






To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Philip Charles Kronk entitled "A Reanalysis of the Leopold-Loeb Psychiatric Trial Testimony: An Object Relations Theory and Borderline State Perspective." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.




Harold J. Fine, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:



Accepted for the Council:



Vice Chancellor
Graduate Studies and Research

A REANALYSIS OF THE LEOPOLD-LOEB

PSYCHIATRIC TRIAL TESTIMONY:

**AN OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY AND
BORDERLINE STATE PERSPECTIVE**

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Philip Charles Kronk

August 1978

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A Ph.D. dissertation is both an ending and a beginning, a sign of accomplishment and an opportunity for further growth. This dissertation reflects the four years of study and training I have had at The University of Tennessee. There are a number of teachers and supervisors I would like to acknowledge.

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Many psychologists have been role models for me over the last four years, but two, Drs. Norman Rasch and Jack Byrne, have always had a special integrity and competence that made clinical psychology for me a profession of service as well as a science of behavior.

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and understanding. To my beloved grandparents, aunts and uncles, thank you for many years of concern and love.

Finally, to my wife, Ann, a special person, who makes my successes sweet, my pains bearable, and my future hopeful.

The purpose of this study was to reexamine the psychiatric

testimony of the 1924 Leopold-Loeb trial from the perspective of object relations theory and the borderline state.

The object relational theories of Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip were used as a theoretical framework. The historical literature on the borderline state was summarized, and two variants of borderline functioning, the narcissistic character disorder and the schizoid-paranoid borderline individual were explored through the clinical theories of Kernberg and Kohut.

The Leopold-Loeb trial was a milestone in American jurisprudence because it was the first time that psychiatric testimony was used as a mitigating defense. The psychiatric testimony by some of America's most eminent psychiatrists reflected the developmental and psychopathological theories of that era in psychiatry. It was a mixture of an instinctually-oriented psychoanalysis and of a physiologically-

based psychiatry. An object relations reanalysis of the psychiatric testimony reveals that Leopold and Loeb were neither psychotic or neurotic. They were variants of a borderline level of functioning.

Loeb reveals himself to be a primitive, narcissistic character disorder, while Leopold is a borderline individual with paranoid and schizoid features. Only in the last ten years has the borderline category become accepted as a distinct diagnostic entity. The psychiatrists at the trial did not have access to this clinical data, nor had

psychoanalytic theory advanced from an id-oriented metapsychology to the present emphasis on ego psychology.

The early developmental background of both boys is reexamined in the study from an object relations viewpoint. Their early use of splitting and their development of a false-self system is discussed. Their developing pathology is seen as a reflection of their internal object world. Leopold and Loeb are seen as lacking a strong, integrated ego, and only together do they form a functioning unit. Their crime and lives are examined as examples of their inner schizoid and narcissistic cores. The murder of Bobby Franks was a way for them to play out a deep, internalized conflict arising from the dynamics of their character structures. Their overall, immature development is reflected in the many ways that they used transitional objects. Their sexual activity is viewed as an imperfect, but very important, relationship that gave them a sense of integration and kept them from regressing to more early primitive, internalized object relationships.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
I. THE CRIME	3
Richard Loeb	4
Nathan Leopold	7
II. THE TRIAL	12
The Psychiatric Testimony	19
Analysis of the 1924 Psychiatric Testimony	22
III. QUESTIONS	37
IV. OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY	43
Melanie Klein	50
The two worlds of man	52
The interaction of the two worlds of man	54
Fairbairn	58
Theory of development	58
Personality dynamics: our internal world	60
The endopsychic structure	63
The schizoid position and psychopathology	65
Goals of object relations therapy	68
Donald W. Winnicott	69
Dependency	70
Growth and the "good-enough mother"	71
The capacity to be alone	72
The false self	73
Being and doing	76
Transitional phenomenon	78
Play	80
Harry Guntrip	82
Psychoanalysis with Fairbairn and Winnicott	82
The aim of therapy: genuine relating	83
The schizoid problem	85
V. THE BORDERLINE STATE	87
Early Psychoanalytic Literature	93
Statistical and Epidemiological Aspects	99
Kernberg	103

CHAPTER	PAGE
Splitting	104
Other diagnostic aspects	106
The narcissistic personality	108
Heinz Kohut	109
VI. THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE	112
VII. A REANALYSIS OF LEOPOLD AND LOEB	117
Early Mothering	118
Their Developing Pathology	122
VIII. THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES: AN OBJECT RELATIONS INTERPRETATION	135
Transitional Aspects	149
Adolescence and Regression	158
IX. AN OBJECT RELATIONS ANALYSIS OF LEOPOLD'S AND LOEB'S SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP	164
X. PSYCHOANALYTIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS . . .	172
The Insanity Plea	174
Psychoanalytic and Psychological Implications	178
REFERENCES	180
VITA	191

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to utilize object relations theory to reexamine the psychiatric testimony in a milestone American trial. While American psychoanalytic theorists as Kernberg and Kohut will be covered, the focus will be on the British School of Object Relations and such writers as Fairbairn, Winnicott and Guntrip.

The dissertation is divided into three major sections. The first section presents the details of the 1924 Leopold-Loeb trial, including a summary analysis of the trial's medical reports, the psychiatric testimony, daily newspaper accounts, and a summary of Leopold's and Loeb's individual backgrounds. The section ends with a number of questions that I feel have not been answered by the psychiatric trial testimony. The Leopold-Loeb trial was an important judicial landmark because it was the first time that psychiatric evidence was used by the defense as a mitigating defense argument. The 1924 psychiatric analysis of Leopold's and Loeb's relationship and crime is a reflection of the id-oriented, psychosexual psychoanalysis of that era. It is the opinion of this writer that a reanalysis of the psychiatric data from an object relations, ego psychological viewpoint can better explain the nature of Leopold's and Loeb's relationship. The second section, therefore, is a summary of major object relations theorists as well as an examination of the literature on the borderline state. The third section reexamines Leopold's and Loeb's relationship utilizing such object relational concepts as ego and object splitting, endopsychic

structure, the false self system, transitional phenomena, inadequate early mothering, the schizoid-paranoid position, and the narcissistic and borderline personality structures. A final section concludes with the implications for psychology, psychoanalysis and law that this study may contribute.

CHAPTER I

THE CRIME

Bobby Franks lived the first fourteen years of his life amidst great wealth and comfort. He was the son of a multimillionaire who had settled his family in Chicago's prestigious Kenwood section. There at the Harvard School for young boys, Bobby played and studied as a student: cocky, well-liked, alive and open to life.

The city of Chicago reported 177 murders between January and July in the year 1924 (Chicago Daily Tribune, July 22, 1924, p. 3). Violent, sudden death was a daily experience of the inhabitants of Chicago. Bobby Franks' kidnapping and murder during May of 1924, however, was an event that would shock Chicago and would come to be known as the "crime of the century." The public was outraged by the murder, and the newspapers and the State demanded the only punishment able to cleanse the young, bloodied victim—the death of the two murderers.

What energized and shocked the public was not the age of the victim, nor the manner of his death. (Young Franks was repeatedly spiked on the skull with a pointed iron bar, although the official cause of death was listed as suffocation and internal bleeding.) What angered, disgusted and frightened the public in 1924, and what draws us today to this crime in a morbid, curious manner are the two young boys who planned and committed the murder. Leopold and Loeb: wealthy, well-bred, genius-level sons of millionaires. Leopold and Loeb: laughing and giggling their way through a trial in which Clarence Darrow was attempting to

save them from a sentence of death. Leopold and Loeb: unable to furnish a motive, to admit insanity, to claim responsibility, to suffer guilt, and to express regret.

Who were these three boys? They were, first of all, members of a wealthy, select group of Chicago's Jewish community. Jacob Franks was an elderly man who had made his fortune in such diverse investment ventures as a watch company, real estate, and a pawnshop. Rejected by Chicago's Jewish high society for this less than acceptable background, Jacob Franks' interests had centered mainly on his family and his investments as he approached his sixty-eight year. Bobby Franks was the youngest of Jacob Franks three children. He was a bright, popular boy, and his future looked very promising. Two boys would deny the fulfillment of that promise. Who were Leopold and Loeb?

Richard Loeb¹

In 1924 Richard Loeb was an eighteen year old postgraduate history student at the University of Chicago. Loeb's father was an executive at Sears, Roebuck and Company. There was little that Richard grew up without in the manner of luxuries and physical pleasure. He lived in a large mansion on the south side of Chicago during the school year, and he spent his summers at the family estate in Charlevoix. (The newspaper's photographs revealed Charlevoix to be a massive, stone

¹The following information on Leopold and Loeb is based on Higdon (1975), Sellers (1926), McKernan (1957), and daily 1924 newspaper accounts of their trial.

castle.) Leob's grandfather had been an abusive, child-beating German Jewish father, and Loeb's own father had reacted by being just the opposite with Richard and his brothers. Though Loeb Sr. reportedly played very little with Richard during his early childhood, he also placed very few demands on his son. Richard's mother was a German Catholic woman, but it appears that she was well received by the German Jewish community. The Loeb fortune was estimated in 1924 to be worth around four million dollars. Young Richard was given a monthly allowance of two hundred and fifty dollars; he also had a personal bank account of three thousand dollars, as well as "a standing order from his father to the family secretary that 'Dickie' was to be given a check for any sum of money at any time without question" (Stone, 1941, p. 435). This easy access to such large amounts of cash would later make it difficult for the prosecution to prove that Leopold and Loeb planned the kidnapping for the ransom money.

Richard Loeb, the third youngest of four boys, grew up as a sickly child until around the age of four and a half. He was a strong lad by the age of nine, and was considered charming and cute by those who met him. At the age of four and a half Richard's family employed a governess, a Miss Struthers, whom the court's medical report would describe as having "definite ideas of strictness and obedience. She was prompt with her punishments, but never excessively severe, and she never used corporal punishment" (McKernan, 1957, p. 66). Richard had greeted her arrival by locking her in a room, and the governess had responded with a unique punishment for young Richard—she forced him to sit in a

chair instead of playing. In order to deal with what the young boy must have considered a masterful keeper, Richard soon formed the habit of lying, and soon developed into a pathological liar.

Richard, years later, would comment that "With all her faults . . . she loved me intensely and felt she was doing it for my betterment." He added, however, that "When she left I sort of broke loose." Miss Struthers soon applied her discipline and watchfulness in the areas of Richard's school work. Her constant and consistent tutoring soon advanced him intellectually beyond other children his age. She continued also to accompany Richard to school until the fourth or fifth grade, and tended to isolate him from playing and interacting with the other boys, acts which would lead to later charges against her that she had "effeminized" Loeb.

Loeb attended the University of Chicago Laboratory, an experimental prep school for both the elementary and high school student. After graduation, he attended the University of Michigan, entering at fourteen and graduating with a B.A. in history three years later. Though intellectually gifted, Richard performed only adequately in college, attaining no honors and preferring to spend his summers in a carefree manner at the family estate in Charlevoix. It became obvious that when Miss Struthers left the Loeb household around Richard's fifteenth birthday he was unable to furnish the motivation needed to be a scholarly student.

Having skipped a number of grades in elementary and high school, Richard soon found himself three and four years younger than most of his

college classmates. The campus in the prohibition days mirrored the mood of the country's youth: thrill-seeking and rebellious. Richard began to copy the behaviors of his older classmates; learning how to drink alcohol and to make love to girls. By the age of fifteen he had contracted gonorrhea, joined a popular fraternity, and begun an intimate friendship with Leopold. Loeb was able to attract friends easily. His wealth, love of fun, his ingratiating ways and good looks made those who knew him unable to accept the fact that he had planned and committed the murder of another young boy for no motive or apparent reason. These same people would later be more shocked to learn from the trial's testimony and medical report on Loeb that he was, and had been for many years, a thief, a compulsive fire setter, a pathological liar and a pervert! The public could, however, easily picture Loeb's companion and codefendant as someone who could have wielded the murder weapon that killed Bobby Franks. Who was this disliked boy?

Nathan Leopold

Nathan Leopold was also the son of a millionaire. His parents were German Jews. Leopold's father, Nathan Leopold, Sr., was a retired box manufacturer, and like Loeb's father, he showered his sons with many material luxuries. Young Leopold was given a monthly allowance of about one hundred and twenty-five dollars; he had his own car, the use of the family chauffeur, as well as many charge accounts.

Leopold was precocious from a very early age, a fact which some psychiatrists would later see as proof of his neurological abnormality.

Leopold began to walk reportedly at three months, and he spoke his first words at four and a half months. Sickly as a child, he quickly turned to books in order to feel superior to his playmates. He advanced rapidly in school, graduating with a B.A., Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Chicago at the age of eighteen. (He is considered by some to be Chicago's youngest graduate at that time.) Young Leopold had many intellectual loves, two of them being ornithology and philology. His collection of over 3,000 bird specimens in his own home reflected his avid interest in bird collecting. Small talks to professional groups and to the public were a way he found to share this interest with others. An early paper of his on the rare Kirtland's Warbler was published in the 1924 volume of Auk (1924, 44-48), when Leopold was merely nineteen years of age. Leopold's love of birds was matched only by his compulsion to learn new languages, and by his college graduation he had studied fifteen languages intensively, being able to speak five of them fluently. Although he was considered conceited and arrogant, Leopold was able to gather around him a circle of acquaintances who respected him for his intellectual abilities.

Nathan Leopold, the youngest of three boys, was born on November 19, 1904. Known affectionately to his family as "Babe," Leopold was very sickly from birth, having problems with his thyroid, difficulties with "controlling" his blood vessels, as well as adrenal insufficiency. Leopold also suffered until he was nine years of age from gastrointestinal disorders, with complications of fever, headaches and vomiting. Another report cited by the Hulbert-Bowman Report stated

that he had a "predisposition" to Bright's disease, which involves inflammation of the kidneys. Leopold was constantly bothered by a number of severe skin conditions. During 1920, he is reported to have had three undiagnosed severe skin disorders, resembling chicken pox, measles and scarlet fever, as well as a severe case of hives. Another curious incident surrounds his perception of his tonsil operation at the age of nine. In Leopold's words: "Before I had my tonsils out I was a girl; after, I became like a little boy" (McKernan, 1957, p. 44).

Though Leopold was the third son born alive, he was the sixth of as many pregnancies. Leopold's mother was ill during his pregnancy, and remained a semi-invalid until her death seventeen years later. Her death would cause Leopold great sorrow and grief. At the time of the trial Leopold was described as "small in stature . . . prominent eyes, coarse hair . . . round-shouldered, flat-footed, with a protuberant abdomen" (Stone, 1941, pp. 436-437). The most striking features about Leopold appears to be his eyes. Their physiognomic structure gave Leopold a haunted and piercing look.

Leopold also grew up surrounded by governesses. His first governess was hired by the Leopold household when Nathan was six months old; she was to stay for five years. A second governess stayed for only six months, while the third, Mathilda "Sweetie" Wantz, was to be the governess who would have a considerable influence on young Leopold. She was a suspicious, homely, immature woman who exposed herself sexually to Leopold; she is also reported to have encouraged him to steal.

Leopold began school at about six years of age. Both Leopold and Loeb were tutored at an early age by governesses, and both entered school with an advanced state of knowledge and information. Leopold's first school was one which had once been coeducational, but was a girl's school at his entrance. Reports vary, but there seem to have been one or two other male students at the school. Leopold was brought to school by a nurse; he was also not allowed to use the school's toilet. At eight he transferred to the Harvard Preparatory School. Leopold soon developed an early interest in ornithology and languages, attempting in the latter discipline at one time to learn how to say "yes" in as many languages as possible. His knowledge of languages included German, French, Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Umbrian, Russian, Spanish, Modern Greek and Oscan.

Leopold entered the University of Chicago at the age of sixteen, stayed for one year, transferred to the University of Michigan to be with Loeb, subsequently fought with him, and returned to Chicago, where he received his degree at age nineteen. After one term of graduate work, Leopold entered the University of Chicago Law School, where he was passed by special examination directly into the second year curriculum. Leopold was always a brilliant student academically, a contrast to Loeb who chose just to "get by." Leopold reportedly spent only an hour and a half studying a day, and was often inattentive in the classroom. His doodlings and drawings done in the classroom, and later analyzed by the court's psychiatrists, reflect where some of his mental energy was going. Much of the material reflects religious

preoccupations, but later college notebooks include "headless bodies, dissected penises, and crucifixion scenes" (Hidgon, 1975, p. 197).

Hidgon (1975, p. 149) states that although they had lived in the same neighborhood, Leopold and Loeb "did not know each other, or at least did not know each other well, until the fall of 1920." A few months later in February of 1921, they had their first homosexual experience together on a train ride to Loeb's summer estate at Charlevoix. They also began their career of crime, although Loeb had been active for some years as a petty thief. They stole objects of all types and shapes ranging from a hotel tennis trophy to department store pipes to automobiles on the street. Other random delinquent acts included throwing bricks through store windows, turning in false fire alarms, and setting fires. Loeb enjoyed arson because he could return to the scene of the crime and prove how clever he was to himself. He sneered at the crowd's wrong guesses as to the fire's origins, and enjoyed "a great feeling of satisfaction from the fact that he knew the real solution to the mystery and nobody else did." More serious burglaries involving the breaking into and entering of fraternity houses would follow.

CHAPTER II

THE TRIAL

The 1920's in America were a time of materialism, prosperity and change. The Great World War was over and the Great Depression was in the future. "The business of America," said President Coolidge, "is business." The labor unions did not always share in these rewards and the 1920's were a period of industrial unrest. In 1922 coal-miners and railroad shopmen would leave almost a million men out of work when they went on strike. Labor would lose important leadership with Samuel Gompers' death in 1924.

The 1920's are remembered as a period when moral codes were discarded and inhibitions let loose. Government scandals as the Teapot Dome mirrored public crime. Langsam (1954) notes that:

Private crimes came to be everyday topics of conversation and the official misdeeds merely reflected on a large scale what happened privately on a smaller scale. In 1921 there was said to have been one major bank robbery per day throughout the country, while one automobile of every 22 in Chicago and every 30 in New York was stolen. "Burglary-insurance rates in American cities were fifteen to twenty times as high as in England," and "the homicide rate of the United States was sixteen times that of England and Wales." Machine guns and sawed-off shotguns were among the weapons employed by postwar criminals. The custom of levying tribute under threat of violence was revived as a widespread source of illegal income under the name of "racketeering."

"Flaming youth" flaunted the 18th Amendment, drinking alcohol in public and in speakeasies. Women raised their skirts and used cosmetics and lipsticks. Theda Bara's portrayal of The Vamp became an image that young girls copied. F. Scott Fitzgerald's portrayal of the

meaninglessness of this period is reflected in This Side of Paradise (1920) and The Great Gatsby (1925). The 1920's were a time when people cared about pleasure more than moral structures. H. L. Mencken used his American Mercury magazine to poke fun at almost everyone connected with tradition, while intellectuals pointed to Sigmund Freud's theory of repression as proof that rebellion was necessary. The pursuit of pleasure took many forms. Talking pictures began in 1927 with Al Jolson in The Jazz Singers. Radio broadcasting to the public began in 1921. Five years later there would be over 600 radio stations in America. On the college campuses, students bobbed their hair, listened to jazz, drank gin, and petted in public. The public was always waiting for that next thrill. Leopold and Loeb would provide it.

The long awaited trial of the People vs Richard A. Loeb and Nathan F. Leopold, Jr. began on July 21, 1924. The charges of murder and kidnapping each brought a maximum penalty of death or a minimum sentence of fourteen years of imprisonment. The state's prosecutor, Robert E. Crowe, was pushing for the death penalty. Opposing Crowe was Clarence Darrow, all of sixty-seven years. Darrow had saved one hundred and two individuals from the death sentence in his long career. Could he save Leopold and Loeb? Crowe, who was running for reelection under the slogan "To make life, children, and property safe in Cook County," had the backing of the newspapers as well as the general public. Crowe, as a judge himself, had sentenced to death a murderer of a young five year old girl; he would go to his grave believing that Leopold and Loeb should have suffered the same fate.

Members of both boys' families accompanied the defense attorneys. Leopold's father and oldest brother gave him strong but silent moral support. In the following weeks both families would come under great pressure and shame as their sons were minutely examined by Chicago's newspapers. Only Nathan F. Leopold, Sr., looking pathetic and beaten, would escape the scathing criticisms of the newspapers in the weeks to come. Richard Loeb's uncle, Jacob Loeb, accompanied by Richard's brother, Allan, represented the Loeb family interests. Loeb's father, claiming a severe illness, would never come to the trial. Loeb's mother would come to visit Richard while he was in jail after Darrow demanded more support from the Loeb family.

Many had speculated that Leopold's and Loeb's attorneys would enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The insanity plea had been an integral part of the English common law system. Rubin (1975) notes that "the first recorded insanity acquittal in English law occurred about 1,000 years ago." The public was angered that a "million dollar defense" team would intimidate the court into a verdict of less than full justice. Helping to fan these fires of discontent were newspaper articles such as the one that appeared in the July 19, 1924 Chicago Daily Tribune (p. 1) and which related that the defense would pick a rare psychiatric disease, "folie a'deux," to free the boys from any punishment. Darrow attempted to quiet these false leads. He asserted:

We want to state frankly that no one in this case believed that these defendants should be released or are competent to be. We believe that they should be permanently isolated from society, and if we as lawyers, thought differently their families would not permit us to do otherwise. (Chicago Daily Tribune, July 22, 1924, p. 2)

Daily newspaper photos of Leopold and Loeb also did not aid the defenses's attempts to defuse the public's anger. Most of these pictures, like the later trial photographs, would show the boys smiling and laughing. They look attractive, well dressed and well fed. Above all, they look amused, as if they are actually enjoying themselves. During the actual trial they would laugh at witnesses, especially those of below average intelligence or those with foreign accents. The prosecution would not miss these incidents to add to their argument that the boys were in full control of their judgement, and had been at the time of the crime, therefore, demanding the full penalty of the law. A joint statement by Drs. Krohn and Singer, two psychiatrists on the payroll of the prosecution, reflects the argument to be used against the boys during the trial:

Anyone who recognizes social rights as Leopold did must also recognize individual rights—the individual's right to life. He must sense the worth of actions, the worth of values. If he kills, robs another of an individual right, he does so with understanding and malice. If he can weigh ounces, he can weigh pounds. (Chicago Daily Tribune, July 26, 1924, p. 2)

The state's lawyers expected a plea of not guilty because of insanity, and they were prepared to launch a strong counter argument. Clarence Darrow, therefore, stunned the courtroom that July day by entering a plea of guilty. In spite of the guilty plea, however, the law stated that the prosecution still had to "prove" the crime. The defense, in turn, would attempt to prove that the boys' mental state and personality makeup were a mitigating aspect.

It was Darrow's contention (Darrow, 1932, p. 234) that he did not wish to contest the sanity or insanity of the boys. In his autobiography, he stated that "We did believe and sought to show that their minds were not normal and never have been normal" (Darrow, 1932, p. 234). Never before had psychiatric testimony been introduced as a mitigating defense. Higdon (1975) notes that while there had been related cases in Alabama and Colorado, there had been no decisions on the use of psychiatric testimony as a mitigating defense by the United States Supreme Court or an Illinois court. On that hot July day Clarence Darrow argued:

The statute provides, your honor, that evidence may be offered in mitigation of the punishment, and we shall ask at such time as the court may direct that we be permitted to offer evidence as to the mental condition of these young men, to show the degree of responsibility they had, and also to offer evidence as to the youth of these defendants, and the fact of a plea of guilty as further mitigation of the penalty in this case. With that we throw ourselves upon the mercy of this court and this court alone. (Sellers, 1926, p. 11)

While Darrow said that he would not try to prove the boys insane, he did intend "to show that our clients are mentally diseased."

In the following week (Wednesday, July 23 to Wednesday, July 30) State Attorney Crowe presented eighty-one witnesses in a meticulous, often boring, demonstration of the guilt of Leopold and Loeb. Piece by piece, Crowe and his assistants put together a puzzle scene of gruesome murder. The following background synopsis of the Franks' murder is taken from the printed newspaper confessions of Leopold and Loeb (The Daily News, June 7, 1924 & The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 6, 1924) as well as

printed excerpts in McKernan's The Amazing Crime and Trial of Leopold and Loeb (1957), originally published in 1926, and material from Seller's (1926) and Higdon's accounts (1975) of the crime.

Leopold and Loeb had planned the murder for some time before the actual attempt. Leopold would state that they had "planned a general thing of this sort . . . as long as last November," but they had no particular victim in mind. This minor fact was, again in the words of Leopold "left undecided until the day we decided to pick the most likely-looking subject that came our way. The particular case happened to be Robert Franks" (McKernan, 1957, p. 24). Fourteen year old Bobby Franks had known Richard Loeb, and had played on Loeb's home tennis court, located across from the street from Franks' own house. He was, therefore, not suspicious when Leopold and Loeb beckoned him into their car. Higdon (1975) believes that the main reason for the kidnapping was the collection of ransom, and that the murder was merely "incidental" to this scheme. The boys' easy access to large amounts of money goes against this argument. The complicated personality dynamics of these boys cannot be honed down to a single motive as ransom. The psychiatrists at the 1924 trial could not do so, and we cannot expect to do so today.

It is generally acknowledged that the idea for the kidnapping scheme was Loeb's. The Hulbert-Bowman medical report, which would be entered as evidence in the trial, noted that Loeb was angry with a boy named William and expressed these feelings of anger to Leopold on a trip back from a series of fraternity house burglaries in November of

1923. Loeb suggested kidnapping this individual William for ransom, and then killing him and destroying any identifying marks on the body. In the weeks to come, Leopold and Loeb treated the kidnapping scheme as an intellectual exercise, even though William was no longer the considered victim anymore. Each enjoyed discussing particular schemes and plans to collect the ransom, as well as particular persons to kidnap. Loeb, at one point, suggested his brother as a kidnap hostage, while Leopold wanted to kidnap and rape a girl. Both boys considered their own fathers as potential hostages. A number of other boys were proposed and then rejected for being too strong, too old, or having parents not likely to come up with the ransom. Finally Leopold and Loeb decided that the kidnap victim would be chosen later—by chance. A kidnap letter was typed up, but its address was left blank, contingent on the finding of a victim.

Leopold and Loeb would both speak of their victim as almost finding them in a random, fateful manner. Once inside their car, young Bobby was beaten a number of times on the head with a steel chisel. This did not kill him so he was pulled into the back seat where a rag was stuffed into his mouth. It appears that Bobby Franks died shortly after this. Leopold and Loeb would later disagree in their separate accounts exactly who wielded the actual blow that killed Bobby Franks that May afternoon. After the actual killing Leopold and Loeb drove the car around with the body of their young victim still inside. They removed his pants and socks at one point so that they might, in the words of Loeb, "be saved the trouble of too much undressing later on."

They also stopped to eat hot dogs, while the body of the dead boy remained inside the car. Once they reached where they wished to bury the body, Leopold and Loeb completely disrobed their victim and poured hydrochloric acid on his face and genitals. An elaborate kidnap plan that had been worked out weeks in advance was consummated. A senseless, seemingly motiveless, crime had been committed without passion and without anger. It is no wonder that the parents of Chicago's children were frightened, and that the editorials of Chicago's newspapers called for the punishment of death. Only Clarence Darrow stood between the boys and their execution. Could he present an argument or bring forth an explanation that could explain the behaviors of Leopold and Loeb?

The Psychiatric Testimony

Darrow would find his answer in psychiatry. In his own words:

. . . the defense counsel soon ascertained that both boys were suffering from extensive derangements of their emotional life or affectivity, which derangements entered into and caused the commission of a crime, and which, therefore, in a court of justice, would most naturally be a circumstance mitigating the offense. (Darrow's introduction to McKernan, 1957, p. viii)

Darrow had earlier sent an assistant defense attorney to the eightieth annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association to ask psychiatrists, or alienists as they were called in those days, to come and examine Leopold and Loeb. The publishers of the Chicago Tribune had even offered Sigmund Freud twenty-five thousand dollars to come to Chicago and "psychoanalyze" the murderers. The newspaper tycoon, Hearst, would later offer Freud any sum that he wanted as well as the

private use of an ocean liner if Freud would come and demonstrate why the boys should not be executed. In reply to these offers and inquiries, Ernest Jones reports Freud writing back:

Your telegram reached me belatedly because of being wrongly addressed. In reply, I would say that I cannot be supposed to be prepared to provide an expert opinion about persons and a deed when I have only newspaper reports to go on and have no opportunity to make a personal examination. An invitation from the Hearst Press to come to New York for the duration of the trial I have had to decline for the reasons of health. (Trilling & Marcus, 1961, p. 448)

While Sigmund Freud could not come to examine Leopold and Loeb, the defense attorneys were able to get a number of prominent psychiatrists to examine them. These clinical examinations were to be the basis of the psychiatric testimony the defense would later present in court. The alienists for the defense consisted of William Alanson White, M.D., William Healy, M.D., and Bernard Glueck, M.D. Two other psychiatrists, H. S. Hulbert, M.D., and Karl Bowman, M.D. had earlier examined Leopold and Loeb extensively and had reported their findings in a medical report known as the Hulbert-Bowman report. This amazing document, entered as evidence, represents many hours of psychiatric examination and covers such aspects as the family history, the physical history, the academic and sexual history, the early development and fantasies, and the physical examinations of each boy. Another medical report by Drs. White, Healy, Glueck and Hamill would not be entered as evidence into the courtroom proceedings. This second valuable document, however, is reprinted in McKernan (1957) and includes more clinical details concerning the mental status and fantasy life of Leopold and Loeb.

McKernan edited unprintable sexual material in her 1957 book, but Higdon (1975) has printed these more intimate details of Leopold's and Loeb's sexual relationship. Other psychiatric testimony is reprinted in Sellers (1926) book on the trial.

The defense alienists based their testimony on the Hulbert-Bowman medical report and on their clinical examinations of Leopold and Loeb. The state had also enlisted the help of psychiatrists. During the first week that they were brought into custody and confessed to the state, Leopold and Loeb were examined by Drs. Hugh Patrick, Archibald Church and William O. Krohn. The state's psychiatrists only performed a cursory and inadequate examination of the boys, but their testimony is important as a counterpoint to the testimony by the defense's psychiatrists. The psychiatrists hired by the state stressed a more neurological, and less psychodynamic, orientation.

The extensive psychiatric testimony appears to be an adequate reflection and representation of the developmental psychology and psychopathology of that era in psychiatry. As such it is diffused throughout with psychoanalytic insights of an instinctual, psychobiological, psychosexual psychology as well as neurological half-truths. It was, however, the only systematic attempt to examine the background and lifestyles of the two boys at that time. The psychological tests administered—the Monroe Silent Reading test, the Kelly-Trabue language ability test, the Proverbs test, the McAlly Cube test, the Kent-Rosanof association test—seem limited and somewhat naive judged by today's standards. The psychiatric examinations for all

their faults were a real attempt to explain the brutal crime for which Leopold and Loeb could not verbalize a motive.

Analysis of the 1924 Psychiatric Testimony

The first psychiatrist to testify was William Alanson White, M.D. White was the Superintendent of the United States Hospital for the Insane, (now called St. Elizabeths) in Washington, D.C. A nationally prominent psychiatrist, W. A. White had been an early American exponent of Freud's theory of personality. In 1914 he had organized the Washington Psychoanalytic Society, and in 1913 White started The Psychoanalytic Review, the first American journal of psychoanalysis. Although White's psychiatry textbook went through fourteen editions, his greatest contribution was his important influence on the development of such young psychiatrists as Harry Stack Sullivan, who worked under him at St. Elizabeths (Chapman, 1976).

Dr. White's opinion was that the only way to understand the murder was "by understanding the back and forth play of these two personalities as they are related to each other." "Dickie" Loeb, said White had "antisocial" and "criminalistic tendencies," which, though they had compensating value to him personally, tended to be "disintegrating and socially destructive." The antisocial tendencies that White spoke of were Loeb's fantasies that he was a master criminal or a famous criminal. These fantasies followed from and seemingly evolved from the fantasies of being in jail, which will be discussed shortly.

Being a master criminal gave Loeb intense pleasure because it made him feel superior to others in that only he, as the perpetrator, would know the exact details of a crime. Loeb fantasized himself as being the "Master Criminal Mind of the Century" and he hoped to direct "criminal operations that no detective could solve." As a master criminal he saw himself always as the leader, with one or more associates. One of the reasons that Loeb would later form an intimate relationship and close friendship with a social inferior as Leopold was that Leopold worshiped Loeb as his superior and vowed to follow his wishes. A "flesh and blood" companion in crime was more than Loeb had ever hoped to find. Loeb often would walk past different houses while he directed imaginary companions, signalling them with his hands as to which house to rob. Now he would have a live confederate to follow his orders.

White and the other defense psychiatrists were more attracted to Leopold than to Loeb. This may have been due to their respect for Leopold's native abilities as well as an understanding that he was the more complicated personality of the two. Leopold also actively engaged the psychiatrists in their examinations of him, while Loeb would lose interest easily, even falling asleep when the examiners' questions (and interest!) turned to Leopold. White testified that although the boys were chronologically nineteen years of age, Leopold could be considered the emotional equivalent of a seven or eight year old, while Loeb could be viewed as mature in judgement as a four or five year old.

White felt that because he was early viewed as a weak child, Loeb was overly protected by his governesses until he was "projected" out

into the world of others at around the age of fourteen. Unable to cope with this external world, Loeb soon took to lying, being unable in White's words to "distinguish between the real and fantastic worlds, just as he is unable to tell the truth from a lie" (White's testimony, Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 2, 1924, p. 2). This lying often took what White called a "negative" form. Loeb, for example, would tell his parents: "I was not doing what you did not want me to do," which is a rather complicated and deceptive bit of communication.

White felt that all of Loeb's life had been "in the direction of self-destruction" and that Loeb had often considered suicide. White testified concerning Loeb that:

He was the host of an infantile emotional make-up which was a long way from the possibility of functioning harmoniously with his developed intelligence. He was going in the direction of a split personality, because of this inner, unresolved conflict. (Sellers, 1926, p. 16)

The Hulbert-Bowman medical report stated that around the age of ten or eleven Loeb began to develop a specific fantasy as he lay in bed at night:

Perhaps the earliest of these was that he would picture himself in jail. He would imagine that he was being stripped of his clothing, being shoved around and being whipped. There was a great feeling of self-pity in this, but no feeling of fear. "I was abused, but it was a very pleasant thought. The punishment inflicted on me in jail was pleasant. I enjoyed being looked at through the bars, because I was a famous criminal." (McKernan, 1957, p. 70)

In Loeb's fantasy of being looked upon in jail, the onlookers were, first, often themselves naked, and secondly, often females of a young age. Loeb was reported to have had strong feelings for the underdog,

and believed that a downtrodden man in need of money "had a perfect right to take it any way he could get it" (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 2, 1924, p. 3).

Young Leopold also had vivid, intense fantasies, which would have important influences on his emotional functioning. The one fantasy which received the most notoriety concerned the "king and slave" theme. This fantasy began around age five and involved a king being in complete control of a number of slaves. Leopold fantasized himself sometimes as the king, but in about 90 percent of the fantasies he was a slave. The Hulbert-Bowman report commented on the following aspects of the king-slave fantasy:

His first account of the phantasy was that there was a king who had a slave, and the slave was intensely devoted to the king. This slave was the strongest man in the world. In some way or other, and the way varied, he saved the life of the king. The king was very grateful and wanted to give him his liberty, but the slave refused. The slave was usually comfortable as regards his living conditions, but occasionally, in some of the phantasies, the slave would be in a cell.

There were often "kings' banquets" where each king brought his body slave along to serve him. The slaves were all chained, but the patient was only chained with a tiny gold chain, which he could easily have broken. When he was in the role of a slave he was always very good-looking and very strong. Often there were combats when a champion would be picked from each side to settle a question. The patient would be selected to represent his side and would always win. In another phantasy the king would be holding court, and the patient, as his slave, would be lying at his feet. Someone would endeavor to murder the king, but the patient would prevent this.

. . . A later development was that the king would get this slave when he was a boy, even when he was a baby, at least before he was ten or eleven years of age, and before he had been completely developed physically, then the king would find the boy being beaten by cruel slave drivers, and he had been neglected until he was dirty and sick. Thereupon the

king would take the boy for his slave. After the slave had saved the king's life, the king would try to give the slave his liberty, but the slave would refuse saying that the king had saved his life. The king would then say that this had caused no effort on his part, therefore, he was entitled to no particular gratitude. The slave, however, would persist that this made no difference and would refuse to accept his liberty. (McKernan, 1957, pp. 90-91)

Leopold continually searched for a king to whom he could be subservient. His ideal was a large, muscular, beautiful boy. In Richard Loeb, he would find his "king." Loeb, in turn, would find someone who would follow and regard him as a "master criminal." Once Leopold made a chart of attributes that a perfect man would have. He gave most people about thirty or forty points, gave himself sixty-two points, but gave Loeb ninety points.

Another important area of Leopold's fantasy life involved religious themes. These fantasies may have been delusional in some of their aspects. Leopold had exhibited an early interest in religion, and had visited many different church denominations in his neighborhood. The crucifixion scene appears to have been one of the two major themes in his religious preoccupations. His college notebooks were sketched throughout with crucifixation scenes as well as pictures of dissected penises. The second area of possible delusional concern in Leopold's religious preoccupations was his feelings that his departed mother was a sainted woman.

He regarded his mother as the most superior woman. After she died he regarded his aunt practically as her equal. He confused their two identities, and confused the two of them with the Madonna. (McKernan, 1957, p. 89)

The loss of his mother caused Leopold to believe that there was no God, for how could an infallible God take his mother away from him and leave "a lot of worthless women in the world."

Leopold prayed when he was very young, but this praying was always accompanied by four sets of muscular movements, which involved wiggling his toes and heels. The movement, White would note, was the Catholic sign for the cross. Another strong belief of Leopold was his philosophy of life based loosely on Friedrich Nietzsche's idea of the superman. Leopold saw himself as such a superman, and therefore, free from the daily social rules and regulations that bound a world of ordinary people. White described Leopold's philosophy of life as a mechanistic, hedonistic, selfish one. Leopold, he felt, had early in life developed "a feeling of antagonism towards the tender emotions."

Dr. William Healy was the second alienist to testify on behalf of the defense. Healy, a graduate of Harvard and Rush Medical School, had studied in Vienna and London. An expert on juvenile delinquency, Healy had consulted to the Chicago juvenile court system from 1909 to 1917, when he had helped to develop the famous Judge Baker Foundation in Boston.

Dr. Healy saw the murder of Bobby Franks as "the result of diseased motivation." He saw Leopold as having a "paranoiac personality" and Loeb as being a pathological liar and an "unscrupulous individual," in spite of the fact that Loeb had "some well expressed and very decent ideas about girls." Healy spent part of his testimony on the sexual aspects of Leopold's and Loeb's sexual relationship. He noted that they

had met while in their fifteenth year. Each entered the relationship with specific mental peculiarities which would supplement "the other's already constituted abnormal needs in a most unique way." While drinking, and later, criminal activities would bring Leopold and Loeb close, it was their sexual relationship which would cement their bonds. Their sexual activities were the foundation for their well-known "agreement." At a period when they appeared to be on the verge of a breakup, an agreement was made stating that Loeb would allow Leopold to use his body sexually in exchange for Leopold's blind allegiance in any criminal activity that Loeb might suggest. Loeb, of course, would later suggest the murder and kidnapping scheme.

Leopold's feelings for Loeb were certainly of a homoerotic nature. Years after Loeb had been murdered in prison, Leopold still kept a picture of him on prominent display in his apartment. One is not as assured that Loeb viewed Leopold as a desirable sexual partner. Both boys experimented early with female partners, although Leopold always fantasized that his sexual partner was a man, usually Loeb. They also experimented a number of times with what Healy would call "mouth perversions," but their sexual activity together followed a specific, almost ritualized, act in which Leopold would put his penis between Loeb's legs. Loeb would at times, noted Healy, "pretend to be drunk, then this fellow would undress him and then he would almost rape him and would be furiously passionate at the time . . . " (Higdon, 1975, p. 215).

At the time of the trial it was the accepted opinion that Leopold's perversion was the result of early sexual play with his governess. Leopold's third governess came to his household when he was around six, and stayed about six years. Quoting from the Hulbert-Bowman report, Higdon (1975, p. 198) states that she exhibited her naked body before Leopold and his brother, Sam. She called her breast "ball," her nipples "strawberries" and allowed the boys to wrestle with her. It also seems that Leopold was allowed to put his penis between her legs from behind while she lay on her stomach. Higdon quotes Leopold as saying "She had a great influence over my brother and myself . . . she displaced my mother." Four years after her dismissal, Leopold's mother would die.

One area where the alienists for the state and defense clashed concerned the neurological and endocrinal basis for the emotional disorders of the boys. Although the defense psychiatrists based their testimony mainly on a psychoanalytic interpretation of the boys' behavior, they were not adverse to explaining away the boys' motivation by physiological explanations. William Healy felt that the crime was the result of "diseased" motivation, for example, and that Leopold exhibited "definite signs of nervous instability," reflected in his "greatly exaggerated use of the muscles of the face . . . many nervous gestures, ready flushings, and pallor" (Sellers, 1926, p. 20). Healy felt also that this nervous instability was due to "some pathology of the glands, of internal secretion, probably of the sympathetic nervous system" (Sellers, 1926, p. 20). Dr. Hulbert, testifying on

August 10, 1924, would state that Leopold had a "so-called neurocirculatory asthemia, or a nervous weakness, associated with a weakness of the heart and blood vessels" (Dr. Hulbert's testimony, Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 10, 1924). Hulbert later that day would testify that Leopold's endocrine disorder was responsible for "his precocious mental development, his rapid advancement through school, his ease of learning, the cruel instincts, his shallow mood and his good bearing, and particularly his mental activity and early mental development" (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 10, 1924, p. 4). Loeb did not escape Hulbert's analysis. Hulbert stated that there was a close relationship for Loeb "between his physical abnormalities, largely of the endocrine system, and his mental condition" (Sellers, 1926, p. 27).

The psychiatrists for the state were just as adamant in not accepting an endocrinal explanation for Leopold's and Loeb's aberrant development as they had not accepted the psychodynamic explanations given previously. Dr. Rollin Woodyatt, a psychiatrist for the state, would testify that psychiatry's knowledge of the endocrine glands could be "compared to the interior of Africa before Stanley went there."

Dr. Harold Hulbert, coauthor of the Hulbert-Bowman report, stressed the lack of remorse or emotion by Leopold and Loeb after the crime had been committed. The crime to Leopold had been a technical matter; he had even discussed it with his mother and had felt pleasure at her anger. Leopold was reported never to have dreamed about his crime, nor did it in any way affect or disturb his sleep patterns or dream content.

Hulbert's analysis of Leopold's personality left few emotional scars untouched. His lack of friends, his hypersensitivity to others, his superman philosophy, his sexual fantasies of torture and sadism were all minutely examined. Hulbert spoke of Leopold's longing for power, which he said was concretized when he saw his older brother in a military uniform. Leopold's king-slave fantasies would shortly follow for he also wanted to be in charge of a group of men. At the age of six, Leopold was told the story of St. Christopher, which supposedly also helped in the development of the king-slave fantasies.

Loeb's inner life was also closely examined. His petty thievery, his pathological lying, his need to talk to his teddy bear each night as he recalled the days' events were all laid bare by Dr. Hulbert's testimony. When questioned as to Leopold's motive for the crime, Hulbert would reply, "It was a desire on the part of Richard Loeb to commit a perfect crime, and a desire on his part to do whatever Richard Loeb wanted him to do" (Sellers, 1926, p. 30). It was to be an explanation that would gain wide acceptance.

In his testimony Dr. Healy would testify to the poor judgement of Leopold and Loeb. This is one common theme among the testimony of the defense psychiatrists. Here, for example, is a cross examination of Dr. Hulbert by the State's chief attorney Crowe:

Mr. Crowe: "Now, Doctor, you do not think very much of Loeb's judgement, do you?"

Dr. Hulbert: "No, sir."

Mr. Crowe: "Will you give some illustration of his lack of judgement?"

Dr. Hulbert: "Yes, sir. The greatest illustration is that, he, a boy with opportunities for higher than the average boy in Chicago, would engage himself in a life which was definitely doomed to destruction."

Mr. Crowe: "Well, that is the crime itself."

Dr. Hulbert: "Yes, that is the best example of defective judgement that I can find in him." (Sellers, 1926, p. 33)

This testimony is typical of the psychiatrists' statements concerning Leopold's and Loeb's lack of judgement in that it consists of circular reasoning. They committed the crime, therefore, they must have had poor judgement. The defense psychiatrists were unable to adequately account for the boys' high intellectual and academic achievements as well as their "poor judgement." At times the psychiatrists appear to be overwhelmed by the boys' intellectual abilities, particularly Leopold's talents. Healy is impressed by Leopold's high intelligence, and notes that "You can make out a list of twenty words and he will read them over and then he can tell the order of those words, or if you tell him any one of the words he can tell you which word came after it and which word came before it" (Sellers, 1926, p. 20). Certainly this is the tone of an admiring fan more than an objective examiner.

There is, perhaps, another reason besides the wealth, social status, and intellectual abilities of Leopold and Loeb that make the psychiatrists unable to explain adequately the crime. A clinical explanation of emotional disorder or atypical development is dependent on its theoretical underpinnings. The psychiatrists who testified on behalf of the defense were men who were committed to the growing new discipline of psychoanalysis. The prosecution's psychiatrists, in

contrast, were opposed to psychoanalysis. Their training was more traditional, reflecting the belief that there was an organic basis for emotional disorders. Psychoanalysis with its emphasis on sexual and aggressive drives, symbolic aspects of symptoms, and unconscious defensive mechanisms was considered mere tales of fiction spun in moments of fantasy. These attitudes against Freudian psychoanalysis can be seen in the cross examination of Dr. Archibald Church, one of the state's psychiatrists, by Clarence Darrow. Dr. Church, a professor of nervous and mental diseases and medical jurisprudence, was also a neurologist.

Mr. Darrow: "What do you mean by an emotion?"

Dr. Church: "Emotion is a play of feeling."

Mr. Darrow: "There is a difference between the part of the human anatomy which produces emotion and the mind, which is supposed to be the seat of reason, isn't there?"

Dr. Church: "I don't know of any such difference. No one has emotion unless he intellectually perceives it."

Mr. Darrow: "You are assuming that mind is the product of brain action?"

Dr. Church: "Yes, I believe it."

Mr. Darrow: "The mind is probably a product of the whole organism, isn't it?"

Dr. Church: "No, I don't think so."

Mr. Darrow: "Is there anything in the mind excepting the manifestations of the physical organization?"

Dr. Church: "Practically not."

Mr. Darrow: "Are there various centers in the brain for certain emotions?"

Dr. Church: "Not as far as I know. There are some who place sexual emotions in the cerebellum and others who place certain moral emotions in the large ganglia at the base, but as far as I know, there is no confirmation of these localizations."

Mr. Darrow: "Is it correct to say moral emotions?"

Dr. Church: "Well, that is descriptive of one variety of emotional action, those which pertain to the duties and obligations between men."

Mr. Darrow: "Where does one get those?"

Dr. Church: "They are usually a matter of experience or education. The ethical ideas must always be instilled in a child, because the only two emotions which he has at birth are fear of sound and fear from a sense of falling."
(Sellers, 1926, pp. 34-35)

Darrow later on specifically questioned Dr. Church on an important cornerstone of Freudian theory, the nature and importance of dreams:

Mr. Darrow: "You know something about dreams?"

Dr. Church: "Yes. I regularly inquire into the character of dreams in nervous people. According to Freud they are a very good index of character. I do not follow Freud to that degree."

Mr. Darrow: "Do you follow him to any extent?"

Dr. Church: "No. The character of the dreams, whether pleasurable or unpleasurable, has for me a significance as a reflex of the physical condition; but the content of the dream to my mind is of very little significance."

Mr. Darrow: "Do fantasies have anything to do in diagnoses?"

Dr. Church: "Yes. I think fantasies have a significance in regard to character."

Mr. Darrow: "Did you examine for any in this case?"

Dr. Church: "No." (Sellers, 1926, pp. 36-37)

When asked by the state's attorney, Sbarbaro, why he considered Loeb not insane, Dr. Church would answer:

As to Loeb. The young man was entirely oriented, he knew who he was, and where he was, and the time of day, and everything about it. His memory was extraordinary good; his logical powers as manifested during the interview was normal, and I saw no evidence of any mental disease. (McKernan, 1957, p. 139)

When asked about Leopold's mental condition, Church answered that Leopold had no evidence of mental disease because:

He was perfectly oriented, of good memory, of extreme intellectual reasoning capacity, and apparently of good judgement within the range of the subject matter. (McKernan, 1957, p. 139)

The state's alienists were not just taking their adversary role against the defendants. It appears that they were not able to view Leopold and Loeb as being psychotic at the time of their examination or at the time of the murder. If the boys were not psychotic, how else could their crime be understood. Normal and neurotic individuals don't kill a young boy without emotion or motive.

Dr. Krohn, another of the state's alienists, could not perceive the defendants as insane individuals, at least not like the insane individuals that he treated. There was no decay of their intellectual functioning, no bizarre or confused thinking, and no lack of appropriate judgement. Dr. Krohn could find no evidence of any of these signs of psychosis in Leopold and Loeb, stating as his evidence the following:

The logical sequence of the entire story as it was related, the catching up of each thread when broken by discussion, the other party interrupting, the other party to the homicide interrupting, taking up the thread of the argument, using illustrations for the purpose of enforcing the point concerning which he made appeal to the audience, a logical sequence that is rare to find in its excellence of continuity and relations.

Furthermore, the stream of thought flowed without any interruption or any break from within. There was not a single remark that was beside the point. The answer to every question was responsive. There was no irresponsive answer to any question. (McKernan, 1957, p. 58)

The state's alienists were unable to accept Leopold and Loeb as being mentally impaired because their answers were logical and responsive, their memory recall excellent, their attention span good, and because

they were perfectly oriented as to time, space and social relations.

The question to be considered was whether they were wrong or whether the theoretical basis on which they evaluated Leopold and Loeb was deficient.

CHAPTER III

QUESTIONS

Did the psychiatric testimony of both the defense and state psychiatrists adequately explain the motives, the behavior, and the developmental history of Leopold and Loeb? Was the psychoanalytic theory of the 1920's able to encompass in its developing theoretical framework two wealthy, gifted, boy-murderers, whom the psychiatrists could not agree were either neurotic or psychotic?

Let us examine the question of whether the boys were psychotic or schizophrenic. It was often stated that the defense psychiatrists believed privately that Leopold and Loeb may have been psychotic or schizophrenic. Drs. White and Glueck were said to have had this opinion. Glueck, who had diagnosed Loeb a "disintegrated personality" at one point during the trial visited Leopold after his release from prison (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 7, 1924, p. 2). Higdon (1975, pp. 338-339) notes that Glueck "returned home and told his son that his original assumption in 1924 that Leopold was a paranoid schizophrenia was still correct despite all the good work he had done in prison and afterward." Whitney Hall, who did not testify in court for the boys, wrote in his diagnostic report on them that they were "psychopathic inferiors," a condition he noted also called at times "moral imbecility," "impulsive insanity," and "moral insanity" (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 11, 1924, p. 1). "They would not be satisfied in heaven," he concluded, "and they would probably wreck

hell." Were the defense psychiatrists unable to publicly label Leopold and Loeb as schizophrenic because Clarence Darrow had decided not to use the plea of insanity? And were the prosecution's psychiatrists unable to admit that Leopold and Loeb were insane because the state sought to prove that the boys were competent (and guilty) enough to suffer the death penalty? At one point during the trial Darrow cross-examined Dr. Singer on whether Leopold or Loeb were schizophrenic.

Darrow: "What kind of person is a schizophrenic person?"

Dr. Singer: "Why a schizophrenic person is a schizophrenic kind of person." (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 17, 1924, p. 2)

Singer, when pushed by Darrow would state that Leopold and Loeb could not be schizophrenic because they were not impulsive and schizophrenics were impulsive. He reasoned that Leopold and Loeb could not be impulsive because they had planned the crime for six months.

My impression from reading the psychiatric testimony, the medical reports, and the daily newspaper accounts is that the psychiatrists were unable to view Leopold and Loeb as insane, psychotic, or schizophrenic because the boys did not fit into the then accepted psychiatric understanding of insanity or psychosis. These were not raving maniacs but two individuals with an enormous amount of cultural information gained through years of scholastic study and toil. One of them, Loeb, was not a withdrawn, autistic, youth but a popular, engaging conversationist. It appears that until they were caught, Leopold and Loeb were on the paths of successful careers. Where, then, was the progressive deterioration of Kraepelin's adolescent

schizophrenic? Where were the problems in attention, association and will that Bleuler stressed? Freud had viewed schizophrenia as a disturbance between the ego and one's environment, yet both boys functioned daily in reality, and they were not seen as psychotic by those around them.

If Leopold and Loeb could not be understood as insane, then how could their crime and lives be better conceptualized? Healy noted that:

The crime in its commission and in its background has features quite beyond anything in my experience or knowledge. There seems to have been so little normal motive, the matter was so longer planned, so unfeelingly carried out, that it represents nothing that I have ever seen or heard of before. (Healy's testimony, Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 5, 1924, p. 6)

Two lines of thought, however, seem to be analyses worth pursuing. The first idea is White's contention that the crime would only be explained adequately by examining Leopold's and Loeb's mutual relationship. In short, what they provided for each other would reflect what they each lacked separately as individuals. "The crime," said White

was the outgrowth more of Dickie's way of feeling than of Babe's. But it was maintained as a result of the intellectual agility of Babe, his insistence that quarrels should not be final, and that their relationship should not discontinue, and he was willing to make all sorts of concessions." (White's testimony, Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 3, 1924, p. 3)

White appears to be saying that Loeb supplied the feeling and Leopold the intellect and motivation. But there is another more important reason to study Leopold's and Loeb's relationship, and that is, primarily because it is a relationship. Why did Leopold need Loeb? Why did Loeb need Leopold? What did their relationship reflect of their

own individual selves, of their self-concepts, of how they saw themselves fitting into a world of people, and a world of love and hate? How did they feel about themselves? And what major events in their developmental history could have lead to these feelings? Could these two boys growing up amidst such comfort and wealth still be conceived as being deprived?

The second important idea which appears to be a way to understanding Leopold's and Loeb's pathology is Darrow's use of their mental state and personality make-up as mitigating aspects. While Darrow's contention can be seen as verified in the end due to his successful defense of the boys, other commentators on the trial are less sure that he used the psychiatric defense testimony in an adequate presentation. Menninger called the trial a "milestone," but he also noted this point.

There was one difference in this trial. Without calling it a disease, without speculating about knowledge of right and wrong, Dr. White tried to explain the behavior of the murderers as the product of impulses contrary to their conscious ideals but expressive of certain strange unconscious strivings that, for reasons not clear, overwhelmed their control. Neither the public nor the court quite understood this explanation, and most people were confirmed in the idea that psychiatrists could be found to say in court whatever they were paid to say. (Menninger, 1966, pp. 120-121)

It is my contention that the psychiatric explanations of the boy's development and dynamics were unsuccessful, not because the use of psychiatry was contraindicated, but because the theoretical growth of psychoanalysis in 1920 was not, itself, adequate to the task.

Where was psychoanalytic theory in 1924? One reflection of its theoretical position can be seen in the society proceedings of the 1924

annual meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association. The proceedings were reported in Volume XI of the 1924 Psychoanalytic Review (pp. 442-449). During the 1924 proceedings future prominent psychiatrists as Karl Menninger, Harry Stack Sullivan and Glueck were admitted to membership, but their important theoretical and clinical reformulations of psychoanalytic theory were not yet apparent. "Ego and libido gratifications of infantile (unconscious) cravings" was advanced as the cause of spontaneous cures in some psychoneurotic patients in one of the papers presented. Harry Stack Sullivan read a paper on "the oral complex," which he saw as being "the most important fundamental point of concentration and redirection of the libido or hormic energy in the path from the pleasure principle" (p. 477). Isador H. Coriat, elected president of the American Psychoanalytic Association that year, read a paper on "the character traits of urethral erotism," in which he related urethral erotism to the anal period of psychosexual development.

The proceedings of the 1924 meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association clearly reflect the stage of psychoanalytic theory in American psychiatry at the time of the 1924 trial of Leopold and Loeb. As such they adequately reflect Freud's views on development as shown in such works of his as Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) and Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915). What they do not reflect are his later reformulations in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933) and the importance in shift to the emphasis on ego psychology in The Ego and the Id (1923). Of course, they cannot show the importance that psychoanalysis would give to the ego over the id in explaining the

development of an individual, from Anna Freud's pioneering work on the defense mechanisms of the ego (Freud, A., 1946) to Heinz Hartmann's emphasis on the autonomy of the ego (Hartmann, 1958, 1964) to Robert White's (1963) emphasis on intrinsic ego satisfactions.

The 1924 psychiatric testimony at the Leopold and Loeb trial also reflects the developmental psychological and psychopathological theory of that era in psychiatry. It is diffused throughout with psychoanalytic insights of an instinctual, psychobiological, psychosexual theory of development alongside of neurological and endocrinological half-truths. One can feel the psychiatrists struggling with what psychosis means, and attempting to see how the newly introduced term of schizophrenia relates to the concept of insanity. Always they are attempting to place it within a psychoanalytic framework which stresses how our instincts of sex and aggression are somehow made to conform and transfer us into social (and socialized) individuals. Then, suddenly, two boys come along to make their theories reflect their own inadequacies. It is the purpose of this work to show that a reanalysis of the psychiatric testimony and a reexamination of the relationship between Leopold and Loeb will reveal that their pathology, their deviant development, and their crime can best be understood within the more recent theoretical aspects of psychoanalysis, namely the borderline states and psychoanalytic object relations theory.

CHAPTER IV

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY

Object relations theory is a reflection of the direction in which psychoanalytic theory has changed in the last thirty years. The central importance given to ego functions, the emphasis on the growth of a self, and the focus on one's earliest relationships as conditions for adequate, effective self-hood and future interpersonal relationships have become important issues for study and research.

Psychoanalysts such as Winnicott have awakened us to the importance of the first object relationship between the mother and the infant (Winnicott, 1953, 1955, 1965a, 1965b, 1971a, 1971b), as well as to the need for adequate mothering to fully utilize a supportive maturational process. Fairbairn has taken aggression and libido out of the context of instinct and psychosexual stages of development and placed them within the context of developing and maintaining ongoing human relationships (Fairbairn, 1941, 1944, 1952, 1954). The central psychoanalytic question is no longer focused on "adapting" (Hartmann, 1939, 1950, 1952) but on "relating" (Guntrip, 1961, 1966, 1968, 1971). Problems in development, therefore, no longer hinge on atypical psychosexual defects, but, instead, on such problems as independence-dependence, the ability to be alone, and the ability to relate to another person. The innermost, unconscious aspects of a person are still frightening and perplexing, but for different reasons. Not for the instinctual, sexualized energy about to be impulsively set free, as understood in the

traditional psychoanalytic literature, but for the regressed, weak, schizoid-depressive aspects of self-hood never adequately evoked or fully facilitated.

Object relations theory postulates that the baby starts life as a primitive, undifferentiated self whose first interpersonal relationship, that of mother to child, has crucial consequences which forces the child to defend himself from the anxiety of frustration and deprivation by a number of defensive, mental maneuvers. This involves the handling of aggression, anger, hate and idealized love through projecting outward, internalizing inward, or by splitting up those threatening aspects into opposing dynamic systems. Later interpersonal relationships are considered to have been affected by these early experiences.

Mahler (1972a, 1972b, 1975) sees the earliest stage of human development as one of dependence and symbiosis. Growing up, says Mahler (1972a), is a mourning process because of the constant threat of object loss. The child's physical dependence on the mother is weaned earlier than his psychological dependence, just as the physical birth and the psychological birth are not the same event. The "separation-individuation" phase of development is a period when many important psychological achievements take place. This phase lasts from the 4th or 5th to the 30th or 36th month. An earlier, "objectless" phase, the phase of normal autism, precedes the first true subphase of growth, the subphase of differentiation. This first subphase at about four months of age is a time of great symbiosis with the mother, and the child's

increased sensorium makes the mother's presence more real to him in both a visual and tactile manner.

During the period of seven to ten months to fifteen to sixteen months, the child "spills over" libidinal interest in his mother to inanimate objects, some of whom become transitional objects. Specific areas of autonomous ego functioning are developing in the child, but only in the continued presence of the mother on whom the child can "emotionally refuel" himself (early practicing subphase).

The child's expanded use of his locomotor functioning is an important aspect of the next phase, the "practising subphase proper." The child is becoming more active and seemingly oblivious of his mother. The following subphase is the important separation-individuation subphase from sixteen to twenty-five months. The child is less able to tolerate separation from the mother. More aware of his separateness, the child draws closer to his mother (the period of reapproachment). The child must see himself as a separate unit from his parents and accept the loss of the omnipotence they gave to him, and which he believed they shared with them. Mahler (1972a, p. 338) regards one's entire life as a process of

distancing from and introjection of the lost symbiotic mother, an eternal longing for the actual or fantasied "ideal state of self," with the latter standing for a symbiotic fusion with the "all good" symbiotic mother, who was at one time part of the self in a blissful state of well-being.

Mahler and her associates were able to differentiate a fourth subphase, that they cautiously would name "the child on the way to object constancy" (Mahler, 1972b). Separation and individuation for Mahler

are aspects of the two processes that are intertwined in the development of an individual.

Mahler believes that the ego of the borderline person is fixated at the reapproachment subphase. Masterson and Rinsley (1975) have also noted the important contribution of the mother's libidinal availability and withdrawal in the development of the borderline individual. At this point in development "oral, anal, and early genital pressures and conflicts meet and accumulate." They force the child to acknowledge the importance and separateness of his body image. Specific anxieties connected with the reapproachment subphase involve the fear of object loss and abandonment. The child is sensitive to the parent's approval and disapproval, but he is also aware of their parental demands and structures that he has internalized (Mahler, 1972b).

Edith Jacobson's (1961, 1964) theory of object relations development is considered (Guntrip, 1971) to have certain aspects that bring her closer in theoretical thinking to Fairbairn. Jacobson's theory, unlike Fairbairn's however, stresses the early physiological origins of the self and she views libidinal and aggressive drives as developing from "undifferentiated drive energy" (1964, p. 15). The infant begins life in a state of primary narcissism (tension and relief). His only world is his inner physiological world. As the child distinguishes his self from others he discovers his ego. The processes of secondary narcissism and masochism accompany the development of the mental representation of the self. The concept of identity for Jacobson is located not just in the ego but in many psychic structures,

where it is a localized self-representation. Identity depends on the development of libido and aggression. At this point in her theory Jacobson abandons the drive theory of traditional psychoanalysis and she explains libido and aggression as dependent on object-relations, especially the parent-child relationship. The parents frustrate and inhibit narcissistic aspects and replace them with more valid objects to identify with. Self and object constancy develop as an initial step for healthy identifications. The superego and its preoedipal precursors are reflections of the bond between the child and his parents. The superego shields the self from narcissistic harm, becomes a regulator of self-esteem and an influence on specific moods, all of which greatly influence the strength and intactness of one's ego functioning (Jacobson, 1961, 1964).

Object relations theory is the most recent development in the theoretical progression of psychoanalysis from an id-oriented to an ego-oriented psychology. Rapaport (introduction to Erickson, 1959) divided ego psychology into four distinct historical phases. The first phase involved the conceptualization of the ego as a primitive, intrapsychic structure, which was seen as a defense against damned up and repressed memories and effects (Breuer and Freud, 1895). The second historical phase of ego development understood the ego as the agent of repression towards instinctual drives. Other related concepts were the conception of the importance of secondary process involved with the ego's mode of functioning, as well as a sharpening of the reality principle.

Rapaport noted that the third phase revolves around the publication of Freud's The Ego and the Id (1923). While Freud still understood the ego as being differentiated out of id instinctual energies, he did make the ego somewhat more autonomous by placing some of the ego's functioning in a more conscious arena. Freud further freed the ego from the domination of the id in The Problem of Anxiety in 1926. Signal anxiety provided the ego with the first beginnings of an adaptive style of reality functioning.

Rapaport stated that the fourth phase of ego psychology emphasized the importance of object relations as shown in the works of Hartmann (1939, 1950, 1952), Kris (1950, 1952), Lowenstein (1950), and Erikson (1946, 1950, 1959). Hartmann conceptualized the ego as developing out of an early undifferentiated phase independent of the id's development. Along with this autonomy, Hartmann saw adaptation as an ego function that was conflict-free from the instinctual drives. Neutralization of the individual's energy involved structure formation through automatization. Erikson's work replaces the central importance given to psychosexual aspects of libido with a psychosocial emphasis on the individual's entire life cycle. Each of Erikson's eight stages of development are tied to a phase-specific developmental task that must be mastered.

In Great Britain, ego psychology was developing from different roots. Ian Suttie's The Origins of Love and Hate (1935) emphasized love over sex and aggression in the development of an individual. Later social attitudes, according to Suttie, were dependent on the child's

earliest relationship with his mother. Suttie redefined hate as a reaction to the loss of love rather than an innate death instinct. Suttie also influenced Winnicott's later work by emphasizing the importance of play in the child's world. Suttie's theoretical reworking of aggression is reflected in Fairbairn's work on the importance of object relating as an end in itself.

Guntrip (1969) distinguishes between the system-ego of American ego psychologists such as Hartmann, and the theoretical views of the British School of Object Relations, which Guntrip sees as emphasizing the "whole person." Guntrip states that he cannot get a "feel" for the human person in Hartmann's writing as he can in Winnicott's or Fairbairn's work. Hartmann's conception of the ego comes across in his writings as part of a "complex structural organization" while the ego in object relations theory is more central to our understanding of the individual as a "self" or a "person." In fact, object relations theory, though partly focusing on an internalized world of bad objects, never loses sight of its belief that man's major struggle is the development and preservation of a central core, the self, in our relationship with other selves. Guntrip (1969) notes that the concern of object relations theory with our inner world is intimately tied up with our feeling of being whole in our external world.

The problem is not that of conceiving of a rational intellectual ego-structure controlling blind biopsychic forces, but of understanding the psychosomatic whole human being, the biologically based infantile psyche, realizes its potentiality for becoming a "person," utilizing all its energies and capacities as they mature, in the good environment of maternal support; growing towards the "ideal"

goal of a "whole" mature adult person, capable of fullness of living in personal relationships, with no pathological splitting between emotion and intellect, or between infantile and adult. We are not concerned with blind forces and mechanical control apparatuses, a natural way of thinking in the atmosphere of nineteenth-century science. We are concerned with a living whole human being and how he can become a viable ego, a real self, a personal "I," with all his inborn energies flowing together as an inwardly free and spontaneous capacity to enjoy, love and create. (Guntrip, 1969, pp. 405-406)

Three object relations theorists, Fairbairn, Winnicott and Guntrip, will now be discussed. The work of Melanie Klein will first be examined, however, as her emphasis on our "inner world" is a contribution that is seen as a transition from classical psychoanalysis to object relations theory.

Melanie Klein

Melanie Klein's work may be viewed as a bridge between traditional Freudian theory and the object relations theories of Fairbairn and Winnicott. Although it is still heavily invested in instinctual explanations of behavior, Klein's theory is the foundation for modern object relations theory's ideas on normal and psychopathological development.

Melanie Klein was born in 1882 in Vienna. She left an early study of medicine to marry an industrial chemist. After Klein and her husband moved to Budapest, she became interested in Freud's ideas, and subsequently she was analyzed by Sandor Ferenczi and Karl Abraham. Many of Ferenczi's early ideas on "active therapy" would later be reflected in Klein's use of play in therapy. In 1919 she began the psychoanalytic

treatment of her first child, a five year old male named Fritz. After the breakup of her marriage, Klein moved to London, but her feelings of separation would only be heightened as her psychoanalytic colleagues began first to disagree with, and then, violently to dissent her metapsychological theory of development (Linden, 1966).

When Klein moved to England in 1926 under the sponsorship of Ernest Jones, she was at first warmly welcomed by the British analysts. Only a few analysts were interested in the treatment of children. Klein's views would soon split the British Psychoanalytic Society into a number of splinter groups—those who aligned themselves with Klein, an opposing "classical" group, and a "middle-of-the-road" group, who attempted to incorporate aspects of both camps. Some of Klein's notable students have been W. R. Bion, Susan Isaacs, Herbert Rosenfeld, and Hanna Segal (Linden, 1966).

It was not the actual use of play techniques that horrified Klein's psychoanalytic counterparts as much as the frightening underlying sexual and sadistic aggressive fantasies that she said the play techniques revealed. Klein actively treated children for about twenty years, from 1919 to the late forties. (After that she continued to supervise child analysts until her death.) Her theories grew directly out of these therapy experiences with children. For example, the analysis of Klein's youngest patient (Rita, age two years and nine months) made her realize that a good transference could only develop if the patient was able to perceive the therapy situation as distinct and separate from the child's physical home. The 1924-26 analysis of Erna, a paranoid female, helped

Klein to see that the early oral-sadistic superego could be directly connected to the later development of psychosis (Linden, 1966).

Klein's ideas have been criticized by Waelder as early as 1937 (Waelder, 1937). Bibring (1947), Glover (1945), Zetzel (1956), Greenson (1974), Guntrip (1961), Winnicott (1962) and Kernberg (1969) have reviewed and criticized those theoretical aspects of Klein's metapsychology that have had a difficult time in being accepted by ego psychologists. These criticisms have questioned Klein's belief in an inborn death instinct as well as an innate knowledge of such ideas as coitus and the genital organs. It is also felt that Klein disregarded environmental factors for biological and instinctual explanations. Klein failed adequately to differentiate between normal and pathological processes, while her overall terminology is considered vague and ambiguous. Some of Klein's ideas, however, are important as theoretical foundations for Fairbairn's theory of object relations. These ideas will now be briefly summarized.

The Two Worlds of Man

Perhaps the most important idea that Klein has bequeathed to object relations theory is that all people live in two different worlds. The first is the external, physical world of structure and substance, while the second is the inner world of psychic reality. This internal world is more than the traditional Freudian unconscious. The mind, as Guntrip would say, has a reality of its own. In time an infant will place aspects of his inner world outside as well as take in aspects of

external reality. These emotionally charged exchanges lead to a complicated psychic structure of internal objects. Aggression, frustration, satisfaction, and sadism are all processes that set up a specific internal structure in every individual. In Klein's theory, anxiety was an important emotion in the structuring of the objects in one's inner psychic world. Persecutory anxiety was the anxiety felt by an ego under attack while depressive anxiety, which developed later on, grew out of a feeling of ambivalence towards a loved object.

Klein's theory starts as Freud's does from an instinctual perspective. The infant is first a biological organism, born with specific needs such as hunger and thirst. The earliest experiences that the child has of these physical needs is through fantasy. Fantasy has a specific meaning for Klein and it should not be interpreted in the everyday understanding of some kind of daydreaming. For Klein, fantasy is reality as experienced by the infant. It is fantasy because it is a primitive, distorted, egocentric interpretation of reality by the child. Interpretation as used here is perhaps even too cognitive a term, as the infant has not yet maturationally developed cognitive processes. Klein understood fantasy as an unreflective relationship, the medium of exchange between the infant's instinctual demands and the environment outside that will either satisfy or frustrate these demands. As an unreflected attitude it validates for Klein the existence of an early ego, but not necessarily a reflected or bounded self. Segal (1964) gives the example of a hungry infant, who on being offered a breast, refuses it. The fantasy, she says, might have been

one of destroying the breast immediately before being offered it. Now when suddenly the breast appears the infant is confused. The physical breast before the infant is seen as a "terrifying persecutor" which had returned imbued with the badness that was projected onto it from the previous attack.

It is obvious from Klein's description that the world of the infant is a dangerous one full of persecutors as well as frustration and fulfillments. The infant is susceptible to strong, at times overwhelming, emotions. Unlike an adult, however, the infant is defenseless.

The Interaction of the Two Worlds of Man

Klein was aware of these "primordial forces" that could flood the child if they were not somehow managed. Through the medium of fantasy, the ego could modulate the organism's instinctual demands through a number of different ways of relating to the dangerous material. These operations are known by such names as projection, introjection and splitting. The child by projection could deflect those destructive, hostile feelings outside of himself. Introjection is considered more in the service of the life instincts to Klein, because it involves a process of taking in. These theoretical aspects have two implicit assumptions. The first one is that the infant is able to make primitive distinctions between "inside" and "outside" long before the physical body has been accepted as a phenomenal concept. The second assumption is that the child is born with the ability to express

feelings of anger, violence and primitive feelings of destruction and hate.

As the young weak ego develops it begins to acknowledge the existence of other people in its world, but an holistic concept of a person has no meaning to an organism unaware of even its own boundaries. The infant can only concentrate on and be aware of small, isolated aspects or "part objects" of another person's body at first. Klein states that the earliest object that the infant is aware of is the mother's breast, his first part-object. The destructiveness the child now feels has an object that it can project unto some of these feelings. Yet as this same breast can bring relief, the child will learn that the "other" can also be a source of comfort and solace.

The first three to six months of life is a time of great anxiety for the young infant. The child is considered to be in a "paranoid position" in relation to his internal and external objects. The paranoid position is an attempt by the infant to adjust to his emotional development through his mother. He feels persecuted by his objects. In time, he learns to overcome these fears, and is said to be in the "depressive position," where sadistic aspects of the object are diminished. The infant can now incorporate the whole object only to find that he has ambivalent feelings towards the incorporated object, his mother. Love and hate merge too closely at times, and the infant's concerns turn to preserving the mother, while making reparation for his feelings of hate and destruction towards her.

Splitting is another fantasy mechanism that the infant uses to deal with the frustrating aspects of his inner life. External objects can be split, as when the mother's breast is split into good (ideal) and bad (persecuting) objects. The ego, itself, may also be split which led Klein to call the first developmental position the schizoid-paranoid position. As the mother progresses from being a part-object to being a whole object, the child's main concern is to preserve his internal good objects from his own anger and aggression. Depressive anxiety is the fear of losing those good objects. It is, says Segal,

a constellation of object relations and anxieties characterized by the infant's experience of attacking an ambivalently loved mother and losing her as an external and internal object. This experience gives rise to pain, guilt and feelings of loss. (Segal, 1964, p. 126)

The successful resolution of this problem is a step in the development of a relating self. As Klein has said:

In the infantile neurosis of the early depressive position finds expression, is worked through and is gradually overcome; and this is an important part of the process of organization and integration which, together with his sexual development, characterizes the first years of life. Normally the child passes through his infantile neurosis, and among other achievements arrives step by step at a good relation to people and to reality. I hold that this satisfactory relation to people depends upon his having succeeded in his struggles against the chaos inside him (the depressive position) and having securely established his "good" internal objects. (Klein, 1940, p. 130)

Is Klein right? Do children pass through a part of their childhood with a neurosis, and does this neurosis emerge, itself victorious, out of a blackness of psychosis? Can early sexual experiences matter so much and at such an early age? Do we all contain an inner world of conflict, of

deep hate, of love denied, of hopes frustrated, and of ideals to follow? And can this world at one time have been the site of great pain within us, of stunted growth, of missed opportunities, of paths not taken out of fear or hate. If this is true, if there is such a world, how can we reach it? Is it a long, forgotten part of our childhood or is there a dark path that leads back to it? And what will we find? Will we have the strength not to avert our gaze, and see ourselves once again as infants? Carl Jung once wrote a story in his autobiography about a young physician who came to him with the question of whether he should become an analyst himself. One day in therapy the young doctor brought a dream to Jung. He told of being in a long hall, through which he continued to open door after door, until finally he was in a large, black room that was simply so enormous in size that a person could not see to its end. Suddenly the man became aware of another presence, besides himself, out there in the dark, and he began to look closer and closer until he could see the faint outlines of a shape. As he looked more distinctly, he was surprised to find that it was a baby. Are we all like Jung's patient to travel back to our beginnings only to find the weak infant within us? Three writers and analysts who have looked into those beginnings are Donald Winnicott, Harry Guntrip and Ronald Fairbairn. From their own journeys as well as the journeys of their patients, they have brought back bits and pieces of our internal world. Their ideas have come together as Object Relations Theory. What they have taught us is frightening as it is reassuring. The first analyst that we will look at is Fairbairn.

Fairbairn

W. Ronald D. Fairbairn was a physician and psychoanalyst whose theory of personality growth is considered an alternative to the Freudian libido theory. Fairbairn believed that an ego was present at birth for all individuals, a view in contrast to Freud's belief that an ego developed from one's more primitive "id." Fairbairn saw the early ego of the infant as a "mouth ego" (Fairbairn, 1940) for it was through his mouth that the infant first reached out to engage and take back part of the outside world. The earliest "libidinal attitude" is, therefore, one of "taking." Incorporation, however, raises important questions for the infant. Questions as "Am I empty or full?" Here Fairbairn's theory departs from Freud's in that while Freud feels that pleasure is the goal of object seeking, Fairbairn states that "the ultimate goal of libido is the object" (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 31). The position that Fairbairn is taking by this important statement is that although we have a body, psychological mechanisms cannot be reduced to physiological processes.

Theory of Development

Fairbairn also discards the stage-successive theory of character development based on the organization of the libidinal aim as one grows older. The Freudian theory, based largely on Karl Abraham's work, saw the child as passing through a number of stages during the first five years of life. Each stage was, in turn, actively related to a particular mode of reacting as well as to a specific body zone. The oral stage was

the first age, followed by the anal and phallic stages. A period of latency separated these three pregenital stages from the final genital stage. During each stage the libido, through the specific body zones, reduced instinctual tension, thereby giving the individual pleasure by investing in objects in the outside world for the individuals benefit. This investing, or cathexis, was soon internalized through the process of identification because an individual could not always be satisfied when he wanted. The result, in traditional Freudian theory, is the development of delay, and therefore, of an ego.

In contrast, Fairbairn saw our ability to relate to objects as essential to our very human nature. Relating was not a way to channel instinctual energy, but a process whereby one changed from an infantile dependent orientation on an object to a mature dependence on it. The first objects that the infant encounters, however, were only "part-objects," that is, the infant is only able to relate to aspects of the object.

Fairbairn's first theorized period of development, that of infantile dependence, is divided into an early oral stage and a late oral stage. The first part-object that the infant encounters in the early oral stage is the breast of the mother. The breast is seen as something distinctive from the mother, who has not yet been experienced as a whole object.

By the time of the late oral stage the mother has become understood as related somehow to the breast. The infant is now in a dilemma. How does he combine his feelings of hate and love towards his mother, who

has now been understood as a whole person for the first time, encompassing both his love and his hate? Fairbairn states that in the next stage of development, the transitional stage, the ambivalent object is dichotomized and replaced by two objects, an accepted one and a rejected one. The final stage, that of mature dependence, is characterized by the attitude of mature giving. No longer is our existence, like the infant's, based upon a primary identification with the object, instead it is based on a sense of self gradually differentiated from objects outside of one's self.

Personality Dynamics: Our Internal World

While the infant is splitting objects in his external world, he is also splitting aspects of his self, or ego, to deal with these frustrating, often frightening, objects. The concept of ego splitting is not strictly a psychoanalytic concept. Such theorists as G. H. Mead and Cooley utilized splitting to develop their ideas of man as a social individual.

Splitting as a concept has been criticized by Pruyser (1975), who asked "What splits in splitting?" Tracing the history of the term "splitting" through changes in psychoanalytic theory, Pryser notes that the word was used in different ways depending on the historical period in question. Freud's use of the word is contrasted to Bleuler's use of the process of splitting in the schizophrenic.

Pryser believes that Fairbairn's use of the concept of splitting is tied to these facts: Fairbairn's patients often talked of being

empty or full; Fairbairn accepted Klein's views of "internal imagos," which seem to reside within the person; Fairbairn, like Klein, was preoccupied with oral and anal aspects, which can make one see the personality as a "sort of superimposed container." Pruyser understands Fairbairn's use of splitting as the "beginning of that long-term process of separation between subject and object which is precipitated by birth" (Pruyser, 1975, p. 34). After examining how splitting is used in object relations theory, Pruyser notes that

. . . there is a radicalization of differences capsuled in the word splitting—differences which in more relativistic terms could be approached by such words as distributing, apportioning, allocating, assigning, selecting, differentiating, sorting out, emphasizing, focusing, and a host of other terms implying some process of discernment. . . . it stands, instead, for disjoining by hyperselectivity. (Pruyser, 1975, p. 36)

Fairbairn's theory states that an infant develops an internal world when he transfers his relationships with objects inside of himself. Incorporation is not just fantasy; it is a "distinct psychological process." The basic structural aspect in Fairbairn's theory is the "central ego," which is present at birth. It is this central ego which relates to the first part-objects. The world, which at first may be satisfying to the infant, soon reveals its frustrating aspects. The infant attempts to deal with these frustrating aspects by internalizing them. Why the process of internalization as a defensive measure? There is really little else, beside using fantasy, that the weak, defenseless infant can use to make his early existence bearable.

The object which is internalized is split into two segments, an "exciting" or "needed" object and a "rejecting" or "frustrating" object. Both objects are repressed by the central ego, while a third object, the ideal object or ego-ideal, is not repressed. The repressed exciting object is called the libidinal object by Fairbairn, while the repressed rejecting object is called the antilibidinal object.

While the central core of the ego, which acts as the agent of repression, itself remains unrepressed, it must still retain attachments to the libidinal (exciting) and antilibidinal (rejecting) objects, which have been repressed. It does this by splitting off "two segments of itself to go into repression with the two repressed objects" (Sullivan, 1963, p. 28). What Fairbairn called the libidinal ego becomes attached to the libidinal (exciting) object, while an antilibidinal ego becomes attached to the antilibidinal (rejecting) object. The two egos are then themselves repressed.

Fine (Mendez & Fine, 1976, p. 380) has noted that object relational theorists as Fairbairn do not take into account such ego processes as perception, motility and cognition. Fine believes that this has occurred because of a fear of becoming entrenched in a psychobiological approach from which they have struggled so long to break loose. One answer, says Fine (Mendez & Fine, 1976), is to add a fourth ego structure, Fine's "enfolding ego," to Fairbairn's internal theoretical structure.

This enfolding ego not only is involved in productive works and in creativity but also regresses in the service of the ego. When wedded to Winnicott's idea of a capacity to be

alone or, in more conventional ego psychology terms, the capacity to endure, tolerate, and look forward to solitude, the nature of the enfolding ego presents another possible offshoot and revision of object-relations theories. (Mendez & Fine, 1976, p. 380)

The concept of an enfolding ego, says Fine, leads to the formulation of a state of being that he calls "integrated schizoidism." This condition utilizes both Winnicott's use of solitude and ego psychology's executive functioning, and it can be seen as the "fountainhead for higher creative constructs, ideas, spontaneity, empathy, and warmth."

The Endopsychic Structure

This internal situation, said Fairbairn, represents an endopsychic structure. The antilibidinal ego, also called the "internal saboteur" by Fairbairn, attacks both the libidinal ego and the libidinal object. Fairbairn saw this as "evidence of the measure of 'suffering' which the libidinal ego is prepared to endure out of devotion to its object" (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 103). Aggression in Fairbairn's object relations theory is now viewed as the relationship between the central ego towards its subsidiary egos (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 105). The libidinal ego is a counterpart to Freud's id, but as a reverse to Freud's theory Fairbairn's "id" develops out of a central ego. While Freud's id is a "mere reservoir of instinctive impulses" (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 106), Fairbairn's libidinal ego is a complete dynamic structure. The internal saboteur (antilibidinal ego) cannot also be directly compared to Freud's superego. Fairbairn's comparable "superego" is a complex structure comprising of the ideal object, the antilibidinal ego and the

antilibidinal object (Fairbairn, 1963, p. 224). Fairbairn's internal saboteur, unlike Freud's superego, is devoid of such "moral" aspects as guilt.

The concept of repression is also seen from a different perspective in Fairbairn's theory. It is not a defense against "bad" (i.e., frustrating) internalized objects. Guilt for Freud developed out of the resolution of the oedipal conflict, but for Fairbairn guilt was an "additional defense against situations involving bad internalized objects." How do these two processes develop in Fairbairn's theory? First, Fairbairn does not deny the existence of impulses, but states that impulses only become bad when they are directed towards bad, or frustrating, objects (Fairbairn, 1943). Once these bad objects are internalized and repressed, the impulses are also internalized and repressed in the process. The child must now deal with the feeling that he has bad impulses inside of him. One defense against these bad objects is when the child decides that he would rather be bad than possess bad objects. The child believes that if he is bad than perhaps his objects may turn good. This process has been closely related to the development of a delinquent or antisocial stance by a child. The antisocial stance, said Winnicott, is an attempt to compel the environment to be important (Winnicott, 1956, p. 309). Stealing is seen as an attempt to seek and possess not the object stolen, but the early mothering that the child felt deprived of. The child is attempting, however, to only make his external world safe, while it is his internal world which cries out for security. Fairbairn summarizes the

delinquent's attempt to deal with his inner world of bad internalized objects this way:

. . . it is better to be a sinner in a world ruled by God than to live in a world ruled by the devil. A sinner in a world ruled by God may be bad; but there is a certain sense of security to be derived from the fact that the world around is good. (Fairbairn, 1943, pp. 66-67)

We have, at this point, looked at three ways that individuals can keep their bad objects from becoming conscious. The first, which is universal, is repression. The other two involve the invocation of guilt and an antisocial stance.

The Schizoid Position and Psychopathology

The endopsychic structure which results from the splitting of the ego is further reflected in the "schizoid position," which is a fundamental type of reaction and relation to our internal bad-object relations. Since all people have frustrating experiences as infants, and therefore, have split aspects of their egos. All people, in the view of object relations theory, must deal with the schizoid aspects of their internal life. Fairbairn (1941) saw the schizoid conflict arising out of an early conflict in the oral phase. This conflict involved the alternative "to suck or not to suck" which Fairbairn translated as "to love or not to love." For someone frustrated at this early level, the theme throughout one's life would be "how to love without destroying with that very love." Fairbairn felt that "the great tragedy of the schizoid individual" is that "his love seems to destroy" (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 50). The schizoid problem or "love made

hungry," said Guntrip (1969, p. 24) "rouses the terrible fear that one's love has become so devouring and incorporate that love itself has become destructive." This is the reason that Fairbairn called "futility" the characteristic effect of the schizoid state.

The second major dynamic relationship we maintain with our internal bad objects is called the "depressive position," and it has its beginnings in the late oral phase. The basic dilemma for the depressive position is one of ambivalence. It does not reject the object, as the schizoid does, but instead substitutes direct aggression in the form of biting. If the person can direct his hatred, which also comes from being frustrated, towards the object, he is said to have successfully mastered the conflict at the depressive position. If, however, loving and hating the same object arouse intense ambivalent feelings in the individual, he can become afraid to love for fear that his hate will destroy that which he loves and needs. This fear grows into a feeling of guilt. If the schizoid problem is "love made hungry," than the depressive problem is "love made angry" (Guntrip, 1969, p. 24). Hate, said Guntrip,

is love grown angry because of rejection. We can only really hate a person if we want their love. Hate is an expression of frustrated love needs, an attempt to destroy the bad rejecting side of a person in the hope of leaving their good responsive side available, a struggle to alter them. The anxiety is over the danger of hate destroying both sides, and the easiest way out is to find two objects, and love one and hate the other. But always hate is an object-relationship. (Guntrip, 1969, p. 26)

Fairbairn understood psychopathology as techniques to defend the ego against the early oral conflicts of the schizoid and depressive states.

Traditional Freudian theory had conceptualized paranoid, obsessional and hysterical states as psychosexual fixations during different libidinal stages of character formation.

Fairbairn saw the obsessive maneuver as a conflict over whether to expel or retain one's objects as contents. The obsessional state was considered an "active" one by Fairbairn in that both the accepted and the rejected objects are internalized during the conflict. This was in contrast to the phobic state in which both the accepted and rejected objects are externalized, and the conflict becomes one over "flight from and return to the object."

In the hysterical state, the accepted object becomes externalized, while the rejected object is internalized. The conflict for the hysteric during the transitional stage develops when he or she must accept or reject the object. The hysteric tends to overvalue the real object while dissociating herself from aspects of those relationships that produce conflict. The paranoid, in reverse of the hysteric, internalizes his accepted object while externalizing his rejected object. Objects in the outer world are viewed as "persecutors" by the paranoid as a result.

Fairbairn (1941) saw involuntional melancholia as occurring at a time in a person's life when libidinal urges diminished while aggressive urges did not diminish. This situation is experienced as a loss of object with the result that a depressive position is reactivated.

These different techniques—paranoid, obsessional, hysterical—are maneuvers to keep us from regressing to a schizoid feeling of weakness and aloneness. They are based, said Guntrip, "on mankind's universal preference for feeling bad but strong rather than feeling weak and afraid." This is especially apparent in such a maneuver as depression, guilt or the antisocial stance (Guntrip, 1969, p. 134). While Fairbairn saw the earliest psychopathological symptoms as hysterical, the earliest psychopathological process was the schizoid one (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 131).

Goals of Object Relations Therapy

Fairbairn (1944) understood the goals of therapy, which used a psychoanalytic object relations framework, as being first, to reduce the original split of the central ego by returning to its aspects taken over by the libidinal and antilibidinal egos. The second goal for Fairbairn was to bring together the exciting and rejecting objects. These changes would involve the reduction of the aggression that tied the egos to each other as well as to their objects.

In therapy, Fairbairn felt that the "deepest source of resistance is the release of bad objects from the unconscious" (Fairbairn, 1943, p. 69). Release of these objects makes the external world a very frightening place, but their release is a chief goal of therapy even if it produces a severe transference neurosis (Fairbairn, 1943, p. 69). Only through relief can they be decathected. The acceptance of the therapist as a good object can promote the discharge of bad objects.

The discharge of bad objects will also release feelings of guilt. Fairbairn states that interpreting the guilt relieves the oedipal conflict, but also tends to further repress internalized bad objects. "If a True Mass is being celebrated in the chancel" said Fairbairn, "A Black Mass is being celebrated in the crypt" (Fairbairn, 1943, pp. 69-70).

Dreams are important in object relations therapy because they represent aspects of the endopsychic structure or one's internal world. The dream for Fairbairn is a universal schizoid phenomenon. This is in contrast to traditional Freudian theory which saw wish fulfillment as an aim of dreams. Analyzing the dream can help an object relations oriented therapist to understand better the relationship of the patient's endopsychic structure deep inside. The next object relations theorist to be covered is Winnicott, who wrote on the early beginnings of ego development in the individual.

Donald W. Winnicott

Donald W. Winnicott, a pediatrician and psychoanalyst, is known for the important theoretical ideas that he was able to extract from his clinical work. Some of these classical, but still relevant, ideas Winnicott gave to Object Relations theory concern the concepts of the transitional object, the "capacity to be alone," and the "good enough mother." Winnicott was the only son in a well-to-do middle class family of three children. Athletic as a child, Winnicott would always give the impression of being in motion. Originally trained as a

pediatrician, he turned to psychoanalysis at a time when the British Psychoanalytic Society was composed of such individuals as Ernest Jones, Melanie Klein, Anna Freud and Fairbairn. Winnicott's contributions are more highly regarded today for their theoretical brilliance than when they were first formulated thirty years ago. Some of these important concepts will now be summarized briefly.

Dependency

The infant to Winnicott starts its life as a dependent, immature organism. Its first mode of being is an oral one because of this immature, needy status. Winnicott understood the infant's development as a journey from dependence to independence. Unlike early Freudian traditional analysts, Winnicott postulated that every individual had an ego at birth. The qualitative nature of this ego—its inherent weakness, its oral, demanding nature, its dependent status—was the basis for Winnicott's theory of the development of a self. He saw dependency as being comprised of three stages: absolute dependence, relative dependence, and a final stage involving the early beginnings of a movement towards independence but not self-care.

Life for Winnicott is a struggle from its very beginning, not only in the external reality we all share, but in a child's "inner world in which battles are lost and won, a world in which magic holds sway" (Winnicott, 1964).

Growth and the "Good-Enough Mother"

In order to develop, a child must have the primary prerequisite of an "average expectable environment," which in turn, must contain a "good-enough mother." It was Winnicott's strong belief that "the mothering of one's own baby is entirely personal, a job that no one else could take over and do as well as oneself" (Winnicott, 1964, p. 88). A good mother was one who was able to provide a secure environment for the infant. This orientation was the "primary maternal preoccupation." An important way that this secure environment was provided was in the way that the mother held her child. Winnicott's concept of holding went beyond mere physical holdings; it included the ability of the mother to live with her child and to provide a constant, reliable setting so that their time and space became as one. The best mothering came out of a sense of empathy, of "maternal self-reliance," of devotion. To Winnicott:

Everyone who is sane, everyone who feels himself to be a person in the world, and for whom the world means something, every happy person, is in infinite debt to a woman. At a time in earliest infancy where there was no perception of dependence, we were absolutely dependent. (Winnicott, 1964, p. 10)

Since the baby is completely dependent on his mother to fulfill and understand his every need it is important that the mother be able to pick up subtle changes in her infant. This is done by a process that Winnicott called "projective identification" and it involves a "merging" of the mother with her child. The infant's developing ego, as a result, is only as strong as the quality of maternal care that he is given.

As the child develops, the mother no longer attempts to meet his every need by projective identification. Instead, she allows the child to signal his or her needs. The mother is thus allowing the child to separate from her and the first stage from dependence to independence is begun. The process of becoming independent is related to the development of a secure, intact sense of self, or what Winnicott called "basic ego-relatedness." An important step in developing "ego-relatedness" is the development of the "capacity to be alone."

The Capacity to be Alone

Winnicott considered the capacity to be alone as a sophisticated phenomenon, one that reflected the development of ego-relatedness. To be alone did not mean to be solitary, a condition which could occur in a group. Winnicott felt that the infant learns to be alone in the presence of his mother. Being "alone" in the presence of another person may at first seem to be a paradox, but having an "I" that can be alone is the result of much emotional growth, and this growth can only occur in the context of a supportive person. In time, it will no longer be necessary to be in the actual presence of the other person.

Winnicott felt that the capacity to be alone implied "that the individual has had the chance through good-enough mothering to build up a belief in a benevolent environment." An example of this may be seen in the play therapy of children. The child may be able at times to forget that the therapist is in the room with him. He may not "forget" that the therapist is physically present, but instead his relationship with

the therapist will allow the child to feel secure enough to play by himself. The play therapy situation has developed into an ego-supportive environment, which hopefully can be introjected. This individual with his capacity to be alone can then venture into the outside world, somehow stronger, more whole. But what of the child who does not develop the capacity to be alone?

A child who does not become exposed to a process of good-enough mothering begins life as inadequate and unwhole. Object relations theorists believe that very inadequate mothering can produce a psychotic child. In this situation a child is left in a condition of extreme dependence. Other children would not be as traumatized by their unmet dependency needs but would later on be liable to resolve these needs through an affective disorder or an antisocial stance. Another possible answer to a failure in ego development from a lack of good-enough mothering is the emergence of a false self system.

The False Self

The concept of the false self, though made popular by Laing (Laing, 1965), was developed originally by Winnicott. The concept is a reflection of the unique clinical skills that defined Winnicott's style of thinking. He was able to look at an unhappy and poorly functioning, sometimes psychotic, individual and see that part of this person was somehow unreal even to the person himself. Others would have made the pathology central and thereby isolated it from a more meaningful context.

Laing's understanding of the "false self" is rooted in his existential framework and therefore his definition includes such aspects as alienation and unembodiedment. Laing's concept of mystification is a communicational pattern and a subjective orientation designed never to give away oneself to another, in both a literal and figurative sense.

The false self is the result of the mechanism of splitting. Aspects of oneself are somehow denied because they are too threatening or upsetting. A person with a strongly developed false self system may feel that somehow this repressed, denied aspect may gain dominance over one's entire mode of functioning. This is an interesting point because it leads to an alternative way of looking at feelings of anxiety. While anxiety is often considered to be a subjective feeling (i.e., it is "I" who is anxious), the causes are often perceived to be external stresses. For example, one is anxious because he is taking a Ph.D. oral examination or because his mother-in-law is coming to visit for the holidays. The anxiety may also be viewed as deriving from biological demands. A soldier is anxious because it is wartime and he is frightened, must go to the bathroom, and feels that he may die any moment. Traditional Freudian analysis spoke of anxiety as being engendered by id demands. Winnicott understood that in certain types of personality organizations anxiety could be caused by aspects of their very self, which they could neither accept, discard or integrate.

Laing (1965) states this idea as follows: Why is one "unreal," he asks, when one begins to invest oneself in one's fantasies? It is

not, he replies, simply that one has attempted to escape from the content of the real, e.g., poverty, but that one has fled from the form of the real, its character of "presence." "The person who does not act in reality and only acts in fantasy," says Laing, "becomes himself unreal" (Laing, 1965).

Winnicott believed that the false self system develops as a result of the early mother-child relationship. The false self for Winnicott is both a failure in normal developmental and a success in neurotic defensive organization (Winnicott, 1954). The result of poor mothering is that the sense of self is posited in the shell rather than the kernel of one's subjective experience. The false self as a defense mechanism may remain both unconscious and debilitating unless a more genuine, secure sense of self can be developed. Winnicott felt that such a change must always be accompanied by regression. Laing (1967) would speak of this experience as a voyage in which the madman must travel through in order to reach the birth of a more genuine, central self, a true self. As an example, on card VIII of the Rorschach a nine year old, foster child, who was considered oppositional and undisciplined, gave the following response: "This reminds me of a crack with a boy looking out." This highly creative and original response may be seen as a longing for rebirth, a desire to leave the womb and venture forth as a whole, real individual, instead of gaining an identity through opposing others. This is more clearly seen in the patient's elaboration on the inquiry part of the response. He stated: "He's got two doors open a little and some of the shadow is on the floor. It's

shaped like a crack. Its got a little line through there. (Examiner's question: Is it a boy or girl?) Well, the eyes . . . could be a girl." This is clearly a regressive response. It is also important because in the regression there is a confusion of masculinity and femininity, which brings us to Winnicott's views on "being" and "doing."

Being and Doing

The lack of a sense of a real self, of a personal identity, can affect many different areas of our functioning. An important area is that of one's sexuality. What does it mean to be masculine, to be feminine? Winnicott felt that we all possess both female and male factors in our personality makeup. He called these elements "being" and "doing." "Being" he saw as the result of an "assured stable selfhood" while "doing" was a "spontaneous creative activity that was grounded in one's being" (Guntrip, 1971). For Winnicott being is prior to doing.

Winnicott's conceptualization of a passive state of primary union that he called the "pure female element" and a more separate, active, angry male element appears somewhat chauvinistic today. Winnicott (1971, p. 82) would state that

. . . object-relating in terms of this pure female element has nothing to do with drive (or instinct). Object-relating backed by instinct drive belongs to the male element in the personality uncontaminated by the female element.

Winnicott believed that problems with one's sexual identity were related to problems in one's overall sense of self. A person may split off and deny either the masculine or feminine aspects of his personality. This makes therapy difficult as the therapist may find to

his surprise that he is analyzing the "split-off part, while the main functioning person appears only in projected form" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 77). Winnicott comments that the man who enjoys initiating young girls into sexual experience may be more identified with the girl than himself. The result is an inability for his male element to enjoy itself, and this lack of inner stability mirrors his lack of external object-constancy. The result is that he must continually search for a new girl.

"Being" and "doing" should complement each other in the healthy personality. A mistaken belief that one involves "strength" and the other involves "weakness" can lead to a "pseudo" male or female role. One must pretend to be always tough, aggressive, active and destructive to prove he is male. On the other hand, one may attempt to look weak and submissive in order to receive attention. The first approach denies that one can be sensitive to others, while the second stance denies one can be assertive and make a difference in the world. How do these male and female elements contribute to the growth of a stable ego? Guntrip (1969) answers in this manner

. . . A secure sense of being, shared with a stable mother both before and after birth, must remain as a permanent foundation in the unconscious, on the basis of which a separate ego-identity can develop stably and elaborate into a highly developed personality. . . . The conscious ego is the ego of separation, of "doing," of acting and being acted on, and in that sense is the location of the male element in personality. It must derive its strength from the deepest unconscious core of the self that has never lost the feeling of "being-at-one-with" the maternal source of its life. (Guntrip, 1969, p. 266)

Transitional Phenomenon

The concept of the transitional object, and the closely related phenomenon of play, are the last two of Winnicott's ideas to be considered. Winnicott had presented his idea of a transitional object before the British Psychoanalytic Society as early as May of 1951. At that time he suggested that the transitional phenomenon begins at about "four to six to eight to twelve months." It involves an "intermediate area of experience," and it is both a subjective experience and an object. The object was judged by the infant to belong neither to part of his body nor to the external reality outside of his body. As a mode of experience, Winnicott stated that the transitional object lay between "oral erotism and true object relationship." Some examples of transitional phenomenon are not true objects in the physical sense, as in the examples that Winnicott presented of "an infant's babbling or the way an older child goes over a repertoire of songs and tunes while preparing for sleep." A more familiar transitional object for us is Linus's blanket in the comic strip, Peanuts.

Winnicott felt that every transitional object had special aspects and qualities in order to be truly related to as a transitional phenomenon. These aspects may be summarized by the following list:

1. The object is controlled by the infant, and the parents abrogate to this.
2. The object is treated both affectionately at times and destructively at other times.
3. Only the infant can change the object.

4. On a symbolic level, the object must survive intense feelings of hate and aggression, while

5. it still gives the infant a sense of warm love.

6. It is located cognitively in the infant's eyes in an experiential medium that is neither in reality or fantasy.

7. It loses its meaning in time for the child. (Winnicott, 1951)

Winnicott believed that the transitional object has important implications for later adult development. He felt that an individual could adopt a transitional object that could persist as a characteristic of an adult's life. A fetish object, long viewed in the traditional psychoanalytic literature as a way to escape the fear of castration, may be understood as a transitional object.

The transitional object is important as a bridge in the child's struggle from dependence to independence, or as Winnicott would say, from illusion to disillusionment. The good-enough mother gives the child the illusion that all his needs are met. The result is a sense of security. In time, however, the mother must wean the child, i.e., she must disillusion him. The result is a subjective feeling of frustration on the child's part. If the child is not disillusioned he will remain in a world dominated by magical, ineffectual solutions. In a secure relationship, however, the frustration is accompanied by feelings of mastery, a sense of reality, and the integration of past, present and future. For Winnicott such a growth process could only take place in an adaptive, loving relationship. The mother would have no hope of success unless at first she has been able to give sufficient

opportunity for illusion." The physical termination of breast feeding is not in itself, therefore, the entire, or most important, aspect of weaning.

The transitional object is an aid in the process from dependence to independence, from illusion to disillusionment, from magic fantasy to reality, from inner to outer, from narcissism to true object relating, from self to the other. It will tend to be used when people with inadequate self-esteem are under stress in later developmental conflicts, especially those involving separation-individuation. In his therapeutic sessions with children Winnicott often used string as a play material because it symbolized separation.

Play

In thinking about play, Winnicott realized that it was located neither "inside" or "outside." Instead, he saw playing as "doing." The child is able to select objects from external reality, and then use them to express some inner reality. Play is then a direct development from transitional phenomena. Play, in turn, leads to shared playing, and, finally, to larger cultural experiences.

Play for Winnicott was located in a "potential space" between the individual and on external object (usually the environment). In that space the child through play discovers aspects of the world that are considered "not-me." If this discovery takes place within a secure environment of adequate mothering the child will not become frightened of becoming lost in the world of "not-me." The deprived or psychotic

child has had more traumatic experiences with his objects and with loss and he cannot play as a normal child. The normal child fills the potential space with a creative outpouring of his own inner feelings. He fills the world, but the world is still external from him. The deprived child fills the potential space with such developments as a "false-self." The area of the potential space is then not even really a part of himself. The space may also be filled with persecutory elements for the child (Winnicott, 1971) with the child feeling helpless and overwhelmed. The child, unable to play, will withdraw into an autistic state. He will lose an opportunity to be assertive, to gain mastery over the control of actual objects, and to develop creativity. Most important, he will lose the opportunity to learn about the interplay between his inner world and the external world. He will also lose the opportunity to develop "trust" as the child plays in the presence of another at one important phase. He loses the opportunity to manipulate the muscles of his body and to the excitement that comes from play. He may become anxious even, but this is controlled within the structure of the play's use of fantasy.

Play is essential for the development of a sense of self and for the development of a stable, autonomous ego. Mastery, creativity, trust, and the control of external objects are all aspects of a mature ego.

Harry Guntrip

Harry Guntrip, Ph.D., was originally trained as a minister, but entered the practice of psychotherapy during the emergency of World War II. His clinical talents were soon recognized and he was appointed a lecturer and psychotherapist in the Department of Psychiatry at Leeds University. Guntrip's Ph.D. thesis explored the views of Melanie Klein and Fairbairn from a sociological viewpoint. Long before he had heard of Fairbairn and his object relations theory of personality, Guntrip had realized that psychotherapy could only be understood as a unique, personal relationship. Guntrip, like Freud, used his own history and daily life to understand the psychological themes that all individuals share. He kept a record of his dreams, as well as detailed records of his personal therapy sessions with Fairbairn and Winnicott.

Psychoanalysis with Fairbairn and Winnicott

Guntrip was analyzed by both Fairbairn and Winnicott. In a posthumous paper, Guntrip (1975) related some of the personal incidents involving these special relationships. Guntrip had over 1,000 sessions with Fairbairn "in the 1950's when he was past the peak of his creative powers of the 1940's." Guntrip found Fairbairn returning to a more orthodox Freudian technique in contrast to his object relations theory. In their sessions, Guntrip continued to stress the deeper schizoid aspects of his personality, but Fairbairn dismissed Guntrip's ideas on regression as a reflection of the character trait of withdrawness. In time, however, Guntrip was able to convince Fairbairn of the importance

of the concept of a "regressed ego" split off from the libidinal ego. In contrast to the intellectual, formal Fairbairn, Guntrip found Winnicott a simple and warm man. Guntrip also found Winnicott's style of therapy as one in which Winnicott's theoretical concepts were effortlessly interpreted into human terms. "Fairbairn's ideas," wrote Guntrip, "were 'exact logical concepts' which clarified issues, Winnicott's ideas were 'imaginative hypotheses' that challenged one to explore further" (Guntrip, 1975, p. 155).

The Aim of Therapy: Genuine Relating

Although Guntrip (1975) stated that "our theory must be rooted in our psychopathology" he felt that the process of psychotherapy was a unique personal experience. In his own words, psychotherapy was a "genuine, reliable, understanding, and respecting, caring personal relationship" where a person "can begin at last to feel his own true feelings, and think his own spontaneous thoughts, and find himself to be real" (Guntrip, 1971, p. 182). Guntrip believed that psychoanalysis should go beyond the treatment of psychoneurotic and oedipal problems. Ultimately, a successful analysis must deal with the individual's schizoid problem, which Guntrip (1971, p. 180) was as the need "to feel sure of one's reality and viability as a person, the need to be." Sometimes this relating meant not relating, or just waiting until the patient felt secure enough in the analytic session.

Guntrip saw interpretations not as a way to uncover oedipal conflicts but as a way to have the patient see that his compulsive,

anxious way of relating was a struggle to prove he was real and integrated. Fairbairn (1941, p. 40) had spoken of such a way of relating to others as "relationships by default." The person begins to look for "substitutive satisfactions" as masturbation. Jackson (1957) analyzed the compulsive and guilt cycle of masturbation in the schizoid adolescent as a "wish to control the object and the fear of abandonment that such control brings with it." Fairbairn saw exhibitionism as another inadequate way to relate to another person. He found it to be a "technique for giving without giving, by means of a substitution of 'showing' for giving'" (Fairbairn, 1940, p. 16). Exhibitionism is a way to express feelings and emotions "before an external object" instead of "towards an object," which is a more mature genital approach (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 87). Other relationships as homosexuality, sadism and masochism were also attempts to relate "which have broken down" (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 40).

Guntrip believed that in therapy a person could learn how to relate. The aim of psychotherapy was to provide the patient with the mothering he was deprived of during the early years of his life. Such a therapy produces dependency and regression in the patient. Guntrip felt that "normal regression" was important for us to maintain our bodies through sleep and rest. He saw "pathological regression" as underlying the schizoid problem, that intense fear of one's aloneness and weakness. Guntrip felt that a study of the schizoid individual was necessary for understanding the problem of a person with a "weak ego whose development has been gravely compromised in the earliest stages" (Guntrip, 1969, p. 105).

The Schizoid Problem

The schizoid problem, says Guntrip (1971) is the fear of entering into relationships with other people because one is not sure whether one has a self. Winnicott saw the ability to relate as a product of the development of basic ego-relatedness. Winnicott would speak of a "true self" left unnourished while a "false self" system developed to maintain a facade of contact with a feared but needed social world of people.

Fairbairn (1940) saw the schizoid person's preoccupation with inner reality as the most important schizoid characteristic. Intellectualization, a common schizoid tendency, was an effort to work through problems in an inner manner. Unfortunately, thinking tends to become overvalued and is the only way that some schizoid persons can be creative. The result is that words and thoughts soon become more important than feelings and emotions. Another important result of the schizoid's preoccupation with his inner world is a sense of "secrecy" over his internal contents (Fairbairn, 1940). Since internal contents are so overvalued, there is a necessity for secrecy as well as a fear that they might be stolen. Guntrip (1969) saw this aspect of the schizoid as a form of narcissism.

In Fairbairn's object relations theory of personality, the schizoid person develops as a consequence of rejection at the early oral stage. The child becomes frustrated in his very first love relationship. Fairbairn (1940) felt that the child can only explain the lack of love towards him by feeling that his own love must have been destructive and bad. Thus begins a lifetime of refusing to place one's love outside of

one's self by attempting to abolish all relationships. Guntrip saw the schizoid resolution as such an attempt to "cancel external object relations and live in a detached and withdrawn way" (Guntrip, 1969, p. 19).

In an analysis of the schizoid personality, Guntrip (1969) states that not only does the schizoid fear that his love will devour the other person but that the relationship will devour him. The result is an "in and out program" as a way of relating without becoming attached or possessed. The schizoid person can relate by such diversionary ways as by identifying with a person, as in the maneuver of infatuation. Identification, however, leads to a fear of overdependence, which is solved by withdrawing again from the relationship. Overwhelmed by the world, the schizoid person may regress rather than feel emotion or closeness to another person. Guntrip saw the ultimate regressive impulse as a need to return to the safety of the womb (Guntrip, 1969). Guntrip understood the goal of therapy was to give the patient a "controlled and constructive" regression, with the hope of converting this regression into "rebirth and regrowth."

CHAPTER V

THE BORDERLINE STATE

The American therapeutic community's emphasis on object relations took a different line of development than its British counterpart. Melanie Klein offended her fellow British analysts with her theoretical extensions of Freudian instinct theory, but Fairbairn, Winnicott and Guntrip were able to formulate more autonomous theories based on object relations. American therapists were not aware of their work, and the American therapists developed a psychology based on ego processes rather than on object relations.

Theory in American psychiatry had little impact on the treatment of institutionalized patients. The insane were viewed as being physically sick, and they were considered a medical problem. The early psychiatrists were called "alienists" because of the foreign, alien nature they treated. The easiest way out of this medical problem lay in an organic interpretation of the strange phenomenon that the psychiatrist found presented to him. These people said the psychiatrist were afflicted by a disease of the brain or nervous system. The discovery of the causes of general paresis gave hope to the medical profession that the strange forms of "dementia" would also soon be found within the skulls or nervous systems of the insane. Treatment methods as electroconvulsive shock, psychosurgery and psychopharmacology would follow from this belief.

Psychiatry also refined its diagnostic categories during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Influenced by a medical perspective, psychiatry formulated emotional disorders in terms of physiological concepts. This orientation is reflected in the diagnostic statements of the state's psychiatrists in the Leopold-Loeb trial.

Psychiatry was unable to force all forms of emotional disturbance into its conceptual boxes. This dissatisfaction is no more fully revealed than in the current blending of the historical distinctions between neurosis and psychosis, and the emergence of a new but unofficial category, the borderline state or syndrome. The dichotomy between the neurotic and the psychotic is a man-made, historical and philosophical distinction. In the late Renaissance a distinction was made between disorders of mania and disorders of melancholia. The later was seen only as a partial distortion of reality similar to recent concepts of neurosis, while mania was seen as a generally disorganized, sometimes violent, state with poor judgement similar to recent concepts of psychosis. Kahlbaum in 1863 would also classify mental disorders into "total" and "partial" insanity along such lines.

It appears that American therapists were concerned with the same clinical problems as were European therapists. American therapists did not have a general personality theory that focused on one's object relations. The discovery of patients with conventional social facades but severely impaired interpersonal abilities, therefore, remained a serious diagnostic for American therapists. In time the relationship

of the borderline patient to British object relations theory was recognized.

When the English school, such as Guntrip, talk about borderline, they seem to have included patients who might ordinarily be labeled schizoid in the United States. These schizoid patients have the same colorful complex as the flamboyant clinging borderline. However, as part of their character style, they choose withdrawal and isolation as a way of coping with the wishes of devouring and being devoured. . . . The borderline patient in his daily existence attempts to cope with one repeated fear and conviction that he has been and will be abandoned by important people in his life. The histories of borderline patients reveal loss, relative neglect or over indulgence—all alternating with neglect. (Fine, 1977, pp. 13-14)

It is difficult to analyze the social determinants of a movement one is living through, but Fine (1977) has mentioned specific sociological and historical influences on the growth of borderline persons seeking treatment.

Since the late fifties therapists have observed a notable increase in the so-called narcissistic disorders and borderline states among late adolescents and young adults whose early childhood coincided with a significant movement of influence in the late 1940's and early 1950's. There was also a shift from the authoritative certainty, that is, in Reisman's term, in a direction to a dependency upon fluctuating external information in a quest for certainty. The narcissistic and borderline disorders in the grown offspring of these postWorld War II, other directed parents involve action oriented symptoms, drug addiction, promiscuity, wrist-slashing, delinquency, exhibitionism, impulsivity; symptoms that differ from the psychoneurosis in the degree of physical sensation that these narcissistic symptoms entail. Such symptoms are desperate measures to ward off a fundamental narcissistic susceptibility, namely, a depression evolving from a frozen rage at a parental image that arouses expectation but immobilizes its consummation by well meaning ambivalence. (Fine, 1977, p. 16)

The particular manner in which they relate to others has become a distinguishing diagnostic feature of the group called the borderline

person. As early as 1942, Deutsch wrote of some patients whose interactions with others lacked "genuineness." Such persons did not fit into the ordinary categories of neurosis, yet they were too well-adjusted to be classified as psychotic. While writers as early as Stern in 1938 stressed the narcissistic character roots of the borderline, it is only recently that object relations theorists as Kernberg (1967, 1970, 1971) Kohut (1966, 1971) and Giovacchini (1972, 1973) have systematically researched the narcissistic personality structures of some borderline patients. Other theorists see the borderline as a variant of the schizoid that British object relation theorists such as Fairbairn and Guntrip write of.

The borderline person is able to project a superficial conventional adaptation to others. Real emotional responsiveness to another person is lacking. What is always present, however, is an engulfing, dependent, demanding style of relating. Other related patterns of behavior include intense affect, impulsive behavior and brief psychotic experiences.

The danger is that the borderline category will become a "wastebasket" category. Grinker (Grinker, Werble, & Drye, 1968) attempted a long-term, systematic study of hospitalized borderline patients, but aspects of Grinker's sample population's premorbid behavior have been criticized by Gunderson and Singer (1975). Other studies on the borderline person have focused on data from psychological testing to verify the presence of a borderline condition. Rapaport (Rapaport et al., 1946, Vol. 2) found bizarre reasoning and over-elaborate associations in the Rorschach protocols of their borderline

patients. Schaffer (1954, p. 66) notes that while a tester may "obtain perfectly orderly intelligence test results" the borderline person may produce a Rorschach with peculiarities such as inadequately basing a whole response on a simple detail on the card. Such Rorschach behavior is viewed as pathognomic of an over-ideational person, and Rapaport (1946) reported such findings in his over-ideational "preschizophrenics." Unstructured, ambiguous tests tend to show deviant thought processes in borderline patients (Zucker, 1954; Shapiro, 1954; Fisher, 1955; McCully, 1962; Weiner, 1966). These deviant thought processes, however, do not always develop into psychotic symptoms, though the borderline person has been thought to have the capacity to become psychotic under regressive situations.

In an excellent summary of the literature, Gunderson and Singer (1975) list a number of characteristics of the borderline person. Intense effect of a hostile or depressed nature is one characteristic mentioned. The depression of the borderline person is like the "futility" that Fairbairn found in his schizoid patients. The anger of the borderline person has also been linked to the anger felt as a result of early unmet oral needs. Though the borderline person may show a superficial social adaptiveness, Gunderson and Singer (1975) feel that there is often a history of impulsive behavior in the borderline's background. This may take the form of sexual promiscuity or drug use. The most important distinguishing feature of the borderline person, however, is the quality of their interpersonal relationships. Intense effect may be demanded but not reciprocated. The major difficulty appears to be an inability

to tolerate intimacy in a close relationship. This is why an analysis on the level of their object relations appears to be an important element in a full understanding of the dynamic makeup of the borderline person.

Object relations theory has also chosen to focus on our inability to escape from interpersonal relationships, and the intimate relationship between having "others" in our world and developing a sense of self. Object relation theorists as Fairbairn focused on the "schizoid problem," the fear that one's love may devour and destroy that which one needs. While object relations theory understands the schizoid orientation as a reflection of a particular internal "bad object" relationship, the schizoid person behaviorally shows many aspects of the borderline person. The schizoid person may have superficial interpersonal relationships, but he actually feels drained or exhausted by these contacts. Since his ego is so weakly developed, most relationships are considered a potential danger to his sense of self and realness. Since his inner life has been overly developed in relation to his interpersonal skills, there is often a great deal of narcissism, along with a compensatory sense of superiority. The world is also a frightening place for the borderline person. What the borderline person has shown us is that a person can move about in our culture with neurotic outward behaviors, as well as with an inner, frightened, angry, inadequate, psychotic self and still not be hospitalized.

Early Psychoanalytic Literature

One of the earliest references to the borderline state in the literature is Adolph Stern's 1938 Psychoanalytic Quarterly article entitled "Psychoanalytic Investigation of and Therapy in the Borderline Group of Neurosis." Stern believed that these patients belonged in the narcissistic character neuroses category and that narcissism was an essential part of the disorder. Stern also stated a clinical fact he found in his patient's parents that would be cited by many in the clinical literature to follow him: one of the parents was either neurotic or psychotic, and he or she often developed psychotic episodes. Stern concentrated on the mother as the precipitating factor and gave us an early description of what Winnicott would later discuss as "poor mothering." Stern's patients subsequently suffered from what he called "affective (narcissistic) malnutrition." This basic insecurity bred in latter life an inordinate hypersensitivity to and an overwhelming feeling of the world as an anxiety-producing agent. This anxiety was, in turn, reacted to in a number of ways—extreme emotional reactions of anger and depression, masochistic behaviors, somatic complaints, and the use of projection. Stern was very much struck by the basic insecurity of these people. He wrote that:

One rarely gets an impression that these patients at any period in their lives possessed self-assurance or self-confidence, unless the environment in some form or other gave it to them for the time being through approval, or when some experience gave them a temporary feeling of being completely adequate. Self-assurance usually was an evanescent experience, rather than one gained through a process of growth, maturity, experience, or reality testing. (Stern, 1938, p. 476)

In contradiction to the stage-successive, psychosexual theory of neurosis of his day, Stern believed that the insecurity of his borderline patients dated from before the development of the oedipal conflict. (This is, of course, a Kleinian view.) He also believed that a "great part of ego functioning is involved in this illness" (p. 489). Stern felt that the lack of adequate ego functioning also explained the use of projective mechanisms. Perhaps these patients projected because they did not have a strong enough ego to accept responsibility in other words, to say "I did it."

Stern's borderline patients compelled him to modify his psychoanalytic treatment procedures. The reason for the modification was due to their insecurity, their extreme dependence, and their inability to form an "affective relationship on any basis." The analyst tended to be idealized by these patients, who saw him as a "personal, corporeal god and magician." "How else can I feel," said one of Stern's patients, "but in awe of you." Stern noted that many of these patients only accepted the analyst as "some vague presence without definite form who must not even be looked at" (p. 480).

Another basic difficulty which Stern felt that all borderline patients shared was "growing up," which in their fantasy they saw as somehow related to perfection. What happens when the borderline patient reaches adulthood? Stern noted that when "he successfully attains adulthood, the patient has a secret idea that his performance was not real, and that he might easily be unmasked as make-believe" (Stern, 1938, p. 483).

In his 1938 article Stern listed what he believed were some of the major clinical symptoms found in the borderline patient. His list included: (1) narcissism, (2) psychic bleeding, (3) inordinate hypersensitivity, (4) psychic and body rigidity—"the rigid personality," (5) negative therapeutic reactions, (6) "What looks like constitutionally rooted feelings of inferiority, deeply imbedded in the personality," (7) masochism, (8) "deep organic insecurity or anxiety," (9) use of the projective mechanism, and (10) difficulties in reality testing, particularly in personal relationships (Stern, 1938).

Helene Deutsch's 1942 article on the "as if" personality is considered the landmark article on borderline personality organization (Deutsch, 1942). Deutsch, like Stern, found that some of her patients did not fall neatly into the ordinary neurotic or psychotic categories of emotional disorders. Deutsch noted that "the individual's whole relationship to life has something about it which is lacking in genuineness and yet outwardly runs along "as if it were complete" (Deutsch, 1942, p. 302). Deutsch's "as if" patient easily formed intense relationships which were devoid of warmth. He was like an actor, said Deutsch, who may be "technically well trained but who lacks the necessary spark to make his impersonations true to life" (Deutsch, 1942, p. 303). These people were not inhibited or repressed in their emotional life; they were, instead, unable to relate to or invest any aspects of themselves in another person. Lipshutz (1955) noted how such "as if" people would enter quickly into a relationship, only to leave just as quickly when an emotional investment or closeness was

demand. Their very intensity, however, revealed their need to fill their deep emptiness. Such persons may become fanatical adherents to faddish religions or pseudophilosophical cults, but their allegiance to one cult is soon replaced by another new interest.

In 1953, Robert Knight of the Menninger Foundation discussed the diagnostic difficulties involved in making the borderline category a separate and acceptable diagnostic entity. These factors included the belief that one must have a break with reality or a falsification of reality with the presence of hallucinations or delusions. The break with reality, said Knight, is more a bending than a sudden "snapping." A second misconception was that neurosis and psychosis must be mutually exclusive. The third misconception was, perhaps, Knight's bravest point for he attacked the Freudian, psychosexual, libidinal theory of development and pathology as being "one-sided" and inadequate.

Knight defined the borderline state as one in which

. . . normal ego functions of secondary process thinking, integration, realistic planning, adaptation to the environment, maintenance of object relations, and defenses against primitive unconscious impulses are severely weakened.

(Knight, 1953, p. 6)

Knight felt that during an initial interview these patients may present a "deceptive, superficially conventional, although neurotic front." This statement is in contrast with Stern's (1938) and Lipshutz's (1955) descriptions of their initial interactions with their borderline patients. Stern noted his patients often came into therapy with an anxiety-producing neurosis that tended to develop into a violent, grasping at the analyst for security. Lipshutz (1955) found

that in his initial experiences with borderline patients their transference feelings involved great hate or love (including a desire for intercourse). When the therapist challenges this strong "cathexis" towards him, the patient may project these strong, delusional feelings onto a third person, either a stranger, or as Lipshutz says, an "endowed" friend.

Knight did agree, however, that "the ego of the borderline is a feeble and unreliable ally in therapy," and the goal of therapy was to "improve and strengthen the ego operations." The more ego-syntonic the borderline is to his pathological material, the greater would be his disturbance. Knight warned that the therapist should not attack the symptoms and defenses of the borderline patient for they are ego operations keeping them "from further psychotic disorganization."

Another important early psychoanalytic study is Zilboorg's 1941 article on "Ambulatory Schizophrenias" (Zilboorg, 1941). Zilboorg saw schizophrenia as a "generic name covering a certain type of psychopathological processes," which can present itself "in various degrees of intensity, various stages of development" (p. 151). Zilboorg believed that borderline cases were on the less advanced end of the spectrum and cases of dementia praecox were on the more advanced end. Zilboorg would coin the term "ambulatory schizophrenic" for those individuals who were schizophrenic but would not come to the attention of the psychiatric profession. He believed, for example, that certain murderers were of this class. Lastly, Zilboorg believed that "unconscious homosexuality plays an enormous role in the psychology of

these people" (p. 154), an early reference to the disturbed sexual functioning of the borderline patient.

Zilboorg did not stress the atypical ego development of these individuals. His quote that homosexuality played a role in motivation of the borderline shows that while Zilboorg has noted an important fact (impaired sexual identity) he had only a libidinal, successive-stage, id-psychology within which to conceptualize his findings. Zilboorg's overall views on the borderline patient may be understood as owing much to the theoretical orientation of Adolf Meyer, who believed that schizophrenia was a complex form of adaptation. Zilboorg merely attempted to present the borderline state as a more adaptive form of schizophrenia. Zilboorg, like many other psychoanalysts, was not ready to make the borderline state a distinct category.

Twenty-four years after Helene Deutsch's article on the "as if" personality, a panel of the 1965 meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association discussed the clinical and the theoretical implications of her findings. Their discussions clearly show that the concept of the borderline had clearly expanded in importance from Deutsch's 1942 article (Weiss, 1966). Chairman Samuel Atkin noted that, "Every analyst that I have discussed the topic of 'as if' has the strong impression that the concept is applicable, somehow, in many of their cases, and not merely in the clearly schizoid characters" (p. 573). Nathaniel Ross stated that there should be a spectrum of "as if" states rather than a sharply differentiated syndrome and he suggested such characteristics as a lack of genuineness, transience, and

changeability. Helene Deutsch, speaking twenty-four years after her article, was able to state those situations in the "psychological expression of life" which could nurture an "as if" personality to develop. These situations were:

. . . Continuous tensions between external and internal reality, our dreams, our fantasies, the problems of our ambivalences, our developmental progress and our ever-present regressive trends, the struggle between life and death, the continuous attacks on our ego ideal from both outside and inside, the seldom absent obstacles to achieving solid object relationships and adequate adaptation. . . . (Weiss, 1966, p. 581)

Statistical and Epidemiological Aspects

The 1966 American Psychoanalytic Association panel concluded that the use of the "as if" or borderline category had greatly increased, but the use of the borderline category as a subset of schizophrenia had also greatly expanded. American mental health professionals were not ready to accept the borderline state as a separate diagnostic category.

Kendell and his coworkers (1971) found that while British psychiatrists have a broader concept of manic depressive illness than their American counterparts, American psychiatrists have a broader concept of schizophrenia than the British, embracing what in Britain is regarded as manic and neurotic illness as well as personality disorders. British psychiatrists, they note, seem to "tune in" more readily to affective aspects of a disordered person, while American psychiatrists seem to be influenced by the cognitive behaviors presented, i.e., by the "disordered thinking aspects." Kendell et al. concluded that American psychiatrists have a broader concept of schizophrenia.

In another article, Kuriansky and his coworkers examined the hospital diagnoses of the New York State Psychiatric Institute for the periods 1932-1941 and 1947-1957 with an N of 64 for each period. In the earlier 1932-1941 period, Kuriansky found that twenty to thirty percent of the patients were originally diagnosed as schizophrenic, while by 1952 almost eight out of ten admissions were so diagnosed. The psychiatric records at Maudsley Hospital, London, were examined as a historical comparison. The proportion of patients diagnosed as schizophrenia has remained fairly constant at Maudsley.

Could it be that different types of people were being classified as schizophrenics in the 1947-1957 sample? The authors examined the demographic characteristics of both American samples and found them rather similar with regard to sex, age, marital status, race, and number of previous admissions. For example, sixty-three individuals in the first sample of sixty-four were white, while sixty-two of the second sample of sixty-four were white. Twenty-three of the 1940 group were male, while twenty-five of the 1950 group were male. Thirty-six of the first sample were married as compared to thirty-eight of the second sample.

The results of the Kuriansky et al. study indicate that for the American hospital the criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenia became broader by the 1950's. Their finding is consistent with the increase in the literature of patients diagnosed as borderline, pseudoneurotic or ambulatory schizophrenia. In the second period of time studied (1947-1957) it was obvious that psychiatrists were more willing to

include a more ambiguous but heterogeneous group of disturbed people and classify them as schizophrenics.

An important example of the attempt by psychiatry to broaden the concept of schizophrenia to include the borderline patient is the exposition of the "pseudoneurotic" form of schizophrenia (Hoch & Polatin, 1949; Hoch & Cattell, 1959). In examining schizophrenia as a separate diagnostic entity Hoch and Polatin (1949) noted that originally schizophrenia was diagnosed only when there was deterioration present. This orientation basically concentrated on the outcome of the "disease." This importance on the progressive decay and regression of the patient is present in the writings of both Kraepelin and Bleuler. Furthermore, Bleuler specifically listed a number of accessory symptoms that schizophrenics exhibited at certain periods during their illness. These included hallucinations, illusions and delusions. Hoch's and Polatin's definition of the pseudoneurotic form of schizophrenia, however, did not include deterioration or such secondary symptoms as poor sleep patterns, anorexia and phobias. They also found that their pseudoneurotic patients often had a mixture of genital and pregenital aspects of psychosexual development.

In a later article, Hoch and Cattell (1959) stated that the best way to diagnose pseudoneurotic schizophrenia was through the secondary symptoms of pan-anxiety, pan-neurosis, and pan-sexuality. The pan-anxiety was seen as a diffuse, intense anxiety felt in response to even minor stimuli. The neurotic core could include the gamut of neurotic symptomatology from obsessions and phobias to acting out and

drug-dependent behavior. The pan-sexuality was reflected in the chaotic-sexual organization and sexual functioning of these patients.

Other characteristics that Hoch and Cattell defined as part of the pseudoneurotic's personality organization included the following:

- A. Primary process thinking which involved a dominating fantasy life that spewed forth a fusion of contradictory and inconsistent ideas.
- B. Disturbances in the continuity and flow of the thought processes.
- C. Disturbances of awareness, attention, and concentration regarding the self-image and the body image including difficulty in distinguishing between internal and external stimuli.
- D. Stereotyped, anachronistic thought content.
- E. A low threshold to anxiety.
- F. The inability to sustain or stop an emotion or tension.
- G. The somatization of emotional reactions.
- H. A keen awareness of the lack of feeling tone or the ability to gratify one's needs.
- I. The exploitation of others in order to experience emotion.

(Hoch and Polatin, 1959, pp. 17-43).

Hoch's concept of the pseudoneurotic is still anchored in the bedrock of the schizophrenic process. It can be seen as a transitional concept between traditional concepts of schizophrenia and the view of the borderline state as a separate diagnostic entity. What the borderline category needed was for someone to blend the clinical and

phenomenological data into a theory that would encompass these elements as well as present a statement of this atypical development. The British School of Object Relations was able to place the schizoid personality within a larger model of defective ego functioning. In America Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut were able to develop broad theoretical frameworks that would give the borderline state the systematization and analysis it would need in order to be viewed as a separate diagnostic entity. Kernberg and Kohut may be seen as the exponents of an American School of Object Relations.

Kernberg

Kernberg's (1967) major foundation for a distinct entity to be called a "borderline personality organization" is that there are a group of patients who have a "specific, stable, pathological personality organization" that is not merely a "transitory state fluctuating between neurosis and psychosis" (Kernberg, 1967, p. 642). Traditional psychoanalytic techniques are, furthermore, ineffective with borderline patients because they tend to develop a "transference psychosis" rather than a "transference neurosis" under classical psychoanalytic treatment. The reason for this phenomenon is that the borderline patient easily loses reality testing and develops delusional ideas in the transference situation concerning his relationship with the therapist. Bychowski (1953, p. 489) related the anecdote of a male medical student who was being analyzed for symptoms of anxiety hysteria. During treatment of this patient, he "unexpectedly"

developed a severe paranoid reaction, a development that his analyst did not foresee or understand. It was Bychowski's contention, however, that the patient's "psychotic episode was provoked, or at least made possible through psychoanalysis." It appears that the treatment, by removing the patient's defenses, had subsequently exposed his weak ego. Bychowski's example appears to be an early example of the dangers of traditional analysis for a borderline patient.

Splitting

Kernberg, a psychoanalyst and professor of clinical psychiatry at Columbia, formulated his ideas on the borderline condition while he was Director of the Menninger Memorial Hospital in Topeka. Kernberg believed that an understanding of his borderline patients could best be conceptualized by an "analysis of the pathology of their internalized relationships" (Kernberg, 1975, p. 7). Splitting is Kernberg's major concept in his overall theoretical scheme. He views splitting as the most important defensive operation that is used by the borderline. Kernberg uses splitting in a restricted sense, and he defines it as "the process of active keeping apart of introjection and identifications of opposite quality" (Kernberg, 1975, p. 94). Splitting for the borderline person begins as a "simple defect in integration" in the development of his ego. Kernberg sees as crucial the borderline's inability to deal with the aggressive aspects of his early development, which he sees as emanating from instinctual "drives" and a severe early frustration. Unable to "synthesize positive and negative introjections"

the borderline must dissociate his good images from his bad objects. Splitting diffuses anxiety when these contradictory elements come together.

Fine (1977), who calls the borderline person a "limenic" (threshold) person, states that the process of "coalescence" should be studied as well as the process of splitting in the borderline. Fine says that:

The borderlines that I have seen struck me as having an intense coalescence phenomena. It is a special form of denying, a divided attitude implying both an affirmation and a disavowal. He treats many areas of his life with affection and hostility. Within a paradoxical logic the ego of the limenic manages to hold two contrary attitudes and premises in a syncretic fashion. (Fine, 1977, p. 24)

Fine believes that this special process of denying in the form of coalescence is the basis for an "intrinsic pattern" that he finds in schizoid, borderline and narcissistic patients—a "fata-morgana" fantasy.

The fantasy is a simple one: there is a wish to have all one's needs met in a perfect relationship. The morgana fantasy is always passive, always tied to the conviction that somewhere is a person capable of meeting one's needs. The wish to be cared for so completely that no demand will be made on the person except for incorporating. (Fine, 1977, p. 25)

Fine (1977) believes that the morgana fantasy originates during the reapproachment subphase of Mahler's separation-individuation process.

If a sense of separateness is seen as an intrapsychic achievement, then the Morgana reflects that the goal has been stymied. . . . Therefore, conflicts of a separation can be easily reactivated in later life especially at those times when the patient is expected to function separately. It is at this time that the patient is always in danger of regressively repeating the behavior of the reapproachment

phase of development, meeting what is experienced as frustration and then finally to the reactivation of the morgana as a regressive solution to the fear of abandonment and turning away. (Fine, 1977, pp. 26-27)

Other Diagnostic Aspects

Kernberg (1975) lists a number of neurotic symptoms that are shared by borderline patients. Anxiety is the first aspect mentioned and Kernberg sees the anxiety as being of the "chronic, diffuse, free-floating" type. Borderline patients may have a number of different neurotic symptoms as phobias, obsessional rituals or paranoid trends. The borderline personality organization is also reflected in their perverse sexual development. In order to escape the early oral rage that occurred as a result of early oral frustration, the borderline prematurely develops genital strivings (Kernberg, 1975, p. 41). The result is a premature development of oedipal feelings, but under an enormous amount of aggressiveness. (Kernberg's theory of development at times is similar to Melanie Klein.) Homosexuality is one example of such an early development.

Kernberg's views of perverse sexual development in the borderline person is different than Fairbairn's view of the development of sexual symptoms as a conversion hysteric-like symptom. Kernberg, in contrast, is still invested in a more traditional, psychoanalytic psychosexual theory of genital development (Mendez & Fine, 1976).

Above all, however, Kernberg views the borderline personality structure as a manifestation of ego weakness. This is a view that allies him closely with the theoretical viewpoint of the British School

of Object Relations (Mendez & Fine, 1976). This lack of ego integration is reflected in the borderline's problems in tolerating anxiety or in controlling his impulses. Ego strength for Kernberg depends on the neutralization of instinctual energy. Ego weakness, in contrast, is not disorganization but a "rigid constellation of primitive defenses" (Kernberg, 1975, p. 170). Some of these primitive defense mechanisms are splitting, denial and identification, all of which project the borderline person from ambivalence and intimacy. Kernberg's emphasis on early primitive defensive mechanisms leading to the borderline's later inadequate ego development is a reflection of his more general theoretical views on the development of intrapsychic structure (Kernberg, 1966). Kernberg names introjection, identification and ego identity as the processes which eventually should lead to a secure ego, a sense of self and mastery and a consistency in interpersonal relationships. Guntrip (Mendez & Fine, 1976) saw Kernberg's theory as "too sophisticated, too intellectualized, a scheme forced on the phenomena." The result, noted Guntrip, is that

Kernberg, like Klein, tries to explain too much too exactly and produces that horror, a "metapsychology," an impersonal theory of the experience of persons, under the idea that science must be impersonal. (Mendez & Fine, 1975, p. 370)

In spite of these criticisms Kernberg's analysis of the borderline personality organization is the most important American contribution to our understanding of persons with inadequate ego development. Kernberg views the borderline state as "the most severely regressed level of character disorders" (Kernberg, 1975, p. 156). He sees the narcissistic

personality as similar to the borderline state because of the predominance of primitive, splitting mechanisms (Kernberg, 1970, 1973, 1975).

The Narcissistic Personality

Kernberg conceptualizes the borderline's internal difficulty as one in which identification is over-idealized with self- and object-representations. The narcissistic personality's difficulty involves the pathological fusion of ideal self, ideal object and actual self images. The pathological fusion leads to faculty superego. Another important difference is that unlike the borderline, the narcissistic individual functions well in social situations. They can also control their impulses better than the borderline, as well as work more consistently at tasks. Kernberg describes the narcissistic personality as one who is shallow, egocentric and grandiose. Exploitive and ruthless in his treatment of others, he can become easily bored with others when they no longer supply him with what he needs.

Kernberg (1975) perceives "normal narcissism" as the product of "relationships between the self and the intrapsychic structures." Some of these structures are the ideal-self, object representations, "organic factors" as general good health and external reality factors. Kernberg also states that normal narcissism is dependent on keeping "libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives" in equal balance. "Pathological narcissism" is based, in contrast, on a process of identification that has over-invested itself in the wrong internalized

object, the ideal self. Other variants of pathological narcissistic development involve "the relation to an object that represents the self while the self is identified with that object." A more severe form of narcissistic pathology is the "relation of a grandiose self to a temporarily projected grandiose self." Such dynamic structures can then explain why the narcissistic person's ability to relate to others is impaired as it reflects aspects of a bad internalized object relationship. The narcissistic person may also be defending against paranoid feelings that are a projection of unmet early oral needs. An alternative way to conceptualize the narcissistic personality has been advanced by Heinz Kohut, who will be examined as the second major exponent of an American theory of object relations.

Heinz Kohut

Heinz Kohut, M.D., is a Professional Lecturer in Psychiatry at the University of Chicago, and a training analyst at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. Kohut's theory of the narcissistic personality (1971) starts from the condition of primary narcissism, which all individuals share. Kohut does not view narcissism as excluding actual relating to an object, but sees it as a pathological way of relating to objects such that objects are used in the service of the self or are invested with aspects of the self.

Unlike Kernberg, Kohut does not view the narcissistic personality as a borderline state, and Kohut sees the borderline state, itself, as a mild or "disguised" form of psychosis. Kohut's theory, like

Kernberg's, is tied to a Freudian psychosexual model. The self, for example, is developmentally connected with instinctual energy. "The central pathology of the narcissistic personality disturbance . . . ," says Kohut (1971, p. 19) "concerns primarily the self and the archaic narcissistic objects." These narcissistic objects are "archaic, narcissistically cathected, and prestructural." The stable, personality configurations that these archaic aspects attain allow a specific type of transference reaction in the analytic situation. Unlike the borderline state, they do not fragment the personality regression, and Kohut uses this aspect to distinguish the narcissistic personality disorder from the borderline disorder.

In fact, Kohut feels that a diagnosis of a narcissistic personality disturbance cannot be made solely on the presenting symptoms or even the life history of the patient. The only clear indicator is the manner in which the transference develops between the narcissistic patient and the analyst. This involves the activation of the "idealizing transference" and the "mirror transference."

Kohut views the narcissistic personality as an arrest in normal development. The child's primary narcissism cannot be used to develop into an empathic, mature, genital individual due to inadequacies in the mothering process. The result is that the child develops a compensating grandiose and exhibitionistic self-image, the "grandiose self." The child's previous, good feeling of perfection in his state of primary narcissism is transferred over to an admired, omnipotent and transitional self-object, the "idealized parent imago." The child will

then feel empty when separated from an object, and he will attempt to be near any object continuously. Any object is acceptable for a narcissistic character disorder because any relationship can be terminated and substituted for another one. This developmental arrest, says Kohut, will be reflected in the individual's sexual life, in work inhibitions, in his "ability to form and maintain significant relationships," as well as in delinquent activities, pathological lying, a lack of empathy, uncontrolled rage and hypochondriacal preoccupations (Kohut, 1971, p. 23).

CHAPTER VI

THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

The conflicting testimony of the trial's psychiatrists begins to make more diagnostic sense when Leopold's and Loeb's behaviors are viewed in terms of the borderline state and the narcissistic character pathology. The behaviors of the boys are best understood in terms of their object relations and from an ego psychological viewpoint. The belief that the crime was due to "diseased motivation" is an attempt to use medicine and physiology, but such use is inappropriate, misleading, and unenlightening. What did it matter that Leopold's face flushed easily. He was a very inhibited, shy young boy. The use of the boys' endocrine system to explain their crime is a reflection of the viewpoint that one's mind can be reduced to the flow of certain secretions in one's body. The explanation of motivation through one's instincts has now been discarded by ego psychology.

The belief that if somehow they could prove that Leopold and Loeb had good judgement they could also prove them sane, was an important stumbling block for the prosecutions' psychiatrists. They did not know that a borderline person might show excellent social manners and a conventional facade. The prosecution attempted to use the high intellectual level of the boys as proof they were capable of reasoning. The psychiatrists did not understand that borderline persons may be capable of high academic achievement as well as adequate work performance

since they can split off intellectual functioning from emotional involvement.

In the 1920's to be "crazy" meant to be socially unadaptive. The emphasis appears to have been on testing reality rather than on distorting reality. Psychosis was seen as deteriorative and irreversible. The capacity of the borderline individual to develop regressive, psychotic symptoms under ambiguous, stressful situations was not understood and Leopold's and Loeb's destructive, impulsive actions could only be seen as the result of some criminalistic tendencies. Again, psychiatrists could not understand that the impulsive behaviors are a reflection of an inadequate, unintegrated ego. During this period impulsive behavior was thought to represent the instinctual, id aspects of personality.

The state's psychiatrists would point to Leopold's and Loeb's good orientation, excellent memories, and good reasoning capacity to prove that they were not insane. The borderlines' unimpaired secondary processes, however, do not adequately reflect their impaired primary process organization. It does not touch on their intense fear of abandonment, their belief that they can be destroyed by interpersonal closeness, nor does it include the neurotic defenses they erect to protect themselves and to keep others away.

The court psychiatrists talked about the sense of superiority that each boy felt, but this feeling of superiority could only be related to such behaviors as Leopold's enjoyment of Nietzsche's philosophy. Or was it just possible that they learned from the attitudes and behaviors of their parents that the world belonged to them for the taking. When

Loeb was in an automobile accident at the age of fifteen, his father paid the hospital bills of the woman and child he had hit. His father also was "persuaded" to "pay off a mortgage on the woman's home, and to send her on a trip that winter to mend her shattered nerves" (McKernan, 1957, p. 50). Leopold was able to obtain a rare permit to shoot birds in Chicago's parks. Did these incidents adequately explain Leopold's and Loeb's sense of superiority? They are only partial explanations, for a valid explanation must include a metapsychological understanding of the role of narcissism in the development of the borderline and narcissistic disorders. Only such an explanation can make sense of Leopold's and Loeb's feelings of inflated self-esteem and despair, their neurotic facades and their crumbling internal worlds.

It makes no theoretical sense to see Leopold as a cold-blooded criminal or Loeb as his victim. When a reporter told Leopold that he was sorry for him being in jail, Leopold quickly responded

Now listen, I certainly do not like that. I don't want you to feel sorry for me, and if you do, I wish you would change your mind. I do not feel sorry for myself for what I did. I did it, and that's all. I got myself in this jam, and it is up to me to get out. (McKernan, 1957, p. 58)

This is not the bravado of a cold-blooded criminal, but of an ego-weak individual, who would rather be seen as bad and strong than weak and alone.

Leopold and Loeb's crime and lives reflect their inner emptiness, their capacity for object relating, as well as being a statement of their internalized object world. They are borderline individuals who desperately need feedback from their environment because their egos are

inadequate to the task of becoming mature, loving adults. They are the "as if" personalities of Deutsch's article, appearing twenty years before its publication. They reflect Kernberg's formulations on the borderline state and Kohut's theories on pathological narcissism. We find in them the intense use of splitting, the lack of ego integration, the difficulty to deal with aggressive aspects of early development, perverse sexual development and the fusion of self- and object-representations.

The object relations analysis which follows will show that Leopold and Loeb had inadequate, weak egos. While Leopold fits easily into a borderline diagnosis (with prominent schizoid and paranoid features), Loeb appears to be a severe narcissistic character disorder. At the time of the trial, Loeb appeared to function more adequately than Leopold in everyday social life. This conventional facade hid a very primitive ego structure. He appears to have had almost no capacity to engage in mature object relations, instead viewing people as narcissistic extensions of himself.

It is Leopold who makes (and wants) a relationship. Loeb desired a criminal partner, Leopold wanted a lover. What did Loeb give to Leopold? He gave the inhibited, physically weak, obsessive, intellectual boy the one aspect he lacked—the capacity to act. Loeb moved among people. He was strong and popular; his very nickname "Dickie" was a phallic one. Leopold had inner life; only Loeb could move about in the world and act on it. Separately they were mere shells of what it means

to be person, each without a core. Together they formed one whole person. Together they were real. Together they had possibilities.

If Leopold could not live without Loeb, it is possible to speculate on unconscious reasons of Leopold's getting caught after the crime. Does it not seem reasonable that he always wanted to keep Loeb with him, even in prison? It is believed that the boys were discovered because Leopold left a pair of his specially made eyeglasses at the scene of the crime and because the ransom letter was connected to his own typewriter. Did Leopold win, after all? Didn't Leopold and Loeb spend six years of their prison term together (until Loeb's murder by another inmate in 1936)? Isn't this what Leopold wanted from life—living with the man he needed and idealized? In prison they breakfasted together, played together and set up a correspondence school in a suite of rooms where they had complete privacy. We do not know if Leopold wanted to be caught in order to possess Loeb forever, and to stop from entering the world of people as a mature, active adult. An object relational analysis of their lives, however, will reveal that they lacked an adequate sense of self, and it can show exactly how they developed their weak egos.

CHAPTER VII

A REANALYSIS OF LEOPOLD AND LOEB

The first question that an object relations analysis of Leopold and Loeb must ask is whether either boy had an integrated sense of self, a central core of identity that was experienced as "real" rather than "dead" or "false." These are central questions because the development of a mature, adequate sense of self in object relations thinking is not an easy attainment. Instead, it is a struggle from the very beginning. Those individuals who develop an inadequate, stunted or "false" self have the added burden of struggling to preserve what they see as their very being.

Of course, not all of this activity is on a conscious level. Fairbairn saw that the central ego was in a constant aggressive battle with the subsidiary egos, the libidinal ego and antilibidinal ego. Guntrip concentrated on how one deals with one's devouring love, while Melanie Klein dealt with how we combine the destructive and loving aspects of our egos during a later ambivalent, transitional phase. Laing (1965) has concentrated on more ontological, phenomenological questions of whether one's self is embodied or unembodied. All of these writers, however, agree on two points: First, the experience of a real, central, integrated self is necessary for adequate functioning and psychological well-being; second, the development of such a sense of self is not an easy attainment. It is a long and difficult task.

Early Mothering

The concept of adequate, early mothering is intimately related to growth in object relations theory. Winnicott (1965b) has written extensively on how the "facilitating environment" interacts with the "maturational processes" of the infant. One important aspect of Winnicott's "average expectable environment" is the mother on whom the infant is absolutely dependent. Borderline cases are the results of environmental failures to give structure, nurturance and a sense of self. It is often believed that since Leopold and Loeb were the children of millionaires that they "must have had everything." What were the early environments of Leopold and Loeb?

The most important point to be made about Leopold's mother was that she was sick throughout her pregnancy and that she was an invalid until her death seventeen years after Leopold's birth. The implications for Leopold feeling deprived and frustrated are obvious. There is another important point, however, concerning her illness. In Klein's terminology, the paranoid position for Leopold must have been a frightening, overpowering one. The normal feelings of being frustrated and persecuted, which are an intense state for the normal, developing infant, must have been heightened for Leopold by the fact that his mother was too ill to give him adequate nurturance.

But what of Leopold's entrance into the depressive position after he had passed through the paranoid position? Could he merge his love and hate towards her and recognize that she was the cause of both

elements? Probably not, because she was responsible for more feelings of hate than of love in Leopold's life. This difficulty in ambivalence appears to have been a central problem throughout Leopold's life. The answer he found was to idealize his mother, to make her into a "saint" and deny that should could no him any wrong. The result is the almost psychotic identification of his mother with the Blessed Virgin, the Madonna.

This may be viewed as one of Leopold's earliest attempts to split off objects in his external world into "good" and "bad" aspects. What did Leopold do with the hatred and rage he felt towards his early, inadequate mothering if he split his mother-image into an all-good woman? He projected it unto all the other women in the world, whom he would consider "worthless." They were indeed, worthless, because like his mother, Leopold felt they could not offer him (and had not offered him) anything of value. But not all of the hate was directed outward, for Leopold felt that somehow he was responsible for his mother's sickness, and, later on, for her death. It must have seemed to Leopold that his love had devoured his mother, for had it not crippled her at his birth and later consumed her entirely. While this may not have been entirely conscious process, it appears that this hypothesis reflects Leopold's intrapsychic dynamics and endopsychic structure.

While Leopold used paranoid mechanisms to ward off depressive aspects in his style, he was basically a schizoid person of borderline status and functioning. Loeb, who is more narcissistic, was concerned with the angry, demanding aspects of his frustrations. Leopold is more

withdrawn, more intellectual and paranoid, more aware of the fact that he is weak and different. Loeb appears to have developed a false self system to keep his problems within an ingrained, narcissistic character style. Thus both boys were dealing with important existential questions, but each had chosen to split off aspects of themselves and others into different patterns of character organization.

An early nurturant environment is not, however, dependent on mother alone. What of the rest of Leopold's family? Except for an aunt, Leopold's father and much older brothers appear not to have made much of a close psychological impact on him. Both Leopold's and Loeb's fathers were elderly businessmen who showed their concern for their children by giving them material goods. Little has been written of the nurse who took care of Leopold during his first six months. A German governess, Marie Gressler, took care of him until he was five, only to be replaced by another governess for six months. It is, however, Leopold's next governess, Mathilda "Tillie" Wanty, who has been scrutinized carefully by the court psychiatrists at the trial. Higdon (1975, p. 198) notes that they felt she "was homely, suspicious, had a violent temper, and may have been feeble-minded." It is known that she sexually played with the boys and allowed them to play with her. It may be assumed that for Leopold this merely tended to fuse even more the sexual and aggressive aspects of his life.

Loeb also had grown up under the care of governesses. It appears that his father was a self-contained, authoritarian man. After Richard's confession, he refused to ever mention his name or have it

mentioned in his household. Richard's mother was described by the psychiatrists as "a woman in good health, with excellent poise, keen, alert, interested." The court psychiatrists, being paid by the two families, went out of their way not to "taint" either family by ever suggesting that they contributed in any way to the crime. We do know, however, that since the boys lived under their roofs, the parents were responsible for their development.

The psychiatrists and the Hulbert-Bowman report both agreed that the most important and striking early influence on Loeb was his governess, Miss Struthers. She was a strict and demanding taskmaster whose every word was law. Loeb would remember that

To myself I would think certain things were not as they should be. I would brood some.
To get by her I formed the habit of lying. (McKernan, 1957, p. 66)

Struthers attempted to make an "ideal" boy out of Loeb. She would not allow him to be anything but perfect. In her attempts to do this, the psychiatrists noted that "she effeminized him and would not allow him to mix with other boys" (McKernan, 1957, p. 66). The court psychiatrists were neither kind nor secretive in their evaluations of Struthers' personality adjustment. They noted that she had returned at the time of the trial to Chicago and had expressed "some sexual delusions of persecution and ideas of reference." The Hulbert-Bowman report further noted that

an opportunity was obtained to talk with her, and at this time she was very much on her guard, very suspicious and irritable. She refused to discuss a number of topics. She

showed no insight whatever into the mental attitudes of small children. She made extreme claims as to how well she had brought up the patient and what a perfect boy he was until she left.

Her claims are obviously untrue, although she doubtless believes them, and simply demonstrates her complete lack of understanding of human nature. She is unquestionably a paranoid person, with various misinterpretations and a suspicious and seclusive attitude towards others. (McKernan, 1957, pp. 67-68)

These were then the early beginnings of the two boys—a frustrating, distant environment for Leopold and a demanding, frustrating one for Loeb. How their pathology unfolded as a result of such early development is the next area of their lives that we shall reexamine from an object relations perspective.

Their Developing Pathology

It appears that as Leopold grew older, he continued to save his needed objects by withdrawal. This resulted in his feeling very alone and forced him to project some of his rage outward. The projection of his rage only made the world more threatening, causing him to withdraw further. Leopold, however, would not give up without a fight. His severe childhood illnesses may be seen as attempts (like the antisocial stance of some delinquents) to make the environment respond to him, recognize him, and care for him. "Psychosomatic symptoms," as one psychoanalyst noted, "are regressive, psychophysiological states" (Margolin, 1953, p. 33).

Leopold was especially bothered by a number of severe, often undiagnosed, skin disorders. The skin disorders may be understood in a

number of ways. First, they probably reflect Leopold's turning in of his anger onto his own self. They also have important clues as to his early schizoid struggle to preserve a weak, frightened self. The early skin disorders may be seen as attempts to ward off a much deeper, psychotic regression from which no doubt Leopold would have left his borderline state to enter into a full-blown psychotic one. By defining the boundaries of his self, his skin, Leopold was at least able to acknowledge that he had some sort of boundary to his self, even if only a physical, painful one.

The psychosomatic regressions did not appear to be successful, except perhaps, for saving Leopold from becoming psychotic. Leopold continued to withdraw and develop a central schizoid core and paranoid, projective mechanisms of defense. He turned to books, to words, to intellectualization. He withdrew from others, fearing them because he had projected his aggression and anger outward, and believing that people would frustrate and deny him once again. Leopold's internal world of object relations was played out in his external world. The other children responded by calling him such names as "flea." His 1920 high school yearbook noted:

The present junior class is, indeed, a good crowd. In the leadership of . . . , as Class President, they have become distinctly a social crowd, not omitting the Great Nathan. In another place, this appears in quotations: "Of course, I am the Great Nathan. When I open my lips let no dog bark." And in another place a poem speaks of the same person: "And so out list of juniors has, At least, been briefly told, With one exception only— It is the mighty Leopold."

In another place it referred to him as "Nathan Leopold, the crazy bird of the school, the member of the fifth class, who is forever harping on birds, their use, and their twiterings, known in all zoos, bird paradises and bipedal creature communities. (McKernan, 1957, pp. 45-46)

Leopold's passion for ornithology has been interpreted by Levin (1956) as a symbolic way to deal with his birth and the stork that brought him into life. It appears to have had a number of other functions. First it produced an outlet through which to vent some of his inner feelings of aggression and rage as Leopold shot and stuffed his own personal collection of birds. There are positive aspects as well, in that he could get off into the woods by himself and enjoy the absence of other people.

But bird collecting, as all of Leopold's intellectual pursuits, were measures to prove that he was important, that he was real. They were attempts at object relating. His love of bird watching enabled him to be with other people by giving talks to small groups interested in ornithology. Leopold could relate to others as long as he was in the role of expert. People were not threatening if they were in a subservient position. The same need for and fear of object relating can be seen in many of Leopold's other "interests." His attempt to learn so many different languages is an attempt to communicate with others, but unfortunately, Leopold had to fail for he could learn the words, but not the underlying feelings. His early wish to learn to say "yes" in as many languages as possible is another attempt to assert himself, to say "I make a difference in the world."

Leopold was, however, gradually splitting off the intellectual aspects of his life from the emotional aspects. Leopold would have been glad to be all mind and not have to acknowledge the existence of body or bodily needs. We can see some of the external reinforcement of this attitude in his parents' refusal to allow him to use the school's bathrooms for relief when he was in the lower grades of elementary school. By the time of the crime, Leopold had managed successfully to split his emotions off from himself and to disown them as something alien. He would deny to the press that he had cried during a stressful court scene, preferring to say that he had, however, "noticed a malfunctioning of my lachrymal glands" (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 12, 1924). The prison guards would be shocked when Leopold's father visited him for Leopold burst into tears. The guards could not believe that this cold, thinking machine had any feelings. Why did he cry? Did he think of the "king-slave" fantasy where the king rescues the slave from prison? Did he fuse his identity for a second with his father and lose his very boundaries? Was Leopold crying for himself?

The extent to which Leopold experienced his body as an alien "thing" is seen in the following quotation taken from a newspaper account of how he viewed a stomach pain some time before the trial (Chicago Daily Tribune, July 28, 1974, p. 2). The body is seen as itself composed of objects, some of them disgusting, and the themes of decay and explosion permeate the quote. Leopold's projected aggression is also reflected in his fear of penetration and pain, even from a person (physician) who is supposedly trying to help him.

I had a pain and upon considering it closely, I decided that it was upon the right side, where I had been taught by hearsay that the appendix had its domicile. By association of ideas I felt reasonably sure that I was suffering from sppendicitis. Hence, not relishing [sic] the thought of having a rip saw inserted forcibly into my side and afterwards having my appendix carefully chiseled or planed off, I know not which, I was far from happy.

However, I decided I did not care to have my appendix, which in my opinion was no more or less than a balloon placed inside the human body with the express purpose of filling itself with pus, and causing its owner, as one might say, wearer, no end of trouble, burst and scatter the contents through my body, I decided to call a doctor. While I was awaiting his arrival, an overwrought imagination could feel my appendix gradually swelling, and I wondered whether the doctor would arrive on time.

This splitting of mind from body, of good and bad aspects of self may be understood in object relations terminology as the development of a false self system. The false self system reflects the lack of integration in borderline persons. It is also a defense (Winnicott, 1965b, p. 143) used to protect aspects of one's self that are experienced as being somehow more "real." Winnicott (1965b, p. 146) notes that with a false self the person "builds up a false set of relationships, and by means of introjections even attains a show of being real." The danger of a false self is that it tends to take over more and more of the person's characteristics until the "true self" is but a small aspect of one's total functioning (Laing, 1965). The false self can give no sense of gratification, though it may enable one to move in a smooth and reliable manner among people and a world of overwhelming demands and strong emotions. The only difficulty is that one must look to the reactions of others in more ambivalent situations.

These attitudes are seen in many of the behaviors of Leopold and Loeb. Dr. White tells of a talk with Loeb during which he asked Loeb how he felt about being "grilled" by the police. He first said that he "enjoyed it," but as White "let him alone," Loeb denied his statement and said he didn't enjoy it. But Loeb soon contradicted this by saying "maybe" he did not, finally adding that "I was excited, anyhow" (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 2, 1924, p. 3). Loeb does not really know how he felt because no doubt he felt ambivalent about being grilled, as it was a situation about which he often fantasized. In another related incident, Dr. White testified (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 2, 1924, p. 3) that Leopold told him that he had looked "forward to the experience of considering himself objectively as a murderer." White reported that Leopold found the actual situation "not so exciting, because no material change has occurred." Murderers, Leopold would add, think and feel like anybody else. We can also speculate on Leopold's statement as a reflection of unconscious feelings and unconscious guilt over the death of his mother. Plagued throughout his life with the feeling that somehow his very existence caused his mother's death. Now he could objectively see himself as the murderer that he knew himself to have been. The fact that he felt no difference would prove to Leopold that he had always been a murderer.

The Chicago Daily Tribune (July 26, 1924, p. 1) related another incident that reflected how much Loeb's self needed others to verify what he really felt since he was so alienated from his feelings. The exchange between them went this way:

Reporter: "Dick, the people on the outside are thinking you are about the coldest blooded mortal in the world because of the way you are acting in court. You laugh and josh and appear to have a good time."

Loeb: "Well, what do you want me to do?"

Reporter: "I don't know. I suppose they wanted you to act natural."

Loeb: "That's just exactly what I am doing. I sit in the courtroom and watch the play as it progresses. When the crowd laughs, I laugh. When it is time to be serious, I am that way. I am a spectator, you know, and like to feel myself as one."

You can tell the people on the outside that there is no faking or pretending. I have watched you in the courtroom across the table and you laugh, smile, yawn, look bored, and all the other things. Why should I be different?"

Perhaps, because he was on trial for murder, and there was the possibility that he might be executed soon! Loeb desperately needed others to define who he was. Loeb had contemplated suicide at times, but not out of depression and withdrawal. Instead, he felt suicidal whenever he felt he was less popular.

All these actions by Loeb reflect the narcissistic, borderline aspects of his functioning. His relationships are exploitative, shallow, and extremely parasitic. Behind his charming facade is his "ruthlessness," which reflects the lack of integration of his good and bad objects. Loeb was unable to be alone. Winnicott (1958) saw the "capacity to be alone" as a reflection of the basic "ego relatedness" of the mature individual. It implied the existence of an "I" or "self," that the person was a separate, integrated unit apart from others. Winnicott also believed that the capacity to be alone reflected the "existence of a good object in the psychic reality of the individual." He was free from persecutory anxiety.

Kernberg (1975) has noted that the narcissistic character structure involves a fusion of the ideal self, the ideal object and the actual self images in order to deny dependency on either internalized or external objects. The result is a grandiose, inflated self concept with a great deal of repression concerning those aspects of the self which do not live up to the ideal standards (the false self system).

We can see such a fusion of Loeb's objects and images if we examine his development after the arrival of his governess, Miss Struthers. She attempted to make Loeb a perfect child and would accept nothing short of this goal. She blended herself entirely with Loeb, and there is little doubt that she tried to accomplish through him what she was unable to do in the world. What was Loeb to do with those aspects of himself that were less than perfect? He could only deny them to himself, and develop a pattern of lying to keep them from others. Soon he did not know what he really felt and what he was supposed to feel. His brother would later recall that Loeb would lie about almost anything. He seems to have been unable to commit himself for fear that he might say the wrong thing as he could not depend on a stable, integrated sense of self to base his answers.

Loeb's governess also instilled in him that he was a perfect person, who was somehow above the rules of society. Her pathological attachment to Loeb, her reinforcement of his narcissistic grandiosity and her belief that he should only possess ideal objects can be seen in the following letter that Struthers wrote to Loeb at the time of his trial (Chicago Herald and Examiner, August 2, 1924).

May 9, 1924

Dear Dickie:

Your letter was very welcome, and I am now the guilty one in allowing myself to fall down. However, like yourself, I will pick it up again and the result remains to be seen.

It always seems to me that we, you and I, can never be wholly separated. We lived heart to heart so many years and I look back on it now as the most pleasantest [sic] experience of my life.

The struggles of nature at your age are many, and whether you realize it or not, there are pitched battles going on within you. Nature is calling you, and you are resisting. Indeed, my dear Dickie, you are in love. It is true, for your nature is rich and responsive, and your temperament highly developed by your advanced intelligence; but you are not in love with any girl, you are in love with love, with life, with beauty, and Providence has arranged that when you must have experience, you turn toward the human element made expressly for you by woman!

Take what the girls can give you, of joy and pleasure, of dancing and beauty, holding yourself in a manner to give the equivalent, and I know that when the right one comes, you will know her; there will be no questions; it will all be clear and transparent as the day; and that is a great revelation for those who are patient and bide their time . . .

While Struthers was attempting to make Loeb appear to be a perfect child in his outward behaviors, his internal object world was developing in a less than normal fashion. These internal dynamics revealed a very primitive individual.

Volkan (1976) has written on the "primitive internalized object relations" in an individual before the coalescing of good and bad internalized object representations and before the development of a stable self-concept. Volkan (1976) has emphasized that psychotic and borderline patients may have early ego segments that have not been integrated into the individual's personality. These ego segments include self- and object-representations. One of these archaic ego segments has been called "the little man" phenomenon. This phenomenon

evolved out of an early perception of being weak and helpless before one developed an integrated ego (Niederland, 1956). The infant compensates for injuries to his early development and to his loss of infantile omnipotence by developing such pathological ego structures. As the child grows older, he cannot distinguish pathological ego structures from other more true ego structures. The individual with such ego structure may feel that he has a secret (Niederland, 1965), as indeed he does.

Kramer (1955) has written on a different aspect of the "little man phenomenon." Kramer stated that early traumatic experiences can lead to an accelerated and precocious sense of identity. The ego segment, the "little man," is isolated from the rest of the self in order to contain and adapt to this quickened rate of change. However, only in this isolated aspect of the self can the individual still feel some of the early omnipotence that he once lost. It is only through these "primitive symbolizations" that the individual can communicate. The concept of the "little man" is similar to Winnicott's false self system.

Volkan (1976) states that such primitive internalized object relations can be reactivated in later life. They may be reflected in such themes as the "little man phenomenon" that some of Volkan's patients described. Leopold may have been called a "flea" by his fellow classmates, and his body may have been periodically ravaged by many illnesses, but Leopold could always point to his intellectual precociousness as proof of his inner "secret" that he was special and

adequate. In his fantasy, Leopold could be protected by a powerful king, even though, in reality, he had been abandoned by a sickly mother at an earlier time. Although he felt a slave, Leopold remained omnipotent because he was the most powerful slave in the world.

Leopold's king-slave fantasy stressed the intense relationship between the slave and his master. After the slave saved the life of the king, the slave refused the offer of his freedom reflecting the intense anxiety over any separation from the king. As long as Leopold could feel omnipotent and satisfied from a fantasized interpersonal relationship, he had no need to risk relating to external objects.

Leopold attempted to fit real persons into his "king-slave" fantasy, an example of his projecting of internal objects unto the external world. When he was twelve, Leopold first tried to fit an older camp counselor into the role of king. In time, Leopold would fit Loeb into the role of king even though this would involve a certain amount of distortion in the beginning of their relationship. The Hulbert-Bowman report noted

At first his companion had not seemed very good-looking to him, but after a while became the patient's ideal of good looks. He then idealized his companion in other ways, thinking him more athletic than he actually was, and regarded him as an ideal athlete.

He regarded his companion as a superior student, and though he actually knew that his companion was not getting the best of grades at school, he preferred to believe his companion's boasts of his high grades. He felt, and still believes, that his companion was much more brilliant and much more intellectual than he himself was.

About a year ago, he made a table or a chart for the "perfect man." He gave his companion a score of ninety, he gave himself a score of sixty-two, other friends receiving a score of about thirty or forty. (McKernan, 1957, p. 92)

It is little wonder that in time, Leopold could state that "It was blind hero-worship. I almost completely identified myself with him." In fact, identification and infatuation were the immature forms of object relating that Leopold was capable of forming with Loeb. Loeb considered Leopold an extension of his narcissistic self, a companion who looked up to him and considered him to be perfect. Leopold also needed Loeb to play out aspects of his own internalized world of object relations. Leopold did not see Loeb as a unique individual, but as an extended part of himself that he eagerly looked forward to incorporating back into his self. Dr. Glueck would testify of Leopold:

He told me of his attitude toward Loeb, and of how completely he had put himself in the role of slave in connection with him. He said, "I can illustrate it to you by saying that I felt myself less than the dust beneath his feet," quoting from one of the poems of Lawrence Hope. He told me of his object devotion to Loeb, saying that he was jealous of the food and drink that Loeb took, because he could not come as close to him as did the food and drink. (Sellers, 1926, p. 24)

Dr. Healy, in his testimony, would produce a poem that revealed Leopold's complete identification with Loeb. Part of the poem read

Let me dream once that dear delusion
That I am you, O heart's desire.
(Sellers, 1926, p. 24)

Another poem that was of special meaning to Leopold went as follows:

Long past the pulse and pain of passion,
Long left the limit of all love;
I crave some nearer, fuller fashion,
Some unknown way, beyond, above;
Some infinitely inner fusion,
As wave with water, flame with fire;
Let me dream once that dear delusion
That I am you, O heart's desire.
(Sellers, 1926, p. 22)

The times when the veil was lifted, and each saw the other person for whom he really was, Leopold and Loeb felt intense anger towards each other and even thought about killing each other. But they could not destroy each other, for each was a part projection of the other and it would have meant destroying their own selves. The public was accurate in their inability to distinguish Leopold from Loeb, for only together were they an integrating, functioning unit. Alone they were emotional cripples. They were brilliant in intellect, lacking in emotion, but living in a borderline state between reality and regression.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES: AN OBJECT

RELATIONS INTERPRETATION

The murder of Bobby Franks was one of a number of crimes that Leopold and Loeb committed together. They had shoplifted, set fire to small shacks, burglarized some fraternity houses, carried guns, broken store windows with bricks, and had stolen automobiles. These crimes were not done for money. The burglary of one fraternity house only netted seventy-four dollars. Leopold, at that time, was "earning several hundred dollars a week" for his ornithology tours (Higdon, 1975, p. 39). The statement that they performed these crimes for the "thrill" is not really an explanation. It is, at most, a description of how they may have felt at some time during some of the crimes. One may experience a thrill while riding a rollercoaster, but to argue that two boys planned for months a complicated murder for a monetary thrill seems an inadequate, simplistic explanation. Leopold and Loeb did get a "thrill" out of planning the crime. They would get drunk together while they selected different victims and different ways of collecting the ransom money.

The prosecution, however, chose to present the Franks murder as one more crime in Leopold's and Loeb's criminal career, although prosecuting attorney Joseph Savage would call the murder the most "cold-blooded, cruel, and cowardly crime ever committed in history" (Savage's closing

trial statement in Sellers, 1926, p. 62). In his closing statement to the court, Crowe, the chief State's attorney, would emphasize the criminal, not the psychological, aspects of the kidnapping-murder. Leopold and Loeb, he would assert, had performed the crime for the ransom money. Crowe stated that

The kidnapping was planned for ransom. They wanted the money first, and they were going to kidnap a boy to get the money. Then to make sure they were picking the right fellow, whose folks were wealthy, and who could pay the ransom, they had to pick a boy they knew and who knew them. Then the motive for the murder was their own self-preservation. (McKernan, 1957, p. 266)

Crowe asserted that the crime had been planned down to the most minute details. The murder of Bobby Franks was no different than their other criminal activities except that it was more "dastardly" and they had been caught for this crime. The defense attorneys did not contest the murder as a criminal act. Instead, they chose to explain the murder and the other criminal activities as a deficit. Defense counsel, Walter Bachrach, explained Leopold's and Loeb's motivation in these terms:

A person with mental disease likewise has a lack of fixed social habits. Mental disease is primarily the inability on the part of the person suffering to make a successful adjustment to the environment in which he lives, and therefore, a person suffering from a mental disease is in relatively the same position as a child who has not been able, by reason of lack of time, lack of experience, lack of opportunity, to form fixed social habits, and make proper adjustments to a complex world. (Sellers, 1926, p. 94)

An object relations theory analysis of Leopold's and Loeb's criminal activities might view these activities as emanating from an "antisocial stance." Winnicott (1956) states that the antisocial stance

of the delinquent is a stance, or way of being in the world, that "compels the environment to be important." Winnicott saw the roots of delinquency in early deprivation, which affects the growing ego of the child. The child reacts to this environmental failure by seeking out objects (or persons) in his environment, and secondly, by destroying them. Let us examine the object-seeking aspects first.

The antisocial stance, said Winnicott, is reacted to as a nuisance by those in authority in society, usually parents or teachers of the delinquent child. Yet Winnicott also was able to see that the antisocial stance implied hope: the child was still reaching out and interacting with others in his environment. It is only his means of communication that disturb us. The impulsiveness of the behavior only mirrors the inner emptiness that drives the child to seek better object relations outside of himself. The child is searching for something lost. Winnicott saw stealing not as a searching for a specific object, but as a seeking of the mother over whom the child has rights but of whom he has been deprived. The delinquent child is then a hungry, empty child who is impulsively reaching out to fulfill unmet ego needs.

Leopold's and Loeb's criminal activities are also statements about their inner worlds. If one is unsure of who he is, and if the central part of one's being has false aspects to it that cannot be integrated into a whole, functioning ego, how does one acknowledge and fight this emptiness, this impaired, weak self? The antisocial stance, or criminalistic activities, were answers to these questions. The central concept here is a sense of weakness in one's sense of self for even

when we feel weak inside, we must still deal with the world. A related problem is allowing the outer world, or reality, to reflect back that we are worthwhile. The antisocial stance is an inadequate response, primarily because while it adequately reflects the weak, self-aspects of the delinquent, it also usually draws a response of punishment, not help from the environment.

Why then be antisocial? Writers as Freud felt that these antisocial feelings were somehow innate. Guntrip (1969) offers an alternate explanation. Guntrip believes that our instinctual energies can be distorted into antisocial aspects so that we can "suppress the fact that deep within our makeup we retain a weak, fear-ridden infantile ego that we never completely outgrow" (Guntrip, 1969, p. 125). Guntrip is speaking of those basic schizoid aspects that all persons share. A person who has been severely deprived in early life may not have developed the strength of having a real personal self to withstand these aspects of weakness. He may realize that a sense of identity and self need the presence of others, i.e., object relations. Yet he may also feel inadequate to reach out to others, and so he must devise an alternate strategy to make contact. The antisocial stance enables him to feel bad but also strong, which is better than feeling weak and afraid. Guntrip notes that

The diagnosis of "antisocial instincts" has always been man's most convincing rationalization of his plight, a subtle defense against the alarming truth that the real trouble is fear, flight from life at deep mental levels, and the failure of basic strong ego-formation, resulting in consequential inadequacy, both felt and factual, in coping with life. (Guntrip, 1969, p. 137)

Much of Leopold's and Loeb's criminalistic fantasies and activities make sense in the light of this perspective. Loeb's major fantasy involved being a criminal, that is, being bad. But he did not wish to be just an ordinary criminal, he wanted to be a "famous" criminal, a "master mind." These fantasies gave Loeb a sense of superiority. In object relations terminology, they made him experience his self as strong and bad. Often these fantasies would carry over into everyday living as when Loeb shot a hole in his shirt and then told a girlfriend that he had been in a saloon fight.

In Loeb's antisocial acts and fantasies, one finds elements of his need to reach out and be with others. This was no doubt that his need for friends reflected the cultural fact that the 1920's were a time when being in a "gang" were very important as seen in the importance of fraternities, drinking groups, speakeasies and Al Capone. This can be seen in his fantasy of directing imaginary, criminal companions as he walked the streets. Such behavior made him a leader, a strong person, while it also gave him the companionship which he must have hungered for in daily life. The imaginary gang Loeb directed may also be seen as a way that he told himself "Don't be afraid. You are not alone." The imaginary companions were then, in a sense, a protection against real, living, breathing persons, who may be less respecting of him. These "companions" are transitional phenomena, an immature form of relating.

Loeb's prison fantasy may also be examined from an object relations viewpoint. In these fantasies he was naked in a jail cell where he would be whipped and "abused." Loeb would note that he did not

mind others looking at him, but, instead, "enjoyed being looked at through the bars, because I was a famous criminal." Loeb's prison fantasy combines a number of themes. He is famed criminal, therefore he is strong and adequate, yet as he is in prison, his antisocial tendencies are being punished, or at least contained.

Above all else, however, there is an exhibitionistic aspect to the prison fantasy. Fairbairn (1941) has called exhibitionism a "relationship by default." Loeb's relationships with persons in his outer, external world are unsatisfactory, so he must turn inward to fantasy for his objects. Yet even in his internalized world, there is no satisfaction. All that Loeb can do is show, i.e., exhibit, himself to others. Even in his fantasy, he is unable to reach out, to touch, to relate to others. Yet he needs others, especially their approval and adoration. Loeb would set fires and then return to the site to talk to the spectators. The only way he was able to initiate relations with others was through antisocial behavior. Guntrip has noted that sometimes the only effect a delinquent feels he has left is his anger. Only in anger can he be active, that is, be real. Loeb would search the papers the day after he had committed a crime in order to see if his actions would be recognized. Again how much better to be bad, strong and recognized, then to be weak, afraid and unknown.

The truth is that in daily living, Loeb, the "social butterfly," felt inadequate. He boasted of his sexual prowess, but he was often impotent with his female partners. While Loeb's relationship with Leopold has been called perverse, it must be remembered that it was a

relationship, a poor, faltering attempt at maintaining constancy in his object relations.

Both Leopold and Loeb experienced no feelings of remorse over their crimes, which brings us to a related concept in object relations theory, that of "ruthlessness." The infant, notes Winnicott (1955) is ruthless, it shows no concern towards that which it directs its hate and its love. The depressive position for Winnicott was the "stage of concern" in the infant's development of mature object relationships. The infant before this stage is in a "pre-ruth" condition. Ruthlessness comes out of a lack of integration of the infant's good and bad objects. "The process of union," notes Henderson (1976, p. 612),

is a painful one, leading to an increasing sense of one's own responsibility for both love and hatred. When the ego is able to accept both the good and bad objects as aspects of one person, the integration confronts the infant with the burden of tolerating guilt, depression, and concern. The mother he was able to hate ruthlessly now becomes the very same mother he depends upon for his existence.

Loeb's lack of guilt, and his inability to master his depressions, can be seen as evidence that he, like Leopold, was subject to a pattern of early inadequate mothering. We have only looked upon the criminal activities of Leopold and Loeb as reflections of their inner feelings of emptiness and weakness. How else can their behaviors be conceptualized from an object relations perspective?

Another way to look at Leopold's and Loeb's criminal activities is to view these activities as ways they expressed their inner feelings of rage against the world. This rage may have originated from a number of sources. First, there is the oral rage that developed from early,

inadequate mothering. Borderline persons often experience a sense of rage that comes out of their sense of helplessness (Adler, 1972). They are angry because they have not been adequately cared for (symbolically, "fed") and they are angry because they realize that their inadequate early care has left them unable to care for themselves. Leopold's and Loeb's stealing can then be seen as attempts to find a mother they never had. The object, whether it is a pipe or a trophy, is not important. What they symbolize for Leopold and Loeb are "goods" and "possessions" that belong to others but not to them. This is probably why they also threw bricks through store windows, a criminal practice common at that time only among lower-class youths. Did they unconsciously perceive them as places where "goods" were "stored?"

The question arises as to why Loeb committed more crimes than Leopold. Loeb is generally considered to be the one who thought of first kidnapping and killing Bobby Franks. Many also believed that he had committed a number of crimes, some of them serious ones, before the Franks murder, but his defense cautioned him not to talk about them. These crimes, some of which have been named the "ABCD crimes" (Higdon, 1975), involved murders and such mutilations as castrating a taxi driver.

During the trial, Loeb's criminal activities were causally linked to his "antisocial" and "criminalistic" tendencies. This interpretation is based on a view that emphasizes the libidinal drive aspects of aggression. An object relations interpretation would focus on the defensive aspects of the aggressive behavior. Nadelson (1976) notes

that the narcissistic person is a vulnerable person who feels unwanted and unloved. This feeling is projected outward in order to preserve the rest of the self and in order to gain contact with the world.

Leopold is more ideational and paranoid than Loeb in dealing with the world. He is content to isolate himself and withdraw from contact. Loeb's character structure is more narcissistic than Leopold. Leopold is better conceptualized as a schizoid borderline personality. As such he tended to use the defensive process of splitting to keep apart aggressive and libidinal introjections and identifications. In a narcissistic personality as Loeb, these aspects are fused to that aggression involves both the self image and the objects outside of one's self. Kernberg's analysis of such narcissistic persons as Loeb, mentions the use of such attitudes as grandiosity as a "defense against paranoid traits related to the projection of oral rage, which is central to their psychopathology" (Kernberg, 1975, p. 228). The closer the narcissistic person is functioning on a borderline level the greater the potential for his narcissistic rage to emerge. The psychiatric testimony on Loeb suggests that he may have been fighting off an intense, psychotic regression. The murder of the young Franks boy may have been the result of Loeb losing the battle to contain this rage. The Hulbert-Bowman medical report noted that

The patient has some insight into his peculiarities and says that the idea has often come to him as to whether he was "all there." He states that during the past year he has felt different. He feels that he cannot concentrate as well, that his memory is not so good and that he cannot carry on conversation and small talk with others as well as formerly. (McKernan, 1957, p. 81)

Other instances where narcissistic rage may erupt involve situations where an important object which is needed, but also feared, is encountered by the narcissistic person. This is reflected in Loeb's impotence in sexual relationships with females. Loeb's failure to "finish" the sexual act may be understood as an unconscious maneuver to protect the female from his feelings of destruction, while preserving future possibilities for better relationships with different objects. In contrast, Loeb preferred prostitutes as sexual partners, no doubt because the question of mature object relating would not come up with them.

The heightening of Leopold's and Loeb's rage may be understood in object relations theory as a conflict over sex and aggression. This rage was being used as a last defense against regression and the loss of self. Soon they would be forced to leave each other as the school year ended. Both would be thrust out into a world of people that they were not integrated enough to deal with adequately. They were literally in a "fight for life." Rage could be a response to these problems, as well as a way to make them feel more alive. Guntrip (1969) quoted one of his patients as saying, "If I don't get angry with my employees, I'm too timid to face them. I feel some energy when I am angry. Otherwise I feel just a nobody." The release of Leopold's and Loeb's rage, however, would also project outward and make clear one important aspect of their world of internalized objects—the problem of their hatred.

"Hate," says Guntrip (1969, p. 26), "is love grown angry because of rejection." It is clear that once Leopold and Loeb realized that a frustrating, depriving world now demanded things of them, they reacted with hatred and rage." Perhaps this rage culminated in the murder of Bobby Franks.

Levin (1956) has one of his characters in the final chapter of Compulsion analyze in psychoanalytic theory the motives for the Franks murder. The character, remarking how cunning the id is, sees the pouring of acid on the face and genitals of young Franks as an attempt by Leopold to make the body female. Thus, Levin argued, Leopold was able to represent himself as a girl and return to the womb.

Levin's analysis, of course, reflects the psychoanalytic emphasis on the id as reflected in psychoanalytic theory in the fifties. But he is only able to explain Leopold's motives because his explanation remains at a genital level of analysis instead of an earlier level of analysis as does object relations theory. The murder of Bobby Franks is a regressive act, but it is also the result of a breakdown of defensive maneuvers and mechanisms against feelings of rage and hatred. This is where we may state that Leopold and Loeb experienced a "break" with reality.

The murder, itself, can be seen as a "stop-gap measure" against more regressive, schizoid aspects of Leopold's and Loeb's personality. The murder is not really the result of a long period of planning. The period of planning was simply a last ditch effort to keep the boys from acting on their rage immediately. The question was how long could they

contain their hate. In a phenomenological sense, their intent was known long before the action would be consummated or even before the plan could be formulated. The murder was an act of hate, of rage. It was an attempt to alter an aspect of themselves as Levin states it did for Leopold, but on a deeper, intrapsychic level, it was an attempt to alter an internalized, object relationship. The murder would stop the growing hunger, the spreading feeling of emptiness and inadequacy; it would alter the bad rejecting aspects of their internalized worlds, hopefully leaving only their good, responsive side.

Levin (1956) wrote of one aspect of Leopold's aggressive fantasies, but he did not realize that his narrative was about the loss of an object and the use of aggression as a defense. Instead, he understood the boys from a more instinctual, psychoanalytic perspective. The particular passage in Compulsion concerned Leopold's desire to rape a female and reads

Was this the one to do it? How would she look afterward, lying overcome, her clothes in shreds? Would he feel touched? Would a love spread through him? Would he turn to her tenderly to devote a lifetime to removing the horror of his act? The image of violence was perhaps a final assertion of his darker self, wrestling him down to keep him from a love that might alter him. And yet the violent fantasy had in it something of that very love. Far below the image was a throbbing sense that therein lay release . . . (Levin, 1957, pp. 137-138)

I believe that if Leopold had made the choice the victim would have been a female. Leopold needed to kill off the "sick" mother in his internal object world that had caused him to feel so much guilt. All his life Leopold had been unable to make reparation towards her loss

and towards his belief that he had somehow killed her. Killing a female would symbolize that death. He could at last kill a real female with his own hands—a real physical act that he could atone for. No longer would fear of the internal bad object cause him to withdraw in a schizoid fashion from others or enter relations at the expense of paranoid persecutory anxiety. At last Leopold could deal with this hated bad object and attempt to restore object relations in a mature, independent manner. Only at this point could Leopold begin to make reparation to gain the love he had felt denied him because of his inherent badness.

Loeb experienced these feelings of emptiness as depression or what he would label as depression. The Hulbert-Bowman report (McKernan, 1957, p. 81) on Loeb noted:

From a very early age the patient had been subject to fits of depression, particularly during the past two years. These spells now come on whenever he is alone, but disappear whenever he is occupied, therefore he has tended to have a close companion and to discuss and plan something that is interesting to him in order to avoid these spells of depression. During these depressed spells he has frequently contemplated suicide, but never has attempted it.

Loeb's depression may be seen as a defensive maneuver to turn his growing rage inward instead of allowing his anger and hatred to break out into behavior. Loeb used depression to renounce objects in his external world, but the narcissistic young boy needed others to verify how he feels and who he is. Noninvolvement can work for Leopold, because of ingrained schizoid aspects of his character style; Loeb, however, needs people around him. Leopold used intellectualization and

fantasy to substitute for people; Loeb needed people in order to define the very boundaries of his being. The loss of objects for Loeb involved the loss of ego. Any effort to regain contact with the external world for Loeb unfortunately could occur only through the emotional reaction of aggression.

Kernberg (1975, p. 313) notes that the loss of loved internal objects can cause the "loss of meaning of the self and of the world" in the narcissistic person. "Psychotic depression," says Kernberg, "represents . . . the terrifying stage of awareness of the loss of love and meaning against which narcissistic personalities need to defend themselves." It is true then that the choice of Bobby Franks as a victim was a random event, for Leopold and Loeb were merely using young Franks to play out a deep, internalized conflict arising from the dynamics of their character structures. Leopold and Loeb did not hate Bobby Franks; they hated themselves. Franks did share some characteristics with Leopold and Loeb. They were rich, Jewish, and bright. Franks reflected who they were back to Leopold and Loeb with only one difference. Franks' father had been snubbed by the rich, Jewish society he lived in and his interests had turned towards his family. Young Franks had that one thing that both Leopold and Loeb hungered for—loving, concerned parents. Before he was discovered to be the murderer, Loeb said of Franks: "If I were going to murder anybody I would murder just such a cocky little son of a bitch as Bobby Franks" (Higdon, 1975, p. 53).

Transitional Aspects

Aspects of Leopold's and Loeb's behavior may be discussed from an object relations perspective for transitional phenomena. Winnicott (1971) defined transitional phenomena as an intermediate area of experience to which both inner and external reality contribute. The transitional object has been called the first possession. It is considered the first step in the child's journey from a world consisting only of inner objects and primary narcissism to a world of part-objects, full objects, and complexity.

Transitional objects come in all shapes, sizes, and modalities. Winnicott (1960) described a case in which a young boy compulsively used string to communicate with his mother and as a way to deny his anxiety over separation from her. Overinvested as a security device, the string became "frightening" and finally "perverted." Winnicott defined the child's use of the string as a transitional object because it symbolically wrapped up objects and held unintegrated material together. As a transitional article, the string could deny and assuage oneself over being separated.

Fairbairn (1941) conceptualized a transitional stage between the stages of infantile and mature dependence in the development of every individual. Fairbairn (1941) notes that "the abandonment of infantile dependence involves an abandonment of relationships based upon primary identification in favor of relationships with differentiated objects." The anxiety over Loeb's inability to escape from the imprisonment of his

infantile dependence is reflected in his dreams of being in prison. Loeb was symbolically blocked from dealing with two important problems that he must solve at this transitional phase. The first difficulty is forming object relations with more differentiated objects, and the second is coming to terms with his already internalized objects.

Giovacchini (1976) has written of a transitional stage between "a preobject stage" and one "where part-objects are dominant." Mahler and Giovacchini have stressed the symbiotic aspects of development, which necessitate the need of a transitional phase. Transitional objects are, however, only aspects of a total relationship, and Giovacchini notes that "in an intimate object relationship all levels of the personality are involved" (Giovacchini, 1976, p. 421). Giovacchini views Winnicott's transitional phase as one where the child believes that he has created his own introject, as the mother had earlier upheld the illusion for the child of his omnipotence. The transitional object, continued Giovacchini, is the "partial projection of this introject," and an indication that the child can meet his own needs.

Modell (1963) believes that the borderline person's development can be understood as a difficulty with object relationships at the transitional stage. Fintzy (1971) has stated that the borderline child has an abnormally prolonged attachment to transitional objects. Borderline persons retain their transitional objects in disguised ways. It is this secret, disguised use of transitional objects, says Fintzy (1971), that enables borderline individuals to maintain a facade of normalcy in their everyday functioning. The transitional object

becomes endowed with omnipotent properties. This instantaneous symbolic restitutive process permits him to traverse the road of daily living in comfort, for the wished for, and perhaps sporadically, experienced, Shangri-La of the first year has been reconstructed. (Fintzy, 1971)

Loeb's use of his teddy bear each night before he drifted off into sleep is the first example of an object used by him as a transitional object. Each evening, right up to the period of his trial, Loeb would enter his world of fantasy by talking to his toy teddy bear, always beginning with the ritualized words, "As you know, Teddy." The court medical report noted that Loeb

began with his talking to his teddy bear, who would understand all things and so obviate the necessity for the narrator or daydreamer squaring himself with the necessities and logic and consistencies of ordinary life. And, of course, this, too, illustrates Loeb's dual nature, his being even now essentially a child in some respects, while otherwise he is so strikingly capable of hardened and vicious behavior. (McKernan, 1957, p. 121)

Loeb's use of the teddy bear may be understood as a transitional object used to defend against the regressive aspects of losing one's consciousness (self) during sleep and to defend against the loss of his intense, narcissistic investment in his false, everyday self.

Another example of Loeb's use of transitional objects and phenomena involved his creation of imaginary companions. Imaginary companions are important in a child's emotional development during the years of 2 1/2 to 5 years of age (Nagera, 1969). These imaginary companions are used for many functions. For Loeb they appear to be a projection of his primitive ego ideals, as a way to ward off feelings of loneliness and emptiness and as a maneuver to ward off regression

into a schizoid state. Transitional objects can be a progressive stage for most children, but for such as Loeb, they would become a recurring, regressive maneuver in later life to allay anxiety.

Another transitional phenomenon of Loeb's involved his behavior of "shadowing" people, which began when he was around ten or eleven years of age.

He would follow people about, imagining that he was a detective shadowing them. He invented a game of "Detective" with his younger brother, which he has played as recently as two years ago.

About two years ago he "shadowed" one of his uncles home. At that time he wore a mask, and just as his uncle came to his own front door step, the patient said to him, "Hold up your hands," but his uncle said, "Run along home, don't be foolish." (McKernan, 1957, p. 72)

Why did Loeb shadow others? Perhaps in order to feel "real" even if it meant attaching himself to the normal everyday activities of other people. Did the other person disappear when he left Loeb's vision, or did he remain alive and real, somehow independent of Loeb's existence? Loeb's shadowing reflected his severe problems involving separation and his hunger for real contact with others, the mature form of object relating that he was not capable of having in his everyday existence. Loeb's shadowing may also be seen as a counterpart to the toddler's shadowing of his mother, when the child is between fifteen and twenty months of age (Mahler, 1972a). Mahler sees this phenomenon an attempt by the infant to gain object constancy after the "hatching" processes of that period's development.

Leopold used objects in a transitional manner. He used words, for example, as transitional phenomena, as ways to play down his feelings

of separateness from others, as ways to make feeble attempts at object relating, and as a way to integrate his world in an intellectual, . . . pedantic manner. Mahler (1975) identified the development of language and symbolization as ways to establish a concept of a self. Leopold's desire to say "yes" in as many different languages as possible can thus be understood for its deeper object relations indications. In order to say "yes," to assert one's needs, to allow what one wants to become part of one's body, in order to do all these things, one needs a real, integrated sense of self.

Leopold's use of physical illness as a way to differentiate the "me" from the "not me" has been mentioned earlier. This appears to have been an attempt to use one's developing body schema as a transitional object. It seems that Leopold attempted to keep his bad objects inside of himself, but at his perimeter, i.e., the skin of his body. It was a final way to gain control over them. Leopold had difficulty projecting his bad objects outward because he could not admit that his anger was to be directed towards the prime cause of his frustration, his mother. This could only occur when he split her off as an external good, almost ideal, object and projected his anger onto all other women, who were split off as bad objects. Later on, Leopold would need to protect himself from these projected, bad objects by using words in a transitional way to distance himself from them.

Leopold's and Loeb's dependence on transitional objects are also reflected in their stealing. They are, in essence, searching for something, anything, that can bring back that first treasured possession

that was lost so long ago. Loeb, at the age of eight, stole a dollar from a neighborhood boy. The Hulbert-Bowman report (McKernan, 1957, p. 73) notes that "he hid the money, and does not even think he even made use of it." Loeb did make use of it as a transitional object, but the psychiatrists of that time did not have this concept in their theoretical framework. The report continued that

He had absolutely no compunction or feeling of guilt or fear connected with this theft. He got quite a "kick" out of the feeling that he had stolen this money and knew where it was, and that the rightful owner did not.

. . . He soon developed the habit of picking up things in stores, whenever the opportunity offered. He would take anything that he could get. It made no difference whether he needed it or whether he would be able to use it in any way. (McKernan, 1957, p. 73)

Natterson (1971) has discussed another way in which transitional objects are used by borderline individuals. He notes that such individuals may use their very self as transitional objects. Natterson found this to be a significant dynamic factor in those individuals with strong narcissistic and homosexual aspects. Natterson states that the use of the self as a transitional object is "closely connected with intense narcissism." Natterson further says homosexuality is the "exorbitant price" that the individual must pay for his "psychosexually primitive mode of relieving anxiety."

The borderline individual who uses aspects of himself as a transitional object is attempting to possess some quality to prove that he is authentic. Often such persons believe that they are somehow "special" (Lomas, 1962). Leopold understood his intellectual superiority, his genius level functioning, as proof of his "specialness."

He used this attitude as a transitional phenomenon, which had a number of good results. Since he was special, his family must be special. It allowed him to see himself as more active than passive. Being special, however, interfered with one's being able to act spontaneously since special people are not ordinary people. Another unfortunate effect is that to consider oneself special is to consider one's self as separate from others.

Being superior for Leopold reflected the projection of early primitive feelings of omnipotence. Related to snobbery and scorn, being superior is also a thinly disguised way to express resentment and hostility towards others without expressing the deeper, more paranoid rage that he felt.

Leopold's need to be special was also a defense maneuver against regression to an undifferentiated level where he would be a "nobody" or more specifically "no where" or "no one." The fear of loss of any individuality was thus controlled with a sense of superiority even though this involved contact with others, a condition that always involves anxiety. Being superior also means that one's self has demarcation and delineation. One can then protect himself from being engulfed by the outside world. The Hulbert-Bowman report noted Leopold's development of a "pathological, disordered conception of himself."

Beginning very early in life with conceptions of his own superiority, which in intellectual ways were founded on fact, there has been a steady growth of delusional tendencies concerning himself, and to the extent that he definitely conceives of himself as a superior being, quite set apart and

not called on to be amenable to the social regulations or legal restrictions which govern the ordinary human being. His ego is all-important, right or wrong, his desires and well being the only determinants of his conduct. There is conclusive evidence of this conception and attitude developing years ago and being steadily cumulative in his world of ideas as well as his world of behavior. (McKernan, 1957, p. 108)

Winnicott (1971a) has called play a transitional phenomenon.

Playing takes place in an area of functioning that is neither "inside" nor "outside." Playing is doing in Winnicott's theory, for play is an attempt to control what is outside. It is a way to develop mastery over things, and mastery is an aspect of feeling separate and independent. Winnicott states that there is a direct development from transitional phenomenon to playing.

Mahler (1975) has also stressed the child's use of play for mastery and development of a self-concept and as a way to handle the growing awareness that he is separate from his mother. In examining the early histories of Leopold and Loeb, one is struck by the fact that both were deprived of play in their development. Until he was nine, Loeb was considered to be a frail child by his parents, and was not allowed to play with other boys in a rough way. This isolation from other children resulted in Loeb's turning inward to a world of fantasy for the attention he was not receiving from his external world. His fantasies of being a "Master Detective" also began at this time, so we may get an idea of the overwhelming sense of inferiority he was beginning to compensate for with his fantasy life. Loeb's strict governess also excluded him from the company of other boys, and in time, he began to

favor her company to the companionship of his peers. Even when he went to summer camp, Loeb became so homesick that she had to come and visit him.

Leopold was also kept from active peer play during his childhood because he was considered sickly and frail. He soon turned to books. When it was time for Leopold to go to school, his mother insisted on sending him to a "girl's school," at which even there he was considered "too frail for the ordinary sand lot activities" that the other children engaged in every day. When he was finally sent to public school, he was accompanied every day, back and forth, by a nurse. We can see how Leopold was beginning to view himself as weak, since everyone in his environment reflected back to him how frail he was.

Leopold thus would find himself inadequate to meet the demands of another important period of separation. Once more he would intensify his maneuvers to compensate for weakness. He would continue to split external objects, deny any inner feelings of "weak" or tender emotions, use transitional phenomena to relate, and continue to develop a false self system. Loeb also continued to solidify his borderline state, but his early development of a false self system enabled him to give the impression of successfully relating to others—unlike the paranoid, pedantic, withdrawn Leopold. Both Leopold and Loeb, however, would soon enter into a normal developmental period of individuation and separation with which neither boy's weak self would be able to cope in an adequate manner.

Adolescence and Regression

Blos (1967) has written of adolescence as a stage in which a second period of individuation occurs. Blos views adolescence as a second attempt for the individual to disengage himself from earlier internalized infantile objects. The adolescent who fails to disengage himself from these objects threatens his ego integrity. The loss of ego integrity for individuals such as Leopold and Loeb is more frightening and threatening because their ego is already functioning on a borderline level. It is not, therefore, the strong libidinal drives that endanger the adolescent, but an inadequate ego incapable of integrating strong sexual and aggressive feelings. The task of differentiation, the tension from more primitive aspects, and the strong impetus of renewed libidinal drives all combine to make regression a feared process in the adolescent.

The process of individuation is the other side of separation, and separation is another important process for the adolescent. Gordon and Sherr (1974) denote that the central tasks of an adolescent are to separate himself from his family, become interested in work, play, and people outside of his family, and to find his sexual identity.

Psychoanalytic writers have commented on similarities between adolescence and periods of mourning (Freud, A., 1958; Jacobson, 1961; Lampl-De Groot, 1960; Laufer, 1966; Nagera, 1970; Wolfenstein, 1966, 1969). Jacobson (1961, 1964), for example, states that psychic structures must be remodeled during adolescence: new objects must be

invested in and older, more comfortable, ones deattached. Adolescence also interferes with the identifications based on one's relationship with his parents, thereby causing a reorganization of one's superego as well. The stresses of such a structural, intrapsychic change, says Jacobson (1964) can cause certain adolescents to disintegrate into a psychosis. Even normal adolescents, notes Jacobson, "pass through transient periods of narcissistic retreat to the point of real 'inner' object loss and loss of identity" (Jacobson, 1964; p. 175). The loss of the adolescent's defensive system may lead to a collapse of superego operations, as well as an increase in repressive reactions and in primitive defenses based on "infantile introjection and projection mechanisms."

The adolescent must look for new ideals and objects to identify with and emulate. Narcissistic, "strong," or ruthless individuals may be chosen as models. The result, says Jacobson (1964), is that the relationship between the ego and superego is greatly disturbed with the possibility of the adolescent acting out these identification fantasies. The more expansive these fantasies are, the more deficient the adolescent feels as a person, a reflection of the common feeling of low self-esteem in adolescence.

If the adolescent can deal with (or simply, endure) this unsettling period, he will develop into an "autonomous, grown-up, and sexually mature person, and create and accept a corresponding consistent and durable self representation" (Jacobson, 1964, p. 192). The loneliness, confusion and disorganization of adolescence can, however, further

weaken an unstable individual or cause a borderline individual to cross over into a psychotic stance. How did this period affect Leopold and Loeb? How did they react when they reached this stressful, separation-individuation period? Could they have gone past this critical period and have been able to function as young adults? Was their crime a cry for help? Or the snapping of a thin band?

The answer appears to lie in the fact that Leopold and Loeb were borderline character disorders. They had not achieved a solid ego formation and therefore could not engage in mature object relating since they felt that their egos were weak and inadequate. A great deal of this conflict was, however, unconscious, and an important part of their internal, intrapsychic world. This is why their personality deficiencies are best viewed as a characterological disorder. They have changed aspects of their everyday functioning to compensate for weak, diseased inner core. They had accomplished this by splitting inner and outer objects, by prolonging separation problems through the use of transitional objects, and by negating their chances for growth and change by developing false self systems. At both of their cores of being was a defensive, pathological narcissism. They had managed to go through nineteen years of life without other people discovering that both of them did not experience others in normal ways. That is why it would be easy for Leopold to remark on the murder of Bobby Franks that "It was just an experiment. It is as easy for us to justify as an entomologist in impaling a beetle on a pin" (Higdon, 1975, p. 126).

Kernberg (1975) has noted that there is an increase in narcissism during adolescence, a shift in investment from object to self-representations as well as a regressive shift to infantile relations between these self- and object-representations. The more pathologically narcissistic adolescent, however, confuses the self with infantile objects, and such an adolescent searches actively for any object to represent the infantile self. Pathologically narcissistic adolescents may also be unable to discriminate realistic aspects of others as they project primitive, grandiose self-images onto others.

It all comes down to the question of how could you be accused of killing another person if the concept of "another person" is not a real, valid concept for you? After confessing to the murder, Loeb would say "This thing will be the making of me. I'll spend a few years in jail and I'll be released. I'll come out to a new life. I'll go to work and I'll work hard and I'll amount to something, have a career" (Higdon, 1975, p. 127). How long could such an individual walk about in society without being detected? The answer is probably a long time if the individual was as intelligent as Leopold or Loeb. Many narcissistic borderline character disorders occupy important professional jobs. They are able to sublimate aspects of their narcissism through work, while their dead inner core is denied or split off in a false self system. When primitive internal aspects become too threatening, such individuals develop compensatory measures—homosexuality, fetishes and other perversions.

Leopold and Loeb may have committed other equally despicable crimes before the Franks murder, but simply never had been caught. If they could have survived adolescence without being caught for the Franks murder, they might have been able to settle into a narcissistic or schizoid style of living in daily everyday activities. It appears that the strains of renewed libidinal and aggressive drives during adolescence overwhelmed them as these drives could not be integrated into their self or their object relations with others. Adolescence brings a greater awareness of bodily feelings, but such feelings are experienced as frightening and overwhelming when one's ego is undeveloped and weak.

Leopold and Loeb appear to have used their own personal and sexual relationship to express some of their more primitive, narcissistic aspects, as well as using the relationship as a defense against any threat of ego-loss and regression. But their relationship had been strained for some time before the murder of Bobby Franks. Both had thought of killing the other. Yet could either one risk the death of the other? Leopold needed Loeb as his idealized object as he wouldn't, and couldn't relate to other "ordinary" people. Loeb could not lose Leopold as he considered Leopold an extension of his own narcissistic, grandiose self. Perhaps both realized these feelings as they made plans for Leopold to go to Europe by himself. Could they withstand the separation from each other? Such a separation would mean the loss of a loved object for Leopold, a pattern he has repeated all his life in a deeper endopsychic structure built on abandonment and deprivation. And

could Loeb afford to lose Leopold? Could he lose one who worshipped him and understood him? Then what would happen? Would the external world of demanding, "real" people rush in to engulf both boys and discover their individual, but common secret—"There is part of me that is not real." Or would their internal worlds which they had repressed, denied and split off rise up to overwhelm them and destroy them? Would they have to choose between losing the loss of the object's love or the loss of the object itself?

The boys, fearing separation began to experience the initial feelings of anxiety and panic, and, perhaps, they sensed the underlying rage beneath the anxiety over their coming separation. Was the plan to kill Bobby Franks an attempt to kill off some bad inner or outer object, to purge the badness once and for all from their lives, so that they could then return to that place where once they had left as infants? That Shangri-la, where there was no abandonment or separation? The murder was a regressive act reflecting their borderline level of functioning. This does not mean that an ultimate point was now reached in Leopold's and Loeb's life where their problems would have been resolved. Further murders might have been committed after Leopold's return from Europe. Loeb's grandiosity might have even led to gruesome mass-murders like the Manson "family" slayings in our time. The Franks murder only solved the anxiety over this period of separation; it did not change the character structure of Leopold or Loeb.

CHAPTER IX

AN OBJECT RELATIONS ANALYSIS OF LEOPOLD'S AND LOEB'S SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP

The fact that Leopold and Loeb had a homosexual relationship intrigued, titillated, or disgusted the public at the time of the crime and trial. Those who viewed their sexual relationship in terms of a "perversion" undoubtedly had their own perspectives colored by strong emotions. Since Loeb was known to have had heterosexual relationships, and was able to present a conventional, masculine facade, he was seen by the public as being the victim of Leopold's perverted desires. Leopold's verbal descriptions of his intense devotion to Loeb helped strengthen this viewpoint. The additional factor that Leopold's governess had exposed herself to Leopold, and later, sexually played with him reinforced this view. Freudian psychology in the 1920's was eager to find any example of early atypical sexual activity which may have helped to fixate Leopold at an early psychosexual stage.

Loeb had not learned about the differences between the sexes until he was told so by the family chauffeur. Loeb was eleven at the time. Four years later he would have his first sexual intercourse. As a student, Loeb was four or more years younger than his fellow students. He soon tried to out-drink his fraternity brothers, and was known as a somewhat impulsive, immature individual. His narcissistic, friendly nature made him the center of many young girl's favors and attentions.

When he was arrested, and the news of his crime became published, at least a half dozen girls in his own set were prostrated. Two or three of them went to pieces, hysterically informed his family and closest friends that "Dick" was the boy whom they cared for more than any other.

His pink cheek, his soft brown eyes, his sweet ingratiating ways, endeared him to feminine hearts, old and young. He was irresistible to girls of his own age.

His tastes, too, in girls extended through every walk of life. A millionaire's daughter, in his social set, was ill for days after he was arrested. A fisherman's daughter in a gingham dress, on a tiny island in the Straits of Mackinac, wept when she read in the newspapers that her Prince Charming . . . was in trouble. (McKernan, 1957, pp. 48-49)

Leopold's earliest sexual experience was with his governess. He discovered the differences between the sexes at the age of ten. Leopold first had sexual intercourse with a female at the age of fifteen and a half years. Leopold had "numerous sexual relations" according to the Hulbert-Bowman report. It was generally considered that he had a strong sex drive due to the fact that his endocrine system had been overdeveloped as a result of his precociousness. Leopold appears to have been disgusted by his sexual needs as they represented a loss of control. In his book, Compulsion, Levin described the romantic interests of the character who represents Leopold.

He had never allowed himself to develop a crush. The girls in his classes were all older than he. They treated him like a flea. There was a cousin, a year younger, a wispy, fairywaist girl, but she talked all the time about who was in love with whom, and when he had said it was merely a biological impulse, and had kept on referring to girls as females, Alice had announced that she didn't think his line was clever at all; it was simply disgusting.

But it was biological. And that was what dragged a man down. From way back, from deep in childhood, Judd had the feeling that the entire female mechanism was nauseating. (Levin, 1956, p. 97)

Even when Leopold had intercourse with females, he would use Loeb's face and imagine that he was making love to Loeb. Loeb was his perfect friend, his perfect idol, his perfect lover. Loeb did not share these feelings of desire and it was only his need to have Leopold as a partner in crime that made him submit to sexual relations with Leopold. He does not seem to have any feelings of love toward Leopold. Though Leopold had referred to Loeb and himself as "cocksuckers" in an incriminating letter made public at the trial, they did not engage in many sexual acts beyond the one specified in their contract. This involved for Leopold, Dr. Healy would testify, "the privilege of inserting his penis between Loeb's legs at special dates. At one time it was to be three times in two months—if they continued their criminalistic activities together" (Higdon, 1975, p. 214). Certainly not a very exciting sexual relationship. especially since Loeb felt that he had to be (or play at being) drunk in order to accept Leopold's touch. Certainly this was not a mature genital relationship.

Kernberg (1974a) has written on barriers to falling in love and remaining in love. His analysis, based on an object relational perspective, postulates two developmental stages as being essential for the establishment of the capacity to fall in love. The first stage depends on the individual's "early capacity for senuous stimulation of erogenous zones" (particularly oral and skin erotism) which is later connected with the individual's "capacity for establishing a total object relation." Kernberg believes the narcissistic character is a failure of development at this first stage. The second stage in the

capacity to fall in love involves incorporating genital pleasure, a "total" object relationship, and a sexual identification that complements one's partner. Problems at this second stage, according to Kernberg, take the form of oedipal entanglements, sexual inhibitions and more neurotic types of symptomology.

Kernberg places the ability of man to form object relations as more primary than his sexual drives in the development of our capacity to fall in love. "Internalized object relations," he asserts, "are a major organizer of instinctual development in man" (Kernberg, 1974a).

Kernberg lists five ascending levels of our ability to fall in love. The lowest level on the continuum reflects a total inability for forming "genital and tender relations with any other human being." This style is seen in the more severe forms of the narcissistic character disorder.

The second "configuration" (as Kernberg calls each level) is exhibited by narcissistic personalities of moderate impairment. Those individuals at this stage are sexually promiscuous, either in a heterosexual or polymorphous perverse manner. Kernberg (1974a, p. 488) believes that the sexual promiscuity of these persons is related to their unconscious envy and primitive greed, as well as their need to possess and devalue the desired sexual object. The promiscuity of these individuals is not an entirely negative behavior. Kernberg sees it as a struggle to establish object relations in spite of their basic incapacity. It appears that Loeb's character style and behaviors fit at this end of the continuum. Though often impotent, he could form

brief, noninvolved relationships with females. His closest, genital, intimate relationship was with Leopold, and we have examined the many shortcomings of that relationship. At least Loeb did not have to search for the treasures of an earlier, happier period in his life when he was with Leopold. Loeb's anger and fear towards women is reflected in his impotence, his holding back and fear of giving.

The next level of ability to fall and remain in love, says Kernberg, involves some genital involvement but is more characterized by "primitive idealization of the love object, with clinging infantile dependency" (Kernberg, 1974a, p. 487). This is the level of the borderline character, and once again, we see another indication of Leopold's more mature psychic development. The borderline's use of the mechanism of splitting, however, hinders him from forming more mature genital relationships. Leopold, for example, split his internal relations with his mother into two aspects. He idealized her while seeing all other women as bad, disgusting and threatening. Until he could see a woman as a total, integrated person, Leopold could not engage in mature, genital relationships. Leopold's love for Loeb, however, was a step towards such mature relationships. Kernberg notes that the borderline's use of primitive idealization is a step away from the usual "love-hate relation with their primary objects." Kernberg (1974b) states that

The very fact that such borderline patients are able to establish a relatively stable relation with another human being—in the context of which tender and genital feelings can be expressed—represents a real potential for emotional growth. This is often obscured by the extremely violent,

destructive, inappropriate nature of most other, split-off, interactions of these patients, who may utilize the idealized love relation to rationalize and externalize the responsibility for all other interpersonal conflicts. Typically, such patients accuse the rest of the world of being cold, selfish, hostile, conventional, and rigid; if everybody were like their idealized love object, there would, they think, be no problem. (Kernberg, 1974b, p. 744)

It appears that Leopold had more to benefit than Loeb from their relationship. Perhaps Loeb's death kept Leopold from entering into a more mature genital relationship. [Three years after his release from prison, Leopold married a widow in Puerto Rico. They lived for ten years in a stormy marriage (Higdon, 1975, Chapter 27) until Leopold's death in 1971.]

The public and psychiatrists in 1924 misunderstood the importance of Leopold's and Loeb's relationship. They were too captured by the fact that it was a homosexual relationship to see its potential strengths. Loeb, not understood as a narcissistic character disorder, was seen as more stable and reality oriented because he was heterosexual. Yet it is really Leopold who could relate better, at least his potential was greater. People are drawn more towards Leopold than Loeb today as were the psychiatrists at the 1924 trial. Leopold appears more "real" to us. He is struggling, attempting to make sense of his life. He is weak, and we see him as being weak. Loeb pulls less from us because the other person is not real for Loeb. We know that we count as individuals in Leopold's eyes but not in Loeb's view of the world. Loeb could never be weak for us, and we cannot see him as possessing any deep human qualities beyond his pretty

face and athletic body. The psychiatrists did not understand that the "pathological deterioration of internalized object relations of narcissistic personalities" (Kernberg, 1974a, p. 497), as Loeb, made him dead and empty inside with nothing to offer to another person.

Kernberg (1974a) listed two more levels of one's capacity to relate to another person in a mature, loving manner. The fourth level involves people with a capacity for stable relationships but with sexual inhibitions. These individuals are the neurotic psychoanalytic patients. The last level is the highest level where genitality is integrated with tenderness in a "stable, deep object relation."

Leopold and Loeb were drawn to each other because adolescence is a period when one's primary objects of gratification tend to be lost, and one is not emotionally adequate to participate in a mature, genital relationship. Their fantasies both reflect masochistic themes concerning their attachment to one another. The fantasies allowed them to feel they possessed their loved object, while feeling annihilated by it, all the time preserving this balance in an atmosphere of object constancy.

Leopold's and Loeb's sexual relationship served other functions. It helped ward off fragmentation if they had gone their separate ways. It gave them a sense of integration and kept them from regression to more primitive levels. The relationship helped to restore a measure of self-esteem and a sense of self. It was a narcissistic self-extension and self-representation. The relationship was an abortive attempt to ward off early, primitive, internalized object relations. Finally,

their relationship kept them from entering into more frightening object relationship situations with other people.

CHAPTER X

PSYCHOANALYTIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

The final decision of Judge Caverly was to sentence both Leopold and Loeb to life imprisonment and ninety-nine years. Loeb would be stabbed to death in prison at the age of thirty. Leopold would spend thirty-three years in prison before being paroled. Judge Caverly believed that Darrow would not have been able to sustain a plea of insanity had he followed such a strategy

By pleading guilty, the defendants have admitted legal responsibility for their acts; the testimony has satisfied the court that the case is not one in which it would have been possible to set up successfully the defense of insanity as insanity is defined and understood by the established law of this state for the purpose of the administration of criminal justice. (McKernan, 1957, p. 297)

Caverly stressed that the crime was "deliberately planned and prepared for during a considerable period of time," an important point that the state's psychiatrists emphasized in their own testimony. Caverly added that the crime was "executed with every feature of callousness and cruelty." This is probably a false statement. Leopold and Loeb probably felt no emotion at all during the commitment of the murder, which is why they could stop and eat hot dogs with the body of Bobby Franks still in the back of their car.

Darrow would also fail in his attempt to present the psychiatric testimony as a mitigating defense. Caverly would state in his final

statement to the court that even though he felt secure that the body of Bobby Franks had not been abused

. . . it did not need that element to make the crime abhorrent to every instinct of humanity, and the court is satisfied that neither in the act itself, nor in its motives or lack of motives, or in the antecedents of the offenders, can he find any mitigating circumstances, . . . It would have been the task of least resistance to impose the extreme penalty of the law. In choosing imprisonment instead of death, the court is moved chiefly by the consideration of the age of the defendants, boys of eighteen and nineteen years.

It is not for the court to say that he will not, in any case, enforce capital punishment as an alternative, but the court believes it is within his province to decline to impose the sentence of death on persons who are not of full age.

This determination appears to be in accordance with the progress of criminal law all over the world and with the dictates of enlightened humanity. (McKernan, 1957, p. 298)

It would thus be "enlightened" humanism and not psychiatric testimony that would save Leopold and Loeb from the death sentence. Perhaps if psychiatric testimony had emphasized a borderline state approach the court might have accepted the psychiatric testimony as mitigating evidence. If the trial had taken place today perhaps Darrow might have used the borderline development of the boys as proof of their insanity. The use of the borderline state as a basis for an insanity plea (or in place of an insanity plea) has not been utilized as yet. The use of object relations theory and the borderline state literature may be the next step in the development of the insanity plea.

The Insanity Plea

Though insanity only recently has become a medical problem, it has been a legal concern for centuries. The defense of insanity has been conceptualized in legal thinking in three different ways. Madness has been viewed as a diseased mind, as impaired judgement, and as a lack of impulse control. All three definitions of insanity have as their premise the belief that behavior is influenced by one's "mind." This is reflected in the legal concept of mens rea or the "guilty mind." A defendant may state that he is not guilty of first degree murder because he lacks the necessary mental condition, for example, "malice forethought and deliberation."

The insanity defense developed in 17th century England from the Roman legal concept of non compos mentis. In America the insanity defense was based on the English trial of Daniel M'Naghten in 1843. M'Naghten should have received the sentence of death for killing the Prime Minister's secretary, but his attorney argued that he did not know right from wrong. The M'Naghten defense was one based on cognition. The M'Naghten formula stated that the defendant was "laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act; or, if he did know it, that he was doing what was wrong" (Davidson, 1965, p. 3). In time American jurisdictions would add the criterion of the "irresistible impulse" reflecting less of the organic orientation of the "diseased mind" plea and more of the psychoanalytic emphasis on unconscious motivations and

impulses. The individual's "free agency" was considered impaired or destroyed. Irresistible impulse pleas have taken three forms—in the case of sudden explosive reactions, in psychoneurotic instances as pyromania, and in situations of psychotic impulses.

A later development involved the 1954 case of Durham versus the United States in which Judge Bazelon ruled that

. . . an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect. We use "disease" in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of improving or deteriorating. We use "defect" in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease. (Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862)

The M'Naghten rule centered on the person's right to know right from wrong, while the Durham ruling centered on the criminal act as the result of or symptomatic of an underlying illness. The use of the word "illness" has caused many psychiatrists like Thomas Szasz to be critical of the definition since they view madness as problems in living and not as a physical disease. Yet in questions of criminal responsibility the Durham ruling has proven more popular. However, in the related area of "competency" the emphasis has been on a legal definition that relied more on knowing right from wrong, in the sense of knowing the possible effects of performing an action as making out a will.

Because of the general dissatisfaction with these rulings, the American Law Institute proposed a concept of "diminished responsibility" which stated that

(1) a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease he lacks

substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

(2) As used in this article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.

(American Law Institute, 1962)

The use of the borderline state as an aspect of or as an alternative to the insanity defense would be based on a developmental criterion. Its use would strain any previous clear-cut criterion of whether a defendant is legally sane because he is responsible or irresponsible (M'Naghten formula). The developmental criterion of the borderline state would make it difficult to judge exactly what the defendant understands about the quality of his act as his knowledge is clouded and distorted not by unconscious, psychodynamic forces but by more characterological aspects. The emphasis on characterological aspects also contradicts the Durham formula which relies on the "product" of mental diseases or defect criterion. The Durham formula has been called deficient by some (Rubin, 1965) and advanced by others (Biggs, 1955) because it rejects the concept of mens rea in redefining insanity as mental illness. Mens rea, or criminal intent, is only important to a legal definition of criminality. The psychological understanding of motivation and intent are more complicated in psychiatry today. The acceptance of the borderline as a defense would perhaps end, or at least blur, the clear-cut distinction of mens rea.

The use of the borderline state makes the definition of insanity more complicated today. First, it points out that insanity is a legal, not a psychiatric, definition by making clear the difference between

insanity and psychosis. Leopold and Loeb as borderline individuals were susceptible to psychotic breaks, but most of the time they appeared to be functioning fairly well in everyday society. The ruling on "diminished responsibility" by the American Law Institute perhaps comes closest to understanding how psychosis is viewed today, but even that definition concerns itself with "mental disease," a concept many psychologists do not accept. Leopold and Loeb were not fully aware that they were killing another "person." Their early development, in fact, made it difficult for them to adequately conceptualize what it means to be an individual. This dissertation has attempted to show that Leopold and Loeb killed Bobby Franks as a result of their inner, intrapsychic object world. They did not so much kill a person as they acted out an inner conflict. This does not mean that they should have been set free. Their personality development demanded rehabilitation more than punishment.

It is difficult to change borderline individuals to higher levels of functioning. It is almost impossible to make inroads into such psychologically primitive individuals as Loeb. Long term, psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapy might have been an effective form of character change for an individual as Leopold, but our prison system does not provide such a mode of treatment.

The borderline state as an insanity defense raises many issues concerning crime and causation, and responsibility and punishment. The term "mental disease" has been too vague a term in the past and has reflected an emphasis on organic explanations of emotional disturbances.

Object relations theory may do away with attempts to define what is a "mental" disease, and it may also replace this concept with a more complicated explanation of human functioning. Perhaps an explanation too complicated for the ordinary jury to grasp in the beginning of its use. An object relations analysis of Leopold and Loeb as borderline individuals goes beyond the facts that they had good memories and good manners, or that they were well oriented to time and space. Inside they were dead, waiting for others to discover their secret. Their crime and histories show that legal insanity may be a very difficult condition to spot before it comes to the attention of the law. This analysis of their development reveals that they were neither psychotic nor neurotic, but borderline individuals. As such, they are not insane in the legal sense as we use the term today in law.

Psychoanalytic and Psychological Implications

Object relations theory is the direction in which psychoanalytic theory appears to be heading. Admissions to psychoanalytic institutes have dropped off from psychoanalysis's heyday in the 1950's. Psychoanalysis has developed a large body of clinical techniques and treatment methods, which appear to be immune to change for quite a while. Psychoanalytic research and theory, however, have begun to change in the last ten years. Mahler's and Kernberg's work seem to be an indication of the themes and areas that psychoanalysts are becoming concerned about. There is a need now with this theoretical shift to reanalyze

the psychoanalytic literature of the past, particularly many of the well-known case studies. This study has been an attempt in the direction.

Object relations theory is also the most recent extension of ego psychology to establish a complete psychology of the whole experiencing individual. One's past is intimately tied to one's present through use of regressive phenomenon. Motivation is focused on one's interpersonal relations with others, rather than on one's own instinctual drives. Deficits in such ability or potential reflects the problems of our society today, especially its mechanized, schizoid aspects. It is little wonder that psychoanalysts are seeing more borderline patients in their therapy sessions every day. Object relations is truly becoming the ego psychology of tomorrow.

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