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CREATIVE EXPERIENCE AS VALUE: A STUDY OF ROBERT S. HARTMAN'S THEORY OF CREATIVITY

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Creativity is a little understood phenomenon in human experience. It is assumed by philosophers and participants in art and literature that an author or artist is just creative and that is all. No thought is given to what makes for creativity in art and literature and how this differs from simple repetition and mimicry. It is further assumed, uncritically in some circles, that scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers engage themselves in studies where creativity is of no use, and that artists and authors do not think or at least do not think correctly. Both of these black and white polar alternatives, it is argued, are mislead, and ultimately confuse this most important aspect of human life.

The position of Robert S. Hartman allows us to both circumvent the difficulties mentioned above and to gain a clearer understanding of the place that creativity has in each of our lives.

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INTRODUCTION

Last night lying in bed as I looked at the eastern star,
    Taking a good long look, that star with the reddish light,
And thought of the man who, being impelled by the god,
    Bowed to the heavenly task of calculating its course,
And who endeavored with steadfast work to dull and despise
    Poverty's terrible sting, thought the endeavor was vain:
My heart blazed with bitter grief and, ah, master, I thought,
    Was this fate of yours all that the gods could give?
Homer exalted Achilles, stirred by his noble and godlike
    Grandeur, and poets do choose them a hero in song,
Likewise upon that star you turned all the force of your mind
    And its tremendous course was your eternal theme.
Yet a song's not the thing that occasions a god to flutter
    Down from his golden throne, bringing deliverance
For a man to whom dark days the loftier power has ordained,
    And you stars up there, never touched by a human fate,
Over the heads of the wise and foolish blithely you move
    Eternally calm as you pass unperturbed on your ways.

"Johann Kepler"

Eduard Morike[1]

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[1]Friedrich Holderlin and Eduard Morike, Selected Poems, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 173.

In this study we will be concerned with the value of creative experience. But before we can analyze creative experience most fully, we shall have to devote some time to the discussion of value itself. What is value, and in what sense is creativity valuable?

In the paper "The Value Structure of Creativity," Robert S. Hartman argues that creativity is constituted of self identification and hetero-identification coupled with analogical thinking. We will maintain that the history of both science and art are replete with men and their actions which follow this characterization of creativity and that any great artist or scientist will attend to his material in this way--will identify himself with and immerse himself in that material. The origin of modern science itself in the work of Kepler and Galileo followed this paradigm of creativity. Kepler was at home in his universe; it sang for him, spoke to him. Galileo asked himself what it would be like to fall, tried to identify himself with a falling object and the pregnant idea of modern science was born. This posture of natural wonder was even present in the dawn of ancient science with the Presocratics of Greece. Likewise, Hartman's desire to change from a value philosophy to a value science is no mere fad resulting from the highly acclaimed popularity and success of contemporary science; he understands the limitations of science well. It is his desire to see creativity and open-endedness applied to value phenomenon just as in the high points of physical science they were applied to physical phenomenon.

The phenomena of creativity and value are little understood in today's philosophical literature. Creativity and intrinsic value

are known as "intangibles."[2] The status of their meaning, or whether they have any meaning at all, is unclear. But while their meaning is unclear, they govern a large number of the most important choices we make. In valuation, what Kierkegaard says of Hegel's system is certainly true: we build immense mansions but continue to lead our lives in a small building to the side.

At one time in the history of the physical sciences, physical properties were considered intangibles also. Instead of continuing to speak of occult qualities, Galilei Galileo concentrated on primary, not secondary properties--measurable properties.

Galileo's achievement of producing the equation $v = \frac{s}{t}$ was epochal. It quantified the intangible properties of astrology and alchemy in medieval natural philosophy; it made them tangible; it made the intangible tangible. In producing his equation, Galileo was instrumental in bringing medieval science and its reliance upon Aristotelian physics to a close.[3] Galileo's achievement is a model for creativity and creative action. It was an inversion of the medieval world; with it, he stood against his times in favor of his own thinking. He was determined to proceed toward filling in the gaps in the Aristotelian world view, whatever the cost to that world view. He stood against what had become mere decoration, without substance, and in favor of the concrete idea...the living and breathing idea, and gave life to an idea about the concrete, an axiom, which contained in germ the essence of the phenomena with which Aristotelian physics had been

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[2]Robert S. Hartman, "The Value Structure of Creativity," in Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. VI, p. 247.

[3]Ibid., p. 247.

unsuccessful in dealing. And even though he was forced to recant, he was responsible for an idea too powerful to lie dormant.

Rather than repeat ad infinitum a series of distinctions, Galileo made measurement a qualitative as well as a quantitative function. Galileo's method of measurement is based upon the development of formulas derived from the world and made into systems; these systems thus vary directly with the facts to which they apply. In a good science, these systems will change with a change of facts. Galileo asks himself what it is like to fall; he imagines himself falling, just as hundreds of years later Einstein overturned the 19th century world by a similar simple question concerning what it would be like to ride on a beam of light. The creative process of creating and abridging never stops and it always begins as a simple formula derived from immersing oneself in a problem, or identifying oneself with a phenomenon.

Hartman thinks that if we follow the example of Galileo, we can change value philosophy to value science and make value intangibles tangible, and not just continue with the mere rattling of philosophical bones and the endless repetition of analytic concepts.

To Hartman ...

> There are, then, two classes of systems, the philosophical and the scientific. The first are individual and particular "systems"; there is no one system that embraces them all. The second are all parts of one overarching system, a superstructure or universal pattern which, in the natural sciences, is mathematics. But mathematics is not the only such system possible, the only superstructure that determines exact sciences. The musical sciences are structured by the theory of harmony, its keys, chords, scales, and so on. What determines the structure of electronic computers is symbolic logic. There is the possibility of an infinity of such

> superstructures; without them intellectual disciplines cannot be exact sciences. Thus, if ethics is to advance from philosophy to science, a formal structure has to be found for it. This structure is the logic of value or formal axiology.[4]

In the paper entitled "The Value Structure of Creativity," Hartman argued that creativity could also be brought under the auspices of such a value logic as the above. The power of the process that brought about the birth of natural science can also bring about the birth of moral science. Hartman realized quite correctly that Galileo attained exactly what the Medieval Peripatetics attempted to attain but in a way that they could not understand.

In Galileo's time, Aristotelian physics was mere intellectual adornment and decoration taken secondhand from past times and past peoples. It was the virtue and power of Galileo's idea that explanation must be taken from immediate contact with data, that explanation had a job to do and existed not as mere decoration which caused physics' contemporary pertinence, it must make intelligible and not just adorns. And similarly, we can attain what philosophy has always attempted to attain in ethics and aesthetics and other fields of value but not in the same way philosophy has attempted to attain it. We could almost say that it was by a greater force of moral character that Galileo and Kepler and Newton were victorious. They rebelled against secondhand explanations, inherited opinion masquerading as knowledge, and second-hand thought. They lived with data collected honestly, but shunned

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[4]Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of Value, (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), p. 30.

secondhand interpretation. They molded that data with the sincerity, honesty, and sturdiness of their own minds as surely as Micheangelo molded the stone which was to become his "David."

We are in danger in our times of being swallowed by our problems, of having what is really needful of prediction and control go unpredicted and uncontrolled. Our notions and opinions about creativity and value are much like Aristotelian physics of 1642, taken secondhand from history, an epigoni of values with no value. As such, like the physics of Aristotle, it is mere decoration and artifact. One has to but look at the proposals of academic philosophy of the last half century to see their ultimate similarity. We have philosophized while the very difficulties we have attempted to end by our philosophizing have lain unmolested beneath the surface.

We can have this same power of explanation in the realm of value simply by following the spirit of Galileo's method in the physical sciences...that explanation must be taken from immediate contact with life. Our cost may be similar to Galileo's cost, but the sacrifice is necessary if we are to receive humanity's birthright.

It will be the immediate topic of this essay to investigate the nature of the shift from normal philosophy to the spirit of science. What is obvious will be assumed--that aesthetic predicates such as beauty, uniqueness, symmetry, and moral predicates such as good, apply to experiences we consider valuable. It also seems clear that these valuable experiences and distinctive touches know no boundaries and that one can equally value the broadening of understanding revealed in Einstein's 1905 paper on the special theory of relativity, and the enlightenment found by Buddha under the bodi tree. Both resulted, as

did Galileo's velocity experiments, from simple analogies drawn from their sphere of activities from what Hartman calls analogical thinking. Einstein asked himself what it would be like to ride on a beam of light; Buddha reckoned the world as a play of suffering. There are numerous testimonies of such attitudes among artists and mystics, but it is not so often recognized that there are almost as many among accomplished "normal" scientists and mathematicians.

Hartman says that his new science of value begins by making practical application of Cantorian set theory. It would be well to point out here that regardless of whether set theory or any other branch of mathematics applies to value theory, or if value theory can or cannot become a science, the service done to our thinking by the Hartmanian idea that true thought emerges from direct contact with life is invaluable. The timbre of his work can be understood without the deeper bases of set theory, but the subtlest tones would be missing. His insight that creativity and advancement emerge from a one to one relationship with man and material and do not come from an endless repetition of dead concepts, will be the cornerstone of <u>any</u> value theory in the future which can purport to be useful and true.

"Formal value theory is set theory applied to predicates rather than to subjects."[5] The formal relationship is the relation of value and meaning. A set of predicates is defined as an intension, and an intension is defined as the content of a concept, in this case a meaning. The meaning of a thing is the total set of properties connected with it... its richness of properties. <u>Value, thus, is richness of properties</u>.

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[5]Hartman, "Value Structure of Creativity," p. 250.

A thing is a good thing to the extent that it is what it is, that is, possesses the richness of properties it is alluded to having in its concept. It is possible to measure value by meaning. Hartman likens an intension and the predicates it contains to a meter and the centimeters it contains. One is a norm for value measurement, and the other is a norm for linear measure. In measuring value, a set of predicates defining a concept is compared with the set of properties possessed by a thing, and that thing has value precisely to the degree that the set of properties suggested by the intension of its concept, then it is called good. The words "good," "bad," or "mediocre" measure meaning.[6]

Valuation is in this way akin to creativity for it arranges and re-arranges the properties of things. It is a play with properties until they form a known Gestalt; valuation is fluidity and mobility of properties according to certain rules.[7] In the Structure of Value, Hartman tells us that this mobility of properties is what makes valuation possible; the combination of these properties is valuation. Being sensitive to value is having the ability to match sets of predicates in the mind with sets of properties in the thing.

> The dimensions of value-systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic (either-or valuation, fulfillment of a thing by an abstract concept, and the unique and singular character of a thing) - arise from the relation, in combinatorial analysis, of finite and infinite sets. There are possibly three kinds of intensional sets: finite sets, denumerably infinite sets, and non-denumerably infinite sets (with cardinalities n, $\aleph_0$, $\aleph_1$, respectively). Each of these kinds of sets defines a specific kind of

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[6] Ibid., pp. 250-251.

[7] Ibid., p. 252.

> of intension; and the fulfillment of each such intension defines a specific kind of value [8]

N intensional sets define formal concepts such as that of a circle; $_1\aleph_0$ intensional sets define abstract concepts such as house; $_1\aleph_1$ intensional sets define singular concepts, for example, proper names. Things corresponding to such singular concepts are unique. These unique things are not formal concepts, or words of analytic intension--they are Gestalten.

> The intensions of such singular concepts...are not words but Gestalten. In comprehending them we are completely involved, we form a continuum with them. The mathematical form of such a continuum is that of non-denumerable infinity. (Such infinities, $_1\aleph_1$, are infinities of denumerable infinities $_1\aleph_0$; $\aleph_0 = \aleph_1$). The fulfillment by a thing of a singular concept constitutes intrinsic value... Intrinsic valuation is the model of creativity, spontaneity and commitment; of emphatic- and empathic-thinking."[9]

Value science's relationship to creativity is essentially value science's relationship to intrinsic value, since creativity is a part of intrinsic value.[10] It is one phenomenon of value. As a phenomenon of intrinsic value it is "incomparable and irreplaceable." If the phenomena of creativity are had, all is had; if they are lost, all is lost. By the phenomenon of creativity is meant all the facets in which creativity and its material are found. It is found in the material novelly arranged into a creative object. The creator "interpenetrates", becomes one with such an object. In the final form of the interpenetration the created object results. But creativity also

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[9] Ibid., p. 254.

[10] Ibid., p. 247.

results in the attitude of the spectator who views the created object and thus begins the process of creativity again. It is imperative that we point out here that intrinsic value and intrinsic valuation are intimately intertwined by Hartman but not confused...intrinsic value is "conferred" by the process of intrinsic valuation.

Creativity is part of intrinsic value; we must, then, understand what value is in general before we can analyze intrinsic value specifically. To understand Hartman's relation of intrinsic value and creativity, it will first be necessary to discuss value and valuation *per se* more fully.

CHAPTER I

VALUE IN HARTMAN'S AXIOLOGY

G. E. Moore rightly saw in the early part of the century that all attempts to define goodness as a natural property or as any other kind of property or object were doomed to failure. He termed such attempts naturalistic fallacies.

Moore could not produce a science of value because he did not know how to define value. He knew that it was not pleasure, or power, or the Good, but he did not know what it was, so he termed it an unknown, an X.[11] Moore was right when he said that good was undefinable as a philosophical concept or category, hence an unknown, but he did not realize that it was definable as an axiom. Moore wished to write a science of ethics as Newton had written a science of natural philosophy, but he lacked in the value realm that Newton possessed in the physical realm--an axiom. Hartman defines an axiom as "a formula giving rise to a system isomorphic with a field of phenomena."[12] This system is a logical one as it is in any science. Thus with any fully developed science there is a logical system of some sort connected to phenomena, in this case evaluational phenomena, by an axiom.

Even though Moore did not provide us with an axiom, he did try to provide a formula for goodness. To him, this formula is a paradox. Two different propositions are both true of goodness: (1) that it does depend <u>only</u> on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it, and (2) that, though that is so, it is yet not itself an intrinsic property."[13] To Moore this paradox could only be resolved if we knew what we do not know,

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[11] Hartman, <u>Structure of Value</u>, p. 101.

[12] Ibid., p. 101.

[13] Ibid., p. 102.

that is, how the natural properties describe and the value properties do not describe the object. Goodness, according to Moore, depends upon the descriptive properties of an object, but does not describe the object. If I tell you that I have a good house, you would expect that house to fulfill all those requirements that go into making a house you would desire to live in--good roof, sturdy walls, cozy study, and any number of other specifics that make for a desirable house. The goodness or value of a thing depends upon the number of descriptive, natural properties a thing possesses, but is itself not descriptive of the thing. The problem, which is Moore's problem, is that of describing this non-natural "property" which depends on natural properties. The natural properties of objects are handled rather well by common sense or analytic chemistry; and we have seen in the case of Galileo and Newton how science's precising of these problems lead to a significant advance over Aristotelian physics.

The problem is not, then, the investigation of the natural mode of knowledge, but the valuational. The solution to Moore's difficulty lies in seeing that the valuational mode has nothing to do with things such as houses or horses, but it does have something to do with the concepts of these things. "The value predicate 'good', thus, is a property of concepts rather than objects."[14] If a person knows that a car, for instance, is good, he does not necessarily have to be a mechanic. But he must know something of the concept of the automobile of which any particular automobile in question is an instance. According to Hartman, whenever we use the word good, a logical operation is performed.

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[14]Ibid., p. 103.

We combine our ideas of the concept of the object at hand to the actual object at hand--"We combine the predicate of the concept of the thing with the idea of the thing itself,"[15] and a thing is a good thing just to the degree that it fulfills its concept. To Hartman, this means (1) that a thing, say a car, has a certain name--"car," and (2) this thing's name, "car," has a meaning expressed by a set of predicates, and, finally, (3) that the thing names has all the properties contained in the meaning of the name. Thus, we have Hartman's formula--"A thing is good if it fulfills the intension of its concept."[16] This is Hartman's axiom of value, and it is what Moore was attempting to express by his formula for X. It is the fundamental principle for Hartman's formula axiology.[17] In developing his formula,[18] Hartman follows the logicism of Frege, Whitehead, and Russell, where arithmetical predicates such as three, four, five, etc., apply to concepts, not objects. Value predicates likewise apply to concepts and not objects; value as well as mathematics is defined in terms of a formal system, that is, logic. Logic can now be used to explicate value. Moore's paradox is consequently dissolved in the same way that the vicious circle fallacies are dissolved in the introduction to Principia, and we find that good is not a property

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[15] Ibid., p. 103.

[16] Ibid., p. 103.

[17] Ibid., pp. 95-103.

[18] There is a prededent for Hartman's axiom of value in Whitehead and Russell's Principia, Vol. I, 2nd edition, pp. 166-7, and in Russell's Principles of Mathematics where Russell says that "all pure mathematics deals exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very small number of fundamental logical concepts"--From the preface to that work. These fundamental logical concepts are called propositional functions in Principia.

of a thing, but is the property of the properties, or a property of the concept of a thing.

Hartman's science of value is scientific in exactly four ways. First, it defines value in terms of the formal system of logic. The logic of value explains value analogously to the way Mathematics describes nature. Second, the axiom of value is similar to mathematics in the crucial way mentioned above: arithmetical predicates such as three apply to concepts just as value logic applies to concepts. Third, the axiom of value, just as any other axiom, is constituted of variables--the word good is a variable and not a specific value.

Lastly, we follow Galileo's model in disregarding secondary qualities qua secondary qualities and concentrating on primary qualities. We can now measure value in the same way that Galileo could measure motion. The axiom of value tells us precisely how to do this, not by concentrating on the thing which is not amenable to measurement, but on the concept of the thing, which is amenable to measurement. In measuring value, what we really measure is what Galileo had to pass up--the ordinary sense object, that which possesses the ordinary secondary properties. But in this case it is the ordinary secondary properties that do the actual measuring. The secondary properties are primary in this case--their presence or absence determines the value of a thing. The concept serves as the standard for the measurement of value. Good is thus related to the concept of a thing in the same way that length and weight are related to the primary properties of Galileo. Simply speaking, we can liken the meter and a list of value properties to a check list: the object corresponds in length to six meter sticks

laid end to end and hence is six meters in length; also, the chair has 6 properties and is hence a good chair--we count them off.

Moore's naturalistic fallacy is really a fallacy of method--philosophical method--and value science does not succomb to this fallacy. Value science offers us a way around the fallacy. Again, this is not entirely new, for Russell suggested the theory of types to end similar paradoxes. Formal value theory or formal axiology allows us to dintinguish clearly, and relate clearly the types along the heirarchy of types as they apply to value. It allows us to avoid the methodological fallacies of philosophy.

We can show that axiological science does not fall prey to the fallacies of method that characterize philosophical value theory. We find the axiological fallacies to be confusions between different sciences:

a) of general frames of reference
b) of specific frames of reference
c) of general with specific frames of reference
d) of either (a) general or (B) specific frames of reference with their subject matter.

> The first of these fallacies we call the metaphysical fallacy, because it confuses different world views; the second we call the naturalistic fallacy, because its most usual form is the confusion of specific natural sciences with specific moral sciences, e.g. of biology with ethics; but it also confuses different natural sciences with each other or different moral sciences with each other, e.g. ethics with religion. The third is the moral fallacy, for its most usual form is the confusion of axiology with ethics; the fourth is the fallacy of method, the confusion of a science whether (a) natural or (b) moral, whether (α) general (mathematics, axiology) or (β) specific (physics, ethics, etc.) with its subject matter. [19]

[19] Ibid., p. 123.

Axiology has three applications, just as mathematics has three parts. Mathematics itself has three distinct parts, the "logistic," the "mathematical," and the "phenomenal." The first is concerned with the nature of Number itself, the second with the relationship of particular numbers to each other, and the third to the application of numbers to numerable phenomenon. In the second case, we have pure mathematics itself, consisting of arithmetic, geometry, calculus, etc. The difference in the first and second is essentially the difference between mathematical logic and mathematics. The third is the application of mathematics to actual situations just as mathematics is the application of mathematical logic. It is this second instance that we call the theoretical specifics of mathematics. This can be applied to value theory as well; we can divide value as we have divided number. On the first level, we will have formal axiology, secondly the application of formal axiology--what we call theoretical axiology--and thirdly applied theoretical axiology.[20]

Our purpose is not to discuss the mathematical implications of axiology or its applications to specific problems. We are interested in the use of the axiom to distinguish the different realms of value from each other which we have seen above traditional philosophy does not do.

Theoretical axiology has to do with the theoretical specifics of value, the different value sciences and what they apply to. This is the central problem in any transition from philosophy to value science. We must show how science organizes and makes precise, and philosophy

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[20] Ibid., p. 107.

leaves uncontrolled and undefined, the value sciences and their uses mentioned above. We must explicitly define their relationships and their distinctions. They must be accurately distinguished in order to show that we do not fall into the same methodological trap into which we have accused traditional philosophy of falling. After this, we must again be able to interrelate these value sciences in the logic of value and pure axiology. We must show that the tendency of Newton to relate science and theology and of Kepler to relate mathematics and music is false. We must do this in order to distinguish the value of both science and theology and mathematics and music, that is, to prevent confusion.

We have said that intensions are sets of predicates. The combinatorial formula $V_t=2^n - 1$ makes possible the exact measurement of these sets by placing them in the total pattern of value. Three kinds of sets are possible as we have seen before: finite, denumerably infinite, and non-denumerably infinite sets. The first set corresponds to definition, the second exposition, and the third description. The fulfillment of each of these intensions, or concepts, defines a kind of value.

Definition defines a formal concept--geometrical concepts such as a circle or a triangle for example, or any concepts where a thing corresponding to that concept is fully that thing or not so at all. A circle is either a circle (has all the properties of a circle) or it is not. Formal concepts are constructions of the human mind and have only two values, what Hartman terms either perfection or non-value. This is the simplest kind of valuation there is, systemic valuation. A thing

just is what it is or it is not the thing. Systemic valuation is the model for much of our political thinking, e.g. a person is either a true-blooded American, or he is fully unamerican--a Communist. Systemic value is the model for dogmatic thinking and the lowest possible type of valuation, yet it is the type that dominates the valuations of some persons.

Denumerably infinite sets of predicates define, according to Hartman, abstract concepts. Abstractions "draw off" properties common to several things, and such abstraction theoretically could continue ad infinitum. These things are the things of the world. What is of value in exposition is not the thing, however, but the possession or non-possession of the class predicates of the class to which the thing belongs. Thus, if the concept "car" were to possess 1500 properties, we should expect the actual car we are inspecting to possess these 1500 properties or the greater part of them if it is a good car. Extrinsic valuation involves a denumeration or exposition of those properties of a thing by which we can then compare that particular thing with the class of which it is supposedly an example. Thereby, we can ascertain, and to what extent, it fulfills the abstract concept or the precise degree to which it possesses or does not possess the class predicates.

While denumerably infinite sets of intensional predicates define abstract concepts, our third kind of set defines the singular concept or the axiom. Nondenumerably infinite sets are continuum descriptions of singular concepts which denote unique things, singular meaning is uniqueness, novelty, oneness of a kind. A thing may fail to be good in the extrinsic sense and yet fulfill the intrinsic sense of which we are speaking. In so doing, it has fulfilled the highest concept of value

and is a value to the degree that the merely extrinsic cannot fulfill. Old Rover may not be much of a dog any more extrinsically, but he is still my dog with a history that cannot be fully accounted for by the systemic or extrinsic. The depiction of such singular, atypical concepts--"unicepts," is by means of a metaphor defined by Hartman as "a set of predicates used as a variable."[21] Non denumerable sets of predicates, then, function as variables...any word in a language can take on the intension of a metaphor in this sense. Any word can take on this extended meaning just as the plight of Johann Kepler, in the poem quoted earlier, is seen by Morike as the plight of each man. The whole poem becomes a metaphor and an intrinsic value. In Friedrich Holderins' poem "The Poet's Courage", the poet, the creator of metaphors, becomes the metaphor:

For as quiet near shores, or in the silvery
Flood resounding afar, or over silent deep
Water travels in the flimsy
Swimmer, likewise we love to be

Where around us there breath, teem those alive, our kin,
We, their poets; and glad, friendly to every man,
Trusting all. And how else for
Each of them could we sing his god?

Though the wave will at times, flattering, drag below
One such brave man where, true, trusting he makes his way,
And the voice of that singer
Now falls mute as the hall turns blue;

Glad he died there, and still lonely his groves lament
Him whom most they loved, lost, though with joy he drowned;
Often a virgin will hear his
Kindly song in the distant bought.

When at nightfall a man like him, of our kind, comes
Past the place where he sank, many a thought he'll give
To the site and the warning,
Then in silence, more armed, walk on.[22]

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[21] Ibid., p. 113.

[22] Holderin and Morike, p. 201.

Metaphor extends our horizons; it blazes a path for language. Axiology allows us to say how this is so. Since every word in ordinary language is a discursive element of that language, every ordinary language element and all possible ordinary languages (it is possible to speak of all possible ordinary languages because ordinary language is an extrinsic phenomena) are potentially discursive (denumerable) and hence have $\aleph_0$ words. Each of these discursive elements may depict as metaphor $\aleph_0$ senses or meanings. The total meaning of the metaphorical language is then by set theory $\aleph_0^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_1$ meanings. Metaphorical language is then a nondiscursive set and hence describes intrinsic value. In Hartman's words, metaphorical language is a continuum; and each metaphor is itself a continuum. "The fulfillment by a thing of a singular concept, understood in this sense, constitutes <u>intrinsic value</u>."[23] Intrinsic value <u>is</u> "empathic-empathetic thinking" and valuation.[24]

Systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic value are thus the three value <u>dimensions</u> fulfilling formal, abstract, and singular concepts in that order. They form a hierarchy of richness with systemic value being poorer in qualities than extrinsic value, and extrinsic being poorer in qualities than intrinsic value.

> "Richer in qualities" is the definition of "better." "Poorer in qualities" is the definition of "worse." The contextual definition of "ought" is: "The worse ought to be better." Hence intrinsic is better than extrinsic value, extrinsic better than systemic value; and systemic value ought to be extrinsic value, extrinsic ought to be intrinsic value. The

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[23] Hartman, <u>Structure of Value</u>, p. 113.

[24] Ibid., p. 114.

> hierarchy of value is a valuation of value; our science specifies and elaborates systematically what the old philosophy of value only suggested the extensional-intensional scale of richness.[25]

This idea will become very important for us as we go on. In fact, we shall devote one full chapter to this idea alone.[26] But at the moment we are interested in the theoretical specifics of value; that is, the relation of value theory to fields of value phenomena such as sociology or economics, psychology or ecology. All in all, Hartman mentions eighteen,[27] ranging from ethics to grammar. We shall mention only four, and only two of that four are fields with which we shall concern ourselves in this work, two applications of extrinsic value and two applications of intrinsic value. Again, we do this to show that Hartman's value theory, formal axiology, does not confuse these fields as has been the case in philosophy. Sociology and economics are value fields which deal with extrinsic values. Sociology is the application of extrinsic value to groups of persons. Economics is the application of extrinsic value to particular <u>things</u>. Ethics is the application of intrinsic value to persons, and aesthetics is the application of intrinsic value to particular things. "Scientific" axiology relates and distinguishes, in this way, economics, ethics, aesthetics, and sociology. The same can be shown for the other fourteen fields of value.

Hartman tells us in a stirring passage in <u>The Structure of Value</u>:

> The relation between aesthetics and economics is, as indicated, that between intrinsic and extrinsic

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[25] Ibid., p. 114.

[26] Ibid., p. 264.

[27] Ibid., p. 311.

> value applied to individual things. Because intrinsic value is infinitely more valuable than extrinsic value--in the precise sense of "infinitely more" that is defined by the difference between $.\overline{0}$ and $.\overline{1}$ --aesthetic value is infinitely more valuable than economic value. It is, therefore, infinitely more valuable to consider a thing aesthetically than to consider it economically; and therefore my enjoyment of viewing my Orozco is of an infinitely greater value than any sum of money that might be offered me for it. And the buying and selling of works of art has nothing to do with aesthetics.
>
> The difference between ethics and sociology is the difference between intrinsic valuation applied to individual persons and extrinsic valuation applied to groups. As can be demonstrated, the value of a person is infinitely higher than that of a group. It is infinitely more valuable, in the strictly-defined sense of infinity to be a morally good person than to be a good member of society.[28]

It is therefore extremely bad to confuse aesthetics and economic values and ethical and economic values. It is extremely bad to subordinate an aesthetical or ethical value to an economic or sociological value. When this occurs, the system that so subordinates or confuses intrinsic and extrinsic value is a bad system and ought to be made better.[29]

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[28] Ibid., pp. 114-115.

[29] Ibid.

CHAPTER II

INTRINSIC VALUE

Uniqueness, Goodness, and Perfection relate to intrinsic value, extrinsic value, and systemic value in that order. Corresponding to Uniqueness, Goodness, and Perfection are individuality, particularity, and generality. The individual valued through intrinsic value is more concrete than the individual valued as a member of an empirical class, that is, valued extrinsically. Of course, the individual seen extrinsically as a particular example of a class is more concrete than the individual described systemically simply as fitting or not fitting the definition of a concept within a system.

Having discussed the various aspects of value, let us turn to intrinsic value per se. To value something intrinsically is to value that thing in its concreteness, in its individuality. At the same time, Hartman holds that knowledge of the concrete does not lie in the concrete. As natural science developed through ever higher and higher abstraction, it returned to the world of facts with a renewed ability to analyze concrete facts. Thus, Hartman maintains that the same holds true in the sphere of morals as well. But since good is not a descriptive property byt a logical one, it cannot be grasped by the senses. Here there is an analogy to be drawn between value science and modern quantum phenomenon. We do not analyze good as a thing in the way an archaeologist might examine an ancient tool; we set the boundaries and elluci-date the environment of the particular value phenomenon at hand. Hence Hartman says:

> The unreality or nondescriptiveness of good is like an uncertainty relation of moral science. The only way to penetrate to goodness is by the eye of the mind, a Gedanken experiment in the sense of Planck, an

> intuition in the sense of Moore. One has to capture its formal structure. [30]

What then is the formal structure of intrinsic value? Most of the sections of The Structure of Value in which the topic of intrinsic value is discussed concern themselves with the formal structure of the dimension of value; the relation of systemic to extrinsic to intrinsic value. Where intrinsic value is discussed per se it is discussed in relation to these other dimensions of value. Hartman, in these passages, enjoins us to accept the virtues of intrinsic value and the growth of the human spirit. Those of us who were already convinced that the essential and highest goal of the human was toward experiences of ever heightened awareness and consciousness found in Hartman a compatriot, and a compatriot who expressed a difficult and complex position in a straightforward fashion. But others found Hartman to be merely eccentric.

On page 265 of The Structure of Value, Hartman discusses the phenomenon of intrinsic value in detail and attempts to answer the question of how a continuum can be a set of predicates. It will be recalled that in our discussion of goodness we described valuation as the process of matching sets of predicates in the mind with sets of properties in the thing which can be said to fulfill that concept. If Hartman is correct in his assertion that intrinsic value is a continuum, what sort of relationship has this continuum to the thing and its properties said to be valued intrinsically? A continuum as it is used here is to be understood as the obverse of discursive. The singular as

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[30] Ibid., p. 145.

a continuum is reached on what may be mathematically described as the $\aleph$-$\aleph_0'$ level of specification, that is, the level of the concrete. The content of the concrete is $2^{\aleph_0'} = \aleph_1'$, which we have seen above is the formulation of intrinsic value, the level of the singular concept. "The singular as a continuum is theoretically reached on level - , where the content is $2^{\aleph_0'} = \aleph_1'$. If in this case $\aleph = \aleph_0'$, the level of abstraction is either 0 or any level from 1 to $\aleph_0'$ since $\aleph_0' - \aleph_0'$ may be any value from 0 to $\aleph_0'$. In the first case--if the level of abstraction is 0--the differentiation $\aleph_1'$ means the concrete individual. In the second--if the degree of abstraction is higher than zero--it means the ideal individual: any statement used as axiom"[31] Thus to value anything intrinsically is to value that thing <u>itself</u>, that thing <u>singularly</u>. Such valuation is valuation of the concrete, valuation with our feet firmly planted on the ground, so to speak.

The synthetic concept is a concept of perfection or non-value. The synthetic concept contains no properties at all, only formal relations. The singular, since it contains an infinity of properties that are not denumerable cannot be discursive. It is unlike both analytic concepts and synthetic concepts, but it is more meaningful than either. It is for us a continuum and a <u>Gestalt</u>.[32] Singularity and uniqueness arise from this <u>Gestalt</u> quality of a thing. Systemically, Old Rover is a dog or not a dog; extrinsically, he is a dog but not much of one since he is old, slow, almost toothless; but intrinsically he is the dog of my childhood with whom I used to take long walks, etc., etc. As such, he

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[31] Ibid., pp. 201-202.

[32] Ibid., p. 195.

is irreplaceable even though at his death I might bring in a dog that fulfills the intension of the concept "dog" much better. We can thus value Old Rover systemically, extrinsically, or intrinsically, employing the synthetic, the analytic, or the singular. But though we have unpacked the difference between intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic value, we have not as yet answered the question: "How can the structure of the singular intension be expressed in logical terms?"[33]

On page 266 of The Structure of Value, Hartman tells us that

> The intension of the singular ought to be discursive, that is, it should be constituted by individual words. Yet, the set of such words ought to form a continuous non-discursive whole. This means that the singular intension must be constituted by discursive elements which are understood nondiscursively, or by nondiscursive elements which are understood discursively, whereby 'discursive' we understand denumerability of logical elements. In sum, the singular intension is a discursive set of nondiscursive elements, or a nondiscursive set of discursive elements. This logical formulation corresponds to the mathematical formula $2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_1$; the nondenumerable (nondiscursive) set $\aleph_1$ consists of all possible arrangements of denumerable (discursive) sets $\aleph_0$.

If this be true, concepts possess nondiscursive meaning by all possible arrangements of concepts with discursive meanings. Yet how can objects of value in human experience move from being valued extrinsically to being valued intrinsically? It is true that we value some things intrinsically, or at least that we value some things more highly than others as valuable in and of themselves. But the relativist would hold that the fact that I see so very much in Old Rover is due not to any inherent value in the thing but to my emotional and psychological make-up. And while we understand Hartman's attempt to systematize and

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[33] Ibid., p. 266.

analyze such intrinsic valuing by Cantorian set theory, and while we understand that the set theoretical formula $2^{\aleph_0} = 2^{\aleph_1}$, is true by set theory, it is not so clear how human experience follows set theory. It appears that the experience of intrinsic value does not follow so smoothly the set theoretical formula as it first seems. Indeed it seems that the transition from extrinsic to intrinsic value, far from being smooth, is a veritable quantum leap. Over and above all possible arrangements of concepts with discursive meanings, it would seem that the nondiscursive is a completely different dimension of value, evading description in terms of discursive sets. This would appear to be true as timelessness is not a function of time but the absence of the categories of time. Likewise, it would appear that a continuum is just the absence of discursive elements rather than their incorporation. How can the total possible arrangements of things in space and time equal something that is outside space and time and not be amenable to the discursive categories descriptive of space and time?

As an example of concepts with nondiscursive meanings that come about by all the possible arrangements of concepts with discursive meanings, Hartman chooses metaphors. "A metaphor is a word of the ordinary discursive language used as a predicate with a nondiscursive meaning."[34] When we use the term "a peach" metaphorically we do not refer to the definition of "peach" in the technical (systemic) or ordinary (extrinsic) sense. A word used as a metaphor can theoretically be used to replace any word in ordinary language, as: "a peach of a car" or "a peach of a girl". The metaphor as a set lacks definition and extension, i.e. it is

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[34] Ibid.

not amenable to extrinsic and systemic classifications. Hartman tells us that as such, a metaphor set can mean "anything and nothing".[35] A metaphor is an example of a nondenumerable infinity, the example of the set theoretical intrinsic continuum in human experience. It is a set of predicates used as a variable.[36] In this way Hartman argues that a continuum can be a set of predicates. This is how the structure of the singular intension can be expressed in logical terms. A metaphor is the paradigm of intrinsic value, and metaphor can be described set theoretically; hence intrinsic value can be described set theoretically.

But as we have argued before, it would seem that a metaphor is a leap in meaning if it is a meaning at all and not a transition in meaning. It is such a leap that in mystical experience, an example that Hartman himself gives for intrinsic value and metaphorical experience, all "meaning" in the usual sense of that term may be said to be non-existent, though something like import or vivacity of experience might be enlivened rather than diminished. Though the set theoretical formula $2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_1$ is unquestionably correct, we must state with more precision the relationship of that formula to human experience. The example of metaphor used throughout The Structure of Value is helpful but not sufficient to the job of ellucidating this relationship, for it remains that experiences such as creative experiences and mystical experiences are not explicable in terms of space and time. But how these experiences are explicable is not clear in The Structure of Value.

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

We are fortunate that Hartman did not drop his studies here but continued to investigate intrinsic value until his death. In his paper "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," he returned to the question of intrinsic value in greater detail. His intent in this paper was to analyze intrinsic value in the same way, that is the same orderly, clear-sighted way, that the total value phenomenon was analyzed in The Structure of Value. He attempted to investigate the relation of intrinsic value to extrinsic value, or more correctly, the relation of intrinsic space and time to extrinsic space and time of ordinary experience.

> Thus not only may each intrinsic experience be analyzed in its structural uniqueness but also in its structural similarity with other such unique self-contained worlds; so that the totality of Intrinsic Value, in spite of the absolute uniqueness and closure in itself of each of these values yet may form one Universal of Intrinsic Value. [37]

The universe of intrinsic value is not a system similar to the physical system of the natural universe; it is non-natural rather than natural. In this it is similar to a mathematical or musical system as we have pointed out before, in fact, this is precisely what we mean when we speak of the non-natural character of intrinsic value. From the standpoint of logic, a metaphor is a predicate used as a variable just as it was in The Structure of Value. But that is not enough--there is more to it than that. The metaphorical meanings of "peach" are not just the dictionary definitions of peach: they are the dictionary definition of "peach" transformed, not merely a word of the ordinary discursive language used as a predicate with a nondiscursive meaning as it was in

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[37] Robert S. Hartman, "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," in Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 81.

The Structure of Value. But before we can say what this transformation is, we must first discuss the logical structure of intrinsic value as it is explained in the intrinsic value paper. We can then attempt to show that intrinsic value corresponds arithmetically to a continuum (which was maintained in The Structure of Value) and "topologically" to a continuum.[38]

In "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value", Hartman stresses his belief that intrinsic value is beyond the space-time world and that human experience is richer in qualities than mere classification and organization would allow. Often one is reminded of Eckhart who at one point in a sermon said "as far as the soul's creature nature goes, there is no truth, but I hold that there is something more than creature nature in the soul."[39] It is this "more" that Hartman sought to grasp and understand. To Hartman, living in space and time, valuing systemically or extrinsically, meant living among classifications and categories placed upon the world by the mind. It was only in intrinsic value that we were able to compenetrate the world in its uniqueness. To this end he had to redefine the definition of metaphor found in The Structure of Value, metaphor as a set of predicates used as a variable. In the later paper, metaphor is seen as a set of predicates "each of which has a 'neighborhood' that remains invariant in the transformation of the metaphor."[40] In The Structure of Value, it appeared that metaphor

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[38]Ibid., p. 90.

[39]Raymond Bernard Blakney, Meister Eckhart, A Modern Translation, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1941), p. 195.

[40]Hartman, "Axiometric Structure," p. 83.

was purely intentional, hence there was a problem of how, in treating a thing metaphorically, we treated it uniquely and singularly. But in the later paper it becomes clear that even though the metaphor is transformed it keeps the core of its meaning. It is intensional and extensional. Intentionally the metaphor may assume many meanings...a peach of a car, a peach of a girl, etc. But extensionally it is the subjects that these meanings characterize.[41] The intension and the extension are intimately intertwined. As the intension increases so does the extension and vice versa. When Emily Dickinson writes

> I dwell in Possibility-
> A fairer House than Prose-
> More numerous of Windows-
> Superior- for doors-

she does not mean to suggest that there is a physical space of possibility, that she is happier when she lives in a small yellow house than when she lives in an apartment in the city--such a suggestion would be ludicrous. "Possibility" as she uses it here means intrinsic value. These four lines capture a life, its hopes and successes, its despair and its failures in greater detail, in greater "density" than forty pages of matter of fact propositions. In fact, metaphor enables us to express intrinsic value in its infinite variety.[42]

But in the poem from Dickinson, "possibility" never loses its original meaning completely. We are not using "possibility" according to its exact dictionary meaning, but neither are we misusing it. The spirit of a word is as important as its letter just as the letter of the

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[41] Ibid., p. 83.

[42] Ibid., p. 84.

law is nothing apart from the spirit of the law. The kernel of "possibility" is found in Dickinson's poem just as a germ cell is found in the plant seed. The original meaning of "possibility" is not lost in its metaphorical transformation by the poet. The definition as openendedness, as hope, remains at the core of "possibility" in the poem. The original meaning is not changed, but it is transformed, deepened, enlivened. When we speak of someone having great possibility, or when we speak of our lives as suffused with possibility, all of these things Hartman says "are members in the set of topological transformations...rather than members of the logical class..."[43]

The dictionary definition of metaphor suggests that it is the application of a word to an object or word it does not literally denote. In this application, the meaning becomes transformed as well, even though its core meaning remains the same. Metaphors refer to nondenumerably transfinite things in their singularity, the properties of which are infinitely allignable and infinitely transformable. As such, a thing it is what Hartman calls a dynamic universe, "a concrescence of ever transforming totalities."[44]

In denumerable infinite or transfinite intension, the topological points are denumerable because each predicate was abstracted from two things which had it in common. The predicates of "horse" are abstracted from several things which had them in common. Thus results our definition of value as matching sets of predicates in the mind with with sets of properties in the thing. We match on a correspondence

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[43]Ibid., p. 84.

[44]Ibid., p. 86.

level. We match predicates with properties from which results a good, fair, or poor representative of the thing. We match the intension which is in the mind to properties having a counterpart in space and time. Thus the class properties of a house make it a house rather than my house. These properties are not perceptual properties at all, but "in here" in my house or that singular, unique thing in front of me. But there is more to a thing than class properties. There is also what Hartman calls the continuous thing nature of a thing. And as in the example of "possibility" as metaphor above, the thing's spatio-temporal nature serves as the core or focal point upon which we "match" the characteristics of the singular, the thing nature of a thing. If I map my automobile or house or friend upon this core meaning, they assume the form of space-time per se, i. e., the goodness or badness of my auto, house, or friend. This form is ruled by the normative concept "automobile," "house," "friend."

But at the same time, it seems that matching the singular in front of me with abstract models for such a thing does not exhaust the intension of the singular in front of me. As we have seen, it is often true that a thing has great value even when its properties do not match on a one to one correspondence with the predicates of an abstract model. I have a deep affection for my dog though he possesses few of the characteristics of the best examples of the breed. I love my wife as much as I would love her if she possessed all the attributes of the model girl.

In nondenumerable transfinite intensions, whenever we value intrinsically, we are not interested in demarcating a thing's properties.

Here we have the thing as continuum, and its counterpart, the continuum of predicates. The continuum of predicates, the intension of the intrinsic, can be "mapped" upon anything whatsoever because the thing is independent of space and time. In extrinsic value there can only be as many correspondences between models and things or subsets of predicates and their corresponding properties as the space-time substratum permits. And even though the individual singular thing is in space and time, its worth is not trapped there by distinctions possible in the space and time world.

> In non-denumerably transfinite intensions the independence from space and time brings it about that we may map the total intension, as a continuous Gestalt, on any thing whatsoever...I may map the totality of the form "Dorothy" upon heaven--I see Dorothy in the stars--and vice versa that of "heaven" upon Dorothy; I may homeomorphically transform the one into the other. There is no limit to the range of possible transformations. We are here in a realm outside of space and time, of a fullness incomparably richer than that of space-time experience, precisely because unhampered by spatio-temporal limitations. We are in the realm of imagination, but an imagination guided and directed by the exact laws of intensional topological invariance. This invariance brings it about that we never lose reality, the literal meaning of the metaphor, but are tied to it in all the convolutions of imaginative "trips", as Ariadne was in her walk through the labyrinth. For this reason, all that happens in metaphorical imagination appears to, and actually does, happen to us. We are beyond and yet within reality. We are in the realm of intrinsic value. [45]

Each intrinsic value to Hartman is a world unto itself, a world beyond space and time; a Gestalt of meaning beyond the systemic, extrinsic, and ordinary meaning, a world beyond fact but more factual, more immediate than fact.

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[45] Ibid., p. 90.

We have found that the metaphor is a predicate used as a variable, but further, that this was not all there was to metaphor. Metaphor is the meaning of the ordinary, transformed. Not only does a metaphor "stand" for another word or concept, but it transforms it also. To go back to the lines from Emily Dickinson's poem, "I dwell in possibility," the sentence means more than a proposition like "Imagination is more worthwhile than fact." Or, "I live in a world of imagination." Both of these propositions can be ellucidated by defining each word, each intent, my psychological history, etc. But "I dwell in possibility, a fairer house than prose."--The words in this statement are transformed even though their original meanings remain invariant. The word is not extended; only meaning is extended.

As another example, the opening line of Christian Morgenstern's poem, "The Seagulls," reads, "The seagulls by their looks suggest that Emma is their name." It is clear that this cannot be reduced to a synthetic or analytic proposition in any conventional way. Convention is simply not rich enough in this respect, and to assume that it is to make of creative endeavor into a pecumiary endeavor that it most certainly is not. I think I can see that it is true that seagulls do look like their name is Emma, but it is not true simply because of the proposition itself, nor is it true as purely matter of fact. Hartman calls metaphorical propositions "synlytic,"--a proposition in which subject and predicate are densely intertwined, not analytically contained or synthetically associated."[46] Metaphorical statements are

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[46]Ibid., p. 91.

too dense or intertwined to fit the model of analytic or synthetic statements.

What we have said about metaphor holds true for any element of an aesthetic work whether it be poetry, or painting, or music. Ultimately the metaphor, whatever its medium, is the essence of the aesthetic. The aesthetic work is a world within itself having its own space-time relations. They are outside of normal space and time, yet they are just as ordered as anything within normal space and time. Each element of a work of art is a living unit. This living colony of art is due to what we have discussed as the unlimited transformability of the unit metaphor. The richness of a work of art as compared with ordinary mundane experience is due to this infinite, as opposed to finite, transformability of meaning. In keeping with this, we find Hartman saying that "The liegeman who met the lord of Helsingor had less of an experience than we who partake of the tribulations of Shakespeare's Hamlet."[47] This is because as a work of art Hamlet is dense and intertwined.

In the world of intrinsic value, subject and object form one close unity or continuum. When viewing Van Gogh's peasants, line and paint virtually disappear; what remains is the life of man and what a fragile desert flower that life is. In a work of art, the notes, the lines, the words, the voices, are all lifted from the ordinary context of ordinary things and given new life. Art raises the ordinary lifeless experience in its hands.

In "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," Hartman has made his position on intrinsic value much clearer. Intrinsic value is

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[47] Ibid., p. 96.

found in the Lebenswelt, but as intrinsic value, it is not part of the Lebenswelt. It is as if it were on the border of experience continually expanding experience and meaning. We view the object or world as a Gestalt, a singular intension. We view the continuous thing nature of the thing as it is, i. e., beyond space and time. Even so, this Gestalt can be expressed logically. It can be expressed in terms of the logic of sets. This can be expressed by saying that Old Rover has a topological as well as a logical nature; he is a dog as possessing ears, tail, bark, teeth, etc. But the most significant thing about Old Rover is not touched by the enumeration of dog characteristics. He is my childhood pet, friend. Any metaphorical meaning, then, can be said to be contingent upon, but not limited to, the ordinary dictionary meaning of a term. The dynamic of the intrinsic, that is, my love for Old Rover, the fact that I can immerse myself in a poem by Holderin, or a painting by Van Gogh, is the most significant part of my relationship to these things. The fact that Rover is a champion hunter and has papers, or that my Van Gogh painting cost an exorbitant amount of money, or has lots of pretty colors and some novel combinations of these colors that his Dutch predecessors could not match, is pale beside the love and timeless character of these things.

CHAPTER III

CREATIVITY AND INTRINSIC VALUE

Tell Serret that I should be desperate if my figures were correct, tell him that I do not want them to be correct, tell him I mean that if one photographs a digger he certainly would not be digging then. Tell him that I adore the figures of Michelangelo though the legs are undoubtedly too long, the hips and backsides too large. Tell him that, for me, Millet and Lehrmitte are the real artists, for the very reason that they do not paint things as they are, traced in a dry analytical way, but as they--Millet, Lehrmitte, Michelangelo--feel them. Tell him that my great longing is to learn to make those very incorrectnesses, those deviations, remodellings, changes of reality, so that they may become, yes, untruth if you like--but more true than the literal truth.

- Van Gogh
  Letter to Theo; Muenen,
  July 1885
  The Letters of Vincent Van Gogh

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[48]Vincent Van Gogh, The Letters of Vincent Van Gogh, (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 236.

In the rest of our work we will content ourselves with an analysis of creativity as such. Perhaps it will not always be traced in a dry analytical way, as Van Gogh says, but perhaps the reader has come to understand, if he did not at the beginning, that it is not only the job of the philosopher to reason, but to breathe the life into that reason so that it might in the words of Goethe draw us upward.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, Hartman's science of value begins by making a practical application of Cantorian set theory... "formal value theory is set theory applied to predicates rather than to subjects."[49]

One characteristic of value is having the ability to match sets of predicates in the mind with sets of properties in the thing, but further being able to identify with the thing valued. Hartman finds that "the dimensions of value--systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic--arise from the relation, in combinatorial analysis, of finite and infinite sets. There are possibly three kinds of intensional sets: finite sets, denumerably infinite sets, and non-denumerably infinite sets (with cardinalities n, $\aleph_0$, $2^{\aleph_0}$, respectively). Each of these kinds of sets defines a specific kind of intension; and the fulfillment of each such intension defines a specific kind of value."[50] N intensional sets define formal concepts such as that of a circle; $\aleph_0$ intensional sets define abstract concepts such as house; $2^{\aleph_0}$ intensional sets define singular concepts. The things that correspond to such singular concepts are

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[49]Hartman, "Value Structure of Creativity," p. 250.

[50]Ibid., p. 253.

unique.[51] They are not formal concepts, or words of analytic intension, they are Gestalten.

Just as this mobility of properties is what makes valuation possible, it is the play with properties that makes creativity possible. The combination of these properties is valuation and creativity.

As an example of this play with properties, let us examine an illustration of creativity in N. R. Hanson's book Patterns of Discovery. Borrowing from an essay by Charles Sanders Peirce, Hanson suggests a third level of logic which he, following Peirce, calls abduction. While deduction deals with what must be the case, and induction with what actually is the case, abduction deals with what perhaps is. Both Peirce and Hanson go on to suggest that Kepler's insight into Brahae's data on Mercury was the single greatest example of abductional reasoning in the history of science. From his own account in his annals, Kepler seems to have seen the path that Mercury traversed around the sun as an ellipse after many weeks of intense work and consideration. And it is undeniable that this tense thought was decisive in the final Gestalt or organization of the data.

Hanson informs us that

> Kepler was half-inclined to ascribe the errors to imperfections in the method of areas. But he slowly came to suspect that perhaps his predecessors of the previous 2000 years were hasty in thinking the planatory orbits circular. Hindsight makes us underestimate the strength of this ancient maxim; Kepler's challenge seems natural to us. But no bolder exercise of imagination was ever required: Kepler dared to "pull the pattern" away from all the astronomical thinking there had ever been. Not even the conceptual upsets of our century of natural science required such

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[51] Ibid., p. 256.

> a break with the past. Before Kepler, circular motion was to the concept of planet as 'tangibility' is to our concept of 'physical object'. If intangible physical objects are inconceivable to us, so were noncircular planetary orbits to Kepler's predecessors, and contemporaries. Remember, Tycho and Galileo never made this break.[52]

It is exactly this tense thought, force of mind, and willingness to question and break with tradition which characterizes true creativity, the ability to stand alone and give an account of oneself. This point is perhaps captured best in the poem to Kepler by Eduard Morike which was quoted at the beginning of this thesis.

I remember seeing a photograph in earlier years of psychologist Erik Erickson seated in his office; across the desk was a photograph of his wife over the surface of which he had written the words "Die Schone." Again, this is illustrative of the Gestalt of which Hartman speaks. To Erickson this was the picture of The Beautiful. Such a state of affairs is infinities piled upon infinities ($\aleph_0' = \aleph_1'$). Things corresponding to $\aleph_1'$ are unique; uniqueness is the first intrinsic in the Cantorian cardinality continuum ($\aleph_0', \aleph_1', \aleph_2', \aleph_3' \ldots \aleph_\omega'$), it is the first level of intrinsic value. In the table of secondary value combinations in The Structure of Value (page 272), the three highest rankings of compositions of secondary value combinations contain some aspect of the creative process. Creativity, then, is part of the continuum of the highest dimension of value and as part of the continuum of intrinsic value infinities, there is a possibility of ever more powerful intensional levels of creativity. This is so because

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[52]Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 74-75.

creativity is seeing a thing in its uniqueness; and as we have seen, seeing that thing in its uniqueness is to stop valuing it extrinsically and to start valuing it intrinsically. The creator looks upon the extrinsic as intrinsic. Thus, Old Rover as a class member is perhaps a shabby mutt, but as my Old Rover, he is unique as one of a kind, as meaningful and profound as something to which I have a tacit relationship. As we stand to Old Rover, so we can stand to a thing: Rover is that puppy among others at the kennel, who was much smaller than the rest, so small that we pitied him. He is the guard dog that pulled me from the burning barn, he is "Old Rover." In the same way, we can stand to a thing in ever-increasing richness--a process of enrichment: n , 2^n 2^n , 2^{2n} ... $\aleph_0$, $\aleph_1$, $\aleph_2$, $\aleph_3$ ... $\aleph_\omega$. If the creator looks upon the extrinsic as intrinsic, then it must be as an identify of two infinities--perhaps as the continuum $\aleph_0$, $\aleph_1$, $\aleph_2$, $\aleph_3$ ... $\aleph_\omega$ represented as without superscripts and equalling $\aleph_1$, as in Cantorian set theory. Hartman suggests that "creativity is this intrinsic process" the "compenetrating of subject and object...joining of two infinities."[53] It is seeing self as "compenetrating" with object in space and time-- a co-mingling of all possible aspects of $\aleph_0$ and $\aleph_1$; this is the true meaning of uniqueness and the essence of value. Thus, Old Rover is an intrinsic thing simply because I am in a creative relationship with him, he is $\aleph_0$ and $\aleph_1$ for me. I see Rover as intrinsically valuable; I have in one sense "become the thing or object by compenetrating with the infinity of (my) being the infinity of the thing's own being."[54]

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[53] Hartman, "Value Structure of Creativity," p. 259.

[54] Ibid.

I see Rover as intrinsically valuable in the same way that I see a Van Gogh or Monet landscape: I really become lost in viewing that thing in the same way I become lost in a Beethoven string quartet. This is why to Hartman creativity in the final analysis is the concentrated sensitivity of the full living human person, and the reason that the fully living human person is a morally good person.[55] He is one who values intrinsically to his fullest potential. For this person, every good act done with a pure heart has an aesthetic ring to it--as my love for my wife and every aesthetic object is of incomparable goodness.

The history of aesthetics and science is full of examples of creativity. The seeing of Kepler mentioned above is of this class. Kepler saw the condensation of Brahae's data in an axiom, as the function of the simplest curve accounting for the data. In this instance, Kepler saw the singular and its "compenetration" with the infinite, hence Hartman's statement: "The axiom, thus is of a different dimension than the category, in the exact mathematical sense that one axiom is worth an infinity of categories."[56] In aesthetics, Van Gogh, as well as Kepler, is a good case in point. Van Gogh has in many works an uncanny ability to heal the harshness and the suffering of his peasant subjects, simply by depicting them in the light of his feeling for them, his "empathic and empatic" feeling for them. The harshness that is present in the perception and its crystalization on the canvas is overshadowed by the love and empathy of the creator. The "Miners' Wives Carrying Coal" is such a Gestalt of healing.

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[55] Ibid., p. 257.

[56] Hartman, Structure of Value, p. 91.

> The original idea or conception of the work is differentiated in the creative process into ever more distinct yet related details, until the whole becomes a Gestalt, a continuum whose character mirrors that of its creator. The original meaning called idea, conception, intuition, inspiration and the like, is a "foreshortened meaning" of the whole, a perception "at a glance of the reasoning as a whole," "the important moment" where "the impulse toward a certain goal is clearly envisaged" (Sessions) and the whole work is contained in a flash of "blinding clarity, so that it only remained to write down what appeared as in a revelation." [57]

The great German poet, Ranier Maria Rilke, writes of his experiences in writing the Sonnets to Orpheus that perhaps they were...

> the most mysterious...in the way they came up and entrusted themselves to me, the most enigmatic dictation I have ever held through and achieved: the whole first part was written down in a single breathless act of obedience, between the 2nd and 5th of February, without one word being doubtful or having to be changed. And this at a time when I had prepared myself for another big work and was already busy with that, too. How should one not increase in reverence and infinite gratitude over such experiences in one's own existence? [58]

Such strife for resolution, to an end, is not isolated to scientific endeavors or literary or artistic endeavors.[59] It seems to me that the struggles that Einstein went through before the 1905 paper on electrodynamics, the struggles that Beethoven went through to write his music, and the struggles that Buddha underwent before the bodi tree, are not different in quality. Thomas Kuhn and others have suggested that this creative search to solve anomaly is the moving force behind

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[57] Ibid., pp. 260-261.

[58] M. D. Herter Norton, Sonnets to Orpheus, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 7.

[59] Hartman, Structure of Value, P. 223.

scientific endeavors. The attempt to remove incongruities and anomalies is often the motivating factor behind the shift to a new paradigm. The incongruities of classical mechanics in respect to the bending of light rays and the perihellion of Mercury are directly responsible for their resolution in the relativity theory. In a profound sense, both art and science are involved with what Kuhn calls "puzzle solving."

We have discussed before, (Introduction), and it should be clear from what we have said, how Galileo raised the power of Aristotelian concepts. He raised them by intensive abstraction to the level of symbolic function. He did this by seeing in the data a possible order to be expressed by a symbol with a greater power than the analytic concept. The symbolic function is a lesser number with a greater intension, as a logarithm exponent is to the number it expresses--as the exponent of 100 to the base of 10 is 2. Analytic intensions' number of properties is $P = \log_2 N$. Even though synthetic intension corresponds to the system and the number of the system's properties is expressed as $P = \log_2 N$, this in turn can be expressed as the intension of an axiom and in this way has the number of properties of $2^{\aleph_1}$. That is, "extrinsic value bears to intrinsic value the logarithmic relationship that systemic value bears to extrinsic value; for $2^{\aleph_0} = 2^{\aleph_1}$, which latter, $2^{\aleph_1}$, is the cardinality of singular intension whose fulfillment is intrinsic value."[60] This is, of course, non-denumerally infinite as well as being in possession of the intensive abstraction of the systemic intension. This is to be contrasted with extrinsic values whose characteristic is analytic intension with an infinite number of properties,

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[60]Ibid., p. 225.

call them n with extrinsic value types n, 2^n, 2^{2n} ... $\aleph_0$. These are the infinite variational sets of properties that make up experience--set theory applied to sets of properties.

Intrinsic value possesses the same intensive abstraction as systemic value because systemic value is a lower type fact to intrinsic value--"The thing as having N properties is a fact; but as having those same n properties regarded as one set among 2^n - 1 possible sets, is a value."[61] Systemic value is consequently the systemic "fact" of intrinsic value.[62]

Having shown that intrinsic value has the power of intensive abstraction on the order of an axiom, it should be easy to state what relationship the beginning of a creative work (whether that creative work be in ethics or aesthetics, or science) has to the working out of the idea: The beginning is to the end as systemic is to intrinsic described above.

If value and fact are well ordered (I am here assuming an ordinal alignment of fact and value in the cardinality continuum)--according to Cantor if ordinals are well ordered, then they are equal or less than equal, then according to set theory the cardinals of the continuum $\aleph_0$, $\aleph_1$, $\aleph_2$, $\aleph_3$ ... $\aleph_\omega$ are comparable in the same way as the ordinals fact and value of $\aleph_1$ are comparable. There must be a hierarchy ex-

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[61] Hartman, Structure of Value, p. 218.

[62] A similar point was made on page 22 where we said that intrinsic value was the most corporeal form of valuation. But in this case, the degree of abstraction is higher than 0. We can see why it is true what we said in that discussion that as natural science developed through even higher and higher abstraction it returned to the corporeal with a renewed capability of explaining most fully the physical world. This was Newton's greatest insight though it remained a serendipitous, almost tacit discovery until recently.

pressed by continuum $\mathfrak{c}_0, \mathfrak{c}_1, \mathfrak{c}_2, \mathfrak{c}_3 \ldots \mathfrak{c}_\omega$. Infinities can be heaped upon infinities as value is heaped upon fact as expressed by the formula $V_c = 2^{n-1}n$.[63]

At this point, the meaning of the statement of p. 261 of "The Value Structure of Creativity" becomes clear: "The concrete individual as well as his work may then be defined as the extension of an intension with infinite content...In abstraction, though, I may be the one who abstracts, my being is uninvolved. I say that a chair is a good chair without the urgent desire to use it; but on the other hand, I cannot value it intrinsically without at the same time desiring to use it. This 'desiring its use' has a wider sense than the mere desire to seat myself in it. It means total identification."[64] In the process of creativity or in the intrinsic value relationship to any thing, total indentification is required.

We can perhaps now realize the uniqueness of our standing in relation to Old Rover as well as objects of art or closures in science, distinctive touches in general, things which have a high degree of intense involvement of subject and object.

> In the case of a non-repeatable form (the individual in its individuality) these properties are non-discursive and form a continuum. And in the case of a repeatable form (that common to a group of particulars) and, hence, discrete. They are not, however, seen as discrete when one appreciates the uniqueness of the common form, for in such an experience the connotation of the common form becomes non-discursive and thus a continuum. [65]

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[63] Hartman, Structure of Value, p. 228.

[64] Hartman, "Value Structure of Creativity," p. 263.

[65] Value and Valuation; Axiological Studies in Honor of Robert S. Hartman. Ed. by John William Davis, (1st ed.) Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1972. p. 344.

Subjectivist aesthetic theories hold that there are no unique-making, beauty-making, etc. properties of things. What is real in the "judgement," "That is beautiful," is the response character of the statement. There are no beautiful properties, only subjective responses. Objectivist theories, on the other hand, hold that instead of beauty being in the eye of the beholder, it is in the object; value is inherent in the object itself and not in the enjoyment of the object. If we assume the correctness of Hartman's analysis, these polar positions dissolve. Separately, neither subjectivist theory nor objectivist theory is sufficient to provide an understanding of aesthetics. Subjectivist theory is not sufficient because we have seen that a thing possesses certain descriptive properties and is intrinsically valued because it possesses certain permutations and combinations; the fact of the possession of such properties is a value; fact is a sub-species of value. Objective theory is not sufficient because value is not value apart from a valuer; properties are properties of aesthetic things only as a class $\mathcal{L}_0$ of abstract concepts or as a continuum $\mathcal{L}_1$ of singular concepts. The first value is a value of the fulfillment of a thing by an abstract concept, the latter is the value of the thing itself, the value Gestalt--the "seeing" of self as an intrinsic value on a continuum of intrinsic value. To value thusly is to become involved as Rilke became involved, as Eckhart became involved. We are, in intrinsic value, one with what we do, with what we say with our own being.

CONCLUSION

To Hartman, as we have seen, the two ingredients in creativity are self-identification and hetero-identification including analogical thinking. Self-identification is the most important task of our aesthetic or moral life because without self-identification we cannot identify fully with any other thing.[66] Simply to BE is a task in which we shall want all our courage, for our lives are a compendum of extraneous influences. We accomplish our goal just to Be only through intensified effort and trial and error, guided by reason. Hartman would have found Schiller's idea that man is characterized on the one hand by the play impulse and on the other by the twofold seriousness of duty and destiny quite congenial.[67] He would also have found Heraclitus' teaching of law in becoming and of play in necessity quite agreeable.[68] Self-identification is just being ourselves and enriching our treasure by adherence to the task of knowing ourselves, of finding our places in nature.

This process of enrichment does not stop with self knowledge, however. Hetero-identification is necessary, connected with analogical thinking, to that process or enrichment. Able to identify with himself, the creative person is able to identify with a problem:

> In identifying himself with a problem the creative person imposes on an unrelated collection of items

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[66] Hartman, Value Structure of Creativity," p. 257.

[67] Friedrich Schiller, The Aesthetic Education of Man, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1965).

[68] Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy In The Tragic Age of the Greeks, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1969).

> his own uniqueness--he molds the mass of items in his own image. At the same time, in identifying himself with the material, he transforms his own uniqueness into this material...The material, in turn, takes on the law of the self. [69]

Things, in this process, become persons, and persons increase geometrically in richness of properties. The different items of the problem that the creative person confronts conform to a pattern brought to bear upon them by the uniqueness of the creative person's self awareness. He experiences this as a serendipitous experience guided as if by an invisible hand and rolling toward a conclusion. This thought is captured in a poem by Nietzsche in Ecce Homo:

> My soul, a stringed instrument, sang to itself, invisibly touched, a secret gondola song, quivering with iridescent happiness.--Did anyone listen to it? [70]

There is an urge for unification, for release, for closure, and there is hard work and often extreme tension involved in the suspension before the end result is realized. After the suspension there is a final release where "the urge to see these elements as one, as a whole, and unique" is over.[71] To Hartman, then, "we thus may define creativity as the capacity of translating the extrinsic into the intrinsic."[72]

This process began by our becoming aware of ourselves, by following the ancient maxim of the oracle to "know thyself," and translates to the maxim of Hartman to know all things in their uniqueness, to

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[69] Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann, Ecce Homo, (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 252.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Hartman, "Value Structure of Creativity," p. 258.

[72] Ibid.

transform what is stolid and mundane into individuality and uniqueness. And what we intrinsically value becomes part of our own personality. For Robert Smithson, his plans for the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport became an expression of his own immense feeling of timelessness, and "the biggest airport in the world became a speck in the Texas prairie."[73] For Herman Hesse, man's search for meaning is an actual, physical wandering and searching. And in Hartman's own example, when Van Gogh saw a chair it became an "expression of his own being." The melancholy of the artist and the melancholy of the chair were one.

> A simple chair or table, seen in its own intrinsic self hood is a most complex thing--as complex as a human being; and this is the reason one has first to be fully oneself, to identify oneself with oneself, before one can identify himself with something outside himself. [74]

There is a further problem connected with the process of hetero-identification and analogical thinking: the question of perception and the metaphor of the artist as a wanderer are imperative in the fullest understanding of Hartman's discussion. How do the problems that creativity must surmount arise? The topic has come to be discussed among many contemporary artists and their critics, and it was always a topic of discussion in German literary circles. The metaphor of the wanderer is due more to Goethe, Holderin, Hesse, and Nietzsche than to any other. The topic of perception or "seeing" has arisen in discussions in the Twentieth Century by artists and poets. For instance, in a poem written in 1924, Rilke speaks:

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[73]Rolf-Dieter Herrmann, "In Search of a Cosmological Dimension: Robert Smithson's Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Project," in Arts, May, 1978.

[74]Hartman, "Value Structure of Creativity," p. 258.

> Stretch your practiced powers like arms of lyres
> till they reach, until they span contradictions.--
> For the god requires helpful counsel from the man.[75]

Both of these topics are intimately connected though. The creative person sees problems because he has an essentially experimental attitude toward life. He has no home in the world of extrinsic value. In Holderin's thinking, he is the intermediary between men and gods--he is child of earth and heaven--he is earthbound though his spirit soars. The contemporary artist Josef Albers captures the unity of these two points when he insists that

> the creative process remains a secret, a wonder. But we might speculate that creativeness is the lucky readiness to feel, to sense, to see an opportunity--to discover and to invent. In other words, it is to be aware and keen, to be sensitive and flexible . enough not to miss the chance of finding and presenting a new idea, a new seeing. [76]

Albers reiterates our feeling that in the creative act the world is held in suspension, we experience in the very marrow of our bones the "lucky readiness to feel." Our life is a wandering and a looking.

> The aim of art;
> Revelation and evocation of vision. [77]

Again he says, "I scarcely believe that art can be taught directly. But you can do a lot to become more 'sensitive,' to get more sensitive eyes. To look again and again, that's it."[78]

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[75]Walter Kaufmann, Twenty German Poets, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 239.

[76]"Josef Albers", in Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 8, 1974, p. 68.

[77]Ibid., p. 69.

[78]Ibid., p. 70.

One is reminded of Hesse's image of the artist as a wanderer, a perpetual vagabond, for whom sights and sounds are like the sights and sounds of a foreign country that one visits for the first time. But Hesse builds another metaphor on top of the wanderer image--the wanderer in a strange land--the wonderer and the wanderer:

> This is the house where I say goodbye. For a long time I won't see another house like this one. You see I'm approaching a pass in the Alps, and here the northern German architecture, and the German countryside, and the German language come to an end.
>
> How lovely it is to cross such a boundary. The wandering man becomes a primitive man in so many ways, in the same way that the nomad is more primitive than the farmer. But the longing to get on the other side of everything already settled, this makes me and everybody like me, a road sign to the future. [79]

To Hartman, the "creative person is one who essentially lives in the intrinsic realm and who is in the extrinsic a kind of guest."[80]

The creative person is truly "a man who searches and not a man who keeps. He is open to innumerable possibilities including anomaly, paradox, and incomprehensibility. He does not reject these out of hand, but accepts and acts toward them in the way a sculptor reacts to a formless piece of clay, in the way that Michelangelo was said to have reacted to his artistic material. The creative man also forms his life with the same care, gives it style (Ausdruckweise), as in Nietzsche. He accepts incomprehensibility as a creative challenge; he does not reject it flatly in favor of some imposed order. Both order and chaos and comprehensibility and incomprehensibility are looked upon as attributes of

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[79]Hermann Hesse, Wandering, Trans. by James Wright, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1972), p. 5.

[80]Hartman, "Value Structure of Creativity," p. 265.

nature and hence the creative person sees himself not as the conqueror of nature but as a partner in its unfolding. We do not have to mention the practical consequences of this way of thinking for our present crisis in the environment. And as we have pointed out it all begins with the process of enrichment, the intensified looking and attention of the great artist and scientist. To see the distinction between what might be called ordinary creativity and extraordinary inventions, discoveries, and problems overcome in art and science, or for that matter any other field of human endeavor, with the incomparable richness of emotion in Othello and Faust, Kepler and Einstein.

Hartman's aesthetics of experience announces to all of us: "Do not hold to your pseudo-existence in the extrinsic." The task of the creative person is not limited to the origination and having of original thoughts and projects, however. The task expands to the necessity of, after having transformed ourselves, our ideas and objects, the transformation of the world. This transformation requires the same concentrated effort that was required in the transformation of the self. This task is not new in Hartman; it is expressed in Nietzsche as our duty to see ourselves in, and then to transform nature; it is expressed by Dewey as the desire to make what is instrumental consummatory; and it is found in most sensitive persons but it reaches perhaps its most concentrated form in Hartman. What count for "virtues" in our time, he tells us, are high technical (systemic) skills and high commercial (extrinsic) skills, with a dirth of awareness before the richness and wonders that surround us. [81] Modern man, perhaps as never before in history, is

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[81] Ibid., p. 264.

clearly an aesthetic, moral, and religious faddist, almost maniacal in his drive. Hartman's imperative that it is necessary in the strongest sense of that term to transform the systemic and extrinsic into the intrinsic is perhaps, then, his most important contribution. It is this imperative which enshrouds his aesthetics and value theory with its dynamic force.

In "The Value Structure of Creativity," he argues that it is our task to raise the present level of consciousness which is extrinsic to the level of the intrinsic. This mirrors the historical progress of man from his primitive systemic valuations to his present extrinsic valuation, and the physical progress of man from his childhood which is innured with systemic valuation to his adult extrinsic valuation capabilities. Modern man is certainly an organization man as William H. Whyte, Jr., maintains, though his growth need not stop in the extrinsic. We must make of this organization man, modern man, a being as primitive as the first hominid that climbed down from the trees and stepped onto the ancient delta. The level of intrinsic value is the logoi man is to reach for next.

"From the point of view of intrinsic, extrinsic value, mere factuality is a scandal. The world of facts is really the world of abstractions, classifications, fragments of things combined to units which exist only in the mind."[82] Hartman's interest is in transforming the world. Perhaps the program for transforming the self is clear--by concentrated seeing, open-endedness, etc. But what of the transformation of the world? Is his concern just another academic pipe-dream?

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[82]Hartman, "Axiometric Structure," p. 100.

I think not. As value and valuation go hand in hand to Hartman, so does the transformation of the self and the transformation of the world. Connected with this is to be found Hartman's belief that aesthetics and ethics can be expressed in the same idea, that is, intrinsic value applied to persons and things. It is intrinsic value which is important in both instances. Both self-identification and hetero-identification are necessary ingredients in intrinsic valuing, as we have seen. Every experience of heightened awareness gained by concentrated effort and perception, whether it be of individual persons or of individual things, leaves one with the feeling that in ordinary experience something is lacking, something is incomplete and can be made complete. This after all is the promise of the axiom of value.

> Systemic value, extrinsic value, and intrinsic value are the three value dimensions. They constitute a hierarchy or richness, intrinsic being richer in qualities than extrinsic value, extrinsic richer in qualities than systemic value. "Richer in qualities" is the definition of "better", "poorer in qualities" is the definition of "worse". The contextual definition of "ought" is: "The worse ought to be better." Hence, intrinsic is better than extrinsic value, extrinsic better than systemic value; and systemic value ought to be extrinsic value, extrinsic ought to be intrinsic value. The hierarchy of value is a valuation of value; our science specifies and elaborates systematically what the old philosophy of value only suggested, the extensional-intensional scale of richness.[83]

To take art as our example, every movement toward an aesthetic closure in the doing of art is a value in itself to the degree that that very happening is desired, and is not desired for the sake of something else. But at the same time, that repose is not all there is to art.

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[83]Hartman, Structure of Value, p. 114.

Consummation of a turbid process carries with it, so to speak, the anticipation and hope of further consummation: it is a stimulus, for one desires that all experience should have this character, that all experience should be rewarding in its own right. What else is this but the desire for a transformed world?

If we see value as a continuum, we realize that all that is consummatory is instrumental. The intrinsic has an inherent formative function, and just as any consummatory experience is not lost in any individual life, to a lesser extent, yet in some small degree that consummatory experience is not lost to the world.

> The most valuable value, that is, the value that fulfills the concept "value" most fully, is intrinsic value. Any value, thus, ought to be intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is the positive value of a value, that which the value ought to be. Any direction away from intrinsic value is negative, any direction toward or beyond it, positive. In the positive direction lie goodness and its intensifications, in the negative direction badness and its intensifications. The former, we might say, is the direction of enhancement, the latter that of debasement.[84]

If experience, if art, were only extrinsic or instrumental, it would be routine. If it were only final or intrinsic, it would not be experience in the form we are searching for--it would be a mere amusement and part-time pastime...an indulgent dissipation. Any great and encompassing art or experience is not a final end of all experience. It has an eternal quality that far supersedes the revelry of artistic experience by itself. Intrinsic value is similar to love in the poem to love written by Dickinson:

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[84]Ibid., p. 268.

> Love is like Life--merely longer
> Love is like Death during the Grave
> Love is the Fellow of the Resurrection
> Scooping up the Dust and chanting "Live"![85]

Intrinsic value calls us forth from the extrinsic and the mundane and it calls us back from the indulgent dissipations to the task of transforming the world, the extrinsic into ever heightened awareness, and even the intrinsic to even higher intrinsics. The intrinsic in its greatest and finest form includes this instrumental drive. It teaches us to be aware of new modes of perception, to seek new and better experiences and a new and better world.

What is important to Hartman is richness of properties, to recall our earlier chapters. He sees value as a development of properties; those things possessing the richest most subtle properties, and the growth of the individual to higher and higher acquaintance with richness of properties, are what he values the most. Value and valuation go hand in hand.

Plato chided the artists and thinkers of Greece because their experiences were thin and meaningless. They mistook insight for a cheap and easy alternative to intellect and consequently they lacked intellect and cheapened emotion. In contrast to the easy and the spiritless, Plato raised the image of Socrates who certainly possessed a high degree of insight, but an insight bought with intense struggle, the insight of one who is thoroughly acquainted with his subject. Socrates had experienced both sides of pleasure, the highest and the low, consequently he was capable of the clearest judgement even about extrinsic

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[85]Emily Dickinson, Final Harvest, Emily Dickinson's Poems, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 120.

and systemic affairs. His range is the total range of human experience. He must have seen the limitations of the space-time world, he must have been open to higher and higher, more multifarious experiences that may bracket the world of the extrinsic. But we cannot stop here to contemplate if we are to grasp what Hartman means for the world; we have a job to perform. Even though the extrinsic must be our vocation, the intrinsic is our life, our bread and wine. This is nothing more than the open-ended approach that we have spoken of so often, the acceptance of paradox, the incomprehensible, the timeless. Once this is understood, the form, if not the content of Hartman's work, emerges. What is important is the having of these experiences and the furthering of these experiences in the world, the attempt to see new and varied things, the sharpening of perception, the education of the senses, the concrescence in the object, in Albers' words "the lucky readiness to feel, to sense, to see an opportunity." Life becomes simply what it was in the beginning, a game, a playing that allows us to experience with wonder the reality of the world in its completeness.

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