of his regime," and Senegalese intervention was viewed as an expansionist expedition rather than a mission to protect The Gambia from external threat. Senegambia cannot be truly unified on this basis or on the ground of a common historical past. According to Manjang, "their true unification can only be realised, not out of the sentimental appeal of the past, but out of their collective struggles against the common odds of the present." A true Senegambian union, he contended, cannot come about through the enforced amalgamation of two neocolonial states, or the

pseudo-historical pronouncements of official propaganda (Manjang, Part II, pp. 2358-2359).

"Confederation" in the Senegambian context is a word "conjured up" by Jawara "more because of its ambiguity than its exactitude but one that served to appease the greedy expansionism of the Senegalese while keeping at bay, even if only for a while, the formidable menace of immediate annexation" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310). This theory, expressed by Manjang, became a widely held belief, even among those in the Jawara administration.

Manjang: perceptions of Senegal

On the question of "endless discord" between the confederal states, Manjang stated that indeed the confederal accord was merely a desperate ad hoc arrangement made out of the stalemated talks between two hopelessly discordant partners. It was the Senegalese, he contended, who appeared to be the ones striving for speedier implementation of the process while Gambians opted for a strategy of "rather reluctant gradualism" (Manjang, Part I, p.2310). The concept of "reluctant gradualism" was something most Gambian supporters of closer relations with Senegal would opt for, instead of Senegal's strategy of immediate unification.

The National Convention Party's Dibba; and Camara of the Gambia People's Party

Reticence on Senegambia

Two other opposition parties had been reticent on the issue of integration and on the whole area of Senegambian politics. Their positions were not as explicit as those of PDOIS and MOJA. The two, the National Convention Party (NCP) and the Gambia Peoples' Party (GPP), are breakaway factions from the ruling Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP). And both Sheriff Dibba of NCP and GPP's Assan Musa Camara once held the post of Vice President under President Jawara. In fact, Camara was The Gambia's Acting President during the 1981 revolt and he had participated in drawing up support for the Confederation Agreement.

Camara and Dibba had not spoken out strongly on the Senegambia issue. Camara did not include Senegambia in his political agenda partly because of his past association with the Confederation. Political pundits went to the extent of labelling the GPP's programs as a carbon copy of the PPP's.

The NCP leader also failed to make any mention of the Confederation in a statement on the occasion of the Party's eleventh anniversary in 1986; no word on Senegambia was uttered in a statement released by the Party demanding Jawara's resignation before the 1987 general elections; and the issue was left out in a statement broadcast to the

Gambian nation on February 27, 1987 (just before the general elections) by Sheriff Dibba. Though the reasons behind Dibba's reticence on Senegambia are not clear, it will be important to point out that he was detained for several months by the Jawara administration in 1981-82 for alleged complicity in the 1981 revolt. He was released without any charges being brought against him. This may explain why he did not express his political convictions. But not making Senegambia an issue could also be a strategy of demeaning its political significance to Gambian political elites.

One could also infer from Dibba and Camara's reticence that either they were not essentially opposed to Jawara's foot-dragging strategy, or for fear of retribution, they were maintaining a degree of unpredictability on the issue. Unpredictability may have ensured a degree of Senegalese non-intervention in The Gambia's internal political struggles, especially when Senegal had no natural allies. Dibba and Camara did not have enough clout to swing support for Senegambian unity, and it was unlikely that they could have been "bought" to assume such a role. But basically, we could conclude that the two do not favor the unification or complete integration of The Gambia with Senegal, at least under the current atmosphere.

Gambian opposition leaders are important in that they represent significant segments of Gambian society, and their views largely reflect those of their party compatriots. And the discussion on their views serves to show that there is

unity on Senegambian integration across parties and ideological orientations.

Other Gambian groups had not spoken out on the issue, but their positions were reflected by those of other elites discussed here. Businesspersons, for example, generally did not support any arrangement that would culminate in the cessation of their lucrative smuggling trade. The Gambian President's father-in-law, the late Alhaji Momodou Musa Njie, was the leading businessperson in the country. His influence on the Gambian government was not a secret, and his enterprise gained greatly from re-exporting commodities to Senegal and other neighboring countries. Njie was also an important benefactor for the ruling People's Progressive Party, contributing large amounts of money into political campaigns. Such political influence by businesspersons in The Gambia was not uncommon, and due to the country's small market, they had vested interests in maintaining unfettered and profitable access to Senegalese and other markets. Senegambian unity, from their perspective, would have assured them of access to Senegalese consumers, but it would have reduced their incentives.

SENEGALESE ELITES

As indicated earlier, the overall Senegalese perspective on Senegambian unity is found in statements by

government leaders and Senegalese officials of the now defunct confederation.

Government and Parti Socialiste Leaders

First, some background information on the government and the ruling Parti Socialiste (PS). PS practices a brand of African socialism combining private sector with nationalized economic development. It has governed Senegal since independence and remains "a curious amalgam of patron networks cutting across a formal territorial hierarchy of committees. ...Ruling party membership claims have generally been about one-third of registered voters" ("Political Systems," p.956 & 959). In the National Assembly elections of 1988, PS gained an overwhelming majority, taking 111 of the 120 seats in the Assembly.

From the Senegalese government and PS point of view, "the main aim of the Confederation was to repair the damage done by colonisation which separated one entity into two separate countries" (West Africa, March 6-12, 1989, p.352). Pierre Diouf, Senegalese Secretary-General of the Confederation, added that the main goal was "to bring Senegal and The Gambia closer. They are part of the same geographical region" (West Africa March 6-12, 1989, p.352).

Diouf: perceptions of intervention and security issues

In various addresses to the Senegalese and Gambian peoples, President Diouf of Senegal indicated that the Senegalese forces had intervened in The Gambia "at the request of The Gambia's legitimate authorities and by virtue of agreements duly negotiated" in order to "ensure the security of our own people as well as respect our international obligations" ("Restablising The Gambia," p.1806). Diouf added that opposition parties who had condemned the intervention were seriously endangering democracy ("Restablising The Gambia," p.1806).

President Diouf said the consequences of an unfriendly government in The Gambia would be detrimental for Senegal: the stability of the Senegalese government and economic system would be threatened. He explained that "[y]ou just have to look at a map to be aware that both countries are entangled" ("We have Learnt A Useful Lesson," p.17; Coppa, p.60).

Senegalese authorities/ruling party elites' overall views

Senegalese authorities' positions on various dimensions of Senegambian integration have been treated within the discussion on President Jawara's views. The Senegalese authorities and elites within the ruling Parti Socialiste favored organic union between their country and The Gambia; there was also a demand for The Gambia to join the West

African Monetary Union on Senegal's ticket or as a confederation with Senegal--which the Gambians refused to accept; Diouf was also adamant that Senegambian unity should proceed as quickly as possible; and confederation was seen as a "first step, only a first step, towards a closer integration" of The Gambia and Senegal, probably leading to a federation and ultimately a unitary state ("Diouf Calls For Freezing," p.1). Senegalese authorities also thought that The Gambia had never played the game right, having dragged its feet as regards the economic and monetary union much wanted by Senegal ("Senegal: Herculean Tasks," p.1551).

SENEGALESE OPPOSITION LEADERS

Some Senegalese elites, however, had ambivalent attitudes towards the Senegambia Confederation and the issue of unifying The Gambia with Senegal.

Mamadou Dia of Mouvement Democratique Populaire

Mamadou Dia, leader of the opposition Mouvement Democratique Populaire, condemned the confederation and opposed moves to unify The Gambia with Senegal on various grounds. Dia (born in 1910) was Senegal's Prime Minister from 1960-1962 when he came to a showdown with President Senghor, resulting in the elimination of the prime ministership. Dia was imprisoned for attempting to overthrow the government, and kept in jail from 1963-1974. His party, MDP, was registered in 1981.

MDP has a flexible African Socialist platform and its strength is in Dakar and Dia's northern homeland in the Senegal River Basin ("Political Systems," p.959).

According to Dia, Senegal had "too much to do for its internal recovery for the integration of its peripheral regions, Casamance in particular, to permit itself to integrate another region" (Bentsi-Enchill, p.80). He explained that both countries had serious problems and that there was no sense in compounding these through integration. He vowed to vote against confederation and encourage others to do the same if there was a referendum.

Dia's main concern was that the relationship "clearly started on the wrong foot: a confederation that [was] decided without the people, the populations concerned, is a bad beginning" (Bentsi-Enchill, p.79). He noted the difficulties resulting from the different colonial experiences of The Gambia and Senegal and the fact that the confederation came about as a consequence of "Senegalese aggression. It is a veritable annexation. You must call a cat a cat" (Bentsi-Enchill, p.80). Dia, who has no known link with The Gambia, did not take this position because he was essentially opposed to Senegambian integration but due to the fact that the Senegalese and Gambian peoples were not consulted. He was also concerned that the process came about as a consequence of "Senegalese aggression" in The Gambia.

Fara Ndiaye of Parti Democratique Senegalais

The deputy leader of the Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS), Fara Ndiaye, echoed some of Dia's views, but she expressed support for Senegambian integration in the spirit of African unity. According to party officials, its is their principle "to encourage all efforts towards African unity, regional unity, and so forth." But the fact that the Confederation resulted from the Senegalese military intervention created a problem from their perspective (Bentsi-Enchill, p.81).

PDS, a centrist labor party, was founded by lawyer Abdoulaye Wade in 1974. It was the only party to mount a presidentical campaign in 1978--when it won 17.7 percent of the vote, and the only one to win Assembly seats (eighteen). The party won 5 out of 120 seats in the 1988 elections. PDS is ideologically similar to the African socialism of the ruling party, yet it is opposed to nationalization ("Political Systems," p.959). PDS's greatest support base was in urban areas and the Casamance.

PDS's Ndiaye explained that the circumstances in which the confederation took place were not favorable; and The Gambia had been under military occupation. She added that the Senegambia Confederation was "being constructed on shifting sand" and that Senegal had to continue "acting as a gendarme to make sure that Gambians remain tranquil" (Bentsi-Enchill, p.81).

Both Dia and Ndiaye expressed pessimism about the future of the confederation; and their statements may now seem to have been prophecies. Dia stated that "nothing can be expected from such a confederation, built in that way on such foundations. It cannot have much of a future because I don't think one can maintain a political union by force, eternally by force" (Bentsi-Enchill, p.80).

Mouvement Republicain Senegalais (MRS)

The conservative MRS (Senegalese Republican Movement) led by Boubacar Gueye said the Senegalese government used the putsch in The Gambia and its "illegal" intervention in that country as an opportunity to call for a Senegambia merger. MRS is a religious (Islamic) traditionalist party founded in 1978. The party viewed renewed calls for a merger--"which given the relative sizes of the two countries, would amount to annexation with President Jawara as Vice President of a region"--as illegal and aggressive (Doyle, p.1917).

WHY THE DIVERGENCE?

The divergence of views on Senegambian unity persisted, and the move towards closer cooperation between the two countries was remarkably slow despite the confederal arrangements. What are some of the underlying factors of this state of affairs?

First, the Senegalese government wanted the confederation to be more than ornamental; in effect, it wanted to control The Gambia. In view of their vested political interests, "The Gambia's rulers want to go on running their own show," and political and economic union would deprive them of that opportunity (The Economist, Aug. 26 - Sept. 1, 1989, p.32).

Also, some of the divergence in stances towards Senegambian integration is related to elite orientations. As mentioned earlier, elites occupy a crucial position in both The Gambia and Senegal. The major elites in the two countries--political, bureaucratic, intellectual, economic, social--to a large extent reflect modes of thought, values and behavior of their British and French counterparts. The attitudes and values of the major elites within each country are similar. Hence, a focus on political elites gives us an understanding of the perspectives of other elites. The Gambians, for instance, seem to be proud of what they consider their British heritage and deride the ways of the "black Frenchmen" across the border in Senegal (Senghor, p.21). Senghor explained that "[a]ny talk of giving up their adopted way of life [is] repugnant to them. Such psychological predispositions seeped through to the other layers of society..." (Senghor, p.21). The "Gallicized Senegalese elite" also shared similar feelings about their Anglicized compatriots in The Gambia (Senghor, p.21).

France is still Senegal's most important trading partner and large numbers of Senegalese students study in France. The Gambia, on the other hand, does not have a university and many qualified Gambians are sent to Britain for higher education. Britain is also The Gambia's leading trading partner.

Senghor contends that changes in the composition of these elites and in the sociocultural environments have resulted in shifts in elite orientations and social distance (Senghor, p.21). This author, however, takes the view that the "shifts in elite orientations and social distance" have not been substantial enough to create the kind of climate conducive to Senegambian unity. Despite the higher level and frequency of formal interaction between Gambian and Senegalese elites, this has not led to Senegambian unity. It is one thing to have increased contacts between Gambian and Senegalese elites; and willingly shifting authority to a supranational institution is another matter.

There is also an ethnic factor involved in the existence of separate elites with separate interests in Senegambia despite the fact that the same ethnic groups inhabit the two states in the region. The ordinary Gambian citizen's response to the idea of a Senegambia Confederation "is determined by certain ethnic... undercurrents which Gambians themselves find hard to voice in public" ("Unity That Was," p.1634). Political power in The Gambia rests

squarely, as it has since 1962, with the country's 400,000 Mandinka. The ruling Peoples' Progressive Party and the leading opposition party, the National Convention Party, are multi-ethnic but dominated by Mandinka. For the Mandinka, integration with Senegal would be suicide, leading to a dismantling of their long grip on power. The less-influential PDOIS is urban-based and dominated by the non-Mandinka, but its leaders have spoken strongly against Senegambian integration. PDOIS appeared to be nationalist in its orientation.

The Wollof, who have taken good advantage of Western education and now command a place in business and the civil service, have found themselves in competition with the Mandinka. The Wollof of The Gambia comprise the largest group in Banjul and its environs, and these were the places that first benefitted from Western education and training. The Mandinka live largely in the rural areas, where Western education, particularly for women, was scorned for a long time. This limited their access to civil service positions and made them relatively less competitive for government jobs. But the Mandinka's numerical superiority has paid off for them in The Gambia's one-person-one-vote national elections--they have governed the country since the early 1960s. Some Gambian Wollof see Senegambian unity as a means of guaranteeing Wollof dominance in the region. The Wollof comprise the single largest ethnic group in the Senegambia

area. The Wollof dominate politics in the much-larger Senegal. Unification will be favorable to the Wollof since it will guarantee their dominance in Senegambia. Wollof in The Gambia see "`brotherhood' [with the Senegal Wollof], despite the French language, as a buffer against their total eclipse in the rising tide of the professional, business and intellectual Mandinka in a sovereign Gambia" ("Unity That Was," p.1634).

There were also economic reasons for the stand-off on integration. Gambians have always feared that Senegal is bent on assuming a dominant role in any kind of partnership, and this had been sufficient to lead to divergences in their policies (Ezenwe, p.119). Furthermore, the Gambians had reservations about the economic benefits of integration with Senegal. In the context of Senegal's more developed and export-oriented industrial sector, Gambians felt that the "Senegalese would require the abolition of their cheap import policy and the subsequent ending of the clandestine trade with Senegal" (Ezenwe, p.119). The trade is of concern to both economic and political elites in The Gambia because it is profitable for businesspersons and it is a source of revenue for the state.

The Gambia also rejected recommendations for a transnational free-trade area with quotas, based on the fear that integration might not create a sufficient increase in trade and economic activity in The Gambia to accommodate the

consequent extra administration costs and loss of revenue through tariff cuts. For Senegalese elites, "any form of economic association that would not lead ultimately to full integration of The Gambia [seemed] out of the question" (Ezenwe, p.117).

We could therefore conclude from the evidence that the unconditional acceptance of the idea of confederation was the price the Gambia government paid for the Senegalese political support and military intervention that restored the Jawara regime in The Gambia. Senegambia was "based on expediency rather than free choice" (Ezenwe, p.120). And the Senegalese "fear that, when the dust settles, the Gambians may wish to reassert their own political sovereignty" became a reality in August 1989. This matter and the aftermath of the break-up of the Senegambia Confederation will be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Until the dismantling of the Senegambia Confederation in September 1989, "a complex of external and internal pressures" were said to be "leading to a gradual narrowing of divergencies in inherited systems of government and administration" (Senghor, p.16). But other "background features" weakened the potentialities of Senegambian integration (Senghor, p.5), and the gap between the Senegambian dream and reality widened as the Confederation collapsed. This concluding chapter is therefore a discussion of the dilemmas of Senegambian integration within the context of the failed confederation. How has the conflict between national sovereignty and the desire for unity inhibited integration? What are the prospects of Senegambian unity in view of the 1989 fiasco? An examination of events leading to the dissolution of the confederation and its aftermath will help answer these questions. Actions taken by the former confederal partners and statements made by Gambian and Senegalese leaders after the break-up of the confederation will also give insight into the likelihood of a future Senegambian nation-state.

THE CONFEDERATION: A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

The integrative process under the Senegambia Confederation had been rather slow. Eight years after the confederation was created, it had hardly moved in many crucial areas. A Confederal Parliament was created and a Council of Ministers constituted to "strengthen the unity" of the two countries' defense and their economies and to coordinate their policies in other fields. But the institutions lacked intiative and failed to make progress due to the conflicting attitudes of the confederal partners. Parliamentary meetings were merely of symbolic significance. In the area of security, a confederal army was set up to strengthen the unity of The Gambia and Senegal's defense. The Confederal Army, however, was permanently stationed in The Gambia, and Senegalese troops in that country continued to be viewed as occupation forces.

It is in the economic dimension of integration that the least progress was made. Studies on economic integration were conducted and a "Report on the Tariff Structures, Trade Practices, Trade Practices and Restrictions, and Third Party Arrangements" was released. Nevertheless, the objective of harmonizing the economies of The Gambia and Senegal into one functioning unit benefitting both countries was not achieved. The two states continued to have separate currencies; free trade in local products was not agreed to; a peanut price war ensued between the confederal partners; and the smuggling of goods into Senegal continued unabated.

There was also chaos and confusion in the area of external relations. The Senegambia Confederation was to make it possible for Senegal and The Gambia to coordinate policy in their international relations--and to devise similar policies through consultation. But The Gambia's resumption of ties with Libya in 1985 well before the Senegalese contemplated such action, was one example of the lack of consultation in foreign affairs. Also, The Gambia sought military aid from Britain in spite of strong Senegalese dissuasion.

However, relatively significant progress was made in the sphere of telecommunications. The Confederation's goal was to plan the development of telecommunications networks within Senegambia; and a Confederal Telecommuniactions Commission was set up to facilitate this. The confederation established phone lines between Basse in The Gambia and the Senegalese town of Wellingara; and the telecommunications systems of the two countries were subsequently harmonized.

Very little movement was made in the information field. The confederal partners had hoped to coordinate policy in the field of information and to exchange information. In this regard, a Confederal Information Commission was constituted and some radio programs were produced jointly by Radio Gambia and Radio Senegal. The media, however, were not in tune with each other; there was very little exchange of information; and programming over Senegalese television

continued to be done primarily in French and Wolof. (The Gambia does not have any television stations, and English, Mandinka, and Wollof are the major languages.)

DISMANTLING OF THE SENEGAMBIA CONFEDERATION

The "paper-thin" nature of the accords which confederated The Gambia with Senegal was brought into focus with the August 1989 order to pull out Senegalese troops from their confederal posts in The Gambia. From the signing of the Kaur Declaration in 1981, "the hitherto cordial relations between [Presidents Jawara and Diouf] progressively [became] strained to the point where only skilled management kept the tensions in check. But patience ... finally snapped. The erstwhile confederation is no more" ("Unity That Was," p.1634).

In addition to the slow pace of integration discussed here, the two leaders' divergent views became apparent. It became clear to most Senegambians that their leaders were "poles apart on their understanding of the issues involved. Jawara [was] inclined to accept delays as inevitable. Diouf [was] adamant that union should proceed as quickly as possible" ("Unity That Was," p.1634).

The demise of the confederation came as a surprise to most observers of politics in the region. Just a month earlier (July 1989), the confederal parliament unanimously adopted the 1989/90 confederal budget, despite the

underlying grievances. According to news accounts, the falling-out began when the Gambian president wrote a letter to his Senegalese counterpart saying, in substance, that it was unfair for Senegal to permanently hold the presidency of the confederation. President Jawara later confirmed through several interviews that he had made the request ("A Shotgun Wedding Ends," p.1454). This controversy underscored the point made earlier that the Senegambia Confederation Agreement was lopsided in favor of Senegal. President Jawara was under duress and accepted the accords primarily to secure Senegalese military support for the re-establishment of his regime. Jawara knew before signing the agreement that the post of confederal president was reserved for the Senegalese; and the request for the rotation of the presidency showed his lack of commitment to the confederation. Jawara's request was a deliberate attempt to derail the confederation.

> On the face of it, the rotation of the presidency might have a pleasing symmetry. But it is absolutely inconceivable that the Senegalese could accept it, and Sir Dawda must have known this as well. Indeed, perhaps the Gambian leader had anticipated the consequences of his request since he is aware that Gambians, for the most part, are no fans of a Senegambian arrangement, which necessarily institutionalised and publicised the reality of their humble national status ("A Shotgun Wedding Ends," p.1454).

The two neighbors, however, did not want outsiders to witness their troubles. The Gambian authorities first denied that Jawara's letter had ever been written. But the

Senegalese thought the request was ungrateful and ordered the evacuation of their soldiers from The Gambia on August 19, 1989 without any prior warning. A few days later--after an indignant communique was released in The Gambia--the Senegalese Minister of the Armed Forces, Medoune Fall, showed up in Banjul to explain.

There were two versions of his conversation with President Jawara. A communique issued by the Gambian government said "Fall had apologized for the precipitate way in which the pull-out was announced" ("Shotgun Wedding Ends," p.1454). According to this version, the worsening and persistence of the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania had led Senegal to withdraw its troops from The Gambia. Fall reportedly said that Senegal did not want to call on Gambian forces to help under the terms of the confederation because it was specifically a Senegalese problem. Well, the 1981 revolt in The Gambia was also specifically a Gambian problem, but that did not deter Senegalese intervention. The Senegalese government, according to its defense chief, wanted to resolve the Senegal-Mauritania conflict by its own means without putting the Gambian government in a difficult position. Fall said before calling for the mobilization of the citizens of Senegal "we need to have all our military potential available" ("Senegalese Troops Out," p.9371.

But another version had it that Fall "had laid the cards on the table for the Gambians: either you play the game by the rules that we both agreed--with Diouf as president and with you making some progress in stopping the smuggling--or we will take our football back" ("A Shotgun Wedding Ends," p.1454). Regardless of the version that is correct, "The Gambia's rulers want to go on running their own show, and its businessmen do very nicely out of contraband rice, sugar, whisky and clothing shipped through Banjul port into Senegal" ("Seven-year Itch," p.32).

On the same day that the Senegalese defense minister offered an explanation to the Gambian government, President Jawara received the Mauritanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Commander Cheikh Sid'Ahmed Ould Baba said he bore a message from Colonel Ould Taya dealing with bilateral relations and did not concern the Senegal-Mauritania dispute ("Senegalese Troops Out," p.9371). The Mauritanian minister's visit at a time of mounting tensions between Senegal and Mauritania indicated that the Gambia government was bent on pursuing an independent course in foreign relations in spite of the Confederation's existence.

Days after his defense minister called on Jawara, President Diouf proposed a "freeze" in the confederation to The Gambia saying that it had failed to integrate the two states. Diouf emphasized that there had not been "any serious prospect of progress toward Senegambian integration

within the confederation." He added that the "confederal institutions were just talking shop and that there was no point in holding cabinet meetings and assembly sessions if no real progress is made toward solving the fundamental problems of integrating the two states" ("Confederation Frozen," p.9372). He further stated that:

> Today Senegal and Gambia ought to have the courage to take the only realistic measure: to freeze the functioning of the [confederation] and concentrate instead on cheaper and less ambitious cooperation accords ("Senegal-The Gambia: Confederation Frozen," p.1491).

On the eve of the celebration of the first anniversary of the Confederation, President Diouf viewed Senegambian integration as an example for the future. But after eight years of confederation, the Senegalese leader said there was not at the moment any serious prospect of progress towards Senegambian integration within the context of the confederation. Diouf observed that "the confederal institutions are becoming insignificant" ("President Jawara on President Joof's Proposal," p.17).

President Jawara accepted Diouf's proposal to "freeze" the confederation and instructed his foreign minister, Omar Sey, to negotiate with his Senegalese counterpart about dismantling it ("Senegal: Jawara's Riposte," p.1578). So even though President Diouf had only announced a "freezing" of the confederation, it was Jawara who took the vital step of calling for it to be dismantled ("Impact of Senegambia

Fall-out," p.1971). The Confederal Army was subsequently disbanded, the Confederal Parliament dissolved, the Council of Ministers terminated, and preliminary arrangements made for negotiations on the disposal of confederal assets and other matters.

AFTERMATH OF THE SENEGAMBIA FALL-OUT

Consequently the Senegambia Confederation ceased to exist on September 30, 1989, with little international attention paid to its demise. The structure attracted a great deal of optimism when it was created in 1982, but it was "little mourned" upon its failure ("Death of Senegambia," p.3764). Official statements and protocols that stated "baldly that assets are to be divided by the end of the year, and that security forces are to be unscrambled, cannot begin to convey the setback to the idea of unity in the area, even in West Africa as a whole" ("Death of Senegambia," p.3764).

The ease with which the confederation was dissolved showed the paper-thin nature of the confederal agreement. A Gambian reportedly observed that "they who created the confederation in the first place, killed it also" ("Confederation: Its Knell," p.2). This was an indication of opposition to integrating the two neighbors within the Gambian public and the lack of mass involvement in the

decision to confederate The Gambia with Senegal. For the ordinary Gambian and Senegalese, the confederation:

> proved to be a bureaucratisation of an unwritten relationship. It did not essentially change anything. Instead, what it brought about in its wake was mountain of paperwork and much of red tape; instead of smoothing forever the relationship, it almost engulfed it under bureaucratic red tape, making life much more difficult for all Senegambians ("Confederation: Its Knell," p.2).

And in the wake of the Senegambia fall-out, relations between The Gambia and Senegal began to worsen as a series of events and public charges and countercharges indicated. First, there was a tightening-up of the borders and there were reports of Gambians traveling to or through Senegal being harassed by Senegalese authorities. These allegations were confirmed by the Gambian external affairs minister, Omar Sey, during a press briefing in November 1989. The Senegalese government, aware of the widespread opposition to integration among even ordinary Gambians, targeted them for harassment. According to Sey, the reports of harassment and other complaints were investigated and:

> their veracity [was] established beyond all doubts. In addition to the unfriendly treatment meted out to Gambians, the Senegalese government had imposed certain sanctions and embargoes against trade with The Gambia and Gambian businesses and parastatals. The 'considered opinion' of the Gambian government was that this harassment and imposition of trade barriers was not conducive to the maintenance of 'friendly and indeed priviledged relations' between the two countries, and these 'grave concerns' had been made known through diplomatic channels ("The Impact of the Senegambia Fall-out," p.1971).

To make matters worse, the Senegalese government issued a directive to its customs border officials to suspend transit facilities for goods destined for or coming from The Gambia, in violation of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) protocol on interstate transit of goods--which both countries had ratified. New and prohibitive tariffs were also introduced on goods taken into Senegal from The Gambia, and Senegalese immigration authorities allegedly resorted to "an extreme application of immigration laws that might in the long run adversely affect family ties and reunions across the common borders of The Gambia and Senegal" ("The Impact of the Senegambia Fall-out," p.1972). In fact the situation regarding gas and other supplies in The Gambia became so tense as a result of Senegalese economic sanctions that the Gambia government called on the business community to do whatever it can to ensure independence from Senegal in such commodities ("The Gambia: Gas Talk Rumours," p.1990).

The Gambian foreign minister explained that cross-border trade between the two neighbors was "mutually beneficial." Minister Sey added that it was a misconception to claim that the trade was one-sided, with Gambians smuggling food into Senegal. But various reports confirmed that the average Gambian felt the impact of the break-up of the confederation. For instance, the Gambian dalasi, which had been fairly stable around seven to the U.S. dollar, fell

to 8.50 to the dollar ("The Impact of the Senegambia Fall-out," p.1972).

The smuggling of goods continued unabated despite the cooling of relations and the tightening of borders between the former confederal partners. Travelling to or through Senegal became a problem for Gambians with an increase in allegations of harassment by Senegalese authorities. Cooperation by the two states in many areas ceased with the dissolution of confederal institutions. Consultations between the two presidents have, however, been re-established--as Jawara's trip to Senegal in January 1990 indicated. But the bitterness after the collapse of the confederation remained.

NEW APPROACH IN SENEGAL-GAMBIA RELATIONS

So despite "a solid precolonial foundation for unity based on both culture and language," attempts to unify The Gambia and Senegal have been unsuccessful. And as the events immediately after the failure of confederation indicated, the dream of Senegambian unity is becoming much more elusive. The two neighbors, however, revived the dream once again when President Jawara paid a visit to Dakar, the Senegalese capital, in January 1990 for talks on improving relations between The Gambia and Senegal. This time the focus was on regional cooperation through bodies like ECOWAS rather than political unification. This leads to questions

raised earlier: Why did the Senegambia Confederation fail? What are the prospects of Senegambian unity in the wake of the Confederation's demise?

WHY THE CONFEDERATION FAILED

President Jawara's demand for the rotation of the presidency of "Senegambia" and "the difficulty of integrating such widely different economies" appeared to be "the root of the blockage of confederation" ("Death of Senegambia," p.1675). From Dakar's perspective, the Gambian leader's request was "the last straw." According to authorities in Senegal, The Gambia had done little over the years "to stem the veritable flood of smuggled goods into its larger neighbor, which the Senegalese would like to control-- because it undermines their manufacturing base--by a joint trade zone with a common tariff" ("A Shotgun Wedding Ends," p.1454). But there was more to the "divorce" between The Gambia and Senegal.

Contrasts in political development between The Gambia and Senegal contributed to the failure of the Confederation and made the path to unification very difficult, if not impossible to follow. Senegal's capital, Dakar, was the center of administration for the whole of French West Africa and in December 31, 1980 the country became the first African country to witness voluntary retirement and peaceful transition to a constitutional successor government when

President Leopold Senghor stepped down for Abdou Diouf. The Senegalese president is also elected by universal suffrage for no more than two successive terms ("Political Systems," p.955-956).

The Gambian President, on the other hand, could serve unlimited terms. The country has also been ruled by Dawda Jawara since its independence from Britain in 1965. The Gambia lacks the caliber of vigorous press which exists in Senegal, and it has enjoyed relatively less influence in international politics. And neither economic or geographic factors nor a firm belief in African unity appeared "sufficiently strong to overcome the centripetal forces resulting from independence" (Welch, p.249). Independence, in the case of The Gambia, has meant a desire to maintain her sovereign rights against the backdrop of Senegalese forcefulness for a union of the two neighbors.

Shortly after gaining independence in 1965, Jawara and other Gambian elites began realizing the prestige inherent in exercising political authority over a sovereign and independent nation, the desire for a unified Senegambian nation became more of an illusion. And so it remains. The administration has entrenched itself too deep in the soil as a sovereign state and has enjoyed too much autonomy to willingly yield to Senegalese calls for unification. This could be observed from the areas in which concrete agreements were made and actions taken during the

confederation era. The telecommunications systems of the two countries were harmonized, a Confederal Army created, and other confederal institutions established; but the two countries' economic regimes were not harmonized; The Gambia refused joint membership with Senegal in international organizations; and the confederal partners failed to devise similar policies regarding foreign affairs. It therefore proved far easier to reach agreements on peripheral matters than on substantial issues dealing with sovereignty and national independence.

The contrasts in political development between The Gambia and Senegal are paralleled in their economic structures. Senegal forms an integral part of UMOA--the customs and monetary grouping of French-speaking West Africa. And because of their access to larger markets, industries located in Senegal operate on a vast scale, producing more than Senegal could absorb. High earnings from groundnuts and a restrictive trade policy help bring about a high standard--and cost--of living (Welch, p.267).

Manufacturing has not developed in The Gambia for the obvious reason that production for a population of about 800,000 is uneconomic. Also, Senegal maintains a relatively high-cost, high-salary system (Welch, p.268).

These contrasts in economic structures imposed severe strains on the Confederation and created hurdles on the path to unification. To harmonize the economic structures of the

two states would require a great deal of sacrifice on the side of Gambian elites, who have been very unwilling to shoulder the burden. The prices of commodities and the cost of living would have increased significantly in The Gambia as a result of economic union, and the Senegalese did not agree to compensate The Gambia to remedy such a situation.

The desire for Senegambian unity is further limited by such factors as the administrative, cultural, linguistic, and institutional differences. Colonialism, which served to integrate various ethnic groups under statal formations, also fostered the development of different micronational identities among inhabitants of the various African states. These inhabitants of the European-created states began to have a sense of identity separate from those of their kinsmen outside the artificial boundaries; and they developed different structures, lifestyles, and orientations--thus posing barriers to unity.

Also, the Confederation failed because it lacked legitimacy and [as critics had charged] President Jawara was coerced into reaching the confederal agreement with the Senegalese authorities. Neither a referendum nor an opinion poll was conducted to gauge public sentiment towards the setting up of the Senegambia Confederation. Eight years after the accord was signed--and when Jawara felt politically and militarily secure--he criticized the agreement as being unfair and called for radical changes,

which the Senegalese found unacceptable. President Jawara's primary interest during the 1981 crises and in the immediate aftermath of the revolt was to re-establish his regime at any cost. In essence, Jawara was like a "drowning man, who will clutch at any straw" for help ("Unity That Was," p.1634). The Confederation was the price the Gambian president had to pay for the Senegalese intervention to restore his regime. His lack of commitment and the circumstances and environment of the "negotiations" on confederation eroded any support for Senegambian unity in The Gambia and further complicated the confederal process.

Another factor which may have contributed to the slow pace of Senegambian integration during the confederal relationship was ethnicity. The similarity of ethnic groups across the political frontiers is considered to be one of the most notable features of the Senegambian situation; but ethnicity also constitutes a problem. There is a difference in the proportion of each of the major ethnic groups in the total populations of The Gambia and Senegal. The Mandinka make up the majority group in The Gambia, whereas the Wollof occupy this position in Senegal. And the Gambian Mandinka's unwillingness to play a secondary role in a Wollof-dominated Senegambia has made the integration process a difficult one. The ethnic problem is partly a result of the separate influences of British and French colonial systems on The Gambia and Senegal respectively--which also created

cultural, economic and political differences between the two states. The partitioning of the Senegambia region into two states meant the creation of political boundaries that divided ethnic groups. And as a result, the balance of power between these groups was affected and the groups became subjected to different foreign orientations.

Thus despite a common desire for African unity, propinquity, common socio-economic factors, the predominance of Islam, the use of Wollof as a lingua franca and political considerations, the gap between the Senegambian dream and reality remains wide. The evidence supports Lindberg's theory that "political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.417). It is precisely the divergence of political elites' attitudes toward Senegambian unity resulting from the elements discussed earlier that has impeded Senegambian integration. This research also underscores the theory that "political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat, of force" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.417). Propinquity, political and economic rationality, and the desire for African unity were long cited as logical bases for Senegambian unity. But since The Gambia's attainment of independence in 1965, its leaders continued to be rather reluctant in efforts to integrate their country with

Senegal. The growing insecurity of the Jawara government and the Senegalese role in re-establishing the regime, however, made the Senegambia Confederation an attractive proposition to Gambian authorities in 1981. And the presence of Senegalese forces at strategic points in The Gambia contributed to agreements between the confederal partners on peripheral matters, while The Gambians dragged their feet on substantial issues. But once President Jawara felt militarily and politically secure enough, he demanded a major restructuring of the confederation--which he said was unbalanced. That essentially led to the collapse of the Confederation.

PROSPECTS OF SENEGAMBIAN UNITY

With the demise of the Confederation then, what are the prospects of Senegambian unity? The cooling of relations between The Gambia and Senegal and the "foot-dragging" pace of integration during eight years of confederation are consequences of a divergence of interests and attitudes between Gambian political elites and Senegalese authorities. In view of the data presented in this study and other factors, it becomes clear that the chances of a peacefully-constituted Senegambian nation-state are considerably low.

There is very little hope for the unification of The Gambia with Senegal, at least as far as evidenced from the

way events have been unfolding for the past three decades. This may not be the kind of prognosis that Senegalese authorities would appreciate, but it is based more on reality than mere ideals. The resistance of Gambian political elites is a major road block to unification. An indication of the continued reluctance could be found in statements made by President Jawara after tensions began to heighten between the former confederal partners. He said:

> There was greater enthusiasm for unity. Independence was fresh in the minds of the people, and there was some amount of good euphoria. Since then we have become more mellow through experience. We now know the practical difficulties as well as the possibilities. There is still the hope and wish for African unity, and a major plank here is regional cooperation through bodies like Ecowas ... (Obe, February 1990, p.268).

The Gambian president, therefore, hoped that the relationship between The Gambia and Senegal would shift in the direction of functional cooperation rather than unification. This might mean continued cooperation in the development of telecommunications networks, consultation (but not necessarily coordination) on international affairs, and the establishment of ad hoc committees to address existing and new problems within the region. The shift was away from attempts to unify the political structures and to harmonize the economic regimes of the two states. And even though President Jawara emphasized that "We have to keep making efforts" (Obe, February 1990, p.268), the vision of a

Senegambian nation-state continues to fade in the face of Gambian opposition. The experience of the Senegambia Confederation also suggests that the integration of some political structures is not enough to bring about supranational unity. But with the current dramatic changes on the international scene and the possibility of a new generation assuming the helms in Senegal and The Gambia, it is conceivable that Senegambian unity could be rejuvenated.

NOTES

NOTES

[1]Senegal is divided into 8 regions for purposes of local administration--Cape Verde, Thies, Sine Saloum, Louga, Diourbel, Fleuve, Casamance, and Eastern Senegal. Opposition to the Senegalese government has erupted in Casamance, where a separatist movement was involved in serious clashes with police in 1982 and 1983 (Pragnell & Castle, p.503). Thirty-five dissidents were eventually jailed for involvement in the disturbances. There is the Senegambian state could lead to demands for similar status by Casamance and the other regions.

[2]The United Party (UP) was formed in 1951 by Pierre Njie, a lawyer, who entered the political arena backed by influential local muslim personalities. The UP is an urban-based party, most of whose support comes from Banjul. Prior to the 1977 national elections, it was the main opposition party in The Gambia--a position since assumed by the National Convention Party. "Little efort was made to muster support for UP candidates in [the 1977] election, which led to a great decline in support. The future status of UP is unclear" (Delury, p.378).

[3]The Gambia's press is very small and concentrated in Banjul. The Goverment Information Office published The Gambia News Bulletin three times a week during this period--1980/81. There are several newssheets, but these are also concentrated in Banjul and its environs. The Gambia has two radio stations--Radio Syd, which operates 20 hours a day--and a government broadcasting service which operates 13 hours a day. In 1982, the country had 120 radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants (The Gambia In Brief; Third World Guide, p.119).

[4]The currency of The Gambia is dalasi and bututs, which were exchangeable at 4.00 dalasi to the pound sterling, and 2.5 dalasi to the U.S. dollar in 1981. The dalasi is now (May 1990) exchangeable at 11.23 to the pound sterling and 8.50 to the U.S. dollar.

[5]Almost all commercial activity in The Gambia centers upon the marketing of groundnuts by the government-controlled Gambia Produce Marketing Board--which sets the price paid to producers. Gambian groundnuts are sold at world market prices and are open to price fluctuations. In 1987, 120,000 tons of groundnuts were produced (Fact Sheets On The Gambia).

[6]"Tourism, which is a major earner of foreign exchange, witnessed a fall during the 1979/80 season. A total 24,821

tourists visited The Gambia compared with 25,907 during the 1978/79 season" ("Drought Leads to Economic Decline", p.2280).

[7]Some of the material in this dissertation is covered in this author's master's thesis titled, "The Creation of Senegambia: An Integrative Process With Uncommitted Gambian Elites" (The University of Tennessee, 1987). Amadou Janneh is a citizen of The Gambia, where he lived until 1983. Also, substantial information for this dissertation was derived from his experience as a news reporter for The Gambia's Department of Information and Broadcasting from 1981-83.

[8]The exact number of "loyalist forces" was never determined or made known, but they were thought to be less than 100 Field Force men.

[9]Information on the British Special Air Service (SAS)'s role in the Gambian revolt is contained in "They Dared And Won Discreetly," The Economist, Aug. 15, 1981, p.32.

[10]Kukoi Samba Sanyang, who led the 12-member Supreme Council of the Revolution, has taken refuge in Libya. The Council included: Apai Sonko, Simon Talibo Sanneh, Kantong Fatty, Demba Camara, Husenu Jarwo, Momodou Sanyang, Junkung Saho and Cambeng Badji--all of them political nonentities.

[11]The main opposition parties in Senegal are Mouvement Democratique Populaire (MDP) and Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS). MDP, which is led by former prime minister Mamadou Dia, was registered in 1981. It has a flexible African socialist platform. PDS is a centrist labor party founded in 1974 by lawyer Abdoulaye Wade.

[12]The circumstances of the actual negotiations are not clear--particularly information on how long they took, who was involved, and who wrote the text of the Confederation Agreement. President Jawara claimed to have proposed Confederation to President Diouf in August 1981 in the aftermath of the revolt in his country.

[13]About 85 percent of the 1982/83 confederal budget went to defense and security, and Senegal contributed two-thirds of the budget. The budget declined drastically, from 4,355,367,220 CFA francs in 1983/84 to 2,996,433,550 CFA francs in 1989/90. The 1989/90 budget represented a 12 percent drop over that of 1988/89.

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VITA

Amadou Scattred Janneh was born on September 17, 1962 in Gunjur, a small village in the West African state of The Gambia. He attended Gunjur Primary School from 1968 to 1974, later advancing to Saint Augustine's High School. He completed his high school education in 1979.

From December 1979 to May 1981, he worked as a clerical assistant for The Gambia's Rural Development Project at Mansakonko, and in June 1981 he joined the staff of Radio Gambia as a news reporter. He continued working at Radio Gambia until January 1983 when he came to the United States for further studies.

Mr. Janneh attended Boggs Academy in Keysville, Georgia for a semester and then moved to Knoxville, Tennessee. He enrolled at Knoxville College where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree With High Honors in Communications in June 1986. He also worked as a reporter for "The Knoxville Journal"--a daily newspaper--from February to August 1986.

He accepted an assistantship at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville in September 1986. He received numerous awards, including one from The McClure Fund For The Study of World Affairs. Mr. Janneh earned a master's degree in political science at The University of Tennessee in December 1987. He plans to teach international relations and comparative politics after receiving the Doctor of Philosophy degree.